Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2011 9781626372887

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Global Peace Operations ANNUAL REVIEW OF

2011

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This volume is a product of the Center on International Cooperation’s (CIC) Political and Peacekeeping Operations program. CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University. Project Team VOLUME EDITORS AND LEAD RESEARCHERS

Andrew M. Sinclair and Benjamin C. Tortolani SERIES EDITOR

Bruce D. Jones CONTRIBUTING EDITOR

Jake Sherman SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER

Victoria DiDomenico CONTRIBUTORS

Tatiana Carayannis, Tom Gregg, Mark Harris, Morgan A. Hughes, Laurie Mincieli, Parnian Nazary, Bret Nelson, Elizabeth Sellwood, and Erin Weir The project’s advisory board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, Rosario Green, ’Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, Sir Rupert Smith, and Stephen J. Stedman. CIC is grateful for their advice and support. The Center on International Cooperation is solely responsible for the content of this publication. Any errors of fact or analysis, and any and all judgments and interpretations about missions and operations discussed herein, are those of CIC alone. This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

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Global Peace ANNUAL REVIEW OF

Operations 2011

A PROJECT OF THE

Center on International Cooperation

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Published in the United States of America in 2011 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2011 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

ISBN: 978-1-58826-768-9 (hc) 978-1-58826-793-1 (pb) ISSN: 1932-5819

Printed and bound in Canada The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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Contents

Foreword, Jean-Marie Guéhenno Preface, Jake Sherman Mission Acronyms Map of Global Peace Operations, 2010

vii ix xi xii

Director’s Comment Bruce D. Jones

1

Strategic Summary 2010

3

1 Peacekeeping’s Transitional Moment Ian Johnstone

9

2 Mission Reviews

19

Alphabetical order by location 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6

Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT, MICOPAX) Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) Haiti (MINUSTAH) Liberia (UNMIL) Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID) Timor-Leste (UNMIT, ISF)

3 Mission Notes

20 26 33 40 47 55

63

Alphabetical order by location 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9

Afghanistan (ISAF, UNAMA, EUPOL Afghanistan) Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea, EUPM, OSCE) Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, Operation Licorne) Cyprus (UNFICYP) Georgia (EUMM) Kosovo (UNMIK, EULEX, OMIK, KFOR) Middle East (UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS, MFO Sinai, TIPH, UNAMI, NTM-I) Moldova-Transdniestria (JCC) Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

v

64 69 72 78 80 82 85 94 96

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CONTENTS

3.10 3.11

Somalia (AMISOM) Western Sahara (MINURSO)

98 104

4 Global Statistics on UN-Commanded Missions

107

5 Global Statistics on Non-UN-Commanded Missions

143

6 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

171

Alphabetical order by mission acronym 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15

MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) MONUSCO (UN Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) UNIFIL ((UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UMMIS (UN Mission in Sudan) UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

Index About the Book

176 185 194 203 213 222 231 240 250 258 268 278 287 293 303 309 317

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Foreword

system of international trusteeship: of placing those states incapable of effectively governing themselves under the guardianship of the United Nations. Yet, the overwhelming majority of states would have fundamental objections to the United Nations becoming a kind of new colonial power, thus undermining the principle of sovereignty and eroding the very foundation on which the United Nations rests. In fact, the contrary is required: the international system must empower states to sustainably fulfill their sovereign responsibilities toward their citizens and other states. This will require, at times, international engagement in areas traditionally within the remit of the state, including development of national security and justice institutions. More and more, the United Nations, in cooperation with other multilateral organizations and national governments, is being called upon to assist weak states in consolidating their authority, fulfilling core sovereign functions, and providing basic services. To do this, the UN and others have mobilized enormous resources through ambitious, multidimensional peace operations over the past decade and a half. And more and more, this assistance is growing in duration, scope of activity, and depth of engagement. The aim of these operations must not be to circumscribe state sovereignty but to strengthen governments and extend their writ. This is the goal. But, as a number of UN operations approach nearly a decade in the field, the difficulty of matching this goal to actual outcomes is manifest. Despite considerable

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change. —Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, The Leopard

We live in a world of sovereign states. It is states that are responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, for economic and social development, for guaranteeing the rights of their citizens—and states that constitute the international system. Yet, many states today are struggling to meet their national and international responsibilities as they confront the threat of civil war, terrorism, and transnational crime. Establishing peace and prosperity in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Somalia is among the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. How to do so is a matter of considerable debate and of significant consequence for national governments, the United Nations, and other international actors. The traditional view of sovereignty is one of nonintervention. Proponents of this view argue that sovereignty is a founding principle that cannot be infringed upon. This is echoed in the UN Charter, which states that the organization is “based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” and, with the one exception of peace-enforcement under Chapter VII, proscribes intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”* Faced with the challenge of weak and failing states, others have argued for a return to the

*Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paras. 1 and 7, respectively. vii

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FOREWORD

progress, neither the UN nor the broader international system have yet acquired the means of fully achieving this goal—nor adequately considered the risks associated with such an ambitious undertaking. Indeed, as several high-profile cases demonstrate, peace operations may lose their legitimacy if they do not meet the high expectations that have been put in them. This gets to the core of the thematic focus of this volume: transitions in peace operations. In practical terms, the markers that will determine when a peace operation is no longer required—when a government has enough capacity to take full ownership—are shifting. Whereas the holding of elections was long considered the point at which the role of a peace operation ended, it is now acknowledged that postcrisis elections rarely result in a broadbased, representative government. Consequently, the UN is now accompanying governments well beyond the first election, supporting peacebuilding and institution building, to build resilient states that can manage and respond to future crises. However, the increased costs of longer missions have not been fully taken into account. At a time when many governments are facing tighter budgets at home, this resource gap creates pressure for drawdown even in places where premature withdrawals have previously led to renewed violence and international deployment. In political terms, this shift confronts the UN with new dilemmas as it is requested to support governments that do not yet represent the full breadth of their peoples and that may not enjoy the people’s trust. The task facing the international community is not simply one of consolidating the authority of those in power. It is to build inclusive and resilient institutions that will be strong enough to withstand tensions and manage them through political processes. But a government emerging from conflict may be wary of such inclusivity, and legitimate differences of opinion may occur on

what is the right balance between consolidating the capacity of the state to assert its authority and the need to reach out to those who challenge the emerging authorities. The difficulty of maintaining a relationship of trust with governments that are gradually consolidating their authority is compounded by the interplay of outside interests. Neighbors have often much more leverage than the UN because they are there to stay, and they have used the weakness of the state to increase their influence. This relates to a final point: the primacy of politics has to be the dominant mode of engagement, around which all efforts are orchestrated. Thus, how the UN should transition from the role of mediator to adviser creates a dilemma: Too close engagement risks the impartiality of the UN and, at worst, makes the UN a tool of state-sanctioned violence. Too distant engagement risks condoning a system of governance based on coercion and losing the leverage necessary to secure gradual reform. Striking the right balance requires a much deeper consensus among member-states on what they want to achieve through the UN and what kind of peace is good enough for the international community. The UN has several key comparative advantages in orchestrating international support to countries in crisis: its legitimacy, derived from universal membership, its impartiality, its financing mechanisms, and its capacity to bring together in a coherent vision security and development. But if it does not quickly adapt, the UN is at risk of losing this central role in conflict management. To remain relevant, the UN must become more flexible, and its member states must build a genuine consensus on the goals they pursue when they decide to launch ambitious multidimensional operations. Only in this way will the UN ensure the “sovereign equality of all its Members” on which the Charter is based.

— Jean-Marie Guéhenno Director, Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University, and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation and Brookings Institution

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Preface

The 2011 edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, the sixth in the series produced by the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC), comes at a critical time for peacekeeping. As this volume details, global peace operations continue to face serious constraints that will affect their sustainability as an effective means of responding to conflict. Increased stability in certain conflict zones and a growing reluctance to mandate new deployments of large-scale military peace operations have given rise to a deepening debate about alternatives to peacekeeping. While CIC recognizes the continued need for military-based peacekeeping operations, we are also aware that the peace operations landscape is indeed shifting. Thus, several missions that were covered in previous volumes of the Annual Review (such as the UN Assistance Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, UNAMI and UNAMA; the UN Integrated Office in Burundi, BINUB; and the UN Mission in Nepal, UNMIN), now designated as political missions, are not included in this year’s volume. CIC published the first ever Review of Political Missions, which can be found online at www.cic.nyu.edu, in 2010. Despite these shifts, as the present volume reminds us, political missions can only complement military peace operations; they cannot replace them. Peacekeeping remains an essential tool of the international community in addressing conflict. This year’s edition is the result of continuing support from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and the African Union’s Peace and

Security Department—though the Review retains, as it always has, editorial independence. CIC is grateful to Alain Le Roy, the UN UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Susana Malcorra, the UN Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Field Support; and Ramtane Lamamra, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, for their support of our efforts. This publication could not have been possible without the financial assistance of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Norway, and the Compton Foundation. As with previous editions, this year’s Annual Review is the product of CIC’s small but talented editorial and research team housed in the Political and Peace Operations Program. Andrew M. Sinclair and Benjamin C. Tortolani served as the lead researchers and volume editors. Andrew not only led and managed the editing and production of the book, but aptly drafted much of its narrative content. Benjamin drew on his extensive knowledge and expertise to help steer the project’s direction throughout the year. Victoria DiDomenico capably gathered and generated the extensive UN data and helped in the production and editing stages. Morgan Hughes also assisted in the collection and layout of the UN data. The project team was greatly assisted by CIC staff members Yvonne Alonzo, Lynn Denesopolis, Antonie Evans, Noah Gall, Megan Gleason, Richard Gowan, Tom Gregg, Andrew Hart, Alischa Kugel, Michele Shapiro, Gigja Sorenson, Teresa Whitfield, and Constance Wilhelm throughout the year. Thanks also go to Emily O’Brien, Yanikk Lewis, Laurie Mincieli, Bret Nelson, John Senior, and Abby Stoddard. ix

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CIC is particularly grateful to Jean-Marie Guéhenno for authoring the foreword for this year’s volume. As he points out, the milestones determining when a peace operation is no longer required are shifting. Because UN peace operations are increasingly accompanying governments beyond elections to support peacebuilding, new dilemmas arise as the UN transitions from the role of the mediator to that of advisor. Thanks also to Ian Johnstone for writing the timely thematic essay on peacekeeping transitions. His chapter elucidates the challenges facing peace operations as pressure mounts for withdrawal—whether that pressure is consent- or progress-based. He argues that greater attention should be paid to three questions at the heart of contemporary peacekeeping: How transformative should a peace operation be? What are the parameters of consent? What is the nature of the relationship between internal and external actors? The task should be not to try and resolve conceptual uncertainties, but rather to devise strategies for managing the unavoidable tensions and operational dilemmas that they create. A number of people at the UN provided great guidance and support to the substantive

content of the book. In particular, CIC would like to thank David Haeri, chief of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section for DPKO. We would also like to highlight the help of Vladimir Bessarabov, Adam Day, Arnab Ghosh, Megh Gurung, Patrick Hein, Clare Hutchinson, Sajid Khan, Michael Mesina, Gloria Ntegeye, Kristina Segulja, Fernanda Tavares, and the many desk officers who reviewed drafts of the mission reviews and notes. We would also like to draw special attention to Ayako Kagawa, who meticulously prepared the maps for this edition. CIC alone is responsible for all errors, omissions, and mistaken statements of fact or analysis contained herein. Once again, CIC was able to compile this volume because of its partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). We are thankful for Sigrun Andresdottir’s efforts in compiling the non-UNcommanded data. Finally, we are grateful to Lynne Rienner Publishers and its staff, especially Steve Barr, whose tireless efforts deserve particular recognition. —Jake Sherman Deputy Director for Programs (Conflict), and Contributing Editor, Annual Review

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Mission Acronyms

AMISOM EUBAM Rafah EUFOR Althea EULEX EUMM EUPM EUPOL Afghanistan EUPOL COPPS EUPOL RD Congo EUSEC RD Congo ISAF ISF JCC KFOR MFO Sinai MICOPAX MINURCAT MINURSO MINUSTAH MONUC MONUSCO NTM-I OMIK RAMSI TIPH UNAMA UNAMI UNAMID UNDOF UNFICYP UNIFIL UNMIK UNMIS UNMIT UNOCI UNTSO

AU Mission in Somalia EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Police Mission in Afghanistan EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo International Security Assistance Force International Security Forces Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force NATO Kosovo Force Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai Mission de Consolidation de la Paix UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO Training Mission in Iraq OSCE Mission in Kosovo Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands Temporary International Presence in Hebron UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Assistance Mission in Iraq AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur UN Disengagement Observer Force UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Interim Force in Lebanon UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Mission in Sudan UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UN Truce Supervision Organization

xi

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PEACE OPERATIONS 2010

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3000 2000

4000

5000 km 3000 mi

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Director’s Comment

As this year’s Review was being finalized, developments in Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and Afghanistan remind us of this critical lesson from earlier operations: size matters. In 1994, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, (UNAMIR) watched from the sidelines as a fragile peace agreement collapsed into mass genocide. Aside from a few episodes of heroics, the 2,400 troops of UNAMIR were easily pushed aside by the more than 50,000 combatants of the Forces Armeés Rwandaise. Equal tragedy played out against similarly scaled forces in Angola. These missions were aptly described by a force commander of the period as “a bet—that the parties won’t test our mettle.” It’s a bet the UN lost. The Security Council learned that hard lesson. Five years later, 20,000 UN troops, reinforced at the vital moment by 2,000 UK Royal Marines, stood firm against an effort to overturn Sierra Leone’s peace agreement and helped give that country a fresh chance. Sierra Leone is now entering its twelfth year of stability. Similarly scaled missions, occasionally reinforced both militarily and politically, would hold the line in Timor Leste and Liberia, both of which have—for now—put hostilities behind them. And as the Review was being prepared for publication, the UN force in Côte d’Ivoire, with 7,500 troops and unified political backing from the General Assembly, UN Security Council, the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was standing firmly behind the election results the mission itself oversaw. Having registered success with missions in the 10,000–20,000 range, the UN extended that

model to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and later Somalia (via the AU.) But relative to size of territory and opposing forces, those missions are similar in scale not to those that oversaw successes in West Africa and Timor Leste, but those that met with dramatic failure in Central Africa in the early 1990s. With around 20,000 troops in the DRC, the UN has—totally unsurprisingly—been unable to prevent atrocities and rape or to truly lay the foundation for stable governance. In Sudan, as we send this volume to press, the UN faced an uncertain prospect: if tense political, resource, and territorial issues unresolved by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement escalated into crisis after the January referendum, would the 20,000 UN and AU troops, spread across an inhospitable terrain the size of Western Europe, be sufficient to prevent tragedy? History suggests not. In Afghanistan, by contrast, the most recent surge brought US and NATO forces to an all-time high of 130,000 troops. These troops do not create the power to permanently defeat the Taliban, but effectively used they do give the coalition the leverage to negotiate effectively with all actors. The vital thing is to use that leverage to establish a credible Afghan and regional political dynamic that can maintain stability long after the drawdown of Western forces. The massive overstretch and cost of UN forces in the Horn and Central Africa have led to questions about the sustainability of peacekeeping. Much of the past year was dominated by discussions of alternative models, cost reductions, the use of special political missions, 1

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and reforms to the UN’s operational architecture—a debate the NYU Center on International Cooperation has encouraged and occasionally joined. Elsewhere we have strongly reinforced the point that size alone is far from enough: capability matters and politics matters. The debate, though, must not neglect the point that force— an adequate force, with the right capacities—is

an essential tool for political negotiations. Force without politics is nothing; but politics without force will often fail, to the detriment of the UN and tragedy on the ground. —Bruce D. Jones Director, Center on International Cooperation

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Strategic Summary 2010

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Union, accounted for 10 percent of overall deployments this year with 1,623 civilian police. Despite recognition of the need to broaden the base of UN troop contributing countries (TCCs), South Asian and African states continued to supply most of the troops for UN operations. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India remained the largest military contributors to UN-commanded operations. The US continued to be the largest military contributor to non-UN-commanded missions with 92,173 troops in ISAF. Growth for UN-commanded operations slowed considerably in 2010. The measured drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the closure of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), led to significant reductions in two of the UN’s major operations. While continued growth in 2010 reaffirms peacekeeping’s role in conflict management, these numbers stand in contrast to a growing reality: over the course of 2010, peacekeeping operations, especially the UN’s, were under tremendous operational, political, and financial pressure to scale down. Simultaneously, the international community’s appetite for the creation and deployment of new large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations weakened as well. No new peacekeeping mission has been mandated since the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was created on 31 July 2007. It is against these trends that this year’s volume highlights peacekeeping transitions—

Global Peacekeeping in Transition

While talk about transitions, imminent contraction, and consolidation in peacekeeping dominated discussions about global peace operations in 2010, overall deployment levels continued to rise. Much of the growth in global peacekeeping can be attributed to the United States’ reinforcement of the NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, which increased by 59,462 troops in 2010 to a total of 130,492 troops—an 84 percent increase from 71,030 troops in 2009.* Yet, even if NATO is excluded from the picture, UN and AU peacekeeping deployments increased in overall size—the UN grew by 2.4 percent over the year, contrary to expectations, adding 2,362 peacekeepers to reach a total global deployment of 99,172. At the same time, the spiraling situation in Somalia and the potential for that conflict to spread beyond the country’s borders led the AU to boost its peacekeeping force (Africa Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM) by some 40 percent with the addition of 2,078 troops. Overall, peacekeeping grew by 32 percent over the year; there were 256,170 peacekeepers deployed in 2010 compared with 194,379 in 2009. Unlike military peacekeeping, where NATO’s Afghan operation overshadows the UN’s, overall police deployments in peace operations continue to be dominated by the UN. The UN accounted for 87 percent of all deployed police in 2010 with 14,025 civilian police. The next largest contributor, the European

*Year to year comparisons are made between September 2009–September 2010 for non-UN-commanded missions and October 2009–October 2010 for UN-commanded missions.

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STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2010 • 5

the withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation and the handing over of responsibility to national authorities, another international presence, or other regional and local actors. As demonstrated in this volume, missions are transitioning amid a range of different operational environments. In Liberia, a phased withdrawal is proceeding in a relatively stable security environment. UNMIL continues to be on track in meeting its benchmarks ahead of the 2011 elections. Likewise, in Timor-Leste transition planning has commenced for the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) as the mission steadily hands over security functions to the national police. Conversely, MINURCAT precipitously ceased its operations—notwithstanding continued insecurity and ill-prepared Chadian security and justice institutions—after the government of Chad requested the Security Council not renew MINURCAT’s mandate. This abrupt denial of consent led to a hasty exit of peacekeepers.

In Haiti, the earthquake on 12 January 2010 devastated the country, resulting in severe loss of life, widespread humanitarian need, and destruction of infrastructure. The UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—which entered the year preparing for a drawdown—quickly became the primary search-and-rescue provider in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The mission’s flexible reaction to the disaster was even more remarkable given the casualties suffered by the mission itself after a staggering 102 personnel perished—the highest number killed in a single event in the history of UN peacekeeping. In late 2010, MINUSTAH peacekeepers were blamed by the Haitian population for introducing the growing cholera epidemic, which after three months had killed 2,800 and infected 130,000 others. Compounding this already difficult environment was the presence of widespread violent protests that erupted following contested presidential elections. MINUSTAH’s quick adaption to these changing circumstances

Deployment of Military Peacekeepers, 2000–2010

140,000 130,000 120,000 110,000

Number of Military Peacekeepers

100,000 90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 2000

2001

2002

2003 UN

2004

2005 NATO

2006

2007

2008

2009

Regional and Ad Hoc Deployments

2010

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Deployment of Military Peacekeepers Excluding ISAF, 2000–2010

90,000 80,000

Number of Military Peacekeepers

70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

UN

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Regional and Ad Hoc Deployments

NATO

Top Ten Military Contributors to UN-Commanded Operations: 31 October 2010

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

over the course of 2010 underscored the unanticipated setbacks that challenge a mission under transition. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) transformed into a stabilization mission (MONUSCO) in 2010 after

Ethiopia

Uruguay

Ghana

Rwanda

Nepal

Nigeria

Egypt

India

0

Bangladesh

2,000

Pakistan

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the president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, called for the mission’s withdrawal by mid-2011. As the UN’s largest and most expensive operation, MONUSCO faced serious pressures during the year, including deteriorating security in the east, continued predatory practices against civilians

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STRATEGIC SUMMARY 2010 • 7

Source of Deployed Police: 31 October 2010

Other 526 (3%)

European Union 1,623 (10%)

United Nations 14,025 (87%)

by the state’s own armed forces, an insurgency in Equateur Province, and over 300 mass rapes in North Kivu, some 12 kilometers from a MONUSCO base. Measuring these troubling developments against a stalled national security sector reform process, the continued presence of domestic and foreign militias, and general unpreparedness for the 2011 elections, the political and security situation of the DRC remained perilous. Finally, South Sudan’s referendum on independence presents the clearest case of a peace operation in transition. Preparations for the vote and its consequences have been the focus of UNMIS in 2010. UNMIS realigned its forces toward border flashpoints and provided an immense amount of support to referendum preparations. Yet at the close of the year, several points of contention—including the future of the oil producing Abyei region—remained unresolved between the two parties. With the future of the operation uncertain at the close of the year, its ability to protect civilians was further hindered following the withdrawal of the Indian helicopter deployments that represented nearly one third of the mission’s aerial military capacity. The resultant picture from 2010 is one of peacekeeping under continuing strain and

pressure, but also of continuing demand. As Ian Johnstone underscores in Chapter 1, “Peacekeeping’s Transitional Moment,” the challenges facing peacekeeping as pressure mounts for withdrawal are not easily overcome. Mitigating dilemmas arising from competing priorities against existing realities is crucial. For instance, how can a mission draw down sustainably in order to alleviate strains on resources while still allowing enough flexibility to reallocate those resources elsewhere given current and future needs?

Conclusion

The year 2010 ended with a 50 percent increase in authorized troops for AMISOM and likely reinforcements for the besieged UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Combined with the uncertainty in post-referenda Sudan, how will peacekeeping contract in overall numbers if the international community continues to buttress high-profile missions with more troops? Indeed, these events would seemingly contradict the narrative of contraction. What lies behind this, however, are two countervailing trends: that current operations continue to face pressure to

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scale down in overall size, and that the international community is unwilling to deploy new, large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Thus, while conditions on the ground necessitate action, and sometimes additional reinforcements, the era of continued growth for multidimensional peacekeeping may be coming to a close. The significant slowing in the global rate of UN deployment in 2010 is a sign of this predicted reduction. With MONUSCO, UNMIL,

and other major UN missions drawing down, conditions and or consent permitting, peacekeeping may well be entering a period of overall decline in global deployment—offsetting any small increases for specific missions. Regardless of the global picture, the future strategic direction of peacekeeping hinges on its performance over the coming year in the largest and most watched operations in the DRC, Sudan, Haiti, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Looking Back at the New Horizon Process in 20101

More than a year after launching the New Horizon reform initiative—aimed at strengthening UN peacekeeping to meet current and future demands—the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) took stock of the process in 2010 with their first Progress Report.2 While meaningful progress was made in 2010 in terms of important institutional reforms, developments targeted toward more strategic reforms were lacking. Whereas the New Horizon process was launched in 2009 at a time of considerable strain for peacekeeping amid record high levels of deployment, the 2010 Progress Report notes that UN peacekeeping may be entering a period of consolidation where the focus will be less on building new, large operations and more on transition in existing operations with renewed attention to the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus. The ongoing efforts are focused broadly in two main areas: strategic and institutional reforms. Of these, strategic reforms, such as increasing the pool of troopand police-contributing countries, registered little progress in 2010. Institutional

reforms, however, fared somewhat better. For instance, consultations among the Security Council, troop- and policecontributing countries, and the Secretariat on mandates and operations, and more open and inclusive formal and informal dialogues among peacekeeping stakeholders, became more common. The issue of protection of civilians (PoC) also saw progress at the 2010 session of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, or C34, when DPKO and DFS presented a draft operational concept note on PoC—a major step toward developing and operationalizing comprehensive mission-wide PoC strategies and trainings. UN member states endorsed the DFS-proposed Global Field Support Strategy (A/64/633), which seeks to improve the resourcing and service delivery of field missions in 2010 in its almost fully proposed form. Its implementation in the coming year is expected to bring more rapid and effective mission startup and timely deployments, in addition to improving conditions for civilian support staff. The Review of International Civilian Capacities is also an important development

in this regard as it strengthens the availability of quality civilian peacekeeping personnel. The obstacles that divide member states between those who fund peacekeeping operations and those who provide personnel remained. Little action was taken by current and potential force contributors to more consistently support UN operations, as essential questions about the limits and possibilities of peacekeeping remain unresolved. Compounded by financial concerns, member states demonstrated little incentive to back their words with actions on this front. While some areas of the New Horizon agenda have progressed more than others, the initiative has only just begun. Peacekeeping must remain flexible in order to evolve to changing realities and demands in the field. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if peacekeeping’s so-called period of consolidation will provide the necessary space for tackling specific reforms or hinder their progress. A focus on transition planning and the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus appear to continue in the near future.

Notes: 1. To access all the New Horizon Reports, including the first paper A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping visit http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon.shtml 2. The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1

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Peacekeeping’s Transitional Moment Ian Johnstone

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Transition from full-scale peacekeeping was a topic of lively debate in 2010. From Liberia and Timor-Leste, where measured drawdowns are under way; through Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the governments called for early withdrawal of the missions; to Sudan, where significant changes are on the horizon, UN peacekeeping seems to be entering a period of “consolidation.”1 Non-UN operations are also scaling back, in the Balkans for example. Add to these the lessons of Sierra Leone, Burundi, Haiti, and Côte d’Ivoire and it is fair to say that peacekeeping itself is in a “transitional moment,” a potential turning point for the entire enterprise.2 This ferment on the ground was matched by reflection in UN headquarters on the appropriate conditions for withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission and the challenges of handing over residual tasks to other external actors.3 While the questions being asked are important and overdue, a note of caution is in order. Financial constraints, domestic politics in key capitals, bureaucratic rivalries within international organizations, and human-resource failings are driving the debate as much as considered analysis of whether, when, and how a peacekeeping mission should exit. In reaction to concerns about “overstretch” and an overly ambitious peacebuilding agenda, the pendulum may be swinging too far in the opposite direction. Peacekeeping is not a panacea, but nor is it simply one interchangeable option from a menu of instruments for the management of peace and security. There is a risk that in the enthusiasm for smaller, less-expensive operations, the international community will give up on largescale peacekeeping altogether. This would be a mistake. Although some contraction is on the

horizon and alternatives to peacekeeping have proven their worth, unpredicted crises and unpredictable sources of political will could stem the tide. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the expansion of the African Union mission in Somalia, and NATO’s commitment to remain in Afghanistan until 2014 illustrate the point. Thus it is important in planning for transitions not to let cost and political expediency cloud judgment about what peacekeeping operations do well and what only they can do. The most intractable challenges for transition processes are not technical—not how to build local administrative capacity, for example—but political. They are manifest in the multiple pressures a mission faces: pressure to withdraw prematurely from some quarters, pressure to stay longer than necessary from others; pressure to plan for an exit, matched by pressure to signal continuing engagement; pressure to promote local ownership, while insisting on respect for international standards. The pressures, and the operational dilemmas associated with them, are especially acute at the moment of transition because they compel reflection on a fundamental question: given the enormous constraints and inordinate expectations under which peacekeeping missions labor, what can they reasonably be expected to achieve before pulling out? In this chapter, I argue that a proper answer requires greater attention to three questions that go to the heart of contemporary peacekeeping: How transformative should a peace operation seek to be? What are the parameters of consent? What is the nature of the relationship between internal and external actors? These uncertainties have been on the fault line of debate about peacekeeping at least since the end of the Cold War. They do not lend themselves to easy 10

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answers. Indeed, the task is not to resolve the conceptual uncertainties, as they are inherent in the strategic environment in which contemporary peacekeeping occurs. Rather, the task is to devise strategies for managing the unavoidable tensions and operational dilemmas they create.

Conceptual Uncertainties How Transformative Should a Peace Operation Be? The Core Business of Peacekeeping

Mission mandates and policy documents have converged on a list of five areas in which progress is thought to be necessary in order to secure sustainable peace: safety and security; political processes; rule of law and human rights; governance and the extension of state authority; and socioeconomic development.4 To some, this agenda represents a holistic vision of what it takes to consolidate peace; to others it translates into a laundry list of desirable objectives that are impossible to fulfill. To others still it embodies a neocolonial exercise in social engineering that diverts attention from local conditions and actual needs.5 For all, it raises questions about the scope and limits of outside intervention: even if, in line with that agenda, the deep transformation of postconflict societies is a worthy goal, what role can outsiders play in making it happen? A number of subsidiary questions follow from that central conceptual uncertainty. How much security is enough, for example? Is the absence of large-scale violent conflict the goal? Or is the agenda more ambitious—to build local security institutions capable of providing basic law and order throughout the territory? The DRC may have achieved the first, but the second is nowhere in sight. Similar questions can be asked about the rule of law. Is a functioning criminal justice system enough, or should peace operations be concerned with property rights and land tenure? If good governance is a goal, does the existence of uncorrupt institutions meet it or should a peace operation seek to cultivate broadly inclusive, democratic politics? On both

rule of law and governance, Sierra Leone has achieved more than the bare minimum, and Liberia is heading in that direction. Is the same possible in North and South Sudan or is that expecting too much? Socioeconomic factors undoubtedly require attention in postconflict societies, but the role a peacekeeping operation should play in fostering development is contested. In Haiti, before the earthquake there was tension within the UN system between the need for speedy job creation versus the demands of longer-term capacity building. Related to lingering uncertainty about end states is an institutional question: what is the core business of peacekeeping vis-à-vis other external actors? The Capstone Doctrine highlights security, rule of law, politics, and coordination.6 Among the priorities established in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding, it is stated that peacekeeping’s core capacities are “support to national political processes and the provision of safety and security.” This may include “the re-establishment of frameworks for governance,” but leaves out things like the provision of basic services and the socioeconomic dimensions of peacebuilding— where peacekeepers are primarily in the role of supporting other external actors.7 The New Horizon Progress Report of October 2010 specifies three primary roles for peacekeepers as early peacebuilders: articulating priorities and guiding strategies; enabling other national and international actors to implement peacebuilding tasks by providing a security umbrella and expanding political space; and implementing some peacebuilding tasks directly, in critical areas such as police, justice, corrections, and security sector reform.8 These documents provide a useful starting point for establishing priorities and dividing labor among the multitude of actors involved in a peace process. But the devil is in the details. Benchmarking practice delves into those details by dividing “core” from “contextual” benchmarks—those that fall squarely within a mission’s mandate from those where it plays a supporting role (as in Liberia, Haiti, and Timor). But inconsistency in the categorization

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UN Photo/Paul Banks

the DRC, holding off pressure for premature termination of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), now named the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).9 Thus, benchmarks can both generate momentum to overcome the inevitable reluctance of peacekeeping missions to plan for their own exits, while also ensuring that the focus in on substantive progress, rather than artificial timelines. The challenge is to manage “benchmarkdriven” withdrawals in a manner that lets the benchmarks, rather than political expedience, do the driving.

Recruits for the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) perform a training exercise at their academy in Rajaf, South Sudan, 7 October 2010.

of benchmarks, as well as in the use of quantitative versus qualitative indicators, suggests continuing uncertainty about what a peacekeeping operation should seek to accomplish prior to withdrawal. The Security Council could help to clarify the uncertainty, but practice has been driven by expediency as much as an honest application of the tool. In Liberia, benchmarks have been helpful in measuring progress on the three-phase consolidation, drawdown, and withdrawal plan. Conversely, in Chad the criteria proposed by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1861 (2009) as the exit strategy for the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) largely ignored in discussions over termination of that mission. (Interestingly, a new set of benchmarks were set out in Security Council resolution 1923 to measure the government’s ability to meet its “protection of civilians” commitments.) In Timor, carefully negotiated criteria for handing policing responsibilities to the Timorese district by district were applied only loosely, given a felt political need to complete the process by the end of 2010. The UN has been insisting on a benchmark-guided withdrawal from

Consent to What and by Whom? Contract Among the Parties vs. Compact with the Population

While consent remains a “bedrock principle” of peacekeeping,10 it is often not reliable (as in the DRC); it can be manipulated (as in Darfur) and, when brought about under pressure, it may not provide a sustainable foundation for the presence of a peace operation (as in Chad). Moreover, even in the best of circumstances, consent to a multidimensional peace operation is open-ended. No peace agreement, no matter how comprehensive, can provide for every contingency. Gaps in the accords materialize, problems of interpretation arise, and circumstances change throughout the life of a peace process (as in North-South Sudan). Consent, then, is a contested concept. Even the basic question “consent to what?” has no easy answer. It means consent to the deployment of a mission, at least, and, in contemporary doctrine, consent to a political process—typically embodied in a peace agreement.11 The notion that peacekeeping can only succeed if accompanied by a viable political process is more helpful than the truism that peacekeeping is not the right instrument when there is no peace to keep. But gauging the viability of a political process is no easy task. The UN Secretariat and Security Council wondered whether that existed in Côte d’Ivoire in 2006. Ultimately both concluded that a UN peacekeeping operation

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could help to cultivate the nascent political process that was under way. In the period leading to the 2010 elections the gamble seemed to have paid off; whether the outcome of those elections proves otherwise remains to be seen. Moreover, consent to deployment of a mission and a political process does not necessarily translate into consent to the mandate—especially the ambitious, transformative mandates described above.12 Thus the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) has a mandate to facilitate security sector review, but the Government has made it clear it has no interest in that and so no progress has been made.13 In North-South Sudan, large portions of UNMIS’ mandate to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement fell by the wayside in the face of obstruction or indifference on both sides. It is easier to sustain consent for less ambitious mandates: fewer interlocutors need to be engaged and the leverage of outsiders can be targeted. But consent to a minimalist intervention may not provide sufficient reassurance to all stakeholders. Rebel groups expected to lay down their arms and join a political process, for example, may insist on deep institutional and political reform, with some sort of external guarantee that the changes will hold. That begs the question, whose consent matters? The Capstone Doctrine usefully distinguishes strategic from tactical consent, holding that a UN mission must gain and keep the consent of the main parties to the conflict, though not necessarily local “spoilers.” Determining whether a particular “spoiler” is a minor actor operating locally or a proxy for one of the main parties is the challenge, as the DRC and Sudan, both in Darfur and the South, illustrate. An even thornier question is whether a peace agreement is best seen as a contract between the parties or a compact with the population. There is a premium on local ownership in a peace process, both as a normative stance (people ought to have control over the decisions that affect their lives) and as requirement for effectiveness (no peace process will succeed if there is not broad buy-in). Implementing that piece of conventional wisdom in a particular

postconflict society must start from an understanding of government capacities, the strength of civil society, and the nature of the relationship between the government and civil society— all of which are moving targets. Inevitably, a peace operation must work with those who hold power—typically the parties to the conflict. As institutions are consolidated, more direct engagement with midlevel government officials, the legislative branch, opposition parties, and local governors and administrators is often required. Yet true local ownership must also include civil society and the private sector. Thus the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) holds quarterly meetings with civil society, and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) has organized “democratic governance forums” to give ordinary citizens a chance to interact directly with their leaders. Both cases have benefitted from leaders (Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Jose Ramos Horta) who are supportive of engagement with the grassroots. Other interlocutors of UN peace operations are less-well-disposed to bottom-up peacebuilding; for example, in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even in the most conducive environments, there are limits on how much a peacekeeping mission can reach out to civil society without undermining the legitimacy of the host government. Ironically, after a transitional government hands over to an elected successor, the scope for inclusive engagement on the part of the peacekeepers may narrow. This is the converse of another operational dilemma: if peacekeepers have a mandate to help the government extend state authority and the legitimacy of that government is contested by a substantial portion of the population, then legitimacy of the peace operation is tainted by association. The Relationship Between Internal and External Actors? Peacekeeping as an Obsolescing Bargain

The notion of consent to a peace operation suggests that the relationship between the peacekeepers and local authorities is itself a bargain. To the extent that that is true, in simple (and artificial) terms, the bargain looks something like

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this: local elites seek security and development assistance, in exchange for which they are willing to tolerate governance reforms, human rights monitoring, and other elements of participatory peace.14 Because the former are likely to reinforce the power of elites, whereas the latter may undermine it, there is an ongoing negotiation on implementation of the mandate between the parties to the peace agreement and between them and outside actors. The problem for the peacekeepers is that the bargain is an obsolescing one. As Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis explain, the authority of the UN is never greater than at the moment of signing a peace agreement because that is when the parties are most dependent on the UN, and the UN has put little of its prestige and resources on the line.15 Moreover, the welcome of intervening forces by the host population tends to diminish over time.16 This “obsolescing welcome” is matched by diminishing will in intervening countries, especially as the perceived costs of continued deployment start to outweigh benefits. The above description is a caricature of most peace processes. There are many places where the national leadership is committed to democracy and in fact relies on democratic standards to encourage moderates and marginalize spoilers. Yet even there, built-in obsolescence can raise problems—for example, in trying to strike the right balance between providing needed services and building national capacity. In Timor-Leste, staffing ministries with foreign advisers is seen by many as counterproductive because they tend to perform governing functions rather than mentoring local officials. In Liberia today, UNMIL would like the government to handle the elections on its own—in effect doing itself out of the job it performed in 2005. But with government capacity lacking, UNMIL is torn between playing a hands-off role or providing so much help in seeing the job done well that it ends of substituting for rather than complementing the government What this suggests is that the dynamics of the bargain depend on the strength of the government

with which one is dealing. Typically, the UN starts out dealing with weak transitional governments, as in Haiti, the DRC, and Timor-Leste in the early years. They need the UN (and other external actors), especially for security and development assistance, and therefore are willing to tolerate significant external interference in exchange. But as the government gets stronger, it becomes less tolerant of international tutelage—content to accept a small peacebuilding presence if that means greater economic aid, but less interested in a military presence and governance advice. This dynamic played out in Burundi after the 2005 elections and in the DRC after the 2006 elections. The close victory in 2006 made the Kabila government feel strong enough to begin exerting its will vis-à-vis opposition forces and outsiders, but still weak enough that it felt compelled to do so through less than democratic means. Then, as security deteriorated in the east and the Security Council decided to streamline the long list of activities MONUC was meant to perform, priority was placed on protection of civilians and most governancerelated tasks dropped out.17 The dilemma for the UN in these circumstances is how to use its declining leverage to remain engaged across the multidimensional spectrum without looking and behaving like an unwelcome occupation force. Adding a further layer of complexity, UN operations often face incremental obstructions, never quite amounting to a frontal assault on the mission but debilitating enough to seriously jeopardize its ability to fulfill the mandate.18 Thus Eritrea, in response to Ethiopia’s refusal to accept the decision of the boundary commission, incrementally imposed restrictions on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), first by banning helicopter observation, then by restricting land patrols, and finally by cutting off all fuel deliveries to troops stationed on its side of the border. A similar pattern has been playing out in Sudan. At what point does this “death by a thousand cuts” amount to the constructive withdrawal of strategic consent? Finally, the peacekeeping “bargain” is not negotiated and implemented in a normative

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vacuum. It is situated within a normative framework embodied in the UN Charter, relevant international law, and organization practice. This can strengthen the hand of the peace operation— for example, in insisting on respect for human rights and norms of participatory governance— but it also creates operational dilemmas. How, for example, do UNAMID and UNMIS (the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur and the UN Mission in Sudan) navigate the difficult terrain of working, and brokering agreements, with a government led by a president indicted for war crimes and genocide? How should the UN react to the DRC government’s foot-dragging on its own “zero tolerance” policy with respect to human rights abuses committed by the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)? The dilemma for the UN is that the harder it pushes for adherence to basic norms as a matter of principle, the greater the risk of losing the cooperation of those who hold power.

Transition Strategies

As noted above, these uncertainties and the associated operational dilemmas are true dilemmas in the sense that they are endemic, not conducive to quick managerial fixes.19 They are rooted in real differences of opinion about the nature of peacekeeping and the appropriate role of outsiders in rebuilding postconflict societies. Because they will not be resolved soon, there is all the more reason to devise transition strategies that account for them. Treat Peace Agreements as Living Documents

Peace agreements have been described as “relational contracts,”20 “curable covenants,”21 and “constitutional” instruments,22 all of which suggest they are living documents that must be interpreted creatively in light of changing circumstances. Comprehensive peace agreements seek to structure an open-ended, long-term relationship. They implicate not only the parties to the conflict and signatories to the accord but

other stakeholders as well, including opposition groups, vulnerable populations, neighboring countries, and perhaps even the broader population. The lesson is not to ignore the peace agreement as circumstances change but to use it as the foundation for an ongoing process of managing relations between these multiple actors. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between north and south Sudan illustrates the point. Much of it has not been implemented as written, but nor has it been abandoned by any stretch—indeed, debates over the timing of the referendum and postreferendum arrangements come down to debates over how strictly to adhere to the CPA. Employ an Expansion Vision of Consent

Consent in contemporary peacekeeping should be understood expansively—as consent to the deployment of a peace operation, to the mandate it is given, and to the political process it nurtures. This suggests an inclusive form of engagement with all stakeholders in the “social compact” that a peace agreement embodies, through both formal and informal mechanisms. While it is not possible to specify how much buy-in from each stakeholder is necessary, in most situations strong government resistance to inclusive politics is an indicator that withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission would be premature. Prior to the earthquake in Haiti, the strategy of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was to provide the space for a period of relative calm during which it was hoped a habit of inclusive politics would develop. That standard argues for a measured drawdown of MONUSCO. It also suggests the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) will be needed for some time to come. Use Benchmarks to Foster Accountability and Dialogue

Benchmarks should be used both as accountability mechanisms and as devices for inclusive consultations on transition. They are a way of measuring progress toward fulfillment of the terms of a peace agreement and implementation

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of a mandate, holding internal and external actors accountable for the commitments they make. The benchmarks in Liberia have been useful thanks in large part to President Johnson Sirleaf’s use of them in that way. They are also tools for expanding on the original peace agreement, by stimulating principled deliberation on the conditions for and pace of withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation. In the DRC, both benchmarks and the Integrated Strategic Framework have been the basis for (somewhat contentious) discussion between the UN and government on the pace and nature of MONUC/ MONUSCO’s withdrawal, and indeed civil society has been pushing for a role in the joint government-MONUC mechanism to guide the drawdown.23 While flexibility in the application of benchmarks is necessary, that flexibility must be based on honest assessments rather than political expedience.

force a premature withdrawal of the mission.24 This kind of assistance can be useful, but the UN itself—whether a peacekeeping mission, a successor arrangement, or the UN country team—only has so many bargaining chips. Lead nations like the UK in Sierra Leone can help. Acting as “godfather,” they can provide security guarantees, support moderate elements, and sanction spoilers. They can also do the heavy lifting on security and justice sector reform, as well as other forms of long-term capacity building. Lacking an obvious godfather—for example, in the DRC—calculations about drawdown are different. For the purposes of transition and handover, an assessment should be done not only of national capacities and those of the UN system but also the capacity and commitment of bilateral partners.

Conclusion Stand on Principle

If the relationship embodied in a peace agreement is a “social compact,” then standing on principle can be justified on pragmatic as well as normative grounds. Small violations or obstructions may seem tolerable in the interest of maintaining a cooperative relationship with the host government, but this can be a slippery slope, as the cases of Eritrea and Darfur illustrate. Moreover, transition away from full-scale peacekeeping is precisely the moment when key power holders in the postconflict society may be inclined to opt for political expedience at the expense of international standards. Deferring to their preferences at any price is not managing consent but abdicating responsibility for ensuring the mandate is fulfilled in a principled manner. Look to “Lead Nations”

If the peacekeeping bargain tends to obsolesce over time, then devices must be found for sustaining the bargain through the transition process. An aspect of the transition from MONUC to MONUSCO was to enhance the peacebuilding limb of the UN presence in the DRC as an incentive for the government not to

The attention being devoted to “transition” today is circumstantial evidence that peacekeeping works: the policy debates are not driven by failure as much as by differing understandings of success. The most difficult challenges of drawdown and handover tend to be conceptual and political. Certainly there are operational challenges, but these stem from deeper questions about how to define security and the rule of law, or measure intangibles like state authority or a viable political process. Uncertainty about how transformative a peace operation should seek to be, whose consent to the peace process matters, and what role outsiders should play in that process adds to the complexity. While “local ownership” and national capacity-building are watchwords for the transition process, this should not be an excuse for premature withdrawal of a mission. The authority of peacekeeping derives from its character as a political instrument, typically traced to a Security Council mandate. This, plus its multinational character, multidimensional presence, and overall size, means a peacekeeping operation carries political weight

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that other actors rarely possess. This is not to suggest that peacekeeping is the only source of leverage outsiders can bring to bear, but decisions about drawdown and handover ought to

account for the unique influence that comes from the ability to engage across the multidimensional spectrum, backed by the power and legitimacy of a unified Security Council.

Notes Ian Johnstone is professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This chapter is partly based on research done for the Best Practices Section of the Division of Policy, Evaluation, and Training of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Parts of it are also being published as “Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 18(2) (2011). I am grateful to Jake Sherman, Ben Tortolani, and Andrew Sinclair for comments on an earlier draft and to the insights of Garth Schofield, with whom I am collaborating on a related project. The essay reflects the views of the author alone. 1. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1 (October 2010), pp. 7-8. 2. The term transitional moment echoes Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments” to describe critical turning points in a nation’s history. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991). 3. See the Security Council Open Debate on Transition and Exit Strategies, 12 February 2010, S/PV.6270. See also Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2010/2, 12 February 2010. 4. In the UN context, see, for example, Report of the Secretary-General, “No Exit Without Strategy,” S/2001/384 (20 April 2001); Center on International Cooperation, Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty (April 2009); Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (July 2009); Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881S/2009/304 (11 June 2009); Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/64/866-S/2010/386 (16 July 2010); UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine), March 2008; New Horizon Progress Report, supra note 1. For thinking outside the UN context, see United States Institute for Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (2009). 5. In the academic literature, see, for example, Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, eds., The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (2009). See also Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” International Studies Review 36 (2010): 337–365. 6. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine), March 2008, p. 23. 7. New Horizon, p. 23. 8. New Horizon Progress Report, supra note 1 at 14. 9. S/RES/1925 (28 May 2010), para. 7. 10. UN General Assembly, Report of the Panel on United Naitons Peacekeeping Operations (the Brahimi Report), 21 August 2000, A/55/305–S/2000/809, para. 48; Capstone Doctrine, pp. 31. 11. Capstone Doctrine, p. 31. 12. This insight comes from Daniel Safran-Hon , in “Means to Ends: Withdrawal of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Moving from Crisis to Opportunity,” submitted for publication. On file with author. 13. International Crisis Group, Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, Asia Briefing No. 15, 15 December 2010. 14. Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood,” in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, eds., The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009). 15. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 309. 16. David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” in Paris and Sisk eds, Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 81 and 83. 17. S/RES/1906 (23 December 2009).

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18. Capstone Doctrine, p. 32, describes this as de facto withdrawal of consent. 19. Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk make the same point in describing the dilemmas of state building. See Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, “Conclusion: Confronting the Contradictions,” in Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 304. 20. Ian Johnstone, “Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping (forthcoming 2011). 21. Fen Osler Hampson, “The Risks of Peace: Implications for International Mediation,” Negotiation Journal 22, no. 1 (January 2006):13–30, at 16–22. 22. Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 23. United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (13 to 16 May 2010), S/2010/288, 30 June 2010, para. 17. 24. Security Council Report, Monthly Forecast, Democratic Republic of Congo, April 2010.

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2.1 Chad and the Central African Republic

The UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) ceased operating during 2010. Following the withdrawal of consent for the mission by the Chadian government in early 2010, the UN Security Council negotiated the withdrawal of MINURCAT by yearend, with a full transfer of responsibilities to fledgling Chadian security and judicial institutions. This sudden transition has occurred amid rampant banditry and insecurity among those living in the country’s eastern border areas and those actors mandated to deliver humanitarian relief to the substantial refugee and internally displaced populations there. Considering this situation along with possible volatility stemming from the developing situation in neighboring Sudan, MINURCAT’s withdrawal could potentially result in a further deterioration of human security and regional stability during 2011.

Beginning in 2005, eastern Chad has been the site of daily violence—violence involving theft and affecting individuals and aid workers alike—as well as rebel movements associated with the ongoing Chadian civil war. Banditry with impunity continues to be widespread, the result of a lack of functioning legal and judicial institutions. This has been exacerbated by ethnic tensions and tremendous disparities in wealth and regional development. Deep divisions and unequal power dynamics between ethnic groups continue as well. By late 2006, the UN Security Council, consumed by the unfolding crisis in Darfur, was yet unable to negotiate the deployment of peacekeepers into Darfur itself. Discussions about a future peace operation in Chad were focused on the border area, where violence was most acute. In the long-standing tension between Chad and Sudan, there has been a history of coups being launched from safe havens in the neighboring country. This focus proved once again to be well founded when, in 2008, a Chadian rebel attack mounted from inside Darfur was nearly successful in unseating the Chadian government, and a Darfurian rebel offensive from a rear base inside Chad became the first-ever direct attack on the Sudanese capital. Meanwhile, the Central African Republic, Chad’s southern neighbor state, continued to suffer instability, as a result of decades of mutinies, rebellions, and military interventions by its neighbors. In 2008, a political dialogue between the government of the CAR, the political opposition, and rebel leaders aimed to bring an end to the chronic violence and instability in the country. However, alleged failures on the part of the government to implement agreements forged

Background

Chad is currently host to roughly 255,000 refugees from the Darfur region of Sudan and more than 64,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR), to the south. More refugees continue to arrive every month, and with violent insecurity still prevalent in both Sudan and the CAR, the prospects for their return are not improving. The eastern region of Chad is also host to roughly 168,000 internally displaced people, most originating from the border area and driven from their homes by cross-border attacks originating inside Sudan. Like the refugees, the Chadian internally displaced persons (IDPs) continue to face violence in return areas and so they remain in displacement sites, dependent on international assistance. 20

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in the dialogue caused rebel groups to resume armed activity early in 2009.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR 0

EUFOR and MINURCAT

Calls for an international peacekeeping deployment in Chad and the CAR were precipitated in 2005 and 2006 by the mass internal displacement caused by cross-border attacks by Sudanbased militias. Prevailing violence was threatening the humanitarian response that the refugee and IDP communities were dependent on, and tension between local Chadian groups and the large, rapidly growing Darfurian refugee population was causing insecurity in the large refugee camps concentrated in the east of the country. In addition to the protection of civilians in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, the initial UN Secretariat proposal for a possible UN deployment in 2007 was much broader than the mandate that was eventually to be adopted. The proposal included provisions for a bordermonitoring role on the axis between Chad and Sudan as well as an official role in the facilitation of an internal Chadian political dialogue to bring about the end of the civil war. While the government of the CAR was amenable to the proposal, the Chadian government strenuously resisted any mention of Chadian internal politics or a UN role in border monitoring, and in the end neither of these responsibilities was included in the mandate. Only after serious debate and pressure from their French allies did the government of Chad agree to the deployment of peacekeepers on its soil, and even then the government consented to European Union (EU) troops, not UN peacekeepers. In September 2007, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1778, which reflected the compromise struck between the government of Chad, the UN, and the EU. The resolution authorized the deployment of 300 UN civilian police, 50 military liaison officers, and a small

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number of civilian support personnel. It also authorized a twelve-month deployment of an EU “bridging force,” which was meant to fill the emergency gap and establish the foundation for a possible follow-on UN mission while negotiations about the authorization of that mission continued. The EU peacekeeping force (EUFOR) began to deploy in February of 2008 and was declared operational on 15 March of the same year. EUFOR consisted of an authorized strength

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of 3,307 EU soldiers (3,107 in Chad and 200 in northeastern CAR). Acting under a Chapter VII mandate, the EUFOR solders were called upon to establish broad area security in their area of operations, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to protect UN staff and humanitarian personnel. In January 2009, just two months before the agreed end of EUFOR’s deployment, the UN Security Council adopted a mandate authorizing the deployment of up to 5,200 UN troops and 300 UN police, 25 military officers, and sufficient civilian staff to support the full range of activities involved in a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. The UN mission, known by the French acronym MINURCAT, was mandated to take over the major military tasks performed by EUFOR, including wide area security, support to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the protection of civilians under imminent threat. The mission also included an active human rights monitoring element, as well as a section dedicated to strengthening the weak Chadian legal and judicial sectors. The mandate also detailed the creation and support of an entity called the Détachement Intègre de Sécurité (DIS), which was designed

UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

25 September 2007 (UNSC Res. 1778) Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) Major-General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji (Senegal) Mamadou Mountaga Diallo (Guinea) $215.0 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Military Observers: 20 Troops: 1,327 Police: 109 International Civilian Staff: 354 Local Civilian Staff: 585 UN Volunteers: 147

For detailed mission information see p. 176

to counter the law-and-order vacuum in and around the refugee camps. DIS recruits were first identified by the government of Chad from among the ranks of the existing Chadian police, military, and gendarmerie. These recruits were then given training, equipment, and on-the-job mentoring by UN civilian police. This was a creative way to create a well-trained, well-monitored police force with the authority to conduct investigations and arrests as part of the Chadian security structure. On 15 March 2009, roughly 1,877 EUFOR soldiers were “re-hatted” and placed under UN command. These forces were drawn primarily from France, Poland, and Ireland, but also included smaller contingents from Albania, Austria, Croatia, Finland, and Russia. Over the course of 2010, MINURCAT troop numbers were supplemented by contributions from some thirtyfive troop-contributing countries.

