An Intellectual History of China, Volume Two: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief From the Seventh Through The Nineteenth Century 9004281347, 9789004281349

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An Intellectual History of China, Volume Two

Brill’s Humanities in China Library Edited by Zhang Longxi (City University of Hong Kong) Axel Schneider (Göttingen University)

VOLUME 12

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bhcl

An Intellectual History of China, Volume Two Knowledge, Thought, and Belief from the Seventh through the Nineteenth Century By

GE Zhaoguang Translated by

Josephine Chiu-Duke Michael S. Duke

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is the result of the translation license agreement among Ge Zhaoguang of Fudan University, Fudan University Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. This book is translated into English from an abbreviated version of the original《中国思想史》(葛兆光著) (Zhongguo sixiang shi, by Ge Zhaoguang) with the financial support of the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences (中华社会科学基金) and Fudan University Press. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018008143

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1874-8023 isbn 978-90-04-36789-0 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-28134-9 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Chronology of Chinese States and Dynasties vii Abbreviations Used in Footnotes and Bibliography ix Note on Translation xi Author and Translators xv Series Editors’ Foreword xvi 7 Tang Dynasty Thought I: From Unity to Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to Mid-10th Centuries CE) 1 Prologue: Power, Education and the Intellectual World  1 1 Mediocrity in a Flourishing Age: Knowledge and Thought in the First Half of the 8th Century 4 2 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism I: The Decline of Theoretical Interest 20 3 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism II: The Victory of Chan Buddhism and the Defeat of Buddhism 35 8 Tang Dynasty Thought II: From Unity to Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to Mid-10th Centuries CE) 52 1 The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism III: Language and Meaning 52 2 Re-establishing National Authority and Intellectual Order: A New Understanding of Intellectual History Between the 8th and 9th Centuries 62 3 Anti-Buddhist Persecution of the 840s and 9th-Century Daoist Religion 84 9 From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I (Mid-10th Century to the End of the 16th Century) 96 Prologue: China Before the Birth of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle 96 1 Luoyang and Kaifeng (Bianliang): Separation of the Political and Cultural Centers 104 2 Continuation of Neo-Confucianism: The Zhu Xi-Lu Xiangshan Debates and Their Surroundings 125

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Contents

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From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 149 1 State and Scholars Support the Expansion of Culture and Establish the Uniformity of Ethics in Everyday Life in the Song Dynasty 149 2 From Yuan to Ming: The General Condition of the World of Knowledge, Thought and Belief 166 3 Making Waves Again: The Rise and Significance of the Learning of Wang Yangming 178

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From Ming to Qing I: From Tianxia, “All under Heaven,” to the “Ten Thousand States” (End of the 16th to the End of the 19th Centuries) 201 Prologue: From “All under Heaven” to an “Age of Ten Thousand States”: Background to the Reinterpretation of Ming and Qing Intellectual History 201 1 Collapse of Heaven and Earth I: The Ancient Chinese Cosmic Order Encounters Western Astronomy 205 2 Collapse of Heaven and Earth II: “All under Heaven,” “China,” and the “Four Barbarians” as Depicted in Ancient Chinese Maps of the World 216 3 The Rise of Textual Criticism and Evidential Research and the Chinese Intellectual World from the Mid-17th to the Late 18th Centuries 227

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From Ming to Qing II: Chinese Intellectual World in the 18th and 19th Centuries 247 1 Attempting to Rebuild the Intellectual World: The Turn of the 18th- and 19th-Century Evidential Research 247 2 Influx of New Western Knowledge and Changes in the Chinese Intellectual World in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century 267 3 The Late Qing Rediscovery and Reinterpretation of Traditional Chinese Resources: Classical Learning, Study of the Ancient Schools of Philosophers and Buddhism 283



Epilogue: China in 1895: The Symbolic Significance of Intellectual History 305 Bibliography 323 Index 336

Chronology of Chinese States and Dynasties Xia 2000?–1600? BCE Shang 1600?–1027? BCE Zhou 1027?–256 BCE Western Zhou 1027?–771 BCE Eastern Zhou 771–256 BCE Spring and Autumn Period 771–481 BCE Warring States Period 481–221 BCE Qin 221–206 BCE Western Han 202 BCE–8 CE Wang Mang 9–23 CE Eastern Han 25–220 CE Three Kingdoms 220–280 Wei 220–265 Shu 221–263 Wu 222–280 Western Jin 265–316 Sixteen Kingdoms 301–439 North-South Dynasties 317–589 South Eastern Jin 317–420 Liu Song 420–479 Southern Qi 479–520 Liang 502–557 Chen 557–589 North Northern Wei (Tuoba Wei) Xianbei or Särbi 386–535 Eastern Wei 534–550 Western Wei 534–557 Northern Qi 550–577 Northern Zhou 557–581 Sui 581–618 Tang 618–907 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 907–960 Northern Song 960–1127 Southern Song 1127–1276 Liao Khitan 916–1125

viii Jin Jurchen 1125–1234 Xi Xia Tangut 1038–1227 Yuan Mongol 1271–1368 Ming 1368–1644 Qing Manchu 1636–1911

Chronology of Chinese States and Dynasties

Abbreviations Used in Footnotes and Bibliography CASS 中國社會科學院 Chinese Academy of Social Science Chan, SB A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 1963 CHC Cambridge History of China Commercial Press 商務印書館 CSJC 叢書集成 Congshu jicheng CTP Chinese Text Project, http://ctext.org/ De Bary, Sources  Sources of the Chinese Tradition from Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd Edition, Vol. 1 ECJ 二程集 Er Cheng ji ESWS  二十五史 Ershiwu shi, Zhonghua punctuated edition (all are Zhonghua unless otherwise stated) GSZ 高僧傳 Gaoseng zhuan HHS 後漢書 Hou Hanshu HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies HS 漢書 Hanshu JAS Journal of Asian Studies JTS 舊唐書 Jiu Tangshu LJYJ 陸九淵集 Lu Jiuyuan ji QTW 全唐文 Quan Tangwen SBBY 四部備要 Sibu beiyao SBCK 四部叢刊 Sibu congkan SGSZ 宋高僧傳 Song Gaoseng zhuan SHYJG 宋會要辑稿 Song huiyao jigao SKQS 四庫全書 Siku quanshu Soothill, Dictionary A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, online SS 宋史 Songshi SSXYJJ 世說新語校箋 Shishuo xinyu jiaojian SUNY State University of New York Tsukamoto, History A History of Early Chinese Buddhism Watson, CT The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu Wilkinson Chinese History: A New Manual XTS 新唐書 Xin Tangshu XZZTJCB 續資治通鑑長編 Xuzizhi tongjian changbian YS 元史 Yuanshi Zhonghua 中華書局 Zhonghua shuju ZWGWJ 朱文公文集 Zhu Wengong wenji

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Abbreviations Used in Footnotes and Bibliography

ZYL ZZJ ZZQS ZZTJ

朱子語類 Zhuzi yulei 张載集 Zhang Zai ji 朱子全書 Zhuzi quanshu 資治通鑑 Zizhi tongjian

Note on Translation It has been almost four years since the publication of our translation of the first volume of Professor Ge Zhaoguang’s An Intellectual History of China in 2014. In this second volume, readers will find that the translators’ note is basically the same as that in the first volume, but here we have added information about the edition of the Chinese texts that served to prepare for this translation project.* We have also offered some additional comments on the availability of the sources when the volume was first completed in 2000. The work translated here was first published in two volumes as Zhongguo sixiangshi, di yi juan: Qi shiji qian Zhongguo de zhishi, sixiang yu xinyang shijie 中國思想史，第一卷，七世紀前的知識、思想與信仰世界 (1998) and Zhongguo sixiangshi, di er juan: Qi shiji zhi shijiu shiji Zhongguo de zhishi, sixiang yu xinyang 中國思想史，第二卷，七世紀至十九世紀中國的知識、   思想與信仰 (2000). The original text ran to just over 1,400 pages. This translation represents Professor Ge’s unpublished abbreviation of these two Chinese editions into just 666 pages of Chinese text. Volume Two of this two-volume translation covers pages 372 to 666 of this unpublished Chinese text. This extensive work was a considerable success in China. As of 2014, it has been printed ten times with more than seventy thousand sets sold after its first publication, quite unusual for such a scholarly book. There may be many reasons for this success. One is that it was published in an environment where education and scholarship were allowed to resume their proper place in society after decades of social and political turmoil during Chairman Mao’s rule. A longing for knowledge and understanding of their own history has been widespread ever since the end of that rule. External causes can of course only explain part of the story. Without the great erudition and deep insights he employs in a reflective and open-minded manner, Professor Ge’s work may not have appealed to so many Chinese readers in a manner that some earlier works of a similar nature have failed to do. There have previously been valuable Chinese works on Chinese intellectual history both written and translated by prestigious scholars in the field. Fung Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy was translated by Derk Bodde and published in 1952 and 1953 while part of Hsiao Kung-Chuan’s History of Chinese *  This addition is based on Professor Paul R. Goldin’s thoughtful review of the first volume published in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy (online September 30, 2014). We are grateful to him for pointing out a few mistakes in the volume, and if it is possible to have another edition, we will certainly make the corrections as he suggested.

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Political Thought was translated by F. W. Mote and published in 1979. These texts have been regarded by many scholars as required classics and they have well served Chinese studies in the West. Fung’s History, however, focuses on the exposition of Chinese thought as a branch of philosophical study, and Professor Mote’s passing in 2005 meant that only half of Hsiao Kung-Chuan’s original work could be made available to the English speaking world. A translation of Ge Zhaoguang’s most important recent study of Chinese intellectual history for the English speaking world would seem, then, to offer a rich supplement to the above texts as well as bringing in different perspectives and new understandings of a tradition that has more than two thousand years of history. As Professor Ge’s own “introduction” (pp. 1–67 of volume one—An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief through 1895 (Brill, 2014)—makes clear, his approach to Chinese intellectual history is very different from that of previous Chinese scholars in the field. Here, it is perhaps not out of place to state briefly that he discusses the importance of appropriating as wide a range of source materials as possible, especially those that only came to light recently and those that were neglected in the past. He also emphasizes the necessity of understanding ideas and thought in their proper historical contexts so that his Chinese readers can reduce their unavoidable preconceived modern assumptions and see the dialectical interaction between historical background and intellectual thought. Throughout, he stresses the complex dynamics involved in the interaction among the intellectual thought of elite Chinese scholars, their historical conditions, their canonical texts and what he calls the “worlds of general knowledge, thought and belief.” In the process, some key issues, including the formation of the Chinese world order, its underlying value system, the origins of the Chinese cultural identity and the impact of foreign thought, emerged to underscore his narrative. Such discussions can no doubt help readers understand why this work was so well received in contemporary China and hopefully also help stimulate dialogue about these issues in the field since they are clearly relevant to our time. It is necessary to emphasize that Professor Ge’s work was written primarily for Chinese readers before the 21st century. As rich as the knowledge and insights included in his two volumes are, he was understandably unable to employ the information and discoveries offered by many new studies of traditional Chinese intellectual history in different time periods published after 2000 in Chinese, Japanese, English, and other major languages. This should not, however, hinder cross-cultural dialogue since these new studies of various specific time periods may not contradict, but agree with and supplement, the overall picture presented in Professor Ge’s two volumes.

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As translators, we have been faced with the daunting task of trying to match our linguistic and intellectual abilities with Professor Ge’s enormous scholarly range and coverage of Chinese textual and archeological source materials. The many excellent available translations of Chinese works and the various online Chinese texts have been most helpful to us. We have also greatly benefited from discussions of our questions with Professor Ge in Vancouver. Without his quick and careful answers through email exchanges to our questions on each chapter, it would have been impossible to complete this work within a reasonable time.

Some Technical Matters

All citations of the “twenty-five dynastic histories” (Ershiwu shi 二十五史) are from the Zhonghua shuju punctuated editions. In Chinese, Professor Ge’s original work relies on very many Chinese translations of works originally in non-Chinese languages. Whenever possible, we have sought out the original texts that these translations are based on and reproduced them rather than re-translating from Chinese translations. We have noted any minor changes made to these published translations to match Professor Ge’s overall format. To avoid unnecessary confusion, references to those Chinese translations are not included. In addition to using published translations of Chinese classical texts in many cases, all other translations of quoted Chinese materials are our own. At the first appearance of a Chinese book, an italicized English translation is given with non-italicized Chinese Romanization in parentheses; subsequent appearances of the same text are given in English only. For example: The Exact Meaning of the Five Classics (Wujing zhengyi) first, and The Exact Meaning of the Five Classics from then on. Romanized Chinese titles are given in the notes. Complete references are given in the bibliography. For traditional Chinese books we use j. for juan 卷 meaning chapter or volume. Page numbers for books and journals are given after the date of publication without p. or pp. Chinese characters are given for selected terms in hopes that readers will find them useful. In dealing with the titles of Buddhist sources, we have done the same as with Chinese titles, giving an English translation with the Indian language titles in parentheses. For these English translations of titles, we have relied on Zenryû Tsukamoto, A History of Early Chinese Buddhism (Chûgoku Bukkyô tsûshi), as translated by Leon Hurvitz. In translating the titles of Daoist texts we have followed the same format and relied on Livia Kohn, ed., Daoism Handbook.

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If such standard translations of Buddhist and Daoist texts are unavailable, we have attempted our own. For Buddhist terms, we have relied on the online edition of A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms by William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous. Translating this volume has been a humbling experience, and any infelicities in our translation, in spite of Professor Ge’s timely help, are unquestionably our own. Josephine Chiu-Duke and Michael S. Duke Vancouver, December, 2017

Author and Translators Ge Zhaoguang is a Professor of History at Fudan University, Shanghai. He was the founder of Fudan’s National Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies and served as its Director for six years. He is well known for his studies of Chinese history and the religious and intellectual history of ancient China. He has been a visiting professor at Kyoto University in Japan, City University of Hong Kong, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium and National Taiwan University. He was also appointed Princeton University Global Scholar for 2009–2010. Among his many Chinese publications are Zen Buddhism and Chinese Culture (1986), Taoism and Chinese Culture (1987), Ten Chinese Classic Canons (1993), Chinese Intellectual History, 2 volumes (1998 and 2000), Here in ‘China’ I Dwell (2011), and What is China (2018, available in English translation). Josephine Chiu-Duke is an Associate Professor of Chinese Intellectual History in the Asian Studies Department of the University of British Columbia, and Co-Director of the Centre for Chinese Research. She is the author of To Rebuild the Empire: Lu Chih’s Confucian Pragmatist Approach to the Mid-T’ang Predicament (2000) and the editor of a Chinese work entitled Liberalism and the Humanistic Tradition—Essays in Honor of Professor Lin Yü-sheng (in Chinese, 2005). She is the co-translator of Ge Zhaoguang, An Intellectual History of China, Vol. One: Knowledge, Thought and Belief Before the Seventh Century CE (2014), and coeditor of Ying-shih Yü, Chinese History and Culture, 2 volumes (2016). She has also published many articles in both English and Chinese on traditional Chinese women and traditional and contemporary Chinese thought. Michael S. Duke is Professor Emeritus of Chinese and Comparative Literature from the Asian Studies Department of the University of British Columbia. He is the author of several books including Blooming and Contending (1985). He has also translated many modern Chinese works of fiction such as Raise the Red Lantern (1993), The Fat Years (2011), co-translated, with Timothy D. Baker, Cho-yun Hsu, China: A New Cultural History (2012), and is the co-translator of Ge Zhaoguang, An Intellectual History of China, Vol. One: Knowledge, Thought and Belief Before the Seventh Century CE (2014), and co-editor of Ying-shih Yü, Chinese History and Culture, 2 volumes (2016).

Series Editors’ Foreword The rise of China as an economic and political power is unquestionably one of the most striking phenomena of global significance as we enter the first decade of the twenty-first century. Ever since the end of the “Cultural Revolution” and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, tremendous changes have transformed China from an isolated and relatively weak country into a rapidly developing and dynamic society. The scale and speed of such transformations have taken the world—even the Chinese themselves—by surprise; China today is drastically different from, and in a remarkably better condition than, China thirty years ago despite the many economic, social, and political difficulties and problems that yet remain to be dealt with. China scholars in Europe and North America are called upon to provide information and explanation of the rise of China, a country with history and tradition reaching back to antiquity and yet showing amazing strength and cultural virility in the world today. Interest in China is not limited to the traditional field of Sinology or China studies, nor is it confined to the academic world of universities, for more and more people outside of academia are curious about China, about its history and culture, as well as the changes taking place in the contemporary world. The Western news media brings images from China to every household; Sinologists or China scholars publish numerous articles and books to satisfy the general need for understanding: China is receiving a high-level of attention in the West today whether we turn to the scholarly community or look at popular imagination. In understanding China, however, very little is available in the West that allows the average reader to have a glance at how China and its culture and history are understood by the Chinese themselves. This seems a rather strange omission, but in much of the twentieth century, the neglect of native Chinese scholarship was justified on the grounds of a perception of political control in China, where scholarship, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, was dominated by party ideology and strictly followed a prescribed party line. Such politically controlled scholarship was thought to be more propaganda than real scholarship, and consequently Western scholars rarely referred to contemporary Chinese scholarship in their works. In the last thirty years, however, Chinese scholarship and public opinion, like everything else in China, have undergone such tremendous changes that the old stereotype of a politically controlled scholarship no longer holds. New and important archaeological findings in China have changed our knowledge of ancient texts and our understanding of Chinese history in significant ways,

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and detailed studies of such new materials are available in native Chinese scholarship. Since the 1980s, many Chinese scholars have critically reflected on the nature of scholarship and questioned the old dogma of political and ideological orthodoxy, while many important books have been published that present a new outlook on Chinese history and culture. The time has come for Western scholars and other interested readers to engage academic perspectives originating in China, and making important academic works from China available in English is an important step in this engagement. Translation of influential academic works from China will greatly contribute to our better understanding of China from different perspectives and in different ways, beyond the dichotomies of the inside and the outside, a native Chinese view and a Western observer’s vantage point. Brill’s Humanities in China Library is an established book series that has been commissioned by Brill in response to that need. The series aims to introduce important and representative works of native Chinese scholarship in English translation, in which each volume is carefully selected and expertly translated for the benefit of Western scholars as well as general readers who have an interest in China and its culture but may not read the Chinese language in the original. It is our hope that this series of representative books in translation will be useful to both specialists and general readers for understanding China from a different point of view, and that it will be an important step towards a fruitful dialogue and an exchange of ideas between Chinese and Western scholars. Zhang Longxi Axel Schneider

Chapter 7

Tang Dynasty Thought I: From Unity to Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to Mid-10th Centuries CE)

Prologue: Power, Education and the Intellectual World

When dynasties changed in ancient Chinese history, it was not enough for the new rulers to rely only on military might and political tactics. They also had to obtain the widespread support of general cultural norms before their political domination and the actions of their government could be generally accepted. According to Max Weber (1864–1920)’s observations, there are three types of legitimate and rational domination: (1) traditional, (2) legal and (3) charismatic. Imperial power in ancient China was, however, far more complex than that. It was an integrated “universal kingship” in which historical tradition, military power, thought, religion, culture and spiritual authority were combined and overlapping. Precisely for this reason, if the rulers wanted to obtain legitimacy and reasonableness for their power and authority, they had to have cultural and intellectual support. To gain cultural and intellectual support, they also had to have a monopoly on the interpretation of the thought of the classics, establish educational and official recruiting systems, and create a new intellectual and conceptual system and a new cultural atmosphere.1 The rulers of the Tang dynasty that replaced the Sui dynasty in the first half of the seventh century were concerned from its inception about the legitimacy of their regime. This was especially the case with the second emperor, Tang Taizong, or Li Shimin (r. 626–649). Besides employing quite enlightened and effective political tactics, he also relied on frontier expansion and pacification of alien border peoples to establish his prestige. At the same time, he employed very intelligent cultural tactics, such as issuing authoritative editions of the five classics and a new ritual code for the five-fold division of rituals to claim discursive power over the explication of the classics. He established the hierarchical order of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism to confirm his authority in the intellectual world, and so on. All of these efforts were not in 1  See Max Weber, “Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaf ” (The Three Types of Legitimate Rule), Preussische Jahrbücher 187, 1–2, 1922 Originally published in the journal Preussische Jahrbücher 187, 1–2, 1922, translated by Hans Gerth, in Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4.1 (1958), 1–11.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_002

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vain and by around 636, the middle of the zhenguan reign period (627–649), the legitimacy and authority of the new imperial regime and the new emperor received general recognition. A few decades later, the legitimacy of the Great Tang ceased to be an issue as people’s memories of the previous dynasties faded with the passage of time. Especially after the promulgation of the Zhenguan Ritual Code (Zhenguan li, 637) and the Xianqing Ritual Code (Xianqing li, 658), the completion of The Exact Meaning of the Five Classics (Wujing zhengyi, 642) and the seriatim publication of the histories of preceding dynasties—the History of the Jin (Jinshu), the History of the Qi (Qishu, includes the Southern and the Northern Qi, Nan Qi shu and the Bei Qi shu), the History of the Zhou (Zhoushu), the History of the Liang (Liangshu), the History of the Chen (Chenshu), the History of the Southern Dynasties (Nanshi), History of the Northern Dynasties (Beishu), the History of the Sui Dynasty (Suishu) and so on—it was well proven that the Mandate of Heaven had passed to the Great Tang empire. Under considerable political pressure, the arguments between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism had also quieted down. At that time, a seemingly new ideology, new institutional norms, and a new history had been established. The establishment of education, examination and recruiting systems that carried on the Sui dynasty models particularly brought about the integration of thought and knowledge. A unified state then had a unified thought and culture. A unified state also having a unified thought and culture, however, is both extremely fortunate and also unfortunate. In ancient China, there was a very widespread concept that humanity should have an ultimately rational “order,” and that this “order” surely constituted an extremely satisfactory interpretive system. The mainstream of the ancient Chinese intellectual world was always engaged in arguing for and constructing this sort of interpretive system. It attempted to explain how the structure of space and time in Heaven and Earth, the political structure of rulers (diwang 帝王) and states (diguo 帝國), ethics and morality in human society, and the myriad phenomena of nature were all perfectly incorporated into this order. Under conditions of widespread social disorder, when the state was divided, the ethnic nationality was in crisis, morality was in chaos and so on, and these problems were incapable of solution, then the thought that had this sort of “order” as its central element would command very sharp critical abilities and unquestionable ideals, truth, and justice. When a dynasty was well established and everything seemed to be perfectly fine, however, it would seem as though the mission of thought had come to an end. Because thought seemed to have lost its object of criticism, it would

Tang Dynasty Thought I

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rapidly be reduced to a species of knowledge that was merely an appendage to the classic texts. Under the domination of the examination system, thought was reduced to some meaningless texts and formulas that existed only for the sake of memorization and recitation. In an age of unification of All Under Heaven, educated people were deprived of a place for independent thought, lost their most important sense of questioning, and could only remain in their increasingly narrow official careers. Given the Tang dynasty’s rather relaxed official recruitment, as serving officials, scholars concentrated on knowledge and thought within the scope of the official examinations. The whole world of knowledge, thought and belief was controlled by the “official examinations.” These “official examinations” were not fair intellectual competitions between different people; they were rather a political declaration of one’s acceptance of the correct answers under the domination of the authorities. It is recorded that after a scholar entered an academic institution, he had an examination every ten days, a major examination at the end of each year, and if he received a low grade three times, he had to stop taking the exams and return home. The advantages of official life were both a motive and a source of pressure because the knowledge and thought of the intellectual stratum was tied down by the examination system. From the reign of emperor Gaozong (r. 649–683) to that of Xuanzong (r. 712–756), the government established a bureaucratic system designed to absorb the whole intellectual stratum and an evaluation and assessment system designed to control that intellectual stratum. The regime also summarized all knowledge, thought and belief through the large-scale collection of texts and leishu encyclopedia compilation projects. Emperor Xuanzong’s annotations of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing), the Diamond Sûtra (Jingangjing) and the Laozi (Daodejing) were even more an indication of the trend toward the syncretic integration of the Three Teachings (Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism) as well as a demarcation of the boundaries of thought. In light of this, Shen Jiji (ca. 740–ca. 800) later wrote that the world was at peace during the kaiyuan (713–741) and tianbao (742–756) reign periods. As he wrote: during those periods, even though there were grand plans and excellent strategies they were not appropriated, and there was no need for people with wonderful proposals and heroic martial talents to exert themselves…. Thus, gentlemen in the age of great peace concentrated only on selecting and looking for wives with good family backgrounds and

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preparing essays for possible examination questions so that they could obtain official rank and salary.2 This was especially the situation during the High Tang period (713–756 or most of the eighth century) when the social atmosphere was one of luxury, wealth and self-satisfaction. Since official careers were so wide open, educated men either competed eagerly in the pursuit of fame and profit, immersed themselves in romantic and unconventional lives, or idled about under the patronage of great families. They no longer possessed the critical spirit and independent consciousness of former times and they were no longer able to diagnose and criticize the ills of society. The entire society was preoccupied with superficial satisfactions. They ardently sang the praises of the order and stability of the age and the affluence of life. They also rhapsodized about the power and prestige of their empire reaching out to the “four seas” (the known world), but very rarely did anyone show any anxiety or fear or notice the hidden crises to come. When an age ceases to have an object for its social criticism, when its knowledge becomes only a bargaining chip, when its thought becomes mere ornamentation, and when its language is only used for game playing, has the intellectual world of that age not also begun to grow increasingly mediocre? 1

Mediocrity in a Flourishing Age: Knowledge and Thought in the First Half of the 8th Century

The An Lushan (ca. 703–757)-Shi Siming (703–761) Rebellion broke out in 755 and lasted until 763. This rebellion marked a turning point in the history of the Tang dynasty, and indeed, in all of Chinese history. It also divided Chinese intellectual history into two periods. Although the transformation of the ancient Chinese intellectual world did not become fully apparent until the following century, the signs of that coming transformation had already appeared during this period. The Tang dynasty had actually just experienced crises of both thought and political order at the beginning of the eighth century. First off, Wu Zetian (624–705, r. 690–705) supplanted the Li family Son of Heaven, replaced the 2  Tongdian, j. 15, “Xuanju san,” 358. The High Tang usually refers to the forty-three years of the kaiyuan and tianbao reign periods, but Stephen Owen, The Great Age of Chinese Poetry: The High Tang (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1981), xi–xv, considers it to comprise almost the entire eighth century.

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Tang dynasty with the Zhou dynasty and unprecedentedly, even unimaginably, set herself up as a female Emperor. Her actions presented a most serious challenge not only to the traditional Chinese distinctions between men and women but also to the ancient Chinese cosmological view that “Heaven [male] is high and noble and Earth [female] is low and humble” (tian zun di bei 天尊地卑).3 Wu Zetian’s Zhou dynasty introduced reforms in many traditional political systems and threw the once unified and stable political order and intellectual world into disorder. Secondly, the previously very strict channels of official recruitment became extremely relaxed and a large number of scholars who were not scions of the great or noble families moved from the periphery to the center. This in turn caused the hitherto clearly stratified aristocratic society and its ceremonial rituals, ethics, and morality to lose their constraining power. Although this turmoil in the political regime came to a temporary halt when the Tang Emperor Zhongzong (Li Zhe, r. 705–710) resumed the throne, unrest still remained in thought and social order, and they did not really return to their original state following the restoration of the political system. The early eighth-century government had a very strong desire for reform.4 In 714, Emperor Xuanzong not only ordered the return to normal life of twelve thousand Buddhist monks and nuns, but also, following the advice of his ministers, he strongly supported the Confucian classics and tradition. In the next few years, Xuanzong personally carried out a strict rectification of the discipline or intellectual trends of the official examination degrees “enlightening the classics” (mingjing) and “advanced scholar” ( jinshi). He also ordered learned officials to sort out texts in accordance with the four categories of classics, history, philosophy and literature. Furthermore, to re-establish the legitimacy of the Tang dynasty regime, a series of symbolic cultural activities were carried out. They included creating a new calendar system during the kaiyuan reign period, measuring the great earth again, and performing 3  This Yijing passage is translated in Richard John Lynn, ed. and translated, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 1994, 131. 4  For example Tang Ruizong (Li Dan, r. 684–690 and 710–712) repeatedly issued edicts calling for reformation of social customs and the restoration of rites and ceremonies, and the government emphasized the re-establishment of order all the way down to the beginning of kaiyuan reign period. Many histories say that this was the result brought about by Tang Xuanzong’s efforts in establishing good rule during his early reign, but they do not regard it as a self-salvation movement of the traditional aristocratic society. Many historians believe that the time from Wu Zetian to Xuanzong constituted a process where educated members from lesser lineages or from lower ranks at court continuously rose, but I believe that Xuanzong did not necessarily consciously support the newly rising stratum; rather he very much hoped for the restoration of the old social order and traditions.

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the Feng and Shan ceremonies on Mt. Tai in 725 to re-emphasize the sacredness of the Heavenly Mandate undertaken by the Tang dynasty to govern all under the Heaven. In 732 the Rites of Kaiyuan (Kaiyuan li) was finally completed and the state’s re-establishment of the ritual order seems to have come to a successful conclusion. This was a time in which tradition had already lost its fascination, and so these government actions did not give rise to any new interest among the general society. From the middle of the seventh to the middle of the eighth century, China experienced a period of “mediocrity in the midst of flourishing.” This was because mainstream knowledge and thought no longer possessed either the power of self-correction or clear judgments of contemporary social problems. A very strange intellectual situation occurred during this period. On the one hand, orthodox ideas and thinking were raised by government power to the position of an unquestionable ideology that dominated everything, while, on the other hand, in popular society, thought and ideas were reduced to a form of knowledge learned and recited by rote without the necessity of reflection. Only political power and worldly benefits could serve to maintain the attraction of orthodox ideas and thinking for the intellectual stratum. Just as Emperor Xuanzong said, the contemporary intellectual classes only knew how to write flowery essays and talk vulgar nonsense to please the crowd; their schools were like playhouses and their lectures were like dramatic performances.5 In contrast to this, however, in the first half of the eighth century, previously marginalized Buddhism and the Daoist Religion became the most active and dynamic forms of knowledge, thought and belief of the age. The life styles and patterns of thought of alien peoples that had never occupied the mainstream in the past emerged as the freshest and most popular of contemporary fashions—heresy and the periphery had already become quiet threats to the mainstream and the center. For this generally labeled “flourishing” eighth century, I want to call readers’ attention to the following phenomena that perhaps exerted profound influences on the contemporary world of knowledge, thought and belief. 1.1 First off, during this period, mainstream thought and ideas became both simplified and dogmatic. Chinese history always seems to have presented such phenomena. In general, when thoughts and ideas were supported by political power and became a monopoly ideology while at the same time serving as the 5  “Edict on the Ritual for Confucius and the Sages” (Jiangxing shidianli ling), QTW, j. 20: 97.

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content of official examinations and the basis of official promotions directly connected to personal interests, these sorts of thoughts and ideas rapidly became simplified dogmas that could only provide materials to be recited by rote memory. At the same time, simplistic texts to transmit and reproduce these thoughts and ideas, however rigid and dogmatic, would be very quickly copied, circulated and recited in great numbers following the requirements of education, official examinations and social communication. Even though some people opposed this trend and tried to preserve the integrity of the classic texts, this conservative attitude toward traditional knowledge could not, in the end, overcome the widespread demands of the general society. The powerful enticement and influence of the official examination system (keju) on the educated men of the time was extremely important. The contemporary “enlightening the classics” and “advanced scholar” examination system, the scope of the examination questions, and the appraisal preferences of those grading the exam essays often suggested to the scholars a certain academic or intellectual orientation. For example, the topics of the jinshi examinations of that age, the examination that was regarded as attracting the most outstanding talents, tended to lead the examinees to rack their brains and strain their imaginations searching out and piling up stale rhetorical phrases. At the same time, the limited rhymes the examinees were allowed to use also limited their thought and expression. The topics in the “writing of refined beauty” (wenci yili) and the “vast erudition and grand composition” (boxue hongci) exams also led toward knowledge and thought becoming mere verbal ornamentation. Even the various examinations in specialized field were judged on the basis of literary style and were replete with showy but insubstantial qualities. As ever more members of the general intellectual elite no longer possessed the sort of easy cultural tradition of the aristocracy, but anxiously needed to be able to deal with practical examination knowledge, classical knowledge could scarcely escape becoming simplified and dogmatic. Let me give an example. After the seventh century, various types of manuals on human relationships and rules of etiquette and various classificatory handbooks, and books for entertaining and exchanging poems were very popular in Chinese society. This demonstrates that the previous erudite knowledge and easy going self-cultivation had already disappeared and that the newly rising educated cohort relied on these simplified handbooks and manuals to guide their expression and behavior. It also shows that the knowledge foundation of very many of these people was only the undemanding knowledge that they derived from these simplistic texts. From the point of view of intellectual history, this simplification of knowledge had already transformed knowledge into common sense, turned education into dogma, and employed the format

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most easily remembered and recited by rote to cram up people’s memories. Even though in the eighth century, this knowledge and thought still emanated from the ancient classics, they had already become texts for memorization and recitation in response to various contingencies. They lacked a sense of inner belief and meaning in real life. They vainly possessed an ornamental nature but had lost the ability to judge and critique social problems. 1.2 Secondly, thought also followed the structural changes in the intellectual group and inclined increasingly toward ornamentation and superficiality. This change was inseparable from the contemporary secularization of knowledge. Just as Chen Yinque (Chen Yinke, 1890–1969) long ago pointed out, from the time of Wu Zetian through Tang Xuanzong’s reign, a major change in Tang dynasty society was simply that the “ordinary court officials” replaced the original “aristocratic members of the great families from the Guan-Long regions (roughly including today’s southern and central areas of Shaanxi, southwest Shanxi, and southeast Gansu provinces).”6 Due to the opening up of channels for upward mobility, education became increasingly universal, and in general, beginning with the reign of Empress Wu, the newly rising educated stratum steadily replaced the old aristocracy.7 Due to this newly rising educated stratum’s particular concentration on worldly importance and their practical orientation, their intellectual interests and tendencies of thought were very different from those of the original aristocratic scholars. One element that spurred on the intellectual interests and tendencies of thought of this newly risen intellectual stratum to become a universal social custom was mobility. Mobility (ease of movement) undermined the spatial structure of traditional society in which the aristocracy relied on their family names, their lineages and their fixed regional dwelling places. Due to the prolonged stability and increase in wealth, the scholars of the eighth century, especially the first half of the century, could travel and move around very easily. This great change in social structure and the expansion of cultural space had a rather profound influence on intellectual history. Just as the Mid-Tang figure Liu Fang (?–?) said in discussing lineages, from the Sui dynasty on, the 6  Chen Yinque draft manuscript, Tangdai zhengzhishi lüegao, 37. 7  Translators’ note: Chen’s views have been greatly modified, but his important contribution to the study of Tang political and institutional history is, to be sure, still highly appreciated. For the modifications, see The Cambridge History of China, Volume 3, Sui and T’ang China, 589–906, Part 1, edited by Denis Twitchett, London: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 10–11. The Chinese translation of this book was not available until after 2000.

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stable society of region, social status, wealth and occupation had gradually disintegrated. This was because mobility caused the formerly quite stable social order and the ideas that maintained that order to be thrown into great disarray.8 In the long period of disunity, from the fall of the Eastern Han (220) to the beginning of the Sui (589), the constant dwelling places of the great lineages, the family background and superior circumstances of aristocratic intellectuals, their exemption from worldly cares, and their habit of pursuing transcendent thought no longer existed with the break up of aristocratic society. They were never to return again.9 In the eighth century, the individual household or family ( jiazu) replaced the lineage (zongzu) as the foundation of society and the state. The collapse of the great lineages rendered the old selection and recommendation system (chaju tuijian) an unrealistic fantasy, while the opening up of official careers allowed a large number of previously marginalized scholars of lowly birth to enter into practical political life and participate in the contest for political power and personal rewards. Because they needed power and advantages in actual political life, they began to abandon the previous aristocratic style of stately dignity while some worldly ideals began to become fashionable public trends. The lives of scholars of that period were no longer ones of reverence, thrift and solemnity, but rather of luxury and frivolity. Their ideals were no longer virtuous nobility and a free and easy demeanor that transcended vulgar society, but rather worldly status and wealth. The cultural capital they relied upon to achieve social prestige was no longer extensive knowledge and profound thought, but rather a flamboyant literary style and a rich imagination. The ability to memorize and recite became an important standard for measuring a person’s worth, and a rich vocabulary and skill at rhyming became powerful tools for gaining social renown. Among these newly rising scholars who were ceaselessly streaming in to the center, not only was aristocratic society falling 8  X TS, j. 199, “Ruxue shang Liu Chong zhuan fu,” 5679. Liu Fang hoped to rely on the three elements of “being tied to a person’s regional or prefectural origin,” “being sustained by a prestigious family or lineage name” and “being connected by marriage” to distinguish clearly the relations among the powerful and influential lineages as well as great surnames so as to have a base to rebuild social order in the Tang. 9  Translators’ note: Nicolas Tackett’s important study demonstrates that aristocratic scholars did continue to maintain their networks and power in the post-An Lushan Rebellion era until after the Huang Chao Rebellion. See his The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). Tackett’s research findings do not necessarily contradict Ge Zhaoguang’s overall interpretation in the sense that, as can be seen in the following chapters, Ge is concerned with showing the decline of aristocratic power as a major tendency in the development of Chinese society during the Tang and Song dynasties.

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apart, but even the way of life based on ritual norms and its conceptual system were already on the verge of collapse. Just this situation, however, stimulated quite a few marginal scholars to communicate back and forth in vigorous pursuit of both their ideals and personal benefit. Scholars who were formerly restricted to the periphery outside of the capital Chang-an could now enter into the center of the contemporary world of thought and belief and they were actually able to transform profoundly the thinking of the whole society. As much as the former intellectual world had begun to resound with heteroglossia, knowledge had still not discarded the old and brought in the new, and thought had escaped from criticism of reality. The once highly regarded, solid, dignified study of the classics was replaced by frivolous and flamboyant creative literature. Literature was the fashion of that period and thought became only the packaging for literature. An antiacademic tendency pervaded the entire society. 1.3 Finally, the boundaries of belief began to blur, a phenomenon that had actually begun before the eighth century. From the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties periods (220–589) on, the process of conflict, compromise, and accommodation of Buddhism and the Daoist Religion with Confucianism had steadily eroded the sphere of mainstream belief. In the seventh century, though, due to the necessity of establishing the legitimacy and reasonableness of a new dynasty, there was a process of renewed clarification of thought, knowledge and belief following a political ideology founded on Confucianism. The editing of The Exact Meaning of the Five Classics, compilation of dynastic histories, rigorous regulation of the content of the examination system questions and strict government limitations on the propagation of Buddhist and Daoist thought among the upper strata of society combined to constrain the spread of heresy for a while. In the prosperous and relaxed social environment of the first half of the eighth century, however, orthodox Confucianism lost its power to control and lead. Some non-Confucian religious personages were extremely favored and virtually became symbols of contemporary intellectual trends leading toward a transformation of the world of belief. During the reigns of emperors Ruizong (Li Dan) and Xuanzong (reign ended in 756), many Buddhist and Daoist personalities received special imperial praise and encouragement. Even though the government issued orders on many occasions forbidding officials to associate with Buddhist monks and Daoist priests, street markets to cast and sell statues of the Buddha and Buddhist scriptures, women from great families

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to donate money to temples and monasteries such as Huadu and Fuxian, and even did not allow the ordination of new Buddhist monks for twenty years while strictly regulating the populations of Buddhist monasteries and Daoist temples, these policies did not stop the spread of Buddhism and Daoism. This was because the imperial house was intimate with Daoists and Buddhists, and scholars and leading officials also had very close relations with them. This meant that the intellectual world with Confucianism as its core that the government was working so hard to establish in the early eighth century grew imperceptibly less and less powerful. Let us first examine the situation of the Daoist Religion. Starting at the beginning of the kaiyuan reign period (713), the government set up shrines on the five famous mountains—Tai, Hua, Heng, Song and Heng—to the Highest Lord Lao (Laojun, a title of Laozi in the Daoist Religion), and ordered every family, high and low, in the realm to keep a copy of the Laozi in their home. Shrines to the Laozi as Emperor of the Mysterious Beginning (xuanyuan huangdi 玄元皇帝) were ordered set up in the two capitals of Chang-an and Luoyang and in all prefectures. Daoist schools called “Sublime Mysterious Studies” (chong xuanxue 崇玄學) were also established for the study of the Laozi, the Zhuangzi, the Liezi and the Book of Master Wen (Wenzi). On the birthday of the three important Daoist deities, the deities of Heaven, Earth and Water, i. e. on the fifteenth day of the first, seventh and tenth lunar months, scholars were ordered to lecture on the Classic of the Way and its Power (Laozi) and the True Scripture of the Southern Florescence (Zhuangzi). During this period, every prefecture had a Daoist Jade Emperor Palace and the number of temples of the Daoist Religion reached the historically unprecedented number of one thousand six hundred and eighty-seven. As for Buddhism, there were two things in the history of Tang dynasty Buddhism that had great symbolic importance. The first was that special religious areas were set aside in the palace chapel for reading aloud Buddhist scriptures, fasting assemblies (zhaihui 齋會), lecturing on Buddhist scriptures and practicing the Buddhist religion. Many eminent monks took advantage of this channel to come down from their forest retreats and enter the city and even the imperial palace; at that, they daily increased their influence on the upper strata of society. The second thing was that Buddhism not only set up temples and monasteries in Chang-an and Luoyang, but also legally established government temples throughout the prefectures, and the government actually appointed monks as officials to administer them. These newly established Buddhist temples and the monks who were allowed to set them up and were given official permits to become monks and join them became the

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representatives of official government religion. For example, Kaiyuan temples were set up in many places throughout the realm and one of their most important duties was to carry out appropriate Buddhist rituals on birthdays and anniversaries of death days of members of the Tang royal family. At the same time, when people in the general society needed relief from distress or suffering, the Kaiyuan temple monks would carry out ceremonies on their behalf to give them a sense of spiritual comfort. The two religions of Buddhism and Daoism were not the only ones that became widespread. Right before and after the eighth century, following the circulation and cohabitation of alien peoples in Han Chinese regions, the so-called “three barbarian religions” of Manichaeism (monijiao 摩尼教), Nestorian Christianity ( jingjiao 景教), and Zoroastrianism (xianjiao 祆教) that had early on been brought to China started increasingly to be propagated in these areas of predominantly Han Chinese civilization. During that time, there were Nestorian Da Qin temples (literally Roman temples) in Chang-an, Luoyang, Lingwu (Ningxia), Zhouzhi (Shaanxi), Shazhou (Gansu) and Guangzhou, while Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism were similarly beginning to flourish. The entrance of these religions from beyond the area of Chinese civilization into the Chinese belief world caused the barriers of the Chinese world of knowledge, thought andbelief to become progressively weaker. One series of events that took place at this time was unusually important for intellectual history. In 722, Tang Xuanzong issued to the whole country his Commentary on the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing zhu); from 732 to 733, Xuanzong completed his Imperial Commentary on the Daodejing (Daodejing yuzhu); right after that, in 734 he issued his annotated edition of the Diamond Sûtra (Jingangjing). It would seem that the emperor’s thinking was already confused. The issuance of these three readers of classic texts in the emperor’s name carried perhaps the greatest symbolic significance for the intellectual history of that period. Putting aside the question of the intellectual quality of the commentaries, the fact that an emperor who was the symbol of orthodox thought and social order chose these three texts that are Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian classics and are also the most brief and concise texts on those three forms of thought and texts that explore precisely the origins of the universe and the depths of the human heart/mind was certainly very significant. Does the fact that these three classics were given commentaries with official approval and that they were required reading for officials and people throughout the country not suggest that the intellectual climate after the eighth century was going to shift in the direction of fusion, simplification, and looking inward?

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1.4 It has often been said that thought is the medicine of society and any vital form of thought should be able to offer a profound diagnosis for the ills of society. Even if it is unable genuinely to serve as a scalpel to dissect the social o­ rganism and excise any malignancy, it should be able to offer relevant criticism and by means of such sharp criticism make people reflect on their situation. The world of knowledge, thought and belief in the eighth century would seem to have already lost that particular ability to diagnose and criticize society. First off, Heaven and Earth and the cosmos as the ultimate foundation of the state’s political legitimacy and the social order seem to have already lost their effectiveness. They had already lost the ability to support and confirm the truth of contemporary thought and order. Originally the ancient Chinese had a tendency to believe in hierarchy and social order and that “Heaven does not change and Earth does not change.” They regarded the orderly movements of Heaven and Earth and the cosmos and their spatial structure as symbols of and supports for the legitimacy and rationality of this order. The system that maintained this order was simply the ritual norms that were “set up in accordance with the Way of Heaven.”10 From the Wei-Jin period on (220–420), the Confucian study of the classics, Book of Rites (Liji) studies, and Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) studies were always most closely related to questions of social order. The study of the Spring and Autumn Annals offered support for both political ideology and the political power to exercise control by reference to history, while the Book of Rites used ceremonies symbolic of social hierarchy to establish social order. For a very long period of time, all the way down to the eighth century, the Book of Rites was a repository of the most important knowledge. There were three discussions that nearly all the famous literati and officials participated in from the xianqing reign period of Emperor Gaozong through the kaiyuan and tianbao reign periods of Emperor Xuanzong (from the 660s to 756): (1) a long running discussion of the dishes and vessels of wood and bamboo (bian, and dou), that is, ritual vessels, and mourning garments to be used in ancestral temples;11 (2) a debate during the shengli reign period of Empress Wu (698–699) as to whether the three-year mourning period was 10  This was a very important ancient Chinese concept. The “Ceremonial Usages” (Liyun) chapter of the Book of Rites states that “the rites and ceremonies must have their roots in the big and the one, that is Heaven,” and Kong Yingda comments that “the biggest is called Heaven, and the undivided is one.” That is to say, the rites and ceremonies are modeled on Heaven and Earth and so they are reasonable. 11  See XTS, j. 122, “Wei Anshi zhuan fu Wei Tao zhuan,” 4356.

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actually thirty-six or twenty-five months;12 (3) a clarification, from the Early to the High Tang, of the status of seniors and juniors in the same lineage as well as the rank order of social standing among the prominent families and lineages by means of genealogical records.13 All of this proves the importance of the study of the rites as the knowledge background of political ideology. Despite the fact that the social order had already undergone steady change, academic and intellectual habits still kept the rites in a central position. This thinking about the cosmos and human society that was completely constructed after the Han dynasty and had never received any serious challenges was unable, however, to explain the dazzling series of changes in the social hierarchy that took place during this time period. In traditional Chinese thinking, a society with clearly demarcated social ranks was taken to be correct and unalterable. Every person who lived within that ordered society was expected to live in the manner appropriate to his or her status so as to maintain the stability of the social and hierarchical structure. In reality, though, at that time the social order was continually being broken down. In the first place, ever since Wu Zetian’s time, Princess Taiping, Empress Wei (wife of Emperor Zhongzong [Li Xian, r. 684 and 705–710]), Shangguan Wan-er, Princess Changning, and Princess Anle actively interfered in the government. Even some palace maids sometimes got involved in court affairs. All of this demonstrated that the status of Yin and Yang had been turned upside down and the unalterable principles of Heaven and Earth had already been overturned.14 Second, from 710 to 713, Emperor Ruizong and his son Xuanzong were involved in a power struggle. This further indicated that the rites built on the bond between Heaven and Earth and between fathers and sons no longer had any power to constrain behavior. Third, changes in the center of power and the social hierarchy presented an even greater challenge to the traditional order and further implied doubts about the tradition of Heaven and Earth and the cosmos as the ultimate foundation of social order. Due to their constant moving around, the original great lineages and families were always in a state of division at the same time that lower class scholars with no aristocratic blood were streaming in from all directions to join the “process of selection and appointment of officials” (xuanguanchang 選官場). Entering the 12  JTS, j. 91, “Zhang Jianzhi zhuan,” 2936. 13  JTS, j. 102, “Xu Jian zhuan,” 3157. 14  See XTS, j. 120, “Huan Yanfan (653–706) zhuan,” 4310: “Allowing Yin to ride above Yang is against the principle of Heaven; allowing wives to rise above husbands is against the principle of the human life. Going against Heaven is inauspicious and going against the human is morally wrong.”

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center by means of the examination system, they began to share power with the aristocracy and this changed the original social structure with its orderly hierarchy of noble and low born.15 Fourth and finally, before the An Lushan Rebellion, a few men from alien peoples or low status who were appointed as officials to oversee the border regions, together with groups of scholars gathered around them, caused the political and cultural center of gravity between the center and the periphery to be thrown out of balance. As a result, the boundaries between center and periphery, aristocrat and commoner, the great and the lowly, civilized and uncouth, and Han and nonHan had become blurred. The social order that once had a clear hierarchical ranking collapsed as a result of the cultural overlapping of various ethnic groups, geographical regions and powerful and influential families. The original Chinese tradition of ritual norms based on Heaven and Earth and cosmic differences also broke down together with these changes. At that, the concept of ritual norms as the supporting background for the genealogical studies of great families also lost it power to regulate and rectify society. In the second place, at the same time, old historical knowledge could no longer prove the superiority of the Han Chinese ethnic group and its civilization, nor could it criticize the idea that the various alien cultures then residing within the borders of the country were not equally reasonable. Something that has often been neglected by researchers is that the Tang dynasty imperial Li family that succeeded the Northern Zhou and the Sui dynasty did not originally have a purely Han ethnic blood relationship. They were, furthermore, not so bold and confident about their non-Han origins and consequently they always wanted to employ the orthodox doctrine of dynastic succession to support the legitimacy of their power and authority. They also changed their ancestral origin to the aristocratic block in Longxi in the northwest to conceal the historical fact of their partially non-Han origins and to support the orthodox status of their culture. In terms of genealogical connections, the early Tang took the Northern Zhou as the rightful heirs to the empire and later based their legitimacy on the legitimacy of the Northern Zhou and Sui dynasties. This could to some extent weaken the claim that the Han ethnic group was the only orthodox civilization and also allow the non-Han Son of Heaven to have the same legitimacy in the 15  In 733, there were already 17,686 officials from the eminent dignitary rank of Three Preceptors (sanshi 三師) down, and for clerks 57,416 from the rank of Accessory Clerk (zuoshi 佐史) down. The state and society’s overall division of power and hierarchical structure had already undergone great changes. That is why Sima Guang wrote that “there are more ways of entering officialdom than can be recorded.” ZZTJ, j. 213, 6802.

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historical genealogy. Later on during the reigns of Gaozong and Xuanzong, however, this historical genealogy was seriously challenged; in the eleventh month of 750, Emperor Xuanzong decided to change the orthodox succession from the northern dynasties to the southern dynasties and unintentionally revised dynastic history. Perhaps this was because the dynasty had been established for over a hundred years and he no longer needed to worry about being of non-Han origin, or perhaps he wanted to seek a connection with a pure Han blood relationship due to the ruling family’s submission to Han Chinese civilization. That would make it seem, then, that the Tang dynasty not only possessed political legitimacy but also cultural respectability. Perhaps this kind of change in the historical narrative was intended to focus criticism on contemporary reality, but the result was precisely to evade contemporary reality. What actually was the real contemporary situation? It was that being surrounded on all sides by alien cultures, the Han Chinese civilization’s monopoly of superior power was daily declining. The Tang dynasty was a very open, cosmopolitan period and the eighth century was particularly so. Not only did various alien peoples live within the Tang imperial territory, but the dynasty also developed close relationships with the cultures of distant countries in the southwest and the northwest by communication channels over land and sea. Even though the coming of Buddhism and the rise of the Daoist Religion did not radically shake the foundations of Chinese confidence in their preexisting ancient mainstream civilization, cultural conflicts and competition were quietly going on. One result of this mixing of the cultures of different peoples was that the traditional Han Chinese ethical norms were losing their universal ability to constrain behavior at the same time that traditional modes of behavior were also losing their general reasonableness. The Han Chinese industrious, plain and simple, cultured, refined and ritually modest and regulated way of living based on Confucian-established norms of human relationship was being supplanted by the bold, unconstrained, uninhibited, extravagant, decadent way of life preferred by alien peoples and this was being privately imitated by many members of the great families and the educated elite. In addition to Buddhism, the existence of various Nestorian Da Qin temples and Zoroastrian Ahura Mazda temples were evidence of the fascination the knowledge, thought and belief of alternative civilizations had for contemporary people. The importation of various forms of dress, playthings, games, songs and dances and so on also demonstrated the attractiveness of these alternative cultures for everyday life. At the time, one Lü Yuantai (around 705–710, in Zhongzong’s time) brought up a seemingly very simple and yet actually very

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profound question: “How can our dynasty based on rites and ceremonial etiquette imitate the customs of the barbarians?”16 Past historical knowledge could not really explain, however, why Han Chinese should be superior to alien peoples, nor could it prove the superiority of Han civilization over theirs. Even though the emperors ruling over China believed that history had already bestowed both political and cultural reasonableness upon them, and Chinese scholars still believed that their culture would not be challenged, Han Chinese civilization was actually being threatened from all sides already. This was especially the case after the An Lushan Rebellion when the state could no longer calmly observe the rise of the non-Han peoples. After all, should they dampen their psychological feeling that Han Chinese civilization was uniquely superior and accept coexistence and the mutual appreciation of other civilizations, or should they re-write the historical narrative and re-establish the superiority and orthodox genealogy of Han Chinese civilization in that narrative? Contemporary scholars did not seriously reflect upon this question and so it was left for the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127) finally to give it a conclusive answer. In the third place, the traditional system of ritual norms and the concepts of ethics and morality were no longer able to regulate and critically evaluate social life. In the face of increasingly unrestrained feelings and uncontrollable desires, traditional ritual norms and morality seemed to be in a most embarrassing situation, and we could give innumerable examples of contemporary lapses in morality. By the kaiyuan and tianbao periods, a quite untraditionally extravagant atmosphere pervaded society. Many scholars and officials gathered around a few newly emerged powerful upstarts to pursue lives of luxury. They not only abandoned the values of hard work, simple living and self-control, but even the most traditional Confucian spirit of public service could not give rise to feelings of responsibility in them. They no longer regarded success in social undertakings as their highest ideal. The contemporary world of thought was incapable of offering any remedy for these rapid changes in social life. They could only trot out some traditional prescriptions and repeatedly quote the ancient classics on hard work, frugality, reverence, respect, self-control, return to propriety (the rites), diligence in government affairs, and taking good care of people. For example, in the early eighth century, Lu Huishen (?–716) sent up a memorial discussing contemporary government affairs. He first cited Confucius’ words to criticize the tenure for the official as being too short so that officials could not discharge their duties 16  XTS, j. 118, “Song Wuguang zhuan fu Lü Yuantai zhuan,” 4277 citing a memorial by Lü.

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at ease; then he cited the Book of History (or Documents, Shangshu) to criticize officials for not paying attention to official documents and enjoying their salaries for doing nothing. He criticized the corruption of government officials, but the classics he cited did not really provide any specifically corresponding methods for preventing and controlling the widespread corruption and incompetence of contemporary officials. The social diagnoses of these Confucian scholars were perhaps fairly correct, but they were always just armchair discussions of strategy.17 Another example is Yuan Chuke (8th century) who sent a memorial to Wei Yuanzhong (?–707) warning him about ten problems of contemporary society, such as the failure to name an heir apparent, women occupying men’s offices, the sale of official certificates to become monks or nuns, the granting of official positions to various entertainers and so on. His diagnosis of social ills was still based upon the ritual norms of the old order, and their prescriptions for curing these ills were also quite outmoded.18 It was not the case that no one noticed this sort of widespread mediocrity and degeneration.19 Throughout the entire eighth century, many people frequently criticized these conditions, and there were two famous instances of such criticism. The first occurred when Zhang Yue (663–730) and Zhang Jiuling (673–740) both worked hard to restore thought and social order and actually did spur on society and opinion for a brief time. Their proposals for political reform and advocacy of rites, music, culture, and education on the one hand were intended to restore early Tang traditions and on the other hand were actually also propagating the need for reform. That kind of “restoration” was merely to start using the old ritual norms again to deal with new problems and that kind of “reform” could not restrain people’s increasing self-indulgence. At the same time, there was no way for tradition to explain or critique the new social changes. At a time when employing the traditional cosmology as a support for ritual norms and the regulation of national order, making traditional Xia-Yi (Chinese-barbarian) distinctions to deal with the problem of the mixing of ethnic groups, and applying traditional ethnics and morality to rectify human relationships after the collapse of the great families were all unsuitable

17  JTS, j. 98, “Lu Huishen zhuan,” 3065–3067. 18  XTS, j. 122, “Wei Yuanzhong zhuan,” 4345–4348. 19  Some scholars have pointed out the sorry state of the intellectual landscape at that time—regarding flowery but empty diction as displaying literary talent, willingly serving as lackeys for influential officials or the imperial court, forming factions and constantly wrangling, general decline of morality, etc. See Tai Jinnong, “Lun Tangdai shifeng yu wenxue,” in his Jinnong lunwen ji, 1989, 105–118.

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and out of date, China’s pre-existing knowledge, thought and belief systems were powerless to reverse the contemporary situation. The second critique occurred after the middle of the eighth century during the baoying (762–763) reign period—notably this was just after the An Lushan Rebellion had been put down throughout the country. Yang Wan (?–777) sent up a memorial critical of the jinshi examinations and calling for the restoration of the ancient method of seeking out the filial and incorruptible (cha xiaolian 察孝廉) for recommendation from town to county, from county to prefecture, and after the prefectural examination, to the provincial level. Yang believed that this could change the practice of recitation from rote memory and stubbornly sticking with just any one school of thought as well as regulate the selection process. At that time, Yang Wan could be said to be the symbolic leader of the cultural spirit of scholar-officials, but his recommendations could not be implemented. The background of the ills that he was dealing with were the great changes in society and so the cure that he proposed was ineffective. When his proposals were sent to other officials for discussion, they pointed out that scholars then had very great mobility, village household registries were confused, and the original lineage system was no longer useful. For those reasons, there was no way to practice selection by recommendation. All one could do was to make a few improvements. To maintain the superficial fairness of the official selection system, passing the “examinations” remained the general method. Every scholar had the opportunity to enter the cultural elite through the examination route. The leisure, prosperity and natural status position of the aristocratic elite was disappearing, but the examination scholars who replaced them as the bearers of culture did not possess their aristocratic wealth, leisure, and generations of educational cultivation. Competition on the narrow road to official service often forced them to adopt an extremely practical attitude toward the existing society and an accommodating stance toward the official government ideology. They no longer had the time to think, and even if they did think, they generally maintained a practical attitude. With such a background, thought could not but become increasingly mediocre. As a result, since the mainstream ideology with Confucianism as its core was already helpless in the face of the breakdown of social ethics and morality, it could not but allow space for Buddhism and the Daoist Religion to enter through the back door into the world of mainstream knowledge, thought and belief. 1.5 People of later ages have continually praised the “atmosphere of the High Tang.” This atmosphere was indeed pretty fine from the point of view of its

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populousness and affluence, the brilliant quality of its poetry, and the generous and open-minded attitude with which Tang people accepted various other cultures. From the point of view of Chinese intellectual history, however, the situation was precisely the opposite. First off, the integration of knowledge, the establishment of intellectual boundaries, and the regulation of the intellectual order since the early seventh century not only created a world that dominated all knowledge, thought and belief, it also seems to have left the intellectuals bereft of questions or issues. At that, they fell into a situation in which they had nowhere to exert their intelligence. Second, the separation of intellectual doctrines from practical politics further led to a situation in which their thought was merely useless armchair theorizing, or could only become a tool for seeking personal benefit. Since scholars were seeking official appointment, they all had to follow this single road and their thought and knowledge lost any vital life force or power of keen criticism in this competitive race for office. Finally, once their fine and detailed train of thought and emotion could not offer any assistance to and criticism of knowledge, thought and belief, it became continuously expressed in poetry in which “if my lines don’t startle others, in death I’ll find no rest.”20 Consequently, their ideas went into prose writings and their intelligence went into verse. All the while thought tended increasingly toward mediocrity and intellectual abilities were turned toward the intense contemplation of how to polish and refine one’s poetry. 2

The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism I: The Decline of Theoretical Interest

Something happened in Chinese intellectual history at this time that very much deserves our attention. That is, from the mid-eighth century, after the An Lushan Rebellion, the study of those Buddhist doctrines that had flourished for some time tended to fade away. It seems that many scholars were tending toward genuine faith and the meaning of such faith in Buddhism lay not in the study and reading of the scriptures, but in practicing meditation and maintaining Buddhist precepts. That means they protected their bodies from pollution by strictly obeying the Buddhist precepts and then practiced meditation to experience their original mind or their original state of purity. Then they 20  The celebrated phrase “if my lines don’t startle others, in death I’ll find no rest.” is from a poem by Du Fu (712–770). Translation is from Stephen Owen, The Great Age of Chinese Poetry: The High Tang, 1981, 209.

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continued to abide carefully by the Buddhist precepts to conserve this state and make sure they did not lose it. This practical religious belief directly aimed at the heart was the correct path of Buddhism. This was not only the view of lay believers; even among Buddhist monks, the trend of simultaneously practicing meditation and obeying Buddhist precepts, entering the religion by means of the precepts, and regarding meditation as their ultimate destination was also becoming increasingly common. At the same time, the once popular reading of the scriptures and interpreting the doctrines grew less and less important. We should mention here in passing that Tang dynasty Buddhist leaders were divided into three categories. Those who primarily translated the scriptures and explicated their doctrines were called “masters of the scriptures” ( fashi 法師); those who were responsible for teaching the rules and practice of the discipline, overseeing the ethics of the lay believers and the behavior of the Buddhist monks were called “masters of the discipline” (lüshi 律師); those called “masters of meditation” (chanshi 禪師) regarded meditation and personal experience of the deepest recesses of the mind as the most important path to the Buddhist faith. At the end of the North-South Dynasties period and the beginning of the Tang dynasty, the study of Buddhist doctrines was very flourishing and masters of the scriptures—monks who were accomplished at translating and interpreting the meaning of the scriptures—were given extremely ceremonial and deferential treatment. This was particularly the case when society in the contemporary centers of government and culture, like Chang-an and Luoyang, had even more widespread interests in Buddhist ideas. By the end of the eighth century and the beginning of ninth, though, the situation had already changed greatly. At that time, precepts and meditation became the two most attractive elements of belief in Buddhism. The practitioners of chan meditation, especially of the Southern school, the Ox-Head school and Tiantai, became nearly the most active Buddhist propagators of that time. At the same time, the practitioners of discipline (Buddhist precepts and commandments) always included a few eminent monks who attracted scholars by the force of their personalities and had rather close relations with various literati. Their influence swept through all of China and they were respected and admired by many of the most powerful officials and most outstanding scholars such as Li Hua (715–766), Qi Ying (748–795), Yan Zhenqing (709–785), Quan Deyu (759–818), Li Mi (722–789), Liu Zongyuan (773–819), Liu Yuxi (772–842), Bo Juyi (772–846) and so on. Masters of the scriptures were ignored no doubt due to the decline of interest in scriptural knowledge. The next questions we ought to ask are what after all caused interest in exegesis and theory, so flourishing from the North-South Dynasties period to the early Tang, to disappear at this time? Furthermore, while interest in the

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personal experience of Buddhist faith continually increased, what caused people to be on guard against Buddhism’s permissive and undisciplined atmosphere at the same time that the lofty behavior of scrupulously abiding by monastic discipline and Buddhist commandments became an ideal pursued by scholars? Before we answer these questions, let’s first consider a resource from the first half of the ninth century. Zongmi (780–841), who practiced both Chan and Huayan (Flower Garland) Buddhism, was already somewhat dissatisfied when he critically recalled the history of Buddhist propagation in China. He criticized Buddhism since the early Tang for “having produced numerous explanations about the phenomena of the world, with the content of these explanations changing back and forth and frequently being false and superficial, and taking power and authority for substance and truth.” In other words, being overly concerned with doctrines and analyses of concepts while neglecting the real purpose of the faith. In this, he revealed the view of ninth century Buddhists.21 What were the phenomena of early Tang Buddhism he was talking about really like, then? Why did later Buddhists criticize the atmosphere of that period? 2.1 In the early period of Buddhism’s entrance into China, reading the sûtras was the most important channel for scholars to accept it. The ideas of this religion from India were both more detailed and more profound than ancient Chinese thought and they aroused a high level of theoretical interest among the educated elites. Very many sûtras, even contradictory sûtras or those deriving from different intellectual origins, were eagerly studied and discussed. After several centuries of Buddhist propagation, things changed. After the sixth and seventh centuries, the intellectual world of Chinese Buddhism adopted a general pattern of relying principally on one sûtra or one similar set of sûtras to elucidate and expound religious doctrines. Some Chinese monks hoped to employ the meticulous analysis and rigorous logic of the terms, thinking and principles of one type of scripture to unify the entire system of Buddhist knowledge and thought and to penetrate the most profound and allembracing Buddhist doctrines. Although there were differing opinions and mutual discrepancies in the study of Buddhist ideas among the upper strata during the North-South 21  See Zongmi, Yuanjue jing dashu, j. shang 1, Xu cangjing, ce 9, 327.

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Dynasties period, the Mahâyâna Buddhist thought that was popular with the great families was of two general types. One type was the school of Nâgârjuna. It argued from fundamental reality and believed that “the substance of all things is permanently empty” ( fati hengkong 法體恆空). This way of thinking was based on the Prajñapâramitâ texts of Mahâyâna Buddhism: the Vimalakîrti-nirdesa-sûtra as translated by Kumârajîva (c. 334–413), the Prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra), the Mâdhyamika shâstra (Middle school or Three Treatise school, sanlun zong 三論宗) and the Saddharma Pundarîka-sûtra (Fahua jing or Lotus Sûtra). Although their various interpretations of Buddhism were somewhat divergent, in general they could be understood on the basis of the Daoist and Neo-Daoist thought that Chinese scholars were very familiar with and so they were very quickly accepted. This was especially so because the monks Zhizhe (Zhiyi, 538–597), with the Lotus Sûtra as his main text, and Jizang (549–623), with the Three Treatise school sûtras as his main texts, were both treated with great respect during the Sui and Tang dynasties. Not only did the disciples and followers of this school have great influence, but its doctrines were very popular for some time.22 The other type followed the thought of Asanga (ca. 410–ca. 500) and Vasubandhu (ca. 420–ca. 500). It argued from the causative links in the chain of being (yuanqi 緣起) and so maintained the idea that “all things that have noumenal or phenomenal existence exist in the mind or consciousness only” (wanfa weishi 萬法唯識). The knowledge and thought of this Yogâcâra (Way of Yoga) or Consciousness Only (Weishi 唯識) school was extremely complex. Paramârtha (499–569) of the Southern dynasties Chen state (557–589) translated the Mahâyâna-samparigraha (Acceptance of the Great Vehicle, She dasheng lun) that propagated this consciousness only knowledge and thought, and the Dasabhûmikâ-sûtra (Dilun) was also propagated at the time. Nevertheless, it was not until after Xuanzang (600–664) translated and commented on these Consciousness Only scriptures and Kuiji (632–682) and Woncheuk (Yuance, 613–696) explained and interpreted the Consciousness Only ideas that this complex and abstruse thought became one of the central topics of contemporary studies of Buddhist doctrines. Xuanzang’s aspiration was to “unify all Buddhist doctrines under one interpretation,” but his actual work primarily involved the translation of various Buddhist sûtras. Among the seventy-five texts in one thousand three 22  They are commonly called the Three Treatise school (Sanlun zong) and the Lotus school (Fahua zong). Our translations are mainly from Soothill’s Dictionary, but some are our own attempts.

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hundred and thirty juan the translation of which he supervised, were several important Consciousness Only texts, including the Yogâcâra-bhûmi-shâstra (Yujiashi dilun), the Buddhabhûmi-sûtra-shâstra (Fodijing lun), the Vijnaptimâtrâtasiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness Only, Cheng weishi lun) and so on. His disciples Kuiji and Woncheuk expounded the doctrines and spread the Consciousness Only school throughout China. This school of Buddhist thought offered a great many extremely complex and abstruse ideas and concepts. Among them are the following: the eight consciousnesses (parijñâna, bashi, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touch, mano-vijñâna, the sense-center consciousness and âlaya-vijñâna; the storehouse consciousness (from which come all “seeds” of consciousness); three types of nature (sanxing): nature that maintains the seeming or imagined to be real (parikalpita, pianji suo zhixing), nature of dependence on elements and without a nature of its own (paratantra, yita qi zixing), complete and perfect nature, or perfect reality (parinishpanna, yuancheng shixing); the three powers of transformation (san nengbian), i.e. the six senses (vijñâna): different when cooked, or matured (the effect differing from the cause, vipâka, yishou); thinking and measuring, or comparing (siliang); the seventh vijñâna, intellection, thought center consciousness (siliangshi); five groups of the hundred modes or “things”: the eight perceptions, or forms of consciousness (xinfa); the fifty-one mental ideas (xin suoyou fa); the five physical organs and their six modes of sense, e. g. ear and sound (sefa); six inactive or metaphysical concepts (fenweifa), that is the twenty-four indefinites, or unconditioned elements (xin buxiangying xing); six inactive or metaphysical concepts (wuweifa); the five divisions or stages (wuwei) of idealism—ziliang wei, accumulating food for virtue and wisdom; jiaxing wei, cultivating and meditating the consciousness only view; tongda wei, realizing the law of consciousness only; xiuxi wei, cultivating and practicing consciousness only; and jiujing wei or Fowei, the supreme stage of Buddhahood, eliminating all worries and knowledge and reaching the ultimate wisdom)—that transform from ordinary knowledge to Buddhist knowledge or wisdom, and many other ideas and concepts. All of these complicated ideas, concepts, analyses, speculations and experiences constituted one vast and rigorous system of thought.23 To summarize it briefly, Consciousness Only doctrine holds that all phenomena (dharma, fa 法) in the universe are created by “consciousness” and “consciousness” is the ability of human beings to see clearly and have knowledge 23  See Xianyang shengjiao lun, j. 1–4, in Sheshi pin di-yi, Taishô, j. 31, 480–501. Our translation has also been guided by Chan, SB, 370–395 on Xuanzang and the Consciousness Only school.

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and cognition. Human beings originally have the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness or âlaya, and this âlaya consciousness is the origin of human wisdom and knowledge; it stores up all possibilities like the “seeds” (of consciousness). There are two possible manifestations of these seeds of consciousness. One is a fundamental original nature that does not rely on other kinds of causes to be manifest. It is also called anâsrava (no leak or flow, wulou 無漏) because it will not allow human consciousness and feelings to flow into various illusions and become lost in (louxie 漏泄, leak into) the suffering of the triple worlds of sensuous desire, form and formless pure spirit.24 The second is âsrava (youlou 有漏) meaning “outflow” or “distress.” Because of the seven abodes or stages of perception or consciousness that are born out of education, this form of consciousness and feeling takes illusion for truth (reality) and people become lost in (louxie, leak into) various forms of suffering. Because these seeds of consciousness have various “powers of transformation,” sentient beings are often unable consciously to maintain their condition of original true âlaya consciousness. They move into the world of ordinary consciousness due to the seventh or thought-center consciousness (the klista-mano-vijñâna, monashi 末那識) and then experience various feelings (of form and color, sound, smell, taste and touch). The eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body (wushi 五識, five parijñānas, perceptions or cognitions) give birth to various illusions and discriminations of consciousness between all phenomena such as likes, dislikes, loves and desires and these give rise to various forms of suffering. The central idea of the entire Conscious Only doctrine was how to allow human beings to escape from these sufferings and return to âlaya consciousness. The path of escape they imagined was a process of self-salvation just the opposite of the process that gave rise to the eight forms of consciousness or perception. That is, a path that was exactly the opposite of how ordinary people went from âlaya consciousness to various forms of illusory consciousness and feelings. By this path the religious practitioner returned from various forms of illusory consciousness and feelings back to âlaya consciousness and this was called the “transformation from ordinary knowledge to Buddha knowledge or wisdom” (zhuanshi chengzhi 轉識成智). What this made clear was a path from the outside world to the inner world, from a consciousness that observes, contacts, experiences and analyzes the external world into a form of wisdom that comes from the inner mind and is self-confirming and self-apprehending.

24   Cheng weishi lun, j. 2, Taishô, j. 31, 8.

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2.2 Just as Xuanzang, Kuiji, Woncheuk and other monks embraced the Consciousness Only school, there was another group of Buddhists whose ideas were based on the Avatamsaka-sûtra (or the Mahâvaipulya Buddhâvatamsaka-sûtra, the Flower Garland Sûtra, Huyuan jing). Du Shun (557–640) was later recorded as the founder of this Huayan or Flower Garland branch of Buddhism, but the person who really shaped this doctrine was his disciple Zhi Yan (602–668) and it was his later disciple Fazang (642–712) who was responsible for making this doctrine very popular at all levels of Chinese society. It is said that in 699, Fazang expounded the Flower Garland Sûtra to Empress Wu Zetian and that allowed these Huayan Buddhists to become celebrated. They expounded the sûtra in terms of several groups of ideas that included the “perfect harmony of everything” (six characters of everything in perfect harmony, liuxi­ ang yuanrong 六相圓融), the “four dharma-realms” or “dharmadhâtu” (si fajie 四法界), the “ten philosophical ideas” (ten mysteries or gates, shi xuanmen 十玄門), the “five divisions and ten schools of thought” (wujiao shizong 五教 十宗) and so on. According to the Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Conscious­ ness Only, “Everything in the three realms (the entire phenomenal world) is only one mind” (sanjie suoyou, weishi yixin 三界所有, 唯是一心). Starting with this fundamental premise, this school analyzed the entire phenomenal world as arising from mind. Everything in the phenomenal world has the same six characteristics (liuxiang 六相) at the same time: (1) since all phenomena really have no nature of their own, but arise from human consciousness, perceptions and feelings and human “consciousness” is governed by different “roots” or “sources” (mûla, gen); every phenomenon has various elements of perception or feeling—these are known as “universals” (universal characteristics of all phenomena, zongxiang 總相); (2) since the various elements of perception or feeling are not really the same, there are also “particulars” (specific characteristics, biexiang 別相) that contrast with universals; (3) these various elements of perception or feeling are necessarily interdependent and form one general body—this is called “(being of) the same universal” (tongxiang 同相); (4) since the one general body also includes various different elements of perception or feeling, each one different from the other, then there is also “difference” or “differentiation” (yixiang 異相); (5) from the differentiation and integration of these elements of feeling are formed various characteristics in the phenomenal world and this is called “formation of characteristics” (chengxiang 成相); (6) these elements cannot leave their place or separate from the aggregated body; if they did, they would not be able to exist—this would be “destruction”

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or “decay” (huaixiang 壞相). According to their understanding, the entire phenomenal world is a manifestation of this “perfect harmony of everything,” and this world of perfect harmony of everything is simply the Realm of Dharmas (dharmadhâtu, fajie 法界) that is manifested right before our eyes. What they called dharmadhâtu, the Realm of Dharmas, however, refers on the one hand to zhenru 真如—the bhûta-tathatâ (the one reality or the Buddha-nature), above all differentiation and immutable—or to the natural purity of the rulai zangxin 如来藏心 Tathâgata-nature (the Buddha-nature possessed by all sentient beings). On the other hand however, because, following causal circumstances, it changes into the multifaceted phenomenal world, they emphasized that everything in this finite world and the spiritual world beyond are the function of mind. Because the various elements of the phenomenal world all arise from the mind, they are interconnected and mutually reflective and all have some sort of original common nature. For this reason, the Huayan school firmly believed that “one is all and all is one” (yi ji yiqie, yiqie ji yi 一即一切, 一切即一). Because worldly intelligence cannot comprehend this, ordinary people first recognize the “phenomenal world” or “phenomenal existence” (shi fajie 事法界) a world of illusions and endless distinctions, they take the false for the true and they believe that this world really is a world of manifold diversity. If people went a step further and became conscious that everything is only the transformations of the mind and that the original nature of the phenomenal world is Shûnyatâ (emptiness, kong), then they would be able to touch the original nature of the phenomenal world and reach “the universe as law or mind (li fajie 理法界, the dharmakâya, common essence, of all beings). Even this understanding of the phenomenal world is, however, not sufficiently penetrating because regarding the entire phenomenal world as empty in nature, one may still fall into the trap of believing that “emptiness has two distinctions” (kong you liang bie) or “practice and theory are divided” (shi li xiang fen). On this account, the third realm should be one in which “the Buddha-nature and the thing (the Absolute and phenomena) are not mutually exclusive” (lishi wu-ai fajie 理事無礙法界). That is to say, practice and theory, the individual and the whole, can all exist at the same time and be mutually connected. Here there is still one more distinction, though, and that is the distinction of “names” (nâman, ming 名); maintaining the distinction between “practice” (shi 事) and “theory” (li 理), one still cannot harmonize them. People must transcend this final distinction and seek out the ultimate realm of Buddhism where “phenomena are not mutually exclusive, but in a common harmony as parts of the whole” (shishi wu-ai fajie 事事無礙

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法界). People must try to achieve this state and understand that nothing in the Realm of Dharmas is mutually exclusive and all characteristics (xiang) are in harmony; they must comprehend that the universe is mutually connected and harmoniously intertwined—this is the true realm of the Buddha. On the basis of their understanding of the ultimate goals of Buddhism, Huayan divided all of Buddhism into five teachings and ten schools based on their degree of understanding of the Buddhist dharma. According to Fazang, these five teachings were: (1) Hînayâna, based on the early Buddhist Âgama sûtras (Ahanjing 阿含經). Hînayâna Buddhists believed in various simple doctrines such as the “Four Noble Truths” (sidi 四諦) and the “twelve links in the chain of existence (shi-er yinyuan 十二因緣). (2) The primary stage of Mahâyâna. It referred to (a) the Shûnya or Prajñâ (Wisdom) sects that held that every dharma (all things) are Shûnyatâ (empty) and to (b) the Yogâcâra (Consciousness Only) school that believed that everything is a manifestation of mind. (3) Mahâyâna in its final stage. It taught that the Buddha-nature (bhûtatathatâ) is universal and every sentient being can become a Buddha. (4) The Sudden Enlightenment school. The previous four schools could only be practiced by gradual cultivation, but there was still this school that believed “that no thought emerging can be called reaching the realm of Buddha, and this (naming, calling) is not formed according to one’s level and speed of understanding Buddhist teaching.”25 Just as the Brahma-viśesa-cintî-pariprcchâsûtra (Siyi jing) and the Lankâvatâra-sûtra (Lengjia jing) said, it was a Buddhist vehicle by which one could transcend many stages and be instantly enlightened. (5) Of course, the last teaching was that of the perfect, all-embracing Huayan school that surpassed all of the other schools. According to their way of thinking, only by having reached this stage was Buddhist doctrine finally complete and perfect.

2.3 Although among the Buddhist theorists active from the seventh to the mideighth century there were masters who lectured on the Prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra, Boruo jing) and the Nirvânasûtra (Niepanjing), the most profound schools and also the ones with the most theoretical character were the two discussed above. Of course, Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism (Vajrayana) was also rather popular at court and throughout society due to its widespread promotion by Shubhakarasimha (Shan Wuwei, 673–735),

25  Fazang, Huayanjing tanxuanji, j. 1, in Dazheng xinxiu da cangjing, ce 35, 115.

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Vajrabodhi (Jin Gangzhi, 669–741) and Amoghavajra (Bukong, 705–774).26 Although it enriched the ancient Chinese intellectual world, it was very difficult for it to blend into the intellectual mainstream. This was probably the case for two reasons: (1) the teachings of Esoteric Buddhism conflicted with China’s mainstream ideas of morality, and (2) its mystical cultivation practices differed from the traditional Chinese humanistic ethical values. The erudition of the Buddhist masters and the profundity of Buddhist doctrines certainly did give rise to an ardent interest in such theories among the Chinese intellectual elite. Around the eighth century there were many large assemblies to discuss and debate Buddhist teachings and their frequent attacks and rejoinders recall to mind the disputes about Neo-Daoist mysteries that took place during the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties period.27 The study of various Buddhist sûtras and their exposition also attracted a great many scholars at the time. In the Buddhist monasteries in the great cities, there were many ardent expounders of these various sûtras, but this kind of enthusiasm dissipated quite rapidly. The Consciousness Only school’s excessive search for the “original aim or purpose” of Buddhism and their hopes to match the homeland of Buddhism in the realm of ideas and to be able to analyze the universe and the human mind at the highest level of meticulousness and complexity was really an unrealistic fantasy in the Chinese language context. For this reason, that sort of Buddhist thought only flourished in the cities for a few decades and then ran out of disciples to carry it forward. Judging from the Consciousness Only school’s theoretical orientation, this can probably be blamed on its tendency toward intellectual aristocratization. Although the school’s detailed and complicated names and appearances (mingxiang 名相), abstruse logical distinctions, and convoluted methods of argumentation satisfied the desires of some scholars and monks well versed in theoretical ideas, and genuinely achieved their goal 26  The brief time that Esoteric Buddhism lasted in China may have been related to the Chinese people not being accustomed to accepting complicated theories and mystical cultivation practices. The paucity of Han Chinese Tantric monks, especially famous monks, would seem to confirm this point. See Zhou Yiliang’s study Tangdai mizong, 1996, for more on Esoteric Buddhism. 27  These sorts of disputations generally featured one particular monk who would put forward several propositions and then the opposing masters would try to refute him. Perhaps this practice was derived from Indian methods of theoretical disquisition, but China also had such practices. For example, during the Sui dynasty, Shen Jiong frequently “ordered three or five people to challenge a new proposition put forward by him. Afterwards, he would take the lead to integrate these different views into a general theory” See Xu Gaoseng zhuan, j. 13, Taishô, j. 50: 526.

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of surpassing the theoretical level of past masters, nevertheless this sort of purely abstract activity increasingly lost its power to promote religious faith. Although it enriched the world of Chinese knowledge and thought, it turned its back on the religious needs of the Chinese people. In the same manner, the complexity and abstruseness of the names and appearances and logical argumentation of the Huayan school was no less formidable than that of the Consciousness Only school. Their theoretical ideas were enormously complex and prolific. Their analyses of “substance” or “fundamental” (ti) versus “function” or the “phenomenal” (yong), “practice” (shi), “theory” (li) and “names” (ming) seemed too minute and trivial even for Buddhists who were very well versed in doctrinal theory. Their over-emphasis on the appearance of symmetrical design in their ideas also made their explanations seem very formalistic to their readers and could not escape appearing mechanical and inflexible. This was especially true of their wish to give a completely harmonized interpretation of Buddhism and attempt to include, make compatible, and transcend all theoretical ideas. This caused their interpretations to become enormously complex, over-burdened with trivial details, cryptic and obscure and so their theories had great difficulty penetrating the Chinese intellectual world. 2.4 There were indeed ancient Chinese who possessed outstanding talent for theoretical thinking. Men like Xuanzang, Kuiji, Zhiyan, and Fazang all demonstrated high standards of intellectual ability. I believe, though, that ancient Chinese scholars did not really enjoy pure theoretical ideas of such detail and complexity, especially after the High Tang atmosphere of practical knowledge became widespread. This may have led to the decline of interest in doctrinal theory and indirectly to the flourishing of Chan Buddhist practices. I actually believe that in a certain sense Chan temporarily saved Buddhism because a religion cannot, after all, be permanently immersed in the construction of purely theoretical doctrines. Relying only on abstract symbols to analyze the mind, consciousness, and feelings and on the logical pursuit of the origins of the universe left the goals of religious faith in an essentially unresolved limbo. Religion is primarily a spiritual quest for an agent (a sacred object), a goal (redemption or transcendence) and a function (to give meaning to life and to provide the power of identification and coherence) to manifest its importance. There were three even more important reasons for this contemporary decline in doctrinal or theoretical interests.

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The first was the collapse of the aristocratic intellectual stratum and the rise of an ordinary intellectual group who were full of the practical spirit of moving ahead and getting on. This led the entire society away from purely scholarly interests divorced from practice. As noted above, their mastery of the knowledge necessary to change their social status and situation in life led to the simplification of knowledge and a climate of practicality.28 I have always wondered whether or not Xuanzong’s selection of the Diamond Sûtra for imperial commentary to some extent drove forward the essentialization of Buddhist thought. and whether or not the Chan school’s commitment to reading and explicating short scriptures led to an indifference toward large systems of thought. Second, another quite important element was the disruptions of war. In the widespread chaos of war after the middle of the eighth century, those large Buddhist monasteries housing many monks given to doctrinal exploration found it very difficult to maintain the flourishing conditions of the past. After the outbreak of the An Lushan Rebellion in 755, not only was the society plunged into chaos but the Buddhists were also hard put to avoid suffering a general calamity. At that time, not only did the rebel armies wantonly pillage and loot monasteries and so on, but even the official armies also slaughtered and plundered. In the midst of such dangerous and chaotic conditions, the Buddhist monks had no time to engage in scholarship. Under these trying conditions, the doctrinal study that once flourished in the monasteries of the big cities suffered a setback from which it never recovered.29 28  For example, the SGSZ, j. 5: 95, “Tang zhong Dayunsi Yuan Hui zhuan” on Jia Zeng and Yuan Hui’s discussions of Master Guang (Pu Guang)’s “Jushe shuyi” (“Commentary on the Abhidharma-kosha or Treasury of Abhidharma”) uses the phrase “extremely complex and difficult to locate.” … “He stated that it is difficult because he did not want to incur confusion (may also mean: because he did not intend to read it). He stated that it is complex because he would not be able to grasp the real meaning of the Commentary regardless of some understanding of it.” On this account, Huai Yuan made his “Abbreviations” of ancient commentaries.  Fozu tongji, j. 10, in Taishô, j. 49: 203, also records that Liang Su, “because the meaning of the ‘Zhiguan’ text is rich and vast, and it takes time to understand it,” edited out part of the original text and also wrote a “Tongli or General Principles of Zhiguan.” 29  Concerning the importance for Buddhist thought of the great monasteries, Sun Changwu has pointed out that “both the large translation projects and the rich Buddhist writings constituted high caliber academic scholarship. A minority of learned monks took advantage of the conditions offered by Chang-an to carry out this work … Their contribution to cultural and intellectual history was extremely great.” Here I have approached this topic

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Third, in the middle of that sort of social transformation, any theoretical analyses requiring mutual encouragement and debate before they could clarify their thinking and any pure theories requiring calm deliberation before they could proceed with their narration became little more than inappropriate luxuries and unobtainable skills quite divorced from religious faith. These were historical developments that Buddhism simply could not avoid. If we look back and survey the history of Buddhism before that time, we will see that the continuation and improvement of Buddhist theoretical abilities were guaranteed by the four series of activities: (1) translating sûtras, (2) lecturing on the scriptures, (3) doctrinal debates, and (4) writing commentaries. “Translating sûtras” did not simply refer to the activity of translation per se; it rather referred to the practice of the state or a particular monastery gathering together a rather large group of people collectively to share the work of translating Buddhist sûtras.” Lecturing on the scriptures,” took place especially in the monasteries where eminent monks would publicly preach the sûtras to influential scholars, aristocrats or the emperor. This sort of symposium required one to have a rather high-level of theoretical accomplishment, and during these discussions of lofty ideas the doctrinal consciousness of both the lecturers and the audience would be stimulated. “Doctrinal debates” were organized theoretical discussions that constituted a method for Buddhist monasteries to study and exchange ideas. Through these debates, doctrines would receive encouragement and thinking would become more rigorous. “Writing commentaries” was a way to present more meticulous elucidations and explanations of already very abstruse and complex sûtras and theories by means of scholarly annotations. In the seventh century, the Lotus Sûtra, Prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra, Vimalakîrtinirdesa sûtra, Nirvânasûtra, Dashabhumika-sûtra, Satyasiddhi-shâstra (Cheng­ shi lun) and other Buddhist sûtras were all given very careful commentaries. Some sûtras had sub-commentaries on the commentaries, and there were even several annotated editions of the same text in circulation at the same time. These commentaries and sub-commentaries became more and more detailed, analyzing and re- analyzing doctrinal ideas, or they became increasingly refined and concise, both integrating and re-integrating the scriptural messages.

from the other way around by pointing out that because the great monasteries were the main support for academic Buddhism, the depredations of war brought this encouragement to an end. Sun Changwu, “Tang Chang-an Fosi kao,” Tang yanjiu, 2 (1996), 1–49.

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The practice of reading these commentaries constituted the gate to enlightenment for Buddhist believers while writing commentaries became an expression of the depth of the writer’s knowledge of Buddhism. In the seventh and eighth centuries in the great monasteries, such as the Ci-en, Xingshan, Zhangjing and Fuxian, in Chang-an, Luoyang and other large cities, Buddhist masters maintained very high theoretical standards due to their translating and lecturing on the scriptures, debating Buddhist doctrines, and writing commentaries to the sûtras. At the same time Buddhism penetrated the upper levels of aristocratic society and also drew closer to the higher intellectual stratum. This kind of academic Buddhist thought was often steeped in abstruse doctrines and took great pleasure in such complex, detailed doctrines and their empty yet mysterious ultimate realm. After the mid-eighth century, however, this tendency seems to have turned a corner and with the decline of the aristocracy, the rise of a practical atmosphere and the wartime destruction of the great urban monasteries, this large-scale translation of and lecturing on Buddhist scriptures and debating and writing commentaries on Buddhist doctrines lost its support system. Hence, in the written Buddhist materials of the eighth to ninth centuries, we see that interest in Buddhist theories seems to have suddenly come to an end and the doctrinal work carried on by the Buddhist masters seems to have lost its powers of attraction. People seem to have preferred more to accept the practical methods of cultivation and the road to liberation offered by the masters of discipline and the masters of meditation. It was precisely for such reasons that the faithful both in and out of the Buddhist church received spiritual inspiration from the practice of the School of Discipline (lümen 律門) that had always been a religious strength of Buddhism and whose strict discipline, simple life, and persevering determination manifested the significance of the noble character and meaning of its faith. Chan Buddhism also began to emerge at that time. Regardless of whether it was Northern or Southern Chan, their contempt for theory, their lucid and direct understanding of Buddhist doctrines and their close interest in spiritual salvation led many more believers to be interested in their version of the faith.30 The decline of interest in theory may also have harmed both the ancient Chinese people’s ability to deal with the abstract world and the creative 30  This trend may well have already begun in the middle of the eighth century. Not to mention Shenxiu and his disciples Puji and Yifu who were deeply venerated by the faithful, and Huineng and Shenhui who were very popular for a while in the south, but even people like Faxian, often overlooked by modern histories of Chan Buddhism, also held that sort of stubborn attachment to scriptural doctrines in contempt.

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capacity of their philosophical language. The universe has a self-evident existence, but to comprehend this universe a corresponding world has to be constructed in the mind by means of symbolic language and levels of connection. Only through this new process of simulation, analysis and construction can people bring this self-existing world into view. This is the way it was in Indian Buddhism. The phenomenal world (world of dharma) was constructed by a series of sensations (consciousnesses) from the mind, and their system of exceptionally detailed terms, speculative reasoning, and determinations (nâman, ming) constituted a description of that process of consciousness and sensations. This description had no relationship to the phenomenal world before people’s eyes, but that phenomenal world had to rely on it to appear. For this reason, the more complex and detailed this set of theoretical constructs was, the more it was then separated from human experience and formed a purely abstract philosophical world. Perhaps this was the first step toward later “pure philosophy,” but in China this sort of philosophical thought did not really continue. Later Chinese intellectual history demonstrated that the direct grasp of the world by experience and feelings, the general comprehension of problems of the cosmos and human life, and the artistic use of language made up the old tradition of ancient Chinese thought. The great esteem for intuitive knowledge (wisdom) and the disdain for linguistic knowledge that came from Buddhism constituted a new tradition in ancient Chinese thought. The Chinese intellectual world of later ages received a certain amount of influence from the profound and longlasting continuation of both these old and new traditions. It therefore always maintained an attitude of respecting and keeping at a distance the complex, abstract, symbolic theoretical world. This was especially so in the generally secularized age of the Tang dynasty. Under the influence of the An Lushan Rebellion, no matter how profound, refined and detailed Buddhist doctrines were, that sort of aristocratic intellectual climate was very difficult to maintain. In the propagation of Buddhism, the abstruse and complicated doctrines were very quickly replaced by effortless, simplified methods of realization. 2.5 In 810, the Tang court ended the large-scale official translation of Buddhist sûtras, a symbolic event in Buddhist history.31 New doctrinal theories could no longer stimulate interest among the Chinese people and Mâdhyamika, 31  SGSZ, j. 3: 57, states that “it has been more than one hundred and fifty years since the court suspended sûtra translations from the fifth year of Tang Xianzong’s yuanhe reign period (810) to the Later Zhou (951–960) and thus, this [Buddhist] Dao has been silenced.”

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Yogâcâra, and Huayan Buddhism slowly declined. Even though Chengguan (738–839 or 760–838) was an outstanding doctrinal studies monk, his detailed annotations and complicated explanations were no longer able to arouse any doctrinal enthusiasm and his ambition to include all Buddhist theories and ideas also ran counter to the practical tendency of that age. No matter how much his great erudition amazed people, after him there was never another monk whose doctrinal studies equaled his.32 I may as well mention here that later Chan masters made quite satirical remarks about Buddhist doctrines. They considered these Buddhist ideas, so carefully constructed out of abstruse and complicated theories, to be mere linguistic expressions of the “Buddhist dharma” and disdainfully considered this sort of “Buddhist dharma” as a “hindrance” (lizhang 理障) to the truth and/ or nirvâna. They believed that “wisdom” (zhi)—intellectual understanding of the sûtras—could not really comprehend the “Way” of Buddhism. In their view, the key was to obtain a mental realization of the transcendent realm in one’s mind and this realization could be seized upon by oneself in an instant of “sudden enlightenment” (dunwu 頓悟). This direct mental realization of the Buddhist dharma was the ultimate truth of Buddhism. They considered relying on reason and intellect to understand the truth of Buddhism to be a “film or mote” (yi 翳) or “golden flakes” ( jinxie 金屑) in the eyes that prevented people from fully understanding the Buddhist truth and reaching enlightenment. As they sarcastically put it, “although golden flakes are very costly, they fall into one’s eyes and cloud one’s vision (understanding).” In other words, no matter how precious were the “golden flakes” of theoretical analyses and scriptural knowledge, to those who searched for faith, they were like a dark shade or screen that clouded the eyes and made it impossible to see things correctly.33 This age really did not have much need of abstruse and complicated doctrines, and so the interest in Buddhist theories that flourished at the beginning of the High Tang melted away in the Mid-Tang. 3

The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism II: The Victory of Chan Buddhism and the Defeat of Buddhism

Prior to the second half of the eighth century, traditional dhyâna (meditation) masters (chanshi) were just one group of Buddhists who stood on equal footing with masters of the scriptures ( fashi) and masters of the discipline 32  SGSZ, “Tang Daizhou Wutaishan Jingliangsi Chengguan zhuan,” j. 5: 104–107. 33  See Zutang ji, 1994, “Furong lingxun,” j. 17: 640 citing monk Guizong Zhichang.

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(lüshi). Chan Buddhism (chanzong 禪宗) was just one method of Buddhist cultivation leading to enlightenment, and the Eastern Mountain Chan with the Lankâvatâra-sûtra as its main text was only one rather more conspicuous branch of Chan Buddhism. Due, however, to the remarkable decades long activities of Shenxiu (?–706), Puji (651–739) and Yifu (658–736) of the Northern Chan school and Huineng (638–713), Shenhui (684–758), Benjing (667–761) and Huizhong (?–775) of the Southern Chan school and so on, in the middle of the eighth century, meditation masters came to surpass masters of the scriptures and masters of the discipline, and the way of meditation or chanfa became of central interest to Buddhist believers. Chan in China also became a very large system that encompassed both theory and practice. Huineng of the Southern school of Chan transformed the traditional way of Chan with his idea that “the self-mind (svacitta, one’s own mind) is the Buddha-nature” (zixin ji foxing 自心即佛性), his method of sudden enlightenment, and his undifferentiated transcendent realm of Shûnyatâ. On the one hand, he carried on the Buddhanature thinking that “the self-mind is the Buddha,” while on the other hand he sought out the ultimate realm of Shûnyatâ and so opened up the path of later Chan Buddhist thought.34 The theoretical and doctrinal thinking of Chan Buddhism was not very quickly unified, however, and many different ways of thinking and techniques were popular among its different masters. In the early eighth century, all schools of Chan Buddhism—Zhishen (539–618)’s followers in Western Sichuan, Shenxiu’s followers of the Northern school, the Ox-Head school in the Southeast, and Huineng’s followers in the South—wanted to establish a system that would include the cosmos-in-itself (the noumenal universe), the ultimate realm, and the religious life. Their efforts continued down to the middle of the eighth century. After them, especially from the end of the eighth century to the beginning of the ninth century—the Mid-Tang—all of Chinese Buddhist thought, especially Chan Buddhist thinking, underwent a very extensive transformation. In the writings of later Chan Buddhists describing the transmission of the lamp of Buddhism (chuan deng lu 傳燈錄), this period of Buddhist history has been simplified as the history of Chan Buddhism, and this history of Chan Buddhism has also been abbreviated and truncated into the history of the Southern school only, but this scenario is highly problematic. According to contemporary historical materials, we can see that from the second half of the eighth century on, so-called “Chan Buddhism” should have included five 34  On this period of Chan Buddhist history and thought, see Ge Zhaoguang, Zengdingben Zhongguo Chan sixiangshi—cong 6 shiji dao 10 shiji, 2008.

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different major systems: the Northern school, the Heze (Lotus Marsh) school, the Ox-Head school, the Tiantai school and the Hongzhou school that grew increasingly flourishing later on. The situation of eighth-century to ninthcentury Buddhism, especially the history of Chan Buddhism, was much more complicated than they later described it. 3.1 Let us first consider the Northern school after Puji and Yifu. In general, we have believed that the Northern Chan school declined very quickly after the rise of the Southern school, but this was really a misapprehension. In the second half of the eighth century there were many very active figures who were disciples of Puji, that is second generation disciples of Shenxiu. It is quite easy to see, then, that the history of Northern Chan Buddhism had really not come to an end. This school was still quite influential in Chan history all the way down to the xiantong reign period of 860–874. It was perhaps for this reason that Guifeng Zongmi (784–841) in his contemporary commentary on the history of Chan Buddhism, the Chart of the Master-Disciple Succession of the Chan Gate that Transmits the Mind Ground in China (Zhonghua chuanxin di chanmen shizi chenxi tu), wrote that “the succession of their posterity has been unending to this day.”35 The Japanese scholar monk Ui Hakujû wrote in his Researches in the History of Zen Buddhism (Zenshûshi kenkyu) that the history of Northern Chan was not what people had generally thought; in fact it lasted for some one hundred and fifty plus years, from 706 when Shenxiu passed away in Luoyang to the death of Master Rizhao in 862. Even more telling is the fact that after the middle of the ninth century, disciples of Northern Chan were still active; their school had certainly not disappeared. Next let us look at the disciples of Shenhui of the Heze school. There are very few records of Shenhui’s tradition in the transmission of the light of Buddhism historical records, but this does not accord with the facts of Mid-Tang history. At least in the beginning of the Mid-Tang, the Heze school was actually one of the most influential schools of Chan Buddhism. It is just that it appeared to be on the decline in comparison with the flourishing condition of the Hongzhou school. In the Mid-Tang, the conflict between these two branches of Southern Chan was extremely sharp. At the beginning of the Mid-Tang, the Heze school failed to flourish so greatly as Northern Chan during the kaiyuan and tianbao

35   Zhonghua chuanxin di chanmen shizi chenxi tu, quoted from Zhongguo Fojiao sixiang zi­liao xuanbian, j. 2, ce 2, 460. The English title of this Chart is from Zongmi on Chan by Jeffrey Lyle Broughton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

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periods. It very quickly lost out in its competition with the Hongzhou school and so appeared to be in rather steep decline. What were the main reasons for this? It appears from the extant materials that the later followers of Shenhui became increasingly conservative. They often presented themselves as transcending all schools and did not clearly exhibit the main characteristics of Southern Chan. They often blended the sudden and gradual enlightenment doctrines and tried to take a harmonizing position by advocating the convergence of all Chan ideas. At that they lost the true features of Southern Chan. Given these tendencies, they could not compete with the Mazu Chan school which advocated the identity of mind and Buddha—“the mind is the Buddha” ( ji xin shi Fo 即心是佛), “apart from mind there is no Buddha” ( fei xin fei Fo 非心非佛)—“everything is truth” (yiqie jie zhen 一切皆真) and “all human behavior is the [Buddhist] Way” (chulei shi dao 觸類是道). Moving gradually toward emphasizing “the ordinary mind is the [Buddhist] Way” (pingchang xin shi dao 平常心是道), the Mazu Chan school was thus quite able to preserve its own unique outlook that was simple, clear, and straightforward. In the beginning of the ninth century and in the face of the fierce competition from the rising Mazu Chan school, the domain of the Heze school was eventually reduced. Next we come to the Ox-Head school. This was another Mid-Tang branch of Chan Buddhism and it was led by Huizhong (683–769), Xuansu (668–752)’s disciples Yize (713–770) of the Buddhist grottoes on Tiantai Mountain and Faqin (714–792) of Mount Jing. This school once flourished very widely and was listed as one of the four great schools at the beginning of the MidTang along with the Northern school, the Heze school and the Hongzhou school. In the beginning of the dali reign period (766–780), Faqin was invited to Chang-an by Emperor Daizong (Li Yu, 727–779, r. 762–779). At that time he was greatly admired by very many literati and scholar-officials. Although Yize did not have such sensational influence as Faqin, he seems to have had very great attainments in Chan theory, and so in the yuanhe reign period (806–821) the term “Grotto Studies” (Fokuxue) emerged.36 He went to the headquarters of Tiantai Buddhism on Tiantai Mountain in Zhejiang to preach and even managed to rival Tiantai’s Guoqing Temple. It is said that during the time of the Ox-Head Chan master Guan Zongde (d. 809), “there were nearly ten thousand followers of Ox-Head Chan Buddhism.”37 36  SGSZ, j. 10: 229, “Tang Tiantaishan Fo kuyan Yize zhuan.” 37  Hu Di 胡的, Da Tang Gu Taibai chanshi taming (bing xu), http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/ zh-cn/X63n1225_001 and https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/大唐故太白禪師塔銘(並 序). Also see QTW, j. 721.

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Relations between the Heze school and the Hongzhou school were some­ what strained, but the Ox-Head school had a very harmonious relationship with the Hongzhou school. The ultimate for Ox-Head school thought was to speak of “Shûnyatâ” and “Nonbeing,” and their method of cultivation was a kind of natural indulgence. In this they went even further than Huineng’s Southern school. After Mazu, the Hongzhou school also moved toward this sort of thinking. They sought the goal of spiritual and behavioral freedom, took a sort of relaxed going along naturally as the way of cultivation, and regarded the undifferentiated transcendent realm described by the Prajñâ concept of Shûnyatâ as the ultimate Buddha realm. Was this not, then, a direct connection to the Ox-Head school? And was the later disappearance of the Ox-Head school not due to the increasing closeness of their thought to that of the Hongzhou school until they essentially merged together?38 The final school we will consider is the Tiantai school. Although previous researchers have always separated the Tiantai school from Chan Buddhism and considered it the first independent Chinese Buddhist school, if we look at the Tang dynasty situation, their leaders were all called Chan masters (chanshi) and they both regarded the practice of meditation (dhyâna, chan) as the primary path to salvation. After their great masters Zhizhe and Guanding (561–632), they steadily produced a historical genealogy for Tiantai Buddhism, but they did not really have much influence among the various Chan schools. In the eighth century only a few of their monks—Hongjing (634–712) from Dangyang in Hubei, Huizhen (673–751) who lived in Nanquan in Jingzhou (Hubei), Chujin (698–759) who lived in the Dayuan monastery in Xian (Shaanxi), Xuanlang (673–754) who lived on Mount Zuoxi in Puyang (Zhejiang), Zhanran (711–782) of Jingxi in Changzhou, Daozun (?–784) of Mount Zhixing in Jiangsu and so on—had any influence. By the beginning of the ninth century, there were only Yuanhao (?–817), Zhiyuan (768–844) and others maintaining their position with considerable difficulty under pressure from the great flourishing of Southern Chan. Since Tiantai Buddhism did not receive imperial favor, it could not compare to the thriving of Chan, Consciousness Only, and Huayan Buddhism. It was only due to the belief and enthusiastic promotion of scholars like Li Hua (715–766) and Liang Su (753–793) that this

38  At the end of the eighth century and beginning of the ninth century, the Hongzhou Chan masters gradually moved into the Ox-Head school’s original territory in Jiangning, Zhenjiang, Suzhou, Changzhou, Chizhou, Ningguo, Huainan, and Fengyang, that is, the area of present day Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces, and this probably led to the demise of the Ox-Head school.

