An Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent: Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674430174, 9780674333802

Citation preview

AN ESSAY C O N C E R N I N G T H E UNDERSTANDING, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, AND ASSENT

LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

JOHN LOCKE

A N ESSAY CONCERNING THE UNDERSTANDING, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, AND ASSENT BY

JOHN

LOCKE

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

BENJAMIN RAND, PH.D., LL.D. HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CAMBRIDGE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1931

COPYRIGHT, I 9 3 I B Y T H E P R E S I D E N T AND FELLOWS O F HARVARD C O L L E G E

P R I N T E D AT T H E HARVARD U N I V E R S I T Y CAMBRIDGE, M A S S . , U . S . A.

PRESS

TO THE MEMORY OF

T H E RIGHT H O N O U R A B L E

LIONEL

FORTESCUE

THIRD EARL OF LOVELACE

EDITOR'S PREFACE HIS volume contains the hitherto unpublished draft of Locke's Essay Human Understanding.

concerning

T o the late Right Hon-

ourable the Earl of Lovelace, 1 who inherited as the direct descendant of the Lord Chancellor, Peter

King, the manuscripts

bequeathed

by

Locke to the cousin of the philosopher, I owe the kind permission to print for the first time from this Collection the letters of Edward and M a r y Clarke and of their daughter Elizabeth written to Locke, which appeared in my Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke?

An even

greater debt of gratitude is due by me to the late Earl of Lovelace for granting permission to have the photostat copy made of the original draft of Locke's Essay concerning Human

Understanding,

which is also preserved in his own handwriting in the Lovelace Collection. It is in grateful recognition of these kind favors received from him that 1 Lord Lovelace died on the fifth of October, 1929, at Ben Damph in Ross-shire, Scotland. ' Benjamin Rand, Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke. Oxford, England, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1927.

( v i i )

PREFACE

I have dedicated this work to the Right Honourable Lionel Fortescue, Earl of Lovelace. The original draft of Locke's " E s s a y " has been reproduced from the photostat copy in this printed form with strict adherence to the text, save that the spelling, capitals, and punctuation have been modernized. To secure a faithful reproduction much care has been demanded, owing to the minute handwriting, verbal contractions, marginal additions, occasional errors, and frequent changes by the author. Only in one instance, where the numbers of the sections have been duplicated, has it been thought necessary, in order to prevent confusion on the part of the reader, to indicate this repetition by the addition of an alpha to the duplicate numbers. Marginal titles were inserted by Locke for the first portion of the draft in the table of contents; but in the later part he placed these opposite the successive sections of the text. These marginal titles have been used above the sections corresponding to them in the running titles of this work. A missing paragraph at the close of the draft has also been supplied in brackets from the first edition of the printed work. The opportunity now given to scholars for ( viii )

PREFACE

tracing the history of the development by Locke of his famous " E s s a y " through access for the first time to the original draft, will, it is hoped, give real value to this work. But in any study of the growth of the individual doctrines of the philosopher it will be necessary to compare the presentation of them in the draft with their final form in the printed editions of the work as issued by the philosopher in his lifetime. To pave the way for such researches an attempt has been made to ascertain when possible the sections and chapters of the books in the first edition of the " E s s a y " which correspond to the successive sections as numbered in the margin of the draft. Where Locke has made use of the contents of the draft almost verbatim in the completed text, these references can be exact. But where it happens that sentences or paragraphs have been brought together from different parts of the draft to form the final text they can at best only denote similar subject matter. These textual references to the first edition of the " E s s a y " have been placed on the pages above the corresponding sections as found in the draft. In the editor's introduction a further comparison has been made of the draft and text. It has (ix)

PREFACE

here been attempted to present seriatim those doctrines of the philosopher which appear in this first draft of the " E s s a y . " The extent and thoroughness of Locke's presentation of many of his beliefs in this early draft of 1671 may be a matter of surprise even to the most sagacious students of his philosophy. Indeed there has been no investigation of the earlier development of the particular views set forth by Locke in the " E s s a y " in which access to this draft might not have been of great advantage. If the future productions of scholars shall in any way be made even more fruitful than in the past, it will amply justify the present publication of this original draft of Locke's " E s s a y . " For the reproduction of Locke's portrait, attributed to John Closterman, as frontispiece, I am indebted to the courtesy of the Trustees of the National Portrait Gallery in London.

The

portrait of Locke by his secretary, Sylvanus Brownover, appears in the second edition of his " E s s a y . " The fine portrait of the philosopher painted very late in his life by Sir Godfrey Kneller is to be found in various editions of Locke's works. The best portrait of Locke, in the prime of life, I believe to be that by John

CO

PREFACE

Greenhill, which is reproduced in my Locke and Clarke. For the exceeding correctness with which the typewritten copy of the photostat draft of the " E s s a y " has been made, I am much indebted to the assistance of Mr. George C. Seeck. To the Corporation of Harvard University, I have reason to be grateful both for a grant from the Milton Fund to make the photostat copy, and for an award from the appropriation of Studies in the Humanities to secure the present publication of the original draft of Locke's "Essay." B E N J A M I N RAND EMERSON

HALL

HARVARD

UNIVERSITY

28 January, 1931

LOCKE'S ESSAY INTRODUCTION BY BENJAMIN RAND

HE origin of Locke's An Essay concerningHuman Understanding is told in the introductory epistle of his printed work, in the following notable and often discussed passage: "Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this 'Essay,' I should tell thee, that five or six friends, meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties that arose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which

C ȟ )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse; which, having been thus begtin by chance, was continued by entreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it." Lady Masham, in the sketch of Locke's life which she sent to Jean LeClerc on the twelfth of January, 1704-05, places the time of this meeting in 1670-71. James Tyrell, one of the "assembled friends," in the margin of his own copy of the " E s s a y " now preserved in the British Museum, gives it as 1673. Locke, in a letter to Edward Clarke, dated the thirty-first of December, 1686, says, if the statement be correctly transcribed, that it is five or six years since some friends upon an accidental discourse set him upon this enquiry. But Lord Peter King, who had access to Locke's

cor-

respondence by the inheritance of his manuscripts, says in his Life of John Locke that the Essay concerning Human Understanding was first sketched out at Oxford in 1670. The first entrance into this discourse in any event naturally (xiv)

INTRODUCTION precedes the writing of the present d r a f t of the " E s s a y " in 1671. I t is now possible through this d r a f t of the " E s s a y " to determine accurately the period of production of the entire work.