Key Developments Chad

A series of successful government offensives against rebel groups throughout 2009 and 2010 have significantly weakened the rebel movement in eastern Chad. After a number of failed peace agreements, President Déby’s February 2010 visit to Khartoum produced a rapprochement between the two countries that continues to hold. The border, which had been officially closed for seven years, was reopened in April 2010 and a 3,000-strong soldier Joint Border Force was established. Evidence of improved Chad/Sudan relations have manifested in a more difficult operating environment for both Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups, which have historically found support in their respective neighboring territories. In May, the Chadian government refused entry into the country for Khalil Ibrahim, a leader of a Sudanese rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, and in May the Sudanese government expelled three Chadian rebel leaders. In a high-profile, widely criticized decision, the Chadian government also refused to arrest

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Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir when he traveled to Chad for a regional summit, in spite of Chad’s obligations as a signatory to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICC warrants out for President Bashir’s arrest.

In January 2010, the government of Chad withdrew its consent that had allowed EUFOR to transition into a militarized MINURCAT and asked that the Security Council not renew the mandate for MINURCAT, which was set to expire in March. The Chadian government cited the incomplete troop deployment—only 3,7491 of the full authorized strength of 5,500 military and police officers were deployed at that point— and alleged that the mission was incompetent to fulfill its mandate. The government asserted that, following the weakening of the rebel forces, as well as the rapprochement with Sudan, Chadian security forces would be in a better position to take up the protection role that the peacekeepers had been mandated to play. In June, a joint government of Chad/UN High-Level Working Group was established to assess the security situation with respect to the protection of civilians and to manage issues relating to the transition of protection tasks from MINURCAT to government forces. In particular, the High-Level Working Group was tasked with planning for the transition of the DIS from a force significantly supported by MINURCAT to a fully autonomous, Chadian-run policing body. A joint technical working group was appointed by the High-Level Working Group and began discussions pertaining to the long-term financial support of the DIS. As of July 2010, only $6.9 million of the $21.7 million needed to run the DIS had been received, raising questions about the sustainability of the DIS and its ability to fill the potential security vacuum in the absence of MINURCAT. A new body—called the Bureau de Sécurisation et des Mouvements (BSM)—was created within the Chadian government in order to coordinate the DIS and manage requests for escorts by humanitarian actors. Concurrently, the

Ashraf Shazly/AFP/Getty Images

Withdrawal of Chadian Consent

An armed member of the joint Sudanese-Chad border security forces is pictured in the West Darfur town of Jebel Moon, 7 November 2010.

DIS has increased the number of patrols, day and night, conducted in and around the IDP and refugee camps and has increased the number of escorts provided in an effort to maintain the flow of humanitarian assistance. The BSM was also charged with the coordination between the DIS, other law enforcement agencies, and humanitarian protection actors. The government of Chad also began hosting a series of Humanitarian Dialogue Forums between the government, humanitarian actors, MINURCAT, and the local media and intended to establish a “shared understanding of the concept and practice of the protection of civilians.” The Central African Republic

In 2010, the CAR was set to host presidential and parliamentary elections; however, the polls, first scheduled for April and then postponed twice— first to later in April and then to October—seem to have been put on hold again. President François Bozizé—who will stand for reelection—has cited security concerns. It is unclear if the elections will take place before the end of the year. The security situation in the MINURCAT area of operations—the northeast of the CAR— continues to be characterized by ethnic divisions,

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banditry, and cross-border crime. Also, three armed groups are currently operating in the area, resulting in the displacement of some 64,000 Central African civilians into Chad. The threat that Central African instability poses for the region is largely limited to banditry. Cross-border rebel incursions have not occurred since 2006. However, the threat of violent attacks against civilians—including refugees and IDP and humanitarian staff—remains a daily concern. The CAR currently hosts roughly 9502 refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the south, as well as some 197,0003 internally displaced people. This is the result of the violent attacks perpetrated against civilians in both northeastern DRC and the southern CAR by the Ugandan militia called the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is known to be operating in southern Sudan as well, and the regional dimension of this threat has prompted calls for closer collaboration between the UN peacekeeping operations with a presence in Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR. UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in the CAR

The UN peacebuilding support office in the CAR—called BONUCA—was mandated to provide support to the development of democratic institutions as well as the national reconciliation processes aimed at stabilizing the country. In 2009, the mandate of BONUCA was expanded to include support for the reform of security sector institutions as well as the rule of law. BONUCA was also tasked with providing support to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Increased engagement on the part of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and a perceived need to enhance coordination with MINURCAT (which is headquartered in the Chadian capital of N’djamena) precipitated a 1 January 2010 handover of responsibility from BONUCA to the new integrated peacebuilding office, BINUCA. In addition to its regional coordination role, the new office—like its predecessor—is mandated

to support national reconciliation and DDR efforts in the CAR. In addition to the UN presence there, the CAR is also host to MICOPAX, the peacekeeping force mounted by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). MICOPAX includes 527 combat troops, as well as civilian police, civilian staff, and gendarmes. The mission coordinates with BINUCA staff and is mandated to promote peace, stability, and respect for human rights, while providing support to reconciliation efforts and electoral planning. MINURCAT Transition

This has been a year of transition for MINURCAT. In January the government called for the withdrawal of the mission, and while the government initially called for complete withdrawal by June 2010, a last-minute agreement between President Déby and the UN Security Council allowed for an extension of some parts of the MINURCAT mandate until October 2010. Even with the extension, the mandated troop strength was reduced to a maximum of 1,900 soldiers in Chad and 300 in the Central African Republic. The final withdrawal of all remaining troops began on 15 October and is expected to be completed by 31 December 2010. MINURCAT’s new mandate held implications for the mission’s concept of operations and the rules of engagement, which were revised to reflect changes in the mission’s mandated tasks. The new mandate authorized significant changes to the protection-of-civilians tasks, specifically limiting the geographic scope of this protection from the mission’s full area of operations to just the “immediate vicinity” of MINURCAT forces. All area security patrols ceased as of 27 May, and all humanitarian security escorts have been taken over by the DIS. MINURCAT forces continued to provide security for UN personnel, facilities, and assets, as well as escorts for UN military carrying out enabling support functions, medical evacuations for UN staff, and the extraction of humanitarian actors in danger. The mission continued to maintain

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a quick reaction force to respond in case of emergencies. In addition to the residual military tasks still being performed by the peacekeepers in the last months of 2010, MINURCAT continued to support the development of credible police and judicial institutions in the east. The mission worked simultaneously with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to develop a responsible drawdown strategy. In advance of its departure, the mission completed the training of 158 nonprofessional justices of the peace in May 2010 and continues to rehabilitate courts through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in a number of central towns in eastern Chad. MINURCAT rule-of-law experts are also providing funding and technical support to reinforce the legal-aid services provided at the Maison des Avocats in Abeche. The mission is also mobilizing local NGOs to ensure the continuity and expansion of legal-aid services throughout the east. Human rights monitoring continued in refugee camps, and MINURCAT staff continued to build capacity among Chadian authorities and civil society organizations to carry out human rights monitoring and advocacy after the mission’s withdrawal. Despite MINURCAT’s efforts, eastern Chad remained host to acute insecurity that resulted in the need to temporarily suspend or modify humanitarian activities, and in some cases has led to the withdrawal of humanitarian staff. Furthermore, additional problems such as food shortages (the result of poor rainfall) are exacerbating the scale of humanitarian need, and the continued presence and ongoing arrival of

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

October 2002 January 2003 Albert Akouéndéngué (Gabon) $57.3 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Troops: 551 Civilian Police: 150

new refugees is placing serious strains on the scarce natural resources in refugee host areas.

Conclusion

Amid government assurances that the security situation is under control and plans for MINURCAT—a mission precipitated by calls for civilian protection assistance—to hand over responsibility to Chad’s security and justice bodies, the security situation remains volatile for civilians and humanitarian staff. The persistent banditry— including carjacking, violent armed robbery, and increasingly frequent abductions—as well as the pervasive climate of impunity has resulted in a reduction of humanitarian access and constitutes a threat to the availability of critical assistance in Chad’s refugee and IDP camps. While these perpetrations were widespread when the mission was deployed, the potential for them to increase even further once MINURCAT’s transition is complete is a distinct possibility during 2011.

Notes 1. UN Missions contributions by country, 31 January 2010—http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ contributors/2010/jan10_5.pdf 2. 2010-11 UNHCR Planning Figures for Central African Republic—http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/ vtx/page?page=49e45c156. 3. Ibid.

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2.2 Democratic Republic of Congo

This was a difficult year for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), despite the efforts made in 2009 to weaken and dismantle armed groups operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and despite improvements in regional relations. Over the course of the year, the security situation in the east deteriorated significantly as new alliances between Congolese and foreign armed groups emerged in North Kivu and as both the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued their deadly reprisal attacks against civilian populations in the Kivus and Orientale Province. Meanwhile, a six-month popular insurgency emerged in the western province of Equateur, and the national army—the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)— continued its predatory practices against civilians. In March 2010, the relationship between MONUC and the government of the DRC reached crisis levels, as Kinshasa called for the United Nations to withdraw all of its peacekeeping forces by mid-2011, two years earlier than UN planners had anticipated.

war (notably Rwanda), broke with him and attempted a similar ouster, but this time without success. Resulting from the stalemate in the conflict and considerable external pressure, the war ended with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999. Signatories to the agreement included the Congolese parties and the neighboring states involved in the conflict. The withdrawal of most foreign troops shortly after the signing of the agreement created a power vacuum in rebel-held territories, and a third war began behind UN-monitored cease-fire lines in northeastern Congo. This war was fought between ever-smaller groups— foreign and domestic—that have since become significant actors in the illicit activities in that region. In June 2003, following a national dialogue and a series of regional agreements, a government of national unity—consisting of leaders representing almost every local actor in the wars—was sworn in. This transition culminated in a UN-supported national election in 2006. Joseph Kabila was narrowly elected president after two hotly contested rounds of voting. Four years after that landmark election, the UN mission in the Congo—renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO)—has entered its fourth and, some expect, final phase. Phase one was the initial UN deployment of a small observer mission in 1999 following the second Congo war—the one that erupted in August 1998. Its initial mandate, authorized by Security Council Resolution 1279, was to support the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Phase two coincided with the political transition in the Congo begun in 2003. By 2004, MONUC had grown into a substantial integrated mission with the mandate to support the

Background

The conflict in the Congo can be seen as three interlocking wars. The first began in September 1996 as an invasion (of what was then Zaire) by a coalition of neighboring states. The invasion ousted President Mobutu and replaced him with Laurent Kabila in May 1997. The second Congo war broke out in August 1998 when a similar configuration of neighboring states, some of whom had been Kabila’s patrons in the first 26

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government of national unity, the transition, and the complex and expensive national electoral process held in 2006. The mission’s third phase began in 2009 when, in keeping with its reinforced mandate, MONUC entered a more robust peacekeeping phase, focusing largely on the unfinished business of the stabilization of eastern Congo. A series of joint military operations with the Congolese national armed forces against armed groups in the east yielded mixed results and came under heavy criticism for its failure to protect civilians. Most significantly, these joint military operations, conducted with a national army known for human rights abuses, exposed the operational tensions in the mission’s multiple mandates called for in Resolution 1856. The UN mission entered its fourth and final phase on 28 May 2010 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1925, substantially reconfiguring the UN mission in the Congo and reframing the force as a stabilization mission. Resolution 1925 authorized the withdrawal of up to 2,000 troops from the country, further concentrated the mission’s attention on civilian protection and military operations in the east, and established a reserve force that can react, in principle, to incidents throughout the country. Coming on the heels of efforts by the Congolese government to see a substantial reduction in the UN’s presence, Resolution 1925 marked the beginning of a process that, barring the resumption of regional hostilities, will ostensibly culminate in the mission’s departure.

From MONUC to MONUSCO

Signs of the growing tensions between the government of DRC and MONUC were evident throughout the latter half of 2009 amid international concern over the deteriorating security situation in the country and the inability of the Congolese armed forces and the UN mission to protect civilians. On 4 March 2010, during a UN technical assessment mission to the DRC to discuss a gradual, three-year disengagement plan that had been proposed earlier by the UN, President Kabila

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* In addition to its Kinshasa headquarters, MONUSCO maintains liaison offices in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bujumbura (Burundi), Harare (Zimbabwe), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Lusaka (Zambia), and Windhoek (Namibia).

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

30 November 1999 (UNSC Res. 1279) Roger Meese (United States) Lieutenant-General Chander Prakesh (India) Abdallah Wafy (Niger) $1,369.0 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 17,112 Military Observers: 715 Police: 1,181 International Civilian Staff: 948 Local Civilian Staff: 2,782 UN Volunteers: 597

For detailed mission information see p. 203

instead called on MONUC to begin withdrawing its forces in June 2010 and complete the drawdown by June 2011. This was a sudden departure from Kinshasa’s earlier request that the UN submit a plan for the progressive drawdown of the mission by 30 June 2010, the country’s fiftieth anniversary of independence. It also

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underscored the degree to which the relationship between MONUC and the Kinshasa government had deteriorated over the course of the year. Understandably, the DRC government sought to satisfy a domestic constituency still searching for a peace dividend from the 2006 transition. Announcing the withdrawal of the world’s largest peacekeeping mission on the country’s fiftieth anniversary of independence would send a powerful message that the DRC has made progress and that the country is marking a new beginning—a key message of national pride for an incumbent president entering the 2011 electoral-campaign cycle. However, violence and serious human rights abuses by armed groups and national security elements alike continued throughout the country, prompting a public outcry that discussions about withdrawing UN forces on an accelerated timetable were based on political considerations rather than on a realistic assessment of conditions on the ground. Given the limited capacity of Congolese armed forces to take over security responsibilities, a precipitous withdrawal of MONUC forces would create a dangerous power vacuum, especially in the east, and risk whatever progress had been made to date. The stalled national security sector reform process underscores the risks to civilians should MONUC pull out too rapidly and without achieving the objectives set by the Security Council in its mandating resolutions. This is highlighted by the FARDC’s inability to hold territory “cleared” of armed groups and by the continued human rights abuses committed by integrated FARDC units, especially in areas of the Kivus dominated by the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). After extensive diplomatic pressure, Kinshasa softened its position on the drawdown and the MONUSCO compromise was reached. A former United States ambassador to the DRC, Roger Meese, replaced Alan Doss on 1 July 2010 as head of the new stabilization mission. As of 31 July 2010, the mission’s total strength stood at 19,685 uniformed personnel, a figure

that takes into account a drawdown in mid2010 of 1,700 troops. The mission’s new, twelve-month mandate further concentrates the military force of the UN mission in three provinces in the east— North and South Kivu and Orientale—and turns over the other eight provinces to MONUSCO’s civilian components to support peace consolidation and stabilization efforts. Under the new mandate, the further withdrawal of UN troops is conditional, to be geared to conditions on the ground and to a joint assessment exercise of those conditions with the DRC authorities. Largely approached as a confidence-building exercise, the first joint assessment missions were held in July and August 2010. While some reports suggest that this process has established a good basis for improved communication with the DRC government, others have criticized the process as rushed and its methodology flawed as it lacks a mechanism to allow civil society to comment on the findings.

Political Developments

On 4 April 2010, a budding insurgency that had emerged a few months earlier in the western province of Equateur—the Enyele insurgency— swept into Mbandaka, the provincial capital of Equateur, catching Congolese authorities and UN peacekeepers alike by surprise. The insurgents were able to occupy the airport almost without resistance and killed one UN peacekeeper before the Congolese army and MONUC contingents forced them to withdraw the following day. The attack was by no means the most deadly of the insurgency, nor its largest battle: in late 2009, attacks on the sector capital of Dongo Centre had killed numerous civilians and caused massive displacement. However, the significance of an unforeseen, unopposed attack on a provincial capital outside the volatile eastern part of the country was not lost on observers, and many were left scrambling to explain the unexpected events. Born of local grievances and backed by a wide array of opposition forces both inside the

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country and in the diaspora, the Enyele insurgency was projected into an environment in Equateur ripe for unrest. Notable factors were the presence of former DPP security forces (JeanPierre Bemba’s Division de Protection Présidentielle) in Gemena and Congo-Brazzaville; the prevalence of hundreds of disgruntled, unemployed, and demobilized soldiers; and an ongoing institutional crisis in Equateur’s provincial government and sense of political exclusion under both President Laurent and President Kabila. Although the Enyele insurgency ended with its leader’s arrest in neighboring CongoBrazzaville, the factors that allowed it to metastasize on a national scale persist. Deep-seated grievances and tensions among some communities in Equateur remain unresolved, as in other provinces. These grievances include a growing frustration with political repression, combined with the absence of effective state governance and authority. In Bas-Congo Province, tensions between the popular politico-religious movement Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) and government authorities continue unabated since the so-called BDK massacres of March 2008 by state security services. In Katanga, two potential threats to stability include a possible resurgence of historic, interethnic violence and, to a lesser extent, a revival of secessionist sentiments. Endemic poverty, the competition for economic resources, and the return of displaced populations remain potential sources of conflict across much of the country. While progress has been made in some areas on the national economic front—for example, roads are being built thanks to bilateral agreements; economic growth is up; and the DRC has reached the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) completion point, wiping out millions of dollars of national debt—these other broader dynamics are likely to challenge the successful implementation of any stabilization strategy in DRC that assumes all areas but eastern DRC to be free of civil unrest. That said, the bulk of the current violence is concentrated in eastern Congo, where the

Katrina Mason/Reuters

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A Ghanaian peacekeeeper stands guard in front of the local port in the DRC’s northern Equateur province of Mbandaka, 13 April 2010.

implementation of the March 23 agreements between the government and armed groups in the Kivus remains at a standstill. New alliances of convenience between residual Congolese and foreign armed groups and between them and Congolese army officers are locked in fierce competition for control over lucrative mining interests. These intense rivalries have devastating consequences for civilian populations in the region. Attacks on civilians routinely include sexual violence, lootings, and abductions, and continue to result in one of the highest rates of displacement in Africa today. In North and South Kivu Provinces, targeted FARDC military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and their Mayi-Mayi allies are ongoing, some with the support of MONUSCO, despite limited results in neutralizing the FDLR. The FLDR and Mayi-Mayi groups continued their reprisal attacks against civilian populations, especially in mineral-rich Walikale territory between July and September 2010, when civilians were looted, killed, raped, and kidnapped. CNDP-integrated FARDC units have themselves been accused of targeting civilians

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and are considered by many humanitarian agencies as some of the worst perpetrators of sexual violence in the region. In North Kivu, the ADFNALU (an alliance between the Allied Democratic Forces and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda) has reportedly reemerged and been the target of FARDC military operations. In Orientale Province, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continues to operate between the northeast of the DRC, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan. The group routinely attacks civilians and is accused of carrying out a repeat of its December 2008 “Christmas massacres” again in December 2009, when it killed more than one hundred civilians in remote villages in Haut- and Bas-Uélé. On 13 December 2010, the mission announced that it would redeploy 900 peacekeepers to the Dungu district of Upper Uele region in preparation for potential “holiday season” attacks. Of concern also is the impact that the 2011 referendum process in Sudan might have on the LRA dynamic. Joint FARDC and Uganda People’s Defence Forces operations targeting the LRA continue, with MONUSCO logistical support. The regional threat presented by the LRA, however, and the remoteness of northern Orientale Province have severely challenged MONUSCO’s increasingly limited resources and its ability to effectively protect civilians targeted in reprisal attacks. The mission’s failure in July and August 2010 to respond to more than 300 rapes committed by FDLR and Mayi-Mayi fighters in remote villages in the Walikale region of North Kivu—a mere twelve kilometers from a nearby MONUSCO base—demonstrates that the DRC remains a challenging environment for civilian protection. While the mission acknowledged its failure to respond and has since instituted several new measures to improve communications with remote villages, budget cuts that have accompanied the shift from peacekeeping to stabilization and the anticipated loss of fourteen attack helicopters by the end of 2010 will only further complicate MONUSCO’s ability to respond to threats against civilians. Part of the challenge of any stabilization strategy in the DRC will be delinking armed

groups from the political economies and criminal networks that sustain them. The UN expert groups have been an effective tool for investigating and exposing those involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. However, follow-up has been inconsistent, and arrests have been difficult and few. With regard to the security sector reform process, the DRC authorities have expressed a preference for bilateral arrangements and have limited the role of the new UN mission to training police battalions and supporting military justice. As 2010 drew to a close, the DRC entered into a new electoral dynamic, and the 2011 election cycle is likely to provide significant challenges to MONUSCO’s stabilization efforts. The election calendar announced by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) in September 2010 calls for the first round of presidential elections together with legislative elections to be held on 27 November 2011, with a second round, if necessary, together with provincial elections, to follow on 26 February 2012. As in 2006, local elections will again be delayed, this time to the second half of 2013, if they are held at all. Local elections are significant in any effort to decentralize governance in the DRC, and they are constitutionally mandated, yet they continue to be postponed and left unfunded. The calendar itself is already raising the prospect of conflict as it leaves a gap between the end of President Kabila’s current mandate and the start of the mandate that will be given to the newly elected president. This and the delays in the handover of responsibilities from the transitional CEI to the post-transition electoral institution, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), risks creating a constitutional crisis, which already is being exploited by spoilers. Unlike in 2006, there is no international mechanism like the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) to assist the Congolese parties to negotiate a solution out of the crisis. Since the 2006 election, international policy in the DRC has been fragmented and largely bilateral.

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Also unlike 2006, the resources likely to be available for the conduct of these elections will be far more limited. The current budget for the 2011 election cycle stands at $715 million, nearly $100 million more than the record-setting cost of the 2006 DRC elections. Of that, the DRC government has pledged nearly $400 million, but it has yet to deliver, and early indications from the international community show that Congo fatigue among donors is real. That, combined with the constraints imposed on treasuries around the world by the global economic recession, means that the international community is unlikely to foot the bill for this election. The implications of these resource constraints are enormous for MONUSCO, which is committed to providing logistical and technical support for the elections. The recent repatriation of MONUSCO aircraft has already had a major impact on the mission’s air mobility and operational capacity. The significance of ensuring credible elections for peace consolidation in the DRC cannot be overstated, and it is crucial that the government of DRC and the international community signal to Congolese voters a strong commitment to democratic principles. Yet the current context of a strong but increasingly unpopular incumbent, a divided opposition, a smaller UN mission with far less capacity, and severe Congo fatigue among donors risks putting the mission in a position of ultimately signing off on a potentially flawed process. While most discussions surrounding the manner and timing of MONUSCO’s drawdown have focused on the security situation and armed conflicts, both domestic and international actors have expressed concern at an increasing trend of harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and journalists. Documented by the UN and NGO community alike, this pressure has continued unabated as the country approaches national elections in 2011. Concerns have been raised that as the UN withdraws from the western part of the country, and eventually from the country as a whole, the political space its presence provides for journalists and human rights defenders to operate will diminish.

The UN mission’s Radio Okapi is perhaps one of the most significant potential legacies of the mission. Launched in 2002 during the interCongolese dialogue in Sun City, Okapi was created to provide the Congolese public with information on the humanitarian situation and political transition. Since then, it has taken up a central role in the DRC’s media community, both by providing breaking news from remote areas to the rest of the country and by empowering independent journalists to report on sensitive issues. From its conception, Okapi was intended to outlast the UN mission. However, many questions still surround Okapi’s future: how can its continued independence and operation be ensured? Regional relations in the Great Lakes, for the most part, have improved in the past year. The DRC’s rapprochement with Rwanda has been fragile but has persisted and provided some useful avenues for regional cooperation. Relations with Angola, on the other hand, have deteriorated over an ongoing dispute to do with off-shore oil concessions. The publication in October 2010 of the UN report mapping the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC between 1993 and 2003 strained the KinshasaKigali relationship. The report’s findings that Rwanda had committed acts of genocide in the DRC during the course of the Congo wars was met with harsh criticism in Kigali and with a threat to withdraw Rwandan troops from UN peacekeeping operations. Reaction to this landmark report in Kinshasa was mixed. On the one hand, its findings and many of its recommendations were welcomed, but official reaction was muted, lest this destabilize relations with Kigali. Concerns about the impact of the mapping report on regional relations were echoed inside the UN and plagued the official release of the report.

Conclusion

The security situation in eastern DRC in particular remains of serious concern. Various coalitions of entrenched armed groups compete over

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lucrative natural resources. This situation continues to take its toll on Congolese civilians and also on UN mission personnel. Four peacekeepers and two civilian staff were lost in clashes with armed groups in 2010. Moreover, the Easter Day attack by Enyele insurgents in Mbandaka is a further reminder of the risks to stability elsewhere in the DRC where institutions of state authority are weak. The persistence of human rights abuses by FARDC elements remains one of the greatest sources of insecurity in the country, yet the enforcement of President Kabila’s zero-tolerance policy with regard to indiscipline within FARDC ranks remains limited.

While there has been no further discussion of a drawdown of blue helmets, in the environment of the DRC the planning of the mission’s stabilization strategy will be a challenge: while the volatile security context has not changed, there has been change to the enabling domestic political situation in which the mission operates. The celebration of Congo’s fiftieth anniversary of independence this year and the national elections next year provide an opportunity to begin the difficult conversation about what long-term international engagement in the DRC will look like, post-peacekeeping.

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2.3 2. Haiti

On 12 January 2010, Haiti was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in what amounted to the largest urban natural disaster in recorded history, killing more than 200,000 people and leaving 1.5 million homeless. The Haitian people suffered immensely, as did the UN. While the earthquake did not destroy the previous gains made in peace and stability in Haiti, it did damage them and left in its wake new obstacles. Nevertheless, despite the tragic losses, the Haitian people, the UN, and the international community coalesced in a remarkable demonstration of resilience. Through the combined international and national response to the mounting humanitarian catastrophe in the immediate emergency phase, large-scale crises were averted: over one and a half million Haitians received emergency shelters, and over four million, food and water. This reality was partly due to the activities of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, MINUSTAH quickly adapted to the crisis throughout the year, effectively transitioning from a mission at the beginnings of its consolidation to a multidimensional disasterrelief operation, once again acting as the primary guarantor of security and political stability. Meanwhile MINUSTAH continued its logistical, security, economic, and political support to the Haitian state and people. Nevertheless as time wore on, a growing cholera epidemic that began in October, which killed over one thousand, has highlighted the dire humanitarian situation nine months after the earthquake. Outbreaks of violence directed at MINUSTAH peacekeepers, whom many have blamed for bringing cholera into the country, only compounded tensions and uncertainty ahead of the presidential elections held on 28

November. Indeed, the cholera outbreak posed not only a public health crisis, but a threat to security and the future of the mission. With the recovery still in progress at the end of 2010, and widespread turmoil and discontent from the disputed presidential election, the continued need for MINUSTAH’s deployment could be seen clearly. Overall, the disaster served to reinforce the reality that Haitians and the international community must overcome both new and old problems facing the country with redoubled efforts and resources.

Background

In 1991, a military coup ousted the then-president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, setting in motion political, economic, and social turmoil that continues to this day. The breakdown of civilian rule was

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met with violence and insecurity, prompting a series of international interventions and peacekeeping operations. In 2000, after President Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas Party swept presidential and parliamentary elections with some 10 percent voter turnout, the opposition parties contested the results. Three years later, they were calling for his resignation and refusing to recognize his government. In February 2004, armed conflict broke out, insurgents gained control of the north of the country, and Aristide again fled. In response to this crisis, the Security Council authorized a US-led multinational interim force (MIF) to support local police, facilitate humanitarian aid, and promote the rule of law and human rights. By June 2004, the follow-on UN mission, MINUSTAH, replaced the MIF to oversee and facilitate the establishment of a transitional government, disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate all armed groups, and assist in the reform of the police and judicial sectors. MINUSTAH contended with a precarious security situation for its first few years. However, despite the insecurity bred by gangs and simmering conflict, MINUSTAH helped support elections, which saw President René Préval

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Authorization Date Start Date SRSG Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542) 1 June 2004 Edmond Mulet (Guatemala) Major-General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz (Brazil) Geraldo Chaumont (Argentina) $380.0 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 8,651 Police: 3,146 International Civilian Staff: 493 Local Civilian Staff: 1,215 UN Volunteers: 226

For detailed mission information see p. 194

(Aristide’s former prime minister) elected as Haiti’s president during 2006. As gang violence increased in and around Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, President Préval requested increased MINUSTAH support to tackle the growing threat. Joint MINUSTAH and Haitian National Police (HNP) operations in the slums, the gangs’ strongholds, eliminated much of the gang leadership and by mid-2007 had brought some stability to the country. This allowed MINUSTAH to transition from purely security operations to assisting Haitian authorities build their security and justice capacity. In early 2008, the Secretary-General proposed a consolidation plan for the mission, whose ultimate goal was MINUSTAH’s eventual drawdown. The five-point benchmarks he proposed were the resolution of political differences through nonviolent means and completion of elections; extension of state authority; establishment of reliable security structures; development of credible judicial and penal institutions; and improvement in socioeconomic conditions. Progress in meeting the benchmarks was plagued by the combined effects of three devastating hurricanes during 2008, a steep rise in food prices and the global financial crises, and a political stalemate. Nevertheless, there were signs for progress in 2009. The UN SecretaryGeneral appointed former US president Bill Clinton as his special envoy to Haiti after $350 million in aid was pledged for Haiti’s economic recovery. The security situation also improved considerably, with a decrease in gang violence and kidnappings. Thus while slow institutional development and high levels of poverty continued to be obstacles to MINUSTAH’s efforts at the end of 2009, there was reason for cautious optimism about continued progress at the start of 2010.

Key Developments The Earthquake

On 12 January 2010, the 7.0 magnitude earthquake wreaked unimaginable destruction on the Haitian state and its people: 222,570 people

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were killed; many thousands more were injured or disabled; and some 1.5 million were left homeless. The earthquake caused an estimated $7.8 billion in damage. MINUSTAH also suffered tremendously: 102 personnel were killed, including the Special Representative, Hédie Annabi, his principal deputy, and the acting UN police commissioner. For the UN, it was a tragic event: the organization suffered the highest number of casualities ever in a single incident. The earthquake greatly diminished the already weak capacity of the Haitian state. Nearly one-third of the country’s civil servants died and many government buildings were leveled or heavily damaged. The main provider of security, the HNP, also suffered heavy losses with seventy-seven officers killed and hundreds injured. One-half of Haiti’s 8,535 prisoners, many of whom were held for gang-related activities, escaped. On 19 January, UN Security Council Resolution 1908 authorized 1,500 additional police and 2,000 military personnel for MINUSTAH. A month later, some 1,500 troops and nearly 500 police had been pledged with additional commitments continually coming in. Some 300 volunteer staff from UN headquarters and other peacekeeping missions were temporarily redeployed to Haiti in the immediate postearthquake period. A battalion from Brazil, engineering companies from Japan and the Republic of Korea, military police from Guatemala, and infantry from Argentina and Peru arrived in the months following the earthquake to supplement MINUSTAH’s capacity. In the days following the catastrophe, UN agencies and programs, MINUSTAH, member states, Haitians, including the HNP, and NGOs began search-and-rescue operations and provided life-saving emergency and humanitarian assistance. Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping (and former SRSG in Haiti), was officially appointed on 26 March 2010 to Haiti to serve as the acting Special Representative and head of MINUSTAH. In the largest humanitarian operation in response to a natural disaster, the US deployed more than 20,000 personnel to Haiti as a part of

UN Photo/Sophia Paris

HAITI • 35

Argentinean peacekeepers with MINUSTAH carry containers of water into the town of Grande Saline, in Haiti’s Artibonite region, 28 October 2010.

Operation Unified Response, which provided critical logistical support and supplies. The Joint Task Force–Haiti (JTF-H) was then established by the Americans as a part of the operation to exercise command and control of the disaster-relief efforts, which forty-three countries participated in. American troops in the JTF-H assisted in reopening both the Port-au-Prince airport (the day after the earthquake) and the seaport (22 January). By 24 January, MINUSTAH and the Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) had established a joint operations and tasking center with liaison officers from the United States, Canada, the EU, and the Caribbean Community to act as the focal point for tactical planning of the relief operations. By early March, as troop contributions increased, MINUSTAH’s military component and the mission took on an increasing role in the security and humanitarian efforts. Bilateral military operations began reducing their presence. At a 31 March Conference on Haiti, donor governments pledged $5.3 billion over the following two years and a total of $10 billion over the following ten years in support of President Préval’s Action Plan for the Reconstruction and

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Development of Haiti. The plan is based on the idea of “building back better” by decentralizing economic development outside of the capital and forging a more resilient state. A new Interim Recovery Commission was set up to oversee and manage the recovery and reconstruction process. Co-chaired by Clinton and prime minister Bellerive, it is in charge of reviewing and approving projects and monitoring progress. Reassessing MINUSTAH

Before 12 January, Haiti’s prospects appeared promising: legislative, presidential, and municipal elections were scheduled for 2010; crime, gang activities, and kidnappings had been brought under better control; and international attention was on Haiti, with hundreds of millions of dollars pledged for development. Meanwhile, MINUSTAH was preparing for a drawdown based on the Secretary-General’s five benchmarks laid out in 2008. While there were setbacks in 2009, the mission expected to make achievable progress toward those benchmarks and enter a period of consolidation. The earthquake altered all of this. In the immediate emergency phase, searchand-rescue, relief operations, and humanitarian assistance were paramount. MINUSTAH and the HNP acted as first responders, providing critical and life-saving support to those most affected by the disaster. While there were initial fears of widespread looting and crime following the breakdown of the fledgling state capacity to provide order, the HNP maintained patrols, in partnership with MINUSTAH, around key areas such as warehouses and banks, to ensure stability. A joint HNP and MINUSTAH presence in two of the largest camps in Portau-Prince, at the Pétion-Ville club and in Cité Soleil, provided a visible show of force deterring potential criminal and violent acts. Despite suffering immense losses themselves, HNP officers continued to work in the hours and days after the earthquake. At just over 8,000 active officers on the eve of the earthquake, more than 90 percent of officers were back on duty by the end of February, demonstrating their resilience, professionalism, and

the progress that has been made in police reform. Because of the scale of the disaster, it was clear that there needed to be a reorientation of MINUSTAH’s strategic planning. To this end, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Edmund Mulet, has been tasked by the Secretary-General to lead a field-based integrated planning process with the UN country team for the first stage. The results and recommendations of the review, endorsed by the UN Haiti Integrated Strategic Planning Group, laid out an integrated approach in five key areas and a surge for MINUSTAH. Specifically, it proposed an integrated approach that focused on fostering political stability, through constitutional reform, elections, and democratic governance; coordinating and enabling the postearthquake disaster-relief effort; maintaining a secure and stable environment, while strengthening the rule of law, human rights and protection, and Haiti’s police, judicial, and corrections institutions; supporting the government in implementing its vision of strengthened state capacity and decentralization; and helping Haiti build social capital through a balanced social agenda. The review also recommended a “surge effort” for the coming eighteen months to two years, requiring an increase in activities within MINUSTAH’s current mandate and providing more logistical, technical, and operational assistance to the Haitian government and authorities. The Security Council authorized an additional 680 police to augment the UN police force and continue the training of the HNP. The Council did not, however, alter the authorized strength of MINUSTAH’s military component (having previously authorized an additional 2,000 military personnel).1 The additional police reached full deployment ahead of the 28 November presidential and legislative elections. In September, the Secretary-General said that the November elections, the formation of a new government in early 2011, and an assessment of the security situation will be the considerations that will determine future deployment of the additional “surge” personnel in

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MINUSTAH. It remains unclear whether or not MINUSTAH can return to its preearthquake planned consolidation phase. In the second stage, the process of designing the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) according to the revised Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) guidelines commenced and was finalized in December 2010. The ISF also serves as the UN country team’s interim UNDAF and must therefore be endorsed by the government of Haiti. Activities of MINUSTAH Military and Police Components

In the days and months following the earthquake, MINUSTAH conducted search-and-rescue efforts, provided security escorts for humanitarian operations, and engaged in clearing debris from roads to enable humanitarian access. Since the mission headquarters was badly damaged, the MINUSTAH logistics base in Port-au-Prince became a temporary operations center for UN and many non-UN actors participating in emergency relief activities. The military component of the mission supported the World Food Program (WFP) food distribution in both mobile and static sites, enabling the WFP to reach nearly 600,000 people with more than 16 million meals within little more than two weeks of the earthquake. Engineering units engaged in clearing access to roads and clearing debris from government buildings and canals and helping rebuild the national penitentiary and the National Police Academy. In early August, a Japanese engineering company repaired the Ouanaminthe Bridge between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The 1.3 million displaced persons residing in crowded camps because of the earthquake resulted in increased incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). To address this, MINUSTAH trained its troops, UNPOL, and HNP officers on how to prevent and respond to and record SGBV in the camps, setting up a referral system and a dedicated reporting mechanism and data collection. In response to increasing reports of rape in the camps, a 200-strong team of UNPOL was created in September 2010 with a presence in six of the highest risk camps

and daily patrols in seventy other camps. This campaign was in addition to the Internally Displaced Person Camp Unit, composed of nearly 470 officers and a gender unit of six UNPOL female officers. MINUSTAH also continued its community violence–reduction program. Eight months after the earthquake, the program had more than one hundred projects totaling $14 million to address those most in need. The program also employed 44,000 Haitian workers to rebuild and repair damaged infrastructure, including dams, canals, the Jacmel prison, and the national penitentiary. In preparation for the rainy season and future hurricanes, MINUSTAH rehabilitated more than sixty drainage canals and fifteen watershed areas at risk of flooding. In October, nine months after the earthquake, cholera began spreading along the Artibonite River. In response, MINUSTAH assisted humanitarian agencies and the Haitian government to contain the disease to prevent its spread from reaching IDP camps and major cities. This included helping the National Directorate of Water Supply and Sanitation (DINEPA) to distribute more than 800 kilograms of chlorine powder to piped water distribution points near the heaviest infected areas near the Artibonite River; increasing the number of cholera treatment centers; training authorities to manage, transport, and bury bodies safely; and distributing water purification tabs and soap. However, because cholera had not been present in Haiti for many decades, anger quickly spread toward MINUSTAH peacekeepers after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that the specific strain of cholera in Haiti was South Asian. A base near the Meille River, a tributary to the Artibonite River, which houses Nepalese peacekeepers for the mission, was blamed by many for bringing the disease to Haiti. The UN-collected samples from the base have tested negative for the disease. Often viewed negatively by the population and used as a scapegoat for the political elite, MINUSTAH is no stranger to outbreaks of discontent at their presence. However, in this case, the tensions reached a fevered pitch. On 15

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November MINUSTAH troops returned fire on a group of Haitian demonstrators during a series of chaotic and violent protests in Cap-Haitien and Hinche. One armed protester was shot dead in self-defense by a MINUSTAH peacekeeper and another died from gunshot wounds. In total, six peacekeepers were injured in what the UN described as “politically motivated” violence. The protest erupted as the cholera death toll and infection rate increased and public frustration mounted. By 19 November, the disease had reached the national prison in Port-auPrince and protests against the UN became commonplace countrywide. No matter the disease’s origins, the public sentiment and violence against the UN was enough to hamper international efforts to fight the spreading epidemic. By 17 November MINUSTAH canceled flights carrying medical supplies and soap to Cap-Haitien and Port-dePaix, and Oxfam and the World Health Organization (WHO) halted water chlorination projects. On 8 December, a report by a French epidemiologist conducted on behalf of the French and Haitian governments said that human waste dumped in Meille River at a UN peacekeepers’ base was most likely the source of the disease. On 15 December, the UN announced that it would set up an independent commission to examine the cause of the outbreak. By 21 December, more than 120,000 had been affected by cholera, which has spread to all of Haiti’s ten provinces; more than 2,500 people have died. Elections

As Special Representative Edmund Mulet said to the Security Council on 13 September 2010, the path to stability in Haiti is adherence to the timetable for elections and the constitutional transfer of power to a new government in February 2011. In the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections, MINUSTAH provided essential security, technical, and logistical support. To help cover the costs of the elections, the Haitian government, the Provisional Electoral Council, UNDP, and MINUSTAH agreed on a project document with a budget of $28.9

million USD. MINUSTAH also undertook a comprehensive inspection of 1,483 voting centers around the country and determined new locations for centers that had been badly damaged or destroyed because of the earthquake. The HNP and MINUSTAH also began conducting security assessments in preparation for national and regional security plans for the elections. These preparations, which began in mid-June, handled protection for election officials, materials, and polling centers. On 28 November, presidential elections were held. The OAS and the UN hailed the polls as valid, despite “irregularities.” Nevertheless, twelve of the eighteen presidential candidates called for the vote to be canceled. Tensions soon mounted and protesters took to the streets demanding annulment of the elections. On 7 December, preliminary results announced that the governing party’s favorite, Jude Celestin, would be in a runoff with former first lady Mirlande Manigat. Michel Martelly, a popular musician who came in third, was excluded from the runoff prompting violent protests from his supporters. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) expected to release the final results on 20 December, but it was delayed indefinitely. The OAS sent an experts mission to help authorities verify the results. Security, Justice, and the Rule of Law

Although widespread disorder and chaos did not ensue following the earthquake and the situation remained relatively calm until the oubreaks of violence surrounding the cholera epidemic, establishing rule of law and effective and accountable judicial and security sectors remained a priority. The earthquake caused an increase in crime and sexual and gender-based violence in IDP camps and cross-border narcotics trafficking. With the weakening of state authority, cocaine shipment also dramatically increased. MINUSTAH continued security and justice sector reform, although the immediate period after the earthquake witnessed a shift in emphasis away from longer-term reform and toward immediate security needs. A key challenge is to restore progress to the goal of achieving a

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14,000-strong HNP force by 2011, especially since police buildings and essential records, including copies of the vetting files, were destroyed in the earthquake. In July, the tribunal of Port-au-Prince resumed hearings in temporary buildings. MINUSTAH, in partnership with other organizations, assisted the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to establish three legal-aid offices targeted toward the poor and vulnerable in the IDP camps. There are now more than a dozen offices in operation throughout the country. Corrections reform was also deeply affected by the earthquake. Prison administration was rendered next to impossible after the loss of infrastructure, files, and registries. Nevertheless, the MINUSTAH Corrections Unit continued training hundreds of new Haitian corrections officers. In October, a prison riot at the national penitentiary was ended only after a forceful UN police intervention. Achieving progress on the establishment of rule of law will likely continue to plague Haiti’s long-term recovery effort—as it did before the earthquake. The issues of resettlement of IDPs, land titles, and economic recovery are all related to achieving clear, uniformly applied laws that are respected by the population. In particular, resettlement will remain an obstacle

Note 1. S/RES/1908 (19 January 2010).

to progress on other fronts. Even before the earthquake only around 5 percent of Haiti’s land was officially recorded. Now, with the loss of land titles, property owners, and more than a million homeless, the problem is even more acute. The uncertainty prevents progress in not only long-term areas such as encouraging foreign investment and achieving economic development, but also short-term areas such as deciding on responsibility for rubble removal and determining designated dumping sites.

Conclusion

MINUSTAH was confronted with a drastically changed operational environment at the start of 2010 and will similarly enter 2011 with an entirely different scenario. MINUSTAH, and the UN broadly speaking, exhibited a significant level of flexibility in transitioning to face a changed paradigm in the aftermath of the January earthquake. As Haiti continues in its recovery and reconstruction amid political uncertainty and a ravaging cholera epidemic, a similar operational fluidity on the part of MINUSTAH and its international partners will be crucial to getting back onto the track disrupted by natural disaster.

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2.4 Liberia

At the end of 2010, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in its seventh year of operation, continued to play a critical role in Liberia’s postconflict recovery. With presidential and legislative elections slated for 2011 and with UNMIL’s expected further drawdown and withdrawal after the installation of the next government, all eyes are on Liberian state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, which are still unprepared to assume full responsibility for provision of law and order. A central challenge for UNMIL in providing security and training during 2010 was to avoid overshadowing the capacity of the government of Liberia (GoL) and not substituting for it. While the mission does not have an executive mandate, the challenge is to balance increased training and support to national institutions while simultaneously reducing operational dependency.

With both domestic and regional threats abounding, including ethnic and communal tensions, high unemployment, criminality, drug and human trafficking, corruption, and political violence in neighboring countries, there was uncertainty about the GoL’s ability to autonomously manage these myriad threats. Bearing these factors in mind, the Security Council renewed UNMIL’s mandate in September 2010 for an additional twelve months and authorized it to provide support for the elections in 2011. Nevertheless, international pressure to drawdown UNMIL’s significant military and police components continued to mount throughout the year, heightening pressure to develop national Liberian capacity.

Background

From bases in Côte d’Ivoire, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and its leader, Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia in 1989, sparking a civil war that in its first eight years claimed more than150,000—mostly civilian—lives, injured thousands more, and displaced nearly a million people. After the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) helped broker a peace agreement in 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to assist the ECOWAS Military Observer Group, ECOMOG, implement the terms of the peace. In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected president, formed a government, and UNOMIL withdrew. Five months later, in November 1997, the UN launched the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL), the first of its kind. However, the civil war resumed after the lingering problems of political exclusion, national reconciliation, and an ill-prepared security sector went unaddressed.

UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

19 September 2003 (UNSC Res. 1509) Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) Major-General Muhammad Khalid (Pakistan) Gautam Sawang (India) $524.1 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 7,931 Military Observers: 134 Police: 1,304 International Civilian Staff: 432 Local Civilian Staff: 984 UN Volunteers: 225

For detailed mission information see p. 258

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In August 2003, the brutal, fourteen-year conflict was finally brought to an end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana. The civil war killed an estimated 250,000 people, displaced one-third of the population, and left the country in ruins physically, institutionally, and economically. On 18 August 2003, peace talks between the Taylor government and the two rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to the agreement by President Taylor to go into exile in Nigeria. The CPA provided for the establishment of a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) until the election of a new government at the end of 2005. The CPA also requested the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping force to Liberia under Chapter VII of the Charter to support the NTGL and assist in the implementation of the peace agreement. By its Resolution 1509 (2003), the Security Council established UNMIL with an authorized strength of 15,000 troops, including 3,500 re-hatted ECOWAS troops, and 1,115 police personnel. UNMIL has a multidimensional mandate that authorizes it to provide security, while assisting in laying the foundations for a lasting peace. UNMIL is mandated to support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement; develop and implement a DDR program; protect UN personnel as well as civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; facilitate humanitarian assistance; support security sector reform, in particular police reform; assist in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country; and assist in national elections, which were held in 2005 and placed President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in office. With the withdrawal of UNAMSIL in neighboring Sierra Leone, UNMIL was given the additional task of securing the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Freetown, since 2005. Also, since September 2009, the mission had an additional mandated task of supporting the 2011 national elections. In his report on UNMIL (S/2007/479) of 8 August 2007, the Secretary-General recommended a three-stage drawdown of UNMIL’s

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military component. By Resolution 1777 (2007) of 20 September 2007, the Security Council approved the first stage of the Secretary-General’s recommendation, which led to the repatriation of some 2,450 troops from October 2007 to October 2008, leaving the troop level at 11,691. By its Resolution 1836 (2008) of 29 September 2008, the Security Council authorized the second stage of the drawdown, including a reduction of the mission’s military component by 1,460 troops between September 2008 and March 2009, leaving UNMIL’s troop strength at 10,231; streamlining UNMIL’s military sectors from four to two; maintaining the strength of the police advisers; and increasing the number of formed police units from five to seven. The Security Council approved the third stage of UNMIL’s drawdown by its Resolution 1885 (2009) of 15 September 2009, which involved the repatriation of 2,029 troops, three attack helicopters, and 72 armoured personnel carriers by May 2010, leaving 7,952 troops in Liberia. In February 2010, UNMIL reduced its 250strong military guard force deployed at the Special Court for Sierra Leone by 100 personnel, and will retain 150 troops until the Special Court completes its work. UNMIL’s strength at the end of its drawdown phase in May 2010 is

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8,101 military and 1,375 police personnel. No further drawdown is envisaged until after the installation of the next government in January 2012. Further, significant progress was made in 2009: the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Program (DDRR) was closed, reporting more than 101,000 disarmed and demobilized and 90,000 assisted; US contractors implementing the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) handed over responsibility to Liberia’s Ministry of Defense; and the final report of the 2003 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was released.

Key Developments Political Situation

Activities in preparation for the 2011 presidential and legislative elections dominated political developments in 2010. There was intense debate over reapportionment of electoral districts that deadlocked passage of the so-called Threshold Bill in the legislature. The bill, which was twice vetoed by President Johnson Sirleaf, would have given the National Elections Commission (NEC) the ability to redraw electoral districts according to the 2008 census. Instead, a compromise bill was passed that retains the sixty-four districts from the 2005 elections and grants nine new legislative seats to more populated counties. The elections are presently scheduled for 11 October 2011, but could be held the first week of November if a referendum planned for August 2011 seeking to amend election-related aspects of the constitution passes. Managing election-related disputes and peacefully resolving political tensions were and will continue to be a top priority. Underscoring the importance of this, many recalled that disputed elections results have led to widespread violence in the past, as in 1985 and 1997. Unlike the elections held in 2005 (which were implemented with enormous UNMIL and other key UN and international partner support) the 2011 elections are being planned with the view to exploit all national capabilities first before relying on UNMIL. The burden will be

on the government to demonstrate its capacity to hold elections on its own. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) released its final report in June 2009, the GoL has not yet implemented the recommendations as a part of overall national reconciliation. President Sirleaf has requested the Ministry of Justice and the Law Reform Commission to analyze the report for its legal implications, but no formal structures have been established. The Independent National Commission on Human Rights, which according to the TRC Act has a role in ensuring that the TRC’s recommendations are implemented, was established, but is not yet operational. In 2010, Liberia arrived at an important milestone not only for its overall economic health but its viability as a state: it reached the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), prompting a cancellation of $4.6 billion in external debt. This achievement will open up opportunities for the GoL to access international credit and seek investment for development. Anticorruption efforts continued, despite the acrimonious debates surrounding the General Audit Commission’s ministerial audits. While certain ministries were audited in order to reach HIPC completion, some ministers leveled criticisms at the Commission. With lackluster public and ministry support, the overall anticorruption effort was tarnished. Unemployment remained a key obstacle to sustained economic recovery and stability. A related concern is incomplete reintegration of former combatants who do not have sustainable livelihoods. Finding employment for these groups and the burgeoning youth population will remain vital for securing the fragile stability. Security Situation

As in previous years, 2010 was characterized by a relatively stable security situation, despite some flare-ups of violence among extant ethnic and communal tensions and criminal activity. In Nimba County, in the northeastern part of the country ethnic conflicts over land remained common. In Lofa County, widespread violence erupted between the Mandingo and Lorma

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communities in February 2010, killing four and wounding many more. Buildings were destroyed, including mosques and churches, and more than fifty prisoners escaped from the local prison. UNMIL peacekeepers supported Liberian police, including the armed Emergency Response Unit, to quell the violence, underscoring the inability of the GoL security sector to independently respond to domestic threats to stability. Clashes also erupted in Maryland County in the southeastern tip of Liberia, demonstrating that potential for violent contestation remains throughout the country. UNMIL continued to closely monitor the situations in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire due to their potential to impact regional instability and undermine the fragile gains in peace and stability in Liberia. Some 2,000 Liberian former combatants in Côte d’Ivoire are associated Ivoirian militias. However, a joint UNMIL, UNOCI, and UNDP field mission in June concluded that they did not pose an immediate threat to Liberia’s stability. Rape and armed robbery continued to pose a significant security threat to the civilian population of Liberia, as did increases in both drug and human trafficking. Liberia’s weak security institutions and porous borders left the country vulnerable to exploitation by transnational criminal networks. Furthermore, GoL’s weak lawenforcement capabilities and inadequate legislation meant that crimes are often committed with impunity. To fill these gaps, UNMIL continued to engage in joint border operations with Guinea, Sierra Leone, and ONUCI. However, building the capacity of the government to mitigate these threats remained the top priority. A welcomed move in this regard was the February 2010 GoL signing of the Freetown Commitment of the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). The commitment endorsed the practical implementation of WACI’s mandate for cooperative crimefighting among West African states alongside the UN and other international partners. Security and Justice Reform

Strengthening Liberia’s security and justice sectors continued to rank primarily as an operational focus for UNMIL throughout 2010.

Enormous obstacles remain. The problems of poor infrastructure, shortages of qualified personnel, and financial gaps continue to hamper the development of a credible justice sector, while predatory police services and lax oversight mechanisms prevented the consolidation of an accountable, just, and professional security sector. With an average salary of around US$80 per month, a culture of professionalism has failed to take root among Liberian National Police (LNP) officers, who remain prone to extortion and bribes, especially at checkpoints. To address police misconduct, UNMIL began in April 2010 preparation for a database to record incidents of LNP abuse, and the minister of justice signed the Professional Standards Division Policy and Procedure to increase accountability. Public-relations campaigns and community-policing training programs, supported by UNMIL, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and UNDP, assisted during the year in improving the public’s confidence in the LNP. One reason cited for the LNP’s dismal support among the population is that its ranks were not subjected to the same robust vetting and training as that of the AFL, carried out by two US private security companies: DynCorp and Pacific Architects Engineers (PAE). Many Liberians are still afraid to report crimes out of fear that they will face reprisals without the guarantee of LNP protection. With this reality in mind, UNMIL’s main focus in 2010, despite budget constraints, was increasing the strength and readiness of the LNP for the 2011 elections. The Emergency Response Unit (ERU), an armed corps of officers whose role is vital in reacting to armed robbery, violence, and other crimes, reached a strength of 344 in 2010. The focus, however, was to prioritize growing the Police Support Unit from its current 150 officers to 600 by June 2011, ahead of the elections. Unlike the bulk of the LNP, these officers would be armed. Training these additional units and maintaining the current ones will require more funding and UNMIL support than currently exists. Supplying barracks, infrastructure, vehicles, and specialized equipment to the new forces will remain a challenge. The ERU struggled to maintain an operational fleet in 2010.