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branch of Chan Buddhism was able to maintain its position in the Southeast in the early ninth century.39 Although Tiantai Buddhism continued to carry on its idealist or consciousness only thought, the origins and constitution of its knowledge and thought actually grew increasingly complex and varied, especially when its followers tried to transcend and include all Buddhist theories and practices.40 At the same time, they continued to waver between doctrinal studies and Chan practices.41 Their ideas came to seem even more disorganized and their theories even more detailed and complex. Their celebrated fourth patriarch Chengguan (737–838 or 738–839) actually had his name linked with Confucius’ disciples Ziyou and Zixia. In his writings, he evinced a sort of comprehensive and syncretic tendency. Tiantai’s complete combination or perfect harmony among all differences and their meticulous theories could not, however, include all Buddhist schools; they steadily lost ground under the attacks of the simple and easily understood practices of Chan Buddhism. Added to this was the destruction caused by Tang Emperor Wuzong (Li Chan, r. 840–846)’s persecution of Buddhism and the chaos of the various wars at the end of the Tang dynasty that caused the loss of most of their theoretical writings. With this loss of support from their classic scriptures, the tradition of the Tiantai school was virtually cut off. It was not until King Wuyue (Qian Liu, 852–932) of the Kingdom of Wuyue in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period found their lost doctrinal writings from abroad in the tenth century that Yiji (919– 987) of Luoxi in Zhejiang (Mt. Tiantai) and others emerged.

39  In his Sui-Tang Fojiao shigao, Tang Yongtong also states that “after Jingxi (i.e. Jingxi Zhanran, 711–782), the An Lushan Rebellion and Emperor Wuzong’s huichang reign period (841–846) persecution, Tiantai Buddhism also greatly declined.” Tang Yongtong, Sui-Tang Fojiao shigao, 1982, chapter four, 140. 40  Just as Liang Su criticized in his “Tiantai famen yi”: “Those who discourse on the dharma are tied to the written word and none of them know how to explain things by themselves. Those who practice Chan meditation believe the nature of anything and its phenomenal appearance are without substance and non-existent, and thus they can no longer lead them to return to [the correct path].” He seems to have been dissatisfied with both tendencies. QTW, j. 517, 2327. 41  Zongmi, Wanzi xinzuan xu Cangjing, j. 2, states that although Southern Chan and Tiantai both advocate sudden enlightenment and gradual cultivation, “sudden enlightenment became increasingly intensified in the Southern Chan, while the Tiantai school’s interpretation of sudden enlightenment gradually was made part of the central principles in discussing its scriptures. ” Xu zangjing (Taishô Continuation), 15 ce, 219.

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3.2 Of all the various Chan Buddhist schools, the Hongzhou Mazu school derived from Huineng’s Southern Chan became very popular in both north and south during the ninth century. From Tang dynasty records, we can see that during the zhenyuan and yuanhe reign periods (785–820) the most celebrated Mazu Chan masters were Zhizang (738–817) of Xitang Monastery (in Jiangxi), Weikuan (754–817) of Xingshan Temple (in Xian, Shaanxi) and Huaihui (756–815) of Zhangjing Monastery (in Xian, Shaanxi). This is completely at variance with the records of the transmission of the lamp of Buddhism history.42 Zhizang of Xitang was Mazu Daoyi (709–788)’s first close disciple; after Mazu passed away, he was certainly Mazu’s chosen successor among all of the many monks under his leadership at Gonggong Mountain (Jiangxi). Mazu died in 788 and three years later, Zhizang responded to repeated popular appeals and began to expound Buddhist teachings, spreading Mazu’s Chan practices widely throughout the south. At this time people said that Zhizang was to Mazu’s teaching, and Mazu was to Buddha’s doctrines, as Dong Zhongshu was to the ideas of Mencius, and Mencius was to the teachings of Confucius—they were all Masters coming from one unbroken line. An important master from another branch of Mazu Chan was Huaihui of Zhangjing Temple. He was active in the north and spread Mazu Chan thought into the areas of the Northern and Heze Chan schools. In particular, in 808, he was summoned to live in the Zhangjing Temple in Chang-an, and every year he expounded Buddhist doctrines before the emperor, occupying a central cultural stage. It is recorded that this “Great Master of the Mountains” once carried on a fierce debate with his opponents. Especially important is his Transmission of the Masters (Fashi zichuan) that traces the genealogy of Huineng and Shenxiu and the history of the division of Southern and Northern Chan. In it he wrote that “the heart/mind is clear and clean in its original state. It is not because we dispel consciousness to purify the heart/mind, or remove filthiness to make it clean.”43 This kind of pleasurably straightforward Chan

42  The history of Chan Buddhism has always followed the transmission of the light (lamp) of Buddhism version that took Huaihai of Baizhang (720–814) as Mazu’s most important disciple, but this is mistaken because Huaihai of Mount Baizhang’s status at that time was nowhere near as high as that of Huihai, Zhizang, Weikuan, and Huaihui. 43  Quotation about the heart/mind is from Quan Deyu, “Tang gu Zhangjingsi baiyan dashi beiming bingxu,” text at https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/唐故章敬寺百岩大師碑 銘（並序）.

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thought influenced very many scholar-officials, and so Huaihui was called the leading master of his generation. Another monk who came to Chang-an at about the same time as Huaihui and spread Mazu Southern Chan thought was the celebrated Chan master Weikuan of Xingshan Temple. According to Bo Juyi’s “Essay on Chuanfa Tang (Chuanfa Tang bei), we know that after Mazu passed away, Weikuan visited Fujian, Zhejiang, and other places and spread widely the Way of Chan. Sometime after 797 he visited the north and in 809, he followed Huaihui in being invited by Emperor Xianzong (Li Chun, r. 805–820) to enter the Anguo Temple; the following year, the emperor invited him to the Linde Palace and questioned him about Buddhism.44 Later on, he continued to live in the great Xingshan Temple, the most important Buddhist temple in Chang-an. As with Huaihui, Weikuan used the question and answer and disputation formats to explain various issues such as the unsullied mind is originally pure (xinxing ben jing, 心性本淨), no cultivation and no thoughts (wuxiu wunian, 無修無念), Chan departs from speech and words (chan li yanshuo, 禪離言說), and so on to propagate the ideas of the Southern school of Mazu Chan. In the process, he gained many followers among the literati and scholar-officials and was especially successful in clarifying the genealogy of Mazu Chan and spreading the belief in Mazu as the orthodox line of descent in the Southern school among the general public.45 Mazu Daoyi’s Chan thought was extremely clear and straightforward and he had a very large number of disciples; his thought flourished during the zhenyuan and yuanhe reign periods. As we know, the south was originally the “base area” of Southern school Chan, especially the Mazu Hongzhou school (Mazu Daoyi also being known as Hongzhou Daoyi), but by this time the influence of the Mazu organization had already spread into the north and moved into the central area of the Northern and Heze Chan schools. That both Huaihui and Weikuan came to Chang-an in the early ninth century and 44  Chuanfa Tang is a place in the Xingshan Monastery. Bai Juyi’s essay describes Monk Weikuan’s life and his explanation of the transmission of Chan Buddhism under a succession of different Chan Masters. This “Chuanfa Tang bei” is in Bo Juyi ji, 1979, j. 41. Also see https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/白氏長慶集/卷041. 45  Weikuan had many disciples. The Chuanfa Tang bei states that “he had almost a thousand disciples and thirty-nine of them attained great distinction or reputation.” Juan 10 of the Northern Song Records of the Transmission of the Lamp (Jingde chuandenglu) however, lists only six disciples; not only does it omit Yichong and Yuanjing who “entered the Master’s chamber and directly received his teaching of the Way,” but of the six mentioned there is only one name and nothing about their lives.

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moved into the most prestigious Zhangjing and Daxing temples represents the victory of Mazu Daoyi’s form of Chan Buddhism. Because they entered into the political and cultural center and conversed with the emperor, spread new Chan thought widely among the literati and scholar-officials, clarified sectarian disputes, and achieved the position of orthodox transmission, Mazu Chan rose rapidly during the zhenyuan and yuanhe reign periods and became the mainstream form of Southern Chan. By the second decade of the ninth century, the map of Chinese Buddhism had already undergone great changes. Following the gradual loss of interest in pure Buddhist theory, the practice of seeking out the meaning of the former classics also disappeared from the purview of the faithful. Chinese intellectual circles came to accept Chan Buddhism’s attention to the mind and life conditions of the believers and its system of monastic discipline. Following the Hongzhou organization’s occupation of the mainstream position after the ninth century, Chan thought was increasingly transformed in the direction of a natural and easy philosophy of life and slowly permeated the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief. 3.3 What is the relationship between human nature and the Buddha-nature? This was a perennial question for Chinese Buddhism. Even though after Faxian translated the Mahâparinirvâna-sûtra (Da po niepan jing) in the Eastern Jin and everyone admitted that “all people possess the Buddha-nature,” the relationship between human nature and the Buddha-nature had still not been settled. If one believed that although human nature possesses Buddha-nature it is still different from Buddha-nature and that the process of going from human nature to Buddha-nature requires people to keep the commandments (śîla, rules), calm their body through meditation (dhyâna), practice wisdom (prajñâ) and go through arduous forms of cultivation, then there still remained an important theoretical activity to maintain the existence of the Buddhist community, the rules and Buddhist cultivation. These practices were, then, a last line of defense for religious belief. If, however, one believed that human nature simply was the Buddha-nature and people could abandon all religious restraints and studies, then that opened wide the door to the secularization of the Buddhist religion and foreshadowed the self-destruction of Buddhism. To go any further in that direction would mean that the rules would be relaxed, cultivation could be dispensed with and religious belief would naturally collapse. The price of spiritual or mental freedom is sometimes the loss of ultimate meaning. This is a key theoretical point, and from the earliest Chan studies

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to the latest Chan school, the transmutations of Chan intellectual history seem to have always been intimately related to this point. In general, traditional Chan thought always tended toward the firm opinion that although human beings possessed the Buddha-nature, human nature was not simply equivalent to the Buddha-nature. From Hongren (601–675) on, Dharmatâ (Faru 法如, 638–689), Shenxiu, Lao-an 老安 (i.e. Daoan 道安) and the other Northern Chan masters all carried on this trend of thought. It was said that Shenxiu’s famous gâtha very accurately summarized traditional Chan thought: The body is the tree of perfect wisdom (bodhi) The mind is the stand of a bright mirror. At all times diligently wipe it. Do not allow it to become dusty.46 On this account, when Zhang Yue summarized Shenxiu’s thought, he wrote that the key was “concentrating on intoning the Buddha’s name to stop all other thoughts, and striving to the utmost to control the mind”47 The way that the Chan masters saved the ordinary believers was to enlighten them on how to eliminate their illusory thoughts and employ the “method of concentration on intoning the Buddha name to stop all other thoughts” to cause the faithful to practice “abandoning thought” (linian 離念) and “observing their minds” (guanxin 觀心). That was traditional, orthodox Chan Buddhist thought, but in the early eighth century it was seriously challenged by Huineng of the Southern Chan. Huineng did not much believe that dust (chenyuan 塵緣, that is, causes) really polluted the mind, and from that starting point, he revealed his differences from traditional Chan learning. He said that Buddhism must “take calmness (meditation, samâdhi) and wisdom (prajñâ) as its foundation” (yi dinghui wei ben 以定惠為本).48 Samâdhi (achieved through meditation) and prajñâ (wisdom) were frequently used Chan ideas, but what Huineng meant by samâdhi and prajñâ was quite different from the traditional idea. The traditional idea was “to go from samâdhi to prajñâ” (yi ding fa hui, 以定發慧), from meditation to wisdom, in which meditation was simply a technique 46  Chan, SB, 431. On Daoan 道安, see Song Dan, “Songshan Huishansi gu Dade Daoan chanshi beiming” QTW, j. 396, http://www.mahabodhi.org/files/yinshun/32/yinshun32-07 .html Also see a study of Lao-an’s dates at http://qk.laicar.com/Home/Content/394720. 47  “Tang Yuquansi Datong chanshi beiming,” QTW, j. 231: 1030. 48  For our translation of these terms, see Chan, SB, 433 passages from the Platform Sûtra §13.

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or process and wisdom was the achievement of genuine enlightenment. Because the human mind contains the Buddha-nature within it, the Buddhanature first had to be brought to the surface before it could manifest itself and because the worldly nature of the human mind has to be slowly cultivated before it can be suppressed, traditional Chan always maintained definite methods of cultivation such as obeying the rules, meditating, repeatedly intoning the name of the Buddha and so on. As they saw it, samâdhi and prajñâ (meditation and wisdom) were two separate things and they always advocated “going from samâdhi to achieve prajñâ.”49 Huineng, however, believed that “meditation (samâdhi) should equal wisdom (prajñâ)” just like the relationship between a lamp and its light: “if there is a lamp, there is light and if there is no lamp, there is no light.”50 That is to say, samâdhi is simply prajñâ, prajñâ is simply samâdhi, and it is not necessary to rely on samâdhi (meditation) to achieve prajñâ (wisdom). Because the causes (dust, chenyuan) that pollute the mind are all illusions brought about by humanity’s wild thoughts and because human beings possess the keen sense of awareness, this “cleansing” or “eliminating” of the dust is certainly not polishing the mirror of the mind. It is rather an awareness in one’s consciousness that the mirror of the mind is originally clean and the dust is only a false image: Fundamentally perfect wisdom has no tree. Nor has the bright mirror any stand. Buddha-nature is forever clear and pure. Where is there any dust?51 49  The second gate of the Dunhuang edition of the Mahâyâna Gates of Upâya for the Unborn (Dacheng wusheng fangbianmen), “Kai zhihui men” mentions this idea many times. Taishô, j. 85: 1274. 50  From the Platform Sûtra of the Sixth Patriarch. De Bary & Bloom, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 494–504 has extensive translations. The passage “Meditation [samâdhi] itself is the substance of wisdom [prajñâ]; wisdom itself is the function of meditation” is on p. 499. See the Platform Sûtra, Dinghuipin, section 4 for the passage “Where there is a lamp there is light; where there is no lamp there is no light” (You deng ji you guang; wu deng ji wu guang 有燈即有光, 無燈即無光) http://ddc.shengyen.org/mobile/text/10-06/132.php, 第四天：晚上. 51  Chan, SB, 432. Chan also gives another version of this famous ghâta: The mind is the tree of perfect wisdom. The body is the stand of a bright mirror. The bright mirror is originally clear and pure. Where has it been defiled by any dust?

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In this way, Huineng fundamentally revised the division of the mind into two parts present in traditional Chan thought and began the comprehensive importation of Prajñâ school thought. Continuing on naturally in this way of thinking brought about an enormous upheaval in Buddhist thought. At first and all the way through Shenhui’s system, the contradictions of Huineng’s thought still remained—the distance in the mind between “man” and “Buddha,” “polluted” and “clean,” and samâdhi and prajñâ had not been completely eliminated. People still required prajñâ wisdom (borezhi 般若智) to bring about their “sudden enlightenment.” The problem was that in as much as the human mind is “itself the treasury or storehouse (of all Buddhist truth, zijia baozang 自家寶藏)” and no different from the Buddhamind, then why would people still have to employ “knowledge” and “wisdom” in an extremely arduous pursuit of “enlightenment?” In as much as all distress and all the elements that intrude on the mind and cause mental anxiety (kleśa and âgantu-kleśa) have no real existence in the world of the mind, then why do people still have to hold tenaciously on to the defensive line of “True Buddhahood” or “Absolute Reality?” In the late eighth and early ninth centuries, then, when Hongzhou Chan advocated an even more thorough naturalism, the contradictions left behind from Huineng and Shenhui’s thought were totally cleared away. In the thought of Mazu Daoyi, because the human mind was simply the Buddha-nature and there was no difference between the “human mind” and the “Buddha-mind,” whatever was manifest in the ordinary world of the human mind was simply the pure land of the Buddha-realm and ordinary ideas (meanings) were simply the great ideas (meanings) of the Buddha-dharma. For this reason, every form of natural human behavior was a manifestation of the true essence of life. This was simply the idea that “everything we touch or do is the Way, and so just follow our heart.”52 The traditional idea that “this mind is the Buddha” ( ji xin ji Fo) had finally reached its limit and Chinese intellectual history made a great turn at that point. Under the influence of the Prajñâpâramitâ idea that everything is Shûnyatâ (empty), the idea that “this mind is the Buddha” that derived from the Lankâvatâra tradition finally turned toward the idea that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha” ( fei xin fei Fo). Sometime between 766 and 805, Mazu Daoyi put forth this idea for the first time in Chinese intellectual 52  This is Zongmi’s explanation of Mazu’s Chan thought. Zongmi, Wanzi xinzuan xu Cangjing《卍字新纂续藏经》, j. 3. See also Wudeng Huiyuan, 1991 or 2007, j. 3, Mazu Daoyi chapter.

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history. He said that “this mind is the Buddha” was only an expedient idea or a “momentary saying” and could really not lead people to achieve the Buddhanature. Once people truly entered into Buddhist cultivation or practice and turned their attention to their innermost heart, Mazu affirmed, at that point they should realize that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha.” The saying that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha” received some positive responses from Mazu’s disciples. Pu Yuan (748–834) of Nanquan in Anhui, Zizai (741–821?) of Mt. Funiu (in Henan), Ruhui (744–843) of Dongsi (in Hunan) and others all supported this thoroughly naturalistic thought because it represented the new direction of Chan Buddhism—“the ordinary mind.” As they said, “the ordinary mind” (pingchang xin) is the “Way” (dao).53 3.4 Methods of cultivation were most important in the process of approaching the Buddha-nature from human nature. The various methods that different Chan schools argued about—the differences between “sudden” versus “gradual” enlightenment, so-called “sitting in meditation” versus “not sitting in meditation,” and so-called “just sitting (facing the wall) in meditation” versus “natural non-action”—were all essentially concerned with the question of whether or not to practice cultivation. As long as Chan Buddhism wanted to survive, some sort of cultivation or practice was, of course, a practical necessity. No matter how much extreme Southern Chan argued that there was no need for cultivation, reaching an awareness of the idea that just acting naturally was itself liberation was also mental cultivation in a broad sense. In the intellectual history of Chan Buddhism, then, the so-called practical art of how to cultivate or practice Buddhism would change in accordance with changes in the theories of human nature and the Buddha-nature. Should one resolutely hold on to external things like obeying the monastic rules, meditation and reading the sûtras, or should one regard only internal things like concentration or calmness of mind as important? Should one guard the purified realm of one’s inner mind, or should one indulge human nature and not confine oneself in any way? The answer to these questions was a major element of Chan Buddhism as well as the dividing line between the various schools of Chan. Obeying the rules, meditating and repeatedly intoning the name of the Buddha all carried great weight in traditional Chan thought. The traditional four dhyānas and eight concentrations (sichan bading 四禪八定) all demanded 53  See chapter five, section two “Cong ‘ji xin ji Fo’ dao ‘fei xin fei Fo,’ in Ge Zhaoguang Zengding ben Zhongguo Chanzong sixiangshi, 2008 especially 382–388.

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that one go through an arduous process before one could move from delusion (mâyâ, mi 迷) to enlightenment (bodhi, wu 悟).54 This was the consensus of very many traditional Chan masters; all the way down to the Mid-Tang, Northern Chan monks still firmly maintained this rationalistic belief. One could only enter the crystal-clear realm of purification from all illusions by degrees, going through an arduous process of cultivation. In the Southern Chan of Huineng and Shenhui, however, the difference between bodhi (enlightenment) and mâyâ (delusion) was only a single turn of the mind. Shenhui believed that human beings are born with the original intelligence to return to the roots of their beginning mind and that this sort of intelligence was simply the Buddharealm that they should achieve. Precisely because human nature originally possesses this kind of “knowledge,” there is no need to practice the various superfluous forms of cultivation such as mental concentration or fixation in meditation, developing the mind of bodhi or bodhisattva, and so on; they are all as superfluous as “painting legs on a snake.” All one had to do to achieve sudden enlightenment was to return to one’s original knowledge or intelligence. These ideas had not yet reached their extreme point because no matter whether it was “sudden” or “gradual” enlightenment, as long as a distinction was made between mâyâ and bhodi, cultivation was still necessary. According to the most completely extreme way of thinking, this boundary between mâyâ and bhodi would also be eliminated. For this reason, we need to pay attention to the influence of the Ox-Head school of thought. The school was expert in discussing Shûnyatâ and Nonbeing and it considered “just letting go of your mind/thoughts and acting” (zhixing fangren 直行放任) as the most convenient way of cultivation. In High Tang to Mid-Tang times, this kind of thought and methodology had already developed in the direction of seeking freedom and spontaneity (ziran, the natural). The freedom and naturalness of the Ox-Head school was quite different from the thinking of the Heze school, and it had a rather profound influence on later Chan, especially on the Hongzhou school. Ever since Mazu stated that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha,” and the idea spread widely that one could reach Buddhahood without meditation, ever more Chan masters advocated theories that abandoned the need for cultivation. The following sayings on this line became prominent: “when hungry, then eat; when tired, then sleep” (Huihai of Dazhu in Fujian); “when hot, cool off; when cold, stand near the fire” (Jingcen [788– 868] of Changsha in Hunan); “become a Buddha without any exertion of mind or effort” (Congshen [778–897] of Zhaozhou Temple in Hebei); “the dharma 54  Soothill’s definition of the sichan bading 四禪八定: “The four dhyānas on the formrealms [sejie 色界] and the eight concentrations, i. e. four on the form-realms [sejie] and four on the formless realms [wuse jie 無色界].”

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does not require great effort; just live an ordinary life” (Yixuan [?–866/867] of Linji in Hebei); “call him a man of the Buddhist Way, but he is also called a man who does nothing” (Lingyou [771–853] of Weishan in Hunan); “Roam around as your mind takes you, free and unrestrained whenever it is fitting; just let go to your heart’s content (because) there is no sacred explanation” (Tianhuang Daowu [748–807] of Jingzhou [in Hubei).55 What needs to be further explored, however is the question that if religious faith is “no special activity,” the “Buddha-mind” is the same as “my mind” (woxin 我心), the “ordinary mind” is the “Way,” and cultivation is useless, then would not religion and religious belief be simply unnecessary? At this time the “chan” (meditation) of Chan Buddhism had already quietly disintegrated and the meaning of Buddhism as a guardian and a guide to liberation for its believers had also declined. Once religion had atrophied to become ordinary life and the spiritual transcendence derived from religious faith had been replaced by natural, ordinary, everyday life, then a form of thinking grew up among Buddhist believers that regarded “ease and comfort” as the most ideal realm of thought. This was especially widespread among the upper levels of society. 3.5 Finally, if one really reaches the Buddha-nature from human nature, what kind of a state or realm is it? What benefit do believers derive from the attainment of that realm? This is the result of cultivation (Buddhist practice) and the promise that Buddhism must make to those who cultivated its religious practices as well as the questions that the religion had to answer for its believers. Chan Buddhism is a religion without a supreme being such as “God” or “Heaven.” It promises its believers a purely psychological state of life that is “calm in mind,” “natural” and “easy.” How, though, can this kind of state make the faithful experience its attraction and derive from it a feeling of settling down and getting on with their lives? Throughout Chan intellectual history, this question was constantly being discussed and debated. “Calmness of mind” or “ataraxy” (anxin 安心) was the highest ideal sought by cultivation in early Chan thought.56 Even as early as Eastern Jin times (265– 420), Huiyuan (334–416), who regarded intoning the Buddha-name as the gate to enlightenment, said that intoning the Buddha’s name could concentrate 55  These quotations are scattered throughout the Jingde chuandeng lu, in Dazheng xinxiu da cangjing, 1992. 56  In juan 1 of Jingjue’s Lengjia shizi ji, when discussing the origins of Chan thought and recalling Gunabhadra (394–468)’s thought, he writes that “those who aspire to Buddhahood must first learn to quiet their minds.” Taishô, j. 85: 1286.

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and silence thoughts and bring about calmness of mind and tranquility. Later on, Chan masters from the school of Bodhidharma, Daoxin (580–651) and Hongren (601–675) also urged believers to practice meditation; through long meditation they could experience the “silent void (nirvana)” and “eternity.” It was said that through such meditative practice the believers could experience a state of purity of mind (qingjing 清靜) and such purity of mind was just what Buddhism always sought. All the way through the seventh century to the early eighth century, traditional Chan thought continued to hope to go from meditation to wisdom and make the mind go from pollution to purity. This was regarded as the road of return to humanity’s spiritual homeland. By the time of Huineng and Shenxiu, this goal had already changed. They advocated the “absence of thought” (wunian 無念).57 Although they did not fundamentally deny the ultimate state of purity of mind, they already asserted that arduous cultivation and long sitting in meditation were not necessary, and they eliminated the difference between the state of purity of mind and the vulgar realm of dust (everyday life). All of this opened the way for Chan Buddhism’s later naturalism. They greatly esteemed freedom of mind and natural life, both quite different from the promotion of religious cultivation by traditional Chan practice. Ninth-century Hongzhou Chan was precisely following Huineng’s thought when it made the world of natural life the ultimate realm of their pursuit. “Naïve naturalness” or “naïve spontaneity” (tianzhen ziran 天真自然) was the slogan they put forth. What we need to pay attention to, however, is that if we follow humanity’s natural disposition, there will be love and hate, feelings and desires, amazement and disgust, stubbornness and distress, all the things that traditional Buddhism warns against. The Southern Chan of the Hongzhou school, however, told its believers that this “ordinary mind” was reasonable because when people do not deliberately make distinctions between right and wrong, love and hate, good and evil, their minds will simply dwell in a state of complete relaxation and absence of thought. They believed that the genuine truth of Chan Buddhism was simply “roaming around as your mind will take you, free and unrestrained whenever it is fitting.”58 Congshen of Zhaozhou and Puyuan of Nanquan (748–834) had a most celebrated dialogue: The Master asked: “What is the Way?” Nanquan said “The ordinary mind is the Way.”59 Some of the Mazu school Chan masters expressed a general mood of free, bold and unrestrained dialogue, actions that followed their hearts’ desires, 57   Wunian might also be translated “no thoughts.” We follow Chan, SB, 435 translation. 58  “Longtan heshang,” Zutang ji, j. 5: 188–189. 59  “Zhaozhou heshang,” Zutang ji, j. 18: 656.

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contempt for restrictions, and practiced free thought. We have discovered, then that the realm of freedom of mind that they sought was already very different from the realm of purity of mind sought by early Chan Buddhism. 3.6 From Sengzhao (384–414)’s question and answer: “is the Way far away? Reality is wherever there is contact with things” (Dao yuan hu zai, chu shi er zhen 道遠乎哉，觸事而真) in his “Essay on the Emptiness of the Unreal” (Bu zhen kong lun)60 to the assertion of Mazu and his disciples that “there is no mind and there is no Buddha” and “the ordinary mind is the Way,” Prajñâpâramitâ and Lao-Zhuang thought finally melded together and came to serve as principles guiding attitudes toward everyday life. At that Chan Buddhism also ultimately achieved the domestication (or Sinification) of Prajñâpâramitâ thought. What I should point out here is that the aim of Buddhism is salvation for the souls of all human beings. What it is concerned with is not only metaphysical issues, question about the legal system of society or people’s basic needs for food, housing and so on. It is rather concerned with questions of ultimate significance that have an effect on both human life and the transcendence of that life. From the beginning, Buddhism held out a vision of a brilliant and everlasting ultimate realm that it called the realm of the Buddha-nature. Its intention was nothing less than to lead the faithful to escape from their actual, transitory, wretched world full of suffering. Ultimately, Buddhism also presented its believers with an ordinary and effortless realm that could only be actualized in their minds. It came to regard the world of everyday life as the ultimate realm of religion, the character and emotions that all human beings have (human nature), as the much sought after Buddha-nature, and people’s ordinary state of mind as a sacred mental realm. At that, Buddhism finally completed its transformation from an Indian religion to Chinese Chan Buddhism. This also caused the Buddhism that was full of religiosity step by step to abandon its responsibility for instruction and guidance for spiritual life. It became an advocate for an esthetic appreciation of life interests, linguistic knowledge, and a graceful attitude toward living. For these reasons, in spite of the fact that Buddhism penetrated deeply into Chinese life and the world of Chinese art, still over a long period of time it gradually faded out of the worlds of Chinese thought and belief. 60  Excerpts from Senzhao’s essay are in Chan, SB, 350–356. This phrase is on 356.

Chapter 8

Tang Dynasty Thought II: From Unity to Intellectual Crisis (ca. Mid-7th to Mid-10th Centuries CE) 1

The 8th- to 10th-Century Transformation of Buddhism III: Language and Meaning

In 815, Huaihui of Zhangjing Temple died, Zhizang of Xitang and Weikuan of Xingshan died in 817, followed by the deaths of Puyuan of Nanquan and Weiyan of Yaoshan (751–834) in 834. In the space of twenty years, the thirdgeneration disciples of Huineng and the Southern Chan were history. Ten years later in 845, Emperor Wuzong ordered a purge of Buddhism. It is recorded that in the summer of that year, some 4,600 temples and monasteries were destroyed and some 260,000 monks and nuns were forced to return to secular life.1 Those Chan monks that were unwilling to be secularized had no other option than to run away and hide to continue their religious activities. After the calamity passed, not only did the Buddhist sangha and the masters of discipline (the former needing commentaries to the sûtras and places to teach their doctrines, and the latter requiring altars), both dwindle, but many Chan schools faded away one after another. With the exception of the Hongzhou school, the Northern, Heze and Ox-Head schools of Chan all went into decline, while the Tiantai school had already begun to diminish even before the 845 purge. The fourth-generation disciples of Huineng’s Southern Chan emerged anew, though. Although they had endured the 845 purge as well as the general chaos of war after 881, they and their disciples still emerged one after another and made Southern Chan popular again in both north and south. Among them were several celebrated Chan masters, such as the sixth generation Yicun (822–908) of Xuefeng (in Fujian) and Benji (840–901) of Caoshan (in Jiangxi), the seventh generation Wenyan (864–949) of Yunmen (in Guangdong) and the ninth generation Wenyi (885–958) of Qingliang (in Nanjing). In their separate activities, they founded the Guiyang (or Weiyang), Linji, Caodong, Yunmen and Fayan schools of Chan and ushered in the tenthcentury “age of the five schools of Chan.” 1  Z ZTJ, 248: 8015–8017.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_003

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There are still many questions about the history of the founding of these five schools during the ninth and tenth centuries, but I am not going to examine them in detail. Nevertheless, we should pay attention to three things. First, when the practice of Buddhist cultivation was increasingly made a part of everyday life by Southern Chan during the Mid- to Late Tang, the expression of Buddhist thought also underwent an obvious change of direction. The bookish language of the classic sûtras was replaced by the ordinary language of everyday life, and this ordinary language, was in turn replaced by various kinds of deliberately distorted discourse. This deliberately distorted discourse developed into the “keen words” ( jifeng 機鋒) and paradoxical anecdotes or riddles (gong-an 公案) customarily employed by Chan masters. Second, from the point of view of intellectual history, the appearance of jifeng and gong-an demonstrated that language had gone from being symbolic of meaning to constituting meaning itself, and from a tool for the transmission of truth to truth itself. The truth expressed by Mahâyâna Buddhism was no longer following its traditional way of thinking that truth was not to be found with language; it had undergone a great transformation, as if truth was to be found precisely within language itself. Third, China’s particular intellectual context and social background caused this religious language that was originally within the realm of thought to develop into the linguistic artistry and playfulness of literature. Profound reflections on religious truth turned into the quick wit and skillful thinking of daily life. The language of the arts replete with wit and clever tropes caused the thought of Chan Buddhism to become a realm of literature and art while, Chan Buddhism itself, at the same time became more and more a part of literati culture (wenrenhua). For all these reasons, we should pay particular attention to the new changes in Chan Buddhist thought from the ninth to the tenth centuries.2 1.1 In Chan Buddhism’s intellectual history before the middle of the ninth century, Southern Chan masters deliberately expressed their criticisms of authority, their abandonment of the classic sûtras, and their contempt for language. It seems that the sûtras could no longer incite the interest of the believers and logical analyses could only reveal superficial levels of thought, but could not 2  Intellectual history should value this linguistic change of direction in the intellectual realm. Even though it only went around in a linguistic circle and very quickly turned again, still, this sort of philosophic awareness of language had not appeared in the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief for over a thousand years—since at least the appearance of Moism, Hui Shi and Gongsun Long in the fourth to third centuries BCE.

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reach the origins of truth. Much less could language express the real essence of truth. Buddhism’s original meticulous thinking about religious faith, layer upon layer of rational speculation and rational explanation were replaced by joyful intuitive awareness. “Sudden enlightenment” became, then, a trick to escape from thought and reflection, and this caused the Buddhist religion to be transformed into an art form. Ridicule of theory and contempt for writing can be found everywhere in the works of Southern Chan masters. For example, Lingyou (771–853) of Guishan (in Hunan) asked his disciple Huiji (807–883) of Yangshan (in Jiangxi) “How much of the forty-chapter Nirvâna-sûtra is the preaching of the Buddha and how much is the preaching of Mâra, the Evil One?” Huiji answered “It is all the preaching of Mâra.” Again, Congshen (778–897) of Zhaozhou (in Hebei) belittled those who argued about the differences of meaning in written words by asserting that they were only able to act as “judges” (panguan) but not to achieve “liberation” ( jietuo). He said derisively that “at least you are literate.”3 In spite of this disparagement of writing, in actual fact very many Chan masters were well-versed in the classic sûtras and often had recourse to the written word. For example, Puyuan (748–834) of Nanquan (in Anhui) and Yixuan (?–886) of Linji (in Hebei) were both quite proficient in the classic sûtras and knowledge of Yogâcâra (Consciousness Only).4 Wenyi of Qingliang of the Fayan school wrote the Treatise on the Three Realms of Consciousness Only (Sanjie weixinlun), the Meaning of the Six Characteristics of the Huayan school (Huayan liuxiang yi) and the Ten Admonitions for the Fayan School (Zongmen shiguan lun).5 Throughout the entire history of Southern Chan Buddhism, written records were not really completely abandoned as later Chan masters claimed. The writings of various Chan masters—texts of Chan Masters’ speeches (yuben), essentials of Chan Masters’ speeches (yuyao) and additional records of Chan Masters’ teachings (bielu)—that explicated the Buddhist dharma continued to be popular everywhere. Even the Quotations (yulu) of Mazu Daoyi, the monk who most vehemently renounced the written word, was widely copied everywhere. His disciple, Tianran (739–824) of Danxia (Mt. Danxia in Henan), compiled even more written words, such as “Song of Appreciating Our Pearl” (Wan zhuyin 玩珠吟), “Song of the Precious Black Dragon Pearl” (Lilong zhuyin 驪龍珠吟), “Song of Toying with Our Pearl” (Nong zhuyin 弄珠吟), and so on. These three songs emphasize the impor3  Jingde chuandenglu, j. 9: 266. 4  “Linji heshang,” Zutang ji, j. 19: 719. 5  According to Soothill, Dictionary, the three realms, or Triloka, of Buddhism are the “world of sensuous desire, world of form, and formless world of pure spirit.”

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tance of regarding our own heart as the Buddha heart (a precious pearl) so that there is no need to look for a pearl outside of ones own heart. Behind many of the seemingly simple ideas put forth in the Chan Buddhist thought of the ninth and tenth centuries, there was actually quite profound and complicated knowledge from the sûtras. Thus when carefully examined, Chan Buddhism no longer appears to have so absolutely rejected the classic sûtras, eliminated theoretical discussions and abandoned the written word. It must be pointed out, however, that in the Mid- and Late Tang, traditional Buddhism’s style of reading the sûtras and using language certainly began to change. If we recall the history of Buddhism, we will see that in the Buddhist interpretation, exposition, and propagation of the thought of the sûtras, besides direct translation and reading, there were two other frequently employed styles of dissemination of knowledge and truth. One style involved “incanting aloud” (zhuandu 轉讀) and “public chanting” (changdao 唱導). Zhuandu was the melodious incanting of sûtra texts while chang­ dao was the recitation and chanting of Buddhist doctrines in the manner of the popular entertainment speaking-, and singing- literature (shuochang wenxue 說唱文學).6 The other style consisted of notes and commentaries on chapters, sections, sentences, and phrases of the sûtras. Buddhist discussions of the sûtras from as early as the Eastern Jin (317–420) already had some commentaries—written notes on their understanding of the meaning of the classic texts as well as textual explications of sûtra passages. This kind of common intellectualistic practice was particularly prevalent during the southern dynasties when doctrinal study flourished, and, by the seventh century, quite a few Buddhist sûtras contained very detailed commentaries. “Incanting aloud” only involved chanting sûtra texts, but did not itself add anything to the meaning of the sûtras; much less could it replace the classic texts themselves.7 Although “public chanting” added speaking and singing performances of everyday metaphors of interpretation, propagation, stories and verses, still in this style of dissemination, the implications of language remained confined to how to convey cleverly the message of Buddhist thought; the form

6  G SZ, j. 13, “Jingshi: lun,” states that “according to Indian customs, all chanting of the Buddhist dharma was called bai 唄, “chanting.” In our land, chanting the sûtras is called “incanting aloud,” zhuandu and songs of praise (gezan) are called fanbai 梵唄, “chanting Sanskrit prayers.” Tang Yongtong, GSZ, annotated edition, 1992, 508. 7  Sengyou, Chu sanzang ji ji, j. 15, “Dao-an fashi zhuan,” says that “every time the sûtras were explained, only the general ideas were discussed in the form of zhuandu, ‘incanting aloud,’ and that is all.” Taishô, j. 55: 108.

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of the language itself never possessed its own significance.8 Commentaries on chapters and passages in the classics were only an extension of the contents and thought of the Buddhist sûtras. Although these annotations and interpretations could also increase knowledge of the texts, the words of the commentaries themselves still remained confined to the scope of meaning of the sûtra texts and this precisely limited any expansion of the scope of the commentary; it had to be centered on the text itself to produce its knowledge and could not depart from the text of the sûtra to create its own thought. For these reasons, Buddhism’s mainstream conception of language was still that language was an “obstruction” or “hindrance” to enlightenment. Although language was able to transmit meaning, it could also obscure it. “Abandoning the raft and going ashore” and “forgetting the trap after catching the fish” remained apt metaphors for language that were put forth in prominent theories from Prajñapâramitâ to Neo-Daoism. Continuing to exclude language from meaning (place language beyond meaning) was precisely why Chan Buddhism from the beginning declared “do not establish the written word” (buli wenzi 不立文字). “Do not establish” simply meant do not affirm the truth or authority of written words because language is really not meaning and sometimes it can even obscure meaning. 1.2 During this period, however, the situation changed. Originally Chan Buddhism carried on the Mahâyâna tradition of suspicion of language and writing. The Chan history Hall of Ancestors Collection (Zutang ji) contains the following anecdote: When Huineng was lecturing on the dharma at Caoxi (Guangdong), he once said: “There is something that has no words, no head, no tail, no here, no there, no inside, no outside, is not square, is not round, is not large, is not small, is not the Buddha, and is not a material thing. Then what is it?” he asked his audience. No one could understand him, except Shenhui who pointed out that “this is the original source of all Buddhas and also the Buddha-nature of Shenhui.” Over a century later, when the Chan master Huiji of Yangshan interpreted this story, he said that ever since Buddhism was transmitted into China, everyone had been confused by the written doctrines of the sûtras, but Bodhidharma and Huineng wanted to rescue the people from this confusion caused by the written word so they said, “do not establish the written word.”9

8  G SZ, j. 13: 521. 9  Zutang ji, j. 18: 692.

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Chan Buddhism was, of course, aware that the transmission of thought required language, it was just that the mind should not be tied down and restrained by written words. Chan masters pointed out that the words written in the sûtras were only for transmitting meaning; in themselves they were not significant. Just as in the Chan story “pointing at the moon,” the finger (zhitou 指頭) that points (zhi 指) at the moon is not itself the moon.10 Nevertheless, to rely only on what Chan Buddhism called “transmission from mind to mind” (yi xin chuan xin 以心傳心) could not really transmit the truth. Especially after Chan became the mainstream Buddhist school in the ninth century, it needed a systematic format to preserve Buddhist faith and knowledge. At that point, some Chan masters acknowledged the importance of the sûtras and even the idea that language itself was significant or full of meaning. Here need to add a further discussion about Chan and language. That is, in the eighth to ninth centuries, in order avoid superstitious belief in the sûtras and stubborn attachment to the written word, Chan masters frequently resorted to the use of ordinary everyday language to spread Chan thought. This kind of ordinary “vernacular” language (baihua) not only removed the obstruction of refined “literary language” (wenyan) but also served to suggest that both people’s minds and language should return to the state of everyday life as the only way to avoid violating the principles of ease and naturalness. The problem with this arose, however, because when people employed this plain, unadorned ordinary everyday language to speak so plainly of some fact or significant meaning, they would frequently remember what they said while forgetting how it was said. Much less would they reflect upon the profound meaning of Buddhist truth in everyday life; such truth would be destroyed by this ordinary dull language. Furthermore, when such truth had been done away with by this ordinary everyday language, the very existence of Buddhism would forfeit its significance. According to Chan Buddhist ideas, this kind of everyday usage was known as “dead language” (literally, dead sentences, siju 死句). To make language and writing have significance in themselves, Chan believed it had to render them different from everyday usage and allow this exceptional, even abnormal, language to focus the attention of the faithful on language in itself. They called this “living language” (literally, living sentences, huoju 活句). In the ninth and tenth centuries, then, Chan masters created many forms of “living language” that were quite different from ordinary everyday usage. Here are a few examples. The first form of “living language” was the self-contradictory 10  See Wudeng huiyuan, j. 10, 562 on Qingliang Wenyi.

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or logically unacceptable phrase.11 Such phrases were once very popular in Chan circles. For example, “face south and see the north star” (Wenyan of Yunmen); “rabbits do not necessarily have no horns just as Oxen do not necessarily have horns” (Benji of Caoshan), and so on. The second type of “living language” involved deliberate misinterpretations or irrelevant answers to questions. These sorts of false answers, just like the phrase “an ox head does not fit a horse tail,” are found everywhere in the quotations (yulu) of Chan masters. Someone might ask: “what sort of talk can surpass the Buddha?” and the answer would be: “horse tail (ephedra) from Puzhou (in Shanxi) and monkshood (aconitum carmichaelii) from Yizhou (in Sichuan).” Again someone might ask: “What is the ancient Buddha-mind?” and the answer would be: “rubble at the base of a brick wall.”12 This sort of extremely unfamiliar discourse destroys the cause and effect relationship in any colloquy. In a question about Buddhist doctrine one expects an explanation of that doctrine just as in a question about practicing austerities one expects an explanation of that practice, but Chan Buddhism deconstructs such customary reasoning and leaves its audience with an uncomfortably awkward feeling. This feeling of “awkwardness” runs right contrary to the human habit of rationality. Chan Buddhists were searching precisely for the unusual or abnormal because they believed that for people to remain puzzled after thinking for a long time was the only thing that would allow them finally to turn around and search for a new realm beyond rationality and logic. Chan Buddhism always warned people to be on guard against becoming mired down in endless investigations of Buddhist doctrines because during such ceaseless questioning they might forget the real significance of their quest. Their study of Buddhist truth might begin to change into a form of theoretical competition. Chan masters ridiculed such practices as “demanding answers from books” or “searching for answers in writing” that lead people down divergent paths. At the same time though, they understood that once people were used to employing reason and language to understand the world of truth, it was already very difficult for them to free themselves from them. It was for this 11  In his The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), William James points out the use of “self-contradictory phrases” in relation to understanding. He writes that in the tradition of Western mysticism there were also things like “dazzling obscurity,” “teeming desert,” “eternity is timeless,” “whispering silence” and so on. James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature (1902), New York: Penguin Books, 1982, 420, 422. 12  See respectively Zutang ji, j. 11: 429; Wudeng huiyuan, j 13, 777, Zutang ji, j. 18: 661, Jingde chuandenglu, j. 10: 279; Wudeng huiyuan, j. 4: 205.

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reason that in the ninth century Chan masters frequently used these seemingly strange methods and relied on language to undermine language. Through superficial contradictions, misreadings and false replies, they undermined the rationality of people’s accepted discourse and understanding of questions and they upset the customary relationship between questions and answers. They did all this to obstruct people’s ways of thinking and expectation of interpretations to transcend the history and rationality of language. 1.3 Both Chan Buddhist thinking about and use of language were very profound and it is said that the later use of paradoxical anecdotes or riddles (gong-an) was a way of employing language to reach the truth.13 Because when a believer ponders these deliberate misinterpretations or irrelevant answers to questions again and again, he or she may become mired down in an unprecedented predicament of consciousness. If such a believer affirms that the Chan master’s discourse that runs counter to common sense possesses a certain significance, then his or her ordinarily used resources for understanding history, discriminatory logic, and linguistic habits will all suddenly lose their effectiveness and he or she can only become lost in darkness. At that point, the believer will have to seek anew for a different path to transcendence. Just as the Chan master Huiqing of Bajiaoshan (Mt. Bajiao in Hubei), originally from Śîla, said, it is just as though a person on a journey, “suddenly came to face a bottomless pit while a wildfire was closing in from behind and a thicket of brambles was on both sides. If he goes forward, he’ll fall into an abyss; if he goes back, the wildfire will consume him; if he goes to either side, he will be stopped by the brambles. At that point, what can he do to escape with his life? If he escapes, he must find a road to rebirth, but if he cannot escape, he’s a dead man.”14 That is to say, if one is able to start from the original location of thought before being swallowed up in history, rationality and language and seek out “his true features before his parents gave birth to him,” then he can employ this language contrary to language to give prominence both to his own self-mind (zixin, svacitta 自心) and to the real truth. With this language, he can then comprehend the genuine 13   Gong-an originally referred to official documents (andu), but later on Chan Buddhism employed the term for anecdotes and so on for the edification of the faithful. Suzuki Daisetsu (D. T. Suzuki) discusses them together with various Buddha names of the Pure Land school, various ways of chanting Buddha’s sutras of the Tiantai school, and the method of observing the Buddha of Tantric Buddhism. See, “Zen shishôshi kenkyû,” “Koan ron,” in Suzuki Daisetsu zenshu, j. 4 (1968), 177. 14   Wudeng huiyuan, j. 9: 551.

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truth (zhendi, satya 真諦) of the Buddhist dharma. At that point, language is no longer just a “fish trap”—it is the “fish” themselves. Language is simply truth and meaning. The problem still remained, however, that language had both the power to give prominence to the truth and, at times, to obscure the truth. It was only those poems and songs that did not have just one single, fixed, and accurate annotation and explanation that were able to make known the inner meanings of things. For this reason, in the tenth century, many quick-witted, provocative and humorous dialogues became models of imitation for later Chan monks. Some very clever tropes and witty passages were repeatedly employed, especially after various literati and scholar-officials became Chan Buddhists. These very knowledgeable Chan masters who also possessed great literary talent brought literary language into their dialogues explaining Chan ideas and gave Chan Buddhist colloquies a new vitality as well imparting a flavor of artistic language to them. In Chan writings of the Late Tang, we can see how these men not only employed lines of Tang poetry as tropes in the practice of Chan meditation and enlightenment but also wrote up their own dialogues and lectures in the form of poetry rich in literary qualities. From an examination of later Chan Buddhist quotations, we can see that this language replete with great wisdom later on developed into genuinely literary language. When Chan masters no longer went through a process of understanding their own minds and careful reflection, but merely imitated the phrases of previous generations and employed them in elegant and polished gong-an anecdotes, these gong-an easily declined to the level of stale and repeatedly duplicated dogma. Sometimes Chan monks recycled these tropes merely as a form of intellectual competition and a contest of wits rather than a presentation of wisdom. Once they had imported the literati’s natural artistic quest and literary preferences into their dialogues, these dialogues that should originally have purveyed profound philosophical thought came to constitute only a creative literature (wenxue) that showed off quick-witted thinking and facile cleverness. Once both Chan masters and the believers were no longer able genuinely to regard these dialogues as containing serious intellectual questions and rather mistakenly regarded these seemingly playful keen words ( jifeng) as a form of veritable game playing, then they could only serve in great numbers as material for the artistry of creative writers and not as sources of genuine edification about the cosmos and human life. Their function became, then, merely to render the language of Chan Buddhism closer to the language of poetic verse. In his preface to a collection of Buddhist poems or gâtha a monk from Mt. Longya (in Hunan), the Late Tang poet-monk Qiji (863–937), mentioned

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the common practice around 860 of Chan Buddhists writing poetry. We still need more research to determine whether or not the Chan trend toward literature (wenxuehua) began at that time. At any rate, there certainly were many literary talents among Chan monks of the ninth and tenth centuries. Brilliant and elegant phraseology is to be found in the dialogues of Zhixian (?–898) of Xiangyan Monastery (in Henan), Benji of Caoshan, Wenyi of Qingliang and others. Living in the mountains in relaxed and leisurely conditions, they were greatly inspired to write poetry. In their descriptions of their states of mind and natural surroundings, are found many tropes and worlds akin to the realms of poetry, or perhaps they were simply poems. As mentioned above, since the eighth century an obvious trend in Chinese Buddhism was the decline of interest in doctrinal theories. The believers showed themselves to be weary of the intricate details of conceptual determination, the excessive analyses of levels of meaning, and the manipulation of abstract symbols. The fate of the Consciousness Only and Huayan schools was an apt example of this phenomenon. During this time, Chan Buddhism undermined the seriousness of the religion and the profundity of doctrinal theories by transforming religious life into ordinary daily life, regarding religious language as artistic language, and converting deeply philosophical expressions into emotionally ladened poetry. Nevertheless, at this time Chan Buddhism was welcomed by the faithful, especially by the literati and scholar-officials. After the dazhong reign period (847–849), Chan Buddhism slowly recovered from Wuzong’s great persecution of Buddhism, came to an understanding with imperial power at the center and military governors in different regions, attracted a great number of believers, and grew into the mainstream Buddhism of the age. Many literati, scholars and bureaucratic aristocrats expressed an exceptionally ardent interest in Chan. It is recorded that after the Chan master Yicun of Xuefeng opened up Mt. Xuefeng, “Buddhists from everywhere under Heaven, whether Hua or Xia, rushed to it as though answering a summons.”15 He also received the favor of many officials and even of the Son of Heaven himself. After the fall of the Tang, the Qian, Li and Liu families of the Later Tang (923–936), Later Jin (936–946), and Later Han (947–950), of the Five Dynasties in the north and of the various kingdoms in the south, all exhibited great interest in Chan Buddhism.16 When they practiced Chan meditation and visited Chan masters, they competed with them in intelligence and language, 15  SGSZ, j. 12: 287. 16  For example, Shibei (835–908) of Mt. Xuansha in Fujian, Qingliang Wenyi, Deshao (891– 972) of Mt. Tiantai in Zhejiang, Xiujing of Huayan Monastery in Xian, Shaanxi, Chongji of Tianlong Monastery in Zhejiang, Taiqin (?–d. 974) of Qingliang in Nanjing, Zongjing of

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sparring with them in keen words ( jifeng) and paradoxical riddles (gong-an) rich in linguistic wit and humor. They concentrated their energy on the suggestiveness, richness, and inclusiveness of language, exploiting fully the special characteristics of Chinese to come up with narrations of profound significance in everyday life or to write poetic lines replete with implicit humor. All of this led the practice of Chan to become increasingly the pleasurable pastime of upper class literati. At this time, the religiosity of Chan Buddhism was progressively weakened due to the social stratification of its adherents and the change in cultural orientation, while its literary artistry and interest in everyday life became the center of attention for the faithful. At that, those outstandingly brilliant dialogues and highly philosophical keen words also lost their critical nature and sense of transcendence of the commonsense world and rational discourse. They became simply linguistic techniques for the literati to express their life interests and their literary talents. 2

Re-establishing National Authority and Intellectual Order: A New Understanding of Intellectual History Between the 8th and 9th Centuries

From the end of the eighth century through the beginning of the ninth century, was an extremely difficult period for the Tang dynasty. This originally very powerful state seemed to lose its authority and control over events, and its declining political situation produced a chain reaction of disorder in the worlds of knowledge, thought and belief.17 Internal disorders, civil strife and foreign aggression were continuous during this period. I’ll examine first the internal disorders. From the middle of the eighth century on, provincial military governors ( fanzhen 藩鎮) became increasingly powerful and constantly threatened the existence of the dynasty. From 782, during the jianzhong reign period of Emperor Dezong (Li Kuo, r. 779–805), beginning with Zhu Tao (?–785), Tian Yue (751–784), Wang Wujun (735–801) and Li Na (758–792) calling themselves king (wang), military governors in various provinces increasingly disregarded imperial authority and competed with each other to challenge the dynasty. However fortunate the dynasty was in fending off crises one after another and finally recapturing Longxing Monastery in Zhejiang, and so on all received the support of the Southern Tang (937–975), Southern Han (917–971), Min (909–945), and Later Tang regimes. 17  The Chinese word guojia 國家 can mean government, state and nation. We translate it according to context.—trs.

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the capital city of Chan-an, people’s confidence in the rejuvenation of the dynasty had probably not been restored even into the beginning of the ninth century. Then there was external aggression. The greatest threat to the dynasty came from the non-Chinese groups in its four neighboring regions. At its most flourishing, the Tang could still not do anything about them and in the dispirited conditions of the Mid-Tang, the regime was even more worried about these external threats. Even though the Tujue (Türks) threat had been eliminated, the Tubo (Tibetan) threat from the western frontier continued to cause the dynasty many sleepless nights. These external threats were not merely limited to military incursions; they also included the loss of any feeling of security and even a wavering of confidence in Tang civilization among the general population. At such a time, not only did these internal and external troubles discourage people, but the social conditions of the dynasty also disappointed them. For a long time imperial authority seemed to have lost its power to awe or intimidate while the military governors on the frontiers each conducted their own government, central government officials were poorly paid, and people did not trust one another. Due to the crisis situation that the nation found itself in, a mood of pragmatic expediency was widespread and ethics and morality faded away. Pure thought, knowledge and belief no longer carried any authority either and even the scholar-officials were all in a very embarrassing predicament. The people of the capital city had also lost all feeling of security. With Buddhism penetrating the upper levels of society, the customs of foreign peoples permeating the entire society and scholars treating traditional thought with contempt while running after heretical doctrines, the entire mainstream intellectual order was on the verge of collapse.18 Just then, however, an opportunity for dynastic revival was in the offing. The Huihe (or Huihu, Uighurs), the Shatuo Türks (Western Tujue) and several ethnic groups in Yunnan broke away from the Tubo (Tibetans), while during that decade or so the Tang repeatedly defeated them and slowly removed the threat on their western border. From 806 on, due to a number of concomitant factors, the court’s control over the military governors improved, the central government’s financial situation became more prosperous, and, under these conditions, determination to restore the dynasty also grew increasingly strong.19 18  ZZTJ, j. 239, 7713, 7714. 19  Chen Yinque wrote in his Tangdai zhengzhishi shulungao (1980, 95), that “Emperor Xianzong’s objective in governing the country was to rectify the deep-rooted dali and zhenyuan reign period (766–779 and 785–805) customs of seeking temporary peace

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During the yuanhe reign period (806–821) of Emperor Xianzong, owing to the pacification or voluntary submission of some of the powerful military governors, it would seem that the conditions of the Tang dynasty underwent a change for the better. Many important changes that influenced later intellectual history took place during this complicated and subtle period. 2.1 Most discussions of changes in Tang and Song intellectual history begin with Han Yu (768–824), but they have not paid sufficient attention to Han’s essay “Pacification of Huaixi” (Ping Huaixi bei).20 In essence this work emphasizes the necessity for the authority of a powerful state, government or nation (guojia), that this state’s power is embodied in the person of the emperor, and that the emperor and his imperial power are both authorized by the “Mandate of Heaven”—providing their natural legitimacy and reasonableness. This essay strongly expresses the hopes of Han Yu and others to rebuild the nation and bring the people of the four frontiers into submission as well as their reliance on authority and order. Beginning with the reign of Emperor Dezong, many scholars began to ponder the problem of national authority and restoration. After experiencing the An Lushan Rebellion of the mid-eighth century and the acute crisis it brought about, simply relying on old methods to emphasize the sacredness of receiving the Mandate of Heaven to rule and the unity of political ideology did not seem to be very effective. These old methods included such things as promulgating a new calendar, performing the fengshan sacrifices on Mt. Tai, offering sacrifices to Heaven, Earth and Confucius and so on. Those traditional Chinese methods for ruling the nation had already become weak and ineffectual before the High Tang and by the Mid-Tang, things like general amnesties for All Under Heaven and emperors sincerely “blaming themselves” in an attempt to win over the hearts of the people had also been shown to be fruitless. The practice of emperors visiting the homes of the common people, listening to their complaints and rewarding those who dared to voice their criticisms was still unable to repair a collapsing social order. In those circumstances, criticisms and treatment of contemporary political problems became concentrated on the question of how to restore governmental, state, or national authority. The most important priorities for that were first to pacify the external enemies and through appeasement; that is, to use military force to pacify the military governors and re-establish the authority of the central government. 20  QTW, j. 548, 2458.

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the military governors inside China’s borders and second to re-establish the authority of thought and culture. During the zhenyuan reign period (785–805), after the country had regained some of its former strength and external threats had settled down somewhat, a group of officials in charge of rites replaced those in charge of finances, and court discussions about how to restore an ideal order replaced discussions of practical administrative tactics. This change made ideas on how to reorganize the laws and discipline of the imperial court widespread in public opinion and even moved contemporary scholars in the direction of support for centralized power. The background for reflections on the loss of political authority came from two sources. The first was from historical memory. Quan Deyu, who presided over literary circles, used the fall of the Han empire as an example in his “Discussions on the Fall of the Two Hans” (Liang Han bian wang lun) to call for the re-establishment of national (state, government) order. In these people’s minds, the national or state order that the imperial power symbolized was above everything. Facing a crisis of the collapse of that order, even superficial Confucian rhetoric could also be dispensed with, otherwise it would be a case of “using Confucian teachings to extend one’s evil thoughts” and “wielding passages from the six Confucian classics to extend one’s evil ambitions.”21 The second source was the actual contemporary situation. The arrogance toward China of the alien peoples or barbarians in the four neighbouring regions, the threat of the military governors to the central authority, and partisan conflicts at court were all undermining and eroding imperial power. What Pei Du (765–839) feared—that “the eunuchs would usurp power, the Son of Heaven would be only an empty name and the scholar-officials would lose all sense of morality”—precisely expressed the greatest anxieties of contemporary scholars.22 Their approval of the “two tax system,” support for the government’s direct control of household registers, praise for the centralized commandaries and counties system, criticism of the ancient fengjian system, demand that the military governors’ monopoly of salt transportation be returned to the imperial court, and that the eunuch leadership of the military be taken over by the central government were all expressions of the widespread feelings of the scholars of that time. For example, praise for the centralized system of commandaries and counties ( junxian) in Liu Zongyuan (773–819)’s “On Fengjian” (Fengjian 21  “Liang Han bianwang lun,” QTW, j. 495, 2235. 22  “Pei Du zhuan,” XTS, j. 173: 5213. Also see “Yuan Zhen zhuan,” XTS, j. 174: 5228, where Pei Du is recorded to have said “if Your Majesty wants to put down the rebels, You must first purify the court, and then it can be done.”

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lun) was simply a demand for a powerful and effective imperial power to establish national order.23 In this context, the “resoluteness” (duan 斷) in Han Yu’s “Pacification of Huaixi” where he says, “All of the success in Cai was achieved through resoluteness,” echoes what he said in 815: “all success or failure depends upon Your Majesty’s resoluteness.”24 In the minds of these people, it would be much better to appeal to the ruler’s own “sagely judgement and arbitrary resolution” than to tolerate confusion and disorder in a time of widespread chaos. 2.2 As much as many scholar-officials since the beginning of the ninth century had been trying fundamentally to reestablish national authority and order, their demands still basically aimed at the intellectual order. Although they were sometimes able to participate in politics and government policies, they could not generally join the political center of government. Their reflections and discussions were mainly focused on how to restore intellectual order and authority. As men of culture who undertook the task of expressing social thought, they always relied on the endorsement of some form of traditional thought or the promotion of some kind of social ideal to express their hopes for the future direction of the country. Contemporary appeals for the return of traditional Confucian studies followed this tendency. They called this ideal condition one in which “the Way prevails for All Under Heaven” (tianxia youdao 天下有道, a phrase appearing several times in the Analects) and they believed that there 23  Du You, Tongdian, j. 31, 849, “Zhiguan 13, Wanghou zongxu,” says that “establishing a regional state will only benefit a lineage, but establishing a prefectural system can benefit ten thousand households (all the people).” Although Du was influenced by Liu Zhi’s lost Zhengdian, his changing Liu’s praise for the feudal enfeoffment system, very clearly expresses this tendency toward the establishment of national order.  Han Yu’s essay “Dui Yu wen,” by opposing the tradition that that it was unjust for Great Yu to pass his power down to his son, and particularly emphasizing the natural legitimacy of Heaven bestowing imperial power on the imperial clan was also intended to increase the power of the ruler as well as suggesting his support for national order and political authority. Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1, 30–32; Liu Zongyuan’s “Fengjian lun” says “now our state has completely established the system of counties and prefectures accompanied by setting up Prefects and Magistrates throughout the land. It is certain that this system should not be changed. If our government controls the military well and is careful in the selection of local officials, then there will be good and just rule.” Liu Zongyuan ji, 1979, j. 3: 74. 24  A note in ZZTJ, j. 239: 7712 explains that this statement “refers to the deep-rooted dali and zhenyuan reign periods (766–779 and 785–805) practices (of appeasement).”

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really was an eternal “Way” (Dao) that embraced and controlled everything. Practical policies and actual changes should not be valued above the “Way.” Just as Li Ao (772–836/841) said, “the morally superior man follows the Way and not the multitude.”25 There was, of course, good reason for this concern with the intellec­ tual order. As mentioned above, from the High Tang on, the Chinese intel­ lectual world was in a state of general mediocrity and had long since begun to lose its authority. At the same time, the scholars whose métier was knowledge and thought were no longer well-regarded. Since the court could not take in talented persons, scholars could only turn to the military governors. Their position was not as high as imagined, and, at the same time, those ritual norms that were once so venerated in society were declining daily. During the dazhong reign period (847–860), in Liu Tui (fl. ca. 850)’s “A Southerner’s Letter on the Village Drinking Rite” (Jiangnan lun xian yinjiu lishu), a description of the sadly worn out state of the ritual vessels during a ceremony to send off the first grade examination candidates to the next level would seem to be a fitting symbol of the disintegration of the intellectual order.26 In similar fashion at this time, the classics, including those Confucian texts validated in the Early Tang, were no longer authoritative; they could be subject to doubt in the official examinations. For example, the final set of questions from Yuan Jie (723–772)’s “Questions for Presented Scholars” (Wen jinshi) actually contained the following: “Which chapter(s) of the three rites can be deleted? Which of the three commentaries (to the Spring and Autumn Annals) can be abandoned? The Moists school condemned music. What rite did they follow? The Confucian school trusted in Fate. Is this statement correct?”27 Private criticism of the 25  Li Ao, “Congdao lun,” QTW, j. 636: 2846. 26  QTW, j. 789: 3660. Zhao Lin (834 jinshi)’s, Yin hualu, 1957, j. 4 records that Liu Yanfan, sometime between the High- and Mid-Tang, was an expert in the Confucian classics who had become a Buddhist monk, but deeply regretted the decline of Confucianism in society. He said that “none of those in recent times who honor the Confucian Way can match the ways of the older generations.” For a monk to lament the decline of the Confucian scholars is emblematic of the age. 27  QTW, j. 380: 1708. Later on people criticized Yuan Jie for this and said that he did not consider Confucius as his teacher, but Li Shangyin (813?–858) defended him and even publicly declared that “besides humanity, rightness, morality and virtue (ren yi dao de), what does Mr. Kong have to offer? For thousands of years, we have seen sage after sage everywhere.” See “Rongzhou jinglüeshi Yuan Jie wenji houxu,” Fannan wenji, 1988, j. 7: 434. Somewhat later, Dugu Ji (725–777) also posed questions similar to those of Yuan Jie; see QTW, j. 384: 1728. The “three rites” are the Yili, Liji and Zhouli and the three commentaries are the Zuozhuan, Gongyangzhuan and Guliangzhuan on the Chunqiu.

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classics was perhaps even more common. The skepticism of Dan Zhu (725– 770) and others of the Mid-Tang toward the three commentaries to the Spring and Autumn Annals was definitely not an isolated case. At this time, there were three intellectual trends that caused great anxiety among the scholar-officials. First, in a society that generally sought practical results, knowledge and thought were easily dominated by a psychology of intense pragmatism. Many scholars who wished to engage in politics were concerned with tactical issues rather than ideals. They were interested in how to solve the problems of taxation, military supply, government efficiency, bureaucratic integrity and so on. They did not feel any need to aim too high and seek a “golden age of peace.” To manage practical problems satisfactorily was good enough for them. Second, this mental attitude allowed some historically manageable intellectual resources to be very quickly brought forward in the Mid-Tang—knowledge of things like the administration of finance and taxation, ideas about strengthening the legal system, military strategy and tactics and so on. Especially when Confucian authority and idealism were increasingly in decline, some resources that were previously marginalized, like various schools of thought regarded as “heresy” by Confucians, became active again. As Liu Ke (fl. ca. 873) described the situation: “Today there are some very outstanding men among the impoverished scholars of the realm and they are able to discuss Yellow Emperor Daoism, or Confucian teachings, or penal law.”28 This trend demonstrated that the once unified and distinct order of thought and the intellectual world were already divided and chaotic and those heresies that had once been suppressed and forced to the “margins” were already making a grand entrance into the “center” and beginning to invade the mainstream intellectual world. Although the saying that “the zhenyuan reign period honored the unconventional and the yuanhe reign period honored the strange” was meant to apply to literature, the tendency to rebel against conventional orthodoxy was not limited to literature. In the Mid-Tang when many kinds of knowledge, thought and belief were very active, the intellectual world seemed not to have an authoritative mainstream.29

28  “Shang Wei youcheng shu,” QTW, j. 742, 3400. 29  For example, at the time there were people who scored victories over their opponents by means of their discourse and, according to Shu Yuanyu (d. 835)’s “Bei Shanxi guteng wen”: “actually said that their writings were the best in the world, and so they despised the Way of the sages.” QTW, j. 727. There were also men who were extremely conceited and “often called themselves the only one in the universe,” seemed to be expert in the Three

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Third, the flourishing of Buddhism produced an even greater intellectual crisis. Throughout the Tang dynasty, Buddhism had penetrated deeply into the world of daily life and many contemporary scholars were very interested in it. Li Hua, Liang Su, Quan Deyu, Pei Xiu (791–864), Liu Zongyuan and Bo Juyi all had a very favorable opinion of Buddhism. Quite a few scholars felt that Buddhism was useful not only in the realms of spirituality and daily life but also for reestablishing social order. No matter how much this great number of scholars was able in theory to limit the significance of Buddhism to the spiritual level of mental cultivation and transcendence, this foreign faith had already entered Chinese life and even its politics. It also constituted a threat to the traditional Chinese intellectual world. 2.3 In ancient China, the restoration of thought and political order often went hand in hand. In the nearly thirty years from the end of the yuanhe reign period into the huichang period (820–846), the factional struggles within intellectual circles and the succession struggles at court grew ever more fierce. The death of Emperor Xianzong, considered the “restoration emperor,” in 820, was a great shock to many scholar-officials. Their dream of restoration was dependent on the enthusiastic efforts of the emperor, political reforms, and the hard work of important ministers; it was then shattered again. Nevertheless, during this same time there were opportunities for revival. The decline of the Huihu (Uighurs), internal chaos among the Tubo (Tibetans) and the recovery of the four garrisons and eighteen prefectures of Hehuang (overlapping present day Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang) again revived hope for the rebuilding of peace and prosperity in the Great Tang as well as stimulating the national confidence and self-respect of Tang scholars.30 Excavating historical resources again, establishing intellectual genealogies, confirming doctrinal boundaries, and rejecting various dissident views became chief priorities for contemporary scholars who were attempting to restore order. Under those conditions, their deep-rooted sense of national confidence and self-respect was first easily aroused. This ancient Chinese feeling of self-centeredness sometimes almost amounted to a form of xenophobia against people who were, as the Zuo Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Zuozhuan) put it, “not of our kind and so their hearts and minds must be different” ( fei wo zu lei, qi xin bi yi

Teachings and always criticized the former sages. See Yunxi youyi, 1994, j. 4 discussion of Cai Jing of Yongzhou. 30  TZTJ, j. 247: 7999.

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非我族類，其心必異).31 This feeling led to a number of intellectual phenomena to be discussed below. First came critical attacks on Buddhism and other religions and beliefs originating with different non-Han Chinese peoples. People having Han Chinese culture (Hanzu wenhua) had a psychological sense of their cultural superiority and a concomitant tendency toward the exclusion of others. For example, anti-Buddhist critiques during the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties eras reproached Buddhism for being a barbarian religion. In the Early Han, as noted in Volume One of this work, Fu Yi (555–639) vehemently criticized Chinese believers in Buddhism by saying that “… in the teaching of Confucian scholars, they even talk about the demonic barbarians and their dissolute language.”32 In the first half of the Tang dynasty, though, feelings of optimism were most prevalent and such harsh critiques of Buddhism were not very common. In general, the anger and criticism of Tang scholars was aimed at Buddhism’s struggles against the Tang government to secure its economic interests and had little to do with the thought, doctrines and beliefs of the religion. After the shock of the An Lushan Rebellion, Chinese scholars’ ideas changed and “the defense and distinction between non-Chinese (Yi) and Chinese (Xia) also grew rigorous.”33 Some scholars who hoped to eliminate the threat of this alien religion in a fundamental way, spurred on by their national confidence and self-respect, passionately criticized Buddhism as a barbarian religion and the Buddha as a barbarian.34 They believed that “if the ways of the barbarians are practiced in China (Zhonghua) … and barbarian customs are allowed to transform the Chinese (Zhuxia 諸夏), it will be a great calamity.”35 Regardless of the fact that in their daily life very many scholar-officials did not necessarily reject Buddhism and even carried on rather warm and friendly relations with Buddhist monks, they still “opposed Buddhism.” This indicates, furthermore, that the discourse of extreme national self-centeredness and its political strategies being brought forth at this time were simply making known the reaffirmation of the mainstream authority of traditional ideology as well as the stance of reorganizing the social and political order. It was even more a symbol and a manifesto of an intellectual orientation. 31   Zuozhuan, “Chenggong 4 nian,” has this passage: “The state of Chu, though it is very big, they are not our kind of people, how could they love us?” CTP. 32   Guang Hong ming ji, j. 11: 89 cites Fu Yi’s “Shang fei sheng Foseng biao.” 33  Fu Lecheng, “Tangdai Yi-Xia guannian zhi yanbian,” in Han Tang shilun ji, 1977 and 1995, 214. 34  Han Yu, “Lun Fogu biao,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 8: 613–616. 35  Li Ao, “Qu Fozhai lun,” QTW, j. 636: 2846.

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Second, there were some subtle changes in the intellectual background of the Mid-Tang period. As the foundation of mainstream thought, Confucianism was very important and the most important studies that could be directly applied to society, government and thought were of the Spring and Autumn Annals and the study of rites and ceremonials. The former relied on historical knowledge to supply a foundation for political legitimacy and rationality, while the latter relied on ceremonial or ritual rules to regulate social order. In the study of the Spring and Autumn Annals at that time, the “three commentaries” (Zuozhuan, Gongyangzhuan, Guliangzhuan) had lost their authority and the laconic and segmented outlines of the original Annals text could hardly offer any principles for interpretation and development of thought. At the same time, in an age when great family lineages and territorial connections were breaking up, the study of rites and ceremonies had lost its ability to integrate and clarify the social order and had declined to the status of mere words that were learned and recited by rote. In the ninth century, these tendencies were increasingly obvious, and for that reason when history and the socio-political system were no longer able to establish value and meaning, Confucian scholars all the more extoled the “Way” that transcended everything. They regarded this moral “Way” as a foundational principle and hoped on the basis of it to re-establish the order of thought, knowledge and belief as the cornerstone of Chinese thought. According to Han Yu’s “Essentials of the Moral Way” (Yuandao), this “Way” was particular to Confucianism and very different from the “Way” of Buddhism and Daoism. He wrote, “To love broadly is called humanity (ren 仁); to act according to what should be done is called rightness (yi 義). To proceed from these principles is called the moral Way (Dao 道).” This “Way” as it is written about in various classic texts is expressed in rites and music (liyue) and penal laws and government decrees (xingzheng); put into practice in the life of the masses, it is the proper social class order of scholars, peasants (farmers), artisans (craftsmen) and merchants (shi, nong, gong, shang); in social stratification, it is the proper relationships between rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, friends, guests and hosts, brothers, and husbands and wives. If one uses it for personal cultivation, one will find “ease and happiness”; if one uses it for the sake of others, one can be “loving and fair”; if one has it in one’s own mind, one can find “harmony and tranquility”; finally, if the political rule of the state (guojia) relies on it, “there will be no place where it is inappropriate.”36

36  Han Yu, “Yuandao,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1: 18. Some of our translation is taken from De Bary & Bloom, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 569, 573. Translation of ren changed

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Hence, putting forth this “Way” should serve as the underlying foundation of everything. How was this all-transcendent “Way” to be verified? How could it connect individual cultivation and the norms of society? And, finally, how could it establish national (government) and social order? According to Han Yu, this “Way” is eternally correct because it is in accord with correct human nature (xing) and correct human nature relies on the edification and restraints of education and law. Han Yu’s “An Inquiry on Human Nature” (Yuanxing) states that “human nature consists in five virtues, namely, humanity, propriety, faithfulness, rightness, and wisdom” (ren, li, xin, yi, zhi 仁, 禮, 信, 義, 智), and there are three grades of human nature: “superior, medium, and inferior” (shang, zhong, xia). Similarly, “what constitutes the feelings are seven: pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire (xi, nu, ai, ju, ai, wu, yu 喜, 怒, 哀, 惧, 愛, 惡, 欲) and they also have three grades of “superior, medium, and inferior.”37 Due to their education, superior people consciously move toward the “Way,” while inferior people obey the “Way” by habitually following the law. Although these ideas that carried over from Han dynasty Confucians, especially Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179–ca. 104 BCE), had a number of supporters, still they were obviously contradictory and not very profound.38 According to this view, the idea of “returning to one’s true nature” would not have universal value, but would only apply to medium grade people. This is because superior people would not really need to search for their pure human nature, and inferior people would be unable to find theirs. Given that Buddhism and the Daoist Religion already generally accepted the idea that every human being possessed a pure and unadulterated human nature, however, Confucians also had to have a response to this idea. For this reason, Li Ao’s “On Returning to One’s True Nature” (Fuxing shu) revised Han Yu’s ideas by maintaining that returning to one’s true nature depends upon humanity’s basic nature (benxing): “The reason that a man can be a sage lies in his true nature” (ren zhi suoyi wei shengren zhe, xing ye 人之所以為聖人者，  

from “humaneness” to “humanity.” This essay is also translated in Chan, SB, 454–456, with the less interpretive title “An Inquiry on the Way.” 37  Han Yu, “Yuan xing,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1: 22. Translation is from Chan, SB, 451–454. 38  In his “Mengzi Xunzi yanxing lun,” Huangfu Shi (777–835) agreed that “there are three grades of human nature: inferior ignorant people, medium people, and superior wise people.” QTW, j. 686, 3315.

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性也).39 Every person’s basic nature is pure and unadulterated and bestowed

on one by Heaven: “there is no true nature that is not good” (xing wu bushan 性無不善).40 The reason that people turn away from their original true nature and cause social disorder is simply because their feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate and desire obscure their true nature. It was, then, extremely important to consciously “return to one’s true nature.” To restore human nature by means of education; to restore the universal “Way” by means of pure human nature; to re-establish intellectual authority by relying on this “Way”; and to rebuild the central core of government through this intellectual authority—all of these things constituted the tradition and responsibility of Confucian intellectuals. The concept of “returning to one’s true nature” was, of course, not really Li Ao’s original invention. There were discussions of human nature and feelings (xingqing 性情) in early Confucianism. The bamboo texts of Guodian offer proof that this topic was already being discussed in the intellectual world of the Warring States period.41 In general, early Confucianism may have had more to say about human nature than we once thought. The idea that due to external stimulation human nature gives rise to feelings and desires already existed in embryonic form very early on, and with the interpretations and explanations of Han dynasty Confucians, it became both a historical resource and an intellectual topic. At this time, however, this idea had its own specific background. After experiencing the social upheavals of the Mid-Tang and the impact that Buddhism had on the Chinese intellectual world, and when Confucian thought needed to find a new intellectual foundation, Chinese thinkers borrowed many resources from Buddhism and the Daoist Religion. Ideas like “icchantika possess the Buddha-nature” from the Nirvâna sûtra (Mahâparinirvâna-sûtra, Da po niepan jing); “one mind, two characteristics” from the Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna (Mahâyâna Śraddhotpâda Śâstra, Dacheng qixin lun); and “rest of body for clearness of vision” (zhiguan 止觀) from the Tiantai school all 39  Li Ao, “Fuxing shu, shang” QTW, j. 637, 2849. See T. H. Barrett, Li Ao: Buddhist, Taoist or Neo-Confucian?, 1992, for a study of Li Ao. Chapter 4 contains a complete translation and discussion of his “Fuxing lun” and “returning to one’s true nature” (Barrett’s translation). This passage is translated and discussed on page 94. 40  This quote is from Cheng Yi, Ercheng yishu, no. 18, in “Cheng Yichuan de renxing lun,” Fang Shihao ed., Hong Kong renwen zhexuehui wangye. 41  “Xing zi ming chu,” “Yu cong er” and so on all discuss xingqing, Guodian Chumu zhujian, 1998, 179, 203. For a complete study of the Guodian texts, see Scott Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, A Study and Complete Translation, 2012.

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furnished ninth-century Confucian thought with resources from Buddhist discussions of human nature and feelings.42 Both Sui-Tang Daoism and religious Daoism’s ideas of “nature is tranquil, feelings are active” (xing jing qing dong) and “curbing your mind to recover your true nature” (shouxin fuxing), and the idea of moving toward “nature” purified of defiling illusions and renouncing “feelings” that symbolized desires likewise stimulated thinking about “returning to one’s true nature.” At this time, Confucian scholars already realized that, as Liu Yuxi (772–842) wrote, because “Confucians employ the Middle Way to govern the society, and seldom speak of nature and destiny, hence their Way ceases to function when the world is in chaos.”43 They then appropriated intellectual resources from Buddhism and religious Daoism to construct their own discourse on nature and feelings. As a result, stimulated by its contemporary background, this composite concept of nature and feelings was made up of various reflections that drew from early Confucianism, Wei-Jin and NorthSouth Dynasties Buddhism and Neo-Daoism, and Sui-Tang Daoist Religion, with the support of Confucian classics like the “Great Learning” (Daxue) and the “Doctrine of the Mean” (Zhongyong). It changed the direction of a Confucianism dominated by Xunzi’s ideas toward the thinking of Zisi and Mencius. 2.4 To re-establish the authority of any kind of knowledge and thought in ancient China required both historical and textual backing. In the absence of supporting evidence of historical origins, or the confirmation of classic texts, especially the Confucian classics, the reasonableness of any interpretations would always be suspect. At that time, the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean” were re-emphasized as part of the recovery of Confucian historical materials. The “Great Learning” provided a way of thinking that brought together moral cultivation of the mind and the administration of national order. It supplied the sequence of cultivation, one after another, of the “investigation of things” (gewu 格物), the “extension of knowledge” (zhizhi 致知), “sincerity of thought” (chengyi 誠意), “rectification of the heart/mind” (zhengxin 正心), and so on, and then followed the path of “cultivating one’s self” (xiushen 修身), “ordering 42  Medieval (3rd to 9th centuries) Buddhism’s ideas about human nature and feelings were extremely rich and had a profound influence on contemporary Confucianism. Translations of Buddhist terms are from Soothill, Dictionary. 43  Liu Yuxi (772–842), “Yuanzhou Pingxiang xian Yangqi shan gu Guang Chanshi bei,” Liu Yuxi ji, 1990, j. 4: 57.

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one’s family” (qijia 齊家) and “regulating the state” (zhiguo 治國) to “bring peace to All Under Heaven” (ping tianxia 平天下).44 These ideas completely altered the direction of the older ways of thinking that relied on the structure of Heaven and Earth and the cosmos as a foundation for establishing lineage laws and ethical order and that relied on lineage laws and ritual norms as the basis for the rectification of national order. The establishment of national (governmental, guojia), ethnic (national, minzu), and social order was changed to a process of self-awareness from within outward instead of the former process of restraint from the outside. In that way, the ultimate foundation of all legitimacy and reasonableness was transferred from “Heaven and Earth and the cosmos” (tiandi yuzhou) to the human “mind, nature and feelings” (xinling xingqing 心靈性情”). The “Doctrine of the Mean” provided a text that supplied a way of thinking derived from an orthodox Confucian classic for ideas that were otherwise perhaps deeply influenced by Buddhism. This text connected the Mandate of Heaven and human nature, human nature and the principles of universal nature, the principles of universal nature and the behavior of the individual, the family and the nation (state, guojia) to establish an interpretive foundation for the reasonableness of ethics, morality, and politics. Ideas in the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean,” such as that the superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone … Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are aroused it is called equilibrium (zhong, 中 centrality, mean) … Only after knowing what to abide in can one be calm … Only after having achieved tranquility can one have peaceful repose … Only after having peaceful repose can one begin to deliberate. Only after deliberation can the end be attained … and so on45 were combined with the techniques of the “investigation of things” (gewu), the “extension of knowledge” (zhizhi), moral “self-cultivation” and “achieving enlightenment through sincerity” (chengming 誠明) to provide this way of thinking decidedly emphasizing the purification of the individual nature with textual proof derived from the Confucian tradition. Hence it was

44  See Daxue, section 2 for the eight steps of cultivation; also see Volume One, page 140 of this History for another discussion of these ideas. 45  Chan, SB, translations from the “Doctrine of the Mean” §1 and the “Great Learning” §1 on pages 98 and 86 respectively. Chan’s chung is changed to zhong. Pages 84–113 of Chan, SB contain selected translations of these two texts with discussions of Zhu Xi’s comments.

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demonstrated that such thought was not the exclusive property of Buddhism and Daoism. Rather, its legitimacy could be proven by Confucian texts. Simply relying on the support of ancient classical texts was, however, not enough. A genealogy of intellectual history was also required. When a customary world of knowledge, thought and belief is being threatened, searching for historical roots, defining the individual’s identification with the ethnic group (nation, minzu) and the state (nation, guojia) through a reorganization of history and establishing the authority of thought and knowledge are all frequently employed methods. In the age of Han Yu and Li Ao, Buddhism and the Daoist Religion had already established their own proselytizing systems and these systems had the same significance as that of the system of accompanying sacrifices in the Confucian temples. They validated an orthodoxy and the reasonableness of a form of truth by reference to generation after generation of symbolic figures. From the early ninth century on, then, Han Yu, Li Ao and others expended a great deal of effort to construct a Confucian genealogy out of their own history, and the key figure in this construction was Mencius, though he was not actually re-discovered by them. After the An Lushan Rebellion, some people had already asserted that Mencius should be the most famous Confucian after Confucius, and in random discussions of the Confucian tradition in Buddhist texts of the late eighth and early ninth centuries, Mencius was also said to follow Confucius.46 In the works of scholars of the early ninth century, like Han Yu, Liu Zongyuan, and others, Mencius, however, is mentioned with unusual frequency and had become the key figure in the historical genealogy of Confucianism. This Confucian genealogy that Mencius inherited and carried on was called daotong 道統, the “tradition of Confucian moral principles” or “the succession of the Way.” This daotong thus symbolizes the tradition of truth that clearly distinguished itself from the heretical Buddhism and Daoism. As Han Yu wrote in his “Essentials of the Moral Way”: What Way is this? It is what I call the Way, not what the Daoists and Buddhists have called the Way. Yao passed it on to Shun, Shun to Yu, Yu 46  In 763 when the An Lushan Rebellion had just been put down, the Head of the Ministry of Rites Yang Wan (d. 777) asserted that Mencius was also “a great learned Confucian,” and recommended that in studying for the Filial and Incorrupt examination (xiaolian yike), the Mengzi should be studied together with the Lunyu and the Xiaojing. This may have been the beginning of the re-emergence of Mencius. Later on in 780, the Prefect of Haozhou, Zhang Yi (d. 783) compiled the Menzi yinyi. In the Early and High Tang, Mencius did not have much influence and very few people quoted from the Mengzi.

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to Tang, Tang to King Wen, King Wu and the Duke of Zhou; then these passed it on to Confucius, who passed it on to Mencius. But after the death of Mencius it was not passed on.47 This passage is significant in two important ways. First, it establishes the legitimacy of a historical genealogy of thought by continuing the orthodoxy of the legenday Four Emperors (Yao, Shun, Yu and Tang), the Two Kings (Wen and Wu), the Duke of Zhou and Confucius through Mencius to contemporary times: “My Way is thus the Way that was passed down by Confucius, Mencius and Yang Xiong.”48 It draws upon the support of this imaginatively constructed historical genealogy to establish the authority of a way of thought with itself at the center. Second, it establishes the historical origins of a rational system of thought. Since the Mencian way of thinking extends opportunely from intrinsic human nature toward extrinsic political rule, then “the idea that only a sage can realize his heavenly endowed nature was explained clearly by Mencius in his book, and one should study it thoroughly…. The way of realizing this nature is none other than being sincere.49 In this way the genealogy of correct thought continues on naturally. Han Yu believed that if they possessed a historical genealogy of thought, they could eliminate the influence of alien religion, restore the authority of Confucian knowledge, thought and belief, and re-establish the demarcation of center and periphery in the intellectual world. He further believed that the political world would follow the intellectual world and its authority and order would be restored.50

47  Han Yu, “Yuandao,” Han Changli wenji jiaozhu, 1986, j. 1. Translation from De Bary & Bloom, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 573. De Bary renders daotong as “Succession of the Way” in his later discussions of Song Neo-Confucianism. See Sources chapter 20. 48  Han Yu, “Chongda Zhang Ji shu,” Han Changli wenji xiaozhu, 1986, j. 2: 136. 49   Han Yu, “Da housheng wen Lunyu shu,” Han Changli wenji xiaozhu, 1986, houfu, “Yiwen,” 727. 50  I should also point out that at the same time that they re-established order in the intellectual world, they also had to re-establish the authority of the language used to express this new thought. In essence, the “Reviving Ancient Prose Movement” (fuxing guwen yundong 復興古文運動) of Han Yu and others simply used elegant ancient prose to resist the overly decorative and ornate language used in the official examination system. With the emergence of the slogan that “writing expresses the Way” (wen yi zai dao 文以載道) in the eleventh century, this elegant ancient prose transcended literature per se and possessed the ability to transmit thought and ideas.

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2.5 In his “On Han Yu” (Lun Han Yu), Chen Yinque summarized six aspects of Han’s thought as “establishing the tradition of the moral principle or daotong to demonstrate the historical origins of transmission [of the Dao];” “pointing directly to human relations and eliminating the trivial details of studying sentences and phrases;” “rejecting Buddhism and Daoism and rescuing government and society from evil;” “condemning the Buddha and asserting the clear boundary between Chinese and Barbarians;” “changing the literary style and achieving wide efficiency through its propagation;” and “encouraging and promoting newcomers while expecting that his teaching could be spread, or made known, to later generations.”51 These six aspects are seen to constitute the significance of Han Yu’s carrying on the past heritage and opening up future thought, culture, and scholarship. Although later on many scholars doubted or even criticized Chen Yinque’s thinking and conclusions, we still in general agree with him. These six aspects do indeed represent the common intellectual tendencies of Han Yu and a great many scholars contemporaneous with him. Now I need to further point out that ever since the shock of the An Lushan Rebellion, scholars had continuously entertained the idea of “reform” (weixin 維新). They hoped to “eradicate old habits” (ge jiufeng) and “return to the correct Way” (gui zhengdao).52 Li Jifu (758–814), Pei Du (765–839), and Li Deyu (787–85), when in government office, resisted alien peoples outside the country, pacified the provincial military governors inside the country, and defended imperial power to restore order in the state. Han Yu, Li Ao and many contemporary scholars had similar ideas about re-affirming the authority of Confucianism to reform the intellectual world. Their ideas included the following: (1) To emphasize the universal rationality of the “Way,” to ground this universal rationality of the “Way” on “human nature,” and to re-establish morality and political order by consciously returning to basic human nature (benxing). (2) Through the re-establishment of this world of knowledge, thought and belief, to make society return to the pure and honest customs, simple thinking, and peaceful and unsophisticated state of ancient times. To rely

51  Chen Yinque, “Lun Han Yu,” Lishi yanjiu 2 (1954), 105–114. 52  The word “reform” (weixin) had already been used in 778 in a memorial by Peng Yan (fl. 766–780) See, “Peng Yan zhuan,” JTS, j. 127: 3580.

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upon the “tranquility” ( jing 靜) of everyone’s original nature to restrain the “activity” (dong 動) of everyone’s feelings and desires. (3) To re-establish the authority of the state and the intellectual order. At the time, all of this was undoubtedly an extremely idealistic way of thinking. In a certain sense, they simply did not want to consider various aspects of the real world and of actual individual feelings and emotions. They regarded the “Way” as the absolute truth; regarded “nature” (xing) as basic human nature and denied “feelings” or “emotions” (qing); they regarded Confucian doctrines as the only truth in the intellectual world and repudiated all heresies; they made “social order” their only priority and regarded it as supremely reasonable while rejecting the rationality of any other political alternatives; they went so far as to raise the imperial power above everything else and to endow it with a very formidable exclusiveness. Scholars who find themselves in extremely anxious and distressed situations often produce such idealistic “utopian” forms of thought. It should be admitted that this idealistic thinking harbored within it another possibility. When such exceedingly idealized thinking was carried out to its ultimate limit and emphasized the absolute authority of the state (government) and the intellectual order, then all other needs—the individual’s emotional needs, free space for society, enjoyment of national or ethnic cultures, the public’s pluralistic choices, and even intellectual and cultural policy compromises—would lose their reason for existence in the face of this idealistic supreme truth. Implicit in this state of affairs might be a tendency toward totalism, and the result of such totalism is generally intellectual conformity and obedience. Of course, in the yuanhe (806–821) and changqing (821–824) reign periods and even later, this sort of thinking did not really go to extremes. In the beginning of the ninth century, when Han Yu became the leader of a new thought group, he was not immediately accepted by general public opinion and did not receive complete support from the political authorities. His was, after all, a group of men of letters and they were expressing an extremely high-minded, unrealistic and impractical idealism. At the beginning of the yuanhe reign period, from 806 to 810, in Chang-an and Luoyang, Han Yu and other scholars, including Meng Jiao (751–814), Zhang Ji (ca. 766–c. 830) and Li Ao, came together to form a coterie of men of letters that had considerable influence among literary circles, but they were only active in the field of literature. Han Yu became a genuine leader of intellectual circles in 811 after he returned to Chang-an and after the deaths of Lu Tong (790–835), Li He (790–816), and Meng Jiao. Han Yu reached increasingly high official positions, interacted with

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an ever-broader group of people in society, and, due to his penchant for teaching others, his thought began to have an influence. In 815, Han Yu participated in a series of political plans that finally brought his thinking a step closer to harmonizing with mainstream political ideas.53 Because his thinking actually carried on the ancient Chinese slogan of “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians” (zunwang rangyi 尊王攘夷), it could naturally carry the banner of “the return to antiquity” ( fugu) to strengthen its legitimacy and reasonableness. At the same time, it also responded to contemporary realities, and, on that account, received support from those who shared a widespread feeling of anxiety. When the ideas of Han Yu and his friends began to be taken seriously, however, they also came in for some intense criticism from various people, even from some of his friends who held the same principles. There was particular scholarly resistance to the absolute and extremist tendencies of his thought and argumentation. People who were partial to Buddhism took exception, intentionally or unintentionally, to his absolute rejection of it.54 Some people were also deeply antipathetic to his penchant for lecturing others and his way of propagating thought and literature through high praise.55 Some people could not understand his argumentative habits, his fondness for writing, his thinking of the use of language as a vehicle of the Way, and his manner of seeming to occupy the high ground in the possession of the truth.56 There were also some objections to his high-sounding moral idealism and his excessive praise for Mencius.57 53  See ZJTJ, j. 239: 7712. 54  For example, Liu Zongyuan’s “Song seng Haochu xu,” records that Han Yu twice criticized him for being “addicted to the Buddha,” but he continued to maintain that some aspects of Buddhism “should not be condemned” because it’s “Way was not different from that of Confucius.” Liu Zongyuan ji, 1979, j. 25: 673. 55  On Han Yu’s penchant for lecturing others, see Sun Qiao (855 jinshi), “Yu youren lun wen shu,” QTW, j. 794: 3690. Even Liu Zongyuan did not necessarily like this practice of forming cliques and factions. See his “Yu Wei Zhongli lun shidao shu,” “Da Yan Houyu xiucai lun wei shidao shu,” and “Bao Yuan Junchen xiucai bi shiming shu,” in Liu Zongyuan ji, 1979, j. 34, 872, 878, 880. 56  Pei Du criticized Han Yu in his “Ji Li Ao shu,” for “not using writing to establish institutions, but regarding it as a game.” QTW, j. 538: 2419. Zhang Ji also criticized Han Yu as “loud and garrulous” and extremely competitive.” See Zhang Ji, “Shang Han Changli shu,” and “Shang Han Changli er shu,” QTW, j. 684: 3105. 57  Although Liu Zongyuan and Han Yu were basically in the same intellectual camp, they nevertheless had many differences. For example their ideas about “Heaven” and about the “Way” were not the same. Liu Zongyuan was also somewhat critical of Mencius who

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Han Yu’s emphasis on the “Way” and his universalizing and absolutizing of this moral principle as well as his idealistic tendency toward re-constitution of the social and government orders implied in such thinking was naturally attacked by political and governmental circles. Among them, the most severe and explicit criticism came from Li Zongmin (d. 846?), a man who occupied a rather high political position and whose views were in conflict with those of Pei Du and Li Deyu. In his “Discussion of Going Along with the Times” (Suilun), Li Zongmin took great exception to the contemporary atmosphere of “reverence for Mencius” because he believed that policies should be decided according to current circumstances and society should not be administered on the basis of any fixed “Way.” He mocked those who stubbornly adhered to antiquity and “did not change when encountering changes, nor follow the times when opportunity was at hand” as “gluing the fretts and still trying to play the zither,” and asked whether “there was a constant norm when implementing laws in ancient time.” He further ridiculed what he regarded as the excessively hypocritical empty talk of those who continued to make high-sounding speeches when society was facing a crisis and expedient methods of saving the situation were available to them. He also derided the moral idealism of Mencius as, “nothing but making people one after another protect their own goodness, how could it [be of any use for] governing the world?”58 This intellectual history polemic undoubtedly had undercurrents of differing political viewpoints and practical tactics. At that time, there were, perhaps, really two different groups behind the differing opinions about “going along with the times” (suishi 隨時) or “guarding the Way” (shoudao 守道). One faction believed in defending the actually existing contemporary situation to deal with various political and economic crises. The other faction strongly advocated changing the existing situation to bring back good order and re-establish authority. These two groups differed in their evaluation of the situation and in their choice of tactics. Those radical scholars who felt the loss of national or state authority and the breakdown of order, demanded that their already defective nation (state, government) rely on the “Way” to reaffirm a state of affairs in which imperial power is unified, that their already decaying society re-establish the ethical and moral order according to the “Way,” and that the excessively florid language of contemporary prose return to the style of ancient prose “writing to express the Way” to emphasize “meaning” and “significance.” was so vigorously praised by Han Yu. Liu believed that Mencius “loved the Way but lacked feelings, thus the results of his teaching were slow and sparse.” “Li shang,” Liu Zongyuan ji, j. 20: 546. 58  QTW, j. 714: 3248–3249.

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They employed the term “Great Peace” (taiping) to situate their social and political goals in the realm of an extremely high idealism. There was also, however, a group of rather more realistic scholars who rejected this anxious and pessimistic state of mind and its high-sounding idealism. For example, Niu Sengru (780–849)’s evaluation of the contemporary situation was that “today the four barbarians do not disturb our land, the common people live and work in peace; there are no powerful families among private households; above, the emperor is not deceived, and below, the people have no resentment or complaint; although we have not reached the height of flourishing, the situation is good enough to be considered well ordered.” Niu Sengru did not seem to have any interest in the idealism of the emperor and some scholars that demanded further progress towards an age of “Great Peace” and the pursuit of a “golden age of prosperity” (shengshi 盛世). He even complained to the emperor saying that “Your Majesty’s demands for fulfilling [my] tasks being such as they are, how can I assume this position [of Chief Minister] for long?”59 2.6 There can be no doubt that the desire of Han Yu and other scholars of the early ninth century to rebuild the authority of the government or the state (guojia) and the intellectual order was derived from their deep anxiety for the Han Chinese ethnic group (minzu), the state, and the society of that time. They also carried on the ancient idea of “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians.” They tapped into the historical memory of tradition within which they emphasized their feeling of identity with Chinese history, geographical territory, and nationality. They took historical sources from existent classical texts and tried to construct from them a system of knowledge and thought that could resist various forms of heresy. In their enlarged early-ninth-century fabrication of a so-called “tradition of Confucian moral principles” (daotong), they narrated Chinese history anew to lend support to the legitimacy and reasonableness of their new thought and to reestablish the leading role of knowledge, thought and belief. There were several kinds of significance latent in their actions. First, the newly described idea of daotong made possible the reconstruction of a genealogy of knowledge and thought. The new interpretation of the theory of human nature and feelings (xingqing) also allowed for the discovery of a new 59  “Niu Sengru zhuan,” XTS, j. 174: 5213. From Shi Jie (1005–1045)’s Song dynasty essay strongly critical of Niu Sengru, we can see that from the Tang to the Song Confucian idealists influenced by Han Yu were very dissatisfied with Niu and his faction. “Niu Sengru lun,” Culai Shi Jie xiansheng wenji (1986), j. 11: 122.

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cornerstone and an ultimate foundation for transforming traditional thought. Third, the newly and repeatedly emphasized ancient texts (like the Mencius, the “Doctrine of the Mean,” and the “Great Learning”) would provide new and authoritative classical texts for later changes in the direction of thought. Fourth and finally, “ancient prose” (guwen), endowed with a significance that transcended literature, seems to have become a glorious emblem of ancient knowledge and new thought and it symbolized the locus classicus of the “Way.” As mentioned above, however, at the time this tendency only existed in the form of a possible direction for Chinese intellectual history. Because it never achieved either discursive supremacy nor strong support from imperial power, therefore through the Late Tang and the Five Dynasties period (to 960), this radical idealism really did not receive much more support. During the last years of the progressively declining Tang dynasty, this kind of thinking only expressed the idealism of the intellectual stratum and their great desire for the return of authority and order. Mencius, whom they esteemed so highly, never held such high status in their lifetimes, and his name never appeared on the list of official sacrifices. Even though in the Confucian temples in some local districts, like Chuzhou (in today’s Zhejiang), Mencius and Xunzi were included among the Confucians to receive sacrifices,60 Mencius was only officially recognized and given official status during the xining (1068–1078) and yuanfeng (1078–1086) reign periods of the Song dynasty, that is, in the seventies and eighties of the eleventh century.61 We know, then, that Han Yu and the thoughts, discussions, and feelings of the ninth century had to wait until they were rediscovered and reinterpreted in the Song dynasty before they could come to constitute a new mode of thinking. That is the way intellectual history works: in the course of the discovery of new historical resources, the construction of new historical genealogies and new interpretations, the worlds of knowledge, thought and belief are gradually transformed.

60  This was a special case and really not the official system throughout the country. Even though during the xiantong reign period (860–874), Lu Guimeng (?–881) clearly reiterated that Mencius should be ranked above Xunzi, and Pi Rixiu (834/84–883) even more enthusiastically recommended that the Mengzi be made into an examination subject and that Han Yu be included in the sacrifices to Confucius in the Imperial University, none of these things actually came about. Lu Guimeng, “Daru ping,” QTW j. 801, 3729; Pi Rixiu, “Qing Han Wengong peixiang taixue shu,” “Qing Mengzi wei xueke shu,” QTW, j. 796, 3701; see Sun Guangxian (900–968), Beimeng suoyan, 2002, j. 2, 7. 61  SS, j. 16: 311–312; j. 105: 2548.

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Anti-Buddhist Persecution of the 840s and 9th-Century Daoist Religion

As mentioned above, in 845 Emperor Wuzong ordered the destruction of Buddhist temples and monasteries and the forcible secularization of monks and nuns; some five hundred thousand acres of farmland (using one 頃 qing is 2.7 acres) and one hundred and fifty thousand male and female servants (nubei 奴婢) were reclaimed by the state. At the same time, Zoroastrian priests and more than three thousand Zoroastrians were also forcibly secularized. At that time, with the exception of a few governor generals north of the Yellow River who did not obey the central government, this practice involved virtually the entire area of Tang China.62 It became known as “the Huichang Period AntiBuddhist Persecution” (huichang miefo 會昌滅佛).63 We should ask an important question about this sweeping persecution of Buddhism: did it have an even more intellectual history background? 3.1 The first thing we need to examine is the situation of the Daoist Religion in the first half of the ninth century. From the early Tang on, Daoist religionists who followed the Highest Clarity school (also Supreme Purity, shangqing, 上清) of Maoshan Daoism (Mt. Mao is in today’s Jiangsu) came to occupy the mainstream at the center of the world of knowledge, thought and belief.64 The Maoshan Highest Clarity school, from Sima Chengzhen (647–735) to Li Hanguang (682–769), had the greatest influence among upper echelon scholars. Even When Yan Zhengqing (709–785) in the dali (766–780) reign period and Li Bo (773–831) in the zhenyuan (785–805) reign period actually traced the history of this school, Lu Xiujing (406–477) and Tao Hongjing (456–536) of the North-South Dynasties period and Wang Yuanzhi (580–667), Pan Shizheng (?–682), Sima Chengzhen, and Li Hanguang of the Sui-Tang period were all still considered the mainstream and orthodox school of religious Daoism. This way of thinking, of course, may perhaps have been an imaginative construction of later times. The extent to which the 62  Yuanren (Ennin in Japanese, 794–864), Ru Tang qiufa xunli xingji, 1992, j. 4, 496. 63  See “Wuzong ji,” JTS, j. 18 shang: 605–606. Yuanren (Ennin), Ru Tang qiufa xunli xingji, 1992, j. 4: 479 on Yangzhou. For some modern scholarship on the huichang persecution of Buddhism, see Tang Yongtong, Sui-Tang Fojiao shigao (1982), chapter 1 part 6, 41–51, “Huichang fa-nan.” 64  See Isabelle Robinet, “Shangqing—Highest Clarity, in Livia Kohn, ed., Daoism Handbook, 2000, 196–224.

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Maoshan Highest Clarity school flourished during the Tang can be seen from the way the emperors honored and looked after it. The emperors especially favored this school during the eighth century when Sima Chengzhen and Li Hanguang were active. It was just as Yan Zhenqing wrote: “Being elevated as the teachers of the emperor, coming in and out of His Majesty’s enlightened palace, and enjoying the prestigious palanquin as a favor specially bestowed on them.”65 According to the Complete Tang Prose (Quan Tangwen), “the Maoshan school was the universal leader of the Daoist Religion.”66 Although after the chaos of the An Lushan Rebellion of the mid-eighth century, the Maoshan Highest Clarity school no longer included so many outstanding Daoist activists, nevertheless because its influence far surpassed all other branches of the Daoist Religion Maoshan was still the most sacred location of religious Daoism in the ninth century, especially among the scholar class. Just as Liu Shi (fl. 8th century) wrote, “the status of the Huayang, the Highest Clarity school of Daoist Religion, is just like the status of Confucius in the teaching of Confucianism.”67 At this time, all of the famous scholar-officials who were associated with the Daoist Religion believed in the Maoshan school. Men like the well-known calligrapher Yan Zhenqing and Wei Qumou (749–801), who called himself Yimingzi (a man without a name), had close relationships with Li Hanguang; the poet Gu Kuang (725–814) and his son Gu Feixiong (fl. ca. 836) also went to Mt. Mao to cultivate Daoism and be inducted into the Maoshan school with formal certificates. The most noteworthy of these men was Li Deyu who was later involved in the huichang suppression of Buddhism. He was a worshipper in the Maoshan school and not only did he call himself “a disciple of The Three Pure Ones,” but his wife, née Liu, and his concubine, née Xu, also received certificates as formal members of the Daoist Religion. In the ninth century, however, the Maoshan Highest Clarity school could no longer monopolize the leading position of religious Daoism at the imperial court. Although this branch still maintained the highest position among high echelon scholars, due to the confused condition of religious Daoism’s genealogy, Daoist masters of other branches followed them into the center of power. By the early ninth century, the Nanyue branch from Mt. Heng began to assert its influence. Nanyue or Mt. Heng is the Southern Mountain; one of the Five Sacred Mountains, it is located in modern Hunan province. For 65  Yan Zhenqing, “You Tang Maoshan Yuan Jing xiansheng Guangling Li jun beiming,” QTW, j. 340: 1523–1524. 66  Liu Shi (fl. eighth century), “Maoshan Ziyangguan Xuanjing xiansheng bei,” QTW, j. 377: 1694. 67  Ibid.

