Torts : the laws of Australia [Third edition.] 9780455238487, 0455238480

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TORTS THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA

THIRD EDITION

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TORTS THE LAWS OF AUSTRALIA

THIRD EDITION DR PAUL VOUT BA, LLB, SJD (Syd) Member, Victorian Bar Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales

Published in Sydney by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited ABN 64 058 914 668 19 Harris Street, Pyrmont, NSW 2009 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Vout, Paul T., editor. Torts : the laws of Australia / Paul Vout (editor). 3rd edition. ISBN: 9789780455238487 (paperback). Includes bibliographical references and index. Torts – Australia – Textbooks 346.9403 © Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited 2016 This publication is copyright. Other than for the purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. All legislative material herein is reproduced by permission but does not purport to be the official or authorised version. It is subject to Commonwealth of Australia copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) permits certain reproduction or publication of Commonwealth legislation. In particular, s 182A of the Act enables a complete copy to be made by or on behalf of a particular person. For reproduction or publication beyond that permitted by the Act, permission should be sought in writing. Requests should be submitted online at http://www.ag.gov.au/cca, faxed to (02) 6250 5989 or mailed to Commonwealth Copyright Administration, Copyright Law Branch, Attorney-General’s Department, Robert Garran Offices, National Circuit, Barton ACT 2600. Product Managers: Paul Gye, Thien Thu Luc Team Leader: Maki Watanabe Book Project Leader: Shannon Kelly Legal Editors: Adam Dallas, Shannon Kelly, Ivy Ling, Ruth Moraes, Meng Yen Phua, Craig Ryan Senior Production Editor: Wade Macquine Production Editorial Services: Maximum Data Svcs Phils Inc Index: Puddingburn Publishing Services Pty Ltd Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW 2210

Quick Reference Directory

33.1 Tort and Contract

33.2 Negligence

Quick Reference Directory This quick reference directory helps identify the location of Subtitles within this book. For a complete User’s Guide, see p xix. For a complete Table of Contents, see p xxi.

33.3 Occupiers’ Liability

33.4 Product Liability

33.5 Breach of Statutory Duty

33.6 Strict Liability

33.7 Nuisance

33.8 Trespass and Intentional Torts

33.9 Defences

33.10 Damages

33.11 Concurrent Torts

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Foreword The Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG In October 2007, I wrote the foreword to the second edition of this work. At the time, I was still serving as a Justice of the High Court of Australia and had no formal connection with The Laws of Australia (TLA) series. The editor of that edition of Torts was Dr Paul Vout of the Victorian Bar, who had earlier served as one of my associates when I was President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. I admired his analytical skills and his industry. I expressed deep appreciation for his clear thinking about the categories and rules that make up the law of torts. Now, nearly ten years after this work’s second edition, I endorse its third. In doing so, I acknowledge the many times during the intervening decade that I have had recourse to the earlier second edition. These works bring clarity to the otherwise chaotic modern law of torts in Australia, making the whole appear seamlessly united and coherent, when the opposite is often the case. TLA is the premier legal encyclopaedia for the Australian legal profession. It relies on experienced members of the practising legal profession to author and update the titles and subtitles into which the detail of the law is divided. Working closely and in harmony with the dedicated editors of Thomson Reuters (themselves skilled lawyers), it selects the most relevant cases, statutory provisions and other sources of law from the myriad available. The encyclopaedia conceptualises the subdivisions of topics in ways that will be congenial and helpful to users. It presents the resulting material in a discursive form, but under headings and subheadings that are designed to take the reader quickly to areas of need. I pay tribute to all of the editors and authors who work on the TLA project, and specifically to those who have contributed to the close analysis of the law of torts in Australia, as is found in these pages. In the decade since the last edition of Torts, many things have changed, both in the law and in the way in which the legal profession uses texts such as this. One of the largest changes has been a shift in how the encyclopaedia is consumed: from the looseleaf hard copy system that existed in 2007 to the electronic presentation of the work that predominates today. With the rise of the electronic version of TLA came a demand from subscribers for more up-to-date material and the expectation that computerised material would be immediately current and easily accessible. This presents a huge challenge in maintaining an encyclopaedia of law, due to the constant emergence of new cases and fresh statutes. It means that authors of a book such as this one must be vigilant to check that nothing significant has changed in the law since the date of publication. Fortunately, new technology

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itself – with search engines and an abundance of online legal data – makes it easier to remain up-to-date than was the case when I began my legal journey. New technology has also brought about the means of regularly producing new “dropout” monographs such as this text. In the past, producing a book of encyclopaedic knowledge about the law was something of a nightmare, because of the need to scrupulously check thousands of citations over and over again. Now much of that production process has already been completed for the looseleaf version of the text. Experience has taught me that, however accomplished with new technology and demanding of current content as they may be, legal practitioners still like hard copy books to collect the law as it stands at a given time. In publishing monographs through this “dropout” process, new editions are easier to produce, and thus can be more frequent than they were in the past. I congratulate Thomson Reuters on supplementing the TLA service by producing highly valuable texts such as the present, and so providing access to it for non-subscribers of the looseleaf product. I know from my own use of this book that it is a constant resource of invaluable material and analysis. Presenting the titles and subtitles so clearly necessarily provokes the mind of the reader to question some of the directions taken by the law – and to consider the needs of law reform. The grand reform of much of the law of torts, proposed in 1974 by the National Accident Compensation Inquiry of Sir Owen Woodhouse ONZ KBE DSC and Sir Geoffrey Palmer KCMG AC QC was never adopted in Australia. Some of the reforms that have been adopted by statute appear to have been motivated less by simplification and modernisation of the law of torts than by a reduction in “green slip” insurance costs for politicians and short-sighted electors, who complain about the system until they or their families need to rely on it. As the last edition of this text enters its tenth year, and this latest edition begins its first, many Australian and international experts on the law of torts gather at the University of Cambridge, England, for the Eighth Biennial Conference on the Law of Obligations. Ten major changes that have come about in this discipline in recent decades will be discussed there. The changes include: (1)

the decline in the unifying role of the House of Lords and the Privy Council in the Commonwealth;

(2)

the rise of wider comparative law sources;

(3)

clearer acknowledgment of the legislative creative role of the judge in expressing the common law;

(4)

the impact of human rights law and of judicial review on concepts of law;

(5)

the decline and fall of the civil jury trial for resolving factual disputes;

(6)

new approaches to the construction of expanding legislative provisions;

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FOREWORD

(7)

the adoption of greater realism about the function of tort law;

(8)

the intrusion of artificial statutory limitations on liability;

(9)

the impact of new technology on the law; and

(10) the greater inclination of lawyers and litigants to criticise and to express high expectations of “justice” in the law. These, and doubtless many other changes, mean that the law of torts, in practice, continues to change and adapt to new times and new expectations. These phenomena will lead, in shorter catch up times, to new editions of this work to help the busy legal practitioner and judge form a foundation for their research into the law of torts. I once again congratulate Paul Vout, and thank all those who have contributed to this volume. Jeremy Bentham espoused the idea of a legal encyclopaedia that would bypass those whom he disparagingly called “Judge & Co”. It would, he hoped, allow the law to speak about its rules more clearly and directly to the people governed by it. We are by no means close to realising Bentham’s dream as yet. But TLA and works like this book are precious steps in the right direction.

THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL KIRBY AC CMG Former Justice of the High Court of Australia Editor in Chief of The Laws of Australia June 2016

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Preface In the minds of many lawyers and law students, the law of torts is a largely settled chapter of Australian law. After the triumph of the “salient features” test over “proximity” as the touchstone for the existence of a duty of care in novel cases1 and the statutory reforms of negligence following the Ipp Report,2 there is little to excite in contemporary torts law, right? Wrong. Since the last edition of this text was published in August 2007, the full court of the High Court has heard and determined approximately 50 negligence cases. Further cases involving the law of nuisance,3 trespass to land4 and the intersection of a putative duty of care with the law of assault, battery and false imprisonment5 have been considered by that court. Four cases illustrate the range and complexity of issues considered by Australian appellate courts in the field of torts since the second edition. In case 1, police found V in his car in a lonely beachside car park in the early hours of the morning. There was a hose running from the exhaust pipe into a window. V was writing something. The keys were in the ignition but the engine was off and the car was cold. The two officers talked to V for about 15 minutes. V admitted that he had been contemplating suicide but told them that he had changed his mind. He refused to show the officers what he had been writing. V also declined offers of assistance, including an offer to telephone his wife. The officers had power under s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic)6 to apprehend a person who appeared to be mentally ill if they had reasonable grounds for believing that the person was likely to attempt suicide. The officers did not exercise that power. They allowed V to leave. Later that afternoon, V took his own life at home. The officers’ patrol duty sheet recorded that V had no psychiatric history but contained the word “depressed” without elaboration. The officers testified in a proceeding commenced by V’s wife that they did not think that V was mentally ill. Were the officers negligent in failing to exercise their statutory power?7 In case 2, the Supreme Court of New South Wales ordered K, a previously convicted violent offender, to be detained for six months under the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) by way of preventative detention. That Act was found to be unconstitutional8 and K sued the State of New South Wales for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Was the Supreme Court of New South Wales acting executively or judicially when it made the order for preventative detention? Was the order valid until set aside by the High Court? Or was it invalid ab initio, entitling K to damages for false imprisonment from the moment of his detention?9 Case 3 concerned a farm that was certified as “organic”. It was surrounded by xi

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farms sown with canola crops, including genetically modified (GM) crops. The organic farmer had never grown canola. In 2008, the organic farmer was advised that GM canola plants growing from seeds blown onto his farm could threaten his organic certification. From November 2010, canola swathes (stalks with seeds) were found on the farmer’s property after his neighbour’s GM canola crop has been swathed (ie cut). The stalks were tested and found to be GM. In December 2010, a large portion of the farmer’s land was decertified. Did the farmer’s neighbour commit a nuisance by planting, swathing or failing to control seeds blown from his GM canola? Did he negligently cause the loss of the farmer’s organic certification?10 In the final case, a solicitor prepared a will for D. The solicitor was instructed that the entirety of D’s estate was to be bequeathed to C, the son of D’s de facto partner, whom D treated as his own son. The solicitor failed to ask D whether there were any family members who might make a family provision claim on his estate. D’s principle assets were two properties he owned as tenant in common in equal shares with C. After D’s death, his estranged daughter successfully claimed a large portion of the estate under the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas). C sued the solicitor, claiming the solicitor had negligently failed to advise D of the possibility that his daughter might make a claim under the Act and the options available to him to reduce or extinguish his estate so as to avoid such a claim. In particular, C alleged that the solicitor failed to advise D that he could avoid exposing his estate to a claim under the Act either by converting his and C’s interests in the two properties to joint tenancies, so that those properties would pass to the respondent by survivorship, or by making inter vivos gifts to C.11 Was the solicitor negligent? The first mentioned case, Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, considered the interrelationship between a statutory power conferred on police and the existence or otherwise of a duty to exercise it in certain situations. It also dealt with the fraught issue of suicide and whether liability for its occurrence extends beyond situations such as death in custody. The second case, New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26, examined the nature and effect of the orders of a superior court of record, and liability for false imprisonment in the event that the orders of that court are void from the date they are made, where found to be unconstitutional. The third case, Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, considered the reasonableness of an interference with the organic farmer’s property rights by way of contamination from neighbouring land during harvest, and traversed the contemporary and passionate topic of GM crops. The final case, Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, tested the applicability of the decision in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487 and considered the range of possible scenarios a solicitor can reasonably be expected to anticipate when giving advice and whether instructions in response to that advice can be inferred.

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In Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra, the High Court held that the police officers owed no duty of care to either the deceased nor his widow. They did not negligently fail to exercise their power under the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) to apprehend Mr Veenstra. Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated that the proposed duty would mark a significant departure from an underlying value of the common law which gives primacy to personal autonomy, for its performance would have the officers control conduct of Mr Veenstra deliberately directed at himself. ... [T]here is no general duty to rescue.12

Crennan and Kiefel JJ concluded that s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) required that there be an opinion, held by a police officer, that the plaintiff’s husband was mentally ill when he was observed. “Depending on the circumstances, a person who has attempted, or is likely to attempt, suicide may or may not satisfy the criteria of mental illness in s 8.”13 Their Honours found that, since neither officer had formed the view that Mr Veenstra was mentally ill, the power to apprehend under s 10, and thus the power to avoid the self-harm, was not available.14 In New South Wales v Kable, the High Court held that, in issuing a preventative detention order, the Supreme Court of New South Wales was acting judicially, not executively.15 It held further that such an order, being an order of a superior court of record, remains valid until set aside.16 Since the preventative detention order was valid until set aside, Mr Kable was not entitled to damages for false imprisonment in connection with the time he was detained pursuant to the order and the High Court found it unnecessary to consider the issue further.17 In Marsh v Baxter, the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, by majority (Newnes and Murphy JJA, McLure P dissenting), upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the spread of GM canola swathes onto the organic farmer’s land did not constitute a nuisance by his neighbour. After succinctly summarizing the current law of private nuisance,18 Newnes and Murphy JJA found that the GM canola swathes which were transferred to the appellants’ land were benign in the sense that there was no risk of any genetic transfer to any species of animal, crop or produce. There was also no prospect that the GM canola seeds could germinate and become a volunteer plant before the appellants harvested their wheat in early 2011.19

Accordingly, their Honours found there was no unreasonable interference with the appellant’s use and enjoyment of his land.20 Alternatively, they held, the organic farmer’s claim should fail because his operation was “abnormally sensitive to such an incursion”.21 By majority, the Court also rejected the claim in negligence, Newnes and Murphy JJA holding that a reasonable person in the position of the respondent would not have harvested his GM canola crop by a different method (“direct heading” rather than swathing) for the benefit of the organic farmer.22 Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused.23 In Badenach v Calvert, the High Court held that the solicitor was not negligent. French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ reasoned that:

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Whilst advice about the possibility of a claim against his estate is clearly relevant in the context of the retainer, advice about how to avoid such a claim by inter vivos transactions with property interests is not. From the solicitor’s perspective it could not be assumed that the client would need this latter advice. The respondent’s case, understandably, is not put on the basis that the client, on hearing that a claim by the daughter was a mere possibility, would have instructed the solicitor that he wished to take all lawful steps to defeat such a claim. Such an approach is understandable because there is no way of knowing what the client’s instructions would have been.24

The plurality also found an issue with causation, stating that: Even if it be accepted that the solicitor came under a duty to advise the client in the terms alleged, it cannot be concluded, on the balance of probabilities, what course of action the client would then have taken.25

They concluded that the putative duty was not one that applied to the respondent by analogy with Hill v Van Erp.26 Separately, Gordon J noted: Hill v Van Erp is not authority for the proposition that a solicitor instructed to prepare a will always owes a duty of care to an intended beneficiary. The facts of that case were particular, and the duty of care to the intended beneficiary found to exist was limited.27

The appeal was allowed.28 Together these cases demonstrate that tort law and, in particular, the law of negligence, continues to apply to matters of great human significance, to the impacts of the latest technology, the constitutional place and power of the courts and the practice of law by the profession in an increasingly litigious society. In short, they illustrate that the law of torts is as important, as relevant and as dynamic as it has ever been. I am proud to continue as editor of Torts: The Laws of Australia into this third edition, under the guiding hand of editor-in-chief, the Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG. The contributing authors have given much time, thought and effort in upholding the currency of materials contained in this new edition and it shows. The propositional style of exposition and analysis of the law of torts found in this series, as distinct from the format of traditional text books, remains – in my view – a valuable and unique tool for both students and practitioners of the law in the second decade of the 21st century. PAUL VOUT

1 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59. 2 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 1 June 2016). 3 Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; 82 ALJR 1259; [2008] HCA 36. 4 Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; 82 ALJR 1021; [2008] HCA 26. xiv

PREFACE

5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

15

16

17

18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28

CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (t/as Tandara Motor Inn) v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 1; [2009] HCA 47. Since replaced by the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic). Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15. Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; 70 ALJR 814. New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26. Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169. Special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 12 February 2016: Marsh v Baxter [2016] HCATrans 22. Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18. Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [87]–[88]. Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [147]. Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [149]–[150]. See “Negligence” [33.2.320], [33.2.1105] and [33.2.1340] of this edition. New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [27]; Gageler J at [70]. New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [32]; Gageler J at [56]. New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ at [43]. See “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.1700]. Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA at [765]–[774]; see also McLure P at [241]–[257]. Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA at [780]. Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA at [782]. Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA at [783]. Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA at [748]. See “Interference with Use and Enjoyment of Property Rights” [33.7.180]. Marsh v Baxter [2016] HCATrans 22. Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ at [31]. Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ at [34]. Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ at [42]–[49]. Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, Gageler J at [84]. See a discussion of Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18 in the context of the existence or extent of a duty of care at “Standard of Care” [33.2.1513].

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Acknowledgments Torts – The Laws of Australia is also published in The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia as Title 33 Torts. The publisher wishes to acknowledge the following: The Laws of Australia Current Editor-in-Chief The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG BA, LLM (Hons), BEc (Syd), Hon D Litt (Newcastle, Ulster, James Cook), Hon LLD (Macq, Syd, NLSU India, Buckingham, ANU, UNSW, Murdoch, Indiana, Melb, UTS, Bond, Colombo, Victoria, Deakin, Monash, Queen’s (Ontario)), Hon D Univ (UniSA, Southern Cross, Griffith, La Trobe, CQU), FIAMA, FAAL, Hon FASSA, Hon FAAH, Hon Bencher of the Inner Temple Former Justice of the High Court of Australia The Laws of Australia Founding Editor-in-Chief John A Riordan BA, LLB, Dip Law (Oxon) Barrister-at-Law Title 33 Torts Title Editors Geoff Masel BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Title Editor 1993 – 2001) Dr Helen Grant LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD (Qld) Lecturer, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland (Title Editor 2002 – 2003) Dr Paul Vout BA, LLB, SJD (Syd) Member, Victorian Bar Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Northern Ireland, England and Wales (Title Editor 2006 – present)

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User’s Guide Background Torts – The Laws of Australia is also published in The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia as Title 33 Torts.

Style Each numbered paragraph of this book begins with a bold-text summary statement, which is then expanded upon in the rest of the paragraph. Each paragraph generally contains a legal principle and, where appropriate, identifies and references the key legislation and leading case law relevant to each Australian jurisdiction, that is, the Commonwealth, States and mainland Territories. These references are mostly found in the footnotes accompanying each numbered paragraph. Paragraphs are uniquely and sequentially numbered throughout the work, starting at [33.1.10] (meaning paragraph 10 of Subtitle 33.1). References in the Tables of Cases and Legislation, the Bibliography, the Index, and the Table of Words and Phrases are to paragraph numbers. Note that in The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia, paragraphs typically occur in gaps of 10: for example, [33.1.10], [33.1.20], [33.1.30]. In the encyclopaedia, this allows room for the insertion of additional commentary paragraphs between the gaps in future updates. Where such insertions have taken place, variations may therefore occur in the normal gapping sequence: for example, [33.2.1510], [33.2.1513], [33.2.1516], [33.2.1520], [33.2.1525], [33.2.1530], [33.2.1540]. This feature of The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia may occur at various points in this book. The main Table of Contents for the book refers to page numbers. A more detailed Table of Contents, referring to paragraph numbers, is provided at the beginning of the Subtitle.

Cross-referencing This book contains extensive cross-references to paragraphs within the book (eg “see [33.6.460]”), and also more widely to content from other Subtitles (or parts of Subtitles) of The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia (eg “Application of Limitation Acts” [5.10.260]–[5.10.320]). These and other references to material published throughout the 36 Titles of The Laws of Australia encyclopaedia (eg 2 Administrative Law) are used to guide you to related areas of law in the entire encyclopaedic work.

Currency Torts – The Laws of Australia is current to 1 June 2016.

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USER’S GUIDE

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xx

Table of Contents Foreword ..................................................................................... Preface......................................................................................... Acknowledgments ........................................................................ User’s Guide ............................................................................... Table of Cases ............................................................................. Table of Legislation ....................................................................

Page vii xi xvii xix xxiii clxxxvii

33.1 Torts and Contract Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Concurrent Liability.................................................................... Damages in Tort and Contract....................................................

3 5 11 15

33.2 Negligence Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Duty of Care: General Principles ............................................... Misstatements.............................................................................. Nature of Loss............................................................................. Particular Defendants.................................................................. Particular Plaintiff Interests ........................................................ Breach of Duty of Care ..............................................................

35 37 51 77 123 137 167 185

33.3 Occupiers’ Liability Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Causes of Action ......................................................................... Defences ......................................................................................

225 227 231 259

33.4 Product Liability Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Contract ....................................................................................... Negligence................................................................................... Statutory Liability of Suppliers and Manufacturers .................. Misleading or Deceptive Conduct and Unfair Practices ........... Product Recall and Safety Standards .........................................

267 269 273 281 305 331 333

33.5 Breach of Statutory Duty Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Cause of Action........................................................................... Defences ......................................................................................

343 345 349 369

33.6 Strict Liability Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Principles ..................................................................................... Animals ....................................................................................... Vicarious Liability.......................................................................

377 379 383 393 423

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33.7 Nuisance Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Private Nuisance ......................................................................... Public Nuisance........................................................................... Parties .......................................................................................... Defences ...................................................................................... Remedies ..................................................................................... 33.8 Trespass and Intentional Torts Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Intention and Related Concepts.................................................. Trespass ....................................................................................... Torts to Chattels .......................................................................... Economic Torts ........................................................................... False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process......................................................................................... Miscellaneous Torts ....................................................................

Page 447 449 455 475 481 491 501 519 521 525 531 575 605 635 705

33.9 Defences Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Intentional Torts .......................................................................... Negligence...................................................................................

721 723 725 777

33.10 Damages Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Types of Damages....................................................................... Form and Scope of Damages ..................................................... Factors in Assessment of Damages ............................................ Personal Injury ............................................................................ Loss of Reputation...................................................................... Survival Actions.......................................................................... Interests in Property.................................................................... Economic Loss............................................................................ Equitable Damages in Tort ......................................................... Limitations on Compensation..................................................... Alternatives to Damages.............................................................

811 813 819 837 843 865 899 903 909 929 943 947 973

33.11 Concurrent Torts Table of Contents ........................................................................ Introduction ................................................................................. Classification of Multiple Tortfeasors ........................................ Contribution.................................................................................

979 981 983 995

Bibliography................................................................................ Index ............................................................................................ Words and Phrases......................................................................

1015 1039 1093

xxii

Table of Cases [References are to paragraph numbers]

A A, Re (1990) 72 DLR (4th) 722............................................................ [33.9.230] A v National Blood Authority (No 1) [2001] 3 All ER 289................. [33.4.730] A v New South Wales (2005) 63 NSWLR 681; [2005] NSWCA 292....................................................................................................[33.8.1860] A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10....................[33.8.150], [33.8.190], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1880], [33.8.1920] A (children) (conjoined twins: medical treatment) (No 1), Re [2001] Fam 147; [2001] 2 WLR 480............................................................................ [33.9.340] A Woodley Osteopathic Services Pty Ltd v Transport Accident Commission [2013] VSCA 350.............................................................................. [33.6.300] AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 574................[33.10.210] AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507; [1993] 2 WLR 507............................................ [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.210] AB v Tameside & Glossop Health Authority [1997] 8 Med LR 91... [33.2.1310] Abbott v Arcus (1948) 50 WALR 41.................................. [33.7.240], [33.7.850] Abbott v Freeman (1876) 35 LT 783.....................................................[33.6.290] Abbott v Refuge Assurance Co [1962] 1 QB 432; [1961] 3 WLR 1240.................................................................................... [33.8.1860] Abela v Giew (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 485; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 235.....................................................................................[33.5.10], [33.5.150] Abington v Lipscomb (1841) 1 QB 776; 113 ER 1328........................ [33.8.790] ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65.......................................................................[33.2.640], [33.2.680] Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436................. [33.4.730] Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440................ [33.8.1870], [33.8.1920] Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1886) 11 App Cas 247.......... [33.8.1870], [33.8.1920] ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274................................................................[33.8.420], [33.8.430], [33.8.460] ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook (2009) 237 CLR 656; 83 ALJR 986; [2009] HCA 28..................................................................................[33.1.280]

xxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Acrow (Automation) Ltd v Rex Chainbelt Inc [1971] 1 WLR 1676.................................................................................... [33.8.1150] ACTEW Corp Ltd v Mihaljevic [2004] ACTSC 59.............................. [33.5.140] AD & SM McLean Pty Ltd v Meech (2005) 13 VR 241; [2005] VSCA 305.................................................................................[33.2.1160], [33.6.300] Adams v Ascot Iron Foundry Pty Ltd (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 120; 89 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 27.........................................................................................[33.10.380] Adams v Kennedy (2000) 49 NSWLR 78; [2000] NSWCA 152....... [33.8.1540] Adams v Mayor of Brunswick (1894) 20 VLR 455..............................[33.7.870] Adams v Taringa Shire Council [1927] St R Qd 163...........................[33.7.850] Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 130 ER 693............................[33.11.350], [33.11.400] Adamson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (1956) 58 WALR 56...... [33.2.1650] Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488.................... [33.1.300], [33.1.310] Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420; 84 ALJR 19; [2009] HCA 48..................................................................................[33.3.180] Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514................................................................ [33.4.400], [33.10.2010] Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538................. [33.4.460], [33.4.470] Admiralty Commissioners v The SS Chekiang [1926] AC 637........ [33.10.1470] Admiralty Commissioners v The SS Susquehanna [1926] AC 655........................................................ [33.10.1460], [33.10.1470] AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449.........[33.8.1360] AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1918) 35 RPC 101......... [33.10.1710] Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; [2000] HCA 41..................................................................................[33.9.910] Agincourt, The (1824) 1 Hagg 271; 166 ER 96................................... [33.9.470] Ahluwalia v Robinson [2003] NSWCA 175..........................................[33.3.190] Aiken v Kingborough Corp (1939) 62 CLR 179; 33 Tas LR 73........... [33.3.30] Air Express Ltd v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 249; 55 ALJR 107.........................................................[33.10.1980] Aird v Grantham (unreported, WASCA, Kennedy, Franklyn and Walsh JJ, 154, 159 of 1997, 18 September 1998)................................. [33.6.290], [33.6.390] Airline Pilots’ Case (Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2)) [1991] 2 VR 636.....[33.8.1140], [33.10.1690], [33.10.1700] Airline Pilots’ Case (Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots) [1991] 1 VR 637.................[33.8.1130], [33.8.1140], [33.8.1150], [33.8.1160], [33.8.1250], [33.8.1260], [33.8.1280] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Airwork (NZ) Ltd v Vertical Flight Management Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 641.......................................................................................[33.6.620] Aisbett v City of Camberwell (1933) 50 CLR 154; [1933] VLR 454; (1933) 12 LGR (NSW) 6................................................................................... [33.9.590] Aitken v Bedwell (1827) Mood & M 68; 173 ER 1084.................... [33.8.1590], [33.8.1600] Aitken Agencies Ltd v Richardson [1967] NZLR 65............................ [33.8.880] Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; [2000] NTCA 15...... [33.3.290], [33.3.310] Albery-Speyer v BP Oil Ltd (1980) 124 SJ 376................................... [33.4.450] Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542......................................... [33.2.1150], [33.2.1780], [33.6.600] Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; [1991] 3 WLR 1057.................................................................................... [33.2.1310] Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216; [1969] 2 WLR 1252.................[33.8.1670] Aldham v United Dairies (London) Ltd [1940] 1 KB 507................... [33.6.290] Aldred v Stelcad Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 201..................................... [33.3.190] Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57; 77 ER 816................[33.6.310], [33.7.220] Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8 June 1979)................... [33.7.240], [33.7.380], [33.7.850], [33.7.880] Aldworth v Stewart (1866) 4 F & F 957; 176 ER 865........................ [33.9.470] Alex Kay Pty Ltd v Fife (1966) 9 FLR 246................... [33.11.370], [33.11.380] Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310....... [33.1.290], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2000] Alexander v Mayor & Corp of Sydney (1861) 2 Legge 1451..............[33.7.910] Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; 78 ALJR 411; [2004] HCA 7............................................................. [33.11.350], [33.11.370] Alexander v Perpetual Trustees Western Australia Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; 78 ALJR 411; [2004] HCA 7............................................................[33.1.140] Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328........................................... [33.2.390] Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437.......... [33.2.370], [33.9.720], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2150] Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; 78 ALJR 1099; [2004] HCA 37...............................................................[33.8.470], [33.9.480] Allan v Loadsman [1975] 2 NSWLR 789...........................................[33.10.900] Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634...........[33.8.340], [33.9.280] Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital (1981) 125 DLR (3d) 276............[33.8.340] Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] ICR 942; [2001] EWCA Civ 242......................................................................................................[33.4.460] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxv

TABLE OF CASES

Allen v Chadwick (2014) 120 SASR 350; [2014] SASCFC 100........ [33.9.290], [33.9.730] Allen v Chadwick (2015) 90 ALJR 138; [2015] HCA 47.................... [33.9.290] Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1............................................... [33.8.150], [33.8.1080] Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001; [1981] 2 WLR 188...[33.7.660] Alley v Minister of Works (1974) 9 SASR 306.................................[33.10.2160] Alliance & Leicester Building Society v Edgestop Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1462...................................................................................... [33.9.600] Allied Finance & Investments Ltd v Haddow & Co [1983] NZLR 22............................................................................[33.10.1730] Allin v City & Hackney Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 167..... [33.2.1310] Allison v KPMG Peat Marwick [2000] 1 NZLR 560.........................[33.11.200] Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26.......................................................[33.8.1180], [33.8.1210] Al-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Longcroft [1990] 1 WLR 1390...................................................................................... [33.2.670] Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320....... [33.4.460] Al-Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley [1990] Ch 313; [1990] 2 WLR 344.................................................. [33.2.520], [33.2.660], [33.2.670] Alsop v Lidgerwood (1916) 22 ALR (CN) 13...................................... [33.6.410] Alvin Purple Case (Hexagon Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Commission) (1975) 7 ALR 233......................................................................... [33.10.1710] Amaca v New South Wales (2003) 77 ALJR 1509; 1 DDCR 39; [2003] HCA 44................................................................................ [33.11.390] American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 2 WLR 316................................................................. [33.7.830], [33.10.2280] Ames v Waterlow (1869) LR 5 CP 453............................................... [33.8.1550] Amess v Hanlon (1873) 4 AJR 90......................................................... [33.8.520] Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322............ [33.8.1800], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1830], [33.8.1890] Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415; 46 ALJR 638..................[33.8.2010] Amstad v Brisbane City Council (No 1) [1968] Qd R 334; (1967) 16 LGRA 372................................................................. [33.7.660], [33.8.520] Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355............................................ [33.2.390] Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1966) 115 CLR 493; 40 ALJR 330....................................................................................[33.2.1760] Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; 78 ALJR 907; [2004] HCA 28................... [33.2.1060], [33.5.270], [33.11.153], [33.11.390] Andary v Burford [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-302......................... [33.10.220] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Anderson v Buckton (1718) 11 Mod 303; 88 ER 1054........................ [33.6.430] Anderson v Buckton (1719) 1 Str 192; 93 ER 467.............................[33.10.250] Anderson v Enfield City Corp (1983) 34 SASR 472; 54 LGRA 69....[33.4.400] Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668................................. [33.2.390], [33.9.570] Anderson v MacKellar County Council (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 444; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 308; 14 LGRA 352......................................... [33.5.10], [33.5.180] Andjelic v Marsland (1996) 186 CLR 20; 70 ALJR 435.................. [33.10.510], [33.10.530] Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1..........................................[33.7.190] Andrew v Kilgour (1910) 19 Man LR 545........................................... [33.6.350] Andrewartha v Andrewartha (No 1) (1987) 44 SASR 1.................. [33.10.1750] Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229; [1956] 3 WLR 732............. [33.4.160] Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225............ [33.10.180], [33.10.1100] Andriolo v G & G Constructions Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-235............................................................................. [33.2.800], [33.6.720] Angelopoulos v Angelopoulos (1978) 80 LSJS 409............................[33.10.360] Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51.... [33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.490] Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; [1977] 2 WLR 1024...... [33.2.380], [33.2.520], [33.2.810], [33.2.1120], [33.2.1130] Ansell v Arnold [1963] SASR 355........................................................ [33.9.770] Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2) (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 2 VR 636........... [33.8.1140], [33.10.1690], [33.10.1700] Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637...[33.8.1130], [33.8.1140], [33.8.1150], [33.8.1160], [33.8.1250], [33.8.1260], [33.8.1280] Anthanasopoulos v Moseley (2001) 52 NSWLR 262; [2001] NSWCA 266..................................................................................................[33.10.1490] Anthoness v Bland Shire Council (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 659; 77 WN (NSW) 506..............................................................[33.10.1460], [33.10.1480] Anthony v Commonwealth (1973) 47 ALJR 83; 29 LGRA 61............ [33.7.710] Anthony v Haney (1832) 8 Bing 186; 131 ER 372.............................. [33.9.430] Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1...........................................................[33.5.200] Antonow v Leane (1989) 53 SASR 60.................................................. [33.9.770] Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (No 2) (2013) 45 WAR 379; [2013] WASCA 213...........................................................................[33.2.820] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272; [2012] FCA 748.............................................................................[33.10.2280] Applebee v Percy (1874) LR 9 CP 647.................................................[33.6.360] Applicant v Larkin [1976] WAR 199.................................................... [33.6.350] Arbon v Anderson [1943] KB 252.......................................................[33.8.1620] Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401; [1984] 3 WLR 350....................... [33.10.180], [33.10.210], [33.10.220], [33.10.2120] Archibald v Cabramatta & Canley Vale Municipal Council (1930) 10 LGR (NSW) 23...........................................................................................[33.7.660] Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co [1977] AC 405; [1975] 3 WLR 815........................................................................................ [33.2.660] Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v RA Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 581.........................................................................[33.10.2280] Armat v Little; Ex parte Little [1909] St R Qd 83............................... [33.9.450] Armellin v Ljubic [2009] ACTCA 22.................................................. [33.8.1640] Armidale City Council v Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd (1999) 104 LGERA 9; [1999] FCA 330.............................................................................................[33.2.600] Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Str 505; 93 ER 664...............................[33.8.830] Armstrong v Fuller (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 269...................................[33.8.1850] Armstrong v Rudd (1978) 46 FLR 42............................ [33.10.180], [33.10.840] Armstrong v Sheppard & Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; [1959] 3 WLR 84.......................................................................................... [33.7.850] Armytage v Commissioner for Government Transport [1972] 1 NSWLR 331................................................................................. [33.10.370] Arneil v Paterson [1931] AC 560........................................................[33.11.210] Arnison v Smith (1889) 41 Ch D 348................................................. [33.8.1300] Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576........................................................ [33.9.540] Arrowsmith v Le Mesurier (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 211; 127 ER 605.................................................................[33.8.1540], [33.8.1670] Artcraft Pty Ltd v Dickson [2014] SASC 108.................................... [33.10.210] Arthur v Anker [1997] QB 564; [1996] 2 WLR 602.........[33.9.240], [33.9.260] Arthur v Commonwealth (1992) 108 FLR 206................................... [33.11.400] Arthur Robinson (Grafton) Pty Ltd v Carter (1968) 122 CLR 649; 41 ALJR 327....................................................................................[33.10.820] AS James Pty Ltd v Duncan [1970] VR 705........................................ [33.3.480] ASA Constructions Pty Ltd v Iwanov [1975] 1 NSWLR 512.......... [33.10.1870] Ascic v Westel Co-op Ltd [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-159.............[33.10.900] Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 91 ER 126...... [33.8.2160], [33.8.2170] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 409; [1957] 3 WLR 1104................................................................... [33.3.500], [33.9.940] Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441; [1971] 2 WLR 1051................................................................... [33.4.170], [33.4.200] Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 1 AC 962; [2008] 2 WLR 975; [2008] UKHL 25...................................... [33.8.330], [33.8.410] Ashrafi Persian Trading Co Pty Ltd (t/as Roslyn Gardens Motor Inn) v Ashrafinia [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-636; [2001] NSWCA 243...................................................................................[33.2.980], [33.3.180] Assheton v Merrett [1928] SASR 11......... [33.8.1790], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1910] Associated Midland Corp v Bank of New South Wales [1983] 1 NSWLR 533........................................................ [33.10.1520], [33.10.1540] Associated Midland Corp Ltd v Bank of New South Wales (1984) 51 ALR 641................................................................................... [33.10.1540] Associated Newspapers Group plc v Insert Media Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 509.................................................................................... [33.10.2280] Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1961] 2 QB 162; [1961] 2 WLR 523...................................................................................... [33.11.180] Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1964] AC 371; [1962] 3 WLR 229...................................................................................... [33.8.1743] Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6.........[33.1.10], [33.1.140], [33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.2.610], [33.3.300], [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.9.760], [33.9.870], [33.11.350] Athens-MacDonald Travel Service Pty Ltd v Kazis [1970] SASR 264.............................................................................. [33.1.300] Atkins v Kilby (1840) 11 Ad & E 777; 113 ER 609.............................[33.9.560] Atkinson v Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co (1877) 2 Ex D 441........................................................................................................[33.5.10] Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202; 52 ALJR 707; 9 ATR 142..........................................................[33.10.170], [33.10.590], [33.10.860] Attenborough v London & St Katharine’s Dock Co (1878) 3 CPD 450..................................................................................................[33.10.1510] Attorney General (NSW) v Agarsky (1986) 6 NSWLR 38...................[33.9.570] Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49............... [33.6.600], [33.6.610], [33.6.710], [33.10.1740] Attorney General (NSW) Ex rel Elisha v Holy Apostolic & Catholic Church of East (Assyrian) Australia New South Wales Parish Association (1989) 37 NSWLR 293; 95 FLR 392.........................................................[33.8.1380] Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262...................................[33.2.390] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxix

TABLE OF CASES

Attorney-General (Can) v Ritchie Contracting & Supply Co Ltd [1919] AC 999............................................................................... [33.10.2280] Attorney-General (NZ) v Birkenhead Borough Council [1968] NZLR 383..............................................................................[33.7.890] Attorney-General (NZ) v Niania [1994] 3 NZLR 106........................[33.10.730] Attorney-General (NZ) v Wilson & Horton Ltd [1972] NZLR 364..........................................................................[33.10.1740] Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Kerr v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285........[33.2.1380], [33.9.230] Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Kerr v T [1983] 1 Qd R 404............. [33.9.230] Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Pratt v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346; (1987) 63 LGRA 294......................[33.7.380], [33.7.530], [33.7.850] Attorney-General (SA) v Municipal Tramways Trust [1931] SASR 99................................................................................ [33.7.660] Attorney-General (UK) v Cambridge Consumers Gas Co (1868) LR 4 Ch App 71........................................................................................................[33.7.850] Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770..................................................................... [33.7.370], [33.7.510] Attorney-General (UK) v Stone (1895) 12 TLR 76..............................[33.7.540] Attorney-General’s (UK) Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; [1981] 3 WLR 125........................................................................................ [33.9.210] Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council (1995) 38 NSWLR 545.........[33.9.580] Atwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16.................. [33.9.570] Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534..........................[33.8.1540], [33.8.1550] Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson [1996] ATPR 41-454.......[33.11.360] Austral Bronze Co Pty Ltd v Ajaka (1970) 44 ALJR 155...[33.5.250], [33.6.10] Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liq) v Airservices Australia (2000) 203 CLR 136; 74 ALJR 1184; [2000] HCA 39.............................[33.11.370] Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v AMEV Finance Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-228............................................................ [33.10.1540] Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd [1991] 2 VR 407........................................................ [33.8.810], [33.10.1540] Australian Breeders Co-op Society Ltd v Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488................................................................................... [33.11.390] Australian Broadcasting Corp v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510....................................................................................[33.10.1100] Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; 76 ALJR 1; [2001] HCA 63.....................................[33.8.590] Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; [2006] HCA 46......................................[33.7.830], [33.8.1400], [33.10.2280] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxx

TABLE OF CASES

Australian Capital Health Authority v Moorby (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Beazley JJA and Dunford AJA, 40748 of 1994, 25 June 1997)................................................................................................ [33.2.1760] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1; [2001] FCA 187................................................ [33.6.170] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v BMW Australia Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-944; [2003] FCA 727.......................................... [33.4.1170] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd (1998) 40 IPR 619................................................[33.4.746] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Mandurvit Pty Ltd [2014] ATPR 42-471; [2014] FCA 464............................................ [33.4.694] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 88 ALJR 176; [2013] HCA 54............................................. [33.6.170] Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Valve Corp (No 3) [2016] FCA 196.............................................................................................[33.4.630] Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Driscoll [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-175......................................................................... [33.10.510], [33.10.520] Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen (unreported, NSWCA, Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Clarke JA, CA 40079 of 1993, 13 October 1993).............................................................................................. [33.10.1100] Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1969] 1 AC 590; [1967] 3 WLR 1338; (1967) 117 CLR 221; 41 ALJR 66..... [33.8.1910], [33.10.10], [33.10.200] Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria [1989] VR 617............................................................[33.8.710], [33.10.1540] Australian Hi-Fi Publications Pty Ltd v Gehl [1979] 2 NSWLR 618................................................................................... [33.7.710] Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Krstevski (1973) 128 CLR 666; 47 ALJR 563....................................................................................[33.2.1820] Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Ryan (1957) 97 CLR 89....................... [33.5.160] Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387.................. [33.4.30], [33.4.340] Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466; 61 ALJR 205......................................................................................[33.9.580] Australian Oil Refining Pty Ltd v Bourne (1980) 54 ALJR 192........[33.2.1600] Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700; 55 WN (NSW) 246........................................................................... [33.8.890] Australian Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Metcalf (1961) 106 CLR 177; 35 ALJR 405......................................................................................[33.3.290] Australian Rugby Football League Ltd v News Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 692.............................................................. [33.8.1210], [33.8.1220] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 173 ALR 702; [2000] FCA 823.................................[33.8.1210], [33.10.200] Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180.............[33.2.530], [33.2.1160], [33.3.10], [33.3.30], [33.3.40], [33.3.160], [33.3.200], [33.3.210], [33.3.250], [33.3.290], [33.3.340], [33.3.350], [33.6.290], [33.6.470] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; [2011] FCA 717...................................................... [33.2.1720] Australian Shipbuilding Industries (WA) Pty Ltd v Packer (1993) 9 WAR 375..................................................................... [33.4.440], [33.4.510] AV Jennings Construction Pty Ltd v Maumill (1956) 30 ALJ 100.... [33.11.390] Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1998) 44 NSWLR 1; 104 LGERA 355...............................................................................[33.1.300], [33.10.2060] Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-351............................................................................................ [33.10.2060] AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 7 ACSR 759....................................................................................................[33.11.350] Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183.........................................................[33.10.370]

B Baans v Alice Springs Town Council Inc (1991) 105 FLR 291...........[33.7.530] Baar v Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 472.........................................................................................[33.3.310] Baby R, Re (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 69.....................................................[33.9.230] Bacon v Cooper (Metals) Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 397......................... [33.10.1480] Baddeley v Earl Granville (1887) 19 QBD 423................................... [33.5.420] Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18................................[PREFACE], [33.2.1513] Badger v Ministry of Defence [2006] 3 All ER 173; [2005] EWHC 2941.......................................................................................[33.4.510] Baggermaatschappij Boz & Kalis BV v Australian Shipping Commission (1980) 54 ALJR 382........................................................................[33.2.1560] Baghdadi v P & M Quality Smallgoods Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 406....................................................................................................[33.11.390] Bagnall v Schmidt (1980) 25 SASR 93.............................................. [33.2.1760] Bagot v Stevens Scanlan & Co Ltd [1966] 1 QB 197; [1964] 3 WLR 1162...................................................................................... [33.1.340] Bagshaw v Buxton Local Board of Health (1875) 1 Ch D 220...........[33.7.910] Bagshaw v Taylor (1978) 18 SASR 564............................................... [33.6.300] Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 322................ [33.8.1590], [33.8.1700] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxii

TABLE OF CASES

Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd (1970) 12 DLR (3d) 646.............. [33.8.1590], [33.8.1700] Bailey v Director General of Department of Natural Resources (NSW) [2014] NSWSC 1012...................................................................................[33.8.2167] Bailey v Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 700........................[33.10.240] Bain v Altoft [1967] Qd R 32................................................................ [33.9.210] Bains Harding Construction & Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd v McCredie Richmond & Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 437....................................[33.3.480] Baird v Roberts [1977] 2 NSWLR 389...[33.10.860], [33.10.890], [33.10.2160] Baker v Barclays Bank Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 822................................... [33.8.790] Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; 170 ER 1033... [33.10.1210], [33.10.1750] Baker v Gilbert [2003] NSWCA 113.................................................... [33.3.160] Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-op Society Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1472.................................................................................... [33.2.1760] Baker v Snell [1908] 2 KB 825............................................................. [33.6.390] Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966....[33.2.1340], [33.2.1350], [33.2.1360] Baker v Webberly (1631) Het 171; 124 ER 429...................................[33.6.330] Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1970] 2 WLR 50................. [33.10.2000], [33.11.180] Baker’s Creek Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Hack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) Eq 207; 10 WN (NSW) 217................................................ [33.8.470], [33.8.480] Bakker v Joppich (1980) 25 SASR 468.............................................. [33.11.360] Baldwin v Casella (1872) LR 7 Ex 325................................................[33.6.360] Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41.......[33.9.510], [33.9.520] Balfron Trustees Ltd v Petersen [2002] Lloyd’s Rep PN 1................. [33.6.630] Ball v Axten (1866) 4 F & F 1019; 176 ER 890..................................[33.8.180] Ball v Consolidated Rutile Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 524...........[33.7.360], [33.7.380] Ball v Ray (1873) LR 8 Ch App 467.................................................... [33.6.310] Ballard v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 208; [2008] NSWSC 1019........................................................[33.8.1270], [33.8.1280], [33.8.1740] Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680; 83 LGERA 115..................................................................................................[33.10.1710] Balmain Ferry Case (Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson) (1906) 4 CLR 379; 7 SR (NSW) 372................ [33.8.1580], [33.8.1670], [33.9.270] Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (Balmain Ferry Case) (1906) 4 CLR 379; 7 SR (NSW) 372................ [33.8.1580], [33.8.1670], [33.9.270]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228..... [33.1.300], [33.10.1550] Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 66; 122 ER 27......... [33.7.170], [33.7.250], [33.7.680] Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626..................................... [33.10.360] Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons Ltd [1932] AC 452............ [33.10.2120] Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; [2000] WASC 210....................................................................................................[33.8.2000] Bank of Australasia v Nias (1851) 16 QB 717; 117 ER 1055...........[33.8.1820] Bank of New South Wales v Milvain (1884) 10 VLR (L) 3................. [33.1.300] Bank of New South Wales v Owston (1879) 4 App Cas 270.............[33.8.1780], [33.8.1840] Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525....................[33.7.240] Banks v Ferrari [2000] NSWSC 874....................................................[33.8.920] Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301; 60 ALJR 362..............................................[33.2.370], [33.2.1050], [33.3.260] Bannerman v Mills [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-079.......................[33.2.1390] Bannerman v Victoria [2009] VSC 438................................................ [33.6.610] Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665; [1989] 3 WLR 25............................................................[33.2.570] Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245...................[33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.830], [33.7.840], [33.7.870], [33.7.890], [33.7.900], [33.10.380], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1860], [33.10.1870] Barclay v Fealy (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 627; 27 WN (NSW) 158...... [33.8.1860] Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40.......................[33.1.10], [33.2.820], [33.4.380], [33.10.1740] Barclay’s Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec Developments Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1253...................................................................................... [33.8.790] Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363.................[33.1.140], [33.2.610] Barisic v Devenport [1978] 2 NSWLR 111.................... [33.9.860], [33.11.200], [33.11.390] Barker v Adelaide City [1900] SALR 29..............................................[33.8.580] Barker v Sands & McDougall Co Ltd (1890) 16 VLR 719...............[33.8.1820] Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426.................. [33.8.520], [33.8.560], [33.9.260] Barker v The Queen (1994) 54 FCR 451; 78 A Crim R 1.................. [33.8.520] Barley v Paroz (unreported, QSC, Sheahan J, 3138 of 1976, 4 April 1979).................................................................................................. [33.9.600]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Barnard v Evans [1925] 2 KB 794....................................................... [33.9.380] Barnard v Towill (1998) 72 SASR 27...................................................[33.9.800] Barnes v Commonwealth (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 511; 54 WN (NSW) 164.......................................................................................[33.2.1310] Barnes v Hay (1988) 12 NSWLR 337........................... [33.4.460], [33.10.1980] Barnes v Irwell Valley Water Board [1939] 1 KB 21...........................[33.4.440] Barnes v Lucille Ltd (1907) 96 LT 680................................................ [33.6.360] Barnes (an infant) v Hampshire County Council [1969] 1 WLR 1563.................................................................................... [33.2.1000] Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428; [1968] 2 WLR 422...................................[33.2.330], [33.10.1980] Barnett v H & J Packer & Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 575.................... [33.4.440] Barr v Manly Municipal Council (1967) 70 SR (NSW) 119; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 136; 14 LGRA 164.................................................................[33.3.30] Barrett v Associated Newspapers Ltd (1907) 23 TLR 666.............. [33.10.1710] Barrett v Dubbo City Council [2006] NSWCA 65...............................[33.3.190] Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550; [1999] 3 WLR 79.......................................................................................... [33.2.940] Barrett v Hardie & Thompson Ltd [1924] NZLR 228......................... [33.6.290] Barrett v JR West Ltd [1970] NZLR 789..............................................[33.2.550] Barrett v Steel Products Distributing Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 981.............................................................................[33.5.160] Barretts & Baird (Wholesale) Ltd v Institution of Professional Civil Servants [1987] IRLR 3................................................................................... [33.8.190] Barrow v CSR Ltd (unreported, WASC, Rowland J, 1148, 1161 of 1987, 4 July 1988)........................................................................................ [33.10.850] Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451.....[33.8.430], [33.8.440], [33.8.1100] Barton v Chhibber [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-185..... [33.7.240], [33.7.250], [33.7.870] Barton v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 95.............................[33.4.980] Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75; 55 ALJR 31..................... [33.8.2010] Basebe v Matthews (1867) LR 2 CP 684............................................[33.8.1850] Basely v Clarkson (1681) 3 Lev 37; 83 ER 565............... [33.8.555], [33.9.150] Basildon District Council v JE Lesser (Properties) Ltd [1985] QB 839; [1984] 3 WLR 812........................................................................................ [33.3.480] Batchelder v Holden Ltd [2009] VSC 29..............................................[33.4.785] Batchelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448; 55 ALJR 494................... [33.10.540], [33.10.880] Bateman v Lashbrook (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 478; 47 WN (NSW) 198.........................................................................................[33.8.480] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Baten’s Case (1610) 9 Co 53; 77 ER 810............................................ [33.7.900] Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201............ [33.7.220], [33.7.380], [33.8.150] Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704; 55 LGRA 165................................................................. [33.7.220], [33.8.520] Batistatos v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; 80 ALJR 1100; [2006] HCA 27...........[33.8.1940], [33.8.1970], [33.8.2010], [33.8.2020] Bativala v West [1970] 1 QB 716; [1970] 2 WLR 8............................[33.6.300] Battista v Cooper (1976) 14 SASR 225................................................[33.8.325] Batts Combe Quarry Ltd v Ford [1943] Ch 51.................................. [33.8.1200] Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338........ [33.7.240], [33.7.370], [33.7.380], [33.7.520], [33.7.850] Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Domachuk (1988) 66 LGRA 110.... [33.7.370], [33.7.520] Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97.................... [33.6.610], [33.10.230], [33.10.1530] Bawden v Saint Carthy and Southern Transport Pty Ltd (unreported, SASC, Johnston J, 1026 of 1983, 5 February 1988)..................................[33.11.360] Baxter v Camden London Borough Council (No 2) [2001] QB 1; [1999] 2 WLR 566........................................................................................ [33.7.190] Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635; 76 ALJR 114; [2001] HCA 66................. [33.11.170], [33.11.200], [33.11.230], [33.11.240] Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1872) LR 7 CP 415.................................................................................[33.6.630], [33.8.1630] Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1873) LR 8 CP 148.................................................................................[33.6.690], [33.8.1630] Baylis v Waugh [1962] NZLR 44........................................................ [33.11.360] Bayliss v Lea (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 521; 79 WN (NSW) 218............ [33.7.170] BBMB Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd v EDA Holdings Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 409.................................................................................... [33.10.1520] Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 43 FCR 1............................. [33.8.1260] Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131.............. [33.8.180], [33.8.310], [33.9.180], [33.9.190], [33.9.330] Bean v Wade (1885) 2 TLR 157............................................................[33.1.340] Beasley v Marshall (No 1) (1986) 40 SASR 544.......... [33.10.490], [33.10.950] Beasley v Marshall (No 2) (1985) 41 SASR 299............................... [33.10.980] Beasley v Marshall (1977) 17 SASR 456........................ [33.2.1640], [33.9.730]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145; 40 ALJR 211; 18 LGRA 65........ [33.7.220], [33.7.380], [33.8.30], [33.8.1080], [33.8.2150] Beaulieu v Finglam (1401) YB 2 Hen IV, fo 18, pl 6......................... [33.6.160] Beaulne v Ricketts (1979) 96 DLR (3d) 550...................................... [33.8.1320] Beausoleil v La Communaute des Soeurs de la Charité de la Providence (1964) 53 DLR (2d) 65..................................................................... [33.9.250] Beavis v Apthorpe (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 852................................. [33.10.2080] Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459............................................................................... [33.8.1870] Beck v Farrelly (1975) 13 SASR 17................................................. [33.10.2160] Beck v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co [1961] SASR 311................ [33.9.920] Beckwith v Philby (1827) 6 B & C 635; 108 ER 585..........................[33.9.160] Beckwith v Shordike (1767) 4 Burr 2092; 98 ER 91............................[33.6.330] Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618; 42 ALJR 80........................................................................................[33.7.830] Beer v Wheeler (1965) 109 SJ 457....................................................... [33.6.370] Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404............................... [33.6.350], [33.6.360], [33.6.380], [33.6.390] Behrooz v Secretary of Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 219 CLR 486; 78 ALJR 1056; [2004] HCA 36...........................................................[33.8.1570], [33.8.1620] Belgrave Nominees Pty Ltd v Barlin-Scott Airconditioning (Aust) Pty Ltd [1984] VR 947...............................................................................[33.10.2280] Bell v Thompson (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 431; 51 WN (NSW) 138.....[33.11.200] Bellambi Coal Co Ltd v Murray (1909) 9 CLR 568............................[33.9.930] Bellinger v Autoland Pty Ltd [1962] VR 514....................................... [33.8.910] Belous v Willetts [1970] VR 45............................................................. [33.3.480] Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd v Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307....................[33.4.460] Benham v Gambling [1941] AC 157...................................................[33.10.850] Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400........... [33.5.200], [33.5.220], [33.7.510] Bennett v Flood (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 158..........................................[33.8.830] Bennett v Jones [1977] 2 NSWLR 355...............................................[33.10.500] Bennett v Minister for Community Welfare [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-210................................................................................................ [33.6.610] Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 550.....................[33.4.510], [33.6.610], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2040] Bennett v Tugwell [1971] 2 QB 267; [1971] 2 WLR 847....................[33.9.940] Bennett & Wood Ltd v Orange City Council (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 426; 85 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 135........................................................................ [33.5.10] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Bennetts v Honroth [1959] SASR 170.................................................. [33.7.850] Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467..... [33.7.230], [33.7.660], [33.9.580], [33.9.590], [33.10.1560] Benson v Lee [1972] VR 879......................................... [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300] Bentley v Wright [1997] 2 VR 175..................[33.2.550], [33.2.570], [33.2.670] Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666................................................................. [33.8.1790], [33.8.1820] Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450...................... [33.8.1550], [33.8.1690], [33.8.1790], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1890] Besozzi v Harris (1858) 1 F & F 92; 175 ER 640........... [33.6.350], [33.6.370], [33.6.390] Best v Samuel Fox & Co Ld [1952] AC 716....................................[33.10.1750] Beswicke v Alner [1926] VLR 72...................................[33.7.850], [33.10.2280] Bethune v Heffernan [1986] VR 417; (1985) 20 A Crim R 122......... [33.8.470] Bettel v Yim (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 543...................................................[33.8.340] Betts v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 107 FLR 352....................................................................................[33.11.400] Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall (No 2) [1973] 2 NZLR 45...... [33.10.1360], [33.10.1390], [33.10.1400] Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97....... [33.10.2120] Bevillesta Pty Ltd v Liberty International Insurance Co [2009] Aust Torts Reports 81-995; [2009] NSWCA 16.................................................[33.3.280] BHP Billiton Ltd v Hamilton (2013) 117 SASR 329; [2013] SASCFC 75......................................................................................................[33.10.820] Biddle v Bond (1865) 6 B & S 225; 122 ER 1179.............................. [33.8.860] Bilambil-Terranora Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465; (1980) 52 LGRA 1........ [33.8.710], [33.10.170], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1420], [33.10.1500] Birch v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1906) 4 CLR 324; 7 SR (NSW) 244; 23 WN (NSW) 167................................................................... [33.7.660] Birch v Taubmans Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 93; 74 WN (NSW) 70.......................................................................................[33.10.1750] Birch v Thomas [1972] 1 WLR 294......................................................[33.9.940] Birchmeier v Rockdale Municipality (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 201; 12 LGR (NSW) 73.........................................................................................[33.8.1860] Bird v Fort Frances (Town) [1949] 2 DLR 791................................... [33.8.830] Bird v Holbrook (1828) 4 Bing 628; 130 ER 911.............................. [33.8.2130] Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 668................. [33.8.1570], [33.8.1650] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Birkett v Hayes [1982] 1 WLR 816.................................................... [33.10.500] Birkholz v RJ Gilbertson Pty Ltd (1985) 38 SASR 121.................. [33.10.1990] Birmingham Corp v Sowsbery [1970] RTR 84................................. [33.10.1530] Birse Construction Ltd v Haiste Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 675................... [33.11.370] Bishop v Arts & Letters Club of Toronto (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 107..................................................................................................[33.10.2070] Bishop v Cunard White Star Co Ltd (The Queen Mary) [1950] P 240.................................................................................. [33.10.1220] Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46.................................................................... [33.11.360], [33.11.370] Bitupave Ltd v McMahon (1999) 18 NSWCCR 481.......................... [33.11.390] Black v Christchurch Finance Co Ltd [1894] AC 48...........................[33.6.150] Black v JR Perry Nominees Pty Ltd (2012) 221 IR 456; [2012] VSCA 122......................................................................................................[33.6.650] Black Diamond Group Pty Ltd v Manor of Maluka Pty Ltd [2015] 1 Qd R 180; [2014] QSC 219............................................. [33.8.920], [33.10.1530] Blacker v Waters (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 406; 45 WN (NSW) 111......[33.8.310], [33.9.170], [33.9.190] Blackstock v Foster (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 341; 75 WN (NSW) 393......................................................................[33.4.460], [33.4.470] Blackwell v AAA [1997] 1 VR 182..................................................... [33.10.220] Blakeney v Pegus (No 2) (1885) 6 LR (NSW) 223; 2 WN (NSW) 13.........................................................................................[33.2.1310] Bland v Yates (1914) 58 SJ 612n.......................................................... [33.6.310] Blundell v Attorney-General (Police Department) [1967] NZLR 492............................................................................[33.8.1520] Blundell v Attorney-General (Police Department) [1968] NZLR 341............................................................................[33.8.1520] Blundell v Musgrave (1956) 96 CLR 73.............................................[33.10.990] BMA v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201......................................... [33.5.190] BMW Australia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2004) 207 ALR 452; [2004] FCAFC 167..................................... [33.4.1170] BNP Case (Foti v Banque Nationale de Paris (No 2)) (1989) 54 SASR 433................................................................................... [33.10.510] Boaler v Holder (1887) 51 JP 277...................................................... [33.8.1850] Board v Thomas Hedley & Co Ltd [1951] 2 All ER 431.................. [33.2.1330] Boase v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2005] WASC 269............[33.10.250] Bodley v Reynolds (1846) 8 QB 779; 115 ER 1066.........................[33.10.1470] [References are to paragraph numbers] xxxix

TABLE OF CASES

Bodum v DKSH Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 280 ALR 639; [2011] FCAFC 98......................................................................................................[33.8.1340] Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582...................................................................................... [33.2.1820] Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232; [1997] 3 WLR 1151...................................................................................... [33.4.490] Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850...................... [33.2.1510], [33.3.240], [33.7.240] Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VR 97............................... [33.9.270] Boncristiano v Lohmann [1998] 4 VR 82.............................................[33.1.300] Bond v Kelly (1873) 4 AJR 153......................................... [33.8.550], [33.9.260] Bondarenko v Sommers (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 269; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 295...................................................................................[33.9.980], [33.9.990] Bone v Seale [1975] 1 WLR 797................................... [33.7.880], [33.10.1410] Bonette v Woolworths Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 142; 54 WN (NSW) 57...........................................................................................[33.6.690] Bonic v Fieldair (Deniliquin) Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 636.................[33.7.250] Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269............................................. [33.10.2280] Bonnici v Kur-ring-gai Municipal Council (2001) 121 LGERA 1; [2001] NSWSC 1124.....................................................................................[33.7.250] Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; [1956] 2 WLR 707.............................................. [33.4.460], [33.5.270], [33.10.2000] Bonshaw Freehold Gold Mining Co v Prince of Wales Co (1867) 4 WW & A’B (E) 126....................................................................................... [33.7.850] Booksan Pty Ltd v Wehbe (2006) 14 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-678; [2006] NSWCA 3.......................................................................................... [33.5.400] Boosey v Purday (1849) 4 Ex 145; 154 ER 1159............................ [33.10.2030] Boothey v Morris (2002) 219 LSJS 379; [2002] SASC 126...............[33.6.290], [33.6.460], [33.6.470] Boral Bricks New South Wales Pty Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 IR 70......[33.8.1200] Boral Bricks NSW Pty Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 IR 70......... [33.7.220], [33.7.240] Boral Bricks NSW Pty Ltd v Frost [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-077................................................................................................ [33.7.240] Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd v Pyke [1992] 2 Qd R 25................. [33.11.410] Borland v Makauskas [2000] QCA 521................................................ [33.3.260] Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382....................................................... [33.4.470] Bosaid v Andry [1963] VR 465......................................................... [33.10.1870] Bosch v Liebe [1976] VR 265...................................... [33.10.880], [33.10.2160] Botany Bay City Council v Latham (2013) 197 LGERA 211; [2013] NSWCA 363........................................................................................................[33.5.10] [References are to paragraph numbers] xl

TABLE OF CASES

Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; 60 ALJR 422; 20 A Crim R 156...................................................................................[33.8.370], [33.9.210] Bourchier v Commissioners for Railways (Vic) [1910] VLR 385........[33.7.660] Bourchier v Mitchell (1891) 17 VLR 27...............................................[33.6.420] Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1986] QB 716; [1985] 3 WLR 1027.............................. [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162], [33.8.2165] Bourhill (Hay) v Young (Pregnant Fish Wife’s Case) [1943] AC 92.............................................................. [33.2.240], [33.10.2070] Bourke v Butterfield & Lewis Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 354; 27 SR (NSW) 339; 43 WN (NSW) 180........................................................................... [33.5.400] Bouronicos v Mylex Corp Ltd [1975] VR 120.....................[33.5.160], [33.6.10] Bouvy v Count de Courte (1901) 20 NZLR 312................................ [33.8.1850] Bowditch v McEwan [2003] 2 Qd R 615; [2002] QCA 172..............[33.2.1380] Bowen v Blair [1933] VLR 398................................... [33.10.230], [33.10.2030] Bowen v Edmonton (City) (No 2) (1977) 80 DLR (3d) 501................ [33.2.590] Bowen v Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 394.....................................................................................[33.2.1120] Bowen v Tutte [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-043..........[33.10.540], [33.10.890] Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] 1 KB 65................. [33.8.840] Boyce v Bayliffe (1807) 1 Camp 58; 170 ER 875.............................. [33.8.1740] Boyle v Kodak Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 661................................................. [33.5.420] Boyle v Shire of Mornington (1883) 9 VLR (L) 265........................... [33.7.690] BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783...................................................................................... [33.10.520] BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 352; [1982] 2 WLR 253...................................................................................... [33.10.520] BP Oil New Zealand Ltd v Ports of Auckland Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 208.......................................................................................[33.7.545] Bracegirdle v Orford (1813) 2 M & S 77; 105 ER 311.................... [33.10.250] Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408; [1975] 2 WLR 282.............. [33.10.1430], [33.10.1870] Bracks v Smyth-Kirk (2009) 263 ALR 522; [2009] NSWCA 401..... [33.8.1750] Bracks v Smyth-Kirk [2010] HCATrans 145....................................... [33.8.1750] Bradburn v Great Western Railway Co (1874) LR 10 Ex 1............[33.10.2160] Bradford City Metropolitan Council v Arora [1991] 2 QB 507; [1991] 2 WLR 1377.................................................................................... [33.10.200] Bradford Corp v Pickles [1895] AC 587.............................................. [33.8.150] Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205............................................................................................. [33.8.1300] [References are to paragraph numbers] xli

TABLE OF CASES

Bradley v Wallaces Ltd [1913] 3 KB 629..........................[33.6.290], [33.6.410] Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415......... [33.8.480], [33.8.2135] Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241.....[33.2.1800], [33.3.260], [33.3.360] Brady v Schatzel; Ex parte Brady [1911] St R Qd 206....................... [33.8.420] Brady v Warren [1900] 2 IR 632........................................[33.6.310], [33.6.400] Braithwaite v South Durham Steel Co Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 986......... [33.11.390] Brambles Constructions Pty Ltd v Helmers (1966) 114 CLR 213; 39 ALJR 410....................................................................................[33.11.380] Brancato v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 7 NSWLR 30..................................................................................... [33.5.420] Brand v Bardon (unreported, NSWCA, Handley, Powell and Stein JJA, 40048 of 1995, 18 July 1997)................................................... [33.4.170], [33.4.200] Brandeis Goldschmidt & Co Ltd v Western Transport Ltd [1981] QB 864; [1981] 3 WLR 181........................................................................ [33.10.1530] Brandt v Craddock (1858) 27 LJ Ex 314........................................... [33.8.1550] Braniff Airways Inc v Curtiss-Wright Corp 411 F 2d 451 (1969)......[33.4.1100] Branson v Didsbury (1840) 12 Ad & E 631; 113 ER 953...............[33.10.2030] Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 311; [2007] VSCA 311........................................................... [33.8.580], [33.8.590] Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41; 62 ALJR 447............. [33.10.40] Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; 70 ALJR 772.......................... [33.1.140] Brekkes Ltd v Cattel [1972] Ch 105; [1971] 2 WLR 647................. [33.8.1150], [33.8.1170] Bresatz v Przibilla (1962) 108 CLR 541; 36 ALJR 212................... [33.10.900], [33.10.970], [33.10.1750] Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449; (1966) 43 ALJR 122..................... [33.8.1990] Brewer v Dew (1843) 11 M & W 625; 152 ER 955........................ [33.10.1100] Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997.............................. [33.2.1290], [33.10.830] Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396.......[33.1.140], [33.1.290], [33.1.300], [33.10.180], [33.10.1720] Bridge v Chadwick (1950) 50 SR (NSW) 230; 67 WN (NSW) 154....................................................................................... [33.11.170] Bridges v Hawkesworth (1851) 21 LJQB 75........................................ [33.8.830] Bridgett v Coyney (1827) 1 Man & Ry KB 211............[33.8.1520], [33.8.1570] Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 346............................................. [33.3.290], [33.3.300], [33.3.350] Brighten Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 319......................................................................................................[33.8.590] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlii

TABLE OF CASES

Brilawsky v Robertson & Cannell (1916) 10 QJPR 113.................. [33.10.1530] Brimelow v Casson [1924] 1 Ch 302.................................................. [33.8.1250] Brinsmead v Harrison (1871) LR 6 CP 584....................................... [33.11.220] Brinsmead v Harrison (1872) LR 7 CP 547.................. [33.8.1750], [33.11.220] Brisbane v Cross [1978] VR 49............................................................ [33.6.300] Brisbane Shipwrights’ Provident Union v Heggie (1906) 3 CLR 686....................................................................................... [33.8.1260] British American Tobacco Exports BV v Trojan Trading Co Pty Ltd (2010) IPR 392; [2010] VSC 572.................................................................[33.5.170] British Cash & Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006....................................................................................... [33.8.2000] British Celanese Ltd v AH Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 959.................................................................................... [33.10.1400] British Economical Lamp Co Ltd v Empire Mile End Lane Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 386....................................................................................... [33.8.890] British Fame, The v The MacGregor [1943] AC 197...................... [33.10.2150] British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson [1940] 1 All ER 479.......[33.8.1210] British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch 556........... [33.8.1200], [33.10.1690] British Railway Traffıc & Electric Co Ltd v CRC Co Ltd [1922] 2 KB 260......................................................................................... [33.8.1870] British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877; [1972] 2 WLR 537....................................................................... [33.3.30], [33.3.340] British Telecommunications plc v James Thomson & Sons (Engineers) Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 9................................................................................ [33.2.820] British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185; [1956] 2 WLR 41.............................................. [33.10.170], [33.10.590], [33.10.600] British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673.................. [33.10.2120] Brittliffe v Brittliffe (1989) 8 MVR 571.............................................. [33.10.990] Broadhurst v Millman [1976] VR 208............................. [33.9.860], [33.11.390] Broadway Approvals Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd (No 2) [1965] 1 WLR 805........................................................................................ [33.8.190] Broadway Pty Ltd v Lewis [2012] WASC 373..................................... [33.8.470] Brock v Copeland (1794) 170 ER 328.................................................. [33.6.390] Brock v Richards [1951] 1 KB 529.......................................................[33.6.300] Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405; [2000] WASCA 192........... [33.6.700] Broder v Saillard (1876) 2 Ch D 692................................................... [33.6.310] Broderick v Forbes (1912) 5 DLR 508.................................................[33.6.410] [References are to paragraph numbers] xliii

TABLE OF CASES

Broderick Motors Pty Ltd v Rothe [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-059............................................................................. [33.7.220], [33.7.240] Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29................ [33.2.1180], [33.2.1510], [33.3.170], [33.5.10], [33.5.160], [33.5.180], [33.5.220], [33.7.390] Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Fisher (1984) 38 SASR 50..........[33.10.210] Brook v Cook (1961) 105 SJ 684.......................................................... [33.6.380] Brooke v Bool [1928] 2 KB 578.....................................[33.8.1270], [33.11.160] Brooke v Grimpel [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-108....[33.8.1840], [33.8.1880] Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36..... [33.1.10], [33.1.140], [33.2.340], [33.2.810], [33.2.1130], [33.4.380] Brooks v Hodgkinson (1859) 4 Hurl & N 712; 157 ER 1021........... [33.8.1550] Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645....[33.10.30], [33.10.180] Brown v Chapman (1848) 6 CB 365; 136 ER 1292..... [33.8.1540], [33.8.1550] Brown v GJ Coles & Co Ltd (t/as Coles New World Supermarket) (1985) 8 FCR 304; 17 A Crim R 79............................................................ [33.8.360] Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718............ [33.8.190], [33.8.1550], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1920], [33.8.1930] Brown v Heathcote County Council [1982] 2 NZLR 584....................[33.2.590] Brown v Lizars (1905) 2 CLR 837; [1905] VLR 540.......................... [33.9.490] Brown v Mackenzie (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 302.................................. [33.8.830] Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 210.....................................[33.2.1620] Brown v Sevrup Fisheries Pty Ltd [1970] Tas SR 1...........................[33.11.350] Brown v South Australia (1984) 36 SASR 147.................................. [33.10.360] Brown v Target Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 37 SASR 145......................[33.3.360] Brown v Toohey (1994) 35 NSWLR 417........................... [33.6.290], [33.6.300] Brown v Watson (1871) 23 LT 745....................................................... [33.9.560] Brown v Willington [2001] ACTSC 100............................................. [33.10.930] Brownbill v Kenworth Truck Sales (NSW) Pty Ltd (1982) 59 FLR 56......................................................................................[33.10.2170] Browne v Dawson (1840) 12 Ad & E 624; 113 ER 950......................[33.8.470] Brown’s Valve Service Pty Ltd v Cristina [1997] 1 VR 536................[33.9.780] Bruce v Housing Corp (NZ) [1982] 2 NZLR 28.................................. [33.2.590] Bruno v Davies (unreported, SASC, White J, 413 of 1982, 29 June 1988)................................................................................................ [33.10.850] Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141........................................[33.10.370] [References are to paragraph numbers] xliv

TABLE OF CASES

Brus v Australian Capital Territory [2007] ACTSC 83..................... [33.2.1150] Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375...... [33.1.10], [33.1.140], [33.2.270], [33.2.520], [33.2.580], [33.2.600], [33.2.810], [33.2.820], [33.2.1120], [33.2.1130] Bryan v Parks & Wildlife Commission (NT) [2005] NTSC 1..............[33.6.290] Bryanston Finance Ltd v de Vries (No 1) [1975] QB 703; [1975] 2 WLR 718................................................................. [33.11.230], [33.11.240] Bryden v Health Department [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-075.....[33.10.2070] BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221... [33.2.270], [33.2.340], [33.2.580], [33.2.640], [33.2.660] Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Can) Ltd (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 658...................................................................................[33.4.410], [33.4.490] Buckle v Holmes [1926] 2 KB 125.................................... [33.6.350], [33.6.400] Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All ER 1145................................................ [33.9.940] Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264..... [33.6.630], [33.6.650] Building Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 104; 37 IR 380.................................................................. [33.8.1250] Bujnowicz v Trustees Roman Catholic Church [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-824; [2005] NSWCA 457.......................................................... [33.2.1010] Bull v Batten (1987) 5 MVR 341.......................................[33.9.800], [33.9.860] Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osboorne (1896) 17 LR (NSW) Eq 242...[33.10.1500] Bullivant v Wright (1897) 13 TLR 201............................................. [33.10.1710] Bullock v Miller (1987) 14 Tas R 129........................... [33.2.1640], [33.10.920] Bulsey v Queensland [2015] QCA 187............................................... [33.8.1570] Bulut v Koksal [1988] VR 241.......................................................... [33.10.2160] Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342......... [33.8.790], [33.8.815], [33.8.870], [33.8.880], [33.8.910], [33.10.1530], [33.10.1870] Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61..............................[33.2.240], [33.2.1310], [33.8.180], [33.8.2130] Burchett v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 366; 3 LGRA 232; 75 WN (NSW) 402.................................[33.7.530], [33.7.670] Burford v Allan (1993) 60 SASR 428.................................................[33.10.960] Burford v Allen [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-184.......[33.10.900], [33.10.950], [33.10.960], [33.10.980] Burgchard v Holroyd Municipal Council [1984] 2 NSWLR 164; (1984) 53 LGRA 7...................................................................................... [33.2.1130] Burke v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGRA 1...............................[33.2.580] Burke v Lunn [1976] VR 268................................................................ [33.1.300] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlv

TABLE OF CASES

Burnett v Randwick City Council [2006] NSWCA 196....................... [33.8.830] Burnett v Randwick City Council [2007] HCATrans 091.....................[33.8.830] Burnicle v Cutelli [1982] 2 NSWLR 26............................................. [33.10.930] Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331.........[33.2.40], [33.2.320], [33.2.350], [33.2.1580], [33.4.400], [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.150], [33.6.160], [33.6.320], [33.6.710], [33.6.720], [33.10.1360], [33.10.2110], [33.11.153] Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541; [1970] 2 WLR 1005..................[33.10.2170] Burns v Johnston [1916] 2 IR 444...................................................... [33.8.1670] Burns v Johnston [1917] 2 IR 137...................................................... [33.8.1670] Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 653; 61 ALJR 81.................................................................[33.1.290], [33.10.2120] Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816................................................... [33.11.400] Burrum Corp v Richardson (1939) 62 CLR 214................. [33.3.30], [33.3.170] Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26...............................[33.8.1570], [33.8.1580] Burton v Islington Health Authority [1993] QB 204; [1992] 3 WLR 637...................................................................................... [33.2.1380] Burton v Winters [1993] 1 WLR 1077..................................................[33.7.900] Burwood Land Co Ltd v Knox (1895) 21 VLR 381.............................[33.8.480] Bus v Sydney County Council (1989) 167 CLR 78; 63 ALJR 440...[33.2.1050], [33.2.1530], [33.2.1560] Bushell’s Case (1670) 6 St Tr 999; 89 ER 2........................................[33.9.570] Bushells Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1948] St R Qd 79....................[33.10.1390] Business Computers International Ltd v Registrar of Companies (UK) [1988] Ch 229; [1987] 3 WLR 1134................................................[33.2.390] Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114........................................[33.10.170], [33.10.490], [33.10.1500] Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78; [1917] VLR 175...................[33.1.310] Butler v Rick Cuneen Logging Pty Ltd [1997] 2 VR 99......................[33.9.850] Butler v Simmonds Crowley & Galvin [2000] 2 Qd R 252; [1999] QCA 475....................................................................................................[33.8.1960] Butt v Newman (1819) Gow 97; 171 ER 850.......................................[33.9.560] Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 11 East 60; 103 ER 926....................... [33.9.720] Buttigieg v VL Finance Pty Ltd [1986] VR 392...................................[33.8.950] Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1358..................................... [33.4.450] Byass (an infant) v Nicholson (1995) 14 SR (WA) 322.......................[33.9.730] Bye v Bates (1989) 51 SASR 67........................................ [33.2.950], [33.9.730] Byrne v Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722; 159 ER 299............................[33.2.1760] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlvi

TABLE OF CASES

Byrne Byrne Byrne Byrne

v v v v

Castrique [1965] VR 171.....................................................[33.10.2280] Hebden; Ex parte Hebden [1913] St R Qd 233..................... [33.9.450] Hoare [1965] Qd R 135...........................................................[33.8.830] Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 762....... [33.8.520]

C C v S [1988] QB 135; [1987] 2 WLR 1108......................................... [33.9.230] Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130............ [33.2.390], [33.8.1810], [33.8.1830], [33.9.570] Cadbury-Schweppes Pty Ltd v Pub Squash Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 193...................................................................................... [33.8.1340] Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 434; [2005] FCAFC 265................................................... [33.2.670] Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 145; [2005] FCA 1280...................................................................... [33.2.670] Cadman v Saskatchewan (Department of Parks & Renewable Resources) (1988) 51 DLR (4th) 52....................................................................[33.6.400] CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (t/as Tandara Motor Inn) v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 1; [2009] HCA 47.................[PREFACE], [33.3.180], [33.4.430] Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Fenwick (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 482.....[33.11.390] Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202; 57 SR (NSW) 513; 74 WN (NSW) 310.....................................................[33.2.1600], [33.11.200] Calf v Sydney County Council [1972] 2 NSWLR 521; (1972) 26 LGRA 56............................... [33.5.10], [33.5.140], [33.5.180], [33.5.220] Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426..........[33.1.140], [33.3.210], [33.3.290], [33.3.310], [33.6.290] Callaghan v Wm C Lynch Pty Ltd (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 830.......... [33.10.20], [33.10.170], [33.10.2030] Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270.........[33.2.210], [33.2.310], [33.2.340], [33.2.400], [33.2.520], [33.2.600], [33.2.630], [33.2.820], [33.4.380], [33.4.390], [33.10.250], [33.10.1730] Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd (1984) 155 CLR 72; 58 ALJR 38........................................................................................[33.1.310] Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 852................................................................................. [33.10.190] Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; [2009] NSWCA 258................................................................... [33.2.680], [33.2.790] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlvii

TABLE OF CASES

Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228; [1989] 2 WLR 624...................................................................................... [33.8.1800] Calvert v Stollznow [1982] 1 NSWLR 175.......................................... [33.3.290] Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53................ [33.6.150], [33.7.250], [33.7.680], [33.10.1360], [33.10.2110] Cameron v James [1945] VLR 113.....................................................[33.8.1850] Caminer v Northern & London Investment Trust Ltd [1949] 2 KB 64............................................................................................. [33.7.530] Camm v Salter [1992] 2 Qd R 342................................ [33.10.530], [33.10.540] Cammell Laird & Co Ltd v Manganese Bronze & Brass Co Ltd [1934] AC 402.................................................................. [33.4.30], [33.4.160] Campbell v McKay (1905) 38 NSR 333............................................. [33.8.1550] Campbell v Nangle (1985) 40 SASR 161 at 180.......... [33.10.960], [33.10.980] Campbell v Ramsay (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 327; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 253; [1968] 1 NSWR 425....................................................................... [33.8.2162] Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 80 ALJR 1441; [2006] HCA 41..................................................... [33.8.1990] Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501; 68 LGRA 27............................................................. [33.10.250], [33.10.1410] Campomar Sociedad Ltd v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; 74 ALJR 573; [2000] HCA 12.................................. [33.8.1330], [33.8.1360] Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd v British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd [1983] 1 SCR 452; (1983) 145 DLR (3d) 385.............................. [33.8.1260] Canadian National Railway v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co [1992] 1 SCR 1021; (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289........................................... [33.2.820] Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal [1987] 1 SCR 711; (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385..............................................................................[33.1.140] Canadian Pacific Wine Co Ltd v Tuley [1921] 2 AC 417; [1921] 60 DLR 520....................................................................................... [33.8.560] Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 67 FLR 66........................... [33.3.170], [33.11.370], [33.11.380], [33.11.400] Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164....... [33.2.650], [33.2.660] Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 159; 59 ALJR 763; [1986] AC 1; [1985] 3 WLR 381..................................................................... [33.2.520], [33.2.820] Candy v Bennett (1991) 13 MVR 363............................... [33.6.290], [33.6.300] Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317; [2002] VSCA 84..................... [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Cant v Parsons (1834) 6 Car & P 504; 172 ER 1339...................... [33.8.1670], [33.8.1780] [References are to paragraph numbers] xlviii

TABLE OF CASES

Canterbury v Spence, 464 F 2d 772 (1972)..........................................[33.9.220] Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Rogers [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-246.................................................... [33.6.630], [33.10.200] Canterbury City Council v Petrik [2002] NSWCA 52......................... [33.3.180] Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358........... [33.2.510], [33.2.520], [33.2.530], [33.2.550], [33.2.640], [33.2.650], [33.2.660], [33.2.670], [33.2.800], [33.4.380] Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004; [1997] 3 WLR 331........................................................................................ [33.2.390] Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham [1975] 1 NZLR 576........................... [33.2.550] Carborundum Realty Pty Ltd v RAIA Archicentre Pty Ltd (1993) 25 ATR 192...............................................................................[33.10.570], [33.10.580] Card v Case (1848) 5 CB 622; 136 ER 1022...................................... [33.6.360] Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-874; [2007] NSWCA 4.............................................................................. [33.3.490] Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853.................[33.4.410], [33.4.490], [33.4.740], [33.4.746], [33.4.785] Cargill v Mervyn (1876) 2 NZ Jur (NS) 50..........................................[33.6.430] Carlyon v Lovering (1857) 1 H & N 784; 156 ER 1417.....................[33.7.710] Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549; [1955] 2 WLR 517...................................................................................... [33.2.1020] Carmichael v Caledonian Railway Co (1870) LR 2 Sc 56; 8 Macph 119....................................................................................................[33.10.500] Carmichael v Sutherland Shire Council (1972) 25 LGRA 435........... [33.7.660] Carnegie v Victoria (unreported, VSCFC, Crockett, O’Bryan and Gray JJ, 998 of 1976, 14 September 1989)...............[33.8.1640], [33.8.1690], [33.8.1700], [33.8.1770] Carolan v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1566.......... [33.8.810], [33.8.930], [33.8.945] Carosella v Ginos & Gilbert Pty Ltd (1982) 57 ALJR 315.............[33.10.1390] Carratt v Morley (1841) 1 QB 18; 113 ER 1036...............................[33.8.1550] Carrera v Honeychurch (1983) 32 SASR 511......................................[33.6.290] Carrick v Commonwealth [1983] 2 Qd R 365....................................[33.10.990] Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474; [2001] QCA 234...................[33.8.180], [33.8.2130] Carroll v Rees (1985) 2 MVR 423....................................................... [33.6.290] Carr-Saunders v Dick McNeil Associates Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 922.................................................................................... [33.10.1430]

[References are to paragraph numbers] xlix

TABLE OF CASES

Carslogie Steamship Co v Royal Norwegian Government (The Carslogie) [1952] AC 292............................................................................... [33.10.2010] Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; 67 ALJR 634........................................[33.10.220], [33.10.710], [33.10.1100] Carter v Kenyon (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 222......................[33.7.220], [33.7.490] Carter v Murray [1981] 2 NSWLR 77.............................. [33.7.530], [33.7.540] Carter v Thomas [1893] 1 QB 673....................................................... [33.9.380] Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340.......[33.8.170], [33.8.180], [33.8.325], [33.8.360], [33.8.380], [33.8.390] Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758; [1963] 2 WLR 210................................................................. [33.10.370], [33.10.380] Cartwright v McLaine & Long Pty Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 549; 53 ALJR 413......................................................................................[33.7.530] Cash Resources Australia Pty Ltd v Ken Gaetjens Real Estate Pty Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-276................................................................ [33.2.570] Cashfield House Ltd v David & Heather Sinclair Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 452.......................................................................................[33.6.720] Cashmere Pacific Ltd (in rec & liq) v New Zealand Dairy Board [1996] 1 NZLR 218.......................................................................................[33.5.180] Casino Show Society v Norris [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-664.......[33.3.170] Casley v Commonwealth [1981] WAR 85; (1980) 41 FLR 127....... [33.8.1590], [33.8.1610] Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5) (1988) 67 LGRA 108........................... [33.6.160], [33.6.720], [33.7.250], [33.7.530] Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645............................................ [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.730] Cassidy v Ministry of Health (UK) [1951] 2 KB 343....................... [33.2.1150], [33.2.1780], [33.6.710] Castellan v Electric Power Transmission Pty Ltd (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 159; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 67............................................ [33.11.200], [33.11.370] Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; 60 ALJR 679......................................................................................[33.7.830] Castrique v Behrens (1861) 3 El & El 709; 121 ER 608................. [33.8.1820], [33.8.1850] Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152.............................................................. [33.2.1510], [33.5.400] Caterson v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1973) 128 CLR 99; 47 ALJR 249...................................................................[33.9.770], [33.9.930] Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183........... [33.10.250] Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 1312; [References are to paragraph numbers] l

TABLE OF CASES

[2003] HCA 38..........................................[33.2.90], [33.2.1400], [33.10.170] Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) LR 10 QB 453.................. [33.2.1370] Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428.................. [33.2.1110], [33.2.1120], [33.3.190] Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145; [1959] 3 WLR 262...................................................................................... [33.2.1620] CBD Investments Pty Ltd v Ace Ceramics Pty Ltd [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-359................................................................................................ [33.2.810] CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013; [1988] 2 WLR 1191...................................................................................... [33.8.150] Cekan v Haines (1990) 21 NSWLR 296............................................ [33.2.1600] Central British Columbia Planers Ltd v Hocker (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 689......................................................................................................[33.2.550] Central Darling Shire Council v Greeney [2015] NSWCA 51............[33.2.790] Central Gold Fields Shire v Haley (2009) 24 VR 378; 167 LGERA 268; [2009] VSCA 101........................................................... [33.3.170], [33.3.220] Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147; (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 481......................................................................................................[33.1.140] Century Insurance Ltd (in prov liq) v New Zealand Guardian Trust Ltd (unreported, FCA, French J, 81 of 1995, 2 October 1997)........... [33.11.380] Cervellone v Besselink Bros Pty Ltd (1984) 55 ACTR 1.....................[33.3.170] CES v Superclinics (Aust) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47................[33.2.1400], [33.10.2170] CES v Superclinics (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Newman J, 14479 of 1988, 18 April 1994)..................................................................... [33.10.2170] Chabbra Corp Pte Ltd v The Jag Shakti [1986] AC 337; [1986] 2 WLR 87...................................................................................... [33.10.1510] Chadwick v Allen [2012] SADC 105.................................................. [33.10.960] Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912.................. [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300] Chairman of National Crime Authority v Flack (1998) 86 FCR 16....[33.8.830] Challen v McLeod Country Golf Club [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-760; [2004] QCA 358................................................................................ [33.7.530] Chamberlaine v Chester & Birkenhead Railway Co (1848) 1 Ex 870; 154 ER 371.......................................................................[33.5.10], [33.5.260] Chan v Fong (1973) 5 SASR 1........................................[33.2.1640], [33.9.730] Chan v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 29......................................................................................... [33.5.180] Chandra v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1046.... [33.11.390] Chapel Road Pty Ltd v ASIC (No 10) (2014) 307 ALR 428; [2014] NSWSC 346...............................................................................[33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] [References are to paragraph numbers] li

TABLE OF CASES

Chaplin v Dunstan Ltd [1938] SASR 245............................................ [33.6.660] Chaplin v Hawes (1828) 3 Car & P 554; 172 ER 543........................ [33.9.750] Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786.....................................................[33.10.2040] Chapman v Cole (2006) 15 VR 150; [2006] VSCA 70.................... [33.8.1880], [33.8.1920] Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170..................[33.2.1340], [33.9.740], [33.9.930], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2010], [33.11.170], [33.11.370] Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4) (Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106..................................... [33.5.200], [33.5.220] Chapman v McDonald [1969] IR 188...............................................[33.10.1740] Chappell v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153.....[33.10.2280] Chaproniere v Mason (1905) 21 TLR 633......................................... [33.2.1760] Charella Farms Pty Ltd v Dalwallinu Shire (1987) 5 SR (WA) 18.... [33.6.290] Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co [1914] 3 KB 772........................................................................................... [33.7.660] Charlwood v Greig (1851) 3 Car & K 46; 175 ER 457...................... [33.6.360] Charman v Pickering (unreported, SASC, Olsson J, 2148 of 1991, 24 October 1991).................................................................................................. [33.6.460] Chase, Re [1989] 1 NZLR 325......................................................... [33.10.1210] Chase v de Groot [1994] 1 NZLR 613.......................... [33.2.810], [33.10.1720] Chasemore v Richards (1859) 7 HLC 349; 11 ER 140........................[33.8.150] Chatwood v National Speedways Ltd [1929] St R Qd 29...................[33.9.910], [33.9.920] Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29............................................[33.2.600] Chaytor v London, New York & Paris Association of Fashion Ltd (1961) 30 DLR (2d) 527........................................................ [33.8.1570], [33.8.1670] Cheetham v Bou (1989) 10 MVR 242............................. [33.2.1570], [33.9.860] Cheney v Bardwell (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 401; 16 WN (NSW) 97... [33.8.1860] CHEP Australia Ltd v Bunnings Group Ltd [2010] NSWSC 301...... [33.8.790], [33.8.920] Chiaverini v Hockey [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-223.................... [33.10.830] Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299; [1968] 2 WLR 201..................................................................... [33.8.560], [33.9.160] Chicco v Woodville City Corp [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-028.....[33.2.1610] Childs v Lewis (1924) 40 TLR 870................................[33.8.1540], [33.8.1740] Chin v Venning (1975) 49 ALJR 378............ [33.8.310], [33.8.1600], [33.9.190] Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia [1967] 1 WLR 813...............[33.2.1820] Chinery v Viall (1860) 5 H & N 288; 157 ER 1192........................ [33.10.1510] [References are to paragraph numbers] lii

TABLE OF CASES

Ching v Surrey County Council [1910] 1 KB 736.............. [33.5.10], [33.5.140] Chinn v Morris (1826) 2 Car & P 361; 172 ER 163......................... [33.8.1570] Chippett v Thompson (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 349................................. [33.9.570] Chittenden v Hale [1933] NZLR 836....................................................[33.6.470] Chowdhary v Gillot [1947] 2 All ER 541.............................................[33.6.670] Christian v Johannesson [1956] NZLR 664...................... [33.6.370], [33.6.470] Christiani & Nielsen Pty Ltd v Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd (1993) 2 Tas R 122..................................................................................................[33.2.820] Christie v Bridgestone Australia Pty Ltd (1983) 33 SASR 377.......... [33.9.830] Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316........................................................ [33.7.210] Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573................................................... [33.9.510] Christopher v The MV Fiji Gas (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-168.............................................................................................. [33.2.1370] Christopherson v Bare (1848) 11 QB 473; 116 ER 554...................... [33.9.280] Chubb Cash Ltd v John Crilley & Son [1983] 1 WLR 599........... [33.10.1510], [33.10.1520] Church of Scientology Inc v Transmedia Productions Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-101...................................................... [33.8.520], [33.8.590] Cianciarulo v HP Products Pty Ltd [1959] VR 170............................ [33.9.930] Cinema Center Services Pty Ltd v Eastaway Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [1999] ACTSC 141....................................................................................... [33.4.170] Cinnamond v British Airports Authority [1980] 1 WLR 582...............[33.8.560] Cipollone v Liggett Group Inc 505 US 504 (1992)..............................[33.4.450] Cirjak v Todd (1977) 17 SASR 316................................. [33.9.730], [33.10.360] Citibank Ltd v Papandony [2002] NSWCA 375.................................. [33.8.810] Citicorp Australia Ltd v BS Stillwell Ford Pty Ltd (1979) 21 SASR 142................................................................................. [33.10.1510] City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Southern Aerial Super Service Pty Ltd (1961) 106 CLR 477; 35 ALJR 206..........................................[33.8.930], [33.9.420] City of Gosnells v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437; 85 LGERA 214...... [33.6.300] City of London Corp v Appleyard [1963] 1 WLR 982.........................[33.8.830] Civic v Glastonbury Steel Fabrications Pty Ltd [1985] Aust Torts Reports 80-746................................................................................................ [33.9.850] Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 77 ATR 242; [2009] WASC 52.............................................................. [33.7.30], [33.8.500] Clarey v Principal & Council of Women’s College (1953) 90 CLR 170; [1954] St R Qd 57.............................................................................[33.7.200] Clark v Esanda Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 1.............................................. [33.4.190] Clark v Kramer [1986] WAR 54......................................................... [33.10.940] [References are to paragraph numbers] liii