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Box 2.4 Women, Peace, and Security: A Decade of Resolution 1325

In light of the tenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the UN began to review the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace operations in an effort to accelerate progress and assess the challenges still facing robust implementation.The landmark resolution called for the integration of women into the peace and security processes and has since been complemented with three additional resolutions—1820, 1888, and 1889—in order to better support women in every stage of the peace process and ensure their security. This past year saw a series of events meant to commemorate the anniversary, including Global Open Days organized by DPKO, UNIFEM, UNDP, and DPA. These meetings helped bring together women’s organizations with UN officials to engage in dialogues about pressing issues for women and their priorities for peace. More than 1,500 women from countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Croatia, and Sri Lanka were able to meet with Special Representatives of the SecretaryGeneral to discuss problems with sexual and gender-based violence, the need for better monitoring and evaluation, and access to timely information. In addition, the Open Days brought attention to the effort to increase women’s inclusion in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding phases. The Secretary-General issued a report in September on the initiative as well, outlining seven commitments meant to ensure that women’s priorities are addressed,

including the provision of security, adequate financing, and a systematic inclusion of women in each stage of the process. The report further urged member states to act with consistency and coherence in implementation, but acknowledged the difficulties ahead in attaining the resources and the security necessary to enable significant action. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also pledged that the UN would lead by example in implementing Resolution 1325, citing the growing number of women in decisionmaking positions such as Special Representatives and Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as proof of its successful advances. Other areas seem promising as well, including the effort to increase the number of women serving as UN police personnel in peace operations. Bangladesh and India have each deployed all-female police forces, and the UN is gradually moving toward their target of having women comprise 20 percent of the force. Progress, however, has been uneven and inconsistent at times. August’s mass rapes in the Congo highlighted some of the gaps that still threaten women’s security, while the Open Days dialogue revealed the dearth of financial resources, especially those that focus on the education and economic development of women. Furthermore, the increase in the incorporation of gender issues into peace agreements is contrasted by the fact that less than a quarter of these agreements contain specific provisions.

In an effort to meld the formal and customary justice mechanisms, a national conference supported by UNMIL was held in April on enhancing access to justice, with a focus on ending harmful practices in the customary system and ending corruption in the formal system. Similarly, UNMIL backed the Ministry of

The Security Council’s Open Debate in October additionally highlighted some of the issues stunting full implementation. Michelle Bachelet, making her first appearance as executive director of the newly formed UN Women, commended the preparation the UN has done, but urged a shift from policy to action. Despite the call for tangible commitments from member states during the debate, the majority opted out, choosing only to reaffirm their commitment and intentions to support Resolution 1325 instead of guaranteeing any measurable action. The event did lead to the adoption of twenty-six indicators meant to track future progress in order to help fill in the data gaps that have made assessment difficult so far. Looking to build on the momentum of the anniversary and create a plan for moving forward into the next decade, the Security Council agreed to hold a high-level review in 2015 to renew commitment to Resolution 1325, assess the progress on all levels, and address continuing obstacles. It also signaled its intention to integrate the indicators put forth by the Secretary-General to monitor implementation, and called for annual reporting and a strategic framework to further guide the UN forward. Some women’s organizations, for their part, are hoping the decade to come will be one of strong action and measurable progress in order to create the change that is needed.

Justice’s efforts to address the backlogs in the justice system and harmonize the relationship between the police and prosecutors. To address the high number of reported rape cases and reports of human trafficking, a joint GoL and UN program on sexual and gender-based violence delivered training to security personnel at

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borders to prevent and respond to this type of violence. Corrections facilities continued to be plagued by inadequate funding, low staffing levels, and poor infrastructure. As a result, jailbreaks continued to occur, as the incident in Lofa County in February 2010 demonstrated. Without adequate recourse to justice, disputes continue to be settled through violence and vigilantism, with potential to spread to mobs. UNMIL began enhanced training and mentoring in line with the government’s national defense strategy that aims for independent operability of the AFL by 2012. Sixty-one US military personnel currently serve as defense sector reform mentors for the AFL. They provide training in infantry tactics, operational planning, engineering, logistics, military justice, administration, medical services, and communications. The United States continued to control the AFL’s weapons and ammunition, although preparations are under way for the army to eventually take responsibility for their own armaments. Lack of Liberian leadership by top military officers remained problematic in 2010. Seconded officers from ECOWAS member states remained in leadership positions in the AFL. With a few incidents of AFL misconduct and violence against civilians occurring in 2010, the AFL has much to accomplish before it can earn the population’s trust and regain full responsibility. Preparations for UNMIL Drawdown

On 8 October 2010, the UN Country Team, UNMIL, and other actors endorsed “Delivering as One”—the concept that aims to enhance the UN system’s delivery of assistance to Liberia. It is believed that this move will facilitate UNMIL’s transition, better coordinate aid activities, and enhance GoL ownership. On 16 October 2010 following a request from the GoL, the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) formally adopted Liberia to the PBC’s agenda, making it the fifth country added and the first with peacekeeping troops on the ground. Jordan’s ambassador, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, was elected as chair of the country-specific configuration.

UN Photo/Staton R. Winter

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Members of the Nigerian contingent of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) stand at attention during a ceremony marking the International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers in Monrovia, Liberia, 28 May 2010.

Moving forward, the priority is the development of a strategic agenda for peacebuilding in the country, one that ideally will follow after UNMIL’s withdrawal. To this end, the GoL has emphasized to the commission that rule of law, security sector reform, and national reconciliation are top priorities. In July, following discussions about the upcoming UNMIL transition held in Monrovia, facilitated by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, the National Security Council formally announced the creation of a joint transition planning working group, with both UN and GoL representatives. The working group began a situational assessment of the GoL’s capacities and gaps, with a particular focus on the security sector. The assessment, which includes a comprehensive threat analysis, will ultimately provide for optimal prioritization of activities to strengthen the GoL’s security institutions. In preparation for these assessments, UNMIL, in early 2010, submitted a list of tasks it performs to the GoL. In preparation for UNMIL’s phased withdrawal, addressing the lack of an over-the-horizon force will remain problematic. In Sierra Leone,

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for instance, the UK and UNMIL acted as guarantors of security as UNAMSIL withdrew, and Australia similarly provided this role in TimorLeste as UNTAET left that country. Furthermore, beyond the potential for a relapse into conflict, UNMIL’s presence has been cited as a factor for foreign companies’ investment in the Liberia. Encouraging investment—a fundamental component of Liberia’s long-term economic sustainability—will be difficult without security guarantees. Managing public expectations has also been recognized as a critical part of the transition planning. There have been discussions about the need to pursue a robust public-information campaign to secure the Liberian public’s support for Liberian security institutions in the wake of UNMIL’s security cover. The UN must not appear to be abandoning Liberians. Managing all of the related impacts of UNMIL’s departure will require concerted action, but the real test rests on the ability of Liberian state institutions to provide security and rule of law.

Conclusion

Liberia will remain fragile unless the country’s security and justice institutions can provide for

the population and deliver on their responsibilities. Peace and stability in the country are currently being sustained through the security guarantee and services provided by UNMIL. The 2011 elections processes will provide a significant political test of the progress made in Liberia. Much work remained to be done, including preparing for the technical and logistical challenges involved in conducting the elections and the institutional and security challenges that a contentious vote could unleash. Indeed, there are uncertainties about the government of Liberia’s capacity to manage the political and social tensions that the elections may bring about. Seven years since its initial deployment, UNMIL ranks among the larger peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN, representing a significant draw on resources. During 2010 this elicited pressure from the international community for UNMIL to complete its withdrawal and transition to a much lighter presence by 2012, despite slow development of Liberian security and judicial institutions. Registering major progress in these areas will be a main operational focus in the coming year and will be the cornerstone to a stable Liberia following UNMIL’s exit.

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2.5 Sudan

Sudan dominated the discourse surrounding global peace operations during 2010 and will continue to do so in 2011. Host to two peacekeeping operations—onethird of the UN’s total deployment—Sudan will undergo a dramatic transformation during the coming year as the implementation period laid out in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) comes to a close with referenda on the South’s independence and the status of the oil-rich Abyei region. The referendum on the South will be open to votes from those who can prove they are from the South or can prove familial linkages there, including southerners living in the North and abroad. The planned vote on Abyei’s status stalled at the end of 2010, as disagreements on voter eligibility prevented the poll from being held. Whether in January 2011 the South votes for independence or unity with the North, the CPA’s subsequent expiry holds major implications not only for the people of Sudan itself but also for the UN peacekeeping operations there and for the international community more broadly. The stakes are undeniably high for Sudan in the coming year, and a complex and coordinated effort will be needed to ensure that the country does not return to war. This reality and the potential for heightened instability in an already volatile Central Africa region elicited a tremendous amount of operational activity during 2010. Following contested general and local elections in April, preparing for the referenda and their potential outcomes became the main focus for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the range of

bilateral and civil society actors engaged in the country. Despite these efforts, preparations for the South Sudan referendum were severely delayed at the end of 2010, and lack of agreement on the modalities of the Abyei referendum left the vote on its status postponed. Acrimony between the North and South remained high, with clashes between the two sides’ armed forces and both North and South amassing military resources along border flashpoints during the last quarter of the year. With attention focused on the North-South situation, the conflict in the Darfur region deteriorated significantly during the year. Darfur remained under a state of emergency throughout 2010, with conflict raging between the Khartoum government and rebels and between rebel groups themselves. The joint UN-AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID), reached full strength during 2010, but its impact on the conflict and ability to protect civilian populations remained extremely limited. Persistent obstruction by both the Khartoum government and rebel groups largely prevented the mission from executing its mandated task. UNAMID itself continued to be the object of attacks and banditry. It is certain that Sudan will be transformed during 2011. Considering the low capacity of the government of South Sudan’s institutions and the situation in Darfur, the need for continued deployment of peace operations in Sudan can clearly be seen. Transitioning to confrontation with the potentially volatile post-CPA operational context and navigating tense political terrain will be central challenges. 47

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HQ

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Ed Damazin

UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590) Haile Menkerios (South Africa) Major-General Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria) Rajesh Dewan (India) $938.0 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011 Troops: 9,451 Military Observers: 486 Police: 655 International Civilian Staff: 897 Local Civilian Staff: 2,821 UN Volunteers: 422

For detailed mission information see p. 268

Background

The Security Council first authorized the creation of a UN Advance Mission in Sudan

(UNAMIS) in Resolution 1547 on 11 July 2004, charging it with laying the groundwork for the UN’s role in supporting the CPA that ended the decades-long conflict between government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movememt (SPLA/SPLM). The CPA is a timebound document, and the implementation period is scheduled to end in July 2011, following the referenda on independence and the Abyei region’s status. On 24 March 2005, Resolution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS into UNMIS, a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered on helping implement the CPA. Its responsibilities include the monitoring and verification of troop redeployments, assisting with the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) to help secure contested regions, promoting the rule of law (including combating impunity), supporting preparations for elections and referenda, and investigating CPA violations. UNMIS’s mandate also specifically includes coordinating humanitarian assistance, protecting and promoting human rights, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if necessary. Persistent intercommunal violence in South Sudan over the course of the past five years has led to an increasingly negative perception of UNMIS because it appeared to be failing to deliver on its protection-of-civilians mandate. While UNMIS has a significant military element, it was primarily designed to oversee the disengagement of the parties to the conflict and their redeployment to the respective sides of the border in implementation of the CPA, not particularly to protect civilians from sudden outbreaks of non-CPA-related violence. The mission is thus deployed to bases at the sector levels developed by UNMIS, rather than at the state level where proximity to civilian populations would be increased. Further, the SPLA and the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) maintain the primary responsibility for protecting civilians. As the CPA implementation period has progressed, UNMIS has increasingly assisted the signatories in their roles. In this vein, during 2009 and 2010, at the request of the

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CPA signatories, UNMIS’s role has expanded to supporting the parties as they approach the critical CPA milestones.

North-South Developments, 2010 Presidential and General Elections

Preparations for Sudan’s first multiparty elections in more than two decades consumed Sudanese politics and UNMIS activities during the first quarter of 2010. In advance of the elections and at the request of the National Elections Commission (NEC), UNMIS advised and provided technical support in drafting operational plans for polling and vote counting, designed voter registration and training materials, assisted in the procurement of materials necessary to conduct the polls, and provided crucial transport support. Alongside the African Union’s High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), UNMIS also worked to maintain an environment conducive to holding elections. Following the resolution of multiple sticking points between the CPA signatories during February and March 2010—particularly those related to the 2008 census results and the allocation of National Assembly seats—elections at national and state levels were held during 11– 15 April. The voting results released on 26 April were not surprising: the National Congress Party (NCP) and its leader President Omar alBashir retained their hold on power in the North, while Salva Kirr and the SPLM were overwhelmingly victorious in the South. The run-up to the elections saw constriction of political freedoms in both North and South. UNMIS received multiple reports from political parties of obstruction of freedoms, unwarranted arrests, and intimidation by security forces. Following the polls, reports of irregularities, voter prevention, and fraud proliferated on both sides of the border. In the South, this led to several armed rebellions launched by those disenfranchised by the election results. The rebellion led by a renegade SPLA general, George Athor, in Jonglei State was particularly violent and saw the SPLA responding in force to put down the unrest in July. This reflected an

increasingly proactive stance of the SPLA in an effort to demonstrate both authority and capability in the run-up to the referenda. However, the SPLA responses to the postelection violence were followed by reports of misconduct on the part of SPLA forces, accounts that could not be confirmed by UNMIS because regular members of the SPLA blocked their access to the conflict sites. Referenda Preparations

Following the elections, in the second half of 2010 the focus of the CPA signatories and the international community quickly turned to the referenda on the South’s independence and the status of the border region of Abyei. UN Security Council Resolution 1919 of April 2010 mandated UNMIS and the international community to expand their activities “to provide technical and monitoring assistance including referenda observation capacity as requested by the Sudanese, to support popular consultations.” As requested, UNMIS served a lead role in the international community’s efforts to support the referenda and ensure their timely and transparent conduct. Overall, conducting the referenda presents an immense logistical challenge to the UN and its international partners. South Sudan remains one of the most underdeveloped regions in the world. The territory of the South is larger in area than California, but has only about forty miles of paved roads. Further, the southern population is nearly 90 percent illiterate and has little institutional memory of voting. The lack of infrastructure and immense political challenges pose enormous obstacles to conducting the referenda. With this in mind, UNMIS strengthened its strategic planning cell and established an integrated planning team at its headquarters in Khartoum in the first half of 2010. The newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios, outlined five goals for the period leading up to the referenda: (1) organizing the referenda in both Southern Sudan and Abyei; (2) organizing the popular consultations in Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan as stipulated in the CPA; (3) agreement

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on postreferendum frameworks and their implementation; (4) maintenance of security and protecting civilians; and (5) continued development of South Sudan’s governance and security institutions. Pursuing these goals, during the year UNMIS and the UN mobilized a significant amount of human and financial resources. In the aftermath of the general elections in April, the UN consolidated its UNMIS and UNDP elections staff into one team, the UN Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED). UNIRED streamlined its reporting and operational structures and provided guidance and technical assistance to its main interlocutor, the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC). The SSRC maintains ownership responsibilities for the planning, organization, and conduct of the referendum in South Sudan. UNIRED also provided assistance in the development of the regulatory framework for the vote, advice on operational planning, logistical support, training of referendum staff, PR campaigns, and cooperation with other international stakeholders. To enhance its delivery of support and assistance for the referenda and expand UNMIS coverage across the vast South Sudan territory, the mission established referenda support bases at county level in each of the South’s ten states. The bases are staffed with both civilian and police UNMIS personnel to help monitor the referenda process and provide logistical support and technical advice. By October, an additional 600 security, logistics, and technical experts had been deployed in UNMIS on a temporary basis. Meanwhile, eight additional transport helicopters were added to UNMIS’s fleet to assist in referenda preparations and in the delivery of some 120 tons of referenda-related equipment and material. In total, UNMIS’s activities in support to the referenda required roughly $86 million in addition to the mission’s nearly $1 billion annual budget. In response to the request made by the CPA signatories, in September the SecretaryGeneral established a Panel on the Referenda in the Sudan. This monitoring body is to engage all relevant actors involved in the referenda,

periodically report to the Secretary-General on the political and security situation, use its good offices to directly help the parties overcome stalemates on both pre- and postreferenda frameworks, and encourage the parties to overcome impediments to holding the referenda. The panel is chaired by Benjamin Mkapa, former president of Tanzania, and will remain active for six months. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council remained highly involved in the progress toward the referenda and in deliberating potential alterations to UNMIS’s deployment and mandated tasks. In September, the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting on Sudan that included Security Council members and representatives from both North and South Sudan, and the international community pledged its support to the referenda and whatever outcome it produced. Reflecting the urgency of the South Sudan referendum and associated challenges, to give the members background for their deliberations the Security Council visited Sudan in October, assessing the situation on the ground and the status of the preparations. It was the Security Council’s third such visit since the signing of the CPA in 2005. UNMIS continued to support the popular consultation process in Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan State during the year. These are negotiations between the SPLM and the NCP regarding the implementation of the CPA, the distribution of power and wealth between the two states and the government of Sudan, as well as deliberations on land rights, religious and cultural freedom, and security. During 2010 progress was made in Southern Kordofan, where in June authorities adopted a code of conduct and streamlined the public description of the popular consultations. Meanwhile, in early September Blue Nile State established a twenty-member parliamentary commission to assess the CPA implementation. Beyond the UN, a significant amount of international activity aimed at ensuring that the referenda proceed. The AU’s High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), headed by the former South African president Thabo Mbeki,

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worked to assist in the parties’ implementation of the CPA. Throughout 2010, AUHIP worked with the CPA signatories on aspects related to creating postreferenda arrangements on security, citizenship, natural resources, currency matters, and international obligations. Negotiations on these matters between the two governments began in July 2010, but little if any tangible progress was made by the end of the year. However, a November meeting in Khartoum, attended by the parties as well as UNMIS representatives and the US Special Envoy to Sudan, General Scott Gration, resulted in a draft agreement, Framework for Resolving Outstanding Issues Relating to the Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Future Relations of North and South Sudan, which ideally would guide future negotiations. The European Union deployed an Election Observation Mission to Sudan (EOM) to observe and monitor the referenda. The EOM was deployed in two phases during 2010 and early 2011. First to arrive, in November, was an initial team of fourteen experts, sent to assess voter registration. These experts were located in both Juba and Khartoum. A larger contingent of roughly eighty observers, which arrived in December 2010, is monitoring the overall voting process. Bilaterally, a multitude of stakeholders worked with both the Khartoum and Juba authorities in an effort to organize the referenda in a timely manner and see that its results be respected on both sides of the border. While most of these activities of the international community were beyond the headlines, the activities by the United States government were notable. In September, the United States offered Khartoum an incentive package aimed at inducing the government to cooperate with the referenda preparations and outcome. In exchange for its cooperation, the United States would ease sanctions on Khartoum allowing for some investment and trade and restore diplomatic relations with the country. Conversely, the US proposed greater sanctions in the event of Khartoum’s resistance. Khartoum dismissed the offer as both a threat and external meddling in the business of a sovereign state. The US also has indicated that it

AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

Start Date Authorization Date AU/UN Special Representative Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

Implement mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda) James Oppong-Boanuh (Ghana) $1,808.1 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 17,050 Military Observers: 264 Police: 4,747 International Civilian Staff: 1,109 Local Civilian Staff: 2,689 UN Volunteers: 468

For detailed mission information see p. 213

may remove Sudan from its list of sponsors of terrorism if Khartoum recognizes the outcome of the South’s referendum, which by all indications will result in its independence.

Security Preparations

The security situation throughout South Sudan remained unsettled and extremely tense throughout the year. The unrest in the South that followed the general and state elections came in addition to already-high levels of intercommunal violence. Adding to this were intermittent attacks by the Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army during the second half of 2010. These attacks displaced nearly 30,000 civilians in Western Equatoria State alone. Finally, and most worrying, in the months leading up to the referenda, reports of military buildup on both sides of the border proliferated, with clashes breaking out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA, with reports of aerial bombing of border areas in the south by the SAF. The persistent violence throughout the year drew significant attention to the still developing

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Box 2.5 Darfur

The joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission to Darfur (UNAMID) has an authorized strength of 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 formed police units of 140 officers. UNAMID was mandated in July 2007 to help provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as to monitor compliance with ceasefire agreements, report on the security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), and assist with the implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). After a delayed deployment process that began in 2008, UNAMID neared full strength during 2010. Further, the mission also received several force-enabling helicopters from Ethiopia that increased its long-range capabilities. Despite these additional resources, the conflict in Darfur flared dramatically. In the face of ongoing violence and obstruction by both the government’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the various Darfur rebel groups, UNAMID was able to contribute only marginally to the dire security and humanitarian situations there. The ongoing conflict had major implications for the already-suffering civilian population in Darfur, as violence yielded massive

displacements and persistent obstruction severely hampered humanitarian aid activities in camps for the displaced. Beyond the conflict between SAF and rebel groups, the trend of attacks, ambushes, kidnappings, carjackings, and violent robberies aimed at UNAMID military and civilian staff, and humanitarian aid workers in Darfur continued throughout 2010. Multiple UNAMID troops were killed in clashes throughout the year, taking the total UNAMID contingents lost in service to over 30 since 2008. This situation persisted throughout the year and was not confined to any one part of the operational area. The grim security and humanitarian situation face by UNAMID and other actors was perpetuated by the lack of a credible peace agreement between the Darfur rebel groups and the Khartoum government. Despite efforts to convene the AU/UN-and-Qatar-mediated negotiations in Doha, the talks remained seized for the better part of the year, with the largest Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), abstaining from May until December. Nevertheless, as talks on a potential cease-fire resumed in the final weeks of 2010, clashes were ongoing in Darfur. Further complicating matters in Darfur during 2010, and throughout Sudan

nature of South Sudan’s security architecture and the deep divisions that remain among the communities there. Owing to perceived personal insecurity and decades of conflict, South Sudan’s population is rife with weapons and largely distrustful of security institutions. During the year, the SPLA did little to assuage these negative perceptions. As the SPLA took on a more proactive security role during the year, UNMIS received multiple reports of transgressions against civilian populations during SPLA operations and of grave

more generally, was the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment for genocide in Darfur of Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir. This followed the ICC’s arrest warrant for al-Bashir for alleged war crimes perpetrated in Darfur issued in 2009. The ICC indictment and arrest warrant had a divisive impact, as alBashir continued to travel Rome Statute signatories throughout the year despite the calls for arrest by many Western countries. Meanwhile, the government continued to crack down on dissenting political parties, shutting down radio stations in Darfur during the year and severely curtailing civil liberties in the region. Clearly, 2010 was a difficult year for UNAMID and international partners in Darfur, and 2011 looks to be equally as challenging. The referendum in the South will undoubtedly impact the situation in Darfur and could serve to sharpen the already hostile attitudes of both the rebel groups and Khartoum government. At the close of the year, this situation was cause for serious concern, especially as UNAMID continued to struggle to execute its mandated goals and the future of the mission remained uncertain in the event of heightened intransigence from the Khartoum government.

humanitarian violations committed during the SPLA’s forced-disarmament campaigns. In several instances, the SPLA—often threatening violence—blocked UNMIS from conducting observation patrols, both by land and by helicopter. In addition to the restrictions on its movement imposed by CPA signatories, UNMIS’s mobility and rapid-reaction capabilities declined further on 31 October when India withdrew its six military helicopters deployed in UNMIS. The withdrawal of these resources represents a onethird loss of UNMIS’s military aerial capability.

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Commercially contracted resources quickly replaced the Indian helicopters, but the replacements differ significantly from military equipment in ability to respond to a crisis. Nevertheless, UNMIS continued to cooperate with the government of Sudan and the SPLA on security matters during the year. Joint UNMIS-SPLA security committees at regional, state, and county level were created to both ensure UNMIS freedom of movement as the sensitive referendum periods approached and support the exchange of situational information. Similarly, UNMIS and SPLA finalized during 2010 a strategy for protecting civilians. The protection strategy, going beyond approaches such as simply the use of force, takes a more holistic, mission-wide view. During 2010, the joint UNMIS/UNDP Justice and Security Sectors Advisory and Coordination Cell (JSSACC) was launched. This represented a significant increase in the UN’s support to security and justice sector reform activity in the South. The JSSACC aims to assist the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in developing security sector architecture in South Sudan and simultaneously assist in developing governance and judicial structures to support security actors. Ultimately, it is hoped that this work will lay the foundation for long-term development of the justice and security sectors beyond the CPA implementation period. The JSSACC also serves a crucial donor support coordination to GOSS. Police training took on a new gravity and operational profile in 2010. The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is expected to take a lead role in maintaining order during and after the referenda. To facilitate in building up the SSPS, in January 2010 the Dr. John Garang Unified Training Academy was opened outside Juba, and by December more than 5,700 SSPS officers had completed an intensive, year-long training supported by UNMIS and the UNDP. Of those cadets, 1,500 also received training in crowd and riot control and special weapons training. Further, by December more than 14,000 members of the SSPS had received referendasecurity training provided by the UN. This is in

UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran

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A Sudanese boy watches as officers of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) participate in a road trip exercise, dubbed “Haboob Chase” that took them across North and West Darfur. They are pictured in the vicinity of the North Darfur towns of Saraf Omra and Kabkabiya, 26 June 2010.

addition to 10,000 officers who had received such training in advance of the April elections. To build confidence in the police, UNMIS police contingents were co-located with SSPS commissioners in each of the ten states during the year. Despite these activities, concerns remain as to the professionalism and capacity of the SSPS: the reality is that South Sudan lacks a cultural history of policing. In the past, the SPLA has largely been the only guarantor of security.

Political Developments

Despite all this operational activity and the resources dedicated by the UN and the international community, the conduct of the referenda ultimately falls back on the CPA signatories. While both the North and South repeatedly gave assurances that they were committed to holding the referenda on 9 January 2011, by the end of 2010 words had not translated to actions, preparations remained dangerously behind schedule, and the potential for renewed conflict mounted.

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Following months of disagreements and delay, the SSRC—comprised of representatives from the North and South—was approved by the Sudanese government in late June 2010. The SSRC is responsible for planning, organizing, and conducting the referendum in Southern Sudan. While the formation of the SSRC represents a step in the right direction, its activity was paralyzed until September, when the parties were finally able to agree on several key posts. Even with that, negotiations in the SSRC itself, facilitated by AUHIP, UNMIS, and the US on critical pre- and postreferendum arrangements such as border demarcation, citizenship, and revenue sharing—all potential areas for violent conflict—had seen no progress by midDecember. Meanwhile, the Khartoum government insists that it will be impossible for the referendum to proceed without the border being demarcated. In a significant step forward, delayed voter registration for the South Sudan referendum began in November with significant support from UNMIS. The registration period ended on 8 December 2010, with some 3 million southerners registering for the poll. Progress toward arrangements for the resource-rich Abyei referendum fared even worse. By mid-December, the Abyei Referendum Commission had yet to be formed, drawing speculation at year’s end as to whether the referendum would happen as planned. This is an area of extreme concern as Abyei has been a contested and often volatile region throughout the CPA period. While the parties agreed to a Permanent Court of Arbitration decision on the region’s border during 2009, the physical demarcation of that border remains unresolved, further heightening the prospects of Abyei serving as the flashpoint for postreferendum violence.

To put it generally, the experience in Sudan over the course of the past five years has reflected a tendency for political elites to wait until the last minute to settle disputes. It is not immediately evident that this is what will happen over the South’s independence. The population has yet to reap dividends from the CPA implementation period and view their independence as an end goal promised in the CPA. If independence is not delivered, willingness to move forward with any other formulation remains uncertain.

Conclusion

While all signs from the referendum point to independence for the South, final results are not expected until mid-February 2011. Even then, the changes will not be fully implemented until July 2011, when the CPA officially expires. Indeed, there remain many outstanding issues, chief among them Abyei, left to be negotiated. For UNMIS the future shape of the mission will depend on negotiations between the parties and on how South Sudan chooses to proceed internally during the first half of the year. By the beginning of 2011, developments on the ground, while tense, did not necessitate a robust response from UNMIS. Nevertheless, it is likely that a UN mission will be in Sudan for some time. The need for any new formulation to address a drastically changed political environment and one that can aptly balance between peacekeeping and increased attention on longer-term peacebuilding activities should be primary concerns. Negotiations were ongoing to enhance the mission’s military component. What is certain is that Sudan will continue to remain a strategic concern for peacekeeping in 2011.

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2.6 Timor-Leste

After the crisis of 2006, Timor-Leste continued to remain stable, with no significant security problems throughout 2010. Efforts by the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), with the military backup presence of the Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF), have provided political and security support in the ongoing consolidation of peace. During 2010, significant developments in promulgation of legislation for the national security sector, strategic planning for the justice sector, and the ongoing resumption of primary policing responsibilities by the national police highlighted the increasing national ownership of security sector development. The continued lack of clear delineation of responsibilities in security sector agencies continues. There are indications that integrated security arrangements for the national army and police will remain a feature of internal security management in the future. The UN has now been engaged in peace operations in Timor-Leste for more than a decade. As UNMIT enters its fifth year of peacekeeping operations after the 2006 crisis, the international community’s attention is shifting to the prospect of transition from peace operations to future development support. The timing of the future transition process, however, will be largely directed by the stability of the political and security situation after national elections scheduled for 2012.

The subsequent scaled-down UN political mission was tasked with enabling the smooth transition from peacekeeping operations to traditional developmental support by UN system and international partners. One year into the mission, with the collapse of Timor-Leste security sector institutions during the 2006 crisis, the country descended into political violence. That UN peace operations in Timor-Leste arguably represented the UN’s most successful peacekeeping intervention led many in the UN and the international community to question the shortcomings of the transition process from peacekeeping. In 2006, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the “United Nations and the international community have learned from lessons elsewhere, and have now

TIMOR-LESTE

Savu Sea

Strait of Wetar

Manatuto

Liquica

After the violence of the UN-organized popular consultation on East Timor’s de facto independence in 1999, postreferendum UN peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste ended in 2005.

Lospalos

Ainaro

Viqueque

Same

Suai

Background

Lautem

Aileu

Gleno Maliana

Baucau

Ti m o r S e a 0 0

30 km

20 mi

Savu Sea Pante Macassar

OECUSSE

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been starkly reminded by the Timor-Leste crisis, that nation-building and peace-building are longterm tasks.” UN peacekeeping operations were resumed in Timor-Leste in August 2006. The UNMIT integrated peacekeeping mission was established under Security Council Resolution 1704. The main mandate areas included support for political stability; assistance to national elections in 2007; restoration of security through UN police with executive policing mandate and police development; support for the review and reform of the security sector; strengthening the rule of law and human rights; promotion of a culture of democratic governance, including the provision of advisers to state institutions; and support for economic and social development. Since its establishment, UNMIT has not undergone significant downsizing, other than UN staff deployed to support national elections in 2007. In February, the Security Council renewed UNMIT’s mandate for one year in Security Council Resolution 1912 (2010). There were no significant changes to the mandate. The phased resumption of policing responsibilities from UN police to the national police led to an initial cautious drawdown of UN police numbers in April, which will continue until June 2011. At the end of 2010, UNMIT is comprised of 1,583 UN police, including 1,023 regular police officers and 560 in four formed police units contributed by Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Portugal. Two platoons of formed police, a total of 70 police personnel, will be withdrawn by March 2011. It is planned that 223 regular police officers will be gradually decreased to a remaining 1,290 UN police by June 2011, to be be comprised of 800 regular police officers and 490 in formed police units. It is expected that those UN police levels will remain until after national elections in 2012, which will be determined by a UN Secretariat technical assessment due by early 2011. The ISF has continued to maintain stability and provide a security backup presence to the UN police and the national security agencies, under bilateral arrangements between Australia

and New Zealand with the national government. Due to the ongoing improvements in the security situation, the ISF has gradually reduced its strength from about 1,100 personnel in mid-2008 to 475 personnel in late 2010, which includes 75 New Zealand soldiers. Since February, the rank of the ISF commander has been adjusted accordingly from brigadier-general to colonel. In 2010, ISF’s two forward-operating bases in the east and west were closed. All ISF personnel are now based in Dili, with rapid-reaction-force capability. The ISF has also gradually modified its posture by undertaking less patrolling. Soldiers also carry unloaded weapons, and machine guns are kept in armories. Since 2008, ISF has also adjusted its composition to provide training in skills, planning, and engineering to the national army, in support of the bilateral Australian Defense Cooperation Program. The postelection assessment of the future role of the ISF, together with the national authorities, will determine any future transition planning. The Secretary-General will report to the Security Council on possible adjustments to UNMIT’s strength and mandate in February 2011. Other than the planned UN police reductions, few major changes are expected. Until that time, UNMIT will be allocated thirty-four unarmed military liaison officers tasked with cross-border liaison and mentoring to border liaison officers in the national army. UNMIT will also retain its current strength of civilian personnel, including international civilian staff (462), international UNVs (143), and UN national staff (1,000). As UNMIT remains an integrated mission with a “one UN system” approach, the UN in Timor-Leste also provides substantial numbers of international UN civilians in functional and advisory roles to state institutions such as ministries, the courts, and the parliament, usually facilitated through UNDP programming. In 2010, UNMIT underwent significant changes in its mission leadership. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Atul Khare, who had capably led the mission since December 2006, was succeeded by

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Ameerah Haq. SRSG Haq arrived in January 2010. Several weeks after her arrival, the unexpected death of the Deputy SRSG for Rule of Law and Security Sector Support, Takehisa Kawakami, threatened to leave a leadership vacuum in those politically sensitive areas of the mandate. The successor to Kawakami, Deputy SRSG Shigeru Mochida, arrived in September 2010, enabling mission continuity, which was particularly welcome since the position had been vacant for many months prior to the late Kawakami’s initial appointment.

Key Developments

UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

25 August 2006 (UNSC Res. 1704) Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh) Luis Miguel Carrilho (Portugal) $206.3 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Military Observers: 33 Police: 1,485 International Civilian Staff: 362 Local Civilian Staff: 893 UN Volunteers: 175

For detailed mission information see p. 278

Political

During the year, the AMP coalition government continued to address challenging longer-term issues such as development of the security sector and the justice system, institutional reform, and intensified social and economic development. In April, AMP presented its National Strategic Development Plan for 2011–2030. Despite revenues from its oil resources, TimorLeste remains the poorest country in Asia. The proliferation of government infrastructure projects to fuel the stagnant economy has led also to increasing allegations of widespread corruption. Following the establishment of the first independent Anti-Corruption Commission empowered to pursue criminal investigations, the appointment of its first commissioner in February by parliamentary consensus is a positive development with future potential for the robust combating of corruption. Throughout 2010, the AMP government continued to endure the challenges of coalition politics. The deputy prime minister, himself a leading national political figure, serving in the newly created portfolio for management and public administration, resigned following a public clash with the prime minister. In October, the indictment of the other deputy prime minister and the foreign minister on charges of corruption presented challenges for the coalition. Nevertheless, the prime minister’s willingness to suspend the two ministers to face prosecution

International Stabilization Force (ISF)

Authorization Date Start Date Force Commander Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

20 June 2006 (UNSC Res. 1690) May 2006 Colonel Michael Reilly (Australia) $151.0 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011 474

is a positive indication of recognition of the need for accountability at the highest levels of government, particularly due to increasing perceptions in society that the political elite holds itself above the rule of law. Despite the political machinations, the AMP coalition can be expected to endure its differences until national elections in 2012, which will be followed by first-time nationwide municipal elections. In August, the president commuted the sentences of twenty-six soldiers and police convicted of murder and attempted murder in relation to the 2006 crisis, resulting in their immediate release from imprisonment. Twenty-four of those released had been convicted in a high-profile trial in March for separate armed attacks on the president and prime minister on 11 February 2008. The president’s motivation to pardon was his strong belief in political reconciliation. But the

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A UN police officer with the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), together with officers from the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste, visits a Timorese neighborhood damaged by heavy rains, 17 February 2010.

move further exacerbated concerns of a growing culture of impunity, criticism coming from the Roman Catholic Church and civil society. Transfers of Policing Responsibility

The major mandate focus of UNMIT remained policing and police development. UN police continue to retain executive policing authority, but the phased process of resumption of primary policing responsibilities in districts and police units began in May 2009. The process of joint UNMIT-government teams conducting assessments of all thirteen district police units and national police units, on the basis of agreement on mutually agreed criteria for readiness of national police to resume primary policing responsibilities, was completed by September. By the final quarter of 2010, three out of thirteen districts and six police units remained under UN police authority, having been assessed as not ready for resumption. In September 2010 alone, the resumption of policing responsibilities by the national police took place in four districts and three police units, including the Immigration Department and the Border Patrol Unit.

In the postresumption phase, UN police remain in respective districts and units to monitor, advise, and continue in support of the national police. Until now, no significant changes in the security situation or crime reporting have been reported in districts where national police resumed policing responsibilities. Nevertheless, some observers continue to question the overall operational capability and professional capacity of the national police. In early 2010, the government had pushed for the full resumption of police authority to be transferred to the national police by the end of 2010. Ongoing problems in relation to the lack of operational and logistical arrangements for national police delayed the resumption of policing responsibilities in a number of districts. With 2,944 police officers (94%) fully certified by September, the high number of national police in the remaining three districts not yet having completed the certification process presents further challenges to the resumption process particularly in the capital of Dili. The full transfer of policing authority from UN police to the national police is not expected until mid-2011. Although UN police numbers will be further cautiously reduced during 2011, significant numbers of UN police, including formed police units, will remain until postelection assessment in 2012. In February, the UN Secretary-General reported that the postresumption challenges of police monitoring, mentoring, and advising will require police-contributing countries to deploy police officers with “required profiles and skillsets.” The job profiles of the UN police were subsequently adjusted, including those for advisers, mentors, monitors, and internal investigators. The recruitment of civilian experts was also recommended to assist in institutional development and oversight of the national police due to the current limitations of UN police resources. The recruitment of nineteen civilian specialist advisers to support police institutions in areas such as special operations, finance, and forensics was under way in the final quarter of 2010. Such an assessment of the limitations of the UN police model of police-capacity

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development highlights the need for alternative approaches to police training in future peace operations. Developments in the Security Sector

The draft of the mandated security sector review, without significant input from disinterested national counterparts, was submitted by the UNMIT security sector support unit to the Office of the President. A long-awaited publicperceptions survey on the security sector reached its final stages of completion, though delayed for reasons similar to that cited above. The security sector reform (SSR) review project, under a joint UN-government project management board managed by UNDP, continued to approve ad hoc security sector capacity development projects, including the establishment of a National Defence Institute; support for an earlywarning mechanism; an emergency response assessment; and support projects for civil society organizations engaged in SSR. UNMIT has directly engaged with the national army through military liaison mentoring facilitated by military liaison officers and through human rights training conducted by UNMIT human rights officers along with Provedor and civil society groups. Marking a significant development in the national ownership of the SSR process, the national parliament passed the government’s legislative framework for the security sector in March 2010; namely, the National Security Law, the National Defence Law, and the National Internal Security Law. The security legislation introduces an “integrated system of national security” that would coordinate the activities of state security agencies, particularly the national army and the national police. UNMIT provided recommendations to improve civilian oversight of the security sector and to define the role of security agencies in the laws, particularly the army and the police, in the late stages of the drafting process in 2009. In October, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s report to the Security Council expressed “hope” that the security laws’ “operationalization and subsidiary legislation will provide greater clarity on the delineation of the respective roles and responsibilities of the military and

police, particularly with regard to offering the former a meaningful role in a peacetime setting.” To date, no such subsidiary legislation has been drafted, as earlier envisaged by the UN. The first draft of the overarching National Security Policy remains with the council of ministers without any indication that the policy would alter the integrated security arrangements. Although no operational implementation of the integrated security system has been developed, it is expected that increasing joint tasks and operations between the army and police in internal security matters will be justified by the security sector legislation. In early 2010, largescale special police operations against allegedly criminal gangs in rural areas of west TimorLeste were provided with the support of 200 soldiers. Despite UN police retaining executive policing authority in that specific area, the police operations were an entirely national police initiative, without UN police involvement. Such high-visibility police operations, involving special police units using semiautomatic assault rifles, has increased concerns of the apparent “militarization” of the special police. This brings the potential of leading to a resurgence of institutional rivalries between the army and the police, as witnessed during the 2006 crisis. Support to Justice System Development

The justice system has been seriously challenged by internal coordination, lack of resources, and limited functioning for most of its short history. Two recent initiatives have the potential to positively impact on the future development of the justice system: the UNMIT Administration of Justice Unit facilitated the Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment (ICNA), as mandated under Security Council Resolution 1704. Its recommendations included improving the coordination mechanisms, strengthening the capacity of the court system and judicial actors, and protecting judicial independence. In mid-2010, many of the ICNA recommendations were included in the Justice Sector Strategic Plan for 2011–2013 (JSSP). The JSSP provides the first strategic framework for the justice system in several areas, including institutional

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development, judicial training, and access to justice. Important objectives are proposed including the standardization of the traditional justice sector and for international judicial actors to move away from line functions in the courts to solely mentoring and advisory functions. The UNDP Justice Sector Program (JSP) continues to play a main role in support of the justice sector through providing seventeen international judicial trainers to formally train judicial actors and other staff in the justice system, but also perform line functions in the courts. A total of thirty-seven national judicial actors are currently appointed to the judiciary. In 2011, the increasing conduct of trials by national judicial actors can be expected, particularly as another thirteen will qualify to take judicial appointments. An ongoing major problem for the justice system is the number of pending prosecution cases. By June, 4,965 cases remained under investigation, although few more than 1,700 new cases had been filed during the year. The backlog is due to a number of factors, including the lack of case-management systems, problems of coordination between police investigators and the prosecution service, and also the questionable quality of police investigations. An Australian bilateral-aid justice project with technical support from the JSP is providing support for a significant initiative to operationalize the first coordinated case-management system throughout the justice system. Transition Planning

Shortly after the arrival of SRSG Haq in January 2010, the UN Secretariat deployed a technicalassessment mission (TAM). The TAM was mandated to review progress in UNMIT’s mediumterm strategy but also initiated some significant considerations for transition planning. The TAM recommendations included coordination with international partners, such as Australia, to plan for the transition to future police training due to the “limited capacity” of UN police in police development and training skills; that UNMIT should progressively decrease its advisers in the transition to providing such advisory support from the UN system, particularly the UN

Development Programme (UNDP); that there should be continued multidonor support for UNDP programs such as the Justice Sector Program, particularly in judicial training, and capacity-development support for the parliament and the anticorruption commission; that there is continued need to focus on human rights monitoring, including the proposal that the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights assess the viability of establishing a human rights monitoring presence following UN peace operations. The TAM also importantly recommended that UNMIT plan to reduce the negative impact of UNMIT’s withdrawal on the local economy and the 1,000 national UNMIT staff, the latter through professional training to help them take reemployment opportunities. The transition from peacekeeping operations is expected to be a reconfiguration of UNMIT’s current mandated activities, with an increased emphasis on the capacity development in all areas of the mandate. In September, UNMIT agreed with the president and senior government officials to establish a joint mechanism for transition planning and implementation through 2012, with plans to include the UN system and international partners. The joint mechanism is intended to enable the transfer of functions to national authorities, the UN system, international partners and civil society. The joint mechanism will further “ensure that the transition process is consistent with Government strategies, such as the Strategic Development Plan.” At this stage, the UNMIT, the national authorities and the international community appear committed to promoting national ownership of the transition process into peacebuilding efforts. The engagement of international development partners in transition planning strategy and implementation will be critical to address remaining gaps and responsibilities identified in transition planning. At present, bilateral police development and military training is primarily undertaken by Australia and Portugal, in addition to bilateral police-training projects by Japan, New Zealand, and the United States, but also training of the military police by Brazil and

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advisory support to the military by New Zealand and the United States. Timor-Leste’s increasingly close regional ties with China, Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia have the potential to further extend into future police-development support and military training. The EU and other partners provide support to security sector development projects. UN-coordinated justice sector capacity development is mainly supported by Portugal, Australia, Ireland, and Norway, while Australia, Brazil, and the United States maintain bilateral justice system support. Many such bilaterally funded UN programs will foreseeably continue under UNDP auspices after the transition from UNMIT peace operations.

Conclusion

The political and security situations in 2010 remained relatively calm and stable. Despite the efforts of the national authorities, UNMIT, and international partners toward the consolidation of peace since 2006, the underlying root causes of the 2006 crisis have not been fully resolved, and state institutions continue to remain fragile, especially the security sector. The forthcoming

election period in 2012 will mark a significant test of the capacity of state institutions, particularly security agencies, to withstand potential political conflict. Although the national police will have resumed full policing authority from UN police by the time of the elections, UNMIT will maintain a UN-police presence with backup security support from ISF. The postelection political and security situation will largely determine the transition process from peace operations to development support. Transition planning currently remains in its early stages, but encouragingly in a developing joint initiative together with the national authorities at their highest level. The transition planning process should ensure that long-term commitments to strengthening state institutions will be agreed on by the national authorities, the UN system, and international partners, particularly in security sector and justice system development. To mitigate against previous experiences of conflict relapse after peace operations, that future transition process should be properly coordinated to ensure a sustainable and strategic transition to long-term security and development, rather than a quick exit strategy for peace operations.

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3.1 Afghanistan

The year 2010 in Afghanistan was shaped by the agreements reached at the London Conference held on 28 January, co-chaired by the government of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the UN. The conference witnessed a renewal of the mutual commitment of the government of Afghanistan and the international community on the basis of President Karzai’s inaugural speech on 19 November 2009. The London Conference identified steps toward greater Afghan leadership in the areas of security, economic development, governance, and regional cooperation. It also set the grounds for the Kabul Conference, hosted in Afghanistan on 20 July. On the military front, 2010 saw the deployment of 59,462 additional ISAF troops, the replacement of the commander of ISAF (COMMISAF), Stanley McChrystal, by General David Petraeus,

AFGHANISTAN

Kerki

Termez

Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube)

a significant increase in both security incidents and civilian casualties, and the emergence of alliance fatigue, marked by the departure of the Dutch forces from Uruzgan Province. A further major event for the year was the parliamentary elections held in late September.

Background

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the USled coalition forces of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) initiated military action in Afghanistan. They overthrew the Taliban government and aimed to kill or capture the leaders of the Al-Qaida terrorist network. The Al-Qaida and Taliban leadership escaped across the border to Pakistan. Many rank-and-file members of the Taliban reintegrated into their villages. Following the fall of the Taliban regime, a group of prominent Afghans and world leaders met in Bonn, Germany, under United Nations auspices and signed the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, more commonly known as the Bonn Agreement, on 5 December 2001. In March 2002, in Resolution 1401, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to support the Bonn Agreement for establishing a permanent Afghan government. To provide security in Kabul and the surrounding areas, the Security Council established the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), requested by the Bonn Agreement, under Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001). In 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF (which had previously rotated among participating troop contributors on an ad hoc

Khorugh

AFGHANISTAN

HQ UNAMA 03/2002

HQ

HQ

ISAF

12/2001

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN 06/2007

Rawalpindi

Tank

Chaman

Zhob

Quetta

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basis). From 2004 to 2005, ISAF gradually expanded to the provinces, taking command of existing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in the northern and western regions. The same year, following the integration of nearly 12,000 US troops under the NATO chain of command, ISAF replaced OEF as the main combat force on the ground. Following the 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections, the political benchmarks established by the Bonn Agreement were completed. In response to the expressed need for a follow-on framework of cooperation, the Afghan government and its international partners signed the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006, committing each to high-level benchmarks in the areas of security, governance, reconstruction, and counternarcotics. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), co-chaired by UNAMA and the Afghan government, was established to oversee implementation of the compact. UNAMA’s mandate was revised in 2007 and 2008, providing additional authorities and capacity for donor coordination and aid effectiveness. This year, the forces have a joint governmentISAF transition plan, which aims to enable the government of Afghanistan to strengthen further its ownership and leadership across all government functions. ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability of the insurgency and support the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the NATO Training Mission, and the main focus is to increase the capability of ANSF to take the lead in providing security in Afghanistan. The large military operation of ISAF and the government focuses on Helmand and Kandahar, where insurgents are most active.

Key Developments Parliamentary Elections

On 18 September, the second parliamentary elections of the post-Bonn era were conducted. Despite an enormous number of individuals putting themselves forward as candidates (2,753 candidates competing for 249 seats), only

3.6 million votes were cast, representing 40 percent of 9.2 million eligible voters. ISAF assisted the ANSF to provide security for candidates and voters for the parliamentary elections. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) assumed, respectively, the first and second line of security. ISAF played only an additional role. From the outset, insurgents threatened to disrupt the electoral process, and from a total of 6,835 polling centers, 2,448 polling stations remained closed. Of the polling stations that opened, approximately 300 security incidents were reported on election day. These attacks resulted in at least 21 voters killed and 46 wounded. In addition, several election workers were kidnapped. However, in comparison with the presidential election in 2009, the number of security-related incidences decreased by 40 percent. As a result of excessive fraud and corruption, 10 percent of the votes were nullified. Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission received 3,000 complaints. Underage voting, proxy voting, use of fake voter ID cards, and repeated voting were common forms of fraud throughout the country. People received bribes and threatening text messages and phone calls to vote for a particular candidate. In some polling stations, most of the ballot boxes were already half filled before the voting even started. Despite the fraud, corruption, and low voter turnout, the fact that elections took place, in a country suffering from four decades of war, is an achievement. It is credible that people went to the polls despite threats from insurgents—threats such as that they would chop off the ink-dipped fingers of voters. Villagers carried ballot boxes on their backs and on mules to the voting centers—an illustration of the commitment of Afghan people to establishing peace in their nation. Transition from McChrystal to Petraeus

In June 2010, President Obama replaced McChrystal with Petraeus after a Rolling Stone article revealed that McChrystal had made disparaging remarks about administration officials.

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McChrystal had served for a year as COMMISAF. Petraeus, before replacing McChrystal, was the commander of US Central Command. He was also the chief architect of the US counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, which was partially adopted for Afghanistan under McChrystal. The appointment of Petraeus was seen as a demonstration of Obama’s commitment to reasserting authority over one of the highest and most challenging priorities of his presidency. The change in leadership precipitated a public discussion over timelines regarding the withdrawal of troops. In a debate largely held in the international media, Petraeus argued that the July 2011 withdrawal date was premature. Petraeus emphasized that both the start date and the rate of withdrawal should be based on “conditions on the ground.” In response to criticism over how the millions of dollars spent on defense contracts fuel corruption (and perhaps even end up in the wrong hands), the new leadership also set up new guidelines for awarding billions of dollars worth of defense contracts. Afghan National Security Forces Training

President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of security responsibility to the ANSF. The ANSF consists of 134,000 ANA, 109,000 ANP, and the Afghan Air Force. The eventual goal for the ANSF is to reach 171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by October 2011. As of October 2010, the ANP has 1,000 female personnel. The goal is to increase this number to 5,000 by October 2014. With a special focus on ANSF training this year, ISAF and NATO have set specific goals and brought significant changes and improvements to the training. These include improved retention and a rise in wages. The ratio of instructors to students has gone from 1 for every 79 trainees in 2009 to 1 for every 29 in 2010. This year a new training center opened in Kabul, adding to the existing Kabul Military Training Center. The new center houses the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and the Afghan Defense University (ADU). The ANSF trainers have a special emphasis on literacy and aim to bring Afghan forces up to a basic understanding of language and mathematics. To encourage self-

sufficiency, ISAF now offers workshops to teach Afghans how to repair equipment and to source some of the equipment from Afghan businesses. Despite many improvements, significant challenges remain. The public perception, performance, and proficiency of the ANA have been generally positive, while the feedback on ANP suffers. Problems in the ANSF include a lack of an ANA master plan for facilities development, inadequate program management, and insufficient quality control, which has been increasingly imbalanced by the sharp rise in the quantity of forces. Some of the main challenges in the ANP include low literacy rates, deceptive recruitment tactics, desertions, drug use, and corruption. ANP personnel have also been involved in smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion at checkpoints. The international trainers and Afghanistan government have set goals to address these challenges in the ANSF. Security and Civilian Casualties

In 2010 there was a significant increase in the number of security incidents resulting in civilian casualties. The first two months of 2010 saw a 94 percent increase in the number of reported incidents compared with the same period in 2009. Suicide attacks occurred at a rate of about three per week, half of them in the southern region. Complex suicide attacks were reported at a rate of two per month, double 2009 rates. Insurgents, on average, assassinated seven civilians per week, a 45 percent increase compared with 2009. The first six months of 2010 saw 1,074 civilians killed and more than 1,500 injured. The figures included 209 female and 217 children casualties. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks were the first and second highest causes of civilian casualties, respectively. Responsibility for the civilian casualties breaks down as insurgents 61 percent; US/NATO forces 20 percent; Afghan government forces 10 percent. As a result of inadequate medical care, many of the injured cannot be adequately treated. Alliance Fatigue

Although the ISAF consists of forty-seven contributing countries and 119,819 troops, more

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than one-half of them from the United States, the mission faces alliance fatigue, especially among European allies. Generally, in Europe the war in Afghanistan is so unpopular that it has become a dangerous political gamble for governments to continue to support it. The Dutch coalition government collapsed when NATO asked the Netherlands to extend its mission until August 2011. The Dutch withdrew 2,200 troops in August 2010 and Canada is set to withdraw its 2,800 troops in 2011. When President Obama decided to escalate the war, originally the plan was to send 30,000 US troops, counting on European allies to send an additional 10,000 troops. However, Europe contributed only an additional 1,000 troops—500 German and 500 British. France’s President Sarkozy said, “France will not send another single soldier.” But he confirmed that France would maintain its 3,300 troops in the country. With the Dutch and Canada withdrawing and France not willing to contribute more troops, there is a fear that more European countries will follow this example and pull out. Alliance fatigue puts extra pressure on the United States in the war against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. It also adds to the urgency of enabling the ANSF to be in charge of security in Afghanistan.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Authorization Date Start Date Force Commander Budget Troop Contributing Nations Strength as of August 2010

20 December 2001 (UNSC Res. 1386) December 2001 General David H. Petraeus (US) $460.4 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) 47 Troops: 130,492

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

Authorization and Start Date Expiration Date SRSG Senior Military Adviser Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

28 March 2002 (UNSC Res. 1401) 23 March 2011 Staffan de Mistura (Sweden) Brigadier-General Mark Skidmore (Canada) $226.9 million (1 January 2009–31 December 2010) Military Observers: 20 International Civilian Staff: 1,200 Local Civilian Staff: 300

Conclusion

The international community and the people of Afghanistan must collaborate in order to establish peace and stability, a credible government, and basic human rights in Afghanistan. The future of Afghanistan depends on the commitment of the international community and the government of Afghanistan to carry out the promises of the London Conference. This year, emphasis was on transition to “full Afghan ownership,” complemented by a long-term commitment of the international community. Military and diplomatic decisions shape the future of Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan and the international community are planning to lure moderate Taliban members back into Afghan society and create a fund to offer jobs, cash, and security to militants turning in their weapons. The question for 2011 is whether the ANSF

EUPOL Afghanistan

Authorization Date Start Date Force Commander Budget Contributing states Strength as of 30 September 2010

30 May 2007 (CJA 2007/369ICSFP) 15 June 2007 Brigadier-General Jukka Savolainen (Finland) $87.2 million (10 October 2009–30 September 2010) 22 EU member states Civilian Police: 140

will be adequate to take control of security in Afghanistan and whether integration of the Taliban and making peace with them is the path to solving the Afghan question.