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example, in the beginning of the yuanhe (806–821) reign period, Tian Liangyi and Jiang Shehong were “absolutely outstanding in their Daoist cultivation, and people from near and far all admired and respected them.”68 Tian Liangyi was also known as Tian Xuying (?–811) and Jiang Shehong as Jiang Hanhong (fl. 806–820). According to various sources, around the ninth century the followers of He Zunshi (?–743) and Tian Liangyi of the Nanyue branch were quite important. From the High Tang on, after He Zunshi there was not only Tian Xuying (Liangyi) but also, Du Guangting (850–933), the most important Late Tang religious Daoist. Among the Daoist masters of this branch, Tian Liangyi, Feng Weiliang (fl. 806–820) and Ying Yijie (810–894) known later as the “Three Masters of the Numinous Treasure Mystery Grotto” (Dongxuan Lingbao sanshi 洞玄靈寶三師)—the original initiative master ( jingshi 經師), the subsequent, preaching or transmission master ( jieshi 藉師), and the inducting master (dushi 度師)—even though they sometimes also proclaimed themselves to be followers of the Maoshan Highest Clarity school.69 In Emperor Wuzong’s time, the doctrinal genealogy of those Daoist masters who frequented the court and urged on the persecution of Buddhism was, however, not very clear. From Zhao Guizhen (?–846) to Wang Qiong (9th century) and from Liu Xuanjing (?–851) to Deng Yankang (773–859), they came mostly from Nanyue, Mt. Magu (in Jiangxi), Mt. Luofu (in Guangdong) and so on. They did not necessarily come from one branch of religious Daoism, but they had a common orientation and common expertise. It would seem that in addition to the arts of Daoist immortals, they were particularly good at establishing vegetarian dietary regimens and performing sacrifices for blessings and avoiding disasters, worshiping the astral deities, ordering about ghosts and spirits, and refining and ingesting cinnabar elixirs. Perhaps it was for this reason that they were favored and trusted by emperors Jingzong (Li Zhan, r. 825–827) and Wuzong. Perhaps this was also why they met with severe criticism, even from scholars who were also believers in religious Daoism. 3.2 In 826, Li Deyu, who was in Runzhou (in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu) at the age of forty, sent a memorial up to Emperor Jingzong expressing his doubts about Zhao Guizhen and Du Jingxian (fl. 825), Zhou Xiyuan (mid-9th century), and others that he had recommended to the court. He particularly criticized these invitees to court as the kind of people who were definitely “pedantic and obscure, 68  Zhao Lin, Yin Hualu, j. 4, jiaobu, yuanhe chu. See http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=231063. Also see http://www.guoxue.com/tangyanjiu/tdsl/yhl/yhl04.htm. 69  “Dongxuan lingbao sanshi ji,” Daozang, Dongxuanbu pululei, you er, di liu ce, 751–752.

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strange, and without principle; they treat the conventional practice of melting ice with special medicine as not important, but show off their weird and uncanny methods to deceive the wisdom of Your Majesty.” He said that the Daoist Religion was worthy of belief, but one should not believe in these men.70 In 844, just when the arrogance of Zhao Guizhen and other Daoists was at its height and they were most clamorous, Li Deyu, at the age of fifty-eight, again warned Emperor Wuzong against favoring and trusting Zhao.71 Li Deyu’s attitude was quite representative. He believed in the Daoist Religion, and his attitude was the same as other Daoist religionists during the huichang persecution of Buddhism. This was not, however, solely because he was a long-time believer in religious Daoism. An even more important reason was that the result of this persecution of Buddhism was in agreement with his desire to re-establish the authority of the government and intellectual order. At that time, as discussed above, there were a considerable number of higher officials and scholars who shared a widespread feeling of anxiety. They carried on the traditional idea of “honoring the king and repelling the barbarians,” and derived from it a trend of thought leading toward the re-establishment of the authority of the government and the intellectual order. They were always uneasy about the Buddhist monastic economy that seriously threatened the power of the Chinese state and about the Buddhist beliefs that had penetrated deeply into the world of Chinese thought. Even though the persecution of Buddhism arose due to the activities of Daoist masters whom they did not very much trust or hold in esteem, still they often looked on from the sidelines or were even happy to see it happen. They were not really stunned by or ashamed of the sometimes excessive persecution of the Buddhists. Their indulgent attitude actually facilitated this fairly cruel movement to eliminate Buddhism. What is even more worthy of our attention is that Li Deyu, no matter how devout his belief in the Daoist Religion, was fundamentally a Confucian scholar-official. He obviously did not approve of or endorse the activities of Zhao Guizhen and other Daoist masters at the court of Emperor Wuzong, much less did he approve of their seemingly mysterious Daoist techniques, ceremonies and practices.72 In his critique, these ceremonies and practices with their long history in religious Daoism were regarded by Confucian scholar-officials 70  “Li Deyu zhuan,” JTS, j. 174: 4517–4518. 71  ZZTJ, j. 247: 8000 records the events of bingzi, fourth month, huichang year four. 72  According to a “Lun” in SGSZ, j. 17; 435, Zhao Guizhen mainly “instructed the emperor on the arts of how to prolong life and the arts of mysterious secrets such as have not existed in ancient times or today.”

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as the preposterous black arts of sorcerers and wizards. Li Deyu pursued a balanced position of maintaining a tolerant attitude toward the Daoist Religion and its persecution of Buddhism, both supported by the emperor, while vigilantly guarding against presumptuous and absurd Daoist master like Zhao Guizhen. The widespread consensus of the great majority of contemporary scholars was to separate out the Daoist Religion’s ideas of transcendence and tranquility and its ultimate ideals and practical techniques and recognize them as Daoism (daojia). At the same time, they equated Daoist adepts ( fangshi, magicians) and Daoist masters who were experts at relieving distress and reproached them for being shamans and wizards. For example, in the second half of the eighth century, in his On the Biographies of Immortals (Shenxian zhuan lun), Liang Su criticized those Daoist masters who “transform gold to make cinnabar elixirs and refine the vital essence to preserve life;” he believed that they did not understand Lao-Zhuang thought and did not deserve to be included in the “Daoist School.”73 In the yuanhe reign period, Pei Lin (d. 838) also memorialized Emperor Xianzong concerning his belief in those adepts who refined elixirs. His critique was that “all of those who show off their techniques for refining elixirs are certainly not people who comprehend the Way; they all come to court seeking their own benefit and asserting that they can concoct elixirs to make you immortal.”74 Even Niu Sengru, whose political stance differed from Li Deyu, was also very antipathetic to Emperor Jingzong’s “inviting Daoist masters from all over the world to talk to him about long life” during the baoli reign period (825–827). He wrote that “Your Majesty should read the Five Thousand Words of the Supremely Mysterious and Primordial Emperor (Laozi) to obtain pure tranquility and a long, healthy life. Those Daoist masters are all mediocre characters, who boast emptily about absurdities. How can they be worthy of emulation?75 This was exactly the same as Li Deyu’s opinion. In general, scholar-officials all approved of the Daoist Religion’s spiritual beliefs, tranquil lifestyle, and ideal of transcendence while rejecting its concoction of elixirs, dietary regimens, sacrifices, prayers to avoid calamities, burying magic incantations and imprecations in a designated site when starting a construction project, and all such rituals, practices and techniques. They believed that these ceremonies, practices and techniques were barbarous, ignorant and 73  QTW, j. 519: 2336. 74  “Pei Lin zhuan,” JTS, j. 171: 4450, quotes from a memorial he submitted during the chang­ qing reign period (821–824). 75  “Tang gu Taizishaoshi Qizhang jun Kaiguogong zeng Taiwei Niugong muzhiming, bing xu,” Du Mu, Fanchuan wenji, 1978, j. 7: 114.

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antithetical to civilization. From very early in Chinese history, it was the common tendency of the intellectual strata to accept the spiritual beliefs of religion while rejecting religious ceremonies and practices. 3.3 In ancient times, because Confucian doctrines constituted an ideology that was the foundation of imperial politics, and officials to fill the imperial bureaucracy were selected from this intellectual stratum, Confucian knowledge and culture exerted a tremendous pressure, so much so that it forced the Daoist Religion to transform itself. Ever since the fourth-century, the Daoist Religion had been trying to purify itself to draw closer to the scholar elite strata and to their faith and religious consciousness; since then, the Daoist Religion had yielded to the mainstream. In public forums, in dissemination to the higher strata of Chinese society, and in their writings and the arrangement of their classical canon, members of the Daoist Religion tried very hard to conceal their ritual and practical nature while highlighting their theoretical and transcendent side. There have been at least four important phenomena that researchers have paid attention to that can make this trend in the Daoist Religion of the Tang and Song dynasties clear. First was the theory of “Twofold Mystery” (chongxuan 重玄) that appeared in the Daoist Religion from the seventh century on, and the concomitant orientation toward emphasizing theory. The idea of the “Twofold Mystery” derived from the first chapter of the Laozi: “… Darker than any Mystery, The Doorway whence issue all Secret Essences.”76 From the Southern dynasties and Sui-Tang period on, a group of scholars in the Daoist Religion explained and interpreted this concept of Twofold Daoist Mystery and regarded it as the ideal common realm uniting humanity and the universe. This gave rise to a re-interpretation and re-institution of the Daoist Religion’s concept of human nature, methods of cultivation, and ultimate goals.77 This 76  Arthur Waley’s translation of last two lines of Laozi, chapter 1 is in the spirit of the Chinese scholars discussed here. The Way and its Power, 1948, 141. Chan, SB, 139 gives a less mystical translation: “… They both can be called deep and profound (xuan 玄), Deeper and more profound, The door of all subtleties!”. 77  The earliest examination of “Emphasizing the Mysteries” thought was Meng Wentong, “Jiaoli Laozi Cheng Xuanying (fl. 630s and 640s) shuxulu) in Guxue zhenwei, 1987, 343– 360. The first work to discuss its main points and to designate it as a school of thought was Minoru Sunayama’s “Daojiao zhongxuanpai biaowei” in Shûkan Tôyôgaku 43 (1980), later included in Minoru’s Zui Tô Dôkyô shisōshi kenkyû, 1990, part 2, chapter one. Other Chinese research on this tendency includes Lu Guolong’s Zhongguo zhongxuanxue, 1993,

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trend toward emphasizing theory that began in the Sui-Tang period continued to increase among the higher-level members of the Daoist Religion. For example, works appeared like The Principle Meanings of the Mysterious Gate (Xuanmen dayi) as well as Meng Anpai (7th century)’s encyclopedic Pivotal Meanings of Daoist Teaching (Daojiao yishu), and others that contain re-interpretations of Daoist mysteries under the influence of Buddhism.78 Second was the Scripture of the Genesis Point (Benji jing), published during the Sui dynasty. This classic that thoroughly discussed the “Dao nature” (daoxing 道性) was both highly esteemed by the government and widely popular in the general society. Scholars have generally noted that among the manuscripts of the Daoist Religion discovered at Dunhuang, there are 103 copies of The Canon of the Greatest Mystery of the Genesis Point (Taixuan zhenyi benji jing, abbreviated as Taixuan jing). This makes up some 21% of the 493 Daoist Religion manuscripts from Dunhuang, more than any other scriptures of the Daoist Religion.79 Moreover, the central discussions of this Daoist classic do not concern the arts of the immortals (shenxian zhi shu), but rather quite abstract questions such as “the primal origin or genesis point” (koti, benji 本際 or primal nothingness benwu 本無), “immortal Dao body” (daoshen 道身 or Dao nature, daoxing), “twofold forgetfulness” ( jianwang 兼忘 or Daoist austerities, xiulian 修煉), the realm of the Twofold Mystery (chongxuan jingjie 重玄境界) and so on. Third was the symbolic stance and the orientation of the Highest Clarity (Supreme Purity) school of Maoshan Daoism that was supported by imperial patronage. They emphasized and disseminated the idea from the Laozi that “the pursuit of the Dao consists in decreasing (subtracting) day by day, decreasing and again decreasing until you reach the point of non-action (wuwei),”80 and Zhuangzi’s “goal of non-interference (wuwei zhi zhi 無為之旨).” When they discussed the practices of the Daoist immortals, all of the Highest Clarity Daoist and others. I believe that “Emphasizing the Mysteries” is only an intellectual tendency in Sui-Tang Daoist Religion and should not be regarded as a school of thought. See Ge Zhaoguang, “Ping Sui-Tang daojiao sixiangshi yanjiu,” Tang yanjiu 2 (1997), 466–470. 78  See Mugitani Kunio, “Nanbeichao Sui Tang chu daojiao jiaoyixue guankui” in Riben xuezhe lun Zhongguo zhexueshi, Zhonghua, 1986, 232–250. 79  There are many copies of the Benji jing (本際經) among the Daoist Religion manuscripts from Dunhuang; see Kamata Shigeo, Dôzônai Bukkyô shisô shiryô shûsei. 80  These lines are from the Laozi, chapter 48. We have modified Arthur Waley and Wing-tsit Chan’s translations. Waley, 201 has “The practice of Tao consists in subtracting day by day, Subtracting and yet again subtracting, Till one has reached inactivity.” Chan, SB, 162 has “The pursuit of Tao is to decrease day by day. It is to decrease and further decrease until one reaches the point of taking no action.”

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leaders who maintained good relationships with the emperor—Pan Shizheng, Sima Chengzhen, Li Hanguang, Wu Yun (?–778)—always told the emperor he should emphasize morality and that refining cinnabar elixirs to obtain long life and become an immortal was really not important for emperors, but was rather “the behavior of the uncouth.”81 Finally, there were the Maoshan Highest Clarity school texts by important figures, such as Sima Chengzhen’s Master of Heavenly Immortality (Tianyin zi) and On Sitting in Oblivion (Zuowanglun), Wu Yun’s The Mysterious Network (Xuanganglun) and so on. These texts of the Tang dynasty Daoist Religion have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. They represent the Daoist Religion’s interest in metaphysical philosophy and its ideas concerning the pursuit of transcendence. Because the Daoist Religion presented these text to scholars as very praiseworthy, and elite scholar-officials demonstrated an interest in them they brought about a change in the Daoist Religion of these scholar-officials. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the polemic competition between the Daoist Religion and Buddhism from the two Jin and the NorthSouth Dynasties period (from 265 to 589) into the Tang dynasty also spurred on these changes among the upper level members of the Daoist Religion. It can be justly said that Daoist religious thought did not originally have any particularly rich theoretical elements, especially not concerning human nature and transcendence. That is why, from the Wei-Jin and North-South Dynasties on, the Daoist Religion continually borrowed various Buddhist terms, knowledge and thought, and dressed them up in ancient Daoist garb. For example, the “Twofold Mystery” trend of thought, mentioned above as one of the four significant phenomena of the history of the Daoist Religion during the Sui-Tang period, absorbed various elements of Buddhist thinking while the Scripture of the Genesis Point cites Buddhist ideas concerning many technical terms such as the Buddha nature ( foxing), dispelling unreal appearances or phenomena, abandoning thought, and practicing calmness (meditation) and wisdom (dinghui 定慧). At the beginning of the High Tang, the various greatly respected Masters of the flourishing Highest Clarity school of Maoshan Daoism were all quite well versed in Buddhism. Perhaps it was just in their polemics with Buddhism that they unconsciously assimilated Buddhist knowledge and 81  See Yunji qiqian, j. 113: 632; Yan Zhenqing, “Xuan Jing xiansheng Guangling Li jun bei­ ming,” QTW, j. 340, 1523–1524; the former cites Liu Shi, “Maoshan Ziyangguan Xuan Jing xiansheng bei,” QTW, j. 377, 1694; Quan Deyu, “Wu Zunshi zhuan,” in Daozang, Taixuan bu, 6 zun, 23 ce, 682. The transmission of this text is problematic; it is quite different from Quan’s preface to Wu Yun wenji, and further research is needed determine its authenticity.

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this caused the members of the upper echelon of the Daoist Religion to pay increasingly greater attention to metaphysical and spiritual questions like original human nature and human life, the origin and transformation of the universe, the possibility of human transcendence and so on. This also led these upper echelon members to display a more elegant and simple life philosophy and inclinations and interests that transcended the secular world. Interest in these issues and their style of living gradually became the sign that marked their entrance into the upper level of society, and such issues also became the focus of the upper echelon of believers in the Daoist Religion. Of course we should also be aware that the polemics between Buddhism and Daoism in the Tang dynasty, especially those carried out in front of the emperor, were no longer genuine religious confrontations. In Xuanzong’s time (712–756), the tendency was toward moderation between the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, and as time went on these intellectual confrontations grew increasingly attenuated. The discourse of the Three Teachings was in balance at the royal court, and, with the exception of the argument between Wu Yun and Shen Yong (710–788), these discussions actually developed into dramatic performances in which the advocates of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism simply tried to please the emperor.82 The coming together of various forms of thought was already the trend, and 82  For example on the birthday of Emperor Dezong in the twelfth year of the zhenyuan period (796), a discussion forum on the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism was held for the occasion. However, it was turned into an entertainment for the emperor by the mutual mocking of Confucian scholar-officials Zhao Xu and Xu Mengrong (?–818), Daoist scholar-official Wei Qumou (749–801), and a Buddhist named Tan Yan. In the tenth month of the first year of the taihe period (827), the discussion forum that Bo Juyi, the Director of the Palace Library, a Buddhist named Yilin, and a Daoist Yang Hongyuan participated in simply became a ritualistic activity.  The last serious and fierce polemic between Buddhism and Daoism in the Tang dynasty was incited by Wu Yun (?–778) in the dali reign period (766–779). It is said that at the time Wu Yun had written three essays—“Mingzhen bianwei,” “Fuzheng chuxie,” and “Bianfang zhenghuo”—“to defame Buddhist masters and honor Daoist doctrines.” This gave rise to an ardent debate with the Chan Master Shen Yong. See “Fozu tongji,” in Taishô, j. 49, 202. SGSZ, j. 17 also records that “earlier the Daoist Wu Yun from Mt. Song in Henan produced several evil treatises to slander and attack Buddhism. Those muddle headed people were deluded by them. Chen Shaoyou (724–784), the Surveillance Commissioner (guancha shi) of our region (in Zhejiang), invited Monk Shenyong to judge between Buddhism and Daoism which represents the perfect Dao…. At the time when Shenyong and Wu Yun had just arrived there, Wu Yun’s carriage got overturned; Shenyong thus wrote a treatise in three juan entitled On Breaking and Overturning the Baffled or Confused (Po daofan milun). Almost none of these essays survived into later times, and

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hence, whether they spoke in derision or to curry favor, all parties had to put on a unified front under the auspices of political power. If we explore, however, the deeper significance of these debates between the Three Teachings, then we need to explain something about the Daoist Religion that had originally been “marginalized” in the area of theory. As they entered the center of the intellectual world, in those competitive confrontations of language and thought, the advocates of religious Daoism had to raise significant issues that could challenge their opponents, and some of the intellectual topics they brought up were very important. For example, during the xianqing reign period (656–661) Li Rongli (fl. 683) proposed discussing “the significance of the Genesis Point (or primal origin)” (benji yi) and “the meaning of the Dao gave birth to the ten thousand things” (dao sheng wanwu yi, derived from Laozi chapter 42) touching upon the quite profound issue of the origin of the universe as well as a rather abstruse linguistic question. Facing the refutations and counter arguments of the Buddhists, also forced the advocates of the Daoist Religion to think deeply about Buddhist philosophy and its very complex methods of argumentation. In every debate, they had to pick out carefully some central topics, and this selection process itself required a detailed understanding of the various intellectual positions of Buddhism, Daoist Religion, and Confucianism. In the process of gaining this understanding, the Daoist religionists could not help re-evaluating their own positions, reasoning and discourse. As the Song Gaoseng zhuan puts it: “facing the various confusing and crisscrossing lines of reasoning, they had to resist and refute them one by one, and, in so doing, the disordered lines of thought became re-regulated and reorganized on their own and eventually returned to the right and just path.”83 In these sorts of competitive confrontations of knowledge, thought and belief, some subtle and abstruse Buddhist theories seeped into the Daoist Religion. Those ideas about spiritual transcendence that scholars regarded as more refined and elegant came to prominence among the elite scholars of the Daoist Religion and so they and their classic texts came to take precedence over the beliefs and techniques in the Daoist Religion that had originally derived from shamans and adepts (magicians). There is another point about the Daoist Religion from the last half of the eighth century to the first half of the ninth century that we need to pay attention to. The genealogy of schools of the Daoist Religion that originally seemed to be quite straightforward had become rather confused. The schools, like the there are very few records of this polemic; they are almost completely absent in documents on the Daoist Religion. 83  “Tang Jingzhao Da-an Guosi Li She zhuan,” SGSZ, 1987, j. 17: 420.

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Zhengyi or Tianshi (Celestial Masters) Zhengyi, Lingbao or Numinous Treasure, and the Highest Clarity (Supreme Purity), that could be clearly delineated on the basis of their practices, written charms, ceremonies and their areas of religious activity during the North-South Dynasties, in the ninth century ceased to represent obvious demarcations of schools of Daoist Religion. They no longer maintained definite regional areas of activity either. The so-called Zhengyi, Lingbao and Highest Clarity schools became increasingly more like a hierarchical ladder which was used to define people as junior fellow apprentices with different statuses under the same religious master or group. During the North-South Dynasties and the Sui-Tang period, the increasingly intermixed and converging Daoist ritual procedures and their texts and talismans for eliminating evil spirits among the Zhengyi, Lingbao, and Highest Clarity schools seem to have already distinguished their high or low status. Among the various texts and talismans, the rather intellectualized (wenrenhua) and highbrow Highest Clarity (Supreme Purity) school of Maoshan Daoism came to be ranked highest. Placing the Zhengyi school rather low in the Daoist Religion and giving the Highest Clarity school premier status itself suggests a value orientation. Since they wanted to win the high esteem of scholars in public forums, Daoist masters may have wanted to hide their original doctrinal backgrounds and appear in the guise of the Highest Clarity school. Many contemporary members of the Daoist Religion would then seek to obtain texts and talismans for eliminating evil spirits from the Highest Clarity and would all declare themselves members of this school. At the same time, they would claim that they had grasped Highest Clarity knowledge and thought, and were willing to express even more in open forums that what they grasped was the profound theory for realizing pure and quiet cultivation. This tendency suggests that at that time members of the Daoist Religion had to admit that the highest realm of their faith was its seemingly recondite theories, pure lifestyle, and elegant discourse. There was no other way they could go because if their religion was to be established in higher levels of society and in mainstream culture, they had to cater to the tastes and interests of the scholars who were in command of intellectual authority. They also had to establish a place for themselves within a recognized intellectual genealogy. In the world of ancient China where imperial, religious and intellectual authority were all highly unified, this was the only way for a religion to establish itself in elite society. By the ninth century, then, this tendency had become a consensus among high level members of the Daoist Religion and it had also become the key to the recognition of the Daoist Religion among the upper strata of Chinese society. When scholars wrote biographies or inscriptions on

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stone tablets for celebrated masters of the Daoist Religion, such knowledge, thought and belief was always highlighted in their narratives. 3.4 The leaders of Emperor Wuzong’s “Huichang Period Anti-Buddhist Persecution” were actually not, however, members of the upper level mainstream of the Daoist Religion. They were rather a group of Daoist priests who were not really welcomed by the intellectual strata or the official bureaucracy. Although they employed various magic arts to win imperial support, this really rather illadvised anti-Buddhist movement came to an end after Emperor Wuzong died from ingesting elixirs. In the third month of the sixth year of the huichang period (846), Tang Emperor Xuanzong (Li Chen, r. 846–859) came to the throne. He immediately had Zhao Guizhen and other Daoist priests executed and banished the Daoist master Xuanyuan Ji (9th century) to Lingnan (modern Guangdong and Guangxi). In the following year, Xuanzong also ordered the restoration of previously destroyed Buddhist monasteries. The persecution of Buddhism that was originally caused by the Daoist Religion resulted, in the end, in the failure of the Daoist Religion in the world of the Chinese elite. After the religion suffered this defeat, its knowledge and techniques of summoning and testing incantations and magic symbols, dietary regimens, prayers for warding off calamities, concocting elixirs, and “uniting the vital essence” (heqi 合氣) of male and female seem to have become further removed from elite society and mainstream civilization following the repudiation and fall from grace of those Daoist priests. After the ninth century, then, at least in public forums, the practitioners of the Daoist Religion could not but make a pure and tranquil nourishment of life the sign of their belief, the mysteriously unfathomable discourse of their scriptures the hallmark of their religion, and a lofty transcendence of the dusty world the ideal goal of their austere cultivation. All of those summoning and testing incantations and magic symbols, dietary regimens, prayers for warding off calamities, concocting elixirs and “uniting the vital essence” of male and female that were originally a very important part of the Daoist Religion were even more “marginalized” and declined to a status of secondary importance. They went from being a celebrated part of the practice of religious Daoism to an existence as secret arts, declining from the upper to the lower level of religious observance.

Chapter 9

From Song to Ming: The Establishment of a New Tradition I (Mid-10th Century to the End of the 16th Century)

Prologue: China Before the Birth of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle

For some twenty years in the second half of the tenth century, the Song emperors Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin, 927–976, r. 960–976) and Taizong (Zhao Kuangyi, 939–997, r. 976–997) recovered or pacified the states of Northern Han, Southern Tang, Wuyue, Southern Han, Later Shu, and so on. Except for the Liao Khitan dynasty (916–1125) in the north and the Xi Xia Tangut state (1038–1227) in the north west, the constantly changing situation of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907–960) and the land seizures of the Regional Commanders since the Mid-Tang dynasty were basically brought to and end. With the establishment of the Song dynasty (Northern, 960–1127; Southern, 1127–1276), China again entered an era of “unity” (yitong 一統). With the Liao and the Xi Xia occupying a very large piece of land formerly controlled by the Tang empire, however, this “unity” was far from perfect. Under pressure from the border regions, the disdainful attitude of Chinese emperors toward “All Under Heaven” was subtly transformed. At the beginning of the Song dynasty, the celebrated official Zhao Pu (922–992) consoled himself by saying that “the five stars and twenty-eight constellations along with the five sacred mountains and the four great waterways are all in China and not with the four barbarians (siyi 四夷).”1 On the one hand, they felt somewhat at peace by limiting their borders to the area of China occupied by the Han people, but on the other hand they were quite worried because they now knew that this China was no longer a tianxia; it no longer represented “All Under Heaven.” Precisely because they were facing foreign countries, besides resisting the threat of alien peoples, the Song dynasty of the Zhao family also had to emphasize the legitimacy of their government (state, guojia) and demonstrate the reasonableness of their culture. They felt a profound and pressing anxiety, and this anxiety was the starting point for Song cultural awareness. These were 1  “Guan huixing,” Song wenjian, 1992, j. 41, 619. According to XZZTJCB, 1979, j. 30, 685, this memorial was submitted in 989.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_004

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the feelings both of the emperors and the high officials. After the loss of state authority and the increasing intellectual chaos of the Late Tang and the Five Dynasties period, these urgent feelings of apprehension were conspicuous among many intellectuals both at court and in the society at large. Both the menace of foreign enemies and internal divisions represented a crisis of legitimacy for the government (the state) and the social order. Re-establishing state authority and intellectual order were both rather thorny problems. This was especially so at the beginning of the Song. Having experienced the chaos of the end of the Tang and the Five Dynasties, the military revolt of 960 that brought Zhao Kuangyin to power and then his sudden death leading to the suspicion that Zhao Kuangyi murdered his elder brother to usurp the throne, how could people be convinced that this was a legitimate and reasonable political regime? In traditional China where a new regime always had to prove that it had “received and was carrying out the Mandate of Heaven,” it required more than just political and military power. It also seemed to need a series of cultural policies to support its legitimacy. On this account, the following actions of the early Song court were quite significant. First, they re-established a ritual system and tried to validate the legitimacy of Heaven’s gift of power to them by means of a series of ceremonies. Second, they progressively established an authoritative and efficient bureaucratic system and reestablished political, economic, and cultural order. All this was well received by the general public. Finally, step by step they re-established the efficiency of the world of knowledge, thought and belief, employed education and examinations to foster a hierarchical intellectual class, and re-established a well ordered cultural support system in order to re-affirm intellectual order. After about forty or fifty years, due to the signing of the Chanyuan Treaty of 1004 with the Liao Khitan state, external threats to the Song dynasty were temporarily eliminated. By the reign of Zhenzong (Zhao Heng, 916–1122, r. 997–1122), the legitimacy of the state and its power had become generally accepted. Since it had established an authoritative governmental system and restored political, economic and cultural order, the Zhao Song dynasty was also acknowledged and accepted by the scholar class. The dynasty also began a process of re-establishing intellectual order using a strategy of reigning in the military and developing the civil institutional system, rehabilitating the world of knowledge, thought and belief, and using education to foster a hierarchical intellectual class. No matter how much the state re-established its legitimacy and gained the acceptance of the scholar class, however, the crisis of the world of knowledge, thought and belief still persisted. This was because the successful re-establishment of governmental authority and national (minzu) confidence

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had primarily to rely on people’s acceptance of a common culture and common ethics. After the elimination of external hardships, internal problems began to arise. Because the unity of the intellectual world no longer existed, the old world of knowledge, thought and belief had lost its power to restrain behavior. Especially after Zhenzong’s reign when confirmation of the legitimacy of dynastic power had become a thing of the past, then, provoked by the internal troubles and outside aggression, establishing the reasonableness of the intellectual order became a new focal point. Various greater anxieties that were hidden deep in the minds of the scholar class began to rise to the surface, and this led to some changes in the intellectual atmosphere of that age. As Chen Liang (1143–1194) wrote, “in the qingli (1041–1049) and jiayou (1056–1064) reign periods, those renowned scholars of the time often worried that the government would not change its laws (would not launch reforms).”2 In fact, they were not only concerned with the “laws”; the intellectual strata were also reflecting anew on the effectiveness of all knowledge, thought and belief. Hence the tendency to demand an intellectual transformation began to appear at that time. The first priority was to re-establish the significance of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief to rebuild national confidence and self-esteem during a period of widespread confusion of values. The ancient Chinese people habitually believed that China was not only the geographical center of “All Under Heaven” (tianxia) but that it was also the center of a civilizational tianxia. At that time, however, no matter how much the Chinese insisted that “All Under Heaven is one family,” various alien peoples were always quite powerful. Under attack from the cultures of these alien peoples, traditional Chinese civilization had lost its guiding force in the world of everyday life. Its significance also needed to be re-established. The intellectual world of the early Song always seemed to be discussing the political issue of “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians” (zunwang rangyi) and the historical issue of “orthodoxy” or the “tradition of political power” (zhengtong 政統, loyalty to the ruler). As soon as these arguments moved from the political realm to the cultural arena, they would begin to discuss how to “honor the king (royal house) and repel the barbarians” in the intellectual sphere and what is the “tradition of political power” in the realm of civilization. Northern Song scholars frequently expressed such intellectual demands. For example, Sun Fu (992–1057) called for the defense of Confucian doctrines while denouncing Buddhism and Daoism for “eliminating humanity and rightness, abandoning rites and music, and obstructing 2  “Quanxuan zige,” Chen Liang ji (zengding ben), 1987, j. 11.

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the eyes and ears of the world.”3 Shi Jie (1005–1045)’s essays “On China” (Zhongguo lun) and “On the Bizarre” (Guai shuo) both focused on this attempt to rebuild the centrality of Chinese civilization; in “Guai shuo” he attacked the euphuistic Xikun literary style as harmful to the sagely Way. He most stringently distinguished both the spatial and the cultural differences between “China” and the “four barbarians.” He believed the most urgent need was to resist Buddhism that was close to undermining the “constant Way (changdao 常道) of China” because it “destroyed the Way of ruler and ministers, cut off the feelings between fathers and sons, went contrary to the rites and music, broke down the five constant virtues, changed the constant position (status) of the four classes (shi nong gong shang, scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants), abandoned the Chinese people’s proper dress, removed the ancestors (from the temples), and sacrificed to the barbarians.”4 This “discourses on dynastic legitimacy” (zhengtong lun) polemic of Song dynasty historians was simply a process of reconstructing history by employing a foundation of cultural and ethnic (or national, minzu) identity for the dynasty during its time of “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians.”5 Having this sort of mentality, the significance of re-establishing the intellectual world was even more strongly emphasized. The second important priority was to re-establish an ideology and a set of lofty principles for the intellectual world, and then employ them to direct social life. This would include directing the political, economic and cultural realms in order to make the whole world of life in society correspond to these principles. Although the Zhao Song dynasty had already successfully convinced the scholar class to recognize the legitimacy of their political power, these scholars also hoped that their nation (state, government) would possess cultural legitimacy as well. On this account, they often made more idealistic demands on the government. Quite a few scholars had not entered the political world, but they were always very interested in politics and they often employed a very lofty idealism to demand a general legitimacy of politics.6

3  “Taishan xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 2, 58–59. 4  “Zhongguo lun,” “Guai shuo,” shang, zhong, xia pian, in Shi Jie, Culai Shi xiansheng wenji, 1986, j. 10, 116 and j. 5, 60–62. 5  See Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072), “Yuan zhengtong lun,” “Ming zhengtong lun,” and so on in Jushi waiji, j. 9 in Ouyang Xiu quanji, 1992, 414–416. 6  For example, when Xing Bing (932–1010) preached the Confucian classics before the emperor, “in addition to interpretation and elaboration based on commentaries and exegeses, he often employed current affairs as analogies,” “Rulin zhuan,” SS, j. 431, 12800.

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This kind of lofty idealism was based on historical experience. These scholars believed that the loss of governmental authority since the Mid-Tang was due to moral degeneration and ethical collapse. People had become indifferent to the legitimacy of the government and the rationality of the social order. It was precisely the relaxation of the restraints of morality and ethics and the disappearance of self-awareness that brought about such a historical crisis. The long two centuries of change made quite a deep impression on the memory of the intellectual class and also stimulated their thinking about rebuilding the nation and the social order. Ever since the Mid-Tang, what scholars like Han Yu and others continued to be extremely worried about was precisely the loss of governmental authority and the chaotic lack of intellectual order. They also believed, however, that to re-establish in a fundamental way the national authority and ethnic self-confidence they had to do more than simply make the people recognize the legitimacy of the state. It was even more important to rely on people’s identification with a common civilization and common ethical principles. The foundations for such a united and shared identification were “principle” (li 理) and “the Way” (dao 道) because only they were able to transcend individual life, political power, and geographical region. Thus the saying “nothing is greater than the Way and principle” (dao li zui da 道理最大).7 Shao Yong (1011–1077) wrote “There is nothing in the universe (tianxia) without principle, nature and destiny.”8 And the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), wrote that “Heaven has this principle, the sages adhered to and practiced it, it is called the Way (Dao).” Principle and the Way even surpassed the emperor. A final priority—to re-establish the critical ability of the Chinese knowledge, thought and belief world—also amounted to a reaffirmation of the significance of culture and the position of the scholars. The Song dynasty nomination and appointment of a large number of scholars opened up a channel for the official selection of scholars and filled the capital city with a great many of them. The re-establishment of government schools, especially the building of new government schools and setting up of government teachers in the prefectures and counties, and the encouragement of private learning and private schools also generated an extremely large collection of scholars in the 7  See Yao Mian, “Guichou tingdui,” Xuepo ji, 1981/83, j. 7, 3A–33B, and Shen Kuo, Mengxi bitan, Xu bitan, 2003, 285. 8  Shao Yong goes on, “These can be known only when principle has been investigated to the utmost, when nature is completely developed, and when destiny is fulfilled. The knowledge of these three is true knowledge. Chan, SB, 487–488, passage is from the Huangji jingshi shu (Supreme Principles Governing the World), 6: 26a–b.

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peripheral regions. The sacrifices to the former sages led by these teachers in the prefectures and counties and the intellectual orientation of these teachers themselves had an influence on the academic atmosphere and intellectual trends throughout the country. Their influence in the local areas allowed an atmosphere of urban culture to spread into the peripheral regions. The greater significance of this trend was that it provided the local gentry (shishen 士紳) and newly risen families a chance to train a rather large number of members of the scholarly class, and this slowly eroded the monopolistic position of the center and the great families (guizu) in knowledge, thought and belief. Under these conditions, the scholars who hoped to participate in politics often employed intellectual discussions to express their political opinions, and these opinions often developed into the positive actions of scholarly leaders. In this way, the struggle over the center of power and influence between the “tradition of political power” (zhitong 治統) and the “tradition of moral principle” (that is, the tradition of the Way of Confucius and Mencius, daotong 道統), between political power and moral and intellectual power, began to emerge. In the 1070s and 1080s, the political center and the cultural center became disconnected, and this led to the rise of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle (lixue 理學).9 Originally in ancient China, the intellectual stratum’s tactics for restricting imperial power generally relied on cultural knowledge that transcended political power. In early imperial times, however, as in Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE)’s day, scholars relied on “Heaven” (tian) to restrict the emperor’s power. They employed their interpretations of “Heaven-sent” calamities to limit imperial abuses of power. Relying on their ability to interpret various natural phenomena, they used the transcendent power of cultural knowledge to criticize imperial power and achieve a certain balance with it. After the “theory of calamities” (zaiyi shuo 災異說) and divination combined with mystical 9  There are two different meanings of the term daotong 道統: (1) the “tradition of moral principle” used in this passage, and (2) the correct Transmission of the Way or the Succession of the Way as established by Zhu Xi and others as an important part of Neo-Confucianism. There are also two main schools of Neo-Confucianism that are translated differently by various scholars: (1) Daoxue 道學, the Learning of the Way and Lixue 理學, the Learning of Principle (both the literal translations used by Theodore de Bary) also called the School of Principle by Wing-tsit Chan. (2) Xinxue 心學, the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (de Bary), the School of Mind (Chan). We use the Learning of the Way for Daoxue, the School of Principle for Lixue and the School of Mind for Xinxue depending on Professor Ge’s usage. For more on daotong and Neo-Confucianism see, Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China, 1983, 9, where he discusses daotong as the “repossession or reconstitution of the Way (daotong)”; romanization changed to pinyin. Also see his Introduction and Chapter 1: “Human Renewal and the Repossession of the Way.”

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Confucianist beliefs (chenwei 讖緯) were rejected by rationalistic scholars, they could only believe in the power of culture and knowledge, and so they hoped for a principle (li) that possessed universal applicability. They believed that because this principle was able to transcend all extant rules of nature and society, and because the scholars possessed the ability to interpret, explain and put this principle into practice, they could employ these interpretations to represent or epitomize the significance and value of knowledge, thought and belief. Just as later scholars passionately asserted, “Only the Way and Principle (daoli) are the greatest under Heaven, thus even as august a One as the Son of Heaven sometimes had to submit himself to the single word of an ordinary person, and even though he had all the wealth within the four seas, he was not supposed to use it to favor his relatives and friends.”10 “The emperors could not obtain immunity from the decisions of principle. They had to face the scholars and the culture that they represented “because they had to rule the world with the scholar-officials, not with the commoners.”11 For such reasons, in Song dynasty intellectual history, we often encounter terms like “All Under Heaven” (tianxia 天下) used together with “Great Peace” (taiping 太平), the Way (dao 道) used together with principle (li 理) and “heart/mind” (xin 心) used together with “nature” (xing 性). In fact, there was a rather concrete background behind these abstract terms. First, when scholars were very anxious about “China,” what they proposed was actually “All Under Heaven” and the “universal Way and Principle” that would suit “All Under Heaven.” Second, when they were very concerned about “enriching the country and strengthening the military” ( fuguo qiangbing 富國強兵), the goal they proposed was, however, that “All Under Heaven enjoy great peace 10  Huang Keren, ed., Huang Song zhongxing liangchao shengzheng, j. 47, [1168, qiandao 4], 1967. 11  X ZZTJCB, 1979, j. 221, 5370, xining 4th year 3rd month (1071). For example, Ouyang Xiu believed that only following the teachings of Confucius and scrupulously abiding by the “rites and rightness” (liyi 禮儀) constituted the eternal “root” (foundation). Only this “root” was able to transform fundamentally this crisis-filled world: “When the Confucian Way becomes illuminated, the teaching of the hundred schools will naturally come to an end,” and “if we can teach and cultivate it, diligently practice it and immerse ourselves in it day by day so that ordinary people will all happily move toward this Way, then it will be fully realized throughout All Under Heaven.” Only this kind of “principle,” with its “penetration among the people in a gradual manner will definitely last long and eventually [help the world] reach the realm of great peace.” On this account, Ouyang and others believed in the existence of a kind of universal truth that surpassed imperial power, and that everyone including emperors had to obey this universal truth; it was valid anywhere in the world. See “Benlun,” shang xia, Jushi ji, j. 17 in Ouyang Xiu quanji, 124.

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forever” (tianxia zhaoxi taiping 天下朝夕太平).12 Great Peace did not merely mean that the country should be populous, affluent and powerful; it was a realm of everlasting happiness and peace. Finally, when social life, especially the increasingly prosperous urban life, lost its unifying moral foundation, the basic method the scholars put forth to save society was self-awareness of “heart” (xin) and “nature” (xing). They resolutely persisted in this form of cultural idealism while simultaneously regarding the thinking embodied in the Neo-Confucian Learning of the Way (daoxue 道學) or Neo-Confucian School of Principle (lixue 理學) as the only road to China’s salvation. Without doubt this current of intellectual idealism and the movement for the promotion of thought followed and carried forward the way of thinking of Han Yu and others since the Mid-Tang. They examined once again various historical resources and seem to have had a four-fold strategy. First, to construct a so-called “tradition of moral principle” or “succession of the Way” (daotong 道統) and to write a new account of the history of thought to support the legitimacy and reasonableness of their new thought. Second, to re-interpret the ancient theory of “human nature and feelings” (xingqing shuo 性情說) so that it could serve as the ultimate new foundation for changing traditional intellectual thought. Third, to emphasize repeatedly new classical texts such as the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean” to provide authority for a later change of intellectual direction. Fourth, to accord to “Ancient Prose” (guwen) a significance that transcended writing and make it a splendid representation of both the ancient and the new thought as well as a symbol of the Way. They particularly carried forth and amplified Mid-Tang thinking about human nature and, even more significantly, raised ethical principles, hitherto merely moral demands and standards of behavior, to a paramount importance that surpassed all other first principles and established them as the foundation of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle. It must be pointed out, however, that this current of intellectual idealism and the movement for the promotion of thought always remained on the political 12  “Xie Mi zhuan,” SS, j. 306, 10095, quoting his memorial at the beginning of Zhenzong’s reign. There were many discussions of this “great peace,” and it had already become an ideal realm sought after by contemporary scholar-officials. To give two examples, “Han Yi zhuan,” SS, j. 315 quotes him as saying “when great peace prevailed under Heaven, the mind of the sage ruler would want to make even insects, grass and trees achieve satisfaction.” A poem by Cai Xiang (1012–1067) contains the lines: “our imperial house has enjoyed several decades of great peace and this is the exact time to look into antiquity and rectify our institutional rule and ritual norms.” In Zhang Zai’s famous phrase: “to establish great peace for the ten thousand generations to come.” Zhangzi yulu, zhong, ZZJ, 1978, 322.

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margin. At a time when a great number of scholars were still crowding into the examination sites and only a minority supported this transcendent position, this thought tide and intellectual movement did not really become a noted school of thought. As long as it could not obtain the support of the powers that be and could not become an ideology but only remained as the thought expressed by some very anxious scholars, it could only persist as a method of criticism and a respected form of thought among the scholar class. Following the gathering of a group of rather influential scholars at Luoyang during the second half of the eleventh century, however, as well as the emergence of more penetrating discussions of theory and history, this trend of though eventually came to be supported by some scholar-officials and expanded its influence. This planted the seeds of a later transformation of Chinese intellectual history. 1

Luoyang and Kaifeng (Bianliang): Separation of the Political and Cultural Centers

In the late 1060s into the 1070s in the political capital of Kaifeng (Bianliang), a group of scholar-officials, with the emperor’s support and represented by Wang Anshi (1021–1086), carried out their new realist policies. At the same time, in the cultural capital of Luoyang, another group of scholar-officials who were influential but temporarily lacked political power held fast to a position of high-minded conservatism. The most prestigious of them was Sima Guang (1019–1086). They had widespread influence among scholar-officials, and many people looked forward to their return to power. Although this hope could not really become a reality, still the existence of this cultural center that was capable of contending against the political center was attractive to a great number of scholars and literati. Song dynasty Luoyang was not only the gathering place of great and prestigious families but also of the scholarly class. With the exception of Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), whose position in intellectual history is quite problematic, and Zhang Zai (1020–1077), who alone lived in China’s west, many of the most important scholars in Northern Song intellectual history, especially of the NeoConfucian School of Principle—Shao Yong (1011–1077), Cheng Hao, and Cheng Yi—all lived in the Luoyang area. These scholars had very close relationships with Sima Guang, Wen Yanbo (1006–1097) and Fu Bi (1004–1082), all of whom lived in retirement in Luoyang. Together they came to constitute the center of scholarship and culture at that time. For a decade or so, in this place not too far from the capital, they made up an intellectual circle that called attention to its ethics and morality and appealed through its thought and scholarship.

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It expressed a different voice in the contemporary world of knowledge, thought and belief. Looking back on Chinese history, we can see that it was very rare in ancient China for the political center and the cultural center of the country to be so strictly separated. Under the governance of the ancient Chinese “universal kingship” in which political, religious and cultural authority were combined, the emperors and their governments not only symbolized truth itself, they also had a monopoly on the discursive power to interpret the truth. Just at the time when imperial power was expanding in the 1070s and 1080s, however, this separation of the political and cultural centers occurred. How, then did this come about, and what influence did it have on the Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief? 1.1 Researchers studying Song dynasty history have all noticed that really extensive change in the Northern Song began in 1044 (year four of the qingli reign period). After over eighty years, even though the regime’s political power was already well consolidated, society was increasingly calm and orderly, and the population had begun to grow prosperous, latent crises were beginning to become apparent. The dynasty had numerous and extremely inefficient officials, enormously large, indolent and incompetent military forces, and suffered frequent outbreaks of very troublesome incursions on the western border. In addition, both the rise of corruption stemming from long-term peace and the worsening economic conditions caused the dynasty to be even more concerned.13 It was precisely under these conditions that a desire for change pervaded the upper classes. The need for change had already become a consensus among the scholar-officials and a leading element of public opinion in the broader

13  13 Wang Mao (1151–1213), Yenyi yi mou lu, 1981, j. 2, 17 & 14 records that “after the xianping (998–1003) and jingde (1004–1007) reign periods, there was a false picture of peace and prosperity; people’s costumes and items of daily use became gradually extravagant. Not only did the families of the scholar-officials advocate and worship such a trend, even ordinary people in market towns and rural villages all wanted to outdo each other with luxurious and beautiful things. Thus, those who disliked this trend started to criticize it.” It also records that after the xianping period, commodity prices rose precipitously: “from the xianping to the xiangfu period (1008–1016), there were but ten plus years, and yet society has changed to such an extent, not to mention that after a long period of peace, this extravagant and wasteful trend became increasingly widespread and extended even to the time between zhenghe (1111–1118) and xuanhe (1119–1125) reign periods?”.

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society.14 This situation finally led Emperor Shenzong (Zhao Zhongzhen, Zhao Xu, 1048–1085, r. 1067–1085) and Wang Anshi to embark on their radical reforms during the xining reign period (1068–1077). There is an issue related to later intellectual history that should be discussed here. Even though the reforms of the qingli reign period (qingli xinzheng 慶歷新政, 1041–1049, often referred to as the Minor Reforms) followed by Wang Anshi’s New Policies (bianfa 變法) of the xining period (1068–1077) simply represented a natural extension of the tide of reform thought, what needs to be noted here, however, is that during the xining period, the thinking of the scholar-officials underwent a rather dramatic change. One group of scholarofficials, like Wang Anshi, carried forth the qingli reform thinking and were oriented toward adopting intensely pragmatic tactics. With the emperor’s support, they carried out a series of experiments in radical change. Another group of scholar-officials, however, was oriented toward adopting a form of moderate cultural conservatism and a position of high-minded moral idealism. They attempted by means of the reconstruction of cultural tradition and with the help of moral rationality to establish firmly the regulative and instructive significance of knowledge and thought as well as their bearers in socio-political order, and further to rectify and establish an ideal social order in a moderate and gradual manner. In light of these changes, during the xining and yuanfeng reign periods (1068–1085) a bifurcation occurred among the Song literati elite. Lü Gongzhu (1018–1089), Fan Chunren (1027–1101), Zhang Fangping, Fu Bi, Han Qi (1008– 1075), Cheng Hao, Zhu Guangting, Zhang Zai, Lü Dajun (1029–1080), Su Shi and (1037–1101) Su Che (1039–1112) came to a parting of the ways with Wang Anshi. Even Ouyang Xiu, who had vigorously recommended Wang in the beginning, was forced to withdraw from the political arena in 1070 because his political

14  “Zhang Fangping zhuan,” SS, j. 318, 10335, records that during Emperor Renzong’s reign (Zhao Zhen, r. 1022–1063), Zhang Fangping (1007–1091) submitted a memorial that said “Since the xiangfu reign period (1008–1016), the court has simply tolerated all kinds of irregularities, and gradually lost the old rules set up by the founding fathers. Rules of promotion and filling vacancies in the civil examination system, appointing sons to high offices, and the five-year review of military personnel have all broken down. Ordering generals to maintain armies is not following old law either. Since the state finance is in poor condition, orders tend to come out from different parts of the government. The big merchants and powerful local people then take advantage of this loophole to seek their own profits, and thus the regulations of tea, salt, incense, and alum are in chaos. These rules and regulations are the foundation of good and prosperous rule. Your Majesty must treat them as of urgent concern.”

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views did not conform to Wang’s.15 What these scholars had in common was their opposition to setting up a completely new political system. They did not wish to institute a fundamental transformation of politics and they especially did not want to see the country thrown into excessive turmoil. In this split between what might superficially be called “activist” or “interventionist” and “quietist” or “non-interventionist” positions, we can see the conflict between the reform faction and the conservative faction, between radical and gradualist tactics. Was there an even deeper intellectual history background behind this situation? Obviously, the separation of the “tradition of political power” (zhengtong) and the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong 道統) was another reason. In his “Letter in Answer to Fan Xunzhi,” Zhang Zai said something very thoughtprovoking. He wrote that what is troublesome now is that “the imperial court considers the [Confucian] Learning of the Way (daoxue), and the art of ruling (zhengshu 政術) as two separate things, and this has become something that we really should worry about.”16 The people he was referring to as the bearers of so-called daoxue and zhengshu were ancient Chinese “teachers” (shi 師) and officials (li 吏) respectively. Ever since the Han dynasty, it had always been an intractable problem whether it was better for “teachers to act as officials” (yi shi wei li 以師為 吏) and rely on education to establish the kingly way (wangdao), or for “officials to serve as teachers” (yi li wei shi 以吏為師) and rely on laws to establish the Way of the Overlords (or Hegemons, badao). Although we can say that the traditional Chinese political system was “a combination of the ways of the Overlords [Hegemons] and the Sage Kings” (wang ba dao za zhi 王霸道雜之), nevertheless in political practice any partiality could always disturb the center of gravity between culture and politics. During the xining and yuanfeng reign periods, the Chinese political world was obviously dominated by the radical reformers who relied on imperial support, and this led to three changes in the cultural and intellectual worlds. First, the power of the 15  XZZTJCB, j. 211, 5134–5135, records that while in Qingzhou Ouyang Xiu submitted a memorial discussing the “green sprouts cash” (qingmiao qian 青苗錢), with the result that Wang Anshi attacked him in front of Emperor Shenzong, even going so far as to say that he “does not know the classics, does not comprehend moral principles, discredits the Rites of Zhou, and slanders the “Appended Phrases” of the Yijing. In this way, many scholars were harmed by him and it almost led to their ruin.” 16  “Da Fan Xunzhi shu,” ZZJ, addendum “Wenji yicun,” 349. The complete quote is “the court treats the Learning of the Way (daoxue) and the art of ruling (zhengshu 政術) as two separate things, and this has been something to worry about since ancient times.”

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emperor and the government increased until politics overwhelmed culture and came to constitute the central core of daily life. Second, the study of the rites (lixue 禮學) that had always served as resources for the political system, the study of writing literary essays as a strategy for entering officialdom, and the study of governance for administrative officials were all made to occupy the central core of the intellectual world. Third, the tendency toward intellectual realism, or pragmatism, gradually assumed the central position in the Chinese intellectual world. What were the results of these changes? From the vantage point of the scholar-officials, they would be forced to play the role of minor “officials” (li) and give up their dignity as “teachers,” leaving the emperors, their governments, and their officials in charge of politics to control everything while the scholars in charge of culture steadily lost their status.17 Scholars in the role of “teachers” generally expressed their political thinking by means of the Way, that is, culture, and so they always called for “respect for the teacher and valuing the Way in his teaching” (zunshi zhongdao 尊師重道).18 From the point of view of the political rulers, however, they enthusiastically hoped for the scholars to act as mere “officials” and make culture serve as a resource for the explanation of politics. For example, Emperor Shenzong became very angry if the scholars did not carry out his decrees, wanted the official examination questions to have more to do with decrees and ordinances ( faling), and earnestly hoped for the shi “teachers” to become li “officials.” Sima Guang was ardently opposed to this because he felt that it would make the “teachers” who were the symbols of morality into “officials” who only implemented the laws.19 This Confucian learning of the Way (daoxue) and the art of ruling (zhengshu) having been thus separated illustrates the fact that daoxue—culture—was already unable to influence politics, and zhengshu had also lost the support of culture. When this group of scholars gathered in Luoyang, most of them were already retired or out of office. They had a knowledge of the Confucian 17  Translators’ note: shidafu 士大夫 are generally higher officials, and the term as used from the Song dynasty onward is generally translated as scholar-official, while li 吏 generally refers to minor officials or mere clerks or functionaries; the contrast explains why the shidafu were reluctant to be reduced to the status of li. 18  For example, in Cheng Hao’s “Qing xiu xuexiao zun shiru qushi zhazi,” he says that “the sage is far in the past and the Way of the teacher has not been established…. we should establish one morality to harmonize customs, but if the teaching of the sage teacher is not rectified (correct), what then can morality rely upon to become an inclusive unity?” Henan Chengshi wenji, j. 1, in ECJ, 1981, 448. 19  Quoted in “Xuanju si,” in Wenxian tongkao, j. 31 top of 295.

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Learning of the Way, but were far from “the arts of ruling.” They did have a good deal of social capital, though, and also quite a number of supporters. The following elements of their cultural background are well worth attending to. First, due to the widespread use of printing, the speed of cultural dissemination was daily increasing. At the same time, the prosperity of private academies and prefectural and county schools led to the steady transmission of knowledge to the general population. Through their private teaching, these scholars attracted disciples, traveled around widely, and increasingly gained society’s respect and support. Probably sometime after the qingli reign period (1041–1048), they grew into a very large scholar elite class. Second, this class lived in the midst of a comparatively liberal and relaxed discursive milieu. Teaching, debating, and letter and book writing in the Northern Song often dealt with contemporary political and social issues, and created to some extent a discursive space that also contributed to the separation of the cultural and political centers. Third, since these Song dynasty scholar-officials began to re-establish families and clans, a class of what we call “village gentry” (xiangshen 鄉紳) came into being. They took office and entered into politics by means of their cultural knowledge and then relied on their political connections to become family and clan leaders. This led them to become the only stratum between the emperor and the common people since the great hereditary families of the Han and Wei periods. In the Northern Song, the strength of this gentry class could hardly be ignored. In a certain sense, these scholar-official leaders and teachers of Luoyang actually possessed abundant resources, and, with these resources, they symbolized a marginal position and a form of idealism. Employing culture to offset politics, they attempted to use their cultural center to achieve a balance with the political center. I have always believed that the current of reform thinking from the MidTang through the Song harbored a strong tendency towards centralization ( jiquan zhuyi 集權主義). This was very clearly expressed in the Northern Song. For example, Wang Anshi hoped to bring about a unified situation in which “no one has a differing opinion” (ren wu yilun 人無異論) and energetically proposed strengthening the power of the ruler to control public opinion.20 In 1072, then, when Emperor Shenzong seriously stated that “today when everyone follows different doctrines, what can we rely on to unify morality?” and when he wanted Wang Anshi to “make the scholars settle on a fixed

20  “Da Wang Shenfu shu,” 2 and “Yu Ding Yuanzhen shu,” Wang Wengong wenji, 1974, j. 72, and j. 75.

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unity,” this already adumbrated a severely autocratic tendency.21 One result of the reforms would probably be just to strengthen this tendency. The marginalized scholar-officials were naturally antipathetic to that sort of power. While these Luoyang scholars had high prestige and commanded abundant resources, but were far from the center of political power, then, they would express different concerns arising from gentry society by means of historical narratives, ethical explanations, and the establishment of a new cosmological theory. 1.2 As mentioned above, the traditional scholar-official class in general relied on their authoritative interpretations of natural calamities to restrain imperial power. Ever since the Han dynasty, they were used to employing these explanations in the manner of Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179–ca. 104 BCE). They relied on these calamities to warn the emperors and express in a roundabout way the views of the intellectual class at a time when imperial power was supreme over everything and only “Heaven and Earth” could transcend “imperial power” and command the authority to proclaim the truth. In the Song dynasty, however, this tradition slowly lost its efficacy. In an age when people believed that “a change in Heaven is not worth fearing” (tianbian buzu wei 天變不足畏), the scholar-officials’ explanations of natural calamities were no longer sufficient to warn or restrict the limitless power of the emperors.22 For precisely this reason, these scholars wanted to emphasize the “Way and principle” (dao li) that transcended imperial power. They hoped that this Way that enveloped everything in existence and explained society, nature, and human beings would become a self-evident principle. In their view, no matter how much things changed, only by establishing the absolute value of the Way or principle could the shi “scholars” really be shi “teachers” and the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong) be higher than the “tradition of political power” (zhitong 治統). In other words, only by establishing the paramount status of truth and its interpreters could these scholars have genuine power and authority.

21  XZZTJCB, j. 229, 5570. Actually, as early as 1070, Wang Anshi had already told Shenzong that “if everyone in the court gives a different view, that starts agitation among them, then how can one bring about good governance?”, and his view received Shenzong’s approbation. As Shenzong said, “Allowing different views to start agitation is certainly not acceptable.” Ibid., 5169. 22  “Wang Anshi liezhuan,” SS, j. 86.

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They were also quite aware that one of the resources they possessed was the Way and principle. An anecdote about Cheng Yi can serve to illustrate their attitude. It was said that he regarded himself as following the way of the teacher (shidao 師道) when he lectured to the emperor with a dignified demeanor, and the emperor greatly revered him. When people asked him why this was so, he said “because I wear the simple clothes of a commoner to act as the emperor’s teacher, how could I not conduct myself with dignity?”23 A second resource that they possessed was the background support of the scholar-official community. Since the emperor had to face the scholars and their symbolic culture, Wen Yanbo (1006–1097) could tell the emperor that “[Your Majesty] rules All Under Heaven with the scholar-officials, not with the common people.”24 That is to say emperors must rely on the scholar-official bureaucracy to rule the country and the people, and only on that account could the will of the scholarofficials carry sufficient weight to restrain imperial power. During the xining and yuanfeng reign periods (1068–1085), Luoyang became the central gathering place for these scholars. They did not command any practical power and they were only able to concentrate their energies on cultural discourse. Nevertheless, because they were always concerned with the fundamental problems of the state (guojia) and they possessed quite substantial social and cultural resources, they constituted the contemporary center of knowledge and thought. They established the position of the scholar-officials in culture and politics. From the beginning of the Northern Song and for a rather long period of time, scholar-officials had two interwoven points of focal concern. One was “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians,” that is, restoring the authority of the state and social order. Works like Sun Fu’s “On the Subtle Principle of Respecting the Ruler in the Spring and Autumn Annals” (Chunqiu zunwang fawei), Shi Jie’s “On China,” and Ouyang Xiu’s “Essay on Fundamentals” (Benlun) and “Discourses on Dynastic Legitimacy” (Zhengtong lun), all revolved around how to increase the authority of the state, promote Han Chinese civilization and Confucian ideas, resist the twin cultural and military threats from alien lands, and appeal for Chinese ethnic and cultural identity.25 Their second focus was “illuminating principle and discussing 23  “Henan Chengshi waishu,” j. 12 quotes “Shao shi wenjian lu,” in Er Chen ji, 1981, 423. 24  XZZTJCB, j. 221, 5370, xining sinian sanyue. 25  For Ouyang Xiu’s “Benlun,” see De Bary, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 590–595. In his “Discourses on Dynastic Legitimacy in the Northern Song” (Hoku Sô sono ta no seitô ron 北宋その他 の正統論), Nishi Jyunzô points out that the Northern Song discourse on dynastic legitimacy and the Han dynasty idea of the absolute power of the unified state’s Son of Heaven

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nature” (mingli bianxing 明理辯性). By emphasizing the preeminent value of ethics and morality, they extrapolated from the origin of mind and nature all the way to the ultimate Way and principle of the universe, and constructed a new system of knowledge and intellectual order. For example, Hu Yuan (993– 1059), Sun Fu, Chen Xiang (1017–1080), Jia Gongsong (mid-eleventh century) and others all focused on this point. From the time of Emperor Renzong (Zhao Zhen, r. 1022–1063), “honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians” and “illuminating principle and discussing nature” established an intellectual atmosphere that formed the inner element to their external political thought. By the time of Emperor Shenzong, these two focal concerns made up the general trend of scholarly thought. These two points of concern were really two sides of the same coin, and together they were intended to rebuild the authority of the state and the intellectual order. As already noted, from as early as the Mid-Tang, Han Yu, Li Ao and others had already voiced such anxiety about the authority of the state and the intellectual order. The writings of Han Yu and other early ninth century scholar-officials naturally became the starting point for the intellectual reflections of Song dynasty scholars. Sun Fu, Shi Jie, Mu Xiu (979–1032), Liu Kai (948–1001), Ouyang Xiu, and so on were all impressed by Han Yu’s reverence for and enthusiastic promotion of the “tradition of moral principle” or the “succession of the Way” (daotong), “human nature and feelings” (xingqing) and Ancient Prose (guwen). They eventually incorporated Mid-Tang thought as a historical resource to support the rebuilding of the world of knowledge, thought and belief. The situation had changed, however, perhaps because the Mid-Tang was a period during which the authority of the state was weak, but the state and government of the middle of the Northern Song was quite strong and stable and imperial power had increased with it. On this account, the scholars transferred the focus of their reflections from “the authority of the state” to “intellectual order.” Commanding only intellectual power and without political power, these scholar-officials attempted to employ the “tradition of moral principle,” to restrain the “tradition of political power,” to employ history and culture to criticize political power, to use the power of thought to gain the widespread were two different things. Dynastic legitimacy in the Northern Song required a historical record, a unified state, and an ethical identity, that is, a historical tradition, political space, and cultural power must all be possessed at the same time in order to realize the concept of the unity of All Under Heaven. This concept transcended the actual unification of the country and developed into a demonstration of the legitimacy of the state. “Hoku Sô sono ta no seitô ron”, in Hitotsubashi ronsô (1953), j. 30, no. 5, 34–48.

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acknowledgement and endorsement of the scholar class, and to provide an alternative voice during a period of formidable imperial power. It must be pointed out here that in a situation in which they did not have political power or responsibilities, but were extremely dissatisfied with contemporary politics, it was very easy for the scholar-officials to exhibit a high-minded idealism and an intense moralism. They generally made very high demands on others. That is, they demanded that people be aware of and reflect upon their mental attitudes and behavior as well as strive, by means of conscious emphasis on ethical concepts and standards, to establish a social order in accordance their ideals. They often raised social ethics to the level of original and instinctive nature (ziran benxing 自然本性), and raised morality to a position of transcendence. On the one hand, they particularly emphasized the Way and principle, believing that they transcended society, nature, and humanity. This gave ethical principles, originally connected only to “human beings,” support from “nature” and “society.” It also made the universe of Heaven and Earth, the governance of society, and human ethics jointly to share a single ultimate “Way and principle.” The Great Ultimate of Zhou Dunyi’s Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (Taijitu shuo) and what Shao Yong called principle were meant precisely to transform truth into a universal principle. What Zhang Zai called principle was higher than “Heaven and Earth,” and Cheng Hao’s assertion that “when there is the Way and there is principle, Heaven and the Human will be one, and there can be no separation” was also intended to emphasize that principle cannot be limited to any present reality, time or place, and to employ it to envelope everything—to be that “one single thread” mentioned by Confucius when he said “There is one single thread binding my way together.”26 On the other hand, they regarded this transcendental Way or principle as the foundation for explaining the universe, the basic standard for politics and governance, and the origin of morality in human nature. In the practical world of everyday life, it served them as an absolute principle for guiding and criticizing everything. The Cheng brothers said, “nature is simply principle; from Yao and Shun down to ordinary people, principle has always been one.” They wanted people to grasp this “one thread” and to search for the ultimate truth of the universe, society, and humanity by means of exhausting principle, developing ones nature to the utmost, and understanding destiny.27 26  “Zhangzi yulu shang,” in Zhang Zai ji, p. 312. Lunyu 4. 15, D. C. Lau, Confucius the Analects, 1979, 74. 27  Cheng brothers, “Henan Chengshi yishu,” j. 18 in Er Chen ji, 1981, 204. See Chan, SB, 512 on exhausting principle, developing nature, and understanding destiny.

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1.3 At this time, the scholar-officials faced two challenges. One emanated from the political center, that is the practical thinking of the reformers. This kind of practical thought increasingly undermined the fundamental significance of the scholar-official class as the guardians of cultural values. The other came from the heretical doctrines of Daoism and Buddhism. The rise of many different heretical doctrines made it difficult for people to choose their spiritual stance and thereby brought about a rupture of history and tradition that deprived the scholar-officials of their intellectual authority. Sun Fu’s “The Humiliation of the Confucians” (Ru ru) excitedly exclaimed that not only were Yangzi (Yang Zhu), Mozi, Shen Buhai and Han Fei causing intellectual chaos, but Buddhism and the Daoist Religion were running riot throughout China so that the domain of Confucianism was almost eliminated.28 With such uneasy feelings, they needed to push their intellectual search for the Way and principle to the extreme, placing “Way and principle” in a paramount position. It was a general intellectual practice of contemporary scholar-officials to search for a fundamental interpretation of classical texts. They customarily sought to provide an overall explanation of all knowledge, and such explanations were often reduced to a small number of large abstract principles such as “the “Great Ultimate,” the “Way,” “Principle” or “Nature” (taiji, dao, li or xing). In his Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, Zhou Dunyi posited an empty position called the “Ultimate of Nonbeing” (wuji 無極)29 above the “Great Ultimate” simply to express exhaustively investigating and searching for the origin, and the “Great Ultimate” that he employed as a symbol for the origin, according to his own interpretation, is simply an absolute “unity” (one, oneness, yi 一).” This “unity” not only represents the undivided state of primal chaos of the universe but also the absolute unmoved condition of the human heart/mind. Human beings need to return to the spiritual realm of the “quiet, motionless tranquility,” or “sincerity” (cheng 誠), as it may also be called.30 28  “Taishan xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 2, 58–59. On these kinds of comments, see Cheng Hao’s acutely critical remarks: “The reason that the Way is not clear lies in the harm caused by heretical doctrines.” in “Daoxue yi—Cheng Hao zhuan,” SS, j. 427, 12717. For more of Zhou Dunyi’s writings, see Chan, SB, 460–480 and De Bary, Sources, 1999, 669–682. 29  The “Ultimate of Nonbeing” is Wing-tsit Chan’s translation, in Chu Hsi: Life and Thought, 1987, 55, 86, 115, 116; in Chan, SB, 464, it is rendered as “Non-ultimate”; in De Bary, Sources, 673, it is translated as Non-Polar in contrast to Supreme Polarity (our Great Ultimate). 30  See “Tongshu—Cheng ji de di-san” and “Tongshu—Sheng di-si,” in Zhou Dunyi, Zhouzi tongshu, p. 1. De Bary, Sources, 676 translates Tongshu as Penetrating the Classic of Changes and describes it as “focus[ing] on the sage as the model of humanity.” On cheng,” sincerity,” see Chan, SB, 465–467, especially 465n 28: “The word means not only sincerity in the

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Zhang Zai, in similar fashion, put “principle” above “Heaven and Earth.” He regarded “principle” as the key to experiencing and comprehending “the Way of Heaven and Earth” (tiandi zhi dao) and regarded traditional ideas about Heaven and Earth as unbelievable fabrications. The establishment of “principle” was precisely the difference between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism and Daoism. As Zhang Zai put it, “the ten thousand things all possess principle, if one does not know how to understand principle to the utmost it is like living one’s entire life in a dream.31 Cheng Yi was even more straightforward. Someone asked him “what is the Way of Heaven?” He replied, “it is only principle, principle is simply the Way of Heaven.”32 Although Song Confucians had not completely rejected traditional pre-Tang cosmological knowledge such as Heaven and Earth, Yin and Yang, four seasons, Five Phases, and so on, they had already begun a new method for observing and explaining the universe. Shao Yong wrote that “the Way is the root of Heaven and Earth, and Heaven and Earth are the root of the ten thousand things. Observe the ten thousand things from Heaven and Earth, and the ten thousand things are simply the ten thousand things; observe Heaven and Earth from the Way, and Heaven and Earth are also the ten thousand things.33 This is a very important passage. It means that when people carefully observe the material things of the universe (the ten thousand things, wanwu), they present a diverse and complex individual appearance where a bull is a bull, a tree is a tree, and so on. It is only when one rises to the high level of the origin of the cosmos—the Way or principle—that one can grasp them as a totality and then use them as the one single thread (principle) to make an overall explanation of them. Only on the level of the Way and principle are people able to truly explain and interpret the myriad things and affairs of the universe. This Way or principle, however, is also innate within the human “heart/mind.” To push knowledge and thought to their ultimate origins and to investigate the foundations of the reasonableness of knowledge and thought was the characteristic feature of the ratiocinations of Song dynasty scholar-officials. Another characteristic feature was their transferal of the foundations of the reasonableness of ultimate origins from the external Heaven and Earth and the cosmos to the internal human mind and nature. The foundation of the narrow sense, but also honesty, absence of fault, seriousness, being true to one’s true self, being true to the nature of being, actuality, realness.” 31  “Zhangzi yulu, shang,” ZZJ, 1978, 312, 216 and “Zhangzi yulu, zhong,” ZZJ, 321. 32  “Henan Chengshi yishu,” j. 22 shang, ECJ, 290. 33  “Guan wu di sishi-san,” Huangji jingshi shu, 1965, j. 11 shang, and “Guan wu waipian,” ibid., j. 20 xia. Daocang, Taixuan bu, 23 ce, 422, 446.

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reasonableness of Shao Yong’s “nature” (xing), Zhou Dunyi’s “heart/mind” (xin), Zhang Zai’s “knowledge” or “knowing” (zhi 知) and Cheng Yi’s “principle” (li) was derived from humanity’s original nature (benxing) or rationality (lixing, literally the nature of having li or principle).34 At that time, their intellectual orientation and anxiety about rebuilding social order spurred on these Song scholar-officials to what later scholars would call their “inward turning” (neizhuan 内轉) or “inner transcendence” (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) thinking. This mode of thinking provided the precise foundation for the growth of Song Neo-Confucianism, the School of Principle. 1.4 In this thinking that revolves around the ideas of principle, three interconnected key statements were “principle is one but its manifestations are many” (li yi fen shu 理一分殊), “to investigate things and to understand principle to the utmost” (gewu qiongli 格物窮理), and “to exhaust principle and human nature to the utmost” (qiongli jinxing 窮理盡性).35 “Principle is one but its manifestations are many” simply means that the things and affairs of the universe are complex, but its ultimate reason is very simple. Ancient Chinese terms like “one/unity” (yi), “ultimate” ( ji), “great” (da), and even “nothingness” (wu) all really have this significance. This idea may actually be connected to Buddhism, especially to the Huayan School. When Cheng Yi was asked his opinion of the Flower Garland Sûtra (Avatamsaka Sûtra, Huayan Jing), he said it is a matter of “a myriad principles return to one principle” (wan li guiyu yi li 萬理歸於一理). When asked further whether there was 34  For example, a later member of the Shao family [Shao Yong’s grandson], Shao Bo (?–1158), explained the idea of “Xiantian Yixue, 先天易學” [which treats the Classic of Changes as a metaphysical study of the original nature of being] in his Shao Shi wenjian houlu, j. 5 zhong, 40–41. He wrote that Shao Yong’s “Xiantian tu [chart of eight trigrams] is about the message or methods of the mind”; “it regards the mind as the root foundation, and its discussion on statecraft or governing the state is really not that important for Kangjie (Shao Yong).” 35  “Principle is one but its manifestations are many,” is from Cheng Yi, Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1, 23–24, Er Cheng quanshu, SBBY, translated in Chan, SB, “To investigate things in order to understand principle to the utmost does not require the investigation of all things in the world….” is from Er Cheng yishu, as translated in De Bary, Sources, 696. “[The sage] exhausted principles to the utmost and dealt thoroughly with human nature, and in doing so arrived at the workings of fate.” is from “Shuo gua” (Explaining the Trigrams) §1 of the Classic of Changes (Yijing) as translated in Richard John Lynn, ed. and translated, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 1994, 120.

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any way to break away from this idea, he could only admit that “there is also no way to prove it wrong.”36 The Song Confucians, however, had very many other formulations concerning principle and affairs or things (shi 事)—for example, “the one” and “the many” (duo), “the Way” and “concrete thing” (qi 器), “root” (ben) and “branch” (mo), “general” or “universal” (gong 共), and “particular” or “specific” (shu 殊), the “Principle of Heaven” (tianli) and “human desires” (renyu), and so on. It is obvious, though, that Song Confucians made a clear value distinction between principle and affairs or things. They wanted to examine principle and they hoped to grasp the “fundamental basis” (genben) of all phenomena, not simply some concrete affairs or things or any commonplace political or administrative system. Cheng Yi once rather proudly asserted that “although my learning came from receiving instruction, the words ‘Principle of Heaven’ were, nevertheless, grasped by my own understanding.” Because this fundamental ultimate “Principle of Heaven” was the new resource for their critiques, these scholar-officials could only maintain their sense of transcendent confidence above everything under the banner of principle and the Way (daoli). On this point, however, they of course scrupulously separated their constant search for “principle” from Buddhism’s endless pursuit of Shûnyatâ (kong). They were all at pains to explain that the spiritual condition of “silence” ( jiran 寂然) and “absence of desires” when one experiences the truth as the Principle of Heaven was a perfect fit for human nature and definitely not the same as Buddhism’s “vast and empty tranquility” (kongkuo xuji 空闊虛寂) of a clear mind. The final goal of their pursuits was a real, substantial principle and their attitude toward this principle was one of “sincerity” (cheng). When they approached or experienced this principle, their minds had to maintain the same kind of “seriousness” ( jing 敬) they had toward truth. When this principle was the guide for life in society, it could establish a meaningful order. This was certainly very different from Buddhism.37 As Zhang Zai once put it, 36   Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 18, ECJ, 195. Also see Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1, ECJ, 1180. Song Confucians seem to have regarded Zhang Zai’s narration even more highly. Cheng Yi said that “the ‘Western Inscription’ (Ximing) illuminated and clarified the idea that ‘principle is one but its manifestations are many.’” See “Da Yang Shi (1053–1135) lun ‘Ximing’ shu,” Henan Chengshi wenji, j. 9, ECJ, 609. See De Bary, Sources, 683–684 for a complete translation of Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription.” 37   Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1 criticizes as follows: “Scholars thought that to get rid of knowledge and opinions and abandon all worries was to grasp the Way. This amounts to “abolishing wisdom and cleverness” and will definitely slip into a state of Chan meditation.” Because in that state, there will be no firmly established meaning and value in their heart/ mind, and thus he believes that “this won’t do until there is a concentration [zhu 主] in

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“Confucians investigate principle to the utmost and therefore can follow their nature. This constitutes the Way. Buddhists, on the other hand, do not know how to investigate principle and arbitrarily consider [Emptiness, Shûnyatâ] as the true nature. Consequently their theory cannot prevail.”38 Because “principle is one but its manifestations are many,” the Song Confucians wanted “to investigate things and to understand principle to the utmost.” Despite the fact that in weighing up thought and knowledge, they were somewhat scornful of concrete knowledge, since their principle was universally contained in all things and affairs, they accepted that the way to experience and grasp principle was through observation, inference, reflection, and analysis of various “material objects” (shiwu 事物). Zhang Zai said “often observe material things, often understand principle to the utmost, and in that way you can exhaust the nature of material things,”39 and Shao Yong said that everyone could “with one mind observe a myriad minds, with one body observe a myriad bodies, with one world observe a myriad worlds.”40 These statements simply mean that one can understand the truth from the world of everyday life and the numerous and complicated natural world in front of ones eyes. To quote Cheng Yi’s formulation, “in front of our eyes are only material things, and all material things have principle just as fire is hot and water is cold; between rulers and ministers and fathers and sons there is always principle.”41 We should say that this intellectual tendency made Song Neo-Confucians continue to maintain a high level of interest in “following the path of inquiry one’s heart. Concentrating on heart means to concentrate with seriousness, and concentration with seriousness in turn means to concentrate on the one (yi, principle or one’s mind).” ECJ, 1191–1192. 38   Zhengmeng (Correcting Youthful Ignorance)—Zhongzheng pian di ba, ZZJ, 31. Translation from Chan, SB, 515–516 with minor changes. See Henan Chengshi cuiyan, j. 1, section entitled “The Buddhist pursuit of the Way (Dao) is like looking at the sky through a tube” where he writes that “Buddhism only concentrates on things above without understanding what happens in the surrounding environment,” and also that Buddhism “only strives to understand the profound principle above without studying what is happening in society below, and thus makes no connection between the root and the branches.” He is actually suggesting that the Buddhist search for truth is definitely not practicable in the social order and the world of daily life. See Chan, SB, 563 for Cheng Yi’s opposition to Buddhist “tranquility,” and also 785 (and 522, 547, 593, 264–65) for the difference between jing 敬 and gong 恭 “seriousness.” 39  “Zhangzi yulu shang,” ZZJ, p. 312. 40  “Guanwu pian di si-shi-er,” Huangji jingshi, j. 11 shang, Daozang, Taixuan bu, gui yi, di 23 ce, 421. 41   Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 19, ECJ, 247.

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and study” (dao wenxue 道問學), and shows that they did not devote all of their mental effort and intelligence to “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing 尊德性) It should also be pointed out that the psychological precondition for the “investigation of things” was first “rectifying ones mind and making one’s will sincere” (zhengxin chengyi 正心誠意), that is, raising morality to be the ultimate goal of the “investigation of things.”42 For this reason it also embodied the mode of thinking in which knowledge was transformed into morality, and this caused knowledge to lose its independent sphere and significance. It was precisely due to this latter psychological reason that the Song NeoConfucians made “to exhaust principle and human nature to the utmost” (qiongli jinxing) the ultimate goal of learning. The phrase “to exhaust principles to the utmost and deal thoroughly with human nature” comes from the “Explaining the Trigrams” section in the Classic of Changes. The ancient Chinese people often believed that if they could grasp one absolute truth then they could resolve all of the questions of nature (wuli, the principle of material things; the modern word for physics), society (zhengyi, justice) and life (daode, morality). This sort of thinking was also echoed by Buddhism in that the Tiantai and Huayan sects made many similar arguments. The difference was that in the interpretation of Song Neo-Confucians, the significance of such thought gradually shifted from comprehensive coverage of the material world of nature, social justice, and everyday morality toward innate inner nature, moral self-correction, and self-conscious moral cultivation. At that, the significance of “exhausting principle and human nature to the utmost” came to be investigating and experiencing the principle of the myriad things and events in order to give prominence to humanity’s original good nature. The goal of “investigating things and understanding principle to the utmost” then developed into an exploration or development of human nature. As Zhang Zai interpreted this line from “Explaining the Trigrams,” “to exhaust principle and nature to the utmost is already saying that nature is close to human nature; having exhausted the principle of material things and also exhausted human nature to the utmost, one can then reach destiny, and destiny is also said to refer to oneself.”43 On this account the search for the meaning of principle began to focus on inner ethics and morality; this was reportedly called “studying to improve oneself” (wei ji zhi xue, 為己之學).

42   Zhengxin and chengyi come from the “Great Learning.” See Chan, SB, 86 for translations of these terms and 84–94 for a complete translation. 43  “Hengqu Yi shuo, Shou gua,” ZZJ, 235.

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Ancient Chinese people believed that every person’s inner nature possessed the self-conscious ability to establish the value of life. Although this sort of self-conscious original nature was not diverse and multifaceted like the myriad things of the cosmos so that people could grasp its existence through their feelings, however, its significance could be made to stand out through people’s reflexive understanding of their inner experience. People could also confirm the reasonableness of the social order by giving prominence to this moral origin. Through this process of “rectifying ones mind and making one’s will sincere” to “regulating the state” and “bringing peace to All Under Heaven” as pointed out in the “Great Learning,” people could complete the meaning their lives. This was simply the meaning of “exhausting the principle of material things and exhausting one’s nature to the utmost so as to understand one’s destiny.” 1.5 The earliest usage of the term “Learning of the Way” (daoxue) for NeoConfucianism started during the qingli (1041–1049) and huangyou (1049–1054) reign periods of the Northern Song. It indicated a change in the scholarly landscape and intellectual tendencies. The genuine completion or fulfillment of the Neo-Confucian “Learning of the Way” or “School of Principle” (lixue) did not occur, however, until the mid-eleventh century, after the separation of the political and the cultural centers of China. Still the contents of the world of knowledge, thought and belief of the scholars of that period of time were very rich and complex. The intellectual interpretations and comments of men like Shao Yong, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi and Sima Guang actually contained many different views. It was simply that they had among them a relatively similar thought process—a pursuit of the “principle” and the “Way” that transcended everything else. When we discussed Wei-Jin thought above, we noted that Confucian doctrines were quite weak when it came to thinking about “human nature and the Way of Heaven.” This weakness betrayed a great inadequacy of Confucian discourse on truth and arguments about human nature at the time that these topics became an extremely active area for heretical ideas. Nevertheless, it was precisely the Song Confucians’ reflections and reassessments of this area of thought that became the starting point of the Song reconstruction and renewal of Confucianism. After Han Yu and Li Ao, the thinking of Song Neo-Confucians like Shao Yong, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi and others went beyond individual morality and social order to a search for the fountainhead of all morality and order. They reinterpreted “human nature and the Way of Heaven” and drew on some of the resources of Buddhism and the Daoist Religion to rebuild

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a reasonable foundation for morality and order, and thus regained possession of this lost intellectual domain.44 During this time, Song Neo-Confucians re-established an entire conceptual system concerning the “Way,” “principle,” “material force” (qi 氣), “heart/mind,” “human nature” and “feelings.”45 The core of this conceptual system was that it transferred the foundation of reasonableness from “Heaven” to “Man” (ren, human beings), made the “original nature” (benxing) of humanity the origin of an axiomatic “goodness” (shan) and the foundation of a self-evident “Heaven,” and re-established an absolute truth that linked together the natural world (ziran), society and humanity. They demanded that every person should demonstrate this kind of original nature and develop this kind of consciousness of their nearness to truth. As the Song Neo-Confucians saw it, this conceptual system was a comprehensive plan that encompassed humanity, society and the cosmos. The plan could be said to have at least four parts. First, to confirm every person’s original nature, encourage people’s intentions to move toward goodness, and allow their goodness to receive the support and affirmation of principle. Second, to re-confirm the relationships between human beings by means of this affirmation of the goodness of human nature that would then constitute the foundation of social values, allow for society’s mutual identification with these values, and bring about the re-establishment of social order. Third, to connect these ideas about humanity and social values with the Principle of Heaven to create a vast mutually supporting system. Fourth, to employ the idea that “principle is one but its manifestations are many” to separate ultimate truth from ordinary knowledge, employ the practice of “investigation of things and understanding principle to the utmost” to regulate the acquisition 44  For example, Zhang Zai reinterpreted Zi Gong’s statement that “one cannot get to hear (bu de er wen 不得而闻) [the Master’s] views on human nature and the Way of Heaven.” (Lunyu, 5. 13, Lau, Analects, 78) He wrote that “one cannot get to hear” did not mean that Confucius did not have an argument on the subject, but rather that one could not rely on what the ears hear (er wen 耳闻) in terms of human nature and the Way of Heaven. He went on to assert that the learning of his contemporary Confucians was already much clearer and it not only “realized rituals in daily activities, but also made human nature and the Way of Heaven visible in these activities. Someday it will surpass the teachings of Mencius.” “Jingxue liku—xue da yuan shang,” ZZJ, 281. Cheng Yi also answered a student’s question about this and asserted that the “human nature and the Way of Heaven” that “one cannot get to hear [the Master’s] views on” could actually be “understood on ones own, but could not be transmitted in words.” The statement certainly did not mean that Confucius had not discussed this subject. “Henan Chengshi cuiyan,” j. 2 ECJ, 1252. 45  For qi as “material force,” see Chan, SB, 784.

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of knowledge and the path of thought, and to employ the exercise of “exhausting principle and fulfilling human nature to the utmost” to establish the orientation of thought for inner transcendence—all to create a new foundation of Confucian (that is, Neo-Confucian) thought. It was precisely at this point that the direction of the later mainstream Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief and the Neo-Confucian strategies for the re-establishment of social and intellectual order were revealed. A great many Song dynasty scholarofficials also identified with that direction and those strategies. Song Confucians were quite proud of their re-establishment of this traditional knowledge and intellectual order. Zhang Zai asserted that this was “to establish a mind (moral mind or principle) for Heaven and Earth, to set up a destiny (meaningful life) for human beings, to continue the lost teaching of the past sages, and to build a great peace for ten thousand generations to come.”46 What he called “establishing a mind, a moral mind or principle, for Heaven and Earth” symbolized the fact that the new Neo-Confucian explanation of the cosmos would be based on a fresh ultimate foundation. The time and space of Heaven and Earth would no longer be the ultimate origin of all reasonableness; it would have to receive internal confirmation or proof from “principle.” And “principle” was unarguable; it only required self-interpretation by the “heart/mind” to confirm its reasonableness. What he called “setting up a destiny, a meaningful life for human beings,” expressed the complete confidence of the Neo-Confucians in their social responsibilities. They believed that reestablishing an intellectual order based upon ethics and morality would allow people to experience anew the value and meaning of life, mark off the boundary between that and the uncultured and barbarous, and achieve a worthwhile world of social life. What he called “continuing the lost teaching of the past sages” seems to express their hopes for the re-establishment of the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong). They believed that the learning of the ancient sages from Confucius on had been repeatedly interrupted. Only now, because they had re-established the authoritative truth of principle, the foundation of social order, and the value and meaningfulness of life, was it possible for the interrupted learning of the ancient sages to be fully developed and promoted. Finally, “build a great peace for ten thousand generations to come” refers to the ideal world that they hoped for. The usual political and economic strategies could only temporarily enrich the country and strengthen the military and, in the discourse of the ancient Chinese, bring about the “Way of the Hegemon” (badao) that could establish a strong state and maintain a flourishing condition for a limited period of time. When “principle” was generally recognized as 46  “Jinsi lu shiyi,” ZZJ, 376.

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the foundation of civilization, however, it would bring about the “Kingly Way” (wangdao) and extend widely to All Under Heaven to constitute the cornerstone of eternal peace. 1.6 In the 1070s and 1080s, however, the situation in China was still one where the “learning of the Way” and the “art of government” were two separate realms. The trend of thought of the scholars discussed above was only a species of highminded moral idealism and a moderate form of conservatism that existed in the non-governmental world of thought. Except for a short time during the yuanyou reign period (1086–1094) when Sima Guang and others returned to office, this Neo-Confucian thought that was later known as “Learning of the Way” or “School (Learning) of Principle” really did not hold a high position in the world of thought. Although it was very attractive to and a source of inspiration for some scholars, it was not transformed into a political ideology because it never had government support and never achieved the status of a kind of absolute “truth.” In the world of contemporary politics, a very practical or pragmatic orientation of thought continued to hold the leading position. From the reforms of the qingli (1041–1049) reign period to the New Policies, or New Laws (radical reforms, xinfa 新法) of the xining reign period (1068–1077), this form of practical thought gradually developed. Because it achieved rapid results, it became the representative thought of that time, and it was also the mainstream form of thought enjoying imperial support. The main characteristics of this form of thought can be summarized as follows: emphasizing practical political tactics; emphasizing the classic Rites of Zhou (Zhouli) that could be used as the basis for political or governmental actions; advocating the discussion of profit and desire; being partial toward economic strategies as between economics and culture; advocating the strengthening of state (government) administration; not hesitating to maintain the priority of imperial power; speaking in defense of expedient hegemonic government (bazheng 霸政), and even going so far as to admit the importance of legalism ( fazhi zhuyi 法制主義).47 Perhaps it was precisely this intellectual trend that made those powerless scholar-officials employ idealism and conservatism to contend against it. Those who were branded as the so called “first ones expressing different 47  Thus, as mentioned above, Emperor Shenzong was quite dissatisfied that “so many of this generation of scholars do not study legal decrees,” and Wu Chong (1021–1080) also wanted legal studies (lüxue 律學) to be made part of the official examination questions. He criticized “gentry officials [for] being ashamed to study this field.” “Xuanju si,” Wenxian tongkao, j. 31, 295.

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views at the beginning of the New Policies” simply referred to this group of Neo-Confucian scholars.48 They had quite a strong sense of confidence and believed that their way of thinking possessed a universalist concept of truth. They believed that the approach of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” and “exhausting principle and developing human nature fully” of their Neo-Confucian “Learning of the Way” was not only a way of learning but also the starting point for social behavior. The “art of ruling” and “knowing how to govern the world and the state as well as all the families” were regarded as only minor, inessential branches as opposed to the important roots; at best, they were only the practical applications of knowledge.49 This was because “knowing how to govern the world and the state as well as all the families must be founded on one’s own self. There is no such thing as a person who can govern the whole world and the state as well as all the families, but is not able to conduct himself correctly.”50 On this account, the Neo-Confucians, under the overall guidance of “principle,” scrutinized the moral legitimacy of government actions without regard for the practical nature of its tactics, examined the quality of individual morality without regard for its social functions, and frequently drew upon very severe idealism as a standard of evaluation for the government and the individual. In short, this group of scholars employed moral idealism and placed it above political pragmatism. They wanted to use cultural conservatism to restrain excessively radical policies and employ the gentry scholars’ intellectual authority and the power of public opinion to control the ever-expanding contemporary state and government. Since they only commanded cultural authority without political power, all they could do was to continue to advance their own form of critical idealism.51 48  SS, j. 427, 12717. 49  The cited Chinese phrase is zhi tianxia guojia 治天下國家 and is from the “Doctrine of the Mean” article 21. CTP. James Legg’s translation is: “Knowing how to govern the kingdom with all its states and families.” 50  “Henan Chengshi cuiyan,” j. 1, ECJ, 1197. 51  See “Jingxue liku—zongfa,” ZZJ, 259–260; Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 18, ECJ, 242. During the yuanyou reign period, this group of scholars held political power for a short time. Cheng Yi said that “nothing is more worrisome for our state than that those occupying government positions do not know the importance of learning. If rulers do not know the importance of learning, then they will not be able to know the great Way and the court will not be able to obtain the way of good governance. Not knowing the Way, then superficial views can easily find an ear while words of moral principle will have a hard time doing so.” “His emphasis on the priority of “learning” (xue) and the “Way” (Dao) over “ruling” (zheng) and “laws” ( fa) was simply to defend the priority of the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong) over the “tradition of political power” (zhitong). XZZTJCB, j. 397, 9676.

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During the period when the Neo-Confucian School of Principle was just taking shape, it was always marginalized and only symbolized the idealistic trend of thought of the scholar-official class. It was said that Shenzong once asked Wang Anshi about the suitability of employing Sima Guang, but Wang was firmly opposed to the idea. Wang Anshi believed that the way to handle this group of scholars with their moral idealism and cultural conservatism was resolutely to exclude them from political power. Only in this way could he maintain his political mainstream position and carry forward his radical policies. Otherwise they might be very troublesome, using their cultural authority to return to the mainstream and monopolizing the central discourse with their version of universal truth. During this period when practical values controlled all reforms, they could only be kept marginalized and unacknowledged. In sum, in the 1070s and 1080s, the differences between Kaifeng (Bianliang) and Luoyang, bureaucrats in and out of office, and practical policies and cultural ideals brought about a division in the world of Chinese thought between the “tradition of political power” (zhengtong) and the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong), “teachers” (shi) and officials (li), and the political and cultural centers that was unprecedented in Chinese history. 2

Continuation of Neo-Confucianism: The Zhu Xi-Lu Xiangshan Debates and Their Surroundings

In 1175 (last year of the Southern Song qiandao reign period), through the introduction of Lü Zuqian (1137–1181), Zhu Xi (1130–1200) met with the brothers Lu Jiuling (1132–1180) and Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan, 1139–1193) at the Goose Lake Temple on Mt. Qian in Xinzhou in Jiangxi. They discussed thought and learning; each one holding on to his own views, they parted unhappily in disagreement. From then on, they strongly defended their different positions and their disciples were also divided. As Huang Zongxi (1610–1695) wrote: “those who modeled themselves on Zhu defamed Lu as a wild Chanist; those who modeled themselves on Lu regarded Zhu as a vulgar scholar; the learning of the two each grew into their own schools, as different as ice and charcoal.”52 The debates between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan demonstrated the first clear split in the seemingly unified Neo-Confucian School of Principle. From the point of view of intellectual history, we could say that this also indicated that the various different ways of thought within the School of Principle had also come 52  “Xiangshan xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 58.

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to maturity. Later on, this “maturity of various ways of thought” also provided many more intellectual resources for diverse orientations. These debates are known in Chinese intellectual history as the Meeting at Goose Lake Temple (E hu zhi hui 鵝湖之會), sometimes called the Goose Lake Temple Debates. They took place at a time a full century after the rise of the Luoyang School of Principle in the Northern Song, nearly fifty years since the demise of the Northern Song and the founding of the Southern Song, and also about fifty years before the School of Principle broke out of its predicament and became the mainstream political ideology.53 Strictly speaking, this Meeting at Goose Lake Temple, that has regularly been presented as a major event in Chinese intellectual history, was actually an affair involving only a small group of individuals, and probably did not have very much influence on contemporary social life. Still, it took place during a period when the School of Principle was most vital. In that year, Zhu Xi was forty-six, the Lu brothers were forty-four and thirty-seven, Lü Zuqian was thirty-nine, and another celebrated scholar, Zhang Shi (1133–1180), who did not attend, was forty-three. They were all living in an age of rich and vigorous thought when discussions of the universe and human nature were very free and full of imagination. 2.1 Before going on, let me survey the history of this century. In 1126, the first year of Song Emperor Qinzong (Zhao Huan, 1100–1156, r. 1126–1127)’s jingkang reign period, the great army of the Jurchen Jin state marched south and brought the Northern Song to an end the following year. Thus 1127 marks the beginning of the Southern Song dynasty. Early in the Southern Song, both the court and the scholars were preoccupied with three things: how to deal with a powerful enemy and maintain their regime; the necessity of validating the legitimacy of imperial power by means of rites and ceremonies after the fall of the Central Plains; and, in the confused state of government affairs both in and outside China, the necessary reinstatement of a practical-minded bureaucracy to reorganize and consolidate an ordered state administrative structure. Under such circumstances and for a very long period of time, impractical discussions of human nature and principle were temporarily set aside, and high-minded moral idealism was also out of favor. Having experienced the bitter pain of 53  Although the party proscription of the qingyuan reign period (1195–1201) was lifted in Song Ningzong (Zhao Kuo, 1168–1224, r. 1194–1201)’s time, it was not until Emperor Lizong (Zhao Yun, 1205–1264, r. 1224–1264) began to employ Neo-Confucians and accord great importance to Zhu Xi’s Sishu jizhu that the School of Principle really entered mainstream politics. See “Ningzong ji san,” SS, j. 39, 754; j. 41, and “Lizong ji yi,” 789.

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dynastic destruction and devastation, political pragmatism occupied the mainstream. Assuring the safety of the regime (dynasty) was an absolutely sufficient reason, during this special period of time, for people to pay most attention to things like political action, funding the military, people’s feelings of obedience or opposition, political success or failure and the installation of a legal system. In 1128, the second year of the jianyan reign period (1127–1131), a scholar sent a memorial to the emperor stating that “now there are three things that should be discussed by officials in designated departments: military affairs, budget and expenses, and the efficiency of the officialdom.”54 Even the father and son, Hu Anguo (1074–1138) and Hu Yin (1098–1156), who had supported the Learning of Principle, criticized the atmosphere in which “scholars regard using empty talk as making them superior, but they are actually unsuitable for practical use; they view managing practical affairs as vulgar conduct and say that such conduct is not worthy of mention.”55 The significance of thought and culture was really not so important during this special period of time, and idealism about morality seemed to be a very long way from practical reality. Nevertheless, from the xining and yuanfeng reign periods (1068–1085) on, the flourishing moral idealism and cultural conservatism of the scholar-officials from Luoyang continued to prosper among the gentry class, and the practice of discussing human nature and principle did not decline due to the changes of the times. This intellectual fashion, especially the learning of the Cheng brothers, began to spread to many areas due to the propagation of Xie Liangzuo (1050–1103), You Zuo (1053–1123), Yang Shi (1053–1135) and Lü Dalin (ca. 1042– ca. 1090) as well as the expositions of the early Southern Song scholars Yin Chun or Yin Tun (1071–1143), Zhu Zhen (?–1138), and Lin Guangchao (1114–1178) as well as Hu Anguo and his sons Hu Yin and Hu Hong (1105–1161).56 After the party proscriptions were lifted in the Southern Song, even the emperors also

54  Li Xinchuan (1167–1240), Jianyan yilai xinian yaolu, 1988, j. 14, 298. 55  Ibid., j. 27, 533–545 contains the complete text of Hu Yin’s memorial of jianyan year 3 (1129); the text contained in “Rulin wu-Hu Yin zhuan,” SS, j. 435, 12918 is only an abbreviation. 56  “Xulu,” Song-Yuan xue-an,” 3, says “Those who introduced the Luo Learning to the Xi-an Shaanxi area were the three Lü brothers, Lü Dajun (1031–1082), Lü Dazhong (1020–c. 1100), and Lü Dalin (c.1042–c.1090); its way to Hubei and Hunan areas was through the teaching of Xie Liangzuo (1050–1103) from Shangcai (Henan) in the southern part of the Hubei area; its spread in the Sichuan area was through Cai Shi and Ma Juan; its spread in the Zhejiang area was through the four Yongjia scholars Zhou Xingji (1067–1125), Liu Anjie (f. 12th century), Xu Jingheng (1072–1128) and Bao Ruoyu (f. 11th–12th century), and its spread in the Jiangsu area was through Wang Xinbo (f. 12th century).”

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began to take an interest in ideas of moral idealism and cultural conservatism.57 In 1136, however, when the Chief Minister Zhao Ding (1085–1147), who favored nature and principle studies (xinglixue) resigned, Chen Gongfu (ca. 1081–ca. 1150) urged the emperor to prohibit the “Luoyang Studies” (Yichuan xue) of Cheng Yi. He said that the mutual recognition of scholars and their formation of a community could threaten imperial power. This strategic proposal obviously fit in very well with the emperor’s needs, and he immediately signaled his approval. The repeated protestations of men like Hu Anguo and Lü Zhi (1092–1135) in defense of Cheng Yi’s transmission of the ideas of Confucius and Mencius and interpretations of Confucianism seem to have been quite useless. At that time almost all the scholars who were oriented toward the School of Principle could only remain silent while ideas about nature and principle were marginalized. This situation lasted for several decades until the time of Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi, Lü Zuqian, Lu Xiangshan (Jiuyuan), and Lu Jiuling (1132–1180). It should be pointed out, however, that during these decades the number of scholars who were interested in the study of nature and principle increased rather than decreased. Even though this high-minded moral idealism and strict cultural conservatism did not find much room for development in the political arena, such an intellectual atmosphere still continued to proliferate among an increasing number of private academies and communities of local scholarofficials. Due to the growing ease of printing, the development of transportation and communication, and the custom of holding intellectual discussions, this trend of thought was often able to attract new adherents through the exchange of letters, discussion meetings, and lectures.58 Such thought was even more welcomed by scholars because it could be studied by relying on textual exegesis of the classics, could be propagated using those classic texts, could be 57  “Daoxue er,” SS, j. 428, 12735: “After Emperor Gaozong crossed the Yangzi [and settled down in the south], he then summoned Yang Shi to establish the sequential order for officials to attend the court. He also summoned Hu Anguo to assume the positions of Supervising Secretary and Secretariat Drafter and made both Fan Chong (?–1141) and Zhu Zhen (1072–1138) the Crown Prince’s teachers.” Emperor Gaozong of the Southern Song (1107–1187, r. 1127–1162) was not really opposed to the learning of Cheng Hao [called the learning of Yiluo because Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi usually taught in the areas between the Yi and Luo rivers in Luoyang, Henan]. Gaozong actually accepted Fan Chong’s suggestion in the fifth year of the haoxing reign period (1131–1162) to summon Cheng Yi’s disciple Yi Chun (1071–1142) to serve as a member of the Hanlin Academy. See Jianyan yilai xinian yaolu, 1988, j. 14, 297, j. 17, 352, j. 105, 1712, j. 109, 1774. 58  The degree to which Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan, Lü Zuqian, Zhang Shi, Chen Liang, and so on were able to assemble together, exchange letters and deliver lectures at that time is quite rare in Chinese history.

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expounded by means of a lecture and discussion format, and, even more, could rely on the background of the classics to criticize the present situation. A group of such scholars became the leaders of a new intellectual world; they had great reputations and very many followers. For example, Zhang Shi in the Yuelu Academy (Changsha, Hunan), Zhu Xi in the White Deer Grotto Academy (Jiujiang, Jiangxi), and Yang Jian (1141–1226) in the Lake Tai Academy (Wuxi, Jiangsu) all had considerably great influence. Their influence had three main aspects. First, they raised the cultural awareness and moral standards of the intellectual stratum by means of the classic texts and their rational arguments. Second, they involved themselves in politics, discussed “the right way of governing the state” (guoshi, 國是), and put forth their opinions on national, religious and local issues. And third, they criticized the Imperial University and education in the official schools as well as the officials in the schools in the prefectures and counties, demonstrating the local gentry’s idealistic position on education.59 This last point is particularly important. According to statistics from the Southern Song, there were two hundred and fifty private academies in Jiangxi, Hunan, Zhejiang and Fujian, not to mention the number of private village schools (xiangshu 鄉塾). If every one of these academies had a hundred students and teachers, that would make at least twenty or thirty thousand people. In these places where scholars gathered together, they discussed the Principle of Heaven and human desires, the sequence of principle and vital essence or material force (li qi xianhou 理氣先後), the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, the dispute between rightness and profit (yi li zhi bian 義利之辯), and so on. In the course of these discussions, these scholars gradually cultivated a sense of lofty personal integrity and strict standards of criticism.60 This current of thought, however, was always resisted by the political bureaucracy. We will recall that in 1136, Chen Gongfu called for the prohibition of Luoyang Neo-Confucianism or the “Luoyang Studies” of Cheng Yi. 59  See Zhu Xi, “Xuexiao gongju siyi,”, ZWGWJ, j. 69, 27a–28a; also see Zhu Xi’s critique of official schools in “Song Li Bojian xu,” Wengong wenji, j. 75, 27b. He said that “although there are school officials throughout the empire, those who study under them are only after what is currently popular and intending to use it for seeking a government position.” As for the Way of “cultivating one’s self” (xiushen), “ordering one’s family” (qijia), and “regulating the state” (zhiguo) in order to “bring peace to All Under Heaven” (ping tianxia), they have never even heard of it.” 60  See Liu Zijian’s discussion of Zhu Xi in “Buhe shiyi he shenghuo zuofeng,” chapter 5 of his Songmo suowei daotong de chengli, in Liang Song shi yanjiu huibian, 1987, 268–273. Also see Zhu Hanmin, “Nan Song lixue yu shuyuan jiaoyu,” Zhongguo zhexue 16 (1993), 110–119.