TABLE OF CASES

Clark v Urquhart [1930] AC 28........................................................ [33.10.1680] Clark v Woods (1848) 2 Ex 395; 154 ER 545....................................[33.8.1740] Clarke v Coleambally Ski Club Inc [2004] NSWCA 376.................... [33.3.170] Clarke v Gisborne Shire Council [1984] VR 971; (1984) 57 LGRA 135........................................................... [33.2.1130], [33.10.1410] Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775............[33.8.180], [33.8.420], [33.8.2135] Clavel v Savage [2015] NSWCA 61................................ [33.8.180], [33.8.1860] Clay v AJ Crump & Sons Ltd [1964] 1 QB 533; [1963] 3 WLR 866........................................................................................ [33.4.350] Clayton v Le Roy [1911] 2 KB 1031................................. [33.8.790], [33.8.880] Clayton v Victoria [1968] VR 562........................................................ [33.3.170] Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corp [1976] 2 NZLR 729... [33.7.545], [33.10.1400], [33.11.400] Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465.......................................................... [33.9.440] Cleary v Jeans (2006) 65 NSWLR 355; [2006] NSWCA 9............ [33.10.1680] Climaze Holdings Pty Ltd v Dyson (1995) 13 WAR 487; 58 IR 260......................................................................................................[33.6.710] Clinton v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1912] 3 KB 198.....................................[33.6.380] Clippens Oil Co Ltd v Edinburgh & District Water Trustees [1907] AC 291............................................................................... [33.10.2120] Clissold v Cratchley [1910] 2 KB 244...........................[33.8.1550], [33.8.1820] Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447; [2001] VSCA 180......................................................................................................[33.3.180] Clubb v Wimpey & Co Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 69................................. [33.8.1540] Clubb v Wimpey & Co Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 148............................... [33.8.1540] Clune v The Queen [1982] VR 1; (1981) 5 A Crim R 246................. [33.9.520] Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978; [1998] 2 WLR 902........................................................................................ [33.5.200] Coastal Recycled Cooking Oils Pty Ltd v Innovative Business Action & Strategies Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 831............................................[33.8.810] Cobb v O’Donoghue [1980] Qd R 402............................................. [33.10.2160] Cobbett v Grey (1850) 4 Ex 729; 154 ER 1409............[33.8.1520], [33.8.1620] Cocke v Jennor (1614) 80 ER 214...................................................... [33.11.240] Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286; [1982] 3 WLR 1121...................................................................................... [33.5.220] Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 68 ALJR 401; 72 A Crim R 32.....................................................................................[33.8.470], [33.9.480] Codd v Cabe (1876) 1 Ex D 352........................................................ [33.8.1720] Coe v Kernovske (1990) 10 MVR 563...............................[33.9.800], [33.9.840] [References are to paragraph numbers] liv

TABLE OF CASES

Coffey v Queensland [2012] QCA 368..................................................[33.8.410] Coffey v Queensland [2012] QSC 186.................................................. [33.8.410] Coffs Harbour City Council v Backman [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-614; [2001] NSWCA 202.......................................................................... [33.3.320] Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107......................... [33.8.940] Cohen v Morgan (1825) 6 Dow & Ry KB 8......................................[33.8.1840] Cole v Ellis (1992) 60 SASR 481....................................................... [33.10.910] Cole v Lawrence [2001] NSWSC 92...................................................[33.11.390] Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; 78 ALJR 933; [2004] HCA 29.................[33.3.10], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] Coleman v Barrat [2004] NSWCA 27.................................................. [33.6.460] Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 171; 80 WN (NSW) 593; [1964] NSWR 363............[33.8.1810], [33.8.1830], [33.8.1890], [33.8.1910] Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; 78 ALJR 1166; [2004] HCA 39..................................................................................[33.9.480] Coleman v Watson & Shaw [2007] QSC 343..................................... [33.11.160] Coles Myer Ltd v Webster [2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-033; [2009] NSWCA 299....................................................................................................[33.8.1540] Colget v Norris (1886) 2 TLR 414....................................................... [33.6.360] Collingrove, The (1885) 10 PD 158.................................................... [33.8.1820] Collins v Carey [2002] QSC 398....................................... [33.6.300], [33.6.360] Collins v Carey [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-709; [2003] QCA 291......................................................................................................[33.6.290] Collins v Clarence Valley Council [2015] NSWCA 263.................... [33.2.1510] Collins v Larsen (1995) 14 SR (WA) 131............................................ [33.9.800] Collins v Rose (1839) 5 M & W 194; 151 ER 83............................... [33.9.560] Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172........ [33.8.370], [33.8.450], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1670], [33.8.1780], [33.9.440] Collinson v Wairarapa Automobile Association Mutual Insurance Co [1958] NZLR 1................................................................................ [33.11.390] Coloca v BP Australia Ltd [1992] 2 VR 441................. [33.8.410], [33.10.210], [33.10.730] Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert, Re (2004) 220 CLR 308; 78 ALJR 1451; [2004] HCA 44..................................................................................[33.9.460] Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41...... [33.6.640], [33.6.650], [33.6.690], [33.6.710] Columbia Coffee & Tea Pty Ltd v Churchill (t/as Nelson Parkhill) (1992) 29 NSWLR 141............................................................................. [33.10.1720] [References are to paragraph numbers] lv

TABLE OF CASES

Colville v Small (1910) 22 OLR 426.................................................. [33.8.2000] Colwill v Reeves (1811) 2 Camp 575; 170 ER 1257.........[33.8.330], [33.8.780] Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1985) 64 ACTR 1......................................................................................................[33.10.1100] Comcare v PVYW (2013) 88 ALJR 1; [2013] HCA 41.....[33.6.170], [33.6.630] Cominco Ltd v Westinghouse Canada Ltd (1981) 127 DLR (3d) 544....................................................................................................[33.4.1100] Commercial & General Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1973) 129 CLR 374; 47 ALJR 612................................... [33.11.410] Commercial Union Assurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Lamont [1989] 3 NZLR 187................................................................[33.8.1840], [33.8.1870] Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Microwave Safe Australia Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 287...........................................................................[33.4.980] Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292; 35 ALJR 163....................................................................................[33.2.1820] Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Anderson (1961) 105 CLR 42; 35 ALJR 128........................................................................................[33.3.30] Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Hanna (1954) 28 ALJR 656; 55 SR (NSW) 109; 72 WN (NSW) 47........................................................ [33.9.780] Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v McDermott [1967] 1 AC 169; [1966] 3 WLR 267; (1966) SR (NSW) 98; 83 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 384; 40 ALJR 1..........................................................................................[33.3.350] Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Scott (1959) 102 CLR 392; 33 ALJR 126..................................................................................[33.10.1740] Commissioner for Railways (Qld) v Halley (1978) 20 ALR 409........ [33.9.780] Commissioner for Railways (Qld) v Ruprecht (1979) 142 CLR 563; 53 ALJR 606......................................................................................[33.9.780] Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39........... [33.9.860], [33.9.880], [33.9.890], [33.9.910], [33.9.920], [33.9.930], [33.9.970] Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Estate of Russell (2002) 55 NSWLR 232; 118 IR 144; [2002] NSWCA 272................................................... [33.8.2170] Commissioner of Taxation v Cooling (1990) 22 FCR 42; 21 ATR 13......................................................................................................[33.10.580] Commissioners for Lord High Admiral (UK) v The SS Amerika [1917] AC 38................................................................................. [33.10.1210] Commissioners for Lord High Admiral (UK) v The SS Volute [1922] 1 AC 129............................................................................................[33.4.460] Commissioners of Transport (NSW) v Barton (1933) 49 CLR 114; 33 SR (NSW) 507; 50 WN (NSW) 230........................................................ [33.3.10] [References are to paragraph numbers] lvi

TABLE OF CASES

Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123........................................[33.1.270], [33.10.2030], [33.10.2040] Commonwealth v Anderson (1960) 105 CLR 303; 34 ALJR 323...... [33.8.470], [33.8.550] Commonwealth v Brisbane Milling Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 559....... [33.10.230] Commonwealth v Chessell (1991) 30 FCR 154..................................[33.10.500] Commonwealth v Cocks (1966) 115 CLR 413; 40 ALJR 33............... [33.6.670] Commonwealth v Connell (1986) 5 NSWLR 218............. [33.2.390], [33.6.690] Commonwealth v Fernando (2012) 200 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 18......................................................................................................[33.8.2160] Commonwealth v Flaviano (1996) 40 NSWLR 199...........................[33.11.370] Commonwealth v Griffıths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; [2007] NSWCA 370......................................................................................................[33.6.590] Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749..... [33.2.980], [33.2.990], [33.2.1000], [33.2.1010], [33.6.590], [33.6.610], [33.6.620] Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389..........[33.4.460], [33.9.840], [33.10.2060] Commonwealth v Murray [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-207............ [33.10.220] Commonwealth v O’Callaghan [2001] WASCA 276........................... [33.3.240] Commonwealth v Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227..................................[33.10.1740] Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; 64 ALJR 540....... [33.2.390] Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138... [33.8.1840], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1910] Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527...................... [33.8.1850], [33.8.1900], [33.8.1910], [33.8.1920] Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311; 48 ALJR 196....................................................................................[33.8.1940] Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Sydney Wide Stores Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 304; 55 ALJR 574.................................................[33.8.900] Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466; [2007] FCAFC 132....................................................................................................[33.8.1260] Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Corke Instrument Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd (2005) 223 ALR 480; [2005] FCA 799................. [33.8.1220] Community Services, Director-General of Department of v BB [1999] NSWSC 1169....................................................................................................[33.9.300] [References are to paragraph numbers] lvii

TABLE OF CASES

Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] AIPC 92-432; [2011] FCA 1319............[33.8.1340] Comptroller of Customs v Martin Square Motors Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 289.......................................................................................[33.2.590] CompuServe v Cyber Promotions, 962 F Supp 1015 (1997)............... [33.8.720] Comstock v General Motors Corp, 99 NW 2d 627 (1959)................ [33.4.1100] ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302...[33.8.1340] Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Australian Building Construction Employees’ & Builders Labourers’ Federation (1988) 83 ALR 385....................................................................................... [33.8.480] Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866.................................. [33.2.1700], [33.9.910] Connellan Nominees Pty Ltd v Camerer [1988] 2 Qd R 248.............. [33.7.710] Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1964] AC 1254; [1964] 2 WLR 1145.................................................................................... [33.8.2010] Connolly v Sunday Times Publishing Co Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 263......[33.10.240] Connor v Macdonald (1912) 6 QJP 119............................................... [33.9.440] Connorville Estates Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric Commission (Tas) [1967] Tas SR 26....................................................................................................[33.10.2280] Conroy v Lowndes [1958] Qd R 375.................................................... [33.7.890] Consolidated Broken Hill Ltd v Edwards [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-815; [2005] NSWCA 380.......................................................................... [33.3.320] Consolidated Co v Curtis & Son [1892] 1 QB 495.......... [33.8.890], [33.9.150] Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd [1944] KB 693......... [33.1.340], [33.8.2170] Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2014) 318 ALR 107; [2014] VSCA 348............[33.8.1090], [33.8.1150] Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCATrans 122..........................................[33.8.1090], [33.8.1150] Conway v George Wimpey & Co Ltd [1951] 2 KB 266... [33.6.680], [33.9.160] Cook v Australian Capital Territory Racing Club Inc [2001] ACTSC 106......................................................................................................[33.3.260] Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25......... [33.2.1630], [33.2.1670], [33.9.910], [33.9.970], [33.9.990], [33.10.2150] Cook v Lewis [1951] SCR 830; [1952] 1 DLR 1............................... [33.11.160] Cook v Modern Mustering Pty Ltd (2015) 304 FLR 176; [2015] NTSC 82......................................................................................................[33.2.1516] Cook v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 548; [2000] FCA 677.............. [33.4.740] Cook v Saroukos (1989) 97 FLR 33..................................................... [33.8.890] Cook Strait Skyferry Ltd v Dennis Thompson International Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 72.......................................................................................[33.8.1220] [References are to paragraph numbers] lviii

TABLE OF CASES

Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556; [1978] 2 WLR 978.................. [33.10.530] Cooper v Booth (1785) 3 Esp 135; 170 ER 564................................ [33.8.1820] Cooper v Railway Executive [1953] 1 WLR 223................................. [33.6.430] Cope v Sharpe (No 2) [1912] 1 KB 496...............................................[33.9.380] Coppin v Tobler Bros Canberra Marine Centre Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 183.............................................................. [33.4.170], [33.11.350] Copyright Agency Ltd v Haines [1982] 1 NSWLR 182; (1982) 61 FLR 236......................................................................................[33.8.1150] Corbett v Pallas (1995) 86 LGERA 312.............................................. [33.7.240] Corbett v Taylor (1879) 5 VLR (L) 455............................................... [33.4.170] Corea v Peiris [1909] AC 549.............................................................[33.8.1860] Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile v Sogemin Metals Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1396...................................................................................... [33.9.600] Cortis v Baker [1968] SASR 367..........................................................[33.9.770] Corvi v Ellis [1969] SC 312................................................................ [33.11.370] Corvisy v Corvisy [1982] 2 NSWLR 557...................... [33.8.460], [33.10.2280] Costi (formerly Constantinou) v Minister of Education (1973) 5 SASR 328..................................................................................... [33.10.180] Cotogno v Lamb (No 3) (1986) 5 NSWLR 559................................. [33.10.200] Cottee v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 469.................. [33.4.170] Couch v Steel (1854) 3 El & Bl 402; 118 ER 1193...............................[33.5.10] Coulthard v CSR Ltd (unreported, WASC, Owen J, 1421 of 1992, 2 October 1992)................................................................................................ [33.10.850] Coulthard v South Australia (1995) 63 SASR 531.............................. [33.6.700] Cousins v Canadian Northern Railway (1908) 9 WLR 308.............. [33.8.1780] Cousins v Greaves (1920) 54 DLR 650................................................ [33.6.430] Cousins v Wilson [1994] 1 NZLR 463................................................[33.10.210] Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364...............[33.6.140], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1610], [33.8.1650], [33.8.1660] Cowell v Madden (1991) 15 MVR 114.................................................[33.6.290] Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605................ [33.8.550], [33.9.270], [33.9.390] Cowper v JG Goldner Pty Ltd (1986) 40 SASR 457...........................[33.8.940] Cox v Bath (No 3) (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 263; 9 WN (NSW) 171..... [33.9.410] Cox v Burbidge (1863) 13 CB (NS) 430; 143 ER 171.... [33.6.410], [33.6.420], [33.6.430], [33.6.440] [References are to paragraph numbers] lix

TABLE OF CASES

Cox v Coulson [1916] 2 KB 177...........................................................[33.3.350] Cox v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd [1905] AC 168........[33.8.1920] Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713; 8 ABC 58.................[33.8.1260], [33.8.1940] Cox v Mayor of Essendon (1894) 16 ALT 7.................[33.7.870], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1400] Cox v McIntosh [1992] CLY 1523........................................................ [33.6.330] Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 211; 65 ALJR 314..................................................................................[33.10.1100] CR Taylor (Wholesale) Ltd v Hepworths Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 659... [33.10.1380] Craftsman Homes Australia Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 519.......................................................................................[33.8.600] Crago v Multiquip Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-620................................. [33.4.980] Craig v Marsh (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 323; 52 WN (NSW) 123..........[33.8.890] Craig v Troy (1997) 16 WAR 96.......................................................[33.10.2000] Crawford v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 4450 of 1989, 21 February 1994)................ [33.7.530], [33.7.540], [33.7.680] Cresswell v Sirl [1948] 1 KB 241......................................................... [33.9.380] Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 1; [1999] HCA 59....................... [33.2.230], [33.2.240], [33.4.380] Critchley v Cross [2000] NSWSC 6..................................................... [33.3.320] Crockett v Roberts (2002) 11 Tas R 393; [2002] TASSC 73.............[33.10.960] Crocodile Marketing Ltd v Griffıth Vintners Pty Ltd (1989) 28 NSWLR 539................................................................................. [33.4.980] Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435................................................................................. [33.8.1260] Crofts v Murton [2009] EWHC 3538................................................[33.10.2120] Crossley v Rawlinson [1982] 1 WLR 369.......................................... [33.2.1340] Crow v Wood [1971] 1 QB 77; [1970] 3 WLR 516.............................[33.6.440] Crowther v Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd [1985] Aust Torts Reports 80-709................................................................................................ [33.8.920] Crowther v Shannon Motor Co [1975] 1 WLR 30...............................[33.4.190] Cruttendon v Brenock [1949] VLR 366................................................ [33.6.360] Cruz-Vargas v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co 348 F 3d 271 (2003)........... [33.4.430] C-Shirt Pty Ltd v Barnett Marketing & Management Pty Ltd (1996) 37 IPR 315..................................................................................................[33.10.1680] CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Formosa (2009) 235 FLR 273; [2009] NSWCA 363......................................................................................................[33.5.150] [References are to paragraph numbers] lx

TABLE OF CASES

CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 59; 3 DDCR 192; [2005] HCA 64.............................................................[33.10.30], [33.10.930] CSR Ltd v Tanco Kimpex Export Corp Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 568....... [33.4.160] CSR Ltd v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 463........................... [33.2.800], [33.4.490] Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084...................[33.5.160], [33.5.180], [33.6.610], [33.8.1710], [33.8.1740], [33.8.1770] Cubillo v Commonwealth (1999) 89 FCR 528; [1999] FCA 518...... [33.8.1550] Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455; [2001] FCA 1213........................................................[33.8.1710], [33.8.1740], [33.8.1770] Cuckow v Polyester Reinforced Products Pty Ltd (1970) 19 FLR 122........................................................................................[33.4.440] Cull v Green (1924) 27 WALR 62.................. [33.7.530], [33.7.540], [33.7.690] Cull v Judd [1980] WAR 161.........................................[33.10.850], [33.10.960] Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772...............[33.10.170], [33.10.500], [33.10.530], [33.10.540], [33.10.590], [33.10.600], [33.10.860] Cumberland v Clark (1996) 39 NSWLR 514..................................... [33.8.1830] Cummings v Canberra Theatre Trust (unreported, FCAFC, Brennan, Fisher and Mcgregor JJ, 18 June 1980).....................................................[33.10.930] Cummings v Granger [1977] QB 397; [1976] 3 WLR 842................ [33.6.390], [33.6.470] Cunningham v Whelan (1917) 52 LT 67............................[33.6.300], [33.6.310] Curmi v McLennan [1994] 1 VR 513................................................... [33.2.960] Curtis v Thompson (1955) 106 LJ 61................................................... [33.6.290] Cusack v Stayt (2000) 31 MVR 517; [2000] NSWCA 244................. [33.9.200] Cutler v McPhail [1962] 2 QB 292; [1962] 2 WLR 1135.................[33.11.240] Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398.............[33.5.10], [33.5.180], [33.5.190], [33.5.200] Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 79 ALJR 839; [2005] HCA 14......................................[33.2.1060], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1560]

D D v S (1981) 93 LSJS 405.....................................................................[33.9.220] D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368.................... [33.1.10], [33.2.810], [33.2.820], [33.4.350], [33.4.500] D Galambos & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10............... [33.1.300] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12................................................................................[33.8.1800] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxi

TABLE OF CASES

Da Costa v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1978) 20 ALR 257..... [33.2.1820] Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd [1946] 2 All ER 333......... [33.2.1610] Daebo Shipping Co Ltd v Go Star (2012) 207 FCR 220; [2012] FCAFC 156....................................................................................................[33.8.1180] Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 VR 428......[33.2.270], [33.2.340] D’Agruima v Seymour (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 15................................ [33.6.420] Dahl v Grice [1981] VR 513.................................................................[33.4.460] Dahl v Purnell (1992) 15 Qld Lawyer Reps 33................................. [33.2.1400] Dailly v Spot-On Investments Pty Ltd [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-363.............................................................................................. [33.2.1560] Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Gardner [1968] 2 QB 762; [1968] 2 WLR 1239............................................................... [33.8.1150], [33.8.1170] Daily Telegraph Co Ltd v Stuart (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 291; 45 WN (NSW) 48........................................................................[33.7.190], [33.7.240] Dairy Farmers Co-op Ltd v Azar (1990) 170 CLR 293; 64 ALJR 535; 34 IR 40....................................................................[33.5.160], [33.5.280], [33.6.10] Dale v Fox [2012] TASSC 84......................... [33.8.160], [33.8.360], [33.9.190] Daley v Gypsy Caravan Co Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 22................... [33.4.350], [33.4.500], [33.4.510] Daley v Martin (No 1) [1982] Qd R 23.........................[33.8.460], [33.10.2280] Dall v Blue Wren Taxi Co Pty Ltd [1926] VLR 365.......................... [33.11.350] Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 3 WLR 385................... [33.9.520] Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740........ [33.7.240], [33.7.710] Daly v General Steam Navigation Co Ltd (The Dragon) [1980] 1 WLR 120...................................................................................... [33.10.930] Daly v Liverpool Corp [1939] 2 All ER 142......................................[33.2.1645] Daly v Thiering (2013) 249 CLR 381; 88 ALJR 67; [2013] HCA 45......................................[33.10.760], [33.10.930], [33.10.990] D’Ambrosio v De Souza Lima (1985) 60 ACTR 18...........................[33.10.920] Danby v Beardsley (1880) 43 LT 603................................................. [33.8.1840] D’Angola v Rio Pioneer Gravel Co Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 495................................................................................. [33.11.200] Daniel v Rickett, Cockerell & Co Ltd [1938] 2 KB 322....................[33.11.390] Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248............. [33.2.1630], [33.2.1720], [33.9.750], [33.9.760], [33.11.390] Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 258........................... [33.4.170] Daniels v Telfer (1933) 34 SR (NSW) 99; 51 WN (NSW) 29.......... [33.8.1830] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxii

TABLE OF CASES

Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; 77 ALJR 40; [2002] HCA 49..................................................................................[33.9.480] Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 364..............[33.2.820], [33.5.140], [33.5.160], [33.5.230] Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2015] HCATrans 93.............[33.5.140], [33.5.160], [33.5.230] D’Aquino v Trovatello [2015] VSCA 78.............................................[33.10.380] Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067........................................[33.10.1460] Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 558; 150 A Crim R 314; [2004] NSWCA 431.........................................[33.8.390] Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 Hurl & N 1; 156 ER 1093.......................[33.8.1690] Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell (1886) 11 App Cas 127............[33.10.380] Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36....................................................................................... [33.8.1630] Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36............ [33.5.140], [33.5.150], [33.5.170], [33.5.190], [33.5.230], [33.6.10], [33.6.580], [33.6.590], [33.6.720] Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500; 61 ALJR 76........................................................................................[33.9.940] Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450; [2007] FCA 1216...................................................... [33.2.660] Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993)......[33.4.480] Davenport v Commissioner for Railways (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 552; 70 WN (NSW) 334....................................................................................... [33.11.400] David v Abdul Cader [1963] 1 WLR 834...........................................[33.8.2162] David Jones Ltd v Federated Storemen & Packers’ Union of Australia (NSW) (1985) 14 IR 75............................................................................... [33.8.1200] David Jones Ltd v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 110; 34 SR (NSW) 561; 51 WN (NSW) 196........................................................................[33.4.30], [33.4.170] David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 23 FCR 1....................................................................................... [33.10.2040] David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; 66 ALJR 768; 24 ATR 125.................................. [33.10.2040] David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] Davidson v Chief Constable (North Wales) [1994] 2 All ER 597..... [33.8.1540] Davidson v Connaught Laboratories (1980) 14 CCLT 251.................[33.4.490] Davidson v JS Gilbert Fabrications Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 1........[33.10.1460] Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1959] AC 604; [1959] 2 WLR 331...................................................................................... [33.2.1060] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Bennison (1927) 22 Tas LR 52.............................................. [33.8.510] Davies [1975] QB 172; [1974] 3 WLR 607..........................[33.6.300] Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76................................................. [33.8.1180] Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd [1949] 2 KB 291................[33.9.860], [33.10.2150] Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207; [1972] 3 WLR 801......................[33.10.2040], [33.10.2050] Davies v Tenby Borough [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 469.......................... [33.10.990] Davies v Thomas Owen & Co [1919] 2 KB 39....................................[33.5.420] Davis v Bunn (1936) 56 CLR 246............ [33.2.1740], [33.2.1760], [33.2.1800] Davis v Capper (1829) 10 B & C 28; 109 ER 362........................... [33.8.2160] Davis v Cole [1939] VLR 320...............................................................[33.6.420] Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89...... [33.8.1790], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1840], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1890] Davis v Kitching [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-029.......................... [33.2.1350] Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434............................................................. [33.8.540] Davis v Pearce Parking Station Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 642..............[33.9.940] Davis v Radcliffe [1990] 1 WLR 821....................................................[33.2.550] Davis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 392......................................... [33.8.1560] Davis v The Queen [2007] HCATrans 652......................................... [33.8.1560] Dawkins v Rokeby (1866) 4 F & F 806; 176 ER 800........................[33.8.1820] Day v Bank of New South Wales (1978) 18 SASR 163; 33 FLR 376.....................................................................[33.8.710], [33.9.600] Day v Ost [1973] 2 NZLR 385............................................................. [33.2.550] De Bomford v Pithers (1987) 4 SR (WA) 276......................................[33.6.300] De Freville v Dill (1927) 96 LJKB 1056............................................[33.8.1660] De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498........................ [33.7.240], [33.7.540], [33.7.680], [33.10.1410] De Mesnil v Dakin (1867) LR 3 QB 18............................................. [33.8.1740] De Reus v Gray (2003) 9 VR 432; [2003] VSCA 84.........................[33.11.230] De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338; 77 ALJR 99; [2002] HCA 52..............................................................................[33.10.1240] Davies Davies Davies Davies

v v v v

De Vries v Wightman [1961] Qd R 196............................................ [33.10.1680] Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223.............................................[33.8.360], [33.8.375], [33.8.400], [33.8.410] Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370; 50 SR (NSW) 50; 67 WN (NSW) 76..................................[33.6.140], [33.6.630], [33.6.650], [33.6.700] Dederer v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-792; [References are to paragraph numbers] lxiv

TABLE OF CASES

[2005] NSWSC 185.............................................................................[33.2.80] Deen v Davies [1935] 2 KB 282........................................................... [33.6.290] Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (2001) 118 LGERA 117; [2001] QCA 342................................................ [33.8.1150], [33.8.1160], [33.8.2165] Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council [2002] HCATrans 326............................................................................... [33.8.1150], [33.8.1160] Degotardi v Shellharbour Municipal Council (1953) 18 LGR (NSW) 258...................................................................................[33.7.240], [33.7.840] Dehn v Attorney-General (NZ) [1988] 2 NZLR 564..........................[33.10.230] Del Ponte v Del Ponte (1987) 11 NSWLR 498............ [33.10.820], [33.10.840] Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] 1 AC 321; [2001] 3 WLR 1007; [2001] UKHL 55................ [33.7.170], [33.7.200], [33.7.215], [33.7.250], [33.7.860] Delohery v Permanent Trustee Co (NSW) (1904) 1 CLR 283; 22 WN (NSW) 66...........................................................................................[33.7.710] Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 474; [2003] FCA 1413....................................................................[33.8.1990], [33.8.2000] Delphin v Savolainen (1989) 10 MVR 37..................... [33.2.1570], [33.2.1640] Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223........ [33.3.170], [33.3.200], [33.3.220], [33.3.250], [33.3.280], [33.3.290] Denison v Fawcett (1958) 12 DLR (2d) 537......................................[33.8.1310] Dennis v Brownlee (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 719; 80 WN (NSW) 1239; 9 LGRA 415................................................ [33.5.150], [33.5.190], [33.5.220] Dennis v Ministry of Defence (UK) [2003] All ER (D) 300; [2003] EWHC 793 (QB)............................................................................... [33.7.700] Dent v Standard Life Association (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 560; 21 WN (NSW) 182...............................................[33.8.190], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870] Department of Housing & Works v Smith (No 2) (2010) 265 ALR 490; [2010] WASCA 25.........................................................................................[33.3.230] Department of the Environment (UK) v Thomas Bates & Sons Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 1075....................................................................................[33.2.810] Department of the Environment (UK) v Thomas Bates & Sons Ltd [1991] 1 AC 499; [1990] 3 WLR 457........................................................[33.2.1130] Derbyshire Building Co Pty Ltd v Becker (1962) 107 CLR 633; 35 ALJR 498......................................................................................[33.4.170] Dering v Uris [1964] 2 QB 669.......................................................... [33.10.240] Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2006) 62 ATR 40; [2006] VSC 46........................................................................................................[33.2.550] Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79...............................................[33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.580], [33.2.640] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxv

TABLE OF CASES

Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon [2005] VCAT 552........................ [33.2.550] Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337..........[33.2.510], [33.2.520], [33.8.1290], [33.8.1300], [33.10.1680] Dessent v Commonwealth (1977) 51 ALJR 482.......... [33.10.890], [33.10.2160] Deutz Australia Pty Ltd v Skilled Engineering Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 173; [2001] VSC 194...............................................................................[33.11.410] Dewell v Hackshalls Ltd (1956) 74 WN (NSW) 191...........................[33.9.930] Dewell v Sanders (1618) Cro Jac 490; 79 ER 419.............................. [33.7.710] Dewhirst v Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34........................................... [33.7.710] Dhalla v Jodrey (1985) 16 DLR (4th) 732......................................... [33.10.210] Di Masi v Piromalli [1980] WAR 57.................................................... [33.7.710] Di Napoli v New Beach Apartments Pty Ltd (2004) 11 BPR 21,493; [2004] NSWSC 52.........................................................................................[33.8.580] Diamond v Minter [1941] 1 KB 656..............................[33.8.1540], [33.8.1740] DIB Group Pty Ltd (t/as Hill & Co) v Cole [2009] Aust Torts Reports 882-022; [2009] NSWCA 210........................................................ [33.2.1060] Dickenson v Waters Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 593; 48 WN (NSW) 232..................................................................[33.8.1540], [33.8.1590] Dickinson v Dickinson (1986) 3 SR (WA) 233.................................... [33.2.950] Dickinson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (WA) (1987) 163 CLR 500; 61 ALJR 553......................................................................................[33.2.950] Digital Equipment Corp v Darkcrest Ltd [1984] Ch 512; [1984] 3 WLR 617........................................................................................ [33.2.390] Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 323; 49 ALJR 233............................................................... [33.11.180], [33.11.370] Dillon v Nash [1950] VLR 293......................................................... [33.10.1870] Dillon v O’Brien (1887) 20 LR Ir 300..................................................[33.9.530] Dimes v Petley (1850) 15 QB 276; 117 ER 462.................................. [33.7.910] Dimond Manufacturing Co Ltd v Hamilton [1969] NZLR 609........... [33.2.660] Dingo Fence Case (Street v Bar Association (Qld)) (1989) 168 CLR 461; 63 ALJR 715......................................................................................[33.10.40] Director General of Department of Community Services (NSW) v Y [1999] NSWSC 644.......................................................................................[33.9.300] Director of Consumer Affairs (Vic) v Alpha Flight Services Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1434.........................................................................................[33.4.1140] Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Hart [2005] 2 Qd R 246; [2005] QCA 051......................................................................................................[33.8.830] Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483............................... [33.7.160], [33.7.170], [33.7.250], [33.7.860] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Dixon v Davies (1982) 17 NTR 31..................................................... [33.10.940] Dixson v Tange (1891) 12 LR (NSW) Eq 204; 8 WN (NSW) 31.......[33.7.890] Dodd v McGlashan [1967] ALR 433.................................................... [33.9.910] Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433................ [33.10.490], [33.10.1360], [33.10.1390], [33.10.1400], [33.10.2120] Dodsworth v Holt (1964) 44 DLR (2d) 480....................................... [33.11.170] Dolan v Bright, The Times, 17 November 1962.................................. [33.6.390] Dolbel v Dolbel (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 758; 80 WN (NSW) 1056.....[33.2.950], [33.3.160] Dollar Sweets Case (Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia) [1986] VR 383..................... [33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.830], [33.8.1230], [33.10.2280] Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383........[33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.830], [33.8.1230], [33.10.2280] Dominion Mosaics & Tile Co Ltd v Trafalgar Trucking Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 246.................................................................... [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380] Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 482; 65 WN (NSW) 218................................[33.7.180], [33.7.200], [33.7.240], [33.7.850] Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 60 FLR 124; 5 A Crim R 160............. [33.9.510] Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498...........[33.8.1150], [33.8.1180], [33.8.1190], [33.8.1220] Donjerkovic v Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty Ltd (1980) 24 SASR 347................................................................................. [33.10.2140] Donnelly v Graves (1880) 6 VLR (L) 247....................................... [33.10.1510] Donnelly v Joyce [1974] 1 QB 454...................................................[33.10.2160] Donnelly v Joyce [1974] QB 454; [1973] 3 WLR 514...................... [33.10.990] Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.............. [33.2.20], [33.2.40], [33.2.210], [33.2.230], [33.2.330], [33.2.370], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1516], [33.4.20], [33.4.30], [33.4.330], [33.4.340], [33.4.350], [33.4.360], [33.4.370], [33.4.400], [33.4.410], [33.4.490], [33.4.500], [33.7.200] Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97...................[33.10.200], [33.10.210] Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271........[33.2.1300], [33.11.390] Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154.... [33.6.290], [33.6.370], [33.6.390], [33.9.910] Dorsett v Adelaide City [1913] SALR 71............................................. [33.6.290] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxvii

TABLE OF CASES

D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12...[33.2.390], [33.2.510], [33.2.520], [33.2.820], [33.2.1660], [33.9.570] Dougherty v Ah Lee (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 8...................................... [33.7.220] Dougherty v Chandler (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 370; 63 WN (NSW) 183.................................................................. [33.11.160], [33.11.200] Doughty v Martino Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 27 VR 499; [2010] VSCA 121....................................................................................................[33.2.1370] Douglas Valley Finance Co Ltd v S Hughes (Hirers) Ltd [1969] 1 QB 738; [1967] 2 WLR 503............................................................................ [33.8.890] Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591....................[33.8.960], [33.10.2280] Doust v Godbehear (1925) 28 WALR 59........................................... [33.8.1220] Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; 77 ALJR 1706; [2003] HCA 51..................................................................................[33.4.370] Dowell Australia Ltd v Kelly (unreported, VSCFC, O’Bryan, King and Vincent JJ, 4772 of 1987, 14 September 1988)............................. [33.10.850] Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509................................................................ [33.8.1950], [33.8.1980] Downham v Bellette [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-038....................[33.10.180], [33.11.210] Downs v Secker (1989) 152 LSJS 107..................................................[33.6.460] Downs v Williams (1971) 126 CLR 61; 45 ALJR 576.....[33.5.140], [33.5.150], [33.5.160], [33.5.190] Downunder Rock Cafe Pty Ltd v Roberts [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-481.............................................................................................. [33.2.1550] Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158; [1969] 2 WLR 673...................................... [33.10.1680], [33.10.2110], [33.10.2120] Doyle v Vance (1880) 6 VLR (L) 87.....................................................[33.6.400] Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 44 IPR 281; [1999] FCA 461.............................................................................[33.10.1710] Drakos v Woolworths (SA) Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 431..... [33.2.1800], [33.3.360] Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992....................[33.6.290], [33.6.300], [33.6.360] Draper v Trist [1939] 3 All ER 513..................................................[33.10.1710] Dredge v South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 374.................................[33.2.1050] Driscoll v Collins (1892) 31 NBR 604............................................... [33.8.1743] Drive-Yourself Lessey’s Pty Ltd v Burnside (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 390; 76 WN (NSW) 209...................................................[33.3.10], [33.3.310], [33.8.2140] Drymalik v Feldman [1966] SASR 227................................................ [33.9.520] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366; [2002] UKHL 48................................................................................. [33.11.157], [33.11.390] Dubois v Noarlunga District Council [1959] SASR 127; (1959) 59 LGRA 53...................................................................................... [33.7.660] Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (No 2) (2000) 78 SASR 216; [2000] SASC 418....................................................................................................[33.11.370] Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (No 5) (2003) 85 SASR 325........[33.11.370] Dulhunty v JB Young Ltd (1975) 50 ALJR 150....................................[33.3.360] Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669..................... [33.2.1290], [33.2.1330], [33.10.2070] Dumont v Miller (1873) 4 AJR 152................................. [33.8.470], [33.10.230] Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158; [1981] 2 WLR 693; [1981] 1 NSWLR 76; (1981) 45 LGRA 411............ [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Dunning v Scheibner (unreported, NSWSC, Wood J, 13776 of 1988, 15 February 1994).................................................................................[33.10.830] Dunphy v Moore (1865) 13 LT 179.................................................... [33.8.1780] Dunshea v Ryan (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 163; 18 WN (NSW) 181...... [33.8.1820], [33.8.1840] Dunstan v King [1948] VLR 269....................................... [33.7.180], [33.7.240] Dutcher v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1988) 7 MVR 447......................................................................................................[33.9.800] Dutschke v Bormann (1988) 50 SASR 171........................................ [33.10.540] Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373; [1972] 2 WLR 299................................................................... [33.2.540], [33.2.1130] Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410................[33.4.460] Dwyer v Southern (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 896; 78 WN (NSW) 706...[33.2.1340] Dyer v Munday [1895] 1 QB 742......................................................... [33.6.690] Dykstra v Head [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-280............................ [33.10.900] Dymocks Book Arcade Ltd v McCarthy [1966] 2 NSWR 411............[33.8.710], [33.10.1500]

E E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290....................... [33.10.1710] Eadie v Groombridge (1992) 16 MVR 263....................... [33.6.300], [33.6.460] Eagles v Orth [1975] Qd R 197......................................... [33.9.800], [33.9.860] Earl of Harrington v Corp of Derby [1905] 1 Ch 205...................... [33.10.380] Earnshaw v Loy (No 1) [1959] VR 248..............................................[33.8.1850] Earnshaw v Loy (No 2) [1959] VR 252..............................................[33.10.240] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxix

TABLE OF CASES

East Fremantle Corp v Annois [1902] AC 213.................................... [33.7.660] Eastern Asia Navigation Co Ltd v Fremantle Harbour Trust Commissioners (1951) 83 CLR 353........................................................ [33.7.530], [33.7.670] Easther v Amaca Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 328..................................... [33.10.930] Easton v Kooistra [1956] Tas SR 1.......................................................[33.7.690] Eather v Jones (1975) 49 ALJR 254.....................................................[33.6.360] Eather v Jones [1974] 2 NSWLR 19................................... [33.6.10], [33.6.360] Eaton v Pitman (1991) 55 SASR 386.................................................[33.2.1340] Eaton v Pitman [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-008............................ [33.2.1340] Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459................................... [33.8.1300] Edson v Roads & Traffıc Authority (2006) 65 NSWLR 453; [2006] NSWCA 68......................................................................................................[33.2.1570] Edwards v Amos (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 204........................................[33.8.860] Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460...........................................[33.2.1390] Edwards v Blue Mountains City Council (1961) 6 LGRA 263; 78 WN (NSW) 864......................................................................[33.7.660], [33.9.590] Edwards v Joyce [1954] VLR 216...................................................... [33.11.400] Edwards v Mallan [1908] 1 KB 1002...................................................[33.1.140] Edwards v Midland Railway Co (1880) 6 QBD 287.....[33.8.1630], [33.8.1650] Edwards v State Trustees Ltd [2016] VSCA 28....................................[33.2.800] Edwin Hill & Partners v First National Finance Corp plc [1989] 1 WLR 225...................................................................................... [33.8.1250] EE McCurdy Ltd (in liq) v Postmaster-General [1959] NZLR 553... [33.8.880], [33.8.920] Effem Foods Ltd v Nicholls [2004] ATPR 42-034; [2004] NSWCA 332......................................................................................................[33.4.780] Egan v Barrier Branch of Amalgamated Miners’ Association (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 243; 34 WN (NSW) 129.................................................... [33.8.1260] Egan v Egan [1975] Ch 218; [1975] 2 WLR 503.........[33.8.460], [33.10.2280] Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481..................... [33.8.920], [33.9.150], [33.10.1520], [33.10.1530], [33.10.1550] Egerton v Harding [1975] QB 62; [1974] 3 WLR 437........................[33.6.440] Elborow v Allen (1622) Cro Jac 642; 79 ER 553.............................[33.10.1710] Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co Ltd [1924] AC 522................................................................................... [33.1.140] Elderkin v Merrill Lynch, Royal Securities Ltd (1977) 80 DLR (3d) 313......................................................................................................[33.2.550] Electricity Trust (SA) v O’Leary (1986) 42 SASR 26......................[33.10.1490] Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2014) 204 LGERA 238; [References are to paragraph numbers] lxx

TABLE OF CASES

[2014] ACTCA 45............................................................................. [33.5.390] Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT (2015) 110 IPR 164; [2015] FCA 62.................................................................................[33.4.1140] Eleftherotria, The MV v The MV Despina R [1979] AC 685; [1978] 3 WLR 804...................................................................................... [33.10.490] Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335; [1995] 2 WLR 173............................................................................ [33.2.390] Elias v Pasmore [1934] 2 KB 164........................................................ [33.8.560] Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322..... [33.8.410] Elizabeth, Re (1989) 96 FLR 248......................................................... [33.9.300] Ellis v Banyard (1911) 106 LT 51.........................................................[33.6.300] Ellis v Johnstone [1963] 2 QB 8; [1963] 2 WLR 176......................... [33.6.300] Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10..................... [33.6.400], [33.6.420], [33.6.430], [33.6.440] Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553...............[33.2.1150], [33.6.710], [33.9.220] Ellison v L [1998] 1 NZLR 416.......................................................... [33.10.210] Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1987) 16 FCR 410........................................................................... [33.4.785] Elvin & Powell Ltd v Plummer Roddis Ltd (1933) 50 TLR 158........[33.8.880], [33.9.160] Elwes v Brigg Gas Co (1886) 33 Ch D 562.........................................[33.8.830] EM Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane [1999] Aust Torts Reports 81-499.............................................................................................. [33.11.390] Emanuele v Hedley (1997) 137 FLR 339..................... [33.8.1840], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1880], [33.9.610] Emcorp Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1988] 2 Qd R 169...............................................................................[33.8.520], [33.8.590] Emerald Construction Co v Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691............... [33.8.1200], [33.8.1210] EMI (Aust) Ltd v Bes [1970] 2 NSWR 238..........................................[33.4.460] Endihill Pty Ltd v Grasso Searles & Romano [1993] 2 Qd R 136... [33.10.560] Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969..................................................[33.6.610] England v Cowley (1873) LR 8 Ex 126................................................[33.8.890] Ennis v Butterly [1996] 1 IR 426; [1996] IEHC 51........................... [33.8.1320] Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils 275; 95 ER 807............................ [33.9.540] Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22; [1998] 2 WLR 350................[33.10.2010] Environment Protection Authority v Alkem Drums Pty Ltd (2000) 121 A Crim R 152; 113 LGERA 130; [2000] NSWCCA 416............................. [33.5.190] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Erilich v Leifer [2015] VSC 499........................................................... [33.2.990] Ernst & Whinney v Willard Engineering (Dagenham) Ltd (1987) 40 BLR 67........................................................................................................[33.2.820] Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 1) [1979] AC 731; [1979] 3 WLR 68............................................................................ [33.8.1360] Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448.........[33.2.270], [33.2.300], [33.2.520], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.560], [33.2.600], [33.2.630], [33.2.640], [33.2.650], [33.2.660] Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Excel Finance Case) (1994) 61 SASR 424..................................................................... [33.10.1720] Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583........... [33.1.140], [33.2.550], [33.2.600], [33.2.610], [33.2.670], [33.10.1720] Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corp [1956] AC 218; [1956] 2 WLR 81.......................................................................................... [33.8.500] Eugenie Holdings Pty Ltd v Stratford (unreported, NSWSC, Giles J, 50003 of 1990, 12 November 1991)................................................................ [33.2.650] Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36......[33.7.870], [33.10.1360], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1390] Evans v Finn (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 297; 21 WN (NSW) 118............. [33.7.230], [33.7.240], [33.7.680], [33.7.870], [33.7.880] Evans v Lindsay (2006) 46 MVR 531; [2006] NSWCA 354.............. [33.9.850] Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184................................................................. [33.8.1540], [33.8.1840] Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-169............................................................................................ [33.10.1740] Eve, Re [1986] 2 SCR 388; (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 1............................ [33.9.300] Everett v Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198.................................................. [33.8.1850] Everitt v Martin [1953] NZLR 298....................................................... [33.8.770] Evers v Bennett (1982) 31 SASR 228...................................................[33.9.860] Evers; Re Leary, Ex parte (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 146........................ [33.9.520] Excel Finance Case (Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords) (1994) 61 SASR 424..................................................................... [33.10.1720] Exchange Hotel Ltd v Murphy [1947] SASR 112................................ [33.8.360] Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Gregory & Co [1896] 1 QB 147.....[33.10.1690] Executor Trustee & Agency Co (SA) Ltd v Hearse [1961] SASR 51; (1961) 35 ALJR 248n....................................................................................[33.9.740] Executor Trustee Australia Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1995) 63 SASR 393..................................................................................... [33.2.660] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxii

TABLE OF CASES

Eyre v New Zealand Press Association Ltd [1968] NZLR 736......... [33.11.200]

F v R (1982) 29 SASR 437................................................................. [33.2.1400] v R (1983) 33 SASR 189........................... [33.2.1400], [33.4.410], [33.9.220] (in utero), Re [1988] Fam 122; [1988] 2 WLR 1288....................... [33.9.230] (mental patient: sterilisation), Re [1990] 2 AC 1; [1989] 2 WLR 1025................................................ [33.8.370], [33.8.375], [33.9.340] Fabian v Welsh [1999] QCA 365.......................................................... [33.6.300] Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437............................................ [33.9.980] Fabre v Lui [2015] NSWCA 157.......................................................... [33.3.280] Fagan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [1969] 1 QB 439; [1968] 3 WLR 1120.......................................................................... [33.8.390] Fagan v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150 CLR 666; 56 ALJR 781......................................................................................[33.8.325] FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Curtin (1997) 25 MVR 289......... [33.2.1290], [33.9.770] Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32; [2002] 3 WLR 89; [2002] UKHL 22........................................................... [33.4.460] Fairhurst v Aspden [1961] QWN 14...................................................[33.10.940] Falconer v ASLEF [1986] IRLR 331.................................................. [33.8.1210] Falkingham v Fregon (1899) 25 VLR 211........................................... [33.8.550] Falkner v Bourke (1990) 19 NSWLR 574..........................................[33.10.500] Falko v James McEwan & Co Pty Ltd [1977] VR 447....................... [33.1.300] Fallas v Mourlas (2006) 65 NSWLR 418; [2006] NSWCA 32............ [33.2.80] Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-831; [2006] NSWCA 17................................................................ [33.2.80] Fangrove Pty Ltd v Tod Group Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 236.............................................................................[33.2.810], [33.2.1130] F F F F

Fanzelow v Kerr (1896) 14 NZLR 660......................... [33.8.1800], [33.8.1840] Faraonio v Thompson (1978) 19 SASR 56................... [33.10.520], [33.10.560] Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 148 TLR 215.......... [33.6.290], [33.6.300] Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693.................[33.7.370], [33.7.380], [33.7.520], [33.7.900] Farr v Schultz (1988) 1 WAR 94........................................................ [33.10.960] Farrer v Nelson (1885) 15 QBD 258....................................................[33.6.310] Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286...... [33.8.520], [33.8.2020], [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162], [33.8.2165] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Fassifern Investments Pty Ltd v Gordon (unreported, NSWSC, Abadee J, 11672 of 1985, 12 September 1991)................................................ [33.2.650] Fatur v IC Formwork Services Pty Ltd (2000) 158 FLR 136; [2000] ACTSC 110.................................................................................................... [33.11.390] Faulkner v Keffalinos (1970) 45 ALJR 80........................................[33.10.2000] Feather v Rogers (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 192; 26 WN (NSW) 27..........[33.9.560] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605; 72 ALJR 1065; [1998] HCA 42..................................................... [33.8.1350] Feher v Perrett Traders Pty Ltd (1988) 6 MVR 433........ [33.9.800], [33.9.860] Feiner v Domachuk (1994) 35 NSWLR 485.................... [33.7.240], [33.7.250], [33.7.680] Fenn v Paul (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 315; 49 WN (NSW) 130............[33.8.1820] Fennell v Robson Excavations Pty Ltd [1977] 2 NSWLR 486...........[33.7.240], [33.7.530], [33.10.2000] Ferguson v Jensen [1920] 53 DLR 616; (1920) 33 CCC 218...........[33.8.1670] Ferguson v Queensland [2007] QSC 322..................... [33.8.1640], [33.8.1660], [33.8.1690], [33.8.1770] Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR 1553.................................................[33.3.170] Fergusson v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd (1884) 10 VLR (L) 279......................................................................................................[33.7.910] Fernandez v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 190............................................................................... [33.10.1990] Fernando v Commonwealth (No 5) [2013] FCA 901......................... [33.10.210] Fernando v Commonwealth (2014) 231 FCR 251; [2014] FCAFC 181....................................................................................................[33.10.210] Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd (t/as Sports Auto Group) [2015] FCA 1127....................................................................................................[33.4.670] Ferrett v Worsley (1993) 61 SASR 234................................................ [33.9.800] Ffrench v Sestili (2006) 98 SASR 1; [2006] SASC 44..... [33.6.650], [33.6.700] Field v Nominal Defendant (Qld) [1992] 2 Qd R 288....................... [33.10.950] Field v Nott (1939) 62 CLR 660...........................................................[33.6.610] Field v Soccer Association (SA) [1953] SASR 224...........[33.7.240], [33.7.850] Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70............................................................[33.9.530] Fielding v Variety Inc [1967] 2 QB 841; [1967] 3 WLR 415......... [33.10.1710] Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323...................................[33.8.1180], [33.8.1200], [33.8.1210], [33.10.2030] Filburn v People’s Palace & Aquarium Co Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258.................................................[33.6.350], [33.6.360], [33.6.390]

[References are to paragraph numbers] lxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Financial Wisdom Ltd v Newman (2005) 12 VR 79; 191 FLR 138; [2005] VSCA 110.......................................................................................... [33.6.650] Finbow v Domino (1957) 11 DLR (2d) 493....................................... [33.2.1650] Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; 20 ALJ 451................[33.1.300], [33.10.230], [33.10.2030], [33.10.2040] Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Callinan (1978) 140 CLR 427; 52 ALJR 637...............................................................[33.10.500], [33.10.540] Fischer v Stuart (1979) 37 FLR 46......................................[33.6.10], [33.6.350] Fish Steam Laundry Pty Ltd v Col Johnson Electrics Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 585..............................................................................................[33.10.1380] Fisher v Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc, 424 SW 2d 627 (1967)............. [33.8.390] Fisher v Oldham Corp [1930] 2 KB 364..............................................[33.6.610] Fisher v Police (SA) (2004) 154 A Crim R 511; [2004] SASC 232... [33.8.440] Fisher v Smithson (1978) 17 SASR 223...........................................[33.10.1750] Fitch v Hyde-Cates (1982) 150 CLR 482; 56 ALJR 270............... [33.10.1220], [33.10.1230] Fitter v Veal (1701) 12 Mod 542; 88 ER 1506.................................. [33.10.360] Fitzalan v Nicholson (1896) 13 WN (NSW) 51................................. [33.8.1850] Fitzgerald v ED & AD Cooke Bourne (Farms) Ltd [1964] 1 QB 249; [1963] 3 WLR 522.................................................. [33.6.290], [33.6.350], [33.6.360] Fitzgerald v Lane [1989] AC 328; [1988] 3 WLR 356......................[33.11.390] Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268.......... [33.4.460], [33.9.840], [33.9.860], [33.10.1980] Fitzjohn v Mackinder (1861) 9 CB (NS) 505; 142 ER 199...............[33.8.1830] Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 200..............[33.2.1800] Fitzwilliam v Beckman [1978] Qd R 398.......................[33.8.460], [33.10.2280] Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Dolly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500................................................. [33.1.290], [33.1.300], [33.1.310] Fleeming v Orr (1855) 2 Macq 14........................................................[33.6.390] Fletcher v Harris (2005) 190 FLR 59; [2005] ACTSC 27.................. [33.8.520] Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265........[33.6.140], [33.6.150], [33.6.420], [33.6.440] Fletcher v Toppers Drinks Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 911.................. [33.4.360] Fletcher Challenge Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 196............................................................ [33.8.1340], [33.8.1360] Flett v Coulter (1903) 5 OLR 375........................................................ [33.6.440] Florida Hotels Pty Ltd v Mayo (1965) 113 CLR 588; 39 ALJR 50......................................................................................[33.11.400] Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 280; [2001] FCA 370.................................................[33.8.1690], [33.8.1890], [33.8.1960] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Flowfill Packaging Machines Pty Ltd v Fytore Pty Ltd [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-244...................................................................................[33.8.880] Foaminol Laboratories Ltd v British Artid Plastics Ltd [1941] 2 All ER 393............................................................................................... [33.1.300] Fogden v Wade [1945] NZLR 724........................................................ [33.8.430] Fontaine v Quality Platers (1994) 12 WAR 71................................[33.10.2140] Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283....................[33.8.410], [33.9.350], [33.9.370], [33.10.180], [33.10.210], [33.10.220] Footscray Corp v Maize Products Pty Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 301; [1943] VLR 148.................................................................................. [33.7.10] Forbes v Cocks [1950] QWN 14...........................................................[33.8.470] Forbes v Selleys Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 149..................................... [33.4.460] Ford v Barnett (1987) 5 MVR 95...................................... [33.9.800], [33.9.860] Fordyce v Montgomery 424 SW 2d 746 (1968)................................... [33.8.180] Forsayth Mining Services Pty Ltd v Jack (unreported, WASCFC, Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Murray JJ, 129 of 1993, 10 May 1995)................... [33.2.350], [33.6.720] Forsdike v Stone (1868) LR 3 CP 607..............................................[33.10.1100] Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] AC 852; [1989] 2 WLR 290........................................................................................ [33.3.480] Forst v Graves (1967) 52 LSJS 464................................................... [33.10.360] Fortuna Seafoods Pty Ltd v The “Eternal Wind” [2008] 1 Qd R 429; [2005] QCA 405.......................................................................................... [33.2.1370] Fosbroke-Hobbes v Airwork Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 108........................ [33.3.500] Foth v O’Hara (1958) 120 CCC 305..................................................[33.8.1540] Foti v Banque Nationale de Paris (No 2) (BNP Case) (1989) 54 SASR 433................................................................................... [33.10.510] Fouldes v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540; 151 ER 1153...............[33.8.800], [33.8.815] Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426; [1959] 2 WLR 241...................[33.8.310], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1660], [33.9.190] Fowles v Eastern & Australasian Steamship Co Ltd (1916) 2 AC 556; (1913) 17 CLR 149....................................................................................... [33.6.610] Fox v Commissioner for Main Roads [1988] 1 Qd R 120.................[33.10.980] Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438; 55 ALJR 562.............................[33.10.2120] Foxall v Barnett (1853) 2 El & Bl 928; 118 ER 1014...................... [33.8.1740] France v Gaudet (1871) LR 6 QB 199...........[33.1.290], [33.8.340], [33.8.900] Francis v Cockrell (1870) LR 5 QB 501........................... [33.3.160], [33.3.290] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Franklin v Giddins [1978] Qd R 72..................................................[33.10.1510] Franklins Self Serve Pty Ltd v Wyber (1999) 48 NSWLR 249; [1999] NSWCA 390.................................................................................. [33.10.2160] Fraser v Booth (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 113; 67 WN (NSW) 66.......... [33.7.200], [33.7.210], [33.7.240] Fraser-Wallas v Waters [1939] 4 All ER 609.......................................[33.3.350] Frederick W Nielsen (Canberra) Pty Ltd v PDC Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ACTR 1.............................................................................[33.2.820] Freeman v Home Offıce (No 2) [1984] QB 524; [1984] 2 WLR 802..................................................................... [33.9.200], [33.9.250] French Knit Sales Pty Ltd v N Gold & Sons Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 132................................................................................. [33.2.1370] Freudenstein v Marhop Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 724............................ [33.3.30] Freudhofer v Poledano [1972] VR 287.............................................. [33.10.180] Frey v Fedoruk [1950] SCR 517; [1950] 3 DLR 513........................[33.8.1770] Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286; [1975] 3 WLR 379........................ [33.9.840] Frost v Aylesbury Dairy Co Ltd [1905] 1 KB 608............................... [33.4.170] FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd v Delaney (1985) 58 LGRA 405...............[33.7.250], [33.7.660] Fullarton v North Melbourne Electric Tramway & Lighting Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 181; [1916] VLR 231......................................................... [33.7.660] Fuller v Cook (1584) 3 Leo 100; 74 ER 567..................................... [33.8.1790] Fuller v New South Wales Department of School Education & Training [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-756; [2004] NSWCA 242.......................... [33.2.1030] Furness v Adrium Industries Pty Ltd [1996] 1 VR 668................... [33.10.1500] Furness v Clarke (1970) 1 SASR 359.................................................. [33.7.250] Furness v Clarke (1971) 1 SASR 359 at 366....................[33.7.250], [33.7.680] Furniss v Fitchett [1958] NZLR 396.................................................. [33.2.1310]

G Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175............................................................................. [33.10.1530] Gabolinscy v Hamilton City Corp [1975] 1 NZLR 150...................[33.10.1410] Gabriel v Lobban [1976] VR 689..................................................... [33.10.2280] Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366....... [33.2.390], [33.3.510], [33.5.430], [33.9.610], [33.9.980], [33.9.990] Galea v Cooper [1982] 2 NSWLR 411; (1982) 66 FLR 270............ [33.8.1260] Galea v Gillingham [1987] 2 Qd R 365............................................... [33.6.290] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council (2013) 197 LGERA 381; [2013] NSWCA 382.......................................................................... [33.7.200] Galland v Mineral Underwriters Ltd [1977] WAR 116..................... [33.8.1270] Galoo Ltd (in liq) v Bright Grahame Murray [1994] 1 WLR 1360....[33.2.670] Galsworthy v Reid (1911) 32 ALT 189............................................... [33.10.240] Gama v Qantas Airways Ltd (2006) 195 FLR 475; [2006] FMCA 11........................................................................................................[33.5.140] Gambriell v Caparelli (1975) 54 DLR (3d) 661.................................. [33.8.430] Gammell v Wilson [1982] AC 27; [1981] 2 WLR 248.....................[33.10.1230] Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; 51 ALJR 315...............................................................[33.10.360], [33.10.800] Gardam v George Wills & Co Ltd (1988) 82 ALR 415.......................[33.4.980] Gardam v Splendid Enterprises Pty Ltd (1987) 33 A Crim R 123......[33.4.980] Gardiner v Moore (No 2) [1969] 1 QB 55; [1966] 3 WLR 786....... [33.11.240] Gardiner v Victoria [1999] 2 VR 461; [1999] VSCA 100..................[33.5.170], [33.5.190] Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695.................................................... [33.9.860] Garnaut v Rowse (1941) 43 WALR 29.................................................[33.9.250] Garratt v Dailey, 279 P 2d 1091 (1955).........[33.8.170], [33.8.320], [33.8.390] Garrett v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 332......................[33.8.2162], [33.8.2165], [33.8.2167] Gartside v Sheffıeld, Young & Ellis [1983] NZLR 37.......................... [33.2.340] Gaskell v Denkas Building Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 632...... [33.3.190] Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 60 ALJR 239................................................[33.1.270], [33.2.510], [33.2.550] Gaunt v Fynney (1872) LR 8 Ch App 8............................................... [33.7.190] Gayler & Pope Ltd v B Davies & Son Ltd [1924] 2 KB 75.............. [33.6.290], [33.6.420] Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403; [1959] 3 WLR 221...................... [33.2.1610] Gazzard v Hutchesson [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-337................. [33.10.210] GDM and Protected Estates Act 1983 (NSW), Re [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-190.............................................................................................. [33.10.990] Gedeon v Commissioner of Crime Commission (NSW) (2008) 236 CLR 120; 82 ALJR 1465; 187 A Crim R 398; [2008] HCA 43...................... [33.1.290] Geest plc v Lansiquot [2002] 1 WLR 3111; [2002] UKPC 48........[33.10.2140] Gemmell Power Farming Co Ltd v Nies (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 469; 52 WN (NSW) 162......................................................................[33.4.160], [33.4.170] General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953] AC 180; [1953] 2 WLR 6.......................................................................................... [33.2.1060] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

General & Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644.......................................... [33.8.950], [33.10.1520], [33.10.1530] General Motors Acceptance Corp (Aust) v Davis [1971] VR 734...... [33.8.950] General Motors Acceptance Corp (Canada) v Fulton Insurance Agencies Ltd (1978) 24 NSR (2d) 114................................................................... [33.2.550] Gent-Diver v Neville [1953] St R Qd 1............................. [33.9.840], [33.9.920] George v Dowling (1992) 59 SASR 291....................... [33.2.390], [33.10.2150] George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246...................................................................................[33.9.480], [33.9.540] George Wimpey & Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corp [1955] AC 169; [1954] 3 WLR 932.......................................................................... [33.11.380] Georgeski v Owners Corp SP 49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534; [2004] NSWSC 1096....................................................................................................[33.8.480] Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15...................................... [33.9.560], [33.9.570] Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; 52 ALJR 142..... [33.2.1000], [33.2.1010], [33.3.30] Ghani v Jones [1970] QB 693; [1969] 3 WLR 1158........................... [33.9.150] Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 62 ALJR 611; 35 A Crim R 1.......................................................................................[33.2.390], [33.9.570] Gibbett v Forwood Products Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 290..... [33.4.170], [33.4.980] Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520; 33 SR (NSW) 219; 50 WN (NSW) 84...........................................................................................[33.9.570] Gibbs v Pike (1842) 9 M & W 351; 152 ER 149.............................. [33.8.1820] Gibbs v Rea [1998] AC 786; [1998] 3 WLR 72................................ [33.8.1870] Gibbs v Tunaley (1845) 1 CB 640; 135 ER 692.............................. [33.10.2030] Gifford v Dent (1926) 71 SJ 83............................................................. [33.8.480] Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 77 ALJR 1205; [2003] HCA 33............ [33.1.300], [33.2.1040], [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300], [33.2.1310] Gilding v Eyre (1861) 10 CB (NS) 592; 142 ER 584...[33.8.1850], [33.8.1950] Gilham v Breidenbach [1982] RTR 328................................................[33.8.540] Gill v Australian Wheat Board [1980] 2 NSWLR 795; (1980) 49 FLR 111...................................................................................... [33.10.570] Gillan v Brannan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-136......................... [33.10.860] Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236.........[33.8.2135] Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830......................................................... [33.8.400], [33.9.300] Gillie; Ex parte Cornell, Re (1996) 70 FCR 254.............. [33.8.820], [33.8.890] Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxix

TABLE OF CASES

[1993] QB 343; [1992] 3 WLR 449.............[33.7.30], [33.7.360], [33.7.660] Gingin Shire v Coombe (2009) 169 LGERA 236; [2009] WASCA 92........................................................................................................[33.3.230] Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies Ltd [1959] 1 All ER 414..............[33.5.270] Giorginis v Kastrati (1988) 49 SASR 371..........................................[33.10.890] Giumelli v Johnston [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-085....................... [33.9.210] Given v Snuffa Pty Ltd [1978] ATPR 40-083........................................[33.4.980] GJ Knight Holdings Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council [1975] 2 NSWLR 796; (1975) 34 LGRA 170............................................. [33.2.590] Gladman v Johnson (1867) 36 LJCP 153............................................. [33.6.360] Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v South Wales Miners’ Federation [1903] 2 KB 545......................................................................................... [33.8.1250] Glanville v Sutton [1928] 1 KB 571.................................. [33.6.360], [33.6.380] Glass v Hollander (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 304; 52 WN (NSW) 76...... [33.8.880] Glasspoole v Young (1829) 9 B & C 696; 109 ER 259.......................[33.9.150] Glavonjic v Foster [1979] VR 536....................................................[33.10.2140] Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1998) 90 FCR 40................. [33.4.400], [33.4.730], [33.4.746], [33.4.850] Glenelg Shire; Ex parte Sealey, Re (1885) 11 VLR 64........................[33.7.910] Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (2000) 79 SASR 185; [2000] SASC 429...................................................................................... [33.10.1490] Gliderol International Pty Ltd v Skerbic (2009) 170 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 16..................................................................[33.4.170], [33.4.740], [33.4.830] Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832... [33.8.190], [33.8.1550], [33.8.1800], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1880] Glynn v Houston (1836) 1 Keen 329; 48 ER 333.............................. [33.8.1570] Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87...............................[33.9.850] Godden v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board [1972] 2 NSWLR 183............................................................................... [33.10.2000] Goff v Great Northern Railway Co (1861) 3 El & El 672; 121 ER 594.................................................................[33.8.1630], [33.8.1650] Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293............. [33.2.1780], [33.6.710] Gold v Haringey Health Authority [1988] QB 481; [1987] 3 WLR 649........................................................................................ [33.9.220] Gold & Copper Resources Pty Ltd v Newcrest Operations Ltd [2013] NSWSC 345....................................................................................................[33.10.230] Goldburg v Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711....... [33.10.2120] Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang (2007) 81 ALJR 919; [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxx

TABLE OF CASES

[2007] HCA 15................................................................................[33.10.850] Golden West Refining Corp Ltd v Daly Laboratories Pty Ltd [1995] ATPR 41-378......................................................................... [33.4.980] Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182..... [33.2.330], [33.6.160], [33.7.30], [33.7.250], [33.7.530] Goldsmith v Bisset (No 3) (2015) 71 MVR 53; [2015] NSWSC 634....................................................................................................[33.2.1635] Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478............ [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.11.160] Goldsoll v Goldman [1914] 2 Ch 603..........................[33.8.1240], [33.10.1690] Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292.................................................[33.8.1240] Goldsworthy v Burnside City Corp (unreported, SASCFC, Bollen J, SCGRG/89/2160 of 1989, 10 November 1993)........[33.2.1060], [33.2.1560] Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18; 63 ALJR 11......... [33.8.840], [33.8.945], [33.9.530] Gomberg v Smith [1963] 1 QB 25; [1962] 2 WLR 749... [33.6.290], [33.6.300] Goode v Thompson [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-617; [2001] QSC 287......................................................................................................[33.9.730] Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods Ltd v Cospak International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 704.......................................................................................[33.1.140] Goodwyn v Cheveley (1859) 4 H & N 631; 157 ER 989.................... [33.6.420] Gordon v Harper (1796) 7 TR 9; 101 ER 828................[33.8.810], [33.8.2140] Gordon v Tamworth Jockey Club Inc [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-698; [2003] NSWCA 82............................................................................ [33.3.180] Gorely v Codd [1967] 1 WLR 19........................................................[33.2.1635] Gorman v HW Hodgetts & Co [1932] SASR 394............................[33.10.1520] Gorman v Williams (1985) 2 NSWLR 662...........................................[33.3.240] Gorris v Scott (1874) LR 9 Ex 125...................................................... [33.5.280] Goryl v Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 463; 68 ALJR 432......................................................................................[33.10.40] Gosden v Elphick (1849) 4 Ex 445; 154 ER 1287............................. [33.8.1540] Gosnells City v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437; 85 LGERA 214...........[33.6.290] Goss v Nicholas [1960] Tas SR 133..................................................... [33.9.360] Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; 58 ALJR 560...................... [33.1.270], [33.10.1680] Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 271; 60 ALJR 49..........[33.10.2120] Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Aboushadi [1999] Aust Torts Reports 81-531; [1999] NSWCA 396........................................................ [33.10.2000] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Best [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-210.................................................... [33.2.1650], [33.2.1760], [33.2.1800] Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Bordiuk [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-190.............................................................................................. [33.10.710] Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Burbury (1989) 10 MVR 189....................................................................................................[33.10.820] Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Fredrichberg (1968) 118 CLR 403; 42 ALJR 198....................................................................................[33.2.1760] Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Mackie [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-053.............................................................................................. [33.10.960] Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Rosniak (1992) 27 NSWLR 665............................................................................... [33.10.980] Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210; [1984] 3 WLR 953.............................. [33.2.520], [33.2.820] Govic v Boral Australian Gypsum Ltd [2015] VSCA 130................. [33.2.1060] Gowling v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd (1980) 24 SASR 321................................................................................... [33.10.850] Grabkowski v Majchrowski (1978) 19 SASR 290.............................. [33.10.360] Gracie, The SS v The SS Argentino (1889) 14 App Cas 519..........[33.10.1460], [33.10.1470] Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; 35 ALJR 174...................... [33.10.860], [33.10.880], [33.10.2160] Graham v KD Morris & Sons Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 1..... [33.7.830], [33.8.580] Graham v Royal National Agricultural & Industrial Association (Qld) [1989] 1 Qd R 624........................................................................................ [33.6.300] Graham v Voigt (1989) 95 FLR 146; 89 ACTR 11.......[33.8.940], [33.10.1550] Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2000) 102 FCR 307; 109 LGERA 1; [2000] FCA 1099................................[33.2.1170], [33.4.780] Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54........... [33.2.210], [33.2.240], [33.2.1170], [33.4.440], [33.4.780], [33.4.830] Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769....................... [33.8.1670], [33.8.1940], [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1980] Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62; (1968) 18 LGRA 140................................................................. [33.5.200], [33.7.510] Grandel v Mason [1953] 1 SCR 459; [1953] 3 DLR 65................... [33.2.1330] Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49......... [33.1.300], [33.2.1760], [33.2.1780], [33.4.30], [33.4.170], [33.4.220], [33.4.340], [33.4.350], [33.4.360], [33.4.440] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxii

TABLE OF CASES

Grant v Cooper, McDougall & Robertson Ltd [1940] NZLR 947..... [33.4.340], [33.4.440] Grant v National Coal Board (UK) [1956] AC 649; [1956] 2 WLR 752........................................................................................ [33.5.280] Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd [1948] AC 549...................................... [33.4.510] Grant v Thompson (1895) 11 TLR 207.............................................. [33.8.1990] Grant v YYH Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 360....... [33.8.710], [33.8.790], [33.8.910] Grantham Homes Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 37 FLR 191............................................................................[33.9.600] Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1; 63 ALJR 630; 41 A Crim R 183....................................................................................................[33.8.2010] Grasso v Brandt (1986) 3 MVR 211.................................................. [33.2.1570] Grasso v Love [1980] VR 163; (1979) 39 LGRA 101.....................[33.10.2280] Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70..................[33.8.410], [33.8.1240], [33.8.1660], [33.8.1747], [33.10.210], [33.10.220] Gray v Richards (2014) 253 CLR 660; 88 ALJR 968; [2014] HCA 40...........................................................[33.10.560], [33.10.980] Greater Nottingham Co-op Society v Cementation Piling & Foundations Ltd [1989] QB 71; [1988] 3 WLR 396...................................................[33.2.820] Green v Cale (1903) 6 WALR 17......................................................... [33.7.690] Green v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-907; [2007] QCA 260.................................................................. [33.9.840] Green v Perry (1955) 94 CLR 606....................................................... [33.3.290] Green v Victorian WorkCover Authority [1997] 1 VR 364.................. [33.6.710] Greenbury v Lyon; Ex parte Lyon [1957] St R Qd 433.......................[33.9.410] Greenlands Ltd v Wilmshurst [1913] 3 KB 507................................. [33.8.1910] Greenwood v Bennett [1973] QB 195; [1972] 3 WLR 691............. [33.10.1460] Greenwood v Commonwealth [1975] VR 859...................................... [33.6.670] Greenwood v Papademetri [2007] NSWCA 221.................................. [33.7.380] Greenwood v Sefton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Wood J, 12235 of 1988, 6 July 1990)..................................................... [33.4.170], [33.4.440] Gregory v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-306............................................................................................ [33.10.1740] Gregory v Piper (1829) 9 B & C 591; 109 ER 220............................ [33.8.500] Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419; [2000] 2 WLR 306...................................................................................... [33.8.1820] Gregory’s (Properties) Pty Ltd v Muir (1993) 17 MVR 86.................[33.6.300] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Grehan v Kann [1948] QWN 40........................................................... [33.9.370] Greyvensteyn v Hattingh [1911] AC 355.............................................. [33.9.380] Gribben v Woree Caravan Park & Motels [1970] Qd R 420.............. [33.3.290] Griffın v Coles Myer Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 478..................................... [33.2.1800] Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp (No 1) [2007] NSWSC 711....................................................................................................[33.8.1400] Griffıth v Turner [1955] NZLR 1035.................................................... [33.6.290] Griffıths v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 111................................................................................... [33.8.1250] Griffıths v Commonwealth (1983) 50 ACTR 7; 72 FLR 260........... [33.10.2000] Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792............ [33.10.540], [33.10.930], [33.10.960], [33.10.970], [33.10.990], [33.10.1220], [33.10.1750] Griffıths v Peter Conway Ltd [1939] 1 All ER 685...........[33.4.200], [33.4.420] Griffıths v Wood (1994) 62 SASR 204.................................................. [33.9.730] Grima v RFI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 345........... [33.9.850], [33.11.390] Grimes v Miller (1896) 23 OAR 764..................................................[33.8.1550] Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526.............. [33.6.610], [33.8.1860], [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Grimwood v Campbell [1955] SASR 313.............................................[33.6.460] Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] HCA 42......................................[33.10.540], [33.10.930], [33.10.990] Grinham v Willey (1859) 4 Hurl & N 496; 157 ER 934................... [33.8.1540] Grinham v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W Discount Stores) (unreported, SASC, Mullighan J, 99 of 1992, 1 May 1992).......................................... [33.8.1670] Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532................................................ [33.8.1860] Grosvenor Hotel Co v Hamilton [1894] 2 QB 836... [33.10.1350], [33.10.1400] Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570.......... [33.2.390], [33.6.610], [33.8.1550], [33.9.460] Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402.........................[33.5.10], [33.5.190] Gruber v Backhouse (2003) 190 FLR 122; [2003] ACTSC 18......... [33.8.1840] Grundy v Lewis (1995) 62 FCR 567.............................. [33.11.180], [33.11.370] GS v News Ltd [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-466............................... [33.2.550] Guay v Sun Publishing Co [1953] 2 SCR 216; [1953] 4 DLR 577....................................................................................... [33.2.1310] Guide Dogs Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dogs Association (NSW & ACT) (1998) 42 IPR 481..................................................[33.8.1380] Guide Dogs Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dogs Association (NSW & ACT) (1999) 43 IPR 531; [1999] FCA 316.................... [33.8.1380] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Guidera v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1990) 11 MVR 423...............................................................................[33.9.800], [33.10.2150] Guides Australia Inc v McMartin [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-828; [2006] NSWCA 20....................................................................... [33.2.60], [33.3.220] Guilford Industries Ltd v Hankinson Management Services Ltd (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 398............................................................................. [33.8.1950] Guille v Swan, 19 Johns 381 (1822)..................................................... [33.8.180] Gulabrai v Hamer-Mathew (unreported, NSWCA, Meagher, Beazley and Stein JJA, 40056 of 1995, 26 June 1997)...................................... [33.8.1960] Gumina v Williams (No 2) (1990) 3 WAR 351................................ [33.10.1100] Gutkin v Gutkin [1983] 2 Qd R 764................................................... [33.10.990] Gwinnett v Day [2012] SASC 43....................................... [33.8.790], [33.8.820] GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376.................. [33.8.1230], [33.8.1240], [33.10.1690]

H H v New South Wales (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 255; [2009] NSWDC 193....................................................................................................[33.2.1000] H v Pennell (1987) 46 SASR 158.......................................................[33.2.1635] H v The Queen [1996] 1 NZLR 299..................................................... [33.9.200] H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791; [1977] 3 WLR 990.................................................. [33.1.260], [33.1.290], [33.1.300] Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339................................. [33.10.1980], [33.10.2010] Habib v Commonwealth (No 2) (2009) 175 FCR 350; [2009] FCA 228....................................................................................................[33.8.1100] Habib v Commonwealth (2010) 183 FCR 62; [2010] FCAFC 12..... [33.8.2170] Habinteg Housing Association v James [1994] NPC 132....................[33.6.310] Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156.... [33.2.530], [33.3.10], [33.3.210], [33.3.320], [33.3.340], [33.3.350], [33.3.470], [33.3.510], [33.8.310], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1640], [33.9.190], [33.9.380], [33.9.390] Haddon v Lynch [1911] VLR 230...................................... [33.7.190], [33.7.240] Haddow v Duke Co NL (1892) 18 VLR 155.................[33.8.710], [33.10.1520] Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145; 9 Ex 341............................. [33.1.290] Hahn v Conley (1971) 126 CLR 276; 45 ALJR 631............................[33.2.940] Haig v Bamford [1977] 1 SCR 466; (1976) 72 DLR (3d) 68..............[33.2.660] Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60; 65 ALJR 349... [33.10.500], [33.10.540] Haines v Copyright Agency Ltd (1982) 64 FLR 184..........................[33.8.1150] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Haines v Davey (1836) 4 Ad & E 892; 111 ER 1019......................[33.10.2030] Haines v Rytmeister (1986) 6 NSWLR 529........................................[33.2.1020] Hale v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1953) 87 CLR 529........[33.10.170] Halech v South Australia (2006) 93 SASR 427; [2006] SASC 29... [33.2.1310] Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778; [1964] 3 WLR 479...................................................................................... [33.2.1330] Hall v Beckenham Corp [1949] 1 KB 716........................................... [33.7.530] Hall v Bonnett [1956] SASR 10.......................................................... [33.11.360] Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205... [33.3.290], [33.3.490] Hall v Fare [1973] WAR 156..............................................................[33.10.940] Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309..........................................................[33.8.420] Hall v Sorley (1980) 23 BCLR 281...................................................... [33.6.390] Hall v Tarlinton (1978) 19 ALR 501............................. [33.10.820], [33.10.890] Hall & Co Ltd v Pearlberg [1956] 1 WLR 244............................... [33.10.1420] Hallet v Schoevers (1992) 109 ACTR 1; 106 FLR 233.................... [33.10.530], [33.10.540] Hall-Gibbs Mercantile Agency Ltd v Dun (1910) 12 CLR 84.......... [33.8.1390], [33.10.1710] Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 59 ALJR 124; 13 A Crim R 250................................................................[33.8.520], [33.8.540], [33.9.240] Hallowell v Nominal Defendant (Qld) [1983] 2 Qd R 266..................[33.9.860] Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 683.......................... [33.7.190] Halstead v Mathieson [1919] VLR 362................................................ [33.6.430] Halvorsen Boats Pty Ltd v Robinson (1993) 31 NSWLR 1........... [33.10.1980], [33.10.2050] Hambrook v Stokes Bros [1925] 1 KB 141.........................................[33.2.1300] Hamer-Mathew v Gulabrai (No 2) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-334.............................................................................................. [33.10.200] Hamilton v Joyce [1984] 3 NSWLR 279..............................................[33.7.710] Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2002] 3 NZLR 308; [2002] UKPC 9..........................................................................................................[33.4.200] Hamlin v Bruce Stirling Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 374..... [33.10.1380], [33.10.1410] Hammond v Commonwealth (1982) 152 CLR 188; 56 ALJR 767.... [33.8.1940] Hampic Pty Ltd v Adams [2000] ATPR 41-737; [1999] NSWCA 455...................................................................................[33.4.400], [33.4.980] Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367...............................[33.3.360] Hancock v Prison Commissioners (UK) [1960] 1 QB 117; [1959] 3 WLR 583...................................................................................... [33.8.1610] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Handcock v Baker (1800) 2 B & P 260; 126 ER 1270....................... [33.9.360] Handley v Datson [1980] VR 66; (1979) 41 FLR 458...................... [33.10.950] Haniotis v Dimitriou [1983] 1 VR 498................................................. [33.9.390] Hanly v Berlin [1975] Qd R 52..........................................[33.9.790], [33.9.860] Hanna v Commissioner for Railways (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 22; 72 WN (NSW) 15...........................................................................................[33.9.780] Hanrahan v Ainsworth (1985) 1 NSWLR 370................................... [33.8.1950] Hansard v Attwood [1951] NZLR 1095..............................................[33.8.1860] Hansen v Burrum Shire Council [1953] St R Qd 178..........................[33.7.660] Hansen v Gloucester Developments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 14...... [33.10.1380] Hanson v Grassy Gully Gold Mining Co (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 271; 17 WN (NSW) 187.........................................................................................[33.7.220] Hanson v Matthew Bros Contractors Ltd (1990) 55 SASR 183.......[33.11.170], [33.11.400] Hanson v Wearmouth Coal Co Ltd [1939] 3 All ER 47.................... [33.11.370] Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198... [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1390], [33.10.2130] Harcourt v Aiken (1902) 22 NZLR 389..............................................[33.8.1880] Harden v Ridges [1983] 2 NSWLR 586............................................... [33.6.460] Hardware Services Pty Ltd v Primac Association Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 393..............................................................................................[33.10.2040] Hardy v Cotter (1881) 7 VLR (E) 151................................................. [33.8.710] Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277.................[33.2.1340], [33.6.160], [33.7.10], [33.7.20], [33.7.30], [33.7.530] Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45; [1958] 3 WLR 463..........[33.2.390], [33.8.1810], [33.8.1830] Harkess v Woodhead [1950] SASR 54.............................. [33.7.180], [33.7.240] Harm v Winter (2004) 13 ANZ Ins Cas 61-593; [2004] QSC 010......[33.3.350] Harper v Ashtons Circus Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 395................... [33.3.290], [33.3.300], [33.3.480] Harper v Carr (1797) 7 TR 270; 101 ER 970..................................... [33.9.560] Harper v Gray & Walker [1985] 1 WLR 1196...................................[33.11.380] Harper v Phillips [1985] WAR 100.................................................. [33.10.1220] Harris v Birkenhead Corp [1976] 1 WLR 279.....................................[33.3.170] Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95....................[33.6.720], [33.7.190], [33.7.250], [33.7.530], [33.7.680] Harris v Commercial Minerals Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 1; 70 ALJR 425..................................................................................[33.10.2160] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; [2003] NSWCA 10..........................................................[33.10.210], [33.10.530], [33.10.1870] Harris v Dignum (1859) 1 F & F 688; 175 ER 908.......................... [33.8.1540] Harris v Evans [1998] 1 WLR 1285.....................................................[33.5.200] Harris v James (1876) 45 LJQB 545....................................................[33.7.540] Harris v Lombard New Zealand Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 161...............[33.10.1510] Harrison v British Railways Board [1981] 3 All ER 679................. [33.2.1340], [33.2.1350] Harrison v National Coal Board (UK) [1951] AC 639....................... [33.5.230] Harrison v Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co [1891] 2 Ch 409.......... [33.7.190], [33.7.680] Harrison v Suncorp Insurance & Finance (unreported, QSC, Lee J, 1579 of 1993, 12 December 1995)...............................................................[33.10.830] Harrisons Group Holdings Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) 51 SASR 36................................................................................... [33.10.1470] Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15...................[33.2.1380], [33.2.1390], [33.9.230], [33.10.710] Harrods Ltd v R Harrod Ltd (1924) 41 RPC 74................................ [33.8.1360] Harry M Miller Attractions Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1970] 1 NSWR 614.................................................[33.10.2280] Hart v Hall & Pickles Ltd [1969] 1 QB 405; [1968] 3 WLR 744.... [33.11.370] Hart v Herron (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Sheller and Cripps JJA, 226 of 1980, 3 June 1993).......................................................................... [33.10.200] Hart v Herron [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-201............. [33.8.450], [33.9.200] Hart v Nominal Defendant [1972] 2 NSWLR 253.............................[33.10.360] Hartley v Sandholme Iron Co Ltd [1975] QB 600; [1974] 3 WLR 445...................................................................................... [33.10.600] Hartnell v Sharp Corp of Australia Pty Ltd (1975) 5 ALR 493..........[33.4.980] Harvey v RG O’Dell Ltd [1958] 2 QB 78; [1958] 2 WLR 473........ [33.11.410] Harvey v Truro Rural District Council [1903] 2 Ch 638.....................[33.7.710] Haseldine v CA Daw & Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343..............................[33.4.340] Haseldine v South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 530; [2007] SASC 39......................................................................................................[33.2.1090] Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22; 85 ALJR 836; [2011] HCA 28.................................................................................. [33.9.460] Hatton v Morton (1921) 61 DLR 365...................................................[33.6.440] Hatzinikolaou v Snape (1989) 97 FLR 86; 41 A Crim R 389.......... [33.8.1860], [33.9.500] Havenaar v Havenaar [1982] 1 NSWLR 626........... [33.10.2070], [33.10.2080] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd v Howards Storage World Pty Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 273; [2009] FCA 242........................................................[33.1.290] Hawkins v Alder (1856) 18 CB 640; 139 ER 1521..........................[33.10.2030] Hawkins v Clayton (t/as Clayton Utz & Co) (1986) 5 NSWLR 109................................................................................... [33.10.10] Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240... [33.1.10], [33.1.140], [33.1.340], [33.2.270], [33.2.340], [33.2.540], [33.2.610], [33.2.800], [33.2.1520], [33.3.300], [33.4.520], [33.10.10], [33.10.380], [33.10.1360], [33.10.1730], [33.10.2040], [33.11.350] Hawthorn Corp v Kannuluik [1906] AC 105........................................[33.9.590] Hay v Butler & Crooks (1991) 7 WAR 333....................................... [33.8.1700] Haylan v Purcell (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 1; 65 WN (NSW) 228.......... [33.5.160] Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146....... [33.2.1340], [33.2.1350], [33.2.1360] Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000] 3 All ER 890........[33.8.390] Haythorpe v Rae [1972] VR 633...........................................................[33.8.950] Hayward v Georges Ltd [1966] VR 202............................................... [33.6.690] Hayward v O’Keeffe [1993] 1 NZLR 181...........................................[33.8.1660] Hazel v Charman (1987) 4 MVR 507.................................................. [33.9.800] Hazell v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 590; [1968] 2 NSWR 497....................................................................... [33.8.1630] Hazell v Parramatta City Council (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 229; 15 LGRA 263............................................................. [33.8.1550], [33.8.1910] Hazelwood v Webber (1934) 52 CLR 268; 35 SR (NSW) 140; 52 WN (NSW) 53....................................................................[33.6.160], [33.10.1400] HB Homes Pty Ltd v Beer [1986] 2 Qd R 379.................................... [33.8.590] HC Sleigh Ltd v Blight [1969] VR 931...............................................[33.8.1210] Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280......................[33.8.550], [33.9.260], [33.10.210], [33.10.1510], [33.10.1550] Heap v Ind Coope & Allsopp Ltd [1940] 2 KB 476......... [33.7.530], [33.7.540] Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; 82 ALJR 1259; [2008] HCA 36................................................................................. [PREFACE] Heather v Pardon (1877) 37 LT 393.....................................................[33.7.710] Heath’s Garage Ltd v Hodges [1916] 2 KB 370.............. [33.6.300], [33.6.350] Heaton v AXA Equity & Law Life Assurance Society plc [2002] 2 AC 329..........................................................................................[33.11.200] Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101........... [33.2.210], [33.2.340], [33.2.510], [33.2.520], [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.560], [33.2.570], [33.2.580], [33.2.590], [33.2.600], [33.2.630], [33.2.640], [33.2.660] [References are to paragraph numbers] lxxxix

TABLE OF CASES

Hegarty v EE Caledonia Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413................... [33.2.1340] Hegarty v Shine (1878) 4 LR Ir 288.................................. [33.9.210], [33.9.250] Heidke v Sydney City Council (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 143; 18 LGR (NSW) 180; 69 WN (NSW) 56..................................................................... [33.9.270] Heil v Suncoast Fitness [2000] 2 Qd R 23........................................... [33.5.160] Heine v Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH 2 O 294/02.................. [33.4.430] Helix Cotton Case (McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd) (1997) 72 FCR 1; 93 A Crim R 1........................ [33.2.820], [33.4.520], [33.10.210] Helson v McKenzies (Cuba Street) Ltd [1950] NZLR 878.................. [33.8.880] Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691....................................................... [33.8.360] Henderson v McCafferty [2002] 1 Qd R 170; [2000] QSC 410.......... [33.9.570] Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761............................... [33.1.140], [33.2.510], [33.2.600], [33.2.610] Henman v Stephenson [1980] Qd R 410n.........................................[33.10.2160] Hennessy v Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1716..................................................................................................[33.2.1510] Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412..... [33.8.410], [33.10.180], [33.10.190], [33.10.730], [33.11.160] Henry Berry & Co Pty Ltd v Rushton [1937] St R Qd 109................ [33.8.860] Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31; [1968] 3 WLR 110..................................................................... [33.4.170], [33.4.220] Henry Roach (Petroleum) Pty Ltd v Credit House (Vic) Pty Ltd [1976] VR 309...............................................................................[33.10.2280] Hensley v Reschke (1914) 18 CLR 452................................................ [33.8.550] Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438......[33.2.390], [33.3.340], [33.3.510], [33.4.450], [33.5.150], [33.9.980] Heperu Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd [2010] HCATrans 16.....................................................................................[33.8.790], [33.8.810] Hepples v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 173 CLR 492; 66 ALJR 231; 22 ATR 852............................................................. [33.10.580] Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254; [1929] VLR 215.............................................................................. [33.10.180] Herbert Clayton & Jack Waller Ltd v Oliver [1930] AC 209..............[33.1.300] Hercules Textile Mills Pty Ltd v K & H Textile Engineers Pty Ltd [1955] VLR 310............................................................. [33.9.830], [33.9.930] Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67............ [33.8.1670], [33.9.270] Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305..................................[33.8.1850], [33.8.1860] Herring v Boyle (1834) 1 Cr M & R 377; 149 ER 1126...................[33.8.1680] [References are to paragraph numbers] xc

TABLE OF CASES

Herrington v British Railways Board [1971] 2 QB 107; [1971] 2 WLR 477........................................................................................ [33.3.340] Herschtal v Stewart & Ardern Ltd [1940] 1 KB 155........ [33.4.340], [33.4.440] Heslop v Chapman (1853) 23 LJQB 49..............................................[33.8.1900] Hevican v Ruane [1991] 3 All ER 65................................................. [33.2.1310] Hewertson v Courtaulds (Aust) Ltd (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 398; 74 WN (NSW) 218.........................................................................................[33.9.930] Hewitt v Benale Pty Ltd (2002) 27 WAR 91; [2002] WASCA 163.....[33.3.280] Hewitt v Bonvin [1940] 1 KB 188..................................... [33.6.580], [33.6.640] Hexagon Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Commission (Alvin Purple Case) (1975) 7 ALR 233......................................................................... [33.10.1710] Hiap Lee (Cheong Leong & Sons) Brickmakers Ltd v Weng Lok Mining Co Ltd [1974] 2 MLJ 1.......................................................................[33.10.2100] Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167........[33.8.1550], [33.8.1770], [33.8.1860] Hicks v Lake Macquarie City Council (No 1) (1992) 77 LGRA 261... [33.5.10] Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649........ [33.6.290], [33.6.350], [33.6.370], [33.6.390], [33.11.390] HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Waterwell Shipping Inc (1998) 43 NSWLR 601; 146 FLR 76.........................................................[33.2.1620] Hilder v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1434...................................................................................... [33.3.350] Hill v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1990] 1 WLR 946........................................................................................ [33.9.510] Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] QB 60; [1987] 2 WLR 1126...................................................................................... [33.2.390] Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 WLR 1049...................................................................................... [33.2.390] Clark (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 550; [1969] 2 NSWR 733...........[33.6.290] Cooke (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 49; 75 WN (NSW) 82............... [33.10.230] Freestone (1992) 16 MVR 118................................................... [33.6.300] Higgins [2012] NSWSC 270.......................................................[33.8.470] James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812..................... [33.2.1780], [33.4.360], [33.4.440] Hill v James [2004] NSWSC 55......................................................... [33.8.1310] Hill Hill Hill Hill Hill

v v v v v

Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 295.... [33.8.790], [33.8.820], [33.8.890] Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2008] HCATrans 228....................................... [33.8.820] Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487..........[PREFACE], [33.1.10], [33.1.270], [33.2.270], [33.2.300], [33.2.340], [33.2.360], [33.2.380], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.600], [33.2.630], [33.2.680], [33.2.810], [33.2.820] [References are to paragraph numbers] xci

TABLE OF CASES

Hillcoat v Keymon Pty Ltd [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-642; [2002] QSC 023...................................................................................[33.3.190], [33.6.590] Hillcoat v Keymon Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 527........................................[33.3.190] Hillesden Securities Ltd v Ryjack Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 959..................[33.8.890], [33.10.1530] Hillman v Black (1996) 67 SASR 490..................................................[33.2.390] Hilton v Wallace [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-231.............................[33.9.240] Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case (Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4)) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106..................................... [33.5.200], [33.5.220] Hines v Commonwealth [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-338.............. [33.10.940], [33.10.950], [33.10.980] Hines v Tousley (1926) 95 LJKB 773................................................... [33.6.290] Hinings v Hinings (1864) 10 LT (NS) 294....................................... [33.10.2030] Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40; [1970] 2 WLR 684.......[33.2.1290], [33.10.830] Hirsch v Bennett [1969] SASR 493.................................................... [33.10.820] Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 88...................... [33.10.1480], [33.10.2120], [33.10.2130] Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158....[33.8.710], [33.8.750], [33.8.1330], [33.8.1340], [33.8.1350], [33.8.1370] Hobell v Leonard (unreported, NSWCA, Samuels J, Priestley and Clarke JJA, 40209 of 1989, 29 May 1990)........................................................ [33.10.890] Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430; 46 SR (NSW) 251; 63 WN (NSW) 123.......................................................................................[33.2.1820] Hocking v Bell (1947) 75 CLR 125.................................................... [33.2.1820] Hodge & Sons v Anglo-American Oil Co (1922) 12 Ll L Rep 183.... [33.4.350] Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373.............................. [33.10.930], [33.10.990] Hoey v Felton (1861) 11 CB (NS) 142; 142 ER 749....[33.8.1740], [33.8.1747] Hoffmann v Boland [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-134; [2013] NSWCA 158......................................................................................................[33.2.940] Hoffmueller v Commonwealth (1981) 54 FLR 48............................ [33.10.2070] Hogan v AG Wright Pty Ltd [1963] Tas SR 44............ [33.8.340], [33.10.1400], [33.10.2110] Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries (Owners) Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 588........................................................................................... [33.10.2010] Hogan v Gill [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-182.............. [33.2.960], [33.8.310], [33.9.180] Hoikkala v King (1989) 9 MVR 293.................................................. [33.2.1570] [References are to paragraph numbers] xcii