In L o c k e ' s o w n

handwriting preceding the d r a f t there is written the title Intellectus,

1671,

with his initials,

J. L . ; and on the following page there is added more fully the title De intellectu humano, An

Essay.

And

with

the text

i6ji.

of the d r a f t

there is given as the full title of the work Essay

concerning

Opinion,

the Understanding,

and Assent.

An

Knowledge,

T h e word " O p i n i o n " in

this title has apparently been substituted " B e l i e f , " since the latter has been erased.

for

When

the writing of the d r a f t is well a d v a n c e d , L o c k e repeats no fewer than three times in the text t h a t he dates a computation used as an illustration from the " p r e s e n t year 1 6 7 1 . " T h e entire d r a f t of the " E s s a y " as now printed for the first time was thus apparently fully written in the y e a r 1671. W h e n L o c k e retired to H o l l a n d in 1683, he took with him this d r a f t of the " E s s a y . "

I t was

not until this retirement t h a t he found the necessary leisure to resume his meditations upon its (xv)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

theme with the resolve to place them without further interruptions in their final form. letter

1

In a

to his friend Edward Clarke written from

Utrecht on the first of January, 1684-85, he says: " m y enquiry concerning Humane Understanding, a subject which I had for a good while backwards thought on by catches and set down without method several thoughts upon, as they had at distinct times and on several occasions come in my way; and which I was now willing in this retreat to turn into a less confused and [incoherent discourse, and add what was wanting to make my designs intelligible to such of my friends who had desired it of me, and to whom I had promised a sight of it when a little out of the rubbish, and to that purpose had brought those along with me to this country."

Locke there-

upon in this retirement proceeded with the revision of the draft and new presentation of his "old scattered" notions. The real task at hand was to recast his thoughts as expressed in the form of an " E s s a y , " and, after having added what was wanted, to present them in the form of a book. In this final form he hoped the reader would better discover the "design and connection of parts." 1

Rand, Locke and Clarke, p. 117.

(xvi)

INTRODUCTION

A series of epitomes forwarded by Locke from Holland to his friends in England mark the stages in the progress of revision and enlargement of the " E s s a y . " The epitome of the second book was sent to England in May, 1685, f ° r perusal by the Earl of Pembroke, to whom the treatise was finally dedicated. An epitome of the third book was received by Edward Clarke in the autumn of 1686. With a final epitome, sent also to Clarke, on the thirty-first of December, 1686, Locke writes: " You have here at length the fourth and last book of my scattered thoughts concerning the Understanding, and I see now more than ever that I have reason to call them scattered, since never having looked them over all together till since this last part was done I find the ill effects of writing in patches as this whole essay has been." Locke adds that he hopes by another review to place "these papers" in yet better order, but he believes little will be found in the argument that needs altering. The manuscript of Locke's "Abstract of the Essay," 1 from which LeClerc made the French translation which appeared in the Bibliotheque Universelle in January, 1

This "Abstract of the E s s a y " was printed in Lord King's The Life of John Locke. New ed., London, 1830, II, 231-293.

( xvii)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

1687-88, has been attached and paged by him with the present draft of his An Essay concerningHuman Understanding, thereby revealing their close connection in his final revision. Locke himself both gives the date of its writing in the actual text of the draft, and also in similar manner states the date of its closing revision in the printed " E s s a y . " In a passage of the draft which relates to past existence as known by memory, the illustration as given in the text has the date of 1671. When he reproduces this illustration almost verbatim in the " E s s a y " the date is changed to the tenth of July, 1688. Similarly, a computation which is made in the draft is stated to be from " t h e present year 1671," but when reproduced, otherwise unchanged, in the last revision, the date is changed to " T h e present year, 1689."

The liinits of the time in which

Locke was engaged upon the " E s s a y " are thus the year 1671, when he wrote the draft in England, and the closing year of his retirement in Holland in 1689, when he completed "Essay."

the

Locke returned to England on the

twelfth of February, 1689, and the first edition of his An Essay concerning Humane

Understanding

was issued from the press in March, 1690. ( xviii)

INTRODUCTION

Having ascertained the precise bounds

of

the writing of Locke's " E s s a y , " what is here of greater moment is the discovery somewhat thereby of the development of his thought in the production of his great work. The real meaning of his words appearing in his introductory epistle may then have clearer meaning when he says, " i t was brought into that order thou now seest i t . " I t is particularly more desirable to learn, if possible, what was done by Locke during his stay in Holland to turn his earlier writing of the " E s s a y " into a less confused and more coherent discourse, and to discover what he added thereto to make his design more intelligible. I t is hoped that this may be accomplished in some measure by a comparison of the draft of 1 6 7 1 , as here printed for the first time, with the completed text as it appears in the first edition of the " E s s a y " in the year 1690. §§ i—16. Locke begins his " E s s a y , " both in the draft and in the final text, with a description of his enquiry into the understanding as both pleasant and useful. H e states, however, in the draft a further use, omitted in the text, of such an enquiry, to the effect that it may make us content with ignorance of things found to lie beyond (xix)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

the reach of our capacity, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct conceptions. The design of the work to enquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds of belief, opinion, and assent, and the method whereby he seeks to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and to regulate the degrees of assent, as stated in the earlier draft, are reproduced almost verbatim in the final text. But he adds thereto at this place in the draft only an important definition of what ideas stand for in his enquiry. " I t may not be amiss to tell you," he writes, " t h a t in this following discourse I shall use the word 'idea' to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, and by it express all that is meant by notion, phantasm, species, or whatever else the mind can be employed about in thinking." Hence, whatever the mind is conscious of is an idea, though other subordinate terms may be used. The question now naturally arises how these ideas come into the mind. Locke finds a generally received opinion that there are certain innate principles, both speculative and practical, stamped, as it were, upon the minds of men, and (xx)