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From the shaoxing reign period (1131–1162) of Emperor Gaozong (r. 1127–1162), to the shaoxi era (1190–1195) of Emperor Guangzong (r. 1198–1194), these scholars were repeatedly attacked by various officials at the imperial court. These attacks culminated in the well-known Qingyuan Party Proscription of 1195 to 1201 that began with Zhao Ruyu (1140–1196) being forced out of office in 1195. Their enemies claimed that this intellectual trend was a threat to the political power holders and that their trend of thought was only empty talk harmful to the state (wuguo 誤國).61 The Southern Song Neo-Confucian School of Principle still continued to develop even in this context. It spread rapidly and became customary among the scholar class while always remaining in a marginal position under pressure from the political mainstream. In the intellectual circles of popular society, it had already gained the power of public opinion and established a certain amount of public space, but in the center of political power and practical political activity it never obtained any discursive rights. 2.2 Zhu Xi was without doubt the most important figure among all of the Southern Song Neo-Confucian scholars, both his contemporaries and later generations. Many scholars have already written to point out his important significance in the history of Neo-Confucianism: the successful development of the “study of principle and material force” (li qi zhi xue 理氣之學) and of “form and number” (xiang shu zhi xue 象數之學), the establishment of the system of Song NeoConfucianism, and so on. In our reconsideration of the importance of Zhu Xi in intellectual history today, however, I think we should particularly discuss the following three aspects. First, the establishment of the “tradition of moral principle” or the “succession of the Way” (daotong). This so-called “succession” or “transmission” was originally an imaginary historical genealogy that consisted of the thought of certain individuals from the past carefully selected and given prominence by some thinkers to form a sort of suggestive “history.” This sort of history was then given sacred significance to express the reasonableness and eternal nature of some kinds of thought; thus it constituted a so-called “succession” or “transmission” (tong 統). Giving such prominence to this “transmission” meant that the principles emanating from this system of thought should be venerated as universal truth, and that those who describe this historical train of thought also possess the authority to interpret the truth. 61  “Lin Li zhuan,” SS, j. 394, 12029.

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After Han Yu put forth the “succession of the Way” or the “tradition of moral principle” and used it to symbolize the entirely different nature of the tradition of Confucian truth compared to the Daoist and Buddhist heresies, in the Northern Song it was then vigorously propagated by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi until this “succession” or “transmission” began to be universally accepted as a historical commonplace among the scholar class. In the establishment of this “tradition of moral principle,” there were, however, still two problems that had to be solved. One was to enable Mencius to be genuinely accepted as the expounder of Confucian truth who formed the connecting link with the past tradition, and to remove those comparatively impure figures such as Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE), Wang Tong (584–617), and so on. The second was to explain that after Confucius and Mencius, the tradition of Confucian truth was then passed down through the line of the “Luoyang Studies” of the Cheng brothers. In his White Deer Grotto Academy, Zhu Xi once asked his students why people criticized Mencius. He also told them that Confucianism flourished greatly in the Song dynasty; officially there was the learning of Ouyang Xiu, Wang Anshi, and the Su brothers, and in society there was the learning of Hu Yuan and the Cheng brothers.” Who, then,” Zhu asked, “had the correct doctrine?”62 Obviously, the “succession of the Way” still needed to be verified and manifested again. In this respect, there were two aspects to Zhu Xi’s most important work. First, he edited the Records of the Origins of the School of the Chengs (Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu) and reconstructed the history of the transmission of the Way. This work tracing the origin and transmission of the School of Principle begins with Zhou Dunyi and then in succession discusses Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Shao Yong, the Zhang Zai brothers, the disciples of the Cheng brothers like the three Lü (Dazhong, Dajun, Dalin), Xia Liangzuo, You Zuo, Yang Shi, Yin Tun and Hu Anguo of the early Southern Song, and finally the disciples of the School of Principle who were close to Zhu Xi himself. He superimposed the transmission of the truth and its propagation from teacher to disciple and described the dissemination of thought from one generation to the next as one historical genealogy. This both established the boundaries of the truth and made clear the surrounding heresies. And this made it possible for later scholars to have clear standards of selection, imitation, acceptance, and rejection when searching for the truth.63 62  ZWGWJ, j. 74, “Bailu shutang cewen,” 12b–13a. 63  Thus the tiyao of the SKQS zongmu, j. 57, 519, “Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu,” says that “the men of Song’s discussions of sub-schools and distinctions of factions in the School of Principle begin with this book.” The SS followed even more the ideas of this book in its “Daoxue

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Second, with Lü Zuqian, he edited Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu). In this book, quotations of Zhou Dunyi, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and Zhang Zai are brought together according to the ideas of the “rectification of the mind/ heart” (zhengxin), “cultivating one’s self” (xiushen), “ordering one’s family” (qijia), and “regulating the state” (zhiguo) in order to “bring peace to All Under Heaven” (ping tianxia). They are divided into fourteen juan with the following titles: “On the Substance of the Way,” “The Essentials of Learning,” “The Investigation of Things and the Investigation of Principle to the Utmost,” “Preserving One’s Mind and Nourishing One’s Nature,” “Correcting Mistakes, Improving Oneself, Self-Discipline, and Returning to Propriety,” “The Way to Regulate the Family,” “On Serving or Not Serving in the Government, Advancing or Withdrawing, and Accepting or Declining Office,” “On the Principle of Governing the State and Bringing Peace to the World,” “Systems and Institutions,” “Methods of Handling Affairs,” “The Way to Teach,” “Correcting Mistakes and the Defects of the Mind,” “Sifting the Heterodoxical Doctrines,” and “On the Dispositions of Sages and Worthies.”64 According to Wing-tsit Chan, the compilation of Reflections on Things at Hand was also based on Zhu Xi’s own philosophy and his idea of the transmission of the Way (daotong) because it offers a more rigorous description of that transmission and continuation than the Records of the Origins of the School of the Chengs. Not only does it place Sima Guang, who was good at politics and history and was doubting Mencius and honoring Yang Xiong, outside of the daotong transmission, but it also places Shao Yong, whose thought has strong Daoist implications, outside the system of Confucian orthodoxy. It establishes an intellectual genealogy for the School of Principle using Zhou Dunyi as its beginning, the Cheng brothers as its orthodoxy, and Zhang Zai as a supplement to it.65 zhuan,” and thus firmly established a so-called “transmission of the Way” (daotong) in the historical record. 64  Zhu Xi offered a rather detailed explanation of the general meaning of the Jinsi lu table of contents in ZYL, j. 105, 2629. Wing-tsit Chan, tr., Reflections on Things at Hand, 1967, is a complete annotated translation of the Jinsi lu. We use Chan’s translations of the table of contents. 65  This genealogy of the transmission of the Way was quite quickly accepted by very many people. In the ninth year (1216) of jiading reign period (1208–1224), Yuan Xie (1144–1224) wrote in his Lianxi xiansheng citang ji that “the tradition of the Way gradually became profound and subtle, and its transmission continued like an unending thread.” (see Jiezhai ji, j. 9, CSJC edition, 132.) Also, we again find that Li Xinchuan (1167–1244) did not compile the Daoming lu in ten juan in 1239 until after the emperor in 1224 recognized that “Mr. Yichuan (Cheng Yi) continued Cheng Hao’s teaching and became the Confucian master model of the Song dynasty.” Li Xinchuan reaffirmed this genealogy through a

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Next, Zhu Xi re-established the “classics.” In order to move the interpretation of the Confucian classics in the direction of School of Principle thinking, he had to re-determine the order of importance of the classic texts. This was a very important strategic question. According to Zhu Xi’s thinking, Reflections on Things at Hand was a stepping stone leading to the Four Books, and the Four Books were really a stepping stone leading to ultimate truth.66 So it was even more important to re-confirm the status of the Analects (Lunyu), the Mencius (Mengzi), the “Great Learning” (Daxue) and the “Doctrine of the Mean” (Zhongyong) as the preeminent and most fundamental Confucian classics, and to interpret their ideas on the basis of School of Principle concepts. In this light, Zhu Xi’s most important contributions to later Chinese intellectual history are not only that he established the “transmission of the Way” but also that he produced a new classic text dealing with this daotong—the Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu). Among the Confucian classic texts, the Analects, Mencius, “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean” had begun to be highly regarded starting in the middle period of the Tang dynasty. Zhu Xi’s contribution was that he brought these four texts together and employed them to configure a system of classic texts that supported Neo-Confucian School of Principle thinking. Then he made these four classics into the textual basis for the genealogy of his “transmission of the Way,” providing textual support for the history of this transmission from Confucius to Zisi to Mencius. Finally, through his annotations, both concise and precise, and his elucidations in the Collected Commentaries on the Four Books, he connected together and harmonized the thinking of the School of Principle. From extant sources, we know that very early on Zhu Xi began to pay attention to various scholars’ interpretations over time of the Analects, Mencius, the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean.” In reading the works of the older generation of School of Principle scholars, he spent a great deal of time on and paid particular attention to their discussions of the meaning and significance of these four classic texts. In his Collected Commentaries, he not only judiciously selected many older commentaries but also cited the explanations and elaborations of many earlier School of Principle scholars. He himself also made many new interpretations that provided both very clear explanations of the four classical texts and a summation of School of Principle thinking, connecting it from the “Principle of Heaven” (tianli) to the “ten thousand things” historical narrative and collecting and storing their writings in the preface to his Daoming lu, see Xuxiu SKQS, ce 517, 507–508. 66  ZYL, j. 105, 2629.

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(wanwu, the whole world). For all of these reasons, several centuries later, the Collected Commentaries on the Four Books were designated by the government as the official texts for the imperial bureaucratic examinations; it became the most influential ancient Chinese text transmitting the thought of the NeoConfucian School of Principle. Third and finally, by dint of systematic efforts at concretization and popularization, Zhu Xi gradually brought those moral and ethical principles that originally belonged to upper class scholars down into the everyday life of the common people. Of all ancient Chinese thinkers, Zhu Xi was probably the one who most consciously popularized his thought, applied it to daily life and created a practical system. Perhaps it was due to his long years of teaching that he paid so much attention to how to apply School of Principle ideas to daily life. As he investigated these abstract and profoundly abstruse principles, he repeatedly emphasized their realization in daily life as well as the expression of those principles in people’s everyday thought and behavior. He really did not agree with the idea of the absolute inwardness of truth; he rather attended to the implementation of “principle” in daily life. On this account, he paid close attention to the rules and ceremonies of the common people’s everyday life. He once made a rather painstaking revision of the Lü Family Community Compact (Lüshi xiangyue). He also paid a great deal of attention to the early teaching of beginning students and wrote a preface to Cheng and Dong’s Principles of Learning (Cheng Dong er xiansheng xueze) edited by Cheng Duanmeng (d. 1191) and Dong Zhu (1152–?). Among works of this kind, Zhu Xi’s most important and historically most influential work was his Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals (Zhuzi jiali). He believed that although the ritual order and norms of “capping, marriage, funerals, sacrifices, and rituals” of “families and clans” were only outward ceremonies, these ceremonies could still point to the contents that implicitly included those conceptual values such as “title and status” (mingfen 名分) and “love and respect” (aijing 愛敬). Thus he revised ancient Chinese ceremonial etiquette in hopes that with the support of these external ceremonies people would be made to “be careful about their titles and status and value love and respect” as well as develop “the Way of cultivating one’s self, ordering one’s family, carefully attending to the funeral rites of one’s parents, and sacrificing respectfully to one’s ancestors.”67 This work contained a chapter on “general principles of ritual” and a system of the four important ceremonies—“the capping ceremony,” “weddings,” “funerals,” “sacrificial rites”—that made up the ethical standards 67  “Jiali xu,” ZWGWJ, j. 75, 18 A-B. In 1174 Zhu Xi also edited Gujin jiajili. See Wang Maohong, ed., Zhu Xi nianpu, 1998, j. 1, 62.

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for families and clans. In compiling it, Zhu Xi’s principle was to follow as much as possible the popular customs of his day to revise the ancient ritual system and its accoutrements that were very difficult for his contemporaries to practice. He also established common offering halls (or ancestral shrines, citang 祠堂) for scholars and common people according to the realignment of contemporary social hierarchy. He also employed the method of Sima Guang’s Letters and Etiquette (Shuyi 書儀) to revise the Cheng brothers’ entrenched ideas about ancient rites. Professor Patricia Ebrey has well described the significance of Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals: Zhu Xi drew on Confucian ritual scholarship going back to the classics but also incorporated many modifications and adjustments. His goal was to encourage performance of more authentically Confucian forms of the rituals and thus combat the popularity of customs he considered vulgar or superstitious…. [Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals] is a militantly Confucian book, designed to promote the practice of rituals modeled on revered Confucian sources and to combat the practice of Buddhist rites or other rites that could not be reinterpreted as Confucian. Its author, Zhu Xi, was committed to working for the strengthening of Confucian values and practices.68 It was precisely Zhu Xi’s efforts to popularize Confucian ideas and bring them into daily life that guaranteed that the principles of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle would genuinely penetrate Chinese society.69 2.3 From the point of view of later intellectual history, however, the School of Principle’s tendency to search for “inward transcendence” (neizai chaoyue) exerted a very great influence. In their exploration of knowledge, they often broke away from the concrete phenomenal world, not limiting themselves to concrete people and things, but always trying to find a fundamental “Way” or “Principle.” They sought an ultimate explanation that could “bind [their ideas]

68  Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Chu Hsi’s Family Rituals, 1991, ix, xv. 69  If we examine what various local gazetteers (difang zhi) record concerning local customs, we will discover that all the way to the beginning of the twentieth century what the Zhuzi jiali had to say about the rules for wedding and funeral ceremonies was still most commonly employed by local gentry families.

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together in one single thread.”70 And on this account, they came to be known as the so-called School of Principle and Learning of the Way. This was quite different from traditional Confucianism being “unable to hear the Master’s views on human nature and the Way of Heaven” (xing yu tiandao 性與天道).71 The orientation of Song Neo-Confucianism was not simply satisfied with the construction of standards and norms for government or state order (guojia zhixu) and daily life, but sought even more the universality and absolute nature of those standards and that order, and closely questioned their ultimate support. On this account, they had to re-establish a metaphysical (xing er shang, 形而上) foundation for those standards and the order that transcended concrete objects, affairs and phenomena. When Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian were writing their Reflections on Things at Hand, in spite of their aversion to discussing such questions as the fundamental principles of the universe, they still had no alternative but to begin their work with a chapter entitled “On the Substance of the Way” (daoti 道體) that discusses just those issues. In School of Principle discourse, this fundamental element that they called “Principle,” “Way,” and “Great Ultimate” involved first of all a metaphysical world that transcended (existed before) the phenomenal world of things and events. Just as Zhu Xi wrote in his “Answer to Lu Zijing (that is, Lu Jiuyuan or Lu Xiangshan)” (Da Lu Zijing), “anything that has a form and a shape is a vessel or an instrument and the principle that was employed to make this thing is the Dao or Way.”72 Secondly, it was a principle prior to and giving birth to everything in the world (the ten thousand things and events, wanshi wanwu 萬事萬物) and constituted the regulations that formed a connecting thread from the beginning to the end of everything in the world. As Zhu Xi said, “Before Heaven and Earth existed, there was after all only principle.”73 Thirdly, it was absolute, unconditional and pure. As Zhu Xi said, “there is only one Great Ultimate, and it has no comparison” … “it is simply the principle of the highest good.”74 Finally, “before it was activated” (weifa 未發), it existed in a void and tranquil state that was nevertheless pregnant with the extremes of both activity and quietude, and this Yin and Yang of motion and stillness con70   Lunyu, 4. 15: “The Master said, ‘Can! There is one single thread binding my way together.’” Lau, Analects, 74. 71   Lunyu, 5.12: “Zigong said, ‘One can get to hear about the Master’s accomplishments, but one cannot get to hear his views on human nature and the Way of Heaven.’ ” Lau, Analects, 78. 72  ZWGWJ, j. 36, 14A. 73  ZYL, 1, 1. Translations from Chan, SB, 635. 74  ZYL, 100, 2549. Translations adapted from Chan, SB, 638 and 640.

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tained all of the ten thousand things and events of the cosmos.” After it was “activated” (yifa 已發), however, when “principle” appeared in the phenomenal world (that exists after physical form, xing er xia 形而下), it would appear in the “material force” (qi 氣, energy or life force) that constituted the basic element of everything in the cosmos. Although “principle” is an absolute “unity” (yi, one), “material force” is divided into yinqi 陰氣 and yangqi 陽 氣 that gave birth to the “substance” (zhi 質) of the Five Phases (wuxing 五行), and then the Yin and Yang combined with the Five Phases gave birth to the ten thousand things (the cosmos).75 In this way a unified “principle” had a multitude of different appearances among the ten thousand things and events of the cosmos. Here Zhu Xi once again cites the Northern Song Neo-Confucian dictum of Cheng Yi: “the principle is one, but its manifestations are many” (liyi fenshu).76 In his Collected Commentaries on the “Great Learning,” he also said that “the things of this world all have their principles …”77 It was precisely because “principle” exists everywhere that people had to observe and experience every thing and event, that is, follow Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of things and extension of knowledge” (gewu zhizhi 格物致知) or “fathoming the principle of any thing or affair”78 As regards human beings who are born endowed with “material force,” because “material force” is divided into clear and turbid types (qingqi 清氣 and zhuoqi 濁氣), before it “begins to operate” (weifa) it does not differ very much, but after it has “begun to operate” (yifa) it is completely different. When the mind “has not begun to operate,” its “nature” (xing) is in accord with “principle” (li); but after the mind “begins to operate,” it gives rise to various thoughts and feelings (emotions) and then people begin to have different kinds of thoughts and behavior. On this account, a mind set of “seriousness” ( jing 敬) must be employed to carry out self-reflection and self-restraint on the mind, and this is what is known as the “rectification of the mind” (zhengxin 正心) and “sincerity of thought” (chengyi 誠意). It is precisely these two ways of investigating knowledge and thought that embody Zhu Xi’s intellectual pursuit and moral practice. Of necessity, on the one hand, he tended toward the intellectualism of “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue), 75  ZYL, 1, 9. 76  ZYL, Ch. 1, 2; cf. Chan, SB, 639. 77  See De Bary, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 729 and 721–731 for extensive quotations from Zhu Xi’s Daxue zhangju. 78   Daxue zhangju in Sishu zhangju jizhu, 1983: “’The extension of knowing lies in the investigation of things’ means that if we wish to extend our knowing, it consists in fathoming the principle of any thing or affair we come into contact with …” Translation from De Bary, Sources, Vol. 1, 1999, 729.

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and on the other hand, he tended toward the moral stance of “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing). Zhu Xi was fairly consistent in his view of “the investigation of things and extension of knowledge.” He believed that “from the ultimate non-being and being to the minuscule one tree, one grass, and one insect, each has its own principle.”79 And so he not only read extensively but also paid considerable attention to various phenomena of society and nature. In his every day teaching, he often required his students to explore various forms of new knowledge, and in his conversations with his disciples, he repeatedly stressed both reading and observing material things. He believed that as a scholar one should follow this style of study combining the pursuit of knowledge and moral cultivation and rising from “following the path of inquiry and study” into the realm of “honoring the moral nature.” Owing to his increasingly intense debates with Lu Xiangshan (Lu Jiuyuan) and others, Zhu Xi’s position gradually became more partial to the intellectualism of “following the path of inquiry and study.” This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that in such intense debates, people could not help but overstate their positions.80 Zhu Xi was really always quite alert to the relationship between “following the path of inquiry and study” and “honoring the moral nature.” On the one hand, he criticized the scholar class for “suffering from the harmful way of studying the current Classics required by the examination system,” that is for the erroneous practice of placing knowledge from the Confucian classics and knowledge about the natural world into two separate sections, and also regarding knowledge from Confucian texts as only something to be recited by rote memory having nothing at all to do with the restraint of the mind.81 On the other hand, he took precautions to avoid the shortcoming of being influenced by the general atmosphere of Daoism and Buddhism that was singlemindedly devoted to constraining the mind and regarded all forms knowledge as superfluous burdens. He sought with great difficulty to find a balance between knowledge and thought. He agreed with and endorsed the so-called “transmission of the mind of the three sages” (sansheng chuanxin 三聖傳心) of the “Counsels of the Great Yu” in the Book of History (Shangshu). There it says: “The human mind is precarious (i. e., liable to make mistakes), the mind of the Way (the moral mind) is subtle (i. e., the mind that follows the Way). 79  ZYL, 296. 80  For more on Zhu Xi’s intellectualism and morality, see Yü Ying-shih, “Morality and Knowledge in Zhu Xi’s Philosophical System,” in Wing-tsit Chan, ed., Chu Hsi and NeoConfucianism, 1986, 228–254. 81  See ZYL, 10, 175.

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Have absolute refinement and singleness of mind. Hold fast to the Mean” (ren xin wei wei, Dao xin wei wei, wei jing wei yi, yun zhi jue zong 人心惟危，道心 惟微，惟精惟一，允执厥中).82 Zhu Xi believe this because he asked people to employ a mind set of “seriousness” ( jing ) by means of the “investigation of things” (gewu) and the “exercise of seriousness” ( jujing 居敬) to guide their own minds and gradually move from the chaos of sensual desires toward the purification of their temperament (nature of the mind, xinxing 心性), from the “human mind” (renxin 人心) to the “mind of the Way” (daoxin 道心). In Zhu Xi’s thinking, Lu Jiuyuan’s (Lu Xiangshan) direct and simplistic idea that “the mind is principle (xin ji li 心即理) was the same as Southern Chan Buddhism. For Zhu, this was undoubtedly only a one-sided affirmation of the “human mind” that ignored any warning about the “sensual desires” (qingyu 情欲) the mind randomly harbors; it lacked any period of effort (gongfu 功夫) to restrain the mind. If “sensual desires” are indulgently unrestrained, they will be just like Wild or Crazy Chan Buddhism (kuangchan 狂禪) and then “evil” (e 惡) desires will be out of control. 2.4 Zhu Xi’s thinking had already more or less taken shape before the 1175 Goose Lake Temple Debate with Lu Jiuling and Lu Jiuyuan, and after those debates, he continuously revised and enriched the content and systematic nature of his ideas. There was really no lack of differing opinions at the time. Not only between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, and not only between those who scrupulously abided by the traditional study of the classics and those who believed in the study of nature and principle. Even among those who equally believed in the School of Principle, there were also various different orientations and trends of thought. For this reason, at the same time that he was establishing the daotong and arranging the classics, throughout his life Zhu Xi strenuously rejected Buddhism and Daoism, and what he called “mixed learning” (zaxue 雜學). In addition to religious Buddhism and the Daoist religion, he carried out severe critiques of many former doctrines. During the process of developing his knowledge and thought, Zhu Xi always found himself in the unfavorable situation of doing battle on all sides with his greatest contemporary theoretical threats coming from two sources, one pragmatic and one transcendent. One of these challenges came from utilitarian and pragmatic trends of thought within the School of Principle itself. Utilitarian and pragmatic thinking always has a sort of natural reasonableness in any age, but especially in 82  Translated by Wing-tsit Chan in his Chu Hsi: Life and Thought, 1987, 66–67.

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an age in which the state and society are in relatively difficult circumstances. At such times, people are more likely to demand practical and clearly visible results from ideas, knowledge and beliefs; they are not very likely to accept the sort of transcendent thinking and idealism that belong in the purely spiritual realm. Take Lü Zuqian and Chen Liang for example.83 They may both have felt that merely discussing transcendent ideas could really not save the state (nation) nor establish order. And so they may have given more consideration to historical experience, realistic politics and practical actions. Just as Huang Zongxi wrote, they “taught people to understand things through doing them. When managing affairs, as long as every step is realistic and whatever is said is also definitely realized in action, then people will certainly comprehend the principle of these affairs and be able to develop various ways to accomplish their tasks.”84 But Zhu Xi always remained wary of those excessively utilitarian tactics known as “saving the drowning.”85 He said that this sort of thinking “followed both rightness and interest and employed both the way of kings and the way of the hegemon.”86 He believed that this common practice of emphasizing realism and practical results could damage the transcendent nature of truth and the independent nature of criticism. What Zhu Xi truly wanted to accomplish was to establish an “orthodox Way (zhengdao 正道) based on the three bonds and five constant virtues (sangang wuchang 三綱五常)” and to fill every scholar’s mind with an “authentic Confucian” (chunru 醇儒) spirit. On the basis of such a lofty idealism, they could preserve an independent scholarly stance, and, in addition to making suggestions and offering political tactics, they could still possess the power to criticize the government.87 Chen Liang was quiet dissatisfied with what he regarded as Zhu Xi’s excessively transcendent and lofty theories. In a letter in response to Zhu Xi, Chen politely but forcefully criticized his ideas. He wrote that if in an era when the tendency of the times is changing, one only insists on thinking highly of “employing the Way to rule All Under Heaven” (yi Dao zhi tianxia 以道治天下), criticizes 83  Of course, we should also include Xue Jixuan (1134–1173), Chen Fuliang (1141–1203), Ye Shi (1150–1223), and so on. Although these scholars were somewhat different from Chen Liang, they all still generally tended to pursue practical efficacy. See “Genzhai xue-an,” Song Yuan xue-an, j. 52. According to Zhu Xi, Lü Zuqian possessed the good qualities of both trends of thought. See ibid. 51. 84  “Longchuan xue-an,” Song Yuan xue-an, j. 56. Also see Wu Jiang, “Nan Song Zhedong xueshu lungao,” Zhongguo wenhua 8 (1993), 32–39. 85  “Saving the drowning” (jiuni 救溺) is from Mengzi 6A.17, Lau, Mencius, 124–125. Chen Liang’s response also alludes to this passage. 86  “Da Chen shu si,” one of “Da Chen shu shi-er,” Zhu Wengong wenji, j. 36, 25a. 87  “Ji Chen Tongfu,” and “Da Chen Tongfu,” ZWGWJ, j. 36, 20B, 22A, 25A.

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the Han and the Tang dynasties for combining “the ways of the kings and the hegemons” along with the practical expedients for “saving the drowning,” this would amount to making the path of the “Learning of the Way” too narrow. He believed that constantly pursuing the purity of the Principle of Heaven was actually quite impractically making people aim too high. Even worse, it amounted to regarding the Way as something that only the ancient sages can possess. And that was the same as claiming that the Way is not really universal and everlasting. As a result, Chen claimed, the Way that originally belonged to everybody would be turned into a “hidden treasure” monopolized by a few Confucian scholars. This kind of intellectual monopoly would insure that these scholars who believed that they possessed intellectual authority would always maintain a higher status than the rest of society.88 It may be that Chen Liang did not understand Zhu Xi’s thinking very well. At that time scholars could not control politics on the basis of culture. They could only rely on knowledge to criticize politics. On that account, merely advocating utility and pragmatism would not only be unable to provide scholars with the power to criticize freely but would very possibly cause them to lose any space for criticism and willingly give up their already very narrow critical stance in the name of politics, state (government) and emperor. Since the members of the School of Principle were always marginalized in terms of political power, they would most likely be inclined to using the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong) to restrain the “tradition of political power” (zhitong) and to rely on transcendent truth to limit real power. In a letter to a friend, Zhu Xi once explained why he definitely wanted to “put humanity and rightness (righteousness) first, and not consider utility as our the most urgent priority.”89 He was not really saying that utility was not important, but he was emphasizing a seemingly abstract “principle,” and it was actually for establishing a legitimate reason that would transcend political power and help carry on criticism and supervision of the government. It would seem, however, that Chen Liang was never able to understand the profound significance of this position.90 An even more extreme and powerful challenge came from Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) who strongly advocated a theory of inner transcendence. Compared to Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan was more deeply influenced by Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism. He was also much more intense in his pursuit 88   Chen Liang ji (zengding ben), j. 28, 340, 347, 352: “You jiachen qiu (yu Zhu Xi) shu,” “You yisi chun (yu Zhu Xi) shu zhi yi,” “You yisi qiu shu.” 89  “Song Zhang Zhonglong xu,” Zhu Wengong wenji, j. 75, 16a. 90  On the polemics between Chen Liang and Zhu Xi, see Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi, 1982.

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of a transcendent realm. In his view, man’s “original mind” (benxin 本心) was simply the “Principle of Heaven” (tianli). And so, a scholar only had to grasp his pure “human mind” (renxin) and it would already have become the “mind of the Way” (daoxin). He believed that traditional Confucianism’s separation of the “Principle of Heaven” and “human desires” and Zhu Xi’s emphasis on the difference between the “human mind” and the “mind of the Way” were both highly problematic.91 For Lu, the mind was simply the universe and it included the two poles of good and evil; that is to say every possibility was contained in the mind. The goal of human cultivation and the ultimate meaning of their existence lay only in the inward nurture of the mind. For these reasons, he believed that the direction of study and learning should be looking inward and not seeking outward; Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of things and extension of knowledge” could not help being excessively verbose and confusing. Thus, once when he answered a student’s question: “what is the investigation of things?,” Lu replied: “Study the principles of things (yanjiu wuli).” The student went further and asked him: “There are so many things in the world. How can one study all of them?” Then Lu told him: “‘All things are already complete in oneself’ (quoting Mencius 7A.4). It is only necessary to understand principle (zhiyao mingli 只要明理)” and you can master everything.92 In this vein, he further said that the ideas in the classics are not really that important because the entire truth is contained in Mencius’ admonition to “exert [one’s] mind to the utmost.” That is, to understand fully and experience the mind that connects “man” (ren, the human) and “Heaven.”93 He regarded his method as much more expeditious and uncomplicated than getting tangled up in the knowledge of the classics, and so he mocked Zhu Xi’s learning and approach as excessively verbose and confusing. He also criticized Zhu Xi for “not enjoying

91  “Yulu shang,” Lu Jiuyuan ji (hereafter LJYJ), j. 34, 395, and “Yulu xia,” j. 35, 463, j. 35: “There are good and evil sides to people just like there are these two sides in Heaven…. This view is from the “Book of Music” not from the words of the sages.” Also j. 35, 475: “It is highly problematic to say that the Principle of Heaven is separate from human desires.” 92  Dialog with Li Bomian translated in Chan, SB, 584, from Xiangshan quanji, 35:7b–8a. “Yulu xia,” LJYJ, j. 35: “If in our study we know the fundamentals, then all the Six Classics are my footnotes.” Translated in Chan, SB, 580, from Xiangshan quanji, 34:1b. 93  “Yulu shang,” LJYJ, j. 34, 395. Mengzi 7A:1 states that “he who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven (Nature)” ( Jin qi xin zhe, zhi qi xing ye. Zhi qi xing, ze zhi tian yi 盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣) Translated in Chan, SB, 585.

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the big world, but opting for occupying a small trail and a small road; not aiming at being a big man, but choosing to act as a small-minded man.”94 This is just the way Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) ridiculed Zhu Xi at the Goose Lake meeting. Lu’s sort of thinking often scorned study and the search for knowledge and valued reflexive examination of the mind, neglecting the significance of the classics and emphasizing subjective understanding. In 1175, Lu wrote the following two lines of poetry: Work that is simple and easy will in the end be lasting and great, Understanding that is devoted to isolated details will end up in aimless drifting.95 He was thus putting “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing) ahead of “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue). At the time, Lu Jiuyuan was really not that confident. Later on he may also have realized that he was being quite extreme, but in order to emphasize his position, he still wanted to persist in his view that “if one does not know how to honor his moral nature, how can he talk about following the path of study and inquiry.”96 It was very difficult for anyone to refute those who pushed ideas to the point of extreme idealism and universalism. In terms of the general orientation of members of the School of Principle, they all agreed that spiritual improvement and spiritual transcendence were more important than anything else. On the defensive, Zhu Xi could only question the validity of Lu Xiangshan’s theories in general terms. First, he raised doubts about the origin of Lu’s theories and suggested that Lu’s ideas had very strong Buddhist and Daoist overtones. Next, Zhu argued that Lu’s practical thinking was shallow and contrived and pointed out that he was too contemptuous of knowledge and learning. Finally, in his 94  “Yulu xia,” LJYJ, j. 35, 444, 449. 95  Chan, SB, 583, Xiangshan quanji, 34: 24a–b. 96  Chan, SB, 582, Xiangshan quanji, 34: 4b–5a. “Yulu shang,” LJYJ, j. 34, 400. In his Songxue, Jia Fengzhen believes that this line of thought came from Cheng Yi and “then passed on to Xie Liangzuo and Wang Zhenze, but it was only that Xiangshan was dissatisfied with Cheng Yi’s teaching, and thus often rejected it,” 115–116.  Ying-shih Yü notes this passage in note 3 of “Morality and Knowledge in Zhu Xi’s Philosophical System,” in Wing-tsit Chan, ed., Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, 1986, 228– 254: See Lu Xiangshan’s “nianpu” 年譜 in the Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, SBCK, Ch. 36, 321; and Yulu 語錄 in Ch. 34, 261.  See Lu Xiangshan’s “nianpu” in the Xiangshan xiansheng quanji, SBCK, Ch. 36, 321; and Yulu in Ch. 34, 261.

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letters and conversations with his friends and disciples, Zhu Xi spoke about his profound anxiety. He felt that several of Lu’s ideas were quite dangerous: regarding the “mind” as the origin of everything; equating the “human heart” with the “Principle of Heaven”; rejecting the pursuit of knowledge through study and the cultivation of self-restraint. The result of these ideas, Zhu felt, might be to elevate the ordinary worldly “human heart” to the same transcendent level as the “heart of the Way,” and remove the restraint that the “Principle of Heaven” should have over the “human desires” that necessarily exist in the mind of man. In the final analysis, such ideas could lead to the complete collapse of the defensive wall of ethics and morality because both goodness and evil could justify their reasonableness and rationality by relying on this “mind.” In later intellectual history, we can see that Zhu’s views were unfortunately very accurate. Later on, the orientation of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) and his successors’ Neo-Confucian School of Mind (xinxue 心學) quite simply undermined the moral ideals that they themselves repeatedly sought. The debate between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan was only a difference of opinion within the School of Principle, and their thinking was not that far apart on many issues. They were both investigating the ultimate meaning and fundamental principle of the universe, society and human life, advocating a kind of lofty moral idealism and strict cultural conservatism, and standing on the margin of political power hoping to employ the “tradition of moral principle” to restrain the “tradition of political power.” Even their ideas concerning study and learning, about which they most differed and debated, were not really so very far apart. Although Lu Jiuyuan always privileged the significance of the “mind,” Zhu Xi also attached a similarly great importance to the mind. Although Lu Jiuyuan continually criticized Zhu Xi’s system for being disorganized or incoherent, Zhu Xi actually very much emphasized the search for meaning and criticized culling phrases and passages without understanding their meaning. The so-called “reading books and appreciating the principle [embodied in them]” is just what it implies here.97 Perhaps at the time their disagreements were not as great as they were later imagined to be. The excessive differences between Zhu and Lu were gradually magnified in later polemics and only became so extreme when later generations read through and selected from the historically available intellectual sources. 2.5 Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan’s Influence Having mentioned intellectual sources, we should point out in passing the influence that Zhu Xi’s thought and works had on later intellectual history. 97  “Da Lü Ziyue,” ZWGWJ, j. 47, 5A.

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First, Zhu Xi linked together the “Way” (dao) or “principle” (li), the ultimate origin of everything with “concrete things” (qi) and “material force” (qi) of the phenomenal world. He also placed the Way and principle in a transcendent position, and asked people to hold fast to the Way, forget material things and search for the “Principle of Heaven” while downplaying “human desires.” Owing to all of this there existed a great deal of tension between the two extremes of the metaphysical and the physical realms. Although this tension caused people to be somewhat vigilant about their mind and spirit, it also caused them to exist permanently in the midst of contradiction. Second, Zhu Xi investigated both questions of ethics in the social realm and questions about material things in the natural world under the category of a common “principle.” As a result it was very easy for him to practice a habitual kind of thinking. That is, when confronting questions concerning the natural world, he would investigate ethical rationality. When confronting questions in the area of society, however, he would investigate the rigorous nature of the material world. Thus it came about, in Zhu Xi’s thought, that knowledge of the natural world and knowledge of society were too closely connected. Later on this sort of connection would further lead to a great rupture. Because these two realms lacked their own respective independence, when new knowledge coming from a different civilizational system attacked each of them individually, it would create a chain reaction between them. Once new questions in the realm of the natural world came to influence the old traditions of social ethics, or new questions of social ethics came to influence old interpretations of the natural world, then the old traditions and the old interpretations would be completely rejected or collapse at the same time. Third, Zhu Xi’s theory of “the investigation of things and extension of knowledge” assigned everything in the category of knowledge to the self-cultivation of human character and the spiritual realm. This resulted in the strengthening of a particular element of ancient Chinese tradition, namely that the ultimate significance of learning is “to improve one’s self” (weiji 為己).98 This perhaps particularly influenced Chinese scholars in their disdain for knowledge of phenomena in the natural or physical world, the world that exists after physical form (xing er xia 形而下) and their very high regard for knowledge of the world of moral ideals, a metaphysical world of “what exists before physical form (xing er shang 形而上).”99

98   Lunyu 14.24: “The Master said, ‘Men of antiquity studied to improve themselves 為己; men of today study to impress others.’” Lau, Analects, 128. 99  See Chan, SB, 786–787 for an explanation of xing er shang and xing er xia.

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We should also examine the influence that Lu Jiuyuan’s thought and works had on later intellectual history. Lu Jiuyuan’s first importance for later generations was that in the world of the Neo-Confucian Learning of Principle he gave particular prominence to the significance of the “mind.” The original intention of elevating “mind” to such a high status was naturally to emphasize the self-consciousness, autonomous, and self-regulating nature of man’s moral rationality. But as Zhu Xi had observed, implicit in this was another tendency similar to that of Southern Chan after it changed from the stance of Northern Chan. That is when people particularly affirm the autonomy and self-regulation of the “mind,” and the human “mind” also cannot possibly always aim at pure moral rationality but rather is often dominated by “feelings” and “desires,” then would the mind, in its ceaseless extension, not come to recognize tacitly the reasonableness of “human desires?” Although in Lu Jiuyuan’s time this sort of thinking did not appear, when later generations emphasized individuality, it may have actually served as an intellectual resource. Lu Jiuyuan’s second importance for later generations was that when he emphasized a personal experience of truth that transcended all individual concrete knowledge, he inadvertently affirmed the existence of a kind of universal truth. That is what meant when he asserted that Sages appeared in the Eastern Seas and they shared this same mind, and they shared this same principle (ci xin tong ye, ci li tong ye 此心同也, 此 理同也). Sages appeared in the Western Seas, and they shared this same mind, and they shared this same principle…. No where in the world will this mind and this principle be different (ci xin ci li, mo bu tong ye 此心此 理,莫不同也).100 This reasoning affirming that universal truth can transcend time and place inadvertently undermined the authority of history and power, the classics and elites, ethnic nationality and tradition to explain and interpret the truth. And this caused the ability of the state (guojia), ethnic nationality (minzu), and tradition to restrict the influence coming from other civilizations to vanish. As a result, knowledge, thought and belief were then situated in an open and pluralistic world, and any reason for refusing factual truth had been discredited. Although in Lu Jiuyuan’s time this kind of thinking certainly did not lead to the collapse of the absolute meaning and significance of traditional Chinese 100  “Nianpu,” LJYJ, j. 36, 483. Also see De Bary, Sources, 716 for similar passage from Xiangshan quanji.

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ideas of truth, when in the future “China” genuinely encountered “the world” and “tradition” genuinely encountered “modernity,” this idea of one mind might possibly become a genuine intellectual resource leading to the acceptance of new knowledge. And this would cause the Chinese intellectual world to experience a shocking crisis. Of course, all this is something to be taken up later. At that time, though, Lu Jiuyuan’s ideas did not exert any particularly great influence, much less than Zhu Xi’s line of thinking. Even Zhu Xi’s ideas did not actually become the mainstream intellectual discourse either. Under great political repression, in the final analysis it always remained marginalized. This was true despite the fact that their contemporaries already acknowledged the importance of the Cheng brothers, Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, Lü Zuqian, and so on for pointing out the transmission of the moral Way (daotong) of Confucius, Yan Hui, Zengzi and Mencius, and for establishing the position of the “Great Learning,” the “Doctrine of the Mean,” and other classics.101 Despite the fact that the influence of the Confucian Learning of Principle was gradually growing due to the increasing numbers of the gentry class, the development of the means of dissemination of writings, the opening up of clan education, and the steady establishment of space for a common discourse, throughout the Song, political repression always pushed it into a marginal position. During the Qingyuan Party Proscription of 1195 to 1201, Zhu Xi, the only remaining School of Principle scholar still alive, was already sixty-six, Lu Jiuyuan had been dead for two years, Lü Zuqian, who had mediated between Zhu and Lu had been dead for fourteen years, another Neo-Confucian, Zhang Shi, who was equally as famous as Zhu Xi, had also been dead for fifteen years, and it was already twenty years since the Goose Lake debates. This restrictive situation persisted for over a decade. In 1209 (year four of the jiading era), the restrictions on the School of Principle slowly began to lessen. In 1220, the court conferred posthumous titles on Zhou Dunyi, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, and the most celebrated members of the Northern and Southern Song School of Principle genealogy were one by one granted posthumous titles. This was a symbol that the ban on School of Principle thought was completely lifted and that the genealogy of the School of Principle was now officially recognized. It still did not so smoothly enter the center of power, however. It was almost half a century after the Qingyuan Party Proscription, in the first year of the chunyou reign period (1241), that Emperor Lizong (Zhao Yun 趙昀, 1205–1264, r. 1224–1264) issued an order in his own hand authorizing Zhang Zai, Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi to receive sacrifices 101  Ye Shi, “Tong-an xian Zhu xiansheng citang ji,” Shuixin wenji, j. 10, in Ye Shi ji, 167.

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in the Confucian Temple. It was only when their names were placed on the list to receive these sacrifices, that the “succession and tradition of the moral way” (daotong) was finally granted a legitimate place under the “tradition of the power” (zhengtong). At this point the history of the Song Neo-Confucianism School of Principle finally underwent a great transformation. I have frequently reflected on the problematic nature of the changes that occurred during this period of history. The School of Principle was originally an intellectual doctrine employed by the gentry class to resist political authority by means of cultural authority; it relied on transcendental thinking to withstand worldly tendencies, and it was a richly creative revolutionary way of thinking. Once it entered into the official ideology and served as the content of the official bureaucratic examinations, it would be reproduced by later scholars who cherished various sorts of worldly desires. At that point, its original nature would be steadily distorted. Nevertheless, we have to admit that it was precisely because this originally purely ideational form of thought came to be supported by its position as constituting the examination authority and benefiting official careers that it was able to become a set of concepts in general use and enter into the world of daily life. Furthermore, it was precisely because it came to be regarded as correct and unalterable knowledge, like the principles of Heaven and Earth themselves, and was duplicated and circulated everywhere that it became the most popular way of thinking and direction of learning among the scholarly world. And on this account, it actually altered both the mainstream and the leitmotif of Chinese culture while at the same time creating the landscape of the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief for the next eight hundred years.

Chapter 10

From Song to Ming: Establishing a New Tradition II 1

State and Scholars Support the Expansion of Culture and Establish the Uniformity of Ethics in Everyday Life in the Song Dynasty

In the middle of the eleventh century during the reign of Emperor Renzong (Zhao Zhen 趙禎, 1010–1063, r. 1022–1063), with the support of Xia Song (985– 1051), the government used its administrative power to order more than 1,980 shaman (shiwu 師巫) households to “change professions, return to agriculture, and to practice acupuncture and medicine.” All of their paraphernalia, including spirit images (shenxiang 神像), talismans ( fulu 符箓), spirit robes (shenshan 神衫), magic staffs (shenzhang 神杖), soul headbands (hunjin 魂巾) and soul caps (hunmao 魂帽), were also ordered destroyed or confiscated.1 Of course the government had issued such prohibition orders more than once. General prohibitions of shamans, witches, and unorthodox and unacceptable cults in order to improve the ethics of everyday life and moral order through the exercise of political power had always received the support of emperors and the central government. Ancient governments’ resistance to “unacceptable cults” and “shamanistic customs” usually took the form of establishing schools to raise the educational standards. In the same manner during Renzong’s reign, Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) recommended the establishment of new schools. Many of the newly established schools not only transmitted knowledge but also even more widely disseminated “civilization” (wenming) as the content of education.2 From the records of various extant Song dynasty gazetteers, we can see that after the jingyou reign period (1034–1038) schools really began to be universalized. The state revised its previous policy of engaging celebrated Confucian scholars to teach in these schools and began to appoint government officials as teachers. This strategy of having “officials serve as teachers” (yi li wei shi 以吏為師) further brought the top-down activity to promote civilization into government administration and also greatly accelerated its progress.

1  Xia Song, “Hongzhou qing duan xianwu,” Song wenjian, j. 43, 652. 2  “Zhoujun shuyuan,” Hong Mai, Rongzhai sanbi, j. 5, in Rongzhai suibi, 1993, 477.

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This collaborative effort by officialdom and the gentry to promote the broadening of civilization through the twin methods of strict prohibition and educational persuasion continued for several centuries from the Northern through the Southern Song dynasties. The government continuously issued imperial orders and enacted laws forbidding temples for worshiping unorthodox gods (yinci 淫祠), improper cults (sacrifices not acceptable to ritual norms, yinci 淫祀), and “congregations of men and women from dusk to dawn (yeju xiaosan 夜聚曉散).” They also forbade the old custom of drowning newborn babies known as haozi (薅子, weeding out), the use of ceremonial banners and weapons (yizhang 儀仗) in sacrifices to spirits, and self-punishing religious practices such as burning the head or arms, stabbing to cause bleeding, breaking the fingers, and so on. The gentry also continued to run schools, put into effect various regulations and ceremonies of etiquette, promote harmonious relations within clans, and encourage a climate of respect for the elderly and filial piety toward parents. Due to all of these actions, a quite rapid and widespread process of advancing civilization occurred during the Song dynasty—from the cities expanding to the villages, from the central region radiating out to the peripheral areas, and from the elite scholarly class disseminating down to the lower stratum of the general population. Following this process of promotion, social life experienced a transformation. To put it in ordinary terms, society was moving in the direction of a higher level of civilization. Because the influence on society of the intellectual stratum responsible for interpreting culture was increasing, the spread of knowledge had become extremely easy due to the art of printing, and the convenience of travel was making the distance between the cities and the countryside increasingly shorter, the advance of civilization during the Song dynasty seems to have increased at a hitherto unprecedented pace of acceleration. The expansion of civilization from the cities to the countryside, the extension of a moral and rational order of life from the top to the bottom of society, and the shift from external to internal acknowledgement of social rules combined to develop a pattern of everyday life customs. This may possibly have been the soil from which the Song dynasty School of Principle grew, and also the basis on which it was accepted by the Song scholar-official class as their ethical and moral doctrine. It was also the result of its progressively entering deeply into the world of everyday life due to its standardization and secularization. In any case, this expansion of civilization reconfigured the uniform nature of the ethics of everyday life for the Han Chinese after the Song dynasty. The resulting landscape of everyday social life was seemingly very much different from that of China in the Tang dynasty and earlier, it would also seem that

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Chinese society, thought and culture had genuinely undergone a profound change.3 1.1 As noted above, the banning of temples worshipping officially unacceptable gods and improper sacrifices did not begin with the Song dynasty; starting in the Wei-Jin era (265–557), successive governments had issued rather strict prohibitions against such practices. Many officials also carried out fierce crackdowns against these cult activities all the way to the Tang dynasty. For example, Di Renjie (630–700) of the High Tang and Li Deyu (787–850) of the Mid-Tang both suppressed similar popular beliefs.4 These severe measures were symbolic of the way the government employed its political power to advance civilization and to establish or strengthen social order. When dynasties were still stable and prosperous, the emperors and the nobility were usually not very anxious to outlaw temples worshipping officially unacceptable gods and improper sacrifices. They could tolerate the existence of such abnormal sacrifices and spirits (or gods, shenling) as providing quaintly interesting and exotic spectacles. When the authority of the state (government) and social order were in great danger, however, these illegal sacrificial activities came to be seen as damaging to social order. At such times, these sacrificial ceremonies originally fabricated by the populace were regarded as a real challenge to the political power of the state. During the Song dynasty, there was a great deal of government promotion of civilization that steadily penetrated some relatively remote and marginal areas. For example, in Yongzhou (modern Nanning in Guangxi) at the beginning of the Northern Song dynasty, Fan Min (936–981) promoted medical treatment of illness to reduce the prevalence of shamanistic practices; in Lingnan (south China, including Guangdong and Guangxi), the emperor commissioned officials to forbid superstition and encourage education; in Wenzhou (in modern Zhejiang) shamans were even put to death by cutting them in half in order to put a total end to shamanistic beliefs. In Xuzhou (in modern Jiangsu) at the same time some forty-five people, including the criminal wizard Li Xu, were also punished; in several prefectures in Xichuan (in modern Sichuan), white-robed 3  The differences between the Tang and Song dynasties is a topic that has been repeatedly discussed, but very many of these discussions have been carried out from the point of view of the history of social development and concentrated their attention on things like social structure and economic organization. This is clearly inadequate. 4  “Di Renjie zhuan,” JTS, j. 89,” and “Li Deyu zhuan,” XTS, j. 180, 5330.

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shamans were even more strictly prohibited; a magistrate named Li Weiqing, immediately on taking office in Fuling (near the modern Chongqing region), had the highest ranking shaman brought in and whipped to demonstrate that shamans did not possess any magical powers, and to encourage the people to abandon their beliefs in the spirits and to put their faith in medicine instead. Around the same time, the court also adjusted the name list of gods and spirits in the legally sanctioned sacrifices. At the beginning of the Song dynasty, Emperor Taizong removed from the list the famous Qin general Bai Qi (?–258 BCE) and general Wang Sengbian (d. 555) of the Liang, both of whom had received sacrifices in the Tang dynasty. Bai was removed because he was too cruel and Wang because his morality was suspect. Next he issued an edict removing the names of twenty-two people, including three from the Warring States period: the notable political and military reformer Wu Qi (440–381 BCE), the famous military strategist Sun Bin (d. 316 BCE), and the general Lian Po (?–?), because they were faulty in their morality or achievements or had physical defects (e. g., Sun Bin had been punished by face-tattooing and was rendered crippled by having his kneecaps removed). The same edict elevated Guan Zhong (c. 720–645 BCE), the celebrated political advisor to Duke Huan of Qin, to an important position in the sacrificial ranks.5 These changes in the lists of temple sacrifices expressed the court’s official position. Because the sages and worthies who received sacrifices were granted legitimacy thereby, these were “official sacrifices” (zhengsi 正祀); they were set up to furnish ideal examples for the living, and so any rise or fall in the lists had ethical and moral significance. The center sent down orders forbidding sacrifices to various spirits whose names were not on the official lists with the intention of conveying moral and ethical standards through official rejection of those spirits. This also indicated the control of the center over the local, the official over the popular, the mainstream over the marginal, and the integration of secular life through political power. A very large number of gods and spirits were worshiped in the Song dynasty. There were two categories of worship in non-religious temples. The First involved temple sacrifices to mountains, rivers, local gods of the land, and the Dragon King. They can be said to embody changes of reverence for the natural world. The second involved commemorative temple sacrifices to historical emperors, meritorious ministers, celebrated generals, filial sons, female martyrs (who died preserving their honor or chastity), and village worthies. These 5  See XZZTJCB, j. 4 qiande yuannian (late in 963), 92–94; SHYJG, 16 ce, li 16, 686. We have to point out that this reform was repealed during the qingli reign period (1041–1042). See “Li zhi,” SS, j. 1058.

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two categories of temple were officially recognized by the government. There were, however, still many varieties of unofficial popular worship. And on this account, from the Northern Song to the Southern Song both the central government and local officials continued to make great efforts to eliminate these so-called “temples for worshipping unorthodox gods” and “improper cults” in order to monopolize the power to offer sacrifices to the gods or spirits.6 It was precisely this promotion by government power that contributed to the dissemination and expansion of the concept of the nation or the state (guojia guannian) and the propagation of mainstream civilization. The dismissal and replacement of those gods and spirits whose morality was suspect reflected a critique of such behavior not in accord with proper ethics and morality. That a few supernatural beings (guishen 鬼神) and even common people who could serve as moral exemplars were placed into a new canon of sacrificial ceremonies demonstrated an affirmation of the reasonableness of some sorts of ethical behavior. That those sacrifices that were not in the canon of sacrificial ceremonies were abolished symbolized conversely the existence of a unified system of supernatural beings, and the existence of a unified system of supernatural beings, then, symbolized the control of a unified state politics (guojia zhengzhi) and universal values of civilization. What the “Doctrine of the Mean” meant by the saying “for conduct there are the same ethical rules” (xing tonglun 行同倫) could only become the universal and self-conscious pursuit of the general population when cultural power, though outside of political and military power, also actually participated in this control.7 For this reason the scholar-official class that bore the responsibility for civilization continued quite actively to employ their power to push forward the process of achieving “the same customs and a single morality (tong fengsu, yi daode 同風俗, 一道德)” throughout the three hundred plus years of the Song dynasty.8 During the Song dynasty, the court and the officialdom always carried out very severe attacks against popular sacrifices and ceremonies because they believed that these kinds of sacrifices together with the secret activities 6  To give some Southern Song dynasty examples, in the important Jiangnan area in the south there was much worshipping of unorthodox gods including Wutong, Muxia Sanlang, Muke, Dujiao Wutong, Tongtian Erniang, Menggong Shizhe, Huang Sanlang, Taibaigong, and so on. As soon as the Southern Song government was established, they started to “destroy these officially unacceptable cults.” “Gaozong qi,” SS j. 30, 564. 7  “Zhongyong,”  §29, CTP, James Legge translation. 8  “The same customs and a single morality” was a commonly repeated phrase in the Song dynasty. See my discussion in section 4 of “Du Yu Yingshi xiansheng Zhu Xi de lishi shijie ji xiangguan pinglun,” http://book.douban.com/review/5583280/.

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they engendered among the people presented a challenge to national order. Communal activities “learning and teaching the methods of witchcraft” and “congregations of men and women from dusk to dawn” had the potential ability to create another power center beyond the reach of the government’s political power. The strength of beliefs that “only know how to fear the gods, and no longer fear the law” also had the potential to produce a religious authority beyond the reach of the government’s political authority.9 If the general population carried out sacrifices to various gods and spirits on their own it could undermine the government’s monopoly power over sacrifices and ceremonies. It could also allow popular society and regional authorities an alternative channel to obtain the Will of Heaven through sacrifices and ceremonies. For these reasons, proscribing unacceptable sacrifices not only increased the government’s authority and made those who relied on religion for relief from distress or suffering turn instead to relying on the government, it also set the social order right and made people live according to certain social regulations. 1.2 “A single morality and the same customs” was a phrase that was frequently repeated by the Song dynasty government and gentry. In a civilization that had “morality” as its core to transform and reorganize customs, to impel national ethics and morals toward unification and social order toward standardized rules, the “nation” (guojia) that the imperial power symbolized and the “society” that the gentry represented were of one mind. When the Northern Song dynasty was just established, orders were repeatedly sent down to change the old customs that did not conform to Confucian principles.10 Then for several hundred years, the Song emperors sent down orders to extend the popularization of New Etiquette (Xinyi 新儀) and such writings about the rules and ceremonies involved in social life.11 They wanted to use their power to make the ideas formulated in the classics into the habitual customs of the people’s daily lives. This stern proscription combined with positive advocacy naturally produced obvious results. In a few hundred years with the support of the state power, the “civilization” endorsed by the upper stratum of urban society, with the classic texts, as interpreted and explained by scholar-officials, as its foundation 9  XZZTJCB, j. 159, qingli liunian jiuyue. 10  “Xingfa er,” Song huiyao jigao, 1957, 165 ce, records the imperial orders of jianlong sinian and qiande sinian, 6496. 11  For more on the many such works with “ceremonies” in the title, see SS, j. 98–125 (Zhi 志 51–78).

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and serving as a system of “rules” for life gradually expanded outward from the center to the periphery, from the cities to the countryside and from the upper classes to the lower levels of society. This resulted in the construction of a unified ethics of everyday life for the people of China (Zhongguoren) with the Han Chinese (Hanzu) as its center. In what follows, I want to give three examples of this process. The first is “killing people to sacrifice to demons” (sharen jigui 殺人祭鬼). Chinese and Japanese scholars have both taken note of this abnormal phenomenon. Extending down to the Song dynasty, the custom of “killing people to sacrifice to demons” was still widespread in Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei and similar locales.12 The custom was known as “capturing the living” (caisheng 採生); the range of its practice was very broad and it had not yet disappeared even in the Southern Song. What is even more amazing is that not only in border areas but even in a relatively developed and central place like the Wuxing area (modern Zhejiang) such things happened. In the first year of the jiatai reign period (1201) an official reported that because the local people believed that “if one dies after murdering someone, he can become a god,” often if he can be persuaded to commit suicide, a custom known as “urging self-injury” (qishang 起傷), was actually popular. That was simply to urge a murderer to commit suicide and then later set up a temple to sacrifice to him and even to call him a god (shen); in one year there were actually forty-nine people killed in this way.13 It should be pointed out that an era in which an abundance of reports about “killing people to sacrifice to demons” appears again in the historical records is precisely an era in which the mainstream society is strongly resisting this kind of custom. The court’s strict prohibition of temples worshipping officially unacceptable gods and improper sacrifices also included a ban on “killing 12  See Tai Jinnong, “Nan Song renti xisheng ji,” in Jinnong lunwenji, 325–338; Sawada Mizuho, Chûgoku no minkan shinkô, 1982, 331–340. Also see Pang Dexin, “Zongjiao xinyang ji qita,” chapter 6 of his Cong huaben ji nihuaben suojian zhi Songdai liangjing shimin shenghuo, 374–379. There is also a section specifically discussing the use of human bodies for sacrifices (renti xisheng ji 人體犧牲祭). This is especially valuable because in addition to the usual historical materials, he also cites passages from many types of fiction (xiaoshuo). 13  “Xingfa er,” SHYJG, 166 ce, 6561. Zhao Yushi, Bin tui lu, 1983, j. 7, 85 records that “Lin Qianzhi, the Prefect of Qinzhou (in modern Guangxi) committed the crime of eating human flesh. He was removed from office and banished to Hainan as a slave.” It also records many other cases of cannibalism from the Tang dynasty, the Five Dynasties and the Song. We can see then that this “barbarous” custom still existed in the Tang dynasty and even “also in the present” (the Song dynasty). However, from the fact that the tale of Lin Qianzhi eating human flesh “was regarded as bizarre by All Under Heaven when it became known” we can see that such customs were already disappearing.

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people to sacrifice to demons.” The severe punishment of such practices by official law inevitably also acted as a powerful deterrent on these illegal popular practices. According to the “Criminal Law, section two” chapter of the Draft Recovered Edition of the Essential Documents and Regulations of the Song (Song huiyao jigao), in the forty some years from the first year of the xianping reign period (998) of Emperor Zhenzong (Zhao Heng 趙恆, 968–1022, r. 997–1022) to the first year of the kangding reign period (1040) of Emperor Renzong, imperial orders forbidding the practice of “killing people to sacrifice to demons” were issued at least three times. In the Southern Song when the government for an extended period of time employed several policies, such as the baojia system, to implicate and punish a criminal’s associates, offering rewards for making accusations against criminals, employing specialist informers, and strictly enjoining officials from receiving money or goods from shamans, these hitherto common practices steadily faded away. At that, the social customs of places like Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hunan, Hubei and Guangdong were gradually transformed.14 The second example is similar to abolishing the custom of “killing people to sacrifice to demons.” It was the disappearance of public nude performances (luoxi 裸戲) and erotic ceremonies. This was accompanied by the gradual establishment of women’s absolute, unconditional attachment to the families of their husbands. From various sorts of historical documents, we know that before the Song dynasty “sex” (xing 性) was a very common topic of discussion and the taboo against male and female nudity was not so severe. The institution of marriage was also not so strict, not to mention that divorce and remarriage were very common occurrences. This situation slowly changed during the Song dynasty. If we say that in a certain sense civilization is a system of rules, then we can say that during the Song dynasty, and especially among the scholar-official class, this system of rules became increasingly stringent. Any behavior that went beyond the boundaries set by this system of rules would be seen as uncivilized. Two things from that era that especially attract our attention are Sima Guang’s memorial to the emperor calling for a ban on the entertainment spectacle of women’s nude wrestling and Cheng Yi’s statement that

14  According to “Xingfa er,” SHYJG, j. 165 ce, in the southeast region of the Northern Song dynasty, especially in Xuanshe (in modern Anhui), Jiangning (modern Nanjing area) and Raoxin (Jiangxi), the custom of “weeding out children” (haozi 薅子) was practiced; that is “where male [children] were more numerous, they killed the male [children], and where female [children] were more numerous, they killed the female [children].”

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for a women “to starve to death is a small thing, but to loose her chastity is a very serious matter.”15 From the existing sources, we can surmise that in the Northern Song the taboo against the female body does not seem to have been so strict. That in the eleventh century Emperor Renzong could watch “naked women perform right before his eyes” (in Sima Guang’s words) in a public place with numerous other people would make it seem that at the time the nude female body really did not give rise to any unusual feelings. Sima Guang and some other scholar-officials felt that such spectacles ran contrary to the ceremonial rites and propriety, and they asked the court to abolish them. These sorts of male and female taboos progressively grew into a “consensus.” With this consensus, the female body became a symbol of uncleanness and something to be kept hidden and secret. In like manner, it came about that married women’s relationships with their husbands became subordinate ones, and this greatly increased the strength of male society. One of the very important results of all this, of course, was that due to the end of freedom of contact between men and women and women becoming the appendages of men, the traditional ethical system with its characteristic regular succession of older and younger and clear distinctions between male and female and the system of primogeniture as its central tenets was once again reaffirmed.16 The spread of customs and the expansion of civilization started from the top of society. We can see that among the intellectual stratum and the great families this defense of rites and rightness was highly praised. This was not in the laws and not a general rule among the populace, but since it was widely accepted and held up as a model by the gentry, under the influence of the gentry’s recommendations and the state’s punishments it gradually became a universal norm among the people. It usually takes quite a long time from the advocacy of a new concept through its practice in daily life to the construction of a conventional custom, but this change, however slow, was bound to be realized once a number of scholar-officials came to regard it as a form of honor and a fashion. From then on, it would influence many people. The expansion of

15  Sima Guang, “Lun shangyuan ling furen xiangpu zhuang,” Sima Wenzhenggong chuanjiaji, j. 23; Jinsi lu, j. 6, see Chen Rongjie [Wing-tsit Chan], Jinsi lu xiangzhu jiping, 2007, 346. On Cheng Yi, Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi’s opposition to remarriage of both men and women, see Henan Chengshi yishu, j. 22B, Ercheng ji, 303; “Jingxue liku-sangji,” ZZJ, 298; ZYL, j. 90, 3319. 16  Chen Dongyuan, Zhongguo funü shenghuo shi, chapter 6, “Song Ru duiyu funü de guannian,” says: “Because the Cheng brothers revered the rites they took the ancient sayings too seriously and so they became very strict concerning the concept of female chastity.”

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civilization is often just like a circle of ripples radiating out from the center of an idea to the periphery of society. Third and finally, we can discern a particular phenomenon in the change of atmosphere between the Tang and Song dynasties. This is the rejection, on the part of the nation represented by the imperial power and the society represented by the gentry, of any abnormal behavior contrary to mainstream ethics. This rejection was aimed at strengthening state power and social order. It had three main aspects: criticism of the civilization of non-Chinese ethnic groups; suppression of popular religious activities; and firm restrictions on any antisocial behavior. These three aspects were undoubtedly related to the tension resulting from the Song dynasty always being under pressure from foreign peoples, to the dynasty’s need to strengthen state control, and even more to the defense and expansion of the traditional ethical order by the gentry class. With the dual promotion of the state and the gentry, a very uniform state and social order was re-established and grew increasingly stronger. First, there was the criticism of and resistance against the civilization of non-Chinese ethnic groups. To use the contemporary language, they intended to “rigorously debate [the distinction between] Hua (Chinese) and Yi (nonChinese, barbarians” (yan bian Hua Yi 嚴辯華夷). Once when Zhu Xi was talking he very seriously pointed out that they should “discuss [the distinction between] Hua and Yi” (bian de Hua Yi 辯得華夷), that is re-establish and re-confirm the Han Chinese tradition. In his historical memory, the history of the China of the Han Chinese being infected by barbarian customs (hufeng 胡風) could be traced back to the Tang and Sui and even to the time when the Tabgatch (Tuoba) began its rule over North China as the Yuan (Northern) Wei during the Era of Disunity. According to his understanding, the Chinese civilization of the Han Chinese had already been undermined by barbarian peoples (huren), or alien civilizations had already replaced the native Han Chinese civilization. So in his mind the most important thing to do was to distinguish clearly the dividing line between Hua Chinese and Yi barbarians.17 Starting very early on, however, alien peoples had been traveling from the west to the east and continually infiltrating the comparatively wealthy, populous and civilized area of the Han Chinese. Their religions and cultures, including Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeanism, and so on came into China 17  ZYL, j. 11, 2328. In addition to this, the idea of the orthodox doctrine of dynastic succession (zhengtonglun 正統論) in Song dynasty historiography and the admonition in the classics to “honor the king (royal house) and repel the barbarians” (zunwang rangyi) both actually strengthened a Han-Chinese-centered civilization as well as expressing anxiety about alien or heretical civilizations.

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with them and led to confusion and transformation in the Han-centered world of knowledge, thought and belief. By the Tang dynasty this situation had already become extremely serious.18 On this account, Song dynasty scholar-officials were extremely vigilant against this kind of change in Chinese civilization. Second, was the suppression of various kinds of popular religious beliefs and activities. These included Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism that had been spreading since the Tang dynasty, various shrines offering sacrifices to spirits and demons (cishen sigui 祠神祀鬼) that already existed among the Han Chinese, regional sacrifices to mountains and rivers, as well different types of religious activities that were not sanctioned by the state authorities—these were all totally prohibited. The state forbade the private engraving of classic texts, strange religious beliefs and practices, even including the practice of cremation that we consider quite “civilized” today. Because they derived from the culture of alien lands and did not accord with Han Chinese civilization, the state and the gentry both carried out severe crackdowns on the popular belief in many “demonic religious teachings” (yaojiao 妖教) as well as social customs that were not part of Han Chinese traditions. Under the unremitting resistance and rejection of the gentry class and School of Principle scholars, including Cheng Yi, Sima Guang, Zhu Xi, and so on, all of these things came to be completely prohibited.19 This was of course related to the constant threat from foreign peoples. The most widespread resistance to foreign civilization found its common expression in the propagation and exaggeration of ancient Chinese civilization. Third and finally, the state and the gentry were quite vigilant against all antisocial popular activities. Let me give two explanatory examples of this. The first involves ceremonial banners and weaponry used in popular sacrificial ceremonies. From the Northern through the Southern Song dynasties the government repeatedly sent down orders forbidding both the use of banners and 18  Not to mention the tremendous influence of Buddhism, we can take Zoroastrianism as an example. It began to exert its influence in Han Chinese regions in the fourth century. Since Sogdian people continually penetrated China from the west, Zoroastrianism also came east with them. Although it was strongly attacked during the reigns of emperors Wuzong of the Tang (r. 840–846), and Shizong (r. 954–959) of the Later Zhou, it still continued to have believers all the way into the Northern Song. 19  On gentry resistance to cremation, see Liu Yizheng, “Huozang kao,” Shixue zazhi, 1/3 (1929), 1–5; Zhu Ruixi, et al., Liao Song Xixia Jin shehui shenghuo shi, 1998, chapter 11, “Sangzang (1): Song xia Hanzu juzhu qu,” 189–194. (As we pointed out in Volume One of this history, Jacques Gernet’s Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276, 1959, 173–176, discusses the “widespread” use of cremation in the Southern Song, and believes that it began with upper class Buddhist.—tr.).

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real weapons as ceremonial ensigns and weapons in popular sacrifices and the copying of symbolic implements used by the state. On the one hand, this was meant to protect and monopolize the imperial power and order symbolized by certain commemorative objects. On the other hand, it was intended to avoid the formation of a genuine challenge to dynastic political power because the possession of real weapons and banners could very easily lead to rebellion.20 The second example concerns popular gatherings, especially “learning and teaching the methods of witchcraft” and “congregations of men and women from dusk to dawn.” Such gatherings constituted one of the social problems most in evidence in official reports to the court. The information contained in these reports was that the imperial power and the gentry both need to have a settled agricultural social order in which the people went out to work the fields in the morning and returned home in the evening. Because such gatherings violated the normally approved rules of work and rest and secretly taught and transmitted beliefs outside of the government’s political ideology, in the eyes of the power holders, they were very dangerous activities greatly to be feared. In the political memory of the government, these sorts of abnormal activities and secret beliefs could quite easily bring about the collapse of social order. Hence the prohibition of such practices was always very stringent. At the same time, however, Han Chinese civilization was drawing support from political power to advance into its border areas. The customs of the various peoples living on the borders of Song China were originally quite different, but the state and government of the day were very cruel toward these border peoples and the so-called barbarians (manyi 蠻夷). They both forced these alien peoples to accept the rules of Han Chinese civilization and, at the same time, worked very hard to transform their customs. As for those peoples who refused to accept the rules of Han civilization, the Chinese made war on them and forced them to submit. In the three hundred plus years of the two Song dynasties, their civilization with Han Chinese at its center and Confucianism as its core continued to advance. Through the expansion of their government system and their education to the border areas, the general knowledge and regulations of the civilization of the upper strata in the Han regions during the Song dynasty gradually formed a uniform civilization and assimilated the various populations on their borders. 1.3 Imperial power and the gentry cooperated in the construction and expansion of a unitary civilization. 20  See “Xingfa er,” Song huiyao jigao, 1957, 6503, 6517, 6557.

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One of the rather important changes in the Song dynasty was the great expansion of the gentry class. A great deal of recent research has shown that besides the Song scholars who gained access to the centers of political power by way of the official keju 科舉 examinations, there was a large number of them who were dispersed to the various local regions. Even though the number of men who sat for the examinations increased from some eighty thousand in the eleventh century to around four hundred thousand in the thirteenth century, the number of them who achieved the “advanced scholar” ( jinshi 進士) degree was after all not very large. As a result, a rather large number of scholars steadily entered into popular regional society and carried the ideas and rules of “civilization” from the cities to the villages, from the upper classes to the lower classes and from the center to the periphery of the country. Any discussion of the gentry class promotion of civilization must of course mention the significance of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle. The first thing we need to say is that due to the flourishing of clan organizations, to a large degree the gentry represented clan society, and the severe, stern, and unforgiving ideas of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle for family and clan order and its strict principles obviously had a great influence on a series of later family rituals, village compacts, clan rules, clan genealogies, and so on. Many people have taken notice of texts such as the Wengong Family Rituals (Wengong jiali) that was edited by Zhu Xi himself and continued in use for several hundred years and the Lü Family Village Compact (Lüshi xiangyue) that was edited by Zhang Zai’s disciple Lü Dajun (1029–1080) and later revised by Zhu Xi.21 The Lu family clan of the celebrated Lu Jiuyuan in Fuzhou in Jiangxi actually had young people sing in the early mornings to remind clan members of the various rules of Confucian ethics and morality. It is said that the words to their songs were written by Lu Jiuyuan’s elder brother.22 These systematic regulations of the doctrines of the School of Principle that perhaps unconsciously penetrated society were precisely emblematic of the popularization of the School of Principle. It was only such popularized Neo-Confucian School of Principle ideas that genuinely possessed a significance for the direction of the daily life of society. At this point, thought became principles, principles became rules and regulations, and rules and regulations entered the daily lives of the populace. Once the populace in general had lived under these

21  “Zeng sun Lüshi xiangyue,” ZWGWJ, j. 74, SBCK, Shangwu Yinshuguan. 22  “Lushi yimen,” Luo Dajing, Helin yulu, neipian, j. 5, 1983, 324. On the Lu clan’s family ethics, see Xu Huailin, “Lu Jiuyuan jiazu ji qi jiagui shuping,” Jiangxi shifan daxue xuebao, 2 (1989), 45–50.

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rules and regulations for a long time, they unknowingly became the “common sense” of everyday usage. The second thing we need to say is that in the Neo-Confucian concept of the cosmos there was basically no place for spiritual beings (guishen 鬼神). For example, Zhu Xi repeatedly said that guishen derived from the energy of material force ( jingqi 精氣) and the hun and po souls (魂魄) resulted from the interaction of the cosmic forces Yin and Yang. These ideas bordering on atheism were actually held by many gentry scholars.23 With the exception of sacrifices to the ancestors in the clan temples, they were quite apathetic to many sacrifices to guishen. On this point their attitude was the same as the attitude of the state in forbidding the improper sacrifices of unorthodox cults.24 Third and finally, we can see that the position of the gentry in their promotion of civilization was often the same as that of the state. They actively participated in political actions to purify thought and define social order.25 The Southern Song Neo-Confucian, Chen Chun (1159–1223), wrote in his Meanings of Neo-Confucian Philosophical Terms (Beixi ziyi) that “generally the sacrifices that should not be made are all improper sacrifices to unorthodox gods.” What, then, were the “sacrifices that should not be made”? In Chen Chun’s view, not only Buddhism and Daoism, but even the stars, Mt. Tai, Mt. Heng and other spiritual entities (shenling 神靈) whose sacrifices were approved by the state should also be on the list of “sacrifices that should not be made.” Obviously the ideas of Neo-Confucians of the School of Principle were incompatible with sacrifices to guishen. In his Crane Forest Morning Dew (Helin yulu), the Song scholar Luo Dajing (1196–1242) recorded that it was said that when Lu Jiuyuan was in Jingmen (in Hubei), “he did not perform religious services on 23  A Southern Song scholar Chu Yong edited a book called On dispelling doubts (Chuyi shuo) that is probably the most brilliant and most complete Song refutation of so-called superstition, though it has not been fully explored by scholars. 24  For example, Zhuang Chuo’s consciously prohibiting “eating only vegetables and serving the devil” (chicai shimo 食菜事魔) was because they “do not serve the ancestors, but they bury them naked” (luozang 裸葬) and because they believe that “human life is suffering” so they kill people in the belief that they are saving them from suffering and sending them on to a better place. Zhuang Chuo (?–?), Jilei bian, j. shang, 1983, 12. For a brief discussion of the Neo-Confucian view of guishen, see, Wing-tsit Chan, tr., Reflections on Things at Hand, 366–367. On the ancient Chinese concepts of the two souls, see Ying-shih Yü, “‘O Soul, Come Back!’ A Study in the Changing Conceptions of the Soul and Afterlife in PreBuddhist China,” HJAS, 47/2 (December 1987): 363–395. 25  Of course this is not to say that this tendency only began in the Song dynasty; after the Han dynasty this was the quite self-conscious behavior of the intellectual stratum. It is just that they never had such complete theoretical support as they did in the Song.

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the Lantern Festival,” and when Cheng Dachang (1123–1195) and Zheng Bing (1121–1194) were in Jianning (in Fujian), they also “did not allow the monks to expound their Buddhist teachings in public forums.” It was also said that when Zhu Xi was in Linzhang (Zhangzhou in Fujian), he only “supervised the burning of incense according to local customs, but did not allow people to ask any questions.”26 From the relationships between the state (imperial power), the gentry (educated elite) and the common people, we can see that two different trends seem to have emerged in Chinese history from the Tang dynasty into the Song. On the one hand, by means of its economic policies and political strategies, state control over the general population intensified; the state increasingly manifested a tendency towards autocracy. The state and the legal system, ethics and morality, and concepts of civilization that it symbolized were rapidly expanding, from the center to the periphery and from the cities to the villages. On the other hand, with the growth in the gentry population, after the end of the age of great aristocratic families, they organized clan gatherings (clan settlements or villages, jiazu juhui 家族聚會), and this resulted in the gentry coming to act as intermediaries between the state and the people. From channels such as the official examinations, service as officials, inherited meritorious titles and ranks, and so on, the gentry came to be the leaders of local society. In their negotiations with the state, they promoted the expansion of the state’s legal system, ethics and morality, and concepts of civilization, but at the same time they also resisted the state’s direct rule over the general population. Sometimes they also became the spokesmen for the interests of the populace and impeded the unlimited growth of state power. For these reasons, conflicts between the state and the gentry at times became very serious. The state was often very anxious about the propagation of the thought and opinions of the gentry class; they would try to limit them whenever they could. This was particularly the case with the doctrines of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle that transcended political authority and seemed to possess the discursive power to express the truth. The state would sometimes attempt to restrict it by every possible means. Doing their utmost to forbid the propagation of reports on the current political situation and policies, events on the borders, military preparations, and popular nongovernmental publishing was simply the Song dynasty’s way of warning the scholars about their interference in politics and a tactic for strengthening state control.27 From the end of the Northern Song to the middle of the Southern 26   Helin yulu, yi bian, j. 3, 1983, 164. 27  See “Xingfa er,” Song huiyao jigao, 1957, 165–166 ce, 6514, 6519, 6527, 6529, 6558.

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Song the rejection and prohibition of various School of Principle writings and recorded quotations (yulu) all reflected official repression of the popular gentry (minjian shishen 民間士紳).28 In general terms, in their expansion of a civilization with the ceremonial rites as its background and support for traditional morality as its core, the imperial power and the gentry, political power and cultural authority, were very much the same. The state worked at this by “punishing” the people according to the laws, and the gentry worked at it by “disciplining” the people through education. We can see that the Song dynasty gentry class often relied on regulations like family rules ( jiagui), family rituals ( jiali), clan rules (zugui), and village compacts (xiangyue), as well as the dissemination of beginning reading materials, and even the popular entertainments present in sacrifices and ceremonials (such as shuochang 說唱 speak-and-sing performances) to transmit extensively the knowledge, thought and belief of the scholarly elite to the popular masses. In this universal endorsement of civilization, they would also seem to have employed rational means to represent the civilized order (of the state). All of the Song dynasty family rules, family rituals, clan rules, and village compacts that we can still see today basically reflect and embody the principles of “conforming to Confucian ethics” (hehu lijiao 合乎禮教), “emphasizing moral education” (zhuzhong jiaohua 注重教化), and “agreeing with the laws of the state” ( fuhe guofa 符合國法).29 The various kinds of Song dynasty textbooks still extant also generally transmit the traditional knowledge, historical memory and social principles commonly supported by both the imperial power and the Neo-Confucian School of Principle. At the same time, overtones and tendencies of ethical and moral education began to appear in the performances presented during ancestral temple sacrifices, clan gatherings, and festival activities. In recent years, researchers have noticed that in the Southern Song dynasty there were quite a few popular educational texts with titles like “Exhortation to Work at Farming,” “Orders about Customs,” “Exhortation to Practice Filial Piety,” “Exhortation to Study”, and so on. Well-known scholars, including Chen Dexiu (1178–1235) and Zhu Xi himself, personally authored such texts. They repeatedly exhorted secular society on the necessity of working hard at farming, complying with village customs, being filial toward fathers and mothers and, if they had extra time, reading more of the classic texts of the former sages and the works of the School of Principle to strive for a better future. Through 28  See Tai Jinnong, “Nan Song xiaobao,” in Jinnong lunwen ji, 339–342. 29  See Zhu Ruixi, Liao Song Xixia Jin shehui shenghuo shi, 1998, Chapter 25, “Minjian jiazu zuzhi,” 428–429.

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this popularization, the gentry class promulgated to the general population ideas of life that in later times came to be know as “civilization.” In general, these ideas represented attempts to convince or even force the populace to establish and to follow a kind of rational order of life. They also included very many stipulations concerning compliance with the legal ordinances of the state. No matter whether inside or outside the family and clan, and no matter whether it was the common people or the educated elite, they should always keep in mind the key term “order” (zhixu 秩序)—as correct and unalterable as Heaven and Earth, in accord with the Heavenly Principle—an “order” that should emanate from one’s innermost being. It was precisely during this push by imperial power and the gentry that some Confucian principles, as correct and unalterable as Heaven and Earth, came to be solidified. A system of orderly life established on these principles also came to be acknowledged and extended to various regions of the country.30 Consider, for example, the concept of “filial piety” (xiao 孝) fundamental to family and clan order. It was not simply a concept; it was a system. Not supporting and providing medical treatment to ones sick parents and grandparents or taking ones wealth and moving out of the family while ones parents were still alive were both considered to be crimes that violated social morality, and such practices were forbidden.31 “Loyalty” (zhong 忠), the fundamental support for state (national) order, also became an all-embracing and overarching ethical concept after the universal acceptance of the legitimacy and reasonableness of imperial power. Even religions that originally emphasized transcendence also had to be mindful of the existence of imperial power. These regulations endorsed by scholars and derived from the ancient Confucian ceremonial system of etiquette also expanded into the lives of the common people of various regions of the country and became their new habitual customs. To use contemporary language, in the space dominated by the power of the state, a unitary ethics and morality slowly developed, a universally accepted world of thought began to take shape, and in the end constructed the Chinese people’s world of daily life. In this daily life, the Chinese people, consciously or unconsciously, had already identified with rules of life and a social order embodying rationality, self-control and harmonious relations centered upon family and clan, and they upheld the ethical and moral concepts based on these regulations and order. With all of this, the unity of Chinese civilization with ethnic

30  On the spread downward of “civilization,” see Zhang Bangwei, “Songdai wenhua de xiangdui puji,” in Guoji Songdai wenhua yanjiu taolunhui wenji,” 1991. 31  See “Xingfa er,” SHYJG, 165 ce, 6496.

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Han Chinese as the mainstream was genuinely established during this historical epoch. 2

From Yuan to Ming: The General Condition of the World of Knowledge, Thought and Belief

In the last years of the Southern Song, after the death of Lu Jiuyuan, Zhu Xi and their outstanding disciples, thought and scholarship seems to have come to a halt. Contemporary people were already cognizant of this predicament of poor performance and few accomplishments. Some of them sarcastically said that the bookstores were full of books about nature and principle (xingli 性理). Anyone could buy a few of these works, edit them this way and that, and then quite easily talk pretentiously about great ideas. Some people would read the Four Books for a few days and then start pontificating about the nature of the “Great Ultimate,” but they were not even interested in reading the ancient classics. This was certainly a crisis of thought and scholarship.32 Some people used the word “vulgarization” to explain that after the ideas of the School of Principle entered popular society, they underwent a great transformation. They pointed out that because former scholars had personal historical memory and demanded practical, realistic social strategies, in their scholarship they frequently embodied their own thoughts and feelings. By comparison, contemporary so-called scholars of the Learning of the Way only regarded ideas as texts to be recited by rote while believing such textual recitation to be evidence of genuine thought.33 Those scholars who had always been antipathetic to the School of Principle were even less polite in their criticisms. Zhou Mi (1232–1298) cited Shen Zhonggu, an elderly Confucian from Wuxing (in Zhejiang), as saying that his contemporaries who styled themselves Neo-Confucians (followers of daoxue) did not deserve the name. They looked down on everyone, regarding those who were concerned with the economy as plundering the common people, those who were concerned with military affairs as coarse brutes, those who concentrated on literature as paying excessive attention to trivia and losing their sense of purpose, and those who were concerned with politics as vulgar bureaucrats. They read works like the Four Books, Reflections on Things at Hand, The AllEmbracing Book or Penetrating the Classic of Changes (Tongshu), Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, the Eastern Inscription (Dongming) and 32  Ouyang Shoudao (1208–1272), “Song Huang Xinshu xu,” Xunzhai wenji, j. 7, 11A. 33  “Li Renzhong shikao xu,” Xunzhai wenji, j. 11, 1B.

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the Western Inscription (Ximing), and Recorded Quotations (Yulu) and believed that they were (according to the “four sentences of Heng Qu [Zhang Zai]) “establishing lofty standards for the people, establishing their heart/mind for Heaven and Earth, opening up great peace for all ages, and carrying on the lost learning of the former sages.” Nevertheless, their fame was very great and their influence very wide; many scholars joined that current of thought and together they pushed aside their critics. Even the emperor could not help but reluctantly put up with them.34 All this was the inevitable outcome of the process of popularization of School of Principle thought. Once this way of thinking, originally possessing analytic and critical acuity, became popular and fashionable, it could easily devolve into a text to be memorized and recited. There were only so many books to be read and so many things to be said over and over again. Even though these few texts were classics and the few things said were the truth, these few texts and their truths came to seem like mere high-sounding rhetoric and could hardly serve as guidelines for daily life. As a result, they turned into abstract dogma. Having said this we should also admit that superior thought often has to wait for this sort of mediocre popularization, and brilliant ideas always have to be duplicated and abbreviated by not very outstanding people and turned into slogans to be bruited about or texts to be recited before they can really inter into the life of society. In this way, thought sacrifices its profundity and wisdom, but it gains many more followers. Of course, there is one more very important point, and that is that for a form of thought to become a universal truth it must perforce become a political ideology, and to become a political ideology it must draw its support from the seat of power. 2.1 Although after Emperor Lizong of the Southern Song died in 1264, the School of Principle slowly gained official approval, in the final analysis it never actually became a state institution. To put it another way, since an institutionalized linkage was never made between the knowledge embodied in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism and the official examinations with their prospects for office-holding, the School of Principle remained a free form of knowledge and thought.35 However, the integration with political power that the 34  “Daoxue,” Zhou Mi, Kuixin zazhi, Xuji xia, 169. 35  Late in the Southern Song, Yao Mian (1216–1262), in answering the emperor at court, quoted Zhao Pu (922–992)’s words emphasizing that “the Way and Principle are the greatest” and further said that “once this statement is accepted all forces and all things will respond and follow it” and that is why there was the School of Principle. He criticized

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Neo-Confucian School of Principle did not achieve during the Song dynasty began its process of institutionalization and achieved its transformation toward political ideology during the Yuan dynasty under the rule of an alien people. This would seem to have been quite a natural historical process. When the Mongol Yuan entered the Central Plains, they could not but accept the tradition and culture where ethnic Han Chinese occupied most of the land. As time passed, then, a scholarly group that supported Confucianism was formed among the Mongols and the semu people (色目 “colored eyes” or “people of varied categories,” one of the four ethnic designation under the Yuan). The Mongol Yuan’s cultural strategies underwent some rather profound transformations. First, in 1232, the fourth year of the Mongol Yuan Emperor Taizong (Ögedei Qaghan, 1186–1241, r. 1229–1241), Yelü Chucai (1190–1244) found a descendent of Confucius for him, and the emperor ennobled him as the Sagely Duke Yan (衍聖公, Yan shenggong). In 1236 the Yuan set up an Office of Compiling and Editing (Bianxiusuo 編修所) and an Office of Classical Texts (Jingjisuo 經籍所) in Yanjing (modern Beijing) and Pingyang (in Shanxi). In 1237, Liu Zhong, the Commissioner-in-Chief (xuankeshi 宣課使) of Dezhou prefecture (in Shandong), was allowed to hold the official examinations in his own prefecture; they were divided into the three categories of the meaning of the classics ( jingyi 經義), poetry (cifu 詞賦) and essays (lun 論), and it is said that they attracted four thousand three hundred examinees. In the following year, all the other regions also held the official examinations.36 Second, in 1247, before ascending the throne, Khubilai Qaghan (1215–1294, Yuan Emperor Shizu, r. 1260–1294) had a discussion with the Confucian scholar Zhang Dehui (1195–1275) concerning the true meaning of Confucianism and the significance of Confucian studies for political rule. Zhang convinced Khubilai to sacrifice to Confucius and, a few years later, he and Yuan Haowen (1190– 1257) “invited Emperor Shizu to take the title of Great Scholar of Confucianism studying for the keju examinations as “poisoning their minds” … “concentrating on the words (literary composition) but not the Way” … “and thus setting up empty learning in name only.” That his passionate views were praised by officials who believed in the School of Principle demonstrates that at that time the position of the School of Principle was quite independent, their thought was quite free, and the social and intellectual atmosphere was relatively relaxed. See Yao Mian, “Guichou tingdui,” Xuepo ji, 1981/83, j. 73A–33B. 36  See “Yelü Chucai zhuan,” YS, j. 146, 3459; j. 81, “Xuanju yi,” 2015. Also see Yao Congwu, “Jin Yuan zhiji Kong Yuancuo yu Yan shenggong zhiwei zai Menggu xinchao de jixu,” Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, 39/2 (1969), 189–196.

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(Rujiao da zongshi, 儒教大宗師), and the emperor happily accepted.”37 In 1271, then, when the dynasty was officially proclaimed, it was announced that the name of the dynasty was to be Yuan, and it is said that this was taken from Qian yuan 乾元, the fundamental nature of Qian (Heaven, Pure Yang) in the Classic of Changes.38 Third, during the huangqing reign period (1312–1313) of Yuan Emperor Renzong (1285–1320, r. 1311–1320), the official keju examination system was put in place. It stipulated the “Great Learning,” the Analects, the Mencius, and the “Doctrine of the Mean” as the examination texts with Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Four Books as the key reference book. And so it was that the School of Principle that had developed in the Song dynasty started to be integrated with politics in the Yuan dynasty. It became not only an intellectual discourse with political power but also a political discourse with intellectual force. In the Yuan dynasty, this channel for the advancement of educated men was still not particularly wide; that is, the systematic linkage between thought and power could still not take in very many more scholars. Nevertheless, its symbolic significance was quite strong, and it suggested to very many scholars a way of exchanging knowledge for personal benefit. In this kind of political environment, ethnic conflicts began to lessen and cultural identities began to be establishsed. Although the first Mongol Yuan Confucian, Zhao Fu (?–?) could still be considered a Han Chinese nationalist, with the somewhat later Xu Heng (1209–1281), Hao Jing (1223–1275), and Liu Yin (1249–1293), the boundaries between ethnic groups had already disappeared and cultural distinctions were also unclear. Because the Mongol Yuan also enthusiastically put the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian School of Principle into practice, everyone seemed to share commonly recognized truths; anyone who kept these truths in mind was part of a single family. And so culture could transcend ethnic boundaries, and the tradition of Confucian moral principle (daotong) could also connect different political powers.39 When the famous Confucian scholar Hao Jing paid his last respects to the major Mongol minister 37  “Zhang Dehui zhuan,” YS, j. 163, 3821–3825. 38  “Shizu benji si,” YS, j. 7, 138. See Lynn, Classic of Changes, 129–142. 39  This not only implies Han Chinese acceptance of Mongolian imperial power, but also naturally involves Mongol and semu people’s acceptance of Han Chinese civilization. As one historian has pointed out, “the collective consciousness of scholars of every nationality already ranked higher than any particular ethnic consciousness … In cultural terms there was really no difference between Mongols, semu people, and Han Chinese scholars.” See Xiao Qiqing, “Yuanchao duozu shirenquan de xingcheng chutan,” in his Yuanchaoshi xinlun, 1999, 240–241.

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Yang Weizhong (1205–1259), he said that Yang collected School of Principle writings, established a Zhou Dunyi Temple and a Great Ultimate Academy and invited Zhao Fu to lecture in it, and so “relying on this, our Way did not perish, and All Under Heaven again witnessed China’s rule.” It is obvious that this “China” certainly did not differentiate between Song and Yuan or Han Chinese and Mongols. As soon as School of Principle Neo-Confucianism achieved universal acceptance and Confucians received a modicum of respect from the political powers, and especially when the cultural order that Confucianism hoped for and identified with was comprehensively instituted, then the earlier intense nationalist emotions could finally subside.40 2.2 During the process of turning the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle into an ideology in the Yuan dynasty, the most important scholar was perhaps Xu Heng. We can see from various sources that as a Confucian scholar Xu really did not have very many original ideas; his importance was primarily in promoting and expanding the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle. During the zhiyuan reign period (1264–1295), his twelve disciples “were the tutors (zhaizhang 齋長) in several study halls in the imperial university.” In this way, this Neo-Confucianism with its roots in the Han Chinese culture was surprisingly transformed into a kind of very widespread knowledge and authoritative thought in this empire under the rule of an alien civilization. In some ways, its significance even surpassed what it was in the Song dynasty. When it came to School of Principle’s knowledge and thought, however, there were very few new advances, and Yuan scholars could not at all compare with the generation of Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi, Lü Zuqian and Lu Jiuyuan, or even with their best disciples. From the records of the Scholarly Cases of Song and Yuan Classical Scholars (Song Yuan xue-an), we can see that the topics they discussed were still confined to the “Heavenly Principle,” the “mind/heart,” the “investigation of things,” and the “extension of knowledge.” Even the words they used in their discourse and elucidations were also still those of the Song dynasty. It should be pointed out especially that in their intellectual world the distinction between practical knowledge and free or independent thought 40  In one section of his “Yuandai de Ruhu: Rushi diwei yanjinshi,” Xiao Qiqing points out that previous assessments of the low status of Confucian scholars during the Yuan dynasty, such as the idea that the status of Confucian scholars was just above the beggars who were ranked at the lowest strata by the Yuan rulers, were not really accurate. He says that “earlier people obviously exaggerated the low status of Confucian scholars.” In Xiao Qiqing, Yuandaishi xintan, 1983, 36.

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was already muddled. For them, knowledge was simply textual material to be recited by rote, and this textual material that was recited by rote effectively constituted the principles of thought. Ma Tingluan (1223–1289) toward the end of the Southern Song once said that practical learning for the keju examinations was not genuine knowledge, but genuine thought is what scholars really pursue in their reading and studying. Thus we see that in the Yuan dynasty, politics had “brought the study of the classics, the School of Principle, and preparation for the imperial examinations together as one.”41 And this meant that knowledge that was of practical utility had overpowered everything. The upshot was that thought turned into mere texts, texts degenerated into mere words, words were fodder for memorization and recitation, and the significance of memorization and recitation was exchange for benefits (profit). It should be particularly noted that once this originally very meaningful Neo-Confucian thought was no longer a weapon of criticism wielded by a few marginalized scholars, but had become the principles of a political ideology, it would frequently morph into some very strange things. This was unfortunately just the case in the Yuan dynasty. As Cheng Duanli (1271–1345) wrote in his “Preface to Jia Xuanweng (1213–?)’s Poetry”: Ever since Master Cheng and Master Zhu appeared, true Confucian studies were again illuminated. Ever since Xu Wenzhen gong relied on the light of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle to assist Emperor Shizu (Kublai Qaghan), true Confucian teachings were again prominent. In recent years the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle has been used for imperial examinations to choose scholars for officialdom (qushi, 取士). The true Confucian Way has gradually been seen in the style of governing (lizhi, 吏治).42 According to this statement, the School of Principle of the Cheng-Zhu era was a doctrine that elucidated thought, but in Xu Heng’s time it was used to assist the emperor. In the keju examination era, the School of Principle was implemented in the official style of administration. The Neo-Confucian School of Principle was no longer a free form of thought; it had become part of the newly implemented political institutions. According to the research of several scholars, during the Yuan dynasty, with the exception of a fortunate few, there was a limited number of important 41  Cheng Duanli (1271–1345), “Yiyang xian xinxiu Lanshan shuyuan ji,” Weizhai ji, 1994, j. 5, 3A. 42  Ibid., j. 4, 22A.

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channels for scholars to enter the upper levels of society. One was to take up a post as a Confucian teacher and as the head of an academy, and another was to fill an official government post and serve as a staff member in one of the various levels of the many branches of government.43 Scholars occupying both of these status positions had actually been taken into the state system. The former were given official appointments and their responsibility was to teach. That is, to instruct students in the text book version of the School of Principle. The responsibility of the latter was to handle government affairs, and they transformed Confucian principles into practical policies. Together they changed a form of knowledge and thought that was once rich in critical acumen into a schoolroom dogma or political strategy. Whether it was the former or the latter, the result was still the popularization or vulgarization of Confucian learning. In reality, the idea that the “true Confucian Way has gradually been seen in the style of governing” simply meant that the Yuan dynasty was repeating the Han dynasty history of “employing scholars as government personnel” (yi ru wei li 以儒為吏) and taking Confucian learning in the direction of politicization and standardization. At the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, there was considerable admiration for private learning outside of the official system. People hoped that Confucian learning could be shifted in the direction of popular society and serve to disseminate knowledge and awaken thought. However, in the process of connecting the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle to political power and economic gain, two complementary potential tendencies were produced. First, as imperial examination subjects, Cheng-Zhu thought could end up as textual dogma. Second, through their connection with political power, Cheng-Zhu principles could become part of the political system. Superficially it would look as though the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle had entered the center of power and been victorious, but in reality, it would have surrendered its independent critical stance and steadily lost all capacity for self-transcendence and continuous renewal.44

43  On the Yuan dynasty establishment of official schools and academies in various places, see Chen Gaohua, “Yuandai de difang guanxue” in Yuanshi conglun 5 in Chen Gaohua, Yuanshi yanjiu xinlun, 2005, 376–420, especially 395–396. He points out that these schools were very crowded because they were very important for getting ahead and so scholars thronged to compete in them. 44  Perhaps this intellectual situation was not really particularly clearly expressed during the Yuan dynasty because its history was very short, but I believe that it was precisely during the Yuan that this trend began and was well established.

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2.3 In the second half of the fourteenth century, the Yuan dynasty was replaced by the Ming, and Han Chinese replaced the Mongols as emperors, but the mainstream thought remained the School of Principle. Han Chinese replaced the Mongols as emperors and called the Mongols barbarians. They criticized the Mongol Yuan for “abandoning the three bonds and five constant virtues.”45 They also said that the Yuan dynasty “caused the teaching of the costume and ceremonies of the former kings to be mixed together with those of the barbarians.” They emphasized the importance of “schools” and “moral transformation through education,” and demanded that All Under Heaven “discuss the Way of the sages … in order to eliminate polluted habits.”46 The Cheng-Zhu School of Principle of the Yuan era, however, remained the mainstream political ideology of the Ming dynasty and also the most important knowledge for the generality of scholars who took the imperial examinations. At the beginning of the Ming, though, the popularization and political institutionalization of Confucianism, especially the knowledge and thought of the School of Principle, may perhaps have become increasingly serious. In 1368, the third month of the first year of the Hongwu Emperor (Ming Taizu, Zhu Yuanzhang, 1328–1398, r. 1368–1398), he ordered the examinations set up for the selection of scholars, and in the tenth month, he set up the Imperial University system. In 1370, the capital and various provinces began the triennial provincial imperial examinations (xiangshi 鄉試) on a large scale. In the third month of 1384, the Ministry of Rites proclaimed the format for the keju imperial examinations.47 All of this was very rapidly institutionalized. 45  This is from Zhu Yuanzhang’s text on the founding of the dynasty, Ming Taizu shilu, j. 26, Ming shilu, ce 1, 1968, 127. 46  Ibid., j. 46, in Ming shilu, 257. 47  The first round of these examinations contained three questions testing the meaning of passages from the Four Books. There had to be more than two hundred words in each answer. In addition, there were four questions testing the meaning of passages from the Confucian Classics and each answer had to have more than three hundred words. To interpret the meaning of the Four Books, Zhu Xi’s commentaries were predominant. As for the Classics, Zhu Xi’s commentary to the Book of the Songs (Shijing) was primary; Cheng Yi’s and Zhu Xi’s commentaries to the Classic of Changes, Mr. Cai’s [Cai Chen (1167– 1230)] commentary, and the ancient exegeses [exegeses made during the Han, Jin, Tang and Song dynasties] were the principal ones used to interpret the Book of Documents or Book of History (Shangshu); for the Spring and Autumn Annals, the three commentaries of Zuozhuan, Gongyangzhuan, and Guliangzhuan, and those of Mr. Hu [Hu Anguo] and Zhang Qia (1160–1237) were the primary; and the ancient exegeses were the main works for the Book of Rites (Liji). The second round of examinations included one discursive essay,

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The regulations and content of the imperial examinations as well as the interests protected by the system were already approved by the political power, and so the scope for freedom of knowledge and thought grew more and more narrow.48 From the Hongwu Emperor’s ordering that all students memorize his “Great Announcements” (Dagao 大誥) and that eighty-five objectionable passages be excised from the text of the Mencius (in 1394) down to the Yongle Emperor (Zhu Di, Chengzu, 1360–1424, r. 1402–1424)’s issuing strict official reprimands and admonitions and severely punishing the Confucian scholar Zhu Youji (from Raozhou in Jiangxi) for vilifying the School of Principle, knowledge and thought was already under the control of politics. During the Yongle Emperor’s reign, the Complete Collection of the Five Classics (Wujing daquan), Complete Collection of the Four Books (Sishu daquan), and the Complete Collection on Neo-Confucian Nature and Principle (Xingli daquan) were compiled with prefaces by the Emperor himself. This even more established these absolute and universal truths and stipulated the direction of reading and understanding for all scholars.49 Under the double restraint of these highly authoritative moral reprimands and admonitions and classic textual discourse with its high truth value, together with the double political inducements and economic enticements, the vulgarization and standardization of knowledge and thought was very serious indeed. Even Gao Panlong (1562–1626), who supported these policies, could not avoid also admitting that the Confucian learning of that time was something that “scholars start to read five on making judgments and one on knowledge about government edicts, announcements, regulations, and various internal policies. The third round of examinations included five questions on knowledge of the Classics, history and current affairs. See the Veritable Records of Emperor Ming Taizu (Ming Taizu shilu), juan 160. Veritable Records of the Ming (Ming shilu), Volume 1, p. 643. Although this process of institutionalization was once discontinued due to various reasons such as Emperor Ming Taizu’s dissatisfaction with the examination system and his exclusion of examination candidates from the Jiangnan area due to his repression of the southern scholars, this abuse of imperial power actually suggested to the scholars that culture was dominated by power, and thus the officially affirmed thought of the School of the Principle turned out to be viewed as an unalterable principle or a matter of course. 48  Yang Qiqiao’s “Mingchu rencai peiyang yu dengjin zhidu jiqi yanbian,” in his Ming-Qing shi jue-ao, 151–240. Yang provides a meticulous study of the development of the institutional academic system during this period. He also points out the serious problems that gradually came to light under the system, and that the decline of academic scholarship was inevitable under such a system. 49  After the fall of the Ming dynasty, Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) studied its history and even consider it the reason for the decline of the study of the classics. See Rizhi lu, j. 18 in Rizhi lu jishi, 650–651.

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when they are young, but they do not know one word that is of use when they are old.”50 From their criticisms of the development of thought during this period of intellectual history, we can see some of the problems and concerns that later people had about these issues. By the hongzhi, zhengde and jiajing reign periods (1488–1567), the defects were increasingly obvious. As Wang Yangming had already discerned, due to the rigidity of thought very many scholars could only turn their intelligence toward philological studies, memorization and recitation, and poetry and belle lettres—all of which Wang regarded as empty and worthless forms of learning. During Wang Yangming’s lifetime, social life had already undergone huge changes, but during this time of change, thought had still remained stubbornly entrenched in the same old dogmas. How could such thought effectively respond to the changes and rectify the crisis? This was precisely the widespread concern and anxiety felt by scholars at the time. Later historians have widely examined the social and intellectual ruptures that occurred during this era. Very many documents, especially local gazetteers (difang zhi) and random jottings (biji), record the changes that took place in society. First, the unified nature of the whole country under the blanket of imperial control broke down; in the southern Jiangnan area, culture increasingly displayed various changes; cultural fissures between different areas began to appear. Second, the cultural orientation of the cities and the countryside increasingly diverged, especially in the Jiangnan region. The hitherto unified nature of urban and rural areas broke down. In the cities, where commerce and consumerism were central preoccupations, behavior that was rejected in traditional thought—pleasure seeking, extravagant spending, unscrupulous accumulation of wealth and flaunting that wealth—permeated the whole society and emerged as the reigning fashion. The cities and the villages that once formed a single body were now separated. Third, in these different regions the once unified lifestyles of the various levels of society began to be undermined. Due to their wealth, the urban merchants and great families began to create new life orientations, while some of those scholars who scrupulously abided by tradition hoped to maintain the seriousness of the traditional way of life and social order and by so doing to maintain their own cultural influence. On account of these changes, there was also a disconnect between the value orientation of various levels of society. Lastly, within the ranks of the scholars themselves, their formerly similar lifestyle was also lost. Part of them, due to advancement in office, owning property, or going into commerce, grew prosperous and very rapidly changed the orientation of their 50  “Chong zhengxue pi yishuo shu,” Gaozi Yishu, j. 7, 2B.

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lives. Some scholars, then, were quite shocked by these sorts of changes and severely criticized them. In short, dislocations occurred between north and south, urban and rural, wealthy and poor, and internally in the conceptual world of the intellectual stratum. In other words, from the point of view of the history of social life, this was a profound transformation taking place after a unified civilization had been established from the Song dynasty on. The historically constructed ethical standards to maintain social order had been steadily lost; the unified nature of ethical precepts that were originally respected, at least on the surface collapsed, one after another under these conditions of dislocation in the disparate worlds of daily life. At this time when the unified nature of social life was disappearing, however, the unified nature of thought still remained. The political ideology and ethical and moral concepts under the control of the imperial power employed the official examinations, children’s education, popular literature, family and clan rituals, and popular customs to penetrate the conceptual world and continue to dominate the life of society. Many men of culture were still quite satisfied; they even believed that Zhu Xi’s interpretations of the Four Books already embraced all formal and practical knowledge (knowledge having both substance and function, youti youyong 有體有用). Some of them were even too lazy to actually read those classic texts; they simply “focus[ed] on reading and studying essays currently prescribed for the civil examination as a shortcut.”51 However, a few acute scholars discovered that in real social life knowledge could not explain various sorts of unusual phenomena, and thought was unable to respond to all kinds of changes in the social order. The resources at these scholars’ disposal were unable to diagnose and remedy the many-sided changes in state (guojia) and society. Two things resulted from this situation: moral idealism was advocated in speech and writing while vulgar pragmatic tactics were employed in real life—ideology and practice had become separated, but there was no medicine to cure the ills of the time. The world of mainstream knowledge, thought and belief continued to carry on with the same mediocre and well well-worn doctrines. It was precisely those mediocre and well-worn doctrines that compelled those scholars to turn around and look for alternative resources that could stimulate new ideas. In that age when the scope of intellectual resources was relatively narrow and there was no stimulus or influence coming from other civilizations, the easiest resource to find was a form of knowledge, thought and 51   Zhanshi xiaobian, j. 30, p. 30 quoting from Lin Qingzhang [1948–], Qingchu de qunjing bian weixue, 1990, 30.