TABLE OF CASES

Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough Borough Council [2000] QB 836; [2000] 2 WLR 1396...................................................................................... [33.7.250] Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489................................................ [33.8.2000] Hole v Chard Union [1894] 1 Ch 293................................................ [33.10.380] Hole v Hocking [1962] SASR 128........................................................ [33.4.470] Hole & Son (Sayers Common) Ltd v Harrisons of Thurnscoe Ltd [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345...........................[33.10.1360], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1400] Holgate v Bleazard [1917] 1 KB 443................................ [33.6.430], [33.6.440] Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660.......[33.9.500] Holland v Metropolitan Health Services Board (WA) [2001] WASCA 155....................................................................................................[33.11.370] Holland v Tarlinton (1990) 10 MVR 129............................................. [33.9.980] Hollebone v Midhurst & Fernhurst Builders Ltd [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 38.....................................................................[33.10.1370], [33.10.1390] Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757.......... [33.6.140], [33.8.880], [33.8.890], [33.9.150] Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609...........[33.4.400], [33.4.410], [33.4.490], [33.4.1100] Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (1999) 31 MVR 49; [1999] NSWCA 334........[33.6.710] Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44................................................... [33.6.590], [33.6.710] Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470........................................[33.2.1750] Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468..............[33.7.210] Holmes v Ashford [1950] 2 All ER 76............................... [33.4.410], [33.4.500] Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692; 7 SR (NSW) 821; 24 WN (NSW) 172.........................................................................................[33.1.270] Holmes v Mather (1875) LR 10 Ex 261............................................... [33.8.310] Holmes v Wilson (1839) 10 Ad & El 503; 113 ER 190......................[33.8.570], [33.10.380] Holroyd v Doncaster (1826) 3 Bing 492; 130 ER 603..................... [33.8.1550], [33.8.1700], [33.8.1770] Holt v Payne Skillington (1996) 77 BLR 51........................................ [33.1.140] Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421............ [33.4.460], [33.10.2000] Holy Apostolic & Catholic Church of East (Assyrian) Australia New South Wales Parish Association v Attorney General (NSW); Ex rel Elisha (1989) 18 NSWLR 291; 16 IPR 619..........................................................[33.8.1380] Home Offıce (UK) v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140.......................................... [33.2.310], [33.2.1100], [33.10.2010] [References are to paragraph numbers] xciii

TABLE OF CASES

Homeowners Insurances Pty Ltd v Job (1983) 2 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-535.............................................................................................. [33.10.500] Homestead Award Winning Homes Pty Ltd v South Australia (1997) 72 SASR 299................................................................................... [33.8.2167] Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 88 ALJR 786; [2014] HCA 29..................................................................................[33.4.480] Honeywill & Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial Photographers) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191.................................................... [33.6.720], [33.11.400] Hong Cui Huang v University of New South Wales [2014] FCCA 644......................................................................................................[33.6.650] Hood v Commonwealth [1968] VR 619.............................................. [33.11.370] Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 682... [33.8.1680], [33.9.470] Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43; [1974] 3 WLR 329.... [33.7.840], [33.10.2280] Hooper v Truscott (1836) 2 Bing NC 457; 132 ER 179......................[33.8.190] Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 92 ACSR 677; [2013] FCA 115...................................................................... [33.11.350], [33.11.370] Hopkins v Crowe (1836) 4 Ad & E 774; 111 ER 974....................... [33.8.1540] Hopper v Reeve (1817) 7 Taunt 698; 129 ER 278............................... [33.8.390] Horbelt v Elliott (1995) 184 LSJS 31................................................... [33.6.460] Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153............[33.9.270], [33.9.370], [33.9.390], [33.9.600], [33.10.2150] Horne v Queensland (1995) 22 MVR 111....................[33.2.1000], [33.2.1010], [33.9.730] Horne v Queensland [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-343................... [33.2.1000], [33.2.1010] Horner v Battyn (1739) Bull NP 61.................................................... [33.8.1570] Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441; (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 545.......[33.2.330], [33.2.1340], [33.2.1610], [33.2.1810] Hosie v De Ferro (1984) 3 BPR 9418.................................................. [33.7.870] Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157; [2001] FCA 1040............................... [33.8.1200], [33.8.1210] Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; [1987] 3 WLR 232..................... [33.5.270], [33.10.250], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2030] Hotson v Fitzgerald [1985] 1 WLR 1036........................................... [33.10.250] Houda v New South Wales [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-816; [2005] NSWSC 1053.............................................................................[33.8.1740], [33.8.1800] Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694; [1962] 2 WLR 1015................................................................. [33.2.1730], [33.8.940] Houghton v Oakley (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 26; 16 WN (NSW) 183.......................................................................................[33.8.1820] [References are to paragraph numbers] xciv

TABLE OF CASES

Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841; 117 ER 323............................. [33.8.1550] Houldsworth v Glasgow City Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317................. [33.2.670] Housecroft v Burnett [1986] 1 All ER 332......................................... [33.10.960] Houston v Queensland Railways (1994) 20 MVR 198...................... [33.2.1800] Howard v Bega Municipal Council (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 138; 3 LGR (NSW) 139; 33 WN (NSW) 69.................................................. [33.7.660], [33.9.590] Howard v Hamilton (1996) 16 WAR 292.......................... [33.9.860], [33.9.910] Howard v Jarvis (1958) 98 CLR 177; 32 ALJR 40...... [33.2.1090], [33.2.1105] Howard v Wing [2000] TASSC 147...................................................... [33.9.360] Howard E Perry & Co Ltd v British Railways Board (UK) [1980] 1 WLR 1375...................................................................................... [33.8.880] Howe v Teefy (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 301; 44 WN (NSW) 102........... [33.9.420], [33.10.2040] Howkins & Harrison v Tyler [2001] Lloyd’s Rep PN 1.................... [33.11.370] Hoye v Bush (1840) 1 Man & G 775; 133 ER 545.......... [33.9.150], [33.9.560] Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61......... [33.3.260], [33.3.270], [33.3.500], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640; 79 ALJR 190; [2004] HCA 54...................................... [33.2.520], [33.2.540] Huckle v Money (1763) 2 Wils 205; 95 ER 768................................ [33.8.1747] Hudson v Roberts (1851) 6 Ex 697; 155 ER 724................................ [33.6.360] Huet v Lawrence [1948] St R Qd 168.................................................. [33.9.410] Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837; [1963] 2 WLR 779........ [33.10.2060] Hughes v Williams [1943] KB 574........................................................[33.6.300] Huljich v Hall [1973] 2 NZLR 279.....................................................[33.8.1120] Hull v Canterbury Municipal Council [1974] 1 NSWLR 300; (1974) 29 LGRA 29................................................................... [33.2.580], [33.2.590] Hulley v Silversprings Bleaching & Dyeing Co Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 268............................................................................................ [33.7.710] Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389; [1950] VLR 44.................................................................................. [33.6.710] Humphrey v Hansen (1997) 25 MVR 402............................................ [33.9.730] Humphrey v Nowland (1859) 2 Legge 1167......................................... [33.8.470] Humphrey v Nowland (1862) 15 Moo PC 343; 15 ER 524.................[33.8.470] Humphreys v Dreamland (Margate) Ltd (1930) 100 KB 137..............[33.3.170] Humphries v Southern Cross Ski Club [2012] VSC 232......................[33.9.270] Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 402.....................................[33.10.1100] Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 693.................................... [33.10.1100] [References are to paragraph numbers] xcv

TABLE OF CASES

Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36..........................................................[33.10.500], [33.10.530], [33.10.1730] Hunnerup v Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co (Aust) Ltd (1974) 7 SASR 215..................................................................................... [33.11.360] Hunt v Shanks [1918] SALR 254.......................................[33.6.330], [33.6.440] Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10.............[33.1.280], [33.4.460], [33.11.200], [33.11.390] Hunter v British Coal Corp [1999] QB 140; [1998] 3 WLR 685..... [33.2.1310] Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655; [1997] 2 WLR 684........[33.7.30], [33.7.220], [33.7.230], [33.7.490] Hunter v Johnson (1884) 13 QBD 225................................................. [33.9.440] Hunter v McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270; 89 ALJR 39; [2014] HCA 44................................................................................[33.2.1516] Hunter v Scott [1963] Qd R 77......................................................... [33.10.1750] Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Marchlewski (2000) 51 NSWLR 268; [2000] NSWCA 294.............................. [33.10.180], [33.10.710], [33.10.820] Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Presland (2005) 63 NSWLR 22; [2005] NSWCA 33............................................................... [33.8.1740], [33.10.2080] Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1990] VR 41..............................................................[33.8.810], [33.10.1540] Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v CG Maloney Pty Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 420.............................................................. [33.8.810], [33.8.850] Hunter & New England Local Health District v McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270; 89 ALJR 39; [2014] HCA 44..............[33.2.290], [33.2.1150] Huntley v Thornton [1957] 1 WLR 321..............................................[33.8.1260] Hursey Case (Williams v Hursey) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269....................[33.8.1190], [33.8.1260], [33.8.1270], [33.10.180], [33.10.210] Husher v Husher (1999) 197 CLR 138; 73 ALJR 1414; [1999] HCA 47................................................................................[33.10.910] Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] QB 1; [1999] 2 WLR 1142................................................................... [33.7.530], [33.7.540] Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131.........[33.8.380], [33.8.760], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1600] Hutchison v Davidson [1945] SC 395........................[33.10.1360], [33.10.1370] Huxley v Berg (1815) 1 Stark 98; 171 ER 413.................................. [33.10.250] Hyder v Commonwealth (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336......................................................................................................[33.9.510] Hyder Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd (2002) [References are to paragraph numbers] xcvi

TABLE OF CASES

18 BCL 122; [2001] NSWCA 313........................ [33.10.1480], [33.10.2130] Hyett v Great Western Railway Co [1948] 1 KB 345........................ [33.2.1340] Hyland v Campbell [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-352.................... [33.10.2030]

I ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1992) 38 FCR 248................................................................................... [33.10.2280] ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Walsh [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-452................................................................................................ [33.4.460] Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 328....................................................................................................[33.8.1220] Ikonomos v Lesiuk (1973) 6 SASR 111........................... [33.2.950], [33.10.360] Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40...[33.2.400], [33.2.1670], [33.3.490], [33.9.910], [33.9.970], [33.9.990], [33.10.960] Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656; [1964] 3 WLR 329..................................................................... [33.5.420], [33.9.930] Independent Oil Industries Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394; 54 WN (NSW) 152.................................................... [33.8.1200] Indermaur v Dames (1866) LR 1 CP 274...............................................[33.3.30] Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366; [1955] 2 WLR 245.....[33.4.200], [33.4.420] Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd v Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 311; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 264.................................................................... [33.10.230] Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Market Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 653; [2008] NSWCA 206................................. [33.2.615] Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 6) (2007) 63 ACSR 1; [2007] NSWSC 124............................. [33.2.615] Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2010) 78 NSWLR 641; 241 FLR 125; [2010] NSWCA 137................................................... [33.10.880], [33.10.940] Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191... [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.580], [33.2.640] Interstruct Pty Ltd v Wakelam (1990) 3 WAR 100............. [33.5.250], [33.6.10] Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 1 NZLR 513; [1996] AC 624; [1996] 2 WLR 367............................................................................ [33.2.810] Inverugie Investments Ltd v Hackett [1995] 1 WLR 713.................[33.10.1420] Ipswich Interstate Transport Terminal Pty Ltd v Walker [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-327...............................................................................[33.10.1980] Irrewarra Estate Pty Ltd v A & S Arnott Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 360....................................................................................................[33.8.1340] [References are to paragraph numbers] xcvii

TABLE OF CASES

Irving v Slevin (1982) 30 SASR 66..................................... [33.6.10], [33.6.460] Irwin v Poole (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 186.............................................[33.4.160] Island Way Pty Ltd v Redmond [1990] 1 Qd R 431.............................[33.8.960] Issa v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 1 WLR 956............ [33.5.180] Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 40 FCR 303................................................ [33.9.980] Iversen v Zendel Industries (NZ) Ltd (1993) 7 PRNZ 205.................. [33.8.320] Ives v Western Australia [2010] WASC 178......................................... [33.6.610]

J J & E Hall Ltd v Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620............................... [33.10.1490] Jaber v Rockdale City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-952; [2008] NSWCA 98.......................................................................................... [33.2.80] Jacklin v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 2795 [1975] 1 NSWLR 15..................................................................................... [33.5.200] Jackson v Bagwell [1992] 2 Qd R 390............................................... [33.10.540] Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; 67 WN (NSW) 227......... [33.2.240], [33.10.370] Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474................... [33.2.390], [33.3.510], [33.9.610], [33.9.980] Jackson v Smithson (1846) 15 M & W 563; 153 ER 973................... [33.6.360] Jackson v Stothard [1973] 1 NSWLR 292....................................... [33.10.1220] Jackson v Watson & Sons [1909] 2 KB 193.........................................[33.4.170] Jacobi v Griffıths [1999] 2 SCR 570; 174 DLR (4th) 71.................... [33.2.350] Jaenke v Hinton [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-368............................. [33.3.220] Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426.....[33.1.290], [33.2.210], [33.2.330], [33.2.370], [33.2.380], [33.2.520], [33.2.800], [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.10.180], [33.10.250], [33.10.830] Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269.............................................. [33.10.1430] Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; 63 ALJR 640; 41 A Crim R 307....................................................................................................[33.8.2010] James v Campbell (1832) 5 C & P 372; 172 ER 1015........................[33.8.180] James v Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339..................................... [33.8.1200] James v Fullerton (1983) 77 FLR 321..................................................[33.6.290] James v Harrison (1977) 18 ACTR 36................................................. [33.2.790] James v Oxley (1939) 61 CLR 433; 39 SR (NSW) 70; 56 WN (NSW) 36...........................................................................................[33.9.160] James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70......[33.6.350], [33.6.360], [33.6.390] [References are to paragraph numbers] xcviii

TABLE OF CASES

James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Newton (1997) 42 NSWLR 729......[33.10.2160] James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Roberts (1999) 47 NSWLR 425; [1999] NSWCA 314............................................................... [33.10.890], [33.11.390] James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Seltsam Pty Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 53; 73 ALJR 238; [1998] HCA 78...................................[33.11.360], [33.11.370] James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 679; [2000] NSWCA 107........................................................................ [33.11.360] James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113; [1991] 2 WLR 641....................[33.2.550], [33.2.660], [33.2.670] Jamieson v Graham (1995) 22 MVR 97.............................................. [33.9.860] Jansen v Dewhurst [1969] VR 421................................................... [33.10.1460] Jansons v Public Curator (Qld) [1968] Qd R 40................................. [33.9.930] Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316..............................[33.8.2130], [33.8.2135] Jarvis v Scrase [2000] 2 Qd R 92; [1998] QCA 441.........................[33.2.1290] Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233; [1972] 3 WLR 954....... [33.10.1550] Jarvis v Williams [1955] 1 WLR 71..................................................... [33.8.850] Jazairy v Najjar (1998) 27 MVR 498.................................................[33.2.1800] JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413; (1983) 1 BCL 159........................................................................... [33.8.2000] JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398............................. [33.5.10], [33.5.140], [33.5.220], [33.5.260] Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647..................................................[33.10.1680] JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289..........[33.2.660] JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1983] 1 All ER 583..........[33.2.660] Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; 83 ALJR 1180; [2009] HCA 43.................................[33.8.1990], [33.8.2000] Jefford v Gee [1970] 2 QB 130; [1970] 2 WLR 702.... [33.10.500], [33.10.520] Jeffrey v Weeding [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-032....................... [33.10.1400] Jeffries v Fisher [1985] WAR 250.........................................................[33.9.930] Jeffries v Great Western Railway Co (1856) 5 El & Bl 680; 119 ER 680........................................................................................ [33.8.860] Jeffries v Pankow 112 Ore 439; 223 Pac 903 (1924)........[33.8.790], [33.8.880] Jenkins v Hansen & Yuncken (Tas) Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-255.............................................................................................. [33.2.1560] Jenner v Harbison (1879) 5 VLR (L) 111.......................................... [33.8.1860] Jensen v Clark [1982] 2 NZLR 268..................................................[33.10.1100] Jerom v Knight (1587) 1 Leo 107; 74 ER 99.....................................[33.8.1790] Jerred v T Roddam Dent & Son Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 104................ [33.11.390] [References are to paragraph numbers] xcix

TABLE OF CASES

Jervois Sulphates (NT) Ltd v Petrocarb Explorations NL (1974) 5 ALR 1...................................................................... [33.8.1270], [33.8.1820] JF & BE Palmer Pty Ltd v Blowers & Lowe Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 89...................................................................[33.11.153], [33.11.240] JH Coles Pty Ltd v Need [1934] AC 82; (1933) 49 CLR 499; 7 ALJR 360......................................................................................[33.8.1370] Jindi (Nominees) Pty Ltd v Dutney (1993) 26 ATR 206.................. [33.10.1730] JLW (Vic) Pty Ltd v Tsiloglou [1994] 1 VR 237....... [33.10.1980], [33.10.2040] Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations [1924] 1 KB 341.......... [33.7.900] Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794; [1981] 3 WLR 155.................................................................................... [33.10.2000] Jobson v Nankervis (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 277; 61 WN (NSW) 76.... [33.7.710] Joel v Morison (1834) 6 Car & P 501; 172 ER 1338..........................[33.6.660] John F Goulding Pty Ltd v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1932) 48 CLR 157; [1932] VLR 408.......................................[33.8.910], [33.8.930] John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1977] 2 NSWLR 400................................................................................... [33.9.580] John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131................. [33.10.220], [33.10.500] John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd v Jordin (No 2) (1985) 79 FLR 210......................................................................................[33.11.360] John Holland Group Pty Ltd v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2006) 204 FLR 290; [2006] ACTSC 108............................................... [33.10.1100] John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (NSW Branch) (2009) 178 FCR 461; 186 IR 17; [2009] FCA 645......................................................................................................[33.8.480] John Munroe (Acrylics) Ltd v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority [1997] QB 983; [1996] 3 WLR 988.................................................[33.2.390] Johns v Hansen (1900) 19 NZLR 319................................................ [33.8.1850] Johns v Minister of Education (1981) 28 SASR 206.... [33.2.1000], [33.2.1635] Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; [1979] 2 WLR 487....................... [33.1.340], [33.10.170], [33.10.1870] Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195............................... [33.6.390], [33.6.470] Johnson v Commonwealth (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 133; 44 WN (NSW) 54.........................................................................................[33.8.2130] Johnson v Emerson (1871) LR 6 Ex 329......................[33.8.1820], [33.8.1840], [33.8.1850] Johnson v Kelemic [1979] FLC 90-657....................... [33.10.990], [33.10.1750] Johnson v Kent (1975) 132 CLR 164; 49 ALJR 27; 34 LGRA 230................................................................. [33.7.220], [33.7.360] [References are to paragraph numbers] c

TABLE OF CASES

Johnson v K-Mart Enterprises Inc 297 NW 2d 74 (1980).................[33.8.1520] Johnson v Nationwide Field Catering Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 494..............................................................................................[33.10.1750] Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51......[33.1.300], [33.10.490], [33.10.840], [33.10.2040] Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27............[33.2.510], [33.2.820], [33.4.380], [33.4.390] Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218.....................................[33.8.1840], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1880], [33.8.1920] Johnston v Burton (1970) 16 DLR (3d) 660.......................................[33.11.160] Johnston v Frazer (1990) 21 NSWLR 89...........................................[33.2.1700] Johnstone v Stewart [1968] SASR 142....... [33.8.410], [33.10.190], [33.10.210] Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 1082..........[33.7.215], [33.7.860] Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56.... [33.2.1110], [33.3.170], [33.3.190], [33.3.280], [33.3.290] Jones v Gooday (1841) 8 M & W 146; 151 ER 985....................... [33.10.1370] Jones v Hameister (1976) 14 SASR 328............................................ [33.2.1640] Jones v Harvey (1983) 1 MVR 111.................................................... [33.10.180] Jones v Lee (1911) 28 TLR 92..............................................................[33.6.300] Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570..................[33.6.10], [33.6.290], [33.6.350], [33.6.380], [33.6.390], [33.6.400], [33.6.460] Jones v Manchester Corp [1952] 2 QB 852....................................... [33.11.400] Jones v McIntyre [1973] Tas SR 1........................................................ [33.6.300] Jones v Mortgage Nominees Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 418........................ [33.11.350] Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618; [1965] 3 WLR 296...........................[33.6.440] Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374......... [33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.660], [33.7.870], [33.9.580], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1390], [33.10.1400] Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 1453..... [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54......... [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Jones v Sydney Municipal Council (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 315..............[33.7.880] Jones v Tatham (1818) 8 Taunt 634; 129 ER 530............................[33.10.2030] Jones v Vaughan (1804) 5 East 445; 102 ER 1141.............................. [33.9.560] Jones v Williams (1843) 11 M & W 176; 152 ER 764........................[33.7.900] Jongen v CSR Ltd [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-192....................... [33.10.910], [33.10.2160] Joondalup Gate Pty Ltd v Minster for Lands (WA) (1996) 33 ATR 327 ..........................................................................................................[33.10.570] [References are to paragraph numbers] ci

TABLE OF CASES

Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34...[33.1.320], [33.2.1690], [33.9.720], [33.9.730], [33.9.810], [33.9.850], [33.9.910] Joss v Snowball (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 218; 91 WN (NSW) 45; [1969] 1 NSWR 426..................................................................................... [33.6.680] Jovanovski v Billbergia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 211.........................[33.2.1080] JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269; [1964] 3 WLR 541................................................................. [33.8.1210], [33.8.1230] Juhlinn-Dannfelt v Crash Repairs Pty Ltd [1969] QWN 1..................[33.8.950] Jull v Wilson [1968] NZLR 88.............................................................. [33.4.510] Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520; [1982] 3 WLR 477..................................................................... [33.2.520], [33.2.820] JW Harris & Sons Ltd v Demolition & Roading Contractors (NZ) Ltd [1979] 2 NZLR 166.....................................................................................[33.2.1130]

K K v Minister for Youth & Community Services [1982] 1 NSWLR 311................................................................................... [33.9.300] Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; 70 ALJR 814................................................................ [PREFACE], [33.8.1700] Kain v Mobbs [2008] NSWSC 383.....................................................[33.2.1640] Kakouris v Gibbs Burge & Co Pty Ltd (1970) 44 ALJR 384..............[33.5.400] Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow (No 3) [2007] NSWCA 298....................................................................................................[33.10.500] Kalokerinos v Burnett (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Powell JJA, 40243 of 1995, 30 January 1996).................................................[33.10.2150] Karabotsos v Plastex Industries Pty Ltd [1981] VR 675................. [33.10.2140] Karacominakis v Big Country Developments Pty Ltd (2000) 10 BPR 18,235.............................................................................................[33.10.2120] Karamalis v Commissioner of Railways (SA) (1977) 15 ALR 629..... [33.9.860] Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 50 A Crim R 98........................................................................................................[33.9.550] Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 49 A Crim R 153..............[33.9.550] Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354; 71 ALJR 107.............................. [33.10.990] Kartinyeri v Woolworths (SA) Pty Ltd (2004) 234 LSJS 145; [2004] SASC 172......................................................................................................[33.3.360] Katelaris v Medical Council of New South Wales (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 617....................................................................................................[33.8.2162] Katie, Re (1995) 128 FLR 194..............................................................[33.9.300] [References are to paragraph numbers] cii

TABLE OF CASES

Kay v Barnett [1909] QWN 39...................................... [33.8.710], [33.10.1530] Kay v Murray Irrigation Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1411............................. [33.4.820] Kaye v Robertson (1990) 19 IPR 147; [1991] FSR 62........................ [33.8.390] Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723.............................................[33.10.1750] Kearry v Pattinson [1939] 1 KB 471....................................................[33.9.400] Kebewar Pty Ltd v Harkin (1987) 9 NSWLR 738; 63 LGRA 412.... [33.7.220], [33.7.240] Keeble v Hickeringill (1809) 11 East 574; 103 ER 1127................... [33.8.1110] Keeffe v McLean-Carr [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-224.................. [33.6.460], [33.10.2010] Keeys v Queensland [1998] 2 Qd R 36.............................................. [33.2.1030] Kelly v Carroll [2002] NSWCA 9.........................................................[33.9.850] Kelly v Dowell Australia Ltd [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-184.......[33.10.850] Kelly v Hazlett (1976) 75 DLR (3d) 536.............................................. [33.9.280] Kelly v Smith (1986) 42 SASR 13...................................................... [33.2.1560] Kelly v Sweeney [1975] 2 NSWLR 720................................................[33.6.300] Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (Great Britain & Ireland) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 334; [1957] 2 WLR 1007.....................................[33.8.480], [33.8.580] Kempsey District Hospital (NSW) v Thackham (1995) 36 NSWLR 492............................................................................. [33.10.2160] Kempsey Shire Council v Lawrence [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-375................................................................................................ [33.9.590] Kendell v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-272....................................................................... [33.10.180], [33.10.1100] Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1967] 2 WLR 129................. [33.8.1720] Kennard v Jones (1791) 4 TR 495; 100 ER 1139............................ [33.10.2030] Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88; [1980] 3 WLR 361........... [33.10.1860], [33.10.2280] Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1997) 77 FCR 307.... [33.1.270], [33.1.290] Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; 73 ALJR 901; [1999] HCA 25...................................... [33.2.520], [33.2.630] Kensington Starch & Maizena Co v Mayor of Essendon & Flemington (1880) 6 VLR (L) 265...................................................................................[33.7.490] Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43....................................................[33.7.380] Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177.................[33.7.20], [33.7.220], [33.7.360], [33.7.370], [33.7.380], [33.7.500], [33.7.510] Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74.............................................................[33.9.920] Kenthurst Investments Pty Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (1964) 10 LGRA 307.................................................................................... [33.7.850] [References are to paragraph numbers] ciii

TABLE OF CASES

Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144......................................[33.2.520], [33.2.640], [33.2.680] Kevan v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1972] 2 NSWLR 710...[33.3.170] Key v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1941) 64 CLR 619; 41 SR (NSW) 259; 58 WN (NSW) 214................................................ [33.3.300], [33.9.930] Khodaparast v Shad [2000] 1 WLR 618............................................ [33.10.180] Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727; [1993] 3 WLR 476................[33.7.240] Kidd v McRae (1921) 23 WALR 98..................................................[33.10.1470] Kidman v Farmers’ Centre Pty Ltd [1959] Qd R 8......................... [33.10.1510] Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53...[33.7.190], [33.7.240], [33.7.530], [33.7.850] Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460; 47 ALJR 369................... [33.8.1910] Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600.................[33.2.1760], [33.2.1790], [33.4.360], [33.4.460] King v Commissioner of Railways (Qld) [1971] Qd R 266................. [33.9.930] King v Franklin (1858) 1 F & F 360; 175 ER 764..............................[33.9.470] King v Philcox (2015) 255 CLR 304; 89 ALJR 398; [2015] HCA 19................................................................................[33.2.1530] King v Phillip Island Shire Council (unreported, VSC, Nathan J, 3319 of 1988, 10 August 1994)...................................................................... [33.7.510] King v Wilkinson (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 444; 74 WN (NSW) 222...... [33.2.400] King v Yurisich (2006) 153 FCR 78; [2006] FCAFC 136................... [33.2.520] Kingshott v Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co Australia Ltd (No 2) (1987) 8 NSWLR 707................................................................................... [33.5.250] Kinsella v Gold Coast City Council (No 3) [2016] QSC 14................[33.2.810] Kirk v Gregory (1876) 1 Ex D 55......................................[33.8.770], [33.9.380] Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211....... [33.6.610] Kitano v Commonwealth (1974) 129 CLR 151; 48 ALJR 343...........[33.8.820], [33.8.890], [33.8.1150] Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association (UK) [1958] 1 WLR 563...[33.10.2040] Kite, The [1933] P 154.........................................................................[33.2.1800] Kiwi Munchies Pty Ltd v Nikolitsis (2006) 63 ATR 365; [2006] VCAT 929......................................................................................................[33.8.830] Klesteel v Mantzouranis (2006) 46 MVR 101; [2006] NSWSC 915......................................................................................................[33.6.670] Knapp v Railway Executive [1949] 2 All ER 508................................ [33.5.240] Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 586; [2007] FCAFC 170....................................................................................................[33.8.1330] Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 466; [2007] FCA 70......................................................................................................[33.8.1330] [References are to paragraph numbers] civ

TABLE OF CASES

Knight v Home Offıce (UK) [1990] 3 All ER 237.............................. [33.2.1090] Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349.............................................. [33.10.2010] Knott v London County Council [1934] 1 KB 126........... [33.6.360], [33.6.370] Knowlson v Solomon [1969] NZLR 686...............................................[33.6.470] Kocis v SE Dickens Pty Ltd (t/as Coles New World Supermarket) [1998] 3 VR 408........................................................................................... [33.3.360] Koeck v Persic [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-386............................. [33.10.710] Koehler v Cerebos (Aust) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44; 79 ALJR 845; 139 IR 309; [2005] HCA 15................................................................................[33.2.1040] Kohan v Stanbridge (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 576; 33 WN (NSW) 167.........................................................................................[33.9.390] Kohnke v Karger [1951] 2 KB 670..................................................... [33.11.200] Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531.......[33.2.350], [33.2.1060], [33.6.590], [33.6.600], [33.6.620], [33.6.720], [33.11.153] Kondracuik v Jackson Morgan & Sons (1988) 47 SASR 280............[33.9.780], [33.9.860] Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421......................................[33.8.570] Koorarang Investments v Richardson [1982] AC 462..........................[33.6.700] Kosky v Trustees of Sisters of Charity [1982] VR 961...................... [33.2.1380] Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491................................................................... [33.1.260], [33.1.290] Koursk, The v The Itria [1924] P 140....... [33.11.150], [33.11.160], [33.11.170] Kovac v Kovac [1982] 1 NSWLR 656................................................[33.10.990] Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119............ [33.1.300] Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113...[33.7.160], [33.7.250], [33.7.530], [33.7.650], [33.7.680] Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563; 69 ALJR 629....................................................................................[33.8.1300] Krakowski v Trenorth Ltd [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-401............ [33.11.400] Kralj v McGrath [1986] 1 All ER 54..................................................[33.10.180] Kretschmar v Queensland [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-272...........[33.2.1010], [33.2.1610] Kubach v Hollands [1937] 3 All ER 907..............................................[33.4.500] Kuchenmeister v Home Offıce [1958] 1 QB 496; [1958] 2 WLR 453...................................................................................... [33.8.1740] Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122; [2001] 2 WLR 1789; [2001] UKHL 29..................... [33.10.10], [33.10.200], [33.10.210] [References are to paragraph numbers] cv

TABLE OF CASES

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; 85 ALJR 533; [2011] HCA 11..................[33.2.1030], [33.3.260], [33.3.360] Kulczycki v Metalex Pty Ltd [1995] 2 VR 377.....................................[33.9.860] Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; 82 ALJR 1021; [2008] HCA 26.............................................................. [PREFACE], [33.8.550] Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 2 WLR 1353; [2002] UKHL 19....................... [33.1.280], [33.8.790], [33.10.1530] Kyogle Shire Council v Francis (1988) 13 NSWLR 396; 66 LGRA 167.......................................... [33.2.510], [33.2.590], [33.10.1720] Kyriacou v Kogarah Municipal Council (1995) 88 LGERA 110........ [33.2.570]

L L v Commonwealth (1976) 10 ALR 269............................................. [33.8.1620] L v Robinson [2000] 3 NZLR 499...................................................... [33.10.210] L and M; Director-General of Department of Family Services & Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (Intervener), Re (1993) 17 Fam LR 357................[33.9.300] L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65......... [33.1.270], [33.2.510], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.570], [33.2.580], [33.2.590], [33.2.600], [33.2.610], [33.10.1720] Lacey v Schneider (1989) 9 MVR 512....... [33.2.1570], [33.2.1640], [33.9.860] Lachaume v Broughton (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 475; 20 WN (NSW) 161.......................................................................................[33.8.1820] Lackersteen v Jones (1988) 92 FLR 6.................................................. [33.8.410] Lade & Co Pty Ltd v Black [2007] QSC 385.......................................[33.6.410] Lafranchi v Transport Accident Commission (Vic) (2006) 14 VR 359; [2006] VSCA 81................................................[33.2.1650], [33.2.1770], [33.2.1800] Lagan Navigation Co v Lambeg Bleaching, Dyeing & Finishing Co Ltd [1927] AC 226................................................................................... [33.7.900] Lagden v O’Connor [2003] 1 All ER 277; [2003] UKHL 64..........[33.10.1460] Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64.............[33.10.10], [33.10.170], [33.10.1390], [33.10.1490], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2090] Lahoud v Lahoud [2009] ANZ ConvR 9-032; [2009] NSWSC 623...................................................................................[33.8.710], [33.8.960] Laird v Attorney-General (Jam) (1974) 21 WIR 416.........................[33.8.1840] [References are to paragraph numbers] cvi

TABLE OF CASES

Lake v Taggart (1978) 1 SR (WA) 89...................................................[33.6.350] Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625; [1981] 2 WLR 1038.................................................................................. [33.10.2010] Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549......... [33.1.310], [33.8.410], [33.8.1743], [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.730] Lambert v Great Eastern Railway Co [1909] 2 KB 776...................[33.8.1630], [33.8.1840] Lambert v Lewis [1980] 2 WLR 299.................................................... [33.2.600] Lanahmede Pty Ltd v Koch [2004] SASC 204..................................... [33.3.180] Lancashire & Cheshire Association of Baptist Churches Inc v Howard & Seddon Partnership [1993] 3 All ER 467........................................ [33.1.340] Landry v Bathurst Lumber Co (1916) 35 DLR 701........................... [33.8.1630] Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230; 83 ALJR 993; [2009] HCA 29................................................................................[33.8.1820] Langmaid v Dobsons Vegetable Machinery Pty Ltd [2014] Aust Torts Reports 82-178; [2014] TASFC 6................................................. [33.5.10], [33.5.140] Lanyon v Noosa District Junior Rugby League Football Club Inc [2002] QCA 163......................................................................................................[33.3.260] Laresu Pty Ltd v Clark [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-068; [2010] NSWCA 180...................................................................................[33.3.170], [33.3.230] Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843................... [33.8.1110], [33.8.1120], [33.8.1130], [33.8.1140], [33.8.1250], [33.8.1280] Latham v Singleton [1981] NSWLR 843............................................ [33.8.1270] Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643; [1953] 3 WLR 259................... [33.2.1600] Latrobe Valley Village Inc v CSR Ltd (unreported, VSC, Phillips J, 1881 of 1987, 26 June 1990).......................................................................... [33.2.810] Latter v Braddell (1881) 44 LT 369......................................................[33.9.250] Launchbury v Morgans [1973] AC 127; [1972] 2 WLR 1217............ [33.2.400] Laurelgates Ltd v Lombard North Central plc (1983) 133 NLJ 720...[33.4.190] Lauren v Jolly [1996] 1 VR 189......................................................... [33.11.370] Laurie v Raglan Building Co Ltd [1942] 1 KB 152.......................... [33.2.1760] Lavender v Betts [1942] 2 All ER 72..................................................[33.8.1100] Lavin v Albert [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 WLR 955............................. [33.9.490] Law v Wright [1935] SASR 20..................[33.10.180], [33.10.230], [33.10.730] Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1995] Ch 152; [1994] 3 WLR 1221........................................................................ [33.8.1230] Lawlor v Johnston [1905] VLR 714.................................. [33.7.900], [33.8.580] Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49................ [33.7.220], [33.10.1370] [References are to paragraph numbers] cvii

TABLE OF CASES

Lawrie v Meggitt (1974) 11 SASR 5................................................ [33.10.2010] Laws v Florinplace Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 659.......................................[33.7.220] Laws v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 53; [2007] NSWSC 316......................................................................................................[33.4.830] Lawton v BOC Transhield Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 608............................[33.2.270] Laybutt v Glover Gibbs Pty Ltd (t/as Balfours NSW Pty Ltd) (2005) 79 ALJR 1808; [2005] HCA 56................................ [33.2.1030], [33.2.1050] Le Cornu Furniture & Carpet Centre Pty Ltd v Hammill (1998) 70 SASR 414..................................................................................... [33.2.350] Le Poidevin Industries Pty Ltd v Roberts (1990) 11 MVR 570......... [33.6.300], [33.6.450] Le Poidevin Industries Pty Ltd v Trimboli (unreported, SASC, Debelle J, 2182 of 1990, 5 December 1991)........................................... [33.6.290], [33.6.300] Leach v Money (1765) 19 St Tr 1001; 96 ER 320...............................[33.9.540] League Against Cruel Sports Ltd v Scott [1986] QB 240; [1985] 3 WLR 400.................................................. [33.6.330], [33.8.490], [33.9.190] Leahy v Beaumont (1981) 27 SASR 290......................... [33.2.1650], [33.9.180] Leake v Loveday (1842) 4 Man & G 972; 134 ER 399.......................[33.8.860] Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1978] QB 849; [1978] 2 WLR 774.................................................[33.7.530] LeBagge v Buses Ltd [1958] NZLR 630...........................................[33.10.2170] Lee v Blakeney (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 141; 3 WN (NSW) 119......... [33.10.1420] Lee v Jones [1954] 1 DLR 520........................................................... [33.8.1770] Lee v Riley (1865) 18 CB (NS) 722; 144 ER 629............ [33.6.420], [33.6.430] Lee v Walkers (1939) 162 LT 89........................................................... [33.6.390] Lee v York Coach & Marine [1977] RTR 35........................................[33.4.190] Leeds Industrial Coop Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851................. [33.7.890] Leeman v Montagu [1936] 2 All ER 1677............................................[33.6.310] Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90............ [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1970], [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Leibo v S Buckman Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 1057...................................[33.8.1930] Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6........... [33.2.310], [33.2.350], [33.2.1160], [33.5.230], [33.6.710], [33.7.390] Leigh & Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd (The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785; [1986] 2 WLR 902.............................. [33.2.520], [33.2.820] Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1; 83 ALJR 1086; 189 IR 285; [2009] HCA 35.................................................................... [33.6.710] Leinenga v Logan City Council [2006] QSC 294.............................. [33.8.2160] [References are to paragraph numbers] cviii

TABLE OF CASES

Leith v Medhurst [1991] 2 VR 362....................................................... [33.6.170] Lemmer v Bertram [1971] 2 SASR 397................................................[33.8.360] Lemmon v Webb [1894] 3 Ch 1.............................................................[33.8.500] Lemmon v Webb [1895] AC 1......................... [33.7.710], [33.7.900], [33.8.500] Lenfield, Re (1993) 114 FLR 195..........................................................[33.8.450] Lepore v New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 420; [2001] NSWCA 112......................................................................................................[33.6.630] Leppard v Excess Insurance Co Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 512................. [33.10.1380] Leschke v Jeffs (1995) 49 QJPR 138.................................................[33.10.2000] Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43......... [33.7.180], [33.7.240], [33.7.530], [33.7.540], [33.7.660], [33.7.700], [33.9.590] L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180.........[33.7.530], [33.7.850] Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573.................... [33.8.310], [33.8.320], [33.8.490], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1650], [33.8.1660], [33.9.190] Letang v Ottawa Electric Railway Co [1926] AC 725.........................[33.9.920] Letourneau v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (1998) 162 DLR (4th) 734......... [33.4.430] Levi v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; 58 WN (NSW) 63...................................................[33.2.790], [33.2.1330], [33.4.420] Levine v O’Keefe [1930] VLR 70...................................... [33.9.150], [33.9.530] Levy v Watt (2014) 308 ALR 748; [2014] VSCA 60........................... [33.8.790] Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234; [1963] 2 WLR 1063.................................................................................. [33.10.1100] Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; [1981] 2 WLR 713................................................ [33.4.190], [33.4.500], [33.4.1130] Ley v Lewis [1952] VLR 119............................................................ [33.10.1520] Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] AC 350............................................................ [33.4.460], [33.10.1980] Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Bluestone Group Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 470....................................................................................................[33.8.1960] Lieberopoulos v Jettner (1987) 140 LSJS 25....................................... [33.8.940] Liesbosch, The v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449............ [33.10.10], [33.10.170], [33.10.1390], [33.10.1490], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2090] Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431................................................................................... [33.9.960] Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver (2001) 75 ALJR 867; [2001] HCA 24...... [33.9.850], [33.9.860], [33.11.390] Lightbody v Gordon (1882) 9 R 934...................................................[33.8.1840] [References are to paragraph numbers] cix

TABLE OF CASES

Lilley v Alpine Resorts Commission (Vic) [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-475............................................................................................ [33.10.1980] Lilley v Doubleday (1881) 7 QBD 510................................................. [33.8.940] Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority (UK) [1979] QB 196; [1979] 3 WLR 895...............................................[33.10.360] Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority (UK) [1980] AC 174; [1979] 3 WLR 44....... [33.10.360], [33.10.490], [33.10.560] Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457.....[33.8.520], [33.8.590] Lind v Stump (1916) 12 Tas LR 74.......................................................[33.6.290] Lindhe v Royal Childrens Hospital (Vic) (unreported, VSC, Eames J, 6064 of 1990, 28 August 1992).................................................................... [33.10.850] Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB 128; [1980] 3 WLR 660..........................[33.9.530] Lindsay v Lovell [1917] VLR 734.........................................................[33.9.460] Lindsey v Sears, Roebuck & Co 389 So 2d 902 (1980).....................[33.8.1520] Linke v Schramm [1932] VLR 352....................................................... [33.8.950] Linsell v Robson [1976] 1 NSWLR 249............................................. [33.10.900] Lipman v Clendinnen (1932) 46 CLR 550..............................................[33.3.30] Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] QB 51; [1999] 3 WLR 137..................................................................... [33.7.530], [33.7.540] Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148................ [33.8.530], [33.8.1570], [33.9.480], [33.9.490], [33.9.520], [33.10.210] Lisle v Brice [2002] 2 Qd R 168; [2001] QCA 271...............................[33.2.40] Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; [2001] 2 WLR 1311; [2001] UKHL 22........................................................................ [33.2.990], [33.6.630] Lister v Perryman (1870) LR 4 HL 521............................................. [33.8.1860] Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 2 WLR 158................................................................. [33.11.400], [33.11.410] Little v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94...........................................[33.6.610] Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257....... [33.8.1820], [33.8.1860], [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162], [33.8.2165], [33.8.2167] Little v Suncorp Insurance & Finance (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R 273... [33.11.370] Liverpool Corp v H Coghill & Son Ltd [1918] 1 Ch 307....................[33.7.710] Livingstone v Halvorsen (1978) 53 ALJR 50................................... [33.10.1980] Livingstone v Mitchell [2007] NSWSC 1477........................................[33.1.300] Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25..................... [33.1.250], [33.10.170] LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490; 74 LGRA 282.................................... [33.8.580], [33.8.590] [References are to paragraph numbers] cx

TABLE OF CASES

Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716.................... [33.6.700], [33.8.1630] Lloyd v Lewis [1963] VR 277............................................................. [33.2.1370] LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74......................................................................................................[33.8.1220] Lobb v Ellis (1989) 10 MVR 88........................................................... [33.9.860] Local Board of Health for City of Perth v Maley (1904) 1 CLR 702......................................................................................... [33.7.660] Locher v Turner [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-336.... [33.10.950], [33.10.1750] Lock v Ashton (1848) 12 QB 871; 116 ER 1097................................[33.8.1540] Lock v ASIC [2016] FCA 31................................................................[33.8.2160] Lockhart v Osman [1981] VR 57.......................................................... [33.4.160] Lollis v Loulatzis [2007] VSC 547....................................................[33.10.1420] London Association for Protection of Trade (UK) v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15............................................................................................[33.8.1910] London County Council v Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 997........................................................................................ [33.6.650] London Graving Dock Co Ltd v Horton [1951] AC 737.................... [33.3.160], [33.9.930] London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan [1918] AC 777................. [33.8.900] London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155............. [33.5.140] London & South of England Building Society v Stone [1983] 1 WLR 1242.................................................................................. [33.10.2120] Longden v Weigall (1877) 3 VLR (L) 266....................[33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1880], [33.8.1920] Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173; [1981] 3 WLR 33...................................................... [33.5.10], [33.5.200], [33.5.220] Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489......... [33.8.1280], [33.10.250], [33.10.1100] Lonrho plc v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479; [1989] 3 WLR 631..............[33.8.1150], [33.8.1160], [33.8.1170] Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188..............[33.8.1260], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1980] Lonrho plc v Tebbit [1991] 4 All ER 973.............................................[33.2.670] Loose Fit Pty Ltd v Marshbaum [2011] NSWCA 372......................... [33.3.190] Lorca v Holts’ Corrosion Control Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 261......... [33.10.2120], [33.10.2140] Lord v Nominal Defendant (1980) 24 SASR 458.................................[33.9.190] Lord Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479; [1977] 3 WLR 136........................................................................................ [33.8.580] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxi

TABLE OF CASES

Lord Cawdor v Lewis (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 427; 160 ER 174..........[33.10.1420] Lord Citrine, The v The Hebridean Coast [1961] AC 545; [1961] 2 WLR 48...................................................................................... [33.10.1470] Lotz v Bullock [1912] St R Qd 36.........................................................[33.9.390] Louis v Commonwealth (1987) 87 FLR 277.......................................[33.8.1570] Love v Port of London Authority (UK) [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541..........................................................................................[33.10.2070] Lowery v Walker [1910] 1 KB 173....................................................... [33.6.390] Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10............................................................. [33.6.390] Lowns v Woods [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-376...............................[33.2.330] LT King Pty Ltd v Besser (2002) 172 FLR 140; [2002] VSC 354......[33.2.530] Lubrano v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 4038 (1993) 6 BPR 13,308.................................................................................................[33.5.200] Luetich v Walton [1960] WAR 109.................................... [33.8.190], [33.9.560] Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 El & Bl 216; 118 ER 749........[33.8.1190], [33.8.1230] Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 286; 39 SR (NSW) 66; 56 WN (NSW) 31...............................................[33.1.340] Lund v JL Tiedemanns Tobaksfabrik AS (unreported, HR-2002-00753a, Norway SC, 31 October 2003)......................................................... [33.4.430] Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352................................[33.2.1740], [33.2.1750] Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411.......[33.2.950], [33.2.1380], [33.10.990] Lyons v Lyons [1981] VR 497............................................................. [33.10.950]

M M v K (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 392........................................................... [33.8.360] Macarthur Districts Motor Cycle Sportsmen Inc v Ardizzone (2004) 41 MVR 235; [2004] NSWCA 145....................................................................[33.2.80] MacDonald v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp 475 NE 2d 65 (1985)...... [33.4.410] MacDonald v Sebastian (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 636.............................. [33.8.320] Machattie v Lee (1861) 10 LR (NSW) 182; 6 WN (NSW) 13......... [33.8.1900] Mackay v Abrahams [1916] VLR 681.................................................. [33.9.270] MacKenzie v MacLachlan [1979] 1 NZLR 670................................. [33.8.1220] MacKenzie v Martin [1953] 1 DLR 161; (1952) 104 CCC 264........[33.8.1710] MacKenzie v Martin [1954] SCR 361; [1954] 3 DLR 417................[33.8.1710] Mackenzie v Nominal Defendant (2005) 43 MVR 315; [2005] NSWCA 180......................................................................................................[33.9.820] M’Kone v Wood (1831) 5 Car & P 1; 172 ER 850.............................. [33.6.370]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxii

TABLE OF CASES

Macleay Pty Ltd (t/as Wobbies World) v Moore [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-151............................................................................. [33.3.500], [33.9.960] Maclenan v Segar [1917] 2 KB 325..................................................... [33.3.290] Macpherson v Beath (1975) 12 SASR 174...........................................[33.8.430] Macpherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184......................................... [33.8.180] MacPherson v Kevin J Prunty & Associates [1983] 1 VR 573..........[33.3.480], [33.11.350] Macquarie Generation v Hodgson (2011) 186 LGERA 311; 6 ARLR 229; [2011] NSWCA 424......................................................... [33.5.10], [33.5.190] Madden v Coy [1944] VLR 88..............................................................[33.7.850] Madden v Kevereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305..................................... [33.10.1870] Magill v Magill (2005) 33 Fam LR 193; [2005] VSCA 51.............. [33.8.1290], [33.8.1320] Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51.................[33.8.1290], [33.8.1300], [33.8.1320], [33.8.2135] Magnay v Burt (1843) 5 QB 381; 114 ER 1293................................ [33.8.1550] Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504..............[33.10.2000], [33.10.2010], [33.10.2080], [33.11.180], [33.11.370] Maiden v Maiden (1909) 7 CLR 727; 9 SR (NSW) 396; 26 WN (NSW) 77...........................................................................................[33.8.470] Maine v Townsend (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 1..................... [33.8.1590], [33.8.1840] Mainguard Packaging Ltd v Hilton Haulage Ltd [1990] 1 NZLR 360.......................................................................................[33.2.820] Maiward v Doyle [1983] WAR 210............................... [33.10.930], [33.10.990] Majindi Northern Territory (2010) 27 NTLR 89; [2010] NTSC 25....[33.8.410] Majory; Ex parte Debtor, Re v FA Dumont Ltd [1955] Ch 600; [1955] 2 WLR 1035; [1955] 2 All ER 65..................................................[33.8.1950] Makawe Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (2009) 171 LGERA 165; [2009] NSWCA 412...................................................................................... [33.2.680] Malachy v Soper (1836) 3 Bing NC 371; 132 ER 453....................[33.10.1710] Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316.....[33.10.870], [33.10.1990], [33.10.2030], [33.10.2050] Malfroot v Noxall Ltd (1935) 51 TLR 551........................................... [33.4.340] Mallett v Dunn [1949] 2 KB 180...................................................... [33.10.1750] Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166; [1969] 2 WLR 767................ [33.4.460], [33.10.560], [33.10.2050] Mallock v Mason (1938) 5 LJNCCR 387............................................. [33.6.310] Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241; [1987] 2 WLR 480........................................................................................ [33.2.790] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141....................................................... [33.7.490] Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1980] QB 49...............[33.8.945] Malz v Rosen [1966] 1 WLR 1008..................................................... [33.8.1860] Manchester Corp v Farnworth [1930] AC 171.................................... [33.7.660] Manga v Attorney-General (NZ) [2000] 2 NZLR 65......................... [33.8.1740] Mann v Ellbourn (1974) 8 SASR 298........................... [33.10.860], [33.10.870] Mann v Flinders Medical Centre (1999) 203 LSJS 1........................ [33.2.1370] Mann v Jacombe (1960) 78 WN (NSW) 635; [1961] NSWR 273....[33.8.1850] Mansell v Griffın [1908] 1 KB 947....................................................... [33.9.440] Manser v Spry (1994) 181 CLR 428; 68 ALJR 869........................ [33.10.2160] Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263.................................. [33.2.1650] Manson v Shire of Maffra (1881) 7 VLR (L) 364................................[33.7.250] Manton v Bales (1845) 1 CB 444; 135 ER 613............................... [33.10.2030] Manton v Brocklebank [1923] 2 KB 212....... [33.6.330], [33.6.350], [33.6.380], [33.6.400], [33.6.410] Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd (The Nicholas H) [1996] AC 211; [1995] 3 WLR 227.............................. [33.2.390], [33.2.810] March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335.......[33.1.280], [33.2.1560], [33.4.460], [33.4.470], [33.4.510], [33.5.270], [33.9.720], [33.9.840], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2000], [33.10.2020] Mariola Marine Corp v Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (The Morning Watch) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 547.................................................................[33.2.670] Marion’s Case (Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300...................[33.8.360], [33.8.375], [33.8.400], [33.8.450], [33.9.200], [33.9.220], [33.9.280], [33.9.300] Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (WA) (1999) 93 FCR 34; 94 IR 244; [1999] FCA 899....................................... [33.8.1260] Mark v Barkla [1935] NZLR 347......................................................... [33.6.430] Markellos v Wakefield (1974) 7 SASR 436...................................... [33.10.1750] Marks v Frogley [1898] 1 QB 888......................................................[33.8.1820] Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; 73 ALJR 12; [1998] HCA 69.................................................................[33.1.10], [33.1.270] Marlborough Harbour Board (NSW) v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223............................................................................... [33.10.370] Marlor v Ball (1900) 16 TLR 239..................................... [33.6.350], [33.6.390] Marrapodi v Smith-Roberts (unreported, ACTSC, Fox J, 16 September 1968)................................................................................................ [33.11.410] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528; [1962] 3 WLR 912................... [33.2.390] Marschler v G Masser’s Garage (1956) 2 DLR (2d) 484................. [33.11.360] Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169.................. [PREFACE], [33.7.170], [33.7.180], [33.7.200], [33.7.660] Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187....................................................... [33.7.660] Marsh v Baxter [2016] HCATrans 22.................................................. [PREFACE] Marsh v Bower (1772) 2 Black W 851; 96 ER 502.........................[33.10.2030] Marshall v Batchelor (1949) 51 WALR 68.......................................... [33.9.920] Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339.................... [33.6.140], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1590], [33.8.1700], [33.8.1740] Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162............... [33.10.510], [33.10.540], [33.10.590], [33.10.760], [33.10.960], [33.10.990] Martell v Coal Miners’ Association (Vic) (1903) 29 VLR 475..........[33.8.1260] Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363; [1955] 2 WLR 463...................................................................................... [33.8.1990] Martignoni v Harris [1971] 2 NSWLR 102......................................... [33.6.460] Martin v Isbard (1946) 48 WALR 52............................................... [33.10.2010] Martin v Stratman [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-262.......................[33.11.170], [33.11.200], [33.11.360] Martin v Tasmania Development & Resources (1999) 89 IR 98; [1999] FCA 593....................................................................................................[33.8.2167] Martin v Trustees of Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Sydney [2006] NSWCA 132........................................................................ [33.2.1010] Martin v Watson [1996] AC 74; [1995] 3 WLR 318......................... [33.8.1840] Martin v Western District of Australasian Coal & Shale Employees’ Federation Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia (Mining Department) (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 593; 51 WN (NSW) 203...............................[33.5.200] Martindale v Duncan [1973] 1 WLR 574.........................................[33.10.1470] Marziale v Hathazi (1975) 13 SASR 150........................................... [33.10.840] Mason v Burke (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 19..............................................[33.11.160] Mason v Clarke [1955] AC 778; [1955] 2 WLR 853.......................... [33.8.480] Mason v Keeling (1704) 12 Mod 332; 88 ER 1359......... [33.6.300], [33.6.360], [33.6.400] Masters v Brent London Borough Council [1978] QB 841; [1978] 2 WLR 768.................................................................................... [33.10.1350] Matheson v G Stuckey & Co Pty Ltd [1921] VLR 637.... [33.6.290], [33.6.410] Matthews v Dean (1990) 11 MVR 455...............................................[33.10.720] May v Burdett (1846) 9 QB 101; 115 ER 1213............... [33.6.350], [33.6.360], [33.6.390] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxv

TABLE OF CASES

May v Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission [2015] FCAFC 93........................................................................................................[33.4.470] Mayfair Ltd v Pears [1987] 1 NZLR 459.........................................[33.10.2110] Maynegrain Pty Ltd v Compafina Bank [1982] 2 NSWLR 141...... [33.10.1510] Maynegrain Pty Ltd v Compafina Bank [1984] 1 NSWLR 258; (1984) 58 ALJR 389......................................................................................[33.6.140] Mayor of Colchester v Brooke (1845) 7 QB 339; 115 ER 518........... [33.7.910] Mazinski v Bakka (1978) 20 SASR 350................................................[33.2.320] MB (caesarean section), Re [1997] 2 FCR 541....................................[33.9.230] MBF Australia Ltd v Malouf (2008) 3 BFRA 222; [2008] NSWCA 214......................................................................................................[33.8.810] MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203..... [33.10.500], [33.10.530], [33.10.540], [33.10.590], [33.10.600], [33.10.860] McArthur v Williams (1936) 55 CLR 324............................................ [33.9.550] McArthur & Co v Cornwall [1892] AC 75.......................................[33.10.1420] McC (a minor), Re [1985] AC 528; [1984] 3 WLR 1227................ [33.8.1550], [33.8.2160] MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehman Bros International (Europe) [1998] 4 All ER 675............................................................................................... [33.8.850] McCabe v Pickford (1982) 29 SASR 362.............................................[33.6.460] McCaffrey v Hill (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 303; 20 WN (NSW) 106.......[33.8.1860] McCann v Switzerland Insurance (Aust) Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 579; 75 ALJR 325; [2000] HCA 65......................................................... [33.4.470] McCarty v North Sydney Municipal Council (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 210; 4 LGR (NSW) 59; 35 WN (NSW) 85...........[33.7.220], [33.7.490], [33.7.830] McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157............................. [33.8.420], [33.9.350] McClintock v Trojan Workforce No 4 Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 216........ [33.10.540] McCreary v Whitney (1987) 6 MVR 303............................................[33.10.940] McCrohon v Harith [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-056; [2010] NSWCA 67......................................................................................................[33.8.1390] McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906; [1987] 3 WLR 212................................................................. [33.2.1030], [33.11.153] McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Co [2014] QSC 34........................[33.4.746] McDonald v Coles Myer Ltd (t/as K-Mart Chatswood) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-361.......................................[33.8.1740], [33.8.1743], [33.10.180] McDonald v Commonwealth (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 129; 62 WN (NSW) 242.........................................................................................[33.6.620] McDonald v Dalgleish (1973) 35 DLR (3d) 486................................[33.11.160]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxvi

TABLE OF CASES

McDonald v Ludwig [2007] QSC 28.................................................... [33.9.260] McDonald v Shire of Coburg (1887) 13 VLR 268...............................[33.7.660] McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297............................[33.5.160], [33.5.250] McDowall v Reynolds [2004] QCA 245................................................[33.8.480] McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd (1993) ANZ ConvR 11; [1993] 1 NZLR 39.........................................................................................[33.1.290] McEwan v Mills (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 118................................... [33.7.540] McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289................ [33.7.380], [33.7.510], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1740], [33.8.2130] McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2004] VSC 289...............................................................................[33.8.1570], [33.8.2130] McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 1...... [33.2.1300], [33.10.830] McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1.....................[33.4.460], [33.5.270], [33.10.1980], [33.10.1990] McGibbon v McCurry (1909) 43 ILTR 132..........................................[33.6.440] McGilvray v Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) [2001] WASC 345....................................................................................... [33.10.910] McGovern v British Steel Corp [1986] 1 ICR 608...............................[33.5.270] McGowan & Co Ltd v Dyer (1873) LR 8 QB 141......... [33.6.700], [33.8.1630] McGrath v Fairfield Municipal Council (1985) 156 CLR 672; 59 ALJR 655............................................................... [33.11.400], [33.11.410] McGrath v Marshall (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 106.............. [33.8.560], [33.9.250] McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267....[33.8.160], [33.8.310], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1650], [33.9.170], [33.9.190], [33.9.290] McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; 39 ALJR 459.................... [33.2.1635], [33.9.290], [33.9.730] McInnes v Wardle (1931) 45 CLR 548.............................. [33.6.150], [33.7.530] McIntosh v Mair (1979) 21 SASR 150; 46 FLR 363...................... [33.10.2160] McIntosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112.......................... [33.9.520], [33.10.180] McIntosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112; 30 ACTR 19..................... [33.8.1743] McIntosh v Williams [1976] 2 NSWLR 237..................................... [33.10.2170] McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543............... [33.10.600], [33.10.1240], [33.10.2050], [33.10.2170] McIntyre v Miller (1980) 30 ACTR 8............................................... [33.10.1750] McKain v RW Miller & Co (SA) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1; 66 ALJR 186......................................................................................[33.10.40] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxvii

TABLE OF CASES

McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166; [1982] 2 WLR 890...................................................................................... [33.2.1390] McKean v McIvor (1870) LR 6 Ex 36..................................................[33.8.880] McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; [1999] FCA 1101........... [33.6.610], [33.8.1260], [33.8.1280], [33.10.1700] McKenna v Richey [1950] VLR 360................................................. [33.10.1870] McKenna & Armistead Pty Ltd v Excavations Pty Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 515; 74 WN (NSW) 289................................................ [33.8.890], [33.8.940] McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1.............. [33.7.190], [33.7.240], [33.7.850], [33.7.880] McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303............[33.8.960], [33.10.1460] McKern v Burke (1986) 3 MVR 279.................................................... [33.6.300] McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343....................... [33.8.1180], [33.8.1260] McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621......................................................................................... [33.10.2010] McKinnon v Burtatowski [1969] VR 899..............................................[33.2.330] McKinnon Industries Ltd v Walker [1951] 3 DLR 577........................ [33.7.200] McLean v Brett (1919) 49 DLR 162..................................................... [33.6.430] McLean v Tedman (1984) 155 CLR 306; 58 ALJR 541................... [33.2.1030], [33.2.1590], [33.9.780] McLeod v Rub-a-Dub Car Wash (Malvern) Pty Ltd (unreported, VSC, Stephen J, 29 February 1972)........................................................... [33.7.490] McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 WLR 982...........[33.2.800], [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.10.830] McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 277 FLR 418; [2013] NSWSC 933.......................................................................[33.10.1100] McMeekin v City of Maryborough [1947] St R Qd 192...................... [33.7.690] McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (Helix Cotton Case) (1997) 72 FCR 1; 93 A Crim R 1........................ [33.2.820], [33.4.520], [33.10.210] McNally v Spedding [2004] NSWCA 400............................................ [33.3.180] McNamara v Duncan (1971) 45 FLR 152......[33.9.200], [33.9.240], [33.9.280] McNeill v Frankenfield (1963) 44 DLR (2d) 132.................................[33.6.390] McNeilly v Imbree (2007) 47 MVR 536; [2007] NSWCA 156......... [33.10.960] McPherson v Whitfield [1996] 1 Qd R 474....................... [33.3.490], [33.9.920] McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687............................................... [33.6.350] McTavish v Shire of Wyalkatchem [1976] WAR 188............................[33.9.580] McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] 2 SC 1................[33.4.350], [33.4.370], [33.4.430] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxviii

TABLE OF CASES

McWaters v Day (1989) 168 CLR 289; 64 ALJR 41........................... [33.9.460] McWhirter v Emerson-Elliott (No 2) [1962] WAR 162....................... [33.7.690] McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 295.........[33.2.1030] McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723................................................................................. [33.4.510] Meade v Haringey London Borough Council [1979] 1 WLR 637...... [33.5.200] Meadows v Ferguson [1961] VR 594.......................... [33.10.890], [33.10.2170] Meadows v Maloney (1972) 4 SASR 567.........................................[33.10.1750] Meah v McCreamer (No 1) [1985] 1 All ER 367............................ [33.10.2080] Meah v McCreamer (No 2) [1986] 1 All ER 943..... [33.10.2080], [33.10.2170] Mears v London & South Western Railway Co (1862) 11 CB (NS) 850; 142 ER 1029.................................................................[33.8.710], [33.8.2140] Meates v Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 308..................................... [33.2.570] Mediana, The SS v The Lightship Comet [1900] AC 113................. [33.10.170], [33.10.1530] Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Trafigura Beheer BV [2007] EWCA Civ 794..................................................................................................[33.10.1520] Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (SA) (1995) 182 CLR 1; 69 ALJR 118..................................................................................[33.10.2010] Mee v Cruikshank (1902) 86 LT 708.................................................. [33.8.1610] Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44........ [33.8.1570], [33.8.1670], [33.8.1680] Melbourne & Metropolitan Tramways Board (Vic) v Postneck [1959] VR 39.....................................................................................[33.9.860] Mellor v Leather (1853) 1 El & Bl 619; 118 ER 569..........................[33.8.970] Mellor v Moran (1985) 2 MVR 461................................................... [33.2.1300] Mendola v Warren (1993) 19 MVR 385............................................... [33.9.860] Mendoza v City of Melbourne (1897) 22 VLR 611............................[33.11.170] Mengel v Northern Territory (No 2) [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-266.............................................................................................. [33.10.530] Mennie v Blake (1856) 6 El & Bl 842; 119 ER 1078..........................[33.8.970] Menow v Honsberger [1974] SCR 239; (1973) 38 DLR (3d) 105.... [33.2.1810] Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v Argent Pty Ltd (1972) 46 ALJR 432..................................................................................[33.10.1740] Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport & Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580................................................................ [33.2.1600], [33.2.1820] Mercer v South Eastern & Chatham Railway Companies’ Managing Committee [1922] 2 KB 549.............................................................[33.2.330]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxix

TABLE OF CASES

Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd v Peterson (2011) 196 FCR 145; [2011] FCAFC 128............................................................................[33.4.460] Meredith v Commonwealth (No 2) (2013) 280 FLR 385; [2013] ACTSC 221....................................................................................................[33.10.850] Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570; [1983] 2 WLR 778............................................ [33.8.1150], [33.8.1210], [33.8.1230] Merrett v Babb [2001] QB 1174; [2001] 3 WLR 1; [2001] EWCA Civ 214......................................................................................................[33.2.640] Merryweather v Nixan (1799) 8 TR 186; 101 ER 1337.................... [33.11.350] Mersey Docks & Harbour Board (UK) v Coggins & Griffıth (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1....................................................................................... [33.6.620] Meshlawn Pty Ltd v Queensland [2010] QCA 181.............................. [33.2.820] Metal Fabrications (Vic) Pty Ltd v Kelcey [1986] VR 507............. [33.10.2120] Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; [1989] 3 WLR 563.......... [33.8.1810], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1980] Metcalfe v London Passenger Transport Board (UK) [1938] 2 All ER 352............................................................................................. [33.10.360] Meth v Moore (1982) 63 FLR 309........................................................ [33.3.160] Metro Meat Ltd v Werlick [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-242............[33.10.500] Metrolink Victoria Pty Ltd v Inglis [2009] VSCA 227.........................[33.1.290] Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210.................[33.8.1850], [33.8.1940] Metropolitan Meat Industry Board (NSW) v Williams (1991) 24 NSWLR 54............................................................ [33.10.530], [33.10.540] Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2009] NSWSC 1033.....[33.8.1180] Michaels v Taylor Woodrow Developments Ltd [2001] Ch 493; [2001] 2 WLR 224...................................................................................... [33.8.1270] Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 69 ALJR 686; 80 A Crim R 542......................................................................................................[33.9.500] Mickelberg v Western Australia [2007] WASC 140............................. [33.6.610] Midalco Pty Ltd v Rabenalt [1989] VR 461...................[33.8.410], [33.10.210], [33.10.730] Middleton v Western Australia (1992) 8 WAR 256..............................[33.6.610] Middleweek v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1992] 1 AC 179; [1990] 3 WLR 481...................................................................................... [33.8.1620] Midwood & Co Ltd v Manchester Corp [1905] 2 KB 597..................[33.7.660] Migotti v Colvill (1879) 4 CPD 233....................................................[33.8.1610] Mihaka v Wellington Publishing Co (1972) Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 10.......................................................................................[33.11.160] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxx

TABLE OF CASES

Milankovic v Viscount Manufacturers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 1... [33.5.250], [33.6.10] Miles v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney (1904) 1 CLR 470; 22 WN (NSW) 67...........................................................................................[33.1.310] Miles v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1311......... [33.2.1060], [33.2.1150], [33.2.1160] Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443; [1975] 3 WLR 758...................................................................................... [33.10.490] Milk Bottles Recovery Ltd v Camillo [1948] VLR 344........................[33.8.790] Millar v Bornholt (2009) 177 FCR 67; [2009] FCA 637...................[33.8.1820] Millar v Candy (1981) 58 FLR 145........................... [33.10.1470], [33.10.1490] Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; [1977] 3 WLR 20....... [33.7.240], [33.7.700], [33.10.1860], [33.10.2280] Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9...[33.2.40], [33.2.210], [33.2.390], [33.2.530], [33.2.800], [33.3.510], [33.4.450], [33.5.430], [33.9.980] Miller v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (1988) 6 MVR 531n........... [33.10.850] Miller v Royal Derwent Hospital Board of Management (1992) 14 Tas R 271....................................................................................................[33.2.1290] Miller v Ryan [1980] 1 NSWLR 93....................................................[33.8.2010] Miller v Shoalhaven Shire Council (1957) 2 LGRA 46....[33.7.240], [33.7.840] Miller v United States Steel Corp 902 F 2d 573 (1990)...................... [33.2.300] Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357; 84 ALJR 644; [2010] HCA 31....................[33.2.510], [33.2.615] Millington v Griffıths (1874) 30 LT 65..................................................[33.7.710] Mills v Baitis [1968] VR 583; (1968) 17 LGRA 242...................... [33.10.2170] Mills v Mills (1631) 79 ER 809...........................................................[33.11.220] Milner v Delita Pty Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 299........................................ [33.10.500] Minchillo v Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd [1995] 2 VR 594...........[33.4.980] Minchillo v Lanes Ford Trucks Pty Ltd [1992] ASC 56-156...............[33.4.980] Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) v San Sebastian Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 268; (1983) 51 LGRA 257................................................................. [33.2.340], [33.2.640] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; 81 ALJR 1; [2006] HCA 50.........................[33.5.200] Minister of State for Interior v RT Co Pty Ltd (1962) 107 CLR 1; 36 ALJR 61....................................................................................[33.10.1420] Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802.................................................. [33.2.270], [33.2.340], [33.2.540] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Mint v Good [1951] 1 KB 517........................................... [33.7.530], [33.7.540] Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93.... [33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.870], [33.10.1500] Mirvahedy v Henley [2002] QB 769; [2002] 2 WLR 566; [2001] EWCA Civ 1749....................................................................................................[33.6.350] Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] 2 AC 491; [2003] 2 WLR 882; [2003] UKHL 16........................................................................................................[33.6.350] Mitchell v Clancy [1960] Qd R 62......................................................[33.10.830] Mitchell v Jenkins (1833) 5 B & Ad 588; 110 ER 908......................[33.8.1690] Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160.............................................[33.8.1860], [33.8.1880], [33.8.1930] Mitchell v Norman; Ex parte Norman [1965] Qd R 587.................... [33.9.400], [33.9.420] Mitchell v Tarbutt (1794) 101 ER 362................................................ [33.11.220] Mitchell v Tsiros (No 2) [1982] VR 301............................................... [33.7.690] Mitchil v Alestree (1676) 1 Vent 295; 86 ER 190............. [33.6.290], [33.6.380] MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 6) (2011) 185 LGERA 276; [2011] NSWSC 1613...........................[33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Mobbs v Kain (2009) 54 MVR 179.................................................... [33.2.1640] Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; 75 ALJR 164; [2000] HCA 61...................................... [33.2.980], [33.3.180] Model Dairy Pty Ltd v White [1935] ALR 432.................................... [33.8.890] Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598..................................................................[33.8.150], [33.8.1080] Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25......[33.8.150], [33.8.1080], [33.8.1170] Mohr v Cleaver [1986] WAR 67........................................................... [33.2.600] Monaghan Surveyors Pty Ltd v Stratford Glen-Avon Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 94........................................................................................................[33.5.400] Monie v Commonwealth [2007] NSWCA 230..................[33.9.880], [33.9.910], [33.9.920] Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46................................................................... [33.7.530], [33.7.670] Montemaggiori v Wilson (2011) 58 MVR 497; [2011] WASCA 177....................................................................................................[33.10.890] Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui (2006) 14 VR 55; [2006] VSCA 30........................................................................................................[33.2.810] Moore v AGC (Insurances) Ltd [1968] SASR 389...........................[33.10.2010] Moore v DER Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1476............................................ [33.10.1490] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxii

TABLE OF CASES

Moore v Devanjul Pty Ltd (No. 5) [2013] QSC 323............................ [33.8.555] Moore v Government Railways Commission (WA) (1990) 3 WAR 409...................................................................................... [33.11.380] Moore v News of the World Ltd [1972] 1 QB 441; [1972] 2 WLR 419.......................................................................................... [33.5.10] Moore v R Fox & Sons [1956] 1 QB 596; [1956] 2 WLR 342.........[33.2.1800] Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Finch [1962] 1 QB 701; [1962] 3 WLR 110..................................................................... [33.8.880], [33.8.890] Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; 59 ALJR 77...................................................................[33.8.150], [33.8.1080] Moran v McMahon (1985) 3 NSWLR 700....................[33.10.710], [33.10.820] Morash v Lockhart & Ritchie Ltd (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 647............... [33.2.550] Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374.......[33.3.160], [33.3.290] Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd v Reid [1946] VLR 237........................ [33.8.480] Morelli v Fitch [1928] 2 KB 636.......................................................... [33.4.170] Morgan v Attorney-General [1965] NZLR 134.................................. [33.2.1090] Morgan v Aylen [1942] 1 All ER 489................................................. [33.2.1350] Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710; [1968] 3 WLR 506........................ [33.8.1110] Morgan v Hughes (1788) 2 TR 225; 100 ER 123................................[33.9.550] Morgan v Khyatt [1964] AC 475; [1964] 1 WLR 475; [1964] NZLR 666...........................................................[33.7.870], [33.7.900] Morgan v Lake Macquarie City Council (unreported, NSWCA, Clarke, Handley and Cripps JJA, CA 40451–40456, 40649 of 1992, 2 September 1993)............................................................ [33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.530] Morgan v Owners of Strata Plan 13937 [2006] NSWSC 1019..........[33.3.220], [33.3.230] Morgan v Pearson (1979) 22 SASR 5................................................ [33.2.1610] Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655.................................................. [33.2.650], [33.2.660], [33.2.670] Morley v Murray (1980) 42 FLR 271............................................... [33.10.2160] Morris v Alcon Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-923; [2003] FCA 151...................................................................................[33.4.746], [33.4.785] Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 3 WLR 276..................................................................... [33.6.140], [33.6.700] Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792; [1973] 2 WLR 843... [33.11.410] Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24................[33.3.240], [33.3.320], [33.3.340], [33.3.470] Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552; [1956] 1 WLR 177...................................................................................... [33.2.1620] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Morris v Zanki (1997) 18 WAR 260.............................. [33.10.710], [33.10.980] Morrison v Sarkis [2014] HCATrans 57............................................... [33.6.460] Morrison v Upper Hutt City Council [1998] 2 NZLR 331..................[33.2.380] Morriss v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925..............................................[33.9.330] Morriss v Winter [1930] 1 KB 243..................................................... [33.8.1610] Morro v Australian Capital Territory (2009) 234 FLR 71; [2009] ACTSC 118...............................................................................[33.8.1740], [33.8.1743] Morton v Douglas Homes Ltd [1984] 2 NZLR 548........................... [33.11.170] Morton v Knight [1990] 2 Qd R 419................................. [33.9.810], [33.9.860] Morvatjou v Moradkhani [2013] NSWCA 157.................................. [33.10.890] Mosman Park Town v Dalden Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 64 LGRA 9........................................................................................ [33.8.590] Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council [1925] 2 KB 750...... [33.10.1350], [33.10.1380] Motis Exports Ltd v Dampskibsselskabet AF 1912 A/S [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 571................................................................................ [33.6.140] Motor Accidents Insurance Board (Tas) v Pulford [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-235.............................................................................................. [33.10.710] Motor Accidents Insurance Board (Tas) v Richards (1991) 14 Tas R 221....................................................................................................[33.10.710] Motor Dealers Credit Corp Ltd v Overland (Sydney) Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 516; 48 WN (NSW) 205................................................................... [33.8.890] Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust v Wilson [1976] WAR 175..................[33.9.840] Mouat v Clark Boyce [1992] 2 NZLR 559....................................... [33.10.1410] Mounsey v Orange Grove Bricks Pty Ltd [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-392................................................................................................ [33.9.740] Mount Albert Borough Council v Johnson [1979] 2 NZLR 234....... [33.2.1130] Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88.....[33.1.290], [33.1.300], [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300], [33.9.930], [33.10.180], [33.10.830] Mountain Cattlemen’s Association of Victoria Inc v Barron [1998] 3 VR 302......................................................................................... [33.2.1560] Mouse’s Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63; 77 ER 1341............................... [33.9.340] Mowbray v Merryweather [1895] 2 QB 640...................................... [33.11.400] Mrs Eaton’s Car Sales Ltd v Thomasen [1973] 2 NZLR 686......... [33.10.1470] Mulcahy v Hydro-Electric Commission (Tas) (1998) 85 FCR 170......[33.5.180] Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] QB 732; [1996] 2 WLR 474........................................................................................ [33.2.390] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63..................[33.2.230], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1516], [33.2.1530], [33.2.1560], [33.2.1600], [33.3.500], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304.............................................. [33.2.1635] Mulliner v Florence (1878) 3 QBD 484............................................... [33.8.810] Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99................................. [33.2.1760] Munce v Black (1858) 7 ICLR 475..................................................... [33.8.1820] Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235......... [33.10.2140] Munday v Gill (1930) 44 CLR 38.........................................................[33.8.530] Mungekar v Hermes Precisa Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 225..................[33.9.780] Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) v Ashby [1951] SASR 61................. [33.9.770] Munnings v Australian Government Solicitor (No 2) (1994) 68 ALJR 429....................................................................................[33.8.1800] Munnings v Australian Government Solicitor (1994) 68 ALJR 169....................................................................................[33.8.1800] Munnings v Barrett [1987] Tas R 80.....................................................[33.9.240] Munnings v Hydro-Electric Commission (Tas) (1971) 125 CLR 1; 45 ALJR 378; 25 LGRA 149............................................................[33.3.160] Munro v Anglican Church of Australia, Diocese of Bathurst (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, McHugh JJA and Clarke AJA, 490 of 1985, 14 May 1987)................................................................................................ [33.2.1000] Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332.............. [33.6.310], [33.7.180], [33.7.190], [33.7.240], [33.7.700], [33.7.850] Munro v Tooheys Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 74.............................................. [33.4.980] Munro v Willmott [1949] 1 KB 295.................................................. [33.10.1460] Murcia Holdings Pty Ltd v Nedlands City (1999) 22 WAR 1; [1999] WASC 241....................................................................................................[33.8.2167] Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414......... [33.1.10], [33.2.810], [33.2.820], [33.2.1120], [33.2.1130], [33.4.370], [33.10.1730] Murphy v Brown (1985) 1 NSWLR 131...........................................[33.10.1460] Murphy v Stone Wallwork (Charlton) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1023........ [33.10.360] Murray v Harringay Arena Ltd [1951] 2 KB 529................................[33.3.490] Murray v M’Neill (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 136........................................[33.9.430] Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442........................... [33.8.400], [33.9.260] Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692.......[33.8.1520], [33.8.1550], [33.8.1680], [33.8.1690] Murray, Doe d v Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 847; 109 ER 1001......... [33.5.190], [33.5.200] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Musca v Astle Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251..........[33.8.1310], [33.10.210] Musca v Colombini [1970] WAR 33................................................... [33.10.360] Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43...................................................[33.6.160] Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316.........[33.2.510], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.560], [33.2.570], [33.2.580], [33.2.590], [33.2.600], [33.2.680] Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478.........[33.2.510], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.560], [33.2.570], [33.2.580], [33.2.590], [33.2.600], [33.10.1720] Mye v Peters (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 298; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 26....[33.9.730] Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597..... [33.8.410], [33.8.550], [33.8.1540], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1590], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1630], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1650], [33.8.1670], [33.8.1680], [33.8.1690], [33.8.1700], [33.8.1740], [33.8.1743], [33.8.1760], [33.8.1770], [33.8.1780], [33.9.150], [33.9.550], [33.10.180], [33.11.210] Myer Stores Ltd v State Fire Commission [2012] TASSC 54.............[33.2.210], [33.2.390]

N Nada v Knight [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-032.............................. [33.8.1620] Nada Shah v Sleeman (1917) 19 WALR 119.................... [33.6.350], [33.6.400] Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501......[33.10.830], [33.10.1980], [33.10.2070], [33.10.2080] Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423; 67 ALJR 426............................................[33.2.1530], [33.2.1560], [33.3.220] Nair v Health Administration Corp [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-312.............................................................................................. [33.2.1050] Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620........ [33.7.220], [33.7.660], [33.9.590] Namol Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Pty Ltd (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 388; 27 ATR 181...........................................................................................[33.10.580] Napaluma v Baker (1982) 29 SASR 192............................................[33.10.940] Narhex Australia Pty Ltd v Sunspot Products Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 535......................................................................................................[33.4.980] Nash v Barnes [1922] NZLR 303..................................................... [33.10.1460] National Australia Bank Ltd v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377.............................................................. [33.2.360], [33.8.900] National Australia Bank Ltd v McFarlane [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-819; [2005] VSC 438.....................................[33.8.1790], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1880] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18...............[33.1.140], [33.1.280], [33.1.290], [33.2.610], [33.2.820], [33.6.140], [33.8.340], [33.8.900], [33.10.1680] National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd [2002] 4 VR 252....................................................................................... [33.10.1510] National Coal Board v JE Evans & Co (Cardiff) Ltd [1951] 2 KB 861........................................................................ [33.8.310], [33.8.780] National Instruments Pty Ltd v Gilles (1975) 49 ALJR 349..............[33.10.900] National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; [1961] Qd R 277; (1961) 35 ALJR 4........................ [33.4.470], [33.10.2160] National Mercantile Bank Ltd v Rymill (1881) 44 LT 767.................. [33.8.890] National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Coffey & Partners Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 401.................................................[33.2.810], [33.2.1130] National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v General Television Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 62 ALJR 553...............................................[33.10.2280] National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v Marble Tile Co Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 55049 of 1992, 28 July 1992)............................ [33.2.810] National Phonograph Co Ltd v Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 335.............................................................................. [33.8.1170] Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377.........................................[33.6.650], [33.8.180], [33.8.2130], [33.8.2135] Nau v Kemp & Associates Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 687; [2010] NSWCA 164....................................................................................................[33.11.230] Neal v CSR Ltd [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-052............................ [33.10.950] Neill v New South Wales Fresh Food & Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362; 36 ALJR 297....................................................................................[33.2.1820] Neilsen v Hempston Holdings Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 302...............[33.10.600] Neilson v City of Swan (No 6) [2013] WASC 53.......... [33.8.2160], [33.8.2165] Neilson v City of Swan (2006) 147 LGERA 136; [2006] WASCA 94......................................................................................................[33.8.2160] Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75............. [33.2.1050], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1560], [33.3.30], [33.3.210], [33.3.220], [33.3.230], [33.3.240], [33.3.260], [33.3.290], [33.3.310], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] Nelson v Hughes [1947] VLR 227........................................................ [33.7.710] Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; 70 ALJR 47............................[33.8.840] Nelson v Nelson [1923] QSR 37........................................................... [33.8.920] Nelson v Nelson [1923] St R Qd 37......................................................[33.8.920] Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140; 39 ALJR 288........... [33.2.1760] Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172.........[33.7.170], [33.7.200], [33.7.215], [33.7.250], [33.7.860] Neuchatel Asphalte Co’s Trade Mark, Re [1913] 2 Ch 291...............[33.8.1350] Neumann v Bakeaway Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1016n.................................[33.6.140] Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368........... [33.8.1990], [33.8.2000] Neville Nitschke Caravans (Main North Road) Pty Ltd v McEntee (1976) 15 SASR 330; 40 LGRA 276........................................ [33.7.510], [33.7.890] New South Wales v Abed [2015] Aust Torts Reports 82-195; [2014] NSWCA 419...............................................................................[33.8.1830], [33.8.1840] New South Wales v Broune [2000] NSWCA 3..................................... [33.3.170] New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 236; [2005] HCA 76..........................................[33.2.350], [33.2.1090], [33.3.180] New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; 81 ALJR 1368; 172 A Crim R 555; [2007] HCA 32..................................................................... [33.9.540] New South Wales v Corby [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-050; [2010] NSWCA 27........................................................................................................[33.8.460] New South Wales v Delly (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 367..................... [33.8.1510], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1540] New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303..................... [33.8.1510], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1540], [33.8.1747] New South Wales v Delly [2008] HCATrans 226......... [33.8.1510], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1540] New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20..................[33.2.230], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1516], [33.2.1525], [33.4.440] New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445...................................................................................[33.2.90], [33.8.1747] New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57.......[33.1.310], [33.2.90], [33.8.410], [33.8.460], [33.8.470], [33.8.530], [33.8.600], [33.8.1747], [33.8.1910], [33.10.10] New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26...................................................... [PREFACE], [33.8.1700] New South Wales v Landini [2010] NSWCA 157......... [33.8.1830], [33.8.1890] New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4.....[33.2.350], [33.2.980], [33.2.990], [33.2.1070], [33.6.590], [33.6.610], [33.6.630], [33.6.650], [33.6.690], [33.8.2135] New South Wales v McMaster (2015) 328 ALR 309; [2015] NSWCA 228......................................................................................................[33.9.360] New South Wales v Mikhael [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-117; [2012] NSWCA 338.................................................................................... [33.2.1000] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

New South Wales v Napier [2002] NSWCA 402................................[33.2.1090] New South Wales v Oliver [2006] NSWCA 124.................................[33.2.1090] New South Wales v Quirk [2012] NSWCA 216................................. [33.8.1860] New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208...................................................................................[33.8.410], [33.9.600] New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000] NSWCA 119....................................................................................................[33.2.1300] New South Wales v Sticker [2015] NSWCA 180................................[33.2.1010] New South Wales v TD (2013) 83 NSWLR 566; [2013] NSWCA 56........................................................................................................[33.6.140] New South Wales v Zreika [2012] NSWCA 37...................................[33.8.1890] New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v Attorney-General [1986] 1 NZLR 14.........................................................................................[33.2.820] New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v O’Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80..............................................................[33.10.1400], [33.10.2120] New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd v Brooks [1995] 1 WLR 96..... [33.6.700] Newcastle Entertainment Security Pty Ltd v Simpson [1999] Aust Torts Reports 81-528; [1999] NSWCA 351...............................................[33.3.280] Newcrest Mining Ltd v Thornton (2012) 248 CLR 555; 87 ALJR 198; [2012] HCA 60........................................................... [33.11.170], [33.11.200] Newington v Gall (unreported, NSWSC, Abadee J, 11533 of 1990, 2 March 1994).................................................................................................. [33.6.460] Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555; 58 LGRA 289...........[33.7.490], [33.8.480] Newman v Clements [1966] WAR 84..................................................[33.10.600] Newman v Nugent (1992) 12 WAR 119..............................................[33.10.990] Newmarket Corp Pty Ltd v Kee-Vee Properties Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 157......................................................................................................[33.4.830] News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410......................................... [33.8.1210], [33.8.1220], [33.10.2280] Newsam v Ladd (1972) 22 FLR 16.......................................................[33.6.360] Newton v Constable (1841) 2 QB 157; 114 ER 62............................ [33.8.1550] Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298................................ [33.2.1800] Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245; 64 ALJR 222..................... [33.10.990] Nibali v Sweeting & Denney (WA) Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-258........................................................................... [33.2.1730], [33.8.940] Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd [1936] Ch 343...................... [33.8.2170] Nichols v Marsland (1875) LR 10 Ex 255........................................... [33.6.390] Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1.............................[33.6.390], [33.10.2010] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxix

TABLE OF CASES

Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry & Engineering Co Ltd [1957] 1 WLR 613..................................................................... [33.4.460], [33.5.270] Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308..............[33.9.800], [33.10.960], [33.10.2150] Nicholson v Walker (1979) 21 SASR 481.........................................[33.10.2000] Nicol v Allyacht Spars Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 611; 61 ALJR 640......................................................................................[33.5.270] Nicol v Nicol (1887) 13 VLR 322.........................................................[33.7.900] Nielsen v Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1912) 14 CLR 354................. [33.7.660] Nielsen v Kamloops (City) [1984] 2 SCR 2; (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 641....................................................................................................[33.2.1130] Nikolaidis v Satouris [2014] NSWCA 448........................................... [33.9.570] Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394; 63 ALJR 297..........................................[33.1.300], [33.10.490], [33.10.2040] Nikolic v Commonwealth Accommodation & Catering Services Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 413....................................................................................[33.11.400] Nilan v Nilan (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 271.........................................[33.10.1420] Nilon v Bezzina [1988] 2 Qd R 420............................. [33.10.2000], [33.11.170] Nitrigin Eireann Teoranta v Inco Alloys Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 498........[33.2.820] Noagues v Hope (1874) 4 QSCR 57.....................................................[33.7.890] Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429; 22 WN (NSW) 67......................[33.9.500] Nolan; Ex parte Young, Re (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11........................................................................................................[33.9.460] Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis (1996) 186 CLR 49; 70 ALJR 450...............................................................[33.10.960], [33.10.980] Nominal Defendant v Haslbauer (1967) 117 CLR 448; 41 ALJR 1........................................................................................[33.2.1760] Nominal Defendant (NSW) v Le Busque (1987) 4 MVR 544n.......... [33.10.850] Nominal Defendant (NSW) v Puglisi (1984) 58 ALJR 474..............[33.10.1980] Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551; (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 1.................................................[33.8.400], [33.9.200] Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288....................... [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1970], [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226; (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449....... [33.9.250] Norman v Sutton (1989) 9 MVR 525................................................[33.10.1750] Norris v Blake (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 49.................................... [33.10.900] Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161.................. [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.600], [33.2.610] Norris v W Moss & Sons Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 346................................[33.5.270] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxx

TABLE OF CASES

North v Wood [1914] 1 KB 629............................................................ [33.6.370] North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Liddle (1994) 118 FLR 109......................................................................................[33.9.830] Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428..... [33.2.1110], [33.3.170], [33.3.190], [33.3.200], [33.3.280], [33.3.290], [33.6.710], [33.6.720] Northern Territory v Mengel (1994) 83 LGERA 371.........................[33.10.170] Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527.....[33.7.220], [33.7.380], [33.8.30], [33.8.150], [33.8.1100], [33.8.1120], [33.8.1150], [33.8.1210], [33.8.1260], [33.8.2130], [33.8.2150], [33.8.2160], [33.8.2167], [33.10.170] Northern Territory v Shoesmith (1996) 5 NTLR 155; 132 FLR 138; 91 LGERA 17...................................................................... [33.3.170], [33.9.770] Northumberland Insurance Ltd (in liq) v Alexander (1984) 8 ACLR 882.....................................................................................[33.2.1820] Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523................................................. [33.10.1860] Norton v Hoare (No 1) (1913) 17 CLR 310; [1913] VLR 516........... [33.9.380] Norton v Monckton (1895) 43 WR 350.............................................. [33.8.1740] Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247................................................[33.4.10], [33.4.400], [33.4.1100] Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828.........[33.2.580], [33.2.820] Nottingham Health Authority v Nottingham City Council [1988] 1 WLR 903...................................................................................... [33.11.370] Nova Mink Ltd v Trans-Canada Airlines [1951] 2 DLR 241............. [33.2.790], [33.2.1330] Nowak v Waverley Municipal Council [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-200................................................................................................ [33.3.490] Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98............ [33.8.1820], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1920] Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83......... [33.8.1820], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1920] NSW v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133.............[33.10.230], [33.10.920], [33.10.2030] Nye v New South Wales [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-725; [2003] NSWSC 1212..................................................................................................[33.8.1740]

O O’Brien v Dawson (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 295; 58 WN (NSW) 206.......................................................................................[33.8.1260] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxi

TABLE OF CASES

O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18; 43 SR (NSW) 1; 60 WN (NSW) 3......................................................................[33.8.1220], [33.8.1260] O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 QB 288; [1956] 3 WLR 172...............[33.8.1550], [33.8.2160] Oakley v Lyster [1931] 1 KB 148......................................................... [33.8.890] Obestain Inc v National Mineral Development Corp Ltd (The Sanix Ace) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 465.............................................................[33.10.1510] OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762; [2005] 2 WLR 1174; [2005] EWCA Civ 106......................................................................................................[33.8.710] OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21................... [33.8.710], [33.8.1150], [33.8.1180], [33.8.1190], [33.8.1200], [33.8.1210], [33.8.1230] O’Brien v Dunsdon (1965) 114 CLR 669n; 39 ALJR 78.................. [33.10.170] O’Brien v McKean (1968) 118 CLR 540; 42 ALJR 223.................. [33.10.490], [33.10.560] O’Brien v Rosedale Shire Corp [1969] VR 645; (1969) 22 LGRA 271.................................................................................... [33.7.660] O’Callaghan v Parker 395 US 258 (1969)...........................................[33.9.460] Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19; [1969] 2 WLR 1359....[33.8.470] Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 626; 60 ALJR 480....[33.6.600], [33.6.610], [33.6.620], [33.6.710] O’Connor v Commissioner for Government Transport (1954) 100 CLR 225................................................................................... [33.2.1560] O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73................[33.5.10], [33.5.140], [33.5.150], [33.5.160], [33.5.170], [33.5.190], [33.5.210], [33.5.220] O’Dwyer v Leo Buring Pty Ltd [1966] WAR 67..................................[33.4.440] O’Gorman v O’Gorman [1903] 2 IR 573.......................... [33.6.310], [33.6.400] O’Grady v Westminster Scaffolding Ltd [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238...................................................................[33.10.1460], [33.10.1490] Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431; [1987] 3 WLR 1145....... [33.2.330], [33.9.930] Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654...[33.7.240], [33.7.490], [33.10.1410] O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159................................................... [33.2.600] Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg AG (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522......................................................................................................[33.4.980] OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department (UK) [1997] 3 All ER 897.......................................................................... [33.2.330], [33.2.1340] Ollier v Magnetic Island Country Club Inc [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-743; [2004] QCA 137.............................................................................. [33.2.1700]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxii