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Box 3.1 India-Pakistan

Amid the third consecutive summer of strong anti-Indian protests in JammuKashmir, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continues to monitor and report on the stressed situation. While little has changed in the past year regarding UNMOGIP’s role and the relationship between India and Pakistan, there is moderate hope that meaningful negotiations will soon get under way. The UNMOGIP has been supervising the cease-fire since the Karachi Agreement was signed in July 1949. Minor adjustments occurred in 1972, when the Line of Control (LOC) was established in Kashmir between India and Pakistan as part of the Simla Agreement. Since the agreement, UNMOGIP has maintained military observers along the LOC and reports to the Security Council on an ad hoc basis. The mission is also tasked with patrols, inspections, and investigation of any alleged violations of the line, and, when permitted by the host countries, with performing other field tasks in the area. The relationship between India and Pakistan has remained tense, although both sides agreed to start a dialogue on the Jammu-Kashmir issues, among others, in 2004. While talks started in 2007, they were abruptly ended by the 2008 attack in Mumbai by Pakistani terrorists.

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

Authorization Date Start Date Chief Military Observer Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

21 April 1948 (UNSC Res. 47) 1 January 1949 Major-General Kim Moon Hwa (Republic of Korea) $16.1 million (2010–2011) Military Observers: 42 International Civilian Staff: 24 Local Civilian Staff: 48

For detailed mission information see p. 287

Relations are starting to improve again, with a face-to-face meeting held in Russia in June of 2009 between India’s Prime Minister Singh and Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari. This year, the foreign ministers of both countries met in person for the first time since the Mumbai attacks, but no tangible developments occurred. India and Pakistan were able to agree on formal steps toward resuming negotiations, although the talks themselves have been slow to progress. Recently, negotiations have stalled over differences regarding preconditions, with India demanding that Pakistan take a stronger stance against domestic terrorism. However, Pakistan government officials reject any preconditions

for talks and, for the talks to continue, have suggested that India show greater flexibility. Distracted this summer by the floods emergency in Pakistan, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited the region, but had little to say on the Jammu-Kashmir conflict beyond urging both sides to be patient and willing to compromise. Security remains an issue of concern as antiIndia protesters have been killed by Indian forces, and it seems only minor steps to improve the situation have been taken by either government. Ultimately, a major breakthrough is needed in the negotiations in order to bring hope for a solution to the Kashmir problem.

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3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Fifteen years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remains deeply divided along nationalist lines. The protracted differences between the Bosniak, Serb, and Croat communities have stymied progress on reforms critical to overcoming the country’s conflict-ridden past. During 2010 this reality meant that the presences of the complex and intrusive military and civilian peace operations deployed by the European Union and the OSCE remained throughout the year despite relative stability. While the presidential elections on 3 October 2010 were held peacefully and yielded the formation of a new tripartite presidency that promised a change of course, no discernible difference was perceived by year-end. Although the various operations were originally intended to be a short-lived international presence to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnia war, the late 1990s saw the entrenchment of the roles of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF), an Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative in maintaining postconflict stability. Security responsibilities were eventually transferred to the European Union, with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) replacing IPTF in January 2003 and a military mission (EUFOR Althea) taking over from SFOR in December 2004.

providing operational advice and inspection of BiH police activities. The EUPM also plays an active role in assisting in the BiH police reform process. During 2010, the EU realigned the mission’s mandate to focus on corruption and organized crime, with particular emphasis on the state-level law-enforcement agencies, improving interaction between police and the judicial system. The mission is mandated to be in the field until 31 December 2011. EUFOR Althea consists of approximately 1,700 troops deployed in the BiH capital Sarajevo, with satellite liaison and observation teams deployed throughout the BiH territory. The mission’s primary functions are concerned with the maintenance of security, acting as a deterrence force, and ensuring compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace. As stability has increased since its initial deployment, EUFOR has transferred several of its executive activities to BiH authorities in the areas of de-mining and the management of weaponsstorage sites. EU troops also continued to cooperate with US forces under the command of a residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. On 25 January 2010, the Council of the European Union approved plans for EUFOR Althea to additionally act in a nonexecutive mode in the areas of capacity building and training. In this vein, during the year EUFOR monitored joint military affairs in BiH, particularly in the movement of weapons and military equipment and the disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition. The mission also worked to build the capabilities of BiH armed forces through joint training exercises and conducted combined capacity building and training conferences in coordination with NATO. During 2010, EUFOR also supported the EUPM activities aimed at providing assistance to BiH authorities in combating

Key Developments

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organized crime. EUFOR also continued its assistance to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the continued search for those suspected of war crimes committed during the conflict.

EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

Authorization Date

Start Date Operation Commander Force Commander Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP); 9 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1551) December 2004 General Sir John McColl (UK) Major-General Bernhard Bair (Austria) $25.8 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Troops: 1,932

EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

11 March 2002 (EU Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP) January 2003 Brigadier-General Stefan Feller (Germany) $19.1 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Civilian Police: 72 Civilian Staff: 33

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

8 December 1995 (Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council) December 1995 Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (United States) $21.5 milliion (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Civilian Staff: 70

EUFOR Althea and EUPM operate parallel to the political operations of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), who is responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The OHR is mandated with executive-decision powers— the so-called Bonn powers—that have been used several times since 1995 to overcome political stalemates or sack corrupt officials. The OHR also acts as EU Special Representative to BiH (EUSR) and is mandated to assist in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the country’s progress toward European Union integration. The OHR was scheduled to close in June 2008, but due to deadlock on key reforms the office has remained deployed throughout 2010, and its mandate was renewed through 2011. During 2009, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—a supra-OHR body—outlined five broad reform objectives that BiH must deliver on for the OHR to be drawn down and to hand over to the less-intrusive EU Special Representative (EUSR). The objectives include the sustainable resolution of the issue of apportionment of property between the state and other levels of government; the sustainable resolution of defense property; the completion of the Brcko final award; fiscal sustainability; and the entrenchment of the rule of law. In June, the OHR closed its office in Mostar after a mayor was selected for the city. This only came about, however, after fourteen months of deadlock and through an executive decision on the candidate made by the OHR, reflecting both the continued relevance of the OHR and the climate of political stagnation in the country. BiH did make some progress toward NATO integration during 2010: in April, BiH’s application to NATO’s Membership Action Plan was accepted. The program is a step toward NATO membership and aims to guide those countries that wish to join the Alliance in their preparations by providing advice, assistance, and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership. Nevertheless, moving forward will depend on the resolution of the issue of defense property, one of the objectives defined by the Peace Implementation Council for closure of the OHR.

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General elections, held on 3 October 2010, were facilitated by the peace operations. Further to its civilian operations already on the ground, in August the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed 300 electoral observers to monitor polling stations, the voting process, the counting of votes, and the tabulation of results. These additional monitors were deployed at the invitation of the Central Elections Commission of BiH. After a recount, it was determined that the vote was free of fraud and resulted in a tripartite presidency representing elected officials from each BiH community. Both the relative calm in BiH throughout the year and the successful elections belie the deep political stalemate that has blocked BiH’s progress from its conflict-affected past and the transition from an intrusive and executive

NATO Headquarters Sarajevo

Authorization Date

Start Date Head of Mission

28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit) 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575) December 2004 Brigadier-General David Enyeart

international presence. While the promise of a changed political approach has been put forward by the new presidency, overcoming deepseated nationalist differences will require concessions on all sides as well as the continued political and security engagement of the international community.

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3.3 Côte d’Ivoire

As 2010 drew to a close, Côte d’Ivoire was at “real risk” of descending into civil war as incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power after losing a 28 November runoff election against Alassane Ouattara. The standoff threatened to reignite the conflict that ended in 2007. The tense climate surrounding the elections dominated the operational environment for the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and while Gbagbo’s call for the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers went unheeded, the mission finds itself pitted on one side against another. The international community, including the UN, the US, the EU, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and many others have all unequivocally backed Outtara, who won the runoff election with 54.1 percent of the votes, winning by an 8 percent margin. Undoubtedly, UNOCI is a critical force for preventing a further escalation of the disputed election into a full-blown war between Gbagbo’s supporters, largely composed of southerners including the military, and those of Outtara, composed of northerners and the rebel Forces Nouvelles.

Accords, which established a cease-fire and a government of national reconciliation in 2003, internecine fighting between the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and rebels, including the Forces Nouvelles, continued. As a result, in April 2004, the Security Council created UNOCI, with a mandate to support implementation of the accords. Since its inception, UNOCI has supported a number of follow-on peace deals, the most recent being the Ouagadougou Agreement of 2007 and its supplements. Operation Licorne—a French deployment initially mandated to operate with the former Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI)—continued to provide support to UNOCI. Signed in March 2007, under the auspices of Burkina Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré, the Ouagadougou Agreement addresses, inter alia, issues of identification of the population; voter registration and the holding of elections; the dismantling of armed militias, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and the restructuring of the national army; the removal of the zone of confidence; and the restoration of the state authority. Unlike previous agreements, clear timelines and two follow-up mechanisms were established: first, a standing consultative mechanism composed of President Laurent Gbagbo, the prime minister, Guillaume Soro, a former president, Konan Bedie, and a former prime minister, Alassane Ouattara, with President Compaoré as facilitator; and, second, the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee (EMC), comprised of the facilitator and three representatives from the signatories to the agreement. Using the broadly popular Ouagadougou Agreement as a roadmap, initial efforts to reunify

Background

In September 2002, amid growing ethnic and political tensions, Côte d’Ivoire erupted into civil conflict after some of the state’s military forces staged an unsuccessful coup d’état and launched attacks across the country. At issue were questions of identity, citizenship—important for resolving presidential-eligibility disputes—and political representation. The government forces retained control over the south of the country, while rebels held strongholds in the north. Although the parties signed the Linas-Marcoussis 72

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HQ MINURSO 04/1991

MINURCAT HQ 09/2007

UNMIL HQ 09/2003

HQ

Operation Licorne 02/2003

UNOCI HQ 04/2004

HQ HQ HQ

UNAMID HQ 07/2007

UNMIS HQ 03/2005

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UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

Authorization Date Start Date SRSG Force Commander Police Commissioner Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528) 4 April 2004 Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea) Major-General Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh) Major-General Jean Marie Bourry (France) $485.1 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 7,572 Military Observers: 192 Police: 1,316 International Civilian Staff: 380 Local Civilian Staff: 737 UN Volunteers: 267

For detailed mission information see p. 293

Operation Licorne

Authorization Date Start Date Force Commander Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

24 January 2006 (UNSC Res. 1625) February 2004 Brigadier-General Francis Autran (France) $96.6 million (1 October 2009– 30 September 2010) 900

the country got under way. In a dramatic public display for militia disarmament, thousands of Ivoirians witnessed the burning of tons of surrendered weapons in Bouake in July 2007. The zone of confidence that had divided Côte d’Ivoire’s northern territory from the south was replaced by a green line, patrolled by newly mixed police units. Despite some progress, however, delays in the extension of state authority, citizenship identification, DDR of former combatants, and integration of the military threatened to undermine the fragile peace. In December 2008, in the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement,

the parties changed the sequencing of the peace process and gave priority to reunification instead of presidential elections, which had hitherto been the main focus. In order to hold elections, specific reunification tasks must be completed two months in advance, including transferring authority from zone commanders to prefects; centralizing the treasury; completing the profiling and integration of Forces Nouvelles elements (military, police, gendarmerie) into the integrated command center; and paying $1,000 to all demobilized former combatants and militiamen. This dramatic shift prompted UNOCI to reconfigure according to benchmarks set by the Secretary-General: (1) DDR and dismantling of militias; (2) the holding of presidential elections in November 2009; (3) the restoration of state authority throughout the country; and (4) the commencement of a security sector reform process for the whole of the country. By the end of 2009, UNOCI’s force configuration was flexible in movement, had a capacity for rapid reaction in the event of an outbreak of violence, and was structured to support the Ivoirian military’s integrated command center. However, in 2009 reunification efforts stalled, falling short of the requirements to hold elections as stipulated by Ouagadougou IV. Nevertheless, the government scheduled presidential elections for 29 November 2009. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) completed registration, yielding some 5.3 million individuals (known as the “white list”) confirmed as eligible voters and some 1.03 million individuals unconfirmed as eligible (known as the “grey list”). Because of disagreements over these lists, the elections were postponed to the beginning of March 2010.

Key Developments

In January 2010, the electoral processes halted due to disagreements surrounding a separate parallel list of some 429,000 persons produced by the president of the IEC, Robert Beugré Mambé. The emergence of the list caused the government to question the commission’s integrity and allege massive fraud of the provisional

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lists. Shortly thereafter, President Gbagbo dissolved both the IEC and the government. By late February, however, a new government and IEC were installed. These troubling developments raised tensions at a time when reports surfaced that the ruling party had requested courts to purge ineligible voters. After violent and deadly protests erupted, President Gbagbo delayed elections for the fifth time since they were first scheduled in 2005. He also redoubled his efforts to emphasize the importance of disarmament and reunification before the polls could be held. With the opposition parties at odds with the government’s stance, an impasse set in, deadlocking progress in 2010. Nonetheless, the UNOCI Electoral Assistance Division and Certification Cell continued to provide technical advice and assistance to the new IEC. The situation pitted three main groups against each other: the president and his supporters, who want reunification before presidential elections; against the opposition parties, who want elections before reunification; against the Forces Nouvelles, who want identification before reunification. While the SecretaryGeneral noted that the stalemate has led some to question the Ouagadougou Agreement’s continuing relevance, he underscored that in the absence of any alternative there would be cause for serious concern if the agreement were to be abandoned. On 24 September the voters list of some 5.7 million individuals was officially certified. Campaigning began on 15 October. As a part of its effort to help stage the elections, UNOCI assisted in the distribution of voter and identity cards in both the north and south of the country. Despite serious disputes over voter lists, differences were resolved and Côte d’Ivoire peacefully held presidential elections on 31 October. The incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo received 30 percent of the vote, while former prime minister Alassane Ouattara received 32 percent. The two candidates faced each other in a runoff on 28 November, with Ouattara winning. About six million voted in the runoff election on 28 November—a turnout of around 70 percent. While there was some election-related

UN Photo/Basil Zoma

CÔTE D’IVOIRE • 75

A woman voter is shown at a polling station in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, ready to cast her ballot in the country’s long-awaited presidential elections, 31 October 2010.

violence with seven killed during the week, the polls were conducted fairly according to the UN and international and regional electoral monitors. On Wednesday 1 December the head of the IEC announced that Ouattara had won with 54.1 percent of the vote against 45.9 percent for Gbagbo. However, the Constitutional Council, a governmental body loyal to Gbagbo, announced that the results were invalid because they were released a day late and electoral law had not been followed. On 2 December, violence erupted and eight were shot dead at Ouattara’s office. The Ivorian military, still controlled by Gbagbo, closed the land, sea, and air borders, and the state extended a curfew set before the election. The Constitutional Court swiftly announced Gbagbo as the winner on Friday 3 December. As violence spread across the country some 6,000 people had fled to the neighboring countries of Liberia and Guinea. On 7 December, the UN asked nonessential staff to leave the country. The world came down quickly against Gbagbo. Weeks after the poll, ECOWAS and the AU had suspended Côte d’Ivoire from their organizations, as Gbagbo’s grip on the Ivoirian

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Box 3.3 SCR 1308: A Decade of HIV/AIDS and UN Peacekeeping

Ten years have passed since Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000) established a mandate for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to raise awareness and prevent the transmission or contraction of HIV in UN peacekeeping operations. Resolution 1308 recognized the link between the HIV/AIDS pandemic and international peace and security; HIV/AIDS is exacerbated in states plagued by violence and instability, conversely, the unchecked spread of HIV/AIDS presents a threat to global security. DPKO has sought to train its peacekeepers to become advocates for awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS. Simultaneously, the DPKO has made an important priority of preventing the transmission of HIV among peacekeepers and host communities. The past decade has seen innovations along these two tracks in practices for HIV/ AIDS prevention and awareness in UN peacekeeping operations. Resolution 1308 established programs of predeployment orientation/ training and in-mission induction and education of UN peacekeepers about the spread of HIV/AIDS, and sought to facilitate cooperation between UNAIDS and other UN agencies to improve HIV/ AIDS prevention interventions and services. Today, there are chief HIV/AIDS

officers/advisers with teams in nine large DPKO peacekeeping missions and HIV focal points in eleven smaller DPKO-led and Special Political Missions (SPM). DPKO has sought to heighten awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS in UN peacekeeping operations with methods that have been improved upon over time. Innovations in HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness have been implemented in various field missions. An important practice this past decade in DPKO’s fight against HIV/ AIDS is voluntary confidential counselling and testing (VCCT) for peacekeepers. Since 2000, there has been a steady increase in the number of peacekeepers who undergo VCCT. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has utilized regional HIV focal points. Local familiarization of the mission through the use of UN international staff as regional HIV focal points allowed for a more in-depth assessment of the needs and responses of the HIV Unit, establishing an effective, decentralized system of focal points. MINUSTAH also partnered with the Public Information Office (PIO) to promote HIV awareness and prevention. The UN and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has trained UN Police (UNPOL) from Community Policing

state was as firm as ever. To break this, on 13 December the EU agreed to sanctions against Gbagbo’s administration. The World Bank on 22 December froze funding to the country, amounting to over $800 million. UNOCI troops surrounded the Golf Hotel in Abidjan where Ouattara was sworn in as president. Prime Minister Guillaume Soro left Gbagbo and joined Ouattara’s government. The president’s residence was secured by the Ivorian military, while UNOCI troops and the Forces Nouvelles protected Ouattara’s camp.

Centers as regional focal points for HIV/ AIDS prevention and awareness, which established unique access to local communities, and particularly vulnerable groups (women, children, and victims of gender-based violence), in remote sectors and regions. The UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) organized an inspiring program to train change agents in HIV/AIDS from both sides of the Sudanese conflict. Returning home, they had the skills to train other Sudanese in HIV/AIDS prevention. Missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and Liberia (UNMIL) successfully increased the rate and uptake of HIV voluntary counseling and testing by utilizing static, mobile, and mixed strategies to provide peacekeepers with improved access to VCCT, particularly in remote areas of deployment. The rate of VCCT in-mission rose from 8 percent to 36 percent. A decade ago, the UN Security Council first described the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a threat to international security. Today, there is an ongoing discussion about the relationship between human security and international security. In this context, this year, UNAIDS and DPKO are preparing a report documenting the implementation and progress of Resolution 1308. The last such joint report was in 2005.

Gbagbo called for UN and French troops to leave the country on 17 December. But the Secretary-General’s spokesman quickly responded by saying that UNOCI would continue to stay in the country and fulfill its mandate. By the end of year the violence had claimed almost 200 lives. Attacks against UNOCI peacekeepers and Ouattara supporters continued. Soro and Ouattara supporters said they want Gbagbo’s “departure by any means.” ECOWAS said that force might be used if Gbagbo fails to relinquish power. Meanwhile,

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UN officials confirmed on 23 December that there was evidence that Gbagbo’s regime had hired armed mercenaries from Liberia, and possibly Angola. The Ivorian military continued to attempt to blockade and suffocate UN forces and Ouattara’s camp at year’s end. Armed groups continually blocked UNOCI supply vehicles and patrols. While the post-election environment radically altered the Mission’s posture, DDR programs faced major obstacles in 2010. Some of the major challenges facing the implementation of DDR are the lack of capacity of the Integrated Command Centre, lack of resources for cantonment sites, the government’s inability to pay the $1,000 promised to former combatants and militia personnel, inadequate reintegration opportunities for demobilized combatants, and a lack of progress on issuing identity cards and elections—important incentives for combatants to give up their arms. The Integrated Command Centre’s mixed brigades still lack adequate manpower and resources. Nevertheless, 600 former combatants from the Forces Nouvelles began disarming and demobilizing in June 2010 in the northern, rebel-held town of Korhogo, and joined a group of some 1,200 former combatants set to enter cantonment and to join the integrated national army. On 27 May 2010, the Security Council approved a one-month technical rollover of the mission, in light of the postponement of elections. While some members desired a UNOCI

drawdown, their hopes were dashed because of the deteriorating political and security situation. On 30 June, the Council renewed UNOCI’s mandate until the end of 2010. An additional 500 military and police personnel reinforced UNOCI during the elections. On 20 December, the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNOCI until 30 June 2011 and authorized the Secretary-General to exend until 31 March 2011 the temporary deployment of up to 500 additional personnel and the temporary redeployment of troops from UNMIL to Côte d’Ivoire. In early January 2011, DPKO and the Security Council were discussing plans to deploy an additional 2,000 troops to UNOCI.

Conclusion

While Côte d’Ivoire successfully held presidential and runoff elections the country remains divided and on the brink of renewed conflict. UNOCI’s presence is therefore as critical as ever. Yet, with a radically changed operational and political environment, and Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power to his democratically elected rival Ouattarra, it remains to be seen how much pressure the UN and others can put on Gbagbo without threatening to inflame tensions further. Indeed, while holding the election was a major step forward, the fallout of Gbagbo’s actions not to respect the outcome has undermined much of the gains made toward unification and ending the eight-year political crisis.

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3.4 Cyprus

Despite the initial uncertainty surrounding the April electoral victory of Dervis Erogulu’s hard-line National Unity Party in Northern Cyprus, the UN-backed negotiations that began in 2008 in an effort to create a bizonal, bicommunal federation of Cyprus have steadily continued throughout 2010. Although both Erogulu and his Greek counterpart, President Demetris Christofias, stressed they would prefer a deal by the end of 2010, the year ended without any major progress on core issues. Erogulu signaled that his side would end negotiations if an agreement was not reached by the end of the year, however both sides met in December and agreed to meet again in 2011.

In addition, UNFICYP is responsible for daily activities that support the Cypriot population, including social and economic issues like education and transfers of the deceased across the buffer zone, along with religious and sociocultural gatherings. Thousands of citizens from both communities participated in more than one hundred bicommunal events planned and hosted by UNFICYP and local partners over the past year. The UN also maintains buffer-zone crossing points that began opening in 2003 to facilitate movement between the two parts of the island. De-mining operations also continue to make solid progress, and Turkey provided an additional nine minefields to the UN for clearance during 2010. Not all Cypriots are content with the UNFICYP’s presence, however. In the last year, forces have contended with increased aggression from both sides. Most of these interferences have been minor, however, and there were no significant violations of the cease-fire. While previous rounds of negotiations have not solved the conflict, including the lauded UN plan supported by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999, relations between the two communities are improving. A clear indication is the more than 750,000 crossings through the buffer zone between November 2009 and May 2010. More significantly, the seventh such crossing point that links the northern village of Liminitis with Kato Pyrgos in the south was completed by October 2010. Prior to the April 2010 elections, former Northern Cyprus President Talat intensified negotiations with President Christofias because of fear that a governmental transition from Talat to Erogulu would stall or end the negotiations. Erogulu surprised critics, however, by

Key Developments

Stressing the opportunity for a decisive move toward resolution, the Security Council voted to extend the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mandate in June for an additional six months and in December until June 2011, with Turkey alone dissenting twice, as it did in the December 2009 vote. Entering its forty-sixth year, the UN mission underwent a management change as Lisa M. Buttenheim succeeded TayéBrook Zerihoun as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in April 2010. The UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus is tasked with preventing violence between the Turkish Cypriot community in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south by providing good offices, maintaining law, and contributing to a resumption of normal relations. The mandate was further expanded after an outbreak of violence in 1974 to include monitoring the ceasefire agreement, patrolling the established buffer zones, and undertaking humanitarian assistance. 78

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continuing discussions with few alterations, although Demetris Christofias disapproves of the Turkish Cyprus deadline and holds only modest projections about what can be completed by year’s end. A further sign of the relative goodwill and dedication to the negotiation process on both sides is the commitment to talks through August 2011. The intensive rounds of negotiations enabled both sides to find ground on which to converge regarding governance and the economy, although specific details were lacking. Both the Greek and Turkish governments have also publicly weighed in: Greece continues to press for a federation with a single sovereignty and single international personality; Turkey has recommitted to Northern Cyprus even if that means it must sacrifice EU membership. Although tougher subjects like property and power sharing have been tackled this year, ultimately no conclusive decisions have been made by the parties involved in the negotiations. A sole exception is the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in March in favor of the Turkish Cypriot government’s Immovable Property Commission, agreeing that restitution would not be possible in all property cases, a decision that Christofias criticizes. The UN is urging both sides to speed up the negotiations and continue confidence-building measures to reach a solution they feel is possible.

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Force Commander Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

4 March 1964 (UNSC Res. 186) Lisa Buttenheim (US) Rear Admiral Mario César Sánchez Debernardi (Peru) $58.2 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 859 Police: 68 International Civilian Staff: 37 Local Civilian Staff: 113

For detailed mission information see p. 231

The talks in July and August, which dealt with property and other issues, produced little progress. The meetings in December equally showed that neither side was willing to concede on property issues such as reinstatement and compensation, despite both sides agreeing to “intensify” their contacts to push the peace talks forward. Nevertheless, without decisions on these fundamental issues, and with potential for both sides to entrench in their respective sticking points, UNFICYP’s presence will remain critical for the coming year.

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3.5 Georgia

Tensions between Georgia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained high during 2010. The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) maintained its presence along the areas near the Abkhazian and South Ossetian administrative boundary lines.

Ossetia. In 2008 Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia. Russia intervened on South Ossetia’s behalf and expelled Georgian forces that had moved in. The conflict broadened to include Abkhazia as Russian forces moved into Georgian territory to gain control of the Kodori Valley. Though lasting only five days, the conflict killed hundreds and displaced thousands. The August 2008 conflict had major consequences for peacekeeping. The CIS peacekeeping force ceased to exist after the war, and UNOMIG ended its operations after its mandate was not renewed by the UN Security Council. EUMM began its operations in October 2008 to monitor the stabilization process and compliance with the six-point agreement that ended the fighting. The mission confirmed Russian withdrawal of its forces from Georgia, though some remained in disputed areas.

Background

Georgia has been the site of a series of peace operations after territorial conflicts over the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions erupted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Georgia’s independence. In 1992, a ceasefire ending war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia established the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to coordinate the actions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)–South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), a battalion of some 1,500 Russian-led troops. The same year, the OSCE created a mission to assist the government of Georgia in conflict settlement, democratization, human rights protection, and promoting the rule of law. In 1993, following fighting over the Abkhazia region in northwest Georgia and three broken cease-fire agreements, the UN established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to verify cease-fire compliance between Abkhazia and Georgia. A 1994 brokered cease-fire created the CIS peacekeeping force (CISPKF). Tensions grew with intermittent outbreaks of violence over the years. In 2004, Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili’s reunification policies caused violence to flare up with South

Key Developments

The EUMM continued to be the only peacekeeping presence on the ground in 2010. It is mandated for operation in Georgian-controlled territories only and prevented access to border areas where the conflict remains most acute. (South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue to deny the mission authority to operate in their territories.) In addition to its reporting function, the mission is tasked to promote stabilization, normalization, and confidence building. EUMM maintained good relations with the Georgian government and continued engaging with both Abkhazia and South Ossetian authorities through the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings, which also include representatives from the OSCE,

80

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the Georgian government, and Russia. The IPRM continued to be the primary vehicle for both sides to exchange information on administrative boundary-line incidents, questions of boundary demarcation, crossing procedures, and detainees. Georgia released six detainees in late March 2010. In December, EUMM and the OSCE co-facilitated the eighth meeting of the IPRM, where the parties discussed a number of matters and agreed to continue their negotiations in early 2011. A high level of mistrust between the parties persisted throughout 2010. According to Georgian authorities, on 6 August a Russian jet dropped a missile in a field, though it failed to explode. Russia denied the accusation, saying that the incident was entirely fabricated. On 11 August, Russia announced that it had deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system, the S-300, in Abkhazia. The territory’s leadership also indicated that it would sponsor a Russian military base on its territory and would not allow Georgian refugees to return without being granted full independence. Despite these troubling developments, direct—albeit tense—talks between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia continued. On 8 June, in the eleventh round of talks since the 2008 war, the two sides discussed a range of security and humanitarian issues, but failed to reach an understanding on the need for a new agreement on the non-use of force, a key Georgian

EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

15 September 2008 (CJA 2008/736/CFSP) October 2008 Ambassador Hansjörg Haber (Germany) $36.3 million Civilian Police: 181 Civilian Staff: 128

demand. On 27 July, Abkhazia pulled out of the talks, which were convened by the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, alleging Western bias and lack of progress. On 18 October, Russian forces withdrew from the Georgian village of Perevi near South Ossetia, moving to the other side of the border, outside of Georgian-controlled territory. A small contingent of Georgian forces moved into the village with EUMM observers.

Conclusion

While the mission no doubt contributes to preventing further violence and serves an important early warning function, its overall impact remains limited without the ability to observe all parties’ (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) compliance to the six-point agreement.

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3.6 Kosovo

With the continued presence of four international peace operations—from the UN, NATO, the EU, and OSCE—the overall situation in Kosovo remained relatively peaceful in 2010. However, outstanding intercommunal tensions and a Kosovo political crisis threatened to undermine the fragile stability.

this has been difficult for all missions, EULEX in particular.

Key Developments Political and Security Situation

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in an advisory opinion that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law, Security Council Resolution 1244, or the constitutional framework. Less than a week later, Serbia’s parliament passed a resolution stating that it would never recognize an independent Kosovo, despite calling for peaceful negotiations on its status. The security situation remained relatively peaceful, in spite of the ICJ ruling. However, the situation in northern Kosovo, where the majority Serbian population largely rejects the Kosovo administration, was tense. In May 2010, Serbian-organized local elections were held in northern Mitrovica. KFOR soldiers and the Kosovo police intervened to prevent clashes between some 1,000 Kosovo Serbs and nearly 2,000 Kosovo Albanians who had been caught in a standoff at the city’s main bridge. On 2 July, around 1,500 Kosovo Serbs gathered to protest the opening of a civil-service center in an ethnically mixed area in northern Mitrovica. An explosion at the gathering injured twelve and killed one. On 16 October 2010, Kosovo’s coalition government collapsed after ministers of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) resigned from the government. The Kosovo parliament passed a no-confidence vote on the government, prompting elections that had to be held within forty-five days. Parliamentary elections

Background

During 1998, following Serbian leader Slobodan Milosovic’s move to bring the autonomous Kosovo territory under direct Serbian control, armed conflict erupted between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian armed forces. The fighting, which killed and displaced thousands, prompted an intense reaction in the form of a four-month NATO bombing campaign. In June 1999, NATO deployed the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to supervise the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo as agreed upon in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution also established the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a temporary civilian administration. Kosovo has since been host to a number of peace operations. After nearly nine years of international administration, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, a move that complicated international support and policy for the region. Soon after, on 9 December 2008, UNMIK ended its administrative role and transferred operational responsibility for law and order to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Operating under Resolution 1244, EULEX, UNMIK, the OSCE mission in Kosovo (OMIK), and KFOR are to remain “status neutral” regarding Kosovo. However, in practice 82

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were successfully held in December and in selected towns and cities in early January 2011. Peace Operations

Although at a reduced presence, UNMIK continued to exercise some rule-of-law responsibilities and maintained technical-level contacts with the Kosovo authorities. Enjoying widespread acceptance by all communities, UNMIK continued working toward addressing common priorities, including the issue of missing persons, a critical area that impacts reconciliation. Encouragingly, in 2010 there was an increase in returns from both inside and outside Kosovo, with considerably more than 1,000 displaced persons returning to their homes. UNMIK also facilitated communication between Serbia and nonrecognizing states, often playing the role of interlocutor. Meanwhile, EULEX continued its rule-oflaw support to Kosovo in three sectors: police, judiciary, and customs. EULEX combined monitoring, mentoring, and advising the Kosovo authorities with executive functions in high-risk areas. EULEX maintained formed police units ready to act as second responders; utilized judges, prosecutors, and investigators to handle war crimes, interethnic crimes, and terrorism; and assisted the Kosovo Customs Service. In 2010, no serious incidents necessitated a robust EULEX response. On 1 March, EULEX, KFOR, and the Kosovo police began joint patrols in the north, up to the Montenegrin border, in an area that was previously under KFOR control. EULEX also continued to support the Kosovo Judicial Council and the reestablishment of a multiethnic court in northern Mitrovica. However, progress has been slow. The vetting and reappointment process is behind schedule and there is a supply shortage of qualified judges. To combat crime and corruption, EULEX assisted in the arrest of organized crime leaders involved in narcotics and weapons trafficking and helped arrest and prosecute members of the KLA responsible for past atrocities. In efforts to stamp out corruption at the government level, EULEX successfully investigated and indicted

UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Authorization and Start Date

SRSG Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) (Note: paragraph 19 of the resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise.) Lamberto Zannier (Italy) $47.9 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Military Observers: 8 Police: 8 International Civilian Staff: 141 Local Civilian Staff: 235 UN Volunteers: 27

For detailed mission information see p. 250

EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

4 February 2008 February 2008 Yves de Kermabon (France) $162 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Civilian Police: 1,182 Civilian Staff: 512

several senior government officials, including members of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, and the governor of the Central Bank. In October 2010, with KFOR strength at around 10,000, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that NATO will progressively reduce its presence to 5,000 troops over the next few months. KFOR has meanwhile also stepped up efforts in the north through increased checkpoints and patrols on both sides of the Ibar River (a boundary separating the Albanian south and predominantly Serbian north).

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OMIK, the OSCE’s largest field mission, continued monitoring and supporting local institutions with a focus on human rights, democracy, and public safety. The mission has five regional offices and more than thirty field teams observing municipalities throughout the country.

Conclusion

Serbia’s EU application is still pending, and meanwhile it has received renewed pressure to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), including the capture of Ratko Mladic, the accused mastermind of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Kosovo’s government crises and December elections also contribute to uncertainty about the future. Kosovo prime minister Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won the elections. It was the country’s first parliamentary vote since declaring independence from Serbia. A government must be formed within ninety days. It is unclear how these developments will impact potential talks between Serbia and Kosovo. In early 2010, Kosovo advocated for the EU and the United States to mediate a dialogue and the UN General Assembly embraced the EU’s role as facilitator between the two sides. Both Serbia and Kosovo have been receptive to talks; however, key issues such as northern Kosovo’s territorial integrity and potential

OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

1 July 1999 July 1999 Ambassador Werner Almhofer (Austria) $33.1 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Civilian Staff: 168

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

10 June 1999 June 1999 Major-General Erhard Bühler (Germany) $40.7 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Troops: 9,923

special status are contentious points for inclusion in direct negotiations. Ultimately, as the Secretary-General has repeatedly said, long-term peace, stability, and development will come from reconciliation between the communities in Kosovo and the wider region.

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3.7 Middle East

No major conflict broke out in the Middle East in 2009–2010. Violence continued in many areas, however, and the region’s outstanding conflicts remained unresolved. Tensions have, if anything, increased in 2010. Bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations restarted under US auspices in September 2010, but quickly broke down when Israel refused to renew a freeze on settlement construction that had been in place for ten months. The Palestinians remain internally divided, with Hamas in control of Gaza, and efforts by Egypt and others to secure Palestinian reconciliation have so far been fruitless. Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad is implementing an institution-building program in the West Bank. The program has attracted substantial donor support, and Israel and the United States have praised Fayyad’s efforts to enhance Palestinian security. The West Bank economic situation has improved slightly, though Israeli closures continue to impede progress. Israel’s continued blockade of Gaza contributed to a further deterioration of economic and humanitarian conditions there. International pressure to end the blockade intensified. In May, the Israeli navy attacked a Turkish-registered aid flotilla bound for Gaza, killing nine activists. Turkey withdrew its ambassador to Israel, describing the Israeli military action as “totally contrary to the principles of international law” and “inhumane state terrorism.” In Lebanon, 2009 ended on an optimistic note with the formation of a national-unity government and prime minister Saad Hariri’s visit to Syria. During 2010, friction between government members increased and Hezbollah continued to accumulate weapons. Speculation

that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will indict Hezbollah members has contributed to tensions. Iraq is unstable, and despite successful elections a government has not been formed. Violence continues with severe consequences for Iraqi civilians. Iran’s nuclear program continues to be a source of major concern to regional players and to the Security Council. The lack of political progress in the region has been accompanied by important security developments, including Iran’s continued refusal to submit to international pressure regarding its nuclear activities and the buildup of Hezbollah’s arsenal. Israel regards both these developments as grave threats to its security. The work of international peace operations in mediating between parties and ensuring that incidents do not trigger broader conflict has become increasingly important in this context. Iran continues to defy international efforts to control its nuclear activities. The United States is using diplomatic channels to address the Iranian nuclear issue, working via the Security Council, the P5+1 group, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Turkey and Brazil launched an alternative diplomatic track and in May reached an agreement according to which Iran would send low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for high-enriched uranium for use in a research reactor. The United States rejected this deal and in June succeeded in establishing further Security Council–endorsed sanctions against Iran. In July, the European Union imposed additional sanctions against Iranian energy and banking sectors. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu maintains that a nuclear Iran would constitute an existential 85

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Naqoura

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70+(+. CPF 70&1( CTGC QH QRGTCVKQP

Sharm al-Sheikh

threat to Israel and transform the region. In Netanyahu’s view, if Iran acquired nuclear weapons its “militant proxies would be able to fire rockets and engage in other terror activities while enjoying a nuclear umbrella,” raising the stakes

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50

50

100

150 km

100 mi

of any confrontation with Israel. Israeli leaders continue to discuss an aerial attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel claims that Hezbollah—which it considers one of Iran’s proxies—has crossed

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several “red lines” this year. One such line was Hezbollah’s alleged acquisition of Scud missiles from Syria, which Israeli president Shimon Peres announced in April 2010. Hezbollah neither confirmed nor denied this claim. Israel also expresses concern about the alleged buildup of Hezbollah military infrastructure south of the Litani: in July 2010, it released declassified analysis of southern Lebanon that it claimed showed Hezbollah has “turned over 100 Southern Lebanese villages into military bases” during the past four years “in gross violation of UN Resolution 1701.” Israel uses these points to justify its own violations of Resolution 1701, mainly through continued overflights of Lebanese territory. Hezbollah, for its part, claims that it has accomplished a strategic shift: it can respond in kind to any attack by Israel. In speeches in February and May 2010, the Hezbollah secretarygeneral, Hassan Nasrallah, vowed that Hezbollah would match any damage Israel might inflict upon Lebanon with equal damage, and that it would attack all Israel-bound ships were Israel to subject Lebanon to a naval blockade. According to its revised political charter, released in December 2009, Hezbollah “has developed from a liberation power to a balance and confrontation one, to a defence and deterrence one.” Hezbollah’s military buildup is taking place in a context of increasing tension within Lebanon. Regional involvement in Lebanese politics is, as usual, extensive: in July, Syrian president Bashar Assad and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia made a joint visit to Beirut to pledge their support for Lebanese stability and unity. Assad’s visit—his first since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005—was widely interpreted as one of several signs that Syrian influence over the domestic politics of Lebanon is increasing. Other indicators include Hariri’s visits to Damascus and his statement exonerating Syria for involvement in his father’s killing. The Iranian role in Lebanon may also be rising: President Ahmedinejad visited Lebanon in October. Israel regards with concern the apparent growth of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, combined with the weakening of the March

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Officers of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and members of the Lebanese Armed Forces verify the exact position of the Blue Barrel BP-12 in Rumaysh, South Lebanon. Blue Barrels determine the Blue Line, or line of withdrawal, marked between Israel and Lebanon after the pull-out of Israeli forces from South Lebanon in 2000, 7 October 2010.

14 coalition. Hamas’s continuing control of the Gaza Strip, periodic rocket attacks from Gaza, and the possibility that Hamas is acquiring more substantial military capabilities are also sources of worry for Israeli policymakers. Egypt remains calm, but President Mubarak’s failing health is contributing to speculation about a successor regime and the transfer of power. Egypt plays a crucial role in the region, not least because of its relationship with Israel and the role it plays in dealing with the situation in Gaza. Political turmoil in Egypt would have widespread regional consequences. The overall picture is of a veneer of calm overlaying an increasingly tense and militarized situation. In August 2010, the Middle East was described as “exceptionally quiet and uniquely dangerous” by the International Crisis Group. The group opined, “The build-up in military forces and threats of an all-out war that would spare neither civilians nor civilian infrastructure, together with the worrisome prospect of its regionalisation, are effectively deterring all sides” from initiating conflict. Unexpected

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UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Authorization and Start Date Force Commander Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

19 March 1978 (UNSC Res. 425/426) Major-General Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain) $518.7 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 11,881 International Civilian Staff: 330 Local Civilian Staff: 657

For detailed mission information see p. 240

events could, however, trigger a military escalation that would be very difficult to control.

Background

UNIFIL, the Interim Force in Lebanon, is the largest UN peace operation in the region. First established in 1978 by Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, UNIFIL was tasked with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces and helping the government of Lebanon to reestablish control over the south. In May 2000, UNIFIL assisted in the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind a line—the Blue Line—identified by the UN. The Lebanese government was unable to deploy forces in the south, and in 2004 the Security Council again demanded extension of Lebanese government authority throughout Lebanon. It also called for withdrawal of Syrian troops (accomplished in 2005) and “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.” War erupted in Lebanon in July 2006 when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol and abducted two soldiers. Israel bombed Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory; Hezbollah fired hundreds of rockets into Israel. More than 1,000 Lebanese and 161 Israelis were killed, and thousands were displaced on both sides. The war ended with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution

established a new mandate for UNIFIL, adding to its original responsibilities the tasks of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, ensuring that no foreign forces would be present in Lebanon without government consent, assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in taking steps toward the establishment of an area free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets, and weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani River, and authorizing UNIFIL to take all necessary action as it deems within its capabilities to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. Resolution 1701 allowed for the expansion of UNIFIL up to 15,000 troops and a Maritime Task Force. The latter is currently without a flagship or admiral, which is a source of concern to UNIFIL. In September 2010, the government of Lebanon agreed to establish a Strategic Dialogue Mechanism, the purpose of which is to “review regularly the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL and those of the Lebanese Armed Forces” (LAF), with a view to identifying LAF requirements “for the accomplishment of tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006).” This is one outcome of the joint technical review undertaken last year by UNIFIL and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Key Developments

The year has been a challenging one for UNIFIL. There was a change of leadership: A Spaniard, Major-General Alberto Asarta Cuevas, took over the post of force commander from LieutenantGeneral Claudio Graziano in January. There was renewed focus on Ghajar, a village on the Blue Line, the northern part of which is occupied by Israel. Increasing tensions in the mission area and the broader region also affected UNIFIL. Several security incidents occurred in the mission area, including an exchange of fire across the Blue Line on 3 August that left four people dead. The incident occurred when the LAF responded with live fire to an Israeli operation to remove a tree, which was situated south of the Blue Line but north of the technical fence.

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The exchange of fire lasted approximately three hours. An Israeli officer, two Lebanese soldiers, and a Lebanese journalist were killed as a result. UNIFIL was in contact with both parties prior to the incident, seeking to secure Israeli postponement while mutually acceptable alternatives were explored. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) postponed the operation for a short period but then went ahead. The incident led to high tension in the mission area and to media speculation about an Israeli response that would trigger war. Significantly, the LAF (not Hezbollah) was responsible for the firing this time, and Nasrallah stated that he did not expect the incident to lead to renewed conflict. UNIFIL sought to calm tensions by clarifying that Israel had not invaded Lebanese territory. On the following day, the parties met in the Tripartite forum established by UNIFIL. They agreed to respect the Blue Line. UNIFIL is now investigating options for a code of conduct to regulate the work of Israeli and Lebanese forces in sensitive areas. UNIFIL is continuing to work with the parties in an effort to ensure that the incident remains an isolated one. Several other significant security incidents occurred during the reporting period. In December 2009 and June 2010, UNIFIL found explosives in its area of operations. In April, a tense standoff between the LAF and IDF occurred near the Lebanese village of Abbasiya, as the IDF conducted work south of the Blue Line but north of the technical fence. On the following day, Lebanese civilians, led by a member of parliament, crossed the Blue Line in protest. A similar protest took place some days later in the Shebaa Farms area. On both occasions, UNIFIL liaison between the parties sought to restore calm. Protests against UNIFIL took place in late June when the force was conducting a “maximum strength deployment” military exercise. Initially a joint UNIFIL-LAF exercise was planned, but the LAF chose not to participate. When UNIFIL went ahead with the exercise without the LAF, it faced protests from the local population, including stone throwing and impediments to movement. Peacekeepers were slightly

wounded. It is not clear whether the protests were organized or spontaneous expressions of annoyance at the presence of a large number of foreign troops in a densely populated area. There have been almost no popular protests against UNIFIL in the subsequent three months. Four years have passed since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. UNIFIL’s credibility—and that of the UN in general—may be being eroded by lack of progress in implementing outstanding provisions of 1701. The Secretary-General noted that the discovery of weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations “underlines the fact that establishing a zone free of unauthorized weapons and armed personnel between the Litani River and the Blue Line . . . remains a long-term endeavour.” He further noted that the UN regularly receives reports “to the effect that Hizbullah has re-established its arsenal and military capabilities . . . a fact not disavowed by Hizbullah with regard to Lebanon north of the Litani River.” Israel also violates 1701, making “almost daily” intrusions into Lebanese airspace. The UN has continued to seek Israel’s withdrawal from the divided village of Ghajar. In July, the Secretary-General reported that UNIFIL and UNSCOL discussions with the parties had “intensified with a view to reaching a conclusion regarding this long-standing issue.” No concrete progress has been made, however. Although Ghajar was a relatively minor issue in 2006, UN officials now refer to it as a potential catalyst for progress on other aspects of 1701—notably movement toward establishing a permanent cease-fire. On 17 November Israel’s security cabinet approved withdrawal of the IDF from the northern part of Ghajar and redeployment south of the Blue Line. In their place, UNIFIL peacekeepers were given responsibility over the area. The new force commander and his team have been deployed into a highly tense and complex context. They have also had to adjust to the peculiarities of the UN system: the operative paragraphs of Security Council Resolution 1701 do not fall neatly into “military” and “political” categories, and neither the Secretary-General nor the Security Council has ever defined the

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respective responsibilities of the force commander and the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL). UNIFIL and UNSCOL run parallel, if coordinated, processes on several issues, including Ghajar. They hold separate meetings with the parties, informing each other about the substance of discussions. UNIFIL describes its efforts and UNSCOL’s as “complementary”; however, the parallel operation of both offices creates the potential, at least, for gaps and misunderstandings in the UN’s efforts. Political

In late 2009, the formation of a national unity government in Lebanon contributed to an atmosphere of optimism. By late September 2010, this optimism had been replaced by a sense of crisis, concern that the prime minister would be unable to hold his government together, and fear that Lebanon might once more descend into conflict. What went wrong? One problem is that the government has achieved little in practical terms. The prime minister has been unable to cut through the web of corruption and vested interests to deliver visible improvements in areas such as telecommunications, water, and electricity. Although Lebanon is a middle-income country, most areas of the capital still face daily power cuts. In August, an electricity crisis prompted popular protests. Lebanon’s leaders have also failed to make progress toward resolving the country’s internal and external security dilemmas. The Dialogue resumed on 9 March, and the parties continue to sit at the table, but “a number of participants” have refused to discuss Hezbollah’s weapons, arguing that “discussion in the National Dialogue should not serve to question the ‘resistance.’” Without such discussion, the Dialogue is almost empty of content. Speculation that the UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) would indict Hezbollah members contributed to tensions. Throughout the spring and summer, Hezbollah rhetoric against the tribunal intensified: Nasrallah described it as an “Israeli project.” Tension may have contributed to violence that broke out in Beirut in

August. Prime Minister Hariri’s comments in September exonerating Syria for involvement in his father’s murder were doubtless intended to ease friction within his government, and between the Future Movement and Hezbollah more broadly. As one commentator put it, Hariri had chosen “between competing priorities that have become increasingly impossible to pursue simultaneously: the drive to find his father’s killers and the need to govern Lebanon.” The September comments may have further weakened Hariri politically, however, and as the month wore on rumors intensified that he was losing his own people and would be unable to hold the government together. The weakness of the government stands in clear contrast with the physical and political strength of Hezbollah. On 3 September, armed Hezbollah bodyguards entered the international airport without permission from the state authorities to receive former general security chief Jamil as-Sayyed, who was returning from detention by the STL and is wanted by the Lebanese judiciary. A Hezbollah spokesman described this incident, in which Hezbollah acted in defiance of the state, as “normal.” Tensions between Hariri’s Future Movement and Hezbollah have also manifested themselves in disagreement within parliament over Lebanese funding for the STL. The Future Movement has pledged to continue to support the STL, regardless of “threats and intimidation attempts.” With Saad Hariri’s government looking increasingly fragile, Lebanon’s regional neighbors are watching developments in the country with great interest. UNDOF

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established in May 1974 to supervise the cease-fire and the Israel-Syria disengagement agreement. During 2010, the cease-fire was maintained and UNDOF’s area of operation remained generally quiet. UNTSO

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to monitor

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observance of cease-fires negotiated between Israel and its neighbors. UNTSO provides observers and logistical and financial support to UNIFIL and UNDOF, as well as a small observer group in Egypt at the request of the Egyptian government. UNTSO did not undergo any formal changes to its mandate or authorized strength during the year; nor did it suffer any casualties. EUBAM Rafah

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) was established in 2005 to help implement the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access by providing a third-party presence at the Rafah crossing point. When Hamas forces took control of Gaza in June 2007, EUBAM suspended its operations, although the Council of the EU has continued to extend its mandate. Thirteen international and eleven local staff remain in post, but the work of the mission will remain suspended until the situation in Gaza changes. EUPOL COPPS

The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) was established in 2005 to support and advise the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). A follow-up mission, EUPOL COPPS, began operating in January 2006. The operation trains Palestinian police in a number of areas, including traffic control, drugs interdiction, and public order. EUPOL COPPS has also improved police infrastructure, and fosters cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian police services. In October 2008 a rule-of-law section was inaugurated. There was no review of the mandate within the reporting period. A program section has been added to support the mission’s Rule of Law and Police Advisory components. The mission comprised 85 staff (33 local and 52 international). They work only in the West Bank at present. TIPH

Established by Israeli-Palestinian agreement in 1994, the Temporary International Presence in the Hebron (TIPH) is mandated with providing

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

Authorization and Start Date Force Commander Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

31 May 1974 (UNSC Res. 350) Major-General Natalio C. Ecarma (Philippines) $47.8 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 1,043 International Civilian Staff: 41 Local Civilian Staff: 103

For detailed mission information see p. 222

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

Authorization and Start Date Chief of Staff Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

29 May 1948 (UNSC Res. 50) Major-General Robert Mood (Norway) $60.7 million (1 January 2010–31 December 2011) Military Observers: 152 International Civilian Staff: 89 Local Civilian Staff: 127

For detailed mission information see p. 303

European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah)

Authorization Date

Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

5 November 2005 (Agreement on Movement and Access); 12 December 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP) 30 November 2005 Colonel Alain Faugeras (France) $3.1 million Civilian Police: 4

security for Hebron residents and promoting stability through monitoring, reporting, and assistance. The TIPH is coordinated by Norway and staffed by personnel from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

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EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

14 November 2005 (Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP) 1 January 2006 Commissioner Henrik Malmquist (Sweden) $9.1 million Civilian Police: 25

Temporary International Presence in the Hebron (TIPH)

Authorization Date

Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

15 January 1997 (Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron); 12 January 1997 (Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron) January 1997 Brigadier-General Einar Johnsen (Norway) $3.4 million Civilian Police: 21

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Force Commander Budget as of 30 September 2010 Strength as of 30 September 2010

3 August 1981 (Protocol to the Treaty of Peace) April 1982 Ambassador David M. Satterfield (US) Major-General Warren J. Whiting (New Zealand) $76.3 million

on the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) in order to monitor their compliance with human rights standards. The TIPH comprises sixty-six international and ten national staff. MFO Sinai

MFO Sinai was established in 1981 following withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force II and conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The MFO supervises implementation of security provisions of this treaty. On 1 September 2005, the MFO took on responsibility for monitoring the deployment of border guards along the Egyptian side of the Egypt-Gaza border. During the reporting period, there were no changes to MFO’s mandate and no major changes to the force structure. In March, MajorGeneral Warren Whiting, of New Zealand, was appointed force commander. The MFO suffered no casualties through acts of violence in 2010. UNAMI

On 5 August the Security Council extended for another year the mandate of UNAMI, underscoring the importance of the mission in its support of the fledgling Iraqi government. The mission continued to assist the government and people of Iraq in achieving political and national reconciliation; providing support for elections; facilitating regional dialogue; providing support for refugees and internally displaced; and providing advice for economic and social development. Since the contested parliamentary elections in March 2010, UNAMI has been engaged in diplomatic efforts with the competing factions to seek a resolution to the impasse. On 12 November an agreement was reached by the parties that broke the deadlock on the formation of a new Iraqi government.

