Administrative law : the laws of Australia 9780455238524, 0455238529

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA

Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited 19 Harris Street Pyrmont NSW 2009 Tel: (02) 8587 7000 Fax: 1300 304 196 [email protected] http://legal.thomsonreuters.com.au For all customer inquiries please ring 1300 304 195 (for calls within Australia only)

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA MARK ROBINSON SC BA, LLB (Hons) (Macq) Barrister, Supreme Court of New South Wales and High Court of Australia Barrister, Maurice Byers Chambers

Published in Sydney by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited ABN 64 058 914 668 19 Harris Street, Pyrmont, NSW 2009 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Robinson, Mark A. (Mark Anthony), editor. Administrative law : the laws of Australia / editor: Mark Robinson. ISBN: 9780455238524 (paperback). Includes bibliographical references and index. Administrative law – Australia. 342.9406 © Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited 2016 This publication is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. All legislative material herein is reproduced by permission but does not purport to be the official or authorised version. It is subject to Commonwealth of Australia copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) permits certain reproduction or publication of Commonwealth legislation. In particular, s 182A of the Act enables a complete copy to be made by or on behalf of a particular person. For reproduction or publication beyond that permitted by the Act, permission should be sought in writing. Requests should be submitted online at http://www.ag.gov.au/cca, faxed to (02) 6250 5989 or mailed to Commonwealth Copyright Administration, Copyright Law Branch, Attorney-General’s Department, Robert Garran Offices, National Circuit, Barton ACT 2600. Product Managers: Paul Gye, Thien Thu Luc Team Leader: Maki Watanabe Book Project Leader: Adam Dallas Legal Editors: Adam Dallas, Natasha Gould, Shannon Kelly, Ivy Ling, Ruth Moraes, Craig Ryan Senior Production Editor: Wade Macquine Production Editorial Services: Maximum Data Svcs Phils Inc Index: Puddingburn Publishing Services Pty Ltd Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW 2210

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Quick Reference Directory

2.1 Administrative Law System

Quick Reference Directory This quick reference directory helps identify the location of Subtitles within this book. For a complete User’s Guide, see p xiii. For a complete Table of Contents, see p xv. 2.3 Access to Information

2.7 Other Forms of Review and Appeal

vi

Foreword The Honourable Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE GBM I have much pleasure in writing this Foreword to Administrative Law: The Laws of Australia, a volume based on the original work in Thomson Reuters’ The Laws of Australia (TLA) encyclopaedia. As the title to the series suggests, TLA is in essence an Australian equivalent of Halsbury’s Laws of England, adopting a similar format. Wisely, however, the editor has resisted the temptation of following the example provided by Halsbury’s in stating propositions with a degree of certainty, yet qualifying that degree of certainty by reference to material contained in the footnotes. This book states the relevant qualifications in the text and consigns the footnotes to their primary role, that is, to serve as identifiers of the authorities and statutory provisions, which support the propositions and qualifications stated in the text. This book is comprehensive in its coverage. It deals with the administrative law in the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories. It consists of three broad subtitles, the “Administrative Law System”, “Access to Information” and “Other Forms of Review and Appeal”. The most extensive coverage in the present book relates to access to information, the jurisdiction and powers of the Ombudsman (federal and state), and statutory appeals. The discussion on “Access to Information” is both informative and comprehensive. Access to information is indispensable if our democratic government is to be effective. Dixon J was able to say in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 that the “counsels of the Crown are secret”.1 Since that comment was made, it has been recognised that the public should have greater access to information possessed by government and its agencies, subject to appropriate qualifications, even if this access falls far short of the media’s misleading mantra on “the public’s right to know”. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) was the forerunner of a series of Commonwealth, State and Territory statutes designed to secure greater provision of, or access to, information in the hands of government. Nevertheless, governments are resistant to the notion of providing information and will, on occasion, strenuously oppose the grant of applications for access. The detailed reasons given by Jagot J2 in Dreyfus v Attorney-General (Cth) (2015) 68 AAR 207; [2015] AATA 995 provide a striking and interesting example of government resistance. Access to information is, as already mentioned, essential to the effective working of our form of democratic government. In the absence of relevant and

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FOREWORD

accurate information, electors are not able to make informed choices. Brexit was an obvious and disturbing illustration. Availability of government information is also an antidote to corruption. Likewise, the discussion of the powers of the Ombudsman is both detailed and informative. For my part I doubt that the importance of Ombudsman review is sufficiently appreciated by the legal community. Even a casual reading of this subtitle will convey to the reader a strong impression of how instructive a review by the Ombudsman can be if it results in an adverse report concerning government action. For a lawyer, the detailed discussion of the jurisdiction and powers of the Ombudsman, along with the relevant procedures, is of even greater value. Similar comments can be made about the treatment of review by statutory tribunals. Among the many matters discussed are the status of government policy, procedural requirements, including cross-examination and its limits, evidence and the investigative powers of tribunals. Again, the discussion is instructive and extensive. There is a useful bibliography which references not only text books but also academic articles which throw light on particular topics and issues. This book will be a valuable source of information and learning to practitioners and lawyers generally. THE HONOURABLE SIR ANTHONY MASON AC KBE GBM Former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia September 2016

1 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, Dixon J at 179. 2 Confirmed by the Full Federal Court on appeal in Attorney-General (Cth) v Dreyfus [2016] FCAFC 119 (Besanko, Robertson and Griffiths JJ).

viii

Preface I am very pleased to present this book as both editor and an author. For 20 years (since 1997) I have undertaken my duties as Title Editor of the two-volume “Administrative Law” title of The Laws of Australia published by Thomson Reuters. In that time, I was an occasional author of some of the work as well. This book is derived from that excellent legal encyclopaedia. This book is a companion to Judicial Review – The Laws of Australia, published in 2014 by Thomson Reuters. In the practice of administrative law, judicial review (quashing executive or administrative decisions in the superior courts) is only part of the suite of available remedies and strategies able to be deployed when seeking to challenge administrative action. This book deals with the rest. It deals with everything in administrative law other than judicial review, including tribunal review of decisions (state and federal) and freedom of information (state and federal) and the important work of the Ombudsmen (state and federal) dealing with maladministration. In my 20 years as editor, together with the impressive staff of the The Laws of Australia, I managed to secure and sometimes maintain a formidable team of legal authors and updating authors comprising some of the best administrative law lawyers and academics in Australia today. The names and details of all the persons who worked as authors of this book are located inside. They each deserve significant credit for their good work. Particular mention must go to John Fitzgerald, a legal practitioner and author who worked tirelessly on the chapters of this book concerning tribunals, Ombudsmen and statutory appeals. In the chapter concerning freedom of information, titled “Access to Information”, the major reforms of 2009 at the state and federal levels meant that building on the work of previous authors was not feasible. John Fitzgerald started from scratch. Accordingly, “Access to Information” is his work and his alone (for the moment). It is an important and unique work and it includes a legal dissertation of statements of reasons issued (or not) by administrative decision-makers in Australia. This is a wide-ranging and practical book for legal practitioners, academics and students, covering administrative law at the state, territory and federal levels. It is a work of which I am very proud to have been a part. Administrative law is an expanding and constantly evolving area of law. Challenging administrative or executive decisions by way of independent external merits review tribunals, seeking freedom of information or seeking Ombudsman review is a significant part of everyday practice for many legal practitioners in Australia.

ix

PREFACE

The text of the book covers: • the administrative law system in Australia; • federal and state tribunals; • freedom of information (federal and state); • statements of reasons for administrative decisions; • statutory appeals; and • Ombudsmen (federal and state). I acknowledge the generous assistance given to me over the years by the authors and updating authors responsible for this work. It has been wonderful working with them and I have also learned something from their experience and professionalism. I thank Thomson Reuters for actively supporting and improving the work over my 20 years. The editors and senior staff of this publisher have always played that role very well, often with very hard work undertaken behind the scenes. I particularly wish to thank Maki Watanabe, Thu Luc, Catherine Fitzgerald, and Catherine Roberts for their active support in the creation of this book and for bringing it to completion. MARK ROBINSON SC Barrister, Maurice Byers Chambers

x

Acknowledgments Administrative Law – The Laws of Australia is also published in The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia as Title 2 Administrative Law. The publisher wishes to acknowledge the following: The Laws of Australia Current Editor-in-Chief The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG BA, LLM (Hons), BEc (Syd), Hon D Litt (Newcastle, Ulster, James Cook), Hon LLD (Macq, Syd, NLSU India, Buckingham, ANU, UNSW, Murdoch, Indiana, Melb, UTS, Bond, Colombo, Victoria, Deakin, Monash, Queen’s (Ontario)), Hon D Univ (UniSA, Southern Cross, Griffith, La Trobe, CQU), FIAMA, FAAL, Hon FASSA, Hon FAAH, Hon Bencher of the Inner Temple Former Justice of the High Court of Australia The Laws of Australia Founding Editor-in-Chief John A Riordan BA, LLB, Dip Law (Oxon) Barrister-at-Law Title 2 Administrative Law Title Editors Professor Denis Galligan LLB (Qld), BCL, MA (Oxon) Barrister-at-Law, Queensland; Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford; Director of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford (Title Editor 1992 – 1995) Mark A Robinson SC BA, LLB (Hons) (Macq) Barrister, Supreme Court of New South Wales and High Court of Australia; Barrister, Maurice Byers Chambers (Title Editor 1997 – present)

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xii

User’s Guide Background Administrative Law – The Laws of Australia is also published in The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia as Title 2 Administrative Law.

Style Each numbered paragraph of this book begins with a bold-text summary statement, which is then expanded upon in the rest of the paragraph. Each paragraph generally contains a legal principle and, where appropriate, identifies and references the key legislation and leading case law relevant to each Australian jurisdiction, that is, the Commonwealth, States and mainland Territories. These references are mostly found in the footnotes accompanying each numbered paragraph. Paragraphs are uniquely and sequentially numbered throughout the work, starting at [2.1.10] (meaning paragraph 10 of Subtitle 2.1). References in the Tables of Cases and Legislation, the Bibliography, the Index, and the Table of Words and Phrases are to paragraph numbers. Note that in The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia, paragraphs typically occur in gaps of 10: for example, [2.1.10], [2.1.20], [2.1.30]. In the encyclopaedia, this allows room for the insertion of additional commentary paragraphs between the gaps in future updates. Where such insertions have taken place, variations may therefore occur in the normal gapping sequence: for example, [2.3.1510], [2.3.1513], [2.3.1516], [2.3.1520], [2.3.1525], [2.3.1530], [2.3.1540]. This feature of The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia may occur at various points in this book. The main Table of Contents for the book refers to page numbers. A more detailed Table of Contents, referring to paragraph numbers, is provided at the beginning of the Subtitle.

Cross-referencing This book contains extensive cross-references to paragraphs within the book (eg “see [2.7.460]”), and also more widely to content from other Subtitles (or parts of Subtitles) of The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia (eg “Application of Limitation Acts” [5.10.260]–[5.10.320]). These and other references to material published throughout the 36 Titles of The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia (eg 2 Administrative Law) are used to guide you to related areas of law in the entire encyclopaedic work.

Currency Administrative Law – The Laws of Australia is current to 15 September 2016.

xiii

USER’S GUIDE

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xiv

Table of Contents Foreword ..................................................................................... Preface......................................................................................... Acknowledgments ........................................................................ User’s Guide ............................................................................... Table of Cases ............................................................................. Table of Legislation ....................................................................

Page vii ix xi xiii xvii lxxiii

2.1 Administrative Law System Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Administrative System in Its Legal and Constitutional Context ........................................................................................ Nature, Exercise and Control of Administrative Acts ...............

3 5 9 15

2.3 Access to Information Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Systematic Policy........................................................................ Statement of Reasons.................................................................. Right to Information ...................................................................

21 31 33 39 59

2.7 Other Forms of Review and Appeal Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Ombudsman................................................................................. Tribunals...................................................................................... Statutory Appeals ........................................................................

279 285 287 339 453

Bibliography................................................................................ Index ............................................................................................ Words and Phrases......................................................................

459 469 497

xv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvi

Table of Cases [References are to paragraph numbers]

0-9 3D Scaffolding Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 73 ATR 729; 49 AAR 100; [2008] FCA 1477............................ [2.7.1240], [2.7.1770]

A A v Pelekanakis (1999) 91 FCR 70; [1999] FCA 236........................... [2.1.140] A and Health Commission (Vic), Re (1985) 1 VAR 108...................... [2.3.2560] A and Heathcote Hospital, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 594 of 1993, June 1994)................................................................... [2.3.2080] A Medical Assessment Panel; Ex parte Hays, Re (unreported, WASCA, Wheeler J, 1289 of 1998, 5 October 1998)........................................[2.3.410] AAT Case 12,865 (1998) 39 ATR 1032.................................................[2.7.1850] Aavelaid v Dental Practice Board of Victoria [2002] VCAT 1376..... [2.7.1640] Abdul-Karim v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association [2005] NSWCA 93........................................................................................ [2.7.2100] Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; 73 ALJR 584; [1999] HCA 14................................................[2.1.140], [2.1.300], [2.7.1280] Abernathy v Deitz (1996) 39 NSWLR 701............................................. [2.3.410] Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322...................[2.3.700], [2.3.850], [2.3.2090], [2.3.2110], [2.3.2670], [2.3.2680] ACE v Director-General of Department of Education & Training [2011] NSWADTAP 23................................................................................. [2.7.1270] ACT Housing v KA [2003] ACTRTT 43............................................... [2.7.1030] ACT Medical Board v A Medical Practitioner [2009] ACAT 34.........[2.7.1690] Adamou and Director-General of Social Security, Re (1985) 3 AAR 321......................................................................................................[2.7.1400] Adams v Island Industries Pty Ltd (2007) 155 LGERA 280; [2007] NFSC 6............................................................................................................[2.3.410] Adams and Tax Agents’ Board, Re (1976) 1 ALD 251........................ [2.7.1070] ADG Engineers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Timuss [2015] QCATA 119............. [2.7.1010] ADI Ltd v Equal Opportunity Commission [2005] WASAT 49........... [2.7.1690] Adrenalin Sports Brisbane Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier Treasurer & Minister for

xvii

TABLE OF CASES

Sport [2003] QSC 184.........................................................................[2.3.450] Aerolink Air Services Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Re [2003] AATA 1357........................................................................................ [2.7.1580] Ainsworth v Ombudsman (1988) 17 NSWLR 276................................. [2.7.790] Al Hakim v Ombudsman (Vic) [2001] VCAT 1972.............................. [2.3.2220] Aldred and Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, Re (1989) 20 ALD 27........................................................................................................[2.3.2365] Alfaro v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2007] NSWSC 1035....................................................................................................[2.7.1300] Algoni Pty Ltd v Secretary of Department of Industrial Relations (1985) 3 NSWLR 515..................................................................................... [2.3.420] Alice Springs Town Council v Mpweteyerre Aboriginal Corp (1997) 139 FLR 236; 94 LGERA 330........................................................... [2.3.430] Alice Springs Town Council v Watts (1982) 50 LGRA 149...................[2.7.790] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167; 75 ALJR 1551; 33 AAR 557; 48 ATR 253; [2001] HCA 58........................ [2.7.960], [2.7.1450] Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; 74 ALJR 1206; [2000] HCA 40..................................................................................[2.7.1050] Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Aust) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250....................................................................................... [2.7.1520] Altman and Family Court of Australia, Re (1992) 15 AAR 236.........[2.3.2365] Ambikapathy v Victorian Legal Aid [1999] VCAT 1361......................[2.7.1240] Andelman v Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2011) 54 AAR 273; [2011] FCA 299......................................................................................................[2.7.1860] Anderson and Australian Federal Police, Re (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414.......[2.3.1050], [2.3.2100], [2.3.2130], [2.3.2470], [2.3.2530], [2.3.2550] Anderson and Community Services Victoria, Re (unreported, VCAT, Galvin DP, 10th April 1992)......................................................................... [2.3.2220] Anderson and Offıce of Public Service Commissioner (Qld), Re (unreported, QICmr, Henry IC, 712 of 2005, 7 December 2006)........................[2.3.2350] Andrews and Australian Research Council, Re (2007) 44 AAR 407; [2007] AATA 1026........................................................................................ [2.3.2840] Angus Fire Armour Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1988) 19 FCR 477; 9 AAR 421.................................................................. [2.7.1480] Animal Liberation v Conservator of Flora and Fauna [2009] ACAT 17.....................................................................................[2.7.1650], [2.7.1810] Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596; 65 ALJR 167........................ [2.7.540] Ansell v Wells (1982) 63 FLR 127........................................................ [2.7.1190] Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) [References are to paragraph numbers] xviii

TABLE OF CASES

48 ALR 500......................................................................................... [2.3.350] Anteden Pty Ltd v Glen Eira City Council (2000) 16 VAR 334; [2000] VSC 366......................................................................................................[2.7.1030] Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria; Ex parte State Public Services Federation, Re (1992) 175 CLR 442; 66 ALJR 817; 44 IR 382........................ [2.3.1330] Apache Energy Pty Ltd v National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (2012) 57 AAR 123; [2012] AATA 296......................................................................................................[2.3.1280] Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines & Petroleum (No 2) [2011] WASC 283........................................................................................... [2.3.890] Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines & Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167...................................................[2.3.890], [2.3.2840], [2.3.2850] Appellants v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (2011) 252 FLR 209; [2011] ACTSC 133......................................... [2.7.940] Applicant and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship, Re [2010] AATA 422......................................................................................................[2.7.1690] Archer and George Town Council (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 1008247 and 1010166 of 2011, 27 January 2011).................................................................................................. [2.3.2340] ARM Construction Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1986) 10 FCR 197; 17 ATR 459................................................................... [2.3.350] Arnold v Queensland (1987) AAR 463.................................................[2.3.1670] Arulogun v Queensland Health [2011] QCAT 573............[2.7.1530], [2.7.1860] Ascic v Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALN N184................... [2.3.2000], [2.3.2010] ASD v Offıce of the Information Commissioner Chief Executive, Offıce of Liquor and Gaming Regulation [2013] QCATA 281....[2.3.2180], [2.3.2210] Asher, Re v Department of Infrastructure (2006) 25 VAR 143; [2006] VCAT 1375....................................................................................................[2.3.1740] Asher v Department of Innovation, Industry & Regional Development [2005] VCAT 2702..................................................................... [2.3.2690], [2.3.2700] Asher v WorkCover Authority (Vic) [2002] VCAT 369..... [2.3.1390], [2.3.2700] Askew and City of Gosnells, Re [2003] WAICmr 19........................... [2.3.2320] Aslimoski v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2001] ACTAAT 28........................................................................................................[2.7.1080] Astone v TAC [1998] VICCAT 666....................................................... [2.7.1200] AT, Re [2010] QCATA 14...................................................................... [2.7.1200] AT v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 131.................[2.7.1290], [2.7.2000] Atkins v Police (Vic) (1994) 51 FoI Review 31a..................................[2.3.3060] [References are to paragraph numbers] xix

TABLE OF CASES

Atkins v Police (Vic) (1999) 82 FoI Review 64....................................[2.3.3040] Atkinson and Public Transport Commission (Vic), Re (1992) 5 VAR 255......................................................................................................[2.3.2520] Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; 64 ALJR 327; 33 IR 263........................................................................................................[2.1.150] Attorney-General (Cth) v Dreyfus [2016] FCAFC 119...............[FOREWARD], [2.3.2930] Attorney-General (NSW) v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 729................................................................................... [2.3.320] Attorney-General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 557; [2005] NSWCA 261............................................................................ [2.7.930] Attorney-General (Qld) v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350; [2000] QCA 222.......................................................................................[2.3.415], [2.3.420] Attorney-General (Tas) v Cameron (2007) 152 LGERA 45; [2007] TASSC 22..........................................................................................................[2.3.410] Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86.................................................................. [2.3.750], [2.3.2250] Attorney-General (Vic) v The Warehouse Group (Aust) Pty Ltd (2002) 19 VAR 111; [2002] VSCA 76..........................................................................[2.7.930] Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180.........[2.3.890], [2.3.1670], [2.3.2080], [2.3.2690] Attudawage v Medical Board of Australia (No 2) [2011] QCAT 452......................................................................................................[2.7.1770] Aunela and Telstra Corp Ltd, Re (2007) 45 AAR 416; [2007] AATA 1392....................................................................................................[2.7.1200] Aussie Invest Corp Pty Ltd, Re v Hobsons Bay City Council (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188....................................................................[2.7.1660] Austech Institute for Further Education Pty Ltd v Vocational Education Training Accreditation Board [2009] NSWADT 6...........................[2.7.1640] Australian and Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, The (2006) 43 AAR 505; [2006] AATA 755....[2.3.1340], [2.3.1350] Australian Broadcasting Commission and Police (TAS), Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 709005 of 2007, 23 May 2008)...............[2.3.2490] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Herald & Weekly Times Pty Ltd [2012] AATA 914.............................................................................. [2.3.1430] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; 64 ALJR 462; 5 BR 137.............................................................................[2.1.300], [2.7.970] Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1....................................................................[FOREWARD], [2.3.10] Australian Doctors’ Fund Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 49 FCR 478; 19 AAR 343........................................................................................................[2.3.860] [References are to paragraph numbers] xx

TABLE OF CASES

Australian Fisheries Management Authority v PW Adams Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 314; 22 AAR 261................................................................ [2.7.2020] Australian Medical Association Ltd and Health Department of Western Australia, Re [1999] WAICmr 7.................................... [2.3.1910], [2.3.1970] Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320; 10 AAR 303...................................................................................[2.7.1200], [2.7.1240] Australian Postal Corp v Bessey [2001] FCA 266............................... [2.7.1020] Australian Postal Corp v Forgie (2003) 130 FCR 279; 38 AAR 63; [2003] FCAFC 223..........................................................................................[2.7.970] Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v VBN [2005] FCA 1868....................................................................................................[2.7.1560] Australian Securities Commission v Somerville (1994) 51 FCR 38...... [2.3.360] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 181 FCR 130; 51 AAR 244; [2009] FCAFC 185...................................................................................[2.7.1670], [2.7.1690] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559; 75 ALJR 363; [2001] HCA 1........[2.1.140], [2.7.940] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v PTLZ (2008) 48 AAR 559; [2008] FCAFC 164...........................................................[2.7.940], [2.7.1670] Australian Technical College (Northern Tasmania) Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L45008/06 of 2009, 15 January 2009).....................................................................................[2.7.2250] Australian Trade Commission v F & F Asia Pty Ltd (1996) 69 FCR 252........................................................................................[2.7.1130] Avery v Registry of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2008] NSWADTAP 68........................................................................................................[2.7.1100] Avery and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (2009) 77 ATR 551; [2009] AATA 559.......................................................................................... [2.3.3030] Avilion Group Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 56................................................................................. [2.7.1740] AVS Group Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2012] NSWADT 1........................................................................................[2.7.1100] AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2010) 78 NSWLR 302; [2010] NSWCA 81............................ [2.7.1530], [2.7.1640] Ayton and Police Force (WA), Re [1999] WAICmr 8.......................... [2.3.1980]

B B and Armadale Health Service, Re [2007] WAICmr 4.......................[2.3.3130] B and Brisbane North Regional Health Authority, Re (1994) 1 QAR 279......................................................................................................[2.3.2300] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxi

TABLE OF CASES

B and Medical Board (ACT), Re (1994) 33 ALD 295......................... [2.3.2000] B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 5) [2010] NSWADTAP 21................................................................................. [2.7.1550] B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 74 NSWLR 481; [2008] NSWCA 187.......................... [2.7.1150], [2.7.2070] B Marsh Nominees Pty Ltd v Moonee Valley City [2004] VSC 237..... [2.3.415] Bahadori v Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 44; [2008] NSWCA 150........................................................................................ [2.7.960] Bailey v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1977) 136 CLR 214; 51 ALJR 429; 7 ATR 251............................................................................................[2.3.310] Baini and Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Re [2012] AATA 440......................................................................................................[2.7.1700] Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; 57 ALJR 749; 14 ATR 713... [2.1.290], [2.3.2350] Bannan; Ex parte Suleski, Re [2001] WASCA 289................................[2.3.410] Barbon v West Homes Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 405................. [2.7.1200], [2.7.1580] Bare v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission (Vic) [2015] VSCA 197............................................................................................[2.3.880] Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18; [1953] 2 WLR 995.......................................................................................... [2.1.290] Barndon and Police Force (WA), Re [2006] WAICmr 13....................[2.3.2010] Barnes and Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (Vic), Re (1985) 1 VAR 16........................................................................................................[2.3.2100] Barnett v Gulf Industries Pty Ltd [1999] TASSC 4................................[2.3.430] Barrett v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2014] NSWCATAD 31....... [2.3.920] Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953............................ [2.7.1040] Bausch v Transport Accident Commission (1996) 11 VAR 117...........[2.7.1400] BDH Projects v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2010] ACAT 37.....................................................................................[2.7.1070], [2.7.1540] BDK v Department of Education and Communities [2015] NSWCATAP 129......................................................................................................[2.7.1210] Beaton v Psychologists Board of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 223.....................................................................................[2.7.940], [2.7.1290] Beauchamp v Department of Education [2006] VCAT 1653..............[2.3.1050], [2.3.2480] Beckner v Minister of Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 49......................................................................................... [2.7.1230] Bee v An Assessor under s 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act [2015] NTCAT 2........................................................................................... [2.7.1060] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxii

TABLE OF CASES

Beer v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAD 23.....................[2.7.1670] Bell v Transport Accident Commission [1998] 3 VR 288.................... [2.7.1000] Bennett v Building Professionals Board [2011] NSWADT 111........... [2.7.1430] Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2003) 77 ALD 375; [2003] FCA 53.................................................................[2.3.2350] Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 40 AAR 118; 57 ATR 52; [2004] FCAFC 237...... [2.3.2980], [2.7.970] Bennett v Director General of National Parks & Wildlife Service [2000] NSWADT 136....................................................................................[2.3.1780] Benson v Ware [2012] QCATA 24.........................................................[2.7.1500] Beringer Blass Wine Estates Ltd v Geographical Indications Committee (2002) 125 FCR 155; 36 AAR 98; [2002] FCAFC 295....................[2.3.415] Berryman v Department of Education (Vic) (unreported, VCAT, Macnamara DP, 45123 of 1998, 4 February 1999)..............................................[2.3.2220] Better Homes Queensland Pty Ltd v O’Reilly [2012] QCATA 37...... [2.7.1920], [2.7.2000] BGC (Aust) Pty Ltd v Fremantle Port Authority (2003) 28 WAR 187; [2003] WASCA 250....................................................................[2.3.2300], [2.3.3200] BHP Billiton Ltd v NSW Department of Primary Industries [2010] NSWADT 8..........................................................................................................[2.7.1520] BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; 79 ALJR 348; [2004] HCA 61..................................................................................[2.7.1080] Bignell v New South Wales Casino Control Authority [2001] NSWADTAP 41........................................................................................................[2.7.1520] Birnbauer & Davies v Inner & Eastern Health Care Network [1999] VCAT 1363....................................................................................................[2.3.1870] Birney and Attorney-General (WA), Re [2002] WAICmr 22................[2.3.2820] Birrell v Department of State & Regional Development [2001] VCAT 50........................................................................................................[2.3.1560] Birrell v Victorian Economic Development Corp (1989) 3 VAR 358...................................................................................[2.3.1040], [2.3.2860] BKE v Offıce of Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523..................[2.7.1810] BL v Offıce of the Information Commissioner, Department of Communities [2012] QCATA 149............................................................................[2.3.2180] Bleicher v Australian Capital Territory Health Authority (1990) 24 FCR 497; 12 AAR 246.......................................................................................[2.3.2520] Bleicher v Australian Capital Territory Health Authority (1991) 101 ALR 17.................................................................... [2.3.2990], [2.3.3080] Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland v Lennox [2010] QCAT [References are to paragraph numbers] xxiii

TABLE OF CASES

702......................................................................................................[2.7.1580] Body Corporate Strata Plan No 4166 v Stirling Properties Ltd (No 2) [1984] VR 903; (1984) 56 LGRA 227...............................................[2.3.440] Boehm and Commonwealth Ombudsman, Re (1985) 8 ALN N29.........[2.7.770] Boehm and Ombudsman (Cth), Re (1985) 8 ALN N29....................... [2.3.2000] Bojkovski & Department of Social Security (unreported, AATA, Taylor M, 5354 of 1989, 25 August 1989)........................................................ [2.3.2100] Booth v Dillon (No 1) [1976] VR 291................................... [2.7.300], [2.7.310] Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434.................. [2.7.290], [2.7.300], [2.7.790] Booth v Dillon (No 3) [1977] VR 143.................................................... [2.7.220] Bowden v An Assessor under s 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act [2015] NTCAT 5............................................................................... [2.7.1020] Boyd v Ombudsman [1983] 1 NSWLR 620............................................[2.7.730] BR v Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal [2009] VSC 152.............. [2.7.1920] Brackenreg v Comcare [2005] AATA 88.............................................. [2.7.1720] Bradto Pty Ltd v Victoria [2007] VSC 106.......................................... [2.7.1240] Bray v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corp (1994) 62 SASR 218..................................................................................... [2.3.2300] Bread Manufacturers (NSW) v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404; 56 ALJR 89..........................................................................................[2.1.290] Brennan and Law Society (ACT), Re (1984) 1 AAR 529................... [2.3.1330], [2.3.1350] Brennan and Law Society (ACT) (No 2), Re (1985) 8 ALD 10...........[2.3.2000] Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW), Re (1978) 1 ALD 167......................................................................................... [2.7.1070] Brighthope v Police (Vic) (unreported, VicAAT, Macnamara MF, 15666 of 1995, 13 October 1995).............................. [2.3.2090], [2.3.2130], [2.3.2160] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336..................................... [2.7.1810] Brisbane Airport Corp Ltd v Wright (2002) 120 FCR 157; 35 AAR 192; [2002] FCA 359.................................................................................[2.7.1450] Brisbane City Council v Albietz [2001] QSC 160................................ [2.3.1330] Briscoe-Hough v Filipopoulos [2004] NSWADT 217..........................[2.7.1860] Bristol Custodians Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADTAP 44................................................................................. [2.7.1560] British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing [2011] FCAFC 107........................................................[2.3.2340] British Columbia Development Corp v British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] 2 SCR 447; 14 DLR (4th) 129........ [2.7.180], [2.7.260], [2.7.340], [2.7.470] Bronzewing Ammunition Pty Ltd v Safework NSW [2015] NSWSC [References are to paragraph numbers] xxiv

TABLE OF CASES

1494....................................................................................................[2.7.2050] Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 118; [1999] FCA 563......................................................................................................[2.7.1500] Brown and Police Force (WA), Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 2295 of 1995, 14 July 1995)...................................................... [2.3.2860] Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67.............................................................. [2.7.1240] Bryant v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [No 2] (1993) 26 ATR 541......................................................................................................[2.3.2980] Brygel, Re v Department of Justice (1997) 70 FoI Review 60............[2.3.2120] Buckley v Bennett Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1; 52 ALJR 505......................................................................................[2.7.1260] Buffıer v Bowen (1972) 32 A Crim R 214.............................................. [2.7.270] Buhagiar and Police (Vic), Re (1989) 2 VAR 530........... [2.3.3030], [2.3.3050], [2.3.3090], [2.3.3120], [2.3.3130], [2.3.3140] Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616; 51 ALJR 260.............................................................[2.7.1040] Burgess v Umina Park Home for the Aged (1993) 2 Tas R 246........... [2.3.415] Burkala and City of Belmont, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94089 of 1993, 25 August 1994)...................................................... [2.3.2820] Burswood Management Ltd v Attorney-General (Cth) (1990) 23 FCR 144......................................................................................... [2.3.360] Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1991) 175 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 753......................................................................................[2.7.1400]

C C v W [2015] NSWSC 1774..................................................................[2.7.1960] C and Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Community Development, Re [2007] WASAT 116........................................................ [2.7.1310], [2.7.1710] C and Department for Community Development, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1894 of 1994, 12 October 1994)..................[2.3.2160] Cairns Port Authority and Department of Lands, Re (1994) 1 QAR 663........................................................................................................[2.3.850] Calypso Fisheries Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of Department of Employment, Economic Development & Innovation [2011] QCATA 24...............[2.7.1980] Campagnolo v Benalla & District Football League Inc [2009] VSC 228......................................................................................................[2.7.1860] Campbell v Port Phillip City Council [1999] VCAT 128.................... [2.7.1830] Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; 4 DDCR 526; [2006] NSWCA 284.......................................... [2.3.320], [2.3.410], [2.3.430] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxv

TABLE OF CASES

Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd, Re (1994) 1 QAR 491..........................[2.3.2650], [2.3.2660], [2.3.2670], [2.3.2680], [2.3.2820] Capricornia Credit Union Ltd v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2007] FCAFC 112.......................................................[2.7.1650] Cardillo v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 574......................................................................................................[2.7.1490] Carey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 145 ALD 236; [2014] AATA 762.......................................................................................... [2.7.1860] Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd, Re (2006) 32 WAR 501; [2006] WASCA 219.................................................[2.7.1700], [2.7.1920], [2.7.2036] Carter v Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] 1 Qd R 111; (2013) 234 A Crim R 211; [2013] QCA 140..........................................................................[2.3.380] Carter and Department of Health (ACT), Re (unreported, ACTAAT, Curtis P, 87 of 1994, 23 January 1995).............................................................[2.3.850] Cawley v Casey (2007) 59 AILR 300-121; [2007] QSC 5.................... [2.3.430] Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442............................... [2.3.890], [2.3.2080] Cerednic v Freeman [2011] QCATA 25.............................[2.7.1740], [2.7.1780] CGU Insurance Ltd v Porthouse (2008) 235 CLR 103; 82 ALJR 1135; [2008] HCA 30....................................................................................[2.3.890] Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163........... [2.7.300], [2.7.330], [2.7.540], [2.7.550], [2.7.630], [2.7.650] Chan Cuong Su v Public Guardian [2014] NSWCATAP 32............... [2.7.1280] Chand v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 131......................................................................................................[2.7.1410] Chand v Azurra Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 227.......[2.7.1230], [2.7.1830] Chand v Rail Corp of New South Wales (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 27........................................................................................................[2.7.1930] Chand v Rail Corp of New South Wales (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 11........................................................................................................[2.7.1690] Chand v RailCorp [2011] NSWCA 79..................................................[2.7.1100] Chandra v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCA 335...................................................................................[2.7.1210], [2.7.1290] Chandra and Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, Re (1984) 6 ALN N257...................................................................................................[2.3.2490] Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis (2001) 25 WAR 147; 167 FLR 79; [2001] WASCA 405........ [2.3.1330], [2.3.1340], [2.3.1350] Chapman v Wilson [2011] QCAT 400...................................................[2.7.1520] Chapman and Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Re [References are to paragraph numbers] xxvi

TABLE OF CASES

(1996) 43 ALD 139........................................................................... [2.3.1900] Charnley Glen Pty Ltd v Boroondara City Council (2000) 17 VAR 178; [2000] VSC 340.................................................................................[2.7.1030] Chemical Trustee Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [2013] AATA 623......................................................................................................[2.3.1615] Chemists’ Dispute Case (Commonwealth v Pharmacy Guild of Australia) (1989) 91 ALR 65............................................................................... [2.3.350] Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Pacific General Securities Ltd (No 2) (2005) 63 ATR 127; [2005] NSWADTAP 54................ [2.7.1110], [2.7.1120] Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Child Protection v Hardingham [2011] WASCA 262...........................................................................[2.7.2070] Chief Psychiatrist and A, Re [2011] ACAT 21................. [2.7.1240], [2.7.1260], [2.7.1310], [2.7.1780] Chiropractors Association of Australia (SA) v WorkCover Corp (SA) (1999) 75 SASR 374; [1999] SASC 470....................................................... [2.3.310] Chowdhary v Bayne (1999) 29 AAR 100; [1999] FCA 41..................[2.7.2020] Christian Youth Camps Ltd v Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd [2014] VSCA 75............................................................................................[2.3.2460] Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal (2010) 53 AAR 166; [2010] FCA 1146........................................................................[2.7.1250], [2.7.1930] Christie and Queensland Development Corp, Re (1993) 1 QAR 1.......[2.3.870] Chu v Telstra Corp Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 505; 42 AAR 100; [2005] FCA 1730....................................................................................................[2.3.2930] Churche v Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (2006) 153 FCR 373; 91 ALD 290; [2006] FCA 613............................................................[2.3.860] Churche v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 89; [2006] FCA 923............................................................ [2.3.360] Cianfrano v Director-General of Department of Commerce [2005] NSWADT 282...................................................................................[2.3.1680], [2.3.1700] Cianfrano v Director-General of New South Wales Treasury [2005] NSWADT 7..........................................................................................................[2.3.1740] Cianfrano v Director-General, Premier’s Department [2006] NSWADTAP 48........................................................................................................ [2.7.1110] City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Information Commissioner (Qld) [2010] QCATA 60.........................................................................[2.3.920], [2.3.1360] City of Unley v Warnecke (2004) 232 LSJS 432; [2004] SADC 48...[2.3.1050], [2.3.2470], [2.3.2490] City Parking Pty Ltd v City of Melbourne (1996) 10 VAR 170.......... [2.3.1870] Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Allan (2001) 114 FCR 14; 33 AAR 362; [2001] FCA 1064...............................................................................[2.7.1900] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd (2009) 179 FCR 554; 50 AAR 482; [2009] FCAFC 137............................[2.7.1920] Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Hotop (2005) 145 FCR 232; 41 AAR 192; [2005] FCA 1023...............................................................................[2.7.1640] Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Ovens (2011) 55 AAR 288; [2011] FCAFC 75........................................................................................................[2.7.1220] CKI Transmission Finance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Taxation Offıce (2011) 85 ATR 337; 55 AAR 493; [2011] AATA 654..................... [2.3.1280] Clark v Department of Treasury & Finance [2002] VCAT 1040........ [2.3.1670] Clarke v National Mutual Life Insurance Ltd (2007) 27 VAR 347; [2007] VSC 341...............................................................................................[2.3.430] Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee (2003) 131 FCR 28; 37 AAR 309; [2003] FCAFC 143...............[2.7.1150], [2.7.1170], [2.7.2070] Clements and Health Department of Western Australia, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95124 of 1994, 29 November 1995)............................................................................... [2.3.3040], [2.3.3060] Close and Australian National University, Re (1993) 31 ALD 597.... [2.3.3040] Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; 73 ALJR 1348; 99 IR 309; [2000] HCA 47..................................................................................[2.7.2240] Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Bass Coast Shire Council [2010] VCAT 1807....................................................................................................[2.7.1650] Cobaw Community Health Services v Christian Youth Camps Ltd [2010] VCAT 1613........................................................................................ [2.7.1810] Coe and Chief Minister’s Department, Re [2006] ACTAAT 8............ [2.3.1040] Coffey and Centrelink, Re [2003] AATA 633........................................[2.3.2350] Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261...................[2.3.850], [2.3.890], [2.3.1240], [2.3.1280], [2.3.2470], [2.3.2510] Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (No 2), Re (1990) 170 CLR 267; 64 ALJR 526; 33 IR 473........................................................................ [2.7.2240], [2.7.2270] Coleman and Director-General of Local Government Department of Pentland, Re (1985) 1 VAR 9............................................................................[2.3.2100] Collection Point Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2013) 212 FCR 184; 95 ATR 334; [2013] FCAFC 67...............................[2.3.2930] Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389; 71 ALJR 123; 24 AAR 282; 35 ATR 249................................................................ [2.3.1150] Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 338........................................................................................[2.7.1070] Collector of Customs, Tasmania, Re v Flinders Island Community Association (1985) 7 FCR 205............................................................................. [2.7.1780] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Collings Homes Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] NSWSC 567......................... [2.7.1780] Collins v Repatriation Commission (1980) 48 FLR 198........................[2.3.350] Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17........................... [2.7.1910], [2.7.1980] Comaz (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] VSC 294......................................................................................................[2.7.1300] Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522.......................................... [2.7.2080] Comcare v Fiedler (2001) 115 FCR 328; 34 AAR 237; [2001] FCA 1810.................................................................................[2.7.1080], [2.7.1760] Commission for Children and Young People v “AG” [2002] NSWSC 582........................................................................................................[2.7.940] Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576....................................................................................... [2.7.1270] Commissioner for Children & Young People v FGC [2011] QCATA 291......................................................................................................[2.7.1690] Commissioner for Children & Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111................................................................................... [2.7.1240], [2.7.1790] Commissioner for Children & Young People v Storrs [2011] QCATA 28.....................................................................................[2.7.1100], [2.7.1410] Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Australian Wine Consumers Co-op Society Ltd [2007] NSWADTAP 14........... [2.3.1460], [2.3.2220], [2.3.2230] Commissioner for Housing (ACT) v Key (2003) 191 FLR 8; [2003] ACTSC 101......................................................................[2.3.410], [2.3.420], [2.3.430] Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Samsonidis (2007) 158 FCR 276; [2007] FCAFC 54..................................................... [2.3.2240] Commissioner of Fair Trading v Lindfield [2004] NSWADTAP 28....[2.7.1080] Commissioner of Police v Deputy Ombudsman (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McInerney J, 30033 of 1990, 3 December 1990)............. [2.7.550], [2.7.790] Commissioner of Police v Sleiman (2011) 78 NSWLR 340; 249 FLR 242; [2011] NSWCA 21......................................................... [2.7.1080], [2.7.1310] Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Camilleri [2012] NSWADTAP 19....[2.3.890] Commissioner of Police (NSW) v District Court (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 606................................................................................. [2.3.2510] Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Fine [2014] NSWCATAP 24.........[2.7.1520], [2.7.1650] Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gray (2009) 74 NSWLR 1; [2009] NSWCA 49.....................................................................................[2.7.1150], [2.7.2030] Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Pang [2009] NSWADT 11............. [2.7.1090] Commissioner of Taxation, Re v Salenger (1988) 81 ALR 25.............[2.7.1020] Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 407....................................................................................... [2.3.1330] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxix

TABLE OF CASES

Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Brian Hatch Timber Co (Sales) Pty Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 111; 2 ATR 658.................................[2.3.310] Commonwealth v Beale (1993) 30 ALD 68..........................................[2.7.1900] Commonwealth v Dutton (2000) 102 FCR 168; [2000] FCA 1466..... [2.3.2350] Commonwealth v Hittich (1994) 53 FCR 152................... [2.3.1610], [2.3.1620] Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (Defence Papers Case) (1980) 147 CLR 39; 55 ALJR 45..................................................[2.3.750], [2.3.850] Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604......... [2.3.1680] Commonwealth v Pharmacy Guild of Australia (Chemists’ Dispute Case) (1989) 91 ALR 65............................................................................... [2.3.350] Compton v Deputy Commissioner Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 384......................................................................................................[2.7.1120] Comptroller-General of Customs v Members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1994) 123 ALR 140.......................................................... [2.7.1520] Conde and Queensland Police Service [2012] QICmr 51....................[2.3.2080] Connolly and Department of Finance, Re (1994) 34 ALD 655...........[2.3.2750] Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509...............................[2.3.1870] Cooke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1654...........[2.7.2270] Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 715.......................................................................................... [2.7.1520] Corbett and Australian Federal Police, Re (1986) 5 AAR 291......... [2.3.3060], [2.3.3150] Corporate GIS Consultants Pty Ltd & Douglas [2002] ACTAAT 49........................................................................................................[2.3.2300] Corporations & Securities Panel Case (Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills) (1991) 173 CLR 167; 66 ALJR 171...................................................[2.1.290] Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434; 7 AAR 187............................................... [2.3.2250], [2.3.2300] Corry v Skobla [2011] QCATA 101........................................................ [2.7.940] Corse and Ministry of Justice, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 6496 of 1996, 13 December 1996).............................................[2.3.2365] Costello and Secretary of Department of Transport, Re (1979) 2 ALD 934......................................................................................................[2.7.1070] Coulston v Offıcer of Public Prosecutions Victoria [2010] VCAT 1234....................................................................................................[2.7.1680] Coulton v Comcare [2001] FCA 1312.................................................. [2.7.1730] Council of Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 26........................................................... [2.7.1670] Courier Mail and Queensland Police Service, The [2013] QICmr 3..........................................................................................................[2.3.2080] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxx

TABLE OF CASES

Cox and Department of Defence, Re (1990) 20 ALD 499..................[2.3.3120], [2.3.3130], [2.3.3140] Coyle and Transport Accident Commission, Re (2001) 18 VAR 251......................................................................................................[2.7.1660] Crewdson v Central Sydney Area Health Service [2002] NSWCA 345......................................................................................................[2.3.2990] Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner [2010] QCAT 690...................................................................................[2.7.1710], [2.7.1900] Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner [2011] QCAT 161......................................................................................................[2.7.1650] Crime and Misconduct Commission v Deputy Commissioner Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 319..................................................... [2.7.1530] Crook v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2003] NSWSC 974......................................................................................................[2.7.1810] Crooks v Department of Natural Resources [1996] VICCAT 401.......[2.7.1090] Crowley and Director-General of Department for Planning & Infrastructure, Re [2006] WASAT 236......................................................................[2.7.1440] Cuddles Group Pty Ltd v Director General of Department for Community Development [2006] WASAT 114.....................................................[2.7.1640] Cumming and Metropolitan Health Service Board, Re [2000] WAICmr 7..........................................................................................................[2.3.2120] Cummins v Chief Executive of Department of Corrective Services [2005] QSC 202.......................................................................................[2.3.410], [2.3.460] Curlewis and City of Albany, Re [2011] WASAT 85............................[2.7.1430] Cutbush v Team Maree Property Service (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89...[2.7.1670] Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Leases Tribunal (Qld) [1996] 2 Qd R 462....................................................................................................[2.3.430]

D D’Adam v New South Wales Treasury [2014] NSWCATAD 68............ [2.3.920] DA v Deputy Commissioner [2011] QCATA 359.............. [2.7.1800], [2.7.1920] D’Adam v New South Wales Treasury [2015] NSWCATAP 61........... [2.3.1740] Dagli v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541; [2003] FCAFC 298..................................................... [2.3.450] Dale and Australian Federal Police, Re (1997) 47 ALD 417............. [2.3.2150] Dalla-Costa and Discrimination Commissioner, Re [1995] ACTAAT 126......................................................................................................[2.7.1060] Dalla-Riva v Department of Treasury & Finance (2005) 23 VAR 396; [2005] VCAT 2083........................................................................................ [2.3.2750] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1985) 16 ATR 292........................................................................................................[2.3.350] Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1985) 7 FCR 382; 16 ATR 736.......................................................................................[2.3.310], [2.3.350] Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1986) 160 CLR 246; 60 ALJR 333; 17 ATR 483................................................................. [2.3.350] Damorange Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority [2008] NSWADT 309......................................................................................................[2.7.1880] Danagher v Child Support Registrar (2014) 228 FCR 213; 65 AAR 122; [2014] FCA 1408............................................................[2.7.1500], [2.7.1700] Das and A & A Airconditionioning Pty Ltd, Re [2011] ACAT 52.......[2.7.1980] Davidson v Victorian Institute of Teaching (2006) 25 VAR 186; [2006] VSCA 193........................................................................................................[2.7.970] Davies v Transport Accident Commission [2000] VSC 379................ [2.7.2060] Davis v City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd (2012) 2 Qd R 103; [2011] QSC 285......................................................................................................[2.3.1360] Davis v Victoria Police [2008] VCAT 1343......................................... [2.7.1150] Day v Collector of Customs (1995) 57 FCR 176; 21 AAR 342..........[2.3.3230] Daycorp Pty Ltd v Parnell [2011] SADC 191.......................[2.3.850], [2.3.920] Daynes v Public Advocate (2005) 24 VAR 121; [2005] VSC 485..... [2.7.1230], [2.7.1790], [2.7.2090] De Domenico v Marshall (1999) 94 FCR 97; [1999] FCA 1305......... [2.3.430], [2.7.1710] Deacon v Australian Capital Territory [2001] ACTSC 8.................... [2.3.2310] Defence Papers Case (Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd) (1980) 147 CLR 39; 55 ALJR 45..................................................[2.3.750], [2.3.850] Dekanic and Tax Agents’ Board (NSW), Re (1982) 62 FLR 154; 13 ATR 569......................................................................................................[2.7.1640] Denton and Commissioner of Police (WA), Re [2009] WASAT 115... [2.7.1530] Department of Agriculture & Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836...................................................................................[2.3.2080] Department of Consumer & Employment Protection v Chequecash Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 18............................................................................... [2.7.2080] Department of Education & Training v Mullett (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 29........................................................................................................[2.7.1830] Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 8 FCR 85.......... [2.3.2090], [2.3.2160] Department of Housing & Works v Bowden [2005] WASC 123......... [2.3.2350] Department of Industrial Relations v Burchill (1991) 33 FCR 122; 14 AAR 408........................................................................................................[2.3.860] Department of Industrial Relations v Forrest (1990) 21 FCR 93; 11 AAR [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxii

TABLE OF CASES

256......................................................................................................[2.3.3230] Department of Justice v AY [2010] NSWADTAP 17............................[2.7.1660] Department of Premier & Cabinet v Birrell (No 2) [1990] VR 51..... [2.3.2210] Department of Premier & Cabinet (SA) v Thomas [2014] SADC 56... [2.3.820] Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544........[2.3.2000], [2.3.2500], [2.3.2520] Department of the Premier and Cabinet (SA) v Thomas [2014] SADC 56.....................................................................................[2.3.1910], [2.3.2150] Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Kennedy [2011] QCATA 254........... [2.7.1640] Deputy Premier and Minister for State Development, Infrastructure & Planning and Premier [2014] QICmr 41........................................... [2.3.890] Di Falco and Kingsborough Council, Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 803013 of 2008, 25 August 2008).................................................... [2.3.2510] Diamond and Chief Executive Offıcer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707..................[2.3.1670] Digwood v Forests (NSW) [2009] NSWADT 107................................ [2.3.3180] Dimatos v Coombe [2011] VSC 619.....................................................[2.7.1920] Dimitrijev v Department of Education [1998] QICmr 14.................... [2.3.2930] Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Australian Finance Direct Ltd [2004] ASC 155-064; [2004] VCAT 645..................................................... [2.7.1520] Director of Housing v Sudi (2011) 33 VR 559; [2011] VSCA 266.....[2.7.1070] Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6......................................................[2.3.850], [2.3.2500], [2.3.3200] Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 180.... [2.7.2060] Director-General of Social Services and Hales, Re (1983) 78 FLR 373..........................................................................................[2.7.970] Disley v Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 530....................... [2.7.1100] Dixon v Attorney-General (Cth) (1987) 15 FCR 338.............................[2.7.270] Dornan v Riordan (1990) 24 FCR 564.................................. [2.3.350], [2.3.440] Doyle v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSWADT 84........................ [2.7.1070] Doyle v Department of Human Services [2002] VCAT 176................ [2.3.1870] Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634......................................................................................................[2.7.1120] Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409..................................................[2.7.1060], [2.7.1120], [2.7.2070] Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088; [2003] HCA 26....................................................... [2.7.1290] Dreyfus v Attorney-General (Cth) (2015) 68 AAR 207; [2015] AATA 995........................................... [FOREWARD], [2.3.2790], [2.3.2830], [2.3.2930] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Druett v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2003] FCAFC 234............. [2.7.960] Drummond v Telstra Corp Ltd [2008] VCAT 2630..............................[2.7.1860] Dunbar and City of Stirling, Re [2006] WASAT 331.......................... [2.7.1800] Duncan v Chief Executive Offıcer of Centrelink (2008) 244 ALR 129; [2008] FCA 56...............................................................................................[2.3.2980] Duncan v Hoptop [2004] FCA 274....................................................... [2.7.2020] Duncan and Companies Auditors & Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Re (2009) 49 AAR 494; [2009] AATA 70............................................. [2.7.1760] Dunne/Barden and Department of Education & Training (ACT) [2007] ACTAAT 26.................................................................... [2.3.1900], [2.3.3210] Dunstan v Department of Corrective Services [2004] NSWADT 177......................................................................................................[2.3.2080] Dyrenfurth and Department of Social Security, Re (1987) 12 ALD 577...................................................................................[2.3.1980], [2.3.2000]

E Eastman and Department of Territories & Local Government, Re (1983) 5 ALD 182............................................................................. [2.3.640], [2.3.870] Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; 75 ALJR 277; [2000] HCA 63..................................................................................[2.7.1300] Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs, Re (1993) 1 QAR 60..................... [2.3.850], [2.3.860], [2.3.870], [2.3.1780], [2.3.1865], [2.3.1900] Edelsten and Australian Federal Police, Re (1985) 4 AAR 220.........[2.3.2100] Edgar v Department of Environment, Land & Planning [1993] ACTAAT 59........................................................................................................[2.7.1090] Edoo v Minister for Health (2010) 72 SR (WA) 16; [2010] WASAT 74........................................................................................................[2.7.1240] Education & Training, Director-General of Department of v Mullett (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 29....................................................................... [2.3.850] Education & Training, Director-General of Department of v Mullett [2002] NSWADTAP 13................................................................................... [2.3.890] Edwards v Giudice (1999) 94 FCR 561; [1999] FCA 1836.................. [2.3.320] Edwards and Electricity Corp t/as Western Power Corp, Re [1999] WAICmr 13.....................................................................................[2.3.2460], [2.3.2510] Ekermawi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2009] NSWSC 143......................................................................................................[2.7.1010] Ekermawi v Great Lakes Council [2010] NSWADT 35.........................[2.3.900] Environmental Defender’s Offıce WA (Inc) and Ministry for Planning, Re [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

[1999] WAICmr 35.........................................................[2.3.1680], [2.3.1740] Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326...................................................................................[2.7.1060], [2.7.1880] Esber v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 430; 66 ALJR 373; 15 AAR 249...................................................................................[2.7.1060], [2.7.1090] Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196........................................................................................ [2.7.1500] Evans v Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2012) 289 ALR 237; [2012] FCAFC 81..... [2.7.1100] Ex Parte Australian Sporting Club Ltd; Re Dash (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 63...........................................................................................[2.7.1040]

F Family & Community Services and AX03C, Re Secretary of Department of [2003] AATA 46................................................................................ [2.7.1690] Faulkner v Conwell (1989) 21 FCR 41.................................................. [2.3.450] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia & New Zealand Savings Bank Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 466; 69 ALJR 12; 29 ATR 11........................[2.7.2260] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614; 64 ALJR 166......................................................................................[2.7.2260] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pham (2013) 94 ATR 528; 60 AAR 264; [2013] FCA 579.................................................................................[2.7.1680] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Raptis (1989) 20 ATR 1262......[2.7.1130] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Seymour (2015) 65 AAR 443; [2015] FCA 320.............................................................................................[2.7.1740] Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570; 57 ALJR 317; 5 TPR 171...... [2.1.160] Fendley Consultancy Pty Ltd and Queensland Treasury and Trade [2013] QICmr 11........................................................................................... [2.3.2460] Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 407; [2000] FCA 324.......................................................... [2.7.1490] Field Deployment Solutions Pty Ltd v SC Projects Australia Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 60........................................................................................... [2.7.2040] Filonis v Transport Accident Commission [2003] VCAT 2038............[2.7.1550] Firestone and Legal Aid Offıce (ACT) [2006] ACTDT 3.....................[2.7.1860] Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (No 2) (2008) 253 ALR 52; [2008] FCAFC 200..............................................................................[2.3.880] Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188...............[2.3.850], [2.3.860], [2.3.1560], [2.3.1680], [2.3.1730], [2.3.1740], [2.3.3230] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Fitzgerald v Medical Board of Queensland [2010] QCAT 565.......... [2.7.1680], [2.7.1830] Fitzgibbon v Council of New South Wales Bar Association [2011] NSWCA 165......................................................................................................[2.7.2030] Fitzpatrick v Offıce of Liquor & Gaming (NSW) [2010] NSWADT 72........................................................................................................[2.3.2350] Flat Glass Industries Ltd v MCS Builders Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 148......................................................................................................[2.7.1830] Flegg v Hallet [2014] QSC 278.............................................................. [2.3.920] Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 442.... [2.7.1290] Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 38 FCR 137; 24 ATR 194......................................................................................................[2.7.1740] FMG Pilbara Pty Ltd and Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Re [2012] WASAT 31........................................................................................................[2.7.1520] Fong & Partners Pty Ltd and Shire of Roebourne, Re [2007] WAICmr 11.....................................................................................[2.3.2330], [2.3.2710] Ford v Child Support Registrar [2009] FCA 328.................................[2.3.2080] Ford and Child Support Registrar, Re (2005) 41 AAR 146; [2005] AATA 860......................................................................................................[2.3.3180] Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39..............................[2.3.850], [2.3.2570], [2.3.2680], [2.3.2690], [2.3.2720] Forrester v AIMS Corp (2004) 22 VAR 97; [2004] VSC 506............. [2.7.1860] Foster and Police (Vic), Re (1989) 3 VAR 110....................................[2.3.3140] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989; [2003] HCA 22... [2.7.1040], [2.7.1910] Fox and Queensland Police Service [2001] QICmr 1............................[2.3.860] Francis and Department of Defence, Re (2012) 59 AAR 35; [2012] AATA 838........................................................................................................[2.3.610] Francis-Wright v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2001) 17 VAR 306; [2001] VSC 35....................................................... [2.7.1170], [2.7.2033] Franks v Warringah Council (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 53................[2.3.2850] French v Sydney Turf Club Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWADTAP 54..........[2.7.1930] French v Sydney Turf Club Ltd [2002] NSWADT 24.......................... [2.7.1770] Frugtniet v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2005] NSWCA 257...................................................................................[2.7.1080], [2.7.1240] Frugtniet v Tax Practitioners Board (2013) 95 ATR 607; 60 AAR 515; [2013] FCA 752.............................................................................................[2.7.2060]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

G G v Health Commissioner (Vic) (unreported, VCC, Rendit J, 27 July 1984).................................................................................................. [2.3.3030] G v K [2007] WASC 319.......................................................................[2.7.1170] Gala v Fraser Coast Regional Council [2010] QCAT 576..................[2.7.1680] Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121.................................................... [2.1.290] Gallo v Duflou [2014] NSWCATAP 115.............................................. [2.7.1240] Ganchov and Comcare, Re (1990) 11 AAR 468; [1990] AATA 419...[2.7.1030] General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84.............. [2.3.700], [2.3.850], [2.3.860], [2.3.2220] General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125.................................................................. [2.7.1580], [2.7.1860] Geographe Point Pty Ltd and Town of Claremont, Re (2009) 64 SR (WA) 1; [2009] WASAT 98............................................................................. [2.7.2120] Geographical Indications Committee v O’Connor (2000) 32 AAR 169; [2000] FCA 1877...........................................................................................[2.7.2020] George v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 38.....................................................................................[2.3.460] George v Nisselle [2005] VSC 177......................................................... [2.3.430] Georgeson and Government Employees Superannuation Board (WA), Re [2013] WAICmr 10............................................................................[2.3.2790] Gersten v Australian Federal Police [2001] FCA 159.........................[2.3.1620] Gersten v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 61 ALD 445; [2000] FCA 1221...................................................................... [2.3.1620] Gibson and Repatriation Commission, Re [2006] AATA 1090............[2.7.1930] Giris v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1969) 119 CLR 365; 43 ALJR 99; 15 ATD 235; 1 ATR 3........................................................ [2.3.310], [2.3.350] Glenister v Dillon (No 2) [1977] VR 151...............................................[2.7.270] Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550.......[2.7.210], [2.7.230], [2.7.270], [2.7.460], [2.7.470] Glennan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 90 FCR 538.... [2.7.1130] Godenzi and City of Joondalup, Re [2007] WASAT 189.....................[2.7.1210] Gold and Australian Federal Police, Re (1994) 37 ALD 168............[2.3.2100], [2.3.2110] Gold Coast Bulletin and Department of Police [2010] QICmr 38...... [2.3.2130] Goldie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 383; 36 AAR 238; [2002] FCAFC 367................[2.7.1860] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Golem v Transport Accident Commission (No 1) (2002) 19 VAR 265; [2002] VCAT 319.......................................................................................... [2.7.1400] Gordon Resources Pty Ltd v Queensland [2012] QCATA 135............ [2.3.3250] Grant v Repatriation Commission (1999) 57 ALD 1........................... [2.7.1080] Grasso v CMG Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 306....... [2.7.1750] Greg Rowe & Associates and Minister for Planning, Re [2001] WAICmr 4..........................................................................................................[2.3.2650] Grove (Cootamundra) Pty Ltd v Landgrove Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 333....................................................................................... [2.3.310] Grover v Commissioner of Police [2005] WASC 263..........................[2.7.1780] Grubisic v General Manager of Burwood Council [2004] NSWADT 261......................................................................................................[2.3.2820] Guastalegname v Chevros Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 408............................ [2.7.1190] Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends Association and Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (Vic), Re (1988) 2 VAR 404..................................................[2.3.1040] Guse v Comcare (1997) 25 AAR 477................................................... [2.7.1860] Guy and Department of Transport, Re (1987) 12 ALD 358................ [2.3.1670] Guyt and Health Department of Western Australia, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1493 of 1993, 16 March 1994).................... [2.3.3180]

H H v Department Of Education [2015] WASC 276.............. [2.3.640], [2.3.2010] H (a pharmacist), Re [1972] Qd R 402................................................ [2.7.1040] H and Graylands Hospital, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 5096 of 1996, 6 December 1996).....................................................[2.3.2010] Habul v Mahoney [2011] QCATA 130..................................................[2.7.1300] Hafez and Valuer General, Re [2012] WASAT 103............................. [2.7.1800] Halliday and Corporate Affairs, Re (1991) 4 VAR 327.......................[2.3.2930] Hamilton v Transport Accident Commission [2001] VCAT 2027........[2.7.1530] Hancock v Executive Director Of Public Health [2008] WASC 224.... [2.3.320] Haneef and Australian Federal Police, Re [2009] AATA 51...............[2.3.1560] Hardingham v Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Child Protection [2011] WASC 86............................................................................... [2.7.2090] Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315; 66 AAR 403; [2015] FCAFC 92..............................................................................[2.7.2070] Harrigan v Department of Health (1986) 6 AAR 184......................... [2.3.2220] Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (No 2) (1983) 78 FLR 264 ............................................................................................................[2.3.1870] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236................ [2.3.700], [2.3.850], [2.3.1980], [2.3.2000], [2.3.2760], [2.3.2880] Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1984) 1 FCR 150................[2.3.1760], [2.3.1900] Harrison and Commissioner for Social Housing, Re [2012] ACAT 10........................................................................................................[2.7.1220] Hart and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (2002) 36 AAR 279; 51 ATR 1086; [2002] AATA 1190......................................................... [2.3.2750] Hartwig and City of Canning, Re [2008] WASAT 243........................[2.7.1490] Harvey v Mutsaers (2011) 181 LGERA 444; [2011] VSC 23............. [2.7.1070] Hassett and Law Society (Tas), Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 811070 of 2009, 28 May 2009).................... [2.3.2350] Hayes v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1996) 43 ALD 783......................................................................................................[2.3.2160] Health Department of Western Australia v Australian Medical Association Ltd [1999] WASCA 269...........................................................................[2.3.1910] Health Resorts of Australasia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission, Re [2007] WASAT 60.............................. [2.7.1070], [2.7.1080] Heaney and Public Service Board Telecommunications Commission, Re (1987) 13 ALD 1........................................................................................... [2.3.1970] Hearl and Mulgrave Shire Council, Re (1994) 1 QAR 557................ [2.3.2820] Heatley v Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487; 51 ALJR 703......................................................................................[2.7.1210] Hemsley and City of Subiaco, Re [2008] WAICmr 46.........................[2.3.2750] Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2006) 24 VAR 174; [2006] VSCA 7.............................. [2.7.940], [2.7.1170] Hideaway Cafe Bar Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of Offıce of Liquor & Gaming Regulation [2012] QCAT 46............................................................. [2.7.1640] Highway Construction Pty Ltd and State Supply Commission (WA), Re [2000] WAICmr 25........................................................................................[2.3.1700] Hill v Repatriation Commission [2005] FCAFC 23............................. [2.7.1010] Hillock and Aboriginal Development Commission, Re (unreported, AATA, Layton DP, 3296 of 1986, 16 March 1987)..................................... [2.3.3280] Hoare v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 56 ATR 1113; [2004] AATA 623.......................................................................................... [2.7.1020] Hobart Central Child Care Pty Ltd and Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Re (2004) 40 AAR 38; [2004] AATA 1222......................................[2.7.1350] Hobart City Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (Tas) (2007) 17 Tas R 137; [2007] TASSC 99................. [2.3.310], [2.3.415] Hockey v Yelland (1984) 157 CLR 124.................................................. [2.7.790] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxix

TABLE OF CASES

Hodgkin v Planet Platinum Ltd [2012] VCAT 576.............................. [2.7.2120] Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1992) 40 FCR 402; 15 AAR 429.................................................................. [2.7.960] Hopwood v Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee [2002] NSWADT 44........................................................................................................[2.7.1260] Horesh, Re v Ombudsman (1986) 1 VAR 149........................................[2.7.770] Hoser v Department of Sustainability & Environment [2012] VCAT 264......................................................................................................[2.7.1800] Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc v Minister for Health, Housing & Community Services (1992) 39 FCR 225; 16 AAR 566............. [2.7.1080] Hounslow v Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (unreported, FCA, Sweeney J, 84 of 1985, 20 December 1985)................................... [2.3.3280] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.............................. [2.7.2000], [2.7.2250] Household Financial Services Ltd v Commercial Tribunal of New South Wales (1995) 36 NSWLR 220....................................................................... [2.7.940] Howard and Treasurer of the Commonwealth, Re (1985) 7 ALD 626; 3 AAR 169..................................................................[2.3.850], [2.3.1520], [2.3.1910] Howell v Macquarie University [2008] NSWCA 26.......... [2.3.850], [2.7.1920], [2.7.2000] Hudson and Department of Premier, Economic & Trade Development, Re (1993) 1 QAR 123.........................................[2.3.860], [2.3.1680], [2.3.1700] Hulls and Victorian Casino & Gaming Authority, Re (1997) 12 VAR 483.....................................................................................[2.3.850], [2.3.1910] Hunnam v Evans (2003) 129 LGERA 106; [2003] VSC 284................[2.3.430] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344..... [2.7.1500], [2.7.2060] Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241; 48 AAR 304; [2008] FCAFC 128............................................................................[2.7.1150]

I Ideal Constructors Pty Ltd v Wikeepa [2015] NSWCATAP 131......... [2.7.1290] Ikosidekas v Karkanis [2015] VSCA 121............................................. [2.7.1300] Illawarra Retirement Trust v Secretary of Department of Health & Ageing (2005) 143 FCR 461; [2005] FCA 170............................................ [2.3.2240] IM v Adult Guardian [2011] QCATA 114.............................................[2.7.1220] Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002, Re Minister for (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; [2003] HCA 60.......................[2.7.1240] Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham, Re Minister for (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1........................................... [2.3.410] [References are to paragraph numbers] xl

TABLE OF CASES

Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam, Re Minister for (2003) 214 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 699; [2003] HCA 6.........................................[2.1.140] Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah, Re Minister for (2001) 206 CLR 57; 75 ALJR 889; [2001] HCA 22................[2.7.1160], [2.7.1270] Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme, Re Minister for (2003) 216 CLR 212; 77 ALJR 1829; [2003] HCA 56.................................[2.3.410], [2.3.420], [2.3.430], [2.3.440] Independent Cement & Lime Pty Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2000) VAR 290; [2000] VSC 355....................................[2.7.1520] Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) v Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADTAP 79.............................................................. [2.3.2710] Information Commissioner (WA) v Ministry of Justice [2001] WASC 3..........................................................................................................[2.3.1040] Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334; 43 ALJR 330........................................................................................[2.1.140] Ionescu v John Blair Motor Sales [2011] VCAT 706.......................... [2.7.1690] Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54....... [2.3.700], [2.3.850], [2.3.870], [2.3.920], [2.3.1480], [2.3.1910] Islam v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2009) 51 AAR 147; [2009] FCA 1526...........................................................................................[2.7.1300] ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council (2008) 20 VR 447; 162 LGERA 59; [2008] VSCA 180.............................................................................. [2.7.1260] ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council [2006] VCAT 1304.............. [2.7.1770] Italiano v Carbone [2005] NSWCA 177........ [2.7.1220], [2.7.1280], [2.7.1510] Iwasaki Sangyo Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Department of Environment & Resource Management [2011] QCAT 710........................................................[2.7.1850]

J Jacobs and Department of Defence, Re (1988) 15 ALD 645.............. [2.3.3150] Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 225 FCR 482; [2014] FCAFC 123............. [2.7.1250], [2.7.1770], [2.7.2100] James v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences [2010] QCAT 231...................................................................................[2.7.1800], [2.7.1830] James and Australian National University, Re (1984) 2 AAR 327..... [2.3.1990] James and Sayers, Re [2006] WASAT 332...........................................[2.7.1690] Jeffries v Police (SA) (2003) 225 LSJS 186; [2003] SADC 2............ [2.3.3040], [2.3.3140] Jephcott and Secretary of Department of Health, Re (1985) 7 ALD [References are to paragraph numbers] xli

TABLE OF CASES

215......................................................................................................[2.3.2320] John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Hitchcock (2007) 70 NSWLR 484; [2007] NSWCA 364............................................................................ [2.3.880] John Flynn Community Group Inc v ACT Heritage Council (2012) 6 ACTLR 266; 261 FLR 462; 187 LGERA 146; [2012] ACTSC 50.................[2.3.310] Johnson and State Government Insurance Commission (WA), Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1395 of 1994, 29 May 1995)...... [2.3.2510] Johnston v Department of Education & Training (2006) 24 VAR 467; [2006] VCAT 979.......................................................................................... [2.3.2980] Joint Coal Board v Cameron (1988) 24 FCR 204............................... [2.3.1340] Jones v Architects Board (WA) [2004] WASCA 219..............................[2.3.430] Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388..........[2.7.1220], [2.7.1270], [2.7.1280] Jones and Shire of Swan, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94017 of 1993, 9 May 1994)............................................................ [2.3.2760] Jorgensen v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 208 ALR 73; [2004] FCA 143.......................................[2.3.2000], [2.3.2300] JQ v Double Bay Out of School Hours Inc [2008] NSWADT 337..... [2.7.1690] JSM, Re [2011] QCAT 351.................................................................... [2.7.1150] JT Snipe Investments Pty Ltd v Hume City Council [2008] VCAT 1496....................................................................................................[2.7.2120]

K K v New South Wales Ombudsman [2000] NSWSC 771....................... [2.7.790] K and Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 1012-123, 15 June 2011).................................................................................................... [2.3.850] K and Department of Social Security, Re (1984) 6 ALD 354............. [2.3.2560] Kalinga Wooloowin Residents Association Inc and Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation [2011] QICmr 49.....................................................................................[2.3.1040], [2.3.2300] Kalman and Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission, Re [2015] AATA 278.......................................................................................... [2.3.3230] Kamminga and Australian National University, Re (1992) 26 ALD 585; 15 AAR 297...........................................................................[2.3.850], [2.3.2300] Kanina Banner Pty Ltd and Minister for Health & Ageing, Re (2002) 35 AAR 29; [2002] AATA 169.................................. [2.7.1350], [2.7.1670], [2.7.1680] Karakatsanis v Racing Victoria Ltd (2013) 42 VR 176; [2013] VSCA 305...................................................................................[2.7.1700], [2.7.1810] Karami and Department of Planning & Infrastructure, Re [2006] WASAT [References are to paragraph numbers] xlii

TABLE OF CASES

166......................................................................................................[2.7.1810] Kasupene v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 49 AAR 77; [2008] FCA 1609............................................................ [2.7.1130], [2.7.1280] Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 2 FCR 64................ [2.7.530], [2.7.540], [2.7.770], [2.7.790] Kay v Commissioner of Department of Corrective Services (NSW) (No 2) [2000] NSWADT 67............................................................................[2.3.850] Kealy v Milanovic [2015] VCAT 1644................................................. [2.7.1500] Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58.....................................................................................[2.7.1740], [2.7.1990] Kelk v Moreland City Council [2009] VCAT 2242.............................. [2.7.1520] Kelly, Re v Department of Finance & Treasury [2001] VCAT 419.... [2.3.2820] Kennedy v Deputy Assistant Commissioner [2011] QCAT 360........... [2.7.1690] Kennedy and Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue, Re [2010] ACAT 55................................................................................ [2.7.1070] Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Ltd v Gantidis (1979) 140 CLR 675; 53 ALJR 478; 40 LGRA 132.............................................[2.3.415], [2.3.430] K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; 83 ALJR 327; [2009] HCA 4............................................................. [2.3.890] Khan v Kang [2014] NSWCATAP 48................................................... [2.7.1780] Khashashneh v Travel Compensation Fund [2015] NSWCATAP 142......................................................................................................[2.7.1300] Khera v Law Society of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWADTAP 14..........................................................................................................[2.7.940] Khoo v South Western Sydney Local Health District [2015] NSWCATAD 183......................................................................................................[2.7.1760] Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Department for Resources Development, Re [2000] WAICmr 51...............................................[2.3.2570] King v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 353.....[2.7.1240] King Ranch Australia Pty Ltd, Re v Cardwell Shire Council [1985] 2 Qd R 182; (1985) 55 LGRA 348..............................................................[2.3.310] Kingham v Cole (2002) 118 FCR 289; [2002] FCA 45....................... [2.7.1240] Kintella Pty Ltd v Scotte [1999] ACTSC 100.......................................[2.7.1130] Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; 60 ALJR 113................[2.7.540], [2.7.1200] Kirk v ACT Housing [2005] ACTRTT 19............................................. [2.7.1030] Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; 84 ALJR 154; 190 IR 437; [2010] HCA 1.............................................................. [2.1.10], [2.1.150] Kirkwood and Department of Human Services & Health, Re (1997) 68 FoI Review 28.......................................................................................... [2.3.3280] [References are to paragraph numbers] xliii

TABLE OF CASES

KLGL and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Re [2008] AATA 452......................................................................................................[2.7.1560] Kline v Offıcial Secretary to Governor General (2013) 249 CLR 645; 88 ALJR 161; [2013] HCA 52........................................................... [2.3.920] Knezevic; Ex parte Carter, Re [2005] WASCA 139..............[2.3.410], [2.3.430] Knight v Commissioner of Police [2011] WASC 93............................ [2.7.1290] Knight v Department of Justice [2011] VCAT 1708............................ [2.7.1740] Knight v Oztrack Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 119..............................[2.7.1830] Kobelke and Minister for Planning, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94007 of 1993, 27 April 1994)................... [2.3.2365], [2.3.2480] Kolotex Hosiery (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1975) 132 CLR 535; 49 ALJR 35; 5 ATR 206............................................ [2.3.310] Konieczka v Police (SA) (2006) 245 LSJS 458; [2006] SASC 288... [2.3.2000], [2.3.3230] Konieczka v Police (SA) [2006] SADC 134...................... [2.3.2130], [2.3.2160] Kosky v Department of Human Services (1998) 13 VAR 420............. [2.3.2750] Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 663; [2010] HCA 32.........................[2.7.1010], [2.7.1040], [2.7.1710], [2.7.1780] Kotsiras v Department of Premier & Cabinet [2003] VCAT 472....... [2.3.2700] Kowalski v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2010) 114 ALD 8; [2010] FCAFC 10................................................................[2.7.1300] Kowalski v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2011) 191 FCR 345; 54 AAR 238; [2011] FCAFC 44..............................[2.7.1400] Kowalski & Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission, Re (2007) 47 AAR 300; [2007] AATA 1988..................................................... [2.7.1770] Kowcun v Monaghan (2013) 279 FLR 362; [2013] NTSC 57............ [2.3.1430] Kristoffersen v Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business [2002] FCA 55................................................ [2.3.2460], [2.3.2550] Kronen v Police (SA) (1993) 173 LSJS 352......................................... [2.3.3030] Kuligowski and Director-General of Transport (NSW) [2011] WASAT 126......................................................................................................[2.7.1860] Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 334........................................................................................[2.7.1130]

L Lacey v Juunyjuwarra People [2004] QCA 297...................................[2.7.1080] Laidlaw v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 70........................................................................................................[2.7.1100] [References are to paragraph numbers] xliv

TABLE OF CASES

Laing v Jacobson [2011] QCATA 37.................................................... [2.7.2000] Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251......................................[2.3.2650] Lapham and Offıce of the Community Advocate, Re (1998) 53 ALD 485; [1998] ACTAAT 289................................... [2.3.2210], [2.3.2240], [2.3.2310] Lapidos and Ombudsman (No 2), Re (1987) 2 VAR 148 (VicAAT)..... [2.7.770] Latham v Director General of Department of Community Services [2000] NSWADT 58......................................................................................[2.3.1780] Law Society of New South Wales v Orford (No 2) [2008] NSWADT 221......................................................................................................[2.7.1200] Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 45............................................................................................ [2.7.1770] Lawless and Medical Board of Western Australia (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1995 of 1995, 5 July 1995)............................[2.3.860] Lawless and Secretary of Law Department, Re (1985) 1 VAR 42...... [2.3.2130] Lawrence v Chief Executive Offıcer, CRS Australia (2006) 42 AAR 539; [2006] FCA 341.................................................................................[2.7.1240] Lay v Alliswell Pty Ltd [2002] V ConvR 54-651; [2001] VSC 385....[2.7.1860] Lee v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1996) 68 FCR 491; 23 AAR 339............................................................................................[2.7.1090] Lee and Ministry of Education, Re (1989) 3 VAR 429........................[2.3.3140] Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2011] ACTSC 207......................................... [2.7.1970], [2.7.1980] Legal Practitioners Conduct Board (SA) v Wharff [2009] SADC 126...................................................................................[2.3.3240], [2.3.3290] Legal Services Commissioner v Brereton [2008] VCAT 1723............. [2.7.1690] Legal Services Commissioner v Doran [2012] VCAT 285.................. [2.7.1670] Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer [2010] QCAT 411..................[2.7.1700] Leighton v Day [2014] WASC 164......................................................... [2.3.310] Leighton and Department of Local Government & Regional Development, Re [2008] WAICmr 50............................................................................[2.3.3180] Leon Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Donnell [2009] VSC 430...... [2.7.1240], [2.7.1790] Leverett and Australian Telecommunications Commission, Re (1985) 8 ALN N135...................................................................................................[2.3.3040] Lewenberg v Legal Aid (Vic) (2005) 22 VAR 354; [2005] VSC 28...... [2.3.400] Li v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2014] WASCA 179.... [2.7.1500] Lianos and Department of Social Security (No 2), Re (1985) 9 ALD 43........................................................................................................[2.3.3280] Lida Build Pty Ltd v Miller [2010] QCATA 17....................................[2.7.1280] Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA [References are to paragraph numbers] xlv

TABLE OF CASES

194...................................................................................[2.7.1240], [2.7.1270] Little and Department of Natural Resources, Re (1996) 3 QAR 170......................................................................................................[2.3.1470] Lloyd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1999] NSWADTAP 3................ [2.7.2000] Loch v Land and Housing Corporation (NSW) [2014] NSWCATAP 110......................................................................................................[2.7.1880] Loftus Constructions Pty Ltd v Staunton [2015] NSWCATAP 154..... [2.7.1230] Logounov v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 46 ATR 158; [2000] FCA 1745...........................................................................................[2.7.1860] Loughnam v Altman (1992) 39 FCR 90; 16 AAR 488.........................[2.3.2365] Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112......................................................................................................[2.7.2040] LS v Mental Health Review Board [2013] WASCA 128...[2.7.1060], [2.7.1080] Lucas and Commissioner for Social Housing in the Australian Capital Territory, Re [2010] ACAT 71....................................... [2.7.1150], [2.7.1690] Luton and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (1996) 22 AAR 492......................................................................................................[2.3.3230]

M Ma v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 225............ [2.7.2090] Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422; [2008] VSCA 45....................... [2.7.1080], [2.7.1650], [2.7.1760], [2.7.1900] Mackenzie and Western Australia Police, Re [2011] WAICmr 28........[2.3.700], [2.3.2550] Maconachie v Kullenberg [2005] NSWCA 294.................[2.7.1170], [2.7.1290] MacTiernan and Minister for Regional Development, Re [2009] WAICmr 29........................................................................................................[2.3.2930] MacTiernan and Secretary of Department of Infrastructure & Regional Development, Re [2015] AATA 584................................................... [2.3.920] Magazzu v Business Licensing Authority (2001) 17 VAR 264; [2001] VSC 5..........................................................................................................[2.7.1300] Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2008) 6 DDCR 61; [2008] NSWCA 101........................................................................................ [2.3.320] Maher v Adult Guardian [2011] QCA 225........................ [2.7.1210], [2.7.1300] Mainore Pty Ltd and ACT Planning & Land Authority, Re [2011] ACAT 24........................................................................................................[2.7.2120] Maksymiuk v Savage [2015] QCA 177................................................. [2.7.2040] Mallet and Edith Cowan University, Re [2008] WAICmr 13.............. [2.3.2990] Malone; Ex parte Casey, Re [2003] WASC 266.................................... [2.3.415] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlvi

TABLE OF CASES

Mangoplah Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Great Southern Energy [1999] NSWADT 93........................................................................................................[2.7.1060] Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550............. [2.3.700], [2.3.850], [2.3.890], [2.3.2130], [2.3.2330], [2.3.2850] Manly and Ministry of Premier & Cabinet, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1694 of 1994, 16 September 1994)............ [2.3.2130], [2.3.2150] Mann and Australian Taxation Offıce, Re (1985) 3 AAR 261; 16 ATR 630......................................................................................................[2.3.1980] Mann and Capital Territory Health Commission (No 2), Re [1983] AATA 413......................................................................................................[2.7.1530] Mann and Department of Health (ACT), Re (1994) 37 ALD 266.......[2.3.3080] Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437; 18 AAR 392........................ [2.7.1270] Martin v Gosdschan [2011] QCATA 224..............................................[2.7.1790] Martyr and Law Reform Commission (WA), Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95147 of 1995, 3 July 1996)........................[2.3.1030] Masters v McCubbery [1996] 1 VR 635; (1995) 9 VAR 164................[2.3.410] Matthews and Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Re [2014] AATA 769............................................................................................ [2.3.920] Maud v Racing Victoria Ltd [2015] VSCA 276................................... [2.7.2050] Mauger v General Manager of Wingecarribee Shire Council [1999] NSWADT 35.......................................................................................[2.3.870], [2.3.2090] Mauro v Hooper [2008] SASC 159........................................................ [2.3.430] McAuliffe v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1991) 13 AAR 462........................................................................................................[2.3.430] McAuliffe v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609.......................................................................................[2.3.410], [2.3.430] McClintock v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCATA 310...................................................................................[2.7.1150], [2.7.1250] McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354.......................................................................[2.7.1100], [2.7.1810] McDonald v Guardianship and Administration Board [1993] 1 VR 521.........................................................................[2.7.1060], [2.7.1100] McGhee v Dixon (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L 45020/07 of 2009, 9 January 2009).....................................................................................[2.7.2250] McGuirk v University of New South Wales (2009) 75 NSWLR 224; [2009] NSWCA 321...................................................................................... [2.3.3260] McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1362...... [2.7.1710] McIntosh and Department of Premier & Cabinet, Re (2009) 32 VAR 371; [2009] VCAT 1528........................................................... [2.3.850], [2.3.1910] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlvii

TABLE OF CASES

McKenzie v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1986) 65 ALR 645....................................................................................... [2.3.2100] McKinnon v Nepean Blue Mountains Local Health Network [2012] NSWADT 86........................................................................................................[2.3.2460] McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2004) 39 AAR 392; [2004] AATA 740........................................................................... [2.3.700], [2.3.730] McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70; 41 AAR 23; [2005] FCAFC 142......................... [2.3.850], [2.3.880], [2.3.1900] McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45...........[2.3.850], [2.3.860], [2.3.880], [2.3.900], [2.3.920], [2.3.1030], [2.3.1530], [2.3.2690], [2.3.3210] McKinnon and Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs, Re (2008) 47 AAR 393; [2008] AATA 161......................................................................................................[2.3.1880] McKinnon and Secretary of Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet, Re [2007] AATA 1969......................................................... [2.3.1760], [2.3.1900] Medical Board of Western Australia v A Medical Practitioner [2011] WASCA 151......................................................................................................[2.7.1670] Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) v Sifredi (2000) 16 VAR 347; [2000] VSC 33.......................................................................................[2.3.890], [2.3.2330] Melvista Park Pty Ltd & Western Australian Planning Commission, Re [2009] WASAT 52......................................................................................... [2.7.1750] Mental Health Review Board (WA) v PM [2005] WASAT 338........... [2.7.1070] Mentink v Albietz [1999] QSC 9.......................................... [2.3.410], [2.3.2300] MH v NSW Maritime [2011] NSWADT 248........................................ [2.7.1850] Michael and Secretary of Department of Employment, Science & Training, Re (2006) 42 AAR 488; [2006] AATA 227........................................... [2.7.1930] Michael; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd, Re [2002] WASCA 231......................................................................................................[2.3.1560] Michel and Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QICmr 24............................................................................... [2.3.2240] Mickelberg and Australian Federal Police, Re (1984) 6 ALN N176...................................................................................................[2.3.2130] Mijatovic v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2008] WASCA 115..................................................................[2.7.960], [2.7.1200], [2.7.2100] Mildenhall and Department of Premier & Cabinet (No 1), Re (1995) 8 VAR 284......................................................................................................[2.3.1760] Mildenhall and Department of Premier & Cabinet (No 2), Re (1995) 8 VAR 478......................................................................................................[2.3.1040] Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Administrative [References are to paragraph numbers] xlviii

TABLE OF CASES

Appeals Tribunal [2005] FCA 559................................................... [2.7.2020] Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556; 60 ALJR 698........................................................................................[2.3.300] Mills v Local Lands Services [2015] NSWCATAD 207.......................[2.7.1110] Milton v City of Unley [2008] SADC 116......................... [2.3.1330], [2.3.2550] Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; 60 ALJR 560......................................................................................[2.7.1130] Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Douglas (unreported, FCAFC, Black CJ, Burchett and Kiefel JJ, 18 of 1995, 28 May 1996)............................................................................................[2.3.415] Minister for Arts, Heritage & Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274......................................................................................... [2.1.300] Minister for Disability Services v People with Disabilities (NSW) Inc [2001] NSWADTAP 7..................................................................................... [2.7.970] Minister for Disability Services v People with Disability Australia Inc [2010] NSWADTAP 44................................................................................. [2.7.1450] Minister for Foreign Affairs v Lee (2014) 227 FCR 279; 64 AAR 397; [2014] FCA 927.............................................................................................[2.7.1120] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; 85 ALJR 327; [2011] HCA 1............................................................[2.7.1910] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; [2009] HCA 39..................................................................................[2.7.1410] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Arslan (1984) 4 FCR 73............................................................................................. [2.3.450] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41...................................[2.3.300], [2.7.1080], [2.7.1810], [2.7.1820] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; 70 ALJR 568...........................[2.1.150], [2.3.410], [2.7.1910] Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Taveli (1990) 23 FCR 162........................................................................ [2.3.450], [2.3.460] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; 76 ALJR 598; [2002] HCA 11..............[2.7.1220], [2.7.1930] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; 73 ALJR 746; [1999] HCA 21...............[2.1.140], [2.7.1010], [2.7.1310] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281................... [2.3.415], [2.3.420], [2.3.430] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30...............[2.3.300], [2.3.410], [2.3.415], [2.3.420], [2.3.440], [2.7.1910] Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) [References are to paragraph numbers] xlix

TABLE OF CASES

78 ALJR 992; [2004] HCA 32........................................................... [2.3.430] Minister for Industry and Commerce v Tooheys Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 325..........................................................................................[2.7.280] Minister for Resources & Energy v Gold & Copper Resources Pty Ltd (2015) 208 LGERA 228; [2015] NSWCA 113.............................................. [2.3.375] Minister for Resources; Ex Parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 403; [2007] WASCA 175.............................................................................[2.3.880] Minister for Transport (WA) v Edwards [2000] WASCA 349.............. [2.3.850], [2.3.1040] Ministry for Planning v Collins (1996) 93 LGERA 69 ...................... [2.3.1865] Minniti v Motor Vehicle Industry Board [2011] WASCA 275............. [2.7.1780] Minogue v Department of Justice (2004) 21 VAR 179; [2004] VCAT 1194....................................................................................................[2.3.1030] Miskovic and Department of Immigration & Citizenship, Re (2009) 107 ALD 241; [2009] AATA 76........................................................................ [2.3.3120] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Department of Transport (1986) 12 FCR 156....................................................................................... [2.3.2840] Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475; 37 ALJR 182.......................................... [2.7.1090], [2.7.1160] Moloney v Motor Accident Commission (2013) 117 SASR 189; [2013] SASCFC 58....................................................................................... [2.3.1430] Moloney and Department of Human Services, Re (2001) 18 VAR 238......................................................................................................[2.3.1870] Mond v Department of Justice [2005] VCAT 2817..............................[2.3.2150] Moon and Department of Health, Re (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 310149 of 2010, 12 August 2010)................................................................. [2.3.2180] Moore v Department for Education and Child Development [2014] SADC 49........................................................................................................[2.3.2490] Moore and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, Re [2006] AATA 425.......................................................................................... [2.7.1350] More v Water and Rivers Commission (WA) [2006] WASAT 112....... [2.7.1120] Moriarty and Department of Health [2010] QICmr 35........................[2.3.2365] Morris and Australian Federal Police, Re (1996) 63 FoI Review 35........................................................................................................[2.3.1280] Morris and Forestry Tasmania (No 1), Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 610001 of 2007, 3 April 2007).................................. [2.3.2570] Morris and Forestry Tasmania (No 3), Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 708009 of 2008, 28 July 2008)..................................[2.3.2650] Morrissey and Crown Solicitor’s Offıce (WA), Re [2000] WAICmr 24........................................................................................................[2.3.2240] [References are to paragraph numbers] l

TABLE OF CASES

Morton and City of Stirling, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1794 of 1994, 5 October 1994).........................................................[2.3.2110] Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Planning Commission (WA) (2004) 29 WAR 273; 136 LGERA 16; [2004] WASCA 149................................................ [2.3.420] MR v Adult Guardian and Public Trustee of Queensland [2011] QCATA 211......................................................................................................[2.7.1260] Mt Isa Irish Association Friendly Society Ltd v Chief Executive Department of Justice & Attorney General [2011] QCAT 457..................................[2.7.970] MTYG and Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority, Re [2008] AATA 448......................................................................................................[2.7.1690] Muir Electrical Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (No 2) [2002] VSC 224.............................................................................................[2.7.2060] Mulligan v Wholesale Skid Steers Pty Ltd [2012] QCATA 33.............[2.7.1230] Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2004] VSC 146.............................................. [2.3.1330], [2.3.1350] Munro and Repatriation Commission, Re [2010] AATA 942...............[2.7.1750] Murchison v Keating (1984) 1 FCR 341.................................................[2.7.270] Murraylink Transmission Co Pty Ltd v National Electricity Market Management Co Ltd [2003] VSC 265................................................[2.3.420] Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (1984) 6 ALD 112; 1 AAR 419; 15 ATR 787................................................................................. [2.3.870] Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128... [2.7.1020] Muto v Secretary to the Department of Planning and Community Development (2013) 38 VR 293; 196 LGERA 223; [2013] VSCA 85................. [2.7.2060] MZXOT v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 233 CLR 601; 82 ALJR 1061; [2008] HCA 28......................................................... [2.1.140]

N N and Royal Perth Hospital, Re [2009] WAICmr 21...........................[2.3.2370] NAAO v Secretary of Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 FCR 401; 34 AAR 508; [2002] FCAFC 64..................[2.7.2080] National Parks Association of New South Wales Inc v Department of Lands [2005] NSWADT 124..................................[2.3.1700], [2.3.1730], [2.3.1740] Naylor v Young [2011] QCAT 434........................................................ [2.7.1830] Neary v Treasurer of New South Wales [2002] NSWADTAP 4...........[2.7.1170] NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277; 77 ALJR 1263; [2003] HCA 35......................................................... [2.1.300] Neeson v Chief Executive Offıcer of Centrelink (2006) 154 FCR 489; 43 AAR 410; [2006] FCA 1107................................................... [2.3.3080], [2.3.3120] [References are to paragraph numbers] li

TABLE OF CASES

Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee, Re [2010] WASAT 39.....................................................................................[2.7.1770], [2.7.1900] Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee, Re [2011] WASAT 88........................................................................................................[2.7.1380] Neilson and City of Swan, Re [2002] WAICmr 11...............................[2.3.2240] Nepean Country Club Ltd v Paterson [2009] VSC 436.......................[2.7.2070] Neumann and City of Swan, Re [2007] WASAT 30............................. [2.7.1530] New South Wales Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340..... [2.7.1090] News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64.................. [2.3.850], [2.3.920], [2.3.2210], [2.3.2220], [2.3.2460], [2.3.2500] News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (1984) 5 FCR 88........................................................................................... [2.3.2120] News Corp Ltd and National Companies & Securities Commission (No 6), Re (1984) 1 AAR 511............................................................................. [2.3.2120] Nguyen Giang Vu and Department of Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs, Re (unreported, AATA, Balmford SM, 5215 of 1989, 29 June 1989)..........................................................................................[2.3.3150] Niebieski Zamek Pty Ltd v Southern Rural Water [2003] VCAT 223......................................................................................................[2.7.1900] Ninan and Department of Commerce, Re [2012] WAICmr 31............ [2.3.1040] Nine Network and Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2012] QICmr 8..........................................................................................................[2.3.2140] Niola Nominees Pty Ltd and Minister for Health, Re (1986) 9 ALN N200; [1986] AATA 84................................................................................ [2.7.1030] Noble v Centacare (2003) 176 FLR 346; [2003] ACTSC 37................ [2.3.410] Nobleta v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 730................... [2.7.1880] Norrie v Registrar of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2011] NSWADTAP 53........................................................................................................[2.7.1960] North Goonyella Coal Mines Pty Ltd and Millard and Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2012] QICmr 36........................................... [2.3.2150] Norville Nominees Pty Ltd v Strathbogie Shire Council [2008] VSC 339......................................................................................................[2.7.1270] Nowicki v Martyn (1995) 131 FLR 88....................................................[2.3.430] Nowicki v Martyn (unreported, ACTSC, Miles CJ, S 35 of 1995, 2 November 1995).................................................................................................. [2.7.1150] NSW Breeding & Racing v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) (2001) 53 NSWLR 559; [2001] NSWSC 494.......................... [2.7.1030], [2.7.2030] Nuevo v Valuers Registration Board of Queensland [2011] QCAT 152........................................................................................................[2.7.940] [References are to paragraph numbers] lii

TABLE OF CASES

O O’Donnell v Environment Protection Authority (2012) 192 LGERA; 68 FLR 48; [2012] ACTSC 140....................................................... [2.7.1090] O’Donnell v Environment Protection Authority [2010] ACAT 4......... [2.7.1090] O’Keeffe v Richards [2010] QSC 386................................................... [2.7.1290] O’Rourke v Miller (1985) 156 CLR 342.............................................. [2.7.1240] O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210; 64 ALJR 87.......[2.3.750], [2.3.850] O’Sullivan v Repatriation Commission (2003) 128 FCR 590; 37 AAR 169; [2003] FCA 387.................................................................................[2.7.1200] Olsson and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Re (1986) 10 ALN N48..................................................................................[2.3.3050], [2.3.3140] Ombudsman v Moroney [1983] 1 NSWLR 317......................................[2.7.660] Omran v Australian Postal Commission (1992) 15 AAR 232............. [2.7.1830] Ontario (Ombudsman) v Ontario (Health Disciplines Board) (1979) 104 DLR (3d) 597............................................................................... [2.7.220] Ontario (Ombudsman) v Ontario (Labour Relations Board) (1986) 44 DLR (4th) 312................................................................................[2.7.220] Ontario (Ombudsman) v The Queen (1975) 117 DLR (3d) 613............[2.7.730] O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners (1982) 153 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 130; 13 ATR 706................................................................. [2.1.290] Osborne v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2000] NSWADTAP 10... [2.7.1020] Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; 82 ALJR 1288; [2008] HCA 37......................................................... [2.3.850] Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2010) 241 CLR 320; 84 ALJR 528; [2010] HCA 24........................................ [2.3.3220], [2.7.940] O’Sullivan v Family Court of Australia (1997) 25 AAR 482; 141 FLR 204......................................................................................[2.3.1430] O’Sullivan v Health & Community Services (Vic) (1995) 8 VAR 449......................................................................................................[2.3.2220] O’Sullivan v Police (Vic) [2005] VCAT 532........................................ [2.3.2080] O’Sullivan and Police Force (Vic), Re (1986) 1 VAR 171.................. [2.3.2100] Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465; 2 BR 151....................................................................... [2.3.350] OV v Members of the Board of Wesley Mission Council (2010) 79 NSWLR 606; [2010] NSWCA 155............................................. [2.7.1250] Owners of St John’s Court – Rivervale Strata Plan 6052 and Clark (No 2), Re (2011) 75 SR (WA) 69; [2011] WASAT 16..................................... [2.7.1930] Owners of Strata Plan 18449 and City of Joondalup, Re [2005] WASAT [References are to paragraph numbers] liii

TABLE OF CASES

304......................................................................................................[2.7.1030]

P Pacific Cinemas (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1999) 149 FLR 417; [1999] ACTSC 15..................................................... [2.7.1300] Pacific General Securities Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 63 ATR 127; [2003] NSWADT 183................................................. [2.7.1560] Pacific International College Pty Ltd v Secretary of Department of Education and Training [2015] AATA 547........................................................ [2.7.1620] Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1968] AC 997; [1968] 2 WLR 924.......................................................................................... [2.3.410] Page and Director-General of Social Security, Re (1984) 6 ALN N171...................................................................................................[2.3.3030] Page and Metropolitan Transit Authority, Re (1988) 2 VAR 243........ [2.3.870], [2.3.2490] Pages Hire Centre (NSW) Pty Ltd and Boros v Department of Premier and Cabinet [2014] SADC 3.................................................[2.3.2230], [2.3.2430] Palmer and Minister for Australian Capital Territory, Re (1978) 1 ALD 183........................................................................................................[2.3.350] Palmer and Minister for Australian Capital Territory, Re (1978) 23 ALR 196; [1978] AATA 51................................................................................ [2.7.1530] Pancontinental Mining Ltd v Burns (1994) 52 FCR 454..................... [2.7.2020] Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97.........................................................................................[2.7.2040] Parisi and Australian Federal Police, Re (1987) 14 ALD 11............. [2.3.2140] Parke and Repatriation Commission, Re (1985) 2 RPD 404.................[2.7.960] Parker v Western Australia (2008) 167 FCR 340; [2008] FCAFC 23..........................................................................................................[2.3.420] Parnell and Attorney-General’s Department [2014] AICmr 71...........[2.3.1870] Parsons v Stone Traders Pty Ltd [2008] WASAT 145......................... [2.7.1820] Paterson and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Re (1994) 33 ALD 635......................................................................................................[2.3.3280] Paterson and Department of Arts, Heritage & Environment (No 2), Re (1985) 8 ALD 227......................................................................................... [2.3.3280] Path Line Australia Pty Ltd v EPA & Integrated Waste Services Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 37................................................................................ [2.3.1560] Patsalis and Commissioner of Police (NSW) (No 2), Re [2004] NSWADT 185......................................................................................................[2.3.2820] Paul v Goulburn Murray Rural Water Corp [2009] VCAT 970..........[2.7.1450] [References are to paragraph numbers] liv

TABLE OF CASES

Paul Murphy Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADTAP 71................................................................................. [2.7.1130] Paul & Paul Pty Ltd v Business Licensing Authority [2010] VSC 460......................................................................................................[2.7.1920] PC v University of New South Wales (No 2) [2005] NSWADT 264... [2.7.2120] Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256; 47 AAR 20; [2007] FCAFC 156........................................................................................[2.7.1880] Peatling and Department of Employment & Workplace Relations, Re (2007) 44 AAR 494; [2007] AATA 1011....................................................... [2.3.900] People with Disability Australia Inc v Minister For Disability Services [2011] NSWCA 253........................................................................................ [2.7.960] Pepper v Attorney-General (Qld) (No 2) [2008] 2 Qd R 353; [2008] QCA 207........................................................................................................[2.3.380] Percerep v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 483....................................................................................... [2.7.1200] Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue (1994) 50 FCR 405............................................. [2.7.1080] Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue [1995] ACTAAT 113........................................... [2.7.1100] Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Building Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 217........................................................................................................[2.7.970] Perth Radiation Oncology Centre and Department of Health, Re [2002] WAICmr 5..........................................................................................[2.3.2310] Pescott and Victorian Tourism Commission (No 2), Re (1988) 2 VAR 437......................................................................................................[2.3.2520] Petroulias and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (2006) 62 ATR 1175; [2006] AATA 333........................................ [2.3.1990], [2.3.2160], [2.3.2300] Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376.............................. [2.3.310], [2.7.1910] Pigliardo and Town of Vincent, Re [2007] WASAT 104...................... [2.7.1080] Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2012) 246 CLR 379; 86 ALJR 1126; [2012] HCA 36.................................[2.3.880] Pinesales Pty Ltd and Commissioner of State Revenue, Re [2006] WASAT 202......................................................................................................[2.7.1100] Pintarich v Schadbolt (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L45011/2006 of 2008, 22 September 2008)................................................................ [2.7.2250] Pisano and Health Solutions (WA) Pty Ltd [2012] WAICmr 24......... [2.3.1340] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; 77 ALJR 454; [2003] HCA 2.......................................................................[2.1.10], [2.1.160] Planarc Pty Ltd v Frankstone City Council [2006] VCAT 682...........[2.7.1800] PLS (NT) Pty Ltd v Director-General of Licensing [2015] NTCAT [References are to paragraph numbers] lv

TABLE OF CASES

4.......................................................................................[2.7.1070], [2.7.1900] Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, Re (1979) 36 FLR 482...........[2.7.1150], [2.7.1670], [2.7.1680], [2.7.1710], [2.7.1780], [2.7.1790] Poletti v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 52 FCR 154....... [2.7.2230] Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board (NSW) [2009] NSWSC 347......................................................................................................[2.7.1810] Police Force of Western Australia v Winterton (unreported, WASCA, Scott J, SJA 1078 of 1997, 27 November 1997)...........................................[2.3.2890] Police (Vic) v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223; [2008] VSCA 218..............[2.3.1530], [2.3.2490] Pollentine v Attorney-General (Qld) (unreported, QCA, Fitzgerald P, Thomas and White JJ, 6923 of 1996, 6 December 1996)............................... [2.3.410] Pollock v Queensland Police Service Weapons Licensing Branch [2010] QCAT 77............................................................................................ [2.7.1790] Port Stephens Council v Sansom [2007] NSWCA 299........................ [2.7.2120] Porter and Department of Community Services & Health, Re (1988) 8 AAR 335......................................................................................................[2.3.1740] Post Newspapers Pty Ltd and Town of Cambridge, Re [2006] WAICmr 25........................................................................................................[2.3.2080] Post Offıce Agents Association Ltd v Australian Postal Commission (1988) 84 ALR 563......................................................................................... [2.1.140] Poudyal v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FMCA 265............................................................................. [2.7.1850] PR v Director-General of Department of Community Services [2005] NSWADT 38......................................................................................[2.7.1510] PRA v MA (2004) 21 VAR 16; [2004] VSCA 20.............. [2.7.1150], [2.7.1190] Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155......................................................................................... [2.7.1410] Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (Corporations & Securities Panel Case) (1991) 173 CLR 167; 66 ALJR 171...................................................[2.1.290] Preiss and ACT Planning & Land Authority, Re [2008] ACTAAT 25........................................................................................................[2.7.1070] Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWADTAP 23........................................................................................................[2.7.1960] Priebe v Police (SA) [2007] SADC 119..........[2.3.1050], [2.3.2470], [2.3.2510] Prime Minister and Cabinet and Secretary of Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Re Secretary of Department of (2015) 66 AAR 242; [2015] AATA 361........................................................................ [2.3.610] Prime Minister & Cabinet and Treasurer, Re Secretary of Department of [References are to paragraph numbers] lvi

TABLE OF CASES

(2014) 145 ALD 392; 64 AAR 95; [2014] AATA 485.................... [2.3.3230] Pritchard v Police (Vic) [2008] VCAT 913....................... [2.3.1780], [2.3.1870] Proctor v Melton Shire Council [2003] VCAT 1520............................[2.7.1450] Puafisi v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 39........................................................................................................[2.7.1270] Public Service Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 112........ [2.3.310], [2.3.320], [2.3.420], [2.3.430], [2.3.440] Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209...[2.3.310], [2.3.320], [2.3.340], [2.3.410], [2.3.470], [2.7.620] Public Service Board (Vic) v Wright (1986) 160 CLR 145; 60 ALJR 304........................................................................................[2.3.850] Purnell and Repatriation Commission, Re (1991) 14 AAR 63............[2.7.1470]

Q Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins (1992) 28 NSWLR 26; 45 IR 292.....[2.7.1010] QR v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] NSWADTAP 59...........[2.7.1150], [2.7.2000] Qualweld Australia Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] NSWCATAP 249............................................................................... [2.7.1290] Quarell v Lieutier [2013] TASMC 37................................................... [2.7.2250] Queensland v Albietz [1996] 1 Qd R 215............................................. [2.3.2510] Queensland v Leadbeatter [2011] QCATA 60...................................... [2.7.1660] Queensland v Mahommed [2007] QSC 18............................................[2.7.1310] Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [1996] 2 Qd R 580................ [2.3.1330], [2.3.1340], [2.3.1350] Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [2000] 1 Qd R 621; [1998] QSC 231......................................................................................................[2.3.2350] Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615.......... [2.1.290], [2.7.280] Queensland Police Service v Compton [2011] QCATA 112................ [2.7.1960] Queensland Racing Ltd v McMahon [2010] QCATA 73.....[2.7.960], [2.7.1060]

R R, Re [2000] NSWSC 886..................................................................... [2.7.1960] R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; 54 ALJR 314...............................................................[2.7.1650] R v Bedfordshire Inhabitants (1855) 4 El & Bl 535; (1855) [References are to paragraph numbers] lvii

TABLE OF CASES

119 ER 196......................................................................... [2.3.850], [2.3.880] R v Dixon; Ex parte Prince [1979] WAR 116; (1978) 42 LGRA 119...................................................................................... [2.7.540] R v Hallstrom; Ex parte Waldron [1986] QB 824; [1985] 3 WLR 1090........................................................................................ [2.7.790] R v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 180 CLR 322..................................................................................... [2.3.1560] R v Moodie; Ex parte Mithen (1977) 51 ALJR 850.............................[2.7.1630] R v Syme; Ex parte Page [1970] WAR 153......................................... [2.7.1040] R v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327; 57 ALJR 59........................................................................................[2.3.1560] R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170; 56 ALJR 164........................................................................................[2.1.290] R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228; 7 ALJR 169.................................................................[2.7.1710] R v Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia (1955) 93 CLR 528......................................................................................... [2.1.290] R and City of Greater Geraldton, Re [2012] WAICmr 25...................[2.3.2900] Racehorse Owners’ Association (WA) and Offıce of Racing & Gaming, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95189 of 1995, 1 March 1996).................................................................................................. [2.3.2820] Racing Queensland Ltd v Bellamy [2011] QCATA 30......................... [2.7.1810] Radar Investments Pty Ltd and Health Insurance Commission, Re (2004) 80 ALD 733; [2004] AATA 166............................................................ [2.3.2860] Rae and Department of Arts, Heritage & Environment, Re (1985) 7 ALD 449; 3 AAR 222.........................................................................................[2.3.3280] Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522................................................. [2.1.290] Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412.............................................................................. [2.7.2120] Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 69 FLR 328..........................................................................................[2.3.350] Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd and Aboriginal Development Commission, Re (1986) 10 ALD 380........................................................................... [2.3.2670] Ramsay v Australian Postal Corp (2005) 147 FCR 39; 41 AAR 1; [2005] FCA 640..........................................................................[2.7.1240], [2.7.1790] Randall v Northcote Town Council (1910) 11 CLR 100; [1911] VLR 163a.................................................................................[2.3.850] Ravlich and Attorney-General (WA), Re [2010] WAICmr 5............... [2.3.1050], [2.3.2480] Ravlich and Department of Productivity & Labour Relations, Re [2000] [References are to paragraph numbers] lviii

TABLE OF CASES

WAICmr 58........................................................................................[2.3.1670] Ravlich and Minister for Regional Development & Lands, Re [2009] WAICmr 9.......................................................................................[2.3.1740], [2.3.1760] Raymond v Doidge [2012] QCAT 163.................................................. [2.7.1470] Re v Local Government Standards Panel [2015] WASC 51................[2.7.1080] Read and Public Service Commission (WA), Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 493 of 1993, 16 February 1994)................... [2.3.850], [2.3.860], [2.3.870], [2.3.2090] Redfern and University of Canberra, Re (1995) 38 ALD 457.............[2.3.2980] Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala, Re (2000) 204 CLR 82; 75 ALJR 52; [2000] HCA 57............................................................[2.7.1150] Registrar of the Veterinary Surgeons Board (SA) v Mooney [2009] SADC 62..................................................................[2.3.3240], [2.3.3250], [2.7.2250] Renmark Hotel Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1949) 79 CLR 10......................................................................................... [2.3.1330] Repatriation Commission, Re v Maley (1991) 14 AAR 278................ [2.7.1780] Repatriation Commission v O’Brien (1985) 155 CLR 422; 59 ALJR 363........................................................................................[2.3.440] Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327; 7 AAR 17....[2.7.1260], [2.7.1810] Repatriation Commission v Warren (2008) 167 FCR 511; 47 AAR 461; [2008] FCAFC 64..........................................................................................[2.7.1080] Res 1 v Medical Board (Qld) [2008] QCA 152......................................[2.3.430] Resch and Department of Veterans Affairs, Re (1986) 9 ALD 380.... [2.3.3030], [2.3.3040], [2.3.3060] Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte Defence Housing Authority, Re (1997) 190 CLR 410; 71 ALJR 1254........................................... [2.1.140] Resort Management Services Ltd v Noosa Shire Council [1997] 2 Qd R 291; (1996) 92 LGERA 387......................................................................[2.7.1090] Retain Beacon Hill High School Committee Inc v Department of Commerce (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 58........................................ [2.3.2750], [2.3.2760] Retain Beacon Hill High School Committee Inc v Department of Education & Training [2006] NSWADT 351.........................................................[2.3.2820] Ricegrowers Co-op Mills Ltd v Bannerman (1981) 56 FLR 443; 1 TPR 116........................................................................................................[2.3.360] Richardson and Commissioner of Corporate Affairs (Vic), Re (1987) 2 VAR 51........................................................................................................[2.3.2100] Richardson and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (2004) 55 ATR 1091; [2004] AATA 367.............................................................................. [2.3.1880] Rimanic v Bus Licensing Authority [2010] VCAT 1997...................... [2.7.1010] [References are to paragraph numbers] lix

TABLE OF CASES

Rindos and University of Western Australia, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 2095 of 1994, 10 July 1995)........................[2.3.2000] Rittau v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 186......................[2.7.1030] Riverina Wines Pty Ltd v Registrar of Workers Compensation Commission (NSW) (2007) 4 DDCR 607; [2007] NSWCA 149............................[2.3.320] Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2001] FCA 1410...........................................................................................[2.7.1730] Roads Corp v Maclaw No 496 Pty Ltd (2001) 19 VAR 169; [2001] VSC 435........................................................................................................[2.7.960] Roberts and ACT Planning & Land Authority, Re [2009] ACAT 10...[2.7.1060] Roberts Ltd v Barker (unreported, TASSC, Evans J, 137 of 1998, 3 November 1998).................................................................................................... [2.3.430] Robinson v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 328; 15 ATR 538...............................................................................................[2.3.310] Robinson v Director-General of Department of Health [2002] NSWADT 222......................................................................................................[2.3.2000] Roden Security Services Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWADTAP 10.................................................. [2.7.1300], [2.7.1820] Rodriguez v Telstra Corp Ltd (2002) 66 ALD 579; [2002] FCA 30... [2.7.1780] Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115; 79 ALJR 1366; 41 AAR 355; [2005] HCA 40...........................................................[2.7.1910] Rovere v Secretary, Department of Education and Training [2015] AATA 462.....................................................................................[2.3.920], [2.3.1870] Rowell v Clark [2006] WASC 159........................................................ [2.7.1150] Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2001) 207 CLR 72; 75 ALJR 1342; [2001] HCA 49....................[2.7.2033], [2.7.2070] Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 22 VAR 467; [2005] VSC 136..............................................[2.7.1020] RR v Department of Army (1980) 482 F Supp 770...........[2.3.2990], [2.3.3060] Rubigny and Secretary of Department of Family & Community Services, Re (2002) 71 ALD 777; [2002] AATA 1170......................................... [2.7.1470] Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Truong, Re (2001) 202 ALR 305........................................................[2.3.430] Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Truong, Re [2001] HCATrans 113...................................................... [2.3.430] Ruffell Pty Ltd and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, Re (2003) 37 AAR 148; [2003] AATA 356.........................[2.7.1430] Russell v Yarra Ranges Shire Council [2009] VSC 486.......................[2.7.1150] Russell Island Development Association Inc and Department of Primary [References are to paragraph numbers] lx

TABLE OF CASES

Industries & Energy (1994) 33 ALD 683........................................ [2.3.2540] RW v Protective Commissioner [2005] NSWADT 209.......................... [2.7.970] Ryan, Re v Department of Infrastructure (2004) 22 VAR 226; [2004] VCAT 2346..............................................................[2.3.1680], [2.3.1700], [2.3.1740] Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869........[2.3.890], [2.3.1040], [2.3.1865], [2.3.2330], [2.3.2560], [2.3.2710]

S S and Retirement Benefits Fund Board, Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 72 of 2010, 16 March 2010)...................................... [2.3.2550] S & G Homes Pty Ltd v Owen [2015] NSWCATAP 190.................... [2.7.1880] SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294; 79 ALJR 1009 215; [2005] HCA 24....................... [2.7.1310] Sabag v Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWCA 411......................................................................................................[2.7.1200] Saitta Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2000) 106 FCR 554; [2000] FCA 1546....................................................................................................[2.7.1070] Salaries and Allowances Tribunal v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 324; [2008] WASC 39....................................................... [2.3.1330] Salisbury City Council v Biganovsky (1990) 54 SASR 117; 70 LGRA 71........................................................................................ [2.7.290] Sammut v AVM Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 27............... [2.7.1240], [2.7.1780] Saskatchewan (Ombudsman) v Saskatchewan (Minister for Social Services) (1979) 103 DLR (3d) 695................................. [2.7.300], [2.7.310], [2.7.470] SC Land Richmond Pty Ltd v Dura (Aust) Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 2519........................................................................................ [2.7.1820] Scanes v Wilson (1974) 22 FLR 262.....................................................[2.7.1040] Schofield and WorkCover (ACT), Re (2000) 61 ALD 238; [2000] ACTAAT 30.....................................................................................[2.3.2090], [2.3.2350] Scholes and Australian Federal Police, Re (1996) 44 ALD 299........[2.3.2100], [2.3.2540] Scicluna & Danicic v Development Consent Authority – Litchfield Division [2015] NTCAT 3............................................................................... [2.7.1080] Scrivanich and Australian Taxation Offıce, Re (unreported, AATA, Ballard SM, No S83/54, 27 October 1983)......................................[2.3.3050] Seachange Management Pty Ltd v Bevnol Constructions & Developments Pty Ltd [2008] VCAT 1479..................................................................... [2.7.1300] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxi

TABLE OF CASES

Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28............ [2.3.580], [2.3.890], [2.3.1990], [2.3.2080], [2.3.2650], [2.3.2690], [2.3.2700] Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business v Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 301; 34 AAR 10; [2001] FCA 1375................................. [2.3.2010] Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business v Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 32 AAR 531; [2001] FCA 382..................................................... [2.3.2650], [2.3.2660] Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Boswell (1992) 36 FCR 367......................................................................................... [2.3.360] Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Whittaker (2005) 143 FCR 15; [2005] FCAFC 15.................................... [2.3.1610], [2.3.1620] Secretary of Department of Infrastructure v Williamstown Bay & River Cruises Pty Ltd (2011) 181 LGERA 195; [2011] VSC 191...........[2.7.1710], [2.7.1780] Secretary of Department of Justice v Osland (No 2) (2007) 26 VAR 425; [2007] VSCA 96............................................ [2.3.850], [2.3.1780], [2.3.1910] Secretary of Department of Premier & Cabinet v Hulls [1999] 3 VR 331........................................................................................... [2.7.2040] Secretary of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet v Haneef (2010) 52 AAR 360; [2010] FCA 928...............................................................[2.3.1615] Secretary of Department of Social Security v Jordan (1998) 83 FCR 34; 27 AAR 407............................................................................................[2.7.1740] Secretary of Department of Social Security v SRA (1993) 43 FCR 299; 18 AAR 498............................................................................................[2.7.1580] Secretary of Department of Social Security v Van Den Boogaart (1995) 37 ALD 619............................................................................................ [2.7.2060] Secretary of Department of Workplace Relations & Small Business v The Staff Development and Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 301; 34 AAR 10; [2001] FCA 1375........................................................................ [2.3.1880] Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272...................................[2.3.860], [2.3.1680], [2.3.1700], [2.3.1740] Secretary to Department of Premier & Cabinet v Hulls [1999] 3 VR 331; [1999] VSCA 117.............................................................................. [2.3.2210] Secretary to Department of Treasury & Finance v Dalla-Riva (2007) 26 VAR 96; [2007] VSCA 11............................................................................[2.3.430] Seers v Exhibition Centre Pty Ltd (2009) 232 FLR 415; [2009] ACTSC 85........................................................................................................[2.7.1010] Segal v Waverley Council (2005) 64 NSWLR 177; [2005] NSWCA 310.......................................................................................[2.3.415], [2.3.430] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxii

TABLE OF CASES

Setterfield and Chisholm Institute of Technology (No 2), Re (1986) 1 VAR 202................................................................[2.3.3050], [2.3.3130], [2.3.3140] Seymour and Migration Agents Registration Authority, Re [2012] AATA 86........................................................................................................[2.7.1530] SG v AG [2008] WASC 123.................................................................. [2.7.1270] Shaw v Rigby Cooke Lawyers [2011] VSC 214................................... [2.7.1300] Shergold v Tanner (2000) 102 FCR 215; [2000] FCA 1420 .............. [2.3.1780] Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31.............. [2.3.1070], [2.7.960], [2.7.1050], [2.7.1060], [2.7.1080], [2.7.1090] Shi v Migration Institute of Australia Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 326; 38 AAR 222; [2003] FCA 1304...............................................................................[2.7.1640] Shopping Centre Council of Australia and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Re (2004) 78 ALD 494; [2004] AATA 119......................................................................................................[2.3.1670] Sigma Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v Marvell Investments Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 242..........................................................................................[2.7.2060] Simons v Department of Justice [2006] VCAT 2053........................... [2.3.2120] Simons and Victorian Egg Marketing Board (No 1), Re (1985) 1 VAR 54.....................................................................................[2.3.2100], [2.3.2510] Simonsen and Edith Cowan University, Re [1994] WAICmr 10..........[2.3.2010] Simpson v Director General of Department of Education & Training [2000] NSWADT 134....................................................................................[2.3.1865] Sinclair and Secretary of Department of Social Security, Re (1985) 9 ALN N127...................................................................................................[2.3.2100] Slater and State Housing Commission (WA) (Homewest), Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95248 of 1995, 22 February 1996).................................................................................................. [2.3.2750] SMA Projects Pty Ltd v Jovanovic (2006) 24 VAR 327; [2006] VSC 176......................................................................................................[2.7.1920] Smith v NSW Housing and Land Corp [2015] NSWCATAP 255........[2.7.1810] Smith and Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Commission, Re [2000] AATA 512...................................................................................[2.3.1760], [2.3.1870] Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) v Secretary of Department of Community Services & Health (1991) 28 FCR 291........................ [2.3.2250] Snook and Western Australian Planning Commission, Re [2012] WASAT 38........................................................................................................[2.7.1850] Sobh v Police Force (Vic) [1994] 1 VR 41; (1993) 65 A Crim R 466........................................................................................................[2.3.850] Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277; 226 IR 214; [References are to paragraph numbers] lxiii

TABLE OF CASES

[2012] FCAFC 146.............................................................[2.3.320], [2.3.440] Sordini v Wilcox (1982) 64 FLR 439...................................................... [2.7.270] Soulemizis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247......... [2.3.420] South East Water Ltd v Transpacific Cleanaway Pty Ltd (2010) 177 LGERA 1; [2010] VSC 46.............................................................................. [2.3.1070] Southside Autos (1981) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 37 WAR 245; [2008] WASCA 208................................[2.7.1000], [2.7.2060] Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd, Re v Government Railways Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 2997 of 1997, 20 October 1997).................................................................... [2.3.2300] Spoolder and Secretary of Department of Social Security, Re (1991) 24 ALD 786......................................................................................................[2.7.1730] Spragg and Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs, Re [2014] AATA 667........................................................................................................[2.3.920] Spurling v Development Underwriting (Vic) Pty Ltd [1973] VR 1; (1972) 30 LGRA 19...................................................................................... [2.7.1260] St George Community Housing v Kaya [2014] NSWCATAP 94.........[2.7.1810] Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261; 57 ALJR 731........................................................................................[2.1.160] Staff Development & Training Centre and Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business, Re (2000) 30 AAR 330; [2000] AATA 78..................................................... [2.3.2010], [2.3.2750] Staged Developments Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2001] VCAT 1447....................................................................................................[2.7.1750] Staging Connections Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (NSW) [2004] NSWCA 357........................................................................................................[2.3.410] State Bank of New South Wales and Department of Treasury, Re (1991) 5 VAR 78.............................................................................................. [2.7.1680] State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel [1998] 1 VR 102....[2.7.1860] Stateships v Lawson [2009] FCA 59..................................................... [2.7.1780] Statham and Bickerton, Re v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 16 ALD 723............................................................................................ [2.7.2080] Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; 60 ALJR 662...................................................................[2.7.2000], [2.7.2100] Steadfast Group Pty Ltd v WorkCover NSW [2010] NSWADT 23......[2.3.2930] Stewart v Department of Tourism, Sport & the Commonwealth Games (2003) 19 VAR 363; [2003] VCAT 45......................................................... [2.3.2700] Stewart v Heath (No 2) [2013] TASMC 4............................................ [2.7.2250] Stewart v Yarrawarra Aboriginal Corporation [2015] NSWCATAP 4..........................................................................................................[2.7.1790] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Storer v Murphy (No 1) (1991) 104 FLR 303........................................ [2.3.370] Strange and Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Re (2002) 68 ALD 751; [2002] AATA 240.......................................................................................... [2.3.3080] Stutchbury v Pittwater Council (1999) 105 LGERA 1; [1999] NSWLEC 177........................................................................................................[2.3.420] Subramanian and Refugee Review Tribunal, Re (1997) 44 ALD 435 ............................................................................................................[2.3.1865] Sudath v Health Care Complaints Commission (2012) 84 NSWLR 474; [2012] NSWCA 171...................................................................................... [2.7.1710] Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2014) 226 FCR 555; 64 AAR 120; [2014] FCAFC 93...........................................................[2.7.1240], [2.7.1810] Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323...[2.3.350], [2.7.1150], [2.7.1280], [2.7.1420] Summers v Repatriation Commission (2012) 293 ALR 86; [2012] FCAFC 104......................................................................................................[2.7.1290] Sunol v Collier (2012) 81 NSWLR 619; 258 FLR 282; [2012] NSWCA 14........................................................................................................[2.7.1070] Surace v Rita Commisso Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] QCATA 271......[2.7.1020] Sutherland Shire Council and Department of Industry, Science & Resources, Re (2001) 33 AAR 508; [2001] AATA 718..........................................[2.3.10] Sweeney and Australian Information Commissioner, Re (2014) 64 AAR 186; [2014] AATA 531................................................................................ [2.3.920] Syngenta Crop Protection Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 61 ATR 186; [2005] FCA 1646........................................................ [2.7.2260] SYT and Department of Health (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 270019 of 2009, 15 March 2010).......................................................................[2.3.2480] SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; 81 ALJR 515; [2006] HCA 63.....................[2.7.1270] Sze-Tho and Medical Practitioners Board, Re (2002) 19 VAR 76......[2.7.1690]

T T v Medical Board (SA) (1992) 58 SASR 382....................................... [2.3.310] Tamas v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2003) 9 VR 154; [2003] VSCA 113.......................................................................................... [2.7.1660] Tasmania v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tas) [2009] TASSC 48..... [2.3.1070] Tasty Chicks Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2011) 245 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 1183; 80 ATR 251; [2011] HCA 41........ [2.7.2240] Taxpayer and Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Re (2004) 39 AAR 53; [2004] AATA 398.............................................................................. [2.7.1350] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxv

TABLE OF CASES

Taxpayer and Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Re (2006) 63 ATR 1019; [2006] AATA 598.............................................................................. [2.7.1550] Taylor v Chief Inspector of RSPCA [1999] NSWADT 23...[2.3.870], [2.3.1330] Taylor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 208..............................................................................[2.3.450] Taylor v WorkCover Authority (NSW) [2003] NSWADT 186.............. [2.3.2300] Teacher J v Queensland College of Teachers [2012] QCATA 115......[2.7.1690] Telstra Corp Ltd v Warren (unreported, FCA, Tamberlin J, NG016 of 1996, 26 February 1997)...................................................................................[2.7.1260] Telstra Corp Ltd and Department of Broadband, Communications & the Digital Economy, Re (2010) 113 ALD 623; [2010] AATA 118....... [2.3.880], [2.3.1700] Teo and City of Stirling, Re [2008] WASAT 270................................. [2.7.1830] Theis and Department of Aviation, Re (1986) 9 ALD 454; 5 AAR 27..................................................................[2.3.1970], [2.3.2000], [2.3.2140] Thomas and Royal Women’s Hospital, Re (1988) 2 VAR 618............. [2.3.2550] Thompson and Secretary of Department of Education, Science & Training, Re (2007) 98 ALD 119; [2007] AATA 1801......................................... [2.3.2000] Thompson & Growers Co-op Co Pty Ltd and Export Development Grants Board, Re [1985] AATA 16...............................................................[2.7.1200] Thomson v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2009] ACAT 38............. [2.7.960] Thwaites v Department of Human Services (unreported, VCAT, Preuss SM, 29365 of 1996, 15 January 1999).....................................................[2.3.2750] Tiwi Islands Shire Council v Procurement Review Board (NT) [2013] NTSC 83..........................................................................................................[2.3.310] Tolman Holdings Pty Ltd and City of Joondalup, Re [2005] WASAT 348......................................................................................................[2.7.1520] Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337..............[2.7.1280] Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry, Re [2003] AATA 1301........................................................................................ [2.3.1740] Toomer and Department of Primary Industries & Energy, Re (1990) 12 AAR 16..................................................................[2.3.2520], [2.3.3030], [2.3.3050] Torchia v Swanton [2012] NSWADTAP 5............................................ [2.7.1170] Towie v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2004] VCAT 2545..........[2.3.3180] Towie v Victoria (2008) 19 VR 640; [2008] VSC 177..... [2.7.1150], [2.7.1290], [2.7.1860], [2.7.2100] Town of Cottlesloe v Multiplex (Marine Parade) Pty Ltd (2007) 153 LGERA 391; [2007] WASCA 113.................................................................. [2.7.2060] Townsville City Council v Department of Main Roads [2006] 1 Qd R 77; [2005] QCA 226................................................................................ [2.7.1010] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Trafford v Police (SA) [2014] SADC 121.......................... [2.3.2080], [2.3.2430] Tran v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2009] ACAT 46.................. [2.7.1070] Transend Networks Pty Ltd v Launceston City Council [2001] TASSC 134........................................................................................................[2.3.430] Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61............................ [2.7.1080], [2.7.1100], [2.7.1130], [2.7.1530], [2.7.1560] Transport Accident Commission v Coyle [2001] VSCA 236................. [2.7.960] Trautwein v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1936) 56 CLR 63... [2.7.2270] Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 68 NSWLR 366; [2006] NSWCA 387...................................................................................... [2.7.1150] Tucker v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 16........................................................................................................[2.7.1150] Tuitaalili v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCA 1224....................................................................................................[2.7.1090] Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483..............[2.7.2020] Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069.................................................................................[2.3.450] Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 172..............................................................................[2.3.450] Tung v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 219.... [2.7.1270] Turnbull v NSW Medical Board [1976] 2 NSWLR 281.......................[2.7.1040] Turner v Horsfall [2002] VSC 195....................................................... [2.7.1260] Tyers v Director of the Building Appeal Board [2013] TASMC 23.... [2.7.2250] Tyeweretye Club Inc (t/as Tyeweretye Social Club) v Liquor Commission (NT) (1993) 112 FLR 428............................................................................[2.3.430] Tzoudas v Ministry of Transport [2009] NSWADTAP 36....................[2.7.1810]

U Underwood v Queensland Department of Communities [2012] QCA 158......................................................................................................[2.7.2040] United Bonded Fabrics Pty Ltd v Roseman [2000] NSWADTAP 13........................................................................................................[2.7.1780] United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520....................................................................................... [2.7.1520] University of Melbourne v Robinson [1993] 2 VR 177.... [2.3.1050], [2.3.2460] University of New South Wales v McGuirk [2006] NSWSC 1362..... [2.3.3260], [2.7.1760], [2.7.1860]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxvii

TABLE OF CASES

V Vasseur v Wright [2011] QCATA 20..................................................... [2.7.1740] Vasta and Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Re [2010] AATA 500........ [2.7.1690] VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee (2003) 58 NSWLR 631; 128 LGERA 419; [2003] NSWCA 297.............................[2.3.415], [2.3.420] VBI Properties Pty Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2003) 20 VAR 57; [2003] VSCA 17........................................................... [2.7.2060] VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (No 5) (2006) 92 ALD 259; [2006] AATA 710...................................................................... [2.7.1200] VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2005) 44 AAR 192; [2005] AATA 861.............................................................................. [2.7.1520] VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2005) 44 AAR 212; [2005] AATA 1060............................................................................ [2.7.1560] VCA v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2008) 105 ALD 236; [2008] AATA 580........................................ [2.7.1700], [2.7.1720], [2.7.1730] VCA and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Re (2007) 43 AAR 529; [2006] AATA 873.............................................................................. [2.7.1550] VEAL of 2002, Applicant v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88; 80 ALJR 228; [2005] HCA 72...............................................................[2.7.1200], [2.7.1250] Veale and City of Swan, Re [2012] WAICmr 12.................................. [2.3.2930] Veale and Town of Bassendean, Re (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94004 of 1993, 25 March 1994)...................................................[2.3.850] Vella and Crimes Compensation Tribunal, Re (1985) 1 VAR 65........ [2.7.1820] Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 117.......... [2.7.2120] Vero Insurance Ltd v Witherow (2004) 21 VAR 413; [2004] VSC 272......................................................................................................[2.7.1470] Victoria v McKenna (1999) 140 IR 256; [1999] VSC 310.................... [2.3.410] Victoria v Tymbook Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 418.....................................[2.7.1820] Victoria Legal Aid v Kuek [2010] VSCA 29.........................................[2.7.1090] Victoria Police v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223; 30 VAR 212; [2008] VSCA 218........................................................................................................[2.3.820] Victorian Bar Inc v Perkins Ruling No 4 [2006] VCAT 460............... [2.7.1820] Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73......................................................................................... [2.7.1040] Viliamu v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 80 ATR 965; 53 AAR 380; [2010] AATA 884.......................................................................................... [2.7.2110] Visa Cancellation Applicant and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship, Re [2011] AATA 690...............................................................................[2.7.1690] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxviii

TABLE OF CASES

W Wade v Comcare (2002) 69 ALD 602; [2002] FCAFC 289................ [2.7.1230] Wade and Commissioner For Fair Trading [2011] ACAT 71............... [2.3.880] Wakim; Ex parte McNally, Re (1999) 198 CLR 511; 73 ALJR 839; [1999] HCA 27....................................................................................[2.1.160] Wallace v Health Commission (Vic) [1985] VR 403......... [2.3.1280], [2.3.2860] Wallis Lake Fisherman’s Co-op Ltd v ACN 079 830 595 Pty Ltd t/as Jolly Joe’s Fish “n” Chips (No 2) [2011] NSWADTAP 2....................... [2.7.1700] Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440.............................................[2.7.940] Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Mitchell [2010] QCA 264..............................[2.7.1090] Waratah Coal Pty Ltd and Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning [2012] QICmr 66........................................................[2.3.2365] Ward v Centrelink [2005] FCA 73.........................................................[2.3.2550] Ward v Family Care Meeting Convenor of Youth Court & Courts Administration Authority (SA) [2003] SADC 18..........[2.3.2210], [2.3.2230], [2.3.3270] Ward and Secretary of Department of Industry & Commerce, Re (1983) 8 ALD 324............................................................................................ [2.3.1280] Ward and Tasmania Police (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 1009-121 of 2011, 7 February 2011)..................................[2.3.2090] Warehouse Group, The v Bevendale (No 2) [2002] VSC 291.............[2.7.1220], [2.7.1310] Warren and Department of Defence, Re (1994) 54 FoI Review 86.... [2.3.3050] Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492......................................................................................... [2.3.750] Water Corporation v McKay [2010] WASC 210................. [2.3.640], [2.3.1910] Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; 61 ALJR 350.........[2.3.2350] Waterford and Department of Health (ACT), Re (unreported, ACTAAT, Curtis P, 75 of 1994, 6 February 1995)............................................[2.3.2710] Waterford and Department of Treasury, Re (1983) 5 ALD 193...........[2.3.3030] Waterford and Department of Treasury (No 2), Re (1984) 1 AAR 1..........................................................................................................[2.3.1865] Watson v ACT Planning & Land Authority (No 1) [2010] ACAT 5... [2.7.1490], [2.7.1700] Watson v ACT Planning & Land Authority (No 2) [2010] ACAT 7.... [2.7.1450] Watson v Offıce of Information Commissioner (Qld) [2015] QCATA 95.......................................................................................[2.3.920], [2.3.2080] Watson and Minister for Forestry, Re [2011] WAICmr 8.................... [2.3.1740] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxix

TABLE OF CASES

Wecker v Secretary of Department of Education Science & Training (2008) 168 FCR 272; [2008] FCAFC 108............. [2.7.1310], [2.7.1400], [2.7.1410] Wei v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 29 FCR 455......................................................................................... [2.1.310] Weldt v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 835........................................................................................................[2.1.140] Wells, Re v Department of Premier & Cabinet (2001) 18 VAR 293; [2001] VCAT 1800....................................................................... [2.3.850], [2.3.1910] Wels and Department of Premier & Cabinet, Re (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 99 of 2009, 29 September 2009).................................................................................................. [2.3.2510] West Australian Newspapers Ltd and Salaries and Allowances Tribunal (WA), Re [2007] WAICmr 20...................................................................... [2.3.2660] West Australian Newspapers Ltd and Western Power, Re [2006] WAICmr 10........................................................................................................[2.3.2120] Western Australian Planning Commission and Coogee General Store Pty Ltd, Re [2007] WASAT 182...................................................[2.7.1220], [2.7.1640] Western Australian Planning Commission and CPP Pty Ltd, Re [2006] WASAT 379....................................................................................... [2.7.1090] Western Australian Turf Club v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1978) 139 CLR 288; 52 ALJR 382; 8 ATR 489........................................ [2.3.1330] Whalley v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2003] NSWSC 273........... [2.3.340] Whalley v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2004] NSWSC 220........... [2.3.340] Whitely and Curtin University of Technology, Re [2008] WAICmr 24........................................................................................................[2.3.1910] Wignall and Commissioner of Police, Re [2006] WASAT 206............[2.7.1790] Wildcare Queanbeyan NSW Inc and Conservator of Flora & Fauna, Re [2011] ACAT 68...........................................[2.7.1110], [2.7.1120], [2.7.1790] Wilderness Society (WA) Inc and Department of Environment and Conservation, Re The [2011] WAICmr 24....................................... [2.3.1670] Williams and Registrar of Federal Court, Re (1985) 3 AAR 529.......[2.3.2520] Wilson v Department of Premier & Cabinet [2001] VCAT 663..........[2.3.1870] Wines and Valuer General, Re [2005] WASAT 263............................. [2.7.1830] Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 88 ALJR 52; [2013] HCA 43........................... [2.3.310], [2.3.420], [2.3.440] Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 295...............[2.7.1400], [2.7.1740] Winter v Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87........................................................................................................[2.7.1010] Wiseman v Commonwealth (unreported, FCA, Sheppard, Beaumont and [References are to paragraph numbers] lxx

TABLE OF CASES

Pincus JJ, 167 of 1989, 24 October 1989).................... [2.3.2490], [2.3.2540] Wiseman and Department of Transport, Re (1985) 4 AAR 83........... [2.3.3130], [2.3.3150] Wolsley and Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, Re (1985) 7 ALD 270......................................................................................................[2.3.2100] Wong; Ex Parte Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd, Re [2004] WASCA 247........................................................................................................[2.3.430] Woodyatt and Minister for Corrective Services, Re (1995) 2 QAR 383......................................................................................................[2.3.1280] Wright v Minister for Education, Employment & Training [2000] SADC 82........................................................................................................[2.3.3030] Wright v Valuer-General (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L45026/2008, 2009, 24 June 2009).......................................................................... [2.7.2250] Wytkin and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth), Re (2003) 52 ATR 1001; [2003] AATA 171.............................................................................. [2.3.3080]

X X v Community Services Commission [1999] NSWADT 26.................. [2.7.970] XFJ v Director of Public Transport [2009] VCAT 96......................... [2.7.1690] Xia v Wang & Bian [2009] ACAT 21................................................... [2.7.1280] Xu v Sydney West Area Health [2006] NSWADT 3............................. [2.7.1990] XYZ v State Trustees Ltd (2006) 25 VAR 402; [2006] VSC 444....... [2.7.1290], [2.7.1410], [2.7.2080]