TABLE OF CASES

O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24........................................................................................................[33.3.300] O’Neill v Chisholm (1972) 47 ALJR 1................................................. [33.9.810] Onus v Telstra Corp Ltd [2011] NSWSC 33........................................ [33.7.510] Opat v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1992] 1 VR 283.......................................................................[33.2.810], [33.2.1130] Oram v BHP Mitsui Coal Pty Ltd [2015] 2 Qd R 357; [2014] QSC 230....................................................................................................[33.2.1290] Orange Crush (Aust) Ltd v Gartrell (1928) 41 CLR 282; 29 SR (NSW) 19; 46 WN (NSW) 1............................................................................. [33.8.1330] Ordog v Mission (District) (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 718....................... [33.2.1130] Orica Investments Pty Ltd v McCartney [2007] NSWSC 645..........[33.8.1180], [33.8.1200] Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Vic) Inc (2002) 120 FCR 191; [2002] FCA 860.......... [33.10.1100] Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1120............. [33.6.670] Oropesa, The [1943] P32................................................................... [33.10.2010] O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC 188; [1997] 3 WLR 86.......................................................................................... [33.5.260] Osborn v Gillett (1873) LR 8 Ex 88................................................. [33.10.1750] Osborne v Chocqueel [1896] 2 QB 109................................................[33.6.360] Osborne v Milman (1886) 17 QBD 514............................................. [33.8.1620] Osborne v Milman (1887) 18 QBD 471............................................. [33.8.1620] O’Shea v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wale Ltd [1971] Qd R 1......................................................................................................[33.9.920] Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344.............................................. [33.2.390] Osman v United Kingdom [1999] Fam Law 86....................................[33.2.390] Otter v Church, Adams, Tatham & Co [1953] Ch 280; [1953] 1 WLR 156.................................................................................... [33.10.1210] Otto v Bolton [1936] 2 KB 46........................................ [33.2.1110], [33.2.1120] Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; 71 ALJR 1548; 97 A Crim R 195......................................................................................................[33.9.540] Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (Wagon Mound (No 2), The) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165............ [33.2.1510], [33.2.1550], [33.3.240], [33.4.440], [33.7.30], [33.7.200], [33.7.380], [33.7.510], [33.7.860], [33.10.2060], [33.10.2070], [33.10.2090], [33.10.2100] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (Wagon Mound (No 1), The) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451......[33.1.290], [33.7.215], [33.7.860], [33.8.340], [33.10.2060] Owen v John L Norris Holdings Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1337........... [33.7.870], [33.7.880] Owen v O’Connor (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 1051; 80 WN (NSW) 1535; 9 LGRA 159...................................................................................... [33.7.380] Owners of Strata Plan No 13218 v Woollahra Municipal Council (2002) 121 LGERA 117; [2002] NSWCA 92.................................. [33.7.200], [33.7.250] Owners of Strata Plan No 30339 v Torada Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1154....................................................................................................[33.7.900] Oyster Case (Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan) (2000) 102 FCR 307; 109 LGERA 1; [2000] FCA 1099................................[33.2.1170], [33.4.780] Oyster Case (Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54........... [33.2.210], [33.2.240], [33.2.1170], [33.4.440], [33.4.780], [33.4.830] Oyston v St Patrick’s College [2013] NSWCA 135........................... [33.2.1000]

P P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583; 68 ALJR 449........................................... [33.9.300] P v R [2010] QSC 139...........................................................................[33.8.410] Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd v Mirror Motors Pty Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 548; 77 WN (NSW) 666............................................................... [33.10.1510] Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993; [1989] 3 WLR 1150................................................................... [33.2.580], [33.2.820] Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486.......................................... [33.8.1960] Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549; 35 ALJR 17..................................[33.10.30] Page v Smith [1996] AC 155; [1995] 2 WLR 644.............................[33.2.1290] Pain v Rochester (1602) Cro Eliz 871; 78 ER 1096..........................[33.8.1930] Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295.................. [33.6.310], [33.7.180], [33.7.190], [33.7.200], [33.7.680] Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331........ [33.8.360], [33.9.210], [33.9.240] Palmer v Finnigan [2010] QSC 064..................................................... [33.3.290]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69.............. [33.1.290], [33.8.1240], [33.8.1400], [33.10.1680], [33.10.1690], [33.10.1710], [33.10.2110] Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co, 162 NE 99 (1928)...................... [33.2.240] Paltidis v State Council of Young Men’s Christian Association of Victoria Inc [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-850; [2006] VSCA 122.................... [33.3.490] Pantalone v Alaouie (1989) 18 NSWLR 119................... [33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.7.490], [33.7.530], [33.10.1380] Panton v Williams (1841) 2 QB 169; 114 ER 66...............................[33.8.1550] Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249..........................[33.9.250] Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 156 CLR 7; 59 ALJR 201.....................................................................[33.3.10], [33.3.340] Pargiter v Alexander (1995) 5 Tas R 158.........................................[33.10.1550] Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367..............................[33.2.1580] Park v J Jobson & Son [1945] 1 All ER 222.......................................[33.6.440] Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004; [1982] 2 WLR 503........................................................................................ [33.8.830] Parker v Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295; 38 ALJR 444............[33.2.390] Parker v Dzundza [1979] Qd R 55................................................... [33.10.1750] Parker v Godin (1728) 2 Str 813; 93 ER 866...................................... [33.8.890] Parker v Housing Trust (SA) (1986) 41 SASR 493........................... [33.2.1120] Parkhill v Qualmer (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 131................................. [33.10.1750] Parkview Constructions Pty Ltd v Abrahim [2013] NSWCA 460..... [33.2.1060] Parmley v Parmley [1945] SCR 635; [1945] 4 DLR 81....................[33.11.400] Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224.............. [33.2.600], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1390], [33.10.2000] Parry v Crooks (1981) 27 SASR 1................................ [33.8.460], [33.10.2280] Parry v Woolworths Ltd [2010] 1 Qd R 1; [2009] QCA 26................ [33.5.250] Parsons v King (1891) 8 TLR 114........................................................[33.6.360] Pas (Town), The v Porky Packers Ltd [1977] 1 SCR 51; (1976) 65 DLR (3d) 1..........................................................................................................[33.2.590] Pask v Owen [1987] 2 Qd R 421.......................................................... [33.2.970] Pasley v Freeman (1789) 3 TR 51; 100 ER 450...........[33.8.1290], [33.8.1300] Pasmore v Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council [1898] AC 387........ [33.5.10] Pasqualotto v Pasqualotto [2013] VSCA 21...................................... [33.2.1050] Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276; [1978] 3 WLR 687........................................................................................ [33.9.230] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Patrick v Colerick (1838) 3 M & W 483; 150 ER 1235..................... [33.9.430] Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1; 72 ALJR 873; [1998] HCA 30...........[33.8.1270] Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) Pty Ltd v Hennessy [2015] NSWCA 253....................................................................................................[33.2.1510] Patsalis v New South Wales (2012) 81 NSWLR 742; 266 FLR 207; [2012] NSWCA 307................................................................... [33.5.140], [33.5.390] Patten v Moffatt [1999] NSWSC 1322................................................[33.11.400] Patterson v McGinlay (1991) 55 SASR 258...................................... [33.2.1610] Paugh v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co, 834 F Supp 228 (1993)................[33.4.430] Paul v Rendell (1981) 55 ALJR 371....... [33.10.800], [33.10.900], [33.10.2030] Paul v Summerhayes (1878) 4 QBD 9..................................................[33.6.330] Paul Chapman Building Pty Ltd v Boyd (1992) 27 NSWLR 255... [33.10.1740] Paxhaven Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General (NZ) [1974] 2 NZLR 185....................................................................[33.7.490], [33.7.545] Peake v Steriline Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-154.............................................................................................. [33.2.1060] Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423................ [33.8.410], [33.9.350], [33.9.360], [33.10.180], [33.10.210] Pearson v Coleman Bros [1948] 2 KB 359....................... [33.6.370], [33.6.390] Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] 2 Qd R 574; [2006] QCA 350.... [33.7.540] Pedler v Washband [1949] St R Qd 116...............................................[33.8.470] Pedley v Davis (1861) 10 CB (NS) 492; 142 ER 544......................... [33.9.560] Peech v Best [1931] 1 KB 1..................................................................[33.6.310] Pelmothe v Phillips (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 58; 15 WN (NSW) 217...[33.7.230], [33.7.870] Pemberton v Attorney-General (Tas) [1978] Tas SR 1......................[33.8.2162], [33.8.2165] Pemberton v Southwark London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 1672...................................................................................... [33.7.490] Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34.....................[33.8.760], [33.8.790], [33.8.810], [33.8.890] Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625; 55 ALJR 258; 12 ATR 256............... [33.10.170], [33.10.600] Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10.... [33.9.850], [33.9.860], [33.10.2150], [33.11.390] Penruddock’s Case (1597) 5 Co 100; 77 ER 210................................ [33.7.900] Percy v Glasgow Corp [1922] 2 AC 299.......................[33.8.1630], [33.8.1840] Perera v Vandiyar [1953] 1 WLR 672............................. [33.1.310], [33.8.1100] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

Performance Cars Ltd v Abraham [1962] 1 QB 33; [1961] 3 WLR 749.................................................................................... [33.10.1460] Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 84.....................................................................................[33.8.790], [33.8.810] Perpetual Trustees & National Executors of Tasmania Ltd v Graham (1990) 13 MVR 563......................................................................................[33.6.290] Perpetual Trustees & National Executors of Tasmania Ltd v Perkins [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-295................................................................ [33.8.830] Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36.......[33.2.40], [33.2.300], [33.2.310], [33.2.360], [33.2.370], [33.2.400], [33.2.530], [33.2.570], [33.2.580], [33.2.600], [33.2.615], [33.2.640], [33.2.660], [33.2.680], [33.2.820], [33.2.1130], [33.4.370], [33.4.380], [33.4.390] Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255......................................... [33.2.800] Perry v Clissold [1907] AC 73; (1906) 4 CLR 374............................. [33.8.480] Perry v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 1.............................................................................................[33.9.920] Perry v Sidney Phillips & Son [1982] 1 WLR 1297.......................[33.10.1410], [33.10.2120] Perth Corp v Halle (1911) 13 CLR 393............................................... [33.7.660] Pete’s Towing Services Ltd v Northern Industrial Union of Workers [1970] NZLR 32..............................................................................[33.8.1250] Peters v Stanway (1835) 6 Car & B 737; 172 ER 1442....................[33.8.1670] Peterson v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd (2010) 184 FCR 1; [2010] FCA 180..........................................................................[33.4.410], [33.4.490] Petersville Sleigh Ltd v Sugarman [1987] VR 295.......................... [33.10.1710] Petree v Knox (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 503; 34 WN (NSW) 235......... [33.8.1220] Petricola v Metropolitan Transit Authority [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-247............................................................................................ [33.10.1750] Petrie v Dowling [1992] 1 Qd R 284........[33.2.1290], [33.2.1310], [33.10.830] Petrou v Hatzigeorgiou [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-071..............[33.10.1980] Pfeiffer v Van Den Brink (unreported, SASC, Duggan J, 1912 of 1990, 10 May 1991)..........................................................................................[33.6.300] Pham v Lawson (1997) 68 SASR 124........................... [33.2.1300], [33.2.1310] Pharm-a-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 494; [2010] FCA 361......................................................[33.8.2160] Pheeney v Doolan (No 2) [1977] 1 NSWLR 601.............................. [33.10.500] Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] AC 619; [2000] 3 WLR 776........... [33.2.390] Phelps v Western Mining Corp Ltd (1978) 33 FLR 327.................. [33.10.2280] Phil Clark Contractors v Drewet [1977] 2 NZLR 556........................ [33.2.570] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Philips v Ward [1956] 1 WLR 471............................ [33.10.1390], [33.10.1400] Philips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566......................... [33.2.1660] Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832........ [33.5.10], [33.5.190], [33.5.220] Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65...............[33.3.30], [33.3.220], [33.3.240], [33.3.250], [33.3.470] Philpott v Kelley (1835) 3 Ad & E 106; 111 ER 353.......................... [33.8.880] Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827; [1980] 2 WLR 283........................................................................................ [33.1.340] Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc [1991] 2 AC 370; [1991] 2 WLR 513............................................................................ [33.5.260] Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980] AC 136; [1978] 3 WLR 955................................................................. [33.10.540], [33.10.890] Piggly-Wiggly Alabama Co v Rickles, 103 So 860 (1925)...................[33.8.390] Pilkington v Wood [1953] Ch 770; [1953] 3 WLR 522................... [33.10.2120] Pink v JA Sharwood & Co Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 725.......................... [33.8.1350] Pinn v Rew (1916) 32 TLR 451............................................................ [33.6.370] Piro v W Foster & Co Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 313................................... [33.5.400] Piromalli v Di Masi [1980] WAR 173.................................................. [33.7.710] Pisano v Fairfield City Council (1991) 73 LGRA 184.................... [33.10.1990] Pitcher v Martin [1937] 3 All ER 918...............................[33.6.290], [33.6.310] Pittar v Alvarez (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 618; 34 WN (NSW) 2............ [33.7.180] Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24; [1990] 3 WLR 542............................... [33.9.980] Pizer v Pizer [1926] VLR 231...............................................................[33.8.910] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; 77 ALJR 454; [2003] HCA 2....................................................................................[33.9.480] Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118; 42 ALJR 237...............................................................[33.10.710], [33.10.820] Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 US 833 (1992)................................................................................................. [33.9.230] Plater v Collingwood City Council (1967) 65 DLR (2d) 492............. [33.6.310] Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [2000] 2 AC 190; [1999] 2 WLR 518..................................................................... [33.7.215], [33.7.860] Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231............ [33.8.310], [33.8.390], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1640], [33.9.190] Plenty v Argus [1975] WAR 155....................................................... [33.10.2140] Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231....... [33.8.430], [33.8.460], [33.8.470], [33.8.530], [33.8.540], [33.9.240], [33.9.270], [33.9.480], [33.9.530] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Plummer-Allinson v Spencer L Ayrey Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 254........... [33.2.600] Pocock v Moore (1825) Ry & M 321; 171 ER 1035......................... [33.8.1570] Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492....[33.9.770], [33.9.780], [33.9.850], [33.10.2150], [33.11.390] Pola v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-460.............................................................................................. [33.8.1960] Poland v John Parr [1927] 1 KB 236.................................................. [33.6.690] Polemis, Re [1921] 3 KB 560........................................ [33.8.340], [33.10.2060] Police v Greaves [1964] NZLR 295..................................................... [33.8.430] Police (SA) v G, DM [2016] SASC 39.............................. [33.9.440], [33.9.450] Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653.....[33.8.410], [33.8.600], [33.10.190], [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.220] Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49................................................................................... [33.9.780] Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 231; 52 ALJR 337.................................................[33.9.960] Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 138; (1980) 144 CLR 300; 54 ALJR 552...............[33.9.960] Port Stephens Shire Council v Tellamist Pty Ltd (2004) NSWCA 253; 135 LGERA 98....................................................................................... [33.8.1747] Porter v Hannah Builders Pty Ltd [1969] VR 673.............................. [33.9.270] Porter v OAMPS Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 327; [2005] FCA 232...........[33.8.2160] Ports of Auckland Ltd v Auckland City Council [1999] 1 NZLR 601.......................................................................................[33.7.660] Posthuma v Campbell (1984) 37 SASR 321........................................ [33.2.940] Pou v British American Tobacco (NZ) Ltd [2006] 1 NZLR 661......... [33.4.430] Poynder v Kent [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-984; [2008] VSCA 245............................................................................... [33.8.1150], [33.8.1160] Poynder v Kent [2009] HCATrans 120...........................[33.8.1150], [33.8.1160] Prast v Cottesloe Town (2000) 22 WAR 474; 111 LGERA 253; [2000] WASCA 274....................................................................[33.3.260], [33.3.500] Pratt v British Medical Association [1919] 1 KB 244...................... [33.10.250], [33.10.1690] Pratt v Young (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 214............................................ [33.6.310] Pratten v Pratten [2005] QCA 213....................................................... [33.8.880] Pregnant Fish Wife’s Case (Bourhill (Hay) v Young) [1943] AC 92.............................................................. [33.2.240], [33.10.2070] Preist v Last [1903] 2 KB 148.............................................................. [33.4.170] Prentice v Harrison (1843) 4 QB 852; 114 ER 1118.........................[33.8.1550] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxxxix

TABLE OF CASES

Presidential Security Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Brilley (2008) 73 NSWLR 241; 188 A Crim R 299; [2008] NSWCA 204..........[33.8.1630] Presser v Caldwell Estates Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 471................. [33.2.600] Preston v Dowell (1987) 45 SASR 111.............................................. [33.2.1680] Preston v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd [1971] SASR 221...[33.10.360] Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273............ [33.5.190], [33.5.200] Price v Messenger (1800) 2 B & P 158; 126 ER 1213....................... [33.9.560] Pricom Pty Ltd v Sgarioto [1994] ATPR 41-365...........[33.11.350], [33.11.370] Pride of Derby & Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] Ch 149; [1953] 2 WLR 58.................................[33.7.530], [33.7.850] Prideaux v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 163 CLR 483; 61 ALJR 600; 28 A Crim R 43........................................................ [33.9.390] Prince v Attorney-General (NZ) [1996] 3 NZLR 733..........................[33.9.570] Pritchard v Long (1842) 9 M & W 666; 152 ER 281....................... [33.10.250] Pro Teeth Whitening (Aust) Pty Ltd v Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer [2013] FCA 1376............................................................ [33.4.1120] Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651; 51 ALJR 184.............................[33.3.510], [33.5.270], [33.5.430], [33.9.980] Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301.............................................. [33.7.530], [33.7.700], [33.7.900] Proprietors of Strata Plan No 17226 v Drakulic (2002) 55 NSWLR 659; 1 STR (NSW) 313; [2002] NSWCA 381.......................................... [33.2.1160] Proprietors of Strata Plan No 30234 v Margiz (1993) 7 BPR 14,458.................................................................................................[33.5.200] Proprietors of Strata Plan No 464 v Oborn (1975) 1 BPR 9,623.......[33.5.200] Protheroe v Railway Executive [1951] 1 KB 376..............[33.3.160], [33.3.290] Protonotarios v Zapasnik (1992) 106 FLR 243..................................[33.10.540] Proudman v Allen [1954] SASR 336................................. [33.9.340], [33.9.380] Prough v Entriken 11 Pa 81 (1849).....................................................[33.8.1950] Provan v HCL Real Estate Ltd (1992) 24 ATR 238......[33.10.570], [33.10.580] Provender Millers (Winchester) Ltd v Southampton County Council [1940] Ch 131....................................................................................[33.7.660] Przetak v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust [1961] WAR 2; (1960) 7 LGRA 131.......................................................................... [33.7.690] Public Transport Commission (NSW) v Perry (1977) 137 CLR 107; 51 ALJR 620......................................................................................[33.9.180] Public Transport Corp (Vic) v Sartori [1997] 1 VR 168................... [33.2.1030] Public Trustee (as Administrator of Estate of Saroukas) v Sutherland Shire Council (1992) 75 LGRA 278...................................................... [33.10.1990] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxl

TABLE OF CASES

Public Trustee (NSW) v Hermann (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 442......................................................................................................[33.7.870] Public Trustee (NSW) v Jones (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 526; 42 WN (NSW) 173.........................................................................................[33.8.890] Public Trustee (Vic) v Gray-Masters [1977] VR 154...........................[33.8.950] Puflett v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 121 (1987) 17 NSWLR 372................................................................ [33.5.10], [33.5.140] Puglisi v Australian Fisheries Management Authority (1997) 148 ALR 393..................................................................................... [33.9.150] Pullen v Gutteridge, Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 27....... [33.1.140], [33.1.340], [33.10.1730] Purcell v Thomas (No 2) [1904] St R Qd 189..................................[33.10.1510] Purcell v Watson (1979) 26 ALR 235n................................................. [33.9.860] Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; 39 ALJR 123............... [33.2.1740], [33.10.1990], [33.10.2070] Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Ad & E 602; 112 ER 966.......... [33.8.390], [33.8.430] Pursley v Bennett (1885) 11 PR 64.....................................................[33.8.1760] Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3... [33.2.270], [33.2.300], [33.2.330], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.590], [33.2.660], [33.2.680], [33.5.10], [33.5.150], [33.8.2160], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1390], [33.10.1730], [33.10.2000]

Q Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 2) (1996) 68 FCR 367............... [33.4.400] QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245................ [33.8.1550], [33.8.1790], [33.8.1800], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1860], [33.8.1870], [33.8.1890] Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd (2000) 32 MVR 263; [2000] NSWSC 932....................................................................................................[33.8.2000] Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743; [1959] 2 WLR 510...................................................................................... [33.2.1050] Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674................................................................[33.8.1820], [33.8.1890] Quayle v New South Wales [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-367.........[33.2.1090], [33.2.1290], [33.2.1310], [33.10.830] Queen’s Bridge Motors & Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Edwards [1964] Tas SR 93........................................................................................................[33.3.480] Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 ALJR 562...................................................................[33.7.830], [33.7.840] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxli

TABLE OF CASES

Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454; (2001) 122 A Crim R 517; [2001] QSC 174.............................................................................................[33.9.340] Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691; [1999] FCA 499......................................................................[33.8.1260], [33.8.1270] Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266; 40 ALJR 13........................................................................................[33.9.540] Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1945) 70 CLR 539; 8 ATD 30.....................................................................[33.6.710] Quick v Alpine Nurseries Sales Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1248.............[33.7.40], [33.7.200], [33.7.250], [33.8.150] Quigley v Commonwealth (1981) 55 ALJR 579............................... [33.10.1990] Quinn v Hill [1957] VR 439................................................................[33.2.1090] Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495............. [33.8.1260], [33.8.1280], [33.10.250], [33.10.1700] Quinn v Llesna Rubber Co Pty Ltd [1989] VR 347........................... [33.11.380]

R R, Re [2000] 2 Qd R 328.......................................................................[33.9.300] R v Adams [1980] QB 575; [1980] 3 WLR 275...................................[33.9.550] R v Army Council; Ex parte Ravenscroft [1917] 2 KB 504.............. [33.8.1820] R v Austen (No 2) (2010) 5 ACTLR 70; 246 FLR 362; [2010] ACTSC 136......................................................................................................[33.9.490] R v Banner [1970] VR 240....................................................................[33.9.520] R v Bembridge (1783) 22 St Tr 1; 99 ER 679....................................[33.8.2167] R v Betts (1850) 16 QB 1022............................................................ [33.10.2030] R v Bournewood Community & Mental Health NHS Trust; Ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 WLR 107....................[33.9.310], [33.9.320], [33.9.340] R v Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413....................................................[33.9.250] R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556................................[33.9.210] R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23...........................................................[33.9.250] R v Clifford [1980] 1 NSWLR 314; (1979) 1 A Crim R 88................ [33.7.370] R v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226; 6 A Crim R 51............................... [33.9.520] R v Cross (1812) 3 Camp 224; 170 ER 1362.......................................[33.7.710] R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371; 141 DLR (4th) 503..........................[33.9.210] R v Davidson; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1996] 2 Qd R 505..................................................................................................[33.8.520] R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340............ [33.5.180], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1610], [33.8.1620], [33.8.2162] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxlii

TABLE OF CASES

R v Derby Crown Court; Ex parte Brooks (1984) 80 Cr App R 164................................................................................................[33.8.2010] R v Dica [2004] QB 1257; [2004] 3 WLR 213; [2004] EWCA Crim 1103....................................................................................................[33.9.250] R R R R

v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 3 WLR 186.........................................[33.8.1560] v Drinkwater (1981) 27 SASR 396................................................... [33.6.350] v Flattery (1877) 2 QBD 410............................................................ [33.9.250] v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [1999] QB 1043; [1999] 1 WLR 103................................ [33.8.1610], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1650]

R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48....................... [33.6.140], [33.8.1610], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1650], [33.9.480] R v Hampden Shire; Ex parte M’Mahon (1886) 8 ALT 74................. [33.7.910] R v Henson (1852) Dears CC 24; 169 ER 621.................................... [33.6.310] R v Hopley (1860) 2 F & F 202; 175 ER 1024....................................[33.9.450] R v Hughes (1879) 4 QBD 614............................................................. [33.9.550] R v Huy Vinh Quach (2010) 27 VR 310; 201 A Crim R 522; [2010] VSCA 106...............................................................................[33.8.2160], [33.8.2167] R v Iorlano (1983) 151 CLR 678; 58 ALJR 22................................... [33.9.520] R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671............................................................... [33.9.450] R v Judges of Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Pilkington ACI (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 142 CLR 113; 53 ALJR 230..........[33.10.2280] R v Kelly (1988) 90 FLR 335; 33 A Crim R 171................................ [33.9.520] R v King (2003) 59 NSWLR 472; 139 A Crim R 132; [2003] NSWCCA 399......................................................................................................[33.9.230] R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314.................................................... [33.8.440] R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443............................................ [33.9.340], [33.9.350] R v Macquarie (1875) 13 SCR (NSW) 264...................[33.8.1570], [33.8.1580] R v Madden [1975] 1 WLR 1379..........................................................[33.7.360] R v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233; [1965] 3 WLR 1138................... [33.8.1260], [33.8.1270] R v McEachran (2006) 15 VR 615; [2006] VSCA 290..................... [33.8.1560] R v McKay [1957] VR 560....................................................................[33.9.380] R v McMeikan (1869) 6 WW & A’B (L) 68........................................ [33.7.700] R v Mitton (1827) 3 Car & P 30; 172 ER 309..................................... [33.9.410] R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97............. [33.8.440] R v Newman (1853) 1 El & Bl 558; 118 ER 544.............................. [33.8.1690]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxliii

TABLE OF CASES

R v Newport (Salop) Justices; Ex parte Wright [1929] 2 KB 416...... [33.9.440] R v O’Neill (2001) 122 A Crim R 510; [2001] NSWCCA 193...........[33.9.520] R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600..............................................................[33.8.180] R v Pedley (1834) 1 Ad & E 822; 110 ER 1422..................................[33.7.540] R v Reid [1973] QB 299; [1972] 3 WLR 395................. [33.8.1560], [33.9.450] R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542.................................................... [33.9.350] R v Sang [1980] AC 402; [1979] 3 WLR 263....................................[33.8.2010] R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279; [1993] 3 WLR 698............................... [33.7.530] R v Sing; Ex parte Harrison (1979) 36 FLR 322................................ [33.9.540] R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 55; 98 ER 529............................................ [33.8.1800] R v Soane (1738) Andr 272; 95 ER 395...............................................[33.9.540] R v Terry [1955] VLR 114.....................................................................[33.9.450] R v Timmins [1913] QWN 44................................................................[33.9.410] R v Turner (No 2) [1971] 1 WLR 901..................................................[33.9.420] R v Venna [1976] QB 421; [1975] 3 WLR 737....................................[33.8.180] R v Wallis; Ex parte Employers Association of Wool Selling Brokers (1949) 78 CLR 529....................................................................................... [33.5.200] R v Waugh (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 20................................................... [33.9.390] R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340.............................................................. [33.9.250] R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; 47 A Crim R 211...........................[33.9.520] R (a minor) (wardship: consent to treatment), Re [1992] Fam 11; [1991] 3 WLR 592........................................................................................ [33.9.300] R Lowe Lippmann Figdor & Franck v AGC (Advances) Ltd [1992] 2 VR 671................................................. [33.2.550], [33.2.660], [33.10.1720] RA & TJ Carll Ltd v Berry [1981] 2 NZLR 76................................... [33.2.590] Rabbitt v Roberts (1996) 67 SASR 358................................................[33.3.350] Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron (1995) 95 ATC 4552.............................[33.10.580] Raciti v Wadren Pty Ltd [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-848; [2006] VSCA 132...................................................................................[33.3.220], [33.3.230] Racz v Home Offıce [1994] 2 AC 45; [1994] 2 WLR 23...................[33.8.2162] Radakovic v RG Cram & Sons Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 751.........[33.10.900] Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460; 83 ALJR 654; [2009] HCA 16...........................................................[33.8.1390], [33.8.1400] Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-946; [2008] NSWCA 66.......................................................................... [33.8.1390] Radovanovic v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust [1980] WAR 105......[33.2.1760] Ragnelli v David Jones (Adelaide) Pty Ltd (2004) 90 SASR 233; [2004] SASC 393.......................................................................................... [33.3.360] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxliv

TABLE OF CASES

Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351; [2000] 3 WLR 1184.......[33.10.2000], [33.10.2010], [33.11.370] Raimondo v South Australia (1979) 53 ALJR 358........ [33.2.1060], [33.2.1560] Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in liq) v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465............................................................................................[33.6.370] Rajski v Bainton (1990) 22 NSWLR 125........................................... [33.8.2020] Rakena v Richardson & Co Ltd [1968] NZLR 915........................... [33.10.600] Raleigh v Goschen (1898) 1 Ch 73....................................................... [33.6.610] Ralevski v Dimovski (1986) 7 NSWLR 487....................................... [33.10.820] Ralik Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (unreported, NSWSC, Cole J, 50261 of 1989, 14 August 1990)......................................... [33.2.540] Ram Coomar Coondoo v Chunder Canto Mookerjee (1876) 2 App Cas 186............................................................................................ [33.8.2000] Ramage v Evans [1948] VLR 391.........................................................[33.9.380] Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16; 38 ALJR 106.... [33.2.1000], [33.6.610], [33.9.440] Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; 42 ALJR 89.... [33.2.240], [33.11.240] Randall v Newson (1877) 2 QBD 102.................................................. [33.4.170] Randel v Brisbane City Council (No 2) [1990] 2 Qd R 440; (1989) 69 LGRA 336.................................................................................... [33.3.170] Rands v McNeil [1955] 1 QB 253; [1954] 3 WLR 905....[33.6.370], [33.6.390] Randwick City Council v Muzic [2006] NSWCA 66............................[33.9.920] Ranger v Giffın (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531............................... [33.8.830] Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd v Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union of Australia (1987) 89 FLR 349......................................................... [33.8.1250] Ranieri v Ranieri (1973) 7 SASR 418.................................................. [33.9.920] Rap Industries Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-876................................................................... [33.11.350] Rapid Roofing Pty Ltd v Natalise Pty Ltd [2007] 2 Qd R 335; [2007] QCA 94........................................................................................................[33.6.140] Rapier v London Tramways Co [1893] 2 Ch 588............. [33.6.310], [33.7.680] Rapley v Rapley (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 94; 47 WN (NSW) 36........ [33.8.1870], [33.8.1880] Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524.............................. [33.8.1390], [33.10.1710] Raven v Burnett (1895) 6 QLJ 166....................................................... [33.9.570] Ravenga v Mackintosh (1824) 2 B & C 69; 107 ER 541.................. [33.8.1860] Ravenscroft v Rederi AB Transatlantic [1991] 3 All ER 73.............. [33.2.1310] Ravenscroft v Rederi AB Transatlantic [1992] 2 All ER 470............ [33.2.1310] Rawlinson v Purnell Jenkinson & Roscoe [1999] 1 NZLR 479........ [33.8.1820] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxlv

TABLE OF CASES

Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-341................................................................................................ [33.2.550] Rayner v Shearing [1926] SASR 313................................................... [33.6.420] Rayson v South London Tramways Co [1893] 2 QB 304................. [33.8.1820], [33.8.1890] Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850; 138 ER 1437.................................. [33.8.440] Read v Croydon Corp [1938] 4 All ER 631......................................... [33.4.340] Read v Edwards (1864) 17 CB (NS) 245; 144 ER 99...... [33.6.360], [33.6.380] Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1945] KB 216.............................................. [33.7.20] Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156......................... [33.6.150], [33.6.280] Read v Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47....................................[33.3.480] Readhead v Midland Railway Co (1869) LR 4 QB 379...................... [33.3.160] Readymix Holdings International Pty Ltd v Wieland Process Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1480............................................................ [33.4.980] Redding v Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117; 57 ALJR 393.....[33.10.500], [33.10.710], [33.10.2160] Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1................................................... [33.8.1300] Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652; [1969] 2 WLR 1437............................................ [33.7.830], [33.7.840], [33.10.2280] Redpath v Allan (1871-73) LR 4 PC 511..............................................[33.5.190] Redway v McAndrew (1873) LR 9 QB 74..................... [33.8.1820], [33.8.1850] Reeve v Brisbane City Council [1995] 2 Qd R 661........................... [33.2.1310] Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363.................. [33.2.1105], [33.4.30], [33.4.430], [33.9.760], [33.10.2010] Reeves v The Queen (2013) 88 ALJR 215; [2013] HCA 57................[33.9.220] Regal Pearl Pty Ltd v Stewart [2003] ASAL 55-091; [2002] NSWCA 291......................................................................................................[33.4.170] Registrar of Titles (WA) v Spencer (1909) 9 CLR 641...................... [33.10.170] Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880; (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1...............[33.4.490] Reid v Chapman (1984) 37 SASR 117................................................. [33.7.220] Reid v Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1....................... [33.8.480] Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; 39 ALJR 177........................ [33.8.360] Rendell v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1957] VR 604.....[33.6.140], [33.8.880], [33.9.150] Rentokil Pty Ltd v Channon (1990) 19 NSWLR 417........................[33.10.490], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380] Reschke v Hensley [1913] SALR 105................................................... [33.8.550] Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 27 ATR 256..... [33.10.580] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxlvi

TABLE OF CASES

Revesz v Orchard [1969] SASR 336................................................... [33.10.360] Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567; [1996] 2 WLR 239........................ [33.3.340] Reyes v Wyeth Laboratories 498 F 2d 1264 (1974)............................. [33.4.410] Reynolds v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [1985] QB 881; [1985] 2 WLR 93......................................................... [33.8.710], [33.8.1850] Reynolds v Katoomba RSL All Services Club Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR; [2001] NSWCA 234.................................................................................... [33.2.1370] Reynolds v Kennedy (1748) 1 Wils 232; 95 ER 591..........................[33.8.1550] RG & TJ Anderson Pty Ltd v Chamberlain John Deere Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 363............................................................................. [33.10.1510] RH Willis & Son v British Car Auctions Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 438....... [33.8.890] Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F 2d 847 (1972)............................................................ [33.2.550] Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 482 F 2d 1000 (1973).......................................................... [33.2.550] Rich v Pilkington (1691) 90 ER 704................................................... [33.11.220] Rich v Queensland [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-626; [2001] QCA 295......................................................................................................[33.6.630] Richard Ellis (WA) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1995) 124 FLR 157......................................................................................[33.2.550] Richards v Victoria [1969] VR 136...........[33.2.790], [33.2.1000], [33.10.2010] Richardson v Mt Druitt Workers Club [2011] NSWSC 31.................. [33.3.220] Richardson v Norris Smith Real Estate Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 152........[33.2.550] Richardson v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1......................... [33.9.800], [33.10.970] Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390..................................[33.10.500] Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49............................. [33.7.240], [33.7.530], [33.7.870], [33.7.900] Richter v Risby [1987] Tas R 36; (1987) 27 A Crim R 68.................. [33.7.900] Rickard v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (2009) 54 MVR 214; [2009] NSWSC 1115.....................................................................................[33.7.390] Rickards v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1983] 3 NSWLR 155................................................................ [33.7.530], [33.7.660] Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263; (1913) 16 CLR 387....................[33.6.150], [33.9.580] Rickless v United Artists Corp [1988] QB 40; [1987] 2 WLR 945.......[33.5.10] Riddell v Pakeman (1835) 2 Cr M & R 30; 150 ER 13.................... [33.8.1550] Ridis v Strata Plan 10308 (2005) 63 NSWLR 449; 1 STR (NSW) 205; [2005] NSWCA 246..................................................................... [33.5.10], [33.5.140] Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242................................................ [33.8.510], [33.9.340], [33.9.380] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxlvii

TABLE OF CASES

Rigg v Alietti [1982] WAR 203.......................................... [33.6.290], [33.6.470] Rimmer v Liverpool City Council [1985] QB 1; [1984] 2 WLR 426...................................................................................... [33.2.1120] Rinsale Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-231................................................................................................ [33.8.590] Risk Allah Bey v Whitehurst (1868) 18 LT 615..................................[33.8.1690] Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works [1974] SCR 1189; (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 530................................... [33.4.390], [33.4.1100], [33.10.1730] Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265................................................................[33.8.370], [33.8.420], [33.9.440] Roads Corp v Dykes (2011) 58 MVR 62; [2011] VSCA 118..............[33.2.330] Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42....... [33.1.290], [33.2.80], [33.2.230], [33.2.1516], [33.2.1525], [33.2.1560], [33.2.1590], [33.3.10], [33.3.30], [33.3.220], [33.3.230], [33.3.270], [33.3.500], [33.4.430], [33.4.440], [33.9.850] Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42; 86 ALJR 494; [2012] HCA 16...............................................................[33.6.580], [33.8.150] Roberts v Buster’s Auto Towing Service Ltd (1976) 70 DLR (3d) 716....................................................................................................[33.8.1540] Roberts v Chief Constable of Kent [2008] EWCA Civ 1588.............. [33.6.330] Roberts v City of Gosnells (1995) 13 SR (WA) 72.............................. [33.6.300] Roberts v DRB Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] ACTSC 268....................... [33.2.1060] Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878; [1988] 3 WLR 1247............... [33.10.960] Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823.........................................[33.2.1650] Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356........................[33.2.390], [33.2.940] Robins v Kennedy & Columb [1931] NZLR 1134............................... [33.6.310] Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd [1910] AC 295...................[33.8.1580], [33.8.1670], [33.9.270] Robinson Robinson Robinson Robinson

v v v v

Glover [1952] NZLR 669.................................................[33.2.1650] Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850; 154 ER 363........ [33.1.270], [33.10.170] Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch D 88................................................. [33.7.200] Post Offıce [1974] 1 WLR 1176............ [33.10.1980], [33.10.2010], [33.10.2070]

Robinson v Vogelsang (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1942............................ [33.6.300] Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22.............. [33.2.1550] Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 228....................................................................................................[33.10.210]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxlviii

TABLE OF CASES

Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152............................[33.7.40], [33.7.200], [33.7.250], [33.7.255], [33.8.500] Rochdale Canal Co v King (1849) 14 QB 122; 117 ER 49............ [33.10.2030] Roche v Grant [1935] 2 DLR 553; (1935) 63 CCC 315................... [33.8.1550] Rockdale Municipal Council v Harvey (1965) 11 LGRA 344.............[33.7.850] Rodrigues v Ufton (1894) 20 VLR 539...............................................[33.8.2140] Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973)............................................................ [33.9.230] Rogers v Rawlings [1969] Qd R 262.................................................... [33.2.950] Rogers v Whitaker (1991) 23 NSWLR 600.......................................... [33.4.490] Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47.....................[33.2.1660], [33.4.410], [33.4.490], [33.8.375], [33.9.220], [33.9.320], [33.9.340] Roggenkamp v Bennett (1950) 80 CLR 292... [33.9.890], [33.9.910], [33.9.930] Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997)....................[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.170], [33.6.290], [33.6.390], [33.6.470] Rolfe v Katunga Lucerne Mill Pty Ltd [2005] ASAL 55-146; [2005] NSWCA 252......................................................................................................[33.4.170] Roman Catholic Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra & Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161; 79 ALJR 1195; [2005] HCA 31... [33.2.1000], [33.2.1010], [33.2.1610] Romano v Spagnol (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Meagher and Cole JJA, CA 40566 of 1994, 17 October 1994)............................ [33.6.360] Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5.............[33.2.240], [33.2.1170], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1520], [33.2.1560], [33.2.1590], [33.3.30], [33.3.210], [33.3.220], [33.3.240], [33.3.260], [33.3.470], [33.3.500], [33.4.30], [33.4.430], [33.10.1980] Romig v Tabcorb Holdings Ltd [2014] QSC 249............................... [33.2.1050] Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121; (1959) 16 DLR (2d) 689....................................................................................................[33.8.2165] Roncoli v Tolson [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-201...........................[33.2.1570] Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269.................... [33.1.310], [33.8.1090], [33.8.1110], [33.8.1270], [33.10.30], [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1700] Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172... [33.2.1700], [33.9.910], [33.9.920] Rooth v Wilson (1817) 1 B & Ald 59; 106 ER 22............................... [33.6.440] Roots v Oentory Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 745........................................[33.2.550] Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-121.............................................[33.3.310], [33.3.360], [33.3.500] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxlix

TABLE OF CASES

Rose v Ford [1937] AC 826................................................................ [33.10.850] Rose v Matt [1951] 1 KB 810............................................................... [33.9.420] Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141...................................... [33.6.590], [33.6.680] Rosecrance v Rosecrance (1995) 129 FLR 310................ [33.9.800], [33.9.830] Rosemont Enterprises Inc v Random House Inc, 261 F Supp 691 (1966)............................................................................................... [33.8.1980] Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; 75 ALJR 734; [2001] HCA 18..................................................................................[33.4.490] Rosenthal v Alderton & Sons Ltd [1946] KB 374............................[33.10.1520] Rosniak v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1997) 41 NSWLR 608............................................................................... [33.10.900] Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297; [1979] 3 WLR 605.......[33.2.270], [33.2.340], [33.2.530], [33.10.1730] Ross v Warrick Howard (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 4 SR (WA) 1..............[33.8.310] Rouvinetis v Varady [2009] NSWSC 109............................................. [33.2.930] Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577......[33.10.1100] Rowan v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 559......................... [33.5.220] Rowe v Hawkins (1858) 1 F & F 91; 175 ER 640.............................[33.8.1720] Rowell v Alexander Mackie College of Advanced Education (1988) 25 IR 87......................................................................................................[33.11.410] Roy v Lagona [2010] VSC 250......................................................... [33.10.1420] Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470; [1970] 3 WLR 202......... [33.8.1810], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1830] Royal Commission on Thomas Case, Re [1982] 1 NZLR 252.......... [33.8.1850] Roysdon v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co, 849 F 2d 230 (1988).................[33.4.430] Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407; 18 ABC 57.......................[33.8.1950] Rozsa v Samuels [1969] SASR 205...................................................... [33.8.430] Ruby v Marsh (1975) 132 CLR 642; 49 ALJR 320...... [33.10.500], [33.10.520] Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120...... [33.7.660], [33.9.590] Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269; [2003] NSWCA 262........[33.8.380] Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48....................[33.6.140], [33.8.380], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1540], [33.8.1630], [33.8.1700], [33.9.480] Ruffıno v Grace Bros Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 732.........................[33.11.200] Ruhan v Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 439; 37 WN (NSW) 145................................................ [33.6.310], [33.7.490] Rukavina v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1992] 1 VR 677..... [33.10.2150]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cl

TABLE OF CASES

Rundle v State Rail Authority (NSW) [2001] NSWSC 862.................[33.3.340], [33.3.490] Rush v Commissioner of Police (2006) 150 FCR 165; 160 A Crim R 342; [2006] FCA 12............................................................[33.8.2160], [33.8.2165] Rushworth v Taylor (1842) 3 QB 699; 114 ER 674.............................[33.8.790] Russell v J Hargreaves & Sons Pty Ltd [1957] St R Qd 440..............[33.10.30] Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538; 24 SR (NSW) 502; 41 WN (NSW) 10.....................................................[33.8.830], [33.8.840], [33.8.930] Russellan Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1992) 75 LGRA 263.................................................................................. [33.10.570] Rust v Victoria Graving Dock Co (1887) 36 Ch D 113.................. [33.10.1350], [33.10.1400] Rutherford v Attorney-General [1976] 1 NZLR 403......... [33.2.580], [33.2.590] Rutherford v Hayward (1877) 3 VLR (L) 19.....................[33.6.410], [33.6.440] Ruthning v Ferguson [1930] St R Qd 325............................................ [33.6.310] RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 11 BCL 74......................................................................................... [33.2.820] Ryan v AF Concrete Pumping Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 113............[33.10.1740] Ryan v City of Victoria [1999] 1 SCR 201; (1999) 168 DLR (4th) 513......................................................................................................[33.7.510] Ryan v Fildes [1938] 3 All ER 517.....................................................[33.11.400] Ryan v Simpson (1872) 6 SALR 38.................................................... [33.8.1540] Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205............................................ [33.2.1105] Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330...........[33.2.320], [33.6.10], [33.6.30], [33.6.140], [33.6.150], [33.6.160], [33.6.320], [33.6.420], [33.6.720], [33.9.580], [33.9.590], [33.10.1360], [33.10.2110]

S S v Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 217; [2005] FCA 549................................... [33.2.350], [33.2.1090] S v G [1995] 3 NZLR 681.....................................................................[33.9.200] S (adult: refusal of treatment), Re [1993] Fam 123; [1992] 3 WLR 806........................................................................................ [33.9.230] S (an infant) v S [1972] AC 24; [1970] 3 WLR 366........ [33.9.220], [33.9.250] Saccardo Constructions Pty Ltd v Gammon (No 2) (1994) 63 SASR 333................................................................................... [33.11.360] Saccardo Constructions Pty Ltd v Gammon (1991) 56 SASR 552... [33.11.360] Sacher Investments Pty Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 5................................................................................... [33.10.2120] [References are to paragraph numbers] cli

TABLE OF CASES

Sachs v Miklos [1948] 2 KB 23................................... [33.10.490], [33.10.1520] Sadler v Cresco Fertilizers Pty Ltd [1939] VLR 438....[33.11.200], [33.11.220] Sadler v Great Western Railway Co [1896] AC 450.......................... [33.11.170] Sadler and Victoria v Madigan [1998] VSCA 53..........[33.8.1640], [33.8.1690] Saint v Jenner [1973] Ch 275; [1972] 3 WLR 888..............................[33.7.220] Salama v Pisarek (unreported, NSWSC, Cole J, 55041 of 1991, 10 September 1992).................................................................................................. [33.2.810] Saleslease Ltd v Davis [1999] 1 WLR 1664.....................................[33.10.1530] Salmon v Percivall (1631) Cro Car 196; 79 ER 772..........................[33.8.1550] Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1264.................... [33.2.330] Samson v Aitchison [1912] AC 844....................................[33.6.600], [33.6.670] Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v LG Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 113 IPR 11; [2015] FCA 227............................................[33.10.1710] Samuel v Payne (1780) 1 Doug 359; 99 ER 230................................. [33.9.150] San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405....... [33.2.510], [33.2.520], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.560], [33.2.590], [33.2.600], [33.2.610], [33.2.630], [33.2.640], [33.10.1720] Sanchez-Sidiropoulos v Canavan [2015] NSWSC 1139.......................[33.2.990] Sandeman v Robinson (1877) Knox 382...............................................[33.8.930] Sanders v Snell (1997) 73 FCR 569....................................................[33.8.1200] Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329; 72 ALJR 1508; [1998] HCA 64................... [33.8.150], [33.8.1150], [33.8.1200], [33.8.2167] Sanderson v Dunn (1911) 32 ALT (Supp) 14....................................... [33.6.410] Sandstone DMC Pty Ltd v Trajkovski [2006] NSWCA 205.............. [33.2.1070] Santa Teresa Housing Association Inc v Jamieson (1993) 3 NTLR 131; 120 FLR 315....................................................................................[33.11.410] Sara v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 203......................................................................................................[33.9.930] Sarch v Blackburn (1830) 4 Car & P 297; 172 ER 712... [33.6.360], [33.6.390] Sarkis v Morrison (2013) 64 MVR 433................................................[33.6.460] Sarvanidis v Chicago Bridge & Iron Constructors Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-292.................................................................................[33.2.1560] SAS Trustee Corp v Cox (2011) 285 CLR 623; [2011] NSWCA 408......................................................................................................[33.1.140] Saunders v Edwards [1987] 1 WLR 1116.........................................[33.10.2170] Savage v Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 450; 77 WN (NSW) 64............................................................................. [33.9.930] [References are to paragraph numbers] clii

TABLE OF CASES

Savill v Roberts (1698) 12 Mod 208; 88 ER 1267.......[33.8.1820], [33.8.1890], [33.10.1100] Savory v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Southern) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1158...................................................................................... [33.6.620] Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 1 WLR 623........... [33.8.1660] Sayers v Perrin (No 3) [1966] Qd R 89........................................... [33.10.2070] SB v New South Wales (2004) 13 VR 527; [2004] VSC 514............. [33.2.330], [33.2.940] Scala v Mammolitti (1965) 114 CLR 153; 39 ALJR 315.................... [33.1.300] Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe [1958] 1 WLR 1057.................................................................................... [33.8.1260] Scanlon v American Cigarette Co (Overseas) Pty Ltd (No 3) [1987] VR 289...................................................................................[33.3.490] Scarletti Pty Ltd v Millwood Printing Co Pty Ltd (unreported, VSC App Div, Phillips CJ, Crockett and Southwell JJ, 8500 of 1993, 28 July 1994)................................................................................................ [33.8.1190] Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18......................................[33.2.1760], [33.2.1770], [33.2.1800] Schemmell v Pomeroy (1989) 50 SASR 450........................................ [33.8.880] Schiliro v Peppercorn Child Care Centres Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 518; [2000] QCA 18.................................................................................. [33.5.220] Schiller v Mulgrave Shire Council (1972) 129 CLR 116; 47 ALJR 650; 27 LGRA 354................................................................... [33.3.30], [33.3.170] Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275......[33.8.1210] Schneider v Heath (1813) 3 Camp 505; 170 ER 1462...................... [33.8.1300] Scholz v Standish [1961] SASR 123................................ [33.2.1650], [33.9.180] Schuller v SJ Webb Nominees Pty Ltd (2015) 124 SASR 152; [2015] SASCFC 162......................................................................................................[33.9.900] Schulz v Schmauser [2001] 1 Qd R 540; [2000] QCA 17................... [33.5.220] Schumann v Abbott [1961] SASR 149.......... [33.8.555], [33.8.600], [33.11.160] Schweizer v Central Hospital (1974) 53 DLR (3d) 494...................... [33.9.280] Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; 74 ALJR 1410; [2000] HCA 52.......................[33.6.600], [33.6.670], [33.6.700], [33.8.1630] Scott v Edington (1888) 14 VLR 41..................................................... [33.6.360] Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596; 159 ER 665......................................................................................[33.2.1760] Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491................................................. [33.10.1100] Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; 96 ER 525......... [33.6.330], [33.8.320], [33.8.380] [References are to paragraph numbers] cliii

TABLE OF CASES

Scott Group Ltd v MacFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553....... [33.2.540], [33.2.600], [33.2.660] Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193................................................................ [33.2.340] Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341.........................................................[33.6.300] Seas Sapfor Ltd v Electricity Trusts (SA) (1996) 187 LSJS 369......... [33.2.820] Seaway Hotels Ltd v Cragg (Canada) Ltd (1959) 17 DLR (2d) 292....................................................................................................[33.10.250] Seaway Hotels Ltd v Cragg (Canada) Ltd (1959) 21 DLR (2d) 264....................................................................................................[33.10.250] Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300.................. [33.8.360], [33.8.375], [33.8.400], [33.8.450], [33.9.200], [33.9.220], [33.9.280], [33.9.300] Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880.............. [33.7.40], [33.7.530], [33.7.860] Seeley v Gray (1987) 48 SASR 130......................................................[33.3.350] Seidler v Luna Park Reserve Trust (unreported, NSWSC, Hodgson J, 1166 of 1995, 21 September 1995).......................... [33.7.190], [33.7.240], [33.7.850] Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157.................... [33.5.180], [33.5.200], [33.5.260], [33.10.1400] Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 89 ALJR 572; [2015] HCA 18....[33.11.390] Seligman v Docker [1949] Ch 53.......................................................... [33.6.310] Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 68 ALJR 313........................[33.1.270], [33.2.540], [33.4.490], [33.10.2030], [33.10.2050] Seltsam Ltd v Minahan (1996) 13 NSWCCR 410................................[33.4.460] Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29.................................................................................[33.4.460], [33.10.1990] Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill (2006) 4 DDCR 1; [2006] NSWCA 158......................................................................................................[33.2.240] Semple v Mant (1985) 39 SASR 282; 21 A Crim R 110.....................[33.8.520] Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English [1989] 1 Qd R 678.............. [33.10.510], [33.10.520] Settree v Roberts [1982] 1 NSWLR 649.............................................[33.10.920] Sewell v National Telephone Co Ltd [1907] 1 KB 557......................[33.8.1540] Shaddock’s Case (L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1)) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65......... [33.1.270], [33.2.510], [33.2.530], [33.2.540], [33.2.550], [33.2.570], [33.2.580], [33.2.590], [33.2.600], [33.2.610], [References are to paragraph numbers] cliv

TABLE OF CASES

[33.10.1720] Shair Mahomet v Commissioner of Railways (1903) 5 WALR 107.... [33.9.270] Shandloff v City Dairy Ltd [1936] 4 DLR 712................... [33.4.30], [33.4.340], [33.4.440] Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854...................[33.4.160] Shapiro v La Morta (1923) 40 TLR 201.......................................... [33.10.1710] Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563... [33.10.170], [33.10.710], [33.10.800], [33.10.810], [33.10.850], [33.10.890], [33.10.940], [33.10.950], [33.10.960] Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81..............[33.8.1860], [33.8.1880], [33.8.1900] Sharpe v Sweeting (ET) & Son [1963] 1 WLR 665........................... [33.2.1120] Shaw v Commonwealth (1995) 124 FLR 190.....................................[33.10.520] Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344................................................. [33.2.210], [33.2.390], [33.6.610] Shedlezki v Bronte Bakery Pty Ltd (1970) 72 SR (NSW) 378; 92 WN (NSW) 151; [1970] 2 NSWR 588.................................................... [33.5.270] Sheehan v Dreamland (Margate) Ltd (1923) 40 TLR 155...................[33.3.350] Sheen v Fields Pty Ltd (1984) 155 CLR 698n; 58 ALJR 93............. [33.2.1560] Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287....... [33.7.890], [33.10.1860], [33.10.2280] Shepherd v SJ Banks & Son Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 437............... [33.11.170] Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340; [1970] 3 WLR 348........................................................................................ [33.7.830] Sherman v Nymboida Collieries Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 580; 37 ALJR 319......................................................................................[33.5.270] Sherras v Van der Maat [1989] 1 Qd R 114..................[33.11.390], [33.11.400] Shirt v Wyong Shire Council [1978] 1 NSWLR 631............................[33.2.230] Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104............... [33.2.1800], [33.3.250], [33.3.360] Short v City Bank of Sydney (1912) 15 CLR 148; 13 SR (NSW) 517.................................................................................[33.8.890], [33.8.1200] Shrosbery v Osmaston (1877) 37 LT 792........................................... [33.8.1900] Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220.......[33.2.1560], [33.2.1810], [33.4.450], [33.5.150], [33.9.790] Sibley v Milutinovic [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-013... [33.8.450], [33.9.200], [33.9.240], [33.9.280] Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia (1970) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 743; [1970] 2 NSWR 47......................................................................................[33.8.1150] [References are to paragraph numbers] clv

TABLE OF CASES

Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760............ [33.7.220], [33.8.1110], [33.8.1120], [33.8.1150], [33.10.2280] Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2 WLR 480......................................................... [33.9.220], [33.9.260] Sievwright v Ward [1935] NZLR 43................................................... [33.8.2000] Silberman v Silberman (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 554; 27 WN (NSW) 151.........................................................................................[33.1.300] Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd [1988] QB 758; [1988] 2 WLR 761............................................................................ [33.2.820] Simeon v Avery [1959] NZLR 1345...................................................... [33.6.300] Simms v Leigh Rugby Football Club Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 923...........[33.3.490] Simon v Condran (2013) 85 NSWLR 768; [2013] NSWCA 388.......[33.9.340], [33.9.430] Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322.....[33.1.270], [33.1.290], [33.10.500], [33.10.520], [33.10.2120] Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25..................................[33.6.290], [33.6.390], [33.6.470], [33.8.510] Simpson v Blanch [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-458.....[33.2.1160], [33.6.300], [33.6.720] Simpson v Knowles [1974] VR 190; (1973) 29 LGRA 313.................[33.8.480] Simpson v Robinson (1848) 12 QB 511; 116 ER 959...[33.8.1690], [33.8.1743] Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 3 App Cas 279............................. [33.2.1370] Sinclair v William Arnott Pty Ltd (No 2) (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 88; 81 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 204.................................................................................. [33.11.390] Sindle v New York City Transit Authority 352 NYS 2d 183 (1973).... [33.9.600] Singh v Ali [1960] AC 167; [1960] 2 WLR 180.................................. [33.8.840] Singh v Smithenbecker (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 207; 40 WN (NSW) 11..................................................... [33.8.520], [33.8.550], [33.9.260] Singleton v Williamson (1861) 7 H & N 410; 158 ER 533................. [33.6.440] Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118; [1974] 3 WLR 459.........[33.2.390], [33.9.570] Six Carpenters’ Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 146; 77 ER 695..................... [33.8.560] Skea v NRMA Insurance Ltd (2005) 43 MVR 495; [2005] ACTCA 9........................................................................................................[33.2.1290] Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480...[33.10.840], [33.10.850], [33.10.890], [33.10.940], [33.10.1220] Skinner v Commonwealth [2012] FCA 1194..................[33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Skinner v Secretary of State for Transport, The Times, 3 January 1995....................................................................................................[33.2.390] [References are to paragraph numbers] clvi

TABLE OF CASES

Skousen v Nidy 367 P 2d 248 (1961)....................................................[33.8.390] Slater v Clay Cross Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 264; [1956] 3 WLR 232.... [33.3.350] Slater v Finning Ltd [1997] AC 473; [1996] 3 WLR 190.................. [33.4.200], [33.4.420] Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441...............[33.8.340], [33.8.370], [33.8.420], [33.8.430], [33.8.440], [33.8.450], [33.8.460], [33.8.910], [33.8.920], [33.8.930], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1770] Sleiman v Commissioner of Corrective Services (NSW) [2009] NSWSC 304....................................................................................................[33.8.1620] Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266........................................................ [33.2.1800], [33.3.250], [33.3.360] Slivak v Lurgi (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 304; 75 ALJR 481; 103 IR 52; [2001] HCA 6.................................................................[33.5.190], [33.5.250] Sloan v Kirby (1979) 20 SASR 263......................................................[33.9.910] Slonim v Mizrachi Nominees Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 453; [1998] VSC 214....................................................................................................[33.10.910] Smee v Tibbetts (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 391; 70 WN (NSW) 261.....[33.10.1750] Smith v Baker & Sons [1891] AC 325.................................................. [33.9.920] Smith v Buckley [1965] Tas SR 210...................................................... [33.3.480] Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109.....[33.6.290], [33.6.350], [33.6.360], [33.6.380], [33.6.390] Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd [1972] 1 QB 244; [1971] 3 WLR 206...................................................................................... [33.10.810] Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187...................... [33.8.1290], [33.8.1300] Smith v Cheeky Monkeys Restaurant (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 241; [2009] NSWDC 257...................................................................[33.8.410], [33.8.460] Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 552; 52 WN (NSW) 180......................................................................... [33.8.1910] Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (unreported, HCA, 1935)................................................................................................ [33.8.1910] Smith v Cook (1875) 1 QBD 79......................................... [33.6.290], [33.6.410] Smith v Cornish [1971] Tas SR 383 (NC 17); (1971) 23 LGRA 87...[33.7.360] Smith v Cotton (1926) 27 SR (NSW) 41; 44 WN (NSW) 59............[33.8.1850] Smith v Curtis (unreported, NSWSC, Grove J, 9886 of 1983, 11 November 1986).................................................................................................. [33.6.290] Smith v Day (1882) 21 Ch D 421..................................................... [33.10.1870] Smith v Day [1992] 1 Qd R 233......................................................... [33.10.950] Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790............... [33.2.380], [33.2.520], [33.2.560], [33.2.580], [33.2.590], [33.2.640], [33.2.650] [References are to paragraph numbers] clvii

TABLE OF CASES

Smith v Great Eastern Railway Co (1866) LR 2 CP 4........................ [33.6.370] Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397; 44 ALJR 78..........[33.9.610], [33.9.980] Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405; [1962] 2 WLR 148.................................................................................... [33.10.2070] Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256................. [33.2.930], [33.2.960], [33.2.970], [33.2.1105], [33.3.180], [33.9.290] Smith v Leurs [1944] SASR 213........................................................... [33.9.290] Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241; [1987] 2 WLR 480........................................................................................ [33.3.220] Smith v Lord [1962] SASR 88..........................................[33.2.1650], [33.9.180] Smith v McIntyre [1958] Tas SR 36................................. [33.9.850], [33.11.390] Smith v O’Byrne; Ex parte O’Byrne (1893) 5 QLJ 126...................... [33.9.450] Smith v Perese [2006] NSWSC 288........................................................[33.2.80] Smith v Scott [1973] Ch 314; [1972] 3 WLR 783................................[33.7.540] Smith v Shields (1964) 108 SJ 501........................................................[33.6.390] Smith v Stone (1647) Style 65; 82 ER 533...........................................[33.6.440] Smith v Williams (2006) 47 MVR 169; [2006] QCA 439....................[33.6.300] Smith v Yarnold (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 316; [1969] 2 NSWR 410..................................................................................... [33.3.290] Smith v Zhong (2015) 49 WAR 215; [2015] WASCA 202................ [33.10.910] Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254; [1996] 3 WLR 1051.................................................................................. [33.10.1680] Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1997] AC 254; [1996] 3 WLR 1051............................................... [33.1.290] Smith’s Newspapers Ltd v Becker (1932) 47 CLR 279......................[33.10.890] Smithson v Garth (1691) 83 ER 711................................................... [33.11.160] Smythe v Reardon [1949] St R Qd 74..............................[33.8.1320], [33.9.250] Sneddon v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 351............................... [33.6.610] Snook v Mannion [1982] Crim LR 601................................................ [33.8.540] Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2006] VSC 138..................................................................... [33.11.170] Soare v Ashley [1955] VLR 438..........................................................[33.8.1790] Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215; [1960] Qd R 204; (1960) 33 ALJR 463.............................[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.670], [33.11.390] Solloway v McLaughlin [1938] AC 247.....................[33.10.1520], [33.10.1530] Solomons v Pallier (2015) 72 MVR 365; [2015] NSWCA 266.......... [33.9.810] Solomons v R Gertzenstein Ltd [1954] 2 QB 243; [1954] 3 WLR 317........................................................................................ [33.5.220] [References are to paragraph numbers] clviii

TABLE OF CASES

Solorio v United States, 483 US 435 (1987)........................................ [33.9.460] Soltau v De Held (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 133; 61 ER 291........................ [33.7.880] Sommerhalder v Burjan [1962] SASR 271...........................................[33.8.550] Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160; 81 ALJR 525; [2007] HCA 1....................................................................................[33.2.670] Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700............................................................ [33.8.1270] South Australia v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161...............[33.2.610], [33.8.1310] South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331; [2010] SASC 56..................[33.8.1520], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1660], [33.8.1700], [33.8.2135] South Australia v Mountford (2001) 79 SASR 389; [2001] SASC 85......................................................................................................[33.11.230] South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191; [1996] 3 WLR 87................................................... [33.2.520] South Australian Ambulance Transport Inc v Wahlheim (1948) 77 CLR 215..................................................................................... [33.2.1610] South Australian Co v City of Port Adelaide [1914] SALR 16..........[33.7.490], [33.7.510] South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282............................................ [33.2.820] South Pacific Resort Hotels Pty Ltd v Trainor (2005) 144 FCR 402; [2005] FCAFC 130........................................................................................[33.6.650] South Parklands Hockey & Tennis Centre Inc v Brown Falconer Group Pty Ltd (2004) 88 SASR 65; [2004] SASC 81.......................................[33.1.300] South Staffordshire Water Co v Sharman [1896] 2 QB 44.................. [33.8.830] South Sydney Junior Rugby League Club Ltd v Gazis [2016] NSWCA 8..........................................................................................................[33.3.160] South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Cole (2002) 55 NSWLR 113; [2002] NSWCA 205........................................... [33.2.1570] South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 239................................................................................. [33.8.1250] Southall v Jones (1879) 5 VLR (L) 402............................................... [33.6.290] Southern Portland Cement Ltd v Cooper [1974] AC 623; [1974] 2 WLR 152; (1973) 129 CLR 295; 47 ALJR 790.............[33.3.30], [33.3.320], [33.3.340] Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director of Department of Conservation & Land Management (2012) 42 WAR 287; 189 LGERA 359; [2012] WASCA 79..........................................................[33.7.215], [33.7.660] Southern Regional Health Board v Grimsey (1998) 8 Tas R 166..... [33.10.960] Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 3 WLR 200........................................................................................ [33.8.500] Southwark London Borough Council v Mills [2001] 1 AC 1; [1999] 3 WLR 939........................................................................................ [33.7.170] [References are to paragraph numbers] clix

TABLE OF CASES

Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734; [1971] 2 WLR 467........................................................................................ [33.9.380] Soutter v P & O Resorts Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 106.......[33.5.160], [33.5.190] Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 397; 41 ALJR 129..... [33.5.170], [33.5.190], [33.5.390] Spackman v Foster (1883) 11 QBD 99..............................[33.8.790], [33.8.890] Spargo v Greatorex (1992) 59 SASR 1........................ [33.10.800], [33.10.990], [33.10.2080] Spargo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 39...............[33.10.910], [33.11.170] Spark v Whale Three Minute Car Wash (Cremorne Junction) Pty Ltd (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 1087......................................................................... [33.8.480] Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27; [1972] 3 WLR 502.......................................................................... [33.10.250] Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2005] FCA 455...................[33.8.1990], [33.8.2000] Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1.................. [33.8.1540], [33.8.1690], [33.8.1740], [33.10.180], [33.10.710] Spedding v Nobles (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 29..... [33.2.1160], [33.3.180] Speed Seal Products Ltd v Paddington [1985] 1 WLR 1327........... [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960] Speirs v Caledonian Collieries Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 483; 74 WN (NSW) 23......................................................................................... [33.11.200] Spencer v Australian Capital Territory (2007) 13 BPR 24,307; [2007] NSWSC 303.......................................................................................[33.7.240] Spencer v Registrar of Titles (1910) 103 LT 647............................. [33.10.1420] Spencer v Silva [1942] SASR 213.................. [33.7.190], [33.7.240], [33.7.850] Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489........... [33.6.160], [33.7.530], [33.10.1370], [33.10.1380], [33.10.1400] Spira v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 57 NSWLR 544; [2003] NSWCA 180.................................................................................... [33.8.1100] Spira v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2004] HCATrans 465.....[33.8.1100] Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296; [1994] 3 WLR 354..................................................................... [33.2.550], [33.2.820] Sprod v Public Relations Oriented Security Pty Ltd [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-817; [2005] NSWSC 1074...........................................................[33.6.650] Sprod v Public Relations Oriented Security Pty Ltd [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-921; [2007] NSWCA 319.......................................................... [33.2.1070]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clx

TABLE OF CASES

SSC & B: Lintas New Zealand Ltd v Murphy [1986] 2 NZLR 436; [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-008.............................................................. [33.8.1260] SSYBA Pty Ltd v Lane [2013] WASC 445...... [33.8.470], [33.8.570], [33.8.590] St Anne’s Well Brewery Co v Roberts (1928) 140 LT 1....................... [33.7.540] St George Club Ltd v Hines (1961) 35 ALJR 106............................... [33.4.470] St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936........................................................................................ [33.9.230] St Margaret’s Hospital for Women (Sydney) v McKibbin [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-130.................................................................................[33.10.820] Stafford v Conti Commodity Services Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 691.......... [33.2.550] Stairmand v Baker (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40778 of 1991, 7 February 1992).....................[33.10.850] Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No 2) [2003] 1 AC 959; [2002] 3 WLR 1547; [2002] UKHL 43....................... [33.8.1300] Standard Electronic Apparatus Laboratories Pty Ltd v Stenner (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 833...............................................[33.8.750], [33.8.810], [33.10.1510] Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66................... [33.9.890], [33.9.910], [33.9.930], [33.9.970] Stanford v Robertson [1947] 1 DLR 493.............................................. [33.6.370] Stanley v Powell [1891] 1 QB 86..........................................................[33.8.310] Stapeley v Annetts [1970] 1 WLR 20..................................................[33.8.1860] Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663; [1953] 3 WLR 279.... [33.4.460], [33.5.270], [33.11.390] Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor (t/as New Star Industrial Co) (1975) FSR 256........................................................................................... [33.8.1350] Starks v RSM Security Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-763; [2004] NSWCA 351................................................................. [33.2.1070], [33.6.650] State Electricity Commission (Vic) v Fooks [1994] 1 VR 259..........[33.11.360], [33.11.380] State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656..........................................[33.6.300], [33.6.310] State Government Insurance Commission (WA) v Oakley (1990) 10 MVR 570..................................................................................................[33.10.2000] State Rail Authority (NSW) v Sharp [1981] 1 NSWLR 240............ [33.10.1750] State Rail Authority (NSW) v Watkins [2001] NSWCA 405................ [33.3.260] State Rail Authority (NSW) v Wiegold (1991) 25 NSWLR 500.......[33.10.2080] Stearn v Prentice Bros Ltd [1919] 1 KB 394.................... [33.6.310], [33.6.320] Stennett v Hancock [1939] 2 All ER 578...........................[33.4.340], [33.4.440]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clxi

TABLE OF CASES

Stenning v Johnson (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40007 of 1990, 18 April 1991)......................... [33.10.540] Stephens v Anglian Water Authority [1987] 1 WLR 1381................... [33.8.150] Stephens v Elwall (1815) 4 M & S 259; 105 ER 830..........................[33.8.890] Stephenson v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (1953) 19 LGR (NSW) 137......................................................................................................[33.7.530] Stephenson v Waite Tileman Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 152..................... [33.10.2080] Stereff v Rycen [2010] QDC 117......................................................... [33.11.160] Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194.........[33.2.40], [33.2.800], [33.2.1080], [33.6.140], [33.6.150], [33.6.710], [33.6.720], [33.11.153] Stevens v Collinson [1938] 57 NZLR 64............................................ [33.11.390] Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433; 67 ALJR 343........................... [33.10.40] Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1......................................................[33.8.2000] Stevens v Midland Counties Railway Co (1854) 10 Ex 352; 156 ER 480...................................................................[33.8.190], [33.8.1870] Stevens v Nudd [1978] Qd R 96............................................................[33.6.300] Stewart v Andri (1994) 19 MVR 1......................................................[33.10.940] Stewart v Carnell (1984) 2 MVR 147................................................ [33.2.1570] Stewart v Enfield Municipal Council (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 204; 2 LGR (NSW) 165; 32 WN (NSW) 46........................................................ [33.7.530] Stewart v Layton (t/as BM Salmon Layton & Co) (1992) 111 ALR 687................................................................................. [33.10.1870] Stieller v Porirua City Council [1983] NZLR 628.............................[33.2.1130] Stimac v Nicol [1942] VLR 66............................................................[33.8.1850] Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442; 80 ALJR 1339; [2006] HCA 37.....................[33.6.360], [33.8.310], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1710] Stoakes v Brydges [1958] QWN 5.................. [33.7.190], [33.7.210], [33.7.240] Stock v Wierda (unreported, SASC, Debelle J, 2487 of 1990, 21 June 1991).................................................................................................. [33.6.460] Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497............ [33.6.310], [33.6.350], [33.7.200], [33.7.240], [33.7.250] Stojan (No 9) Pty Ltd v Kenway [2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-043; [2009] NSWCA 364...................................................................................... [33.3.170] Stokes v House With No Steps [2016] QSC 79...................................[33.2.1516] Stokes v Russell (unreported, TASSC, Cosgrove J, 2 of 1983, 18 January 1983)................................................................................................ [33.2.1000] Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156....... [33.5.230], [33.6.140], [33.6.150], [33.6.690], [33.6.710], [33.6.720] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxii

TABLE OF CASES

Storey v Ashton (1869) LR 4 QB 476...................................................[33.6.660] Storm v Geeves [1965] Tas SR 252.......................................................[33.8.510] Stormer v Ingram (1978) 21 SASR 93.......... [33.6.310], [33.6.350], [33.7.830], [33.7.850] Stott v West Yorkshire Road Car Co [1971] 2 QB 651; [1971] 3 WLR 282...................................................................................... [33.11.360] Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; [1996] 3 WLR 388...............................[33.2.390] Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246....................................................................................... [33.10.1530] Strategic Minerals Corp NL v Basham (1997) 25 ACSR 470............. [33.2.550] Street v Bar Association (Qld) (Dingo Fence Case) (1989) 168 CLR 461; 63 ALJR 715......................................................................................[33.10.40] Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5.........................[33.1.280], [33.2.1750], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15......................[PREFACE], [33.2.270], [33.2.330], [33.2.1105], [33.2.1340], [33.3.180], [33.5.10] Stubbe v Jensen [1997] 2 VR 439.........................................................[33.1.140] Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498; [1993] 2 WLR 120........................[33.8.310] Sturch v Willmott [1997] 2 Qd R 310............................ [33.10.930], [33.10.990] Sturdy v The Queen (1974) 47 DLR (3d) 71........................................ [33.6.370] Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852....... [33.7.180], [33.7.700], [33.7.710] Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319; [1999] NSWCA 338.....[33.10.930] Sullivan v Hydro-Electric Power Commission (Ont) (1960) 23 DLR (2d) 756....................................................................................................[33.2.1330] Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59......................... [PREFACE], [33.2.40], [33.2.210], [33.2.290], [33.2.310], [33.2.340], [33.2.360], [33.2.380], [33.2.660], [33.2.800], [33.4.380], [33.5.160] Sunbolf v Alford (1838) 3 M & W 248; 150 ER 1135.......................[33.8.1700] Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361........[33.9.860], [33.9.890], [33.9.910], [33.9.920], [33.10.2150] Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1; 49 ALJR 117....................................................................................[33.8.1390] Suosaari v Steinhardt [1989] 2 Qd R 477.....[33.4.340], [33.4.440], [33.11.170] Surtees v Kingston-upon-Thames Royal Borough Council, The Independent, 27 March 1991........................................................................................[33.2.940] Sutcliffe v Holmes [1947] KB 147.........................................................[33.6.440] Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153; [1990] 2 WLR 271......[33.10.220] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Sutherland Shire Council v Becker (2006) 150 LGERA 184; [2006] NSWCA 344......................................................................................................[33.7.240] Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120....... [33.2.210], [33.2.270], [33.2.360], [33.2.370], [33.2.380], [33.2.520], [33.2.540], [33.2.590], [33.2.680], [33.2.800], [33.2.1130], [33.5.10], [33.10.1730], [33.10.2000] Sutton v Johnstone (1786) 1 Term Rep 493; 99 ER 1215................ [33.8.1550], [33.8.1820], [33.8.1860] Suttons Foodlands Store Pty Ltd v Goldsworthy [1969] SASR 282....[33.9.740] Svingos v Deacon Avenue Cartage & Storage Pty Ltd (1971) 2 SASR 126................................................................................... [33.10.2110] Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4.................... [33.2.370], [33.2.1590], [33.2.1610], [33.2.1620] Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849; [1981] 2 WLR 814........... [33.8.530], [33.9.490] Swan v South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 532................. [33.2.390], [33.2.1100] Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172......... [33.10.830], [33.10.1210], [33.10.1740] Swan Brewery Co Ltd v Shire of Belmont [1974] WAR 196.............. [33.7.510], [33.7.660] Swanevelder v Holmes (1990) 52 SASR 549....................................... [33.9.540] Swans, Case of (1572) 7 Co Rep 15b; 77 ER 435...............................[33.8.710] Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR 317; [2006] HCA 19........ [33.2.1080], [33.6.580], [33.6.590], [33.6.710], [33.9.750] Swick Nominees Pty Ltd v Leroi International Inc (No 2) (2015) 318 ALR 666; [2015] WASCA 35....................................................[33.4.380] Swift v Wearing-Smith [2016] NSWCA 38.................... [33.2.1510], [33.2.1600] Swimsure (Laboratories) Pty Ltd v McDonald [1979] 2 NSWLR 796................................................................................. [33.8.1390] Swinton v China Mutual Steam Navigation Co Ltd (1951) 83 CLR 553....................................................................................... [33.3.160] Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285...................[33.10.1420] Sycamore v Ley (1932) 147 LT 342................................... [33.6.360], [33.6.390] Sydney City Council v Bosnich (1968) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 168; [1968] 3 NSWR 725................................................................................. [33.10.1740] Sydney Corp v West (1965) 114 CLR 481; 12 LGRA 79; 39 ALJR 323......................................................................................[33.8.880] Sydney County Council v Dell’Oro (1974) 132 CLR 97; 48 ALJR 471...............................................................[33.2.1050], [33.2.1530] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Sykes v Beadon (1879) 11 Ch D 170.................................................... [33.9.610] Sykes v Connolly (1895) 11 WN (NSW) 145....................................... [33.7.540] Sylvester v GB Chapman Ltd (1935) 79 SJ 777................ [33.6.290], [33.6.390] Symeonakis v Symeonakis (1990) 12 MVR 233................................. [33.2.1570] Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447.............. [33.8.1570], [33.8.1590], [33.9.150] Symons Nominees Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1996) 25 MVR 174......................................................................................................[33.7.660] Symons Nominees Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-081......................................................................... [33.7.660]

T T v T [1988] Fam 52; [1988] 2 WLR 189............................................ [33.9.220] T (adult: refusal of treatment), Re [1993] Fam 95; [1992] 3 WLR 782........................................................................................ [33.9.230] T; T, Re v T [1988] Fam 52; [1988] 2 WLR 189.............. [33.8.360], [33.8.370] Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272; 83 ALJR 390; [2009] HCA 8........................................................... [33.1.270] Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Dank [2011] QCA 253.....................................[33.5.10] Tabe v Stanbury (1988) 8 MVR 48....................................[33.9.800], [33.9.860] Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; 84 ALJR 292; [2010] HCA 12... [33.1.270], [33.1.340] Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 2 TPR 48....... [33.8.1340] Taggart v Rose [1975] WAR 41............................................................ [33.9.840] Tahche v Cannon [2003] HCATrans 524....................... [33.8.2160], [33.8.2162] Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80; [1985] 3 WLR 317.................................................. [33.1.140], [33.2.820], [33.8.900] Tai Te Whetu v Scandlyn [1952] NZLR 30.......................................[33.10.1420] Tak & Co Inc v AEL Corp Ltd (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,887.................. [33.1.310] Takaro Properties Ltd (in rec) v Rowling [1978] 2 NZLR 314........... [33.2.590] TAL Structural Engineers Pty Ltd v Vaughan Constructions Pty Ltd [1989] VR 545................................................................................. [33.11.350] Talacko v Talacko [2015] VSC 287.....................................................[33.8.1180] Talbot v Lusby [1995] QSC 143........................................................ [33.10.1750] Talcott v National Exhibition Co 128 NYS 1059 (1911)................... [33.8.1580] Tallents v Bell [1944] 2 All ER 474......................................................[33.6.400] Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35......................[33.2.530], [33.2.580], [33.2.800], [33.2.1290], [33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1516], [33.8.1290] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxv

TABLE OF CASES

Tampion v Anderson (No 2) [1973] VR 715.................[33.8.2160], [33.8.2162], [33.9.570] Tao Zhu v Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games [2001] NSWSC 989.....................................................................................[33.10.250] Tarleton v McGawley (1794) Peake 270; 170 ER 153....................... [33.8.1110] Tarling v Nobel [1966] ALR 189....................................... [33.4.360], [33.4.510] Tarlton v Fisher (1781) 2 Doug KB 671; 99 ER 426........................ [33.8.1550] Tasmania v Boyd [2010] TASSC 13......................................................[33.2.680] Tasmania Development & Resources v Martin (2000) 97 IR 66; [2000] FCA 414....................................................................................................[33.8.2167] Tassone v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage & Drainage Board [1971] 1 NSWLR 207.......................... [33.5.180], [33.5.190], [33.5.210], [33.5.220] Taylor v Auto Trade Supply Ltd [1972] NZLR 102...[33.10.1350], [33.10.1400] Taylor v Beere [1982] 1 NZLR 81...................................................... [33.10.180] Taylor v City of Perth [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-191...................[33.7.510], [33.7.830], [33.7.840] Taylor v Ford (1873) 29 LT 392......................................................... [33.8.1820] Taylor v Jecks (1993) 10 WAR 309.................................................. [33.10.1100] Taylor v O’Connor [1971] AC 115; [1970] 2 WLR 472................... [33.10.590] Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1491.....................[33.4.350], [33.4.500], [33.4.1130] TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82........................[33.8.340], [33.8.410], [33.8.520], [33.8.600], [33.10.2110] TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9.......................................................................................... [33.8.600] Teamay v Severin (1988) 94 FLR 47.................................................... [33.7.510] Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Business Associates Ltd (unreported, NZCA, Cooke, Richardson and McKay JJ, 7, 41 of 1993, 23 June 1993).................................................................................................. [33.1.310] Telecom Vanuatu Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1209....................................................................................................[33.8.710] Telstra Corp Ltd v Smith [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-487........... [33.10.2010] Temperley v Playground Supplies Pty Ltd (1980) 3 TPR 506............. [33.4.980] Tempest v Snowden [1952] 1 KB 130............................ [33.8.1800], [33.8.1930] Teno v Arnold [1978] 2 SCR 287; (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 609.............[33.10.980] Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19.....[33.2.270], [33.2.340], [33.2.530], [33.2.550], [33.2.560], [33.2.580], [33.2.640], [33.2.680], [33.4.380] Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491; 36 ALJR 362..................... [33.1.270], [References are to paragraph numbers] clxvi

TABLE OF CASES

[33.9.860], [33.10.810] Thackwell v Barclays Bank plc [1986] 1 All ER 676.......................... [33.8.840] Thai World Import & Export Co Ltd v Shuey Shing Pty Ltd (1989) 17 IPR 289....................................................................................................[33.8.1350] Theyer v Purnell [1918] 2 KB 333....................................................... [33.6.430] Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362; [1991] 2 WLR 27........................[33.10.510] Thomas v Elder Smith Goldsborough Mort Ltd (1982) 30 SASR 592..................................................................................... [33.6.290] Thomas v Kula [2001] WASCA 362................................................... [33.10.930] Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307; 81 ALJR 1414; [2007] HCA 33................................................................................[33.8.1250] Thomas v Powell (1837) 7 Car & P 807; 173 ER 352...................... [33.8.1760] Thomas v Quartermaine (1887) 18 QBD 685...................................... [33.9.890] Thomas v Southcorp Australia Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 34.... [33.4.730], [33.4.740] Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A’asia) Ltd v Samco Meats Pty Ltd [1995] 2 VR 474..........................................................................................[33.11.180] Thomas Brown & Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen (1962) 108 CLR 391; 36 ALJR 229...................................................................[33.8.840], [33.9.610] Thomopolos v Blackburne (1989) 10 MVR 7.....................................[33.2.1570] Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131.................... [33.8.1750], [33.11.140], [33.11.153], [33.11.160], [33.11.170], [33.11.240], [33.11.360] Thompson v Faraonio [1979] 1 WLR 1157; (1979) 54 ALJR 231..........................................[33.10.500], [33.10.520], [33.10.540] Thompson v Henderson & Partners Pty Ltd (1990) 58 SASR 548.............................................................. [33.11.370], [33.11.400] Thompson v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449 at 475....[33.4.370], [33.4.400], [33.4.420] Thompson v London City Council [1899] 1 QB 840..........................[33.11.170] Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405; [1984] 2 WLR 522...................................................................................... [33.2.1620] Thompson v Sydney Municipal Council (1938) 14 LGR (NSW) 32.....................................................................................[33.7.220], [33.7.490] Thompson v Vincent (2005) 153 A Crim R 577; [2005] NSWCA 219......................................................................................................[33.2.390] Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19.........[33.3.10], [33.3.30], [33.3.160], [33.3.170], [33.3.210], [33.3.220], [33.3.240], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335.................................[33.7.220] Thomson v Nix [1976] WAR 141.......................................................... [33.6.300] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Thorne v Strohfeld [1997] 1 Qd R 540............................................. [33.10.1750] Thornton v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [1979] QB 626; [1979] 3 WLR 1............................................................................................ [33.5.260] Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v Henderson & Lahey [1988] 2 Qd R 216..............................................................................................[33.10.2000] Thorpes Ltd v Grant Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1955) 92 CLR 317; 55 SR (NSW) 117; 72 WN (NSW) 92..................................................................... [33.7.220] Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1; [2000] 2 WLR 1220; [2000] UKHL 33......................................... [33.8.2167] Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] 3 All ER 558............................................................................................. [33.8.2162] Thurston v Charles (1905) 21 TLR 659............................................[33.10.1100] Thurston v Todd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 335............................[33.10.170] Thurston v Todd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 231............................[33.10.960] Thwaites v Brahe (1895) 21 VLR 192..................................................[33.7.710] Thynne v Petrie [1975] Qd R 260....................................................... [33.10.380] Tille v Parkinson [1992] 2 Qd R 322..................................................[33.10.850] Tillett v Ward (1882) 10 QBD 17......................[33.6.10], [33.6.420], [33.6.440] Timewell v Virgoe (1868) 5 WW & A’B (L) 147................................. [33.8.920] Timms v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2002] NSWCA 298....... [33.2.570] Tinaroo Shire Council v Purcell [1904] St R Qd 186.......................... [33.8.830] Tingle v JB Hinz & Sons [1970] Qd R 108.......................................... [33.9.930] Tippett v Fraser (1999) 74 SASR 522; [1999] SASC 267.............. [33.10.1740] Titchener v British Railways Board [1983] 1 WLR 1427................... [33.3.490], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267................ [33.2.1740], [33.2.1760], [33.10.1980] Tobin v The Queen (1864) 16 CB(NS) 310; 143 ER 1148................. [33.6.580], [33.6.610] Todman v Victa Ltd [1982] VR 849...................................................... [33.4.400] Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632...............[33.10.170], [33.10.360], [33.10.550], [33.10.560], [33.10.590], [33.10.710], [33.10.800] Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47........................ [33.3.160], [33.3.220], [33.4.30], [33.4.430] Tompkin v American Brands 219 F 3d 566 (2000).............................. [33.4.430] Toohey v Hollier (1955) 92 CLR 618.......................... [33.2.1370], [33.10.1750] Topladye v Stalye (1649) Style 165; 82 ER 615...................................[33.6.440] Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 976.....[33.2.800] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxviii

TABLE OF CASES

Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48....[33.6.150], [33.6.710], [33.7.30], [33.7.530], [33.7.670] Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106; [1969] 2 WLR 289...................................................................................... [33.8.1230] Torrent v Lancaster [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-089......................[33.10.970] Toteff v Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647................................................ [33.10.1680] Tottenham Investments Pty Ltd v Carburettor Services Pty Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-292......................................................................... [33.8.940] Towart v Adler (1989) 52 SASR 373.................................................... [33.2.950] Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; [2012] WASCA 212....................................................................................................[33.2.1330] Toyota Finance Australia Ltd v Dennis (2002) 58 NSWLR 101; [2002] NSWCA 369...................................................................................... [33.9.410] Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384....................................................... [33.8.880] Tracey; Ex parte Ryan, Re (1989) 166 CLR 518; 63 ALJR 250.........[33.9.460] Trade Credits Ltd v Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd (1985) 12 NSWLR 670............................................................................. [33.10.1720] Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382......................................................................................[33.11.350] Trade Practices Commission v Queensland Aggregates Pty Ltd (No 3) (1982) 61 FLR 52; 1 TPR 417................................................................... [33.8.1780] Traecey v Churchill [1980] 1 NSWLR 442........................................ [33.10.590] Traffıc Calming Australia Pty Ltd v CTS Creative Traffıc Solutions Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 741...............................................................................[33.8.1180] Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200............................................................... [33.7.900] Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 3 WLR 1467; [2003] UKHL 61................. [33.6.150], [33.6.160], [33.7.230] Transfield Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hall (2008) 75 NSWLR 12; [2008] NSWCA 294................................................................... [33.3.280], [33.6.720] Trans-Pacific Insurance Co (Aust) Ltd v Grand Union Insurance Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 675................................................................... [33.10.530] Travis v Vanderloos (1984) 54 LGRA 268..... [33.7.240], [33.7.250], [33.7.870] Treasure Cot Co Ltd v Hamley Bros Ltd (1950) 67 RPC 89........... [33.10.1710] Treloar v Henderson [1968] NZLR 1085......................................... [33.10.2120] Trend v Trend (1987) 4 MVR 423.........................................................[33.6.290] Trend Management Ltd v Borg (1996) 40 NSWLR 500; 72 IR 16... [33.10.210] Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679; [1981] 3 WLR 766................................................................. [33.8.1990], [33.8.2000] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxix

TABLE OF CASES

Treonne Wholesale Meats Pty Ltd v Shaheen (1988) 12 NSWLR 522............................................................................... [33.10.980] Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2), Re [1963] Ch 199; [1962] 3 WLR 955.... [33.8.2000] Trethowan v Capron [1961] VR 460...............[33.6.350], [33.6.390], [33.6.470] Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285................[33.2.1170], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1640], [33.8.1660], [33.8.1700] Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107; 62 ALJR 508..........................................[33.9.940], [33.9.960] Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497; 51 SR (NSW) 173; 68 WN (NSW) 187.......................................................................................[33.10.180] Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147..... [33.8.190], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1550], [33.8.1830], [33.8.1870], [33.9.480], [33.9.520], [33.9.560], [33.9.590] Trotter v South Australia (unreported, SASC, Zelling AJ, SCGRG 357 of 1984, 27 November 1992).............................................................. [33.8.1540] Trustbank Canterbury Ltd v Lockwood Buildings Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 666.....................................................................................[33.10.210] Trustees of Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-399.............................................................. [33.2.1000] Tsouvalla v Bini [1966] SASR 157....................................................... [33.9.190] Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 136 CLR 681n; 50 ALJR 720...............................................................[33.4.460], [33.10.1990] Tuberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684.........................[33.8.430] Tucker v Hennessy [1918] VLR 56....................................................... [33.6.290] Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222...............[33.2.1810], [33.4.450], [33.5.150] Tuckett v Brice [1917] VLR 36............................................................. [33.7.710] Tuite v Exelby (1992) 25 ATR 81...................................[33.10.570], [33.10.580] Tuncel v Renown Plate Co Pty Ltd [1976] VR 501......................... [33.10.2160] Turner v Ambler (1847) 10 QB 252; 116 ER 98................................[33.8.1880] Turner v New South Wales Mont de Piete Deposit & Investment Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 539; 10 SR (NSW) 900; 27 WN (NSW) 87.....................[33.8.710], [33.10.230] Turner v Stallibrass [1898] 1 QB 56.................................................... [33.1.140] Turner v Wright (1880) 6 VLR (L) 273..............................................[33.8.1860] Twentieth Century Blinds Pty Ltd v Howes [1974] 1 NSWLR 244.....[33.6.460] Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464..............................................[33.10.2120] Twine v Bean’s Express Ltd (1946) 62 TLR 458................................. [33.6.680] Twomax Ltd v Dickson, McFarlane & Robinson [1982] SC 113........ [33.2.660] Tyler; Ex parte Foley, Re (1994) 181 CLR 18; 68 ALJR 499.............[33.9.460] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxx

TABLE OF CASES

Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd v Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 526...........................................................................[33.2.810]

U Udale v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1983] 1 WLR 1098.....[33.2.1400] Ultramares Corp v Touche, 174 NE 441 (1931)............... [33.2.210], [33.2.300] Unik Time Co Ltd v Unik Time Ltd [1983] FSR 121....................... [33.10.1710] Union Lighterage Co v London Graving Dock Co [1902] 2 Ch 557............................................................................................ [33.7.710] Union Transport Finance Ltd v British Car Auctions Ltd [1978] 2 All ER 385............................................................................................... [33.8.810] United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1.................... [33.11.220] United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v Hardy (1991) 23 NSWLR 323; 6 BR 300....................................................................................................[33.8.2020] United Uranium NL v Fisher (1964) 112 CLR 676n; [1965] ALR 99...................................................................................[33.9.770] Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Miller [2015] NSWCA 320....................................................................................................[33.2.1010] Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways (1958) 101 CLR 73; [1958] Qd R 528; (1958) 32 ALJR 228........................................................... [33.11.390] Upton v TVW Enterprises Ltd [1985] ATPR 40-611............................ [33.8.880] Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124...[33.8.1910], [33.10.10], [33.10.30], [33.10.180], [33.10.190], [33.10.200], [33.10.1100] Uzabeaga v Cottesloe Town [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-739; [2004] WASCA 57.........................................................................................[33.3.160]

V Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88; [1969] 3 WLR 927........................................................................................ [33.4.170] Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62............. [33.2.80], [33.2.230], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1520], [33.2.1530], [33.2.1600], [33.3.20], [33.3.160], [33.3.220], [33.3.230], [33.3.240], [33.3.260], [33.3.270], [33.3.500], [33.4.30], [33.4.430], [33.4.440] Vale v Whiddon (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 90; 67 WN (NSW) 119; 17 LGR (NSW) 197...........................................................................................[33.3.30] Van Amstel v Country Roads Board [1961] VR 780.......................... [33.10.370] Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v Aulsebrooks Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 354; (1984) 2 IPR 337....................................................................... [33.8.1150], [33.8.1160] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828.............. [33.10.590], [33.10.930], [33.10.990] Van Gervan v Fenton [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-103...................[33.10.990] Van Heeren v Cooper [1999] 1 NZLR 731.........................................[33.8.1850] Van Oppen & Co Ltd v Tredegars Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 504.................[33.8.890] Van Win Pty Ltd v Eleventh Mirontron Pty Ltd [1986] VR 484; (1985) 58 LGRA 259.................................................................................. [33.11.360] Vancouver v Rhodes [1955] 1 DLR 139.........................[33.11.153], [33.11.240] Vanderpant v Mayfair Hotel Co Ltd [1930] 1 Ch 138......................... [33.7.680] Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35.... [33.8.1830], [33.8.1850], [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1980] Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56; [2013] 2 AC 1................................................................................................[33.6.630] Varmedja v Varmedja [2008] NSWCA 177.......................................... [33.8.460] Vassilef v BGC Marine Services (NSW) Pty Ltd [1980] Qd R 21.... [33.10.940], [33.10.2140] Vaughan v Shire of Benalla (1891) 17 VLR 129...............[33.7.490], [33.8.480] Veivers v Connolly [1995] 2 Qd R 326............................................... [33.2.1400] Venables v West (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 54; 20 WN (NSW) 26.......... [33.10.1470] Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299.......... [33.8.310], [33.8.1600], [33.9.190], [33.9.600] Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577.....................................[33.2.1300] Vero Lenders v Taylor Byrne Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1430, Greenwood J at [57]................................................................................................... [33.11.150] Verwayen v Commonwealth (No 2) [1989] VR 712............................. [33.2.390] Verwayen v Commonwealth [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-173...........[33.2.390] Veselinovic v Thorley [1988] 1 Qd R 191...........................................[33.10.990] Vesey v Public Trustee (SA) [1960] SASR 71.................................. [33.10.1210] Vickery v Taylor (1910) 11 SR (NSW) 119; 28 WN (NSW) 43........[33.8.1260] Victoria v Bryar (1970) 44 ALJR 174.................................................[33.2.1000] Victoria v Hodgson [1992] 2 VR 613................................................... [33.2.670] Victoria v Horvath (2002) 6 VR 326; [2002] VSCA 177................... [33.2.390], [33.6.610] Victoria v Howie [1985] Aust Torts Reports 80-722........................ [33.10.1460] Victoria in Neal v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 454; 213 A Crim R 190......................................................................................................[33.9.210] Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 997............................................................................................... [33.1.290] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxii

TABLE OF CASES

Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 38 SR (NSW) 33; 55 WN (NSW) 13.....[33.7.220], [33.8.150] Victorian Railways Commissioners v Hale [1953] VLR 477.............[33.10.170] Victorian WorkCover Authority v Monash University [2016] VSC 178....................................................................................................[33.2.1030] Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650; [1963] 3 WLR 374................................................................. [33.2.1340], [33.2.1360] Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-541; [1999] NSWSC 1113..............................................................[33.10.180], [33.10.190] Vince v Cripps Bakery Pty Ltd [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-668....[33.2.1290] Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1......[33.1.140], [33.2.800], [33.2.1160], [33.2.1520], [33.3.190], [33.3.290], [33.3.300], [33.3.310], [33.4.350], [33.4.500], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] Volman (t/as Volman Engineering) v Lobb [2005] NSWCA 348.........[33.7.380] Von Stanke v Northumberland Bay Pty Ltd [2008] SADC 61......... [33.10.1490] Vooght v Winch (1819) 2 B & Ald 662; 106 ER 507.......................... [33.7.710] Vorvis v Insurance Corp (BC) [1989] 1 SCR 1085; (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 193.................................................................................[33.1.310], [33.10.210] Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) 112 CLR 316; 38 ALJR 48............[33.2.1030], [33.2.1600] Vunic v Housing Trust (SA) [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-211......... [33.2.1560]

W W, Re (1997) 136 FLR 421....................................................................[33.9.300] W v Essex County Council [1999] Fam 90; [1998] 3 WLR 534......... [33.2.380] W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction), Re [1993] Fam 64; [1992] 3 WLR 758............................................................................ [33.9.300] Wade v Allsopp (1976) 136 CLR 681n; 50 ALJR 643......................[33.10.890], [33.10.900] Wade Sawmill Pty Ltd v Colenden Pty Ltd (t/as Pilks Pine) [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-927; [2007] QCA 455..................................[33.8.950], [33.8.960] Wagner v International Railway Co 133 NE 437 (1921)...................[33.2.1360] Wagon Mound (No 1), The (Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451......[33.1.290], [33.7.215], [33.7.860], [33.8.340], [33.10.2060] Wagon Mound (No 2), The (Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165............ [33.2.1510], [33.2.1550], [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

[33.3.240], [33.4.440], [33.7.30], [33.7.200], [33.7.380], [33.7.510], [33.7.860], [33.10.2060], [33.10.2070], [33.10.2090], [33.10.2100] Wagstaff v Haslam (2007) 69 NSWLR 1; [2007] NSWCA 28.......... [33.2.1160] Wah Tat Bank Ltd v Chan Cheng Kum [1975] AC 507; [1975] 2 WLR 475...................................................................................... [33.11.230] Wainright v Home Offıce [2004] 2 AC 406; [2003] 3 WLR 1137; [2004] UKHRR 154; [2003] UKHL 53].................................................... [33.8.2135] Walker v Carter [2011] HCATrans 250.................................................[33.8.325] Walker v FAI Insurance Ltd [1991] Tas R 258................................... [33.10.530] Walker v Hall (1876) 40 JP 456............................................................ [33.6.370] Walker v Hamm [2008] VSC 596.....................................[33.8.325], [33.8.2130] Walker v Tugend (1981) 28 SASR 194..... [33.10.360], [33.10.850], [33.10.940] Walker as Commissioner for Fair Trading (WA) v Rugs A Million Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 127............................................................................. [33.8.520] Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375; 87 ALJR 648; [2013] HCA 19...............................................................[33.1.280], [33.4.490] Wallace v Newton [1982] 1 WLR 375.................................................. [33.6.360] Waller v James (2006) 226 CLR 136; 80 ALJR 846; [2006] HCA 16................................................................................[33.2.1390] Wallis v Dawkins (1881) 15 SALR 132................................................ [33.6.460] Walmsley v Humenick [1954] 2 DLR 232.............................................[33.8.310] Walsh v Curry [1955] NI 112.............................................................. [33.11.370] Walsh v Ervin [1952] VLR 361..................... [33.7.500], [33.7.510], [33.8.1570] Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39....................... [33.8.1680], [33.8.1740], [33.8.1743], [33.8.1760], [33.8.1780], [33.10.1100] Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315; 64 ER 849..........................[33.7.200] Walter D Wallet, The [1893] P 202..................................................... [33.8.1820] Walter H Wright Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1958] VR 318...............[33.11.370] Walton v British Leyland UK Ltd (unreported, UKHC, Willis J, 12 July 1978)................................................................................................ [33.4.1100] Wan v Sweetman (1998) 19 WAR 94.................................................. [33.8.1880] Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc [2001] 1 WLR 368........................................................................................ [33.7.380] Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc [2002] QB 756; [2002] 2 WLR 512; [2001] EWCA Civ 1236...........................[33.6.310], [33.7.380] Wann v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 596...... [33.10.970], [33.10.990] Ward v Cannock Chase District Council [1986] Ch 546; [1986] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

2 WLR 660...................................... [33.10.1370], [33.10.1390], [33.10.2020] Ward v Hertfordshire County Council [1970] 1 WLR 356................ [33.2.1010] Ward v Lewis (1896) 22 VLR 410........................................................ [33.1.340] Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 810...................................... [33.2.1800] Warden v Bailey (1811) 4 Taunt 67; 128 ER 253...............................[33.8.1820] Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514; 66 ALJR 839...............................................................[33.4.785], [33.10.1980] Waribay Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison [1991] 2 VR 391........................ [33.10.2030] Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180; 140 ER 1052............... [33.8.1540], [33.8.1550], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1670] Warnock v Victoria [2006] VSCA 205.................................................. [33.3.320] Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293................... [33.8.1780] Warren v Haines [1986] Aust Torts Reports 81-014.......................... [33.2.1000] Warren v Scruttons Ltd [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 497.......................... [33.10.2070] Warwick v Foulkes (1844) 12 M & W 507; 152 ER 1298............... [33.8.1743], [33.8.1780] Warwicker Assessments v Zadow (1989) 1 WAR 307...... [33.2.550], [33.2.600], [33.2.630], [33.2.820] Washburn v Robertson (1912) 8 DLR 183......................................... [33.8.1700] Watch Tower Bible Society v Sahas (2008) 36 WAR 234; [2008] WASCA 51........................................................................................................[33.8.950] Waters v Maynard (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 618; 41 WN (NSW) 166... [33.8.470], [33.9.240], [33.10.230] Waters v Mussig [1986] 1 Qd R 224...................................................[33.10.990] Waterwell Shipping Inc v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-444....................................................................... [33.2.1620] Watkins v Loosemore (1986) 4 MVR 367.............................................[33.6.300] Watkins v Victoria (2010) 27 VR 543; 203 A Crim R 20; [2010] VSCA 138......................................................................................................[33.8.370] Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 174............................................................................ [33.4.340], [33.4.440] Watson v Cowen [1959] Tas SR 194..................................................... [33.8.500] Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd [1960] SC (HL) 92........................................................................................................[33.4.350] Watson v George (1953) 89 CLR 409................................[33.3.290], [33.3.300] Watson v Haines [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-094......[33.2.1010], [33.2.1610] Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; 45 ALJR 444.................. [33.8.1520], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1590], [33.8.1700], [33.8.1740] Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480........................................................ [33.9.570] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxv

TABLE OF CASES

Watson v Powles [1968] 1 QB 596; [1967] 3 WLR 1364................. [33.10.810] Watson Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels & Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104.................................................................................[33.10.20], [33.10.170] Watt v Bretag (1982) 56 ALJR 760..................................[33.9.860], [33.11.390] Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 WLR 835................. [33.2.1610] Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353............................................ [33.2.1380], [33.9.230] Watters v Glace Bay Town (1987) 34 DLR (4th) 747........................[33.8.1740] Watts v Fraser (1835) 1 M & Rob 449; 174 ER 154...................... [33.10.1100] Watts v Leitch [1973] Tas SR 16.................................... [33.10.190], [33.10.220] Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421................................................... [33.1.300] Watts v Public Trustee (WA) [1980] WAR 97.......................................[33.2.340] Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; 34 ALJR 186....... [33.2.1290], [33.2.1330], [33.2.1740], [33.10.2070], [33.10.2140] Waugh v James K Allan Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1........................ [33.2.1650] Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250... [33.2.1050], [33.5.250], [33.5.270], [33.6.10] Waugh v Montgomery (1882) 8 VLR (L) 290................... [33.6.410], [33.6.430] Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher [1996] QB 334; [1995] 3 WLR 772........................................................................................ [33.8.830] Waverley Council v Ferreira [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-818; [2005] NSWCA 418..................................................................... [33.2.60], [33.2.790] Waverley Council v Lodge (2001) 117 LGERA 447; [2001] NSWCA 439...................................................................................[33.3.260], [33.3.500] Wayman v Davies (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Meagher JJA and Fitzgerald AJA, CA 40047 of 1996, 12 August 1998).................... [33.6.300] WD & HO Wills (Aust) Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1998) 43 NSWLR 338................................................................................. [33.2.820] Weaver v Ward (1616) Hob 134; 80 ER 284..................... [33.8.310], [33.9.330] Webb v South Australia (1982) 56 ALJR 912..................[33.2.1560], [33.4.400] Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886....................[33.9.560], [33.9.590] Webster v McIntosh (1980) 49 FLR 317; 3 A Crim R 455..................[33.9.500] Weeks v Weeks (1977) 81 DLR (3d) 371.............................................. [33.6.430] Weinert v Schmidt (2002) 84 SASR 307; [2002] SASC 340............. [33.10.930] Welbridge Holdings Ltd v Greater Winnipeg (Municipality) [1971] SCR 957; (1970) 22 DLR (3d) 470................................................................... [33.2.590] Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956...................... [33.10.10], [33.10.2170] Wellaway v Courtier [1918] 1 KB 200.............................. [33.6.410], [33.6.440] Weller & Co v Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] 1 QB 569; [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxvi

TABLE OF CASES

[1965] 3 WLR 1082........................................................................ [33.2.1370] Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1; 38 ER 236.................[33.9.300] Wellington v Arters (1792) 5 TR 64; 101 ER 37..............................[33.10.2030] Wellington City v Singh [1971] NZLR 1025.........................................[33.8.880] Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 QB 265; [1958] 3 WLR 128...................... [33.2.1660] Wells v D’Amico [1961] VR 672.........................................................[33.10.370] Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland Sand & Silica Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170; [1964] 2 WLR 453........................................................................................ [33.4.160] Welton v North Cornwall District Council [1997] 1 WLR 570........... [33.2.380] Wenck v Morris Woollen Mills (Ipswich) Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 142.................................................................................[33.5.160], [33.6.10] Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454; 46 ALJR 498.... [33.1.290], [33.10.1870] Wenn v Evans (1985) 2 SR (WA) 263............................... [33.8.410], [33.9.370] Wenpac Pty Ltd v Allied Westralian Finance Ltd (1994) 123 FLR 1..........................................................................................[33.8.860] Wentworth v Attorney General (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 481.........[33.8.1940] Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] QB 654; [1993] 2 WLR 175...................................................................................... [33.10.530] West v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62; 55 ALJR 544..................................................................................[33.10.1980] West v Nicholas (1915) 17 WALR 49................................................... [33.7.240] West v Peters (1976) 18 SASR 338.................................................... [33.8.1600] West v Smallwood (1838) 3 M & W 418; 150 ER 1208....................[33.8.1550] West Virginia v Muegge, 360 SE 2d 216 (1987)................................ [33.8.1520] West Wiltshire District Council v Garland [1995] Ch 297; [1995] 2 WLR 439........................................................................................ [33.5.260] Western Australia v Dale (1996) 15 WAR 464; 90 LGERA 307........ [33.3.170] Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; 76 ALJR 1098; [2002] HCA 28..................................................................................[33.8.480] Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248.................................. [33.10.1990] Western Credits Pty Ltd v Dragan Motors Pty Ltd [1973] WAR 184.................................................... [33.10.1500], [33.10.1520] Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511................ [33.3.220], [33.3.240], [33.3.250], [33.3.260], [33.3.350] Westpac Banking Corp v Hughes (2012) 1 Qd R 581; [2011] QCA 42........................................................................................................[33.8.810] Westripp v Baldock [1938] 2 All ER 779............................................. [33.8.510] Westripp v Baldock [1939] 1 All ER 279............................................. [33.8.510] Westwood v Cordwell [1983] 1 Qd R 276................. [33.10.1380], [33.10.1390] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxvii

TABLE OF CASES

Whatman v Pearson (1868) LR 3 CP 422............................................ [33.6.660] Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552; [1966] 2 WLR 581....... [33.3.170] Wheatland v Dixon (1995) 22 MVR 431............................................[33.2.1760] Wheelahan v City of Casey (No 3) [2011] VSC 15..............................[33.2.680] Wheeler v Baldwin (1934) 52 CLR 609................................................[33.8.480] Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19; [1995] 3 WLR 466.......... [33.6.310], [33.7.660] Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 669.................[33.5.420], [33.9.930] Wheeler v Page (1982) 31 SASR 1.................................................... [33.10.530] Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107....................................... [33.7.190], [33.7.200], [33.7.680], [33.7.840] Whinfield v Lands Purchase & Management Board (Vic) (1914) 18 CLR 606; [1914] VLR 662............................................................. [33.6.160], [33.9.580] Whippey v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 452............................................. [33.6.290] Whitbread v Rail Corp (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 130......... [33.8.410], [33.9.370] White v Australian & New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 266; 17 ALJR 30........................................................................................[33.1.300] White v Betalli (2007) 71 NSWLR 381; [2007] NSWCA 243............ [33.5.200] White v Blackmore [1972] 2 QB 651; [1972] 3 WLR 296................. [33.3.500], [33.9.940] White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455; [1998] 3 WLR 1509.................................................................................... [33.2.1300] White v Combridge (1984) 59 ACTR 18............................................ [33.10.800] White v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK), The Times, 24 April 1982..................................................................................................[33.8.1910] White v Connolly [1927] St R Qd 75....................................................[33.9.370] White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 81 ALJR 1259; [2007] HCA 29..................................................................................[33.9.460] White v John Warwick & Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1285........................[33.1.140] White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18......... [33.8.360], [33.8.375], [33.8.400], [33.8.410], [33.8.450], [33.9.260], [33.9.280] White v Jones [1993] 3 WLR 730......................................[33.2.270], [33.2.340] White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207; [1995] 2 WLR 187.......................... [33.2.540] White v McLean (1890) 24 SALR 97................................................... [33.7.710] White v Pile (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 176...............................................[33.9.330] White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95...........................................[33.8.430], [33.8.440], [33.8.1743], [33.8.1747] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxviii

TABLE OF CASES

White v Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 97...... [33.10.900] White v Weller; Ex parte White [1959] Qd R 192................................[33.9.450] White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart [2002] HCATrans 340..........................................................[33.8.1690], [33.8.1890], [33.8.1960] Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; 21 SR (NSW) 398; 38 WN (NSW) 6....................................[33.8.1240], [33.10.200], [33.10.210] Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538........................................................................................ [33.10.1420] Wickham v Treloar (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 7; 77 WN (NSW) 350..... [33.10.840] Wickham Holdings Ltd v Brooke House Motors Ltd (1967) 1 WLR 295.................................................................................... [33.10.1510] Wieben v Wain (1991) 13 MVR 393................................................... [33.10.960] Wiech v Amato (1973) 6 SASR 442.................................[33.2.1640], [33.9.730] Wiffen v Bailey [1915] 1 KB 600................................... [33.8.1820], [33.8.1890] Wilchick v Marks [1934] 2 KB 56........................................................ [33.7.540] Wilding v Burgemeister [2012] SADC 152...........................................[33.6.460] Wilkes v Lord Halifax (1768) 19 St Tr 1406........................................ [33.9.540] Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1; 98 ER 489....[33.8.410], [33.8.1743], [33.9.540] Wilkins v Manning (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 220.................................... [33.6.470] Wilkinson v Cooperative Estates Ltd (1919) 15 Tas LR 22................. [33.7.850] Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57......... [33.8.190], [33.8.325], [33.8.2130], [33.8.2135], [33.10.830] Wilkinson v Joyceman [1985] 1 Qd R 567........................................... [33.3.350] Wilkinson v Spooner [1957] Tas SR 121...............................................[33.7.710] Willcox v Kettell [1937] 1 All ER 222.................................................. [33.9.260] Willett v Futcher (2005) 221 CLR 627; 79 ALJR 1523; [2005] HCA 47................................................................................[33.10.980] Willey v Synan (1937) 57 CLR 200...................................................... [33.8.830] Williams v Attorney-General [1990] 1 NZLR 646............................... [33.2.820] Williams v Banks (1859) 1 F & F 557; 175 ER 851..........................[33.8.1900] Williams v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1995) 21 MVR 148......................................................................................................[33.9.860] Williams v Holland (1833) 10 Bing 112; 131 ER 848......................... [33.8.300] Williams v Home Offıce (No 2) [1981] 1 All ER 1211...................... [33.8.1610] Williams v Home Offıce (No 2) [1982] 2 All ER 564........................ [33.8.1610] Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269....................[33.8.1190], [33.8.1260], [33.8.1270], [33.10.180], [33.10.210] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxix

TABLE OF CASES

Williams v Jones (1736) Cas t Hard 298; 95 ER 193........................ [33.8.1570] Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820.... [33.1.340], [33.8.160], [33.8.310], [33.8.320], [33.8.1600], [33.8.1650], [33.9.200] Williams v Oataway (2005) 11 VR 529; [2005] VSCA 137.............. [33.10.540] Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431................[33.8.1940], [33.8.1950], [33.8.1960], [33.8.1980], [33.8.2010] Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1.......................................................................................[33.9.510], [33.9.520] Williams v Twynam Agricultural Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1098........................................................ [33.2.1060], [33.2.1150], [33.2.1160] Williamson v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 252; 76 WN (NSW) 648.....................................................[33.10.370], [33.10.570] Williamson v Friend (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 133; 18 WN (NSW) 194.........................................................................................[33.7.540] Williamson v GJ Coles & Co Ltd [1985] VR 59..................................[33.3.360] Willis v Allen [1923] SASR 146.......................................................... [33.11.160] Willis v Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105; 48 WALR 93..............[33.10.490] Willoughby Municipal Council v Halstead (1916) 22 CLR 352; 17 SR (NSW) 202; 33 WN (NSW) 198; 3 LGR (NSW) 165............................... [33.10.210] Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; [1988] 2 WLR 557................................................................. [33.4.460], [33.10.1990] Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43...................................................................... [33.9.940], [33.9.960] Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1294...[33.8.730], [33.8.750], [33.8.860] Wilson v Marshall [1982] Tas R 287.................................................... [33.8.770] Wilson v McLeay (1961) 106 CLR 523; [1961] Qd R 488; (1961) 35 ALJR 256.................................................................[33.10.30], [33.10.970] Wilson v New Brighton Panelbeaters Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 74............ [33.8.340], [33.9.150] Wilson v Peisley (1975) 50 ALJR 207.... [33.10.360], [33.10.800], [33.10.2070] Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237; [1986] 3 WLR 1............................. [33.8.370] Wilson v Rastall (1792) 4 TR 753; 100 ER 1283.............................[33.10.2030] Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57................... [33.2.1030], [33.2.1060], [33.11.153] Wilton v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1973] 2 NSWLR 644................................................................ [33.8.710], [33.9.600] Wilton v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1974] 2 NSWLR 96..................................................................................... [33.8.710] Windeyer v Riddell (1847) 1 Legge 295............................................... [33.8.560] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxx

TABLE OF CASES

Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi (2011) 254 FLR 87; [2011] NSWSC 196...................................................................................[33.8.590], [33.8.600] Winkfield, The [1902] P 42............................................. [33.8.710], [33.10.1510] Winky Pop Pty Ltd v Mobil Refining Australia Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 348..................................................................................................[33.10.1400] Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v G [1997] 3 SCR 925; (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 193................................................................[33.9.230] Winter v Bancks (1901) 84 LT 504....................................................... [33.8.890] Winter v Bennett [1956] VLR 612.........................................................[33.9.860] Winteringham v Rae (1965) 55 DLR (2d) 108................................. [33.10.2070] Winters v Burrows (unreported, NSWCA, Samuels, Mahoney and McHugh JJA, CA 289 of 1986, 6 August 1987)............................. [33.6.290] Winters v Davidson (1989) 9 MVR 239............................................. [33.2.1570] Wise Bros Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1947) 75 CLR 59; 48 SR (NSW) 54; 65 WN (NSW) 28.................................................... [33.6.160] Withers v Henley (1614) Cro Jac 379; 79 ER 324............................. [33.8.1610] Withyman v New South Wales [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-124; [2013] NSWCA 10........................................................................................ [33.2.990] Wodrow v Commonwealth (1993) 45 FCR 52.................................. [33.10.2170] Wollington v State Electricity Commission (Vic) (No 2) [1980] VR 91.................................................................................[33.10.2160] Wollongong City Council v Fregnan [1982] 1 NSWLR 244; (1982) 46 LGRA 391...................................... [33.2.1130], [33.10.490], [33.10.1390] Wood v Fetherston (1901) 27 VLR 492................................................[33.9.570] Wood v Mason Bros Ltd (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 66; 8 WN (NSW) 114......................................................................................... [33.8.860] Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 183; 107 ACTR 1; 7 BR 309................................................................ [33.10.1100] Woodhead v Barrow [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-238....................[33.10.800], [33.10.870] Woodland v Essex County Council [2014] AC 537; [2013] 3 WLR 1227; [2013] UKSC 66................................................................................[33.6.720] Woodman v Richardson & Concrete Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 866............[33.3.160] Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9.....[33.2.1610], [33.3.260], [33.3.290], [33.3.300], [33.3.470], [33.4.30], [33.4.430], [33.9.880], [33.9.910] Woodward v Porteous [1971] Tas SR 386 (NC 25)............................. [33.9.840] Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16.................... [33.1.10], [33.1.140], [33.2.340], [33.2.530], [33.2.570], [33.2.600], [33.2.660], [33.2.810], [33.2.820], [33.2.1130], [33.4.380] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxi

TABLE OF CASES

Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-660; [2002] QCA 88.................................................................. [33.2.1130] Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43; [1962] 3 WLR 616.............[33.2.1700], [33.3.490] Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (1996) 40 NSWLR 101; 91 LGERA 361...........................................[33.2.570], [33.2.810], [33.2.820], [33.2.1130] Woollen Underwear Case (Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49......... [33.1.300], [33.2.1760], [33.2.1780], [33.4.30], [33.4.170], [33.4.220], [33.4.340], [33.4.350], [33.4.360], [33.4.440] Woollerton & Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 411........................................................................................ [33.8.580] Woolley v Dunford (1972) 3 SASR 243......................... [33.8.1180], [33.8.1230] Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003, Re (2004) 225 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 43; [2004] HCA 49..................................................................................[33.9.300] Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603; 60 WN (NSW) 90..... [33.4.170], [33.10.1210] Woolworths Ltd v Perrins [2015] QCA 207....................................... [33.2.1040] Woolworths (WA) Pty Ltd v Berkeley Challenge Pty Ltd (2004) 28 WAR 540; [2004] WASCA 196.........................................................................[33.11.360] Workman v Cowper [1961] 2 QB 143; [1961] 2 WLR 386.................[33.9.380] World Series Cricket Pty Ltd v Parish (1977) 16 ALR 181............ [33.10.2280] Wormald v Cole [1954] 1 QB 614; [1954] 2 WLR 613... [33.6.410], [33.6.430] Wormald v Robertson [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-180.....................[33.3.180] Worth v Gilling (1866) LR 2 CP 1........................................................[33.6.360] Wren v Holt [1903] 1 KB 610............................................................... [33.4.170] Wright v Albany Shire Council [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-239....[33.10.890] Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255...... [33.4.370], [33.4.400], [33.4.440] Wright v Lodge [1993] 4 All ER 299............................. [33.11.170], [33.11.390] Wright v Wilson (1699) 1 Ld Raym 739; 91 ER 1394.......................[33.8.1580] Wringe v Cohen [1940] 1 KB 229........................................................ [33.7.530] Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30; [1973] 2 WLR 405............................. [33.10.1870] Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798............................................................. [33.10.1430], [33.10.1870] Wyatt v Rosherville Gardens Co (1886) 2 TLR 282......... [33.6.350], [33.6.390] Wyatt v White (1860) 5 Hurl & N 371; 157 ER 1226...[33.8.1820], [33.8.1850] Wyllie v Tarrison Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 184.................................... [33.4.160]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxii

TABLE OF CASES

Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65.....[33.9.720], [33.9.840], [33.9.850], [33.10.2150], [33.11.390] Wynn v Insurance Ministerial Corp (NSW) (1995) 184 CLR 485; 70 ALJR 147...............................................................[33.10.880], [33.10.890] Wynn Tresidder Management Pty Ltd v Barkho [2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-016; [2009] NSWCA 149............................................................ [33.5.210] Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106....... [33.2.60], [33.2.230], [33.2.240], [33.2.790], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1516], [33.2.1520], [33.2.1530], [33.2.1550], [33.2.1560], [33.3.220], [33.3.340], [33.4.440] Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-754; [2004] NSWCA 247..................................................................... [33.2.80], [33.3.160]

X X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26................. [33.2.1380], [33.9.230], [33.10.1990], [33.10.2030] X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network (Randwick and Westmead) (incorporating the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children) (2013) 85 NSWLR 294; [2013] NSWCA 320............................................. [33.8.375] X v Sydney Children’s Hospital Network (2013) 85 NSWLR 294; [2013] NSWCA 320...................................................................................... [33.9.300] X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 152............................... [33.2.390], [33.5.150], [33.5.180], [33.5.220] XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352..................[33.8.410], [33.8.1750], [33.8.1910], [33.10.180], [33.10.190], [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.220], [33.11.157], [33.11.230] Xuereb v Viola [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-012............[33.7.220], [33.7.240], [33.8.150]

Y Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd [1949] DLR 1; [1949] AC 386.......... [33.2.1640] Yakamia Dairy Pty Ltd v Wood [1976] WAR 57.................................. [33.6.430] Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151......................................... [33.10.2040] Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351; [1999] HCA 53....................... [33.8.710] Yardley v Hine (1867) 17 LT 264........................................................[33.8.1760] Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664; [2000] FCA 1106.................................................................................................. [33.11.370] Yianni v Edwin Evans & Sons [1982] QB 438; [1981] 3 WLR 843..................................................................... [33.2.580], [33.2.640] [References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxiii

TABLE OF CASES

Yisrael v Chamberlain John Deer Pty Ltd (1987) 5 MVR 491........... [33.9.800] York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391...... [33.7.380], [33.7.660], [33.7.700], [33.7.840], [33.7.890], [33.9.590], [33.10.2280] Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776........ [33.6.170], [33.8.1310] Yorke v Ross Lucas Pty Ltd (1982) 69 FLR 116; 2 TPR 199............[33.8.1310] Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691................................................................................... [33.4.460] Yorkshire Electricity Board v Naylor [1968] AC 529; [1967] 2 WLR 1114.................................................................................... [33.10.850] Youl v Harbottle (1791) 1 Peake 68; 170 ER 81..................................[33.8.880] Young v Tomlinson [1979] 2 NZLR 441............................................. [33.2.1130] Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126........ [33.7.240], [33.7.870], [33.7.880], [33.7.900], [33.8.500] Yukong Line Ltd (Korea) v Rendsburg Investment Corp (Liberia) (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 294.......................................................................... [33.8.1260]

Z Zachariassen v Commonwealth (1917) 24 CLR 166............................[33.6.610] Zalewski v Turcarolo [1995] 2 VR 562..............................[33.2.390], [33.9.980] Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11..................... [33.8.430], [33.8.440], [33.8.1570], [33.8.1580] Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 NSWLR 702; [2010] NSWCA 343....... [33.2.1635] Zappia v Allsop (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40192 of 1993, 17 March 1994)......[33.6.460], [33.6.470] Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; 61 ALJR 375; 25 A Crim R 163...................................................... [33.9.350] Zeplin v North German Insurance Co (1880) 1 LR (NSW) L 321... [33.8.1840] Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530; 79 ALJR 217; [2004] HCA 56........................................................... [33.8.1130], [33.8.1250] Zimitat v Douglas [1979] Qd R 454.............................. [33.8.460], [33.10.2280] Zimmler v Manning (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 235....................................[33.9.430] Zraika v Walsh [2015] NSWSC 485................................................... [33.2.1290] Zuijs v Wirth Bros Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 561; [1955] WCR (NSW) 77........................................................................................................[33.6.710] Zumeris v Testa [1972] VR 839........................................................ [33.10.2000] Zumpano v Montagnese [1997] 2 VR 525....................... [33.2.820], [33.2.1130]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxiv

TABLE OF CASES

Zunter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 594; [2005] NSWSC 119.....................................................................................[33.11.390]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxv

TABLE OF CASES

clxxxvi

Table of Legislation [References are to paragraph numbers]

Commonwealth of Australia A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 s 9-5.............................. [33.10.580] s 9-10............................ [33.10.580] Australian Consumer Law................ [33.2.100], [33.2.1140], [33.4.20], [33.4.40], [33.4.630], [33.4.642], [33.4.743], [33.4.820], [33.4.830], [33.4.970], [33.6.170], [33.8.600], [33.8.1310], [33.8.1380], [33.8.1390] s 2(1)...........[33.4.642], [33.4.647], [33.4.650], [33.4.687], [33.4.743], [33.4.780], [33.4.815] s 3(1)...............................[33.4.644] s 3(2)...............................[33.4.644] s 3(4)...............................[33.4.644] ss 3(4) – (9).................... [33.4.644] s 5....................................[33.4.642] s 7(1)...............................[33.4.642] s 7(1)(a).......................... [33.4.750] s 7(1)(b).......................... [33.4.750] s 7(1)(c).......................... [33.4.750] s 7(1)(d).......................... [33.4.750] s 7(1)(e)......... [33.4.20], [33.4.750] s s s s

7(2)...............................[33.4.750] 7(3)...............................[33.4.750] 9....................................[33.4.650] 9(1)...............................[33.4.743]

clxxxvii

s s s s s

9(2)............[33.4.743], [33.4.746] 9(3)...............................[33.4.743] 9(4)...............................[33.4.743] 11..................................[33.4.642] 18..............[33.2.510], [33.2.550], [33.2.670], [33.4.980], [33.6.170], [33.8.1310], [33.8.1380], [33.8.1390], [33.10.2280], [33.11.350], [33.11.390] s 18(1).............................[33.4.970] s 29(1)(a)..... [33.4.970], [33.4.980] s 33..................................[33.4.970] s 54................[33.4.30], [33.4.630], [33.4.689], [33.4.695], [33.4.710] ss 54 – 59....................... [33.4.630] s 54(1).............................[33.4.650] s 54(2).............................[33.4.650] s 54(3).............................[33.4.650] s 54(4).............................[33.4.650] s 54(5).............................[33.4.650] s 54(6).............................[33.4.650] s 54(7).............................[33.4.650] s 55...............[33.4.689], [33.4.710] s 55(1).............................[33.4.660] s 55(2).............................[33.4.660] s 55(2)(a)........................ [33.4.660] s 55(2)(b)........................ [33.4.660] s 55(3).............................[33.4.660] s 56..............[33.4.670], [33.4.680], [33.4.689], [33.4.710] s 56(1).............................[33.4.670] s 56(2).............................[33.4.670]

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s 56(3).............................[33.4.670] s 57..............[33.4.670], [33.4.680], [33.4.689] s 57(1).............................[33.4.680] s 57(1)(c)........................ [33.4.680] ss 57(1)(c) – (e)............. [33.4.680] s 57(2).............................[33.4.680] s 58..................................[33.4.697] s 58(1).............................[33.4.685] s 58(2).............................[33.4.685] s 59..................................[33.4.687] s 59(1).............................[33.4.697] s 59(2).............................[33.4.689] s 60................................[33.2.1140] s 61................................[33.2.1140] s 64..................................[33.4.630] s 104..............................[33.4.1140] s 104(2)......................... [33.4.1160] s 105(1)......................... [33.4.1160] s 106..............................[33.4.1140] s 106(5)......................... [33.4.1140] s 106(7)......................... [33.4.1170] s 109..............................[33.4.1140] s 109(1)......................... [33.4.1150] s 111.............................. [33.4.1150] s 113..............................[33.4.1150] s 114..............................[33.4.1140] s 114(1)......................... [33.4.1150] s 115..............................[33.4.1150] s 116..............................[33.4.1150] s 117..............................[33.4.1150] s 118..............................[33.4.1140] s 118(5)......................... [33.4.1140] s 118(7)......................... [33.4.1170] s 122.........[33.4.1100], [33.4.1120]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

123..............................[33.4.1100] 127..............................[33.4.1120] 128(1)......................... [33.4.1110] 128(2)......................... [33.4.1110] 128(4)......................... [33.4.1110] 128(7)......................... [33.4.1110] 131(1)......................... [33.4.1100] 131(2)......................... [33.4.1100] 131(5)......................... [33.4.1100] 134..............................[33.4.1140] 134(2)......................... [33.4.1160] 135(1)......................... [33.4.1160] 136..............................[33.4.1140] 136(1)......................... [33.4.1170]

ss 136(1) – (3).............. [33.4.1170] s 136(4)......................... [33.4.1170] s 136(5).... [33.4.1140], [33.4.1170] s 136(8)......................... [33.4.1170] s 138............[33.4.740], [33.4.800], [33.4.810], [33.4.820], [33.4.850] s 139............[33.4.740], [33.4.800], [33.4.810], [33.4.820], [33.4.850] s 140............[33.4.740], [33.4.800], [33.4.810], [33.4.820], [33.4.850] s 141............[33.4.740], [33.4.800], [33.4.810], [33.4.820], [33.4.850] s 142................................[33.4.785] s 142(a)(i)....................... [33.4.780] s 142(a)(ii)...................... [33.4.780] s 142(b)........[33.4.450], [33.4.780] s 142(c)........................... [33.4.780] s 142(d)...........................[33.4.780] s 143................................[33.4.820] s 143(1)...........................[33.4.820]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

143(2)...........................[33.4.820] 144................................[33.4.810] 145................................[33.4.820] 147................................[33.4.750] 148(1)(a)...................... [33.4.790] 148(1)(b)...................... [33.4.790] 148(2)...........................[33.4.790] 148(3)...........................[33.4.790] 148(3)(a)...................... [33.4.790] 148(3)(b)...................... [33.4.790] 148(3)(c)...................... [33.4.790] 149(1)...........................[33.4.850] 149(2)...........................[33.4.850] 150................................[33.4.630] 150(1)...........................[33.4.840] 150(2)...........................[33.4.840] 194.........[33.4.1140], [33.4.1170] 194(5)......................... [33.4.1140] 194(6)......................... [33.4.1140] 197..............................[33.4.1140] 197(5)......................... [33.4.1140] 197(6)......................... [33.4.1140] 203.........[33.4.1140], [33.4.1170] 232............................[33.10.2280] 236...............[33.5.10], [33.5.140] 236(1)...... [33.4.980], [33.4.1170] 236(2)..... [33.4.980], [33.4.1170], [33.5.410] 259................................[33.4.694] 259(1)...........................[33.4.689] 259(1)(b)...................... [33.4.694] 259(2)...........................[33.4.691] 259(2)(a)...................... [33.4.692] 259(2)(b)(i).................. [33.4.692] 259(2)(b)(ii)................. [33.4.694]

s 259(3)...........................[33.4.691] s 259(3)(a)...................... [33.4.694] s 259(3)(b)...................... [33.4.693] s 259(4)........[33.4.690], [33.4.710] s 259(5)...........................[33.4.690] s 260................................[33.4.691] s 261................................[33.4.692] s 262(1)...........................[33.4.694] s 262(2)...........................[33.4.694] s 263(2)(a)...................... [33.4.694] s 263(2)(b)...................... [33.4.694] s 263(3)...........................[33.4.694] s 263(4)...........................[33.4.694] s 263(5)...........................[33.4.694] s 263(6)...........................[33.4.694] s 264................................[33.4.694] ss 264 – 266................... [33.4.694] s 271............[33.4.698], [33.4.700], [33.4.710] s 271(1)...........................[33.4.695] s 271(2)...........................[33.4.695] s 271(3)...........................[33.4.696] s 271(4)...........................[33.4.696] s 271(5)...........................[33.4.697] s 271(6).......[33.4.695], [33.4.696], [33.4.697], [33.4.698] s 272(1)...........................[33.4.698] s 272(1)(a)..................... [33.4.695], [33.4.696], [33.4.697] s 272(2)...........................[33.4.698] s 272(3)...........................[33.4.698] s 273................................[33.4.700] s 274................................[33.4.715] s 274(1)...........................[33.4.710] s 274(2)...........................[33.4.710] s 274(3)...........................[33.4.710] s 274(4)...........................[33.4.710]

[References are to paragraph numbers] clxxxix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s 12DA.........[33.2.510], [33.2.670] Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989

s 276................................[33.4.630] s 276(1)...........................[33.4.720] s 276(2)...........................[33.4.720] s 276A.............................[33.4.715] s 276A(1)........................ [33.4.715] s 276A(2)........................ [33.4.715] s 276A(3)........................ [33.4.715] s 276A(4)........................ [33.4.715] Ch 2.................................. [33.4.20] Ch 3.................................. [33.4.20] Pt 2-1.......................... [33.10.1720] Pt 3-1.......................... [33.10.1720] Pt 3-2.............. [33.4.20], [33.4.30], [33.4.630], [33.4.640], [33.4.642] Pt 3-2 Div 1...................[33.4.720], [33.6.170]

s 143(1).........................[33.8.1320] Competition and Consumer Act 2010................. [33.4.30], [33.8.1080], [33.10.2280] s 6....................................[33.4.970] s 82..............................[33.10.1680] s 87G(1)(b)..................... [33.4.820] s 131................................[33.4.970] s 131C.............................[33.4.630] s 131C(1)........................ [33.4.830] s 131C(4)........................ [33.4.830] s 132C........................... [33.4.1120] s 132D...........................[33.4.1120] s 132J............................ [33.4.1120] s 137A........[33.4.800], [33.4.1130] s 137A(1)(a)(ii)...............[33.4.800]

Pt 3-3.............................[33.4.1170] Pt 3-5.............. [33.4.20], [33.4.30], [33.4.630], [33.4.650], [33.4.730], [33.4.740], [33.4.785], [33.4.815], [33.4.820], [33.4.830], [33.4.840], [33.4.860]

s 137A(2)(a)(ii)...............[33.4.800]

Pt 5-4............ [33.4.20], [33.4.640], [33.4.710], [33.4.720] Pt 5-5.............................. [33.4.642]

s 138C(3)........................ [33.4.860]

Pt VA...............................[33.4.730]

s 138E(1)(b)(ii)...............[33.4.860]

Div 1............................... [33.4.640]

s 139A...............................[33.2.30]

Div 2............ [33.4.640], [33.4.820]

Pt 3.5...............................[33.4.860]

Div 3............................... [33.4.640]

Pt VIB............................. [33.4.820]

s 138................................[33.4.860] s 138(2)(b)...................... [33.4.860] s 138A.............................[33.4.860] s 138A(2)........................ [33.4.860] s 138B(2)(b)....................[33.4.860] s 138C(3)(b)....................[33.4.860] s 138E(1)(b)....................[33.4.860]

Pt VIB Div 2.................. [33.4.820]

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 s 14A...............................[33.9.510] s 64B...............................[33.6.610] Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001........[33.11.390]

Sch 2........... [33.2.100], [33.2.510], [33.2.550], [33.2.670], [33.2.1140], [33.4.20], [33.4.30], [33.4.450], [33.4.630], [33.4.970],

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxc

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

s 3Z................................. [33.9.510] s 35(1)...........................[33.8.1810]

[33.4.1100], [33.5.10], [33.5.140], [33.5.410], [33.6.170], [33.8.600], [33.8.1310], [33.8.1380], [33.8.1390], [33.10.1720], [33.10.2280], [33.11.350] Competition and Consumer Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2015........... [33.4.860], [33.4.1100] Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010.................[33.4.860] reg 92............................ [33.4.1100] Constitution s 109................................[33.9.300] s 117................................[33.10.40] Ch III.............................. [33.9.460] Copyright Act 1968......... [33.10.2280] s 36..................................[33.5.140] s 115...............[33.5.10], [33.5.140]

s 89(1).............................[33.8.470] Pt IAA Div 2.................. [33.9.540] Pt IAA Div 4.................. [33.9.540] Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 s 34..................................[33.9.470] s 49..................................[33.9.470] Customs Act 1901 s 198................................[33.9.540] s 199................................[33.9.540] Damage By Aircraft Act 1999..................................... [33.6.170] Defence Force Discipline Act 1982..................................... [33.9.460] Designs Act 2003............ [33.10.2280] Family Law Act 1975..........[33.9.300] s 66X.............................[33.8.1320] s 114(1)....................... [33.10.2280] s 120.....[33.10.1210], [33.10.1750] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976

Corporations Act 1989

s 32AB............................ [33.4.860]

Pt 13................................[33.6.650] Corporations Act 2001...... [33.11.390] s 710................................[33.2.670] s 728................................[33.2.670]

Federal Court Rules r 2....................................[33.8.300] Federal Court Rules 2011

s 729................................[33.2.670] s 1041H...........................[33.2.670]

r 6.02.............................[33.8.1940] r 16.02.............................[33.8.300] r 16.44...........................[33.8.1910]

Corporations Law s 819................................[33.6.650] Crimes Act 1914 s 3T................................. [33.9.530] s 3W................................[33.9.510]

Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995................................. [33.10.2160] High Court Rules 2004 r 6.06.............................[33.8.1940]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxci

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936................................... [33.10.360] s 160A...........................[33.10.580] s 160ZB(1)....................[33.10.580] s 160ZB(2)....................[33.10.580] s 160ZZH......................[33.10.580] s 160ZZI....................... [33.10.580] s 160ZZK......................[33.10.580] s 160ZZL...................... [33.10.580] s 263................................[33.9.540] Pt IIIA...........................[33.10.580]

s 197A...........................[33.8.1620] National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009............[33.9.420], [33.9.430] Navigation Act 1912 s 410B.............................[33.6.620] Navigation Act 2012 s 326................................[33.6.620] Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 s 71...............[33.9.540], [33.9.550] Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 s 11..................................[33.8.470] ss 11 – 12....................... [33.8.470] s 20..................................[33.8.470]

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997................................... [33.10.360] s 6-5.............................. [33.10.570] s 15-30.......................... [33.10.570] s 100-25........................ [33.10.580] s 108-5(1)......................[33.10.580] s 108-5(2)......................[33.10.580] s 118-37........................ [33.10.580] Pt 3-1............................ [33.10.570] Pt 3 Div 108................. [33.10.580]

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988..... [33.6.170], [33.10.720] s 44.................[33.5.10], [33.5.390] s 45.................[33.5.10], [33.5.390] Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992.... [33.10.720] Sex Discrimination Act 1984

Insurance Contracts Act 1984 s s s s s

s 106(1)...........................[33.6.650]

9(1)(e)....[33.11.380], [33.11.410] 48..................................[33.9.960] 51..................................[33.9.960] 65................................[33.11.380] 66...........[33.11.380], [33.11.410]

Social Security Act 1991................................. [33.10.2160] s 1161..........................[33.10.2160] s 1166..........................[33.10.2160] s 1169..........................[33.10.2160] s 1178..........................[33.10.2160] Pt 3.14.........................[33.10.2160]

Life Insurance Act 1995....[33.10.360] Marriage Act 1961 s 23(1)(d)...................... [33.8.1320] Migration Act 1958............. [33.5.180] s 189..........[33.8.380], [33.8.1540], [33.9.480]

Taxation Laws Amendment (Structured Settlements and Structured Orders) Act 2002................................... [33.10.360]

s 189(1)...........................[33.9.480] [References are to paragraph numbers] cxcii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia – continued

Trade Marks Act 1995..... [33.8.1380], [33.10.2280] Trade Practices Act 1974.....[33.4.30], [33.4.785], [33.6.170] s 52..............[33.2.510], [33.2.550], [33.2.670], [33.4.980], [33.6.170], [33.10.1710], [33.10.2280], [33.11.350] s 53..............................[33.10.1710] s 53(a)............................. [33.4.980] s 55..................................[33.4.970] s 65C............................. [33.4.1170]

Work Health and Safety Act 2011......................................[33.5.390] s 267................................[33.5.390] Australian Capital Territory Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002..................... [33.2.30], [33.2.50], [33.6.310], [33.10.1720]

s 75AD............................[33.4.740] s 75AF............................ [33.4.740] s 75AG............................[33.4.740] s 75AO............................[33.4.820]

s s s s s s

5..................................[33.2.1340] 5(2).................................[33.2.90] 5(3)(a)............................ [33.2.90] 5(3)(b)............................ [33.2.90] 15(2).........................[33.10.1210] 16(2).....[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210]

s 16(3)(b)(i)................ [33.10.1220] s 16(3)(b)(ii)............... [33.10.1230] s 19................................[33.11.350]

s 80..............................[33.10.2280] s 82................[33.5.10], [33.5.140], [33.5.410] Pt VA...........[33.4.630], [33.4.730], [33.4.815] Pt VIB............................. [33.4.820] Div 2A.............................. [33.4.30]

s 20(1)...... [33.11.200], [33.11.220]

Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010...........[33.8.600], [33.8.1290], [33.8.1300], [33.8.1310], [33.8.1380], [33.8.1390]

ss 21(2) – (3)................ [33.11.390] s 21(3)(a)......................[33.11.380], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 27....................................[33.2.90] s 34..........[33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.2.1320] s 34(1)...........................[33.2.1290]

Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010...........[33.8.600], [33.8.1290], [33.8.1300], [33.8.1310], [33.8.1380], [33.8.1390] Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 ...................................[33.4.746]

s 20(2)........................... [33.11.230] s 20(2)(a).......................[33.11.200] s 20(2)(b)...................... [33.11.200] s 21(1)..... [33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370] s 21(2)........................... [33.11.390]

s 34(2)...........................[33.2.1320] s 35................................[33.2.1320] s 36................................[33.10.830] s 36(1)...........................[33.2.1320] s 41..................................[33.7.660] s 43................[33.2.60], [33.2.250],

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxciii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Australian Capital Territory – continued

s 139E......................... [33.10.1100] s 139F......................... [33.10.1100]

[33.2.790] s 43(1)(b)...................... [33.2.1510]

s 139G....[33.10.180], [33.10.1100]

s 43(2)(d)........................ [33.3.220]

s 139H.....[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100] s 139I.......................... [33.10.1100]

s 44....................................[33.2.60]

s 152.............[33.3.480], [33.4.210]

s 45(1)...............................[33.2.70]

s 168..............................[33.2.1110]

s 47................[33.2.90], [33.3.470], [33.9.850], [33.10.2150]

s 168(1).......[33.3.210], [33.3.340], [33.3.350] s 168(2)........[33.3.230], [33.3.340]

s 43(2)...............................[33.2.60]

s 94...............[33.3.210], [33.3.520] s 95..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820]

s 168(2)(e)... [33.3.250], [33.3.340]

s 95(2).............................[33.9.820]

s 168(3)........[33.3.210], [33.3.470]

s 95(3).............................[33.9.820]

s 168(4).............................[33.3.10]

s 96..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 96(3).............................[33.9.820]

s 168(5).........[33.3.10], [33.3.280], [33.3.290] s 168(6)...........................[33.3.190]

s 96(5)..........[33.9.820], [33.9.910]

s 169................................[33.6.290]

s 97..................................[33.9.800]

s 170.............[33.6.160], [33.7.250]

s 98...............[33.2.90], [33.10.750]

s 173............................[33.10.1720]

s 99................................[33.10.790]

ss 173 – 175............... [33.10.1720]

s 99(1)...........................[33.10.710]

s 212..............[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.450]

s 100............[33.2.90], [33.10.770], [33.10.1750]

s 168(2)(f)....[33.3.250], [33.3.340]

s 212(2)(a)...................... [33.6.330]

s 101............[33.1.320], [33.4.210], [33.7.690], [33.9.870] ss 101 – 105................... [33.4.210]

s 214..............[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.300], [33.6.350], [33.6.450]

s 101(b)...........................[33.3.480]

s 215................................[33.6.320]

s 102............[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.7.690], [33.9.850]

s 216..............................[33.2.1060]

s 102(1)(b)...................... [33.9.850]

s 221..............................[33.8.1990]

s 102(2)...........................[33.5.400] s 110..............................[33.2.1180]

Ch 7............ [33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740] Ch 7A...........[33.2.90], [33.11.390]

s 111.............................. [33.2.1180]

Ch 8..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180]

s 113.............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180]

Pt 2.1..............[33.2.90], [33.2.330]

s 107B...............................[33.2.90]

s 218.......[33.2.1370], [33.10.1750] s 219................................[33.3.190]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxciv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Australian Capital Territory – continued

Crimes Act 1900 s 38................................[33.8.1560]

Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt

2.2.................................[33.2.90] 2.2A..............................[33.2.90] 2.3.................................[33.2.90] 2.4...........................[33.10.1210] 2.5.........[33.1.330], [33.8.1750], [33.11.200] 3.1...........................[33.10.1240] 3.2.............................[33.2.1320] 4.2.............................[33.2.1540] 4.3.............[33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460]

Pt 7.1...............................[33.3.470] Pt 7.3...........[33.3.470], [33.6.290], [33.9.720], [33.9.850], [33.9.890], [33.10.2150] Pt 12.1......... [33.2.1160], [33.3.10], [33.6.290] Dictionary....................... [33.3.160] Court Procedures Act 2004 s 7............[33.10.500], [33.10.530], [33.10.540] Sch 1 Item 20.............. [33.10.500], [33.10.530], [33.10.540]

s 42..................................[33.9.230] s 189................................[33.9.540] s 212................................[33.9.510] s 218................................[33.9.510] Criminal Code 2002 Pt 3.4.............................[33.8.1810] Domestic Animals Act 2000..................................... [33.6.170] s 49..................................[33.6.460] s 50..................................[33.6.460] s 50(1).............................[33.6.460] s 50(3)(a)........................ [33.6.470] s 50(3)(c)(i).....................[33.6.470] s 50(3)(c)(ii)....................[33.6.470] s 55..................................[33.6.460] s 55(2).............................[33.6.460] s 55(4)(a)........................ [33.6.470] s 55(4)(b)........................ [33.6.470] s 55(4)(c)........................ [33.6.470] s 55(6).............................[33.6.460] Dictionary....................... [33.6.460] Education Act 2004

Court Procedures Rules 2006 r 406................................[33.8.300] rr 406 – 407....................[33.8.300] r 407(1)(d).................... [33.8.1910] r 1619......[33.10.500], [33.10.530], [33.10.540] r 1619(6)....................... [33.10.530] r 1619(7)....................... [33.10.520] r 1619(8)....................... [33.10.520] r 1620............................[33.10.500] Sch 2............................. [33.10.530] Crimes (Abolition of Offence of Abortion) Act 2002..............[33.9.230]

s 7(4)...............................[33.9.440] Emergencies Act 2004 s 34..................................[33.9.380] Enclosed Lands Protection Act 1943 s 4....................................[33.8.470] Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992................... [33.8.1080] s 7....................................[33.2.510] Pt 2..................................[33.6.170] Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991............... [33.9.320]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxcv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Australian Capital Territory – continued

s 7(3)(e).......................... [33.9.320] s 32N...............................[33.9.320] s 70..................................[33.9.320]

Pt 2..................................[33.3.220] Pt 2A...............................[33.3.220] Supreme Court Act 1933 s 20(1).............................[33.7.890] s 26..............................[33.10.1860] s 67A.............................[33.8.1940]

Human Rights Act 2004 s 10(2).............................[33.9.220] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 s 29..................................[33.3.190]

Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978..................................... [33.9.220] s 23..................................[33.9.300] Trespass on Territory Land Act 1932

Limitation Act 1985

s 4....................................[33.8.470]

s 11..................................[33.5.410] s 16B...........[33.5.410], [33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 21(1)........................... [33.11.370] Machinery Regulation 1950 reg 13(1)......................... [33.6.170] reg 13(4)......................... [33.6.170]

Victims of Crime (Financial Assistance) Act 1983......... [33.10.720] Work Health and Safety Act 2011 s 267................................[33.5.390] Workers Compensation Act 1951..................................... [33.6.170] s 31.................[33.5.10], [33.5.390]

Magistrates Court Act 1930 New South Wales

Pt 2.3...............................[33.9.570] Mental Health Act 2015......[33.9.310] Partnership Act 1963

Animals Act 1977................ [33.6.310] s 4(1).............[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.450]

s 14................................[33.11.157]

s 4(2)(b).......................... [33.6.330] s 7(2)............[33.6.300], [33.6.450] s 7(2)(a)........ [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.350]

Residential Tenancies Act 1997 Sch 1 cl 54(1).................[33.3.190] Sch 1 cl 54(1)(a)............ [33.3.290]

s 9....................................[33.6.320] s 10..................................[33.6.290]

Sale of Goods Act 1954 s 18..................................[33.4.170] s 19..................................[33.4.170] s 20..................................[33.4.170]

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 s 174................................[33.9.300] s 175................................[33.9.300]

Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912..................................... [33.5.140] Smoke-Free Public Places Act 2003 s 8....................................[33.3.220]

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 29..................................[33.9.300]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxcvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

Civil Liability Act 2002........[33.2.30], [33.2.50], [33.2.80], [33.2.90], [33.3.230], [33.5.400], [33.8.375], [33.10.170], [33.11.390] s 1................................[33.10.1750] s 3B..............[33.8.375], [33.8.410] s 5A.................................[33.5.400] s 5A(1)......... [33.1.280], [33.7.660] s 5B...............[33.2.60], [33.2.250], [33.2.790] s 5B(1)(b)......................[33.2.1510]

s 5S............... [33.2.90], [33.3.470], [33.9.850], [33.10.2150] s 5T................................... [33.2.90] s 12................................[33.10.750] s 13................................[33.10.750] s 14................................[33.10.750] s 14(2)(b)...................... [33.10.550] s 15..............[33.2.90], [33.10.510], [33.10.540] ss 15 – 15C.......................[33.2.90] s 15(1)...........................[33.10.760] s 15(2)...........................[33.10.760] s 15(3)...........................[33.10.760]

s 5B(2).............................. [33.2.60]

s 15(4)...........................[33.10.760]

s 5B(2)(d).......[33.2.60], [33.3.220]

s 15(5)...........................[33.10.760]

s 5C...................................[33.2.60]

s 15B(2)........................ [33.10.770]

s 5D.................................[33.3.360]

s 15B(4)........................ [33.10.770]

s 5D(1).............................. [33.2.70]

s 15B(5)(b)....................[33.10.770]

s 5F................ [33.2.80], [33.9.900]

s 15C(2)........................ [33.10.780]

s 5G.................................[33.9.900]

s 16................................[33.10.790]

s 5G(2)............................ [33.9.900]

s 17................................[33.10.790]

s 5H.............[33.2.80], [33.2.1150], [33.3.270] s 5I.................................... [33.2.80]

s 18(1).....[33.10.510], [33.10.540], [33.10.990] s 18(2)(a)..................... [33.10.520], [33.10.540] s 18(3)...........................[33.10.530]

s 5I(2)................................[33.2.80] s 5K...................................[33.2.80] s 5L................................... [33.2.80] s 5M................................ [33.3.270] s 5N.................................[33.3.500] s 5O...................................[33.2.90]

s 18(4)...........................[33.10.530] s 21................[33.1.310], [33.2.90], [33.8.410], [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.730]

s 5P............................... [33.2.1150]

s 30..........[33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.2.1320], [33.10.830] s 30(3)...........................[33.2.1320]

s 5Q................[33.2.90], [33.2.350]

s 30(5)...........................[33.2.1320]

s 5R...............[33.2.90], [33.5.400], [33.9.720] ss 5R – 5T...................... [33.5.400]

s 31................................[33.2.1320]

s 5O(2).............................. [33.2.90] s 5O(4).............................. [33.2.90]

s 32................................[33.2.1320] s 32(1)...........................[33.2.1290]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxcvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

s 32(2)...........................[33.2.1320] s 33................................[33.2.1320] s 34....................................[33.2.90] s 42................................[33.2.1180] s 43.............[33.2.1180], [33.5.390] s 43A...............................[33.5.390] s 45...............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180] s 49.................[33.2.90], [33.9.820] ss 49 – 50......................... [33.2.90] s 50(2).............................[33.9.820] s 50(3).........[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 50(4).............................[33.9.820] s 50(5).............................[33.9.820] s 52..................................[33.3.330] s 54................[33.2.90], [33.3.520], [33.9.980] s 56....................................[33.2.90] s 58(1)...............................[33.2.90] s 58(2)(a).......................... [33.2.90] s 70(2)...............................[33.2.90] s 71................................[33.2.1400] cl 1................................ [33.2.1370] cl 6.................................. [33.5.400] Pt 1A.................................[33.3.10] Pt 1A Div 2.................. [33.2.1540]

[33.10.720], [33.10.740] Pt 2 Div 2......................... [33.2.90] Pt 2 Div 7..................... [33.10.360] Pt 3................................[33.2.1320] Pt 4................................ [33.11.390] Pt 5............... [33.2.90], [33.2.1180] Pt 8................[33.2.90], [33.2.330], [33.2.1340] Pt 8A.................................[33.2.90] Pt 9....................................[33.2.90] Pt 10..................................[33.2.90] Pt 11.................................. [33.2.90] Sch 1 Pt 1 Item 2(3).... [33.10.180] Sch 1 Pt 2 Item 2(3).... [33.10.180] Civil Liability Bill 2002....[33.10.170] Civil Procedure Act 2005 s s s s s s

93..................................[33.8.960] 100..............................[33.10.500] 100(3).........................[33.10.530] 100(4).........................[33.10.520] 100(5).........................[33.10.520] 101..............................[33.10.500]

Community Protection Act 1994................[PREFACE], [33.8.1700] Companion Animals Act 1998..................................... [33.6.170]

Pt 1A Div 3................... [33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Pt 1A Div 4..................... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt 1A Div 5..................... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt 1A Div 6..................... [33.2.90], [33.2.600], [33.2.1150] Pt 2..............[33.2.90], [33.10.170],

s 7....................................[33.6.460] s 25..................................[33.6.460] s 25(2)(a)........................ [33.6.470] s 25(2)(b)........................ [33.6.470] s 25(4).............................[33.6.460] s 26..................................[33.6.460] s 27..................................[33.6.460] s 28..................................[33.6.470] s 28(2).............................[33.6.460] Pt 3 Div 2....................... [33.6.460]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxcviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

Employee’s Liability (Indemnification of Employer) Act 1982

Compensation to Relatives Act 1897.............. [33.6.460], [33.10.1240]

s 2(3)............................. [33.11.410] Employees Liability Act 1991

Contracts Review Act 1980..................................... [33.9.950]

s 3..................................[33.11.410] s 5..................................[33.11.410] s 6..................................[33.11.410]

Conveyancing Act 1919 s 177................................[33.7.240]

Fair Trading Act 1987...... [33.8.1080]

Crimes Act 1900 s 61AA............................[33.9.440] s 82..................................[33.9.230] ss 82 – 84....................... [33.9.230] s 86................................[33.8.1560] s 327..............................[33.8.1810] s 357F............................. [33.8.550] s 357H.............................[33.8.550] Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007.......... [33.10.2280] Damage by Aircraft Act 1952..................................... [33.6.170] s 2(1)...............................[33.8.580] Defamation Act 1974

s 28..................................[33.2.510] Pt 3..................................[33.6.170] Fire Brigades Act 1989 s 13..................................[33.9.380] s 16..................................[33.9.380] Guardianship Act 1987....... [33.9.320] s 6E(1)(b)........................[33.9.320] s 6E(1)(d)........................[33.9.320] s 33..................................[33.9.320] s 36..................................[33.9.320] s 37(1).............................[33.9.320] s 40..................................[33.9.320] Pt 5..................................[33.9.300] Human Tissue Act 1983...... [33.9.220]

s 46(3)(b)...................... [33.10.180]

Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901

Defamation Act 2005

s 4....................................[33.8.470]

s 34..............................[33.10.1100] s 35..............................[33.10.1100]

Interpretation Act 1987 s 30(1)(c)........................ [33.5.400] s 30(1)(e)........................ [33.5.400]

s 36.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] s 37..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100] s 38..............................[33.10.1100]

Judicial Offıcers Act 1986 Pt 8A...............................[33.9.570] Landlord and Tenant Act 1899

Education Act 1990

s 12..............................[33.10.1420]

s 35(2A).......................... [33.9.440] s 47(h).............................[33.9.440]

Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 s 99..................................[33.9.510]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cxcix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

[33.9.850], [33.9.890] Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983..................................... [33.6.590]

s 100................................[33.9.510] Pt 5..................................[33.9.540]

s 5....................................[33.6.590] s 7.................[33.5.230], [33.6.590] Pt 4..................................[33.6.610]

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 s 2................................[33.10.1210] s 2(1)...........................[33.10.1210] s 2(2)(a)(i)....................[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210] s 2(2)(a)(ii)..................[33.10.1230] s 2(2)(d)...................... [33.10.1220]

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 Sch 1................................. [33.2.30] Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW).....................................[33.2.30] Limitation Act 1969

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946......... [33.11.390] s 5............[33.8.1750], [33.11.200], [33.11.350], [33.11.390] s 5(1)(a)...[33.11.200], [33.11.220], [33.11.230] ss 5(1)(a) – (b)............. [33.11.230] s 5(1)(b)........................ [33.11.200] s 5(1)(c)...[33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370], [33.11.380], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 5(2)............................. [33.11.390]

s 14(1).............................[33.5.410] s 18A...........[33.5.410], [33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 26(1)........................... [33.11.370] s 50C..........[33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 58..................................[33.8.310] ss 58 – 60....................... [33.8.310] Pt 2 Div 6....................... [33.5.410] Liquor Act 2007 s 73(1)(b)........................ [33.3.180] s 73(4)(a)........................ [33.3.180] s 73(5).............................[33.3.180]

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 s 7.................[33.5.400], [33.9.850] s 8................[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.5.400], [33.7.690], [33.9.870] s 9................[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400], [33.7.690], [33.10.2150] s 9(1)(b).......................... [33.9.850] s 12...........[33.8.1750], [33.11.200] Sch 1 Pt 2 cl 3............... [33.3.480], [33.4.210]

Local Government Act 1919..................................... [33.2.270] s 582A.............................[33.9.580] Local Government Act 1993 s 125.............[33.7.360], [33.7.520] s 628(4)...........................[33.7.360] s 673................................[33.7.520] s 678................................[33.7.520] Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993

Sch 1 Pt 3....[33.1.330], [33.3.470], [33.6.290], [33.9.720],

s 3..................................[33.8.1990] ss 3 – 4......................... [33.8.1990]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cc

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

[33.10.210] s 216................................[33.9.950]

Mental Health Act 1990......[33.2.290]

Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006............ [33.10.760], [33.10.930], [33.10.990]

Mental Health Act 2007......[33.9.310] Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970

Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942

s 49..................................[33.9.300]

s 35B(1)........................ [33.10.550]

Motor Accidents Act 1988............ [33.10.720], [33.10.2150] s 71................................[33.10.550]

Partnership Act 1892 s 9..................................[33.11.157] ss 9 – 12....................... [33.11.157]

s 72................................[33.10.760] s 73................................[33.10.510]

Police Act 1990

s 74............[33.2.1690], [33.9.800], [33.9.910] s 76.............[33.2.1690], [33.9.910]

s 213................................[33.9.560] Property (Relationships) Act 1984................................... [33.10.830] Pt 5..............................[33.10.2280]

s 79...........[33.10.530], [33.10.720] s 79A.............................[33.10.720]

Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997

s 81................................[33.10.360] s 81A.........[33.1.310], [33.10.200], [33.10.210]

Ch 8................................ [33.7.360] Residential Tenancies Act 2010

Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999............. [33.10.170], [33.10.360], [33.10.720] s 130A...........................[33.10.760]

s 52..................................[33.3.190] s 52(1).............................[33.3.290] Sale of Goods Act 1923...... [33.6.170] s 18..................................[33.4.170] s 19..................................[33.4.170] s 20..................................[33.4.170] s 57..................................[33.4.170]

s 131..............................[33.10.720] ss 131 – 134................. [33.10.720] s 137..............................[33.10.510] s 138................................[33.9.910] s 138(2)(b)(ii)................. [33.9.820]

Smoke-free Environment Act 2000

s 138(2)(c)...................... [33.9.800]

s 8....................................[33.3.220] Pt 2..................................[33.3.220]

s 138(3)...........................[33.9.820] s 140.............[33.9.910], [33.9.950]

Sporting Injuries Insurance Act 1978................................... [33.10.720]

s 141A...........................[33.10.760] s 141B...........................[33.10.760]

Statutory Duties (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945

s 143..............................[33.10.360] s 143(2).........................[33.10.360]

s 2....................................[33.5.400]

s 144..........[33.1.310], [33.10.200],

[References are to paragraph numbers] cci

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

New South Wales – continued

Northern Territory Adult Guardianship Act.......[33.9.320]

Supreme Court Act 1970

s 17(2)(d)........................ [33.9.320]

s 68...........[33.7.890], [33.10.1860] s 93..................................[33.8.960]

s 21..................................[33.9.320]

Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006...............................[33.7.255] s 3....................................[33.7.255]

Advance Personal Planning Act 2013

s 21(4).............................[33.9.320] Pt 4..................................[33.9.320] Pt 5..................................[33.9.320]

s 4....................................[33.7.255]

Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act.................................... [33.10.1240] s 10................................[33.2.1370]

s 4(2)...............................[33.7.255] s 4(3)...............................[33.7.255] s 5....................................[33.7.255]

Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act...................................... [33.8.1080]

s 7....................................[33.7.255] s 9(2)(i)........................... [33.7.255]

s 27..................................[33.2.510] s 48....................................[33.2.30] Pt 4..................................[33.6.170]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 14.7...............................[33.8.300] r 15.7.............................[33.8.1910]

Courts and Administrative Tribunals (Immunities) Act 2008.........[33.9.570]

r 15.8.............................[33.8.1910] Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008

Criminal Code

s 8..................................[33.8.1940]

s 196(2)...........................[33.9.440]

Victims Rights and Support Act 2013................................... [33.10.720]

s 208A.............................[33.9.230]

Work Health and Safety Act 2011......................................[33.5.390]

s 208C.............................[33.9.230]

s 208B.............................[33.9.230] Criminal Code Act

s 267................................[33.5.390]

s 195..............................[33.8.1560]

Workers Compensation Act 1926................................... [33.10.540]

Sch 1............ [33.9.230], [33.9.440] Defamation Act 2006

Workers Compensation Act 1987............... [33.6.170], [33.10.170], [33.10.540], [33.10.720] s 9...................[33.5.10], [33.5.390]

s 31..............................[33.10.1100] s 32..............................[33.10.1100] s 33.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100]

s 151J(2)....................... [33.10.550]

s 34..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100]

s 151N(3)........................ [33.5.400]

s 35..............................[33.10.1100]

s 151AA........................[33.2.1060]

Emergency Medical Operations Act

s 151R.......[33.1.310], [33.10.200], [33.10.210]

s 3....................................[33.9.300]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Northern Territory – continued

s s s s s s s

22................................[33.2.1060] 22A.............................[33.11.410] 22A(2)........................ [33.11.410] 22A(3)........................ [33.11.410] 23................................[33.2.1320] 24................................[33.2.1290] 25..........[33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.10.830] s 25(1)...........................[33.2.1320] s 32..................................[33.6.460] s 32(1).............................[33.6.460] s 32(2).............................[33.6.460] Pt IV..........[33.1.330], [33.8.1750], [33.11.200] Pt V............. [33.1.330], [33.3.470], [33.6.290], [33.9.720], [33.9.850], [33.9.890], [33.10.2150] Pt VII............................ [33.2.1320]

s 3(3)...............................[33.9.320] Fire and Emergency Act s 23(3).............................[33.9.380] Guardianship of Adults Act 2016..................................... [33.9.320] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.................... [33.6.170] s 5(1)...........................[33.10.1210] s 5(2)...........................[33.10.1210] s 6(1)(a)... [33.10.200], [33.10.210] s s s s

6(a)........................... [33.10.1210] 6(c)(ii)...................... [33.10.1220] 6(c)(iii)..................... [33.10.1230] 12(2)..... [33.11.200], [33.11.220], [33.11.230]

ss 12(2) – (3)................ [33.11.230] s 12(3)(a).......................[33.11.200] s 12(3)(b)...................... [33.11.200] s 12(4)..... [33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370], [33.11.380], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 13................................[33.11.390] s 15..............[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.4.210], [33.5.400], [33.9.870] ss 15 – 21A.................... [33.4.210] s 15(1).........[33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.7.690] s 16..............[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.2.90], [33.3.480], [33.5.400] ss 16 – 21A.................... [33.5.400] s 16(1).............................[33.7.690] s 16(1)(b)........................ [33.9.850] s 17(2)...............................[33.2.90]

Limitation Act s 12.............[33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 12(1).............................[33.5.410] s 24................................[33.11.370] Local Government Act 2008 s 194................................[33.7.520] Mental Health and Related Services Act........................................ [33.9.310] Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act................... [33.6.170], [33.10.720] s 5..................................[33.10.720] s 11(1)............................. [33.9.800] s 11(2)............................. [33.9.800] Partnership Act s 14(1)........................... [33.11.157] Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003

s 21A............[33.3.480], [33.4.210]

s 12................................[33.10.360]

[References are to paragraph numbers] cciii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Northern Territory – continued

s 23(3)...........................[33.10.760] s 23(4)...........................[33.10.760]

Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003..............[33.2.30], [33.2.50], [33.2.1510], [33.2.1540], [33.3.230] s 4(1)...............................[33.7.660]

s 27................................[33.10.790] s 28................................[33.10.790] s 29..........[33.10.510], [33.10.540], [33.10.990] s 30(1)(a)..................... [33.10.520], [33.10.540] s 30(2)...........................[33.10.530]

s 7......................................[33.2.90] s 7A...................................[33.2.90] s 8..................[33.2.90], [33.2.330], [33.2.1340] s 8(2).................................[33.2.90]

Pt 2....................................[33.3.10] Pt 2 Div 2......................... [33.2.90]

s 8(3).................................[33.2.90]

Pt 4..............[33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740]

s 8(4).................................[33.2.90]

Pt 4 Div 3......................... [33.2.90]

s 9................[33.3.180], [33.3.210], [33.3.330], [33.3.520]

Pt 4 Div 4......................... [33.2.90]

s 10................[33.2.90], [33.3.180], [33.3.210], [33.3.330], [33.3.520], [33.9.980]

Pt 4 Div 6..................... [33.10.360] Police Administration Act s 123................................[33.9.510]

s 14..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 14(2).............................[33.9.820]

s 124................................[33.9.540]

s 15..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820], [33.9.910] s 17................[33.2.90], [33.3.470], [33.9.820]

Pt VIIA........................... [33.6.610]

s 18..........[33.10.510], [33.10.540], [33.10.760] s 19................[33.1.310], [33.2.90], [33.8.410], [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.730]

s 161................................[33.9.560] ss 161 – 162................... [33.9.560] Proportionate Liability Act 2005 Pt 2................................ [33.11.390] Residential Tenancies Act s 47...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 48...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] Return to Work Act.............[33.5.390], [33.10.720]

s 20................................[33.10.750] s 21................................[33.10.750]

s 53....................................[33.5.10] Sale of Goods Act

s 22................................[33.10.750]

s 18..................................[33.4.170]

s 22(2)(b)...................... [33.10.550]

s 19..................................[33.4.170]

s 23....................................[33.2.90]

s 20..................................[33.4.170]

s 23(1)...........................[33.10.760]

s 57..................................[33.4.170]

s 23(2)...........................[33.10.760] [References are to paragraph numbers] cciv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Northern Territory – continued

Supreme Court Act s s s s s

14(1)(b)........................ [33.7.890] 62..............................[33.10.1860] 84...........[33.10.500], [33.10.530] 84(2)(a)...................... [33.10.530] 85................................[33.10.500]

Supreme Court Rules r 13.02.............................[33.8.300] Tobacco Control Act s 10..................................[33.3.220] Trespass Act s 5....................................[33.8.470] ss 5 – 8........................... [33.8.470] s 11..................................[33.8.470] Vexatious Proceedings Act 2006 s 7..................................[33.8.1940] Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006................................... [33.10.720] Work Health and Safety (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 s 267................................[33.5.390] Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2015

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

s 4...................[33.5.10], [33.5.390] Queensland Civil Liability Act 2003........[33.2.50], [33.3.230] s 9..................[33.2.60], [33.2.250], [33.2.790] s 9(1)(b)........................ [33.2.1510] s 9(2).................................[33.2.60] s 9(2)(d).......................... [33.3.220]

s s s

10....................................[33.2.60] 11(1)............................... [33.2.70] 13.................[33.2.80], [33.9.900] 14..................................[33.9.900] 14(2).............................[33.9.900] 15..............[33.2.80], [33.2.1150], [33.3.270] 15(2)(c).......................[33.2.1150] 16....................................[33.2.80] 16(2)...............................[33.2.80] 19....................................[33.2.80] 21................................[33.2.1150] 22....................................[33.2.90] 22(2)...............................[33.2.90] 22(4)...............................[33.2.90] 22(5)........................... [33.2.1150] 23.................[33.2.90], [33.9.720] 24................[33.2.90], [33.3.470], [33.9.850], [33.10.2150] 28....................................[33.2.90] 35.............[33.2.1180], [33.5.390] 36................................[33.2.1180] 37...............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180] 39(2)...............................[33.2.90] 45................[33.2.90], [33.3.520], [33.9.980] 46.................[33.2.90], [33.9.820] 47..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] 47(3).............................[33.9.820] 47(4).............................[33.9.820] 48..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820]

s 48(4).............................[33.9.820] s 48(5)..........[33.9.820], [33.9.910] s 49A.............................[33.2.1400] ss 49A – 49B................[33.2.1400] s 52................[33.1.310], [33.2.90],

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

Pt 1 Div 4.... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt 1 Div 5..... [33.2.90], [33.2.600], [33.2.1150] Pt 1 Div 7..... [33.2.90], [33.2.330], [33.2.1340] Pt 2....................................[33.2.90] Pt 3 Div 1.... [33.2.90], [33.2.1180]

[33.8.410], [33.10.180], [33.10.200], [33.10.730] s 52(1)......[33.10.200], [33.10.210] s s s s s s

52(2).............................[33.8.410] 53(1).........................[33.10.2120] 53(2).........................[33.10.2120] 53(3).........................[33.10.2120] 53(4).........................[33.10.2120] 54................................[33.10.750]

s s s s

54(2).........................[33.10.1220] 56....................................[33.2.90] 56(2)...........................[33.10.780] 57................................[33.10.750]

Pt 3 Div 2......................... [33.2.90] Pt 4................................[33.10.360] Pt 5....................................[33.2.90] Sch 2............................... [33.7.660] Civil Liability (Good Samaritan) Amendment Bill 2007...........[33.2.90] Civil Liability Regulation 2014 s 6................................[33.10.1750]

s 57(2)...........................[33.10.550] s 58..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1370], [33.10.1740], [33.10.1750] s 58(3).........................[33.10.1740] s 59....................................[33.2.90] s 59(1)...........................[33.10.760] s 59(1)(c)...................... [33.10.760] s 59(3)......[33.10.770], [33.10.810] s 60....................................[33.2.90] ss 60 – 62......................... [33.2.90] s 60(1)...........................[33.10.510] s 60(2)(b)...................... [33.10.540] s 60(3)...........................[33.10.530] s 61................................[33.10.790] s 62................................[33.10.790] Ch 2............. [33.2.1540], [33.3.10] Ch 3............ [33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740] Pt 1....................................[33.2.90]

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 s 58................................[33.10.500] s s s s

58(4)...........................[33.10.530] 59................................[33.10.500] 61................................[33.10.550] 61(4)(b)..................... [33.10.550], [33.10.750] Pt 10............................[33.10.1240] Criminal Code..................... [33.9.340] s 70..................................[33.9.390] s 123..............................[33.8.1810]

Pt 1 Div 2..... [33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Pt 1 Div 3.... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590]

ss 123 – 125................. [33.8.1810] s 224................................[33.9.230] ss 224 – 226................... [33.9.230] s 230................................[33.7.360] s 266................................[33.9.530] s 269................................[33.9.370] s 274................................[33.9.410] ss 274 – 276................... [33.9.410] s 277................................[33.9.390] s 278................................[33.9.390]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

s 63(1)(b)........................ [33.9.320] s 63(2).............................[33.9.320] s 63(3).............................[33.9.320] s 68..................................[33.9.320] Sch 2 cl 6........................[33.9.320] Sch 2 cl 6........................[33.9.320]

s 280................................[33.9.440] s 281................................[33.9.470] s 282................................[33.9.340] s 286................................[33.9.340] s 354..............................[33.8.1560] s 546................................[33.9.510] ss 546 – 551................... [33.9.510] ss 546 – 552................... [33.9.510] s 680................................[33.9.530]

Land Act 1994 Pt 4 Div 8....................... [33.7.710] Land Title Act 1994 Pt 6 Div 4....................... [33.7.710] Law Reform Act 1995

Criminal Code Act 1899 Sch 1......... [33.7.360], [33.8.1560], [33.8.1810], [33.9.230], [33.9.340], [33.9.370], [33.9.390], [33.9.410], [33.9.440], [33.9.470], [33.9.510], [33.9.530] Defamation Act 2005 s s s s

34..............................[33.10.1100] 35..............................[33.10.1100] 36.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] 37..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100] s 38..............................[33.10.1100] Equity Act 1867 s 62..................................[33.7.890] Fair Trading Act 1989...... [33.8.1080] s 16..................................[33.2.510] Pt 3..................................[33.6.170] Fire and Emergency Services Act 1990 s 53(2).............................[33.9.380] Guardianship and Administration Act 2000..................................... [33.9.320] s 33(1).............................[33.9.320] s 42..................................[33.9.320]

s 3..................................[33.2.1060] s 5................[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.5.400], [33.7.690], [33.9.870], [33.11.350] s 6(a)....... [33.11.200], [33.11.220], [33.11.230] ss 6(a) – (c)...................[33.11.230] s 6(b)............................. [33.11.200] s 6(c)....... [33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370], [33.11.380], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 7..................................[33.11.390] s 10..............[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400] s 10(1).............................[33.7.690] s 10(5)...............................[33.2.90] s 13..............................[33.10.1750] s 21...............[33.3.480], [33.4.210] Pt 3..............[33.1.330], [33.6.290], [33.8.1750], [33.9.720], [33.9.850], [33.9.890], [33.10.2150] Pt 3 Div 3....................... [33.3.470] Div 2............................. [33.11.200] Div 2............................. [33.11.200]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

Property Law Act 1974 s 179................................[33.7.240] s 198A(1)........................ [33.7.710]

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s 10(1).............................[33.5.410] s 11..............[33.5.410], [33.8.310], [33.8.1710]

Repealing Rules 1900......... [33.7.890] Sch 2........................... [33.10.1860]

s 31..................................[33.8.310] ss 31 – 32....................... [33.8.310] s 40................................[33.11.370]

Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008

Liquor Act 1992.................. [33.2.820]

s 185(2)........[33.3.190], [33.3.290] Rules of the Supreme Court r 2....................................[33.8.960]

Local Government Act 2009 s 240(3)...........................[33.7.520]

Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 16..................................[33.4.170]

Magistrates Act 1991

s 17..................................[33.4.170]

s 51..................................[33.9.570]

s 18..................................[33.4.170]

Mental Health Act 2000......[33.9.310]

s 56..................................[33.4.170]

Mental Health Act 2016......[33.9.310]

Statute Law Revision Act 1908..................................... [33.7.890]

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s 55............[33.1.310], [33.10.200], [33.10.210]

Sch 2........................... [33.10.1860] Succession Act 1981

Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936

s 66(1).........................[33.10.1210] s 66(2)(a).................... [33.10.1220] s 66(2)(b)..................... [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210] s 66(2)(d)(ii)............... [33.10.1230]

s 16(b).............................[33.10.40] s 19..................................[33.10.40] s 20..................................[33.10.40] Partnership Act 1891 s 13................................[33.11.157]

Summary Offences Act 2005 s 6....................................[33.7.360] s 11..................................[33.8.470]

Peace and Good Behaviour Act 1982 s 4................................[33.10.2280] Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002.................. [33.2.30], [33.10.170] s 4(1).............................[33.10.170]

Supreme Court Act 1867 s 10..............................[33.10.1860] Supreme Court Act 1995

s 4(2).............................[33.10.170] Police Service Administration Act 1990

s 25..................................[33.8.960] Tobacco and Other Smoking Products Act 1998

s 10.3...............................[33.9.560] s 10.5............[33.6.610], [33.9.560]

s 26V...............................[33.3.220] s 26Z............................... [33.3.220]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Queensland – continued

s 18(2).............................[33.6.290] s 18(3)..........[33.6.290], [33.6.350]

s 26ZG............................ [33.3.220]

s 18(5).............................[33.6.290]

Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979..................................... [33.9.220] s 20..................................[33.9.300]

s 18(6).............................[33.6.290]

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999

s 18(9).............................[33.6.450]

s 18(7).............................[33.6.290] s 18(8).............................[33.6.330]

r 149................................[33.8.300]

s 18(10)...........................[33.6.310]

r 150(1)(b).................... [33.8.1910]

s 18(10)(c)...................... [33.6.320]

r 155..............................[33.8.1910]

s 19..............[33.3.160], [33.3.170], [33.3.190] s 20..........[33.2.1110], [33.2.1510], [33.3.210] s 20(1).........[33.3.280], [33.3.340], [33.3.350], [33.3.470], [33.6.290]

r 262................................[33.8.960] r 285................................[33.8.960] Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 s 6..................................[33.8.1940] Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009................................... [33.10.720] Work Health and Safety Act 2011

s 20(2)..........[33.3.230], [33.3.340] s 20(2)(d)..... [33.3.250], [33.3.340] s 20(3).............................[33.3.230]

s 267................................[33.5.390] Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003...... [33.6.170] s 108...............[33.5.10], [33.5.390]

s 20(4).............................[33.3.500] s 20(5)..........[33.3.290], [33.3.310]

s 306B......[33.10.200], [33.10.210]

s 20(6).........[33.3.210], [33.3.330], [33.3.340] s 21..................................[33.3.190]

s 309................................[33.1.310]

s 22..................................[33.3.350]

Pt 9 Div 4..................... [33.10.360]

s 32................[33.2.60], [33.2.250], [33.2.790] s 32(1)(b)...................... [33.2.1510]

South Australia

s 32(2)...............................[33.2.60]

Building Work Contractors Act 1995 s 32................................[33.2.1140]

s 32(2)(d)........................ [33.3.220]

Civil Liability Act 1936........[33.2.30], [33.2.50], [33.3.480], [33.6.290], [33.6.460], [33.6.470] s 3.............[33.10.550], [33.10.750]

s 33................................[33.2.1320]

s 18................[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.300], [33.6.320], [33.6.450] s 18(1).............................[33.6.450]

s 33(1)...........................[33.2.1290] s 33(2)...........................[33.2.1320] s 34(1)...............................[33.2.70] s 36..................................[33.9.900] s 37..................................[33.9.900] s 37(2).............................[33.9.900] s 38.................[33.2.80], [33.3.270]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

South Australia – continued

s 67...............[33.2.90], [33.2.1400] s 68..............................[33.10.1750] s 71(4)(b).......................... [33.2.90] s 72.............[33.2.390], [33.8.1810] s 74................................[33.2.1340] s 74(1)...............................[33.2.90] s 74A.................................[33.2.90] s 75....................................[33.2.90] Pt 4.............. [33.2.1160], [33.3.10], [33.3.190], [33.6.290] Pt 5..............................[33.10.1240] Pt 6 Div 2..... [33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Pt 6 Div 3... [33.2.80], [33.2.1540], [33.2.1590]

s s s s s s s s s

38(2)(c).......................[33.2.1150] 39....................................[33.2.80] 39(2)...............................[33.2.80] 41....................................[33.2.90] 41(2)...............................[33.2.90] 41(4)...............................[33.2.90] 41(5)........................... [33.2.1150] 42...............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180] 43................[33.2.90], [33.3.520], [33.9.980] s 44..................................[33.9.720] s 45....................................[33.2.90] s 46..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 46(2).............................[33.9.820] s 46(3).............................[33.9.820] s 47..............[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 47(3).............................[33.9.820] s 47(6)..........[33.9.820], [33.9.910] s 49(2).............................[33.9.800] s 49(3).............................[33.9.800] s 50...............[33.3.470], [33.9.720] s 51..................................[33.7.660] s 52...............[33.2.90], [33.10.790] s 53...........[33.2.1320], [33.10.830] s 54...............[33.2.90], [33.10.750] s 55...........[33.10.550], [33.10.750] s 56...........[33.10.510], [33.10.540] s 58...............[33.2.90], [33.10.760] s 59................................[33.11.410] s 59(2)........................... [33.11.410] s 59(3)........................... [33.11.410] s 63................................[33.2.1060] s 65.........[33.2.1370], [33.10.1750]

Pt 6 Div 4..... [33.2.90], [33.2.600], [33.2.1150] Pt 6 Div 5.... [33.2.90], [33.2.1180] Pt 7..................................[33.3.470] Pt 8..............[33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740] Pt 9 Div 11.... [33.2.90], [33.2.330] Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995....[33.9.220], [33.9.320] s 4....................................[33.9.300] s 12..................................[33.9.300] s 13...............[33.9.300], [33.9.320] Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1969..................................... [33.8.325] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 1..................................[33.8.1990] ss 1 – 3......................... [33.8.1990] s 22(2).............................[33.9.440] s 39................................[33.8.1560] s 81..................................[33.9.230] ss 81 – 82A.................... [33.9.230]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccx

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

South Australia – continued

Fair Trading Act 1987...... [33.8.1080]

s 242..............................[33.8.1810] s 271................................[33.9.510] s 273................................[33.9.540]

s 14..................................[33.2.510] Pt 3..................................[33.6.170] Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005 s 59..................................[33.9.380]

Defamation Act 2005 s s s s

32..............................[33.10.1100] 33..............................[33.10.1100] 34.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] 35..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100] s 36..............................[33.10.1100] Development Act 1993...... [33.11.200] s 72................................[33.11.200] District Court Act 1991 s 38A.............................[33.10.360] Dog and Cat Management Act 1995..................................... [33.6.170] s 5(1)...............................[33.6.460] s s s s

5(2)...............................[33.6.460] 6(2)...............................[33.6.460] 6(3)...............................[33.6.460] 65..................................[33.6.460]

s s s s s s s

66..................................[33.6.460] 66(1).............................[33.6.460] 66(2).............................[33.6.460] 66(3)(a)........................ [33.6.470] 66(3)(c)..... [33.6.460], [33.6.470] 66(3)(d)........................ [33.6.470] 66(3)(e)........................ [33.6.460]

Guardianship and Administration Act 1993..................................... [33.9.320] s 31..................................[33.9.320] s 61..................................[33.9.320] Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001............. [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.10.2150], [33.11.380] s 3.................[33.1.320], [33.9.870] s 3(1)...........[33.3.480], [33.5.400], [33.7.690] s 4..................................[33.11.350] s 4(1)...............................[33.3.480]

s 66(4).............................[33.6.470] s 66(5).............................[33.6.460] Dog Control Act 1979 s 34..................................[33.6.460] Environment Protection Act 1993 Pt 10................................[33.7.360]

s 6(1)....... [33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370] ss 6(1) – (2).................. [33.11.360] s 6(4)............................. [33.11.370] s 6(4)(a).........................[33.11.380] s 6(4)(b)........................ [33.11.380] s 6(5)............................. [33.11.390] s 6(7)............................. [33.11.390] s 6(8)(a).........................[33.11.360] s 6(8)(b)....[33.11.360], [33.11.380] s 6(8)(d)........................ [33.11.380] s 6(9)........ [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 6(9)(a).........................[33.11.380] s 6(9)(b)........................ [33.11.390] s 6(9)(c).........................[33.11.410] s 7................[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.2.90], [33.3.470], [33.3.480], [33.4.210],

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

South Australia – continued

Motor Vehicles Act 1959 s 113A.......[33.1.310], [33.10.200], [33.10.210] s 133................................[33.9.950]

[33.5.400], [33.9.720], [33.9.850], [33.9.890] s 7(1)...............................[33.7.690] s 7(2)...........[33.1.320], [33.9.870], [33.11.390] s 8................[33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400] s 9(a)............................... [33.1.330] s 12...........[33.8.1750], [33.11.200] s 12(1)...... [33.11.200], [33.11.220] s 12(2)........................... [33.11.230] ss 12(2) – 12(4)............ [33.11.230] s 12(2)(a).......................[33.11.200] s 12(2)(b)...................... [33.11.200] s 12(3)........................... [33.11.200] s 12(4)........................... [33.11.200] Pt 2...............[33.6.290], [33.9.850] Pt 3................[33.2.90], [33.9.850], [33.11.390] Limitation of Actions Act 1936..................................... [33.8.310] s 35..............[33.5.410], [33.8.310], [33.8.1710] ss 35 – 36...................... [33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 36..................................[33.5.410]

Partnership Act 1891 s 10................................[33.11.157] Police Act 1998 s 65...............[33.6.610], [33.9.560] Residential Tenancies Act 1995 s 67..................................[33.3.190] s 68...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 93..................................[33.9.390] Pt 5 Div 4....................... [33.9.390] Pt 5 Div 6....................... [33.9.390] Return to Work Act 2014................................... [33.10.720] Pt 4 Div 4..................... [33.10.360] Return to Work Regulations 2015 reg 35(1)....................... [33.10.550] Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 13..................................[33.4.170] s 14..................................[33.4.170] s 15..................................[33.4.170] s 54..................................[33.4.170] Summary Offences Act 1953 s 17..................................[33.8.470]

Magistrates Court Act 1991

s 17A...............................[33.8.470]

s 33A.............................[33.10.360] s 44..................................[33.9.570] Mental Health Act 2009......[33.9.310] Misrepresentation Act 1972................................. [33.10.1720]

s 17D...............................[33.9.390] Summary Procedure Act 1921 Pt 4 Div 7................... [33.10.2280] Supreme Court Act 1935

s 6................................[33.10.1720] ss 6 – 7....................... [33.10.1720]

s 30...........[33.7.890], [33.10.1860] s 30B(1)........................ [33.10.360] s 30B(2)........................ [33.10.360] s 30BA.......................... [33.10.360]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

South Australia – continued

s 30C.......[33.10.500], [33.10.510], [33.10.520] s 30C(1)........................ [33.10.510] s 30C(3)........................ [33.10.510] s 30C(4)(a)....................[33.10.530] s 30C(4)(ab)..................[33.10.220] s 39................................[33.8.1940] s 114..............................[33.10.500] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986...... [33.6.170] s 53.................[33.5.10], [33.5.390] Wrongs Act 1936 s 17C.............................[33.2.1510] s 27A............[33.3.480], [33.4.210] Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1983..................................... [33.6.320] Tasmania Administration and Probate Act 1935

r 98(2)(b)........................ [33.8.300] r 99(1)........ [33.8.300], [33.8.1910]

s 27..............................[33.10.1210] s 27(3)(a)..................... [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210] s 27(3)(c)(ii)................[33.10.1220] s 27(3)(c)(iii).............. [33.10.1230]

Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 13.07(3)...................... [33.8.1910] Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 s 2................................[33.10.1210] s 2(2)...........................[33.10.1210] s 3(1)(a)(i)...................[33.10.1220] ss 3(1)(a)(i) – (iii).......[33.10.1220] s 3(1)(a)(iv).................[33.10.1230] s 3(1)(b)....................... [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210]

Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010..........[33.6.170], [33.8.1080] s 6....................................[33.2.510] Civil Liability Act 2002........[33.2.30], [33.2.50], [33.2.790], [33.3.230] s 3....................................[33.7.660]

Tobacco Products Regulation Act 1997 s 46..................................[33.3.220] Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983..................................... [33.9.220] Victims of Crime Act 2001................................... [33.10.720] Volunteers Protection Act 2001....................................... [33.2.90] Work Health and Safety Act 2012 s 267................................[33.5.390]

s 5................[33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 5(1)...............................[33.9.820] s 5(2)...............................[33.9.820] s 5(4)...............................[33.9.820] s 6..................[33.2.90], [33.3.520], [33.9.980] s 11................[33.2.60], [33.2.250], [33.2.790] s 11(1)(b)...................... [33.2.1510] s 11(2)............................... [33.2.60] s 11(2)(d)........................ [33.3.220] s 12....................................[33.2.60] s 13(1)...............................[33.2.70]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxiii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Tasmania – continued

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

15.................[33.2.80], [33.9.900] 16..................................[33.9.900] 16(2).............................[33.9.900] 17.................[33.2.80], [33.3.270] 17(2)(c).......................[33.2.1150] 20....................................[33.2.80] 21................................[33.2.1150] 22....................................[33.2.90] 22(2)...............................[33.2.90] 22(4)...............................[33.2.90] 23.................[33.2.90], [33.9.720] 25....................................[33.2.90] 25(2)...........................[33.10.780] 26...............[33.2.90], [33.10.750] 27...............[33.2.90], [33.10.790] 28A........[33.10.550], [33.10.750] 28A(a)........................ [33.10.550] 28B.................................[33.2.90] 28B(1)........................ [33.10.760] 28B(2)........................ [33.10.760] 28B(3)........................ [33.10.760] 28D......[33.2.1370], [33.10.1750] 32..........[33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.2.1320], [33.10.830] 32(3)...........................[33.2.1320] 33................................[33.2.1320] 34................................[33.2.1320] 34(1)...........................[33.2.1290] 34(2)...........................[33.2.1320] 35................................[33.2.1320] 35B(1)............................ [33.2.90] 35B(3)............................ [33.2.90] 35C(1)(a)........................[33.2.90] 38................................[33.2.1180] 39..................................[33.3.270]

s 40.............[33.2.1180], [33.5.390] s 41..................................[33.5.390] s 42...............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180] s 43..................................[33.5.390] s 43A.................................[33.2.90] Pt 4....................................[33.2.90] Pt 5................................[33.10.360] Pt 6...............[33.2.1540], [33.3.10] Pt 6 Div 3..... [33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Pt 6 Div 4.... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt 6 Div 5.... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt 6 Div 6..... [33.2.90], [33.2.600], [33.2.1150] Pt 7..............[33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740] Pt 8................................[33.2.1320] Pt 8A.............[33.2.90], [33.2.330], [33.2.1340] Pt Pt Pt Pt