Troops: 1655 NTM-I

There have been no changes to TIPH’s mandate since December 2009, although the mission has sought to increase its observations and reporting

The NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) continued providing training, advice, and mentoring to the Iraqi armed forces in 2010. The mission is becoming increasingly crucial to building the long-term stability of Iraq as US forces drawn down. The training mission focuses on three

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main areas of engagement: supporting the Iraqi command and control structures; professionalizing the armed forces through training and education; and professionalizing the Iraqi federal police.

UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)

Authorization and Start Date Budget Head of Mission Strength as of 30 September 2010

14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500) $207.7 million (1 January 2011–31 December 2011) Ad Melkert (Netherlands) Troops: 221 Military Observers: 12 International Civilian Staff: 351 Local Civilian Staff: 467

NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

Authorization Date

Start Date Force Commander Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546), 30 July 2004 (establishment NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq [NTM-I]), 16 December 2004 (modified into full-fledged training mission) August 2004 Lieutenant-General Michael D. Barbero (USA) $23.0 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Troops: 170

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3.8 Moldova-Transdniestria

The conflict between Moldova and breakaway Transdniestria remained deadlocked throughout 2010, despite attempts by both Russia and the European Union to break the political impasse. Although no new violence broke out, tensions still run deep between the two parts of the former Soviet Republic.

Transdniestrian region. These efforts culminated in 2005 in the 5 + 2 talks that included Russia, Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, the OSCE, Moldova, and Transdniestria. These talks were suspended in 2006 after a Transdniestria walkout over a customs dispute with Moldova. Involvement by the EU has also met with difficulty, resulting in its decision to withdraw its envoy to Moldova and the southern Caucasus, Kilmai Miszei. The presence of Russian troops in Transdniestria has also become a point of contention. Moldova has asked for the replacement of Russian troops with international observers to maintain the cease-fire, while Transdniestrian officials have called for an increase in Russian troops. Russia, for its part, has considered removing its troops from the JCC. It is unlikely that Russia intends to remove its 1,200-plus troops providing security to Soviet-era military installations.

Background

At the heart of the ongoing conflict are questions of political and cultural identity. The desire of Moldova to integrate into the European Union and foster its close ties to Romania is in opposition with the Transdniestrian desire to maintain close ties with its cultural and linguistic roots in Ukraine and Russia. In September 1990, Transdniestria, fearing Moldovan-Romanian integration, declared its independence. This secession resulted in an intense conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria that lasted until a cease-fire was reached. The cease-fire agreement mandated Russia’s recognition of Moldova’s territorial integrity; established provisions for Dniestrian independence should Moldova join Romania; and created the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPF), comprised of 402 Russian troops, 355 Moldovan troops, and 492 Transdniestrian troops. There are also 10 Ukrainian observers under the auspices of the Russianled Joint Control Commission (JCC). With the JCC enforcing the MoscowChisnau peace agreement, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sought to reach a permanent peace agreement between the two sides, focusing on a negotiated and lasting end to the political conflict, the consolidation of the sovereignty of Moldova, and creating special political status for the

Key Developments

In February 2010, expressing frustration with the frozen conflict, the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) denounced the lack of progress in resolving the dispute and called for a return to the 5 + 2 talks. In June 2010, the Moldovan acting president, Mihai Ghimpu, endorsed a proposed initiative by Russia and Germany to create an EU-Russia security forum whose first task would be to tackle the twenty-year conflict. Any progress will be contingent upon the resolution of the Moldovan domestic political situation. Since 2009, the Moldovan parliament has been unable to select a president. An alliance of four pro-Western parties, Alliance for European Integration (AEI), has a slight majority 94

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in parliament; however, political opposition in the form of the Moldovan Communist Party (CP) has maintained enough influence to threaten walkouts whenever parliament attempts to select a leader. These domestic fault lines also reflect the current conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria. The CP is decidedly pro-Russia; the AEI is pro-West, with strong ties to Romania, and desires EU integration. On 5 September 2010, a national referendum put forth to determine whether the president of Moldova ought to be directly elected by the people, thus circumventing the political impasse in parliament, failed to pass as a result of low voter turnout due to a CP boycott. National elections were held in late November. However, this did not overcome the government deadlock.

Moldova—Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Forces

Authorization Date Start Date Chief of Staff, Joint Headquarters Strength as of 30 September 2010

21 July 1992 July 1992 Colonel Aleksei Tumasher (Russia) Troops: 1,362 Millitary Observers: 40

If a functioning Moldovan government is put in place, this conflict could be at least one step closer to resolution. Otherwise, this conflict will likely continue to fester.

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3.9 Solomon Islands

As 2010 progressed, so did the development of the Solomon Islands’ capacity for economic sustainability, rule of law, and government accountability and service. Support for all three areas of development falls under the mandate of the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and with this progress the support organization has effectively continued to transition from the initial focus of its mission, peacekeeping, to one of capacity building and playing an advisory role. RAMSI was formed by the Pacific Island Forum and deployed on 24 July 2003 at the request of the government of the Solomon Islands as a regional response to a five-year conflict (1998–2003) between the Malatians and Guale ethnic groups. RAMSI successfully provided security and facilitated the surrender of criminal gangs supported by both groups engaged in the conflict. In addition to peacekeeping, RAMSI’s mandate includes a tripartite mission of assisting the government: to establish and maintain law enforcement and an independent judiciary; to foster economic development; and to ensure methods of governance accountable to Solomon Islanders. RAMSI has worked with the government to improve the reputation of the Royal Police Force (RSIPF) through improved training and oversight, focusing on eliminating corruption, establishing accountability, and emphasizing professionalism. In 2009, the government and RAMSI established a new framework, emphasizing development in the provinces outside the Solomon Island capital of Honiara. RAMSI has three branches, supervised by the special coordinator, Graeme Wilson. The Combined Task Force forms the military branch;

the Participating Police Force forms the civilian police force; and the government support branch is staffed with advisers for governance, justice, and economic development.

Background

Despite its presence being at the request of the Solomon Islands government, there have in the past been tensions between RAMSI and the government. The intentions of the heavily Australian RAMSI were called into question by the anti-RAMSI administration of prime minister Monnasseh Sogavare. Relations between the government and RAMSI quickly improved after a vote of “no confidence” in the Sogavare administration and the subsequent election of prime minister Derek Sikua in 2007. The election of the pro-RAMSI Sikua administration acted as a positive public referendum on the presence of RAMSI and its partnership with key government stakeholders.

Key Developments

In 2010, RAMSI focused on building the capacity of the Solomon Islands government to form and maintain its own legal and economic institutions, and RAMSI has thus established a more advisory level of support, providing guidance as the government increases its capacity for governance. Additionally, RAMSI Special Coordinator Wilson encouraged the people of the Solomon Islands to take advantage of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which conducted its first hearings in March 2010. The commission is an attempt to enable Solomon Islanders to air their grievances and experiences of corruption and intimidation that were perpetrated 96

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by members of the government prior to 2003. The commission’s goals also include the resolution of ethnic tensions and their underlying roots in land-use issues. On 4 August 2010, the Solomon Islands held national elections for only the second time since RAMSI began its mission. RAMSI and the RSIPF were largely successful in maintaining peace during this historically tumultuous event for Solomon Islanders. The recent elections were relatively tame, with 508 candidates competing for 50 parliamentary seats. On 24 August, a former foreign minister, Danny Philip, successfully led a political coalition to defeat the Democratic Party candidate, Steve Abana, in a tight election. Philip, the new prime minister, is supported by the political party of former prime minister Sogavare, a vocal critic of RAMSI, and Philip’s election may have implications for the future relationship between RAMSI and the government. RAMSI’s reputation took a hit with the accidental shooting of a Solomon Islander by a RAMSI soldier on the outskirts of Honiara during the week of the elections. The shooting is

Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

Authorization Date Start Date Head of Mission Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

23 October 2000 (Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué) July 2003 Graeme Wilson (Australia) $42.5 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 150 Civilian Police: 305 Civilian Staff: 134

being investigated; it has, however, stoked antiRAMSI sentiment, not only as a result of the shooting itself but also due to the immunity extended to RAMSI personnel in legal matters. In 2011, undoubtedly the level of cooperation between the Philip government and RAMSI will have direct implications for the continued progress of the Solomon Islands’ political and economic development.

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3.10 Somalia

Somalia remained mired in violence in 2010 amid an overall deteriorating security and humanitarian situation. Increased insurgent attacks, including from Al-Shabaab, against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had dire consequences for civilians: more than 200,000 Somalis fled their homes and hundreds have been killed or injured within the past year. Al-Shabaab’s brazen, Al-Qaida–inspired attacks—in particular a suicide attack against civilians in Uganda—highlighted regional effects of terrorism spreading from the conflict in Somalia. Meanwhile, tensions within the TFG and Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) raised concern among the international community about the government’s effectiveness and legitimacy. On 21 December, the UN Security Council increased the authorized force of AMISOM from 8,000 troops to 12,000.

had died of hunger and some 1.5 million were on the verge of starvation. Peacekeeping

Four months after imposing an arms embargo, with violence increasing and a worsening humanitarian situation, in April 1992 the Security Council established the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). The mission’s narrow mandate was to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and protect UN humanitarian operations. Despite the presence of UNOSOM I, attacks on aid groups brought humanitarian operations to a standstill. As a result, US president George H. W. Bush deployed a US-led, Councilsanctioned multinational force, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to use “all necessary means” to create an environment for the resumption of humanitarian aid. The 37,000-strong force, authorized under Chapter VII, was largely successful in its goal to create safe humanitarian space, and in March 1993 control of the operation was turned back over to the UN in the form of UNOSOM II with a new and expanded “nation-building” mandate. UNOSOM II forces suffered heavy casualities and engaged in intense battles with militias, including one led by General Aidid, whose men killed twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers. In October 1993, a botched US attempt to capture Aidid left eighteen Americans dead and precipitated a withdrawal of US and Western forces. By March 1995, the remaining UN peacekeepers had ignominiously left Somalia. Twelve years later, in February 2007, the Council authorized the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to protect the TFG, support political dialogue and national reconciliation, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the reestablishment of Somali security

Background

Although Somalia served as the testing ground for post–Cold War peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in the early 1990s, it has nonetheless remained the world’s most comprehensively failed state. International interest and interventions have ebbed and flowed over the past two decades and, despite some recent success in buttressing the TFG, immense humanitarian and security challenges continue to stymie the consolidation of state authority necessary for peace and stability. In 1991, Somalia was swept with clanbased violence following the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime. With no viable central government, militias fought for control over territory and resources. The humanitarian toll was immense: by early 1992, more than 300,000 people 98

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forces. Although originally envisioned as a bridging mission that would base its exit strategy on the eventual handover to a multidimensional UN mission, by the beginning of 2011 AMISOM continued to be the only peacekeeping presence. Political and Security

One of the first mildly successful attempts to restore a functioning government was the creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), formed in Djibouti in 2000. However, much of Somali society viewed the government as unrepresentative and actively challenged it. As a result, in talks sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2004, the Transitional Federal Government replaced the TNG. The TFG president, Abdulahi Yusuf, soon requested a strong peacekeeping presence to support his government. IGAD decided to send an AU-sponsored mission, IGASOM, but it never materialized. Beset by internal disagreements and external threats, the new government met in exile. For nearly half of 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)—a rival of the TFG—exerted control over Mogadishu and most of southern Somalia. Because they brought a modicum of stability, the UIC was broadly popular among Somalis. In December 2006, Ethiopia intervened to oust the UIC and prop up the TFG. A fierce, complex insurgency resulted, led by AlShabaab, a militia under the hard-line factions of the UIC. Many Somalis viewed the TFG as a puppet of Ethiopia, and Al-Shabaab gained popularity for espousing national resistance to foreign occupation. Large-scale fighting erupted in 2007 and 2008 and more than a million Somalis were internally displaced. Against this backdrop, a group of disaffected UIC members, both government and diaspora leaders, came together to form the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) to oppose the Ethiopian presence and the TFG. As fighting ensued, the UN Political Support Office in Somalia (UNPOS) brought representatives of the ARS and the TFG together for talks in neighboring Djibouti, dubbed the Djibouti Process. The parties agreed on a political settlement

0 0

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Map No. 4255.12 UNITED NATIONS September 2008

Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Authorization Date Start Date Force Commander Budget Strength as of 30 September 2010

6 December 2006 (UNSC Res. 1744) March 2007 Major-General Nathan Mugisha (Uganda) $100.2 million (1 October 2009–30 September 2010) Troops: 7,200 Civilian Police: 50

that allowed for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the establishment of an “international security presence” in their place, and inclusion of the ARS into the TFG. However, after joining the peace process, the ARS split into two groups: moderates and hard-liners. The hardliners rejected the Djibouti agreement and were more determined than ever to fight the TFG and its backers, Ethiopia and AMISOM.

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In early 2009, new signs of hope began to emerge: Ethiopia withdrew its forces and a moderate Islamist, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected president of the TFG. While initially diffusing much of the insurgency driven by Al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgent threat remained persistent. Unable to quell the insurgency, the government voted to implement sharia law in April 2009. But in June, the government declared a state of emergency and insurgents came close to taking the presidential palace. Throughout 2009, a spate of insurgent attacks, including suicide bombings and assassinations, brought Somalia back to a heightened state of insecurity, even though the government continued to operate out of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab and other hard-line Islamist insurgents continued to control much of the countryside in southern Somalia. While the conflict in Somalia has been largely confined to its southern half, with Somaliland and Puntland remaining relatively peaceful, piracy off Somalia’s coast knows no bounds, neither on nor offshore. Two major initiatives were active in 2009: the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) and the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. The former reached operational capacity in 2009 to protect humanitarian-aid and commercial vessels; the latter helped coordinate funds and projects for restoring rule-of-law and security sector institutions to curb the spreading growth of piracy, whose origins are on land.

Key Developments Political and Security

Two years after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the election of Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Somalia’s security situation remained bleak. The government, while operating in parts of Mogadishu, still was unable to retain control of much of the capital, let alone the southern half of the country. Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups continued to hold vast swaths of territory, which they used to recruit and train fighters to violently oppose the TFG and AMISOM. Al-Shabaab staged multiple bold attacks in 2010. On 11 July, three Al-Shabaab suicide

bombers killed seventy-six civilians who were watching the World Cup final in Kampala. The attacks were explicitly meant to “punish” Uganda for contributing the majority of AMISOM’s troops. In August and September, the Islamist militant group fought heavily against AMISOM and TFG troops, staging numerous attacks in and around Mogadishu, leaving hundreds dead. On 23 August, during Ramadan, Al-Shabaab attacked a hotel in Mogadishu, killing thirtytwo people, including six parliamentarians. Another attack, at the Mogadishu airport as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Augustine Mahiga, was flying out after meetings with President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, further highlighted the group’s ability to strike inside one of the few key centers controlled by the government. As civilians are caught in the fighting and are killed or wounded, the intense conflict between AMISOM and Islamist militants has led to a backlash against the peacekeeping and government force. A number of incidents of civilian casualties from AMISOM and government counterattacks against insurgent attacks have contributed to weak popular support for the TFG. In one incident on 17 November, at least sixteen civilians were killed in Mogadishu’s Bakara market after fighters from an armed group clashed with African Union troops. The year 2010 was marked by some positive developments despite the country’s severe humanitarian crisis and security situation. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s government made strides in reaching out to groups outside of the Djibouti process. The cooperation agreement between the TFG and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), signed on 15 March, set into motion a series of positive developments, including inclusion of the group into the TFG and armed forces. Furthermore, members of other Islamist groups, including Hizbul Islam, have joined the government, and a number of prominent Al-Shabbab commanders and fighters have renounced violence and defected to the TFG. There was also increased concern from Somalis and the international community about infighting and feuds within the TFG, with UN

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Special Representative Mahiga calling for government unity. On 16 May, President Sheikh Ahmed dissolved the cabinet, prompting the speaker of the parliament to resign. Four days later, however, the speaker and the cabinet were reinstated. By the beginning of July a new cabinet was formed, with ASWJ and diaspora members, but the prime minister resigned on 21 September after months of disagreements with the president. The new prime minister, Mohammed Abdullahi Mohamed, named a new, leaner cabinet, cutting twenty-one offices and retaining only two members of the previous government. While this has been welcomed by some, others are unsure how the new cabinet will fare given its disregard for the clan-based power-sharing system. The Independence Federal Constitution Commission launched the consultation process on the draft constitution, which will be issued in December 2010. Because the transition period stipulated by the Djibouti process is set to end in August 2011, many are concerned about the government’s lack of progress in fulfilling the transitional agenda. An international conference cohosted by the UN and the Turkish government in May 2010 (the Istanbul Conference on Somalia) highlighted Somalia’s political, security, and reconstruction needs and underscored the importance of tackling the root causes of the region’s piracy onshore by training and funding the Somali security forces and economic restructuring. Much like the Brussels conference of 2009, the Istanbul conference brought more than fifty member-states together to pledge support for the TFG and reinforce the message that the international community remains committed to helping Somalia recover. However, unlike Brussels, new pledges were not made; the TFG has received 76 percent of the total pledges from the earlier conference. The EU Training Mission (EUTM), established to strengthen the Somali security sector, commenced in April. EUTM began a twelvemonth training of more than 2,000 Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including nearly 100 ASWJ soldiers, at the Bihanga camp, 200 kilometers west of Kampala. In

Ismail Taxta/Reuters

SOMALIA • 101

Ugandan peacekeepers from AMISOM patrol in their armored personnel carrier (APC) around Somalia's house of parliament in the capital Mogadishu, 27 May 2010.

addition to specific military training, recruits learned about international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law and the protection of civilians, including the specific protection needs of women and children. EU NAVOR, or Operation Atalanta, continued to carry out its main tasks in 2010: protecting the World Food Program (WFP) and other vulnerable vessels and contributing to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. On 14 June 2010, the Council of the EU extended the operation’s mandate for two years. The TFG also signed a bilateral cooperation agreement on countering piracy with the Puntland region in April. Peacekeeping

AMISOM operated in an increasingly hostile environment, with frequent insurgent attacks. Despite this, the force maintained control of key installations in Mogadishu: the presidential palace, the airport, and the harbor, and Kilometer 4 (K4) (Sector 1) and the Military Academy and Mogadishu University (Sector 2). Overall, AMISOM, which is largely confined to operating in the capital, lacked the capability and resources to effectively implement its mandate.

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Box 3.10 Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

Concerted international efforts to combat piracy off Somalia’s coast continued in 2010 with forty-nine UN member states working in some manner toward providing a measure of security from piracy. The states involved ranged from the United States and China to Russia and Iran, with participation also coming from seven international organizations and three multinational coalitions (led by the EU, NATO, and the United States). While the members of this diverse group of countries are united to counter piracy, their motivations for doing so range from protecting humanitarian-aid vessels and cargo ships supplying the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to providing security to the vital Gulf of Aden shipping lanes. There have been measurable successes over the past year; however, substantial concern about piracy emerging from Somalia continues, and coordinating the activities of this wide range of actors remains a primary operational challenge. UN Security Council Resolution 1897, passed in November 2009, extended the legal authority to the international community to combat pirates in Somalia’s territory and territorial waters and commended the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

(CGPCS). The CGPCS is an international cooperation mechanism, a common point of contact on all aspects of combating piracy for the international community through quarterly meetings with stakeholders at UN headquarters. The CGPCS is composed of four working groups: operational coordination, chaired by the United Kingdom; legal matters, chaired by Denmark; strengthening shipping self-awareness, headed by the United States; and communications and media strategy, chaired by Egypt. Similarly, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group, established in 2008, is a voluntary international military group—a vehicle for sharing best practices and informal discussions on combating piracy. While SHADE initially consisted only of the three multinational coalitions operating off Somalia, it rapidly expanded to involve bilateral deployments. This forum meets monthly at the expert level in Bahrain. In 2010, China agreed to an increased coordination role in SHADE, boosting the profile of its antipiracy efforts. The International Maritime Bureau reported that increased international efforts contributed to a decrease in the number of pirate attacks in the first half of 2010, even as the capability of pirates

AMISOM peacekeepers have insufficient equipment for protecting AMISOM installations, and instead of using concrete bunkers and barriers, the troops have resorted to sandbags. The UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOA), a field-support operation led by the Department of Field Support (DFS), continued delivering logistics and support capacity to AMISOM. The resourcing and funding of AMISOM and the TFG remained problematic. The UN does not have the resources to adequately fund the TFG civil servants and police nor to reimburse countries providing troops to AMISOM.

to mount attacks far from shore increased. This reality underscored the need for a further level of coordination in regard to addressing the root causes of piracy and ensuring a viable model for prosecution of detained pirate suspects. The justice and security sectors in Somalia lack the capability to adequately address either challenge, and the international community has yet to agree on a united approach. UN Security Council Resolution 1918, adopted unanimously in April 2010, requested a report from the SecretaryGeneral on possible approaches to prosecution of piracy suspects. The Secretary-General’s response, delivered in August, outlined seven options, ranging from the enhancement of UN capacitybuilding activities to the establishment of an international tribunal under Chapter VII authority. As the Security Council considered these recommendations, Kenya announced in October 2010 that it was pulling out of a deal to try suspected pirates captured by the EU, accusing its European partners of failing to live up to their commitments. Balancing the sometimes conflicting interests of regional stakeholders and their international partners will doubtless be key to ensuring the viability of a future pirateprosecution model.

While the EU pays allowances to AMISOM personnel, troops are currently paid less than that of UN missions. This is seen as an obstacle to incentivizing more countries to contribute troops to an already dangerous operation. In response to the increased insurgent threat, many states pushed for more troops for the modestly sized AU force. On 5 July, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) committed to deploying 2,000 peacekeepers to AMISOM and reiterated its call for AMISOM to be turned into a UN mission. At the AU Summit in Kampala, some two weeks

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after the suicide attacks, some states called for more robust rules of engagement (ROE) and a supplement of 14,000 troops to bring the authorized size of the peacekeeping force to 20,000. However, beyond approving the previous IGAD request for 2,000 troops, there was no agreement on a change in the ROE of AMISOM. Earlier, in February, the AU Peace and Security Council once again called for the UN to impose a nofly zone and a sea blockade to prevent the entry of individuals and matériels for the insurgency. While this has not occurred, the UN arms embargo remained in place and instituted targeted sanctions in April. The joint security committee, created as a part of the Djibouti process, with representatives from the TFG and the international community, continued efforts to support the institutional development of the security sector. The committee has urged the adoption of the National Security and Stabilization Plan and the Security Sector Assessment and for the government to act on its recommendations.

Conclusion

On 21 December, the UN Security Council extended AMISOM until 30 September 2011 and increased the authorized force by 50 percent,

from 8,000 to 12,000. Uganda indicated that it would provide the 4,000 additional troops. As in the previous resolutions, the Council reiterated its intent to create a UN peacekeeping operation, but Council members’ appetite for making this a reality remained limited. The decision to augment the AU force came soon after an announcement from erstwhile rivals Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam that they would be joining together as allies in their fight against the TFG and AMISOM troops. Regardless, the violence and insecurity of 2010 has impacted civilians. Between January and 14 November, the WHO reported that there were 3,955 weapons-related casualties from the two major hospitals in Mogadishu, including 718 children less than five years of age. A third hospital reported 2,959 weapons-related casualties in the same period. As Somalia enters 2011 and the TFG nears the end of its transitional period, the country’s future relies as much on the political authority of the Somali central government as it does on neutralizing the growing terrorist threat of AlShabaab and other insurgent groups. The outcome of increased AMISOM troop deployments and security-related, military responses remains unclear. As in the past, Somalia insurgent groups appear likely to increase attacks if more outside troops arrive.

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3.11 Western Sahara

Negotiations in February and November 2010 between the government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO) on the future of Western Sahara stalled yet again over the issue of final status for the territory. Consistent with the positions put forth during the first round of negotiations in April 2007, Morocco remained firm that Western Sahara be an autonomous region within the kingdom of Morocco, while POLISARIO insisted that a referendum be held, with independence included as an option. The UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) continued to maintain and verify the cease-fire in the territory. The territory also suffered the worst violence since the cease-fire when Moroccan forces raided the Sahrawi-inhabited Gadaym Izik camp outside the capital city Laayoune. As a result of the ensuing violence, a number of Moroccan and Sahrawis were killed and injured, including one Spanish national. Background

MINURSO was established in 1991 to monitor the cease-fire agreement between Morocco and POLISARIO and implement a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The cease-fire ended a protracted war over the territory that erupted in full force following Spain’s withdrawal in 1975. Twenty years after the establishment of the mission, the referendum, originally planned for January 1992, has not been held due to irreconcilable differences between the parties over the terms of the vote and voter eligibility. MINURSO has

maintained the status quo in the territory in the absence of a political settlement by the parties. Throughout the 1990s MINURSO identified eligible voters to participate in the referendum on the future status of the territory. However, after publishing the Provisional Voters List (PVL) in 1999, a series of appeals were filed that slowed the process. To break the deadlock, James Baker, former US secretary of state and then–Personal Envoy of the SecretaryGeneral, presented what became known as “the Baker Plan” in two iterations in 2001 and 2003. The latest 2003 Framework Agreement proposed semiautonomous status for the Western Sahara for a period of five years culminating in a referendum that included integration with Morocco, independence, or autonomy. POLISARIO agreed to negotiate on the basis of this plan, but the terms were rejected by Morocco. Peter Van Walsum succeeded Baker as the Personal Envoy, presiding over direct and unconditional negotiations between the parties called for by the Security Council in Resolution 1754. Four rounds of talks were held in Manhasset, New York, in 2007 and 2008. Although some progress was made on the humanitarian front, the parties did not move from their entrenched positions regarding independence for the territory. Van Walsum left his post with a letter to the Security Council in which he said that independence was not a realistic option.

Key Developments

In January 2009, the Secretary-General appointed US diplomat Christopher Ross as Personal Envoy. Throughout 2009 and 2010, Ross has tried

104

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UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

Authorization and Start Date SRSG Force Commander Budget Strength as of 31 October 2010

29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690) Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt) Major-General Zhao Jingmin (China) $60.0 million (1 July 2010–30 June 2011) Troops: 20 Military Observers: 204 Police: 6 International Civilian Staff: 100 Local Civilian Staff: 164 UN Volunteers: 20

For detailed mission information see p. 185

UN Photo/Martine Perret

to break the parties’ intransigence by meeting with regional stakeholders such as Algeria, the prime backer of POLISARIO, and Mauritania and visiting capitals of the so-called Group of Friends. Yet despite supplementing bilateral efforts with wider consultation, substantial political progress has remained elusive. Indeed, the fifth round of the Manhasset negotiations has yet to be convened, despite informal consultations between the parties on 10–11 February 2010, Ross’s regional visits in March and October, and his meetings in the capitals of the Group of Friends, including London, Paris, Madrid, Washington, and Moscow, in June and July. MINURSO continued to implement its mandate in the context of good relations with the Royal Moroccan Army and POLISARIO’s military forces. The mission conducted ground and aerial patrols to monitor adherence to the military agreements, and the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre increased its collaboration with the parties to eradicate the threat of landmines and unexploded remnants of war. Despite mutual concerns expressed by the parties about alleged violations of human rights of the refugees and in the Western Sahara, the mission has no human rights mandate, and the UN has no staff on the ground to address these issues. In April 2010, at the behest of the SecretaryGeneral, the Security Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year, calling on the parties to enter into a more substantive phase of negotiations and continue negotiations without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the selfdetermination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. On 8 November, as Christopher Ross set to meet POLISARIO, Moroccan, Mauritanian, and Algerian representatives in Manhasset, New York, Moroccan forces raided Gadaym Izik camp outside of Laayoune where some 12,000 Sahrawis resided. Among the conflicting reports

A member of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)'s Military Liaison Office chats with a group of local Western Saharans, 17 June 2010.

of deaths and injuries, the clashes killed between eleven and twenty people, including Moroccan forces. POLISARIO claimed 700 were injured and more than 150 missing. A development from the informal talks held on 8 and 9 November was that the parties agreed to resume “without delay” family visits by

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air (which were suspended in March by the POLISARIO) to connect Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf, Algeria, to the Western Sahara and to discuss (for the first time with full Algerian participation) the confidence-building measures of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR). While rejecting each other’s proposals as the basis for future negotiations, the fact that the parties agreed to discuss these goodfaith confidence-building measures in talks in December and early 2011 was encouraging.

Box 3.11 Aid Worker Security Database

The rising number of armed attacks against civilian aid operations in current conflicts has spurred new efforts to improve the capacity of aid workers to assess and mitigate their security risk. An important component of this effort is better reporting, tracking, analyzing, and sharing of information among humanitarian organizations on these attacks. Over the past several years, incident data tracking by individual agencies has begun to improve; however, gaps and underreporting continue, and the vast majority of organizations have no means or a very inconsistent approach to incident tracking and analysis. Partly because aid agencies have relied for so long on perception and anecdotal information to drive their security decisionmaking, they find it difficult to shift to a more standardized, centralized approach to documenting and analyzing security incidents. As a result, while aid personnel tend to agree that a centralized tracking system would help individual and collective decisionmaking, the opportunity and organizational drivers to realize such a system have been missing. Seeking to fill this information gap, on 19 August 2010, marking the second World Humanitarian Day, Humanitarian Outcomes launched the online version of the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD). The AWSD tracks major incidents of violence against aid workers, with data going back to 1997. Initiated in 2005, the

AWSD remains the single most comprehensive global source of this data, providing a much-needed quantitative evidence base for analysis of the changing security environment for civilian aid operations. Statistics provided by the AWSD formed the basis of a major study released in September 2006 by the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute and the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, as well as briefing papers and data updates in 2006 and 2009. The AWSD figures and related trend analyses have been extensively cited in reports and official statements by the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, governments, and a wide range of media outlets. With the launching of the related website (www.aidworkersecurity.org), for the first time global data on attacks against aid workers are publicly accessible. Having removed details such as the names of individual organizations and victims, the online version of the database contains all major incidents of deliberate violence (resulting in death, abduction, or serious injury) committed against aid workers across the world. Each incident report contains the location, date, type of organization (e.g., local and international NGOs and Red Cross/ Red Crescent Societies, UN agencies, and the ICRC), and whether the victims were national or international staff. The

AWSD also records the type of tactics or means of violence used in the attacks. Incident reports are systematically collected from public sources and augmented by internal information provided directly to the project by aid organizations. The project has also formed agreements with a number of regional and field-level security consortiums for direct information sharing and verification of incidents. Incident reports are crosschecked and verified with the relevant agencies on a quarterly basis. High insecurity for aid workers can significantly reduce access to a needy population and limit both the amount and quality of aid provided. To better understand and measure this serious implication of aid worker attacks, the research team is increasing documentation of the impacts of this insecurity, such as suspensions of programs and withdrawals in the aftermath of attacks. Over the next few years, the AWSD research team will provide constant monitoring and updated analysis of trends in the security environment for aid operations. It will refine and further systematize its methodology for gathering and verifying incident data, and will seek an institutional partner within the international aid community to house and sustain the database for the use of all humanitarian practitioners, policy makers and researchers in future.

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Global Statistics on UN-Commanded Missions

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This chapter contains data on all current missions of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Department of Field Support (DFS). Data regarding UN support to AMISOM and UNSOA is not included unless otherwise specified. The data presented here is aggregated from the mission-by-mission material in Chapter 6. It is based on public UN documents and sources, combined with data provided by DPKO and DFS and in some cases by the UN Department of Management (DM) and the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) Programme in Bonn.

This chapter covers the period running from 1 July 2009 to the third quarter of 2010. The coverage reflects the UN’s 1 July 2009–30 June 2010 budgetary year in addition to information available on later months. Previous editions have included data on some Department of Political Affairs (DPA) missions supported by DFS, however, this information is now contained in a separate Center on International Cooperation publication, the Review of Political Missions. Variances in data from previous volumes reflect the removal of these figures.

4.1 Total UN Troops: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

120,000

Total Number of Troops

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

Auth. Troops Troops

Source: DPKO FGS.

108

Oct. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS • 109

4.2 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2010

10,000

9,602 8,645 7,727

Number of Troops

8,000

6,000 5,069

4,881 3,770

4,000

3,488 2,845 2,396 2,368

2,198 2,022

2,000

2,004 1,905 1,892

1,599 1,556 1,544 1,437 1,066

Source: DPKO FGS.

4.3 Troops Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2010

18,000

17,112 17,050

16,000

Number of Troops

14,000 11,881

12,000

10,000

9,451 8,651 7,931

8,000

7,572

6,000

4,000

Source: DPKO FGS.

20

0

0

0

0

MINURSO

UNMIK

UNMIT

UNMOGIP

UNTSO

1,043 859

UNFICYP

MINURCAT

UNOCI

UNMIL

MINUSTAH

UNMIS

UNIFIL

UNAMID

MONUSCO

0

1,327

UNDOF

2,000

Spain

France

Senegal

Morocco

China

Indonesia

Italy

South Africa

Brazil

Jordan

Ethiopia

Uruguay

Ghana

Nepal

Rwanda

Nigeria

Egypt

Pakistan

Bangladesh

India

0

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Page 110

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS • 111

4.4 Top Twenty Increased UN Military Contributors: 31 October 2009–31 October 2010

Egypt Brazil Tanzania Burkina Faso Nepal Indonesia Korea Japan Zambia Mongolia Peru Denmark Sierra Leone Argentina Sri Lanka Malaysia Ghana Guatemala South Africa Jordan

1,170 910 616 530 321 274 233 225 196 167 161 146 127 115 69 49 44 37 32 24 Number of Military Personnel

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: This is a year-on-year comparison of actual troop and military observer figures.

4.5 Variance in UN Military Contributions by Region: 31 October 2009–31 October 2010

North America

15

Central and South America

Europe

933

–2,794

28

Middle East

–17

Central and South Asia

936

East Asia and the Pacific

Africa

1,389 Actual Number of Troops

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: This is a year-on-year comparison of actual troop and military observer figures.

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4.6 Total UN Military Observers: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

3,500

Number of Military Observers

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

Oct. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0

July ‘09

500

Auth. Military Obs. Military Obs.

Source: DPKO FGS.

4.7 Top Twenty Military Observer Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2010

120

113 99 95 84 79

63 58

55

54

54

54

51 44

41

41

40

40

37

36

36

36

Tunisia

58

Tanzania

63 60

Niger

80

Canada

Number of Military Observers

100

20

Source: DPKO FGS.

Paraguay

Romania

Brazil

Malaysia

Uruguay

Senegal

Jordan

China

Nigeria

Zambia

Nepal

Yemen

Russia

Ghana

India

Bangladesh

Egypt

Pakistan

0

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4.8 Military Observers Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2010

800 715 700

600

486

500

400

300

264 204 192

200

152

134

Source: DPKO FGS.

8

0

0

0

0

MINUSTAH

UNDOF

UNFICYP

UNIFIL

20 MINURCAT

33 UNMIT

UNMIL

UNMOGIP

UNTSO

UNOCI

MINURSO

UNMIS

0

UNAMID

42

UNMIK

100

MONUSCO

•

Number of Military Observers

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4.9 Total UN Police: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

20,000 18,000

Total Number of Police

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000

Auth. Police Police

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

Oct. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0

July ‘09

2,000

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4.10 Top Twenty Police Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October 2010

2,500

2,008

2,000

1,500

842 816

226 211 195 167

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

4.11 Police Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October 2010

5,000 4,747 4,500 4,000

Number of Police

3,500

3,146

3,000 2,500 2,000 1,485

1,500

1,316 1,304

1,181

1,000

655

0

0

UNTSO

0

UNMOGIP

0

UNIFIL

6

UNDOF

UNFICYP

UNMIS

UNMIL

MONUSCO

UNOCI

UNMIT

MINUSTAH

UNAMID

Source: DPKO PD.

8

MINURSO

68

0

UNMIK

109

MINURCAT

500

Turkey

Sierra Leone

France

Zambia

Côte d’Ivoie

166 162 161 158 155

Uganda

290 255

Portugal

Ghana

Senegal

Nigeria

India

Nepal

Pakistan

Jordan

Bangladesh

0

374 346

Rwanda

500

Gambia

893

Malaysia

905

Egypt

919

1,000

Philippines

Number of Police

1,769

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4.12 Top Twenty Increased UN Police Contributors: 31 October 2009–31 October 2010

Bangladesh Senegal Pakistan Jordan Egypt India Italy Sierra Leone Gambia France Nepal Philippines Rwanda Mali Namibia CAR Burkina Faso Canada Thailand Romania Tanzania

500 229 202 159 153 151 114 94 85 68 68 51 36 35 28 21 19 18 17 16 16

Number of Police Personnel

Source: DPKO PD. Note: This is a year-on-year comparison of actual police figures.

4.13 Variance in UN Police Contributions by Region: 31 October 2009–31 October 2010

North America

Central and South America

9

20

Europe

155

Middle East

161

923

Central and South Asia

East Asia and the Pacific –131

Africa

262 Number of Police Personnel

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: This is a year-on-year comparison of actual police figures.

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4.14 Formed Police by UN Mission: 31 October 2009 and 31 October 2010

2,500

Oct. 2009 1,949

2,000

Number of Police

Oct. 2010

1,854

1,819

1,500 1,131 1,000

886 887

900

841 845 749

555 524 500

0 UNAMID

MINUSTAH

MONUC/ MONUSCO

UNMIL

UNOCI

UNMIT

Source: DPKO PD. Note: This is a year-on-year comparison of actual formed police unit figures.

4.15 Formed Police Contributions by UN Mission: 31 October 2010

MINUSTAH Bangladesh Jordan India Pakistan Senegal Nigeria Nepal Egypt Malaysia Portugal Indonesia Italy France Israel Total

320 319 300 280 140 140 140 — — — — 127 74 14 1,854

Source: DPKO PD.

MONUSCO 389 — 250 — 248 — — — — — — — — — 887

UNAMID 559 280 — 131 280 280 140 140 — — 139 — — — 1,949

UNMIL

UNMIT

UNOCI

Total

— 240 245 — — 120 240 — — — — — — — 845

105 — — 139 — — — — 140 140 — — — — 524

300 450 — 150 — — — — — — — — — — 900

1,673 1,289 795 700 668 540 520 140 140 140 139 127 74 14 6,959

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4.16 Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 8.7%

North America 0.1%

Europe 9.1%

Africa 35.3%

Middle East 2.5%

Central and South Asia 36.6%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

East Asia and the Pacific 7.7%

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

30,032 6,552 31,145 2,161 7,781 7,389 87 85,147

35.3% 7.7% 36.6% 2.5% 9.1% 8.7% 0.1%

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: The regions used here and in the charts below are defined as follows: Africa: all members of north athe African Union and Morocco. Central and South Asia: all members of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (including Afghanistan) and all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to the east of the Caspian Sea, other than Russia. East Asia and the Pacific: all states in or bordering on the Pacific, the states of South-East Asia and Mongolia. Central and South America: all members of the Organization of American States other than Canada, the United States and Mexico. Europe: all states to the north of the Mediterranean, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Malta, Russia and Turkey. Middle East: all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. North America: Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

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4.17 Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 10.2% Europe 1.0%

East Asia and the Pacific 0.0%

Middle East 15.4%

Central and South Asia 0.0%

Africa 74.4%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

62,478 33 42 13,076 867 8,651 — 85,147

73.4% 0.0% 0.0% 15.4% 1.0% 10.2% —

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4.18 Origin of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 1.4% North America 1.4% Europe 7.2%

Middle East 13.7%

Africa 34.3%

Central and South Asia 34.4%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

East Asia and the Pacific 7.6%

Police

Percentage of Total

4,809 1,068 4,827 1,924 1,004 199 194 14,025

34.3% 7.6% 34.4% 13.7% 7.2% 1.4% 1.4%

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4.19 Deployment of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 22.4%

Europe 0.5% East Asia and the Pacific 10.6% Africa 66.4%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

Police

Percentage of Total

9,318 1,485 — — 76 3,146 — 14,025

66.4% 10.6% — — 0.5% 22.4% —

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4.20 Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 2.7% Middle East North America Europe 2.5% 0.1% 1.5%

Central and South Asia 42.7%

Africa 46.5%

East Asia and the Pacific 4.1%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

29,053 2,551 26,662 1,547 950 1,665 50 62,478

46.5% 4.1% 42.7% 2.5% 1.5% 2.7% 0.1%

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4.21 Origin of UN Police Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 0.6% Europe North America 3.4% 0.2% Middle East 15.6%

Africa 41.2%

Central and South Asia 33.8% East Asia and the Pacific 5.1%

Region

Police

Percentage of Total

Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

3,839 474 3,149 1,457 321 55 23 9,318

41.2% 5.1% 33.8% 15.6% 3.4% 0.6% 0.2%

Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

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4.22 Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2010

Central and South America 0.5%

North America 0.1% Africa 7.5%

East Asia and the Pacific 25.6% Europe 47.7%

Central and South Asia 18.6%

Middle East 0.0%

Region Africa East Asia and the Pacific Central and South Asia Middle East Europe Central and South America North America Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

978 3,349 2,438 3 6,234 62 12 13,076

7.5% 25.6% 18.6% 0.0% 47.7% 0.5% 0.1%

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4.23 Total UN Civilian Personnel (international, local and UNV): 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

50,000 45,000

Total Civilian Personnel

40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000

Oct. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

Auth. Civilian Staff Civilian Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; UNV Programme. Notes: Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Figures do not include staff from UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes.

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4.24 UN Mission International Civilian and DPKO Headquarters Staff Occupational Groups: 31 October 2010

Occupation

International Percentage Percentage Percentage Civilian International DFS DFS DPKO DPKO Staff Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff

Administration Aviation Cartography Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Financial Management Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Program Analysis Medical Services Military Police Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Relations and Liaison Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Supply Specialists Training Transport

Total

744 206 — 168 2 62 374 226 265 147 69 48

13.0% 3.6% — 2.9% 0.0% 1.1% 6.5% 3.9% 4.6% 2.6% 1.2% 0.8%

114 13 3 — — — 9 52 95 — — 3

27.9% 3.2% 0.7% — — — 2.2% 12.7% 23.2% — — 0.7%

117 — — — — — 3 5 10 — — 8

28.3% — — — — — 0.7% 1.2% 2.4% — — 1.9%

544 53 850

9.5% 0.9% 14.8%

27 3 28

6.6% 0.7% 6.8%

— — 1

— — 0.2%

3 83 — — 290 124 133 147 — 176 711 57 — — 255

0.1% 1.4% — — 5.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.6% — 3.1% 12.4% 1.0% — — 4.4%

— 4 — 1 — — 10 — — — — — 27 — 20

— 1.0% — 0.2% — — 2.4% — — — — — 6.6% — 4.9%

— — 84 24 84 — 32 — 5 11 2 7 — 19 1

— — 20.3% 5.8% 20.3% — 7.7% — 1.2% 2.7% 0.5% 1.7% — 4.6% 0.2%

5,737

409

413

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO EO. Notes: Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. DPKO HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year. The “other/n.a.” category contains the staff members not classified due to insufficient information at the time of the data publication or other factors.

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4.25 UN Mission International Civilian Staff Occupations: 31 October 2010

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO EO. Note: Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not represented.

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4.26 DFS and DPKO Headquarters Staff Occupations: 31 October 2010

120

117 114

DFS HQ Staff

100

95

DPKO HQ Staff 84

84

80

60 52 40 32 27

24

5

Human Resources Mgmt.

Financial Mgmt.

Info. Systems and Tech.

Supply Specialists

Logisitics

1

1

Transportation

Relationa and Liaison

Social Affairs

Info. Mgmt.

Training

Rule of Law

Police

Program Mgmt.

Military

10

7 3

Aviation

0

4

Engineering

0

3

Medical Support

2

0

Political Affairs

13

9 3

Legal

5

Cartography

7

Public Info.

8 3

Security

11

10

Humanitarian Affaris

20

28

27

20

19

Administration

•

Number of Headquarters Personnel

130

1/18/11

Source: DPKO EO. Note: HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

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4.27 Highest National Representation in UN Missions: 31 October 2010

UN Missions – International Professional and General Service Staff Total International Staff in Missions = 7,081

Country United States Kenya Philippines India Canada Ghana Sierra Leone United Kingdom Nigeria Ethiopia Serbia France Pakistan Uganda Cameroon Tanzania Australia Côte d’Ivoire Italy Lebanon

Number of Percentage of Total International Staff International Staff 363 339 265 234 202 201 198 190 159 156 152 147 130 122 115 115 100 99 96 91

10.4% 9.8% 7.6% 6.7% 5.8% 5.8% 5.7% 5.5% 4.6% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 3.7% 3.5% 3.3% 3.3% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.6%

Source: DFS FPD. Note: Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not represented.

DPKO Missions – Local Professional and General Service Staff Total Local Staff in Missions = 14,153

Mission UNMIS MONUSCO UNAMID MINUSTAH UNMIL UNMIT UNOCI UNIFIL MINURCAT UNMIK MINURSO UNTSO UNFICYP UNDOF UNMOGIP

Number of Local Staff

Percentage of Total Local Staff

2,821 2,782 2,689 1,215 984 893 737 657 585 235 164 127 113 103 48

19.9% 19.7% 19.0% 8.6% 7.0% 6.3% 5.2% 4.6% 4.1% 1.7% 1.2% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.3%

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4.28 Highest National Representation in UN DPKO Headquarters: 31 October 2010 Total DPKO and DFS Headquarters Staff: 829 540 Professional Staff and 289 General Service Staff

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Country United States Philippines Canada France United Kingdom Germany India Australia Italy Japan Russia China Nigeria Ghana Pakistan Uruguay Myanmar Kenya Bangladesh Brazil Ireland

DFS

DPKO

DFS and DPKO

96 25 17 12 11 8 11 8 4 5 8 5 7 6 4 7 8 6 — 4 8

88 22 13 18 19 18 13 8 11 10 7 9 7 7 9 6 4 5 10 6 2

184 47 30 30 30 26 24 16 15 15 15 14 14 13 13 13 12 11 10 10 10

Percentage of Total DPKO HQ Staff 22.2% 5.7% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.1% 2.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%

Source: DPKO EO. Note: HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

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4.29 Total Personnel in UN Missions: 31 October 2010

Mission

Troops

Military Observers

Police

International Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Total

UNAMID MONUSCO UNMIS MINUSTAH UNIFIL UNMIL UNOCI UNMIT MINURCAT UNDOF UNFICYP MINURSO UNMIK UNTSO UNMOGIP

17,050 17,112 9,451 8,651 11,881 7,931 7,572 — 1,327 1,043 859 20 — — —

264 715 486 — — 134 192 33 20 — — 204 8 152 42

4,747 1,181 655 3,146 — 1,304 1,316 1,485 109 — 68 6 8 — —

1,109 948 897 493 330 432 380 362 354 41 37 100 141 89 24

2,689 2,782 2,821 1,215 657 984 737 893 585 103 113 164 235 127 48

468 597 422 226 — 225 267 175 147 — — 20 27 — —

26,327 23,335 14,732 13,731 12,868 11,010 10,464 2,948 2,542 1,187 1,077 514 419 368 114

Total

82,897

2,250

14,025

5,737

14,153

2,574

121,636

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Police figures include formed police units.

4.30 UN Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 October 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff DFS HQ Professional DFS HQ General Service DPKO HQ Professional DPKO HQ General Service UN Logistics Base in Brindisi Total

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

80,955 2,154 12,646 4,075 11,777 130 54 211 31 213 112,246

1,942 96 1,379 1,662 2,376 100 125 99 99 93 7,971

97.7% 95.7% 90.2% 71.0% 83.2% 56.5% 30.2% 68.1% 23.8% 69.6% 93.4%

2.3% 4.3% 9.8% 29.0% 16.8% 43.5% 69.8% 31.9% 76.2% 30.4% 6.6%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO EO. Notes: Police figures include formed police units. HQ staff includes all general service staff and all professional staff with contracts of one year or more.

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4.31 Total Monthly Fatalities in UN Missions: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

120

100

80

60

40

20

Oct. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ‘09

0 July ‘09

•

Number of Personnel

134

1/18/11

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Increased fatalities for January 2010 are attributed to the loss of 96 MINUSTAH staff due to the earthquake on 12 January 2010. UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included.

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4.32 Fatalities by UN Missions: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

MINUSTAH UNAMID UNMIL MONUC UNOCI UNIFIL MONUSCO UNMIS MINURCAT UNMIT UNFICYP UNOMIG UNTSO MINURSO UNDOF UNMIK UNMOGIP Total

Number of Fatalities

Percentage of Fatalities

114 36 20 15 13 11 8 8 6 4 1 1 1 — — — — 238

47.9% 15.1% 8.4% 6.3% 5.5% 4.6% 3.4% 3.4% 2.5% 1.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% — — — —

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Note: Increased fatalities for MINUSTAH staff due to the earthquake on 12 January 2010.

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4.33 Fatalities in UN Missions by Incident Type: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

Illness 23.9%

Malicious Act 7.6%

Other 7.6%

Accident 60.9%

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Increased fatalities for MINUSTAH staff due to the earthquake on 12 January 2010. UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Malicious acts include both what were previously referred to as hostile acts and crime. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

4.34 Fatalities in UN Missions by Personnel Type: 1 July 2009–31 October 2010

Police 12.2%

International Staff 18.1%

Other 3.4%

Troops 49.6%

Local Staff 16.8%

Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.

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4.35 UN Peacekeeping Budgets: 1 July 2009–30 June 2011

Budget (in thousands of US dollars)

2,000,000 1,800,000

1 July ‘09–30 June ’10

1,600,000

1 July ‘10–30 June ’11

1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000

Support Account

Support of AMISOM

UNLB

UNOMIG

UNMIK

UNDOF

UNFICYP

MINURSO

UNMIT

UNOCI

MINURCAT

MINUSTAH

UNMIL

UNIFIL

UNMIS

MONUC/MONUSCO

UNAMID

0

Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/63/26 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: Figures above include only peacekeeping operations funded out of the peacekeeping budget; see table below for missions funded from the regular UN budget. In accordance with S/RES/1925 of 28 May 2010, the title of the mission MONUC was changed to MONUSCO effective 1 July 2010. MINURCAT and MINUSTAH budgets for 1 July 2010–30 June 2011 include commitment authority for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2010.

4.36 Other Peace Operations Budgets: 1 January 2010–31 December 2011 (in thousands of US dollars) Appropriations DFS DPKO UNMOGIP UNTSO Total

8,349.5 11,200.2 17,530.1 70,631.1 107,710.9

Sources: UN Document A/64/6/Add.1; DFS FBFD. Note: DPKO and DFS budget lines are for peacekeeping operations executive direction and management costs, programme of work and programme support.

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27.2%

12.5% 8.2% 8.0% 7.6%

Greece

Denmark

Austria

Norway

Sweden

Belgium

1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7%

Switzerland

Netherlands

Australia

Russia

2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9%

Republic of Korea

Spain

3.2% 3.2%

Canada

Italy

3.9%

China

France

Germany

United Kingdom

Japan

5.0%

United States

Percentage of Assessed Contribution

4.37 2010 Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget

Source: DM OPPBA.

4.38 2010 Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Regular Budget

Percentage of Assessed Contribution

23.9%

12.2%

7.8% 6.4% 6.0% 4.9%

Source: DM OPPBA.

Austria

Norway

Sweden

Belgium

1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%

Switzerland

Russia

Brazil

1.8% 1.6% 1.6%

Netherlands

Australia

Republic of Korea

2.3% 2.2%1.9%

Mexico

Spain

China

Canada

Italy

France

United Kingdom

Germany

Japan

United States

3.1% 3.1% 3.1%

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4.39 Top Twenty Assessed Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations: 30 November 2010 (in thousands of US dollars)

Member State United States Japan United Kingdom Germany France Italy China Canada Spain Republic of Korea Russia Australia Netherlands Switzerland Belgium Sweden Norway Austria Denmark Greece

2010 Effective Assessment Rate

Outstanding Contributions as at 31 December 2009

Assessments Issued in 2010

Collections/Credits/ Overpayments Applied in 2010

Oustanding Contributions as of 30 November 2010

27.2% 12.5% 8.2% 8.0% 7.6% 5.0% 3.9% 3.2% 3.2% 2.3% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7%

5,235,581.7 6,809,383.2 11,549.9 — 91,135.4 0.0 30,712.1 — 1,775,517.6 870,669.6 — — — 0.3 49,529.3 — — — 0.5 441,012.3

26,750,306.3 12,058,509.0 7,830,574.6 7,703,958.9 7,261,245.7 4,801,597.2 3,777,483.6 3,078,677.0 3,049,990.2 2,170,019.0 1,896,638.8 1,855,610.0 1,781,679.0 1,085,784.5 1,032,608.5 1,021,924.3 835,989.6 817,529.3 706,884.0 663,078.8

27,679,578.5 12,124,342.7 6,793,290.0 7,703,958.9 5,295,213.7 3,833,552.6 3,571,345.3 3,078,677.0 1,845,102.8 1,676,313.6 1,111,032.4 1,855,610.0 1,781,679.0 1,085,784.5 768,538.9 1,004,973.3 835,989.6 783,041.5 695,159.0 69,606.2

4,306,309.5 6,743,549.5 1,048,834.5 — 2,057,167.3 968,044.5 236,850.5 — 2,980,405.0 1,364,375.1 785,606.4 — — 0.3 313,598.8 16,950.9 — 34,487.7 11,725.5 1,034,484.9

Source: DM OPPBA. Note: Credits utilized are derived from unencumbered balance of appropriations and other income for peacekeeping operations utilized at the time that assessments for the same operations were issued.