Y YG & Governor General v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247......................................................................................................[2.7.1060] York v General Medical Assessment Tribunal (Qld) [2003] 2 Qd R 104; [2002] QCA 519.................................................................................. [2.3.310] Young v Callan [2004] TASSC 100.........................................................[2.3.410] Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85................... [2.3.2530], [2.3.2670], [2.3.3030] Youth & Family Focus Inc v Hughes [2007] TASSC 108..................... [2.3.420] YW87TN and Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2012] QICmr 2..........................................................................................................[2.3.2080]

Z Z v University of A (No 4) [2002] NSWADT 14..................................[2.7.1690] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxi

TABLE OF CASES

ZAA v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWCATAP 234.............. [2.7.1190] Zaidi v Health Care Complaints Commission (1998) 44 NSWLR 82................................................................................... [2.7.1310] Zampatti v Western Australian Planning Commission (2010) 176 LGERA 150; [2010] WASCA 149...........................................................................[2.7.1060] Zervos v Perpetual Nominees Ltd (2005) 23 VAR 145; [2005] VSC 380......................................................................................................[2.7.1520] Zeus & Ra Pty Ltd v Nicolaou (2003) 6 VR 606; [2003] VSCA 11...[2.7.1470] Zheng and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship, Re [2011] AATA 304......................................................................................................[2.7.1800] Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 371......... [2.7.2060] Zurich Bay Holdings Pty Ltd and City of Rockingham, Re [2006] WAICmr 12........................................................................................................[2.3.2660]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxii

Table of Legislation [References are to paragraph numbers]

Commonwealth of Australia Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 25C...............................[2.7.1470] s 25D...............[2.3.340], [2.3.350], [2.3.420] Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975...... [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.1.180], [2.3.300], [2.3.330], [2.3.340], [2.3.350], [2.7.990], [2.7.1060], [2.7.1120], [2.7.1150], [2.7.1240], [2.7.1330], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1480], [2.7.1520], [2.7.1610], [2.7.1660], [2.7.1880], [2.7.1890], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2060], [2.7.2080] s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

3(3).................................[2.7.970] 5......................................[2.7.930] 7(1).................................[2.7.930] 18B............................... [2.7.1140] 19A.................................[2.7.930] 25(1)..............[2.1.300], [2.7.960] 25(6)(a)........................ [2.7.1000] 25(6)(b)........................ [2.7.1000] 26(1).............................[2.7.1630] 27...............[2.7.1440], [2.7.1450] 27(1AG)....................... [2.7.1350] 27A...............................[2.7.1430] 28..................[2.3.340], [2.3.360], [2.7.1540] 29(1)..........[2.7.1470], [2.7.1480] 29(1)(d)........................ [2.7.1490] 29(2).............................[2.7.1490] 29(4).............................[2.7.1490] lxxiii

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

29(7).............................[2.7.1500] 30(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1460] 30(1A)....... [2.7.1510], [2.7.1520] 30(A)............................ [2.7.1510] 31(1).............................[2.7.1510] 32..................................[2.7.1660] 33(1).............................[2.7.1310] 33(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1010] 33(1)(c)..... [2.7.1250], [2.7.1400] 33(1AA)....................... [2.7.1650] 34A............[2.7.1350], [2.7.1670] 34A(1).......................... [2.7.1610] 34A(1A)....................... [2.7.1610] 34J................................ [2.7.1210] 35..................................[2.7.1150] 35(1).............................[2.7.1670] 35(2)......... [2.7.1150], [2.7.1350], [2.7.1670] s 35(5).............................[2.7.1670] s 35A...............................[2.7.1740] s 36..............[2.7.1150], [2.7.1330], [2.7.1350] s 36A............[2.7.1350], [2.7.1510] s 36B............ [2.7.1150], [2.7.1350] s 37................[2.3.340], [2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] s s s s s s s s

37(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1560] 37(1AF)........................[2.7.1350] 37(2).............................[2.7.1570] 38..................................[2.7.1570] 39..................................[2.7.1150] 39(1).......... [2.7.1150], [2.7.1200] 39(2)............................. [2.7.1150] 40..................................[2.7.1350]

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Pt IV Div 3..................... [2.7.1610]

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

40(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1740] 40(1)(c)..... [2.7.1220], [2.7.1740] 40(1A).......................... [2.7.1620] 40(1B).......................... [2.7.1620] 41(1).............................[2.7.1630] 41(2).............................[2.7.1640] 42A(1A)....................... [2.7.1840] 42A(2)(a)......................[2.7.1840] 42A(4).......................... [2.7.1840] 42A(5).......................... [2.7.1840] 42A(8).......................... [2.7.1870] 42B...............................[2.7.1840] 42C(1).......................... [2.7.1840] 42C(1)(c)......................[2.7.1880] 42D...............................[2.7.1840] 43....................................[2.3.415] 43(1).........[2.7.1400], [2.7.1890], [2.7.1900] s 43(2).............................[2.7.1910] s 43(2B)......... [2.3.340], [2.7.1910] s 44..............[2.7.2020], [2.7.2060], [2.7.2070], [2.7.2080], [2.7.2090] s 44(1).............................[2.7.2040] s 44(2A)(a)......................[2.7.2060] s 44(4)..........[2.7.2080], [2.7.2100] s 44(5).............................[2.7.2080] s 44(7).............................[2.7.2080] s 44A...............................[2.7.2050] s 60(3).............................[2.7.1350] s 62(4).............................[2.7.1350] s 62(6).............................[2.7.1350] s 66..................................[2.7.2110] s 69B............................... [2.7.2110] Pt IIIAA.......................... [2.7.2270]

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976................. [2.7.1140] reg 5(1)........................... [2.7.1470] reg 9................................ [2.7.1480] reg 19.............................. [2.7.2270] reg 19A........................... [2.7.2270] reg 19AA........................ [2.7.2270] reg 19B........................... [2.7.2270] Sch 1............................... [2.7.1470] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.... [2.1.10], [2.1.30], [2.1.160], [2.3.310], [2.3.350], [2.3.360], [2.3.370], [2.3.380], [2.3.450], [2.7.270], [2.7.280], [2.7.420], [2.7.770], [2.7.790], [2.7.2010], [2.7.2020] s 3(1)................[2.1.290], [2.7.270] s 5......................................[2.3.360] s 7......................................[2.1.310] s 10(1)(b).......................... [2.7.420] s 11..................................[2.7.1500] s 13..................[2.3.310], [2.3.340], [2.3.350], [2.3.360], [2.3.400], [2.3.450] s 13(1)...............................[2.3.360] s 13(11)............................. [2.3.360] Sch 2................ [2.3.360], [2.3.390] Sch 2 cl e..........................[2.3.360] Sch 2 cl f.......................... [2.3.360] Sch 3................................. [2.3.390] Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2000....................................... [2.1.180] Air Navigation Act 1920..... [2.3.2530] Air Navigation Regulations 1947..................................... [2.3.2530]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxiv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

Federal Court Rules 2011

Australian Federal Police Act 1979....................................... [2.7.250] Pt V Div 7........................ [2.7.250] Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010...............[2.3.180], [2.3.590], [2.3.600] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 s 54..................................[2.7.2110] Broadcasting Services Act 1992..................................... [2.7.1410] Constitution........... [2.1.20], [2.1.140], [2.7.1070] s 73......................................[2.1.10] s 75....................................[2.1.140] s 75(iii)..............................[2.1.140] s 75(v)................[2.1.10], [2.1.140] Corporations Act 2001........[2.3.1360] Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 s 113..................................[2.3.340] Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948 s 37..................................[2.3.3140] Evidence Act 1995................[2.3.450], [2.3.2350] s 3......................................[2.3.450] s 118................................[2.3.2350] s 119................................[2.3.2350] Pt 1....................................[2.3.450] Pt 3.2.................................[2.3.450]

r 31.03...............................[2.3.450] Pt 33 Div 33.1................ [2.7.2260] Pt 33 Div 33.2................ [2.7.2060] Freedom of Information Act 1982...... [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.3.180], [2.3.580], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.640], [2.3.730], [2.3.860], [2.3.930], [2.3.1060], [2.3.1070], [2.3.1100], [2.3.1120], [2.3.1130], [2.3.1210], [2.3.1220], [2.3.1230], [2.3.1240], [2.3.1260], [2.3.1280], [2.3.1290], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1540], [2.3.1560], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1710], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1800], [2.3.1970], [2.3.2160], [2.3.2240], [2.3.2250], [2.3.2340], [2.3.2370], [2.3.2400], [2.3.2460], [2.3.2500], [2.3.2570], [2.3.2600], [2.3.2790], [2.3.2820], [2.3.2930], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3020], [2.3.3040], [2.3.3080], [2.3.3210], [2.3.3230], [2.7.740], [2.7.790] s 3......................................[2.3.850] s 3(1).................................[2.3.920] s 3(1)(b)............................ [2.3.920] s 4................[2.3.1210], [2.3.1270], [2.3.2370]

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 19..................................[2.7.2230]

s 4(1)...........[2.3.1060], [2.3.1290], [2.3.3000] s 4(5)...............................[2.3.1590] s 4(10).............................[2.3.1580] s 5....................................[2.3.1560] s 5(1).................................[2.3.960] s 6C.................................[2.3.1070]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

7....................................[2.3.1430] 7(2A)............................ [2.3.1440] 7(2C)............................ [2.3.1440] 8....................................[2.3.1060] 8(2)(g).......................... [2.3.1120] 8A..............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1120] 8C(1)............................ [2.3.1220] 8D.................................[2.3.2970] 8D(2)(b)....................... [2.3.2970] 8D(3)............................ [2.3.2970] 9....................................[2.3.2980] 9A(b)............................ [2.3.1100] 11.................[2.3.700], [2.3.1060] 11(1)............................. [2.3.1270] 11(2)............................. [2.3.1520] 11A(4).......................... [2.3.2790] 11A(5)........ [2.3.730], [2.3.1510], [2.3.1810], [2.3.1950], [2.3.2790] 11B............ [2.3.1520], [2.3.1560] 11B(1)............................ [2.3.730] 11B(3).......................... [2.3.1520] 11B(3)(a)........................ [2.3.920] 11B(4)......... [2.3.730], [2.3.1520] 11B(5)........ [2.3.730], [2.3.1520], [2.3.1560] 12...............[2.3.1440], [2.3.3030] 13...............[2.3.1070], [2.3.1910] 13(1).............................[2.3.1070] 13(2).............................[2.3.1070] 13(3).............................[2.3.1070] 15..................................[2.3.2790] 15(2).............................[2.3.2790] 15(3).............................[2.3.2790] 15(4).............................[2.3.2790]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

15(5)(a)........................ [2.3.2790] 15(5)(b)........................ [2.3.2790] 15AC............................ [2.3.3230] 15AC(3)(a)...................[2.3.2790] 16..................................[2.3.2790] 17...............[2.3.2790], [2.3.2930] 20(1).............................[2.3.2790] 20(3).............................[2.3.2790] 21..................................[2.3.2790] 22..................................[2.3.2790] 24..................................[2.3.2790] 24A...............................[2.3.2790] 24AA(1)(a)...................[2.3.2790] 24AB(3)....................... [2.3.2790] 26..................................[2.3.2790] 26(1)(aa).......................[2.3.1520] 26A............[2.3.1630], [2.3.2830] 26A(1)(c)(ii)...................[2.3.730] 27...............[2.3.2830], [2.7.1430] 27(1)(b)(ii)..................... [2.3.730] 27A...............................[2.3.2830] 27A(1).......................... [2.3.2840] 27A(1)(b)(ii).................. [2.3.730] 28....................................[2.7.770] 29(1).............................[2.3.2790] 31A............[2.3.1500], [2.3.1520] 31B...............................[2.3.1810] 31B(b)......... [2.3.730], [2.3.1950] 33..............[2.3.1570], [2.3.1580], [2.3.1600]

s s s s s s s

33(a)............................. [2.3.1580] 33(a)(iii)....................... [2.3.1610] 33(b)..........[2.3.1580], [2.3.1620] 33A...............................[2.3.1670] 34(1)(a)(i).....................[2.3.1720] 34(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1720] 34(1)(c)........................ [2.3.1720]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

34(3).............................[2.3.1720] 34(4).............................[2.3.1750] 34(5).............................[2.3.1750] 34(6)(a)..... [2.3.1750], [2.3.1770] 36.................[2.3.2100], [2.7.770] 36(6)(a)........................ [2.3.1900] 37...............[2.3.2030], [2.3.2040] 37(1)(a)........................ [2.3.2120] 37(1)(c)........................ [2.3.2040] 37(2).............................[2.3.2040] 37(2)(b)........................ [2.3.2130] 38..............[2.3.2170], [2.3.2220], [2.7.770] 38(1A).......................... [2.3.2240] 38(2).............................[2.3.2240] 40..................................[2.3.1980] 41(1)...............................[2.3.890] 42(2).............................[2.3.2340] 42(3).............................[2.3.2340] 43(1)(c)(ii)......................[2.3.890] 45..................................[2.3.2250] 45(1).............................[2.3.2300] 46..................................[2.3.2360] 47..................................[2.3.2570] 47(1)(a)........................ [2.3.2650] 47(1)(b)..... [2.3.2590], [2.3.2660] 47B............[2.3.1630], [2.3.1670] 47C...........[2.3.1780], [2.3.1790], [2.7.770] 47C(2)(a)......................[2.3.1830] 47C(2)(b)......................[2.3.1830] 47C(3)(c)......................[2.3.1830] 47D...............................[2.3.2720] 47E............................... [2.3.1920] 47F........... [2.3.1220], [2.3.1520],

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2390] 47F(1).............................[2.3.890] 47F(2)...........................[2.3.2400] 47F(3)...........................[2.3.2420] 47G...............................[2.3.2570] 47G(1)(b)....................... [2.3.890] 47G(3).......................... [2.3.2720] 48..............[2.3.1060], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3010] 48(a)............................. [2.3.3020] 48(b).............................[2.3.3020] 48(c)............................. [2.3.3070] 48(d).............................[2.3.3070] 49..................................[2.3.3050] 50(2)(a)........................ [2.3.3080] 50(2)(b)........................ [2.3.3080] 50(3)..........[2.3.3080], [2.3.3140] 51..................................[2.3.3080] 51A...............................[2.3.3080] 51B(1).......................... [2.3.3080] 51B(2).......................... [2.3.3080] 53A...............................[2.3.3170] 53B..............[2.3.730], [2.3.3170] 53C...............................[2.3.3170] 54..................................[2.3.3170] 54A...............................[2.3.3170] 54B(1).......................... [2.3.3170] 54C(3).......................... [2.3.3170] 54C(4).......................... [2.3.3170] 54D...............................[2.3.3230] 54E(a)...........................[2.3.3170] 54E(b).......................... [2.3.3170] 54L............................... [2.3.3230] 54M.............................. [2.3.3230] 54N...............................[2.3.3230] 54S............................... [2.3.3230]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 93A.................................[2.3.610] Pt I.................................. [2.3.1260] Pt II............. [2.3.1100], [2.3.1120], [2.3.1430] Pt III................................[2.3.2790] Pt IV Div 2.................... [2.3.1500], [2.3.1540] Pt IV Div 3.................... [2.3.1500], [2.3.1540]

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

54W(b)......................... [2.3.3230] 54X(3).......................... [2.3.3230] 55(5)(c)........................ [2.3.3230] 55(6)(c)........................ [2.3.3040] 55D(1).......................... [2.3.3230] 55E............................... [2.3.3230] 55K...............................[2.3.3230] 55K(1).......................... [2.3.3230] 55K(2).......................... [2.3.3230] 55K(3).......................... [2.3.3230] 55K(4)(a)......................[2.3.3230] 55L(2).......................... [2.3.3230] 55T............................... [2.3.3230] 55U...............................[2.3.3230] 56..................................[2.3.3290] 57A...............................[2.3.3230] 57A(1).......................... [2.3.3230] 57A(2).......................... [2.3.3230] 58.................[2.3.900], [2.3.3230] 58(2).............................[2.3.3230] 58AA(1)....................... [2.3.3040] 58AA(1)(a)...................[2.3.3040] 58AA(1)(b).................. [2.3.3040] 58E............................... [2.3.3230] 61..................................[2.3.3230] 62..................................[2.3.3230] 63...............[2.3.3230], [2.7.1670] 64..................................[2.3.3230] 66..................................[2.3.3230] 66(1).............................[2.3.3280] 66(2).............................[2.3.3280] 66(2)(a)........................ [2.3.3280] 66(2)(b)........................ [2.3.3280] 66(2)(c)........................ [2.3.3280] 66(2)(d)........................ [2.3.3280]

Pt V................................. [2.3.2990] Sch 3............................... [2.3.2170] Freedom of Information Amendment Act 1991 s 45..................................[2.3.2250] Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010................[2.3.180], [2.3.600], [2.3.2980] s 11B(3).......................... [2.3.1520] s 129................................[2.3.3290] Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009............... [2.3.180], [2.3.770], [2.3.1120] Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2010.............. [2.3.1520] Freedom of Information (Removal of Conclusive Certificates and Other Measures) Act 2009..............[2.3.180], [2.3.600] Income Tax Assessment Act 1936..................................... [2.7.2260] Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 s 25.5...............................[2.7.2270] Judiciary Act 1903................ [2.1.140] s s s s

38(e)............................... [2.1.140] 39B...............................[2.7.2020] 39B(1)........... [2.1.140], [2.1.160] 39B(1A)......................... [2.1.160]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s 5(2).................................[2.7.200] s 5(2)(a)........... [2.7.240], [2.7.290]

s 39B(1A)(a).....................[2.1.160] s 39B(1A)(c).....................[2.1.160] s 44....................................[2.1.140]

s 5(2)(b)............................ [2.7.210] s 5(2)(ba).......................... [2.7.210] s 5(2)(d)............................ [2.7.330] s 5(3A).............................. [2.7.240]

Migration Act 1958 s 430................................[2.7.1910] s 474..................................[2.1.160] s 485..................................[2.1.140] s 501G...............................[2.3.450] Pt 8....................................[2.1.160] Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001...[2.1.160]

s 6(1)(a)............................ [2.7.400] s 6(1)(b)(i)........................ [2.7.410] s 6(1)(b)(ii)...... [2.7.370], [2.7.430] s 6(1)(b)(iii)...................... [2.7.440] s 6(1A).............................. [2.7.420] s 6(2).................................[2.7.420] s 6(3).................................[2.7.420] s 6(4).................................[2.7.420]

Native Title Act 1993 s 162(2).............................[2.3.420]

s 6C...................................[2.7.750] s 7(1).................................[2.7.380]

Ombudsman Act 1976............ [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.270], [2.7.300], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.420], [2.7.430], [2.7.460], [2.7.530], [2.7.580], [2.7.650], [2.7.690], [2.7.720], [2.7.780], [2.7.790]

s 7(3).................................[2.7.380]

s 3(1)...............[2.7.190], [2.7.210], [2.7.220] s 3(2).................................[2.7.190]

s 8(5)................[2.7.540], [2.7.550]

s 3(3).................................[2.7.190] s 3(5).................................[2.7.300] s 3A...................................[2.7.190] s 4A...................................[2.7.710] s 5......................................[2.1.300] s 5(1)................[2.1.290], [2.7.190] s 5(1)(a)............................ [2.7.370] s 5(1)(b)............................ [2.7.350] s 5(1)(c)............................ [2.7.190]

s 7(4).................................[2.7.380] s 7(5).................................[2.7.380] s 7A...................................[2.7.460] s 8......................................[2.7.500] s 8(1).................................[2.7.480] s 8(2)................[2.7.490], [2.7.760] s 8(3)................[2.7.450], [2.7.490] s 8(4).................................[2.7.490] s 8(5)(a)............................ [2.7.530] s 8(5)(b)............................ [2.7.540] s 8(9).................................[2.7.530] s 8(10)..............[2.7.300], [2.7.650] s 9.....................[2.7.450], [2.7.500] s 9(3).................................[2.7.520] s 9(3)(c)............................ [2.7.520] s 9(4).................................[2.7.520] s 11...................[2.7.580], [2.7.780] s 11A.................................[2.7.790] s 11A(1)............................ [2.7.790]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000...................................[2.1.10]

12(1)...............................[2.7.390] 14....................................[2.7.500] 15(1)...............................[2.7.570] 15(1)(a)(i)......[2.7.300], [2.7.580] 15(1)(a)(ii).....[2.7.290], [2.7.590] 15(1)(a)(iii).................... [2.7.600] 15(1)(a)(iv).....................[2.7.630] 15(1)(a)(v)......................[2.7.640] 15(1)(b).......................... [2.7.610] 15(1)(c)(i).......................[2.7.610] 15(1)(c)(ii)......................[2.7.620] 15(2).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680] 15(3)(a).......................... [2.7.680] 15(4)...............................[2.7.680] 15(5)...............................[2.7.530] 15(6)...............................[2.7.680] 16(1)...............................[2.7.690] 17....................................[2.7.700] 19(1)...............................[2.7.710] 19L................................. [2.7.150] 19ZI................................[2.7.150] 20C.................................[2.7.150] 33....................................[2.7.790] 35...................[2.7.760], [2.7.770] 36....................................[2.7.510] 37....................................[2.7.790]

Patents Act 1990

Private Health Insurance Act 2007....................................... [2.7.150] Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 s 8......................................[2.7.710] s 10....................................[2.7.710] s 46....................................[2.7.710] Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 63..................................[2.7.1430] Social Security Act 1991.....[2.3.2100] Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 Pt 4....................................[2.1.300] Taxation Administration Act 1953 s 14ZZ..........[2.7.2230], [2.7.2260] s 14ZZE.......................... [2.7.1670] s 14ZZK..........................[2.7.2270] s 14ZZO..........................[2.7.2270] s 14ZZO(a)..................... [2.7.2270] Pt IVC.............................[2.7.2260] Uniform Evidence Act s s s s

69....................................[2.3.450] 69(1)...............................[2.3.450] 69(3)...............................[2.3.450] 155..................................[2.3.450]

Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986

s 35(3).............................[2.7.2230] s 36(4).............................[2.7.2230] Privacy Act 1988....................[2.1.10], [2.3.1060], [2.3.1220], [2.3.2370], [2.3.3000] Sch 1................................... [2.1.10]

s 175................................[2.7.1480] Australian Capital Territory ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008...................[2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.7.950], [2.7.980], [2.7.1060],

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxx

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Australian Capital Territory – continued

s 38(2).............................[2.7.1670] s 39..................................[2.7.1670]

[2.7.1120], [2.7.1330], [2.7.1350], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1510], [2.7.1540], [2.7.1660], [2.7.1980], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2080] s 7(a)............ [2.7.1010], [2.7.1310]

s 39(2)(b)........................ [2.7.1670]

s 7(b)............................... [2.7.1150]

s 44(2)(c)........................ [2.7.1220]

s 8....................................[2.7.1310]

s 48(1).............................[2.7.2120]

s 9......................................[2.7.960]

s 48(2)(b)........................ [2.7.2120]

s 10..................................[2.7.1470]

ss 48(2)(b) – 48(2)(d).....[2.7.2120]

s 10(2).............................[2.7.1490]

s 53(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1640]

s 11.................[2.7.960], [2.7.1490]

s 53(2).............................[2.7.1640]

s 22A.................................[2.7.970]

s 54..................................[2.7.1210]

s 22B............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540]

s 55..................................[2.7.1840]

s 22C...............................[2.7.1570]

s 55(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1880]

s 22E............................... [2.7.1330]

s 56..................................[2.7.1840]

s 22H(1).......................... [2.7.1350]

s 60(2).............................[2.7.1910]

s 22H(2).......................... [2.7.1350]

s 60(3).............................[2.7.1910]

s 22L(2).......................... [2.7.1350]

s 60(4).............................[2.7.1220]

s 22Q...............................[2.7.1440]

s 67A...............................[2.7.1430]

s 23..................................[2.7.1310]

s 67B.................................[2.7.980]

s 26..............[2.7.1250], [2.7.1310], [2.7.1400] s 27(1).............................[2.7.1000]

s 68(2)..........[2.7.1400], [2.7.1890]

s 27(2).............................[2.7.1000]

s 82...............[2.7.1940], [2.7.1970]

s 29(3).............................[2.7.1460]

s 82(a)............................. [2.7.1980]

s 29(5)..........[2.7.1510], [2.7.1520]

s 82(b).............................[2.7.1980]

s 29(6).............................[2.7.1510]

s 83..................................[2.7.2060]

s 30..................................[2.7.1660]

s 86..................................[2.7.2040]

s 31..................................[2.7.1610]

s 88....................................[2.7.930]

s 32..................................[2.7.1840]

Pt 4A............[2.7.1040], [2.7.1510]

s 32(3).............................[2.7.1870]

Pt 4A Div 4A..................[2.7.1350]

s 33..................................[2.7.1610]

Pt 4A Div 4A.3...............[2.7.1350]

s 39(2)(c)........................ [2.7.1670] s 41(1).............................[2.7.1620] s 41(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1740] s 41(4).............................[2.7.1620]

s 68(3).............................[2.7.1900] s 79...............[2.7.1940], [2.7.1980]

s 34(3)..........[2.7.1350], [2.7.1670] s 35..................................[2.7.1610] s 38...............[2.7.1150], [2.7.1670] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

[2.3.2790], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3020], [2.3.3090], [2.3.3100], [2.3.3110], [2.3.3220], [2.7.740]

Australian Capital Territory – continued

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2009 reg 7................................ [2.7.1430] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989................... [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.1.290], [2.3.370] s 13...................[2.3.340], [2.3.370] Sch 2................................. [2.3.370] Sch 2 cl 2.1(a).................. [2.3.370] Annual Reports (Government Agencies) Act 2004 s 6(1).................................[2.7.710] Community Advocate Act 1991 s 19(2).............................[2.3.2210] Court Procedures Rules 2006 Pt 5.3...............................[2.7.2060] Div 2.14.1B.................... [2.7.2060] Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005....................................... [2.7.250] Evidence Act 2011................. [2.3.450] s 3......................................[2.3.450] Pt 1....................................[2.3.450] Pt 3.2.................................[2.3.450] Freedom of Information Act 1989...... [2.1.10], [2.3.170], [2.3.590], [2.3.740], [2.3.820], [2.3.960], [2.3.1010], [2.3.1020], [2.3.1120], [2.3.1290], [2.3.1300], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1600], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1800], [2.3.1940], [2.3.1970], [2.3.2210], [2.3.2250], [2.3.2340], [2.3.2570], [2.3.2600],

s 2(2).................................[2.3.920] s 3..................[2.3.955], [2.3.1270], [2.3.2370] s 4....................................[2.3.1300] s 6................[2.3.1300], [2.3.1430], [2.3.1440] s 6A.................................[2.3.1440] s 7.....................[2.3.953], [2.3.960] s 7(1)(a)(i).........................[2.3.955] s 7(1)(a)(ii)........................[2.3.955] s 7(1)(a)(iii)... [2.3.955], [2.3.1010] ss 7(1)(a)(iii) – 7(1)(a)(v).... [2.3.955], [2.3.1010] s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

7(1)(b)............................ [2.3.960] 8.....................[2.3.953], [2.3.960] 8(1).................................[2.3.955] 8(1)(a)...........................[2.3.1120] 8(2)(a)............................ [2.3.960] 10.................[2.3.953], [2.3.1270] 11(1)............................. [2.3.1440] 11(2)............................. [2.3.1440] 14..................................[2.3.2790] 14(1).............................[2.3.2790] 14(2)............[2.3.700], [2.3.2790] 14(3).............................[2.3.2790] 15..................................[2.3.2790] 16..................................[2.3.2790] 16(1).............................[2.3.2790] 17....................................[2.3.700] 17(2).............................[2.3.2790] 18(1)(c)........................ [2.3.2790] 18(1)(d)........................ [2.3.2790] 19(1).............................[2.3.2790]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Australian Capital Territory – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

19(3).............................[2.3.2790] 20.................[2.3.830], [2.3.2790] 21..................................[2.3.2790] 23(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2790] 23(5).............................[2.3.2790] 25...............[2.3.2790], [2.3.3170] 26..................................[2.3.2830] 27..................................[2.3.2830] 34.................[2.3.830], [2.3.1630] 34(2).............................[2.3.1650] 35(1)(a)........................ [2.3.1720] 35(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1720] 35(1)(d)........................ [2.3.1720] 35(2).............................[2.3.1750] 35(2)(c)........................ [2.3.1770] 36................[2.3.830], [2.3.1780], [2.3.1790]

s s s s s s s

36(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1810] 36(2).............................[2.3.1830] 36(3).............................[2.3.1830] 36(4)(c)........................ [2.3.1830] 36(5).............................[2.3.1850] 37..................................[2.3.2030] 37A...........[2.3.1570], [2.3.1600], [2.3.2940] 37A(2).......................... [2.3.2790] 38..................................[2.3.2170] 39.................[2.3.830], [2.3.2720] 40................[2.3.830], [2.3.1920], [2.3.2390] 40(2).............................[2.3.1940] 41...............[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380] 42..................................[2.3.2350] 42(2).............................[2.3.2340] 43..................................[2.3.2570]

s s s s s s s s s

s s s s s s s s s s

43(1)(a)........................ [2.3.1450] 43(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1450] 43(1)(c)........................ [2.3.1450] 43(1)(c)(i).......................[2.3.820] 43(3).............................[2.3.2720] 44....................................[2.3.830] 44(1)(a).......................... [2.3.820] 45..................................[2.3.2250] 46..................................[2.3.2360] 48..................[2.3.953], [2.3.960], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3010], [2.3.3070]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

48(a)............................. [2.3.3020] 48(b).............................[2.3.3020] 50(1).............................[2.3.3090] 50(2).............................[2.3.3090] 51...............[2.3.3090], [2.3.3170] 51(2).............................[2.3.3090] 51(4).............................[2.3.3090] 59(1).............................[2.3.3170] 59(2).............................[2.3.3170] 59(3)(a)........................ [2.3.3170] 59(4).............................[2.3.3170] 60..................................[2.3.3190] 60(2).............................[2.3.3190] 60(3)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3190] 60(4).............................[2.3.3190] 61(1)(b)........................ [2.3.3190] 62(1).............................[2.3.3190] 62(2).............................[2.3.3220] 62(3).............................[2.3.3190] 68...............[2.3.1630], [2.3.3190] 69..................................[2.3.3190] 69A...............................[2.3.3190] 71..................................[2.3.3190] 72(2).............................[2.3.3190] 73(1).............................[2.3.3190]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxiii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Australian Capital Territory – continued

Sch 1A............................ [2.3.1300] Sch 2............ [2.3.1300], [2.3.1430]

s 74(2).............................[2.3.3190] s 76..................................[2.3.3190] s 80..................................[2.3.2790] Pt 1....................................[2.3.955] Pt 3..................................[2.3.2790] Pt 5..................................[2.3.2990] Dictionary......................... [2.3.955]

Human Rights Act 2004...... [2.7.1350]

Freedom of Information Act 2016...... [2.1.10], [2.3.170], [2.3.590], [2.3.700], [2.3.740], [2.3.820], [2.3.830], [2.3.920], [2.3.960], [2.3.1010], [2.3.1020], [2.3.1120], [2.3.1270], [2.3.1290], [2.3.1300], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1450], [2.3.1570], [2.3.1600], [2.3.1630], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1720], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1770], [2.3.1780], [2.3.1800], [2.3.1810], [2.3.1830], [2.3.1850], [2.3.1920], [2.3.1940], [2.3.1970], [2.3.2030], [2.3.2170], [2.3.2210], [2.3.2250], [2.3.2340], [2.3.2350], [2.3.2360], [2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2390], [2.3.2570], [2.3.2600], [2.3.2720], [2.3.2790], [2.3.2830], [2.3.2940], [2.3.2990], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3010], [2.3.3020], [2.3.3070], [2.3.3090], [2.3.3100], [2.3.3110], [2.3.3220], [2.7.740]

Legislation Act 2001 s 2......................................[2.3.955] s 170................................[2.7.1350] s 171................................[2.7.1350] s 179...............[2.3.340], [2.7.1910] s 255................................[2.7.1470] Dictionary......................... [2.3.955] Ombudsman Act 1989............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.420], [2.7.430], [2.7.460], [2.7.520], [2.7.530], [2.7.580], [2.7.690], [2.7.720], [2.7.780], [2.7.790] s 3(1).................................[2.7.190]

Freedom of Information Regulation 1991.................... [2.3.590], [2.3.1300] Sch 1............................... [2.3.1300]

s 3(2).................................[2.7.190] s 4A...................................[2.7.710] s 5(1).................................[2.7.190] s 5(1)(a)............................ [2.1.290] s 5(1)(a)(i).........................[2.7.370] s 5(1)(b)............................ [2.7.350] s 5(2).................................[2.7.200] s 5(2)(a)........... [2.7.240], [2.7.290] s 5(2)(b)............................ [2.7.210] s 5(2)(l)............................. [2.7.330] s 5(4).................................[2.7.240] s 5(5).................................[2.7.240] s 6(1)(a)............................ [2.7.400] s 6(1)(b)(i)........................ [2.7.410] s 6(1)(b)(ii)...... [2.7.370], [2.7.430] s 6(1)(b)(iii)...................... [2.7.440] s 6(2).................................[2.7.420]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxiv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 18(2).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680] s 18(3)(a).......................... [2.7.680] s 18(4)...............................[2.7.680] s 18(5)...............................[2.7.530] s 18(6)...............................[2.7.680] s 19....................................[2.7.700] s 19(1)...............................[2.7.690] s 19(2)...............................[2.7.690] s 21....................................[2.7.710] s 31....................................[2.7.790] s 33....................................[2.7.760] s 35....................................[2.7.510] s 36....................................[2.7.790] Pt 2 Div 2.3...................... [2.7.250]

Australian Capital Territory – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

6(4).................................[2.7.420] 6(7).................................[2.7.420] 6A...................................[2.7.420] 7(1).................................[2.7.380] 7(3).................................[2.7.380] 7(4).................................[2.7.380] 7(5).................................[2.7.380] 8......................................[2.7.460] 9(1).................................[2.7.480] 9(3)................[2.7.490], [2.7.760] 9(4)................[2.7.450], [2.7.490] 9(5).................................[2.7.490] 9(6).................................[2.7.550] 9(6)(a)............................ [2.7.530] 9(6)(b)............................ [2.7.540] 9(11)............................... [2.7.530] 9(12)...............................[2.7.300] 11...................[2.7.450], [2.7.500] 11(5)(a)...........................[2.7.520] 11(5)(b).......................... [2.7.520] 11(6)............................... [2.7.520] 13...................[2.7.580], [2.7.780] 14....................................[2.7.790] 14(1)...............................[2.7.790] 15(1)(a).......................... [2.7.390] 17....................................[2.7.500] 18(1)...............................[2.7.570] 18(1)(a)(i)......[2.7.300], [2.7.580] 18(1)(a)(ii).....[2.7.290], [2.7.590] 18(1)(a)(iii).................... [2.7.600] 18(1)(a)(iv).....................[2.7.630] 18(1)(a)(v)......................[2.7.640] 18(1)(b).......................... [2.7.610] 18(1)(c)(i).......................[2.7.610] 18(1)(c)(ii)......................[2.7.620]

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012....................................... [2.7.370] s 11(1)(a)(iv).....................[2.7.370] Royal Commissions Act 1991..................................... [2.3.1300] Supreme Court Act 1933 s 20..................................[2.7.2240] Territory-owned Corporations Act 1990....................................... [2.7.190] Utilities Act 2000 s 43A...............................[2.7.1430] New South Wales Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997................... [2.7.950], [2.7.1510], [2.7.2030] s s s s s s

4....................................[2.7.1440] 6(1).................................[2.7.970] 6(3)...............................[2.7.1070] 8(2)...............................[2.7.1510] 9......................................[2.7.960] 48..................................[2.7.1430]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

s 49...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] s 52..................................[2.7.1570] s 53....................................[2.7.980] s 55....................................[2.7.980] s 58...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] s 58(4).............................[2.7.1570] s 59...............[2.7.1330], [2.7.1360] s 60(1).............................[2.7.1630] s 60(2).............................[2.7.1640] s 60(3).............................[2.7.1640] s 63(1).............................[2.7.1060] s 63(2)..........[2.7.1400], [2.7.1890] s 63(3).............................[2.7.1900] s 64..................................[2.7.1110] s 65..................................[2.7.1840] Ch 7 Pt 1........................ [2.7.2030] Administrative Decisions Review Regulation 2009 reg 5.................................. [2.7.980] Administrative Decisions Review Regulation 2014.................. [2.7.1140] Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Div 8.1.............................. [2.7.920] Adoption Act 2000 s 192..................................[2.7.980] s 192(8)(b)...................... [2.7.1430] s 193..................................[2.7.980] Anti-Discrimination Act 1977....................................... [2.7.920] Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013...... [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.7.950], [2.7.980], [2.7.1000], [2.7.1040], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2060], [2.7.2080]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

5(1).................................[2.7.970] 7......................................[2.7.930] 16....................................[2.7.930] 28(1)...............................[2.7.960] 28(2)(a).......................... [2.7.980] 28(2)(b)........................ [2.7.1040] 28(2)(d).......................... [2.7.980] 31..................................[2.7.1040] 32..................................[2.7.1940] 34..................................[2.7.2030] 35..................................[2.7.1000] 38(2)......... [2.7.1150], [2.7.1250], [2.7.1310], [2.7.1400] 38(3).............................[2.7.1360] 38(3)(b)........................ [2.7.1360] 38(4)..........[2.7.1010], [2.7.1310] 38(5).............................[2.7.1280] 38(6)(a)........................ [2.7.1410] 38(6)(b)........................ [2.7.1740] 38(6)(c)..... [2.7.1240], [2.7.1740] 40..................................[2.7.1490] 41..................................[2.7.1500] 41(1).............................[2.7.1500] 44(1)..........[2.7.1510], [2.7.1520] 44(4).............................[2.7.1510] 44(4)(a)........................ [2.7.1510] 45..................................[2.7.1660] 45(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1660] 46..................................[2.7.1620] 46(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1740] 46(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1240] 48(3)(b)........................ [2.7.1620] 49...............[2.7.1150], [2.7.1670] 49(2).............................[2.7.1670] 50..................................[2.7.1210] 51..................................[2.7.1220] 55(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1840]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

r r r r

New South Wales – continued

s 55(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1840] s 55(2).............................[2.7.1870] s 59..................................[2.7.1840] s 59(1).............................[2.7.1880] s 60..................................[2.7.2120] s 60(2).............................[2.7.2120] s 62(2).............................[2.7.1910] s 62(3).............................[2.7.1910] s 62(3)(b)........................ [2.7.1910] s 62(3)(c)........................ [2.7.1910] s 64..................................[2.7.1670] s 67..................................[2.7.1700] s 67(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1670] s 78..................................[2.7.2120] s 79(2).............................[2.7.1040] s 80(2)(b)........................ [2.7.1970] s 80(3).............................[2.7.1970] s 81(1).............................[2.7.2000] s 83(1).............................[2.7.2040] s 83(3)..........[2.7.2080], [2.7.2100] s 83(5).............................[2.7.2050] s 84..................................[2.7.2060] s 84(2)(b)........................ [2.7.2060] s 126................................[2.7.1670] Pt 6 Div 1....................... [2.7.1040] Pt 6 Div 2....................... [2.7.1940] Sch 3 cl 17......................[2.7.2040] Sch 3 cl 18......................[2.7.2040] Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013.................. [2.7.1140] Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014........................... [2.7.1140] r 13.................................. [2.7.1160] r 24(1)(a).........................[2.7.1470] r 24(1)(c).........................[2.7.1480]

24(3)(a).........................[2.7.1490] 24(4)............................. [2.7.1490] 26(2)............................. [2.7.1590] 27(b)............................. [2.7.1460]

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979........... [2.3.1190] Evidence Act 1995................[2.3.450], [2.7.1700] s 3......................................[2.3.450] s 9....................................[2.7.1360] s 10..................................[2.7.1360] s 128................................[2.7.1360] s 131................................[2.7.1670] Pt 1....................................[2.3.450] Pt 3.2.................................[2.3.450] Pt 3.10..........[2.7.1360], [2.7.1670] Freedom of Information Act 1989................. [2.3.2230], [2.3.2350], [2.3.2450], [2.3.2710], [2.3.2750], [2.3.3260], [2.7.920] s 5(2)(b)............................ [2.3.920] Sch 1 cl 9........................[2.3.1780] Government Information (Information Commissioner) Act 2009......[2.3.180], [2.3.590], [2.3.600] Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009... [2.1.10], [2.3.180], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.730], [2.3.770], [2.3.1070], [2.3.1130], [2.3.1140], [2.3.1170], [2.3.1180], [2.3.1200], [2.3.1210], [2.3.1220], [2.3.1230], [2.3.1260], [2.3.1270], [2.3.1380], [2.3.1390], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1550], [2.3.1560], [2.3.1600], [2.3.1630], [2.3.1660],

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s

[2.3.1740], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1790], [2.3.1920], [2.3.1960], [2.3.2180], [2.3.2240], [2.3.2350], [2.3.2370], [2.3.2450], [2.3.2570], [2.3.2640], [2.3.2710], [2.3.2720], [2.3.2750], [2.3.2790], [2.3.2970], [2.3.3170], [2.3.3260], [2.7.740], [2.7.760] 2(1)(e).......................... [2.3.1720] 3(1).................................[2.3.920] 4.................[2.3.1430], [2.3.2360] 4(1)...............................[2.3.1060] 5......................................[2.3.920] 6....................................[2.3.2180] 9..................[2.3.700], [2.3.1060], [2.3.1070] 9(1)............[2.3.1270], [2.3.1500] 12..................................[2.3.1180] 12(1)............[2.3.920], [2.3.1810] 12(2)..........[2.3.1520], [2.3.1560] 13................[2.3.730], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1510], [2.3.1520]

s 14..............[2.3.1180], [2.3.1390], [2.3.1520], [2.3.1630], [2.3.1690], [2.3.1860], [2.3.1960], [2.3.2170], [2.3.2250], [2.3.2370], [2.3.2570],

[2.3.1220], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1560], [2.3.1660], [2.3.1710], [2.3.1920], [2.3.2070], [2.3.2180], [2.3.2360], [2.3.2450], [2.3.2640], [2.3.2720] s 14(1).............................[2.3.1500] s 14(2)..........[2.3.1520], [2.3.1560]

s s s s s s s s s

15..................................[2.3.1520] 15(a)............................... [2.3.920] 15(b)..........[2.3.1520], [2.3.1560] 16..................................[2.3.2790] 17(d)...............................[2.3.610] 18...............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1130] 18(c)............................. [2.3.1060] 18(g)............................. [2.3.1180] 20..............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1130], [2.3.2970] s 22(2)............................. [2.3.1100] s 25..............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1170], [2.3.2970] s 26(1)............................. [2.3.1170] s 26(3)(a)........................ [2.3.1220] s 27..............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1140], [2.3.2970] s 27(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 27(2).............................[2.3.2790] s 28..................................[2.3.1140] s 29..................................[2.3.1150] s 30(1)............................. [2.3.1140] s 30(1)(a).........................[2.3.1140] s 30(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1140] s 30(1)(c).........................[2.3.1140] ss 30(1)(c) – 30(1)(e)..... [2.3.1140] s 30(1)(d)........................ [2.3.1140] s 30(2)............................. [2.3.1150] s 31...............[2.3.1140], [2.3.1150] s 32..................................[2.3.1160] s 34..................................[2.3.1160] s 38..................................[2.3.1160] s 39..................................[2.3.1160] s 40..................................[2.3.1160] s 41..................................[2.3.2790] s 41(1)(c)........................ [2.3.2790] s 42..................................[2.3.2790]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

s 43...............[2.3.1380], [2.3.2790] s 49..................................[2.3.2790] s 51(2).............................[2.3.2790] s 53..................................[2.3.2790] s 54(2)(a)........................ [2.3.2830] s 54(2)(b)........................ [2.3.2830] s 54(2)(c)........................ [2.3.2830] s 54(2)(d)..... [2.3.1630], [2.3.2830] s 55..................................[2.3.1520] s 57(1)..........[2.3.2790], [2.3.3230] s 58(1)(c)........................ [2.3.2790] s 58(1)(d)........................ [2.3.2790] s 60..................................[2.3.2790] s 61..................................[2.3.2790] s 63(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 74..................................[2.3.2790] s 78..................................[2.3.2790] s 80...............[2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] s 82(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 82(2).............................[2.3.3170] s 82(4).............................[2.3.3170] s 83(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 84(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 86(1)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] s 86(5).............................[2.3.3230] s 88..................................[2.3.3170] s 89..................................[2.3.3230] s 89(2).............................[2.3.3230] s 90..................................[2.3.3230] s 92..................................[2.3.3230] ss 92 – 95....................... [2.3.3230] s 97..................................[2.3.3230] s 100................................[2.3.3230] s 101(1)...........................[2.3.3230] s 101(2)...........................[2.3.3230]

s 105................................[2.3.3230] s 106................................[2.3.3230] s 107................................[2.3.3230] s 108(2)(a)...................... [2.7.2120] Pt 2 Div 1....................... [2.3.3260] Pt 3.................................. [2.3.1130] Pt 3 Div 4.... [2.3.1060], [2.3.1170] Pt 4..................................[2.3.2790] Pt 4 Div 2....................... [2.3.2790] Pt 4 Div 4....................... [2.3.2790] Pt 4 Div 5....................... [2.3.2790] Sch 1........... [2.3.1390], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1550] Sch 1 cl 1.....[2.3.1560], [2.3.2170] Sch 1 cl 2(1)...................[2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 2(1)(a).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 2(1)(b).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 2(1)(d).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 2(1)(e).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 2(2)(a).............. [2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 2(2)(b).............. [2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 2(3)...................[2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 2(4)...................[2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 2(4)(a).............. [2.3.1770] Sch 1 cl 2(4)(b).............. [2.3.1770] Sch 1 cl 5(1)...................[2.3.2340] Sch 1 cl 6........................[2.3.1380] Sch 1 cl 7........................[2.3.2070] Sch 1 cl 12...[2.3.1560], [2.3.2170] Sch 2............................... [2.3.1430] Sch 2 cl 2.......[2.3.2070], [2.7.760] Sch 4............................... [2.3.1860] Sch 4 cl 1........................[2.3.2450] Sch 4 cl 4.....[2.3.1220], [2.3.2450] Sch 4 cl 4(1)(a).............. [2.3.1070] Sch 4 cl 4(1)(b).............. [2.3.1070] Sch 4 cl 10......................[2.3.1060]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

Lotteries and Art Unions Act 1901 s 22A(2)............................ [2.7.970]

Sch Sch Sch Sch Sch

4 4 4 4 4

cl cl cl cl cl

11......................[2.3.1060] 12......................[2.3.1060] 12(1)(d)............ [2.3.1070] 12(2).................[2.3.1070] 12(3).................[2.3.1070]

s 22A(4)............................ [2.7.970] Ombudsman Act 1974............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.330], [2.7.340], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.420], [2.7.430], [2.7.480], [2.7.490], [2.7.520], [2.7.650], [2.7.660], [2.7.690], [2.7.790] s 5(1).................................[2.7.190] s 6(1).................................[2.1.290] s 12(1)...............................[2.7.370] s 12(1)(a).......................... [2.7.200] s 12(3)...............................[2.7.380] s 12(4)...............................[2.7.380] s 12(4A)............................ [2.7.380] s 13(1)..............[2.7.190], [2.7.350] s 13(4)...............................[2.7.440] s 13(4)(b)(i)...................... [2.7.410] s 13(4)(b)(iii).................... [2.7.340] s 13(4)(b)(iv).................... [2.7.400] s 13(4)(b)(v)......................[2.7.420] s 13(4)(b)(vi)... [2.7.370], [2.7.430] s 13(5)...............................[2.7.420] s 13A.................................[2.7.490] s 13AA..............................[2.7.460] s 13AA(1)......................... [2.7.350] s 13AA(2)......................... [2.7.350] s 15(1)...............................[2.7.390] s 16(1)(a).......................... [2.7.480] s 16(1)(b).......................... [2.7.480] s 17...................[2.7.490], [2.7.760] s 18....................................[2.7.450] s 19....................................[2.7.450]

Government Information (Public Access) Bill 2009..................[2.3.770], [2.3.1070] Government Information (Public Access) (Consequential Amendments and Repeal) Act 2009...........[2.3.180], [2.3.600] Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009.... [2.3.1100], [2.3.1180], [2.3.2970] reg 3................................ [2.3.1180] Sch 1............ [2.3.1180], [2.3.1190] Sch 1 cl 1(1)................... [2.3.1190] Sch 1 cl 1(2)................... [2.3.1190] Sch 1 cl 1(3)................... [2.3.1190] Sch 1 cl 2........................[2.3.1190] Sch 1 cl 3........................[2.3.1190] Sch 1 cl 4........................[2.3.1190] Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002.................[2.3.2450] Interpretation Act 1987....... [2.3.1070] s 80..................................[2.7.1470] Legal Profession Act 2004 s 602................................[2.7.1700] Liquor Act 2007 s 144H(6)........................ [2.7.1080] Local Government Act 1993..................................... [2.3.1190]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xc

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Pt 4A.................................[2.7.800] Sch 1................................. [2.7.200] Sch 1 Item 1(b)............... [2.7.240], [2.7.290] Sch 1 Item 2..................... [2.7.210] Sch 1 Item 2(a).................[2.7.210] Sch 1 Item 2(b)................ [2.7.220] Sch 1 Item 3..................... [2.7.220] Sch 1 Item 6..................... [2.7.230] Sch 1 Item 7..................... [2.7.230] Sch 1 Item 8..................... [2.7.230] Sch 1 Item 12(a)...............[2.7.330] Sch 1 Item 13................... [2.7.320] Sch 1 Item 20................... [2.7.220]

New South Wales – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s

19(2)...............................[2.7.500] 20....................................[2.7.500] 21(2)...............................[2.7.520] 21(3)...............................[2.7.520] 21A.................................[2.7.520] 22....................................[2.7.520] 24(1)..............[2.7.490], [2.7.540] 24(2)..............[2.7.540], [2.7.550] 24(2)(b).......................... [2.7.530] 25(2)...............................[2.7.530] 25H(1)............................ [2.7.370] 25X(1)............................ [2.7.370] 26(1).............[2.7.560], [2.7.570], [2.7.680]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

26(1)(a)......... [2.7.300], [2.7.580] 26(1)(b)......... [2.7.290], [2.7.590] 26(1)(c).......................... [2.7.600] 26(1)(d).......................... [2.7.610] 26(1)(e).......................... [2.7.630] 26(1)(f)...........................[2.7.620] 26(1)(g).......................... [2.7.640] 26(2)...............................[2.7.670] 26(3)..............[2.7.560], [2.7.680] 26(5)...............................[2.7.680] 27....................................[2.7.700] 27(1)...............................[2.7.690] 28....................................[2.7.300] 29....................................[2.7.720] 30(1)...............................[2.7.710] 31AB.............................. [2.7.650] 34....................................[2.7.760] 35A.................................[2.7.790] 35A(1)............................ [2.7.790] 35B.................................[2.7.790] 37....................................[2.7.510]

Police Act 1990.... [2.7.250], [2.7.320] s 121..................................[2.7.320] s 139..................................[2.7.320] ss 139 – 141..................... [2.7.320] Pt 8A Div 5...................... [2.7.250] Pts 8A Div 5 – 8.............. [2.7.250] Police Service (Complaints) Amendment Act 1994............ [2.7.320] Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998............[2.3.2450], [2.7.1850] Retail Leases Act 1994..........[2.7.920] Security Industry Act 1997 s 29(3)............................. [2.7.1150] State Owned Corporations Act 1989....................................... [2.7.190] Supreme Court Act 1970 s 23..................................[2.7.2240] s 69......................................[2.1.10] s 69(3)...............................[2.3.440] Taxation Administration Act 1996 s 97..................................[2.7.2240]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xci

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

ss 11(1)(b) – 11(1)(d)....... [2.3.955] s 11(2)............................... [2.3.960] s 11(3)............................... [2.3.960] s 12..................................[2.3.1440] s 15.................[2.3.953], [2.3.1270] s 17(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 18(2).............................[2.3.2790] s 18(2A).......................... [2.3.2790] s 19....................................[2.3.700] s 19(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 29..................................[2.3.2790] s 30...............[2.3.1630], [2.3.2830] s 31.................[2.3.953], [2.3.3000] s 34...............[2.3.1640], [2.3.3070] s 38..................................[2.3.3170] s 39(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 39(2).............................[2.3.3170] s 40(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 40(2)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3190] s 41(a)............................. [2.3.3170] s 43..................................[2.3.1480] s 45(1)(a)(i).....................[2.3.1720] s 45(1)(a)(ii)...................[2.3.1720], [2.3.1730]

New South Wales – continued

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 59.9.................................[2.3.375] Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Act 1992................. [2.3.1430], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1450] Pt 4 Div 2....................... [2.3.1450] Pt 4 Div 3....................... [2.3.1450] Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011............ [2.3.450] s 3......................................[2.3.450] Pt 1....................................[2.3.450] Pt 3.2.................................[2.3.450] Information Act 2002............. [2.1.10], [2.3.170], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.740], [2.3.770], [2.3.960], [2.3.970], [2.3.1020], [2.3.1270], [2.3.1280], [2.3.1480], [2.3.1570], [2.3.1600], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1770], [2.3.1820], [2.3.1900], [2.3.2350], [2.3.2430], [2.3.2600], [2.3.2790], [2.3.2800], [2.3.3000], [2.7.740] s 1(b)...............................[2.3.1950] s 3(2).................................[2.3.730] s 4...[2.3.190], [2.3.955], [2.3.960], [2.3.2370], [2.3.3000] s 5.................[2.3.1280], [2.3.1430] s 5(5)...............................[2.3.1430] s 6......................................[2.3.955] s 11....................................[2.3.953] s 11(1)(a)...........................[2.3.955] s 11(1)(b).......................... [2.3.955]

s 45(1)(a)(iii).................. [2.3.1720] s 45(1)(a)(iv)...................[2.3.1720] s 45(1)(a)(v)...................[2.3.1720], [2.3.1750] s 45(1)(a)(vi)...................[2.3.1720] s 45(1)(a)(vii).................[2.3.1720], [2.3.1730] s 45(2).............................[2.3.1750] s 45(3).............................[2.3.1750] s 46...............[2.3.1640], [2.3.2030] s 46(1)(a)........................ [2.3.1570] s 46(3).............................[2.3.2050] s 47E(c)...........................[2.3.1980]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xcii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Pt 3 Div 3....................... [2.3.2990] Pt 4 Div 2...... [2.3.770], [2.3.1570] Pt 4 Div 3....................... [2.3.1570] Pt 5....................................[2.3.190] Sch 1............................... [2.3.2170]

Northern Territory – continued

s s s s s s

48..................................[2.3.2170] 49(c)............................. [2.3.2360] 49(e)............................. [2.3.2360] 49(f)..............................[2.3.2360] 50...............[2.3.1480], [2.3.1950] 50(1)...........[2.3.830], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1810] s 51..............[2.3.1570], [2.3.1600], [2.3.1630], [2.3.1670] s 52..................................[2.3.1790] s 52 ................................ [2.3.1780] s 52(2).............................[2.3.1830] s 52(3).............................[2.3.1830] s 52(4).............................[2.3.1840] s 52(5)..........[2.3.1480], [2.3.1820] s 52(5)(c)........................ [2.3.1910] s 53..................................[2.3.1920] s 55..................................[2.3.2250] s 56...............[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380] s 56(1)(a)........................ [2.3.2390] s 56(2).............................[2.3.2430] s 57....................................[2.3.830] s 57(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2570] s 57(3).............................[2.3.2720] s 57(3)(b)........................ [2.3.2570] s 58..................................[2.3.2720] s 62..................................[2.3.3190] s 103................................[2.3.3190] s 105................................[2.3.3190] s 106(3)(a)...................... [2.3.3190] s 114................................[2.3.3190] s 116................................[2.3.3190] s 125................................[2.3.3190] Pt 3....................................[2.3.190] Pt 3 Div 2....................... [2.3.2790]

Information Regulations.......[2.3.590], [2.3.2790] Interpretation Act 1979 s 68..................................[2.7.1470] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014................. [2.7.1400], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1640], [2.7.1660], [2.7.1940], [2.7.2040] s 3......................................[2.7.950] s 5(1)...............................[2.7.1000] s 5(2)...............................[2.7.1000] s 7......................................[2.7.930] s 30....................................[2.7.960] s 31(b).............................[2.7.1040] s 33..................................[2.7.1040] s 34(2).............................[2.7.1430] s 35...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] s 36..................................[2.7.1570] s 38..................................[2.7.1330] s 41..................................[2.7.1540] s 43..................................[2.7.1630] s 44(1).............................[2.7.1630] s 44(2).............................[2.7.1640] s 45..................................[2.7.1040] s 46..................................[2.7.1040] s 46(1).............................[2.7.1060] s 46(3).............................[2.7.1080] s 47..................................[2.7.1650] s 48..................................[2.7.1110] s 49..................................[2.7.1840] s 50..................................[2.7.1900]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xciii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

Northern Territory – continued

s 53(1).............................[2.7.1310] s 53(2)(a).........................[2.7.1150] s 53(2)(b).... [2.7.1250], [2.7.1310], [2.7.1400] s 53(2)(d)........................ [2.7.1410] s 54..................................[2.7.1280] s 56(a)............................. [2.7.1740] s 57..................................[2.7.1220] s 60..................................[2.7.1670] s 62(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1670] s 62(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1670] ss 62(1)(b) – 62(1)(e)..... [2.7.1670] s 69(2).............................[2.7.1210] s 71..................................[2.7.1363] s 72..................................[2.7.1363] s 74..................................[2.7.1750] s 78..................................[2.7.1470] s 80..................................[2.7.1870] s 89..................................[2.7.1620] s 92..................................[2.7.1620] s 92(a)............................. [2.7.1740] s 94..................................[2.7.1490] s 94(3).............................[2.7.1490] s 94(6).............................[2.7.1500] s 96(3).............................[2.7.1610] s 100(2)...........................[2.7.1840] s 101................................[2.7.1840] s 102................................[2.7.1840] s 103................................[2.7.1840] s 105(2)...........................[2.7.1910] s 107................................[2.7.1610] s 111................................[2.7.1670] s 112................................[2.7.1840] s 112(3)........................... [2.7.1880] s 118................................[2.7.1610]

122................................[2.7.1840] 122(3)...........................[2.7.1880] 123................................[2.7.1840] 123(2)...........................[2.7.1880] 126................................[2.7.1840] 126(3)...........................[2.7.1880] 127(1)(c)...................... [2.7.1460] 128................................[2.7.1510] 128(1)(a)...................... [2.7.1520] 128(1)(b)...................... [2.7.1520] 128(1)(c)...................... [2.7.1520] 129................................[2.7.1510] 129(1)...........................[2.7.1510] 130(1)...........................[2.7.1660] 131................................[2.7.2120] 132................................[2.7.2120] 133................................[2.7.2120] 139................................[2.7.1140] 141(3)(c)(i)...................[2.7.2080] 142................................[2.7.2050] 149................................[2.7.1900]

Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulations.......................... [2.7.1140] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2016..................................... [2.7.1140] r 4(2)............................... [2.7.1470] r 5....................................[2.7.1480] r 5(2)............................... [2.7.1470] r 5(5)............................... [2.7.1600] r 6....................................[2.7.1590] r 6(1)(b).......................... [2.7.1600] Ombudsman Act 2009............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.320], [2.7.370],

[References are to paragraph numbers] xciv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Northern Territory – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

[2.7.380], [2.7.420], [2.7.430], [2.7.460], [2.7.530], [2.7.690], [2.7.720] 3......................................[2.7.190] 4.....................[2.7.190], [2.7.220] 5.....................[2.7.190], [2.7.220] 6......................................[2.7.190] 6(1).................................[2.1.290] 14....................................[2.7.250] 14(1)..............[2.1.290], [2.7.190] 14(1)(b).......................... [2.7.350] 15...................[2.7.200], [2.7.520] 15(1)(a)......... [2.7.240], [2.7.290] 15(1)(b).......................... [2.7.240] 16....................................[2.7.200] 16(1)...............................[2.7.210] 16(1)(a)......... [2.7.210], [2.7.220] 16(1)(b)......... [2.7.210], [2.7.220] 16(1)(c).......................... [2.7.230] 16(1)(g).......................... [2.7.330] 16(1)(h).......................... [2.7.220] 17....................................[2.7.360] 20....................................[2.7.790] 21(1)...............................[2.7.320] 23(2)...............................[2.7.380] 25(3)...............................[2.7.400] 26....................................[2.7.380] 28....................................[2.7.460] 28(1)...............................[2.7.460] 33(a)(ii).......................... [2.7.410] 33(a)(iii)......................... [2.7.410] 33(b)..............[2.7.370], [2.7.430] 33(d)...............................[2.7.440] 34....................................[2.7.420]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

35....................................[2.7.420] 35(1)...............................[2.7.420] 36....................................[2.7.390] 47....................................[2.7.480] 47(a)............................... [2.7.480] 49(1)..............[2.7.490], [2.7.760] 49(3)...............................[2.7.490] 50(2)...............................[2.7.530] 52...................[2.7.450], [2.7.500] 53...................[2.7.450], [2.7.500] 54(a)............................... [2.7.500] 58....................................[2.7.560] 59....................................[2.7.570] 59(1)(a)(i)......[2.7.300], [2.7.580] 59(1)(a)(ii).....[2.7.290], [2.7.590] 59(1)(a)(iii).................... [2.7.600] 59(1)(a)(v)......................[2.7.610] 59(1)(a)(vi).....................[2.7.620] 59(1)(a)(vii)....................[2.7.630] 59(1)(a)(viii).................. [2.7.640] 60....................................[2.7.300] 63....................................[2.7.670] 63(2)...............................[2.7.680] 63(3)(a)......... [2.7.680], [2.7.690] 63(4)..............[2.7.680], [2.7.700] 64....................................[2.7.720] 65....................................[2.7.250] 66....................................[2.7.250] 67....................................[2.7.250] 67(1)(b).......................... [2.7.370] 89....................................[2.7.450] 100..................................[2.7.540] 100(2)............[2.7.530], [2.7.550] 101(1)(a)(ii)....................[2.7.590] 101(3).............................[2.7.670] 103(1)(b)(ii)................... [2.7.680] 104(3)............[2.7.690], [2.7.700]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xcv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Northern Territory – continued

s s s s s s s s s

Government Owned Corporations Act 1993

117.................[2.7.370], [2.7.520] 118..................................[2.7.520] 120..................................[2.7.760] 124..................................[2.7.510] 126..................................[2.7.510] 129..................................[2.7.510] 152..................................[2.7.710] 160..................................[2.7.790] 160(1).............................[2.7.790]

Ombudsman (Northern Territory) Act 1978

s 157..................................[2.7.190] Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 s 107................................[2.7.1150] Health Services Act 1991 s 62A...............................[2.3.2180] s 62B...............................[2.3.2180] Information Privacy Act 2009.... [2.3.180], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.2450] s 12...............[2.3.1210], [2.3.2450] Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 3................[2.3.2450] Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 4................[2.3.2450] Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 5................[2.3.2450] Sch 3 Pt 4 cl 6................[2.3.2450] Sch 4 cl 6(2)...................[2.3.2450]

s 13(1)...............................[2.1.290] Residential Tenancies Act 1999....................................... [2.7.930] Supreme Court Act 1979 s 14..................................[2.7.2240]

Judicial Review Act 1991.......[2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.3.380]

Queensland

s 4......................................[2.1.290] Pt 4....................................[2.3.340] Sch 2................................. [2.3.380] Sch 2 cl 1..........................[2.3.380]

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 27B..............[2.3.340], [2.7.1910] s 36..................................[2.3.1060] s 49..................................[2.7.1470] Adult Proof of Age Card Act 2008 s 40..................................[2.7.1430] Constitution of Queensland 2001 s 58..................................[2.7.2240] Evidence Act 1977 s 79..................................[2.7.1700] Financial Accountability Act 2009

Ombudsman Act 2001............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.250], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.420], [2.7.430], [2.7.530], [2.7.690], [2.7.790] s 7(1)................[2.1.290], [2.7.190]

s 63....................................[2.7.710] Freedom of Information Act 1992....................................... [2.3.600]

s 8......................................[2.7.190] s 8(1).................................[2.7.210] s 9(2).................................[2.7.200] s 9(2)(c)............................ [2.7.210] s 12....................................[2.7.190]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xcvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

12(a)............................... [2.1.290] 12(a)(iii)......................... [2.7.350] 14...................[2.7.190], [2.7.210] 16....................................[2.7.200] 16(1)..............[2.7.240], [2.7.290] 16(2)(a).......................... [2.7.220] 16(2)(b).......................... [2.7.230] 16(2)(c).......................... [2.7.250] 16(2)(d).......................... [2.7.250] 17....................................[2.7.790] 19....................................[2.7.360] 20(1)(a).......................... [2.7.380] 20(1)(c).......................... [2.7.400] 20(3)(a).......................... [2.7.380] 20(3)(c).......................... [2.7.400] 20(3)(d).......................... [2.7.470] 20(6)...............................[2.7.380] 21....................................[2.7.370] 22....................................[2.7.460] 23(1)(b).......................... [2.7.410] 23(1)(c)......... [2.7.370], [2.7.430] 23(1)(d).......................... [2.7.420] 23(1)(e).......................... [2.7.420] 23(1)(e)(ii)......................[2.7.440] 23(1)(e)(f)...................... [2.7.440] 23(2)...............................[2.7.420] 23(4)...............................[2.7.390] 24....................................[2.7.450] 25....................................[2.7.450] 25(2)(a)......... [2.7.490], [2.7.760] 25(2)(d).......................... [2.7.490] 26(2)...............................[2.7.530] 26(3)..............[2.7.530], [2.7.550] 27(1)...............................[2.7.480] 28...................[2.7.450], [2.7.500]

s 29...................[2.7.450], [2.7.500] s 34....................................[2.7.500] s 41....................................[2.7.510] ss 41 – 43......................... [2.7.510] s 45....................................[2.7.520] s 46(1)...............................[2.7.520] s 46(3)...............................[2.7.520] s 49(2)...............................[2.7.570] s 49(2)(a)......... [2.7.300], [2.7.580] s 49(2)(b)......... [2.7.290], [2.7.590] s 49(2)(c).......................... [2.7.600] s 49(2)(d).......................... [2.7.610] s 49(2)(e).......................... [2.7.620] s 49(2)(f)...........................[2.7.630] s 49(2)(g).......................... [2.7.640] s 50(1).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680] s 50(2)...............................[2.7.300] s 50(3)...............................[2.7.680] s 51(2)(a).......................... [2.7.680] s 51(2)(b).......................... [2.7.680] s 51(3)...............................[2.7.690] s 51(4)...............................[2.7.700] s 55(2)..............[2.7.540], [2.7.550] s 57....................................[2.7.720] s 59....................................[2.7.800] s 67....................................[2.7.800] s 83(2)...............................[2.7.710] s 85....................................[2.7.710] s 87....................................[2.7.710] s 88....................................[2.7.800] s 89....................................[2.7.800] s 92....................................[2.7.760] s 93....................................[2.7.790] s 93(1)...............................[2.7.790] s 93(2)...............................[2.7.790]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xcvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009...............[2.7.1120], [2.7.1320], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1880], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2060], [2.7.2090] s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

6......................................[2.7.960] 6(4)...............................[2.7.1000] 6(7)...............................[2.7.1000] 7(2)...............................[2.7.1000] 9......................................[2.7.960] 9(2)(b).......................... [2.7.1040] 17(2)...............................[2.7.970] 19(c).......... [2.7.1400], [2.7.1890] 20...............[2.7.1060], [2.7.1650] 21..................................[2.7.1660] 21(1).............................[2.7.1630] 21(2)(a)........................ [2.7.1540] 21(2)(b)........................ [2.7.1200] 21(3).............................[2.7.1570] 21(4).............................[2.7.1570] 21(6).............................[2.7.1320] 22(3).............................[2.7.1640] 22(4).............................[2.7.1640] 24(1).............................[2.7.1900] 25(b).............................[2.7.1040] 28..................................[2.7.1310] 28(1).............................[2.7.1740] 28(2).............................[2.7.1010] 28(3)............................. [2.7.1150] 28(3)(c).... [2.7.1250], [2.7.1400], [2.7.1740]

s s s s s

28(3)(e)........................ [2.7.1410] 29..................................[2.7.1280] 30..................................[2.7.1280] 32..................................[2.7.1840] 32(2).............................[2.7.1210]

s 33..................................[2.7.1470] s 33(1).............................[2.7.1480] s 33(3).............................[2.7.1490] s 40(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1460] s 41(1).............................[2.7.1510] s 41(2).............................[2.7.1510] s 42..................................[2.7.1510] s 42(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1520] s 42(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1520] s 42(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1520] s 43..................................[2.7.1660] s 46..................................[2.7.1840] s 47..................................[2.7.1840] s 47(2)(c)........................ [2.7.2120] s 48..................................[2.7.1840] s 48(2)(c)........................ [2.7.2120] s 57(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1220] s 61(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1500] s 61(3).............................[2.7.1500] s 62...............[2.7.1600], [2.7.1610] s 62(5).............................[2.7.1320] s 63..................................[2.7.1620] s 63(3).............................[2.7.1320] s 66..................................[2.7.1670] s 69..................................[2.7.1610] s 72..................................[2.7.1840] s 72(5).............................[2.7.1870] s 74..................................[2.7.1320] s 74(1).............................[2.7.1670] s 75..................................[2.7.1610] s 83(1)..........[2.7.1320], [2.7.1670] s 84..................................[2.7.1840] ss 84 – 86....................... [2.7.1840] s 90...............[2.7.1150], [2.7.1670] s 90(2).............................[2.7.1670] s 95(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1240] s 95(2)(b)........................ [2.7.1240]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xcviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

97..................................[2.7.1620] 98(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1740] 98(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1240] 98(2).............................[2.7.1320] 98(3).............................[2.7.1320] 100................................[2.7.2120] 102(1)...........................[2.7.2120] 102(3)...........................[2.7.2120] 122................................[2.7.1910] 142................................[2.7.1940] 146.............[2.7.1940], [2.7.2000] 147................................[2.7.1970] 147(3)...........................[2.7.2000] 149.............[2.7.2040], [2.7.2060] 150.............[2.7.2040], [2.7.2060] 151(2)(a)...................... [2.7.2060] 151(2)(b)...................... [2.7.2060] 153................................[2.7.2080] 153(2)...........................[2.7.2100] 154................................[2.7.2080] 157.............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1430] 157(2)(b)...................... [2.7.1540] 161..................................[2.7.930] 226................................[2.7.1140]

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009............ [2.7.1140] r 7....................................[2.7.1470] r 10..................................[2.7.1470] r 44..................................[2.7.1590] Pt 9 Div 2....................... [2.7.2120] Retirement Villages Act 1999....................................... [2.7.920] Right to Information Act 2009...... [2.1.10], [2.3.180], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.730],

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

[2.3.850], [2.3.920], [2.3.930], [2.3.1040], [2.3.1070], [2.3.1200], [2.3.1210], [2.3.1230], [2.3.1360], [2.3.1380], [2.3.1390], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1510], [2.3.1540], [2.3.1550], [2.3.1560], [2.3.1630], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1660], [2.3.1680], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1780], [2.3.1790], [2.3.1900], [2.3.1920], [2.3.1960], [2.3.2070], [2.3.2180], [2.3.2290], [2.3.2365], [2.3.2370], [2.3.2570], [2.3.2600], [2.3.2640], [2.3.2720], [2.3.2860], [2.7.740], [2.7.920] 2(5)...............................[2.3.1720] 3......................................[2.3.920] 3(1).................................[2.3.730] 3(2).................................[2.3.920] 12..................................[2.3.1060] 12(2).............................[2.3.1060] 13..................................[2.3.1060] 16(2).............................[2.3.1430] 18..................................[2.3.3230] 20..................................[2.3.1060] 20(2).............................[2.3.1230] 21..................................[2.3.1060] 21(1).............................[2.3.1060] 23...............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1270] 24..................................[2.3.2790] 27..................................[2.3.2860] 33..................................[2.3.2790] 36..................................[2.3.2420] 37...............[2.3.1630], [2.3.2830] 38..................................[2.3.2790]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xcix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s s s s s s s s s s s

Queensland – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

39..................................[2.3.2250] 39(1)...............................[2.3.730] 39(2)...............................[2.3.730] 39(3)...............................[2.3.920] 41..................................[2.3.2790] 43..................................[2.3.1380] 44(1)...............................[2.3.730] 44(2)...............................[2.3.730] 44(4)...............................[2.3.920] 45....................................[2.3.700] 47(3)(a)........................ [2.3.2790] 47(3)(b)....... [2.3.730], [2.3.2790] 47(3)(e)........................ [2.3.2790] 47(3)(f).........................[2.3.2790] 48..................................[2.3.1500] 48(1)............[2.3.730], [2.3.1500] 48(2)...............................[2.3.730] 49................[2.3.730], [2.3.1380], [2.3.1510] s 49(1)............[2.3.730], [2.3.1510] s 49(2)...............................[2.3.730] s 49(3).........[2.3.1500], [2.3.1520], [2.3.1560]

54...............[2.3.2790], [2.3.2800] 54(2)...............................[2.3.730] 68(1).............................[2.3.2790] 68(1)(e)........................ [2.3.2790] 68(4).............................[2.3.2790] 69(2)(b)........................ [2.3.2790] 70(1)(b).......................... [2.3.730] 72..................................[2.3.2790] 73..................................[2.3.2790] 75..................................[2.3.2790] 78..............[2.3.1060], [2.3.1200], [2.3.1230]

s 80(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 80(2).............................[2.3.3170] s 81(a)............................. [2.3.3170] s 81(b).............................[2.3.3170] s 81(c)............................. [2.3.3170] s 81(d).............................[2.3.3170] s 81(e)............................. [2.3.3170] s 82(c)............................. [2.3.3170] s 83(2)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] s 83(3).............................[2.3.3170] s 85..................................[2.3.3230] s 86..................................[2.3.3230] s 88(1)(d)........................ [2.3.3230] s 99..................................[2.3.3230] s 103................................[2.3.3230] s 105(1)...........................[2.3.3230] s 105(2)...........................[2.3.3230] s 108................................[2.3.3230] s 110................................[2.3.3230] s 110(1)........................... [2.3.3230] s 119................................[2.3.3230] ss 119 – 121................... [2.3.3230] s 132...............[2.3.610], [2.3.1520] s 191................................[2.3.3170] s 194..................................[2.3.600]

s 49(3)(a)....... [2.3.730], [2.3.1560] ss 49(3)(a) – 49(3)(c)..... [2.3.1560] s 49(3)(e).......................... [2.3.730] s 49(3)(f)...........................[2.3.730] s 49(3)(g).......................... [2.3.730] s 49(4)...............................[2.3.730] s 50..................................[2.3.1380] s 50(1)...............................[2.3.730] s 50(2)...............................[2.3.730] s 51..................................[2.3.1380] s 51(1)...............................[2.3.730] s 51(2)...............................[2.3.730]

[References are to paragraph numbers] c

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 2...............[2.3.2370], [2.3.2570] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 3...............[2.3.1230], [2.3.1920], [2.3.2370] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 3................[2.3.1230] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 5................[2.3.2370] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 6................[2.3.2370] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 7................[2.3.2070] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 10..............[2.3.2070] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 14.............[2.3.1520], [2.3.1630] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 15..............[2.3.2570] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 19..............[2.3.1920] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 20..............[2.3.1860] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 21..............[2.3.1920] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 22.............[2.3.1560], [2.3.2180] Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 1...............[2.3.1520], [2.3.1630]

Queensland – continued

Ch 3 Pt 1........................ [2.3.2790] Chs 3 Pt 1 – 7................ [2.3.2790] Pt 2..................................[2.3.1520] Pt 3..............[2.3.1520], [2.3.1710], [2.3.2640] Pt 3 Div 2.... [2.3.1540], [2.3.2790] Pt 4..............[2.3.1520], [2.3.2640], [2.3.2720] Pt 11................................ [2.3.3290] Sch 1............................... [2.3.1440] Sch 1 cl 4........................[2.3.2070] Sch 3........... [2.3.1390], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1550], [2.3.2180] Sch 3 cl 2(1)...................[2.3.1750] Sch 3 cl 2(1)(a).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(1)(b).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(1)(c).............. [2.3.1680] Sch 3 cl 2(2)(b).............. [2.3.1750] Sch 3 cl 2(3)(a).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(3)(b).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(3)(c).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(3)(c).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(3)(f)...............[2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 2(4)...................[2.3.1750] Sch 3 cl 2(5)...................[2.3.1720] Sch 3 cl 6........................[2.3.2360] Sch 3 cl 8........................[2.3.2250] Sch 3 cl 9.....[2.3.1570], [2.3.1600] Sch 3 cl 10(1)(h)............ [2.3.2020] Sch 3 cl 10(d).................[2.3.2080] Sch 3 cl 12.....................[2.3.1560], [2.3.2170], [2.3.2180]

Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 4...............[2.3.1780], [2.3.1860] Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 4(3)(c)...... [2.3.1900] Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 5................[2.3.2070] Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 6................[2.3.1230] Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 7................[2.3.2570] Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 8................[2.3.2250] Sch 6............. [2.3.730], [2.3.1060], [2.3.1070], [2.3.1210], [2.3.1270], [2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] Right to Information Bill 2009....................................... [2.3.770] Right to Information Regulation 2009.................... [2.3.590], [2.3.2790] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999..................................... [2.7.2060]

Sch 3 cl 12(2).................[2.3.2240] Sch 4........... [2.3.1390], [2.3.1500], [2.3.1560], [2.3.1960] Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 1................[2.3.1690]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ci

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 9(2)(d)............................ [2.3.955]

Queensland – continued

ss 9(2)(d) – 9(2)(f)........... [2.3.955] South Australia

s 9(3).................................[2.3.990] s 10..................[2.3.953], [2.3.960], [2.3.990] s 10(1)...............................[2.3.960]

Children’s Protection Act 1993 s 58..................................[2.3.2230] District Court Act 1991

s 11....................................[2.3.960]

s 42E............................... [2.7.2250] s 42E(3)....... [2.3.3230], [2.7.2250]

s 12..................[2.3.700], [2.3.953], [2.3.1270], [2.3.2170], [2.3.3270] s 13..................................[2.3.2790]

Freedom of Information Act 1991...... [2.1.10], [2.3.170], [2.3.590], [2.3.755], [2.3.775], [2.3.970], [2.3.990], [2.3.1020], [2.3.1430], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1480], [2.3.1600], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1730], [2.3.1750], [2.3.2340], [2.3.2400], [2.3.2600], [2.3.2720], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3020], [2.3.3250], [2.7.740] s 3(3).................................[2.3.755]

s 13(d)...............................[2.3.755] s 14(2).............................[2.3.2790] s 14A(2)............................ [2.3.775] s 15..................................[2.3.2790] s 16..................................[2.3.2790] s 18(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 19(2)..........[2.3.2790], [2.3.3230] s 20..................................[2.3.2790] s 20(1)(a)........................ [2.3.2790] s 20(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2790]

s 4.................[2.3.1020], [2.3.2370]

s 20(1)(c)........................ [2.3.2790]

s 4(1)...............[2.3.955], [2.3.990], [2.3.1000], [2.3.2380], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3100]

s 22..................................[2.3.2790] s 22(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 22(1)(f).........................[2.3.2790]

s 4(3).................................[2.3.955]

s 22(2).............................[2.3.2790]

s 4(4).................................[2.3.955]

s 22(5).............................[2.3.2790]

s 4(5).................................[2.3.955]

s 23...............[2.3.2790], [2.3.2800]

s 9....................[2.3.953], [2.3.960], [2.3.1790] s 9(1).................................[2.3.960]

s 23(2)(f)(i)....................... [2.3.730] s 24..................................[2.3.2890] s 25...............[2.3.1630], [2.3.2830]

s 9(2).................................[2.3.960]

s 26..................................[2.3.2830]

s 9(2)(a).......... [2.3.955], [2.3.990], [2.3.1000], [2.3.1830]

s 27..................................[2.3.2830]

ss 9(2)(a) – 9(2)(c).......... [2.3.955], [2.3.1000] ss 9(2)(a) – 9(2)(e)......... [2.3.1000]

s 28..................................[2.3.2830]

s 9(2)(b).......................... [2.3.1830]

s 29(3).............................[2.3.3170]

s 29(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 29(2)(e)........................ [2.3.3170]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 40(8).............................[2.3.3230] s 41(3)...............................[2.3.755] s 48...............[2.3.3230], [2.3.3240] Pt 3..................................[2.3.2790] Pt 4..................................[2.3.2990] Sch 1................ [2.3.730], [2.3.755] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(a).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(b).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(e).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(f)..............[2.3.1720], [2.3.1730] Sch 1 cl 1(2)(a).............. [2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 1(2)(ab)............ [2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 1(2)(b).............. [2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 1(2a)................. [2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 2(2)(a)(i)...........[2.3.1770] Sch 1 cl 4........................[2.3.2030] Sch 1 cl 4(2)(a)(v)..........[2.3.2020] Sch 1 cl 4(2)(b).............. [2.3.2060] Sch 1 cl 4(3)...................[2.3.2040] Sch 1 cl 4(3a)................. [2.3.2040] Sch 1 cl 5........................[2.3.1630] Sch 1 cl 5(1)(b)............. [2.3.1650], [2.3.1670]

South Australia – continued

s 29(5)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] s 29(6).............................[2.3.3170] s 30..............[2.3.3000], [2.3.3010], [2.3.3070] s 30(a)............................... [2.3.960] s 30(b).............................[2.3.3020] s 30(c)............................. [2.3.3020] s 34..................................[2.3.3100] s 35..................................[2.3.3100] s 37..................................[2.3.3100] s 38(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 38(2)(d)........................ [2.3.3170] s 38(3).............................[2.3.3170] s 38(4)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] s 38(5).............................[2.3.3170] s 39..............[2.3.3240], [2.3.3270], [2.7.750] s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

39(1)(b)........................ [2.3.3230] 39(2).............................[2.3.3230] 39(3).............................[2.3.3230] 39(5)(a)........................ [2.3.3230] 39(5)(b)........................ [2.3.3230] 39(9)..........[2.3.3230], [2.3.3240] 39(11)........................... [2.3.3230] 39(12)...........................[2.3.3230] 39(13)...........................[2.3.3230] 39(15)...........................[2.3.3230] 40..................................[2.3.3250] 40(1).............................[2.3.3290] 40(2).............................[2.3.3230] 40(2)(a)........................ [2.3.3270] 40(2)(b)........................ [2.3.3270] 40(3).............................[2.3.3230] 40(4).............................[2.3.3230] 40(7)..........[2.3.3230], [2.3.3250]

Sch 1 cl 6....[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2390] Sch 1 cl 6(2)...................[2.3.2430] Sch 1 cl 6(3a).................. [2.3.755], [2.3.2430] Sch 1 cl 6(3a)(b)............ [2.3.2400] Sch 1 cl 7........................[2.3.2570] Sch 1 cl 7(1)...................[2.3.2720] Sch 1 cl 7(1)(a).............. [2.3.1450] Sch 1 cl 7(1)(b).............. [2.3.1450] Sch 1 cl 9.....[2.3.1780], [2.3.1800] Sch 1 cl 9(1)(b).............. [2.3.1810] Sch 1 cl 10(2).................[2.3.2340]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ciii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 13(2)...............................[2.7.350]

South Australia – continued

s 13(3)...............................[2.7.420] Sch Sch Sch Sch Sch Sch Sch Sch Sch

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2

cl cl cl cl cl cl cl cl cl

12......................[2.3.2170] 13......................[2.3.2250] 13(1)(b)(i).......... [2.3.775] 15......................[2.3.2720] 16......................[2.3.1920] 16(2).................[2.3.1430] 17......................[2.3.2360] g........................[2.3.1430] p........................[2.3.1430]

s 13(3)(a).......................... [2.7.420]

Freedom of Information (Exempt Agency) Regulations 2008.... [2.3.590] reg 5................................ [2.3.1430]

s 18(1)...............................[2.7.460]

Freedom of Information (Fees and Charges) Regulations 2003.................... [2.3.590], [2.3.2790]

s 18(3)...............................[2.7.450]

s 14....................................[2.7.360] s 15(3a)............................. [2.7.370] s 15(4)...............................[2.7.380] s 16(1)...............................[2.7.400] s 17(2)(b).......................... [2.7.410] s 17(2)(d).......................... [2.7.440] s 17(3)...............................[2.7.390] s 18....................................[2.7.460] s 18(1a)............................. [2.7.480] s 18(2)..............[2.7.490], [2.7.760] s 18(3)(b).......................... [2.7.490] s 18(4).............[2.7.530], [2.7.540], [2.7.550]

Freedom of Information (General) Regulations 2002...................[2.3.590]

s 18(5)...............................[2.7.300] s 19...................[2.7.450], [2.7.500]

Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986

s 20....................................[2.7.520] s 21(1)...............................[2.7.520]

s 55..................................[2.3.2230]

s 23....................................[2.7.500]

Ombudsman Act 1972............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.250], [2.7.330], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.420], [2.7.460], [2.7.530], [2.7.540], [2.7.690], [2.7.790] s 3(1)...............[2.1.290], [2.7.190], [2.7.200], [2.7.210], [2.7.220] s 5(1).................................[2.7.220]

s 24....................................[2.7.510] s 25(1)...............................[2.7.570] s 25(1)(a)......... [2.7.300], [2.7.580] s 25(1)(b).......................... [2.7.590] s 25(1)(c)......... [2.7.290], [2.7.600] s 25(1)(d).......................... [2.7.610] s 25(1)(e).......................... [2.7.620] s 25(1)(f)...........................[2.7.630] s 25(1)(g).......................... [2.7.640]

s 5(2)(a)............................ [2.7.250]

s 25(2).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680] s 25(3)...............................[2.7.680]

s 13....................................[2.1.290]

s 25(4)...............................[2.7.680]

s 13(1)..............[2.7.190], [2.7.210]

s 25(5)...............................[2.7.690]

[References are to paragraph numbers] civ

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 43(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1280] s 43(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1280] s 43(2)(a)........................ [2.7.1410] s 43(2)(e)........................ [2.7.1220] s 43(2)(f).........................[2.7.1210] s 44(3).............................[2.7.1610] s 46..................................[2.7.1840] s 47(2).............................[2.7.1840] s 47(3).............................[2.7.1840] s 47(4).............................[2.7.1840] s 48..................................[2.7.1840] s 49..................................[2.7.1840] s 50..................................[2.7.1610] s 50(10)...........................[2.7.1670] s 50(11)........................... [2.7.1880] s 51..................................[2.7.1610] s 51(10)...........................[2.7.1880] s 51(11)........................... [2.7.1670] s 52(3).............................[2.7.1880] s 53..................................[2.7.1460] s 54..................................[2.7.1510] s 54(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1520] s 54(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1520] s 54(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1520] s 55(1).............................[2.7.1510] s 55(2).............................[2.7.1510] s 56(1).............................[2.7.1660] s 60(1).............................[2.7.1670] s 60(2)(e)........................ [2.7.1670] s 60(2)(f).........................[2.7.1670] ss 60(2)(f) – 60(2)(i)...... [2.7.1670] s 69..................................[2.7.1367] s 71(3a)........................... [2.7.2070] s 71(4).............................[2.7.2080] s 85..................................[2.7.1870] s 91(3).............................[2.7.2120]

South Australia – continued

s s s s s s s

25(6)...............................[2.7.700] 26....................................[2.7.760] 27....................................[2.7.720] 28....................................[2.7.790] 29(1)...............................[2.7.710] 30....................................[2.7.790] 30(1)...............................[2.7.790]

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013................. [2.7.1330], [2.7.1367], [2.7.1400], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1640], [2.7.1660], [2.7.1940], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2080] s 3......................................[2.7.950] s 4....................................[2.7.1000] s 5......................................[2.7.930] s 8(1)(a)(ii)......................[2.7.1150] s 31....................................[2.7.960] s 34(4).............................[2.7.1080] s 34(7).............................[2.7.1000] s 35...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] s 35(1).............................[2.7.1650] s 35(4).............................[2.7.1570] s 36(1).............................[2.7.1630] s 36(2).............................[2.7.1640] s 37..................................[2.7.1900] s 38..................................[2.7.1840] s 39(1)..........[2.7.1000], [2.7.1310] s 39(1)(b)..... [2.7.1250], [2.7.1400] s 39(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1010] s 39(2).............................[2.7.1367] s 40(1).............................[2.7.1620] s 40(3)(b)........................ [2.7.1740] s 42..................................[2.7.1750] s 42(3)(b)........................ [2.7.1740]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

South Australia – continued

Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001..................................... [2.7.2250] s 26..................................[2.7.2250]

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2015..................................... [2.7.1140]

Ombudsman Act 1978............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.250], [2.7.300], [2.7.330], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.430], [2.7.480], [2.7.530], [2.7.690], [2.7.790] s 4......................................[2.7.190] s 4(1)(b)............................ [2.7.250] s 12...................[2.1.290], [2.7.190] s 12(2)...............................[2.7.300] s 12(3)...............................[2.7.200] s 12(5)...............................[2.7.240] s 12(5)(a)......... [2.7.240], [2.7.290] s 12(5)(b).......................... [2.7.210] s 12(6)...............................[2.7.240] s 13....................................[2.7.350] s 14(1)...............................[2.7.380] s 14(4)...............................[2.7.370] s 14(5)...............................[2.7.470] s 16....................................[2.7.360] s 17....................................[2.7.370] s 18....................................[2.7.380] s 19(2)...............................[2.7.400] s 19(5)...............................[2.7.400] s 20(1)...............................[2.7.420] s 20(3)...............................[2.7.420] s 20A.................................[2.7.460] s 21(1)(b).......................... [2.7.410] s 21(1)(c).......................... [2.7.430] s 21(1)(d).......................... [2.7.440] s 22....................................[2.7.390]

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014.................. [2.7.1140], [2.7.1470] r 9.................................... [2.7.1140] r 12..................................[2.7.1480] r 13..................................[2.7.1470] r 21..................................[2.7.1590] r 33..................................[2.7.1500] r 73...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1600] r 89..................................[2.7.1750] Pt 6..................................[2.7.1470] Pt 12................................[2.7.1750] Pt 15................................[2.7.1750] Pt 16................................[2.7.1750] Tasmania Evidence Act 2001.................[2.3.450] s 3(1).................................[2.3.450] Pt 2....................................[2.3.450] Freedom of Information Act 1991................. [2.3.1710], [2.3.2510], [2.3.2550] s 3(2).................................[2.3.920] Industrial Relations Act 1984....................................... [2.7.330] Judicial Review Act 2000.......[2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.3.390] s 4......................................[2.1.290] s 28....................................[2.3.390] s 29...................[2.3.340], [2.3.390] Sch 3................................. [2.3.390]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 32....................................[2.7.790] s 33....................................[2.7.790] s 33(1)...............................[2.7.790] s 33(3)...............................[2.7.790] Sch 2................................. [2.7.200] Sch 2 Item 1..................... [2.7.200] Sch 2 Item 2..................... [2.7.230] Sch 2 Item 4..................... [2.7.330]

Tasmania – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

23(1)(a).......................... [2.7.480] 23(1)(b).......................... [2.7.480] 23(2)...............................[2.7.480] 23A.................................[2.7.450] 23A(1)(c)........................[2.7.490] 23A(3)........... [2.7.490], [2.7.760] 23A(5)........... [2.7.540], [2.7.550] 23A(6)........... [2.7.530], [2.7.550] 23A(7)............................ [2.7.300] 24....................................[2.7.450] 24(1)...............................[2.7.500] 24(2)...............................[2.7.520] 24(3)...............................[2.7.520] 24(4)...............................[2.7.520] 24(4)(b).......................... [2.7.520] 25....................................[2.7.500] 26....................................[2.7.760] 27....................................[2.7.510] 28(1)...............................[2.7.570] 28(1)(a)......... [2.7.300], [2.7.580] 28(1)(b).......................... [2.7.590] 28(1)(c)......... [2.7.290], [2.7.600] 28(1)(d).......................... [2.7.610] 28(1)(e).......................... [2.7.620] 28(1)(f)...........................[2.7.630] 28(1)(g).......................... [2.7.640] 28(2).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680] 28(3)...............................[2.7.680] 28(4)...............................[2.7.680] 28(5)...............................[2.7.690] 28(6)...............................[2.7.700] 29....................................[2.7.720] 29(2)...............................[2.7.720] 30....................................[2.7.710]

Right to Information Act 2009...... [2.1.10], [2.3.180], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.1070], [2.3.1100], [2.3.1210], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1540], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1770], [2.3.1920], [2.3.1960], [2.3.2030], [2.3.2430], [2.3.2950], [2.3.2970], [2.3.3220], [2.7.740] s s s s s s s

3(2).................................[2.3.920] 5.................[2.3.2370], [2.3.3170] 5(1)............ [2.3.1060], [2.3.1100] 6....................................[2.3.1380] 6(1)...............................[2.3.1430] 6(2)...............................[2.3.1430] 7..................[2.3.700], [2.3.1060], [2.3.1270] s 8....................................[2.3.1440] s 9....................................[2.3.1440] s 12...............[2.3.1100], [2.3.2950] s 12(2).............................[2.3.1520] s 12(3)(c)........................ [2.3.2790] s 13..................................[2.3.2790] s 13(6).............................[2.3.2790] ss 13(6) – 13(8).............. [2.3.2790] s 13(7).............................[2.3.2790] s 14..................................[2.3.2790] s 15..................................[2.3.3190] s 15(1).............................[2.3.2790]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s s s s

43(4)(a)........................ [2.3.3170] 43(5).............................[2.3.3170] 44..................................[2.3.3190] 44(1)(b)(ii).................. [2.3.3170], [2.3.3190] s 44(2).............................[2.3.3190] s 45..................................[2.3.3190] s 45(1)(f).........................[2.3.3190] s 46..................................[2.3.3190] s 46(1)(c)........................ [2.3.2790] s 47.................[2.3.3190], [2.7.750] s 47(4).............................[2.3.3190] s 48..................................[2.3.3190] s 49.................[2.3.610], [2.3.1100] Pt 1..................................[2.3.1520] Pt 2..................................[2.3.2790] Pt 3..................................[2.3.1500] Pt 3 Div 1.... [2.3.1500], [2.3.1540] Pt 3 Div 2.... [2.3.1500], [2.3.1540] Sch 1............................... [2.3.1960] Sch 1 cl 1(i)....................[2.3.2060] Sch 1 cl 1(r)....................[2.3.2060] Sch 1 cl 1(o)...................[2.3.1920] Sch 1 cl 1(j)....................[2.3.2060] Sch 1 cl 1(p)...................[2.3.1920] Sch 1 cl 1(q)...................[2.3.1920] Sch 2............................... [2.3.1520]

Tasmania – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

16(3).............................[2.3.2790] 17..................................[2.3.2790] 18(1).............................[2.3.2790] 18(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2790] 18(2).............................[2.3.2790] 18(4).............................[2.3.2790] 19(1).............................[2.3.2790] 22..................................[2.3.2790] 26(1)(a)........................ [2.3.1720] 26(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1720] 26(2).............................[2.3.1750] 26(3).............................[2.3.1750] 26(4).............................[2.3.1770] 28..................................[2.3.1070] 29...............[2.3.1570], [2.3.1600] 30..................................[2.3.2030] 33..................................[2.3.1810] 33(1).........[2.3.1500], [2.3.1510], [2.3.1520], [2.3.2790] 33(2)..........[2.3.1520], [2.3.1560] 34..................................[2.3.1630] 34(2).............................[2.3.1630] 35...............[2.3.1780], [2.3.1790] 35(2).............................[2.3.1830] 35(3)(b)........................ [2.3.1830] 35(4).............................[2.3.1840] 36..............[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2830] 37...............[2.3.2680], [2.3.2830] 38...............[2.3.2570], [2.3.2680] 38(a)............................. [2.3.2720] 38(b).............................[2.3.2720] 39..................................[2.3.2570] 40..................................[2.3.2720] 43...............[2.3.2680], [2.3.3170]

Right to Information (Consequential and Transitional) Act 2009...................... [2.3.180], [2.3.600] Right to Information Regulations 2010..................................... [2.3.2790] reg 4................................ [2.3.2790] Subordinate Legislation Act 1992 s 3(1).................................[2.1.290]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

[2.3.1800], [2.3.1920], [2.3.2400], [2.3.3090],

[2.3.1830], [2.3.2350], [2.3.2500], [2.3.3140], [2.7.740] s 3(2).................................[2.3.920] s 5....................................[2.3.1270] s 5(1).................................[2.3.955] s 6C.................................[2.3.3230] s 7.....................[2.3.953], [2.3.960] s 7(1)(a)............................ [2.3.960] s 7(1)(a)(i).........................[2.3.955] ss 7(1)(a)(i) – 7(1)(a)(i)....[2.3.955] s 7(1)(a)(ii)........................[2.3.955] ss 7(1)(a)(ii) – 7(1)(a)(vi)..... [2.3.955] s 7(1)(a)(vii)...[2.3.955], [2.3.2980] s 7(1)(a)(viii).................... [2.3.955] s 7(1)(b)............................ [2.3.960] s 8.....................[2.3.953], [2.3.960] s 8(1).................................[2.3.955] s 10....................................[2.3.960] s 10(1)...............................[2.3.955] s 11...................[2.3.953], [2.3.960] s 11(1)............................... [2.3.955] s 13.................[2.3.953], [2.3.1270] s 14..............[2.3.1380], [2.3.1440], [2.3.2790] s 17..................................[2.3.2790] s 17(3).............................[2.3.2790] s 18..................................[2.3.2790] s 20....................................[2.3.700] s 20(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2790] s 21...............[2.3.2790], [2.3.3230] s 23..................................[2.3.2790] s 23(1).............................[2.3.2790] s 23(1)(d)........................ [2.3.2790] s 23(3).............................[2.3.2790]

Tasmania – continued

Victoria Administrative Law Act 1978...... [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.3.380], [2.7.2033] s 2......................................[2.1.290] s 3......................................[2.1.290] s 8.....................[2.3.340], [2.3.400] s 8(5).................................[2.3.400] s 10....................................[2.3.440] Adoption Act 1984...............[2.3.2430] Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008..................................... [2.3.2430] Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 s 24(1)............................. [2.7.1150] Children and Young Persons Act 1989 s 64..................................[2.3.2220] s 67..................................[2.3.2220] Constitution Act 1975 s 85..................................[2.7.2240] Evidence Act 2008.................[2.3.450] s 3......................................[2.3.450] Pt 1....................................[2.3.450] Pt 3.2.................................[2.3.450] Freedom of Information (Access Charges) Regulations 2014.................... [2.3.590], [2.3.2790] Freedom of Information Act 1982...... [2.1.10], [2.3.170], [2.3.590], [2.3.600], [2.3.740], [2.3.960], [2.3.1020], [2.3.1050], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1730], [2.3.1750], [2.3.1760],

[References are to paragraph numbers] cix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 33(9).........[2.3.1050], [2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2480] s 34................[2.3.830], [2.3.2680], [2.3.2830] ss 34 – 36......................... [2.3.830] s 34(1)..........[2.3.1390], [2.3.2570] s 34(1)(a)........................ [2.3.1450] s 34(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1450] s 34(2)..........[2.3.1390], [2.3.2700] s 34(4).............................[2.3.2720] s 35..................................[2.3.2250] s 36(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2720] s 38...............[2.3.2170], [2.3.2220] s 39..................[2.3.953], [2.3.960], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3010], [2.3.3020], [2.3.3070]

Victoria – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s

25..................................[2.3.2790] 25A...............................[2.3.2790] 25A(1).......................... [2.3.2790] 25A(2).......................... [2.3.2790] 27..................................[2.3.2790] 28..................................[2.3.3170] 28(1)(a)........................ [2.3.1720] 28(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1720] 28(1)(d)........................ [2.3.1720] 28(2).............................[2.3.1750] 28(3)..........[2.3.1750], [2.3.1770] 28(4).........[2.3.2790], [2.3.2940], [2.3.3230] s 28(5).............................[2.3.3230] s 29................[2.3.830], [2.3.1630], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1670]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s 29A...........[2.3.1570], [2.3.1600], [2.3.3170] s 29A(2)....... [2.3.2790], [2.3.2940] s 30................[2.3.830], [2.3.1780], [2.3.1790] s 30(1)(b)........................ [2.3.1810] s 30(3).............................[2.3.1830] s 30(4).............................[2.3.1830] s 30(5).............................[2.3.1850] s 30(6).............................[2.3.1840] s 31.................[2.3.830], [2.3.2030] s 31(3).............................[2.3.2040] s 32(2).............................[2.3.2340] s 33..............[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2390], [2.3.2830] s 33(2A).......................... [2.3.2400] s 33(4).............................[2.3.2560] s 33(7).............................[2.3.2430] s 33(8).............................[2.3.2430]

41..................................[2.3.3090] 42..................................[2.3.3090] 43..................................[2.3.3230] 46..................................[2.3.3090] 47..................................[2.3.3090] 49...............[2.3.3080], [2.3.3140] 49A...............................[2.3.3230] 49A(1).......................... [2.3.3170] 49A(3).......................... [2.3.3170] 49A(4).......................... [2.3.3170] 49B...............................[2.3.3230] 49B(1).......................... [2.3.3170] 49C...............................[2.3.3230] 49G...............................[2.3.3230] 49J................................ [2.3.3230] 49J(3)........ [2.3.3170], [2.3.3190] 49K...............................[2.3.3230] 49L............................... [2.3.3230] 49L(1).......................... [2.3.3170] 49M(1)......................... [2.3.3170] 49N...............................[2.3.3230]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cx

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

[2.7.230], [2.7.250], [2.7.370], [2.7.390], [2.7.420], [2.7.470], [2.7.530],

[2.7.240], [2.7.330], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.460], [2.7.520], [2.7.690], [2.7.790] s 2......................................[2.1.290] s 2(1)...............[2.7.190], [2.7.200], [2.7.210], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.250], [2.7.270] s 13(1)..............[2.1.290], [2.7.190]

Victoria – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s

49O...............................[2.3.3230] 49OA............................[2.3.3230] 49P............................... [2.3.3230] 49P(1)...........................[2.3.3170] 49P(3)(a)...................... [2.3.3170] 49P(4)...........................[2.3.3170] 50....................................[2.3.830] 50(2).............................[2.3.3230] 50(3B).......................... [2.3.3090] 50(3D).......................... [2.3.3190] 50(3G).......................... [2.3.3190] 50(4).........[2.3.3200], [2.3.3220], [2.3.3230] s 50(5).............................[2.3.3230] s 50(5A).......................... [2.3.3230] s 50(6).............................[2.3.3190] s 52...............[2.3.3190], [2.3.3230] s 53(1)..........[2.3.2790], [2.3.3190] s 55..................................[2.3.3230] s 56..................................[2.3.3230] Pt III................................[2.3.2790] Pt IV................................[2.3.2050] Pt V................................. [2.3.2990]

s 13(3)(b).......................... [2.7.270] s 13A.................................[2.7.460] s 14(1)(a).......................... [2.7.370] s 14(2)(b).......................... [2.7.380] s 14(3)...............................[2.7.470] s 15(4)...............................[2.7.330] s 15(5)...............................[2.7.420] s 15(6)...............................[2.7.420] s 15A(1)(b)....................... [2.7.410] s 15A(2)............................ [2.7.400] s 15F................................. [2.7.390] s 16....................................[2.7.360] s 16A(1)............................ [2.7.350]

Freedom of Information Amendment (Freedom of Information Commissioner) Act 2012......[2.3.590], [2.3.600]

s 17(1)(b).......................... [2.7.480]

Freedom of Information Regulations 2009....................................... [2.3.590]

s 17(5)...............................[2.7.530]

Health Records Act 2001

s 17(6)...............................[2.7.300]

s 17(2)..............[2.7.490], [2.7.760] s 17(3)..............[2.7.450], [2.7.490] s 17(4)..............[2.7.530], [2.7.550] s 17(5A)............................ [2.7.530]

s 36..................................[2.3.3170]

s 18....................................[2.7.450]

Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984

s 18(1)...............................[2.7.500]

s 53..................................[2.7.1470]

s 18(3)...............................[2.7.520]

Ombudsman Act 1973............ [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.220],

s 18(4)...............................[2.7.520] s 19....................................[2.7.520]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Victoria – continued

Residential Tenancies Act 1997....................................... [2.7.920]

s 20................[2.3.2220], [2.7.760], [2.7.770] s s s s s s s s s s s

State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 s 90....................................[2.7.190]

21....................................[2.7.500] 22....................................[2.7.510] 23(1)...............................[2.7.570] 23(1)(a)......... [2.7.300], [2.7.580] 23(1)(b)......... [2.7.290], [2.7.590] 23(1)(c).......................... [2.7.600] 23(1)(d).......................... [2.7.610] 23(1)(e).......................... [2.7.620] 23(1)(f)...........................[2.7.630] 23(1)(g).......................... [2.7.640] 23(2).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680]

Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 s 4(1)(b)............................ [2.1.290] Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2008 O 7.................................. [2.7.2060] O 8.................................. [2.7.2060] Teaching Service Order 140 cl 4.19............................. [2.3.2220] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998...................[2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.7.1060], [2.7.1330], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1640], [2.7.1880], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2060], [2.7.2090] s 3...................[2.7.950], [2.7.2060]

s 23(3)...............................[2.7.680] s 23(4)...............................[2.7.680] s 23(5)...............................[2.7.690] s 23(6)...............................[2.7.700] s 24....................................[2.7.720] s 24(1)...............................[2.7.720] s 25....................................[2.7.710] s 25A(2)........... [2.7.540], [2.7.550] s 27....................................[2.7.790] s 28....................................[2.7.380] s 29....................................[2.7.790] s 29(1)...............................[2.7.790] s 29(3)...............................[2.7.790] Sch 1................................. [2.7.240] Sch 2............... [2.7.190], [2.7.200], [2.7.210], [2.7.250], [2.7.270] Sch 2 Item 7..................... [2.7.210] Sch 2 Item 8..................... [2.7.220] Sch 2 Item 11................... [2.7.230]

s 4(1).................................[2.7.970] s 4(2)(b).......................... [2.7.1070] s 5....................................[2.7.1440] s 5(b)...............................[2.7.1440] s 8......................................[2.7.930] s 40....................................[2.7.960] s 42.................[2.7.960], [2.7.1040] s 45..................................[2.7.1540] s 46...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] s 49..............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1370], [2.7.1570] s 50(1).............................[2.7.1630] s 50(3).............................[2.7.1640] s 51(1).............................[2.7.1400] s 51(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1890] s 51(2).............................[2.7.1900]

Open Courts Act 2013.........[2.7.1150]

s 51A...............................[2.7.1840]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 101(2)...........................[2.7.1670] s 101(3)...........................[2.7.1670] s 102................................[2.7.1230] s 102(1)(b)...................... [2.7.1240] s 102(3)...........................[2.7.1740] s 104.............[2.7.1370], [2.7.1620] s 105................................[2.7.1370] s 105(2)...........................[2.7.1370] s 109(1)...........................[2.7.2120] s 109(3)...........................[2.7.2120] s 117................................[2.7.1910] s 117(5)........................... [2.7.1910] s 120................................[2.7.1870] s 126(1)...........................[2.7.1500] s 126(4)...........................[2.7.1500] s 130(2)(a)...................... [2.7.1220] s 148.............[2.7.2033], [2.7.2040] s 148(2)(b)...................... [2.7.2060] s 148(3)(b)...................... [2.7.2060] s 148(5)...........................[2.7.2060] s 148(7)........[2.7.2080], [2.7.2100] s 149L............................. [2.7.2050] s 158................................[2.7.1140] Sch 1.............. [2.7.930], [2.7.1000]

Victoria – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

53...............[2.7.1330], [2.7.1370] 54...............[2.7.1330], [2.7.1370] 56..................................[2.7.1370] 57..................................[2.7.1110] 59(1)(b)(ii)................... [2.7.1460] 60..................................[2.7.1510] 60(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1520] 60(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1520] 60(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1520] 62..................................[2.7.1660] 62(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1660] 64....................................[2.7.930] 67..................................[2.7.1470] 73(1).............................[2.7.1510] 73(3).............................[2.7.1510] 74..................................[2.7.1840] 75...............[2.7.1840], [2.7.1900] 76..................................[2.7.1840] 78..................................[2.7.1840] 80...............[2.7.1370], [2.7.1610] 80(3).............................[2.7.1370] 81..................................[2.7.1620] 83..................................[2.7.1610] 88..................................[2.7.1610] 92..................................[2.7.1670] 93..................................[2.7.1840] 97..............[2.7.1010], [2.7.1280], [2.7.1310] 98..................................[2.7.1310] 98(1).............................[2.7.1740] 98(1)(a).........................[2.7.1150] 98(1)(c)..... [2.7.1250], [2.7.1400] 98(4)............................. [2.7.1150] 100(2)...........................[2.7.1210] 101.............[2.7.1670], [2.7.1680]

Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Fees) Regulations 2001..................................... [2.7.1140] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2008............ [2.7.1140] r 2.03.................................[2.7.930] r 4.03...............................[2.7.1470] r 4.05...............................[2.7.1480] Sch 2............................... [2.7.1470]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxiii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 12..................................[2.3.2790]

Victoria – continued

s 12(1)(e)........................ [2.3.2790] Western Australia

s 13(2).............................[2.3.2790] s 13(3).............................[2.3.2790]

Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003

s 14..................................[2.3.2790]

s 38(1)...............................[2.7.250]

s 15..................................[2.3.2790] s 20..................................[2.3.2790]

Criminal Code s 1......................................[2.7.250] Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913

s 22....................................[2.3.700] s 23(1)(a)........................ [2.3.2790] s 23(3).............................[2.3.2790]

Schedule............................[2.7.250]

s 24..................................[2.3.2790] s 25..................................[2.3.2790]

Evidence Act 1906...............[2.7.1700]

s 26...............[2.3.2790], [2.3.2930]

Financial Management Act 2006

s 27(1).............................[2.3.2790]

s 3......................................[2.7.710]

s 27(1)(g)........................ [2.3.2790]

s 5......................................[2.7.710]

s 27A...............................[2.3.2930]

s 61....................................[2.7.710]

s 30..................................[2.3.2790]

Freedom of Information Act 1992...... [2.1.10], [2.3.170], [2.3.590], [2.3.740], [2.3.970], [2.3.1020], [2.3.1040], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1640], [2.3.1650], [2.3.1730], [2.3.1750], [2.3.2340], [2.3.2600], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3220], [2.7.740] s 1(a)................................. [2.3.960]

s 32..................................[2.3.2830]

s 1(b).................................[2.3.960]

s 43...............[2.3.3170], [2.3.3180]

s 2....................................[2.3.2790]

s 43(2)..........[2.3.3170], [2.3.3190]

s 6................[2.3.1380], [2.3.1440], [2.3.1790] s 9......................................[2.3.955] s 10....................................[2.3.953]

s 45..................[2.3.953], [2.3.960], [2.3.3000], [2.3.3020], [2.3.3070] s 47G...............................[2.3.2930]

s 10(1).............................[2.3.1270]

s 48(1)............................. [2.3.3110]

s 11..................................[2.3.2790]

s 48(2)............................. [2.3.3110]

s 11(1)(a).........................[2.3.2010]

s 48(3)..........[2.3.3080], [2.3.3140]

s 11(1)(b)........................ [2.3.2010]

s 48(4)..........[2.3.3080], [2.3.3140]

s 11(2)............................. [2.3.2790]

s 50..................................[2.3.3110]

s 33..................................[2.3.2830] s 36..............[2.3.1630], [2.3.2790], [2.3.2940] s 39(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 39(3)(a)........................ [2.3.3170] s 39(3)(b)........................ [2.3.3170] s 40(2).............................[2.3.3170] s 42..................................[2.3.3170]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxiv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Western Australia – continued

ss 50 – 52....................... [2.3.3110] s 54(1).............................[2.3.3170] s 65(1).............................[2.3.3190] s 66..................................[2.3.3190] s 66(2).............................[2.3.3190] s 66(5).............................[2.3.3190] s 75(1).............................[2.3.3190] s 75(2).............................[2.3.3190] s 76..................................[2.3.3190] s 76(1).............................[2.3.3190] s 76(3).............................[2.3.3190] s 76(4).............................[2.3.3220] s 77..................................[2.3.3190] s 82..................................[2.3.2170] s 84..................................[2.3.3190] s 85..................................[2.3.3290] s 94(a)............................... [2.3.955] ss 94(a) – 94(c)................ [2.3.955] s 94(d)............ [2.3.955], [2.3.1120] ss 94(d) – 94(g)................ [2.3.955] s 95..................[2.3.955], [2.3.960], [2.3.1000] s 96...................[2.3.953], [2.3.960] s 97....................................[2.3.953] s 102................................[2.3.3190] Pt 2..................................[2.3.1380] Pt 2 Div 1....................... [2.3.2790] Pts 2 Div 1 – 4...............[2.3.2790] Pt 3..................................[2.3.2990] Pt 4..................................[2.3.1380] Sch 1 cl 1(1)...................[2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(a).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(b).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(c).............. [2.3.1720] Sch 1 cl 1(1)(d).............. [2.3.1720]

Sch 1 cl 1(2)..................[2.3.1750], [2.3.1770] Sch 1 cl 1(4)...................[2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 1(5)...................[2.3.1750] Sch 1 cl 2.......[2.3.830], [2.3.1630] Sch 1 cl 2(2)...................[2.3.1650] Sch 1 cl 2..........................[2.3.830] Sch 1 cl 3....[2.3.2370], [2.3.2380], [2.3.2570] Sch 1 cl 3(1)..................[2.3.1050], [2.3.2480] Sch 1 cl 3(3)...................[2.3.2420] Sch 1 cl 3(4)...................[2.3.2420] Sch 1 cl 3(5)...................[2.3.2420] Sch 1 cl 4(1)...................[2.3.1450] Sch 1 cl 4(2)...................[2.3.1450] Sch 1 cl 4(3)...................[2.3.1450] Sch 1 cl 5........................[2.3.2030] Sch 1 cl 5(1)(b).............. [2.3.2120] Sch 1 cl 5(2)...................[2.3.2040] Sch 1 cl 5(3)..................[2.3.1570], [2.3.1600] Sch 1 cl 5(4)...................[2.3.2050] Sch 1 cl 6.......[2.3.830], [2.3.1780] Sch 1 cl 6(1)(b).............. [2.3.1810] Sch 1 cl 6(2)...................[2.3.1830] Sch 1 cl 6(3)...................[2.3.1830] Sch 1 cl 6(4)...................[2.3.1840] Sch 1 cl 7(2)...................[2.3.2340] Sch 1 cl 8.......[2.3.830], [2.3.2250] Sch 1 cl 8..........................[2.3.830] Sch 1 cl 10(1).................[2.3.2720] Sch 1 cl 10(2).................[2.3.2720] Sch 1 cl 11....[2.3.830], [2.3.1920], [2.3.1930] Sch 1 cl 11(1)(a).............[2.3.2010] Sch 1 cl 11(1)(b)............ [2.3.2010] Sch 1 cl 11(2)................. [2.3.1940]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

[2.7.250] s 14(3)..............[2.7.240], [2.7.290]

Western Australia – continued

Sch 1 cl 12......................[2.3.2360] Sch 2 cl 1.....[2.3.1270], [2.3.2370] Sch 9............................... [2.3.1430]

s 14(4)...............................[2.7.420] s 14(5)...............................[2.7.420] s 14(6)...............................[2.7.230] s 15....................................[2.7.360]

Freedom of Information Amendment Act 2004

s 16(1)...............................[2.7.350]

s 4....................................[2.3.2120]

s 16(2)...............................[2.7.470]

Freedom of Information Regulations 1993.................... [2.3.590], [2.3.2790]

s 17(1)...............................[2.7.380] s 17(3)...............................[2.7.370] s 17(5)...............................[2.7.400]

Interpretation Act 1984 s 74..................................[2.7.1470] Legal Aid Commission Act 1976

s 17A.................................[2.7.380] s 18(1)(b).......................... [2.7.410] s 18(1)(c)......... [2.7.370], [2.7.430]

s 64..................................[2.3.2240] Local Government Act 1995

s 18(1)(d).......................... [2.7.440] s 18(2)...............................[2.7.390]

s 5.110.............................[2.7.1080]

s 19(1)...............................[2.7.480]

Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971...... [2.1.10], [2.7.180], [2.7.190], [2.7.220], [2.7.230], [2.7.240], [2.7.250], [2.7.330], [2.7.370], [2.7.380], [2.7.400], [2.7.420], [2.7.430], [2.7.510], [2.7.520], [2.7.530], [2.7.690], [2.7.790] s 4A...................................[2.7.190]

s 19(1a)............ [2.7.460], [2.7.480]

s 4A(1)(b)........ [2.7.190], [2.7.250] s 4A(1)(d)......................... [2.7.190] s 4A(1)(e)..........................[2.7.190] s 13....................................[2.7.190] s 13(2)...............................[2.7.200] s 13(2)(a).......................... [2.7.200] s 13(2)(d).......................... [2.7.210] s 13(2)(h).......................... [2.7.210] s 13(2)(j)........................... [2.7.210] s 14(1).............[2.1.290], [2.7.190],

s 19(2)..............[2.7.490], [2.7.760] s 19(3)..............[2.7.450], [2.7.490] s 19(4)..............[2.7.530], [2.7.550] s 19(5)...............................[2.7.530] s 19(7)...............................[2.7.300] s 20....................................[2.7.450] s 20(1)...............................[2.7.500] s 20(2A)............................ [2.7.520] s 20(3)...............................[2.7.520] s 21....................................[2.7.500] s 22....................................[2.7.520] s 22A.................................[2.7.650] s 23....................................[2.7.760] s 24....................................[2.7.510] s 25(1)...............................[2.7.570] s 25(1)(a)......... [2.7.300], [2.7.580] s 25(1)(b)......... [2.7.290], [2.7.590] s 25(1)(c).......................... [2.7.600] s 25(1)(d).......................... [2.7.610]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Western Australia – continued

s s s s

25(1)(e).......................... [2.7.620] 25(1)(f)...........................[2.7.630] 25(1)(g).......................... [2.7.640] 25(2).............[2.7.560], [2.7.670], [2.7.680]

s 25(3)...............................[2.7.680] s 25(4)...............................[2.7.680] s 25(5)...............................[2.7.690] s 25(6)...............................[2.7.700] s 25(7)...............................[2.7.540] s 26....................................[2.7.720] s 27....................................[2.7.710] s 29....................................[2.7.790] s 30....................................[2.7.790] s 30(1)...............................[2.7.790] s 30(3)...............................[2.7.790] s 30B.................................[2.7.510] Sch 1................................. [2.7.230] Planning and Development Act 2005....................................... [2.7.920] Rules of the Supreme Court 1971..................................... [2.7.2060] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004...... [2.1.10], [2.1.160], [2.7.930], [2.7.1110], [2.7.1330], [2.7.1440], [2.7.1470], [2.7.1500], [2.7.1660], [2.7.1880], [2.7.1900], [2.7.2040], [2.7.2060], [2.7.2090] s s s s s s

3....................................[2.7.2060] 5....................................[2.7.1000] 7......................................[2.7.930] 11....................................[2.7.930] 13....................................[2.7.960] 14....................................[2.7.960]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

17.................[2.7.960], [2.7.1040] 17(1)...............................[2.7.970] 18(2).............................[2.7.1000] 20..................................[2.7.1430] 21...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1540] 24...............[2.7.1200], [2.7.1380] 24(a)............................. [2.7.1540] 25(1).............................[2.7.1630] 25(2).............................[2.7.1640] 25(4).............................[2.7.1640] 26..................................[2.7.1630] 27..................................[2.7.1060] 27(1).............................[2.7.1090] 27(2).............................[2.7.1090] 28..................................[2.7.1110] 29..................................[2.7.1900] 29(1)..........[2.7.1400], [2.7.1890] 29(3).............................[2.7.1900] 30..................................[2.7.1650] 31..................................[2.7.1840] 32(1)............................. [2.7.1150] 32(2)..........[2.7.1310], [2.7.1700] 32(2)(b)........................ [2.7.1010] 32(4).........[2.7.1250], [2.7.1310], [2.7.1740] 32(5)..........[2.7.1310], [2.7.1740] 32(6)(a)..... [2.7.1280], [2.7.1400] 32(6)(b)..... [2.7.1280], [2.7.1400] 32(6)(c)(ii)....................[2.7.1240] 32(7)(a)........................ [2.7.1410] 32(7)(c)........................ [2.7.1240] 32(7)(e)........................ [2.7.1220] 33..................................[2.7.1140] 34(3).............................[2.7.1610] 34(5).............................[2.7.1620] 34(6).............................[2.7.1380] 35..................................[2.7.1620]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s s s s s s s s s s s s

Western Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

35(3).............................[2.7.1380] 36(4).............................[2.7.1460] 37(1).............................[2.7.1510] 37(3).............................[2.7.1510] 38..................................[2.7.1510] 38(1)(a)........................ [2.7.1520] 38(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1520] 38(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1520] 39..................................[2.7.1660] 42..................................[2.7.1470] 42(3).............................[2.7.1480] 46(1).............................[2.7.1840] 46(3).............................[2.7.1840] 47..................................[2.7.1840] 48..................................[2.7.1840] 49..................................[2.7.1870] 52..................................[2.7.1610] 54..................................[2.7.1610] 55...............[2.7.1380], [2.7.1670] 56..................................[2.7.1840] 56(2).............................[2.7.1880] 60(2).............................[2.7.1210] 61...............[2.7.1150], [2.7.1670] 61(2).............................[2.7.1670] 61(4).............................[2.7.1670] 62..................................[2.7.1670] 66..................................[2.7.1620] 67(1)(b)........................ [2.7.1740] 67(1)(c)........................ [2.7.1240] 68(2).............................[2.7.1380] 69..................................[2.7.1380]

77(1).............................[2.7.1910] 77(2).............................[2.7.1910] 84..................................[2.7.1870] 87(2).............................[2.7.2120] 87(4).............................[2.7.2120] 88(3).............................[2.7.2120] 105.............[2.7.2036], [2.7.2040] 105(5)...........................[2.7.2060] 105(7)...........................[2.7.2060] 105(9)........[2.7.2080], [2.7.2100] 106................................[2.7.2050] 159.............[2.7.1330], [2.7.1380]

State Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2004................. [2.7.1140] State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004.................. [2.7.1140], [2.7.1500] r r r r r r r

6....................................[2.7.1470] 7....................................[2.7.1470] 7A.................................[2.7.1470] 8....................................[2.7.1470] 9....................................[2.7.1490] 10...............[2.7.1490], [2.7.1500] 12...............[2.7.1550], [2.7.1560]

Strata Titles Act 1985............[2.7.920] Supreme Court Act 1935 s 16..................................[2.7.2240] s 18..................................[2.7.2240] United Kingdom Australian Courts Act 1828 9 Geo 4 c 83 s 3....................................[2.7.2240]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxviii

2.1 Administrative Law System

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SYSTEM

Current Subtitle Author Mark A Robinson SC BA, LLB (Hons) (Macq) Barrister, Supreme Court of New South Wales and High Court of Australia Barrister, Maurice Byers Chambers (Updating author, Update 324 – November 2016) (Updating author, Update 293 – March 2014) (Updating author, Update 281 – March 2013)

This Subtitle is current to 15 September 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Stephen Argument

Court of the Australian Capital Territory Reader, Faculty of Law, Australian National University

BA, LLB, MPubl (ANU) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales Secretary to the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills ([2.1.140]–[2.1.180] Original author)

(Updating author, Update 113 – December 1999) (Updating author, Update 37 – September 1996) ([2.1.290]–[2.1.310] Original author)

Meng Yen Phua

Peter Dockrill

BA, LLB (UWA) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

BA, LLB (Newcastle) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

(Updating author, Update 232 – December 2008)

(Updating author, Update 171 – November 2003)

John McMillan BA, LLB (ANU) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme

2

2.1 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION.............................................................................[2.1.10] DEFINITION............................................................................... [2.1.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE...............................................................[2.1.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.........................................[2.1.30] ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN ITS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT..................................................................................... [2.1.140] NATURE, EXERCISE AND CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS............................................................................................ [2.1.290]

3

4

Introduction Definition [2.1.10] The “administrative law system” is a complex combination of established common law principles and modern mechanisms set up by legislation. While neither administrative law nor judicial review of administrative action by the courts is of recent origin,1 the administrative law system in most Australian jurisdictions is a result of legislative reform over the past three decades.2 Initially, the most far-reaching reform occurred at the Commonwealth level. It commenced with the establishment of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 19753 and the office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in 1976.4 Another step in the reform process was the enactment of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), which introduced a simplified and codified federal judicial review procedure in place of prerogative writs and public law equitable remedies, codified the common law grounds of review, and, for the first time, created a generally applicable right to obtain the reasons for a decision challengeable under the Act. The initial reform phase culminated with the provision of a right of access to documents held by Commonwealth agencies.5 Overseeing all this reform and monitoring it and advising the federal government as to its operation was the Administrative Review Council (ARC) set up under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). This package of reforms, then styled the “new administrative law”, has operated well since then.6 Corresponding statutory development of State administrative law systems has not been as comprehensive. There is legislation providing for the existence of an Ombudsman’s office in all jurisdictions.7 However, only the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia have established a general-jurisdiction administrative appeals tribunal.8 Only in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria has judicial review legislation been enacted.9 In the other States, and in the Northern Territory, recourse to the common law system of judicial review is the only option, although the ancient prerogative writs have been abolished in some States and replaced by provision for “orders in the nature” of the former writs.10 Freedom of information legislation has been enacted in all jurisdictions.11 Administrative law in the States is constitutionally entrenched and protected as accepted in the joint judgment of the High Court in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; 84 ALJR 154; 190 IR 437; [2010] HCA 1. The Court held that State Supreme Courts were protected by fundamental 5

[2.1.10]

INTRODUCTION

constitutional concepts, and any attempt to limit their supervisory jurisdiction in relation to judicial review of inferior courts and tribunals and in relation to administrative action would likely be invalid as being unconstitutional.12 Writing extra-curially, Chief Justice Spigelman argued the effect of Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) is that: [T]here is, by force of s 73 [of the Constitution], an “entrenched minimum provision of judicial review” applicable to State decision-makers of a similar, probably of the same, character as the High Court determined in [Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; 77 ALJR 454; [2003] HCA 2] to exist in the case of Commonwealth decision-makers by force of s 75(v) of the Constitution.13

1 See WB Lane and S Young, Administrative Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2007) at [1.15]. 2 See WB Lane and S Young, Administrative Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2007) at [1.20]. 3 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). See also “Other Forms of Review and Appeal” [2.7.10]ff. 4 See Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). See also “Other Forms of Review and Appeal” [2.7.10]ff. 5 See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) by the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) have provided individuals with a right of access to their personal information as held by private sector organisations: see Privacy Act 1988, Sch 1 “Australian Privacy Principles”. 6 See A Mason, “Delivering Administrative Justice: Looking Back with Pride, Moving Forward with Concern” (2010) 64 AIAL Forum 4. 7 See Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA). 8 See ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW); Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (SA); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). 9 See Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT); Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld); Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas); Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic). However, see Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice: An Action Plan (AGPS, 1994) at [13.1], recommending that each State and Territory establish a comprehensive administrative law system. 10 See, eg Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69. 11 See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). 12 Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; 84 ALJR 154; 190 IR 437;

6

[2.1.30]

RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES

[2010] HCA 1, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [96]–[100] (Heydon J concurring on this point at [113]). 13 Justice JJ Spigelman, “The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error” (2010) 21 PLR 77 at 81.

Scope of Subtitle [2.1.20] The theoretical bases underlying the administrative law system are the focus of this Subtitle. The Constitution, the common law and express provisions in legislation are the sources providing for review of administrative acts: see [2.1.140]–[2.1.180]. The scope of review available in the administrative law system and the nature of administrative acts are examined at [2.1.290]–[2.1.310].

Related Titles and Subtitles [2.1.30] The concepts introduced in this Subtitle are discussed in greater detail within other Subtitles. The nature of subordinate legislation made by a person or body with Parliament’s express authority is considered in “Delegated Legislation” [2.2.10]ff. More comprehensive coverage of the various grounds on which review of administrative decisions may be sought at common law and pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and similar statutes enacted in some jurisdictions, can be found in “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Reviewable Decisions, Conduct and Powers and General Grounds” [2.4.10]ff and “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Procedural Fairness” [2.5.10]ff. “Remedies in Judicial Review” [2.6.10]ff discusses the remedies available to an individual aggrieved by an administrative decision, and the nature and extent of a court’s discretion in effecting a remedy in certain circumstances. Judicial review is not the only option open to persons or bodies affected by administrative acts. “Other Forms of Review and Appeal” [2.7.10]ff discusses the office of the Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the establishment of which are prefaced in this Subtitle: see [2.1.160]–[2.1.300]. An outline of the legal rights of Australians in relation to accessing information held by the government is provided in “Access to Information” [2.3.10]ff. For an overview of the appointed and sometimes ad hoc bodies which advise government on matters of public interest, see “Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries” [2.8.10]ff.

7

[2.1.30]

INTRODUCTION

8

Administrative System in Its Legal and Constitutional Context [2.1.140] The Constitution provides that administrative acts of the Commonwealth government and administration may be reviewed by the High Court. Section 75 of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters “in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party”1 and “in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth”.2 In the context of s 75(iii) of the Constitution, it should be considered whether the person who took the action complained of can properly be described as “the Commonwealth”. It has been suggested that the phrase includes “some persons so identified with the Commonwealth that one could describe those persons as the Commonwealth’s alter ego”, as well as “a person who might be loosely described as the Commonwealth’s representative, that is, a person or instrumentality appearing in proceedings ‘on behalf of’ the Commonwealth”.3 In the context of s 75(v) of the Constitution, an “officer of the Commonwealth” includes federal Ministers, federal judicial officers, the Federal Commissioner of Taxation and members of Commonwealth boards.4 The original jurisdiction of the High Court to undertake judicial review can also be exercised by the Federal Court and State and Territory courts, as a result of amendments to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Section 39B(1) of that Act provides, in similar terms to s 75(v) of the Constitution, that the Federal Court has jurisdiction in any matter “in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer or officers of the Commonwealth”. Further, s 44 of the Act provides that the High Court may remit, either to the Federal Court or to the court of a State or a Territory, a matter that has been commenced in the original jurisdiction of the High Court.5 Subject to that power of remittal, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in “matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth or a federal court”.6

1 Constitution, s 75(iii). 2 Constitution, s 75(v). 3 See PH Lane, The Australian Federal System (2nd ed, Law Book Co, 1979)

9

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN ITS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT [2.1.140]

4

5

6

pp 615–616. See also Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334; 43 ALJR 330; Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410; 71 ALJR 1254, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 448, McHugh J at 460, Gummow J at 474, Kirby J at 510 (CLR); Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559; 75 ALJR 363; [2001] HCA 1. See PH Lane, The Australian Federal System (2nd ed, Law Book Co, 1979) pp 645–646; M Aronson and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2013) at [2.150]. See also “Prerogative Orders” [2.6.1090]–[2.6.1720]. It is uncertain whether a statutory corporation is an “officer of the Commonwealth”: Post Offıce Agents Association Ltd v Australian Postal Commission (1988) 84 ALR 563 (FCA), Davies J at 575. As to whether the jurisdiction conferred by Constitution, s 75(v) encompasses the ground of review known as “Wednesbury unreasonableness” or “legal unreasonableness” (see “Unreasonableness” [2.4.1900]–[2.4.2000]), see Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; 73 ALJR 584; [1999] HCA 14, Gaudron J at [114]–[116], Kirby J at [208]–[212]; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; 73 ALJR 746; [1999] HCA 21, Gummow J at [121]–[129]. With regard to “legitimate expectations”, see Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 699; [2003] HCA 6. See also “Interests Attracting Duty to Comply with Rules of Procedural Fairness” [2.5.170]–[2.5.230]. The Commonwealth Parliament can provide that the jurisdiction exercised by a court on remittal of a matter shall be more limited than the jurisdiction that would otherwise be exercised by the High Court under Constitution, s 75(v): Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; 73 ALJR 584; [1999] HCA 14. See also discussion of this issue in Weldt v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 835. There, Finkelstein J at [9]–[14] chose not to follow the decision in A v Pelekanakis (1999) 91 FCR 70; [1999] FCA 236, where it was held that Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 485 (as it was then) had not limited the grounds of review that could be considered by the Federal Court on remittal of a case under Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 44. For further discussion of the High Court’s power of remittal, see MZXOT v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 233 CLR 601; 82 ALJR 1061; [2008] HCA 28. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 38(e).

[2.1.150] At common law, the right of the courts to review the legality of administrative decisions is well established. This right emanates from developments in the United Kingdom’s courts from the 17th century until the date of Australian settlement, when the common law of the United Kingdom was received by Australia.1 Judicial review in the State Supreme Courts is protected by fundamental constitutional concepts and any attempt to limit their supervisory jurisdiction in relation to judicial review of inferior courts and tribunals and in relation to administrative action would likely be invalid as being unconstitutional.2 In exercising review, a court is not able to examine the

10

[2.1.160]

merits of the decision in question. The court is limited to reviewing whether the decision-maker has acted fairly, within his or her power and according to the law.3

1 See WB Lane and S Young, Administrative Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2007) at [1.15]. Discussion of the nature of the review of administrative action by courts under the common law is contained in “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Reviewable Decisions, Conduct and Powers and General Grounds” [2.4.10]ff; “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Procedural Fairness” [2.5.10]ff. 2 Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; 84 ALJR 154; 190 IR 437; [2010] HCA 1, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [96]–[100] (Heydon J concurring on this point at [113]). 3 See Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; 64 ALJR 327; 33 IR 263, Brennan J at 35–37 (CLR); Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; 70 ALJR 568, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 271–272 (CLR).

[2.1.160] In addition to the common law, review of administrative decisions is available by express provision in legislation. At the Commonwealth level, these avenues of review arise as a result of legislation enacted by the federal Parliament between 1975 and 1982, following the recommendations of a series of committees and inquiries.1 The legislation comprises the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth),2 the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth)3 and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).4 The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)5 was later enacted as a separate initiative. Some of the States and Territories have attempted, with varying degrees of completeness, to mirror the Commonwealth’s statutory scheme of review of administrative decisions.6

1 The three main reports are known as the Kerr, Bland and Ellicott Committee Reports and they are reproduced in R Creyke and J McMillan (eds), The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law (Australian National University Centre for International and Public Law, 1999). 2 See “Tribunals” [2.7.910]–[2.7.2120]. 3 See “Ombudsman” [2.7.150]–[2.7.800]. 4 The jurisdiction of the Federal Court to undertake judicial review has been extended by Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B(1) (see [2.1.140]), and s 39B(1A), which provides that the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court includes any matter “in which the Commonwealth is seeking an injunction or a declaration” (s 39B(1A)(a)), or “arising under any laws made by the Parliament”: s 39B(1A)(c). The review jurisdiction of the Court is extended also by the accrued jurisdiction that the Court can exercise to deal with all claims that are inseparable from claims over which the Court has jurisdiction and which arise from a common substratum: Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570; 57 ALJR 317; 5 TPR 171; Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261; 57 ALJR 731; Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999)

11

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN ITS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT [2.1.160]

5 6

198 CLR 511; 73 ALJR 839; [1999] HCA 27, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [134]–[150]. However, in other respects the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to undertake review has been limited, notably by Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt 8. After the enactment of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth), judicial review under Migration Act 1958, Pt 8 was restricted by the insertion of a privative clause in s 474. For a discussion of the effects of Pt 8, see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; 77 ALJR 454; [2003] HCA 2. See further “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Reviewable Decisions, Conduct and Powers and General Grounds” [2.4.10]ff. See “Access to Information” [2.3.10]ff. See Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW); Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld); Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas); Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).

[2.1.170] The types of bodies and acts which may be subject to administrative review are many and varied. They include Ministers of State (and actions taken on behalf of Ministers by their departments and officers) and statutory and non-statutory government bodies. Acts and decisions which are subject to review may or may not be expressly provided for by statute. Similarly, there are a variety of legislative or quasi-legislative bodies which may be subject to administrative review. Principally, these are bodies which make delegated legislation on the express authority of Parliament.1 They range from the Governor-General-in-Council making regulations to municipal councils making by-laws. Given the nature and status of both the bodies in question and the nature of the action in question (ie its legislative character), the type of review applicable in such circumstances is in many ways distinct from other forms of administrative review. Judicial review may even extend to some bodies which are essentially of a private nature, but whose powers and functions may have a public aspect or attract the public interest.2 Examples are professional associations and horse racing clubs. However, it has been suggested that increasing governmental reliance on the practices of privatisation, outsourcing and corporatisation “severely limit the effectiveness of administrative law, both as a general method of government accountability and as a system for providing individuals with a remedy”.3

1 See “Delegated Legislation” [2.2.10]ff. 2 See M Aronson and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2013) at [3.220], [7.410]. 3 WB Lane and S Young, Queensland Administrative Law (Lawbook Co., 2002). See also Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Report No 42 (AGPS, 1998).