8B................................. [33.2.90] 9............... [33.2.90], [33.2.1180] 9A............ [33.2.90], [33.11.390] 10..................................[33.2.90]

Criminal Code s 27..................................[33.9.510] s 40..................................[33.9.390] ss 40 – 42....................... [33.9.390] s 41..................................[33.9.390] ss 41 – 42....................... [33.9.390] s 50..................................[33.9.440] s 79(1).............................[33.9.390] s 94................................[33.8.1810] s 140................................[33.7.360] s 141................................[33.7.360] s 191A...........................[33.8.1560] Criminal Code Act 1924 Sch 1......... [33.7.360], [33.8.1560],

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxiv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Tasmania – continued

Housing Indemnity Act 1992 s 7..................................[33.2.1140]

[33.8.1810], [33.9.390], [33.9.440], [33.9.510] Damage By Aircraft Act 1963..................................... [33.6.170]

Human Tissue Act 1985...... [33.9.220] s 21..................................[33.9.300] Justices Act 1959 Pt XA.......................... [33.10.2280] Pt XII.............................. [33.9.570]

Defamation Act 2005 s 34..............................[33.10.1100] s 35..............................[33.10.1100]

Land Titles Act 1980 s 40(3).............................[33.7.710]

s 36.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] s 37..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100] s 38..............................[33.10.1100] Dog Control Act 2000 s 6(c)............................... [33.6.460]

Law of Animals Act 1962 s 19..................................[33.6.300] Legislation Repeal Act 2003................................... [33.2.1060] Limitation Act 1974

s 19...............[33.6.170], [33.6.460]

s 4....................................[33.8.310] ss 4 – 5A........................ [33.8.310] s 4(1)...............................[33.5.410] s 5..................................[33.8.1710] ss 5 – 5A...................... [33.8.1710] s 5(1)...............................[33.5.410] s 5A.................................[33.5.410] s 7..................................[33.11.370]

s 19(1).............................[33.6.460] s 19(7)(a)........................ [33.6.470] s 19(7)(b)........................ [33.6.470] s 60(2).............................[33.6.460] s 61(3).............................[33.6.460] Education Act 1994 s 82A...............................[33.9.440]

Local Government Act 1993

Employers¿ Liability Act 1943 s 5..................................[33.2.1060]

Pt 12 Div 6..................... [33.7.520]

Fatal Accidents Act 1934................................. [33.10.1240]

Mental Health Act 2013......[33.9.310]

Fire Service Act 1979 s 29..................................[33.9.380] Guardianship and Administration Act 1995..................................... [33.9.320] s 25(2)(e)........................ [33.9.320] s 39(1).............................[33.9.320] s 39(2).............................[33.9.320] s 40..................................[33.9.320] s 45..................................[33.9.320]

Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973....[33.6.170], [33.10.720] s 17(3).............................[33.9.950] s 22(3).............................[33.9.800] s 22(4).............................[33.9.800] s 27A.............................[33.10.760] Partnership Act 1891 s 15................................[33.11.157]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Tasmania – continued

Supreme Court Rules 2000 r 227..............................[33.8.1910] r 227(1)........................... [33.8.300] r 350............................[33.10.1420]

Police Offences Act 1935 s 13(1)(e)........................ [33.7.360] s 14A...............................[33.8.470] ss 14A – 14D..................[33.8.470] s 19A...............................[33.8.470] s 55..................................[33.9.530] ss 55 – 58B.....................[33.9.530] s 60..................................[33.9.540]

Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912.....................................[PREFACE] Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1976................................... [33.10.720] s 6(1)(b)... [33.10.200], [33.10.210] Work Health and Safety Act 2012

Police Service Act 2003

s 267................................[33.5.390]

s 84..................................[33.6.610] Public Health Act 1997 s 67D...............................[33.3.220] Real Property Act 1862 s 40..................................[33.7.710] Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013....... [33.9.230] Residential Tenancy Act 1997 s 36J............. [33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 51...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] Sale of Goods Act 1896 s s s s

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988..... [33.6.170], [33.10.720] s 25.................[33.5.10], [33.5.390] s 97(1)........................... [33.11.410] Wrongs Act 1954............. [33.10.2150] s 2................[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.5.400], [33.7.690], [33.9.870], [33.11.350] s 3.............[33.8.1750], [33.11.200] s 3(1)(a)....[33.11.200], [33.11.220]

18..................................[33.4.170] 19..................................[33.4.170] 20..................................[33.4.170] 59..................................[33.4.170]

Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 s 11(13).... [33.7.890], [33.10.1860] s 11(13)(b)...................... [33.7.890] s 11(15)........ [33.6.160], [33.7.250] s 34................................[33.10.500] s 35(1)...........................[33.10.510] s 165..............................[33.10.500] s 194G...........................[33.8.1940]

s 3(1)(b)....[33.11.200], [33.11.230] s 3(1)(c)...[33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370], [33.11.380], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 3(1)(d)........................ [33.11.360] s 3(2)............................. [33.11.390] s s s s

3(3)............................. [33.11.240] 3(3)(b)........................ [33.11.380] 3(5)............................. [33.11.370] 4..................[33.1.320], [33.2.90], [33.3.470], [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400], [33.6.290], [33.9.720], [33.9.870], [33.9.890], [33.10.2150]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Tasmania – continued

ss 65 – 66....................... [33.9.230] s 65(1).............................[33.9.230] s 66..................................[33.9.230] s 207................................[33.9.390] s 314..............................[33.8.1810] ss 314 – 315................. [33.8.1810] s 322A...........................[33.8.1990] s 457................................[33.9.510] s 458................................[33.9.510] ss 458 – 463A................ [33.9.510] s 464A(2)........................ [33.9.520] s 464K(7)........................ [33.8.370] s 465................................[33.9.540]

s 4(1)...........[33.3.470], [33.7.690], [33.9.850] s 4(4).................................[33.2.90] s 5................[33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400] Victoria Accident Compensation Act 1985................ [33.6.170], [33.10.720] s 134AB(32)................. [33.10.550] s 135A............[33.5.10], [33.5.390] s 135A(7)(c)....................[33.1.310] Administration and Probate Act 1958 s 29..............................[33.10.1210] s 29(1).........................[33.10.1210]

Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1972..................................... [33.8.325] Defamation Act 2005 s s s s

s 29(2)(a)..................... [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210] s 29(2)(c)(ii)................[33.10.1220] s 29(2)(c)(iii).............. [33.10.1230] Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012.................[33.6.170] s 8....................................[33.2.510] Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994..................................... [33.6.310] Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006

34..............................[33.10.1100] 35..............................[33.10.1100] 36.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] 37..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100]

s 38..............................[33.10.1100] Dog Act 1958...................... [33.6.390] Domestic Animals Act 1994..................................... [33.6.170] s 3(1)...............................[33.6.460] s 29..................................[33.6.460] s 29(9)(a)........................ [33.6.470]

s 10(c)............................. [33.9.220] s 21...............[33.9.480], [33.9.540] Country Fire Authority Act 1958 s 30..................................[33.9.380]

s 29(9)(b)........................ [33.6.470] Education and Training Reform Regulations 2007 reg 14.............................. [33.9.440]

Crimes Act 1958 s 63................................[33.8.1560] s 63A.............................[33.8.1560] s 65..................................[33.9.230]

Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994 s 11..................................[33.5.390] Fair Trading Act 1999...... [33.8.1080] s 11................................[33.11.350]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

s 10........... [PREFACE], [33.2.1105]

Victoria – continued

Family Violence Protection Act 2008 Pt 4..............................[33.10.2280] Goods Act 1958 s s s s

18..................................[33.4.170] 19..................................[33.4.170] 20..................................[33.4.170] 61..................................[33.4.170]

Guardianship and Administration Act 1986..................................... [33.9.320] s 24(2)(d)........................ [33.9.320] s 37..................................[33.9.320] s 39(1)(a)........................ [33.9.320] s 39(1)(b)........................ [33.9.320] s 42A...............................[33.9.320] s 42E............................... [33.9.320]

Mental Health Act 2014...............[PREFACE], [33.2.1105], [33.9.310] Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 s 34..................................[33.5.390] Partnership Act 1958 s 14................................[33.11.157] s 16................................[33.11.157] Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983................................... [33.10.530] Police Regulation (Pensions) Act 1958 s 123................................[33.6.610] Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008

House Contracts Guarantee Act 1987

s 61..................................[33.7.360] s 64..................................[33.7.360] Pt 6 Div 1....................... [33.7.520]

s 6..................................[33.2.1140] Human Tissue Act 1982...... [33.9.220] s 24..................................[33.9.300]

Residential Tenancies Act 1997 s 65...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 68...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 80...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290]

Limitation of Actions Act 1958 s 5(1)(a).......................... [33.5.410] s 5(1A)......... [33.5.410], [33.8.310] s 5(1AA)..... [33.5.410], [33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 23A..........[33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 27D(1).......................... [33.5.410]

s 226.............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 238.............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] s 322................................[33.9.390] Road Management Act 2004

Magistrates’ Court Act 1989

s 102.............[33.2.90], [33.2.1180]

s 14(2).............................[33.9.570] s 57..................................[33.9.540]

Road Traffıc Act 1935......... [33.5.150]

Marketing of Primary Products Act 1958................................. [33.10.1500]

s 9(1)(d).......................... [33.8.470]

Summary Offences Act 1966

Supreme Court Act 1986

Mental Health Act 1986.....................................[PREFACE]

s 38...........[33.7.890], [33.10.1860] s 48...............[33.6.160], [33.7.250]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxviii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Victoria – continued

Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 s 29................................[33.8.1940]

s 58................................[33.10.500] ss 58 – 60..................... [33.10.500] s 60................................[33.10.520] s 60(1)......[33.10.510], [33.10.530] s 60(2)(a)...................... [33.10.530] s 60(3)(b)...................... [33.10.540] s 60(3)(c)...................... [33.10.220] s 101..............................[33.10.500] Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 13.02.............................[33.8.300] r 13.07(3)...................... [33.8.1910] r 21.03.........................[33.10.1420]

Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996................................... [33.10.720] Victoria Police Act 2013 s 71(2).............................[33.9.560] s 74..................................[33.6.610] s 75..................................[33.6.610] Workers Compensation Act 1958..................................... [33.6.170] Wrongs Act 1958.................. [33.2.30], [33.2.50] s 14A(a).......................... [33.3.190]

Tobacco Act 1987

s 14A(b).......................... [33.3.160] s 14B............................. [33.2.1110] s 14B(1).......................... [33.3.330]

s 5B.................................[33.3.220] s 5D.................................[33.3.220] s 15G...............................[33.3.220] Transfer of Land Act 1958 s 72..................................[33.7.710] Transport Accident Act 1986................ [33.6.170], [33.10.720] s 93................................[33.2.1370] s 93(2)(b)...................... [33.10.720] s 93(7).............................[33.1.310] s 93(10).........................[33.10.760] s 93(13).........................[33.10.550] s 93(15)....[33.10.510], [33.10.540] s 169................................[33.9.950] s 173(1).........................[33.10.550] s 174..............................[33.10.760] s 175(1)....[33.10.510], [33.10.540]

s 14B(2)....... [33.3.280], [33.3.330] s 14B(3)...... [33.3.210], [33.3.340], [33.3.350], [33.6.290] s 14B(4)....... [33.3.230], [33.3.340] s 14B(4)(e)......................[33.3.250] s 14B(4)(f)... [33.3.250], [33.3.340] s 14B(4)(g)......................[33.3.340] s 14B(5).......................... [33.3.290] s 14C...............................[33.3.170] s 14D...............................[33.3.470] s 14F............................... [33.3.330] ss 14F – 14H.................. [33.3.330] s 14G.............[33.2.90], [33.3.520], [33.9.610], [33.9.820], [33.9.980] s 14G(2)(a)........................[33.2.90] s 23A(1)........................ [33.11.350] s 23B............................. [33.11.360] s 23B(1)....[33.11.350], [33.11.370]

Uniform Building Regulations 1969 reg 1604.......................... [33.5.230]

s 23B(3)........................ [33.11.380] s 23B(4)........................ [33.11.360]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxix

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Victoria – continued

s 23B(5)........................ [33.11.360] s 23B(6)........................ [33.11.380] s 24(2)..... [33.11.390], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 24(2A)........................ [33.11.390] s 24(2A)(b)................... [33.11.390] s 24(2B)........................ [33.11.360] s 24(4)........................... [33.11.370] s 24(5)........................... [33.11.370] s 24A.............................[33.2.1060] s 24AA..... [33.11.200], [33.11.220] s 24AB..... [33.11.200], [33.11.230] s 24AD(4)(a).................[33.11.380] s 24AE.......................... [33.11.390] s 24AF.............................. [33.2.90] s 24AF(1)...................... [33.11.390] s 24AG.......................... [33.11.390] s 24AH(1)..................... [33.11.390] s 24AI(1).......................[33.11.390] s 25..............[33.1.320], [33.3.480], [33.5.400], [33.7.690], [33.9.870] s 26..............[33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400], [33.11.390] s 26(1).............................[33.7.690] s 26(1)(b)........................ [33.9.850] s 26(4)...............................[33.2.90] s 28AA........[33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.5.400] s 28B.............................[33.10.760] s 28F............ [33.2.90], [33.10.750] s 28G............[33.2.90], [33.10.790] ss 28G – 28H....................[33.2.90] s 28H.............................[33.10.790] s 28I.............................. [33.10.750]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

28I(2)(b).....................[33.10.550] 28IA............................... [33.2.90] 28IA(1).......................[33.10.760] 28IA(2).......................[33.10.760] 28IB............................[33.10.760] 28ID.......... [33.2.90], [33.10.770] 28IE...........[33.2.90], [33.10.770] 28IF................................ [33.2.90] 28LA.............................. [33.2.90] 30..................................[33.8.580] 31..................................[33.6.170] 31B(1)............................ [33.2.90] 31B(3)............................ [33.2.90] 32................................[33.8.1990] 33..................................[33.6.300] 44...............[33.3.480], [33.7.660] 48................[33.2.60], [33.2.250], [33.2.790]

s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s

48(1)(b)...................... [33.2.1510] 48(2)...............................[33.2.60] 48(2)(d)........................ [33.3.220] 48(3).............................[33.2.790] 49....................................[33.2.60] 50.............[33.2.1150], [33.3.270] 51(1)...............................[33.2.70] 53..................................[33.9.900] 54..................................[33.9.900] 55....................................[33.2.80] 55(2)...............................[33.2.80] 59....................................[33.2.90] 59(2)...............................[33.2.90] 59(4)...............................[33.2.90] 60................................[33.2.1150] 61................[33.2.90], [33.2.350], [33.5.230] s 62.................[33.2.90], [33.9.720] s 63................[33.2.90], [33.3.470],

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxx

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Victoria – continued

Pt XI..............................[33.2.1320] Pt XII........... [33.2.90], [33.2.1180]

[33.9.850], [33.10.2150] s 72...........[33.2.1290], [33.2.1320] s 72(2)...........................[33.2.1320] s 73..........[33.2.1300], [33.2.1310], [33.2.1320], [33.10.830] s 75...........[33.2.1320], [33.10.830] s 83................................[33.2.1180]

Western Australia Acts Amendment (Actions for Damages) Act 1986 s 4................................[33.10.1750] Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004

s 84................................[33.2.1180]

s 8..................................[33.10.500]

Pt IIA.......... [33.2.1160], [33.3.10], [33.6.290] Pt IIC................................ [33.2.90]

Civil Liability Act 2002........[33.2.30], [33.2.50], [33.3.230], [33.7.660]

Pt III............................[33.10.1240] Pt IV..........[33.8.1750], [33.9.720], [33.11.200] Pt IVAA........ [33.2.90], [33.9.720], [33.11.390] Pt V............. [33.1.330], [33.3.470], [33.6.290], [33.9.720], [33.9.850], [33.9.890], [33.10.2150] Pt VA............[33.2.90], [33.10.740] Pt VB.......... [33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740] Pt VBA....... [33.2.90], [33.10.740], [33.10.790] Pt VC............................ [33.10.360] Pt VI................................[33.6.170] Pt VIA...........[33.2.90], [33.2.330], [33.2.1340] Pt VIB............................... [33.2.90] Pt IX..................................[33.2.90] Pt X...............................[33.2.1540] Pt X Div 3.... [33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Pt X Div 4... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt X Div 5.... [33.2.90], [33.2.600], [33.2.1150]

s 4.............[33.10.760], [33.10.790] s 5A...............................[33.2.1540] ss 5A – 5P.................... [33.2.1540] s 5A(2)............................ [33.7.660] s 5AA..............................[33.5.390] s 5AB................................ [33.2.90] s 5AD(2)........................... [33.2.90] s 5AE................................ [33.2.90] s 5AI................................. [33.2.90] s 5B...............[33.2.60], [33.2.250], [33.2.790] s 5B(1)(b)......................[33.2.1510] s 5B(2).............................. [33.2.60] s 5B(2)(d)........................[33.3.220] s 5C(1).............................. [33.2.70] s 5E................................... [33.2.80] s 5F................ [33.2.80], [33.9.900] s 5H...................................[33.2.80] s 5I.................................. [33.3.270] s 5J.................................. [33.3.500] s 5K................[33.2.90], [33.9.720] s 5L............. [33.2.90], [33.2.1690], [33.9.820] s 5L(2)............................ [33.9.820]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Western Australia – continued

s s s s s s s s s

5L(3)............................ [33.9.820] 5N.................................[33.9.900] 5N(2)............................ [33.9.900] 5O................[33.2.80], [33.3.270] 5P................................... [33.2.80] 5PB............[33.2.90], [33.2.1150] 5PB(4)............................ [33.2.90] 5PB(5)............................ [33.2.90] 5S......... [33.2.1290], [33.2.1320], [33.10.830] ss 5S – 5T.....................[33.2.1320] s 5S(2)...........................[33.2.1320] s 5W.............................. [33.2.1180] s 5Y............[33.2.1180], [33.5.390] s 5Z.............. [33.2.90], [33.2.1180] s 9..................................[33.10.790] s 10................................[33.10.790] s 11................................[33.10.750] s 12....................................[33.2.90] s 12(3)...........................[33.10.760] s 12(5)...........................[33.10.760]

ss 12(5) – (7)................ [33.10.760] s 13................................[33.10.760] Pt 1A.................................[33.3.10] Pt 1A Div 3................... [33.1.280], [33.2.70], [33.3.360], [33.4.460] Pt 1A Div 4.................. [33.2.1590] Pt 1A Div 5.................... [33.1.320] Pt 1A Div 6..................... [33.2.80], [33.2.1590] Pt 1A Div 7..................... [33.2.90], [33.2.600], [33.2.1150] Pt 1B............................. [33.2.1320] Pt 1C............ [33.2.90], [33.2.1180] Pt 1D.............[33.2.90], [33.2.330],

Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt

[33.2.1340] 1E................................. [33.2.90] 1F.............[33.2.90], [33.11.390] 2..............[33.2.90], [33.10.170], [33.10.720], [33.10.740] 2 Div 2......................... [33.2.90] 2 Div 3......................... [33.2.90] 2 Div 4..................... [33.10.360]

Criminal Code..................... [33.8.420] s 69..................................[33.9.390] s 70A...............................[33.8.470] s 124..............................[33.8.1810] s 199................................[33.9.230] s 246................................[33.9.370] s 251................................[33.9.410] ss 251 – 253................... [33.9.410] s 254................................[33.9.390] s 255................................[33.9.390] s 257................................[33.9.440] s 258................................[33.9.470] s 332..............................[33.8.1560] Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913.................. [33.8.420], [33.8.470] Schedule.......................[33.8.1560], [33.8.1810], [33.9.230], [33.9.370], [33.9.390], [33.9.410], [33.9.440], [33.9.470] Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003................................... [33.10.720] Criminal Investigation Act 2006 s 25..................................[33.9.510] s 128................................[33.9.510] Pt 5 Div 3....................... [33.9.540] Pt 12 Div 2..................... [33.9.510] Pt 13................................[33.9.530]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Western Australia – continued

s 95..................................[33.7.520] s 349................................[33.7.520]

Damage By Aircraft Act 1964..................................... [33.6.170]

Pt VII Div 1....................[33.7.520]

s 4....................................[33.8.580]

Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983

Defamation Act 2005 s s s s

s 3...................[33.6.10], [33.6.300] s 3(1)...............................[33.6.300] s 3(3)...........[33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.310], [33.6.320], [33.6.450] s 3(4)...............................[33.6.300] s 3(5)...............................[33.6.300]

34..............................[33.10.1100] 35..............................[33.10.1100] 36.........[33.10.180], [33.10.1100] 37..........[33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1100]

s 38..............................[33.10.1100] Dog Act 1976...................... [33.6.170] s 46...............[33.6.460], [33.6.470]

Home Building Contracts Act 1991 s 9(2)............................. [33.2.1140]

s 46(2)..........[33.6.460], [33.6.470] s 46(3).............................[33.6.460] s 46(4).............................[33.6.460]

Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982..................................... [33.9.220]

s 46(5)(a)........................ [33.6.460]

Law Reform (Common Employment) Act 1951

s 46(5)(b)........................ [33.6.460] s 46(6).............................[33.6.460] s 46(7).............................[33.6.460] Fair Trading Act 2010....... [33.6.170], [33.8.1080] s 19..................................[33.2.510] Fatal Accidents Act 1959................................. [33.10.1240] Fire Brigades Act 1942

s 21..................................[33.9.300]

s 3..................................[33.2.1060] Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947...... [33.3.480], [33.4.210], [33.10.2150] s 3....................................[33.5.400] s 3A............[33.4.210], [33.11.350] ss 3A – 5........................ [33.3.480]

s 34..................................[33.9.380] Guardianship and Administration Act 1990..................................... [33.9.320] s 45(2)(d)........................ [33.9.320] s 119................................[33.9.320] Pt 5 Div 3....................... [33.9.320] Health Act 1911...................[33.7.520] s 93..................................[33.7.520] s 94..................................[33.7.520]

s 4................[33.1.320], [33.2.90], [33.4.210], [33.6.290], [33.9.720],

s 4(1)............[33.9.840], [33.9.850] s 4(2).................................[33.2.90] s 4(3)...............................[33.3.520] s 5.................[33.3.470], [33.3.480] s 5(1)............................. [33.11.200]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxiii

[33.1.330], [33.3.470], [33.5.400], [33.7.690], [33.9.870], [33.9.890]

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Western Australia – continued

Sch 3.2............................ [33.7.520] Magistrates Court Act 2004

s 6....................................[33.5.400] s 7............[33.8.1750], [33.11.200], [33.11.220] s 7(1)(a).........................[33.11.200] s 7(1)(b)....[33.11.200], [33.11.230] s 7(1)(c)...[33.11.350], [33.11.360], [33.11.370], [33.11.380], [33.11.400], [33.11.410] s 7(1A).......................... [33.11.400] s 7(2)............................. [33.11.390] Pt 2..................................[33.9.850] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941......... [33.2.1370]

s 37..................................[33.9.570] Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 s 16(4)...........................[33.10.360] s 16(4)(b)(i).................. [33.10.360] s 16(4)(b)(ii)................. [33.10.360] s 26..................................[33.9.950] Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 s 33(3).............................[33.5.390] Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985................ [33.2.1160], [33.6.290]

s s s s

3................................[33.10.1750] 4................................[33.10.1210] 4(1)...........................[33.10.1210] 4(2)(a)....................... [33.10.200], [33.10.210], [33.10.1210] s 4(2)(d)...................... [33.10.1220] s 4(2)(e)...................... [33.10.1230] s 5(1)(e)........................ [33.10.550] Limitation Act 1935 s 38(1).............................[33.5.410] s 47A...............................[33.9.560] Limitation Act 2005.............[33.9.560] s 3(1)...............................[33.5.410] s 13..................................[33.5.410] s 14..................................[33.5.410] s 14(1)........[33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 16.............[33.8.310], [33.8.1710] s 17................................[33.11.370] Local Government Act 1995 s 3.25...............................[33.7.520] s 9.28...............................[33.7.520] Sch 3.1............................ [33.7.520]

s s s s

2.................[33.3.160], [33.3.170] 3....................................[33.3.170] 4......................................[33.3.10] 4(1).............[33.3.10], [33.3.330], [33.3.350], [33.6.290] s 5.................[33.3.210], [33.3.520] s 5(1)...........[33.3.330], [33.3.340], [33.3.500] s 5(2)...........[33.3.210], [33.3.330], [33.3.490], [33.3.520] s 5(3)...........[33.3.210], [33.3.330], [33.3.520] s 5(4)............[33.3.230], [33.3.340] s 5(4)(e).......................... [33.3.250] s 5(4)(f)........[33.3.250], [33.3.340] s 5(4)(g).......................... [33.3.340] s 6....................................[33.3.280] s 7(1)...............................[33.3.500] s 8....................................[33.3.310] s 8(1)...............................[33.3.290] s 9(1).......... [33.2.1110], [33.3.190] s 10..................................[33.3.470]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxiv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

Western Australia – continued

Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 s 4..................................[33.8.1940]

Offenders (Legal Action) Act 2000 s 5....................................[33.3.520] Partnership Act 1895 s 17................................[33.11.157]

Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection From Liability) Act 2002 Pt 2....................................[33.2.90]

Police Act 1892 s 137.............[33.6.610], [33.9.560] s 137(3)...........................[33.9.560] Residential Tenancies Act 1987 s 42...............[33.3.190], [33.3.290] Restraining Orders Act 1997................................. [33.10.2280] Restraint of Debtors Act 1984................................... [33.8.1700]

Pt 3....................................[33.2.90] Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981........ [33.6.170] s 18.................[33.5.10], [33.5.390] s 93B(3)(b)...................[33.10.200], [33.10.210] Workers’ Compensation (Common Law Proceedings) Act 2004................................... [33.10.720]

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971

Imperial

r 8(1)............................... [33.8.300] r 9(3)............................. [33.8.1910] Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 13..................................[33.4.170] s 14..................................[33.4.170] s 15..................................[33.4.170]

Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ Act) 21 & 22 Vict c 27......................................... [33.7.890] s 2................................[33.10.1860] Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 14 Geo 3 c 78

s 54..................................[33.4.170] School Education Regulations 2000 reg 40(2)......................... [33.9.440]

s 86..................................[33.6.160] Statute of Frauds 1677 29 Car II c 3......................................... [33.8.1220]

Supreme Court Act 1935

Great Britain

s 25(10)....[33.7.890], [33.10.1860] s 32................................[33.10.500]

Constables Protection Act 1750 24 Geo 2 c 44...........................[33.9.560]

s 32(2)(a)...................... [33.10.530] New Zealand

s 32(2)(aa).....................[33.10.540]

Animals Law Reform Act 1989

Tobacco Products Control Act 2006

s 5....................................[33.6.300]

s 107B.............................[33.3.220]

Dog Control Act 1996

Transfer of Land Act 1893 s 68..................................[33.7.710]

s 63..................................[33.6.470]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxv

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

United Kingdom

Criminal Law Act 1967.....[33.8.1990] Crown Proceedings Act 1947

Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 1(1)(a)........................ [33.10.850] s 1(1)(b)........................ [33.10.850] An Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England 1846 9 & 10 Vict c 95..................................... [33.10.2030] An Act to Extend the Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England 1850 13 & 14 Vict c 61..................... [33.10.2030] Animals Act 1971............... [33.6.350], [33.6.390] s 2(2)...............................[33.6.360] s 5(2)...............................[33.6.390] s 6(5)...............................[33.6.390] s 8....................................[33.6.300] s 8(1)...............................[33.6.300] Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 s 1(3)............................. [33.11.380] s 3..................................[33.11.220] s 4..................................[33.11.230] Common Law Procedure Act 1852 15 & 16 Vict c 76

s 2(3)...............................[33.6.610] Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969.........[33.2.1060] Factory and Workshop Act 1878 41 & 42 Vict c 16.......................[33.5.10] Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (Lord Campbell’s Act) 9 & 10 Vict c 93.................. [33.2.370], [33.10.1240] Forcible Entry Act 1381 5 Ric 2 c 7........................................... [33.9.390] Judgments Act 1838 1 & 2 Vict c 10 s 17................................[33.10.510] Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935........ [33.11.350] s 6..................................[33.11.350] s 6(1)(a).........................[33.11.220] Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 24 & 25 Geo 5 c 30.................................. [33.10.1210] Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957..................................... [33.3.160] Occupiers Liability Act 1984..................................... [33.3.160]

s 3....................................[33.8.300]

Public Offıcers Protection Act 1609 7 Jac 1 c 5.............................. [33.9.570]

Consumer Protection Act 1987..................................... [33.4.730]

Public Offıcers Protection Act 1623 21 Jac 1 c 12.......................[33.9.570]

Control of Pollution Act 1974..................................... [33.4.450]

Senior Courts Act 1981 s 32A.............................[33.10.360]

Copyright Act 1956 4 & 5 Eliz 2 c 74........................................... [33.5.10]

Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 36 & 37 Vict c 66...... [33.8.300] Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 s 2(1)...............................[33.8.910]

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988....................................... [33.5.10]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxvi

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

United States of America Federal Rules of Evidence r 702................................[33.4.480] International Treaties Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 04/11/1950 Art 6(1)........................... [33.2.390] Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 14/07/1967........................... [33.4.970]

[References are to paragraph numbers] ccxxvii

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

ccxxviii

33.1 Tort and Contract

TORT AND CONTRACT

Current Subtitle Author Clare McKay

(Updating author, Update 307 – May 2015) (Updating author, Update 295 – May 2014)

BA, LLB (Hons) (UWA), BCL (Oxon) Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria (Updating author, Update 319 – June 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Geoff Masel

Dr Paul Vout

BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox

BA, LLB, SJD (Syd) Barrister and Member of the Victorian Bar Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Northern Ireland, England and Wales

(Updating author, Update 71 – April 1998) (Updating author, Update 40 – October 1996) (Original author)

(Updating author, Update 244 – December 2009) (Updating author, Update 213 – May 2007)

Helen Van der Geest BA (Hons), LLB (ANU) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia (Updating author, Update 156 – August 2002) (Updating author, Update 151 – March 2002)

2

33.1 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.1.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.1.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.1.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.1.30] CONCURRENT LIABILITY........................................................ [33.1.140] DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT....................................[33.1.250]

3

4

Introduction Definition [33.1.10] The law of torts and the law of contract serve different purposes. “Tort” derives from the Latin word tortus, which is commonly translated as a synonym for “wrong”. In this Subtitle, a tort is defined as an interference with a person or personal liberty; reputation or dignity; possession of, or title to, land or chattels; certain economic interests; relations with others; and the proper exercise of executive or judicial power. Such interference has been said to arise “from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by law”, which duty is owed to persons generally and does not depend upon any agreement or consent between the parties.1 A tort has also been defined as “an injury other than a breach of contract, which the law will redress with damages”.2 The primary purpose of the law of torts is to compensate a plaintiff for loss or damage suffered, by compelling the wrongdoer to pay for the consequences of their wrongful act. Put differently, tort law is concerned with allocating responsibility for certain types of loss.3 This definition is, however, unsatisfactory for several reasons: (1)

It is only as expansive as the range of interests that the law of torts seeks to protect. Many other interests held by individuals may be interfered with, but such interference does not necessarily constitute a wrongful act for which monetary compensation may be awarded.

(2)

In certain instances, the existence of tortious liability depends on some prior consent, undertaking or assumption of responsibility by the person (ie defendant) who is subject to the duty.4

(3)

Conduct that constitutes a tort will often also constitute a crime. This is due, at least in part, to the common legal and historical origins of tort law and criminal law.

(4)

An award of compensatory damages for loss or injury is not unique to tort law.

(5)

Other remedies may be available to victims of a tort, including self-help and equitable relief in the form of an injunction.5

Yet due to the nature and history of tort law, a more precise definition may not be possible without engaging in a wholesale rationalisation of this area of law (if at all).6 By contrast, the law of contract exists for the purpose of vindicating a single interest: obtaining the other party’s performance of the contractual promise(s) 5

[33.1.10]

INTRODUCTION

bargained for.7 While breach of contract may also give rise to a right to compensation, the loss suffered is wholly different to loss arising from a tortious act. For this reason, the measure of damages in tort and contract signify different kinds of loss, not merely different methods of calculating the quantum of damages recoverable.8 Damages for breach of contract are awarded to put the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been properly performed, whereas damages in tort put the plaintiff in the same position as if the tort had not been committed. It is to address the different aims and purposes served by the laws of torts and contract that disparities between these two heads of liability arise.9 While the theoretical foundations for actions in tort and contract are separate, the historical roots of the two areas of law are, in some instances, closely aligned. Historically, both the tort of negligence and breach of contract derived from the writ of assumpsit,10 a writ which developed from the action on the case.11 In each case, the cause of action arose from an undertaking (assumpsit) by the defendant to do or refrain from doing a particular act.12 During the 16th and 17th centuries, the law of contract arose from assumpsit to form a separate body of legal obligations.13 While these areas of law were traditionally treated as discrete and separate, in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J stated that: The law of contract and the law of tort are, in a modern context, properly to be seen as but two of a number of imprecise divisions, for the purpose of classification, of a general body of rules constituting one coherent system of law.14

On this basis, Deane J considered that the continued dichotomy between the laws of torts and contract was founded on a flawed perception.15 The High Court’s decision in Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375 provides some support for this view. In that case, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ criticised decisions of the House of Lords in D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368 and Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414 as resting “upon a narrower view of the scope of the modern law of negligence and a more rigid compartmentalization of contract and tort than is acceptable under the law of this country”.16 Similarly, in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Gummow J described one role of tort law as filling gaps left by the law of contract.17 Further, in Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40, Kiefel J observed that “there is something of a connection between the two areas of contract and tort”.18 In Kiefel J’s view, the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties may be relevant to the question of whether a duty of care was owed in negligence.19 This tendency to view the laws of torts and contract as somewhat aligned was challenged by the High Court in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, where the Court observed that conceptual and practical differences between the bodies of law remained of “considerable

6

[33.1.10]

DEFINITION

importance”.20 Tortious duties were described as duties imposed by law, while contractual duties arose from private agreements between the parties. In Astley v Austrust Ltd, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that: Long before the imperial march of modern negligence law began, contracts of service carried an implied term that they would be performed with reasonable care and skill. … The evolution of the law of negligence has broadened the responsibility of professional persons and requires them to take reasonable care and skill even in situations where a contractual relationship cannot be established. But given the differing requirements and advantages of each cause of action, there is no justification in recognising the tortious duty to the exclusion of the contractual duty.21

These statements were made in the context of recognising concurrent liability in tort and contract for a solicitor’s professional negligence. Given the differences between the two bodies of law, the High Court could not see a reason why a cause of action would be brought in one to the exclusion of the other. The Court’s decision in this case should not be seen as undermining the identifiable similarities between these areas of law, however, but simply as recognising that the law of torts and contract serve different purposes and afford relief for different types of loss. The findings in Astley v Austrust Ltd concerning contributory negligence in contract have since been reversed by legislation:22 see [33.1.320].

1

Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) pp 3–4 [1-003]. 2 Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) p 3. 3 Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) p 2 [1-002]. 4 Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) pp 5–6 [1-005]. 5 Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) p 3; Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) p 2 [1-002]. 6 For an example of the conflicting views on this question, see Stevens R, “The Divergence of the Australian and English Law of Torts” in Degeling S, Edelman J and Goudkamp J (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co., 2001) pp 38–39. 7 Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) p 4. As Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ observed in Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, at [121], the law of contract protects the interest of a party in having its contractual expectations met. 8 See Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; 73 ALJR 12; [1998] HCA 69, Gaudron J at 503 (CLR). 9 Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) pp 6–9 [1-007]. 10 Fifoot CHS, History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract (Stevens & 7

[33.1.10]

INTRODUCTION

11

12

13

14 15 16

17 18

19

20 21 22

Stevens, 1949) p 165. See also Watson JA, “A Sketch II: Praecipe to Negligence & Contract” in Gleeson JT, Watson JA and Peden E (eds), Historical Foundations of Australian Law (Federation Press, 2013) Vol 2 p 10. Simpson AWB, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (Clarendon Press, 1975) p 199; Windeyer WJV, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed (revised), Law Book Co., 1957) pp 106–107. Windeyer WJV, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed (revised), Law Book Co., 1957) pp 106–107; Baker JH, An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd ed, Butt (UK), 1990) p 330. Fifoot CHS, History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract (Stevens & Stevens, 1949) p 339; Windeyer WJV, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed (revised), Law Book Co., 1957) p 107. See also Baker JH, An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd ed, Butt (UK), 1990) Ch 19. Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 584 (CLR). Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 584 (CLR). Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375. Compare Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, where Callinan J considered (at [221]) that, in light of the High Court’s decision in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, a clear compartmentalisation between tort and contract remained “a live, indeed a flourishing plant in Australian jurisprudence”. Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Gummow J at 231 (CLR). Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40, Kiefel J at [171]. See also Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [59]. Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40, Kiefel J at [172]. See also Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, McHugh J at [65]. Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [47]. Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [48]. See also “Concurrent Torts” [33.11.10]ff; Unfair Dealing “Contribution by Plaintiff” [35.4.160]–[35.4.170] and “Apportionment between Defendants” [35.4.180]–[35.4.240].

Scope of Subtitle [33.1.20] The relationship between tort and contract is increasingly being explored. Two principal areas where the law of torts and the law of contract interact are concurrent liability (see [33.1.140] and [33.1.320]) and damages: see [33.1.250]–[33.1.340].

8

[33.1.30]

RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.1.30] The law of torts and the law of contract are related in a number of areas. For a discussion of the principles governing an award of damages in tort, see “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. Damages in contract are discussed in Contract: General Principles “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff. Concurrent liability of professionals in tort and contract under contracts for service and other arrangements is discussed in 27 Professional Liability.

9

[33.1.30]

INTRODUCTION

10

Concurrent Liability [33.1.140] Concurrent liability in tort and contract affords a right to bring separate claims for conduct which constitutes both a tort and a breach of contract arising from the same set of facts. Most often, concurrent claims in tort and contract arise from liability in negligence which also constitutes breach of a contractual duty (express or implied) to use reasonable skill and care. Recognition of concurrent liability does not, of itself, assist a court in determining which cause of action will prevail where the differences between the two are significant. Where concurrent liability is available, a plaintiff may assert whichever cause of action appears more advantageous in respect of defences, limitation periods, assessment of damages and any other legal consequences. Prima facie, a plaintiff may sue in tort, in contract, or alternatively in both.1 Recognising concurrent liability in tort and contract does not, however, diminish the importance of the differences that exist between these two bodies of law. It is now accepted by both English and Australian courts that concurrent liability in contract and tort may arise in cases of professional negligence.2 “Professionals” in this context has traditionally encompassed a broad range of persons, including solicitors3 and medical practitioners.4 In Australia, concurrent liability for professional negligence has been held to extend to architects,5 engineers6 and professional builders7 (although not with respect to pure economic loss arising from the construction of commercial buildings),8 but not to bankers.9 Beyond the professions,10 it remains uncertain whether concurrent liability in tort and contract can extend to other contracts for the provision of services. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria has noted “a deliberate trend in courts of final appeal … to arrest on grounds of policy the expansion of the law of negligence into areas governed by contract, equity or statute”.11 This is a trend which the Court of Appeal regarded as militating against the extension of liability in negligence, and thus concurrent liability, in “relationships based in contract other than those for professional services”.12 In so restricting concurrent liability, the Court of Appeal purported to apply “the tenor” of one passage in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6,13 although the authority for, and correctness of, that application is questionable in light of subsequent statements made in that case.14 Nevertheless, there may be advantages to a plaintiff bringing a cause of action in tort or contract alone, despite the availability of concurrent liability. A plaintiff who is injured upon entering a premises may elect to sue the occupier in negligence only, despite the existence of a contract between the parties, due to a higher standard of care imposed by tort law.15 An employee injured in the

11

[33.1.140]

CONCURRENT LIABILITY

course of their employment may elect to pursue a claim in contract alone, where the employer’s vicarious liability in tort is not coextensive with obligations imposed by an implied term of the employment contract.16 In some circumstances, it may also be necessary to bring a claim in contract alone where specific reference to the terms of the contract is required to found the plaintiff’s cause of action.17 Further, concurrent liability in tort cannot be admitted where its effect would be to permit a plaintiff to circumvent or escape a contractual obligation, or limitation of liability, for the act or omission which would constitute a tort.18 Concurrent liability is particularly unlikely to arise where the parties have entered into a detailed written agreement that is intended to regulate the performance of their contractual obligations.19 In some circumstances, the terms of a contract may explicitly or implicitly exclude concurrent liability in tort. However, in Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ observed (quoting Le Dain J in the Supreme Court of Canada in Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147; (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 481) that the nature and scope of a duty of care in tort does not depend upon specific obligations or duties created by express terms of a contract. In this regard, matters not dealt with by express contractual terms may be the subject of a duty of care in tort.20

1 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6; Alexander v Perpetual Trustees Western Australia Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; 78 ALJR 411; [2004] HCA 7, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [63]; Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761, Goff LJ at 193–194 (AC). See also Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583 (CA). 2 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6; Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761. 3 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 574–575 (CLR). 4 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; 70 ALJR 772, Brennan CJ at 78 (CLR). 5 Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 84 (CLR). 6 Pullen v Gutteridge, Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 27 (FC); Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 (CA). 7 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 622, 625 (CLR). Compare to Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ at [69]. 8 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, McHugh J at [112], [115]. See also Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36.

12

[33.1.140]

9

10 11 12

13

14 15

16 17

18

19

20

National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18 (consequential losses suffered by insurance broker were too remote to find bank liable for tort of conversion or breach of contract). But see Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363 (QBD (Comm Ct)), Steyn J at 375–376, which was not applied in National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [47]–[48]. See generally Jones MA and Dugdale A (eds), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (20th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) p 617 at [10-07]. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [47]. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [47]; SAS Trustee Corp v Cox (2011) 285 CLR 623; [2011] NSWCA 408, McColl JA at [93] (Campbell JA and Sackville AJA substantially agreeing). National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [47] referring to Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [47]. Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [48]. Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426, although in this case, the High Court found that there was no substantive difference between the content of the duty of care owed by the occupier in tort and any duty owed pursuant to an implied contractual term: see Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 40, Brennan J at 44 (CLR). Stubbe v Jensen [1997] 2 VR 439 (CA). Turner v Stallibrass [1898] 1 QB 56 (CA), Smith LJ at 58; Edwards v Mallan [1908] 1 KB 1002 (CA), Vaughan Williams LJ at 1005; White v John Warwick & Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1285 (CA), Denning LJ at 1294; Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147; (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 481 (CanSC), Le Dain J (for the Court) at [58], [69]; Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal [1987] 1 SCR 711; (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 (CanSC) (concurrent liability in tort does not arise where the congruent duty of care is excluded or rejected as an implied term of a particular class of contract); Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 621–622 (CLR); Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761. Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co Ltd [1924] AC 522, Viscount Finlay at 548; Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147; (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 481 (CanSC), Le Dain J (for the Court) at [59]–[61]; Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal [1987] 1 SCR 711; (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 (CanSC); Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761; Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 622 (CLR). Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 622 (CLR); Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods Ltd v Cospak International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 704, Macready M at [93], [99]. See, eg Holt v Payne Skillington (1996) 77 BLR 51 for further support for this view. But see Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80; [1985] 3 WLR 317 where the House of Lords stated (at 107 (AC)) that duties and obligations owed in tort cannot extend further than those arising expressly or by implication from the parties’ contract. 13

[33.1.140]

CONCURRENT LIABILITY

14

Damages in Tort and Contract [33.1.250] Damages in tort and for breach of contract are awarded to restore the plaintiff to the position they would have been in had the wrong not occurred.1 Some clear differences between the laws of tort and contract affect the application of this general rule: (1)

liability in contract may be directly affected by the terms of a contract (see [33.1.260]);

(2)

damages are assessed from different perspectives – damages for breach of contract are prospective, while damages in tort are assessed retrospectively (see [33.1.270]);

(3)

the test for remoteness of damage for breach of contract is narrower than in tort (see [33.1.290]);

(4)

there are variations in the quantum of general damages recoverable between tort and contract (see [33.1.300]);

(5)

exemplary damages may be awarded in tort but not for breach of contract (see [33.1.310]);

(6)

contribution between defendants is not always available for breach of contract claims (see [33.1.330]); and

(7)

the time of accrual of a cause of action varies between claims in tort and contract: see [33.1.340].

1

Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 (HL), Lord Blackburn at 39. Note that debate exists in Australia as to whether breach of contract may be properly characterised as a wrong. See, eg Campbell D and Harris D, “In Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and the Performance Interest” (2002) 22 Legal Studies 208 at 220. Compare Birks P, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in Owen DG (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) p 31.

[33.1.260] The terms of a contract may affect liability. Parties entering into a contract may agree on specific terms regarding the extent of their liability. No such opportunity arises where there is no express contractual relationship between the parties and claims must, of necessity, be brought in tort. Generally, an appropriately drafted contract, prepared with a view to a particular factual situation, can make provision for what would otherwise be left to inference by law. In Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491, Lord Reid stated that:

15

[33.1.260]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

In contract, if one party wishes to protect himself against a risk which to the other party would appear unusual, he can direct the other party’s attention to it before the contract is made … [I]n tort there is no opportunity for the injured party to protect himself in that way.1

The ability to alter liability by negotiating specific contractual terms extends to the quantum of damages recoverable for breach. As Scarman LJ observed in H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791; [1977] 3 WLR 990: [P]arties to a contract have the right to agree on a measure of damages which may be greater, or less, than the law would offer in the absence of agreement.2

1 Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491, Lord Reid at 386 (AC). 2 H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791; [1977] 3 WLR 990 (CA), Scarman LJ at 806 (QB).

[33.1.270] Damages in tort and contract are assessed from different perspectives. In Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 60 ALJR 239, the High Court stated that: In contract, damages are awarded with the object of placing the plaintiff in the position in which he would have been had the contract been performed – he is entitled to damages for loss of bargain (expectation loss) and damage suffered, including expenditure incurred, in reliance on the contract (reliance loss). In tort, on the other hand, damages are awarded with the object of placing the plaintiff in the position in which he would have been had the tort not been committed (similar to reliance loss).1

This difference was explained by Gaudron J in Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; 73 ALJR 12; [1998] HCA 69 on the basis that the common law measure of damages for tort and breach of contract signify different kinds of loss, not merely different methods by which the amount of loss is measured.2 In the law of contract, damages are awarded for loss arising from the non-performance of a contract. An award of damages protects the plaintiff’s expectation of receiving the other party’s performance, hence the expressions “expectation loss” and “expectation damages”.3 Damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the value of their right to the contractual promise being duly performed, plus any consequential losses which may be incurred.4 By contrast, a plaintiff’s right to recover damages in tort is limited to loss sustained as a result of the defendant’s wrong. Subject to the loss being foreseeable, the measure of damages in tort refers to an amount necessary to restore the plaintiff to the same position as if the tort had not been committed.5 In Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; 84 ALJR 292; [2010] HCA 12, referring to the tort of negligence, Hayne and Bell JJ observed that damages are awarded

16

[33.1.270]

to compensate for some detrimental “difference” suffered by the plaintiff, as a result of the defendant’s wrongful act. Their Honours explained: The comparison invoked by reference to “difference” is between the relevant state of affairs as they existed after the negligent act or omission, and the state of affairs that would have existed had the negligent act or omission not occurred.6

Courts adopt different perspectives in determining the amount of damages recoverable in tort and for breach of contract. In the law of contract, the approach is prospective; damages are awarded according to what the plaintiff expected to receive had the contract been properly performed.7 Damages are assessed on the basis that the defendant promised only to fulfil their side of the bargain and did not guarantee a profitable venture.8 While damages for breach of contract often include an amount for lost profits which the plaintiff expected to receive, where no net profit was anticipated or the amount of lost profits cannot be demonstrated, damages may still be awarded for expenses reasonably incurred in the expectation of receiving full contractual performance.9 When awarding damages in tort, the approach is retrospective; damages are assessed once the wrong has occurred. This difference in perspective is most clearly explained where the defendant’s tort induces entry into a contract. In those circumstances, damages are assessed from a tort perspective, by determining the amount of compensation necessary to restore the plaintiff, as far as possible, to the position they would have been in had the contract not been entered into.10 In assessing the amount of damages recoverable, it is irrelevant that the contract was not profitable. Further, it is not necessary for the defendant to make good the representation which induced the plaintiff’s entry into the contract.11 In some circumstances, an award of damages in tort may closely resemble, or be equivalent to, the quantum of damages recoverable for breach of contract. In Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123, Mason CJ and Dawson J said: An award of damages for expenditure reasonably incurred under a contract in which no net profit would have been realized, while placing the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the contract been fully performed, also restores the plaintiff to the position he or she would have been in had the contract not been entered into. In this particular situation it will be noted that there is a coincidence, but no more than a coincidence, between the measure of damages recoverable both in contract and in tort.12

The measure of damages in tort also begins to resemble the expectation element of damages for breach of contract when reliance on a representation deprives a party of the opportunity to enter into a different contract.13 There is a similar resemblance when a party is awarded damages in tort for failing to obtain a benefit, such as a legacy under a will.14

17

[33.1.270]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

1 2 3 4

5

6 7

8 9 10

11 12

Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 60 ALJR 239, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 11–12 (CLR). Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; 73 ALJR 12; [1998] HCA 69, Gaudron J at 503 (CLR). Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123, Mason CJ and Dawson J at 80 (CLR). Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; 73 ALJR 12; [1998] HCA 69, Gaudron J at 501–504 (CLR). See also Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123. However, see later observations of the High Court in Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272; 83 ALJR 390; [2009] HCA 8, French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [13]–[20] (putting the plaintiff in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed does not necessarily require that they be put in the same financial position as if the contract had been performed. Diminution in value of property may not always be the most appropriate measure of damages, particularly where the plaintiff has incurred increased expense by mitigating, or attempting to mitigate, their loss). For discussion of recoverable consequential losses incurred in mitigation by the plaintiff, see Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 (CA), Samuels JA at 356–357 (plaintiffs suffered further loss as a result of taking reasonable steps to mitigate damage caused by the defendant, which loss was held to be recoverable). L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65; Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1997) 77 FCR 307 (FCAFC). See also the discussion in Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491; 36 ALJR 362, Windeyer J at 505–507 (CLR). See also “General Compensatory Damages” [33.10.170]. Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; 84 ALJR 292; [2010] HCA 12, Hayne and Bell JJ at [66] (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123, Mason CJ and Dawson J at 80 (CLR). For a general statement of principle, see Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850; 154 ER 363, Baron Parke at 855. See generally Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123. Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123, Mason CJ and Dawson J at 81 (CLR). Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692; 7 SR (NSW) 821; 24 WN (NSW) 172, Griffiths CJ at 1703–1704, O’Connor J at 1709 (CLR); Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; 58 ALJR 560, Gibbs CJ at 220–221 (CLR). Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692; 7 SR (NSW) 821; 24 WN (NSW) 172, Griffiths CJ at 1703–1704, O’Connor J at 1709 (CLR). Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123, Mason CJ and Dawson J at 85–86 (CLR). However, Deane J observed at 116 that the different rules governing the measure of damages in tort and contract were of “diminishing significance”. His Honour observed that such differences are largely the result of historical considerations, representing differences between the two causes of action “rather than reasoned development or exegesis of the law”.

18

[33.1.280]

13 Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 60 ALJR 239, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 13 (CLR); Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 68 ALJR 313. See Swanton J, “Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract: The Problem of Defining the Limits” (1996) 10 JCL 21. 14 Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487.

[33.1.280] At common law, the test for causation is generally the same in contract1 and tort, but this test is not always applicable to every tort. In most Australian jurisdictions, causation for the tort of negligence is governed by statutory requirements that a defendant’s negligent act or omission was a necessary condition of the plaintiff’s harm (factual causation) and that it is “appropriate” that liability be extended to the harm so caused (scope of liability).2 Causation in tort is therefore divided into two distinct questions, described by the High Court in Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375; 87 ALJR 648; [2013] HCA 19 as: [A] question of historical fact as to how particular harm occurred; and a normative question as to whether legal responsibility for that particular harm occurring in that way should be attributed to a particular person.3

Both questions must be answered affirmatively to prove a causal link between the defendant’s wrong and harm suffered by the plaintiff. In March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, the High Court rejected the “but for” test as the sole criterion for causation in the tort of negligence, holding that causation was also determined by considerations of common sense.4 Despite this, the “but for” test still remains relevant to determining questions of causation in tort. In Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5, the High Court affirmed that the “but for” test of factual causation is retained in statutory form, in the requirement that the defendant’s negligence must be a “necessary condition” of the plaintiff’s harm.5 Under English law, the “but for” causation test, informed by common sense considerations, may not always apply to every tort. In Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 2 WLR 1353; [2002] UKHL 19, the House of Lords affirmed a decision of the English Court of Appeal, which held that the trial judge had erred in applying the “but for” test as a necessary, although preliminary, criterion to establish causation in the tort of conversion, a tort of strict liability. The House of Lords held that in conversion cases, it may be more appropriate that the plaintiff receives the market value of the use of the goods converted, and that the “but for” test has no place in such a calculation.6 This approach has not been consistently followed in Australia. The case of National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18 concerned a claim for damages for the tort of conversion and for breach of an implied contractual term to provide banking services with

19

[33.1.280]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

reasonable care and skill (the court having determined that the existence of a contractual relationship between the appellant and the respondent precluded liability on the part of the bank for the tort of negligence: see [33.1.140]). The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria drew no distinction between the test of causation in each of these causes of action, applying instead the test as formulated in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335.7 Batt JA stated that “satisfaction of a ‘but for’ test, whilst not irrelevant, is by itself insufficient to establish causation”.8 His Honour found that the bank’s defaults were not “a cause” of the appellant’s loss, the loss having in fact been caused by the fraud of a third party.9

1 See Contract: General Principles “Causation” [7.9.330]–[7.9.420]. 2 See, eg Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 4.3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 3. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Note that these statutory provisions are applicable to the tort of negligence and extend to any claim for damages for harm resulting from negligence, whether the claim is brought in tort, contract, under statute or otherwise. See, eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5A(1). See also Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5, French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ at [17]. 3 Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375; 87 ALJR 648; [2013] HCA 19, French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane J at [11]; see also at [12]–[14]. 4 See, eg March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 515 (CLR). 5 Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5, French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ at [18]. 6 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 2 WLR 1353; [2002] UKHL 19, Brooke LJ at 1002–1014 (AC). 7 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [39]–[41]. 8 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [41]. For other cases considering March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, and its current application in determining questions of causation, see, eg ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook (2009) 237 CLR 656; 83 ALJR 986; [2009] HCA 28; Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10. 9 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Phillips JA at [2], Batt JA at [41].

[33.1.290] Principles governing remoteness of damage in tort and contract1 differ, but there is some uncertainty as to the extent of the differences. In some cases, there may be little or no difference in the practical application of these principles. In 1978, Sir Robin Cooke wrote:

20

[33.1.290]

The law about remoteness of damage in contract and tort is in a strangely unsettled state. Pursuing justice in individual cases, the courts have felt driven to vacillations on points of general principle which have not shown our system of case law at its best.2

In 1991, Ipp J stated that, since Sir Robin Cooke’s statement, there had been no dramatic changes in the law of remoteness.3 The test for remoteness in the law of torts is less demanding than that which applies for breach of contract. Recovery is permitted for loss or damage that is foreseeable in a general way as a possible consequence of a defendant’s wrongful act.4 By contrast, the test for remoteness in contract requires a higher degree of probability, as contracting parties may extend their protection from liability by communicating certain risks to each other. Damages are awarded for breach of contract only in respect of damage that would naturally be expected to flow from the breach, or damage which must have been in the contemplation of a reasonable person at the time of making the contract.5 This general rule arises from the nature of the obligations that each party has undertaken to the other: In contract, if one party wishes to protect himself against a risk which to the other party would appear unusual, he can direct the other party’s attention to it before the contract is made.6

In the law of contract, the types of loss or damage that a defendant ought to expect are based on what was reasonably in the contemplation of a reasonable person “as not unlikely to occur”.7 However, the views expressed by members of the House of Lords in Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491 differ regarding the expression to be used to describe whether or not damage is too remote. In the High Court’s decision in Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454; 46 ALJR 498, Gibbs J observed that there was some difference of opinion as to whether or not it was correct to say that loss was recoverable if its occurrence was “a serious possibility” or “a real danger” or if it was “liable” to occur, or whether or not it was more correct to refer to losses as “not unlikely” to occur. Gibbs J did not consider which phrase most precisely conveyed the desired shade of meaning, because in the case before him it was a near certainty that if the agreement was not performed, the plaintiff would lose the return on his investments.8 Since then, reference to losses “not unlikely” to occur has found favour in several Australian courts.9 In National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria stated the principle as follows, citing Lord Reid in Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II): The crucial question is whether, on the information available to the defendant when the contract was made, he should, or the reasonable man in his position would, have realised that such loss was sufficiently likely to result from the breach of contract to make it proper to hold that the loss flowed naturally from the breach or that loss of that kind should have been within his contemplation.10

Tests of remoteness in the law of torts involve what Lord Steyn has described as

21

[33.1.290]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

“a sliding scale from strict liability to intentional wrongdoing”.11 The torts of negligence and nuisance are to be found midway along that sliding scale.12 For negligence and nuisance, the remoteness test requires reasonable foreseeability of damage at the date of the breach.13 In Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, the High Court adopted another statement made by Lord Reid in Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II): The defendant will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, unless the risk is so small that a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel justified in neglecting it.14

However, in cases of intentional torts such as deceit and injurious falsehood, there is no requirement of reasonable foreseeability,15 as such a requirement may serve to unduly limit a plaintiff’s recovery of damages for consequential loss. By contrast, conversion is a tort of strict liability “and, as such, is to be found at the lower or less culpable end” of Lord Steyn’s sliding scale.16 Batt JA in National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, applying France v Gaudet (1871) LR 6 QB 199, considered that a test of reasonable foreseeability of loss in strict liability torts such as conversion might serve to unduly “extend the defendant’s liability”.17 His Honour concluded that in strict liability torts, a less stringent test of remoteness is applicable, namely, that a plaintiff may only recover consequential losses of which the defendant had “express notice or special knowledge”.18 Measures of remoteness of damage in torts are different to those applicable in contract for two main reasons: (1)

In the law of torts, there is no opportunity for an injured party to gain protection under the terms of a contract.

(2)

Legal principles relating to fault or culpability, and thus the scope of the defendant’s liability to pay for consequential losses caused by wrongful conduct, vary according to the tort committed.

There are also timing differences between the measures of remoteness of damage in contract and tort. The test in contract is based on what was reasonably in the contemplation of a reasonable person at the time of making the contract.19 Tests governing remoteness in tort look to intention, the knowledge of the defendant, and what was reasonably foreseeable at the date when the wrong was committed.20 In cases of concurrent liability, where the tort in issue involves the test of reasonable foreseeability of loss (eg negligence and nuisance), the degree of foreseeability varies between contract and tort. Differences between the two tests are not always significant, however, and have attracted the criticism that to draw any distinction requires one to “swim in [a] sea of semantic exercises”.21 Despite this, in Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310, McHugh JA stated that the difference is a real one which results in a significant narrowing of liability. The word “contemplation” seems to be used in [Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron

22

[33.1.290]

II)] in the sense of “thoughtful consideration” or perhaps “having in view in the future”. It emphasises that, if the parties had thought about the matter, they would really have considered that the result had at least a “serious possibility” of occurring. … An important matter in ascertaining whether the loss or damage is too remote is the extent to which the parties may be taken to have contemplated the events giving rise to that loss or damage. The parties need not contemplate the degree or extent of the loss or damage suffered.22

1 See Contract: General Principles “Remoteness” [7.9.430]–[7.9.490]. 2 Cooke R, “Remoteness of Damages and Judicial Discretion” (1978) 37 Cam LJ 288, 288. See also McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd (1993) ANZ ConvR 11; [1993] 1 NZLR 39 (CA), Cooke P at 43 (NZLR). 3 Ipp DA, “Problems and Progress in Remoteness of Damage” in Finn PD (ed), Essays on Damages (Law Book Co, 1992) p 14. 4 Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 (CA), Glass JA at 401. See also Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88. 5 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145; 9 Ex 341, Alderson B at 354 (Ex). See also Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 997 (CA); Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491. 6 Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491, Lord Reid at 386 (AC). 7 Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491, Lord Reid at 388 (AC). 8 Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454; 46 ALJR 498, Gibbs J at 471–472 (CLR). 9 Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 (CA), Samuels JA at 363; Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Dolly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500 (FCA), Wilcox J at 522; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 (CA), Glass JA at 315, McHugh JA at 363–364; Haviv Holdings Pty Ltd v Howards Storage World Pty Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 273; [2009] FCA 242, Jagot J at [27]. See generally Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 653; 61 ALJR 81, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 667 (CLR). 10 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [44], citing Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491, Lord Reid at 385 (AC) (emphasis added by Batt JA). In the torts context generally, see Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42; Gedeon v Commissioner of Crime Commission (NSW) (2008) 236 CLR 120; 82 ALJR 1465; 187 A Crim R 398; [2008] HCA 43, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [56]. 11 Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1997] AC 254; [1996] 3 WLR 1051, Lord Steyn at 279 (AC). See also National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [58]–[59], [63]. 12 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [58]. 13 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon

23

[33.1.290]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

14

15

16 17 18 19 20

21

22

Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC); Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1997) 77 FCR 307 (FCAFC); Metrolink Victoria Pty Ltd v Inglis [2009] VSCA 227. Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; [1967] 3 WLR 1491, Lord Reid at 385–386 (AC), quoted in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Brennan J at 562–563 (CLR). National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [57], applying France v Gaudet (1871) LR 6 QB 199 and Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [58]. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [57]. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [58]. Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 653; 61 ALJR 81. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC); National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18. H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791; [1977] 3 WLR 990 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 802 (QB). See Swanton J, “The Convergence of Tort and Contract” (1989) 12 Syd LR 40. Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310, McHugh JA at 365.

[33.1.300] Similar principles govern the extent to which direct (or non-remote) damage is recoverable, but the recovery of general damages varies between tort and contract. Traditionally, damages have been divided into “general” and “special” categories.1 “Special damages” refer to items of damage which are capable of precise calculation, such as past monetary loss and expenses incurred as the result of a wrong. “General damages” comprise past and future losses that cannot be precisely quantified, such as damages for pain and suffering and loss of future earning capacity.2 In both tort and contract, a plaintiff may recover for the full extent of the general type of loss suffered, even though the extent of the particular injury was neither in the parties’ contemplation3 nor reasonably foreseeable.4 However, the extent to which general damages can be recovered varies between contract and tort. There is no limit on the recovery of non-pecuniary loss, or general damages, in the law of torts. In particular, damages may be awarded for injuries to feelings or general inconvenience.5 By contrast, general damages are not usually recoverable in the law of contract. In Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; 20 ALJ 451, the High Court held that resentment and disappointment were not “proper elements” of loss in a breach of contract claim.6 In so holding, the High Court was following Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488, where a majority of the House of

24

[33.1.300]

Lords denied damages for injured feelings, mental distress and loss of reputation caused by the manner in which an employment contract had been breached. This general rule is subject to numerous exceptions, some of which are discussed below. Physical or physiological injury, which is a direct result of a breach of contract, may give rise to an award of general damages.7 Breach of contract is also a sufficient wrong to give rise to a statutory cause of action for mental or nervous shock.8 Physical inconvenience caused by a breach of contract may also be a sufficient ground for an award of general damages. In Athens-MacDonald Travel Service Pty Ltd v Kazis [1970] SASR 264, a breach of contract by a travel agent caused the plaintiff considerable physical inconvenience during an overseas holiday, which was compensated by an award of general damages.9 General damages may be awarded for disappointment or distress, where the contract provides for enjoyment, relaxation or freedom from molestation.10 General damages have been awarded for distress for the loss of a home which was defectively built.11 General damages have also been awarded for distress caused by breach of a non-molestation provision in a contract, on the basis that the distress must have been in the parties’ contemplation as its prevention was the precise object of their agreement.12 The fact that a contract is commercial is not necessarily decisive in determining whether or not such damages are recoverable.13 In Falko v James McEwan & Co Pty Ltd [1977] VR 447, Anderson J refused to extend recovery of general damages for distress to include damages for inconvenience and mental distress due to a contractual failure to complete the installation of a heater. His Honour said: Not every inconvenienced or disappointed plaintiff or disgruntled customer can recover damages beyond monetary loss for breach of contract. There may be signs of some judicial thaw, but spring is yet to come.14

Anderson J took the view that mental suffering is not normally in the contemplation of the parties in respect of breach of a commercial contract. Loss of reputation is a recognised head of damage for breach of contract. Artistic performers may recover for the loss of an opportunity to enhance their reputations before the public.15 General damages may be awarded where a breach of contract harms a person’s business reputation, but in these cases some causation of pecuniary loss has been held to be an essential component of the claim.16 In Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Dolly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500, Wilcox J in the Federal Court of Australia awarded substantial damages for harm to reputation caused by a breach of contract. His Honour held that such damages were not restricted to cases of loss of opportunity to enhance reputation, and did not require evidence of exact pecuniary loss. Wilcox J suggested that damages for reputation should be available in all appropriate cases, at least where the purpose of the term breached was to enhance or

25

[33.1.300]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

safeguard reputation. Accordingly, in his Honour’s view, damages for mental distress and reputation should be subject to the same general principles that govern damages for breach of contract.17

1 See Tort: Damages “Introduction” [33.10.30]. 2 Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) p 267. 3 H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791; [1977] 3 WLR 990 (CA). 4 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88. 5 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228, Mason CJ at 359–360 (CLR); see also Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 (CA); Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1998) 44 NSWLR 1; 104 LGERA 355 (CA). 6 Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; 20 ALJ 451, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 144 (CLR); see also Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228, McHugh J at 394 (CLR). 7 Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51; Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394; 63 ALJR 297; Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC). 8 Scala v Mammolitti (1965) 114 CLR 153; 39 ALJR 315, Kitto J at 157 (CLR); Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 77 ALJR 1205; [2003] HCA 33. 9 See Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228. 10 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228. 11 D Galambos & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10; Burke v Lunn [1976] VR 268. See also Boncristiano v Lohmann [1998] 4 VR 82 (CA); South Parklands Hockey & Tennis Centre Inc v Brown Falconer Group Pty Ltd (2004) 88 SASR 65; [2004] SASC 81; Mason K, “Contract and Tort: Looking Across the Boundary from the Side of Contract” (1987) 61 ALJ 228; but see Watts v Morrow [1991] 1 WLR 1421 (CA) (proper measure of damages held to be diminution in value, rather than the cost of repairing defects in property, if the latter would result in the plaintiff recovering more than the true value of the property at the time of acquisition), considered in Livingstone v Mitchell [2007] NSWSC 1477. 12 Silberman v Silberman (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 554; 27 WN (NSW) 151 (FC). 13 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228. 14 Falko v James McEwan & Co Pty Ltd [1977] VR 447, Anderson J at 452. 15 White v Australian & New Zealand Theatres Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 266; 17 ALJR 30; Herbert Clayton & Jack Waller Ltd v Oliver [1930] AC 209. 16 Bank of New South Wales v Milvain (1884) 10 VLR (L) 3; Foaminol Laboratories Ltd v British Artid Plastics Ltd [1941] 2 All ER 393 (KB). See also Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119 (CA); Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228, Brennan J at 370 (CLR). 17 Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Dolly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500 (FCA), Wilcox J at 524.

26

[33.1.320]

[33.1.310] Exemplary damages are generally available in tort1 but not for breach of contract.2 As exemplary damages are punitive rather than compensatory in nature, this remedy is often considered not to fall within the proper scope of the law of torts.3 The availability of exemplary damages is limited in some Australian jurisdictions. In New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory, courts cannot award exemplary or aggravated damages in tortious claims seeking damages for personal injury or death.4 Further, an award of exemplary damages may be barred for certain types of claim, such as motor accidents and cases involving industrial injuries. Limitations on the availability of exemplary damages exist in New South Wales,5 Victoria6 and, to some extent, Queensland7 and South Australia.8

1

2

3 4

5 6 7

8

Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd (1984) 155 CLR 72; 58 ALJR 38; Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549; New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57. Miles v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney (1904) 1 CLR 470; 22 WN (NSW) 67, Griffiths CJ at 477–478 (CLR); Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78; [1917] VLR 175, Griffiths CJ at 89 (CLR); Vorvis v Insurance Corp (BC) [1989] 1 SCR 1085; (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 193 (CanSC); Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488; Perera v Vandiyar [1953] 1 WLR 672 (CA). But see Flamingo Park Pty Ltd v Dolly Dolly Creation Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 500 (FCA), Wilcox J at 526. Note that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has accepted that exemplary damages may be awarded for a breach of contract (see Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Business Associates Ltd (unreported, NZCA, Cooke, Richardson and McKay JJ, 7, 41 of 1993, 23 June 1993)) and such an award was made by Hammond J in Tak & Co Inc v AEL Corp Ltd (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,887 (HCNZ). See, eg Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act (NT), s 19. Note that the Queensland and New South Wales provisions extend to prohibitions on “punitive damages”, which are generally considered to be synonymous with exemplary damages. Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 81A; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 144; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151R. Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), s 93(7); Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 135A(7)(c). Exemplary damages may be awarded against the tortfeasor, but no indemnity is available from a compulsory third party insurer: Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 55; Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 309. Insurers are excluded from liability for aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages: Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 113A.

[33.1.320] Contributory negligence is a partial defence in cases of concurrent liability in tort and contract. If a plaintiff suffers damage resulting partly from the plaintiff’s failure to take reasonable care and partly from the

27

[33.1.320]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

wrong of any other person, damages recoverable in respect of the wrong may be reduced to such an extent as the court thinks just and equitable, having regard to the plaintiff’s share of responsibility for the damage suffered.1 “Wrong” is defined in most jurisdictions to include a breach of contractual duty of care that is concurrent and coextensive with a duty of care in tort.2 “Wrong” also includes an act or omission that gives rise to liability in tort, in respect of which the defence of contributory negligence is available at common law.3 In some jurisdictions, this definition appears to extend to allow apportionment of damages for all torts.4 In Western Australia, contributory negligence is based on the “negligence” of the plaintiff and the defendant.5

1 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 102; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 16; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 10; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 26; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. 2 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 101; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 8; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2 (definition of “wrongful act”); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 25. In South Australia, the term “negligent wrongdoing” is used. This term is defined as a breach of a duty of care that arises under the law of torts; or a breach of a contractual duty of care; or a breach of a relevant statutory duty of care: Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 3 (definition of “negligent wrongdoing”), s 7(2). Prior to legislative intervention, contributory negligence was not a ground for reducing the quantum of damages recoverable where concurrent liability existed in contract and tort, even in circumstances where breach of an implied contractual duty of care was commensurate with the duty imposed in tort, if the plaintiff elected to pursue a contractual claim: Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6. See also Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34; “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. 3 See, eg Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 101; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 8; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5. 4 See Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 3; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2. 5 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 5.

[33.1.330] Apportionment of damages between contributing defendants in most states and territories is governed by legislation in different ways.1 In Western Australia, legislation providing for apportionment of damages is limited to defendants found liable in negligence, and does not extend to defendants who are also held liable for breach of contract.2 This was previously the case in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Queensland, until parliaments in those jurisdictions reversed the effect of the decision in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6.3 Accordingly, in the Australian 28

[33.1.340]

Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, contribution legislation (generally in the context of apportionment of liability provisions) applies to defendants held liable in tort and defendants in breach of a contractual duty of care that is concurrent and coextensive with a tortious duty.4 Where the contractual and tortious duties of care are not coextensive, the statutes governing apportionment of damages will not apply. In the Northern Territory and Tasmania, legislation governing apportionment of damages also includes breach of a statutory duty of care.5 Legislation in South Australia applies to defendants held liable under statute, in tort, and for breach of contract.6

1

2 3

4

5 6

See generally Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 102; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 16; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 10; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 26; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15(1) (definition of “wrong”), Pts IV, V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 8; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt V. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15(1) (definition of “wrong”); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2 (definition of “wrongful act”). Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7, subject to s 9(a).

[33.1.340] Statutes of limitation differ in their application between claims for damages for breach of contract and claims for damages in tort.1 In claims for breach of contract, time runs from the date of the breach even if no damage has yet been suffered, unless to do so would “give rise to injustice”.2 This is because it is not necessary to prove actionable damage for breach of contract claims, in order to give rise to a right to compensation.3 Courts may award nominal damages where no actual harm has been suffered.4 Nominal damages are generally not awarded for actions in tort, except for claims in trespass.5 Actionable damage is an essential element of most causes of action in tort.6 Accordingly, time for the purposes of tortious claims only runs from the date when damage is suffered, not from the date of the negligent act.7 However, for

29

[33.1.340]

DAMAGES IN TORT AND CONTRACT

torts that are actionable per se and do not require proof of damage (such as trespass to land), time runs from the date when the tortious act occurs, even if damage is not suffered or is discovered only at a later date. In cases of concurrent liability, a plaintiff may choose to pursue a cause of action in tort so as to receive the benefit of a longer limitation period.8

1 See Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff. 2 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; [1979] 2 WLR 487, Lord Wilberforce at 401 (AC). See also Bean v Wade (1885) 2 TLR 157 (CA); Ward v Lewis (1896) 22 VLR 410; Bagot v Stevens Scanlan & Co Ltd [1966] 1 QB 197; [1964] 3 WLR 1162; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 583 (CLR). 3 See, eg Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827; [1980] 2 WLR 283 (HL), Lord Diplock at 849 (AC). 4 See, eg Luna Park (NSW) Ltd v Tramways Advertising Pty Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 286; 39 SR (NSW) 66; 56 WN (NSW) 31. 5 See, eg Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd [1944] KB 693. 6 With respect to the tort of negligence, see Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820, Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ at 474 (CLR). See also Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537; 84 ALJR 292; [2010] HCA 12, Gummow ACJ at [50], Kiefel J at [109]; Stapleton J, “The Gist of Negligence Part I: Minimum Actionable Damage” (1988) 104 LQR 213. 7 See, eg Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 583 (CLR). There is no time limit applicable to tortious claims brought before the New South Wales Dust Diseases Tribunal seeking damages for personal injury. 8 Lancashire & Cheshire Association of Baptist Churches Inc v Howard & Seddon Partnership [1993] 3 All ER 467 (QB); Pullen v Gutteridge, Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 27.

30

33.2 Negligence

NEGLIGENCE

Current Subtitle Authors Jessica Clark

Shannon Kelly

LLB (Hons) (La Trobe), BN (ACU) Barrister, Victorian Bar

BA, LLB (Macq) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

([33.2.10]–[33.2.400] Updating author, Update 320 – July 2016)

([33.2.1510]–[33.2.1820] Updating author, Update 320 – July 2016)

Andrew Felkel

Craig Ryan

BEc (Hons), JD (Melb) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria

BA (Hons), MA (Hons) (UNSW), LLB (Syd) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

([33.2.790]–[33.2.1400] Updating author, Update 320 – July 2016) ([33.2.790]–[33.2.1400] Updating author, Update 307 – May 2015) (Updating author, Update 277 – October 2012)

([33.2.510]–[33.2.680] Updating author, Update 320 – July 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors CD Baker

acknowledges the editorial assistance of Kevin Nicholson of the University of Adelaide and Michael Mills of Phillips Fox, Perth, for [33.2.210] – [33.2.400])

MA, BCL (Oxon) Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Adelaide Practitioner, Supreme Court of South Australia Barrister at Law, Inner Temple

Jacinta M Forbes BA, LLB (Melb) Barrister and Member, Victorian Bar

([33.2.1510] – [33.2.1820] Original author)

(Joint updating author, Update 216 – August 2007)

Dr Sandra S Berns

Heath Ross Hazelton

AB (Calif), LLB (Hons), PhD (Tas) Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania

BA (Hons), M Phil (Syd), LLB (UNSW) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

(Original author Sandra Berns

32

PREVIOUS SUBTITLE AUTHORS

Michael G Mills

(Updating author, Update 159 – November 2002)

LLB, BJuris (UWA), JSM (Stanford) Partner, Freehills Partner, Freehill, Hollingdale and Page Partner, Phillips Fox, Perth Visiting Fellow and Part-time Teacher, Law School, University of Western Australia

Charmaine KM Lye BA (Cantab) Barrister, Supreme Court of Victoria (Updating author, Update 277 – October 2012)

Áine M Magee

(Updating author, Update 159 – November 2002) (Updating author, Update 109 – October 1999) (Updating author, Update 42 – November 1996) (Original author Michael Mills acknowledges the editorial assistance of Kevin Nicholson of the University of Adelaide and Sandra Berns of the University of Tasmania.)

BA (Hons), LLB, Dip Insurance Law Barrister and Member, Victorian Bar (Joint updating author, Update 216 – August 2007)

Geoff Masel BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Updating author, Update 53 – August 1997) (Updating author, Update 42 – November 1996)

Toby Mullen BCom, LLB (Hons) (Melb) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New South Wales and Victoria, High Court of Australia Barrister, Victorian Bar

Dugald McWilliams Dip Law (LPAB), LLM (Melb) Legal Practitioner, Supreme Court of New South Wales Barrister and Member, Victorian Bar

(Updating author, Update 277 – October 2012)

(Updating author, Update 218 – October 2007) (Joint updating author, Update 216 – August 2007)

33

NEGLIGENCE

34

33.2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.2.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.2.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.2.40] LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW.......................................................[33.2.50] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.....................................[33.2.100] DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES.............................. [33.2.210] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.2.210] REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY........................................[33.2.230] ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS.............................. [33.2.240] ACTS AND OMISSIONS........................................................ [33.2.320] UNAVOIDABLE DEPENDENCE............................................ [33.2.340] NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES...................................................[33.2.350] ROLE OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS... [33.2.360] PUBLIC POLICY.................................................................... [33.2.380] MISSTATEMENTS......................................................................[33.2.510] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.2.510] RELEGATION OF PROXIMITY..............................................[33.2.530] RELIANCE..............................................................................[33.2.540] Relevant Factors................................................................ [33.2.540] Contractual Relationships.................................................. [33.2.610] Areas Already Regulated by Statute..................................[33.2.615] THIRD PARTIES.....................................................................[33.2.620] NATURE OF LOSS.................................................................... [33.2.790] PERSONAL INJURY.............................................................. [33.2.790] PROPERTY DAMAGE........................................................... [33.2.810] ECONOMIC LOSS................................................................. [33.2.820] PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS................................................... [33.2.930] PARENTS............................................................................... [33.2.930] SCHOOL AUTHORITIES........................................................[33.2.980] EMPLOYERS....................................................................... [33.2.1030] PRISON AUTHORITIES AND POLICE................................[33.2.1090] TRANSFERORS OF REAL PROPERTY..............................[33.2.1110] HOSPITALS.......................................................................... [33.2.1150]

35

OCCUPIERS.........................................................................[33.2.1160] STATUTORY AUTHORITIES................................................[33.2.1170] PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS.................................. [33.2.1290] MENTAL HARM....................................................................[33.2.1290] VULNERABLE PLAINTIFFS................................................ [33.2.1330] RESCUERS..........................................................................[33.2.1340] RELATIONAL INTERESTS.................................................. [33.2.1370] THE UNBORN......................................................................[33.2.1380] BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE................................................ [33.2.1510] STANDARD OF CARE......................................................... [33.2.1510] General.............................................................................[33.2.1510] Reasonable Foreseeability...............................................[33.2.1550] Magnitude of Harm.......................................................... [33.2.1580] Reasonableness of Defendant’s Response.....................[33.2.1590] “Reasonable Person” Standard....................................... [33.2.1630] EVIDENCE........................................................................... [33.2.1730]

36

Introduction Definition [33.2.10] Negligence is part of the law of torts. The law of torts “exists primarily to compensate the victim by compelling the wrongdoer to pay for the damage done”.1 There are two types of liability imposed by tort law on someone whose conduct causes loss or damage to another person: strict liability and fault-based liability. Liability is strict when it is imposed on the actor regardless of, or without the need for proof of, any fault.2 The fault requirement for liability in tort would be satisfied either by an intention to cause the effect which the conduct has upon the victim, or negligence at the time of the conduct. The legal meaning of the term “negligence”3 is, therefore, twofold: it can be taken to mean carelessness, in which case its legal significance is as a means of committing other torts, or it can signify the particular tort of negligence. In the tort of negligence, the burden of proof of all the elements of the tort, including the lack of due care, rests on the plaintiff: see [33.2.1730]. The elements of a claim in negligence are that: (1)

the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care;

(2)

the defendant breached that duty; and

(3)

the plaintiff suffered damage which was caused by the breach of duty, and was not too remote from it in law.

1 2 3

Vines P, “Introduction” in Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) p 3. See “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff. Vines P, “Introduction” in Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) p 121. Note that the authors make the point that despite widespread current usage, “[n]egligence is a basis of liability rather than a single nominate tort”.

[33.2.20] The tort of negligence developed from the action on the case during the earlier part of the 20th century. Historically, the fault necessary to establish an action in either trespass or case consisted of an intentional or negligent action. The essential ingredients of the action on the case, the failure to exercise due care and the harm resulting from this failure, became the foundation of the modern law of negligence with the seminal judgment of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. While its scope was

37

[33.2.20]

INTRODUCTION

originally limited, it expanded gradually and a number of causes of action which were treated as independent torts are now recognised as part of a more general negligence law. These causes of action include an occupier’s liability to lawful visitors and trespassers on the land,1 an employer’s duty of care to his or her employees,2 and liability for dangerous real property or chattels. Liability in negligence for the acts of animals coexists with strict liability in certain circumstances.3

1 See “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff. 2 See Labour Law “Common Law [26.8.150]–[26.8.710]. 3 See “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff.

Liability

for

Injury

at

Work”

[33.2.30] The law with respect to negligence underwent significant change in 2002. Following the release of the Ipp Report,1 all states and territories made significant changes to existing legislation to, among other things: modify the definition of what is “reasonably foreseeable”; offer protection to volunteers, good samaritans and providers of recreational services; restrict costs awards in certain cases; and regulate the awarding of damages.2 This list of reforms is not an exhaustive one and the legislation of each jurisdiction must be examined closely, but the reforms adopted were virtually uniform. These reforms are discussed in more detail at [33.2.50]–[33.2.90].

1 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 1 June 2016). 2 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 139A; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (found in Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW), Sch 1); Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT), s 48; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).

Scope of Subtitle [33.2.40] This Subtitle examines in detail the principles governing the law of negligence. A legislative overview of significant reforms since 2002 is provided at [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. The duty of care, deriving from principles originally enunciated in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, is examined with an overview of how determination has evolved at common law: see [33.2.210]–[33.2.310]. The general rules concerning acts and omissions are

38

[33.2.40]

SCOPE OF SUBTITLE

considered at [33.2.320]–[33.2.330], while the role of justice in judicial analysis concerning whether a duty of care exists is examined at [33.2.360], and the role of public policy and insurance is dealt with at [33.2.380]–[33.2.400]. The law of negligent misstatements follows general principles of liability for acts and omissions. However, this area also raises special issues as the courts attempt to contain actions for negligent misstatement within acceptable limits. The principal control mechanisms developed by the courts are examined at [33.2.510]–[33.2.615], while liability to third parties in the area of negligent misstatement is considered at [33.2.620]–[33.2.680]. Divisions of loss are considered in this Subtitle for the purpose of establishing who can sue.1 Here, the categorisation of loss, by personal injury, property damage and economic loss, is relevant to ascertaining whether a duty of care arises: see [33.2.790]–[33.2.820]. Similarly, the status of particular defendants (see [33.2.930]–[33.2.1180]) and plaintiffs (see [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1400]) has a significant bearing on the question of whether a duty of care exists in particular circumstances. Breach of duty is considered by examining the appropriate standard of care and other factors relevant to the question of breach, including the degree of risk created by the defendant (see [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1580]) and the reasonableness of the defendant’s response: see [33.2.1590]–[33.2.1620]. Matters of evidence are considered at [33.2.1730]–[33.2.1820], including an examination of all the issues in which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In 2002, the law of negligence in Australia was subject to unparalleled change and scrutiny from the legislature, judiciary and community. As noted at [33.2.30], significant legislative change was introduced in all states and territories to reform the law of negligence.2 Given the widespread legislative and community concern about the direction and expansion of the law of negligence, legislative reforms are always likely. Subsequent to these amendments, the common law of negligence remains in a state of flux. The applicable test for the duty of care is still to be settled in Australia. Various decisions of the High Court3 have rejected the concept of proximity as a general conceptual determinant and the unifying theme of the categories of case in which the common law of negligence recognises the existence of a duty to take reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to another.4

Indeed, the “search for a unifying principle in the law of negligence has [to date] proven to be as futile as the search for a unifying principle in the laws of physics”.5 Accordingly, any attempt at the present time to comprehensively detail the law of negligence according to general principle faces the prospect of obsolescence sooner than is usually the case. Nevertheless, in addition to treatment of relatively constant aspects of the law of negligence, this Subtitle:

39

[33.2.40]

INTRODUCTION

(1)

provides an overview of the significant evolution of the law of negligence (an analysis undertaken primarily by reference to the decisions of the High Court, plus material appellate decisions of other superior courts in Australia);

(2)

highlights, where necessary, major legislative changes made to the law of negligence; and

(3)

provides commentary on the popular public (if not legislative) perception that in recent times the development of the law of negligence “has been all in one direction – more liability and more damages”.6

1 For consideration of the assessment of loss and damage, see “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. 2 For commentary on the legislative changes, see Spigelman JJ, “Tort Law Reform: An Overview” (2006) 14 Tort L Rev 5; McDonald B, “Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia” (2005) 27 Syd LR 443. 3 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ at [27], McHugh J at [76]; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [49]; Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, the Court at [59]. 4 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Deane J at 53 (CLR), quoted by the majority of the High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 542 (CLR). 5 Spigelman JJ, “Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State” (2002) 76 ALJ 432 at 442. 6 Lisle v Brice [2002] 2 Qd R 168; [2001] QCA 271, Thomas JA at [5].

Legislative Overview [33.2.50] Legislative reforms were introduced Australia-wide in 2002 to regulate the common law rules relating to negligence. These changes are referred to briefly at [33.2.30]. The relevant primary legislation in each of the states and territories is: (1)

the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT);

(2)

the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW);

(3)

the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT);

(4)

the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld);

(5)

the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA);

(6)

the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas);

40

[33.2.60]

LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW

(7)

the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); and

(8)

the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).

Further reforms were enacted by ancillary legislation in different states and territories, which are referred to at [33.2.60]–[33.2.90]. The reforms introduced in the states and territories were, for the most part, uniform. The main exception is the Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), which has not introduced the legislative changes as broadly as the other jurisdictions. A brief commentary regarding the pivotal provisions of the Civil Liability legislation across the states and territories is provided at [33.2.60]–[33.2.90]. Because of the subtle, but sometimes important, distinctions between the various states and territories, the legislation relevant to each specific jurisdiction should be consulted closely to identify any relevant differences. [33.2.60] The existence of a duty of care is limited in circumstances where the risk was not foreseeable, insignificant or where a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have taken precautions against a risk of harm. The general principles surrounding the existence of a duty of care are found in the Civil Liability legislation in all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory.1 The Civil Liability legislation provides for certain considerations to be taken into account in determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk of harm. Those considerations are: (a)

the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken,

(b)

the likely seriousness of the harm,

(c)

the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm, [and]

(d)

the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.2

In Waverley Council v Ferreira [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-818; [2005] NSWCA 418, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that what is considered by the legislation to be reasonably foreseeable is, in part, a reiteration of the remarks by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106: see [33.2.230]–[33.2.250]. The legislation sets out other principles which are relevant to determining whether or not a duty of care exists.3 Included among these are that a duty of care will not arise merely because there was a different system by which to undertake an activity which could have avoided the harm, or alternatively that the subsequent taking of action that would have avoided the risk of harm does not of itself affect liability or constitute an admission of liability.

1

See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32; Civil Liability

41

[33.2.60]

INTRODUCTION

2

3

Act 2002 (Tas), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B(2). Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(2). See, eg Guides Australia Inc v McMartin [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-828; [2006] NSWCA 20, where the Court of Appeal did not overturn the trial judge’s findings of negligence as it was satisfied the trial judge had paid sufficient regard to the social utility of the scouting movement, as required by Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B(2)(d), in imposing a duty of care on it as an occupier. See also “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff. See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 44; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5C; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 10; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 12; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 49. There are no equivalent provisions in the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia.

[33.2.70] The 2002 legislative reforms (see [33.2.50]) attempt to regulate the operation of causation in negligence claims more closely. The State and Territory Civil Liability legislation deals with causation,1 and sets out the required elements of causation, namely: (a)

that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (factual causation), and

(b)

that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability).2

1 Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 4.3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 3. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5D(1). Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 45(1); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 11(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 34(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 13(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 51(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5C(1).

[33.2.80] The introduction of special provisions regarding inherent risks and obvious risks in dangerous recreational activities have been important additions to the legislative scheme: see [33.2.50]. The State and Territory Civil Liability legislation deals with the plaintiff’s assumption of risk.1 The legislation provides a complete defence to an action in negligence if the harm suffered by the plaintiff is as a result of an inherent risk.2 “Inherent risk” is defined as a risk of something occurring that cannot be avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill.3 In Macarthur Districts Motor Cycle Sportsmen Inc v Ardizzone (2004) 41 MVR 235; [2004] NSWCA 145, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that in

42

[33.2.80]

LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW

circumstances where a young motorcycle rider fell off his bike and was struck by another bike rider shortly after causing serious injury, the organiser of the event still owed a duty of care despite s 5I of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). The trial judge found that there was a significant interval between the time the plaintiff fell off his motorcycle and when he was struck by the other motorcycle. Thus, if a marshal had been positioned nearby, steps could have been taken to avoid the injury. In addition to the provisions regarding assumption of risk, in some states the legislation deals specifically with recreational activities.4 Legislation in New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia provides that a defendant is not liable in negligence for harm suffered by another person as a result of the materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity engaged in by the plaintiff.5 “Obvious risk” is defined as a risk that would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the person who suffers harm, including patent risks or risks which are a matter of common knowledge, whether or not it has a low probability of occurring.6 In New South Wales, it has been held that the defendant bears the burden of proving the elements in s 5L of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).7 Civil Liability legislation in some states provides that there is no proactive duty on a defendant to warn of an obvious risk.8 In Fallas v Mourlas (2006) 65 NSWLR 418; [2006] NSWCA 32, the plaintiff was injured when accidentally shot by his friend, the defendant, while hunting kangaroos at night using a spotlight. Ipp and Basten JJA were in the majority but dismissed the appeal for different reasons. Ipp JA found, as did Tobias JA, that the activity was a dangerous recreational activity within the meaning of s 5K of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). However, Ipp JA found that the plaintiff was not injured by the materialisation of an obvious risk. The defendant failed to persuade Basten JA that the activity was a dangerous recreational activity for the purposes of s 5L of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Although an “obvious risk” is defined in the legislation of some states, there is no definition of the word “obvious” in the relevant sections. In Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-754; [2004] NSWCA 247, which was decided under the common law (albeit after the introduction of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)), Tobias JA used the following definition: “Obvious” means that both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognised by a reasonable man, in the position of the [plaintiff], exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment.9

This definition was not disturbed on appeal to the High Court in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62.10 The question of whether a risk is an obvious risk within the meaning of the legislation will in every case be a question of fact, looking not

43

[33.2.80]

INTRODUCTION

only at the nature of the risk that materialised but also the knowledge and experience of the plaintiff in undertaking the activity.11

1 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 6. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. 2 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5I; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 16; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 39; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 55; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5P. 3 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5I(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 16(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 39(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 55(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5E. 4 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 5; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 5. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia and Victoria. 5 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5L; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 20; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5H. 6 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5F; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 13; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 15; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5F. 7 Fallas v Mourlas (2006) 65 NSWLR 418; [2006] NSWCA 32, Ipp JA at [24], Basten JA at [123]. 8 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5H; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 15; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 17; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 38; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5O. See also “Causes of Action” [33.3.270], Sport and Leisure “Liability” [32.4.10]ff. 9 Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-754; [2004] NSWCA 247, Tobias JA at [161], quoting from American Law Institute, Second Restatement of the Law: Torts (2nd ed, American Law Institute Publishers, 1965). 10 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [223]. 11 For examples of considerations of whether a risk is an “obvious risk” within the legislative meaning of that term, see Smith v Perese [2006] NSWSC 288 (plaintiff injured when struck by a motor boat while diving and fishing); Dederer v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-792; [2005] NSWSC 185 (plaintiff injured while diving from a bridge – reversed on other grounds in Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42); Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-831; [2006] NSWCA 17 (plaintiff injured playing “oztag” touch football); Jaber v Rockdale City Council [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-952; [2008] NSWCA 98 (plaintiff injured while diving from a wharf).

[33.2.90] In addition to the matters referred to at [33.2.60]–[33.2.80], the legislative intervention in torts (see [33.2.50]) has tempered the common law rules of negligence significantly. The following are examples of the more significant areas of reform: 44

[33.2.90]

LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW

(1)

The standard of care for the negligence of professionals:1 This is determined by whether the act of the professional was in accordance with the widely accepted practice in Australia by their peers. Although the relevant provisions of State Civil Liability legislation2 effectively mirror the common law, the legislation provides that the court is not permitted to rely on the peer professional opinion if the court considers the opinion to be irrational.3 Further there is no requirement that the peer professional opinion have universal acceptance in the profession:4 see also [33.2.1520] and [33.2.1620].