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4.40 UN Mandate Renewals: 1 July 2009–30 December 2010

12 months

MONUSCO MINURCAT

14 days 2 mos.

8 months 14 months 12 mos.

7 months

12 months

UNAMID

12 months 12 months

12 months

UNMIT

12 months

12 months

UNMIS MINUSTAH

12 months 12 months

12 months

12 months

12 months 1 mo.

UNOCI 6 mos.

6 months

12 months

Ongoing until the Security Council decides otherwise 12 months

12 months 6 months 12 months

6 months

UNFICYP

12 months 6 mos.

6 months

6 months

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ‘09

Nov. ’09

Oct. ‘09

Sept.’09

Ongoing until the Security Council decides otherwise Aug. ’09

Ongoing until the Security Council decides otherwise

UNTSO July ‘09

UNMOGIP

Sept. ‘10

12 mos.

6 months

Dec. ’10

6 months

UNDOF

Nov. ‘10

MINURSO

Oct. ’10

UNMIK

UNIFIL

12 months 12 months 1 mo. 6 months

12months months 12

MONUC

6 months

5 months

12 months

UNMIL

Source: UN Security Council Resolutions. Notes: Mandate duration noted is mission authorization as per initial Security Council resolution. In some cases, mission authorization was renewed prior to the end of the previous mandate; in such cases the mandate duration may not match the timeline on the graph.

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•

4.41 UN Operations Timeline: 1945–2010

MONUSCO (DRC) MINURCAT (Chad, CAR) UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan) UNMIT (Timor-Leste) UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone) UNOTIL (Timor-Leste) UNMIS (Sudan) ONUB (Burundi) UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire) MINUSTAH (Haiti) UNMIL (Liberia) UNMISET (Timor-Leste ) UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea) MONUC (Dem. Republic of Congo) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) UNTAET (East Timor) Current missions UNMIK (Kosovo) UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone) MINURCA (Central African Republic) Closed missions UNPSG (Croatia) UNTMIH (Haiti) MONUA (Angola) MIPONUH (Haiti) MINUGUA (Guatemala) UNSMIH (Haiti) UNMOP (Previaka) UNTAES (E.Slavonia, Baranja, W. Sirmium) UNMIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) UNPREDEP (Macedonia) UNCRO (Croatia) UNAVEM III (Angola) UNMOT (Tajikistan) UNASOG (Chad/Libya) UNAMIR (Rwanda) UNOMIL (Liberia) UNMIH (Haiti) UNOMIG (Georgia) UNOMOR (Uganda/Rwanda) UNOSOM II (Somalia) ONUMOZ (Mozambique) UNOSOM I (Somalia) UNPROFOR (Balkans) UNTAC (Cambodia) UNAMIC (Cambodia) MINURSO (Western Sahara) ONUSAL (El Salvador) UNAVEM II (Angola) UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) ONUCA (Central America) UNTAG (Namibia) UNAVEM I (Angola) UNIMOG (Iran/Iraq) UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan) UNIFIL (Lebanon) UNDOF (Golan Heights) UNEF II (Egypt) UNIPOM (India/Pakistan) DOMREP (Dominican Republic) UNFICYP (Cyprus) UNYOM (Yemen) UNSF (West New Guinea) ONUC (Congo) UNOGIL (Lebanon) UNEF (Egypt)

UN Mission and Location

142

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UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan) UNTSO (Middle East)

1945

1950

1955

1960

Source: UNSC resolutions

Source: UN Security Council Resolutions.

1965

1970

1975

1980

Duration

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

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Global Statistics on Non-UN-Commanded Missions

143

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This chapter presents data on peace operations conducted under the authority of regional organizations and non-standing coalitions of states; the data is compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). * * * Listed are 25 non-UN multilateral peace operations that started, were ongoing, or terminated during 2010. Figures provided in this chapter are from September 2010 or in the case of operations that were terminated in 2010, the date of closure. The chapter covers a broad range of peace operations, reflecting the growing complexity of operation mandates and the potential for operations to change over time. The chapter does not include good offices, fact-finding, or electoral assistance missions. The operations provided in this chapter are specifically compiled for the Center on International Cooperation and do not reproduce the operations included in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database. The operations are divided into two loosely defined categories: those including military and observer functions (Table 5.10) and those focusing on policing and other civilian functions (Table 5.11). The operations are grouped in the tables by the entity conducting them and listed chronologically within these groups. The tables provide information on the legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation–UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by

regional organizations, the missions’ locations, the start dates, the principal contributors, and the personnel fatalities. The start dates for the operations refer to dates of first deployments. The list of contributing countries presented in this volume does not necessarily refer to the total number of contributing countries: in the case of missions including contributions by more than ten countries the principle contributors are stated, in the case of smaller missions the full list of contributors is provided. For a complete list of countries’ participation in each mission, see the SIPRI database or the SIPRI Yearbook. The actual missions’ strengths represent international personnel located in theatre. Due to constant rotation of mission personnel, the numbers provided are estimates. Mission fatalities are recorded as a total since the beginning of an operation and as a total for October 2009 until September 2010. Causes of death—whether by hostile act, accidental, or through illness—are recorded for fatalities in 2010. As some deaths were the result of other causes, the breakdown of the causes of death does not always add up to the total number of fatalities. Table 5.12 lists the estimated declared costs of the operations underway in 2010. Budget figures are given for the period 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010. The figures are given in millions of US dollars. Conversions from budgets set in other currencies are based on the International Monetary Fund’s aggregated market exchange rates for October 2009 to September 2010.

*For detailed explanations and further information on SIPRI’s multilateral peace operations’ dataset, consult the SIPRI website (http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/pko) or the SIPRI Yearbook.

144

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The way in which various regional organizations finance peace operations is different. Unlike UN budgets, figures of operations conducted by regional organization such as NATO refer only to common costs. This includes mainly the running costs of the headquarters (i.e., costs for civilian personnel and costs for operation and maintenance) and investments in the infrastructure necessary to support the operation. The costs of deploying personnel are borne by individual contributing states and are not reflected in the figures given here. Most EU operations are financed in one of two ways: civilian missions are funded through the Community budget, while military operations or operations with a military component are funded by contributions by the participating member states through the Athena mechanism. In missions by other organizations—and generally the ad hoc missions—budget figures may include program implementation. There are certain limitations to the data. The main problems of reliability are due to varying

definitions of what constitutes the total cost of an operation. The coverage of official data varies significantly between operations; sometimes a budget is an estimate while in other cases it is an actual expenditure. For all these reasons, budget figures presented in Table 5.12 are best viewed as estimates, and the budgets for different operations should not be compared. Data on multilateral peace operations are obtained from the following categories of open source: (1) official information provided by the secretariat of the authorizing organization; (2) official information provided by the mission on the ground, either in official publications or in written responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires; and (3) information from national governments contributing to the operation in question. These primary sources are supplemented with a wide selection of publicly available secondary sources consisting of specialist journals; research reports; news agencies; and international, regional, and local newspapers.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.1 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to Non-UN-Commanded Missions: 30 September 2010 100,000 92,173

90,000 80,000

Total Number of Troops

70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000

561

429

387

358

338

Fiji

731

Colombia

6,522 5,394 5,002 4,200 3,010 3,000 2,630 2,534 2,101 2,044 1,712 963

Greece

9,600

10,000

Austria

20,000

Slovenia

Russia

Moldova

Romania

Australia

Spain

Turkey

Poland

Burundi

Canada

Uganda

Italy

France

Germany

United Kingdom

United States

0

Notes: These Figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large-scale units and may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small scale units. Figures for Moldova include troops deployed from Transdniestria in the Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping force (JCC).

5.2 Top Twenty Police Contributors to Non-UN-Commanded Missions: 30 September 2010 300

286

247

250

233

233

200 168 146

150

121

114 92

100

92

45

38

32

31

22

21

12

11

Greece

51

50

Czech Republic

81

Ireland

Austria

Netherlands

Spain

Norway

Denmark

Hungary

Turkey

United States

Bulgaria

Finland

United Kingdom

Sweden

Poland

Romania

Germany

Italy

0 France

•

Total Number of Police

146

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Note: As the figures for largest contributors represent personnel deployed in large scale units, there may be variations with actual field strength.

11

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6 19

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10 4

16

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14 15 18 13

3 5 1

17 9 2 7

8

12

20

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•

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 149

5.3 Contributions of Military Personnel to Non-UN-Commanded Missions by Organization: 30 September 2010 African Union Coalition/Ad hoc 5% 3%

European Union Economic Community of the 2% Central African States 0.3%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 90%

Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization African Union Coalition/Ad Hoc European Union Economic Community of Central African States Total

Troops/Military Observers

Percentage of Total

140,585 7,200 4,581 4,015

90% 5% 3% 2%

551 156,932

0.3%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.4 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Military Personnel to Regions: 30 September 2010

Middle East 1%

Europe 9%

Africa 7%

East Asia and the Pacific 0.4%

Central and South Asia 83%

Region Central and South Asia Europe Africa Middle East East Asia and the Pacific Total

Troops/Military Observers 130,492 13,257 10,734 1,825 624 156,932

Percentage of Total 83% 9% 7% 1% 0.4%

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5.5 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police by Organization: 30 September 2010

Economic Community of Central African States 7%

African Union 2%

Coalition/ Ad hoc 15%

European Union 76%

Organization

Police

Percentage of Total

European Union Coalition/Ad Hoc Economic Community of Central African States African Union Total

1,623 326

76% 15%

150 50 2,149

7% 2%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.6 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police to Regions: 30 September 2010

Africa 10%

East Asia and the Pacific 14%

Central and South Asia 7% Middle East 2%

Europe 67%

Region Europe East Asia and the Pacific Africa Central and South Asia Middle East Total

Civilian Police

Percentage of Total

1,435 305 219 140 50 2,149

67% 14% 10% 7% 2%

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5.7 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Troops to Africa by Organization: 30 September 2010 Economic Community of Central African States 6%

Coalition/Ad hoc 10% European Union 2%

African Union 82%

Organization African Union Coalition/Ad Hoc Economic Community of Central African States European Union Total

Troops

Percentage of Total

7,200 900

82% 10%

551 138 8,789

6% 2%

Note: EU NAVFOR Somalia is excluded because it does not deploy troops in Somalia.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

5.8 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Troops in Europe by Organization: 30 September 2010

Coalition/Ad hoc 11%

European Union 14%

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 75%

Organization

Troops

Percentage of Total

North Atlantic Treaty Organization European Union Coalition/Ad Hoc Total

9,923 1,932 1,402 13,257

75% 14% 11%

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 155

5.9 Deployment of Non-UN-Commanded Police in Africa by Organization: 30 September 2010 European Union 9%

African Union 23%

Economic Community of Central African States 68%

Organization Economic Community of Central African States African Union European Union Total

Police

Percentage of Total

150 50 19 219

68% 23% 9%

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Total Deaths to Date/ in 2010 (due to hostilities, accidents, illness)

Authorization Date

Start Date

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Somalia1

PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX) (19 January 2007) and SCR 1744 (21 February 2007)2

March 2007

Burundi (3,000), Uganda (4,200)3

—

—

—

Troops: 7,200 Civilian Police: 50 Civilian Staff: 46

../..

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX)

Central African Republic

Libreville Summit (2 October 2002)4

December 2002

Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea

—

Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon

—

Troops: 521 Military Observers: 30 Civilian Police: 150

2/2 (–,2,–)

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC)

MoldovaTransdniestria

Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester Region (21 July 1992)5

July 1992

Moldova (453), Russia (419), Transdniestria (490)

—

—

Troops: 1,362 Military Observers: 40

../..

EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

Bosnia and Herzegovina6

CJA 2004/570/CFSP (12 July 2004) and SCR 1575 (22 November 2004)7

December 2004

Austria (297), Bulgaria (117), Germany (118), Hungary (170), Italy (297), Netherlands (75), Poland (186), Romania (64), Spain (139), Turkey (279)

—

—

Troops: 1,932

21/–

Moldova (10), Russia (10), Transdniestria (10), Ukraine (10)

—

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Location

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Name

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Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Troops, Military Observers, Principal Civilian Police, Civilian Staff Civilian Staff Contributors (Actual)

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5.10 2010 Non-UN-Commanded Military and Observer Missions

CJA 2008/851/CFSP (10 November 2008)

December 2008

France (410), Germany (496), Greece (195), Italy (233), Spain (387), Sweden (130), UK (60)

—

—

Troops: 1,945 France (1), Germany (1), Other (2)

–/–

EU Training Mission in Somalia

Uganda

CJA 2010/197/CFSP (31 March 2010)

April 2010

Belgium (5), Finland (4), France (25), Germany (13), Hungary (4), Ireland (5), Italy (17), Portugal (15), Spain (38), Sweden (4)

—

—

Belgium (1), France (1)

–/–

Troops. 138 Civilian Staff: 2

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1. The mission’s headquarters is based in Nairobi, Kenya. The operation is currently deployed to secure the air and sea ports, Villa Somalia, the old university, the military academy and other strategic sites in Mogadishu. According to official statements (Press release 7 October 2010), AMISOM is now present across more than 40 percent of Mogadishu. 2. AMISOM was established by the AU PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX) on 19 January 2007 and was endorsed by UN SCR 1744 (21 February 2007) under UN Charter Chapter VII. The operation was mandated to support the dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia by supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and contributing to the overall security situation. On 29 June 2008 the operation’s mandate was expanded to include assisting the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement (19 August 2008), including training of Somalia security forces to promote security in the area of Mogadishu. During 2009 the security situation deteriorated, the AU mission increasingly became direct targets of the insurgency. The AU Communiqué on the Situation in Somalia (8 January 2010) extended the mission’s mandate for an additional period of 12 months. UN SCR 1910 (28 January 2010) renewed UN endorsement for the operation until 31 January 2011. 3. The mission is financed by a broad set of donors, including EU and non EU countries. Financial contributions are also made by IGAD and the League of Arab States. 4. MICOPAX was established by a decision of the CEMAL Libreville Summit (2 October 2002) to secure the border between Chad and CAR and to guarantee the safety of former CAR President Patassé. In 2003, following the 15 March coup, its mandate was expanded by a decision of the Libreville Summit (3 June 2003) to include contributing to the overall security environment, assisting in the restructuring of CAR’s armed forces and the supporting the transition process. The latest decision of 12 July 2008 expanded the operation’s mandate to include promoting political dialogue and human rights. The operation is mandated for 6 months, renewable up to 2013. 5. The JCC Peacekeeping Force was established pursuant to the Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester region, signed in Moscow by the presidents of Moldova and Russia (21 July 1992). The JCC—a monitoring commission comprising representatives of Moldova, Russia and Transdniestria—was established to coordinate the activities of the joint force. 6. A multinational manoeuvre battalion (made up of Hungarian, Polish, Spanish and Turkish troops) is stationed in Sarajevo. An integrated police unit and liaison and observer teams are also deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR ALTHEA can be reinforced by KFOR, and by EU Operational and Strategic Reserve Forces. 7. EUFOR ALTHEA was established by CJA 2004/570/CFSP (12 July 2004) and endorsed by the UN SCR 1575 (22 November 2004) under UN Charter Chapter VII. It is mandated to maintain a secure environment for implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement, to assist in the strengthening of local capacity, and to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards EU integration. UN SCR 1895 (18 November 2009) extended the mandate of EUFOR ALTHEA until November 2010. continues

1/18/11

Somalia (Gulf of Aden)

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EU Naval Force Against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia)

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5.10 Continued

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Kosovo8

SCR 1244 (10 June 1999)9

June 1999

Austria (434), Czech Republic (321), France (807), Germany (1,507), Greece (366), Italy (1,409), Portugal (279), Slovenia (387), Turkey (465), USA (1,480)

—

—

—

Troops: 9,92311

128/1 (–,–,1)

SCR 1386 (20 December 2001)12

December 2001

Australia (1,550), Canada (2,982), France (3,760), Germany (4,388), Italy (3,300), Poland (2,417), Romania (1,648), Spain (1,537), Turkey (1,790), UK (9,500), USA (90,000)

—

—

—

Troops: 130,492

1,770/598 (530,–,–)13

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Authorization Date

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Location

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Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Total Deaths to Date/ in 2010 (due to hostilities, accidents, illness)

Name

International Afghanistan11 Security Assistance Mission (ISAF)

Start Date

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Troops, Military Observers, Principal Civilian Police, Civilian Staff Civilian Staff Contributors (Actual)

August 2004

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

Sinai (Egypt)

Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel (26 March 1979)16

April 1982

—

—

—

Australia (25), Canada (28), Colombia (358), Fiji (338), Hungary (41), Italy (78), New Zealand (28), Uruguay (58), USA (693)

—

—

USA (16)

Troops: 170

Military Observers: 1,655 Civilian Staff: 16

–/–

66/1 (–, 1, –)

8. Along with KFOR headquarters in Pristina, KFOR contingents are grouped into several task forces: MNTF North (Mitrovica), led by France; MNTF South (Prizren), led by Germany; MNTF West (Pec), led by Italy; and MNTF East (Urosevac), led by the USA. A Multinational Specialized Unite (MSU) and a Tactical Reserve Manoeuvre Battalion (KTM) are also stationed in Pristina. 9. KFOR was established by UN SCR 1244 (10 June 1999). Its mandated tasks include deterring renewed hostilities, establishing a secure environment, supporting UNMIK and monitoring borders. In 2008 NATO expanded the operation’s task to include efforts to develop a professional, democratic and multi-ethnic security structures in Kosovo. A positive decision of the UN Security Council is required to terminate the operation. 10. The list of contributing countries and number of troops is based on information provided by KFOR in February 2010. However, the contributing countries and the troop numbers have remained approximately the same throughout September 2010 (telephone conversation with PIO JFC Naples 4 November 2010). In an October 2010 press release, KFOR has announced that it will begin its drawdown procedure. 11. The territory of Afghanistan is divided into 5 areas of responsibility: Regional Command (RC) Centre (Kabul), currently led by France; RC North (Mazar-e Sharif), led by Germany; RC West (Herat), led by Italy; RC South (Kandahar), led by the Netherlands; and RC East (Bagram), led by the USA. 12. ISAF was established by UN SCR 1386 (20 December 2001) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a multinational force mandated to assist the Afghan Government to maintain security, as envisaged in Annex I of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. NATO took over command and control of ISAF in August 2003. UN SCR 1943 (13 October 2010) extended the mandate to 13 October 2011. 13. No other distinction is available. 14. NTM-I was established pursuant to UN SCR 1546 (8 June 2004) and approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 November 2004. It is mandated to assist in the development of Iraq’s security institutions through training and equipment of, in particular, middle- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces. Since 2007 the mission is mandated to focus on mentoring and to advise an Iraqi-led institutional training program. 15. More detailed national breakdown was not available. 16. MFO was established on 3 August 1981 by the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed 26 March 1979. Deployment began on 20 March 1982 following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai but the mission did not become operational until 25 April 1982, the day that Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. The mission is mandated to observe the implementation of the peace treaty and to contribute to security. continues

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Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy (60), Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, UK (40), USA15

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SCR 1546 (8 June 2004)14

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Iraq

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NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

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5.10 Continued

Operation Licorne Côte d’Ivoire17

Authorization Date SCR 1464 (4 February 2003)18

Regional Solomon Islands Biketawa Assistance Mission Declaration (2000)20 to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

February 2003 France (900)19

—

—

July 2003

—

Australia (210), Federal States of Micronesia (18), Fiji (4), Kiribati (6), Nauru (5), New Zealand (27), Papua New Guinea (9), Samoa (8), Tonga (7), Vanuatu (4)

Start Date

Australia (70), New Zealand (45), Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Fed. States of Micronesia

—

Troops: 900

Australia Troops: 150 (104), Fiji Civilian Police: 305 (7), New Civilian Staff: 134 Zealand (11), Papua New Guinea (4)

24/– 8/2 (–, 1, 1)

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Location

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

Principal Troop Contributors

Total Deaths to Date/ in 2010 (due to hostilities, accidents, illness)

6:13 PM

Name

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Troops, Military Observers, Principal Civilian Police, Civilian Staff Civilian Staff Contributors (Actual)

Timor-Leste

SCR 1690 (20 June 2006)21

May 2006

Australia (399), New Zealand (75)

—

—

Australia (2)

Troops: 474 Civilian Staff: 2

1/–

1/18/11 6:13 PM

17. The troops are based in Abidjan. 18. Operation Licorne was deployed under the authority of UN SCR 1464 (4 February 2003) and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers to support the ECOWAS mission (2003– 2004) in contributing to a secure environment and, in particular, to facilitate implementation of the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. UN SCR 1528 (27 February 2004) provides its current authorization and revised the mandate to working support of UNOCI. UN SCR 1795 (15 January 2008) expanded the mandate to support implementing the Quagadougou political Agreement (4 March 2007) and the Supplementary Agreements (28 November 2007), in particular assisting in preparations for elections scheduled in October and November 2010. UN SCR 1933 (30 June 2010) extended the mandate to 31 December 2010. 19. The mission is supported by a naval attachment in the Gulf of Guinea (Mission Corymbe, 150 personnel). 20. RAMSI was established under the framework of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, in which members of the Pacific Islands Forum agreed to mount a collective response to crises, usually at the request of the host government. It is mandated to assist the Solomon Islands Government in restoring law and order and in building up the capacity of the police force. 21. ISF was deployed at the request of the Government of Timor-Leste to assist in stabilizing the security environment in the county and endorsed by UN SCR 1690 (20 June 2006). The operation cooperates closely with UNMIT.

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International Security Forces (ISF)

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5.11 2010 Non-UN-Commanded Civilian Police and Civilian Missions

Authorization Date

Start Date

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CJA 2002/210/CFSP1 (11 March 2002)

January 2003

—

—

Czech Republic (5), Finland (7), France (7), Germany (11), Ireland (3), Italy (8), Netherlands (7), Romania (8), Slovakia (4), Ukraine (4)

EU Advisory Democratic and Assistance Republic of Mission for DRC the Congo Security Reform (EUSEC RD Congo)

CJA 2005/355/CFSP2 (2 May 2005)

June 2005

—

—

—

EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)

CJA 2005/889/CFSP4 (12 December 2005)

November 2005

—

—

EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)

Rafah Crossing Point (Egypt and Palestinian Territories)

France (3), Italy (1)

Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)

Bulgaria (2), Civilian Police: 72 Finland (4), Civilian Staff: 33 France (3), Germany (4), Ireland (2), Italy (8), Turkey (2), UK (4)

Belgium (5), Finland (1), France (1), Italy (1), Sweden (1), UK (4)

Civilian Staff: 473 (Civilian Staff: 13, Military Advisers: 34)

Civilian Police: 4 France (1), Germany (1), Civilian Staff: 9 Hungary (1), Italy (2), Romania (1), Spain (2), UK (1)

3/3 –,–,1,2

2/–

–/–

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Principal Troop Contributors

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Total Deaths to Date/ in 2010 (due to hostilities, accidents, illness)

CJA 2005/797/CFSP5 (14 November 2005)

January 2006

—

—

Canada (2), Czech Republic (1), Denmark (1), Finland (3), Germany (2), Netherlands (1), Spain (1), Sweden (4), United Kingdom (2)

Civilian Police: 25 Estonia (2), Civilian Staff: 28 Finland (5), Germany (4), Netherlands (2), Spain (3), Sweden (4), UK (2)

–/–

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EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)

CJA 2007/369/CFSP6 (30 May 2007)

June 2007

—

—

Canada (4), Denmark (12), Finland (18), France (6), Germany (17), Italy (10), Netherlands (12), Norway (9), Spain (4), UK (5)

Canada (2), Civilian Police: Denmark (1), 140 Finland (11), Civilian Staff: 78 Germany (14), Ireland (8), Italy (6), Netherlands (2), Norway (10), Sweden (6), UK (10)

–/–

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1. EUPM was established by CJA 2002/210/CFSP (11 March 2002) and tasked with the establishment of a sustainable professional and multi-ethnic police service in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosnian ownership through monitoring, mentoring and inspection. At the request of the Bosnian authorities, the mandate was modified to focus on the police reform process, strengthening of police accountability and efforts to fight organized crime. CJA 2009/906/CFSP (8 December 2009) extended the mandate to 31 December 2011. 2. EUSEC RD Congo was established by CJA 2005/355/CFSP (2 May 2005). The mission’s initial mandate was to advise and assist the authorities of the DRC, specifically the Ministry of Defense, on security matters, ensuring that policies were congruent with international humanitarian law, the standards of democratic governance and the principles of rule of law. In 2009 the mission’s mandate was broadened to include facilitating the implementations of the guidelines adopted by the Congolese authorities in the revised plan for reform of the armed forces of DR Congo. In carrying out its activities, EUSEC operates in close coordination with MONUSCO and EUPOL DR Congo. CJA 2010/565/CFSP (21 September 2010) extended the mandate to 30 September 2012. 3. The majority of the deployed personnel, 34 are military advisers. Out of those, 23 are based in Kinshasa, while 11 military advisors and one civilian (gender advisor) are located in Bukavu, Goma, Lubumbashi and Muanda. 4. EU BAM Rafah was established pursuant to CJA 2005/889/CFSP (12 December 2005) and on the basis of the Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (15 November 2005). It is mandated to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of Palestinian Authority border control, security and customs officials at the Rafah Crossing Point with regard to the 2005 Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing; and to support the Palestinian Authority’s capacity building in the field of border control. Following riots in 2007, the Rafah Crossing Point was closed and only to be opened under exceptional circumstances. However, EU BAM Rafah retains full operational capabilities. CJA 2010/274/CFSP (12 May 2010) extended the mandate to 24 May 2011. 5. EUPOL COPPS was established by CJA 2005/797/CFSP (14 November 2005). It is mandated to provide a framework for and advise Palestinian criminal justice and police officials, and coordinate EU aid to the Palestinian Authority. CJA 2008/958/CFSP (16 December 2008) extended the mandate to 31 December 2010. 6. EUPOL Afghanistan was established by CJA 2007/369/CFSP (30 May 2007) at the invitation of the Afghan Government. The operation is tasked to contribute to the establishment of civilian policing arrangements and law enforcement under Afghan ownership. CJA 2010/279/CFSP (18 May 2010) extended the mandate to 31 May 2013. continues

6:13 PM

EU Police Mission Palestinian for the Palestinian Territories Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

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Authorization Date

Start Date

Principal Civilian Staff Contributors

Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)

CJA 2007/405/CFSP7 (12 June 2007)

July 2007

—

—

Belgium (5), Finland (1), France (8), Italy (4), Sweden (1)

Finland (1), Civilian Police: 19 France (5), Civilian Staff: 16 Germany (3), Poland (1), Portugal (3), Sweden (3)

EU Rule of Law Kosovo Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)

CJA 2008/124/CFSP8 (4 February 2008)

February 2008

—

—

Bulgaria (33), France (159), Germany (74), Hungary (50), Italy (145), Poland (121), Romania (174), Sweden (51), Turkey (61), USA (67)

Bulgaria Civilian Police: (44), 1,182 Denmark Civilian Staff: 512 (21), Finland (42), France (29), Germany (42), Italy (47), Poland (22), Romania (22), Sweden (34), UK (72)

EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)

CJA 2008/736/CFSP9 (15 September 2008)

October 2008

—

—

Austria (7), Bulgaria (12), France (18), Germany (24),

Czech Republic (6), Finland (21), Germany

Georgia

Civilian Police: 181 Civilian Staff: 128

–/–

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EU Police Mission Democratic in the Democratic Republic of Republic of the Congo the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)

6:13 PM

Location

Principal Civilian Police Contributors

1/18/11

Name

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Total Deaths to Date/ in 2010 (due to hostilities, accidents, illness)

2/1 –,–,1,–

–/–

April 1993

—

—

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina

5th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council11 (MC(5).DEC/1, 8 December 1995)

December 1995

—

—

—

—

Civilian Staff: 12

–/–

Germany Civilian Staff: 70 (4), Greece (4), Ireland (3), Italy (5), Romania (3), Russia (3), Slovakia (3), Spain (3), USA (9)

–/–

Bulgaria (1), Estonia (2), France (1), Italy (1), Latvia (2), Poland (1), Sweden (1), UK (1), USA (2)

7. EUPOL RD Congo was established by CJA 2007/405/CFSP (12 June 2007). CJA 2009/769/CFSP (19 Oct 2009) mandated the mission to assist the Congolese authorities in reforming and restructuring the Congolese Police; improving interaction between police and criminal justice system; supporting efforts against sexual violence; and promoting gender, human rights and the children aspects of the peace process. The mission cooperates with EUSEC DR Congo and MONUSCO. CJA 2010/576/CFSP (23 September 2010) extended the mandate to 30 September 2011. 8. EULEX Kosovo was established by CJA 2008/124/CFSP (4 February 2008). With certain executive responsibilities–in terms of investigating and prosecuting serious and sensitive crimes–the operation is tasked to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo rule of law institutions. It cooperates closely with UNMIK and OMIK. EULEX Kosovo was established by CJA 2008/124/CFSP (4 February 2008). With certain executive responsibilities-in terms of investigating and prosecuting serious and sensitive crimes-the operation is tasked to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo rule of law institutions. It cooperates closely with UNMIK and OMIK. CJA 2010/322/CFSP (8 June 2010) extended the mandate to 14 June 2012. 9. The EUMM was established by CJA 2008/736/CFSP (15 September 2008) in accordance with the agreement on 8 September 2008, following the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008. The operation is tasked with monitoring and analyzing progress in the stabilization process, focusing on compliance with the 6-point peace plan of 12 August 2008, and in the normalization of civil governance; monitoring infrastructure security and the political and security aspects of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and supporting the confidence-building measures. CJA 2010/452/CFSP (12 August 2010) extended the mandate to 14 September 2011. 10. The OSCE Mission to Moldova was established at the 19th CSO meeting (4 February 1993) and authorized by the Moldovan Government through an MOU (7 May 1993). Its tasks include assisting the conflicting parties in pursuing negotiations on lasting political settlement and gathering and providing information on the situation. PC.DEC/909 (24 November 2009) extended the mandate to 31 December 2010. continues

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19th OSCE Committee of Senior Officials meeting10 (4 February 1993)

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(24), Italy (7), Lithuania (4), Netherlands (7), Poland (4), Romania (9), Sweden (19), UK (14)

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Greece (7), Italy (12), Poland (19), Romania (16), Spain (9), Sweden (11)

Start Date

—

Authorization Date

OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

Kosovo

PC.DEC/30512 (1 July 1999)

July 1999

—

—

Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

Hebron (Palestinian Territories)

Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) and the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (21 January 1997)13

February 1997

—

—

Denmark (4), Italy (13), Norway (4), Turkey (7)

Civilian Police, Civilian Staff (Actual)

Austria (15), Civilian Staff: 168 Bosnia and Herzegovina (7), Croatia (6), France (6), Germany (9), Ireland (5), Italy (16), Spain (10), Turkey (11), UK (6), USA (14)

9/–

Denmark (6), Civilian Police: 21 Norway (15), Civilian Staff: 37 Sweden (11), Switzerland (5)

2/–

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Principal Civilian Staff Contributors

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Principal Civilian Police Contributors

1/18/11

Name

Principal Troop Contributors

Principal Military Observer Contributors

Total Deaths to Date/ in 2010 (due to hostilities, accidents, illness)

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5.11 Continued

11. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established by a decision of the 5th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council (MC(5).DEC/1, 8 December 1995), in accordance with Annex 6 of the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The operation is mandated to assist the parties in regional stabilization measures and democratization. PC.DEC/918 (10 December 2009) extended the mandate to 31 December 2010. 12. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established by PC.DEC/305 (1 July 1999). Its mandate includes training police, judicial personnel and civil administrators and monitoring and promoting human rights. The mission is component of UNMIK. Since PC.DEC/835 (21 December 2007) the mission’s mandate is extended [on] a monthly basis unless one of the participating states objects. 13. TIPH 2 was established by the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (17 January 1997) and the Agreement on the Temporary International Peace Presence in Hebron (21 January 1997). It is mandated to provide by its presence, a secure and stable environment and monitor and report breaches of international humanitarian law. The mandate is renewed every 6 months pending approval

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GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 167

5.12 Cost of Non-UN-Commanded Military, Observer, Civilian Police and Civilian Missions: 1 October 2009–30 September 2010 Name

Location

Non-UN Military and Observer Missions African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX) Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC) EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) EU Naval Force Against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia) EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) International Security Assistance Mission (ISAF) NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Operation Licorne Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) International Security Forces (ISF)

Non-UN Civilian Police and Civilian Missions EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC RD Congo) EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) OSCE Mission to Moldova OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The The The The The

Somalia

Cost ($US Millions)

100.21

Central African Republic Moldova-Transdniestria

57.32 —

Bosnia and Herzegovina

25.8

Somalia (Gulf of Aden) Uganda Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Sinai (Egypt) Côte d’Ivoire Solomon Islands

6.4 4.73 40.7 460.4 23.0 76.3 96.6 42.5 (July–June)4 151.0 (July–June)5

Timor-Leste

Bosnia and Herzegovina

19.1

Democratic Republic of the Congo

15.3

Rafah Crossing Point

3.1

Palestinian Territories

9.1

Afghanistan Democratic Republic of the Congo Kosovo Georgia Moldova Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo Hebron (Palestinian Territories)

majority of the AMISOM budget is based on contribution from EU. majority of the MICOPAX budget is based on contribution from EU, France, and ECCAS. mission was established in April 2010. figure only reflects the cost of Australia. figure only reflects the cost of Australia.

87.2 10.8 162.0 36.3 2.9 21.5 33.1 3.4

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5.13 Heads and Force Commanders of Non-UN-Commanded Military, Observer, Civilian Police, and Civilian Missions: 30 September 2010 Name

Location

Non-UN-Commanded Military and Observer Missions African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Somalia

Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX)

Central African Republic

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC) EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)

Moldova-Transdniestria

EU Naval Force against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia)

Somalia (Gulf of Aden)

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) International Security Assistance Mission (ISAF) NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

Sinai (Egypt)

Operation Licorne

Côte d’Ivoire

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

Solomon Islands

International Security Forces (ISF)

Timor-Leste

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Head of Mission

Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission: Nicolas Bwakira (Burundi) Force Commander: Major-General Nathan Mugisha (Uganda) Special Representative: Ambassador Albert Akendengue (Gabon) Force Commander: General Hector Brigadier-General Prosper Nabiolwa (Democratic Republic of Congo) Chief of Staff, Joint Headquarters: Colonel Aleksei Tumashev (Russia) Operation Commander: General Sir John McColl (UK) Force Commander: Major-General Bernhard Bair (Austria) Operation Commander: Major-General Buster Howes (UK) Force Commander: Rear Admiral Philippe Coindreau (France) Major-General Erhard Bühler (Germany) General David H. Petraeus (USA) Lieutenant-General Michael D. Barbero (USA) Ambassador David M. Satterfield (USA) Force Commander: Major-General Warren J. Whiting (New Zealand) Brigadier-General Francis Autran (France) Special Coordinator Graeme Wilson (Australia) Force Commander: Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Landford (Australia) Colonel Michael Reilly (Australia)

continues

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5.13 Continued

Name

Non-UN Civilian Police and Civilian Missions EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for DRC Security Reform (EUSEC RD Congo) EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) OSCE Mission to Moldova OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

Location

Bosnia and Herzegovina Democratic Republic of the Congo Rafah Crossing Point Palestinian Territories Afghanistan Democratic Republic of the Congo Kosovo Georgia Uganda Moldova Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo Hebron (Palestinian Territories)

Head of Mission

Brigadier-General Stefan Feller (Germany) General António Martin (Portugal) Colonel Alain Faugeras (France) Commissioner Henrik Malmquist (Sweden) Brigadier General Jukka Savolainen (Finland) Commissioner Jean Paul Rikir (Belgium) Yves de Kermabon (France) Ambassador Hansjörg Haber (Germany) Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul (Spain) Ambassador Philip N. Remler (USA) Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (USA) Ambassador Werner Almhofer (Austria) Brigadier-General Einar Johnsen (Norway)

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UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics

171

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This chapter contains data on all current missions of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Department of Field Support (DFS).1 It is based on public UN documents and sources, combined with data provided by DPKO and DFS and in some cases by the UN Department of Management (DM) and the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) Programme in Bonn. Variations in types of data sources and reporting dates between missions are often a result of differences in the structure, reporting and funding mechanisms for different types of UN peace operations: • Peacekeeping missions funded by the General Assembly on the basis of a financial period running from 1 July to 30 June of the following year. • Peacekeeping missions funded by the biennial UN budget, which runs from January in even years to December of odd years (UNMOGIP and UNTSO). The features of our dataset are outlined below. Key Facts

Notes on mandates and key personnel. Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

These graphs cover personnel trends through the last UN peacekeeping financial year and through the first quarter of the 2009–2010 financial year on a month-by-month basis. Authorized military and police personnel strengths are based on authorized strengths in Security Council resolutions, relevant budgetary

documentation, or were provided directly by the DPKO Force Generation Service (FGS) and the DPKO Police Division (PD). Actual military and personnel strengths were provided by the FGS and PD. Actual and authorized strengths for international staff and local staff were provided by the DFS Field Personnel Division (FPD). UNV Actual and authorized strengths (based on exchange of letters and mission-specific agreements between the UNV Programme and DFS) were provided by the UNV Programme in Bonn. Personnel: Since 2000

These graphs show average annual number of personnel and average annual number of authorized personnel since 2000 (up to June 2010 for missions funded by the peacekeeping budget and through September 2010 for other missions). For the July 2006–September 2010 periods, actual military and police personnel figures were calculated based on information provided by the DPKO FGS or PD. Authorized military and police personnel figures were derived from Security Council Resolutions or obtained from DPKO FGS and PD in cases where Security Council resolutions did not specify authorized strengths. International and local civilian staff actual and authorized strengths were calculated based on information provided by DFS FPD. UNV actual and authorized figures were provided by the UNV Programme. Average actual and authorized figures for the January–June 2006 period were obtained from official budgetary and financial performance reports covering that year, or from data collected directly from the relevant UN Departments for past editions of the Review. Exceptions

172

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UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS • 173

include UNMOGIP and UNTSO, for which historical and actual personnel figures were derived from the UN’s Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium. Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

These data show all contributors to the mission on 30 September 2010, and were provided by the DPKO FGS and PD. The categories “Troops” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Troops” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. Military Units: 30 September 2010

These data show units in the field on 30 September 2010 by their type and country of origin, based on information provided by DPKO FGS. Military staff are not formed into traditional units in observer missions, political missions, and in the observer elements of larger missions; therefore, these personnel are not recorded in this section. The categories “Troops” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Troops” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

These data, provided by DFS FPD, break down international civilian staff into occupational groups, as assigned by DFS FPD. Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

These data show the total number of male and female troops, military observers, police, international staff, and local staff as of that date. Military data were provided by DPKO FGS, police data were provided by DPKO PD, and international and local staff data were provided by DFS FPD. Data for UNVs were not available. The categories “Troops” and “Military Observers”

are used to classify military staff where: “Troops” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

These data were provided by the DPKO Situation Center. Differences may exist between the historical data shown here and fatality data shown in last year’s edition of the Review due to investigations and reviews of fatality reports undertaken by the Situation Center over the course of the year. Fatality incident types previously categorized as “hostile act” and “criminal act” have henceforth been combined into a single category–“malicious act”. Fatality incident types previously categorized as “selfinflicted” have henceforth been combined into the “other” category. The categories “Military” and “Military Observers” are used to classify military staff where: “Military” refer to both Troops and Staff Officers and “Military Observers” refer to Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers and Military Advisors unless otherwise noted. Vehicles: 30 September 2010

These data cover both UN owned vehicles and those vehicles owned by national contingents serving in the field under a Memorandum of Agreement and for which usage is reimbursed by the UN. Data on contingent-owned vehicles were obtained from a database managed by the DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; data for UN owned vehicles were provided by the DFS Surface Transport Section. Categorization of vehicles varies between the two sections and do not necessarily correlate. The following missions do not have Contingent Owned Equipment: MINURSO, UNMIK, UNMOGIP and UNTSO. Aircraft: 30 September 2010

These data have been provided by the DFS Air Transport Section and identify aircraft by their type (transport fixed-wing, transport helicopter or attack helicopter) and supplier (commercial

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contractor or government contingent). The following missions do not have aircraft: UNDOF, UNMIK, UNMOGIP and UNTSO. Budget and Expenditures: 2009–2011

All 2009–2011 data were obtained from official budgetary and financial performance reports covering that year, or provided by the DFS Field Budget and Finance Division (FBFD). Peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget show the budget and expenditures for the 2008–09 financial year as well as the budget for the 2009–10 financial year. Peacekeeping missions funded from the regular biennial budget (UNTSO and UNMOGIP): these data show both the appropriations and estimated expenditures for the January 2010– December 2011 period. Mission Expenditures: 2000–2009

Covering the financial years since 2000, this overview of expenditures has been derived from mission financing reports, financial performance reports, and reports on mission budgets. Information on UNMOGIP and UNTSO has been provided by DFS FBFD. Some discrepancies may appear between the 2004–2005 data provided here, which is derived from official performance reports on the budget, and those data provided in last year’s edition of the Review, which were provided by the DFS FBFD prior to the publication of official performance reports. The mission expenditure tables for peacekeeping missions funded by the peacekeeping budget are broken down into the three following categories (although there was some variation in subcategories in 2000–20012): 1. Military and police personnel. Includes missions’ subsistence allowance, travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation, death and disability compensation, rations and clothing allowances for military observers and police. This section also includes expenditures on major contingent-owned equipment and freight and deployment of contingent-owned equipment.

2. Civilian personnel. Covers salaries, staff assessment, common staff costs, hazardous duty stations allowances and overtime for international and local staff, as well as covers costs associated with United Nations Volunteers. 3. Operational requirements. Costs associated with general temporary assistance (salaries, common staff costs, staff assessment), government-provided personnel and civilian electoral observers (allowances and travel), consultants, official travel of civilian personnel, facilities and infrastructure, as well as selfsustainment costs of contingent-owned equipment. Also included are costs associated with ground, air, and naval transportation in mission, communications, IT, medical, special equipment, other supplies, services and equipment and quick impact projects. Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010

These data, supplied by DFS FBFD, cover contingents’ expenditures on major equipment for which they can be reimbursed by the UN as well as self-sustainment (rations, etc) for those missions financed by the peacekeeping budget. UNTSO does not have Contingent Owned Equipment. Data for UNMOGIP Contingent Owned Equipment expenditures are not available. Voluntary Contributions: July 2009–June 2010

These data cover those countries and organizations providing financial support to missions other than through assessed contributions. They are provided by the UN Department of Management’s Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA). The following missions do not have voluntary contributions: MINURCAT, UNAMID, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNMIK, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNMOGIP, UNOCI, and UNTSO.

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UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS • 175

Notes 1. Previous editions have included data on some Department of Political Affairs missions supported by DFS, however, this information is now contained in a separate Center on International Cooperation publication, the Review of Political Missions. Data regarding the UNLB and DFS support to AMISOM and UNSOA is not included. 2. Prior to the July 2001–June 2002 financial year, “Staff Assessment” was reported as an additional line item in “Gross Expenditures” for each mission. Since then, staff assessment has been included as part of the “Civilian Personnel” line item. For the sake of consistency, figures for the 2000–2001 financial years are shown using the current financial reporting method and include staff assessment expenditures as part of the civilian personnel expenditures. For those years, civilian personnel expenditures will thus appear to be higher than in the official UN financial reports.

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6.1 MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central

African Republic and Chad) MINURCAT Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG

Force Commander

Police Commissioner

25 May 2010 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1923 (seven month duration and decision to initiate the complete withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian components, other than those required for the mission’s liquidation, by 31 December 2010) 25 September 2007 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1778 (twelve month duration) Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) SG letter of appointment 3 June 2010 Entry on duty 1 June 2010 Major-General Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji (Senegal) SG letter of appointment 27 February 2009 Entry on duty 15 March 2009 Mamadou Mountaga Diallo (Guinea)

176

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 177

MINURCAT Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

6,000

Number of Personnel

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1000

Aprl. ’10 Aprl. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Mar. ‘10 Mar. ‘10

Aug. ’10

Feb. ’10 Feb. ’10

Aug. ’10

Jan. ‘10 Jan. ‘10

July ‘10

Dec. ’09 Dec. ’09

July ‘10

Nov. ‘09 Nov. ‘09

June ’10

Oct. ’09 Oct. ’09

June ’10

Sept. ‘09 Sept. ‘09

May ‘10

Aug. ’09 Aug. ’09

May ‘10

July ‘09 July ‘09

0

900

800

Number of Personnel

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

Sept. ‘10

0

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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MINURCAT Personnel: Since 2007

6,000

5,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

Aug. ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

900

800

700

Average Number of Personnel

178

1/18/11

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Aug. ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1861 and S/RES/1923; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 179

MINURCAT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Nepal Ghana Togo Mongolia Bangladesh Russian Federation Sri Lanka Senegal Yemen Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Jordan Serbia Mali Ireland Egypt France Guinea

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

581 527 358 268 138 119 74 10 — 2 — — 14 — 10 — — —

1 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — — — — 1 — 2 — —

— — — — — — — 8 18 14 16 16 — 12 — 7 8 8

582 528 358 268 140 119 74 21 18 16 16 16 14 13 10 9 8 8

Contributing Country

Benin 3 Madagascar — Nigeria 4 Pakistan 4 Tunisia 2 Namibia 5 Cameroon — Niger — Finland — Kenya 3 Rwanda — Turkey — Ethiopia 2 Poland 2 United States 2 Democratic Republic of Congo 1 Norway 1 Total 2,130

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

MINURCAT Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2

Unit Type

Country

Air Medical Evacuation Team Airfield Maintenance Unit Headquarters Guard Company Headquarters Guard Unit Infantry Battalions Infantry Detachment Level I Hospital Military Police Movement Contol Platoon Utility Helicopter Units

Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Togo Mongolia Ghana, Nepal Togo Serbia Nepal Bangladesh Russia, Bangladesh

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — 2 2 4 — — — — — 1 — — — —

3 6 — — — — 4 4 3 — 2 3 — — —

6 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2

— — 19

— — 132

1 1 2,281

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MINURCAT International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

42 46 3 — — 22 12 9 11 3 7 25 1 59 — 4 9 6 — 6 14 76 4 11 370

11.4% 12.4% 0.8% — — 5.9% 3.2% 2.4% 3.0% 0.8% 1.9% 6.8% 0.3% 15.9% — 1.1% 2.4% 1.6% — 1.6% 3.8% 20.5% 1.1% 3.0%

Source: DFS FPD.

MINURCAT Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

2,110 22 121 277 535 3,065

17 — 11 93 61 182

99.2% 100.0% 91.7% 74.9% 89.8% 94.4%

0.8% — 8.3% 25.1% 10.2% 5.6%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 181

MINURCAT Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — 2 — 1 — 1 — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — —

— — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 1

— — 2 — — — 2 2 1 — 1 4

— — — — — — — — — — — —

— — 5 — 1 — 4 2 1 — 1 7

Incident Type

Time Period 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — 1 — 1 — — — — — — 1

— — 1 — — — 3 2 1 — 1 3

— — 3 — — — 3 — — — — 3

— — — — — — — — — — — —

— — 5 — 1 — 6 2 1 — 1 7

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURCAT Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 9 Combat Vehicles 25 Communications Vehicles 2 Engineering Vehicles 6 Material Handling Equipment 6 Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern) 77 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 181 Total 306

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

658 25 5 53 43 44 96 17 941

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

MINURCAT Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

9 —

6 7 (3 Bangladesh, 4 Russia) 13

— —

9

—

Source: DFS Air Transport Section. Note: Commercial fixed-wing aircraft include one shared with UNMIS.

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MINURCAT (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD) • 183

MINURCAT Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11

1,732.6 173,049.2 19,395.7 — — 76,777.2 5,760.5 5,441.2 131.8 1,427.6 — 185.6 1,250.0 201,673.4 23,330.2 131,025.2 — 17,526.3 31,046.6 1,000.0 690,753.1 7,298.6 683,454.5 — 690,753.1

1,928.7 130,152.4 — — 18,353.3 85,757.3 6,911.4 6,891.3 106.9 1,757.4 — 96.4 2,596.8 116,466.7 19,161.2 112,160.1 — 12,308.5 13,159.4 371.8 528,179.6 8,888.4 519,291.2 — 528,179.6

680.0 49,501.0 — — 7,572.0 41,388.0 2,899.0 4,268.0 — 539.0 — 76.0 976.0 34,483.0 5,380.0 46,892.0 — 5,442.0 14,529.0 375.0 215,000.0 2,737.0 212,263.0 — 215,000.0

Sources: UN Document A/64/660/Add.15; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010– 2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

MINURCAT Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

18,382.1 9,021.7 3,469.7 1,806.9 1,091.9 33,772.3

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MINUTAC/MINURCAT Mission Expenditures: July 2007–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 450,000 400,000 350,000

Expenditures

184

1/18/11

300,000

272,144.2

250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000

70,964.1

143,722.8

50,000 0

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

80,964.7 16,009.6 5,451.3 July ‘07–

July ‘08–

June ’08

June ’09

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

July ‘07–June ‘08

July ‘08-June ‘09

5,451.3 16,009.6 143,722.8 — 165,183.7 999.2 164,184.5

80,964.7 70,964.1 272,144.2 — 424,073.0 — 424,073.0

— 165,183.7

— 424,073.0

Sources: UN Documents A/63/565 and A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD.

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6.2 MINURSO (UN Mission for the

Referendum in Western Sahara) MINURSO Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander

First Force Commander

30 April 2010 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1920 (twelve month duration) 29 April 1991 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 690 (no determined duration) Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt) SG letter of appointment 6 October 2009 Johannes Manz (Switzerland) Major-General Zhao Jingmin (China) SG letter of appointment 22 August 2007 Entry on duty 27 August 2007 Major-General Armand Roy (Canada)

185

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

250

200

150

100

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Troops

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

0

Aug. ’09

50

July ‘09

•

Number of Personnel

186

1/18/11

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 187

MINURSO Personnel: Since 2000

Average Number of Personnel

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Troops

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents A/56/818, A/57/674, A/58/642, A/59/619, A/60/634 and A/61/683; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Malaysia Egypt Russia Ghana France Honduras Brazil Pakistan Yemen Bangladesh El Salvador Croatia Hungary Nigeria China

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

20 — — 7 — — — — — — — — — — —

12 21 17 9 13 12 11 11 10 9 5 7 7 6 5

— 2 — — — — — — — — 3 — — — —

32 23 17 16 13 12 11 11 10 9 8 7 7 6 5

Contributing Country Guinea Italy Mongolia Argentina Ireland Sri Lanka Austria Djibouti Jordan Nepal Paraguay Republic of Korea Greece Poland Uruguay Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 27

5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 192

— — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — 6

5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 225

Sources: DPKO FGS.

MINURSO Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number 1

Unit Type

Country

Advanced Level I Medical Unit

Malaysia

Source: DPKO FGS.

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 189

MINURSO International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

10 5 — — — 11 6 5 — — 1 13 1 14 — — 6 2 — 1 1 10 — 14 100

10.0% 5.0% — — — 11.0% 6.0% 5.0% — — 1.0% 13.0% 1.0% 14.0% — — 6.0% 2.0% — 1.0% 1.0% 10.0% — 14.0%

Source: DFS FPD.

MINURSO Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

18 187 3 82 133 423

9 5 3 18 30 65

66.7% 97.4% 50.0% 82.0% 81.6% 86.7%

33.3% 2.6% 50.0% 18.0% 18.4% 13.3%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1992–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 5

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

2 — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 3

2 — 1 — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 5

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Total 11 — 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 15

Incident Type

Time Period 1992–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Illness 3 — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 4

Accident

Otherb

8 — — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 10

— — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

Total 11 — 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 15

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 191

MINURSO Aircraft: 30 September 2010

MINURSO Vehicles: 30 September 2010

UN Owned Vehicles Vehicle Type

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

3 — 3

3 — 3

— — —

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

347 9 4 4 21 14 15 26 4 444

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

MINURSO Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11

5,368.9 761.5 147.9 — — 14,434.3 3,237.0 733.8 42.0 43.6 — 13.5 707.6 4,555.8 5,284.5 13,692.5 — 2,610.0 1,894.7 — 53,527.6 2,188.7 51,338.9 3,048.9 56,576.5

5,585.4 592.9 — — 143.2 14,461.7 3,579.7 672.7 41.7 37.3 — 13.5 510.5 4,371.8 5,267.5 12,991.2 — 2,610.0 1,944.5 — 52,823.6 2,188.7 50,634.9 3,048.9 55,872.5

5,855.5 796.6 — — 164.6 15,649.4 3,495.2 784.4 — 39.4 — 15.0 690.0 3,918.6 3,897.8 16,487.6 — 2,430.3 2,906.1 — 57,130.5 2,408.1 54,722.4 2,908.0 60,038.5

Sources: UN Document A/64/660/Add.2; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010– 2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINURSO Voluntary Contributions: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor Morocco Algeria Frente Polisario Total

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

2494.0 285.0 68.0 2,847.0

— — — —

— — — —

2,494.0 285.0 68.0 2,847.0

Source: DM OPPBA.