12

[2.1.180]

[2.1.180] A wide range of review and appeal bodies exists within all Australian jurisdictions. Judicial review is exercised only by superior courts. However, there are special courts, tribunals and other bodies which have powers of appeal or review. Such bodies differ as to whether they are established and provided for by statute or by executive action; whether they can review the merits of a decision or are restricted to questions of law; and whether their decisions are subject to review by a superior court. They range from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which is set up under a detailed piece of discrete legislation,1 to the provision in an Act that a certain decision is to be subject to internal review.2

1 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). 2 For a discussion of other methods of administrative review, see Administrative Review Council, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals, Report No 39 (AGPS, 1995) pp 25–30. The Council’s recommendation for the establishment of an integrated review tribunal body, which found expression in the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2000 (Cth), has not been instituted. See also “Other Forms of Review and Appeal” [2.7.10]ff.

13

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN ITS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT [2.1.180]

14

Nature, Exercise and Control of Administrative Acts [2.1.290] The analytical description of a power as legislative, executive or judicial has an irregular effect on administrative law and the scope of review. Legislation sometimes employs these distinctions in defining the scope of review: each Australian Ombudsman has a jurisdiction limited to “a matter of administration”;1 judicial review legislation provides for review of a “decision of an administrative character”;2 and some of the controls on subordinate legislation refer to instruments that are of a “legislative” character.3 Some common law principles also rely on the classifications. For example, a judge is immune from civil liability for acts done in the performance of a judicial function;4 it has been said that the validity of subordinate legislation cannot be reviewed by the writ of prohibition;5 it is ordinarily presumed that the obligation to observe natural justice does not apply to the making of subordinate legislation;6 and the presumption against delegation of power in the absence of express statutory authority applies more strongly to judicial than to non-judicial functions.7 The contemporary relevance of the classification of functions has, however, been doubted in other circumstances. For example, it has been held that the analytical description of a function being held to be legislative should not for that reason alone insulate a decision from review for breach of natural justice,8 or for unauthorised purpose.9 The difficulty of classifying a function under one label rather than another has also been noted,10 and the classification of a function can vary according to the purpose for which the classification is made.11 Nor is it uncommon to find that some statutory authorities exercise the full range of functions: a regulatory agency may act administratively in administering a statutory scheme, legislatively in formulating general principles of conduct to be observed by those to be regulated, and adjudicatively in imposing penalties or resolving disputes in the course of regulation.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 6(1) (definition of “conduct”), s 13(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 6(1) (definition of “administrative action”), s 14(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 7(1) (definition of “administrative action”), s 12(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act”), s 13; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12 (“administrative action”); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2 (definition of “administrative action”), s 13(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(1). See also “Ombudsman” [2.7.150]–[2.7.800]. 2 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of

15

NATURE, EXERCISE AND CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

[2.1.290]

“decision to which this Act applies”); Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT), Dictionary (definition of “decision to which this Act applies”); Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 4; Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas), s 4. Under Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic), ss 2, 3, judicial review is limited to decisions of tribunals. 3 See, eg Subordinate Legislation Act 1992 (Tas), s 3(1) (definition of “subordinate legislation”, para (b)); Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic), s 4(1)(b). 4 See, eg Gallo v Dawson (1988) 63 ALJR 121 (HCA); Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522 (CA). 5 R v Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia (1955) 93 CLR 528, the Court at 541. 6 See DC Pearce and S Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (4th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2012) at [13.2]–[13.4]. 7 See O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners (1982) 153 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 130; 13 ATR 706 (overruled on other grounds in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; 57 ALJR 749; 14 ATR 713); Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18; [1953] 2 WLR 995 (CA). 8 Bread Manufacturers (NSW) v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404; 56 ALJR 89. 9 R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170; 56 ALJR 164. 10 See, eg Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615 (FCA), Gummow J at 634–635. 11 Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (Corporations & Securities Panel Case) (1991) 173 CLR 167; 66 ALJR 171.

[2.1.300] The creation in Australia of many different methods of administrative review partly reflects the different elements that comprise an administrative process. Judicial review (undertaken by courts) does not in practice apply to the full range of administrative activity. For example, judicial review legislation applies mainly to “decisions” – a classification that ordinarily applies to administrative activity that is ultimate and substantive.1 It has been suggested that some executive decisions may not be justiciable, or amenable to judicial review.2 The focus of judicial review on the legality and not the merits of administrative action can also limit the breadth of application of this method of review. The merit review jurisdiction of administrative tribunals and of some courts is similarly confined. Most merit review tribunals have a jurisdiction that is confined to the review of decisions in a particular subject area such as immigration, social security, town planning, or guardianship. Even the jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), although general, does not extend to all areas of government administration: it is limited to reviewing decisions that have been identified in legislation as appellable to the AAT.3 A related feature of some merit review processes is that there is a hierarchy of internal and external merit review processes. For example, Commonwealth social security decisions were once able to be reviewed successively by the Secretary, the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the AAT.4

16

[2.1.300]

In 2015, the Social Security Appeals Tribunal was merged into the AAT. Decisions are now reviewed in the AAT’s Social Services & Child Support Division. Other administrative review agencies have a more extensive jurisdiction. Review by each Ombudsman is not confined to decisions, but extends generally to administrative action. Accordingly, a typical focus in many Ombudsman investigations is whether there has been defective administration, such as delay, inefficiency or inadequate communication. Nevertheless, in each Ombudsman jurisdiction there are areas of administrative activity that are exempted from review, such as action by a Minister, action taken by a person acting as legal adviser and action taken by an agency as the employer of the complainant.5 There are other investigatory agencies that review administrative action, either in specific subject areas (eg policing or government employment) or generally with a view to examining whether there has been a contravention of a specific standard (eg suppressing discriminatory, unethical or corrupt conduct). Commonwealth examples include the Defence Force Ombudsman and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. State examples include, in New South Wales, the Anti-Discrimination Board and the Independent Commission Against Corruption, and in Queensland, the Crime and Misconduct Commission. Administrative decisions and actions may often be subject to review by a variety of different agencies or processes. Choice of one forum rather than another may turn on factors such as cost, the rules of standing, time limitations and the nature of the grievance. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a person to simultaneously invoke more than one process, particularly if there are grounds for challenging separately the legality, the merits and the administrative elements of a decision.

1 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; 64 ALJR 462; 5 BR 137; see also NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277; 77 ALJR 1263; [2003] HCA 35. Judicial review at common law is not subject to the same express limitation, but a similar limitation often arises from the nature of the remedies, which usually issue only at the point that there is an actual or threatened grievance. The judicial review jurisdiction of a court can also be limited by statute: see, eg Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; 73 ALJR 584; [1999] HCA 14. See also “Ouster Clauses” [2.6.2950]–[2.6.3240]. 2 Minister for Arts, Heritage & Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274 (FCAFC); Administrative Review Council, Federal Judicial Review in Australia, Report No 50 (ARC, 2012) Ch 5; Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, Report No 32 (AGPS, 1989). 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 25(1). See also Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, Appeals from Administrative

17

NATURE, EXERCISE AND CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS

4 5

[2.1.300]

Decisions, Issues Paper No 14 (Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, 1991) Ch 5. Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth), Pt 4. See, eg Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5. See also [2.1.10], [2.1.290]; “Ombudsman” [2.7.150]–[2.7.800].

[2.1.310] Administrative review and government administration impose different and at times conflicting pressures and values on administrative decision-making.1 A prominent theme, particularly in judicial review, is that legislation should be construed and applied correctly, and that other legal obligations, such as the requirements of natural justice, should be respected. Other methods of review emphasise acting fairly, reasonably and properly and with appropriate speed in making individual decisions. However, government policies and programs may alternatively focus on achieving an administrative pattern that is efficient, cost-effective and consistent. On occasions these pressures may be conflicting in their direction. For example, inconsistent decision-making may be criticised in a merit review process, or may be regarded as antithetical to the implementation of government policies. Yet, the pursuit of consistency for its own sake may sometimes breach legal standards that require that genuine consideration be given to the merits of each case. There can also be contradictory pressures on the proper procedure for making a decision: peremptory determination of a case may contravene natural justice principles, but successive levels of review and appeal may cause delay and exhaustion of all parties.

1 For one account of these tensions, see S Argument (ed), Administrative Law and Public Administration: Happily Married or Living Apart under the Same Roof (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994). For a case illustration, see Wei v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 29 FCR 455. In that case, many thousands of refugee decisions were outstanding and four of the five refugee applicants successfully argued that statutory mandamus should be issued under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 7 to force the Commonwealth to make particular determinations. Neaves J noted at 467: “The respondent has acknowledged and accepted that the delay in making a decision upon each of the applications is unsatisfactory, undesirable and regrettable but has submitted that it has been unavoidable and unavoidable for reasons beyond the respondent’s control.”

18

2.3 Access to Information

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Current Subtitle Author John D Fitzgerald B Juris LLB (UNSW), MPP (Syd) Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales Research Associate, Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales (Updating author, Update 324 – November 2016) (Original author, Update 263 – July 2011)

This Subtitle is current to 15 September 2016.

20

2.3 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION.............................................................................[2.3.10] DEFINITION............................................................................... [2.3.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE...............................................................[2.3.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.........................................[2.3.30] SYSTEMATIC POLICY.................................................................[2.3.140] SECRECY................................................................................ [2.3.140] POLICY OBJECTIVES............................................................. [2.3.170] WHAT-COUNTS-AS-REQUIREMENTS................................... [2.3.190] STATEMENT OF REASONS....................................................... [2.3.300] INTRODUCTION...................................................................... [2.3.300] HISTORY OF RIGHT TO REASONS.......................................[2.3.310] WHEN CAN REASONS BE OBTAINED AT GENERAL LAW?........................................................................................ [2.3.320] STATUTORY SCHEMES FOR REASONS.............................. [2.3.330] General.................................................................................[2.3.330] First Federal Schemes......................................................... [2.3.340] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL CONSIDERATION OF FEDERAL SCHEMES................................................................................ [2.3.350] AVAILABILITY OF STATEMENTS OF REASONS...................[2.3.360] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Scheme................................................................................ [2.3.360] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) Scheme................................................................................ [2.3.370] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Scheme......... [2.3.375] Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) Scheme..............................[2.3.380] Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas) Scheme............................. [2.3.390] Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) Scheme.........................[2.3.400] JUDICIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTENT........................ [2.3.410] LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTENT................. [2.3.415] Outline.................................................................................. [2.3.415] JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATEMENTS OF REASONS........ [2.3.440] Whether Breach of Duty to Give Reasons Is Error of Law....................................................................................... [2.3.440] Statements of Reasons as Items of Evidence.................... [2.3.450] Cross-examination of Maker of Statement of Reasons.......[2.3.460] 21

CONCLUDING SUMMARY...................................................... [2.3.470] RIGHT TO INFORMATION.......................................................... [2.3.580] GENERAL.................................................................................[2.3.580] SOURCES OF LAW................................................................. [2.3.590] Legislation............................................................................ [2.3.590] Quasi-legislation................................................................... [2.3.610] TRIBUNALS..............................................................................[2.3.640] OVERALL STRUCTURE.......................................................... [2.3.690] General.................................................................................[2.3.690] Fundamental Rule................................................................ [2.3.700] Systematic Structuring of Choice and Evaluation................[2.3.720] Balance................................................................................ [2.3.730] Balance and Harm/Benefit Tests..........................................[2.3.740] Public Interest...................................................................... [2.3.750] Public Interest in Right to Information Legislation............... [2.3.755] Reasonableness in Right to Information Legislation........... [2.3.775] QUALIFICATIONS TO PUBLIC INTEREST AND REASONABLENESS................................................................[2.3.820] General.................................................................................[2.3.820] Harm and Benefit Tests........................................................[2.3.830] Proscribed Public Interest Factors....................................... [2.3.840] POST-RIGHT TO INFORMATION............................................[2.3.850] Judicial and Tribunal Commentary...................................... [2.3.850] NON-ADVERTENCE TO PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY CASES......................................................................................[2.3.860] HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROSCRIBED FACTORS................................................................................. [2.3.870] General.................................................................................[2.3.870] McKinnon’s Case – Public Interest...................................... [2.3.880] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY ON WORD REASONABLE......................................................................... [2.3.890] General.................................................................................[2.3.890] McKinnon’s Case................................................................. [2.3.900] LEGISLATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH, NEW SOUTH WALES, QUEENSLAND AND TASMANIA............................................. [2.3.910] Explicit.................................................................................. [2.3.910] Legislative Objects............................................................... [2.3.920] Implicit.................................................................................. [2.3.930]

22

WHAT-COUNTS-AS-REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM................... [2.3.940] LEGAL OBJECTS ACTED ON BY RIGHT TO INFORMATION LAWS........................................................................................[2.3.950] TABLES OF LEGISLATION......................................................[2.3.953] LEGISLATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA: FUNCTION OF RULES AS TO LEGAL OBJECTS................................................................................. [2.3.960] LEGISLATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA: JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY...................................................................... [2.3.1030] Document........................................................................... [2.3.1030] Document “of” an Agency.................................................. [2.3.1040] Personal Information.......................................................... [2.3.1050] LEGISLATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH, NEW SOUTH WALES, QUEENSLAND AND TASMANIA........................................... [2.3.1060] LEGISLATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH, NEW SOUTH WALES, QUEENSLAND AND TASMANIA: LEGAL OBJECTS............[2.3.1070] OBJECTS OF PUBLICATION AND INSPECTION RULES... [2.3.1080] Introduction.........................................................................[2.3.1080] Rules Relevant to a Topic.................................................. [2.3.1090] Shift to Quasi-legislation.....................................................[2.3.1100] Diversification......................................................................[2.3.1110] Commonwealth...................................................................[2.3.1120] NEW SOUTH WALES............................................................ [2.3.1130] General............................................................................... [2.3.1130] Government Contracts....................................................... [2.3.1140] Disclosure Logs.................................................................. [2.3.1170] Local Government.............................................................. [2.3.1180] QUEENSLAND....................................................................... [2.3.1200] PERSONAL INFORMATION.................................................. [2.3.1210] Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania..................................................................... [2.3.1210] Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.1240] LEGAL SUBJECTS................................................................ [2.3.1260] Introduction.........................................................................[2.3.1260] PROPER APPLICANT............................................................[2.3.1270] PROPER RESPONDENT...................................................... [2.3.1290]

23

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.1330] Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania..................................................................... [2.3.1360] EXEMPTIONS........................................................................ [2.3.1370] General...............................................................................[2.3.1370] MEANING OF “EXEMPT”...................................................... [2.3.1380] Statutory Terminology.........................................................[2.3.1380] Types of Exemptions..........................................................[2.3.1420] Some-agency Exemptions................................................. [2.3.1430] All agency Exemptions.......................................................[2.3.1440] TYPES OF EXEMPTIONS..................................................... [2.3.1460] Characterisation and Outcome.......................................... [2.3.1460] EVALUATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN EXEMPTIONS.....[2.3.1480] Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia................ [2.3.1480] LEGISLATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH, NEW SOUTH WALES, QUEENSLAND AND TASMANIA........................................... [2.3.1490] General...............................................................................[2.3.1490] Harm Test........................................................................... [2.3.1500] COMPARISON MODEL OF BALANCE................................. [2.3.1510] WHAT IS COMPARED?......................................................... [2.3.1520] RULES FOR ACCESS ON DEMAND SYSTEM....................[2.3.1530] Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia................ [2.3.1530] Commonwealth and Tasmania...........................................[2.3.1540] New South Wales and Queensland...................................[2.3.1550] LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM COMPARISON OF FACTORS............................................................................... [2.3.1560] MAJOR ALL-AGENCY EXEMPTIONS...................................[2.3.1570] National Security, Defence and International Relations.... [2.3.1570] The Circumstances in which the Exemption is Intended to Apply.................................................................................. [2.3.1580] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.1610] Damage to International Relations.................................... [2.3.1610] Information Communicated in Confidence by Foreign Government........................................................................[2.3.1615] INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.................................. [2.3.1630] Legislation.......................................................................... [2.3.1630]

24

Intended Circumstances to which Intergovernmental Relations Exemption Applies..............................................................[2.3.1640] New South Wales and Queensland...................................[2.3.1660] Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.1670] CABINET DOCUMENTS EXEMPTION................................. [2.3.1680] Introduction.........................................................................[2.3.1680] Intended Circumstances to which Cabinet Documents Exemption Applies................................................................................[2.3.1720] Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.1740] Exception to Extent of Cabinet Exemption........................ [2.3.1750] Factual Material..................................................................[2.3.1760] Proviso to Exemptions....................................................... [2.3.1770] DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES DOCUMENTS...................... [2.3.1780] Introduction.........................................................................[2.3.1780] LEGISLATION........................................................................ [2.3.1790] Intended Circumstances.................................................... [2.3.1800] Pre-conditions.................................................................... [2.3.1810] Exception to Extent of Exemption......................................[2.3.1830] Proviso to Exceptions........................................................ [2.3.1840] Procedures......................................................................... [2.3.1850] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.1865] “Deliberative Processes”.................................................... [2.3.1865] “Advice”.............................................................................. [2.3.1870] “Prepared”.......................................................................... [2.3.1880] “Purely Factual Material”.................................................... [2.3.1900] Public Interest.................................................................... [2.3.1910] OPERATIONS OF AGENCIES...............................................[2.3.1920] Legislation.......................................................................... [2.3.1920] LEGISLATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA.........................................................[2.3.1930] Intended Circumstances of Agency Exemption................. [2.3.1930] Exception to Extent of Operations of Agency Exemption.......................................................................... [2.3.1940] Pre-condition to Operations of Agency Exemption............ [2.3.1950] New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania................. [2.3.1960] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.1970] Conduct of Industrial Relations.......................................... [2.3.1970]

25

Management of Personnel................................................. [2.3.1980] Proper and Efficient Operations of Agency........................[2.3.1990] Substantial Adverse Effect................................................. [2.3.2000] Tests and Examinations..................................................... [2.3.2010] LAW ENFORCEMENT........................................................... [2.3.2020] LEGISLATION........................................................................ [2.3.2030] INTENDED CIRCUMSTANCES............................................. [2.3.2040] Exceptions to Extent of Operation of Law Enforcement Exemption...................................................................... [2.3.2050] PRE-CONDITION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION...........................................................................[2.3.2060] NEW SOUTH WALES AND QUEENSLAND......................... [2.3.2070] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2080] Danger to Life or Safety.....................................................[2.3.2080] Disclosure of Confidential Source of Information.............. [2.3.2090] Enforcement or Proper Administration of Law................... [2.3.2110] Prejudice to Conduct of Investigation................................ [2.3.2120] PREJUDICE TO EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT METHODS..............................................................................[2.3.2130] PROTECTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY.....................................[2.3.2140] PREJUDICE TO FAIR TRIAL OR OTHER FORM OF ADJUDICATION..................................................................... [2.3.2150] PUBLIC INTEREST................................................................[2.3.2160] SECRECY PROVISIONS....................................................... [2.3.2170] General...............................................................................[2.3.2170] New South Wales and Queensland...............................[2.3.2180] Generic Reference Exemptions......................................... [2.3.2200] Applying Specifically.......................................................... [2.3.2210] South Australia................................................................... [2.3.2230] List Exemption....................................................................[2.3.2240] CONFIDENTIALITY................................................................[2.3.2250] LEGISLATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA.........................................................[2.3.2260] Intended Circumstances of Confidentiality Exemption...... [2.3.2260] Condition Precedent of Confidentiality Exemption.............[2.3.2270] Exception to the Extent of Confidentiality Exemption........[2.3.2280] New South Wales and Queensland...................................[2.3.2290]

26

JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2300] Found Action for Breach of Confidentiality........................ [2.3.2300] Information of Confidential Nature..................................... [2.3.2310] Obtained in Confidence..................................................... [2.3.2320] Harm Test........................................................................... [2.3.2330] LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE................................... [2.3.2340] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2350] Common Law Privilege or Evidence Act Privilege?...........[2.3.2350] CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE.............................................................................[2.3.2360] General...............................................................................[2.3.2360] Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.2365] DOCUMENTS AFFECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION.... [2.3.2370] LEGISLATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA.........................................................[2.3.2380] Intended Circumstances for Personal Information Exemption.......................................................................... [2.3.2380] Unreasonable..................................................................... [2.3.2390] Public Interest.................................................................... [2.3.2410] Exceptions to Intended Extent of Personal Information Exemption.......................................................................... [2.3.2420] Proviso to Exceptions of Personal Information Exemption.......................................................................... [2.3.2430] Exemption Procedure.........................................................[2.3.2440] New South Wales and Queensland...................................[2.3.2450] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2460] Personal Affairs.................................................................. [2.3.2460] Unreasonable..................................................................... [2.3.2490] Financial or Business Affairs Overlap with Personal Affairs................................................................................. [2.3.2500] Personal Identifiers............................................................ [2.3.2510] Work Performance............................................................. [2.3.2520] Information with Public Character...................................... [2.3.2530] Information about Applicant............................................... [2.3.2550] Medical Information............................................................ [2.3.2560] BUSINESS AFFAIRS OF THIRD PERSONS........................ [2.3.2570] Legislation.......................................................................... [2.3.2570]

27

LEGISLATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, NORTHERN TERRITORY, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA.........................................................[2.3.2580] Intended Circumstances of Business Affairs Exemption... [2.3.2580] Without Public Interest Test............................................... [2.3.2590] Public Interest Test.............................................................[2.3.2600] Pre-Condition for Business Affairs Exemption................... [2.3.2610] Exceptions to Intended Circumstances of Business Affairs Exemption.......................................................................... [2.3.2620] Exemption Procedure.........................................................[2.3.2630] New South Wales and Queensland...................................[2.3.2640] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2650] Trade Secrets.....................................................................[2.3.2650] Information of Commercial Value for Other Reasons........[2.3.2660] Information about Professional Activities........................... [2.3.2670] Harm in Nature of Commercial Disadvantage................... [2.3.2680] Likelihood of Harm............................................................. [2.3.2690] Fairness of Harm............................................................... [2.3.2700] Prejudice to Supply of Information.....................................[2.3.2710] BUSINESS, FINANCIAL OR PROPERTY INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT...................................................................... [2.3.2720] General...............................................................................[2.3.2720] Intended Circumstances of Government Business Affairs Exemption.......................................................................... [2.3.2730] Public Interest.................................................................... [2.3.2740] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2750] Characterisation Test..........................................................[2.3.2750] Harm Test........................................................................... [2.3.2760] PROCEDURAL RULE SYSTEM............................................ [2.3.2770] ACCESS ON DEMAND SYSTEM..........................................[2.3.2780] MAKING AN APPLICATION................................................... [2.3.2790] Proper Application.............................................................. [2.3.2790] RESPONDING........................................................................[2.3.2800] Notification and Time Limits............................................... [2.3.2800] Requirement to Clarify Request for Access.......................[2.3.2810] Third Party Consultation.................................................... [2.3.2830] JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY..........................[2.3.2840] EXAMINING............................................................................[2.3.2850]

28

Fact Finding....................................................................... [2.3.2850] Temporal Requirements..................................................... [2.3.2860] Transfer.............................................................................. [2.3.2870] Deferral of Access.............................................................. [2.3.2880] Deletion of Exempt Material...............................................[2.3.2890] Grant of Access in Form Other than Requested............... [2.3.2900] Grant of Access in Full.......................................................[2.3.2910] Refusal to Give Access...................................................... [2.3.2920] REFUSAL TO DEAL FURTHER WITH APPLICATION..........[2.3.2930] REFUSAL OF REQUEST FOR ACCESS.............................. [2.3.2940] PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION........................................[2.3.2950] Publication and Inspection Rules.......................................[2.3.2950] Range of Obligations......................................................... [2.3.2960] Legislation in Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia............ [2.3.2960] Legislation in Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania.................................................................[2.3.2970] Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.2980] AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSON’S PRIVATE LIFE........................................................................ [2.3.2990] General...............................................................................[2.3.2990] Legal Conditions................................................................ [2.3.3010] Intended Circumstances of Amendment Procedures........ [2.3.3020] CASE LAW............................................................................. [2.3.3030] SCOPE OF AMENDMENTS.................................................. [2.3.3040] FACTUAL STATEMENTS....................................................... [2.3.3050] STATEMENTS OF OPINION..................................................[2.3.3060] PROCEDURE.........................................................................[2.3.3070] Introduction.........................................................................[2.3.3070] Commonwealth.................................................................. [2.3.3080] Australian Capital Territory and Victoria.............................[2.3.3090] South Australia................................................................... [2.3.3100] Western Australia............................................................... [2.3.3110] ALTERATION, NOTATION OR DELETION, EXPUNGEMENT.................................................................... [2.3.3120] APPEAL AND REVIEW.......................................................... [2.3.3160] INTERNAL REVIEW...............................................................[2.3.3170] Jurisdiction......................................................................... [2.3.3170]

29

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary.................................... [2.3.3180] External Review................................................................. [2.3.3190] Procedural Modifications.................................................... [2.3.3200] JURISDICTIONAL MODIFICATIONS.....................................[2.3.3210] Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificates................................... [2.3.3210] Public Interest Override..................................................... [2.3.3220] FIRST TIER EXTERNAL MERITS REVIEW.......................... [2.3.3230] PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL MODIFICATIONS................................................................... [2.3.3240] PUBLIC INTEREST OVERRIDE............................................ [2.3.3260] New South Wales...............................................................[2.3.3260] South Australia................................................................... [2.3.3270] Costs.................................................................................. [2.3.3280] Appeal on Legal Issues..................................................... [2.3.3290]

30

Introduction Definition [2.3.10] In Australia, there are two types of access to information legislation: statement of reasons legislation and right to information legislation. Statement of reasons legislation is older than right to information legislation. Statement of reasons legislation requires government decision-makers to explain themselves. These requirements were found in diverse legislation but they were not called “statements of reasons”. The term “statement of reasons” was introduced from the mid 1970s onwards. Right to information legislation applies outside litigation. This legislation requires government agencies to give access to information held by them. This legislation does not require any further explanation of the information or the actions to which the information relates. Australian right to information legislation dates from the early 1980s. All this legislation was originally called “freedom of information” legislation. Although that name is no longer used in all Australian jurisdictions, it remains the better known name in the broader community. Right to information legislation should not be confused with the older constitutional law sense of right to information, where it refers to free flow of information in a polity.1 The constitutional law usage of the phrase has been distinguished or doubted in cases about access to information held by government.2 Besides access to information legislation there are many other laws to regulate gathering, using and distributing information held by governments in Australia. Some statutes promote access to information; others compel secrecy for information held by government; and still others are privacy schemes. Last, there is a collection of laws that protect some information held by governments from compulsory process before and during litigation. These other bodies of law exist alongside the right to information laws described in this work. They will not be discussed here.

1 To be balanced with the consideration that “[t]he counsels of the Crown are secret”: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, Dixon J at 179. 2 See Re Sutherland Shire Council and Department of Industry, Science & Resources (2001) 33 AAR 508; [2001] AATA 718, Wright DP at [16].

31

[2.3.10]

INTRODUCTION

Scope of Subtitle [2.3.20] This Subtitle is a survey of the law in Australia of statements of reasons and right to information. Both these bodies of law are composed of legislation with judicial and tribunal commentary. While this Subtitle describes the links to those bodies of law, it does not take the reader across the doctrinal boundaries into those bodies of law. For example, this Subtitle does not try to describe the general law of legal professional privilege or confidentiality, secrecy legislation or privacy legislation, all of which are dealt with elsewhere: see [2.3.30]. The law as it applies to statements of reasons is discussed at [2.3.300]–[2.3.470], while right to information laws are explored in detail at [2.3.580]–[2.3.3290].

Related Titles and Subtitles [2.3.30] Access to information is an essential and significant aspect of the administrative law system, but also features in other areas of law. It is important in both civil and criminal law proceedings: see 5 Civil Procedure and 11 Criminal Procedure. See also “Administrative Law System” [2.1.10]ff for discussion of the administrative law system generally. Decisions of the Ombudsman feature prominently in this Subtitle, as do decisions of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal and its former Victorian counterpart (now the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal): see “Ombudsman” [2.7.150]–[2.7.800] and “Tribunals” [2.7.910]–[2.7.2120] for further discussion. As noted at [2.3.20], this Subtitle does not attempt to describe the general law of legal professional privilege, the general law on confidentiality or secrecy legislation, so readers may refer instead, for example, to Evidence “Privilege and Public Interest Immunity” [16.7.10]ff and Professional Liability “General Principles” [27.1.10]ff; “Legal Practitioners” [27.3.10]ff for an exposition of the general law of legal professional privilege. For discussion of confidentiality in particular contexts, see, for example: Health and Guardianship “Confidentiality and Health Information Privacy” [20.7.10]ff; Intellectual Property “Confidential Information” [23.6.10]ff; and Human Rights “Privacy” [21.11.10]ff.

32

Systematic Policy Secrecy [2.3.140] Access to information legislation aims to curb excessive secrecy in public democratic governance. Excessive secrecy in democratic government presents two problems. The first problem is its tendency to promote autocracy. James Madison, one of the founding fathers of the United States and its fourth President, made a statement in the early 19th century which encapsulates the threat to democracy posed by excessive secrecy: A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.1

Unfortunately, secrecy is an historical systematic feature of Western European public governance.2 The Westminster system of government, which evolved from the 17th century to the 19th century, assumed government secrecy. In Australia, by the late 20th century, this historical tendency towards secrecy had come to dominate over the public’s right to access to information held by government. One official report bleakly noted: [T]o insert in every new statute a standard provision making it an offence for an official governed by the statute to disclose without authorisation any information of which he has gained knowledge officially.3

1 Madison J, letter to Barry WT, 4 August 1822 in H Niles (ed), Niles’ Weekly Register (Franklin Press, 1823) pp 376, 377. 2 Australian Law Reform Commission, Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia, Report No 112 (ALRC, 2009) at [2.4]. 3 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Freedom of Information: Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on the Freedom of Information Bill 1978 and Aspects of the Archives Bill 1978 (AGPS, 1979) p 233.

[2.3.150] The other serious problem produced by the tendency towards systematic secrecy in public administration (see [2.3.140]) is corruption. Examples of both autocracy and corruption came to light in the period when notions of right to information were first considered in Australia. The most notorious example from that period was public administration under the Bjelke-Petersen government in Queensland (1968–1987). Illegal or corrupt

33

[2.3.150]

SYSTEMATIC POLICY

activities of some agencies and the political elite under these governments were exposed by the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry.1 The Commissioner concluded that excessive systematic secrecy had led to, or at least encouraged, corruption.2

1 GE Fitzgerald, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report No 3 (Queensland Government Printer, 1989). 2 GE Fitzgerald, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report No 3 (Queensland Government Printer, 1989) at [3.2.2].

Policy Objectives [2.3.170] The systematic policy objective of all access to information legislation is the free flow of information in a polity. Better democratic accountability of the executive government rests on a better informed public. Two ways to better inform the public are: (1)

a statutory statement of reasons procedure (see [2.3.300]–[2.3.470]); and

(2)

a statutory right to information procedure: see [2.3.580]–[2.3.3290].

Right to information procedures as originally framed in the 1980s remain largely unamended in the legislation of the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, being the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT),1 Information Act 2002 (NT), Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) and Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

[2.3.180] In 2009 and 2010, the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania made major reforms to their right to information legislation. These reforms had a major policy objective: to shift from the “pull model” to the “push model”. The “pull model” is the model that underpins all legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: see [2.3.170]. Under the “pull model”, information in the hands of government is only (or principally) released in response to specific requests by members of the public. The “push model” takes the opposite approach. Information in the hands of

34

[2.3.190]

WHAT-COUNTS-AS-REQUIREMENTS

government is normally (or principally) released by government without specific request by a member of the public. Government takes the initiative to release information which it considers to be, or might be, of interest to members of the public. The push model is reflected in the Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth);1 Government Information (Information Commissioner) Act 2009 (NSW); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW);2 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas); and Right to Information (Consequential and Transitional) Act 2009 (Tas).3

1 Through amendments made by the Freedom of Information (Removal of Conclusive Certificates and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) and the Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth). 2 As well as the consequential changes made by the Government Information (Public Access) (Consequential Amendments and Repeal) Act 2009 (NSW) (now repealed). 3 See M Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia: Government and Information Access in the Modern State (Butt, 2005) p 498; R Snell and N Tyson, “Back to the Drawing Board: Preliminary Musings on Redesigning Australian Freedom of Information” (2000) 85 FOI Review 2; R Snell, “Three Quick Steps to Enlightened FOI”, The Australian, 28 September 2007 in I Moss, The Independent Audit into the State of Free Speech in Australia (Australia’s Right to Know Campaign, 2007) p 141; Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum (uses the term “proactive publication”); New South Wales Ombudsman, Opening Up Government (NSW Ombudsman, 2009) (uses the term “proactive disclosure”); Queensland Government, The Right to Information: Reviewing Queensland’s Freedom of Information Act (FOI Independent Review Panel, 2008) (uses the terms “proactive publication” and “proactive disclosure”); L Giddings, Minister for Justice, “Second Reading Speech: Right to Information Bill 2009”, Legislative Assembly, Debates, 15 October 2009, Pt 2 pp 44–148 (uses the term “proactive disclosure”).

What-Counts-As-Requirements [2.3.190] In order to implement access to information legislation, especially right to information legislation, a complex set of interpretative provisions called in this work, “what-counts-as-requirements” became necessary.1 Both statement of reasons legislation and right to information legislation reversed the existing legal position as to availability of information held by governments (see [2.3.330] and [2.3.580], respectively). The broad policy intention of access to information legislation was to make the duty of access broad, but not universal and unqualified. To implement this intention, access to information legislation contains a system of provisions, labelled here as “what-counts-as-requirements”, whose common

35

[2.3.190]

SYSTEMATIC POLICY

theme is to answer the question: what “things” form part of the system. In statement of reasons legislation these provisions are relatively straightforward. However, in right to information legislation the “what-counts-as-requirements” provisions are complex. A “what-counts-as-requirements” provision can be thought of, broadly, as a definition. To a legal audience the simplest explanation is by way of comparison to the law of evidence. In the law of evidence, there are many rules about the admissibility of evidence. In essence, such rules state that, for the purposes of a trial, events or things from the real world will be considered by the trial in the fact finding process if one or more requirements are met. An important example of these latter requirements is the rule as to relevance. When these requirements are met then the real world event or thing counts as a “fact” in the trial. This characterization of the rules as to admissibility can be restated in a more general or abstract form as: “For the purposes of A, an X will count as a Y”. The “A” is the fact finding process in the trial; “X” is the event or thing in the real world; and “Y” is a fact. “What-counts-as-requirements” provisions can be illustrated in the context of access to information legislation by a legal fiction. In s 4 of the Information Act 2002 (NT) the word “person” is defined as “an individual and includes a deceased individual within the first 5 years after death”. This definition is used in other rules which impose special duties upon government agencies about a thing called “personal information”.2 The thing “personal information” is defined as “government information from which a person’s identity is apparent or is reasonably able to be ascertained”.3 For the extent of the application of the special rules about personal information to function, the definition of “personal information” must first be understood; and (in turn) for that the extent of that definition to function, the term “person” must be understood. So what is a “person”? It is to answer this question that the legal fiction expressed in the definition of “person” exists. That fiction states the thing labelled as a “person” is comprised of two subordinate categories: (1)

an “individual”; and

(2)

a “deceased person”.

The sense or meaning relation expressed in the second category, that is the word “person” includes the deceased, is an artificial one. The word “person”, if used in a non-specialised sense without qualification, only refers to a living human being.4 Hence the prescribed sense relation of the second category is an abstract relation in the context of the Act that would not otherwise be true or valid in the real world. This example shows how “what-counts-as-requirements” work. They complement rules in legislation that are commanding in nature by supplying at least some of the definitions of the things and people acted upon by the commanding rules found in the legislation.

36

[2.3.190]

WHAT-COUNTS-AS-REQUIREMENTS

“What-counts-as-requirements” provisions are called this because of their way of functioning. Such provisions state that one or more “types of things in the real world” shall be taken to be (or count as) “types” for the purposes of the legislation. Hence the label used here “what-counts-as”.

1 The idea of a “what-counts-as-requirement” is borrowed from the branch of philosophy known as “ontology”: the philosophy of what can be said to exist. In this field these provisions are called “constitutive rules”. JR Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press, 1969) p 33 contains the best known elaboration in English. However the term “constitutive rule” pre-dates Searle in continental European philosophy: see A Conte, “Semiotics of Constitutive Rules” in M Herzfeld and L Melazzo (eds), Semiotic Theory and Practice: Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (Mouton de Gruyter, 1988) p 143. 2 Information Act 2002 (NT), Pts 3, 5. 3 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 4 (definition of “personal information”). 4 A Delbridge (ed), The Macquarie Dictionary (2nd ed, Macquarie Library, 1991) p 1322 (definition of “person”).

37

[2.3.190]

SYSTEMATIC POLICY

38

Statement of Reasons Introduction [2.3.300] A “statement of reasons” is a document given by an administrator or a tribunal which explains a decision made by the administrator or tribunal to a person affected by that decision. In broad terms, the law of statements of reasons has two features. First, it is a legislative invention, like right to information law: see [2.3.580]–[2.3.3290]. However, unlike right to information law, statement of reasons law is not expressed in a single scheme. So requirements for statements of reasons exist in many statutes, as part of broader decision-making powers and duties. Second, this legislative invention is a negation of the position at common law. It cured the refusal of the common law to impose on administrators or tribunals the same procedure for accountability that had long been imposed on judicial officers. A telling description of this innovation came in the form of a comment by Deane J in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 with regards to statement of reasons provisions in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). His Honour said “[t]he Act lowered a narrow bridge over the moat of executive silence”.1 The essence of statement of reasons legislation is expressed in three statements: (1)

the prescribed action is to give reasons;

(2)

the circumstances to which the prescribed action applies is the administrative decision-making by government agencies; and

(3)

the people or entities to whom the prescribed action applies are people affected by a decision and the person who made the decision.

The discussion on statements of reasons is divided into four topics: the policy and history of statements of reasons (see [2.3.310]–[2.3.350]); the availability of a statement of reasons (see [2.3.360]–[2.3.400]); requirements for the content of statements of reasons (see [2.3.410]–[2.3.430]; and the interaction of statements of reasons with judicial review litigation: see [2.3.440]–[2.3.460].

1 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 (FCAFC), Deane J at 63. See also Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556; 60 ALJR 698, Brennan J at 614 (CLR); Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30, Kirby J at [130].

39

[2.3.300]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

History of Right to Reasons [2.3.310] The modern history of statement of reasons law dates from the early 1960s. From the end of the 1960s, commentators noted superior courts were exerting pressure on tribunals to give reasons even if strictly not required to do so.1 As well, comments from some members of the High Court in three cases2 suggested that a duty to provide reasons might exist apart from litigation. Later cases in the federal jurisdiction doubted these comments.3 Eventually Gibbs CJ, in a majority judgment, all but overruled these comments in Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209.4 The period from 1970 onwards saw two other significant developments. Australian common law firmly placed a duty on judicial officers to give satisfactory reasons and firmly rejected the same duty on administrative officers. The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 is the seminal decision that held that at Australian common law there was an inherent duty on a judicial officer to provide satisfactory reasons. It was quickly applied throughout the judicial hierarchies of Australia. This period ended with the High Court decision in Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond, in which the High Court confirmed Pettitt v Dunkley. Nonetheless, Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond excluded application of the doctrine from non-judicial officers in most circumstances. This remains the law in Australia to date.5

1 J Forbes, Disciplinary Tribunals (Law Book Co, 1990) Ch 13; H Whitmore and M Aronson, Review of Administrative Action (The Law Book Company Limited, 1978) p 120. With the exception of the High Court decisions, all cases arose against the background of statutory schemes for appeal: see Grove (Cootamundra) Pty Ltd v Landgrove Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 333 (NSW Land & Valuation Ct); Re King Ranch Australia Pty Ltd v Cardwell Shire Council [1985] 2 Qd R 182; (1985) 55 LGRA 348 (FC). 2 Giris v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1969) 119 CLR 365; 43 ALJR 99; 15 ATD 235; 1 ATR 3, Barwick CJ at 373, 375, Windeyer J at 384 (CLR); Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Brian Hatch Timber Co (Sales) Pty Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 28; 46 ALJR 111; 2 ATR 658, Owen J at 60 (CLR); Kolotex Hosiery (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1975) 132 CLR 535; 49 ALJR 35; 5 ATR 206, Barwick CJ at 541 (CLR). 3 In Bailey v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1977) 136 CLR 214; 51 ALJR 429; 7 ATR 251, Aickin J at 226, 231 (CLR) distinguished the duty before litigation, in respect of “reasons”, from the duty once courtroom litigation has commenced and an order for particulars is sought. Mason J at 221 (CLR) regarded the duty before litigation as one for fairness and legislative intervention. By the time of Robinson v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 328; 15 ATR 538, the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) applied to the federal jurisdiction. Lockhart J refused to order a statement of reasons from the

40

[2.3.320]

4 5

WHEN CAN REASONS BE OBTAINED AT GENERAL LAW?

Commissioner prior to courtroom litigation under s 13 of that Act because there was a duty “under an enactment” within the meaning of that Act. In Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1985) 7 FCR 382; 16 ATR 736 (FC), Wilcox J at 400 (FCR), without referring to Giris v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1969) 119 CLR 365; 43 ALJR 99; 15 ATD 235; 1 ATR 3, and later decisions, commented that provision for the exchange of information from the Commissioner prior to initiation of proceedings had “proved remarkably resistant to the winds of administrative change which have penetrated most Commonwealth Government agencies and tribunals during recent years”. Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209, Gibbs J at 667–668 (CLR). Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 88 ALJR 52; [2013] HCA 43, the Court at [43]; John Flynn Community Group Inc v ACT Heritage Council (2012) 6 ACTLR 266; 261 FLR 462; 187 LGERA 146; [2012] ACTSC 50, Burns J at [48]; Tiwi Islands Shire Council v Procurement Review Board (NT) [2013] NTSC 83, Southwood J at [33]; Public Service Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 112, Basten JA at [41] (Ward JA and Bergin CJ in Equity agreeing); York v General Medical Assessment Tribunal (Qld) [2003] 2 Qd R 104; [2002] QCA 519, Jerrard JA at [31] (McMurdo P and Davies JA agreeing); T v Medical Board (SA) (1992) 58 SASR 382 (FC); Chiropractors Association of Australia (SA) v WorkCover Corp (SA) (1999) 75 SASR 374; [1999] SASC 470 (FC), Bleby J at [70] (Duggan and Debelle JJ agreeing); Hobart City Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (Tas) (2007) 17 Tas R 137; [2007] TASSC 99, Underwood CJ at [5] (upheld on appeal in Hobart City Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (Tas) (2007) 17 Tas R 137; [2007] TASSC 99 (FC)); Leighton v Day [2014] WASC 164, Allanson J at [56].

When Can Reasons Be Obtained at General Law? [2.3.320] Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209 (see [2.3.310]) left open the possibility that in exceptional circumstances reasons can be obtained at general law, though the relevant statutory scheme ([2.3.330]–[2.3.400]) does not expressly provide for reasons.1 The High Court has not revisited this possibility since Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond. Other courts have produced few decisions on the possibility and fewer cases where the duty has been held to exist.2 These rare cases depend on one or both of two conclusions: either a right of appeal from the administrative decision exists or the administrative decision-maker is characterised as being quasi-judicial.

1 Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209, Gibbs CJ at 662–663, Deane J at 675–676 (CLR). 2 See Edwards v Giudice (1999) 94 FCR 561; [1999] FCA 1836 (FC), Moore J at [10],

41

[2.3.320]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

Marshall J at [45] (applied in Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277; 226 IR 214; [2012] FCAFC 146, the Court at [46]; Attorney-General (NSW) v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 729 (CA); Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; 4 DDCR 526; [2006] NSWCA 284; Riverina Wines Pty Ltd v Registrar of Workers Compensation Commission (NSW) (2007) 4 DDCR 607; [2007] NSWCA 149; Mahenthirarasa v State Rail Authority (NSW) (2008) 6 DDCR 61; [2008] NSWCA 101, Basten JA at [51] (obiter); Public Service Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 112, Basten JA at [44]–[45] (Ward JA and Bergin CJ in Equity agreeing); Hancock v Executive Director Of Public Health [2008] WASC 224, Martin J at [64].

Statutory Schemes for Reasons General [2.3.330] Although the common law has remained unchanged (see [2.3.320]), legislation in respect of provision of reasons has changed since 1965. In the federal jurisdiction, all tribunals have a statement of reasons procedure and these provisions have established a legislative precedent for such provisions outside of tribunal decision-making. In State and Territory jurisdictions, legislative requirements for statements of reasons have steadily spread. All major administrative review tribunals have them and they are now common elsewhere. This section concentrates on requirements for statements of reasons outside of major review tribunals.1 Statutory requirements for statements almost always exist as a small part of broader statutory schemes. Thus, for example, the requirements in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) exist alongside many other provisions concerned with procedures in respect of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

1 For discussion of statements of reasons for major review tribunals, see “Other Forms of Review and Appeal” [2.7.10]ff.

First Federal Schemes [2.3.340] The most important piece of legislation in the context of provision of statements of reasons is the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Although this Act applies to only one institution, its requirements for statements of reasons affects hundreds of decision-making processes because the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) spans so many pieces of federal legislation.1 The Act contains requirements for reasons in ss 28, 37 and 43(2B). These operate, respectively, before the 42

[2.3.340]

STATUTORY SCHEMES FOR REASONS

initiation of proceedings, after initiation of proceedings but before hearing, and after the decision of the AAT. In addition, there are two other provisions from this period that have affected multiple regulatory schemes. These are s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (which commenced on 1 October 1980) and s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (which commenced on 12 June 1984). All these provisions make the same requirements for the decisions to which they apply – a statement of: (1)

evidence;

(2)

findings of material fact; and

(3)

reasons.

Like s 28 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, they apply to the decisions of administrators without the need to initiate litigation. Some of the State and Territory jurisdictions copied the federal scheme.2 These provisions are historic because they were the first legislative requirements for reasons affecting multiple regulatory schemes.3

1 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal has jurisdiction to review decisions made under more than 400 Acts and legislative instruments: Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2013–2014 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014) p 11 (available at http://www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat/corporate-information/annual-reports, viewed 15 September 2016). 2 See Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT), s 13; Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), Pt 4; Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas), s 29; Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic), s 8. In New South Wales Supreme Court, Practice Note No. SC CL 3 Supreme Court Common Law Division – Administrative Law List, cl 23 empowers the Supreme Court at its discretion to order the filing of a statement of reasons by a respondent agency. This provision survived a challenge to its validity on the ground of a claimed inconsistency with Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209 in Whalley v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2003] NSWSC 273 (reversed on other grounds in Whalley v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2004] NSWSC 220). For equivalents to Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D, see Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 179; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27B. 3 Although Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 28, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 13 and Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D are the most well known in the federal jurisdiction for statements of reasons, they were by no means the first. Requirements for reasons from specialist tribunals of the federal legal jurisdiction have a long history. The federal income tax laws had “reasons” provisions since 1922. Furthermore, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provision was not even the first “reasons” provision of the federal jurisdiction in the post-1970 period. That honour appears to belong to Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth), s 113 (now repealed) which commenced on 19 June 1973.

43

[2.3.340]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

Judicial and Tribunal Consideration of Federal Schemes [2.3.350] In contrast to the judicial reaction against the Giris v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1969) 119 CLR 365; 43 ALJR 99; 15 ATD 235; 1 ATR 3 innovation of a common law duty to provide reasons (see [2.3.310]), federal courts and tribunals quickly endorsed the new federal legislative duties to give reasons: see [2.3.340]. The first decisions of significance to analyse the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) provisions were by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Re Palmer and Minister for Australian Capital Territory (1978) 1 ALD 183 and by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323. The Federal Court case of Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 69 FLR 328 appears to be the first in which a statement of reasons given under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) was struck down. The Federal Court decision of Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1985) 16 ATR 292 was the first to consider the requirements of s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).1 The same period also saw judicial consideration of statement of reasons provisions added to legislative schemes with specialist tribunals, such as by the Federal Court in Collins v Repatriation Commission (1980) 48 FLR 198 (from the Repatriation Review Tribunal) and Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465; 2 BR 151 (from the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal). These and other early cases became doubly significant since they were to become the leading cases in the federal jurisdiction on adequacy of reasons provided under statutory duties to give reasons.2 At the same time, express requirements for reasons became commonplace. In federal legislation, there are now hundreds of these provisions. An interesting feature of the federal legislation is that almost all use the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 or Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 formula. In the State and Territory jurisdictions, there appears to be a similar number of “reasons” provisions, but a much smaller number of provisions following the federal formula.

1 Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1985) 16 ATR 292 (FCA) (affirmed on appeal in Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1985) 7 FCR 382; 16 ATR 736 (FC); Dalton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1986) 160 CLR 246; 60 ALJR 333; 17 ATR 483). 2 In addition, the following cases from the federal jurisdiction are frequently cited or applied: Dornan v Riordan (1990) 24 FCR 564 (FC); Commonwealth v Pharmacy Guild of Australia (Chemists’ Dispute Case) (1989) 91 ALR 65 (FCAFC); Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500 (FCA),

44

[2.3.360]

AVAILABILITY OF STATEMENTS OF REASONS

Woodward J at 507; ARM Construction Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1986) 10 FCR 197; 17 ATR 459.

Availability of Statements of Reasons Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Scheme [2.3.360] Under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) scheme, there are no extra standing requirements to apply for a statement of reasons beyond those for proceedings under the Act. However, there are some special exclusions. The major point is that a s 13 statement of reasons is available for a “decision to which this Act applies” for which an application for review is sought under s 5 of the Act,1 but not for: (a)

a decision in relation to which section 28 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 applies;

(b)

a decision that includes, or is accompanied by a statement setting out, findings of facts, a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and the reasons for the decision; or

(c)

a decision included in any of the classes of decision set out in Schedule 2.2

Schedule 2 had its rationale in the view taken by the government when the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 came into force: that there were some classes of decisions for which exposure to the reasons requirement was not appropriate but which should be open to review.3 The Federal Court has questioned this rationale and stated it should not adopt an excessively liberal interpretation in construing the exclusions.4 Nonetheless, Sch 2 remains part of the Act. Of the many types of decisions listed in Sch 2, the most significant for the legal profession are in Sch 2 cll (e) and (f). These concern, respectively, the criminal justice system and decisions about the instituting and conduct of proceedings in a civil court. The Full Federal Court in Ricegrowers Co-op Mills Ltd v Bannerman (1981) 56 FLR 443; 1 TPR 116 examined the general operation of Sch 2 cll (e) and (f). Northrop J noted that “[p]aragraphs (e) and (f) are complementary to each other”, cl (e) being concerned with criminal justice and cl (f) with civil justice.5 All members held that the drafting of Sch 2 cl (f) was wide. The Court rejected a submission that the decision which was the subject of a request needed to be at the same time as the civil proceedings, etc. The result is that decisions connected to the initiation or conduct of civil proceedings and investigation of possible breaches of the law are excluded from s 13. A later Full Federal Court continued this approach in Burswood Management Ltd v Attorney-General (Cth) (1990) 23 FCR 144. This case was about a grant of legal aid to meet legal costs in proceedings against the plaintiff. The Court 45

[2.3.360]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

held that Sch 2 cl (f) was not confined to proceedings, etc in which the Commonwealth or an instrumentality was a party. The Court reasoned that since the question of costs “went to the heart” of decisions whether to institute civil proceedings, a decision to grant legal aid could not be so tangential to civil proceedings as to not be “connected with” civil proceedings. The decision of Churche v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 89; [2006] FCA 923 is a reminder of the limits to the exemptions. This case held that a decision to release information gathered under compulsory process from a third party (another government agency) for the first agent’s own regulatory purposes was too tangential to the circumstances listed in Sch 2 cll (e) and (f) for exemption.

1 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 13(1). A “section 13” statement can be sought whether or not the person aggrieved has applied to the Court for an order of review in respect of the decision for which reasons may be sought: Australian Securities Commission v Somerville (1994) 51 FCR 38 (FC), the Court at 48. 2 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 13(11). 3 Australia, Senate, Debates, 1980, p 2573. 4 Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Boswell (1992) 36 FCR 367, Hill J at 377. See also Australia, Senate, Debates, 1980, p 157; Administrative Review Council, Report to the Attorney-General: Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act – Statement of Reasons for Decisions, Report No 33 (AGPS, 1991) Ch 4. 5 Ricegrowers Co-op Mills Ltd v Bannerman (1981) 56 FLR 443; 1 TPR 116 (FCAFC), Northrop J at 454–455 (FLR).

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) Scheme [2.3.370] The scheme of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) closely follows the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth): see [2.3.360]. Both s 13 and Sch 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 mirror the provisions in the Commonwealth Act. In Storer v Murphy (No 1) (1991) 104 FLR 303, Miles CJ confirmed that a magistrate’s decision to commit the defendant for trial is one covered by Sch 2 cl 2.1(a) (excluding decisions “relating to the administration of criminal justice”).1

1 Storer v Murphy at 310–311.

(No

1)

(1991)

46

104

FLR

303

(ACTSC),

Miles

CJ

[2.3.390]

AVAILABILITY OF STATEMENTS OF REASONS

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Scheme [2.3.375] Rule 59.9 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) requires a public authority, which is the respondent to judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, to provide reasons on request of the plaintiff to the Court. In Minister for Resources & Energy v Gold & Copper Resources Pty Ltd (2015) 208 LGERA 228; [2015] NSWCA 113, Sackville AJA observed this power is only available where the initiating process already specifies a “judicial review” ground of relief.1

1 Minister for Resources & Energy v Gold & Copper Resources Pty Ltd (2015) 208 LGERA 228; [2015] NSWCA 113 Sackville AJA at [72] (Ward JA and Bergin CJ in Equity agreeing).

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) Scheme [2.3.380] Schedule 2 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) contains a long list of classes of decisions excluded from the duty to give reasons. This is similar to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (see [2.3.360]) but unlike the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic): see [2.3.400]. Schedule 2 cl 1 also has an exclusion for decisions concerned with criminal justice. In Pepper v Attorney-General (Qld) (No 2) [2008] 2 Qd R 353; [2008] QCA 207,1 it was held that a decision not to refer the conviction of a prisoner to the Court of Appeal was excluded from the duty to give reasons. The decision under review dealt with the prosecution and trial long since passed. The Court held that the Judicial Review Act 1991 did not restrict the scope of the exclusion to decisions about the investigation and trial of criminal offences, either current investigations or current proceedings. Therefore reasons could not be obtained for the decision.

1 Approved in Carter v Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] 1 Qd R 111; (2013) 234 A Crim R 211; [2013] QCA 140, White JA at [19]–[20] (Atkinson and Martin JJ agreeing).

Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas) Scheme [2.3.390] The Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas) scheme follows the Commonwealth model: see [2.3.360]. Section 29 of the Act requires a decision-maker to give reasons unless the decision falls within Sch 3 of the Act or unless the decision already includes or is accompanied by a statement of reasons.1 Schedule 3 contains a list of exemptions similar to Sch 2 of the

47

[2.3.390]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

1 Read with Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas), s 28 (definition of “decision to which this Part applies”).

Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) Scheme [2.3.400] Section 8 of the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) is analogous to s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth): see [2.3.360]. Unlike the Commonwealth provision, the Victorian section contains just one exemption specific to the giving of reasons, namely, s 8(5) where to give reasons “would … be against public policy”. In Lewenberg v Legal Aid (Vic) (2005) 22 VAR 354; [2005] VSC 28, the defendant argued that the giving of a statement of reasons would involve extra costs. This claim was rejected because: Unless the cost was so prohibitive that it could not have been in the contemplation of parliament, the usual cost flowing from satisfying the obligation could not result in the furnishing of reasons being against public policy.1

1 Lewenberg v Legal Aid (Vic) (2005) 22 VAR 354; [2005] VSC 28, Gillard J at [74].

Judicial Requirements for Content [2.3.410] There are two opposing judicial attitudes to the adequacy of statements of reasons. One is the frank forensic risk that “if the decision-maker does not give any reason for his decision, the court may be able to infer they had no good reason”.1 The other is the countervailing judicial view that the statement of reasons is not to be construed as if it were a legal document. It is no more and no less than an explanation by the administrator of the reasons for the decision. The reasons of an administrative decision-maker are: [M]eant to inform and not to be scrutinized upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed.2

It is this second approach which is exemplified in the common observation that non-essential issues need not be addressed in reasons.3

1 Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209, 48

[2.3.415]

2

3

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTENT

Gibbs CJ at 663–664 (CLR) (relying on Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1968] AC 997; [1968] 2 WLR 924 and applied in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212; 77 ALJR 1829; [2003] HCA 56, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ at [39], Kirby J at [124]; see also Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30, Gleeson CJ at [5], Gaudron J at [37], McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [69]); Abernathy v Deitz (1996) 39 NSWLR 701 (CA); Cummins v Chief Executive of Department of Corrective Services [2005] QSC 202. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; 70 ALJR 568, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 272 (CLR), citing McAuliffe v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609 (FCAFC), the Court at 616; Commissioner for Housing (ACT) v Key (2003) 191 FLR 8; [2003] ACTSC 101, Ryan J at [17]; Adams v Island Industries Pty Ltd (2007) 155 LGERA 280; [2007] NFSC 6, Weinberg CJ at [26]; Staging Connections Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (NSW) [2004] NSWCA 357, Bryson JA at [40] (Spigelman CJ and Beazley JA agreeing); Pollentine v Attorney-General (Qld) (unreported, QCA, Fitzgerald P, Thomas and White JJ, 6923 of 1996, 6 December 1996); Attorney-General (Tas) v Cameron (2007) 152 LGERA 45; [2007] TASSC 22 (FC), Slicer J at [9] (Crawford J agreeing); Victoria v McKenna (1999) 140 IR 256; [1999] VSC 310, Smith J at [25]; Re A Medical Assessment Panel; Ex parte Hays (unreported, WASCA, Wheeler J, 1289 of 1998, 5 October 1998) (cited with approval in Re Bannan; Ex parte Suleski [2001] WASCA 289, Kennedy J at [12] (Wallwork and Steytler JJ agreeing)). Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1, McHugh J at [65]; Noble v Centacare (2003) 176 FLR 346; [2003] ACTSC 37, Crispin J at [49]; Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; 4 DDCR 526; [2006] NSWCA 284, Basten JA at [122]; Mentink v Albietz [1999] QSC 9, Muir J at [17]; Young v Callan [2004] TASSC 100, Evans J at [14]; Masters v McCubbery [1996] 1 VR 635; (1995) 9 VAR 164 (CA), Winneke P at 650, 651, Ormiston JA at 653 (VR); Re Knezevic; Ex parte Carter [2005] WASCA 139, McLure JA at [28] (Wheeler and Roberts-Smith JJA agreeing).

Legislative Requirements for Content Outline [2.3.415] One preliminary point about adequacy of reasons is that the “reasons” and the “decision” are different. The terms of legislative schemes always distinguish between “reasons” and “decision”, and the two terms are not synonymous.1 To announce a decision is to reach the conclusion2 or terminal point of a course of deliberation. A decision will express its findings on questions of fact or criteria made compulsory by the legislative scheme, but these are not “reasons”.3 A second preliminary point is, where the legislation also requires a statement of the “material findings of fact”, this means that those findings subjectively

49

[2.3.415]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

thought by the decision-maker to be “material” need to be stated. This does not mean that other findings which might be considered, in an objective sense, to be material need to be stated.4

1 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30, Gaudron J at [30]; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281, Branson J at [37]. 2 Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Ltd v Gantidis (1979) 140 CLR 675; 53 ALJR 478; 40 LGRA 132, Barwick CJ at 680 (CLR). 3 Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Ltd v Gantidis (1979) 140 CLR 675; 53 ALJR 478; 40 LGRA 132, Stephen J at 683–686 (Gibbs J agreeing), Aickin J at 688 (CLR) (Mason J agreeing) (applied in Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Douglas (unreported, FCAFC, Black CJ, Burchett and Kiefel JJ, 18 of 1995, 28 May 1996)); VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee (2003) 58 NSWLR 631; 128 LGERA 419; [2003] NSWCA 297, Beazley JA at [101] (Spigelman CJ and Hodgson JA agreeing); Attorney-General (Qld) v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350; [2000] QCA 222, Thomas JA at [21]–[30] (de Jersey CJ and Ambrose J agreeing); Burgess v Umina Park Home for the Aged (1993) 2 Tas R 246, Underwood J at 262–263; B Marsh Nominees Pty Ltd v Moonee Valley City [2004] VSC 237, Osborn J at [20]; Re Malone; Ex parte Casey [2003] WASC 266, Barker J at [67]. 4 In Beringer Blass Wine Estates Ltd v Geographical Indications Committee (2002) 125 FCR 155; 36 AAR 98; [2002] FCAFC 295, the Court at [102] applied Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30 to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43 duty to provide reasons. See also Hobart City Council v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (Tas) (2007) 17 Tas R 137; [2007] TASSC 99; but see Segal v Waverley Council (2005) 64 NSWLR 177; [2005] NSWCA 310.

[2.3.420] The legislative requirements for adequacy of reasons under statutory schemes is determined by statutory interpretation, not superior “policy” considerations.1 It should be noted that terms used in legislation to describe the requirement for reasons do vary. The courts have more than once noted these variations in the legislative expressions of the duty to give reasons. Some State and Territory schemes use the term “grounds” instead of “reasons”. Courts have held that “grounds” can imply fewer formal requirements than “reasons”.2 Moore J in Parker v Western Australia (2008) 167 FCR 340; [2008] FCAFC 23 noted the significance given to the use of the adjective “any” before the phrase “findings of fact” in s 162(2) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).3 His Honour stated that it implied a more extensive requirement. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281, Branson J noted that several federal statutes used similar but not identical expressions or terms to describe the content of the statement of reasons and asked whether these variations had the result that the required content varied among the Acts.4 In VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee

50

[2.3.420]

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTENT

(2003) 58 NSWLR 631; 128 LGERA 419; [2003] NSWCA 297, Beazley JA drew a distinction between provisions such as s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and another provision in New South Wales.5 The latter provision employed similar terminology, for the purpose of public participation, to require advertising of the terms of a decision and reasons after the fact. In summary, interpretation of these provisions requires attention to the exact legislative terms.6 In Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 88 ALJR 52; [2013] HCA 43, and later decisions, courts have considered a more limited number of factors in deciding what is an “adequate” set of reasons. In Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak, the Court selected two factors: the function of the decision-maker; and the requirement for a statement of reasons. The nature of the statutory function given to the decision-maker was not adjudicative, it was forming an expert opinion. This lessened the necessary rigour of explanation. The requirement for reasons was identified by the Court as forensic one: giving a losing party enough information to decide whether to appeal.7 The objective of reasons then was to disclose the actual reasoning path from evidence through to eventual conclusions upon which the decision is based.8

1 Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 88 ALJR 52; [2013] HCA 43, the Court at [44]–[45]. 2 Algoni Pty Ltd v Secretary of Department of Industrial Relations (1985) 3 NSWLR 515 (CA), Kirby P at 525 (Hope and Glass JJA agreeing). For a careful review of possible differences in attributes between “reasons”, “grounds” and “criterion”, see Stutchbury v Pittwater Council (1999) 105 LGERA 1; [1999] NSWLEC 177, Sheehan J at [69]–[95]. 3 Parker v Western Australia (2008) 167 FCR 340; [2008] FCAFC 23, Moore J at [6]–[18]. Branson and Tamberlin JJ did not comment on this aspect of the enactment’s terms. 4 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281, Branson J at [36] (Goldberg and Allsop JJ agreeing). 5 VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee (2003) 58 NSWLR 631; 128 LGERA 419; [2003] NSWCA 297, Beazley JA at [98] (Spigelman CJ and Hodgson JA agreeing). 6 See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30. 7 See also the classic explanation for the giving of reasons by judges in Soulemizis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 (CA), McHugh JA at 279–281 (approved in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212; 77 ALJR 1829; [2003] HCA 56, Kirby J at [105]). 8 Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 88 ALJR 52; [2013] HCA 43, the Court at [55]; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281; Commissioner for Housing (ACT) v Key (2003) 191 FLR 8; [2003] ACTSC 101, Ryan J at [19]; Public Service

51

[2.3.420]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 112, Basten JA at [46] (Ward JA and Bergin CJ in Equity agreeing); Attorney-General (Qld) v Kehoe [2001] 2 Qd R 350; [2000] QCA 222, Thomas JA at [24] (de Jersey CJ and Ambrose J agreeing); Youth & Family Focus Inc v Hughes [2007] TASSC 108, Tennent J at [36]; Murraylink Transmission Co Pty Ltd v National Electricity Market Management Co Ltd [2003] VSC 265, Nettle J at [57]; Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Planning Commission (WA) (2004) 29 WAR 273; 136 LGERA 16; [2004] WASCA 149, the Court at [26]–[30].

[2.3.430] Cases deciding the adequacy of administrative decision-making typically emphasise that the adequacy of reasons must be assessed against features of each case’s setting. The commonly mentioned features are the nature of the hearing, the issues under consideration, and the evidence given.1 Examples of these features are cases involving the following circumstances: (1)

Facts are in dispute: here the reasons should disclose evidence or other material on which the tribunal or administrator preferred one version of the facts and rejected another.2

(2)

Fact-finding/expert decision-makers: when a decision-maker must make a particular class of factual conclusion, adequate reasons should refer to the underlying findings of fact upon which the eventual conclusions are based.3

(3)

Following the receipt of a report or recommendation: a statement of reasons might state a finding by reference to some other document (eg a summary of the facts in an attached or earlier report). However, it must be possible to reveal the matters that were before the Minister, assign particular weight to at least some of them, and confirm that the decision of the Minister was based on that information only.4

1 De Domenico v Marshall (1999) 94 FCR 97; [1999] FCA 1305, Madgwick J at [61]; Nowicki v Martyn (1995) 131 FLR 88 (ACTSC), Miles CJ at 101; Segal v Waverley Council (2005) 64 NSWLR 177; [2005] NSWCA 310, Tobias JA at [78]–[99] (Beazley and Basten JJA agreeing); Public Service Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 112, Basten JA at [46] (Ward JA and Bergin CJ in Equity agreeing); Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Leases Tribunal (Qld) [1996] 2 Qd R 462 (CA); Mauro v Hooper [2008] SASC 159, Vanstone J at [30]; Transend Networks Pty Ltd v Launceston City Council [2001] TASSC 134, Slicer J at [17]; Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Ltd v Gantidis (1979) 140 CLR 675; 53 ALJR 478; 40 LGRA 132, Barwick CJ at 679–680 (CLR); George v Nisselle [2005] VSC 177, Gillard J at [56]; Clarke v National Mutual Life Insurance Ltd (2007) 27 VAR 347; [2007] VSC 341, Forrest J at [43]; Re Knezevic; Ex parte Carter [2005] WASCA 139. 2 See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992; [2004] HCA 32, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [44]; De Domenico v

52

[2.3.440]

3

4

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATEMENTS OF REASONS

Marshall (1999) 94 FCR 97; [1999] FCA 1305; Alice Springs Town Council v Mpweteyerre Aboriginal Corp (1997) 139 FLR 236; 94 LGERA 330 (NTCA); Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; 4 DDCR 526; [2006] NSWCA 284, Basten JA at [121]; Res 1 v Medical Board (Qld) [2008] QCA 152, Muir JA at [70]–[77] (McMurdo P and Douglas JA agreeing); Mauro v Hooper [2008] SASC 159, Vanstone J at [31]–[35]; Roberts Ltd v Barker (unreported, TASSC, Evans J, 137 of 1998, 3 November 1998); Secretary to Department of Treasury & Finance v Dalla-Riva (2007) 26 VAR 96; [2007] VSCA 11; Re Wong; Ex Parte Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 247, Templeman J at [30] (Murray and Steytler JJ agreeing). McAuliffe v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1991) 13 AAR 462 (FCA), von Doussa J at 474 (upheld on appeal in McAuliffe v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609 (FCAFC), the Court at 617); Commissioner for Housing (ACT) v Key (2003) 191 FLR 8; [2003] ACTSC 101, Ryan J at [16]; Tyeweretye Club Inc (t/as Tyeweretye Social Club) v Liquor Commission (NT) (1993) 112 FLR 428 (NTSC), Thomas J at 448–449; Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372; 4 DDCR 526; [2006] NSWCA 284, Basten JA at [121]; Res 1 v Medical Board (Qld) [2008] QCA 152, Muir JA at [73]; Barnett v Gulf Industries Pty Ltd [1999] TASSC 4, Cox CJ at [13]–[21]; Hunnam v Evans (2003) 129 LGERA 106; [2003] VSC 284. See Re Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Truong (2001) 202 ALR 305 (applied in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281, Branson J at [51]; cited in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212; 77 ALJR 1829; [2003] HCA 56); Re Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Truong [2001] HCATrans 113. See also Jones v Architects Board (WA) [2004] WASCA 219, Simmonds JA at [47] (Steyler and Templeman JJA agreeing); Cawley v Casey (2007) 59 AILR 300-121; [2007] QSC 5, Douglas J at [18].

Judicial Review and Statements of Reasons Whether Breach of Duty to Give Reasons Is Error of Law [2.3.440] The part that statements of reasons play in judicial review should distinguish between the issue of whether disobedience of a duty to provide reasons is a ground of judicial review, and the use of statements of reasons as items of evidence. The first issue involves two perspectives on the various grounds for relief under judicial review. In Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; 88 ALJR 52; [2013] HCA 43, the Court considered the issue from two perspectives. The first was whether breach of the duty to give reasons was an “error of law on the face of the record” for purposes of the prerogative writ of certiorari.1 The second perspective was whether “jurisdictional error” was available as a basis for the same remedy. There the Court held the first perspective applied because the statutory schemes under which judicial review was conducted envisaged this perspective. However, under the same statutory scheme the second perspective was not available

53

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STATEMENT OF REASONS

because the scheme did not envisage that failure to comply with the duty would invalidate the decision. The reasoning of the High Court on the second perspective is an extension of the now-conventional view that not all legal errors are jurisdictional errors.2 A jurisdictional error is a breach of a statutory duty if exercise of the duty is an ingredient of a valid decision.3 Some cases from courts of appeal that follow this approach are: Public Service Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 1124 and Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277; 226 IR 214; [2012] FCAFC 146. Quite apart from these perspectives on the availability of remedies in the nature of judicial review for breach of a statutory duty to give reasons, a third perspective is that the contents of a statement of reasons can provide evidence of other grounds for judicial review.5

1 This arose because Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic), s 10 made such reasons part of the record. The same applies in Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69(3) – (5). 2 See “Jurisdictional Error of Law: Common Law” [2.4.2220]. 3 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [69]. See also Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212; 77 ALJR 1829; [2003] HCA 56. These holdings affirm the holding from Repatriation Commission v O’Brien (1985) 155 CLR 422; 59 ALJR 363, Brennan J (in dissent) at 446 (CLR). Earlier decisions to the contrary on this point, especially Dornan v Riordan (1990) 24 FCR 564 (FC), should now be disregarded on this issue in the federal jurisdiction. 4 Public Service Association and Professional Offıcers’ Association Amalgamated Union (NSW) v Secretary of Treasury (2014) 242 IR 318; [2014] NSWCA 112, Basten JA at [48] (Ward JA and Bergin CJ in Equity agreeing). 5 Body Corporate Strata Plan No 4166 v Stirling Properties Ltd (No 2) [1984] VR 903; (1984) 56 LGRA 227, Ormiston J at 912 (VR).

Statements of Reasons as Items of Evidence [2.3.450] The use of statements of reasons by applicants as items of evidence is a straightforward exercise. The document is a representation made out of court and its admission is objectionable as first-hand hearsay. This objection would not be made by the respondent decision-maker unless there were disputes as to authorship or authenticity of the document. Hence the applicant tenders a statement of reasons by consent and it can be used as the basis of admissions against interest by the decision-maker. The applicant in tendering the document relies upon it being what it seems to be – a representation by the decision-maker (usually after the event) of facts asserted

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in the document, that is, the reasons for the decision. So long as the applicant complies with procedural rules for filing,1 then issues of admissibility do not arise. Conversely, the use of statements of reasons by respondent decision-makers as items of evidence is not straightforward. Prior to the Uniform Evidence Acts,2 the issue was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Arslan (1984) 4 FCR 73 and Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Taveli (1990) 23 FCR 162. The upshot of these cases was that for a respondent to use a statement of reasons under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), they must have verified it by affidavit from the decision-maker, and the respondent could not use the statement of reasons as evidence in a self-serving way. Since the Uniform Evidence Acts there have been a small number of cases. For example, in one case the Queensland Supreme Court applied the Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Taveli requirement that the statement be verified by an affidavit to a statement of reasons produced more than six months after the decision under review.3 The Federal Court has also examined statements of reasons under s 501G of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).4 A statement of reasons produced under a statutory duty is a “Commonwealth record” for the purposes of s 155 of the Uniform Evidence Acts,5 which provides that a Commonwealth record may be adduced if it is a document that purports to be such a record and to be signed by the statutory decision-maker (in that case, the Minister). Although no objection on the ground of form might be taken to a statement of reasons, the document must also satisfy the normal requirements for admissibility. The principal requirement is the hearsay rule.6 Hence for a statement of reasons to be admissible, it must fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. First, as Hely J noted in Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069, a statement of reasons is not normally considered to be part of the res gestae exception.7 In most statutory schemes, the statement is not prepared contemporaneously with the decision.8 Second, normally a statement of reasons is sought to be admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule in s 69 of the Uniform Evidence Acts. A statement of reasons normally satisfies both s 69(1) and (2) if it is prepared by the public official who made the decision in question, since the official would have personal knowledge of the reasons and the statement forms part of the normal records of the organisation responsible for making the decision. However in Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the statement of reasons was prepared many months after the decision, and after proceedings for judicial review had commenced. Hely J held in that case that in the absence of any evidence of the purpose of the document’s creation, he was entitled to infer that it was prepared for the purpose of litigation. Hence it was outside the business records exception because of

55

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STATEMENT OF REASONS

s 69(3). Hence a statement of reasons prepared before judicial review proceedings commence is admissible over objection under the Uniform Evidence Acts scheme without further evidence as to the circumstances under which the document was produced. Even when a statement of reasons produced after proceedings have commenced is admitted, considerable caution must be used when placing weight upon the document.9 An affidavit verifying the document should be tendered.10 In any event, the statement of reasons is not to be regarded as providing conclusive proof of the basis for the decision. The decision-maker may lead additional material to supplement the statement of reasons.11

1 See, eg Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 31.03 for judicial review proceedings under the Federal Court’s Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) jurisdiction, which requires the filing of the terms of the decision under review and of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, s 13 statement of reasons. 2 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). 3 Adrenalin Sports Brisbane Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier Treasurer & Minister for Sport [2003] QSC 184, McMurdo J at [12]. 4 See Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069 (affirmed in Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 172); Dagli v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541; [2003] FCAFC 298; Taylor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 208. 5 See definition of “Commonwealth record” in Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 3, Dictionary Pt 1; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 3, Dictionary Pt 1; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 3, Dictionary Pt 1; Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 3, Dictionary Pt 1; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s 3(1); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 3, Dictionary Pt 1. For discussion of documentary evidence, see Evidence “Documentary Evidence” [16.5.10]ff. 6 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Pt 3.2; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), Pt 3.2; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Pt 3.2; Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), Pt 3.2; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), Ch 3 Pt 2; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), Pt 3.2. 7 Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069, Hely J at [63], following Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Taveli (1990) 23 FCR 162 (FC), Hill J at 168, 187. “Res gestae”: “[T]ransactions forming the immediate context of the specific event in issue … [L: things done]”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. 8 In Tuncok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069, the statement was prepared many months after the decision was made. 9 Dagli v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003)

56

[2.3.470]

CONCLUDING SUMMARY

133 FCR 541; [2003] FCAFC 298, the Court at [67]. 10 Taylor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 208, the Court at [9]. 11 Faulkner v Conwell (1989) 21 FCR 41 (FCAFC), Jenkinson J at 46–47 (Woodward and Ryan JJ agreeing).

Cross-examination of Maker of Statement of Reasons [2.3.460] Whether the maker of a statement of reasons should be cross-examined is an issue which follows from the evidentiary status of a statement of reasons: see [2.3.450]. Usually, cross-examination is at the leave of the court. In judicial review matters, there is no general rule for or against cross-examination. Thus, cross-examination has been considered appropriate where the circumstances of the case at bar require it in the interests of justice.1

1 Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Taveli (1990) 23 FCR 162 (FC), Hill J at 190 (followed in Cummins v Chief Executive of Department of Corrective Services [2005] QSC 202, White J at [5]–[6])); George v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 38, Nicholson J at [39]. But see Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v Taveli, Davies J at 167–16, who cited a number of English cases against the practice of cross-examination of statement makers.

Concluding Summary [2.3.470] Unless or until Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209 (see [2.3.310]) is overruled, it may be argued that a common law requirement for reasons will not develop. In the meantime, in all jurisdictions, legislation will continue to be introduced that imposes a duty to give reasons. The legislatures of Australia in this context appear to tread enthusiastically where the Australian judiciary is more cautious. At the same time, the judiciary expansively interprets these legislative duties with a keen eye on content of the corresponding duties upon judicial officers. In this respect, the judiciary appears to tread enthusiastically where the legislatures have neglected to go. Thus, there is an interesting symmetry in the roles carried out by two arms of public government, as well as an interesting partnership between those arms of government, each performing a role which complements the other.

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[2.3.470]

STATEMENT OF REASONS

58

Right to Information General [2.3.580] Right to information legislation is a scheme of access to information held by government agencies outside the context of litigation. This legislation dates from 1982 onwards and applies only to government agencies. The scheme has two essential rules. The first rule (“access on request rule”) is that anyone has a right to ask for information of any kind held by any government agency. The second rule (“publication rule”) is that government agencies must publish, without prior request, some kinds of information about themselves. Right to information schemes contain a number of exceptions to both rules. The essence of the access on request rule is expressed in three statements: (1)

the prescribed action is – to disclose documents one holds and are requested by the applicant;

(2)

the circumstances to which the prescribed action applies are – all collections of documents held by all agencies; and

(3)

the people or entities to whom the prescribed action applies are – the applicant (any juristic person) and the respondent (any government agency).

In addition, the legislation that expresses this rule contains many qualifications. Some of these qualifications are circumstances acting as conditions precedent (eg the request must be in writing), and some are circumstances that limit what would otherwise be the extent of any prescribed action (eg documents already in public libraries). The essence of the publication rule is: (1)

the prescribed action is – to publish indexes of the collections;

(2)

the circumstances to which the prescribed action applies are – collections of documents that might be requested under the access on request rule and collections of policy documents; and

(3)

the people or entities to whom the prescribed action applies are – any government agency.

In addition, there are some qualifications. The historical significance of both rules is that, prior to the rules, opposite rules 59

[2.3.580]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

applied. In other words, prior to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the first right to information statute), most communications to Commonwealth departments were understood to be confidential because access to the material could be obtained only at the discretion of an appropriate officer.1

1 Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 113 (FCR).

Sources of Law Legislation [2.3.590] There are currently nine right to information Acts1 and a small number of cognate laws.2 In contrast to statement of reasons rules, right to information rules occupy discrete Acts – they are not part of an Act with other kinds of rules.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). 2 Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth); Freedom of Information Regulation 1991 (ACT); Government Information (Information Commissioner) Act 2009 (NSW); Information Regulations 2003 (NT); Right to Information Regulation 2009 (Qld); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Freedom of Information (General) Regulations 2002 (SA); Freedom of Information (Fees and Charges) Regulations 2003 (SA); Freedom of Information (Exempt Agency) Regulations 2008 (SA); Freedom of Information Amendment (Freedom of Information Commissioner) Act 2012 (Vic) (now repealed); Freedom of Information (Access Charges) Regulations 2014 (Vic); Freedom of Information Regulations 2009 (Vic); Freedom of Information Regulations 1993 (WA). There is no equivalent legislation in Tasmania.

[2.3.600] The Commonwealth was the first political jurisdiction in Australia to enact right to information laws. This departure from traditional public administration took the form of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). This Act commenced on 1 December 1982.1 In the following two decades, all States and Territories introduced right to information legislation.2 Until 2009, this legislation was broadly similar and

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SOURCES OF LAW

significant changes, such as the extension or limitation of an exemption to the right of access, were rare. Hence, until 2009, the legislative schemes were stable for over two decades.3 This historical position ceased with the legislation of 2009 and 2010 in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania:4 see [2.3.180]. At the overall level, the clearest difference between legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia (see [2.3.170]) and legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania is that some schemes now lack the function of amendment of personal information.5 Even among the functions which remain common in all schemes, three important differences exist. The first is clarification of the starting or initial position under the access-on-demand rules (ie that all citizens have a right to access any information covered by the schemes). Allied to this is the redrafting of objects clauses to ensure that the access-on-demand rules are interpreted purposively. The second is the treatment of public interest issues. Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania prescribes the “agenda” for that treatment; while the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia does so to a very limited extent.6 The third is the increased emphasis given to proactive release of information under the publication rules.

1 Commenced by proclamation: Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (No G48, 1982) p 2. Readers interested in the development of right to information law reform leading up to the enactment of Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) should see G Terrill, Secrecy and Openness (Melbourne University Press, 2000) and Australian Law Reform Commission, Open Government: A Review of the Federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, Report No 77 (ALRC, 1995) Ch 3. 2 The last to commence was the Information Act 2002 (NT) on 1 July 2003. 3 Secondary literature monographs: P Bayne, Freedom of Information: An Analysis of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and a Synopsis of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (The Law Book Company Limited, 1984); A Cossins, Annotated Freedom of Information Act, New South Wales: History and Analysis (LBC Information Services, 1997); M Paterson, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia: Government and Information Access in the Modern State (Butt, 2005); M Carter and A Bouris, Freedom of Information: Balancing the Public Interest (2nd ed, University College London, 2006). Periodicals: R Snell (ed), Freedom of Information Review (Legal Services Bulletin Co-op, 1986–2004) Vols 1–14. 4 From 2009, a period of major reform commenced. The first reform was the passage of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) (No 13 of 2009) and the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (No 14 of 2009). The major provisions of each of these Acts commenced on 1 July 2009 and 1 December 2009. With the commencement of Right

61

[2.3.600]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

5 6

to Information Act 2009, s 194, the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld) was repealed. The next was the assent to reform legislation in New South Wales on 26 June 2009. These comprise the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (No 52 of 2009), which commenced on 1 July 2010; Government Information (Information Commissioner) Act 2009 (NSW) (No 53 of 2009), which commenced on 17 July 2009; Government Information (Public Access) (Consequential Amendments and Repeal) Act 2009 (NSW) (No 54 of 2009, now repealed), which commenced on 1 July 2010. This was followed in the Commonwealth by the Freedom of Information (Removal of Conclusive Certificates and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) (No 99 of 2009), which commenced on 7 October 2009. This abolished the conclusive certificate procedure. In Tasmania, the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) (No 70 of 2009) and the Right to Information (Consequential and Transitional) Act 2009 (Tas) (No 54 of 2009) were assented to in December 2009. This legislation commenced on 1 July 2010. In 2010, the Commonwealth Parliament passed two further Acts: Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth) (No 52 of 2010); Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) (No 51 of 2010). The relevant provisions of these Acts commenced on 1 November 2010. Subsequently, Victoria made an important reform to its legislation by establishing a Freedom of Information Commissioner via amendments made to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) by the Freedom of Information Amendment (Freedom of Information Commissioner) Act 2012 (Vic). The schemes are those of New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) contains the most complex of the reformed schemes, while the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) has the least complex. Even so, the original scheme (ie the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australian, Victorian and Western Australian schemes) no longer resemble any of the reformed schemes.

Quasi-legislation [2.3.610] Until 2010, right to information statutes were similar in that the detail of the legislation was contained in statutes as opposed to some other form of legislative instrument, such as a regulation. As such, right to information legislation followed the historical pattern of regulation in Australia.1 However, the legislation of 2009 and 2010 in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania is now distinguished from the other legislation because they provide for a tier of “quasi-legislation”2 aside from statutes and delegated legislation for the guidance of decision-makers.3

1 DC Pearce, “The Rule of Law and the Lore of Rules” (1989) Legislative Studies Vol 4 No 2 at 12. 2 The generic term “quasi-legislation” refers to instruments with a legislative effect but which obtain this effect other than through being made by the legislature or its delegate. They are instruments which resemble a law or which are seemingly a law: S Argument, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Quasi-legislation, Parliamentary Paper No 15 (Department of the Senate, 1992) p 6.

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[2.3.640]

3

TRIBUNALS

The instruments are made under the following: Commonwealth – by the Australian Information Commissioner under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 93A; New South Wales – by the Information Commissioner under Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 17(d); Queensland – by the Information Commissioner under Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 132; Tasmania – by the Ombudsman under Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 49. See, eg the Commonwealth instrument: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (OAIC, rev ed, 2014) (available at http://www.oaic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, see “Freedom of information”, “FOI guidelines”, “Combined FIO Guidelines PDF as at 3 October 2014”). Their legislative status has been both approved and qualified by a differently constituted Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In Re Francis and Department of Defence (2012) 59 AAR 35; [2012] AATA 838, Jarvis DP at [18] held that regard should be had to the Guidelines. But see Re Secretary of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and Secretary of Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2015) 66 AAR 242; [2015] AATA 361, Forgie DP at [119] reaching the opposite view, at least where the proceedings before the Tribunal have come on appeal from the Australian Information Commissioner.

Tribunals [2.3.640] The largest body of authoritative commentary on legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia has come from tribunals. The tribunal with the longest experience of right to information legislation is the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, with over 32 years’ experience of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).1 The New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Information Commissioners of the Commonwealth, Queensland and Western Australia, and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal each produce published interpretations of their legislation every year. Of the smaller jurisdictions, the Tasmanian Ombudsman has been an active source of authoritative interpretations of the local legislation. However, despite the now extensive body of cases from tribunals, they do not form a corpus of “binding” case law on any one tribunal. A tribunal might have regard to earlier decisions, including those in its own jurisdiction, but the tribunal is not bound by them.2

1 The earliest Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision which considered the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) is Re Eastman and Department of Territories & Local Government (1983) 5 ALD 182, dated 24 May 1983. 2 Water Corporation v McKay [2010] WASC 210, Kenneth Martin J at [51]; H v Department Of Education [2015] WASC 276, Chaney J at [14].

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Overall Structure General [2.3.690] Right to information legislation can be considered as collections of three groups of rules. These groups of rules can be considered as working together at an overarching or meta-level of analysis. The systems are: (1)

rules about what things are in the right to information scheme (“constitutive rules”);

(2)

rules about what actions are done by the right to information scheme (“regulative rules”); and

(3)

rules about appeals.

Right to information legislation is a complex structure of rules which do different work. There are systems of rules composed, in turn, of sub-systems of rules. For example, within the constitutive rule system of every right to information Act, there is a discrete group of rules that only concern the question what or who is a proper respondent for a request for access to a document? The systems are set out in the following Table. Major classification Constitutive

Minor classification

Proper Respondent Proper Thing Proper Applicant Exemptions

Public Interest Regulative Access on Request Rule Procedural

Description What is in the right to information system? From whom a thing can be sought or who must publish? What can be sought; what must be published? Who can seek a thing from a respondent? The exemptions involve the characteristics of the information or data in the documents to which access is sought, in particular the use or role of the documents in public administration. The exemptions qualify the right of access. What considerations can properly be considered? What is done by the right to information system? This looks to the manner in which access is requested as well as the manner in which the request is met.

Form of Request Grant of Access Refusal of Access Deferral of Access

64

[2.3.700]

Major classification

OVERALL STRUCTURE

Minor classification

Description

Amendment Rule

Some right to information legislation provides for amendment or correction of records. Bodies have a limited obligation to publish some materials, irrespective of whether anyone lodges a request for access to the documents. Documents containing interpretations of legislation used in decision-making. Documents explaining what types of documents are held and how they can be accessed. In all legislation, rights of appeal are given to applicants for access if their requests are refused in whole or in part. Another officer of the respondent agency reviews the initial decision. An entity outside the respondent agency reviews the initial decision.

Publication Rule

Policy Documents Access on Request System

Appeal

Internal External

Fundamental Rule [2.3.700] All the functional systems but one, the publication system, are connected or linked together by one fundamental rule. This rule is: all applicants must be given requested documents unless there is a qualification of that obligation by the legislation.1 Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) provides an example: (1)

if a request is made under s 14(2) of the Act by a person to an agency or Minister;

(2)

for access to a document;

(3)

the agency or Minister to whom the request is made must give access to the document;

(4)

unless at a time of request the document is an exempt document.

The last element of the fundamental rule refers to a central feature of right to information legislation. This is the contrast between the obligation to give access with the qualifications to the obligation.

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The judicial approach to the legislation as a whole strengthens the above interpretation. This approach sees the contrast of rights of access with stated exemptions at the core of the legislative structure.2

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 11; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 17 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 9; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 19; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 45; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 12; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 7; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 20; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 22. 2 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2004) 39 AAR 392; [2004] AATA 740, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [4], Hayne J at [25]–[26], Callinan and Heydon JJ at [111]; Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 (FCA), Beaumont J at 246 (FLR) (followed in General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84, McColl JA at [151] (Handley and Hodgson JJA agreeing)); Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC); Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div), O’Bryan JA at 328; Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550, Owen J at 556, Re Mackenzie and Western Australia Police [2011] WAICmr 28, the Information Commissioner at [25].

Systematic Structuring of Choice and Evaluation [2.3.720] The fundamental rule (see [2.3.700]) is implemented by systematic confinement of otherwise open textured rules. Three approaches to confinement are used: (1)

balance;

(2)

reasonableness; and

(3)

the public interest.

Balance refers to the consideration of competing interests or claims during an evaluation. Reasonableness refers to a yardstick or measure used in the evaluation of the outcome of an action, event or decision. Public interest refers to another yardstick of the outcome of a decision, but one which focuses on whether the outcome is civic or social betterment.

Balance [2.3.730] Right to information legislation requires almost all decisions to compare transparency in government with a need for secrecy, privacy or confidentiality in limited circumstances. The action of “balancing” means comparing two things against a common standard and then assessing which of

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the two things measures more or less. However, it should be stressed that (with the exception of s 3(2) of the Information Act 2002 (NT)), the word “balance” is not used here, as it is in many legal contexts, to mean equilibrium.1 Thus, the balance model refers to two ideas in tandem: (1)

the action of comparison; and

(2)

a mathematical metaphor of a difference following an equation in which one thing is subtracted from another.

Examples of the two ideas include: •

The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) provides an example of the usage of the word “balance” as a difference of one quality or attribute in excess of another. The phrase “access to the document … would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest” occurs in many sections of the Act.2 This usage is referring to a state where there is a surplus of harm to the public interest.

•

The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) uses the word “balance” in both senses and together in some sections. The most common usage is the idea of civic disutility (ie harm to public interest exceeds benefit). This is expressed by the phrases “unless, on balance, it is contrary to the public interest” and “would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest”.3 In s 49 of the Act, the term “balance” is used both in the sense of civic disutility and in the strict sense of comparison.4

•

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania explicitly negates the sense of “balance” as equilibrium. It does so by three different means: (1)

usage of adjectives and verbs, such as “overriding” and “outweigh”, in constructions indicating the act of comparison between competing considerations in the course of deciding whether to grant access;5

(2)

use of the term “pro disclosure bias”;6 and

(3)

stating that the only ground for non-disclosure is that the result is “on balance contrary to the public interest”.7

1 In McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2004) 39 AAR 392; [2004] AATA 740, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [19] warned against the idea of equilibrium as “balance” in the context of right to information legislation. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), ss 11A(5), 11B(1), (4), (5), 26A(1)(c)(ii), 27(1)(b)(ii), 27A(1)(b)(ii), 31B(b), 53B Table. See also Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 13; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 23(2)(f)(i)(B), Sch 1. 3 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Preamble cl 3, ss 3(1), 39(1), (2), 44(1), (2), 47(3)(b), 48(1), (2), 50(1), (2), 51(1), (2), 54(2), 70(1)(b), Sch 6 Dictionary

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4 5 6 7

(definition of “contrary to public interest information”). Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 49(1), (2), (3)(a), (f), (g), (4) (civic disutility), s 49(3)(e) (comparison in the strict sense). See, eg Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). See, eg Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld). See, eg Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld).

Balance and Harm/Benefit Tests [2.3.740] In particular, many of the exemption type provisions from the constitutive system (ie those stating the characteristics of the information or data in the documents to which access is sought which qualify the right of access (see [2.3.690]) involve the comparison model of balance (see [2.3.730]) as an explicit requirement. The form of reference takes two forms. A document is an exempt document if it meets certain other requirements and its disclosure “would on balance be contrary to the public interest” (ie requires proof of a difference of civic or social detriment). Here, it is referred to as a “harm test”. Alternatively, documents which would otherwise be “exempt” are not so classified because their disclosure “would on balance be in the public interest”1 (ie requires proof of a difference of social betterment or improvement). Here, it is referred to as a “benefit test”.2

1 The Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) contains the highest proportion (nine from 15 sections). None of the “exempt documents” provisions of the Information Act 2002 (NT) or the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) use the word “balance”. 2 The Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017) and the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) mostly use the benefit test, while the remaining right to information statutes use the harm test.

Public Interest [2.3.750] The phrase “public interest” features in most functional systems of right to information legislation. The phrase “public interest” has a long history in Australia quite apart from its usage in right to information legislation. By the time of the period when right to information legislation spread around the nation, the High Court had held in O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210; 64 ALJR 87 that: [T]he expression “in the public interest”, when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only … “[by] the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the [statute]”.1

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In the same period, courts held that this concept applied in accessing information held by government agencies. Two statements from these cases plainly set out the conceptual basis of right to information in both of the senses relevant here – access to information and free flow of information in a democratic polity. In Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (Defence Papers Case) (1980) 147 CLR 39; 55 ALJR 45, Mason J said: [I]t is to say that when equity protects government information it will look at the matter through different spectacles … [T]he court will determine the government’s claim to confidentiality by reference to the public interest. Unless disclosure is likely to injure the public interest, it will not be protected.2

In Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86, McHugh JA said: [G]overnments act, or at all events are constitutionally required to act, in the public interest. Information is held, received and imparted by governments, their departments and agencies to further the public interest.3

These, and other cases, confirmed that decision-makers could not treat information as simply property to be disclosed or hidden at their discretion. These judiciaries meant to contrast “public interest” with “private interest” and, in so doing, applied the idea of public interest as civic betterment against official secrecy.

1 O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210; 64 ALJR 87, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 216 (CLR), citing Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492, Dixon J at 505. 2 Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (Defence Papers Case) (1980) 147 CLR 39; 55 ALJR 45, Mason J at 51, 52 (CLR). 3 Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86 (CA), McHugh JA at 191.

Public Interest in Right to Information Legislation [2.3.755] The concept of “public interest” as civic betterment, or avoidance of civic harm occurs throughout right to information legislation. From a textual perspective the idea is expressed explicitly and implicitly. In the latter the phrase is implicit in the word “reasonable” and its derivatives. To illustrate how often it occurs, we take the example of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA). There the phrase occurs in four sections and in nine of the 20 clauses in Sch 1 of the Act. Schedule 1 lists the categories of exempt documents. Thus, the majority of explicit references to “the public interest” are contained in that part of the “what-counts-as-requirements” system

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(see [2.3.190]) which categorises exemptions, while a minority of references are found in other functional systems. This pattern is repeated in all legislation. In addition, in the Freedom of Information Act 1991, the words “reasonable”, “unreasonable”, “reasonably” or “unreasonably” occur in 19 sections and Sch 1 of the Act. The words occur in a variety of functional contexts including: (1)

the objects clause: s 3(3) of the Act;

(2)

many procedural provisions: for example, s 13(d) of the Act (form of requests for access);

(3)

exemption provisions: for example, Sch 1 cl 6(3a) of the Act (exemption for disclosure of documents affecting personal affairs); and

(4)

provisions about merits review: s 41(3) of the Act.

[2.3.770] The idea of “public interest” (see [2.3.750] and [2.3.755]) has a strong role in the exemption type provisions from the constitutive system (ie those stating the characteristics of the information or data in the documents to which access is sought, which qualify the right of access). There is a division in all legislation between exemptions that have a “public interest” test and those which do not. Exemptions are allocated between the two types by legislative mandate. In the one type, Parliament has not already decided against disclosure on public interest grounds. In the second type, Parliament has so decided, and gives to the individual decision-maker no choice whether, in a particular case, there is a case for disclosure or non-disclosure on public interest grounds. For the first category, there is no conclusion in the legislative text of an overriding public interest against disclosure. For the second category, to quote the language of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), “it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure”. This delegation is what is frequently called “the public interest test” present in some exemptions, but not in others.1 That the withdrawal or conferral of deliberation as to the public interest is a deliberate structure is abundantly clear in the extrinsic material for legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania.2 It was also the functional explanation for the allocation of the public interest test in the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. The reasons for allocation between the two categories are not apparent in the text of the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia gives to the decision-maker little, if any,3 practical instruction in the legislation as to exactly how civic utility might be increased or decreased by their decision. Under legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, the

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decision-maker is given some instructions. Consideration based on avoidance of civic detriment does enter the scenario. The extrinsic material for legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania now makes this just as clear.

1 The idea of legislatively presumed harm to the public interest originates in the Information Act 2002 (NT). There, the exemptions are divided between those where the legislation states that harm is conclusively presumed (Pt 4 Div 2), and those where there is a rebuttable presumption of harm (ie where the harm test applies as a rebuttable presumption). To borrow language from the common law of evidence, where the harm test applies, there is a rebuttable presumption. 2 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009 (Cth), Revised Explanatory Memorandum, at General Outline, Sch 3 Pt 2 Items 22, 23, 33; Government Information (Public Access) Bill 2009 (NSW), Explanatory Note at Overview of Bill, [14]; Right to Information Bill 2009 (Qld), Explanatory Memorandum at [48]; L Giddings, Minister for Justice, “Second Reading Speech: Right to Information Bill 2009”, Legislative Assembly, Debates, 15 October 2009, Pt 2 pp 44–148: “[T]he exemptions in this bill that are to be subject to the public interest test are separated from those which refer to information that is exempt by its nature.” 3 Some exemptions under the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia limit the public interest test.

Reasonableness in Right to Information Legislation [2.3.775] The word “reasonable” and its derivatives occur throughout right to information legislation. Once again, we return to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) to illustrate this point: see [2.3.755]. The words are used in a variety of syntactic constructions. The range varies from use as an adjective in a simple adverbial prepositional phrase (eg “[a]n extension under subsection (1) must be for a reasonable period of time”),1 through to a complex subordinate adverbial clause (eg “might reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply”).2 In the first usage, “reasonable period”, “reasonable” is used to express the idea of fairness in social interaction – the extension should not be excessive having regard to the interests of all concerned. In the second usage, the adverbial phrase “might reasonably be expected to” is clearly concerned with an estimate of the probability of something happening. Its usage here is to express the idea of rational thinking processes.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 14A(2). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 13(1)(b)(i).

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Qualifications to “Public Interest” and “Reasonableness” General [2.3.820] Use of the phrase “public interest” in right to information legislation and the use of “reasonable” is commonly qualified. Without more, the phrase “public interest” in legislation is a conferral on decision-makers of a wide, but not unlimited, discretion to advance or protect social well-being. Right to information legislation has structured this discretion by including textual qualifications. While no legislation uses a stipulative definition (eg “public interest means X”), all legislation uses provisions to take some topics “off the agenda” or place other topics “on the agenda” when evaluating “public interest”. In this way, the textual qualifications act as a legislative system for clarifying what are, in judicial review terms, “relevant” or “irrelevant” considerations.1 Some textual qualifications are explicit, others are implicit. For example, s 44(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)2 provides that public interest is harmed because disclosure “would, or could reasonably be expected to, have a substantial adverse effect on the ability of the Government of the Territory to manage the economy of the Territory”. There is a stated restriction of what is meant by “public interest” to a result – “substantial adverse effect” caused by disclosure. However, in s 43(1)(c)(i) of the Act it provides that public interest is harmed where disclosure could: [U]nreasonably affect [a] person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs or [an] organisation or undertaking in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs.

Here, the adverb “unreasonably” implicitly brings in public interest factors. In still other examples, although the text of legislation is silent, courts have found qualifications. In both South Australia and Victoria, the applicant’s motives in seeking access have been held to be irrelevant to the question of whether access should be granted.3

1 See Irrelevant Considerations [2.4.1030]–[2.4.1070]. 2 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017. 3 Department of Premier & Cabinet (SA) v Thomas [2014] SADC 56, Judge Boylan at [16] (following Victoria Police v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223; 30 VAR 212; [2008] VSCA 218, Maxwell P at [16]).

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Harm and Benefit Tests [2.3.830] Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia divides requirements of advertence to public interest into harm and benefit tests. In the Northern Territory, all exemptions, except s 57 of the Information Act 2002 (NT), are based upon harm to the public interest.1 In South Australia, the same position applies – where a public test is required, it is a harm test. By contrast, the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and Western Australia employ both approaches.2

1 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 50(1) states that exemptions in the Division are made out “only if it can be shown that, in the particular case, it is not in the public interest to disclose the information”. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), ss 39, 40, 44 (benefit test), ss 20, 34, 36 (harm test) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), ss 31, 34, 50 (benefit test), ss 29, 30, 34 – 36 (harm test); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cll 2 – 5, 8 – 10, 11 (benefit test), cl 6 (harm test).

Proscribed Public Interest Factors [2.3.840] Some laws proscribe certain issues from consideration of the public interest. These issues include: (1)

loss of confidence in government/embarrassment;

(2)

seniority of author; and

(3)

risk of misunderstanding.

Post-right to Information Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.850] In the decades after Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (Defence Papers Case) (1980) 147 CLR 39; 55 ALJR 45, the task of applying the ideas expressed there to right to information legislation has fallen, in large part, to administrative tribunals1 and, to a lesser extent, superior courts. What follows is a discussion of a collection of decisions which have set the future direction of interpretation of the phrase “public interest” in right to information laws. The first decision is Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236. In this decision, Beaumont J made two brief observations on the nature of

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“public interest” along the way to the substantive issues of the case: [I]t is necessary to weigh the public interest in citizens being informed of the processes of their government and its agencies on the one hand against the public interest in the proper working of government and its agencies on the other … [T]he public interest is not a static concept.2

In these comments, Beaumont J imported the principal ideas expressed in Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd and the line of cases from Randall v Northcote Town Council (1910) 11 CLR 100; [1911] VLR 163a to O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210; 64 ALJR 87 into interpretation of right to information legislation. The next major decision is News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64. In this case, the Full Court of the Federal Court rejected the argument that the objects provision of s 3 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) created a public interest concept of higher rank than other provisions (ie super-ordinate to other provisions).3 The supposed concept of public interest would have intervened or supervened in interpretation to require narrow construction of exemptions and broad construction of rights of access. The reason for the Court’s rejection of the argument was judicial deference to the legislator. The Court stated that the complex terms of the legislation were sufficient to instruct the decision-maker whether or not to make disclosure. On this reasoning, neither the stated objects clause nor a judicial policy favouring disclosure had a role to play.4 However, the observations of the High Court in Public Service Board (Vic) v Wright (1986) 160 CLR 145; 60 ALJR 304 mitigated the effect of News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4). There, the Court unanimously held that the objects clause in the Victorian statute had the following effect: In the light of these sections it is proper to give to the relevant provisions of the Act a construction which would further, rather than hinder, free access to information.5

The Court then went on to speak of “any limits plainly imposed by the Act itself”.6 In terms of statutory construction, the High Court stated that purposive interpretation was permitted by the objects clause but strained constructions were not. In the succeeding years, the two competing approaches, the Full Federal Court’s “no leaning at all” and the High Court’s “leaning but not bending”, have commended themselves in different jurisdictions, but there is no national consensus.7 Between the dates of News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) and Public Service Board (Vic) v Wright, the most controversial decision under the legislation was made. This was the decision of Re Howard and Treasurer of the Commonwealth (1985) 7 ALD 626; 3 AAR 169. In this decision, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal invented five factors to structure the broad discretion inherent in the phrase “public interest”:

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(1)

the higher the office of the persons between whom the communications pass and the more sensitive the issues involved in the communication, the more likely it will be the communication should not be disclosed;

(2)

disclosure of communications made in the course of the development and subsequent promulgation of policy tends not to be in the public interest;

(3)

disclosure which will inhibit frankness and candour in future pre-decisional communications is likely to be contrary to the public interest;

(4)

disclosure, which will lead to confusion and unnecessary debate resulting from disclosure of possibilities considered, tends not to be in the public interest; and

(5)

disclosure of documents which do not fairly disclose the reasons for a decision subsequently taken may be unfair to a decision-maker and may prejudice the integrity of the decision-making process.

Re Howard and Treasurer of the Commonwealth was later strongly criticised and, in effect, rejected in both Queensland and Western Australia.8 In the federal jurisdiction, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria, Re Howard and Treasurer of the Commonwealth is currently good law provided the “Howard factors” (see [2.3.1910]) are seen as “guidance” only.9 The decision of Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6 was notable for an interpretation of the phrase “public interest” in legislation that focuses on betterment or improvement of society. First, it applied an old authority that matters of widespread interest or curiosity are not matters of “public interest” in the setting of right to information legislation.10 Second, the Court described what betterment or improvement of society meant in terms that have rarely been bettered and applied in every jurisdiction of Australia: The public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the well being of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the interest of an individual or individuals. There are … several and different features and facets of interest which form the public interest. On the other hand, in the daily affairs of the community events occur which attract public attention. Such events of interest to the public may or may not be ones which are for the benefit of the public; it follows that such form of interest per se is not a facet of the public interest.11

The next major decision was that of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261. It was held that a consideration of the public interest was relevant to a determination whether disclosure of the personal information would be “unreasonable”.12 The critical question was:

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[W]hether or not the proposed disclosure would serve the public interest purpose of the legislation, which is to open to public access information about government which government holds, this being the information which in truth is held on behalf of the public.13

The significance of this case for the role that public interest plays in right to information legislation is the term “reasonable” occurs more frequently than the term “public interest”.14 Thus public interest becomes relevant to more provisions than just those containing the phrase “public interest”.

1 See GA Flick, Federal Administrative Law (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, subscription service) Vol 1; M Robinson, New South Wales Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) Vol 2; E Kyrou and J Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) Vol 2. In addition, both the offices of the Queensland Information Commissioner and the Western Australian Information Commissioner maintain websites with searchable databases of their decisions. These websites can be found at http://www.oic.qld.gov.au/decisions and http://foi.wa.gov.au/en-us/UR100 (viewed 15 September 2015). 2 Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 (FCA), Beaumont J at 246, 248 (approved in General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84, McColl JA at [151] (Handley and Hodgson JJA agreeing). See also Re Kamminga and Australian National University (1992) 26 ALD 585; 15 AAR 297, the Tribunal at 300 (AAR) (followed by Director-General of Department of Education & Training v Mullett (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 29, the Tribunal at [54]); Re Cairns Port Authority and Department of Lands (1994) 1 QAR 663 (QICmr); Re Carter and Department of Health (ACT) (unreported, ACTAAT, Curtis P, 87 of 1994, 23 January 1995); Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6; Re Read and Public Service Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 493 of 1993, 16 February 1994). 3 Dubbed the “leaning approach” from its United States antecedents. 4 The legislation was stated to contain a “delicate balance” between “the public’s interest in knowing” and “the need in some cases to protect confidentiality and privacy”: News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J at 66. 5 Public Service Board (Vic) v Wright (1986) 160 CLR 145; 60 ALJR 304, the Court at 153 (CLR). 6 Public Service Board (Vic) v Wright (1986) 160 CLR 145; 60 ALJR 304, the Court at 154 (CLR). 7 “No leaning at all” – Commonwealth: News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J at 66; McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [111]; Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; 82 ALJR 1288; [2008] HCA 37, Hayne J at [147]; New South Wales: General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84, Mc Coll JA at [150] (Handley and Hodgson JJA agreeing); Howell v Macquarie University [2008] NSWCA 26,

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8

9

10

11

12 13 14

POST-RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Campbell JA at [48] (Spigelman CJ and Bell JA agreeing); South Australia: Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC) (applied in Daycorp Pty Ltd v Parnell [2011] SADC 191, Judge Millsteed at [35]); Western Australia: Minister for Transport (WA) v Edwards [2000] WASCA 349, Hasluck J at [31]. “Leaning but not bending” – Commonwealth: Public Service Board (Vic) v Wright (1986) 160 CLR 145; 60 ALJR 304; McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45 (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J); Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; 82 ALJR 1288; [2008] HCA 37 (Kirby J); Tasmania: Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J at [40]; Victoria: Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div); Sobh v Police Force (Vic) [1994] 1 VR 41; (1993) 65 A Crim R 466 (App Div). Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60 (QICmr); Re Veale and Town of Bassendean (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94004 of 1993, 25 March 1994) at [22]. Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, Flick J at [137]; General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84, McColl JA at [157] (Handley and Hodgson JJA agreeing); Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC); Re Wells v Department of Premier & Cabinet (2001) 18 VAR 293; [2001] VCAT 1800, Preuss SM at [24] (approved in Secretary of Department of Justice v Osland (No 2) (2007) 26 VAR 425; [2007] VSCA 96, Maxwell P at [76] (reversed on other grounds in Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; 82 ALJR 1288; [2008] HCA 37)). The Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal suggested its own list of factors in Re Hulls and Victorian Casino & Gaming Authority (1997) 12 VAR 483 (VicAAT), Judge Fagan P at 488 (approved in Re McIntosh and Department of Premier & Cabinet (2009) 32 VAR 371; [2009] VCAT 1528 and authorities therein). R v Bedfordshire Inhabitants (1855) 4 El & Bl 535; (1855) 119 ER 196 (followed in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6, the Court at 72 (VR)). Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6, the Court at 73 (VR). The following are a sample of approving citations: McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70; 41 AAR 23; [2005] FCAFC 142, Tamberlin J at [13]; Kay v Commissioner of Department of Corrective Services (NSW) (No 2) [2000] NSWADT 67, Hennessey DP at [31]; Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60 (QICmr); Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC); K and Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 1012-123, 15 June 2011); Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550, Owen J at 586. Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Heerey J at 441 (FCR). Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Heerey J at 441 (FCR). For example, in the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the phrase “public interest”

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occurs in 67 sections, whereas the words “reasonable”, “reasonably”, etc occur in 111 sections.

Non-advertence to “Public Interest” Immunity Cases [2.3.860] Historically, a critical systematic feature of the body of case law on right to information legislation was the failure to refer to public interest immunity.1 No right to information enactment makes an explicit reference to the law of public interest immunity. The record of courts and tribunals on whether advertence to the law of public interest immunity was necessary, desirable, or even possible, showed infrequent and mixed attitudes. In Department of Industrial Relations v Burchill (1991) 33 FCR 122; 14 AAR 408, Davies J held, in effect, that reference to the general law of public interest immunity was permissible but only as a “guide”, that is, subordinate to right to information legislation.2 At the other end of a hypothetical scale of attitudes is the decision in Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, where one member of the Full Court of the Federal Court stated that the Cabinet exemption in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) could not be “divorced” from the general law of public interest immunity as it applies to Cabinet documents.3 In addition to these two views are other views which either opposed reference to the general law, or stressed caution in making reference;4 those which cautiously conceded some relevance,5 and those which approved reference.6 In conclusion, apart from the relevance of the general law to the Cabinet exemption, there was no preponderant opinion one way or the other.

1 See Evidence “Public Interest Immunity” [16.7.1540]–[16.7.1810]. 2 Department of Industrial Relations v Burchill (1991) 33 FCR 122; 14 AAR 408 (FC), Davies J at 124 (FCR) (Jenkinson and Ryan JJ agreeing). 3 Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, Buchanan J at [96] (Stone J agreeing). 4 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [19], General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84, McColl JA at [154] (Handley and Hodgson JJA agreeing); Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272, Buchanan JA at [9]; Lawless and Medical Board of Western Australia (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1995 of 1995, 5 July 1995); Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60 (QICmr). 5 Churche v Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (2006) 153 FCR 373; 91 ALD 290; [2006] FCA 613, Cowdroy J at [56]; Fox and Queensland Police Service [2001] QICmr 1, the Information Commissioner at [22]: “I accept that those cases point to

78

[2.3.870]

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROSCRIBED FACTORS

situations where there may be a public interest consideration favouring disclosure”. Australian Doctors’ Fund Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 49 FCR 478; 19 AAR 343, Beazley J at 489 (FCR): public interest immunity is an “obvious example” of what “public interest” means; Re Read and Public Service Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 493 of 1993, 16 February 1994), where the two were described as “allied”; Re Hudson and Department of Premier, Economic & Trade Development (1993) 1 QAR 123 (QICmr), which described the common policy rationale for the Cabinet exemption and the application of public interest immunity to Cabinet documents as “unexceptionable”.

6

Historical Development of Proscribed Factors General [2.3.870] Courts and tribunals that regularly interpreted the phrase “public interest” developed lists of issues, factors or criteria. This was so common that it can be illustrated by how early in the jurisprudence the first list emerged: (1)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1984) 6 ALD 112; 1 AAR 419; 15 ATR 787 – deliberative process documents (14 months).1

(2)

New South Wales: Mauger v General Manager of Wingecarribee Shire Council [1999] NSWADT 35 – law enforcement exemption (3 weeks).2

(3)

Queensland: Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60 – deliberative process of documents (3 months).3

(4)

South Australia: Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 – deliberative process documents (nil months).4

(5)

Victoria: Re Page and Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243 – “[U]nreasonable disclosure of personal information” (nil months).5

(6)

Western Australia: Re Read and Public Service Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 493 of 1993, 16 February 1994) – deliberative process documents (nil months).6

1 Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1984) 6 ALD 112; 1 AAR 419; 15 ATR 787, Davies J at 512 (AAR). The earliest recorded Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision on the Australian Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII) database about right to information is Re Eastman and Department of Territories & Local Government (1983) 5 ALD 182, dated 24 May 1983: see [2.3.640]. Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) is dated 5 July 1984.

79

[2.3.870]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

2

3

4

5 6

Mauger v General Manager of Wingecarribee Shire Council [1999] NSWADT 35, O’Connor P at [49]. The earliest New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal decision on the Australian Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII) database about right to information is Taylor v Chief Inspector of RSPCA [1999] NSWADT 23, dated 19 April 1999. Mauger v General Manager of Wingecarribee Shire Council is dated 12 May 1999. Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60 (QICmr), the Information Commissioner at 67, 68. The earliest decision of the Queensland Information Commissioner on the Australian Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII) database about right to information is Re Christie and Queensland Development Corp (1993) 1 QAR 1, dated 31 March 1993. Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs is dated 30 June 1993. Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC) is the first decision recorded on the Australian Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII) database concerned with right to information. Re Page and Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243 (VicAAT), Jones P at 245–246. Re Read and Public Service Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 493 of 1993, 16 February 1994), Keighley-Gerardy IC at [75]. This is the first published decision of the Western Australian Information Commissioner.

McKinnon’s Case – Public Interest [2.3.880] A nationally authoritative consideration of the term “public interest” is McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45. The Court there was split on the proper interpretation of the phrase “reasonable grounds” in a provision (now repealed) authorising a decision called a “conclusive certificate”. The statutory setting required the decision-maker to be satisfied there were “reasonable grounds” for the conclusion that the “public interest” supported the decision. Elsewhere in this discussion has been an analysis of the differing views of the Court on what was meant by the statutory formula “reasonable grounds”: see [2.3.900]. The members of the Court also considered the meaning of the phrase “public interest”. On this issue, the members of the Court were split, but along different lines. Both members of the minority (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J) and one member of the majority (Hayne J) took one view, whereas the other two members of the majority (Callinan and Heydon JJ) took another view. Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ approved the settled judicial view that the “public interest” test is a licence to choose among many issues, depending on the circumstances of each case. Hayne J dubbed this approach the “multi-facet” approach.1 Callinan and Heydon JJ rejected this view. They approved the old view that the “public interest” does not mean a matter of interest or curiosity to many people (in other words, the view stemming from R v Bedfordshire Inhabitants (1855) 4 El & Bl 535; (1855) 119 ER 196). However, they could not see any need to engage in a “balancing

80

[2.3.890]

JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY ON WORD REASONABLE

exercise” before concluding what the public interest was at a particular time.2 In the period that has passed since then, the version of Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ has been cited extensively with approval,3 whereas the version of Callinan and Heydon JJ has been cited with approval once.4 Thus, the established judicial view of the “public interest” phrase as found in legislation appears to be the currently preferred one.

1 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [13], Hayne J at [55], who borrowed the term “multi-faceted” from the judgment of Tamberlin J: McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70; 41 AAR 23; [2005] FCAFC 142, Tamberlin J at [12]. 2 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [129]–[130]. 3 Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal (2012) 246 CLR 379; 86 ALJR 1126; [2012] HCA 36, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [42]; Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (No 2) (2008) 253 ALR 52; [2008] FCAFC 200; Wade and Commissioner For Fair Trading [2011] ACAT 71, Crebbin P at [11]; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Hitchcock (2007) 70 NSWLR 484; [2007] NSWCA 364 (who incidentally doubted the legal basis referred to by McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [130]); Bare v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission (Vic) [2015] VSCA 197, Tate JA at [314], Santamaria JA at [548]; Minister for Resources; Ex Parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 403; [2007] WASCA 175. 4 Re Telstra Corp Ltd and Department of Broadband, Communications & the Digital Economy (2010) 113 ALD 623; [2010] AATA 118.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary on Word “Reasonable” General [2.3.890] Judicial interpretation of the many provisions in right to information legislation employing the term “reasonable” has reached two conclusions. The first is that “reasonable” refers to a standard of objective rationality. The leading example of this interpretation is . Bowen CJ and Beaumont J, in interpreting the phrase “could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information” from the now-repealed s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (see now s 47G(1)(b)), contrasted the word “reasonably” with “something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous”.1 This comparison clearly draws attention to “reasonableness” as a standard of thinking, which could also be described as “rational evaluation”. 81

[2.3.890]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

The second conclusion links whatever is “reasonable” with whatever is in the “public interest”. The “public interest” requires competing interests to be weighed against each other. Likewise, whatever are “reasonable grounds” for a conclusion about the “public interest” must, of necessity, involve weighing competing interests.2 The same conclusion had been reached in Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261. In this case, the Court said that: What is “unreasonable” disclosure of information for purposes of [the now-repealed] s 41(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) [see now s 47F(1)] must have, as its core, public interest considerations.3

In addition, the view that other instances of “reasonable” or “unreasonable” under provisions of right to information legislation involve weighing up competing considerations had been reached independently in other decisions.4 Thus, the second conclusion reflects the view that “reasonable” refers to social interaction as well as to cognitive process. The standard of “reasonableness” required claims of one group of people (applicants for access) to be limited by or, in judicial parlance, “weighed against”, the claims of a second group of people (the respondent agency) and vice versa. This standard of social interaction at its most abstract conforms to the meanings of moderate or not excessive. In summary, the area of meaning represented in these usages of “reasonable” lie more in the area of “fairness” than in the area of “rationality”.

1 Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180 (FC), Bowen CJ and Beaumont J at 190. See also Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 117 (FCR); Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442, Mansfield J at [24]; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Camilleri [2012] NSWADTAP 19, the Tribunal at [28], citing Director-General of Department of Education & Training v Mullett [2002] NSWADTAP 13, the Tribunal at [58] (the phrase employed there was “reasonable expectation”); Deputy Premier and Minister for State Development, Infrastructure & Planning and Premier [2014] QICmr 41, the Information Commissioner at [17]–[48]; Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines & Petroleum (No 2) [2011] WASC 283, Edelman J at [42] (approved on appeal in Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines & Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167, Newnes JA at [60] (Martin CJ and Beech J agreeing)). 2 Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, King J at 885, where his Honour noted that proof on the balance of probabilities could not follow the precedent of litigation but permitted proof to be “decided in a less formal way”; Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) v Sifredi (2000) 16 VAR 347; [2000] VSC 33, Hedigan J at [18]; Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550, Owen J at 591–592. This view is consistent with that used by the High Court in other settings: see K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501; 83 ALJR 327; [2009] HCA 4, French CJ at [62] in interpreting the phrase “could reasonably be expected to prejudice criminal investigations or enable the discovery of the existence” (other members of the Court agreed without discussion of this

82

[2.3.900]

3 4

JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY ON WORD REASONABLE

view); CGU Insurance Ltd v Porthouse (2008) 235 CLR 103; 82 ALJR 1135; [2008] HCA 30, where the phrase “a reasonable person in the insured’s professional position” in a contract of professional indemnity insurance was agreed to refer to an objective standard. Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Lockhart J at 438 (FCR). Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Lockhart J at 438 (FCR).

McKinnon’s Case [2.3.900] The reasons for judgment in McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45 made subtle legal implications from the idea of “reasonableness” as a form of “rational evaluation”. In this case, the main issue was what was implied for the right of merits review by a requirement of “reasonable grounds” for a decision to issue a “conclusive certificate” under the then s 58 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The resolution of this issue required the Court to interpret the adjective “reasonable” in the noun phrase “reasonable grounds”. All justices agreed that “reasonable grounds” in s 58 was to be evaluated according to objective rationality against all relevant evidence and argument1 but differed in their more detailed views as to how one went about this evaluation. All three majority judges rejected the test “reasonable” equals “not irrational”.2 Hayne J scrutinised the reasoning of the decision-maker against the test of whether the conclusions were “open” in the sense of seeming to be rational to a person guided by reason.3 Callinan and Heydon JJ stated of the “open in the mind of a person guided by reason” test that they would prefer not to paraphrase the statutory language, but agreed that this test “was certainly, on no view, less advantageous” to an appellant.4 In other words, “reasonable” meant at least this. The minority joined with the majority in commencing from the position that whatever is “reasonable” refers to an objective test as opposed to a subjective test.5 The first step leading to “reasonable” evaluation is that it is to be only applied to evidence and argument that “rationally bears” on the issue at hand. They equated this requirement to the familiar “rationally probative” meaning of “relevant” in the law of evidence.6 Next, for an evaluation to be “reasonable”, it was to be applied in the context of all relevant evidence and argument.7 It was from this point that the minority dissented from the majority. To the minority, the majority’s view was deficient in that “reasonable” only required that, after examining all evidence and arguments, there was material “relevant to, and capable of supporting, a claim or a conclusion”.8 For the minority, evaluation under the provision in question had to proceed to assessment of competing claims as to the public interest, each of these having been already assessed as supported by rationally probative evidence and argument. This extra requirement arose because, in right to information legislation, there was an ultimate concern with the public interest in disclosure of information held by government. This 83

[2.3.900]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

conclusion is consistent with the second conclusion about the term “reasonable” from the older cases: see [2.3.890].

1 Followed in Re Peatling and Department of Employment & Workplace Relations (2007) 44 AAR 494; [2007] AATA 1011, Walker DP at [74]; Ekermawi v Great Lakes Council [2010] NSWADT 35, Montgomery JM at [84]. 2 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Hayne J at [60], Callinan and Heydon JJ at [129]. Their Honours cautioned against confusing the statutory language with the non-statutory paraphrase. 3 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Hayne J at [56], [69], [70]. The italicised words in this passage refer to Hayne J’s view that because the conclusion of the reasoning process under this provision concerned “the public interest”, then a number of facets or considerations might well be relevant. 4 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [131]. 5 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [10]. 6 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [11]. 7 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [12]. 8 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [13].

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania Explicit [2.3.910] Like legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, all legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania uses the phrase “public interest” widely. In particular, the exemption from access provisions and “what-counts-as-requirements” provisions (see [2.3.190]) now use a network of rules for determining whether disclosure of a document is in the public interest: see [2.3.750]. Under the Commonwealth scheme, the

84

[2.3.920]

LEGISLATION IN CTH, NSW, QLD AND TAS

Australian Information Commissioner has elaborated a process for evaluating public interest.1

1 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (OAIC, rev ed, 2014) at [6.11]–[6.33] (available at http://www.oaic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, see “Freedom of information”, “FOI guidelines”, “Combined FOI Guidelines PDF as at 3 October 2014”).

Legislative Objects [2.3.920] Among the important innovations of right to information legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania is strengthening of the legislative objects of transparency in government. Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, each has an objects clause to the effect that the functions and powers under legislation are to be interpreted so as to promote the transparency in government objects of the legislation.1 Similar clauses also used to exist in legislation of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. Unfortunately, courts and tribunals in the period preceding reform legislation (see [2.3.170] and [2.3.180]) in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania did not prefer this object. This led to a “normative vacuum” caused by disregard of the legislation’s stated purposes.2 In legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, there are provisions which strengthen the influence of the objects clause. The new objects clauses either remove or de-emphasise text in the clauses which qualifies the right of access. The Commonwealth changes removed the phrase “limited only by exceptions and exemptions”3 from s 3(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The same words are missing from the Tasmanian objects clause.4 The New South Wales changes omit the phrase “subject only to such restrictions as are reasonably necessary”5 from s 3(1) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) removes the reference to “strike a balance between … competing interests” from s 3(2).6 The Commonwealth Act has also linked its change to the objects clause into the interpretation of the public interest test by an explicit requirement that promotion of the objects clause is a factor in favour of disclosure.7 The New South Wales Act contains a stronger version of this link. Not only is promotion of the objects clause a factor in favour of disclosure,8 but there is a stated presumption in favour of disclosure.9 The Right to Information Act 2009 employs the strongest language possible to implement the transparency in government object at ss 39(3) and 44(4) stating the intention of a “pro-disclosure bias”.10 Under the Commonwealth scheme, this issue was revisited by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court in 85

[2.3.920]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

litigation which led to Kline v Offıcial Secretary to Governor General (2013) 249 CLR 645; 88 ALJR 161; [2013] HCA 52. In the case, one contention of the access-applicant was that the legislative objective of promotion of transparency-in-government favoured a narrow construction of an exception to access (documents of “an administrative nature” held by the Office of the Governor-General). The plurality of the High Court did not agree with this argument.11 This was not because they rejected the relevance of legislative objects at all, but because they thought other competing legislative objectives lessened the influence of the legislative objective relied upon by the access-applicant. The plurality’s adoption of a purposive argument, which differed to the access-applicant’s purposive argument, was a confirmation of the renewed importance of the legislation’s statutory purposes.12

1 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 2(2) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 3(2). 2 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [5]. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 3(1)(b) now says: “The objects of this Act are to give the Australian community access to information held by the Government of the Commonwealth or the Government of Norfolk Island, by … providing for a right of access to documents.” An example of the rejection of the objects clause from the period prior to this reform is Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC), Judge Lunn at 60, 61 (applied in Daycorp Pty Ltd v Parnell [2011] SADC 191, Judge Millsteed at [35]). 4 In Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas), s 3(2) (now repealed) but not Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 3(2). 5 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW), s 5(2)(b) (now repealed). 6 In Flegg v Hallet [2014] QSC 278, Lyons J at [29] held that Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 3 by implication recognised there was a general public interest in the right to access government held information. Qualifying the notion of the primacy of the objects clause in the Queensland legislation is the decision of City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Information Commissioner (Qld) [2010] QCATA 60, Kingham DP at [40]–[44] which, without citing News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64 adopted its argument that the objects clause could not prevail in the face of other and complex terms of the legislation. 7 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 11B(3)(a). 8 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 15(a). 9 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), ss 5, 12(1). 10 Recognised in Watson v Offıce of Information Commissioner (Qld) [2015] QCATA 95, Thomas P at [18]. 11 Kline v Offıcial Secretary to Governor General (2013) 249 CLR 645; 88 ALJR 161; [2013] HCA 52, French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [36]–[57]. 12 Later examples of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal permitting the objects clause

86

[2.3.940]

WHAT-COUNTS-AS-REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM

to influence its decisions are: Re MacTiernan and Secretary of Department of Infrastructure & Regional Development [2015] AATA 584, Walsh SM at [31]; Rovere v Secretary, Department of Education and Training [2015] AATA 462; Re Matthews and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2014] AATA 769, Forgie DP at [135]; Re Spragg and Chief Executive Offıcer of Customs [2014] AATA 667, Hotop DP at [34], [35]; Re Sweeney and Australian Information Commissioner (2014) 64 AAR 186; [2014] AATA 531, Constance DP at [88]–[109]. The High Court’s “balance competing legislative objectives” approach has been applied, to opposing ends by the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal in D’Adam v New South Wales Treasury [2014] NSWCATAD 68, Walker SM at [42] and Barrett v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2014] NSWCATAD 31 Isenberg SM at [14], [15].

Implicit [2.3.930] Like legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania employs the word “reasonable” widely. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) uses the word sparingly in 26 provisions. At the other end of the scale is the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), which uses the word in over 70 provisions including nearly every provision stating a factor relevant, in some way, to the public interest assessment process. Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania abandons the benefit test in its usage of the “public interest” and embraces the harm test. This shift is evident from both explicit and implicit references.

“What-counts-as-requirements” System [2.3.940] The “what-counts-as-requirements” system (see [2.3.190]) of right to information legislation has a systematic centrality matched in few other systems of law. The “what-counts-as-requirements” system in right to information laws answers such questions as: • Who is a proper respondent? • From whom a can thing be sought or who must publish? • What is a proper thing that might be sought? • What can be sought? • What must be published? • Who is a proper applicant? • Who can seek a thing from a respondent? • What proper things are excepted from the general obligation to make disclosure? (Often called “exemptions” they involve the question: what 87

[2.3.940]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

characteristics of the thing to which access is sought qualify the duty of disclosure?) • What considerations of public interest can properly be considered?

Legal Objects Acted on by Right to Information Laws [2.3.950] All right to information statutes have provisions that define or state what things are acted on by its rules and procedures. In this discussion, these things are referred to as the “legal object”. Thus, a thing we call a document or record in lay discourse is made the thing acted upon by the access on request rules. It is the concrete thing for which a request for access is made, it is the concrete thing which an agency decides to disclose or withhold, and it is the concrete thing which is disclosed to the applicant. So there are rules in right to information legislation that set out the requirements for a thing we call a document or record in lay discourse to be counted as a “document”, “record” or “information” in the right to information legislation. The role of the “what-counts-as-requirements” system (see [2.3.190]) for the legal objects is, with the “what-counts-as-requirements” for who is a proper respondent or proper applicant, to make the setting for other rules. The following Table lists these differently named objects in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. All references in the following Tables are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

Tables of Legislation [2.3.953] Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: Names of Legal Objects. Most of the objects listed in the following Table are subject to “what-counts-as-requirements” provisions. Most “what-counts-as-requirements” provisions take the form of a formal definition. Others take the form of a deeming provision. However, some are simply descriptive statements (ie statements setting forth the particulars of the object). The next Table locates the “what-counts-as-requirements” provisions for all objects. ACT

NT

SA

Access on Request Rule

88

Vic

WA

[2.3.953]

Name of Object

Section Publication and Inspection Rules Name of Object (Statements Setting Out Organisational Information About Agency) Section Name of Object (Statements Setting Out Right to Information Arrangements) Section Name of Object (Documents Used in Decisionmaking) Section Amendment and Correction Rule Name of Object

Section

TABLES OF LEGISLATION

ACT Document of an agency, “official document of a Minister”

NT “Government information”

SA Agency’s documents

WA Document of an agency

s 12

Vic “Document of an agency”, “official document of a Minister” s 13

s 10

s 15

Various

Various

Various

Various

“Information statement”

s7 Various

s 11 Various

s9 Various

ss 7, 10, 11 Various

s 96 “Information statement”

s7 Various

s 11 None

s9 “Policy document”

s7 Various

s 96 “Internal manual”

s 10

s8

s 97

s8

Document containing personal information

“Personal information”

s 48

s 31

Document contains information concerning the person’s personal affairs s 30

89

s 10

Personal Document information containing contained in information relating to the a document of the agency personal affairs of a person s 39 s 45

[2.3.955]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

[2.3.955] Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: “What-counts-as-requirements” for Legal Objects.

Access On Request Rule

Publication and Inspection Rules Statements Setting Out Organisational Information About Agency Statements Setting Out Right to Information Arrangements Documents Used in Decision making

ACT NT “Document in “Government relation to an information”: s4 agency”: s 3, Dictionary

SA “Document”: s 4(1)

“Official document, in relation to a Minister”: s 3, Dictionary

“Record”: s 4

“Document”: Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 2, Dictionary Pt 1

“Holds government information”: s6

“Documents held by an agency” where the agency is a Minister: s 4(3) An agency is deemed to hold a document: s 4(4)

Vic WA “Document “Document” : s 9, Glossary of an cl 1 agency”: s 5(1) “Official document of a Minister”: s 5(1)

“Document”: s 5(1)

“Personal information”: s4

An agency is deemed to hold information in computer storage: s 4(5)

s 7(1)(a)(i), (ii)

s 11(1)(a)

Information statement: s 9(2)(a)– (c)

ss 7(1)(a)(i), (vii), 10(1)

“Information statement:” s 94(a) – (c)

s 7(1)(a)(iii) – (v)

s 11(1)(b) – (d)

Information statement: s 9(2)(d) – (f)

ss 7(1)(a)(ii) – (vi), (viii), 11(1)

“Information statement”: s 94(d) – (g)

s 8(1)

None

“Policy document”: s 4(1)

Documents used in decision making: s 8(1)

“Internal manual”: s 95

90

[2.3.957]

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TABLES OF LEGISLATION

ACT “Document”: Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 2, Dictionary “Personal information”: s 3, Dictionary

NT “Personal information”: s4

SA “Personal affairs”: s 4(1)

“Holds government information”: s6

“Document”: s 4(1)

Vic “Document”: s 5(1)

WA “Document”: s 9, Glossary cl 1

“Personal Information”: s 9, Glossary cl 1

Documents held by an agency where the agency is a Minister: s 4(3) An agency is deemed to hold a document: s 4(4) An agency is deemed to hold information in computer storage: s 4(5)

Few of the “what-counts-as-requirements” provisions in the form of a definition are inclusive legal definitions (ie one which relies on the natural meaning of a word and extends or adds to that meaning). The next Table lists the inclusive legal definitions. The rest are exhaustive legal definitions or deeming provisions. [2.3.957] Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: Inclusive Legal Definitions.

Access On Request Rule Amendment and Correction Rule

ACT None

NT None

SA “Document”

Vic “Document”

WA None

None

None

“Personal affairs”

None

None

91

[2.3.957]

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Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: Function of Rules as to Legal Objects [2.3.960] The function of “what-counts-as-requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for legal objects vary. For the access on request rules, the “what-counts-as-requirements” are concerned with two questions: (1)

What concrete thing can properly be the legal object of a request?

(2)

In what circumstance is there a connection between an agency and the object sought, so the agency has responsibilities for that object? In other words, when is a document “of” an agency?

For the publication and inspection rules there are three questions: (1)

What information about an agency’s internal structure must be disclosed?

(2)

What information about both the types of documents held by the agency and administration of right to information laws must be disclosed?

(3)

What existing documents containing quasi-legislation exist?

The “what-counts-as-requirements” for amendment of personal information rules extend from the “what-counts-as-requirements” for the access on request rules. The amendment “what-counts-as-requirements” assume a concrete thing that can properly be the object of a request and this thing has a sufficient connection with an agency to be their responsibility. As well, the amendment “what-counts-as-requirements” restrict the range of qualifying objects with a test that a document must contain “personal information”. This is the major “what-counts-as-requirement” for this type of rule. “What-counts-as-requirements” vary on whether they envisage one object or many. The “what-counts-as-requirements” for the access on request rules and the amendment of personal information rules clearly envisage an agency having many things that are “documents”. Each request for access or application for amendment of personal information concerns only a selection from the total. However, the “what-counts-as-requirements” for objects of the publication and inspection rules differ: (1)

Sections 7(1)(b) and 8(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)1 both use the plural number for the legal objects published or available for inspection – “statements” and “documents” respectively.

(2)

Section 11(3) of the Information Act 2002 (NT) envisages the information required to be published is a part of each agency’s annual report.

(3)

Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) requires eight legal objects called “statements” to be published. Sections 10 and 11

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[2.3.960] LEGISLATION IN ACT ETC: FUNCTION OF RULES AS TO LEGAL OBJECTS

require, respectively, “a register” and “a statement” in the form of an index of certain documents. Section 8 requires “documents” to be available for inspection. (4)

Section 96 of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) requires publication of “an information statement” and s 97(1)(a) requires the agency to make available for inspection “its most up-to-date information statement”. Both these constructions are in the singular number. Opposed to this are references to the “internal manuals”. Section 97(1)(b) uses the phrase “each of its internal manuals”. This construction uses the plural number. The South Australian Act uses similar constructions.2

All “what-counts-as-requirements” for objects assume physical or concrete things in the real world. The “what-counts-as-requirements” for the object of the access on request rules focus on a concrete or physical expression of a message, that is, a thing we would conventionally call a “document”, or “record”.3 It is the medium relative to the message. This concrete thing is defined to contain or express an abstract statement of the meaning of an utterance or expression, or the knowledge contained in the utterance or expression (ie what we conventionally call “information”).4 It is the message relative to the medium. The “what-counts-as-requirements” for the objects of the publication and inspection rules are framed in the same way. Sometimes, the legal objects to be published or made available are called “documents”.5 In others, the legal object to be published or made available is called a “statement”.6 In all instances, the statement is defined to “contain”7 specified information. Again, the object is defined as a medium carrying a message. Finally, the “what-counts-as-requirements” for the amendment of personal information rules most clearly assume the idea of a concrete thing with the characteristic that they “contain”8 information of a certain kind (“personal information”) or from which a message of a particular kind (a person’s identity) can be gleaned.9

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017. 2 See Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), ss 9(1), 10(1). 3 All legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia uses either or both the terms “document” and “record” in the “what-counts-as-requirements” for the object of the access on request rules. 4 All “what-counts-as-requirements” for the object of the access on request rules, except the Information Act 2002 (NT) and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), use the word “information” to denote abstract content contained in the document or record. Freedom of Information Act 1982, s 5(1) (definition of “document”) uses the synonymous construction: “[A] definite meaning to persons conversant with them”. 5 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 8; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 11(2); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), ss 10, 11; Freedom of Information Act 1992

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6

7

8

9

(WA), s 95. There is no equivalent provision in Victoria. Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 7; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 9; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 7(1)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 96. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 7(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 9(2); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 7(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 95. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 30(a); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 39; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 45. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Information Act 2002 (NT), s 4 (definition of “personal information”).