(2)

The amalgamation of non-delegable duty and vicarious liability:5 The reform has seen the amalgamation of non-delegable duty and vicarious liability in New South Wales and Victoria. Section 5Q of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and s 61 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provide that the liability of a defendant for breach of a non-delegable duty will be determined as if the liability were the vicarious liability of that defendant for the negligence of the person to whom the work or task was delegated.

(3)

Contributory negligence:6 Contributory negligence can defeat a claim. An apportionment of 100 per cent for contributory negligence is available in most jurisdictions,7 but not in South Australia and arguably not in the Northern Territory and Western Australia.8 The standard of care to be applied in determining contributory negligence is that of a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff.9 The court is also permitted to take into account the contributory negligence of a deceased person in a claim brought on behalf of dependants of the deceased or the deceased’s estate in all jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory.10

(4)

Damages: The legislative regime regulates the fixing of damages for economic and non-economic loss in personal injury cases.11 Some State and Territory Civil Liability legislation provides for a maximum for damages for both non-economic12 and economic loss, subject to indexation.13 The amounts permitted for gratuitous care, loss of domestic services and loss of superannuation entitlements are also regulated by the tort reforms.14 Although exemplary and punitive damages are not available to the plaintiffs in negligence cases causing personal injury in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Queensland,15 an award of damages under those heads is available to a victim of an intentional tort, such as assault.16 There is no further statutory limitation on the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages brought about by the reforms in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia.

(5)

Proportionate liability: Proportionate liability now plays a part in the assessment of damages for negligence for non-personal injury claims. Proportionate liability provisions in most legislation apply to claims for economic loss or damage to property, or for a breach of state or territory consumer law.17

45

[33.2.90]

INTRODUCTION

(6)

Good samaritans, volunteers and food donors: Most jurisdictions provide for the protection of good samaritans18 and all jurisdictions provide for the protection of volunteers.19 A “good samaritan” is a person who acts in good faith in assisting someone who appears to be injured or is at risk of being injured, without expectation of reward.20 The protection does not come to the aid of a good samaritan in circumstances where they are the primary cause of the injury or risk of injury through an intentional or negligent act or omission.21 Similarly, if a volunteer is affected by drugs or alcohol and fails to exercise reasonable care then they also are not afforded protection.22 Some jurisdictions also afford protection to food donors.23 For a discussion of rescuers, see [33.2.1340]–[33.2.1360].

(7)

Liability of public authorities: The liability of public and other authorities is regulated by the legislative reform. Civil Liability legislation in most states and territories provides for the liability of a “public or other authority” which includes the Crown, a government department, a public health organisation, a local council, a public or local authority or any public official.24 Included in the relevant sections are special provisions protecting roads authorities from liability for failure to carry out or consider carrying out road work unless the authority had actual knowledge of a particular risk at the time of the alleged failure:25 see also [33.2.1170]–[33.2.1180].

(8)

Injuries suffered in the commission of a crime: Criminals are not to benefit from personal injury suffered if done in the commission of an offence in all jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and Western Australia:26 see also [33.2.390]. Legislation in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland and Tasmania provides that the court will not award damages to a plaintiff if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities (beyond reasonable doubt in South Australia) that the injury was suffered at a time when the person was engaged in an activity which constitutes an offence punishable by imprisonment for six months or more.27 These provisions overcome the previous common law position that an intruder to a defendant’s premises cannot benefit from any injury suffered while on the premises if they are engaged in an offence at the time the injury occurred.

(9)

Apologies: Pursuant to State and Territory Civil Liability legislation, the making of an apology by a defendant does not constitute an admission of liability in connection with the matter in question.28

(10) Wrongful birth: New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia have enacted legislative reforms restricting the damages available in claims related to the birth of a child.29 The New South Wales legislation specifically excludes a claim brought by the child itself for personal injury sustained prenatally or during birth.30 The provisions deal with the High Court’s decision in Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 1312; [2003] HCA 38, providing that a court cannot award

46

[33.2.90]

LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW

damages for economic loss for the costs of rearing or maintaining the child or for loss of earnings by the claimant while the claimant rears or maintains the child. The New South Wales legislation specifies that the claimant is not excluded from bringing a claim for additional costs for maintaining a child who suffers a disability. For a discussion on the unborn, see [33.2.1380]–[33.2.1400]. (11) Intoxication: In New South Wales and Queensland, the legislation specifically deals with the effect of intoxication of a plaintiff on the duty and standard of care which may be owed to that plaintiff.31 In all states and territories, except Victoria, there is a rebuttable presumption of contributory negligence in claims where the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the incident.32 Some jurisdictions also specify that contributory negligence is to be presumed where a person over the age of 16 years is injured in an accident by an intoxicated person while relying upon that person.33 In such situations, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk does not apply. In Victoria, the court must consider whether the plaintiff was intoxicated and the level of intoxication in a claim for personal injury damages.34 See also [33.2.1690] for the situation where passengers are aware of a driver’s intoxication.

1

2

3

4

5 6 7

8

9

See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 6; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 5; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 6; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 7. Note that the Western Australian provisions are limited to health care professionals. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5O; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 41; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5PB. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5O(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 41(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5PB(4). Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5O(4); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 41(4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22(4); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59(4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5PB(5). See “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]. See also “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 17; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5R; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 23; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 23; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 62; Civil Liability Act 2002

47

[33.2.90]

INTRODUCTION

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

(WA), s 5K. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and the Northern Territory. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 27; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5T; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 17(2); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 10(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 45; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4(4); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 26(4); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4(2). See also “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 2; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pts VA, VB, VBA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2. See also “Personal Injury” [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]. Compare Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4 Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 60 – 62; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 52; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 27; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 28G – 28H; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2 Div 2. There is no equivalent provision in the Australian Capital Territory. Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 98; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 2 Div 2; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4 Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 58; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 54; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 26; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28F; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2 Div 3. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 100 (domestic services); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 15 – 15C (gratuitous attendant care services, domestic services and superannuation); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 23 (gratuitous services); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 56, 59 (superannuation and gratuitous services); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 58 (gratuitous services); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 25, 28B (superannuation and gratuitous services); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 28IA, 28ID, 28IE, see also ss 28IF, 28LA (gratuitous attendant care services); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 12 (provision of home care services). Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52. See also “Types of Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445 (affirmed in New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57). Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 7A, s 107B; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 34; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 16; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 2, s 28; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), Pt 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 9A, s 43A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IVAA, s 24AF; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1F, s 5AI. Note that the Northern Territory and South Australian provisions do not follow the almost uniform provisions in the other jurisdictions. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.1; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 8; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 9 Div 11; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 8A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VIA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1D. The exception is Queensland. Note that a Bill proposing to introduce good samaritan provisions in Queensland failed in

48

[33.2.90]

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW

2007: see Civil Liability (Good Samaritan) Amendment Bill 2007 (Qld). Although there are no express provisions regarding good samaritans in Queensland, they may be protected under provisions regarding public safety: see Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 7. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 9; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 7; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 3 Div 2; Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 10; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IX; Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection From Liability) Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 5(3)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 56; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 74(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 35B(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 31B(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5AB. In some jurisdictions, this definition extends to include medically qualified persons in given circumstances: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 5(3)(b); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8(2), (4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 74(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 5AB, 5AD(2). Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 58(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 35B(3). The Victorian legislation takes the opposite position, ie the protection applies “even if the emergency or accident was caused by an act or omission of the good samaritan”: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 31B(3). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 5(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 58(2)(a); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8(3); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 71(4)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 35C(1)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5AE. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.2A; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 8A; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 7A; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 39(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 74A; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 8B; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VIB; Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection From Liability) Act 2002 (WA), Pt 3. Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 5; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 3 Div 1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 5 (road authorities only); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 9; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt XII; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1C. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 113; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 45; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 37; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 42; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 42; Road Management Act 2004 (Vic), s 102; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5Z. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 54; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 10; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 45; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 6. In Victoria, in a claim for damages for personal injury, the court must consider whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14G. Compare Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 54; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 10; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 45; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 6. Compare Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 10; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 2 Div

49

[33.2.90]

INTRODUCTION

29 30 31 32

33

34

2; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 4 Pt 1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 75; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IIC; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1E. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 11; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 5; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 67. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 70(2). Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 49 – 50; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 46. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 95; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50(3); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 14; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5L. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 15; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14G(2)(a).

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.2.100] The law of negligence is of pivotal importance to other principles of tortious liability. The concept of a duty of care is a recurrent theme in other areas of tort law. It provides in many regards a yardstick for gauging other forms of liability. The related areas of occupiers’ liability, product liability and strict liability are considered separately in “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff, “Product Liability” [33.4.10]ff and “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff. Defences to an action in negligence are considered in detail in “Defences” [33.9.10]ff and the process of assessing damages in “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. Reference should be made to 27 Professional Liability for applications in specific professional contexts of general principles developed in the law of tort. For specific application of negligence principles in the sporting context, see Sport and Leisure “Liability” [32.4.10]ff. The merits of alternative actions should be considered particularly in the context of negligent misstatement, for example, for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law (found in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) or equivalent legislation. This is because liability for misleading and deceptive conduct is strict and the plaintiff may succeed in recovering for loss of damage without establishing requisites such as the existence of a duty of care or breach of that duty: see 35 Unfair Dealing. The law may recognise concurrent liability in tort and contract. For a further consideration of matters arising out of concurrent liability, see “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. For criminal negligence, see Criminal Law Principles “The Criminal Laws” [9.1.10]ff, and also Criminal Offences “Manslaughter” [10.1.2130]–[10.1.2260].

50

Duty of Care: General Principles General [33.2.210] In 1932, in the landmark case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin laid the foundations of the modern law of negligence when he established the “neighbour test” as the foundation for when a duty of care is owed. This test was expressed as follows: The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.1

The significance of this development was that it freed plaintiffs from the necessity of showing that their case fitted within or was closely analogous to some recognised and established category of case. Instead, the key to the neighbour principle was the test of whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff, either individually or as a member of a class, would be injured. Reasonable foreseeability thus became a necessary condition for determining the existence of a duty of care. However it is not a sufficient condition. The need for additional control mechanisms became clear after the availability of a cause of action for negligent misstatements causing pure financial loss was established in the House of Lords decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, while an action for a negligent act causing pure financial loss was established in the Australian High Court decision in Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270. Recognition of negligence liability for pure economic loss led to recurrent concerns about “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”.2 In Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J gave new emphasis to the notion of proximity as an existing, but underutilised limb of the test for duty of care. Although the notion of proximity does not necessarily provide a sufficiently specific and helpful test for the existence of a duty of care, it is a central concept often used in explaining the reasoning for a conclusion in individual cases.3

51

[33.2.210]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In the context of identifying the duty owed by a statutory authority to a class of persons, the “salient features” were identified by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54 as follows: (1)

the degree and nature of control exercised over the risk of harm that eventuated;

(2)

the degree of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper exercise of power by the statutory authority; and

(3)

consistency or otherwise of the statute with the assertion of a duty.4

In addition, policy considerations may factor into the court’s decision as to whether a duty of care exists in any specific case.5 These considerations include, for example, whether the case falls into a new category,6 whether the defendant had other duties which took priority to his duty to the plaintiff,7 or whether some element of illegality or moral incongruity arises.8 Legislation also plays its part in delimiting the ambit of reasonable foreseeability: see [33.2.250].

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 580. Ultramares Corp v Touche, 174 NE 441 (1931), Cardozo CJ at 444. Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59. Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [149]–[150]. See also [33.2.1170]–[33.2.1180] for statutory limitations on the liability of public authorities. See, eg Myer Stores Ltd v State Fire Commission [2012] TASSC 54, Blow J at [41]. Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120. Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344. Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9.

Reasonable Foreseeability [33.2.230] Reasonable foreseeability is the first element or test for duty of care. It must be remembered though, that the concept of reasonable foreseeability plays different and separate roles in an action for negligence. (1)

As part of the “neighbour principle” for determining a duty of care (see [33.2.210]), reasonable foresight is directed to the identity of the plaintiff. In other words, was the plaintiff, either individually or as a member of a class, someone whom the defendant could reasonably foresee would suffer injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct?1

52

[33.2.230]

REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY

(2)

As part of the determination of a breach of duty, reasonable foresight is directed at the risk of injury, that is, more at the occurrence of the event which causes the injury. For example, could the defendant foresee a fire or a collision, or the misleading of the plaintiff by a misplaced warning as in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106?2 In 2005, the High Court reaffirmed Wyong Shire Council v Shirt as the yardstick for determining breach of duty, although with some qualifications.3

(3)

As part of the determination of remoteness of damage, reasonable foresight is directed at the type of damage which would result from the defendant’s negligence.4

The test of reasonable foreseeability has been described as the “single point of departure for the imperial march of the tort of negligence”.5 It has also been considered “undemanding”,6 although this should not be construed as meaning that the test will always be easily met.

1 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 2 In Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106 an inexperienced water-skier suffered injury when water-skiing within the vicinity of signs reading “deep water”. 3 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Hayne J at [129]; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63. Note that in late 2006, in New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, the High Court was asked to reconsider the continuing application and correctness of Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106. However it determined that it was not appropriate to reconsider Wyong Shire Council v Shirt in the case before it, therefore affirming its continuing authority. See also Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [68]–[69]. Further discussion of the Shirt calculus at “Standard of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1516]. 4 Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [11.30]. 5 Spigelman JJ, “Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State” (2002) 76 ALJ 432 at 441. 6 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 44 (CLR) quoting Shirt v Wyong Shire Council [1978] 1 NSWLR 631, Glass JA at 641; also discussed in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 1; [1999] HCA 59, Kirby J at [223]–[224].

53

[33.2.230]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Additional Control Mechanisms [33.2.240] To succeed in establishing a duty of care, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant ought to have foreseen that negligence on its part might endanger the plaintiff. It is not enough to establish that the defendant knew or ought to have known of the potential hazard. It must be shown that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have foreseen that the situation constituted a real risk to the plaintiff or to a limited class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member. It is not sufficient to prove that harm to persons generally is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.1 Whether a risk is foreseeable to a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member will always be a question of fact. If the class of persons cannot be identified with any particularity, and the risk is one to persons or the public generally, then the existence of a duty of care by a defendant to a particular plaintiff may not be established. This issue is most commonly seen in cases involving statutory authorities and governments:2 see also [33.2.1170]–[33.2.1180]. The “unforeseeable plaintiffs” rule is exemplified by the facts in Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co, 162 NE 99 (1928).3

1 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill (2006) 4 DDCR 1; [2006] NSWCA 158; Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 47–48 (CLR). 2 Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54; Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 1; [1999] HCA 59. 3 In Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co, 162 NE 99 (1928), the plaintiff was standing near some elevated scales on the defendant’s railway platform. Further down the platform a man carrying a small, newspaper-wrapped parcel was attempting to board a train which had begun to pull away from the platform. Two railway guards, the servants of the defendant, endeavoured to assist him to board. In the process, the package, which contained a quantity of fireworks, fell between the train and the platform and exploded. The vibrations from the explosion caused the scales to fall upon the plaintiff, injuring her. While the defendant clearly owed a duty of care to those persons who frequented its platforms to board trains or to disembark from them, and while a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have foreseen that the actions of its servants might lead either to injury to the intending male passenger or harm to the parcel which he was carrying, a reasonable person so situated could not have foreseen that those actions might endanger Mrs Palsgraf. She was, in short, an unforeseeable plaintiff. The Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co rationale found favour in England and Australia: see Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61; Bourhill (Hay) v Young (Pregnant

54

[33.2.270]

ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

Fish Wife’s Case) [1943] AC 92; Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; 67 WN (NSW) 227; Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; 42 ALJR 89.

[33.2.250] Amendments to Civil Liability legislation in all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory have tightened the ambit of what is “reasonably foreseeable”: see [33.2.60]. The legislation provides that a person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless the risk was foreseeable (ie a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known), the risk was not insignificant and a reasonable person in that person’s position would have taken those precautions.1

1

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B.

[33.2.270] Reliance plays a significant role in establishing a duty of care in negligence in a number of areas. These include the liability of public authorities for negligence in the exercise of their statutory powers,1 liability in the three-party situation where one person makes a negligent statement to another who relies upon it to the loss of a third party,2 and liability in negligent misstatement more generally.3 In Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, a home had been constructed upon defective foundations. The local authority had clear powers of inspection under the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW), which it failed to exercise. The legislative provisions were undoubtedly intended, at least in part, to protect prospective purchasers against the dangers of faulty construction. A majority of the High Court held that while the Council was negligent in its failure to inspect the property during construction, it owed no duty of care to the respondents.4 While no clear ratio emerges from the case, the Court emphasised the absence of any evidence of reliance by the Heymans upon the Council’s inspection. Liability in the three-party situation is exemplified by “wills cases” and is difficult because there is generally no actual relationship of any kind between the defendant and the plaintiff. Reliance by third parties is placed upon solicitors in relation to the preparation and execution of wills formally.5 Where liability has been affirmed in third-party cases, a proximate relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff has been constructed by the courts upon the basis that the defendant knew that a specific person (or a small and limited class of persons) would suffer loss if its advice were negligently provided.6 Cases where there is no pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, but where a duty of care arises because the plaintiff relies upon the defendant either in respect of particular information or advice or because the plaintiff has no alternative but to rely upon due care on the part of the defendant, are discussed

55

[33.2.270]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

at [33.2.510]–[33.2.680]. Leading examples of the former are the duty of care regarding negligent misstatements, and of the latter the duty of care of a statutory authority in the exercise of its statutory powers: see [33.2.1170]–[33.2.1180]. At [33.2.930]–[33.2.1160], circumstances are examined in which the law imposes a duty of care due to an independent pre-existing relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff. Such relationships include that between parent and child, between occupier and persons present on the occupier’s land or premises, between employer and employee, between manufacturer and ultimate consumer, and the duty of care that may exist on the part of those who deal in land or chattels towards persons with whom they deal (and other persons). A contentious issue is whether a duty of care should be imposed upon the defendant to take positive action. As a general rule, the law is unwilling to impose duties of affirmative action.7 However, the objection to this is significantly reduced where a pre-existing relationship exists between defendant and plaintiff, or a relationship of reliance has developed such that the defendant either knows or ought to know that the plaintiff will rely upon the care of the defendant. These are considered further at [33.2.340].

1

2

3 4

5 6

7

See Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Gibbs CJ at 445, Mason J at 461 (CLR). Although reliance remains relevant for the reasons noted, the notion of “general reliance” enunciated in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, by Mason J at 464 (CLR) was rejected by the majority judgment in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Brennan J at [18], Gummow J at [62], Kirby J at [225]–[232]. See also [33.2.1170]–[33.2.1180] for statutory limitations of liability of public authorities. See Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240; Lawton v BOC Transhield Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 608 (QB); Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487. Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19. See also [33.2.510]–[33.2.680]. Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 470–471, Brennan J at 493–494, Deane J at 509–512 (CLR); Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 VR 428. Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J at 183 (CLR). Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297; [1979] 3 WLR 605, Sir Robert Megarry V-C at 322–323 (Ch); see also White v Jones [1993] 3 WLR 730 (CA); Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802 (CA); BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221; Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375; Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448 Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487. See also Professional Liability “Legal Practitioners” [27.3.10]ff. See, eg Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [88]. 56

[33.2.290]

ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

[33.2.290] Determining duty of care by reference to the test of reasonable foreseeability and established classes of case means that existing and established causes of action, such as for personal injury or physical harm, remain the same. Hence, if it is foreseeable, in the sense of being a real and not far-fetched possibility, that a careless act or omission on the part of one person may cause harm to another, in established categories of case or causes of action, a duty of care will be held to exist. However, if the common law duty of care is found to be inconsistent with a statutory duty, it will ordinarily be reason for finding that the duty of care does not exist.1

1

Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [60]. For example, in Hunter & New England Local Health District v McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270; 89 ALJR 39; [2014] HCA 44, the Court at [31], [32] and [35], held that to impose a common law duty of care on a hospital to protect people, whom a mentally ill person may come into contact with after discharge from hospital, from harm was inconsistent with statutory duties under the Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) and therefore no common law duty of care was found to exist.

[33.2.300] In actions for pure economic loss or commercial loss, the classes of case which have already been established remain, but further extensions of liability will only occur incrementally, if at all. This is because in the sphere of actions for pure economic loss, or more properly described, “commercial loss”,1 it has been long recognised by the courts that the duty of care acts as a control mechanism to prevent “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”.2 Accordingly, the fact that reasonable foresight of the risk was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on its own for imposing liability has been repeatedly reiterated by the High Court.3 Consistent with this has been the reiteration of the need for a control mechanism to limit liability within socially acceptable bounds.4 The basis upon which the courts will apply and possibly extend the duty of care beyond established categories of cases in novel problems is covered at [33.2.310]. However, the extent to which this may occur will likely be tempered by current community attitudes and expectations. The incremental approach has been favoured by the High Court.5

1

2

Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at [121], Gummow J at [167], quoting from Miller v United States Steel Corp 902 F 2d 573 (1990), Posner J at 574. Ultramares Corp v Touche, 174 NE 441 (1931), Cardozo CJ at 444. The full quote reads: “If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose

57

[33.2.300]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

3

4

5

accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J at 174, Brennan CJ at 166, McHugh J at 201, 211 (CLR); Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Dawson J at 254, McHugh J at 271–272 (CLR). This is most aptly described by Dawson J at 254 (CLR) in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords as follows: “However, mere foreseeability of harm does not, where the only harm is pure economic loss, give rise to a duty of care. The reason for this is that a duty of care imposed by reference to the mere foreseeability of harm in the form of financial loss would extend liability in negligence beyond acceptable bounds. Financial loss occurs as the result of legitimate commercial competition, and commercial activity would be stifled if the law were to impose a duty to take care to avoid that loss. Moreover, if the circumstances in which there was a duty of care to avoid causing purely financial loss were not confined, the extent of the liability imposed would in many cases be virtually without limits, both in terms of persons and amount.” See also Gummow J at 304 (CLR) and his comment that “the trend of authority … with respect to auditors’ negligence reflects an adherence or, in the case of the United States, a renewed adherence to [Ultramares Corp v Touche, 174 NE 441 (1931)]”. See also Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Gummow J at [125]. See Spigelman JJ, “Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State” (2002) 76 ALJ 432 at 441–442. See also Tapsell K, “Turning the Negligence Juggernaut” (2002) 76 ALJ 581. See especially Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at [94]–[99].

[33.2.310] In novel problems or cases, courts will tend to assess whether a duty of care exists by reference to existing principles and cases where a duty has previously been established, on the basis that the duty of care will only be extended incrementally, if at all. In addressing this issue in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the High Court stated that the failure of the law of negligence to identify the unifying principle that would allow a solution to novel problems, does not mean that novel cases are to be decided by reference only to some intuitive sense of what is “fair” or “unfair”.1 Nor were such issues to be resolved by reference to ill-defined concepts of policy, but rather: “The law of tort develops by reference to principles, which must be capable of general application, not discretionary decision-making in individual cases.”2 How this is to be done, and how the existence of a duty of care in all cases is to be determined, remains uncertain. Some guidance to this is provided by the earlier High Court decision in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36. This decision, concerning the financial loss of potato farmers, produced a disparate set of judgments. However, Gummow J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) adopted the approach of Stephen J in Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270 when he isolated a number of “salient features” which combined to constitute a sufficiently close relationship to give rise to a duty of care owed to Caltex, the

58

[33.2.310]

ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

breach of which permitted recovery of purely economic loss. Gummow J, in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, applied and explained the “salient features” approach as follows: The question … is whether the salient features of the matter give rise to a duty of care. … In determining whether the relationship is so close that the duty of care arises, attention is paid to the particular connections between the parties. … There is no simple formula which can mask the necessity for examination of the particular facts.3

Albeit in a dissenting judgment, McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd preferred the incremental approach as consistently and previously adopted by Brennan J: The law should be developed incrementally by reference to the reasons why the material facts in analogous cases did or did not found a duty and by reference to the few principles of general application that can be found in the duty cases. Further … the reasons for upholding or denying a duty in particular cases should be regarded as principles to be applied in determining whether a duty exists within that category. Such reasons will reflect policies that the courts have recognised as relevant in determining the duty issue. In some cases, they will be so decisive in determining duty that they can be applied as rules or principles in other cases.4

Such caution and incremental development is well illustrated in cases seeking to extend the scope of a duty of care which is non-delegable. In Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ observed: In any action in negligence, a proposition about a duty of care must be capable of being expressed in a manner that would enable a judge to direct a jury how to set about deciding whether there had been a breach. This is not difficult in well-established areas such as litigation arising out of industrial accidents, motor vehicle accidents, occupiers’ liability or professional negligence. It may be otherwise, however, in cases which lie at the boundaries of the law of negligence. There, the separation of issues of law (affecting duty) from issues of fact (affecting breach) may be more problematic.5

The High Court in Sullivan v Moody applied what could be called the “precedent test” in adopting6 the comment of Lord Diplock in Home Offıce (UK) v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140 that the judicial development of the law of negligence rightly proceeds by seeking first to identify the relevant characteristics that are common to the kinds of conduct and relationship between the parties which are involved in the case for decision and the kinds of conduct and relationships which have been held in previous decisions of the courts to give rise to a duty of care.7

59

[33.2.310]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The recognition that the law of negligence is no longer, if it ever was, a single uniform body of law moving in the same direction, not only seems to accord with common sense and recent High Court decisions, but also community trends.

1 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [53]. 2 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [49]. 3 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gummow J at [198], analysed in Stanton KM, “Incremental Approaches to the Duty of Care” in Mullany NJ (ed), Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information Services, 1997) p 34. 4 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at [94]–[95]. 5 Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ at [8]. 6 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [51]. 7 Home Offıce (UK) v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140, Lord Diplock at 1058 (AC).

Acts and Omissions [33.2.320] Where physical harm or loss arises because of a negligent act, the general rule is that the damage is recoverable if it is foreseeable. In such circumstances, the inquiry focuses upon whether the harm or loss which occurred was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Even in such cases, however, the mere fact that such harm is foreseeable is insufficient to establish that the defendant has been negligent. Mazinski v Bakka (1978) 20 SASR 350 provides a clear illustration. While the defendant motorist clearly had a duty to look out for pedestrians given the poor pre-dawn visibility, that duty did not extend to ensuring he would not overlook a person lying prone in his driveway.1 In Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, the High Court held that the modern law of negligence “has encompassed and overlain the territory in which the rule in [Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330] operates”.2 On this basis, it held that the act of an owner or occupier of introducing or retaining any dangerous substance or carrying on any dangerous activity on property under its occupation or control, was a category of case in which a relationship of proximity existed with anyone whose personal property was in consequence at risk.3 Despite the use of proximity to reach this decision, a notion which has subsequently fallen into decline, this case remains authority until otherwise decided. In any event, in such cases the element of introduction of danger is itself a control mechanism,4

60

[33.2.330]

ACTS AND OMISSIONS

and the duty of care “both varies in degree according to the magnitude of the risk involved and extends to ensuring that such care is taken”.5

1 2 3 4 5

Mazinski v Bakka (1978) 20 SASR 350 (FC). Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 547 (CLR). For a discussion of what is dangerous, see [33.2.1580]. For a discussion of control mechanisms, see [33.2.240]–[33.2.310]. Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 557 (CLR).

[33.2.330] The general rule is that the law does not impose duties of care to take positive action.1 This is known as the nonfeasance rule. Hence, there will generally be no breach of duty where physical harm or loss arises as a result of a failure to act. There is no duty of bystanders to protect others from themselves or from the actions of others. There is accordingly no duty of care to affect a rescue, even if the means of doing so are within the defendant’s capabilities. In the situation of the Samaritan and the Levite, the law imposes no duty of care on the Samaritan.2 Care must be taken in application of the general rule. The omission to act must be a “pure” omission. For example, a failure to brake while driving a car is not in law an omission, since it forms part of the positive act of driving the car. The general rule is subject to a number of exceptions arising from special circumstances. Where a special relationship exists between defendant and plaintiff, a duty of care may arise to take positive action. That position is clearly demonstrated by the duties of care owed by parents, school authorities, occupiers and employers.3 In a well-known Canadian decision, Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441; (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 545, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the occupier of a boat owed a duty of care to attempt to rescue a passenger who had fallen into the water. The facts of the case were that an invited guest of the defendant fell overboard accidentally. Another guest dived into the water to try to rescue the first guest. Both guests died. The families of both deceased guests brought a fatal accident action against the defendant shipowner and operators. The Court held further that the defendant owed a duty not to mismanage the rescue attempt, thereby inviting a second rescue attempt which ended in drowning. That latter duty clearly does not depend upon occupier’s liability, and its rationale, while debatable, is likely to rest upon the foreseeability of further rescue attempts. In the case of both plaintiffs, however, it was found that no breach had occurred. Similar positive duties would doubtless be imposed upon firefighters and lifeguards.4 For those who do take positive action to rescue another, despite being under no duty to do so, a duty does arise. However, legislative intervention generally offers protection to rescuers and “good samaritans” in some circumstances.5

61

[33.2.330]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The nonfeasance rule may give way where the plaintiff is justified in relying upon a general practice of the defendant. In Mercer v South Eastern & Chatham Railway Companies’ Managing Committee [1922] 2 KB 549, the defendant railway company routinely closed the gates of a level crossing when a train approached. When the gates of the crossing were inadvertently left open, the plaintiff, who was aware of the company’s practice, was struck by a train and injured while using the crossing. The Court held the defendants liable to the plaintiff. Their practice of closing the gates created a justified reliance on the plaintiff’s part and therefore a positive obligation on the defendants to take care to close the gates when a train approached. A duty to take positive action may arise where a statutory authority either created or increased the risk of foreseeable damage and then failed to exercise its power to prevent the damage.6

1 See, eg Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [88]. 2 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 580; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 579 (CLR). For a discussion on rescuers, see [33.2.1340]–[33.2.1360]; Gray N and Edelman J, “Developing the Law of Omissions: A Common Law Duty to Rescue?” (1998) 6 TLJ 240. 3 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3. Other less generalised exceptions to the nonfeasance rule include the duty of a medical practitioner to treat a member of the public not previously treated by that medical practitioner (Lowns v Woods [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-376 (NSWCA)), the duty of a hospital outpatient ward to treat persons who attend the ward (Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428; [1968] 2 WLR 422) and the duty of care of an occupier of land to remove nuisances arising naturally on the land (Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182 (PC)). In McKinnon v Burtatowski [1969] VR 899, it was suggested by Pape J at 908 in comment that a motorist involved in a traffic accident even without fault on their part owes a duty of care to safeguard other users of the road from the hazard created thereby. 4 Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431; [1987] 3 WLR 1145 (affirming Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1264 (QBD)); confirmed in OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department (UK) [1997] 3 All ER 897 (QBD). 5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.1; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 8; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 9 Div 11; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 8A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VIA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1D. In Queensland, there is no express provision regarding good samaritans, but they may be protected under provisions regarding public safety: see Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 7. See also [33.2.90]. 6 SB v New South Wales (2004) 13 VR 527; [2004] VSC 514, Redlich J at [134]; Roads Corp v Dykes (2011) 58 MVR 62; [2011] VSCA 118.

62

[33.2.340]

UNAVOIDABLE DEPENDENCE

Unavoidable Dependence [33.2.340] Where a third party is not the recipient of a misleading statement, or advice or failure to advise, an action in negligence may still be possible. It may be that the actual and intended recipient of the advice has a duty to act on it in a way that will necessarily and foreseeably affect a third party’s financial interests;1 or the circumstances may be such that the third party is unavoidably dependent on the adviser using care in the advice.2 Liability in those circumstances may be limited to the situation where an adviser assumes responsibility towards an identified third party, despite the absence of any actual reliance.3 Where the situations involve words, some will be inclined to characterise the facts to bring them within Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101.4 Alternatively, since there is no actual reliance by the third party, it may be argued that they are not Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd situations at all. The fact that words may be involved is incidental, and the situation is one of a negligent act leading to pure economic loss. The distinction is immaterial. The High Court has indicated that it would no longer seek to categorise facts for this purpose. Thus, for example, in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, where an inordinate delay by a solicitor in advising an executor of his appointment permitted the estate to waste, the High Court was not interested in whether Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd or Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270 (or another category of omissions) was appropriate. Instead, each member, except Brennan J, attempted to apply the generalised proximity requirement to the facts. The Court held, by a majority, that a duty of care was owed which was broken by the omission to act. Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802 raises another difficult issue. A clerk in a local land registry issued a clean certificate to a prospective purchaser of land. When the land was purchased in reliance on the certificate, an encumbrancer lost, by effect of statute, its right to enforce the encumbrance because the purchaser had not been notified of it. The Court of Appeal held that the clerk owed a duty of care not only to the person to whom the certificate was issued, but also to anyone whom he knew, or ought to have known, would be injured by the issue of a mistaken certificate.5 That case ostensibly was decided on the basis that it fell within Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd.6 However, as Glass JA pointed out in Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) v San Sebastian Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 268; (1983) 51 LGRA 257, the case is not of that “conventional” type.7 In those circumstances, it is possible that the significant factor would not be reliance, but that the plaintiff, to the knowledge of the defendant, was unavoidably dependent on the integrity of the advice or certificate given to the intervening purchaser. The problems of unavoidable dependence and so-called vicarious reliance can arise in other contexts, particularly where professional advisers are concerned.8

63

[33.2.340]

DUTY OF CARE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

It is difficult to establish firm, but still helpful, principles in this area. Proximity is no longer determinative and in its place, High Court pronouncements in analogous contexts have emphasised criteria such as the “vulnerability” of the plaintiff.9 In this context vulnerability is not understood to mean that the plaintiff was likely to suffer loss but rather that the plaintiff is unable to protect itself from the consequences of the defendant failing to exercise reasonable care.10 It encapsulates notions such as the plaintiff’s reliance11 on the defendant and the defendant’s control in the circumstances. Maintaining the integrity of other existing legal principles may also have a crucial role in determining a claim.12 The problem has arisen in the context of clients seeking advice from solicitors on the best way to organise their affairs to ensure that a particular third party gains benefit. The advice sought might be how best to organise a client’s tax affairs to benefit a third party, how to establish a trust to benefit a proposed beneficiary in a particular way, or how best to structure a business venture to ensure a particular benefit to a third party business associate. While the third party does not deal directly with the adviser, their identity is known to both parties. Clearly, the recipient will have an action in contract or tort should the advice be negligently given. However, the recipient may suffer none, or only part, of the loss. Part of the loss, perhaps the only loss, will fall on the third party.13 It has previously been suggested14 that in many cases sufficient proximity would be found to yield a duty of care to a third party. However, the level of control, and the extent to which a defendant exercises it in such a situation, as well as the corresponding dependence or reliance of another party may now be determinative.15 Additionally, there may be an assumption of responsibility by the professional towards the third party.16 There may also be reliance by the client, either on its own behalf or on behalf of the third party, rendering the third party unavoidably dependent on the exercise of skill and care by the professional. The simplest illustration is where a solicitor negligently fails to give proper advice on the requirements for executing a will. If the will is invalidated, the loss falls not on the client’s estate but on the intended beneficiary.17

1 But see BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221. 2 Cases that might be characterised in this way include the disappointed beneficiary cases culminating in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487. 3 See the discussion in Vines P, “Duty of Care” in Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) pp 209–211. See also Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 VR 428. See [33.2.540]–[33.2.610] for further discussion of reliance. 4 But see the attempt by Wootten J in BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221, at 228–239. 5 Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802 (CA), Cross LJ at 291 (QB) reserved his position on that issue. 6 Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970]

64

[33.2.350]

7

8 9 10

11 12 13 14

15

16

17

NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES

2 WLR 802 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 268 (QB), but see Salmon LJ at 278 (QB). Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) v San Sebastian Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 268; (1983) 51 LGRA 257 (CA), Glass JA at 298 (NSWLR). See [33.2.90] for discussion of statutory provisions regarding professional standard of care. See also 27 Professional Liability. Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [50]. Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [23]. See also Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36. See Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487. See also [33.2.540]–[33.2.610]. See Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [53]. See “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. See also Contract: General Principles “Parties” [7.3.10]ff. BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221; Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802; Watts v Public Trustee (WA) [1980] WAR 97; but see Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193 (FC); Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297; [1979] 3 WLR 605; White v Jones [1993] 3 WLR 730 (CA); Gartside v Sheffıeld, Young & Ellis [1983] NZLR 37 (CA); Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487. While proximity featured prominently in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, in the judgments of Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, both “control” by the defendant (see Gaudron J at 198 (CLR)) and “reliance” by the plaintiff (see Dawson J at 186 (CLR)) were seen as underpinning it. This responsibility is undertaken by accepting the contractual obligation owed to the client to exercise reasonable care and in carrying out the instructions so as to achieve the benefit to the third party desired by the client. Note, however, the comments of Dawson J in this regard in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487 at 171 (CLR). If such an assumption of responsibility is to be discerned, there is no doubt that it cuts across the doctrine of privity: see Contract: General Principles “Parties” [7.3.10]ff and generally, “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. It is hard to reconcile with the orthodox common law contractual position that in such circumstances the professional has made promises only to the client, and not to the third party. As was the factual situation in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487.

Non-delegable Duties [33.2.350] A non-delegable duty of care arises in special circumstances where one party is responsible for the care or safety of another. The classic statement of principle is that of Mason J in Kondis v State Transport Authority

65

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(Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531. He considered that the issue of vicarious liability need not be addressed1 where a person has undertaken the care, supervision or control of the person or property of another or is so placed in relation to that person or his property as to assume a particular responsibility for his [or her] or its safety, in circumstances where the person affected might reasonably expect that due care will be exercised.2

Non-delegable duties are characterised by notions of vulnerability and control. The duty that is non-delegable must be exercised personally. It is a duty not only to take care but to ensure that care is taken. Non-delegable duties of care arise out of the relationships of employers and employees (see [33.2.1030]); principals and employees of independent contractors;3 school authorities and pupils (see [33.2.980] and [33.2.990]); hospitals and patients (see [33.2.1150]) and occupiers and contractual entrants (see [33.2.1160]): In cases where the care of children, or other vulnerable people, is involved, it is difficult to see what kind of relationship would not give rise to a non-delegable duty of care. It is clearly not limited to the relationship between school authority and pupil. A day-care centre for children whose parents work outside the home would be another obvious example. The members or directors of the club, which provided recreational facilities for children, considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in [Jacobi v Griffıths [1999] 2 SCR 570; 174 DLR (4th) 71], presumably owed a non-delegable duty of care to the children who were sexually assaulted by the club’s employee.4

The High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331 held that a non-delegable or personal duty of care arises in circumstances where the defendant in control of premises introduces or retains on the premises a dangerous substance or undertakes a dangerous activity, or allows another person to do either of these things, and the claimant is a person outside the premises whose personal property is thereby exposed to a foreseeable risk of danger.5 This is because of the special vulnerability and dependence of the claimant if reasonable precautions are not taken. However, the majority judgment further suggests that this rule is not necessarily confined to persons outside the premises or even to those lawfully on the premises. While categories of relationships giving rise to non-delegable duties are not closed, the court is slow to expand them. In Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, the Court held that a Council, as the roads authority, did not owe road users a non-delegable duty of care. Gleeson CJ sets out the importance of the existence of non-delegable duties: In practice, the difference between a duty to take reasonable care and a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken matters where it is not an act or omission of the defendant, or of someone for whose fault the defendant is vicariously responsible, that has caused harm to the plaintiff, but the act or omission of some third party, for whose fault the defendant would not ordinarily be vicariously responsible. If a

66

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NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES

negligent act or omission is that of a defendant, or a person for whose fault the defendant is vicariously responsible (such as an employee), no problem arises. Again, if the nature of a defendant’s responsibility is such that it can be discharged lawfully or properly only by the defendant personally, an attempted delegation would be irrelevant. Some responsibilities are non-delegable in the sense that it is of their essence that they be performed by a particular person, perhaps because of trust or confidence reposed in that person. In some cases, a duty to take care involves a duty to act personally. That kind of non-delegability should not be confused with a case where the engagement of a third party to perform a certain function is consistent with the exercise of reasonable care by a defendant, but the defendant’s legal duty is not merely to exercise reasonable care but also (if a third party is engaged) to ensure that reasonable care is taken. In such a case, the third party’s failure to take care will result in breach of the defendant’s duty. The legal consequence is that the circumstance that the third party is an independent contractor does not enable the defendant to avoid liability. It is because of its practical effect of outflanking the general rule that a defendant is not vicariously responsible for the fault of an independent contractor that the identification of this special responsibility or duty is important.6

The Court is also slow to expand the content of the non-delegable duty of care. In New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, the Court was concerned with the content and scope of a school’s non-delegable duty of care to a student in circumstances of sexual assault by a teacher. The Court dealt with the extent of a non-delegable duty, noting that while it is a duty to ensure that care is taken, it does not extend to an absolute duty to prevent harm. In New South Wales and Victoria, legislative amendments have sought to codify the extent of a non-delegable duty by determining the extent of the liability as if the person were vicariously liable, thus confining the content of the duty:7 see [33.2.90].

1

2 3

A question arises of whether Commonwealth, state or territory authorities may be held to owe a non-delegable duty of care to prisoners where they have contracted with corporate persons to provide prison facilities and staff. It would follow from the approach taken in Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Mason J at 687 (CLR). See, eg S v Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 217; [2005] FCA 549, where the Commonwealth admitted a non-delegable duty regarding immigration detainees. No authority exists regarding criminal prisons. For duty of care to prisoners generally, see [33.2.1090]; New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 236; [2005] HCA 76. Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Mason J at 687 (CLR). Forsayth Mining Services Pty Ltd v Jack (unreported, WASCFC, Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Murray JJ, 129 of 1993, 10 May 1995); Le Cornu Furniture & Carpet Centre Pty Ltd v Hammill (1998) 70 SASR 414.

67

[33.2.350]

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4 5

6 7

New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ at [36]. For a discussion of what is dangerous, see [33.2.1580]. See also Swanton J, “Another Conquest in the Imperial Expansion of the Law of Negligence: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd” (1994) 2 TLJ 101; Swanton J and McDonald B, “Non-delegable Duties in the Law of Negligence” (1995) 69 ALJ 323. Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ at [9]. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5Q; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 61.

Role of Justice and Community Expectations [33.2.360] The concepts of justice, fairness and reasonableness surface in judicial analysis concerning whether or not a duty of care exists. Deane J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120 suggested that: [I]t has been the flexibility of fundamental concepts and principles which has enabled the common law to reflect the influence of contemporary standards and demands and which has in no small part underlain its genius to provide a living element of the social compact of civilisation for different peoples through different ages and in different parts of the world.1

The allusion to the “social compact” appeared to reflect acceptance of underlying principles of justice and fairness as they are applied to different circumstances at different times.2 Following the rejection of the concept of proximity however, the High Court has referred to the “question as to what is fair and just and reasonable” and criticised it as capable of being misunderstood as an invitation to formulate policy rather than to search for principle. The concept of policy, in this context, is often ill-defined. There are policies at work in the law which can be identified and applied to novel problems, but the law of tort develops by reference to principles, which must be capable of general application, not discretionary decision-making in individual cases.3

Instead, the Court has placed greater explicit (if not implicit) emphasis on principles and established categories (see [33.2.290]–[33.2.310]), although policy considerations have also been referred to. Perhaps the leading illustration of this is Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, especially the dicta of Dawson and Gummow JJ,4 where a third party beneficiary recovered damages against the deceased’s solicitor.5 Undeniably, a commitment to justice and fairness underlies the extension of the

68

[33.2.370]

ROLE OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS

duty of care to third parties. The categories of potential claimants are not closed: see [33.2.680].

1 2

3 4 5

Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Deane J at 497 (CLR). Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Deane J at 498 (CLR). See also National Australia Bank Ltd v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 (CA), Clarke JA at 404. Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [49]. Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J at 178, Gummow J at 223 (CLR). See also Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36; Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35 at 41–42.

[33.2.370] The role and influence of community expectations about the law of negligence often tends to be ignored, at least explicitly, in judgments and assessments about the likely direction of the law of negligence. This is a mistake, given that the modern law of negligence and the neighbourhood test for duty of care in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 arose out of a recognition that “liability for negligence … is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay”.1 Indeed, in one sense, negligence law is the community’s discourse through which it decides what protection it expects to receive, what protection it is prepared to give, and how much it is prepared to pay for careless conduct. In a similar vein, in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J stated: The closest that the common law has come to providing a general remedy in respect of injurious conduct is the modern law of negligence with its hypothetical “neighbour” and associated test of “reasonable foreseeability”.2

Or as Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ of the High Court explained in 1986, “What is considered to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case must be influenced by current community standards.”3 Justice Spigelman, writing extracurially, noted that members of the judiciary grew up through a period where public belief and opinion was that victims of accidents should be compensated for accidents for which they were not responsible. His Honour went on to observe that the application or reflection of community standards and expectations in the common law of negligence are doomed to occur with a delayed effect. Whether this is acceptable is a different question, but importantly in the context of community expectations of the law of negligence, his Honour noted that:

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[33.2.370]

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Part of the contemporary pressure for legislative intervention is based on a perspective that the practical operation of the law does not require persons to take responsibility for their own actions. Communal expectations appear to have shifted in this respect.4

Past community expectations about the rights of accident victims to be fully compensated and the concomitant reduction in the extent to which the community had to bear responsibility for its own actions (and losses) found much more immediate application in legislative action. Indeed, it is often overlooked by many contemporary commentators on the law of negligence, that many of the principles and legal developments which enabled and facilitated the current scope for recovery for accident and injury, and which are now treated as part of the common law of negligence, were initially legislative initiatives.5 Legislative changes in most states and territories in 2002 seeking to circumscribe the existence of a duty and the assumption of risk represent a swing of the pendulum away from legislative initiatives to protect individual rights: see generally [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. The current debate reflects the difficulties in balancing competing rights. It is clear that the test for duty of care in Australia is going to be subject to considerable and further scrutiny. Accordingly, new or novel categories of case or duties of care will be developed slowly (if at all) and from case to case by analogy with established categories, rather than by some “massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable considerations” of policy.6 Such an approach appears to be consistent with current community attitudes and expectations. Juries remain an important yardstick of community expectations. In Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ noted: The duty is usually expressed in terms of protecting another against unreasonable risk of harm, or of some kind of harm; the standard of conduct necessary to discharge the duty is usually expressed in terms of what would be expected of a reasonable person, both as to foresight of the possibility of harm, and as to taking precautions against such harm. Life is risky. People do not expect, and are not entitled to expect, to live in a risk-free environment. The measure of careful behaviour is reasonableness, not elimination of risk. Where people are subject to a duty of care, they are to some extent their neighbours’ keepers, but they are not their neighbours’ insurers. Where an action for damages for negligence is tried before a jury, the question whether the conduct of the defendant has been negligent, that is, whether it has departed from what reasonableness requires, is presented as a question of fact for the jury. The jury’s decision will ordinarily involve both a resolution of disputed questions of primary fact and an application, to the facts as found, of the test of reasonableness.7

1 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 580.

70

[33.2.380]

2 3 4

5

6

7

PUBLIC POLICY

Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 578–579 (CLR). Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301; 60 ALJR 362, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 309 (CLR). Spigelman JJ, “Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State” (2002) 76 ALJ 432 at 444. For discussion of the results of this “contemporary pressure”, see [33.2.30], [33.2.40], [33.2.230]. For example, the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (Lord Campbell’s Act) 9 & 10 Vict c 93 (UK) (now repealed) overturned the common law rule against recovery of damages for the death of another person. The creation in the early 20th century of no-fault workers’ compensation schemes ensured some level of recovery for injured workers, with compulsory insurance protecting the workers from insolvency of their employers. Of particular significance was the legislative creation of an apportionment regime, overturning the position at common law in which contributory negligence was a complete defence, albeit subject to a good deal of “stretching”: see, eg Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) pp 600–601. Examples are drawn from the paper by Spigelman JJ, “Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State” (2002) 76 ALJ 432 at 437–438. As articulated in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Brennan J at 481 (CLR) and analysed by Stanton KM, “Incremental Approaches to the Duty of Care” in Mullany NJ (ed), Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information Services, 1997). The incremental approach also seems to be supported by McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36. McHugh J said at [94] that the “most helpful approach to the duty problem is first to ascertain whether the case comes within an established category”. Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ at [5]–[6].

Public Policy [33.2.380] The role of public policy was unclear in the context of proximity and remains so in relation to determining a duty of care. In Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J indicated that the essential function of the proximity test was to confine the duty of care to circumstances in which the policy of the law admits a duty.1 However, he also suggested both in that case and in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, that policy issues might operate independently of the proximity test. In Jaensch v Coffey, for example, Deane J questioned why public policy should preclude recovery for nervous shock sustained by a woman upon receiving a telephone call to inform her that her husband and children had just been killed.2 The policy referred to was the apparent exclusion by the law of a duty in relation to nervous shock caused by merely being told bad news, rather than a policy denying the presence or absence of proximity. In Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, Deane J’s emphasis on the legislative intention underlying the statutory scheme appeared to be based on policy grounds rather than proximity.3

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The High Court in Jaensch v Coffey and Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman did not clarify whether its criticism of Lord Wilberforce’s test in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; [1977] 2 WLR 1024 was global or whether it was exclusively directed at the first tier. It may be that policy issues continue to play an independent role, although this must be regarded as uncertain, especially given the decision in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, which rejected policy in favour of principle: The question as to what is fair, and just and reasonable is capable of being misunderstood as an invitation to formulate policy rather than to search for principle. The concept of policy, in this context, is often ill-defined. There are policies at work in the law which can be identified and applied to novel problems, but the law of tort develops by reference to principles, which must be capable of general application, not discretionary decision-making in individual cases.4

English and New Zealand courts, on the other hand, clearly address public policy as a separate issue, preferring to separate the duty of care into the constituent elements of reasonable foreseeability, proximity, justice, reasonableness and public policy.5

1 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 583 (CLR). In Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J at 179 (CLR) suggested that policy considerations set the outer limits of the tort. 2 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 608–609 (CLR). See also [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1310]. 3 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Deane J at 500 (CLR). 4 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [49]. 5 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790; Welton v North Cornwall District Council [1997] 1 WLR 570 (CA); W v Essex County Council [1999] Fam 90; [1998] 3 WLR 534; Morrison v Upper Hutt City Council [1998] 2 NZLR 331 (CA).

[33.2.390] Public policy is relied on to negate the existence of a duty of care in a number of areas. An advocate, whether barrister or solicitor, owes no duty of care towards clients in the performance of court work. A similar exemption for advocates applies to pre-court work which is intimately connected with work in court. Australian courts have openly based that rule on policy considerations.1 Public policy demands that those engaged in the administration of justice should enjoy freedom of speech without incurring the threat of a legal action in negligence. The advocate’s immunity is shared by judges,2 witnesses,3 officers reporting to a court,4 jurors, and parties.5

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In England, it has been held on policy grounds that the police owe no duty of care to the public in general in relation to the apprehension of criminals and the consequent prevention of injury or damage caused by them.6 However, in Zalewski v Turcarolo [1995] 2 VR 562, the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that public interest immunity was not available to a police officer who was involved in a shooting and did not act in accordance with training and instructions. In Victoria v Horvath (2002) 6 VR 326; [2002] VSCA 177, the questions of the duty owed by the police officer and legislative immunity were the subject of the Court’s scrutiny. The public interest immunity may not be available to police officers acting outside the proper scope of their duties. In Thompson v Vincent (2005) 153 A Crim R 577; [2005] NSWCA 219, Mason P confirmed that the police had a public duty to prevent a breach of the peace but owed the public no duty as to the exercise of their powers to prevent such a breach.7 It has been held that the Parole Board and the Department of Correctional Services do not owe a general duty of care to the public in the manner of release and supervision of released criminals.8 It has also been held that the Department of Community Services, involved in the investigation of allegations of sexual abuse, does not owe a general duty of care to the person against whom the allegations were made.9 Military personnel owe no duty of care to civilians during wartime operations.10 However, during peacetime, military personnel “are liable to civilians injured by negligent acts done in the course of peace-time duties”.11 This exclusion is based upon policy grounds. Those conducting non-military operations during peacetime owe a duty of care to military personnel.12 Whether any duty of care to military personnel might arise during non-military operations in wartime remains to be determined, as does the question of whether any duty to military personnel might arise in respect of military operations carried out in peacetime.13 Parents do not owe any general supervisory duty of care towards their children, at least where their physical safety is concerned. That issue was exhaustively considered by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356, where the Court based its conclusion entirely on policy grounds: see [33.2.930]–[33.2.970]. Where the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal enterprise when injured, the role of public policy remains uncertain.14 The High Court has not addressed policy issues and has previously held instead that the relationship between the participants in an enterprise lacked proximity because the nature of the enterprise made it impossible to determine the standard of care owed by the participants.15 However, in Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366, the minority, comprising Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ, did not accept that reasoning.16 The fact that a plaintiff was acting contrary to law when he or she suffered damage of which the defendant’s negligence is alleged to be a cause does not automatically preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages from the

73

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defendant. Further the issue cannot be resolved by asking only whether there is a causal connection between the plaintiff’s illegal conduct and the occurrence of the damage of which the plaintiff complains.17 The fact that plaintiff and defendant were both acting illegally when the plaintiff suffered injuries of which the defendant’s negligence was a cause, and which would not have been suffered but for the plaintiff’s participation in the illegal act, is also not determinative of whether a duty of care is owed. Whether the parties’ joint participation in illegal conduct should preclude a plaintiff recovering damages for negligence from the defendant depends on a policy judgment. If a statute has been contravened, it will be by reference to the relevant statute, and identification of its purposes, that any incongruity, contrariety or lack of coherence denying the existence of a duty of care will be found, both in cases where a single party18 or both parties were engaged in illegality.19 In Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, both plaintiff and defendant were complicit in stealing a car. The High Court held that the statutory purpose of a law proscribing dangerous or reckless driving is not consistent with one offender owing a co-offender a duty to take reasonable care. However the plaintiff later asked to be let out and was refused. She was thus held to have withdrawn from and ceased to be complicit in the illegal use of the car by the time the defendant lost control of it and struck a pole, which resulted in the plaintiff’s injury.

1 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12; Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 62 ALJR 611; 35 A Crim R 1; Myer Stores Ltd v State Fire Commission [2012] TASSC 54, Blow J at [41]. See also Professional Liability “Legal Practitioners” [27.3.10]ff; see [33.2.90]. 2 Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668 (CA); Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118; [1974] 3 WLR 459 (CA). 3 Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45; [1958] 3 WLR 463; Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130; Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528; [1962] 3 WLR 912 (CA). Note, however, that the exemption does not extend to civil liability for perjury. See Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 72. 4 Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA). 5 Digital Equipment Corp v Darkcrest Ltd [1984] Ch 512; [1984] 3 WLR 617; Business Computers International Ltd v Registrar of Companies (UK) [1988] Ch 229; [1987] 3 WLR 1134. 6 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] QB 60; [1987] 2 WLR 1126 (CA). While that decision could have been reached on other grounds, the Court of Appeal chose to base its ruling upon public policy. The decision was affirmed by the House of Lords in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1988] 2 WLR 1049, but their Lordships gave less emphasis to the policy arguments. Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire was discussed in Osman v United Kingdom [1999] Fam Law 86 (ECHR) as to whether police immunity may breach Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights/ECHR) (1950) ETS 5; 213 UNTS 222, Art 6(1). See

74

[33.2.390]

7 8 9

10

11 12 13

14 15

16 17 18

PUBLIC POLICY

also Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328 (CA); Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA); Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355 (CA). Thompson v Vincent (2005) 153 A Crim R 577; [2005] NSWCA 219, Mason P at [152]–[153]. Swan v South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 532 (FC). See also [33.2.1090]–[33.2.1100]. Hillman v Black (1996) 67 SASR 490 (FC) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused). See also the following English cases for where a local authority has not been held liable ostensibly on grounds of public policy: X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 152 (actions against child protection agencies) (though this was doubted in Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] AC 619; [2000] 3 WLR 776); Skinner v Secretary of State for Transport, The Times, 3 January 1995 (QBD) (the coastguard); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (GB) v West Yorkshire Fire & Civil Defence Authority (consolidated in Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004; [1997] 3 WLR 331 (CA) at 1009, 1023 (QB)); John Munroe (Acrylics) Ltd v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority [1997] QB 983; [1996] 3 WLR 988 (the fire service); Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335; [1995] 2 WLR 173 (CA) (the Crown Prosecution Service); Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd (The Nicholas H) [1996] AC 211; [1995] 3 WLR 227 (a ship classification society, which it was said exercised a quasi-public function); Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA) (the police department). See also Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; [1996] 3 WLR 388 (where the House of Lords held that a county council did not owe a statutory duty of care to the injured plaintiff motorcyclist for the known dangerous condition of a road). Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344. Similarly, no duty of care is owed to military personnel during wartime: Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] QB 732; [1996] 2 WLR 474 (CA), discussed in Mullender R, “Negligence, the Public Interest and the Proportionality Principle” (1997) 5 Tort L Rev 9. Parker v Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295; 38 ALJR 444, Windeyer J at 301 (CLR). Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570. Commonwealth v Connell (1986) 5 NSWLR 218 (CA). See also differing conclusions in Verwayen v Commonwealth [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-173 (VSC); Verwayen v Commonwealth (No 2) [1989] VR 712 (FC). The High Court considered other issues in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; 64 ALJR 540. In some jurisdictions legislation governs the duty owed to a person where that person is injured during the commission of an offence: see [33.2.90], [33.2.390]. Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474; Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366, Mason CJ, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 254–255 (CLR). In George v Dowling (1992) 59 SASR 291, it was held that where a plaintiff travelled in the car driven by a defendant with a blood alcohol reading above .08, there was in the circumstances the necessary proximity required to generate a duty of care. Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366, Brennan J at 259–260, Dawson J at 276, Toohey J at 291–292 (CLR). Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438. Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438.

75

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19 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9.

[33.2.400] The role of insurance has attracted little judicial comment and analysis due to the emphasis by courts on fault and the stated irrelevance of insurance to this determination.1 In negligence cases, the focus on fault is justified by the fact that whether or not a party may be insured is irrelevant to the question of their responsibility, unless the question of indemnity directly arose as a matter in issue.2 Whether an inquiry in a specific case should be made as to whether the defendant has or could purchase insurance, was rejected by McHugh J in his dissent in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36: Whether the plaintiff has purchased, or is able to purchase, insurance is, however, generally not relevant to the issue of vulnerability … courts often wrongly assume that insurance is readily obtainable and that the increased cost of an extension of liability can be spread among customers by adding the cost of premiums to the cost of services or goods. In [Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270] Stephen J rejected the contention that the existence of insurance or the more general concept of “loss spreading” were valid considerations in determining whether a duty of care existed. I agree with his Honour. They do not assist but rather impede the relevant inquiry. Loss spreading is not synonymous with economic efficiency – which will sometimes be a relevant factor in determining duty. Australian courts, however, have not accepted that loss spreading is the guiding rationale for the law of negligence or that it should be.3

Issues of insurance or otherwise should not be raised in a jury trial and may form the basis of an application that the jury be discharged.

1 Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270, Stephen J at 580 (CLR): “The task of the courts remains that of loss fixing rather than loss spreading.” See also the dicta of Gleeson CJ in Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40 and contrasting dicta of Kirby J in the same case. 2 See, eg King v Wilkinson (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 444; 74 WN (NSW) 222. The rule that in issues of liability, evidence about insurance cover is irrelevant, is also applied in England (see Launchbury v Morgans [1973] AC 127; [1972] 2 WLR 1217) and in America: see Franklin MA and Rabin RL, Tort Law and Alternatives: Cases and Materials (6th ed, Foundation Press, 1996) p 699. 3 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at [130] referring to Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270, Stephen J at 580–581 (CLR).

76

Misstatements General [33.2.510] The law of negligent misstatement follows the general principles of liability for negligent acts and omissions.1 It is not a discrete area. “Negligent misstatement” describes a statement of fact, advice or opinion which is inaccurate and misleading, in circumstances where the common law imposes a duty on its maker to exercise reasonable care in its formulation or dissemination, and where that duty has been broken. Negligent misstatements are traditionally associated with the provision of information and advice. In San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ noted that “the distinction between information and advice is an unnecessary and often difficult one to draw”.2 Broadly speaking, a duty of care will arise where a defendant: (1)

freely and voluntarily gives advice to another, either directly or indirectly; and

(2)

the advice is given in circumstances where the defendant knows or ought to know that the ultimate recipient of the advice will probably act on the advice.

As Gillard J stated in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27, a cause of action will arise for purely economic loss if: (i)

the advice is required for a purpose which is known to the adviser when the advice is given;

(ii)

the plaintiff relied upon the statement made by the defendant;

(iii)

the adviser knows the advice will be communicated to the plaintiff either specifically or as a member of an ascertainable class in order to be used for the purpose;

(iv)

the adviser, expressly or impliedly, undertook the responsibility of exercising reasonable care in making the statement;

(v)

it is expressly or impliedly known that the advice is likely to be acted upon without independent enquiry; and

(vi)

… the plaintiff, in reliance upon the statement, suffered loss.3

Although negligent misstatements can cause personal injury or damage to 77

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property, they usually result in pure economic loss which, without constraints, defies limitation. The desire of the courts to impose limits has been a prominent factor in the development of particular control mechanisms. A negligent misstatement of fact will permit the rescission of any contract induced,4 but, unless incorporated as a term, will not give rise to an action for damages for breach of contract.5 The special complications which arise in actions for negligent misstatement are considered further at [33.2.520]. Where the harm suffered by a person is solely economic loss, loss of reputation or liberty, then the common law is slow to impose a liability on the person causing the harm, even where the harm is reasonably foreseeable. Reasonable foresight that the action is likely to cause harm is insufficient to determine whether liability is imposed on a person to avoid harm to another’s finances, reputation or liberty. Indeed, prior to the decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, in the absence of contract or fiduciary duty, no action existed for plaintiffs suffering these losses only.6 Prior to the decision in Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners Ltd the common law was dictated by the obiter of Lord Hershell Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, when his Lordship held that a plaintiff was limited to an action in deceit. To do so, a plaintiff must show that a defendant had made a false representation, either knowingly, with no belief in its truth, or recklessly or carelessly as to whether the statement was true or false. His Lordship stated that: [M]aking a false statement through want of care falls far short of, and is a very different thing from, fraud, and the same may be said of a false representation honestly believed though on insufficient grounds.7

Most commonly, economic loss in the context of negligent misstatement relates to the situations where, in reliance on a statement, a particular person incurs additional costs or wasted expenditure8 or foregoes a lucrative opportunity.9 At other times, as when an auditor negligently certifies corporate accounts as “true and fair”, numerous persons, both existing shareholders and potential investors, may incur loss in reliance upon the accounts.10 The courts have long recognised the capacity of negligent statements to inflict widespread damage upon an indeterminate number of persons. Concern regarding the consequent unacceptable breadth of liability which follows has led to attempts to limit the scope of liability for negligent statements. Where a misleading or deceptive statement causes harm or loss in the course of trade or commerce, the possibility of a statutory action under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law,11 (formerly s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)) or equivalent provisions in other legislation12 should be considered. The

78

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statutory action has a number of clear advantages from the plaintiff’s perspective, and both commonly apply to the same factual situations.13

1

2

3 4 5 6 7 8

9

10 11

12 13

San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 354 (CLR). San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 356 (CLR); see also L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Stephen J at 242–243 (CLR); Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 572 (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27, Gillard J at [716]. See Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff; Contract: General Principles “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff; Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff. See Contract: General Principles “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff. D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12, McHugh J at [103]. Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, Lord Herschell at 375. For example, a financier may be induced to lend money to a borrower with poor credit risk on receipt of the adviser’s carelessly inaccurate advice that the borrower is a good credit risk. For example, a recipient might be induced to take out a type of insurance policy or purchase a particular block of land where, had they received accurate advice from the adviser, the recipient would have procured a different policy or block of land. But see Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 60 ALJR 239; Kyogle Shire Council v Francis (1988) 13 NSWLR 396; 66 LGRA 167 (CA). In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761, it was held that managing agents at Lloyd’s insurance owed a duty of care to members of the underwriting syndicates under the agents’ management. This duty was owed in relation to the suitability of risks to be underwritten and circumstances in which reinsurance should be taken out and claims should be settled. See Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358. Found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. The provision is applied as a single, national consumer law by the state and territory Fair Trading Acts: see Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 (ACT), s 7; Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), s 28; Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT), s 27; Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 16; Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA), s 14; Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 (Tas), s 6; Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic), s 8; Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA), s 19. See, eg Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12DA, which applies to “financial services”. See Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff; Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010)

79

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241 CLR 357; 84 ALJR 644; [2010] HCA 31 where Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ at [99] commented: “Proof of the statutory claim will almost invariably be less onerous for a plaintiff than proof of negligence on the same facts. Liability for misleading conduct under the statute is strict and it follows that a corporation may act reasonably and yet engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive.”

[33.2.520] The concept of reliance has emerged as an important control mechanism to restrict actions for negligent misstatements to acceptable limits: see also [33.2.270] and [33.2.540]–[33.2.600]. Originally, the potential for indeterminate liability led to the rejection of such actions.1 Relief for misstatements was limited to contractual or fiduciary relationships. A distinction was also drawn between negligent acts and words. As Lord Reid explained in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101: [A] negligently made article will only cause one accident, and so it is not very difficult to find the necessary degree of proximity or neighbourhood. … But words can be broadcast with or without the consent or the foresight of the speaker or writer. … There must be something more than the mere misstatement.2

The same point was made by Lord Pearce: The reason for some divergence between the law of negligence in word and that of negligence in act is clear. Negligence in word creates problems different from those of negligence in act. Words are more volatile than deeds. They travel fast and far afield. They are used without being expended and take effect in combination with innumerable facts and other words. Yet they are dangerous and can cause vast financial damage. … If the mere hearing or reading of words were held to create proximity, there might be no limit to the persons to whom the speaker or writer could be liable. Damage by negligent acts to persons or property on the other hand is more visible and obvious; its limits are more easily defined, and it is with this damage that the earlier cases were more concerned.3

The same sentiment has been echoed on various occasions in England and Australia.4 The public policy considerations in limiting the scope for recovery of a claim for pure economic loss were expressed by the High Court in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, most notably by Dawson J: However, mere foreseeability of harm does not, where the only harm is pure economic loss, give rise to a duty of care. The reason for this is that a duty of care imposed by reference to the mere foreseeability of harm in the form of financial loss would extend liability in negligence beyond acceptable bounds. Financial loss occurs as the result of legitimate commercial competition, and commercial activity would be stifled if the law were to impose a duty to take care to avoid that loss. Moreover, if the circumstances in which there was a duty of care to avoid causing purely financial loss were not confined, the extent of the liability imposed would in many cases be virtually without limits, both in terms of persons and amount.5

These comments were made in the context of the concept of proximity, and Dawson J went on to say:

80

[33.2.520]

GENERAL

Thus, for a duty of care to arise in cases of pure economic loss, the law requires, in addition to the foreseeability of harm, a special relationship between the parties which is described as a relationship of proximity.6

Despite the subsequent rejections of the concept of proximity, the broad thrust of Dawson J’s comments remains valid. Foreseeability was an inadequate control particularly in claims for pure economic loss. It failed to distinguish between statements made on social and informal occasions, and those made in a professional or business context. While a duty of care might properly arise in the latter, it would be inappropriate in the former. An impossible burden was cast upon the author of such statements. Potential liability extended to an indeterminate range of persons.7 This was recognised by the majority in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405. They stated that: The recovery of economic loss has traditionally excited an apprehension that it will give rise to indeterminate liability. And there is also an apprehension that the application of the standard of reasonable foreseeability may allow recovery of economic loss of such magnitude and in such circumstances as to provoke doubts about the justice of imposing liability for it on the defendant.8

Another control mechanism is the placement of limitations on the scope of the duty. In South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191; [1996] 3 WLR 87, the House of Lords held that a valuer was under a duty to take reasonable care to provide an accurate valuation on which a lender could decide a course of action. Where the valuer negligently overvalued a property on which a lender secured a mortgage, the valuer was only liable for the foreseeable consequences of the information being wrong. In this case, the valuer was not liable for losses due to the failing market, being losses for which the valuer would not have been liable if the valuation had been correct. Conversely, in Australia, the High Court has not followed the House of Lords decision in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd. Rather, in Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; 73 ALJR 901; [1999] HCA 25, it was held that the losses due to the decline in property prices were sufficiently related to the valuation advice to be recoverable. This was because the potential fall in property prices formed part of the valuation advice and thereby, those losses were part of the losses caused by the advice.9

1 2 3

Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Reid at 483 (AC). Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Pearce at 534 (AC); see also Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990]

81

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4

5

6 7

8

9

2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Oliver at 632–633 (AC). See Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Reid at 482, Lord Pearce at 534 (AC); Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270, Stephen J at 574–575 (CLR); Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; [1977] 2 WLR 1024, Lord Keith at 751–752 (AC); Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520; [1982] 3 WLR 477, Lord Fraser at 532–533, Lord Keith at 536–537, Lord Roskill at 539–546 (AC); Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 583 (CLR); San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 354 (CLR); Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358 (CA), Lord Oliver at 638–639 (AC); Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790, Lord Griffiths at 865 (AC); Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210; [1984] 3 WLR 953, Lord Keith at 240–241 (AC); Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Deane J at 498 (CLR); Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 159; 59 ALJR 763; [1986] AC 1; [1985] 3 WLR 381 (PC), Lord Fraser (for the Privy Council) at 170 (NSWLR); Leigh & Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd (The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785; [1986] 2 WLR 902, the Court at 815–817 (AC); Al-Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley [1990] Ch 313; [1990] 2 WLR 344, Millett J at 330 (Ch); Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Brennan J at 632 (CLR). Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Dawson J at 254 (CLR). See D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12, McHugh J at [103]. Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Dawson J at 254 (CLR). The concern that this test, on its own, was unsatisfactory was encapsulated in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, where Brennan J at 478 (CLR) observed that if “foreseeability of injury were the exhaustive criterion of a duty to act to prevent the occurrence of that injury, legal duty would be coterminous with moral obligation”. San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, and Dawson JJ at 354 (CLR). See also HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640; 79 ALJR 190; [2004] HCA 54; King v Yurisich (2006) 153 FCR 78; [2006] FCAFC 136. For a discussion of the appropriate measure of damages where the negligent valuation did not induce the plaintiff to buy the land, but rather fixed the price that was paid for it, see Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, the Court at [183].

Relegation of Proximity [33.2.530] Previously, proximity was required in claims for negligent misstatement and was often related to the concept of reliance. The prior position was acknowledged by the High Court in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979

82

[33.2.530]

RELEGATION OF PROXIMITY

(1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405. The majority, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ, stated that when economic loss results from negligent misstatement, the element of reliance plays a prominent part in the ascertainment of a relationship of proximity between the plaintiff and the defendant, and therefore in the ascertainment of a duty of care.1

However, the High Court no longer considers the concept of proximity to be a useful determining principle in negligence generally2 and in the case of Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, the High Court has formulated the applicable test for the establishment of a duty of care for negligent misstatement without recourse to it. In Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board, the majority referred to statements made by Barwick CJ in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478.3 In that case Barwick CJ had said: [T]he speaker must realise or the circumstances be such that he ought to have realised that the recipient intends to act upon the information or advice in respect of his property or of himself in connexion with some matter of business or serious consequence … Further, it seems to me that the circumstances must be such that it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the recipient to seek, or to accept, and to rely upon the utterance of the speaker. The nature of the subject matter, the occasion of the interchange, and the identity and relative position of the parties as regards knowledge actual or potential and relevant capacity to form or exercise judgment will all be included in the factors which will determine the reasonableness of the acceptance of, and of the reliance by the recipient upon, the words of the speaker.4

This test is not necessarily exhaustive. In particular, it does not purport to address the situation, for example, where the claimant is not the direct recipient of the advice or information. In such situations, reference to analogous factors concerning liability to third parties may require consideration: see [33.2.620]–[33.2.680]. Nevertheless, where information or advice is given in response to a request and the person who provides the statement knew, or ought to have known, that the request was made on behalf of a third party, a duty of care will generally arise.5 Further, where the third party is unidentifiable, a duty of care may still exist in circumstances where it was reasonably foreseeable that such a person might reasonably rely on the statement, and suffer the loss. A statement in obiter in Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, indicates that, in cases of pure economic loss, a duty of care may arise solely upon assumption of responsibility by the defendant and reliance by the plaintiff.6 The existence of the plaintiff’s vulnerability has also emerged as an important element in determining the existence of a duty of care in the defendant to avoid economic harm to the plaintiff:7 see also [33.2.600]. When used in this manner, vulnerability refers to the inability of the plaintiff to protect itself if the defendant fails to exercise reasonable care in making a statement on which the plaintiff relies and not merely the likely exposure the plaintiff has to financial

83

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MISSTATEMENTS

harm.8 This argument was not available to the financier in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, who relied on a statement of financial position by an auditor because the financier could have made further enquiries to determine the financial health of the company in question. The High Court in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 noted the variety of situations in which liability for negligent misstatement may arise. In that case, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ emphasised that liability is not confined to “instances of negligent misstatement made by way of response to a request by the plaintiff for information or advice”.9 An antecedent request for information or advice assists in demonstrating reliance, but it is not essential. Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ emphasised that: The maker of a statement may come under a duty to take care through a combination of circumstances or in various ways, in the absence of a request by the recipient. The author, though volunteering information or advice, may be known to possess, or profess to possess, skill and competence in the area which is the subject of the communication. He may warrant the correctness of what he says or assume responsibility for its correctness. He may invite the recipient to act on the basis of the information or advice, or intend to induce the recipient to act in a particular way. He may actually have an interest in the recipient so acting.10

1 San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 355 (CLR); Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448. 2 In Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, the majority of the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [59]) stated that the “demise of proximity as a useful informing principle in this area is now complete”. An example of the previous decline in proximity is provided by Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, where the third party beneficiary successfully established that the deceased’s solicitor owed the beneficiary a duty of care, despite the recognition by most Justices that neither reliance nor voluntary assumption of responsibility had been established. Previously, “rule-based” proximity was retained and supported by Kirby J in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, when he said at [244], of the tripartite test enunciated in the House of Lords decision in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 617–618 (AC), that he “would therefore adopt as the approach to be taken in Australia the three-stage test expressed by the House of Lords in [Caparo Industries plc v Dickman]. To decide whether a legal duty of care exists the decision-maker must ask three questions: (1) Was it reasonably foreseeable to the alleged wrong-doer that particular conduct or an omission on its part would be likely to cause harm to the person who has suffered damage or a person in the same position? (2) Does there exist between the alleged wrong-doer and such person a relationship characterised by the law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighbourhood’? (3) If so, is it fair, just and

84

[33.2.530]

RELEGATION OF PROXIMITY

reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope upon the alleged wrong-doer for the benefit of such a person?” See Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180, Mason, Deane and Wilson JJ at 488 (CLR), applying Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 662–663 (CLR). Whereas some authorities treated proximity and foreseeability as substantially synonymous, the differentiation reflects the long history of the common law in which foreseeability of the risk of harm to another is insufficient of itself to impose a legal duty to act to avoid consequences to the other: see McHugh MN, “Neighbourhood, Proximity and Reliance” in Finn PD (ed), Essays on Torts (Law Book Co, 1989) p 17. See generally, Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35. 3 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [47]. 4 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 571 (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). See also the statement of principle of Barwick CJ at 572 (CLR). In L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J at 251 (CLR) (Aickin J concurring) applied it, while Murphy J at 255–256 (CLR) apparently adopted a similar approach. Although the passage was not expressly approved in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, it is consistent with the judgment in that case, including Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ’s observations at 355–357 (CLR) that it applies equally to advice and information, and that a request is not essential, but reliance is important. In qualified terms, Brennan J at 371–372 also seemed to approve the formulation of Barwick CJ. It was approved in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Dawson J at 255 (CLR). 5 Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297; [1979] 3 WLR 605, Sir Robert Megarry V-C at 309 (Ch); LT King Pty Ltd v Besser (2002) 172 FLR 140; [2002] VSC 354, Osborn J at [105]–[106]. 6 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [238]. 7 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36. 8 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [23]. 9 San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 356–357 (CLR). 10 San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 357 (CLR).

85

[33.2.530]

MISSTATEMENTS

Reliance Relevant Factors [33.2.540] The issue of reliance is central to liability for negligent misstatement. It has been described as the “cornerstone of liability for negligent misstatement”.1 Relevant factors associated with reliance are: (1)

reliance must be reasonable (see [33.2.550]);

(2)

reasonableness is not so crucial where there is an inducement to rely;

(3)

the adviser must have known, or ought to have known, that the statement would be relied upon, for example, where advice was given in a serious context or upon a serious occasion (see [33.2.560]);

(4)

additional factors such as voluntary assumption of responsibility and allied concepts of trust and dependence (see [33.2.570]–[33.2.590]); and

(5)

reliance in fact resulting in loss.

The role of reliance was explained by Mason J in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120 on the basis that liability in negligence is largely “based on the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s taking care in circumstances where the defendant is aware or ought to be aware of that reliance”.2 Mason J noted that reliance had been influential in imposing limits upon the far-ranging effect of the foreseeability doctrine and therefore it was natural3 that the plaintiff’s foreseeable and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s statement has been a constant feature of the cases in which a defendant has been held liable for economic loss sustained as a result of negligent misstatement.4

If, as a question of fact, the recipient or an intermediary has acted or refrained from acting in reliance on the statement to her or his detriment, the issue of reliance is not whether a duty of care is owed5 but rather whether or not the allegedly negligent statement caused the detriment.6 The distinction between the reasonableness of reliance necessary for a duty of care to exist and the reliance necessary to show causation of the damage is sometimes drawn judicially by characterising the former as the speaker “being trusted”,7 and the latter as reliance. Whereas it is difficult to conceive of many situations where damage could be caused by negligent misstatement in the absence of reliance by the recipient/plaintiff,8 reliance is not always a critical element for proof of duty of care or of being trusted. In Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, the third party beneficiary successfully established that the deceased’s solicitor owed the beneficiary a duty of care, despite the recognition by most Justices that neither reliance nor voluntary assumption of responsibility had been established:9 see also [33.2.550] and [33.2.590].

86

[33.2.540]

RELIANCE

Note, however, that the High Court decision in Hill v Van Erp illustrates that, “reliance is not always an essential requirement for the plaintiff in a negligence case”.10 Furthermore, the doctrine of general reliance was rejected by the High Court in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3.11 Nevertheless, the practical reality is that in most types of claim for negligent misstatement, the presence or absence of reliance would still seem to be critical to a finding of duty of care.12 Also in claims for negligent misstatement, the existence of reliance will usually be pivotal to a finding of causation, as the bridge between the negligent statement and the alleged damage.13

1

2

3 4

5

6 7

8

San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 357 (CLR). Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 461 (CLR). See also Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 262–263 (CLR). Since Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101. Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 462 (CLR). Mason J relied on the following cases for that proposition: Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223; [1970] 2 WLR 802 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 268 (QB); Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373; [1972] 2 WLR 299 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 394–395, Sachs LJ at 405 (QB); Scott Group Ltd v MacFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553 (CA), Woodhouse J at 576; L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, where reliance was treated as an important, if not a vital, element. See also San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 355 (CLR). In Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div), Marks J (for the Court) at 174 made the following point: “There is, of course, a second aspect of ‘reliance’ which is quite different. It is, irrespective of any duty of care, whether the plaintiffs in fact acted in ‘reliance’ on what Mrs Norris said notwithstanding the fulfilment of the proximity test by reference to ‘reliance’ in the quite different first sense.” See also Ralik Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (unreported, NSWSC, Cole J, 50261 of 1989, 14 August 1990). See Contract: General Principles “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff. Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick J at 572 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478; (PC)); L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J at 250 (CLR). One situation is the “valuer cases”, where a party to a contract suffers loss because

87

[33.2.540]

MISSTATEMENTS

9 10 11

12 13

they are obliged to complete a contract with a price based on a negligent valuation, even though the party was not induced to act or enter the contract based on that valuation. See the discussion of this issue in Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79, Ashley JA at [66]–[109] (Buchanan JA and Kellam AJA agreeing), and in particular Ashley JA’s statement at [91] that, “I do not say that such cases might not be fitted into reliance/inducement framework, though it may be regarded as artificial to do so”. See also Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191; HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640; 79 ALJR 190; [2004] HCA 54. Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487. Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Gummow J at [158]. Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Brennan CJ at [19], Gummow J at [157]–[165], Kirby J at [230]. The principal exceptions to this would appear to be instances where the claim involves an invitation or inducement for the plaintiff to act. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson pointed out in White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207; [1995] 2 WLR 187, at 272 (AC), and quoted with approval in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 263 (CLR), “in the case of claims based on negligent statements … the plaintiff will have no cause of action at all unless he can show damage and he can only have suffered damage if he has relied on the negligent statement”. See also Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 68 ALJR 313, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 348 (CLR) stating that where the misleading conduct is constituted by misrepresentations, acts done by the representee in reliance upon the misrepresentations amount to a sufficient connection to satisfy the concept of causation. Indeed, seen in this light, reliance appears to have returned to its role as enunciated by Deane J in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, in that “[t]he requirements of an assumption of responsibility and the element of reliance … are a means by which the law seeks to avoid undesirable consequences such as indeterminate liability, the destruction of legitimate commercial competition, or the emasculation of other bodies of legal doctrine. Where there is no threat of those undesirable consequences, the assumption of responsibility by a defendant and reliance, or request, by a plaintiff may suggest policy reasons for recognising the existence of a duty of care, although they may not be determinative. Indeed, the element of reliance may be unhelpful as an indication of a relationship of proximity in cases of economic loss which do not involve misstatement. Of course, in cases involving misstatement, the element of reliance plays a prominent part not only in establishing proximity but also in establishing causation”: Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J at 184 (CLR), in reference to Hawkins v Clayton, Deane J at 578–579 (CLR). See also San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 355 (CLR) as authority for the proposition that reliance may be unhelpful in the absence of a claim for misstatement. But see also Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79, Ashley JA (Buchanan JA and Kellam AJA agreeing) at [105]: “[R]eliance, in the sense of inducement, will not always be necessary in the context of proof of causation. In circumstances where a valuer

88

[33.2.550]

RELIANCE

knows the significance to contracting parties of the valuation which he prepares for one of them, I do not think that the law denies recovery to a contracting party – though not the party who retained the valuer – who is obliged to act consonantly with a negligently prepared valuation or else break the contract.” Despite thinking that the language of reliance and inducement was not apt to describe that situation, Ashley JA at [110]–[113] did offer an alternative analysis of causation based on the language of inducement which could be made to fit the situation.

[33.2.550] Reliance must be reasonable.1 The necessary relationship exists when the maker of a statement knows, or ought to know, that the recipient will rely on it:2 see [33.2.540]. Thus, from the point of view of the maker of the statement reliance is reasonable in the circumstances. It will normally be reasonable when, in response to a request, the maker of the statement provides information or advice.3 In addition, the adviser may expressly assume responsibility for a statement, for example by warranting its correctness.4 Often, reasonable reliance will not be so clear cut. It will be found because the adviser either was known or professed to possess skill and competence in the area of the statement.5 The advice or information may concern “a business or professional transaction whose nature makes clear the gravity of the inquiry and the importance and influence attached to the answer”.6 The significance of the special skill or judgment and its effect upon the reasonableness of reliance requires particular attention. Generally, it will not be reasonable to rely upon advice or information unless the person giving it either professes to have some special skill or judgment and undertakes, impliedly or expressly, to apply it for the assistance of another, or is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon that judgment or skill or ability to make careful inquiry. In Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161, reliance was held not to be reasonable.7 The plaintiffs had purchased a motel and general business, allegedly in reliance on the advice of the defendant estate agent that “once you get going it will be a gold mine”.8 They also sought the advice of an accountant. The Court concluded that the purchasers, having indicated that they intended to seek an accountant’s advice on the financial aspects of the business, could not say that they relied on the estate agent in a matter within the special skill of the accountant.9 The estate agent’s area of expertise was the motel market. As the misstatement was not within the agent’s “special skill”, reasonable reliance was not established:10 see [33.2.600]–[33.2.610]. According to Marks J: It would not be reasonable to rely upon advice or information given by another unless the person giving it either professed to have some special skill which he undertook to apply for the assistance of another or was so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry.11

In Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79, a property purchaser claimed it relied on the defendant’s valuation to calculate the goods and services tax (GST) liability on the purchase of a property at settlement. The GST was calculated on the basis of a margin scheme which permitted the purchaser to pay GST on a sum less than the full purchase price. 89

[33.2.550]

MISSTATEMENTS

The purchaser had not obtained a valuation of its own and the vendor refused to delay settlement to permit it to do so. At trial in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, and on appeal to a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the purchaser was held not to have relied on the defendant’s valuation because it would have proceeded to settlement in any event based on the defendant’s valuation, because it presented a more palatable alternative than paying GST on the full purchase price.12 However, on further appeal the Victorian Court of Appeal reversed those decisions. Ashley JA (with whom Buchanan JA and Kellam AJA agreed) said: There are cases, I consider, in which a negligent misstatement can be held to have caused recoverable damage simply because, as the representor knows will happen, the representee is obliged to, and does, act consonantly with the misstatement, and so suffers loss. … I do not say that such cases might not be fitted into reliance/inducement framework, though it may be regarded as artificial to do so.13

Later, Ashley JA noted the difference between reliance in the context of whether there is a duty of care and causation. His Honour said: It is also the case that the necessary anticipation of reliance, in the context of duty of care … is not the same as the actual reliance, or inducement, which has been described in the context of causation. But if a duty of care may arise absent anticipated reliance on the faith of the reliability of a statement, it would seem to follow … that reliance, in the sense of inducement, will not always be necessary in the context of proof of causation. In circumstances where a valuer knows the significance to contracting parties of the valuation which he prepares for one of them, I do not think that the law denies recovery to a contracting party – though not the party who retained the valuer – who is obliged to act consonantly with a negligently prepared valuation or else break the contract.14

Where, as in most cases, some form of reliance is a necessary, an inducement will lessen the reasonableness required to justify reliance. The very purpose of the advice or information is to persuade or encourage the recipient to rely on it and act in a certain way.15 Where an intent to induce is established, it overrides many of the constraints against recovery for economic loss. In those circumstances, reliance which would not otherwise be “reasonable” may be enough.16 The need for special skill or judgment will also be diminished where the advice is provided as an inducement. A developer’s reliance on the council’s planning proposal was held not to be reasonable by the High Court in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405 because “proposals of this kind are subject to alteration, variation and revocation”.17 However, the majority concluded that: In cases where the defendant intends the statement to operate as a direct inducement to action, the reasonableness of the reliance will not be a critical factor, although in other cases the defendant’s appreciation of the reasonableness of reliance will be relevant.18

Liability for negligent misstatement based on reasonable reliance has been established in the following situations: representations by share and commodity

90

[33.2.550]

RELIANCE

brokers to clients acting upon their advice;19 representations made by a car dealer to a prospective purchaser;20 representations made by a head contractor to a subcontractor;21 representations made by estate agents regarding sewerage connections,22 the location of boundaries,23 capacity and life expectancy of a bore on a rural property,24 or the takings of a business;25 and representations by an employer in an employment reference prepared for an employee.26 In Canada, a duty of care has been held to exist in respect of representations by an insurance agent as to the presence or extent of cover.27 As the essence of liability in negligent misstatement is the notion of reasonable reliance, conduct which can lead to such reliance may extend beyond statements of fact to advice, information or even the failure to provide information or advice.28

1 2

3

4

5

See Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, Gaudron J at [76]. Although the decision in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487 was to the effect that the deceased’s solicitor owed the beneficiary a duty of care despite the recognition by most Justices that neither reliance nor voluntary assumption of responsibility had been established, the appropriate interpretation of this case is that it was not a case of negligent misstatement and the finding reflected a policy decision on the responsibility of solicitors to beneficiaries of a will. See Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, for a more recent instance of reliance being treated as an essential element for damage arising from negligent misstatement. See also Strategic Minerals Corp NL v Basham (1997) 25 ACSR 470 (WASCFC). For an elaboration of the element of reliance as a key ingredient in the “special relationship”, see Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 620–621 (AC), especially his observation that the “salient feature of all these cases is that the defendant giving advice or information was fully aware of the nature of the transaction which the plaintiff had in contemplation, knew that the advice or information would be communicated to him directly or indirectly and knew that it was very likely that the plaintiff would rely on that advice or information in deciding whether or not to engage in the transaction in contemplation”. See also Davis v Radcliffe [1990] 1 WLR 821 (PC). Although not always: see Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19. For commentary, see Yorston M, “Liability of Statutory Authorities for Negligent Misstatements” (2002) 76 LIJ 68. Such circumstances may also give rise to liability in contract but a third party recipient (eg of a manufacturer’s warranty) may run foul of the doctrine of privity: see Contract: General Principles “Parties” [7.3.10]ff. The majority judgment in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 357 (CLR), in the context of stating that an antecedent request is helpful but not central to establishing reliance, noted that the “maker of a statement may come under a duty to take care through a combination of circumstances or in various ways, in the absence of a request by the recipient. The author, though volunteering information or advice, may be known to possess, or profess to possess, skill and competence in the area which is the subject of the communication. He may warrant the correctness of what he says or

91

[33.2.550]

MISSTATEMENTS

6

7

8 9

10

11 12 13 14

15

16

assume responsibility for its correctness. He may invite the recipient to act on the basis of the information or advice, or intend to induce the recipient to act in a particular way. He may actually have an interest in the recipient so acting.” See also [33.2.90], [33.2.1660]. Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div), Marks J (for the Court) at 172, quoting from L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Gibbs CJ at 231 (CLR), citing in turn from Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Pearce at 539 (AC). See also Collie v Forsyth (unreported, VSC, Gobbo J, 2479 of 1985, 31 January 1991), Gobbo J at 48 (advice upon which the plaintiff relied was neither a correct nor reasonable interpretation of that advice); Richard Ellis (WA) Pty Ltd v Mullins Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1995) 124 FLR 157 (WASCFC) (where the plaintiff, in entering into an agreement to take new premises, did not rely on the defendant’s representation as to the leasability of the premises). Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div), Marks J (for the Court) at 164. The engagement by the appellant of its own experts in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19 was an important factor in determining that its reliance upon the advice of the respondent statutory authority was not reasonable. See the reasoning of the majority: Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [49], Gaudron J at [87]. In James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113; [1991] 2 WLR 641 (CA) (see [33.2.670]), a factor influencing the decision to deny a duty of care was that it was expected that the plaintiff would consult with its own accountants. Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div), Marks J (for the Court) at 172. Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon [2005] VCAT 552; Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2006) 62 ATR 40; [2006] VSC 46. Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79, Ashley JA at [90]–[91]. Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79, Ashley JA at [105]. See also Ashley JA’s alternative analysis at [110]–[113]; Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191. See the summary of the law in this area, with an emphasis on statements made to induce, in Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div), Marks J at 171–172 and R Lowe Lippmann Figdor & Franck v AGC (Advances) Ltd [1992] 2 VR 671 (App Div). See also Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583 (CA) (negligent pre-contractual statements to a prospective lessee on the amount of petrol likely to be sold). Those conclusions were reached in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405. In support of that proposition, the appellants had relied on a number of American authorities, including Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F 2d 847 (1972), which concerned a claim for negligence by a third party bank against accountants who knew the plaintiff bank required the financial statements in relation to proposed loans to the audited company. See also Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Swartz, Bresenoff,

92

[33.2.560]

17

18

19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28

RELIANCE

Yavner & Jacobs, 482 F 2d 1000 (1973), which applied the principles settled by the judgment of the Court in 1972 to the facts. San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 359 (CLR). San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 358 (CLR). It seems that, in making that observation, the High Court was talking of the reasonableness of reliance in respect of both parties. It was presumably not talking of reliance in the sense of reliance by the plaintiff as a matter of fact, as the plaintiff must prove reliance on the statement which resulted in the damage sought to be recovered. No doubt such “other cases” would include claims for economic loss, as reliance plays a crucial role in such cases in determining whether the necessary relationship of proximity exists, and therefore if a duty of care is owed. See also Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Dawson J at 255 (CLR). But see San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, Brennan J at 372 (CLR), suggesting a more cautious position. See also Warwicker Assessments v Zadow (1989) 1 WAR 307 (FC), Malcolm CJ at 312–313 (WAR), discussed at [33.2.630]. Central British Columbia Planers Ltd v Hocker (1970) 10 DLR (3d) 689; Stafford v Conti Commodity Services Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 691 (QBD); Elderkin v Merrill Lynch, Royal Securities Ltd (1977) 80 DLR (3d) 313. Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham [1975] 1 NZLR 576 (SC). Day v Ost [1973] 2 NZLR 385 (SC). Barrett v JR West Ltd [1970] NZLR 789 (SC). Richardson v Norris Smith Real Estate Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 152 (SC). Rawlinson & Brown Pty Ltd v Witham [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-341 (NSWCA). Roots v Oentory Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 745. Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296; [1994] 3 WLR 354. But see GS v News Ltd [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-466 (NSWSC). General Motors Acceptance Corp (Canada) v Fulton Insurance Agencies Ltd (1978) 24 NSR (2d) 114 (NSCA); Morash v Lockhart & Ritchie Ltd (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 647. But see Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; 60 ALJR 239, where an action, in similar circumstances, was pursued under Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52 (see now Australian Consumer Law, s 18, found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2). Such as in L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65. But see Bentley v Wright [1997] 2 VR 175 (CA).

[33.2.560] In order to attract liability for negligent misstatement, the maker of the statement must realise, or the circumstances must be such that the speaker ought to realise, that the recipient intends to act upon the information or advice.1 This is the converse of the requirement for reasonable reliance by the recipient. It “emphasises the need for caution lest a duty of care be imposed upon a party who has no appreciation of, and could not be expected to appreciate, the implications of making an error”.2 It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain: 93

[33.2.560]

MISSTATEMENTS

(1)

what the speaker actually knew; and

(2)

what a reasonable person in the position of the speaker would have known.