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belief that existed in the historical past but had been marginalized. The most stimulating and challenging intellectual resource at that time, with the exception of Buddhist studies which were less and less prominent in mainstream civilization and among the upper strata of society, was simply the learning of Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) who had squared off against Zhu Xi in the Southern Song. 2.4 Although Lu Jiuyuan’s ideas were quite marginalized at this time, their simple, uncomplicated, quick-witted and clear character of getting to the heart of the matter could still attract many scholars. Here we can briefly review the historical continuity of the arguments between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan. From the Yuan to the Ming, because the official examination subjects that were related to official career advancement were based on the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle, it occupied a monopoly position in the intellectual world. Starting in the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle was in the center like the sun while the ideas of Lu Jiuyuan were regularly criticized. The learning of Lu Jiuyuan, then, always remained silent at that time. From the beginning of the fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century, however, this learning of Lu Jiuyuan attracted a few scholars. Men like Chen Yuan (1256–1330) and Zhao Xie (?–1364), and so on still carried on the learning of Lu Jiuyuan in Jiangxi and Siming (Mt. Siming in Zhejiang), but at the time they were quite marginalized.52 Just because they were marginalized, though, they could on the contrary manifest their pure and lofty intellectual attitude and their spirit of resistance to vulgar worldly society. It was particularly because of its orientation toward searching for the clear and pure state of the mind that the learning of Lu Jiuyuan could even more readily stimulate those radical scholars who were disgusted with the mediocre, incoherent, pragmatic, and trivial thinking of their age. There actually was not such a wide gap between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan, or the School of Principle and School of Mind in terms of their terminologies, learning, and reasoning. The School of Principle originally put quite a bit of emphasis on the inner mind, and Zhu Xi also said that “the mind is principle” (xin jishi li 心即是理).53 It was only that the School of Principle was comparatively more concerned with its limitations and regulations and leaned comparatively more toward the accumulation of knowledge and the understanding of particular details. Although for a long period of time this “mind” 52  “Jingming Baofeng xue-an,” Song-Yuan xue-an, j. 93, 1750. 53  “Lunyu 19,” ZYL, j. 37, 985.

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had been constrained by the limitations and regulations of “principle,” and “innate knowledge” or “innate knowing” (liangzhi 良知) had been overshadowed by the voluminous exegesis on the classics and complicated ceremonial norms, in the Ming dynasty a group of Confucian scholars who valued practice began to bring into prominence the significance of the “mind.” In School of Principle discourse from Cao Duan (Yuchuan, 1376–1434), Xue Xuan (Jingxuan, 1389–1464), Wu Yubi (Kangzhai, 1391–1469), Hu Juren (Jingzhai, 1434–1484) and Chen Xianzhang (Baisha, 1428–1500) on, the relationship between the mind and principle began to change. This change slowly grew more extensive and more profound until in the end it brought about a great transformation in the world of knowledge and thought. Wang Yangming (Shouren, 1472–1528) was simply the last scholar to poke holes in this paper window. 3

Making Waves Again: The Rise and Significance of the Learning of Wang Yangming

In the age in which Wang Yangming lived, the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries, many people were already quite weary of both politics and the imperial examinations. Even though year after year the great majority of scholars kept on studying, memorizing, and taking the examinations according to the state-sponsored curriculum materials on the classics, still in the intellectual world many other intellectual trends had already emerged. It was just that the development of these trends was not at all smooth. In 1528, the year of Wang Yangming’s death, he and his students were accused at court of attacking Zhu Xi, and their arguments were characterized as the sort of idle talk (qingtan 清谈, pure talk) that could destroy the nation. His accuser advised that his doctrines be proscribed. The Jiajing Emperor (Zhu Houcong, 1507–1567, r. 1521–1567) supported this suggestion and announced that Wang Yangming had “spoken recklessly and without restraint, vilified former Confucian scholars, called together disciples to adhere to and promote his teachings, employed trickery to let themselves go without any constraints, and polluted the minds and thoughts of the people.” He further ordered the Censorate (Chief Surveillance Bureau) to announce the order to All Under Heaven that it was forbidden to study Wang Yangming.54 To the end of the jiajing reign, then, the doctrines of Wang Yangming continued to be suppressed. 54   Ming Shizong shilu, j. 98, Ming shilu, 8035.

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This situation did not last very long, however. Although the ideas of Wang Yangming were spurned by the government, because Wang was good at training students, had a very high reputation, and his doctrine of the “extension of innate knowledge/knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知) was rather simple and straightforward and easily stimulated idealism and a critical spirit, in a short time his thinking came to be highly regarded by some scholars and even by some serving officials.55 In 1567, the first year of the Longqing Emperor (Zhu Zaihou, 1537–1572, r. 1567–1572), some officials at court recommended that Wang Yangming and Cheng Baisha receive sacrifices in the official schools (xuegong 學宮). We can see from this that by that time quite a few scholars already had a favorable opinion of Wang Yangming. We should take particular note that society underwent some very great changes at the time. All kinds of signs clearly indicate that after the Jiajing Emperor’s reign, the space for popular society increased considerably, and the lifestyles of urban residents tended toward diversification. The restraining power of traditional ethics was increasingly attenuated at the same time that the government’s control powers were continuously relaxing. Along with the development of cities, commerce, communication, printing techniques, and paper manufacturing, the dissemination of knowledge was much easier and harder to control. The wealth and resources of the gentry and urban residents also made it possible for them to open up alternative ways of disseminating thought and knowledge. It was precisely under these circumstances that a large number of scholars began again the practice of lecturing, and these lectures also advanced the dissemination and communication of new thought. The private schools (sishu) and academies (shuyuan) in particular were very instrumental in their support of this new atmosphere of freedom of study. Because lecturing and teaching in the academies took a stance different from government education, they were centered on knowledge-related learning and the cultivation of morality and not on professional training and striving for official qualifications. They easily stimulated many kinds of free discussion. At that time, not only did Wang Yangming himself lecture in many academies, such as those of Longgang (Guizhou), Guiyang (Guizhou), Lianxi (Jiangxi), Jishan (Zhejiang), Fuwen (Guangxi) and other places, but many scholars also opened up educational establishments outside of the official government 55  We use Ying-shih Yü’s translations of zhi liangzhi here. For a new and perceptive view of Wang Yangming’s contribution to Chinese intellectual history and his ideas on liangzhi, see his, “Reorientation of Confucian Social Thought in the Age of Wang Yangming,” in volume one of Ying-shih Yü, Chinese History and Culture: Sixth Century BCE to Seventeenth Century, 2016.

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schools. There they fiercely criticized government schools and the preparatory studies for the imperial examinations.56 In reality an intellectual force belonging the gentry in popular society was already forming outside of the court, officialdom, and government schools. Because of this trend, in 1584, the twentieth year of the Wanli Emperor (Zhu Lijun, 1563–1620, r. 1572–1620), the emperor had no choice but to obey their opinion and decide to allow Wang Yangming, Chen Baisha and Hu Juren to receive sacrifices in the Confucian Temple and thereby enjoy the highest form of honor for a Confucian. Due to this change of attitude within the court, from the Wanli era on, the doctrines of Wang Yangming rapidly became popular throughout society. 3.1 In a certain sense, we can say that the problems that Wang Yangming was concerned with represented a continuation of the Song dynasty School of Principle. Although the intellectual essence of Wang’s thought absorbed the ideas of Lu Jiuyuan of the Song dynasty, we should still pay attention to Wang Yangming’s differences from Lu Jiuyuan. If we say that the questions asked by Lu Jiuyuan’s thought derived from the history and intellectual world of the Southern Song, then Wang Yangming’s ideas grew out of a Ming dynasty context already dominated by the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle. In other words, the problems Wang Yangming was concerned with really derived from Zhu Xi of the Southern Song, and Wang’s ideas actually represented a revision of Zhu Xi’s doctrines. It is also in this sense that the Ming dynasty ideas of Wang Yangming are a continuation of the Song dynasty School of Principle. One of the essentials of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle was the separation of human desires and the Heavenly Principle. By controlling worldly desires and emotions, they hoped that people could gradually rise to the height of the Heavenly Principle. They often emphasized and magnified the distinction between human desires and the Heavenly Principle. Although they admitted that in reality “mind” is one, they still emphasized that only “the mind of the Way” (daoxin) was in accord with the Heavenly Principle, while the “human mind” always remained sunk in depravity.57 This distinction was very important because only by recognizing this difference in principle could one confirm 56  For example, in his “Wansong shuyuan ji,” Wang Yangming wrote that since the flourishing of the keju examinations “scholars have all run around competing in memorizing literary compositions, and gaining and losing material profits has divided and confused their minds.” Schools and scholars “thus no longer have the desire to make clear the proper human relations.” And so academies and lectures were necessary to supplement government education. Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, 1936, j. 7, 43A–B. 57  ZYL j. 62, 61, 1487, 1462.

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in practice one’s rise from the worldly level up to the realm of the Heavenly Principle—it required a rather difficult process of study. According to Zhu Xi’s theory, because the Heavenly Principle existed and was reflected in the ten thousand affairs and the ten thousand material things (that is, everything in the world), one must observe and experience everything; one must practice “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” (gewu zhizhi) and only then could one understand “principle” (li). Only through the process of “investigation of things and extension of knowledge,” can one verify the significance and value of the teaching and guidance of a scholar as a “teacher who teaches the Dao and skills in villages” (shiru 師儒). Only by confirming the significance and value of the teaching and guidance of a scholar as a “teacher of Confucianism,” could the intellectual stratum finally preserve a space for its existence. This way of thinking is reasonable in its way, but this reasonableness can only be seen when imperial power does not dominate everything, the political world is sufficiently relaxed, and the intellectual stratum has relatively enough room for independence. Only then would there be a real possibility for this kind of moral and political idealism to be genuinely put into practice. However, during the reign of the Hongzhi Emperor (Zhou Youcheng, 1470– 1505, r. 1488–1505), the relaxed political environment had already disappeared, and under the Jiajing Emperor, the domination of imperial power was again very strict. And besides, at a time when the School of Principle had already become a political ideology, the Heavenly Principle could simply become part of the administrative system of autocratic rule and a restraint on free minds. According to School of Principle thinking, only the Heavenly Principle ensures the passage of the mind from depravity to transcendence, from vulgarity to purity, and from the “human mind” to the “mind of the Way.” Precisely because the School of Principle greatly despised the vulgar world and excessively revered the world of transcendence, its moral demands were overly strict, and so it could often devolve into a set of dogmatic precepts by which the government could control all thought while its rules of social restraint could totally stifle people’s lively imagination and free thinking. Wang Yangming’s revision of Zhu Xi’s doctrines that dominated the intellectual world at the time began with a re-definition of “mind.” As Wang’s Instructions for Practical Living (Chuanxi lu) puts it, “the mind is principle. Is there any affair in the world outside of the mind? Is there any principle outside of the mind?”58 58  Translation from Wing-tsit Chan, Instructions For Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming [that is (Wang’s Chuanxi lu, 傳習錄], 1963. part I7. 3. Chan, SB, 667.

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According to Wang Yangming, the mind naturally possesses “innate knowledge/knowing” or “innate knowledge of the good” and such knowledge is the original substance of the mind. The mind is naturally able to know.”59 With this way of thinking, Wang Yangming transformed the external social rules and regulations (li 禮, rites, propriety, etiquette) into a “principle” (li 理) that transcends such concrete norms.60 He also brought this “principle” back into the inner “mind.” When his “innate knowing” naturally emanates from the “mind” it is simply the “mind of the Way” (the moral mind, daoxin). It is inherently in accord with the Heavenly Principle, and it is able to make people’s external behavior spontaneously adjust to “propriety.” Everything in the mind can lead to self-fulfillment. The mind is simply morality itself and also the inspector of morality. People do not need the help of the restraints of an external ethics and morality, nor do they need to rely on the mirror of the Heavenly Principle that is external to the mind. Superficially the difference of these ideas from Song dynasty Confucianism does not actually seem to be very great, but this is precisely the special characteristic of Wang Yangming’s thought. He said that what Lu Jiuyuan really inherited was the thought of Mencius.61 His evidence was quite concise. Because Lu Jiuyuan had said, “as for mind, mind is unitary, and as for principle, principle is unitary,… this mind and this principle really cannot tolerate duality”; this was simply Mencius’ saying that “all the ten thousand things are there in me” (wanwu jie bei yu wo 萬物皆備於我).62 In light of this, Wang Yangming criticized Zhu Xi for incorrectly separating “mind” and “principle.”63 Wang said that “the learning of the sages” (shengren zhi xue) was simply “the learning of mind” (xinxue 心學) and asserted that “the mind is simply human nature, and human nature is simply principle” (xin ji xing, xing ji li 心即性, 性即理). The so-called “principle” that envelopes everything in the universe actually comes from the “mind” that possesses innate knowledge, and the origin of this “mind” possessing innate knowledge is simply our human

59  “Xu Ai lu,” Chen Rongjie, Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 40. Translated in Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, part I, 15. 60  Ibid., p. 41: “the character li 禮 is simply the character li 理.” 61  Wang Yangming, “Xiangshan wenji xu,” (gengchen), Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, 1936, j. 7, 29B. Lau, Mencius, VIIA. 4, 182. 62  “Yu Zeng Zhaizhi shu,” LJYJ, 1, 4–5. Mengzi VII. 4, Lau, Mencius, 182. 63  “Lu Cheng lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 71. Translation from Chan, SB, 673.

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nature that is bestowed by Heaven. Wang repeatedly emphasized that “there is no principle outside the mind; there is no event outside the mind.”64 This way of thinking very much resembles that of Chan Buddhism, and its significance is just the same as when Chan Buddhism replaced Indian Buddhism during the period from the seventh to the eighth centuries. Chan Buddhism rejected the idea of a duality of the “human mind” and the “Buddha mind” and emphasized that the vulgar human mind and the realm of transcendence were united in one. This was really because Chan wanted to transfer the power of salvation from monastic discipline, cultivation, and analysis to personal self-awareness (enlightenment) in the mind. In like manner, Wang Yangming brought the “human mind” and the “mind of the Way” (the moral mind) together as one; this goal was implicit in his way of reasoning. As a Confucian, though, Wang Yangming still believed that good and evil existed in this world, and so in theory he could not abandon the Confucian responsibility for moral education, nor could he turn his back on the Confucian duty to purify the social order. In his own discourse, he was never able to completely endorse the reasonableness of natural (spontaneous) human nature; he still abided by the principles of ethics and morality. That is to say he continued to believe that in the universal human mind there was really not only pure innate nature (tianxing, 天性); there were still impure human desires. Because of this, when his disciple asked him, since “all people have this mind, and this mind is identical with principle, why do some people do good and others do evil?”,65 he could only admit that there was a difference between the “mind of the Way” and the “human mind.” So in another place he said: “When the human mind is rectified it is called the moral mind [mind of the Way, daoxin] and when the moral mind loses its correctness, it is called the human mind.”66 Although this “mind” was originally radiantly bright, but “only because it is hidden by selfish desires is the original substance of heaven lost …” Wang Yangming concluded, however, that the transformation of good and evil or of the human mind and the mind of the Way still simply depended on a person’s own inner mind. He believed that when the obstructions were removed from a person’s mind, that mind could then return to its original condition of unclouded clarity. As he said, “Now if one extends the innate 64  “Shu Zhu Yangbo juan,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, 1936, j. 8, 12A. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part I. 32, 1963, 33. 65  This passage is followed by “The Teacher said, ‘The mind of the evil man has lost its original substance.’” Chan, SB, 674, (Chuanxi lu, 1:24b). 66  “Xu Ai lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 42. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part I. 10, 1963, 16–17.

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knowledge in every thought and removes all these hindrances and obstacles, its original substance will be recovered and right …”67 3.2 If one still had to go from the human mind to the mind of the Way, then what method must one employ? In Zhu Xi’s thought, it was the so-called “investigation of things and the extension of knowledge.” A person had to work as hard as possible to exhaust completely various kinds of knowledge. As Zhu Xi put it, “if you do not exhaust one thing, then you will be deficient in one reason, and if you do not investigate one thing, then you will be deficient in one principle.”68 So Zhu Xi emphasized study. He believed that only in this way could one rise from “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue) to “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing), and by studying books and observing things one could cultivate one’s own mind. Wang Yangming on the other hand advocated the so-called “extension of innate knowledge” (zhi liangzhi 致良知).” “Extension of innate knowledge” was essentially not seeking reason from external knowledge, but rather uncovering the original nature (benxing) possessed by one’s inner mind. This was a very fundamental aspect of Wang Yangming’s thought. According to him, the basic reason that problems arise in society is simply because “in later generations, the doctrine of innate knowledge has not clearly prevailed.” He believed that “if gentlemen of the world merely devote their effort to extending their innate knowledge, they will naturally share with all a universal sense of right and wrong, share their likes and dislikes, regard other people as their own persons, regard the country as their own family, and look upon Heaven, Earth, and all things as one body.”69 In order to correct the biases of the School of Principle, Wang Yangming did a whole series of re-interpretations of the ancient Confucian classics, especially the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean,” that formed the basis of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism. Wang believed that the Cheng-Zhu interpretation of “the investigation of things” (gewu) in the “Great Learning” led many scholars to pursue external knowledge as their goal. He believed that the correct path should be to rely on the inner mind for self-examination and thought; that is, “the important thing in learning is to acquire learning through 67  Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 222, 1963, 199–200. 68  ZYL, j. 15, 295. 69  “Da Nie Wenwei,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. zhong, 258–259. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part II. 180, 179, 163, 167. We modify Chan’s translation slightly to match Wang Yangming’s original.

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the exercise of the mind.”70 On this account, he made a new interpretation of the key “Great Learning” passage on “investigation of things and extension of knowledge” (gewu zhizhi). For Wang, rectifying their minds (zhengxin 正心), making their will sincere (chengyi), investigation of things (gewu), and the extension of knowledge (zhizhi) in the “Great Learning” were only a series of activities searching for nature and principle (xingli 性理) in the inner mind.71 For Wang, “mind,” “things,” “will,” and “knowledge” were really only different aspects of the mind, and he interpreted “rectified,” “sincere,” “investigate,” and “extend” as the mind’s self-conscious adjustment, self-examination, and thought. Wang continued the train of reasoning since Mencius that presupposed that the human mind naturally possesses innate knowledge (liangzhi), that this innate knowledge was the original substance (benti 本體) of the mind, and it was simply the original mind “before it was activated” (weifa). Even though “after it was activated” (yifa), it would have various unwarranted thoughts, that eternal innate knowledge would, however, still seem to be there in the depths of the mind always maintaining its original clarity. People only had to turn back, then, and re-experience that state of clarity. According to Wang Yangming’s interpretation, this realm of the mind that resembles Buddhism is simply what the “Doctrine of the Mean” meant by saying that “the superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone” ( junzi shen qi du 君子慎其獨). This state of the mind that is neither perturbed nor afraid is simply the pure realm of the Heavenly Principle.72 70  “Da Luo Zheng-an shaozai shu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. zhong, 247–248. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part II. 173, Part II. 173, 1963, 159. 71  This iconic passage in the “Great Learning” runs as follows: “The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their will sincere. Those who wished to make their will sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world.” Chan, SB, 86–87. 72  “Xue Kan lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. shang, 148. The first section of the “Doctrine of the Mean” reads as follows: “What Heaven (Tian, Nature) imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (Dao). Cultivating the Way is called education. The Way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can

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It is said that Wang Yangming’s doctrine was aimed at what he considered a defect of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle in separating “knowledge” or “knowing” (zhi 知) and “action” or “acting” (xing 行) into two polarities. Because Zhu Xi put great emphasis on the “investigation of things,” that is the search for knowledge, he could not avoid separating the “Doctrine of the Mean” concepts of “extensive learning” (boxue 博學) and “earnest practice” (duxing 篤行).73 With that, “knowledge” is one pole and “action” is another pole, and one must first obtain knowledge before one can act. This way of thinking led the ChengZhu School of Principle to place too much emphasis on “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue). According to Wang Yangming’s interpretation, the “investigation of things” is really not a search for external knowledge because the ears, the eyes, the mouth, the nose, and the four limbs that obtain knowledge of the world are also controlled by the mind; the body and the mind are one.” Therefore “if there is no mind, there will be no body, and if there is no body, there will be no mind.”74 For Wang, all the external phenomena in the world can be seen as sprouting (emerging) from the mind,75 and all study was fundamentally intended to rediscover this clear and unsullied mind. To establish this mind amounted to achieving true knowledge. And so “extensive learning” was intended only to assure that the Heavenly Principle remained always in the mind, while “earnest practice” was simply to continually practice this storage be separated from us is not the Way. Therefore the superior man is cautious over what he does not see and apprehensive over what he does not hear. There is nothing more visible than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle. Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone (shen qi du).” Chan, SB, 98, with changes into pinyin romanization. 73   Zhongyong, §20 last paragraph, reads as follows: “Study it (the way to be sincere) extensively, inquire into it accurately, think it over carefully, sift it clearly, and practice it earnestly.” (boxue zhi, shenwen zhi, shensi zhi, mingbian zhi, duxing zhi, 博學之，審問 之，慎思之，明辨之，篤行之). Chan SB, 107. 74  “Chen Jiuchuan lu,” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, 282. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 201, 1963, 189. 75  The most famous example of this is the passage in “Huang Mianzhi lu” [following Chan’s translation] concerning the idea that “there is nothing under heaven external to the mind.” Wang said that “these flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms of themselves … Before you look at these flowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy. As you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly. From this you can know that these flowers are not external to your mind.” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, 332. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 275, 1963, 222.

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of the Heavenly Principle. Since human “knowledge” and “action” actually take place simultaneously in an instant, then the minute that innate knowledge is activated it is already also action.76 Otherwise, “How can all things in the world be investigated?” Wang further asked: As “[Cheng Yi] even said ‘Every blade of grass and every tree possesses principle.… [if so] How can we [completely] investigate [them]?”77 In light of this, a Confucian’s every concern should be to maintain the pristine purity of the mind. Wang believed that if there was no sprouting (emergence) from innate knowledge, then so-called knowledge would simply not be genuine knowledge belonging to the mind. When all knowledge was only the emergence and presentation of the inner mind, socalled “knowledge” and “action” could no longer be regarded as two elements; they would all be subsumed into the process of the mind’s search for innate knowledge in the direction of the realm of clarity and brightness. All forms of ancient Chinese thought always tried to derive support for their reasonableness and authority from history and tradition. From Han Yu on, especially in Confucian doctrines from the Song dynasty on, Confucians put particular emphasis on the so-called “tradition of moral principle” or the “succession of the Way” (daotong). They also worked hard to construct a historical progression reaching from themselves back to the ancient Chinese sages and worthies. Wang Yangming was no exception. He believed that he, much more than Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, felt the pulse of genuine Confucian truth from Confucius and Mencius down to the present, and for this reason, he also repeatedly claimed that he himself was the true heir of the authentic Confucian tradition. 3.3 History often seems like a cyclical reincarnation, time after time enacting the same drama. Intellectual history seems even more frequently to carry on the same debates and argue about the same topics from one side and the other. Discussing Wang Yangming’s doctrines, we cannot help but be reminded of the seventh-to-eighth-century polemics between mainstream Buddhism and

76  In “Huang Mianzhi lu,” Wang Yangming had this to say about “the unity of knowledge and action”: “I advocate the unity of knowledge and action precisely because I want people to understand that when a thought is aroused it is already action.” Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, 302. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 226, 1963, 201. 77  “Chen Qiuchuan lu,” Chuanxi lu, Part III. 318. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 318, 1963, 247.

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Chan Buddhism concerning the Buddha nature and gradual enlightenment.78 That polemic concerned the two ghâta: The body is the tree of perfect wisdom (bodhi) The mind is the stand of a bright mirror. At all times diligently wipe it. Do not allow it to become dusty. And Fundamentally perfect wisdom has no tree. Nor has the bright mirror any stand. Buddha-nature is forever clear and pure. Where is there any dust?79 In the Ming dynasty, they seemed to have been playing the same old tune over again. Indeed, Wang Yangming’s thought was obviously stimulated and influenced by Buddhism, but, on the other hand, he also stimulated and influenced the revival of Buddhism among the scholar-officials.80 During the reign of Emperor Wanli, Lianchi (Zhuhong, 1535–1615), Zibo (Zhenke, Daguan, 1543– 1603), Hanshan (Deqing, 1546–1623) and other celebrated Buddhists came into prominence at the same time, and this may well have been related to the intellectual atmosphere around Wang Yangming’s thought.81 Their thinking and their language was also often related to Wang Yangming’s doctrines. In the same way, however, that the clear and uncomplicated “doctrine of sudden enlightenment” (dunwu shuo) of Southern Chan very quickly attracted many believers at the time and led to many worries about the survival of Buddhism itself, just so, due to its quick-wittedness and high-mindedness, did Wang 78  For this polemic between Buddhism and Chan Buddhism, see above “The Eighth to Tenth Century Transformation of Buddhism, II: The Victory of Chan Buddhism and the Defeat of Buddhism.” 79  The first ghâta is by Shenxiu and the second is by Huineng. Chan, SB, 431–432. 80  Tao Wangling, “Xinchou ru du ji Junshi di shiwushou zhi shi” Xie-an ji, 1610, j. 16, has this line: “Those who study Buddhism today, Do so because of the enticement of innate knowledge (liangzhi).” 81  “Xuelang fashi Engong zhongxing fadao zhuan,” in Hanshan dashi ji, records that after Yongle (1403–1424), “the Way of Chan was not popular (conspicuous). There was only a sect that still actively lectured on Chan Buddhism in the Northern capital, but the practice of Chan and its Way in the south gradually disappeared.” It was not until after zhengde (1506–1521) and jiajing (1522–1566) that this situation changed. See Shen Defu (1578–1642), “Chanlin zhu mingsu,” Wanli yehuo bian, 1997, j. 27, 693–694.

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Yangming’s thought also deliver a great shock to the Ming dynasty and make a great deal of trouble for Confucian doctrine. This was because the foundations of his thought gave rise to two different intellectual trends. The first trend embodied the “doctrine in four axioms” (siju jiao 四句教) that Wang Yangming gave to his disciples at the so-called “Colloquy at the Tianquan Bridge” (Tianquan zhengdao) meeting. During those discussions, Wang said: In the original substance of the mind there is no distinction of good and evil. When the will becomes active, however, such distinction exists. The faculty of innate knowledge is to know good and evil. The investigation of things is to do good and remove evil.82 Perhaps these four axioms come closest to the basic meaning of Wang Yangming’s doctrines. Although the idea that “the mind is principle” (xin ji li) had already in theory placed good and evil in one mind, in the final analysis Wang Yangming still admitted that the mind could continue to produce the two poles of good and evil. People still had a responsibility, then, to search for knowledge, that is to “extend innate knowledge” and seek to return to the “original substance of the mind” (xin zhi ben 心之本) that was crystal-clear without any impediment. On this account and similar to the situation of Northern Chan, Wang Yangming very carefully maintained the last line of defense of Confucian morality. Thus after Wang Yangming expressed his “basic aims” in the above quoted four axioms, he repeatedly exhorted his two students, Qian Dehong (1496–1574) and Wang Ji (1498–1583) as to what they should do as follows: People’s minds are dominated by habits. If we do not teach them concretely and sincerely to devote themselves to the task of doing good and removing evil right in their innate knowledge rather than merely imagining an original substance in a vacuum, all that they do will not be genuine and they will do no more than cultivate a mind of vacuity and

82  “Sijujiao,” Chuanxi lu, Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 315, 1963, 243–245. Also see Chan, SB, 687–689 for Chan’s comment on Wang Yangming’s famous “doctrine in four axioms” (sijujiao 四句教). Hou Wailu, et al., asserted that these four axioms “should be seen as Wang Yangming’s final conclusions near the end of his life.” Hou Wailu, et al., Song Ming lixueshi, j. xia, chapter nine, second edition, 1997, 236.

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quietness. This defect is not a small matter and must be exposed as early as possible.83 Precisely because efforts still had to be made Wang Yangming, like Northern Chan before him, paid rather great attention to the process of nourishing and cultivating the mind. He once told his students that the extension of innate knowledge also went forward gradually day by day. Wang’s closest student, Qian Dehong, abided by this part of Wang’s thought, and so he brought up the idea that “the learning of the superior man must work at having no desires” and that it was necessary to employ “watchfulness when alone” (self-watchfulness, shendu 慎獨) to seek “harmony within” (zhonghe 中和) and “admonishment and trepidation” ( jingju 驚懼) to seek “innate knowledge.”84 The second trend is closely associated with Wang Yangming’s student Wang Ji. If we carefully analyze it, the reasoning discussed above can be seen to have left some key questions that were never satisfactorily answered. First, if the original state of the mind was without good or evil, how then could it give rise to the two poles of good and evil? Second, if one says that the original substance of the “mind” comes to contain both good and evil “when the will (yi 意) becomes active,” then how can it possess “knowledge” and how can it guarantee that “goodness” can overcome “evil?” Third, why is it possible for worldly enticements, practical interests and inner desires to obey the guidance of reason and incline toward so-called “innate knowledge?” It was due precisely to the perplexity of these questions that after Wang Yangming a different sort of interpretation developed among his students. It started with the presupposition of “mind is principle”. Wang Ji believed that “the mind is a mind that contains good but not evil, and so the will is a will that contains good but not evil; knowledge (knowing) is also a knowledge that contains good but not evil; and things (wu) are also things that contain good but not evil.”85 This is to say that no matter whether it 83  “Sijujiao,” Chuanxi lu, Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 315, 1963, 244–245. “Nianpu san,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, j. 34, for jiajing sixth year (1527), ninth month renqu, 39A–41B. Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. xia, “Huang Mianzhi lu,” 359–360. 84  See “Zhezhong Wangmen xue-an yi,” Mingru xue-an, j. 11, 227 and 233, citing Qian Dehong’s “Huiyu” and “Lunxue shu”; Mingshi, j. 282, 7272, “Rulin er: Qian Dehong zhuan” simply says that Wang Ji “actually entered into Chan, but Dehong still did not lose the basic rules or principles of being a Confucian. 85  “Nianpu san,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, j. 34, jiajing sixth year (1527), ninth month renqu, 39A–41B.

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is mind, will, knowledge, or material things, they all must “contain good but no evil.” Superficially this interpretation does not seem to be really unusual, but only a matter of emphasizing that the mind originally contains “innate knowledge” and making the “innate (good, liang 良)” of “innate knowledge” or “good knowing” more prominent. Implicit in this slight distinction, though, there was actually an extremely great difference. If the mind, will, knowledge, and material things are all regarded as containing “goodness” and without “evil,” it amounts to bestowing complete reasonableness upon the “mind.” Just the same as with Southern Chan’s final assertion that “my mind is the Buddha,” once the mind is affirmed in this way, then all of the desires of the mind will have been rationalized. During his lifetime, Wang Yangming did not refute Wang Ji’s views, but rather maintained an attitude of mediation toward this way of thinking.86 But after Wang Yangming, these different ideas began to be disseminated under the name of Wang Yangming thought. Since Wang Ji expanded “innate knowledge” to the extreme, the mind was without evil and only contained good, and this created a very large scope for the self-indulgence of human desires. Just like the idea that “my mind is the Buddha” of Southern Chan a thousand years earlier, this search for absolute freedom and spontaneity (ziyou, ziran) undermined the last responsibility of Confucianism for society, ethics, and life.87 Although Wang Ji himself still insisted on “quietism” and being “without thought” in theory, the “genuineness (zhen, 真)” that he emphasized and his affirmation that the mind contained good but not evil still very easily enabled people to follow the path of naturalism (ziran zhuyi) in which they could follow their desires and do as they pleased.

86  In the so-called “Colloquy at the Tianquan Bridge,” Wang Yangming made the following statements to mediate between the views of Qian Dehong and Wang Ji: “You two gentlemen complement each other very well, and should not hold on to one side … Wang Ji should employ Dehong’s view of cultivation, and Dehong should apprehend thoroughly Wang Ji’s view of original substance. If you two gentlemen use your views interchangeably, you will be able to lead all people—of the highest, average, and lowest intelligence—to the truth.” But this imagined balance only existed in theory; in reality there would often be partiality, and this was proven by later history. “Nianpu san,” Wang Wenchenggong quanshu, j. 34, 40A. Chan, Instructions For Practical Living, Part III. 315, 1963, 244. With name and romanization changes and one modification for clarity due to ellipses in the quote. 87  Just as Shimada Kenji wrote in his Shushigaku to Yômeigaku, Wang Ji’s “was a form of Chan Buddhist [Wang] Yangming teaching from the beginning. He eliminated the last vestiges of Confucian content and turned it into something completely Chan Buddhist.”

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Later on, members of the so-called “Left Wing” or radical Wang School were predominantly descended from the internal logic of Wang Yangming’s and Wang Ji’s ideas. Simply put, because they affirmed the reasonableness of the idea that the mind “contains good but not evil,” then this allowed all actions of the mind in real life to be considered reasonable. Because “no feelings and no desires” (wuqing wuyu) was only a theoretical condition, however, and in real life people always “have feelings and desires” (youqing youyu), these people who had feelings and desires found a rationale for liberating or even indulging themselves behind the theoretical reasonableness of those feelings and desires. 3.4 At the time, not everyone actually agreed with Wang Yangming’s ideas. For example, during Wang Yangming’s lifetime people like Luo Qinshun (1465– 1547) and Gu Lin (1476–1545) both sent letters to Wang refuting his opinions on Zhu Xi.88 A few decades later, Chen Jian (1497–1567) wrote his Thorough Debate on Three Teachings (Xuebu tongbian 学蔀通辩) fiercely criticizing the Wang Yangming School. Inside the Wang School itself, Huang Wan (1480–1554) also criticized Wang Ji in his On Illuminating the Way (Mingdao bian). In spite of these critiques, however, by the reign of the Longqing Emperor (Zhu Zaihou, 1537–1572, r. 1567–1572), after the reversal of the political verdict against it, the Wang Yangming School very quickly grew into a contemporary intellectual fashion following the widespread practice of scholars giving lectures and the sudden upsurge of private learning. Wang Yangming’s radical critique of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle and his own idealism attracted many different sorts of people in a very short period of time. A group of very learned men came to agree independently on the revolutionary significance of these kinds of ideas. In the words of Liu Zongzhou (1578–1645), they believed that since the line of the Cheng-Zhu School of teaching was discontinued, there has been no one who could correct the one-sided views and the mistaken ideas and bring Confucian teaching back to the sage’s views and return to the original principle as profoundly and brilliantly as Master (Wang Yangming).89

88  See “Da Gu Dongqiao shu,” “Da Luo Zheng-an shaozai shu,” in Wang Yangming Chuanxi lu xiangzhu jiping, j. zhong, 159–201, 247–256. 89  Liu Zongzhou, “Yangming chuanxinlu yi, xiaoyin,” in Liuzi quanshu yibian, 1892, j. 1, 1119a.

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This was because after the long process of ideological systemization and institutionalization, the School of Principle had already lost its significance as the salvation of the mind, a critique of power and authority, and an establisher of social order. It had devolved into a set of empty moral regulations and bloodless dogmatic texts. A strong and lively form of thought was needed in order to revitalize the age.90 Each of the two tendencies arising out of Wang Yangming’s doctrines had its believers among members of the later Wang School. Among them, besides the above mentioned Qian Dehong, Luo Hongxian (1504–1564), Zou Shouyi (1491–1562), Nie Shuangjiang (1487–1563), and others still advocated holding on to Confucianism’s last line of defense, and had a fearful attitude toward the indulgence of the mind. Because they were still able to separate out and distinguish between the ideal realm and worldly life and between ultimate goals and the present situation, and because they still maintained an aspiration and a spirit for moral improvement, Huang Zongxi considered that they were the true descendants of Wang Yangming. Nevertheless, the disciples of Wang Ji and Wang Gen (1483–1541), especially the so-called “Taizhou School,” represented a different tendency that was even more popular in these several decades. The spirit of naturalism and the search for freedom within the Wang School eventually went beyond the boundaries set by Wang Yangming, and overstepped the bounds allowed by the political system.91 It gradually became the most noticeable and most attractive current of thought. Its followers attacked Chinese tradition and social order as hard as they could; they conflated daily life with the ideal realm, and worldly feelings and desires with the original substance of the mind. They further affirmed the reasonableness of worldly feelings and desires, and regarded the natural (original) condition of the mind as the ultimate ideal condition; they equated the ordinary common mass of people with the sages and worthies, and affirmed 90  In the early Qing, Lu Longqi (1630–1692) commented on why Wang Yangming’s thought was so well received and he mentioned two reasons: (1) “His thought could let people indulge themselves and also feel at ease about it. It was not like Cheng-Zhu’s thought that required them to observe carefully the prescribed rules and norms without any leniency.” and (2) “Wang’s teaching viewed everything under Heaven as empty but only this (heart/ mind) as real. Thus, those who were not worthy were happy about the indulgent side of his teaching while those who were virtuous also wanted to seek his teaching that there is no difference in life and death.” Tang Jian (1778–1861), Qing xue-an xiaoshi, j. 1, SBBY, 3B. 91  Just as Huang Zongxi wrote, “Wang Yangming’s School had Taizhou and Longxi factions and so became fashionable all over the empire [De Bary, Sources, 864 has “spread like the wind over all the land”], but also because of these two factions it ceased to be transmitted.” “Taizhou xue-an, 1,” Mingru xue-an, j. 32, 703.

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the value of human existence and the significance of life. Both the thought and the behavior of men like He Xinyin (1517–1579), Luo Rufang (1515–1588) and Li Zhi (1527–1602) presented a challenge to the traditional social order.92 This sort of audacious idealism and radical naturalism of, in Li Zhi’s phrase, “no sages and no laws” ( feisheng wufa 非聖無法) was particularly enticing to those young men who had long been confined in an intellectual straightjacket. It was also very attractive to men with strong literary temperaments. Later scholars have paid widespread attention to the unconventional literati of that time, such as Yuan Hongdao (1568–1610), Tang Xianzu (1550–1616), Tao Wangling (1562–1609) and Dong Qichang (1555–1636), all of whom emerged under the influence of this intellectual atmosphere. Although from today’s vantage point, their thought did not exceed the boundaries of the traditional Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief, its internal destructive power still moved many people to be abnormally vigilant.93 In 1602 (wanli 30), Zhang Wenda (1554–1613) accused Li Zhi of misconduct in office and impeached him, and then Kang Piyang (1592 jinshi) impeached Da Guan (Zibo Zhenke, 1543– 1603) who, together with Li Zhi, had been dubbed the “two major heresy leaders” (liang da jiaozhu 兩大教主).94 Feng Qi (1558–?), a Secretary in the Bureau of Rites, was even more incensed about this “no sages and no laws” discourse. He sent a memorial to the thrown furiously denouncing this fashion and requesting that the court have all of those heretical writings burned. Having little choice in this situation, Emperor Wanli, who originally supported the Wang Yangming School sent down an imperial edict strongly criticizing the intellectual atmosphere following the wide-scale rise of Wang Yangming thought. The edict said: Recently scholars have not only defamed Song dynasty Confucian scholars and come close to slandering and ridiculing Confucius, but they have also done away with right and wrong and abandoned proper deportment. How can the court now find loyal and filial scholars with moral 92  In his “Shiliu shiji Zhongguo jinbu de zhexue sichao gaishu,” Hou Wailu separated the intellectual currents of that time into four categories; he called the Taizhou School of Wang Gen, He Xinyin and Li Zhi “heretical anti-feudal thought” and proposed that it “was a form of materialism linked to humanism,” Hou Wailu shixue lunwenji, xia ce, 1988, 1–29. 93  The most influential among them was Li Zhi. See Mizoguchi Yûzo (1932–2010)’s study, translated by Suo Jieran and Gong Ying as Zhongguo jindai sixiang de quzhe yu zhankai, 1997. In his “Lun Li Zhi zai Mingdai sixiangshi shang de diwei,” Li Zhuoran is critical of the exaggeration of Li Zhi’s antitraditionalism. See his, Mingshi sanlun, 153–168. 94  Shen Defu, “Liang da jiaozhu,” Wanli yehuo bian, j. 27, 691.

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integrity and righteous behavior to employ as officials? That the situation has come to this is all because our chief examination officials were most interested in valuing talents and wrongly accepted these strange new progressive scholars [into the government].95 3.5 He Xinyin was killed in jail in 1579 and Li Zhi committed suicide in prison in 1602. Political ideology narrowed the scope for thinking, realistic social order demanded the preservation of a unity of thought, and this led to a change of intellectual direction. This change of direction was not, however, only due to political pressure from the court or practical necessity. In actuality, a selfadjustment within Confucianism itself had been going on all along, and some new intellectual tendencies emerged at this time. One of these tendencies was the criticism leveled by Gao Panlong (1562– 1626), Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612) and others at the intellectual world that took the Wang Yangming School as it center. They hoped to employ the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle to remedy the excessive radicalism of Wang Yangming thought, to clarify the intellectual order through a revision of knowledge, and to put forth “the investigation of things” again as an antidote to the vacuous ramblings of the Wang Yangming School. Gao Panlong saw the crisis implicit in their thinking, and so he criticized it as follows: The Wang Yangming School began by “sweeping away sense knowledge in order to clear the mind” and ended by “indulging the mind and abolishing learning.” It began by “sweeping away good and evil in order to empty thought” and ended by “indulging in emptiness and abolishing good behavior.” These tendencies led to “taking reputation, integrity, loyalty, and rightness lightly while scholars rarely practiced moral cultivation.”96 In a similar fashion, Gu Xiancheng pointed out that due to Wang Yangming and his later followers’ excessive emphasis on the significance of the self-awareness of the mind, the restraining force of morality was undermined because the mind is a living thing and very difficult to master.97

95   Ming Shenzong shilu, j. 370, Wanli sanshi nian sanyue yichou, Ming shilu, 11935. However, the citation in the Ming shilu was quite brief or sketchy. See the complete text of Feng Qi, Zhengxue shu in Feng Yingjing, Huangming jingshi shiyong bian, j. 28, 2526. 96  “Chongwen huiyu xu,” Gaozi yishu, j. 9 shang, 24A. 97  See Gu Xiancheng, “Rixin shuyuan ji,” Jing gao cang gao, j. 11, SKQS, ce 1292, 145.

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Gao and Gu both tried to re-introduce the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle and to clarify the intellectual world by means of their new interpretation of the learning of principle. At a time when the Wang School was spreading unchecked, Gao Panlong again asserted the importance of Zhu Xi’s teachings. He said that “without Master Zhu, the Way of Confucius would not have been made known, and not knowing Confucius, the Way of Master Zhu would also not be known.98 Gu Xiancheng also said that “when scholars become used to flighty and absurd practices, it is fine to rectify this with Master Zhu Xi’s teaching; when scholars become stubborn and incapable of change, it is fine to turn them around with Master Wang Yangming’s teaching.”99 These statements could perhaps have represented the thinking of some elite scholars who were looking for a new intellectual orientation. They also represented the hopes of scholars who already had a clear view of contemporary society and its intellectual conditions. These hopes were expressed in a very concentrated form in Gao Panlong’s memorial entitled “On valuing correct learning and refuting strange views” (Chong zhengxue pi yishuo shu) that he sent up to the throne in 1592 (wanli 20). In the text of this memorial, Gao criticized various intellectual schools, but he was also reserved about them. He tried to employ an integrative method to restore the order of the intellectual world.100 Regrettably, however, it was extremely difficult to find a logical connection between the thinking derived from the Cheng-Zhu and the Lu-Wang traditions.101 In the end his thought returned to the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle as a cultural absolute: [Scholars] must read the Four Books and the Five Classics, and must not be engrossed in the doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism. They must lecture 98  “Zhuzi jieyao xu,” Gaozi yishu, j. 9 shang, 3A-4B. Also see “Chongqie Jinsi lu xu,” “Zhuzi xingli yin xu,” “Cheng Zhu quelizhi xu”, and so on, ibid., j. 9 zhong. 99  See Gu Xiancheng, “Rixin shuyuan ji,” Jing gao cang gao, j. 11, SKQS, ce 1292, 146. 100  “Chong zhengxue pi yishuo shu,” Gaozi yishu., j. 7, SKQS edition, see 1A–6B. 101  For example, in the early Qing, Lu Longqi (1630–1692) criticized the two trends as follows: “taking principle as external and wanting to envelope it in mind, that is the learning of Wang Yangming; taking principle as internal and wanting to envelope it in mind, that is the learning of Gao [Panlong] and Gu [Xiancheng]. Wang Yangming’s mistake lies in regarding mind as nature; Gao and Gu’s mistake lies in disliking action and seeking quietude.” This critique in Tang Jian, Qing xue-an xiaoshi, j. 1, SBBY, 3A is not necessarily correct. In my understanding, when they really could not find a path to harmonize the two extremes, promoting Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism again may perhaps have simply made the pendulum swing to the other pole.

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on the four main schools of Song dynasty Neo-Confucian thought and not confuse people by discussing strange novelties. He demanded of scholars that “in their studies they should not separate into factions, and they should not study heterodox ideas.” This naturally led to a great deal of restraint on the intellectual world.102 Another similar new tendency aimed at remedying Wang Yangming School thought came from within the school itself. Besides the men of the Jiangyou or Jiangxi Wang School (represented by Luo Hongxian, Zou Shouyi and Nie Shuangjiang) mentioned above, many other scholars who embraced Wang Yangming’s doctrines gradually came to realize the problem with the Wang School’s excessive promotion of the “mind.” They also became aware that once the controlling “principle” was weakened, this could very well lead to self-indulgence of the mind in everyday life. Whether “mind” and “principle” are one or two was the dividing line between two trends of Confucian thought. If they are two, then the “principle” of the universe has the power to restrain the moral “mind.” If they are one, then the internal mind and nature and the external Heavenly Principle exist together in one thought, people are their own censors (examiners), and once they begin to practice selfindulgence there is no way to limit or stop them. Due to the assumption that “the mind is principle,” the actor and the censor in the entire thought process are brought together in the same mind, but no one knows how or whether this mind in which good and evil are interwoven can examine itself. If this excessively promoted mind lacks the restraints of principle, will it always be able to tend toward the path of goodness, honesty and decency? When the idea that “the mind is principle” was carried to extremes, some questions began to arise. Who is going to guarantee that people will always tend toward the good? Who is able to ensure that innate knowledge can prevent the social order from becoming chaotic? That very many mutual examination or mistake correction groups or meetings (xingguohui 省過會) 102  At the time, many scholars entertained very strong ideas about reforming the ideological world. In his “Sanbainian qian de jianli Kongjiao lun,” Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, 6/2 (1936) 133–162, Chen Shouyi pointed out that Wang Qiyuan (fl. 1620s)’s Qing shu jing tan, published in 1623, simply “established a new and well-ordered theology for a Confucian religion.” The targets of his critique were very clear; he was dissatisfied with the Wang School that “employs the sacred classics to support their own views” and Jiao Hong (1540– 1620) and Li Zhi who “contradict the sacred classics in order to give unbridled scope to their own opinions.” Thus he wrote that Jiao and Li were disloyal, unfilial, inhumane and unrighteous (buzhong, buxiao, buren, buyi) and “their crimes cry out to Heaven; how are they any different from unbridled thieves?”.

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and registers of merits and demerits (gongguobu 功過簿) appeared in the late Ming demonstrates that many people were trying to restrain themselves by relying on methods of external censorship beyond the mind’s self-awareness. And this further demonstrates that the Wang Yangming School’s theory that “the mind is principle” had already encountered a crisis. It was for this reason that the Wang Yangming School itself began to selfconsciously adjust its theoretical formulations. For example, Liu Zongzhou (Jishan, 1578–1645) admitted that ever since the appearance of Wang Yangming’s Instructions For Practical Living, “the moral teaching of families has gradually declined.” On the one hand, then, Liu changed his attitude toward the Zhu Xi system. In his “Essential principles and developments of the Learning of the Sages” (Shengxue zongyao), he arranged the Song dynasty Confucianism of Zhou Dunyi, Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi together with Wang Yangming as one continuous system. On the other hand, he especially stressed “self-watchfulness” (shendu) and hoped to use a kind of conscious moral self-discipline to rescue the self-indulgent mind. In this way, he initiated a style of reasoning that sought a balance between self-cultivation and knowledge by harmonizing Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang thought and placing equal emphasis on inner selfawareness and external control.103 Later on in the early Qing dynasty, even though they believed in Wang Yangming’s ideas, Chen Que (1604–1677), Li Yong (Erqu, 1627–1705), Huang Zongxi, and so on all independently rectified the shortcoming brought about by the Wang Yangming School’s excessive promotion of the mind through their appreciation of gaining knowledge and their strengthening of moral control. Whether they advocated repenting ones mistakes and starting afresh or integrating the classic and history, their goal was, on the one hand, simply to rely on inspection and supervision by others and other concrete measures to induce self-reflection and restrain ones mind.104 Because a third party was required to play the role of objective supervisor and accuser, witness groups (people correcting each other’s moral failings, zhengrenhui 證人會), and mutual examination or mistake correction groups and similar organizations were formed. Similarly, on the other hand, they tried to amass even more knowledge from the classic to serve as the foundation of rationality. Because they required objective knowledge, including knowledge of the history recorded in the classics and of the cosmos, and so on to serve as a support system for truth and rightness (justice), they gave birth to a new round of intellectualism. This is of course a topic to be taken up later. 103  See Liu Zongzhou, “Shengxue zongyao,” in Liu Zongzhou quanji, ce 2, “Yulei 7,” 2007, 2: 28. 104  See Li Yong, “Huiguo zixin,” Erqu ji, j. 1, 3.

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3.6 The late Ming dynasty was a very complex and many-sided age. On the one hand, in terms of morality, theory, writing, erudition, and literature, there were expressions of each by very outstanding individuals. On the other hand, however, underneath this “overly mature splendor” was concealed a profound and serious malaise that these people were unable to self-diagnose and self-treat. The diverse and changeable intellectual world seemed to be unable to find an effective prescription to remedy the situation. Due to over almost a century of battering by the Wang Yangming School, the intellectual world had certainly been thrown into chaos and it had now reached an age of reorganization. No matter how one evaluates the Wang Yangming School, I believe the prevalence of Wang Yangming thought in the middle and late Ming at least bequeathed an atmosphere of freedom to the Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief. Because people tended toward skepticism in their thinking and the originally unified ideology was undermined by various skeptical attitudes, an unprecedented rupture emerged in the intellectual world, and the intellectual classes gradually developed a very relaxed space for expressions of opinion. Because the doctrines of Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming particularly valued the mind’s ultimate authority to judge things, and due to Lu Jiuyuan’s idea quoted above in full that “no matter whether in the Eastern Seas or in the Western Seas, they shared the same mind and the same principle,” (Donghai Xihai xin tong li tong 東海西海心同理同) people became inclined toward a concept of truth that could be called universalism, and this also provided the foundation for a new pluralistic intellectual world. This trend in the Chinese intellectual world came to an abrupt end after the Wanli era due to a series of events that occurred one after the other. The first thing was that the mainstream political ideology combined with its political power carried out a large-scale suppression of this atmosphere of freedom of expression in the name of the state (nation) and social order. During the reign of the Tianqi Emperor (Zhu Youxiao, 1605–1627, r. 1620–1627), the government’s control of freedom to teach through lecturing became increasingly strict. In 1625 (tianqi five), the emperor issued an edict ordering the dismantling of all the private academies in Donglin, Guanzhong, Jiangyou (Jiangxi) and Huizhou, and bringing about a severe setback for freedom of expression.105 The second thing was that the pressure of internal troubles and external aggression gave the scholars no option but voluntarily to change direction. From the end of the Wanli reign into the reign of the Chongzhen Emperor 105   Ming Xizong shilu, j. 62, tianqi wunian bayue renwu, in Ming Shilu, 13870.

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(Zhu Youjian, 1611–1644, r. 1627–1644), social and national (minzu) crises arose one after another. These included the Japanese invasion of Chaoxian (Korea), armed peasant rebellion, and the Manchu invasion of Chinese territory. These events brought the significance of the nation and social order into a preeminent position. Freedom and transcendence of thought lost their urgency and priority in the face of these national crises. When “the nation” or “state” (guojia) is in crisis, the people, country, and civilization that the dynasty represents would seem, as a matter of course, to be justly considered of priority importance. Under such pressure, scholars could only self-consciously choose to study the practical learning that could save the country from its peril and re-establish the order of the laws and discipline of the imperial court. Concern for “the individual,” the “mind” and such like were naturally pushed into the margins of scholars’ field of vision.

Chapter 11

From Ming to Qing I: From Tianxia, “All under Heaven,” to the “Ten Thousand States” (End of the 16th to the End of the 19th Centuries)

Prologue: From “All under Heaven” to an “Age of Ten Thousand States”: Background to the Reinterpretation of Ming and Qing Intellectual History

Ancient China had a great deal of contact with foreign lands, but, except for the influence of Buddhism, foreign civilizations had never given a very great shock to the Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief. Not until Western culture entered China during the Ming and Qing dynasties did Chinese culture really receive a fundamental blow. In 1583, the eleventh year of Emperor Wanli (Shenzong, r. 1572–1620) of the Ming dynasty, the Jesuit missionaries Michele Pompilio Ruggieri (1543–1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) came to China and settled in the city of Zhaoqing in Guangdong province.1 They published Chinese language versions of A Roman Catholic Catechism, True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven and other works; they also translated Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Comprehensive Charts of the Spherical and Vault of Heaven Astronomical Theories (Hungai tongxian tushuo) and other works; and they drafted versions of the Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas (Shanhai yudi quantu). All of this work indicated that Western knowledge, thought and belief had truly come to China. It was not until three hundred years later, however, in the second half of the nineteenth century, that the Western powers finally employed their new foreign knowledge, powerful ships and weapons, and trade and commercial relations to influence profoundly the world of traditional Chinese knowledge, thought and belief and led it to undergo tremendously great changes. The Tang dynasty very confidently called itself the Heavenly Empire, the Center of the World and the Great Country, but at least from the Northern Song on, the Chinese state and government slowly lost its self-confidence. In 1  Francis Xavier (1506–1552) was actually the first Jesuit to enter China, but he only entered Chinese territory briefly before his death in 1552; he had little influence on Chinese history. In the translations of titles and terms in this chapter, we have as far as possible followed those of Benjamin A. Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900, 2005.

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the face of powerful enemies, the ethnic state’s (minzu guojia) stance of shielding itself behind lofty ramparts was certainly reasonable. This position had its drawbacks though. It could easily alter the traditional Chinese openness and cause Chinese thought and culture to adopt a defensive and even isolationist posture. In stark contrast, when the Mongols entered Han Chinese territories and became the ruling group, they pursued a policy of cultural openness. Such a policy of cultural openness existed at least at the beginning of the Ming dynasty. For example, in 1402 the Yongle Emperor issued an edict that said: “Today the four seas are one family, and this is just the time to demonstrate that we do not treat outsiders differently. Anyone who comes from the various states to submit themselves and pay tributes to us, just let them be.”2 On the one hand this demonstrated a breadth of mind while on the other hand it positioned China as the leader of the world. This attitude can be considered quite open-minded.3 Unfortunately China gradually abandoned its global pursuits. Having just set foot in the wide world, it withdrew into itself, and the door that was once open to the world quietly closed, but it could not be completely closed. When the Western powers began to rely on their nautical technology and navigated across the ocean to the Ming empire, the context of Chinese knowledge and thought had already joined a multi-state world, an “age of ten thousand states.” From the middle of the sixteenth century, China’s international position was already rather awkward. In the face of the missionaries and their Western civilization, the Han Chinese concept of tianxia or “All under Heaven” was steadily undermined. Under various shocks from the greater world, China was in a process of transformation from being the center of “All under Heaven” to becoming merely one state (yi guo) in a multi-state world. At the same time China was being watched by powerful enemies on all sides and was invaded by the “Manchu barbarians” from the north, by the “Japanese barbarians” from the east and by the “western barbarians” from across the sea. In government, economics, knowledge, thought and belief, the symptoms of a very dangerous situation were already apparent. For the general intellectual world, these subtle and barely perceptible changes might not have meant much, but for more sensitive scholars these shifts in China’s situation left them with inner feelings that were very hard to articulate. From this time on, then, the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief silently and slowly underwent a profound transformation. Books 2  Ming Taizong shilu, j. 12 shang, 1024. 3  On this period, see Wang Gengwu, “Wubai nian qian de Zhongguo yu shijie,” Ershiyi shiji 1 (1990), 91–100.

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from foreign countries discussing Western methods of thought and practical technology entered the traditional Chinese intellectual world at the same time that many works describing the four frontiers also became available. All of these works exacerbated the sense of concern for possible crisis in the minds of China’s intellectual stratum, and made the Chinese vaguely aware that their world of knowledge, thought and belief was now in a difficult position— between becoming part of a multi-state world or defending their position as the center (Middle Kingdom) of a tianxia. In a country like China with a long historical tradition and a stubborn sense of self worth, there were usually two possible ways to respond to the coming of a different civilization. One was to adopt a superficial attitude of universalism. Although welcoming this seemingly unquestionable knowledge, thought and technology, by means of particular interpretations this new knowledge could be transformed into “ancient studies” and make the world blend into Chinese tradition. The other response was to adopt an attitude of particularism or exceptionalism and, by stirring up strong conservatism and intense nationalist sentiments, resolutely reject anything that could undermine and shake the foundations of China’s ancient knowledge, thought and belief. We know of course that the ancient Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief was embodied in a system that had undergone several bouts of integration and reintegration. The central element of this knowledge system was the concept that made up the Chinese understanding of the universe of time and space: “Heaven is round and Earth is square.” This concept was also the foundation of all authority, including political, intellectual and religious authority. Thus when the Chinese first came in contact with Western knowledge, the “study of Heaven (tianxue)” or astronomy quite naturally aroused their greatest interest. In China, however, where the ultimate foundation of their intellectual system was “the Way (Dao) of Heaven,” this new “study of tian” was most capable of undermining or even deconstructing their world of knowledge, thought and belief. This was because this Heaven (sky) of Western astronomy was precisely the Heaven of the Chinese view that “Heaven is round and Earth is square” that was intimately related to the rationale and reasonableness of the Chinese conceptions of proper human behavior (renlun), their intellectual system, and political power and authority. As just noted above, the Chinese intellectual stratum could either start ceremoniously employing the magic talismanic phrase that “Western learning originated in China” (xixue zhongyuan 西學中源) to maintain their cultural integrity and alleviate the psychological shock of the new knowledge by regarding this foreign civilization as one of only practical knowledge and technology, or they could violently reject this new knowledge by following a

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train of thought from mere “tools” (qi) to the “Way (Dao)” and from mere “function” (practical use, yong 用) to “substance” (ti 體). They could point out that this foreign civilization was a grave threat to traditional Chinese knowledge, thought and belief, and close the door on it in complete rejection. History, of course, has many variables. The change of dynasty from the Ming to the Qing may have been to some extent a historical rupture, but in terms of civilization, history simply continued on its way. Entering the seventeenth century, although the emperors in the Forbidden City had changed from Han Chinese to Manchus, the above mentioned two strategic positions vis-à-vis foreign knowledge had not changed, and with them China maintained a sense of serenity. From the seventeenth to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the deep recesses of the world of knowledge, thought and belief those elements of Western civilization that challenged and shocked China remained distant memories and furnished potential materials and background for new knowledge and thought that often stirred up troublesome waves. Just as Joseph R. Levenson wrote: “In large part the intellectual history of modern China has been the process of making guojia of tianxia.”4 We should say that this historical process had already begun during the Ming dynasty, but in the conceptual world it was not until the late Qing that the depth of the transformation became fully apparent. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the usually confident Chinese suddenly discovered that after making contact with Western civilization their very near neighbor to the east had transformed themselves from barbaric “Japanese pirates” (wokou) into a progressive nation. They had even become a formidable opponent that defeated the great Qing Empire in war and forced it to sign the humiliating treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. From then on China’s sense of serenity was gone and Chinese confidence in the entire edifice of their civilization disappeared. I consider the period from the sixteenth century to the last decades of the nineteenth—with 1895 as a symbolic marker—as a new era in Chinese intellectual history. After China joined the wider world or the wider world entered China in the sixteenth century, Chinese intellectual history had to take cognizance of global factors. First came the Western missionaries and the new knowledge they brought with them; then came the changes in Chinese culture brought about by the Europeans with their powerful warships and the commodity trading they forced upon the Chinese; finally, the Chinese had to think about Asia. Why was it that China and Japan, having entered the 4  Levenson, Joseph R., Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy, 1968, 103 with change to pinyin romanization. Levenson’s book also has a lengthy discussion of the ti-yong dichotomy and the difference between a tianxia and a guo in Chinese history.

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age of globalization from the same background, nevertheless wrote very different chapters in the history of the world? 1

Collapse of Heaven and Earth I: The Ancient Chinese Cosmic Order Encounters Western Astronomy

When the Chinese intellectual class first encountered Western civilization in the Ming and Qing dynasties, they frequently had an unusual reaction. They had quite different interpretive attitudes and patterns of acceptance in regard to the aspects of Western culture concerned with the state (guojia), society, and concepts of human ethics and morality in contrast to those concerned with the cosmos, nature, and scientific knowledge and technology. As a result, these two kinds of Western learning during the Ming and Qing had very different fates. Even though some rather more open-minded scholars like Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), Li Zhizao (1565–1630), Yang Tingyun (1557–1627), and so on approved of Western concepts of religious ethics and morality, it is worth noting that after being translated into Chinese these concepts were quite rapidly absorbed into traditional Confucian ethics.5 Roman Catholicism and the Western ideas behind it were rather quickly diluted and dissolved by scholars long steeped in Confucian history and the traditional ideas embodied in the Chinese language. Due to their systematic, precise, and practical nature, Western cosmological and scientific knowledge of nature was, however, very difficult to interpret and absorb into the traditional Chinese system of knowledge. As an alternative category of intellectual resources, this sort of knowledge, thus, presented an opportunity to penetrate and undermine the world of traditional Chinese thought. Western knowledge of “Heaven” and “Earth” was just one such very important category, and it should receive thorough treatment in Chinese intellectual history.

5  For example, Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe 艾儒略) translated “philosophy” as “lixue” 理學 or the study of li, principle in his Summary of Western Learning (Xixue fan 西學凡), see On Their Own Terms, 2005, 262–264; Alfonso Vagnoni (1566–1640) used the concepts of cultivating one’s self xiushen (修身), ordering one’s family (qijia 齊家), regulating the state (zhiguo 治國) and bringing peace to All under Heaven (ping tianxia 平天下) in his translation of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; Johann Adam Schall (1592–1666) and Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688) both used “extension of knowledge” (zhishi 致知) as the title for books about Western learning.

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1.1 As repeatedly mentioned above, in ancient China the idea that Heaven is round and the Earth is square was an extremely important foundational concept. It made it possible for various fields of thought in ancient China to maintain in their inner logic a harmonious order and similar thinking. It also provided an overall explanation that could link all of these areas together and had a powerful influence on the ancient Chinese people’s mode of thinking, extending into all areas of ordinary life. Everyone accepted the same cosmological theory: space was a concentric circle extending outward in ring after ring; the round Heaven (sky) revolved around the North Pole in a circular orbit; the Earth, then, was a square in the shape of the character jing 井 or ya 亞; Heaven and Earth both had a fixed central point that transcended space and time; this eternally unmoving central point, the center of the concentric circle, was the North Pole and also the spirit or god of the Great Unity (taiyi zhi shen 太一之神), or a symbol of the Dao (Way). These cosmological concepts were extended by analogy to every other sphere of knowledge and thought. As the foundation of the ancient Chinese intellectual world, this cosmological order could give rise to various concrete conceptions, apparatuses and techniques as well as various ideas and beliefs including even esthetic feelings. In his A Study of History, Arnold J. Toynbee noted this ancient Chinese cosmological “order” and basically described (without using the usual terminology) the “resonance” or “correspondence” theory “that the affairs of the cosmos, society and humanity necessarily constituted a mutually interconnected and mutually interacting whole.”6 When we study philosophical writings, however, we generally regard “Heaven” as an ontological, political or mythological concept. This is basically correct, but we need to take note of the fact that above and in the background of these concepts there is also a more fundamental knowledge of celestial bodies. This cosmological idea that “Heaven is constant and unchanging, and the Dao is also constant and unchanging” (Tian bubian, Dao ye bubian) was basically unchallenged throughout the more than a thousand years from the Han to Ming. Even though during and after the Song dynasty, the intellectual stratum was increasingly interested in discussions on how to improve their inner being and moral self-awareness, ideas about Heaven were never seriously challenged in the theories of virtually all thinkers.7 The 6  Ge Zhaoguang, An Intellectual History of China, Volume One, 2014, 246. Toynbee’s remarks are in the Chinese translation of the abbreviated version of Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History: Lishi yanjiu《历史研究》 , vol. 2 of 3, 1966, 324. 7  As John B. Henderson puts it, Chinese cosmological thinking from the Han to the Ming was a “premodern mode of thought” the impact of which was “manifest in most of the arts and

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Persian-speaking astronomer Jamal ad-Din (fl. 1250s) brought new astronomical and geographic knowledge into China in the mid-thirteenth century during the Yuan dynasty, but the new ideas about Heaven (the sky) were not widely transmitted at the time. The intellectual foundations of these new ideas were not discussed; questions concerning the relations between the calendar and the legitimacy of the imperial dynasty were especially not brought up, and all this was soon forgotten.8 This situation changed very greatly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During this period, Western astronomical knowledge and apparatuses, at least in their conclusive observations and experiments, were already fully capable of overturning traditional Chinese cosmology. Relying on geometrical crosssections, Western science was able to produce a sundial that surpassed the accuracy of traditional Chinese sundials. Western telescopes made possible observations of the surface relief of the moon and the satellites of Jupiter, all the more conclusively demonstrating the earth’s relationship to the celestial bodies. The orrery, a mechanical model of the movements of the solar system, was of course also constructed on the basis of an overall Western theory of the cosmos. In the Ming dynasty after the arrival of Western missionaries, the new Western cosmological theories gradually came into China. In 1584, Matteo Ricci’s Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas introduced further explanations of the spherical nature of the earth. Ricci realized that this idea was at variance with Chinese conceptions and he tried to minimize any conflict that such differences might bring about. Nevertheless, since the Western conceptions transformed the earth that the Chinese had always held to be a square into a sphere and proclaimed that the sky (heaven) above that the Chinese always believed rotated around the earth was really a vast motionless space, conflict between the new and the old knowledge was unavoidable. With the influx of Western knowledge, then, the traditional Chinese conceptions of “Heaven” and “Earth” faced serious problems. sciences, most conspicuously in medicine, alchemy, astrology, and the various divinatory sciences, but also in such purely orthodox branches of learning as official historiography, literary criticism, Neo-Confucian philosophy, and mathematical astronomy.” The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology, 1984, xiv. 8  “Tianwen zhi,” YS, j. 48, 998–999 records that in 1267 Khubilai Qaghan, the first emperor of the Yuan (r. 1260–1294) had a [model of the] celestial globe (diqiuyi 地球儀) constructed and “it was a round ball made of wood, seven parts water, green in color, and three parts earth, white in color; on it was painted rivers, lakes and the seas all connected together; the picture [of these rivers, lakes and the seas] was in the shape of a small square well which could be used to calculate the vastness of the round shape [of the globe] and the closeness and distance of the roads.”

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There is no doubt that the missionaries who came to China at that time were primarily interested in proselytizing their Christian religion, but the greatest cultural conflicts came rather from Western astronomical and geographical concepts. Ever since 1593 when the Dominican Fray Juan Cobo (1529–?) published the first Chinese language work, Testimony of the True Religion (Bian zhengjiao zhenchuan shilu), and then many other publications were produced, such as Structure and Meanings of the Heaven and Earth (Qiankun tiyi, 1605), Astronomical Instruments (Jianpingyi shuo, 1611), On the Gnomon (Biaodu shuo, 1614), and so on, they all brought various kinds of new astronomical and geographical knowledge into China. The most troubling of the new ideas was the assertion that the earth “is spherical and not square.” 1.2 Western missionaries continually entered China after Matteo Ricci. In a few decades they revealed to the Chinese a startlingly new and different civilization.9 Copernicus’ heliocentric theory, the Western view of the spherical earth, and Roman Catholic theology all entered China at that time, and the most shocking thing they had to tell the Chinese was that their cosmological idea that “Heaven is round and Earth is square” was mistaken. The idea that the heavens did not move but the earth rotated sent shock waves through the Chinese world. Since the rationality of China’s entire intellectual world was founded on these traditional cosmological concepts of time and space, when this world view was shaken by Western ideas, the traditional Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief began to fall like dominoes.10 In historical studies of relations between the Ming and Qing and foreign countries, many scholars have paid attention to the open conflict between Chinese thought and ideology and the metaphysical concept of “Heaven” and the “Lord of Heaven” (tianzhu) as the Roman Catholic Godhead. They have not considered very much, however, the potential significance to the Chinese intellectual world of the transformations of heaven, or the heavens (and 9  In his 1623 preface to Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe)’s Geografia dei paesi stranieri alla Cina (Zhifang waiji), Li Zhizao wrote that when seven thousand Western books entered China “we wanted to place them in the Imperial Palace Library in order to join [participate in] the scholarship of the sages and the worthies from both the East and the West.” The socalled “to join the scholarship of the sages and the worthies from both the East and the West” actually implied an acceptance of foreign civilization and comparison of the differences between them. See Xie Fang, Zhifang waiji jiaoshi, chapter one. 10  I deal only with Heaven in this section and will discuss questions regarding Earth in the next section.

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earth too) as natural phenomena. On the surface, it would seem that theories about the celestial bodies and calendrical science were very well received by Chinese scholars at the time, but “Heaven,” “Lord of Heaven” and the theological concept of “Heaven” (tiantang) in Western religious thought were actually in direct conflict with Chinese thought. This still did not mean, however, that theories about the celestial bodies and calendrical science could not influence the Chinese conceptual world. As I stated above, because traditional Chinese ideas about time and space that derived from observations and conceptualizations of Heaven (the sky) were most likely the basis of Chinese knowledge, they constituted the most unshakable foundational concepts. Chinese knowledge and thought was built upon this foundation from the Han dynasty on. Whether it was Heaven as a natural phenomenon or a philosophical concept or a mythological entity, they were all consistent and mutually supporting ideas, and so they said “Heaven is constant and unchanging, and the Dao is also constant and unchanging.” If one fine day, though, Western astronomy came along and suddenly told the Chinese about their new knowledge; told them that the idea of Heaven and Earth as the center (of the cosmos) that they had always believed in was not true because they were not the center; told them that Heaven did not fit like a cap over the earth and the apparent leftward movement of the celestial bodies was due to the clockwise rotation of the earth; told them that the earth was not in the center of the four seas, but there were oceans only directly to the east and in the southeast, and so there was no symmetry and no harmony, and so on …, upon receiving this information, Chinese thought would be thrown into chaos. In the Chinese history of ideas, this was the most significant “collapse of Heaven and Earth.” Let us first examine Matteo Ricci’s ideas. Ricci used calendrical time differences, eclipses of the sun and moon, and his experiences travelling around the world to illustrate the spherical nature of the earth. According to Ricci’s explanations, today’s heaven and earth are no longer the “Heaven” and “Earth” of the Chinese. In fact, there were actually people who were “standing up on the other side of the earth from China!” This sort of new knowledge immediately elicited shocked astonishment and curiosity. The concept of a “spherical earth,” the observations that Jupiter has four satellite moons, that Venus exhibits phases like the Moon, that the Milky Way is made up of a collection of stars, and so on were all transmitted into China at this time.11 All of this seems to have steadily changed the nature of “Heaven” for the Chinese. 11  Fang Hao, “Jialilüe yu kexue chuanru woguo zhi guanxi,” Fang Hao wenlu, 1948, 289–290.

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In a few decades, these ideas became quiet popular, even becoming known to government officials. During the chongzhen reign period (1628–1644), with the support of Xu Guangqi and other scholars, the Chongzhen Emperor commissioned the compilation of the Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen Reign (Chongzhen lishu) that included a series of translations of astronomical theories. It incorporated the system of movement of the celestial bodies (the solar system) and the theories of the structure of the cosmos of Claudius Ptolemy (90–168) and Tycho Brahe (1546–1601). Then the Polish mathematician Jan Nicolas Smogulecki (1611–1656) translated works on Western astronomy, and in 1644 his student Xue Fengzuo (1600–1680) incorporated them into his Synthesis of Mathematical Astronomy (Lixue huitong). Not only were scholars like Xu Guangqi and Li Zhizao who associated closely with the missionaries convinced by the ideas that “Heaven and Earth are spherical bodies,” but even Li Zhi also wrote On the Four Seas (Sihai shuo) in which he admitted that there were no oceans to the west, north or south of China, but only to the east and the southeast.12 This caused such traditional ideas as the three sacred islands and ten sacred continents (sandao shizhou 三島十洲), the four barbarians’ (siyi 四夷) lands that surround and protect China, and the idea of China as the center of the world (tianxia) all to lose their foundations. Chinese at that time accepted this new knowledge partly on the basis of historical memory and partly on the basis of experience. Some marginalized ancient Chinese resources actually lent themselves then to the acceptance of Western learning. Here are a few examples: Xiong Mingyu (1601 jinshi) remembered the legend that Qibo, the Yellow Emperor’s teacher, once said that “the Earth is in the middle of Heaven, and the Great Qi (vital energy of the universe) holds it up (di zai tian zhong, da qi ju zhi, 地在天中，大氣舉之)”; Yang Tingyun recalled the story in the ancient Chuci that raised a question: “where is the border of Heaven and Earth? The Confucian scholars, however, could not answer.” Li Zhizao also recalled many allegorical fables in ancient texts such as the Basic Questions (Suwen, part of the Huangdi Neijing), The Gnomon of the Zhou Dynasty and Classic of Computations (Zhoubi suanjing) and even the Zhuangzi.13

12  For example, in his “Ti wanguo erhuantu xu,” Xu Guangqi employed different methods to prove the idea that “heaven and earth are spherical bodies.” 13  Xiong Minyu, “Biaodushuo xu,” Tianxue chuhan, 1986, ce 5, 2527; Yang Tingyun, “Zhifang waiji xu,” Tianxue chuhan, ce 3, 1287; Li Zhizao “Tianzhu shiyi chongke xu,” Tianxue chuhan, ce 1, 356.

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Some people’s personal experiences also started to convince them that the Western theories were actually very reasonable. Not only did their cosmological views and their earth science receive support from the movement of the stars and navigational measurements, but their new knowledge of astronomical phenomena received particular verification in the field of calendrical calculation that was most important to the Chinese court. Having been verified in these ways, this new knowledge became accepted by and spread throughout the scholar-official class. The successful calculation of the lunar eclipse of November 19, 1630 was a singular event that probably made a very deep impression on these scholar-officials. That calculation proved the accuracy of Western calendrical science, and that accuracy caused many Chinese to accept this foreign knowledge; the propagation of this knowledge among the educated elite faced much less opposition after that. In 1629 with the Chongzhen Emperor’s permission, many high officials joined the Imperial Astronomical Bureau and began the large-scale translation of European astronomical theories, and by 1634 the highly influential Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen Reign was completed; there was no time for it to be widely disseminated due to the imminent fall of the Ming, but it had a profound influence in later years. From the Wanli era (1573–1619) on, the spread and acceptance of this new knowledge proceeded in a tranquil environment. We can see from various literary sources that many people, including the Wanli Emperor himself and highly educated and cultured scholars responsible for the interpretation of Chinese cultural traditions, were very interested in the ideas and techniques of the Europeans. I have particularly observed, however, that these Chinese scholars who lived their lives steeped in traditional Chinese civilization and who had a highly developed sense of cultural superiority, still maintained two distinct attitudes toward this new Western knowledge and practiced two different methods of response. One method was to adopt the very widespread theory that “Western learning originated in China” and consider all of this new knowledge as having historical roots in China. This both satisfied the Chinese feeling of self-confidence and also gave the new knowledge an air of reasonableness. The second response was to regard this Western knowledge of “the heavens” as merely ordinary calendrical measurements and calculations, and thus separating it off from traditional Chinese intellectual theories of “Heaven.” When discussing this new knowledge, the Chinese could limit their acceptance to techniques of purely practical use. They would then say that although it was good for acquiring knowledge, it could not lead to an understanding of underlying principles. As soon as this “new knowledge” from abroad began to conflict with traditional China’s “old knowledge,” then that “old knowledge” began to resist, and

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not simply because of nationalistic pride. Matteo Ricci once complained that “the Chinese consider all foreigners to be ignorant barbarians … they think it is beneath their dignity to learn anything from the writings of foreigners.14 The situation was really not so simple. Because this foreign knowledge was so incompatible with ancient Chinese thought, scholars steeped in that thought could not accept, understand, and interpret this novel and, as they believed, rather bizarre knowledge. Many people at that time began to take a stand of intense resistance and to call into question the heliocentric and spherical earth theories. The learned scholar Zhu Guozhen (1557–1632), for example, argued against these ideas on the basis of the traditional Chinese cosmology.15 The Buddhist leader Zhu Hong (1535–1615) also refuted the Western missionary cosmology by reference to Buddhist conceptions of “Heaven.”16 Slightly later the noted Confucian scholar Liu Zongzhou (1578–1645) continued to employ the “round Heaven, square Earth” idea to demonstrate his moral ideals.17 In his Records of Thoughts and Questions: Outer Section (Siwenlu wai­ pian), the most celebrated scholar of the Ming-Qing transition period, Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), used his own personal experience to refute Matteo Ricci’s experience and relied on common sense experience to ridicule Ricci’s new knowledge as “wild and foolish.”18 Even some of those who accepted Western cosmological ideas, did not necessarily completely accept their fundamental principles. Besides the problem of seeking a uniform interpretation of Chinese and Western knowledge and thought, another obstacle to the acceptance of new knowledge was the old concept of the difference between “barbarians and Chinese” (yi 夷 and xia 夏). For example, although official calendar-making could employ the new Western knowledge, as soon as Western astronomy was seen to cause the Chinese to lose face, it would certainly be restricted. From the Wanli (1573–1619), Tianqi (1621–1627) and Chongzhen (1628–1644) reigns of the Ming through the Shunzhi (1644–1662) and Kangxi (1661– 1722) reigns of the Qing, Western implements such as celestial globes, armillary spheres, sun dials, and telescopes continually entered China, even being used at court as well as employed and very much liked by the Chinese intellectual elite. This employment and enjoyment always remained, however, in the concrete material domain of implements or apparatuses (qi) and never 14   Li Madou (Matteo Ricci) Zhongguo zhaji, 1983, j. 1, chapter 9, 94. 15  Zhu Guozhen, Yongchuang xiaopin, 1998, j. 16. 16  “Tianshuo yi,” in Tianxue chuhan, ce 2, 652. 17  “Jishan xue-an,” Mingru xue-an, j. 62, quotes his Daxue zabian. 18  Wang Fuzhi, Siwenlu waipian, in Chuanshan quanshu, ce 12, 460.

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rose to the lofty metaphysical level of fundamental principles or the Way (Dao). It most certainly was not allowed to influence the government, power, or the ideology of the state. As soon as Western astronomy threatened to disturb the traditional Chinese cosmic order, it would definitely come in for fierce criticism. A late Ming work, the Collection Exposing Heterodoxy (Shengchao poxie ji), included two interesting articles. The first, a report of a late Ming legal trial, is entitled an “Announcement on Apprehending an Evil Faction” (Nahuo xiedang hou gaoshi). It states that the foreigners from across the sea are deliberately offending China’s criminal laws, secretly storing astronomical instruments and fabricating theories about the “seven rulers” (qizheng 七政, five stars plus the Sun and Moon,) and seven layers of “Heaven” (qichong tian 七重天). All of this amounts to “holding up the celestial bodies in order to smash them to pieces.” If things went on that way, the author asked, “could anything under Heaven not be turned upside-down and confused by these lies?” The other piece, written by one Zhang Guangtian (fl. 1620), is entitled “A Summary of Ways to Ward off Heresy” (Bixie zhaiyao lüeyi). He writes that Western astronomy encourages the Chinese “privately to study astronomy and forge their own counterfeit calendars” (that is, calendars not approved by the state). The study of Western astronomy will cause the people “to destroy the Way of (the sage kings) Yao and Shun.19 Why would Western astronomical knowledge turn everything under Heaven upside-down, confuse people, and cause them to destroy the Dao of Yao and Shun? Because the “Heaven” that astronomy studied in China was the symbol of imperial power and authority, and Chinese astronomy still supported the cosmic order that the Chinese had believed in for several thousand years. If this cosmic order was destroyed, not only would the power and authority of the state lose its foundational support but the order of the intellectual world would also crumble. In China, astronomy was not only the science of “implements.” It was the foundation of the eternal Way (Dao). If the “implements” changed, the Dao would have to change, and if the Dao changed, Heaven would change with it. The results of these changes would not become fully apparent until several centuries later, but already at this time the Dao of China could not avoid changing.

19  Xu Changzhi, ed., Shengchao poxie ji, j. 2, 5, Xia Guiqi collated edition, 117 & 203.

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1.3 All sorts of Western knowledge and ideas entered China during the Ming and Qing, and the majority of that knowledge that the Chinese accepted was not far from the most advanced Western ideas. These Western ideas had the potential to deconstruct the traditional Chinese intellectual system, including not only Chinese concepts of “Heaven” and other celestial phenomena but also Chinese concepts of “Earth” and geographical knowledge as well as other forms of knowledge. If the “Heaven” that Matteo Ricci spoke of was only part of the study of celestial phenomena, that might be the end of it; as soon as Ricci went slightly beyond that, his ideas could give rise to disputes about ultimate questions. When he went on talking, however, the subject of Heaven and Earth definitely “returning to the One” would then come under even more scrutiny. What after all is the “One” that forms the ultimate foundation of all knowledge?20 Consider the case of the Western theory of the four elements. Superficially the Western earth, air, fire and water seemed to be analogous to the Chinese Five Phases of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. Since these two views “were intimately connected to the inception of a world view, ideas about the human spirit (soul) and the transformations of the ten thousand phenomena (the material world),” the Western four elements theory and the Chinese Five Phases theory were, however, bound to come into conflict. Matteo Ricci once borrowed the Chinese scholars’ ti-yong dichotomy and asserted that the “four elements” are the essence (ti) of the Five Phases, and the Five Phases are the practical application (yong) of the “four elements.” Following this logic, Western learning would become the essence and Chinese learning would become of practical use only, and the traditional position of Qian and Kun (Heaven and Earth in the Classic of Changes) would be turned upside-down.21 20  See Map of the Myriad Countries on the Earth (Carta Geografica Completa di tutti i Regni del Mondo, Kunyu Quantu, zhongxiabu) compiled by Matteo Ricci and several Chinese collaborators. This is why some people criticized Ricci and his collaborators, saying that they “intended to change and disturb the greatest rules and norms that had been passed down since the sage kings Yao and Shun. Are they upholding the norms as the way of Heaven? Or are they simply ignorant about the way of Heaven?” “Can yuan yi shu,” in Xu Changzhi, ed., Shengchao poxie ji, j. 1, 61. 21  In the Chinese scholar’s version of the ti-yong dichotomy, Chinese learning was the “essence” (ti) of Chinese society and Western learning was to be employed only for “practical application” (yong).” Siyuan xinglun,” Qiankun tiyi, j. shang, “Siyuan xinglun,” SKQS edition, 10A–12B.  Responses to the Western theory of four elements was somewhat complicated. Some missionaries, like the Jesuit Alfonso Vagnoni, tried to reconcile the Chinese and Western

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There were of course some scholars who still wanted to accept Western knowledge. Perhaps this was in the first place because they were sincerely pleased by this “practical and useful” knowledge and were, therefore, also willing to accept the reasonableness of the intellectual system that supported it. Their acceptance of this kind of knowledge logically led them to believe in the fundamental principles of Western learning. For example, when Xu Guangqi reflected on his intellectual association with Matteo Ricci, he said that Western missionaries not only possessed a religion that could “supplement Confucianism, Buddhism and the Daoist Religion,” but they also possessed “a form of learning that embodied the investigation of things and the exhaustive investigation of principle (gewu qiongli 格物窮理).”22 We know that the “principle” (li) of ancient China is something that could not easily be used to describe other people or thoughts. Ever since the Song dynasty, “principle” was tianli, the “Principle of Heaven,” the ultimate foundation of everything. If Western astronomical knowledge is not only for “practical application” (yong) but also partakes of the “essence” (ti), and is not only so much “skill or technique” ( ji 技) but also possesses “principle” (li), then could ancient Chinese knowledge and thought any longer be able to have a monopoly on “principle” to support all of its traditional “knowledge”? During the Ming and Qing dynasties, Chinese scholars seem to have had only the two strategies mentioned above to respond to the influx of Western knowledge: regard it as originating in China or reject it completely. These two strategies grew out of a psychological feeling that they had no other alternatives. During the five plus centuries of Ming and Qing history, Sino-Western cultural interaction went back and forth between these two responses. If we examine these Chinese responses without employing our contemporary scientific attitude, however, but with an empathetic understanding of the background of their thinking from the point of view of intellectual history, how then should we interpret this Chinese frame of mind?23 view. Some Chinese scholars, like Xiong Mingyu, Fang Kongzhao (1590–1655) and Fang Yizhi, accepted the Western view and began to doubt the traditional Chinese Five Phases view. Of course some Chinese scholars simply affirmed the Five Phases and opposed the four elements theory; this would lead to disputes about the reasonableness of the foundations of the Chinese cosmology. 22  “Taixi shuifa xu,” in Xu Guangqi ji, j. 2, 66. 23  Just as “Hua Xia zhi jian” in Zhong-Xi jishi has it, Yang Guangxian’s argument with Western missionaries about astronomy was not really about the accuracy of their “measurements” (tuibu 推步). It was rather that “what Guangxian attacked about Western methods was not that they were new methods; he spoke of Mencius rejecting Yang Zhu and Mozi, for fear that people would have no father and no lord.” This position that would seem very

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If we revisit the Chinese intellectual world of that time, we will indeed encounter an anxious state of mind and feelings that they had very few choices. Even if a portion of educated Chinese and scholar-officials had a favorable opinion of the missionaries’ knowledge of astronomy, calendrical science, physics and mathematics, nevertheless, this learning could only survive when limited to the scope of technological “tools” (qi) and “practical applications” (yong); it could not go beyond those limitations. This was because as soon as those “tools” or “implements” became too formidable and impinged on the foundations of the Dao, or those “practical applications” were employed too extensively so as to threaten the entire logic of the Chinese way of thinking— the Chinese “essence” (ti)—conflicts would inevitably arise. At this point, an age of the “collapse of Heaven and Earth” could certainly begin. 2

Collapse of Heaven and Earth II: “All under Heaven,” “China,” and the “Four Barbarians” as Depicted in Ancient Chinese Maps of the World

In 1584 (the Wanli Emperor’s twelfth year), Matteo Ricci had printed in Guangdong the Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas. This was the first map of the world printed in China that was drafted according to Western cartographical views.24 The important significance of this map from the point of view of intellectual history is that it transformed the Chinese traditional image of the world. First, on this map the world is no longer flat; it is spherical. Second, China is no longer the center of the world; it is rather one of many other countries randomly distributed around a spherical world. Third, China no longer occupies the greater part of the map and the four barbarians (siyi) are no longer just a disorderly group of small states on four sides of China. It turns out that there are a great many more or less equivalent countries in the vast world. Although the original of this map has been lost, many more maps based on this one were printed throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The new view of the world presented in this map steadily undermined the traditional Chinese views of “All under Heaven” (tianxia), “China” conservative to us today really well describes the focus of the polemics of that time. Ge Shirui, “Yangwu shiyi,” Qingdai jingshiwen xubian, j.111, 6A. 24  For information on the Shanhai yudi quantu, see Hong Ye (William Hong), “Kao Li Madou (Matteo Ricci) de shijie ditu,” in Hong Ye lunxue ji, 1981, 150–193. Western celestial globes had an influence on Chinese thought similar to this world map, but I am only concentrating here on the maps.

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(Zhongguo as a Middle Kingdom) and the “four barbarian lands” on China’s borders. In China, ideas about the structure of space and time in the heavens and on earth, about the positions of the center and the periphery, and about the relative size of various regions were not simply questions of geography. In the first place, the ancient Chinese view that “Heaven is round and the Earth is square” was not just a natural description of space and time in the cosmos. Through an entire system of linking metaphors and symbols, these ideas had come to constitute the ultimate foundation of the reasonableness of everything in Heaven and on Earth. If this system was undermined, then the reasonableness of almost everything in the human world would also lose its ultimate foundation. The hitherto unalterable truths of Chinese government, culture, and beliefs would have to be closely examined anew. Secondly, even though the ancient Chinese long ago understood that the world was very large and they already had a sense of the difference in size between the tianxia (the whole world) and China (Han lands), their actual idea of the tianxia, even down to the Ming dynasty, was still the “nine continents” of the “Tribute of Great Yu” (Yu Gong) chapter of the Book of Documents. When people thought of the entire inhabited world, the most natural picture that came into their minds was still China in the center with the four barbarians (Eastern Yi, Western Rong, Northern Di and Southern Man) surrounding it. Finally, although from the Han dynasty on, the Chinese were deeply aware of threats from their borders and understood the territoriality of their ethnic nationality (minzu) and their state (guojia), nevertheless when they were really oppressed and became painfully aware that China no longer dominated the world as a tianxia, this awareness led to the activation of a kind of Sinocentric or nationalistic thought. The curious but obstinate idea of China as the center of a tianxia was most unequivocally displayed in ancient Chinese maps of the world and formed the universal memory and knowledge of the Chinese people. This view did not change until the introduction of Matteo Ricci’s map of the world in the Ming dynasty. 2.1 Chinese cartography began very early on and was technically quite well developed. Ever since the Han dynasty the Chinese had quite a bit of knowledge about “the world” from the Roman Empire (Da Qin) to Japan (derogatorily known as the land of dwarfs, woguo 倭國). Even though the geographical knowledge of the ancient Chinese already extended to all of contemporary Asia and beyond, before the sixteenth century they customarily interpreted and pictured the world from the cultural or civilizational point of view. The

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Chinese still believed that the tianxia within the four seas was a space in which the vast land of China was centrally located and surrounded by innumerable small barbarian states.25 In the ancient Chinese mind those barbarian states were on the margins of the tianxia, and any other places that were not in their field of vision were naturally not even included in the scope of the tianxia. The adoption of the tianxia was of course related to the ancient Chinese knowledge and experience of the world. This was also supported by their conception of cosmic space and time. For example, the popular ancient concept of fenye 分野 or field-allocation is a case in point; that is, associating the constellations or celestial regions with a corresponding terrestrial region. Any excess regions were simply regarded as “small states that envy us” and never included in the civilized world of China’s tianxia. It is said that before Pei Xiu (224–271) of the Jin dynasty drafted his Map of the Regions in the “Tributes of Yu” (Yu Gong diyu tu), he possessed a “Great Map of All under Heaven” (Tianxia datu), but we cannot be sure what it was actually like. When Jia Dan (730–805) drafted his World Map of Chinese and Barbarians (Hainei hua yi tu) during the Tang dynasty (in 801), he himself wrote that “the first mention of China comes from the ‘Tributes of Yu,’ while the origin of the external barbarians is first cited in Ban Gu’s History of the Former Han Dynasty.” It would seem that he still maintained the traditional tianxia conception of the world. We can also see from various Song and Yuan dynasty maps still extant that, although the people of that time had a great deal more practical geographical knowledge than previous ages, they were still a long way from understanding the idea that “ten thousand nations are scattered around the world.”26 Besides maps, another source of information about foreign states in ancient China, were the many pictorial descriptions of envoys from tribute states and other foreign personages, such as the Paintings of Presentations of Tributes 25  “Jia Dan zhuan,” JTS, j. 138, 3785–3786, records that Jia Dan “loved geography. Every time when envoys from the four barbarian regions came to court or Tang envoys returned from those areas, he would exchange with them asking about the details of the mountains, rivers, and lands in those areas.” He subsequently drew a map of those areas with the title of Map of Chinese and Barbarians Within the Four Seas (Hainei Hua Yi tu). When presenting this map to the throne, he said in his memorial that the “Tribute of Great Yu” (Yu Gong) first used the term Middle Kingdom while the term outer barbarians originated in Ban Gu’s history (i.e., the History of the Former Han Dynasty). They use prefectures and counties to record the increase and decrease of these units while barbarian tribes were used to describe their rise and decline.” This would seem to still be the traditional tianxia concept of space and time. 26  The phrase “ten thousand nations are scattered around the world” is from Lü Wen (772– 811)’s “Preface” to the “Tianwen zhi shang,” in the Jinshu.

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(Zhigong tu), Paintings of Imperial Audience (Wanghui tu) and Presentation of Tributes to the Imperial Court (Chaogong tu).27 The oldest of these is said to be the Paintings of Presentations of Tributes of Emperor Yuan of the Liang (Xiao Yi, 508–554).28 It is said to have pictured more than thirty foreign envoys. According to Emperor Yuan himself, “the official Zhifang is in charge of the maps of All under Heaven, including all the barbarians from the four neighbouring regions, the nine northern sections, and the seven southern sections of the Fujian region.” This could also be considered a kind of picture of the world. From these images, however, people still could not derive any broader idea of the world because they were only images of countries that presented tribute to the Chinese emperor. Chinese knowledge of foreign lands was undoubtedly derived from communication with them, but the most important source of Chinese understanding was cultural interaction. Differences in levels of civilization gave the Chinese people a much more profound and enduring impression than the presence or lack of material products. Only when the entrance of elements of a foreign civilization shocked China’s native culture were the Chinese forced to realize that there were other civilizations in the world. Only at that point was the concept of tianxia (the whole world) stretched beyond the previous concept of huaxia (ancient China), Sinocentrism (Zhongguo zhongxin) displaced, and the Chinese picture of the world transformed. In this context, it is worthwhile to consider the significance in Chinese intellectual history of the Buddhist conception of the world. Before the arrival of Roman Catholicism, only Buddhism and the Indian civilization behind it had been able to deliver a great shock to Chinese culture and make the Chinese re-assess their own civilization. From Xie Lingyun and Liu Feng (?–200 CE)’s comparisons of Chinese and Indian cultures,29 to Faxian (337–ca. 422) and Xuanzang (ca. 602–664)’s travels to India to collect Buddhist sûtras, we can see some rare instances of a Chinese lack of sufficient cultural self-confidence. In 27  The oldest Zhigong tu passed down was a Tang copy of that of Emperor Yuan of the Liang; somewhat later examples are the Huang Qing Zhigong tu in the SKQS and the Zhigong tu by Xie Sui in the Qianlong era (1735–1796). 28  “Yuandi benji” in the Liangshu, j. 5, calls it Gongzhi tu, while the Yiwen leiju, j. 55 calls it the Gongzhi tu in quotations from Emperor Yuan’s preface, but uses Zhigong tu xu for the title. 29  Xie Lingyun and Liu Feng’s comparisons of Indian and Chinese language and beliefs highlighted the differences between the two cultures. For the Xie Lingyun material, see “Bianzong lun,” Guang Hong ming ji, j. 20, 169, SBBY edition; for Liu Feng and his “Neiwai pangtong bijiao shufa,” see Xu Gaoseng zhuan, j. 2, Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing, j. 50, 436.

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Zong Bing’s lament in his Essay Explaining Buddhism (Ming Fo lun) that the superior men ( junzi) of China cannot “understand the human heart,” we can also see that in the world of ideas the central position of Chinese civilization was at least wavering.30 It was just at such a period of modest wavering, that another civilization could come into prominence and, as it came into prominence, the territory of this civilization was no longer a dependent or subordinate entity in a world dominated by China. It was no longer an insignificant barbarian state, but rather a country at least as civilized as China. At that point, the “tianxia” was no longer the center, and All under Heaven was no longer a concentric circle of clearly defined areas one after another radiating out one after another from China at the center. Perhaps non-Buddhist Chinese still could not accept this map of civilization, but Buddhist monks had to acknowledge the existence of this configuration of space and time. Thus when Song dynasty monks drafted the General Record of Buddhist Masters (Fozu tongji) with twelve scrolls of appended charts, and the three-scroll “Geography of Eastern China” (Dong Zhendan dili tu), “Map of the Various States of the Han’s Western Regions” (Han Xiyu zhuguo tu), and “Map of India in the West” (Xitu Wuyin zhi tu), they structured the world in three parts. During the Song and Yuan dynasties, some scholars probably came to accept this conception, but, unfortunately, there were very few Chinese who were able to separate cultural China (wenhua Zhongguo) from geographical China and admit that China occupied only one small part of the geographical world; so this minority thinking soon disappeared. From the Song through the Ming, even though there was vast territorial expansion in the Yuan, Zheng He (1371–1433) made his magnificent journeys to the Western Ocean (xia xiyang, 下西洋), and Chinese practical knowledge of the world had increased quite a bit, the narratives accompanying the maps continued to repeat the traditional conception of the world. The only exception was the “Honil Gangni Yeokdae Gukdo Ji Do” (or “Kangnido” Hunyi jiangli lidai guodu zhi tu) drafted in 1402, supposedly on the basis of Yuan dynasty geographical knowledge.31 Influenced by Islamic geography, it embraced the world from Japan in the east to Europe in the west and included the Arabian Peninsula and over half of Africa. Nevertheless, the narrative accompanying the graphic representations was still “the spread of Chinese civilization”—the four barbarians are still on the margins of Chinese civilization, China is still depicted as at the center of the world and occupying more than two thirds of the tri-part tianxia—the traditional Chinese view still predominates. 30   Hong ming ji, j. 2, 17. 31  This map is now in Ryûkoku University in Kyôto Japan.

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2.2 When Matteo Ricci’s map of the world appeared in sixteenth-century Ming China, it should be said that it offered another opportunity to change the Chinese view of the world. According to Ricci’s picture of the world, ancient China’s conceptions of the so-called “All under Heaven,” “China” (Middle Kingdom), and the “Four Barbarian Lands” were about to be thoroughly undermined because, to quote Yang Tingyun, “it [the world]” was “all a big circle, without beginning or end, and without center or periphery.”32 It is somewhat strange that when Ricci’s map of the world appeared, several Ming intellectuals very quickly accepted this new picture of the world. Besides those who directly assisted Ricci in printing his map, many very influential scholars like Li Zhi, Feng Yingjing (1555–1606), Xie Zhaozhe (1567–1624) and, a little later, the erudite Fang Yizhi (1611–1671) and others all cited with approval this new theory of world geography.33 We can particularly understand the widespread influence of this new view of the world on Chinese knowledge, thought and belief from the number of printings of such maps and their numerous readers. Furthermore many leishu (類書) encyclopedias, usually taken to be purveyors of general knowledge, also included these types of maps of the world. In addition to this, after Matteo Ricci, the Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office (Zhifang waiji) of Giulio Aleni (1582–1649) was published in 1623, and its front section contained a Complete Map of the Myriad Countries (Wanguo quantu).34 Li Zhizao’s preface to Aleni’s Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office, written in 1623, most clearly records the process by which these scholars came to recognize this new view of the world and the shock this new knowledge gave to China. He wrote that during the Wanli era, when he first saw Ricci’s “complete map of the great world with its drawings of border lines and gradations of measurement all very clear,” he was astonished, but, after repeatedly making his own measurements, he discovered that the Chinese cartographical tradition was really very crude. After admitting that traditional Chinese geography was inferior to Western geography, he went on to describe what a 32  Yang Tingyun, “Zhifang waiji xu,” attached at the beginning of Ai Rulüe (Giulio Aleni), Zhifang waiji. Also see Tianxue chuhan, ce 3, 1289. 33  For Li Zhi’s ideas, see “Da youren” and “Sihai shuo” in Fenshu. For Feng Yingjing, see his general preface to the Fang yu sheng lüe which also includes the Shanhai yudi quantu; for Xie Zhaozhe, see his Wu za zu. For Fang Yizhi, see his Wuli xiaozhi and Tongya. 34  For the scholarly influence of Matteo Ricci’s world map, see Chen Guansheng, “Li Madou (Matteo Ricci) dui Zhongguo dilixue de gongxian ji qi yingxiang,” Yugong, 5/3–4 (1936), 51–72.

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shocking revelation this new picture of the world was to him. This world was so huge and China was so small. In such an enormously large world, why were people always worrying about trifles and scrabbling for fame and profit? He then criticized those who stubbornly clung to the old theory for closing their own eyes and minds. He said that in truth there are unlimited treasures to be found in different places, different customs and different products throughout the wide world.35 Qu Shisi (1590–1651) also described even more clearly, in his “Short comments on Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office” (Zhifang waiji xiaoyan), the transformation of their image of the world and the conceptual changes undergone by those intellectuals who accepted the new knowledge. He already knew that China was certainly neither the only world nor the only center of civilization. He also believed that diverse civilizations were not innately higher or lower, and so it was unreasonable to cling stubbornly to the idea of Chinese cultural superiority.36 These ideas were obviously influenced by Roman Catholic views as well as Daoist and Buddhist relativism. Nevertheless, on the basis of this trend of thought, the ancient Chinese geographical and cosmological views of the world might certainly face collapse. In a country like China, however, where history and traditional customs were still very strong, the impact of this change to a new image of the world would have too powerful an effect on ancient Chinese concepts. On that account, the influence of ethnic or national (minzu) and state (guojia) ideology behind the drafting of maps of the world was still quite formidable. Not only the dominant political authorities, but many Chinese scholar-officials were also unable to accept completely this new image of the world. Even though some scholar-officials were aware of the new world view, it was still psychologically very difficult for them to accept it. For example, in 1636 when Chen Zushou (1634 jinshi) compiled the Illustrious Ming Atlas of the World (Huang Ming zhifang ditu), he criticized Western maps for “making China small and the four barbarians large” (xiao Zhongguo er da siyi). He believed that they should “use Chinese ways to transform barbarians” (yong Xia bian yi 用夏變夷), but China “cannot be changed by the barbarians” (bian yu yi 變于夷). He still placed China in the center of his map because “the four great continents surround China … China sits in the center of the tianxia and orders

35  See Xie Fang, Zhifang waiji jiaoshi, 7 as attached to the beginning of Ai Rulüe (Giulio Aleni), Zhifang waiji. 36  Ibid., 9.

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the peoples of the four seas.37 This was not only Chen Zushou’s view. In the late Ming, Wei Jun (1553–?) also attacked Matteo Ricci’s world map. Even though Ricci had taken great pains to situate China in the center, Chen still indignantly denounced Ricci as follows: “How could he possibly conceive of China as being so small and place it in the near north on the map?”38 If we say that this view was a product of emotional feelings of ethnic self-esteem, then when the famous early Qing Neo-Confucian scholar and important minister to the Kang Xi Emperor (r. 1661–1722), Li Guangdi (1642–1718), debated geography with the Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688), he used another form of rationalism to stress repeatedly that China was situated in the center of the world.39 Why was China’s centrality so important? Because the ancient Chinese temporal and spatial conceptions of “Heaven” and “Earth” also included the foundations of ancient Chinese political authority and rationality. If the great square “Earth” was no longer situated under the canopy of a great round “Heaven,” then everything that ancient Chinese history and tradition told the Chinese about the experiences of their existence would lose its meaning. If the world was no longer made up of “five zones” (wufu 五服, royal domain, regional rulers, guests, controlled, and wild) concentrically arranged from the center out as in the “Tributes of Yu” and the Rites of Zhou, then the Chinese would be unable to find a proper place for their own living space. If the “four barbarians” or “barbarian regions” surrounding China were no longer such small, uncivilized and dependent states, then the self-confidence of the great Celestial Empire, the majesty of the central dynasty, the uniqueness of the Emperor of the most high country, and the grandeur of the supreme monarch of the world (tianxia) would all collapse into nothing. This would indeed be no trivial matter. 2.3 In addition to describing this change in Chinese views of “All under Heaven,” “China,” and the “four barbarians” in intellectual history, we also need to discuss 37  Even many people who more or less accepted Western geographical knowledge also often drafted maps of the “tianxia” on the basis of traditional ideas. For examples, during the Wanli era, there were Liang Zhou’s Qian Kun wanguo quantu gujin renwu shiji produced in a wood block edition by the Fourth Bureau of the Nanjing Ministry of Personnel, Zhang Huang’s “Gujin tianxia xingsheng zhi tu” (in his Tushu bian), and Cao Mingyi’s Tianxia jiubian fenye renji lucheng quantu produced in the Chongzhen era as a wood block edition, and so on. 38  Xu Changzhi, ed., Shengchao poxie ji, j. 3, 185. 39  Li Guangdi, “Ji Nan Huairen dawen,” in Rongcun ji, photocopy of Wenyuange SKQS edition.