INTRODUCTION

their possession from birth. He proposes not only to give the reasons he has to doubt this opinion, but also to show another way to come to the knowledge of and certain assent to some general truths. But while in the draft he begins with the practical, as most stressed by those who advocate innate principles, he later, in the text, reverses the order of treatment, and starts with the speculative. If any idea can be imagined innate it is of all others the idea of God, and therewith Locke begins the disproof of innate principles. For if there be no innate idea of Deity, he adds, it is hard to conceive how there can be any other innate moral principles, as without the notion of a lawmaker there can be no sense of moral obligation. Furthermore, Locke desires that those who talk of first principles graven on the minds of men would also tell what and how many they are, but when writing had not met anyone who had attejnpted so to do. Before resuming his enquiry, he had been informed that Lord Herbert of Cherbury in his work De Veritate had discussed innate principles and given what he regards as six marks of their engraven character on the minds of men. Thus his acquaintance with Lord Cher(xxi

)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

bury's discussion is carried back to 1671. The refutation of such engraven marks is later reproduced almost verbatim in the final text of the " E s s a y . " Besides what has already been said, Locke gives as reasons why he cannot believe any universal principles innate, that the speculative ones are of no great use, and that the practical ones are not self-evident. Moreover, the goodness of God is better seen in sure and useful knowledge attained by the right use of the faculties than by any dependence on innate principles. If any further reason were needed, as Locke thinks, to doubt innate principles, it would be because they appear least where what is innate ought to show itself clearest, as in children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people. The use of reason by the,m is necessary, not to discover what has been engraven on the understanding, but by the right use of the facilities to introduce and find those first principles that have been thought to be innate. The illustration in the draft of quick assent on first hearing by the child of the proposition that " t h e nurse is not a c a t " is merely changed in the text to that of " a n apple is not fire." The central argument remains unchanged. ( xxii)

INTRODUCTION

And the refutation of innate principles in the minds of children ends in both draft and text with the statement that if the idea of God be not innate no other can be supposed to be, but how late it is before any such notion is discoverable by them! One has only to observe how children attain the knowledge they have, and it will be easy to see that their thoughts are enlarged from their very first impressions only as they become acquainted with sensible objects, retain the ideas of them in their memories, and thereafter acquire the art of compounding and putting them together differently. The way by which this is done is, he affirms, to be the subject of his following discourse. I t has been necessary, Locke says, to give this account of all the reasons he had to doubt innate principles, solely in order to lay the foundations which he conceives to be the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge. He expresses the hope, in language similar both in draft and text, in the future part of the " E s s a y " to raise thereon an edifice uniform and consistent, that will truly reveal how the understanding proceeds in the acquisition of knowledge. ( xxiii)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

§ § 1 7 - 3 1 . Locke writes the draft throughout in the form of an essay with numbered sections, and does not use in it any divisions of books and chapters. He seeks to make a logical transition from the preliminary task of refuting "established opinion" to what he regards as the constructive task of his enquiry. From the refutation of innate principles he now proceeds to offer what he believes to be the true history of ideas by which the understanding attains knowledge and probability. The soul he states in the draft to be at first rasa tabula, or white paper, quite void, but altogether capable of ideas which are the proper objects of our understandings wherein our knowledge consists. All our knowledge he believes to be innately derived from experience and observation.

And the two great sources

from whence spring all our ideas are sensation and reflection.

So thoroughly had Locke re-

flected on the character of these two originals of our knowledge that the description of them given in the draft could be reproduced verbatim in the completed text. Before proceeding to develop the counterthesis to innate ideas, Locke states in the draft that the essence of things is unknown, whether Q xxiv

INTRODUCTION

of spirit or of body. There is a like ignorance of the substratum of mental activity, as of the substratum of those simple ideas we have from without. The draft contains here no discussion, as is found in the text, of " t h e soul thinks not always." Instead, Locke enters at once upon the proof that we can frame in our minds no new simple ideas, but only enlarge, compare, or compound them. Hence it is impossible to imagine any sixth object for a sixth sense. The first step in the discovery of knowledge reveals that the mind is fitted to receive impressions, either through the senses or by reflection, and that in so doing the understanding is merely passive. And those ideas are the earliest imprinted on the mind which first affect the senses and make perception. After the reception of simple ideas, the next faculty of the mind, whereby a further progress is made towards knowledge, is retention. This is the keeping of those simple ideas which it has received from sensation or reflection. And in this the mind is often active. The next faculty of the mind which is exercised about these simple ideas is that of discerning. Through it, the understanding clearly perceives every one of these ( xxv )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

simple ideas which it receives, and distinguishes them one from another. Upon this accurate perception depends the evidence and certainty of more general propositions. Next to discerning, there is, as termed in the draft, the faculty of denomination; or, as it is called in the text, naming. By means of it one comes to think of names instead of things. Besides the forementioned faculties of the mind whereby it receives and retains simple ideas, there is another known as comparing. Upon it depends that large body of ideas known as relations. I t is the foundation and ground of all mathematics. All these faculties and first operations of the mind, which it makes use of in understanding, Locke has clearly and concisely listed in the draft, and afterwards developed more at large in the text. Locke believes this to be the method whereby the mind receives, retains, distinguishes, and denominates all its simple ideas, and so lays the foundation of all its future knowledge. Though the range of that knowledge by the mind, from the compounding and enlarging of its ideas, appears to be of an almost infinite extent, yet it is still limited to those simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection. ζ xxvi )

INTRODUCTION

Among the ideas comprehended under relation, particularly those belonging to the faculty of comparing, are, as also stated in the draft, extension and number. In order to understand better their nature and the knowledge we have of them, Locke thinks it well to consider something of simple ideas in general. Concerning these ideas, it is observed that some of them if not repeated are quite lost, while others if not refreshed will quickly fade. T h e ideas of extension, number, and thinking are seldom lost, since they are constantly refreshed by all the objects in the mind. Although these ideas are the most lasting and are universally found in the mind of man, yet they are derived in the same way as all the others and have no other source but sensation or reflection. In closing this discussion of simple ideas, Locke summarizes in the draft, and later reproduces verbatim in the text, what he has so far learned of the true history of the beginnings of knowledge. He pretends not to teach but to enquire, and again repeats that, as vouched by experience, the internal and external senses are the only windows he can discover by which light is let into the dark room of the understanding. ( xxvii)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

§§ 32-40. Locke begins an enquiry in the draft, which is important here to note as belonging ultimately to the Fourth Book of the " E s s a y , " concerning the kind of knowledge we have of those ideas, the proper object of knowledge being truth.

The extent and validity of the

knowledge furnished by our ideas is here clearly stated, before he enters upon a farther investigation of all the various sorts of ideas that can be entertained in a human understanding.