[2.3.970] For the connection between a document and an agency, the “what-counts-as-requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the objects of the access on request rules and the amendment of personal information rules both use existing ideas in the real world. The “what-counts-as-requirements” of “document of an agency” involve ideas of either possession, right of access or control. This usage of the preposition “of” is an accepted usage in English. All “what-counts-as-requirements”, except those in the South Australian Act, share the ideas of possession as one type of “holding”. The Information Act 2002 (NT) and the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) share the idea of “being in control of” as being one type of “holding”. The Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) and the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) definitions of “holding” share the idea of immediate right of access. In other words, they are “what-counts-as-requirements” of the type since they state when an existing idea is “valid” for right to information legislation: see [2.3.190]. [2.3.980] The “what-counts-as-requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the objects of the publication and inspection rules have two functions. The first is clarity of description or definition. The second is whether this category of objects overlaps with the category of objects subject to the tabling, disallowance and publication requirements for delegated legislation. [2.3.990] The information comprising the objects of the publication and inspection rules are of two groups. The first group is the “organisational information bearing group”, which contains information about the organisation of agencies. Further, this group of objects divides into two subgroups. One subgroup is information about the structure of agencies (“structural information”), and the second subgroup is about rules used to coordinate work within an agency (“internal rules information”). The second group is the “information resources group”, which contains information about resources of agencies, including resources under right to information legislation

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[2.3.1000] LEGISLATION IN ACT ETC: FUNCTION OF RULES AS TO LEGAL OBJECTS

The objects of the publication and inspection rules are mostly concerned with non-legal activities. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) are typical. Section 9(2)(a) – (c) describes the information of an agency’s internal structure which must be disclosed in the published document. The provisions use the following phrases: “structure”; “function”; “ways in which the functions … of the agency affect members of the public”; “decision making functions”; “arrangements … to enable members of the public to participate in the formulation of the agency’s policy”; and “exercise of the agency’s functions”. The definition of “policy document” in s 4(1), which is the object of inspection rules of ss 9(3) and 10, contains the following phrases: “interpretations, rules, guidelines … or … statement of the manner, or intended manner, of administration of any … administrative scheme … that is used by the agency in connection with the exercise of such of its functions”. None of these terms will be found as a defined term in a legal dictionary. The object of the structural information bearing subgroup is a document containing information about the hierarchy of roles and tasks within the agency. This document could be redrawn as a traditional organisation chart – blocks containing designations of jobs and roles with lines connecting a superordinate job or role to all subordinate jobs and roles. Both the organisation chart and the document bearing structural information show the agency as the sum of these blocks of jobs or roles. The jobs and roles are the “insides” of the organisation, the environment of other people and entities is “outside”. Both the organisation chart and the document bearing structural information focus on those aspects of the agency which can be called bureaucratic in one sense. The object of the internal rules information-bearing subgroup is a document, which also focuses on aspects of the agency, and can also be called bureaucratic in one sense. Instead of a focus on roles and tasks, there is a focus on vertical coordination by rules. Vertical coordination refers to the control by personnel at or close to the apex of a bureaucracy of personnel further below the apex. Rules, procedures and policies are one instrument to achieve this coordination. The outcome of this vertical coordination is consistency in handling similar situations or decisions. Thus, these rules and procedures tell the occupants of jobs within the organisation how to make similar decisions affecting others in similar situations. [2.3.1000] By default, right to information legislation does not use a generic term for the information contained in the structural information bearing subgroup of objects: see [2.3.990]. Instead, the provisions describe the instances of the objects within the subgroup. The South Australian provisions are typical. Section 9(2)(a) – (c) of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) lists three instances described with terminology of some generality. However, these provisions do not point out what attributes they have in common. There is no superordinate “genus” or subordinate “species”. The “what-counts-as-requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the internal rules bearing subgroup of objects (see [2.3.990]) also avoids generic terminology. Only the 95

[2.3.1000]

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South Australian and Western Australian legislation create a generic term for these objects – “policy document” and “internal manual” respectively.1 The other Acts simply list instances described with terminology of some generality. Again, in no legislation do the provisions indicate what attributes all instances have in common. Once more, the provisions of the South Australian Act are common. The generic term is “information statement”, which is defined in s 9(2)(a) – (e), listing documents used in connection with the exercise of functions which affect privileges of the public. Whether this category of legal objects overlaps with the category of objects for the tabling, disallowance and publication requirements for delegated legislation is more certain in some jurisdictions than in others. There is a range of possible overlap varying from nil in Western Australia, to unlikely in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, to unclear in South Australia.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 4(1); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 95.

[2.3.1010] The “what-counts-as-requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the information resources group of legal objects (see [2.3.990]), and those for the organisational information bearing group of objects (see [2.3.990]), avoid generic terminology. No right to information legislation uses a generic term for the kind of information contained in the structural information bearing subgroup of objects: see [2.3.990]. Instead, the provisions describe the instances of the objects within the group. Section 7(1)(a)(iii) – (v) of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)1 is typical. There are three objects:2 (1)

a statement of the categories of documents available free of charge;

(2)

a statement of the agency’s facilities available to members of the public to access documents under the Act; and

(3)

a statement of information about how to access documents under the Act.

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017. 2 Legislation varies on whether the different kinds of information are in the same object or in separate objects. The Australian Capital Territory law requires separate objects. But other legislation has the different information in the same “statement”.

[2.3.1020] The objects of the amendment of personal information rules are a subset of the objects of the access on request rules. The function of the

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[2.3.1020] LEGISLATION IN ACT ETC: FUNCTION OF RULES AS TO LEGAL OBJECTS

“what-counts-as-requirements” provisions (see [2.3.190]) for these objects is to distinguish them. The differentiating attribute is defined in three Acts and effectively described in the fourth. The attribute that differentiates this species of objects from others in the genus is the presence of information variously called “personal information” (in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), Information Act 2002 (NT) and Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA)) or “concerning personal affairs” (in the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) and Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic)). The defined or described attribute varies in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia between two related but different senses of the adjective “personal”. One sense of “personal” is that a thing relates to a particular or identifiable individual. This information relates the thing to the individual and to no one else. So to say about my driver’s licence that it is my “personal” possession is to say that the license identifies me and no one else as its bearer. A second usage of “personal” is as a synonym for one sense of “private” – “not of an official or public character” Hence, to say about my diary that it is a “personal” possession is to say that its content contains expressions of my individual thoughts unconnected with my status as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The legislative formula used to refer to the first sense, “personal means particular”, is about an individual, whether living or dead, whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained.1 The Freedom of Information Act 1991 does not use a generic description, or a generic attribute, instead listing five kinds of information, such as “marital or other personal relationships”.2

1 See Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 4 (definition of “personal affairs”).

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Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Document [2.3.1030] There has been little judicial or tribunal interpretation of the term “document”. The few comments made suggest the term is understood broadly: (1)

“‘Document’ is broadly defined.”1

(2)

“Indeed, it includes anything whatsoever on which is marked any words, figures, letters or symbols which are capable of carrying a definite meaning to persons conversant with them”.2

In addition, there have only been a small number of holdings where the nature of, or attributes of, a thing have been ratio: (1)

a photocopy is a document;3 and

(2)

a loose-leaf manual is a document.4

1 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Hayne J at [102]. 2 Minogue v Department of Justice (2004) 21 VAR 179; [2004] VCAT 1194, Morris P at [71]. 3 Re Martyr and Law Reform Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95147 of 1995, 3 July 1996) at [27]. 4 Minogue v Department of Justice (2004) 21 VAR 179; [2004] VCAT 1194, Morris P at [74], [75].

Document “of” an Agency [2.3.1040] Where the same data or information is contained in several but different media, the response to a request for access will depend on the terms of the request. The right to information schemes distinguish between the medium containing information or data, and that information or data. This has the outcome that if a request asks for data or information in a specified medium but not others, then only those things that contain the sought after data or information and are of the specified medium should be considered for disclosure. It is the first element of this pattern, “possession”, which has attracted

98

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LEGISLATION IN ACT ETC: JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY

commentary from courts and tribunals. Because they face differently constructed provisions, not surprisingly the courts and tribunals have been divided on interpretation. What follows is a summary of the some of the decisions and the factual contexts: (1)

Australian Capital Territory: Documents of Agency A with ongoing use of them now in possession of Agency B under “centralising” arrangements.1 “Possession” includes physical possession and immediate right of access.

(2)

Queensland: So long as a document is in the physical possession of an agency then the document is “of” the agency; any additional requirement, such as the agency having “legal” custody of the document is inconsistent with the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) scheme.2

(3)

Victoria: The contractual arrangements and terms of appointment of a consultant will determine whether that person is to be considered part of an agency, or outside an agency.3 “Possession” expands from physical possession to “constructive possession”, that is, an immediate right of access.4

(4)

Western Australia: Documents used by Agency A and ultimately under their control stored with Agency B alongside Agency B’s own documents and used by officers of Agency B. Documents held by Agency B. “Possession” means only physical possession or holding of documents.5

1 Re Coe and Chief Minister’s Department [2006] ACTAAT 8, Peedom P at [22]. 2 Kalinga Wooloowin Residents Association Inc and Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation [2011] QICmr 49. 3 Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, Grey J at 878, King J at 883. 4 Re Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends Association and Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (Vic) (1988) 2 VAR 404, Jones VP at 408; Birrell v Victorian Economic Development Corp (1989) 3 VAR 358 (VicAAT); Re Mildenhall and Department of Premier & Cabinet (No 2) (1995) 8 VAR 478 (VicAAT), Macnamara DP at 481. 5 Information Commissioner (WA) v Ministry of Justice [2001] WASC 3, Wheeler J at [20]; see also Minister for Transport (WA) v Edwards [2000] WASCA 349, Hasluck J at [53], [54]. The Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) is concerned with “the fact of possession” rather than notions of ownership or authorship. So there must be an existing legal entitlement to possession or control: Re Ninan and Department of Commerce [2012] WAICmr 31 at [37].

Personal Information [2.3.1050] Judicial and tribunal interpretation of the phrase “personal information” and its analogues has tended to stress the breadth of the idea. As the phrase occurs in both the rule for amendment of information and 99

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one of the exemptions to the access on request rule, cases concerning one usage are relevant to the other usage. In South Australia, the phrase has been considered twice but neither has offered an explication of the term.1 In Victoria, the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) in 2000 introduced s 33(9). It had the effect of shifting the emphasis of the criterion for “personal information”. Previously the idea of “personal information” was that shared with other jurisdictions – the private, as opposed to public life of a person.2 The amendment changed the emphasis to whether an individual’s identity could be discerned: [I]f the document is capable, either directly or indirectly of identifying a particular person whose affairs are mentioned. Whether there is disclosure will depend on a close examination of the information in each particular case.3

In Western Australia, the Information Commissioner has made the same observation about the Western Australian law: [T]hat any information or opinion about a person – whether living or dead – from which that person can be identified is prima facie exempt information under [Sch 1 cl 3(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA)].4

1 In City of Unley v Warnecke (2004) 232 LSJS 432; [2004] SADC 48, Anderson J at [37] concluded: “As was held in [Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414] ‘personal affairs’ is ‘an expression inherently incapable of precise or exhaustive definition’.” In Priebe v Police (SA) [2007] SADC 119, Boylan DCJ at [10] considered a document called an “officer history report” kept by the South Australian Police and concluded that it fell within the classification “information concerning the personal affairs of any person”. 2 University of Melbourne v Robinson [1993] 2 VR 177, Brooking J at 187. 3 Beauchamp v Department of Education [2006] VCAT 1653, Coughlan DP at [42]. 4 Re Ravlich and Attorney-General (WA) [2010] WAICmr 5, the Information Commissioner at [28]. However, it was noted in that case, as well as the earliest from an Information Commissioner of Western Australia, that usually “the definition suggests that disclosure of the document, ordinarily, must reveal something more about an individual, other than his or her name to attract the exemption”: Re Kobelke and Minister for Planning (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94007 of 1993, 27 April 1994), Keighley-Gerardy IC at [68].

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania [2.3.1060] “What-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for what things are acted on by the rules and procedures of legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania are similar to those found in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. The following 100

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Tables summarise the principal features of the rules relevant to a topic among the many provisions of the freedom of information laws. All references in the Tables are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania: Legal Objects Access on Request Rule Name of Object

Section Publication and Inspection Rules Name of Object Section Name of Object

Section Name of Object (Statements Setting Out Right to Information Arrangements) Section

Section Amendment and Correction Rule Name of Object

Section

Cth

NSW

Qld

Tas

“Document of an agency”; “official document of a Minister”

“Government information”

“Document of an agency”; “document of a Minister”

s 11

s9

s 23

“Information in the possession of a public authority”; “information in the possession of a Minister” s7

Information about the agency s8 None

“Open access information” s 18 Agency information guide s 20 Disclosure log

Publication scheme s 21 None

Routine disclosure s 12(2) None

Disclosure log

None

s8 “Operational information” s 8A

Pt 3 Div 4 “Policy documents” s 18(c)

s 78 “Policy document” s 20

“A document … contains personal information” s 48

None

None

Information about the agency

101

None

None

[2.3.1060]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania: “What-counts-as requirements” Cth

NSW

“Document of an agency”: s 4(1)

“Government information”: s 4(1)

“Official document of a Minister”: s 4(1) None

“Document”: s 4(1)

“Held by an agency”: Sch 4 cl 12 “Held by a Minister”: Sch 4 cl 11 “Record”: Sch 4 cl 10

“Operational information”: s 8A

Name of Object

None

Name of Object

None

Name of Object

None

Name of Object

None

Access on Request Rules Name of Object

Name of Object

Name of Object

Name of Object

Publication Rules Name of Object

Amendment and Correction Rule Name of Object

“Personal information”: s 4(1)1

Qld

Tas

“Document of “Information in an agency”: s 12 the possession of a public authority”: s 7 “Document of a “Information in Minister”: s 13 the possession of a Minister”: s 7 None None

“Document”: Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36

“Information”: s 5(1)

“Open access information”: s 18

“Publication scheme”: s 21(1)

“Agency information guide”: s 20 “Policy documents”: s 18(c) “Disclosure log”: s 25 “Government contracts register”: s 27

None

“Required disclosure”; “routine disclosure”; “an active disclosure”: s 5(1) None

None

102

None

“Policy document”: Sch 6, Dictionary None

None

None

None

None

None

[2.3.1070]

LEGISLATION IN CTH, NSW, QLD AND TAS: LEGAL OBJECTS

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania: Inclusive Definitions Access on Request Rules Name of Object Name of Object

Cth

NSW

Qld

Tas

None

None

None

“Document”: s 4(1)

None

“Document of an agency”: s 12 “Document”: Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36

None

1 The phrase “personal information” is no longer defined in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). It is now defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania: Legal Objects [2.3.1070] The legislation in New South Wales and Tasmania now use the term “information” instead of “document”. However, these innovations have opposing meanings. The “what-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the object of the access on request rule in s 9 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), takes a conventional approach. It is now referred to as “government information” rather than “record” or “document”. “Government information” is the message relative to the medium. The term “information” is defined in neither the Government Information (Public Access) Act 20091 nor the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). The Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) has assumed an unconventional definition of “information”. It uses the term “information” instead of “document” or “record” to denote the object of the access on request rule. The terms defining “information” are similar to those for the words “document” and “record” found in other legislation. However, the definition of “information” conflates or combines the idea of a medium with the idea of a message by the clause “and anything in which information is embodied so as to be capable of being reproduced”.

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The requirement that a document be “held” by an agency is altered by expansions and reductions in its scope. Like legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania uses the same “set” of ideas denoted by the word “held” – possession, control and immediate right of access. In addition, the set of ideas is variously expanded or limited by qualifications. “Held” is expanded in three of the Acts: (1)

Under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), an agency has “possession” (the criterion for “holding”) because of contractual measures under s 6C, which deals with an agency’s response where it receives a request for access to a document held by a private sector entity that is a service provider. In addition, s 13 makes prescriptions for documents in the possession of museums, archives, and the like under federal jurisdiction. Section 13(2) is a general expansion of “possession” for documents of an agency now in the possession of the National Archives of Australia. Sections 13(1) and (3) create exceptions for material in the possession of specific institutions.

(2)

Under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009, information is contained in a record “held” by an agency. The idea denoted by the verb “held” is undefined. However, there are several expansions. A record held by a private sector entity, or the State Records Authority is also held by an agency if the agency has “immediate right of access”.2 There is another expansion of “held” where a record is under the control of an agency officer “in his or her capacity as an officer”.3

(3)

The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) also expands “held” where the document is under the control of an agency officer “in his official capacity”.4

Conversely, some legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania reduces the idea of “held”: (1)

The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 reduces the scope of records held by two deeming provisions.5 They exclude records held by an agency if the record is otherwise freely available to the public, or the record “genuinely forms part of the library material” of the agency.6

(2)

The Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) requires that all information held by an agency “relate to the official business” of the agency.7

The “official capacity” or “official business” criteria found in several of the reform Acts are neither defined nor explained. None of the Acts contain a definition or statement of what is “official” capacity or business. The phrases “official capacity”, “capacity as an officer” and “official business” do occur in other legislation.8 However, the High Court’s contemporary approach is one of caution towards application in interpretation of provisions in one statute of similar provisions in other statutes.9 It follows that the question of the meaning to be given to the phrases in future court and tribunal cases will be answered by 104

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looking closely at the relevant statutory provisions, with careful attention being paid to the particular language.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Bill 2009 (NSW), Explanatory Memorandum also did not elaborate. 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 4 cl 4(1)(a), (b). 3 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 4 cl 12(1)(d). 4 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 6 (“Dictionary”). 5 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 4 cl 12(2), (3). 6 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 4 cl 12(3). 7 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 28. 8 Although, significantly, the phrase “official business” does not occur in any Tasmanian legislation other than the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas). 9 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31, Kirby J at [25], Hayne and Heydon JJ at [92] (and cases cited therein); South East Water Ltd v Transpacific Cleanaway Pty Ltd (2010) 177 LGERA 1; [2010] VSC 46, Cavanough J at [11]; Tasmania v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (Tas) [2009] TASSC 48, Porter J at [27].

Objects of Publication and Inspection Rules Introduction [2.3.1080] Right to information legislation of the reform jurisdictions has changed the scope of objects of the publication and inspection rules. The changes are both formal and functional.

Rules Relevant to a Topic [2.3.1090] The changes to the rules relevant to a topic among the many provisions of the freedom of information laws are of two types. The first is that the location of the rules has, in some jurisdictions, moved from legislation to quasi-legislation: see [2.3.610]. The second change is that the rules have diversified or broadened. This second change, called diversification, is related to a change in the policy reasons for right to information. This change is the shift from the so-called “pull model” to the so-called “push model” of right to information: see [2.3.180].

Shift to Quasi-legislation [2.3.1100]

The location of the “what-counts-as requirements” (see

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[2.3.190]) for legal objects of the publication and inspection rules is divided between legislation and quasi-legislation. The legislation of Tasmania represents the most radical change. The Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) contains no publication and inspection rules. Instead, s 12 refers to “routine disclosure” (ie non-compulsory disclosure1 made subject to guidelines issued by the Tasmanian Ombudsman).2 A guideline issued by the Tasmanian Ombudsman on 19 August 2010 deals in part with “routine disclosure”.3 The Queensland Act contains rules and some “what-counts-as requirements” provisions. In addition, an instrument of quasi-legislation, called Ministerial Guidelines, on some of the rules exist.4 They contain “what-counts-as requirements” for the objects of the relevant rules. In New South Wales, the Information Commissioner can issue guidelines and model agency information guides in connection with what is called “open access information”.5 To date, two guidelines concerned with the publication and inspection rules have been made6 in conjunction with the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009 (NSW), which also concerns “open access information” for local government bodies. Both instruments contain “what-counts-as requirements” for the objects of the relevant regulative rules. In the Commonwealth, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) requires agencies in preparing its “information publication scheme” (see [2.3.1120]) under Pt II to have regard to any guidelines published by the Australian Information Commissioner.7 Guidelines about information publication schemes have not been issued to date.

1 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 5(1) defines “routine disclosure” as disclosure of the type an agency “decides may be of interest to the public, but which is not a required disclosure, an assessed disclosure or an active disclosure”. 2 Under Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 49. None have been issued to date. 3 Office of the Tasmanian Ombudsman, Guideline 3/2010: Guideline in Relation to Process of Disclosing Information under Each Type of Information Disclosure (Tasmanian Ombudsman, 2010) (available at http://www.ombudsman.tas.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Right to Information”, “RTI Guidelines”). 4 A Bligh, Ministerial Guidelines for Publication Schemes and Disclosure Logs (Queensland Government, 2009) and C Dick, Ministerial Guidelines: Brisbane City Council Publication Scheme (Queensland Government, 2009) (both available at http://www.rti.qld.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Right to Information Act”, “Publication Schemes”). 5 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 22(2). 6 Communications and Corporate Affairs, Guideline 1: For Local Councils on the Disclosure of Information Contained in the Returns Disclosing the Interests of Councillors and Designated Persons Developed under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (Information and Privacy Commission New South 106

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Wales, 2010) and Communications and Corporate Affairs, Guideline 3: For Local Councils on the Disclosure of Information Contained in the Returns Disclosing the Interests of Councillors and Designated Persons Developed under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (Information and Privacy Commission New South Wales, 2010) (both available at http://www.ipc.nsw.gov, viewed 15 September 2016). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 9A(b).

Diversification [2.3.1110] A greater variety of things must be published or made available for inspection under legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania compared with legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. In some legislation, the diversification of legal objects is done by way of addition to the range of objects under the original legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. In other legislation, the diversification works by replacement of the range of objects under the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. In both, new terminology has either completely replaced the old, or has been added. In the result, claims of similarity or dissimilarity must be made carefully.

Commonwealth [2.3.1120] The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) right to information scheme appears to be least different to the legislation schemes in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. The new arrangements are called an “information publication scheme”1 instead of a “statement of affairs” scheme. The legal objects that must be published or made available for inspection largely resemble the range of legal objects subject to the scheme contained in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT). However, there are now two notable changes, one in the internal rules subgroup of the organisational information bearing group, and the other in the information resources group of objects. The “what-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the internal rules group of legal objects has been altered. The legislation has assumed a generic term, “operational information”, where there was none before. Furthermore, the term has been given an explicit definition in s 8A. This definition differs to those contained in original legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia in that it states generic attributes, but lists no instances of the things denoted. Thus, words such as “manuals”, “guidelines” or “rules” found in definitions or statements from legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia2 are missing. In addition, the

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description of the generic attributes is broad (eg information held “to assist the agency to perform” its functions). However, the Explanatory Memorandum to the reform Act, the Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009 (Cth), describes “operational information” in narrower terms (ie “the rules and guidelines that are used to make decisions affecting members of the public”).3 Thus, the definition of the internal rules group of objects describes a genus, but not its species. The “what-counts-as requirements” for the information resources group of legal objects connected with administration of right to information legislation have been replaced. This information is now unconcerned with facilities or officers administering right to information legislation.4 Instead, the legal object must now contain “information in documents to which the agency routinely gives access in response to requests under Part III (access to documents)”.5 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009 describes this information as follows: [I]nformation in which there has been a demonstrated level of interest from the community by way of access requests should be pro-actively made available to the public (without requiring – or at least limiting the need for – applications to be made.6

It is unclear what common or shared public curiosity satisfies the requirement of “demonstrated level of interest from the community”.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Pt II (Heading). 2 See, eg Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 8(1)(a) (to be Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement 2017). 3 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009 (Cth), Memorandum, p 6. 4 See, eg Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 94(d) – (g). 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 8(2)(g). 6 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2009 (Cth), Memorandum, p 6.

repealed by on 1 July Explanatory

Explanatory

New South Wales General [2.3.1130] The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) right to information scheme introduces changes similar to those made to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The collective name of the publication and inspection rules has been changed to “open access information”.1 The scope of the legal objects of this regime works by a layered set of “what-counts-as requirements” provisions: see [2.3.190]. The principal object

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for any disclosure requirement is called “government information”. One type of this legal object is open access information. In turn, open access information is any of seven types of things listed in s 18. Open access information is published in a record called an “agency information guide”.2 The scope of things which fall within this list is similar in nature to the scope of legal objects of rules under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, except for three crucial enhancements – two which affect all agencies and one which affects only local government agencies. The first enhancement concerns information about contracts entered into by government. The second enhancement concerns information about previously disclosed information. The third enhancement concerns disclosure of a variety of information specific to local councils.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Pt 3. 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 20.

Government Contracts [2.3.1140] The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) has specific provisions requiring publication of information about contracts. This information is contained in a legal object called a “government contracts register”.1 It contains information about contracts provided they meet certain qualifications. As well, the qualifications create three facts for the government contracts register: (1)

“class 1”;

(2)

“class 2”; and

(3)

“class 3” contracts.

In turn, the “what-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the class 1 and class 3 contracts depend on a defined attribute called “value”.2 This attribute is defined in s 28 in any of three alternatives for calculating “value”. Section 27 prescribes that the “value” of class 1 and class 2 contracts must exceed $150,000. Section 31 prescribes that the “value” of a class 3 contract must exceed $5,000,000. A class 3 contract must also meet the qualifications for a class 2 contract. The qualifying attributes for a class 2 contract are listed in the alternative in s 30(1).3 Broadly, the attributes concern either the manner in which the contract was entered4 or the outcomes of the contract.5

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 27. 2 The definition of “value” contains other terms which are not explicitly defined, such as “project”, “real property”, “transfer”, “lease” and “rent”. For example, the

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3

4 5

meaning of the term “project” (regardless of its defined meaning) is the same as in the lay community; so its meaning is not created but assumed. One of the alternatives is Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 30(1)(d): “[T]he contract involves a privately financed project as defined by guidelines published by the Treasury (as in force from time to time).” These guidelines are contained in New South Wales Government, Working with Government: Guidelines for Privately Financed Projects (NSW Treasury, 2006) (available at http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016). Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 30(1)(a), (b). Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 30(1)(c) – (e).

[2.3.1150] The “what-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for the government contracts register (see [2.3.1140]) are of two kinds. The first kind states what information about eligible contracts comprises the register.1 The second kind is the temporal qualification on the government contracts register. The information required for class 1 and class 2 contracts amount to extracts from the contracts of their essential features.2 For class 3 contracts, an entire copy of the contract must be included in the register.

1 The first kind of “what-counts-as requirements” is listed in Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 29 (class 1 contracts), s 30(2) (class 2 contracts), s 31 (class 3 contracts). 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 30(2) contains a number of words which might fall within the description “trade words”, as used by the High Court in Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389; 71 ALJR 123; 24 AAR 282; 35 ATR 249 to denote jargon.

[2.3.1160] The principal qualification on what information makes up the government contracts register (see [2.3.1140]–[2.3.1150]) is a temporal one. It is contained in s 34 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). This qualification ensures that information about contracts remains on the register only for a prescribed period. The period is called the “public access period”. Thus, for example, once contracts are exchanged for a conveyance of a parcel of real property under an eligible contract, information about the contract is included in the register. However, that information is removed on settlement.1 Hence, the government contracts register is a contemporary record, not an historical one.

1 There are other reductions in the extent of information. In Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 32, commercial, in confidence information is excluded in respect of all contracts. In ss 38, 39, 40, there are specific exceptions for information in the hands of prescribed agencies in respect of prescribed contracts.

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Disclosure Logs [2.3.1170] The second major innovation of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) open access information regime is the broader publication of information released under individual requests for access.1 The condition precedent for the rule is – “if the information is information the agency considers may be of interest to other members of the public”.2 If so, the rule creates a record called a “disclosure log”. The information contained in the disclosure log is about information released in response to previous applications for access. The particulars of this information are stated in s 26(1). An important difference to the government contracts register is that the disclosure log is an historical record, not a contemporary record. Once information is included in the disclosure log, it remains there.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Pt 3 Div 4. 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 25.

Local Government [2.3.1180] The third major innovation of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) open access information regime is requirements for publication of information about local councils. The first set of requirements is contained in the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009 (NSW).1 The second set of requirements is contained in a guideline made by the Information Commissioner of New South Wales under ss 12 and 14 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009.2

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 18(g); Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009 (NSW), reg 3, Sch 1. 2 Office of the New South Wales Information Commissioner, GIPA Act Guidelines 1: Local Councils (OIC, 2010) (available at http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/file_manager/ Guideline-1-local-government-public-interest-ACC.pdf, viewed 15 September 2016).

[2.3.1190] Schedule 1 of the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009 (NSW) requires that a number of types of records be published or made available for inspection. These records are objects of the open access information regime rules. Unlike the rules for the government contracts register and the disclosure log, the regulation does not create any new things. Instead, the regulation requires existing records to be published or made available for inspection. The regulation divides the records into four groups.1 The majority of these records are created under the Local Government Act 1993

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(NSW), the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) and cognate legislation.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009 (NSW) Sch 1 cll 1(1), (2), (3), 2, 3, 4.

Queensland [2.3.1200] The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) publication and inspection rules have three objects. They are: (1)

any “policy documents”;

(2)

a “publication guide”; and

(3)

a “disclosure log”.

The “what-counts-as requirements” for a “policy document” are uncontroversial. They are similar in terminology to legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. The “what-counts-as requirements” for a “publication guide” are stated in general terms in the statute and the details are set out in an instrument of quasi-legislation called the Ministerial Guidelines for Publication Schemes and Disclosure Logs.1 The “disclosure log” is the most substantial change to the publication and inspection rules in legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. The provisions of the Queensland Act differ to its counterpart in the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) because there is no condition precedent of broad or common interest among the public. Under s 78 of the Right to Information Act 2009 and the Ministerial Guidelines for Publication Schemes and Disclosure Logs, it is clear that the disclosure log consists of all information released under all previous access applications, except personal information.

1 A Bligh, Ministerial Guidelines for Publication Schemes and Disclosure Logs (Queensland Government, 2009) (available at http://www.rti.qld.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Right to Information Act”, “Publication Schemes”).

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Personal Information Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania [2.3.1210] The idea of “personal information” is relevant in all right to information legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. Only in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) do rules for the amendment of personal information exist. However, in the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the idea remains relevant to the publication and inspection rules. In the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), and the other provisions of legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland, the idea of “personal information” is relevant to the access on request rules. All legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania defines “personal information” in the sense that a thing relates to a particular or identifiable individual. The following formula is used in all reform legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania: [I]nformation or an opinion, including information or an opinion forming part of a database, whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.1

There is one limit on the scope of the object denoted by the phrase “personal information”, that is, whether the phrase extends to information about a deceased person.

1 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), s 12. The definition of “personal information” in Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 6 and Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 4 both employ the definition of this phrase in the relevant jurisdiction’s privacy legislation.

[2.3.1220] Under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), the phrase “personal information” does not include any qualification about whether an identified person is living or dead.1 However, in both the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), the term is understood not to extend to the deceased. Under s 8C(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, the publication and inspection rules do not extend to documents which are “exempt” from the access on request rules. One public interest consideration for deciding if a document is “exempt” is whether its disclosure would involve unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person (including a deceased person).2 Thus, it is possible that information which would otherwise be published or available for inspection might be unavailable or remain 113

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unpublished because it relates to “personal information” of either a living or deceased person. The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) open access information scheme excludes personal information in two ways: (1)

if there is an “overriding public interest against disclosure”; and

(2)

whether there is unreasonable disclosure of personal information.3

The definition of “personal information” in Sch 4 cl 4 includes both living and deceased persons. In addition, the disclosure log provisions clearly exclude “personal information”.4

1 The phrase “personal information” is no longer defined in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). It is now defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47F. 3 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 3. 4 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 26(3)(a).

[2.3.1230] The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), like the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), excludes personal information from its publication and inspection rules in two ways. Section 20(2) of the Right to Information Act 2009 excludes exempt information from these rules. Like the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009, the Right to Information Act 2009 has as a mandatory public interest consideration of whether “personal information” will be unreasonably disclosed.1 Although the definition of “personal information” does not refer to whether the identifiable person is alive or dead, the prescribed “public interest” factors include deceased persons. In addition, the disclosure log provisions found in s 78 clearly exclude “personal information”.

1 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cll 3 – 5, Pt 4 cl 6.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.1240] The leading right to information case in the Commonwealth jurisdiction, Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261, pre-dates the 1991 amendment to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), which introduced the term “personal information”. In Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp, Lockhart J (with whom Jenkinson and Heerey JJ agreed on this point) preferred an approach which allowed “personal affairs” (the term used before the

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1991 amendments) to connote “information which concerns or affects the person as an individual whether it is known to other persons or not”.1 He stated that it was: [U]nwise to substitute for the word “personal” some other word such as the word “private” because one generally accepted meaning of the word “private” is confidential or not widely known. In my opinion a person’s affairs may be personal to him notwithstanding they are not secret to him.

There was no suggestion between the date of this case and the date of the legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and that these observations were not incorporated in the 1991 amendments.

1 Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261, Lockhart J at 436 (FCR).

Legal Subjects Introduction [2.3.1260] The legal subjects of right to information laws are the juristic entities who take actions or who suffer actions done to them. They include those who make requests for access, and those who make appeals. They also include the corporations and officers who hear appeals, and those to whom requests for access are directed. The legal subjects are the animate or volitional agents in right to information laws. The number and names of legal subjects in any given right to information law varies from one jurisdiction to the next. This discussion gives the example of the legal subject who holds documents for the purposes of the access on request system in two Acts, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). In the Commonwealth Act, this legal subject is variously named: (1)

an “agency”;

(2)

a “responsible officer of the agency”;

(3)

an “officer of the agency”;

(4)

a “principal officer of the agency”;

(5)

a “Minister”;

(6)

a “member of the staff of the Minister”;

(7)

the “Department corresponding to the Department of State administered by the Minister”;

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(8)

a “part of the Department of Defence specified in Division 2 of Part I of Schedule 2”; and

(9)

the “decision-maker”.

The same rule system in the New South Wales Act makes do with just three legal subjects: (1)

an “agency”;

(2)

a “Minister”; and

(3)

a “principal officer of the agency”.

Proper Applicant [2.3.1270] The legal subject who seeks access is defined in some legislation but not in others. The legal subject who is the beneficiary of the right to seek access is called a “person” in all legislation.1 With the exceptions of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Information Act 2002 (NT), “person” is not defined in right to information legislation.2 Once a “person” makes an application under the access on request rule systems, they become an “applicant” which, in most legislation, is a defined term.3

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 11(1); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 10 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 9(1); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 15; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 23; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 12; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 7; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 13; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 10(1). 2 In those Acts with no definition, recourse could be made to the local statutory interpretation Act. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 4 (definition of “applicant”); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 3 (definition of “applicant”); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 6 (definition of “applicant”); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 5 (definition of “applicant”); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 2 cl 1 (definition of “applicant”).

[2.3.1280] The legal subject provisions outlined at [2.3.1270] have the outcome that, with the exception of the Information Act 2002 (NT),1 “person” or “applicant” is not qualified by any pre-condition. This conclusion appears to dispel any legally orthodox idea of “standing” or affectation of legal interests.2 In Apache Energy Pty Ltd v National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (2012) 57 AAR 123; [2012] AATA 296 and CKI Transmission Finance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Taxation Offıce 116

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(2011) 85 ATR 337; 55 AAR 493; [2011] AATA 654, a similar question arose as to whether more than one “person” could make the same application for access under Commonwealth legislation. The answer was in the negative. Not only could two or more people not make the same application, but one person, acting on behalf of others could not make an application. This conclusion means that a partnership cannot make an application, nor can an unincorporated association or a person acting on behalf of an unincorporated association. This inconvenient result has been disapproved of by the Australian Information Commissioner.3 This controversy has not been revisited by the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal nor considered by any other tribunal or court.

1 Under the definition of “person” in Information Act 2002 (NT), s 5, non-natural juristic entities are excluded. In other words, a non-juristic entity could not apply in its own right. However, this would not prevent a natural person, such as an employee, from applying on behalf of the non-natural juristic entity. 2 In Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Lockhart J at 436 (FCR) noted the provisions of the Commonwealth enactment did not require a proprietary or any other interest by the applicant in the documents. The same reasoning has been adopted in other jurisdictions: Wallace v Health Commission (Vic) [1985] VR 403, the Court at 406 and Re Woodyatt and Minister for Corrective Services (1995) 2 QAR 383 (OIC). An example of this reasoning is the early case of Re Ward and Secretary of Department of Industry & Commerce (1983) 8 ALD 324, where a convicted felon is not incapacitated by his status as a felon. However, a business name is not a “person” for the purposes of the definition of a “person” who can request access under the Freedom of Information Act 1982: Re Morris and Australian Federal Police (1996) 63 FoI Review 35. 3 See Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Who Qualifies as a ‘Person’ Eligible to Make a Request under s 15 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982? Statement Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner to Supplement an Amendment to Part 3 of the Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, (OAIC, 2013) (available at http://www.oaic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Freedom of Information”, “FOI Guidelines”).

Proper Respondent [2.3.1290] The right to information legislation of every jurisdiction states who or what is the legal subject bearing the duties of disclosure (“the proper respondent”).1 In contrast to the “what-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for a proper applicant (see [2.3.1270]–[2.3.1280]), the “what-counts-as requirements” for a proper respondent comprise a complex structure. The primary systematic function of the “what-counts-as requirements” for a proper respondent is to discriminate between entities. These requirements

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transform some entities in the real world into legal subjects of rules in right to information legislation, and exclude others from the possibility of being legal subjects. In the absence of significant qualifications on who can be a proper applicant (see [2.3.1280]), the “what-counts-as requirements” for a proper respondent is the principal qualification upon the legal subject of right to information rules. A proper respondent normally acts through a natural person. Proper respondents are usually non-natural juristic entities, such as a Department of a jurisdiction’s public service. Where the proper respondent is a non-natural entity, then the actions of a proper respondent must be done by natural people who are the delegates of the non-natural proper respondent. Right to information legislation often, but not always, separately identifies these delegates acting within a scope of authority in carrying out the functions of the proper respondent. In the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), the most common delegates are the “principal officer” and an “officer”.2 Other legislation is similar. This discussion will not consider these natural persons acting as delegates as separate proper respondents, since they are merely delegates. The system of “what-counts-as requirements” for a proper respondent is, in all Acts, a set of related lists. The overall structure of all sets of lists in all legislation is a hierarchy: a list of terms used throughout the legislation to denote who is a proper respondent. One or more of these terms are then further defined by subordinate lists in provisions dedicated to explaining who or what is a proper respondent. The whole collection of lists forms a hierarchy of many layers. The Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)3 (see [2.3.1300]) which is one of the simpler structures, only has five layers.

1 In the Commonwealth, see also Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (OAIC, rev ed, 2014) (available at http://www.oaic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Freedom of Information”, “FOI Guidelines”). 2 Both defined in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 4(1). 3 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

[2.3.1300] Under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)1 determining whether a person or entity is a proper respondent requires examination of many provisions, including the Freedom of Information Act 1989, the Freedom of Information Regulation 1991 (ACT) made under it, other Australian Capital Territory legislation and the general principles of statutory interpretation. What is important are the overall features, as indicated by the following. (1)

First, a number of the terms used in specifying who is a proper respondent 118

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are not defined in legislation at all, for example, the term “unincorporated body”. (2)

Second, other terms are not defined in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 but are defined in other Australian Capital Territory legislation, for example the term “Royal Commission” is defined in the Royal Commissions Act 1991 (ACT).

(3)

Those terms which are defined in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) and its regulations are divided between a hierarchy of lists. These lists are found in different parts of the legislation and its regulations. The lists are located in seven places, namely ss 4 and 6 of the Act, the Dictionary at the definitions of “agency” and “prescribed authority” and in Schs 1, 1A and 2 of the Freedom of Information Regulation 1991 (ACT).

(4)

The relationship between the lists are either that one list extends the other, or that one list limits the other. For example the definition of “agency” is a list of two items and the definition of “prescribed authority” explains or explicates one of the items listed in the definition of “agency”.

(5)

The longest path of explanation relating one list to others has four steps: “agency” → “prescribed authority” → definition of prescribed authority → “(b) any other body … declared by regulations” → entities in Sch 1 of the Freedom of Information Regulation 1991.

The conclusions that a reader will draw from a detailed examination of all the items on all the lists above are twofold. First, the density or intricacy of the relations is surprising such that the hierarchy of lists has five levels of inter-related lists. Second, the legislation does not follow general law notions of whom or what is a separate juristic entity capable of owning property or being a party to litigation in its own right. Under the Freedom of Information Act 1989, real organisations in the real world, which would not be recognised as distinct juristic entities, are made an “agency” as much as a natural person or a corporation sole. A good example of this disregard of the general law is the term “administrative unit”. It does not correspond to any general law notions.

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

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Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.1330] One set of these complex definition provisions which attracted most judicial commentary under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia was a corporate juristic entity established for a public purpose by a law.1 An entity of this description exists in all right to information legislation schemes. Courts and tribunals have dealt with three issues concerning juristic entities: (1)

purpose;

(2)

means or instrument; and

(3)

the relation between purpose and instrument.

The issue of purpose examines the relation of the juristic entity to public governance. The issue of means or instrument examines the relation of the juristic entity to the enactment said to “establish” it. Finally, the last issue asks whether the enactment establishing the entity has a “public purpose”. None of the original right to information laws defined what the adjectival phrase “public purpose” meant. Hence, courts and tribunals looked to authority from other areas of law for guidance, especially from the area of taxation.2 These fora took from the other cases that a public purpose was one which was governmental, and involved some purpose for the benefit of the community, or a large segment of the community. Also, the purpose’s characterisation as “public” was not to be approached rigidly. Finally, since organisations often had a plurality of purposes, then the requisite purpose (or purposes) was a major or dominant one, but not necessarily the exclusive purpose.3 The outcome of these cases was the definition of “public” was a flexible one, so entities which served a public good, such as a charity, but which had no other connection with government, were not caught by the rubric “public”.

1 There were few cases which considered other provisions defining a proper respondent: see, eg Re Collie and Offıce of Commissioner for Public Employment (NT) (unreported, NTICmr, Marcham AIC, 1 of 2008, 25 March 2008), which considered whether the Northern Territory Office of the Commissioner for Public Employment is a tribunal; Brisbane City Council v Albietz [2001] QSC 160,which considered the meaning of the term “local government”; Taylor v Chief Inspector of RSPCA [1999] NSWADT 23, which considered the term “public office”; and Milton v City of Unley [2008] SADC 116, which considered whether the South Australian Guardianship Board and Mental Health Review Tribunal is a tribunal; Salaries and Allowances Tribunal v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 324; [2008] WASC 39, which held that the Salaries and Allowances Tribunal of Western Australia is not a tribunal. 2 Renmark Hotel Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1949) 79 CLR 10 and Western

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[2.3.1350]

3

PROPER RESPONDENT

Australian Turf Club v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1978) 139 CLR 288; 52 ALJR 382; 8 ATR 489 are frequently cited. See also Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 407, Hill J at 430; Re Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria; Ex parte State Public Services Federation (1992) 175 CLR 442; 66 ALJR 817; 44 IR 382. Re Brennan and Law Society (ACT) (1984) 1 AAR 529; Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2004] VSC 146, Habersberger J at [38]–[40]; Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [1996] 2 Qd R 580; see also Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis (2001) 25 WAR 147; 167 FLR 79; [2001] WASCA 405, where Hasluck J at [33] noted that the “public benefit” is not the sole test of what constitutes a “public purpose”.

[2.3.1340] Courts and tribunals of the Commonwealth,1 Queensland2 and Western Australia3 have looked at the question of whether a law was the instrument by which the juristic entity was “established”. Courts and tribunals looked at two different situations: (1)

where a law specific to the entity established the entity; and

(2)

where a law provided for the creation of several corporate juristic entities under corporations law.

In both, there were two further variations: (1)

where the entity was a private organisation before a law reconstituted the entity in its present form; and

(2)

where the entity was constituted by a law from its beginning.

The result was the same in both situations. The entity was held to have been established by the law, even if the law was not the sole source of its powers.4

1 The Australian and Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 43 AAR 505; [2006] AATA 755. 2 Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [1996] 2 Qd R 580. 3 Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis (2001) 25 WAR 147; 167 FLR 79; [2001] WASCA 405; Pisano and Health Solutions (WA) Pty Ltd [2012] WAICmr 24. 4 Joint Coal Board v Cameron (1988) 24 FCR 204.

[2.3.1350] The last issue relating to what constitutes a juristic entity is the relation of the entity’s “public purpose” to its establishment. This question can be illustrated by alternative grammatical constructions. The first would read: “An entity with a public purpose and established by an enactment.” The second would read: “An entity with a public purpose established by an enactment.” In the first construction, there are two coordinate clauses, with neither clause’s requirement subordinate to the other. Thus, the entity’s “public purpose” need not be found in the enactment establishing the entity. In the second construction,

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the first requirement is expressed in the adjectival phrase “with a public purpose” modifying the noun phrase “an entity”. Since the subject of the verb in the construction “established” is both the noun phrase and its adjectival phrase, it is arguable that the entire subject is modified by the second requirement expressed in the sentence adverbial “by an enactment”. In other words, both the entity and its public purpose must be “established” in the enactment. Courts and tribunals have been divided upon the two interpretations. In the Commonwealth and Queensland cases, the present-day purposes of the entity were examined.1 But in Victoria and Western Australia, the purposes expressed in the constitutive enactment were examined.2 In other words, the Commonwealth and Queensland adopted the first alternative construction, but Victoria and Western Australia adopted the second alternative construction.

1 In the older Commonwealth case, Re Brennan and Law Society (ACT) (1984) 1 AAR 529, the “public purposes” were expressed in the enactment establishing the entity in its present form. However in the more recent case, The Australian and Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 43 AAR 505; [2006] AATA 755, this was not so. Unfortunately, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not address the issue. However it should be noted the ratio of the case is inconsistent with Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis (2001) 25 WAR 147; 167 FLR 79; [2001] WASCA 405. See also Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [1996] 2 Qd R 580, Derrington J at 581–583. 2 Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2004] VSC 146, Habersberger J at [26]; Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis (2001) 25 WAR 147; 167 FLR 79; [2001] WASCA 405, Hasluck J at [46].

Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania [2.3.1360] The right to information legislation of reform jurisdictions has made few changes to the legislative scheme for the “what-counts-as requirements” for a proper respondent: see [2.3.1290]. In Queensland, there has been a decision of the Information Commissioner bearing on these questions. In Re Davis and City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 220004 of 2009, 31 March 2010), the Information Commissioner held that a wholly government-owned corporation under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was a “public authority”, one of the types of entities that are classified as an “agency”: see [2.3.1300]. Although the case turned on its facts, it is significant that the Information Commissioner took into account the objects of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld). However, Re Davis and City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd was subsequently set aside by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal in City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Information Commissioner (Qld) [2010] QCATA 60, where Kingham DP

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MEANING OF “EXEMPT”

ruled that as City North Infrastructure had been established under the Corporations Act 2001 rather than under a State Act, it was not a public authority as defined under the Right to Information Act 2009. On appeal, the approach of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal was approved in Davis v City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd (2012) 2 Qd R 103; [2011] QSC 285. Subject to the possibility that objects clauses might be more influential in the future, it is likely that cases from earlier legislation will be followed.

Exemptions General [2.3.1370] The duty to give access under access on request rules is limited by the qualification that it does not apply to things known as “exempt documents” or “exempt information”. The “what-counts-as requirements” for these things tell us what facts make up these things. These requirements are the principal qualifications upon the access on request rules.

Meaning of “Exempt” Statutory Terminology [2.3.1380] The terms “exempt”, and “exemption” are used in this sense in all legislation, except the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW).1 In some Acts, terms with the same sense as “exempt” and “exemption” are used as well as “exempt” and “exemption”.2

1 The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) does not use either “exempt” or “exemption” as a generic term. Instead, it uses the construction “[refusal to provide access] … because there is an overriding public interest against disclosure”. In addition, s 43 uses the term “excluded information” to refer to some kinds of information in the hands of certain agencies. Excluded information is one type of information for which there is an “overriding public interest against disclosure”: Sch 1 cl 6. 2 In the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), there are two other phrases having a similar meaning to “exempt”. These are “documents to which this Act does not apply” (s 43) and “information the disclosure of which would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest”: ss 49, 50, 51. In Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 6, there is listed specific organisations in relation to whose information the Act does not apply “unless the information relates to the administration of the relevant public authority”. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 14 states that a person “is not entitled to obtain access”. Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 6 states that

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“Parts 2 and 4 do not apply to access to documents”. Part 2 contains the access on request rules.

[2.3.1390] The term “exempt” is used in two ways. First, in all legislation except the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the term is used to refer to categories of things which need not be disclosed. For example, the “Cabinet exemption” refers to rules for determining if material is excised from the obligation to make disclosure on the grounds that the documents reveal the activities of the Cabinet institution of government. Second, in the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), there are a small number of provisions which might be called “exemptions” in the same way as the term might be used for other legislation.1 However, there are a comparatively larger number of provisions stating the procedures to decide if material should be exempted from the access on demand rules.2 These provisions state matters to be taken into account, along with one or more other matters in the statutory procedure.3 Because of their different function, these other provisions in the New South Wales and Queensland statutes will not be called “exemptions” in this work.

1 These provisions are found in Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3. 2 These provisions are found in Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4. 3 The same distinction was recognised in respect of Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 34(1) and (2) in Asher v WorkCover Authority (Vic) [2002] VCAT 369, Megay SM at [22].

Types of Exemptions [2.3.1420] “What-counts-as requirements” for an exempt document can be divided according to whether they apply to any agency, or whether they only apply to some agencies. Those which only apply to some agencies are similar in both legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia and legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. Those which apply to all agencies differ between legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia and legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. Although similarities do exist, they are outnumbered by dissimilarities. In particular, in legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania (unlike legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia), the “what-counts-as requirements” for exempt documents held by any agency are divided between those in which a long list of interrelated public interest

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issues apply, and those in which this test does not apply. For this reason, in this discussion we will first canvass in all legislation the “what-counts-as requirements” for exemptions which apply only to specific agencies (“some-agency exemptions”): see [2.3.1430]. We will then deal with “what-counts-as requirements” for exemptions applicable to all agencies (“all-agency exemptions”): see [2.3.1440].

Some-agency Exemptions [2.3.1430] “What-counts-as requirements” for exempt documents applicable to some agencies but not others (“some-agency exemptions”) differ to “what-counts-as requirements” for exempt documents applicable to all agencies (“all-agency exemptions”) in not being co-located with the remainder of the “what-counts-as requirements” for exempt documents. Another complication is that some-agency exemptions are often co-located with provisions defining which agencies are not proper respondents. For example the some-agency exemption for the Motor Accident Commission of South Australia considered in Moloney v Motor Accident Commission (2013) 117 SASR 189; [2013] SASCFC 58 is co-located with rules which exempt various entities (such as a royal commission), from the entire Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA). Some-agency exemptions are quite diverse. These exemptions work by having characterisation requirements: a document or information is exempt if its origin or role in some decision-making process possesses the stipulated characteristic.1 A type of some-agency exemption of particular interest to lawyers is the exemption for the decision-making functions of courts and tribunals. An example is the Information Act 2009 (NT) s 5(5). It exempts activities described as the “judicial function” of a court and the “decision-making” function of a tribunal. Judicial and tribunal consideration of such provisions involves two questions: whether the entity concerned fits within the class of entities with the benefit of the some-agency exemption; and whether the activity giving rise to the sought after information or document fit within the activity with the benefit of the some-agency exemption. Examples are: (1)

the notes of a conciliator acting under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) have the benefit of the exemption;2 and

(2)

documents arising from the counselling activities of the Family Court of Australia have the benefit of the some-agency exemption for courts and tribunals when the documents do not relate to the “administrative function” of a court or tribunal.3

The following Table lists the location of various some-agency exemptions. All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

125

None

Cth Agencies listed in relation to documents in respect of commercial activity; other activities; or certain documents s 7, Sch 2 Pt II s5

s 6; Freedom of Information Regulation 1991 (ACT), Sch 2 None None

NT Various activities

ACT Various activities

None

s 4, Sch 2

NSW “Excluded information”

None

s 16(2)

Qld Documents received, or created, by it in performing a function other than a public function

126 Sch 2 cl (g)

Essential Services Commission

Sch 1 cl 16(2)

SA An agency engaged in commercial activity

Law Society of Tasmania: information relates to performance and exercise of certain of the society’s functions and powers s 6(2)

s 6(1)

Tas Information relates to the administration of the relevant public authority

None

Vic None

Sch 9, Glossary cl 4(3)

Document held by an agency as an agent for a Commonwealth body

Sch 9, Glossary cl 4(2)

WA Document of an agency held by a Minister that is responsible for the agency

RIGHT TO INFORMATION [2.3.1430]

ACT None

None

Cth None

None

None

NT None

None

NSW None

None

Qld None

127 Freedom of Information (Exempt Agency) Regulations 2008 (SA), reg 5

Comparative student performance information

Sch 2 cl (p)

SA South Australian Police

None

Tas None

None

Vic None

WA Document held by a court relating to a court that does not relate to matters of an administrative nature Sch 9, Glossary cl 5 Matter not of an administrative nature held by Economic Regulation Authority Sch 9, Glossary cl 7A

[2.3.1430] MEANING OF “EXEMPT”

[2.3.1430]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

1 A recent example of reasoning out whether claimed material falls within a some-agency exemption is Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Herald & Weekly Times Pty Ltd [2012] AATA 914 in connection with “program material” of the Australian Broadcasting Commission. 2 Kowcun v Monaghan (2013) 279 FLR 362; [2013] NTSC 57. 3 O’Sullivan v Family Court of Australia (1997) 25 AAR 482; 141 FLR 204 (AATA).

All agency Exemptions [2.3.1440] The location of exemptions in legislation in all jurisdictions displays two features. These are: (1)

co-location; and

(2)

division according to whether a public interest test applies.

The first feature refers to where the exemptions are found. In some legislation, the “all agency” exemptions are located in the body of the legislation1 while, in others, the exemptions are located in Schedules.2 The majority of all-agency exemptions are co-located, but a small number are located apart from the remainder. The location of these miscellaneous all-agency exemptions and a brief description is given in the following Table. All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated. Cth Intelligence agency document

ACT Health records

s 7(2A) Defence intelligence document

s6 List of housing assistance properties s 6A

s 7(2C)

NT Qld Tas Vic WA Documents Information Publicly Publicly Publicly to which not related available available available this Act to certain information information information does not characterisapply tics of a role performed by a private organisation for a public authority s 12 Sch 1 s8 s 14 s6 None None None None Publicly available information s9

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[2.3.1450]

Cth Publicly available documents s 12 None

MEANING OF “EXEMPT”

ACT Publicly available information s 11(1) Cabinet notebooks s 11(2)

NT None

Qld None

Tas None

Vic None

WA None

None

None

None

None

None

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic). 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).

[2.3.1450] The division in the location of exemptions according to whether a public interest test applies distinguishes most of the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia from the legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. With the exception of the Information Act 2002 (NT),1 no legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia separates exemptions subject to a public interest test from the location of exemptions not so subject to a public interest test. Furthermore, in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, one “head” of exemption can be partially subject to a public interest test, and partially not so subject. Thus, the exemption for trade secrets (which is not subject to a public interest test under any legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia) is located in the same section or clause as the exemption for business affairs of a third party (which is subject to a public interest test).2 In legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, there is no such co-location.

1 Information Act 2002 (NT), Pt 4 Div 2 (“disclosure generally is not in the public interest”), Pt 4 Div 3 (“disclosure in a particular case is not in the public interest”). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 43(1)(a) (trade secrets), s 43(1)(b) (information having a commercial value), s 43(1)(c) (information other than trade secrets and information having a commercial value) (to be repealed by Freedom of

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Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 7(1)(a) (trade secrets), Sch 1 cl 7(1)(b) (information other than trade secrets); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 34(1)(a) (trade secrets), s 34(1)(b) (other matters of a business, commercial or financial nature); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) Sch 1 cl 4(1) (trade secrets), Sch 1 cl 4(2) (information having a commercial value), Sch 1 cl 4(3) (information other than trade secrets and information having a commercial value).

Types of Exemptions Characterisation and Outcome [2.3.1460] All exemptions can be classified according to two criteria. The first, called a “characterisation test” in this discussion, refers to whether a document or information has certain characteristics about its origins or role. For example, the “Cabinet exemption” (see [2.3.1390]), present in all legislation, refers to documents or information originating in the Cabinet institution of executive government, or which reveal information about that institution and its work. The second, called an “outcome type” in this discussion, refers to whether the disclosure of a document or information will have prescribed results or outcomes.1 For example, all legislation has an exemption about law enforcement: see [2.3.2020]. In some of these exemptions, there is a requirement that disclosure will prejudice law enforcement – “prejudice to law enforcement” is the outcome test for this exemption.

1 Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Australian Wine Consumers Co-op Society Ltd [2007] NSWADTAP 14, the Tribunal at [30].

[2.3.1470] What distinguishes some-agency exemptions from all-agency exemptions is that not only are they unique to a specific agency, but other characteristics are either unique or shared with few other exemptions. In addition, all of the some-agency exemptions share with some of the all-agency exemptions the fact that they are class exemptions. Class exemptions refer to those in which, once a document satisfies the characterisation test, no further consideration of an outcome test is necessary.1

1 Re Little and Department of Natural Resources (1996) 3 QAR 170 (QICmr) labels such exemptions as a “class exemption”.

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EVALUATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN EXEMPTIONS

Evaluation of Public Interest in Exemptions Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia [2.3.1480] The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia (with some exceptions) contains no indications as to what result is or is not “contrary to the public interest” or “in the public interest”, where those phrases occur in exemptions. Nor does legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia (with some exceptions) prescribe how a decision-maker reaches the conclusion that disclosure is or is not “contrary to the public interest” or “in the public interest”1. Furthermore, legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, except the Information Act 2002 (NT) and Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), [use] both the harm test and the benefit test (see [2.3.740]) to assess the public interest. The principal exception to the general rule is the Information Act 2002. The innovations of the Information Act 2002 were: (1)

it was the first to organise exemptions based on whether the public interest would be harmed by disclosure;2 and

(2)

it was the first to prescribe in detail a list of issues relevant to assessment of the public interest for the deliberative processes exemption.3

Apart from the Information Act 2002, textual indications do exist in some legislation for some exemptions. Either the limitations reduce what issues can be considered (ie items are “taken off the agenda”) or they prescribe what issues must be considered (ie items are “placed on the agenda”).

1 In South Australia, this lack of guidance has been somewhat clarified by the procedure, now widely followed, described in Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC), that information release would be “contrary to the public interest” requires the respondent agency to show, on the balance of probabilities, not only some adverse consequence flowing from release, but that “on balance” the factors against release outweigh factors in favour of release. 2 Information Act 2002 (NT), ss 43, 50. 3 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52(5).

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Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania General [2.3.1490] The legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania overturns the chronic under-specification of the phrase “the public interest” in exemption provisions found in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. To understand how the innovations function, it is necessary to be acquainted with legislative terminology and concepts used in the new provisions.

Harm Test [2.3.1500] Right to information legislation in New South Wales and Queensland explicitly places harm to the public interest as the rationale for a refusal to make disclosure. Section 9(1) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and s 48(1) of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) both state that disclosure must be made, unless this would be “contrary to the public interest”. The Right to Information Act 2009 divides between “exempt information” and “contrary to public interest information”. “Exempt information” is defined in s 48 as information of a type, listed in Sch 3, that the legislature has prescribed as excepted from the duty to make disclosure because its release would on balance be contrary to the public interest. Information of the “contrary to public interest information” category is information other than exempt information whose disclosure, in the opinion of the decision-maker, is contrary to the public interest.1 The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 uses the same explicit division, but different language. The Act compels disclosure, unless there is an “overriding public interest against disclosure”.2 This conclusion can be reached in only two ways. One way of it being “conclusively presumed [is] that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure”.3 The other is by way of there being “public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure”.4 The conclusive presumption only applies to information described in Sch 1.5 The Commonwealth and Tasmanian legislation also divides information between two types of information when excepted from the duty to make disclosure. The Commonwealth legislation has two categories: (1)

“exempt” documents; and

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[2.3.1510]

(2)

COMPARISON MODEL OF BALANCE

“conditionally exempt” documents.6

The Tasmanian legislation has only type, “exempt” documents, but divides “exempt” into “exemptions not subject to the public interest test” and “exemptions subject to the public interest test”.7 Both Acts use the harm test (see [2.3.740]) for evaluating “public interest”. Section 33(1) of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) states that information in the “subject to public interest test” category is exempt information if its disclosure will be “contrary to the public interest”. The Table to s 31A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) states about a “conditionally exempt” document that “access to the document is required to be given, unless it would be contrary to the public interest”. The following Table shows the location of the two types of information or documents excepted from disclosure. All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

(Conclusively) Exempt (Contrary to Public Interest) Exempt

Cth Pt IV Div 2

NSW Sch 1

Qld Sch 3

Tas Pt 3 Div 1

Pt IV Div 3

s 14

Sch 4

Pt 3 Div 2

1 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 49(3). 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 3 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 4 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 5 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 6 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 31A. 7 See Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), Pt 3.

(NSW), (NSW), (NSW), (NSW),

s s s s

9(1). 14(1). 13. 14(1).

Comparison Model of Balance [2.3.1510] Where a decision-maker has to evaluate public interest, the methods to be used by a decision-maker under legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania use the comparison model of balance. All references to the comparison model of balance are explicit. The explicit reference in all legislation to “contrary to the public interest” (see [2.3.1480]) implies the existence of factors or considerations in favour of disclosure, factors or considerations in favour of non-disclosure, followed by a comparison of the two groups of factors or considerations and then an evaluation of any difference after comparison. In the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the implication is made explicit by s 49 which

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prescribes a procedure of comparison between factors in favour of disclosure with factors against disclosure followed by a conclusion as to whether one exceeds the other. Legislation uses different phrases to denote the difference after comparison. The phrases are: (1)

“on balance be contrary to”;1

(2)

“on balance … outweigh”;2 and

(3)

“it is contrary to”.3

1 Commonwealth: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 11A(5) (“unless … access to the document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest”); Queensland: Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 49(1) (“the agency … must decide to give access to the document unless disclosure would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest”). 2 New South Wales: Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 13 (“considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh … considerations in favour of disclosure”). 3 Tasmania: Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 33(1) (“if the principal officer … considers, after taking into account all relevant matters, that it is contrary to the public interest to disclose the information”).

What Is Compared? [2.3.1520] The right to information legislation uses different terms to name the things being compared. Tasmania uses “all relevant matters”1 and “matters which must be considered”.2 It does not differently label matters favourable to disclosure or matters unfavourable to disclosure. Queensland uses “factors favouring disclosure” and “factors favouring non-disclosure”.3 New South Wales uses “considerations”,4 except in s 55 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), where “factor” is used in the noun phrase “personal factors of the application”. The Commonwealth Act uses “factor”.5 All of the legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania prescribes the matters to be compared. Some are proscribed, some prescribed in favour of disclosure, and still others prescribed in favour of non-disclosure. These matters are summarised in the following Table. All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

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Proscribed Prescribed In Favour of Disclosure In Favour of Non-disclosure

WHAT IS COMPARED?

Cth s 11(2), 11B(4) s 47F s 11B(3) None

NSW ss 14(2), 15

Qld Sch 4 Pt 1

Tas Sch 2

None s 15 s 14

None Sch 4 Pt 2 Sch 4 Pts 3, 4

None Sch 2 Sch 2

The lists of prescribed matters vary as to number6 and whether they are exhaustive. The Commonwealth legislation lists are non-exhaustive.7 As well, the Tasmanian list of matters relevant to the public interest test is non-exhaustive.8 The Queensland legislation is silent on the issue. Finally, s 14(2) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 proscribes reliance on matters favouring non-disclosure other than those listed in the Table to s 14. Section 12(2) states that matters in favour of disclosure listed in the Act are non-exhaustive. The lists of prescribed matters also vary as to whether they can be added to. Under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, when none of the legislation defined “public interest”, courts and tribunals did create matters to be taken into account. The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision of Re Howard and Treasurer of the Commonwealth (1985) 7 ALD 626; 3 AAR 169 was the best known example of this innovation. Under legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, the local Information Commissioner has the task of creating a body of “quasi-legislation” called guidelines, which have to be taken into account.9 This means a possibility of innovation other than one controlled by the doctrine of precedent.

1 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 33(1). 2 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 33(2). 3 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 49(3). 4 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), ss 13, 14. 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), ss 11B, 26(1)(aa), 31A. 6 At one extreme is nil for exemption claims under the Commonwealth Act other than in connection with privacy. At the other end is the Queensland legislation, which has 30 separate provisions containing a public interest factor in favour of non-disclosure. These are divided between 22 in the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 and 10 in Sch 4 Pt 4. The two Parts cover the same topics. Thus, the terms of Sch 4 Pt 3 draw a broad boundary around the topic and Sch 4 Pt 4 prescribes the central or core concerns within the topic. For example, Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 14 concerns intergovernmental relations. However, Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 1 states more specific instances of “prejudice” to intergovernmental relations, such as disclosure of “information of a confidential nature that was communicated in confidence by or for another government”. 7 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2010 (Cth), Explanatory

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8 9

Memorandum, p 13 states: “The list [in s 11B(3)] is non-exhaustive”. Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 33(2). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 11B(5); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 15(b); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 132; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 12(2).

Rules for Access on Demand System Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia [2.3.1530] Under all legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the fundamental rule of the access on demand system is that an agency has a duty to give access unless a document is an exempt document. In this legal sentence, the terms “unless a document is an exempt document” forms the circumstances that limit what would otherwise be the extent of the action to “give access”. Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia have rules that specifies an assortment of circumstances under which a document becomes an “exempt document”. The act of applying these rules so as to assess whether any of those circumstances exist is the prescribed action required by the existence of the circumstances that limit what would otherwise be the extent of to the action to “give access”. The rules which specify the circumstances under which a document falls within the classification “exempt document” are the “what-counts-as requirements” (see [2.3.190]) for an exempt document. The act of assessing whether any of those circumstances give rise to an exempt document involves either one or two procedures depending on whether the exemption has a public interest test. Where an exemption does not have a public interest test then whether any circumstances exist which fall within one of the exemptions is, in essence, a classification. There is a major premise in the prescribed “what-counts-as requirements” for an exempt document, a minor premise in the circumstances of the case before the decision-maker, and the conclusion whether the circumstances fall or do not fall within the classificatory rule. However, where an exemption does have a public interest test then classification is not the essence of the required procedure. Assuming that the circumstances do provide a factual basis for taking into account an issue, the decision-maker then goes on to the task of weighting the issues, then combining the relevant and weighted issues so as to reach, the required conclusion that the public interest is benefited or harmed. Syllogistic reasoning is left behind and the decision-maker enters upon a different reasoning process where judgment and value choices can play a large role. This distinctive quality was widely recognised by superior courts. In McKinnon

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v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, the leading case on the meaning of “public interest” under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, a majority of judges thought the “public interest” test was distinctive. What is in the “public interest” will require consideration of a number of competing arguments about, or features, or “facets”.1 Gleeson CJ and Kirby J said of the terms used in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia to set out the various exemption requirements that they are “objective descriptions”, while the public interest test involved “contestable facts” or “contestable matters of opinion”.2 In Police (Vic) v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223; [2008] VSCA 218, Maxwell P, speaking of the phrase “unreasonable” used to denote public interest considerations, remarked that it “requires … the making of a judgment, based on a synthesis of the relevant features of the case at hand”.3 Thus, under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, if an exemption has no public interest test, then there is one exemption procedure applying the “what-counts-as requirements” provisions of a classificatory nature. However, if there is a public interest test, there are two exemption procedures. In the first, the decision-maker applies the “what-counts-as requirements” provisions of a classificatory nature and then goes on to a second, applying the distinctive public interest test, which is of a judgemental or synthetic nature. Under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the “what-counts-as requirements” for an exemption can comprise up to six related elements. They are: (1)

The existence of a pre-condition: some exemptions are framed so as to make a circumstance a precondition for the claim for exemption. In some legislation, the requirement of proof that disclosure will harm the public interest is a precondition in the sense that whatever else is shown about disclosure, harm to the public interest must also be shown.

(2)

The existence among the facts of the case before the decision-maker of the circumstances at which the exemption is aimed by the legislation: a simple example might be the legal professional privilege exemption. Its intended circumstances is that a document or information would be privileged from production on the grounds of client legal privilege. This exemption has no further element, but most others do.

(3)

The existence of requirements that diminish the extent or range of the exemption if this requirement is not met, then the material is not exempt. One example is the requirement in all Cabinet documents exemptions that material of purely factual nature falls outside the exemption.

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(4)

The existence of a further proviso: a second provision that fully or partially restores the circumstances under which an exemption applies. One example of a further proviso is the stipulation in relation to the “purely factual” exception to the Cabinet documents exemption that if the purely factual material reveals Cabinet deliberations, then the material is nevertheless exempt.

(5)

Definitions: one or more terms used in the exemption are given a special meaning.

(6)

Procedural: in some exemptions, the legislation explicitly provides that a decision upon exemption follows one or more procedures. An example is that in some schemes, there is a requirement for consultation with people potentially affected by disclosure, often called “reverse” right to information.

The public interest, though of a distinctive character, can be located in any of these elements.

1 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Hayne J at [55]. 2 McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45, Gleeson CJ and Kirby at [4], [5]. 3 Police (Vic) v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223; [2008] VSCA 218, Maxwell P at [23].

Commonwealth and Tasmania [2.3.1540] Under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), the fundamental rule of the access on demand system comes in two forms. The first resembles legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia – an agency must give access, unless a document is an exempt document. The second is that if a document is “conditionally exempt” (or in the Right to Information Act 2009, documents to which Pt 3 Div 2 applies), the agency must give access, unless access would be contrary to the public interest. Like the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the action prescribed by an exemption involves either one or two procedures, depending on whether the exemption has a public interest test. In the first procedure, the decision-maker must decide if a document should be classified as an “exempt document”, a “conditionally exempt document” (or in the Right to Information Act 2009, documents to which Pt 3 Div 2 applies), or neither. As in legislation in the Australian Capital

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Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the action prescribed by the exemption involves applying rules of a classificatory nature. These rules are “what-counts-as requirements” factors relevant for the purpose of any exception. After this procedure, the decision-maker might reach one of three conclusions that a document: (1)

is an “exempt document”;

(2)

is not an “exempt document”; or

(3)

is not a “conditionally exempt document” (or in the Right to Information Act 2009, a document to which Pt 3 Div 2 applies).

If the conclusion is the first, then the actions prescribed by the exemption is complete and the decision-maker must refuse access. If either the second or the third is the conclusion then, again, the actions prescribed by the exemption is complete but now the decision-maker must grant access. If, after the first exemption procedure, the decision-maker concludes that a document is “conditionally exempt” (or in the Right to Information Act 2009, documents to which Pt 3 Div 2 applies), then the second exemption procedure must be carried out. This involves the decision-maker comparing the “factors” (or “matters” in the Right to Information Act 2009) relating to the case before the decision-maker. The legislation supplies rules as to what count as permissible, mandatory, irrelevant factors or matters, and whether the matter or factor weighs in favour of access or against access. Under Commonwealth and Tasmanian legislation, the “what-counts-as requirements” for an exemption vary in what elements they comprise. Those exemptions allocated to the group with a legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest1 have the same type of elements as exemptions under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. Those exemptions allocated to the group with no legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest2 have an additional element. In addition to the same type of elements as exemptions in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the public interest test is a further condition. Because the public interest test is a harm type test, then the exemption does not apply without it being satisfied. Thus, the public interest test is a pre-condition. As explained at [2.3.1530], a public interest test involves a procedure of comparing considerations called “factors” (or “matters” in the Right to Information Act 2009).

1 2

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Pt IV Div 2; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), Pt 3 Div 1. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Pt IV Div 3; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), Pt 3 Div 2. 139

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

[2.3.1550]

New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.1550] Under both the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the fundamental rule is that an agency has a duty to give access, unless a fact called “overriding public interest against disclosure” exists (or “contrary to the public interest” in the Right to Information Act 2009). As with other legislation, the decision-maker carries out the action prescribed by the exemption by either one or two procedures, depending on whether a public interest test applies, in a staged sequence. In the first procedure, the decision-maker must decide if a document should be classified as one to which applies a presumption that there is an “overriding public interest against disclosure” (or that disclosure is “contrary to the public interest” in the Right to Information Act 2009), or one to which the presumption does not apply. This involves applying rules of a classificatory nature as to whether one or more of assorted circumstances specified in the legislation exist. In the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009, these specified circumstances are listed in Sch 1. In the Right to Information Act 2009, they are listed in Sch 3. After the first procedure, the decision-maker might conclude that a document is one to which the presumption applies. If this is their conclusion, then the action prescribed by the exemption is complete and the decision-maker must refuse access. If, after the first procedure, the decision-maker decides that the presumption is not applicable, then the decision-maker completes the action prescribed by the exemption by applying the second procedure. The decision-maker does so by deciding if there is an “overriding public interest against disclosure” (or that disclosure is “contrary to the public interest” in the Right to Information Act 2009). Again, this procedure is done by comparing the “factors” (in the Right to Information Act 2009) or “considerations” (in the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009). The legislation supplies rules as to what count as permissible, mandatory, irrelevant factors or considerations, and whether the factor or consideration weighs in favour of access or against access. Under the New South Wales and Queensland legislation, the “what-counts-as requirements” for an exempt document vary depending on whether a public interest test applies. The exemptions allocated to the group with a legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest have the same type of elements as exemptions under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. If no legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest applies, then the exception is made out only because the public interest test is satisfied. So the exemption procedures of classification and then comparison are the sole constituents of the exemption.

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[2.3.1560]

LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM COMPARISON OF FACTORS

Legal Issues Arising from Comparison of Factors [2.3.1560] The procedure prescribed at the second stage in legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania involves a number of administrative law issues. Right to information legislation makes clear that an act of comparison of competing or potentially competing considerations precedes the ultimate conclusion that disclosure is or is not “contrary to the public interest” and so on. First, legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania makes clear whether the lists of “factors”, “matters” or “considerations” are exhaustive. Under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), no list of factors in s 11B limits the decision under s 11A(5) as to whether disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Section 12(2) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and s 49(3)(a) – (c) of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) refer to the act of identifying factors in favour of disclosure and use the verb “including” in reference to the lists in Sch 4. This implies the lists are non-exhaustive. Section 33(2) of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) states that the list of matters relevant to the public interest test is non-exhaustive. Second, the legislation indicates whether “factors” on the statutory lists are mandatory. The legislation assumes there is a factual foundation for a factor’s application. Section 11B of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and s 15(b) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 assume there is a factual foundation for the guideline listed in s 11B(5) and s 15(b), respectively. So if one or more of the guidelines relates to the circumstances of the decision, then the phrase “must have regard to” the guideline in s 11B(5) and s 15(b) means the decision-maker must give the matter weight as a fundamental element in the decision-making process.1 The list of exemptions for which there is a conclusive presumption of harm to the public interest do not exhaust or cover the field of their subject matter. A number of “factors” deal with the same subject matter as a type of conclusively presumed exempt document.2 One example of the overlap is secrecy legislation. Both the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) deal with the subject of secrecy provisions in other laws under both the list of “conclusively presumed” exemptions and the lists of “factors” relevant to a public interest test.3 In legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, there is a clear expression of legislative intention to divide exemptions between those for which there is a legislative presumption of harm to the public interest, and those for which there is no such presumption. Given this, it is difficult to see that the terms of one class of provision can impliedly limit the terms of the other class, where both refer to the same subject matter.

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Where the statutory lists of factors are not exhaustive, the issue arises whether greater weight must be given to an applicable statutory factor than to an applicable and permissible non-statutory factor. The answer is in the negative because the statutory context here expressly, or by necessary implication, allows factors other than those on the statutory list to be taken into account. Where a non-statutory permissible factor might “tip the balance” or “outweigh” a statutory factor, but is not allowed to do so, the point of taking it into account is negated. This is contrary to the statutory context.4

1 R v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 180 CLR 322, Mason J at 329; R v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327; 57 ALJR 59, Mason J at 333, 337–338. Equivalent statutory formulae are Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 33(2) (“the matters which must be considered in deciding [whether disclosure is contrary to the public interest]”); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 49(3): “[M]ust undertake the following steps” (referring to identification of factors). Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14(2) reaches the same result by a double negative. It states that considerations other than those in the Table to the section “may not” be considered as against disclosure, which is the same as saying that the considerations in the Table must be considered as the only factors against disclosure. 2 This situation is not novel. Under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, it was possible for the subject of one category of exemption to be a consideration relevant to the public interest test of another category of exemption – legal professional privilege exemption and deliberative processes exemption: see Birrell v Department of State & Regional Development [2001] VCAT 50, Levine DP at [37]–[41]); Cabinet exemption and deliberative processes exemption: see Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, Flick J at [131]–[151]; law enforcement exemption and deliberative processes exemption: see Re Haneef and Australian Federal Police [2009] AATA 51, McPherson DP at [62]. 3 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 12, Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 22; Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 6, Sch 1 cll 1, 12. 4 Use of the adjective “fundamental” in this context originated in R v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 180 CLR 322, Mason J at 329. Subsequent judicial consideration of the passage has adopted the view that the meaning of phrases such as “have regard to” and the like in statutes varies with the statutory context: Re Michael; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 231, Parker J at [55] (Malcolm CJ and Buss J agreeing); Path Line Australia Pty Ltd v EPA & Integrated Waste Services Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 37, Debelle J at [22].

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MAJOR ALL-AGENCY EXEMPTIONS

Major All-Agency Exemptions National Security, Defence and International Relations [2.3.1570] The subjects of national security, national defence and international relations are dealt with specifically in most right to information schemes.1 Under the Information Act 2002 (NT),2 and legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania in the Commonwealth, Queensland and Tasmania, the exemption is allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents is legislatively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. This category of exemptions differs to most others in having neither exceptions nor further provisos.

1 See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 33; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 37A (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), ss 46(1)(a), 51; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) Sch 3 cl 9; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 29; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 29A; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 5(3). 2 Under the Information Act 2002 (NT), this exemption is split. Under Pt 4 Div 2, there is a legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The part of the exemption for national security is allocated there. Under Pt 4 Div 3, there is no legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The part of the exemption for internal relations and intergovernmental relations is allocated there.

The Circumstances in which the Exemption is Intended to Apply [2.3.1580] The circumstances in which the exemption is intended to apply are divided between an outcome test type (see [2.3.1460]) and a class exemption type: see [2.3.1470]. Section 33 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) is the principal provision. It was not amended by the 2010 Commonwealth reform legislation.1 It can be considered as two sets of provisions dealing with national security2 and international relations,3 respectively. The national security set is an outcome test type exemption, while the international relations set is a class exemption type.

1 However, the circumstances in which the exemption in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 33(b) is intended to apply, is affected by a definition of what documents or information fall within s 33(b) added in by s 4(10). It relates to formal instruments or agreements between the Commonwealth of Australia and foreign governments. It

143

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2 3

should also not be forgotten that the 2010 reforms added some-agency exemptions concerned with national security. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 33(a). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 33(b).

[2.3.1590] There are six elements in the national security set (see [2.3.1580]), which can be split into three divisions. The first division is the primary element that damage be the outcome of disclosure. The second division is that disclosure either “would” damage security or “could reasonably be expected to cause” damage to security.1 The third division is that the damage be done to either “security of the Commonwealth”2 or “defence of the Commonwealth” or “international relations of the Commonwealth”. This structure reveals six possible analytical sequences (see [2.3.1580]) – two each for the three alternatives in the third division.

1 This exemption is the first to be discussed which uses the word “reasonable”. The meaning of this word in right to information legislation is discussed at [2.3.775]. Here, the word is used in a construction which expresses a rational evaluation of the likelihood of an event occurring. 2 The term “security of the Commonwealth” is defined in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 4(5).

[2.3.1600] The provisions for the international relations set (see [2.3.1580]) contain seven elements. This set is a class exemption type, so the exemption involves only a characterisation test. Like the national security set, the international relations set can be divided in three. The first and primary division is the element that disclosure be of information or matter communicated in confidence. The second division concerns the source of the information. It contains three alternative elements: (1)

“a foreign government”;

(2)

“an authority of a foreign government”; or

(3)

“an international organisation”.

The third and final division concerns the entity to which the information is communicated (ie either “the Government of the Commonwealth” or “an authority of the Commonwealth” or “a person receiving communication on behalf of” either of the other two). This structure reveals nine possible analytical sequences – three each for the alternatives in the third division. State and Territory schemes complement the requirements of s 33 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), but not consistently. Section 37A of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)1 mirrors the Commonwealth provision. The provisions of the Tasmanian and Victorian schemes (s 29 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) and s 29A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic)) refer to security, defence and international relations, but in 144

[2.3.1610]

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terms different to s 33 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Section 51 of the Information Act 2002 (NT) refers to security of the Commonwealth, but not to defence or international relations. Instead, the Information Act 2002 refers to relations between an Australian “body politic” and a “body politic overseas”. Schedule 3 cl 9 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) refers to security of the Commonwealth which includes “the security of a communications system or cryptographic system” used for the “defence of the Commonwealth or … the conduct of international relations of the Commonwealth”. Schedule 1 cl 5(3) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) differs to all other schemes in that it only exempts information received from the Commonwealth agencies listed there while making no reference to security of the Commonwealth, defence or international relations. Neither the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) nor the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) have exemptions on this subject.

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Damage to International Relations [2.3.1610] The Full Federal Court decision of Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Whittaker (2005) 143 FCR 15; [2005] FCAFC 15 (see [2.3.1620]) contains a list of accepted principles for application of s 33(a)(iii) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).1 This list includes the following: (1)

damage to international relations might reasonably be expected where the disclosure of a document may disclose sensitive information so as to cause, or reasonably be expected to cause, actual and significant damage;

(2)

the concept of damage is not to be confined and may include damage to intangibles, such as personal relationships between high level officials and politicians;

(3)

there is no public interest test criterion extending beyond the terms of the exemption provision, in that a document is either within the provision or it is not;2

(4)

the test is not whether there is a risk of damage to international relations: the test requires a higher degree of certainty of damage; and

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(5)

the test is to be applied to the documents at the time of decision and not at the time of creation of the documents.

1 Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Whittaker (2005) 143 FCR 15; [2005] FCAFC 15, the Court at [17]. 2 Commonwealth v Hittich (1994) 53 FCR 152, Black CJ, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ at 154.

Information Communicated in Confidence by Foreign Government [2.3.1615] The exemption for information communicated in confidence by a foreign government has always been given a broad interpretation. So long as the parties involved in the communication intended the communication to be “confidential” in its lay sense, then the requirements of the exemption are satisfied. In other words, the exemption invokes a subjective requirement, not an objective requirement.1 In the later case of Chemical Trustee Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [2013] AATA 623 the Tribunal pointed out that the structure of this exemption in the Commonwealth scheme makes the “information communicated in confidence” branch an alternative to the other branches; no proof of “damage” is necessary.2

1 Secretary of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet v Haneef (2010) 52 AAR 360; [2010] FCA 928, Dowsett J at [11]–[13]. 2 Chemical Trustee Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [2013] AATA 623, Tamberlin DP, Frost DP and Alpins DP at [76].

[2.3.1620] The case of Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Whittaker (2005) 143 FCR 15; [2005] FCAFC 15 (see [2.3.1610]) deals with a single, yet basic issue about claims for exemption under s 33(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). This issue is – at what point in time is confidentiality to be assessed? The Full Court held that claim was to be assessed as at the time the information was communicated, not later.1 An earlier trial court decision of Gersten v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 61 ALD 445; [2000] FCA 12212 answered the question whether by the term “confidentiality”, the Commonwealth enactment imports equitable doctrines of confidentiality, such as “coming to court with clean hands”. The Court answered in the negative.3 The earlier Full Court decision of Commonwealth v Hittich addresses another basic issue, that is, what is the position if the information communicated in confidence subsequently goes into

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the public domain? The Full Court responded that for the purposes of this exemption, the information still satisfies the legal case requirements.4

1 Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade v Whittaker (2005) 143 FCR 15; [2005] FCAFC 15, Black CJ, Kiefel and Emmett JJ at [25]. 2 Upheld on appeal in Gersten v Australian Federal Police [2001] FCA 159. 3 Gersten v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 61 ALD 445; [2000] FCA 1221, Wilcox J at [11]. 4 Commonwealth v Hittich (1994) 53 FCR 152, Black CJ, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ at [8].

Intergovernmental Relations Legislation [2.3.1630] Intergovernmental relations within Australia are protected in all right to information schemes. Under all legislation, the exemption is allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest.1 The structure of the intergovernmental exemption resembles the national security and international relations exemption (see [2.3.1570]–[2.3.1600]) but with added elements. These elements are: (1)

harm or benefit to the public interest; and

(2)

procedural requirements.2

1 The location of the exemption in the various State and Territory right to information Acts is as follows: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47B; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 34 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 51; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 5; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 34; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 29; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 2. For the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the position is different. Issues of potential harm to intergovernmental relations are not allocated to the group for which there is a conclusive presumption of harm to the public interest (or under Right to Information Act 2009, a legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest). Likelihood of damage to relations, or disclosure of information from another government are public interest “factors” or “considerations” against disclosure that must be taken into account by the decision-maker: see Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009, s 14 Table cl 1(c); Right to Information Act 2009, Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 14, Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 1. 2 Under Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 36, a certificate may be made to support a claim for exemption. Certain laws impose on the agency or Minister an 147

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obligation to consult with the other government concerned and to inform it of a decision to disclose the documents in issue: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 26A; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 68; Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 54(2)(d); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 30; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 37; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 25; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 34(2).

Intended

Circumstances to which Intergovernmental Relations Exemption Applies

[2.3.1640] Like the national security and international relations exemption (see [2.3.1570]–[2.3.1600]), the intended circumstances to which the intergovernmental relations exemption is to apply are divided between an outcome test type (see [2.3.1460]) and a class exemption type: see [2.3.1470]. All schemes, except the Information Act 2002 (NT), can be considered as two sets of provisions – one dealing with damage to relations and the other dealing with disclosure of information communicated in confidence. The damage to relations set is an outcome test type exemption, while the disclosure of confidential communications set is a class exemption type exemption. The elements in the damage to relations set can be divided into three divisions. The first division is the primary element that damage be the outcome of disclosure.1 The second division is that disclosure either “would” damage relations, or “could reasonably be expected to cause” damage to relations.2 The third division is the damage to be done to either relations between the Commonwealth and the State or between another State and the State.3

1 Variations in the first division include Information Act 2002 (NT), s 46, Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 34 and Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 29, which use the verb “prejudice” instead of the noun “damage”. 2 Variations in the second division of elements are whether there are two alternative elements or only one. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) use two: “would cause” or “could reasonably be expected to cause” (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017). The Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) uses one: “could reasonably be expected to have”. The Information Act 2002 (NT), the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) use one: “would”. 3 Variations in the third division include the relations damaged by the disclosure and their descriptions. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) has only one relation, that between the Commonwealth and a State. The Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) and the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) have two or more alternatives – the relation between the State or Territory concerned and the Commonwealth, or the relation between the State or Territory concerned and another

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State or Territory, or the relation between the State or Territory concerned and the government of a foreign country. Still, the Information Act 2002 (NT) and the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) use the non-specific adjective “intergovernmental”.

[2.3.1650] The elements in the disclosure of the confidential communications set (see [2.3.1640]) can be divided into two. This set is a class exemption type,1 so the intended circumstances to which the exemption is to apply involves only a characterisation test of the information or document concerned. The first and primary division is that disclosure be of confidential information or matter communicated in confidence.2 The second division is the source of the information.3 All the legislation qualifies this exemption by a public interest test. The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, either uses a harm test, or a benefit test. In some legislation, the public interest test is a condition precedent, while in other legislation it is a further proviso to any exceptions.4 All legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania use a harm test of public interest as a pre-condition.

1 The Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) uses an outcome test type. The Information Act 2002 (NT) does not have a specific exemption for information communicated from another government. 2 Variations in this division include the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), which does not use the qualification “confidential” and the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), which uses both: “information of a confidential nature communicated in confidence”. 3 The variations in this division follow the variations for the third division of elements of the damage to relations set. 4 Benefit test as proviso to any expressions: Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 34(2) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 2(2). Harm test as exemption condition: Information Act 2002 (NT) s 50(1); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 5(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 29.

New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.1660] The subject matter of intergovernmental relations in New South Wales and Queensland is allocated to the statutory procedure used where disclosure of material is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. The terms of the “consideration” under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) are “prejudice relations with, or the obtaining of confidential information from, another government”.1 The

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terms of the “factor” under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) are more complex.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1(c).

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.1670] Other than in Victoria, there have been few cases on the exemption case for intergovernmental relations within Australia. The decisions in Diamond and Chief Executive Offıcer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707 and Arnold v Queensland (1987) AAR 463 made observations about the interpretation of s 47B the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and its predecessor, the now repealed s 33A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) relevant to all schemes that follow its structure. First, the provision has two independent limbs: (1)

“damage to relations”; or

(2)

disclosure of “confidential information”.

However, a fact situation could conceivably create an overlap.1 Second, the phrase “relation between the Commonwealth and the States” covers all contacts which, given the nature of federalism, will be a wide spectrum. Third, although a falling out between counterparts in different political jurisdictions would not usually lead to “damage” to relations between governments, this result is possible.2 Fourth, the modal auxiliary “could reasonably be expected to” cause damage, employed in the Commonwealth scheme (and in others) does not require proof that damage is probable, so long as a sound or rational basis for the possibility of this result is shown.3 Fifth, in the Commonwealth scheme, once the exemption case requirements are met then the exemption exception “public interest” ground might be met where the degree of public disadvantage in disclosure is small.4 Most other cases considering this exemption raise few issues of general application common to all jurisdictions.5 In Re Guy and Department of Transport (1987) 12 ALD 358,6 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that where there is evidence that disclosure is contrary to the explicit wishes of the other government, this fact will normally prove the exemption’s requirements. In Re The Wilderness Society (WA) Inc and Department of Environment and Conservation [2011] WAICmr 24, the Information Commissioner of Western Australia found, in connection with some of the documents sought to be

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protected, that the Commonwealth did not object to the release of the documents. Therefore, the exemption was not made out in that case. The cases of Re Shopping Centre Council of Australia and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2004) 78 ALD 494; [2004] AATA 119 and Clark v Department of Treasury & Finance [2002] VCAT 1040 both deal with circumstances common in policy development – one a cooperative relation, the other a competitive relation. In Re Shopping Centre Council of Australia and Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, both jurisdictions had regulatory schemes in the same economic sector and there was an exchange of views concerning draft legislation in one jurisdiction. In Clark v Department of Treasury & Finance, jurisdictions were competing for Commonwealth funding and there was “secret” advice between officers of one jurisdiction’s agency about the forthcoming “competition”.7

1 Arnold v Queensland (1987) AAR 463 (FCAFC), Wilcox J at 471; Diamond and Chief Executive Offıcer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707, the Tribunal at [102]ff. 2 Arnold v Queensland (1987) AAR 463 (FCAFC), Wilcox J at 471; Diamond and Chief Executive Offıcer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707, the Tribunal at [102]ff. 3 Arnold v Queensland (1987) AAR 463 (FCAFC), Wilcox J at 472 and Diamond and Chief Executive Offıcer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707, the Tribunal at [101] following Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180: see [2.3.2080]. 4 Arnold v Queensland (1987) AAR 463 (FCAFC), Wilcox J at 472. This result might not be obtained in other legal jurisdictions where the public interest exemption exception is expressed differently in that, as a general rule, non-disclosure is only possible if the public interest requires this: Information Act 2002 (NT), s 51; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 5(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 29. 5 There are a number of cases in Victoria raising this exemption, however they have not been cited outside that State: see E Kyrou and J Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) Vol 2 at [29.20]ff. In Diamond and Chief Executive Offıcer of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [2014] AATA 707, Forgie DP at [106] considered that in order for the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 47B exemption to be made out, only evidence of damage to relations between the Commonwealth and one State would be required. 6 Followed in Re Ravlich and Department of Productivity & Labour Relations [2000] WAICmr 58. 7 Clark v Department of Treasury & Finance [2002] VCAT 1040, Bowman J at [26].

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Cabinet Documents Exemption Introduction [2.3.1680] All enactments grant exemptions to documents concerned with the activities of the Cabinet of each jurisdiction’s executive government. The policy behind this category of exemption is the preservation of the confidentiality in Cabinet decision-making. As one former State Premier stated: “[T]he exemptions protect ‘the Cabinet oyster’.”1

1 J Cain, “Some Reflections on FoI’s Early Years” (1995) 58 FoI Review 54 quoted in Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure (2004) 22 VAR 226; [2004] VCAT 2346, Morris P at [31]. This policy was well established in the law on public interest immunity by the time of commencement of legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604. See also Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, Flick J at [95]; Cianfrano v Director-General of Department of Commerce [2005] NSWADT 282, O’Connor P at [57]; Re Hudson and Department of Premier, Economic & Trade Development (1993) 1 QAR 123, the Information Commissioner at 127; Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272, Buchanan JA at [7], Redlich JA at [56]; Re Environmental Defender’s Offıce WA (Inc) and Ministry for Planning [1999] WAICmr 35, the Information Commissioner at [9]. The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) also extends the exemption to a decision process closely associated with the Cabinet institution: the State’s “budgetary processes” (Sch 3 cl 2(1)(c)).

[2.3.1690] Under the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the Cabinet documents exemption is the most prominent of a “class exemption”. It does not require separate proof of harm to the public interest or another more specific adverse consequence from disclosure. Under all legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, the Cabinet documents are allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents are conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. In all legislation, the requirements of the intended circumstances of the exemptions are of the characterisation test type.1

1 In New South Wales and Queensland, protection of Cabinet secrecy also figures as a factor favouring non-disclosure of documents whose disclosure is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest: Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1 (a); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 1. In addition, both these provisions contain an outcome test type

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requirement (see [2.3.1460], ie disclosure will harm desirable civic processes – ministerial responsibility.

[2.3.1700] Interpretation of the scope of the Cabinet documents exemption has been careful not to extend it beyond what an “ordinary meaning of the words” approach will bear.1 Under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the policy of the exemption is served by the exemption being confined to “specific kinds of documents – those central to the Cabinet process – are [those that are] protected and not every document that may relate to a matter that may ultimately be referred to Cabinet”.2 An example of this caution is the approach to the definition of “Cabinet”. All Cabinet documents categories of exemption include a definition to the effect that where the Cabinet institution has committees or subcommittees, then the phrase “Cabinet” extends to those committees. Tribunals have refused to extend the benefit of the exemption to ad hoc committees of senior officials or senior ministers established at the direction of the Cabinet because those committees do not conform to conventional concepts of the Cabinet institution. For example, in Cianfrano v Director-General of Department of Commerce [2005] NSWADT 282, a predecessor tribunal to the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal rejected the argument that a committee composed of public servants set up by a Cabinet resolution to assist Cabinet was a “committee of Cabinet”.3 Also, in Re Telstra Corp Ltd and Department of Broadband, Communications & the Digital Economy (2010) 113 ALD 623; [2010] AATA 118, the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal refused to classify an ad hoc committee of ministers delegated the task of considering a policy issue to be a part of the Cabinet.

1 National Parks Association of New South Wales Inc v Department of Lands [2005] NSWADT 124, Hennessey DP at [37]; Re Hudson and Department of Premier, Economic & Trade Development (1993) 1 QAR 123, the Information Commissioner at 129; Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272, Redlich JA at [40]; Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure (2004) 22 VAR 226; [2004] VCAT 2346, Morris P at [32]. 2 Re Highway Construction Pty Ltd and State Supply Commission (WA) [2000] WAICmr 25, the Information Commissioner at [23]. 3 Cianfrano v Director-General of Department of Commerce [2005] NSWADT 282, O’Connor P at [84].

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[2.3.1710] Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmanian legislation varies in its changes to the text of the former provisions relating to the Cabinet documents exemption. New South Wales and Queensland have extended the scope of the Cabinet documents exemption by including in the list of factors to be considered in the public interest test concerned with collective ministerial responsibility.1 The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) Cabinet documents exemption is extended by the addition of a “briefing Minister” category but limited by the addition of a “dominant purpose” requirement. The terms of the Tasmanian exemption are substantially similar to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) (now repealed).

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1(a); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 note 1.

Intended Circumstances to which Cabinet Documents Exemption Applies [2.3.1720] The intended circumstances for the Cabinet documents exemption (see [2.3.1680]) is a set of alternative types of document or information. These types differ according to a characterisation test criterion (ie how proximate in time or role to the decisions of the Cabinet are the documents or information). The categories, from most to least proximate, are: (1)

Record of Cabinet decisions:1 something which sets down, for posterity, events in a Cabinet meeting.

(2)

Submissions:2 something which expresses in written form a measure or policy proposed for Cabinet approval and so related by cause or purpose to events in a Cabinet meeting.

(3)

Briefing:3 advising a Minister on a submission.

(4)

Preparatory:4 something which shows events dealing with steps to express in written form a measure or policy proposed for Cabinet approval, and to advise Ministers about these written expressions.

(5)

Preliminary:5 something which shows events and processes prior to the written expression of a policy proposed for Cabinet approval.

(6)

Deliberative or decisional:6 something which shows the interactions within Cabinet meetings including any result of those interactions. This category differs to others in that its origin and purpose are not relevant.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 35(1)(b) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon

154

[2.3.1720]

2

3

4

5

CABINET DOCUMENTS EXEMPTION

commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(1)(a); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(1)(a)(iv); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(3)(c) – (f); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 26(1)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(1)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(a). In the Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria, the variations on the term “record” include usage of the adjective “official”. In the Northern Territory and Western Australia, the variations on the term “record” include usage of the more elaborate phrase “an agenda, minute or other record”. In Queensland, several alternatives are given including “Cabinet agendas”, “notes of discussions in Cabinet”, “Cabinet minutes” and “Cabinet decisions”. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(1)(a)(i); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 35(1)(a); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(1)(b); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(1)(a)(i); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(1)(a), (3)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(a); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 26(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(b). The variations in this category employ constructions expressive of an abstract relation between the origin of a document and the Cabinet consideration. The constructions vary in complexity from the simple preposition “for”, to complex prepositional phrases (eg “for the purpose of”) and adverbial clauses (eg “specifically prepared for”), to complex adjectival clauses (eg “[document] that was brought into existence for the purpose of”). The enactments express different intensity of the “purposive” quality of the relation. The Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales provisions include a “dominant purpose” requirement. The Northern Territory provision includes an additional category in s 45(1)(a)(iii): “information [which] was considered by an Executive body”. The New South Wales provision distinguishes two subcategories: submission “for consideration” and submission “for approval”. The Queensland provision employs the noun “consideration”, which is given a broad definition in s 2(5). The South Australian provision employs the adverb “specifically prepared for”. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(1)(c); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(1); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(1)(a)(ii); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(3)(a), (b); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(f); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(d). In the Commonwealth, the variations in this category include: briefing brought into existence for the dominant purpose of briefing a Minister on a Cabinet submission, or proposed Cabinet submission. In New South Wales, s 2(1)(e) is a broad exclusion focused on “the position on a matter in Cabinet” that a particular Minister has taken, is taking, will, or might take. In South Australia, the origin and purpose of the document are qualified with the adverbial “specifically prepared for the use of a Minister”. Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(3)(f), 2(5); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(b). Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(1)(e); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(1)(a)(vi), (vii); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(c), (d). In the Northern Territory, the variations in this category include communications between Ministers or briefings to Ministers about potential

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6

Cabinet decisions or interactions in the Cabinet if the “decision or policy is of a kind generally made or endorsed by an Executive body”. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(3); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 35(1)(d); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(1)(d), (e); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(1)(a)(v); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(e); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(1)(d); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(1). In New South Wales, the variations on this category include that the document must have been prepared after the Cabinet deliberation. The Queensland provision extends the exemption to documents which “could otherwise prejudice the confidentiality of Cabinet considerations or operations”. The Western Australian provision structures the other categories to be minor subcategories of this, the major category.

[2.3.1730] Although the intended circumstances of the Cabinet documents exemption in all political jurisdictions has a common policy, the terminology and structure varies: see [2.3.1720]. For example, the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) qualifies the “Cabinet submission” subcategory1 with the adverb “specifically”. Although there is no decision from South Australia on the significance of this word, it would appear to conclusively answer a contentious question from other political jurisdictions.2 The Tasmanian and Western Australia statutes contain an additional and reinforcing element concerned with purpose – an exception for material that was not created for the purpose of submission to Cabinet. A similar variation exists in the “briefing” subcategory. Section 45(1)(a)(ii) of the Information Act 2002 (NT) simply requires the briefing to be “in relation to a matter to be considered”, while s 45(1)(a)(vii) extends the range of the exemption to briefings for a consultation between ministers outside Cabinet about matters “of a kind generally made or endorsed by” Cabinet. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) describes the purpose as “issues to be considered by the Cabinet”. The Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) describes the prospect of submission as “possible” and follows the Northern Territory extension to a certain type of consultation. These small differences in legislative expression mean that use of precedents from other jurisdictions must be approached with caution.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(1)(f). 2 These small textual differences in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia were noted in Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188 (Commonwealth versus Victorian provisions) and National Parks Association of New South Wales Inc v Department of Lands [2005] NSWADT 124 (New South Wales versus Queensland provisions).

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Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.1740] For each category or type of legal case element, there is little judicial or tribunal commentary. In legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania jurisdictions, the reforms of 2009 and 2010 decrease the number even more.1 The following is a list of cases that are binding in their own jurisdictions or remain relevant: (1)

Record of Cabinet decisions: Re Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry [2003] AATA 1301: [A]n “official record of the Cabinet”… must record certain matters, in the sense of relate or tell or set down those certain matters … it must do so in a form that is meant to preserve that relating, telling or setting down for an appreciable time … the certain matters that are related, told or set down must relate to Cabinet and its functions and not to matters extraneous to those functions.2

(2)

Submissions: the issue which arose in several cases was when the requisite purpose of submission had to have existed. The unanimous answer under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia given in Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188 was “at the time of the document’s creation”.3 In D’Adam v New South Wales Treasury [2015] NSWCATAP 61 the issue was whether “derivative” exemption could be claimed. In this case, an agency prepared a document containing certain information. Later, it or another agency, included the information or summaries of the information in a second document. The second document was only prepared for submission to Cabinet and at the time of the creation of the information, its intended purpose was for inclusion in the second document. The Tribunal held that any information contained in the second document was exempt even when it was expressed in the first document. The issue of the qualities of the requisite purpose is now answered by legislation in most jurisdictions. However, in Victoria, the courts and tribunals have attempted to supply an answer. The cases show that even a less demanding test of purpose (“one of the substantial purposes” test)4 can be failed even where Cabinet submission is more than a “contingency”, or “remote”. In Re Asher v Department of Infrastructure (2006) 25 VAR 143; [2006] VCAT 1375, the documents were routinely prepared by one agency for another. The information was then incorporated into a second document which was routinely submitted to Cabinet.5 The Tribunal held that the first document at the time of its creation did not attract the “proposed to be submitted” subcategory of this exemption, although it implied the second document might.6 An unpublished decision of the Queensland Information Commissioner raises a common factual matrix bearing on proof of facts concerned with

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the Cabinet exemption. In Offıce of the Leader of the Opposition and Treasury Department (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 310145 of 2010, 7 July 2010) there was evidence that a non-statutory procedural guideline required proposals valued over a specified figure to be approved by Cabinet. The existence of this guideline was persuasive of the assertion that information about such a proposal was created for the purposes of submission to Cabinet. The fact that a document besides having as its purpose submission to Cabinet, has another purpose, does not detract from its falling into this category of exempt material.7 (3)

Deliberative or decisional: “deliberations” refers to “treatment” (ie debate) of a subject matter while “decision” refers to “action taken” with respect to a subject matter.8 Another question is what amounts to “disclosure” or “revealing”. Both Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272 and Re Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry concluded that all the facts of a case needed to be examined before answering that question.9

1 In legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania jurisdictions, all authority from the period of legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia must be treated with care because of the strengthening, by legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, of the influence of the objects clause on statutory construction. 2 Re Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry [2003] AATA 1301, Forgie DP at [74]. The requirements of this category were raised in obiter in Re Batchelor v Department of Premier & Cabinet (unreported, VCAT, Fagan P and Coghlan M, 33203 of 1997, 29 January 1998) and Cianfrano v Director-General of New South Wales Treasury [2005] NSWADT 7, O’Connor P at [25], where the Tribunal suggested, without elaboration, that the phrase “official record” would at least extend to the “formal text of Cabinet decisions”. 3 Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, Stone J at [4], Buchanan J at [69], Flick J at [110]; National Parks Association of New South Wales Inc v Department of Lands [2005] NSWADT 124, Hennessy DP at [26] – [34]; Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272, Vincent JA at [40]. 4 Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure (2004) 22 VAR 226; [2004] VCAT 2346, Morris P at [34]. 5 Re Asher v Department of Infrastructure (2006) 25 VAR 143; [2006] VCAT 1375, Davis VP at [34]. 6 Re Asher v Department of Infrastructure (2006) 25 VAR 143; [2006] VCAT 1375, Davis VP at [39] citing Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure (2004) 22 VAR 226; [2004] VCAT 2346. In Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure, Morris P at [40] held the second document but not the first (in the scenario described above) to be exempt. The phrase used in several jurisdictions to describe the qualities of the purpose, “dominant purpose”, is also used under the common law of evidence in relation to

158

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7 8

9

CABINET DOCUMENTS EXEMPTION

client legal privilege: see Evidence “Legal Professional Privilege and Client Legal Privilege” [16.7.250]–[16.7.260]. Re Watson and Minister for Forestry [2011] WAICmr 8. Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272, Buchanan JA at [6] (Vincent and Redlich JJA agreeing). Thus, if the only evidence of the part played by a document in a Cabinet meeting was that it was tabled (ie received), then no “deliberation” or “decision” is revealed: Buchanan JA at [7], [8]. See also Re Porter and Department of Community Services & Health (1988) 8 AAR 335, Todd DP at 340; Re Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry [2003] AATA 1301, Forgie DP at [87], [88]; Re Environmental Defender’s Offıce WA (Inc) and Ministry for Planning [1999] WAICmr 35, the Information Commissioner at [19]. Re Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry [2003] AATA 1301, Forgie DP at [96]; Secretary to Department of Infrastructure v Asher (2007) 19 VR 17; [2007] VSCA 272, Buchanan JA at [8], [61]. A subsidiary or related issue is – must the document be contemporaneous with or subsequent to the decision or deliberation? Re Toomer and Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry, Forgie DP at [88], [89], followed in Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure (2004) 22 VAR 226; [2004] VCAT 2346, Morris P at [44] answered the question in the affirmative on the facts of the case. In Re Asher v Department of Infrastructure (2006) 25 VAR 143; [2006] VCAT 1375, which was after Re Ryan v Department of Infrastructure, Davis VP at [25] noted the conflicting cases on this point in Victoria. In New South Wales, the reforms brought by the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) make cases under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia unreliable guides. In Re Ravlich and Minister for Regional Development & Lands [2009] WAICmr 9, the Information Commissioner at [45], held that the term “deliberations” was given a wide meaning, extending from “active” consideration to the fact of analysis or consideration of some kind in the past.

Exception to Extent of Cabinet Exemption [2.3.1750] All Cabinet documents exemptions have exceptions that diminish the extent of the intended circumstances for the exemption. The exceptions can be divided into types according to characterisation test criteria. These are: (1)

factual:1 material which is factual in nature;

(2)

temporal:2 material which is older than a prescribed time limit;

(3)

official publication:3 material which has already been published to the world as a result of government decision;

(4)

attachment:4 the fact, by itself, of attachment of a document to a Cabinet submission does not make the document exempt; and

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(5)

1

2

3

4

purposive:5 if material was not created for the purpose of submission to Cabinet it is not exempt material.

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(6)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 35(2) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(4); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(2); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(4); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(2)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(3); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(2). In this category, all descriptions of the excepted material are qualified by either “purely” or “solely”. The variations in this category concern the complexity of the description of the excepted material. The descriptions range from a simple adjective “factual” in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) to the adjectival phrase “factual or statistical” in the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA). The Information Act 2002 (NT), the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) and the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) use more elaborate adjectival phrases (ie “statistical, technical, scientific or factual”, “statistical, technical or scientific material”, and “factual, statistical, scientific, or technical” instead of “factual”, respectively). Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(2)(b); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(3); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(1); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(2)(b); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 26(2); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(2); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(4). The variations in this category concern the period of the time limit and the commencement of period. The period is 10 years in all legislation, except the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), where the period is 20 years. The event which is the commencement of the period is either the creation of the information or document (the Information Act 2002 (NT), the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) for information about the State’s budgetary process), the end of the calendar year when the document was created (the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA)), or the consideration by Cabinet of the information, or document (the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas)). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(5); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 35(2); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(2)(a); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(1)(a)(v); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 2(2)(b). Under the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), there is no exception for “publication to the world”. However there is an exception where there has been a Cabinet decision to grant access: Sch 1 cl 1(2a). The variations in this category concern the range of legal case elements to which the exceptions applies. In the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) and the Information Act 2002 (NT), this exception is limited to the “disclose decisions or deliberations” category. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(4); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(3); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 1(2)(ab). 160

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Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 26(3); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(5).

Factual Material [2.3.1760] Across the several jurisdictions, judicial and tribunal commentary on the exception for factual material is not elaborate. In some, the characteristic denoted by the adjective “factual” or any of the alternative constructions is contracted with the ideas denoted by “policy” and its synonyms “advice”, “opinion” or “recommendation”. In other words, whatever is “factual” is not “advice” or “recommendation”.1 By contrast, in Re Ravlich and Minister for Regional Development & Lands [2009] WAICmr 9, the Information Commissioner only relied on a dictionary definition – “based on or concerned with fact or facts and actual, true”.2 All cases which have considered this exception have been unanimous in emphasising that the preceding adjective “purely” (or “solely” in some jurisdictions) requires that the material “must not be mixed with” other non-factual material.3

1

2 3

In Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1984) 1 FCR 150, the Federal Court was considering the same phrase in the deliberative processes documents exemption (see [2.3.1780]) and contrasted “purely factual material” with “true recommendations” or “essentially statements of recommendations”. Re McKinnon and Secretary of Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet [2007] AATA 1969, Forgie DP at [63] (followed in Re Waterford and Department of Treasury (No 1) (1984) 6 ALN N347) was to the same effect. See also Re Mildenhall and Department of Premier & Cabinet (No 1) (1995) 8 VAR 284 (VicAAT), which defined the equivalent phrase in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) as “other than those containing policy, opinion, advice, or recommendation”. Re Ravlich and Minister for Regional Development & Lands [2009] WAICmr 9, the Information Commissioner at [59]. See, eg Re Smith and Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Commission [2000] AATA 512, Forgie DP at [68].

Proviso to Exemptions [2.3.1770] Some exceptions to the disclosure of Cabinet documents are qualified or diminished by further provisos. The most common is a qualification to the factual material exception that the exception does not extend to material which itself reveals a Cabinet deliberation or decision.1

1

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 34(6)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1989

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(ACT), s 35(2)(c) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 2(4)(a), (b); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 45(2); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 2(2)(a)(i); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 26(4); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 28(3); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 1(2). There is one variation on this proviso. Under the Right to Information Act 2009, the requirement that factual material must not disclose a deliberation or decision is expressed as a legal condition rather than a legal proviso. Thus, factual material can only be exempt if it does disclose a deliberation or decision.

Deliberative Processes Documents Introduction [2.3.1780] The deliberative processes documents exemption1 extends protection to policy processes occurring at a level of executive government below the Cabinet. The focus of the protection relates to a distinction between the formation of policy as opposed to its “final statement and implementation”.2 The policy behind the exemption under legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia was said to be the “preservation of confidentiality so as to promote the giving of full and frank advice” at high level of government or in connection with sensitive issues.3 In none of the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia is this exemption without a public interest test. Nor under legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania is it allocated to the group of exemptions for which disclosure is conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest (or under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), legislatively presumed to be contrary to the public interest).

1 The phrase “deliberative processes” is used in the heading of Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47C; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 4; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 6. The term “internal working document” is used in the heading of Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 36 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 9; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30. The heading to Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 35 uses a mixture: “internal deliberative information”. In this discussion, we use the phrase “deliberative processes document” or “deliberative processes exemption”. 2 Shergold v Tanner (2000) 102 FCR 215; [2000] FCA 1420 (FC), the Court at [62]; Bennett v Director General of National Parks & Wildlife Service [2000] NSWADT 136, Robinson JM at [24]–[27]; Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services,

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Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60, the Information Commissioner at 67, 68. This reasoning infers that a document only containing an expression of the final decision cannot be a “deliberative processes document”: Pritchard v Police (Vic) [2008] VCAT 913, Coghlan DP at [16]. Secretary of Department of Justice v Osland (No 2) (2007) 26 VAR 425; [2007] VSCA 96, Maxwell P at [77]; Latham v Director General of Department of Community Services [2000] NSWADT 58, Hennessey DP at [56] in respect of the “deliberative processes documents” exemption under Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 9 (now repealed).

Legislation [2.3.1790] Deliberative processes exemptions in all right to information schemes are composed of several elements. Four of the schemes have a procedure for decision-making. No scheme has a definition provision.1 The following Table locates the deliberative processes documents exemption found in right to information legislation.2 All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

Deliberative Processes Documents Exemption

Cth s 47C

ACT s 36

NSW None

NT s 52

Qld None

SA s9

Tas s 35

Vic s 30

WA s6

1 Under the Commonwealth scheme, the Australian Information Commissioner has included an explanation of the term “deliberative processes”: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (OAIC, rev ed, 2014) (available at http://www.oaic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Freedom of Information”, “FOI Guidelines”) at [6.61]–[6.67]. 2 For the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the position is different. Issues of potential disclosure of deliberative processes documents are not allocated to the group for which there is a conclusive presumption of harm to the public interest (or under the Right to Information Act 2009, a legislative presumption that disclosure is contrary to the public interest). Instead, they are public interest “factors” (or “considerations” under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009) against disclosure that must be taken into account by the decision-maker.

Intended Circumstances [2.3.1800] The requirements for the intended circumstances consist of a characterisation test type. The requirements can be divided into three sets: 163

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(1)

types of interactions (eg “opinions” and “advices”);1

(2)

types of relations to decision making processes (eg the prepositional phrases “in the course of” or “for the purposes of”);2 and

(3)

types of decision-making Government”).3

(eg

“deliberative

processes

of

the

1 The principal variations in the first set are “opinion”, “advice”, “consultation” (all legislation) and “recommendation” (all legislation other than the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017)). The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) prefaces “opinion” with “matter in the nature of, or relating to”. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) prefaces “opinion” with “matter in the nature of”. 2 Used in all legislation are the phrases “in the course of” and “for the purposes of”. 3 The principal variation in the third set is Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 9, which uses “decision-making functions” instead of “deliberative processes”.

Pre-conditions [2.3.1810] A harm test (see [2.3.740]) for the public interest is a pre-condition in all right to information legislation.1 For example, s 11A(5) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) states that where a person requests access to a document of an agency or an official document of a Minister: [T]he agency or Minister must give the person access to the document if it is conditionally exempt at a particular time unless (in the circumstances) access to the document at that time would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), ss 11A(5), 31B; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 36(1)(b) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 12(1); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 50(1); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 9(1)(b); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 33; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 6(1)(b).

[2.3.1820] The Information Act 2002 (NT) differs to all other right to information legislation in having a public interest test specific to the deliberative processes exemption.1 The test lists seven factors against disclosure. These are:

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(1)

seniority of advisor and sensitivity of information;

(2)

information in the course of policy development;

(3)

inhibition of frankness;

(4)

inhibition of independence;

(5)

risk of mischievous interpretation;

(6)

risk of confusion; and

(7)

unfair disclosure of reasons for a decision.

1 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52(5).

Exception to Extent of Exemption [2.3.1830] The exceptions for the extent of the deliberative processes exemption vary between jurisdictions, both as to number and complexity. All legislation exceptions, involve only characterisation test types. The principal types of exceptions for the deliberative processes exemption are: (1)

factual;1

(2)

decision or formal reasons2 (which excepts documents either containing the expression of a decision or the reasons for a decision); and

(3)

internal manual3 (which refers to materials which must be published under the legislation’s publication scheme).

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47C(2)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 36(3) (both provisions contain a separate exception for reports prepared by a special class of authors described as “scientific or technical experts”) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52(2); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 9(2)(b); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 35(2); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30(3); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 6(3). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47C(3)(c); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 36(4)(c); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52(3); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 35(3)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30(4). 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47C(2)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 36(2); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 9(2)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30(2); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 6(2).

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Proviso to Exceptions [2.3.1840] Several right to information jurisdictions have a time limit of 10 years to the deliberative processes exemption. Once the time limit is reached, the exemption cannot be claimed. The commencement of the period is the date of the material’s creation.1

1 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52(4); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 35(4); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30(6); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 6(4).

Procedures [2.3.1850] The Australian Capital Territory and Victorian right to information statutes have “statement of reasons” procedures specific to the deliberative processes exemption.1 The rule requirement is notification of the reasons for the claim of harm to the public interest.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 36(5) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 30(5).

[2.3.1860] The subject matter of deliberative processes documents is, in New South Wales and Queensland, allocated to the statutory procedure used where disclosure of material is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. The terms of the New South Wales “consideration” are: [R]eveal a deliberation or consultation conducted, or an opinion, advice or recommendation given, in such a way as to prejudice a deliberative process of government or an agency.1

The verb “reveal” is defined in Sch 4 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) as “disclose information that has not already been publicly disclosed (otherwise than by unlawful disclosure)”. The terms of the Queensland “factors” are: [C]ould reasonably be expected to prejudice a deliberative process of government.2

Also, under Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 4 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) there is a complex set of provisions which in some ways resemble the terms of the deliberative processes exemption in legislation in the Australian Capital

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Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1(e). 2 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 20.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary “Deliberative Processes” [2.3.1865] The meaning of “deliberative processes” involved in the functions of an agency or Minister has been frequently considered. The currently prevailing view is that the “deliberative processes” involved in the functions of an agency are: [I]ts thinking processes – the processes of reflection, for example, upon the wisdom and expediency of a proposal, a particular decision or a course of action.1

It is not, on this view, critical that the deliberation relates to policy formulation. On the other hand, the deliberative process does not encompass documents “dealing with the purely procedural or administrative processes involved in the functions of an agency”.2

1 Re Waterford and Department of Treasury (No 2) (1984) 1 AAR 1 (AATA), Hall J at 19 . Followed in Simpson v Director General of Department of Education & Training [2000] NSWADT 134, Hennessey DP at [76]–[77]; Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60, the Information Commissioner at 70–71; Re Morris and Forestry Tasmania (No 2) (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 706012 of 2007, 1 September 2007); Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, Gray J at 878, King J at 884; Ministry for Planning v Collins (1996) 93 LGERA 69 (WASC), Templeman J at 72. 2 Re Subramanian and Refugee Review Tribunal (1997) 44 ALD 435 (AATA), McMahon DP at 440. “Whilst the term ‘deliberative processes’ is one of wide ambit, it would not extend to all management documents created on a day to day basis in the functioning of an agency”, McMahon DP at 440.

“Advice” [2.3.1870] There is some case law on the deliberative processes exemption requirements, particularly from Victoria, however the cases do not use citations to cases outside their own. As a result, there is no candidate among them for a “national leading case”. In the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, it has been said that the requirement implies “a notion of 167

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consideration” which, in the case of “advice”, will precede “formation of a view” but not so in the case of “consultation”.1 In Victoria, there are a number of cases but no leading case which has deduced a general principle from the specific instances. In the absence of such a case, the author hazards two comments. The first is that a number of cases point to a dichotomy between “advice” or “consultation” and reportage of facts or events.2 The second is that the circulation of draft documents for comments is strongly, even “implicitly,” the making of an opinion or recommendation.3 Although these cases have not been cited in other jurisdictions on this point, it is likely the same results would follow because of the uniformity in terminology.

1 Re Smith and Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Commission [2000] AATA 512, Forgie DP at [54], [55]. The Australian Information Commissioner has commented on the generic term “deliberative matter” in the following terms: “‘Deliberative matter’ is a shorthand term for ‘opinion, advice and recommendation’ and ‘consultation and deliberation’ that is recorded or reflected in a document. Those are broad terms that bear their ordinary meaning”: Parnell and Attorney-General’s Department [2014] AICmr 71, McMillan AIC at [38] applied in Rovere v Secretary, Department of Education and Training [2015] AATA 462, Popple SM at [25]. 2 City Parking Pty Ltd v City of Melbourne (1996) 10 VAR 170 (VicAAT); Birnbauer & Davies v Inner & Eastern Health Care Network [1999] VCAT 1363, Macnamara DP at [43]; Doyle v Department of Human Services [2002] VCAT 176, Megay SM at [29]; Pritchard v Police (Vic) [2008] VCAT 913, Coghlan DP at [20]; Conyers v Monash University [2005] VCAT 2509, Davis VP at [27]. See also Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (No 2) (1983) 78 FLR 264 (FCA), Beaumont J at 569. 3 Re Moloney and Department of Human Services (2001) 18 VAR 238, Davey VP at [49]; Wilson v Department of Premier & Cabinet [2001] VCAT 663, Macnamara DP at [31].

“Prepared” [2.3.1880] The requirement that the “advice” be “prepared in the course of” deliberations has attracted comment in few cases, most in the federal jurisdiction. In Secretary of Department of Workplace Relations & Small Business v The Staff Development and Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 301; 34 AAR 10; [2001] FCA 1375, the Court pointed out that the Commonwealth legislation has two requirements in the alternative, such that consideration of a claim for exemption must look at both alternatives. In Re Richardson and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2004) 55 ATR 1091; [2004] AATA 367, the Tribunal noted that this requirement means the document must be procured or acquired for the purpose of the agency’s deliberative processes rather than simply received without invitation. In the later decision of Re McKinnon and Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2008) 47 AAR 393; [2008] AATA 161, Forgie 168

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DP elaborated further. The Deputy President concluded that “the deliberative processes must be those that are required as a necessary part of the functions of the agency”.1 In Re Booth and Department of Primary Industries & Water (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 805028 of 2008, 1 December 2008), a document prepared for the internal deliberation of parliamentary members of the political party forming the government of the day in connection with parliamentary debates was held not to be relevantly “prepared” by an agency, as it was unconnected with the internal deliberations of the agency or the Government.

1 Re McKinnon and Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2008) 47 AAR 393; [2008] AATA 161, Forgie DP at [87].

“Purely Factual Material” [2.3.1900] The deliberative processes exemption in right to information legislation does not apply to a document by reason only of purely factual material contained in the document. The notion of “purely factual material” was analysed by the Full Federal Court in Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1984) 1 FCR 150.1 It was held that summaries of factual matter, conclusions expressed as findings, and judgments founded on the expertise of a person, might be classed as purely factual material. Such material would not so be classed if it were to be seen as part of, or would disclose the process of, opinion, advice or recommendation for the purpose of the “deliberative process”.2 A statement of ultimate fact might, however, be purely factual.3 This analysis still leaves room for disagreement and, as a matter of practice, it may not be possible for an applicant to do more than invite the agency or the external review body to apply the relevant tests to the contents of the documents. In two right to information schemes, there is a further exemption exception allied to the “factual material” exemption exception (eg for reports from “experts”).4 In Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp, the Court held that the reference to “technical experts” in the now repealed s 36(6)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) described experts in the mechanical arts and applied sciences generally but did not necessarily extend to a “legal expert”.5

1 Followed in Dunne/Barden and Department of Education & Training (ACT) [2007] ACTAAT 26, the Tribunal at [59]; Re Eccleston and Department of Family Services, Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60, the Information Commissioner at 99. 2 See also Re Chapman and Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 43 ALD 139, McDonald DP at 149–151. It was noted in Re Chapman and 169

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3 4 5

Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs that the line between statements of facts, which can stand alone and therefore be released, and those which are so close to the deliberative process as to form part of it, will often be difficult to ascertain. Readers should also note Re McKinnon and Secretary of Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet [2007] AATA 1969, Forgie DP at [62]–[69], where the Tribunal emphasises the stringency of the modifying adjective “purely”. Among the other schemes, only the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) provision lacks an equivalent modifying adjective. Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1984) 1 FCR 150 (FCA), the Court at 155. Information Act 2002 (NT), s 52(3); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 4(3)(c). Approved in McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70; 41 AAR 23; [2005] FCAFC 142, Jacobsen J at [266] (Tamberlin J agreeing).

Public Interest [2.3.1910] Under the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, courts and tribunals developed lists of matters they considered could be relevant to assessment of the public interest test for the deliberative processes exemption. The most influential and controversial was the list of factors set out in Re Howard and Treasurer of the Commonwealth (1985) 7 ALD 626; 3 AAR 169: see [2.3.850]. The position in South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia is that so long as the “Howard factors” (see [2.3.850]) are viewed as guidance only, then the case is good law.1 In Victoria, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal suggested its own list of factors in Re Hulls and Victorian Casino & Gaming Authority (1997) 12 VAR 483.2 The matters on this list are: (1)

the right of every person to obtain access to documents as provided by s 13 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth);

(2)

the degree of sensitivity of the issues involved in the consideration;

(3)

the stage of the policy development process at which the communication was made;

(4)

whether the disclosure would be likely to inhibit frankness and candour in the making of communications;

(5)

whether disclosure would lead to confusion or unnecessary debate having regard to possibilities discussed;

(6)

disclosure of documents which give merely a part explanation rather than complete explanation for the taking of a particular decision;

(7)

the likelihood that disclosure of the documents would inhibit the independence of officers or the making of proper and detailed research and submissions by them;

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(8)

the likelihood that disclosure would create mischief in one way or another such as a risk of mischievous interpretation; and

(9)

the significance of the document (eg whether it is or is not merely a draft document).

In Western Australia, the Information Commissioner has consistently held that it is contrary to the public interest within the meaning of the deliberative processes exemption for deliberative processes documents to be disclosed while deliberations are in progress.3 Once those deliberations have ceased, then the effluxion of time before the 10-year time limit can be taken into account.4 In the Northern Territory, the only published decision of the Information Commissioner, Re Collie and Offıce of Commissioner for Public Employment (NT) (unreported, NTICmr, Marcham AIC, 1 of 2008, 25 March 2008), considered the public interest factor in s 52(5)(c) of the Information Act 2002 (NT) – “frankness and candour”. The Information Commissioner interpreted that provision to refer to the risk that officers of the agency concerned would be less than frank and candid in the future.5

1 Ipex Information Technology Group Pty Ltd v Department of Information Technology Services (1997) 192 LSJS 54 (SADC); Department of the Premier and Cabinet (SA) v Thomas [2014] SADC 56, Boylan J at [26] (where the court placed considerable weight on the “frankness and candour” factor); Re Wells v Department of Premier & Cabinet (2001) 18 VAR 293; [2001] VCAT 1800, Preuss SM at [24] (approved in Secretary of Department of Justice v Osland (No 2) (2007) 26 VAR 425; [2007] VSCA 96, Maxwell P at [76]); Re Australian Medical Association Ltd and Health Department of Western Australia [1999] WAICmr 7, the Information Commissioner at [36]. 2 Re Hulls and Victorian Casino & Gaming Authority (1997) 12 VAR 483 approved in Re McIntosh and Department of Premier & Cabinet (2009) 32 VAR 371; [2009] VCAT 1528 and authorities therein. 3 Re Whitely and Curtin University of Technology [2008] WAICmr 24, the Information Commissioner at [69] and cases cited therein. See also Water Corporation v McKay [2010] WASC 210, Kenneth Martin J at [55] where the Supreme Court of Western Australia upheld this approach in balancing transparency against commercial interests. 4 Health Department of Western Australia v Australian Medical Association Ltd [1999] WASCA 269, McKechnie J at [27]–[43]. 5 Re Collie and Offıce of Commissioner for Public Employment (NT) (unreported, NTICmr, Marcham AIC, 1 of 2008, 25 March 2008), Marcham AIC at [86].

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Operations of Agencies Legislation [2.3.1920] Most right to information schemes have an exemption to stop disclosure which might, in various specified ways, affect the ongoing operations of agencies.1 Under all legislation, the exemption is allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. For the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), the position is different. Issues of potential harm to the operation of agencies are public interest “factors”, “considerations”, or “matters” against disclosure that must be taken into account by the decision-maker.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47E; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 40 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1(f), (h); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 53; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cll 19, 21, Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 3; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 16; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), Sch 1 cl 1(o), (p), (q); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 11. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) does not have an exemption for this subject.

Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia Intended Circumstances of Agency Exemption [2.3.1930] Like other exemptions, the intended circumstances of the deliberative processes exemption can be considered as three divisions. These are: (1)

potential harm to the operation of agencies;1

(2)

likelihood of this result;2 and

(3)

the governmental activities at risk.3

As in the law enforcement exemption (see [2.3.2020]), the elements of the three divisions combine in a number of possible analytical sequences. Thus, each of the elements of the “potential harm” division combine with each of the elements of the “likelihood” division. However, different elements in the “governmental

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activities” division combine with only some of the elements in the “potential harm” division. Sch 1 cl 11 of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) illustrates these patterns. Its sole “likelihood of harm” element can combine with any of the “potential harm” elements. However, the only “potential harm” element that combines with more than one of the “governmental activities” elements is “have substantial adverse effect”, which combines with both the “management of personnel” element and the “industrial relations” element. All other legislation follows this structure.

1 Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and South Australian legislation use the terms “prejudice” and “have substantial adverse effect”. Western Australian legislation uses the terms “impair”, “have substantial adverse effect” and “prevent from being attained.” 2 Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory legislation use the terms “would” and “could reasonably be expected to”. South Australian and Western Australian legislation use the term “could reasonably be expected to”. Northern Territory legislation use the term “is reasonably likely to”. 3 Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australian and Western Australian legislation use the terms “tests, examinations”, “audits” and “management or assessment of personnel”. Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory legislation also use the term “proper and efficient conduct of operations”. Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australian and Western Australian legislation also use the term “industrial relations”. South Australian legislation also uses the term “effective performance of functions”.

Exception to Extent of Operations of Agency Exemption [2.3.1940] A benefit type test (see [2.3.740]) of public interest is an exception in the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australian right to information legislation. This is provided by s 40(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)1 and Sch 1 cl 11(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

Pre-condition to Operations of Agency Exemption [2.3.1950] A harm type test (see [2.3.740]) of public interest is an exemption condition in the Commonwealth, Northern Territory and South Australia. This is provided by ss 11A(5) and 31B(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 50 of the Information Act 2002 (NT) and Sch 1 cl 16(1)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA). 173

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New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania [2.3.1960] Issues of potential harm to the operation of agencies are, in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, allocated to the statutory procedure used where disclosure of material is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. Potential harm to the operation of agencies is a prescribed issue for consideration of the public interest under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas). The terms of the New South Wales Act’s “consideration” are: (f)

prejudice the effective exercise by an agency of the agency’s functions …

(h)

prejudice the conduct, effectiveness or integrity of any audit, test, investigation or review conducted by or on behalf of an agency by revealing its purpose, conduct or results (whether or not commenced and whether or not completed).1

The terms of the Queensland provisions are that “[d]isclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of testing or auditing procedures”, and various kinds of harm to governmental activities, similar to the terms of the exemptions in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia.2 The terms of the Tasmanian “matters” are also various kinds of harm to governmental activities, similar to the terms of the exemptions in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia.3

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1(f), (h). 2 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4. 3 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), Sch 1.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Conduct of Industrial Relations [2.3.1970] An exemption in respect of industrial relations, as a head of affected governmental activities, is not concerned with effects on industrial relations themselves, but rather with effects on their conduct.1 An effect on “conduct” would be increased mistrust or lack of cooperation by members of a union in industrial relations negotiations.2

1 Re Australian Medical Association Ltd and Health Department of Western Australia

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[1999] WAICmr 7, the Information Commissioner at [70]. Re Australian Medical Association Ltd and Health Department of Western Australia [1999] WAICmr 7, the Information Commissioner at [70]. Interpretation of the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017) on this head of the exemption are likely to follow decisions of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) before its amendment in 2010 by legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania: Re Heaney and Public Service Board Telecommunications Commission (1987) 13 ALD 1; Re Theis and Department of Aviation (1986) 9 ALD 454; 5 AAR 27 (AATA).

Management of Personnel [2.3.1980] In Re Ayton and Police Force (WA) [1999] WAICmr 8, the Information Commissioner of Western Australia held that the industrial relations exemption was limited to issues that are “clearly administrative, as distinct from operational, in nature”.1 The decisions of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) have turned largely on the particular circumstances of the case. In the view of some AAT panels, a material consideration is the extent to which the agency has a practice of disclosure of the kinds of documents in issue.2 Repealed s 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) had been applied to exempt from disclosure matters which would reveal information about the employment affairs of public servants, including, in particular, the name of the officer who made a decision. In many cases, the identity of the officers will be known and, even if this is not the case, it may be that revelation of the name of an officer could not be said to have a substantial adverse effect of the relevant kind.3 Section 47E(c) now replaces repealed s 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. There are now a set of guidelines issued by the Australian Information Commissioner which explain the requirements of section 47E(c).4

1 Re Ayton and Police Force (WA) [1999] WAICmr 8, the Information Commissioner at [22]. 2 See Re Dyrenfurth and Department of Social Security (1987) 12 ALD 577; Re Mann and Australian Taxation Offıce (1985) 3 AAR 261; 16 ATR 630, the Tribunal at 709–710 (AAR). 3 See Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 (FCA), where Beaumont J at 249 emphasised the need for clear proof of a claimed substantial adverse effect. 4 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (OAIC, rev ed, 2014) (available at http://www.oaic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “Freedom of Information”, “FOI Guidelines”) at [6.105]ff.

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Proper and Efficient Operations of Agency [2.3.1990] The leading explanation of what is “operations of an agency” is “extending to the way in which an agency discharges or performs any of its functions”.1 The phrase is not limited to matters related to the internal administration of an agency.2 What is “proper and efficient” has not been considered often, but in Re Petroulias and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2006) 62 ATR 1175; [2006] AATA 333, Forgie DP thought that it was action “which conforms to established standards of behaviour” and “that which produces the desired result with the minimum of wasted effort”.3

1 Re James and Australian National University (1984) 2 AAR 327, Hall DP at 699 approved in Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 117 (FCR). 2 Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 115–116 (FCR). 3 Re Petroulias and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2006) 62 ATR 1175; [2006] AATA 333, Forgie DP at [72].

“Substantial Adverse Effect” [2.3.2000] Some of the sections of the operation of agency provisions in the right to information Acts require an assessment of whether there would be “prejudice”, whereas others require a showing of a “substantial adverse effect”. In the Commonwealth jurisdiction, the Federal Court has held that the phrase “substantial adverse effect” requires a more serious result than “prejudice”. In Jorgensen v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 208 ALR 73; [2004] FCA 143, Weinberg J summarised earlier case law in three points: (1)

“substantial adverse effect” connotes an effect that is serious or significant;

(2)

the consequences must flow from the disclosure of the documents in issue or documents of a specific kind; and

(3)

the rationale of the higher standard is that there will be a cessation or diminution of the future flow of information, as opposed to the effects flowing from disclosure in the case under consideration.1

The same approach has been used in decisions of external review bodies in the States and Territories.2 The harmful effects might flow either from disclosure of the documents (given their nature) or from their particular contents.3 A situation where the prescribed harm has been found is cessation in flow of information to investigations conducted by agencies into wrongdoing of some kind.4 The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal has, on a number of occasions,

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found that the fact that disclosure of the documents in issue might lead the agency to vary its practices was not enough to show that there would be a substantially adverse effect.5

1 See also Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 (FCA); Ascic v Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALN N184 (FCA); Re Dyrenfurth and Department of Social Security (1987) 12 ALD 577 (upheld on appeal in Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544). 2 Re B and Medical Board (ACT) (1994) 33 ALD 295, Curtis P at 301; Konieczka v Police (SA) (2006) 245 LSJS 458; [2006] SASC 288, Perry J at [17]; Re Rindos and University of Western Australia (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 2095 of 1994, 10 July 1995). 3 Re Theis and Department of Aviation (1986) 9 ALD 454; 5 AAR 27 (AATA), the Tribunal at 464 (ALD); Re Brennan and Law Society (ACT) (No 2) (1985) 8 ALD 10, Hall DP at 17; Re Boehm and Ombudsman (Cth) (1985) 8 ALN N29 (AATA), Jenkinson P at 32. 4 Robinson v Director-General of Department of Health [2002] NSWADT 222, Hennessey DP at [71] (investigation of matters referred to an agency by a corruption watchdog); Re Thompson and Secretary of Department of Education, Science & Training (2007) 98 ALD 119; [2007] AATA 1801, Levy SM at [29] (own motion investigation by agency of corruption). 5 See Robinson v Director-General of Department of Health [2002] NSWADT 222, Hennessey DP at [17]; Re Boehm and Ombudsman (Cth) (1985) 8 ALN N29 (AATA), Jenkinson P at 33.