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the trajectory of these changes. Understanding a new form of knowledge is quite similar to translating a new language. To translate a new language one has to match new terms with terms already available in one’s own language, and to understand new knowledge one also has to call up one’s own historical memory, traditional knowledge, and imagination as intellectual resources to understand and interpret the new knowledge. When Matteo Ricci’s map of the world was spread out in front of Chinese intellectuals, those men who were so deeply steeped in the traditional tianxia concept were at a loss as to how to respond. The mainstream intellectual stratum lacked traditional resources to respond, and so they very quickly began to mobilize all of their knowledge of the world to tap into their own history for resources to respond to the new knowledge. No matter whether they accepted or rejected the new knowledge, they all had to rearrange their intellectual resources. The first things they thought of were Zou Yan (305–240 BCE)’s theories and the imaginative visions of the Classic of Mountains and Seas and the Classic on Divine Marvels (Shenyi jing). Those who accepted the new view of the world asserted that, based on Zou Yan’s theory of the nine great continents (da jiu zhou 大九洲) and the Classic of Mountains and Seas and the Classic on Divine Marvels, ancient China already had such a concept of the world.40 With this in mind they could accept the new view with equanimity. Those who opposed the new view said that it was nothing more than Zou Yan’s old theory of Heaven and the legendary stories of the Classic of Mountains and Seas. The Westerners, they said, were only plagiarizing the strange tales and absurd arguments of ancient China, and so there was no reason to worry—their new vision of the world simply repeated the old Chinese imagination.41 It is worth noting, however, that in making this sort of claim, the concepts of the rejecters were changing after all. In ancient China, Zou Yan’s theory of the nine great continents and the exotic tales of worlds beyond the seas in the Classic of Mountains and Seas were all rejected by Confucian rationality as 40  The Annotated Catalog of the Complete Imperial Library (Siku Quanshu tiyao) note on An Account with Illustrations of World Map (Kun yu tushuo) attributes what was recorded in this work, such as “a bronze man stood there straddling the ocean while huge ships passed back and forth between his legs” and animals from Arctic Ocean and so on to the Shenyi jing, shang, p. 634. SKQS zongmu, j. 71. 41  For example, Chen Zushou connected Western geographical knowledge to Zou Yan and hence believed that it would be all right for Western maps to be “retained but not discussed.” “Siyi liu” in the Huangchao wenxian tongkao, j. 298 stated even more baldly that Matteo Ricci’s theory of five continents “simply follows Zou Yan’s Warring States theory of the little seas (pihai 裨海) surrounding the nine continents.”

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beyond the ken of genuine knowledge of the tianxia. The mainstream Chinese view was always that the land within the four seas, the tianxia world, was made up of China’s vast civilized central empire surrounded on four sides by small barbarian states. When the Chinese intellectual stratum, with Confucianism as its mainstream thought, was unable to find the resources to respond to the new view of the world, the best they could do was to marshal these ideas that had been hitherto regarded as mere “conversation pieces” and “strange tales.” When these imaginings were brought back into the Chinese conceptual world, however, changes occurred in the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief through a process in which “center” and “periphery,” “mainstream” and “heterodoxy” exchanged places. Daoist and Buddhist thought and ideas were also involved in the Chinese scholar-officials’ search for intellectual resources concerning images of the world. Buddhist ideas about the mahadvîpa or “four great continents” (si da bu zhou 四大部洲) made it psychologically possible for the Chinese to accept the reality of the new Western concept of five continents. In any case, according to Daoist and Buddhist thought, nothing in the world is absolute—the immense is also the miniscule, and the long-lasting is also the momentary. Following this relativist logic, all obstinacy and arrogance are undermined and no concepts or values are everlasting. On the basis of such a revaluation, the Western four elements theory and the world view of a myriad nations or states existing side by side could both be accepted. In this way the new Western knowledge and Daoist and Buddhist thought, oddly enough, combined and worked together to deconstruct the ancient Chinese view that China was the only center of a tianxia world. Finally, these Chinese intellectuals who were steeped in the traditional tianxia concept also wanted to find the strongest possible intellectual resources within their universally accepted Confucianism to serve as a basis for accepting the new Western view of the world. Qu Shigu wrote the following in his “Short Comments on Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office”: “why not listen to what an earlier Confucian said that sages from the eastern seas or the western seas all share the same mind and the same principle.” An “early Confucian” (Ru xian 儒先) here refers to the Song Neo-Confucian Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan). The original comes from the Chronological Biography (nianpu) of Lu Jiuyuan. It says that when Lu was young he was pondering ultimate questions and when he saw the word “cosmos” (yuzhou), he was suddenly enlightened. He then said “The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe. Over the eastern seas sages appear. They share this mind; they share this principle. Over the western seas sages appear. They share this mind; they

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share this principle.”42 This passage includes a presupposition of both universalism and internationalism. It says that civilization embodies an absolutely universal truth (“true principle” zhenli 真理 in Chinese) that is unrelated to the geographical position of a nation’s territory, but is only (and especially) related to “sages” who are able to experience this truth. While they were accepting the new view of the world and the new religion, quite a few later Chinese scholars, such as Li Zhizao, Wang Jiazhi (1604 jinshi), Mi Jiasui (mid-17th century), Kong Zhenshi (1613 jinshi), Ye Xianggao (1559–1627), Feng Yingjing, and so on appropriated and relied on this passage in their interpretation of a universal and pluralistic view of world civilization. It is particularly interesting to note that later on when the Jesuit missionary Lodovico Buglio (1606–1682) wrote to refute Yang Guangxian (1597–1669), he also cited this passage by Lu Jiuyuan. Buglio wrote that the Chinese should not insist on their Sinocentric view that they are superior to others, “but they should just seek out similarities to mind and principle, not distinguish differences between East and West, and then how could their vision not be broad?”43 In this way the idea that the traditional Chinese empire was the center of a tianxia, and that China was superior to all of the states on its borders was invalidated by the idea of a universal and absolute truth, and as a result li 理, principle or universal truth, became of paramount importance in this new way of looking at the world. It was no longer necessary to cling obstinately to a narrow ethnic (minzu) and nationalist (guojia) view. The new view of the world that tolerated a myriad of equal nations or states could now be accepted within Chinese Confucianism. 2.4 As much as the traditional Chinese intellectual world was facing the “collapse of Heaven and Earth,” and witnessing an exchange of place between “center” and “periphery,” “mainstream” and “heterodoxy,” we need to remember that these changes took place quite slowly and with considerable difficulty. For a number of reasons the ancient Chinese vision of the world did not thoroughly change for quite a long period of time. We should recall that in the middle of the seventeenth century, Yang Guangxian, head of the Bureau of Astronomy

42   Lu Jiuyuan ji, 1980, j. 36, 483. This passage is translated in Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, 1953, 2: 573. See Wing-tsit Chan, SB, 579–580 translation of a similar passage from §22.5a of Xiangshan quanji. According to Chan, yuzhou 宇宙 is a combination of “spatial continuum” plus “temporal continuum.” 43  Li Misi (Lodovico Buglio) “Budeyi bian,” in Tianzhujiao dongchuan wenxian, 332.

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and later to be regarded by many as a legal petifogger; questioned the veracity of Western maps of the world. He felt it laughably preposterous that “the great Earth is round like a ball.”44 There was a great deal of mental anxiety involved in such comments because of the important political implications the traditional world view of China as the center had. Even down to the middle of the nineteenth century when Xu Jiyu (1795–1873) published his A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Huanying zhilüe), even though he described the various states according to the Western maps of the world, he still placed the Complete Atlas of the Illustrious Qing Empire (Huang qing yitong yudi quantu) at the beginning of the work to avoid trouble. In the preface, Xu also solemnly declared that “China is the center of the Great Earth,” and he drew his map to show China occupying two-thirds of the Asian land mass. This book was printed in 1848, fully two and a half centuries after Matteo Ricci printed his first map of the world in China. 3

The Rise of Textual Criticism and Evidential Research and the Chinese Intellectual World from the Mid-17th to the Late 18th Centuries

For two centuries after the 1650s, Chinese intellectual history seems to have been in a depressed state. On the surface, the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief was little different from in the past. Although the Great Qing Empire replaced the Ming dynasty, official political ideology still relied upon Confucian ideas centered on Zhu Xi’s School of Principle. The mainstream intellectual world continued to maintain the homogeneous thought that had developed from the Song and Yuan dynasties. Most literati continued to be nurtured by an education based on reading and studying the Four Books (“Great Learning,” “Doctrine of the Mean,” Analects and Mencius) and the Five Classics (Book of Songs, Book of Documents, Classic of Rites, Classic of Changes and Spring and Autumn Annals with the Zuo Commentary). They also continued to write interpretive commentaries on these works for the edification of later generations. At this time the only different trend seems to have been the academic style that would later come to be know as textual criticism (kaoju 考據, also translated: evidential research, evidential studies, evidential investigation). For a long period of time, through the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns 44  Yang Guangxian, “Niejing” in his collected essays entitled Budeyi. See An Shuangcheng, “Tang Ruowang (Johann Adam Schall) an shimo,” in Ming-Qing dang-an yu lishi yanjiu lunwen xuan, 1080–1097.

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(1735–1796), evidential studies (kaojuxue 考據學) was the core element of intellectual history research, but this meticulous philology and research was, for a segment of the elite intellectual stratum, merely a kind of intellectual performance intended to show off their intellect to gain a high reputation and honors. It did not present any fundamental challenge to the traditional world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief. This overall situation was not as simple, however. Behind the superficial unity of the Qing world of knowledge, thought and belief, everything was breaking up. Confined under the domination of the School of Principle, scholars had gradually lost any space for freedom of thought. While they employed this knowledge as a resource for passing the official examinations, adapting to bureaucratic rules, and making a living, they often sought out alternative knowledge and an alternative intellectual community to identify with. Their search led to intellectual divisions. In the Qing dynasty, this intellectual split was manifest in the opposition between simply proclaiming the truth (zhenli, 真理) and actually investigating the truth (evidentiary investigation, kaojiu zhenshi, 考究真實 or kaozheng 考證), or between foundational thinking and evidential research, or between “moral principle” (yili 義理) and “evidential research” (kaoju).45 The result of this intellectual schism was that textual study, which had a potentially modern flavor, was marginalized by the traditional intellectual world at the same time that it came to occupy the central position in the Qing academic world. Traditional thought, then, lost its solid intellectual (textual) support, and although it occupied the central position in the official political ideology, it was marginal to the interests of the Qing intellectual class. As soon as this change in the actual situation led to a reversal of the marginal and the central, it created a rupture between knowledge and thought. Thought lost its evidentiary intellectual support, and evidentiary knowledge became a resource for the interpretation of alternative thought. We must now turn to the intellectual history of the middle of the seventeenth century. After the Qing conquest of the Ming, their internal policy of cultural universalism temporarily eliminated or suppressed one reason for ethnic conflict. Their foreign policy change from openness to closing down (isolationism) also pushed to one side the tensions between China and the outside world that had existed since the late Ming. A revitalized School of Principle both satisfied the needs of those scholars who had come to loath the emptiness of Wang Yangming’s School of Mind and shored up their identification with the new dynasty and the unitary nature of truth, forcibly reintegrating 45  We translate zhenli 真理 as either truth or doctrine, or sometimes truth (doctrine) because both concepts can be implied in the Chinese use of zhenli.

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all that had collapsed since the late Ming. Concealed behind this forcible reintegration and reconstitution of the Chinese intellectual world and this new unity, however, were some important differences and divisions of thought. 3.1 Due to the influence of Wang Yangming and his later followers, a certain amount of pluralism had developed in late Ming thought; many types of intellectual discourse were already reaching their extreme form and were close to mutual conflict. The first important tendency of these Ming to Qing trends of thought was that Wang Yangming’s ideas caused some people to seek increasingly for transcendence and freedom and even to challenge the political authorities and resist social order. This spurred on others who were profoundly anxious about such thinking to advocate strongly for various remedies such as self-watchfulness, repentance, and external control to limit the inflation of individual spirit and the excesses of egoism.46 The second important tendency was the simultaneous appearance of many different intellectual pursuits and orientations. Those who wanted to employ learning for practical application were interested in “statecraft” ( jingshi 經世). They repeatedly reminded people that they should pay attention to concrete political, economic and military affairs and their requisite knowledge. Some of these people were quite aware of the value of Western astronomy, geography, ballistics, water conservancy, and mathematics. They wholeheartedly admired these Western ideas, so much so that they were willing to abandon some obstinate traditional Chinese beliefs.47 Some others who were steeped in traditional Chinese consciousness, however, looked with great trepidation on these trends that could lead to the collapse of the Chinese intellectual world. They strongly opposed this intellectual tendency and even called for the establishment of a Confucian religion (Kongjiao 孔教).48 The third important tendency was the spread of religious beliefs. A group of people, especially at court and among the nobility, who were interested in finding everlasting life, continued to believe in the Daoist Religion, became infatuated with the philosophy of life, and indulged in experiments with various drugs, supposed elixirs of immortality. Another group of people wanted to transcend this mundane world and so they turned to Buddhism for intellectual support; they also tried to combine Buddhist religious doctrines with 46  The thinking of men like Gao Panlong (1562–1626), Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612), Liu Zongzhou (1578–1645), and so on was superficially different, but essentially the same. 47  For example, Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao, and Yang Tingyun. 48  For example, Wang Qiyuan, Wen Fengxiang, and Xu Sanli (1625–1691).

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the philosophy of Wang Yangming in an attempt to appear more reasonable. Various forms of popular religion also absorbed Buddhist and Daoist ideas and had considerable influence in society. They also gained a great deal of support in the imperial court and through these channels they even penetrated the community of upper class scholars. Of course, the opponents of such religions also firmly maintained their orthodox Confucian stand, sternly opposed all heretical doctrines, called for protection of the solemnity and purity of Confucianism and for keeping a clear distinction between Confucianism, Buddhism and the Daoist Religion. During the Ming-Qing transition, however, these rich and colorful intellectual tendencies were all reduced to one simple discourse of nationalism. Traditional Han Chinese scholar-officials could not accept the great change from the Ming to the Qing even though the late Ming situation had already driven them to despair. When the Ming dynasty was overthrown by a rebellious populace and a foreign ethnic group, they simply could not accept it. They had always connected “civilization” (wenming) with ethnic “nationality” (minzu) and equated “nationality” with the “state/nation” (guojia) and the “state/nation” with the “dynasty” (wangchao), and the “dynasty” with the “emperor” (huangdi). For them the fall of the dynasty and the empire meant nothing less than the extinction of their civilization. Perhaps the fall of no other dynasty in all of Chinese history resulted in the production of such a large number of loyalists (yimin 遺民), survivors who remained loyal to the fallen Ming dynasty, and brought about such a violent cultural shock.49 Witnesses to this great historical change felt great sorrow about culture, thought and politics, and thus an unprecedented amount of reflection and discussion of these matters occurred at the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Qing. These discussions were mixed up with feelings of rebellion and the anguish of seeing their dynasty or state vanquished as well as a great deal of reflective thought about events since the late Ming. With intense emotional fervor, many scholars undertook excruciatingly painful criticisms of the immediate past. This was the case with Fu Shan (1607–1684), Fang Yizhi, Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), Wang Fuzhi, Lü Liuliang (1629–1683), Qu Dajun (1630–1696), and many others. Spurred on by the fall of the Ming dynasty, Han Chinese nationalism was brought forth with slogans like “distinguish between Chinese and barbarians” and “not just the dynasty but the tianxia has been destroyed” ( fei wangguo, nai wang tianxia 非亡國, 乃亡天下). The violently insurrectionary posture of the 49  He Guanbiao, Sheng yu si: Ming ji shidafu de jueze, 1997, has a great deal of detailed information about Ming loyalists and their patriotic martyrdom.

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Ming loyalists and the influential rebellious thought of uncooperative literati in the early Qing were both very difficult problems for the political ideology of the early Qing government. Although these critiques and reflections would later be interpreted as something similar to European Enlightenment thought, what they primarily expressed were indignation and resentment at the fate of their Han Chinese ethnic group (minzu) and feelings of grief at the fall of their own old state (guguo); they were not necessarily a rational reflection on or dispassionate analyses of macro history. For ethnic Han Chinese literati the “distinction between Chinese and barbarians” (Hua Yi zhi fen 華夷之 分) was axiomatic, and it actually embodied a form of ethnic prejudice; this prejudice that derived from identification with the dynasty also superseded value judgments based on the idea of universal civilization. On that account, this seemingly intense critical thought was not really so secure; as soon as their social and emotional foundations changed, they were undermined and their followers faded away. During the century of the Shunzhi (1644–1662), Kangxi (1616–1722) and Yongzheng (1722–1735) imperial reigns, the poignant and unforgettable memory of the fallen Ming dynasty steadily dissipated. After the Manchu-Qing regime began to establish its political legitimacy on the basis of cultural universalism, the intense nationalism of the Han Chinese was faced with an embarrassing predicament. There was a very big weakness in their way of thinking. To wit, what is civilization (wenming)? Do ethnicity (or race, zhongzu) and political authority equal civilization? Does dynastic succession from one ethnic group to another equal the destruction of civilization or the tianxia? According to the general logic of Ming loyalist thought, it would seem that when China was vanquished by a non-Han Chinese ethnic group that was the collapse of civilization. This was to conflate the ethnic meaning of being Yi or Di (non-Chinese “tribes” to the east and north of ancient China) with the cultural meaning of being barbarous and uncivilized (yeman). In his Record of Great Righteousness Dispelling Superstition (Dayi juemi lu, 1730), however, the Yongzheng emperor argued very persuasively that whether or not a government regime is legitimate and reasonable depends upon whether it is politically correct, has the approval of the gods and spirits, and receives the allegiance of the masses. In modern parlance, a government’s legitimacy derives from the reasonableness of its political, spiritual, and cultural support. Yongzheng affirmed that “one who possess virtue (de) is fit to be ruler of the tianxia;” and so he asked “how can you use the distinction between Hua and Yi to treat them differently?”50 When Yongzheng went on with these ideas, the weakness in the Ming loyalist discourse was eventually revealed. 50   Dayi juemi lu, j. 1, 4.

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Gu Yanwu said that “there is the destruction of the dynasty, and there is the destruction of the tianxia.” The destruction of the dynasty (wangguo) takes place when the surname of the emperors and the name of the dynasty (guojia) change, but the destruction of the tianxia takes place when culture disappears. According to Gu Yanwu, it is the function of the emperors and their ministers to prevent the destruction of the nation, but to prevent the destruction of culture was “the responsibility of even the most ordinary and lowly person.”51 This may indeed be true, but if one continues to apply this logic, then if the new dynasty complies with and follows the path of the traditional culture, would their conquest not be a reasonable one in the fashion of the historic “revolts of kings Tang and Wu,” founders of the Shang and Zhou dynasties? If the new Manchu-Qing imperial regime had a higher moral system than national or ethnic rightness (duty) (minzu dayi 民族大義)—practicing “benevolence, compassion, and filial piety” (ren ai ci xiao 仁愛慈孝)—would not the feelings of Han Chinese national or ethnic rightness end up without goals or support? By the end of the Shunzhi, Kangxi, and Yongzheng reigns, the Manchu-Qing government had been established for nearly a century, from 1644 to 1735. The first generation of Han Chinese literati, men like Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, Fu Shan, Fang Yizhi, Qu Dajun (1630–1696), and Lü Liuling (1629– 1683), who had endured the painful demise of the Ming had died off, and the residual longing for the Ming dynasty had dissipated.52 By that time people’s identification had shifted from the “Great Ming Empire” with Han Chinese culture as its core to the Manchu, Mongol, and Han Chinese community that made up the “Great Qing Empire.” The concept of “China” had lost its purely ethnic meaning and had taken on a cultural or civilizational meaning. As a result, Chinese scholar-officials were no longer fixated on maintaining their ethnic dignity, but now set their sights on the establishment of a moral order. 3.2 As discussed above, from the Song dynasty on, the gentry class possessed great cultural authority and generally relied on doctrinal truth (principle) to resist imperial power. Their intellectual resources derived primarily from Song 51  Gu Yanwu, Rizhilu, in Huang Rucheng, Rizhilu jishi, 1994, j. 13, 471. 52  After a decade or more, this resolute distinction between Chinese as good and barbarians as evil was not even sustainable among Ming loyalists. For example, Gu Yanwu discussed scholarship with the so-called turncoat official Sun Chengze (1592–1676) and had a deep friendship with the erudite scholar Zhu Yizun (1629–1709). Huang Zongxi wrote a letter to high Qing officials in support of his grandson in which he called the Qing emperor a “sage ruler.” Even his nationalist feelings had gradually dissipated.

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Neo-Confucianism, especially the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle. The most important of these resources was inner moral transcendence (neizai daode chaoyue 内在道德超越) in relation to political policies and the political order. That is, they criticized concrete political policies from the vantage point of a higher truth (principle) and tried to solve political problems by intellectual and cultural means, relying on the tradition of Confucian moral principle (daotong) to restrain and control political power (zhengtong). The power to interpret the truth generally belonged to the scholar-official class, but the ideal of Confucianism and the School of Principle was to recover or establish political order. At a time when the imperial power dominated everything and political power was higher than any other, however, the power to decide what is or is not truth (correct principle) could also be taken over by the emperor. For example, the early Manchu-Qing emperors very cleverly took control of the doctrines of the School of Principle, allowing the emperor’s “tradition of governance” (zhengtong) to incorporate and co-opt the “tradition of moral principle” (daotong), thus leaving the scholars without the power or right to express their opinions or exert their control over affairs. The government pursued a number of strategies to accomplish its purposes. First of all, they honored or put into important positions so-called famous NeoConfucian statesmen like Xiong Cilü (1636–1709), Li Guangdi (1642–1718), Wei Xiangshu (1617–1687), Wei Yijie (1616–1686), Lu Longqi (1630–1692), Tang Bin (1627–1687), Zhang Boxing (1651–1725), and so on who were quite influential in the Neo-Confucian world.53 At the same time they continually did their best to bring into government key figures such as Zhu Yizun (1629–1709), Yan Ruoqu (1636–1704), Xu Ganxue (1631–1694), and so on. In this way, in both actual practice and intellectual exposition, the government could already assert that the most excellent scholars all shared the same principles as they did. Secondly, they employed imperial edicts and the examination system to appropriate the Han Chinese intellectual tradition and vigorously promote Confucianism or the ideas of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle. During his sixty-year reign, Emperor Kangxi used his power to promote the School of Principle and suppress sectarian deviance, forcing the literati to abandon any unorthodox positions.54 At that he created an official ideology wrapped 53  Lu Longqi and Tang Bin both have received accompanying sacrifices in the two hallways of the Confucian Temple. Zhang Boxing was highly esteemed by both Kangxi and Yongzheng. See Tang Jian, Qing ru xue-an xiaozhi, j. 1, “Pinghu Lu xiansheng zhuan;” j. 2, “Yifeng Zhang xiansheng zhuan;” j. 3, “Suizhou Tang xiansheng zhuan.” 54  Let me give two examples of literati changing their views. After Kangxi criticized Li Guangdi for “pretending to be a follower of Neo-Confucianism” and praised Xiong Cilü for

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up in the language of Neo-Confucian discourse, and this ideology was institutionalized and put into effect throughout Qing society.55 During the Yongzhen reign, the emperor was even more dominant over the right to determine truth or principle. As a result, those literati who originally held an ideal of reestablishing order in the intellectual world were forced by this thought purge [sixiang zhengsu 思想整肅) to become political “fellow travelers.” Their criticism, however full of genuine concern for suffering, equally suppressed the late Ming tendency toward intellectual pluralism.56 Thirdly, the Qing emperors frequently employed their power to criticize sectarian deviance among the literati and to carry out policies of “executing one to warn the rest.” Through these punishments, the Qing emperors firmly established their discursive authority in doctrinal matters. Qing “literary inquisitions” (imprisonment for one’s writings, wenzi yu 文字獄) featured very widespread punishments to combat heresies or subversive thoughts. Particularly emblematic of these inquisitions was Yongzhen’s Violators of the Confucian Ritual Code (Mingjiao zuiren). The mingjiao (名教) was the ritual code of ethical behavior established by Confucianism for the preservation of the ethical and moral order of society. To violate the mingjiao naturally made one a criminal, especially when the emperor held the discursive power over interpretation of the mingjiao; anyone who opposed the emperor was ipso facto a criminal. These punishments further solidified the Qing emperors’ political and moral legitimacy.57

“venerating only Zhu Xi,” Li changed directions and became a celebrated lixue official. In the early Qing, Mao Qiling (1623–1716) criticized Song dynasty commentaries on the Four Books; his Correcting Errors in the Four Books (Sishu gaicuo) cited 451 such errors. When he heard that Kangxi was going to honor Zhu Xi by offering sacrifices in the Confucian temple, however, he burned the blocks for his book. 55  Kangxi examined the Hanlin scholars on the subject of “the true and false in lixue NeoConfucianism” (Lixue zhenwei lun) as well as repeatedly praising celebrated Song dynasty Neo-Confucianism scholars. See Qing shengzu shilu, j. 223, Kangxi 44, gengchen, 2988. The ideological dissemination policy was supported by many literati as a way to protect ethical and moral order throughout the country. 56  Wei Xiangshu and Gan Rulai (1684–1739) both proposed setting up a system of rites to maintain the traditional social order; Tang Bin and other celebrated Neo-Confucian officials forbade the dramas and short fiction of the Jiangsu and Zhejiang area, hence widely propagating this ideology in the name of maintaining ethical and moral order. Xiong Cilü, Lu Longqi, Zhang Boxing, Tang Bin, Wei Yijie (1616–1686) and others rather self-consciously participated in the early Qing reconstruction of thought. 57  See Mingjiao zuiren, appended to Mingjiao zuiren tan, 1999, 49–121.

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The first Confucian scholar in the Qing dynasty to receive sacrifices in the Confucian Temple, Lu Longqi, once asserted that an ideal world would be one that was characterized by a unity of politics (political or imperial power), culture, and thought. This may have only been the ideal world of a man of culture, but it revealed a certain tendency that could lead to ideological dictatorship. In the conceptual world of ancient China, there were only the two categories of public (gong) and private (si), and there was no intermediate discourse between the public and private realms. In the intellectual sphere, “public” and “private” were relegated to the realms of “reason/principle” (li) and “passion/ desire” (yu) respectively. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, theories linking “public” and “private” with “righteousness” (yi) and “profit” (li 利) or “true/ morally correct” (shi) and “false/morally wrong” ( fei) respectively were very widespread and amounted to unquestionable principles. When politics (imperial power), culture, and thought actually were unified, many unfortunate consequences ensued. On the one hand, the emperors could arbitrarily decide everything in the name of the “public” good, and the state (guojia) could abuse its power in the name of social and political order. On the other hand, individuals who were relegated to the realm of “the private,” had no choice but to try to escape this government control of truth. The phrase about so-called “using principle to kill people” (yi li sharen 以理殺人) was precisely about the Qing suppression of all other discourse in the name of a seemingly high-minded politics, dignified morality, and the people.58 In the intellectual space provided by the government, then, there was only one always correct form of thought, and other intellectual discourses were completely stripped of their legitimacy. With the flourishing of Wang Yangming’s thought in the Ming dynasty, there was a real tendency toward intellectual pluralism. After the transition from the Ming to the Manchu-Qing dynasty, however, this Ming pluralism was reduced to a monolithic unity, and the reasonableness of any thought came to be based on Han Chinese national or ethnic duty (minzu dayi 民族大義), and this national or ethnic duty was for the most part also limited to the traditional “orthodox doctrine” (zhengtong lun 正統論). When ethnic or racial differences could no longer support an evaluation of the superiority or inferiority of a civilization, then even culture and doctrinal truth were no longer under the exclusive authority of the intellectual class; they had become rather a tool for the imperial power to criticize that class, and the intellectuals no longer possessed their own independent space. The entire society was under the domination of an empty, dogmatic, absolute, and grandiose doctrinal discourse. There was no way that people could hide 58  The phrase “using principle to kill people” is from Dai Zhen quanshu, 1994, 496.

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from this official discourse; indeed, there was not even any way for people to situate themselves outside of the state system. We should particularly point out that because the Qing dynasty employed “statism” (guojia zhuyi 國家主義) to resist ideas of “power sharing” ( fenquan 分 權), the idea that All under Heaven are one family to criticize regionalism, and their idea that there is only one truth to restrain the expression of individual freedom, they deprived the literati even more of any justification for physical or intellectual escape from universal imperial power. There were vary narrow channels in the first place that the intellectuals could rely upon to escape from the domination of imperial power and the oppression of the “public” (gong) sphere and maintain some small space for freedom to criticize. There were only Regional States (zhuhouguo 諸侯國), the power of the commanding officers and their followers (guanliao mufu 官僚幕府), private academies (shuyuan 書院), village private schools (xiangshu 鄉塾), rural lineages (xiangjian zongzu 鄉間宗族), and so on. As a result, Gu Yanwu advocated “listing the idea of fengjian (establishing Regional States) under the prefecture-county system,” Huang Zongxi promoted the abolition of the rigid relationship between the ruler and his ministers and making prefecture and county schools into places for public discussion, Lu Shiyi hoped to re-establish village clan organizations (xiangli zongzu 鄉里宗族) in order to expand gentry and regional power, and Lü Liuliang complained that “later generations abolished the fengjian system of Regional States and replaced it with the prefecture-county system, and thus the world was unified under the rule of one single ruler.”59 All of these proposals and assertions were actually a continuation of gentry thinking about resistance to government control since the Song dynasty and they embodied their ideas of striving to gain more space for local gentry. All of this sort of thought was, however, stifled in the early Qing. Because the scope of knowledge and thought became increasingly narrow, people could not escape control either 59   Tinglin wenji, j. 1, “Junxian lun,” expresses great dissatisfaction with the emperor’s absolute control. Gu Yanwu advocated a system of power-sharing between center and local regions, including distribution of wealth, assistance for local clans (providing support for local clans so as to strengthen their power), establishment of local schools, and so on. These policies were intended to gain some space in an autocratic system. Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 12–17; Huang Zongxi’s essay “Yuan chen,” in his Mingyi daifang lu asserted that the minister and the ruler relationship is only one of political cooperation and “if I am not in charge of official duties, then I am a stranger to the ruler.” In this way, we see that Huang also tried to gain some space for the local gentry to operate within an autocratic system. The Mingyi daifang lu is translated by William Theodore de Bary as Waiting for The Dawn: a Plan For The Prince, 1993. See Wang Fansen, “Qingchu de xiaceng jingshi sixiang,” Dalu zazhi 98 (1999) 1–21.

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by the system or ideological oppression. In the public sphere they had to comply with the official discourse, and so they could only seek out other channels where they could express their individual thinking and intelligence. Political unity did not lead to unity of knowledge and thought; rather it led to a schism in the Chinese conceptual world. On the one hand, political authoritarianism claimed a monopoly on truth (doctrine), but on the other hand people sought out alternative spaces. Qing dynasty evidential research was precisely the area of activity, beyond the mainstream system of knowledge and thought, in which Qing intellectuals pursued their ideals, and sought recognition and expression. 3.3 There seems to have been two views on the intellectual origins of evidential research. One view saw Qing evidential research as a reaction to Song and Ming scholarship and praised it as if it were the European Renaissance. People like Liang Qichao (1873–1929) and Hu Shi (1891–1962) interpreted it from the point of view that “returning to the ancient ( fugu 復古) is emancipation.” They also treated it as a “major reaction” to the Neo-Confucian School of Principle that “abandoned empty talk and moved toward practical matters (practice).” The system of thought behind their way of thinking was evolution, science, and pragmatism. This led, however, to an unusual scene unfolding on the Chinese stage. That is, the classic texts of the ancient Chinese sages performed in a neoclassical drama of returning to the ancients, but the director’s script seems to have been written based on the European Renaissance. Another view saw evidential research as a continuation of Song and Ming thought. People like Qian Mu (1895–1990) asserted that Qing evidential research came from early Qing scholars who in light of the dynastic transition from Ming to Qing hoped to employ knowledge to practice “statecraft” ( jingshi 經世). Their spiritual support, Qian said, came from Song and Ming NeoConfucianism, and “scholarship will advance further when it moves in a new direction, and it will definitely seek to change when it reaches an impasse.”60 Qian was obviously searching in the resources of China’s own knowledge and thought for a logical path for the development of Chinese intellectual history. How did the Qing dynasty intellectual climate change from empty talk toward practical matters and evidential research? No matter which position they held, scholars (upholding the above mentioned two views) all more or less agreed with the explanation that Qing dynasty thought control and repression 60  Qian Mu, Guoxue gailun, 1979, 61; “Qingru xue-an xu,” in Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi cong­shu, 8 (1980), 336.

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caused the literati to lose interest in present actualities and to pay more attention to China’s classical past. Liang Qichao recounted one by one the keju fraud case of 1657, the 1661–1662 Jiangnan abusive collection of tax deferral case, and the 1661–1663 Zhuang Tinglong (?–1655) case about compiling the Ming dynastic history, and was certain that they were the cause of the transformation of the scholarly landscape.61 The majority of scholars also had similar views and held that Qing evidential research arose from the suppression of thought and the decline of spirit of the scholar-officials. This is a rather persuasive argument and it is still quite influential today. I think, however, that although focusing on policies of persecution such as “literary inquisitions” is generally correct, it is nevertheless somewhat too simplistic. The universal silencing of the intellectuals in the Qing dynasty cannot really be blamed purely and exclusively on the highly repressive policies directed against Han Chinese nationalism. I have come to see that the Qing dynasty silencing of the intellectuals involved more than just the political suppression of deviant thought. There was also the emperor’s monopoly of doctrinal truth—the complete incorporation of Confucian moral principle (daotong) by the “political orthodoxy” (zhitong 治統) of the state. After the foundation of this moral high ground was occupied by the state, the literati scholars lost both the discursive power to interpret doctrine (truth) and the power to guide society. Given that there was already a division in intellectual discourse, there was no place for the literati scholars in the “public” sphere, and it was also not possible for them to share their feelings, knowledge, and thought in the “private” sphere. In this situation, these scholars began to search for an alternative mode of intellectual expression situated somewhere between the poles of the public and the private. As Liang Qichao wrote in section seventeen of his Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period (Qingdai xueshu gailun), their scholarly annotations, reading notes, and letters constituted the new textual criticism or evidential research and historical studies. Liang Qichao noted with great sensitivity that “Qing Confucians did not want to imitate Song and Ming scholars by lecturing to groups of disciples, and, unlike today’s European and American scholars, they did not have various associations and schools at which they could gather and teach. Thus, they had few opportunities for the exchange of knowledge.” As a result, the large amount of detailed and complex explanatory notes and

61  Liang Qichao, Zhongguo jin sanbai nian xueshushi, 1958, sections 2–4; “Qingdai xueshu bianqian yu zhangzhi de yingxiang,” in Zhu Weizheng, annotated, Liang Qichao lun Qing xueshi erzhong, 1985, 103–137.

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commentaries attached to classic texts and handed down to us still tortuously expressed some of their genuine thinking. These reading notes and letters that were printed, published, and sent around through the mail provided alternative channels of communication between mutually recognized scholars, and greatly facilitated the circulation of knowledge. Administrative offices of high officials, private schools of the high born, and the residences of the rich merchants to a certain extent especially provided a forum for the dissemination and continuity of this intellectual discourse. During late Qing imperial China, these offices, private residences, notes, letters, and even annotations of the classics served in a certain sense the function of protecting this new intellectual activity. The scholars served as teachers for the high officials or rich merchants or as advisors to top officials, “or masters of private academies, or prepared local gazetteers for various provincial and county governments, or compiled genealogies for great clans, or authenticated the texts for those who had the means to produce them.”62 Particularly in the area of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui where the economy was quite well developed and political policies were a little more relaxed, there grew up an intellectual landscape centered on evidential research and a community of scholars who prided themselves on that research. 3.4 The external tendency toward transformation of this history of knowledge serendipitously corresponded with the intrinsic direction of contemporary intellectual history. The Ming dynasty Wang Yangming School of Mind gave prominence to the individual’s inner mind, was skeptical of extrinsic doctrines, and represented an intense attack on the restraints on social life and the maintenance of social order by traditional ethics. This inflation of the individual’s inner mind could in practice have led to the elimination of the restraints of ceremonies (rites) and social rules, and this prospect made many people uneasy. They began to hope to remedy the School of Mind, especially the radical tendencies of later Wang Yangming followers, by means of moral self-discipline, and this gave rise to a search for such morality. In a similar fashion, members of the Donglin faction (Donglin dang 東林黨) and others again put forth the idea of the investigation 62  See Liang Qichao, Qingdai xueshu gailun, section 8, Zhu Weizheng, annotated, Liang Qichao lun Qing xueshi erzhong, 54. Qingdai xueshu gailun is translated by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü as Intellectual Trends in the Ch’ing Period, 1959. Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China, 1984, discusses most of these elements of our story.

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of things (gewu 格物 literally, “approaches to phenomena”) and believed that solid factual knowledge was necessary to verify or prove the truth. This in turn led to an academic trend that valued conclusive (evidentiary) knowledge and “broad learning concerning the nature of things” (boxue zhuyi 博學主義). Under the shock of the demise of the Ming dynasty, these two latent tendencies activated two intellectual orientations among early Qing scholar-officials. They can be summed up in two phrases from the Analects of Confucius: “maintain a sense of shame in one’s personal conduct (xing ji you chi 行己有耻),” and “extensively study all learning (bo xue yu wen 博學于文).”63 “Maintaining a sense of shame in one’s personal conduct” meant to employ practical moral reason (daode lixing 道德理性) and moral action to change the Ming intellectual custom of empty talk about the heart/mind (xin) and human nature or temperament (xing).64 Even some of the later followers of Wang Yangming had already begun to quote the Neo-Confucianism of the ChengZhu School of Principle as a corrective to Wang Yangming’s School of Mind. Sun Qifeng (1584–1675) wrote: “Take self-watchfulness as one’s model; take the realization of the Heavenly Principle as most important; take proper everyday human relationships as one’s practice.”65 Chen Que (1604–1677) wrote: “Revere the teaching of self-watchfulness; personally practice it; honor accumulated norms and regulations.”66 Li Yong (1627–1705) also used “repent the past and start anew” (huiguo zixin 悔過自新) as a sign that the focus of their studies was no longer on inner freedom, but rather on putting morality into practice.67 With this transformation of their knowledge and thought, they had already changed the direction of the late Ming Wang Yangming School of Mind. “Extensively studying all learning” called for the investigation of things, and it was considered “a profound shame to be ignorant of any phenomenon.” This 63  “Yu youren lun xueshu,” Lin Ting wenji, j. 3, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 43.  It should be noted that there are three different translations for these Lunyu passages. We basically use Legge’s version in the text above. There are different interpretations of shi 士 as officer, knight of the Way, gentleman and, scholar. Wen 文 is rendered as learning, letters and culture—trs. 64  Later Qing dynasty followers of Wang Yangming, like Sun Qifeng, Li Erqu, and Huang Zongxi had already changed their academic style considerably. They were now following different roads to the same destination as were also representative figures, like Gu Yanwu and Yan Yuan, who opposed the shallow academic atmosphere of the day. 65  “Sun Qifeng zhuan,” Qingshi gao, j. 480; Fang Bao, “Sun Zheng jun zhuan,” also records this change in Sun Qifeng’s thinking; both in Qian Yiji, ed., Bei zhuan ji, j. 127, 5979 and 5986. 66  For Chen Yuanlong, “Qianchu xiansheng zhuan,” see Huang Zongxi, “Chen xiansheng Que muzhiming,” in Qian Yiji, ed., Bei zhuan ji, j. 127, 5996–5999. 67  Li Hong, Er qu ji, “Huiguo zixin shuo,” j. 1, 3 and j. 10, 76, “Nan xing shu.”

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attitude and practice moved away from Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming’s partiality for the mind and also corrected the Song School of Principle’s customary discussions of “heart/mind,” “nature/temperament,” “principle” and “qi” (the life force or vital energy of the universe). Holders of this mind set seriously considered that all knowledge, including knowledge of the traditional classics, relied on conclusive (evidentiary) knowledge to authenticate the reasonableness of morality and the truth of doctrine, and again based morality and truth on the ancient classics. They advocated a word by word examination of the classic texts in search of conclusive and reliable exegesis. Thus, Gu Yanwu said “start with the examination of the words when reading the nine classics, and begin that examination with a knowledge of the sound (phonetic value) of the words, and this is true for all of the books of the hundred schools of classical thought (zhuzi baijia 諸子百家).”68 These two tendencies were actively echoed by many scholars; they were identical to the early Qing intellectual world’s attempts to correct the scholarly atmosphere and synthesize the various schools of thought. By that time, many scholars had already observed that the late Ming intellectual world lacked any guiding force for both society and life. There were two reasons for this collapse of the guiding intellectual order. One was that the search for an excessively mysterious spiritual consciousness and an overly noble moral state often led to contempt for knowledge and a shallow academic style. The other one was that excessive factional conflicts within Confucianism itself weakened and undermined the original unity of Confucian thought. Huang Zongxi and Quan Zuwang (1705–1755) both criticized the School of Principle and the School of Mind for their biases and attacks on each other. They advocated dealing with such closely similar forms of thought by “discarding their shortcomings and retaining their good qualities.” This way of reasoning and harmonization of the two schools of Neo-Confucianism provided resources that supported later evidential research. It led contemporary scholars from purely “honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing) to combining practice with “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue) of external phenomena and represented a turning point in the attitude of Confucian scholarship from “treading the void” (daoxu 蹈虛) to “seeking the real” (zhishi 徵實).69 “Honoring the moral nature” (zun dexing) and “following the path of inquiry and study” (dao wenxue), as mentioned in the introduction to volume one of this history (page 16), are two phrases from the “Doctrine of the Mean” 68  “Da Li Zide shu,” in Tinglin wenji, j. 4, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 1976, 76. 69  In his “Qingdai sixiangshi de yige xin jieshi,” Yu Yingshi particularly emphasizes the context of this thought and scholarship. Lishi yu sixiang, 1976, 124.

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(Zhongyong) in the Classic of Rites (Liji), and originally they simply expressed two goals that every Confucian should pursue. It was difficult, however, for anyone to find a perfect balance between these two goals, and so they came eventually to symbolize different internal orientations in the character of any Confucian scholar. “Treading the void” and “seeking the real” were two emotionally symbolic terms, but they nevertheless quite vividly expressed the different intellectual styles of two separate epochs. We may say that the late Ming actually experienced the phenomenon of scholars “setting books aside, not looking at them and going around talking baseless nonsense,” but then in the Qing dynasty, especially during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong eras, the search for what was imagined to be the original meaning of the classics was carried on through annotating texts, compiling lost resources, discriminating between authentic and forged texts, performing phonetic and philological analyses, and textual exegeses. This sort of scholarship then became the common practice, as many scholar-officials tried to reform the Ming dynasty’s empty academic style. They hoped to arrange systematically the foundations of knowledge and the intellectual order as well as to clarify social ethics through a reorganization of Confucian ideas. They emphasized the ancient classics, hoping to establish the truth (doctrine) on a more certain knowledge base through fundamentally sound interpretations of the classic texts and to reestablish the authority of thought derived from them based on the support of scriptural, phonetic, and textual exegeses. At the same time, they hoped to restore their scholarly and intellectual authority by means of knowledge-based evidentiary research. After the appearance of textual studies of the classics, like Gu Yanwu’s Five Works on Phonetics (Yinxue wushu) and Record of Knowledge Gained Day by Day (Rizhi lu), Yan Ruoqu (1636–1704)’s Textual Criticism of the Old Text Book of Documents (Guwen Shangshu shuzheng), Hu Wei (1633–1714)’s An Investigation into the Cosmograms in the” Classic of Changes” (Yitu mingbian) and Casual Remarks on the “Tributes of Yu” (Yugong zhuizhi), more scholars became increasingly committed to the intellectual trends of “following the path of inquiry and study” and “seeking the real.” One thing we have to acknowledge is that the gradual rise of evidential research in the early Qing not only heralded a change in the scholarly landscape but also a profound revision and reestablishment of Confucian thought. This was certainly the intention of many contemporary scholars because the Neo-Confucian schools of both Principle and Mind that were based upon a “principle” that everyone talks about and everyone says something different about and an indeterminate “mind” that is in state of flux had already fully exposed their shortcomings. These scholars rather wanted to make authentic knowledge from the classics the foundation of truth. As Gu Yanwu said, “In

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ancient times, what was called the study of principle was simply the study of the classics” (gu zhi suo wei li xue, jing xue ye 古之所謂理學，經學也). Huang Zongxi criticized the Ming scholars for ignoring the authentic classics: When the men of the Ming lectured, they just borrowed the dregs of the recorded sayings and did not employ the six classics as the foundation of knowledge; they set their books aside and wandered around talking nonsense. Thus those who study [with Huang] must investigate/exhaust the classics.70 While they were establishing the authoritative nature of certain classic texts, they also endeavored to differentiate between genuine and spurious texts in order to undermine those “forged classics” (weijing 偽經) that served as the foundation for the Neo-Confucian schools of Principle or Mind. For example, Huang Zongxi, Huang Zongyan (1616–1686), Mao Qiling (1623–1716) and Hu Wei’s investigations of the yitu 易圖 cosmograms in the Classic of Changes; Yan Ruoqu, Zhu Yizun and Yao Jiheng (1647–1715)’s investigations of the Old Text Book of Documents (Guwen Shangshu); Chen Que, Yao Jiheng and others’ investigations of the “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean,” and so on all served to undermine many forged classical texts (or forged scriptures). The Classic of Changes cosmograms (such as the Luoshu 洛/雒書, Luo writing and the Hetu 河圖, River Diagram) were said to have provided canonical support for Song Neo-Confucian cosmology.71 The “Great Learning” and the “Doctrine of the Mean” were venerated texts of Neo-Confucianism, while the phrase “the human mind is restless and prone to error, and its affinity with the moral Way is slight” (ren xin wei wei, Dao xin wei wei 人心惟危, 道 心惟微) from the Old Text Book of Documents supported the reasonableness of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle’s separation of Heavenly Principle (tianli) and human desire (renyu).72 If these texts were reinterpreted, it would shake the foundations of Song Neo-Confucianism. 70  “Yu Shi Yushan shu,” Tinglin wenji, j. 3, Gu Tinglin shiwen ji, 1976, 62. Quan Zuwang, “Li Zhou xiansheng shendao beiwen,” Jieqiting ji, j. 11, 9. 71  In his Yitu mingbian, Hu Wei separated the various cosmograms (tu 圖) out from the Yijing text and regarded them as later interpolations. This was actually meant to undermine some ideas and interpretations of Shao Yong, Zhu Xi, and Cai Yuanding. His Hongfan zhenglun was also intended to clear up or wipe out in one stroke the false discussions of the Han Confucians and the chaotic discourse of the Song Confucians.” In this way he could separate the classics themselves from layer upon layer of false doctrines. 72  The Guwen Shangshu passage is in §13 of “The Councels of the Great Yu (Da Yu mo). James Legge translates the full passage thus (CTP text): “The mind of man is restless, prone (to

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Be that as it may, this extremely critical style of examining the classic texts eventually lost its deeply critical nature with the passage of time. This is not difficult to understand. The early Qing Han Chinese critical spirit and the trend toward statecraft had their own particular emotional reasons and historical background, and once the Qing dynasty achieved stability, official repression grew stronger day by day, and the historical memory of the fall of the Ming weakened, then the fervor of Han Chinese nationalism no longer had the power to mobilize people. All that was left was evidential studies of the classic texts, and even this very critical, independent, and popular scholarship was overwhelmed by official scholarship in defense of imperial power. Especially when the high tide of intense Han Chinese nationalist feelings receded, and the ideal of rearranging the intellectual world finally came to naught, the literati scholars found themselves in a rather embarrassing situation. Since it was not supported by any new and original critical theories, knowledge, or terminology, the critique of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism was limited to partial revisions of some internal questions within the School of Principle by means of reinvestigations and revised interpretations of its foundational texts. For similar reasons, especially the lack of new theories, after denouncing it as vacuous, misleading and harmful to the nation, the critique of the Lu-Wang School of Mind could only borrow ideas from the officially accepted ChengZhu School of Principle to attack its rival. With the School of Principle under the protection of the emperors and the examination system, textual studies of the classics in time lost their critical edge. This style of evidential study of other classics through phonetic and philological analyses and textual exegeses

err); its affinity to what is right is small. Be discriminating, be uniform (in the pursuit of what is right), that you may sincerely hold fast the Mean.” (Ren xin wei wei, Dao xin wei wei, wei jing wei, yun zhi jue zhong, 人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允執厥中) Yan Ruoqu’s Guwen Shangshu shuzheng has the following passage that clearly expresses the real purpose of his investigations:  “It was only since the emergence of people like the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, that this passage was adopted, and its meaning was explored and elucidated. They probably truly believed that this passage represented the very idea that had been transmitted from the sage king Yao and had also initiated the teachings of Confucius. They did so because they thought what they based [their ideas] upon came from a respected place (text) and the principle that they upheld was accurate in the first place. Alas, who could have imagined that that passage was actually a forged one!”  Here instead of following James Legg’s translation of daoxin, we follow Alison Harley Black, Man and Nature in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fu-chih, 1989, 59 and 259 in our translations of daoxin.

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then became simply a way for scholars to display their intellect, learning, and cultivation. 3.5 In the mid-Qing, Jiao Xun (1763–1820) once wrote sarcastically that “recently when scholars study, they suddenly set up a research subject and call it textual criticism.” His use of “recently” indicates that the practice of elevating evidential studies or textual criticism from a method of scholarly research or a scholarly tendency to the status of “a research subject,” and using it to introduce oneself and to exclude others might not have been going on for a very long time. On the contrary, the establishment of evidential research may have taken place in the Jiaqing era (1796–1820) in which Jiao himself lived.73 Characterizing this scholarly practice as a confrontation between socalled “Han Learning” (Hanxue, Han school of classical philology) and “Song Learning” (Songxue, Song Neo-Confucian School of Principle) probably began after the appearance of Jiang Fan (1761–1831)’s Record of the Origins of Han Learning (Hanxue yuanyuan ji, 1811) and Record of the Origins of Song Learning (Songxue yuanyuan ji, ca. 1822). The so-called “evidential research” versus “moral principles” or “Han Learning” versus “Song Learning” were just two different scholarly preferences that indicated at most a division in academic orientation among Qing intellectuals. The growth of this interest in evidential research did not, of course, arise from nothing. As noted above, on the one hand it was influenced by scholarly disdain for “empty talk about mind and nature” since the Song and Ming dynasties, and on the other hand it was certainly encouraged, either intentionally or unintentionally, by the Qing emperors. From Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong on, the emperors liked to display their great erudition, and this was certainly very suggestive to Qing scholars. Large-scale officially sponsored organizations of knowledge, like the compilation of the Imperial Library in Four Treasuries (Siku quanshu, 1773–1782), also fostered this sort of academic atmosphere. The personal interests of reigning emperors and high officials also encouraged scholarly endeavors. Nevertheless, I believe that the main impetus for evidential research came from the above mentioned long time loss of a critical voice in affairs and of discursive power over the production of truth on the part of the literati. The traditional resources provided from ancient China for the literati consisted primarily of classical texts, and thus solid evidential research on these texts from China’s very long history became the standard 73  Jiao Xun, “Yu Liu Duanlin jiaoyu shu,” Diaogu ji, 1985, j. 13, 215.

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for comparing superior or inferior intellect and talent. Scholars often distinguished themselves from their peers by means of such expositions of the classic texts. No matter how much present-day scholars and their intellectual histories and histories of scholarship stress the influence of evidential research at that time, I am still not convinced. I believe they should accept something they may feel reluctant to accept. If we examine the wider overall picture of the Qing dynasty, we will see that in the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras (1735–1820), it was still officially recognized Confucianism, based primarily on the traditional classics and their Cheng-Zhu interpretations, that constituted a moral and ethical creed or ideology and dominated the entire intellectual world. Educated people memorized and recited this creed from childhood textbooks, and as adults they took the official examinations on these School of Principle ideas. If one was not well versed in this knowledge and thought, one hardly had any chance of entering the bureaucracy. In public situations and on official occasions, everyone was used to expressing themselves in these Neo-Confucian terms so much that this seemingly dignified and correct terminology became an official discourse. If you did not employ this discourse, you would be unable to express your social status, value orientation, or cultural ideals, and thus you would be unable to receive social approval. Thus in a sense the spread of evidential research opened up a little more intellectual space where scholars could escape control through their intellectual activities as well as obtain personal renown. In this way evidential research, especially philological and historical analyses of classic texts, gradually grew into an intellectual trend that was particularly widespread in the rather more wealthy area of Jiangnan (south of the Yangzi). This intellectual endeavor eventually influenced the entire Chinese intellectual stratum.

Chapter 12

From Ming to Qing II: Chinese Intellectual World in the 18th and 19th Centuries 1

Attempting to Rebuild the Intellectual World: The Turn of the 18thand 19th-Century Evidential Research

Could the study of historical documents based primarily on collating and distinguishing editions actually reconstruct an intellectual system during the most flourishing period of Qing evidential research? Could historical linguistics based primarily on phonetic and philological analyses and textual exegeses really reconstruct a system of knowledge? In theory, perhaps, these goals could be accomplished, but after a long time, however, when evidential research had lost its questioning consciousness (wenti yishi 問題意識) of contemporary society, its means had simply become its purpose. Minor and insignificant evidential research gradually developed into a way of showing off one’s erudition. This produced two related conditions in Qing scholarly and intellectual history. Knowledge and thought became separated. The pursuit of knowledge was bereft of intellectual goals and became a sort of meaningless virtuosity. Thought was also divorced from its knowledge foundations and became empty sermonizing. On the one hand, it offered seemingly conclusive philological or linguistic studies, but on the other hand it customarily reaffirmed over and over some supposedly true dogmas. This situation was especially harmful for both scholarship and thought after various scholars became flag bearers for either “Han Learning” or “Song Learning” and insisted on separating out and affirming either “evidential research” or “moral principles.” In spite of this situation, if we look more closely we will discover that, from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, attempts to employ scholarly language to express intellectual concepts never really stopped. In the period that is commonly referred to as the era of “Qianlong and Jiaqing Learning,” the intellectual history of these two dynastic reigns was actually quite different. During the Jiaqing reign, some evidential research scholars were no longer content with only practicing textual and linguistic criticism; they attempted to use evidential research methods to investigate thought. On the one hand they continued to distinguish authentic and forged classics (scriptures) to undermine the foundations of the Song School of Principle, but on the other hand they tried to find a “general rule” (tongli 通例) to reinvestigate © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_007

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the basic presuppositions of evidential research and establish correct channels for the production of knowledge. For the former, by means of corrected key terms of ancient thought, newly worked out by ever more precise phonetic and philological analyses and textual exegeses, they expressed some new ideas. For the latter, by means of their study of Western knowledge, especially in astronomy, calendrical science, and mathematics, they reconstructed a comprehensive understanding of knowledge. This scholarly tendency began with Dai Zhen (1723–1777) and Qian Daxin (1728–1804) and was later represented in the Jiaqing era by Ling Tingkan (1755–1809), Jiao Xun (1763–1820), Ruan Yuan (1764–1849), and so on. We can thus see that when critical studies of ancient writings and historical linguistics really entered the intellectual world and were employed to distinguish genuine from forged classics (scriptures), and to give historical explanations of key terms, then evidential studies were also able to express some new ideas in intellectual history. Furthermore, as soon as evidential research attempted to transform the traditional intellectual system and reestablish a form of critical reason that could distinguish right from wrong and the true from the false, it also began to harbor resources potentially revolutionary for intellectual history. 1.1 Questions about the relationships between “human feelings” (qing) and “principle/reason” (li)—to use Neo-Confucian terminology, between the human mind (renxin) and the mind of the Dao (the moral mind, daoxin) or between human desires (renyu) and the Principle of Heaven (tianli)—go back very far in Chinese history, and these relationships form part of the foundations for maintaining the traditional order of the world and human life. These relationships are so important because they are concerned with many important questions: Can human morality be improved or not? Can social order be established on the basis of traditional ethics and morality? Can political power or a political regime be maintained by relying on Confucian ideology? Can the civilized values represented by the Confucian elite and their classic texts be successfully established? If people in general agreed that the “Heavenly Principle” was a goal to be sought, then they also had to agree that the ethics and morality established by Confucianism were indisputable principles of Heaven and Earth. A “nation” (state, government, guo) modeled on the “family” ( jia), and the “mind of the Dao” that symbolized such a social order were also beyond question. On the contrary, one should be on guard against human “feelings” and “desires.” This was so simply because unchecked human feelings and desires could aggrandize the

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individual and lead to contempt for society, and thus “the human mind” would damage the “mind of Dao.” According to Confucian ideas, everyone should “hold on to the Principle of Heaven and put an end to human desires” (cun tian li er mie ren yu 存天理而滅人慾).1 The Principle of Heaven was the highest principle of Song dynasty ChengZhu Neo-Confucianism. They developed to an extreme the theory of maintaining the stability of the external social order through inner moral awareness. The problem with this was, however, that the Principle of Heaven covered both the social and the natural realms and included two different sorts of rules and regulations. When the Principle of Heaven was regarded as the “originating principle” (yuanli 原理) of the universe, it was a pre-existing law of the phenomenal world, and therefore unquestionable, just as the phrase “Heaven’s law and Earth’s principle” (tianjing diyi 天經地義) literally implies. When the Principle of Heaven was regarded as the “originating principle” of human society, however, it became merely a historically constructed form of common understanding, at most a kind of social norm or standard. It was, then, only a historical agreement concerning human social order. No matter how much the “principle” of the cosmos was said to serve as the basis of “principle” or “reason” in social life, this was still only an interpretation. To use the Principle of Heaven to negate human desires was actually only a kind of excessively noble hope. It could also go to extremes, using high-mindedness to suppress everyday life and engender mental anxiety and hypocrisy. The indirect or roundabout challenge of Qing evidential research to the School of Principle began with textual research and the undermining of its central idea of “principle” or “reason.” During the Qianlong era, Dai Zhen tried to change the former interpretation that “nature” and “principle” or “reason” are noble while “feelings” and “desires” are vulgar. He said that human nature was like water and human desires were like flowing water; it cannot be said that human nature is upright (zheng 正), but human desires are evil or immoral (xie 邪). According to Dai Zhen, when ancient people discussed “principle” or “reason” they often looked for it within “human feelings and desires,” as far as possible elevating “feelings and desires” (qingyu) to the level of the “Principle of Heaven” and pure “human nature.” Dai asserted that his contemporaries, however, were departing from “human desires” to seek for the “Principle of Heaven.” They wanted to eliminate human desires to render their hearts and minds pure and without feelings or emotions. This goal made excessive demands on humanity, and it came about because the theories of Song Neo-Confucianism 1  See “Li xing,” ZYL, j. 13, 222–225.

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carried with them an artificial tension between the “Principle of Heaven” and human desires.2 Dai Zhen’s main strategy for undermining Song Neo-Confucianism’s opposition between “principle” or “reason” and “desire” was first to do historical research and textual criticism of the words and phrases (the actual texts) of the classics. Qing scholars believed that, because they lacked textual foundations, the Song School of Principle’s interpretations of thought were merely empty castles in the air. Dai Zhen went back to the ancient classics as the foundation of thought and pointed out that the ideas in those classic texts differed from those of the Song School of Principle. Given the Chinese tradition of respect for the ancient Sages, the validity of Dai’s critique was regarded as self-evident. Dai next established the meaning of the actual texts of the classics on the foundation of understanding the characters and words of the classics, and authenticated and determined the meaning of the characters and words of the texts by means of historical linguistic study, thus confirming the true meaning of the thought concepts in the classics. By contrast with other trivial evidential studies, Dai Zhen’s investigation of the meaning of the characters and words, and his historical philology offered a path to undermining the foundations of Song Neo-Confucian scholarship and re-exploring the true meaning of the classics. That was simply his approach of moving from knowledge to thought, or textual evidence to abstract ideas.3 Dai Zhen was not the only scholar to employ this method of criticizing the Song School of Principle; Hui Dong (1697–1758) and Qian Daxin did so as well. In the world of ancient Chinese thought, the textual support of the classics was extremely important; if one’s ideas lost such support, they could lose their justification. On this account, the critiques put forth by Dai Zhen and others using this evidential method had some stunning effects.

2  See Dai Zhen, “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng, j. shang, 1, 10, 11 and j. xia, 59. For excerpts from Commentary on the Meaning of Terms in “Mencius”, see Chan SB, 711–722. 3  Dai Zhen’s “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng begins with a textual critique of li 理 (principle, reason) and it forms the foundation of his argument. That is why Liang Qichao later wrote that “The ultimate goal that the classics are intended to reach is the Dao or Way; what illuminates the Dao are words (ci); what brings words into being are characters (zi). Thus, one must start from learning [the meaning of] characters to understand words, and then go from learning the words to reach the Dao [of the classics] before one can really obtain it.” “Dai Dongyuan xiansheng zhuan,” in Liang Qichao quanji, vol. 7, 4183.

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1.2 In his Commentary on the Meaning of Terms in “Mencius” (Mengzi ziyi shuzheng), what Dai Zhen did was actually intellectual research based on the historical and linguistic study of terms such as li (principle/reason), yu (desires), xing (nature) and ji (self) in the Mengzi.4 According to Dai Zhen’s textual studies, the original ancient meaning of li (principle) was not really a kind of absolute truth isolated and above the world of daily life activities. Because li was over inflated (overdetermined) by Song Neo-Confucianism and ranked above human feelings (qing), however, a rupture in the world of daily life was created. Thus a humanly constructed Principle of Heaven was regarded as the realm of truth, and real-life activities were placed under this Principle of Heaven to be interrogated and censored. Thus reason and life were made into antithetical poles—reason/principle (li) versus feelings (qing) or desires (yu); the Way (Dao) versus tools (qi); superior men ( junzi) versus small men (xiaoren); upright (zheng) versus evil (xie); public (gong) versus private (si)—to give a few examples. Dai Zhen pointed out that it was precisely this creation of antithetical poles that caused “common human emotions and hidden and subtle feelings such as hunger, coldness, anxiety, resentment, and sex” often to be unable freely to express themselves under the oppression of an absolute transcendent Principle of Heaven. Furthermore, due to the fact that people escaped from this Principle in their real lives, this absolute Principle often became a “Principle in name only.” As a result of this, on the one hand there were no perfect junzi but xiaoren remained xiaoren, while on the other hand the powerful could “use Principle to kill people” (yi li sharen).5 Therefore whether it was so-called “Heaven” or “Principle,” it could not be considered an absolute moral decree or a strict moral standard; much less could it be used as a yardstick to measure morality.6 4  In his “Guochao Hanxuepai Dai (Zhen), Ruan (Yuan) erjia zhi zhexueshuo,” in Jing-an wenji, 1997, 75, Wang Guowei wrote that Dai Zhen already knew that evidential research was “a vast jumble, and not the same as scholarship” We need to keep in mind, however, that although Dai Zhen attached significant importance to ideas similar to those of the Song Learning, he nevertheless employed the method of evidential research popular in the Qing dynasty. Later on Ruan Yuan did the same, and this was where they differed from the “Song Learning.” 5  “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng, j. shang, 10. 6  Dai Zhen also cited a passage in the “Yan Yuan” chapter of the Lunyu (12.1) in which Confucius said that “to return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes humanity” (ke ji fu li wei ren 克己復禮為仁) in order to refute Zhu Xi’s idea that “self” is “the selfish desires of the body” while “rites” are “the moderating etiquette of the Heavenly Principle.” He pointed out since the next part of the text says that “the practice of humanity

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Dai Zhen’s critique of “Principle” was greeted with great misgivings by some of his contemporaries. Men like Cheng Tingzuo (1691–1767) and Weng Fanggang (1733–1818) strongly criticized his ideas. Later on, Fang Dongshu (1772–1851), a staunch defender of Song Neo-Confucianism, lashed out even more stridently at Dai by asserting that he was the first person to start the opposition to the School of Principle. Even Zhang Xuecheng (1772–1851), who was very closely related to Dai Zhen, said that because of Dai’s influence many young men in Xiuning and She County (both in Anhui) had learned to launch sensational criticisms against Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism.7 What should be pointed out even more, however, is that Dai Zhen’s thinking never succeeded in transcending the binary opposition of “reason/principle” and “feelings.” The result of his emphasis on the reasonableness of “feelings” or “desires” could simply lead to the abandonment of the past excessive emphasis on “reason” for another extreme sympathy for “feelings,” much in the fashion of the late Ming left-wing followers of Wang Yangming. This could not really heal the breach between an external Principle of Heaven and internal human feelings, between state order and individual lives, or between social standards and private discourse. This mode of thinking that emphasized the reasonableness of innate feelings and desires to overcome the restraints of the Principle of Heaven was still limited to the framework of a binary opposition between “reason” and “desires” (or reason and passion). As soon as Dai gave prominence to the significance of the human mind then he ran the risk of rationalizing selfish desires and falling into the same old rut of the later followers of Wang Yangming, and could not really free himself completely from this predicament

depends on oneself alone” (wei ren you ji 為仁由己), then what, after all, is the difference between the “self” in the first part of the text that is full of desires that need to be overcome and the latter “self” that has the ability independently to overcome its desires? Thus this “self” that has to be overcome is only being discussed relative to the great size of “All under Heaven.” Dai Zhen saw the “self” ( ji) as an “ego” (ziwo) that is full of human nature and emotions. It is only that sometimes it can be subject to biases and confused ideas, and so it needs to be regulated and cultivated by means of rational consciousness and a spirit of morality. He believed that in this way he could repudiate the Neo-Confucian (lixue) idea of using an external “Heavenly Principle” to constrain or repress “human desires.” See “Mengzi” ziyi shuzheng, j. xia, 56. The Lunyu 12.1 passage is Lau, Analects, 112 with his “benevolence” changed to “humanity.” 7  See Hu Shi, Dai Dongyuan de zhexue, chapter 3, “Daixue zhi fanxiang,” where Hu lists the refutations of Dai Zhen by his contemporaries Zhang Xuecheng, Weng Fanggang, Yao Nai (1731–1815), and others along with the support by Ling Tingkan, Jiao Xun, Ruan Yuan, and others. Hu Shi xueshu wenji: Zhongguo zhexueshi, 1991, vol. 2, 1040–1103.

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of Confucian thought since the Ming dynasty.8 The key to all of this was that this train of reasoning was never able to solve one major problem: how to make human desires reasonable or proper, or how to judge what desires are proper and reasonable, and how to guide human desires to be so proper. 1.3 How can one resolve the opposition between “reason” and “emotions” or the “Principle of Heaven” and “human desires” and make it possible for society to have truly applicable standards that are not contrary to human nature and feelings? How can one reestablish a reasonable order of social life on the basis of these standards? These are major questions that have been repeatedly discussed in Chinese intellectual history. From the “Doctrine of the Mean” and the “Great Learning” on, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Song-Ming NeoConfucianism continually debated these problems, but they never came up with any breakthrough ideas. People’s mode of thinking has always gone back and forth between two extreme polarities. Either they emphasize restraining “human feelings” with the “Principle of Heaven” and using “reason” to control “passion,” or they privilege the reasonableness of the “mind” or “feelings” and rely on the idea that the human mind possesses an innate sense of moral awareness to defend the existence of natural human desires. The thinking of Dai Zhen and his contemporaries remained limited to these two polarities, but, later on, between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the thinking of Ruan Yuan, Ling Tingkan, Jiao Xun and others underwent a profound transformation. As with Dai Zhen, their strategy was also to begin with evidential research. They agreed that the ancient classics did not use li as “principle;” at least when the classical texts did use the word li it was definitely not some absolute “Principle of Heaven.” Ling Tingkan criticized Dai Zhen’s limitation as being that “as soon as he opened a classic text, he began to debate about the word li 理.”9 Hence Ling’s evidential research method pointed out that the classic texts did not have the character li. At least only the Book of Songs and the “Great Commentary” to the Classic of Changes (Yi Dazhuan 易大傳) have it, but it always means something like “in order,” “orderly” or “to put in order” (modern tiaoli 條理). So-called li as “principle” was often brought up by later people and it might even have come from Buddhism. Both Ruan Yuan and Jiao Xun also 8  See Liang Qichao, Dai Dongyuan zhexue, in Liang Qichao quanji, vol. 7, 4193–4195; Hu Shi, “Dai Dongyuan zai Zhongguo zhexueshi shang de weizhi” and “Jige fan lixue de sixiangjia,” in Hu Shi xueshu wenji (Zhongguo zhexueshi) vol. 2, 1104–1108 and 1155–1165 respectively. 9  Ling Tingkan, “Hao e shuo,” (xia), Xiaolitang wenji, j. 16, 143–144.

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employed evidential research to trace li back to its origins; they pointed out its questionable nature and maintained that it was not a term intrinsic to the Confucian tradition.10 Thus they undermined the classics texts’ supposed support for li as “principle,” and, as Fang Dongshu wrote, they created a great deal of inconvenience for the Neo-Confucianism of the Song School of Principle.11 Next they argued from the form of the Chinese characters (zixing 字形) in question. They pointed out that man’s so-called “nature” (xing) is not really equivalent to Heaven’s “principle” (li); rather it also contains “feelings and desires” (qingyu) as well as “good and evil” (hao e 好惡).12 According to Qing evidential research scholars, the original meaning of the written words preserved the original meanings of the ancient Sages, and the ancient Sages’ original ideas possessed absolute authority. Thus their textual research into the original meaning of the words amounted to retracing the meanings of the ancient Sages and the canonical texts as well as testing the correctness of later interpretations of those texts. For example, in his philological study of nature and destiny (xingming 性命), Ruan Yuan inspected almost all of the Confucian classics including the Book of Documents, Book of Songs, Zuo Commentary, Guliang Commentary, the “Great Commentary” to the Classic of Changes, and the Analects.13 His final conclusion was that “what is inborn is called nature” (sheng zhi wei xing 生之謂性) was the original ancient meaning, and thus “nature” contains both “humanity, rightness, propriety, and wisdom” “ren yi li zhi 仁義禮智) and “the desires for taste, smell, sensual sounds and sex” (wei xiu sheng se 味嗅聲色). That is to say, xing possesses aspects of both wisdom and reason (rationality) and emotions and desires (passions). Ruan’s Interpretations of Nature and Destiny (Xingming guxun), On Buddhist Ideas of Nature (or Refuting Buddhist Ideas of Nature, Ta xing shuo) and Disputing the Return to the True Nature of Buddhist/Daoist Teaching (Fuxing Bian), and so on all followed this textual research position to reconstruct the ancient meaning of “nature” (xing).14 In the process, Ruan rejected all the ideas about xing that had been derived from Buddhism during the Six Dynasties and Tang and Song eras.

10  See Ruan Yuan, “Xingming guxun,” Yanjingshi yi ji, j. 10 in Yanjingshi ji, 211–236. 11  Fang Dongshu, Hanxue shangdui, j. zhong zhi shang, 61. 12  For example, Ruan Yuan wrote in his “Xingming guxun,” Yanjingshi ji, 228 that “desires are born from feelings, they are intrinsic to human nature; we cannot say that our nature is without desires.” See Ruan Yuan, “Xingming guxun,” 228, in Yanjingshi ji, esp. p. 228. 13  “Xingming guxun,” in Yanjingshi ji, 211–236. 14  “Xing ta shuo” and “Fuxing bian” are in Yanjingshi xuji, j. 3, 1059–1061.

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Ruan’s contemporaries, scholars like Ling Tingkan, Sun Xingyan (1753–1818), Jiao Xun, and others also employed this same method of evidential research to reinterpret this key term xing.15 Later on some lesser known figures like Wang Jiaxi (1775–1816), Hu Jin (1438–?), Hong Zhenxuan (1770–1815) and Xu Yangyuan (1758–1825) followed suit and continued to raise many questions concerning Song Neo-Confucian definitions of li and xing and other such terms. They concluded that these Song interpretations represented the personal ideas of later Confucians rather than the original meanings of the terms. In light of that, they could propose new ideas for the reestablishment of social order.16 1.4 If the human mind contains both elements of “humanity, rightness, propriety and wisdom” that agree with the “Principle of Heaven” and elements of “taste, smell, sensual sounds and sex” that belong to “feelings and desires,” how, then, can human beings be expected to maintain, respect and comply with social order? According to the interpretations of Song Neo-Confucianism, the traditional social order and its legitimacy was established on the basis of the “Principle of Heaven.” They hoped that people would self-consciously maintain the stable existence of social order due to the correspondence of their “human nature” with the “Principle of Heaven.” These Qing evidential research scholars repeatedly pointed out, however, that although the “Principle of Heaven” constructed by Song Neo-Confucians was very transcendent, it was precisely this transcendence that caused it to exist only in a world of artificially constructed concepts and not in the real world of everyday human life. Whenever the social order needed the support of the “Principle of Heaven,” that “Principle of Heaven” could easily fall into a situation in which “What one calls right the other calls wrong and what one calls wrong the other calls right.”17 Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814) and Jiao Xun both pointed out that the “Principle of Heaven” was only a high-sounding proposition, but not a set of rules or regulations. On this account, a high-minded ethics and morality could not necessarily create good order; it could actually lead to dictatorship, conflict and chaos. Since the “Principle of Heaven” was based on a judgement derived from 15  See Sun Xingyan, “Yuan xing pian,” Wenzitang ji, j. 1, 1A–B, Sun Yuanru shiwen ji; Ling Tingkan, “Hao e shuo” shang, “Xun Qing song,” Jiaolitang wenji, j. 16, 141 and j. 10, 76 Jiao Xun, “Xing shan jie yi,” Diaogu ji, j. 9, 127. 16  The four “Xingqing shuo” by Wang Jiaxi, Hu Jin, Hong Zhenxuan, and Xu Yangyuan are all in Gujing jingshi wenji, edited by Ruan Yuan and included in Yan Jie, ed., Jingyi congchao, in Qing jingjie xubian, 1987, j. 1388, vol. 7, 847–849. 17   Zhuangzi, “Discussion on Making All Things Equal” (Qiwu lun) in Watson, CT, 39.

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the human heart/mind, so-called “human nature” was certainly not itself the “Principle of Heaven.” Human nature includes both rationality and desires, and so it was impossible to maintain social order simply by relying on “rationality” (lixing) alone. Just as Jiao Xun said: “Only when it comes to [basic instincts like] eating, drinking and sexual desires shared by men and women, can we then see that everyone has the same mind. Therefore, talking about human nature as good is just to cling to a clever theory, that can not really be maintained.”18 In their reflections, these scholars emphasized the importance of li 禮 “rites” or “propriety” over li 理 “principle/reason” because the “rites” represented a set of regulations. Unlike “principle” that was based upon the belief that human nature is good, the “rites” assumed that human nature contains both good and evil. The rites could thus be directed at human beings with both their desires and their rationality and could direct their words and actions to conform with the order of society. In this way, “if you discipline people due to their violation of certain rites, they won’t be able to argue with you, but you won’t be able to avoid disputes if you discipline them on the basis of their violation of certain principles.”19 Because these regulations were extremely general and ordinary and certainly not more transcendent than the “Principle of Heaven,” they could close the gap between the ideal world and the real world of human life, and they could be employed to establish a human social order that conformed to reasonable laws and social standards.20 We should, however, be mindful of the fact that in ancient China the “rites” could very easily turn into “laws” as the example of such a transition from li to fa in Confucianism from Xunzi to Hanfeizi had demonstrated. Did these evidential research scholars have such a possibility in mind at that time? We have no way to know for certain, but, at a time when the Mencius had already become authoritative, these scholars’ reaffirmation of Xunzi would seem to imply a change of direction in their thinking. For example, Jiao Xun wrote eight essays entitled “On Expediency” (shuo quan 說權) in which he stressed that people should not blindly follow moral absolutism. What Jiao meant by “expediency” was a sort of pragmatism—neither the highest nor the minimum standard, neither extremely severe laws and regulations nor laissez-faire indulgence—rather a set of regulations that were to be flexibly adjusted to the

18  Jiao Xun, “Xing shan jie san,” Diaogu ji, j. 9, 128. 19  Ruan Yuan “Shu Dongguan Chen shi Xuebu tongbian hou,” Yanjingshi xuji, j. 3, Yanjingshi ji, 1062. 20  See Ling Tingkan’s three essays entitled “Fu li” (shang, zhong, xia) in Jiaolitang wenji, j. 4, 27–32.

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times.21 With the “rites” to regulate their everyday life, people would not need to wait for some transcendent “principle” to judge everything nor would they be controlled by any extravagantly lofty form of absolute moral idealism.22 These discussions by scholars from Dai Zhen, Ling Tingkan, and Jiao Xun on represented some new reflections by the ancient Chinese intellectual world concerning social order. The question as to whether “principle” and “feelings” were one or two had been central to many discussions from ancient Confucianism to Buddhism and from Song to Ming Neo-Confucianism. What was so special and important about this discussion at the beginning of the nineteenth-century was that its discussion of “principles” nearly broke through the dichotomy of “principle” and “feelings” as well as the tradition that regarded absolute truth and real life as in opposition. Implicit in this new consideration of the “rites” was an undermining of the centrally concentrated system of power that used the name of the “Principle of Heaven” to practice real thinking and cultural autocracy; it implied reestablishing social order on the basis of common sense knowledge, and regulations. Also implicit in this approach to “feelings and desires” (qingyu) was the notion that “feelings” (ganqing) and “life” (sheng huo) were legitimate aspects of social existence. Because the regulations that these scholars emphasized were neither some absolute “Principle of Heaven” nor simple “human emotions” (renqing), but rather a minimal set of rules, people only had to confirm and abide by these rules in order to obtain legitimate living space. By obtaining such legitimate living space, both private life and private emotions gained legitimacy and the individual “person” (ren) began to be acknowledged. From Dai Zhen to Ruan Yuan, all of the evidential research scholars employed the same methods of historical philology and historical linguistics in their search for truth. Dai Zhen repeatedly asserted that to find the truth one must begin with an investigation of the meaning of individual characters (ziyi 字義) and words (ciyi 詞義) (ci, words are usually two-character combinations) and then proceed to an analysis of sentences, finally ending up with mastery

21   Diaogu ji, j. 10, “Shuo quan yi,” 143. 22  In his “Mingmo Qingchu de yizhong daode yan-ge zhuyi,” Wang Fansen already pointed out that “this thought that was inclined toward viewing human nature as being natural and a unity between principle and desires, or a combination of these two into one … was a very common attitude shared by both left and right schools of Wang Yangming teaching in the Ming. It also occupied an important place in Qing dynasty thought. Scholars such as Dai Zhen, Jiao Xun and Ling Tingkan all elaborated on this view.” See Jinshi Zhongguo zhi chuantong yu tuibian: Liu Guangjing yuanshi qishiwu sui zhushou wenji, 1998, 80.

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of the meaning and significance of any text. This methodology of evidential research was gradually accepted in scholarly circles. It is important to note here that, although this methodology was still limited to the canonical classic texts, if it was universalized and Confucian thought was thereby historicized, then it would transform the scholastic tradition of taking the classics as the standard and Neo-Confucian thought as the truth. In other words, this methodology would move toward employing reason to reevaluate the truth. Of course all of this happened later, but even at this time evidential research was very significant in that its critical methods severely criticized the mainstream political ideology of the time. Since the high-minded moral idealism advocated by Song Neo-Confucianism confused the boundaries between the ideal world and the real world and considered the minority literati’s search for transcendence to be a universal demand of the masses, it sometimes developed into an extremely harsh set of moral standards that repressed every form of “private desire” (siyu) in the name of the “Principle of Heaven.” This was obviously rather inhumane, and Dai Zhen’s phrase “using principle to kill people” referred precisely to the unfortunate result of this sort of grandiose moral idealism. It was particularly during this time when Neo-Confucianism had already become a form of political power and gradually turned into a set of vacuous dogmas to be employed in the civil service examinations that this idealism controlling society in the name of the “Principle of Heaven” increasingly lost the ability to guide private individual life. 1.5 It must be admitted that between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this challenge to Song Neo-Confucianism did not really shake the traditional intellectual world. On the one hand, the “rites” being advocated were still the regulations of traditional society, and it is quite doubtful to what extent they could reorganize an already transformed social order. On the other hand, the profound changes taking place at the time had not actually given rise to widespread alarm. People’s lives continued along their usual paths. Although China had already entered an era when many nations or states existed side by side, in contemporary intellectual circles there were still insufficient resources to overturn the traditional intellectual world. There was still no crisis in society great enough to shock people’s minds, and so these “rites” were unable to replace “principle” and reorganize the order of everyday life. This is not to say that China possessed only traditional intellectual resources at this time. The Chinese literati’s understanding of Western knowledge and thought may actually have been much greater than we know today. At least

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before the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns (1735–1796), the Chinese intellectual world had been deeply influenced by Western knowledge. Not only had celebrated scholars like Wang Xichan (1628–1682), Xue Fengzuo (1599–1680) and Mei Wending (1633–1721) early on received enlightenment from Western knowledge, especially in astronomy and geography, but even Confucian scholars like Zhang Erqi (1612–1678) and Li Guangdi (1642–1718) could not avoid being interested in this new knowledge as were many not very well known literati. Many scholar-officials who were quite antipathetic to Western knowledge and thought and who frequently attacked Catholicism and called the Westerners barbarians still could not help admitting that in the areas of practical knowledge and technology Western knowledge had its advantages over Chinese knowledge. In the early Qing, this enthusiasm received official support. The Qing dynasty was not as sealed off as later people have imagined, but in the early stages of the regime the Manchu emperors seem not to have actually been hostile to this new knowledge. Deeply influenced by Western learning, Emperor Kangxi indeed had a great liking for these practical studies. It was just this encouragement that rather excited the scholars. People even combined this sort of intellectual interest with the trend toward the pursuit of rigorous practical and concrete learning. Although Emperor Kangxi regarded this practical knowledge as quite important, as emperor of China, he nevertheless took a position that would later on have rather profound and lasting influence. That is, he regarded this learning and knowledge to have originated in China. As a result, many scholars were very interested in this new knowledge while at the same time they tried to use Chinese knowledge to interpret it. This situation meant that the steady influx of Western knowledge since Matteo Ricci in the Ming dynasty was not cut off due to the change from the Ming to the Qing; it also led to Western learning being absorbed into the traditional Chinese system of knowledge and therefore loosing its intense shock value.23 Slightly later, the Qing idea that “Western learning originated in China” 23  Among Qing scholars, Mei Wending (1633–1721)’s views were very representative. In his preface to Mastering Chinese and Western Mathematical Calculations Comprehensively (Zhongxi suanxue tong), he wrote that there were in general two attitudes toward Western learning at that time. One was to regard it as nothing very extraordinary, and one was to reject it as heterodoxy. If they could be linked together, however, one need not distinguish ancient and modern or Chinese and Western. He obviously still hoped that the new knowledge could adapt to the old tradition and Western learning could blend into Chinese learning. Jixuetang wenchao, j. 2; Jixuetang shiwen chao, 1959, 52; also see Elman, On Their Own Terms, 2005, 154–156.

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gradually replaced the Ming reasoning that the “sages from the eastern seas or the western seas all shared the same mind and the same principle.” This relieved the tension between ethnic (national, minzu) pride and the new foreign knowledge, while at the same time providing conditions and opportunity for the reception of the new knowledge by seeking in China’s own history for corresponding resources and the language to understand it. I do not intend to go into the details of the influence of Western learning on Qing scholarship or of the concrete responses of Qing scholars to Western learning. I intend rather to point out that although Qing scholars could achieve a temporary measure of psychological equanimity due to the reassuring idea that “Western learning originated in China,” they were still very likely to experience a different sort of challenge from this foreign learning and pattern of thought due to the overall methodology and general principles of Western learning. In the mid-Qing, then, Chinese scholar-officials may have already started to make some conscious responses to this challenge. Signs of changes in their usual way of thinking may have already quietly begun to emerge. 1.6 As noted earlier, the basic presupposition of evidential research was that in general the ancient classics and the sages were absolutely correct, the older the classic text the closer it was to the truth, and the more something was said by the sages the more reliable it was. Conversely, the later a document or text appeared, the farther it was from the sages and, consequently, from the truth. Jiao Xun once satirically asserted that evidential research scholars always believed that the Tang dynasty must be superior to the Song, the Han must be superior to the Tang, Jia Gongyan and Kong Yingda must be superior to Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers, and Xu Shen and Zheng Xuan must be superior to Jia Gongyan and Kong Yingda. This principle was not only applicable to intellectual exposition, but could also be employed in the textual criticism of written documents, and even more so in making judgments on the correctness of knowledge based on the authenticity or inauthenticity of classical texts. Yan Ruoqu and Hu Wei’s textual evaluation of the Old Text Book of Documents and the An Investigation into the Cosmograms in the “Classic of Changes” is a typical example. This sort of principle of evidential research maintained the legitimacy and authority of ancient Chinese tradition, the truth of the sages and the meaning of the classics as simply “unarguable knowledge.” If one did not follow this evidential research principle, though, what could one rely on to judge authenticity or determine the correctness of knowledge? The further search for another universally applicable “general rule” represented a fundamental shift of profound and long-lasting significance in

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Chinese intellectual history. For Chinese scholars who had been steeped in tradition all of their lives, it was an extremely difficult choice whether to accept the “principle” of Western learning or to continue to investigate the Chinese “principle.” A general rule that can be universally applied throughout the world must have a set of rules of reasoning that can deduce “the unknown” from “the known,” and from which it can effectively understand and master the myriad phenomena of the universe. Qing dynasty evidential research scholars were always enthusiastic in the pursuit of such a “general rule;” they were definitely not merely seeking fragmentary and minor technical knowledge. According to Yan Ruoqu: In the affairs of the world, it is easy to go from the roots (foundation) to the branches, but it is difficult to go from the branches to the roots; I believe this is also the case with evidential research.24 In the textual criticism of written documents, then, the way to establish this sort of “foundation” was simply to look for a “general rule.” They hoped, in their words, to follow the branches down to the roots, to search upstream for the source and to find a general rule that would “run through everything” and would lead to the understanding and interpretation of everything. If the idea of “comprehending the words from the characters and comprehending the Way from the words” (you zi yi tong qi ci, you ci yi tong qi Dao 由字以通其詞, 由詞以通其道) alluded to above can be said to serve as the “general rule” of historical linguistics and philology, that leaves us with a further question.25 In the wider intellectual world beyond history and written texts, is there a type of “general rule” that can interpret all common-sense knowledge and explain all phenomena? By examining the extant materials, we can see that the desire to find such a “general rule” or “general practice” by mastering the world as a whole was gradually growing stronger at that time. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the quest for a “general rule” or “general practice” had become a problem upon which a good deal of attention was focused. From Dai Zhen on, a group of scholars, like Ruan Yuan, Jiao Xun and Ling Tingkan, were already trying to employ ordinary etiquette or propriety (li 禮) as a “general rule” to regulate and restrict the world of daily living. In the same way, starting with Dai Zhen, these scholars were also trying to employ the “mathematics” (shu 數) of astronomy and calendrical calculations

24   Guwen Shangshu shuzheng, 1987, j. 8, 3. 25  Dai Zhen, “Yu Shi Zhongming lunxue shu,” Dai Zhen wenji, 1980, j. 9.

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as a “general rule” to interpret and explain the entire phenomenal world. (Shu, numbering, arithmetic, mathematics, is one of the six arts of ancient China.) What we should point out is that a rather important opportunity for the rise of this desire to seek out a general rule or practice presented itself at the time— the entrance of Western learning into China. Researchers have often noticed that the proportion of space given to the study of astronomy and calendrical calculations in works of evidential research was steadily increasing. Qian Daxin once said that “mathematics” (shu, the general term for astronomy and calendrical calculations in ancient China) was not only one of the “six classical arts” [i.e., li, rites, yue, music, she, archery, yu, riding, shu, writing, and shu, numbering or arithmetic], but it was also a form of “Confucian learning” for understanding “the Way.” As we have repeatedly noted, knowledge concerning astronomical phenomena and calendrical calculations in ancient China was not only the foundation of dynastic legitimacy, but it was also the earliest field to be challenged by Western learning and to become an arena of intellectual confrontation. It was precisely within this type of knowledge of “Heaven and Earth,” however, that China possessed the greatest amount of resources from other civilizations; they could provide new resources that could fundamentally break through the old tradition. From Gu Yanwu and Huang Zongxi to Jiang Yong (1681–1762), and from Dai Zhen and Qian Daxin to Ruan Yuan, they all paid considerable attention to this sort of knowledge. When Chinese scholars studied astronomy and calendrical calculation, Western learning often became an important field of reference for them. While they were following the ancient Chinese tradition of “following Heaven and accepting the Mandate (Order)” ( fengtian chengyun 奉天承運) and accepted the importance of astronomy and calendrical calculations, nevertheless they unwittingly went over to accepting Western learning. For example, in his 1795 “Shihu xu,” preface to Jiao Xun’s Explanations of Arcs (Shihu 釋弧), Qian Daxin repeatedly stressed the extremely great significance of astronomy (tianxue).26 He reminded people that this sort of mathematics was the “Confucian idea of ‘passing through the hall into the inner chamber’; that is, having achieved a higher level of proficiency in one’s profession” because it was “the science of measuring Heaven” and “Heaven” was precisely the fundamental basis of Confucian doctrine.27 Ling Tingkan also pointed out, in his “Reply to Sun Yuanru (Xingyan 1753–1818)’s Observations,” that it was simply not feasible “to dismiss the Western view” in astronomy because in astronomy and calendrical 26  Qian Daxin once polished up Kun yu tu shuo for Jiang Youren. See Chouren zhuan, j. 46, in Xuxiu SKQS, 451. 27  In Litang xuesuanji wuzhong, in Xuxiu SKQS, 1045 ce.

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calculations Western methods and Chinese learning were “mutually complementary, like the inside and outside of the same garment.” He went on to say that “Western learning is profound and subtle and if one does not delve into it, one will be ignorant.”28 In his 1799 “Preface to Jiao Xun’s Study of Mathematics,” Ruan Yuan even more strongly emphasized that Confucian scholars must “know mathematics” (that is, astronomy and calendrical calculations).29 Later in 1820, when he set the examination questions for student in his academy, the Sea of Learning Hall, he asked them several kinds of questions about Western and Moslem calendrical science. He obviously hoped that the Chinese traditional intellectual world would begin to change in this regard. Why did they particularly emphasize this field of study? Because it contained the foundation of all other knowledge. Qian Daxin pointed out that various kinds of knowledge definitely had to possess common “mathematics” (shu), and furthermore, this sort of “mathematics” was able to be universally applicable and to lead to new knowledge because “sages from the eastern seas or the western seas all shared the same mind and the same principle.” People all possessed a common “mind” and a common “principle,” but for “those in China who were good at mathematics, Confucian teaching viewed them as possessing only small skills.”30 On this account, he repeatedly called upon people to pay attention to this common “mathematics.” If we say that the phrase “employ propriety in place of principle” expresses the new train of thought of evidential research scholars concerning the reconstruction of social order, then the phrase “seeking a general practice (or principle)” that explains the individual (particular) through an understanding of the whole (general) expresses the thinking of the evidential research scholars in regard to a new understanding of the structure and composition of the universe. In the first year of the Jiaqing era, 1735, with the sole exception of Ruan Yuan, the evidential research scholars Wang Lai (1768–1813), Li Rui (1768–1817), Ling Tingkan and Jiao Xun were all celebrated for their mathematics.31 Chinese scholars’ understanding of Western learning was obviously greater than we 28   Jiaolitang wenji, 1998, j. 24, 214. Also see Qian Daxin, “Da Sun Yuanru guancha shu,” in Qianyantang wenji, j. 36, in Jiading Qian Daxin quanji, 1997, vol. 9, 611. 29  “Litang xuesuanji xu,” Yanjingshi ji, 1993, j. 5, 681–682. 30   Qianyantang wenji, j. 23, in Jiading Qian Daxin quanji, 1997, vol. 9, 362. 31  Wang Lai wrote Mathematical Studies (Hengzhai suanxue) and Ruan Yuan published Li Rui’s Eleven Posthumous Works of Li Rui (Lishi yishu shiyi zhong), the “Preface” (Jilüe) to which states that he was particularly proficient at astronomical single step algorithms; he and Jiao Litang (Jiao Xun) and Ling Cizhong (Ling Tingkan) were regarded as the “three friends who talked about Heaven.” Xuxiu SKQS, 1045 ce photocopy, 527; Elman, On Their Own Terms, 2005, 271–272.

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had previously imagined; they all hoped to master the common “principle” and “mathematics.” In his Author’s Preface to Explanations of Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication and Division (Jia jian cheng chu shi zixu), Jiao Xun wrote that “names or titles emerged after the law was established while principles existed before the law was established.”32 He further said that just as all Chinese characters can be explained and categorized using the “six methods” (liushu 六書), so all phenomena can also be equally explained and categorized using the four mathematical rules of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. In a sense, “mathematics” is an abstract principle that transcends the multifarious phenomenal world. After he conducted specific research in geometry and mathematics, Jiao Xun went on to carry out a new interpretation of the ancient Chinese Classic of Changes.33 He pointed out that there were three things that were most important for the ultimate understanding of the universe: 1) exhaustive exploration (pangtong 旁通), 2) interlocking combination or connection (xiangcuo 相錯), and 3) timely action (shixing 时行); these three were all the result of actual measurements.34 This was perhaps the “constant Way that could link everything together” (yiguan zhi Dao 一貫之道) that they were mentally pursuing. Between the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns (around the 1750s and 1760s), people seem to have been especially interested in discussing fundamental problems. We must recognize that this kind of thinking that sought a new overall or comprehensive interpretation of the universe was really not yet mature, and at this time Western learning had actually not yet become universally applicable knowledge. This was the case because as soon as this foreign knowledge began to pose a threat to Chinese tradition, it would often be shunted aside. This was especially the case while the idea that “Western learning originated in China” continued to hold sway. At that time, even those scholars who possessed a genuine spirit of exploration would stop and turn away from their acquisition of intellectual resources just at the crucial point.

32  Jiao Xun, “Jia jian cheng chu shi zixu,” in Diaogu ji, j. 16, 277. 33  In the intellectual system of ancient China, the Classic of Changes was a foundational text. The principles (li) and mathematics (shu) of the Changes would seem to have been for the ancient Chinese a veritable key to the complete understanding of the cosmos and everything in Heaven and Earth. 34  These three terms are all derived from the Yijing. See Lynn, Changes, 121, 130–131, and 144 respectively for the passages in which pangtong, xiangcuo and shixing occur. Our translations reflect Richard Lynn’s.

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1.7 In his Record of the Transmission of the Masters of the School of Han Learning (Hanxue shicheng ji), Jiang Fan recorded a celebrated couplet by Hui Shiqi (1671–1741): When studying the six classics, one should revere Fu (Qian) and Zheng (Xuan), When observing the hundred virtues, one should follow Cheng (Yi, Hao) and Zhu (Xi). These two lines are very interesting because they symbolize the value orientation and two principles of the traditional intellectual world. The first line refers to the text of the classics and suggests respect for ancient authority. The second line concerns the world of daily life and expresses deference to the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian School of Principle. At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, however, the evidential research of a group of deeply insightful scholars was in fact vaguely questioning these two positions. Evidential research thinking was subject to two kinds of influence and stimulus. One was a distrust of empty talk about doctrines. They saw that strict moral standards and high-minded idealism excessively constrained human desires and were divorced from the everyday life of society. They therefore attempted to replace them with another set of rules and regulations of etiquette and propriety established by popular convention. This was, then, the thinking behind the phrase “employ propriety in place of principle.” The second was anxiety that thought and learning at the higher levels of culture would each go to their own extremes, and as a result of the split between a shallow “principle” (li) and trivial “matters” (shi), they would become either baseless dogma or fragmentary evidential research bogged down in details. They hoped, then, to seek anew for a universally applicable “rule” ( faze 法則) to reestablish a common foundation for knowledge and thought. In this context, what originally seemed to be traditional philology, linguistics, and the study of calendrical calculations (mathematics) took on a rather new significance. That so many people were committed at the time to discussing the “single thread” that ran through the Way of Confucius would seem to have been because they were looking for a new foundation on which to situate safely the intellectual world of thought and knowledge.35 From Dai Zhen and Qian Daxin to the later Ruan Yuan, Jia Xun, Ling Tingkan, Li Rui, Wu Lanxiu (1789–1839), 35   Lunyu 4.15, Lau, Analects, 74: “The Master said, ‘Ts’an! There is one single thread binding my way together.’…”.

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and so on, all of their expositions included the above kinds of intentions either openly or implicitly. At this time, the original study of the classics gradually absorbed modern implications, but once the door to this kind of knowledge combining the old and the new was opened, it was then impossible to prevent the entrance of various sorts of new knowledge from outside. The large-scale influx of new foreign knowledge into traditional scholarship, would most likely herald the beginning of the collapse of the tradition. Temporarily, perhaps, there was no such risk, but danger was concealed in the wings. Contemporary China just then found itself in an embarrassing situation. On the one hand, members of the mainstream intellectual world continued on with their traditional imagination about their own world and themselves, and they considered various forms of foreign knowledge as beneath contempt. On the other hand, there was no way for their increasingly vacuous traditional thinking to respond to the new actualities of life; in the face of Western knowledge and thought, it had to renew itself. If the Chinese did not “change within tradition,” then the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief would experience ruptures both in imagination and in reality. These ruptures would entail two results. They would either lead Chinese scholars totally to abandon the tradition and to enter into the context of global and universal truth, or they would lead Chinese scholars to insist on maintaining their imaginary tianxia and their particular nationalist standpoint. In 1799 Emperor Jiaqing had the corrupt official Heshen (1750–1799) arrested, tried and ordered to commit suicide, and so began a series of social and political crises at the turn of the century that brought a sudden end to the flourishing of the Qing dynasty. Several incidents followed that shook the intellectual world: the scholar Hong Liangji (1746–1809) sent his famous letter of criticism to Emperor Jiaqing; a devastating popular revolt broke out in Sichuan and Shaanxi and lasted from 1794 to 1804 (known as the White Lotus, bailianjiao 白蓮教 Rebellion); the Eight Diagrams Sect (tianlijiao 天理教 or baguajiao 八卦教) rebelled in 1813, attacked the capital, and shocked the intellectual world. Perhaps the psychological impact of these events on the intellectual world deserves our particular attention. At that time, Hui Dong and Dai Zhen had long since passed away, and Wang Mingsheng (1722–1797), Lu Wenchao (1717–1796), and Jiang Sheng (1721–1799) had just died; the few remaining great evidential research scholars of the Qianlong era—Qian Daxin, Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814), and Duan Yucai (1731–1815)—were already quite old, and a new generation of scholars was beginning to dominate the scholarly and intellectual worlds. At that time, Ling Tingkan was forty-five, Jiao Xun was thirty-seven, Ruan Yuan was thirty-six, and Wang Yinzhi (1766–1834) was thirty-four. They had to

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bear the above mentioned social changes of the age, and what they thought already differed greatly from their elders in the evidential research movement. The direction of their inquiries into knowledge was also quite different from the Qianlong era. For them, the world and the Qing empire had already changed, and in their scholarly research they could not but incorporate new resources and offer new reflections. It was just then, in 1799, that Ruan Yuan completed his Biographies of Astronomers and Mathematicians (Chouren zhuan), an intellectual history of Chinese scholarship that is quite noteworthy because it especially arranged in biographical form marginalized areas of study, such as mantic and medical arts, astronomical phenomenon, and geography, and began to bring them to prominence within the purview of the intellectual mainstream.36 This was undoubtedly a distant response to the challenge of Western learning from the late Ming and early Qing as well as to the problems of national corruption and weakness. Perhaps what we should pay even more attention to, however, is that this work faintly adumbrated the anxieties of the Chinese intellectual world facing the West. The compilation of the work was supervised by the leading contemporary scholar Ruan Yuan and proofed and revised by scholars of two generations, including Qian Daxin, Ling Tingkan and Jiao Xun. Did these men whom later generations have regarded as orthodox evidential research scholars already have some new ideas about the traditional Chinese intellectual world? 2

Influx of New Western Knowledge and Changes in the Chinese Intellectual World in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

Ever since Westerners began to come to China in the late Ming, within two or three centuries, various kinds of Western knowledge continuously entered China and gradually began to seep into the Chinese intellectual system. In this regard, most influential was the scientific and technological knowledge that the Chinese called “the study that investigates the phenomena of nature to acquire knowledge” (gezhi zhixue 格致之學) found in various translated Western books. When this intellectual system that modern people would consider reasonable encountered the original already well-formed system of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief, it gave rise to intense conflict. Beside the new knowledge contained in books, many Western scientific implements, such as spectacles, microscopes, clocks, telescopes, armillary spheres, and so 36  See Elman, On Their Own Terms, 2005, 265–273 for discussion of Ruan Yuan’s Chouren zhuan.

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on, came into China from the late Ming and early Qing on. These Western scientific implements were not merely simple tools. Implicit in the background of these tools were technologies, and implicit in the background of these technologies was knowledge. This knowledge with its associated ideas was very different from traditional Chinese knowledge and thought; it contained within it sufficient resources to call into question, undermine, and overturn the Chinese intellectual system. Fundamental conflict and the overthrow of the system did not actually emerge for a rather long time, however; to overthrow in its entirety the intellectual world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief that had taken several thousand years to establish was not that easy. This “new Western knowledge” had aroused the curiosity of many Chinese scholar-officials, encroached upon China’s intellectual world, and pushed the original already well-formed system of Chinese knowledge into a position of passive resistance. Nevertheless, I believe that before the nineteenth century, Western knowledge had only imparted to the traditional Chinese intellectual world resources for new understandings and a foretaste of its overthrow, but had not yet delivered a mortal blow to that intellectual world. Why not? Because for this knowledge to overthrow the ancient Chinese knowledge system and its intellectual world three crucial elements had to be in place. First, the Chinese intellectual stratum would have to accept the new map of knowledge, that is, to accept that there was one or many more different types of independently existing civilizations in the world that were in no way inferior to Chinese civilization. Second, the Chinese intellectual stratum would have to confirm that from their “fundamental essence” (ti) to their “practical applications” (yong) these civilizations possessed intellectual systems completely different from the Chinese system of knowledge and thought. Third, they would have to admit that there might possibly be a truth universally applicable throughout the world, and that this truth might not necessarily reside in China. As long as these three ideas had not gained general acknowledgement, people could easily rely on the idea that “Western learning originated in China” to explain and interpret this foreign knowledge, and so they could still maintain a serene state of mind. In the nineteenth century, this situation began to change. 2.1 In China, the expansion of the “world of thought” frequently followed the expansion of the “geographical world.” Perhaps it was the enlargement of the conceptual notion of geographical space that finally caused the Chinese intellectual world, originally only accustomed to China, to have to admit that

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“there are seas beyond our seas” (that is, that other major geographic regions existed). After the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns (1796–1820 and 1821–1850), the Chinese people had to accept the reality that “there are skies beyond our skies,” and hence all of a sudden in the nineteenth century a great many books concerning world geography appeared. It is said that in the forty years from 1821 to 1861 (the first year of Emperor Daoguang to the eleventh year of Emperor Xianfeng), Chinese scholars wrote twenty kinds of books on foreign geography, and that in the next forty years, to the twenty-sixth year of Emperor Guangxu (1900), the number had swelled to one hundred and fifty-one.37 Among them, two mid-nineteenth-century works, Wei Yuan (1794–1856)’s Treatise on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo tuzhi, published in 1844 and enlarged in 1847 and 1852) and Xu Jiyu (1795–1873)’s Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe, 1848), may be said to mark the transformation of the traditional Chinese intellectual world. According to the research of modern scholars, in the compilation of his Treatise on the Maritime Countries, Wei Yuan quoted from both Chinese works and the writings of foreign scholars. The number of works in the latter category are not as great as in the former, but the quantity of material cited from Western works far outnumbers that from Chinese works. They include both older works by missionaries who came to China during the Ming and Qing and more recent new works by Western writers.38 Compared to Wei Yuan’s Treatise, Xu Jiyu’s Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit contains even more significant new knowledge. Unlike the Treatise, Xu’s Brief Survey is not a practical response to the contemporary situation, but rather a work of geography in a stricter sense. If we say that the Treatise on the Maritime Countries continued to regard the myriad countries as China’s “four borders” (siyi) and situated the Middle Kingdom outside of “the world,” thus reflecting that Wei Yuan still maintained the traditional tianxia view of the world, then Xu Jiyu’s Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit using the term “vast ocean and realm, or rings of oceans” (yinghuan 瀛寰 or 瀛環) for “the world” makes it clear that China’s relation to the world is one of coexistence; that he did not employ the term yi or barbarian to refer to foreign countries further indicates clearly his consciousness of the equality of the “myriad countries.” Xu’s introduction to the representative government systems of the various Western countries and his praise for George Washington’s initiation of

37  For detailed research on the new knowledge of world geography in the late Qing, see Zou Zhenhuan, Wan-Qing xifang dilixue zai Zhongguo, 2000, Chapter 2, 61–157. 38  For all of the above information, see Xiong Yuezhi, “Haiguo tuzhi zhengyin xishu kaoshi,” Zhonghua wenshi luncong, 55 (1996), 235–259.