Truth,

as he affirms in this summary of our knowledge, lies wholly in affirmation or negation, and so properly belongs only to propositions,

either

mental or verbal. Concerning these simple ideas, we certainly know when any one of them actually exists in the mind.

We certainly know

each simple idea to be what it is, and that it is what we perceive it to be.

We have certain

knowledge that one idea is not another, though our senses may err. B y the actual receiving of these ideas we have certain knowledge that something does exist at that time, without us, which causes that idea in us. And to it we give a name as of a distinct quality. T h e certainty of the external evidence is as great as human knowledge is capable of, except of man's self alone. Q xxviii )

"This

INTRODUCTION

being, according to Descartes," he adds in the draft, but omits in the text, " to every one, past all possibility of doubt, that whilst he writes or thinks that he writes, he that thinks doth exist." Besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, there are concurrent reasons for the belief that they do not err in the information of the existence of things without us. For one reason, we cannot avoid having some of those sensible ideas produced in the mind, whether we will or not. There is, too, a manifest difference between the ideas of actual sensation and those stored in memory, as for instance ideas from the light of the sun. The pleasure or pain which accompanies actual sensation may not attend the revival of those ideas without the external objects. Furthermore, our senses bear witness in many cases to the truth of each other's report of the existence of outward things. One may both see and feel the fire. Such assurance of the existence of things by our senses is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, that is, our happiness or misery. While we have undoubted knowledge that when our senses convey ideas to us something at that time really exists without us as their causes, this certainty ζ xxix )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

extends no further than the actual sensation. And it is by our memory that we have similar certainty that heretofore certain simple ideas have existed, whereby we receive the knowledge of the past existence of other things as their causes. Here we find Locke has clearly outlined in the early stages of the draft of the " E s s a y , " as written in 1671, the evidence for the certainty and extent of the knowledge of the existence of external things. This proof, when enlarged by him on the tenth of July, 1688, in Holland, is essentially reproduced to form chapter eleven, " O f our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things," in the Fourth Book, " O f Knowledge and Probability," of the " E s s a y . " §§ 41-46. Besides the knowledge we have of those particular ideas that are in our minds, — that they exist there, — and of the existence of external objects, there is still another kind of knowledge we have by those simple ideas. This relates to a comparison of the degrees of our knowledge of those ideas of the same kind, to ascertain their equality or excess one to another. Such comparative knowledge concerns especially extension and number. The knowledge which we call geometry, Locke describes as nothing but ( xxx )

INTRODUCTION

the comparing of one extension with another and so using them for standards of measurement. Mechanical measuring, though not so exact as mathematical, proceeds after the same manner of comparing magnitudes. The certainty of mathematical truths thereby depends, as he believes, not on demonstrations founded on general axioms, but on the clear and distinct knowledge we have of the simple ideas taken from our senses. I t does not come from any innate light or self-evidence of their own. He thinks that he may add that when we would arrive at that great certainty we call demonstration, all the proof is nothing else than to discover by the intervention of other ideas their agreements or disagreements. When the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other, there is what is termed intuitive knowledge. Qn such intuitions depend the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge. §§ 47~5 2 · While the idea of number may not be more clear than that of extension, Locke is of the opinion that the demonstrations about numbers are more evident and exact than in extension. This is because the ideas of number are ( xxxi)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

more precise, and distinguishable. Inasmuch as the ideas of number are more determinate than those of extension, the certainty of geometrical demonstration depends on arithmetic or the comparing of numbers. Even the axioms of geometry, when well examined, will be found to rest on number. Names and signs are requisite to numbering, which consists entirely of addition and subtraction. In number, the mind has, as it were, an intuitive knowledge of their equality and inequality without recourse to definitions and axioms. This is the foundation of all arithmetical demonstration, and possibly of a great part of geometry. The reason why the certainty of number is more noticed than any other simple idea is that number is applicable to everything that does exist. It is the simplest and most universal of ideas. Although the general treatment of number is reproduced in the final text under modes of the idea of number, this particular discussion of the difference between arithmetical and geometrical demonstration is apparently set forth more clearly and at greater length in the draft than in the "Essay." §§ 53 - 59· An evidence of how Locke, at every stage of his enquiry, kept clearly in mind its cen( xxxii )

INTRODUCTION

tral problem, is seen in the fact that here he again summarizes the discoveries so far made as regards the extent and certainty of human knowledge. He finds it proven: (i) that the foundation of all our knowledge is from simple ideas received from sensation and reflection; (2) that when those simple ideas are in our minds, we know that they are there and that they are distinct from all others; (3) that there exists without us something which is the cause of those simple ideas conveyed to the mind by the senses; and (4) wherever those simple ideas do really exist, they will all have the same proportions of equality and excess as they had when we measured them in our minds. Therefore we have certain knowledge of universal propositions in mathematics and of any other simple ideas, as well as those of number and extension which are capable of being measured. This, he says, in short, is all the knowledge we have of or by simple ideas, considered singly and without further composition. B u t before wholly leaving simple ideas, Locke pauses to remark that all sensation is the perception of some simple idea, which is positive even though the cause of it be a mere privation. He also says that ideas and words are, in their ( xxxiii )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

existence, but particular things; yet, as representatives in their significations, they are universale. " A n d so much for simple ideas." §§ 60-67. Locke next proceeds in the draft to a discussion of complex ideas. These, he says, arise from the power of the mind to compound together variously the simple ideas it has received, and to consider each of these complex ideas as one. They are either (1) modes, (2) substances, or (3) relations. Our complex ideas of substances, he continues in language later reproduced almost verbatim in the text, consist of collections of simple ideas, occasioned by phenomena of sense and reflection being found to co-exist in aggregates in our experience. They are either single or collective. Not being able to imagine how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we inure ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they subsist, and from which they result, which therefore we call substance. The names of substances, being compounded, are a kind of affirmation and very liable to uncertainty. For whereas the names that stand for simple ideas are easily understood, those that stand for complex ideas give occasion for infinite disputes and errors. They therefore deserve to be very carefully considered. ( xxxiv )