MINURSO Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Medical Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

96.5 1.7 61.9 160.1

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MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 193

MINURSO Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Expenditures (in thouasnds of US$)

60,000

50,000

40,000

2,309.1

10,239.6

13,025.0

14,002.7

14,882.6

18,861.9

20,323.6

20,587.7

23,471.6

24,529.9

22,523.2

19,720.8

18,191.5

17,472.9

16,162.6

15,807.2

14,851.2

15,599.0

15,885.9

7,144.0

6,344.7

6,214.8

6,495.3

6,373.5

6,217.6

6,265.7

6,449.7

7,549.5

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

Operational Requirements

Category

July ’00– June ’01

Military and Police Personnel 7,144.0 Civilian Personnel 22,523.2 Operational Requirements 10,239.6 Other 2,309.1 Gross Requirements 42,215.9 Staff Assessment Income 3,773.4 Net Requirements 38,442.5 Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) 3,670.7 Total Requirements 45,886.6

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Other

Jul ’01– June ’02

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ‘09

6,344.7 19,720.8

6,214.8 18,191.5

6,495.3 17,472.9

6,373.5 16,162.6

6,217.6 15,807.2

6,265.7 14,851.2

6,449.7 15,599.0

7,549.5 15,885.9

13,025.0 — 39,090.5

14,002.7 — 38,409.0

14,882.6 — 38,850.8

18,861.9 — 41,398.0

20,323.6 — 42,348.4

20,585.7 — 41,702.6

23,471.6 — 45,520.3

24,529.9 — 47,965.2

2,751.3 36,339.2

2,636.2 35,772.8

2,442.8 36,408.0

2,311.9 39,086.1

2,191.5 40,156.9

1,860.7 39,841.9

2,017.0 43,503.3

— 47,965.2

1,806.1 40,896.6

2,567.4 40,976.4

3,084.0 41,934.8

3,885.2 45,283.2

3,761.3 46,109.7

2,775.9 44,478.5

2,945.2 48,465.5

— 47,965.2

Sources: UN Documents A/56/818, A/57/674, A/58/642, A/59/619, A/60/634, A/61/683 A/62/679, A/63/608, A/C.5/63/26 andA/64/660/ Add.2; DFS FBFD.

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6.3 MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)

MINUSTAH Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner

14 October 2010 (date of issue); 15 October 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1944 (twelve month duration) 30 April 2004 (date of issue); 1 June 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1542 (six month duration) Edmond Mulet (Guatemala) SG letter of appointment 26 March 2010 Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile) Major-General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz (Brazil) SG letter of appointment 11 March 2010 Lieutenant-General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil) Geraldo Chaumont (Argentina)

194

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 195

MINUSTAH Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

9,000

8,000

Number of Personnel

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Auth. Troops

Auth. Police

Troops

Police

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

1,600

1,400

1,000

800

600

400

200

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0 July ‘09

Number of Personnel

1,200

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Personnel: Since 2004

8,000

7,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

May– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

3,000

2,500

Average Number of Personnel

196

1/18/11

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 May– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Int’l Staff

Police

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1542, S/RES/1608, S/RES/1702, A/60/646, A/61/741, S/RES/1702, and S/RES/ 1780; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 197

MINUSTAH Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Brazil Nepal Uruguay Jordan Sri Lanka Argentina Chile Peru Bangladesh India Pakistan Korea Japan Bolivia Philippines Senegal Guatemala Russia Nigeria Canada France Italy Côte d’Ivoire Ecuador Mali Guinea United States Benin Rwanda Niger

2,188 1,074 1,135 611 958 708 503 371 — 1 — 242 225 208 157 — 147 — — 8 2 — — 67 — — 9 — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

4 203 5 385 37 21 15 — 327 309 304 — — — 37 173 — 9 147 133 136 105 97 — 59 49 38 43 43 42

2,192 1,277 1,140 996 995 729 518 371 327 310 304 242 225 208 194 173 14 9 147 141 138 105 97 67 59 49 47 43 43 42

Burkina Faso Colombia Turkey Spain Paraguay Madagascar Egypt Romania Chad Thailand El Salvador Yemen Israel Cameroon Central African Republic China Russia Jamaica Guinea-Bissau Indonesia Serbia Burundi Togo Croatia Grenada Sweden Kazakhstan Lithuania Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — 31 — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

40 36 35 32 — 30 23 23 21 18 17 15 14 11

40 36 35 32 31 30 23 23 21 18 17 15 14 11

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — 8,645

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

11 10 9 8 7 7 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 3,105

11 10 9 8 7 7 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 11,750

Source: DPKO FGS.

MINUSTAH Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number

Unit Type

Country

3 4

Aviation Units Engineering Companies

1 10

Headquarters Company Infantry Battalions

2 1 1 1 1

Infantry Companies Level II Hospital Maritime Unit Military Police Company Platoon

Argentina, Chile, Uruguay Brazil, Chile-Ecuador Composite, Japan, Korea Philippines Argentina, Brazil (2), Chile, Jordan, Nepal (2), Sri Lanka, Uruguay (2) Bolivia, Peru Argentina Uruguay Guatemala Paraguay

Source: DPKO FGS.

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MINUSTAH International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

64 15 31 — 3 24 24 25 13 5 1 29 5 77 — 2 28 12 7 16 26 59 2 17 485

13.2% 3.1% 6.4% — 0.6% 4.9% 4.9% 5.2% 2.7% 1.0% 0.2% 6.0% 1.0% 15.9% — 0.4% 5.8% 2.5% 1.4% 3.3% 5.4% 12.2% 0.4% 3.5%

Source: DFS FPD.

MINUSTAH Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

8,498 — 2,835 325 986 12,644

147 — 270 160 228 805

98.3% — 91.3% 67.0% 81.2% 94.0%

1.7% — 8.7% 33.0% 18.8% 6.0%

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 199

MINUSTAH Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— 9 6 5 2 15 3 — — 12 26 25 1 — 63

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 3 — 1 3 2 — — — 2 18 18 — — 27

— 1 3 3 — 1 — 1 — — 32 32 — — 40

— — 3 — — 2 2 — — — 19 17 1 1 24

— — — — — — — — — — 5 4 1 — 5

— 13 12 9 5 20 5 1 — 14 100 96 3 1 159

Incident Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

— 6 5 — 1 1 1 — — — — — — — 13

— 3 4 6 2 4 — 1 — 3 — — — — 19

Accident — 3 2 3 2 13 2 — — 11 99 96 2 1 122

Otherb

Total

— 1 1 — — 2 2 — — — 1 — 1 — 5

— 13 12 9 5 20 5 1 — 14 100 96 3 1 159

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 17 Combat Vehicles 255 Engineering Vehicles 200 Material Handling Equipment 38 Naval Vessels 24 Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern) 717 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 793 Total 2,044

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

1,152 10 9 62 7 39 98 11 1,388

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

MINUSTAH Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

1 1 (Uruguay) 2

4 6 (2 Argentina, 4 Chile) 10

— —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

—

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MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 201

MINUSTAH Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11

— 196,036.7 57,961.6 32,690.7 — 92,418.4 30,772.9 12,313.0 4,770.5 1,451.1 — 214.9 1,829.1 84,991.9 13,247.2 30,648.6 1,316.4 32,009.0 16,079.2 3,000.0 611,751.2 14,067.3 597,683.9 — 611,751.2

— 219,807.8 — 43,546.1 57,392.7 101,630.4 33,406.4 11,324.3 3,259.7 703.7 — 153.1 1,753.7 110,674.2 17,639.0 30,516.6 770.7 58,213.6 38,600.8 3,000.3 732,393.0 — 732,393.0 — 732,393.0

122,968.6 36,751.5 — — 31,368.4 44,422.0 15,386.5 17,202.3 — 725.6 — 107.5 914.6 52,120.9 6,423.6 15,121.6 658.2 17,018.1 13,790.6 5,000.0 380,000.0 8,219.9 371,780.1 — 380,000.0

Source: DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010– 2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures. Discrepancies in estimated expenditures may be the result of figure estimations.

MINUSTAH Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

35,696.8 6,617.6 17,582.2 7,225.4 5,078.4 3,066.3 75,266.7

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MINUSTAH Voluntary Contributions: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

— —

1,090.0 1,090.0

— —

1,090.0 1,090.0

Commercial enterprisesvarious countries Total

Source: DM OPPBA.

MINUSTAH Mission Expenditures: May 2004–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 700,000 600,000

Expenditures

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500,000

168,998.8 151,288.5

400,000 128,334.7

300,000

151,130.2

143,106.5

88,831.9

94,542.4

239,674.5

246,371.2

120,091.9

124,931.8

56,050.5

200,000

192,850.1

100,000

262,687.8

280,471.1

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

26,150.3 1,246.5 7,159.3

0

May ‘04– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

May ‘04– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

7,159.3 1,246.5 26,150.3 — 34,556.1 60.7 34,495.4

192,850.1 56,050.5 128,334.7 — 377,235.3 5,347.3 371,888.0

239,674.5 88,831.9 151,130.2 — 479,636.6 8,664.8 470,971.8

246,371.2 94,542.4 143,106.5 — 484,020.1 9,313.5 474,706.6

262,687.8 120,091.9 151,288.5 — 534,068.2 12,171.2 521,897.0

280,471.1 124,931.8 168,998.8 — 574,401.7 — 574,401.7

— 34,556.1

— 377,235.3

— 479,636.6

— 484,020.1

— 534,068.2

— 574,401.7

Sources: UN Documents A/59/745, A/60/646, A/61/741 A/62/720, A/63/549/Corr.1 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.4 MONUSCO/ (UN Organization Mission in the MONUC

Democratic Republic of Congo) MONUSCO Key Facts

First Mandate

SRSG

Force Commander Police Commissioner

28 May 2010 (date of issue); 1 July 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1925 (one month duration of MONUC and decision to change title effective 1 July 2010 to “United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)” for twelve month duration) Roger Meece (United States) SG letter of appointment 7 June 2010 Entry on duty 1 July 2010 Lieutenant General Chander Prakash (India) Abdallah Wafy (Niger)

MONUC Key Facts

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner

30 November 1999 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1279 (three month duration) Alan Doss (United Kingdom) SG letter of appointment 17 October 2007 Kamel Morjane (Tunisia) Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) SG letter of appointment 31 October 2008 Major-General Mountaga Diallo (Senegal) Abdallah Wafy (Niger)

203

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MONUC/MONUSCO Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

20,500 20,000 19,500 19,000

Number of Personnel

18,500 18,000 17,500 17,000 16,500 16,000 15,500

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

15,000

Auth. Troops Troops

3,200

2,800

2,400

2,000

1,600

1,200

800

400

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0 July ‘09

•

Number of Personnel

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Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Notes: Military observers figures include staff officers. In accordance with S/RES/1925 of 28 May 2010, the title of the mission was changed from MONUC to MONUSCO effective 1 July 2010.

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MONUSCO/MONUC (THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 205

MONUC Personnel: Since 2000

25,000

Average Number of Personnel

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

3,500

Average Number of Personnel

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657, A/60/669, A/61/672, A/61/852 Add.11, S/RES/1258, S/RES/1279, S/RES/1291, S/RES/1355, S/RES/1445, S/RES/1493, S/RES/1565, S/RES/1621, S/RES/1635, S/RES/1650, S/RES/1669, S/RES/1692, S/RES/1693, S/RES/1711, S/RES/1742, S/RES/1751, S/RES/1756, S/RES/1843; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: In accordance with S/RES/1925 of 28 May 2010, the title of the mission was changed from MONUC to MONUSCO effective 1 July 2010.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MONUSCO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

India Pakistan Bangladesh Uruguay South Africa Nepal Egypt Morocco Ghana Benin Senegal Jordan China Indonesia Guatemala Tunisia Malawi Niger Burkina Faso Romania Côte d’Ivoire Russia Belgium Bolivia Kenya Madagascar Mali Guinea Nigeria Chad

4,243 3,571 2,521 1,285 1,205 1,025 999 831 462 450 40 218 218 175 150 46 50 — — — — — 22 19 — — — — — —

60 55 30 46 14 24 25 4 24 11 23 25 16 16 7 30 18 16 8 21 — 28 7 10 24 — 9 — 18 —

250 — 389 — — — 4 — — 23 263 2 — — — — — 31 29 15 33 4 — — — 23 12 20 2 18

4,553 3,626 2,940 1,331 1,219 1,049 1,028 835 486 484 326 245 234 191 157 76 68 47 37 36 33 32 29 29 24 23 21 20 20 18

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Contributing Country Togo Malaysia Paraguay Ukraine Turkey Zambia Cameroon France Yemen Canada Central African Republic Serbia Sweden Peru Bosnia and Herzegovina Sri Lanka United Kingdom Czech Republic Ireland Poland Spain Switzerland Denmark Mongolia Tanzania United States Mozambique Norway Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — —

— 17 17 12 — 16 5 5 6 10

18 — — 5 16 — 9 9 6 —

18 17 17 17 16 16 14 14 12 10

— 6 — —

— 2 4 7

8 — 4 —

8 8 8 7

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1,193

5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 19,437

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — 17,536

5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 708

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MONUSCO/MONUC (THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 207

MONUSCO Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 5 1

Unit Type

Country

Air Medical Evacuation Teams Airfield Crash Rescue Unit Airfield Service Unit Airfield Support Unit Attack Aviation Units Aviation Unit Brigade Headquarters and Training Teams C-130 Aviation Units Cargo Handling Unit Engineering Company Engineering Units

Morocco, Pakistan, Serbia, South Africa South Africa Bangladesh Uruguay India South Africa, Uruguay India, Pakistan

18

Headquarters Support and Signal Company Infantry Battalions

1 3 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 3 1

Infantry Mechanized Unit Level II Hospitals Level III Hospital Military Police Units Observation Aviation Unit Rear Party of Infantry Unit Riverine Units Special Forces Companies Support Company Utility Aviation Units Water Treatment Plant

Source: DPKO FGS.

Bangladesh, Belgium South Africa Bangladesh China, Indonesia, Nepal, South Africa, Uruguay Bangladesh Bangladesh (2), Benin, Egypt, India (4), Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan (4), Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay Ghana China, Jordan, Morocco India Bangladesh, South Africa India Bolivia Uruguay Egypt, Guatemala, Jordan Malawi Bangladesh, India (2) Uruguay

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MONUSCO International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

122 48 19 — 27 55 43 30 29 — 3 84 4 168 — 15 56 21 36 34 18 94 15 25 946

12.9% 5.1% 2.0% — 2.9% 5.8% 4.5% 3.2% 3.1% — 0.3% 8.9% 0.4% 17.8% — 1.6% 5.9% 2.2% 3.8% 3.6% 1.9% 9.9% 1.6% 2.6%

Source: DFS FPD.

MONUSCO Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

17,179 680 1,154 681 2,402 22,096

357 28 39 265 378 1,067

98.0% 96.0% 96.7% 72.0% 86.4% 95.4%

2.0% 4.0% 3.3% 28.0% 13.6% 4.6%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD. Note: Military observers figures include staff officers.

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MONUSCO/MONUC (THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 209

MONUC/MONUSCO Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — 4 3 8 18 20 18 6 12 8 1 1 3 3 7 1 2 4 104

— — 1 2 3 2 — 1 — — 1 — 1 — — — — — — 10

— — — — — — 1 1 — 3 1 1 — — — — — — — 6

— — 1 2 3 — 2 1 1 1 1 — — — 1 1 — — 1 13

— — 2 1 — 2 2 7 6 6 4 1 1 — 2 4 — 3 1 34

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — 8 8 14 22 25 28 13 22 15 3 3 3 6 12 1 5 6 167

Incident Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — 1 — 3 3 13 9 1 2 — — — — — 5 — 2 3 37

— — 4 5 7 8 8 17 10 16 9 1 3 2 3 6 1 3 2 90

— — 1 3 4 11 4 2 2 3 2 1 — — 1 — — — — 32

— — 2 — — — — — — 1 4 1 — 1 2 1 — — 1 8

— — 8 8 14 22 25 28 13 22 15 3 3 3 6 12 1 5 6 167

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: In accordance with S/RES/1925 of 28 May 2010, the title of the mission was changed from MONUC to MONUSCO effective 1 July 2010. a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

MONUSCO Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 77 Airfield Support 1 Combat Vehicles 449 Communications Vehicles 5 Engineering Vehicles 235 Material Handling Equipment 58 Naval Vessels 32 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 468 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1,938 Total 3,263

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Boats Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

1,907 79 33 2 2 288 26 121 281 26 2,765

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

MONUSCO Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned

Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

20 2 (Bangladesh, Belgium)

24 24 (6 Bangladesh, 14 India, 2 South Africa, 2 Uruguay) 48

— 4 (India)

22

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

4

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MONUSCO/MONUC (THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 211

MONUC/MONUSCO Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10 47,846.7 455,972.0 20,243.5 26,527.2 — 167,258.6 63,181.4 26,285.0 7,162.2 841.0 — 434.2 9,980.8 125,151.7 36,498.6 255,035.8 1,445.2 55,557.8 46,162.9 1,000.0 1,346,584.6 26,236.3 1,320,348.3 4,953.9 1,351,538.5

Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 47,902.1 451,595.9 — 25,866.1 21,024.3 167,362.0 61,694.7 28,369.8 7,210.7 872.8 — 434.0 9,980.0 122,613.1 37,671.5 228,124.3 1,278.8 55,483.5 47,925.8 1,000.0 1,316,409.4 26,236.3 1,290,173.1 4,953.9 1,321,363.3

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 47,742.3 476,268.8 — 27,043.2 20,795.0 179,324.5 64,742.6 32,944.8 — 2,560.5 — 189.8 9,064.3 125,179.4 37,696.9 238,443.3 1,719.6 51,827.6 47,957.4 1,500.0 1,365,000.0 30,456.1 1,334,543.9 4,000.0 1,369,000.0

Sources: UN Document A/64/660/Add.8; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures. In accordance with S/RES/1925 of 28 May 2010, the title of the mission was changed from MONUC to MONUSCO effective 1 July 2010.

MONUC Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

75,481.4 4,871.9 43,068.2 19,090.8 15,341.2 5,387.5 163,241.0

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MONUC Voluntary Contributions: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

3,481.0 3,481.0

— —

— —

3,481.0 3,481.0

Foundation Hirondelle Total

Source: DM OPPBA.

MONUC Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 1,400,000 1,200,000

Expenditures

212

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1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0

445,229.5 385,307.4 442,586.2 443,265.2 380,258.6 215,371.3 238,108.0 203,018.5 163,232.0 261,188.0 140,862.5 484,249.2 229,456.9 112,562.7 448,543.1 470.810.1 474.6 223,159.0 439,523.2 379,763.4 93,521.5 185,247.6 68,491.0 262,734.7 28,080.0 97,177.0156.973.6 29,656.1 July‘00–

July‘01–

July‘02–

July‘03– July ‘04– July ‘05– July ‘06– July ‘07– July ‘08–

June ‘01 June ‘02 June ‘03 June ‘04 June ‘05 June ‘06 June ‘07 June ‘08 June ‘09

Operational Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Category

July ’00– June ’01

Military and Police Personnel 29,656.1 Civilian Personnel 28,080.0 Operational Requirements 185,247.6 Other 474.6 Gross Requirements 243,458.3 Staff Assessment Income 3,013.7 Net Requirements 240,444.6 Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) — Total Requirements 243,458.3

Other

Jul ’01– June ’02

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ‘09

97,177.0 68,491.0

156,973.6 93,521.5

262,734.7 112,562.7

379,763.4 140,862.5

448,543.1 439,523.2 163,232.0 203,018.5

470,810.1 215,371.3

484,249.2 238,108.0

223,159.0 — 388,827.0

229,456.9 — 479,952.0

261,188.0 — 636,485.4

380,258.6 443,265.2 442,586.2 385,307.4 445,229.5 — — — — — 900,884.5 1,055,040.3 1,085,127.9 1,071,488.8 1,167,586.7

6,777.6 382,049.4

10,037.6 469,914.4

12,114.2 624,371.2

14,882.7 17,035.5 19,985.5 20,659.0 — 886,001.8 1,038,004.8 1,065,142.4 1,050,829.8 1,167,586.7

— 388,827.0

1,780.2 481,732.2

2,345.8 638,831.2

3,112.6 3,237.5 2,858.0 4,153.4 — 903,997.1 1,058,277.8 1,087,985.9 1,075,642.2 1,167,586.7

Sources: UN Documents A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657, A/60/669, A/61/672 A/62/737, A/63/563 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.5 UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur)

UNAMID Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate

Joint AU/UN Special Representative First Joint AU/UN Special Representative Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner

30 July 2010 (date of issue); 31 July 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1935 (twelve month duration) 31 July 2007 (date of issue); Implement mandated tasks no later than 31 December 2007 UNSC Res. 1769 (twelve month duration) Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) Date of effect 1 January 2010 Rodolphe Adada (Republic of the Congo) Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda) SG letter of appointment 22 July 2009 General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria) James Oppong-Boanuh (Ghana)

213

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Personnel: January 2009–September 2010

25,000

Number of Personnel

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

Auth. Troops

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Police

Local Staff

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0 July ‘09

•

Number of Personnel

214

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 215

UNAMID Personnel: Since 2007

25,000

Average Number of Personnel

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Police

Local Staff

1,800

1,600

Average Number of Personnel

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1769; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Nigeria Rwanda Egypt Ethiopia Senegal Bangladesh Tanzania South Africa Burkina Faso Pakistan Nepal Jordan Ghana Gambia China Sierra Leone Indonesia Philippines Uganda Zambia Kenya Yemen Namibia

3,318 3,231 2,394 2,356 1,010 580 816 775 802 502 346 7 6 200 319 135 1 — — 7 82 5 2

12 9 24 10 17 6 20 15 7 5 16 5 4 1 2 6 2 — 1 13 6 22 10

450 41 208 — 316 746 82 79 18 265 367 572 457 238 — 158 139 138 112 88 — 60 39

3,780 3,281 2,626 2,366 1,343 1,332 918 869 827 772 729 584 467 439 321 299 142 138 113 108 88 87 51

Malawi 7 Burundi 2 Cameroon — Malaysia 12 Niger — Tajikistan — Zimbabwe 2 Mali 2 Thailand 7 Togo — Kazakhstan — Madagascar — Canada 5 Norway — Germany 3 Finland — Italy 2 Netherlands 2 Republic of Korea 2 Sweden — Bolivia — Palau — Total 16,919

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

8 7 3 1 — — 9 8 2 7 — — — — — — — — — — 1 — 240

34 39 32 20 26 16 5 — — 1 7 6 — 5 — 2 — — — 2 — 1 4,618

49 48 35 33 26 16 16 10 9 8 7 6 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 21,777

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNAMID Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number 1 1 17

1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 1

Unit Type

Country

Headquarters Company Heavy Transport Company Infantry Battalions

Gambia Egypt Burkina Faso, Egypt (2), Ethiopia (2), Nigeria (4), Rwanda (4), Senegal (2), South Africa, Tanzania Nigeria Pakistan Ethiopia Kenya China, Egypt, Pakistan Bangladesh, Ethiopia Ethiopia, Sierra Leone Bangladesh, Nepal Egypt Nepal

Level II Hospital Level III Hospital Medical Transport Company Military Police Company Multi-Role Engineering Companies Multi-Role Logistics Companies Sector Reconnaissance Companies Sector Reserve Infantry Companies Signals Unit Special Forces Company

Source: DPKO FGS.

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 217

UNAMID International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

128 35 31 1 — 85 34 64 40 20 19 129 11 155 1 28 57 16 17 21 29 112 12 61 1,106

11.6% 3.2% 2.8% 0.1% — 7.7% 3.1% 5.8% 3.6% 1.8% 1.7% 11.7% 1.0% 14.0% 0.1% 2.5% 5.2% 1.4% 1.5% 1.9% 2.6% 10.1% 1.1% 5.5%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNAMID Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Male 16,486 242 4,207 799 2,326 24,060

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Female 454 17 562 307 347 1,687

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

97.3% 93.4% 88.2% 72.2% 87.0% 93.4%

2.7% 6.6% 11.8% 27.8% 13.0% 6.6%

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

16 17 3 5 1 8 15 4 4 7 48

1 — — — — — — — — — 1

9 2 — — 1 1 1 — — 1 12

— 2 1 — 1 — 1 — — 1 3

3 6 1 — 4 1 — — — — 9

— — — — — — 2 — 2 — 2

Total 29 27 5 5 7 10 19 4 6 9 75

Incident Type

Time Period 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

11 9 1 1 1 6 5 — 5 — 25

11 16 4 3 6 3 6 3 — 3 33

5 1 — 1 — — 8 1 1 6 14

2 1 — — — 1 — — — — 3

Total 29 27 5 5 7 10 19 4 6 9 75

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 219

UNAMID Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 6 Combat Vehicles 594 Engineering Vehicles 229 Material Handling Equipment 99 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 797 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1,722 Total 3,447

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 2,104 39 16 3 294 103 80 272 4 2,915

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNAMID Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

10 — 10

30 5 (Ethiopia) 35

— 5 (Ethiopia) 5

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNAMID Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

11,731.7 511,188.1 146,178.1 70,336.6 — 161,616.1 56,131.7 19,568.4 4,299.3 243.8 — 480.2 4,563.2 241,268.6 31,425.7 207,415.2 — 83,550.3 44,945.2 4,000.0 1,598,942.2 25,060.3 1,573,881.9 — 1,598,942.2

Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 11,704.9 451,702.8 — 57,437.6 145,943.7 181,722.9 47,312.2 19,055.8 3,570.3 231.9 — 518.4 6,695.6 234,369.8 33,125.4 243,032.6 — 75,113.6 73,245.8 3,997.5 1,588,780.8 — 1,588,780.8 — 1,588,780.8

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 11,396.4 520,581.1 — 74,124.4 168,188.5 261,836.5 65,731.7 29,155.3 — 279.9 — 203.7 4,486.1 223,259.0 32,302.9 261,957.4 — 77,331.2 73,293.4 4,000.0 1,808,127.5 31,972.2 1,776,155.3 — 1,808,127.5

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.13 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNAMID Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

80,299.1 14,240.1 30,938.5 13,355.1 16,963.9 6,829.8 162,626.5

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UNAMID (DARFUR) • 221

UNAMID Mission Expenditures: July 2007–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000

Expenditures

1,200,000

768,046.5

1,000,000 800,000 600,000

754,238.6

184,353.1

64,373.3

586,616.8

400,000 200,000

237,866.7

0

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ‘07–

July ‘08–

June ’08

June ’09

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

July ‘07–June ‘08

July ‘08–June ‘09

237,866.7 64,373.3 754,238.6 — 1,056,478.6 6,692.3 1,049,786.3

586,616.8 184,353.1 768,046.5 — 1,539,016.4 — 1,539,016.4

— 1,056,478.6

— 1,539,016.4

Sources: UN Documents A/63/535 and A/C.5/63/26; DFS FBFD.

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6.6 UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNDOF Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions First Mandate Force Commander First Force Commander

30 June 2010 (date of issue); 1 July 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1934 (six month duration) 31 May 1974 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 350 (six month duration) Major-General Natalio C. Ecarma (Philippines) SG letter of appointment 28 January 2010 Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos (Peru)

222

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 223

UNDOF Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

1,500 1,400

Number of Personnel

1,300 1,200 1,100 1,000 900 800 700 600

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘010

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

500

Auth. Troops Troops

120

Number of Personnel

100

80

60

40

20

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Personnel: Since 2000

1,500

1,400

1,300

Average Number of Personnel

•

1,200

1,000

900

800

700

600

500 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

120

100

Average Number of Personnel

224

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80

60

40

20

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

Source: DPKO FGS.

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 225

UNDOF Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Austria Philippines India Croatia Japan Canada Total

378 349 190 94 31 2 1,044

— — — — — — —

— — — — — — —

Source: DPKO FGS.

UNDOF Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number 2 1 1 1

Unit Type

Country

Infantry Battalions Infantry Company Logistics Battalion Transport Company

Australia, Philippines Croatia India Japan

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military Field Headquarters Staff Officers not included.

Total 378 349 190 94 31 2 1,044

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

5 — 1 — — 3 4 2 — — 1 10 1 4 — — — 3 — — 1 2 — 3 40

12.5% — 2.5% — — 7.5% 10.0% 5.0% — — 2.5% 25.0% 2.5% 10.0% — — — 7.5% — — 2.5% 5.0% — 7.5%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNDOF Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

1,015 — — 30 79 1,124

29 — — 10 24 63

97.2% — — 75.0% 76.7% 94.7%

2.8% — — 25.0% 23.3% 5.3%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 227

UNDOF Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1974–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

38 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 42

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

39 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 43

Incident Type

Time Period 1974–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 7

6 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 6

19 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 19

7 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 11

39 — — — — — 2 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 43

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) Total

2 1 5 5 13

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Ambulances Armoured Personnel Carriers Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 262 9 18 2 66 15 11 68 4 455

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

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UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 229

UNDOF Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11

— 21,489.0 — — — 6,774.3 3,400.7 — 40.0 — — 14.0 378.5 5,536.8 3,768.8 — — 2,284.2 1,343.4 — 45,029.7 1,338.0 43,691.7 — 45,029.7

— 21,956.4 — — — 6,690.6 3,398.1 — 40.0 — — 14.0 372.2 5,530.4 3,774.7 — — 2,244.3 1,287.8 — 45,308.5 1,338.0 43,970.5 — 45,308.5

— 23,778.3 — — — 7,608.4 2,824.5 40.0 — — — 21.2 407.4 6,057.4 3,681.9 — — 2,051.6 1,336.2 — 47,806.9 1,393.0 46,413.9 — 47,806.9

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.4 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNDOF Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FPD.

362.1 256.0 184.7 4.4 807.2

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNDOF Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 50,000 45,000 40,000

Expenditures

230

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35,000

1,798.7

30,000

9,046.8

14,661.1 12,025.6

11,470.1

7,867.5

8,555.6

19,397.8

20,223.8

19,523.8

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

12,773.7

13,401.0

14,256.0

6,892.7

7,597.2

7,166.1

11,114.8

25,000 20,000

5,088.0

13,035.1

8,528.2

9,604.4

6,348.7

15,000 10,000

19,309.3 19,335.2

16,959.4

18,745.6

20,616.4

21,446.4

5,000 0

July ‘00– July ‘01– June ‘01 June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

July ‘03– June ‘04

Civilian Personnel

July ‘07– July ‘08– June ‘08 June ‘09

Military and Police Personnel

Other

July ’00– June ’01

Jul ’01– June ’02

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ‘09

19,335.2 5,088.0

16,959.4 6,348.7

19,309.3 6,892.7

18,745.6 7,597.2

19,397.8 7,166.1

20,223.8 7,867.5

19,523.3 8,555.6

20,616.4 8,528.2

21,446.4 9,604.3

9,046.8 1,798.7 35,268.7

11,114.8 — 34,422.9

12,773.7 — 38,975.7

13,401.0 — 39,743.8

14,256.0 — 40,819.9

12,025.6 — 40,116.9

11,470.1 — 39,549.0

13,035.1 — 42,179.7

14,661.1 — 45,711.8

1,131.6 34,137.1

958.2 33,464.7

1,006.4 37,969.3

1,087.2 38,656.6

1,073.9 39,746.0

1,126.2 38,990.7

1,139.2 38,409.8

1,189.6 40,990.1

— 45,711.8

— 35,268.7

— 34,422.9

— 38,975.7

— 39,743.8

— 40,819.9

— 40,116.9

— 39,549.0

— 42,179.7

— 45,711.8

Sources: UN Documents A/56/813, A/57/668, A/58/641, A/59/625, A/60/628, A/61/662 A/62/719, A/63/521 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.7 UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)

UNFICYP Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander

15 June 2010 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 1930 (six month duration) 4 March 1964 (date of issue and effect) UNSC. Res. 186 (three month duration) Lisa Buttenheim (United States) SG letter of appointment 27 May 2010 Galo Plaza Lasso (appointed as mediator, Ecuador) Rear Admiral Mario César Sánchez Debernardi (Peru) SG letter of appointment 9 April 2008 Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani (India)

231

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UNFICYP Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

900 890

Number of Personnel

880 870 860 850 840 830 820

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

July ‘09

800

Aug. ’09

810

Auth. Troops Troops

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Police

Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Police

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0 July ‘09

•

Number of Personnel

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UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 233

UNFICYP Personnel: Since 2000

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

200

Average Number of Personnel

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Sources: UN Documents A/56/782, A/57/667, A/58/631, A/59/620, A/60/584 and A/61/724; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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UNFICYP Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country United Kingdom Argentina Slovakia Hungary Ireland Australia Chile Paraguay El Salvador India Croatia Austria Italy Netherlands Ukraine Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Peru Brazil Canada Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

271 267 198 84 — — 15 14 — — 2 4 — — — — — 2 1 1 859

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — 18 15 — — 8 7 4 — 4 4 4 3 2 — — — 69

271 267 198 84 18 15 15 14 8 7 6 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 928

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

UNFICYP Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number

Unit Type

Country

1 1 1 1

Aviation Unit Force Engineers Platoon Force Medical Unit Force Military Police Unit

2

Infantry Units

1

Mobile Force Reserve Unit

Argentina Slovakia Argentina Argentina-Hungary-SlovakiaUnited Kingdom Composite Argentina-Slovakia-United Kingdom Composite, United Kingdom Argentina-Hungary-SlovakiaUnited Kingdom Composite

Source: DPKO FGS.

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UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 235

UNFICYP International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

9 — 3 — — 2 2 2 — — 1 4 1 2 — — 5 2 — — 2 2 — — 37

24.3% — 8.1% — — 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% — — 2.7% 10.8% 2.7% 5.4% — — 13.5% 5.4% — — 5.4% 5.4% — —

Source: DFS FPD.

UNFICYP Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

793 — 58 26 70 947

66 — 11 11 43 131

92.3% — 84.1% 70.3% 61.9% 87.8%

7.7% — 15.9% 29.7% 38.1% 12.2%

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UNFICYP Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1963–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

163 1 — — 2 1 — — 1 1 1 — — — 1 — — — — 170

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3

3 — — — — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 5

— — — — — 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

169 1 — — 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 — — — 1 — — — — 180

Incident Type

Time Period 1963–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

15 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 15

41 — — — — — 1 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 44

91 — — — 2 2 — — 1 1 1 — — — 1 — — — — 98

22 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 23

169 1 — — 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 — — — 1 — — — — 180

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 237

UNFICYP Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Combat Vehicles 9 Engineering Vehicles 4 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 4 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 19 Total 36

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Bus Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Total

Quantity 29 2 2 11 12 8 27 91

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNFICYP Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

— — —

— 3 (Argentina) 3

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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UNFICYP Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11

— 20,927.1 2,916.4 — — 6,588.0 7,662.2 — 192.0 — — — 506.8 7,713.9 3,530.1 1,547.4 — 1,817.7 1,011.1 — 54,412.7 2,217.7 52,195.0 1,484.3 55,897.0

— 20,000.1 — — 3,041.2 6,564.1 8,635.2 — 125.3 — — — 274.2 7,905.4 3,783.2 1,570.9 — 1,755.9 756.9 — 54,412.4 2,351.4 52,061.0 1,484.3 55,896.7

— 21,072.6 — — 3,176.6 6,795.9 8,694.7 192.0 — — — — 425.2 8,195.5 3,338.7 1,836.4 — 1,632.4 — 965.7 56,325.7 2,555.7 53,770.0 1,830.6 58,156.3

Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.5 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNFICYP Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

1,217.1 165.4 1,382.5

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UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 239

UNFICYP Voluntary Contributions: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

1,328.0 — 1,328.0

— — —

18,074.0 6,500.0 24,574.0

19,402.0 6,500.0 25,902.0

Cyprus Greece Total

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNFICYP Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

60,000

50,000 18,870.8

Expenditures

40,000

2,090.0 11,045.0 7,887.2

13,466.7

14,917.4

11,440.8

30,000 10,016.0

8,318.4

11,410.4

12,162.6 12,228.3

8,678.4

12,920.6

14,646.6

14,614.1

20,000 22,150.2

20,169.2

22,583.1

22,980.3

21,685.5

18,131.3

19,509.9

21,483.0

22,820.5

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

Military and Police Personnel

Other

10,000

0

Operational Requirements

Category

11,073.5

14,102.4

14,777.0

July ’00– June ’01

Military and Police Personnel 22,150.2 Civilian Personnel 8,318.4 Operational Requirements 7,887.2 Other 2,090.0 Gross Requirements 40,445.8 Staff Assessment Income 1,914.7 Net Requirements 38,531.1 Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) — Total Requirements 40,445.8

Civilian Personnel

Jul ’01– June ’02

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ‘09

20,169.2 8,678.4

22,583.1 10,016.0

22,980.3 11,410.4

21,685.5 12,162.6

18,131.3 12,228.3

19,509.9 12,920.6

21,483.0 14,646.6

22,820.5 14,614.1

11,440.8 — 40,288.4

11,045.0 — 43,644.1

11,073.5 — 45,464.2

14,777.0 — 48,625.1

13,466.7 — 43,826.3

14,917.4 — 47,347.9

14,102.4 — 50,232.0

18,870.8 — 56,305.6

1,489.0 38,799.4

1,721.7 41,922.4

1,865.3 43,598.9

1,984.7 46,640.4

2,001.0 41,825.3

2,110.7 45,237.2

2,358.6 47,873.4

56,305.6

1,356.1 41,644.5

1,271.2 44,915.3

1,707.1 47,171.3

1,355.8 49,980.9

1,278.4 45,104.7

1,474.4 48,822.3

1,504.3 51,736.3

56,305.6

—

—

Sources: UN Documents A/56/782, A/57/667, A/58/631, A/59/620, A/60/584, A/61/724 A/62/718, A/63/536 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.8 UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNIFIL Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate Force Commander First Force Commander

30 August 2010 (date of issue); 31 August 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1937 (twelve month duration) 19 March 1978 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 425/426 (six month duration) Major General Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain) Lieutenant-General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana)

240

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UNIFIL Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

16,000

Number of Personnel

15,000

14,000

13,000

12,000

11,000

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

10,000

Auth. Troops Troops

900 800

Number of Personnel

700 600 500 400 300 200

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0

July ‘09

100

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UNIFIL Personnel: Since 2000

16,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

1,000 900

Average Number of Personnel

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800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Int’l Staff

July ‘09– June ’10

Sources: UN Documents A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626, A/60/629 and A/61/829; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

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UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 243

UNIFIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Italy France Indonesia Spain Nepal India Ghana Malaysia Turkey Republic of Korea China Bangladesh Germany Belgium Portugal Denmark

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

1,734 1,575 1,324 1,064 1,020 910 877 744 504 368 344 325 249 160 146 142

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1,734 1,575 1,324 1,064 1,020 910 877 744 504 368 344 325 249 160 146 142

Tanzania 77 Greece 59 El Salvador 52 Slovenia 14 Brunei 9 Ireland 8 Hungary 4 Guatemala 3 Qatar 3 Sierra Leone 3 Cyprus 2 Cambodia 1 Croatia 1 FYR of Macedonia 1 Nigeria 1 Total 11,724

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

77 59 52 14 9 8 4 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 11,724

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNIFIL Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 17 2

Unit Type

Country

Aviation Units Civil Military Cooperation Unit Combat Support Service Units Corvette Engineering Companies Fast Patrol Boats Field Artillery Unit Force Protection Companies Frigate Infantry Battalions

France, Italy Italy France, Italy, Spain Indonesia France, Italy, Portugal Germany, Greece France Indonesia (2), Italy Turkey Bangladesh (2), China, El Salvador, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy (2), Korea, Malaysia (3), Nepal, Spain, Turkey Italy, Spain

1 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 9

Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Companies ITS Borsini Level II Hospitals Logistics Battalion Maritime Task Force Military Community Outreach Unit Military Police Companies Mine Counter Measure Vessels Multi-Role Engineering Company Quick Reaction Force Sector Headquarters Companies

2 1

Signal Companies UHEL

Italy China, India Denmark Germany, Italy Italy Indonesia, Italy, Tanzania Germany Belgium France El Salvador, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Spain Italy, Spain Spain

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters and national support elements staff and staff officers not included.

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UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 245

UNIFIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

45 4 5 — — 27 12 20 — — — 51 2 62 1 5 15 12 — 5 3 35 1 23 328

13.7% 1.2% 1.5% — — 8.2% 3.7% 6.1% — — — 15.5% 0.6% 18.9% 0.3% 1.5% 4.6% 3.7% — 1.5% 0.9% 10.7% 0.3% 7.0%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNIFIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

11,229 — — 237 490 11,956

495 — — 91 169 755

95.8% — — 72.3% 74.4% 94.1%

4.2% — — 27.7% 25.6% 5.9%

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UNIFIL Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1978–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

233 6 3 3 1 3 — — 11 6 2 — — 2 — 6 3 1 2 274

1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 — — — — — — 1 1 1 1 — — — 1 2 — 2 — 8

1 — — 3 — — — — — 2 — — — — — — — — — 6

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

237 6 4 6 1 3 — 1 12 9 3 — — 2 1 8 3 3 2 290

Incident Type

Time Period 1978–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

84 1 — — — — — 1 6 — — — — — — — — — — 92

46 — 2 3 1 — — — 1 5 1 — — — 1 2 — 2 — 61

Accident 95 5 2 3 — 3 — — 5 4 1 — — 1 — 6 3 1 2 124

Otherb

Total

12 — — — — — — — — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — 13

237 6 4 6 1 3 — 1 12 9 3 — — 2 1 8 3 3 2 290

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 247

UNIFIL Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 11 Combat Vehicles 538 Communications Vehicles 42 Engineering Vehicles 172 Material Handling Equipment 47 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 284 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1,277 Total 2,371

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Armoured Personnel Carriers Automobile Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 642 3 21 45 1 66 77 50 144 18 1,067

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNIFIL Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

Commercial Contingent Owned

— —

— —

Total

—

1 7 (5 Italy, 2 Spain) 8

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

—

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNIFIL Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

— 341,337.0 — — — 58,402.2 33,633.9 — 930.2 — — 276.5 1,370.4 71,903.8 19,488.4 10,171.8 67,295.3 27,133.7 18,312.4 500.0 650,755.6 — 650,755.6 — 650,755.6

Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 — 296,577.7 — — — 56,582.8 34,936.6 — 808.5 — — 309.0 1,114.2 61,509.0 13,724.1 8,725.9 31,213.9 24,405.0 13,902.6 500.0 544,309.3 9,263.6 535,045.7 — 544,309.3

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 — 295,615.1 — — — 56,887.0 33,527.7 549.1 — — — 282.0 1,148.7 49,742.3 8,594.3 7,753.1 30,456.7 20,441.7 13,212.5 500.0 518,710.2 10,996.5 507,713.7 — 518,710.2

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.14 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010– 2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNIFIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

76,386.8 24,061.2 8,632.5 3,509.0 4,694.5 117,284.0

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UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 249

UNIFIL Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 600,000

Expenditures

500,000

214,669.5

400,000

209,603.6 78,731.2

88,756.6

300,000 50,317.1

200,000

6,938.5 33,855.3 25,321.1

100,000 112,944.0

0

July ‘00– June ‘01

296,179.5 298,188.3 235,814.9

32,067.0 29,647.0

21,663.0 34,835.0

69,170.0

51,098.7

18,757.4 30,673.5 40,465.1

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

July ‘03– June ‘04

Operational Requirements

Category

190,600.1

July ’00– June ’01

Jul ’01– June ’02

Military and Police Personnel 112,944.0 69,170.0 Civilian Personnel 25,321.1 29,674.0 Operational Requirements 33,855.3 32,067.0 Other 6,938.5 — Gross Requirements 179,058.9 130,911.0 Staff Assessment Income 4,752.1 4,231.8 Net Requirements 74,306.8 126,679.2 Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) 180.0 201.2 Total Requirements 179,238.9 131,112.2

18,293.3 30,441.7 40,509.1

20,145.6 30,340.8 40,777.8

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

Civilian Personnel

July ‘06– June ‘07

Military and Police Personnel

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

Other

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ‘09

51,098.7 34,835.0

40,465.1 30,673.5

40,509.1 30,441.7

40,777.8 30,340.8

235,814.9 50,317.1

298,188.3 78,731.2

296,179.5 88,756.6

21,663.0 — 107,596.7

18,757.4 — 89,896.0

18,293.3 — 89,244.1

20,145.6 — 91,264.2

209,603.6 — 495,735.6

214,669.5 — 591,589.0

190,600.1 — 575,536.2

4,520.2 103,076.5

4,340.3 85,555.7

4,164.1 85,080.0

4,078.5 87,185.7

5,261.2 490,474.4

9,168.3 582,420.7

— 575,536.2

— 107,596.7

— 89,896.0

— 89,244.1

— 91,264.2

— 495,735.6

— 591,589.0

— 575,536.2

Sources: UN Documents A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626, A/60/629, A/61/829 A/62/751, A/63/520 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.9 UNMIK (UN Interim Administration in Kosovo)

UNMIK Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

SRSG First SRSG

10 June 1999 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1244 (paragraph 19 of the Resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise.) Lamberto Zannier (Italy) SG letter of appointment 20 June 2008 Bernard Kouchner (France)

250

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 251

UNMIK Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

350

Number of Personnel

300

250

200

150

100

50

July ‘10

Aug. ’10

Sept. ‘10

July ‘10

Aug. ’10

Sept. ‘10

Auth. Int’l Staff Int’l Staff

June ’10

Auth. Local Staff Local Staff

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

30

Number of Personnel

25

20

15

10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0

July ‘09

5

Auth. Police

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. UNVs

Police

Military Obs.

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIK Personnel: Since 2000

5,000 4,500

Average Number of Personnel

•

4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

300

250

Average Number of Personnel

252

1/18/11

200

150

100

50

0

July ‘00– June ’01

July ‘01– June ’02

July ‘02– June ’03

July ‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

UNVs

July ‘07– June ’08

Sources: UN Documents A/55/724, A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/59/623, A/60/637 and A/61/675; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 253

UNMIK Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Ukraine Germany Romania Czech Republic Denmark Ghana Italy Norway Pakistan Poland Russia Spain Turkey Total

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 — 1 1 1 — — 1 — 1 — 1 — 8

1 2 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 9

3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIK International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

19 — 13 — — 4 5 7 — — 1 12 12 6 — 2 22 5 1 2 6 21 — 3 141

13.5% — 9.2% — — 2.8% 3.5% 5.0% — — 0.7% 8.5% 8.5% 4.3% — 1.4% 15.6% 3.5% 0.7% 1.4% 4.3% 14.9% — 2.1%

Sources: DFS FPD.

UNMIK Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Male

Female

— 8 8 97 147 260

— — 1 44 89 134

Percentage Male — 100.0% 88.9% 68.8% 62.3% 66.0%

Percentage Female — — 11.1% 31.2% 37.7% 34.0%

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 255

UNMIK Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 1

5 2 1 3 4 5 4 — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — 26

2 1 1 — 1 1 — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 7

— 3 — 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 — — — — — — — — — 18

1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

Total 8 7 2 7 7 8 6 1 3 5 — — — — — — — — — 54

Incident Type

Time Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

1 1 — 1 3 4 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 12

— 4 2 3 3 2 3 1 3 2 — — — — — — — — — 23

7 1 — — — 1 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 11

— 1 — 3 1 1 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 8

8 7 2 7 7 8 6 1 3 5 — — — — — — — — — 54

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIK Vehicles: 30 September 2010

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

229 4 3 10 7 9 17 10 289

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIK Budgets and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11

355.1 — 349.8 — — 26,307.6 6,531.0 1,067.6 23.0 — — 134.5 661.6 5,556.1 443.7 — — 4,313.0 1,066.0 — 46,809.0 3,992.4 42,816.6 — 46,809.0

361.9 — — — 366.9 26,283.0 9,392.9 1,059.1 22.4 — — 152.9 584.3 4,177.5 443.8 — — 2,473.7 741.3 — 46,059.7 3,991.7 42,068.0 — 46,059.7

404.5 — — — 400.2 27,335.9 7,216.7 1,098.1 — — — 217.5 629.1 4,407.4 1,764.6 — — 3,566.5 833.9 — 47,874.4 4,558.1 43,316.3 — 47,874.4

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.6 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

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UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 257

UNMIK Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 400,000

Expenditures

350,000

839.1 49,941.0

73,816.0

44,164.1

300,000

45,452.2

32,081.5

250,000

150,000

27,707.9

184,775.0

200,000

163,458.9

170,595.0

25,217.0

156,162.2

280,113.5

135,815.5

120,802.7

24,164.1 123,048.4

100,000

105,009.2 125,532.0

50,000

115,208.7

106,598.1

106,253.3

70,230.2

64,172.3

73,254.1

July ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

5,918.4

0

July ‘00– June ‘01

July ‘01– June ‘02

July ‘02– June ‘03

Operational Requirements

Category

25,255.3

July ’00– June ’01

Military and Police Personnel 5,918.4 Civilian Personnel 280,113.5 Operational Requirements 73,816.0 Other 839.1 Gross Requirements 360,687.0 Staff Assessment Income 22,775.0 Net Requirements 337,912.0 Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) — Total Requirements 360,687.0

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

38,258.8

July ‘08– June ‘09

Other

Jul ’01– June ’02

July ’02– June ’03

July ’03– June ’04

July ’04– June ’05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ‘09

125,532.0 184,775.0

115,208.7 170,595.0

106,598.1 163,458.9

106,253.3 156,162.2

70,230.2 138,815.5

64,172.3 120,802.7

73,254.1 123,048.4

38,258.8 105,009.2

49,941.0 — 360,248.0

44,164.4 — 329,967.8

45,452.2 — 315,509.2

32,081.5 — 294,497.0

27,707.9 — 233,753.6

25,217.0 — 210,192.0

24,164.1 — 220,466.6

25,255.3 — 168,523.3

25,989.0 334,259.0

25,082.5 304,885.3

23,467.6 292,041.6

22,720.5 271,776.5

19,321.3 214,432.3

16,365.3 193,826.7

16,720.4 203,746.2

— 168,523.3

— 360,248.0

— 329,967.8

— 315,509.2

— 294,497.0

— 233,753.6

— 210,192.0

— 220,466.6

— 168,523.3

Sources: UN Documents A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/59/623, A/60/637, A/61/675 A/62/687, A/63/569 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.10 UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UNMIL Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner

15 September 2010 (date of issue); 1 October 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1938 (twelve month duration) 19 September 2003 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1509 (twelve month duration) Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) SG letter of appointment 22 October 2007 Jacques Klein (United States) Major-General Muhammad Khalid (Pakistan) SG letter of appointment 13 October 2010 Lieutenant-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya) Gautam Sawang (India)

258

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 259

UNMIL Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

12,000

Number of Personnel

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

Auth. Troops Troops

1,600

1,400

1,000

800

600

400

200

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0 July ‘09

Number of Personnel

1,200

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIL Personnel: Since 2003

16,000 15,000 14,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 Aug.‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

1,600

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

260

1/18/11

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Aug.‘03– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Police

Auth. UNVs

Auth. Military Obs.

Local Staff

Int’l Staff

Police

UNVs

Military Obs.