Tests and Examinations [2.3.2010] The “tests, examinations and audits” head of exemption is intended to prevent future candidates for tests tailoring their responses by learning from past questions.1 A “test” in this head of exemption has the same meaning as its ordinary usage – “that by which the presence, quality, or genuineness of anything is determined”.2 In Western Australia, the “tests and examinations” head of exemption has two arms found in Sch 1 cl 11(1)(a) and (b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). In Re H and Graylands Hospital (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 5096 of 1996, 6 December 1996), the Information Commissioner held that the two arms, though overlapping, have different applications. Section 11(1)(a) appears to be directed at protecting the viability of a method or procedure for the conduct of a test, examination or audit by an agency, while s 11(1)(b) appears to be directed at the result of a particular test, examination or audit. In the later decision of Re Barndon and Police Force (WA) [2006] WAICmr 13, the Information Commissioner held that an atypical interview process which had a strong bias towards psychological assessment by inquiry into the nature of the candidates for recruitment, and to look analytically at their responses in

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order to assist in assessing their suitability, qualified as an “examination”.3

1 Ascic v Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALN N184 (FCA) followed in Re Simonsen and Edith Cowan University [1994] WAICmr 10. See also H v Department Of Education [2015] WASC 276, Keighley-Gerardy IC at [21] and [22] where the findings of the Information Commissioner of Western Australia on the harm to the effectiveness of past tests by disclosure, was upheld on appeal. 2 Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business v Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 301; 34 AAR 10; [2001] FCA 1375 (FC); Re Staff Development & Training Centre and Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business (2000) 30 AAR 330; [2000] AATA 78, Forgie DP at [101]. 3 Re Barndon and Police Force (WA) [2006] WAICmr 13, the Information Commissioner at [37].

Law Enforcement [2.3.2020] Documents concerned with law enforcement and public safety are exempted in all right to information legislation. These exemptions cover a number of topics focused on criminal law enforcement and regulatory compliance. The exemptions are similar in their choice of terminology but dissimilar in the variety of topics covered. An example of the terminological similarity is the use of the verbs “prejudice” and “endanger”. They occur in every exemption. An example of the dissimilarity in range of topics is the issue of danger to buildings or structures. This is covered by Sch 3 cl 10(1)(h) of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and Sch 1 cl 4(2)(a)(v) of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), but not in other enactments: see [2.3.2030].

Legislation [2.3.2030] Legislation for the law enforcement exemption can be divided into three classes.1 The legislation in the Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and South Australia have no dedicated public interest test. Legislation in Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia have a public interest test. The law enforcement exemption contained in New South Wales and Queensland legislation are discussed at [2.3.2070]. For example, under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), protection of law enforcement material occurs as an exemption to which no public interest test applies and as the subject matter of three “matters” on the list for the public interest test.

1 Law enforcement exemptions contained in right to information legislation are as

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follows: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 37; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 37 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 46; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 4; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 30; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 31; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 5. The law enforcement exemptions contained in New South Wales and Queensland legislation are discussed at [2.3.2070].

Intended Circumstances [2.3.2040] Under all right to information legislation, the intended circumstances of the law enforcement exemption have requirements of an outcome type: see [2.3.1460]. The overall picture is one that attempts to give as much protection as possible from right to information to this sector of public government. The requirements can be divided into three sets: (1)

harm to someone or a prescribed governmental activity or disclosure of specified information;

(2)

the likelihood of harm;1 and

(3)

the people, governmental activity or information at risk of harm or disclosure.

The elements of the divisions are subdivided between protected people, protected governmental activities and protected information. Each of these subdivisions is in turn divided into further varieties. The overall effect is a structure at three levels of major divisions, minor divisions and “sub-minor” divisions. Section 37 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) provides an illustration of the structure. The first set has two elements: (1)

“prejudice”; or

(2)

“disclose” or “endanger”.

One or the other of these negative results will be caused by disclosure of the material. The second set has two alternatives: (1)

“would”; or

(2)

“could reasonably be expected to”.

The third set consists of the governmental activities or people upon whom the negative results will impact. This is the most complex set. First, it has more elements than the other two sets. Second, not every element in the third set combines with every element of the other two sets. The elements of these three sets can combine in analytical sequences of varying complexity:

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(1)

To take the simplest possible combination, the “endangerment” alternative of the first set is combined with only two elements in the third set – life of any natural person or their physical safety. When these two possibilities are combined with the two alternatives of the second set (“would endanger” or “could reasonably be expected to”), there are a total of four possible analytical sequences.

(2)

The prejudice result of the first set is more complex because of the greater number of varieties of governmental activities – administration, enforcement (two types), investigation (four types), fair trial of a person, impartial adjudication and maintenance of lawful methods for the protection of public safety. When these 10 possibilities are combined with the two alternatives of the second set (“would endanger” or “could reasonably be expected to”), there are a total of 20 possible analytical sequences.

(3)

The disclosure result of the first set is more complex still. It is concerned with both governmental activities and certain individuals (“confidential sources of information”). This produces 20 possibilities. Again, when these 20 possibilities are combined with the two alternatives of the second set, there are 40 possible analytical sequences.2

The South Australian, Victorian and Western Australian right to information statutes provide additional protection by characterisation type exemptions for documents “created by” and, in some cases, “held by” the intelligence units of the police forces of those States.3 Such documents are exempt merely by reason of their having been created, or held, by those units.

1 This exemption uses the word “reasonable”. The meaning of this word in right to information legislation is discussed at [2.3.775]. Here, the word is used in a construction which expresses a rational evaluation of the likelihood of an event occurring. 2 The total number of possible analytical sequences is 64: four for the “endanger” group, 20 for the “prejudice” group and 40 for the “disclose” group. The above structure reveals many possible analytical sequences with different lengths. The shortest is three steps in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 37(1)(c): (1) would; (2) endanger; (3) life. The longest is five steps in s 37(2): (1) would; (2) disclose; (3) lawful method; (4) enforcement; (5) law (in a particular instance). Other jurisdictions copy this structure to varying degrees. 3 See Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 4(3), (3a); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 31(3); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 5(2).

Exceptions to Extent of Operation of Law Enforcement Exemption [2.3.2050] Only some right to information schemes have exceptions and a public interest test. The variety of exceptions can be described as follows:

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(1)

Northern Territory – outcome type (see [2.3.1460]) exceptions but no public interest test;1

(2)

Victoria – both outcome type exceptions and characterisation type exceptions with a benefit type (see [2.3.740]) public interest test;2 and

(3)

Western Australia – both outcome type exceptions and characterisation type exceptions with a benefit type public interest test.3

1 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 46(3). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), Pt IV. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 5(4).

Pre-Condition to Law Enforcement Exemption [2.3.2060] In South Australia, a harm type public interest test is a pre-condition in only some circumstances.1 In Tasmania, on the other hand, its general harm type public interest test includes three matters concerned with the subject matter of law enforcement. They are: (i)

whether the disclosure would promote or harm public health or safety;

(j)

whether the disclosure would promote or harm the administration of justice, including affording procedural fairness and the enforcement of the law; …

(r)

whether the disclosure would be contrary to the security or good order of a prison or detention facility.2

1 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 4(2)(b). 2 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), Sch 1 cl 1(i), (j), (r).

New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.2070] Like the right to information legislation in other jurisdictions (see [2.3.2030]), legislation in both New South Wales and Queensland, allocates the subject of law enforcement to both the group of exemptions to which no public interest test applies and as the subject matter of considerations on the list for the public interest test. The New South Wales legislation goes further than the Tasmanian legislation by having some-agency exemptions dealing with various law enforcement bodies.1 The Queensland legislation goes further than the Tasmanian legislation by specifying many documents concerned with law enforcement as “documents to which the Act does not apply”.2

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In New South Wales, the all-agency exemption for law enforcement in Sch 1 cl 7 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) is a characterisation type exemption for documents. Such documents are exempt merely by reason of their having been created, or held, by the units of law enforcement agencies. In Queensland, the all-agency exemption contains both outcome type and characterisation type exemptions: see [2.3.1460]. The Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) has the most extensive exemption case requirements in the country. It is subject to some exemption exceptions. In New South Wales, the considerations listed in s 14 Table cl 2 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 in relation to the public interest test resemble the requirements of the intended circumstances in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia and are at least as long. By contrast, the descriptions of the factors listed in the Right to Information Act 2009 are succinct.3 Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 5 of the Right to Information Act 2009 is concerned with law enforcement in jails.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 2 cl 2. 2 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 1 cl 4. 3 These descriptions are: Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 7 (“disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected prejudice security, law enforcement or public safety”) and Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 10 (“disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the security or good order of a corrective services facility”).

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Danger to Life or Safety [2.3.2080] The case law on the “danger to life or safety” exemption case requirement focuses on the process of reasoning in making the assessment that disclosure “would or could reasonably be expected to” pose a danger. The first question, which should not be forgotten, is that the exemption requires a causal connection between disclosure and any danger. The facts of Watson v Offıce of Information Commissioner (Qld) [2015] QCATA 95 point this out. In that case, the Information Commissioner of Queensland found that the relationship between the appellant and a third person, whose behaviour was said to pose the threat, was so poor that disclosure would make no difference. Thus, disclosure of documents to the third person could not be withheld on this basis. The leading decision of Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986)

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10 FCR 180 has been applied to this exemption.1 It holds that the correct criterion for what degree of probability is involved in the construction, “would or could reasonably be expected to”, is whether there was a possibility that was a reasonable one, as distinct from one that was irrational, absurd or ridiculous. In O’Sullivan v Police (Vic) [2005] VCAT 532,2 Morris P, following Department of Agriculture & Rural Affairs v Binnie [1989] VR 836, made two points, to the same effect as Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442 and Ford v Child Support Registrar [2009] FCA 328: (1)

“Reasonably likely” does not mean more than a fifty percent chance – instead it means “a chance of an event occurring which is real, not fanciful or remote”. In other words, “a chance which is ‘reasonable’ is one that is sufficient or worth noting”.

(2)

It is the risk of harm, not the occurrence of harm, which is under consideration – such that it is unnecessary to show that physical harm will occur.

In YW87TN and Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2012] QICmr 2, the Queensland Information Commissioner found two factors, among others, which mitigated the risk of danger created by disclosure were the age of the information sought and how much of that information was already on the public record. An instructive example of the assessment of risk is the case of The Courier Mail and Queensland Police Service [2013] QICmr 3. In that case, the access applicant sought information about instances of suicide at particular locations. The Queensland Information Commissioner upheld the refusal of access on the basis that release and publication of the sought-after information would inevitably lead to further attempts at suicide.3

1 Followed in Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442; Ford v Child Support Registrar [2009] FCA 328; Dunstan v Department of Corrective Services [2004] NSWADT 177, O’Connor P at [24]. Decisions of the Information Commissioner of Western Australia have applied either Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180 or Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC): see, eg Re A and Heathcote Hospital (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 594 of 1993, June 1994) at [27]; Re Post Newspapers Pty Ltd and Town of Cambridge [2006] WAICmr 25, the Information Commissioner at [67]ff. 2 Followed in Trafford v Police (SA) [2014] SADC 121. 3 The Queensland legislation has a provision, supplementing the “danger to a person’s safety” clause. Under the additional provision (Sch 3 cl 10(1)(d)) access can be refused if disclosure would result in a “serious act of harassment”. There have been a number of cases from the Queensland Information Commissioner on this more specific provision: see Conde and Queensland Police Service [2012] QICmr 51 and cases cited therein.

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Disclosure of Confidential Source of Information [2.3.2090] The first question as to whether information is exempt under right to information legislation is whether the information has come from a confidential source. In Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 8 FCR 85, it was held that the “mere giving of information without more cannot make the giver a confidential source” and that “a source is confidential if the information was provided under an express or implied pledge of confidentiality”.1 A person who gives a statement as a potential witness in civil proceedings is not a confidential source of information,2 as their evidence might ultimately be disclosed in open court.

1 Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 8 FCR 85, Forster J at 89 (Keely and Davies JJ agreeing) followed in Re Schofield and WorkCover (ACT) (2000) 61 ALD 238; [2000] ACTAAT 30, Peedom P at [24]; Brighthope v Police (Vic) (unreported, VicAAT, Macnamara MF, 15666 of 1995, 13 October 1995); Re Read and Public Service Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 493 of 1993, 16 February 1994). The early decision of the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal in Mauger v General Manager of Wingecarribee Shire Council [1999] NSWADT 35, O’Connor DCJ at [35] applied the traditional policy of criminal courts in protecting the confidentiality of police informers; followed by the Tasmanian Ombudsman in Ward and Tasmania Police (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 1009-121 of 2011, 7 February 2011). 2 Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div).

[2.3.2100] Information supplied in confidence is not necessarily supplied by an informer.1 It has been said that a source might be confidential although the information had passed through a chain of persons.2 In Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414, it was said that: [A] confidential source of information may include a diplomatic source, official or unofficial, and members of other police forces to the extent they may pass on information obtained from a confidential source … [but] questions of confidentiality of communications between Commonwealth agencies … fall to be determined under section 36 [of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)].3

The second question is whether the information in the document relates to the enforcement or administration of the law, such as the administration of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth).4 The third question is whether the disclosure of the information might reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of the informant. If the factual basis for its application is established,5 this exemption offers great protection to informers, but there remains the problem of the informer who has acted with malicious intent. In such cases, it might be considered that the dominant purpose of the provider was for the information not to remain 184

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confidential,6 or the information had no bearing on the enforcement or administration of the law.7 Applicants have not had success with arguments that the Commonwealth exemption does not apply where the information is false, even where the informer may have acted with malice.8

1 Re Simons and Victorian Egg Marketing Board (No 1) (1985) 1 VAR 54 (VicAAT), Higgins M at 58–59; see also Re Barnes and Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (Vic) (1985) 1 VAR 16 (VicAAT), Higgins M at 19–20. 2 Re Edelsten and Australian Federal Police (1985) 4 AAR 220, the Full Tribunal at 226. 3 Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414, Hall DP at 445 (AAR). 4 Bojkovski & Department of Social Security (unreported, AATA, Taylor M, 5354 of 1989, 25 August 1989). 5 But see Re O’Sullivan and Police Force (Vic) (1986) 1 VAR 171 (VicAAT), Fricke J at 177. 6 See Re Wolsley and Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 7 ALD 270, The Tribunal at 275. 7 See P Bayne, Freedom of Information: An Analysis of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and a Synopsis of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (The Law Book Company Limited, 1984) p 159; Re Coleman and Director-General of Local Government Department of Pentland (1985) 1 VAR 9 (VicAAT), Rowlands P at 13. 8 McKenzie v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1986) 65 ALR 645 (FCA); Re Sinclair and Secretary of Department of Social Security (1985) 9 ALN N127. In relation to Victoria, see Re Richardson and Commissioner of Corporate Affairs (Vic) (1987) 2 VAR 51 (VicAAT), Cooney M at 52–53. In Re Gold and Australian Federal Police (1994) 37 ALD 168 (AATA), McDonald DP held that the personal motivation of the source for the giving of confidential information was not on its own necessarily sufficient to exclude material. See also Re Scholes and Australian Federal Police (1996) 44 ALD 299 regarding sources of false information.

Enforcement or Proper Administration of Law [2.3.2110] In Victoria, the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court in Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 held that “the administration of law indicates something concerned with the process of the enforcement of legal rights or duties”.1 The Court held that all heads of exemption under the Victorian right to information scheme had in common that for a document to fall under one of them, it “should have a connection with the criminal law or with the process of upholding or enforcing

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the civil law”.2 These observations have been followed in subsequent cases in other jurisdictions.3

1 Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div), Young CJ at 324. 2 Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div), Young CJ at 324 (O’Bryan J at 328 agreeing). 3 Re Gold and Australian Federal Police (1994) 37 ALD 168 (AATA), McDonald DP at [15]; Re Morton and City of Stirling (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1794 of 1994, 5 October 1994), Keighley-Gerardy IC at [28].

Prejudice to Conduct of Investigation [2.3.2120] In the Commonwealth jurisdiction, there is only one case which describes precisely what is the activity to which a “prejudice [to] the conduct of an investigation” exemption applies.1 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), after noting that the “outcome” of an investigation is “the discovery of what in fact happened”, pointed out that s 37(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) requires prejudice to the conduct rather than the “ultimate outcome”. The AAT considered that “conduct” was used “primarily in the sense of management or handling … of an investigation”. In an appeal to the Full Federal Court on a different point in News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (1984) 5 FCR 88, Beaumont J held that the words “in the particular case” required prejudice to be tested against “the particular circumstances of the case in hand”.2 Woodward J took a different view. His Honour held that the words added nothing to an implicit requirement that a particular breach of the law, as opposed to a breach in the abstract, must be involved.3 The view of Beaumont J has been followed in Victoria where the terms of the legislation follow the Commonwealth.4 In Western Australia, there has only been one case since the law in its current form commenced5 that offers an interpretation of what is meant by the word “investigation” in Sch 1 cl 5(1)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA). The case is Re West Australian Newspapers Ltd and Western Power [2006] WAICmr 10. There, the Information Commissioner followed an earlier decision6 in adopting a broad view of what is an “investigation”. He held that it could be nothing more formal than “seeking a report about a particular matter”. Furthermore, the Information Commissioner held that the phrase “investigation of … any particular matter” required identification of the investigation into a particular matter, being a contravention or possible contravention of the law.7

1 Re News Corp Ltd and National Companies & Securities Commission (No 6) (1984) 1 AAR 511 (AATA), appealed in News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (1984) 5 FCR 88 (FC).

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News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (1984) 5 FCR 88 (FC), Beaumont J at 118. News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (1984) 5 FCR 88 (FC), Woodward J at 101. Re Brygel v Department of Justice (1997) 70 FoI Review 60. See also Simons v Department of Justice [2006] VCAT 2053. Freedom of Information Amendment Act 2004 (WA), s 4 commenced on 19 November 2004 and replaced the verb “reveal” with the verb “prejudice”. Re Cumming and Metropolitan Health Service Board [2000] WAICmr 7, the Information Commissioner at [21], [22]. Re West Australian Newspapers Ltd and Western Power [2006] WAICmr 10, the Information Commissioner at [89], [90].

Prejudice to Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Methods [2.3.2130] Unlike the “prejudice to investigations” head of exemption (see [2.3.2120]), the “prejudice to effectiveness of methods of law enforcement” exemption lacks the qualifying phrase “particular instance” present in that exemption. Hence, this exemption need not relate to any particular instance of activity to prevent, detect, investigate or deal with matters arising out of a breach of the law.1 The words of the legislation indicate that the key idea here is lessening the utility of the methods in the conduct of police operations.2 The clearest type of this effect is thwarting future operations by giving potential perpetrators authoritative knowledge of those methods.3 However, the exemption can be inapplicable if the method is in the public domain.4 A document might also disclose lawful methods “by providing information from the nature of which the methods or procedures employed may be capable of being inferred”.5

1 Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414, Hall DP at 364 (ALD). Thus, “contingency plans for the prevention of unlawful activities” would be within the kinds of lawful methods and procedures covered by Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 37(2)(b). 2 Konieczka v Police (SA) [2006] SADC 134, Boylan J at [15]. See also Re Manly and Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1694 of 1994, 16 September 1994), where the Information Commissioner at [28] described prejudice as “some degree of impairment to investigative methods or procedures” (appealed on a different point in Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550). 3 Re Mickelberg and Australian Federal Police (1984) 6 ALN N176 (AATA) followed in Brighthope v Police (Vic) (unreported, VicAAT, Macnamara MF, 15666 of 1995, 13 October 1995); Gold Coast Bulletin and Department of Police [2010] QICmr 38 (regarding access to police rosters); Re Manly and Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1694 of 1994, 16 September 1994).

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4 5

Re Lawless and Secretary of Law Department (1985) 1 VAR 42, Rowlands J at 50. Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414, Hall DP at 423 (AAR).

Protection of Public Safety [2.3.2140] The protection of public safety is a head of exemption that is rarely claimed. There are two decisions dealing with this exemption from the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal and one from the Queensland Information Commissioner. In Re Theis and Department of Aviation (1986) 9 ALD 454; 5 AAR 27, it was said that “public safety” did not extend beyond “safety from violations of the law and breaches of the peace. It does not extend to air travel safety, except to the extent that that might be put at risk by such violations or breaches.”1 In Re Parisi and Australian Federal Police (1987) 14 ALD 11, it was said that “the words ‘public safety’ ought not to be confined to any particular situation” and rejected an argument that it should be confined to civil emergencies.2 Nine Network and Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2012] QICmr 8 concerns a common regulatory arrangement: a voluntary scheme between participants in an industry and the regulator. This voluntary scheme concerned public safety standards enforced by mandatory or prescriptive requirements in a statutory scheme. Information was sought in relation to infringements of the statutory standards. The Queensland Information Commissioner held that disclosure would not prejudice the voluntary scheme since the fact of compliance or non-compliance with the statutory scheme was distinct to acts done under the voluntary scheme.

1 Re Theis and Department of Aviation (1986) 9 ALD 454; 5 AAR 27 (AATA), the Tribunal at 39 (AAR). 2 Re Parisi and Australian Federal Police (1987) 14 ALD 11 (AATA), the Tribunal at 17.

Prejudice to Fair Trial or Other Form of Adjudication [2.3.2150] Prejudice to a fair trial or other form of adjudication is an exemption that has rarely been claimed. In Re Dale and Australian Federal Police (1997) 47 ALD 417, the Australian Capital Territory Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that the prejudice referred to in the exemption might

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operate against either the defence or prosecution and consists of “all elements having an overall effect upon a fair trial”.1 In Department of the Premier and Cabinet (SA) v Thomas [2014] SADC 56 the South Australian District Court gave a broad interpretation to this exemption.2 It held that in effect, the protection was even wider than legal professional privilege. The terms of exemption in the South Australian legislation extended to many documents prepared for the purposes of litigation regardless of whether they would meet the requirements for legal professional privilege. Mond v Department of Justice [2005] VCAT 2817 is the only Victorian case.3 The report of the decision is somewhat unclear about the legal and factual bases for its outcome. The legal basis appears to be that the Victorian Civil and Administrative Decisions Tribunal discriminated between three claims on the basis that disclosure of one document might not involve an “unfair advantage” to a party in future litigation, but disclosure of other documents might involve an “unfair advantage”. In Re Manly and Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1694 of 1994, 16 September 1994), the Information Commissioner of Western Australia accepted that this head of the exemption involved a “strong” public interest so “any matter likely to affect the right to a fair trial would constitute a sufficient prejudice to attract this exemption”.4

1 Re Dale and Australian Federal Police (1997) 47 ALD 417 (AATA), McMahon DP at 420. The case was considered in North Goonyella Coal Mines Pty Ltd and Millard and Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2012] QICmr 36, the only Queensland case on this head of exemption. In that case, the submission that the information sought could be used to distract the conduct of an impending trial by irrelevant questions was dismissed. 2 Department of the Premier and Cabinet (SA) v Thomas [2014] SADC 56, Boylan J at [22]. 3 The reasoning of the case has been doubted by E Kyrou and J Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) Vol 2 at [31.120]. 4 Re Manly and Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1694 of 1994, 16 September 1994) at [37].

Public Interest [2.3.2160] A public interest test had no role under the original Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).1 In Victoria and Western Australia, a public interest test has no role outside the circumstances covered by exemption exceptions to which the test applies.2 In South Australia, the limited public interest requirements there were examined in Konieczka v Police (SA) [2006] SADC 134. The Court held that the following were relevant considerations:

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(1)

the community’s interest in the effective operation of the police force;

(2)

the community’s interest in the effective operation of the Freedom of Information Act 1982;

(3)

Mr Konieczka’s interest, both as an individual and as a member of the community, in knowing police procedures and policy;

(4)

the possibility of misuse by others of the documents; and

(5)

that allowing Mr Konieczka to know whether any police decision-making process bears upon his complaint or enquiry is relevant to the balancing act required for this criterion.3

1 Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 8 FCR 85 (FCAFC); Hayes v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1996) 43 ALD 783; Re Petroulias and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2006) 62 ATR 1175; [2006] AATA 333, Forgie DP at [21]. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) section was not amended by legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. 2 Brighthope v Police (Vic) (unreported, VicAAT, Macnamara MF, 15666 of 1995, 13 October 1995); Re C and Department for Community Development (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1894 of 1994, 12 October 1994) at [75]. 3 Konieczka v Police (SA) [2006] SADC 134, Boylan J at [16].

Secrecy Provisions General [2.3.2170] Eight jurisdictions have exemptions which read down their right to information legislation in preference to secrecy provisions in other enactments.1 Tasmania does not have an exemption for secrecy. In some of the jurisdictions, the provisions for secrecy exemptions are allocated to the group of provisions that does not require satisfaction of a public interest test. In New South Wales and Queensland, the subject matter of secrecy is also a public interest consideration for the public interest test applicable in those jurisdictions. The secrecy exemption clauses can be divided into two types. The first type (called the “list type” in this discussion) employs a list of specified enactments located in the right to information legislation.2 As a result, only information or documents coming within the terms of those provisions might have the benefit of the right to information exemption. The second type (called the “generic type” in this discussion) relates to those exemptions described in non-specific or generic terms.3 There are hundreds of secrecy provisions in every legal jurisdiction.4 They range over every type of regulatory system. Selecting which of these rules is to prevail over right to information legislation would be a daunting task.

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In the “list” type of secrecy exemption provisions, these pitfalls are avoided by way of a highly specific choice: only a handful of provisions are chosen and the choice is expressed by exact reference. In the generic type of secrecy exemption the solution is a definition for the purposes of classification that works by creating a subset from existing secrecy provisions. The definition rule for the subset uses one of two approaches. In the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, the secrecy provision must “apply specifically” to disclosure. In South Australia, the secrecy provision must criminalise disclosure. Both these approaches create a subset of secrecy provisions “valid” only for the purposes of the right to information legislation.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 38; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 38 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 6, Sch 1 cll 1, 12 (Sch 1 cl 12 included with other secrecy provisions because the effect of the administrative decisions made under the statutes listed in cl 12 is to impose a duty of secrecy); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 48; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 12; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 38; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 12; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 82. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Sch 3; Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 1 cl 1; Information Act 2002 (NT), Sch 1; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 12. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 38; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 12; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 38. 4 While there is no comprehensive list of secrecy provisions for all Australian jurisdictions, the subject of secrecy in the Commonwealth government has been discussed at length in Australian Law Reform Commission, Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia, Report No 112 (ALRC, 2009).

New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.2180] The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) are the only statutes in which the decision-maker can take secrecy provisions of other enactments into account for the public interest test applicable in those States. In New South Wales, there is an additional provision setting out prescribed public interest considerations relevant to the subject matter of secrecy.1 The terms of this provision are broad, allowing notice to be taken of the text of any secrecy provision, whether in New South Wales or elsewhere, as well as the policy behind the secrecy provision. In Queensland, s 6 clearly provides that the provisions of the Right to Information Act 2009 override secrecy provisions in other statutes. Besides the list of provisions in Sch 3 cl 12, Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 22 allows the fact that “disclosure

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of the information is prohibited by an Act” as a public interest factor favouring non-disclosure. In Re Moon and Department of Health (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 310149 of 2010, 12 August 2010), the Information Commissioner described the list of secrecy provisions in Sch 3 as “those which should not be overridden by the [Right to Information Act 2009]”2. The Information Commissioner did not consider the “secrecy” provision in that case (s 62A of the Health Services Act 1991 (Qld)) to be a “secrecy provision” because s 62B of the Health Services Act 1991 (Qld) permitted disclosure of the information if required by another Act. In the later case of BL v Offıce of the Information Commissioner, Department of Communities [2012] QCATA 149 the Appeal Panel of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal considered a secrecy provision listed in Right to Information Act 2009 Sch 3 and accordingly upheld the decision not to disclose. In ASD v Offıce of the Information Commissioner Chief Executive, Offıce of Liquor and Gaming Regulation [2013] QCATA 281 the Appeal Panel of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal upheld an appeal against interpretation of Right to Information Act 2009 Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 22. The Queensland Information Commissioner had refused to give any consideration to a secrecy provision as a factor against disclosure. The Appeal Panel found an error of law and held that cl 22 requires some consideration to be given to the existence of a secrecy provision; to give none defeats the purpose of the clause.3

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 6. 2 Re Moon and Department of Health (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 310149 of 2010, 12 August 2010), the Commissioner at [25]. 3 ASD v Offıce of the Information Commissioner Chief Executive, Offıce of Liquor and Gaming Regulation [2013] QCATA 281, Cullinane JM at [15].

Generic Reference Exemptions [2.3.2200] The four right to information enactments that employ generic reference exemptions can be further divided into two subcategories. The exemptions in the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria are identical, while the exemptions in New South Wales and South Australia are similar, and both differ from the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria exemptions.

“Applying Specifically” [2.3.2210] Application of the secrecy provision exemption in right to information legislation follows a two-stage analysis. The first question is whether the “information” or “matter” contained in the disputed documents falls within the secrecy provision under consideration.1 Assuming the answer to this

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question is in the affirmative, the second question is whether that secrecy provision, in applying to the information or matter, meets the “specifically” criterion.2 The first question is a factual one and its answer will depend on the disputed documents. Precedents will be of little assistance. The second question is a complex one of statutory interpretation. First, an important issue assumed by the “applying specifically” criterion is whether the terms of the secrecy provision prohibit disclosure under the relevant right to information legislation at all. In Re Lapham and Offıce of the Community Advocate (1998) 53 ALD 485; [1998] ACTAAT 289,3 the Tribunal held that a provision (there, s 19(2) of the now-repealed Community Advocate Act 1991 (ACT)), which authorised disclosure “in the course of performing functions” under that Act or “any other Act”, expressly permitted disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT)4 as it was an example of “any other act”.

1 News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J at 68; Department of Premier & Cabinet v Birrell (No 2) [1990] VR 51, Murphy JA at 54. 2 News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J at 68; Department of Premier & Cabinet v Birrell (No 2) [1990] VR 51, Murphy JA at 54; see also Secretary to Department of Premier & Cabinet v Hulls [1999] 3 VR 331; [1999] VSCA 117, Phillips JA at [39]. 3 Disapproved in Ward v Family Care Meeting Convenor of Youth Court & Courts Administration Authority (SA) [2003] SADC 18, Smith J at [58]. This type of reasoning was also rejected in a different statutory context in ASD v Offıce of the Information Commissioner Chief Executive, Offıce of Liquor and Gaming Regulation [2013] QCATA 281. 4 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

[2.3.2220] Although secrecy provisions in right to information legislation are common,1 their detail varies.2 This makes the task of predicting whether an individual secrecy provision is caught by the “applying specifically” criterion a difficult one, unless the same provision has been previously considered.3 Despite this, there are two accepted interpretations of this criterion. The first dates from News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, where the Court proposed a model of three types of secrecy provisions: (1)

those which define the kind of information by reference to the characteristics or qualities of the information concerned;

(2)

those which rely upon the status or capacity of the person in possession of the information; and 193

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(3)

those which refer specifically to the capacity of the person in possession of the information and only generally to the characteristics of the information.

The Court held that the first, but not the second type of provision, was caught by the “applying specifically” criterion, but declined to comment on the third type. The second interpretation dates from after the first: (a)

An enactment does not satisfy s 38 [of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)] if it does no more than prohibit the disclosure of information identified only by reference to the capacity of the person who has received or is in possession of the information …(b) An enactment does not satisfy s 38 if it does no more than prohibit the disclosure of information identified only as information obtained in pursuance of the enactment in which the prohibition is found …

(c)

The two types of enactment to which we have referred do not satisfy s 38 because they do not sufficiently identify the type of information which is the subject of the prohibition upon disclosure. A provision, however, which identifies the information as information “respecting the affairs of another person” will ordinarily be sufficiently specific to satisfy s 38.4

Based upon one or both of these tests, the following provisions have been held to meet the “applying specifically” requirement: (1)

Section 67 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (Vic) – O’Sullivan v Health & Community Services (Vic) (1995) 8 VAR 449.

(2)

Section 64 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (Vic) – Re Anderson and Community Services Victoria (unreported, VCAT, Galvin DP, 10th April 1992).

(3)

Teaching Service Order 140 (Vic), cl 4.19 – Berryman v Department of Education (Vic) (unreported, VCAT, Macnamara DP, 45123 of 1998, 4 February 1999).

1 The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has identified 506 provisions in Commonwealth laws: Australian Law Reform Commission, Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia, Report No 112 (ALRC, 2009) App 4. In Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Australian Wine Consumers Co-op Society Ltd [2007] NSWADTAP 14, Smith J at [40]–[41], the Tribunal Appeal Panel complained of the number of secrecy provisions in the New South Wales jurisdiction. 2 See the differences between the two provisions considered by the New South Wales Administrative Appeals Tribunal Appeal Panel in General Manager of WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Law Society (NSW) (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 and Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Australian Wine Consumers Co-op Society Ltd [2007] NSWADTAP 14, which allowed the Appeal Panel in the later case to distinguish its earlier decision.

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4

SECRECY PROVISIONS

The secrecy provision in Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 20 is a rare example of a provision which has been repeatedly “tested” against Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 38; see Al Hakim v Ombudsman (Vic) [2001] VCAT 1972, Davis DP at [24]–[36] for a review of Victorian Civil and Administrative Decisions Tribunal cases. Harrigan v Department of Health (1986) 6 AAR 184 (FCAFC), the Court at 185–186.

South Australia [2.3.2230] South Australian right to information legislation does not require the secrecy provisions to satisfy the “apply specifically” requirement. Instead, it refers only to those secrecy provisions which criminally penalise. This feature means that the exemption provisions and case law of other political jurisdictions are distinguishable.1 Thus, the only issue as to whether a claim to exemption is made out is whether the documents concerned fall within the prohibition of the secrecy provision.2

1 This was also the position in New South Wales under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) (now repealed): Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Australian Wine Consumers Co-op Society Ltd [2007] NSWADTAP 14. 2 Ward v Family Care Meeting Convenor of Youth Court & Courts Administration Authority (SA) [2003] SADC 18, Smith J at [59] regarding Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA), s 58. See also Pages Hire Centre (NSW) Pty Ltd and Boros v Department of Premier and Cabinet [2014] SADC 3, Beazley J at [126] regarding Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA), s 55.

List Exemption [2.3.2240] In the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australian right to information enactments, the application of the secrecy exemption is considerably simplified by the “list” approach. If disclosure of the information or document is caught by one or another of the listed secrecy provisions then, prima facie, the secrecy exemption applies.1 The New South Wales provision contains a notable qualification – the exemption under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) applies notwithstanding the existence in the “other” enactment of some exception. Thus, information potentially caught by the “other” enactment, but not so in the result because it has the benefit of an exception in the “other” enactment, would still be exempt under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009. The case law has shown that the application of the right to information provision is relatively unproblematic, but application of the “other” enactment can be far from straightforward.2

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In addition to the need for a secrecy provision to fall into the list, application of the secrecy exemptions raises further questions. First, two decisions have recognised that application of the secrecy exemption implies consideration of whether disclosure under right to information legislation is caught by the secrecy provision. In the Commonwealth enactment, there is an exception to the exemption – if disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) “is not prohibited by the enactment concerned or any other enactment”.3 In Illawarra Retirement Trust v Secretary of Department of Health & Ageing (2005) 143 FCR 461; [2005] FCA 170, the Court held that the phrase in the secrecy provision describing permitted disclosure as “conduct that is otherwise authorised under this or any other enactment” did not include disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.4 Second, the Commonwealth and Queensland secrecy exemptions have an explicit exception to the secrecy exemption for “personal information” about the applicant being disclosed to the applicant.5

1 In Re Morrissey and Crown Solicitor’s Offıce (WA) [2000] WAICmr 24, the Information Commissioner noted, in applying the Western Australia provision, that it was intended to “preserve” secrecy imposed under the “other” enactment (there the Legal Aid Commission Act 1976 (WA), s 64) but not extend it. See also Re Neilson and City of Swan [2002] WAICmr 11, the Information Commissioner at [21]–[31]. 2 Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Samsonidis (2007) 158 FCR 276; [2007] FCAFC 54; Michel and Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services [2013] QICmr 24. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 38(1A). 4 Illawarra Retirement Trust v Secretary of Department of Health & Ageing (2005) 143 FCR 461; [2005] FCA 170, Branson J at [53]. The decision of Re Lapham and Offıce of the Community Advocate (1998) 53 ALD 485; [1998] ACTAAT 289 suggests the opposite conclusion about the phrase. 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 38(2); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 12(2).

Confidentiality [2.3.2250] All right to information Acts protect information which has been communicated in confidence to government in the first place. In the Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Victoria, the relevant provision is allocated to the group of exemptions with no public interest test.1 In the Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia, the relevant provision is allocated to the group of exemptions for which there is a public interest test.2 In New South Wales, the subject matter of protecting confidential communication is a “consideration” against disclosure.3 In Queensland, in addition to the provision stating a legislative presumption that

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disclosure is contrary to the public interest, the subject matter is a factor against disclosure.4 The “what-counts-as” requirements (see [2.3.190]) for confidentiality use two strategies. The first strategy is to refer to general law doctrines of confidentiality. In using the strategy of explicit reference to an existing body of law, the provisions are, with the exemptions for legal professional privilege and contempt of court, the only exemptions which replicate the general law. However, this strategy faces two problems. The first is that there is high authority, arising independently from consideration of right to information legislation, for the proposition that equitable doctrines of confidentiality developed for dealings between private individuals should not be too readily applied in public administration.5 Second, there is the issue of specifying what doctrines of confidentiality are being referred to. In Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434; 7 AAR 187, the Full Court considered the original wording of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) “would constitute a breach of confidence”.6 The majority held that these words did not replicate just the equitable remedy for breach of confidentiality. Gummow J, in dissent, held to the opposite effect. The Commonwealth enactment was later amended to incorporate Gummow J’s dissent. Subsequent enactments, except the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), have all copied the Commonwealth’s approach to amendment by making explicit reference to causes of action presently recognised in the general law, or to the availability of a remedy for breach of confidence. The second strategy is to invent a description. Under this strategy, the legislation uses a characterisation type test: see [2.3.1460]. The characteristics of the documents origin make no reference to existing ideas of confidentiality in the general law. This strategy has been used in addition to, or instead of, the first strategy in five jurisdictions. It has the result that a broader range of material falls within the exemption than under the first strategy.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 45; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 45 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 8; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (Vic), s 35. 2 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 55; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 13; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 39; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 8. 3 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 1(g). 4 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 8. 5 Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86, McHugh JA at 191; Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) v Secretary of Department of Community Services & Health (1991) 28 FCR 291 at 304. In any event, where information has been acquired under statutory powers,

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[2.3.2250]

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6

general law doctrines of confidentiality are irrelevant: Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434; 7 AAR 187 (FC), Gummow J at 442 (FCR). Replaced with the words “would found an action … for breach of confidence” in 1991 by Freedom of Information Amendment Act 1991 (Cth), s 45.

Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia Intended Circumstances of Confidentiality Exemption [2.3.2260] Right to information provisions are of both the characterisation type and the outcome type exemptions: see [2.3.1460]. In some jurisdictions, the protection of the exemption replicates, or is co-extensive with, the general law of confidentiality. In other jurisdictions, the protection extends to information not protected by the general law. Further complicating the division of provisions is that some legislation contains distinct references to both – one to the general law of confidentiality and a second reference to other types of confidential information – while other legislation contains a reference to one but not the other.

Condition Precedent of Confidentiality Exemption [2.3.2270] Those exemptions which refer to circumstances not covered by the general law of right to information have additional requirements. The additional requirements are of three kinds: (1)

if the confider were an agency, the document would be exempt under another provision;

(2)

an additional outcome test (see [2.3.1460]) – that disclosure would harm collection of information of the same nature in the future; and

(3)

the circumstances satisfy the public interest harm test.1

1 The public interest test in all right to information legislation, other than that of South Australia, is qualified as to what issues can be considered.

Exception to the Extent of Confidentiality Exemption [2.3.2280] Exceptions to the exemptions cover three subjects. These are: (1)

trade secrets;

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(2)

a public interest benefit test in Western Australia; and

(3)

a time limit in the Northern Territory.

New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.2290] In New South Wales and Queensland, disclosure of confidential information is a “consideration” (or “factor” under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld)) against disclosure of information for the purposes of the public interest tests in those jurisdictions. The terms of the provisions are broadly similar to the terms of confidentiality exemptions in other jurisdictions.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Found Action for Breach of Confidentiality [2.3.2300] Judicial and tribunal interpretation of the confidentiality provisions have followed the dissenting judgment of Gummow J in Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434; 7 AAR 187.1 With regard to the confidentiality provisions, Gummow J held that the term “breach of confidence” in s 45(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) was to be construed in its technical sense, so that a document is an exempt document only if its disclosure would be actionable at general law.

1 Jorgensen v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2004) 208 ALR 73; [2004] FCA 143, Weinberg J at [77]; Re Kamminga and Australian National University (1992) 26 ALD 585; 15 AAR 297. See also more recent decisions, eg Re Petroulias and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2006) 62 ATR 1175; [2006] AATA 333; Corporate GIS Consultants Pty Ltd & Douglas [2002] ACTAAT 49, Peedom MH at [33]; Taylor v WorkCover Authority (NSW) [2003] NSWADT 186; Re B and Brisbane North Regional Health Authority (1994) 1 QAR 279 applied in Kalinga Wooloowin Residents Association Inc and Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation [2011] QICmr 49; Mentink v Albietz [1999] QSC 9, Muir J at [17]; Bray v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corp (1994) 62 SASR 218, Bollen J at 225–226; BGC (Aust) Pty Ltd v Fremantle Port Authority (2003) 28 WAR 187; [2003] WASCA 250, Heenan J at [14] doubting Re Speno Rail Maintenance Australia Pty Ltd v Government Railways Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 2997 of 1997, 20 October 1997).

Information of Confidential Nature [2.3.2310] Some courts and tribunals have considered the alternative limb of the confidential exemption. Like many other exemptions, this requires two tests: 199

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(1)

a characterisation test; and

(2)

a harm test.

Comments on this test are few. In Re Perth Radiation Oncology Centre and Department of Health [2002] WAICmr 5, the adjective “confidential” was given a broad meaning “in the sense that it was not generally known”.1 There, the Information Commissioner of Western Australia held that the attribute of confidentiality had been lost by the passage of time. In Re Lapham and Offıce of the Community Advocate (1998) 53 ALD 485; [1998] ACTAAT 289, the Australian Capital Territory Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that information which was now known to the applicant could no longer be called “confidential”, except in some exceptional cases: [C]ases involving high issues of national security or sensitive undercover police investigations where it is important in the public interest to avoid official acknowledgment of the existence of a document.2

1 Re Perth Radiation Oncology Centre and Department of Health [2002] WAICmr 5, the Information Commissioner at [25]. 2 Re Lapham and Offıce of the Community Advocate (1998) 53 ALD 485; [1998] ACTAAT 289, Curtis P at [10] followed in Deacon v Australian Capital Territory [2001] ACTSC 8, Higgins J at [82].

Obtained in Confidence [2.3.2320] In Re Jephcott and Secretary of Department of Health (1985) 7 ALD 215, the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that the question of whether information was “obtained in confidence” meant being obtained on the basis of an express or implied understanding of confidence.1 This question is one to be decided in all the circumstances of the case.

1 Followed in Re Askew and City of Gosnells [2003] WAICmr 19.

Harm Test [2.3.2330] Assessment of the likelihood of damage in the future to collection of confidential information is an uncertain prediction. In Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, the Court held that:

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The question then is, would disclosure of the information sought impair (ie damage) the ability of the [agency] to obtain similar information in future … It may be noted that it is the ability of the [agency] that must be impaired.1

1 Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, the Court at 872. In Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) v Sifredi (2000) 16 VAR 347; [2000] VSC 33, Hedigan J at [18] observed that proof of harm for the purposes of this test “draws in elements of estimation and judgment rather than proof of a likelihood, as might arise about a fact in the litigation context”. In Re Fong & Partners Pty Ltd and Shire of Roebourne [2007] WAICmr 11, the Information Commissioner at [159] applied Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550.

Legal Professional Privilege [2.3.2340] All right to information enactments contain an exemption aimed at preserving the legal professional privilege. The exemption shares with the provisions for exemption of confidential information, reference to an external body of law. Fortunately, it has not been plagued with the interpretative issues which arose with the provisions for exemption of confidential information: see [2.3.2250]–[2.3.2260]. The exemption is allocated to the group for which there is no public interest test. This exemption is an outcome type exemption (see [2.3.1460]), which refers to the event of production in a court. Except in the Northern Territory (where the phrase “would breach legal professional privilege” is used), all legislation uses the phrase “would be privileged from production”. Exceptions to the extent of this exemption concern two issues. Under s 42(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and Sch 1 cl 5(1) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), a privileged document ceases to attract the exemption if the person entitled to claim privilege waives the privilege.1 Under s 42(3) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 42(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT),2 Sch 1 cl 10(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 32(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) and Sch 1 cl 7(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), the exemption does not apply to material which forms part of material an agency must publish because it is routinely used to make decisions affecting members of the public.3

1 Cases on waiver of privilege in this area are no different to those arising in courts of law or tribunals. The cases turn on their facts. For a recent example involving high level legal advice in the development of policy, see British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing [2011] FCAFC 107. An example at a “not-so-high” level of government is Archer and George Town Council

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2

3

(unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 1008247 and 1010166 of 2011, 27 January 2011) (consideration of legal advice in closed session of local council). Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017. Called “operational material” under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), “policy documents” under the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) and “internal manual” under the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Common Law Privilege or Evidence Act Privilege? [2.3.2350] All right to information enactments, except the Information Act 2002 (NT), specify that the legal professional privilege exemption is to emulate a privilege in operation at the stage of “production” rather than “adducement”. Under legislation (other than the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic)), the applicable rule is the common law privilege rather than the statutory privilege (called “client legal privilege”) operating at the stage of adduction of evidence by ss 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).1 The position in New South Wales and Victoria is different. There, the legislation does use the phrase “client legal privilege” as well as the phrase “legal professional privilege”. Hence, the privilege is Evidence Act 1995 privilege.2

1 As to the elements of legal professional privilege, see Privilege and Public Interest Immunity “Introduction” [16.7.170]; see also Commonwealth v Dutton (2000) 102 FCR 168; [2000] FCA 1466 (FCAFC), which drew a distinction between the common law privilege and client legal privilege, followed in Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2003) 77 ALD 375; [2003] FCA 53, Madgwick J at [20]. See also Re Coffey and Centrelink [2003] AATA 633, Forgie DP at [26]–[30]; Re Schofield and WorkCover (ACT) (2000) 61 ALD 238; [2000] ACTAAT 30, Peedom P at [7]ff, which cites Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; 57 ALJR 749; 14 ATR 713; (ACTAAT), a decision concerned with the common law pre-dating the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) for a description of the privilege to which Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 42 applies (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [2000] 1 Qd R 621; [1998] QSC 231, Williams J at [6] cites a reference to the common law from Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; 61 ALJR 350; Re Anderson and Offıce of Public Service Commissioner (Qld) (unreported, QICmr, Henry IC, 712 of 2005, 7 December 2006), Henry IC at [14]; Re Hassett and Law Society (Tas) (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 811070 of 2009, 28 May 2009); Department of Housing & Works v Bowden [2005] WASC 123, McKechnie J at [14].

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2

CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE

Under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) (now repealed), the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal held, following local changes to the law of evidence, that the exemption was now the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) exemption: Fitzpatrick v Offıce of Liquor & Gaming (NSW) [2010] NSWADT 72.

Contempt of Court and Parliamentary Privilege General [2.3.2360] Documents, the public disclosure of which would be in contempt of a court or which would be an infringement of parliamentary privilege, are affected by an exemption in some right to information legislation.1 The exemptions share with the provisions for exemption of confidential information and legal professional privilege, reference to an external body of law. The policy of this exemption is to ensure that right to information legislation does not override the law of contempt of court and that of protecting parliamentary privilege, so that these bodies are able to regulate their own proceedings, and to operate without interference or obstruction. All the exemption provisions are outcome type exemptions: see [2.3.1460]. All the exemptions are allocated to the group of exemptions without a public interest test. In New South Wales, the subject matter of this exemption is also a “consideration” for the purposes of the public interest test in that State.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 46; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 46 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), ss 4, 14 Table cl 3(c); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 49(c), (e), (f); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 cl 6; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 17; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 12.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.2365] As to what might constitute “an order or direction given by a Royal Commission”, relevant cases include Re Aldred and Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet (1989) 20 ALD 27, Re Altman and Family Court of Australia (1992) 15 AAR 236 and Re Corse and Ministry of Justice (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 6496 of 1996, 13 December 1996). A request for the transcript of an ex tempore judgment of the Family Court falls within this exemption.1 The issue of possible infringement of parliamentary privilege flowing from access under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) has been considered twice in Queensland. The test adopted by the Queensland Information Commissioner has two requirements: the information requested by the access applicant was

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originally created for the purposes of transacting the business of Parliament; and disclosure would impair similar communications.2

1 Re Kobelke and Minister for Planning (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94007 of 1993, 27 April 1994); Loughnam v Altman (1992) 39 FCR 90; 16 AAR 488. 2 See Waratah Coal Pty Ltd and Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning [2012] QICmr 66; Moriarty and Department of Health [2010] QICmr 35.

Documents Affecting Personal Information [2.3.2370] Claims for exemption under the “personal information” head of exemption is one of the more common grounds for non-disclosure. The possibility that the disclosure of material will affect personal information1 is the subject of protection in all right to information legislation. This reflects a policy that personal privacy is worth protecting under access to information legislation.2 Under all legislation, the topic is allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. In some legislation, the provisions for protection of personal information are outcome type exemptions3 while, in others, they are class exemption type provisions:4 see [2.3.1460].

1 For the statutory definition of personal information, see Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 4. The phrase “personal information” is no longer defined in the Freedom of Information Act 1982. It is now defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 3 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 3(a), (b), (g); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 4; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cll 2, 3, 5, Pt 4 cl 6; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 4; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 5; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33(9); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 2 cl 1 (“Glossary”). 2 In Re N and Royal Perth Hospital [2009] WAICmr 21, Bluemmel IC at [44] said “there is a strong public interest in maintaining personal privacy” and “that public interest may only be displaced by some other considerably stronger public interest that requires the disclosure of personal information about another person” (emphasis added). 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47F; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 41; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 56; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 6. 4 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 36; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 3. For the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009

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(Qld), the position is different. Issues of potential harm caused by disclosure of personal information are public interest “factors” or “considerations” against disclosure that must be taken into account by the decision-maker.

Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia Intended Circumstances for Personal Information Exemption [2.3.2380] The intended circumstances for the personal information exemption in all right to information laws is disclosure of, or non-interference with “personal information”,1 “information concerning the personal affairs”2 or “privacy”.3 These terms are defined in all legislation. The terms “personal affairs”, “personal information” and “privacy” are all, in lay usage, broad terms. They share in common the idea of attributes, or activities of a particular natural person, which exist in distinction to the person’s membership in any sort of group. In contrast to other exemptions which replicate doctrines from the general law (eg the legal professional privilege exemption), there is no existing legal notion, or at least no coherent existing legal notion to which to refer. Australian common law does not presently recognise a tort of privacy and common law doctrines of contract or equitable notions of confidentiality provide only fragmentary coverage of the notion.4 The solution to these problems is twofold. The first solution, used elsewhere than in South Australia and Victoria, is to divide the definitions of “personal information” and the like into two components. The first component is any information somehow concerned with an individual. The second component is that the identity of the concerned individual must be apparent from the information. It is the second component that clarifies the potential ambiguity of the first component. The second solution, used in the South Australian and Victorian definitions, is to limit the type of information. The South Australian definition lists a range of types of information from “personal qualities” to “criminal records”.5 The Victorian legislation focuses on address, location and identity. Here, the potential range of attributes or activities is narrowed.6

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47F; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 41 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 36; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 3. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 6; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33. 3 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 56.

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4 5 6

See Human Rights “Privacy and Common Law” [21.11.140]; “Breach of Confidence” [21.11.650]. Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 4(1). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33(9).

“Unreasonable” [2.3.2390] A further requirement of the exemption case in most right to information laws is a test of harm, that is, the disclosure or interference be “unreasonable”.1 Section 56(1)(a) of the Information Act 2002 (NT) requires “interference”, which is undefined. The adjective “unreasonable” is concerned with fairness or acceptability, not the likelihood of the disclosure or interference occurring.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47F; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 40 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 56(1)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 6; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33.

[2.3.2400] The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) and Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) confine the issue of what is “unreasonable” disclosure. The restrictions are: (1)

(2)

Commonwealth: (a)

the extent to which the information is well known;

(b)

whether the person to whom the information relates is known to be (or to have been) associated with the matters dealt with in the document;

(c)

the availability of the information from publicly accessible sources; and

(d)

any other matters that the agency or Minister considers relevant.1

South Australia: (a)

(3)

in respect to documents about certain classes of people, to “having regard to the need to protect that person’s welfare”.2

Victoria: (a)

prescribes a mandatory consideration in deciding if disclosure is

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“unreasonable”: whether disclosure would endanger life.3

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47F(2). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 6(3a)(b). 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33(2A).

Public Interest [2.3.2410] Consideration of the public interest is required in all right to information legislation, but the requirement is located in different parts of the provisions. In the Commonwealth, Northern Territory and Tasmania, it is a harm type test and occurs as a pre-condition – a document is only exempt if disclosure is contrary to the public interest. In Western Australia, it is a benefit type public interest test and occurs as an exception to the intended extent of the exemption. If disclosure is in the public interest, then otherwise exempt material is not so. In legislation which uses an outcome test (see [2.3.1460]) of “unreasonable disclosure” (see [2.3.1220]), the adjective “unreasonable” implicitly requires advertence to the public interest: see [2.3.2540].

Exceptions to Intended Extent of Personal Information Exemption [2.3.2420] All right to information laws have exceptions to the intended extent of the personal information exemption. One that is common to all legislation is about documents or information concerning the applicant themselves. However, the legislation stipulates that the excepted information or document must be only about the applicant.1 The Western Australian legislation has other exceptions.2

1 The constructions expressing the exemption exception vary in complexity from the simple (“other than the person making the application” – Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 36) to the complex (“by reason only of the inclusion in the document of matter relating to the applicant” – Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47F(3)). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 3(3), (4), (5).

Proviso to Exceptions of Personal Information Exemption [2.3.2430] The personal information exemption is altered in all right to information legislation by provisos that extend or limit what would otherwise be the circumstances to which the exemption applies. All legislation extends the range of natural people to deceased people. In some

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[2.3.2430]

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legislation, this extension is limited in time.1 In the Information Act 2002 (NT), an interference with privacy can be “unreasonable”, although it arose “from or out of” a public duty.2 In South Australia, disclosure of untested allegations of criminality is explicitly included in the range of information covered by the provision, if disclosure is unreasonable.3 As well, the South Australian law has a specific broadening of the information protected where the subject of the information is a child, or a person suffering from a disability.4 In Victoria, the exemption is read down by the Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) and the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic).5

1 Information Act 2002 (NT) – 5 years; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) – 25 years. 2 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 56(2). 3 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 6(2). Applied in Trafford v Police (SA) [2014] SADC 121 and Pages Hire Centre (NSW) Pty Ltd and Boros v Department of Premier and Cabinet [2014] SADC 3. 4 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 6(3a). 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33(7), (8).

Exemption Procedure [2.3.2440] Most of the provisions protecting personal information have specific procedures for granting access: see [2.3.1210]–[2.3.1230]. These procedures are of two kinds: (1)

in the situation where the material concerns a third person, there is a duty to consult the third person; or

(2)

if the material concerns the applicant and the decision-maker believes release of the material will harm the applicant, then a type of access through a responsible professional.

New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.2450] The subject matter of personal information is, in New South Wales and Queensland, allocated to the statutory procedure used where disclosure of material is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. The terms of the New South Wales provision are: [C]ould reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects: (a)

reveal an individual’s personal information; or

(b)

contravene an information protection principle under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) or a health privacy principle under the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW).1

The verb “reveal” and the noun phrase “personal information” are both defined

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terms.2 The definition of “personal information” follows the example in other States in which the focus is upon whether the identity of the concerned individual must be apparent from the information. However, the definition differs to others in that it includes certain things, such as fingerprints, but excludes others. These additional features, and the references in note 3(b) to local privacy laws, distinguish these provisions from the personal information exemption provision of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) (now repealed). The terms of the Queensland provisions3 have the same focus as interstate provisions but are not as complex, containing only one explicit exception for information about the applicant.4 Like the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) provisions, the term “personal information” is a defined term which adopts the definition in the local privacy law, the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). That definition (in s 12) also follows the example in other States in which the focus is upon whether the identity of the concerned individual must be apparent from the information.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 3(a), (b). 2 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 4 cll 1, 4. 3 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 3 Pt 3 cl 3, 4, 5, Pt 4 cl 6. 4 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 4 cl 6(2).

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary “Personal Affairs” [2.3.2460] The concept of “personal affairs” is confined to natural persons.1 The definition of “personal affairs” would not extend to information about a department or agency. It refers to information about an individual who can be identified.2

1 A corporation could not have “personal affairs” within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth): News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J at 72; adopted in McKinnon v Nepean Blue Mountains Local Health Network [2012] NSWADT 86, Molony JM at [197]; Christian Youth Camps Ltd v Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd [2014] VSCA 75, Neave JA at [414]; see also Fendley Consultancy Pty Ltd and Queensland Treasury and Trade [2013] QICmr 11, Corby AIC at [32] and [33]. 2 Kristoffersen v Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business [2002] FCA 55, Kiefel J at [25]; see also University of Melbourne v Robinson [1993] 2 VR 177; Re Edwards and Electricity Corp t/as Western Power Corp [1999] WAICmr 13, the Information Commissioner at [97].

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[2.3.2470] Judicial and tribunal interpretation of the phrase “personal information” and its analogues have tended to stress the breadth of the concept. In the federal jurisdiction, the leading case just predates the 1991 amendment that introduced the current term and definition. In Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261, Lockhart J (with whom Jenkinson and Heerey JJ agreed on this point) preferred an approach which allowed that “personal affairs” (the term used before the 1991 amendments) connoted “information which concerns or affects the person as an individual whether it is known to other persons or not”.1 His Honour said that it was: [U]nwise to substitute for the word “personal” some other word such as the word “private” because one generally accepted meaning of the word “private” is confidential or not widely known. In my opinion a person’s affairs may be personal to him notwithstanding that they are not secret to him.2

There has been no suggestion since then that these observations did not survive the 1991 amendments. In South Australia, the phrase has been considered twice, and neither case has offered an explication of the term.3

1 Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Lockhart J at 436 (FCR). 2 Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Lockhart J at 436 (FCR). His Honour noted, however, that “if something is notorious about a person and recorded in a document, this may provide in a given case cogent evidence to justify the finding that its disclosure would not represent an ‘unreasonable disclosure’ of the information”: at 436 (FCR). 3 In City of Unley v Warnecke (2004) 232 LSJS 432; [2004] SADC 48, Anderson J at [37] concluded: “As was held in [Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414] … ‘personal affairs’ is ‘an expression inherently incapable of precise or ‘exhaustive definition’’ (p 430)”. In Priebe v Police (SA) [2007] SADC 119, Boylan DCJ at [10] considered a document called an “officer history report” kept by the South Australia Police and concluded it fell within the classification “information concerning the personal affairs of any person”.

[2.3.2480] The approach in other jurisdictions is to look to whether a person can be identified from the document or information. The only consideration of the phrase “personal information” within the Queensland jurisdiction is SYT and Department of Health (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 270019 of 2009, 15 March 2010), where the Information Commissioner briefly observed: Personal information can be any information that is associated with an identifiable living individual, including a person’s name.1

In Victoria, the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) in 2000 introduced s 33(9). It had the effect of shifting the emphasis of the 210

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criterion for “personal information”. The amendment changed the emphasis to whether an individual’s identity could be discerned: [I]f the document is capable, either directly or indirectly of identifying a particular person whose affairs are mentioned. Whether there is disclosure will depend on a close examination of the information in each particular case.2

In Western Australia, the current Information Commissioner has made the same observation about the Western Australia law: [T]hat any information or opinion about a person – whether living or dead – from which that person can be identified is prima facie exempt information under [Sch 1 cl 3(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA)].3

1 SYT and Department of Health (unreported, QICmr, Kinross IC, 270019 of 2009, 15 March 2010), Kinross IC at [30]. 2 Beauchamp v Department of Education [2006] VCAT 1653, Coughlan DP at [42]. 3 Re Ravlich and Attorney-General (WA) [2010] WAICmr 5, the Information Commissioner at [28]. However it was noted in that case, as well as the earliest from an Information Commissioner of Western Australia (Re Kobelke and Minister for Planning (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94007 of 1993, 27 April 1994) at [68]) that usually “the definition suggests that disclosure of the document, ordinarily, must reveal something more about an individual, other than his or her name to attract the exemption”.

“Unreasonable” [2.3.2490] Courts and tribunals have developed lists of factors that guide decision-makers in assessing whether a disclosure would be unreasonable. In the first place, the lists are based on a balancing approach. Whether “or not disclosure would be unreasonable is a question of fact and degree which calls for a balancing of all the legitimate interests involved”.1 The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has said that whether a disclosure is “unreasonable” requires consideration of all the circumstances, including: (1)

the nature of the information that would be disclosed;

(2)

the circumstances in which the information was obtained;

(3)

the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent;

(4)

whether the information has any current relevance;

(5)

the public interest recognised by the Act in the disclosure of information; and

(6)

the public interest in protection the personal privacy of a third party.2

This list of factors was applied by the Victorian AAT in Re Page and 211

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Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243.3 More particularly, this balancing of interests requires a consideration of all the circumstances, including: (1)

the interest that the applicant has in the information in question;

(2)

the nature of the information that would be disclosed;

(3)

the circumstances in which the information was obtained;

(4)

the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent; and

(5)

whether the information has any current relevance.

1 Wiseman v Commonwealth (unreported, FCA, Sheppard, Beaumont and Pincus JJ, 167 of 1989, 24 October 1989). 2 Re Chandra and Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1984) 6 ALN N257 (AATA), Hall DP at 70 followed in City of Unley v Warnecke (2004) 232 LSJS 432; [2004] SADC 48 at [40]; Re Australian Broadcasting Commission and Police (TAS) (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 709005 of 2007, 23 May 2008), the Tasmanian Ombudsman at 3. 3 Re Page and Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243 (VicAAT), Jones P at 245–246. Approved in Police (Vic) v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223; [2008] VSCA 218, Weinberg JA and Pagone AJA at [77] (disapproved by Maxwell P at [22]). This list of factors has been applied in South Australia: see Moore v Department for Education and Child Development [2014] SADC 49.

Financial or Business Affairs Overlap with Personal Affairs [2.3.2500] The financial or business affairs of a person may also relate to his or her personal affairs. In News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J held that the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) “clearly indicates a dichotomy between business and non-business affairs”.1 In Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544, however, the Federal Court said that information relating to a person’s personal affairs embraced “information concerning … domestic responsibilities or financial obligations”.2 In relation, however, to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), a wide view has been taken of what kinds of financial and business information may relate to the subject’s personal affairs. Thus, it may not be appropriate in this instance to assume a dichotomy between personal affairs and business affairs.3

1 News Corp Ltd v National Companies & Securities Commission (No 4) (1984) 1 FCR 64, Bowen CJ and Fisher J at 70.

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Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544 (FCA), the Court at 539. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6, the Court at 69 (VR) found that references in documents to the “business transactions” of certain persons, which concerned their ownership of a hotel and its business, “were matters of their private concern” and thus related to their personal affairs.

Personal Identifiers [2.3.2510] Personal identifiers, such as name, address and telephone number, do not necessarily relate to the subject’s personal affairs. Whether these personal identifiers do or do not constitutive “personal information” or “information relating to personal affairs” depends upon the context.1 Although some judges have held that usually a name is not “personal information”,2 others have thought that in many situations, a personal identifier, such as a name or address, will in its context relate to the subject’s personal affairs. In Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261, it was held that information about the identity of a telephone nuisance caller which revealed the reasons for the calls, “plainly” related to the caller’s personal affairs.3 The context may, however, permit a conclusion that information revealing a person’s name does not relate to his or her personal affairs. In Commissioner of Police (NSW) v District Court (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 606, Kirby P held that: [T]he name of an officer or employee doing no more than the apparent duties of that person could not properly be classified as information concerning the personal affairs of that person. The affairs disclosed are not that person’s affairs, but the affairs of the agency.4

1 Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Lockhart J at 268–269 (FCR). For example, in Re Wels and Department of Premier & Cabinet (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, Ombudsman Allston, 99 of 2009, 29 September 2009), the Tasmanian Ombudsman held, because of the circumstances there, that while the name of a person was not “personal information” under the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) (now repealed), his home address was so. In Western Australia, the Information Commissioners have taken a much broader view in holding that personal identifiers, such as a name or signature, are “personal information”: Re Johnson and State Government Insurance Commission (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1395 of 1994, 29 May 1995); Re Edwards and Electricity Corp t/as Western Power Corp [1999] WAICmr 13, the Information Commissioner at [98]. 2 Commissioner of Police (NSW) v District Court (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 606; Queensland v Albietz [1996] 1 Qd R 215. 3 Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Heerey J at 440 (FCR); Priebe v Police (SA) [2007] SADC 119, Boylan J at [10]; Re Simons and Victorian Egg Marketing Board (No 1) (1985) 1 VAR 54

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4

(VicAAT); but see Re Di Falco and Kingsborough Council (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 803013 of 2008, 25 August 2008) in relation to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) (now repealed). Commissioner of Police (NSW) v District Court (NSW) (1993) 31 NSWLR 606, Kirby P at 625; see also Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429; 13 AAR 261 (FC), Heerey J at 440 (FCR).

Work Performance [2.3.2520] Whether or not to characterise information about a person’s work as “personal information” has proved the most contentious aspect of the personal affairs exemption. In those jurisdictions where the definition of “personal information” (or “information in relation to personal affairs”) does not now emphasise the issue of identifying the person, there is a large body of case law that is difficult to reconcile. In the federal jurisdiction, there are cases that contain statements of principle which go both ways. In Re Williams and Registrar of Federal Court (1985) 3 AAR 529, it was held that “ordinarily information as to the work capacity and performance of a person is not private” in the sense that it did not “refer to matters of private concern to an individual”.1 However, in Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544, the Court concluded that: [I]t cannot be laid down by way of definition that an assessment of the capacity or previous work performance of an employee or prospective employee necessarily contains “information relating to the personal affairs” of that person. Equally, however, it is not permissible to construe the phrase … as being incapable of application to information contained in an assessment of capacity or work performance.2

The Commonwealth and Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunals have often managed to find that information concerning aspects of a person’s employment did relate to personal affairs.3 Where such information concerns the person’s income or personal financial situation,4 there can be little quarrel with the result. In some cases, however, the conclusion seems strained.5

1 Re Williams and Registrar of Federal Court (1985) 3 AAR 529 (AATA), Beaumont J at 532. 2 Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544, the Court at 538–539. 3 Decisions after Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 8 AAR 544 illustrate how easily matters relating to employment may be found to relate to personal affairs: see Re Toomer and Department of Primary Industries & Energy (1990) 12 AAR 16 (AATA); Bleicher v Australian Capital Territory Health Authority (1990) 24 FCR 497; 12 AAR 246. The Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal has readily held that such information does relate to personal affairs: see Re Pescott and Victorian Tourism Commission (No 2) (1988) 2 VAR 437.

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Re Atkinson and Public Transport Commission (Vic) (1992) 5 VAR 255, Dimtscheff DP at 280. Re Toomer and Department of Primary Industries & Energy (1990) 12 AAR 16 (AATA), Dwyer SM at 26–27.

Information with “Public Character” [2.3.2530] There is some disagreement as to whether information which has a “public character” may relate to a person’s personal affairs. In Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85, the information related to a person in her capacity as a pilot employed by the Queensland government. More particularly, Beaumont J said that “each of the documents relate to the administration by the Department of the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth) and the Air Navigation Regulations 1947 (Cth) thereunder”.1 Thus: [T]he applicant, it is true, is the subject of the documentation but the documents are concerned exclusively with the public regulation of air navigation. The result is that the documents have a public, rather than a private, character.2

The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal has said that a person’s “personal affairs” did not embrace: (1)

matters of concern or interest to or matters or doings which pertained to him or her;

(2)

matters that related to a group of which he or she was a member; and

(3)

matters where he or she had acted as a representative of a group.3

1 Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85, Beaumont J at 89. 2 Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85, Beaumont J at 89. 3 Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414, Hall DP at 433–434 (AAR).

[2.3.2540] Whether a disclosure would be unreasonable requires a consideration of a number of matters, including the public interest in disclosure. Whether “or not disclosure would be unreasonable is a question of fact and degree, which calls for a balancing of all the legitimate interests involved”.1

1 Wiseman v Commonwealth (unreported, FCA, Sheppard, Beaumont and Pincus JJ, 167 of 1989, 24 October 1989); Russell Island Development Association Inc and Department of Primary Industries & Energy (1994) 33 ALD 683, Forgie DP at 694; Re Scholes and Australian Federal Police (1996) 44 ALD 299, the Tribunal at 343.

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Information about Applicant [2.3.2550] One exemption exception contained in right to information legislation is that the document or information in question concerns the applicant. This exception is interpreted broadly and raises few problems.1 In Ward v Centrelink [2005] FCA 73, the documents sought were arguably about the applicant, but the Court rejected the application of this exception because the documents also contained information about other people.2 Another and implied restriction on this exception is that the exemption cannot be waived by the applicant where the document or information extends to opinions expressed by others about that person.3 This is so because the expression of opinion might also be about the author of the opinion. It has been said that the test to determine if information is “joint” is: [T]o ask whether the quality or completeness of the information relating to the applicant is diminished or impaired by deleting reference to the third party’s affairs. If it is not diminished or impaired, the probabilities are that the information with respect to the third party does not relate to the applicant.4

1 Re S and Retirement Benefits Fund Board (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 72 of 2010, 16 March 2010) concerning the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) (now repealed). A case where this was not so was Milton v City of Unley [2008] SADC 116, where the person concerned was deceased and the issue was whether the person’s son, the appellant, should be treated as their legal representative in the absence of a will. The Court concluded that it would do so. 2 Ward v Centrelink [2005] FCA 73, Mansfield J at [37]. See also Re Mackenzie and Western Australia Police [2011] WAICmr 28 where the information about the applicant was inextricably mixed with information about third persons. 3 Kristoffersen v Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business [2002] FCA 55, Kiefel J at [28]. 4 Re Anderson and Australian Federal Police (1986) 11 ALD 355; 4 AAR 414, Hall DP at 427 (AAR) (where the joint information concerned a charge made against the applicant and a third party). In Re Thomas and Royal Women’s Hospital (1988) 2 VAR 618 (VicAAT), Galvin DP at 622, it was decided that the identity of a person’s mother was simultaneously a personal affair of that person in the context of a document relating to that person’s birth and a personal affair of the mother.

Medical Information [2.3.2560] In Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, the Victorian Supreme Court accepted an argument that the now-repealed s 33(4) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) carried with it the implication that a person was entitled to medical records subject to that provision.1 Section 33(4) provided that where a request was made to an agency or Minister for access to a document that contained medical information concerning the person making the request, and it appeared that the

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disclosure of the information to that person might be prejudicial to their physical or mental health or well-being, then access to the document should not be granted, and instead the document should be given to a qualified medical practitioner.

1 Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, Gray J at 882; see also Re K and Department of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 354; Re A and Health Commission (Vic) (1985) 1 VAR 108 (VicAAT).

Business Affairs of Third Persons Legislation [2.3.2570] Each right to information Act contains exemptions concerning the flow to government of information about the business, financial and professional affairs of third persons.1 The policy of the exemption is to reconcile the principal objective of right to information legislation – transparency in government with the needs of business to protect commercially sensitive information.2 Under all legislation, except the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), the topic is only allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. In some legislation, the provisions for protection of business information are outcome type exemptions, while in others they are class exemption type: see [2.3.1460].3

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), ss 47, 47G; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 43 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 4; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 57(1)(b), (3)(b); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 3 cll 2, 15, Pt 4 cl 7; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 7; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), ss 38, 39; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 34(1); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 3. 2 Re Morris and Forestry Tasmania (No 1) (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 610001 of 2007, 3 April 2007); Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39; Re Kimberley Diamond Company NL and Department for Resources Development [2000] WAICmr 51. 3 For the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the position is different. Issues of potential harm caused by disclosure of business affairs information are public interest “factors” or “considerations” against disclosure that must be taken into account by the decision-maker.

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Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia Intended Circumstances of Business Affairs Exemption [2.3.2580] Like the law enforcement exemption, the requirements of the intended circumstances of the business affairs exemption form a complex network of terms. The elements of this exemption can be broken into two or three sets (see [2.3.2590]) whose individual elements can be combined in many variations. This network is further complicated by the allocation of some of the “divisions” to the group of exemptions without a public interest test, and the allocation of others to the group with a public interest test. The overall effect is an attempt to give as much protection as possible to the flow of information of a business or commercial nature.

Without Public Interest Test [2.3.2590] Protection of a small selection of the varieties of information from a third party of a business or commercial nature does not require a public interest test. The selection is divided between a class exemption type and two outcome type exemptions (see [2.3.1460]): (1)

disclosure of a trade secret;

(2)

some likelihood1 of diminution in the value of commercially valuable information; or

(3)

(in the Australian Capital Territory only) some likelihood of prejudice to the future supply of information.

1 The phrase “could reasonably be expected to” is employed in all right to information legislation. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47(1)(b) also uses the simpler phrase “would be”.

Public Interest Test [2.3.2600] The majority of exemptions protecting the flow of information from a third party of a business or commercial nature use a public interest test. This is done in two ways. The first way is by explicit reference to a harm type or benefit type public interest test: see [2.3.830]. The second way is by an implicit reference. The exemptions are all outcome type exemptions (see [2.3.1460]):

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(1)

disclosure of information of a business, commercial or financial nature, other than information protected by the variations with no public interest test;

(2)

some likelihood of harm as a result of the disclosure;

(3)

harm in the nature of commercial disadvantage;1 and

(4)

(in the Northern Territory and Victoria) a harm type public interest test as an exemption condition.

1 Various constructions are employed to express the nature and extent of harm. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017), Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) and Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) employ a simple construction: “adversely affect”. The Information Act 2002 (NT) uses “expose … to disadvantage”. The Freedom of Information Act 1991 and Freedom of Information Act 1992 also use the phrase “diminish the commercial value of information”. The Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) employs the more complex description: “expose … to competitive disadvantage”.

Pre-Condition for Business Affairs Exemption [2.3.2610] All right to information legislation, with the exception of Western Australia, employs exemption conditions concerned with the public interest. These exemption conditions are all harm type tests. In the Northern Territory and Victoria, there are tests of public interest specific to the exemptions. Under other laws, the public interest requirements are those generally for all provisions.

Exceptions to Intended Circumstances of Business Affairs Exemption [2.3.2620] Most right to information legislation provides for exceptions to the exemption for business affairs of third parties. In Western Australia, one exception is a benefit type public interest test: see [2.3.830]. An exception for information about the applicant exists in most legislation.

Exemption Procedure [2.3.2630] Most of the provisions protecting business information have a specific procedure for granting access. This procedure arises in the situation where the material concerns a third person. There is a duty to consult the third person.

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New South Wales and Queensland [2.3.2640] In New South Wales and Queensland, the subject matter of protection for information concerning the business affairs of third persons is allocated to the statutory procedure used where disclosure of material is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest. The terms of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) “considerations” are: (a)

diminish the competitive commercial value of any information to any person; and

(b)

prejudice any person’s legitimate business, commercial, professional or financial interests.1

None of these terms are defined terms. The terms of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) are divided between Sch 4 Pt 3 and Sch 4 Pt 4. Overall, the provisions closely resemble the terms of exemptions in legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia dealing with this subject matter.

1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 4.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Trade Secrets [2.3.2650] Information which would reveal a trade secret is exempt from disclosure.1 In Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28, the Court held that the term “trade secret” is an ordinary term of the English language and approved, as an elucidation of the “basic concept of what is a trade secret”,2 a statement in Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251.3 The upshot of the statement is that a trade secret has three characteristics: (1)

it must be information used in a trade or business;

(2)

“the owner must limit the dissemination of it or at least not encourage or permit widespread publication”; and

(3)

it is “information, which if disclosed to a competitor, would be liable to cause real (or significant) harm to the owner of the secret”.4

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47(1)(a).

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4

JUDICIAL AND TRIBUNAL COMMENTARY

Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 120 (FCR). Applied in Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business v Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 32 AAR 531; [2001] FCA 382, Drummond J at [40]ff. In Re Morris and Forestry Tasmania (No 3) (unreported, Tasmanian Ombudsman, 708009 of 2008, 28 July 2008) and Re Greg Rowe & Associates and Minister for Planning [2001] WAICmr 4, the Ombudsman of Tasmania and the Information Commissioner of Western Australia, respectively, preferred a similar list of characteristics for a “trade secret” first stated in Re Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) 1 QAR 491. Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 120 (FCR).

Information of Commercial Value for Other Reasons [2.3.2660] Information whose commercial value would be diminished or destroyed if revealed is exempt from disclosure.1 In Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business v Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 32 AAR 531; [2001] FCA 382, Drummond J held that: [T]he information must have value to the Department in respect of those of its activities which can be said to bear a commercial, as opposed to an administrative or governmental character.2

In Western Australia, the Information Commissioner summarised earlier decisions as making three points about the phrase “commercial value”: (1)

the term’s assessment must consider the context;

(2)

the term does not require a quantifiable valuation; and

(3)

the term requires the information be valuable for the purposes of a commercial activity.3

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47(1)(b). 2 Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business v Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd (2001) 32 AAR 531; [2001] FCA 382, Drummond J at [58]. 3 Re Zurich Bay Holdings Pty Ltd and City of Rockingham [2006] WAICmr 12, the Information Commissioner at [32]. See also Re West Australian Newspapers Ltd and Salaries and Allowances Tribunal (WA) [2007] WAICmr 20, the Information Commissioner at [115]–[125]. A related test originating in a decision of the Queensland Information Commissioner prior to the 2009 reforms (Re Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) 1 QAR 491) has been widely influential. It proposed two alternatives: (1) the information could be bought and sold (ie it had a “quantifiable valuation”); or (2) it was valuable for the purposes of a commercial activity.

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Information about Professional Activities [2.3.2670] There are several right to information cases which have compared approaches to the characterisation of material as “professional” from different jurisdictions.1 Other cases have commented that it will be difficult to establish that, while acting as such, an employee of an agency has in his or her capacity, any business, commercial or financial affairs material.2

1 Re Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) 1 QAR 491, the Information Commissioner at 510; Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div), Young CJ at 324–325, O’Bryan J at 330–331 (Vincent J agreeing); Re Ralkon Agricultural Co Pty Ltd and Aboriginal Development Commission (1986) 10 ALD 380, the Tribunal at 399, 401. 2 Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85, Beaumont J at 90.

Harm in Nature of Commercial Disadvantage [2.3.2680] What is meant by the description of the harm caused by disclosure in terms such as “disadvantage” or “competitive disadvantage” has seldom been judicially considered. Section 34 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) uses the simple noun “disadvantage” which, in Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322, was held to mean “injury of a financial kind” but not to include mere tactical disadvantages in the context of a disputed claim for compensation.1 Sections 37, 38 and 43 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) uses the phrase “expose … to competitive disadvantage”. In Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J thought the verb “expose” meant no more than its dictionary definition of “lay open to something … [to] subject to risk”.2 He went on to conclude that this phrase had a broad meaning to be construed in a “practical business sense”:3 [S]omething which puts one entity at a disadvantage in relation to a matter which affects its profit making capacity relative to its competitive rivals.4

His Honour thought that such a disadvantage extended to negotiation by a purchaser with suppliers of goods and services.5 In many situations, an adverse effect will be “pecuniary in nature, whether directly or indirectly”.6

1 Accident Compensation Commission (Vic) v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 331. 2 Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J at [41]. 3 Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J at [55].

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Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J at [55]. Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J at [55]. Re Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) 1 QAR 491, the Information Commissioner at 514.

Likelihood of Harm [2.3.2690] The test for harm caused by disclosure of information is predictive. The question asked by the legislation is not whether there is a reasonable basis for a claim that there is presently an adverse effect on such affairs, but whether such an effect could reasonably be expected in the future.1 In Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180, Bowen CJ and Beaumont J expressed the paraphrase “whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous”.2 The comments of the High Court in McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45 on this paraphrase have clarified that the statutory construction assumes a scalar concept of likelihood and places the necessary level of likelihood envisaged by the statutory construction as somewhere above the minimum point (ie more than “not irrational”). Use of the verb “expose” in the statutory constructions implies a risk, rather than a probability.3

1 Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 123 (FCR). 2 Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180, Bowen CJ and Beaumont J at 190. 3 Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, Porter J at [41]; Asher v Department of Innovation, Industry & Regional Development [2005] VCAT 2702, Judge Bowman VP at [38].

Fairness of Harm [2.3.2700] In the context of “harm”, the word “reasonable” is used not only to indicate a likelihood of harm, but also to indicate that the harm must be unfair. The phrase “unreasonably affect” raises the question of fairness and not just the question whether the effect is non-trivial.1 Fairness here, in turn, requires a balancing of conflicting interests.2 In Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28, the Full Court of the Federal Court gave the example of disclosure of information with a strong public interest in favour of disclosure (such as serious criminality)

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notwithstanding the serious personal effect disclosure might have on the person concerned.

1 Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 125 (FCR). 2 Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1992) 36 FCR 111; 16 AAR 28 (FC), the Court at 125 (FCR). See also Asher v Department of Innovation, Industry & Regional Development [2005] VCAT 2702, Judge Bowman VP at [38]: “[N]eed for confidentiality and the need for public accountability and transparency on the part of the government”. In one variation of circumstances under Victorian legislation (matters of a business nature, etc not containing trade secrets), the question of fairness of the harm is structured by rules in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 34(2). These rules were considered in Asher v WorkCover Authority (Vic) [2002] VCAT 369, Megay SM at [34]–[36]. In Stewart v Department of Tourism, Sport & the Commonwealth Games (2003) 19 VAR 363; [2003] VCAT 45, Judge Bowman VP was strongly influenced in his application of these rules by the timing of the requested disclosure relative to the schedule for a commercial undertaking. In Kotsiras v Department of Premier & Cabinet [2003] VCAT 472, Megay SM, in applying these rules to information about an auditing firm’s report on a government program, distinguished between sections of the report setting out expected information, such as the scope of the brief, from other sections which disclosed the details of the firm’s auditing analysis and approach. These cases might be helpful to readers applying the public interest tests contained in the New South Wales and Queensland legislation.

Prejudice to Supply of Information [2.3.2710] There is little case law as to what it means to prejudice the “supply of information” due to disclosure of a document. Apart from some likelihood of prejudice, what would amount to the requisite harm to supply? In the Australian Capital Territory, a threatened boycott in supply of clinically essentially information as a result of disclosure of the identity of clinicians supplying the information was described as a “serious matter”.1 The approach in Ryder v Booth; State Superannuation Board v O’Connor [1985] VR 869, that the risk must be considered as a risk to the ability of government to obtain information from any relevant source in the future, not just the particular supplier in question, has commended itself to the Information Commissioner of Western Australia.2 In New South Wales, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel has held that the existence of a statutory power to compel information does not disbar a claim under this exemption. It is simply one factor.3

1 Re Waterford and Department of Health (ACT) (unreported, ACTAAT, Curtis P, 75 of 1994, 6 February 1995).

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2 3

BUSINESS, FINANCIAL OR PROPERTY INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT

Re Fong & Partners Pty Ltd and Shire of Roebourne [2007] WAICmr 11, the Information Commissioner at [112]–[113]. Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW) v Services Sydney Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADTAP 79, the Tribunal at [76]–[77] in discussing provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) (now repealed – see now Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)).

Business, Financial or Property Interests of Government General [2.3.2720] Just as information about the business affairs of third parties given to government is protected (see [2.3.2570]–[2.3.2710]), so too is information from within government about its own business, financial and property affairs. This protection is done in two ways. First, there are “some-agency exemptions” for government agencies engaged in trade and commerce in respect of these trading or commercial activities.1 Second, most but not all of the “business affairs exemptions” extend to information in the hands of government about commercial dealings by government agencies.2 Third, there is a separate set of provisions concerned with documents, the disclosure of which might have a substantial adverse effect on the financial or property interests of governments. All the applicable “business affairs exemption” provisions3 and all “financial and property interests of government exemptions”4 are allocated to the group of exemptions in which disclosure of documents is not conclusively presumed to be contrary to the public interest.5

1 The criterion for a number of “some-agency exemptions” is the commercial or business affairs of those agencies. In addition, a number of government-owned business organisations are excluded altogether from right to information legislation. 2 For example, in Forestry Tasmania v Ombudsman (Tas) (2010) 20 Tas R 26; [2010] TASSC 39, an agency of the Tasmanian government claimed the business affairs exemption in the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) (now repealed) in respect of information about its commercial dealings as a purchaser of services with a mass media company. 3 These provisions are found in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47G(3); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 43(3) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 4; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 57(3); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 4; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 7(1); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 38(a), (b); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 34(4); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 10(2) – (4). 4 These provisions are found in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47D;

225

[2.3.2720]

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5

Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 39; Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 14 Table cl 4; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 58; Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Sch 4 Pt 4; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), Sch 1 cl 15; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 40; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 36(1)(b); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Sch 1 cl 10(1). For the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) and the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), the position is different. Issues of potential harm caused by disclosure of business affairs information or information about financial or property interests of governments are public interest “factors” or “considerations” against disclosure that must be taken into account by the decision-maker.

Intended Circumstances of Government Business Affairs Exemption [2.3.2730] Although the right to information legislation in all jurisdictions has a common aim (the protection of material concerned with financial affairs, etc), the scope of the provisions varies considerably. At its narrowest (in Tasmania and Victoria), the exemption has a characterisation test (see [2.3.1460]) of whether material is used to assist agencies in conducting transactions concerning financial affairs and so on. At its broadest, the exemption is an outcome type exemption structured, as in other outcome type exemptions (see [2.3.1460]), in three divisions: (1)

likelihood of harm;1

(2)

harm of some kind;2 and

(3)

harm to certain kinds of interests of the jurisdiction.3

In addition, in the Commonwealth, Tasmania and Western Australia, there is protection for information created within an agency from its own research activities.

1 All legislation modulates the risk of harm required by the exemptions through use of auxiliary verbal phrases. The most common is “could reasonably be expected to”. Here the adverb “reasonably” is used as an assessment of the likelihood of events. In the Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory enactments, the simple auxiliary verb “would” is used. 2 The only construction employed to express the nature and extent of harm is “substantial adverse effect”. 3 The phrase used in all legislation, except Western Australia, is “the financial or property interests” of the jurisdiction. In Western Australia, the preferred phrase is “financial or property affairs”.

226

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Public Interest [2.3.2740] All right to information legislation applies a public interest test. In the Commonwealth, the Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania, the test is in the form of an explicit harm type test (see [2.3.740]) as a condition of the exemption. In the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia, there is an explicit public interest requirement of the benefit type (see [2.3.740]) as an exemption exception. Note that the commentary following is not concerned with the “business affairs exemption” for agencies.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary Characterisation Test [2.3.2750] There are few cases on the issue of business, financial or property interests of government as they apply to exempting a document from disclosure. In the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the cases concern the sale or purchase of a good or service.1 In Re Hart and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2002) 36 AAR 279; 51 ATR 1086; [2002] AATA 1190, the Tribunal rejected the submission that documents concerned with taxation collection methods were about the flow of finances to the Commonwealth, in the form of taxation revenue, and hence were about “financial” interest. In Victoria, there is no recorded case where the exemption has been successfully claimed. In any case where the claim has failed, the requirements of the provision have not been explained.2 In Western Australia, no elaboration of the characterisation test has been offered. The Information Commissioner of Western Australia has observed that the exemption acknowledges “the commercial reality that many State and local governments are increasingly engaged in commercial activities”.3 The Western Australian legislation has an extension not present in other legislation to “commercial activities” of government. This extension has been consistently interpreted to refer to things “valuable for the purpose of carrying on the commercial activities of an agency”.4

1 Sale of mineral ore resources: Re Connolly and Department of Finance (1994) 34 ALD 655. Purchase of professional services (social welfare): Re Staff Development & Training Centre and Secretary of Department of Employment, Workplace Relations & Small Business (2000) 30 AAR 330; [2000] AATA 78. 2 See Kosky v Department of Human Services (1998) 13 VAR 420 (VicAAT); Thwaites v Department of Human Services (unreported, VCAT, Preuss SM, 29365 of 1996, 15 227

[2.3.2750]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

3 4

January 1999); Dalla-Riva v Department of Treasury & Finance (2005) 23 VAR 396; [2005] VCAT 2083, Davis VP at [106]. Re Hemsley and City of Subiaco [2008] WAICmr 46, the Information Commissioner at [45]. Re Slater and State Housing Commission (WA) (Homewest) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95248 of 1995, 22 February 1996). In New South Wales, under an equivalent provision in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) (now repealed – see now Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)), there was one case concerning the sale of real property: Retain Beacon Hill High School Committee Inc v Department of Commerce (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 58, the Tribunal at [33].

Harm Test [2.3.2760] The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Western Australian Information Commissioner cases1 on the harm test in the exemption category of business, financial or property interests of government have noted that it employs the same terminology as other exemptions – that of “substantial adverse effects”. They have followed the view of Beaumont J in Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236: In my view, the insertion of a requirement that the adverse effect be “substantial” is an indication of the degree of gravity that must exist before this exemption can be made out.2

The New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel has reached a similar conclusion, that is, that the adjective “substantial” imposes a “tougher test” than the adjective “unreasonable” in the harm test of other exemptions.3

1 See, eg Re Jones and Shire of Swan (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94017 of 1993, 9 May 1994). 2 Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 (FCA), Beaumont J at 249. 3 Retain Beacon Hill High School Committee Inc v Department of Commerce (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 58, the Tribunal at [37].

Procedural Rule System [2.3.2770] Procedural rules, in contrast to “requirements for what counts as” provisions (see [2.3.190]), act on things already existent. In right to information legislation, there are three procedural rule systems: (1)

Access on demand: members of the public have access to material held by government agencies.

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MAKING AN APPLICATION

(2)

Publication: agencies must publish to the world at large some documents.

(3)

Amendment and correction of personal information: members of the public can correct material held by government agencies about themselves.

Access on Demand System [2.3.2780] In contrast to those parts of the legislative schemes listing grounds for exemption, the procedural rules of right to information legislation are comparatively detailed: see [2.3.2790]. It should also be borne in mind that in all political jurisdictions, there is also a quantity of official guidelines on procedural provisions.1 In the absence of case law, these guidelines assume importance in practice.

1 Office of the New South Wales Information Commissioner, Guidelines (available at http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/resources-public-sector-agencies-0, viewed 15 September 2016); Information Commissioner Northern Territory, Guidelines (available at https://infocomm.nt.gov.au/resources/guidelines, viewed 15 September 2016); Office of the Queensland Information Commissioner, Guidelines (available at https://www.oic.qld.gov.au/guidelines, viewed 15 September 2016); State Records of South Australia, FOI in South Australia (available at http://www.archives.sa.gov.au/content/foi-in-sa, viewed 15 September 2016); Ombudsman Tasmania, Right to Information Manual (Ombudsman Tasmania, 2010) (available at http://www.ombudsman.tas.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016); Victorian Government, FOI Online (available at http://www.foi.vic.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016); Office of the Information Commissioner of Western Australia, OIC Guidance (available at http://foi.wa.gov.au/en-us/OICGuidance, viewed 15 September 2016).

Making an Application Proper Application [2.3.2790] All right to information schemes contain rules for the making of a proper application for information. They specify that for an application to be valid under the scheme, an applicant must take certain actions. The following Table lists these rules. All legislative references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated.

229

230 14 days s 15(5)(b) 30 days s 26

Time Limits and Notice Receipt

Period[B] Decision Period[B] Notification Response

s 15(5)(a)

Assistance

s 15(2)

Cth Pt III

ss 15, 24AB(3) s 15(3), (4)

Amendment

Application Form

Access on Demand Rules

14 days s 18(1)(d) 30 days s 25

s 18(1)(c)

ss 14(3), 23(5) s 14

s 14(1), (2)

ACT Pt 3

5 days s 57(1) 20 days s 61

s 51(2)

s 16

s 49

ss 41, 42

NSW Pt 4

N/A s 19(1) 30 days

N/A

s 17(1)[C]

s 18(2)

NT Pt 3 Div 2; Information Regulations 2003 (NT)

Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 2 Varies[A] s 69(2)(b) 40 days s 54

Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 2

s 33

s 24

Qld Ch 3 Pts 1 – 7; Right to Information Regulation 2009 (Qld)

N/A s 14(2) 30 days s 23

N/A

s 15

s 15

s 13

SA Pt 3; Freedom of Information (Fees and Charges) Regulations 2003 (SA)

N/A s 15(1) 20 days s 22

N/A

s 13(6) – (8)

s 13; Right to Information Regulations 2010 (Tas), reg 4 s 13(7)

Tas Pt 2; Right to Information Regulations 2010 (Tas)

Rules for Making Proper Application

N/A s 21 45 days s 27

N/A

s 17

s 17(3)

s 17

Vic Pt III; Freedom of Information (Access Charges) Regulations 2014 (Vic)

N/A s 13(3) 45 days s 30

N/A

s 11

ss 11(2), 14

s 12

WA Pt 2 Divs 1 – 4; Freedom of Information Regulations 1993 (WA)

RIGHT TO INFORMATION [2.3.2790]

Transfer Refusal to Deal Nonpayment of Fees Workload Material Cannot Be Found Deemed Refusal Deferral of Access Grant of Access But with Deletion of Exempt or Irrelevant Material Grant of Access in Form Other Than Requested Grant of Access in Full

ACT s 15

s 14

s 20 s 21

s 19(3)

s 19(1)

Cth s 16

s 29(1)[D]

s 21 s 22

231 s 20(3)

s 20(1)

s 72(1)

s 72(2)

s 74

s 78

s 63(1)

s 60 s 53

s 41(1)(c)[F]

NSW Pt 4 Div 2

[G]

NT s 29

s 68(1)

s 68(4)

ss 73, 75

s 72

s 41

s 33

Qld s 38

s 22(1)

s 22(2)

s 20

s 22

s 18(1) N/A

SA s 16

s 18(1)

s 18(4)

s 18(2)

s 17

s 19(1) N/A

s 16(3)

Tas s 14

s 23(1)

s 23(3)

s 25

s 23

s 25A N/A

s 20(1)(b)

Vic s 18

s 27(1)

s 27(2)

s 24

s 25

s 20

[E]

WA s 15

[2.3.2790] MAKING AN APPLICATION

Cth ACT NSW NT Qld s 17 s 16 N/A s 68(1)(e) Material in Computer Databases Refusal of Access Deemed s 15AC(3)(a) s 61(1) N/A Refusal Workload s s 23(1)(b) N/A 24AA(1)(a)[H] s 24A N/A s 47(3)(e) Requested Material Cannot Be Found s 17(2) s 43 s 47(3)(a) Exempt s 11A(4)[I] Contrary to ss 11A(5), N/A s 58(1)(d) s 47(3)(b) 31B[I] Public Interest s 58(1)(c) s 47(3)(f) Material Otherwise Available Nonpayment of Fees N/A s 37A(2) N/A N/A Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificate [A] Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 2 prescribes notification of receipt in various circumstances. The time limits for notification vary.

232

ss 28(4), 29A(2)

s 14

s 13[I] N/A

ss 23(3), 36

s 23(1)(a) N/A

only in the event of non-compliance by the application,

N/A

N/A

s 12(3)(c)

s 20(1)(b), (c) s 22(5)

s 7[I] s 33(1)[I]

s 26

s 25A(2)

s 20(1)(a) N/A

N/A

s 25A(1)

s 19(1)

s 13(2)

s 53(1)

s 46(1)(c)

WA s 27(1)(g)

s 19(2)

Vic s 23(1)(d)

Tas s 18(1)(b)

SA s 22(1)(f)

RIGHT TO INFORMATION [2.3.2790]

Cth ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA [B] Some provisions prescribe that the time limit is measured in “working days” rather than calendar days. [C] Information Act 2002 (NT), s 17(1) obliges an agency to act “as fairly and openly, as is reasonably possible”. [D] In this regard, the provisions of the charging regime under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) work somewhat circuitously. In short, if the agency notifies the applicant of assessed charges etc and if the applicant does not pay, then the application is deemed to be withdrawn. [E] The duty of a decision-maker under Western Australian law to refuse to deal with an application on the grounds of non-payment of fees appears to be implicit. Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 12(1)(e) requires an application to be accompanied by the prescribed fee. If an application did not have the necessary fee, then the duty of the decision-maker to consider the application would not be enlivened: Re Georgeson and Government Employees Superannuation Board (WA) [2013] WAICmr 10. There is a separate scheme for failure to pay an estimated fee. [F] Under Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Pt 4 Divs 4, 5, there is a separate set of provisions for refusal to deal with an application where the applicant has failed to pay an estimated fee. [G] The duty of a decision-maker under the Information Act 2002 (NT) to refuse to deal with an application on the grounds of non-payment of fees appears to be implicit. Section 18(2A) requires an application to be accompanied by the prescribed fee. If an application did not have the necessary fee, then the duty of the decision-maker to consider the application would not be enlivened. [H] Workload being a potential “practical refusal reason” for the purposes of Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 24: see, eg Dreyfus v Attorney-General (Cth) (2015) 68 AAR 207; [2015] AATA 995. [I] Under Commonwealth, Tasmanian and Victorian legislation, refusal of access on the grounds that material is exempt is not called a “refusal”. Rather, it is a decision that the applicant is not “entitled” to access.

[2.3.2790] MAKING AN APPLICATION

233

[2.3.2790]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

All schemes make a “core” of common requirements. These are: (1)

the application is to be in writing;

(2)

the application fee (if any) is to be paid;

(3)

the application must allow the respondent agency to identify the documents sought; and

(4)

the application is to be lodged with the relevant agency.

In addition, some Acts make a “penumbra” of other formal requirements. Fee requirements are complex and vary from one scheme to the next. The division of these requirements between statute and subordinate legislation varies between schemes. For example, under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT),1 all fees are found in Ministerial Determinations authorised by s 80. By contrast, under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), all fees and charges are stipulated in the statute.

1 Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

Responding Notification and Time Limits [2.3.2800] Right to information legislation imposes time limits on decision-makers. The policy of these provisions is to explicitly require acknowledgment of an application within a specified period and then explicitly set a deadline for a response to the application. If no response is forthcoming by the deadline, then the legislation “deems” a negative response. This allows the applicant to invoke the available appeal rights. There are provisions for extending time limits for the purposes of consultation with third parties, or in the case of complex applications. In addition to time limits, all right to information legislation imposes notification requirements where a decision is made to refuse access. Not only must an applicant be told in a timely manner that a decision has been made, they must also be told exactly what decision has been made and why it has been made. The requirements for notification are both general and specific. Most, but not all, notification provisions require the decision-maker to inform the applicant of the reasons for a decision, the findings on material questions of fact, and refer to the material on which the findings are based.1 In addition, some legislation requires notification of other specific information:

234

[2.3.2820]

RESPONDING

(1)

Commonwealth and Tasmania: the name of the agency and the decision-maker, public interest factors taken into account, and to notify the applicant of their appeal rights;

(2)

New South Wales: the general nature and the format of the records held;

(3)

Queensland and South Australia: s 54 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and s 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) are lengthy prescriptive “codes” for the contents of notices varying between types of outcomes; and

(4)

Victoria and Western Australia: appeal rights.

1 The Information Act 2002 (NT) only requires a statement of “reasons”.

Requirement to Clarify Request for Access [2.3.2810] A right to information application must allow the respondent to identify whatever is sought. This starts a bilateral process. The legislation requires the application to try to represent whatever is sought. The respondent agency, in other provisions, is to be guided by the representation in making its response to the application. This process of clarification is connected to the duty to assist applicants. All right to information schemes impose a duty on agencies to assist applicants clarify their request for access or deal with obvious problems of non-conformity with the legislation. The legislation initially requires the application to “fit” with a capacity of the agency to interpret the application and an ability of the agency to find whatever is sought. The legislation then requires the agency to “fit” its response to whatever is contained in the application. However, if a mismatch occurs in either of the first attempts to “fit”, then other provisions allow the applicant and the agency to later reverse this process by altering the application.1

1 The power to amend an application is not explicitly stated in legislation. Instead the process of interaction described here implies a power in applicants to amend their applications.

[2.3.2820] Examination of a request for access involves understanding the terms of the request for access. This process must involve interpretation of the terms of the request and can involve consultation with the applicant for the purposes of clarifying the terms of the request. However, assistance does not mean that “access to documents” becomes “answers to questions”: The [Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)] is not an Act which gives persons a legally enforceable right to obtain answers to questions asked of government

235

[2.3.2820]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

agencies, or even to have government agencies extract answers to questions from documents in their possession.1

Assessments by a respondent of the clarity of a request have been scrutinised in most of the freedom of information schemes although the issue has not figured in judicial decisions. Two related observations emerge from this commentary – first, that a legally exact clarity of expression in requests, and a corresponding rigour in interpretation of requests is neither required nor desirable;2 and second, that the existence of ambiguity or uncertainty in the terms of a request is to be judged objectively in all the circumstances.3

1 Re Hearl and Mulgrave Shire Council (1994) 1 QAR 557 (QICmr), the Information Commissioner at 567–568. See also Re Cannon and Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd (1994) 1 QAR 491; Re Birney and Attorney-General (WA) [2002] WAICmr 22. 2 Re Patsalis and Commissioner of Police (NSW) (No 2) [2004] NSWADT 185, Britton JM at [34]–[35] (applied in Retain Beacon Hill High School Committee Inc v Department of Education & Training [2006] NSWADT 351, Handley ADP at [11], where Handley ADP applied a “fair and objective reading” test to the terms of a request). See also Grubisic v General Manager of Burwood Council [2004] NSWADT 261, Higgins JM at [27], where Higgins JM noted the express restrictions on the scope of a request found in the terms of the request. In Re Kelly v Department of Finance & Treasury [2001] VCAT 419, Justice Kellam P at [31]–[32], held the purported uncertainty in the terms of a request did not exist because the applicant had responded in detail to earlier questions but the respondent agency had not detailed its residual uncertainty in response to those answers. 3 See Re Burkala and City of Belmont (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 94089 of 1993, 25 August 1994); Re Racehorse Owners’ Association (WA) and Offıce of Racing & Gaming (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95189 of 1995, 1 March 1996) for an explanation of the policy behind this requirement.

Third Party Consultation [2.3.2830] Right to information applications sometimes involve information or documents about third parties. In these situations, legislation provides for consultation or “reverse freedom of information” with the third parties. Third party consultation procedures are limited in all right to information schemes, except the Queensland scheme,1 to specific claims for exemption.2

1 In Queensland, there is a consultation scheme in Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), s 37 that applies to all requests for access. It requires the agency or Minister to hold the view that disclosure “may reasonably be expected to be of substantial concern” to the third party, and then to take steps “that are reasonably practicable … to obtain” the views of the third party.

236

[2.3.2850]

2

EXAMINING

These specific claims for exemption are: interstate relations (Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 26A; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 26 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 54(2)(d); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 30; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 25); business affairs (Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 27; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 27; Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 54(2)(b); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 30; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 27; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 37; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 34; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 33); privacy (Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 27A; Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 54(2)(a); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 30; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 26; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 36; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 32); researchers (Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 54(2)(c); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 28); Aboriginal sacred sites: (Information Act 2002 (NT), s 30). See Dreyfus v Attorney-General (Cth) (2015) 68 AAR 207; [2015] AATA 995, Jagot J at [42]–[49], where Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), ss 27, 27A exemptions were considered.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.2840] Judicial and tribunal commentary on the assorted procedures outlined at [2.3.2780]–[2.3.2830] has been sparse and tends to interpret the consultation duties narrowly. For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Department of Transport (1986) 12 FCR 156, the Full Court of the Federal Court simply repeats the legislative scheme. In Re Andrews and Australian Research Council (2007) 44 AAR 407; [2007] AATA 1026, Forgie DP pointed out that s 27A(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) means that duty to consult for privacy reasons is not automatic – a decision-maker has discretion where one or more of the obstacles to consultation listed there exist. In Western Australia, the Court of Appeal held that in opposing release, the third party bears the onus of proving that access should not be given.1

1 Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines & Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167, Newnes JA at [9] (Martin CJ and Beech J agreeing).

Examining Fact Finding [2.3.2850] No right to information legislation prescribes the method for fact finding. However, some tribunals and courts have commented on these issues. For example:

237

[2.3.2850]

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(1)

In assessing a request, decision-makers should treat documents within the scope of the request one by one, not on a global basis.1

(2)

Decision-makers must have some probative evidence, although proof to a formal standard of balance of probabilities is unnecessary.2

1 Franks v Warringah Council (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 53, the Tribunal at [43]. 2 Manly v Ministry of Premier & Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550, Owen J at 573 (approved in Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Department of Mines & Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167, Newnes JA at [67] (Martin CJ and Beech J agreeing)).

Temporal Requirements [2.3.2860] Examination of a request must be directed to a preliminary question. This question is concerned with at what time an agency’s documents become subject to a request for access – the date of request or at the date of decision upon the request? The only legislation to address this issue is the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) which, in s 27, opts for the date of request. In the Commonwealth, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Re Radar Investments Pty Ltd and Health Insurance Commission (2004) 80 ALD 733; [2004] AATA 166 reversed earlier case law and held that the agency’s duties, and hence its own jurisdiction, occur on the date of request for access. The former Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (see now the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal) held that it is the time of that act when the right of access arises.1 In Western Australia, the only Information Commissioner decision on this point, Re Brown and Police Force (WA) (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 2295 of 1995, 14 July 1995), predates Re Radar Investments Pty Ltd and Health Insurance Commission and relies on the Commonwealth cases not followed in Re Radar Investments Pty Ltd and Health Insurance Commission. There, the Information Commissioner held that the answer depended on the circumstances of each case, including administrative convenience.

1 Birrell v Victorian Economic Development Corp (1989) 3 VAR 358, following Wallace v Health Commission (Vic) [1985] VR 403, which held the applicant’s right to access became an enforceable “right” in strict legal terms at the act of making a valid application.

Transfer [2.3.2870] All right to information legislation allows an agency to transfer an application where another agency holds the material sought. The power of transfer is a unilateral one. It does not require the applicant’s consent.

238

[2.3.2900]

EXAMINING

Deferral of Access [2.3.2880] All right to information legislation allows a decision-maker to grant access but defer provision of material. The legislation varies in the number and complexity of grounds for exercise of this power. It was held in Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 that “the power [to defer] … is one to be exercised, if necessary, in the public interest and thus for the public benefit”.1

1 Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1983) 78 FLR 236 (FCA), Beaumont J at 250.

Deletion of Exempt Material [2.3.2890] All right to information legislation provides for access to edited material. If it is possible for access to be granted to material with exempt or irrelevant material deleted, then an agency can grant access. The legislation varies as to the criterion for deciding if editing is possible. In Western Australia, s 24 of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (WA) uses the term “practicable”. In Police Force of Western Australia v Winterton (unreported, WASCA, Scott J, SJA 1078 of 1997, 27 November 1997), Scott J held that “practicable” referred not only to some physical problem in editing, but also to whether the remaining material lost its meaning or context.1

1 Police Force of Western Australia v Winterton (unreported, WASCA, Scott J, SJA 1078 of 1997, 27 November 1997), Scott J at 16.

Grant of Access in Form Other than Requested [2.3.2900] All right to information legislation allows an applicant to request that access be given in a particular way. However, an agency can refuse to give access in the requested way if to do so will unreasonably interfere with the agency’s operations.1

1 Another reason access might be granted in a form other than that requested is infringement of copyright caused by making copies of documents: Re R and City of Greater Geraldton [2012] WAICmr 25.

239

[2.3.2900]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Grant of Access in Full [2.3.2910] Where a decision is made to grant access in full, right to information legislation provides for a number of possible forms of access. Thus, access can be granted by allowing the applicant to inspect the requested material, or the applicant can be given copies of the requested material. Given that much, if not most, material is now stored in computer databases, there are also provisions stating a procedure for the material to be electronically assembled and presented.

Refusal to Give Access [2.3.2920] Refusal to give access as the response to a request for access can be done on many grounds. Legislation divides between two distinct legal outcomes: (1)

refusal to deal further with a request; and

(2)

refusal of the request.

Legislation is similar in the grounds for one or the other outcome. Thus, all legislation provides for refusal of access to material that is exempt. However, legislation varies considerably in allocation of any given ground for refusal to give access between the two types of outcome. Thus, the ground of refusal to give access because fees have not been paid is, under some legislation, a ground for refusal to deal further with a request, but is a ground for refusal of the request under other legislation.

Refusal to Deal Further with Application [2.3.2930] Right to information legislation contains many grounds for refusal to deal further with an application. The three most commonly used grounds are that: (1)

fees, etc have not been paid;

(2)

to deal with the application will impose an “unreasonable” workload; or

(3)

the material sought cannot be found.

The provisions dealing with refusal to deal with an application on workload grounds and where material cannot be found vary in complexity. There is commonly a requirement for prior notification and comment, and a list of mandatory or permissible considerations in deciding what is an “unreasonable

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workload”, or whether “reasonable” steps have been taken to find material,1 as well as a procedure for notification of the decision.

1 The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) requires that “all” reasonable steps be taken before refusing on this ground. This requirement is more stringent than a requirement that “reasonable” steps be taken, or that the steps taken “need not be exhaustive”: Chu v Telstra Corp Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 505; 42 AAR 100; [2005] FCA 1730, Finn J at [35]. In Collection Point Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2013) 212 FCR 184; 95 ATR 334; [2013] FCAFC 67, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that having to create new software in order to deal with a request for access was, to paraphrase, an “unreasonable workload”. It should be noted that Freedom of Information Act 1982, s 17 deals specifically with requests for access involving computers. The Court noted that several State tribunals considering similar provisions have reached the same conclusion: Re Halliday and Corporate Affairs (1991) 4 VAR 327 (VicAAT); Dimitrijev v Department of Education [1998] QICmr 14; Steadfast Group Pty Ltd v WorkCover NSW [2010] NSWADT 23). Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 26, in the same terms as the Commonwealth law, has been considered by the Information Commissioners of Western Australia. While they have not expressly declined to follow Chu v Telstra Corp Ltd, the test they have applied differs. In Re MacTiernan and Minister for Regional Development [2009] WAICmr 29, the Information Commissioner at [61] stated the following test: “[T]he question is not whether an agency has taken every possible step to locate documents, but whether it has taken all reasonable steps. The adequacy of efforts made to locate documents is to be judged by having regard to what is reasonable in the circumstances …”. See also Re Veale and City of Swan [2012] WAICmr 12. Attorney-General (Cth) v Dreyfus [2016] FCAFC 119 is a recent consideration of the Commonwealth scheme for refusal on the grounds of “unreasonable” workload. The applicant sought FOI a limited range of documents from the Commonwealth Attorney-General: an electronic diary of his appointments made in his Outlook calendar in a weekly format (showing a week to a page for a period of eight months) and in a format containing little information about those appointments). What was sought was, in the main, that the Full Court described (at [17]) was a series of brief and anodyne entries relating to appointments and work arrangements of the Attorney-General then more than 18 months old. The entries in the Commonwealth Attorney General’s diary described who was to be met but not the contents of the meeting. The Commonwealth argued that despite the narrow compass of documents sought the decision-maker would have to conduct extensive and lengthy third party consultations with the persons involved in each appointment (known generally as a “reverse FOI procedure” in respect of documents sought that might affect a third party’s business or professional or financial affairs or a person’s personal privacy as set out in section 27A and 47G of the Commonwealth FOI Act). The Administrative Appeals Tribunal held against this submission on the facts: the nature and quantity of information disclosed in the documents was so limited the decision-maker would not have to “go behind” each diary entry to make a decision whether to release the document or not. The Federal Court agreed, finding no error (in Dreyfus v Attorney-General (Cth) (2015) 68 AAR 207; [2015] AATA 995). The Full Federal Court also agreed, holding (at [24]) that there must be some “rational basis” for

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determining that third parties might be unreasonably affected by an applicant’s FOI request. There was no such basis here.

Refusal of Request for Access [2.3.2940] Right to information legislation shares a number of grounds for making a decision to refuse an application for access. As noted at [2.3.2930], in some legislation those grounds for refusal to further deal with an application which exist in other legislation are grounds for refusal of the application. In addition to these, all legislation shares common grounds for refusal of an application. These are: (1)

Deemed refusal: when the time limit for dealing with a proper request has passed.

(2)

Exemption: the material sought falls within one of the categories of material which is excised from the duty to disclose. In legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, this occurs either because it is in a category whose disclosure is legislatively presumed to be contrary to the public interest, or because its disclosure is considered by the decision-maker to be contrary to the public interest.

In addition to these two grounds for refusal of a request for access, an agency can refuse a request where the thing which is sought is not a thing which can properly be sought under the legislation. This can occur for two reasons: (1)

the thing is not a “document” (which is rare); or

(2)

the thing is a “document”, but there is a specific exclusion of the type of document from those to which the legislation applies (more common).

Finally, some legislation contains provisions for “conclusive certificates” or the like. These are notices that unilaterally declare a document which would otherwise be liable to disclosure as not so liable.1 In practice, these notices are rarely issued.

1 The jurisdictions which retain this procedure are: Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 37A (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), ss 28(4), 29A(2); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 36.

Publication of Information Publication and Inspection Rules [2.3.2950] All right to information legislation, except the Right to

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Information Act 2009 (Tas),1 requires Ministers or government agencies to publish and periodically update information about themselves. This duty to publish exists quite apart from any request for access from a member of the public.

1 Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 12 envisages publication of materials covered in other legislation by publication and inspection rules, but under guidelines issued by the Tasmanian Ombudsman.

Range of Obligations Legislation in Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia [2.3.2960] The rules for publication and inspection provide for two types of obligations. The first is a duty to publish organisational material. The second is a duty to make material in the nature of internal manuals available for inspection and purchase. The duty to publish organisational material takes two forms: (1)

publication as a separate document; and

(2)

publication with the agency’s annual report.

The duty to make material in the nature of internal manuals available for inspection and purchase also takes two forms: (1)

making this material available to the public for inspection and purchase; and

(2)

preparing an index of this material.

Legislation in Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania [2.3.2970] Legislation in the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland1 diversifies the duties for publication and inspection when compared to the other jurisdictions: see [2.3.2960]. Under s 8D of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), the duty to publish is amended to require publication on a website,2 and to require publication not only to the public at large, but also to particular groups.3 Material in the nature of internal manuals must be made available to members of the public. The Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) alters the publication and inspection duties. Organisational material is published in a document called an “agency information guide”.4 The agency information guide

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contains the material in the nature of an internal manual. In addition to this document, an agency must maintain its register of contracts.5 Finally, an agency must separately maintain another document, called a “disclosure log” of information, made available under requests for access.6 The Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2009 (NSW) has a separate set of publication rules for local government. Unlike the publication and inspection rules for other agencies, the rules for local government do not require publication of new documents. Rather, they generally require documents already existing to be available for inspection. The procedural rules for publication and inspection under the Queensland legislative scheme resemble the New South Wales Act. There are three separate requirements: (1)

publication of organisational material;

(2)

disclosure of material in the nature of internal manuals; and

(3)

maintaining a disclosure log of information released under previous requests for access.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Note the exception of Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 8D(3). Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 8D(2)(b). Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 20. Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 27. Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 25.

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.2980] There is very little case law on the information publication requirements of right to information schemes. In Victoria, the types of bodies under s 7(1)(a)(vii) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (“boards, councils, committees and other bodies”) for which the Minister had publication of information duties was considered in Johnston v Department of Education & Training (2006) 24 VAR 467; [2006] VCAT 979. Section 9 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) was overhauled by the Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth). There is no case law on the new publication requirements under the current legislation. However, case law in relation to the old legislation might still be relevant.1

1 See Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 40 AAR 118; 57 ATR 52; [2004] FCAFC 237; Duncan v Chief Executive Offıcer of Centrelink (2008) 244 ALR 129; [2008] FCA 56; Re Redfern

244

[2.3.3000] AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSON’S PRIVATE LIFE

and University of Canberra (1995) 38 ALD 457; Bryant v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [No 2] (1993) 26 ATR 541.

Amendment of Information Concerning Person’s Private Life General [2.3.2990] Under some right to information legislation, a person may request amendment of a record concerned with their private life.1 In RR v Department of Army (1980) 482 F Supp 770, Gesell DJ of the United States District Court expressed the policy reason of the system: Accuracy of government-recorded personnel information is particularly important in our complex and bureaucratically-interrelated society, where an individual’s rights and benefits may well be influenced or determined by what some government agency has to say about him. The prejudice resulting from inaccuracy may affect determinations reached by third parties, public or private, as well as those made by the record-keeping agency.2

The right to information Acts confine the purpose of the amendment system to “the accuracy of official records, not … the merits or legality of the official action recorded in them”.3

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Pt V; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) Pt 5 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), Pt 3 Div 3; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) Pt 4; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) Pt V; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Pt 3. 2 RR v Department of Army (1980) 482 F Supp 770, Gesell DJ at 773. 3 Crewdson v Central Sydney Area Health Service [2002] NSWCA 345, Handley JA at [24]. This applies strongly to attempts to amend evidence or decisions by tribunals or courts (see Bleicher v Australian Capital Territory Health Authority (1991) 101 ALR 17) although a notation on the document might be appropriate: Re Mallet and Edith Cowan University [2008] WAICmr 13, the Information Commissioner at [32].

[2.3.3000] All right to information legislation restricts the object in the procedural rules of the amendment systems. In some, but not all laws, there are explicit restrictions. In the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), Information Act 2002 (NT) and Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), the object is a record containing “personal information”1 – a defined term.2 In the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), the object is a document with information about a person’s “personal affairs”3 – also a defined term.4

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[2.3.3000]

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In the remaining laws the restriction is explicit, but does not involve a rule as to what counts as the object of the amendment procedure.5

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 48; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 31; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 45. In Information Act 2002, the term “record” is not used. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 4(1) (definition of “personal information” which has the same meaning as in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), Dictionary (definition of “personal information”); Information Act 2002 (NT), s 4 (definition of “personal information”); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), Glossary cl 1 (definition of “personal information”). 3 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 30. 4 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 4(1) (definition of “personal affairs”). 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 39 (“information relating to the personal affairs of a person”).

Legal Conditions [2.3.3010] Some legislation qualifies the procedural rules of the amendment system with a precondition. In several statutes, the qualification takes the form of an assumed prior event – access to the documents concerned under the right to information laws.1 In the Australian Capital Territory, there is another limit – the applicant must be an Australian citizen or a person whose presence in Australia is not subject to any time limit imposed by law.2

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 48 (it should be noted that the Commonwealth law extends the assumed prior event to access lawfully provided under a law other than Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 48); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 30; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 39. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48.

Intended Circumstances of Amendment Procedures [2.3.3020] All amendment of personal information systems deal with a claim that information about the private life of a person is inaccurate or misleading in some way. The terminology to label these statutory defects varies little.1 In some legislation, there are other requirements. For example, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and the Freedom of Information Act

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[2.3.3030]

CASE LAW

1989 (ACT) require the document to be one that “has been used, is being used or is available for use by the agency or Minister for an administrative purpose”.2 The Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) requires the document to be “available for use by the agency in connection with its administrative functions”.3

1 “Incomplete, incorrect, out of date, or misleading”: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 48(a); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48(a) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 30(c). “Inaccurate, incomplete, out of date or … [which] would give a misleading impression”: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 39; “Inaccurate, incomplete, out of date, or misleading”: Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 45. 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 48(b); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48(b). 3 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 30(b).

Case Law [2.3.3030] A number of phrases and words from the provisions of right to information legislation have received judicial and tribunal consideration. These include: (1)

“Administrative purpose”: this phrase has also been interpreted broadly as including anything to do with the management of the agency and as extending to all internal activities.1

(2)

“Incomplete”: it has been said that “incomplete” means “not entire or not unqualified”.2 One possible approach to whether a statement is incomplete would be to ask whether the statement is complete in itself (ie intelligible as to what it conveyed) so that reference to some other material is not necessary in order to understand what is being conveyed to the reader – a view that has been taken of the phrase “proper understanding” in s 12 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).3 The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has, however, looked to the quality of the information in the statement in asking whether it presented a complete (in the sense of adequate) picture of the topic addressed by the statements.4 In one AAT decision, it was said that if medical records concerning a person did not reveal that there was a conflict of medical opinion concerning the appropriate diagnosis of that person, then the record would be “incomplete”.5

(3)

“Misleading”: this phrase means leading astray, causing to go wrong, giving the wrong impression. It has also been held to mean delusive, calculated to lead astray or to lead into error.6

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[2.3.3030]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

(4)

“Record”: the Commonwealth and South Australian right to information statutory provisions use both the terms “document” and “record”. While the term “document” is defined (see [2.3.1030]), the term “record” in the amendment system is not. In Re Avery and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2009) 77 ATR 551; [2009] AATA 559,7 the AAT held that “record” was to be given a broad meaning – any physical media upon which information is kept.8 In South Australia, Kronen v Police (SA) (1993) 173 LSJS 3529 held that the term “records” seems generally broader than the term “documents”, and would encompass several or a set of documents.

1 Re Avery and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2009) 77 ATR 551; [2009] AATA 559, Walker DP at [44]. 2 Re Page and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALN N171 (AATA), Gallop J at 173. 3 Re Waterford and Department of Treasury (1983) 5 ALD 193, the Tribunal at 201 (applied in Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85). 4 See Re Toomer and Department of Primary Industries & Energy (1990) 12 AAR 16 (AATA). 5 Re Resch and Department of Veterans Affairs (1986) 9 ALD 380, Hall DP at 385. 6 Re Page and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALN N171 (AATA), Gallop J at 173 (applied in Wright v Minister for Education, Employment & Training [2000] SADC 82, Judge Anderson at [80]). See also G v Health Commissioner (Vic) (unreported, VCC, Rendit J, 27 July 1984), cited in Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 532: “A misleading statement or impression is one which is untrue or is likely to lead to an erroneous conclusion”. 7 Re Avery and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2009) 77 ATR 551; [2009] AATA 559. 8 Re Avery and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2009) 77 ATR 551; [2009] AATA 559, Walker DP at [39]–[40] and authorities cited therein. 9 Kronen v Police (SA) (1993) 173 LSJS 352 (SASC).

Scope of Amendments [2.3.3040] An amendment under right to information legislation may be sought to both statements of fact and opinion.1 In Re Resch and Department of Veterans Affairs (1986) 9 ALD 380, it was said that: [S]tatements of fact concerning a person constitute “information” relating to that person … [such as] matters of fact, capable of objective proof, such as date and place of birth, marital status, children, educational achievements, personal history, work history, medical history and the like.2

That information also included matters of opinion communicated or recorded in respect of the person – matters such as evaluation of personal characteristics, educational performance, work performance, medical diagnoses or prognoses or the like.3 248

[2.3.3050]

FACTUAL STATEMENTS

The external review bodies have not been concerned with the difficulty of drawing the fact/opinion distinction. They have preferred to make case-by-case prudential judgments about whether to amend and, if so, in what manner.4 It is nevertheless a distinction employed in the reasons for decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal decisions.

1 Re Leverett and Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 8 ALN N135 (AATA); Atkins v Police (Vic) (1999) 82 FoI Review 64 (VicAAT); Jeffries v Police (SA) (2003) 225 LSJS 186; [2003] SADC 2; Re Clements and Health Department of Western Australia (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95124 of 1994, 29 November 1995). 2 Re Resch and Department of Veterans Affairs (1986) 9 ALD 380, Hall DP at 385. 3 Re Resch and Department of Veterans Affairs (1986) 9 ALD 380, Hall DP at 385. 4 In respect, however, of the application of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) but subsequent only to its amendment in late 1991, it is important to make the distinction. The effect of Freedom of Information Act 1982, s 58AA(1) is that the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) may only decide to require an amendment of a record of opinion when it finds as a fact that either (or both) “the opinion was based on a mistake of fact” (s 58AA(1)(a)) or “the author of the opinion was biased, unqualified to form the opinion or acted improperly in conducting the factual inquiries that led to the formation of the opinion” (s 58AA(1)(b)): Re Close and Australian National University (1993) 31 ALD 597 (ACTAAT), the Tribunal at 601 (which considered former s 55(6)(c), which contained this provision at the time of that case). This provision reflects the thrust of the Commonwealth AAT decisions made prior to the insertion of former Freedom of Information Act 1982, s 55(6)(c) (see now s 58AA(1)), but does not permit as broad a challenge to opinions as those earlier decisions allowed.

Factual Statements [2.3.3050] The scope to allege that the facts stated in a record are incorrect depends upon what the record purports to assert as a statement of the facts. For example, with regard to a statement of the content of an interview, an inaccurate statement of what was said in the interview may be corrected, but the correctness of any fact asserted by one of the parties to the interview may not be corrected.1 With regard to a statement of the reason for some action taken, the basis of that reason cannot be corrected.2 If the record purports to state the facts, then the correctness of any such statement may be challenged. In some cases, the external review body has conducted a lengthy hearing.3 In other cases, however, it has been suggested that decision-makers

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and review agencies should not be put to the expense of such a lengthy process.4 In certain situations, the body may take the view that it cannot resolve disputed questions of fact.5

1 Re Scrivanich and Australian Taxation Offıce (unreported, AATA, Ballard SM, No S83/54, 27 October 1983). 2 See Re Olsson and Australian Bureau of Statistics (1986) 10 ALN N48 (AATA); Re Setterfield and Chisholm Institute of Technology (No 2) (1986) 1 VAR 202 (VicAAT), Lewis M at 209. 3 See Re Toomer and Department of Primary Industries & Energy (1990) 12 AAR 16 (AATA). 4 Re Warren and Department of Defence (1994) 54 FoI Review 86 (AATA), Allen SM at 96: “It is not possible or realistic … to expect the Tribunal to make an affirmative finding as to whether or not 13 years ago a Warrant officer Grade 1 told the Applicant that his standard of dress was poor and to do something about it. Furthermore it is questionable whether the Tribunal has even the powers to make these enquiries.” To some extent, however, that Tribunal did receive evidence in order to exercise its powers under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 49. 5 As in Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 540. But other decisions have come to the conclusion that some disputed statement of fact in a record is inaccurate.

Statements of Opinion [2.3.3060] The accuracy of a statement of opinion may challenged. There are four alternatives for a claim to amend an opinion:

be

(1)

the facts underlying such opinion have been thoroughly discredited or have been demonstrated to be totally inadequate;

(2)

the person forming such opinion was tainted by bias or ill will, incompetence or lack of balance, or necessary experience;

(3)

the factual substratum underlying the opinion is so trivial as to render the opinion formed dangerous to rely upon and likely to result in error; and

(4)

the facts upon which the opinion was based were misapprehended.1

In Re Corbett and Australian Federal Police (1986) 5 AAR 291, it was said that it is not enough for an applicant to adduce evidence which establishes merely a conflict in the evidence, being the same conflict which faced the author of the opinion the amendment of which is sought. Such a case would be one where the opinion was: [B]ased on a choice between two sets of factual assertions in conflict with each other. That would seem to be the essence of professional judgment where the factual

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predicates are diverse and it is next to impossible to reconstruct the process by which the opinion was formulated and thereby determine what the opinion would have been.2

1 RR v Department of Army (1980) 482 F Supp 770; Re Resch and Department of Veterans Affairs (1986) 9 ALD 380; Atkins v Police (Vic) (1994) 51 FoI Review 31a (AATA); Re Clements and Health Department of Western Australia (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 95124 of 1994, 29 November 1995). 2 Re Corbett and Australian Federal Police (1986) 5 AAR 291 (AATA), Nicholson DP at 298, referring to RR v Department of Army (1980) 482 F Supp 770, Gesell DJ at 775.

Procedure Introduction [2.3.3070] A request or application for amendment of records may, depending on the jurisdiction, be for its amendment,1 correction,2 correction or amendment,3 or amendment to the information or an annotation of the record of the information4 or both. Account must also be taken of the powers of the agency or Minister once a request or application has been made.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 48 (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 30; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 45. 2 Information Act 2002 (NT), s 34. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 39. 4 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 48(c), (d).

Commonwealth [2.3.3080] The scheme for amendment to records under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) differs considerably from that of the other jurisdictions. In response to an application for amendment, a decision-maker under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 may amend the record, in which amendment may take the form of an alteration to the document to make it more complete, correct, up to date or not misleading.1 Alternatively, the decision-maker may annotate the document, in which case the note must specify the respects in which the agency or Minister is satisfied that the information is incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading. In the case of information which is out of date, the note must set out information which is required to 251

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bring the information up to date.2 In response to an application for an annotation, a decision-maker under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 must annotate the document in the manner sought by the applicant,3 unless the decision-maker “considers the statement [sought by the applicant] to be irrelevant, defamatory or unnecessarily voluminous”.4 If the decision-maker decides not to amend wholly or partly in accordance with an application to amend, the decision-maker must in effect take steps to enable the person to make an application for an annotation to be made to the document.5

1 See Neeson v Chief Executive Offıcer of Centrelink (2006) 154 FCR 489; 43 AAR 410; [2006] FCA 1107, Jessup J at [11]–[24]. The removal of a document from a departmental file is not provided for in the Act (Re Strange and Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2002) 68 ALD 751; [2002] AATA 240, Way M at [41]; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 50(2)(a)) but so far as practicable, the decision-maker must “ensure that the record of information is amended in a way that does not obliterate the text of the record as it existed prior to the amendment”: s 50(3). Similar qualifications are found in Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 49; Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 48(3), (4). 2 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 50(2)(b). The Act distinguishes between an application for amendment as against one for the addition of an annotation. In the first case, however, the agency may nevertheless decide to annotate: see Bleicher v Australian Capital Territory Health Authority (1991) 101 ALR 17 (FCA), Sheppard, Gummow, and Einfeld JJ at 22. 3 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 51B(1). The requirements of an application for annotation are specified in s 51A. In Re Mann and Department of Health (ACT) (1994) 37 ALD 266 (ACTAAT), it was held that an agency is entitled to place its own annotation on a record in order to make it clear that the agency is not to be taken as accepting the truth of other annotations. 4 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 51B(2). The word “irrelevant” has its ordinary meaning of “not bearing upon or not connected with the matter in hand, not applicable or pertinent to the matter”: Re Wytkin and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2003) 52 ATR 1001; [2003] AATA 171, Allen M at [37]. 5 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 51. If such application is made, the annotation must be made.

Australian Capital Territory and Victoria [2.3.3090] The schemes for amendment of records found in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) and Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) are similar. The decision-maker may amend the record by either (or both) making an alteration to it or annotating it.1 The annotation must be of the same nature as stipulated in the Commonwealth scheme:2 see [2.3.3080]. If the decision-maker refuses to amend the record in the manner sought by the applicant, the applicant may appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) of the relevant jurisdiction,3 and that body may decide to amend in one or both of the permitted means. If the AAT refuses to amend the record pursuant

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to the terms of the application, the applicant may require the agency or Minister to annotate the record, so long as the annotation is of the same nature as stipulated in the Commonwealth scheme. There are additional requirements if the annotated material is disclosed to a third party.4

1

2 3 4

Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 50(1) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 41; Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 541. Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 50(2); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 42. Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 51; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 50(3B). Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 51(2), (4); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), ss 46, 47.

South Australia [2.3.3100] In South Australia, upon an application for an amendment, the agency or Minister shall amend its records in accordance with the application, or refuse to so amend.1 If the decision-maker refuses to make the amendments sought, the applicant may require the agency or Minister to annotate the record. The scheme for compulsory annotation is similar to that found in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT):2 see [2.3.3090].

1

2

Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 34 (noting the definition of “agency” in s 4(1)). In addition to the ground that the decision-maker does not accept that the record is in the manner claimed incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading, a refusal to amend may be on the grounds that “the application contains matter that is incorrect or misleading in a material respect”, or that procedures for amendment are prescribed in some other legislative scheme: s 35. Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 37. Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017.

Western Australia [2.3.3110] In Western Australia, upon an application for amendment, the decision-maker may amend the record by altering the information, or by adding an annotation to it.1 The annotation must be of the same nature as stipulated in the Commonwealth scheme:2 see [2.3.3080]. If the decision-maker refuses to make the amendments sought, the applicant may require the agency or Minister to annotate the record. The scheme for compulsory annotation is

253

[2.3.3110]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

similar to that found in the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT):3 see [2.3.3090].

1 2 3

Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 48(1) Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 48(2). Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), ss 50 – 52. Note that the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) will be repealed by the Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017

Alteration, Notation or Deletion, Expungement [2.3.3120] Amendment of personal records is discretionary.1 In Re Cox and Department of Defence (1990) 20 ALD 499, Todd DP, a highly respected early member of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, suggested the following guidelines for the discretion:

1

2

(a)

the character of the record, in particular whether it purports to be an objective recording of purely factual material or whether it merely purports to be the record of an opinion/report of one person;

(b)

whether the record serves a continuing purpose;

(c)

whether retention of the record in unamended form may serve a historic purpose;

(d)

whether the record is dated;

(e)

whether amendment is being sought as a de facto means of reviewing another administrative decision;

(f)

the extent to which access to the record is restricted;

(g)

whether creation of the record or any of its contents was induced by malice;

(h)

whether the record is part of a group of records and, if so, whether the other records modify the impact of the record in dispute.2

Neeson v Chief Executive Offıcer of Centrelink (2006) 154 FCR 489; 43 AAR 410; [2006] FCA 1107, Jessup J at [11]; Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 541. Re Cox and Department of Defence (1990) 20 ALD 499, Todd DP at 501 (applied in Re Miskovic and Department of Immigration & Citizenship (2009) 107 ALD 241; [2009] AATA 76, McDonald DP at [13]).

[2.3.3130] External review bodies have expressed a preference for the addition of a notation to give effect to the interest of the individual in the accuracy of records.1 External review bodies have accepted, however, that:

254

[2.3.3140]

ALTERATION, NOTATION OR DELETION, EXPUNGEMENT

[I]t may be necessary to eliminate clear mistakes of fact or irresponsible judgment from an individual’s file so as not to prejudice prospects for a fair determination of his rights and benefits.2

1 Re Wiseman and Department of Transport (1985) 4 AAR 83 (AATA). In Re Cox and Department of Defence (1990) 20 ALD 499, the annotations were made, in part, by annotation of specific parts of the record and, in part, by placing upon the file a copy of the decision of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the reasons for that decision. This represents a common kind of annotation made by the AAT. See also Re Setterfield and Chisholm Institute of Technology (No 2) (1986) 1 VAR 202 (VicAAT), Lewis M at 208; Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 531; Re B and Armadale Health Service [2007] WAICmr 4. 2 Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 531.

[2.3.3140] Some right to information laws assume that an amendment to a record of information may extend to the expungement of at least part or the whole of the record. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) requires the concurrence of the Keeper of Public Records where a correction or amendment “has the effect of deleting or expunging the information”, and this procedure acknowledges that these acts are kinds of correction or amendment.1 The same result follows from s 50(3) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), which states that: To the extent that it is practicable to do so, the agency or Minister must, when making an amendment … ensure that the record of information is amended in a way that does not obliterate the text of the record as it existed prior to the amendment.2

The Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, acting under a clear power to do so, has on occasions expunged information in a record, although it has been said that “expungement is appropriate in cases where material is wrong and demonstrably wrong”.3 The District Court of South Australia has directed the obliteration of words with a “heavy black line”.4 In the case of a document having legal effect, it has been said that amendment cannot amount to a rescission of the document.5

1 Re Lee and Ministry of Education (1989) 3 VAR 429 (VicAAT), Galvin DP at 431, referring to Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 49. 2 See also Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 48(3), (4). 3 Re Buhagiar and Police (Vic) (1989) 2 VAR 530 (VicAAT), Jones P at 541. Re Foster and Police (Vic) (1989) 3 VAR 110 (VicAAT), Rizkalla DP at 121 was a case where, given the potential effect on the subject’s career should the original comment remain in any form, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Victoria decided to “remove the original information completely and replace it with a corrected or amended comment”. See also Re Lee and Ministry of Education (1989) 3 VAR 429 (VicAAT).

255

[2.3.3140]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

4 5

Jeffries v Police (SA) (2003) 225 LSJS 186; [2003] SADC 2, Judge Anderson at [23]. Re Olsson and Australian Bureau of Statistics (1986) 10 ALN N48 (AATA), the Tribunal at 48–49. In Re Cox and Department of Defence (1990) 20 ALD 499, the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not accede to the applicant’s request that the documents in question “not be shown to or taken into consideration by any authority or review for any administrative purpose under [Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948 (Cth), s 37 (now repealed)]”. This refers to the question whether the applicant should be regarded as having been retired on invalidity grounds for the purpose of an invalidity pension. The Tribunal said that such an order far exceeded the bounds of power held by the Tribunal. See also Re Setterfield and Chisholm Institute of Technology (No 2) (1986) 1 VAR 202 (VicAAT), Lewis M at 208–209.