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a democratic system also demonstrate very clearly that his thinking was more liberal or open-minded than that of Wei Yuan. After this, over one hundred and fifty works were written about the world, quite a number of them by Chinese diplomats whose actual experience of the West and Japan genuinely expanded the scope of vision of the Chinese intellectual stratum. On this account, the preface to Treatise on the Maritime Countries contains two very important sentences. The first reads: Then everyone relied on what Chinese scholars said about the West; now everyone relies on what Westerners themselves say about the West. That is to say, in the past, knowledge about the West depended on what Chinese had heard or imagined, but now such knowledge came from Western people themselves. In this way, the reasonableness of Western people’s knowledge of the world was accepted, and this implied a change in intellectual stance. The second sentence is one that we are all quite familiar with: The book was compiled in order to use the barbarians to combat the barbarians; in order to use the barbarians to negotiate with the barbarians; to learn the best technology of the barbarians in order to control the barbarians. These statements meant that the significance of this knowledge was for practical use and for practical use in terms of a nationalist stance. They also symbolize a recognition and even a high regard for alternative civilizations and knowledge.39 In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Chinese people began generally to accept this new picture of the civilized world, and their image of the world was enlarged from the nine continents of the past to the entire globe.40 China itself was reduced in size from the tianxia world of the past to occupying only one corner of East Asia. This expansion of the world and contraction of China led the Chinese intellectual stratum to begin to consider and to accept an extremely important new concept—the existence of areas of multiple civilizations. Those countries that were traditionally thought of as 39  Wei Yuan, “Yuan xu,” Haiguo tuzhi, 1998, 1. 40  Paul A. Cohen, has already pointed out that “Chinese, in 1800, had the sense of being a universe unto themselves, of literally encompassing the world. This sense was still alive in 1840. But by 1900 it had become moribund.” Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tʻao and Reform in Late Chʻing China, 1974, 5.

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a “myriad states” of small barbarians no longer made up the “four frontiers” of the Great Celestial Empire; they were now countries just like the “Middle Kingdom” itself. For this reason, their civilizations or cultures, products, and languages came to be gradually known, and this knowledge also steadily transformed the unreasonable arrogance of the Chinese intellectual class. 2.2 These changes in geographical ideas were followed by changes in historical ideas, and the changes in Chinese ideas about history also entailed a transformation in their fundamental presuppositions about civilized traditions. It followed that, if the Chinese were able to accept that various peoples and countries had different histories and civilizations, then they would have to admit that the tianxia did not contain only a single dominant civilization, but rather a multiplicity of coexisting civilizations. The existence of this multiplicity of civilizations further implied that people should respect and understand the value of alien civilizations. Due to its introduction by Western missionaries, knowledge of foreign civilizations and their histories progressively spread in China during the nineteenth century. Chinese people’s understanding of those foreign civilizations was, then, much greater at that time than it had been two hundred years earlier. Scholarly research shows that from 1809 to 1840, some thirteen books and six periodicals on world history and geography by Western writers were successively published; in the twenty years after 1840, a further twelve books and three more periodicals were published on these subjects. Although they might seem to have been few in number, works like Robert Morrison (1782–1834)’s Brief History of Foreign Countries (Waiguo shilüe), Elijah Coleman Bridgman (1801–1861)’s Brief Chronicle of the American Commonwealth, (revised version entitled Brief Chronicle of the American Federation, Lianbang zhilüe) and William Muirhead (1822–1900)’s Chronicle of Great Britain (Da Yingguo zhi) were quite lengthy and had a very great influence. At this same time, the Chinese people’s understanding of this new knowledge gradually broke away from their interest in strange and novel rumors and fictional jottings, and they began to pen more systematic descriptions of things Western. Such were works like Lin Zexu (1785–1850)’s Chronicle of Four Continents (Sizhou zhi), Wei Yuan’s Treatise on the Maritime Countries, Liang Tingnan (1796–1861)’s Four Essays on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo sishuo), Yao Ying (1785–1853)’s Record of Travels in Sichuan and Tibet (Kangyou ji­xing), Xu Jiyu’s A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit, He Qiutao (1824–1862)’s A Complete History of the Northwest Regions (Shuofang beisheng), and so on. By the 1860s, after an increasing number of diplomats and scholars went abroad,

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historical knowledge of the outside world expanded greatly and the Chinese gradually accepted the idea that in this world there were civilizations with equally ancient and brilliant histories as that of China. This was also a fundamental change. In the past Chinese picture of the world, from the “three sovereigns and five emperors to the present” constituted one continuous history. This history supported the traditional Chinese special concepts of “All under Heaven,” the “Middle Kingdom,” and the “four boundaries.” It also supported the voluntary “tribute system,” and even more the comparative evaluation of civilizations. As foreign lands came into the Chinese purview and historical knowledge concerning them gradually arrived, this knowledge progressively transformed the Chinese historical imagination and memory. The two ideas that the history of the West was as long as China’s and that Western civilization was really not inferior to China’s were steadily accepted by the Chinese intellectual stratum. Zeng Jize (1839–1890) once stated that in dealing with the various Western countries that China was isolated from in the past “it will not do to fear them like the gods nor to despise them as beasts.”41 This was a comparatively calm way of accepting the new structure of the world. The Chinese intellectual class, then, began to have a sound understanding of foreign lands. For example, around 1877 or 1878, Guo Songtao (1818–1891) already had definite knowledge of the history of the West, the Roman Catholic Church, and even ancient Egypt.42 Li Fengbao, who was sent abroad with Guo at the same time, wrote that he saw “the historical records of various countries” in a library in Berlin. When he saw Indian books from three to four thousand years ago, he became even more aware of the incorrectness of the idea that in the tianxia only China had “advanced to the stage of civilization.”43 To take the late Qing understanding of ancient Greek thought as an example, in 1857 the first number of the new journal Shanghai Serial (Liuhe cong­ tan) had an essay entitled “Greece as the Progenitor of Western Literature,” and sometime before 1860 Wang Tao (1828–1897) mentioned both Thales and Socrates in a book he edited entitled Preliminary Investigation of the Origins of Western Learning (Xixue yuanshi kao). After that, Guo Songtao also mentioned the ancient Greek philosophers Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in his diary. With all this, the ideas of an age that could at least compare with the Chinese age of philosophers and a hundred schools of thought gradually emerged into Chinese consciousness. People began to see that even in intellectual doctrines China really did not flourish alone. 41   Zeng Jize yiji, 1983, 167. 42   Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 119, 374, 356. 43  Li Fengbao, Shi De riji, quoted from Zhongguo jindai wenxue daxi: Shuxin riji ji 2, 1993, 76.

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We all know that the ancient Chinese stubbornly maintained the idea that “Heaven does not change, and the Way does not change.” In terms of our modern understanding, their so-called Heaven was probably just the space and time that supported their universal rationality. In other words, it supported both their “world view” and their “idea of history.” Once the world and history both changed, then the tianxia of the past in which the center looked down on the four barbarians on the borders was transformed into a “myriad states” with no center and no external borders, and the civilized “tradition of moral principle” (daotong) transmitted in a straight line from the past was replaced by an image of multiple civilizations moving forward in tandem. All of this brought about a very profound change in Chinese intellectual history. 2.3 The recent history of Chinese self-recognition was intimately related to changes in the Chinese conception of “the world.” For a very long period of time, because China did not face any “others” of equal status it would seem to have lacked a mirror to reflect itself in and so it had no way to recognize itself clearly. China’s nineteenth-century recognition of “the world” was, then, conversely also a re-recognition of “China” (the Middle Kingdom), and a reexamination of traditional knowledge was also in the background of its new knowledge of foreign countries. An important change in the Chinese intellectual world in the second half of the nineteenth century was that their standards for the evaluation of civilization started to vary. In traditional China, people always regarded ethical reasonableness, moral awareness, the identity of state politics, lineage ethics, and a regular, harmonious social order as the central values of civilization. The Chinese always believed that they were superior to the West in these qualities, but this idea was challenged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Many people discovered that Western people also had quite mature and reasonable systems of ethics and morality, and that they also possessed rational organizations for the maintenance of social order. China was not necessarily in a superior position in these areas. During this period of time, due to the steady increase in their knowledge of Western government, politics, religion, and ethics, the Chinese could not but revise their idea that “Westerners” were all “barbarians.” In the second half of the nineteenth century, more and more people who had first hand experience of the West and who were keenly aware of the changes in the world began to carry out serious comparisons of Chinese and Western civilizations, ranging from “essence” (ti) to “practical application” (yong). They were hoping to understand “why they are small and strong, and why we are big and weak.” In his 1861 Protests from Jiaobin Cottage, (Jiaobinlu kangyi),

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Feng Guifen (1809–1874) asked why are the Chinese, being so intelligent, in the four areas where “people’s talents have never been abandoned,” “the land has not been left unused,” “the leaders and the people are not separated,” and “names certainly match realities” still inferior to the foreigners (yiren, barbarians)? These four areas are not merely limited to “practical application” (yong); they also involve questions of “essence” (ti).44 As a result, Chinese began to pay close attention to all the differences between China and the West. For example, Liang Tingnan had rather high praise for the democracy and the legal system of the United States while Bin Chun (1804–?) was also extremely interested in the English Parliament.45 Although this comparative stance still vacillated within tradition, nevertheless they had already seen the differences. There were others who saw even more deeply. Around 1877, from the differences in the Chinese and English political systems, Guo Songtao saw that in the West “they make their government affairs public to their people, and their rulers do not regard these affairs as their private business, and he praised England’s parliamentary democracy, legal justice, and the openness of their public opinion. He recognized the decline of China’s “way of the ruler” ( jundao) and “way of the teacher” (shidao), and even admitted that he was “using their (the West’s) possession of the Way (Dao) to attack China’s lack of the Way.”46 In 1884, Zheng Guanying (1842–1922) also admitted in his Diary of a Southern Tour (Nanyou riji) that the Western countries “possessed both practical application and essence (ti and yong) as the foundation of their nation-building.”47 In 1892, Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) went even further in asserting that democratic countries “are in accord with Mencius’ saying that ‘the people are of supreme importance (min wei gui 民為貴),’” and discussed their political conditions on a par with the ancient Three Dynasties (Xia, Shang, Zhou) that the Chinese most longed for.48 Li Shuchang (1837–1897), who was sent to the West with Guo Songtao, ruefully wrote that although the democratic system of England’s constitutional monarchy “has a monarch in name, in reality it is a nation governed by its people.”

44  Feng Guifen, Jiaobinlu kangyi, Dai Yangben punctuated edition, 1998, 197. 45  Guo Tingyi, “Jindai wenhua zhi shuru ji qi renshi,” in his Jindai Zhongguo de bianju, 1987, 38. 46   Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 393, 548. 47   Zhongguo jindai wenxue daxi: Shuxin riji ji 2, 1993, 270. 48   Xue Fucheng xuanji, 1987, 605–606. Mengzi, “Jinxin zhangju B, §14. Lau, Mencius, 196, “Mencius said, ‘the people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler …”.

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He was deeply aware that this constituted a very ominous challenge emanating from the “barbarians.”49 2.4 Which ones were really better, the Chinese or the Western intellectual doctrines and political systems? The majority of traditionally educated people naturally had their own sense of superiority, but this was surely a question that was not that easy to elucidate. The traditional Chinese system regarded bloodlines as its foundation, families and lineages as its center, and sought overall order in society. The modern Western systems had the individual at their center, regarded power, and rights and obligations as their limits, and strove for freedom. In their different social environments and with their different historical traditions, it was, in the first place, quite difficult to distinguish clearly which was superior and which was inferior. At that time, however, the world’s comparative power relationships underwent rather great changes. After the Opium Wars (1840–43 and 1860–61), China gradually fell into a disadvantageous position, and then its traditional government and civilization was subject to serious challenges from the West. On the one hand, imperialism used civilization as a cover for its encroachment, causing people gradually to overlook that intrusion and call it the “competition of civilizations” instead. On the other hand, the various Western powers dressed “science” (kexue) up in a new foundational “rationality” (lixing), regarding “science” as the outward extension of universal truth and causing people gradually to overlook the problems behind that rationality. As a result, the truth or falsity of something came to be determined by later gains and losses; superiority and inferiority came to be determined by competitive strength or weakness, and originally disparate evaluations and determinations came to possess a seemingly common standard. This embodied a great change in the conceptual world, namely a transformation in the idea of values. The Chinese began a transformation from the evaluation of superiority and inferiority centered on morality and ethics toward the evaluation of the superiority or inferiority of a civilization centered on strength and weakness. As a result of this transformation in methods of assessing superiority or inferiority, “selfstrengthening” (ziqiang 自強) became the center of gravity of the Chinese conceptual world. 49   Xiyang zazhi, j. 8, 251, “Yu Li Mianlin guancha shu.” On the parliamentary system, Song Yuren wrote in his “Taixi geguo caifengji” that he even believed “if China established a parliament … it would be able to do things [govern] easier and also accomplish more than foreign (Western) countries do.” in Guo Songtao, et al., Guo Songtao deng shixiji liuzhong, 349.

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After repeated military defeats and in a state of dismay, Chinese scholars came to regard this method of evaluation as a law of nature possessing universal truth. There were very many intense expressions of opinion at the time that we should regard as representing violent changes of mood rather than rational reflections. From the middle of the ninth century on, tension and anxiety hung like a cloud over the intellectual world of educated Chinese. They believed that if they could not surpass the Westerners and could not defeat the Japanese, then they would be unable to prove the significance of the existence of Chinese civilization or the worth of the Chinese nationality (minzu). It was precisely because people had already begun to place China in a global context, “heroes” among the many nations of the world were determined based on strength and weakness, the strong and the weak were determined on the basis of wealth and power, and truth and falsity were determined on the basis of winning and losing (success or failure) … that “wealth and power” simply came to equal “civilization.” This way of thinking about “civilization” gave rise to a whole series of conceptual changes. Chinese began to reflect upon history and to revise their concept of civilization. A very provocative incident is recorded in the Diary of Guo Songtao (Guo Songtao riji). In the second month of the fourth year of the Guangxu Emperor (1878) Guo read an article in the Times of London that criticized England for awarding a jeweled medal to the king of the “semi-civilized” (ban kaihua 半開化) nation of Persia. From this Guo reflected that China, that had always considered itself to be a civilized nation, was probably regarded by Western people as a “semi-civilized” country just like Persia. He was greatly saddened by this and was quite obviously influenced by the Western thinking that talked of civilization in terms of “strong and weak” and “rich and poor.” The paramount traditional Chinese concept of the “Kingly Way” began to yield to the not so glorious “Way of the Hegemon,” and to enrich the nation and strengthen the military became the most important thing to be accomplished.50 With people feeling that one process had reached its limit and a change should occur, the traditional Chinese civilization’s use of ethics and morality was relegated to secondary importance, and thus: If our people could realistically concentrate on mastering the principles of mathematics and science, grasp the methods of making equipment based on design pictures, and explore difficult texts about rivers and lakes while, at the same time, obtaining all the exquisite wonders by becoming 50   Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 439.

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proficient in these principles and methods, then this would be the way for China to strengthen itself.51 At this point ruptures began to appear in traditional Chinese intellectual concepts. First, people began to doubt the foundations of Chinese knowledge. Some people pointed out that the Chinese intellectual world’s use of the written word, rhyme, commentaries on or philology of the classics, sweeping the floor and conducting oneself with a sense of propriety when receiving guests as the foundations of knowledge was obviously inferior to Western people’s use of scientific instruments in the “investigation of things” (science) based on physics (wuli, principles of matter), chemistry (huaxue, study of transformations) and biology (shengwu, living things).52 Second, people began to doubt the path of the Chinese “investigation of things and extension of knowledge” (gezhi) beginning with sweeping the floor and conducting oneself with a sense of propriety when receiving guests. As this sort of reasoning went on, it led to Yan Fu (1853–1921)’s discussion of “the extremely rapid changes in the world” and call for the “search for wealth and power.”53 Third, there was a reversal in the Chinese judgement of the value of knowledge. Ancient Chinese learning came to be regarded as “useless” knowledge while the new Western knowledge was felt to be “useful.” In 1896 (Guangxu 22) in a preface to Chen Chi (1855–1900)’s Book on Common Activities (Yongshu), Song Yuren (1857–1931) mentioned that one popular idea at the time was that “Everyone in the world is saying our sickness today is our excessive reverence for the literary tradition.” By “literary tradition” Song meant simply the traditional Chinese practice of regarding the Confucian classics as all of knowledge, wasting so much energy and intelligence on this kind of knowledge in the humanities, neglecting other forms of knowledge, and thus leading to a decline in technology of a practical nature. Song felt that all this led to China’s “poverty” and “weakness.”54 2.5 When we examine various kinds of written sources from the second half of the ninth century, we find that new knowledge arriving from outside was rapidly 51   Chouban yiwu shimo (Tongzhi chao), j. 46, 3–4, quoted from Ding Weizhi and Chen Song, Zhong-xi tiyong zhi jian, 1995, 78. 52  Du Mu 都穆, Shixi riji, 1985, 62. (Characters given to distinguish from 杜牧). 53  See Yan Fu “Lun shibian zhiji” and “Yuanqiang” in Yan Fu ji, vol. 1, 1–32. For more on Yan Fu, see Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West, Harvard University Press, 1964. 54   Yongshu, j. shou, in Chen Chi, Chen Chi ji, 1997, 1.

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increasing. I’ll start below with the 1850s and present a few examples chosen at random. First off, books and periodicals introducing Western learning were increasingly numerous. In terms of books, the early situation was still the same as at the end of the Ming and beginning of the Qing when foreign missionaries translated, introduced and promoted such works. For example, various Western books in translation appeared one after another from the American Presbyterian Mission Press established by the American Presbyterian Missionary Association and the London Missionary Society Press set up by British missionaries in Shanghai. Among them, W. A. P. Martin (1827–1916)’s translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law which received official support for its publication and was a very important event in China’s move toward the world.55 After that the Chinese government and populace also began to get into the business of translating and publishing such books. In 1868, the Jiangnan Manufacturing General Bureau set up a Translation Bureau in Shanghai, and in 1873 the School of Combined Learning (Jingshi Tongwen Guan) in the capital set up a Publishing House to translate Western books, an even more important indication of official recognition of Western learning. In terms of periodicals, besides Western language publications, there were many Chinese language periodicals in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s. Important among them were the Chinese Serial (Xia-er guanzhen, monthly, 1853–1856), the Shanghai Serial (monthly 1857–1858), the Chinese and Foreign Gazette (Zhongwai xinbao, fortnightly, 1858–1861), the New Report of Shanghai (Shanghai xinbao, 1861, weekly, later changed to thrice weekly), the more celebrated Shanghai News (Shenbao, 1872–1949), the China (Methodist) Missionary New Paper (Zhongguo jiaohua xinbao) started in 1874 and later changed its name to Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao) and began to move from religious propaganda to the dissemination of science and culture, the Chinese Scientific Magazine (also The Chinese Scientifical and Industrial Magazine, Gezhi huibian; monthly, then quarterly, 1876–1892) that mainly disseminated scientific knowledge. Various forms of new knowledge flowed in an unending stream into the Chinese intellectual world from these books and periodicals. In the second place, Chinese people began to travel the world to experience Western civilization first hand and to understand the new Western learning. At the same time, great quantities of Western implements came into China, and various Western practices also entered China at an ever-increasing pace. During the twenty some years from 1847, when the first group of three Chinese 55  See Liang Bohua, Jindai Zhongguo waijiao de jubian—waijiao zhidu yu Zhong-wai guanxi bianhua de yanjiu, 1990, 54.

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students, including Yung Wing (1828–1912), went to the United States, to 1872 when the Chinese government sent thirty students to the United States, many Chinese went overseas and brought back to the Chinese people scenes of a new world landscape. In the 1860s beginning in the international concessions (zujie 租界), postal services and insurance companies were established, and many things Western, such as printing presses, sewing machines, the art of photography, and museums, began to appear in China. In the 1870s and 1880s, various kinds of Western learning, implements and devices entered China in abundance. The telegraph, telephones, electric lights, stick matches, running water, foreign cloth, and iron nails soon became everyday articles of use in China, especially in the coastal regions. If we look at the pages of the most influential Dianshizhai Pictorial (Dianshizhai huabao) that began in the 1880s, we can see that Western people, goods, customs, and knowledge had already become part of everyday life in Chinese society. It was precisely in this context that Western learning increasingly entered China’s traditional intellectual world. Chinese gradually learned the theory of the origin and development of the universe, the theory that the separation of the moon from the earth was “due to the force of their rotations,” the planets of the solar system, and the periods of their revolutions around the sun; they learned about the force of gravity, the elliptic orbits of the planets, the days required to move around the sun in a week for the various planets, that Mars has an ice cap, Jupiter has four moons, and about Uranus, solar and lunar eclipses, and so on. As for the human body itself, they no longer insisted on the traditional Mencian view that “the organ of the heart can think.”56 In general they now accepted the Western physiological knowledge that the brain is the organ of thought and the heart is responsible for the circulation of blood, although their attitude was still one of hesitation and their understanding still contained some discrepancies.57 Knowledge of Westerns tools and implements that could be directly used in national economics and the people’s livelihood entered the Chinese intellectual world in even greater abundance in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this area there seems to have been no conceptual barriers; the great majority of educated Chinese felt both surprise and admiration and greatly praised these new forms of Western knowledge and technology. Another thing that had great symbolic significance was that ever since the establishment of the Shanghai Polytechnic Institution (Gezhi shuyuan, 1874), 56   Mengzi, 6A:15. Lau, Mencius, 168. 57  See Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 779; Xue Fucheng, Chushi riji xuke, 2002, j. 3, 50; Yong-an quanji, 1963, 1109.

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from 1886 to 1893 many celebrated officials, such as Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) Zeng Guoquan (1824–1890), Liu Kunyi (1830–1902), Xue Fucheng (1838–1894), Zheng Guanying (1842–1922), and so on, all went to this Institution and set the examination questions. From the topics of their questions, we can see that at that time all ranks of the imperial court and the ordinary people were extremely interested in Western science and technology. This was a very rare event in China where the examinations had for a thousand years been centered on the traditional classic texts and knowledge of the humanities. To take one example, the questions set by Li Hongzhang concerned Western methods of measuring temperature, heat and electricity. He also asked the students about the interpretation of “the investigation of things” (gezhi) in the “Great Learning” and whether there were any areas of “coincidence” between the ancient Chinese interpretations of the “investigation of things” since the time of Zheng Xuan and the present ideas of Western science.58 Was he really testing the students, or was he expressing a shift in the intellectual interest of both the court and the general public? 2.6 At a time when “to enrich the nation and strengthen the military” ( fuqiang) was equated with “civilization,” and when Chinese began to realize that simply imitating the West could not really result in self-strengthening, quite a few people began to ponder the question of whether or not traditional Chinese civilization was in need of reconstruction. Finding itself in a state of crisis, this kind of thinking was increasingly strong among the Chinese intellectual world. What, people asked, was really fundamental? Very many people felt that traditional Chinese civilization was in need of renewal, and the transformation of that civilization should begin with education. The traditional concepts and system of education, then, began to be changed. In order to respond to the changing situation and seek practical effectiveness, education was no longer centered on personal cultivation and morality, but it began to be centered on ideas similar to Western science and technology; it began to emulate Western education. One of the direct results of this change for Chinese intellectual history was no less than the final collapse of the traditional Chinese intellectual system.59

58  Wang Ermin, Shanghai gezhi shuyuan zhilüe, 1980, 56–57. 59  The undermining of the traditional Chinese knowledge system was undoubtedly related to the changes in the educational and examinations systems and those changes in turn were undoubtedly related to the gradual penetration of Western style education.

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The traditional Chinese intellectual system was quite different from its Western counterpart. It was centered on the classic texts and tried to understand the path to truth followed by the sages and the classics with the aim of nurturing self-conscious moral cultivation. Therefore, its starting point was the study of language and philology. This traditional knowledge had its own integrated system of reasoning; it regarded establishing a stable social order, maintaining the authority of the ruler and the state (guojia), and nurturing morality among both the elite and the masses as of the highest value. The entire intellectual system was built around this central core. The value hierarchy of knowledge was also judged on the basis of this central core. The entire body of knowledge concerning Heaven, Earth, and the cosmos also established a vast system that embraced nature, society and humanity. Its explanations, classifications and expressions were all different from recent Western ideas; they belonged to an intellectual world with an altogether different self-created system. In recent times, though, Western knowledge had been gradually divided into separate academic disciplines and already possessed a clear classificatory taxonomy. It, too, was an altogether different intellectual world. In the late Ming, Giulio Aleni informed the Chinese in his A Summary of Western Learning (Xixue fan, 1623) that Western knowledge was divided into six branches of study: rhetoric (wenke 文科), philosophy (like 理科), medicine (yike 醫科), civil law ( fake 法科), canon law ( jiaoke 教科) and theology (daoke 道科).60 These six branches of study were incompatible with the Chinese intellectual world’s long-standing classification of knowledge into the classics, history, philosophy, and belle-lettres ( jing shi zi ji 經史子集). On the heels of their admiration and imitation of Western knowledge, educated Chinese increasingly discussed Western educational systems because they believed that the wealth and power of the European nations was related to the organization of these systems.61 On this account, Chinese who went to the West and Japan during the Guangxu reign period, seem to have been very interested in systems of academic disciplines. Guo Songtao, Li Shuchang (1837–1896), Zhang Lichen (fl. 1879) and Wu Rulun (1840–1903) all carefully observed those systems. We know, of course, that the division of knowledge 60  From Li Zhizao, ed., Tianxue chuhan, 1986, ce 1, 27. For the details of Aleni’s and other Jesuit classifications of science brought to China, see Nicolas Standaert, “The Classification of Sciences and the Jesuit Mission in Late Ming China,” in Jan A. M. De Meyer & Peter M. Engelfriet, eds., Linked Faiths: Essays on Chinese Religions and Traditional Culture in Honor of Kristofer Schipper, 2000, 287–317. 61   Guo Songtao riji, 1982, j. 3, 356.

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into academic disciplines and the education based on such classifications are very important, but in the background of the “six branches of study” in the West and the Chinese “four divisions” (sibu 四部) were incorporated different understandings and interpretations of knowledge. As soon as this Western system of academic disciplines and new Western knowledge entered the East from the West, they would undermine the originally existing system of knowledge in the East. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the traditional Chinese system of knowledge categories was increasingly unable to accommodate the new knowledge from the West. It was like a box divided into four big squares and several small squares, and there was no longer any place to locate appropriately the rich resources of new Western knowledge in the former categories (big or small squares) of history, philosophy, and belle-lettres; its squares impeaded both the increase and the understanding of new knowledge. Once the new Western knowledge had increased to the extent that the old box could no longer hold it, then people simply began to doubt the validity of this old box that they called “tradition.” During the Guangxu reign, however, some radical intellectuals increasingly admired this Western system of academic divisions. They believed that the Westerners “divided academic subjects into different categories and increasingly broadened them, and thus their system could make progress steadily and become even more advanced than before.” Acceptance of this classificatory list would clearly subject the traditional Chinese intellectual system to fundamental adjustments, revisions, and clarification. The final reconstruction of the system of academic discipline occurred after the keju examination system was abolished, but signs of the collapse of the Chinese knowledge system appeared much earlier. These portents of collapse gave rise to acute psychological tensions because once this traditional, familiar knowledge system that had been relied upon to support understanding and interpretation collapsed, the intellectual world found it hard to resist a sense of panic. In this situation, there was a widespread demand for a reconstruction of the Chinese knowledge system.62 62  Xue Fucheng, Chu shi Ying Fa Yi Bi siguo riji; Liu Erqi, Guozhai riji, j. 6, 30b also says that “Recently when people discuss world academic learning, they divide it into the three leading topics of philosophy, ethics, and physical sciences, and thus cover quite well its essential elements.” In 1891 when Zhang Zhidong set up the Two Lakes Academy in Wuchang (Hubei), although he retained the traditional classical studies, besides the study of the classics, history, and principle he also established the study of mathematics and economics. In 1893, he went on to advocate the establishment of a “Self-strengthening College” (ziqiang xuetang) with departments of languages, engineering, natural sciences, and

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The Late Qing Rediscovery and Reinterpretation of Traditional Chinese Resources: Classical Learning, Study of the Ancient Schools of Philosophers and Buddhism

In the second half of the nineteenth century, China faced a turbulently changing situation such as it had not faced in three thousand years. In this age of great changes, as it joined the new world, the ancient Chinese world of knowledge, thought and belief could not avoid reorganizing its own system of knowledge. In their diligent search for an intellectual reconstruction that could respond to the new world, the Chinese intellectual class generally chose the path of reinterpretation of their ancient classics. They hoped that by means of such reinterpretations they could ameliorate the shock they had received from the encounter with new knowledge and thought. 3.1 The first things to be reinterpreted were the Confucian classics that had always served as the foundations of power and authority. Since the Confucian classics established the textual foundations of the mainstream Chinese ideology, any reinterpretation of them would represent a very important intellectual realignment. Just as the classics section ( jingbu 經部) of the Annotated Catalog of the Complete Imperial Library (Siku quanshu zongmu) put it: “the classics are nothing less than the self-evident principles (truth) of All under Heaven.”63 The significance of any change in the interpretation of a classic text, then, went beyond the history of knowledge and became part of Chinese intellectual history. During that period of time, any change in the understanding of the Confucian classics could imply a major transformation of the entire Chinese intellectual world. In the face of an unprecedented crisis in the Chinese intellectual world, nineteenth-century classical studies ( jingxue 經學) could not but undergo subtle and unavoidable changes. The first thing people generally pay attention to in this area is the rise of the New Text classical learning ( jinwen jingxue 今文經學, or New Text Confucianism). Ever since Zhuang Cunyu (1719–1788), Kong Guangsen (1751–1786), and especially Liu Fenglu (1776–1829) started the practice of Gongyang interpretation (that is, the interpretation of the Gongyang Commentary to the Spring

commerce (that is, economics). Quoted from Xue Huayuan, Wan Qing “Zhongti Xiyong” sixiang lun (1861–1900), 1987, 171–172. 63  S KQS zongmu, 1965, 1981.

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and Autumn Annals, (Gongyangzhuan),64 they continually attempted to reconfigure the order of the intellectual world through new interpretations of the Confucian classics. Then, by means of this reconfigured intellectual world, they hoped to reconstruct the order of everyday life. As part of this project, they brought out the meaning in the subtle words of the Gongyang Commentary and energetically expounded them. In their interpretive commentaries they even more repeatedly discussed the “the duty between ruler and subject” ( jun chen zhi yi 君臣之義), and the “debate between Chinese and barbarians” (Hua Yi zhi bian 華夷之辯) that were mutually interrelated in the crisis of order they were facing.65 This sort of interpretive method had without doubt already changed classical studies from a form of classical learning to one of modern thought, and transformed historical research into the formulation of political systems. This scholarly practice was pushed to the extreme by those men who were working to set up schools or factions. They wanted to set this academic orientation up against the classical studies of the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras (1735–1820), and when they did, to a certain degree that changed the map of Qing dynasty scholarship and brought about a profound transformation of both thought and learning. On this account, very many scholars believed that the rise of the Changzhou School of New Text Confucianism went beyond evidential research. There were, however, even more elements involved in the changes in middle and late Qing scholarship. Not only should we consider the New Text scholars, but we should also examine the old style evidential research scholars active after the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras. Among those who emphasized the meanings of the subtle words, there were also two different trends. One trend was to rely on the elucidation of the “meaning of the subtle words” to blend various forms of contemporary political thinking into the hermeneutics of classical learning and allow it to go beyond the boundaries of linguistic and philological studies to emerge as a 64  On the significance of the Changzhou New Text School, see Yang Xiangkui, “Qingdai de jinwen jingxue,” in his Yishizhai xueshu wenji, 1983, 325–389. For an even more detailed study, see Benjamin A. Elman, Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: the Ch’ang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China, 1990. Also see Chen Qitai, Qingdai Gongyang xue, 1997. 65  The most conspicuous principles in the Gongyangzhuan are the “orthodox doctrine” (zhengtong lun), the concept of Hua Chinese versus Yi barbarians (Hua-Yi guannian), the distinction between inside and outside of China (nei-wai fenbie), vengeance or revenge ( fuchou), and the distinction between classics/moral principles and expediency ( jingquan). These ideas were well suited to the anxieties of the intellectual class after the middle Qing. Jun chen zhi yi is from Lunyu 18.7, Lau, Analects, 151.

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form of knowledge that expressed real (political) tactics and concerns about the current situation. At that time, then, the authority of the Confucian classics was merely used as a resource to justify their position.66 The other trend wished to emphasize and confirm the reliability and importance of the New Text classics. In order to do so, they introduced historical methods and relied on evidential historical research to expose the unreliability of the Old Text classics (guwen jingdian 古文經典). As a result, the New Text classical learning introduced methods of Old Text classical learning to prove the antiquity of their New Text classics. In works like Kang Youwei’s Forged Classics of the Wang Mang Period (Xinxue weijing kao), A Study of Confucius as a Reformer (Kongzi gaizhi kao), and so on, we often find them using the methodology of historical research. This practice unintentionally transformed classical learning into historiography and played a role in undermining classical learning. From the point of view of intellectual history, New Text classical learning was certainly a doctrine with quite a powerful impact at one time; it is just that very many people overlook the fact that it actually contained two seemingly opposite but really complementary ways of thinking. In his A Textual Study of Master Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Zuoshi Chunqiu kao), Liu Fenglu advocated “returning the events of the Spring and Autumn period to the Spring and Autumn Annals [i. e., the classic], and return whatever is recorded in the Zuo Commentary to the Zuo Commentary [i. e., history].”67 Easy to say, but in practice a very difficult piece of historical research. Given their principle of apparently seeking to distinguish “true” (genuine) and “false” (forged) classics, it would seem that without evidential research and judgment 66  Not only New Text scholars used the classics this way, but similar phenomena also occurred among Old Text scholars. For example, in his Chunqiu gongfa neizhuan, Liu Renxi (1844–1919) used the most fashionable contemporary ideas of “international law” (gongfa 公法) and “universal truth” (gongli 公理) to draw parallels with the Spring and Autumn Annals, and used it to discuss contractual rules in the international arena and general principles in the realm of truth. In his interpretation of the words “a son was born in the same year” (zi tong sheng 子同生) from the sixth year of Duke Huan, he cited the lives of Prince Edward of Great Britain and the Prince of Japan as two examples to explain the necessity of learning for the nobility. In his discussion of the words “the people of Zheng attacked the state of Wei” (Zheng ren fa Wei 鄭人伐衛) from the second year of Duke Yin, he thought about China’s current situation and repeatedly wrote of “drawing a parallel between China and Asia so as to solidify a defence line in the Pacific region.” See the 1912 edition of Chunqiu gongfa neizhuan with a preface by Huang Jie (1871 jinshi) in Xuxiu Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao: jingbu, xia ce, 707. 67  Liu Fenglu, Zuozhuan chunqiu kaozheng, 1995.

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a text (wenben 文本) would not be qualified to serve as a classic ( jingdian 經典). And so the precondition for the establishment of classical learning ( jingxue) would be the confirmation it would receive from historical knowledge. There was still another phenomenon of the history of knowledge and intellectual history that is worth paying attention to. Namely that in their search for a method of true interpretation, the evidential research scholars who carried forward the style of study of the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras eventually gave rise to another seemingly opposite but actually identical tendency.68 That is, through their search for a conclusive historical method, they led classical learning increasingly to expand its interpretive horizons until it also became gradually separated from tradition. The significance of Qing dynasty evidential research was that its methods of interpreting the Confucian classics, centered on phonetic and philological analyses and textual exegeses, allowed classical learning to go beyond the earlier methods of classical interpretation of Song dynasty scholars, and changed their vague and impressionistic nature. According to the understanding of Qing evidential research scholars, this could restore, make clear, and give prominence to the original meaning of the sages. So they called this method of interpreting the classics “employing philology to understand the classics, and illuminating the Way by means of the words.”69 Once this search for a truthful and conclusive method became the highest principle, it would impel classical learning to point in another direction. That is, it would change the meaning of classical learning from a quest for (moral) “truth” (zhenli 真理) to a search for fact-based “reality” (zhenshi 真實). This was especially the case when the interest of scholars increasingly turned toward evidential historical research; then they would put aside moral principles (or doctrines, yili 義理). Just as Chen Li (1810–1882) wrote, quoting Huang Chuwang (1260–1346): “for the time being just leave aside the empty abstract words and phrases and not talk about them.” What did he mean by empty abstract words and phrases? 68  I do not use the terms “Han learning” or “Old Text classical studies” here in order to avoid a contrast with “Song learning” and “New Text classical studies” and creating a misunderstanding about an argument between Han and Song or New and Old. The disparagement of Song learning by evidential research scholars was only a matter of the personal opinions of a minority. Until Jiang Fan’s Hanxue yuanyuan ji and Songxue yuanyuan ji came out and their antagonistic posture became apparent, they really had not been considered two factions. Of those scholars who favored evidential research methods, there were some who studied New Text classics and some who concentrated on Old Text classics; this was the general scholarly atmosphere at the time. 69  See Dai Zhen, “Yu Shi Zhongming lunxue shu,” in Dai Zhen wenji, j. 9, 1980, 140; also see Ling Tingkan, Xiaolitang wenji, j. 35, 1998, 312.

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He simply meant “things like respecting the ruler while making ministers submissive, valuing the kingly rule while belittling hegemonic rule, elevating the Zhou royal house while suppressing the Regional Rulers” because these moral principles (or doctrines) were “correct in their meaning, but everyone knew them.”70 In this intellectual atmosphere that seemed to be the opposite of the New Text scholars’ emphasis on the meaning of the subtle words of the classics, a new orientation of research in classical learning opened up. That was to move from a classical learning that sought reality and conclusiveness and expounded truth and principles to a historiography (historical study, shixue 史學) that sought to discover fact-based reality. For the sake of conclusiveness, accuracy and comprehensiveness of knowledge, these scholars did not hesitate to introduce quite a great deal of new knowledge. As this new knowledge steadily swelled up inside the old knowledge system, it finally burst the original boundaries of classical learning, and this led to the undermining of the authority of the classics. Below are a few typical examples of this situation. First off, “The Canon of Yao” (Yaodian) chapter in the Book of Documents, considered a primary guide for over two thousand years, was the starting point for ancient Chinese astronomy and calendar-making, and ancient Chinese astronomy and calendarmaking were also an important basis of the legitimacy and reasonableness of political power and authority. From the late Ming and early Qing on, however, with the steady influx of increasingly precise Western knowledge, the original theories from the classics faced danger from every angle. Chinese scholars who interpreted the classic texts could only accommodate and introduce this new Western knowledge to fill the breach in Chinese knowledge. Consequently various Western astronomical calculations such as those of Ptolemy (ca. 90–168), Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), Copernicus (1473–1543), Giovanni Domenico Cassini (1625–1712), and so on, as well as ancient Romans from Numa Pompilius (753– 673 BCE) to Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE), and the Alexandrian mathematician Sosigenes (fl. 75 BCE) all became resources for the interpretation of “The Canon of Yao.”71 Secondly, the geographical information in the Da Dai’s Classic of Rites (Da Dai Liji), the “Xia xiaozheng” ritual calendar (Xia xiaozheng was originally chapter 47 of the Da Dai Liji), the “Tributes of Yu” (Yugong in the Book of Documents), and so on were all challenged by the new Western knowledge. 70  Chen Li, Dongshu dushu ji, 1936, j. 10, 30. 71  Alexander Wylie (Weilie Yali, 偉烈亞力 1815–1887), “Preface to Tan Tian,” (Tan Tian xu), Ye Yaoyuan, “Zhong Xi lixue yuanliu yitong lun,” both can be found in Ge Shirui ed., Qingdai jingshi wen xubian, 1988, j. 7 “Xueshu 7”, 15B, and j. 8 “Xueshu 8”, 30A.

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The new Western geographical knowledge that had been steadily brought into China since the late Ming and early Qing had already seeped into Chinese interpretations of the classics. After the Guangxu and Xianfeng reigns (after 1861) the principle of traditional Chinese exegesis of the classics that “the commentaries cannot contradict the classic text” (zhu bu bo jing 注不駁經) was gradually overturned due to the introduction of new Western geographic knowledge of the northwest. Scholars increasingly imported Western astronomical, geographical, and mathematic knowledge to explain the geography of far off alien peoples that were not mentioned in the “Tributes of Yu.”72 These new interpretations presented an unprecedented challenge to the originally unquestionable authority of the Chinese classics. On the surface Confucian classical learning would seem to have continued to maintain its scholarly production and reproduction upon entering the nineteenth century; many excellent works of research in philology and historical linguistics appeared up to the middle of the century. By the second half of the century, however, cracks really began to appear in this type of study of the classics. In their dual anxiety and tension about tradition and present reality, both the New Text and the Old Text scholars tried, through their reinterpretations of the classics, to discover sources of knowledge and thought belonging to their own traditions in order to respond to the daily increasing influx of new knowledge. But these new interpretations actually subjected ancient Chinese classical learning to irreversible harm. On the one hand, their reflections on reality constantly deconstructed the interpretations of the traditional classics; they blended these reflections on reality with their interpretations of the classics and, in the name of the classics, they established their own discussions as authoritative views of the contemporary situation. On the surface, they seemed to regard the Confucian classics as “sacred texts” that were guaranteed to solve all problems, but in reality they turned the classics into pragmatic texts of tactical utility. On the other hand, in their search for conclusiveness, they continually brought in new knowledge, and this new knowledge undermined the sacredness of the classics. They began to regard the classics as historical documents, and classical learning turned into historiography. It was precisely this dual transformation of classical learning that later on, in a certain sense, brought about such rapid changes in Chinese knowledge and thought. They also caused traditional classical learning to be transformed and differentiated into the modern academic subject categories of literature, history, and philosophy. 72  Yang Maojian, Yugong xin tushuo, front matter, tongzhi year 6 (1867) Bilinglong guan printing, Guangzhou. See Xuxiu sibu quanshu zongmu tiyao: jingbu, shang ce, 1997, 283.

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3.2 Next off, the traditional resources that were brought to the fore and reinterpreted were the teachings of hitherto marginal ancient schools of philosophers (zhuzi 諸子) of the hundred schools era. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief may have appeared especially complicated and subtle. During this period, various kinds of knowledge, thought and belief, whether “old” (traditional), “new” (present day), “central” (Chinese, from zhongguo, central states) or “external” (the world), all experienced wave upon wave of dispute. In the late nineteenth century when people were facing thought and culture from abroad, it seemed as though China’s old experience and this new knowledge—the ancient classics and the modern world—suddenly came apart. Just as Mary Clabaugh Wright wrote, at this time the frame of mind of traditional Chinese men of learning was anything but tranquil. They were “haunted by doubts and buffeted by circumstances” and the next generation was even more “frightened and demoralized” because they were “compelled within a single lifetime to face the loss not only of livelihood and self-respect but of every moral and social value.”73 They received a mental shock, and that combined with various imminent practical problems threw them into a state of tension and a rarely experienced cultural predicament. They had to find a way out of this predicament, and so after the 1880s and 1890s educated Chinese began to be divided. Some of them became stubborn nationalists who criticized and resisted Western thought. Some of them became radical internationalists who completely accepted the whole list of Western ideas. Still others continued to employ the ancient Chinese methods of the past two or three hundred years and maintained that the new Western knowledge was no more than a “tool” (qi) of practical knowledge and technology that had nothing to do with the “Way” (Dao) of traditional Chinese thought and belief. They used Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909)’s slogan of “Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for practical application” (Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong 中學為體, 西學為用) to neutralize their psychological imbalance and maintain their national self-respect. Simply rejecting Western ideas would not work, but completely accepting them also had its difficulties. After Western knowledge, thought and belief as a whole entered China and became a powerful discourse, people were bound to discover sooner or later that it represented a completely “alien civilization.” It was a much more alien and unfamiliar cultural system than Indian Buddhism. 73  Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874, 1957, 1966, 5.

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If they truly wanted to understand and master this kind of new knowledge, simple translations would not accomplish the task. Rather they would have to search for resources in their own intellectual background to comprehend and thoroughly interpret this new knowledge. Thus some scholars searched through their own classical tradition and let their classic texts speak again. Some of them surprisingly discovered that the Chinese classical tradition also obtained a new significance. Among the newly explored “classical” tradition that was most astonishing and that most attracted people’s attention was not the traditional classical learning, but rather the learning of the ancient schools of philosophers (zhuzixue 諸子學) and Buddhism, both of which had existed on the margins of the Chinese intellectual world.74 It was just at this time that the learning of the ancient schools of philosophers and Buddhism gradually took center stage and exhibited their contemporary significance. Let us first examine the process by which the study of the ancient schools of philosophers went from latency to prominence. The historical background of the flourishing of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers was the broadening of scholarly interests after the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras (after 1820). When the practice of evidential research was at its height during these eras, classical learning, the study of the Confucian classics, became a field of experimentation. Various traditional scholarly methods, such as etymology, phonetics, philology, study of textual variations and versions, cataloging, collating, finding lost texts or versions, and distinguishing authentic texts from forgeries, had actually already been experimentally applied to classical learning. Almost every Confucian classic had been given new interpretations, and almost all of these interpretations had new explications. When later scholars tried to continue to seek out an area to employ their talents fully in traditional scholarship, then, they could not help but look beyond the canonical classics to discover the schools of ancient philosophers where they could similarly put their skill at textual examination and criticism into practice. Although men like Qian Daxin, Wang Niansun (1744–1832), Wang Zhong (1745–1794), Bi Yuan (1730–1797) and Jiao Xun still mainly employed the methods they used in treating the Confucian classics to deal with the schools of ancient philosophers, they considered their works to be spacious repositories from which they could choose extensively. They either used them to 74  In his “Wan-Qing sixiang fazhang shilun—jige jiben lundian de tichu,” Zhang Hao already noticed this situation and also pointed out that “late Qing thought was not only impacted by the West, but also by Chinese tradition. For that reason, a very important topic in the study of late Qing thought is an investigation of the relationship between these two impacts.” Zhou Moshan, Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwu—Wan-Qing sixiang, 1985, 22–23.

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corroborate general rules of reading the Confucian classics or as contemporary sources for interpreting those classics. In the final analysis, though, they were providing an opportunity for the pre-Qin texts of the various schools to move from the margin to the center. In the area of textual examination, the texts of the schools of ancient philosophers and the Confucian classics came to have a complementary relationship. From the eighteenth into the nineteenth centuries, these new fields of study actually allowed the ancient schools of philosophers an opportunity to regain their legitimacy. If we look a little farther afield, we can still discern that around these scholars there were also some who were working hard in an attempt to give new interpretations to the history of knowledge and to expand the scope of intellectual sources. For example, works like the very influential General Principles of Literature and History (Wenshi tongyi) of Zhang Xuecheng (1738–1801) that gave a new assessment of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers, and Wang Zhong’s On Learning (Shuxue) may probably be counted as participating in this thought tide.75 Together with the ideas of Ruan Yuan, Jiao Xun, Ling Tingkan and others, they represented a new direction in knowledge and intellectual history in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and while no one was paying it much attention this new tendency may have been gradually growing. For example, Wang Shiduo (1802–1889) was quite dissatisfied with Confucianism because it disdained to discuss the methods of Guan Zhong, Shangyang, Shen Buhai, Han Fei, Sunzi, and Wu Qi, and he leveled very intense criticism at the thinking of Confucius. He believed that the ideal of Confucianism was truly “empty thinking” (xuxiang 虛想), and even said that the Confucians’ “constant talk of restoring the past certainly does not make any sense.” On the contrary, he thought very highly of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers and went so far as to assert that “we should establish Jiang Taigong [Lü Shang, or Lü Wang (fl. 11th century BCE)] above the Duke of the Zhou and Confucius [in the state temple], and use [the methods and strategies of] Han Fei, Shen Buhai and Shang Yang accompanied by [the martial 75  Zhang Xuecheng argued from a historical point of view. He affirmed that the various philosophers all derived from the six classics, and that Xunzi and Mencius were both followers of Confucius. See Wenshi tongyi, nei pian 1, “Shijiao shang,” 60 and nei pian 2 “Boyue xia,” 166. Wang Zhong, though, argued from the point of view of thought. He believed that Mozi and Xunzi, and so on each had his own method, and that the polemics between Confucianism, Moism and Daoism arose simply because “they did not agree with each other.” See Shuxue, nei pian 3, “Mozi xu,” “Mozi houxu,” 1A–4B; Shuxue buyi, “Xun Qingzi tonglun,” 5B–8A. His understanding was close to Zhang Xuecheng’s opinions, and they both created an opportunity for the later revival of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers.

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arts of generals] Bai Qi, Wang Jian, and Han Xin as well as [the great statecraft] of Guan Zhong and Zhuge Liang. Then this would almost lead to long-term peace and stability.”76 The above mentioned intellectual orientation provided a latent opportunity for the rise of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers. Nevertheless, we need to point out that during the entire Jiaqing and Daoguang period, before the middle of the nineteenth century, the study of the ancient schools of philosophers remained after all within the scope of philology and historical linguistics. Its appearance only provided sources of knowledge and thought that later generations could make use of. It was not until the second half of the century that a re-evaluation of the thinking of the ancient schools of philosophers was made in an attempt to use their ideas to understand the new Western knowledge. For example, in the face of a completely new intellectual world and a new world of nature, Yao Ying (1785–1853) harkened back to the Classic of Mountains and Seas (Shanhai jing) and the Biography of Mu Tianzi (Mu Tianzi zhuan).77 Again, Zou Boqi (1819–1869), the earliest Chinese to use photography, in his “All Western Methods Existed in Ancient China” used the “Canons” and “Explanations” chapters of the Mozi to interpret mathematics, mechanics and the science of perspective (shixue 視學) in Western learning.78 Chen Li also introduced the Elements of Euclid and various Western instruments such as concave-convex lenses to interpret the Mozi, while later on Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), in his Treatise on Japan (Ribenguo zhi) even more extensively employed the “Exalting Unity” and “Universal Love” chapters of the Mozi to understand the rules of Western politics and society.79 Although these writings had not gone beyond the old refrain that “Western learning originated in China,” nevertheless they did spur on the revival of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers. The modern interpretation of their significance, however, would have to wait for some new opportunities and support from some new resources. Thus it was 76  Quoted from Wang Fansen, “Wang Huiweng yu ‘Yibing riji’,” Dongya jindai sixiang yu shehui: Li Yongchi jiaoshou liuzhi huadan zhushou lunwe ji, 1999, 294. 77  See Yao Ying, Kangyou jixing, j. 9, 272 in Shiliao sanbian series, Guangwen shuju photocopy edition, n.d. (original published in 1850 and 1867). 78  Zou Boqi, “Xueji yide,” j. xia, from Xu Shichang, ed., Qing Ru xue-an, volume 7 of Shijie shuju edition, 1966, j. 175, 42B–43A. The “Canons” ( jing 經) A and B and the “Explanations” ( jingshuo 經說) A and B are chapters 40–43 in the Mozi. See Ian Johnston, The Mozi: A Complete Translation, 2010, 374–577. 79  Chen Li, Dongshu dushu ji, 1936, j. 12, 14. Huang Zunxian, Ribenguo zhi, 1898, j. 32, “Xueshu zhi yi,” 1898, 1–3. The chapters in the Mozi are 11–13 and 14–16 respectively. See Ian Johnson, The Mozi, 90–165.

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not until the end of the century when the late Qing intellectuals again brought forth the study of the ancient schools of philosophers that they did so in a new frame of mind while facing a new context. Under pressure from both a political and an intellectual crisis, the study of the ancient schools of philosophers was no longer simply the rediscovery of the ancient Chinese classics by a small number farsighted men; these ancient works were then an important source for the reorganization of the entire world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief. Their study was no longer simply a matter of topics within the scope of philology and historical linguistics; it involved rather a new questioning and a new direction of thinking. In other words, the thing that really provoked the opportunity for the revival of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers was a transformation in the Chinese intellectual stratum’s experience and a recognition of the unfavorable situation they found themselves in. First off, in the second half of the nineteenth century, scholars began to be gradually conscious of the fact that they were already living in a “global” context. At this time, they finally came to a profound feeling of the shock that an inconceivable yet actually existing new world was inflicting on China. They were being forced to accept new forms of knowledge one after another, and these things for which no corresponding knowledge could be found in the Confucian classics kept flooding into the Chinese people’s field of view. On this account, the various kinds of “strange and incredible things” and “vague and nonsensical discourse” that were originally contained in the works of the various schools of philosophers finally came to be rediscovered in the Chinese historical memory. On the one hand, they were used as methods to imagine new knowledge, while on the other hand they were employed as a wonder drug to dull the pain of China’s mental shock. Secondly, under pressure from the above-mentioned crises, many people seem to have become aware of the lack of practical efficacy of the Confucian doctrines that had always occupied the central position in Chinese thought and of the knowledge of the humanities that had always dominated Chinese education and the official examinations. They then began to pursue knowledge that was inclined to be of more practical utility such as the military knowledge of the Military School (bingjia 兵家), one of the various schools of ancient philosophers.80 People realized very quickly that if they wanted to defend their presently existing political authority and social order, they would need more than ethics and morality; they would need even more a knowledge 80  For example, Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) was very interested in this practical knowledge and technology. Some scholars even believe that Zuo’s scholarly research emphasizing geography, agricultural science, current affairs and military studies were very influential.

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of military affairs. The School of Agriculture (nongjia 農家) was similar to the Military School. In the past, the habitual disdain for agricultural affairs of traditional Confucian scholars had marginalized this kind of knowledge, but in the conditions of this age where “a myriad nations competed against each other,” Chinese scholars had no choice but to begin to pay attention of this practical technology. That is to say, the pressure of a “crisis situation” and “cumulative weakness” combined with the ideal of “enriching the nation” and “strengthening the military” brought the Military School and the School of Agriculture from the margins back again to the center of scholarly concerns. Finally, regarding some ideas that were never present in the ancient Chinese mainstream ideology or in Confucian doctrines, they found some specious resources in the vast unrestrained symbolic metaphors and allegories contained in the writings of the various schools of philosophers. Among those apparently true but actually false resources they discovered both clues to understanding and a certain psychological equilibrium; they even found in the study of the ancient schools of philosophers the sources of the mathematical system and of the democratic organization that were delivering the greatest shocks to the Chinese people. As Zhang Zhidong wrote: From Daoguang on, scholars liked to use books about omens and Buddhist writings to discuss classical learning. From Guangxu on, scholars were especially fond of studying the ancient schools of philosophers of the Zhou and Qin dynasties. Their long-standing errors were, I’m afraid, not anticipated by the many gentlemen who were so interested in studying them.81 These were, however, the intellectual fashions of the time. “All under Heaven” (tianxia) had already been transformed; the map of the world had also already been turned upside down; the old thought could no longer explain the new knowledge; the traditional Confucian classics were no longer enough. Those individuals who had seen the new world earlier than others could very easily leaf through the pages of China’s original historical memory and come up with those source materials. Under these conditions, for example, Zou Yan (ca. 305– ca. 240 BCE)’s theory of the greater nine regions (see page 175 in volume one of this history), the Mozi’s logic, the Huainanzi’s natural science, and the Guanzi’s doctrine of “enriching the nation and strengthening the military” seemingly could all be rediscovered there. 81  Zhang Zhidong, Quanxue pian: zong jing di-wu, 1967, 20.

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Of course, the genuine revival of the study of the ancient schools of philosophers had to wait until the end of the nineteenth century or even the beginning of the twentieth. This was because the truly great transformation of the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief did not begin until after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. In 1895, after the terrible shock of military defeat and the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the war, the Guangxu Emperor asked the examination candidates in the Hall of Preserving Harmony the following questions in the imperial examinations: When Master Sun [Wu] (c. 545–c. 470 BCE) disciplined his armies, Master Wu [Qi] (440–381 BCE) regulated military forces, and in the text of Li Jing (571–649)’s answers to Emperor Tang Taizong (r. 626–649) about military affairs, methods about training hands and feet are all given in detail; when Wang Ji (1378–1460) and Qi Jiguang (1528–1588) of the Ming dynasty discussed their methods of training soldiers, they also included five to six categories. Can you list them all?… When it comes to exploring texts with excellent and subtle qualities and expertise in military strategy, there are texts such as “Instructions on Military Strategy” (Binglüe xun) in the Huainanzi [compiled under Liu An (179–122 BCE)], Du Mu (807–851)’s “On Warfare,” (Zhanlun), and Su Shi (1036–1101)’s “Strategy for Training Armies” (Xunbing lüce). If we put their views into practice, would they really be effective and bring success?82… Since these questions could never receive an answer from within the canon of Confucian classics, the emperor hoped to find other resources from the study of the ancient schools of philosophers. Unexpectedly introducing into an imperial examination usually based on the Confucian classics ideas from the various philosophers that were traditionally regarded almost as heresy had quite a bit of symbolic significance. Perhaps it was an inadvertent shift in source materials, but it was going to bring about a mutual transformation of the intellectual center and periphery.83

82   Da Qing Dezong Jing huangdi shilu, j. 366, 7, Xinwenfeng photocopy, ce 5, 3322. 83  Therefore between the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries there was an increasing discourse on the various ancient schools of philosophy and they contained even more profound understanding. See, for instance, the discussions of Xunzi by Xia Zengyou (1863–1924), Song Shu and Tan Sitong.

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3.3 The rapid transformation of the world of Chinese knowledge, thought and belief from the end of the nineteenth into the beginning of the twentieth century was quite astonishing. From the point of view of intellectual history, the one phenomenon among many that most focuses our attention today is the sudden revival of Buddhist studies after being in decline for quite a long time. As the nineteenth century reached its end, interest in Buddhist studies suddenly revived, especially among a number of scholar-officials who supported the new studies. For example, Wen Tingshi (1856–1904) and Kang Youwei were both extremely interested in Buddhist studies. The man hailed as the “first teacher of the modern Buddhist revival.” Yang Wenhui (1837–1911), collected many lost books, especially lost texts of the Consciousness Only School of Buddhism from Japan and directly stimulated the twentieth century revival of that school. He established the Jinling Sûtra Publishing House ( Jinling kejing chu) and greatly spurred on the twentieth-century study of Buddhism. His exposition and propagation of Buddhist studies encouraged the interest in Buddhism of a large number of late Qing literati. A group of representative individuals of nineteenth century and twentieth century Chinese Buddhist studies appeared, such as Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, Song Shu (1862–1910), Zhang Taiyan (Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936) and the later Ouyang Jian (1871–1943) and Taixu (Lü Peilin, 1890–1947), all appeared after Yang Wenhui.84 It is particularly worth noting that the late Qing men who were fond of Buddhist studies were almost all scholar-officials who were seeking new knowledge. They seem to have received a revelation from the background of Japan’s rapid rise: that Buddhism was not so conservative, that a belief in Buddhism could also lead to modernization, and that Buddhism originally had many connections with Western learning. They even believed that Buddhist studies 84  There has already been some systematic research on the resurgence of Buddhism at this time, such as Tairyô Makita’s Chûgoku Bukkyô shi kenkyû (1957), Guo Peng’s Zhongguo jindai foxue sixiangshi gao (1989), and so on. They offer very good explanations of the relationship between the resurgence of lay Buddhism and Gongyang studies, the relationship between the decline of monastic Buddhism and using monastic assets to establish schools in the late Qing, and so on. Here I am, however, trying to start with the internal logic of the late Qing Buddhist revival and discuss how the contemporary Chinese intellectual class turned back to seek support for traditional values and resources to respond to the tide of Western thought. I discuss how Buddhism moved from the “margin” to the “center” as a way of understanding the intellectual background of Western learning, and how, due to the penetration of Western learning and the collapse of the tradition, it moved again from the “center” to the “margin.”

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were also a good intermediary for understanding Western thought. For example, Western logic could be compared with the logical reasoning of Hetuvidyâ, the Indian “science of cause” (yinxue 因學), and Western psychology could be understood with the help of the Consciousness Only School of Buddhism. Western concepts of the cosmos had been arrived at by means of astronomical apparatuses and the mathematics of physics, but Chinese could more or less understand them with the aid of Buddhist imagination. Western knowledge of the microcosm relied on biology and observations made with microscopes, and the imagination and allegories in the Buddhist sûtras could also help the Chinese to understand these phenomena. Although these were all “analogies,” at that time such analogies were an aid to understanding in the same way that people in the Wei-Jin era (265–420) used the Mysterious Learning (NeoDaoism, xuanxue 玄學) and the method of geyi 格義, “matching the meaning,” to interpret Buddhist terms (see page 38 of Volume One of this history). At the turn of the twentieth century, as the Chinese searched for various kinds of source materials to “match” (ge) the “meaning” (yi) of Western learning, besides the previously discussed ancient schools of philosophers, they also employed Buddhist teachings. Of course, China originally had its own system of terms and methods of reasoning to interpret natural phenomena, but at that time these traditional terms and methods had become less and less efficacious. This was the background in which Buddhism aroused so much interest. Comparatively early on, men like Wei Yuan and Yao Ying used Buddhist learning to explain Western astronomical and geographic knowledge.85 A little later, Kang Youwei read some Buddhist sûtras and made a connection with views of

85  For example, in his Haiguo tuzhi, Wei Yuan used the Indian Buddhist idea of four great continents (si da bu zhou 四大部洲), dvîpa, and asserted that the southern continent of Jambûdvîpa (nanzhan buzhou 南瞻部洲) was what the Westerners called Asia, Europe, and America. What Buddhism called Aparagodaniya (xiniuhe zhou 西牛賀洲) is actually North and South America. The Westerners only knew two of the four Buddhist continents. In fact, Buddhism also had the Pûrva-videha (dongsheng shenzhou 東勝神洲) that was simply the continent of Australia. Because it was separated (from Europe) by the Antarctic Ocean, the Westerners did not know about it. These ideas that both incorporated new knowledge and provided Chinese scholars a great deal of room for selfconfidence were very influential at the time. Yao Ying for one was very interested in them. He further quoted the Chaoshi jing (Sûtra of transcending the world) and the Loutan jing (another name for the Chaoshi jing) to explain “the Westerners’ theory that the earth is round,” and even suspected that the Loutan jing was “written by the sûtra translators on the basis of the ancient Chinese mathematical classic Zhou bi suanjing.” Kangyou jixing, j. 12, 384–385.

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things under a microscope and with the speed of photo electricity.86 Song Shu read the Avatamsaka-sûtra (or the Mahâvaipulya Buddhâvatamsaka-sûtra, the Flower Garland Sûtra, Huayan jing) and the Scripture of the Jewel Accumulation (Ratnasamuccaya, Baoji jing) and then also used these Buddhist sûtras to confirm new European ideas. He wrote a two-juan book entitled Confirmation of Indian and European Learning (Yin-Ou xue zheng) putting forth his belief that the arrival of European learning in the Far East simply confirmed Buddhist doctrines.87 Wen Tingshi read the “lightning as metaphor for the mind” story in “On Heterodox Sects of the Three Dharma” in the Collected Works of Abhidharma and was then very happy to believe that Western learning confirmed Buddhist teachings.88 Tan Sitong stated even more clearly that “all of the various principles that scientists seek using apparatuses and mathematics— the planets are all round like the earth, so many days for each planet equals a year for that planet, the smallest particle of dust and one drop of water both contain thousands of microorganisms, and so on—were already mentioned in Buddhist writings.89 This common intellectual practice continually increased and had a very wide influence. A little later, very many scholar-officials looked at Buddhism in this new way. They believed that Buddhism was something of a cornucopia that contained virtually everything. As Sun Baoxuan put it: The so-called technological arts, whether astronomical calculations, natural science, chemistry, physics (author’s note: like the four elements earth, fire, water and wind, including infinite subjects in this Western learning), optics, acoustics, medicine, agricultural science, engineering, mining and various kinds of technical skills … they are all completely included without omission.90 Besides using Buddhist learning to “explain” the “principles” of Western science, late Qing scholars also relied on the doctrines of Buddhism to “match” the “meanings” of Western philosophy. Today it would seem that we do not 86   Kang Nanhai zibian nianpu, 1992, 12. 87   Song Shu ji, shang ce, 1993, 85, 1993. Also see Song Shu’s “Da Zong Guancha,” in Song Shu ji, xia ce, 788–789. 88   Wen Tingshi ji, xia ce, 1979, 952.; Ahbidamo ji, “Yimen zulun,” sanfapin, CBETA, vol. 26, no. 1536. Soothill, Dictionary defines the three dharma as jiaofa 教法 the Buddha’s teaching; xingfa 行法 the practice of it; and zhengfa 證法 realization or experiential proof of it in bodhi and nirvāna. 89   Tan Sitong quanji, 1954, 324. 90  Sun Baoxuan, “Wangshanlu riji 184,” in Wang Fansen, et al., Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi de zhuanxing shidai, 2007, 225.

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very well understand the philosophical sophistication of the scholars of that era; we also have an insufficient comprehension of their passion for absorbing knowledge from abroad. At the end of the nineteenth century, those men of learning were actually very concerned about the outside world and they knew quite a lot about foreign philosophy, literature, and history. Some of them had already learned a great deal about the Western humanities. Tan Sitong, for example, had already employed Buddhist thought to understand the cosmological theories of Western philosophy, to understand Western medical psychology, to survey and assess Western science and technology, and so on. He had blended nearly all Western ideas into Buddhist doctrines.91 At the turn of the century, Wen Tingshi began in his note books to use the Buddha to reflect on Kant, to use Nâgârajuna (ca. 150–250) to draw parallels with Leibniz, to use Aśvaghosa (ca. 80–ca. 150) to consider Spinoza, and even more to rely on Buddhist sûtras as aids to reading the Dialogues of Plato.92 Entering the twentieth century, Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, and Liang Shuming all tried “to use Buddhist studies to interpret and understand Western learning” into the 1910s.93 This practice of using Buddhist teachings to understand the new knowledge gradually brought the previously marginalized Buddhist studies into the center of Chinese intellectual history. On this account, at the turn of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century as the tide of Western thought washed over China, a thread of hope for the revival of Chinese Buddhism suddenly appeared. As Zhang Xiang (1877–1945) wrote in his preface to Xie Wuliang (1884–1964)’s Outline of Buddhist Studies (Foxue dagang): In the late Qing, the situation reached an extreme and then changed…. In the last decade [of the dynasty], people who were skilled in reading and reciting Mahâyâna Buddhist sûtras in Sanskrit arose in great numbers. Refined and elegant, they were untiring in their exertions, and thus the scholarly atmosphere was probably about to change again.94 Besides the internal reasons that serve to explain the Chinese educated class’s return to their tradition to search for the intellectual resources for this temporary revival of Buddhism in the late Qing, we should also mention one important external background—the stimulus coming from Japan. In fact, many issues in modern Chinese intellectual history are inseparable from 91  “Yitai shuo,” Tan Sitong quanji, 1954, 119. 92   Wen Tingshi ji, xia ce, 1993, 953–956. 93  Wang Fansen, et.al., Zhongguo sixiangshi de zhuanxing shidai, 2007, 227. 94   Foxue dagang, 1916, 1936 (eleventh printing).

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this island nation in the East China Sea; it always formed the background of recent Chinese intellectual history. The Guangxu reign period (1875–1908) in the late Qing generally corresponded to the Meiji era (1868–1912) in Japan. The Meiji Restoration caused a crisis in the traditional Chinese idea of China as a Celestial Empire and Great Nation (tianchao daguo 天朝大國). The reality of Japan becoming increasingly rich and powerful forced educated Chinese to face the changing power situation in East Asia. At that time, the Chinese people’s feelings about Japan were very complicated. On the one hand, many Chinese continued to regard Japan as a “tiny little country”; they were dissatisfied with Japan’s abandoning the old (Asian) ways to learn from Europe. But on the other hand, the rapid rise of Japan made many Chinese extremely envious; they now felt that the traditional teacher (China) could not avoid following the example of the modern student (Japan). Even though they verbally refused to accept Japan’s position, in their minds they attached extreme importance to various kinds of news coming out of Japan. Much of this news about Japan’s politics, economy, and culture gave rise to a series of related reactions in China. Sometimes the Chinese even took gossip and rumors out of Japan very seriously and tried to emulate what they heard. Among these things was information from Japan about Buddhism. At that time, Japanese Buddhism was actually in a rather delicate, position. Just as many Japanese scholars have pointed out, ever since the Edo or Tokugawa period (1603–1868) when Buddhism became the national religion, it grew steadily more corrupt and degenerated into a largely ceremonial and utilitarian practice. Because of this, it was continually subject to vehement criticism by the followers of the Shinto (Shendao 神道) and Confucian religions (Rujiao 儒教). In the early Meiji, after the proclamation of the decrees that “church and state are to be unified” and “Gods and Buddhas are to be clearly separated,” Japanese Buddhism faced an even greater crisis. Under internal and external pressure, a force for self-reform grew up within Japanese Buddhism itself. On the one hand, they reached an understanding with the Meiji government,95 while on the other hand, they opened up new territories abroad for the expansion of Buddhism. All of these efforts were, of course, a struggle for Japanese Buddhism to obtain space to survive. From the nineteenth into the twentieth century, Japanese Buddhism, especially the orthodox Pure Land School, deeply penetrated Chinese society and had great influence in China. Many Chinese gentry, scholars, lay Buddhists, and monks had close secret contacts with monks of the Higashi Hongan-ji 95  Ienaga Saburô, Nihon no kindaika to Bukkyô, in Kôza kindai Bukkyô, j. 2, Rekishi hen, 1961– 63, 16–17.

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(東本願寺) School. Various studies of Japanese Buddhism also gradually came to the Chinese intellectual class, and so-called “alternative academies” (bieyuan 别院) or “schools” (xuetang 學堂) of Japanese Buddhism appeared in Shanghai, Suzhou and Hangzhou. Looked at through the mirror reflection of a Japan that was growing stronger day by day, ever more educated Chinese misread and misunderstood the facts about Japanese Buddhism. From the point of view of some Chinese intellectuals who envied Japan’s wealth and power, were anxious about China’s cumulative weakness, and were also fond of Buddhist doctrines, modern Japan’s respect for and tolerance of Buddhism, Japanese Buddhism’s adjustment of its modern intellectual position, and Buddhism’s assimilation to the philosophy of science were all misread as motive forces for the modernization of Japan, and also as a prescription for the revival of Chinese Buddhism and the transformation of Chinese society. They believed that if China could also revive Buddhism, then certainly it too could grow powerful just as rapidly as Japan had done. Thus from the nineteenth into the twentieth century when Chinese intellectuals went to Japan, they all wanted to ask about Japanese Buddhism, and the enlightenment they received from information out of Japan stimulated the late Qing revival of Buddhism. At that time, Japanese Buddhism taught the Chinese men of culture a great many things. Most important for the Chinese intellectual world was, however, the significance of Buddhism for the reformative transformation of society. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese intellectual world was pervaded by a feeling of crisis. Strong ships and powerful cannons came along bringing opium, but they also carried Western thought, and this left the Chinese intellectual world somewhat at a loss as to what to do about them. On this account, except for a few pragmatic figures who held political offices and some clear-headed members of the Westernizing (or Self-strengthening movement) faction (yangwupai 洋務派) who cared more about concrete and practical innovations involving machines, cannons, laws, and political systems, quite a few men of learning began to regard vigorous self-exertion at the level of thought and culture as more crucial. It was precisely for this reason that they were extremely interested in an important form of contemporary thinking in Japanese Buddhism. That was its emphasis on “generating confidence” ( faqi xinxin 發起信心), “protecting the nation, and loving the truth” (huguo aili 護國 愛理), and their reconfiguration of the social function of Buddhism. We know that many of Japanese Buddhism’s activities during the Meiji period—opening up border areas, proselytizing among the lower classes, establishing charitable enterprises, accompanying the army on overseas campaigns—rapidly transformed it from a posture of withdrawal from worldly affairs to one of entering the secular world, and occupying a place in the

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Japanese process of constructing an ethnic state (minzu guojia). New interpretations of Buddhism by Inoue Enryô (1858–1919) and others further strengthened the idea of Buddhism’s significance in the world. He believed that two things should be pointed out about Buddhism: an elucidation of the identity of Buddhism with science and philosophy, and Buddhism’s significance for “protecting the nation and loving the truth.”96 With this, Buddhism fundamentally changed its vague and ambiguous mode of thinking and its attitude of disregard for worldly affairs. At the turn of the twentieth century the works of Inoue Enryô, Masaharu Anesaki (1873–1949), Senshô Murakami (1851–1929), Ôuchi Seiran (1845–1918) and others concerning Buddhism and science, psychology, philosophy, and history were very popular among Chinese intellectuals. This train of thought about Japanese Buddhism obviously inspired a great number of Chinese intellectuals.97 For example, works like Liang Qichao’s On the Relationship between Buddhism and Collective Rule (Fojiao yu qunzhi zhi guanxi), Zhang Taiyan’s Talk at the Reception for Tokyo Overseas Students (Dongjing liuxuesheng huanyinghui shuoci), and Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940)’s book modeled on Inoue Enryō’s On Buddhism Protecting the Nation (Bukkyô morikuni ron) all tried to employ Buddhism as a resource for national cohesion and spiritual mobilization. In the end, though, regarding Buddhism as an element of social transformation was only an imaginative idea of a minority of educated Chinese. In the first place, considering China’s social conditions at that time, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the relentless challenge of Western ideas, the most urgent priorities facing the Chinese were obviously in the practical realm of political systems, laws, science, and technology, and not in the spiritual realm of religion and belief. Neither the politicians who exercised control over social goods nor the common people who were crying out for material sustenance had any interest in spiritual issues. In the general atmosphere of 96  Inoue Enryō, Kyôiku shûkyô kankei ron, 1893 (Meiji 26), 6. A great many of Inoue Enryô’s works were translated in China and had a very great influence. According to Xiong Yuezhi, prior to 1906 over a dozen of his works had been translated, Xixue dongjian yu wan Qing shehui, 1994, 657. 97  For example, see Kang Youwei. As Xiao Gongquan (Hsiao Kung- chuan) wrote, between 1886 and 1896, Kang Youwei was influenced by Inoue Enryô’s Narrative of an Imaginary Journey in the Starry Regions (Senkai sôyû ki 星界想遊記), and so he became interested in astronomy. This book is listed in the bibliography of Japanese books in j. 14 of Kang Youwei, Riben shumu zhi. See Hsiao, Kung-chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927, 1975, 170–171.

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pragmatic thinking, impractical ideas could only become the topics of fantasy, but could not be turned into operational processes in society. Secondly, from the point of view of the social classes involved in the revival of Buddhist studies, the intellectual class that started the revival had neither the support of the political powers, responses from Buddhism itself, or any foundation among the lower classes. The confidence of the educated class and their disdain for the Buddhist faithful ensured that this revival of Buddhist studies was from its inception only the intellectual activity of a minority. The subject of Buddhism was from beginning to end a topic only discussed by an intellectual elite minority. Thirdly, looking at the concrete contents of the revival of Buddhist studies, they did not present any practical steps that could be carried out in society. Following the traditional Chinese literati interest in Buddhism, many people continued to regard Buddhist beliefs as a form of spiritual practice or a transcendent state. Even for Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, Song Shu and others who repeatedly called for the revitalization of Buddhism, it was primarily a matter of eliminating the difference between life and death in one’s consciousness, transcending advantage (profit) and disadvantage (harm) in one’s thinking, maintaining an attitude of mercy toward humanity, and thereby having an unselfish and fearless spiritual strength. Since they did not practice Buddhist relief aid, education, ceremonies or other activities, the Chinese religious revival that was supposed to be able to generate confidence and stimulate the spirit was only a matter of theoretical discussions. That being the case, what was revived in the short-lived late Qing revival of Buddhist studies was not Buddhism in the religious sense, but rather the cultural significance of Buddhist studies. Its chief significance for people of the Chinese intellectual world did not match their subjective aspirations to make Buddhism into an ideology; rather it was the above-mentioned revelations concerning the use of Buddhist ideas as resources for understanding Western learning. It was precisely for this reason that the late Qing intellectual world’s interest in Buddhist studies was concentrated on the study of the Conscious Only School. This was partly because the Conscious Only texts were lost and then found again; the freshness of the Conscious Only and Faxiang (Dharmalaksana) texts brought back from Japan piqued their interest. It was also partly because the reasoning behind the Conscious Only and Faxiang School’s meticulous analysis of consciousness and their logical methods (yinming, hetuvidyâ) for understanding the world were thought, in the minds of the Chinese intellectuals, to constitute intellectual resources for responding to Western science, philosophy, and logic. In recent Chinese history, Buddhist thought and the sûtras unexpectedly served this temporary role; educated

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Chinese originally wanted to use them to hold back the surging tide of Western knowledge; they never imagined that Buddhism would actually become a channel for the Western thought tide to flow into China. The Buddhist faithful wanted to take advantage of the opportunity for their religion to rise, but events unexpectedly went the other way, and Western thought actually seized the opportunity to enter China. This could rather be said to be “totally beyond one’s expectations.”

Epilogue: China in 1895: The Symbolic Significance of Intellectual History 1 By April 6, 1895, rumors were already rife about whether or not Taiwan would be ceded to Japan, and this made some scholars extremely agitated. On the 17th when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was finally signed, the feelings of all educated Chinese suddenly changed; they felt as though Heaven had collapsed and the Earth had caved in. At that time, not just a few people but everyone concerned about the fate of China seemed to be overcome by feelings of anger and humiliation. Such feelings of anger and humiliation were something that the Chinese had probably never before felt in several thousand years. Before that time, there were very few among the upper class educated people of China who had given any particular thought to Japan. Their impressions and imagination of that island nation of Emishi (or Ebisu), left them with feelings of arrogance, haughtiness and disdain. (Emishi or Ebisu was an ethnic group of ancient Japan, related to the Jômon people and perhaps to the Ainu also; the Chinese name xiayi 蝦夷 literally means “shrimp barbarians.”) In the minds of the recent generation of Chinese, it was impossible to mention the “Eastern Ocean” (Dongyang, old name for Japan) in the same breath, or on the same level, with the “Western Ocean” (Xiyang, the old name for the West). If we say that the Chinese government’s attitude toward the West had changed from arrogance to deference, the Chinese people’s feelings of arrogance based on a sense of superiority toward Japan had not changed. Calling Japan “Eastern Ocean” and juxtaposing it on the conceptual level in comparison to the “Western Ocean” was probably something that happened much later. At that time, however, Japan was developing feelings of superiority and arrogance toward China, while at the same time maintaining a crisis awareness in a difficult situation being surrounded by Great Powers. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901)’s essay “Escape from Asia” (Datsu-A ron) would seem to have symbolized a very important shift in the trend of events; it symbolized that Japan’s position was moving from uniting with Asia to resist the Western Great Powers to proclaiming itself a hegemon in the East and competing for victory with the West. As a result, in Japan’s preparedness and China’s unpreparedness the position of strength and weakness between China and Japan was reversed. In

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004281349_008

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the end “their positions on preserving power versus seizing power changed completely.”1 At that time, the Great Qing Empire that had always considered itself as a Celestial Empire and Great Nation as well as an exporter of culture was really defeated in war by the “Emishi” or “shrimp barbarians” and forced to cede territory and pay reparations to Japan. That their large country was forced to sign a humiliating treaty under the cannon barrels of a small country was very painful to all Chinese. This goes without saying for those who had been continuously calling passionately for reforms, but it even applied to those officials and scholars who are now regarded as “conservatives.” Under those circumstances, the change in their feelings is hard for us to imagine today. “Feelings” is only a term used to describe emotional states, but if “feelings” turn into a mood or state of mind that universally pervades a whole society, they can become a catalyst for rational reflection. Intellectual history has to pay attention to this transformation of feelings into a general mood. It was precisely in such a general mood of anger and pain that even the most conservative of people also hoped for the nation to become strong; only their thinking about self-strengthening was different from that of the radicals. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Lin Shu (1829– 1898), the Qing imperial clansman and the leading Academician in the Hanlin Academy, presented Feng Xu (1842–1927)’s essay “Four Beginnings of Self-Strengthening” (Ziqiang siduan) to the emperor. Feng asserted that the emperor should carry out realistic policies, search for talented people, manage state budget expenses, and support the people’s livelihood. Although he criticized the radical reformers, his ideas were really not anti-reform, but he said “to resist foreign aggression we must first make ourselves secure; and to manage change we must first stand firm with our basic principles.” He hoped first to make the country internally strong and orderly.2 On June 6, 1895, the InspectorGeneral of Guangdong, Ma Piyao (?–1895), also memorialized the emperor and put forth ten recommendations. Although he still listed China’s own thought and ideology as the first self-strengthening priority, his ideas were already quite enlightened; such as opening up channels of communication, setting up newspapers, and criticizing Qing envoys for not understanding Western learning.3 With these general feelings, “self-strengthening” became a consensus among 1  The quotation is from Jia Yi’s famous essay “Guo Qin lun,” translated in de Bary, Sources, 1999, 230 as “… because preserving power differs fundamentally from seizing power.” China was trying to preserve power, but Japan was seizing power. 2  Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe, di 120 ji, 1996, 605–622. 3  Ibid., 627–638.

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the Chinese people. Even though people had been repeatedly calling for “selfstrengthening” for a long time, it was not until 1895 that it became a universal idea and a central term for the court and the general society at every level, regardless of whether it was radical or conservative “self-strengthening.”4 Interesting enough, the Western Great Powers that were intruding on China also continually offered advice to the Chinese, hoping that China would quickly strengthen itself according to the Western model. In January 20, 1895, before the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the missionary Gilbert Reid (1857–1927) called upon the imperial tutor Weng Tonghe (1830–1904), and on February 5, the Baptist missionary Timothy Richard (1845–1919) visited Zhang Zhidong; on February 28, Richard also visited Zhang Yinhuan (1837–1900) to discuss again China’s general situation and strategies for reform. After the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, on April 30, 1895 a Western lawyer promoted self-strengthening to the Chinese intellectual class. At the end of October, a British diplomatic envoy, Sir Nicholas Robert O’ Conor, candidly pointed out to Prince Gong himself (Grand Prince Yixin, 1833–1898): “Today China is already in extreme peril, and while the various nations of the world are plotting together, China is still sound asleep without waking. Why is this the case?” What was his reason for promoting China’s reform and self-strengthening? According to him, it was because British businessmen who had come to China hoped that China would become rich, strong, and free from danger, and those who had not yet come to China also had the same hopes.5 On October 26, Timothy Richard again talked to Weng Tonghe telling him that the five Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States) were planning to take Chinese matters into their own hands, and so “Chinese policies to nourish the people must be urgently discussed.” The most important of these policies, according to Richard, were educating the people, nourishing the people, pacifying the people and making the people new. What was meant by

4  Just as Jonathan D. Spence wrote in his The Search for Modern China (1990, p. 216), among scholar-officials “self-strengthening” had already begun in the mid-nineteenth century just after the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion:  “The Confucian statesmen whose skill, integrity, and tenacity helped suppress the rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century showed how imaginatively the Chinese could respond to the new challenges. Under the general banner of restoring order to the Qing Empire, they had managed to develop new structures to handle foreign relations and collect custom dues, to build modern ships and weapons, and to start teaching international law and the rudiments of modern science. “Self-strengthening” had not proved an empty slogan, but an apparently viable road to a more secure future.” 5  Weng Tonghe riji, ce 5, 2843 (October 31, 1985).

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“make the people new?” Weng Tonghe recorded that Richard said, “making the people new is to reform.” It would seem that both Chinese and foreigners all supported reform for China. What was different, though, was that when the Chinese discussed reform, uppermost in their minds was national self-strengthening in order to resist foreign countries. When Western people advocated the Western way as a form of universalism, they were hoping that after China entered the arena of global politics and economics it would play the game by Western rules. Thus they hoped that the first priority of Chinese reforms would be the development of railroads, and military training would be secondary. “China should employ Western employees along with the Chinese, and also establish Western academic disciplines.”6 2 Just as mentioned above, between 1894 and 1895 (the Sino-Japanese War) very many scholars who were concerned about China’s future were beset by the complicated emotional turmoil of dejection and indignation. Compared to the humiliation of the Opium Wars, we can see that this change of feelings was more obvious and extreme. At that time, He Qi (1859–1914) and Hu Liyuan (1874–1916) wrote in their Foundations of New Policies (Xinzheng shiji), that the 1894 Sino-Japanese War forfeited China’s sovereignty and humiliated the country, made the twenty-three provinces look like so much meat being cut up on the table, and caused China’s four hundred million people to be like prisoners

6  Ibid., 2844 (October 26, 1895). Just as Guo Tingyi pointed out, after 1895 “the reform movement reached its high tide.” First came Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong and other intellectuals and their Self-strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui) and their publication Current Affairs (Shiwu bao 時務報) that symbolized the intellectual bloc’s search for change. Next came the Chinese and foreigners in the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge (Guangxue hui 廣學會) like Timothy Richard, Young John Allen (1836–1907) and others who also used the Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao 萬國公報) and translations of Western books to influence society while urging court officials to move toward reform. Finally, there were government officials like Chen Baozhen (1831–1900), Huang Zunxian, Zhang Zhidong and others who also participated in various activities to reform and renew the political system; even important central government officials like Weng Tonghe also supported such political activities. All of this meant that “the court and the society at all levels was moving forward on the same new road.” See “Jindai xiyang wenhua zhi shuru ji qi renshi,” in Guo Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo de bianju, 1987, 43–44.

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bound up underneath the stairs.7 Even the feelings of Emperor Guangxu were complex and burdensome. After the humiliating peace settlement and facing a society full of emotional turbulence with popular grievances boiling over, the helpless emperor sent an imperial edict to the Grand Academicians, the six Ministries (Personnel, Rites, Revenues, Military Affairs, Justice, and Construction), and the nine major high ministers in the six Ministries and the Censorate, the Court of Judicial Review, and the Office of Transmission, as well as to the Hanlin Academy, the Household Administration of the Heir Apparent, and the Supervising Secretaries and Investigation Censors. In it, he complained that the severe reprimands of the people stemmed from their loyal indignation, but, he said, they do not understand “the sadness of this last resort of mine to remedy the situation.” He frankly stated that he has already been in this difficult situation, and “day and night I pace up and down, and weep bitter tears before holding court, … my extremely difficult feelings are something that those who submit memorials do not fully understand, and my officials and subjects throughout the nation should all understand and forgive me.” In the history of Chinese imperial edicts, this was probably a most unusual one. The Son of Heaven, in the Imperial Palace in the Forbidden City with all of his subjects looking hopefully up to him, being able to reveal so frankly his grievances and feelings of being wronged was also a very rare event. That their emperor actually had such feelings of humiliation probably left his Chinese subjects quite astonished or even shocked. The imperial edict’s expression of complete helplessness and inability to do anything about the situation unexpectedly stimulated a radical mood among the populace. In this passionate state of mind, common at all levels of society, many people arrived at a kind of consensus. It was just what Emperor Guangxu had written in his edict: “We should all resolutely unite together to completely eradicate those age-old malpractices (problems).” What, though, really were those “age-old malpractices or problems” that had to be swept away? This question led to the question of how to carry out “selfstrengthening.” What the emperor saw was a weak military and a declining economy, but he was now only ready to take action at the last minute. Policies like training the military and collecting money represented nothing more than the old “enrich the nation and strengthen the military” ( fuguo qiangbing) train of thought. Chinese scholars and bureaucrats had long ago exhibited such foresight. From 1861 on, since Feng Guifen published his Protests from Jiaobin Cottage, many people had repeatedly advocated such tactics. In 1880 7  He Qi, Hu Liyuan, Xinzheng zhenquan—He Qi, Hu Liyuan ji, 1994, 182. Da Qing Dezong Jing huangdi shilu, j. 366, 3320.

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(the sixth year of Guangxu’s reign) the year after Japan occupied the Ryûkyû Islands, Zheng Guanying (1842–1922) continued the Important Things to Save the Situation (Jiushi jieyao) that he composed in the 1870s and published his Essays on Change (Yiyan), an earlier version of Words of Warning for a Flourishing Era (Shengshi weiyan); in the same year, Xue Fucheng completed his Proposals for Reform and National Defense (Chouyang chuyi). By that time, many people had made such recommendations as clear as they possibly could be made. The problem was that although at the time people had a profound understanding of the crisis they faced, they still had high hopes for China’s destiny. On the one hand, they greatly admired the Western ways of becoming rich and powerful, but on the other hand they still had faith in China’s moral principles and literary tradition. So they hoped to remedy the situation by means of a form of thinking that was later on called “Chinese knowledge for substance and Western knowledge for function” (zhongxue wei ti xixue wei yong).8 In February 1887 Zeng Jize wrote “On China Sleeping First and Awakening Later” (Zhongguo xian shui hou xing lun). Although he used the word “sleeping” in this article, he listed the things that China was doing—purchasing battleships, building artillery batteries, defending its vassal states, resisting foreign enemies, and so on—indicating that he believed China had already awakened. This essay was emblematic of the feelings of intellectuals like Zeng Jize. They believed that with the stimulation from the West, China would very quickly wake up and become a strong and major nation in the world once more.9 In less than a decade, by 1895 when the nation was still not rich and the military was still not strong, and Japan had really risen, these feelings of calm and self-confidence had collapsed. People realized that China had actually not woken up. When China genuinely awakened was in the year 1895, a year that caused the Chinese people the most profound feelings of anguish. Just as Liang Qichao wrote in his Record of the Wuxi (1898) Coup (Wuxi zhengbian ji): “Our country began to awaken from its big dreams of four thousand years due to the Sino-Japanese War ( jiawu yiyi 甲午一役 1894–95).”10 This kind of waking up seemed more like being startled into wakefulness. Emperor Guangxu’s awakening to the truth of the situation symbolized the response of all the Chinese; 8  For more on Zheng Guanying, see Gloria Davies, “Fragile Prosperity,” China Heritage Quarterly, no. 26 (2011), on line at http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php? searchterm=026_davies.inc&issue=026. Also see Guo Wu, Zheng Guanying: Merchant Reformer of late Qing China, 2010. 9  Zeng Jize “Zhongguo xian shui hou xing lun,” Shenbao, 1 (June 14, 1887) and Tseng Chi-tse, “China. The Sleep and the Awakening,” Asiatic Quarterly Review 3, no.1 (1887): 1–12. 10  Quoted from Ding Wenjiang and Zhao Fengtian, Liang Qichao nianpu changbian, 1983, 38.

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it was a form of nervous anxiety accompanying the distress of being at a loss as to what to do. This response of nervous anxiety led later on to the appearance of a whole series of radical reform ideas and even of revolutionary thinking. 3 Thorough reform suddenly became the “consensus” just as radical emotions suddenly became a universal “mood.” As mentioned above, under the stimulation of events of 1895, officials who before were obstinately conservative, Westerners who had been pressuring China, common people who did not very well understand China’s increasing weakness but who had an intimate personal experience of it, as well as those intellectuals who had always consciously felt they had a mission toward the country … all of these groups seem to have become “reformers.” Furthermore, the trend of this reform was unexpectedly almost unanimously moving toward the West. At that time, many daring ways of thinking began to appear, and doubts about Chinese tradition and criticisms of Chinese history also began to be increasingly intense. Two concepts in the background of this transformation of thought had become the unquestionable foundations of people’s reflections. One was the widespread concept of universalism. Supported by the realistic situation that the weak are prey to the strong, and stimulated by the traditional idea that “the victor becomes a king and the loser becomes a bandit,” people believed that the world had to develop in a direction similar to that of the various Western nations, and China was no exception. The other was the concept of distinctive nationalism. People believed that only with nationalism and a powerful state would a nation be able to exist together with the various other nations within the modern world order; and again China was no exception. As we know, Chinese scholars originally continued to have hope for their tradition, at least as long as they could maintain their national pride. They also hoped to employ the old ways of the former kings to develop new policies for later generations. The idea that “Western learning originated in China” as well as the slogan “Chinese knowledge for substance and Western knowledge for function” had always supported this hope for Chinese tradition. As the very radical Song Yuren (1857–1931) wrote in his preface to Chen Chi’s Book on Common Activities (Yongshu), many people at the time all saw that China needed to change the laws and decrees, control the civil service system, establish schools, and set up a legislative assembly. These were all practical strategies because they saw the crisis right in front of them. But he also said that there are usually two types of political resources, either those that come from

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the old ways of the former kings or those that derive from foreign countries. That is to say, either those that are found by searching in Chinese history or those that are borrowed from the outside world. Although he admitted the necessity of studying the West, he also emphasized that If the governance of foreign domains is superior to the old ways of the former kings, then there is no harm in learning from foreign domains. However, when the old ways of the former kings include the [ways of governing] foreign domains, then [learning from them] would be like forgetting one’s ancestors and ancestral traditions, and what is the point of doing that? If learning from foreign domains does not injure the governance of former kings, then there is no harm in it. Hindering the teachings of the sages and forgetting our Chinese roots, how can we do such a thing?11 From 1895 on, though, people started tending to admit, at least in the areas of practical knowledge and technology, that the West was superior to China, and even that Japan was superior to China. China had to reform, and the direction of that reform was to learn from the West, and even to imitate Japan. Li Hongzhang, the man who signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on behalf of the Qing court, recorded that at the beginning of the negotiations when he saw Itô Hirobumi (1841–1909), he felt quite inferior or uneasy. He remembered what Hirobumi had told him several years earlier about why China should gradually change and he felt ashamed. He admitted that “our nation should indeed gradually change; only then can it be independent.”12 If we look back at Chinese history, we can see a profound change of direction. In their reaction to Western civilization from the late Ming to the early Qing most Chinese scholars generally insisted on what Edward A. Kracke called “change within tradition.” This was the case from historical discussions by Chinese scholars on how “Western learning originated in China” to Ruan Yuan’s Biographies of Astronomers and Mathematicians in which he expressed his belief in the great practical importance of astronomy and mathematics and his contempt for Western learning, as well as the attempts of Li Rui (1769– 1817), Li Shanlan (1811–1882) and others to surpass Western scholarship in the field of mathematics. It was also true from when Feng Guifen wrote in his Discussion on Selectively Using Western Learning (Cai xixue yi) that they should 11  Chen Chi, Chen Chi ji, 1997, 2. 12  Li Hongzhang, Zhong-Ri yihe jilüe, “Diyici wenda jielüe,” 7–8; originally published in 1895, collected in Li Yushu ed., Jindai shiliao congshu huibian, first collection, 1969.

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“take China’s own teaching about proper human relations and the Confucian ritual code of behavior as our original foundation, and supplement it with the various nations’ methods of gaining wealth and power” down to the slogan of “Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for practical application” put forward by Zhang Zhidong and others.13 After 1895, however, in Chinese feelings about seeking wealth and power, everything seemed to change in the direction of a Western-style “modern” or “modernity,” that is toward “change beyond tradition.” Many people began to abandon the old traditional learning and move toward the search for Western learning. Take for example Song Yuren. He was always on guard against Westerners “talking about Heaven,” “practicing medicine,” and “discussing the principles of things [that is, physics].” He said that they “want to use their teachings to turn ours upside down.” Although he angrily criticized his fellow Chinese for “thinking highly of Westerners,” in his On Adopting the Customs of Western Nations (Caifeng ji), he wrote a great deal about Great Britain’s education, methods of selecting talents (i.e., choosing officials), parliament, government, prisons, currency system, and military, and he recommended adopting the Western political system.14 Another example is Tang Caichang (1867–1900). After the Sino-Japanese War, he turned even more sincerely toward the West. Ten out of eleven essays in the Record of Selected Essays on General Arts from the Civil Examinations in Hunan (Yuan Xiang tongyi lu, edited by Jiang Biao), completely employ Western standards to discuss Chinese issues. Even though he did not know Western languages and had not been to the West, he still did his best to absorb various sorts of Western knowledge from translated books and works recommended to him, such as the Historical Record of the Myriad Nations (Wanguo shiji), Survey of the Recent History of the West (Taixi xinshi lanyao), National Gazette of Great Britain (Da Yingguo zhi), Review of the Times (Wanguo gongbao), and the Chinese Scientific Magazine (Gezhi huibian). This seems to have become a common practice at that time.15

13  For research on this historical process, see Ding Weizhi and Chen Song’s Zhongxi tiyong zhijian and Xue Huayuan’s Wan Qing Zhongti Xiyong sixiang lun (1861–1900): guanding yishi xingtai de xihua lilun. 14  Song Yuren, Taixi geguo caifeng ji, in Guo Songtao deng shixi ji liuzhong, 1998, 402, also see 337–372 and 375. 15  Tang Caichang had already become conscious that “in today’s world, exegesis to the classics, literary composition, and eight-legged essays have all become superfluous,” and that is why he turned toward the West. See Tang Caichang ji, 1980, 242.

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Of course the “New Policies” (xinzheng 新政) were most influential at this time. In May of 1895, Kang Youwei sent his third memorial up to Emperor Guangxu to be followed soon by memorials sent up by over a thousand scholars urging Guangxu not to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In August, the Self-strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui 強學會) was established, and in December twelve imperial edicts concerning “New Policies” were drafted and sent out. The roots of the later Hundred Days Reform (wuxu bianfa 戊戌 變法) of 1898 were put down that year, and Chinese thinking unconsciously moved toward the West. As an example, even the democratic forms such as the Western promotion of assemblies and the importance placed on public opinion were also regarded as key principles to be respectfully introduced into China. We know that from ancient times, from the village schools in the Spring and Autumn era to the Imperial University in the Song dynasty, there were places in China for scholar-officials to discuss and criticize politics or policies. However, these did not actually become a tradition of democracy; whether in the village schools or the Imperial University, the scholar-officials only hoped to “send up information for the Son of Heaven to hear.” The final key to resolving social problems still remained with the emperor, and so discussing policies at court was really the only effective thing to do. In 1895, however, people were already beginning to realize that “to bring the people together, we must hold assemblies,” and these assemblies had to be held in the capital in order to have the effect of “shouting out from high places.”16 This already amounted to transforming the goals and ideals of “collective striving” into establishing common practices and initiating knowledge; the common practices established, however, were Western practices and the knowledge initiated was Western knowledge. Researchers have all taken note of the fact that after 1895 with the emergence of new media, new-style schools (xuetang 學堂), new scholarly associations, and new newspapers and periodicals, “in this age of transformation, Western culture experienced unprecedented proliferation” and Western knowledge and thought, with the support of these new mediums, was also disseminated with unprecedented rapidity.17 If we say that before 1895 Chinese scholars, especially major Confucians and even scholar-officials on the eastern seacoast still had “a kind of general contempt” toward Western learning, and “ordinary scholar-officials were still extremely closed-minded, after 1895,

16   Kang Nanhai zibian nianpu, 1992, 29–30. 17  Zhang Hao, “Zailun wuxu weixin de lishi yiyi,” Ershiyi shiji, 45, February 1998, 19.

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however, this situation underwent an enormous change.”18 We can take He Qi and Hu Liyuan’s “Suggestions for New Policies” (Xinzheng lunyi) as evidence of this change. In this essay, written between 1894 and 1895, they said that “we must exert ourselves to reform, and government decrees should follow the new [policies].” According to them, these reforms should not only include building railroads, increasing shipping, reordering the census, and setting up daily newspapers; they should also include political reforms like schools, elections, legislative assemblies, and so on. They even suggested a kind of compromise system of monarchical democracy ( junzhuzhi de minzhu zhidu 君主制的民主制度).19 In passing we can mention here that in order to introduce new knowledge faster, people at that time thought of a shortcut. That was to introduce Western learning by means of Japanese translations. Since Japan had already rapidly advanced and China could not match Japan, this method of gaining Western knowledge was adopted by most Chinese who were impatient for success. That the Chinese who still harbored deep feelings of humiliation about being defeated in war by Japan could actually very quickly accept Japan as their teacher was quite an unusual phenomenon; it was also an expression of the tension and anxiety that Chinese people felt at the time. Under attack then by both Japan and the West, the Chinese intellectual world began more and more urgently to travel along a road from which there would be no return. Zhang Hao once pointed out that very many forms of thought produced since 1895 “had an intensely strong collective consciousness and hoped to liberate China from its present crisis. They looked forward to a future China and sought a road toward their goal.” This consciousness was expressed in a tripartite structure—an awareness of crisis, looking forward toward a goal, and channels to accomplish their goal.20 With a crisis awareness of facing national and ethnic destruction and subjugation, they focused the goal they were looking forward to on learning from the West and made radical political reform their channel for accomplishing their goal. This fundamental change began 18  Zhang Hao, “Wan-Qing sixiang fazhan shilun—jige jiben lundian de tichu yu jiantao,” in Zhou Yangshan and Yang Suxian, eds., Jindai Zhongguo sixiang renwu—Wan-Qing sixiang, 1980, 27. 19  He Qi, Hu Liyuan, Xinzheng zhenquan—He Qi, Hu Liyuan ji, 1994, 104. 20  Zhang Hao, “Zailun Zhongguo gongchan zhuyi sixiang de qiyuan,” in Yu Yingshi, et al., Zhongguo lishi zhuanxing shiqi de zhishifenzi, 1992, 55–62. Zhang also pointed out that the “crisis of meaning” started in the last decade of the nineteenth century. See Zhang Hao, “Xin Rujia yu dangdai Zhongguo de xueshu weiji,” in Jiang Yihua, et al., eds., Gang-Tai ji haiwai xuezhe lun jindai Zhongguo wenhua, 1987, 280.

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from 1895, and was already obviously expressed by Kang Youwei and others like him. In the mood of that time, everything was changing and everyone was searching for the new.21 By 1898, the year of the Hundred Days Reform, Fan Zhui (1872–1906) published an essay entitled “On Sincerity” (Kaicheng pian) in the Hunan Daily (Xiangbao) and for the first time put forth the theory of total Westernization. In the same year, Yi Nai (1874–1925) also published “China Should Regard Its Weakness As Strength” (Zhongguo yi yi ruo wei qiang shuo) in the same paper. He hoped that China could stand up resolutely and independently in the world, and if we want to be treated equally in international meetings, we must change the dynasty (dynastic system), change the color of our clothes, in all cases follow the Western system, join international society, and respect the laws of the all the myriad nations.22 4 We should take note of the fact that behind this major tendency to turn toward the West and subsequent internationalism there was also concealed a deep undercurrent of nationalism. When a people with a very long history faces a crisis involving internal troubles and external aggression, some people will often ponder the question of how to preserve their “traditions” under the conditions of so-called “modernity.” That is because what is meant here by traditions are not merely some historical remains, popular customs or national (ethnic, minzu) ideas, but traditions also refer to the foundations for the survival of this historically long-lived people. To preserve or to abandon these traditions is extremely important for this people. Generally speaking, whether or not a tradition, or traditions, are able to be continued ultimately depends on the following four factors. First is the possession of a territory for collective living; a people that loses its homeland will often find it difficult to preserve its tradition. In order for a people condemned to “wander” to survive, their tradition will often be engulfed by an 21  This is why in his Exposition of Humanity (Ren xue, 仁學 1896/1897). Tan Sitong used the words “to burst through” (chongjue 沖決) to express his resolve to “seek the new” (qiuxin 求新). Behind the negation of all history and tradition, they were actually using the appearance of antitraditionalism to carry forward a type of tradition. 22  See Xiangbao leizuan, 1902, jia ji, shang juan, 37 and 4.

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alien civilization. Second is a common belief system. A people that loses their common belief system will have lost a strong force for maintaining their cohesion. Despite the fact that freedom is something that everyone needs, as soon as the common orientation of their value system is lost, an individual in a society will come to feel exceptionally lonely and isolated. Third is a common language. Using a common language is an important foundation of mutual identity. No matter where people are, their language is like an identity badge and the local accent of their native place is like a safe conduct pass; it is often an important factor in making people who use the same language obtain a sense of security and closeness. A group of people who has lost its common language is no longer a nation (people, minzu), and so “loss of language” often signifies the collapse of a tradition. Fourth is a collective historical memory. Historical memory is stored up deep in each individual’s mind; different historical memories define different historical roots; when people bring them to light from deep in their minds it is called “seeking for one’s roots” (xungen 尋 根). This is probably the meaning of Cao Zhi (192–232)’s well-known line “we were originally born from the same roots” (Ben shi tong gen sheng 本是同根生), and thus “seeking for one’s roots” is an extremely important way to reestablish one’s identity. At the end of the nineteenth century, especially after 1895, after China had received such an extreme shock, the Chinese suddenly lost faith in their tradition. Although they still lived in a common territory and still had a common language, their common beliefs began to be shaken and undermined by the new Western knowledge while their common collective historical memory also seemed to be gradually disappearing. All of this caused people to worry about whether or not the confidence of the people (minzu) and the nation (guojia) had been lost. Before the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed, Zhang Peilun (1848–1903) wrote in sorrow to a friend that “if we bow down to the Japs at this time, and the Westerners swarm in, China will have no where to stand.”23 After the treaty was signed, Tang Caichang said even more painfully that “this treaty that we have agreed to does not make peace with the Japs, it simply surrenders to them. Treasonous officials have sold out the nation, something that has never happed before in ancient or modern times.”24 The self-evident context behind all of these doleful expression was the people (nation, minzu) 23  Zhang Peilun, “Letter in answer to Wang Liansheng,” from Jianyuji: shudu liu, 17 shang; quoted from Li Guoqi, “Man Qing de rentong yu fouding—Zhongguo jindai Han minzu zhuyi sixiang de yanbian,” in Rentong yu guojia, 1994, 106. 24   Tang Caichang ji, 223.