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, S/RES/1626, S/RES/1667, S/RES/1694, A/59/624, A/60/645 and A/61/ 715; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 261

UNMIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Pakistan Nigeria Bangladesh Ghana China Jordan Ukraine Nepal India Mongolia Philippines Zimbabwe Fiji Turkey Gambia Zambia United States Argentina Bosnia and Herzegovina Russia Uganda Sri Lanka Egypt Ethiopia Kenya Sweden Namibia Serbia Norway Kyrgyzstan

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

2,953 1,553 1,441 706 564 120 277 18 — 150 117 — — — — — 5 —

7 13 12 11 2 4 2 2 — — 2 2 — — 2 3 4 —

25 142 17 19 18 255 11 249 249 — 24 30 30 29 22 20 8 15

2,985 1,708 1,470 736 584 379 290 269 249 150 143 32 30 29 24 23 17 15

— — — — — 4 — — 3 — — —

— 4 — — 5 7 — — 1 4 — 3

15 10 14 13 7 — 11 11 6 6 9 3

15 14 14 13 12 11 11 11 10 10 9 6

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Yemen Czech Republic Denmark El Salvador Germany Malaysia Poland Brazil Peru Rwanda Benin Bolivia Ecuador Paraguay Switzerland Togo Uruguay Bulgaria Croatia Finland Iceland Moldova Montenegro Niger Republic of Korea Romania Senegal France Indonesia Mali Total

1 — 2 — — — — 2 2 — 1 1 1 1 — 1 — — 2 2 — — — — 1 — 1 1 — — 7,930

— — 3 2 — 5 2 2 2 — 2 2 2 2 — 2 — 2 — — — 2 2 2 1 2 1 — 1 1 130

Police 5 5 — 3 5 — 3 — — 4 — — — — 3 — 3 — — — 2 — — — — — — — — — 1,301

Total 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 9,361

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIL Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number

Unit Type

Country

1 1 5 1 1 3 6

Aviation Unit Communications Squadron Engineering Companies Quick Reaction Force Guard Company Heaquarters Companies Infantry Battalions

3 1 1 2 1

Level II Hospitals Level III Hospital Logistics Company Military Police Units Road and Airfield Maintanence Unit Signal Company Transport Company

Ukraine Nigeria Bangladesh (2), China, Pakistan (2) Pakistan Mongolia Bangladesh, Nigeria, Philippines Bangladesh, Ghana, Nigeria (2), Pakistan (2) Bangladesh, China, Pakistan Jordan Bangladesh Bangladesh, Nepal

1 1

Pakistan Bangladesh China

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 263

UNMIL International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

75 11 28 — — 23 17 15 15 — 1 27 4 67 — 4 24 10 6 12 11 63 4 17 434

17.3% 2.5% 6.5% — — 5.3% 3.9% 3.5% 3.5% — 0.2% 6.2% 0.9% 15.4% — 0.9% 5.5% 2.3% 1.4% 2.8% 2.5% 14.5% 0.9% 3.9%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNMIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

7,777 124 1,124 291 791 10,107

153 6 177 143 191 670

98.1% 95.4% 86.4% 67.1% 80.5% 93.8%

1.9% 4.6% 13.6% 32.9% 19.5% 6.2%

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civlian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIL Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

5 23 26 13 9 12 14 2 2 8 2 2 1 1 — 104

— 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— 3 3 2 2 5 1 — — 1 — 1 — 1 — 17

— 1 3 1 — 1 1 — — 1 — — — — — 7

— 1 4 2 3 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 — — 1 18

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

5 29 36 18 14 21 20 3 3 11 3 4 1 2 1 147

Incident Type

Time Period 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 22 28 16 13 16 10 1 3 6 — 1 — — 1 107

4 6 7 1 1 5 6 2 — 3 1 1 — 1 — 31

— 1 1 1 — — 4 — — 2 2 2 1 1 — 9

5 29 36 18 14 21 20 3 3 11 3 4 1 2 1 147

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 265

UNMIL Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 5 Combat Vehicles 137 Communications Vehicles 2 Engineering Vehicles 138 Material Handling Equipment 24 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 423 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 799 Total 1,528

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 1,206 21 16 2 107 8 41 177 3 1,581

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIL Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

3 — 3

5 11 (Ukraine) 16

— 3 (Ukraine) 3

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNMIL Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

6,968.1 230,908.4 24,619.0 20,005.0 — 89,325.0 18,343.7 11,936.8 474.4 1,651.8 — 997.5 2,579.9 47,830.4 12,096.0 53,454.7 2,805.6 18,805.4 17,177.0 1,000.0 560,978.7 11,129.8 549,848.9 52.8 561,031.5

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 7,059.4 223,701.7 — 19,418.7 25,424.9 87,424.8 18,015.5 11,407.5 461.0 1,346.0 — 1,001.3 2,572.6 52,608.2 13,533.1 59,378.4 2,982.0 15,678.3 15,809.3 1,000.0 558,822.7 10,953.1 547,869.6 52.8 558,822.7

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 6,996.7 186,241.6 — 19,379.8 26,295.2 92,674.6 18,381.5 12,740.5 — 1,663.1 — 1,295.0 2,709.2 46,350.6 11,037.5 60,236.5 3,075.0 17,860.3 16,062.9 1,000.0 524,000.0 12,805.2 511,194.8 52.8 524,052.8

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.9 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNMIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

39,545.5 3,758.8 21,088.1 6,167.7 7,918.7 2,335.6 80,814.4

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UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 267

UNMIL Voluntary Contributions: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars)

Contributor

Contributions in Kind (budgeted)

Contributions in Kind (non-budgeted)

Contributions in Cash (budgeted)

Total

53.0 53.0

— —

— —

53.0 53.0

Germany Total

Source: DM OPPBA.

UNMIL Mission Expenditures: August 2003–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 800,000

Expenditures

700,000 249,078.2

600,000

220,064.8

197,227.5

192,983.5

109,620.6

112,817.8

112,961.8

500,000

185,988.8

400,000

245,146.3

300,000

33,596.3

98,618.9

114,354.8

200,000 100,000

393,267.7

377,419.5

366,156.7

343,523.8

293,168.0

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

269,436.1

0 Aug. ‘03– June ‘04

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Aug ‘03– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

269,436.1 33,596.3 245,146.3 — 548,178.7 3,113.1 545,065.6

393,267.7 98,618.9 249,078.2 — 740,964.8 9,768.1 731,196.7

377,419.5 109,620.6 220,064.8 — 707,104.9 10,877.6 696,227.3

366,156.7 112,817.8 197,227.5 — 676,202.0 11,050.3 665,151.7

343,523.8 112,961.8 192,983.5 — 649,469.1 11,222.1 638,247.0

293,168.0 114,354.8 185,998.8 — 593,521.7 — 593,521.7

100.0 548,278.7

120.0 741,084.8

264.0 707,368.9

52.8 676,254.8

52.8 649,521.9

— 593,521.7

Sources: UN Documents A/59/624, A/60/645, A/61/715, A/62/764, A/63/588 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.11 UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan) UNMIS Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Force Commander First Force Commander Police Commissioner First Police Commissioner

April 29 2010 (date of issue); 30 April 2010 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1919 (twelve month duration) 24 March 2005 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1590 (six month duration) Haile Menkerios (South Africa) SG letter of appointment 29 January 2010 Jan Pronk (Netherlands) Major General Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria) Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar (Bangladesh) Rajesh Dewan (India) Kai Vittrup (Denmark)

268

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 269

UNMIS Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

10,000 9,000

Number of Personnel

8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000

Auth. Troops

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Police

Local Staff

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0

July ‘09

1,000

1,400

Number of Personnel

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

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UNMIS Personnel: Since 2005

10,000 9,000

Average Number of Personnel

•

8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 Mar.– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

Auth. Troops

Auth. Local Staff

Troops

Local Staff

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

1,400

1,200

Average Number of Personnel

270

1/18/11

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Mar.– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

UNVs

July ‘09– June ’10

Sources: UN Documents A/61/689, S/RES/1590 and S/RES/1706; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 271

UNMIS Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

India Bangladesh Egypt Pakistan Kenya Zambia China Rwanda Russia Cambodia Jordan Philippines Nepal Zimbabwe Uganda Ukraine Germany Turkey Gambia Netherlands Nigeria Canada Norway Yemen Australia Brazil Indonesia Sri Lanka Ecuador Sweden Bolivia Namibia Fiji Malaysia Tanzania

2,633 1,621 1,503 1,479 724 544 437 257 123 51 6 — 7 — — — 5 3 — 2 5 7 6 — 9 2 — — — — — — — 2 —

18 6 15 16 4 14 12 10 13 3 10 11 5 9 8 9 25 — — 12 13 20 13 21 6 20 9 6 17 5 15 7 6 6 11

33 22 15 21 16 42 11 37 13 — 36 44 29 29 29 26 3 29 30 15 11 1 8 6 10 2 13 13 — 12 — 6 5 3 —

2,684 1,649 1,533 1,516 744 600 460 304 149 54 52 55 41 38 37 35 33 32 30 29 29 28 27 27 25 24 22 19 17 17 15 13 11 11 11

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Contributing Country Ethiopia Romania Samoa Denmark Jamaica Paraguay Peru Ghana Guatemala Kyrgyzstan United States Guinea Republic of Korea Bosnia and Herzegovina Burkina Faso Sierra Leone Benin United Kingdom Belgium Croatia El Salvador New Zealand Greece Finland Iran Japan Moldova Mongolia Switzerland Argentina Mali Mozambique Poland Uruguay Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — 4 — — — — 1 — — — 1

— 10 — 5 — 9 9 — 7 7 — 7 6

10 — 10 — 9 — — 8 — 1 8 — —

10 10 10 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 7 7

— — — — — — 4 — 2 1 1 — 2 — — — — — — — — 9,442

— 6 6 5 5 4 — 1 2 2 1 2 — 2 2 2 — 1 1 1 — 478

6 — — — — — — 3 — — — — — — — — 1 — — — 1 627

6 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 10,547

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UNMIS Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number

Unit Type

Country

4 5

Aviation Units De-mining Companies

5

Engineering Construction Companies Force Reserve Unit Headquarters Company Infantry Battalions Infantry Companies Level II Hospitals Level III Hospital Military Police Unit Force Riverine Unit Petroleum Unit Signals Company Transport Companies Transport Platoon

India, Pakistan (2), Russia Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan India Rwanda Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Kenya, Pakistan Pakistan, Zambia Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan Egypt Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh India Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan Egypt

1 1 4 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 4 1

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 273

UNMIS International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

99 26 18 — 8 78 31 50 15 40 7 75 3 123 — 8 31 14 38 22 27 101 13 40 867

11.4% 3.0% 2.1% — 0.9% 9.0% 3.6% 5.8% 1.7% 4.6% 0.8% 8.7% 0.3% 14.2% — 0.9% 3.6% 1.6% 4.4% 2.5% 3.1% 11.6% 1.5% 4.6%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNMIS Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

9,291 462 505 629 2,371 13,258

151 16 122 238 443 970

98.4% 96.7% 80.5% 72.5% 84.3% 93.2%

1.6% 3.3% 19.5% 27.5% 15.7% 6.8%

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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UNMIS Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

1 5 3 4 5 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — 19

— 1 2 — — — — — — — — — — 3

— 1 1 — 1 — 1 — — — — — — 3

— 4 1 2 — — — — — — — — — 7

1 4 8 4 3 3 — — — 1 1 — — 21

— — — — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 1

Total 2 15 15 10 10 4 1 — 2 2 1 1 — 54

Incident Type

Time Period 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

— 1 2 — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 5

1 13 9 7 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 — — 36

1 1 2 3 3 1 — 2 — — — — — 10

— — 2 — 1 1 — — — 1 — 1 — 4

Total 2 15 15 10 10 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 — 54

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 275

UNMIS Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 33 Combat Vehicles 160 Communications Vehicles 2 Engineering Vehicles 236 Material Handling Equipment 47 Naval Vessels 21 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 223 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1,089 Total 1,811

Vehicle Type 4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

Quantity 1,552 36 12 4 175 154 126 277 20 2,356

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIS Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

Commercial Contingent Owned

12 —

— —

Total

12

15 16 (6 India, 6 Pakistan, 4 Russia) 31

—

Source: DFS Air Transport Section. Note: Commercial fixed-wing aircraft include one shared with MINURCAT.

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UNMIS Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

26,430.9 248,359.8 35,036.9 — — 147,362.5 57,336.7 12,306.6 7,117.4 1,743.4 — 486.1 5,220.2 106,148.8 24,713.8 156,880.7 107.4 43,264.8 84,834.2 1,000.0 958,350.2 22,217.2 936,133.0 — 958,350.2

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 26,620.0 228,941.7 — — 36,836.8 150,251.9 57,960.9 15,777.4 5,901.2 1,579.8 — 483.6 8,581.5 101,575.1 21,793.4 163,532.9 99.1 41,595.2 85,445.6 999.0 947,975.1 17,872.6 930,102.5 — 947,975.1

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 26,483.7 258,181.0 — — 36,983.8 142,713.5 67,887.4 19,246.7 — 1,779.7 — 472.0 5,160.9 85,246.0 19,482.8 152,706.1 101.7 34,527.0 86,027.7 1,000.0 938,000.0 25,325.9 912,674.1 — 938,000.0

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.3 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNMIS Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

49,468.8 18,011.2 7,948.5 7,783.8 2,116.5 85,328.8

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UNMIS (SUDAN) • 277

UNMIS Mission Expenditures: March 2005–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

1,200,000

Expenditures

1,00 000 800,000 556,380.2

600,000

361,746.3

372,688.6

179,121.8

189,604.7

478,372.5

400,000

152,929.9 91,086.9

200,000 186,343.7

0

17,353.4 231,665.0 15,168.6

Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

279,591.4

298,194.9

Mar.–

July ‘05–

July ‘06–

July ‘07–

July ‘08–

June ’05

June ’06

June ’07

June ’08

June ’09

Operational Requirements

Category

280,966.1

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Mar. ‘05– June ‘05

July ’05– June ’06

July ’06– June ’07

July ’07– June ’08

July ’08– June ’09

15,168.6 17,353.4 186,343.7 — 218,865.7 2,090.2 216,775.5

231,665.0 91,086.9 478,372.5 — 801,124.4 10,968.4 790,156.0

280,966.1 152,929.9 556,380.2 — 990,276.2 18,593.6 971,682.6

279,591.4 179,121.8 361,746.3 — 820,459.5 20,399.0 800,060.5

298,194.9 189,604.7 372,688.6 — 860,488.1 — 860,488.1

— 218,865.7

— 801,124.4

— 990,276.2

— 820,459.5

— 860,488.1

Sources: UN Documents A/60/626, A/61/689, A/62/785, A/63/604 and A/C.5/63/26.

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6.12 UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMIT Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

First Mandate SRSG First SRSG Police Commissioner First Police Commissioner

26 February 2010 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1912 (twelve month duration and endorsment to reconfigure the police component, including its drawdown) 25 August 2006 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1704 (six month duration) Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh) SG letter of appointment 25 November 2009 Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan) Luis Miguel Carrilho (Portugal) Entry on duty 23 February 2009 Rodolfo Aser Tor (Philippines)

278

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UNMIT (TIMOR-LESTE) • 279

UNMIT Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

1,800 1,600

Number of Personnel

1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

Aug. ’10

Sept. ‘10 Sept. ‘10

Local Staff

Aug. ’10

Auth. Local Staff

Police

July ‘10

Auth. Police

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

500 450

Number of Personnel

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIT Personnel: Since 2006

1,800

1,600

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

•

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Aug. ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Police

Auth. Local Staff

Police

Local Staff

500 450 400

Average Number of Personnel

280

1/18/11

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Aug. ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1704; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNMIT (TIMOR-LESTE) • 281

UNMIT Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Malaysia Bangladesh Portugal Pakistan Philippines Nepal Australia Sri Lanka Zimbabwe Jordan China Gambia India Turkey Brazil Singapore Thailand Yemen Egypt Zambia

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

2 4 3 4 3 1 4 — — — 2 — 1 — 4 2 — — — —

229 191 187 163 136 64 50 49 47 31 24 26 25 25 20 20 22 22 21 18

231 195 190 167 139 65 54 49 47 31 26 26 26 25 24 22 22 22 21 18

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Contributing Country Uganda New Zealand Namibia Ukraine Spain Senegal El Salvador Romania Samoa Russia Croatia Kyrgyzstan Republic of Korea Uruguay Japan Fiji Jamaica Sierra Leone Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 2 1 — 1 35

17 15 13 12 9 8 7 7 6 5 4 4 4 3 — — 1 — 1,485

17 16 13 12 9 8 7 7 6 5 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 1,520

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UNMIT International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

64 8 12 1 — 19 12 19 12 — 2 26 3 39 1 10 15 9 18 10 23 41 4 11 359

17.8% 2.2% 3.3% 0.3% — 5.3% 3.3% 5.3% 3.3% — 0.6% 7.2% 0.8% 10.9% 0.3% 2.8% 4.2% 2.5% 5.0% 2.8% 6.4% 11.4% 1.1% 3.1%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNMIT Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

— 33 1,411 232 720 2,396

— 2 74 127 176 379

— 94.3% 95.0% 64.6% 80.4% 86.3%

— 5.7% 5.0% 35.4% 19.6% 13.7%

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

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UNMIT (TIMOR-LESTE) • 283

UNMIT Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalilties

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 1 1 2 — — — 2 1 — 1 — 5

— — 1 — — — — — 1 1 — — 2

1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — 2

— — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 1 3 2 — — — 2 2 1 1 — 9

Incident Type

Time Period 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalilties

Malicious Act 1 — — — — — — — — — — — 1

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

— 1 2 — — — — — 1 1 — — 4

— — 1 1 — — — 1 1 — 1 — 3

— — — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 1

1 1 3 2 — — — 2 2 1 1 — 9

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMIT Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Combat Vehicles 18 Communications Vehicles 2 Material Handling Equipment 3 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 85 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 42 Total 150

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Boats Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

731 2 7 2 3 69 3 19 32 8 876

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMIT Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

2 — 2

4 — 4

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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UNMIT (TIMOR-LESTE) • 285

UNMIT Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10 1,477.8 — 45,123.2 17,453.9 — 61,288.7 6,722.5 8,110.0 1,621.8 — — 668.4 6,023.2 15,990.4 2,739.3 19,805.3 — 13,668.2 5,246.7 — 205,939.4 7,760.7 198,178.7 — 205,939.4

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 1,624.2 — — 15,513.6 48,830.6 57,888.2 9,080.7 7,671.2 1,124.4 — — 608.4 4,141.7 14,092.8 3,242.5 18,174.6 — 12,120.1 5,080.4 — 199,193.4 7,830.7 191,362.7 — 199,193.4

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 1,680.2 — — 16,817.8 46,202.5 68,601.7 9,674.1 9,445.2 — — — 140.5 4,274.1 13,684.8 2,536.4 17,509.5 — 10,949.8 4,795.0 — 206,311.6 9,474.6 196,837.0 — 206,311.6

Sources: UN Documents A/64/660/Add.1 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010–2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNMIT Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

3,415.6 1,160.6 527.6 169.3 247.1 5,520.2

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UNMIT Mission Expenditures: August 2006–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

180,000 160,000

Expenditures

286

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48,297.3

140,000

45,435.7

120,000 100,000

76,958.2

60,000

63,673.0

57,972.7

80,000 30,980.8

40,000 20,000 0

59,225.0

62,844.2

Aug. ‘06–

July ‘07–

July ‘08–

June ’07

June ’08

June ’09

38,909.8

Operational Requirements

Civilian Personnel

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Sources: UN Documents A/62/753, A/63/607 and A/C.5/63/26.

Military and Police Personnel

Aug. ‘06–June ‘07

July ‘07–June ‘08

July ‘08–June ‘09

38,909.8 30,980.8 76,958.2 — 146,848.8 3,009.2 143,839.6 — 146,848.8

59,225.0 57,972.7 45,435.7 — 162,633.4 6,729.7 155,903.7 — 162,633.4

62,844.2 63,673.0 46,297.3 — 172,814.5 — 172,814.5 — 172,814.5

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6.13 UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNMOGIP Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

21 December 1971 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 307 (to continue thereafter until the Security Council decides otherwise) 21 April 1948 (date of issue); 1 January 1949 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 47 (no determined duration) Major-General Kim Moon Hwa (Republic of Korea) SG letter of appointment 16 October 2008 Brigadier H.H. Angle (Canada)

First Mandate

Chief Military Observer First Chief Military Observer

UNMOGIP Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

60

Number of Personnel

50

40

30

20

10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

287

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

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UNMOGIP Personnel: Since 2000

60

50

Average Number of Personnel

288

1/18/11

40

30

20

10

0 Jan.– Dec. ’00

Jan.– Dec. ’01

Jan.– Dec. ’02

Jan.– Dec. ’03

Jan.– Dec. ’04

Jan.– Dec. ’05

Jan.– Dec. ’06

Jan– Dec. ’07

Jan.– Sept. ’08

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Jan.– Sept. ’09

Jan.– Sept. ’10

Sources: UN Documents A/56/6 (Sect.5), A/58/6 (Sect.5) and A/60/6 (Sect.5); DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

UNMOGIP Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country Croatia Republic of Korea Italy Finland Sweden Chile Uruguay Total

Source: DPKO FGS.

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

— — — — — — — —

9 9 7 5 6 2 2 40

— — — — — — — —

9 9 7 5 6 2 2 40

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UNMOGIP (INDIA AND PAKISTAN) • 289

UNMIT International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

3 — — — — 2 2 1 — — 1 7 — — — — — 2 — — 1 2 — 2 23

13.0% — — — — 8.7% 8.7% 4.3% — — 4.3% 30.4% — — — — — 8.7% — — 4.3% 8.7% — 8.7%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNMOGIP Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Male

Female

Percentage Male

Percentage Female

— 39 — 19 44 102

— 1 — 4 4 9

— 97.5% — 82.6% 91.7% 91.9%

— 2.5% — 17.4% 8.3% 8.1%

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UNMOGIP Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1949–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 5

1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

2 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Total 9 — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 11

Incident Type

Time Period 1949–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2

8 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 9

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Total 9 — — 1 — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 11

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNMOGIP (INDIA AND PAKISTAN) • 291

UNMOGIP Vehicles: 30 September 2010

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Ambulance Automobiles Buses Trucks Total

40 1 3 19 3 66

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNMOGIP Budget and Expenditure (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Programme Costs Security and Safety Costs Total

Appropriation Jan ’09–Dec ‘10

Estimated Expenditures Jan ‘09–Dec ‘10

16,426.5 1,103.6 17,530.1

16,658.0 1,116.4 17,774.4

Sources: UN Document A/64/6/Add.1; DFS FBFD. Note: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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UNMOGIP Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Posts Other Staff Costs Travel of Staff Contractual Services General Operating Expenses Hospitality Supplies and Materials Furniture and Equipment Other Expenditures Total Requirements

Jan. ‘00– Dec. ‘01

Jan. ‘02– Dec. ‘03

Jan. ‘04– Dec. ‘05

Jan. ‘06– Dec. ‘07

Jan. ‘08– Dec. ‘09

5,574.1 1,593.5 865.9 — 1,772.6 2.3 1,022.4 1,332.0 — 12,162.8

6,370.9 1,983.8 1,247.5 38.9 1,174.3 2.5 800.1 1,107.6 — 12,725.6

6,482.6 2,038.7 1,309.6 21.5 1,995.9 2.3 355.7 2,527.5 — 14,733.8

4,293.4 5,504.9 193.2 — 3,435.2 2.4 769.5 1,023.3 — 15,221.9

9,193.4 3,300.8 — — — 2.9 — — 5,116.2 17,613.3

Sources: UN Document A/64/6(Sect.5); DFS FBFD. Note: 2008–2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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6.14 UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) UNOCI Key Facts

Latest Key Resolutions

First Mandate

SRSG First SRSG Force Commander

First Force Commander Police Commissioner First Police Commander

30 June 2010 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 1933 (six month duration) 27 May 2010 (date of issue) UNSC Res. 1924 (one month duration) 28 January 2010 (date of issue) UNSC Res. 1911 (four month duration) 27 February 2004 (date of issue); 4 April 2004 (date of effect) UNSC Res. 1528 (twelve month duration) Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea) SG letter of appointment 17 October 2007 Albert Tevoedjre (Benin) Major-General Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh) SG letter of appointment 8 December 2009 Entry on duty 1 April 2010 Major-General Abdoulaye Fall (Senegal) Major-General Jean Marie Bourry (France) Yves Bouchard (Canada)

293

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UNOCI Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

7,500

7,300

Number of Personnel

7,100

6,900

6,700

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

6,500

Auth. Troops Troops

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

0 July ‘09

•

Number of Personnel

294

1/18/11

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 295

UNOCI Personnel: Since 2004

9,000

Average Number of Personnel

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0 Apr.– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Troops Troops

1,400

Average Number of Personnel

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0 Apr.– June ’04

July ‘04– June ’05

July ‘05– June ’06

July ‘06– June ’07

July ‘07– June ’08

July ‘08– June ’09

July ‘09– June ’10

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Police

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Auth. UNVs

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

UNVs

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1528, S/RES/1609, S/RES/1682, S/RES/1739, A/59/750, A/60/630 and A/61/ 673; DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme.

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UNOCI Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Bangladesh 2,090 Jordan 1,062 Pakistan 1,140 Morocco 726 Ghana 507 Benin 427 Niger 393 Senegal 324 Togo 315 Egypt 176 Cameroon — Chad 1 Djibouti — Democratic Republic of Congo — France 7 Turkey — Burundi — Yemen 1 Russia — Tunisia 4 Paraguay 2 Brazil 3 Central African Republic — Nigeria — China — India —

Sources: DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Military Observers

Police

Total

9 7 11 — 5 6 6 14 7 — — 3 —

250 445 151 — 15 53 56 42 25 4 49 35 35

2,349 1,514 1,302 726 527 486 455 380 347 180 49 39 35

— — — — 8 11 7 7 4

31 13 18 14 4 — — — —

31 20 18 14 13 11 11 9 7

— 7 6 6

7 — — —

7 7 6 6

Contributing Country Philippines Romania Canada Guatemala Ukraine Uruguay Nepal Switzerland Argentina Bolivia El Salvador Gambia Guinea Moldova Peru Poland Serbia Tanzania Uganda Zimbabwe Ecuador Ethiopia Ireland Republic of Korea Zambia Namibia Total

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

3 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 2 1 — — — —

3 6 — 5 — 2 3 — — 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 2 2 2

— — 5 — 5 3 — 4 3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2

— — — 7,182

2 2 1 181

— — — 1,267

2 2 1 8,630

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 297

UNOCI Military Units: 30 September 2010

Number

Unit Type

Country Bangladesh, Ghana Bangladesh Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan Bangladesh

1

Aviation Units Communications Company Engineering Companies Guard and Administration Company Gendarme Security Company

8

Infantry Battalions

2 2 1 1

Infantry Companies Level II Hospitals Special Forces Company Transport Company

2 1 3 1

Benin-Ghana-Niger-SenegalTogo Composite Bangladesh (2), Benin, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan Senegal, Togo Bangladesh, Ghana Jordan Pakistan

Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Military headquarters staff and military observers not included.

UNOCI International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

Source: DFS FPD.

International Staff 40 11 5 — 17 14 15 13 11 — 1 39 2 70 — 3 20 7 7 15 11 62 2 18 383

Percentage International Staff 10.4% 2.9% 1.3% — 4.4% 3.7% 3.9% 3.4% 2.9% — 0.3% 10.2% 0.5% 18.3% — 0.8% 5.2% 1.8% 1.8% 3.9% 2.9% 16.2% 0.5% 4.7%

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UNOCI Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type

Male

Female

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

7,093 172 1,250 260 564 9,339

92 12 17 123 174 418

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD.

Percentage Male 98.7% 93.5% 98.7% 67.9% 76.4% 95.7%

Percentage Female 1.3% 6.5% 1.3% 32.1% 23.6% 4.3%

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 299

UNOCI Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

Total

— 10 11 4 13 8 2 2 3 1 7 2 1 4 53

— 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 1

— 1 1 2 2 1 — — 1 — — — — — 7

— 1 — 2 1 — — — — — — — — — 4

— 2 1 — 2 1 — — — 1 — — — — 6

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— 15 13 8 18 10 2 2 4 2 7 2 1 4 71

Incident Type

Time Period 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

Total

— 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 2

— 10 5 3 6 5 1 2 2 6 2 4 35

— 3 8 4 11 3 1 — 2 — 1 — 1 — 30

— 1 — — 1 2 — — — 2 — — — — 4

— 15 13 8 18 10 2 2 4 2 7 2 1 4 71

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNOCI Vehicles: 30 September 2010

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

UN Owned Vehicles

Quantity

Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 4 Combat Vehicles 180 Engineering Vehicles 68 Material Handling Equipment 19 Naval Vessels 2 Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 356 Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 900 Total 1,529

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment Ambulances Automobiles Buses Engineering Vehicles Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

902 14 8 5 67 10 16 90 9 1,121

Sources: DFS Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Management Section; DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNOCI Aircraft: 30 September 2010

Commercial Contingent Owned Total

Transport Fixed Wing

Transport Helicopter

Attack Helicopter

3 — 3

5 3 (Ghana) 8

— — —

Source: DFS Air Transport Section.

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UNOCI (CÔTE D’IVOIRE) • 301

UNOCI Budget and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Military Observers Military Contingents Civilian Police Formed Police Units United Nations Police International Staff Local Staff United Nations Volunteers General Temporary Assistance Government-provided Personnel Civilian Electoral Observers Consultants Official Travel Facilities and Infrastructure Ground Transportation Air Transportation Naval Transportation Communications and IT Supplies, Services and Equipment Quick-impact Projects Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

Budgeted July ‘09–June ‘10 10,544.5 181,982.9 21,659.6 18,391.8 — 75,916.8 17,485.0 11,884.0 1,067.9 395.3 — 111.0 4,649.2 46,559.7 13,149.4 44,668.1 35.4 26,949.9 15,323.6 1,000.0 491,774.1 9,647.9 482,126.2 — 491,774.1

Estimated Expenditures July ‘09–June ‘10 11,149.9 186,979.4 — 18,235.3 22,506.7 72,799.8 17,831.6 12,021.5 1,099.2 408.0 — 344.3 4,477.9 47,060.4 11,714.8 46,379.8 2.5 22,845.5 14,917.5 1,000.0 491,774.1 8,406.0 483,368.1 — 491,774.1

Budgeted July ‘10–June ‘11 10,732.4 178,496.2 — 18,860.5 22,902.1 69,201.1 18,983.1 10,869.1 — 440.8 — 180.9 4,368.6 45,992.3 13,265.9 51,835.4 19.0 22,358.8 15,572.0 1,000.0 485,078.2 10,800.2 474,278.0 — 485,078.2

Sources: UN Document A/64/660/Add.7 and A/C.5/64/19; DFS FBFD. Notes: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change. The “United Nations Volunteers” category for the 2010– 2011 budget includes other uncategorized civilian personnel figures.

UNOCI Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2009–June 2010 (in thousands of US dollars) Military Contingents Formed Police Unit Facilities and Infrastructure Communications Medical Special Equipment Total

Source: DFS FBFD.

35,775.0 5,108.2 15,161.0 7,074.1 4,745.0 3,382.9 71,246.2

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UNOCI Mission Expenditures: April 2004–June 2009 (in thousands of US dollars) 500,000 450,000

Expenditures

302

1/18/11

400,000

138,151.8

147,692.5

80,324.9

87,650.2

92,261.9

231,857.0

239,470.0

235,418.8

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

138,587.7

350,000 129,599.7

300,000 138,326.6

250,000

66,985.2

200,000

45,790.7

150,000 100,000 50,000 0

152,773.2 48,708.4 5,000.1 29,354.7

Apr.– June ‘04

July ‘04– June ‘05

Operational Requirements

Category Military and Police Personnel Civilian Personnel Operational Requirements Other Gross Requirements Staff Assessment Income Net Requirements Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) Total Requirements

185,684.0

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

Civilian Personnel

Military and Police Personnel

Apr.– June ‘04

July ’04– June ‘05

July ‘05– June ‘06

July ‘06– June ‘07

July ‘07– June ‘08

July ‘08– June ‘09

29,354.7 5,000.1 48,708.4 — 83,063.2 547.3 82,515.9

152,773.2 45,790.7 138,326.6 — 336,890.5 4,906.3 331,984.2

185,684.0 66,985.2 129,599.7 — 382,268.9 6,878.8 375,390.1

231,857.0 80,324.9 138,587.7 — 450,769.6 7,597.9 443,171.7

239,470.0 87,650.2 138,151.8 — 465,272.0 9,009.1 456,262.9

235,418.8 92,261.9 147,692.5 — 475,373.3 — 475,373.3

— 83,063.2

— 336,890.5

— 382,268.9

— 450,769.6

— 465,272.0

— 475,373.3

Sources: UN Documents A/59/750, A/60/643, A/61/673, A/62/750, A/63/610 and A/C.5/63/26.

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UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

UNTSO Key Facts

Latest Key Resolution

23 October 1973 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 339 (to continue thereafter, until the Security Council decides otherwise) 29 May 1948 (date of issue and effect) UNSC Res. 50 (no duration determined) Major-General Robert Mood (Norway) SG letter of appointment 9 January 2009 Entry on duty 15 January 2009 Colonel Count Thord Bonde (Sweden)

First Mandate Chief of Staff

First Chief of Staff

UNTSO Personnel: July 2009–September 2010

200 180 160

Number of Personnel

140 120 100 80 60 40 20

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

303

Sept. ‘10

Aug. ’10

July ‘10

June ’10

May ‘10

Apr. ’10

Mar. ‘10

Feb. ’10

Jan. ‘10

Dec. ’09

Nov. ‘09

Oct. ’09

Sept. ‘09

Aug. ’09

July ‘09

0

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UNTSO Personnel: Since 2000

200 180

Average Number of Personnel

304

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160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Jan.– Dec. ‘00

Jan.– Dec. ‘01

Jan.– Dec. ‘02

Jan.– Dec. ‘03

Jan.– Dec. ‘04

Jan.– Dec. ‘05

Jan.– Dec. ‘06

Jan.– Jan.– Dec. ‘07 Sept. ’08

Auth. Military Obs.

Auth. Int’l Staff

Auth. Local Staff

Military Obs.

Int’l Staff

Local Staff

Jan.– Jan.– Sept. ’09 Sept. ’10

Sources: UN Documents A/54/6(Sect.5), A/56/6(Sect.5), A/58/6(Sect.5), A/60/6(Sect.5) and A/60/9(Sect.5); DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

UNTSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 September 2010

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Contributing Country

Troops

Military Observers

Police

Total

Finland Norway Switzerland Ireland Netherlands Australia Denmark Canada Austria Italy New Zealand Argentina

— — — — — — — — — — — —

14 13 13 12 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 5

— — — — — — — — — — — —

14 13 13 12 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 5

China Russia Sweden Nepal Chile Belgium France Slovakia Slovenia United States Estonia Total

— — — — — — — — — — — —

5 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 152

— — — — — — — — — — — —

5 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 152

Sources: DPKO FGS.

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UNTSO (MIDDLE EAST) • 305

UNTSO International Civilian Personnel Occupations: 30 September 2010

Occupation

Percentage International Staff

International Staff

Administration Aviation Civil Affairs Economic Affairs Electoral Affairs Engineering Finance Human Resources Human Rights Humanitarian Affairs Information Management Information Systems and Technology Legal Affairs Logistics Management and Programme Analysis Medical Services Political Affairs Procurement Programme Management Public Information Rule of Law Security Social Affairs Transport Total

19 — — — — 3 4 5 — — 2 10 1 7 — 2 2 2 — — 2 23 — 9 91

20.9% — — — — 3.3% 4.4% 5.5% — — 2.2% 11.0% 1.1% 7.7% — 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% — — 2.2% 25.3% — 9.9%

Source: DFS FPD.

UNTSO Personnel Gender Statistics: 30 September 2010

Personnel Type

Male

Troops Military Observers Police International Civilian Staff Local Civilian Staff Total

— 147 — 72 104 323

Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS.

Female — 5 — 19 20 44

Percentage Male — 96.7% — 79.1% 83.9% 88.0%

Percentage Female — 3.3% — 20.9% 16.1% 12.0%

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UNTSO Fatalities: Inception–September 2010

Personnel Type

Time Period 1948–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Troop

Military Obs.

Police

Int’l. Staff

Local Staff

Othera

18 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 18

12 — — — — 1 1 4 — — — — — — — — — — — 18

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

6 — — — — 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 8

3 — — — 1 — — — 1 — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 6

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

Total 39 — — — 1 2 2 4 1 — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 50

Incident Type

Time Period 1948–1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January-March April-June July-September October-December 2010 (Jan.-Sept.) January-March April-June July-September Total Fatalities

Malicious Act

Illness

Accident

Otherb

25 — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 26

5 — — — 1 1 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 8

8 — — — — 1 — 4 1 — — — — — — — — — — 14

1 — — — — — — — — — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 2

Total 39 — — — 1 2 2 4 1 — 1 — — — 1 — — — — 50

Source: DPKO Situation Centre. Notes: a. Other refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

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UNTSO (MIDDLE EAST) • 307

UNTSO Vehicles: 30 September 2010

UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type

Quantity

4x4 Vehicles Automobiles Buses Engineering Equipment Material Handling Equipment Trucks Vans Total

156 6 16 5 3 17 5 208

Source: DFS Surface Transport Section.

UNTSO Budget and Expenditure (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Programme Costs Total

Appropriation Jan. ’09–Dec. ‘10

Estimated Expenditures Jan. ’09–Dec. ‘10

70,631.1 70,631.1

61,791.9 61,791.9

Sources: UN Document A/64/6/Add.1; DFS FBFD. Note: 2009–2010 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

UNTSO Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2009 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category

Jan. ‘00– Dec. ‘01

Jan. ‘02– Dec. ‘03

Jan. ‘04– Dec. ‘05

Jan. ‘06– Dec. ‘07

Jan. ‘08– Dec. ‘09

Posts Other Staff Costs Hospitality Travel of Staff Contractual Services General Operating Expenses Supplies and Materials Furniture and Equipment Other Expenditures Total Requirements

30,532.2 8,547.1 — 1,793.3 — 2,538.2 1,117.1 1,614.5 — 46,142.4

31,679.1 9,588.0 7.8 2,658.2 49.5 3,422.8 982.0 1,498.4 — 49,885.8

33,215.7 10,443.2 7.6 2,763.5 39.7 5,010.0 1,035.3 3,214.7 — 55,729.7

21,993.1 26,726.5 9.5 234.5 12.9 6,433.8 1,447.4 2,362.1 — 59,219.8

41,833.9 12,103.3 12.5 — — — — — 10,186.7 64,136.3

Sources: UN Documents A/58/6(Sect.5), A/60/6(Sect.5), and A/64/6(Sect.5); DFS FBFD. Note: 2008–2009 expenditures are preliminary and subject to change.

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Index

Afghan National Army, as the first and second line of security, 65 Afghan National Police (ANP), 65 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), training and transfer of security responsibility, 66 Afghanistan: Afghan parliamentary elections and political benchmarks established, 65; and coalition leverage to negotiate with all actors, 1; deployment of 56,000 additional ISAF troops and replacement of the commander Stanley McChrystal, 64; increase in number of security incidents resulting in civilian casualties, 66; London Conference co-chaired by Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the UN, 64; parliamentary elections, 65; and US and NATO forces to all-time high of 130,000, 1; and US-led coalition forces of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 64 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), 4; 2010 increase in authorized troops for, 7 Alliance fatigue: and fear that more European countries will withdraw, 66–67; and Afghanistan war as a dangerous political gamble, 67 AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 4, 213–221 Bas-Congo Province, and tensions between popular politico-religious movement Bunda Dia Kongo and government authorities, 29 Benchmarking practice: dividing “core” from “contextual” benchmarks, 11–12; progress

toward fulfillment of peace agreement and mandate implementation, 15–16 Benchmarks: to foster accountability and dialogue, 15–16; ended the war, 69; deeply divided along nationalist lines and protracted difference between the Bosniak, Serb, and Croat communities, 69; and entrenchment of the roles of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), 69; and general elections facilitated by peace operations, 71; and progress toward NATO integration, 70 Capstone Doctrine: and core business of peacekeeping vis- a-vis other external actors, 11; distinguishes strategic from tactical consent, 13 Central African Republic (CAR): as hosts to roughly 950 refugees from DRC and 197,000 internally displaced people, 24; and instability as result of decades of mutinies and military interventions, 20; and presidential and parliamentary elections put on hold, 23; and the security situation in the MINURCAT area of operations characterized by ethnic divisions, banditry, and cross-border crime, 23 Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): and governments call for early withdrawal of the missions, 10; and request that the Security Council not renew MINURCAT’s mandate, 4 Chad/UN High-Level Working Group, established to assess security situation with respect to protection of civilians and to manage issues relating to transition of protection tasks from MINURCAT to government forces, 23 309

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Chad: eastern region as host to internally displaced people from the border area, 20; as host to refugees from Darfur region of Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR), 20; as site of daily violence involving individuals and aid workers, 20; and weakening of rebel movement in eastern Chad, 22 Chadian government: Bureau de Securisation et des Mouvements (BSM) created to coordinate the DIS and manage requests for escorts by humanitarian actors, 23; as host of series of Humanitarian Dialogue Forums between government, humanitarian actors, MINURCAT, and local media, 23; refusal to arrest President Omar al- Bashir, 22–23 Civil society, and limits on how much a peacekeeping mission can reach out, 1 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Liberia, and agreement by President Taylor to go into exile in Nigeria, 41 Congo conflict: and Congolese army officers in fierce competition for control over lucrative mining interests, 29; and implementation of March 23 agreements between government and armed groups in the KIVU’s, 29; and three interlocking wars in 1996 and 1998 and third war beginning in northeastern Congo, 26–27. See also Democratic Republic of Congo Consent, employing an expansion vision of, 15 Côte d’Ivoire: erupted into civil conflict after state military forces stages an unsuccessful coup d’etat and attacks across the country, 72; as real risk of descending into civil war as President Gbagbo refused to cede power, 72 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): and authorities expressed preference for bilateral arrangements, 30; and delinking armed groups from the political economies and criminal networks that sustain them, 30; and efforts in 2009 to weaken and dismantle armed groups operating in the eastern DRC, 26; and fragile rapprochement with Rwanda that has persisted and

provided useful avenues for regional cooperation, 31; fragmented and largely bilateral international policy in, 30; and Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) completion point, 29; and Kabila government’s strength to exert its will vis-à-vis opposition forces and outsiders, 14; and local elections as significant in any effort to decentralize governance yet they Continue to be postponed and unfunded, 30; pace and nature of MONUC/ MOMUSCO’s withdrawal, 16; security situation remains of serious concern with various coalitions of entrenched armed groups competing over lucrative natural resources, 31–32; and seeking to satisfy a domestic constituency still searching for a peace dividend from 2006 transition, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and brokering of 1993 peace agreement, 40 Emergency Response Unit (ERU), and focus to prioritize growing the Police Support Unit, 43 Enyele insurgency, Democratic Republic of Congo: and deep-seated grievances and tensions among some communities remain unresolved, 29; emerged in western province of Equateur and swept into Mbandaka surprising authorities and UN peacekeepers, 28–29 EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah), established to help implement Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access, 91 EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) established to support and advice Palestinian Civil Police, 91 EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea): acting in a nonexecutive mode in areas of capacity building and training, 69; consisting approximately 1,700 troops deployed in the BiH capital Sarajevo 69; Council of the European Union approved plans for, 69

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EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina: made up of police officers and civilian staff to build sustainable BiH police force, 69; operating parallel to political operations of the Office of High Representative (OHR) and overseeing Dayton Agreement, 70; and security responsibilities transferred to the European Union, 69 EU Special Representative to BiH, mandated to assist in implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 70 Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo(FARDC), and predatory practices against civilians, 26 Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), continued deadly reprisal attacks against civilian populations, 26 Haitian National Police (HNP) operations, and gang strongholds eliminating the leadership and bringing stability to the country, 34 Haiti: cholera’s spread along the Artibonite River and response of humanitarian agencies and the government to contain the disease, 37; and donor governments pledged $5.3 billion over two years and total of $10 billion over the following ten years, 35–36; and earthquake damage and upheaval, 34–35; and elections of 28 November, 38; and Interim Recovery Commission to oversee and manage recovery and reconstruction process, 30; military coup, 33–34; and searchand-rescue operations and life-saving emergency and humanitarian assistance, 35; and US deployment of personnel to Haiti as part of Operation Unified Response, 35 Hezbollah, and government weakness in clear contrast with physical and political strength, 90; Iran and arsenal, 85 Horta, Jose Ramos, 13 International community, and enthusiasm for smaller operations over large-scale peacekeeping, 10

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Afghanistan, 64–65 Iran, and continued refusal to submit to international pressure over assistance to Hezbollah, 85 Iraq, as unstable and lacking government, 85 Israel, and continued blockade of Gaza contributed to further deterioration of economic and humanitarian conditions, 85 Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations, 85 Kabila, Joseph, 5 Kosovo: and armed conflict between Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian armed forces, 82; and coalition government collapse after minister of Democratic League of Kosovo resigned, 82; and fourmonth NATO bombing campaign, 82; and International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling regarding declaration of independence, 82; and overall situation remaining relatively peaceful in 2010, 82; unilateral declared independence from Serbia in 2008, 82 Lebanon: and formation of national-unity government, 85; adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701 and new mandate for UNIFIL, 88 Liberia: national capabilities, 42; and managing election-related disputes and peaceful resolving tensions as to priority, 42, state institutions, 40 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA): continuing to operate between the northeast of the DRC, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan, 30; and routine attacks on civilians, 24, 30 Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, 26 MFO Sinai, established following withdrawal of UN Emergency Force II and conclusion of Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 92 MINURCAT. See UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINURSO. See UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MINUSTAH. See UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

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Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX): UN Organization Stabilization Mission: and the CAR as host, 24; and expanded mandate of BONUCA, 24; mission mandate to promote peace, stability, and respect for human rights and reconciliation, 24; tasked with providing support to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration combatants, 24 MONUSCO. See UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo MINURSO, established to monitor cease-fire agreement between Morocco and POLISARIO and implement a referendum for self-determination of people of Western Sahara, 104 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and invasion of Liberia in 1989 that sparked civil war, 40 New Horizon: reform initiative strengthening UN peacekeeping to meet current and future demands, 8; and peacekeepers as peacebuilders, 11 Non-UN-commanded missions, global statistics on: In Africa by organization, troops/police deployed, 153, 155; civilian missions, 162–166; contributors of troops, 146–147, 149; contributors of police, 146, 148; costs of missions, 167; in Europe by organization, troops deployed, 154; heads of missions, 168–169; military and observer missions, 156–161. See also individual countries OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), electoral observers to monitor voting, 71 Peace agreement, and relationship embodied as living documents and interpreted creatively, 15 Peace operations, and UNMIK’s exercise of rule-of-law responsibilities and technicallevel contacts with Kosovo authorities, 82–83

Peace process, as premium on local ownership in a peace process both as normative stance and requirement for effectiveness, 13 Peacekeeping operation(s): and achievement on rule of law and governance as more than bare minimum, 11; list of five areas in which progress thought to be necessary to secure sustainable peace, 11; and operational, political, and financial pressure to scale down, 4; subsidiary questions following from conceptual uncertainty, 11; and true local ownership including civil society and the private sector, 13 Peacekeeping: bargain and tendency to obsolesce over time and devices, 16; and calls for deployment in Chad and the CAR, 21; and consent as bedrock principle, 12; as obsolescing bargain and provisions for border-monitoring role between Chad and Sudan, 21; and task of gauging viability of political process, 12–13 Political process, task of gauging viability of, 12–13 Radio Okapi, Democratic Republic of Congo, significant potential legacies of the mission, 31 Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI): and focus on building capacity of Solomon Islands government to form and maintain its own legal and economic institutions, 96; formed by Pacific Island Forum and deployed at request of the government, 96; mandate with tripartite mission of assisting the government, 96; Rwanda, and findings of acts of genocide in the DRC during the course of the Congo wars, 31 Security Council: and authorization of US-led multinational interim force (MIF) to support local police, facilitate humanitarian aid, and promote the rule of law and human rights, 34; and renewal of UNMIL’s mandate for an additional twelve months, 40; and US-led multinational interim and United Nations Assistance Mission in

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Afghanistan (UNAMA) to support the Bonn Agreement, 64 Security, justice, and rule of law: and achieving progress on establishment of rule of law and Haiti’s long-term recovery effort, 39; established rule of law and accountable judicial and security sectors 38; MINUSTAH’s security and justice sector reform, 38–39 Serbia, EU application pending and pressure to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY), 84 Sierra Leone, peace agreement and stability of, 1 Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, 13 Solomon Islands: and capacity for economic sustainability, rule of law, and government accountability, 96–97 Somalia: and mission’s narrow mandate to monitor cease-fire in Mogadishu, 98; piracy off Somalia’s coast, potential for conflict to spread beyond country’s borders, 4; enforcement operations in early 1990s, 98; successful attempts to restore a functioning government, 99; as testing ground for post-Cold War peacekeeping and peaceenforcement operations in, 98 South Sudan: need for continued deployment of peace operations, 47; referendum delayed at the end of 2010, Statistics on UN-commanded missions, global: budgets and financial contributions, 137–140; civilian personnel, 127; fatalities, 134–136; gender statistics, 133; mandate renewals, 141; military observers, 112–114; occupations, staff, 128–130; personnel headquarters, 132; personnel, total, 133; police, 115–119; regional, personnel by, 120–126; timeline, operations (1945–2010), 142; troops, 108–111. See also individual countries and individual missions Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the increasing possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence and destabilization, 47 Sudan: and constriction of political freedoms in both North and South, 49; and CPA’s major implication for the people of Sudan

and for the UN peacekeeping operations, 47; and the discourse surrounding global peace operations from 2010 into 2011, 47; and dramatic transformation as the implementation period laid out in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 47; first multiparty elections, 49; and five goals leading up to the referenda, 49–50; and UNOSOM II with new and expanded nation-building mandate, 98 Timor-Leste: carefully negotiated criteria for handing policing responsibilities to the Timorese district, 12; continuing to remain stable with no significant security problems throughout 2010, 55; and international community’s shift to prospect of transition from peace operations to future development support, 55; measured drawdown under way, 10; and staffing ministries with foreign advisers, 14; and transition planning for UN Integrated Mission, 4; UN peace operations in, 55 Transition from McChrystal to Petraeus: and McChrystal’s disparaging remarks about administration officials, 65; and Petraeus’ appointment seen as a demonstration of Obama’s commitment to reasserting authority, 66 Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), Sudan, and concern among the international community about government’s effectiveness and legitimacy, 98 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Liberia, release of final report, 42 Turkey, and agreement reached for Iran to send low-enriched uranium, 85 UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), laying the groundwork for UN role in supporting the CPA, 48 UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1994 fragile peace agreement and collapse into mass genocide, 1 UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), mandate underscoring importance of mission in support of fledgling Iraqi government, 92

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UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), establishment of, 90; 222–231 UN forces in the Horn and Central Africa, and questions about sustainability of peacekeeping, 1–2 UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 278–286 UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): as temporary civilian administration, 82; 250–258 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), as largest UN peace operation in the region, 88; 240–249 UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 68, 287–292 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), mandate in context of good relations with Royal Moroccan Army and POLISARIO’S military forces, 105; 185–193 UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), incrementally imposed restrictions of, 14 UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), continued critical role in postconflict recovery, 40; measured drawdown of, 4; increasing the strength and readiness of LNP for 2011 elections, 43; joint GoL and program on sexual gender-based violence delivered to security personnel and respond to this type of violence, 45; and monitoring situations in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, 43; peace and stability sustained through the security guarantee and services provided, 46; preparation for a database to record incidents of LNP abuse, 43; rape and armed robbery continued to pose and recommendation of three-stage drawdown of military component, 41; stage drawdown of military component, 41; securing the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Freetown, 41; and UNMIL’s backing of justice system to address backlogs, 44; UNMIL’s phased withdrawal and lack of over-the-horizon force, 45–46; 258–267 UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 268–277 UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT): closure of, 4; continued support for development of

credible police and judicial institutions in the east, 25; and criteria proposed and endorsed as exit strategy, 12; and eastern Chad remained host to acute insecurity and need to suspend or modify humanitarian activities, 25; human rights monitoring continued in refugee camps, 25; last-minute agreement allowing for extension of mandate, 24; and new mandate authorizing significant changes to s protection-ofcivilians tasks, 24; plans to hand over responsibility to Chad’s security and justice bodies, 25; 176–184 UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC): and failure to respond to rapes committed by FDLR and Mayi-Mayi fighters, 30; and precipitous withdrawal and creation of a dangerous power vacuum, 28; and relationship between MONUC and the Kinshasa government, 28; transformed into a stabilization mission in 2010, 5 UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), to assist ECOWAS Military Observer Group, 40 UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI): and Constitutional Court announced Gbagbo as winner, 75; and continuing need for UNOCI, 15; and electoral processes halted due to disagreements surrounding a separate parallel list of 429,000 persons, 74–75; and EU agreement for sanctions against Gbagbo’s administration, 76; and installation of a new government and IEC, 75; and likely reinforcements for the besieged operations, 7; growing ethnic and political tensions erupted into civil conflict, 72; and northern territory replaced by a green line and patrolled by mixed police units, 74; and Ouagadougou Agreement signed in March 2007, 72; UNOCI reconfiguration according to benchmarks set by Secretary-General, 74; used as a roadmap with efforts to reunify the country, 73–74; and World Bank froze funding to, 76; and UN officials confirmed evidence that Gbagbo’s regime had hired armed mercenaries from Liberia, 77; 293–302 UN Organization Stabilization Mission

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in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), 203–212 UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL), 40 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 78–79, 231–239 UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): agreement on project budget, 38; and comprehensive inspection of voting centers around the country, 38; and considerations to determine future deployment of addition “surge” personnel, 36–37; consolidation plan for the mission with ultimate goal of drawdown, 34; and continuation of its community violencereduction program, 37; and HNP and MINUSTAH as first responders, 36; flexible reaction to the disaster, 5; and need for reorientation of mission’s strategic planning, 36; peacekeepers blamed by Haitian population for introducing cholera epidemic, 5; and preparing for drawdown based on Secretary-General’s five benchmarks laid out in 2008, 36; and process of designing the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) according to revised Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), 37; and program employed Haitian workers to rebuild damaged infrastructure, 37; and slow institutional development and high levels of poverty as obstacles to, 34; 194–202 UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO): entering its fourth and final

phase as initial UN deployment following the second Congo war, 26–27; and phase two coinciding with political transition in the Congo and MONUC’s growth into substantial mission, 26–27. See also UN Organization STabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO): establishment of, 91; 303–306 UNAMID. See AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur UNDOF. See UN Disengagement Observer Force UNFICYP. See UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNIFIL. See UN Interim Force in Lebanon UNMIK. See UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMIL. See UN Mission in Liberia UNMIS. See UN Mission in Sudan UNMIT. See UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UNMOGIP. See UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UNOCI. See UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UNTSO. See UN Truce Supervision Organization Western Sahara, and negotiations between government of Morocco and Frete Popular, 104 World Food Program (WFP), and Haiti emergency food distribution, 37

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About the Book

Unique in its breadth of coverage, the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations presents the most detailed collection of data on peace operations—those launched by the UN, by regional organizations, by coalitions, and by individual nations—that is available. Features of the 2011 volume include: • a thematic focus on current operations in periods of transition • a summary analysis of trends and developments in peace operations through 2010 • concise analyses of all peacekeeping missions on the ground in 2010 • a review of ongoing reform initiatives • in-depth explorations of key missions, focusing on those that faced significant challenges or underwent major developments in 2010 • extensive, full-color maps, figures, and photographs The editorially independent Review is a project of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

317