[2.3.3150] One less problematic form of elimination is to make an alteration “in such a way that the previous state of the record of information which has been altered remains legible”.1 Further, when the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) speaks of the deletion of matter, the AAT usually means that the text be dealt with in such a way that the amended part is still readable, albeit that it be dealt with in such a way (such as running a line through it) that indicates that it be regarded as erroneous.2

1 Re Nguyen Giang Vu and Department of Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (unreported, AATA, Balmford SM, 5215 of 1989, 29 June 1989) at [59]. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal added that “the fact that the alteration has been made by order of this Tribunal should appear on the face of each record”. 2 Re Wiseman and Department of Transport (1985) 4 AAR 83 (AATA); Re Corbett and Australian Federal Police (1986) 5 AAR 291 (AATA); Re Jacobs and Department of Defence (1988) 15 ALD 645.

Appeal and Review [2.3.3160] All right to information legislation provides for the review of all significant decisions made by agencies and Ministers under the Acts. In general terms, review may be sought by a person seeking access, a person seeking the protection of the reverse right to information provisions, or a person seeking the amendment of his or her personal record. In general terms, the appeal system is structured in a hierarchy: (1)

“internal review”: merits review1 within the agency concerned;

(2)

“first tier external review”: merits review in an investigative manner2 by an organisation external to the agency;

(3)

“second tier external review”: merits review in an adversarial manner by an organisation external to the agency; and

256

[2.3.3170]

(4)

INTERNAL REVIEW

rights of appeal to a court.

1 See “Necessity for Internal Review” [2.7.980]. 2 The terms “investigative manner” and “adversarial manner” are used here to indicate the opposite ends of the range of procedural and evidentiary approaches in administrative tribunals.

Internal Review Jurisdiction [2.3.3170] The range of matters that an internal review entity can review is listed in the various right to information Acts, except in Victoria where the internal review has been replaced by a Freedom of Information Commissioner review. The following Table sets out the relevant internal review provisions. All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated. Each piece of legislation provides for internal review of most of the significant kinds of decisions which are taken by agencies under the law: see [2.3.3160]. The most significant legal exceptions on the jurisdiction are a decision by a Minister or by the principal officer of an agency, and a decision made on an internal review.

257

258

s 59(3)(a)

s 54E(a)

s 59(1)

14 days s 60(3)[K] s 59(2)

s 54B(1)[H]

30 days s 54C(3) s 54C(3)

Provision

Decisionmaking Period[HA] Provision

De Novo Merits Review Jurisdic[L] tion

28 days

s 54E(b)[BA]

s 59(1)

ACT ss 51, 59(1)

ss 54, 54A

Cth ss 54, [A] 54A[B]

30 days

Time Limits Application Period[HA]

Exclusions Decisions Made Personally by Ministers or Principal Officers Decisions on Internal Review Others

Location

s 84(1)

15 days s 86(1)

s 83(1)

20 days

s 82(4), (5)[CA]

s 88

s 82(2)

NSW s 82(1)[C]

30 days ss 39(1), 40(2)[K]

s 39(2)[I]

30 days

s 38

NT s 38

s 80(2)

20 days s 83(2)[K]

s 82(c)

20 days

s 81(d), (e)

s 81(a)

s 81(b), (c)

Qld s 80(1)[D]

14 days ss 29(5), 38(4)[K]

ss 29(2)(e), 38(2)(d)

30 days

s 29(1)

ss 29(6), 38(5)

SA ss 29(1), 38(1)

s 43(4)(a)

[K]

15 days s 44(1)(b)(ii)

20 days, 10 days[J] s 43

Tas s 43[E]

s 49L(1), 49M(1), 49P(1)

30 days s 49J(3)[K]

28 days, 70 days[FA] s 49B(1), (2)

s 49A(4)[F]

N/A

s 49A(3)

Vic s 49A(1)

15 days s 43(2)[K]

s 40(2)

30 days

s 39(3)(b)

s 39(3)(a)[G]

WA ss 39(1), 54(1)

RIGHT TO INFORMATION [2.3.3170]

Cth ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA Remes 40(1) ss 29(3), s 49P(4) s 43 [M] dies 38(3) Reasons s 54C(4) ss 25, 59(4) s 41(a) ss 83(3), 191 s 43(5) s 49P(3)(a) s 42 [A] The applicant for an “access refusal decision” has standing. The term “access refusal decision” refers to the range of administrative actions which can be reviewed by an application for internal review initiated by the applicant. It is defined in s 53A. [B] An “affected third party” for an “access grant decision” has standing. The term “access grant decision” refers to the range of administrative actions which can be reviewed by an application for internal review initiated by an “affected third party”. Both terms are defined by ss 53B and 53C. [BA] Decision occurring by way of deemed refusal. [C] A “person aggrieved” by a “reviewable decision” has standing. The term “person aggrieved” is not defined. The term “reviewable decision” is defined in s 80. [CA] Decisions by the Information Commissioner and decisions by the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. [D] A “person affected” by a “reviewable decision” has standing. The term “person affected” is not defined. The term “reviewable decision” is defined in Sch 6. [E] Both the applicant for information and an “external party” have standing. The term “external party” is defined by s 5. [F] Exempt documents specifically Cabinet documents (s 28) and documents affecting national security, defence or international relations (s 29A). [FA] In relation to a refusal to grant a person access to a document containing health information on the ground referred to in s 36 of the Health Records Act 2001 (Vic). [G] Decisions of a Minister are reviewable [HA] In some legislation, the period can be extended. In addition, in some legislation the period is defined as a specified number of “working days”, or “business days” as opposed to “calendar days”. [H] Subject to some exceptions. [I] The public sector organisation has a discretion to refuse the application if an application for internal review is not made within the period. [J] In the case of an “external party” seeking review of a reverse right to information decision. [K] Period for a deemed decision. [L] Variations in this category include the Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, Tasmanian, and Victorian Acts. “A new decision, as if the decision being reviewed had not been made”: Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009.

[2.3.3170] INTERNAL REVIEW

259

Cth ACT NSW NT Qld SA Tas Vic WA [M] Instead of describing the nature of the internal review process with a general term such “make a fresh decision”, these statutes list the orders that the internal review authority can make.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION [2.3.3170]

260

[2.3.3190]

INTERNAL REVIEW

Judicial and Tribunal Commentary [2.3.3180] In Digwood v Forests (NSW) [2009] NSWADT 107, the Tribunal decided that a valid internal review decision was made by looking at the “substance” rather than the “form” of the actions taken by the agency.1 However, in Re Ford and Child Support Registrar (2005) 41 AAR 146; [2005] AATA 860, the consequence of misidentifying the original decision sought to be internally reviewed could not be remedied at a later date.2 In Towie v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2004] VCAT 2545, the Tribunal held that an internal review is a de novo merits review.3 In Re Leighton and Department of Local Government & Regional Development [2008] WAICmr 50, the Information Commissioner held that the remedial jurisdiction of an agency on internal review under s 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) complemented the nature of review by giving the agency the right to make any decision on internal review it chooses to make.4

1 Digwood v Forests (NSW) [2009] NSWADT 107, Molony JM at [47], [48]. 2 Re Ford and Child Support Registrar (2005) 41 AAR 146; [2005] AATA 860, Forgie DP at [17]. 3 Towie v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2004] VCAT 2545, Judge Dove VP at [21]. See also Re Guyt and Health Department of Western Australia (unreported, WAICmr, Keighley-Gerardy IC, 1493 of 1993, 16 March 1994). 4 Re Leighton and Department of Local Government & Regional Development [2008] WAICmr 50, the Information Commissioner at [76].

External Review [2.3.3190] All right to information legislation provides for de novo merits review by a body external to the decision-making agency. Under some legislation, there are two levels of external review while, in others, there is only one level of external review. These external review bodies may review, on a de novo basis, the application of most of the objections to disclosure that may be raised by an agency and in particular: (1)

the question of whether a document is exempt from disclosure;

(2)

the exercise of the discretions to defer or refuse access to documents otherwise within the scope of the Act;

(3)

decisions in relation to the amendment of personal records; and

(4)

decisions which affect third parties who were or should have been consulted in relation to a request for documents.

The following Table lists the sole external merits review bodies. All references in the Table are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated. 261

[2.3.3190]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Sole External Merits Review Bodies Name

Jurisdiction

ACT

NT

Tas

Vic

WA

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal ss 60, 68, 69, 69A

Information Commissioner

Ombudsman

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

Information Commissioner

s 103

ss 44, 45

s 50(3D)

s 65(1)

N/A

N/A

Deemed Refusal by Original Decisionmaker Period

30 days

20 days

Provision

s 61(1)(b)

ss 15, 45(1)(f), 46

Deemed Refusal on Internal Review Period

14 days

30 days

s 60(3)

s 40(2)

Provision Exclusions No Prior Internal Review[A] Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificate Time Limits Application Period Provision Decisionmaking Period Provision[E] De Novo Merits Review Jurisdiction Limits Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificates [F] Remedies

15 working days s 44(1)(b)(ii)

s 60(2)

s 62

30 days, 45 days s 53(1)

30 days

15 days

s 49J(3)

s 43(2)

s 50(3G), (6)

s 66(5)

N/A

N/A 28 days

90 days

20 days

60 days

s 60(4)[B] N/A

s 106(3)(a)[C]

s 44(2) N/A

s 52 N/A N/A

s 62(1)

s 62(3)

N/A

N/A

s 114

s 47

262

60 days, 30 days[D] s 66(2), (3)[D]

30 days s 76(3) s 76(1)

s 77

[2.3.3200]

INTERNAL REVIEW

ACT NT Tas Vic WA Sole External Merits Review Bodies Procedure Form of s 105 s 66 Application s 74(2) s 75(1) Production of Exempt Material Power to s 73(1) s 75(2) Restrict Publication of Material to Applicants s 71 s 125 s 47(4) s 102[G] Onus of Proof on Agency Further s 72(2) Reasons Costs Order s 76 s 126 s 84 Reasons, s 116 s 48 s 76 Notification[H] [A] These exclusions do not include deemed refusals on internal review. [B] Only where a prior complaint to the Ombudsman has been made. [C] Period for a deemed decision. [D] Third party or “reverse right to information” applications. [E] All legislation allows for extension of the stipulated period. [F] Instead of describing the nature of the external review process with a general term, these statutes list the orders that the external review authority can make. [G] Section 102 variously places the onus of proof on the agency, a third party, or the applicant depending on the provision under which a decision has been made.

Procedural Modifications [2.3.3200] In most right to information Acts, there are provisions governing the procedural aspects of the external review process provided by these Acts. These procedural aspects include: (1)

the form of application;

(2)

the production to the review body of the document claimed to be exempt;

(3)

the obligation of the review body to ensure that matters in documents claimed to be exempt should not be disclosed to any person other than the review body;1

(4)

the onus and standard of proof in proceedings before the review body;

263

[2.3.3200]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

(5)

the ability of the review body to require the decision-maker to provide further reasons for the decision; and

(6)

costs.

1 Except under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 50(4): Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63; (1989) 100 FLR 6. The power to restrict publication of exempt material applies even if the external review body ultimately disagrees with an agency’s view that the material is exempt. It is mandatory and compromises the applicant’s rights to procedural fairness: BGC (Aust) Pty Ltd v Fremantle Port Authority (2003) 28 WAR 187; [2003] WASCA 250, Heenan J at [19].

Jurisdictional Modifications Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificates [2.3.3210] In those jurisdictions that retain conclusive (ministerial) certificates (see [2.3.3240]), the jurisdiction of external review bodies is confined to a review of whether “reasonable grounds” for the certificate exist. The leading case on merits review of “reasonable grounds” for a conclusive certificate is McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; 80 ALJR 1549; 43 AAR 151; 63 ATR 409; [2006] HCA 45. This case is analysed in detail at [2.3.880]. Although this aspect of the case is no longer relevant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), it is binding in other jurisdictions. The outcome of the case is that so long as one “reasonable” ground for the certificate is found, then the merits review tribunal cannot overturn the certificate. Since McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury, so far there has been only one case outside the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal on the reasonable grounds restriction to review of a conclusive certificate. In Dunne/Barden and Department of Education & Training (ACT) [2007] ACTAAT 26, the Tribunal declined to follow McKinnon v Secretary of Department of Treasury. In the opinion of the author, this holding is wrong.

“Public Interest Override” [2.3.3220] Although legislation allows an agency to release exempt material, notwithstanding the absence of a duty under right to information legislation not to do so, the issue of whether an external merits review body “standing in the shoes” of the agency can do so is a vexed question. Under both the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) and Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal and Information Commissioner, respectively, are expressly forbidden from doing so.1 In Victoria,

264

[2.3.3230]

FIRST TIER EXTERNAL MERITS REVIEW

s 50(4) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) expressly allows the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal to grant disclosure even though a document is exempt, where it holds “the opinion that the public interest requires” access. The High Court said of the phrase “public interest” in the context of the provision permitted a wide range of matters to be considered and that the verb “requires” in the provision: [D]irects the decision-maker to identify a high-threshold public interest before the power can be exercised. It is not enough that access to the documents could be justified in the public interest.2

The Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas) does not deal with the issue.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), s 62(2) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 76(4). 2 Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2010) 241 CLR 320; 84 ALJR 528; [2010] HCA 24, French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ at [14]. The provision has attracted a large quantity of case law in Victoria: see E Kyrou and J Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) Vol 2 at [50.400]ff.

First Tier External Merits Review [2.3.3230] In the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria, there are two tiers of external merits review. In the first tier of external merits review, the review body functions in an investigative manner, while the second tier of external merits review functions in an adjudicative manner. Whereas the first tier of external merits review is, in all legislation, to a specialised merits review body, the second tier of external merits review is conducted in the generalist merits review tribunal of the jurisdiction. The following Tables list these bodies. All references in the Tables are to the main right to information statute of the particular State or Territory (see [2.3.590]), unless otherwise stated. First Tier External Merit Review Bodies Name

Cth

NSW

Qld

SA

Vic

Australian Information Commissioner

Information Commissioner

Information Commissioner

Police Ombudsman[C]

Freedom of Information Commissioner

265

[2.3.3230]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

First Tier External Merit Review Bodies Jurisdiction

Cth

NSW

Qld

SA

Vic

ss 54L, 54M

ss 80, 89

s 85 (“reviewable decision”), Sch 6

s 39(2)

ss 6C, 49A

Deemed Refusal by Original Decisionmaker Period

30 days

20 working days s 57(1)

25 business days s 18

30 days

45 days

s 19(2)

ss 21, 43

20 business days s 83(2)

14 days

30 days

s 54D

15 working days s 86(1), (5)

ss 29(5), 38(4)

s 49J

N/A

s 89(2)

s 86[B] N/A

60 days, 30 days s 54S s 55K(2), (3)

40 working days s 90 ss 92 – 95

20 business days s 88(1)(d) 105(1)

30 days

N/A

N/A

N/A

s 39(9)

s 28(4), (5)

No

N/A[G]

No

No

No

s 55L(2) s 55K(1)

ss 92 – 95[D]

s 105(2) s 110(1)

s 39(12) s 39(11)

s 54N

N/A

N/A

N/A

Provision Deemed Refusal on Internal Review Period Provision Exclusions No Prior Internal Review Time[A] Limits Application Period Provision De Novo Merits Jurisdic[F] tion Limits Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificates Public Interest Override [F]

Remedies

Procedure Form of Application

s 15AC

30 days

266

s 39(2)

s 39(3)

N/A N/A

28 days, 70 days s 49B s 49P

ss 49G, 49K, 49L, 49N, 49O, 49OA, 49P s 49C

[2.3.3230]

FIRST TIER EXTERNAL MERITS REVIEW

Cth NSW Qld SA Vic First Tier External Merit Review Bodies Production of ss 55T, 55U N/A s 103 s 39(5)(a), (b) N/A Exempt Material Power to s 55(5)(c) N/A s 108 s 39(15) N/A Restrict Publication of Material to Applicants s 55D(1) s 97 N/A s 48 N/A Onus of Proof on Agency[E] s 55E N/A s 99 N/A N/A Further Reasons Costs Order N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Reasons, ss 54X(3), N/A s 110 s 39(13) s 49P 55K(4)(a) Notification [A] All time limit provisions allow for extension of time. [B] There is a solitary exclusion from the scope of a “reviewable decision”: the “amount of a charge stated in a charges estimate notice”. [C] Jurisdiction to review a decision of a police officer, or the Minister responsible for the administration of South Australia Police is, instead, vested in the Police Ombudsman (s 39(1)(b)). [D] The Information Commissioner of New South Wales has a power to make recommendations, but no power to determine an application for access. [E] Legislation commonly contains some exceptions to the allocation of the onus of proof on the agency. The most common exception is where the applicant for external review is a third party aggrieved by the grant. [F] Instead of describing the nature of the external review process with general terms, some statutes list the orders that the external review authority can make. [G] See next Table.

Second Tier External Merits Review Bodies Name

Jurisdiction Exclusions No Prior Internal Review

Cth

NSW

Qld

SA

Vic

Administrative Appeals Tribunal s 57A[AA]

Civil and Administrative Tribunal s 100

Civil and Administrative Tribunal ss 119 – 121

District Court

Civil and Administrative Tribunal s 50(2)

N/A

267

s 40(2) s 40(4)[A]

[2.3.3230]

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Second Tier External Merits Review Bodies Time[A] Limits Application

Cth

NSW

Qld

SA

Vic

30 days

60 days

s 40(3)

s 52

N/A

[AAA]

Period

28 days

Provision

s 57A(2)

De Novo Merits Jurisdiction Limits

Conclusive (Ministerial) Certificates Public Interest Override

40 working days, 20 working days s 101(1), (2)[B]

s 58

s 50(4)

N/A

s 106[D]

No

N/A

District Court Act 1991 (SA), s 42E(3) s 40(7) s 50(5), (5A)

N/A

s 58(2) Procedure N/A Production of ss 58E, 64 s 56 Exempt Material s 107 s 56 Power to s 63[F] Restrict Publication of Material to Applicants Onus of s 61[G] s 105 ss 40(7), s 55 48[E] Proof on Agency[C] Further s 62[H] Reasons Costs Order s 66 s 40(8) [AA] Pursuant to Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 57A(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction unless the decision under review was made by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 55K or s 54W(b): Re Kalman and Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission [2015] AATA 278, Hack DP at [10]. [AAA] A person, or entity, other than a participant in previous decision-making under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) can have standing to apply for review in the Tribunal: Re Secretary of Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet and Treasurer (2014) 145 ALD 392; 64 AAR 95; [2014] AATA 485, Forgie DP at [62], [63]. [A] Where a party has already sought first tier external merits review from the Ombudsman, that review must be concluded before an application can be brought in the District Court.

268

[2.3.3240]

PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL MODIFICATIONS

Cth NSW Qld SA Vic Second Tier External Merits Review Bodies [B] The longer period is allowed where there has been no prior merits review; the shorter period where the matter has been reviewed by the Information Commissioner. [C] Legislation commonly contains some exceptions to the allocation of the onus of proof on the agency. The most common exception is where the applicant for external review is a third party aggrieved by the grant. [D] See [2.3.3240]. [E] While the agency generally has the onus of proof, this is reversed where the agency has a ministerial assessment of public interest: Konieczka v Police (SA) (2006) 245 LSJS 458; [2006] SASC 288. [F] The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) provisions preclude the review body from ordering that access be given to a legal representative of the appellant: Day v Collector of Customs (1995) 57 FCR 176; 21 AAR 342. The power under Freedom of Information Act 1982, s 63 is supplementary to other powers the Tribunal has to close the courtroom: Department of Industrial Relations v Forrest (1990) 21 FCR 93; 11 AAR 256 (FC), Northrop J at 103 (FCR). [G] The standard of proof under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 61 is on the balance of probabilities: Fisse v Secretary of Department of Treasury (2008) 172 FCR 513; [2008] FCAFC 188, Flick J at [91]. [H] Adequacy of reasons under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 62 means “adequate explanation”: Re Luton and Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1996) 22 AAR 492 (AATA), Bayne SM at 497.

Procedural and Jurisdictional Modifications [2.3.3240] The legislation for first tier merits review proceedings varies greatly in detail. The Table at [2.3.3230] refers to some salient issues. The Commonwealth legislation is the most detailed, while the New South Wales legislation is the least detailed. The remedial jurisdiction also varies. The New South Wales Information Commissioner has only recommendatory powers, while the other bodies have determinative powers. In South Australia, it has been held that reviews under s 39 of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) are “not adversarial” and are essentially “inquisitorial”.1 Under s 39(9), there is a conclusive (ministerial) certificate procedure under which the ministerial assessment of public interest must be upheld “unless satisfied that there are cogent reasons for not doing so”. The appellant bears the onus of proof as this is a specific alteration to the general allocation of an onus of proof on agencies under s 48.2 The adjective “cogent” in the South Australian Act is unique, and differs to the “unreasonableness” standard for review used in other right to information Acts. “Cogent” means “an

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argument or reason clearly expressed and persuasive, compelling or convincing”.3 It does not require proof of error.4

1 Legal Practitioners Conduct Board (SA) v Wharff [2009] SADC 126, Judge Herriman at [40]. 2 This follows the statutory interpretation maxim that the specific should prevail over the general: see DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (4th ed, Butt, 1996) at [7.9]–[7.18]. 3 Registrar of the Veterinary Surgeons Board (SA) v Mooney [2009] SADC 62, Judge Tilmouth at [26]. 4 Registrar of the Veterinary Surgeons Board (SA) v Mooney [2009] SADC 62, Judge Tilmouth at [23]–[27].

[2.3.3250] The conferral of jurisdiction on the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal diverges from all other merits review bodies. Instead of a broad conferral of jurisdiction subject to some (if any) exceptions, the conferral of jurisdiction is narrow. It consists of just three types of decisions: (1)

the declaration that a person is a vexatious applicant;

(2)

a decision about financial hardship status; and

(3)

a question of law.1

In South Australia, it has been held that the merits review jurisdiction of the District Court is a unique variant. It is neither a hearing by way of rehearing (which requires proof of error in the decision complained of) nor a hearing de novo. Instead, it requires “cogent” reasons to set aside the decision, with “cogent” meaning “an argument or reason clearly expressed and persuasive, compelling or convincing”.2

1 Gordon Resources Pty Ltd v Queensland [2012] QCATA 135 illustrates the narrowness of this ground of appeal. 2 Registrar of the Veterinary Surgeons Board (SA) v Mooney [2009] SADC 62, Judge Tilmouth at [26]. In the opinion of the author, this holding (which did not concern the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA)) should be treated with some caution because it did not consider the terms of s 40 of the Act, in particular s 40(7).

270

[2.3.3270]

PUBLIC INTEREST OVERRIDE

Public Interest Override New South Wales [2.3.3260] Unlike the right to information legislation of other jurisdictions, the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) does not expressly forbid external merits review bodies from releasing exempt documents on public interest grounds. Whether the former New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal (see now the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal), “standing in the shoes” of the decision-maker, had the power to do so was the most vexed question of statutory construction under the regime of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) (now repealed).1 This question will probably be re-agitated in the future because the terms of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 differ so much to the Freedom of Information Act 1989. Two points should be noted. First, disclosure of exempt material separately to the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 is unaffected. Second, that in all of the methods for disclosure of material under Pt 2 Div 1, there is an express exception for material for which there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. Conventional merits review arrangements are considered to only allow a merits review body to exercise powers that the decision-maker did exercise, or could have exercised. Following this logic, the powers of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal are no greater than those of the decision-maker at first instance, so the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal is equally limited by provisions of Pt 2 Div 1.

1 University of New South Wales v McGuirk [2006] NSWSC 1362, Nicholas J at [104]; McGuirk v University of New South Wales (2009) 75 NSWLR 224; [2009] NSWCA 321.

South Australia [2.3.3270] In Ward v Family Care Meeting Convenor of Youth Court & Courts Administration Authority (SA) [2003] SADC 18, the District Court of South Australia held that, except in respect of “restricted documents”, the Court can grant access to exempt documents.1 However, this decision should be treated with caution. The case was an appeal from a first tier merits by the Ombudsman under s 39 of the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA). The Court’s attention in this case appears not to have been drawn to s 39(12), which proscribes the Ombudsman granting access to an exempt document on public interest grounds. Conventional merits review arrangements are considered to only allow a merits review body to exercise powers that the decision-maker did exercise, or could have exercised. Following this logic, the powers of the District Court are no greater than those of the decision-maker at first instance, so the Court is equally limited by s 39(12). However, his Honour, with respect, 271

[2.3.3270]

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correctly pointed out that the decision-maker at first instance has a public interest override except in respect of “restricted documents”. In the event that an application was taken to the District Court without first going to the Ombudsman (which is possible under s 40(2)(a) and (b)) then the District Court, on the same logic, would also have a public interest override.

1 Ward v Family Care Meeting Convenor of Youth Court & Courts Administration Authority (SA) [2003] SADC 18, Judge Smith at [8].

Costs [2.3.3280] Some right to information laws make provision with respect to the payment of the costs of an applicant to proceedings upon external review. The power to recommend costs is not analogous to the power to award costs under common law.1 Under s 66(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), where an applicant is at least “substantially successful” in his or her application for review, the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) “may, in its discretion, recommend to the responsible Minister that the costs of the applicant in relation to the proceedings be paid by the Commonwealth”. A non-exhaustive list of the factors to which the AAT shall have regard is specified in s 66(2). To determine in such cases whether the applicant has been successful, the AAT will ask whether the documents would have been released but for the applicant’s persistence in prosecuting the application for review. In Re Lianos and Department of Social Security (No 2) (1985) 9 ALD 43, the AAT held that “substantially successful involves a question of degree which … defies precise definition”.2 The question was “how much information [which was previously denied to him] the applicant has succeeded in obtaining as a result of the proceedings”.3 Success before the applicant lodges the application for review is not relevant. The elements involved are both quantitative (how much of what was requested was released) and qualitative (the value of what was released to both the requester and the public). In Re Paterson and Australian Bureau of Statistics (1994) 33 ALD 635, the AAT held that, in determining whether or not a fee should be remitted in the public interest, the AAT is not concerned with whether any public interest issues arise in deciding whether the relevant documents are exempt. The AAT is only concerned with the question of whether there is a public interest in the release of the kind of documents for which a request for access has been made. Success must be a consequence of the application for review, and not due to other circumstances.4 Whether payment of the costs of his or her application would cause financial hardship to the applicant is a factor under s 66(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. The hardship must be proved.5 Any claimed “benefit to the general public” must also be apparent under s 66(2)(b). The AAT

272

[2.3.3290]

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will have regard to the extent of public concern in the matter. Any commercial benefit from disclosure which accrues to the applicant (or to any person or body which stands behind the applicant) will count against an exercise of the discretion to recommend an award of costs.6 “[T]he reasonableness of the decision reviewed by the Tribunal” is another factor.7 The relevant decision is the decision to refuse to disclose the documents in response to the request, and thus will usually be the decision made on internal review, not the decision to make any release subsequent to the applicant’s appeal to the AAT.8 In order to apply s 66(2)(d), the AAT must evaluate whether the agency’s claims for exemption were reasonable ones to be made at the time they were made. In two cases where the Tribunal made a recommendation that the applicant’s costs be paid by the Commonwealth, the agency had voluntarily disclosed all or most of the documents just prior to, or at the hearing.9 Such delay will therefore be an important factor, but it is not conclusive.10

1 Re Paterson and Department of Arts, Heritage & Environment (No 2) (1985) 8 ALD 227. 2 Re Lianos and Department of Social Security (No 2) (1985) 9 ALD 43, Hall DP at 46. 3 Re Lianos and Department of Social Security (No 2) (1985) 9 ALD 43, Hall DP at 46. 4 Re Hillock and Aboriginal Development Commission (unreported, AATA, Layton DP, 3296 of 1986, 16 March 1987). 5 See, eg Re Kirkwood and Department of Human Services & Health (1997) 68 FoI Review 28. 6 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 66(2)(c). 7 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 66(2)(d). 8 Hounslow v Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (unreported, FCA, Sweeney J, 84 of 1985, 20 December 1985). 9 Re Rae and Department of Arts, Heritage & Environment (1985) 7 ALD 449; 3 AAR 222; Re Lianos and Department of Social Security (No 2) (1985) 9 ALD 43. 10 In Re Paterson and Department of Arts, Heritage & Environment (No 2) (1985) 8 ALD 227, the delay was caused by a matter outside the agency’s control, which was the need to consult with State authorities.

Appeal on Legal Issues [2.3.3290] Under the right to information Acts of some jurisdictions, there is a statutory right of appeal. An appeal on a question of law may be taken to a superior court of record.1 In Queensland, there is a referral of questions of law

273

[2.3.3290]

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procedure available to the Information Commissioner.2 In the remaining jurisdictions, the normal law as to appeals from decisions of tribunals or other officers of the executive apply.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 56; Information Act 2002 (NT), s 129; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 40(1); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 85. The South Australian provision is by leave. As to circumstances when leave will be granted, see Legal Practitioners Conduct Board (SA) v Wharff [2009] SADC 126. 2 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld), Pt 11.

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2.7 Other Forms of Review and Appeal

OTHER FORMS OF REVIEW AND APPEAL

Current Subtitle Authors John D Fitzgerald B Juris, LLB (UNSW), MPP (Syd) Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales ([2.7.10]–[2.7.40], [2.7.910]–[2.7.2120], [2.7.2230]–[2.7.2270] Updating author, Update 324 – November 2016) (Updating author, Update 299 – September 2014) (Updating author, Update 284 – June 2013) (Chs 3–4 Updating author, Update 206 – October 2006) (Ch 5 (superseded) Original author)

Benjamin A Jacobs BA, LLB (Hons) (ANU), LLM (Syd) Barrister, Supreme Court of New South Wales ([2.7.150]–[2.7.800] Updating author, Update 324 – November 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 15 September 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Geoff Airo-Farulla BA, LLB (Hons) (Qld) Lecturer, Griffıth University (Chs 1–2 Updating author, Update 91 – February 1999) (Ch 2 Updating author, Update 37 – September 1996) (Ch 2 Original author)

Merris Amos BEc, LLB (Hons) (Syd), BCL (Oxon) Solicitor, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Chs 1–2 Updating author, Update 37 – September 1996)

Denis Galligan LLB (Qld), BCL, MA (Oxon) Barrister at Law (Qld) Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford

Director, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford (Ch 1 Updating author, Update 37 – September 1996) (Ch 1 Original author)

Jeremy Kam BA, LLB (Hons) (Macq) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia (Chs 1–2 Updating author, Update 206 – October 2006)

Denis O’Brien BA, LLB (Melb), LLM (ANU) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Victoria Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales Partner, Minter Ellison

276

PREVIOUS SUBTITLE AUTHORS

(Chs 4, 5 (superseded) Updating author, Update 104 – August 1999) (Chs 4, 5 (superseded) Updating author, Update 37 – September 1996)

(Chs 4, 5 (superseded) Original author)

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OTHER FORMS OF REVIEW AND APPEAL

278

2.7 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION.............................................................................[2.7.10] DEFINITION............................................................................... [2.7.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE...............................................................[2.7.30] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.........................................[2.7.40] OMBUDSMAN.............................................................................. [2.7.150] GENERAL.................................................................................[2.7.150] WHICH AGENCIES CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?..... [2.7.190] WHAT ACTIONS CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?.......... [2.7.260] WHO MAY INITIATE INVESTIGATIONS?............................... [2.7.350] COMPLAINTS.......................................................................... [2.7.380] DISCRETION NOT TO INVESTIGATE.................................... [2.7.390] PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATION........................................ [2.7.450] REPORTS................................................................................ [2.7.560] GROUNDS FOR ADVERSE REPORT.................................... [2.7.570] REPORTS AND IMPLEMENTATION....................................... [2.7.680] NOTIFICATION OF OUTCOME TO COMPLAINANT..............[2.7.720] REINVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS.................................. [2.7.730] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION............................................... [2.7.740] EXTERNAL REVIEW OF OMBUDSMAN................................ [2.7.780] TRIBUNALS................................................................................. [2.7.910] INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE................................................[2.7.910] SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW.............................. [2.7.920] ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION............................... [2.7.930] Introduction...........................................................................[2.7.930] Legislative Scheme.............................................................. [2.7.940] Conferral of Jurisdiction....................................................... [2.7.960] NECESSITY FOR A DECISION............................................... [2.7.970] NECESSITY FOR INTERNAL REVIEW.................................. [2.7.980] STANDARD PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL POWERS....... [2.7.990] General.................................................................................[2.7.990] Provision for Modification of Standard Powers and Inconsistency......................................................................[2.7.1000] APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND POLICY................ [2.7.1010] NATURE OF APPEALS TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

279

TRIBUNALS............................................................................[2.7.1040] LEGALITY OF DECISION UNDER REVIEW........................ [2.7.1070] AGENDA MANAGEMENT......................................................[2.7.1080] Novel Issues.......................................................................[2.7.1080] Law and Facts to Be Applied............................................. [2.7.1090] Onus of Proof..................................................................... [2.7.1100] Government Policy............................................................. [2.7.1110] Novel Issues....................................................................... [2.7.1130] Applicable Procedural Law.................................................[2.7.1140] Subordinate Legislation..................................................[2.7.1140] Procedural Fairness....................................................... [2.7.1150] Content of Fair Hearing Rule.........................................[2.7.1160] No Hearing..................................................................... [2.7.1170] Fair Hearing Rule before Hearing..................................[2.7.1180] Insufficient Period of Notice............................................... [2.7.1190] Inadequate Information...................................................... [2.7.1200] Fair Hearing Rule during Hearing...................................... [2.7.1210] General.......................................................................... [2.7.1210] Adjournments................................................................. [2.7.1220] Presentation of Evidence and Submissions.................. [2.7.1230] Cross-examination......................................................... [2.7.1240] Information or Material Obtained Externally to Hearing...........................................................................[2.7.1250] Official Notice................................................................. [2.7.1260] Critical Issues and Potentially Adverse Conclusions......... [2.7.1270] Duty to Assist................................................................. [2.7.1280] Fair Hearing Rule after a Hearing................................. [2.7.1290] Rule against Bias............................................................... [2.7.1300] General Law Procedural and Evidentiary Rules................[2.7.1310] Immunity from Disclosure.................................................. [2.7.1320] Queensland....................................................................[2.7.1320] Other Jurisdictions......................................................... [2.7.1330] Bases for Non-disclosure................................................... [2.7.1340] Investigative Functions of Merits Review Tribunals...........[2.7.1390] Investigative Powers.......................................................... [2.7.1400] Investigative Duties............................................................ [2.7.1410] Assessment........................................................................ [2.7.1420]

280

Notification of Appeal Rights.............................................. [2.7.1430] Standing............................................................................. [2.7.1440] Applicants.......................................................................[2.7.1440] Respondents...................................................................... [2.7.1460] Initiation of Proceedings.....................................................[2.7.1470] Formal Requirements.................................................... [2.7.1470] Lodgment....................................................................... [2.7.1480] Time for Application............................................................[2.7.1490] Duration..........................................................................[2.7.1490] Extension of Time.......................................................... [2.7.1500] Joinder................................................................................[2.7.1510] Procedure.......................................................................[2.7.1510] Requirements.................................................................[2.7.1520] Pre-hearing Procedure....................................................... [2.7.1530] Reasons for Decisions under Review and Lodging Documents..................................................................... [2.7.1530] Statement of Reasons................................................... [2.7.1540] Content...........................................................................[2.7.1550] Documents to Accompany Statement of Reasons........[2.7.1560] Contents.................................................................... [2.7.1560] Supplementary Reasons and Documents.................[2.7.1570] Documents Preliminary to Hearing.................................... [2.7.1580] Preliminary Hearings.......................................................... [2.7.1610] Summons........................................................................... [2.7.1620] Stay Orders........................................................................ [2.7.1630] Procedural Role of Respondent Agency at Hearing..........[2.7.1650] Representation................................................................... [2.7.1660] Hearings in Public.............................................................. [2.7.1670] Hearings in Private.............................................................[2.7.1680] Other Restrictions on Access and Publication...................[2.7.1690] Evidence.............................................................................[2.7.1700] Legislative Rules of Evidence........................................[2.7.1700] Non-statutory Rules....................................................... [2.7.1710] Onus of Proof..................................................................... [2.7.1720] COURSE OF EVIDENCE.......................................................[2.7.1730] General...............................................................................[2.7.1730] Form of Evidence............................................................... [2.7.1740]

281

Manner and Form of Expert Evidence...............................[2.7.1750] Statement of Agreed Facts and Concessions................... [2.7.1760] Reopening Evidence or Submissions................................ [2.7.1770] Admissibility of Evidence................................................... [2.7.1780] Relevance...................................................................... [2.7.1780] Hearsay..........................................................................[2.7.1790] Expert Evidence................................................................. [2.7.1800] Evaluation of Evidence...................................................... [2.7.1810] Standard of Proof...........................................................[2.7.1810] Hearsay Evidence..........................................................[2.7.1820] Expert Evidence.............................................................[2.7.1830] Resolution of Applications.................................................. [2.7.1840] Early Resolution: Discontinuance, Dismissal and Agreement......................................................................[2.7.1840] Summary Dismissal and Strike Out...............................[2.7.1860] Reinstatement.................................................................... [2.7.1870] Orders by Consent............................................................. [2.7.1880] Orders Following Contested Hearing.................................[2.7.1890] Introduction.................................................................... [2.7.1890] Remedial Powers............................................................... [2.7.1900] Decisional Statements of Reasons.................................... [2.7.1910] Reopening Decision Because of Jurisdictional Error.........[2.7.1930] Internal Appeals................................................................. [2.7.1940] Appeals on Question of Law..............................................[2.7.1950] Appeals on Questions of Fact........................................... [2.7.1970] General.......................................................................... [2.7.1970] Leave to Appeal on Question of Fact............................[2.7.1980] Appeals from Interlocutory Decisions................................ [2.7.1990] Remedies........................................................................... [2.7.2000] Appeals to Superior Courts................................................[2.7.2010] Avenues of Redress Other than Appeal........................[2.7.2010] Discretionary Factors – Availability of Other Remedies....................................................................... [2.7.2020] Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal...... [2.7.2020] Other Jurisdictions.....................................................[2.7.2030] Statutory Rights of Appeal to Superior Courts under Principal Statutes.............................................................................. [2.7.2040] Stay Orders....................................................................[2.7.2050] 282

Interlocutory Decisions and Interim Orders....................... [2.7.2060] Appeals.............................................................................. [2.7.2070] Question of Law.............................................................[2.7.2070] Remedies........................................................................... [2.7.2080] Extent of Remedial Powers........................................... [2.7.2080] Remittal.......................................................................... [2.7.2090] Discretionary Considerations......................................... [2.7.2100] Costs in Administrative Appeals Tribunal.......................[2.7.2110] Costs in Other Jurisdictions...........................................[2.7.2120] STATUTORY APPEALS.............................................................[2.7.2230] COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTION...................................... [2.7.2230] STATES AND TERRITORIES................................................ [2.7.2240] TAXATION APPEALS............................................................. [2.7.2260]

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284

Introduction Definition [2.7.10] Legal processes, other than common law judicial review, review administrative action by government. The machinery of executive government contains numerous varieties of review. The administrative actions of an entity may be reviewed by that entity. This includes actions done by Ministers of State or the government of the day. This review process may also occur under an enactment, as a matter of routine public administration, or out-of-the-ordinary public administration. Administrative action can also be reviewed by the various parliaments, or by permanent agencies or independent entities with an investigative function. The office of Ombudsman, found in every political jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, is an example of such an agency. Administrative action may also be reviewed by temporary, task-specific investigative entities, such as Royal Commissions. All these processes and entities are part of the broader system of political accountability in a modern democracy. The offices of the Ombudsman function across all systems contained within the broader system of public administration. Additionally, there are other entities whose proper names include the term “Ombudsman” but which function only across one system of public administration or one industry. [2.7.20] Administrative action can be reviewed by permanent entities functioning in an adjudicative fashion independent of the entity that committed the action under review. These entities, which may be labelled for convenience as tribunals, exist in every political jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. Their function resembles adversarial litigation, and they are considered the interface between the legal system and the system of public administration. Finally, in all political jurisdictions, courts of law still carry out administrative review processes other than judicial review. In South Australia and Tasmania, for example, the courts carry out a substantial amount of administrative review.

Scope of Subtitle [2.7.30] This Subtitle focuses on the legal processes that review administrative action and which are alternatives to judicial review. The “generalist” offices of the Ombudsman are discussed at [2.7.150]–[2.7.800]. The more specialised merits review tribunals, namely the six principal administrative

285

[2.7.30]

INTRODUCTION

review tribunals in Australia, are discussed at [2.7.910]–[2.7.2120], while statutory appeals are covered at [2.7.2230]–[2.7.2270].

Related Titles and Subtitles [2.7.40] The powers of a court exercising judicial review, the grounds upon which an aggrieved person may invoke that jurisdiction and the remedies that may be granted by a court exercising judicial review are the subject of a number of other Subtitles. For the court’s judicial review powers, see “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Reviewable Decisions, Conduct and Powers and General Grounds” [2.4.10]ff and “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Procedural Fairness” [2.5.10]ff. The remedies which may be granted by the court in the exercise of its judicial review powers are considered in “Remedies in Judicial Review” [2.6.10]ff. For discussion of civil appeals generally, see 5 Civil Procedure. To compare alternative methods of resolving disputes, see 13 Dispute Resolution.

286

Ombudsman General [2.7.150] Ombudsmen provide an independent review of the administrative actions of a wide variety of administrative agencies. Investigations are usually, but not necessarily, generated on complaint by an individual affected by the action. Ombudsmen do not ordinarily have jurisdiction over non-government organisations, although individuals often mistakenly complain to them about such organisations.1 Exceptions include the voluntary Postal Industry Ombudsman scheme, the introduction of which extends the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman to include those private sector postal operators who register to participate in the scheme; the Overseas Students Ombudsman and the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman.2 Ombudsmen have been established at the Commonwealth level, and in every State and Territory. They are the most accessible mechanism for review of administrative action, because their services are free and their jurisdiction extensive. They handle far more cases each year than other administrative law review mechanisms. Although they do not have determinative powers (see [2.7.160]), their intervention produces a favourable result for the complainant in a substantial proportion of cases which are investigated.3

1 There is a Financial Ombudsman Service to whom complaints concerning financial services providers should be made, and the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman has jurisdiction over all telephone and internet service providers. The Commonwealth Ombudsman has discretion to refer complaints against Telstra to this body. 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), ss 19L, 19ZI, 20C. From 1 July 2015, the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman, formerly established under the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (Cth), is included among the functions performed by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 3 See Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014–2015 (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2015), App 2 (Statistics).

[2.7.160] Ombudsmen provide independent but non-determinative review of administrative action. Ombudsmen are independent of the agency whose action is under review, but they do not simply act as an advocate for the complainant. Their role is to provide both parties with an objective assessment of the propriety of the agency’s actions, rather than advocate for the complainant. Ombudsmen frequently act as mediators between an agency and the complainant, and complainants are often satisfied with the resulting

287

[2.7.160]

OMBUDSMAN

explanation for the agency’s action. Even if the complainant is not satisfied with the agency’s explanation, the Ombudsman will dismiss the complaint if he or she concludes that “the agency decision was … correct or at least constituted a reasonable exercise of an available discretion”.1 On the other hand, where he or she believes a complaint to be justified, an Ombudsman will vigorously pursue its resolution in the complainant’s favour, even in the face of continued agency intransigence. Ombudsmen have only non-determinative powers. They can make recommendations to administrative agencies, but agencies are not bound to accept these recommendations. Common recommendations include that an agency apologise to an aggrieved person, change its decision, accept liability for damage caused to a person, improve its administrative procedures, or make an ex gratia payment to a person. If the agency refuses to accept a recommendation, the Ombudsman’s only sanction is to make an adverse report on the matter to a higher authority. It is up to those authorities to decide whether the Ombudsman’s recommendations should be enforced in some way. Such adverse reports are rarely made.

1 D Pearce, “Ombudsman: Office of Paradox” (paper presented to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 3 May 1990) p 4.

[2.7.170] The Australian Ombudsmen are adapted from the Swedish office of the “Justitie-Ombudsman”, which was established in 1809.1 The Swedish Constitution does not include a system of ministerial responsibility, and the Ombudsman was designed to make the executive accountable to Parliament.2 However, by the time Ombudsmen were established in Australia, the Swedish Ombudsman’s role had changed to focusing on resolving individual complaints against government. The various Australian Ombudsmen’s role has correspondingly been understood primarily as a mechanism of protecting individuals: The Ombudsman legislation emerged at a time when the principal concern was for administrative justice for the individual rather than a more comprehensive view of public accountability.3

However, Ombudsmen have an important role to play in helping administrative agencies to improve their administrative practices. Agencies themselves have come to recognise the Ombudsmen’s potential contribution to systemic improvement. The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s best relations are with the agencies it investigates most often: “[F]amiliarity, rather than breeding contempt, has bred cooperation. The value of the office in providing a second look at decisions has been recognised as worthwhile”.4 A 1991 Senate Committee Report noted strong support by Commonwealth agencies for the Ombudsman’s role in improving their administration.5 In New South Wales, the Ombudsman works closely with agencies, helping them to develop effective

288

[2.7.180]

GENERAL

internal complaint-handling systems and producing significant cost savings for them.6

1 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report 2011–2012 (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2012) p 5. 2 D Pearce, “Ombudsman: Office of Paradox” (paper presented to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 3 May 1990) p 2. 3 E Biganovsky, “Reinventing Freedom of Information: A State Focus” in S Argument (ed), Administrative Law: Are the States Overtaking the Commonwealth? (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994) p 186. 4 D Pearce, “The Ombudsman: Neglected Aid to Better Management” (1989) 48 AJPA 359 at 360. See also A Cameron, “Future Directions in Administrative Law: The Ombudsman” in J McMillan (ed), Administrative Law: Does the Public Benefit? (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1992) p 205. 5 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Offıce of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (AGPS, 1991). 6 D Landa, “The Ombudsman Surviving and Thriving into the 2000s: The Challenge” in S Argument (ed), Administrative Law: Are the States Overtaking the Commonwealth (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994) p 95.

[2.7.180] The various enactments establishing the offices of Ombudsmen all follow the same pattern, with some variations in wording, scope and order of provisions.1 Each enactment provides for a person to be appointed to the office, sets out which administrative agencies and which matters are subject to the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, and specifies how investigations are to be initiated and conducted. The enactments also confer investigatory powers on the Ombudsman, stipulate the procedure upon completion of an investigation and provide for the Ombudsman to report to a higher authority in the event of non-compliance with a recommendation. The Australian judiciary has displayed some hostility to Ombudsman legislation, adopting a narrow and technical approach to the question of the Ombudsmen’s jurisdiction. Such an approach is unwarranted, given both the general nature and purpose of the legislation and its specific provisions. As remedial legislation, it should be given a wide and beneficial operation.2

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA). 2 British Columbia Development Corp v British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] 2 SCR 447; 14 DLR (4th) 129, Dickson J (for the Court) at 137 (DLR).

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Which Agencies Can Ombudsman Investigate? [2.7.190] Ombudsmen are empowered to investigate a “matter of administration” concerning a defined set of administrative agencies. Jurisdiction to investigate a matter of administration is conferred either directly1 or by Ombudsmen being empowered to investigate an agency’s administrative action, which is defined to mean an action “relating to a matter of administration”.2 In New South Wales, the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate the conduct of a public authority,3 which is defined to mean “any action or inaction relating to a matter of administration”.4 All Ombudsman legislation contains fairly complex and varied definitions as to which administrative agencies fall within the relevant Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.5 In some jurisdictions, the legislation includes a very broad “catch-all” definition (see [2.7.260]) and provides that all agencies fitting this description are within jurisdiction unless expressly excluded by a Schedule or some other provision of the Act, or by delegated legislation made under it.6 In other jurisdictions, the legislation provides that a range of administrative agencies are automatically within jurisdiction unless expressly excluded, but other types of agencies are not within jurisdiction unless they are expressly included.7 In practice, essentially all government departments and statutory authorities are within each Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. State Ombudsmen also have jurisdiction over local government authorities.8 Generally speaking, non-government bodies acting on behalf of a government agency under a “contracting out” arrangement are only within jurisdiction if legislation specifically provides for this. This creates issues for the ability of Ombudsmen to deal with administrative problems.9 However, under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), the Western Australian Ombudsman has jurisdiction over “an individual who, or body which, has been delegated the exercise of any power or the performance of any function of” an agency that is within jurisdiction. “Body” is defined by the Act to include an association, company or corporation.10 The concept of “delegation” is wide enough to include the contracting out of the power or function. The position of government business enterprises (GBEs) is inconsistent and there are mixed views on the desirable approach.11 The Commonwealth Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate actions of “Commonwealth-controlled companies”.12 Such companies are defined as an incorporated company in which the Commonwealth has an interest that enables the Commonwealth to effectively control the company.13 Similarly, the Western Australian Ombudsman has jurisdiction with respect to “a corporation or association over which control can be exercised by the State, by a Minister, [or] by a department”.14 The position in the other states depends on the exact wording of the relevant jurisdictional provision and the extent to which individual GBEs have been included or excluded by Schedules to, or regulations

290

[2.7.190]

WHICH AGENCIES CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?

made under, the relevant legislation. Queensland and Victoria have both legislated to limit the jurisdiction which their Ombudsmen would otherwise have over their GBEs.15 The Commonwealth Ombudsman also has the power to enter into an Ombudsman Scheme, which is a scheme providing for “the investigation of complaints by consumers about matters relating to decisions or actions of the holders of licences or authorities granted under an enactment”.16

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(1). 2 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 3, 6, 14(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 7(1), 12; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act”), s 13(1); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definition of “administrative action”), s 13(1). 3 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(1). 4 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 5(1) (definition of “conduct”). 5 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “prescribed authority”), s 3(2); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 3(1), (2); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 5(1) (definition of “public authority”); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 4 (definition of “agency”), s 5; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 8, 14; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition “agency to which this Act applies”); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 4; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definition of “authority”); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), ss 4A, 13. 6 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 5(1) (definition of “public authority”); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 4; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definitions of “authority”, “exempt person or body”), Sch 2; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), ss 4A, 13. 7 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “prescribed authority”), s 3(2), (3); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 3(1), (2); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 4 (definition of “agency”), s 5; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 8, 14; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition “agency to which this Act applies”). 8 Under Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definition of “authority”), a Councilor of a Council is excluded, but not the actions of the local government acting as a corporate body, or any of its employees. 9 See Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Issues Paper (AGPS, 1997); Commonwealth Ombudsman, Nineteenth Annual Report 1995–1996 (AGPS, 1996) Ch 2; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Twentieth Annual Report 1996–1997 (AGPS, 1997) Ch 7. 10 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 4A(1)(e), (2)(b). The Ombudsman only has jurisdiction over such persons or bodies “to the extent of the exercise of the power or the performance of the function”: s 4A(1)(e). 11 The Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration recommended that all Commonwealth government business enterprises (GBEs) should be within jurisdiction unless they could demonstrate a good reason for specific exclusion, rejecting an argument that an Ombudsman review would unfairly disadvantage GBEs competing with the private sector. It noted that Ombudsmen are increasingly being used in the private sector and argued that the Ombudsman’s contribution to improved

291

[2.7.190]

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12 13 14 15

16

management could be used to add value to the GBEs’ service: Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Offıce of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (AGPS, 1991) p 43. In contrast, the Administrative Review Council recommended that GBEs’ competitive commercial activities should not be subject to any administrative law accountability mechanism, including Ombudsman review: Administrative Review Council, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law, Report 38 (AGPS, 1995) p 40. Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3A. Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “Commonwealth-controlled company”). Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 4A(1)(d). “Control” is not defined. See Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 (Qld), s 157; State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 (Vic), s 90. On the other hand, the Territory-owned Corporations Act 1990 (ACT) and the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) do not affect the jurisdiction of those States’ Ombudsmen concerning government business enterprises. Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “ombudsman scheme”), s 5(1)(c).

[2.7.200] Ombudsmen do not have jurisdiction to review the actions of parliaments, courts, governors, Ministers, Cabinets, royal commissions, coroners or other quasi-judicial bodies.1 All Federal, State and Territory parliaments are excluded from the Ombudsmen’s jurisdictions because they do not fall within the various definitions of agencies within jurisdiction.2 The position of the bodies most commonly excluded is discussed further at [2.7.210]–[2.7.250].

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(2); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(2); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 12(1)(a), Sch 1; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 15, 16; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 9(2), 16; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act”); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(3), Sch 2; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definitions of “authority”, “exempt person or body”), Sch 2; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 13(2). 2 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), Sch 2 Item 1 excludes actions of Parliament relating to the passage of Bills; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 13(2)(a) expressly excludes both Houses of Parliament and their committees.

[2.7.210] Ombudsmen do not have jurisdiction over courts.1 Under the separation of powers doctrine, it is considered inappropriate for an administrative agency to review the actions of judicial officers.2 While the decisions of judges are clearly outside the jurisdiction of all Ombudsmen, the position of court administrators, such as registrars and clerks of court, is more varied. The Commonwealth Ombudsman clearly has jurisdiction over court administrators, as the definition of a “prescribed authority” within jurisdiction

292

[2.7.210]

WHICH AGENCIES CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?

includes a “chief executive officer of a court or tribunal”.3 This is defined to include the Clerk of the High Court, the Registrar of the Federal Court, the Chief Executive Officer of the Family Court, the Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Circuit Court, and the Registrar of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.4 However, this power does not extend to investigating action taken by the chief executive officer of a court or a member of their staff when exercising a power of the court or performing a function or exercising a power of judicial nature.5 In New South Wales, the conduct of “a court or a person associated with a court” is excluded from jurisdiction.6 Similarly, in Queensland, courts and the associated holders of judicial office when acting judicially or performing an authorised function are not deemed to be a public authority or agency and are therefore excluded from jurisdiction.7 Western Australia also specifically excludes all of its courts of law and court commissioners, as well as the registrars of its Supreme, District, Family and Liquor Licensing Courts.8 These provisions clearly exclude actions of court administrators from the jurisdiction of the relevant Ombudsman. A Victorian court, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, and an extensive list of officers of those bodies, are each an “exempt person or body” for the purposes of the definition of “authority” in s 2(1) of the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic).9 Further, any other member of the staff of a registrar or office of a court is also an excluded person, to the extent that his or her functions relate to a judicial or quasi-judicial function of the court.10 In the Northern Territory, the actions of any person “discharging or purporting to discharge responsibility of a judicial nature” are excluded, as are the actions of a tribunal or tribunal member in the performance or purported performance of the tribunal’s deliberative functions.11 Similarly, in South Australia, acts “done in the discharge of a judicial authority” are excluded.12 In Tasmania, the threshold for exclusion is higher, with only decisions “made by a court or by a person as a member of a court” excluded.13 These provisions do not, on their face, exclude court administrators from the Ombudsmen’s jurisdiction. However, in Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550 the Victorian Supreme Court, considering an earlier version of the legislation, said that nothing related to the judicial process was within the concept of “a matter of administration”. Gillard J said that it was “very difficult to see how ‘a court of law’ could take ‘an administrative action’”.14

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(2)(b); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(2)(b); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 2; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 16(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 9(2)(c), 14; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act”), s 13(1); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(5)(b); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definitions of “authority”, “exempt person

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[2.7.210]

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

or body”), Sch 2; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 13(2)(d) – (j). For an alternative view, see J Disney, “Ombudsmen in Australia” (1974) 46 Australian Quarterly 38 at 44–45. Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “prescribed authority”). Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “chief executive officer of a court or tribunal”). Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(2)(ba). Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 2(a). Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 9(2)(c) read with ss 8(1), 14. Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 13(2)(d) – (f), (h). Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definitions of “authority”, “exempt person or body”), Sch 2 Item 7. Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1), Sch 2. Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 16(1)(a), (b). Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act”). Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(5)(b). Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550 (FC), Gillard J at 559.

[2.7.220] Ombudsmen have jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies unless they are specifically excluded.1 Thus, in Booth v Dillon (No 3) [1977] VR 143, the Victorian Supreme Court held that the actions of a prison governor making disciplinary decisions about prisoners at a quasi-judicial tribunal were administrative and therefore fell within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. Most Australian jurisdictions specifically exclude some quasi-judicial bodies from the relevant Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.2 However, the Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), the Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) do not exclude these quasi-judicial bodies; therefore, the general principle is that the Ombudsmen have jurisdiction over such bodies operating in those jurisdictions. Some of the legislation defines the exclusion by reference to the membership of the quasi-judicial body. Thus, the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) excludes: [A] body that has the power to take evidence on oath or affirmation and is required, or is expressly permitted, by an enactment to be constituted by, or to include among its members, a person who is a Justice or Judge of a court … or a person who has … the same status as a Justice or Judge of such a court.3

Under the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), a board, tribunal, commission or other body presided over by a judge, magistrate or Australian lawyer presiding as such by virtue of a statutory requirement and appointment are all excluded persons or bodies.4 As well as excluding the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) excludes bodies to which a Supreme Court, District Court, or Land and Environment Court judge or member of the Industrial Relations Commission is appointed and over which such a person has a right to preside.5 The Act goes further by excluding conduct of:

294

[2.7.230]

WHICH AGENCIES CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?

[A] person or body (not being a court) before whom witnesses may be compelled to appear and give evidence, and persons associated with such a person or body, where the conduct relates to the carrying on and determination of an inquiry or other proceeding.6

The Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT) excludes the Parole Board,7 and acts done in the discharge of responsibilities “of a judicial nature”.8 Similarly, the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) excludes administrative action taken by “a tribunal, or a member of a tribunal, in the performance of the tribunal’s deliberative functions”.9 The Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) refers to an act done in the discharge of a “judicial authority” and those acts declared not to be administrative for the purpose of the Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA).10 These provisions may extend beyond formally constituted courts, but the elusiveness of the concept of “judicial” nature, power or authority makes the exact scope of the provisions unclear.

1 Ontario (Ombudsman) v Ontario (Health Disciplines Board) (1979) 104 DLR (3d) 597; Ontario (Ombudsman) v Ontario (Labour Relations Board) (1986) 44 DLR (4th) 312; Booth v Dillon (No 3) [1977] VR 143. 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “prescribed authority” para (a)(ii)); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 3; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 4 (definition of “public authority”), ss 5, 16(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 16(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act” para (c)), s 5(1); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definitions of “authority”, “exempt person or body”), Sch 2 Item 8. 3 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(1) (definition of “prescribed authority”). This includes the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which includes Federal and Family Court judges among its members, which now conducts merits review in applications formerly reviewed by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal. However, the Veterans Review Board remains subject to the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. 4 Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definitions of “authority”, “exempt person or body”), Sch 2 Item 8. 5 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Items 3, 20. 6 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 2(b). 7 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 16(1)(h). 8 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 16(1)(a). 9 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 16(2)(a). 10 Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “administrative act” para (c), (e)).

[2.7.230] Legal advisers to the Crown are excluded from the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction in some jurisdictions. Legal advisers to the Crown are not excluded from the relevant Ombudsman’s jurisdiction under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) and Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA). However, the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) excludes the conduct of

295

[2.7.230]

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public authorities acting as legal advisers to other public authorities,1 as well as the conduct of the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions in relation to any proceedings before a court.2 The conduct of any public authority itself, in relation to any proceedings before a court or body where a person may be compelled to give evidence, is also excluded.3 The Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) exclude actions of persons serving as legal advisers to the Crown generally,4 while the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) excludes the actions of legal advisers only in relation to legal proceedings.5 The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) excludes “any action taken by a person acting as legal adviser or as counsel”,6 as well as the members of any Royal Commission, the Director and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and the Solicitor-General.7 An earlier Victorian provision was discussed by the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court in Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550. The Court held that all actions of the Victorian Department of Law and the Crown Solicitor relating to the preparation and conduct of legal proceedings were excluded from the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction by the requirement that the Ombudsman investigate only “matters of administration”. The Court found that they were matters relating to the judicial process, rather than the process of administration. The specific exclusion of legal advisers was considered to have been made out of “abundant caution” and to have been strictly unnecessary. This view has been criticised: see [2.7.270].

1 2 3 4

5 6 7

Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 6. Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 7. Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 8. Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 16(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), Sch 2 Item 2; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definition of “authority”), Sch 2 Item 11. Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 16(2)(b). Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(6). Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), Sch 1.

[2.7.240] Ombudsmen are not empowered to investigate the actions of Ministers or Cabinets. Under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, Parliament is thought to be a more appropriate review mechanism. The Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) and Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) specifically exclude investigations into the actions of Ministers.1 The Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) specifically exclude investigations of both Ministers and Cabinet.2 The Queensland and Western Australian legislation specifically precludes the Ombudsman from questioning the merits of either a ministerial or Cabinet decision. The Northern Territory Act precludes the 296

[2.7.240]

WHICH AGENCIES CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?

Ombudsman from investigating any “deliberations” of the Executive Council or questioning the merits of a ministerial decision. Neither the Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) nor the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) expressly excludes Ministers or Cabinet. It has been argued that the Victorian legislation exempts Ministers because they are not categorised within its definition of “authority”.3 However, while “authority” is defined to include government departments, administrative offices, Court Services Victoria and various specified entities,4 this definition is not exhaustive. Nevertheless, the Victorian Ombudsman has said: The Act does not provide for the Ombudsman to investigate decisions of Parliament nor decisions of Cabinet. It would be not only intolerable but would subvert the whole process of democracy, elected Governments and the sanctity of Parliament were the Ombudsman to do so … It is equally clear that the decisions of a Minister or Ministerial policy should not be questioned or investigated by an Ombudsman.5

The exclusion of ministerial and Cabinet decisions from direct review does not extend to the advice given to Ministers. Each Act provides that the Ombudsman is entitled to investigate the advice provided to a Minister by her or his advisers, and the actions of a delegate of a Minister.6 Jurisdiction may exist even where it is provided that the action taken is deemed to have been taken by the Minister personally.7 Similarly, Ombudsmen can investigate the actions of other agencies taken as a consequence of a ministerial or Cabinet decision. The Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) expressly provides for this,8 and in the other jurisdictions this power is presumed to exist.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 1(b); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(5)(a). 2 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 15(1)(a), (b); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 16(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(3). 3 EJ Kyrou, Victorian Administrative Law (The Law Book Co Ltd, 1985) at [4199]. 4 Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definition of “authority”), Sch 1. 5 Victorian Ombudsman, Seventeenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, 30 June 1990 (Government Printer, 1990) p 5. 6 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 1(b) excludes from the exception “conduct of a public authority relating to a recommendation made to a Minister of the Crown”; this would include advice by a public servant to a Minister. 7 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(3A); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(4), (5). 8 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(5), (6).

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[2.7.250]

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[2.7.250] The position of Ombudsmen in relation to complaints against police varies across the jurisdictions. The Commonwealth Ombudsman no longer reinvestigates complaints against the Australian Federal Police (AFP),1 but instead reviews the AFP’s administration of Pt V (Professional Standards and AFP Conduct and Practices Issues) of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) on an annual (and ad-hoc) basis, with the power to require the production of documents.2 In the Australian Capital Territory, the Ombudsman has a similar role monitoring police compliance with the Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005 (ACT).3 Under the Police Act 1990 (NSW), the New South Wales Ombudsman has a significant supervisory role from the outset, as well as power to reinvestigate a complaint.4 In the Northern Territory, the Ombudsman must assess a police complaint (whether made to the Ombudsman or a notified police complaint) and decide how to deal with it, or to decline to deal with it.5 Options open to the Ombudsman include dealing with the complaint by the police complaints resolution process, by investigation by a Police Standards Command member, or to deal with the complaint by an Ombudsman investigation.6 In Western Australia, the Police Force of Western Australia is a public authority for the purposes of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) and the Commissioner has the ordinary powers of investigation set out in s 14(1).7 Further, the Corruption and Crime Commission can refer an allegation relating to a “public officer”8 to the Parliamentary Commissioner, although this requires prior consultation with the Parliamentary Commissioner or Auditor General.9 Under the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), the Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) and the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), Ombudsmen do not have a reinvestigatory role.10 Under the Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction in relation to complaints against police,11 but generally the complainant must first take a complaint to the Internal Investigations unit, complaining to the Ombudsman only if dissatisfied with the outcome of that process.12

1 See Speech by the Commonwealth Ombudsman, “The Commonwealth Ombudsman – Future Vision”, to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law Conference on 28 July 2015 (available at http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/24529/28-July-2015-TheCommonwealth-Ombudsman-future-vision-.pdf, viewed 15 September 2016). 2 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), Pt V Div 7. 3 Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Pt 2 Div 2.3. 4 See Police Act 1990 (NSW), Pt 8A Divs 5 – 8. 5 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 14, 65. 6 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 66, 67. 7 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), ss 4A(1)(b), 14(1).

298

[2.7.260]

WHAT ACTIONS CAN OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATE?

8

Criminal Code (WA), s 1 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), App B Schedule) defines “public officer” to include a police officer. 9 Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA), s 38(1). 10 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 16(2)(c), (d); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 5(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 2(1) (definition of “exempt person or body”), Sch 2. 11 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 4(1)(b). 12 Tasmanian Ombudsman, Tasmanian Ombudsman 26th Annual Report 2004–2005 (Ombudsman, 2005) p 35.

What Actions Can Ombudsman Investigate? [2.7.260] The concept of a “matter of administration” is based on the separation of powers doctrine.1 It distinguishes between judicial and legislative matters, which are not within the Ombudsmen’s jurisdiction, and administrative matters, which are. The term “a matter of administration” is a “catch-all” phrase, encompassing almost all administrative action engaged in by an agency (other than judicial and legislative actions). Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that the phrase should not be given a narrow or technical operation, particularly in light of the remedial nature of the Ombudsmen legislation. Rather, it should be taken to encompass everything done by public authorities which is not excluded as legislative or judicial activities, or which is otherwise expressly excluded.2 Australian state courts have not always adopted this approach. In particular, there is some controversy on how widely or narrowly the concept of judicial activity should be defined. There is also disagreement on whether the formulation of government policies falls within the concept of “matter of administration” and, in some jurisdictions, whether unauthorised actions are a “matter of administration”. The extent to which Ombudsmen can investigate personnel decisions also varies among jurisdictions. However, it is clear that the commercial activities of government agencies are within jurisdiction unless expressly excluded. These issues, and the exclusion of legislative actions, are discussed at [2.7.270]–[2.7.340].

1 See JK Bentil, “The Concept of ‘Administrative Action’ and the Ombudsman” [1976] ACL DT 297; N Hennessy and J Goldring, “Administrative Character” (1985) 59 ALJ 659. 2 Thus, in British Columbia Development Corp v British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] 2 SCR 447; 14 DLR (4th) 129, Dickson J at 85 (DLR) said “the phrase ‘a matter of administration’ encompasses everything done by governmental authorities in the implementation of government policy [excluding] only the activities of the legislature and the courts from the Ombudsman’s scrutiny”.

299

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[2.7.270] The Ombudsman legislation makes some provision for limiting an Ombudsman’s jurisdiction in relation to the judicial process: see [2.7.210]. The question is how widely the scope of the “judicial process” extends. This was discussed in some detail by the Full Victorian Supreme Court in Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550. The Court emphasised that, in criminal proceedings, the Crown Solicitor has the status of a party to litigation, and played down the bureaucratic nature of the administration of the criminal justice system by State agencies. It held that all of the actions of the Crown Law Department relating to the bringing of criminal proceedings against a person were essentially the actions of a party to litigation. As such, the Court found that they related to the judicial process, not the administrative one. It therefore followed that the then provision specifically excluding the actions of officers of the Crown Law Department was unnecessary.1 The same Court applied the original Glenister v Dillon decision in Glenister v Dillon (No 2) [1977] VR 151, holding that the activities of the Public Solicitor in representing a person facing criminal charges were concerned with the “judicial function of government” and thus outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.2 Application of the Glenister v Dillon decision produces inconsistent results, because whether or not a particular action is a “matter of administration” depends on what the action “relates to”, rather than the nature of the action itself. For example, administrative actions taken by the Department of Law or Legal Aid Commission in relation to court cases would be “judicial”, because they relate to a court’s judicial functions. However, the same action taken by the same body in relation to merits review proceedings would be “administrative” because they would relate to the administrative function of merits review. The Commonwealth Ombudsman does not accept that Glenister v Dillon applies to the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). That office takes the view that decisions under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) concerning the meaning of “administrative character” for the purpose of that Act, are persuasive authority on the meaning of “a matter of administration” for the purposes of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth).3 The Federal Court has held that decisions of a Legal Aid Commission concerning the representation of a person in legal proceedings,4 decisions made in the conduct of litigation by a public authority5 and decisions to give a statutorily required consent to prosecution6 are all “decisions of an administrative character” for the purpose of s 3(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.7 On this approach, such actions would also be a “matter of administration” under the Ombudsman Act 1976 unless excluded by one of its express provisions, even though they all “relate to” the judicial process.

1 In Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550, the Court was considering an earlier version of Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 13(3)(b). However it is suggested that the operation of 300

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current Ombudsman Act 1973, s 2(1) (definition of “exempt person or body”), Sch 2 would be to the same effect. Glenister v Dillon (No 2) [1977] VR 151, Nelson J at 153. Commonwealth Ombudsman, Fifth Annual Report 1981–1982 (AGPS, 1982) p 23. Sordini v Wilcox (1982) 64 FLR 439 (FCA). Dixon v Attorney-General (Cth) (1987) 15 FCR 338. Murchison v Keating (1984) 1 FCR 341; Buffıer v Bowen (1972) 32 A Crim R 214. See “Reviewable Decisions, Conduct and Powers” [2.4.180].

[2.7.280] “A matter of administration” does not include the making of delegated legislation. As noted at [2.7.200] and [2.7.260], Federal, State and Territory legislatures and their actions are excluded from Ombudsmen’s jurisdictions. Similarly, an Ombudsman cannot investigate the making of delegated legislation by an administrative agency over which he or she has jurisdiction. In Minister for Industry and Commerce v Tooheys Ltd (1982) 60 FLR 325, the Federal Court suggested that under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), “a decision of an administrative character” may include some decisions implemented in the form of delegated legislation, provided that the decision involved the application of general rules to a particular case, rather than the formulation or creation of the general rules themselves. However, this view has been criticised1 and it is unlikely that Ombudsmen will seek to investigate such actions. On the other hand, Ombudsmen can make an adverse report where the action under investigation was taken in accordance with a rule of law, including delegated legislation which is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or discriminatory (see [2.7.600]) and can recommend that the delegated legislation be repealed or amended.

1 See Queensland Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615 (FCA), Gummow J at 635.

[2.7.290] No Ombudsman can investigate policy made by Cabinet or a Minister.1 However, Ombudsmen may review the advice provided by administrators to Ministers on which a policy was based: see [2.7.240]. The extent to which Ombudsmen are entitled to investigate the formulation and implementation of administrative policies is problematic. It has been suggested that the concept of “a matter of administration” must be distinguished even from policies formulated at an agency level. In Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434, the Victorian Supreme Court considered the power of the Ombudsman to investigate steps taken to protect young prisoners from sexual abuse. Dunn J held that the Ombudsman was entitled to investigate any specific steps taken by the Department to prevent sexual assaults from occurring, but not the more significant question of whether young prisoners should be provided with individual rather than dormitory accommodation as a way of protecting

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them from sexual assault. His Honour held that this was a matter of policy and that “a matter of administration” does not encompass the making of such administrative policies, only their “administration” or implementation.2 The Commonwealth Ombudsman has repeatedly rejected the applicability of Booth v Dillon (No 2) to the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. Each Ombudsman is empowered to find that an administrative action is in accordance with a “practice” that is “unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory”;3 it has been argued that the term “practice” is wide enough to encompass administrative policies. However, this argument was rejected by the South Australian Supreme Court in Salisbury City Council v Biganovsky (1990) 54 SASR 117; 70 LGRA 71. Mullighan J said that the term “practice” is not synonymous with “policy”, but refers to practices which develop in the course of administering policies, rather than the policies themselves. It was held that the South Australian Ombudsman is not entitled to express an opinion on matters of policy.4 Both the distinction between policy making and implementation made in Booth v Dillon (No 2) and the distinction between “policies” and “practices” made in Salisbury City Council v Biganovsky are difficult to apply in practice.5 Further, these attempts to limit “a matter of administration” to exclude policy matters fly in the face of the legislation’s remedial nature and have the potential to significantly undermine its beneficial operation. Investigation of individual complaints frequently reveals systemic problems which require attention in order for the individual complaint to be properly resolved. For example, in New South Wales in 1993, 72 percent of the Ombudsman’s recommendations involved changes to law, policy or procedure. The then-Ombudsman said: With some 93 [percent] of recommendations being implemented, this is a substantial achievement in terms of the Ombudsman contributing to real public sector reforms and not simply being a body to mollify unhappy customers of government services.6

1 See especially Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 15(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 16(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(3). Compare Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 1(b); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(5)(a). 2 In response to the decision of Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434, the Victorian Ombudsman agreed that while a decision to provide funding to build single cell accommodation at a prison was a matter of government policy and outside his jurisdiction, a departmental decision not to seek such funding and views held at a departmental level on whether prisoners should be given single cell or dormitory accommodation, should be considered a matter of administration which he could investigate: Victorian Ombudsman, Seventeenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, 30 June 1990 (Government Printer, 1990) p 6. 3 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(ii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(b); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA),

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s 25(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(b); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(b). Salisbury City Council v Biganovsky (1990) 54 SASR 117; 70 LGRA 71, Mullighan J at 123 (SASR). Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434, Dunn J at 439. D Landa, “The Ombudsman Surviving and Thriving into the 2000s: The Challenge” in S Argument (ed), Administrative Law: Are the States Overtaking the Commonwealth (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994) p 95.

[2.7.300] The investigation of unauthorised actions is not automatically outside an Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, despite authorities to the contrary.1 Each Australian jurisdiction provides for Ombudsmen to report on a serious breach of duty or misconduct by an administrator2 and to make an adverse report on the ground that the action investigated “appears to have been contrary to law”,3 which includes unauthorised actions. Further, the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) deems actions taken by an officer of an agency, whether or not properly within their duties, to be the actions of the agency itself where the officer acts as an officer of the agency.4 The Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) provides that “administrative action means action taken in a matter of administration whether there was legal authority for that action or not”.5 In Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J referred to the relevant provisions of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), finding that the Commonwealth Ombudsman could investigate unauthorised actions and make disciplinary recommendations. In contrast, the implications of the relevant provisions were not considered in cases which have held that Ombudsmen do not have jurisdiction to investigate unauthorised or illegal acts committed by administrators because such acts are not “matters of administration”.6 It is suggested that the approach taken in Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman is clearly more in keeping with the overall scheme of the Ombudsman legislation.

1 Booth v Dillon (No 1) [1976] VR 291; Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434; Saskatchewan (Ombudsman) v Saskatchewan (Minister for Social Services) (1979) 103 DLR (3d) 695. 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(10); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(12); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 28; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 60; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 50(2); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(5); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(7); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(6); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(7). 3 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(i); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(i); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(i); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(a); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(a). 4 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 3(5).

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5 6

Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 12(2). In Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434, the complaint concerned a prison officer’s unauthorised statements to the media about a prisoner. Dunn J held at 439 that because the prison officer’s actions were unauthorised, they were not “administrative action[s]” and thus were beyond the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. See also Saskatchewan (Ombudsman) v Saskatchewan (Minister for Social Services) (1979) 103 DLR (3d) 695, where Noble J found that the Ombudsman could not investigate a complaint of sexual assault by a male prison guard on a female prisoner because such an action was not a matter of administration.

[2.7.310] An unauthorised action may become a “matter of administration”, even on a narrow view of the definition. In Saskatchewan (Ombudsman) v Saskatchewan (Minister for Social Services) (1979) 103 DLR (3d) 695, the Court held that the Ombudsman could not investigate a complaint of sexual assault by a male prison officer on a female prisoner because such an action was not a matter of administration. However, it said that if the prison authorities had failed to carry out their administrative duties in enforcing discipline, this would have become “a matter of administration”. This is the situation which arose in Booth v Dillon (No 1) [1976] VR 291, where an assault by a prison officer on a prisoner had occurred in the presence of senior prison officers. The assault itself was held to be outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, but the complaint was characterised as one concerning the senior officer’s enforcement of discipline over both prisoners and staff in the prison and to that extent it involved “a matter of administration”. [2.7.320] In some jurisdictions, unauthorised actions by police officers are expressly included within the relevant Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. The Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT) provides that, in relation to complaints against police, the action complained of does not have to be within the definition of “administrative action” contained in the Act.1 In New South Wales, the Police Service Act 1990 (NSW) (as it was formerly known – see now Police Act 1990 (NSW)) was amended by the Police Service (Complaints) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW) to definitively confirm the power of the Commissioner of Police and the Ombudsman to deal with a complaint about the conduct of a police officer that involves the commission of a criminal offence, or other conduct outside the usual functions of a police officer.2 These provisions avoid the problem of whether unauthorised actions by police officers are subject to the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

1 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 21(1). 2 This amendment was made as a result of the New South Wales Parliament, Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Role of the Ombudsman (Parliament of New South Wales, 1992), Recommendation 28 (at p 152) was as follows: “Complaints regarding off-duty conduct should continue to be notified to the

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Ombudsman and dealt with in the same manner as any other allegation of misconduct, provided that the Ombudsman shall take no action where off-duty conduct bears no relationship to an officer’s status as a member of the Police Service”. See now Police Act 1990 (NSW), ss 121, 139 – 141; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 13.

[2.7.330] Ombudsmen are precluded in some jurisdictions from investigating personnel decisions concerning persons employed by an agency.1 This involves decisions regarding promotion, discipline and leave. In Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J held that this prevents the Commonwealth Ombudsman from investigating a decision by management to discipline an employee, but does not preclude the Ombudsman from recommending a course of discipline. Further, Ombudsmen generally are not prevented from investigating pre-employment and post-employment matters, such as the appointment process and superannuation concerns, although the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) also excludes appointment actions.2 The Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) and the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) place no limit on the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction concerning personnel matters, whereas the Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) excludes only action taken by the Tasmanian Industrial Commission under the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas) in relation to State employees within the meaning of that Act.3 The Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) provides that the Ombudsman must refuse to deal with a complaint relating to: [T]erms and conditions of employment of persons who are or were employed by or in an authority unless the Ombudsman considers that the matter merits investigation in order to avoid injustice.4

1 Ombudsman Ombudsman s 16(1)(g). 2 Ombudsman 3 Ombudsman 4 Ombudsman

Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(2)(d); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(2)(l); Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 12(a); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Act 1974 (NSW), Sch 1 Item 12(a). Act 1978 (Tas), Sch 2 Item 4. Act 1973 (Vic), s 15(4).

[2.7.340] Commercial activities generally fall within the definition of “a matter of administration”. Therefore, Ombudsmen can investigate the commercial activities of agencies within their jurisdiction. In British Columbia Development Corp v British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] 2 SCR 447; 14 DLR (4th) 129, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected the argument that an agency’s commercial activities were excluded from “matters of administration”. The corporation, after several years of negotiation, refused

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to enter into a lease with the proprietors of a restaurant situated within an area that the corporation was redeveloping. The restaurant complained to the Ombudsman, and the corporation challenged the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. The Canadian Supreme Court held that the phrase “matter of administration” encompassed everything done by government authorities in the implementation of government policy, including commercial and proprietary activities and excluding only the activities of the legislature and the courts. The Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) provides that commercial activities of a government agency are within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. The fact that a complaint concerns commercial activity constitutes a discretionary basis on which the Ombudsman may decline to investigate a complaint.1 All Ombudsmen in Australia have adopted the approach of treating the commercial nature of an administrative action as merely going to their discretion whether or not to investigate. Tendering procedures are within the jurisdiction of Ombudsmen. They may intervene where advertised procedures have not been complied with, and where there has been a mistake in assessing a particular tender to the disadvantage of the tendering party.

1 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4)(b)(iii).

Who May Initiate Investigations? [2.7.350] Although complaints received from individuals are the most frequent impetus for an investigation, all Ombudsmen are empowered to conduct “own motion” or “own initiative” investigations.1 There is no difference between an Ombudsman’s powers on own motion investigations and investigations into complaints from individuals. However, a lack of resources prevent Ombudsmen from conducting many own motion investigations, which are usually initiated where a number of related complaints are received about a particular matter. This approach allows the broader issues underlying the complaints to be investigated.2 In New South Wales, the Ombudsman is expressly empowered to make preliminary inquiries for the purpose of deciding whether to make particular conduct of a public authority the subject of an investigation. The inquiries may be made whether or not any person has complained to the Ombudsman about the conduct.3

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 5(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 5(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 14(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 12(a)(iii); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 13(2); 306

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Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 13; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 16A(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 16(1). Commonwealth Ombudsman and Defence Force Ombudsman, Annual Report 1987–1988 (Parl Paper 232, 1988) p 21. Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13AA(1), (2).

[2.7.360] A House, Committee or Member of Parliament may refer a question to an Ombudsman in most jurisdictions.1 Members of Parliament may make complaints to Ombudsmen on behalf of constituents. It is less common for a legislature to refer a question to an Ombudsman for investigation. In New South Wales, Ministers have in the past asked the Ombudsman to investigate certain matters within their own departments.2

1 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 17; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 19; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 14; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 16; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 16; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 15. 2 New South Wales Ombudsman, Fifteenth Annual Report 1989–1990 (NSW Ombudsman, 1990) pp 25–27.

[2.7.370] Most investigations undertaken by Ombudsmen arise out of complaints made by individuals, groups of individuals or businesses. There are two types of standing provisions. Under the first type, Ombudsmen automatically have jurisdiction and standing is only a consideration relevant to the Ombudsmen’s discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint. Under the second type, the Ombudsmen’s jurisdiction is conditional on the complainant having an interest in the matter. The first approach to standing operates under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA). These Acts provide that any person may make a complaint to the Ombudsman, but the Ombudsman has discretion to refuse to entertain the complaint if he or she is of the opinion that the complainant does not have a “sufficient interest” (a “sufficient direct interest” in Queensland or a “sufficient personal interest” in Western Australia) in the subject matter of the complaint.1 The second approach to standing applies under the Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic). These Acts require the complainant to be “directly affected”, “affected” or “personally aggrieved” by the subject matter of the complaint before the Ombudsman has power to investigate it.2 However, because Ombudsmen retain jurisdiction to conduct “own motion” investigations (see [2.7.350]), there is no reason to read standing requirements narrowly or technically. Given that Ombudsmen are empowered to investigate the substance of the matter under their own initiative, a court is unlikely to restrain Ombudsmen from investigating a complaint on the ground that the

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complainant lacks standing. Therefore, even in those jurisdictions where standing is made a jurisdictional issue, the question of whether a complainant has a sufficient interest to warrant an Ombudsman’s intervention is ultimately a matter for the Ombudsman’s discretion. In the absence of specific statutory authorisation, a complaint to an Ombudsman by an agency employee may breach public service secrecy provisions. Most agency employees are covered by secrecy provisions, making it illegal for them to disclose information obtained in the course of their employment. Those provisions do not prevent agency employees from cooperating with an ongoing investigation. However, in the absence of more specific statutory authorisation, they do prevent the disclosure of information in the course of making a complaint to the Ombudsman about an agency’s actions. Statutory authorisation for the making of complaints which overrides such general secrecy provisions is contained in the Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA).3 These Acts provide that statutory restrictions do not apply on the disclosure of information to prevent the making of a complaint to an Ombudsman. Additionally, agency employees may also be entitled to protection conferred by specific whistleblower legislation.4

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), ss 5(1)(a), 6(1)(b)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), ss 5(1)(a)(i), 6(1)(b)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), ss 12(1), 13(4)(b)(vi); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 33(b), 67(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(1)(c); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 18(1)(c). 2 Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 15(3a); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 14(4); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 14(1)(a). 3 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 117; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 21; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 17; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 17(3). 4 For example, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT) is designed to encourage the disclosure of conduct adverse to the public interest in the public sector. Section 11(1)(a)(iv) of the Act makes clear that the Ombudsman, along with others, is a “disclosure officer” entitled to receive a public interest disclosure. See also Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 25H(1) (relating to child protection disclosures), s 25X(1) (relating to the protection of people with disability disclosures).

Complaints [2.7.380] There are minimal formal requirements for making a complaint. This is necessary because Ombudsmen must be accessible if they are to be successful as a method of resolving individual grievances. Ombudsmen’s offices offer assistance in making a complaint. Under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) and Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), oral complaints are accepted.1 However, in Tasmania the Ombudsman may require 308

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an oral complaint to be confirmed in writing,2 and in Queensland the Ombudsman may decline to investigate an oral complaint until the complaint is put in writing.3 The Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) is silent on the form of complaint. The Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) provide that, with certain exceptions for the inability to communicate effectively in writing, a complaint “shall” or “must” be in writing.4 Nevertheless, in those jurisdictions the Ombudsmen’s officers may initially discuss complaints orally, either during visits to rural centres or over the telephone. Officers may also be willing to make some preliminary inquiries on the strength of the oral complaint. However the complaint must be placed in writing before it can be investigated formally. The Ombudsmen’s offices assist in putting complaints into writing. Each Act makes special provision for persons held in custody to make complaints. This is designed to ensure the accessibility of Ombudsmen’s offices to such persons and the confidentiality of such complaints.5

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 7(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 7(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 23(2); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 20(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 14(1). 2 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 14(1). 3 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 20(3)(a). 4 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 12(4), (4A); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 14(2)(b); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 17(1). 5 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 7(3), (4), (5); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 7(3), (4), (5); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 12(3); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 26; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 20(6); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 15(4); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 18; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 28; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 17A.

Discretion Not to Investigate [2.7.390] Ombudsmen have discretion to refuse to investigate complaints that are within jurisdiction. In theory, discretionary refusals to investigate are subject to judicial review, but in practice they are not subject to any external scrutiny. The discretion must, therefore, be exercised with caution. A complainant is entitled to be informed that the Ombudsman has declined to investigate the complaint and to be provided with the reasons for that decision.1

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 12(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 15(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 15(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 36; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(4); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 17(3);

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Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 22; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 18(2). Although there is no provision in the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) to this effect generally, it is the practice of the Victorian Ombudsman to inform complainants when he or she decides to investigate and to provide them with reasons for the decision. See also Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 15F that requires a person who made a protected disclosure complaint to be informed of refusal to investigate.

[2.7.400] A complaint must generally be made within 12 months of the date on which the complainant received notice of the relevant matter of administration, or on which it was reasonable for the complainant to have had such notice. Where a complaint is made outside that time, the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) provide that the Ombudsman has discretion to refuse to entertain the complaint.1 Under the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), this discretion exists where the complaint is made outside that time and the complainant cannot give a satisfactory explanation for the delay.2 The position is the same under the Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), except that in Tasmania the time limit is two years.3 In the Northern Territory, the Ombudsman requires a complainant to make their complaint within 12 months, but may accept a complaint outside this period if the Ombudsman considers doing so is appropriate in the public interest or because of special circumstances.4 The Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) provide that Ombudsmen shall not entertain a complaint made more than 12 months after the complainant had notice of the matter of administration, except in special circumstances.5 The concept of “special circumstances” is wide enough that staleness of the complaint is largely discretionary, rather than a jurisdictional factor. However, the discretion is to accept stale complaints rather than to reject them, as in the other jurisdictions. In any case, Ombudsmen in these jurisdictions retain their discretion to commence an “own motion” investigation into the subject matter of the complaint: see [2.7.350]. The Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) creates the widest discretion. It provides that the Ombudsman, when deciding whether to investigate a complaint, may have regard to “the conduct complained of [having] occurred at too remote a time to justify investigation”, without specifying any particular time limit.6

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 6(1)(a). 2 Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 15A(2). 3 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 19(2), (5). 4 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 25(3). 5 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 20(1)(c), (3)(c); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 16(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 17(5). 6 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4)(b)(iv).

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[2.7.410] Discretion exists to refuse to investigate complaints that are “frivolous or vexatious” or “not made in good faith”.1 Similarly, Ombudsmen may dismiss “trivial” complaints. This power is necessary for the effective use of resources but it must be exercised with caution, as in practice it is not externally reviewable.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(1)(b)(i); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 6(1)(b)(i); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4)(b)(i); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 33(a)(ii), (iii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 17(2)(b); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 21(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 15A(1)(b); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 18(1)(b).

[2.7.420] Ombudsmen have discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint if the complainant has an adequate alternative remedy.1 Before Ombudsmen will intervene, complainants are usually required to attempt to resolve their complaint directly with the agency concerned and to pursue other reasonable review options. Failure to do so is the most common reason why, for example, the Commonwealth Ombudsman refuses to investigate a complaint, and the majority of complaints and inquiries to the Commonwealth Ombudsman are referred back to the relevant agency.2 The Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) expressly provide that the Ombudsman may decline to investigate a complaint unless the complainant has first attempted to resolve the complaint directly with the agency concerned.3 These Acts further provide that those Ombudsmen may decline to investigate a complaint where there is an administrative practice in existence which allows for review of the administrative action by the agency.4 In a similar vein, the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) provides the Ombudsman with the discretion not to investigate a complaint if the complaint has a right of appeal, reference or review that has not been exhausted and it is reasonable in the circumstances to first require the complainant to exhaust that right or remedy.5 The Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) also provides that the Ombudsman “need not” investigate a complaint where a “complaints entity” is able to investigate the complaint “at a level at least substantially equivalent to the level at which the ombudsman would otherwise investigate the complaint”.6 The Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) refers to the existence of “an alternative and satisfactory means of redress” as discretionary consideration.7 In these jurisdictions, the issue of alternative remedies is expressly discretionary. That is, the existence of an alternative remedy, and the question of whether it would be reasonable for the complainant to pursue such an avenue, are simply factors relevant to the discretionary decision of whether to decline to investigate the complaint. On the other hand, under the Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971

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(WA), the question of alternative remedies initially goes to jurisdiction rather than discretion. In these jurisdictions, the Ombudsmen are expressly prohibited from investigating complaints where alternative remedies are available. Most of these provisions refer to a narrow range of alternative remedies, including only a right to have the decision reviewed by a court or tribunal, but the Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) refers to a right of review by any “court, tribunal, person or body”.8 However, these Ombudsmen are able to assume jurisdiction by deciding that it is unreasonable to require the complainant to pursue these remedies.9 The result is that, even in these jurisdictions, the existence of an alternative remedy is ultimately a discretionary, rather than jurisdictional, issue. Alternative remedies include not only a right of review before a court or tribunal, but also formal and informal internal review. Even where internal review is not formally available, the requirement that the complainant first attempt to resolve the complaint directly with the agency can be justified by reference to the general provision that the Ombudsman can decline to investigate a complaint where investigation of it would be “unnecessary or unjustifiable”: see [2.7.440]. The factors relevant to exercising the discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint on the basis that there is an adequate alternative remedy include the cost of the alternative procedure, the financial and personal abilities of the complainant to pursue that course and the effectiveness of the remedies available. For example, the fact that damages are not available as a remedy on judicial review, as opposed to the Ombudsman’s ability to recommend the making of ex gratia payments, may indicate that an investigation by the Ombudsman is the most appropriate form of review. An Ombudsman is more likely to decline to investigate a complaint, or to continue an investigation already commenced, where the complainant institutes other proceedings. The cost and limited effectiveness of judicial review means that its availability is rarely taken as a reason to decline to investigate a complaint. This approach is formalised for the Commonwealth Ombudsman by the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).10

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(1A), (2) – (4D); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), ss 6(2), (4) – (7), 6A; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4)(b)(v), (5); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 34, 35; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(1)(d), (e); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 13(3); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 20(1); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 15(5), (6); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(4), (5). 2 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Annual Report 2004–2005 (AGPS, 2005) pp 20, 67. 3 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(1A); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 6(2). 4 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(4); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 6(7). See also Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 20(3). 5 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(1)(d).

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6 7 8 9

Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(2). Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4)(b)(v). Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 13(3)(a). Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 35(1); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 15(5), (6); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 14(5). 10 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 10(1)(b) provides that the availability of judicial review under that Act is to be disregarded in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s discretion under Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(3).

[2.7.430] Ombudsmen have discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint if the complainant lacks a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the complaint: see [2.7.370]. This is an express discretionary factor under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA).1 In other jurisdictions, the situation is essentially the same: see [2.7.370].

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(1)(b)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 6(1)(b)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4)(b)(vi); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 33(b); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 21(1)(c); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 18(1)(c).

[2.7.440] An Ombudsman who forms the opinion that investigation of a complaint is not necessary or justified for whatever reason may decline to investigate it.1 Victoria is the only exception to this principle.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6(1)(b)(iii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 6(1)(b)(iii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13(4); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 33(d); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 23(1)(e)(ii), (f); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 17(2)(d); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 21(1)(d); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 18(1)(d).

Procedure of Investigation [2.7.450] Ombudsmen possess wide-ranging investigative powers. They may compel administrative agencies to produce documents and officers of an agency to answer questions. They do not have to follow any particular

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investigatory procedure. While they are empowered to hold formal hearings, they generally proceed by way of correspondence and private interviews with individuals and agency employees.1

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), ss 8(3), 9; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), ss 9(4), 11; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), ss 18, 19; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 52, 53, 89; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 24, 25, 28, 29; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), ss 18(3), 19; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), ss 23A, 24; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), ss 17(3), 18; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), ss 19(3), 20.

[2.7.460] Upon receipt of a complaint, an Ombudsman may make a preliminary investigation into the matter to determine whether jurisdiction exists, and if so, whether there are any factors indicating that the discretion to refuse to investigate should be exercised.1 The legality of the practice of making a preliminary investigation was questioned in Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550. Gillard J considered that, under the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) as it then stood, an Ombudsman who received a complaint concerning a matter outside jurisdiction could not commence a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not jurisdiction in fact existed. His Honour said that the Ombudsman could be assumed to be “sufficiently knowledgeable” to be able to determine from the face of the complaint whether or not it came within jurisdiction.2 Following the decision in Glenister v Dillon, the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) were amended to expressly provide that Ombudsmen are empowered to conduct preliminary investigations into jurisdictional and other matters.3 Similar provisions were included in the Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT) and Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) from the outset.4

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 7A; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 8; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13AA; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 28(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 22; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(1); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 20A; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 13A. Compare Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(1a). 2 Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550 (FC), Gillard J at 554–555. 3 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 7A; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 13A. 4 Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 8; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT) s 28; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18.

[2.7.470] In some jurisdictions, the Ombudsman is authorised to investigate a complaint even if it does not relate to a matter within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. This is only so where the Ombudsman considers it likely that the cause of the complaint arose from a matter within jurisdiction.1 The effect of the relevant provision in the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) was not considered in Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550, but clearly such provisions 314

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authorise a preliminary investigation into jurisdiction in the circumstances mentioned.2

1 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 20(3)(d); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 14(5); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 14(3); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 16(2). 2 See Saskatchewan (Ombudsman) v Saskatchewan (Minister for Social Services) (1979) 103 DLR (3d) 695; British Columbia Development Corp v British Columbia (Ombudsman) [1984] 2 SCR 447; 14 DLR (4th) 129.

[2.7.480] An Ombudsman must give written notice to the principal officer of an agency before commencing a formal investigation.1 Under the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) and Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), the Ombudsman must also give notice to the complainant.2 In Western Australia, notice must also be given to the Minister responsible for the agency.3 This also applies in Tasmania where the investigation is to be commenced on the Ombudsman’s own motion, or on a reference by the Governor or Parliament.4 In the Northern Territory, notice must be given to both the complainant and the responsible Minister.5 However, in Western Australia, if the Ombudsman considers that the complaint can “be investigated and resolved expeditiously by conducting an informal investigation”, then the Ombudsman need only give oral notice to the agency’s principal officer and has the discretion not to give any notice to the relevant Minister.6

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(1); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 16(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 47(a); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 27(1); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(1a); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(1)(b); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(1). 2 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 16(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23(1)(b). 3 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(1). 4 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23(2). 5 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 47. 6 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(1a).

[2.7.490] The procedure to be followed during an investigation is at the discretion of Ombudsmen. The only legislative stipulation is that investigations are to be conducted in private.1 Formal hearings involving direct confrontation between the complainant and agency officials are rarely held. Investigations are conducted informally by way of telephone or personal interviews conducted by Ombudsmen’s staff. Subject to procedural fairness requirements (see [2.7.530]–[2.7.550]), Ombudsmen also have discretion as to whose submissions will be heard.2 Under the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), the

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complainant has a statutory right to make submissions regarding the conduct which is the subject of the investigation.3 In other jurisdictions, the complainant is either interviewed or given some other opportunity to make a submission concerning the complaint. In New South Wales, the Ombudsman may at any time attempt to deal with a complaint by conciliation. Participation in the conciliation is voluntary, and evidence of anything said or admitted during the conciliation is not admissible in any subsequent investigation or proceedings.4

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(2); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(3); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 17; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 49(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 25(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(2); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(3); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(2); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(2). 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(3), (4); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(4), (5); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 49(3); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 25(2)(d); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(3)(b); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(3); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(3). 3 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 24(1). 4 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 13A.

[2.7.500] The investigatory powers of Ombudsmen vary according to jurisdictions. In the Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Queensland, the investigatory powers of the Ombudsmen are set out in the legislation.1 In the other jurisdictions, Ombudsmen possess the same investigatory powers as a Royal Commission or Commission of Inquiry.2 Under these powers, Ombudsmen may compel the attendance of persons and require them to answer questions and to produce documents. The Queensland Ombudsman also has the power to compel attendance and provide documents and information relevant to the investigation.3 Ombudsmen also have an express power to enter onto premises in the course of an investigation.4

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), ss 8, 9; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 11; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 52, 53; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 28, 29. 2 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 19(2); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 19; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 24(1); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 18(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 20(1). 3 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 29. 4 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 14; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 17; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 20; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 54(a); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 34; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 23; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 25; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 21; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 21.

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[2.7.510] Interference with or obstruction of Ombudsmen or their officers in the course of carrying out an investigation are offences in each jurisdiction, as is giving false testimony to Ombudsmen and their officers.1 Under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), it is also an offence to victimise a person because the person has made or will make a complaint, has provided or will provide information in the course, or for the purpose of an investigation, or has exercised or will exercise a power or perform a function under the Act.2 In the Northern Territory, it is an offence to prevent or obstruct the making of a complaint to the Ombudsman.3

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 36; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 35; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 37; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 126, 129; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 41 – 43; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 24; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 27; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 22; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 24. 2 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 30B. 3 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 124.

[2.7.520] The Ombudsmen’s powers to compel the production of documents and the giving of testimony generally override statutory secrecy provisions and public interest and legal professional privileges.1 However, under the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), the Ombudsman has a duty to allow a person to rely on a claim of legal professional privilege2 unless the person voluntarily waives that privilege. Under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), persons cannot be compelled to give evidence or produce documents that they “could not be compelled to give or produce in proceedings before a court”.3 In the Australian Capital Territory, the Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) provides that a person is not excused from providing any information, producing a document or other record or answering a question, on the ground that it would disclose legal advice to a Minister.4 In all other jurisdictions, the overriding of public interest privilege does not extend to Cabinet documents. Each jurisdiction (except the Australian Capital Territory) protects the confidentiality of Cabinet proceedings by providing that the Ombudsman may not have access to information or documents concerning Cabinet proceedings.5 Under the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), protection extends to documents or information concerning other Ministerial committees in addition to Cabinet.6 Some jurisdictions also provide for wider public interest immunity grounds to be asserted by way of an Attorney-General’s (or Chief Minister’s) certificate.7

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 9(4); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), ss 11(5)(a), (6); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 117; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 45; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 20; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 24(2), (3); Ombudsman Act 1973

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2 3 4 5

6 7

(Vic), s 18(3), (4); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 20(2A). Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), ss 21(2), (3), 21A. Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 20(3). Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 11(5)(b). Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 9(3)(c); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 22; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 15; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 46(1); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 21(1); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 24(4)(b); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 19; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 22. Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 19. Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 9(3); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 118; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 46(3); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 24(4).

[2.7.530] Before making a final report, Ombudsmen may be required to make a draft report available for comment. Following these comments, the draft may be revised before the official report is published. Subject to statutory and common law procedural fairness requirements, the Ombudsman has discretion as to who sees any draft report, but the whole or parts of it may be available under freedom of information legislation.1 The Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) provide that an agency must have an opportunity to respond before a report is made which is “expressly or impliedly” critical of it.2 Agencies in these jurisdictions also have the right, not available elsewhere, to respond to any report made concerning them after the report is made.3 In New South Wales, the agency’s right to comment is limited to “an opportunity to make submissions”,4 leaving it to the discretion of the Ombudsman as to when this opportunity is to be given. Under the Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), an agency also has a right to make submissions before an “adverse” report is made.5 Conversely, under the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), agencies have the wider right to make comments before any report is made that “may affect or concern” an agency.6 Each jurisdiction, other than South Australia and Tasmania, provides that a Minister may, on request, require an Ombudsman to consult with the Minister before forming a final opinion adverse to the agency.7 In New South Wales, the Ombudsman is required to consult the relevant Minister in every case before publishing a report.8 In Victoria, the Ombudsman must also consult with the mayor before forming an opinion adverse to a municipal council.9

1 Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 2 FCR 64; see [2.7.770], [2.7.790]. 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(5)(a); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(6)(a). 3 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(5); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(5). 4 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 24(2)(b). 5 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 100(2); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(6);

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6 7

8 9

PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATION

Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(4). Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 26(3); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(4). Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(9); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 50(2); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(5); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 s 19(5). Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 25(2). Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(5A).

18(4); 9(11); 26(2); (WA),

[2.7.540] Every Australian jurisdiction except South Australia provides that the Ombudsman must give persons a right to be heard before making adverse comments about them in a report.1 The Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) makes no such provision, but requires that before a report affecting an agency is made, the principal officer of the agency must be given an opportunity to comment.2 However, procedural fairness (in particular, the right to be heard)3 is implied at common law in situations where a person’s reputation may be damaged by the publication of a report by an administrative agency such as the Ombudsman.4 Therefore, even in South Australia, the Ombudsman must give persons a right to be heard before making an adverse report about them. Unlike agencies, complainants do not have an express statutory right to respond or to comment before a report is made,5 but they are entitled to procedural fairness before an Ombudsman makes an adverse finding or comment about them.6 In Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J discussed what is required to satisfy the right to be heard before an adverse report is made about a person. He held that: [A]s nothing in … [s 8(5) of Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth)] demands that the exact form of words contemplated or intended for the report is to be put to the individual concerned, it is sufficient if the substance of the proposed criticism is put.7

This requirement was satisfied where particular findings were “clearly implied” or “clearly insinuated” by the material put to the person concerned, without being expressly stated.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(5)(b); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(6)(b); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 24(2); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 100; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 55(2); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(5); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 25A(2); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(7). 2 Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(4). 3 See generally “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Procedural Fairness” [2.5.10]ff. 4 In R v Dixon; Ex parte Prince [1979] WAR 116; (1978) 42 LGRA 119 (FC), Burt CJ

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5

6 7

at 120–121 (WAR) had suggested that because an Ombudsman’s report is merely recommendatory, it does not affect any “rights” and therefore procedural fairness was not required. However, this has been overruled: see Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; 60 ALJR 113; Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596; 65 ALJR 167; Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163. While Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 24(1) gives complainants an express right to make submissions, this does not extend to a right to comment upon proposed findings. Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 2 FCR 64. Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J at 183.

[2.7.550] Whether the statutory procedural fairness requirement applies to draft reports is not dealt with expressly in the legislation of each jurisdiction. It has been argued that procedural fairness requires an opportunity to be heard before provisional conclusions and recommendations are stated in a draft report.1 The argument is based on a number of grounds, including statutory language requiring a right to be heard before a report is made;2 the concern that draft adverse comments made about agency employees will be seen by the principal officer of the agency; and the belief that once conclusions and recommendations are set out in a draft report, even provisionally, it is difficult to persuade the maker to change them. Former New South Wales Ombudsman, George Masterman QC, argued in response that the reference to “any” report is limited to final reports,3 and that the procedure of producing draft reports is an appropriate method by which the legislation’s procedural fairness requirements can be satisfied.4 The practice of distributing any such document was the subject of an inconclusive legal challenge in New South Wales.5 However, in Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J viewed the production of a draft report and the provision of an opportunity to comment as an appropriate way for the Commonwealth Ombudsman to discharge his or her procedural fairness obligations.

1 See M Newcity, “Ombudsman Heal Thyself” (1984) 9 LSB 175. 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(5); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(6); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 24(2); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 100(2); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 26(3), 55(2); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(4); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(5), (6); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), ss 17(4), 25A(2); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(4). 3 Nowhere does the legislation expressly contemplate the making of draft reports. 4 G Masterman, “A Complaint Against Macquarie University Law School” (1985) 10 LSB 17 at 19; but see M Newcity, “Ombudsman Heal Thyself Revisited” (1985) 10 LSB 90. Nevertheless, Masterman QC changed the description of the document

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circulated in New South Wales from “Draft Report” to “Statement of Provisional Findings and Recommendations”. Commissioner of Police v Deputy Ombudsman (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McInerney J, 30033 of 1990, 3 December 1990).

Reports [2.7.560] Ombudsmen are empowered to make an official report setting out the results of their investigations and recommendations. This report is then sent to the principal officer of the agency involved.1

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(2); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(2); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1), (3); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 58; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 50(1); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(2); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(2); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(2); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(2).

Grounds for Adverse Report [2.7.570] Several of the grounds on which an adverse report may be made resemble the grounds of judicial review, but others are wider.1 Ombudsmen may conclude that an administrative action was defective in some way, even if it was lawful. Ombudsmen are required to be subjectively satisfied that the conduct complained of occurred and that the conduct falls into one of the categories set out in the relevant provision of the legislation.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1).

18(1); s 59; 25(1); 23(1);

[2.7.580] Ombudsmen may make an adverse report where the administrative action was contrary to law.1 As Ombudsmen are administrative rather than judicial agencies, their interpretation of the law has no greater legal force than that of the administrative agency under review. If that agency believes its action to be lawful, the Ombudsman’s interpretation of the law does not always prevail. Ombudsmen who are unable to persuade an agency to adopt their interpretation of the law may recommend that the agency seek further legal advice or seek clarification of the law by Parliament. Failure to do so is a ground for making an adverse report. Under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsmen may also recommend that the

321

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principal officer of the agency refer the matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, as the case may be.2

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(i); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(i); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(i); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(a); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(a); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(a). 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 11; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 13.

[2.7.590] Ombudsmen may make an adverse report where they conclude that the action under investigation was “unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory”.1 Ombudsmen are empowered to consider the merits of an administrative action and may decide that an action was unreasonable even if it would not be susceptible to legal challenge:2 see [2.7.600]. This provision of the legislation is therefore wider than the judicial review doctrine of unreasonableness and Ombudsmen do not have to be satisfied that the action was so unreasonable that no reasonable administrator would have taken it. However, where the administrator had a choice between different courses of action, each of which appears reasonable, the Ombudsman will not make an adverse report simply because the administrator did not choose a course of action which would have been less detrimental to the complainant.3 On the other hand, Ombudsmen may conclude that an action was unreasonable even if the agency was not capable of acting any more reasonably in the circumstances.4 In particular, Ombudsmen usually do not accept the justification frequently offered by administrative agencies that a lack of resources prevented them from acting more reasonably. Ombudsmen may decide that the action under investigation was oppressive. The Commonwealth Ombudsman interprets this provision according to its ordinary meaning, rather than its technical, corporate law meaning. In determining whether an action is oppressive, regard is had to: (1)

the severity of the adverse impact the action has on the complainant;

(2)

the degree of consideration given to the complainant’s case by the agency, including the complainant’s personal circumstances;

(3)

whether other agencies act in the same way in similar circumstances;

(4)

whether the action infringed the complainant’s civil rights and liberties;

(5)

whether the agency put the complainant to unwarranted expense or effort; and

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whether the agency compelled the complainant to resort to unusual measures to dispute its decision.5

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 59(1)(a)(ii), 101(1)(a)(ii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(b); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(b); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(b); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(b). 2 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Third Annual Report 1979–1980 (AGPS, 1980) p 18. 3 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Third Annual Report 1979–1980 (AGPS, 1980) p 76. 4 J Richardson, “The Ombudsman – Guardian, Mentor, Diplomat, Servant and Protector” (1985) 12(4) Canberra Bull Pub Admin 222 at 223. 5 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Sixth Annual Report 1982–1983 (AGPS, 1983) p 16.

[2.7.600] Ombudsmen may make an adverse report where the action under investigation was taken in accordance with a law or a practice which is itself unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or discriminatory.1 This provision should be read as being wide enough to allow Ombudsmen to consider the reasonableness of administrative policies: see [2.7.290]. An adverse report may be made about the administrative action even where it was the only action possible under the relevant law, policy or practice. Ombudsmen have frequently made recommendations that law, policy or practice be changed: see [2.7.290].

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(iii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(iii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(iii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(c); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(c); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(c); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(c).

[2.7.610] An adverse report may be made by an Ombudsman where the action was taken for improper purposes or on the basis of irrelevant considerations.1 These provisions of the legislation reflect the common law ultra vires principles developed by courts exercising judicial review. They extend to include failure to have regard to relevant considerations, although this is not mentioned expressly.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(b), (c)(i); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(b), (c)(i); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(d); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(v); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(d); Ombudsman Act 1972 323

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(SA), s 25(1)(d); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(d); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(d); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(d).

[2.7.620] An adverse report may be made where an Ombudsman concludes that reasons for an action or decision should have been given, but the agency has failed to provide them.1 Ombudsmen often conclude that good administration requires the giving of reasons, even where no legal obligation to do so exists under statute (there being no obligation to give reasons at common law).2 Agencies which refuse initially to provide complainants with reasons for their actions often agree to do so once an Ombudsman has intervened. Complaining to the Ombudsman can therefore be a useful mechanism for obtaining reasons for decisions where no statutory right to reasons exists. Ombudsmen have found that complainants are often satisfied once reasons are provided, and do not further pursue their complaint. This suggests that it would often be more efficient for agencies to explain their actions in the first place.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(c)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(c)(ii); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(f); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(vi); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(e); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(e); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(e); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(e); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(e). 2 Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656; 60 ALJR 209.

[2.7.630] An adverse report may be made where the administrative action was taken because the agency made a mistake of law or material fact.1 The Ombudsmen’s investigative powers give them significant fact-finding abilities. Ombudsmen frequently spend more time determining the facts of the matter than the agency itself, although their findings of fact are not binding.2 It has been suggested that the Ombudsmen’s inquisitorial process makes them ill-equipped to resolve disputed questions of fact or assess witnesses’ credibility, and therefore Ombudsmen should refrain from intervention in such circumstances.3 This view has been criticised,4 and the general practice of Ombudsmen certainly is to attempt to resolve factual disputes, at least where “issues of substantial significance are at stake”.5

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(iv); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(iv); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(e); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(vii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(f); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(f); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(f); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(f); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(f). 2 Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163. 3 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Fourth Annual Report 1980–1981 (AGPS, 1981) p 14;

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[2.7.650]

4

5

GROUNDS FOR ADVERSE REPORT

Administrative Review Council, The Relationship Between the Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Report 22 (AGPS, 1985) pp 13–14. P Bayne, “Administrative Law: The Problem of Policy” in R Wettenhall and J Nethercote (eds), Hawke’s Second Government (Canberra CAE, 1988) pp 164–165. Administrative Review Council, The Relationship Between the Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Report 22 (AGPS, 1985) p 14.

[2.7.640] Ombudsmen may make an adverse report in circumstances where they conclude that the administrative action was “wrong”.1 This provides a “catch-all”, residual category for those cases where an Ombudsman considers that the action was defective in some way that does not fit neatly into one of the other categories explicitly provided in each statute.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(1)(a)(v); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(1)(a)(v); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1)(g); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 59(1)(a)(viii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 49(2)(g); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(1)(g); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(1)(g); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(1)(g); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(1)(g).

[2.7.650] Ombudsmen may not make findings of individual guilt, but may report their “opinion” that an offence has occurred. This was discussed in some detail in Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163. Section 8(10) of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) provides that the Ombudsman must bring any evidence of misconduct by an agency employee to the notice of the agency’s principal officer. Einfeld J rejected the argument that this was the only step available to the Ombudsman where such evidence is found. He held that the Ombudsman may deal with the issue in his or her final report, finding the Ombudsman Act 1976 does not expressly “empower the Ombudsman to make definitive findings of guilt of an individual and this power should not be implied”,1 because: [I]f there is rights such satisfaction construction

a valid construction of the Act that does not trample on common law as the right to be treated as innocent until guilt is proven to the of a duly constituted court beyond reasonable doubt, then that should be adopted.2

Nevertheless, Einfeld J held that the Ombudsman “is free to express genuine opinions”.3 If the Ombudsman does choose to express such opinions, he or she must include “the evidentiary material relied on which goes to the culpability of the individuals”.4 The Ombudsman may also “make recommendations of a disciplinary nature provided that the reasons and supporting evidentiary conclusions are not actual or equivalent to findings of individual culpability”.5 In New South Wales, the Ombudsman may, at any time, furnish information obtained in discharging functions under the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Independent Commission Against 325

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Corruption.6 In Western Australia, the Ombudsman may “consult” the Corruption and Crime Commission, the Inspector of Custodial Services or the Director of Public Prosecutions regarding any investigations the Commissioner is undertaking.7

1 Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J at [177]. 2 Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J at [173]. 3 Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J at [192]. 4 Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J at [192]. 5 Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Ombudsman (1995) 63 FCR 163, Einfeld J at [192]. 6 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 31AB. 7 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 22A.

v Commonwealth v Commonwealth v Commonwealth v Commonwealth v Commonwealth

[2.7.660] Ombudsmen may report that the complaint can be neither “sustained” nor “not sustained” if they are unable to determine the facts of a matter under investigation.1 This situation particularly arises when the Ombudsman investigates complaints against police. In Ombudsman v Moroney [1983] 1 NSWLR 317, the police officer who was the subject of the complaint challenged the power of the New South Wales Ombudsman to make such a report. The police officer was concerned about having an unresolved complaint against him on his record. He argued that the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) required the Ombudsman to reach a definite conclusion about whether or not the complaint was sustained. Rejecting this argument, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the Ombudsman’s report should state his or her actual conclusion or otherwise in the matter.

1 Ombudsman v Moroney [1983] 1 NSWLR 317 (CA).

[2.7.670] When Ombudsmen determine that an administrative action was defective in some way, they may make remedial recommendations. The legislation outlines a number of recommendations which Ombudsmen may make, but does not limit them to these types.1 The only limitation on Ombudsmen’s power to make recommendations, other than the requirement that any action recommended be lawful, is the practical likelihood of them being accepted and implemented by the agency involved.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(2); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(2);

326

[2.7.690]

REPORTS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(2); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 63, 101(3); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 50(1); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(2); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(2); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(2); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(2).

Reports and Implementation [2.7.680] Reports and recommendations, including the reasons on which they are based, must be furnished to the agency and to the responsible Minister.1 Ombudsmen often exercise their power to require the agency to reply to a report within a specified time, detailing the steps it proposes to take in response to the report.2 The agency is under no legal obligation to implement an Ombudsman’s recommendations, but the agency must give reasons for not doing so in most jurisdictions.3 All Ombudsmen consider that they have a good record in obtaining agency compliance. In general, Ombudsmen are able to procure a significant degree of cooperation from agencies in the implementation of their reports, and are able to obtain outcomes favourable to complainants in the majority of cases where the complaint is sustained. However, in a small number of cases they are met by intransigence from the agency and it is necessary to pursue the matter with a higher authority.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(2), (3)(a), (6); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(2), (3)(a), (6); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(1), (3); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 63(3)(a), (4); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 50(1), (3); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(2), (3); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(2), (3); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(2), (3); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(2), (3). 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 15(4); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 18(4); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 26(5); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 63(2); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 51(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(4); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(4); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(4); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(4). 3 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 103(1)(b)(ii); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 51(2)(b); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(4); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(4); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(4); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(4).

[2.7.690] If Ombudsmen are not satisfied with an agency’s response to a report, they are empowered to make a second report to a higher authority. At a Commonwealth level, the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) specifies that the second report must be made to the Prime Minister.1 The Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) provides that the second report must be made to the Chief Minister.2 The Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) provides that the second report may be made to the Presiding Officer of each House of Parliament and a copy 327

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of the report must be sent to the responsible Minister:3 see [2.7.710]. If the report relates to police conduct, under the Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), the Ombudsman may provide the Police Minister with a copy of the report, as well as another report that for tabling in the Legislative Assembly.4 If the Ombudsman’s report does not deal with police conduct, the Ombudsman may give a copy of the report to the responsible Minister for that public authority if dissatisfied with an agency’s response.5 Under the Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) and Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), the second report must be made to the relevant State Premier. In Tasmania, a copy of the report is also made to the responsible Minister,6 while under the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) it must be made to the Governor in Council.7 A second report must include any comments made by the agency in response to the Ombudsman’s original report. The effectiveness of the second report depends on whether the higher authority has power to direct the agency to implement the recommendations, and whether the Ombudsman can persuade the higher authority to exercise this power. As many statutory agencies are not subject to ministerial direction, the utility of this step often depends on the agency’s amenability to persuasion by the higher authority. Historically, in a significant number of cases, the higher authority has supported the agency over the Ombudsman.

1 2 3 4 5 6

7

Ombudsman Ombudsman Ombudsman Ombudsman Ombudsman Ombudsman Ombudsman s 25(5). Ombudsman

Act 1976 (Cth), s 16(1). Act 1989 (ACT), s 19(1), (2). Act 1974 (NSW), s 27(1). Act 2009 (NT), s 104(3). Act 2009 (NT), s 63(3)(a). Act 2001 (Qld), s 51(3); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(5); Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(5); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(5).

[2.7.700] An Ombudsman’s ultimate sanction is to make a third report to Parliament.1 The making of the second report is a statutory precondition to the exercise of Ombudsmen’s ultimate sanction in every jurisdiction, other than in New South Wales, where the second report goes straight to Parliament,2 and the Northern Territory, where the Ombudsman may provide Parliament with the second report.3 Where the agency involved refuses to implement an Ombudsman’s recommendations and the higher authority supports the agency, the efficacy of reporting to Parliament is questionable. The Commonwealth Parliament failed to respond appropriately to the first two reports made under s 17 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). It has been suggested that since that time, Commonwealth Ombudsmen have been inclined to refrain from taking persuasive cases to Parliament out of concern that, if Parliament were to take no

328

[2.7.720]

NOTIFICATION OF OUTCOME TO COMPLAINANT

action to implement the reports, the office of Ombudsman would appear to be ultimately ineffective.4

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 17; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 19; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 63(4); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 51(4); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 25(6); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 28(6); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 23(6); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 25(6). 2 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 27. 3 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), ss 63(4), 104(3). 4 A Cameron, “Lionhunter” (1994) 1 AIAL Forum 29 at 31.

[2.7.710] Each Ombudsman is required to submit an annual report to Parliament.1 In Queensland, the legislation also provides for the submission of a “strategic review” report every five years.2 Such reports are a useful source of information concerning the operations both of Ombudsmen and a variety of government agencies. They contain statistical and financial information relating to the operations of the Ombudsmen as well as summaries of cases investigated during the year. Furthermore, the reports provide a useful opportunity for Ombudsmen to make general observations concerning systemic problems and the management of particular agencies. They are a useful resource for parliamentary and public scrutiny of the operation of government agencies. However, they rarely receive much parliamentary or media attention.3

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), ss 4A, 19(1), read with Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) , s 8 (definitions of “Commonwealth entity”, “listed entity”), ss 10, 46; Annual Reports (Government Agencies) Act 2004 (ACT), s 6(1), Dictionary (definition of “public authority”), read with Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), ss 4A, 21; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 30(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 152; Financial Accountability Act 2009 (Qld), s 63, read with Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 87; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 29(1); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 30; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 25; Financial Management Act 2006 (WA), s 3 (definitions of “agency”, “department”), ss 5, 61, read with Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 27. 2 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 83(2), 85. 3 See R Tomasic and D Fleming, Australian Administrative Law (Law Book Co, 1991) p 322.

Notification of Outcome to Complainant [2.7.720] Most Ombudsmen are obliged to keep the complainant informed about the conduct of an investigation. Ombudsmen generally have discretion to keep the complainant informed of the progress of the investigation while it is occurring, as well as a duty to inform the complainant of the result of the

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investigation.1 Some Ombudsmen are also under a specific obligation to inform the complainant where a recommendation is made to an agency, and no appropriate steps have been taken to implement it within a reasonable time.2 These requirements are absent from the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) and Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT).

1 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 29; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 64; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 57; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 27; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 29; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 24; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 26. 2 Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 27; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 29(2); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 24(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 26.

Reinvestigation of Complaints [2.7.730] Ombudsmen are entitled to reopen investigations where new information surfaces which suggests that the initial finding was incorrect, or the possibility of error otherwise arises.1 For example, in Boyd v Ombudsman [1983] 1 NSWLR 620, the Ombudsman reopened a complaint against a police officer which had been initially found not to be sustained, after the complainant raised a further consideration which strongly indicated that the police officer was at fault. The police officer argued that the Ombudsman had discharged his duty once a formal report had been made and thus had no further authority in the matter. The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the Ombudsman has power to reopen a complaint. The Court stated that fairness to the subject of the complaint requires that Ombudsmen have power to reopen investigations and, if appropriate, to make a new report clearing the person’s name. The corollary of this is that Ombudsmen have power to reinvestigate in the opposite situation, where a complaint was not sustained.2

1 Boyd v Ombudsman [1983] 1 NSWLR 620 (CA). 2 See also Ontario (Ombudsman) v The Queen (1975) 117 DLR (3d) 613.

330

[2.7.760]

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

Freedom of Information [2.7.740] Two issues have arisen from the enactment of freedom of information (FOI) legislation.1 These issues relate to the role of Ombudsman in reviewing requests for information made by individuals of other agencies, and the extent to which Ombudsmen’s offices are subject to FOI requirements.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) (to be repealed by Freedom of Information Act 2016 (ACT) upon commencement on 1 July 2017); Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW); Information Act 2002 (NT); Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA).

[2.7.750] Freedom of information (FOI) legislation in South Australia and Tasmania still empowers Ombudsmen to investigate complaints concerning the manner in which other agencies administer the FOI legislation.1 Such FOI complaints are dealt with in the same manner as other complaints. Ombudsmen are entitled to see the requested documents, and to make recommendations regarding whether or not they should be released. In other jurisdictions, the former role of Ombudsmen investigating FOI complaints has been conferred on Information Commissioners, and Ombudsmen are empowered to refer appropriate complaints to those office holders.2

1 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA), s 39; Right to Information Act 2009 (Tas), s 47. 2 See, eg Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 6C.

[2.7.760] A conflict exists between the private nature of the Ombudsman’s process and freedom of information requirements. Ombudsmen are required to conduct their investigations in private,1 and in each jurisdiction there is a secrecy provision of the legislation designed to protect the confidentiality of information provided to Ombudsmen and to prevent it being disclosed or misused.2 However, most Ombudsmen are equally subject to freedom of information requirements. The private and confidential nature of the Ombudsman process is at odds with the philosophy of freedom of information, and the impact of freedom of information legislation has caused concern to some Ombudsmen.3 In New South Wales, those concerns have been addressed by exempting the Ombudsman’s complaint handling, investigative and reporting functions from the operations of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW).4 However, the Act still applies to the other aspects of the Ombudsman’s administration. In other jurisdictions, the freedom of information

331

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legislation applies to all aspects of the administration of the Ombudsmen’s offices.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 8(2); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 9(3); Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 17; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 49(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 25(2)(a); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 18(2); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 23A(3); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 17(2); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 19(2). 2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 35; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 33; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 34; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 120; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 92; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 26; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 26; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 20; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 23. 3 R Tomasic and D Fleming, Australian Administrative Law (Law Book Co, 1991) pp 335–336; New South Wales Ombudsman, Fifteenth Annual Report 1989–1990 (NSW Ombudsman, 1990) p 39. 4 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), Sch 2 cl 2.

[2.7.770] The general secrecy provisions in the Ombudsman legislation do not confer immunity from the application of the freedom of information legislation. In Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 2 FCR 64, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that the secrecy provision of s 35 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) was not affected by s 38 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), which required the disclosure of information.1 Re Horesh v Ombudsman (1986) 1 VAR 149 followed this approach, with the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal) holding that the secrecy provision of s 20 of the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) was not affected by s 28 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic). Although the general secrecy provisions do not confer immunity from freedom of information legislation, courts and tribunals have been sympathetic to arguments that the Ombudsman process can operate effectively only where confidentiality can be guaranteed, especially where confidentiality is expected as the price of obtaining agency cooperation.2 In Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 2 FCR 64, access was sought to a draft report which had been provided to the agency under investigation. An application for judicial review of the Ombudsman’s decision to refuse access was made under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The Federal Court held that, apart from purely factual material, the document was protected by the now-repealed s 36 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), which protected internal working documents from disclosure in instances of the public interest in disclosure being outweighed by the public interest in protecting the deliberative processes of government.3 Sheppard J rejected the argument that the private nature of the Ombudsman process meant that the public interest would inevitably favour non-disclosure. However, the draft report contained

332

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criticisms of a number of persons, from whom the Ombudsman had sought, but not yet received, submissions. Sheppard J held that in these circumstances it would be contrary to the public interest to require disclosure of the report, given that the criticisms could be modified or dropped once the individuals concerned had been given an opportunity to be heard.

1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 38 provides that a document is exempt if there is an enactment in force applicable specifically to information of the kind contained in the document and that prohibit disclosure of the information, whether the prohibition is absolute or is subject to exceptions or qualifications. 2 Re Boehm and Commonwealth Ombudsman (1985) 8 ALN N29 (AATA); Re Lapidos and Ombudsman (No 2) (1987) 2 VAR 148 (VicAAT). 3 See now Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 47C.

External Review of Ombudsman [2.7.780] The Ombudsman in the Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory may require the principal officer of an agency to refer a question to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for an advisory opinion under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), or to the ACT Civil and Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT).1 The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) held that while the principal officer is obliged to refer the question to it, the AAT is not obliged to give the advisory opinion. Whether it will do so depends on whether the AAT is able to answer the question asked of it and whether its answer is likely to produce a useful and definitive practical result. It should not be asked hypothetical questions, nor mere questions of fact.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 11; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 13.

[2.7.790] Questions concerning an Ombudsman’s jurisdiction may be determined by a superior court under a statutory procedure provided in each jurisdiction.1 Such questions arise where an agency takes the view that the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction to conduct the investigation, either because the agency is outside jurisdiction, or the action under investigation is not a matter of administration. These questions are referred to the relevant State or Territory Supreme Court or, in the case of the Commonwealth, the Federal Court. Apart from the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) and Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), each of these provisions is expressly limited to questions concerning the Ombudsmen’s jurisdiction which arise in the course of an investigation. This may require that the question relate to a particular investigation, rather than be

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hypothetical or speculative. It may also impose a temporal requirement that the procedure for referring this question to the court be activated while the investigation is underway. O’Leary J adopted the second approach in Alice Springs Town Council v Watts (1982) 50 LGRA 149, holding that the procedure can be used only while the investigation is underway.2 As the investigation in that case had been concluded, the procedure was not available. Conversely, in Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434, the statutory procedure for referring a question to the Victorian Supreme Court was used after the Ombudsman had completed the investigations. In Commissioner of Police v Deputy Ombudsman (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McInerney J, 30033 of 1990, 3 December 1990), McInerney J held that the New South Wales provision only applies to questions as to whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to commence an investigation. It does not allow questions to be referred to the court concerning whether jurisdiction, properly entered into, has been exceeded, ie by taking into account irrelevant considerations.3 If such an approach is correct, then these ultra vires actions must be challenged through judicial review proceedings, if available. However, each jurisdiction seeks to limit the susceptibility of Ombudsmen and their officers to other legal proceedings.4 The legislation in each Australian jurisdiction provides that Ombudsmen and their officers shall not be liable, whether on the ground of want of jurisdiction or otherwise, for any act unless it was done in bad faith.5 As clear words are necessary to exclude the superior courts’ inherent supervisory jurisdiction,6 these provisions relate only to actions for damages and do not exclude judicial review proceedings. Further, the legislation in most jurisdictions also attempts in one way or another to oust the jurisdiction of the court to review Ombudsmen’s actions. The Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas) provision is the narrowest, excluding only injunctions and orders of review from being issued against the Ombudsman.7 The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA) provides that no prerogative writ of any sort shall lie against the Ombudsman.8 The Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) provision is the widest, providing that “no order shall be made … restraining the Ombudsman from carrying out, or compelling him to carry out, any investigation”.9 Traditionally, courts give such ouster clauses a narrow operation.10 Where some specific remedies are named as not being applicable to the Ombudsman, the courts continue to issue judicial review remedies which the legislation does not explicitly mention. Therefore, under the Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), declaration, certiorari and prohibition are still available, and under the Northern Territory and Western Australian legislation, declarations and injunctions are available. However, no judicial review is available in Victoria under this narrow approach, apart from that contemplated by s 27 of the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic). There are no provisions in the New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland or South Australian statutes for the ouster of judicial review. In

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New South Wales, the Ombudsman is protected from legal proceedings except in relation to acts done in bad faith.11 In Queensland, the Ombudsman is protected from civil liability for an act or omission made “honestly and without negligence”; any civil liability which the legislation prevents from attaching to the Ombudsman as a result attaches instead to the State.12 In the Northern Territory and South Australia, the legislation provides simply that the Ombudsman is protected from liability for any act or omission made in good faith.13 The New South Wales Supreme Court has declined to adopt the traditional, narrow approach to the New South Wales provision. In Ainsworth v Ombudsman (1988) 17 NSWLR 276, Enderby J argued that because the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) had been amended to include the ouster clause after the Ombudsman had been subject to a number of jurisdictional challenges, such challenges were clearly the mischief at which the amendment was aimed. Effect should therefore be given to that intention by reading the provision as extending to exclude all judicial review proceedings. This approach was approved in K v New South Wales Ombudsman [2000] NSWSC 771. However, the weight of authority is against this approach. While it may be justified by New South Wales legislative history, different legislative history in other jurisdictions renders it unlikely that the New South Wales approach will be followed elsewhere. Adoption of this approach makes the specific provisions dealing with judicial review in the other legislation redundant. In South Australia, although the legislation does not contain a specific judicial review clause, the narrow approach should be followed on the basis that it is assumed that Parliament is aware of the courts’ approach to such clauses, and of the need to express itself in clear language if it wishes to oust judicial review. As Parliament has not expressly excluded judicial review proceedings, they should still be available. The Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory provisions dealing with the determination of the Ombudsman’s powers by the Federal Court or Supreme Court are wider than those in the States and the Northern Territory. These provisions provide that an application may be made to the court to determine any question which arises with respect to the Ombudsman’s exercise of a power or performance of a function.14 This is wide enough to allow both sorts of jurisdictional questions to be dealt with by the court using this procedure. Furthermore, there is no time limitation attached. In both of these jurisdictions, the legislation contains provision protecting the Ombudsman and officers of the Ombudsman from civil actions in respect of loss, damage and injury,15 but these do not exclude common law or statutory judicial review proceedings. In Kavvadias v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1984) 2 FCR 64, an application was made to the Federal Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) for review of a decision of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The decision in this case was made under the Freedom of Information Act 1982

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(Cth), but decisions made under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) are equally reviewable.

1 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 11A; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 14; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 35B; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 20; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 17; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 28; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 32; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 27; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 29. 2 Alice Springs Town Council v Watts (1982) 50 LGRA 149 (NTSC). 3 See Ainsworth v Ombudsman (1988) 17 NSWLR 276, Enderby J at 288. 4 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 33; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 31; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 35A; Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 160; Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 93; Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 30; Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 33; Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 29; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 30. 5 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 33; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 31; Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 35A(1); Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 160(1); Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 93(1); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 30(1); Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 33(1); Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 29(1); Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 30(1). The Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld) and Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) do not refer specifically to liability on the ground of want of jurisdiction. 6 Hockey v Yelland (1984) 157 CLR 124. In R v Hallstrom; Ex parte Waldron [1986] QB 824; [1985] 3 WLR 1090 (CA), a “want of jurisdiction”, was held to not exclude judicial review proceedings. The exclusion of liability from an Ombudsman due to “want of jurisdiction” can be seen in all State legislation except for South Australia. 7 Ombudsman Act 1978 (Tas), s 33(3). 8 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA), s 30(3). 9 Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic), s 29(3). 10 See generally “Remedies in Judicial Review” [2.6.210]ff. 11 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), s 35A(1). 12 Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), s 93(1), (2). 13 Ombudsman Act 2009 (NT), s 160(1); Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA), s 30(1). 14 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), s 11A(1); Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), s 14(1). 15 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), ss 33, 37; Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT), ss 31, 36.

[2.7.800] Ombudsmen are independent statutory officers who are not subject to Ministerial control or direction. While independence is essential to the performance of Ombudsmen’s functions, it is inappropriate for any statutory officer to be completely free from any oversight whatsoever, apart from that provided by being subject to the budget decisions of the government of the day. An appropriate mechanism is for Ombudsmen to be responsible to a Parliamentary Committee concerned with the overall functioning of the

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Ombudsman’s office rather than the conduct of particular investigations.1 In 1991, the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration considered suggestions that the Commonwealth Ombudsman should be “an officer of the Parliament”, with appointment and budget being controlled by Parliament and the Ombudsman being responsible to a committee of Parliament. The suggestions were rejected because the Committee was of the view that such changes would have little impact on the Ombudsman’s independence. However, it did recommend that Parliament refer a continuing oversight role to itself and the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Banking, Finance and Public Administration, which should sit jointly for the purpose. It also recommended that the Chairs and Deputy Chairs of these committees form an advisory panel on nominations to fill vacancies.2

1 This has been mooted in a number of jurisdictions, but adopted in New South Wales: Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW), Pt 4A. In Queensland, the Ombudsman is not subject to direction by any person about the way in which the Ombudsman’s powers in relation to investigations are to be exercised or the priority given to investigations. However the Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee has a role in overseeing the Ombudsman. The Committee is consulted on matters such as the selection and appointment of the Ombudsman, the suspension and removal of the Ombudsman and the annual estimates of expenditure for the Ombudsman’s office: Ombudsman Act 2001 (Qld), ss 59, 67, 88, 89. 2 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Offıce of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (AGPS, 1991) at [8.28] (continuing oversight role), [8.32] (advisory panel to fill vacancies).

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338

Tribunals Introduction and Scope [2.7.910] An administrative review tribunal hears disputes between people and government entities where the subject matter of the dispute is reconsideration in some way of administrative action by government. This Subtitle is concerned solely with the eight principal administrative review tribunals. They are: (1)

the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT);

(2)

the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT);

(3)

the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NTCAT);

(4)

the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT);

(5)

the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT);

(6)

the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT);

(7)

the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT); and

(8)

the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (SAT).

This Subtitle describes the principal features of the adjudicative processes occurring in the tribunals in relation to review of administrative action. The subject matter of this work falls within the general areas of the law of evidence, civil procedure, the law of the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, and rights of appeals from inferior courts and tribunals to superior courts. The function of administrative review is not confined to the tribunals described here; other government entities and some courts carry out reviews of administrative action. Conversely, of the tribunals described here, all but the AAT carry out adjudicative processes unrelated to review of administrative action. The unrelated adjudicative processes are civil dispute adjudication and public original decision-making, which are not discussed in this Subtitle.

System of Administrative Review [2.7.920] The system of tribunals conducting administrative review has changed in four ways since the establishment of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). These changes are: (1)

centralisation;

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(2)

provision for civil law adjudication with administrative review decision-making;

(3)

provision for original decision-making and review decision-making; and

(4)

provision for internal appeals.

Centralisation here means many tribunals being combined into one institution. No political jurisdiction has centralised all administrative review into one institution.1 So administrative review carried out within the organisations making the decisions under review is a common occurrence. Nor has any jurisdiction centralised all administrative review conducted outside the organisations making the decisions under review (external review bodies). The Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia have centralised almost all administrative review formerly done by external review bodies.2 The Commonwealth and New South Wales have centralised much administrative review formerly done by external review bodies,3 but retain other significant specialist administrative review bodies.4 As a result, specialist administrative review tribunals continue to exist. There is no overarching, national or commonly held policy on whether any given range of disputes should or should not be resolved by a new specialist merits review tribunal as opposed to an existing body.5 In the absence of any consensus, one can find a type of dispute that in one political jurisdiction is dealt with by a specialist merits review tribunal, but is dealt with in a generalist administrative merits review body in another political jurisdiction. An example is land use planning disputes. They form part of the jurisdiction of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT), the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (SAT), but do not fall under the jurisdiction of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT), the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) or the centralised merits review merits jurisdiction given to the Magistrates Court of Tasmania. The second and third changes are related. To understand this change, some terms need to be understood. Administrative tribunals only carrying out review of administrative action were the first generation of centralised tribunals. So the Commonwealth AAT, the former Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the former ACT Administrative Appeals Tribunal were not initially given original or civil jurisdiction. The next generation of tribunals amalgamated civil law adjudication with administrative review, and were given original public decision-making. VCAT was the first: it commenced on 1 July 1988, succeeding the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Its principal civil jurisdiction is derived from the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic). The later tribunals to follow this change are described below.

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The predecessor of NCAT, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales (ADT), also commenced in 1988. It was given both a civil jurisdiction under the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW) and an original public decision-making jurisdiction under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), as well as significant administrative review jurisdiction under the now-repealed Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW). Western Australia’s SAT commenced in 2005, and conducts original decision-making in civil jurisdictions such as the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), as well as administrative review decision-making in jurisdictions such as under the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA). ACAT commenced in 2009, succeeding the ACT Administrative Appeals Tribunal. ACAT also took over the Civil Claims work of the former Small Claims Court of the ACT. QCAT also commenced in 2009, with a jurisdiction that includes both civil original decision-making such as the Retirement Villages Act 1999 (Qld) and administrative review, such as under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld). NCAT commenced on 1 January 2013. It was created to amalgamate a number of tribunals, including the New South Wales ADT and others conducting civil law adjudication (such as the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal) or original public decision-making (such as the Medical Tribunal of New South Wales). More recently, NTCAT and SACAT, which commenced respectively on 6 October 2014 and 30 March 2015 were both established with the intention that eventually most external review of administrative decisions would be transferred into them. Hence, Tasmania is now the only political jurisdiction which lacks an institution outside the courts system in which administrative review is centralised. The ADT was the first administrative review tribunal to include an appeal body within its structure,6 with its appeals jurisdiction extending to decisions made in both the original and review jurisdictions. ACAT, NCAT, NTCAT, QCAT and SACAT have since adopted this structural feature.