INTRODUCTION

Still another remarkable difference between simple ideas, that come in by the senses, and complex ideas (and the names whereby they are expressed), is that simple ideas, or rather the words expressing them, are not capable of definition. With complex ideas, the case is quite otherwise, inasmuch as the names are used here to signify a combination of many simple ideas, as of some substance or relation. The signification of the names of complex ideas can thus be determined by the enumeration of those simple ideas which make up that complex idea: which is a definition. But the want of perfect collections of the simple ideas in substances is one cause of the incomplete descriptions of things and hence of imperfect definitions. The uncertain signification of words and consequent lack of perfect definition thus appears to Locke as of great moment to the present "Enquiry." An investigation, he believes, is necessary if we are to distinguish between the understanding of words and the knowledge of things, or to discover what knowledge our understandings are capable of, in things abstracted from words. Hence there naturally follows at this stage in the draft a discussion of the imperfection and abuse of words, with their remedies. Q XXXV

)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

§§ 68-78. Locke writes, in language similar in both draft and text, that the abuse of words whereby men render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification than they need be is due in the first instance to their learning names at an early age before they have the ideas to which the names belong. Most of the disputes, he believes, are about the signification of words, even when they seem to be about things. The familiar illustration of gold is here used in the draft, and is later reproduced in the text. He seeks to emphasize thereby the great difference between the understanding of words and the knowledge of things. Words are rightly understood when the simple or complex idea is known for which the word stands; but things are rightly perceived when a complex idea is framed in the mind of all those simple ideas which are to be found together in the things as they really exist. Locke next seeks in the draft for remedies to remove the difficulties which arise from the use of doubtful words and names of uncertain signification. The first and main remedy he finds is to get a full and perfect collection of all those qualities which belong to any species of things and which distinguish them from all others. This ( xxxvi )

INTRODUCTION

is not so easy to do, he says, as often imagined. For one reason, certain philosophers have been of the opinion that the specific constitution and difference of things depended on a form unintelligible to them. Another reason, too, why the general words or the specific names of substances, modes, and relations have not had determinate complex ideas to which they have been applied, is because men have been led into a fruitless enquiry into the essence of things; whereas it is Locke's belief that the distinction of species is nothing but certain collections of simple ideas in order to naming. I t is not easy, moreover, to agree upon the particular simple ideas which make the complex ones, for which the names or words we find used in every country shall stand. Though a few obvious qualities observed in substances may serve well enough for ordinary use, yet men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of qualities belonging to any sort of thing signified by its name. Here the homely instance of the cassowary in St. James's Park is first used, to be later reproduced. Men apply names to substances for the ends of speech without any consideration of the real essence of things. The more general our ideas of substance, ( xxxvii )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

the more incomplete they are. The genus is but a partial conception of what is in the species; and the species is but a partial conception of what is in the individuals. It is plain, therefore, that those which make the abstract ideas, which are the nominal essences of substances, do thereby make the genus and species. This distinction of the nominal and the real essence of substances, as made in the draft, was later more fully developed in chapter six, " Of the Names of Substances," in the Third Book of the " E s s a y . " §§ 79-88. If it be difficult to find the exact complex ideas of substances, it is harder to agree on the moral ideas that moral words, such as modesty, or gratitude, etc., stand for. These form too a very large part of language. But, in them, Locke thinks, if men could but agree to define their terms, they would attain more certain significations than in substance. This is true because it lies more under their power to determine the precise number of simple ideas that shall be expressed by moral terms. And whereas it is clear, in material things, that names stand for nothing else but framing complex ideas out of certain collections of simple ideas in the making of species, it is even more evident from our idea ( xxxviii

INTRODUCTION

of spirits. The mind can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all the operations it finds in itself to a sort of being without the inclusion of matter. For instance, in framing an idea of the First Being, it is here stated, and afterwards repeated in the text, that we attribute those powers and operations of thinking, knowing, and willing, which we find in ourselves, to Him in a more perfect form and in unlimited degree. The best way, Locke resumes, under remedies to prevent confusion about the signification of words, is for men, the most skilled in the different things, to enumerate the particular ideas wherein they agree as to the definition of these names. This is necessary inasmuch as the nature of the species of things is formed according to the complex ideas chosen by us, and not according to real essences in them. It is otherwise difficult to find out all the simple ideas which constitute the specific difference of things and to give the correct names. The last remedy against the equivocation of words that Locke advances is for men to define their own words, and so let those they would instruct know the meaning in which they are used. The odds are, in discussion, when this is done, the ζ xxxix )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

dispute will be found to relate to the signification of words and not to the nature of things. Furthermore, he thinks that logic and scholastic disputes have contributed much to the doubtfulness of words, since, like the wrangling philosopher of whom Lucian writes, the schoolmen sought applause for subtlety through the use of unintelligible terms. He discreetly omits in the printed work an allusion made here to the Church of Rome. Although the order in the presentation of thought may differ, yet the content, in the treatment of words, is throughout essentially similar, both in the draft and in the final text of the "Essay." §§ 89~89a. Locke says here that he regards as unavoidable this long digression about words from his original design to enquire into the knowledge the mind has of things as they are in themselves, inasmuch as, if names and things are not carefully distinguished, these general words will be taken for the constant marks of the notions of things when they are no more than the voluntary signs of our own ideas. In order better to perceive that all these general words are only the names of our ideas, he traces the way whereby these general names came at first to be made and (xl)

INTRODUCTION

applied.

The manner in which we enlarge our

complex ideas by leaving out properties contained in them is set forth possibly more lucidly in the draft than in the printed work. He seeks, moreover, to prove that the most general words, such as " t h i n g , " " b e i n g , " or " e n t i t y , " are only general appellations of particular ones got by our own experience or observation, and not by new notions or innate ideas. Unless, however, complex ideas have agreement with the truth of things, words are liable to imperfection according to certain rules which he summarizes. The collection of simple ideas combined to frame a complex idea, he says, should be full, distinct, as perfect as possible, and consistent. " A n d so much for words." §§ 9 0 - 9 4 ·

Locke now resumes in the draft

the discussion of the extent and certainty of knowledge, which is the main theme of his " E s s a y , " by summarizing the progress so far made concerning it in his enquiry. He states that it has been found: (i) that all simple ideas come into our understanding from sensation and reflection; (2) that all complex ideas of material things are aggregates of those simple ideas taken either by observation, report, or reflection; and (xli)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

(3) that to these complex ideas we give names, such as, we believe, other people give to like complex ideas. Furthermore,

concerning

the

certainty

of

knowledge we attain thereby, we do or may certainly know, he says, (1) T h a t the complex ideas are in our minds as clearly and distinctly as the simple ideas of which they are compounded. In brief, no idea whether simple or complex in any man's mind is a false idea; but if a man call it by a name that other people do not, it is improper speech. Ideas may be right or wrong, but truth and falsehood belong properly not to ideas but to propositions.