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and the country (state, guojia). Behind the often used slogan of “protect the state, protect the race, protect the faith” (baoguo, baozhong, baojiao 保國, 保種, 保教) was a profound feeling of suffering and sorrow. Later on, this sorrow, apprehension, despondency, and stress seem to have increased day by day. The memorials sent up to Emperor Guangxu by Kang Youwei and over a thousand scholars (the “Public Vehicle Petition” gongche shangshu) were the most concentrated expression of the anxiety and nervous tension that accompanied their feelings of helplessness. Their demands that the emperor encourage “All under Heaven,” hand down an imperial edict taking the blame on himself, expunge the national humiliation, support the sacred teachings of the sages, and eradicate heresies would seem to have been promoting internationalism and making China enter a universal modernity. The identification of the people or nation (guozu rentong 國族認同) and the revitalization of tradition embodied in their memorials, however, with the support of the most radical emotions, simply stimulated the most radically nationalist sense of crisis awareness. Some people had already seen these most deep-seated latent concerns. In his On Adopting the Customs of Western Nations, Song Yuren expressed the view that if the influence of Western learning and Western faiths expanded, they would certainly shake the foundations of Chinese tradition and undermine the Chinese cosmology and system of values.25 5 It should be pointed out that modern Chinese nationalism is an extremely complex phenomenon. Usually in dealing with an alien civilization, a nation that has a traditional civilization with a very long history will have two different kinds of response. One is to adopt an attitude of universalism and to welcome the other civilization’s seemingly unquestionable knowledge, thought and technology in order to merge into the world. The other one is to adopt an attitude of exceptionalism and to reject the alien things that might undermine and weaken the native knowledge, thought and beliefs while stirring up radical nationalism and conservatism. In the minds of Chinese intellectuals, however, it was not a simple case of either nationalism or internationalism. Even though the challenges of the West stirred up nationalistic passions and anxiety about the survival of the nation or people (minzu), yet in the background of modern Chinese nationalism, surprisingly enough, we can see an extremely unusual form of internationalism. There were, of course, historical 25  Song Yuren, “Taixi geguo caifeng ji,” in Guo Songtao deng shixi ji liuzhong, 388.

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reasons for this internationalism because in the traditional Chinese imagination of the world, there always existed a consciousness that “All under Heaven is one family” (tianxia yi jia 天下一家) and a concept of universal truth in which everywhere everyone had the “same mind and [the] same principle” (xintong litong 心同理同). After the nineteenth century, of course, the “tribute system” with China as suzerain, and traditional ideas about “All under Heaven” were undermined and gradually disappeared. Not only did the Western powers begin to enter China after the Opium Wars, but even the various peripheral states that seemed to revolve around China also began to move away; the geopolitical picture of the world had been transformed.26 The unusual thing was, however, that no matter how much “All under Heaven” had already become the “myriad nations,” for the Chinese intellectual world, the consciousness of “All under Heaven is one family” and the concept of “same mind and same principle” still brought about a very complicated orientation when the Chinese faced the world. The Chinese adopted an internationalist interpretation of truth and value, but this gave rise to mixed feelings of love and hate toward “the West” while at the same time bringing about a form of antitraditional nationalism. Lin Yusheng raised the concept of “iconoclastic nationalism” ( fanchuantong de minzu zhuyi 反傳統的民族主義) in a dialogue with Benjamin Schwartz.27 This kind of thinking would seem to be in contrast to protecting the classic texts and fundamentalist nationalism. It looks like it is radically renouncing

26  Even the Qing government institutions that dealt with foreign affairs also had to change in accordance with these geopolitical changes. The two Qing foreign affairs organizations were the Office for Relations with Principalities (Lifan Yuan 理藩院) and the Department in Charge of Foreign Ceremonies (Zhuke Si 主客司). The former was responsible for areas inside the country like Mongolia, Tibet, and Nepal, while the latter handled the tributary states such as Chaoxian (Korea), Vietnam, Burma, Celebes, and Holland or the Netherlands. However, “since the time of the xianfeng and tongzhi reigns (1850– 1875), the European powers (winds) and Japanese forces (Asian rains) were increasingly pressing in on us. We communicated with them during their visits, granted them imperial audiences, and also signed treaties as equal countries. Nevertheless, from the perspective of rites, we still regarded them as enemies. Our old poems and songs mention ‘having guests’, and our transmitted documents also record ‘making friends with neighbours’, and they mean that no matter whether they are from friendly countries or vassal states, it is essential to treat them all as important guests.” Thus, the Qing attitude had already greatly changed. See Qingshi gao, 1977, j. 91, “Li shi—Bin li,” 2673. 27  “Shi Huaci, Lin Yusheng duihualu—yixie guanyu Zhongguo jindai he xiandai sixiang, wenhua yu zhengzhi de ganxiang,” Lin Yusheng, Sixiang yu renwu, 1983, 439–468.

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tradition, but actually the support system behind such thinking is also a kind of tradition. First off, because the ideology of Great China being the center of All under Heaven (the world) and China’s actual position as the cultural center of East Asia created an attitude of extreme self-esteem, China was anxious to prove its great nation status, and so the Chinese were often unable to maintain a calm frame of mind. Second, the authority of Chinese politics, religion, and culture were originally very concentrated and mutually supportive. Political authority relied on religion and achieved its legitimacy by means of various ceremonies, while it was also deemed to be reasonable through the assistance of the cultural discourse of the intellectual elite. At the same time, both religion and knowledge received their raisons d’être under the protection of political power. This was precisely the three in one nature of the so-called political orthodoxy (zhengtong 政統), Confucian (cultural) orthodoxy (daotong 道統) and spiritual orthodoxy (shentong 神統); each of them did not really have an individually autonomous realm.28 At this time when the humanistic knowledge that served as authority and truth in their historical tradition was no longer able to support the confidence of the state and the nation (guojia, minzu), it was easy for antitraditional thinking to appear among an intellectual stratum that felt so painfully that it possessed neither “fundamental essence” (ti) nor “practical applications” (yong). Thirdly, in Chinese tradition itself, there were always various internal tensions. These already included antitraditional tendencies and resources such as “return to the ancients” ( fugu 復古), “revolution” (geming 革命), and “renovation” (genghua 更化). Hence, when people came to the painful conclusion that their tradition had lost its significance, they could still also find resources in another area of the same tradition. It was just on this account that the antitraditionalists of recent Chinese history started out precisely from tradition and the classics. In their way of thinking, nationalism derived its power of 28  The sources of ancient Chinese imperial power and authority should include the virtue, honor and fear mentioned in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, the legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority described in Max Weber’s “The Three Types of Legitimate Rule” (“Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaf,” rule sometimes being translated as “Domination” or “Authority”, Preussische Jahrbücher 187, 1–2, 1922, translated by Hans Gerth, in the journal Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4 (1): 1–11, 1958), or the three types of political system—authoritarian, tyrannical, and totalitarian—discussed by Hannah Arendt in “What is authority” (1954) in her Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (1993).

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mobilization from universal world values, and internationalism obtained its universal significance from an authentic nationalism. These dilemmas and this contradictory psychology rendered recent Chinese intellectual history extremely complex. It was precisely under such conditions that both feelings of nationalism and the pursuit of universalism were activated in a China that still possessed a common territory, common language and, at least temporarily, political autonomy. Because China’s “roots” had not yet been cut off, the inclination to “replenish the roots” (xugen 續根) grew even more intense. The idea of carrying forward the roots of the nation (minzu) and culture supported the mood of nationalism, and, with the slogan of “national salvation through strength” ( jiuwang tuqiang 救亡圖強), was extremely attractive. Because the yardstick for determining right and wrong or good and evil had already come under the control of Western discourse, the value orientation of “searching for wealth and power” and the instrumental rationality of “pursuing the practically useful” also replaced China’s traditional value orientation and ethical rationality. When compared with the West, everyone seemed to be in competition racing along the same track. Hence, internationalism became the recognized form of truth, and just this phenomenon led to the tensions in Chinese intellectual history between “national salvation” ( jiuwang) and “enlightenment” (qimeng), “nationalism” and “internationalism,” and “radicalism” and “conservatism.” 6 In 1895, Yan Fu published in the Times (Zhibao) of Tianjin his “On the Speed of World Change” (Lun shibian zhi ji); the title itself expressed those intellectuals’ nervous anxiety about the situation facing China. In the same year Yan published his “On the Origin of Strength” (Yuanqiang); this title also expressed the road chosen by those intellectuals: only “wealth and power” could successfully deal with this enormous “world change”; only facing up to this great change, unprecedented in two thousand years of Chinese history, could guarantee that the racial heritage of the nation would not be cut off. In order to achieve this priority goal, China had to accept the Western road to modernization. It is said that in the same year, Yan Fu completed his translation of Thomas Henry Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (Tianyan lun), and before he had taken it to be printed, it had already spread like wildfire. The Exquisite Taste Book Seller of Shaanxi rushed to publish it, and it very rapidly became popular. Especially the two terms “struggle for existence” (wujing 物競) and “natural selection”

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(tianze 天擇) further increased the nervous anxiety of those late nineteenthcentury Chinese who were living in such a hard to discuss state of mind. The sentence near the end of the book stating that “the study of evolution will in the future become an unshakable model for everyone who talks about ruling or governance” seems to have been a prophetic omen of twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history.29

29   Tianyan lun, shang, “Daoyan yi—Chabian,” ibid., xia, “Lun shiqi—jinhua,” in Yan Fu ji, 1986, vol. 5, 1324, 1396. Also see Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West, 1964.

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Index achieving enlightenment through sincerity (chengming 誠明) 75 activity (dong 動) of feelings, desires 79 advanced scholar (jinshi 進士) degree 5, 7, 161 Agriculture, School of (nongjia 農家) 294 Aleni, Giulio (Ai Rulüe 艾儒略, 1582–164)  205n5, 208n9, 221, 222n35, 281 Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office (Zhifang waiji) 1623 221 A Summary of Western Learning (Xixue fan, 1623) taxonomy of Western knowledge  281 alien cultures/barbarian peoples 6, 12, 15, 16, 17, 65, 78, 96, 98, 111, 158–160, 168, 170, 271, 288, 289, 317, 318 all the ten thousand things are there in me (wanwu jie bei yu wo 萬物皆備於我), Mencius said 182 art of ruling (zhengshu 政術) 107–108, 107n16 changing traditional Han Chinese ethical norms 16 challenging Han Chinese civilization 17 All-Embracing Book or Penetrating the Classic of Changes (Tongshu) 166 All Under Heaven (tianxia 天下) 3, 64, 66, 75, 96, 98, 102, 111, 120, 123, 129n59, 132, 140, 155n13, 170, 173, 178, 202, 205n5, 216, 218, 219–223, 236, 251n6, 272, 283, 294, 318–320 319 All under Heaven is one family (tianxia yi jia 天下一家) 98, 319 Amoghavajra (Bukong, 705–774) 29 ancient prose (guwen 古文) 77, 81, 83, 103, 112 and Reviving Ancient Prose Movement ( fuxing guwen yundong 復興古文運動)  77n50 An Account with Illustrations of World Map (Kun yu tushuo) 224n40 Analects of Confucius (Lunyu) 66, 113n26, 121n44, 133, 136nn70, 71, 145n98, 169, 227, 240, 252, 254, 265n35, 284n65

An Lushan (ca. 703–757)-Shi Siming (703–761) Rebellion 4, 15, 17–20, 31, 34, 40n39, 64, 70, 76, 78, 85 Asanga (ca. 410–ca. 500) 23 assemblies, popular, called for 314–315 Astronomical Instruments (Jianpingyi shuo, 1611) 208, 213 astronomy, study of Heaven (tianxue) 203, 205–215, 206n7, 215n23, 216, 229, 248, 259, 261–263, 287, 302n97, 312 Imperial Astronomical Bureau 211, 226 Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen Reign completed 1634 210–211 Western astronomy and effect on Chinese thought 205–216 autocracy 163, 257 Bai Qi (?–258 BCE), Qin general 152, 292 Ban Gu, History of the Former Han Dynasty first origin of barbarians 218, 231, 270 Bao Ruoyu (f. 11th–12th century) 127n56 barbarian peoples (non-Han peoples, huren 胡人) 65, 78, 82, 87, 158, 173, 269, 270 cruelly treated (manyi 蠻夷) 160 customs (hufeng 胡風) opposed 17, 158 four (siyi 四夷) 96, 99, 210, 216-227, 273 religions 12, 70 western 202, 259, 273 Basic Questions (Suwen, part of the Huangdi Neijing) 210 being and non-being 138 Benji (840–901) 52, 58, 61 benevolence, compassion, filial piety (ren ai ci xiao 仁愛慈孝) 232 Benjing (667–761) 36 Bin Chun (1804–?) interest in English Parliament 274 biology (shengwu, living things 277, 297 Bi Yuan (1730–1797) 290 Bodhidharma 50, 56 Bo Juyi (772–846) 21, 42, 69, 92n82 Essay on Chuanfa Tang (Chuanfa Tang bei)  42

Index Book of History (or Documents, Shangshu)  18, 138, 173n47 Book of Rites (Liji) 13, 173n47 Ceremonial Usages (Liyun) chapter of  13n10 boxue 博學 extensive learning 186, 240 boxue zhuyi 博學主義 broad learning concerning the nature of things 240 Brahe, Tycho (1546–1601) 210, 287 Bridgman, Elijah Coleman (1801–1861) Brief Chronicle of the American Federation (Lianbang zhilüe) 271 bring peace to All Under Heaven (ping tianxia 平天下) 75 bureaucracy 89, 95, 126, 129, 246 scholar-official 111 Buddha, true realm of the 27 Buddha-nature (bhūtatathatā) 27, 28, 36, 43–56, 73 and gradual enlightenment debate 188 and human nature 43–47 realm of, what use is the 49 Buddhism (Buddhist) commentaries on the sûtras 55–56 bodhi, wisdom, enlightenment (wu 悟)  44, 48, 188, 298n88 conception of the geographical world  219–220 cultivation 36, 43, 47, 53 enlightenment 33, 36, 45, 48, 49, 56, 60, 75, 183 gradual 47, 48, 188 sudden (dunwu 頓悟) 28, 35–36, 40n41, 46, 48, 54 in Tang dynasty 22–35 decline of interest in theory 33–34 patronage of in 11–12 rise of meditation and keeping precepts  20–21 spread despite Tang regulations 10 three types of Tang Buddhist leaders 21 nineteenth century revival of  296–304 Japan, Japanese 300, 301 305, 315 alternative academies (bieyuan 別院) or “schools” (xuetang 學堂) of 301 Chinese disdain for 305

337 threat to Chinese intellectual tradition  69 translations used for Western learning  315 Buddhist Terms and Sayings absence of thought (wunian 無念) 50 bodhisattva 48 calmness (meditation, samâdhi) 44, 91 calmness of mind, ataraxy (anxin 安心)  47, 49, 50 chan 禪 dhyâna, meditation 21, 35, 39, 43, 47 dharma, fa 法 phenomena 24, 34, 35, 40n40, 46, 48, 54, 55n6, 56, 60, 298n88 dharmakâya (essence of all beings) 27 delusion (mâyâ, mi 迷) 48 do not establish the written word (buli wenzi 不立文字) 40n40, 54–57 four dharma-realms (dharmadhâtu) 26 four dhyānas and eight concentrations (sichan bading 四禪八定) 47, 48n54 Four Noble Truths (sidi 四諦) 28 genuine truth (zhendi, satya 真諦) of dharma 60 of Chan Buddhism 50 gong-an 公案 paradoxical anecdotes (riddles) 53, 59, 59n13, 60, 62 guanxin 觀心 observing one’s mind 44 incanting aloud (zhuandu 轉讀) 55 intoning the Buddha-name 44–49 jifeng 機鋒 keen words 53, 60, 62 linian 離念 abandoning thought 44 meditation 禪法 chanfa, dhyâna 20, 21, 35, 36, 39, 40n40, 43, 44, 47–50, 45n50, 60, 61, 91, 117n37 mental anxiety (kleśa and âgantu-kleśa)  46 naïve naturalness or naïve spontaneity (tianzhen ziran 天真自然) 50 no cultivation and no thoughts (wuxiu wunian, 無修無念) 42, 28 ordinary mind (pingchang xin 平常心) is the Way (dao 道) 38, 47, 49–51 public chanting (changdao唱導) 55, 59n13 prajñâ (borezhi 般若智) or shûnya (wisdom) 28, 39, 43–50, 50n50

338 Buddhist Terms and Sayings (cont.) purity of mind (qingjing 清靜) 50–51 Realm of Dharmas (dharmadhâtu, fajie 法界) 26, 27, 28 self-mind (zixin, svacitta 自心) 36, 59 Shûnyatâ (emptiness, kong) 27, 36, 39, 46, 48, 117–118 spontaneity or freedom (ziran, the natural) 48, 50, 113, 121, 191 there is no mind and there is no Buddha (fei xin fei Fo 非心非佛) 46–48, 51, 186 this mind is the Buddha (ji xin ji Fo 即心 即佛) 46–47 three Buddhist dharma 298n88 transmission from mind to mind (yi xin chuan xin 以心傳心) 57 unsullied mind is originally pure (xinxing ben jing, 心性本淨) 42, 186 Huichang Period Anti-Buddhist Persecution (huichang miefo 會昌滅 佛) of Wuzong 40n39, 52, 84–86 Buddhist Schools Chan Buddhism chanzong 禪宗 21, 30, 33, 35–52, 53–62, 139 Chan departs from speech and words (chan li yanshuo, 禪離言說) 42 Chan masters ridicule doctrines, theories, writing 35, 54, 58, 81 history of differs from transmission of the lamp tradition 36–37, 41, 42n45 language and Chan 52–59 baihua vs. wenyan, dead language vs. living language 57 Hall of Ancestors Collection (Zutangji), Chan history 56 quotations (yulu) of Chan masters  49n55, 54, 58, 60 schools of Chan Northern Heze (Lotus Marsh) 37–39, 41, 42, 48, 52 Ox-Head 21, 36–37, 38–39, 48, 52 influence of 48–49 Tiantai 21, 37, 38–41, 52, 59n13, 61n16, 73, 119 Hongzhou 37–39, 41, 43, 48, 50, 52 Southern

Index Mazu Chan, Hongzhou Mazu 38–42, 50 the mind is the Buddha ( ji xin shi Fo 即心 是佛) 38 apart from mind there is no Buddha ( fei xin fei Fo 非心非佛) 38 ridicule of theory in 54 the ordinary mind is the [Buddhist] Way (pingchang xin shi dao 平常心是道)  38, 47, 50–51 Quotations (yulu) of Mazu Daoyi 54 Huineng’s Southern Chan in 9th century  39, 41, 52 Wild or Crazy Chan Buddhism (kuangchan 狂禪) 139 five schools of Chan, 10th century 52 Hînayâna 28 Huayan (Flower Garland) 22, 26–30, 35, 39, 61, 116, 119 Nâgârajuna (ca. 150–250) 299 Mâdhyamika 34 Mahâyâna 23, 28, 53, 56, 73, 299 School of Discipline (lümen 律門) 33 Sudden Enlightenment 28 see dun wu Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism (Vajrayana)  28, 29n26, 59n13 Yogâcâra (Way of Yoga) or Consciousness Only, (Weishi 唯識) 23, 24, 28, 29–30, 39, 54, 61, 296–297 main ideas of 24–30, 303 Qing revival of 303 Buddhist texts Avatamsaka-sûtra (or the Mahâvaipulya Buddhâvatamsaka-sûtra, the Flower Garland Sûtra, Huyuan jing) 26, 116, 298 Brahma-viśesa-cintî-pariprcchâ-sûtra (Siyi jing) 28 Buddhabhûmi-sûtra-shâstra (Fodijing lun)  24 Dasabhûmikâ-sûtra (Dilun) 23 General Record of Buddhist Masters (Fozu tongji) 220 Jingde chuandenglu (Records of the Transmission of the Lamp) 42n45 Lankâvatâra-sûtra (Lengjia jing) 28, 36, 46 Mâdhyamika shâstra (Middle or Three Treatise school) 23

Index Mahâparinirvâna-sûtra (Da po niepan jing) 43, 73 Mahâyâna Śraddhotpada Śastra (Awakening of Faith in the Mahâyâna, Dacheng qixin lun) 73 Mahâyâna-samparigraha (Acceptance of the Great Vehicle, She dasheng lun)  23 Meaning of the Six Characteristics of the Huayan school (Huayan liuxiang yi)  54 Nirvânasûtra (Niepan jing) 28, 32, 73, Platform Sûtra of the Sixth Patriarch  44n45, 45n50 Prajñapâramitâ-sûtra (Perfection of Wisdom Sûtra, Boruo jing) 23, 28, 32, 46, 51, 56 Saddharma Pundarîka-sûtra (Lotus Sûtra, Fahua jing) 23, 32 Satyasiddhi-shâstra (Chengshi lun) 32 Ten Admonitions for the Fayan School (Zongmen shiguan lun) 54 Treatise on the Three Realms of Consciousness Only (Sanjie weixinlun)  54 Vijnapti-mâtrâtasiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness Only, Cheng weishi lun)  24, 26, 124 Vimalakîrti-nirdesa-sûtra 23, 32 Yogâcâra-bhûmi-shâstra (Yujiashi dilun)  24 Buglio, Lodovico (1606–1682) refutes Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) 226 Cai Xiang (1012–1067) on Great Peace 103 Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) Buddhism protects the nation 302 calamities, Heaven-sent, theory of (zaiyi shuo 災異說) 101, 110 calendar, calendrical science/calculation 5, 64, 207, 209, 211, 212, 213, 216, 248, 261–263, 265, 287 cannibalism 155n13 Canon of the Greatest Mystery of the Genesis Point (Taixuan zhenyi benji jing or Taixuan jing) 90 Canon of Yao (Yaodian) 287

339 Cao Duan (Yuchuan, 1376–1434) 178 Cao Zhi (192–232) same roots poem 317 cartography, Chinese 217 Cassini, Giovanni Domenico (1625–1712)  287 centralization (jiquan zhuyi 集權主義)  109–110 change within tradition 266 Chan, Wing-tsit 90n80, 101n9, 114n29, 132 Chanyuan Treaty of 1004 with the Liao 97 Chart of the Master-Disciple Succession of the Chan Gate that Transmits the Mind Ground in China (Zhonghua chuanxin di chanmen shizi chenxi tu) 37 chemistry (huaxue, study of transformations)  277, 298 Chen Baisha receives sacrifices in the Confucian Temple 180 Chen Baozhen (1831–1900) 308n6 Chen Chun (1159–1223), Meanings of Neo-Confucian Philosophical Terms (Beixi ziyi) 162 Chen Dexiu (1178–1235) authors popular education texts 164 Chen Fuliang (1141–1203) and practical efficacy 140n83 Cheng Duanli (1271–1345) “Preface to Jia Xuanweng’s Poetry” 171 Chen Gongfu (ca. 1081–ca.1150) prohibits Cheng Yi’s “Luoyang Studies” 128–129 Chengguan (737–838 or 738–839 or 760–838)  35, 40 Cheng Hao (1032–1085) 100, 104, 106, 113, 114n28, 120, 128n57, 131, 132n65, 147, 198 Qing xiu xuexiao zun shiru qushi zhazi on sage, Way of the teacher 108n18 Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814) critical of Principle of Heaven 255 Cheng Yi (1033–1107) 100, 104, 111, 115–116, 116n35, 117n36, 118n38, 120, 121n44, 124n51, 128n57, 129, 131, 132n65, 137, 143n96, 147, 156, 157n15, 159, 173n47, 187, 198 for women to starve to death is a small thing, but to loose her chastity is a very serious matter 157 Cheng Dachang (1123–1195) and Zheng Bing (1121–1194) forbid Buddhist teaching 163

340 Cheng Tingzuo (1691–1767) criticizes Dai Zhen 252 Cheng Yaotian (1725–1814) 255, 266 chenwei 讖緯, divination and mystical Confucianist beliefs 101–102 Chen Jian (1497–1567)’s Thorough Debate on Three Teachings critique of Wang Yangming 192 Chen Li (1810–1882) 286, 292 Chen Liang (1143–1194) 98, 128n58, 140–143 critique of Zhu Xi 140–143 Chen Que (1604–1677) 198, 240, 243 Chen Yinque (Chen Yinke, 1890–1969) 8n6, 63n19, 78 On Han Yu (Lun Han Yu), Han’s thought  78 Chen Xiang (1017–1080) 112 Chen Xianzhang (Baisha, 1428–1500) 178 Chen Yuan (1256–1330) follows Lu Jiuyuan thought 177 chenyuan 塵緣 dust (that is, causes of illusions 44, 45 Chen Zushou (1634 jinshi), Illustrious Ming Atlas of the World (Huang Ming zhifang ditu) 1636 222–224 Cobo, Dominican Fray Juan (1529–?) 208 Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas (Shanhai yudi quantu) 201 Complete Map of the Myriad Countries (Wanguo quantu) 221 Comprehensive Charts of the Spherical and Vault Comprehensive Charts of the Spherical and Vault of Heaven Astronomical Theories (Hungai tongxian tushuo) (in Chinese, Jesuit translation) 201 corruption 18, 105, 267 cosmology 18, 207, 212, 214n21, 243, 318 Counsels of the Great Yu in the Book of History 138 cultural conservatism 106, 124, 125, 127–128, 144 China, concept of, ethnic, cultural, civilizational 229–232 Celestial Empire and Great Nation (tianchao daguo 天朝大國) 300 Chongzhen Emperor (Zhu Youjian, 1611–1644, r. 1627–1644) 199, 211, 212 faces invasions and rebellion 200, 210

Index commissioned compilation of Mathematical Astronomy of the Chongzhen Reign (Chongzhen lishu) 210–211 Chu Yong (Southern Song), On Dispelling Doubts (Chuyi shuo) refutes superstitions  162n23 civilization(s) alien or foreign 158, 159, 170, 171, 201, 203, 204, 208n9, 219, 271, 289, 317, 318 expands through Song dynasty education  149–166 Han Chinese 12, 15–17, 89, 98–100, 111, 123, 146, 154, 156, 169n39, 170, 176–177, 200, 211, 219, 220, 222, 226, 230–232, 276, 280 Indian 219 Western 202, 204, 205–226, 267–282, 312 Chongji 61n16 Chujin (698–759) 39 cinnabar elixirs of immortality 86, 88, 91, 95, 229 classical studies ( jingxue 經學) 282n62, 283, 284, 286n68 Classic of Changes (Yijing) 5n3, 116n34, 119, 166, 169, 173n47, 214, 227, 242–243, 253–254, 260, 264 Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing) 3, 12 Classic of Mountains and Seas 224, 292 Classic on Divine Marvels 224 classics, forged (weijing 偽經) 242, 243, 247, 248, 285 Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu) 133–134, 169 Collection Exposing Heterodoxy (Shengchao poxie ji) stories against Western astronomy 213 Complete Atlas of the Illustrious Qing Empire (Huang qing yitong yudi quantu) 227 Complete Map of the Earth’s Mountains and Seas (Matteo Ricci 1684) 201, 207, 216 undermined Chinese views of of tianxia, Middle Kingdom 217–218 Copernicus (1473–1543) 208, 287 correspondence/resonance theory of order  206, 255 concept of fenye 分野 field-allocation (celestial and earth regions) 217 cosmology, Chinese cosmological theory in all Chinese arts and sciences 206n7

Index impacted by Western astronomy  207–213 apparatuses: sundial, telescope, orrery  207 assertion that the earth is spherical and not square 208 leads to collapse of [Chinese] Heaven and Earth 209, 217 celestial globe (diqiuyi 地球儀) 207n8 ideas conforming to ancient Chinese sources 210 resistence by Chinese “old knowledge”  212 transformation of heaven (the heavens)  208 cultivating one’s self (xiushen 修身) 74, 129n59, 132, 134, 205n5 commerce and consumerism 175 Confucian classics (Rujia jingdian 儒家經典)  1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 43, 56, 65, 67–68, 74, 129, 133, 135, 138–139, 142, 143, 146, 147, 154, 166–168, 173n47, 178, 184, 196, 197n102, 198, 227, 239–254, 250n3, 258, 260, 265–266, 277, 281–288, 282n62, 290–295, 320 reinterpretation of 184, 283–295 Confucian religion (Kongjiao 孔教)  197n102, 229, 300 Confucian temples 76, 83 Confucianism 1–3, 10, 71, 73–74, 76–78, 85, 92–93, 114, 120, 125–148, 160, 168, 173, 182, 191, 193, 195, 198, 215, 225–226, 230, 233, 237, 241, 246, 248, 253, 256, 291 orthodox decline in Tang 10–11, 19, 68 virtues, five Confucian: humanity, propriety, faithfulness, rightness, and wisdom (ren, li, xin, yi, zhi 仁, 禮, 信, 義, 智) 72 Confucius 17, 40–41, 64, 67n27, 76–77, 80n54, 83n60, 85, 101, 102n11, 113, 121n44, 122, 128, 131, 133, 147, 168, 187, 194, 196, 243n72, 251n6, 265, 291 also see Analects cults, improper practices banned 150–156 Da Dai’s Classic of Rites (Da Dai Liji) 287 Dai Zhen (1723–1777) 248–253, 257, 261, 262, 265, 266

341 textual critique of li 理 (principle, reason)  250n3 undermines Song School of Principle  249–252 using principle to kill people (against excessive moral idealism) 258 Daizong, Tang Emperor (Li Yu, 727–779, r. 762–779) patronizes Ox-Head Buddhism  38 Dan Zhu (725–770) skeptical of three commentaries to Spring and Autumn Annals 68 Dao 道, eternal Way, moral Way 51, 66–67, 71 constant Way (changdao 常道) 99, 264 nothing is greater than the Way and principle (dao li zui da 道理最大)  100 prevails for All Under Heaven (tianxia youdao 天下有道) 66 dao wenxue 道問學, see following the path of inquiry and study daotong 道統, tradition of (Confucian) moral principles, succession of the Way of Confucius and Mencius 76–78, 82, 101, 103, 107, 110, 112, 122, 124n51, 125, 130, 132–133, 139, 141, 147–148, 169, 287, 233, 238, 273 two meanings of explained 101n9 Daoxin (580–651) 50 Daozun (?–784) 39 Daoism (daojia), Daoist School Daoist adepts ( fangshi, magicians) 88, 93 Daoist masters 85–89, 94 Daoist Religion, religious Daoism 6, 10, 11, 16, 19, 74, 84–95, 114, 120, 139, 215, 229–230 adapts to Confucian ideas 89 Maoshan Highest Clarity school (Supreme Purity, Huayang) 84–85, 90 Nanyue school (Mt. Heng) 86 Tang patronage of 11 Twofold Mystery (chongxuan 重玄) emphasizing theory 89–90 Zhengyi or Tianshi (Celestial Masters) Zhengyi 94 Lingbao or Numinous Treasure 94 Dao nature (daoxing 道性) 90

342 De Bary, William Theodore 101n9, Deng Yankang (773–859) 86 democracy, democratic system 269, 270, 274, 294, 314 monarchical (junzhuzhi de minzhu zhidu 君主制的民主制度) 315 Deshao (891–972) 61n16 destiny (meaningful human life) 74, 100, 113, 113n27, 119–120, 122, 254 Dezong (Li Kuo, r. 779–805), Emperor 62, 64, 91n81 Dharmatâ (Faru 法如, 638–689) 44 Di Renjie (630–700) 151 Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong) 74–75, 83, 103, 133, 147, 153, 169, 184–186, 227, 241, 243, 253 Dong Qichang (1555–1636), 194 Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179–ca. 104 BCE) 41, 72, 101, 110 Donglin faction (Donglin dang 東林黨) 239 Draft Recovered Edition of the Essential Documents and Regulations of the Song (Songhuiyao jigao) 156 Du Guangting (850–933) 86 Du Jingxian (fl. 825) 86 Du Shun (557–640) 26 Duan Yucai (1731–1815) 266 Dugu Ji (725–777) criticizes Confucian classics 67n27 Duke of Zhou (Zhou Gong) 77 dunwu 頓悟 sudden enlightenment 35, 188 duxing 篤行earnest practice 186 Du You (735–812)’s Tongdian calls for strong government 66n23 dynastic succession 15, 231 orthodox doctrine of (zhengtonglun 正統論) in Song dynasty 158n17 Earth 5, 11, 13, 64, 274n48, 279, 297n85, 298 also see Heaven and Earth Eastern Inscription (Dongming) 166 Ebrey, Patricia 135 education 18, 19, 25, 72–73, 97, 107, 129, 147–150, 160, 164, 173, 176, 179, 180n56, 183, 185n72, 227, 293, 303, 313 transformation to Western learning  280–282

Index leads to collapse of traditional system  280n59 power and 1–3, 7, 8 Eight Diagrams Sect (tianlijiao 天理教 or baguajiao 八卦教) rebellion 1813 266 empty thinking (xuxiang 虛想) 291 enrich the nation and strengthen the military (fuqiang or fuguo qiangbing 富國強兵)  102, 276, 280, 309 Euclid’s Elements of Geometry (in Chinese, Jesuit translation) 20 evidential research see textual criticism and evidential research Exact Meaning of the Five Classics, The (Wujing zhengyi) xiii, 2, 10 examinations keju 科舉 (examination system, official examinations) 2–7, 10, 15, 19, 67, 77n50, 148, 161, 168, 173n47, 173 and rise in status 14–15, 15n15 based on Cheng-Zhu School of Principle  177 Collected Commentaries on the Four Books as subject of 134, 169 Emperor Shenzong concern with questions of 108, 123n47 Mengzi (Mencius) as subject of 83n60 supported by early Manchu-Qing emperors 233 key texts fixed in 1312–1313 as the Four Books with three catagories of essays (lun 論) 168 meaning of the classics (jingyi 經義), poetry (cifu 詞賦), triennial provincial imperial examinations (xiangshi 鄉試) start 1370 173 content format of 173n47 Cai Chen (1167–1230) commentary on Book of Documents principle text  173n47 Hu Anguo and Zhang Qia (1160–1237) commentary of Book of Rites principle text 173n47 Zhu Xi’s commentaries on Book of Songs and Classic of Changes principle texts 173n47 criticism of by Yao Mian (1216–1262) 167n35

Index

343

filial piety (xiao 孝) 150, 164, 165, 232 five constant virtues 99, 140, 173 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907–960)  40, 61, 83, 96–97, 155n13 Five Phases (wuxing 五行) 115, 137, 214, 214n21 five zones, ancient theory of (wufu 五服, royal domain, regional rulers, guests, controlled, and wild) 223 following Heaven and accepting the Mandate (Order) (fengtian chengyun 奉天承運)  262 factional struggles, intellectual 69, 241 following the path of inquiry and study (dao factions 18n19, 69, 80n55, 81, 82n59, 107, wenxue 道問學) 118, 137138, 143, 184, 186, 131n63, 193n91, 197, 213, 329, 241, 284, 241–242 286n68, 301 foreign affairs, Qing institutions of 319n26 Fan Chong (?–1141) 128n57 four barbarians (siyi 四夷, Eastern Yi, Fan Chunren (1027–1101) 106 Western Rong, Northern Di, Southern Fang Dongshu (1772–1851) criticizes Dai Zhen  Man) 82, 96, 99, 210, 216–226, 273 252, 254 four classes (scholars, farmers, artisans, and Fang Kongzhao (1590–1655) 214n21 merchants, shi nong gong shang) 99 Fang Yizhi (1611–1671) 214n21, 221, 230, 232 Fan Min (936–981) promotes non-shamanistic four elements (earth, air, fire, water), Western theory of and Chinese Five Phases (metal, medicine 151 wood, water, fire, earth) 214, 214n21, 225, Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) 149 298 Faxian (337–ca. 422) 33n30, 43, 219, 303 Four Legendary Emperors: Yao, Shun, Yu, Fu Shan (1607–1684) 230, 232 Tang 77 Fan Zhui (1872–1906) On Sincerity (Kaicheng pian) 1898 calls for total Westernization  freedom, absolute and spontaneity (ziyou, ziran) 48, 50, 113, 191 316 Fu Bi (1004–1082), 104, 106 Faqin (714–792) 38 fugu 復古 returning to antiquity (the Fazang (642–712) 26, 28, 30 ancients) 80, 237, 320 Faxian (337–ca. 422) 33n30, 43, 219, 303 Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) Escape from fengshan (Feng and Shan) ceremonies on Asia (Datsu-A ron) 305 Mt. Tai, 725 6, 64 Fung Youlan xi Feng Guifen (1809–1874) 273–274 Fu Yi (555–639)’s anti-Buddhism 70 Discussion on Selectively Using Western Learning (Cai xixue yi) 312–313 Gao Panlong (1562–1626) 174, 229n46 Protests from Jiaobin Cottage (Jiaobinlu anti-Wang Yangming, pro School of kangyi) 1861 273–274, 309 Principle 196 Feng Qi (1558–?) opposes radical Wang on decline of Confucian learning  Yangming teachings 194 174–175 Feng Weiliang (fl. 806–820) 86 On valuing correct learning and refuting Feng Xu (1842–1927) Four Beginnings of strange views (Chong zhengxue pi Self-Strengthening (Ziqiang siduan) 1895  yishuo shu) 195–196 306 Gnomon of the Zhou Dynasty and Classic of Feng Yingjing (1555–1606) 221, 221n33, 226 Computations, The (Zhoubi suanjing)  Filial and Incorrupt examination (xiaolian 210 yike) 76n46 by Ma Tingluan (1223–1289) 171 by many Ming scholars 179–80 by Wang Yangming 180n56, exceptionalism, Chinese 203, 318 exhaust principle and human nature to the utmost (qiongli jinxing 窮理盡性 116, 119, 124 extension of knowledge (zhizhi 致知) 74, 75, 124, 129, 137–138, 142, 145, 170, 181, 184–185, 205n5, 277

344 Gaozong (r. 649–683), Tang 3, 13, 16 Gaozong (r. 1127–1162), Song 128n57, 130 gentry (shishen 士紳), gentry class 101, 109, 123n47, 124, 127, 129, 135n69, 147–150, 154, 157–165, 159n19, 179–180, 232, 236, 236n59, 300 expansion of gentry class in the Song dynasty 161–165 clan gatherings, (clan settlements or villages, jiazu juhui 家族聚會)  163–164 clan society, clan organization (xiangli zongzu 鄉里宗族) 161, 236 intermediaries between state and people  163 leaders of local society 163 popular (minjian shishen 民間士紳) 164 support for the state 164 village gentry (xiangshen 鄉紳) 109 general rule (tongli 通理) for all knowledge  247, 260–261 genesis point, primal origin of (koti, benji 本際 or primal 90–93 geyi 格義, matching the meaning 297 genuineness (zhen, 真) 191 geography, foreign, world, importance of  217, 220–223, 229, 259, 267–269, 271, 288, 293n80, gods and spirits, legally sanctioned list in Song dynasty 152 elevated to list: Guan Zhong (c. 720–645 BCE) 152 removed from list: Qin general Bai Qi (?–258 BCE), Liang general Wang Sengbian (d. 555), political, military reformer Wu Qi (440–381 BCE), military strategist Sun Bin (d. 316 BCE), and the general Lian Po 152 gongguobu 功过簿 registers of merits and demerits 198 Gongyang school and Gongyangzhuan  67n27, 71, 173n47, 283 main principles of 284n65 goodness (shan 善) 121, 144, 190–191, 197 Goose Lake Temple Debates, see Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan 125ff governing the state, right way of (guoshi 國是)  129, 132 government schools 100, 180

Index guarding the Way (shoudao 守道) vs. going along with the times (suishi 隨時) 81 Great Learning (Daxue) 74–75, 83, 103, 120, 133, 137, 147, 169, 184–185, 227, 243, 253, 280 most iconic passage 185n71 Great Peace (taiping 太平) 82, 102–103, 122, 167 Great Ultimate (Supreme Polarity) 113–114, 114n39, 136, 166, 170 Great Unity taiyi zhi shen 太一之神 spirit or god of 206 Greek thought, ancient, Chinese knowledge of 272 Grotto Studies (Fokuxue) of Faqin 38, 86 Guan Zhong (c. 720–645 BCE) 152, 291–292 Guanzi, The doctrine of “enriching the nation and strengthening the military 294 Guan Zongde (d. 809), Ox-Head master 38 Guanding (561–632), Tiantai master 39 Guangxu Emperor (Zaitian, 1871–1908, r. 1875–1908) 269, 276, 310, 314, 318 sad complaint of bitter situation 309 sets modern examination questions 295 Guangzong (r. 1198–1194), Song Emperor 130 Guifeng Zongmi (784–841) 37 Gu Feixiong (fl. ca. 836) 85 Gu Kuang (725–814) 85 Gu Lin (1476–1545) defends Zhu Xi vs. Wang Yangming 192 Guo Songtao (1818–1891) 272, 274, 276, 281 Diary of Guo Songtao (Guo Songtao riji) on semi-civilized China 276 knowledge of the West 272 praise for English political system 274 guwen, see ancient prose Gu Xiancheng (1550–1612) 196, 229n46 defends Zhu Xi vs. Wang Yangming 195 Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) 174n49, 230, 232, 232n52, 236, 236n59, 240n64, 241, 262 Five Works on Phonetics (Yinxue wushu)  242 Record of Knowledge Gained Day by Day (Rizhi lu) 242 Han Fei 291 Han Learning (Hanxue, Han school of classical philology) 245, 247, 265, 286n68 see Song Learning

Index Hanlin Academy 128n57, 306, 309 Han Qi (1008–1075) 106 Hanshan (Deqing, 1546–1623) 188 Han Xin 292 Han Yu (768–824) 64, 70n34, 76–82, 80nn54, 55, 56, 82n59, 83, 83n60, 100, 103, 112, 120, 131, 187 also see Chen Yinque On Han Yu An Inquiry on Human Nature (Yuanxing)  72 Dui Yu wen 66n23 Essentials of the Moral Way (Yuandao)  71–72, 76–77 (on daotong) Pacification of Huaixi (Ping Huaixi bei)  64, 66 Hao Jing (1223–1275 169 He Qiutao (1824–1862) A Complete History of the Northwest Regions (Shuofang beisheng) 271 He Xinyin (1517–1579) radical Wang Yangming 194, 194n92 killed in jail 1579 195 heart/mind (xin 心) 12, 41, 74, 102, 114–117, 117n37, 121–122, 167, 193n90, 240–241, 256 Hegemon (Overlords, badao 霸道) 107, 305 Way of the 122, 140–141, 276 hegemonic government (bazheng 霸政)  123, 287 He Qi (1859–1914) and Hu Liyuan (1874–1916)  308, 315 Foundations of New Policies (Xinzheng shiji) on Chinese weakness in 1895 308 Suggestions for New Policies (Xinzheng lunyi) 315 Heshen (1750–1799) ordered to commit suicide, 1799 266 Hetu 河圖, River Diagram 243 Hetuvidyâ, Indian “science of cause” (yinxue 因學) 297, 303 Heaven (tian 天), Chinese 5, 11, 13, 13n10, 14n14, 49, 64, 66n23, 73, 77, 80n57, 100, 101, 102, 103n12, 121, 122, 129, 142, 142n93, 169, 183, 184, 185n72, 186n75, 193n90, 281, 305, 313 also see Mandate of Heaven, Principle of Heaven a change in Heaven is not worth fearing (tianbian buzu wei 天變不足畏) 110

345 does not change and Earth does not change 13 does not change and the Way does not change 273 Heaven is constant and unchanging, and the Dao is also constant and unchanging  206, 209 Heaven is round and Earth is square, foundation of Chinese authority 203, 20 foundation of Chinese cosmology 206 Heaven’s law and Earth’s principle (tianjing diyi 天經地義) 249 Way of 13, 115, 120, 121n44, 136, 136n71, 214n20 Will of 154 Heaven (tiantang) in Western religion 209 Heaven and Earth 2, 13, 14, 203, 15, 110, 113, 115, 165, 167, 206, 248, 249, 262, 263n31, 264n33 and the cosmos 75 Collapse of Heaven and Earth 205–226, 227, 305 unchanging foundation of social order  13, 206 He Zunshi (?–743) 86 High Tang period (713–756) 4n2, intellectual decline, mediocrity 20–21 primacy of poetry and belle lettres 20 historical memory 65, 82, 158, 164, 166, 210, 224, 244, 293, 294, 317 historiography (historical study, shixue 史學)  158n17, 206n7, 285, 287–288 Hongjing (634–712) 39 Hong Liangji (1746–1809) letter of criticism letter of crsiticism to Emperor Jiaqing  266 Hongren (601–675) 44, 50 Honil Gangni Yeokdae Gukdo Ji Do (or Kangnido) 1402 geography 220 Hongwu Emperor (Ming Taizu, Zhu Yuanzhang, 1328–1398, r. 1368–1398)  173–174 Great Announcements (Dagao 大誥) by  174 expurgation of the Mencius by 174 orders official examinations 173 Hongzhi Emperor (Zhou Youcheng, 1470–1505, r. 1488–1505) 181

346 Hong Zhenxuan (1770–1815) reinterprets li and xing 255 honoring the king (royal house) and repelling the barbarians (zunwang rangyi 尊王攘夷)  80, 82, 87, 98, 99, 111, 112 honoring the moral nature (zun dexing 尊德性) 119, 138, 143, 184, 241 Hsiao Kung-Chuan xi, xii, 302 Hu Anguo (1074–1138) 127, 128n57, 131, 173n47 Hua Yi (Chinese-barbarian) distinctions 18, 70, 158, 218, 218n25, 231, 284, 284n65 Hu Jin (1438–?) reinterprets li and xing 255 Hu Juren (Jingzhai, 1434–1484) 178, 180 Hu Wei (1633–1714) 243n71, 260 An Investigation into the Cosmograms in the Classic of Changes (Yitu mingbian) 242, 243 Casual Remarks on the Tributes of Yu (Yugong zhuizhi) 242, 243 on Old Text Book of Documents 260 Hu Yuan (993–1059) 112, 131 Huaihai of Baizhang (720–814) 41n42 Huaihui (756–815) and Transmission of the Masters (Fashi zichuan) 41, 41n42, 42, 52 Huainanzi’s natural science 294, 295 Huihai of Dazhu 41n42, 48 Huang Chuwang (1260–1346) 286 Huang Wan (1480–1554)’s On Illuminating the Way (Mingdao bian) critique of Wang Yangming 192 Huangfu Shi (777–835) on human nature  72n38 Huang Zongxi 125, 140, 193, 198, 230, 232, n52, 236, 240n64, 241, 243, 262 Huang Zongyan (1616–1686) 243 Huang Zunxian (1848–1905) Treatise on Japan (Ribenguo zhi) 292, 308n6 Hua-Yi華夷, Chinese-barbarian distinction  158, 231, 284n65 criticism of non-Chinese ethnic groups  158 “debate between Chinese and barbarians” (Hua Yi zhi bian 華夷之辯) 158, 212, 230, 231, 284 Hui Dong (1697–1758) 250, 266 Huihe (or Huihu, Uighurs) 63, 69 Huineng (?–775) 33n30, 36, 39, 41, 44–48, 50, 52, 56

Index gâtha on Buddha-nature 45 the self-mind is the Buddha 36 Huiqing of Bajiaoshan 59 Huiji (807–883) 54, 56 Hui Shiqi (1671–1741) 265 Huiyuan (334–416) 49 Huizhen (673–751) 39 Huizhong (?–775) 36, 38 human emotions (renqing 人情) 251, 257 Hundred Days Reform (wuxu bianfa 戊戌變法) 1898 314, 316 humanity, ren 仁 71, 72, 98, 251n6, 254, 255, 316n21 humanity and rightness 67n27, 98, 141 human nature, xing 性 51, 72, 72n38, 73, 74n42, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 89, 91–92, 116, 116n35, 117, 119, 120, 121n44, 122, 124, 126–127, 136, 182–183, 185n72, 240, 249, 251n6, 253, 254n12, 255, 256, 257n22, and Buddha nature 43–44, 47, 48–59 and feelings (xingqing 性情) 73–74, 82, 103, 112–113, 121 and the Way of Heaven 120, 121n44 basic (benxing 本性) pure innate nature (tianxing, 天性) 183 hundred schools of philosophers (zhuzi baijia 諸子百家) 102n11, 241, reinterpreted 289–297 Hu Shi (1891–1962) 237 Hu Yin (1098–1156) 127 identification of the people or nation (guozu rentong 國族認同) 318 ideology, political 6, 12, 13, 14, 19, 64, 70, 89, 99, 104, 123, 126, 148, 160, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173, 181, 195, 199, 208, 213, 222, 227, 228 , 231, 233, 234n56, 246, 248, 258, 283, 294, 303, 306, 320 ideology and practice become separated in Ming dynasty 176 illuminating principle and discussing nature (mingli bianxing 明理辯性) 111–112 immortal Dao body (daoshen 道身 or Dao nature, daoxing) 90 Imperial Library in Four Treasuries (Siku quanshu, 1773–1782) 224n40, 245, 283 imperial power and authority, Chinese, sources of 320n28 improper cults (yinci 淫祀) 150, 153

Index innate knowledge, innate knowing (liangzhi 良知) 178–179, 182, 185, 187, 188n80, 189–191, 187 extension of 184 inner transcendence (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) 116, 122, 141 Inoue Enryô, 302nn96, 97(1858–1919) and Buddhism for the nation 302 intellectualism 137–138, 198 intellectual order 20, 62–83, 87, 97, 98, 100, 112, 122, 195, 241, 242 international concessions (zujie 租界) 279 investigate things and understand principle to the utmost (gewu qiongli 格物窮理) 116, 116n35, 118 investigation of things (gewu 格物, approaches to phenomena) 74–75, 119, 121, 124, 129, 132, 137–139, 137n78, 142, 145, 170, 181, 184–185, 185n71, 186, 189, 195, 215, 240, 277, 280 inward turning (neizhuan 内轉) 116 Itô Hirobumi (1841–1909) 312 Jamal ad-Din (fl. 1250s) 207 James, William 58n11 Japan, influence on China 202, 204, 270, 276, 281, 284n65, 292, 295, 296, 299–303 Meiji Restoration 300 Jesuits in China 201, 214n21, 223, 226, 281n60 Jia Dan (730–805) World Map of Chinese and Barbarians (Hainei Hua Yi tu) 801 218, 218n25 Jia Gongsong (mid-11th century) 112 Jiajing Emperor (Zhu Houcong, 1507–1567, r. 1521–1567) forbids study of Wang Yangming 178 Jiang Fan (1761–1831) 245, 265, 286n68 Record of the Origins of Han Learning (Hanxue yuanyuan ji, 1811) 245 Record of the Origins of Song Learning (Songxue yuanyuan ji, ca. 1822) 245 Record of the Transmission of the Masters of the School of Han Learning (Hanxue shicheng ji) 265 Jiang Taigong (Lü Shang, or Lü Wang) 291 Jiang Yong (1681–1762) 262 Jiao Xun (1763–1820) 245, 248, 253, 255, 256, 257, 260, 261, 262, 264, 266, 267, 290, 291

347 Author’s Preface to Explanations of Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication and Division (Jia jian cheng chu shi zixu) 264 Explanations of Arcs (Shihu 釋弧) 262 li 理not “principle” in ancient classics  253–254 three important things for ultimate understanding of the universe 264 eight essays “On Expediency” (shuo quan 說權) against moral absolutism 256 jinshi 進士 advanced scholar degree 5, 7, 19, 67, 161 進士) Jizang (549–623), Lotus Sûtra expert 23 Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE) 287 Jurchen Jin state defeat Norther Song dynasty 1127 126 six methods of writing Chinese (liushu 六書) 264 Kaiyuan (Buddhist) temples 12 Rites of Kaiyuan (Kaiyuan li), 732 6 Kang Xi Emperor (r. 1661–1722) 223 Kang Youwei (1858–1927) 296–297, 302n97, 308n6, 316, 318 A Study of Confucius as a Reformer (Kongzi gaizhi kao) 285 Forged Classics of the Wang Mang Period (Xinxue weijing kao) 285 third reform memorial to Guangxu 1895  314 influenced by Inoue Enryô 302n97 killing people to sacrifice to demons” (sharen jigui 殺人祭鬼) or capturing the living” (caisheng 採生) 155 Kingly Way (wangdao 王道) 107, 123, 276 King Wuyue (Qian Liu, 852–932) revives Tiantai Buddhism 40 knowledge or knowing (zhi 知) 116 Khubilai Qaghan (1215–1294, Yuan Emperor Shizu, r. 1260–1294) 168, 207n8 discusses Confucianism with Zhang Dehui (1195–1275) 168 takes title Great Scholar of Confucianism (Rujiao da zongshi, 儒教大宗師)  168–169 knowledge, conclusive (evidentiary) 240, 241

348 Kong Guangsen (1751–1786) and Gongyang school 283 Kong Zhenshi (1613 jinshi) 226 Kuiji (632–682) and Consciousness Only 23, 24, 26, 30 Kumârajîva (c. 334–413) 23 Lao-an 老安 (i.e. Daoan 道安) 44 Laozi (Daodejing, Classic of the Way and its Power) 3, 11, 89, 89n77, 90, 93 Laozi (the person) 11, 88 On Returning to One’s True Nature (Fuxing shu) 72 legalism ( fazhi zhuyi 法制主義) 123 legal studies (lüxue 律學) 123n47 legitimacy (of government, dynasty) 1, 2, 5, 10–16, 64, 66n23, 71, 75, 76, 77, 96–100, 103, 124, 126, 152, 165, 207, 231, 234–235, 255, 257, 260, 262, 287, 291, 320 cultural legitimacy 99 discourses on dynastic legitimacy (zhengtong lun) 99, 111, 111n25 leishu (類書) encyclopedias 3, 221 li 吏 minor officials, clerks, functionaries  108n17 liangzhi 良知see innate knowledge, innate knowing Li Ao (772–836/841) 67, 70n35, 76, 78, 79, 112, 120 On Returning to One’s True Nature (Fuxing shu) 72–73 Liang Qichao (1873–1929) 237–239, 250n3, 253n8, 296, 299, 302, 303, 308n6 On the Relationship between Buddhism and Collective Rule (Fojiao yu qunzhi zhi guanxi) 302 Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period (Qingdai xueshu gailun) on Qing scholars reading notes and letters  238 Record of the Wuxi (1898) Coup (Wuxi zhengbian ji) 310 Liang Su (753–793) 31n28, 39, 40n40, 69 Shenxian zhuan lun (On the Biographies of Immortals) 88 Lianchi (Zhuhong, 1535–1615) 188 Liang Tingnan (1796–1861) 271, 274

Index Four Essays on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo sishuo) 271 praise for United States democracy 274 Liao Khitan dynasty (916–1125) 96–97 Li Bo (773–831) 84 Li Deyu (787–85) 78, 81, 85, 86–88, 151 Li Fengbao (Qing dynasty) reads of India in Berlin library 272 Li Guangdi (1642–1718) 233 debates on geography 223 interested in Western knowledge 259 Li Hanguang (682–769) 84–85, 91 Li He (790–816) 79 Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) 280, 312 Li Hua (715–766) 21, 39, 69 Li Jifu (758–814) 78 Li Mi (722–789) 21 Lin Guangchao (1114–1178) 127 Lin Zexu (1785–1850) Chronicle of Four Continents (Sizhou zhi) 271 Li Rongli (fl. 683) on origin of universe (genesis point) 93 Li Rui (1768–1817) celebrated for mathematics 263, 265, 312 Li Shangyin (813?–858) defends Yuan Jie’s critique (see Yuan Jie) 67n27 Li Shanlan (1811–1882) want to surpass Western mathematics 312 Li Shuchang (1837–18997) 281 asserts England is governed by its people  274 Li Xinchuan (1167–1244) affirms Zhu Xi’s daotong genealogy 132n65 Li Yong (Erqu, 1627–1705) 198, 240 Li Zhizao (1565–1630) 205, 208n9, 210, 221, 226 Lin Shu (1829–1898) 306 Li Na (758–792) usurps title of king 62 lineages (xiangjian zongzu 鄉間宗族), rural 236 Ling Tingkan (1755–1809) 248, 252n7, 253, 255, 257, 257n22, 261, 265, 266, 267, 291 importance of Western astronomy 262–263 linguistics, historical 247–248, 257, 261, 265, 288, 292–293 Lingyou (771–853) of Guishan 49, 54

Index literary inquisitions (imprisonment for one’s writings, wenzi yu 文字獄) of Qing dynasty 234 Liu Anjie (f. 12th century) 127n56 Liu Fang (?–?, Tang dynasty) 8–9, 9n8 Liu Feng (?–200 CE) 219, 219n29 Liu Fenglu (1776–1829) and Gongyang school 283, 285 A Textual Study of Master Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Zuoshi Chunqiu kao) 285 Liu Kai (948–1001 112 Liu Ke (fl. ca. 873) on intellectual situation in Mid-Tang 68 Liu Kunyi (1830–1902) 280 Liu Renxi (1844–1919) Chunqiu gongfa neizhuan 285n66 Liu Shi (fl. 8th century) 85 Liu Tui (fl. ca. 850) A Southerner’s Letter on the Village Drinking Rite (Jiangnan lun xian yinjiu lishu) on disintegration of Tang intellectual order 67 Liu Xuanjing (?–851) 86 Liu Yin (1249–1293 169 Liu Zhong, held official examinations in 1237  168 Liu Yuxi (772–842) 21, 74 Confucian Middle Way 74 Liu Zongyuan (773–819) 21, 69, 76, 80nn54, 55, 57 On Fengjian (Fengjian lun) for strong central government 65, 66n23 Liu Zongzhou (Jishan, 1578–1645) praises Wang Yangming 192, 229n46 Essential principles and developments of the Learning of the Sages (Shengxue zongyao) genealogy of NeoConfucianism Song to Ming 198 Records of Thoughts and Questions:Outer Section (Siwenlu waipian) used traditional Chinese ideas 212 Li Yong (1627–1705) 240 Li Zhi (1527–1602) radical Wang Yangming 194, 194n93 no sages and no laws (feisheng wufa 非聖 無法) 194 On the Four Seas (Sihai shuo) admits Western ideas 210 suicide in prison in 1602 195

349 Lizong (Zhao Yun, 1205–1264, r. 1224–1264) Emperor 167 favors Zhu Xi and lixue 126n53 orders lixue scholars sacrifices in Confucian Temple 147 Li Zongmin (d. 846?), Discussion of Going Along with the Times (Suilun), anti-Han Yu polemic 81 local gazetteers (difang zhi) 135n69, 149, 175, 239 Longqing Emperor (Zhu Zaihou, 1537–1572, r. 1567–1572) 178, 192 “Lord of Heaven” (tianzhu) Roman Catholic Godhead 208 loyalty (zhong 忠) 165, 195 Lü Dajun (1029–1080) 106, 127n56, 161 Lü Dazhong (1020–c. 1100) 127n56 Lü Gongzhu (1018–1089) 106 Lü Liuliang (1629–1683) 230, 236 Luo Dajing (1196–1242), Crane Forest Morning Dew (Helin yulu) 162–163 Luo Hongxian (1504–1564) 193, 197 Luo Qinshun (1465–1547) defends Zhu Xi vs. Wang Yangming 192 Luo Rufang (1515–1588) radical Wang Yangming 194 Luoshu 洛/雒書 , Luo writing 243 Luoyang Studies (Yichuan xue), see Cheng Yi Lu Guimeng (?–881) 83n60 Lu Huishen (?–716) critique of Tang officialdom 17–19 Lu Jiuling (1132–1180) 125, 128, 139 Lu Jiuyuan (Lu Xiangshan) 125–148, 142n91, 161–162, 166, 170, 177, 180, 182, 199, 225–226, 241 attraction for Ming scholars 177 debates with Zhu Xi 125–148 influence of Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan  144–148 universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe 225 Lu Longqi (1630–1692) 233 critique of Wang Yangming and ChengZhu, Ge Zhaoguang disagrees with  196n101 first Qing Confucian to receive Confucian temple sacrifices 235 Lu Tong (790–835) 79 Lu Wenchao (1717–1796) 266

350 Lü Family Village Compact (Lüshi xiangyue) edited by Lü Dajun, revised by Zhu Xi  161 Lü Zuqian (1137–1181) 125–126, 128, 128n58, 132, 136, 140, 140n83, 147, 170 Lü Yuantai (c. 705–710) against barbarian customs 16–17 Lü Zhi (1092–1135) defends Cheng Yi 128 magic staffs (shenzhang 神杖) of shamans  149 mahadvîpa or Buddhist four great continents (si da bu zhou 四大部洲) 225 Mao Qiling (1623–1716) 233n54, 243 Mandate of Heaven 2, 6, 64, 75, 97, 262 Manichaeism (monijiao 摩尼教) 12, 159 Ma Piyao (?–1895) ten self-strengthening recommendations 306 Mao Qiling (1623–1716) 233n54, 243 Map of the Myriad Countries on the Earth (Matteo Ricci, et al.) 214n20, marriage and divorce 9n8, 134, 156–157, remarriage 157n15 Martin, W. A. P. (1827–1916) translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law 278 Masaharu Anesaki (1873–1949) on Buddhism and science 302 material force (vital essence, qi 氣) 121, 129, 130, 137, 145, 162 clear and turbid (qingqi 清氣 and zhuoqi 濁氣) 137 material objects (shiwu 事物) 118 mathematics (shu 數) of astronomy and calendrical calculations 261 Ma Tingluan (1223–1289) 171 Mazu Daoyi (also called Hongzhou Daoyi, 709–788) 41–43, 46, 47, 48, 51, 54 see also Mazu Chan Buddhism Quotations (Yulu) of 54 Meeting at Goose Lake Temple (E hu zhi hui 鵝湖之會), see Zhu Xi, Lu Xiangshan Mei Wending (1633–1721) receives Western knowledge 259, 259n23 Mencius or the Mengzi 41, 74, 76, 76n46, 77, 80, 80n57, 83, 83n60, 101, 121n44, 128, 131–133, 142, 147, 169, 174, 182, 185, 187,

Index 215n23, 227, 251, 256, 274, 274n48, 291n75 and Confucian genealogy of daotong, see daotong 76 Mengzi made a keju examination text  169 Meng Anpai (7th century), Pivotal Meanings of Daoist Teaching (Daojiao yishu) 90 Meng Jiao (751–814) 79 Middle Kingdom (China) 201, 217, 218n25, 221, 269, 271, 271, 273 Mi Jiasui (mid-17th century) 226 military governors ( fanzhen 藩鎮), Tang provincial 61–67, 78 Military School (bingjia 兵家), ancient  293–294 mind of the Way (daoxin 道心) 138–139, 142, 180–184 mind, human 29, 45–46, 138–139, 142, 180–181, 183–185, 243, 248–249, 252–253, 255 and nature as origin of cosmos 115 mind is principle (xin ji li 心即理) 139, 177, 181, 189–190, 197–198 nature of the mind (temperament), xinxing 心性 139 original mind (benxin 本心) 20, 142, 185 mind, nature and feelings (xinling xingqing 心靈性情) 75 mingjiao (名教) Confucian ritual code of ethical behavior 234 mingjing enlightening the classics degree 5 Ming loyalists (yimin 遺民) 230–231, 232n52 modernity, modern, modernization 147, 296, 301, 313, 321, 316, 318 mobility (social and ease of movement)  8–9, 19 and collapse of the great lineages in Tang  8–9 moral idealism 80–81, 106, 123–128, 144, 176, 257–258 morality and ethics 100, 275 moral principle see daotong moral principle (yili 義理) vs. evidential research 228 moral rationality 106, 146 Morrison, Robert (1782–1834) Brief History of Foreign Countries (Waiguo shilüe) 271

Index Mozi 114, 215n23, 291n75 Mozi, the 292 Mozi’s logic 294 Mu Xiu (979–1032) 112 Muirhead, William (1822–1900) Chronicle of Great Britain (Da Yingguo zhi) 271 Mysterious Learning (Neo-Daoism, xuanxue 玄學) 56, 74, 297 nation or state (guojia) 153, 318–319 concept growing in Song dynasty 153 national or ethnic duty (minzu dayi 民族大義) 235 nationalism, discourse of 226, 230–231, 238, 244, 311, 316, 318–321 antitraditional 319 and universalism/internationalism 311, 316, 318–319 iconoclastic (Lin Yusheng, fanchuantong de minzu zhuyi 反傳統的民族主義)  319 fundamentalist 319 national salvation through strength ( jiuwang tuqiang 救亡圖強) 321 national salvation ( jiuwang) vs. enlightenment (qimeng) 321 nature (xing 性) 24, 25–27, 40n40, 43–45, 47–51, 72, 73–75, 72n38, 77–79, 82, 89, 91, 92, 100, 100n8, 102–103, 110, 112–126, 116nn34, 35, 121n44, 127, 128, 130–139, 136n71, 142n93, 182–186, 185n72, 196n101, 240, 241, 245, 249, 251, 251n6, 253, 254n12, 255–256, 257n22, nature and destiny (xingming 性命) 74, 100, 254 what is inborn is called nature (sheng zhi wei xing 生之謂性) 254 nature and principle (xingli 性理) 126–129, 139, 166, 185 Neo-Confucianism School of Principle (lixue 理學), Cheng-Zhu School of Principle  101–178, 130n63, 167n35, 195, 196, 227–228 , 233, 237, 240–254, 265 also called Daoxue 道學, the Learning of the Way 101n9, 120 as schoolroom textual dogma or political strategy 172

351 institutionalization in Yuan and Ming  168, 174n47 On Valuing Correct Learning and Refuting Strange Views 195, 196 politicization and standardization in the Yuan 170–172 popularization and decline in Song to Ming 166 literally, the Learning of Principle  101n9 popularization in Song dynasty 161 supported by early Manchu-Qing emperors 233 transformed as official ideology, see chapter 10 148–200 School of Mind (xinxue 心學) 101n9, 144, 177–187 see Wang Yangming literally, the Learning of the Mind-andHeart 101n9 Nestorian Christianity ( jingjiao 景教) 12, 16 New Etiquette (Xinyi 新儀) 154 New Policies (bianfa 變法), New Laws (xinfa 新法) of Wang Anshi 106, 123–124 New Policies (xinzheng 新政) of late Qing 308, 311, 314–315 New Text classical learning (jinwen jingxue 今文經學, New Text Confucianism)  283–286, 285n66, 286n68, 287–288 Changzhou School of New Text Confucianism 284 Nie Shuangjiang (1487–1563) 193, 197 Niu Sengru (780–849) 82, 88 non-action (wuwei 無為) 47, 90 non-interference, goal of (無為之旨) 90 nonbeing 39, 48, 114 Numa Pompilius (753–673 BCE) 287 O’ Conor, Sir Nicholas Robert supports self-strengthening 307 official schools (xuegong 學宮) 129, 172n43, 179 Office of Compiling and Editing (Bianxiusuo 编修所), Yuan 168 Office of Classical Texts (Jingjisuo 經籍所), Yuan 168 Old Text Book of Documents (Guwen Shangshu shuzheng 242, 243, 260

352 Old Text classical learning (guwen jingxue 古文經學) 285 one single thread of Confucius’ thought 113, 115, 136, 265n35 On the Gnomon (Biaodu shuo, 1614) 208 On the Subtle Principle of Respecting the Ruler in the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu zunwang fawei) 111 Opium Wars (1840–43 and 1860–61) 275, 308, 319 ordering one’s family (qijia 齊家) 74, 129n59, 132, 134, 205n5 original substance of the mind (xin zhi ben/ benti 心之本/本體) 182, 184, 185–196, 191n86 original substance of heaven 183 orthodoxies, three Chinese: political (zhengtong 政統), Confucian (cultural) (daotong 道統), orthodoxy (shentong 神統) 320 Ôuchi Seiran (1845–1918) on Buddhism and science 302 Ouyang Jian (1871–1943) and Buddhist studies  296 Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072) 99n5, 102n11, 106, 107n15, 111, 112, 131 Discourses on Dynastic Legitimacy (Zhengtong lun) 111 Essay on Fundamentals (Benlun) 111 paintings of foreign personages 218–219 Paintings of Presentations of Tributes (Zhigong tu), the oldest 218–219 Paintings of Imperial Audience (Wanghui tu)  219 Presentation of Tributes to the Imperial Court (Chaogong tu) 219 Huang Qing Zhigong tu (Tang copy)  219n27 Zhigong tu by Xie Sui (Qianlong era)  219n27 Pan Shizheng (?–682) 84, 91 Paramârtha (499–569) 23 Party Proscription, Qingyuan 126n53, 127, 130, 147 Pei Xiu (224–271) Map of the Regions in the “Tributes of Yu” (Yu Gong diyu tu) 218 Pei Xiu (791–864) 69

Index Peng Yan (fl. 766–780) 78n52 Pei Du (765–839) 65, 79, 80n56, 81 fears for the Tang dynasty 65 Pei Lin (d. 838) 88 people are of supreme importance (min wei gui 民為貴) 274 physics (wuli, principles of matter) 119, 216, 277, 297, 298, 313 Pi Rixiu (834/84–883) 83n60 polemics (Buddhist-Daoist) 91–92, 92n82 pragmatism, or practical approach to politics  68, 108, 124, 127, 141, 237, 256182n60, Prajñapâramitâ thought domesticated 51 primal nothingness (benwu 本無) 90 principle (li 理) 27, 100, 102, 182, 226, 250n3, 253, 256 nothing is greater than the Way and principle (dao li zui da 道理最大)  100 principle is one but its manifestations are many (li yi fen shu 理一分殊)  116–137, 116n35, 117n36 Principle Meanings of the Mysterious Gate (Xuanmen dayi) 90 Principle of Heaven (tianli 天理) 14n14, 117, 121, 129, 133, 141–142, 142n91, 144–145, 215, 248–258 as the “originating principle” (yuanli 原理) of the universe 249 as the “originating principle” of human society 249 highest principle of the School of Principle 249 printing 109, 128, 150, 179 private schools, academies (shuyuan書院), village schools (xiangshu 鄉塾, private learning 100, 109, 129, 179, 236 protect the state, protect the race, protect the faith (baoguo, baozhong, baojiao 保國, 保 種, 保教) 318 Ptolemy, Claudius (ca. 90–168) 210, 287 public (gong) and private (si) equal: 235 Public Vehicle Petition (gongche shangshu) to Guangxu 318 Puji (651–739) 33n30, 36–37 Puyuan of Nanquan (748–834) 52, 54 dialogue with Congshen of Zhaozhou  50–51

Index qi 氣 vital energy or life force of the universe  137, 210, 241 Qian Daxin (1728–1804) 248, 250, 265–267, 290 preface to Jiao Xun’s Explanations of Arcs (Shihu 釋弧) 262 Chinese scholars must learn mathematics  263 Qian Mu (1895–1990) 237 Qiji (863–937) 60 Qingliang Wenyi 52, 54, 61, 61n16 qingtan 清谈 pure talk, idle talk 178 Qing dynasty monolithic unity and suppression of thought 229–237 statism (guojia zhuyi 國家主義) against power sharing (fenquan 分權) 236 Qi Ying (748–795) 21 Quan Deyu (759–818) 21, 65, 69, 91n81 Discussions on the Fall of the Two Hans (Liang Han bian wang lun) 65 Quan Zuwang (1705–1755) 241 Qu Shisi (1590–1651) Short Comments on Account of Countries Not Listed in the Records Office (Zhifang waiji xiaoyan) 222, 225 random jottings (biji 筆記) 175 reason or principle vs. passion or desire 253 unity of principle and desire 257n22 Recorded Quotations (Yulu) 167 rectification of the heart/mind (zhengxin 正心) 74, 132, 137 rectifying ones mind and making one’s will sincere” (zhengxin chengyi 正心誠意)  119–120, 185 reform, weixin 維新 78, 78n52, 98, 311 Regional Commanders, Tang 96 Regional States (zhuhouguo 諸侯 236 regulating the state (zhiguo 治國) 75, 120, 129n59, 132, 205n5 Reid, Gilbert (1857–1927) supports self-strengthening 307 ren 仁 see humanity renovation (genghua 更化) 320 Renzong (Zhao Zhen, 1010–1063, r. 1022–1063) Song Emperor 149 Renzong (1285–1320, r. 1311–1320) Yuan Emperor

353 establishes keju examination system 1312–1313 169 key texts fixed as the Four Books with Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Four Books 169 resonance/correspondence theory of order 206, 255 return to the ancients (fugu 復古) 320 revolution (geming 革命) 320 revolutionary (thinking, etc.) 148, 192, 248, 279, 311, Ricci, Matteo (1552–1610) 201, 207, 208, 212–227, 214n20, 224n41, 259 proves earth is round 209 Richard, Timothy (1845–1919) supports self-strengthening 307, 308n6 rightness, righteousness, justice (yi 義)  67n27, 71, 72, 98, 129, 140, 141, 157, 195, 198, 254, 255 rites, ceremonies, ritual, ritual system, ritual order 13, 17, 71, 97, 98 importance of li 禮 rites or propriety over li 理 principle/reason 256 rites and music 71, 98–99 rites and rightness (liyi 禮儀) 102n11, 157 debates on in Tang 13–14 Roman Catholicism 205, 219 Roman Empire (Da Qin) 217 Ruan Yuan (1764–1849) 248, 251n4, 252, 253, 254, 254n12, 255, 257, 261–263, 265–267, 291, 312 Disputing the Return to the True Nature of Buddhist/Daoist Teaching (Fuxing Bian) 254 on astronomy and mathematics: Biographies of Astronomers and Mathematicians (Chouren zhuan) 1799 267 on nature and destiny: Interpretations of Nature and Destiny (Xingming guxun) 254 On (or Refuting) Buddhist Ideas of Nature (Ta xing shuo) 254 Ruggieri, Michele Pompilio (1543–1607) 201 Ruhui (744–843) 47 Ruizong (Li Dan, r. 684–690 and 710–712) 5 issued edicts calling for reformation of social customs 5n4

354

Index

shame, sense of 240 Shanghai Polytechnic Institution (Gezhi shuyuan, 1874) 279 shaman (shiwu 師巫) 88, 93, 149 sacrifices, sacrificial ceremonieses 101 housolds returned to agriculture 149 ceremonial banners and weaponry suppressed 149–156 prohibited 159–160 Shang Yang 291 cremation forbidden in Song dynasty  Shao Yong (1011–1077) 100, 100n8, 104, 159, 159n19 113–116, 116n34, 118, 120, 131, 132, 243n71 demonic religious teachings (yaojiao Xiantian tu [Chart of eight trigrams] and 妖教) forbidden 159 mind 116n34 erotic ceremonies public nude Shen Buhai 114, 291 performances (luoxi 裸戲) 156 Shen Defu (1578–1642) 188n81 official (zhengsi 正祀) 152 Shenhui (684–758) 33n30, 36–38, 46, 48, 56 popular (anti-government) gatherings Shen Jiji (ca. 740–ca. 800) 3 prohibited 160 Shenxiu (?–706) 33n30, 36–37, 41, 44, 50 temple sacrifices in Song gâtha on body and mind 44, 188 dynasty 152–153 Shen Yong (710–788) 92, 92n82 to heterodox spirits and demons (cishen Shenzong (Zhao Zhongzhen, Zhao Xu, sigui 祠神祀鬼) forbidden 159 1048–1085, r. 1067–1085), Song Emperor  unorthodox banned 148–151, 153–155 105–125 , 107n15, 110n21, 123n47 use of human bodies for sacrifices (renti Shibei (835–908) 61n16 xisheng ji 人體犧牲祭) 155n12 scholar-officials (shidafu 士大夫) explained  Shi Jie (1005–1045) 82n59, 112 On China (Zhongguo lun) 99, 111 108n17 On the Bizarre (Guai shuo) 99 Scholarly Cases of Song and Yuan Classical Shinto (Shendao 神道) 300 Scholars (Song Yuan xue-an) 170 schools, new (Western) style (xuetang 學堂)  Shrimp barbarians (xiayi 蝦夷) 305–306 Shubhakarasimha (Shan Wuwei, 673–735)  301, 314 28 Scripture of the Genesis Point (Benji jing)  Shunzhi (1644–1662) Emperor 212, 232 90–91 Shu Yuanyu (d. 835) on Late Tang scholarly seeking the real (zhishi 徵實) 241 conceit 68n29 self-cultivation, moral 7, 75, 145, 198 Siku quanshu, see Imperial Library in Four self-strengthening (ziqiang 自強) 280, Treasuries 282n62, 300–307, 307n4, 308 Self-strengthening Society (Qiangxue hui)  silence ( jiran 寂然) and absence of desires  117 308n6, 314 Sima Chengzhen (647–735) 84, 85 Western support for 307–308 Master of Heavenly Immortality Society for the Diffusion of Christian and (Tianyinzi) 91 General Knowledge (Guangxue hui On Sitting in Oblivion (Zuowanglun) 91 廣學會) 308n6 Sima Guang (1019–1086) 15n15, 104, 108, 120, Sengzhao (384–414) 51 123, 125, 132, 156–157, 159 Senshô Murakami (1851–1929) on Buddhism Letters and Etiquette (Shuyi 書儀) 135 and science 302 sincerity, sincere (cheng 誠) 77, 114n30, 117 sensual desires (qingyu 情欲) 139 achieve enlightenment through seriousness ( jing 敬) 117, 117n37, 118n38, 137 (chengming 誠明) 75 exercise of seriousness” (jujing 居敬)  sincerity of thought (chengyi 誠意) 74, 137 139 Sino-centrism, Chinese nationalism 217, sex, xing 性 156, 251, 254–256 219, 230, 238, 244, 311, 318 Shall, Johann Adam (1592–1666) 205n5 ruler and subject, duty between (jun chen zhi yi 君臣之義) 284

Index Sino-Japanese War ( jiawu yiyi 甲午一役 1894–95) 295, 308, 310, 313 simplification and dogmatism of ideas in the Tang 6–8 ornamentation and superficiality 8 six arts of ancient China (六術) 262 Smogulecki, Jan Nicolas (1611–1656) translated Western astronomy works 210 Song Gaoseng zhuan 93 Song Learning (Songxue, Song NeoConfucian School of Principle) 245 see Han Learning Song Shu (1862–1910) 296, 297, 303 and Buddhist studies 296 Confirmation of Indian and European Learning (Yin-Ou xue zheng) 298 discusses Xunzi 295n83 uses Buddhist sûtras to explain European ideas 297 Song Yuren (1857–1931) 227, 311 On Adopting the Customs of Western Nations (Caifeng ji) for adopting Western political system 313 preface to Chen Chi Book on Common Activities (Yongshu), causes of Chinese weakness, 1896 277, 311 Sosigenes (fl. 75 BCE) 287 soul caps (hunmao 魂帽) of shamans 149 soul headbands (hunjin 魂巾) of shamans  149 souls, hun 魂 and po 魄 51, 162 spirit images (shenxiang 神像) of shamans  149 spiritual beings (guishen 鬼神) 162 spiritual entities (shenling 神靈) 162 Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) 13, 67–69, 71, 111, 173n47, 227, 285, 285n66 spirit robes (shenshan 神衫) of shamans  149 statecraft (jingshi 經世) 116n34, 229, 237, 244, 293 Structure and Meanings of the Heaven and Earth (Qiankun tiyi, 1605 208 study that investigates the phenomena of nature to acquire knowledge (gezhi zhixue 格致之學) 267 substance (ti 體) 204 substance (zhi 質) derived from material force 137

355 Su Che (1039–1112) 106 Sun Baoxuan, Buddhism contains all Western science 298 Sun Fu (992–1057) 98, 111, 112, 114 The Humiliation of the Confucians (Ru ru) laments decline of Confucianism  114 Sun Qifeng (1584–1675) 240 Su Shi (1036–1101) 106, 295 Sun Chengze (1592–1676) 232n52 Sun Xingyan (1753–1818) 255 superior man ( junzi 君子), the 67, 75, 185, 190 watchful over himself when he is alone (junzi shen qi du 君子 慎其獨) 185 full passage 185n72 suppression of popular religious beliefs, practices 158–159 Tabgatch (Tuoba) 158 taiping see Great Peace Taiqin (?–d. 974) 61n16 Taizhou School of Wang Gen, He Xinyin and Li Zhi 193, 193n91, 194n92 Taiwan ceded to Japan in 1895 305 Taixu (Lü Peilin, 1890–1947) and Buddhist studies 296 Taizong (Ögedei Qaghan, 1186–1241, r. 1229–1241) Yuan Emperor 168 Taizong (Zhao Kuangyi, 939–997, r. 976–997) Song Emperor 96, 152 talismans ( fulu 符箓) of shamans 94, 149 Tang Bin (1627–1687) 233, 233n53, 234n56 Tang Caichang (1867–1900) favors learning from the West 313, 313n15, 317 Record of Selected Essays on General Arts from the Civil Examinations in Hunan (YuanXiang tongyi lu) 313 Tang imperial Li family’s non-Han origins 15 Tang Taizong, Li Shimin (r. 626–649) 1–2, 295 Tang Xianzu (1550–1616) 194 Tan Sitong (1865–1898) 295n83, 296, 298, 299, 303, 308n6 Buddhist ideas confirm Western science  298, 299 discusses Xunzi 295n83 Exposition of Humanity (Ren xue, 仁學 1896/1897) 316n21

356 Tao Hongjing (456–536) 84 Tao Wangling (1562–1609) 188n80, 194 teachers (shi 師) vs. officials (li 吏) 107–110 respect for the teacher and valuing the Way in his teaching (zunshi zhongdao 尊師重道) way of the teacher (shidao 師道) 111 ten thousand things (wanwu 萬物), material things of the universe 93, 115, 133, 136–137, 182 Testimony of the True Religion (in Chinese, Catholic translation) 208 textual criticism (kaoju考據) and evidential research (also: evidential studies [kaojuxue 考據學], evidential investigation, (evidentiary investigation [kaojiu zhenshi 考究真實 or kaozheng 考證] 227–247, 247–290 contrast with fact-based “reality” (zhenshi 真實) 286 searching for the original meaning of the classics 242 Three Masters of the Numinous Treasure Mystery Grotto (Dongxuan Lingbao sanshi) 86 three sacred islands and ten sacred continents (sandao shizhou 三島十洲) Tian Liangyi or Tian Xuying (?–811) 86 Tianqi Emperor (Zhu Youxiao, 1605–1627, r. 1620–1627) ends private academinies 1625 199 tianxia (All Under Heaven) 3, 64, 66, 75, 96, 98, 102, 102n11, 111, 111n25, 120, 123, 129n59, 132, 140, 155n13, 170, 173, 178, 236, 251n6, 272, 283, 294, 318–320 collapse of 201–227 to age of multi-state world 201–205 making guojia of tianxia (Joseph R. Levenson) 204 Tian Yue (751–784) usurps title of king 62 three bonds and five constant virtues (sangang wuchang 三綱五常) 140 ti 體 substance (vs. yong 用 function) 30, 204, 204n4, 214n21 Tianhuang Daowu (748–807) of Jingzhou  49 tianxia see All Under Heaven, universe

Index Tianran (739–824) of Danxia 54–55 Song of Appreciating Our Pearl (Wan zhuyin 玩珠吟) 54–55 Song of the Precious Black Dragon Pearl (Lilong zhuyin 驪龍珠吟) 54–55 Song of Toying with Our Pearl (Nong zhuyin 弄珠吟) 54–55 Toynbee, Arnold J., A Study of History on Chinese world view 206 tradition of political power, orthodoxy, see zhengtong 116 transcendence 30, 49, 51, 59, 62, 69, 88, 91–93, 95, 113, 116, 122, 135, 141, 143, 165, 172, 181, 183, 200, 229, 233, 255, 258 inner moral transcendence (neizai daode chaoyue 内在道德超越) 233 Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (defeat by Japanese) 204, 295, 305–307, 312, 314, 317 treading the void (daoxu 蹈虛) 241–242 Tributes of Yu (Yugong) 218, 223, 242, 287, 288 true nature (of human beings) 72–73 recover your 74 return to 72–73, 254 Shûnyatâ as 118 True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (in Chinese, Jesuit translation) 201 Tubo (Tibetan) threat 63, 69 Tujue (Türks) threat eliminated 63 Shatuo Türks (Western Tujue) 63 Twofold Mystery (chongxuan jingjie 重玄境界), realm of the 89–91 Two Kings: Wen, Wu 77 twofold forgetfulness (jianwang 兼忘) 90 Ui Hakujû, Researches in the History of Zen Buddhism (Zenshûshi kenkyu) 37 Ultimate of Nonbeing (wuji 無極) above Great Ultimate 114 unified society breaks down in Ming  175–176 universalism 143, 199, 203, 308, 311, 318 and internationalism 226 and nationalism 311, 321 cultural 228 , 231 universally applicable “rule” ( faze 法則) for all knowledge 265

Index

357

Wang Tao (1828–1897) Preliminary Investigation of the Origins of Western Learning (Xixue yuanshi kao) 272 Wang Tong (584–617) 131 Wang Yangming 王陽明 (Shouren 守仁, 1472–1528) 144, 175, 178–200, 228–241, 240n64, 252, 257n22, atmosphere of freedom created, suppressed 199 Colloquy at the Tianquan Bridge 191n86 continuation of School of Principle  180–184 critique of keju examinations 180n56 doctrine in four axioms” (siju jiao 四句教)  189–190 extension of innate knowledge/knowing (zhi liangzhi 致良知) 178, 184 Yü Ying-shih on 179n55 Vagnoni, Alfonso (1566–1640) 205n5, 214n21 Instructions for Practical Living (Chuanxi values of Chinese civilization 273, 281 lu 傳習錄) 181, 198 Vajrabodhi (Jin Gangzhi, 669–741) 29 human mind and mind of the Way not the vast and empty tranquility (kongkuo xuji same 183 空闊虛寂) 117 impure desires in the human mind 183 Vasubandhu (ca. 420–ca. 500) 23 moral mind vs. incorrect human mind  Verbiest, Ferdinand (1623–1688) 205n5, 223 183 receives Confucian temple sacrifices in Wang Anshi (1021–1086) 104–110, 107n15, Wanli era 180 110n21, 125, 131 mind and principle one or two 197 Wang Fuzhi 230, 232 revisions of Zhu Xi doctrines 181–187 refutes Matteo Ricci as foolish 212 learning of the sages is the “learning of Wang Gen (1483–1541) 193, 194n92 mind” (xinxue 心學) 182 Wang Ji (1498–1583) 189–190, 190n84, 191, mind is simply human nature, human 191n86, 192, 193 nature is simply principle (xin ji xing, ideas equal Chan Buddhism 191n87 xing ji li 心即性, 性即理) 182 leads to “Left Wing” radical Wang no principle outside the mind; no event Yangming school 192 outside the mind 183 mind contains good but not evil 191 every comes from the mind 186, leads to naturalism (ziran zhuyi) 191 186n75 Wang Jiaxi (1775–1816) reinterprets li and xing  re-interpretations of the Confucian 255 classics 184 Wang Jiazhi (1604 jinshi) 226 study of forbidden by Jiajing Emperor  Wang Lai (1768–1813) celebrated for 178 mathematics 263 unity of knowledge (zhi 知) and action Wang Mao (1151–1213) critique of Song (xing 行) 186–187, 187n76 dynasty life 105n13 Wang Qiong (9th century) 86 Wang Mingsheng (1722–1797) 266 Wang Shiduo (1802–1889) promotes ancient Wang Niansun (1744–1832) 290 schools of philosophers 291 Wang Qiyuan (fl. 1620s)’s Qing shu jing tan Wang Wujun (735–801) usurps title of king  (1623) sets up Confucian theology  62 197n102 universal kingship 1, 105 universal truth (true principle, zhenli 真理)  102n11, 125, 130, 146, 167, 174, 226, 266, 275–276, 285n66, 319 universe (tianxia, yuzhou) 12, 24, 28–30, 34, 36, 89, 92–93, 100, 112–116, 126, 136, 142, 144, 182, 197, 203, 210, 225, 241, 249, 261, 263–264, 279 unorthodox gods (yinci 淫祠) 150, 153, 153n6, 162 urban merchants and great families, wealth of 175 urging self-injury (qishang起傷) 155 using principle to kill people (yi li sharen 以 理殺人) in Qing dynasty 235, 251, 258 utopian idealism and totalism 79

358 Wang Xichan (1628–1682) receives Western knowledge 259 Wang Xinbo (f. 12th century) 127n56 Wang Yuanzhi (580–667) 84 Wang Yinzhi (1766–1834) 266 Wang Zhong (1745–1794) 290, 291 On Learning (Shuxue) 291 Wanli Emperor (Shenzong, Zhu Lijun, 1563–1620, r. 1572–1620) 180, 188, 194, 201, 211 Washington, George 269 Way, moral Way, see Dao Way and principle (daoli 道理) 100, 102, 110–115, 145, 167n35 Way of Heaven 13, 115, 120, 121, 121n44, 136, 214 Way of the Hegemon (badao 霸道) 122, 140, 276 Weber, Max (1864–1920) three types of domination 1n1 weeding out children (haozi 薅子), infanticide 156n14 Wei Jun (1553–?) attacked Matteo Ricci’s world map 223 Weikuan of Xingshan Temple 41, 42, 42n44, 52 Wei Qumou (749–801) 85, 92n82 Wei Xiangshu (1617–1687) 233, 234n56 Wei Yijie (1616–1686) 233, 234n56 Wei Yuan (1794–1856) 269–271, 297 compares Buddhist and Western geography 297n85 Treatise on the Maritime Countries (Haiguo tuzhi) 269, 271 use the barbarians to combat the barbarians, etc. 270 Weng Fanggang (1733–1818) criticizes Dai Zhen 252, 252n7 Wengong Family Rituals (Wengong jiali) edited by Zhu Xi 161 Wen Tingshi (1856–1904) 296, 298, 299 and Buddhist studies 296–299 Western learning confirms uses Buddhist teaching 298, 299 Weng Tonghe (1830–1904) supports selfstrengthening 307, 308n6 Wenyan (864–949) 52, 58 Wen Yanbo (1006–1097) 104, 111

Index Wenyi (885–958) 52, 54, 61 Western Inscription (Ximing) 117n36, 167 Westernizing (Self-strengthening) faction (yangwupai 洋務派) 301 Western learning 203, 205, 210, 214, 215, 259–264, 267, 268, 272, 278, 279, 289, 292, 296–299, 303, 306, 311, 313–318 books and periodicals introducing  278 confirms Buddhist ideas 298 knowledge Chinese absorbed in late Qing 279 originated in China (xixue zhongyuan 西學中源) 203, 211, 259, 268, 312 Western logic 297 White Lotus, bailianjiao 白蓮教, Rebellion, 1794–1804 266 will, human (yi 意) 113, 190 witness groups (people correcting each other’s moral failings, zhengrenhui 證人會) 198 women 5, 10, 18, 150, 154, 160, 256 status declines in Song dynasty 156 women’s body unclean 157 female chastity 157, 157n16 Woncheuk (Yuance, 613–696) 23, 24, 26 world history 271 writing expresses the Way (wen yi zai dao 文以載道) 77n50 Wu Chong (1021–1080) favors legal studies  123n47 Wu Lanxiu (1789–1839) 265 Wu Rulun (1840–1903) 281 Wu Yubi (Kangzhai, 1391–1469) 178 Wu Yun (?–778) 91–92 The Mysterious Network (Xuanganglun)  91, 91n81 Wu Zetian (624–705, r. 690–705), Empress Wu  4–5, 5n4, 8, 14, 26 and female interference in government  14 and rise of educated stratum over aristocracy 8 Xavier, Francis (1506–1552) 201n1 xenophobia, self-centeredness 69–70 Xia xiaozheng, ritual calendar (from Da Dai Liji) 287

Index Xianzong (Li Chun, r. 805–820), Tang Emperor 34n31, 63n19, 64, 69, 88 patronizes Mazu Buddhism 42 Xia Song (985–1051) 149 Xia Zengyou (1863–1924 discusses Xunzi  295n83 xingguohui省過會examination/mistake correction groups/meetings 197 Xie Liangzuo (1050–1103) 127, 127n56, 143n96 Xie Lingyun ( 385–433) 219, 219n29 Xie Zhaozhe (1567–1624) 221 Xiong Cilü (1636–1709) 233, 233n54, 234n56 Xiujin 61n16 xiulian 修煉 Daoist austerities 90 Xi Xia Tangut state (1038–1227) 96 xixue zhongyuan see Western learning originated in China Xing Bing (932–1010) 99n6 Xianqing Ritual Code (Xianqing li, 658) 2 Xuanlang (673–754) 39 Xuansu (668–752) 38 Xuanyuan Ji (9th century) 95 Xuanzang 玄奘 (ca. 602–664) 23–24, 26, 219 Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712–756), Tang 3 critical of contemporary intellectual class 6 issues his Commentary on the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing zhu, 712); Imperial Commentary on the Daodejing (Daodejing yuzhu, 732 to 733); and annotated edition of the Diamond Sûtra (Jingangjing, 734) 3, 12, 31 secularization of Buddhist monasteries  5 hope to restore old social order & traditions 5n4 power struggle with his father, Ruizong  14 revised dynastic history 16 attacks Daoists, restores Buddhist monasteries 95 Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit (Yinghuan zhilüe, 1848) 269 Xuanzong 宣宗 (Li Chen, r. 846–859), Tang  3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12–16, 31, 92, 95 Xue Fengzuo (1599/1600–1680) 210, 259 receives Western knowledge 259

359 Synthesis of Mathematical Astronomy (Lixue huitong) 210 Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) Western democracy accords with Mencius 274, 274n48, 280, 282n62, 310 Reform and National Defense (Chouyang chuyi) 1880 310 Xue Jixuan (1134–1173) 140n83 Xue Xuan (Jingxuan, 1389–1464) 178 Xu Ganxue (1631–1694) 233 Xu Guangqi (1562–1633) 205, 210, 210n12, 215 Xu Jiyu (1795–1873) 269 A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit (Huanying zhilüe) 227 Xu Heng (1209–1281) 169–171 Xu Jingheng (1072–1128) 127n56 Xu Mengrong (?–818) 92n82 Xu Yangyuan (1758–1825) reinterprets li and xing 255 Xunzi and the Xunzi 72, 74, 83, 83n60, 256, 291n75 Yan Fu (1853–1921) 277, 321–322 Evolution and Ethics (Tianyan lun) 321 natural selection (tianze 天擇) 322 struggle for existence (wujing 物競) 322 On the Origin of Strength (Yuanqiang) 1895 321 on the search for wealth and power 277, 277n53 On the Speed of World Change (Lun shibian zhi ji) 1895 321 Yan Ruoqu (1636–1704) 233, 242–243, 244n72, 260, 261 Textual Criticism of the Old Text Book of Documents (Guwen Shangshu shuzheng) 242, 260 Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) 215n23, 226 Yang Jian (1141–1226) 129 yangqi 陽 氣 bright/positive material force  137 Yang Shi (1053–1135) 117n36, 127, 128n57, 131 Yang Tingyun (1557–1627) 205, 210, 221 Yang Wan (?–777) call for examination reform  19, 76n46 Yang Weizhong (1205–1259), promotes School of Principle in Yuan 169–170 Yang Wenhui (1837–1911) and Buddhist revival  296

360 Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE) 77, 131–132 Yan Zhenqing (709–785) 21, 85 Yaodian see Canon of Yao Yao Jiheng (1647–1715) 243 Yao Nai (1731–1815) 252n7 Yao Ying (1785–1853) 292, 297, 297n85 Record of Travels in Sichuan and Tibet (Kangyou jixing) 271 Yelü Chucai (1190–1244) 168 Ye Shi (1150–1223) 140n83 Ye Xianggao (1559–1627) 226 yi 義, see rightness, righteousness Yi Chun (1071–1142) 128n57 Yifu (658–736) 36 Yi Nai (1874–1925) China Should Regard Its Weakness As Strength (Zhongguo yi yi ruo wei qiang shuo) 1898: China must change the dynasty and follow Western system 316 Yicun (822–908) 52, 61 Yiji (919–987) of Mt. Tiantai 40 Yin and Yang 14, 115, 136–137, 162 Yin Chun or Yin Tun (1071–1143) 127 yinqi 陰氣 dark/negative material force 137 Ying Yijie (810–894) 86 Yixuan (?–886) of Linji 49, 54 Yize (713–770) 38 yong 用 function (vs. ti 體 substance) 30, 176, 184–185, 204, 310–311 Yongle Emperor (Zhu Di, Chengzu, 1360–1424, r. 1402–1424) 174, 188n81, 202 defends School of Principle 174 Complete Collection of the Five Classics (Wujing daquan), Complete Collection of the Four Books (Sishu daquan) 174 Complete Collection on Neo-Confucian Nature and Principle (Xingli daquan) published with prefaces by 174 welcomes foreigners to China 202 Yongzheng Emperor (1722–1735) 231, 233n53, 234, 242, 245 Record of Great Righteousness Dispelling Superstition (Dayi juemi lu, 1730) 231 Violators of the Confucian Ritual Code (Mingjiao zuiren) 234 You Zuo (1053–1123) 127, 131 Yuan Xie (1144–1224) Zhu Xi’s tradition of the Way 132n65

Index Yuan Chuke (8th century) warns of Tang problems 18 Yuanhao (?–817) 39 Yuan Haowen (1190–1257) 168 Yuan Hongdao (1568–1610) 194 Yuan Jie (723–772)’s Questions for Presented Scholars (Wen jinshi) and doubting the classics 67 Yuan to Ming intellectual changes 166–178 Yung Wing (1828–1912) 279 Zeng Guoquan (1824–1890) 280 Zeng Jize (1839–1890) 272, 310 do not fear the Western countries 272 On China Sleeping First and Awakening Later (Zhongguo xian shui hou xing lun) 1897 310 Zhang Boxing (1651–1725) 233, 233n53, 234n56 Zhang Dehui (1195–1275) convinces Khubilai Qaghan to sacrifice to Confucius 168 Zhang Erqi (1612–1678) receives Western knowledge 259 Zhang Fangping (1007–1091) critique of Wang Anshi reforms 106, 106n14 Zhang Ji (ca. 766–c. 830) 79, 80n56 Zhang Lichen (fl. 1879) 281 Zhang Peilun (1848–1903) sorrow at defeat by Japanese 317 Zhang Shi (1133–1180) 126, 128, 128n58, 129, 147, 170 Zhang Taiyan (Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936)  299, 302 Buddhist studies 296, 303 Talk at the Reception for Tokyo Overseas Students (Dongjing liuxuesheng huanyinghui shuoci) 302 Zhang Wenda (1554–1613) accused and impeached Li Zhi 194 Zhang Xiang (1877–1945) preface to Xie Wuliang (1884–1964) Outline of Buddhist Studies (Foxue dagang) 299 Zhang Xuecheng (1772–1851) criticizes Dai Zhen 252, 291 General Principlesof Literature and History (Wenshi tongyi) 291 Zhang Yinhuan (1837–1900) supports self-strengthening 307

Index Zhang Yue (663–730) 18, 44 and Zhang Jiuling (673–740) reform proposals 18 Zhang Zai (1020–1077) 103n12, 104, 106, 113, 115–122, 117n36, 121n44, 131–132, 147, 157n15, 161, 167 Letter in Answer to Fan Xunzhi critical of Song imperial court 107 Western Inscription (Ximing) 117n36 Zhang Zhidong 282n62, 294, 307, 308n6, 313 Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for practical application (Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong 中學 為體, 西學為用) 289 establishes Two Lakes Academy and Self-strengthening College 282n62 Zhanran (711–782) 39, 40n39 Zhao Fu (?–?) the first Mongol Yuan dynasty Confucian 169–170 Zhao Guizhen (?–846) 86–88, 87n72, 95 Zhao Pu (922–992) 96, 167n35 Zhao Ruyu (1140–1196) forced out of office  130 Zhao Xie (?–1364) follows Lu Jiuyuan thought  177 Zheng Guanying (1842–1922) 280, 310 Diary of a Southern Tour (Nanyou riji) praises Western ti and yong 274 Important Things to Save the Situation (Jiushi jieyao) 310 Essays on Change (Yiyan) 310 Words of Warning for a Flourishing Era (Shengshi weiyan)1880 310 Zheng He (1371–1433) 220 zhengtong 政統, tradition of political power, loyalty to the ruler, orthodoxy 98–99, 107, 111, 125, 148, 158n17, 233, 235, 284n65, 320 Zhenguan Ritual Code (Zhenguan li, 637)  2 Zhenzong (Zhao Heng, 916–1122, r. 997–1122) Song Emperor 97–98, 103n12, 156 zhitong 治統, tradition of political power  101, 110, 124n51, 141, 238 Zhi Yan (602–668) 26 Zhishen (539–618) 36 Zhixian (?–898) 61

361 Zhiyuan (768–844) 39 Zhizang (738–817) 41, 41n42, 52 Zhizhe (Zhiyi, 538–597) 23, 39 Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) 74–75, 83, 103, 133, 147, 153, 169, 184–186, 185n72, 227, 241–243, 250, 253 Zhongzong (Li Zhe, r. 705–710), Tang 5, 14, 16 Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) 104, 114, 116, 131–132, 147, 170, 198 Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (Taijitu shuo) 113 Zhou Mi (1232–1298) criticizes School of Principle 166–167 Zhou Xiyuan (mid-9th century) 86 Zhuge Liang 292 Zhu Tao (?–785) usurps title of king 62 Zhuang Chuo (?–?) prohibits Manichean “eating only vegetables and serving the devil” (chicai shimo 食菜事魔) 162n24 Zhuang Cunyu (1719–1788) and Gongyang school 283 Zhuang Tinglong (?–1655) 238 Zhuangzi and the Zhuangzi 11, 90, 210 Zhu Xi (1130–1200) 101n9, 157n15, 161–165, 166, 169, 173n47, 176–177, 178, 180–182, 184, 186–187, 192, 196, 198, 227, 233n54, 243n71, 251n6, 260 Answer to Lu Zijing (Lu Jiuyuan, Lu Xiangshan)” (Da Lu Zijing) 136 brought moral and ethical principles to common people’s everyday lives 134 Collected Commentaries on the “Great Learning” 137 critical of barbarian customs (hufeng) 158 debates with Lu Xiangshan 125–148 edited the Records of the Origins of the School of the Chengs (Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu), genealogy of lixue 131 edited, with Lü Zuqian, Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu), quotes lixue scholars on key concepts 132 endorsed the transmission of the mind of the three sages (sansheng chuanxin 三聖傳心) 138 establishes an intellectual genealogy for the School of Principle 132

362 Zhu Xi (1130–1200) (cont.) establishes the daotong transmission 130 emphasizes Mencius 131 influence of Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan) 144–148 knowledge of nature and society too close 145 privileges morality over natural world 145 opposes pragmatic, utilitarian lixue  139–140 opposes theory of inner transcendence of Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan) 141–144 produced Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu) on the daotong and lixue thought 133 re-established the Confucian classics 133 Four Books (Lunyu, Mengzi, Daxue, Zhongyong) as preeminent 133 rejects Buddhism, Daoism, and called “mixed learning” (zaxue 雜學) 139 revised ancient Chinese ceremonial etiquette in Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals (Zhuzi jiali) 134–135, 135n69 revised Cheng brothers’ ideas on ancient rites with Sima Guang’s Letters and Etiquette (Shuyi) 135 revised the Lü Family Community Compact (Lüshi xiangyue) 134 wants to establish an orthodox Way (zhengdao 正道) based on three bonds and five constant virtues (sangang wuchang 三綱五常) 140

Index wrote preface to Cheng Duanmeng (d. 1191) and Dong Zhu (1152–?), eds., Cheng and Dong’s Principles of Learning (Cheng Dong er xiansheng xueze) 134 Zhu Guozhen (1557–1632) argued against western knowledge 212 Zhu Hong (1535–1615) refutes the Western missionary 212 Zhu Yizun (1629–1709) 232n52, 233, 243 Zhu Zhen (1072–1138) 127, 128n57 zhuzi baijia 諸子百家 hundred schools of classical thought 102n11, 241, 272, 289 Zibo (Zhenke, Daguan, 1543–1603) 188, 194 Zizai (741–821?) 47 Zong Bing Essay Explaining Buddhism (Ming Fo lun) 220 Zongjing 61n16 Zongmi (780–841) Tiantai master 22, 40n41, 46n52 Zoroastrianism 12, 84, 158, 159, 159n18 Zhou Xingji (1067–1125) 127n56 Zou Boqi (1819–1869) earliest Chinese to use photography 292 Zou Shouyi (1491–1562) 193, 197 Zou Yan (305–240 BCE) 224, 224n41 theory of the greater nine regions 294 theory of the nine great continents (da jiuzhou 大九州) 224 Zuozhuan (Zuo Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals 69, 71, 173n47, 227, 254, 285 Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) 293n80