1 The Council of Australasian Tribunals is a non-government organisation which maintains a register of tribunals which are brought to its attention. The register is updated annually: see Council of Australasian Tribunals, Register of Australasian Tribunals, (Council of Australasian Tribunals, 2015) (available at www.coat.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016, proceed to “About”, “Register of Tribunals”). 2 These bodies are the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia.

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[2.7.920]

TRIBUNALS

3 4 5

6

Respectively, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. For example, the Commissioners of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales. Recent policy reviews of tribunal centralisation are: Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney General, Discussion Paper: Reform of Civil and Administrative Justice (Department of Justice and Attorney General, 2007) and Tasmania, Department of Justice, A Single Tribunal for Tasmania (Department of Justice, 2015). Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) Ch 8 Div 8.1 (repealed).

Establishment and Organisation Introduction [2.7.930] The tribunals1 were established by statute, and all exist separately to the court system. A hierarchy of members comprises each administrative tribunal. An office-holder called the President heads each tribunal. The President of each tribunal is a judicial officer. Other office-holders are both legally qualified and non-legally qualified. The business of the tribunals surveyed here is divided according to subject matter. The tribunals surveyed here divide their work into organisational units called “lists” or “divisions”, just as State Supreme Courts are divided into divisions. The organisation of each tribunal is as follows: (1)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT): Established by s 5 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The AAT’s President specifies who constitutes the AAT, which must not be more than three members.2 The President must be a judge of the Federal Court of Australia.3 The principal divisions of the AAT are the General Administrative Division, the Security Appeals Division, the Taxation Appeals Division (also known as the Small Taxation Claims Tribunal), and the Veterans’ Appeals Division. There is also a National Disability Insurance Scheme Division, which has been in operation since 1 July 2013.4

(2)

ACT Civil and Administrative Appeals Tribunal (ACAT): Established by s 88 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT). ACAT is headed by a President (who need not be a judge). ACAT is divided into four principal administrative divisions, called “lists”. These are the Administrative Review list, the Residential Tenancies List, the Civil Disputes List, and the Appeals List.

(3)

NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT): Established by s 7 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW). The administrative review functions of NCAT are divided between an “administrative review” jurisdiction and an “external appeal” jurisdiction. Requirements for constitution vary between the two classes of jurisdiction and vary in accordance with the requirements of the legislation giving NCAT

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jurisdiction. In a predecessor tribunal to NCAT it was held that similar requirements as to special constitution were compulsory, in that a breach of the requirement invalidated a purported decision.5 The divisions of NCAT are the Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division, the Consumer and Commercial Division, the Occupational Division, and the Guardianship Division.6 (4)

Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NTCAT): Established by s 7 of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), NTCAT’s work is presently divided between its original jurisdiction, the most important of which is its jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act 1999 (NT), and its review jurisdiction. Its review jurisdiction is presently limited but is expected to grow to over 100 Acts within two years.

(5)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT): Established by s 161 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), QCAT’s work is divided into: the Alternative Dispute Resolution division; the Civil, Administrative and Disciplinary division; the Human Rights division; Client Services, which is concerned with minor civil disputes; Operations Support; and Corporate Services.7

(6)

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT): Established by s 5 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), SACAT’s work is divided into three streams: community matters, housing and civil matters and administrative and disciplinary matters. It is expected that over time, a majority of jurisdictions presently dealt with in the Administrative and Disciplinary Division of the District Court of South Australia will be moved into SACAT.

(7)

Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT): Section 8 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) established VCAT. According to s 64, for the purposes of any particular proceeding, VCAT may be constituted by one, two, three, four or five members, at least one of whom must be a legal practitioner. Certain matters before VCAT may be heard only where VCAT is specially constituted.8 The composition of VCAT may be subject to judicial review.9 VCAT is separated into “divisions”: the Human Rights Division, the Administrative Division, the Residential Tenancies Division and the Civil Division. Rule 2.03 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2008 (Vic) then further allocates the work of each Division between “lists”. There are nine lists established by this rule.

(8)

State Administrative Tribunal (SAT): Section 7 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) established the SAT; according to s 11, the President specifies who constitutes the SAT, which must not be constituted by more than three members. Neither the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 nor subordinate legislation makes any provision for organisational divisions of the SAT’s workload. The SAT itself

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divides the workload into four “streams”: Commercial and Civil; Development and Resources; Human Rights; and Vocational Regulation.10

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. A survey of the organisational features of ACAT, QCAT, VCAT and SAT is done by Justice John Chaney, Australian Super-Tribunals – Similarities and Differences (presentation delivered to the Law Society of South Australia, 14 June 2013) (available at http://www.sat.justice.wa.gov.au/P/papers_and_presentations.aspx, viewed 15 September 2016). 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 19A. 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 7(1). 4 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013) pp 13–14. 5 Attorney-General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 557; [2005] NSWCA 261. 6 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 16. 7 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (QCAT, 2013) p 20. 8 Schedule 1 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) provides a long list of requirements as to the constitution of Tribunal panels for different enabling legislation. 9 Attorney-General (Vic) v The Warehouse Group (Aust) Pty Ltd (2002) 19 VAR 111; [2002] VSCA 76. 10 State Administrative Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (SAT, 2013) p 4.

Legislative Scheme [2.7.940] All the tribunals1 are creations of legislation. This legislation gives to the tribunals all their jurisdiction, in the sense of their authority to adjudicate a dispute.2 This legislation also gives all of their powers, in the sense of the steps that tribunals can take during litigation and the remedies they can grant.3 It follows that the tribunals lack “inherent jurisdiction”, much like courts of limited jurisdiction.4 Their jurisdiction must be found expressly, or by necessary implication (“implied jurisdiction”) in the legislation establishing the tribunals. The basis for any implied jurisdiction is: an express conferral of jurisdiction carries with it implied powers necessarily incidental to be able to work effectively within its jurisdiction.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the

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[2.7.950]

2

3

4

ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION

NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Administrative Tribunal Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559; 75 ALJR 363; [2001] HCA 1, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ at [2]; M Leeming, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 2012) Ch 1. The distinction between “jurisdiction” and “powers” is one frequently made by the High Court: Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2010) 241 CLR 320; 84 ALJR 528; [2010] HCA 24, French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ at [9]. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v PTLZ (2008) 48 AAR 559; [2008] FCAFC 164, North and Downes JJ at [34]; Appellants v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory (2011) 252 FLR 209; [2011] ACTSC 133, Refshauge ACJ at [137]. In respect of predecessor tribunals to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, see, eg Household Financial Services Ltd v Commercial Tribunal of New South Wales (1995) 36 NSWLR 220 (CA); Walton v McBride (1995) 36 NSWLR 440 (CA); Commission for Children and Young People v “AG” [2002] NSWSC 582, Dowd J at [32]. See also Khera v Law Society of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWADTAP 14, the Appeal Panel at [20]; following Corry v Skobla [2011] QCATA 101, Oliver SM at [8]; Nuevo v Valuers Registration Board of Queensland [2011] QCAT 152, Deane M at [13]; Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2006) 24 VAR 174; [2006] VSCA 7, Maxwell P at [27] (Eames and Nettle JJA agreeing); Beaton v Psychologists Board of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 223, Pullin JA and Murray AJA at [21].

[2.7.950] A legislative scheme governs the overall administrative review jurisdiction of the tribunals.1 In every tribunal, there is a statute establishing the tribunal that interacts with other legislation. The term “principal statute”2 is used here to refer to the statute establishing the tribunal in question, while the term “enabling laws” is used here to refer to the other legislation that gives jurisdiction to the tribunal in question.3 The structure of this type of scheme has four basic and related features: (1)

provision for conferral of jurisdiction by enabling laws;

(2)

provision in the principal statute for standard procedural and remedial powers;

(3)

provision for modification of the standard procedural and occasional remedial powers of the principal statute; and

(4)

provision, in the event of inconsistency, for the enabling laws to prevail over the principal statute.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and

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2

3

Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. In all political jurisdictions except New South Wales, the principal statute is a single piece of legislation. In New South Wales, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) is established by one statute, the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW); but its rules as to jurisdiction, etc for the task of administrative review is divided between the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 and the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW). For the sake of brevity, the term “principal statute” when applied here to NCAT refers to both pieces of legislation. The different principal statutes give different names to what is here called “enabling laws”. Those names include “authorising laws” in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) Dictionary, “relevant Act” in the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 3 and South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 3 as well as “enabling enactments” in Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 3.

Conferral of Jurisdiction [2.7.960] The principal statutes themselves confer no authority to adjudicate. Rather, every legislative scheme contains a number of enabling laws giving jurisdiction matched by one provision in the principal statute that receives that jurisdiction.1 Reading the general provisions of the principal statute in conjunction with the more specific provisions of the enabling laws allows understanding of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.2 Courts strictly construe the necessity for an enabling law conferring the authority to adjudicate.3 This approach to interpretation of enabling laws is similar to an “expressio unius” approach: in the absence of an express reference to conferral, none is assumed.4 As described in Re Parke and Repatriation Commission (1985) 2 RPD 404, “administrative review tribunals do not have a ‘roving commission’ to do justice between private citizen and government”.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 25(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 9, 11; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 28(1); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 9; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 30; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 6, 9; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 31; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), ss 40, 42; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) ss 13, 14, 17. 2 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31, Kirby J at [25]. 3 Examples of this approach are: Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167; 75 ALJR 1551; 33 AAR 557; 48 ATR 253; [2001] HCA 58,

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4

NECESSITY FOR A DECISION

Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [9]; Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1992) 40 FCR 402; 15 AAR 429; Druett v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2003] FCAFC 234; Thomson v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2009] ACAT 38, the Tribunal at [24]; People with Disability Australia Inc v Minister For Disability Services [2011] NSWCA 253, Beazley JA at [76]; Bahadori v Permanent Mortgages Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 44; [2008] NSWCA 150; Queensland Racing Ltd v McMahon [2010] QCATA 73, the Tribunal at [12]; Transport Accident Commission v Coyle [2001] VSCA 236, Phillips JA at [12] (Brooking and Batt JJA agreeing); Roads Corp v Maclaw No 496 Pty Ltd (2001) 19 VAR 169; [2001] VSC 435, Balmford J at [19]; Mijatovic v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2008] WASCA 115, the Court at [134], [135]. D Pearce, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2007).

Necessity for a Decision [2.7.970] An enabling law must meet two requirements to give jurisdiction to a tribunal.1 First, the enabling law must provide for appeal from the action complained of to the tribunal. Second, the action must also be of the type for which the enabling law provides appeal. Uncertainty about the second requirement arises because of inevitable limits on any legislative scheme for conferral of jurisdiction. These limits are of two types. Limits arise from the degree of detail used in enabling laws. These legislative schemes usually prescribe with great particularity which exercises of powers can be appealed. A typical provision is s 22A(2) of the Lotteries and Art Unions Act 1901 (NSW), which provides that “[t]he Minister may, by written notice given to the person or organisation conducting the lottery, give a direction prohibiting the conduct of the lottery activity”. Section 22A(4) confers jurisdiction on the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) in the following terms: A person or organisation given a direction under [s 22A(2)] may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision by the Minister to give the direction.

The second limit comes from the nature of the activity with which the appeals are concerned, being decision-making. Decision-making encompasses a variety of activities, with the word “decision” having an “indefinite and wide meaning” meaning in its ordinary usage.2 But, as noted by a predecessor tribunal to NCAT, in order for an appeal system to work, the action complained of must not only be final, it must be overt and it must also be communicated in some way.3 In order to operate within both limitations, some of the principal statutes included a definition to enlarge the range of actions described.4 However, this

347

[2.7.970]

TRIBUNALS

approach is not taken by all relevant principal statutes; some give no substantive definition, but rather label the action which can be appealed. It is then defined by reference to the enabling laws.5 Whichever approach is employed by the legislation in question, courts and tribunals have dealt with the issue by augmenting the existing legislative definitions. Rather than focusing on the characteristics of the instrument or means by which a decision is achieved through, this approach looks at the effect, or outcome, of the action: That [a decision] will generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration. A conclusion reached as a step along the way in a course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision would not ordinarily amount to a reviewable decision, unless the statute provided for the making of a finding or ruling on that point so that the decision, though an intermediate decision, might accurately be described as a decision under an enactment.6

In summary, provided that there exists no contrary statutory intention, merits review tribunals have jurisdiction over the final or determinative action of the decision-maker.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Re Director-General of Social Services and Hales (1983) 78 FLR 373 (FCAFC), Lockhart J at 396. 3 Minister for Disability Services v People with Disabilities (NSW) Inc [2001] NSWADTAP 7, the Appeal Panel at [59]. 4 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 3(3); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 5(1); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 6(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 4(1). 5 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22A; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 17(2); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 17(1). 6 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; 64 ALJR 462; 5 BR 137, Mason CJ at 337 (CLR) (Brennan and Deane JJ agreeing), applied by Bennett v Chief Executive Offıcer of Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; 40 AAR 118; 57 ATR 52; [2004] FCAFC 237, Gyles J at [72]; Australian Postal Corp v Forgie (2003) 130 FCR 279; 38 AAR 63; [2003] FCAFC 223, the Court at [50]; Mt Isa Irish Association Friendly Society Ltd v Chief Executive Department of Justice & Attorney General [2011] QCAT 457, the Tribunal at [14]; Davidson v Victorian Institute of Teaching (2006) 25 VAR 186; [2006] VSCA 193, Maxwell P at [24]; Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Building Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 217, McLure P at [17], Murphy JA at [93]. Both X v Community Services Commission [1999] NSWADT 26, the Tribunal at [20] and RW v Protective Commissioner [2005]

348

[2.7.980]

NECESSITY FOR INTERNAL REVIEW

NSWADT 209, the Tribunal at [11] are decisions of a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal applying Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; 64 ALJR 462; 5 BR 137.

Necessity for Internal Review [2.7.980] A further jurisdictional condition to review is that a decision must first be reconsidered within the decision-making agency. This process of review is commonly known as “internal review”. Among the legislative schemes for the tribunals,1 the location of this requirement varies. Both the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) and the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) make explicit reference to internal review, while all other principal statutes contain no reference. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 provision for internal review differs to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) provisions. Section 67B of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 is only a procedural provision requiring notification of appeal rights. The scheme for internal review in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) is more complex because the requirement for internal review is absent or excluded for many decisions subject to review. In summary, there is no requirement for prior internal review for decisions falling in the external appeal jurisdiction of NCAT.2 For decisions in the administrative review jurisdiction, there is a division in enabling legislation between those to which the scheme in ss 53 and 55 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) apply, and those to which that scheme does not apply either because of reg 5 of the Administrative Decisions Review Regulation 2009 (NSW) or contrary provision in the enabling legislation (such as ss 192 and 193 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)). In all other legislative schemes, the nature of the internal review, its procedures, and its role in the jurisdiction of external review bodies is solely a matter for the enabling laws, and these are not mentioned in the principal statute.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative review in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal is divided between four jurisdictions under Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 28(2)(a) – (d): the general jurisdiction, administrative review jurisdiction, appeal

349

[2.7.980]

TRIBUNALS

jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The nature of the jurisdictions, their procedures and their remedies vary.

Standard Procedural and Remedial Powers General [2.7.990] In contrast to the provisions about jurisdiction, all the principal statutes and subordinate legislation contain explicit reference to procedure, evidence, and appeals. In addition, there are many rules of standing, representation, and composition of the tribunals.1 This suite of powers applies to all proceedings unless modified or excluded by enabling laws: see [2.7.1000]. With the exception of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), all principal statutes divide the powers and rules into those applicable to all jurisdictions and those only applicable to their administrative review jurisdiction.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia.

Provision

for

Modification of Standard Inconsistency

Powers

and

[2.7.1000] The principal statutes all recognise that enabling laws might modify or exclude one or more of the standard powers and rules contained in the principal statute. First, in all the principal statutes, the possibility of modification is recognised in a generally applicable provision,1 Second, there are specific provisions of the principal statutes expressly subordinate to provisions of enabling legislation. Third, in all the principal statutes except the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), there is a generally applicable provision stating that in the event of consistency, the provision of the enabling law prevails.2 Judicial and tribunal interpretations of all these provisions recognise that incidences of modification or inconsistency can occur by either express words or by necessary implication. Interpretation of the third type, the “inconsistency”

350

[2.7.1010]

APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND POLICY

provisions, recognises that the provisions inconsistencies, they do not create them.3

assume

the

existence

of

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 25(6)(a); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 27(1); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 35; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 5(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 6(4), (7); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), ss 34(7), s 39(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 39(2), Sch 1; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 18(2). 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 25(6)(b); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 27(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 5(1); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 7(2); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 4; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 39(2), Sch 1; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 5. 3 Bell v Transport Accident Commission [1998] 3 VR 288 (CA), Tadgell JA at 290, Phillips JA at 298–299; Southside Autos (1981) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 37 WAR 245; [2008] WASCA 208, McLure and Newnes JJA at [85].

Applicable Substantive Law and Policy [2.7.1010] All the tribunals1 apply the relevant substantive law in the same way as a court in conducting administrative review of cases. Unlike courts, the tribunals are permitted by provisions in the principal statutes to departure from procedural law to some extent: see [2.7.1310]. Sometimes those provisions include a clause, called an “equity and good conscience” provision, instructing the tribunal concerned to act “according to equity, and good conscience”.2 Such provisions have been in statutes for many decades, and they are interpreted by courts not to confer substantive rights in addition to other provisions of the statute concerned; rather they operate procedurally, and within the bounds of procedural fairness.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33(1)(b); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 7(a); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(4); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009

351

[2.7.1010]

TRIBUNALS

3

(Qld), s 28(2); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 39(1)(c); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 97; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(2)(b). Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins (1992) 28 NSWLR 26; 45 IR 292 (CA), Gleeson CJ and Handley JA at 29–31 (NSWLR); Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; 73 ALJR 746; [1999] HCA 21; Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 663; [2010] HCA 32, French CJ at [16]˙. This interpretation has been applied to the tribunals described here and to their predecessors: see Hill v Repatriation Commission [2005] FCAFC 23, the Court at [75]; Seers v Exhibition Centre Pty Ltd (2009) 232 FLR 415; [2009] ACTSC 85, Refshauge J at [119]; Ekermawi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2009] NSWSC 143, Schmidt AJ at [39]; Townsville City Council v Department of Main Roads [2006] 1 Qd R 77; [2005] QCA 226, Keane JA at [43]; Rimanic v Bus Licensing Authority [2010] VCAT 1997; Winter v Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87, the Tribunal at [38]. An illustration of how a tribunal’s wish to follow quick and informal decision “ran headlong into” the requirements of the fair hearing rule is ADG Engineers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Timuss [2015] QCATA 119, Stilgoe SM at [1].

[2.7.1020] The duty to apply substantive law extends to the duty to follow decisions of superior courts. Courts and the tribunals considered here or their predecessors have consistently so held.1

1 Re Commissioner of Taxation v Salenger (1988) 81 ALR 25; Australian Postal Corp v Bessey [2001] FCA 266, Gyles J at [17]; Hoare v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 56 ATR 1113; [2004] AATA 623, the Tribunal at [29]; Osborne v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2000] NSWADTAP 10, the Appeal Panel at [27]; Bowden v An Assessor under s 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act [2015] NTCAT 5, Bruxner P at [47]–[55]; Surace v Rita Commisso Enterprises Pty Ltd [2011] QCATA 271, the Tribunal at [20]; Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 22 VAR 467; [2005] VSC 136, Harper J at [12]; Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128, Martin CJ at [50].

[2.7.1030] Whether or not tribunals should follow their own decisions has been questioned. This is an important practical issue since in the majority of jurisdictions given to the tribunals they, not superior courts, are the most common authoritative interpreters of the law. Most statements from the tribunals on this question emphasise that the doctrine of stare decisis1 does not operate within each tribunal, but a doctrine of comity does: (1) Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Decisions by presidential members (including Deputy Presidents) are followed unless there are exceptional reasons for not doing so.2 (2) ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT): ACAT’s predecessor, the Residential Tribunal, applied the comity doctrine to its own previous decisions.3 352

[2.7.1040]

NATURE OF APPEALS TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNALS

(3) NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal: In only one of its predecessor tribunals, the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal, had this question been authoritatively answered. Although the doctrine of stare decisis did not apply, previous decisions by the Appeal Panel were to be followed.4 (4) Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT): The prevalent view is that the doctrine of comity, but not the doctrine of stare decisis operates on VCAT in respect of its previous decisions, or those of a predecessor tribunal.5 (5) State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (SAT): The SAT adopted the policy that a member of the SAT should follow a decision of another member of the SAT (or a member of a former tribunal which the SAT has replaced) that is in point unless satisfied that the earlier decision was clearly in error. However, the President may depart from a decision of a member or indeed a legally qualified member on a question of law.6

1 Stare decisis: “[T]he legal doctrine of the binding force of precedent”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 162. 2 Re Niola Nominees Pty Ltd and Minister for Health (1986) 9 ALN N200; [1986] AATA 84, the Tribunal at [10]; Re Ganchov and Comcare (1990) 11 AAR 468; [1990] AATA 419, the Tribunal at [41]. 3 Kirk v ACT Housing [2005] ACTRTT 19, the Tribunal at [17]; ACT Housing v KA [2003] ACTRTT 43, the Tribunal at [122]. 4 Rittau v Commissioner of Police [2000] NSWADT 186; approved in NSW Breeding & Racing v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) (2001) 53 NSWLR 559; [2001] NSWSC 494, Barrett J at [47]. 5 Anteden Pty Ltd v Glen Eira City Council (2000) 16 VAR 334; [2000] VSC 366, Balmford J at [26]; Charnley Glen Pty Ltd v Boroondara City Council (2000) 17 VAR 178; [2000] VSC 340, Balmford J at [33]. 6 Re Owners of Strata Plan 18449 and City of Joondalup [2005] WASAT 304, the Tribunal at [31].

Nature of Appeals to Administrative Review Tribunals [2.7.1040] It is legislation, not the common law, that creates administrative review appeals.1 It follows that legislation can invest an administrative review appeal with any jurisdictional character that it deems appropriate, and the nature of the jurisdiction must be discerned in the relevant enabling law.2 So whether the proceedings are called “appeal”, “review” or something else is unimportant.3 The legal system in Australia had, by the commencement of the modern era of administrative review, developed a well-understood taxonomy of appeal

353

[2.7.1040]

TRIBUNALS

proceedings from administrative bodies to courts.4 This taxonomy distinguishes between appeals confined to questions of law and appeals that extended to questions of fact. In appeals extending to questions of fact, the courts further distinguished three “minor” types: (1)

appeals in a “strict sense”;

(2)

appeals “by way of rehearing”; and

(3)

appeals “de novo”.

Among the tribunals,5 most administrative review proceedings are appeals de novo.6 In addition, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) have administrative review proceedings other than appeals de novo. In both tribunals, some administrative review proceedings are appeals by way of rehearing, or appeals on a question of law. In NCAT the class of “other” administrative review proceedings is called “external appeals” under s 31 and Pt 6 Div 1 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW). The nature of an external appeal is decided by the enabling legislation.7 In QCAT the class of “other” appeals is called an “appeal jurisdiction” under s 25(b) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). The nature of the appeal is not specified there. Like the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), this issue is left to the relevant enabling laws.

1 Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, Dixon J at 108 (CLR); Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989; [2003] HCA 22. 2 Ex Parte Australian Sporting Club Ltd; Re Dash (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 63, Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 663; [2010] HCA 32, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [89]. 3 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 46 makes it clear that the characteristics of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal review jurisdiction, is identical to de novo review despite use of the label “rehearing” in s 45. De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 4 Scanes v Wilson (1974) 22 FLR 262; Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616; 51 ALJR 260, Mason J at 619–620 (CLR); Turnbull v NSW Medical Board [1976] 2 NSWLR 281 (CA), Moffit P at 288; see also Glass JA at 297; Re H (a pharmacist) [1972] Qd R 402, Williams J at 407; Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VR 953, O’Bryan J at 957; R v Syme; Ex parte Page [1970] WAR 153 (FC), Jackson CJ at 155–157.

354

[2.7.1060]

5

6

7

NATURE OF APPEALS TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNALS

The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. Jurisdiction of this nature is called the “Administrative Review” jurisdiction in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), Pt 4A; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 28(2)(b). Jurisdiction of this nature is called the “Review Jurisdiction” in the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal: see Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), ss 31(b) and 33; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 9(2)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 42; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 17. Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 79(2).

[2.7.1050] The principal difference between an appeal by way of rehearing and an appeal de novo1 is that a rehearing appeal requires the applicant to demonstrate error, whether it be factual, discretionary or legal. Alternatively, de novo appeals have no such requirement. An appeal by way of rehearing is conducted on the materials before the decision-maker “below”, whether they are a court, tribunal, or public servant, although in some cases there will be a power to receive additional evidence. The purpose of the proceedings is to determine whether the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error.2 In an appeal de novo, the court or tribunal hears the matter afresh and may overturn the decision appealed from regardless of error.

1 De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; 74 ALJR 1206; [2000] HCA 40, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [23]; Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [97].

[2.7.1060] Upon the commencement of the modern era of administrative review, appeals from administrators to tribunals were understood in the same way as the existing appeals de novo1 from administrators to courts. Thus, the seminal Federal Court case Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 described the function of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal as looking for the “correct or preferable [decision] on the material before the Tribunal”.2 All tribunals

355

[2.7.1060]

TRIBUNALS

carrying out administrative review proceedings by appeals de novo follow this approach,3 regardless of whether the principal statute prescribes the nature of the appeal function.4 In the modern era of administrative review, the widespread adoption of the appeal de novo model for administrative review proceedings has had implications for: jurisdiction over the legality of the decision under review; agenda management; the search for a “correct or preferable decision”; the onus of proof; application of government policy; and the duty to raise novel issues. However, adoption of the appeal de novo model has not, in practice or in law, led to the adoption of investigative or inquisitorial methods in procedure or evidence.

1 De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409, Bowen CJ and Deane J at 419; approved by Esber v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 430; 66 ALJR 373; 15 AAR 249; and Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31. 3 Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 was followed in Re Dalla-Costa and Discrimination Commissioner [1995] ACTAAT 126; Re Roberts and ACT Planning & Land Authority [2009] ACAT 10; Commonwealth precedent was followed in Mangoplah Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Great Southern Energy [1999] NSWADT 93; YG & Governor General v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247, Hodgson JA at [25]; Queensland Racing Ltd v McMahon [2010] QCATA 73 held that QCAT must make the “correct and preferable decision”; see also Bee v An Assessor under s 24 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act [2015] NTCAT 2, Bruxner P at [3]; VCAT’s predecessor followed Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 in McDonald v Guardianship and Administration Board [1993] 1 VR 521 (FC); see also Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326; Zampatti v Western Australian Planning Commission (2010) 176 LGERA 150; [2010] WASCA 149; LS v Mental Health Review Board [2013] WASCA 128, the Court at [90]–[99]. 4 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) and Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) do not explicitly prescribe the nature of the appeal function. The principal statutes for the other tribunals do, although the language varies a little: Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 63(1); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 46(1); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 20; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27.

356

[2.7.1070]

LEGALITY OF DECISION UNDER REVIEW

Legality of Decision under Review [2.7.1070] Tribunals conducting administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo1 are not prevented from conducting proceedings where the decision under review might have been illegal. A distinction is drawn between the fact of the decision under review and its legality.2 However, this proposition might not apply where the suggested illegality arises from invalid delegated legislation, as tribunals are reluctant to question the validity of delegated legislation.3 Furthermore, the tribunals and their predecessors have been reluctant to consider questions of constitutional validity, which is a quintessentially judicial task.4

1 De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Re Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1978) 1 ALD 167 (AATA) (upheld in Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 338 (FCAFC)); BDH Projects v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2010] ACAT 37; PLS (NT) Pty Ltd v Director-General of Licensing [2015] NTCAT 4, Bruxner P at [63]–[73]; Harvey v Mutsaers (2011) 181 LGERA 444; [2011] VSC 23, Emerton J at [25]; Re Health Resorts of Australasia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2007] WASAT 60. Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 6(3) prescribes this outcome and is thus a legislative adoption of the principle in Re Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW). The same result occurs under Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 4(2)(b): Director of Housing v Sudi (2011) 33 VR 559; [2011] VSCA 266, Maxwell P at fn 77. 3 Re Costello and Secretary of Department of Transport (1979) 2 ALD 934; Saitta Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2000) 106 FCR 554; [2000] FCA 1546, Weinberg J at [103]; Re Preiss and ACT Planning & Land Authority [2008] ACTAAT 25, the Tribunal at [25]; Doyle v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSWADT 84, the Tribunal at [19]–[35]; Director of Housing v Sudi (2011) 33 VR 559; [2011] VSCA 266, Weinberg JA at [285]; Mental Health Review Board (WA) v PM [2005] WASAT 338, the Tribunal at [84]. Compare Tran v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2009] ACAT 46, the Tribunal at [14]. 4 Re Adams and Tax Agents’ Board (1976) 1 ALD 251 held that while a tribunal cannot determine a question of constitutional validity, it can look to the Constitution to ensure its decision conforms to the Constitution. However, subsequent decisions of courts and the tribunals have adopted differing views: in Re Kennedy and Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue [2010] ACAT 55, the Appeal Panel upheld a trial decision to decline to hear constitutional issues because the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal was not the “appropriate forum”. In Sunol v Collier (2012) 81 NSWLR 619; 258 FLR 282; [2012] NSWCA 14, the Court stated that if a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal had incorrectly decided a question of constitutional validity, the prudent procedure for the affected party was to apply for declaratory relief in the common law judicial review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Victorian Court of Appeal has approved the

357

[2.7.1070]

TRIBUNALS

same approach: see Director of Housing v Sudi (2011) 33 VR 559; [2011] VSCA 266, Weinberg JA at [285].

Agenda Management Novel Issues [2.7.1080] Tribunals conducting administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo1 have discretion to raise novel issues. First, like any court, a tribunal must satisfy itself that it possesses the jurisdiction invoked by the parties, even if the parties have not disputed jurisdiction.2 Second, because a tribunal in an administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo conducts “its own, independent assessment and determination of the matters necessary to be addressed”,3 it has its own discretion to “amend the agenda”. Tribunals, like the decision-makers, assess the matter afresh. As expressed in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41, the tribunal “stands in the shoes” of the decision-maker.4 The novel issue added to the agenda might be an issue that must be resolved, because it is a mandatory consideration, or the issue being a permissible consideration in the context of the facts of the case make it desirable to resolve. In either event, the tribunals can raise the issue regardless of the previous reasons,5 or the conduct of the parties.6 The converse proposition, that the tribunal is entitled to take issues off the agenda is also true: Commissioner of Police v Sleiman (2011) 78 NSWLR 340; 249 FLR 242; [2011] NSWCA 21.7 As is always the case, the enabling law can detract from the tribunal’s liberty to set the agenda.8 For example, s 144H(6) of the Liquor Act 2007 (NSW) prescribes that the body conducting the review must consider the same matters the decision-maker was required to take into account. A further reservation on the tribunal’s liberty to raise novel issues is that for the purposes of deciding its jurisdiction in any administrative review proceedings conducted by way of appeal de novo the tribunal must establish clearly what decision has in fact been made.9 Having decided this, the tribunal on administrative review can address any issues mandatory for the making of such a decision, and appropriately confine or extend the range of facts to be addressed.10 In this sense, the administrative review tribunal ensures that it “answers the same question” as the original decision-maker.

1 De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; 79 ALJR 348; [2004] HCA 61; Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc v Minister for Health, Housing & Community Services (1992) 39 FCR 225; 16 AAR 566; Aslimoski v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2001] ACTAAT 28, the Tribunal at [14];

358

[2.7.1080]

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Commissioner of Fair Trading v Lindfield [2004] NSWADTAP 28, the Appeal Panel at [7]; Lacey v Juunyjuwarra People [2004] QCA 297, Davies JA at [20] (Mackenie and Mullins JJ agreeing); Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA); Re Health Resorts of Australasia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2007] WASAT 60, the Tribunal at [21]. 3 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31, Kiefel J at [141]. This principle is expressed in some principal statutes: Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 46(3). 4 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 (FCAFC), Smithers J at 46 (FLR). Sometimes this principle is described as placing “no” weight on the decision under review. This expression is somewhat misleading. A tribunal can take into the same issues considered by the decision-maker. In the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal the question is put beyond doubt by South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 34(4). It requires the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal to place “appropriate weight” on the decision under review. 5 See, eg, Repatriation Commission v Warren (2008) 167 FCR 511; 47 AAR 461; [2008] FCAFC 64; Aslimoski v Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2001] ACTAAT 28; Frugtniet v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2005] NSWCA 257; Scicluna & Danicic v Development Consent Authority – Litchfield Division [2015] NTCAT 3, Bruxner P at [29]; Re Pigliardo and Town of Vincent [2007] WASAT 104. 6 For example, the failure of a party to ventilate a relevant consideration (Grant v Repatriation Commission (1999) 57 ALD 1 (FCA); Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422; [2008] VSCA 45; Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA)); and a concession by a party that is not factually justified: Comcare v Fiedler (2001) 115 FCR 328; 34 AAR 237; [2001] FCA 1810; Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue (1994) 50 FCR 405, Wilcox J at 418–419, approved Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422; [2008] VSCA 45. 7 Commissioner of Police v Sleiman (2011) 78 NSWLR 340; 249 FLR 242; [2011] NSWCA 21, the Court at [182]. 8 See Re v Local Government Standards Panel [2015] WASC 51 where Corboy J at [23]–[25] held that Local Government Act 1995 (WA), s 5.110 did not allow agenda amendment. 9 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31, Kiefel J at [133] stated: “It may therefore be appreciated that the decision, and the statutory question it answers, should be identified with some precision, for it marks the boundaries of the review.” 10 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31; LS v Mental Health Review Board [2013] WASCA 128, the Court at [97], [98].

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Law and Facts to Be Applied [2.7.1090] The general rule applicable to tribunals conducting administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo is that the facts to be considered and the law to be applied are as at the date of review.1 This is because the reviewing tribunal does not correct error in the past, it does over again what the decision-maker might have done.2 In Western Australia, s 27(1) and (2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) express the principle. The phrase “date of the review” refers to the date of the conclusion of the review. However, this general principle has two reservations: contrary statutory provisions may exist,3 and where accrued rights or obligations are created by the original decision-maker applying the prevailing law, the tribunal should apply this law, even if it has since changed.4

1 This principle is unstated in all principal statutes except one, but established by case law: see Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31; Tuitaalili v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCA 1224, Katzmann J at [60]; O’Donnell v Environment Protection Authority [2010] ACAT 4, the Tribunal at [72]; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Pang [2009] NSWADT 11, the Tribunal at [43]; Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Mitchell [2010] QCA 264, Chesterman JA at [47]; Victoria Legal Aid v Kuek [2010] VSCA 29, Buchanan JA at [23]. De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475; 37 ALJR 182, Kitto J at 502 (CLR). 3 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286; 82 ALJR 1147; 48 AAR 345; [2008] HCA 31, Kirby J at [46], Hayne and Heydon JJ at [99], see also Crennan J at [142]. 4 Esber v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 430; 66 ALJR 373; 15 AAR 249 treated administrative review proceedings as akin to judicial proceedings for the purpose of retrospectivity questions, a decision which has been followed in all jurisdictions: Lee v Secretary of Department of Social Security (1996) 68 FCR 491; 23 AAR 339 (FC); Edgar v Department of Environment, Land & Planning [1993] ACTAAT 59; O’Donnell v Environment Protection Authority (2012) 192 LGERA; 68 FLR 48; [2012] ACTSC 140; New South Wales Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340; Resort Management Services Ltd v Noosa Shire Council [1997] 2 Qd R 291; (1996) 92 LGERA 387; Crooks v Department of Natural Resources [1996] VICCAT 401; Re Western Australian Planning Commission and CPP Pty Ltd [2006] WASAT 379.

Onus of Proof [2.7.1100] The nature of administrative review proceedings conducted by way of appeal de novo is incompatible with the common law principle relating to the burden of proof. Administrative review tribunals have an independent obligation to arrive at the “correct or preferable” decision. In

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[2.7.1110]

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McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354, Woodward J said the use of the burden of proof in administrative review proceedings conducted by way of appeal de novo “should be approached with great caution”.1 However, later cases have conceded that a party wishing to secure a particular outcome from an administrative review proceeding or wishing to have the tribunal make a particular finding of fact must, as a matter of practicality, adduce evidence in support of their claim.2 It should also be noted that contrary legislative provisions affect the common law onus of proof.3 Further, the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal – a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal – and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal both required the “prosecuting” regulatory authority to bear the onus of making out the disciplinary charges where disciplinary matters occurred in their administrative review jurisdictions.4

1 McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354, following Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue [1995] ACTAAT 113; Avery v Registry of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2008] NSWADTAP 68, the Tribunal at [24], [25]; Commissioner for Children & Young People v Storrs [2011] QCATA 28, the Tribunal at [17]; Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA), Tadgell JA at 259 (VR); Re Pinesales Pty Ltd and Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] WASAT 202, the Tribunal at [45]. De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Evans v Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2012) 289 ALR 237; [2012] FCAFC 81, the Court at [18]; Chand v RailCorp [2011] NSWCA 79, Hodgson JA at [67]; Laidlaw v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 70, the Tribunal at [23]; McDonald v Guardianship and Administration Board [1993] 1 VR 521; Re Pinesales Pty Ltd and Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] WASAT 202, the Tribunal at [46]. 3 Some taxation statutes impose an onus of proof on taxpayers who dispute an assessment, while right to information statutes normally impose the onus of proof on the agency disputing disclosure. 4 AVS Group Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2012] NSWADT 1, the Tribunal at [24]; Disley v Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 530.

Government Policy [2.7.1110] In tribunals conducting administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo,1 there are different ways for government policy to be applied, or at least considered. The term government policy covers a very wide range of rules divided into three general categories: (a)

written policies, whether of statutory origin or otherwise, that are the outcome of public consultation; are of general application; are publicly available and are consistently applied;

361

[2.7.1110]

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(b)

advice from expert committees (statutory or otherwise) that are entirely responsive to a request for advice on an individual issue; and

(c)

ad hoc policies that derive wholly from intra-departmental sources in response to situations that arise from time to time.2

In four of the eight tribunals considered in this Chapter, there is a mechanism in the principal statute under which the tribunal must defer to written policy not found in delegated legislation. These are seldom used. Section 64 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) requires the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) to “give effect” to instruments that fall within the defined term “Government policy”. Additionally, NCAT “may have regard” to instruments that do not fall within this term.3 Section 48 of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) allows a Minister to certify that a document was “publicly available” at the date of the decision under review. It does not specify what role that document should play in the proceedings. Section 57 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) prescribes a number of steps prior to the decision under review, commencing with certification of the instrument by the relevant Minister and concluding with reliance by the decision-maker upon the policy. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal must then apply these instruments.4 The provisions of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) are similar to the Victorian provisions.5

1 De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Re Wildcare Queanbeyan NSW Inc and Conservator of Flora & Fauna [2011] ACAT 68, the Tribunal at [23]. 3 An example of a “government policy” case is Cianfrano v Director-General, Premier’s Department [2006] NSWADTAP 48, whereas an example of an “other policy” case is Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Pacific General Securities Ltd (No 2) (2005) 63 ATR 127; [2005] NSWADTAP 54, the Tribunal at [58], in which the Appeal Panel stated it was preferable, where a policy was not unlawful or unjust, for the Tribunal to defer to an administrator’s policy. The enabling legislation can also require consideration of policy: Mills v Local Lands Services [2015] NSWCATAD 207. 4 M Stuart, “Tribunals and Policy” in R Creyke (ed), Tribunals in the Common Law World (Federation Press, 2008) p 139. 5 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 28. See E Morrow, “Merit Review in WA: The Cost of Applying Government Policy In The Course Of Review” (2006) 49 AIAL Forum at 48.

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[2.7.1130]

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[2.7.1120] Where the principal statute makes no provision for application of government policies1 or the policy falls outside such provisions of the principal statute, the policy should be taken into account regardless, unless it is unlawful or its application will produce an unjust result in that particular instance.2 A tribunal conducting administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo should not attempt to lay down policy itself, especially where existing policy comes from a Minister.3 Despite the widespread use of non-statutory policies in public administration,4 there are few cases from the tribunals of them being considered, besides criminal deportation cases in the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

1 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) and Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) do not contain any reference to the application of government policies. 2 Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 (FCAFC) (Drake); Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 (AATA) following Re Wildcare Queanbeyan NSW Inc and Conservator of Flora & Fauna [2011] ACAT 68; Compton v Deputy Commissioner Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 384; More v Water and Rivers Commission (WA) [2006] WASAT 112. See also Minister for Foreign Affairs v Lee (2014) 227 FCR 279; 64 AAR 397; [2014] FCA 927 where Robertson J at [59]–[60] summarises the Federal Court’s consideration of Drake. 3 Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, the Tribunal at 644; Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Pacific General Securities Ltd (No 2) (2005) 63 ATR 127; [2005] NSWADTAP 54. De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 4 Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, “Grey-letter Law”: Report of the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation (AGPS, 1997).

Novel Issues [2.7.1130] It is possible for de novo appeals to require administrative review tribunals to raise issues not previously identified by the parties. Supervisory courts rarely find error by a tribunal for failure to raise novel issues, and they readily concede that de novo appeals allow a tribunal to raise novel issues:1 see [2.7.1080]. Were a supervisory court to set aside a tribunal’s decision, the basis for an order would be error of law for failure to consider a “relevant” consideration, being one the tribunal is bound to take into account.2 In Australian merits review tribunals, examples concern factual issues which were described as a “statutory precondition”,3 “central issue”4 or a

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[2.7.1130]

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“critical matter in issue”.5

1 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Raptis (1989) 20 ATR 1262; Glennan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 90 FCR 538. De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 2 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; 60 ALJR 560. 3 Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 334; Paul Murphy Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADTAP 71. 4 Kasupene v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 49 AAR 77; [2008] FCA 1609; Australian Trade Commission v F & F Asia Pty Ltd (1996) 69 FCR 252; Kintella Pty Ltd v Scotte [1999] ACTSC 100, Crispin J at [24]. 5 Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA).

Applicable Procedural Law Subordinate Legislation [2.7.1140] The tribunals1 have instruments other than principal statutes that prescribe rules of evidence, practice and procedure. In marked contrast to the courts, the quantity of this subordinate legislation is small. The amount, complexity and distribution of the rules between principal statute and underlying instruments vary between tribunals. They also vary within any given tribunal between jurisdictions. The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976 (Cth) and a disallowable instrument, the Code of Practice for Notification of Reviewable Decisions and Rights of Review 1994. There is a set of directions as to procedure of the AAT under s 18B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). In addition, there are several non-statutory guidelines on procedure. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal has rules and procedures in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2), as well as the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1) and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Expert Witness Code of Conduct) Procedural Directions 2009 (No 1). The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal has the following subordinate instruments: the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013 (NSW); the Administrative Decisions Review Regulation 2014 (NSW); the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW); and a set of “Procedural Directions”.2 The Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013 (NSW), Administrative Decisions Review Regulation 2014 (NSW) and Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) are subordinate legislation. The 364

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Procedural Directions are used as guides to everyday decision-making on matters of procedure. The Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal has three instruments of subordinate legislation: the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2014 (NT); the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2016 (NT) and one “Practice Direction” under s 139 of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT). The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) has an instrument of subordinate legislation, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld). In addition, QCAT’s President has issued a number of instruments called “Practice Directions” under s 226 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has three instruments of subordinate legislation: the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2015 (SA); the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA) and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Practice Directions under r 9 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014. Similarly, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) has two instruments of subordinate legislation: the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Fees) Regulations 2001 (Vic) and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2008 (Vic). In addition, VCAT has a body of instruments called “Practice Notes” made under s 158 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). Some Practice Notes apply to all proceedings, while others only apply to proceedings in one list. In Western Australia, the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) has two instruments of subordinate legislation: State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA) and the State Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2004 (WA). In addition, the SAT has a body of instruments called “Practice Notes” made under s 33 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). The SAT also has an instrument called the Standard Orders Made at Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences3 setting out routine procedural directions made at preliminary hearings.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Procedural Directions are available at the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal website: NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Publications (available at

365

[2.7.1140]

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3

www.ncat.nsw.gov.au, viewed 15 September 2016). State Administrative Tribunal, Standard Orders Made at Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences (SAT, 2014)

Procedural Fairness [2.7.1150] All the principal statutes except the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) state that the rules of procedural fairness apply. Section 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 does not refer to “natural justice” or “procedural fairness”, unlike its State and Territory-level counterparts. Courts have consistently interpreted this section to refer implicitly to the rules of procedural fairness.1 However, s 39(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 is subject to the provisions listed in ss 35, 36, 36B and 39(2), provisions expressing requirements of fairness in procedure. Section 7(b) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) requires that the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal must “observe natural justice and procedural fairness”. Section 38(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) applies natural justice.2 Some of the enabling legislation for the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal significantly reduces the natural justice requirements, such as s 29(3) of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW).3 Section 53(2)(a) of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) requires the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal to comply with natural justice. Section 28(3) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) applies procedural fairness and s 107 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) is one example of derogation from it.4 Section 8(1)(a)(ii) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) states that both natural justice and procedural fairness are objectives of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Section 98(1)(a) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) applies procedural fairness, while s 98(4) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 permits its exclusion. Superior courts in Victoria have repeatedly held that the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) is bound to apply procedural fairness in the absence of unequivocal contrary legislative intention.5 Section 24(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) does not add materially to the requirements of procedural fairness.6 Section 32(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) both applies procedural fairness and permits its derogation by enabling laws.

366

[2.7.1150]

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However, the principal statutes have specific provisions dealing with private hearings and orders restricting access to evidence; these specific provisions are the primary vehicles used on rare occasions to restrict a party’s procedural fairness rights to attend a hearing or have access to filed material filed.7 Courts and tribunals approach the question of the exclusion of a party from the hearing as “a much graver step” than even exclusion of the public.8 The provisions impose a high threshold that must be reached for a tribunal to exclude a party: both preservation of the confidentiality of the material to be adduced and that exclusion is more likely to produce a just result.9 It should be noted that a breach of the rules of procedural fairness is considered by both the tribunals and superior courts to be a “question of law” for the purposes of appellate provisions.10

1 Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 (FCAFC), Deane J at 402; D Jarvis, “Procedural Fairness as it Applies in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal” (2007) 81 ALJ 465. 2 In Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Skiwing Pty Ltd (2006) 68 NSWLR 366; [2006] NSWCA 387, the Court held that the rules of procedural fairness applied to a predecessor tribunal of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 3 Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gray (2009) 74 NSWLR 1; [2009] NSWCA 49. 4 Re JSM [2011] QCAT 351. 5 PRA v MA (2004) 21 VAR 16; [2004] VSCA 20; J Pizer, “The VCAT and Natural Justice” (2004) 11 AJ Admin L 161. 6 Russell v Yarra Ranges Shire Council [2009] VSC 486, Kaye J at [41]–[42]. 7 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 35(2); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 38; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 49; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 90; Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 61. Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241; 48 AAR 304; [2008] FCAFC 128 is an example of the rare case where the principal statute required substantial derogation from normal procedural fairness requirements. 8 Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482 (AATA), Brennan J at 508. 9 Instances of these powers being used to exclude are rare in the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, or their predecessors: see Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482; Tucker v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 16; Re Lucas and Commissioner for Social Housing in the Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACAT 71, the Tribunal at [32]; QR v Commissioner of Police (NSW)

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[2005] NSWADTAP 59, the Appeal Panel at [25]; Davis v Victoria Police [2008] VCAT 1343, the Tribunal at [17]. 10 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; 75 ALJR 52; [2000] HCA 57, Gaudron and Gummow JJ at [41]; Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee (2003) 131 FCR 28; 37 AAR 309; [2003] FCAFC 143, Gray ACJ and Gyles J at [8]; Nowicki v Martyn (unreported, ACTSC, Miles CJ, S 35 of 1995, 2 November 1995); B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 74 NSWLR 481; [2008] NSWCA 187; McClintock v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCATA 310; Towie v Victoria (2008) 19 VR 640; [2008] VSC 177, Kyrou J at [44]–[48]; Rowell v Clark [2006] WASC 159, Templeman J at [34].

Content of Fair Hearing Rule [2.7.1160] Although the fair hearing rule is separate to the procedures listed in a principal statute, courts have always stated that the statutory framework within which the power is located affects the content of the fair hearing rule.1 At one extreme, the statutory framework might give little or no guidance as to what procedural fairness requires, in which case courts and tribunals can only regard the statute as “background” information.2 Conversely, the statutory scheme may clearly prescribe what procedural steps are to be taken, in which case those prescriptions are respected by the courts in assessing whether procedural fairness has been breached.3 Statutory procedures typically seek to implement fair procedures. For example, r 13 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) prescribes how documents such as notices of hearings are to be served so that both parties receive timely notice in accordance with the fair hearing rule and general concepts of procedural fairness. Conversely, some statutory procedures clearly go beyond what might be required of procedural fairness by the common law: the statement of reasons procedures in all the principal statutes considered here are a case in point. Thus statutory procedures stand apart from but are related to the common law fair hearing rule.

1 Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner 113 CLR 475; 37 ALJR 182. 2 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex 206 CLR 57; 75 ALJR 889; [2001] HCA 22, Gleeson at [28]. 3 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex 206 CLR 57; 75 ALJR 889; [2001] HCA 22, Gleeson at [53].

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of Taxation (1963) parte Miah (2001) CJ and Hayne JJ parte Miah (2001) CJ and Hayne JJ

[2.7.1190]

AGENDA MANAGEMENT

No Hearing [2.7.1170] Among the tribunals,1 there have been rare cases where an affected person receives no hearing at all. The reasons for this failure can include the tribunal making orders taking a risk that the affected party was notified about the hearing;2 decisions in absence of an oral hearing;3 mistake in the tribunal’s registry;4 inexplicable failure to notify parties of a proposed decision5 or a party having a disability that made discovery of their views very difficult.6

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, and their predecessors. 2 Francis-Wright v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2001) 17 VAR 306; [2001] VSC 35. 3 Neary v Treasurer of New South Wales [2002] NSWADTAP 4. 4 Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee (2003) 131 FCR 28; 37 AAR 309; [2003] FCAFC 143. 5 Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2006) 24 VAR 174; [2006] VSCA 7; Torchia v Swanton [2012] NSWADTAP 5, the Appeal Panel at [101]. 6 G v K [2007] WASC 319; see also Maconachie v Kullenberg [2005] NSWCA 294, McColl JA at [54]ff (Giles and Basten JJA agreeing).

Fair Hearing Rule before Hearing [2.7.1180] A common problem occurring at early procedural stages is that of inadequate prior notification.1 This generally falls into two distinct categories: cases where the affected party has not been given enough time before a hearing to properly prepare and cases where the affected party has not been given sufficient information about the upcoming hearing to properly prepare their case.

1 See M Aronson and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2013) Ch 8; “Hearing Rule” [2.5.460]–[2.5.510].

Insufficient Period of Notice [2.7.1190] Instances of insufficient notice are rare.1 Statutory procedural rules contain procedures to allow the period between service of the initiating 369

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process and hearing to be decided by the tribunal but infrequently prescribe a fixed period. A rare case of the period decided by the tribunal concerned being held insufficient was PRA v MA (2004) 21 VAR 16; [2004] VSCA 20, where an application was made to remove the respondents as enduring attorneys for a disabled person under a power of attorney. The attorneys were notified of these proceedings, but the applicants subsequently sought to have the proceedings brought on urgently. As a result, the respondents received less than one business day as notice, which the Court of Appeal held was insufficient and a breach of the fair hearing rule.2

1 At common law, the affected person must have a reasonable period of prior notice: Ansell v Wells (1982) 63 FLR 127 (FCAFC). 2 At common law, the affected person must have a reasonable period of prior notice: Ansell v Wells (1982) 63 FLR 127 (FCAFC). Another example is Guastalegname v Chevros Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 408 where the applicant was unaware that a proposed hearing was for the substantive hearing, not a preliminary hearing. See also ZAA v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWCATAP 234 where the applicant was away on holidays at the time of notification until the day of the hearing.

Inadequate Information [2.7.1200] In instances of a party receiving insufficient information prior to the hearing, there are two sub-categories: inadequate specificity or clarity, and inadequate disclosure of potentially adverse material. In both sub-categories, the fair hearing rule exists alongside additional statutory requirements for the pre-hearing filing of documents in the nature of the pleadings and the procedures for pre-hearing statements of reason. In conjunction with the common law fair hearing rule, these systems act to mitigate potential problems of procedural fairness. In the tribunals,1 the problem of insufficiently clear prior notification of contested issues has manifested in different situations, such as a party raising novel issues at the hearing,2 the notice of hearing failing to advise of possible consequences thereof,3 and a failure to raise proper particulars.4 Conversely, insufficient information may be a consequence of a party failing to meet the duty to disclose potentially adverse material. This duty is both a requirement of the fair hearing rule5 and a specific statutory duty in certain jurisdictions.6 At the pre-hearing stage, the issue of non-disclosure of potentially adverse material is usually minimised by two statutory procedures. The first mitigating procedure is the requirement in all administrative review proceedings conducted by way of appeal de novo that the decision-maker disclose before the appeal, his or her rationale for the appealed decision (called a statement of reasons) and exchange relevant material along with the statement of reasons.7

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Second, most tribunals conducting administrative review proceedings by way of appeal de novo use the procedure of pre-hearing exchange of all material on which parties intend to rely at hearing.8 The few cases where potentially adverse material is already in the possession of the other party or the tribunal by the start of hearing, but is not disclosed to the affected party can be divided into two groups: mistake9 and cross-examination.10

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, and their predecessors. 2 The nature of a de novo appeal permits this, but notice of the new issues must be given “well in advance of the hearing”: Re Thompson & Growers Co-op Co Pty Ltd and Export Development Grants Board [1985] AATA 16; VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (No 5) (2006) 92 ALD 259; [2006] AATA 710. De novo: “[F]rom the beginning; anew”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. 3 Re AT [2010] QCATA 14. 4 Sabag v Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWCA 411; Law Society of New South Wales v Orford (No 2) [2008] NSWADT 221, the Tribunal at [99]; Mijatovic v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2008] WASCA 115, Buss JA at [56]. If a party’s case is insufficiently particularised, then it is more likely to be summarily dismissed: see Barbon v West Homes Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 405. 5 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; 60 ALJR 113 suggests that the adverse material that must be disclosed is “credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made”: see also Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88; 80 ALJR 228; [2005] HCA 72. 6 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 39(1). 7 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 37; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22B; Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), ss 49, 58; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 35; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 21(2)(b), 157; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 35; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), ss 46, 49; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 21, 24. 8 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction – Direction Given under Section 18B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (30 June 2015) r 4.14; NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division, Procedural Direction 2 – Revenue Matters (13 February 2014) cl 8.1; NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division, Procedural Direction 6 – Government Information (Public Access) Act Matters (17 March 2014) cl 3.5; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 73; State Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note 2 – Review Proceedings (19 August 2008).

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9

See Percerep v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 483; O’Sullivan v Repatriation Commission (2003) 128 FCR 590; 37 AAR 169; [2003] FCA 387. 10 Where cross-examination is to be allowed, the cross-examiner must have a right not to disclose the material ahead of cross-examination, so as to maximise the effectiveness of cross-examination: Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320; 10 AAR 303; Astone v TAC [1998] VICCAT 666. The procedure now used in the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal is to let the party whose witness will be cross-examined know of the existence of the undisclosed material, but keep the material from them before cross-examination: Re Aunela and Telstra Corp Ltd (2007) 45 AAR 416; [2007] AATA 1392.

Fair Hearing Rule during Hearing General [2.7.1210] Whether a hearing is conducted by oral hearing or by written submissions is an initial and vital issue. The fair hearing rule does not always require an oral hearing, although in some circumstances it may do so.1 All of the principal statutes have provisions permitting a hearing by written submissions alone.2 The Commonwealth and Victorian provisions require the consent of both parties, while the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales provisions requires the tribunal to seek comment from the parties.3 Other jurisdictions do not expressly require consent or comment from the parties. Thus, the issue for the remaining jurisdictions is whether the fair hearing rule applies to exercises of the statutory power.4

1 Heatley v Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487; 51 ALJR 703, Aickin J, Stephen and Mason JJ agreeing at 516 (CLR). 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 34J; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 54; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 50; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 69(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 32(2); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 43(2)(f); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 100(2); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 60(2). 3 BDK v Department of Education and Communities [2015] NSWCATAP 129, the Tribunal at [31]–[47]. 4 In Queensland, the power to dispense with an oral hearing in QCAT is subject to the fair hearing rule: Maher v Adult Guardian [2011] QCA 225; Chandra v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCA 335. In Western Australia, the only precedent disallowing a request for an oral hearing was due to the likelihood of an increased legal cost: Re Godenzi and City of Joondalup [2007] WASAT 189.

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Adjournments [2.7.1220] The fair hearing rule can require an adjournment so a party has a reasonable opportunity to prepare their case.1 All the principal statutes give a power to adjourn proceedings, or assume a power to adjourn.2 Some proceedings in the tribunals3 where an adjournment at hearing was considered necessary include the belated adducement of a revised government policy instrument applicable to the proceedings,4 evidence and submissions that was difficult to understand and hence respond to,5 the misunderstanding by a self-represented litigant of the case against them,6 insufficient period of prior notice of reliance on a document,7 adjournment to allow concurrent court proceedings to conclude,8 and numerous failures to comply with statutory procedures.9

1 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; 76 ALJR 598; [2002] HCA 11. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 40(1)(c); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 44(2)(c), 60(4); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 51; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 57; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 57(1)(c); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 43(2)(e); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 130(2)(a); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(7)(e). 3 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, and their predecessors. 4 Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Ovens (2011) 55 AAR 288; [2011] FCAFC 75. 5 Re Harrison and Commissioner for Social Housing [2012] ACAT 10. 6 Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388. 7 IM v Adult Guardian [2011] QCATA 114; The Warehouse Group v Bevendale (No 2) [2002] VSC 291. 8 Re Western Australian Planning Commission and Coogee General Store Pty Ltd [2007] WASAT 182. 9 Italiano v Carbone [2005] NSWCA 177.

Presentation of Evidence and Submissions [2.7.1230] Frank denial of a party’s statutory and common law right to call evidence or make submissions during a hearing are rare.1 In Beckner v Minister of Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 49, proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) followed the

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applicant’s criminal conviction. In the AAT, the applicant sought to adduce fresh evidence concerning the sentencing remarks from the criminal proceedings. The AAT disallowed this, but later made adverse conclusions based on the sentencing remarks. The Federal Court held the truncation of the evidence was a breach of procedural fairness. In Chand v Azurra Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 227, a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal heard a case between husband and wife applicants and a corporate respondent. The husband-applicant was cross-examined by the respondent’s representative. During cross-examination, the wife-applicant kept interrupting the cross-examination. After two warnings from the presiding member, the tribunal member excluded her from the hearing room for the duration of the cross-examination. After the cross-examination, she returned to the hearing room. On appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal, no breach of procedural fairness was found because the exclusion decision was consistent with common practice in courts, and the two applicants suffered no restriction on their reasonable right to present their case.2 In Daynes v Public Advocate (2005) 24 VAR 121; [2005] VSC 485,3 the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) was requested by a party to call witnesses, adduce documentary evidence and cross examine the other party’s witnesses where there was a clear conflict of evidence on the critical factual issues. VCAT refused these requests, which the Supreme Court of Victoria held was a breach of both procedural fairness and s 102 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), because there was a conflict of evidence and VCAT’s procedural decisions denied the party its opportunity to adduce evidence.

1 In both Wade v Comcare (2002) 69 ALD 602; [2002] FCAFC 289 and Mulligan v Wholesale Skid Steers Pty Ltd [2012] QCATA 33, a party had exchanged a written statement of their witness’s evidence. The other party did not call for the witness to attend for cross-examination and the tribunal did not think the witness’s oral evidence would add to their written statement. The party could not point to any aspect of their written statement of evidence that the witness would expand on or add to by oral evidence. The tribunals concerned declined to call the witness, which was deemed not to be a breach of the fair hearing rule. 2 However, a tribunal can become too concerned with case management and so not allow a party a reasonable chance to present their case: Loftus Constructions Pty Ltd v Staunton [2015] NSWCATAP 154, the Tribunal at [47]. 3 Daynes v Public Advocate (2005) 24 VAR 121; [2005] VSC 485, Smith J at [36].

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Cross-examination [2.7.1240] Most principal statutes expressly permit cross-examination.1 Where cross-examination is permitted, the principal statutes allow the tribunal to limit the time available for cross-examination.2 In addition, when courts have applied the fair hearing rule to the tribunals’3 decisions on cross-examination, they have emphasised the opportunity to conduct cross-examination. However, this is not a matter of course.4 The qualifications on the use of hearsay evidence reinforce the importance of cross-examination. Although hearsay evidence is admissible in the tribunals, its admission is subject to procedural fairness and its assessment is subject to issues of weight. The rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 dictating that a party cannot later rely on evidence contrary to the testimony of a witness without putting the evidence to the witness to explain the contradiction, have been held or assumed to apply to the tribunals, notwithstanding the decision in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; [2003] HCA 60 that the rule in Browne v Dunn is not applicable to the Refugee Review Tribunal.5

1 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 46(1)(c); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 95(1)(b), 98(1)(c); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 102(1)(b); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 32(6)(c)(ii), 67(1)(c). 2 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(6)(c); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 95(2)(b); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(7)(c). In addition, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) has been interpreted to allow the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal to limit cross-examination: Lawrence v Chief Executive Offıcer, CRS Australia (2006) 42 AAR 539; [2006] FCA 341, Jacobson J at [27], [28]. 3 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, and their predecessors. 4 O’Rourke v Miller (1985) 156 CLR 342, followed by Ambikapathy v Victorian Legal Aid [1999] VCAT 1361 found that the fair hearing rule did not always require a right to cross-examination. An emphasis on the importance of cross-examination is seen in Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320; 10 AAR 303; Ramsay v Australian Postal Corp (2005) 147 FCR 39; 41 AAR 1; [2005] FCA 640; Commissioner for Children & Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111; Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA 194 especially the judgment of Young JA. Conversely, Kingham v Cole (2002) 118 FCR 289; [2002] FCA 45; Re Chief Psychiatrist and A [2011] ACAT 21 do not. However, the necessity of

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5

cross-examination is dependent on circumstance: in Leon Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Donnell [2009] VSC 430, Habersberger J at [98] held an error of law by denial of cross-examination because the outcome of proceedings was described as “heavily dependent” on the issue of the credibility of conflicting evidence, and is a “qualified right”: Sammut v AVM Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 27. In Gallo v Duflou [2014] NSWCATAP 115, the Appeal Panel of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (at [21]–[42]) held these principles were applicable in that Tribunal. 3D Scaffolding Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 73 ATR 729; 49 AAR 100; [2008] FCA 1477; Frugtniet v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2005] NSWCA 257; King v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 353, Macfarlan JA at [105], [106]; Bradto Pty Ltd v Victoria [2007] VSC 106; Edoo v Minister for Health (2010) 72 SR (WA) 16; [2010] WASAT 74. In Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2014) 226 FCR 555; 64 AAR 120; [2014] FCAFC 93, the Full Court of the Federal Court, at [46]–[51], rejected a submission that the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 is, for an administrative tribunal, a “principle of law” it was bound to apply. However, they did affirm the view that overriding requirements of fairness and rationality justify the rule’s application.

Information or Material Obtained Externally to Hearing [2.7.1250] All the tribunals1 can receive relevant evidence by means other than adducement during the course of a hearing. This ability is variously expressed as a power for the tribunal to inform itself “on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit” or “in any way it considers appropriate”.2 Once the material is in the possession of the tribunal,3 the fair hearing rule controls how it may be used; if the material’s bearing on the decision is such that it cannot be dismissed from further consideration, the material should be notified to the parties and comment sought.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33(1)(c); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 26; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 53(2)(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 28(3)(c); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 39(1)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 98(1)(c); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(4). 3 There are many situations in which the tribunal may acquire evidence outside the course of a hearing, such as foreshadowed documentary evidence becoming available

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4

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after the hearing. Changes to the constitution of the tribunal part-way through a hearing may also lead to necessity to take account of evidence at the earlier hearings. Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88; 80 ALJR 228; [2005] HCA 72; Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 225 FCR 482; [2014] FCAFC 123, the Court at [42]ff; OV v Members of the Board of Wesley Mission Council (2010) 79 NSWLR 606; [2010] NSWCA 155, Allsop JA at [13]; Christiansen v Social Security Appeals Tribunal (2010) 53 AAR 166; [2010] FCA 1146; McClintock v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCATA 310.

Official Notice [2.7.1260] All the tribunals1 include non-legal experts as members in order to deal regularly with non-legal areas of specialist knowledge. By the commencement of the modern era of administrative review, expert members of tribunals were allowed to bring to bear their accumulated expertise and experience to the matters before them.2 This phenomenon continues in the tribunals.3 One ramification of the presence of non-legal experts is to allow recourse to this information by the process of memory, known as the doctrine of “official notice”. The common law fair hearing rule controls the usage of this extrinsic material. Recourse to “general expert knowledge” to evaluate questions of fact does not involve the fair hearing rule.4 However, the fair hearing rule comes into play when an expert tribunal proposes that expert knowledge will “play an important part in the final decision” or prove a fact through expertise instead of recourse to facts.5

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Buckley v Bennett Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1; 52 ALJR 505, Barwick CJ at 10–11 (CLR). 3 Telstra Corp Ltd v Warren (unreported, FCA, Tamberlin J, NG016 of 1996, 26 February 1997); Re Chief Psychiatrist and A [2011] ACAT 21; Hopwood v Veterinary Surgeons Investigating Committee [2002] NSWADT 44, the Tribunal at [62]; MR v Adult Guardian and Public Trustee of Queensland [2011] QCATA 211; ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council (2008) 20 VR 447; 162 LGERA 59; [2008] VSCA 180, the Court at [16]. 4 Spurling v Development Underwriting (Vic) Pty Ltd [1973] VR 1; (1972) 30 LGRA 19. 5 J Smillie, “The Problem of ‘Official Notice’: Reliance by Administrative Tribunals

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on the Personal Knowledge of their Members” (1975) Public Law 64; Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327; 7 AAR 17 (FC); Re Chief Psychiatrist and A [2011] ACAT 21, the Tribunal at [8]; Turner v Horsfall [2002] VSC 195.

Critical Issues and Potentially Adverse Conclusions [2.7.1270] Corresponding to the fair hearing rule requirement to disclose adverse material is a limited requirement to draw the parties’ attention to critical issues or possible adverse conclusions reached through the proceedings.1 A critical issue represents a question, while an adverse conclusion is a response unfavourable to a party. This requirement is an exception to the normal operation of the fair hearing rule, which does not require notice be given or comment sought on analysis of issues of fact or law, or tentative conclusions. A judicial officer is not required by the fair hearing rule “to make a running commentary” on a party’s case “so there is a forewarning of all possible reasons for failure” in the usual application of the rule.2 The conditions under which a duty to draw a parties attention to a critical issue or the possibility of an adverse conclusion: [R]equire the decision-maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material.3

To decide if a breach of the fair hearing rule has occurred, it must be established whether the affected party has notice of the issues or possible conclusion and had the opportunity to comment, or if the course of proceedings would have put a reasonable person on notice during the period of the hearing.4

1 Two examples of this principle are: Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437; 18 AAR 392 (observations of applicant’s physical abilities during course of hearing not drawn to counsels’ attention); and Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388, the Court at [46] where an unrepresented applicant in a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal clearly misunderstood the case against them and made no effective response to a direction from the tribunal. Compare Tung v Health Care Complaints Commission [2011] NSWCA 219. 2 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57; 75 ALJR 889; [2001] HCA 22, Gleeson CJ Hayne J at [31]; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; 81 ALJR 515; [2006] HCA 63; see also “Hearing Rule” [2.5.600]. 3 Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 (FC), the Court at 592. 4 Puafisi v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 39; Lindsay v Health Care Complaints Commission [2010] NSWCA 194 (a case from a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal); ACE v Director-General of Department of Education & Training [2011] NSWADTAP 23; Norville Nominees Pty Ltd v Strathbogie Shire Council [2008] VSC 339; SG v AG

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[2008] WASC 123.

Duty to Assist [2.7.1280] Provisions in some of the principal statutes and enabling laws oblige the tribunals1 to assist parties to understand proceedings.2 They supplement the obligation of the tribunals to give notice and invite comment on critical issues and potentially adverse conclusions. The fair hearing rule does not usually3 require the decision-maker to take special steps to assist a party present their evidence or understand the case they must meet: The relevant duty of the Tribunal is to ensure that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to present his case. Neither the Act nor the common law imposes upon the Tribunal the impossible task of ensuring that a party takes best advantage of the opportunity to which he is entitled.4

This approach has seemingly shifted the approach of the courts’ interpretation of common law requirements.5 The provisions that extend to the tribunals appear to extend the obligation beyond those of the fair hearing rule.6

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(5); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 54; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 29, 30; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 43(1)(b), (c); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 97; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(6)(a), (b). 3 Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388; see also “Hearing Rule” [2.5.630]. 4 Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 (FCAFC); Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; 73 ALJR 584; [1999] HCA 14. 5 Kasupene v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 49 AAR 77; [2008] FCA 1609; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT3: Fair Hearing Obligation (1 January 2013); Tomasevic v Travaglini (2007) 17 VR 100; [2007] VSC 337; C Cantrall and K Wu, “Showing Procedural Fairness to the Self-Represented Litigant” (2010) 48 LSJ 66. 6 Xia v Wang & Bian [2009] ACAT 21; Chan Cuong Su v Public Guardian [2014] NSWCATAP 32, the Tribunal at [14]ff; Lida Build Pty Ltd v Miller [2010] QCATA 17. See also Italiano v Carbone [2005] NSWCA 177, Basten JA at [114]ff where breach of similar provisions in the principal statute of a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal was held to be a ground to invalidate the

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decision under review independent of any breach of procedural fairness.

Fair Hearing Rule after a Hearing [2.7.1290] There are three complaints of breach of the fair hearing rule following a hearing. The first relates to surprising identification of issues.1 Conversely, complaints may be made relating to surprising conclusions of facts.2 The third is that a tribunal’s failure to deal with a substantial and clearly articulated argument involved a denial of procedural fairness.3

1 Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 442; AT v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 131; Maconachie v Kullenberg [2005] NSWCA 294, McColl JA at [54]ff (Giles and Basten JJA agreeing); Ideal Constructors Pty Ltd v Wikeepa [2015] NSWCATAP 131. 2 O’Keeffe v Richards [2010] QSC 386; Towie v Victoria (2008) 19 VR 640; [2008] VSC 177. The difference between reliance on a novel issue of fact (which is impermissible) and surprising weighting of factual evidence (which is permissible) can be small: Knight v Commissioner of Police [2011] WASC 93. 3 Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088; [2003] HCA 26 (Dranichnikov), Gummow and Callinan JJ at [24], Kirby J at [88], Hayne J at [95]; applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision by the Full Federal Court in Summers v Repatriation Commission (2012) 293 ALR 86; [2012] FCAFC 104, the Court at [46]; Qualweld Australia Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] NSWCATAP 249, the Tribunal at [62] (the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal); Chandra v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCA 335 (the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal); Beaton v Psychologists Board of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 223, the Tribunal at [27] (State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia). The Supreme Court of Victoria has considered the Dranichnikov doctrine as a failure to exercise a statutory duty, rather than as a failure to afford procedural fairness: XYZ v State Trustees Ltd (2006) 25 VAR 402; [2006] VSC 444, Cavanough J at [3].

Rule against Bias [2.7.1300] Breaches of the rule against bias by the tribunals1 are rare. The rule against bias is that a decision-maker must disqualify themselves if they are not actually impartial, or a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend the member might not bring an impartial attitude to the case.2 Claims of bias in the tribunals usually arise from the conduct of a tribunal member aimed at case management during the course of a hearing. However, contemporary judicial and tribunal practices allow for a more interventionist case management approach, which does not breach the long-established rule against bias. Further, the relatively recent rise in the proportion of unrepresented parties before the tribunals generates a challenge for the rule against bias. A

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tribunal member may legitimately confine the evidence and submissions of an unrepresented party to certain relevant issues, but be perceived by that party as aggressively partial.3 In addition, there are a small number of successful bias applications arising from exceptional circumstances of prior association between the tribunal member and a party4 or conduct of the tribunal member.5

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; 75 ALJR 277; [2000] HCA 63; see also “Rule against Bias” [2.5.860]–[2.5.1210]. In Comaz (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] VSC 294, Croft J at [26]–[30] rejected a submission that the test for bias developed in courts should be somehow modified when applied to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 3 Kowalski v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2010) 114 ALD 8; [2010] FCAFC 10; Roden Security Services Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWADTAP 10; Habul v Mahoney [2011] QCATA 130; Shaw v Rigby Cooke Lawyers [2011] VSC 214. Even so, “intervention during the elucidation of evidence” by a tribunal member towards an unrepresented party can become excessive, leading to a reasonable apprehension of bias: Seachange Management Pty Ltd v Bevnol Constructions & Developments Pty Ltd [2008] VCAT 1479, the Tribunal at [61]. 4 Pacific Cinemas (Canberra) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1999) 149 FLR 417; [1999] ACTSC 15. 5 Islam v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2009) 51 AAR 147; [2009] FCA 1526; Alfaro v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2007] NSWSC 1035; Khashashneh v Travel Compensation Fund [2015] NSWCATAP 142 at [13]–[18]; Maher v Adult Guardian [2011] QCA 225, Magazzu v Business Licensing Authority (2001) 17 VAR 264; [2001] VSC 5; Ikosidekas v Karkanis [2015] VSCA 121.

General Law Procedural and Evidentiary Rules [2.7.1310] All the tribunals1 have a statutory discretion to depart from the rules of evidence, practice and procedure. The statutory language varies in both terminology and detail but typically includes instructions that the tribunal must act on “the substantial merits”, its procedure is “within the discretion of the Tribunal” and the tribunal concerned is not bound “by the rules of evidence”.2

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Judicial and tribunal interpretation of such provisions has narrowed the expansive language employed in the provisions; any effort to extend their scope is confined to procedural law. Additionally, any such effort is non-prescriptive. The High Court has described such provisions as “facultative, not restrictive”,3 suggesting they require the tribunal to operate as an administrative body with flexible procedures, not as a body with technical rules.4 These views have been applied to the legislation governing some of the tribunals and their predecessors.5 It should be noted they have no effect on the rules of procedural fairness: see [2.7.1150].

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 7(a), 8, 23, 26; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(2), (4); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 53(1), (2)(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 28; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 39(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), ss 97, 98; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(2), (4), (5). 3 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; 73 ALJR 746; [1999] HCA 21, Gaudron and Kirby JJ at [75]. 4 SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294; 79 ALJR 1009 215; [2005] HCA 24, Gleeson CJ at [1]. 5 Wecker v Secretary of Department of Education Science & Training (2008) 168 FCR 272; [2008] FCAFC 108, Weinberg J at [96]; Re Chief Psychiatrist and A [2011] ACAT 21; Commissioner of Police v Sleiman (2011) 78 NSWLR 340; 249 FLR 242; [2011] NSWCA 21; Queensland v Mahommed [2007] QSC 18; The Warehouse Group v Bevendale (No 2) [2002] VSC 291; Re C and Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Community Development [2007] WASAT 116. Compare Zaidi v Health Care Complaints Commission (1998) 44 NSWLR 82, where the Court of Appeal declined to apply the rule of evidence in criminal law known as the “similar fact evidence” rule to a decision of a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

Immunity from Disclosure Queensland [2.7.1320] The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) is the simplest of the legislative arrangements. It contains no special procedure for claiming any immunity from disclosure. It contains only one basis

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for immunity from disclosure not available in judicial proceedings: under ss 74 and 83(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), evidence of “anything said or done during”, either a compulsory conference or mediation proceedings is inadmissible in later proceedings at the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Otherwise (with one exception),1 the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) provisions referring to rules of privilege simply preserves those rules already available under the common law and other legislation.2

1 See Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 21(6): the decision-maker has a duty to give to the tribunal a post-application statement of reasons (and relevant documents), despite “any provision in an Act prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of the information”. 2 Production of documents to the tribunal by a party or a third person is excused where “there is a valid claim to privilege from disclosure”: Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 62(5), 63(3). Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, s 98(2) prevents the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal from compelling a witness to answer “if the witness has a reasonable excuse for refusing to answer the question”, which includes but is not limited to the privilege against self-incrimination: s 98(3).

Other Jurisdictions [2.7.1330] All other principal statutes (except the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA)) feature a common procedure applicable to post-application statements of reasons (and relevant documents) that allows the decision-maker to claim immunity from disclosure in that statement. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) and State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) contain a straightforward procedure: the procedure commences with a certificate that disclosure of information is contrary to the public interest.1 The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal follows the procedure under s 59 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) that an administrator can have an objection to disclosure in a post-application statement of reasons assessed at a special hearing.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 36; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22E; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 38; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), ss 53, 54. In Western Australia, these procedures operate to prevent disclosure to the applicant, not to prevent inclusion of the documents in the s 49 documents filed with the tribunal: State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 159.

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Bases for Non-disclosure [2.7.1340] The principal statutes for each tribunal provide different bases for a claim for privilege. These differ according to whether the claim for privilege is made at the stage of pre-hearing statements of reasons, summons and production, mediation proceedings, oral evidence at hearing or adducement of documents at hearing. In this respect, none of the principal statutes resemble any other. [2.7.1350] Both the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) offers statutory immunities. The AAT allows a “public-interest like” basis under ss 36 and 36B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Section 37(1AG) revokes any other potential bases for privilege. However, the decision-maker can use ss 35(2) and 37(1AF) to prevent the disclosure of documents to the applicants. At the stages of summons, production and adducement of documents, ss 36 and 36B may also be induced to assert a public-interest like immunity. Immunity may also be claimed on the basis of common law legal professional privilege. Section 40 is read subject to the common law legal professional privilege.1 Common law public interest immunity may also operate when the statutory immunity procedure is not in use.2 Section 62(6) also preserves the common law privilege against self-incrimination.3 Mediation proceedings in the AAT are convened under s 34A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 and are held in confidence.4 Statutory immunity asserting a public interest immunity-like basis also exists for giving oral evidence at hearing: the Commonwealth Attorney-General can intervene in the hearing and tell the AAT that a witness’ answer to a question will infringe the existing certificate.5 Sections 60(3) and 62(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 give a witness the same privileges (including the privilege against self incrimination and client legal privilege) as a witness in proceedings before the High Court.6 Part 4A Div 4A of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) provides a statutory immunity against a pre-hearing statement of reasons in the ACAT.7 Sections 170 and 171 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) require the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 to be interpreted subject to common law privileges. A public interest-like statutory immunity against disclosure in the summons, production and adducement of documents can also be found in Pt 4A Div 4A.3. Similarly, this scheme excludes common law public interest immunity,8 but not the operation of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).9

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Sections 170 and 171 of the Legislation Act 2001 require the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 to be interpreted subject to common law privileges. During mediation proceedings, evidence of “any words spoken” at a preliminary conference is inadmissible in later proceedings under s 34(3) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008. Oral evidence at hearing can also be given a statutory immunity against disclosure; the body issuing the certificate can intervene in the hearing and tell ACAT that a witness’s answer to a question will infringe the existing certificate.10 However, this must be interpreted according to ss 170 and 171 of the Legislation Act 2001, which requires the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 to be interpreted subject to common law privileges.

1 Re Hobart Central Child Care Pty Ltd and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 40 AAR 38; [2004] AATA 1222, the Tribunal at [38]. 2 Re Moore and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2006] AATA 425, the Tribunal at [20]. 3 Re Taxpayer and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 39 AAR 53; [2004] AATA 398, the Tribunal at [11]. 4 Re Kanina Banner Pty Ltd and Minister for Health & Ageing (2002) 35 AAR 29; [2002] AATA 169, the Tribunal at [4]. 5 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 36A. 6 Re Taxpayer and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 39 AAR 53; [2004] AATA 398, the Tribunal at [11]. 7 However, this scheme excludes common law public interest immunity: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22H(1). This does not exclude the operation of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, s 22H(2). 8 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22H(1). 9 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22H(2). 10 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22L(2).

[2.7.1360] In New South Wales, ss 9 and 10, and Ch 3 Pt 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) remain relevant under s 59 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW). This protects documents from disclosure for summons, production or adducement. The privilege against self-incrimination stated in s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 can be claimed by a witness at a hearing in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.1 Section 38(3) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) excuses a person from answering a question if they have a “reasonable excuse”, as reflective of the common law privileges.

1 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(3)(b).

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[2.7.1363] In the Northern Territory, the Minister with responsibility for the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal can issue a certificate exempting material from disclosure on a wide range of public-interest type grounds. In addition, a wide range of privileges from disclosure, available in a court, are also available in the Tribunal.1

1 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), ss 71, 72.

[2.7.1367] The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal does not have a special procedure for claiming privilege but does preserve it. This is preserved in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA).1

1 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), ss 39(2), 69.

[2.7.1370] The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) has no special provision applicable to the disclosure of post-initiating-process statement of reasons and relevant documents. The bases for immunity under ss 53 and 54 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) relate to the s 49 requirement that a decision-maker must lodge material. As in other jurisdictions, Victoria offers a statutory immunity asserting a public-interest immunity against disclosure.1 Conversely, under s 80, inter partes production and discovery is not protected by common law privileges. In VCAT’s review jurisdiction, common-law public-interest immunity is revoked by s 56 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998. Non-party production or attendance under ss 81 and 104 of the Act does have the benefit of common law privileges, except not the privilege against self-incrimination. Such a privilege is not available in VCAT,2 but s 105(2) of the Act provides immunity in courts and other tribunals in respect of evidence given in VCAT. Other privileges and immunities available in proceedings in the Supreme Court are also available in VCAT, subject to ss 80(3) and 105 of the Act. Section 105 also revokes the privilege against self-incrimination; as such, a witness cannot refuse to answer a question on this basis. However, s 105(2) provides immunity against evidence given in VCAT in courts and tribunals.

1 Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), ss 53, 54.

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Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 105(2).

[2.7.1380] Similarly to other jurisdictions, a statutory immunity exists under s 159 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). A similar immunity attaches to disclosure of documents that have been summonsed, produced or adduced.1 Legal professional privilege attaches to the information disclosed under s 24 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004.2 Privileges and immunities available in the Supreme Court of Western Australia are also available in the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT), under s 69 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004. The privilege against self-incrimination is revoked in the SAT, but s 68(2) provides immunity against disclosure in courts and other tribunals in regards to evidence provided in the SAT. Evidence of “anything said or done during” a compulsory conference or mediation is inadmissible in later proceedings.3

1 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 34(6), 35(3). 2 Re Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2011] WASAT 88, the Tribunal at [15]. 3 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 55.

Investigative Functions of Merits Review Tribunals [2.7.1390] The procedural functions of the tribunals1 do not correspond exactly with the traditional procedural role of a court. The legislative schemes surveyed here depart from the traditional model in two ways: the first is in the conferral of investigative powers (see [2.7.1400]), and the second in the imposition of investigative duties: see [2.7.1410].

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia.

Investigative Powers [2.7.1400] All the principal statutes give investigative powers in three ways. First, they state in general terms that the tribunal concerned “may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate.”1 Second, they 387

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provide the tribunals2 with a set of powers to summons witnesses, and produce documents. Finally, the principal statutes (except those of the Northern Territory and South Australia) invest the tribunals with all the powers of the original decision-maker.3 The High Court has interpreted the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (AAT’s) general provision to mean that the AAT has an “own motion” power to investigate.4 If the evidence is unsatisfactory, the AAT can question witnesses or grant an own motion adjournment and direct the parties to file further evidence, or make its own inquiries or summons witnesses on its own motion.5 However, these powers to investigate do not come with a duty to investigate. In the case of the AAT, it has been held these investigative powers are discretionary.6 In Victoria, a similar conclusion was reached about both the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal7 and its predecessor.8 It was observed that use of investigative powers is a contingency of the circumstances of a case, especially whether parties are represented or legally sophisticated.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33(1)(c); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 26; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 53(2)(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 28(3)(c); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 39(1)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 98(1)(c); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(6)(a), (b). 2 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 68(2); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 63(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19(c); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 51(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29(1). The Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) do not do so. 4 Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1991) 175 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 753, Brennan J at 424–425 (CLR). 5 Re Adamou and Director-General of Social Security (1985) 3 AAR 321. 6 Wecker v Secretary of Department of Education Science & Training (2008) 168 FCR 272; [2008] FCAFC 108; Kowalski v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2011) 191 FCR 345; 54 AAR 238; [2011] FCAFC 44. 7 Bausch v Transport Accident Commission (1996) 11 VAR 117, Eames J at 141.

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Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 295, Byrne J at [9]; Golem v Transport Accident Commission (No 1) (2002) 19 VAR 265; [2002] VCAT 319.

Investigative Duties [2.7.1410] Express duties to inquire are rare.1 The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NTCAT), Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT), South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) and Western Australia’s State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) all have similarly expressed duties. NCAT and the SAT are required “to ensure that all relevant material is disclosed to the Tribunal so as to enable it to determine all of the relevant facts in issue in any proceedings”,2 while NTCAT, SACAT and QCAT are required to “ensure that all relevant material is disclosed to the Tribunal” but only “so far as is practicable”.3 No statute places an inflexible duty to make inquiries. The New South Wales Court of Appeal has said this duty would not be triggered until and unless there was “relevant material to be disclosed so as to enable it to determine the facts in issue … and the duty did not require that the Tribunal act on speculation that there might be more material of relevance”.4 In Queensland, Commissioner for Children & Young People v Storrs [2011] QCATA 28 held that the provision is not triggered unless: [T]he tribunal forms the view that the material is critical to its being able to decide the review and that it cannot reasonably make its determination on the review without the material being available to it.

In this case, QCAT thought that the duty would be discharged by ordering the parties to obtain the putative material. In Re Building Corp WA Pty Ltd t/as Giorgi Exclusive Homes and Cliff [2012] WASAT 207, the SAT said in response to a submission that the SAT, under s 32(7)(a) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), should have made inquiries. The SAT rejected the submission on the facts and observed the duty to make inquiries “[i]f it became apparent during the hearing that any material had to be disclosed to the Tribunal to enable it to arrive at a proper determination”. In addition to any statutory duties and powers, there is also the so-called “Prasad duty” to make inquiries. This duty is based upon common law concepts of Wednesbury unreasonableness, or jurisdictional error,5 and refers to the duty to make an “own motion” inquiry occur if the inquiry is “obvious”, about “a critical fact” which “is easily ascertained”.6 It has been observed this duty is no more onerous than the statutory own motion power to investigate.7

1

M Groves, “The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal Proceedings” (2011) 33 Syd LR 177 points to a unique provision in the now-repealed Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). 389

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2 3

4 5

6

7

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) s 38(6)(a); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(7)(a). Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 53(2)(d); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 28(3)(e); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 43(2)(a). Chand v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 131, Giles JA at [57]. Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155. The “Prasad” duty applies to some of the tribunals: Wecker v Secretary of Department of Education Science & Training (2008) 168 FCR 272; [2008] FCAFC 108, Greenwood J, at [109] (Weinberg J agreeing); XYZ v State Trustees Ltd (2006) 25 VAR 402; [2006] VSC 444, Cavanough J at [56]; Chand v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 131. Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; [2009] HCA 39, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [25]. A survey of cases since the High Court decisions shows that claims based on the Prasad duty rarely succeed: M Smyth, “Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals” (2010) 34 MULR 230. See also “Unreasonableness” [2.4.1960]–[2.4.2000]. Chand v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 131, Giles JA at [57], [58] (Hodgson and McColl JJA agreeing).

Assessment [2.7.1420] The adversarial model of civil law adjudication has consistently been followed by the tribunals1 in their review jurisdictions.2 As per the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal: In the ordinary case, a tribunal which is under a duty to act judicially and which has the relevant parties before it will be best advised to be guided by the parties in identifying the issues and to permit the parties to present their respective cases in the manner that they think appropriate.3

This approach has been consistently followed in all of the tribunals’ review jurisdictions.

1

2

The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2006) pp 7, 58, 64, 66; M Groves, “The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal Proceedings” (2011) 33 Syd LR 177; A Wilson, “Tribunal Proceedings and Natural Justice: The Duty to Inquire” (2013) 32 UQLJ 23.

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Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 (FCAFC).

Notification of Appeal Rights [2.7.1430] Potential applicants must be notified of their appeal rights before any review proceedings are initiated in any of the tribunals.1 The duty to notify in all legislative schemes surveyed here is distributed between principal statute,2 enabling law3 and subordinate legislation.4 Non-compliance with notification requirements can alter the answer to question whether the prescribed period has commenced to run.5

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 27A; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 67A (a “reviewable decision notice”); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 48; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 34(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 157 (an “informative notice”); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 20. 3 For example, Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), s 63; Utilities Act 2000 (ACT), s 43A; Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), s 192(8)(b); Adult Proof of Age Card Act 2008 (Qld), s 40; Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 27. 4 Code of Practice for Notification of Reviewable Decisions and Rights of Review 1994; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2009 (ACT), reg 7. 5 Re Ruffell Pty Ltd and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 37 AAR 148; [2003] AATA 356; Bennett v Building Professionals Board [2011] NSWADT 111; Re Curlewis and City of Albany [2011] WASAT 85.

Standing Applicants [2.7.1440] There are two approaches to determining who is an applicant. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) and Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) follow one, while the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT), the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) take an alternative approach. 391

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The principal statutes of the AAT, ACAT and VCAT state that a person may qualify as an applicant if “interests are affected” by the relevant decision.1 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) does not explain the meaning of an “interest” or the manner of being affected. Conversely, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) and Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) contain definitions2 expanding what is meant by an “interest” and affectation. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) provision is more limited than the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 provision, as the former is confined to non-natural entities while the latter applies to all types of persons and entities. Alternatively, the principal statutes in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia contain either no provision at all, or no substantive provision. Section 4 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) provides only that an “interested person” can apply. The term “interested person” is given a legally exhaustive definition that points to standing requirements in the enabling laws. Neither the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) nor State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)3 contain any substantive explanation of who qualifies as an applicant.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 27; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22Q; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 5. In Victoria, if the enabling law provides that a person whose interests are affected by a decision may apply to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) for review of a decision, those “interests” take the meaning provided by Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, s 5. A person may apply for review whether their interests are directly or indirectly affected by the decision: Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, s 5(b). 2 Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 5. 3 Re Crowley and Director-General of Department for Planning & Infrastructure [2006] WASAT 236, the Tribunal at [15]: “The question of standing is usually settled by the statutory provisions under which an application for review or an appeal are brought.”

[2.7.1450] When evaluating an applicant’s standing, the tribunals’1 statutory schemes are generally more pertinent than rules about standing used in courts.2 This is the approach taken by the leading Australian authority, Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167; 75 ALJR 1551; 33 AAR 557; 48 ATR 253; [2001] HCA 58. There the High Court described the standing provisions expressed in s 27 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

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(Cth) as having “an ambulatory operation”.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Brisbane Airport Corp Ltd v Wright (2002) 120 FCR 157; 35 AAR 192; [2002] FCA 359; Watson v ACT Planning & Land Authority (No 2) [2010] ACAT 7, the Tribunal at [9]; Minister for Disability Services v People with Disability Australia Inc [2010] NSWADTAP 44, the Appeal Panel at [53]; Paul v Goulburn Murray Rural Water Corp [2009] VCAT 970, the Tribunal at [10]; Proctor v Melton Shire Council [2003] VCAT 1520, the Tribunal at [36]. 3 Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167; 75 ALJR 1551; 33 AAR 557; 48 ATR 253; [2001] HCA 58, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [17].

Respondents [2.7.1460] The criteria of who may be a respondent in proceedings before a tribunal are similar across jurisdictions.1 All of these provisions provide that the decision-maker is entitled to be a respondent.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 30(1)(b); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 29(3); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 27(b); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 127(1)(c); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 40(1)(b); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 53; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 59(1)(b)(ii); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 36(4).

Initiation of Proceedings Formal Requirements [2.7.1470] All the legislative schemes except for the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) require the initiating process to be in writing,1 follow the prescribed form and be accompanied by the prescribed document.2 Section 42 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) obliges applicants to file compliant applications and empowers the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) to reject non-compliant applications. Two schemes allow an application to be partly written and partly oral.3

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The distribution of the formal requirements between principal statute, and subordinate legislation4 varies from one scheme to the next. In all schemes, enabling laws can modify, exclude or substitute formal requirements for initiating process. These requirements are not applied as strictly as conventional civil litigation. Particularity in pleading is unnecessary. The tribunals have adopted the doctrine of “substantial compliance” with forms5 in respect of the legislative requirements for the content of initiating process in some instances,6 but not all.7

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 10; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 33 (a procedural provision only); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 67. The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA) refer to an “initiating process” which is defined as a “document”. 2 Prescribed documents are the supplied statement of the decision under review, and the reasons for that decision. 3 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 13; State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 8. 4 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976 (Cth), reg 5(1), Sch 1 Form 1; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1), rr 6, 27; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 24(1)(a); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2016 (NT), rr 4(2), 5(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld), rr 7, 10; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), Pt 6; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2008 (Vic), r 4.03, Sch 2 Forms 1, 2; State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), rr 6, 7, 7A, 8; State Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note 2 – Review Proceedings (19 August 2008) r 6. 5 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25C; Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 255; Interpretation Act 1978 (NT), s 68; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 78; Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 80; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 49; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 53; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 74. 6 Re Purnell and Repatriation Commission (1991) 14 AAR 63; Raymond v Doidge [2012] QCAT 163; Zeus & Ra Pty Ltd v Nicolaou (2003) 6 VR 606; [2003] VSCA 11. 7 Re Rubigny and Secretary of Department of Family & Community Services (2002) 71 ALD 777; [2002] AATA 1170; Vero Insurance Ltd v Witherow (2004) 21 VAR 413; [2004] VSC 272.

Lodgment [2.7.1480] The process required to initiate proceedings in one of the tribunals1 varies. It may be called “lodgment”,2 “filing in the registry”,3 or “accepted”.4 Some requirements are found in subordinate legislation.5 The manner of lodgment can be prescribed by the enactment giving authority to

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review. For example, s 175 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) prescribes how and when an application for review can be made. In Angus Fire Armour Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1988) 19 FCR 477; 9 AAR 421, a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court held that “lodgment” within the meaning of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) meant physical handing to or delivery to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and its physical acceptance by the AAT.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 See, eg Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(1). 3 See, eg Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 33(1). 4 See, eg State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 42(3). 5 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976 (Cth), reg 9; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 24(1)(c); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2016 (NT), r 5; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 12; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2008 (Vic), r 4.05.

Time for Application Duration [2.7.1490] All legislative schemes prescribe a time limit on the initiating process, except for the South Australian and Victorian schemes.1 This limit is universally 28 days2 from the decision to be reviewed.3 Like the formal requirements, enabling laws can displace whatever rules are prescribed under the principal statute.4

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(1)(d); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 10(2); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 40; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 94; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 33(3); State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(2); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 10(2); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 24(4); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 94(3); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld),

395

[2.7.1490]

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3

4

s 33(3); State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9. The event starting the 28-day period varies according to jurisdiction: in the Commonwealth, it starts the day on which a document setting out the decision, and stating the reasons for it, is given to the applicant. In the Australian Capital Territory, the period begins on the day on which the decision under review was made; in New South Wales, it is commenced either the day on which the internal review decision is made, the day on which the applicant is provided with the statement of reasons, or the day on which they are notified of the decision under review. In both Queensland and Western Australia, the 28-day period commences on the date of notification of the decision under review, while there is no comprehensive law on point in Victoria – the enabling laws of various statutes set out the time limitation. Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(4); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 11; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 24(3)(a); State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 10. Cases concerning time limits prescribed in enabling legislation include: Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR 407; [2000] FCA 324 (FC); Watson v ACT Planning & Land Authority (No 1) [2010] ACAT 5, the Tribunal at [14]; Cardillo v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 574, the Tribunal at [13]–[16]; Re Hartwig and City of Canning [2008] WASAT 243, the Tribunal at [8].

Extension of Time [2.7.1500] All of the tribunals’1 legislative schemes provide discretion to extend the period of lodgment of the initiating process.2 In Queensland and Victoria, an extension of time can be given where “to do so would cause [prejudice] … that cannot be remedied by an appropriate order for costs or damages”.3 In all other jurisdictions except for Western Australia,4 the discretion is expressed in broader terms and without any legislative guidance.5 In the presence of only broadly expressed legislative guidance, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal have turned to the principles developed by the Federal Court to guide extensions of time for lodgment of applications for review under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The leading case is the well-known decision of Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344, in which it was held that the court will not grant an extension unless it is properly satisfied that there is a need to do so.6

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia.

396

[2.7.1510]

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3 4 5

6

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Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(7); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2), r 7; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 41; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 94(6); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 61(1)(a); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 33; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 126(1); State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 10. Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 61(3); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 126(4). The State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) and State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA) contain no provisions for extension of the period of time. Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(7) (“if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so”); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2), r 7(4) (“only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for making the order”); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 41(1) (“[t]he Tribunal may … extend the period of time for the doing of anything under any legislation in respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction despite anything to the contrary under that legislation”). See, eg Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 118; [1999] FCA 563; Danagher v Child Support Registrar (2014) 228 FCR 213; 65 AAR 122; [2014] FCA 1408; Benson v Ware [2012] QCATA 24, the Tribunal at [9]; Kealy v Milanovic [2015] VCAT 1644. In Western Australia, the leading case is Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196 (FC), a decision in terms similar to Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344. Its application to the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia has been approved in Li v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2014] WASCA 179, the Court at [15].

Joinder Procedure [2.7.1510] Each principal statute controls how persons and entities are joined as parties, or allowed to participate as non-parties. The majority of the principal statutes specify that the tribunal concerned can both determine whether a person or entity applying be joined as a party,1 and grant leave to a person or entity to intervene.2 These procedures are in addition to the provisions providing a right to participate in proceedings under certain circumstances. All principal statutes except the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) provide the relevant Attorney-General or Minister with an unlimited right of intervention.3 As in a court, the step of joinder in tribunal proceedings is “a fundamental matter which requires at least a minimum degree of formality”.4 However, these discretionary procedures cannot prevail over provisions that proscribe joinder. For example, s 29(6) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) forbids joining of a person as an applicant if that person could not have applied in the first place under the relevant enabling law.

397

[2.7.1510]

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Similarly, s 8(2) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) expressly excludes other persons having “a role in the making of the decision” from the statutory description of “administrator”, the mandatory respondents. In PR v Director-General of Department of Community Services [2005] NSWADT 38, a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal found that an agent or employee of the decision-maker could not normally be joined as respondents under the predecessor legislation to the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 30(1A), 31(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 29(5); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 44(1), (4); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 128; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 42; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 54; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 60; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 38. 2 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 129; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 41(2); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 55(2); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 73(3); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 37(3). 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 30(A), 36A; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), Pt 4A; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 44(4)(a); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 44(4)(a); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 129(1); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 41(1); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 55(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 73(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 37(1). 4 Italiano v Carbone [2005] NSWCA 177, Spigelman CJ at [9], Einstein J at [166], a decision concerning a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

Requirements [2.7.1520] Schemes for joinder differ between jurisdictions and differ according to whether any one condition of standing is a necessary condition. At the Commonwealth level, s 30(1A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) expressly requires that the applicant for joinder have “interests” “affected by the decision” under review. The applicant must show “genuine affectation of an interest which attaches to him”.1 The requirement in the Australian Capital Territory is less stringent: s 29(5) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) requires the applicant for joinder to have only an “interest in the application”, as well as standing as an applicant in the first place.

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The remainder of the principal statutes are expressed more broadly. They each provide the affectation-of-interests test as one of three possible grounds for joinder. The test in these statutes differs to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provision in that the event giving rise to affectation of interests is described as “the proceedings”, rather than “the decision”.2 The other two possible grounds go to discretionary considerations as to whether the applicant “should be bound by or have the benefit of a decision”3 or “it is desirable that the person be joined”.4 There are a small number of widely accepted principles in applying these provisions. First, joinder is a discretionary decision because all the principal statutes for the tribunals surveyed here leave the discretion to permit joinder relatively unconfined. The tribunals follow the conventional approach that once one or more of the requirements for joinder are met, the tribunal concerned goes on to a separate inquiry as to whether joinder is desirable.5 Second, the affectation-of-interests test used for joinder is that a person seeking to be joined must be other than that of a member of the general public with a belief that the decision or conduct under review should be prevented or made to comply with the law. The applicant-for-joinder must go further and show genuine “affectation of an interest”.6 In addition, one practical question often arises in joinder applications: will the proceedings, without the joinder applicant, not ventilate all relevant evidence and issues?7

1 United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520. 2 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 128(1)(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 42(1)(b); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 54(1)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 60(1)(b); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 38(1)(b). 3 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 128(1)(a); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 42(1)(a); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 54(1)(a); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 60(1)(a); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 38(1)(a). 4 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 44(1); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 128(1)(c); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 42(1)(c); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 54(1)(c); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 60(1)(c); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 38(1)(c). 5 VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2005) 44 AAR 192; [2005] AATA 861, the Tribunal at [23]; Bignell v New South Wales Casino Control Authority [2001] NSWADTAP 41, the Appeal Panel at [12]; Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 715, the Tribunal at [30]; Independent Cement & Lime Pty Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2000) VAR 290; [2000] VSC 355, Nettlefold J at [12]; Re FMG Pilbara Pty Ltd and

399

[2.7.1520]

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6

7

Minister for Indigenous Affairs [2012] WASAT 31, the Tribunal at [21]. In Victoria, the test has been expressed similarly as being higher than the test for desirability of granting an amendment to pleadings, but lower than the test for summary judgment: Zervos v Perpetual Nominees Ltd (2005) 23 VAR 145; [2005] VSC 380, Cummins J at [11]. Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Aust) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 (FC), Burchett J at 265–266. See also Comptroller-General of Customs v Members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1994) 123 ALR 140; Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Fine [2014] NSWCATAP 24, the Tribunal at [41]; Chapman v Wilson [2011] QCAT 400; Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Australian Finance Direct Ltd [2004] ASC 155-064; [2004] VCAT 645; Re Tolman Holdings Pty Ltd and City of Joondalup [2005] WASAT 348, the Tribunal at [39]. Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 715; Kelk v Moreland City Council [2009] VCAT 2242; BHP Billiton Ltd v NSW Department of Primary Industries [2010] NSWADT 8.

Pre-hearing Procedure Reasons for Decisions under Review and Lodging Documents [2.7.1530] Pre-hearing procedures in the tribunals1 place an obligation on the decision makers to disclose reasons for the decision under review, as well as the relevant documents. These requirements bear no resemblance to the conventional law of civil procedure as to pleadings, discovery, interrogatories and inspection because they function not to allow the respondent to attack the applicant’s case or defend the respondent’s case, but “to facilitate the review … by the tribunal concerned”.2 They facilitate administrative review in giving the disappointed affected person information so as to make an informed decision whether or not to pursue administrative review,3 and enabling the reviewing tribunal to make informed judgments about the decision under review.4 Administrative review tribunals rely on respondent agencies to make full disclosure in pre-hearing statements of reasons.5 Tribunals have been known to express displeasure in frank terms when non-compliance is detected.6

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Re Seymour and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2012] AATA 86; AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2010) 78 NSWLR 302; [2010] NSWCA 81. 3 Re Palmer and Minister for Australian Capital Territory (1978) 23 ALR 196; [1978] AATA 51.

400

[2.7.1540]

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5

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Re Mann and Capital Territory Health Commission (No 2) [1983] AATA 413; Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA), applied by Hamilton v Transport Accident Commission [2001] VCAT 2027, the Tribunal at [25]. Re Seymour and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2012] AATA 86; Crime and Misconduct Commission v Deputy Commissioner Queensland Police Service [2010] QCAT 319; Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA); Re Neumann and City of Swan [2007] WASAT 30. See Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA); Arulogun v Queensland Health [2011] QCAT 573; Re Denton and Commissioner of Police (WA) [2009] WASAT 115.

Statement of Reasons [2.7.1540] Respondent agencies have a special statutory duty to disclose reasons for the decision being appealed and relevant material in their possession to the tribunal and applicant. Conventional civil litigation has no equivalent duty. With the exception of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), the legislative schemes for the tribunals1 require a statement of reasons from the decision-maker. As these requirements occur before a hearing they will be called in this work “pre-hearing” statements of reasons, to distinguish them from similar requirements when the tribunal itself makes a decision; called “decisional statements of reasons”. The legislative schemes contain two “pre-hearing” duties similar in content, but at different points in time. The first is duty to give reasons on request to the affected person before any litigation is commenced,2 while the second is a similar duty to give reasons to the tribunal concerned along with other relevant documents once proceedings have started.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 28; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22B; Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 49; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 35; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 157(2)(b); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 35; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 45; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 21. 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 37; Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 58; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 41; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld),

401

[2.7.1540]

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s 21(2)(a); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 46; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 24(a). Although there is no equivalent duty to give reasons in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), it appears from the reported decisions of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal that it has continued to require of respondents the filing of a document which equates to a statement that would have complied with the now-repealed Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 37: see, eg BDH Projects v ACT Planning & Land Authority [2010] ACAT 37, the Tribunal at [8].

Content [2.7.1550] The commonly prescribed standard for the content of a pre-hearing statement of reasons is comprised of three requirements: that the statement sets out “the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision”. Some tribunals also have subordinate legislation and quasi-legislation concerning the content of pre-hearing statements of reasons in addition to requirements of legislation and those developed by courts and tribunals.1 The requirement for a statement of reasons of an agency’s decision is now common across many legislative schemes administered by public administration in Australia. Such requirements in other legislative schemes have received a large amount of interpretation from courts and tribunals: see [2.3.430]. Although similar requirements in these legislative schemes have received little judicial and tribunal interpretation the adequacy of a set of reasons produced for proceedings in one of the tribunals surveyed here is assessed against this larger body of jurisprudence that extends beyond precedents set in tribunals. Cases in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that consider the adequacy of pre-hearing statements of reasons express criteria identical to those used to assess statements of reasons produced under other legislation. In Re Taxpayer and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 63 ATR 1019; [2006] AATA 598, the AAT used a requirement the same as the requirement for statutory statements of reasons under other legislation called the “determinative issue” theory. Similarly, in Re VCA and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 43 AAR 529; [2006] AATA 873, the AAT applied to a statement of reasons the same requirement as the “subjective” theory now used to assess statements of reasons under other legislation.2

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Practice Direction Relating to Section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (26 March 2007); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 6 of 2011 – Access to Documents in Applications for Review and Referral Matters (6 January 2012), r 3(b); State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 12. 2 Re VCA and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2007) 43 AAR 529; [2006] AATA 873, the Tribunal at [17]. See also Filonis v Transport Accident Commission

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[2003] VCAT 2038, the Tribunal at [8]; B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 5) [2010] NSWADTAP 21, the Appeal Panel at [154].

Documents to Accompany Statement of Reasons Contents [2.7.1560] Once an application is made, the decision-maker must lodge all documents or parts of documents relevant to the application.1 Some of the tribunals2 have complementary requirements in subordinate legislation and quasi-legislation.3 All of these provisions include a requirement of relevance, which can be broken down into three issues: (1)

“Objective relevance” versus “subjective relevance”: this question examines whether the requirement refers to what “any reasonable decision-maker would have considered … to be relevant”, or what the decision-maker actually considered relevant.4 Section 37(1)(b) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) requires “objective” relevance.5

(2)

“Adjectival relevance” versus “probative evidence”: the term “adjectival relevance” here refers to the standard used in the civil justice system in connection with compulsory process, being “the capacity … to support a conclusion or proposition that has an arguable relevance to the proceedings”.6 The “probative evidence” standard is that used in the Australian justice system to assess relevance of material sought to be adduced as evidence, being the requirement of having the capacity to rationally affect the assessment of a fact in issue. It has been held in both the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal and a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal that the “adjectival relevance” standard is applicable.7 The other Tribunals have yet to establish the validity of adjectival relevance.

(3)

“Ongoing relevance” versus “non-ongoing” relevance: if otherwise relevant material comes into the decision-maker’s hands after filing the pre-hearing statement of reasons, must it also be filed? In practice, the answer to this question is yes: most legislation provides that the post-application statement of reasons and all accompanying documents lodged to be exchanged with other parties, or made available to them.

1 This is not the case in the Australian Capital Territory’s Civil and Administrative Tribunal, but is in every other administrative review tribunal: see [2.7.1540]. 2 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and

403

[2.7.1560]

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3

4 5

6 7

Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. See Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Practice Direction Relating to Section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (26 March 2007); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 6 of 2011 – Access to Documents in Applications for Review and Referral Matters (6 January 2012), r 3(a); State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 12. VBN v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2005) 44 AAR 212; [2005] AATA 1060. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v VBN [2005] FCA 1868, a view which is shared by New South Wales and Victoria: see Transport Accident Commission v Bausch [1998] 4 VR 249; (1998) 13 VAR 61 (CA); Pacific General Securities Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 63 ATR 127; [2003] NSWADT 183. Re KLGL and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2008] AATA 452, the Tribunal at [15]. Re KLGL and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2008] AATA 452; Bristol Custodians Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADTAP 44.

Supplementary Reasons and Documents [2.7.1570] Once a pre-hearing statement of reasons and accompanying documents are lodged, there may be deficiencies in the information provided. The tribunal concerned can remedy this issue by making orders for further reasons or documents1 in all jurisdictions except for Western Australia.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 37(2), 38; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 22C; Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), ss 52, 58(4); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 36; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 21(3), (4); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 35(4); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 49.

Documents Preliminary to Hearing [2.7.1580] Although the tribunals1 do not have rules of pleadings in a conventional sense, there are rules governing the disclosure of evidence and the clarification of issues prior to hearing. The rules of procedural fairness apply to tribunals, and require pre-hearing explanation of relevant evidence and issues. Procedural fairness defines the limits of the dispute and puts the parties on notice of the adverse findings sought against them.2 In addition, the possibility of summary dismissal encourages adequate explanation by a party of their own case and the case against the other party.3

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Additionally, the pre-hearing procedures and documents exchanged prior to hearing have legal consequences, although they should not be confused with pleadings. First, they serve as evidence of what notice each party subjectively had of the case to be put against them as at the commencement of the hearing. There have been many cases where the Federal Court has, on judicial review proceedings, relied upon this evidence, especially in applications alleging breach of the fair hearing rule of procedural fairness.4 Second, in tribunals where costs may be awarded (being the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal), there have been many cases where an application for costs is derived or defended on the basis of pre-hearing procedure, including the contents of documents in lieu of pleadings.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Re Aerolink Air Services Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2003] AATA 1357; Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland v Lennox [2010] QCAT 702. 3 The relation of adequacy in pleadings to summary dismissal is recognised in the well-known judgment of Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125, which stated that the test for summary dismissal “so manifest on the view of the pleadings, merely reading through them, that it is a case that does not admit of reasonable argument”; see Barbon v West Homes Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 405. 4 See, eg Secretary of Department of Social Security v SRA (1993) 43 FCR 299; 18 AAR 498.

[2.7.1590] All of the tribunals1 have pre-hearing procedures that function like pleadings in conventional civil litigation. In the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, both parties must file and exchange a document called a “Statement of Issues” by the first preliminary conference. By the second preliminary conference, a second document called the “Statement of Facts and Contentions” must be filed.2 In the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, parties must exchange the application for review and a response to the application.3 In the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the respondent in review jurisdiction proceedings must file and exchange a document called a “Reply to Application” setting out its response to the application for review.4 In the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, a respondent must file a “response”.5 In the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, a respondent must file a response to the application for review.6 In the South

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Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, a respondent must file a “response” within 21 days.7 In the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, there are practice notes concerning pre-hearing procedure specific to classes of jurisdiction. Finally, in the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, both parties must file and exchange a document called a “statement of the issues, facts and contentions”.8

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction (26 March 2007), rr 2.1, 2.2. 3 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1), rr 10, 13. 4 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), r 26(2). 5 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2016 (NT), r 6. 6 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (Qld), r 44. 7 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 21. 8 State Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note 2 – Review Proceedings (19 August 2008), r 15.

[2.7.1600] Except for the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, subordinate and quasi-legislation governing the pre-hearing procedure for administrative review tribunals requires the parties to file and exchange the documents upon which they intend to rely at a hearing.1 This interaction between the parties is organised at preliminary hearings.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction (26 March 2007), r 2.2; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NT), rr 5(5), 6(1)(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 62; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (VCAT, 2013) p 22; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 73; State Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note 2 – Review Proceedings (19 August 2008), rr 15(b), 17.

Preliminary Hearings [2.7.1610] Like courts, tribunals place considerable effort and invest considerable resources in preliminary hearings. In the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, there are two types of preliminary hearing

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prescribed in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth): (1)

s 34A(1) prescribes “preliminary conference[s]”; and

(2)

s 33(1A) provides for a “directions hearing”.

There is a legislative scheme governing preliminary hearings.1 The policy of all tribunals is to facilitate settlement of disputes and actively manage the progress of proceedings. Principal, subordinate and quasi-legislation provides for processes from preliminary through to final hearings to facilitate this goal. In the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, s 35 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) prescribes “mediation referral”, while a “preliminary conference” is available under s 33 of the Act. There is a legislative scheme governing preliminary hearings.2 In the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal,3 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal4 and Western Australia’s State Administrative Tribunal5 there are three types of preliminary hearings prescribed: (1)

a directions hearing;6

(2)

a compulsory conference;7 and

(3)

a mediation.8

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), Pt IV Div 3; Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction (26 March 2007), r 2; Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Guidelines (AAT, 2006). 2 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 31; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1), r 16. 3 See also Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 6 of 2010 – Compulsory Conferences and Mediations (21 April 2010). 4 See also Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT4: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (1 January 2013); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT5: Directions Hearings and Urgent Hearings (15 March 2012). 5 See also State Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note 2 – Review Proceedings (19 August 2008), rr 23 – 29. The types of orders routinely made at these preliminary hearings are listed in State Administrative Tribunal, Standard Orders Made at Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences (SAT, 2012). 6 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 96(3); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 62; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 44(3); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 80; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 34(3). 7 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 107;

407

[2.7.1610]

TRIBUNALS

8

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 69; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 50; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 83; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 52. Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 118; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 75; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 51; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 88 (“referral to mediation”); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 54 (“referral for mediation”).

Summons [2.7.1620] Like courts, tribunals can compel a person to attend as a witness1 and/or produce documents.2 The provisions can require a pre-hearing production and inspection of documents or a summons power proper. Like the power of courts to issue a summons, this power is subject to requirements of relevance and avoidance of oppression.3

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 40(1A); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, (ACT), s 41(4); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 46; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 92; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 97; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 40(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 104; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 35, 66. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 40(1B); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, (ACT), s 41(1); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 48(3)(b); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 89; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 63; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 40(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 81; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 34(5). 3 Pacific International College Pty Ltd v Secretary of Department of Education and Training [2015] AATA 547, Deutsch DP at [2].

Stay Orders [2.7.1630] The making of an application for review does not change the operation or implementation of the decision. The principal statutes of all of the tribunals,1 except the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal have an express provision to this effect,2 which are not absolute; these provisions are subject to contrary provisions in enabling laws. However, it should be noted that implementing or putting into operation a decision differs to varying a decision. The position at common law, and in some principal statutes, is that lodging an

408

[2.7.1640]

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application with a merits review body is an implicit withdrawal from the decision-making capacity of the initial body to vary any existing decision.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 41(1); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 60(1); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 44(1); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 21(1); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 36(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 50(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 25(1). 3 R v Moodie; Ex parte Mithen (1977) 51 ALJR 850 (HCA). See also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 26(1); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 43; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 26.

[2.7.1640] All the tribunals1 can use discretion to grant a stay of a decision that is the subject of an application for review. The purpose of the stay order power is to secure the effective hearing and determination of the review application. This requirement is either expressed in the principal statute or imposed by judicial interpretation.2 The principal statutes vary in specification of mandatory considerations for exercise of the stay order power. The length of the list of considerations varies from none3 to three.4 They all consider the interests of any potentially affected person, any submission made by or on behalf of the administrator and the public interest. Section 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) requires the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to form the opinion “that it is desirable” to make the order and consider “the interests of any persons who may be affected by the review”. Section 53(1)(b) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) requires the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal to ask whether the applicant for the orders “would be disadvantaged or suffer harm” if the order was not made. In addition to these statutory criteria, the tribunals have, to varying extents, adopted considerations for the grant of a stay pending an appeal from the law of civil procedure. Adherence to that agenda varies; in the federal jurisdiction, courts and tribunals have emphasised the width of the discretion.5 In Queensland and Western Australia, there is close adherence to the civil law considerations.6 In New South Wales, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal has noted that the statutory list of considerations includes “the public interest”, a

409

[2.7.1640]

TRIBUNALS

factor which receives less emphasis in conventional inter partes litigation.7 In Victoria, the common law is considered relevant.8 Although negative in form, a stay order can have a positive effect. For example, if an occupational licence is not renewed and the licence holder appeals within the prescribed period, the tribunal can grant a stay order in terms that extends or prolongs the “life” of the licence until such time as the appeal is disposed of.9

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 41(2); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 53(2); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 60(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 44(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 22(3); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 36(2); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 50(3); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 25(2). 3 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). 4 Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 60(3); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 22(4); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 25(4). 5 See Re Dekanic and Tax Agents’ Board (NSW) (1982) 62 FLR 154; 13 ATR 569, the Tribunal at 155–156 (FLR); Shi v Migration Institute of Australia Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 326; 38 AAR 222; [2003] FCA 1304, Tamberlin J at [25]: “[Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 41(2)] should be given a liberal interpretation”. 6 Deputy Commissioner Stewart v Kennedy [2011] QCATA 254, the Tribunal at [11]; Re Western Australian Planning Commission and Coogee General Store Pty Ltd [2007] WASAT 182, the Tribunal at [19]. 7 Austech Institute for Further Education Pty Ltd v Vocational Education Training Accreditation Board [2009] NSWADT 6, the Tribunal at [17], [18]. 8 Aavelaid v Dental Practice Board of Victoria [2002] VCAT 1376. 9 Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Hotop (2005) 145 FCR 232; 41 AAR 192; [2005] FCA 1023; AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police (NSW) (2010) 78 NSWLR 302; [2010] NSWCA 81, Basten JA at [17], Campbell JA at [96]; Hideaway Cafe Bar Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of Offıce of Liquor & Gaming Regulation [2012] QCAT 46, the Tribunal at [14]; Cuddles Group Pty Ltd v Director General of Department for Community Development [2006] WASAT 114, the Tribunal at [24]ff.

410

[2.7.1650]

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Procedural Role of Respondent Agency at Hearing [2.7.1650] Subject to specific statutory provisions, the procedural role of respondent agencies in the tribunals1 is the same as conventional civil litigation. Model litigant policies of governments are equally applicable to proceedings in tribunals as in conventional civil litigation. However, in litigation before tribunals, respondent agencies have a special statutory duty to disclose reasons for the appealed decision and relevant material already in their possession to both the tribunal and the applicant. Such obligations arise as a consequence of the initiating process, and must be discharged within prescribed time limits soon afterwards. There are no equivalent duties on agencies in conventional civil litigation. The principal statutes also impart specific statutory duties on individuals, such as using his or her best endeavours to assist the tribunal in making its decisions.2 Finally, in limited circumstances the role of a respondent agency can be restricted under the “Hardiman doctrine”.3 This doctrine states that if there is an active contractor to the applicant, ordinarily it is only appropriate for the agency to play a limited role restricted to providing information and submissions related to public interest.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33(1AA); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 47; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 20; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 35(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 30. 3 So called after its statement in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13; 54 ALJR 314. 4 Capricornia Credit Union Ltd v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2007] FCAFC 112; Animal Liberation v Conservator of Flora and Fauna [2009] ACAT 17, the Tribunal at [15]; Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner [2011] QCAT 161. In the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Hardiman doctrine will only be applied in exceptional circumstances: Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Fine [2014] NSWCATAP 24, the Tribunal at [59]. Opposing views have been expressed in relation to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal: Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422; [2008] VSCA 45, the Court at [39]; Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Bass Coast Shire Council [2010] VCAT 1807, Dwyer DP at [101]ff.

411

[2.7.1650]

TRIBUNALS

Representation [2.7.1660] The principal statutes of each tribunal state the parties’ rights of representation. The various provisions may confer legal representation or representation by a person other than a lawyer as a right. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) provide for both in all circumstances.1 Section 45 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) has a general rule against parties to proceedings being represented by any other person. To be represented by any other person, whether or not a legal practitioner, requires prior leave under s 45(1)(b) of that Act. This leave requirement was interpreted in a predecessor tribunal as comprising a principal criterion that leave was granted when the interests of justice would be served by grant of leave.2 Considerations for this criterion were: (1)

the interest of a party in having their case put effectively;

(2)

the interest of the opposite party in not having a method and style of representation employed which exacerbates cost, expense and trauma to no positive end; and

(3)

the interest of the community as a whole in having the justice system deal with disputes in a cost efficient, timely and conclusive way.

Section 43 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) allows representation as of right in only three circumstances: when the party is a child or a person with impaired capacity; when the proceeding relates to taking disciplinary action; or when an enabling Act states the person may be represented. Outside of these circumstances, leave is required for representation,3 and there is a legislative presumption against legal representation.4 Section 62 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) divides between prescribed circumstances when representation is by leave and those when there is a right to representation. Any representation by a person, other than a professional lawyer, requires leave. Section 62(1)(b) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 lists four different circumstances in which legal representation is a right. Outside these circumstances, all representation, including by a lawyer requires leave.5 Only the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has commented on the meaning of the term “representation”. There it was understood to mean appearance at a hearing, not the role of preparing documents before hearing; “representation” in a tribunal can be understood to take more of the role of an advocate than a solicitor.6 The Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) and State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) provides for legal representation as of

412

[2.7.1670]

AGENDA MANAGEMENT

right in all circumstances, and for representation by a person other than a lawyer by leave.7

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 32; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 30. 2 Department of Justice v AY [2010] NSWADTAP 17, the Tribunal at [40]. 3 Queensland v Leadbeatter [2011] QCATA 60. 4 In its review jurisdiction, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) will readily allow representation for the State government agency because of their special responsibilities to assist QCAT under Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 21. 5 The whole legislative scheme has been interpreted to favour self-representation: Re Aussie Invest Corp Pty Ltd v Hobsons Bay City Council (2004) 22 VAR 212; [2004] VCAT 2188, the Tribunal at [7]; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT1: Common Procedures (1 June 2013), r 19. 6 Re Coyle and Transport Accident Commission (2001) 18 VAR 251; Tamas v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2003) 9 VR 154; [2003] VSCA 113. 7 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 130(1); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 56(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 39.

Hearings in Public [2.7.1670] Provisions in the principal statutes concerned with public hearings are divided into two categories.1 The first category contains the principal provisions prescribing hearings to be held in public,2 subject to stated exceptions. There are two types of exceptions to the public-hearing provisions: an exception required by an enabling law, and provisions giving discretion,3 based on a list of mandatory considerations in the exercise of the discretion. The second group consists of specific allied provisions4 concerned with publication of the identity of parties or other information about proceedings. The mandatory considerations to be taken into account when there is a discretion as to whether to hold a public hearing are mostly outcome tests: that a public hearing will have a prescribed result is considered to be a civil detriment, or the prescribed detriment is to be “avoided”. The lists of mandatory considerations differ between jurisdictions; while some considerations are common factors to all statutes, others are not. Section 35(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) is the simplest: it commences with a statement of the presumption that hearings be in public and then only directs the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to “pay due regard to any reasons given” for the presumption’s rebuttal. Conversely, s 61(4) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) is lengthy: it lists eight possible considerations.

413

[2.7.1670]

TRIBUNALS

In addition, four other features should be noted. First, enabling laws may permit private hearings.5 Second, all principal statutes permit preliminary hearings concerned with alternative dispute resolution to be conducted in private and make evidence of events at those hearings inadmissible in later proceedings.6 Third, the powers discussed here are rarely used to restrict a parties procedural fairness rights to attend a hearing and have access to material filed with the tribunal: see [2.7.1730]. Finally, the exercise of the powers discussed here must be distinguished from the disposition of a proceeding without holding an oral hearing (“on the papers”) which is expressly permitted under all principal statutes: see [2.7.1210]. The Australian legal system’s traditional value of “open justice” informs judicial and tribunal interpretation of this legislation. Thus, the leading statements7 for the AAT suggest that “to exclude the public from a hearing is a serious step”; “[t]he norm is that the proceedings before the AAT shall be in public” and that the desirability of hearings to be in public is to be “the basis” of the AAT’s consideration of adopting a different approach. All the tribunals and their predecessors have made similar statements in respect of their own legislation.8

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 35(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 38; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 49; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 60; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 90; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 60(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 101; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 61. 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 35(2); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s 63; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 38(2), 39; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 49(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 62(1)(a); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 90(2); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 60(2)(e); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 101(2); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 61(2). 4 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 35(2); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 39(2)(b), (c); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 64, 126; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 62(1)(b) – (e); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 66; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 60(2)(f) – (i); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998

414

[2.7.1680]

5 6

7

8

AGENDA MANAGEMENT

(Vic), s 101(3); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 62. For example, Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZE (Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal). In the Commonwealth, see Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 34A; Re Kanina Banner Pty Ltd and Minister for Health & Ageing (2002) 35 AAR 29; [2002] AATA 169, the Tribunal at [4]. In the Australian Capital Territory, see ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 34(3). Under Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 67(1)(c) the evidentiary privileges in Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Pt 3.10, including evidence of settlement negotiations under Evidence Act 1995, s 131, apply to all evidence. In the Northern Territory, see Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 111. In Queensland, see Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 74(1), 83(1). In South Australia, see South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), ss 50(10), 51(11). The Victorian provisions are contained in Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 92. In Western Australia, see State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 55. Respectively, Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 181 FCR 130; 51 AAR 244; [2009] FCAFC 185, Downes and Jagot JJ at [74]; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v PTLZ (2008) 48 AAR 559; [2008] FCAFC 164, Black CJ at [6], North and Downes JJ at [41]–[42]. Council of Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 26, the Tribunal at [58]; Beer v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAD 23; Cutbush v Team Maree Property Service (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89, the Tribunal at [8]; Legal Services Commissioner v Doran [2012] VCAT 285, the Tribunal at [12]; Medical Board of Western Australia v A Medical Practitioner [2011] WASCA 151, the Court at [88].

Hearings in Private [2.7.1680] Exclusion of the public from a hearing is regarded as “a serious step” used in those “exceptional cases” where the ordinary principle that it is desirable for hearings to be held in public “cannot be applied”.1 Private hearings have been considered necessary by tribunals for a range of reasons, including avoiding commercial damage,2 the applicant’s disability,3 an impending criminal trial,4 and the public interest.5 It should be noted that private hearings are routine in some classes of proceedings because of modification by enabling laws, such as right to information cases.6

1 Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482 (AATA). 2 See Re Kanina Banner Pty Ltd and Minister for Health & Ageing (2002) 35 AAR 29; [2002] AATA 169. 3 See Gala v Fraser Coast Regional Council [2010] QCAT 576.

415

[2.7.1680]

TRIBUNALS

4

5 6

See Fitzgerald v Medical Board of Queensland [2010] QCAT 565. However, in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pham (2013) 94 ATR 528; 60 AAR 264; [2013] FCA 579, Katzmann J pointed out that an application for a confidentiality order on this basis is mitigated by the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination. See Coulston v Offıcer of Public Prosecutions Victoria [2010] VCAT 1234. The decision of Re State Bank of New South Wales and Department of Treasury (1991) 5 VAR 78 is a reported right to information case where the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal followed the procedure used in Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482 of excluding the public and the applicant, but not their counsel. These circumstances are now governed by modifications to Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 101.

Other Restrictions on Access and Publication [2.7.1690] All the tribunals1 are empowered to restrict access to evidence or publication without total public exclusion.2 Use of such powers is relatively common in comparison to orders excluding the public from a hearing. It should also be noted that all principal statutes contain specific procedures where the executive government issues a notice or certificate protecting information or documents from disclosure on public interest grounds and the generally applicable powers are frequently extended and modified by enabling laws. Applications for restrictions on evidence consider a variety of factors, but there exists a common approach across jurisdictions. An application for restrictions invariably involves a balance between a private interest of a party, a witness or a person supplying information, and the well-recognised public interest in transparency of tribunal hearings. The potential for some embarrassment or commercial impact on a party or witness is insufficient to outweigh the traditional public interest in transparency.3 However, the potential for compromise of the privacy of children is often sufficient to outweigh the traditional public interest in transparency.4 Where the tribunal considers that the balance favours restrictions of some kind, the tribunal will mould its remedy to suit the circumstances and will always prefer the least restrictive option. Like courts, tribunals have the option of rendering a party or witness anonymous to protect the privacy of a child5 or a witness,6 the reputation of a party,7 or the reputation8 or personal safety of a witness.9

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the

416

[2.7.1700]

2 3

4

5 6

7

8 9

AGENDA MANAGEMENT

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. The special case of restrictions to documents accompanying a pre-hearing statement of reasons is discussed at [2.7.1360]. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 181 FCR 130; 51 AAR 244; [2009] FCAFC 185; JQ v Double Bay Out of School Hours Inc [2008] NSWADT 337; Chand v Rail Corp of New South Wales (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 11; Kennedy v Deputy Assistant Commissioner [2011] QCAT 360; Ionescu v John Blair Motor Sales [2011] VCAT 706; Re James and Sayers [2006] WASAT 332. Re Visa Cancellation Applicant and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] AATA 690; Re Applicant and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] AATA 422; JQ v Double Bay Out of School Hours Inc [2008] NSWADT 337; Teacher J v Queensland College of Teachers [2012] QCATA 115, the Tribunal at [49]; Re Sze-Tho and Medical Practitioners Board (2002) 19 VAR 76. Re Secretary of Department of Family & Community Services and AX03C [2003] AATA 46. ACT Medical Board v A Medical Practitioner [2009] ACAT 34; Legal Services Commissioner v Brereton [2008] VCAT 1723 granted to media access to witness statements about the proceedings, but withheld attachments and annexures. Re MTYG and Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority [2008] AATA 448; Commissioner for Children & Young People v FGC [2011] QCATA 291; XFJ v Director of Public Transport [2009] VCAT 96. Z v University of A (No 4) [2002] NSWADT 14; Kennedy v Deputy Assistant Commissioner [2011] QCAT 360. Re Lucas and Commissioner for Social Housing in the Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACAT 71; Re Vasta and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2010] AATA 500; ADI Ltd v Equal Opportunity Commission [2005] WASAT 49.

Evidence Legislative Rules of Evidence [2.7.1700] The application of legislative rules of evidence depends upon the legislation concerned. Subject to one exception, the application clauses of the various Evidence Acts across jurisdictions do not apply to any of the tribunals.1 In Queensland, the President of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) has held that s 79 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) applies to QCAT.2 In Western Australia, the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) is the applicable statute. Its application is expressly excluded by s 32(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).3 Finally, all tribunals must apply rules of evidence that are expressly made applicable by the principal statutes or enabling laws.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the 417

[2.7.1700]

TRIBUNALS

2 3 4

NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. See Danagher v Child Support Registrar (2014) 228 FCR 213; 65 AAR 122; [2014] FCA 1408, Gilmour J at [38]; VCA v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2008) 105 ALD 236; [2008] AATA 580; Re Baini and Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 440; Watson v ACT Planning & Land Authority (No 1) [2010] ACAT 5; Wallis Lake Fisherman’s Co-op Ltd v ACN 079 830 595 Pty Ltd t/as Jolly Joe’s Fish “n” Chips (No 2) [2011] NSWADTAP 2; Karakatsanis v Racing Victoria Ltd (2013) 42 VR 176; [2013] VSCA 305, Osborn JA at [33] (Beach JA agreeing). Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer [2010] QCAT 411, the Tribunal at [28]. Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501; [2006] WASCA 219. See eg Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 602: making certain people non-compellable witnesses. It should be noted that Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 67 preserves certain evidentiary privileges under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

Non-statutory Rules [2.7.1710] Despite instructions in all principal statutes that the tribunal concerned is not bound by the rules of evidence, the tribunals1 choose to apply rules of evidence. This approach is followed, because procedural fairness and the rational application of statutes require the approach.2

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228; 7 ALJR 169. This approach was endorsed in Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 663; [2010] HCA 32. See also Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482; De Domenico v Marshall (1999) 94 FCR 97; [1999] FCA 1305 (FC); Sudath v Health Care Complaints Commission (2012) 84 NSWLR 474; [2012] NSWCA 171, Meagher JA at [79] (Whealy JA agreeing); McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1362; Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner [2010] QCAT 690; Secretary of Department of Infrastructure v Williamstown Bay & River Cruises Pty Ltd (2011) 181 LGERA 195; [2011] VSC 191; Re C and Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Community Development [2007] WASAT 116.

418

[2.7.1730]

COURSE OF EVIDENCE

Onus of Proof [2.7.1720] In a practical sense, the onus of proof lies with the party seeking to have a decision reviewed. This is because information central to setting aside or affirming the original decision is usually within the control of the applicant. Practical requirements dictate that the applicant should have the opportunity to put this material to the tribunal first, so the original decision-maker can respond, and the tribunal can see why the applicant believes that the decision should be reviewed.1

1 VCA v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2008) 105 ALD 236; [2008] AATA 580. The inverse also applies: when the decision under review is to withdraw a benefit, usually it is the applicant who has the information which can explain why an alternative decision is the correct and preferable decision: Brackenreg v Comcare [2005] AATA 88, the Tribunal at [9].

Course of Evidence General [2.7.1730] None of the principal statutes prescribe the course of evidence, even though there are many sections empowering a specific procedure for gathering evidence. In the absence of legislative prescription, the order of evidence usually is controlled by procedural fairness and the existence of a burden of proof in a practical sense. The order of evidence in civil litigation when followed by tribunals usually results in compliance with the fair hearing rule.1 However, it is possible that the circumstances of a particular case will dictate that the usual practice will breach the requirements of procedural fairness,2 and conversely that departures from the usual practice by interposition of a witness will breach procedural fairness.3 The necessity for placing a practical onus of proof on a party who wishes to have a decision under review set aside leads to same outcome because the information central to setting aside that decision will usually be within the control of the applicant. For practical reasons, the applicant should have the opportunity to put this material on first, so the decision-maker can respond and the tribunal4 can see at the outset why an alternative outcome to the decision under review is the “correct and preferable” decision.5

1 Re Spoolder and Secretary of Department of Social Security (1991) 24 ALD 786.

419

[2.7.1730]

TRIBUNALS

2 3 4

5

Riverside Nursing Care Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2001] FCA 1410, Sundberg J at [6]. Coulton v Comcare [2001] FCA 1312, Cooper J at [69]. The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. VCA v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2008) 105 ALD 236; [2008] AATA 580, the Tribunal at [162], [164].

Form of Evidence [2.7.1740] The principal statutes of the tribunals1 do not specify the form of the evidence, so discretion is to be used by the tribunals. All the principal statutes contain a provision empowering the tribunal concerned to examine witnesses under oath,2 and most contain a provision empowering the tribunal to choose whether, and to what extent, evidence is presented orally or in writing.3 Judicial and tribunal interpretation either points out that these provisions confer a choice, not an obligation, to examine on oath,4 or concede that admission of unsworn evidence is possible.5 Nonetheless, the practice of administrative review tribunals is that evidence-in-chief in a typical case will be both documentary and oral.6 Some tribunals adopt the procedure of ordering a written statement of all witness’s evidence before the hearing, and only permitting further evidence-in-chief by leave.7

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 40(1)(a), (c); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 41(1)(a); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 46(1)(b); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 92(a); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 98(1)(b); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 40(3)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 102(3); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 67(1)(b). Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 35A allows the Commonwealth AAT to hear evidence by video link. Where the witness to give evidence is overseas and therefore, in practical terms, non-compellable, the Court has been reluctant to grant a contested application under this provision: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Seymour (2015) 65 AAR 443; [2015] FCA 320.

420

[2.7.1750]

3

4

5

6

7

COURSE OF EVIDENCE

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 38(6)(b), (c); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 56(a); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 28(1), (3)(c); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 42(3)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 98(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(4), (5). Secretary of Department of Social Security v Jordan (1998) 83 FCR 34; 27 AAR 407; Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 38 FCR 137; 24 ATR 194; Vasseur v Wright [2011] QCATA 20, the Tribunal at [7]; Cerednic v Freeman [2011] QCATA 25. Avilion Group Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 56, the Appeal Panel at [64]; Winn v Blueprint Instant Printing Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 295, Byrne J at [9]. See Knight v Department of Justice [2011] VCAT 1708, where the Tribunal said at [14] that while written evidence is “an option”, oral evidence is the norm. This is the case in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (see Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction (26 March 2007) r 2.2) and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal: see Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58, the Tribunal at [14].