(2) We have certain knowledge

that some substances, that is, such collections of simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be combined, do really exist together.

But

this knowledge can extend only as far as the present testimony of our senses employed about particular objects does affect them. (3) We have certain knowledge of the past existence of those things whereof our memory still retains ideas.

the

But this knowledge also reaches no far-

ther than our senses.

What in particular has

here been learned concerning our knowledge of the external world Locke reproduces on the (xlii)

INTRODUCTION

tenth of J u l y , 1688, when he writes chapter eleven, " O f our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things," as part of the Fourth Book of the " E s s a y , " published in 1690. Besides the foregoing complex ideas of sensible substances which we have by collections of simple ideas received from our senses, we are able to frame the complex ideas of those beings we call spirits from the simple ideas of the operations of our minds. We do so, Locke says, in language later reproduced in the chapter " Of our Complex Idea of Substances," in the Second Book, by supposing each mental operation as thinking, willing, knowing, and power of voluntary motion, to be in a higher degree co-existent in some immediate substance. Moreover, our ideas of spiritual substances are as clear as those of bodily substances. J u s t as we know and have clear ideas of the two primary qualities of extension and cohesion in body, so likewise we have distinct ideas of the two primary qualities of thinking and power of voluntary action belonging to spirit.

I t is evi-

dent that the simple ideas that make up both of them are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection. Similarly, we shall find that our complex idea ( xliii )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

of God is made up of the simple ideas we received from sensation or reflection. The mind has the power to enlarge any of the ideas it has received and extend them without bounds. In this way the ideas of knowledge and power, with all other qualities which make up the complex idea of spirit, when enlarged to what we say to be the infinite, enable us to frame the best idea we have of a Supreme Being. Merely the possession of the idea of God in our minds does not suffice to prove his existence, any more than having the idea of spirits is evidence that things answering to those ideas do actually exist without us. But as it is certainly true that next to our own existence something without us exists to account for sensible effects, so likewise it is similarly evident that something does eternally exist without us, exceeding us in all those perfections He has bestowed upon us. Though we are capable of attaining a certain knowledge of the existence of Deity beyond the testimony of our senses, still the rise and foundation of that knowledge rests upon our senses and reflection. B y the things that are seen we come to know the invisible being. §§ 95-100. Heretofore in the draft Locke has treated of the extent of the knowledge we possess ( xliv )

INTRODUCTION of positive things, such as the operations of our minds, the o b j e c t s of our senses, and the substances wherein these are combined. In so doing he finds he has been compelled to include a m o n g positive ideas m a n y simple ideas w h i c h enter into the complex ideas of modes, as well as the a c t i v e and positive powers w h i c h form the g r e a t p a r t of the complex ideas of m o s t substances, and are indeed relative.

R e l a t i o n s , as he discovers, m a k e

u p b y far the greatest p a r t of our ideas, because there is not a n y idea in our m i n d which is n o t c a p a b l e of being compared in some w a y or other w i t h a n y other thing, and so c a p a b l e of relations.

T h i s leads him to discuss a t length the

notion of relation, the k n o w l e d g e whereof he believes of far greater

e x t e n t — and the words,

ideas, and propositions depending on it to be far more — than t h a t of positive things.

Concerning

relations in general, there are several things w h i c h m a y be considered: ( i ) T h e r e is no one thing, w h e t h e r simple idea or substance, m o d e , or relation, t h a t is n o t capable of an almost infinite n u m b e r of considerations in reference to other things; (2) the ideas w e h a v e of relations are c a p a b l e at least of being more perfect and dist i n c t than those of substances; (3) though there (xlv)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

may be a multitude of relations, yet they all terminate in those simple ideas of sensation or reflection; and (4) terms leading the mind beyond the subject, and so extrinsic to it, are relative words. This summary of our ideas of relations in general was left unchanged by Locke when later he dealt with the subject in the " E s s a y . " §§ 101-125.

In order to understand time and

eternity aright, it is necessary to consider what idea we have of duration, and how we came by it. The proof is here presented in the draft for the first time, and later reproduced in the text, that our notion of succession arises from reflection on the train of ideas in our own minds. It is the distance between any parts of their succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, that we call duration. The view of duration, as set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs, is that which is most properly called time. Time, in other words, is duration set out by measures. The mind having got the idea of duration, and therewith the proper significance of time, the next natural thing, as Locke states, for us to do, is to seek out the most reliable measure of the common duration of things. For such measure( xlvi)

INTRODUCTION

ment, the best guide is, moreover, the reflection on the number of ideas that have succeeded in our minds between any periods of duration, the length of which we would measure. It is in this way that mankind, having observed the constant revolutions of the sun, and presumed them equal one to another, has taken this standard as the most reliable measure of duration. The idea of eternity Locke derives by the same means and from the same origin as that of time. Having got the idea of succession and duration by reflecting on the train of our ideas, and having from the revolutions of the sun or otherwise got ideas of certain length of duration, we can in our thoughts add any such measures of duration to one another ad infinitum. To suppose a duration exceeding as many such periods as we can reckon, let us add whilst we will, is the notion we have of eternity. It is in the way of illustration in the measuring of duration that Locke here speaks in the draft of the duration of the world to "this present year 1 6 7 1 , " thereby determining afresh the date of its writing. Of the infinity of duration we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add forever without end. ζ xlvii )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

§§ 126-130. Locke has thus far dealt with the ideas we have of time, duration, and eternity, under Relations. He now proceeds to summarize the extent of our knowledge of them as so far gained. It is likewise to be remarked that these crucial reflections on the extent of our knowledge, as made at stated intervals in the draft, continued to be throughout the object of his enquiry, and were later to be brought together to form the Fourth Book of the " E s s a y . " From these two fountains of all knowledge, viz., sensation and reflection, we get the ideas of duration and of the measures of it. The idea of duration is derived from reflection on the succession of ideas in our own mind, and the measure of it is from observable equal periods or revolutions of sensible objects.

The idea of

eternity arises from the power of adding any number of such periods of which we have the idea, one to another, as often as we will, similarly with the infinity of numbers.