Manner and Form of Expert Evidence [2.7.1750] All of the tribunals1 have special rules about the form of expert evidence, because it is important to many administrative review proceedings.2 Non-compliance with these rules may impact the weight given to the evidence.3 The tribunals have followed the lead of the courts in adopting concurrent evidence techniques for expert evidence in appropriate cases.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Guidelines for Persons Giving Expert and Opinion Evidence (AAT, 2011); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1), r 23; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Expert Witness Code of Conduct) Procedural Directions 2009 (No 1), r 5; NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, NCAT Procedural Direction 3 – Expert Witnesses (7 February 2014); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 4 of 2009 – Expert Evidence (11 November 2009); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT2: Expert Evidence (15 March 2012). A number of the standard orders made at preliminary hearings prescribe the manner and form of expert evidence, especially State Administrative Tribunal, Standard Orders Made at

421

[2.7.1750]

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3

4

Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences (SAT, 2012), Orders 45–49. In addition, the State Administrative Tribunal has a non-statutory instrument, “A guide for experts giving evidence in the State Administrative Tribunal”. Both the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal can appoint experts to create expert reports: Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 74 (“assessors”); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 42. The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has a large body of rules in South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), Pts 12, 15, 16. Re Munro and Repatriation Commission [2010] AATA 942, the Tribunal at [26]; Grasso v CMG Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd [2011] QCAT 306; Staged Developments Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2001] VCAT 1447, the Tribunal at [94]; Re Melvista Park Pty Ltd & Western Australian Planning Commission [2009] WASAT 52, the Tribunal at [14]. Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Guidelines for the Use of Concurrent Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT, 2011); NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, NCAT Procedural Direction 3 – Expert Witnesses (7 February 2014), r 23; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Guide to Expert Conferences (QCAT, 2009), called an “experts’ conclave”; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (SA), r 89; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Practice Direction 2014 (SA), Pt 6; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT2: Expert Evidence (15 March 2012), r 34; State Administrative Tribunal, Standard Orders Made at Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences (SAT, 2012), Orders 46–48.

Statement of Agreed Facts and Concessions [2.7.1760] All the tribunals1 employ bilaterally agreed statements of fact and unilaterally conceded facts as evidence. Provided the tribunal considers the agreed statement or the conceded fact is not fanciful, it can lawfully conduct the proceedings on the basis of the statement or concession.2 However, the tribunal can ignore the agreed statement or conceded fact if it thinks it must do so to achieve its jurisdictional duty to determine the “correct and preferable” decision: see [2.7.1770]. Further, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has concluded that a party can resile from a prior bilaterally agreed statement without leave.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Comcare v Fiedler (2001) 115 FCR 328; 34 AAR 237; [2001] FCA 1810; University of New South Wales v McGuirk [2006] NSWSC 1362, Nicholas J at [57]; Khoo v

422

[2.7.1770]

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South Western Sydney Local Health District [2015] NSWCATAD 183, Lucy SM at [60]; Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422; [2008] VSCA 45. Re Duncan and Companies Auditors & Liquidators Disciplinary Board (2009) 49 AAR 494; [2009] AATA 70.

Reopening Evidence or Submissions [2.7.1770] Occasionally the tribunals,1 like courts, are asked to receive evidence or submissions after the close of the hearing. Like other questions about the course of evidence, there are no specific prescriptions in any of the principal statutes to guide the tribunals. Judicial and tribunal interpretation of the more generally expressed statutory procedural powers unanimously acknowledge the possibility of a hearing being reopened.2 With the exception of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), each tribunal looks to whether the interests of justice are best served in the reopening of a case. This is reflective of the approach taken by courts.3 Conversely, the approach of the AAT has been to emphasise its discretion, rather than be bound by the prior conduct of the parties, because proceedings are not adversarial and its overriding duty is to reach the “correct and preferable” decision.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 3D Scaffolding Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 73 ATR 729; 49 AAR 100; [2008] FCA 1477; Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 45; French v Sydney Turf Club Ltd [2002] NSWADT 24; Attudawage v Medical Board of Australia (No 2) [2011] QCAT 452; ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council [2006] VCAT 1304; Re Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 39. 3 Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner [2010] ACAT 45; French v Sydney Turf Club Ltd [2002] NSWADT 24; Attudawage v Medical Board of Australia (No 2) [2011] QCAT 452; ISPT Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council [2006] VCAT 1304. 4 Re Kowalski & Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission (2007) 47 AAR 300; [2007] AATA 1988. In addition, the Tribunal’s decision must be consistent with its obligation under the fair hearing rule to allow each party a reasonable opportunity to present their case: Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 225 FCR 482; [2014] FCAFC 123, the Court at [31].

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Admissibility of Evidence Relevance [2.7.1780] The so-called “no evidence” rule is the basic requirement for the legal validity of evidence in tribunals. This test requires the material upon which proof of a fact is based must be rationally capable of persuading the finder of fact the alleged fact is true1 whether on its own, or in combination with other material. The quality of the material taken into account is identical to the requirement of “relevance” in the law of evidence applied in courts. This basic rule is applicable in all of the tribunals.2 Challenges to the admission of evidence in the tribunals based on alleged infringement of the “no evidence” rule are rarely successful.3

1 Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 663; [2010] HCA 32. 2 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. See Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482; Re Chief Psychiatrist and A [2011] ACAT 21; Khan v Kang [2014] NSWCATAP 48, the Tribunal at [25]; Cerednic v Freeman [2011] QCATA 25; Secretary of Department of Infrastructure v Williamstown Bay & River Cruises Pty Ltd (2011) 181 LGERA 195; [2011] VSC 191; Grover v Commissioner of Police [2005] WASC 263; Sammut v AVM Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 27. 3 Re Collector of Customs, Tasmania v Flinders Island Community Association (1985) 7 FCR 205; Re Repatriation Commission v Maley (1991) 14 AAR 278; Rodriguez v Telstra Corp Ltd (2002) 66 ALD 579; [2002] FCA 30; Stateships v Lawson [2009] FCA 59; Collings Homes Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] NSWSC 567; United Bonded Fabrics Pty Ltd v Roseman [2000] NSWADTAP 13; Minniti v Motor Vehicle Industry Board [2011] WASCA 275.

Hearsay [2.7.1790] Relevant hearsay material is admissible in all the tribunals.1 The principal question about hearsay evidence usually relates to the weight it is assigned, rather than admissibility.2 Procedural fairness may require that the maker of the hearsay statement be available for cross-examination.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the

424

[2.7.1800]

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3

COURSE OF EVIDENCE

NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482; Re Wildcare Queanbeyan NSW Inc and Conservator of Flora & Fauna [2011] ACAT 68, the Tribunal at [6]; Stewart v Yarrawarra Aboriginal Corporation [2015] NSWCATAP 4, the Tribunal at [90]; Pollock v Queensland Police Service Weapons Licensing Branch [2010] QCAT 77, the Tribunal at [40]; Leon Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Donnell [2009] VSC 430, Habersberger J at [72]; Re Wignall and Commissioner of Police [2006] WASAT 206, the Tribunal at [281]. Ramsay v Australian Postal Corp (2005) 147 FCR 39; 41 AAR 1; [2005] FCA 640, Spender J at [30] (FCA); Commissioner for Children & Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111, Hodgson JA at [4]; Martin v Gosdschan [2011] QCATA 224; Daynes v Public Advocate (2005) 24 VAR 121; [2005] VSC 485, Smith J at [32].

Expert Evidence [2.7.1800] The tribunals1 do not apply the exclusionary opinion evidence rule. Instead, the tribunals lessen the weight placed on opinion evidence where the witness is a non-expert2 or the expert assumes the role of advocate.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Re Zheng and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] AATA 304, the Tribunal at [113]; DA v Deputy Commissioner [2011] QCATA 359, the Tribunal at [146]; Hoser v Department of Sustainability & Environment [2012] VCAT 264, the Tribunal at [109]; Re Hafez and Valuer General [2012] WASAT 103, the Tribunal at [21], [22]. 3 James v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences [2010] QCAT 231; Re Dunbar and City of Stirling [2006] WASAT 331, the Tribunal at [19]. But see Planarc Pty Ltd v Frankstone City Council [2006] VCAT 682: the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal did not admit the material as evidence, but allowed the party to put the material forward in submissions.

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[2.7.1800]

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Evaluation of Evidence Standard of Proof [2.7.1810] In the tribunals,1 the material facts on which a decision is based must be established on the balance of probabilities.2 The tribunals also follow the rule that a tribunal of fact must be in a state of “reasonable satisfaction” as to the proof of fact, bearing in mind the seriousness of the finding of fact.3 This approach has been followed by Australian administrative review tribunals where the circumstances or the enabling law requires it.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41; McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354; Animal Liberation v Conservator of Flora and Fauna [2009] ACAT 17; St George Community Housing v Kaya [2014] NSWCATAP 94, the Tribunal at [9]; Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board (NSW) [2009] NSWSC 347, Johnson J at [32]; Racing Queensland Ltd v Bellamy [2011] QCATA 30, the Tribunal at [24]; Cobaw Community Health Services v Christian Youth Camps Ltd [2010] VCAT 1613; Re Karami and Department of Planning & Infrastructure [2006] WASAT 166, the Tribunal at [16]. 3 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 4 See, eg Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327; 7 AAR 17 (FC), Beaumont J at 334 (FCR); Animal Liberation v Conservator of Flora and Fauna [2009] ACAT 17, the Tribunal at [7]; Crook v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2003] NSWSC 974; Tzoudas v Ministry of Transport [2009] NSWADTAP 36, the Appeal Panel at [15]–[19]; Racing Queensland Ltd v Bellamy [2011] QCATA 30, the Tribunal at [24]. In Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2014) 226 FCR 555; 64 AAR 120; [2014] FCAFC 93, the Court rejected a submission that the rule in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 is, for an administrative tribunal, a “principle of law” it was bound to apply. However, they did affirm the view that overriding requirements of fairness and rationality justify application of the requirements of the rule. In other words, as matter of law, Briginshaw v Briginshaw is not binding on tribunals, but the requirements of that case still apply because the case is based on fairness and rationality still applies. The Appeal Panel of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal has so interpreted Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority: Smith v NSW Housing and Land Corp [2015] NSWCATAP 255, the Tribunal at [29]. In addition the New South Wales Supreme Court has warned against the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal disregarding Briginshaw v Briginshaw: BKE v Offıce of Children’s Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523, Beech-Jones J at [29]. It should be noted the Victorian Court of Appeal reached the

426

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same conclusion in Karakatsanis v Racing Victoria Ltd (2013) 42 VR 176; [2013] VSCA 305, Osborn JA at [37] (Beach JA agreeing).

Hearsay Evidence [2.7.1820] Once hearsay evidence is admitted, the weight attached to it is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal trying the fact. That the material has the status of “hearsay” does not necessarily require lessened weight as compared to evidence of which a witness has personal knowledge.1 However, it may have that effect under circumstances where: there is little supporting evidence and the material itself lacks probative force;2 the identity of author of a statement is unknown3 or the maker of the statements is available and the hearsay material is not detailed.4

1 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 44 FLR 41 (FCAFC), Deane J at 60; Re Vella and Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1985) 1 VAR 65, the Tribunal at [68]–[69]. 2 Roden Security Services Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2010] NSWADTAP 10, the Appeal Panel at [64]; Victorian Bar Inc v Perkins Ruling No 4 [2006] VCAT 460, the Tribunal at [7]; Parsons v Stone Traders Pty Ltd [2008] WASAT 145, the Tribunal at [87]. 3 Victoria v Tymbook Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 418, the Tribunal at [82]. 4 SC Land Richmond Pty Ltd v Dura (Aust) Constructions Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 2519, the Tribunal at [15].

Expert Evidence [2.7.1830] The tribunals1 apply with equal rigour the approach to assessment of weight developed by the common law.2 Such factors as bias or lack of independence,3 the qualifications or experience of the witness,4 events subsequent to the facts upon which the expert’s opinion is based,5 failure to link the opinion to facts assumed or proven,6 unavailability of the witness for cross-examination,7 and exposure of the reasoning process linking assumed or proven facts with the expressed opinion.8

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Flat Glass Industries Ltd v MCS Builders Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 148, the Tribunal at [19]; Re Wines and Valuer General [2005] WASAT 263, the Tribunal

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3 4

5 6 7

8

at [26]. See also Chand v Azurra Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 227 per Macfarlan JA (Spigelman CJ and Basten JA agreeing). James v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences [2010] QCAT 231; Knight v Oztrack Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 119, the Tribunal at [9]. Department of Education & Training v Mullett (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 29, the Appeal Panel at [42]; Fitzgerald v Medical Board of Queensland [2010] QCAT 565, the Tribunal at [25]. Naylor v Young [2011] QCAT 434, the Tribunal at [194], [195]. Re Teo and City of Stirling [2008] WASAT 270, the Tribunal at [41]. Omran v Australian Postal Commission (1992) 15 AAR 232 (FCAFC), the Court at 235; Campbell v Port Phillip City Council [1999] VCAT 128, the Tribunal at [32], [33]; Re Teo and City of Stirling [2008] WASAT 270, the Tribunal at [42]. Re Wines and Valuer General [2005] WASAT 263, the Tribunal at [35].

Resolution of Applications Early Resolution: Discontinuance, Dismissal and Agreement [2.7.1840] All principal statutes give tribunals power to bring review proceedings to an end without completing the normal course of proceedings. Tribunals may remit proceedings to the original decision-maker for reconsideration without coming to a decision,1 dismiss proceedings following grant of leave to withdraw,2 dismiss proceedings following unilateral withdrawal3 or summarily dismiss proceedings.4 Alternatively, parties may settle.5

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 42D; Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 65; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 49; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 32; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 38; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 51A; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 31. 2 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 56; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 100(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 46; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 47(2); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 74; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 46(1). 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 42A(1A); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 55(1)(a); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 47(3). 4 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 42A(2)(a), (4), (5), 42B; ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 32; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 55(1)(b) – (d); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), ss 101, 102, 103; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 47, 48, 72; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), ss 46, 47(4), 48, 49; Victorian Civil and

428

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Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), ss 75, 76, 78; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 46(3), 47, 48. Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 42C(1) – (3); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 55; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 59; Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), ss 112, 122, 123, 126; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 84 – 86; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 93; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 56.

[2.7.1850] Remittal without entry of a decision is permissible in all of the tribunals.1 All the tribunals may remit proceedings back to the original decision-maker without making a decision as a form of alternative dispute resolution. The frequency of the power’s use is rarely noted. In respect of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, AAT Case 12,865 (1998) 39 ATR 1032 held that the use of the power to remit a case to the original decision-maker would be “rare”. In addition, in Western Australia’s State Administrative Tribunal, it has been noted that in the jurisdictions dealing with land use planning and resource development, the mechanism of remittal for reconsideration is routinely used in favour of consent orders following settlement.2 When used in the tribunals, the common reason given is convenience: it is efficient in the circumstances to allow the primary administrator to revisit the decision under review.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Re Snook and Western Australian Planning Commission [2012] WASAT 38, the Tribunal at [41]. In MH v NSW Maritime [2011] NSWADT 248, a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal noted the practice of that tribunal in its jurisdiction under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) was to remit the matter back to the original decision-maker to allow them to complete the internal review: the Tribunal at [12]. 3 Poudyal v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FMCA 265, Smith FM at [48]; Iwasaki Sangyo Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Department of Environment & Resource Management [2011] QCAT 710.

Summary Dismissal and Strike Out [2.7.1860] The power to terminate proceedings short of a full or contested hearing is given to each of the tribunals.1 As in the civil justice system, the tribunals use an order for dismissal or strike out as a last resort.2 The tribunals 429

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have also habitually followed the example of the civil justice system in striking out an application based on its prospects of success – its chances of succeeding must be lower than “unlikely”.3 A further issue associated with the standard of persuasiveness is whether the respondent to the summary dismissal’s assertions of fact are contestable. An application for summary dismissal proceeds on the assumption that all factual assertions made by the summary dismissal-respondent will be made out. In other words, if at the time of the summary dismissal application there are disputed questions of fact, then the application will fail.4 The tribunal’s reluctance to use these discretionary powers is illustrated in Forrester v AIMS Corp (2004) 22 VAR 97; [2004] VSC 506. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal summarily dismissed an application because it was assumed that the applicant would not adduce any expert medical evidence (when his case related to his medical condition), without which his case was doomed to fail. However, the Victorian Supreme Court found that this was an incorrect use of the power, despite the applicant’s case being “quite weak” and “most unlikely” to succeed.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125, Barwick CJ at 129; Goldie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 121 FCR 383; 36 AAR 238; [2002] FCAFC 367; Andelman v Secretary of Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2011) 54 AAR 273; [2011] FCA 299; Guse v Comcare (1997) 25 AAR 477; Logounov v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 46 ATR 158; [2000] FCA 1745; Carey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 145 ALD 236; [2014] AATA 762; Towie v Victoria (2008) 19 VR 640; [2008] VSC 177; Lay v Alliswell Pty Ltd [2002] V ConvR 54-651; [2001] VSC 385; Drummond v Telstra Corp Ltd [2008] VCAT 2630. 3 University of New South Wales v McGuirk [2006] NSWSC 1362; Arulogun v Queensland Health [2011] QCAT 573; Campagnolo v Benalla & District Football League Inc [2009] VSC 228. 4 Firestone and Legal Aid Offıce (ACT) [2006] ACTDT 3, the Tribunal at [10] (in a predecessor of the current tribunal); Briscoe-Hough v Filipopoulos [2004] NSWADT 217, the Tribunal at [38]; State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel [1998] 1 VR 102 (CA); Kuligowski and Director-General of Transport (NSW) [2011] WASAT 126, the Tribunal at [21].

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[2.7.1880]

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Reinstatement [2.7.1870] Reinstatement of dismissed proceedings is possible. However, the grounds for this differs between jurisdictions.1

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 42A(8); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 32(3); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 55(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 80 (reopening proceedings); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 72(5); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 85 (reviewing a decision); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 120; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 49, 84.

Orders by Consent [2.7.1880] All of the tribunals1 have discretion2 in making order by consent consistent with a settlement agreement. The requirements of exercising this discretion vary between the tribunals. Section 42C(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 59(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and s 56(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) only require the proposed orders to be within jurisdiction of the relevant tribunal. Section 55(1)(c) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), in addition to this jurisdictional requirement, necessitates that the proposed order is the “correct and preferable decision”. Conversely, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) and Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) contain no such requirements. Courts have held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 and the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 provision require consideration of the merits of the proposed orders.3 It has been noted that the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 provision has been applied by reference to whether the parties have reached agreement, not reference to the merits of the proposed orders.4 The New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal should only make consent orders in terms that are within its powers,5 and suggested that it should not be considered precedential. The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal has one decision where an application for consent orders was rejected because their terms were “non-sensical”.6 The discretion given to the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal requires consideration of its jurisdiction to make the proposed order and whether a third party unrepresented at the hearing is affected.7 In addition,

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the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal can consider whether the terms of settlement are appropriate.8

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256; 47 AAR 20; [2007] FCAFC 156; Damorange Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority [2008] NSWADT 309, the Tribunal at [14]; Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326, Allanson J at [37]. 3 Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256; 47 AAR 20; [2007] FCAFC 156; Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326, Allanson J at [44]. 4 J Pizer, Pizer’s Annotated VCAT Act (3rd ed, JNL Nominees Pty Ltd, 2007) p 325. 5 S & G Homes Pty Ltd v Owen [2015] NSWCATAP 190, the Tribunal at [39]. In Loch v Land and Housing Corporation (NSW) [2014] NSWCATAP 110, the Tribunal at [27], [28], the Appeal Panel of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal held that consent orders could be set aside on the grounds of unconscionable conduct. 6 Nobleta v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 730. 7 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), ss 112(3), 122(3), 123(2); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), ss 50(11), 51(10), 52(3). 8 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 126(3).

Orders Following Contested Hearing Introduction [2.7.1890] The tribunals’ remedial powers in their administrative review jurisdiction are expressed in wide terms. For example, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) states that “for the purpose of reviewing a decision, the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred … on the person who made the decision”.1 Effectively, the tribunal is a substitute for the decision-maker, having identical powers to the original decision-maker.2

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43(1). 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43(1); ACT Civil and 432

[2.7.1900]

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Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 68(2); Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), s 63(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19(c); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 51(1)(a); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29(1).

Remedial Powers [2.7.1900] All of the tribunals1 have similar remedial powers in their administrative review jurisdiction. A tribunal may make an order to affirm, vary, set aside and substitute another or set aside and remit the application back to the original decision-maker.2 Each of the principal statutes confers remedial powers upon the relevant tribunal, but interpretation has differed between jurisdictions. The Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has held it should only remit a matter for consideration when it is not positioned to formulate a decision as a substitute for the one set aside.3 However, the AAT cannot give direction that a particular decision is to be made.4 In PLS (NT) Pty Ltd v Director-General of Licensing [2015] NTCAT 4, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal remitted a decision back to the decision-maker under s 149 of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) where there was some doubt as to what had been decided by the decision-maker. In occupational discipline proceedings on review of a penalty decision, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal can increase the penalty, but should give the applicant the opportunity to withdraw the application.5 Section 51(2) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) assumes the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction; if not, proceedings should be dismissed under s 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998.6 The remedy of remittal for reconsideration is rarely exercised.7 In Western Australia, Re Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 39 held that s 29 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) is read subject to the enabling law and other provisions of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004; it does not expand on those powers.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43(1); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 68(3); Administrative Decisions Review

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[2.7.1900]

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3 4 5 6 7

Act 1997 (NSW), s 63(3); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 50; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 24(1); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 37; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 51(2); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29(3). Commonwealth v Beale (1993) 30 ALD 68. Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Allan (2001) 114 FCR 14; 33 AAR 362; [2001] FCA 1064. Crime and Misconduct Commission v Assistant Commissioner [2010] QCAT 690, the Tribunal at [22]. Niebieski Zamek Pty Ltd v Southern Rural Water [2003] VCAT 223, the Tribunal at [73]. Macedon Ranges Shire Council v Romsey Hotel Pty Ltd (2008) 19 VR 422; [2008] VSCA 45.

Decisional Statements of Reasons [2.7.1910] All the tribunals1 must give reasons for their decisions. All principal statutes (except for that of South Australia) require the giving of reasons2 and finding of facts with reference to evidence.3 Additionally, there is a statutory requirement in both the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales to provide the legal reasoning behind a decision.4 In South Australia, the requirement for reasons remains with the enabling legislation and common law.5 The adequacy of decisional statements of reasons from the tribunals is assessed against the same body of law as the adequacy of judgments from judicial officers.6 Further, statements from the High Court in respect of administrative review tribunals other than the tribunals surveyed here are the leading authorities. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; 70 ALJR 568 is significant for its endorsement of the conventional view about appellate intervention based on inadequacy of reasons; it held that in complying with legislative requirements for reasons, administrators and tribunals will not be overturned by appellate courts provided the stated reasons are informative, even if they do not use detailed or legally precise expression. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30 concerned s 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in respect of decisional statements of reasons from the Refugee Review Tribunal, containing the equivalent to the provisions of the principal statutes. The High Court focused on the historical and subjective quality of the four component requirements: the decision; the reasons; the findings on material facts and references to evidence or any other material on which the findings of facts are based. The High Court’s reasoning in Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115; 79 ALJR 1366; 41 AAR 355; [2005] HCA 40 confirms that

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[2.7.1920]

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reasons must be given to enable the reviewing court to make an informed judgment on the relevant decision.7 This affirms the conventional determinative view that “reasons must be sufficient to expose why the decision went the way it did”. The High Court case of Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; 85 ALJR 327; [2011] HCA 1 is to the same effect.8

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43(2); ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 60(2); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 62(2); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) s 105(2); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 122; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 117; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 77(1). 3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43(2B); Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 179; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 62(3); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 105(2); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27B; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 117(5); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 77(2). 4 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 60(3); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 62(3)(b), (c). 5 See also “When Can Reasons Be Obtained at General Law?” [2.3.320]. 6 Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115; 79 ALJR 1366; 41 AAR 355; [2005] HCA 40; Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; 77 ALJR 989; [2003] HCA 22; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30. In the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, these principles have been endorsed by comments in Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17, the Tribunal at [17], now widely followed there. 7 Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115; 79 ALJR 1366; 41 AAR 355; [2005] HCA 40, McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [19]. This approach follows Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 75 ALJR 1105; [2001] HCA 30, Gummow, McHugh and Hayne JJ at [69]. 8 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; 85 ALJR 327; [2011] HCA 1, French CJ and Keifel J at [32].

[2.7.1920] Appellate courts and tribunals have reached different conclusions as to whether a failure by any of the tribunals to comply with a duty to provide decisional statements of reasons requires appellate intervention. In Civil Aviation Safety Authority v Central Aviation Pty Ltd

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[2.7.1920]

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(2009) 179 FCR 554; 50 AAR 482; [2009] FCAFC 137, the Federal Court concluded that a tribunal’s failure to provide reasons does not require intervention. The Court in Howell v Macquarie University [2008] NSWCA 26 reached the same conclusion. Conversely, in Victoria, more recent authorities from the Supreme Court have held that inadequate decisional reasons from the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal are errors of law attracting appellate relief.1 In Queensland, opposing authorities exist: for example, DA v Deputy Commissioner [2011] QCATA 359 concluded that the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal’s failure to provide reasons for its decisions justified appellate intervention.2 Conversely, Better Homes Queensland Pty Ltd v O’Reilly [2012] QCATA 37 held that such intervention did not require intervention. In Western Australia, Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501; [2006] WASCA 219 held in the context of the enabling law under consideration there, errors of law in giving inadequate reasons were not “jurisdictional errors” for the purposes of the common law of judicial review, and thus did not require appellate intervention.

1 See, eg SMA Projects Pty Ltd v Jovanovic (2006) 24 VAR 327; [2006] VSC 176; BR v Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal [2009] VSC 152; Dimatos v Coombe [2011] VSC 619; Paul & Paul Pty Ltd v Business Licensing Authority [2010] VSC 460. 2 DA v Deputy Commissioner [2011] QCATA 359, the Tribunal at [16].

Reopening Decision Because of Jurisdictional Error [2.7.1930] The doctrine of functus officio, or “having discharged his duty”1 does not apply where a decision-maker has committed a jurisdictional error and becomes aware of it: it must reopen its decision upon application. This precedent, established in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; 76 ALJR 598; [2002] HCA 11 applies to the tribunals.2

1 In Re Michael and Secretary of Department of Employment, Science & Training (2006) 42 AAR 488; [2006] AATA 227, Downes P at [17] conceded the possibility of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal reopening a decision based on the principle established in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; 76 ALJR 598; [2002] HCA 11. However, the circumstances where the reopening would lead to a different decision must be limited to where the decision “was obviously wrong and when the cause of the error is some administrative or similar mistake”. This was repeated in Christiansen v Social Security Appeals

436

[2.7.1950]

2

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Tribunal (2010) 53 AAR 166; [2010] FCA 1146. See also Re Gibson and Repatriation Commission [2006] AATA 1090; Chand v Rail Corp of New South Wales (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 27; French v Sydney Turf Club Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWADTAP 54; Re Owners of St John’s Court – Rivervale Strata Plan 6052 and Clark (No 2) (2011) 75 SR (WA) 69; [2011] WASAT 16. The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia.

Internal Appeals [2.7.1940] Internal appeals are available in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal.1 An “internal appeal” refers to an appeal from the tribunal at first instance to itself as an appellate body. The two principal features of the internal appellate jurisdiction of tribunals are the variety of possible appeals and whether leave is required. There are two categories of internal appeals: appeals confined to a question of law and appeals on other grounds. None of the relevant principal statutes require leave for an appeal confined to a question of law.

1 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), ss 79, 82; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 32, Pt 6 Div 2; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 142, 146. See K O’Connor, “Appeal Panels in Super Tribunals” (2013) 32 UQLJ 31. Neither the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) nor the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) allow internal review from decisions in their review jurisdiction.

Appeals on Question of Law [2.7.1950] Potential internal appellants must face the distinction between appeals on a question of law (which do not require leave) and a question of fact (which require leave). For the purposes of making an appeal, the potential internal appellant must consider three issues: (1)

Is the issue stated in the appeal a question of “law” as opposed to “fact”?

(2)

Must the appeal pleadings explicitly express the question?

(3)

Will the appellate body intervene once an error of law is shown?

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[2.7.1960]

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[2.7.1960] The tribunals1 do not find making decisions on the fact-versus-law distinction any easier than do the courts. The Appeal Panel of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal has affirmed that errors susceptible to judicial review at common law are also to be considered “questions of law” for the purposes of internal appeals.2 The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) has stipulated that the question of law in an internal appeal must be “inherent” in the appeal grounds, however expressed,3 a ruling which also applies to the Administrative Decision Panel’s Appeal Panel.4

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Re R [2000] NSWSC 886, Young J at [24]–[25]; Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWADTAP 23, the Tribunal at [13] approved C v W [2015] NSWSC 1774, Lindsay J at [43]. 3 Queensland Police Service v Compton [2011] QCATA 112. 4 Norrie v Registrar of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2011] NSWADTAP 53.

Appeals on Questions of Fact General [2.7.1970] Section 82 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) permits two types of appeal based on a question of fact: appeals “as a new application”; and appeals “as a review of all or part” of the decision in the first instance. Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2011] ACTSC 207 found these phrases to be equivalent to the concepts of appeals de novo and appeals by way of rehearing. Section 80(2)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) permits an internal appeal on “any other ground” besides a question of law, by leave. Section 80(3) specifies that an Appeal Panel may deal with an appeal “by way of a new hearing” at which new evidence can be given. Section 147 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) prescribes that an appeal on a question of fact be by way of rehearing.

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[2.7.1980]

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Leave to Appeal on Question of Fact [2.7.1980] Leave to appeal based on a question of fact differs between tribunals. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) has no leave requirement: Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2011] ACTSC 207 interpreted s 79 of the Act as giving “a right of a full appeal within the [ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT)]”. However, the choice between treating an appeal “as a new application” under s 82(a) (a de novo appeal) or “as a review” under s 82(b) (an appeal by way of rehearing) is at the discretion of ACAT. Re Das and A & A Airconditionioning Pty Ltd [2011] ACAT 52 found that treating an appeal as an appeal by way of rehearing application under s 82(b) of the Act is the preferred approach: an appeal will only be treated as a de novo appeal where the hearing at first instance “was conducted in such a way that it cannot be said to have substantially delivered justice between the parties”.1 In the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the grant of leave to appeal for an internal appeal follows principles similar to those used in the courts. The rules concerning appeals are: (1)

The applicant for leave must demonstrate something more than that the primary decision maker was arguably wrong.

(2)

Ordinarily leave is only appropriate where there is:

(3)

(a)

an issue of principle;

(b)

a question of public importance;

(c)

an injustice which is reasonably clear;

(d)

a clear factual error; or

(e)

an unorthodox fact finding process.

Where the appeal concerns a question of procedure, the Appeal Panel must exercise restraint in granting leave.2

When the grant of leave to appeal is necessary, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal has consistently applied a set of requirements derived from the civil justice system:3 (1)

Is there a reasonably arguable case of error in the primary decision?

(2)

Is there a reasonable prospect that the applicant will obtain substantive relief?

(3)

Is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant caused by some error?

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[2.7.1980]

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(4)

Is there a question of general importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the appellate court or tribunal, would be to the public advantage?

1 Re Das and A & A Airconditionioning Pty Ltd [2011] ACAT 52, the Tribunal at [19]. 2 Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17, the Tribunal at [80]. 3 Calypso Fisheries Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of Department of Employment, Economic Development & Innovation [2011] QCATA 24.

Appeals from Interlocutory Decisions [2.7.1990] Leave to appeal from interlocutory decisions is necessary in both the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. In both jurisdictions, the appellant must show there would be a substantial injustice in failing to do so, which involves demonstrating some prospects of success in order to appeal an interlocutory decision.1

1 Both the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal and a predecessor tribunal to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal have said that where the interlocutory decision involves the exercise of discretion, leave will not usually be granted unless a matter of general principle is involved, or one of the parties will suffer an injustice if the original decision is allowed to stand: Xu v Sydney West Area Health [2006] NSWADT 3, the Tribunal at [12]–[14]; Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58, the Tribunal at [5], [6].

Remedies [2.7.2000] On an internal appeal, a tribunal’s appellate panel has the same remedial powers as the tribunal at first instance. Like appeals in other civil jurisdictions, the granting of remedies in an internal appeal is discretionary: the tribunal may make orders “as [the tribunal] thinks [or considers] appropriate”.1 From their inception, the tribunals2 have applied the principle established in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 for restraint in appellate intervention of discretionary or evaluative judgments made at the first instance.3 The tribunals also apply the principle from common law judicial review that not every

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demonstrated error of law required appellate intervention. For intervention, the error must have made a difference to the outcome.4

1 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2), r 21(d), (e); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 81(1); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 146, 147(3). 2 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia and their predecessors. 3 Lloyd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1999] NSWADTAP 3; Laing v Jacobson [2011] QCATA 37. 4 See Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; 60 ALJR 662. See also Howell v Macquarie University [2008] NSWCA 26; AT v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 131; QR v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] NSWADTAP 59; Better Homes Queensland Pty Ltd v O’Reilly [2012] QCATA 37.

Appeals to Superior Courts Avenues of Redress Other than Appeal [2.7.2010] In all of the tribunals,1 there are avenues of redress in superior courts for decisions of the tribunals beyond the rights of appeal given in the principal statutes. In all jurisdictions there are common law rights of initiating judicial review proceedings in courts of superior jurisdictions. Avenue for recourse is also provided in the nature of judicial review given by legislation such as the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Finally, some enabling laws also give concurrent rights of appeal to superior courts.

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia.

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[2.7.2010]

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Discretionary Factors – Availability of Other Remedies Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2.7.2020] In the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), relief will be ordinarily be declined under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) in both the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit Court if the applicant can find relief under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The courts will also decline relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).1 Under both the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and the Judiciary Act 1903, a decision of the AAT is within the Federal Court’s jurisdiction.2

1 Tuite v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1993) 40 FCR 483; Australian Fisheries Management Authority v PW Adams Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 314; 22 AAR 261 (FC); Chowdhary v Bayne (1999) 29 AAR 100; [1999] FCA 41; Duncan v Hoptop [2004] FCA 274; Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2005] FCA 559. 2 Pancontinental Mining Ltd v Burns (1994) 52 FCR 454; Geographical Indications Committee v O’Connor (2000) 32 AAR 169; [2000] FCA 1877 (FC), the Court at [20].

Other Jurisdictions [2.7.2030] In New South Wales, s 34 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) prescribes that the Supreme Court may refuse to conduct a “judicial review” of a decision of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) if the rights of appeal under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) have not been used. This provision clearly assumes that the common law judicial review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to actions of NCAT. Under similar legislation governing the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT), the predecessor tribunal to NCAT, a party in ADT proceedings in the review jurisdiction dissatisfied with a decision of the ADT was expected to exercise their statutory rights of internal appeal under Ch 7 Pt 1 of the then Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW).1 However, this rule was flexible, and the Supreme Court could use its discretion and agree to hear a matter.2 Further, there was case law that where common law judicial review of decisions by the ADT were taken instead of statutory appeal proceedings in the Supreme

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Court under the then Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, the judicial review proceedings could have been an abuse of process.3

1 NSW Breeding & Racing v Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW) (2001) 53 NSWLR 559; [2001] NSWSC 494, Barrett J at [13]. 2 Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Gray (2009) 74 NSWLR 1; [2009] NSWCA 49, McColl JA at [129], Tobias and Giles JJA agreeing. 3 Fitzgibbon v Council of New South Wales Bar Association [2011] NSWCA 165, Basten JA at [17].

[2.7.2033] Section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) prescribes the process to appeal a Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) decision. The availability of a remedy under s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 is “an important discretionary reason” not to grant a remedy in response to use of an alternative right of appeal.1 Conversely, the existence of an alternative right of appeal under the Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) does not prevent a party from appealing under s 148.2

1 Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2001) 207 CLR 72; 75 ALJR 1342; [2001] HCA 49. 2 Francis-Wright v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2001) 17 VAR 306; [2001] VSC 35, Gillard J at [80].

[2.7.2036] In Western Australia, s 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) sets out the procedures for appealing the State Administrative Tribunal’s (SAT’s) decisions. Although it is not an exclusive code for appealing the SAT’s decisions, resorting to common law judicial review proceedings should be discouraged, and granted only in exceptional circumstances.1

1 Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501; [2006] WASCA 219.

Statutory Rights of Appeal to Superior Courts under Principal Statutes [2.7.2040] The extent of the requirement for leave to appeal varies between the principal statutes. The only principal statute that does not require leave to appeal at all is the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).1 The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) requires

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[2.7.2040]

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leave for appeals from interlocutory decisions.2 Leave is required for all appeals in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) and the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).3 In Victoria and Western Australia, the leading case on whether leave should be granted is Secretary of Department of Premier & Cabinet v Hulls [1999] 3 VR 331.4 Phillips JA considered the decision to grant or refuse leave was a discretionary one that could not be rigidly prescribed, and listed a number of issues that an applicant for leave would need to address: (1)

the existence of a question of law whose resolution in the applicant’s favour will advance the applicant’s claim for relief;5

(2)

the standard of proof for the leave application is expressed by such phrases as “prima facie case”, “arguable case” or “attended with sufficient doubt”;

(3)

the wider importance of the question of law is a permissible consideration; and

(4)

if the decision appealed from is an interlocutory order, the traditional civil law policy against permitting appeals from interlocutory decisions should be applied – that is, the applicant for leave should show “substantial injustice”.

If the decision appealed from is a final order the applicant for leave will still need to show prejudice – but this will usually be easier to show.

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(1). 2 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 149, 150; Underwood v Queensland Department of Communities [2012] QCA 158; Maksymiuk v Savage [2015] QCA 177. 3 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 86; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 83(1); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 148; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105. It should also be borne in mind that under Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), Sch 3 cll 17, 18 a limited number of decisions in the Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court or Land and Environment Court, bypassing internal appeal. 4 Adopted and approved Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board (2007) 33 WAR 361; [2007] WASCA 97, Buss JA at [17] (Wheeler and Pullin JJA agreeing); Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112, Murphy JA at [28]. 5 Field Deployment Solutions Pty Ltd v SC Projects Australia Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 60, Mitchell J at [93] – [101].

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[2.7.2060]

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Stay Orders [2.7.2050] Some principal statutes deal with the operation of the appealed decision upon making an appeal. The principal statutes dictate that the making of an appeal does not stay the operation of the appealed decision, or prescribe a stay order pending the appeal’s resolution.1 Such powers are exercised along with principles used for similar powers available to the superior courts in their other jurisdictions.2

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44A; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 83(5); Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 142; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 149L; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 106. 2 See, eg Bronzewing Ammunition Pty Ltd v Safework NSW [2015] NSWSC 1494; Maud v Racing Victoria Ltd [2015] VSCA 276, Cavavough AJA at [33]ff.

Interlocutory Decisions and Interim Orders [2.7.2060] Statutes in certain jurisdictions address appeals from decisions of the tribunals1 that are not final or dispositive of the matter. Sections 149 and 150 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) specify some decision which are not final orders. In the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) and the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the term denoting the act of the relevant tribunal which can be appealed from is defined in such a way as to include non-final or interim orders or determinations.2 In the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), there is no specific reference to non-final orders in the provision, s 44 of the Act, giving jurisdiction to the Federal Court to hear appeals. It was established at an early stage that any act less than a final or dispositive order could not be appealed under the right of appeal given by s 44.3 Other than the requirement for leave and the possibility of a stay order pending an appeal, neither the principal statutes nor the body of procedural rules for the superior courts contain many specific rules about the procedure and evidence in appeals to superior courts.4 Where specific periods for lodging an appeal are contained in principal statutes the period is uniform: 28 days, subject to the possibility of an extension by the superior court.5

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and

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[2.7.2060]

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2

3

4

5

Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 3 (“order”); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 3 (“decision”). This has been acknowledged by superior courts: VBI Properties Pty Ltd v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2003) 20 VAR 57; [2003] VSCA 17, Callaway JA at fn 16 (Chernov and Vincent JJA agreeing); Muir Electrical Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (No 2) [2002] VSC 224, Mandie J at [40]; Sigma Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v Marvell Investments Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 242; Town of Cottlesloe v Multiplex (Marine Parade) Pty Ltd (2007) 153 LGERA 391; [2007] WASCA 113, Buss JA at [10]–[15] (Steyler and Roberts-Smith JJA agreeing). Director-General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 180 (FCAFC); Frugtniet v Tax Practitioners Board (2013) 95 ATR 607; 60 AAR 515; [2013] FCA 752. Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Pt 33 Div 33.2 is the exception: it is devoted to appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to the Federal Court. Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), Pt 5.3 deals with all appeals to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, including appeals from the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT). Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), Div 2.14.1B deals with transfer of applications to ACAT, or appeals to the Appeal Division of ACAT to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory under ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 83. Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 84 prescribes that the manner and time limits for appeals to the Supreme Court are governed by that Court’s rules.New South Wales Supreme Court, Practice Note No. SC CL 3 Supreme Court Common Law Division – Administrative Law List deals with all appeals assigned to the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court. This includes referrals of law under the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW). Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 151(2)(a) simply provides that appeals are made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Those rules contain no special provisions for appeals under the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 148(2)(b), (3)(b) simply provides that appeals are made “in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court”. Apart from the references that follow the rules of the Supreme Court contain no special provisions for appeals under the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2008 (Vic), O 7 deals with taxation appeals; Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2008 (Vic), O 8 with the land valuation list or the planning and environment list of the administrative division of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(5) requires applications for leave to be in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA). Extension of time powers: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(2A)(a); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 84(2)(b); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 151(2)(b); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 148(5); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(7). The power to extend time is discretionary and exercised taking into account the factors familiar in other appeals in the civil justice system: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; Secretary

446

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of Department of Social Security v Van Den Boogaart (1995) 37 ALD 619 (FCA); Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 371 (FCAFC); Muto v Secretary to the Department of Planning and Community Development (2013) 38 VR 293; 196 LGERA 223; [2013] VSCA 85, Neave JA at [13]; Davies v Transport Accident Commission [2000] VSC 379, Eames J at [20]; Southside Autos (1981) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 37 WAR 245; [2008] WASCA 208, Buss JA at [92] (McLure JA and Newnes AJA agreeing).

Appeals Question of Law [2.7.2070] Any appeal on a question of law under the principal statutes takes place in the original jurisdiction of the superior court concerned, not its appellate jurisdiction. Although known as an “appeal”, it is an “invocation of judicial power” in the nature of judicial review.1 The grounds of appeal must be such that the question of law is not merely involved in the subject matter of the appeal, but is itself the subject matter of the appeal. This requirement confines appeals to a narrower spectrum than appeals “involving a question of law” or a “mixed question of fact and law”.2 In South Australia, the right of appeal is not limited to an appeal on a question of law. An appeal is heard by way of rehearing.3

1 Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2001) 207 CLR 72; 75 ALJR 1342; [2001] HCA 49; Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Child Protection v Hardingham [2011] WASCA 262. See also Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409 (FCAFC); Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee (2003) 131 FCR 28; 37 AAR 309; [2003] FCAFC 143, Gyles J at [63] (of Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44). 2 B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 74 NSWLR 481; [2008] NSWCA 187; Nepean Country Club Ltd v Paterson [2009] VSC 436; Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Child Protection v Hardingham [2011] WASCA 262. The strictness of this approach, derived from earlier Federal Court cases, has recently been reviewed in Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315; 66 AAR 403; [2015] FCAFC 92, the Court at [62]. In respect of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to hears appeals from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, it should be noted that a question of law includes both a jurisdictional error and a non-jurisdictional question of law: Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation, the Court at [62](7). 3 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 71(3a).

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Remedies Extent of Remedial Powers [2.7.2080] The remedial powers given to superior courts vary. The ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) does not address the extent of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court’s remedial powers. The provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) and express a broad power to “determine the appeal and may make such orders as it thinks appropriate”,1 as well as specific powers to affirm, set aside or set aside and remit the appealed decision. Primary statutes in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia contain a power to substitute the court’s own decision for that of the tribunal concerned, in addition to other powers.2 Further, it should be noted that the Federal Court has consistently interpreted the power in s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 “to make such orders as it thinks appropriate” to allow substitution of its own decision. The powers to substitute a decision have been interpreted consistently. In essence, the power will only be used where, legally, one result is possible.3

1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(4), (5); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 83(3); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 71(4). The Federal Court of Australia is given a specific power to make findings of fact in some circumstances: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 44(7). This power is only used in limited circumstances: Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522, Branson J at [17]. 2 Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 141(3)(c)(i); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), ss 153, 154; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 148(7); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(9). 3 Re Statham and Bickerton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 16 ALD 723 (FCAFC); NAAO v Secretary of Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 FCR 401; 34 AAR 508; [2002] FCAFC 64; XYZ v State Trustees Ltd (2006) 25 VAR 402; [2006] VSC 444, Cavanough J at [66]. The power will not be used where there were disputed questions of evidence to be resolved: Department of Consumer & Employment Protection v Chequecash Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 18, Simmonds J at [91].

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Remittal [2.7.2090] Remittal of issues to tribunals for further evidence is permitted by statute in all of the tribunals1 except for the Australian Capital Territory. The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) and State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) also permit orders that the tribunal be constituted in a specified manner. It should be noted that the Federal Court has always interpreted s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) power “to make such orders as it thinks appropriate” in a manner consistent with the express powers in Queensland, Victorian and Western Australia. The decision to remit proceedings back to the tribunal can involve a range of discretionary judgments as to whether any specific orders should be made for the further conduct of proceedings in the tribunal. Upon remittal, superior courts prefer that the tribunal below be constituted differently, but this is not a rigid rule. The Victorian Supreme Court has made directions that because of a finding of apprehended bias, then the remitted matter be heard by a differently constituted panel.2 Judges of the Federal Court have made similar directions for the same reason, such as in Ma v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 225. A similar order was made by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Hardingham v Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Child Protection [2011] WASC 86.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Daynes v Public Advocate (2005) 24 VAR 121; [2005] VSC 485. 3 Hardingham v Chief Executive Offıcer of Department for Child Protection [2011] WASC 86, EM Heenan J at [177].

Discretionary Considerations [2.7.2100] As in civil justice jurisdictions, the grant of remedies in an appeal from any of the tribunals1 is discretionary. The remedial power is often expressed as to “make orders”, which is then qualified by auxiliaries expressive of permission (as opposed to obligation) and adjectival phrases or clauses expressive of choice.2 Judicial interpretation takes these legislative

449

[2.7.2100]

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expressions literally; like remedies in judicial review proceedings, they are not granted for immaterial errors.3

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(4); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 83(3); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 153(2); Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 148(7); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(9). 3 See Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; 60 ALJR 662; Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 225 FCR 482; [2014] FCAFC 123, the Court at [104]ff; Abdul-Karim v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association [2005] NSWCA 93; Towie v Victoria (2008) 19 VR 640; [2008] VSC 177; Mijatovic v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2008] WASCA 115.

Costs in Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2.7.2110] The narrowest power to award costs is s 69B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which only allows the award of costs in appeals brought under s 54 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth). This discretion is also the narrowest of all the jurisdictions, in that costs can only be awarded to a successful applicant for review. It should be noted that some enabling laws for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal empower the award of costs, such as Commonwealth employees’ compensation legislation. Under s 66 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Tribunal can recommend to the Commonwealth Attorney-General that, in prescribed circumstances, a party’s costs be paid.1

1 Viliamu v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 80 ATR 965; 53 AAR 380; [2010] AATA 884.

Costs in Other Jurisdictions [2.7.2120] In contrast to costs powers given to courts, the costs powers given to the tribunals1 are limited. As a general rule, there shall be no order as to costs, with discretionary powers to depart from the rule in prescribed circumstances.2 The provisions of the principal statutes have features in

450

[2.7.2120]

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common. The principal statutes contain both provisions concerned with the liability of a party or parties to pay costs, and procedural rules about costs. An example of the first type is the power to award costs after summary dismissal under ss 47(2)(c) and 48(2)(c) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). An example of the second type is s 78 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), which provides for an enforcement procedure after a costs award has been made. Almost all rules about costs are expressed in the principal statute. Delegated legislation and quasi-legislation have a small role. The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal is bound by Pt 9 Div 2 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld).3 In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland and Victoria, the jurisdiction’s primary statute contains only one provision (or at least one principal provision) under which costs can be awarded. That provision expresses a broad discretion to depart from the normal or “default” position of no costs, accompanied by a list of considerations to be brought to bear on the decision.4 In both the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia, the discretion to depart from the default no-costs position is sharply divided. Both contain a discretion that is not expressly limited. Section 48(1) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) simply provides that the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal can order costs otherwise than under other provisions of the Act or enabling laws.5 Section 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) contains no criteria for the award of costs. However, in addition to these provisions there are specific requirements to award costs in a prescribed set of circumstances.6 In the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal costs are permitted in its review jurisdiction where the applicant has “brought or conducted proceedings frivolously or vexatiously” or regulations permit.7 Irrespective of the precise structure of costs powers in the principal statutes, they are not frequently used in review jurisdictions due to a view that awarding costs in review jurisdictions will discourage usage of the rights to merits create by enabling laws.8

1 The tribunals referred to in this paragraph are limited to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia. 2 ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 48(1); Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 60; Northern Territory Civil and

451

[2.7.2120]

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3

4

5 6 7 8

Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 131; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 100; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 109(1); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 87(4). It should also be borne in mind that enabling legislation can displace the “default” rule contained in the principal statute. In New South Wales, Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), s 108(2)(a) is an example. Courts have held that explicit policies as to the award of costs expressed in guidelines should not be used as a substitute for the terms of the legislation allowing for the award of costs: Port Stephens Council v Sansom [2007] NSWCA 299, Spigelman CJ at [55]; Vero Insurance Ltd v Gombac Group Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 117. In New South Wales, the threshold is “special circumstances”: see Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 60(2). In Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT), s 132, the list of considerations is not accompanied by any overarching requirement such as “special circumstances”. In addition, in its review jurisdiction, the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal must have regard to additional considerations, set out in s 133. The requirement in Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 102(1) is “in the interests of justice”. The list of permissible considerations is in Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 102(3). The threshold requirement is fairness. The list of permissible considerations is in Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic), s 109(3). Re Mainore Pty Ltd and ACT Planning & Land Authority [2011] ACAT 24, the Tribunal at [36], [54]. ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 48(2)(b) – (d); State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), ss 87(4), 88(3). South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), s 91(3). Re Mainore Pty Ltd and ACT Planning & Land Authority [2011] ACAT 24 (calculated decision to delay discontinuance of proceedings until the latest possible time). The former New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT) rarely made costs awards at first instance in the review jurisdiction: PC v University of New South Wales (No 2) [2005] NSWADT 264, the Tribunal at [46]. In the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, departure from the no-costs default position is so strong as to require “compelling” circumstances: see Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia have followed a policy similar to that of the former ADT: Hodgkin v Planet Platinum Ltd [2012] VCAT 576, the Tribunal at [12], [13]; JT Snipe Investments Pty Ltd v Hume City Council [2008] VCAT 1496, the Tribunal at [6]; Re Geographe Point Pty Ltd and Town of Claremont (2009) 64 SR (WA) 1; [2009] WASAT 98, the Tribunal at [14].

452

Statutory Appeals Commonwealth Jurisdiction [2.7.2230] The Federal Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of federal government agencies is part of its original jurisdiction under s 19 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).1 This provides for jurisdiction to be vested in the Federal Court by legislation, including authority to “hear and determine” appeals from decisions of persons and entities “other than courts”. The Act does not specify what these appeals may entail, leaving this specification to the relevant enactments. Putting to one side appeals on a question of law which function like common law judicial review, there are not many examples of this type of appeal jurisdiction. Section 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) gives taxpayers who are dissatisfied with decisions by the Commissioner of Taxation made on objections lodged by them a right to appeal either to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review of the decision, or to the Federal Court against the decision. Another example is ss 35(3) and 36(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), which confer rights of appeal to the Federal Court against certain decisions of the Commissioner of Patents.

1 It follows that despite the name “appeal”, such proceedings are not, strictly speaking, exercises of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction: Poletti v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 52 FCR 154, the Court at 156–157.

States and Territories [2.7.2240] Apart from Tasmania, the role played by courts in merits review is threefold. In New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia, there are specialist courts concerned with land use and planning whose jurisdiction includes merits review: the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, the Planning and Environment Court of Queensland and the Environment, Resources and Development Court of South Australia. In addition, superior courts are given by jurisdiction concurrent to some of the tribunals. An example from New South Wales is s 97 of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW). Finally, superior courts have a residual collection of jurisdictions given by enabling laws where the nature of the appeal right permits to a greater or lesser extent some review of the facts. Where jurisdiction is conferred on the court to determine appeals based on the statutory right to appeal, the jurisdiction is original, not appellate.1 The original 453

[2.7.2240]

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jurisdiction of superior courts can be described as “unlimited”, because their grant of jurisdiction is defined as whatever is necessary to do justice2 or by reference to the jurisdiction of English superior courts before the Judicature Acts.3 However, enabling laws of permit the legislatures of those jurisdictions are to increase, diminish, modify or augment the original grant of jurisdiction.4 Enabling laws also provide whether a superior court’s jurisdiction is a de novo rehearing or an appeal of a different nature. There is a rebuttable presumption of statutory interpretation that where an enabling law gives a right of appeal (regardless of its name) from an administrative body to a court, the nature of the proceedings is an appeal de novo.5

1 Tasty Chicks Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2011) 245 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 1183; 80 ATR 251; [2011] HCA 41. 2 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 20; Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 23; Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld), s 58; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), s 85. 3 Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 14; Australian Courts Act 1828 9 Geo 4 c 83 (UK), s 3; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), ss 16, 18. 4 B Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (9th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2011) at [1.100]. 5 Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (No 2) (1990) 170 CLR 267; 64 ALJR 526; 33 IR 473; Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; 73 ALJR 1348; 99 IR 309; [2000] HCA 47.

[2.7.2250] South Australia and Tasmania have a system of partial centralisation of the statutory appeals process, with courts playing a central role in providing merits review. The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal has limited merits review jurisdiction and South Australia has retained an Administrative and Disciplinary Division of the District Court – effectively, an Administrative Appeals Court. By s 42E of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), the court is not bound in such matters by the rules of evidence, but must act according to equity and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms. The nature of appeal is more restricted than a hearing de novo, since s 42E(3) instructs the Court not to depart from the decision below “except for cogent reasons”. Registrar of the Veterinary Surgeons Board (SA) v Mooney [2009] SADC 62 considered this to be an appeal by way of rehearing, not de novo. Something more than disagreement with the decision below must be reached, but the breadth of appellate intervention is broad: it is unconfined by the principle in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.1 In Tasmania, the Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001 (Tas) created the Administrative Appeals Division (AAD) of the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001 gives the AAD jurisdiction under approximately 50 enabling laws. The de novo nature

454

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of the appeal right is described in s 26 of the Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001. The Tasmanian Magistrates Court has since made a number of important findings about jurisdiction, evidence, practice and procedure in the Administrative Appeal Division.2

1 2

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 505. See Tyers v Director of the Building Appeal Board [2013] TASMC 23; Quarell v Lieutier [2013] TASMC 37, Cooper M at [4]; Stewart v Heath (No 2) [2013] TASMC 4; McGhee v Dixon (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L 45020/07 of 2009, 9 January 2009); Australian Technical College (Northern Tasmania) Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L45008/06 of 2009, 15 January 2009); Pintarich v Schadbolt (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L45011/2006 of 2008, 22 September 2008); Wright v Valuer-General (unreported, TASAAD, Shott CM, L45026/2008, 2009, 24 June 2009).

Taxation Appeals [2.7.2260] Taxpayers who are dissatisfied with decisions of the Commissioner of Taxation made on objections lodged under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) may appeal to either the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) or the Federal Court.1 Part 33 Div 33.1 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) governs the conduct of proceedings within the Federal Court if the latter course is taken. The purpose of the procedure of assessment, objection and appeal or review is “to ascertain the true tax liability of the taxpayer under the substantive provisions of the Act”, as opposed to demonstration of error by the Commissioner.2 The appellant can challenge the correctness of both the amount of the assessment and any of the particulars of the assessment. The right of appeal is wide, though not as wide as a hearing de novo.3 In discharging the burden of showing that an assessment is excessive, the appellant is not limited to grounds of judicial review for jurisdictional error; in an “appeal” under Pt IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), matters of fact may be decided by the Federal Court.4

1 2 3 4

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614; 64 ALJR 166. S Barkoczy, C River, J Baring and N Bellamy, Australian Tax Casebook (10th ed, CCH, 2010) p 313. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia & New Zealand Savings Bank Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 466; 69 ALJR 12; 29 ATR 11. Syngenta Crop Protection Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 61 ATR 186; [2005] FCA 1646. See also Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZ. 455

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[2.7.2270]

[2.7.2270] A taxpayer should consider certain factors when deciding whether to appeal to the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) or the Federal Court under the appeal process. Irrespective of which avenue is pursued, the Australian Taxation Office is a “privileged litigant”1 because the onus is on the applicant to prove that the assessment is “excessive”.2 The relevant factors for the taxpayer to consider include the following: (1)

Small Taxation Claims Tribunal (STCT): If the taxpayer seeks review in the AAT of a decision of the Commissioner of Taxation made on an objection, the matter will be determined in the AAT’s Taxation Appeals Division. If the amount of tax in dispute is less than $5,000, the merits review is handled by the STCT, which is part of the Taxation Appeals Division.3 For these smaller tax disputes, the STCT will generally be the more appropriate forum because of the lower application fee4 and the greater opportunity for informal resolution of the matter. For larger tax disputes, the relative merits of the AAT and the Federal Court as forums for review are discussed at (2)–(5) below.

(2)

Type of case: The Federal Court offers the advantage that an authoritative judicial ruling can be obtained on the matter at issue. If only a question of law is involved and a decisive determination of the law will assist not only the case in question but also other cases, an appeal to the Federal Court is preferable to an appeal to the AAT. Decisions of the AAT do not constitute binding precedents. However, if an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner is in question, it may be preferable for the taxpayer to appeal to the AAT. The AAT is empowered to “stand in the Commissioner’s shoes” and exercise the discretion conferred on the Commissioner. The Federal Court cannot do this. If the Federal Court finds that the law has been applied correctly, it cannot interfere on the basis that it would have reached a different view on the facts.

(3)

Costs: Parties before the AAT bear their own costs, while parties before the Federal Court risk an award of costs against them. The absence of a power in the AAT to award costs has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that access to review is not impeded by the prospect of applicants being liable both for the Commissioner’s costs as well as their own, should the appeal fail. The disadvantage is that successful applicants must bear the costs of bringing the appeal. However, all of the taxpayer’s legal expenses in respect of bringing an appeal in the AAT or the Federal Court are deductible under s 25.5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).

(4)

Formality: The AAT is an administrative tribunal, not a judicial tribunal. Therefore, its processes are less formal than those of the Federal Court. Because the AAT is not bound by the rules of evidence, it may be possible

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[2.7.2270]

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to have evidence admitted before the AAT that might not be admissible before the Federal Court. (5)

Publicity: Proceedings before the AAT (other than the STCT) in tax matters are conducted in private if the taxpayer so requests. The written reasons for the AAT’s decision following a hearing that is conducted in private must not disclose the taxpayer’s name. Anonymity may be lost, however, if the Commissioner subsequently appeals to the Federal Court from the decision of the AAT.

1 Cooke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1654, Conti J at [9]. 2 Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), ss 14ZZK, 14ZZO. To discharge this onus, the appellant must show what is the correct amount of the taxpayer’s taxable income in respect of which the Commissioner of Taxation should have made the assessment: Trautwein v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1936) 56 CLR 63, Latham CJ at 87–88. Subject to s 14ZZO(a), the appellant is entitled to put new evidence before the Court: Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (No 2) (1990) 170 CLR 267; 64 ALJR 526; 33 IR 473, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 274 (CLR). 3 See Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), Pt IIIAA; see also Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Small Taxation Claims Tribunal Practice Direction (13 March 2000) (available at http://www.aat.gov.au/LawAndPractice/PracticeDirectionsAndGuides.htm, viewed 15 September 2016). 4 The filing fees for matters before the Small Taxation Claims Tribunal (for amounts of tax in dispute of less than $5,000) and for matters before the Taxation Appeals Division (for amounts in dispute over $5,000) are set by Administrative Appeals Tribunal Regulations 1976 (Cth), regs 19, 19AA. These fees are increased every two years in accordance with movements in the Consumer Price Index: regs 19A, 19B.

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458

Bibliography [References are to paragraph numbers]

A Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice: An Action Plan (AGPS, 1994)..........................................................................................................................[2.1.10] ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Expert Witness Code of Conduct) Procedural Directions 2009 (No 1)...................................................................... [2.7.1140], [2.7.1750] ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1)....[2.7.1140], [2.7.1470], [2.7.1590], [2.7.1610], [2.7.1750] ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2)............. [2.7.1140], [2.7.1500], [2.7.2000] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Guidelines (AAT, 2006).......................................................................................................... [2.7.1610] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013).......................................................................................................[2.7.930] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2013–2014 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014).......................................................................................................[2.3.340] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction (26 March 2007).............................................................[2.7.1590], [2.7.1600], [2.7.1610], [2.7.1740] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, General Practice Direction – Direction Given under Section 18B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (30 June 2015)......................................................................................................................[2.7.1200] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Guidelines for Persons Giving Expert and Opinion Evidence (AAT, 2011)...........................................................................................[2.7.1750] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Guidelines for the Use of Concurrent Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT, 2011).................................................... [2.7.1750] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Practice Direction Relating to Section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (26 March 2007).......... [2.7.1550], [2.7.1560] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Small Taxation Claims Tribunal Practice Direction (13 March 2000)................................................................................................... [2.7.2270] Administrative Review Council, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals, Report No 39 (AGPS, 1995)................................................... [2.1.180] Administrative Review Council, Federal Judicial Review in Australia, Report No 50 (ARC, 2012)............................................................................................................[2.1.300] Administrative Review Council, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law, Report 38 (AGPS, 1995)...................................................... [2.7.190]

459

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Administrative Review Council, Report to the Attorney-General: Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act – Statement of Reasons for Decisions, Report No 33 (AGPS, 1991) Ch 4.........................................................................[2.3.360] Administrative Review Council, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The Ambit of the Act, Report No 32 (AGPS, 1989)....................... [2.1.300] Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Issues Paper (AGPS, 1997)............................................................................................... [2.7.190] Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Report No 42 (AGPS, 1998).............................................................................................. [2.1.170] Administrative Review Council, The Relationship Between the Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Report 22 (AGPS, 1985)................................. [2.7.630] Argument S (ed), Administrative Law and Public Administration: Happily Married or Living Apart under the Same Roof (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994)........................................................................................................................[2.1.310] Argument S, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Quasi-legislation, Parliamentary Paper No 15 (Department of the Senate, 1992).......................................................................... [2.3.610] Aronson M and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2013)..................................................................... [2.1.140], [2.1.170], [2.7.1180] Australia, Senate, Debates, 1980........................................................................... [2.3.360] Australian Law Reform Commission, Open Government: A Review of the Federal Freedom of Information Act 1982, Report No 77 (ALRC, 1995)........................ [2.3.600] Australian Law Reform Commission, Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia, Report No 112 (ALRC, 2009)........................ [2.3.140], [2.3.2170], [2.3.2220]

B Barkoczy S, C River, J Baring and N Bellamy, Australian Tax Casebook (10th ed, CCH, 2010)........................................................................................................... [2.7.2260] Bayne P, “Administrative Law: The Problem of Policy” in R Wettenhall and J Nethercote (eds), Hawke’s Second Government (Canberra CAE, 1988)..............[2.7.630] Bayne P, Freedom of Information: An Analysis of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) and a Synopsis of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (The Law Book Company Limited, 1984).....................................................................[2.3.600], [2.3.2100] Bedford N and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2006).......................................................... [2.7.1420] Bentil JK, “The Concept of ‘Administrative Action’ and the Ombudsman” [1976] ACL DT 297.................................................................................................................... [2.7.260] Biganovsky E, “Reinventing Freedom of Information: A State Focus” in S Argument (ed), Administrative Law: Are the States Overtaking the Commonwealth? (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994).................................................................. [2.7.170]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 460

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Commonwealth Ombudsman, Twentieth Annual Report 1996–1997 (AGPS, 1997)........................................................................................................................[2.7.190] Communications and Corporate Affairs, Guideline 1: For Local Councils on the Disclosure of Information Contained in the Returns Disclosing the Interests of Councillors and Designated Persons Developed under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (Information and Privacy Commission New South Wales, 2010)..........................................................................................................[2.3.1100] Communications and Corporate Affairs, Guideline 3: For Local Councils on the Disclosure of Information Contained in the Returns Disclosing the Interests of Councillors and Designated Persons Developed under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (Information and Privacy Commission New South Wales, 2010)..........................................................................................................[2.3.1100] Conte A, “Semiotics of Constitutive Rules”..........................................................[2.3.190] Cossins A, Annotated Freedom of Information Act, New South Wales: History and Analysis (LBC Information Services, 1997)..........................................................[2.3.600] Council of Australasian Tribunals, Register of Australasian Tribunals, (Council of Australasian Tribunals, 2015).................................................................................[2.7.920] Creyke R and J McMillan (eds), The Kerr Vision of Australian Administrative Law (Australian National University Centre for International and Public Law, 1999)........................................................................................................................[2.1.160]

D Delbridge A (ed), The Macquarie Dictionary (2nd ed, Macquarie Library, 1991)........................................................................................................................[2.3.190] Dick C, Ministerial Guidelines: Brisbane City Council Publication Scheme (Queensland Government, 2009)............................................................................................... [2.3.1100] Disney J, “Ombudsmen in Australia” (1974) 46 Australian Quarterly 38.......... [2.7.210]

F Fitzgerald GE, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct, Report No 3 (Queensland Government Printer, 1989)......... [2.3.150] Flick GA, Federal Administrative Law (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, subscription service).................................................................................................................... [2.3.850] Forbes J, Disciplinary Tribunals (Law Book Co, 1990)....................................... [2.3.310]

G Giddings L, Minister for Justice, “Second Reading Speech: Right to Information Bill 2009”, Legislative Assembly, Debates, 15 October 2009....................[2.3.180], [2.3.770]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 462

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Groves M, “The Duty to Inquire in Tribunal Proceedings” (2011) 33 Syd LR 177......................................................................................................[2.7.1410], [2.7.1420]

H Hennessy N and J Goldring, “Administrative Character” (1985) 59 ALJ 659....[2.7.260] Herzfeld M and L Melazzo (eds), Semiotic Theory and Practice: Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (Mouton de Gruyter, 1988).................................................................................... [2.3.190]

I Information Commissioner Northern Territory, Guidelines................................ [2.3.2780]

J Jarvis D, “Procedural Fairness as it Applies in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal” (2007) 81 ALJ 465................................................................................................[2.7.1150]

K Kyrou E and J Pizer, Victorian Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service)........................................................... [2.3.850], [2.3.1670], [2.3.2150], [2.3.3220] Kyrou EJ, Victorian Administrative Law (The Law Book Co Ltd, 1985)............[2.7.240]

L Landa D, “The Ombudsman Surviving and Thriving into the 2000s: The Challenge” in S Argument (ed), Administrative Law: Are the States Overtaking the Commonwealth (Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1994)..............................[2.7.170], [2.7.290] Lane PH, The Australian Federal System (2nd ed, Law Book Co, 1979)........... [2.1.140] Lane WB and S Young, Administrative Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2007).........................................................................................................[2.1.10], [2.1.150] Lane WB and S Young, Queensland Administrative Law (Lawbook Co., 2002)........................................................................................................................[2.1.170] Leeming M, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 2012)........................................................................................................................[2.7.940]

M Mason A, “Delivering Administrative Justice: Looking Back with Pride, Moving [References are to paragraph numbers] 463

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Forward with Concern” (2010) 64 AIAL Forum 4................................................. [2.1.10] Masterman G, “A Complaint Against Macquarie University Law School” (1985) 10 LSB 17.............................................................................................................................[2.7.550] Morrow E, “Merit Review in WA: The Cost of Applying Government Policy In The Course Of Review” (2006) 49 AIAL Forum....................................................... [2.7.1110] Moss I, The Independent Audit into the State of Free Speech in Australia (Australia’s Right to Know Campaign, 2007)........................................................................... [2.3.180]

N New South Wales Government, Working with Government: Guidelines for Privately Financed Projects (NSW Treasury, 2006)........................................................... [2.3.1140] New South Wales Information Commissioner, GIPA Act Guidelines 1: Local Councils (OIC, 2010)........................................................................................................... [2.3.1180] New South Wales Ombudsman, Fifteenth Annual Report 1989–1990 (NSW Ombudsman, 1990)................................................................................[2.7.360], [2.7.760] New South Wales Ombudsman, Opening Up Government (NSW Ombudsman, 2009)........................................................................................................................[2.3.180] New South Wales Parliament, Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Role of the Ombudsman (Parliament of New South Wales, 1992).......................[2.7.320] New South Wales Supreme Court, Practice Note No. SC CL 3 Supreme Court Common Law Division – Administrative Law List............................................ [2.3.340], [2.7.2060] Newcity M, “Ombudsman Heal Thyself” (1984) 9 LSB 175...............................[2.7.550] Newcity M, “Ombudsman Heal Thyself Revisited” (1985) 10 LSB 90.............. [2.7.550] Niles H (ed), Niles’ Weekly Register (Franklin Press, 1823)............................... [2.3.140] NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division, Procedural Direction 2 – Revenue Matters (13 February 2014)........[2.7.1200] NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division, Procedural Direction 6 – Government Information (Public Access) Act Matters (17 March 2014)..................................................................................... [2.7.1200] NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, NCAT Procedural Direction 3 – Expert Witnesses (7 February 2014)................................................................................ [2.7.1750] NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Publications....................................... [2.7.1140]

O O’Connor K, “Appeal Panels in Super Tribunals” (2013) 32 UQLJ 31............ [2.7.1940] Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act [References are to paragraph numbers] 464

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1982 (OAIC, rev ed, 2014).......... [2.3.610], [2.3.910], [2.3.1290], [2.3.1790], [2.3.1980] Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Who Qualifies as a ‘Person’ Eligible to Make a Request under s 15 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982? Statement Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner to Supplement an Amendment to Part 3 of the Guidelines Issued by the Australian Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, (OAIC, 2013)......................................................................................................................[2.3.1280] Office of the Information Commissioner of Western Australia, OIC Guidance............................................................................................................... [2.3.2780] Office of the New South Wales Information Commissioner, Guidelines........... [2.3.2780] Office of the Queensland Information Commissioner, Guidelines..................... [2.3.2780] Office of the Tasmanian Ombudsman, Guideline 3/2010: Guideline in Relation to Process of Disclosing Information under Each Type of Information Disclosure (Tasmanian Ombudsman, 2010)........................................................................... [2.3.1100] Ombudsman Tasmania, Right to Information Manual........................................ [2.3.2780]

P Paterson M, Freedom of Information and Privacy in Australia: Government and Information Access in the Modern State (Butt, 2005)......................... [2.3.180], [2.3.600] Pearce D, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2007)..... [2.7.960] Pearce D, “Ombudsman: Office of Paradox” (paper presented to the Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 3 May 1990)....................................................[2.7.160], [2.7.170] Pearce D, “The Ombudsman: Neglected Aid to Better Management” (1989) 48 AJPA 359...........................................................................................................................[2.7.170] Pearce DC and S Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (4th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2012).............................................................................................................. [2.1.290] Pearce DC and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (4th ed, Butt, 1996)......................................................................................................................[2.3.3240] Pearce DC, “The Rule of Law and the Lore of Rules” (1989) Legislative Studies Vol 4 No 2.........................................................................................................................[2.3.610] Pizer J, Pizer’s Annotated VCAT Act (3rd ed, JNL Nominees Pty Ltd, 2007)...[2.7.1880] Pizer J, “The VCAT and Natural Justice” (2004) 11 AJ Admin L 161.............. [2.7.1150]

Q Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (QCAT, 2013)........................................................................................................................[2.7.930] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Guide to Expert Conferences (QCAT, 2009)......................................................................................................................[2.7.1750] [References are to paragraph numbers] 465

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 4 of 2009 – Expert Evidence (11 November 2009).................................................................[2.7.1750] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 6 of 2010 – Compulsory Conferences and Mediations (21 April 2010).................................[2.7.1610] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Direction No 6 of 2011 – Access to Documents in Applications for Review and Referral Matters (6 January 2012)...................................................................................................[2.7.1550], [2.7.1560] Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney General, Discussion Paper: Reform of Civil and Administrative Justice (Department of Justice and Attorney General, 2007)........................................................................................................................[2.7.920] Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, Appeals from Administrative Decisions, Issues Paper No 14 (Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, 1991).......................................................... [2.1.300] Queensland Government, The Right to Information: Reviewing Queensland’s Freedom of Information Act (FOI Independent Review Panel, 2008)................................. [2.3.180]

R Richardson J, “The Ombudsman – Guardian, Mentor, Diplomat, Servant and Protector” (1985) 12(4) Canberra Bull Pub Admin 222.........................................................[2.7.590] Robinson M, New South Wales Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service).................................................................................................................... [2.3.850]

S Searle JR, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press, 1969).............................................................................................................[2.3.190] Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Freedom of Information: Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on the Freedom of Information Bill 1978 and Aspects of the Archives Bill 1978 (AGPS, 1979)..........................................................................................................[2.3.140] Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Offıce of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (AGPS, 1991).................. [2.7.170], [2.7.190], [2.7.800] Smillie J, “The Problem of ‘Official Notice’: Reliance by Administrative Tribunals on the Personal Knowledge of their Members” (1975) Public Law 64........................ [2.7.1260] Smyth M, “Inquisitorial Adjudication: The Duty to Inquire in Merits Review Tribunals” (2010) 34 MULR 230...........................................................................................[2.7.1410] Snell R and N Tyson, “Back to the Drawing Board: Preliminary Musings on Redesigning Australian Freedom of Information” (2000) 85 FOI Review 2.......[2.3.180] Snell R (ed), Freedom of Information Review (Legal Services Bulletin Co-op,

[References are to paragraph numbers] 466

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1986–2004)..............................................................................................................[2.3.600] Snell R, “Three Quick Steps to Enlightened FOI”, The Australian, 28 September 2007.........................................................................................................................[2.3.180] Spigelman JJ, “The Centrality of Jurisdictional Error” (2010) 21 PLR 77............[2.1.10] State Administrative Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (SAT, 2013).............. [2.7.930] State Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note 2 – Review Proceedings (19 August 2008)..........................................[2.7.1200], [2.7.1470], [2.7.1590], [2.7.1600], [2.7.1610] State Administrative Tribunal, Standard Orders Made at Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences (SAT, 2012)................... [2.7.1610], [2.7.1750] State Administrative Tribunal, Standard Orders Made at Directions Hearings, Mediations and Compulsory Conferences (SAT, 2014)...................................... [2.7.1140] State Records of South Australia, FOI in South Australia................................. [2.3.2780] Stuart M, “Tribunals and Policy” in R Creyke (ed), Tribunals in the Common Law World (Federation Press, 2008)....................................................................................... [2.7.1110]

T Tasmania, Department of Justice, A Single Tribunal for Tasmania (Department of Justice, 2015).......................................................................................................... [2.7.920] Tasmanian Ombudsman, Tasmanian Ombudsman 26th Annual Report 2004–2005 (Ombudsman, 2005)............................................................................................... [2.7.250] Terrill G, Secrecy and Openness (Melbourne University Press, 2000)................ [2.3.600] The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996)........ [2.3.450], [2.7.1030], [2.7.1040], [2.7.1050], [2.7.1060], [2.7.1070], [2.7.1080], [2.7.1090], [2.7.1100], [2.7.1110], [2.7.1120], [2.7.1130], [2.7.1200] Tomasic R and D Fleming, Australian Administrative Law (Law Book Co, 1991).......................................................................................................[2.7.710], [2.7.760]

V Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Annual Report 2012–2013 (VCAT, 2013)......................................................................................................................[2.7.1600] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT1: Common Procedures (1 June 2013).....................................................................................[2.7.1660] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT2: Expert Evidence (15 March 2012)................................................................................... [2.7.1750] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT3: Fair Hearing Obligation (1 January 2013)................................................................................ [2.7.1280] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT4: Alternative [References are to paragraph numbers] 467

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dispute Resolution (ADR) (1 January 2013)....................................................... [2.7.1610] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Practice Note – PNVCAT5: Directions Hearings and Urgent Hearings (15 March 2012)...............................................[2.7.1610] Victorian Government, FOI Online..................................................................... [2.3.2780] Victorian Ombudsman, Seventeenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, 30 June 1990 (Government Printer, 1990)...................................................................[2.7.240], [2.7.290]

W Whitmore H and M Aronson, Review of Administrative Action (The Law Book Company Limited, 1978)........................................................................................[2.3.310] Wilson A, “Tribunal Proceedings and Natural Justice: The Duty to Inquire” (2013) 32 UQLJ 23................................................................................................................[2.7.1420]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 468

Index [References are to paragraph numbers]

business affairs of third persons....................... [2.3.2570] commercially valuable information............ [2.3.2660]

Access to Information agency documents, right of access to constitutive rules..........[2.3.970] appeal and review application for review

exemption case......[2.3.2580]

notification of appeal rights......................[2.7.1430] exempt documents

exemption exceptions..............[2.3.2620] exemption procedure...[2.3.2630]–[2.3.2640]

agencies, of................ [2.3.1420] all-agency exemptions...[2.3.1440]–[2.3.1450] operations of agencies................. [2.3.1920] exemption case................... [2.3.1930] exemption condition........... [2.3.1950] exemption exception.......... [2.3.1940] industrial relations, conduct of.........[2.3.1970] legislation......... [2.3.1960] management of personnel.......... [2.3.1980] proper and efficient operations......... [2.3.1990] “substantial adverse effect”............... [2.3.2000] test, examinations and audits................ [2.3.2010] some-agency exemptions........... [2.3.1430], [2.3.1470] “benefit test”................ [2.3.740] 469

exemption condition................[2.3.2610]

harm test commercial disadvantage..... [2.3.2680] fairness of harm..................[2.3.2700] likelihood of harm..................[2.3.2690] New South Wales..................... [2.3.2640] prejudice to supply of information............ [2.3.2710] professional activities, information about...................... [2.3.2670] public interest test, with........................[2.3.2600] public interest test, without...................[2.3.2590] Queensland............ [2.3.2640] trade secrets...........[2.3.2650] business, financial or property interests of government.................[2.3.2720] characterisation test......................... [2.3.2750]

INDEX

Access to Information – continued

exemption case......[2.3.2730] harm test................[2.3.2760] public interest test......................... [2.3.2740] Cabinet... [2.3.1390], [2.3.1460], [2.3.1680] categories of documents..............[2.3.1720] class exemption, as............................[2.3.1690] exceptions under characterisation test......................... [2.3.1750] factual material............. [2.3.1760] interpretation of scope......................[2.3.1700] judicial and tribunal commentary...........[2.3.1740] proviso...................[2.3.1770] reform legislation.............. [2.3.1710] terminology and structural variation.................[2.3.1730] “characterisation test”............................ [2.3.1460] confidential information.................[2.3.2250] exemption case......[2.3.2260] exemption condition................[2.3.2270] exemption exception...[2.3.2280]–[2.3.2290] legislative provisions, interpretation of actionable breach of confidentiality... [2.3.2300] harm test for

disclosure..........[2.3.2330] information of confidential nature................ [2.3.2310] obtained in confidence.........[2.3.2320] contempt of court or infringement of parliamentary privilege arising from disclosure................... [2.3.2360] “deliberative processes” of government................[2.3.1780], [2.3.1930] exception to exemption............. [2.3.1830], [2.3.1940] exemption case requirements under characterisation test......................... [2.3.1800] exemption condition...............[2.3.1810], [2.3.1950] New South Wales................ [2.3.1960] Queensland....... [2.3.1960] Tasmania...........[2.3.1960] judicial and tribunal commentary “advice”............ [2.3.1870] “prepared”........ [2.3.1880] procedure...............[2.3.1850] New South Wales................ [2.3.1860] Queensland....... [2.3.1860] proviso...................[2.3.1840] “purely factual material”................ [2.3.1900] right to information legislation.............. [2.3.1790] documents affecting personal information.................[2.3.2370]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 470

INDEX

Access to Information – continued

breadth of “personal information” concept..............[2.3.2470] financial or business affairs, overlap with personal affairs................ [2.3.2500] identification of person from document or information....... [2.3.2480] information about applicant........... [2.3.2550] information with “public character”...[2.3.2530]–[2.3.2540] medical information....... [2.3.2560] “personal affairs”.............. [2.3.2460] personal identifiers.......... [2.3.2510] work performance information....... [2.3.2520] exemption case......[2.3.2380] “unreasonable” disclosure...[2.3.2390]–[2.3.2400], [2.3.2490] exemption exceptions..............[2.3.2420] exemption procedure..............[2.3.2440], [2.3.2450] exemption proviso...................[2.3.2430] public interest considerations........[2.3.2410] explicit requirements... [2.3.740]

law enforcement.........[2.3.2020] enforcement of proper administration of law......................... [2.3.2110] exceptions..............[2.3.2050] exemption case requirements.......... [2.3.2040] danger to life or safety................ [2.3.2080] disclosure of information from confidential source...[2.3.2090]–[2.3.2100] prejudice to conduct of investigation..... [2.3.2120] prejudice to effectiveness of law enforcement methods............ [2.3.2130] prejudice to fair trial or other adjudicative form.................. [2.3.2150] pre-condition......... [2.3.2060] public interest test, whether applicable............. [2.3.2030], [2.3.2070], [2.3.2160] right to information legislation New South Wales................ [2.3.2070] Queensland....... [2.3.2070] Tasmania...........[2.3.2030] legal professional privilege, subject to....................[2.3.2340] common law privilege.................[2.3.2350] meaning... [2.3.1380]–[2.3.1390] “outcome test”........... [2.3.1460]

“harm test”................... [2.3.740]

public and private interests....[2.3.1480]–[2.3.1510]

international relations......................[2.3.1570]

public interest test......[2.3.1910]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 471

INDEX

federal scheme, under........................[2.3.360] State and Territory schemes, under....... [2.3.370]–[2.3.400] common law, under.... [2.3.320], [2.3.470] content requirements....[2.3.420]

Access to Information – continued

secrecy as basis criminal penalty provisions.............. [2.3.2230] generic exemption clause....................[2.3.2170], [2.3.2200]

“decision” and “reasons” distinguished................ [2.3.430] definition...................... [2.3.300] “determinative issue” theory........................... [2.3.430] failure to provide, whether error of law........................... [2.3.440] historical context..........[2.3.310] legislation..... [2.3.10], [2.3.300], [2.3.330]–[2.3.340] judicial and tribunal considerations..........[2.3.350]

list exemption clause....................[2.3.2170], [2.3.2240] New South Wales..................... [2.3.2180] Queensland............ [2.3.2180] South Australia......[2.3.2230] two-stage analysis...[2.3.2210]–[2.3.2220] types.......................... [2.3.1420], [2.3.1460]–[2.3.1470] information legislation........[2.3.10]

“material findings of fact”, for................................. [2.3.430] model of reasons..........[2.3.430] policy objective............[2.3.170] procedural fairness.......[2.3.310] rationality of................[2.3.420], [2.3.430]

legislation............................[2.3.10] constitutive rules.........[2.3.190], [2.3.690], [2.3.940], [2.3.960], [2.3.970]–[2.3.1020] duties.............................. [2.3.10] original legislation....... [2.3.170]

statutory schemes, under............[2.3.330]–[2.3.340] federal..... [2.3.340]–[2.3.360]

tribunal decisions.... [2.3.640] purpose......................... [2.3.140] reform legislation.........[2.3.180] “open texture problem”.... [2.3.190] policy objectives...............[2.3.170] reform legislation.........[2.3.180]

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) costs................................ [2.7.2120] Divisions........................... [2.7.930]

right to reasons historical context..........[2.3.310] statement of reasons

doctrine of comity.......... [2.7.1030]

adequacy of.................[2.3.190], [2.3.410], [2.3.420] availability of

initiation of proceedings formal requirements...[2.7.1470]

establishment... [2.7.920], [2.7.930] evidence........[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830]

lodgment.....................[2.7.1480]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 472

INDEX

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) – continued

of..................................... [2.7.1220] Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Cth)

time limit....................[2.7.1490]

adversarial model of civil litigation, adoption of..... [2.7.1420] costs.................................[2.7.2110] dismissal of application.... [2.7.1840]–[2.7.1860] reinstatement.............. [2.7.1870]

extension................[2.7.1500] internal appeals...............[2.7.1940] leave to appeal................[2.7.2040] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] pre-hearing procedure.....[2.7.1530] procedural law subordinate legislation................... [2.7.1140] questions of fact, appeals on.................................... [2.7.1970] leave to appeal........... [2.7.1980] remedial powers.......... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900] standing........ [2.7.1440]–[2.7.1460] statement of reasons....... [2.7.1910] failure to provide....... [2.7.1920] stay orders.... [2.7.1630]–[2.7.1640] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT), establishment of....................................... [2.7.930] immunity from disclosure........................ [2.7.1330] basis for non-disclosure............ [2.7.1350] internal review.................. [2.7.980] joinder of parties............ [2.7.1510] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] Adjournment fair hearing rule, application

Divisions........................... [2.7.930] documents pre-hearing disclosure.................. [2.7.1530], [2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] summons, under.........[2.7.1620] establishment.................... [2.7.930] evidence........[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830] hearings private.........................[2.7.1680] public..........................[2.7.1670] initiation of proceedings formal requirements...[2.7.1470] lodgment.....................[2.7.1480] investigative powers....... [2.7.1400] Ombudsman, advisory opinion for......................................[2.7.780] orders.............................. [2.7.1880] consent....................... [2.7.1880] parties joinder......[2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] standing of applicants...[2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] respondents............[2.7.1460] powers remedial... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900] pre-hearing disclosure... [2.7.1530], [2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] preliminary

[References are to paragraph numbers] 473

INDEX

public hearings................[2.7.1670] remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080]

Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Cth) – continued

conferences..................... [2.7.1610] procedure notice of appeal rights...........................[2.7.1430] representation............. [2.7.1660]

representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] Administrative Decision judicial review of reasons for... [2.3.440]–[2.3.460] “reasons”, distinguished from...................................[2.3.430] review of agencies and processes existence of wide range of.............[2.1.180], [2.1.300] relationship between......................[2.7.20]

reasons for decision........[2.7.1910] failure to provide....... [2.7.1920] statement of, right to..................[2.3.330], [2.3.340] remedies discretion where alternative available..................... [2.7.2020] standing parties, of..............[2.7.1440]–[2.7.1460] stare decisis.....................[2.7.1030] statement of reasons for decision under review................... [2.7.1910] failure to provide....... [2.7.1920] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140]

merits review system jurisdiction..............[2.1.300], [2.7.2240] varieties of..................... [2.7.10] statement of reasons..............[2.3.300]–[2.3.470] Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), under.............................[2.3.340]

summons......................... [2.7.1620] taxation appeals..........[2.7.2260]–[2.7.2270]

“Commonwealth record”, use of.................................. [2.3.450] cross-examination of maker............................[2.3.460]

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Cth), establishment of..... [2.7.930]

evidence, as form of.... [2.3.450] failure to provide......... [2.3.440] taxation decision

costs.................................[2.7.2110] immunity from disclosure........................ [2.7.1330] basis for non-disclosure............ [2.7.1350] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610]

application for review...... [2.7.2260]–[2.7.2270] costs, awarding of......[2.7.2270] privacy issues.............[2.7.2270] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) remedies under

[References are to paragraph numbers] 474

INDEX

of...................... [2.1.290]–[2.1.310] administrative review bodies and acts subject to...................................[2.1.170] different methods......... [2.1.300] government policies and programs, conflict with...............................[2.1.310] bodies subject to review...[2.1.170]

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – continued

statement of reasons for decision........................ [2.3.340] statement of reasons..............[2.3.340]–[2.3.360] cross-examination of maker............................[2.3.460] evidence, as..................[2.3.450] Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) statement of reasons......... [2.3.370] Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) government policy, giving effect to......................................[2.7.1110] immunity from disclosure..... [2.7.1330], [2.7.1360] “interested person”, standing of..................................... [2.7.1440]

development of................... [2.1.10] States, in.........................[2.1.10] investigatory agencies...... [2.1.300] merits review jurisdiction........................ [2.1.300] power to review analytical description, effect of.................................. [2.1.290] common law, at............[2.1.150] Constitution, under...... [2.1.140] legislation, express provision in..................[2.1.160], [2.1.180] scope of review................ [2.1.290]

internal review.................. [2.7.980] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), establishment of................[2.7.930] procedural fairness.........[2.7.1150], [2.7.1160] remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080]

States, development in....... [2.1.10] Agency information, right of access to..................................... [2.3.1420] all-agency exemptions...[2.3.1440]–[2.3.1450]

remedies, discretionary factors..............................[2.7.2030] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic) statement of reasons......... [2.3.400] Administrative Law System administrative acts, nature, exercise and control

constitutive rules..........[2.3.970] operations of agencies................. [2.3.1920] exemption case................... [2.3.1930] exemption condition........... [2.3.1950] exemption exception.......... [2.3.1940] industrial relations, conduct of.........[2.3.1970]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 475

INDEX

proviso........................[2.3.1770] reform legislation.......[2.3.1710] terminology and structural variation..................... [2.3.1730] Ombudsman, exclusion from jurisdiction of...[2.7.200], [2.7.240]

Agency – continued

legislation......... [2.3.1960] management of personnel.......... [2.3.1980] proper and efficient operations......... [2.3.1990] “substantial adverse effect”............... [2.3.2000] test, examinations and audits................ [2.3.2010] some-agency exemptions........... [2.3.1430], [2.3.1470]

Common Law administrative decisions, review of....................................... [2.1.150] Conciliation investigation by Ombudsman...................... [2.7.490] Confidential Information right to information, exemption to..................................... [2.3.2250] exemption case...........[2.3.2260]

Amendment personal records, of constitutive rules..........[2.3.960]

exemption condition.....................[2.3.2270] exemption exception...[2.3.2280]–[2.3.2290] legislative provisions, interpretation of

Appeal statutory appeals..........[2.7.2230]–[2.7.2270] Bias rule against, basis of.......[2.7.1300] tribunal proceedings....... [2.7.1300] Browne v Dunn rule in..............................[2.7.1240] Cabinet disclosure of documents, exemption from............. [2.3.1390], [2.3.1460], [2.3.1680] categories of documents.................. [2.3.1720] class exemption, as.... [2.3.1690] exceptions under characterisation test... [2.3.1750] factual material......[2.3.1760] interpretation of scope...........................[2.3.1700] judicial and tribunal commentary................[2.3.1740]

actionable breach of confidentiality........[2.3.2300] harm test for disclosure...............[2.3.2330] information of confidential nature.....................[2.3.2310] obtained in confidence..............[2.3.2320] Constitution administrative Acts of Commonwealth, power to review...............[2.1.140]–[2.1.180] Constitutional Law separation of powers matter of administration, basis of.................................. [2.7.260] Coroner Ombudsman, exclusion from

[References are to paragraph numbers] 476

INDEX

[2.3.1950]

Coroner – continued

New South Wales................ [2.3.1960]

jurisdiction of....................[2.7.200] Corruption

Queensland....... [2.3.1960] Tasmania...........[2.3.1960] judicial and tribunal commentary “advice”............ [2.3.1870] “prepared”........ [2.3.1880]

secrecy and....................... [2.3.150] Costs right to information application for external review.........................[2.3.3280] tribunals........ [2.7.2110]–[2.7.2120]

procedure...............[2.3.1850] New South Wales................ [2.3.1860] Queensland....... [2.3.1860]

Court merits review residual or specialised role............................. [2.7.2240] South Australia...........[2.7.2250] Tasmania.................... [2.7.2250] Ombudsman, exclusion from jurisdiction of...[2.7.200], [2.7.210] statutory appeals..........[2.7.2230]–[2.7.2270] Cross-examination contradictory testimony Browne v Dunn, rule in.................................[2.7.1240] tribunal proceedings....... [2.7.1240] Crown Privilege legislation............................[2.3.10] Deliberative Process Document “deliberative processes”....................... [2.3.1865] exemption from disclosure..... [2.3.1780], [2.3.1930] exception................... [2.3.1830], [2.3.1940] exemption case requirements under characterisation test......................... [2.3.1800] exemption condition...............[2.3.1810],

proviso...................[2.3.1840] “purely factual material”................ [2.3.1900] right to information legislation.............. [2.3.1790] public interest test......[2.3.1910] Document agency, of........................[2.3.1040] constitutive rules..........[2.3.970] construction and interpretation...................[2.3.1030] Environment, Resources and Development Court (SA) merits review.................. [2.7.2240] Error of Law administrative decision, failure to give reasons...................... [2.3.440] Evidence statement of reasons for decision judicial review, application to...................................[2.3.450] tribunal proceedings...[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830] Expert Evidence tribunal proceedings...... [2.7.1750], [2.7.1800]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 477

INDEX

corruption and secrecy..........................[2.3.150] Governor

Expert Evidence – continued

Federal Court of Australia jurisdiction review of government agency decisions.....................[2.7.2230] taxation, appeal against decision........ [2.7.2260]–[2.7.2270] Freedom of Information appeal and review of agency or ministerial decisions external review, notification of appeal rights...............[2.7.1430] legislation national security, exemption of documents affecting... [2.3.1570] Ombudsman complaints on decisions under freedom of information...................[2.7.750] immunity from provisions..................... [2.7.770] private nature of investigations, conflict with................. [2.7.760] role, effect on............... [2.7.740] Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Ombudsman, exclusion from jurisdiction of....................[2.7.200] Hearsay tribunal proceedings...... [2.7.1790], [2.7.1820] Improper Motive or Purpose Ombudsman, adverse report by, grounds for........................[2.7.610] Industrial Relations access to information, documents exempt from....................[2.3.1970] Information “document” distinguished.................... [2.3.960], [2.3.1070] Inspection of Documents constitutive rules for objects............................... [2.3.980] information comprising objects.......................... [2.3.990] Investigation notice

commencement................. [2.3.600] right to information legislation..........................[2.3.600] “information publication scheme”...................... [2.3.1120] Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) right to access information agency........................ [2.3.1300] proper respondent...... [2.3.1300] Government secret................................. [2.3.140]

investigation, of........... [2.7.480] progress and outcome................... [2.7.720] offences false evidence to, giving........................... [2.7.510] interference with or obstruction of investigation............ [2.7.510] Ombudsman, by agencies, of................... [2.7.10], [2.7.190]–[2.7.250] jurisdiction to investigate... [2.7.150], [2.7.190] actions and decisions excluded from

[References are to paragraph numbers] 478

INDEX

appeals..........[2.7.2230]–[2.7.2270] Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld)

Investigation – continued

investigation..............[2.7.200]– [2.7.240], [2.7.280] matters of administration, investigation into...............[2.7.260]–[2.7.340] matters outside of jurisdiction, investigation into......... [2.7.470] police, of..... [2.7.250], [2.7.320] preliminary investigations............... [2.7.460]

statement of reasons......... [2.3.380] Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas) statement of reasons......... [2.3.390]

Land and Environment Court (NSW) merits review.................. [2.7.2240] Law Enforcement exemption of documents from disclosure........................ [2.3.2020] enforcement of proper procedure for administration of investigation...[2.7.450]–[2.7.550] law.............................. [2.3.2110] refusal to exceptions...................[2.3.2050] investigate....[2.7.390]–[2.7.440] exemption case reinvestigation of requirements...............[2.3.2040] complaints... [2.7.250], [2.7.730] danger to life or tribunals, by safety..................... [2.3.2080] duties.......................... [2.7.1410] disclosure of information functions.....................[2.7.1390] from confidential powers........................ [2.7.1400] source...[2.3.2090]–[2.3.2100] Judicial Review prejudice to conduct of investigation.......... [2.3.2120] acts subject to................... [2.1.170] prejudice to effectiveness of administrative decision law enforcement reasons for... [2.3.440]–[2.3.460] methods................. [2.3.2130] Administrative Decisions (Judicial prejudice to fair trial or Review) Act 1977 (Cth), under other adjudicative statement of reasons... [2.3.330], form....................... [2.3.2150] [2.3.340], [2.3.350], pre-condition.............. [2.3.2060] [2.3.360] public interest test, whether cross-examination of applicable.................. [2.3.2030], maker.......................[2.3.460] [2.3.2070], [2.3.2160] evidence, as............. [2.3.450] right to information legislation failure to provide.... [2.3.440] New South bodies subject to...............[2.1.170] Wales..................... [2.3.2070] other forms of appeal and Queensland............ [2.3.2070] review..................................[2.7.10] Tasmania................[2.3.2030] statutory

[References are to paragraph numbers] 479

INDEX

investigative duties......... [2.7.1410] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520]

Law Enforcement – continued

Legal Professional Privilege administrative proceedings, application to Western Australia.......[2.7.1380] Ombudsman, in investigation by...................................... [2.7.520] right to information, exemption to..................................... [2.3.2340] common law privilege..................... [2.3.2350] Legal Representation tribunals.......................... [2.7.1660]

mediation........................ [2.7.1610] orders.............................. [2.7.1880] parties joinder......[2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] representation............. [2.7.1660] powers remedial... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900] pre-hearing disclosure......[2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] question of law and fact, appeals on.................................... [2.7.1960]

Local Government open access information regime, implications of...................[2.3.1180]–[2.3.1190] Minister Ombudsman

leave to appeal........... [2.7.1980] remedies discretion where alternative available..................... [2.7.2030] representation..................[2.7.1660] stare decisis.....................[2.7.1030] stay orders.... [2.7.1630]–[2.7.1640] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] summons power..............[2.7.1620]

exclusion from jurisdiction of................. [2.7.200], [2.7.240] report by.......................[2.7.680] National Security freedom of information legislation, exemption from disclosure under............ [2.3.1570], [2.3.1590] New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) appeals internal, leave to appeal......................... [2.7.1980] costs................................ [2.7.2120]

Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NTCAT) commencement................. [2.7.930] costs................................ [2.7.2120] documents pre-hearing disclosure................... [2.7.1530]

dismissal or discontinuance of proceedings...[2.7.1840]–[2.7.1860] Divisions........................... [2.7.930] establishment... [2.7.920], [2.7.930] evidence........[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830] internal appeals...............[2.7.1940]

government policy, application of..................................... [2.7.1110] initiation of proceedings..................... [2.7.1470] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] leave to appeal................[2.7.2040]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 480

INDEX

Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NTCAT) – continued

orders by consent............[2.7.1880] pre-hearing disclosure......[2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] remedial power............... [2.7.1900] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] standing........ [2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] stay orders.......................[2.7.2050] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] summons......................... [2.7.1620] work “streams”................. [2.7.940] Notice Ombudsman, of investigation by...................................... [2.7.480] progress and outcome........................[2.7.720] Offences Ombudsman false evidence to, giving........................... [2.7.510] interference with or obstruction of investigation............ [2.7.510] Ombudsman administrative action, review of........................ [2.1.300], [2.7.10] adverse report, grounds for..................... [2.7.570]–[2.7.670] action contrary to law................................[2.7.580] defective administrative action............................[2.7.670] improper purposes....... [2.7.610] irrelevant considerations...............[2.7.610]

mistake of fact............. [2.7.630] mistake of law............. [2.7.630] reasons for action or decision, failure to give...............[2.7.620] “unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory” action............................[2.7.590] rule of practice, in accordance with...... [2.7.600] agencies, investigation of....... [2.7.10], [2.7.190]–[2.7.250] annual report to Parliament......................... [2.7.710] complaints freedom of information, decisions under............ [2.7.750] requirements for making..........................[2.7.390] standing to make..........[2.7.370] unresolved.................... [2.7.660] conciliation by.................. [2.7.490] documents production of................[2.7.520] enactments establishing office..................................[2.7.180] external review of...................... [2.7.780]–[2.7.800] Administrative Appeals Tribunal, advisory opinion by..................................[2.7.780] independent statutory officers, as.................................. [2.7.800] jurisdictional disputes, procedure for................[2.7.790] false testimony to, offence where giving................................ [2.7.510] freedom of information complaints on decisions under.............................[2.7.750]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 481

INDEX

Ombudsman – continued

immunity from provisions..................... [2.7.770] private nature of investigations, conflict with................. [2.7.760] role, effect on............... [2.7.740] function............................. [2.7.150] implementation of reports agency, copy to............ [2.7.680] higher authority, report to...................................[2.7.690] minister, copy to.......... [2.7.680] Parliament, report to annual...................... [2.7.710] refusal by agency to implement recommendations.... [2.7.700] recommendations limitation on............ [2.7.680] refusal by agency to implement................[2.7.700] inconclusive determinations...................[2.7.660] individual guilt, findings of....................................... [2.7.650] interference with or obstruction of investigation, offence where.................................[2.7.510] investigation by persons who may initiate..........[2.7.350]–[2.7.370] jurisdiction to investigate........ [2.7.150], [2.7.190] actions and decisions excluded from investigation...[2.7.200]–[2.7.240], [2.7.280] agencies.........................[2.7.10], [2.7.190]–[2.7.250]

Cabinets.......[2.7.200], [2.7.240] coroners........................[2.7.200] courts...........[2.7.200], [2.7.210] disputes concerning, procedure for resolution of........... [2.7.790] government business enterprises.................... [2.7.190] Governors.....................[2.7.200] legal advisers to the Crown...........................[2.7.230] legislation, conferred by..................................[2.7.190] local government authorities.....................[2.7.190] ministers...... [2.7.200], [2.7.240] parliaments................... [2.7.200] police, complaints against, reinvestigatory powers in relation to..................... [2.7.250] quasi-judicial bodies.... [2.7.220] Royal Commissions..... [2.7.200] legal professional privilege............................ [2.7.520] matters of administration, investigation into....................[2.7.260]–[2.7.340] administrative action, defined..........................[2.7.190] administrative agencies, defined set of.............................[2.7.190] commercial activities... [2.7.340] conduct of a public authority, defined..........................[2.7.190] delegated legislation.... [2.7.280] limitations on............... [2.7.270] personnel decisions......[2.7.330] police, complaints against.......................... [2.7.320] policy decisions........... [2.7.290]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 482

INDEX

Ombudsman – continued

quasi-judicial bodies.... [2.7.220] separation of powers doctrine.........................[2.7.260] tendering procedures....[2.7.340] unauthorised actions..........[2.7.300]–[2.7.310] matters outside of jurisdiction, investigation into.............. [2.7.470] notice investigation, of........... [2.7.480] progress and outcome................... [2.7.720] offences false evidence to, giving........................... [2.7.510] interference with or obstruction of investigation............ [2.7.510] Ombudsman Scheme........ [2.7.190] opinion of..........................[2.7.650] origin of office.................. [2.7.170] “own motion” or “own initiative” investigation......................[2.7.350] police investigation of complaints administrative action, whether.................... [2.7.320] reinvestigatory powers..................... [2.7.250] Postal Industry Ombudsman scheme.............................. [2.7.150] powers...............................[2.7.150] findings, to make......... [2.7.650] jurisdictions, variation between........................ [2.7.500] non-determinative........ [2.7.160] reopen complaints, to...................................[2.7.730]

wide-ranging nature..... [2.7.450] preliminary investigations.................... [2.7.460] procedure for investigation..... [2.7.450]–[2.7.550] discretion, exercise of.................................. [2.7.490] privacy requirements... [2.7.520] freedom of information, conflict with............ [2.7.760] written notice to agency.......................... [2.7.480] public interest privilege....[2.7.520] referral of questions to..... [2.7.360] refusal to investigate........ [2.7.390]–[2.7.440] adequate alternative remedy..........................[2.7.420] frivolous or vexatious complaints.................... [2.7.410] lack of interest............. [2.7.430] necessary or justifiable, whether.........................[2.7.440] time limit for complaint......................[2.7.400] reinvestigation of complaints.........................[2.7.730] police, against.............. [2.7.250] report by............................[2.7.560] adverse comment in, right to be heard before making....[2.7.540] draft report, procedural fairness and............. [2.7.550] agency response, unsatisfactory............... [2.7.690] draft, availability as..... [2.7.530] higher authority, to...... [2.7.690] inconclusive determination in...................................[2.7.660] opinion rather than verdict of

[References are to paragraph numbers] 483

INDEX

right to information legislation, access under.............[2.3.1210]–[2.3.1240]

Ombudsman – continued

guilty............................ [2.7.650] role................... [2.7.160], [2.7.170] Scheme..............................[2.7.190] secrecy provisions breach of...................... [2.7.370]

Planning and Environment Court (QLD) merits review.................. [2.7.2240] Police Ombudsman investigation of complaints by

immunity under............[2.7.770] standing provisions...........[2.7.370] Order Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Cth), made by..................[2.7.1880]–[2.7.1890] Parliament (Commonwealth) Ombudsman exclusion from jurisdiction of.................................. [2.7.200] report by annual...................... [2.7.710] recommendations, refusal by agency to implement................[2.7.700] Parliament (State) Ombudsman investigations exclusion from jurisdiction of.................................. [2.7.200] referral of question to...................................[2.7.360] Parliament (Territory) Ombudsman, exclusion from jurisdiction of....................[2.7.200] Parties to Proceedings

administrative action, whether.................... [2.7.320] reinvestigatory powers..................... [2.7.250] Privilege Against Self-incrimination administrative proceedings, application in New South Wales...... [2.7.1360] Procedural Fairness Ombudsman investigation, draft report of............................ [2.7.550] tribunals, application to..................................... [2.7.1150] Public Interest discretionary factors......... [2.3.850] exemptions from disclosure........................ [2.3.1480] legislative reference explicit.........[2.3.910], [2.3.930] implicit......................... [2.3.930] objects of legislation....[2.3.920] McKinnon’s case............. [2.3.880], [2.3.900]

joinder of parties administrative decisions...[2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] Personal Information definition......................... [2.3.1210] judicial and tribunal interpretation...................[2.3.1050]

meaning and nature of.....[2.3.850], [2.3.880] reasonableness, link with................. [2.3.755], [2.3.775], [2.3.890] right to information legislation, use in................................[2.3.720], [2.3.750]–[2.3.770],

[References are to paragraph numbers] 484

INDEX

[2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] question of law and fact, appeals on.................................... [2.7.1960] remedial powers.......... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900]

Public Interest – continued

[2.3.1480] constitutive rule for exemptions, role in...... [2.3.770] “harm” and “benefit” tests.............[2.3.830], [2.3.930], [2.3.1500] proscribed factors........[2.3.820], [2.3.840] historical development of..............................[2.3.870] reform legislation, in..............[2.3.1490]–[2.3.1500] textual qualifications on use................................ [2.3.820] Public Interest Immunity case law, non-advertence in....................................... [2.3.860] legislation............................[2.3.10] Ombudsman, investigation by...................................... [2.7.520] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) costs................................ [2.7.2120] Divisions........................... [2.7.930] establishment... [2.7.920], [2.7.930] evidence........[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830] initiation of proceedings formal requirements...[2.7.1470] lodgment.....................[2.7.1480] time limit....................[2.7.1490] extension................[2.7.1500] internal appeals...............[2.7.1940] investigative duties......... [2.7.1410] leave to appeal...............[2.7.2040], [2.7.2060] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] pre-hearing procedure....[2.7.1530],

remittal of proceedings...[2.7.2090] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] standing........ [2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QLD) leave to appeal................[2.7.2040] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT), establishment of................[2.7.930] questions of fact, appeals on.................................... [2.7.1970] remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080] remittal of proceedings...[2.7.2090] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] Remedies Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), under discretionary nature... [2.7.2020] statement of reasons for decision........................ [2.3.340] Reports Ombudsman, by................[2.7.560] adverse comment in, right to be heard before making....[2.7.540] draft report.............. [2.7.550] adverse report, grounds for................ [2.7.570]–[2.7.670]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 485

INDEX

implement........... [2.7.700] inconclusive determination in...................................[2.7.660]

Reports – continued

action contrary to law........................... [2.7.580] defective administrative action....................... [2.7.670] improper purposes...[2.7.610] irrelevant considerations..........[2.7.610] mistake of fact........ [2.7.630] mistake of law.........[2.7.630] reasons for action or decision, failure to give.......................... [2.7.620]

opinion rather than verdict of guilty............................ [2.7.650] Right to Information

“unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory” action....................... [2.7.590] rule of practice, in accordance with..................... [2.7.600] “wrong” action, in relation to..............................[2.7.640] agency response, unsatisfactory............... [2.7.690] draft, availability as..... [2.7.530] higher authority, to...... [2.7.690] implementation agency, copy to....... [2.7.680] higher authority, report to..............................[2.7.690] minister, copy to..... [2.7.680] Parliament, report to annual................. [2.7.710] refusal by agency to implement recommendations...[2.7.700] recommendations limitation on....... [2.7.680] refusal by agency to

access on demand regulative rules........ [2.3.1530]–[2.3.1550], [2.3.2780] Commonwealth..... [2.3.1540] New South Wales..................... [2.3.1550] Queensland............ [2.3.1550] Tasmania................[2.3.1540] access on request rule...... [2.3.580] constitutive rules.........[2.3.960], [2.3.970] qualifications for exempt documents.................. [2.3.1370] regulative rules, objects of.............. [2.3.960], [2.3.1060], [2.3.1070] amendment of private personnel record............[2.3.2990]–[2.3.3020] alteration preserving legibility of previous information.................[2.3.3150] application procedure....................[2.3.3070] Commonwealth..... [2.3.3080] Australian Capital Territory.................[2.3.3090] South Australia......[2.3.3100] Victoria.................. [2.3.3090] Western Australia................ [2.3.3110] discretion to amend... [2.3.3120] expungement of part or whole of record.....................[2.3.3140]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 486

INDEX

Right to Information – continued

factual statements.......[2.3.3050] notation, additional.... [2.3.3130] scope of amendment................. [2.3.3040] statements of opinion....................... [2.3.3060] appeal and review...........[2.3.3160] external review...........[2.3.3190] costs.......................[2.3.3280] first tier merits review.................... [2.3.3230] conferral of jurisdiction on Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT)............. [2.3.3250] legislation......... [2.3.3240] procedural aspects................... [2.3.3200] public interest override..................[2.3.3220] New South Wales................ [2.3.3260] South Australia........... [2.3.3270] internal review jurisdiction.............[2.3.3170] validity of decision..................[2.3.3180] jurisdictional modifications conclusive (Ministerial) certificates..............[2.3.3210] statutory right of appeal on legal issues................. [2.3.3290] applicant, proper........... [2.3.1270]–[2.3.1280] applications..................... [2.3.2790] refusal of request for access......................... [2.3.2940]

refusal to deal further with.............................[2.3.2930] responding to deferral of access.....................[2.3.2880] deletion of exempt material..................[2.3.2890] fact finding method...................[2.3.2850] grant of access in form other than requested....... [2.3.2900] grant of access in full......................... [2.3.2910] notification.............[2.3.2800] refusal to give access.....................[2.3.2920] requirement to clarify access...[2.3.2810]–[2.3.2820] temporal requirements.......... [2.3.2860] third party consultation.......... [2.3.2830], [2.3.2840] time limits............. [2.3.2800] transfer to another agency....................[2.3.2870] understanding request terms...................... [2.3.2820] balancing competing interests............................. [2.3.720] comparison model........[2.3.730] explicit requirement, as..............................[2.3.740] legal issues arising from comparison............ [2.3.1560] matters compared............... [2.3.1520] reform legislation, in............................[2.3.1510] tribunal decisions......... [2.3.640]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 487

INDEX

Right to Information – continued

defence............................ [2.3.1570] disclosure logs................ [2.3.1170] exemptions intergovernmental relations exemption case and qualifications...[2.3.1640]–[2.3.1650] judicial and tribunal commentary...........[2.3.1670] legislation.............. [2.3.1630] New South Wales................ [2.3.1660] Queensland....... [2.3.1660] major government agencies, for............................... [2.3.1570] exemption case requirements.......... [2.3.1580] international relations........... [2.3.1600], [2.3.1610]–[2.3.1620] national security............. [2.3.1590] government contracts constitutive rules for register........................[2.3.1150] “public access period”........................[2.3.1160] publication of information in.................................[2.3.1140] “information”, meaning of.................... [2.3.960], [2.3.1070] international relations..... [2.3.1570] legislation.........................[2.3.580], [2.3.590]–[2.3.600] constitutive rule system.........[2.3.690], [2.3.940], [2.3.950] objects, for.........[2.3.960]–[2.3.1020],

[2.3.1060] Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) scheme.....[2.3.1120] Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) scheme..... [2.3.1130]–[2.3.1190] legal objects................. [2.3.950] quasi-legislation.......... [2.3.610], [2.3.1100] reform legislation Commonwealth “information publication scheme”................. [2.3.1120] constitutive rules... [2.3.1060] diversification........ [2.3.1110] objects of.................[2.3.920] regulative rules............[2.3.690], [2.3.960], [2.3.2770] access on demand system, for........[2.3.1530]–[2.3.1550] access on request rule, legal objects of................[2.3.960], [2.3.1070] legal subjects.........[2.3.1260] objects acted upon......[2.3.950], [2.3.2770] publication and inspection rules, objects of..........[2.3.980]–[2.3.1020], [2.3.1080]–[2.3.1110] State and Territory schemes New South Wales...[2.3.1130]–[2.3.1190] Queensland............ [2.3.1200] structure....... [2.3.690]–[2.3.770] apical provision, link via.......................... [2.3.1530] public interest, role of..............................[2.3.770]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 488

INDEX

of................. [2.3.850], [2.3.880]

Right to Information – continued

structuring choice and evaluation..................... [2.3.720] local government, publication of information on.................. [2.3.1180]–[2.3.1190] national security.............[2.3.1570], [2.3.1590] “open access information” scheme.............................[2.3.1130] personal information exclusion from publication and inspection rules.......... [2.3.1230] identified person, whether living or dead.............[2.3.1220] “personal affairs”....... [2.3.1240] reform legislation, under........[2.3.1210]–[2.3.1230] public interest.................. [2.3.720], [2.3.750] constitutive rules for exemptions, role in...... [2.3.770] discretionary factors.....[2.3.850] exemptions, in..............[2.3.1480]–[2.3.1490] explicit legislative references... [2.3.755], [2.3.910], [2.3.1500] “harm” and “benefit” tests.............[2.3.830], [2.3.930], [2.3.1500] historical context..........[2.3.750] immunity, non-advertence to...................................[2.3.860] implicit legislative references.... [2.3.755], [2.3.930] McKinnon’s case........ [2.3.880], [2.3.900] meaning and nature

proscribed factors........[2.3.820], [2.3.840] historical development of..............................[2.3.870] reasonableness, link with.............[2.3.755], [2.3.775], [2.3.890] textual qualifications....[2.3.820] publication of information constitutive rules..........[2.3.960] judicial and tribunal commentary................[2.3.2980] obligations, range of..............[2.3.2960]–[2.3.2970] publication rule............ [2.3.580] regulative rules...........[2.3.2950] Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), new publication requirements under......................[2.3.2980] reasonableness.................. [2.3.720] explicit legislative references.... [2.3.775], [2.3.930] implicit legislative references.... [2.3.775], [2.3.930] meaning........................[2.3.755] judicial and tribunal interpretation........... [2.3.890] public interest, link with..............[2.3.755], [2.3.890] syntax.......... [2.3.755], [2.3.930] respondent, proper.......... [2.3.1290] corporate juristic entities..... [2.3.1330]–[2.3.1350] “public purpose” for establishment.........[2.3.1350] Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT), under.... [2.3.1300] reform legislation,

[References are to paragraph numbers] 489

INDEX

Right to Information – continued

under...........................[2.3.1360] sources of law.................... [2.3.590]–[2.3.610] Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries Ombudsman, exclusion from jurisdiction of....................[2.7.200] Secrecy access to information, purpose of....................................... [2.3.140] corruption and...................[2.3.150] exemption to right to information, basis for generic exemption clause.......[2.3.2170], [2.3.2200]

Social Security review of decisions Social Services and Child Support Division, AAT..............................[2.1.300] Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) merger into Social Services and Child Support Division, AAT...................................[2.1.300] merit, review of decision on...................................... [2.1.300] South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) appeals............................ [2.7.2070] leave........................... [2.7.2040]

list exemption clause.......[2.3.2170], [2.3.2240] secrecy provisions, application of criminal penalty provisions.............. [2.3.2230] New South Wales..................... [2.3.2180] Queensland............ [2.3.2180] South Australia......[2.3.2230] two-stage analysis...[2.3.2210]–[2.3.2220] Ombudsman complaint, breach relating to...................................[2.7.370] immunity under............[2.7.770] public governance, in....... [2.3.140] Secret “official secret”................. [2.3.140] Small Taxation Claims Tribunal taxation appeals.............. [2.7.2270]

centralised administrative action.................................[2.7.930] commencement................. [2.7.930] costs................................ [2.7.2120] documents pre-hearing disclosure................... [2.7.1530] initiation of proceedings..................... [2.7.1470] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] rehearing, appeal by way of..................................... [2.7.2070] remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] standing........ [2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] summons......................... [2.7.1620] work “streams”................. [2.7.940]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 490

INDEX

remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080] remittal of proceedings...[2.7.2090] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] State Administrative Tribunal (SAT), applicable provisions

Standing Ombudsman, of................ [2.7.370] tribunal proceedings applicants...[2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] respondents.................[2.7.1460] State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) (WA) discretion and appeal rights............................... [2.7.2036] establishment... [2.7.920], [2.7.930] evidence........[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830] initiation of proceedings formal requirements...[2.7.1470] interim orders..................[2.7.2060] investigative duties......... [2.7.1410] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] leave to appeal................[2.7.2040] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] remedial powers.......... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900] standing........ [2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] stare decisis.....................[2.7.1030] statement of reasons....... [2.7.1910] failure to provide....... [2.7.1920] stay orders.... [2.7.1630]–[2.7.1640] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] summons......................... [2.7.1620] workload “streams”.......... [2.7.930] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) immunity from disclosure..... [2.7.1330], [2.7.1380]

application of law and facts............................ [2.7.1090] establishment................[2.7.930] Summons production of documents, for tribunals......................[2.7.1620] tribunals, issued by.........[2.7.1620] Taxation Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Cth), review of decision by costs, awarding of......[2.7.2270] Federal Court appeal procedures, distinguished..........[2.7.2270] referral of questions of law to............................[2.7.2270] formality of procedures.................. [2.7.2270] privacy issues.............[2.7.2270] appeal........... [2.7.2260]–[2.7.2270] costs............................[2.7.2270] formality.....................[2.7.2270] publicity..................... [2.7.2270] type of case................[2.7.2270] Small Taxation Claims Tribunal...........................[2.7.2270] Tribunals

legal professional privilege..................... [2.7.1380] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] public hearings................[2.7.1670]

adjournments...................[2.7.1220] administrative review examples.......................[2.7.910] system, changes to.......[2.7.920]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 491

INDEX

Tribunals – continued

adversarial model of civil litigation, adoption of..... [2.7.1420] agenda management....... [2.7.1080] agreement to resolve proceedings..................... [2.7.1840] appeal by rehearing appeal de novo, distinguished.............. [2.7.1050] appeal rights, notification of..................................... [2.7.1430] appeals to, nature of.................. [2.7.1040]–[2.7.1060] appeals to superior courts...............................[2.7.2010] application for review, effect on decision........................... [2.7.1630] stay of decision..........[2.7.1640] bias.................................. [2.7.1300] centralisation.....................[2.7.920] costs.............. [2.7.2110]–[2.7.2120] critical issues and adverse conclusions, duty to notify...............................[2.7.1270] cross-examination........... [2.7.1240] de novo appeal................[2.7.1040] implications................[2.7.1060] novel issues, raising of............. [2.7.1080], [2.7.1130] rehearing, distinguished.............. [2.7.1050] decision under appeal, necessity for......................................[2.7.970] discontinuance of proceedings..................... [2.7.1840] dismissal of proceedings.................... [2.7.1840], [2.7.1850] reinstatement

following.................... [2.7.1870] documents pre-hearing disclosure...[2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] duty to assist...................[2.7.1280] enabling legislation...........[2.7.950] agenda management, impact on................................[2.7.1080] establishment.................... [2.7.930] evidence admissibility...[2.7.1780]–[2.7.1790] course of.....................[2.7.1730] denial of right to call..............................[2.7.1230] disclosure................... [2.7.1580] discretion to depart from............................[2.7.1310] evaluation...[2.7.1810]–[2.7.1830] experts, from............. [2.7.1750], [2.7.1800], [2.7.1830] externally obtained.....[2.7.1250] form............................[2.7.1740] hearsay.... [2.7.1790], [2.7.1820] legislative rules.......... [2.7.1700] non-statutory rules..... [2.7.1710] reopening after close of hearing........................[2.7.1770] evidentiary rules............ [2.7.1020], [2.7.1710] expert evidence..............[2.7.1750], [2.7.1800] expert members.............. [2.7.1260] fair hearing rule adjournments..............[2.7.1220] assistance to parties... [2.7.1280] before hearing..... [2.7.1180]–[2.7.1200] breach, post-hearing complaints.................. [2.7.1290]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 492

INDEX

internal review.................. [2.7.980]

Tribunals – continued

content........................ [2.7.1160] during hearing..... [2.7.1210]–[2.7.1260] evidence and submissions, presentation of........... [2.7.1230] exception.................... [2.7.1270] functus officio, application of..................................... [2.7.1930] government policy, application of...................[2.7.1110]–[2.7.1120] “Hardiman doctrine”, application of..................................... [2.7.1650] hearing access and publication restrictions..................[2.7.1690] oral or written submissions................ [2.7.1210] preliminary................. [2.7.1610] private.........................[2.7.1680] public..........................[2.7.1670] hearsay......... [2.7.1790], [2.7.1820] immunity from disclosure........................ [2.7.1330] bases from non-disclosure ..................[2.7.1340]–[2.7.1350] New South Wales...... [2.7.1360] pre-hearing statement of reasons........................[2.7.1370] Queensland.................[2.7.1320] Victoria.......................[2.7.1370] Western Australia.......[2.7.1380] information before hearing, inadequacy of..................[2.7.1200] interim orders..................[2.7.2060] interlocutory decisions, appeals from..............[2.7.1990], [2.7.2060] internal appeals...............[2.7.1940]

investigative functions....[2.7.1390] investigative powers....... [2.7.1400] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] jurisdiction........................ [2.7.940] conferral....................... [2.7.960] enabling laws............... [2.7.950] limitations on............ [2.7.970]–[2.7.980] merits review............... [2.1.300] modification or exclusion of powers and rules........[2.7.1000] law and facts as at date of review..............................[2.7.1090] leave to appeal................[2.7.2040] legal professional privilege Western Australia.......[2.7.1380] legislative scheme..............[2.7.940]–[2.7.950] members............................[2.7.930] experts........................ [2.7.1260] merits review.................... [2.1.300] “model litigant” policy........... [2.7.1530], [2.7.1650] no hearing, reasons for... [2.7.1170] notice inadequate, prior to hearing........................[2.7.1180] insufficient.................. [2.7.1190] “official notice” doctrine........................... [2.7.1260] onus of proof................. [2.7.1100], [2.7.1720] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] powers.............................[2.7.1890] procedural.....................[2.7.990] remedial....[2.7.990], [2.7.1890], [2.7.1900]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 493

INDEX

[2.7.1850]

Tribunals – continued

practice and procedure discretion to depart from............................[2.7.1310] pre-hearing procedure.....[2.7.1530] statement of reasons disclosure of........[2.7.1360]–[2.7.1380], [2.7.1530] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] privilege against self-incrimination New South Wales...... [2.7.1360] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] procedural rules subordinate legislation, prescribed by..............[2.7.1140] proceedings, initiation of formal requirements...[2.7.1470] lodgment.....................[2.7.1480] time limit....................[2.7.1490] extension................[2.7.1500] question of fact appeals............................ [2.7.1970] leave to appeal........... [2.7.1980] question of law appeals..........[2.7.1950]–[2.7.1960] original jurisdiction of superior court........................... [2.7.2070] reinstatement of proceedings..................... [2.7.1870] remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080] remedies.......................... [2.7.2000] discretionary factors..... [2.7.2020]–[2.7.2036], [2.7.2100] remittal of proceedings.................... [2.7.1840],

superior courts, from............................[2.7.2090] reopening decision based on jurisdictional error.......... [2.7.1930] reopening evidence or submissions.....................[2.7.1770] representation, right to... [2.7.1660] resolution of applications...[2.7.1840]–[2.7.1860] respondents role............................. [2.7.1650] standing...................... [2.7.1460] review legality of decision.... [2.7.1070] novel issues, raising of............. [2.7.1080], [2.7.1130] right to information, decisions on...................................... [2.3.640] Small Taxation Claims Tribunal...........................[2.7.2270] standard of proof............ [2.7.1810] standing applicants...[2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] respondents.................[2.7.1460] stare decisis doctrine...... [2.7.1030] statement of agreed facts and concessions..................... [2.7.1760] statement of reasons....... [2.7.1910] failure to provide....... [2.7.1920] pre-hearing disclosure................... [2.7.1540] accompanying documents..............[2.7.1560] content................... [2.7.1550] supplementary reasons and documents..............[2.7.1570] stay orders... [2.7.1630]–[2.7.1640], [2.7.2050]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 494

INDEX

representation............. [2.7.1660] powers remedial... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900]

Tribunals – continued

strike out of proceedings..................... [2.7.1860]

pre-hearing disclosure... [2.7.1530], [2.7.1580]–[2.7.1600] preliminary hearings.......[2.7.1610] remedial powers.......... [2.7.1890]–[2.7.1900] remedies

subject matter of dispute...............................[2.7.910] substantive law and policy............[2.7.1010]–[2.7.1030] summons issued by........ [2.7.1620] superior court decisions, duty to follow.............................. [2.7.1020]

discretion where alternative available..................... [2.7.2033] remittal of proceedings...[2.7.2090] representation of parties..............................[2.7.1660] standing........ [2.7.1440]–[2.7.1450] stare decisis.....................[2.7.1030] statement of reasons for decision under review................... [2.7.1910] failure to provide....... [2.7.1920]

witnesses cross-examination of................................ [2.7.1240] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) costs, award of................[2.7.2120] Divisions........................... [2.7.930] documents pre-hearing disclosure................... [2.7.1530] establishment... [2.7.920], [2.7.930] evidence........[2.7.1700]–[2.7.1830] hearing public, in.................... [2.7.1680] initiation of proceedings

stay orders... [2.7.1630]–[2.7.1640], [2.7.2050] subordinate legislation.... [2.7.1140] summons......................... [2.7.1620] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) government policy, giving effect to......................................[2.7.1110] immunity from disclosure..... [2.7.1330], [2.7.1370] procedural fairness..........[2.7.1150] remedial powers of superior courts...............................[2.7.2080]

formal requirements...[2.7.1470] lodgment.....................[2.7.1480] time limit....................[2.7.1490] extension................[2.7.1500] interim orders..................[2.7.2060] investigative powers....... [2.7.1400] joinder of parties........... [2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520] leave to appeal................[2.7.2040] orders by consent............[2.7.1880] parties to review joinder......[2.7.1510]–[2.7.1520]

remittal of proceedings...[2.7.2090] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), establishment of....................................... [2.7.930] Words and Phrases administrative action........ [2.7.190] administrative law

[References are to paragraph numbers] 495

INDEX

Words and Phrases – continued

system................................. [2.1.10] administrative purpose....[2.3.3030] Cabinet exemption..........[2.3.1390] conduct of a public authority............................ [2.7.190]

government policy.......... [2.7.1110] information......................[2.3.1070] material findings of fact... [2.3.430] misleading.......................[2.3.3030] record.............................. [2.3.3030] statement of reasons......... [2.3.300]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 496

Words and Phrases [References are to paragraph numbers]

A

access grant decision.............................................................................. [2.3.3170] access-on-demand rules............................................................................[2.3.600] access on demand...................................................................................[2.3.2770] access on request rule.............................................................................. [2.3.580] access on request...................................................................................... [2.3.580] access refusal decision........................................................................... [2.3.3170] access to documents............................................................................... [2.3.2820] access to information legislation............................................................. [2.3.140] adequacy of reasons............................................................................... [2.3.3230] adequate explanation.............................................................................. [2.3.3230] administrative act.....................................................................[2.7.210], [2.7.220] administrative action.............................................. [2.7.190], [2.7.300], [2.7.320] administrative character............................................................................[2.7.270] administrative law system.......................................................................... [2.1.10] administrative purpose........................................................................... [2.3.3030] adversarial manner..................................................................................[2.3.3160] affected third party................................................................................. [2.3.3170] agency information guide.......................................................................[2.3.2970] agency....................................................................................................... [2.7.210] amendment and correction of personal information............................. [2.3.2770] appears to have been contrary to law......................................................[2.7.300] authority................................................................................... [2.7.210], [2.7.240]

B balance model...........................................................................................[2.3.730] balance...................................................................................... [2.3.720], [2.3.730] balancing...................................................................................................[2.3.730]

497

WORDS AND PHRASES

benefit test.................................................................................................[2.3.740] body...........................................................................................................[2.7.190] business affairs exemptions....................................................................[2.3.2720] business days.......................................................................................... [2.3.3170]

C

calendar days....................................................................... [2.3.2790], [2.3.3170] cogent...................................................................................[2.3.3240], [2.3.3250] commercial activities..............................................................................[2.3.2750] commercial value....................................................................................[2.3.2660] Commonwealth-controlled companies.....................................................[2.7.190] Commonwealth record............................................................................. [2.3.450] competitive disadvantage....................................................................... [2.3.2680] conclusive certificates.............................................................................[2.3.2940] conduct......................................................................................................[2.7.190] considerations......................................................................................... [2.3.2720] constitutive rule........................................................................................ [2.3.190] constitutive rules......................................................................[2.3.190], [2.3.690] constitutive system.................................................................. [2.3.740], [2.3.770] constructive possession.......................................................................... [2.3.1040] contain.......................................................................................................[2.3.960] could reasonably be expected to............................................................[2.3.2730]

D decision of an administrative character................................................... [2.7.280] decision..................................................................................................... [2.3.415] decisions of an administrative character..................................................[2.7.270] deemed refusal........................................................................................[2.3.2940] deeming provisions...................................................................................[2.3.955] delegation..................................................................................................[2.7.190] disadvantage............................................................................................[2.3.2680] disclosure log..........................................................................................[2.3.2970] disclosure officer.......................................................................................[2.7.370] document.........................[2.3.950], [2.3.960], [2.3.1030], [2.3.2940], [2.3.3030] documents.............................................................................. [2.3.960], [2.3.3030] [References are to paragraph numbers] 498

WORDS AND PHRASES

E entitled.................................................................................................... [2.3.2790] excluded person........................................................................................ [2.7.210] exempt document......................................................................................[2.3.740] exempt person or body.............................................................................[2.7.210] exempt.......................................................................................................[2.3.740] exemption...............................................................................[2.3.940], [2.3.2940] exhaustive legal definitions...................................................................... [2.3.955] expose to competitive disadvantage...................................................... [2.3.2680] expose.................................................................................. [2.3.2680], [2.3.2690] external party.......................................................................................... [2.3.3170]

F factors......................................................................................................[2.3.2720] fairness....................................................................................[2.3.890], [2.3.2700] financial or property affairs....................................................................[2.3.2730] financial or property interests................................................................ [2.3.2730] first tier external review......................................................................... [2.3.3160] first tier of external merits review......................................................... [2.3.3230] freedom of information.............................................................................. [2.3.10] fundamental rule.......................................................................................[2.3.700]

G grounds......................................................................................................[2.3.420]

H harm test................................................................................................... [2.3.740] harm........................................................................................................ [2.3.2700] holding...................................................................................................... [2.3.970] Howard factors......................................................................................... [2.3.850]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 499

WORDS AND PHRASES

I inclusive legal definitions.........................................................................[2.3.955] incomplete...............................................................................................[2.3.3030] information resources group.................................................................... [2.3.990] information statement.............................................................................[2.3.1000] information............................................................[2.3.950], [2.3.960], [2.3.3040] internal review........................................................................................ [2.3.3160] internal rules information.........................................................................[2.3.990] investigative manner...............................................................................[2.3.3160] irrelevant................................................................................................. [2.3.3080]

J judicial function of government...............................................................[2.7.270] judicial process......................................................................................... [2.7.270]

L leaning approach.......................................................................................[2.3.850] legal object................................................................................................[2.3.950]

M make a fresh decision.............................................................................[2.3.3170] material findings of fact........................................................................... [2.3.415] material..................................................................................................... [2.3.415] matter of administration...... [2.7.190], [2.7.210], [2.7.260], [2.7.270], [2.7.280], [2.7.290], [2.7.300],[2.7.310], [2.7.340] ministerial responsibility.......................................................................... [2.7.240] misleading............................................................................................... [2.3.3030] multi-facet.................................................................................................[2.3.880]

O officer of the Commonwealth...................................................................[2.1.140] officer of the Parliament...........................................................................[2.7.800] [References are to paragraph numbers] 500

WORDS AND PHRASES

Ombudsman Scheme................................................................................ [2.7.190] ontology.................................................................................................... [2.3.190] open...........................................................................................................[2.3.900] oppressive................................................................................................. [2.7.590] organisational information bearing group................................................[2.3.990]

P period...................................................................................................... [2.3.3170] person affected........................................................................................[2.3.3170] person aggrieved.....................................................................................[2.3.3170] personal affairs.....................................................................[2.3.1020], [2.3.3000] personal information.............................................[2.3.190], [2.3.960], [2.3.3000] personal...................................................................................................[2.3.1020] person........................................................................................................[2.3.190] policy document....................................................................................... [2.3.990] policy........................................................................................................ [2.7.290] possession................................................................................................ [2.3.1040] power to amend...................................................................................... [2.3.2810] practicable...............................................................................................[2.3.2890] practice......................................................................................................[2.7.290] prejudice..................................................................................................[2.3.2710] prescribed action.......................................................................................[2.3.580] prescribed authority................................................................. [2.7.210], [2.7.220] private interest.......................................................................................... [2.3.750] private..................................................................................................... [2.3.1020] proactive disclosure.................................................................................. [2.3.180] proactive publication................................................................................ [2.3.180] proper understanding.............................................................................. [2.3.3030] public authority........................................................................[2.7.210], [2.7.250] public interest test.................................................................................... [2.3.770] public interest..... [2.3.720], [2.3.750], [2.3.755], [2.3.820], [2.3.850], [2.3.860], [2.3.870],[2.3.880], [2.3.890], [2.3.900], [2.3.910], [2.3.930], [2.3.3220] public officer............................................................................................. [2.7.250] publication rule.........................................................................................[2.3.580] publication............................................................................................... [2.3.2770] [References are to paragraph numbers] 501

WORDS AND PHRASES

pull model.................................................................................................[2.3.180] push model................................................................................................[2.3.180]

Q qualitative................................................................................................[2.3.3280] quantifiable valuation............................................................................. [2.3.2660] quantitative..............................................................................................[2.3.3280] quasi-legislation........................................................................................ [2.3.610]

R rational evaluation................................................................... [2.3.890], [2.3.900] rationality.................................................................................................. [2.3.890] rationally bears......................................................................................... [2.3.900] reasonable expectation..............................................................................[2.3.890] reasonable grounds............................................... [2.3.890], [2.3.900], [2.3.3210] reasonable period......................................................................................[2.3.775] reasonableness........................................................ [2.3.720], [2.3.890], [2.3.900] reasonable...... [2.3.775], [2.3.890], [2.3.900], [2.3.2690], [2.3.2700], [2.3.2930] reasonably.............................................................................. [2.3.890], [2.3.2730] reasons..................................................................................... [2.3.415], [2.3.420] record.................................................................... [2.3.950], [2.3.960], [2.3.3030] records.....................................................................................................[2.3.3030] refusal......................................................................................................[2.3.2790] regulative rules......................................................................................... [2.3.690] relevant......................................................................................................[2.3.900] report.........................................................................................................[2.7.550] requires....................................................................................................[2.3.3220] res gestae.................................................................................................. [2.3.450] reveal.......................................................................................................[2.3.1860] reviewable decision............................................................. [2.3.3170], [2.3.3230] right to information legislation..................................................[2.3.10], [2.3.580] right to information.................................................................................. [2.3.750] right.........................................................................................................[2.3.2860] routine disclosure....................................................................................[2.3.1100] [References are to paragraph numbers] 502

WORDS AND PHRASES

S second tier external review.................................................................... [2.3.3160] second tier of external merits review.................................................... [2.3.3230] some-agency exemptions........................................................................[2.3.2720] special circumstances............................................................................... [2.7.400] State employees........................................................................................ [2.7.330] statement of reasons legislation................................................................. [2.3.10] statement of reasons.................................................................. [2.3.10], [2.3.300] statement................................................................................................... [2.3.960] structural information............................................................................... [2.3.990] substantial adverse effect....................................[2.3.820], [2.3.2730], [2.3.2760] substantial............................................................................................... [2.3.2760] sufficient direct interest............................................................................ [2.7.370] sufficient interest.......................................................................................[2.7.370] sufficient personal interest........................................................................[2.7.370]

U under an enactment.................................................................................. [2.3.310] unreasonable workload...........................................................................[2.3.2930] unreasonable.......................................................................... [2.3.890], [2.3.2760] unreasonably affect................................................................................. [2.3.2700] unreasonably............................................................................................. [2.3.820]

W want of jurisdiction.................................................................................. [2.7.790] what-counts-as-requirements................ [2.3.190], [2.3.755], [2.3.940], [2.3.953], [2.3.960] working days....................................................................... [2.3.2790], [2.3.3170] would on balance be contrary to the public interest...............................[2.3.740] would on balance be in the public interest............................................. [2.3.740] wrong........................................................................................................ [2.7.640]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 503

504