Of an actual in-

finite number we have no positive idea, as the infinity thereof lies only in the power, which the mind possesses, of making possible endless additions. No other ideas, apart from duration, extension, and potentially number, include finite ( xlviii )

INTRODUCTION

parts as essential to them, and consequently the ideas of them tend not to infinity. It is, therefore, only figuratively that we speak of power, wisdom, and goodness as the infinite attributes of Deity. Nevertheless, Locke adds, besides what our senses inform us concerning the time and duration of real things, we may have a certain knowledge that something has existed from eternity. §§ 1 3 1 - 1 4 0 . Having laid down the foregoing premises concerning certain general relations, Locke next proposes, in similar language of draft and text, to show how the idea of the most comprehensive of all relations, that of cause and effect, is also derived from sensation and reflection, and to discover what knowledge we have thereof. The beginning of any simple idea or substance by the operation of any other idea or substance, observed by our senses, gives us the idea of cause and effect. A cause is that which makes any other thing, either simple idea or substance, or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that which had its beginning from something besides and without itself. The notion of cause and effect being thus derived from our senses, there is next to consider, in pursuance of the design of this ( xlix )

LOCKE'S ESSAY

Essay, what knowledge we have of the existence and reality of things as thus related. First: In our knowledge of this relation, we are certain only of the existence of the cause of any effect as far as our senses inform us, but we do not know the manner whereby the effect is produced. We can hardly conceive the efficacy of causes to consist in anything but motion, but this is not at all necessary for framing the idea of the causal relation.

Second: When we certainly know that

anything produces such and such effects, the certainty of the knowledge is adequate to the information of our senses, but extends no further. We cannot make universal propositions concerning causes and effects, of whose truth we can be assured, beyond those powers which are included in the idea of the thing signified by that word in the verbal proposition. And this does not suffice for the knowledge of things existing without us. Though we can have no further knowledge of the connection of assigned causes and effects than what we attain by our senses, we have, Locke says, a certain knowledge of the truth of the universal proposition that nothing can begin to be without a cause, or, everything that hath a beginning hath a cause. The certainty of knowl-

CO

INTRODUCTION

edge of this, as of all other universal propositions, when not barely verbal, but relating to things without us really existing, is founded upon a supposition. T h e thing supposed is, that something does really exist which we can never know farther than our senses do inform us concerning the existence of things without; or than reflection informs us concerning the existence of the operation of our own minds within.

B u t the

existence of a n y o n e thing without us being made known by our senses, or the existence of ourselves being made known to us by reflection on our thought, it is not difficult to arrive at the certain knowledge of a first cause and an eternal being by applying our faculties to the consideration of causes and effects. §§ 141-144.

T h e next relation discussed by

Locke in the draft is the very common and comprehensive one of place.

This subject is after-

wards resumed by him in the text under simple modes of the idea of space. Place he regards as nothing but extension with relation to some other bodies or imaginary points that are at a certain determinate

distance from it.

How place is

thereby relative to particular bodies is illustrated, in similar language of draft and text, by a comCH)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

pany of chessmen on the squares of a chessboard in the cabin of a moving ship. We know anything to be in any determinate place only so far as we have the assurance of our senses.

But

supposing anything to exist, we cannot conceive it but to be in some place. §§ 145-155. The grand relations of time, place, and causality having been shown to depend on those simple ideas we have received from sensation or reflection, Locke proceeds to the enumeration of those particular relations which more immediately belong to men, and especially concerns their actions whereon morality depends. Though the notions of these seem most removed from sense, yet he believes it can be shown that they are also derived from those simple ideas we have received by sensation and reflection. Names are given to those relations according to the grounds and occasions which make several things be compared together. The names so bestowed are (1) proportional, (2) natural, (3) instituted or voluntary, (4) potential, and (5) moral.

From this

ranking of relations in the draft, only that of potential is omitted in the text, since it is there treated under another relation of cause and effect. Inasmuch too as the notions of the princi(Hi)

INTRODUCTION

pal relations here enumerated are founded upon those simple ideas received by sensation and reflection, it would not, as Locke believes, be a difficult matter to prove this to be equally true of all other sorts of relations. Locke here again reviews, in a summary, the extent of our knowledge, and states what ideas we have so far gained of relations. First: It is evident that all relations terminate in, and are ultimately founded on, those simple ideas we have received from sensation and reflection. Second: That in relations we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation as we have of those simple ideas whereon it is founded. Third: That in the so-called moral relations we have a true notion of the relation by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. This summary of the ideas which we have of general relations Locke reproduces verbatim at the close of chapter twentyeight, "Of Ideas of other Relations," in Book Two of the "Essay." In the draft, however, the order of treatment is reversed, and the discussion of relation ends with the particular ideas of moral relations. C IHi)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

§§ 156-162. There are two sorts of moral rules or laws of actions, Locke says, by which men judge of the rectitude of their conduct. In the first place, our notions of virtues and vices may be taken from the common consent and usages of the country to which we belong. In this case those actions are virtuous which tend to the preservation of society, and those are ill which dissolve its bonds. This is the knowledge, he adds, which is found in the ethics of the schools, and it begins at the contrary end to that which we have of things as really existing. Men in the latter instance first frame notions of virtues and vices, and afterwards judge their actions by standards of their own making. The law of moral action which Locke here calls that of virtue and vice in the draft, is termed the philosophical law in the first edition, and the law of opinion or reputation in the second edition, of his " E s s a y . " In the second place, there is another standard of our actions which is not of our own making, but depends upon rules set by a superior power. Here we have the declared will of a lawmaker. How the lawmaker has declared his will and law will be deferred, Locke says, till a fit occasion is given to speak of God and the law of nature. I t (liv)

INTRODUCTION

suffices for the purpose at hand to mention that the law being supposedly known, the relations of our actions to it, either of agreement or disagreement, are as easily and clearly known as any other relation. And whether the rules be taken from the fashion of the country or from the will of the lawmaker, they are none other than a collection of simple ideas. Since morality consists in the relation of voluntary actions to these rules, we perceive how moral beings and notions are founded on and terminate in those simple ideas we have received from sensation and reflection. And with this discussion of the standard of moral actions, Locke concludes the draft of the "Essay." T h a t Locke should have written so much and so well in pursuit of his enquiry as to the certainty and extent of human knowledge, and that subsequently he should find so little need of alteration in the substance of his doctrines in his " E s s a y , " will doubtless be a revelation to most students of his philosophy. I t may indeed lead to a revision of much that has been written concerning the growth of his masterpiece. Notwithstanding this undoubted agreement of draft and text of the " E s s a y " in much of their Civ)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

contents, it will be readily discovered from the preceding comparison of them, wherein arose the need of so many years, particularly "with intervals of neglect" before the " E s s a y " could have been given to the world in its present form. Frequent rewriting and the development of vital doctrines required much labor on his part. The very task of the rearrangement from the unbroken style of an essay to divisions of a book demanded years of time. The entire material of the draft, written as he says " by incoherent parcels," had to be entirely recast before the various topics could be turned into a less confused and incoherent discourse and be presented in books and chapters and sections of the finished treatise. Then too, Locke had to add, as he says, " w h a t was wanting to make my design intelligible." For the First Book of the "Essay," which was the least changed, the discussion of innate speculative principles was much enlarged. The various sections in each chapter were rewritten, where required, to improve his treatment of the theme. Locke, having controverted "established opinions " in a First Book, proceeded in the more important task of drawing upon the material of the draft in order to present in a Second Book what (Ivi)

INTRODUCTION

appeared to him to be the true history of human knowledge. All ideas come from sensation and reflection; but some of them are simple and some complex. The simple ideas he first dealt with in the order followed in the draft; but the subjectmatter he enlarged until it became eleven chapters. When dealing with substance in the draft, Locke says that ideas are in the mind, and qualities in bodies. He makes too the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, yet he nowhere develops this difference at the length he found necessary in writing the eighth chapter of the Second Book of the "Essay." He also in the draft was led to enquire what kind of knowledge we have of or by the simple ideas: the proper object of knowledge being truth, which lies in propositions. This likewise gave occasion with Locke for much future reflection. In the preparation of the Second Book, after discussing simple ideas, Locke enters upon the examination of complex ideas. These consist of modes, substances, and relations. Duration, extension, and number are discussed at much length in the draft. They become afterwards important chapters under Complex Ideas in the Second Book. In the draft he made here a long digres(lvii)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

sion to discourse on the connection between ideas and their verbal signs under words. He later reserved, however, its subject-matter for a third book in the " E s s a y . "

Henceforward in the

draft the topic of relations was kept in the foreground under the subjects of duration, place, and cause and effect. These subjects were afterwards developed in successive chapters of the Second Book. Locke, moreover, adds to them a chapter in the " E s s a y " on " O f Ideas of other Relations," including therewith moral relations, which he had fully treated in the draft of 1671. The Third Book of the completed treatise was discussed by Locke as a "digression" in the draft. Very much of the material on this subject as it appears in the draft was later reproduced verbatim in the final text. The difference between nominal and real essences in our ideas of substance received, however, much further thought during the preparation of the " E s s a y . " The subjects of the imperfection and abuse of words, with their remedies, which were much interrelated in the draft, had also to be completely recast to form the several chapters of the printed treatise. The Fourth Book of the " E s s a y " deals with the extent and validity of our knowledge as con( Iviii)

INTRODUCTION

versant only about our ideas. I t was the analysis of human knowledge which was the real purpose of Locke's enquiry. This aim he kept steadily in mind throughout the writing of the draft. Indeed the preceding review would seem largely to justify the surmise of scholars, as previously made, that in preparing this Discourse " t h e investigations proper to the Fourth Book were those which engaged Locke at the outset." (Locke's Essay, ed. A. C. Fräser, I, lvii.) At various intervals throughout the draft, Locke, as we have seen, would pause in the discussion of the successive themes to summarize therefrom the extent and certainty of our knowledge. Hence the summary on knowledge following his digression " o n words" in the draft may possibly have suggested a similar order for the Third and Fourth Books of the "Essay." These summaries of knowledge, scattered throughout the draft, were, it may be said in a general way, brought together by Locke to form the central theme of the Fourth Book of the "Essay." The subjects of knowledge in general and the degrees of knowledge, of truth in general and the certainty of universal propositions, were merely sketched in the draft, but afterwards as (lix)

LOCKE'S ESSAY

more fully treated they became the earlier chapters of the Fourth Book. On the other hand, our knowledge of the existence of God, and particularly the proofs of the existence of things without us, were topics so fully developed in the draft that it was only necessary to transfer the material for the chapters on similar subjects in the final text. The investigations of the nature of faith and probability by which assent is extended beyond knowledge are mostly subsequent to the enquiry of the draft. Locke had also to write on "Reason," and " Of Faith and Reason," doubtless during his retirement in Holland, to form the concluding chapters of the Fourth Book of the "Essay."

AN ESSAY C O N C E R N I N G

THE

UNDERSTANDING, KNOWLEDGE, O P I N I O N AND ASSENT

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION INNATE

by Benjamin Rand

xiii-lx

PRINCIPLES:

Worth while to enquire into our understanding. § ι . . . Enquiry into knowledge and opinion, to find in the variety of opinions there be any truth and the way to know it. § 2 Original of ideas, what knowledge by them and the certainty thereof, grounds of opinions and degrees of assent. §3

1$

16

18

No κοιναί evvoLou. Universal consent no proof. § 4 . . . No universal consent of practical principles. Whole nations without any notion of a Deity. The name of God universally received or not. No proof for or against His existence. The goodness of God never imprinted those ideas of Him which are to be found in men's minds. No God, no law of morality, which yet may be approved. Moral rules and conscience about them proves them not innate. § 5

ig

22

Self-preservation not generally observed. First principles not enumerated and set down. § 6

jj

If those principles may be effaced by education, then universal consent is gone, and those first principles are to no purpose. § 7

36

Contrary opinions received for principles. § 8

j>7

Because: 1 0 Taught young. § 9 2° All men must have some principles, but few have time or skill to examine them. 3 0 Tis believed that principles must not be examined. Criterion of principles. § 10

G)

j8

40

CONTENTS Impossible: No first principle, because no self-evident, nor prove any existence. § n N o reason to think God should implant in us principles either useless, or unevident, or various. Our attainment of truths or principles is by a right use of our faculties. § 12 First principles not found in savages, idiots, children; therefore, not innate. § 13

48

Reason not necessary to discover innate principles. § 14

51

Assent upon the first hearing of some propositions, proves them not innate. § 1 5 No innate principles in children, because no innate ideas; but all received from familiar objects. § 1 6 SIMPLE

^

45

jj 5