As Lord Reid said in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, a duty arises where the other gave the information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the inquirer was relying on him. I say “ought to have known” because in questions of negligence we now apply the objective standard of what the reasonable man would have done.3

Where information or advice is provided in response to a request, or a person has special skill and provides information or advice to another on a serious occasion or in a serious context,4 the adviser will generally realise, or should realise, that the recipient of that information or advice is likely to rely on it.5 A duty of care will then arise. The circumstances will not always establish that the adviser actually knew that the statement would be relied on, particularly where the claim is by a third party recipient:6 see also [33.2.620]. Then the second limb becomes relevant. The question is whether a reasonable person would have known, on an objective assessment, that the statement would be relied upon. The circumstances in which a statement is made will be crucial to the determination. It will be more difficult where claims by third parties are concerned, particularly where they are unknown to the maker of the statement. At present, the appropriate test in Australia appears to be the proposition stated by McHugh J in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448: [A]bsent a statement to a particular person in response to a particular request for information or advice or an assumption of responsibility to the plaintiff for that statement, it will be difficult to establish the requisite duty of care unless there is an intention to induce the recipient of the information or advice, or a class to which the recipient belongs, to act or refrain from acting on it. Mere knowledge by a defendant that the information or advice will be communicated to the plaintiff is not enough. Nevertheless, the decisions have all emphasised that a lack of an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting is not necessarily fatal to a plaintiff’s claim because other factors may be present that obviate the need for such an intention.7

1 Following on from reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, this represents the second step of the test for negligent misstatement as enunciated in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 571 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)) and relied upon in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [47].

94

[33.2.570]

2 3 4

5

6

7

RELIANCE

Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [48]. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Reid at 486 (AC). Particularly when it is information or advice dealing with “a matter of business”: Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 572 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101. Lord Reid at 486 (AC) described the options open to an adviser: “A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill and judgment were being relied on, would, I think, have three courses open to him. He could keep silent or decline to give the information or advice sought: or he could give an answer with a clear qualification that he accepted no responsibility for it or that it was given without that reflection or inquiry which a careful answer would require: or he could simply answer without any such qualification. If he chooses to adopt the last course he must, I think, be held to have accepted some responsibility for his answer being given carefully, or to have accepted a relationship with the inquirer which requires him to exercise such care as the circumstances require.” Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790, Lord Griffiths at 863–865 (AC). Similarly, it was suggested in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 357 (CLR), that “instances of liability for misstatement volunteered negligently will be ‘rare’”. See also Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 571–572 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, McHugh J at 275 (CLR).

[33.2.570] Where a duty of care is said to arise out of a special relationship between the representor and the representee, it encompasses two distinct elements. Those are the representor’s voluntary assumption of responsibility for the accuracy of the information or advice provided and the representee’s corresponding reliance upon it. Thus, a special relationship arises when a defendant undertakes to provide information or advice on a serious business matter affecting the plaintiff’s interests and either knows or ought to know that the plaintiff is likely to rely upon it. In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, the defendant bank voluntarily undertook to provide information concerning the financial stability of one of the plaintiff’s clients. The plaintiff relied upon the advice provided. The House of Lords held that had the bank not disclaimed responsibility for the information provided it would have been liable for the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff. While initially it was thought that a duty of care would arise only where the representor possessed some special skill or competence,1 that position has gradually been eroded.2 The view of Barwick CJ in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970)

95

[33.2.570]

MISSTATEMENTS

122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 4783 is now preferred. According to Barwick CJ, the fundamental requirement is not for any special skill or expertise on the part of the representor but for a relationship of inequality between the representor and the representee to rely upon the advice or information proffered.4 The High Court in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36 and Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, also required the existence of the plaintiff’s vulnerability, discussed at [33.2.600] as an important element in establishing the duty of care. In England, it has been suggested that a mere failure to speak could lead to liability in circumstances where the defendant had voluntarily assumed responsibility and the plaintiff relied on that assumption.5 Likewise, in New Zealand, a contractor has been held liable to a backhoe operator for failing to warn him of the presence of underground electric cables.6 Clearly the contractor’s silence regarding a material fact within the scope of his knowledge operated as an assurance that the operator could proceed without concern. A similar assumption of responsibility clearly underlies the duties owed by school authorities to their pupils and those of prison authorities towards prisoners: see [33.2.980]–[33.2.1020] and [33.2.1090]–[33.2.1100]. In Australia, it remains unclear when silence does or does not give rise to a case for negligent misstatement. In Bentley v Wright [1997] 2 VR 175, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that the alleged negligent failure of a farmer to provide relevant information to an owner as to the date the last ostrich egg was laid did not give rise to a duty of care, for a mere failure to speak does not give rise to a liability in negligence, unless there had been a voluntary assumption of responsibility. In this case, on the facts, it was held that there had been no such assumption of responsibility. However, in Timms v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2002] NSWCA 298, the New South Wales Court of Appeal, in remitting this case for retrial, entertained the prospect that a bank failing to advise its customer that a business proposal had serious financial difficulties (after earlier advising that it was a sound investment), could be guilty of misrepresentation by silence.7

1 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC). 2 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65; Meates v Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 308 (CA); Cash Resources Australia Pty Ltd v Ken Gaetjens Real Estate Pty Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-276 (SASC). 3 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 565–573 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). 4 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556;

96

[33.2.580]

5

6 7

RELIANCE

42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 571 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). See Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (1996) 40 NSWLR 101; 91 LGERA 361, where the Court held that the Council owed the plaintiffs a duty of care in relation to information provided in telephone conversations. Similarly, see Kyriacou v Kogarah Municipal Council (1995) 88 LGERA 110 (NSWSC). Compare L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J at 253, Stephen J at 238 (CLR). Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665; [1989] 3 WLR 25 (CA). These elements will be more difficult to establish where silence is relied on, rather than an actual misrepresentation. On the facts in that case, the Court relied upon the principle that no such obligation existed in an ordinary commercial contract where no special circumstances such as undue influence were operative. Phil Clark Contractors v Drewet [1977] 2 NZLR 556 (SC). Timms v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2002] NSWCA 298, Beazley JA at [137].

[33.2.580] Known reliance or the assumption of responsibility, or a combination of the two, will attract a duty of care where information or advice is provided in a serious context.1 It is now clear that the critical issue is whether the plaintiff’s reliance upon the information or advice provided is reasonable given all the circumstances.2 Thus, a duty of care has been imposed where a statutory authority has carelessly provided erroneous information.3 The efficacy of any disclaimer has also been doubted.4 While a disclaimer is clearly effective to negate voluntary assumption of responsibility, if the duty of care is based upon the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s reliance rather than upon any assumption of responsibility by the representor, the basis for giving force to a disclaimer becomes elusive.5 While knowledge of a disclaimer will make the plaintiff’s reliance upon any statement proffered less reasonable than might otherwise be the case, and while such might function in the same way as the idea of voluntary assumption of risk, this would require clear notification of the disclaimer and acceptance by the plaintiff of the risks involved. For this reason it appears possible that where the inequality between the maker of the statement and its recipient is great and reliance is clearly both reasonable and predictable, a disclaimer may prove ineffective. Similarly, it is difficult to understand what, if any, role is available for a disclaimer in situations where three parties are involved, such as the “valuer cases”, although the possibility of a valid disclaimer in such cases has been acknowledged in principle.6 Both in Australia and in England, valuers have been held liable to third-party purchasers despite disclaimers purporting to restrict liability to the financial institutions obtaining the valuations.7 While an appropriately and carefully drafted disclaimer will generally be effective both to negate assumption of responsibility and to make it clear that reliance is unreasonable in the circumstances,8 that will not always be the case.9 Any disclaimer must not only be interpreted narrowly, in line with the contra

97

[33.2.580]

MISSTATEMENTS

proferentem10 rule, but its operation must be evaluated in light of all the circumstances, including the relationship between the representor and the representee and whether, all things considered, it remains reasonable for the representee to rely upon the advice or information provided. For example, a disclaimer will not exclude responsibility for damage resulting to the representee where the damage flows from the very use of the valuation for which the representor has impliedly accepted responsibility for.11

1 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 619 (CLR); Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gaudron J at [30], McHugh J at [124], Callinan J at [393]; Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, Gaudron J at [73]–[76]; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [238]. 2 Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19, Gaudron J at [76]. 3 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65; Rutherford v Attorney-General [1976] 1 NZLR 403 (SC); Hull v Canterbury Municipal Council [1974] 1 NSWLR 300; (1974) 29 LGRA 29. 4 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 570–571 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). 5 It is worth noting that in Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790, Lord Griffiths at 862 (AC) adopted the view that the role given to voluntary assumption of responsibility in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101 was a device to uphold the validity of the disclaimer. If the concept of voluntary assumption of liability is fundamentally extraneous, it is difficult to see what work remains for a disclaimer. 6 BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221. The actual disclaimer in that case, however, was held not to cover the facts, emphasising the need for careful drafting. See also Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79. 7 See dicta to that effect in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 570–571 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). See also BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221; Yianni v Edwin Evans & Sons [1982] QB 438; [1981] 3 WLR 843; Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790. Burke v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGRA 1 (NSWSC); Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79; Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191 also warrant consideration. 8 Disclaimers have been upheld in third party situations in England: see Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993; [1989] 3 WLR 1150 (CA); Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828 (CA).

98

[33.2.590]

RELIANCE

9

BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221; Yianni v Edwin Evans & Sons [1982] QB 438; [1981] 3 WLR 843; Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790; Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79. See also Burke v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGRA 1 (NSWSC). 10 Contra proferentem: “[A]gainst the person producing”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 41. The rule of interpretation is that the construction least favourable to the person putting forward an instrument should be adopted. 11 See Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79, Ashley JA at [48]; BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221, Wootten J at 236–237.

[33.2.590] Reliance and voluntary assumption of responsibility are often interchangeable. A voluntary assumption of responsibility arises where the maker of the statement recognises, or should recognise, that it will be relied on by the recipient, that is, that the maker of the statement “is being trusted”.1 Trust and dependence are used interchangeably to refer to such an assumption. Generally, the notion of voluntary assumption of responsibility adds nothing to the requirement for reasonable reliance. Lord Griffiths suggested in Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790 that, by itself, it was unlikely to be a realistic or helpful test. He held that while reference is made in a number of the speeches [in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101] to the assumption of responsibility as a test of liability … it must be remembered that those speeches were made in the context of a case in which the central issue was whether a duty of care could arise when there had been an express disclaimer of responsibility for the accuracy of the advice. Obviously, if an adviser expressly assumes responsibility for his advice, a duty of care will arise, but such is extremely unlikely in the ordinary course of events.2

Reasonable reliance, rather than voluntary assumption of responsibility, has become more significant for two reasons. First, it is clear that liability can be imposed where the speaker was under a statutory duty to provide information or advice, or was performing a statutory function in doing so. A prime example is the liability of a local authority when it issues inaccurate zoning certificates.3 Other instances where statutory authorities have been held liable include negligently issuing a certificate falsely stating that a truck was roadworthy,4 and negligently representing that development consent granted was valid, when it was void.5 Courts, both in Australia and elsewhere, while concerned to limit the scope of potential plaintiffs and the liability to which such authorities may be exposed, recognise at the same time that, by the exercise of their powers, public authorities encourage, if not induce, reliance on the exercise of such powers.6

99

[33.2.590]

MISSTATEMENTS

Cases abound in Canada,7 the United States8 and New Zealand9 concerning the liability of governmental and quasi-governmental authorities, and are useful for the wide range of factual situations explored.10 Second, voluntary assumption of responsibility is more difficult to establish. Most makers of statements would not anticipate, particularly in relation to third parties, that any responsibility has been assumed. The question then becomes whether the maker of the statement should be deemed to have voluntarily assumed responsibility by assessing what a reasonable person would have assumed. No significant distinction can be drawn between assertions that a recipient “reasonably relied” on, “trusted”, or was “dependent” on advice or information,11 at least in the context of a two party situation.12 There can, however, be a difference between “dependence” in this sense and reliance when it concerns a public authority failing to exercise a power. In such cases, for example Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, it is not essential to show positive conduct by the maker of the statement or action by the recipient to the recipient’s detriment. Rather, in the words of Mason J: [T]he plaintiff’s reasonable reliance will arise out of a general dependence on an authority’s performance of its function with due care, without the need for contributing conduct on the part of a defendant or action to his detriment on the part of a plaintiff.13

His Honour went on to state that, in the case of public authorities, the foreseeability of the plaintiff’s general reliance can be a sufficient basis for finding a duty of care because: Reliance or dependence in this sense is in general the product of the grant (and exercise) of powers designed to prevent or minimise a risk of personal injury or disability, recognised by the legislature as being of such magnitude or complexity that individuals cannot, or may not, take adequate steps for their own protection. This situation generates on one side (the individual) a general expectation that the power will be exercised and on the other side (the authority) a realisation that there is a general reliance or dependence on its exercise of power.14

The distinction between voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance is also relevant to the role of disclaimers.

1 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 572 (CLR) (reversed on other grounds in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC)). 2 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790, Lord Griffiths at 862 (AC). 3 See Kyogle Shire Council v Francis (1988) 13 NSWLR 396; 66 LGRA 167 (CA); but see L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65. In the latter case, the Council had assumed the responsibility of providing certain additional

100

[33.2.590]

4 5

6

7

8 9

10 11

12

13

14

RELIANCE

information to inquirers over a long period of time, although it was not obliged to. Having engendered this expectation in regular inquirers, an omission to provide the information on the occasion in question was found to be a breach of the duty owed. Rutherford v Attorney-General [1976] 1 NZLR 403 (SC); but see Bruce v Housing Corp (NZ) [1982] 2 NZLR 28 (HC) (negligent approval of house design). Hull v Canterbury Municipal Council [1974] 1 NSWLR 300; (1974) 29 LGRA 29; see also GJ Knight Holdings Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council [1975] 2 NSWLR 796; (1975) 34 LGRA 170. Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120; San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405. See also Professional Liability “Government Authorities” [27.9.10]ff. Bowen v Edmonton (City) (No 2) (1977) 80 DLR (3d) 501; Welbridge Holdings Ltd v Greater Winnipeg (Municipality) [1971] SCR 957; (1970) 22 DLR (3d) 470; The Pas (Town) v Porky Packers Ltd [1977] 1 SCR 51; (1976) 65 DLR (3d) 1. Dalehite v United States 346 US 15 (1953) illustrates the American approach. Takaro Properties Ltd (in rec) v Rowling [1978] 2 NZLR 314 (CA); Brown v Heathcote County Council [1982] 2 NZLR 584 (HC); RA & TJ Carll Ltd v Berry [1981] 2 NZLR 76 (HC); Comptroller of Customs v Martin Square Motors Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 289 (CA). Care ought to be taken in relying upon decisions from other jurisdictions which are only cited in this context for the purpose of illustration. A duty of care will not arise merely because a recipient has relied upon a statement. Such reliance must have been reasonable and the circumstances such that the maker of the statement realised or ought to have realised that reliance would be placed on the statement. Where there is foreseeable reliance by the recipient of the advice, dependence upon the implementation of that advice by a third party with consequential loss may result in a duty of care based on the interaction of the dependence, responsibility, trust and reliance: see [33.2.340]. In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, what, but for a disclaimer, would have transformed a “mere misstatement” between the bankers and another bank’s clients into a “special relationship” giving rise to a duty of care was the existence of a voluntary assumption of responsibility towards the recipient by the adviser, as adumbrated by Lord Reid at 483 (AC). As in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd, the fact that the speaker has voluntarily assumed a responsibility is characterised by the recognition that the statement will be relied on by the recipient. In this sense a voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance by the recipient are often two sides of the same coin. For third parties who might be seen as dependent on advice being accurate, but who do not directly rely on it themselves: see [33.2.340]. Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 464 (CLR). Note that although the notion of “general reliance” enunciated in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, Mason J at 464 (CLR) was rejected in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Brennan CJ at [20], Gummow J at [156]–[165], Kirby J at [230]–[232], the broad proposition cited remains correct. Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564;

101

[33.2.590]

MISSTATEMENTS

56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 464 (CLR). Brennan J at 486 (CLR) took the same view, but on the basis that a public authority which adopts a practice of exercising its powers induces a recipient reasonably to rely on them. Deane J at 508 (CLR) took a similar approach.

[33.2.600] The possession of special skill and competence by the maker of the statement1 may give rise to a duty of care, although the crucial factors are trust, reliance and vulnerability, rather than expertise.2 In L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J concluded that a duty to take reasonable care will arise “whenever a person gives information or advice to another upon a serious matter in circumstances where the speaker realises, or ought to realise, that he is being trusted to give the best of his information or advice as a basis for action”.3 Accordingly: (1)

special skill or expertise, although not necessary, will frequently be important;

(2)

a serious business or professional context is also relevant; and

(3)

the fact that the adviser held special skill or expertise and made a statement related to that skill or expertise in a serious business or professional context will be significant in demonstrating that reliance was reasonable and that the adviser ought to have realised it was likely to occur.4

A duty of care may not exist if the maker of the statement did not profess special skill or expertise, unless other factors render reliance reasonable. These may include:5 (1)

being the sole repository of the relevant information;6

(2)

a misstatement in the course of business or professional duties;7 and

(3)

a financial interest in the transaction about which the statement is made. Such an interest may make it clear the statement will be relied upon.8

Such circumstances may lead to the inference that the maker of a statement realised it would be relied upon.9 The requirement for reasonableness excludes most statements or advice by persons professing special skill or competence given on social or other informal occasions. A casual comment during a social event is unlikely to lead to the necessary degree of reliance,10 although even statements made on an apparently social level can lead to a cause of action if, despite the occasion, the elements are otherwise satisfied. In Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29,11 the plaintiff, who knew nothing about cars, asked the defendant, a close friend, to find a suitable second-hand car for her to buy. Although he was not a mechanic, he had some knowledge of cars. She insisted that the car should not have been in an accident. The defendant recommended a car, although he knew that there were clear indications it may have been in an accident. The car proved to be unroadworthy, having been

102

[33.2.600]

RELIANCE

poorly repaired after a bad accident. The defendant was held to owe, and have breached, a duty of care. In Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, the third party beneficiary successfully established that the deceased’s solicitor owed the beneficiary a duty of care, despite the recognition by most Justices that neither reliance nor voluntary assumption of responsibility had been established. In a diverse set of judgments, a common theme among the majority was that on policy grounds, judgment should be entered for the plaintiff. This was because such a finding was equitable in the unique instance of a solicitor’s relationship with the client and as a consequence, the beneficiary of the will.12 The standard of care to be applied when considering the negligence of professionals is regulated by legislation in all jurisdictions except for the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory:13 see also [33.2.90]. The emergence of the requirement of vulnerability must not be overlooked:14 see also [33.2.530]. In Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, the plaintiff had purchased a warehouse and office complex designed by the defendant, the foundations of which were defective. The original owner of the building sold it to the plaintiff. The contract of purchase included no warranty that the building was without defects and there was no assignment to the plaintiff of any rights vesting in the vendor, which the vendor may have in respect of such defects. The Court distinguished the case from Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375 on the basis that the original owner had assumed responsibility for the requirements of the foundations. As CDG Pty Ltd had not assumed that responsibility and there had been no known reliance by the original owner, no duty arose.15 On the issue of vulnerability, the majority said: Since [Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270], and most notably in [Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36], the vulnerability of the plaintiff has emerged as an important requirement in cases where a duty of care to avoid economic loss has been held to have been owed. “Vulnerability”, in this context, is not to be understood as meaning only that the plaintiff was likely to suffer damage if reasonable care was not taken. Rather, “vulnerability” is to be understood as a reference to the plaintiff’s inability to protect itself from the consequences of a defendant’s want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would cast the consequences of loss on the defendant. So, in Perre, the plaintiffs could do nothing to protect themselves from economic consequences to them of the defendant’s negligence in sowing a crop which caused the quarantining of the plaintiffs’ land. In [Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487], the intended beneficiary depended entirely upon the solicitor performing the client’s retainer properly and the beneficiary could do nothing to ensure that this was done. But in [Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448], the financier could itself have made inquiries about the financial position of the company to which it was to lend

103

[33.2.600]

MISSTATEMENTS

money, rather than depend upon the auditor’s certification of the accounts of the company … [There were no facts that the subsequent owner] was, in any relevant sense, vulnerable to the economic consequences of any negligence of the [engineers] in their design of the foundations for the building.16

1 In Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478, the Privy Council overturned the prior decision of the High Court in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316 that such persons are not limited to members of a profession or business. In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761, Lloyd’s agents were found to hold themselves out as possessing a special expertise regarding the suitability of risks being underwritten and circumstances of reinsurance and settlement of claims. See also [33.2.90], [33.2.1620]. 2 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J at 250–251, Murphy J at 255–256 (CLR); San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 356, Brennan J at 371–372 (CLR). See also Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224 (CA), McHugh JA at 324 (NSWLR); Armidale City Council v Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd (1999) 104 LGERA 9; [1999] FCA 330 (FC) (local council liable for granting development approval for residential subdivision where land was contaminated). On the issue of vulnerability, see Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [23]. 3 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J at 250 (CLR). 4 A requirement of a special relationship, which includes skill and competence in a serious business or professional context, has been adopted in England. The special relationship aspect was developed by the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Morris at 502–503, Lord Hodson at 514, Lord Devlin at 528–529 (AC). The requirement of a serious business or professional context resulted from the decision of the Privy Council on an appeal from the High Court in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316. The High Court had earlier concluded that advice given by the appellants to the respondent about the financial viability of a subsidiary in which the respondent proposed to invest constituted a relationship which imposed on the appellants a duty of care with respect to the advice given. On appeal, the Privy Council reversed that decision on the grounds that a duty of care would only arise if the speaker had, or had represented possession of, special skill and expertise in the subject matter of the statement: Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC). The majority judgment of the Privy Council noted that a person carrying on a business or profession which calls for special skill and competence is held out, by the very conduct of that business or profession, as having

104

[33.2.600]

RELIANCE

special skill and expertise. However, it was held that the adviser did not have a financial interest in the transaction; therefore he owed no duty of care to exercise reasonable care and skill in the supply of the gratuitous advice. 5 For example, Mohr v Cleaver [1986] WAR 67 (FC) (investment advice given by an accountant who was not and did not profess to be an investment adviser); Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div) (real estate agent who disclaimed any expertise in respect of the financial viability of the motel, the transaction on which she was advising). It should be noted that, in the latter case, the Appeal Division did not find that the defendant could not owe a duty with respect to matters outside her field of expertise. For a discussion of that and other issues arising from the two decisions, see Davies M, “‘Special Skill’ in Negligent Misstatement” (1990) 17 MULR 484. 6 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65; Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 261–265, Dawson J at 255–256, Gummow J at 299 (CLR). 7 Scott Group Ltd v MacFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553 (CA); Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 261–265, Dawson J at 255–256, Gummow J at 299 (CLR). 8 Warwicker Assessments v Zadow (1989) 1 WAR 307 (FC), Malcolm CJ at 312–313. That basis for liability was interpreted restrictively in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478, Lord Diplock (for the Privy Council) at 636–638 (CLR); Presser v Caldwell Estates Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 471 (CA) (commission to be received by real estate agent on sale of property not sufficient). See also Plummer-Allinson v Spencer L Ayrey Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 254 (SC). However, it was interpreted more generously in O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159, Bray CJ at 190–191. The relevant interest must be financial: San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 358 (CLR). It would include, eg that of a contracting party: see Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583 (CA), cited in Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butt, 2009) p 421; Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 261–265, Dawson J at 255–256, Gummow J at 299 (CLR). 9 See San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 357 (CLR), where most of those circumstances were described: “The maker of a statement may come under a duty to take care through a combination of circumstances or in various ways, in the absence of a request by the recipient. The author, through volunteering information or advice, may be known to possess, or profess to possess, skill and competence in the area which is the subject of the communication. He may warrant the correctness of what he says or assume responsibility for its correctness. He may invite the recipient to act on the basis of the information or advice, or intend to induce the recipient to act in a particular way. He may actually have an interest in the recipient so acting.” 10 Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, Barwick CJ at 571 (CLR); Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478, Lord Diplock (for the Privy Council) at 638 (CLR). At common law, the same may

105

[33.2.600]

MISSTATEMENTS

11 12 13

14 15

16

be said for most advertising claims: Lambert v Lewis [1980] 2 WLR 299, Stephenson LJ (for the Court of Appeal) at 328 (WLR). Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 WLR 29 (CA). Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, especially the dicta of Dawson J at 178–179, Gummow J at 223, 229 (CLR). Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 6; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 5; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 6; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 7. Note that the Western Australian provisions are limited to health professionals. See also Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36. Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [25]–[26]. Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [23], [31].

Contractual Relationships [33.2.610] Statements made in the course of contractual or pre-contractual relationships may give rise to a duty of care. Even if such a statement might, or does, become a term of a contract, a duty of care is not precluded. In Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583, the defendant’s agent provided the plaintiff with an estimate of the sales or “throughput” of a petrol station which the plaintiff subsequently leased from the defendant. The advice was inaccurate and, notwithstanding that it was found to constitute a contractual warranty, it was also found to breach a duty of care. The decision was cited with approval by Gibbs CJ in L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65.1 In South Australia v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161, the appellant conceded that, notwithstanding the contractual relationship, the relationship between the parties could lead to a duty of care. The High Court did not challenge that concession, although it stated that its judgment should not be treated as affirmation that a duty of care arose in the circumstances. The recognition of concurrent duties focused attention on the interaction of the requirements of tort and contract, particularly where the impact of a contractual disclaimer on the existence of a duty of care must be considered.2 However, courts of final appeal have been reluctant to expand the law of negligence into areas governed by contract, equity or statute. In Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, in examining the liability of a solicitor for professional negligence in both contract and tort, the majority of the High Court stated: Rather than ask why the law should imply such a term in a contract for professional services, it might be more appropriate to ask why should the law of negligence have any say at all in regulating the relationship of the parties to the contract? The contract

106

[33.2.615]

RELIANCE

defines the relationship of the parties. Statute, criminal law and public policy apart, there is no reason why the contract should not declare completely and exclusively what are the legal rights and obligations of the parties in relation to their contractual dealings.3

Concurrent liabilities in contract and tort are usually limited to professional persons. In National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, the Court rejected the argument that a banker had concurrent liabilities in tort and contract because in this context, a banker is not a professional person.4 The Court chose not to follow the English authority of Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363, which held that a banker could be sued in both contract and tort. The Court held that, on this question, the Queen’s Bench Division’s decision was not good law.

1

2

3 4

L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Gibbs CJ at 233 (CLR). See also Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145; [1994] 3 WLR 761, discussed in Swanton J and McDonald B, “Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract under the Hedley Byrne Principle” (1995) 3 TLJ 131. See “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. In Norris v Sibberas [1990] VR 161 (App Div), submissions by the real estate agent’s counsel that the pre-contractual representations should be treated as mere puffery received short shrift by Marks J (for the Court) at 173: “In my opinion, the issues here are not to be resolved by reference to characterisation of the impugned statements, whether as puffs or otherwise. It was emphasised by the High Court in [San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405] that the applicable law is tort, not contract. The law relating to puffs concerns the characterisation of a representation inducing contract. In contract, there is strict law governing the characteristics of a representation. Where there is a sufficient relationship of proximity to give rise to the duty to take reasonable care not to make misstatements, unlike the law governing contract, it does not matter that the statements might be an opinion, a prediction, advice or mere information. The principles applicable are quite different.” See also comments on the interaction of contractual and tortious duties in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 582–586 (CLR). Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [47]. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [47] (Phillips and Callaway JJA concurring).

Areas Already Regulated by Statute [33.2.615] The efficacy of claims for negligent misstatement in areas already regulated by statute has been questioned. As noted at [33.2.510], loss and damage caused by the same representations are often pursued as tortious claims based on negligent misstatement and statutory claims based on misleading or deceptive conduct. However, in Miller & Associates Insurance

107

[33.2.615]

MISSTATEMENTS

Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357; 84 ALJR 644; [2010] HCA 31, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ commented that: Proof of the statutory claim will almost invariably be less onerous for a plaintiff than proof of negligence on the same facts. Liability for misleading conduct under the statute is strict and it follows that a corporation may act reasonably and yet engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive.1

In Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 6) (2007) 63 ACSR 1; [2007] NSWSC 124,2 a case brought against various parties associated with the preparation of a prospectus for a reinsurance company which was to be issued on the Australian Securities Exchange, McDougall J said that where there is a “highly regulated” scheme for protection of the investing public, there are real risks in imposing a common law duty of care. If the duty does no more than mimic the scheme of statutory protection, it is otiose – at least, where the plaintiffs fall within the class of those entitled to the benefit of the statutory scheme … and where a duty of care offers them no greater protection … If a duty of care is alleged to have some more onerous incident or content than the scheme of statutory regulation, then … the courts should be slow to go where the legislature did not.3

1 Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357; 84 ALJR 644; [2010] HCA 31, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ at [99]. 2 The judgment was varied on appeal, but the appeal did not touch on the negligence findings: see Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Market Ltd (2008) 73 NSWLR 653; [2008] NSWCA 206. 3 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 6) (2007) 63 ACSR 1; [2007] NSWSC 124, McDougall J at [1079]. McDougall J’s comments were based on the comments of Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at [120].

Third Parties [33.2.620] Reliance is critical in most claims by third parties. Potential third parties may be divided into three classes: (1)

third parties for whose benefit information or advice is expressly given (see [33.2.630]);

(2)

third parties within a definite and ascertained class which is likely to rely upon information and advice for a particular foreseeable purpose (see [33.2.640]); and

(3)

third parties who cannot be ascertained when the advice is given or who form part of an unascertained class: see [33.2.650]–[33.2.670].

108

[33.2.640]

THIRD PARTIES

Parties within the first two groups might reasonably be expected to suffer damage from a negligent misstatement. The liability to those within the third category is less clear. [33.2.630] A third party for whose benefit information or advice is expressly given will be able to establish reliance.1 In Warwicker Assessments v Zadow (1989) 1 WAR 307, an assessor was engaged by the insurer of a damaged truck. The assessor was aware that the owner would be provided with the report and would rely upon it. Reliance was established. Malcolm CJ held that: [W]here a statement is made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff, or the members of a limited class including the plaintiff, to commit themselves financially upon the basis that the statement is true, and the plaintiff acts in reliance on the statement, the law will impose a duty of care on the maker of the statement.2

An adviser who has knowledge, or the means of obtaining knowledge, that an identified third party is likely to suffer loss as a result of a negligent act or omission will be liable for economic loss.3 In Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; 73 ALJR 901; [1999] HCA 25, a valuer prepared a report as to the value of a property for a bank but the valuation acknowledged that other parties, including the lender and the respondent “may use and rely upon” the report and valuation in “the same manner as intended” by the bank. The express provision of potential reliance by the respondent imported a duty of care owed by the appellant to the respondent.

1

2

3

San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 355 (CLR). Warwicker Assessments v Zadow (1989) 1 WAR 307 (FC), Malcolm CJ at 312. The approach of Malcolm CJ is consistent with that in Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270, Mason J at 593 (CLR). The best known example is Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101. See also Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487.

[33.2.640] Members of an identifiable class whose reliance relates to a particular foreseeable transaction are within the ambit of negligent misstatement. The High Court recognised liability under that head in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405 and emphasised the role played by reliance.1 BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 2212 is also instructive. The facts concerned an

109

[33.2.640]

MISSTATEMENTS

investment trust. The trustee was required to have its assets valued periodically. Following each valuation, the trustee would apply a fixed formula to set the value of the individual units. Trade would be based on those values. The defendant valuer knew the purpose to which its valuation would be put. When it carelessly overvalued a valuable asset, the unit value was artificially enhanced. Unit holders who retained or redeemed their investment obtained a windfall at the expense of new entrants. Because the trustee relied on the valuation, the plaintiff unit holders, who had paid too much for their units, were the passive victims of the inevitable loss. Wootten J in BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd categorised the facts as an extension of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101. It is likely that the same result would be reached today.3 Only clients of the trustee were able to apply for units and these, though not individually known, were members of a limited and ascertainable class whose existence was known to the valuer. Moreover, the purpose for which the valuation was required was known by the defendant who assumed responsibility to that class.4 The trustee was obliged to act in ways which affected the plaintiff’s financial interests. In other words, the plaintiffs relied vicariously on the defendant.5 Certain “valuer cases” demonstrate that limited and identifiable third party members of a class may be owed a duty of care even where those persons are not individually known. In Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, after noting that each case depends on its own facts, the Full Federal Court found that the lack of specific knowledge of the identity of the plaintiff who had relied on a valuation obtained by an intermediary did not mean that no duty of care was owed to that party.6 Gray, Mansfield and Tracey JJ said that [a] duty of care arises where the valuer knew or ought to have known that the valuation would be acted upon in connection with some matter of business or serious consequence by a client of [the intermediary].7

The Court went on to find that the duty of care was owed not only to the intermediary’s client but also to the unidentified third party plaintiff because, in the circumstances, the valuer was aware that the client’s involvement also extended to some form of joint venture and that the potential transaction might extend beyond refinancing for the client.8 A similar approach was taken by the Full Court of the Federal Court in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65. In finding that a ratings agency was liable in negligence to the client of a bank in respect of losses resulting from the client’s purchase from the bank of credit derivative notes which had received the agency’s highest rating, the Court considered the ratings agency’s business model. Noting that “expert information and advice is part and parcel of modern commercial life”,9 the Court said that the ratings agency’s business included providing independent expert opinions on the creditworthiness of products and holding itself out as doing so “by publicly publishing and explaining its ratings”.10 In this context, the Court found that the risk assumed by the ratings agency for reward was liability to investors in the notes who

110

[33.2.640]

THIRD PARTIES

relied on the rating and who suffered loss because the creditworthiness of the notes was much lower than that disclosed by the rating given them by the agency.11 The Court said: From an allocation of risk perspective, it cannot be said that the precise identity of the recipient of the expert information was a necessary element. [The ratings agency] knew the investors (described as “interested parties”) existed and authorised the distribution of the rating to them. The criteria in [Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19] were and are sufficient, without more, to address that aspect of the issue.12

The English “valuer cases” also extend the duty to a wider class. Valuers, engaged by intermediaries such as building societies and local authorities, have been found to owe a duty of care to known and unknown individuals who purchase houses in reliance on valuations which had been made available to them by the intermediaries. Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790 is typical.13 It was held that valuers engaged by, respectively, a building society and a local authority, owed the prospective purchasers a duty of care. The valuers were fully aware of the nature of the transaction contemplated by the plaintiffs, knew that their advice would be communicated directly or indirectly to them, and knew that it was likely that it would be relied on in deciding whether to purchase the houses. English and Australian authorities have been more willing to extend the duty to third parties in the case of valuers and surveyors than has been the case with, for example, auditors. The inherent limitation upon the size of the class limits the number of persons who might reasonably rely upon any particular valuation. A valuer often knows, or ought to know, that a valuation will be provided to and relied upon by the prospective purchaser/investor.14 In the above cases, that factor prevailed over the expressed intention of the valuers that the valuation should not be acted on by anyone other than the direct recipient.15

1

2 3

San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 355 (CLR); Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Hayne J at [341]–[342]. The facts and the decision are discussed at some length in Nicholson K, “Third Party Reliance on Negligent Advice” (1991) 40 ICLQ 551. BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221, Wootten J at 232. Wootten J had the benefit only of Glass JA’s analysis (which was at the time persuasive) in Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) v San Sebastian Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 268; (1983) 51 LGRA 257 (CA). The High Court’s decision had not then been handed down. See also Derring Lane Pty Ltd v Fitzgibbon (2007) 16 VR 563; [2007] VSCA 79 and Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191, both of which approved of and applied BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty

111

[33.2.640]

MISSTATEMENTS

4

5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14

15

Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221. This is similar to a trustee requesting the information for the purpose of passing it on to a client, as in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101. If the adviser in BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221 had negligently undervalued the investment portfolio, then the unit-holders who chose to redeem, now at an undervalue, would have cause to complain. An existing unit-holder in that situation appears to be in as strong a position as a new entrant. It may be difficult to characterise the loss as reliance based. Assets are sold for reasons other than because the price has fallen. The unit-holders have again had their asset damaged by the adviser: see Nicholson K, “Third Party Reliance on Negligent Advice” (1991) 40 ICLQ 551 at 571, 574–575. Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, Gray, Mansfield and Tracey JJ at [108]. Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, Gray, Mansfield and Tracey JJ at [108]. Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, Gray, Mansfield and Tracey JJ at [108]. ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65, the Court at [591]. ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65, the Court at [591]. ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65, the Court at [591]. ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65, the Court at [591]. See also Merrett v Babb [2001] QB 1174; [2001] 3 WLR 1; [2001] EWCA Civ 214; Professional Liability “Valuers” [27.8.10]ff for a more detailed analysis of the special duties owed by valuers. Yianni v Edwin Evans & Sons [1982] QB 438; [1981] 3 WLR 843; Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790; but see BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221. See Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Oliver at 638–639, 641 (AC); see also the discussion of disclaimers at [33.2.580].

[33.2.650] Where the third party is unidentifiable, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the information or advice would be communicated to the plaintiff as a member of an identified class for a purpose that would very likely lead the plaintiff to enter into a transaction and thereby run the risk of incurring economic loss.1 Thus, in Fassifern Investments Pty Ltd v Gordon (unreported, NSWSC, Abadee J, 11672 of 1985, 12 September 1991), the plaintiff agreed to purchase steel trusses from the first defendant. The second defendant, a mechanical design engineer, had compiled a report on the condition of the trusses and either knew, or ought to have known, that the report would be shown to prospective purchasers. The report was shown to the eventual purchaser, the plaintiff. Abadee J concluded that no liability could attach to the engineer as, when the report was prepared, there was no existing class of purchasers, “actual or

112

[33.2.660]

THIRD PARTIES

prospective or strictly even … contingent”.2 There was only a “possible, potential or prospective class”3 if the vendor decided to sell. Further, there was no identifiable body of prospective purchasers. The ultimate purchaser might be drawn from anywhere. There was no limitation on the time for a sale, and thus no limit upon the period for which the report might operate. The test is whether the advice was tendered for a particular transaction or type of transaction, and the adviser knew or ought to have known that it would be relied upon by a particular person, or class of persons, in that transaction.4

1 2 3 4

Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448. Fassifern Investments Pty Ltd v Gordon (unreported, NSWSC, Abadee J, 11672 of 1985, 12 September 1991). Fassifern Investments Pty Ltd v Gordon (unreported, NSWSC, Abadee J, 11672 of 1985, 12 September 1991). See the numerous cases which have approved Lord Denning’s dissenting judgment in Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA), including Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Oliver at 641, Lord Bridge at 621 (AC), who referred to Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; [1989] 2 WLR 790, where, on this reasoning, it was held that the surveyors engaged by the building society and local authority did owe a duty of care to the prospective purchasers. See also Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA). But see the comments in Eugenie Holdings Pty Ltd v Stratford (unreported, NSWSC, Giles J, 50003 of 1990, 12 November 1991).

[33.2.660] Actions by investors or lenders against company auditors in England reveal the complexity of the issues raised by claims by unidentifiable third parties.1 The Court of Appeal in Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 held that accountants, in the absence of a contractual or a fiduciary relationship, did not owe the investor third party a duty of care. The dissenting judgment of Denning LJ, in particular, paved the way for the historic decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101:2 They owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and also I think, to any third person to whom they themselves show the accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show the accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some other action on them. But I do not think the duty can be extended still further so as to include strangers of whom they have heard nothing and to whom their employer without their knowledge may choose to show their accounts ... The test of proximity in these cases is: did the accountants know that the accounts were required for submission to the plaintiff and use by him?3

113

[33.2.660]

MISSTATEMENTS

Lord Denning’s approach was quoted with approval by Lord Devlin and Lord Pearce4 and approved in subsequent decisions in which auditors were held to owe a duty of care to potential, but unknown, investors from a class of persons whose reliance could reasonably be foreseen.5 The House of Lords introduced a particular purpose test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358 in an attempt to reverse the trend towards indeterminate liability. The plaintiff sued the auditors of a company, of which the plaintiff had accomplished a takeover, for negligence, alleging that the auditors owed it, as a current and prospective shareholder, a duty of care. It alleged that in purchasing the shares it relied on the accuracy of the published audited account which disclosed a pre-tax profit of £1.3 million, but, if the accounts had been properly audited, they would have disclosed a loss of £46 million. On hearing an appeal from the trial of a preliminary issue on the facts as alleged, the Court of Appeal held that an auditor owed a duty of care to an investor who was already a shareholder when the report was published.6 That decision was overruled on appeal to the House of Lords. Foreseeability, no matter how high, did not suffice to found a duty of care to investors. On the facts, proximity did not exist. The House of Lords proposed a three-stage test for determining the existence of a duty of care, namely that the plaintiff can establish a duty of care when: (1)

the causing of the damage was reasonably foreseeable;

(2)

that a relationship of proximity existed; and

(3)

it was just and reasonable to impose a duty on the defendant.7

According to Lord Bridge, liability for misstatement must be tied to the particular purpose for which the statement was made and disseminated. He noted that the cases support the necessity to prove … as an essential ingredient of the “proximity” between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the defendant knew that his statement would be communicated to the plaintiff, either as an individual or as a member of an identifiable class, specifically in connection with a particular transaction or transactions of a particular kind (eg, in a prospectus inviting investment) and that the plaintiff would be very likely to rely on it for the purpose of deciding whether or not to enter upon that transaction or upon a transaction of that kind.8

The same restriction was expressed in varying ways by three other members of the House.9 The court must discern the statutory purpose for the audit and its publication. Each of the three main judgments10 gave careful attention to the issue. In each, the conclusion was reached that both the statutory duty and that at common law is owed to shareholders as a class and not as individuals.11 It arms them to protect their collective interest in the proper management of the company. No duty is owed to any individual shareholder, irrespective of reliance. It follows, all the more strongly, that no duty would be owed to an outside investor who relied on the accounts.12 No difficulties arise where a

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shareholder, or outside prospective investor or lender, commissions an auditor or other expert to report on the financial viability of investing in or lending to the company.13 The situation above must be distinguished from that in which, for example, misleading accounts cause an existing shareholder to sell at an undervalue because the market, relying on the accounts, artificially depresses the price. Here the loss does not arise from the shareholder’s reliance on the audit, but from the fact that the value of its shareholding has been damaged. Lords Bridge and Oliver left open the possibility that a duty of care may be owed by an auditor to a shareholder in those circumstances.14 If BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221 was correctly decided (see [33.2.640]) it may also be possible to argue a duty of care in Australia in those circumstances.15 The High Court has made it clear in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448 that the mere act of an auditor supplying a signed report stating a company’s position, knowing that the company would, in turn, pass the statement to its creditors, is not sufficient to establish a duty of care to any third party recipient.16 In Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450; [2007] FCA 1216, Middleton J accepted that “auditors do not owe a duty … merely by virtue of their acting in the capacity as auditors”.17 However, Middleton J was unwilling to strike out a pleading which alleged that an auditing firm owed a duty of care to avoid the infliction of pure economic loss by means of a negligent audit. In doing so, Middleton J accepted that Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448 “may well be an authority which raises many difficulties for the respondents”.18 But he was unwilling to accept that it laid down any preconditions to liability of auditors where [the Court was] not dealing with a claim for negligent misstatement and where the concept of vulnerability may become relevant and where all the salient features of the case need to be examined.19

1 2 3 4 5

See also Professional Liability “Auditors and Accountants” [27.4.10]ff. See also Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Lord Reid at 487, Lord Hodson at 509 (AC). Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA), Denning LJ at 180–181 (KB). Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101, Devlin LJ at 530, Pearce LJ at 538–539 (AC). Haig v Bamford [1977] 1 SCR 466; (1976) 72 DLR (3d) 68; Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co [1977] AC 405; [1975] 3 WLR 815; Dimond Manufacturing Co Ltd v Hamilton [1969] NZLR 609 (CA); Twomax Ltd v Dickson, McFarlane & Robinson [1982] SC 113 (OH); Scott Group Ltd v MacFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553 (CA); JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289 (QB) (affirmed in JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1983] 1 All ER 583 (CA)). However,

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6

7

8 9

10

11 12

13

14

many of those decisions were overruled or their reasoning disapproved by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358. In Al-Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley [1990] Ch 313; [1990] 2 WLR 344, after reviewing the House of Lords decision in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, Millett J at 337 (Ch) concluded that this decision marked the furthest limit for duty of care for negligent misstatement in England. For a full discussion of the issues raised in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and subsequent cases, from an Australian and English perspective, see Nicholson K, “Third Party Reliance on Negligent Advice” (1991) 40 ICLQ 551. See also Professional Liability “Auditors and Accountants” [27.4.10]ff. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 617–618 (AC). Although this test was adopted by Kirby J in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, at [244], it was subsequently rejected by the High Court: see Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ at [9], McHugh J at [77]; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59, the Court at [49]. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 621 (AC). Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Roskill at 629, Lord Oliver at 637–638, Lord Jauncey at 658 (AC). In this respect, and generally, Lord Denning’s dissenting analysis in Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA), at 174–184 (KB), was seen by Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, Lord Bridge at 623 (AC) as “masterly” and to require “little, if any, amplification or modification in the light of later authority”. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lords Bridge, Oliver and Jauncey. The most detailed treatment is that by Lord Oliver at 630–632, 652–654 and by Lord Jauncey at 662–663 (AC). Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 626–627, Lord Oliver at 653–654, Lord Jauncey at 661–662 (AC). Their Lordships rejected the reasoning and results in such decisions as Scott Group Ltd v MacFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553 (CA); Twomax Ltd v Dickson, McFarlane & Robinson [1982] SC 113 (OH). JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289 (QB) (affirmed in JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1983] 1 All ER 583 (CA)) was not overruled, but rather distinguished, on a fine reading of the facts. See Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 625, Lord Oliver at 648–649, Lord Jauncey at 662–663 (AC). See also the subsequent Court of Appeal decision in Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 319 (Ch). Al-Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley [1990] Ch 313; [1990] 2 WLR 344 was seen as correctly decided in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, Lord Bridge at 623, Lord Oliver at 641–642, Lord Jauncey at 662 (AC). It follows from Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 3 WLR 101 itself, but see James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113; [1991] 2 WLR 641 (CA) (no duty on the facts). Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358, Lord Bridge at 626–627, Lord Oliver at 653–654 (AC).

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15 See Nicholson K, “Third Party Reliance on Negligent Advice” (1991) 40 ICLQ 551 at 560–561, 571–575. See Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448; Executor Trustee Australia Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1995) 63 SASR 393; R Lowe Lippmann Figdor & Franck v AGC (Advances) Ltd [1992] 2 VR 671 (App Div). 16 Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; 71 ALJR 448, McHugh J at 275 (CLR). In Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [23] referred to Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords and said that the financier in that case could have informed itself of the financial state of the company by means other than the auditor’s report and thus the requisite element of “vulnerability” on the part of the financier was not established. 17 Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450; [2007] FCA 1216, Middleton J at [57]. 18 Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450; [2007] FCA 1216, Middleton J at [69]. 19 Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450; [2007] FCA 1216, Middleton J at [57].

[33.2.670] English lower court decisions illustrate the restrictive approach to finding a duty of care for negligent misstatements adopted since Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358. In James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113; [1991] 2 WLR 641, Neill LJ affirmed that in England, a “restrictive approach is now adopted to any extension of the scope of the duty of care beyond the person directly intended by the maker of the statement to act upon it”.1 The case concerned a “friendly” takeover, during which the target company had its accountants prepare draft accounts for the negotiations. They were shown to the plaintiff predator company. No duty was found on the facts. The accounts were “drafts”, and it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff would treat them as final and rely upon them. The factors likely to be significant in such a case are: (1)

the purpose for which the statement was made;

(2)

the purpose for which the statement was communicated;

(3)

the relationship between the adviser, the recipient of the advice and any relevant intermediary;

(4)

the size of the class to which the recipient belonged;

(5)

the state of knowledge of the adviser; and

(6)

reliance by the recipient.

In Bentley v Wright [1997] 2 VR 175, the Victorian Court of Appeal applied the restrictive approach in James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co and quoted from the judgment of Neill LJ that one should consider whether and to what extent the advisee was entitled to rely on the statement to take the action that he did take. It is also necessary to consider whether he did in

117

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fact rely on the statement, whether he did use or should have used his own judgment and whether he did seek or should have sought independent advice. In business transactions conducted at arms’ length it may sometimes be difficult for an advisee to prove that he was entitled to act on a statement without taking any independent advice or to prove that the adviser knew, actually or inferentially, that he would act without taking such advice.2

In Bentley v Wright, the purchasers of an ostrich hen had successfully sued the vendor of the ostrich for damages for breach of contract and negligent misstatement, after it was discovered the ostrich hen was sterile. The purchasers had also been successful against the share farmer who looked after the ostrich. The Victorian Court of Appeal overturned the County Court’s finding of negligent misstatement on the part of the sharefarmer for the reasons that: (1)

there was no factual basis for a conclusion that the sharefarmer had assumed any responsibility voluntarily to impart information which she thought relevant to the purchasers;

(2)

there was no evidence of any special relationship between the sharefarmer and the purchasers which would justify the imposition of a duty to disclose to the purchasers the date the hen last laid an egg; and

(3)

there was no finding of fact to support a conclusion that the sharefarmer realised that the purchasers would rely on her advice.

A duty will not fasten to a statement made for a particular purpose when it is used for a different purpose.3 Company directors owe a duty to persons who subscribe for shares in reliance on a prospectus.4 The High Court decision of Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160; 81 ALJR 525; [2007] HCA 1 permits a shareholder to bring an action against a company if they have been misled as to the value of shares in the company and, on that basis, purchase shares in the company. Previously, shareholders could not bring such an action unless they had renounced the contract pursuant to which the shares were bought.5 However the rule in Houldsworth v Glasgow City Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317, which previously prevented a shareholder from commencing such a proceeding when they still owned the shares and had not renounced the contract under which they were purchased, is now not a principle recognised in Australia.6 Although the plaintiff’s causes of action in Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic was on the basis of misleading and deceptive conduct contrary to what was then s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth),7 s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), aside from the general restrictions on the imposition of a duty of care to a potential shareholder, there is no reason why, given appropriate circumstances, a shareholder could not also have an action for negligent misstatement. After a particular takeover bidder is identified, a duty of care may arise.8 Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 is significant because Slade LJ distinguished Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, and found an arguable case existed that if 118

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during the conduct of a contested take-over, after an identified bidder has emerged, the directors and financial advisers of a target company choose to make express representations with a view to influencing the conduct of the bidder, then … they owe him a duty not negligently to mislead him.9

Each director was aware that the plaintiff would rely on the relevant representations “and intended that they should”.10 The situation was analogous to Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583.11 Potential variations on that type of situation will eventually cause some difficulties.12 Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd left the potential liability of third party interveners open.13 Most of the discussion concerned the position of the directors. Similar conclusions were reached concerning two sets of financial advisers, the target firm’s advising merchant bank and its accountants. The Court of Appeal recognised that its decision may give rise to “far-reaching consequences in the commercial world”.14 In Mariola Marine Corp v Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (The Morning Watch) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 547, handed down before the House of Lords decision in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman but after that of the Court of Appeal became available, Phillips J held that a classification society owed no duty of care to those who might foreseeably suffer economic loss in reliance on the negligent classification of a vessel. Although the issue of a classification certificate may carry an express or implied representation as to the condition of the vessel, Phillips J held that the primary purpose of the regime was to “enhance the safety of life and property at sea, rather than to protect the economic interests of those involved … in shipping”.15 Although Lloyd’s maintained a classification system which encouraged third parties to rely on the implied assurance that a currently classified vessel was in good condition and it had been expressly informed by the sellers that they wished to put the vessel through a special survey before putting it on the market, Phillips J found the facts materially indistinguishable from those in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman. In his view, that case “marked the furthest limit to which the duty of care for negligent misstatement has so far been taken in England, and its reasoning does not encourage any further advance”.16 Given the more restrictive decision in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman by the House of Lords, that statement is persuasive and has so far stood the test of time and subsequent decisions in England.17

1

2

James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113; [1991] 2 WLR 641 (CA), Neill LJ at 125 (QB), Nourse and Belcombe LJJ concurring. See also Lonrho plc v Tebbit [1991] 4 All ER 973 (CHD). Bentley v Wright [1997] 2 VR 175 (CA), Tadgell JA at 184 (Charles and Callaway JJA agreeing), quoting James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113; [1991] 2 WLR 641 (CA), Neil LJ at 126–127 (QB).

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3 4 5

6

7 8

9 10 11 12

13

14

15 16

17

Al-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Longcroft [1990] 1 WLR 1390 (CHD) (albeit in the context only of an application to strike out). Duties are imposed by Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 710, 728, 729. Houldsworth v Glasgow City Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317; Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 145; [2005] FCA 1280 (reversed in Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 434; [2005] FCAFC 265); Victoria v Hodgson [1992] 2 VR 613. Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160; 81 ALJR 525; [2007] HCA 1, Gleeson CJ at [13]–[16], Gummow J at [49], Crennan J at [265]. See also Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 434; [2005] FCAFC 265. Now Australian Consumer Law, s 18 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2). Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA). As with Al-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Longcroft [1990] 1 WLR 1390 (CHD), the case was concerned with interlocutory proceedings only. Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 314 (Ch). Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 319–320 (Ch). Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583 (CA). During a takeover, there is always the possibility that other previously unknown or uninterested persons will intervene with a higher bid: see Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 321 (Ch). Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 324 (Ch). See also Nicholson K, “Third Party Reliance on Negligent Advice” (1991) 40 ICLQ 551 at 563–567. Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295; [1991] 2 WLR 655 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 324 (Ch). See also Nicholson K, “Third Party Reliance on Negligent Advice” (1991) 40 ICLQ 551 at 566–567: “Company directors, many of whom will have no adequate insurance cover, will find the decision extremely anxiety provoking! Ex hypothesi, in this type of situation an indemnity from the company may be difficult to obtain and, where obtained, perhaps worthless. It is right that the courts proceed cautiously in this area.” Mariola Marine Corp v Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (The Morning Watch) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 547 (QBD), Phillips J at 559. Mariola Marine Corp v Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (The Morning Watch) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 547 (QBD), Phillips J at 560, quoting with slight alterations from Al-Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley [1990] Ch 313; [1990] 2 WLR 344, Millet J at 337 (Ch). Galoo Ltd (in liq) v Bright Grahame Murray [1994] 1 WLR 1360 (CA).

[33.2.680] The trend of cases suggests that practically, a more instructive approach to determining the existence of a duty of care may be achieved by reference to discrete areas of tort law.1 The rejection of the concept of proximity as a determinant of individual and novel disputes partly arose because of the recognition that attempts to establish a single general principle of liability

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“which run[s] the gamut from physical injury to emotional distress to various kinds of economic loss”, was unwise, too ambitious and elusive.2 Just as proximity has seemingly failed as a common underlying theme in the law of negligence, so the time to assess the law of negligence as one consistent body of law may have passed. The better approach is to analyse specific factual situations by reference to analogous factual or discrete categories of case, including: personal and physical injury, statutory liability, economic loss, professional liability, or possibly, the liability of specific professions in particular situations.3 Indeed, a review of the reported High Court decisions of the last 15 years in the law of negligence, suggests that the best explanation of these decisions is not provided by a conceptual framework, but by seeking to understand the decision on the basis of its specific facts or category of case.4 In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J formulated the incremental approach as the most satisfactory: In my view, given the needs of practitioners and trial judges, the most helpful approach to the duty problem is first to ascertain whether the case comes within an established category. If the answer is in the negative, the next question is, was the harm which the plaintiff suffered a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s acts or omissions? A negative answer will result in a finding of no duty. But a positive answer invites further inquiry and an examination of analogous cases where the courts have held that a duty does or does not exist. The law should be developed incrementally by reference to the reasons why the material facts in analogous cases did or did not found a duty and by reference to the few principles of general application that can be found in the duty cases.5

In Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; [2009] NSWCA 258, in a passage that has been regularly cited and applied in a number of jurisdictions since,6 Allsop P referred to the High Court’s rejection of the general determinant of proximity (or any other particular test) and usefully set out the current approach to determining whether a duty of care exists in any circumstance. Allsop P said: If the circumstances fall within an accepted category of duty, little or no difficulty arises. If, however, the posited duty is a novel one, the proper approach is to undertake a close analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the putative tortfeasor by references to the salient features or factors affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury.7

This approach is consistent with the approach adopted by the Full Federal Court in Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, where Gray, Mansfield and Tracey JJ considered the general principles that govern when a duty of care will arise for negligent misstatement,8 then proceeded to analyse the specific position of valuers in respect of negligent misstatement by reference to previous case law in respect of that category of duty.9 Similarly, in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65 the Full Federal Court

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MISSTATEMENTS

considered the principles applicable to the imposition of a duty of care in cases of negligent misstatement,10 and then, on the basis of its factual analysis of the ratings agency’s business model found that the agency was liable in negligence to the bank’s client.11

1 “Incrementalism”, as articulated in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Brennan J at 481 (CLR) and analysed in Stanton KM, “Incremental Approaches to the Duty of Care” in Mullany NJ (ed), Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information Services, 1997), may simply be a pragmatic response and a solution to the problem of analysis, the problem having been created by the uncertainty surrounding the concept of proximity and the test to be applied to determine the existence of a duty of care. As the skill of a practising lawyer revolves around predicting how future decisions are likely to be made, it is suggested that presently, this is best done not by way of a principle based formula, but by reference to discrete areas of authority concerning a typical factual situation. See also Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35. 2 Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Gummow J at 229 (CLR), quoting Christe G, “The Uneasy Place of Principle in Tort Law” in Owen DG (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) p 123. See also Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Kirby at [237]–[240]. 3 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Brennan J at 481 (CLR). 4 See generally Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35. 5 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at [94]. 6 See, eg Makawe Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (2009) 171 LGERA 165; [2009] NSWCA 412, Hodgson JA at [17], Simpson J at [92]; Wheelahan v City of Casey (No 3) [2011] VSC 15, Osborn J at [31]; Tasmania v Boyd [2010] TASSC 13, Blow J at [13]. 7 Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; [2009] NSWCA 258, Allsop P at [102]. Allsop P at [103]–[104] usefully listed a number of the salient factors that may be relevant depending on the case. 8 The general principles relied upon in Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, the Court at [97] were the “Evatt principles” espoused by Barwick J in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; 42 ALJR 316, at 571 (CLR), as approved in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19. 9 The position in respect of valuers was analysed at Kestrel Holdings Pty Ltd v APF Properties Pty Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 418; [2009] FCAFC 144, the Court at [100]–[104]. 10 ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65, the Court at [573]–[578]. 11 ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 65, the Court at [591].

122

Nature of Loss Personal Injury [33.2.790] Generally, the test of reasonable foreseeability is sufficient to establish a duty of care in claims for personal injury. As Lord Goff noted in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241; [1987] 2 WLR 480: [W]e have nowadays to appreciate that the broad general principle of liability for foreseeable damage is so widely applicable that the function of the duty of care is not so much to identify cases where liability is imposed as to identify those where it is not.1

Nevertheless, while foreseeability remains an important determinant as to whether a duty of care exists, it is not the sole determinant. As noted by Allsop P in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; [2009] NSWCA 258, after a comprehensive survey of the authorities, “[i]n a novel area, reasonable foreseeability of harm is inadequate alone to found a conclusion of duty”.2 Rather, the proper approach is to undertake a close analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the putative tortfeasor by references to the “salient features” or factors affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury.3 Consideration of whether a duty of care has arisen and has been breached is unnecessary unless factors such as a pre-existing relationship or public policy necessitate their consideration. For example, in Richards v Victoria [1969] VR 136 the relationship between a teacher and pupils in the classroom was examined in order to assess the nature of the duty owed by the teacher to a pupil who had been injured during a brawl with a fellow student. In James v Harrison (1977) 18 ACTR 36, the plaintiff left a shop immediately behind a shop assistant who hurried up the footpath. When the employee turned suddenly to return to the shop, the plaintiff was knocked to the ground and injured. In those circumstances it was held that the employee owed the plaintiff a duty of care and had breached that duty. Similarly, questions arise concerning hypersensitive plaintiffs and the extent to which defendants ought to be burdened by the precautions necessary to protect them:4 see [33.2.1330]. Following the release of the Ipp Report,5 a raft of legislative change took place in all jurisdictions: see [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. Among those legislative changes was the enactment of, essentially, uniform legislation to tighten what is “reasonably foreseeable”. For example, s 5B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides:

123

[33.2.790]

NATURE OF LOSS

(1)

(2)

A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm unless: (a)

the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew or ought to have known), and

(b)

the risk was not insignificant, and

(c)

in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s position would have taken those precautions.

In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following (amongst other relevant things): (a)

the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken,

(b)

the likely seriousness of the harm,

(c)

the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm,

(d)

the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.

This provision in the Civil Liability Act 2002 has been enacted in all other states and territories, save for the Northern Territory (which still follows the common law)):6 see also [33.2.60]. Section 48(3) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides a specific definition of what is considered an “insignificant risk”. The other state and territory statutes do not provide that definition. However, as Ipp JA held in Waverley Council v Ferreira [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-818; [2005] NSWCA 418, what is considered by the legislation to be reasonably foreseeable is, in effect, partly a reiteration of the remarks by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106.7

1 Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241; [1987] 2 WLR 480, Lord Goff at 280 (AC). 2 Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; [2009] NSWCA 258, Allsop P at [106]. 3 Levi v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; 58 WN (NSW) 63 (FC); Nova Mink Ltd v Trans-Canada Airlines [1951] 2 DLR 241. In both cases, the defendant was not required to take the special needs of hypersensitive plaintiffs into account despite the normal rule that one must take the plaintiff as one finds them. 4 Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; [2009] NSWCA 258, Allsop P at [102]. These “salient features” are listed by Allsop at [103]. Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar was a decision concerning the imposition of a duty of care in a novel case: whether a wife who now suffers from malignant mesothelioma, contracted as a result of coming into contact with asbestos dust and fibres on her husband’s work clothes in the family home and car, was owed a duty of care. See also Central Darling Shire Council v Greeney [2015] NSWCA 51, Macfarlan JA at [33]. 5 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at

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6

7

PERSONAL INJURY

www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 1 June 2016). See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B. Waverley Council v Ferreira [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-818; [2005] NSWCA 418, Ipp JA at [45], referring to Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 47–48 (CLR).

[33.2.800] Previously, proximity required consideration in cases where the connection between the carelessness of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff was less immediate and direct. For instance, prior to its decline, proximity had been found to exist between the architect or builder of a residential property and those who may, in the future, be injured by negligence in its design or construction.1 Further, the contractual relationship between head contractor and subcontractor has been held to generate proximity for a duty of care to arise. Thus a head contractor on a building site was held liable for injuries suffered by a director and employee of the subcontractor on a building site.2 In CSR Ltd v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 463, the Court of Appeal sought to evade the operation of the “corporate veil”3 by finding that although the plaintiff sufferers of asbestosis were employed by the subsidiary, Asbestos Products Pty Ltd, sufficient proximity existed between the parent company, CSR Ltd, and the plaintiffs to generate a duty of care commensurate with that owed by the employer. The fact that the parent company, CSR Ltd, exercised substantial control and influence over its subsidiary was sufficient to generate the necessary degree of proximity. Notably, however, the application of proximity in this case occurred within the framework of a three-stage test that was essentially an amalgam of incrementalism4 and the test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 3585 and reflects the uncertainty that has emerged around the use of proximity as a determinant of duty of care. The continuation of this uncertainty, despite High Court pronouncements on the decline of proximity, was evident in nervous shock cases (see [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1310]), where proximity has played a critical role in establishing a duty of care. In such cases the court usually considered the relationship or circumstantial proximity between the plaintiff and those whose injuries are alleged to have caused nervous shock,6 the physical proximity between the plaintiff and the event,7 and the causal proximity between the event and the ensuing harm. However, in the case of Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, in separate judgments the High Court unanimously held that a special relationship existed between the respondent and the appellant that gave rise to a duty of care for nervous shock.8 To utilise relationship as a determinant of duty of care is to recall proximity in all but name.9 The strength of this contention is increased somewhat by the fact that Callinan J referred to, and relied upon, proximity to encapsulate the

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working relationship of the respondent and the deceased and so determine that the respondent owed the appellant a duty of care.10 In Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9 the High Court declared that the demise of proximity had now been completed.11

1 Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1; note the observation in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 578 (CLR), that “a relationship of proximity ordinarily exists between the architect or builder of a residential building (eg a maternity hospital) and the members of the class of persons who will in future years be born or housed in it. That relationship of proximity is such as to give rise to a duty of care to avoid a real risk of injury by reason of faulty design of the building. The duty is owed to each member of the class.” See also Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194; Andriolo v G & G Constructions Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-235 (ACTSC). See also Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 976 (CA), where the owner of a bus was not liable in negligence because insufficient proximity was found where a period of nine hours had elapsed between the bus being left unattended with keys in the ignition and the death of a pedestrian struck by the bus after it was stolen. See also Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255, where the Court of Appeal held that there was a relationship of proximity between an injured passenger in a light aircraft and persons who inspected and certified the aircraft for air-worthiness. 2 Andriolo v G & G Constructions Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-235 (ACTSC) (following Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240; Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194; Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1). 3 The “corporate veil” denotes the separation at law between the corporate entity and those persons who control the entity: see Business Organisations “Company Formation” [4.1.10]ff. 4 See Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Brennan J at 481 (CLR). For an analysis of incrementalism, see Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35 at 40–41, 52; Stanton KM, “Incremental Approaches to the Duty of Care” in Mullany NJ (ed), Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information Services, 1997). 5 See Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35 at 52. 6 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 WLR 982. See also Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Gibbs CJ at 555 (CLR). Deane J at 578–611 (CLR) dealt with the relationship issue as going to the foreseeability of injury by shock. But see the discussion in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59 at [46]–[49]. 7 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426. 8 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gleeson CJ at [37], Gaudron J at [54], McHugh J at [139], Gummow and Kirby JJ at [237], Hayne JJ at [304]. Notably, Callinan J at [357] referred to the special

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relationship as a “relationship of proximity”. Although distinct judgments were handed down in relation to the two cases heard together in this judgment, the two matters were combined. In this way, the two cases serve as the poles on a continuum upon which the success or failure of potential actions in nervous shock can be adjudged. 9 See Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35 at 50. See also Vines P, “Scope of Duty and Standard of Care in the High Court: Dederer and the Careless Plaintiff” (2010) 7 Australian Civil Liability 34. 10 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Callinan J at [356]–[357]. 11 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [59]: “The demise of proximity as a useful informing principle in this area is now complete.” See also Edwards v State Trustees Ltd [2016] VSCA 28, Whelan JA at [59]–[61].

Property Damage [33.2.810] Reasonable foreseeability is generally sufficient to establish liability where damage to property is involved. Care must be taken, however, to distinguish between a claim for actual damage to property, and a claim involving economic loss due to, for example, faulty construction. Similarly, ambiguities and complications may arise in respect of three-party situations where it is necessary to establish a proximate relationship between a third party with no direct physical connection with the lost or damaged property and the owner of the property. The latter situation was considered upon the basis of assumed facts in Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd (The Nicholas H) [1996] AC 211; [1995] 3 WLR 227. After a vessel developed signs of structural damage while in transit with a cargo of zinc, a representative of the classification society responsible for its seaworthiness certificate examined it at anchor off a transit port and recommended that complete repairs be effected. Only temporary repairs were effected as the owners did not wish to carry out permanent work. At a second inspection by the classification society representative, the surveyor recommended that the vessel be allowed to proceed to its final destination and further repairs be effected there. The repairs failed shortly after leaving port, and the vessel sank with its entire cargo one week later. The cargo owners sought to recover their loss both from the vessel’s owners and from the classification society. After the vessel’s owners settled, the plaintiff sought to pursue its action against the classification society. The House of Lords assumed, without deciding, that there was a sufficient degree of proximity between the cargo owners and the classification society for the existence of a duty of care. However, it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty because of its detrimental effect on the role of classification societies in international trade. The distinction between damage to property and defective construction causing pure economic loss has been considered by the House of Lords1 and in

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subsequent English and Australian cases.2 In England, the distinction turns upon whether the defect remains hidden until it causes physical injury or damage to other property or whether it is discovered before that occurs. In the former instance, English courts treat the core issue as damage to property and reasonable foreseeability is generally sufficient. In the latter, it has been dealt with as pure economic loss, and in England recovery has been denied on that basis.3 In Australia, the position may be otherwise. A duty of care may exist, at least where a plaintiff purchaser is able to show that they relied upon the skill and care of a builder; and did so with respect to a domestic dwelling.4 In Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, the High Court held that liability for economic loss (the value of a house) arose between a builder and a subsequent owner because the relationship possessed a requisite degree of proximity to give rise to a duty of care on the part of the builder to avoid such loss.5 There was a general reliance by a purchaser on the builder.6 By contrast, it would appear that economic loss is less likely to be recoverable with respect to a commercial building.7 In Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, CDG Pty Ltd designed the foundations of a warehouse and office complex for the then owner of the premises. Woolcock subsequently purchased the premises, which suffered substantial structural distress as a result of settlement of the foundations and required steps to be taken to prevent damage to person or property. Woolcock alleged that CDG owed and had breached a duty of reasonable care owed to it in designing the foundations. The Court, by majority, held that CDG did not owe such a duty.8 McHugh J held that the ratio decidendi of Bryan v Maloney was limited to dwelling houses and did not extend to commercial buildings,9 and further noted that imposing a duty in circumstances where the defect has been identified before any damage occurs would have unsatisfactory consequences for the administration of justice and the efficiency of commerce.10 However the majority distinguished Bryan v Maloney because in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd, the relationship between the original owner and CDG was such that the original owner controlled the investigations as to the adequacy of the foundations. Because there was no assumption of responsibility on the part of CDG and known reliance by the original owner, no duty arose to the original owner and could not, therefore, to Woolcock.11 This is the preferred explanation for the distinction between Bryan v Maloney and Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd and not because the former involved a domestic dwelling and the latter a commercial building.12 Therefore although it is theoretically possible that a duty may exist in the context of commercial buildings, it would be necessary to establish there was assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendant and known reliance by the plaintiff: see [33.2.540]–[33.2.610]. In Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014)

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254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, it was alleged that the builder of strata-title serviced apartments owed a duty of care to an owners corporation for pure economic loss arising from the cost of rectifying latent defects in the construction of the common property. The owners corporation did not come into existence until about two years after the builder entered into the building contract with the developer. The High Court applied Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd. Hayne and Kiefel JJ made the following of observations about reliance, vulnerability and the existence of a duty of care in this context: It may be assumed, without deciding, that the developer and the purchaser of a lot from the developer relied on the builder to do its work properly. The purchaser of a lot could not check the quality of the builder’s work as it was being done. Perhaps the developer was in no different position. (That would turn on what meaning is given to the superintendence provisions of the developer’s contract with the builder.) The Owners Corporation was in no better position to check the quality of the builder’s work as it was being done than the original purchaser of a lot. Because these parties could not check the quality of what the builder was doing, it can easily be said that each relied on the builder to do its work properly. Reliance, in the sense just described, may be a necessary element in demonstrating vulnerability, but it is not a sufficient element. As noted earlier, vulnerability is concerned with a plaintiff’s inability to protect itself from the defendant’s want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would cast the consequences of loss on the defendant. It is neither necessary nor profitable to attempt to define what would or would not constitute vulnerability. It is enough to observe that both the developer and the original purchasers made contracts, including the standard contracts, which gave rights to have remedied defects in the common property vested in the Owners Corporation. The making of contracts which expressly provided for what quality of work was promised demonstrates the ability of the parties to protect against, and denies their vulnerability to, any lack of care by the builder in performance of its contractual obligations. It was not suggested that the parties could not protect their own interests. The builder did not owe the Owners Corporation a duty of care.13

Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ set out their reasons for distinguishing the duty found to be owed by the builder in Maloney from the facts of the case before them.14 In Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Gaudron J suggested that where the interest infringed is a “precise legal right”, it may sometimes be appropriate to treat the loss as more closely analogous to property damage.15 Damages for property damage are regulated by legislation: see [33.2.90].

1 2

D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368. Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414; Department of the Environment (UK) v Thomas Bates & Sons Ltd [1989] 1 All

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ER 1075 (CA); National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Coffey & Partners Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 401 (FC); Opat v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1992] 1 VR 283; CBD Investments Pty Ltd v Ace Ceramics Pty Ltd [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-359 (NSWSC); National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v Marble Tile Co Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 55049 of 1992, 28 July 1992); Latrobe Valley Village Inc v CSR Ltd (unreported, VSC, Phillips J, 1881 of 1987, 26 June 1990); Salama v Pisarek (unreported, NSWSC, Cole J, 55041 of 1991, 10 September 1992). 3 See Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414, overruling Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; [1977] 2 WLR 1024. The House of Lords held that unless the defects had caused injury to the plaintiff or harm to the property of the plaintiff, the loss was purely economic, irrespective of any danger to the occupants. 4 National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Coffey & Partners Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 401 (FC); Opat v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1992] 1 VR 283. But see CBD Investments Pty Ltd v Ace Ceramics Pty Ltd [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-359 (NSWSC); National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v Marble Tile Co Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Rolfe J, 55049 of 1992, 28 July 1992); Latrobe Valley Village Inc v CSR Ltd (unreported, VSC, Phillips J, 1881 of 1987, 26 June 1990). See also Sirtes GA, “Tortious Claims for Defective Buildings: Threading through the Labyrinth” (1993) 9 BCL 170. 5 It should be noted that as both parties accepted the lower court’s classification of the damage as pure economic loss, the court did not examine whether or not the classification was correct. 6 In New Zealand, Tipping J in Chase v de Groot [1994] 1 NZLR 613 (HC) held that the builder of a house owes a duty of care to future owners to build the house in accordance with the building permit and the relevant building code and bylaws. It was held that it would make no difference if the builder were also the owner of the house. The Privy Council, on appeal from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 1 NZLR 513; [1996] AC 624; [1996] 2 WLR 367 (PC), held that in New Zealand, a local authority, through its building inspector, owed a duty of care to a building owner in approving building foundations to ensure they were not defective. See also Todd S, “Defective Property: The Turn of the Privy Council” (1996) 4 Tort L Rev 91; Tobin R, “The Last Word on Building Negligence? Invercargill City Council v Hamlin” (1996) 4 TLJ 13; James MF, “Tortious Liability for Defective Buildings: A Commonwealth Perspective” (1995) 11 PN 132. 7 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16; Fangrove Pty Ltd v Tod Group Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 236 (CA). See also Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (1996) 40 NSWLR 101; 91 LGERA 361 (CA), Clarke JA at 133 (NSWLR). 8 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [35], McHugh J at [114], Callanan J at [231]. 9 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, McHugh J at [71]. See also Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd v Walker Group Constructions Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 526, Ball J at [56]; Kinsella v Gold Coast City Council (No 3) [2016] QSC 14. 10 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, McHugh J at [107]–[109]. See also Brookfield

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11

12 13

14

15

ECONOMIC LOSS

Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, in which it was held that Brookfield Multiplex Limited, the builder of strata-titled serviced apartments on land in Chatswood, did not owe a duty of care to the owners corporation to avoid causing it to suffer loss resulting from latent defects in the common property which were structural, or constituted a danger to persons or property in the vicinity, or made the apartments uninhabitable. Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [25]–[26]. Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui (2006) 14 VR 55; [2006] VSCA 30, Maxwell P at [6]. Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [56]–[58]. Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ at [135]–[140]. Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Gaudron J at 197–198 (CLR). By the phrase “precise legal right”, Gaudron J appears to mean a right recognised by law.

Economic Loss [33.2.820] Pure economic loss claims must be distinguished from claims for economic loss consequent upon physical injury or property damage. Pure economic loss most frequently occurs because of a negligent statement although it may also arise because of a negligent act. Reasonable foreseeability that the action is likely to cause harm is insufficient to determine whether liability is imposed on a person to avoid harm to another’s finances, reputation or liberty.1 For example, property damage suffered by one party may result in the dislocation of supply to a third person who relies upon that supply for its commercial operations. A consequential cessation of supply would severely limit or bring to a halt the third party’s business, causing potentially heavy pure economic loss which would be attributable to the initial damage. In Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270, the High Court allowed recovery for pure economic loss in circumstances in which the plaintiff had bare contractual rights in respect of the damaged property but did not have legal ownership or possessory title. Similarly, in New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v Attorney-General [1986] 1 NZLR 14, an electricity cable owned by one party and serving the factory of a third party was negligently damaged, interrupting supply to the factory and resulting in a loss of profits to the third party.2 In England, the position appears to be otherwise, and the English courts have denied recovery where bare contractual rights to the damaged property are involved.3 Again, while in both these cases the scope of the potential liability was stringently limited by the fact that both the pipe and the cable served only one premises, a single negligent act has, in some 131

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circumstances, the potential to disrupt supply to hundreds or thousands of premises. An electrical authority which negligently caused a bushfire was held not to owe a duty of care to persons suffering pure economic loss in the form of loss of profit from dealing in the produce of land on the basis that those persons did not constitute an ascertained class.4 In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, a potato grower sued the respondent for negligently importing diseased seed, which affected potatoes in the vicinity of the appellant’s farm. Although the appellant’s farm and potatoes were not infected by the diseased seed, the appellant suffered economic loss because it was forbidden from exporting its potatoes to Western Australia, due to their proximity to the land affected by the diseased seed. Therefore the appellant’s loss was pure economic loss and not consequential upon damage to person or property. The majority of the High Court held that the appellant could recover its loss due to the reasonable likelihood of harm and because the appellant fell into an ascertainable class of person vulnerable to the respondent’s actions. Pure economic loss resulting from a negligent act was one of the key issues for the Supreme Court of Victoria in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27 arising from the Longford Gas Plant explosion. A group proceeding was commenced by a number of aggrieved parties who were divided into the following: (1)

business users: persons including corporations who were gas users for the purpose of operating a business, including a manufacturing business, who suffered damage to property and/or pecuniary loss as a result of the interruption or cessation of the supplied gas;

(2)

domestic users: persons who, at the time of the explosion (25 September 1998) were gas users for domestic purposes and who suffered damage to property and/or pecuniary loss as a result of the stoppage; and

(3)

stood down workers: persons stood down from their employment as a result of the September stoppage and who suffered pecuniary loss as a consequence.5

Gillard J of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the defendants owed a duty to the business users who suffered physical damage to property and economic loss resulting from damage to property, but not for economic loss which did not result from damaged property. The defendants did not owe any duty to the domestic users, nor to the stood down workers on the basis that their loss was pure economic loss. This exemplifies the reluctance of courts to award damages for pure economic loss. In Meshlawn Pty Ltd v Queensland [2010] QCA 181, a nightclub owner and operator sued the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation for the financial loss suffered as a result of the defendant’s refusal to renew its extended hours permits. In finding that a duty of care existed (but was not breached), the Queensland Court of Appeal looked to the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) (the relevant 132

[33.2.820]

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statutory scheme) before concluding that the chief executive of the Liquor Licensing Division (Qld) owed the appellants a limited duty of care to honestly and carefully consider the applications for renewal and all relevant material when exercising its power to grant or deny extended hours permits. In Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40, an airplane crashed in Western Australia due to the failure of one of its engines on takeoff. All passengers were employees of Nautronix Limited, which had charted the airplane in order to test some marine technology that it was developing. As a result of the crash, two Nautronix Limited employees died. The High Court found that Mr Penberthy, the plane’s pilot, was liable in negligence for the pure economic losses suffered by Nautronix Limited as a result of its employees’ death. A claim for pure economic loss by Naturonix Limited against Mr Barclay, an aeronautical engineer who had modified a bearing in the failed engine some three years before, was successful in the Western Australian Court of Appeal but abandoned before the matter could be determined by the High Court. In Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 364, the New South Wales Court of Appeal found that the respondent Council did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care to ensure that the defendant did not suffer economic loss resulting from the Council’s refusal or delay in implementing its decision in relation to the plaintiff’s development application. The decision to grant the planning application was delayed by a number of years because of an initial error on the part of the Council to correctly calculate the capacity of the town sewerage system. Concern has arisen, particularly in England, regarding attempts to use the law of torts to evade chains of discrete contractual relationships.6 Initially, recovery had been allowed where an undertaking to the plaintiff was based on a contractual promise made to a third party. In Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520; [1982] 3 WLR 477, the plaintiffs contracted with the main contractors for the construction of a factory. The floor of the factory was to be laid by the defendant subcontractors. To their knowledge they had been nominated for this purpose by the architects, acting as the plaintiff’s agents. The defendants negligently laid a defective floor which required constant maintenance and which eventually had to be replaced. They were held to owe a duty of care concerning the economic loss their negligence had caused the plaintiffs. While the House of Lords characterised the loss as pure economic loss, the defendants were liable because of the proximity between themselves and the plaintiffs. As nominated subcontractors, they must have been aware that the plaintiffs were relying on their skill and experience. The relationship was as close as it could be “short of [actual] privity of contract”.7 The decision in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd could have been explained in terms of the plaintiffs’ reliance on the defendants’ voluntary undertaking. The more recent case law undoubtedly interprets it in that way.8 However, in line with the strictures in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80; [1985] 3 WLR 317 against tort being allowed to intervene in 133

[33.2.820]

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contractual situations, English law generally rejects bypassing a deliberate scheme of contractual arrangements by allowing an action in tort.9 Thus in Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993; [1989] 3 WLR 1150, it was held that an engineer employed to decide questions arising out of a contract between his employer, the ruler of Dubai, and the plaintiffs, owed no duty of care in tort to the plaintiffs, even though it was accepted that he must act fairly and impartially. The Victorian Court of Appeal in National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18 held that, except in cases of negligence on the part of a professional providing professional services, a duty of care will almost never be imported into a relationship which is otherwise contractual.10 The general uncertainty in this area is exemplified by comparing the Court of Appeal decision in Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 WLR 828 with the House of Lords decision in British Telecommunications plc v James Thomson & Sons (Engineers) Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 9. Decided within a few days of Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter, Norwich City Council v Harvey concerned contractual arrangements for the construction of a building which provided that the building owner was to bear the risk of any loss or damage by fire. When a fire was caused by the negligence of subcontractors, the owner brought a suit in negligence. The Court of Appeal held that the provision in the head contract reflected the intention of the owner and the head contractor and that, since the subcontractor had contracted with the head contractor on that basis, it was not just or reasonable that the subcontractor should bear the loss. Despite the lack of privity, the Court held that the subcontractor ought not to be excluded from the protection of the contract. The relationship between the owner and the subcontractor was not sufficiently close and direct for a duty of care to arise. While the position in Australia must be regarded as uncertain, in Warwicker Assessments v Zadow (1989) 1 WAR 307, the Western Australian Supreme Court held that an insurance assessor employed by an insurance company owed a duty of care to the plaintiff who acted on the report to his loss. Wallace J dissented on the ground that the assessor’s only duty was towards the insurance company which employed him.11 In Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, the builder of a house owed a duty of care to a subsequent purchaser of a house in relation to the defective construction of the house, which was considered purely economic loss, on the basis of sufficient proximity between the parties and a known reliance by the purchaser on the builder.12 Bryan v Maloney was distinguished in Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (1996) 40 NSWLR 101; 91 LGERA 361 on the basis that the evidence established that the purchaser had not relied on the builder. The subsequent High Court decision of Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16 has illustrated that it is more difficult to import the duty with commercial buildings than domestic dwellings: see [33.2.810]. In Zumpano v Montagnese [1997] 2 VR 525, the Court held that an owner-builder did not owe a duty of care to the purchaser of the house to ensure that the plumber installed a vent for release of noxious gases

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from the sewerage system, when the builder built the house for his own use, rather than under a contract, and the house was subsequently sold to the plaintiff as the “builder’s own home”. In Christiani & Nielsen Pty Ltd v Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd (1993) 2 Tas R 122, a claim by a subcontractor against a principal for pure economic loss in respect of building works was struck out. In the circumstances of that case, it was considered that the parties were to be taken to have distanced themselves from each other quite deliberately by entering into detailed written agreements. In Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J expressed the opinion that any exclusion of liability by a contracting party to the other contracting party was no reason to deny the existence of a duty of care to a third party.13

1 2

3

4

5 6

7 8

D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12, McHugh J at [103]. New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v Attorney-General [1986] 1 NZLR 14 (HC). See also Williams v Attorney-General [1990] 1 NZLR 646 (HC); Mainguard Packaging Ltd v Hilton Haulage Ltd [1990] 1 NZLR 360 (HC). For Canadian authority, see Canadian National Railway v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co [1992] 1 SCR 1021; (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289. Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 159; 59 ALJR 763; [1986] AC 1; [1985] 3 WLR 381 (PC); Leigh & Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd (The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785; [1986] 2 WLR 902. Seas Sapfor Ltd v Electricity Trusts (SA) (1996) 187 LSJS 369 (SASC). See also McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (Helix Cotton Case) (1997) 72 FCR 1; 93 A Crim R 1. Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27, Gillard J at [5]–[14]. Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210; [1984] 3 WLR 953; D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368; Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd [1988] QB 758; [1988] 2 WLR 761 (CA); Greater Nottingham Co-op Society v Cementation Piling & Foundations Ltd [1989] QB 71; [1988] 3 WLR 396 (CA); Ernst & Whinney v Willard Engineering (Dagenham) Ltd (1987) 40 BLR 67 (QBD); Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993; [1989] 3 WLR 1150 (CA); Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296; [1994] 3 WLR 354. See Magnusson RS, “Spring in the House of Lords” (1994) 2 TLJ 210; Thawley T, “Duty to Be Careful when Giving Employees References” (1996) 70 ALJ 403; Wadsley J, “Liability for References – A Breath of Life” (1994) 10 PN 147; Mead P, “The Impact of Contract upon Tortious Liability of Construction Professionals” (1998) 6 TLJ 145. Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520; [1982] 3 WLR 477, Lord Roskill at 542 (AC). Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414, Lord Keith at 466–467 (AC). The case is likely to be distinguished and therefore not followed in the English courts: see Nitrigin Eireann Teoranta v Inco Alloys Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 498 (QB), May J at 505 (WLR), who described the facts of Junior

135

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9

10 11

12

13

Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520; [1982] 3 WLR 477 as “unique”. Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80; [1985] 3 WLR 317 (PC). In that regard Lord Scarman said at 107 (AC): “Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the law’s development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship. Though it is possible as a matter of legal semantics to conduct an analysis of the rights and duties inherent in some contractual relationships including that of banker and customer either as a matter of contract law when the question will be what, if any, terms are to be implied or as a matter of tort law when the task will be to identify a duty arising from the proximity and character of the relationship between the parties, their Lordships believe it to be correct in principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the law to adhere to the contractual analysis.” For a survey of the English position, see Martin R, “Statutory and Contractual Limitations on the Extent of a Common Law Duty of Care for Pure Economic Loss” (1993) 9 PN 165. For a survey of relevant Canadian law, see Tilbury M, “Purely Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada” (1994) 2 TLJ 1. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [47]. See “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. See also Frederick W Nielsen (Canberra) Pty Ltd v PDC Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ACTR 1; RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 11 BCL 74 (NSWSC); South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA); Sirtes GA, “Tortious Claims for Defective Buildings: Threading through the Labyrinth” (1993) 9 BCL 170. Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375 was applied in Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (No 2) (2013) 45 WAR 379; [2013] WASCA 213. See also Wallace IND, “Murphy Rejected: The Bryan v Maloney Landmark” (1995) 3 Tort L Rev 231. Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; 71 ALJR 487, Dawson J at 181–184 (CLR). See also WD & HO Wills (Aust) Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1998) 43 NSWLR 338.

136

Particular Defendants Parents [33.2.930] The scope of the duty of care owed by parents concerning the acts of their children involves two distinct questions. The first concerns the extent of the duty of care to the child itself. The second concerns the duty of care owed to third parties respecting the actions of the child. In both cases, the main issue is the extent to which the law imposes a positive obligation on the parent to act, that is, how far an exception exists to the normal rule that there is no liability for nonfeasance. The leading Australian case on parents’ liability towards third parties, Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, does not address the question of nonfeasance. Rather, the question was whether a parent owed a duty of care to a third party injured by a shanghai (slingshot) given by the parent to the child.1

1

Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, applied in Rouvinetis v Varady [2009] NSWSC 109.

[33.2.940] Parents owe their children no duty of care of general supervision. This is the case even where it is reasonably foreseeable that without such supervision the child may be injured. This was the expressed view of Barwick CJ and McTiernan J in the High Court decision of Hahn v Conley (1971) 126 CLR 276; 45 ALJR 631, although the High Court as a whole did not endorse that expression of opinion.1 It was also the considered view of a unanimous Full Court in Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356. King CJ offered a number of policy justifications. First, parental policies regarding supervision are variable and therefore an objective standard of care would be difficult to determine. Second, insurance cover for injury to family members is unobtainable. Finally, he found the suggested analogy with the duty of schoolteachers toward their pupils unconvincing.2 Legoe J suggested that the possibility of legal liability would constitute a “sword of Damocles” hanging over the heads of parents.3 It was an unreasonable intrusion into the parent–child relationship. While the last point suggests the parallel absence of any duty to third parties, King CJ isolated the two as separate issues. He thought that a duty of care might be owed to third parties even though no duty was owed to the child itself.4 Insurance cover for liability to third parties would be obtainable.

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The fineness of the distinction involved is illustrated by the fact that a distinction has been made between the position of natural parents and that of foster parents in this regard. In England, foster parents have been held to owe a duty of general supervision to a child in their care.5 The distinction may be explained by the fact that the position of foster parents is, in many respects, more analogous to that of teachers, being usually temporary in nature and arising through the operation of law. In SB v New South Wales (2004) 13 VR 527; [2004] VSC 514, Redlich J queried whether the policy that children should not be able to sue their parents still existed or whether the law would now intervene in the parent–child relationship.6 It was not an issue which needed to be resolved in that case. In Hoffmann v Boland [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-134; [2013] NSWCA 158, the Court of Appeal was not able to reach a consensus as to whether a grandparent owed their grandchild a duty of care in circumstances where the grandchild suffered a significant brain injury in an accident which occurred whilst she was being carried down a staircase by her grandmother at a family holiday house. However, the Court did agree that if a duty of care were to be held to exist that it would not have been breached in the particular circumstances of the case.

1 The view of Barwick CJ in Hahn v Conley (1971) 126 CLR 276; 45 ALJR 631, at 283–284 (CLR) was accepted in comment in Posthuma v Campbell (1984) 37 SASR 321 (FC), Jacobs J at 329. 2 Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356 (FC), King CJ at 361–362. 3 Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356 (FC), Legoe J at 369. 4 Robertson v Swincer (1989) 52 SASR 356 (FC), King CJ at 362. 5 Surtees v Kingston-upon-Thames Royal Borough Council, The Independent, 27 March 1991 (CA) held that foster parents owed their foster child a duty of care of general supervision, but were not in breach of that duty. But see Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550; [1999] 3 WLR 79, where the English Court of Appeal reversed a strike out application which had been successful on the basis that the plaintiff’s cause of action was not justiciable. The plaintiff had developed a psychiatric illness and alleged that a local authority was negligent as the plaintiff had relocated house nine times in 18 years while under the care of the authority. The Court of Appeal considered that it was inappropriate to strike out the proceedings and permitted the action to continue. 6 SB v New South Wales (2004) 13 VR 527; [2004] VSC 514, Redlich J at [203].

[33.2.950] A duty of care may exist between parents and children where special circumstances are present.1 Where the parent has placed the child in a situation of increased danger requiring greater supervision than is normally necessary to ensure safety, a duty of care has been found in a number of cases. Even in such circumstances, however, it is arguable that policy considerations ought to negate any duty. In normal circumstances, the claim against the parent

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is made not by the child, but by a third party defendant seeking contribution from the parent in respect of the third party’s liability towards the child. Enforcing a contribution claim against the parent is tantamount to making a deduction from the damages awarded to the child, since it may be assumed that the child has an interest in the parent’s assets. Nonetheless, the case law establishes that in special circumstances a duty may arise. In Rogers v Rawlings [1969] Qd R 262, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland held a mother liable to her child where she had joined a waterskiing party and allowed the child to participate in it without exercising appropriate care for the child’s safety. In Dickinson v Dickinson (1986) 3 SR (WA) 233, the District Court of Western Australia held a father liable to his injured child when the injury arose from another of his children playing with matches, and the father had left the children in the car when the accident occurred.2 In Bye v Bates (1989) 51 SASR 67, the defendant’s children were playing with their friends in the defendant’s home. He left the house, telling the visiting children to go home. The plaintiff child clutched the live element of a vaporiser left on the back verandah and was injured. The defendant was held liable. The vaporiser was readily accessible to the children, and the defendant had withdrawn supervision. Together, these constituted special circumstances. Contrast this situation with Towart v Adler (1989) 52 SASR 373, where the defendant landlord was held liable to a six-year-old child who fell from an upper storey window after climbing to the top of a double bunk near the window, but the claim for contribution against the father failed. While the father had opened the window, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia held that the opening of the window did not create special circumstances sufficient to take the case outside the general rule that the parent owes the child no general duty of supervision:3 see [33.2.940]. Parents owe a duty of care to their children when driving a motor vehicle. Policy arguments are irrelevant due to the presence of compulsory insurance.4

1

2 3 4

See Rogers v Rawlings [1969] Qd R 262 (FC); Dickinson v Dickinson (1986) 3 SR (WA) 233, a finding not challenged by the High Court in Dickinson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (WA) (1987) 163 CLR 500; 61 ALJR 553; Dolbel v Dolbel (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 758; 80 WN (NSW) 1056 (FC); Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 (CA). See also Yeo S, “Am I My Child’s Keeper? Parental Liability in Negligence” (1998) 12 AJFL 150. See also Dickinson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (WA) (1987) 163 CLR 500; 61 ALJR 553. See Ikonomos v Lesiuk (1973) 6 SASR 111. Dolbel v Dolbel (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 758; 80 WN (NSW) 1056 (FC); Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 (CA).

[33.2.960] In some circumstances, parents can be liable to third parties who suffer harm or loss through the act or acts of their child. In Australia,

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[33.2.960]

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the leading case on this point is Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256. In this case Dixon J said: It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another’s actions to prevent harm to strangers. The general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third.1

Dixon J, however, found that a parent is under a duty to prevent a child inflicting intentional damage on others or causing damage “by conduct involving unreasonable risk of injury to others”.2 Both Latham CJ and Starke J held that the establishment of such a duty in a particular case would depend upon the circumstances of that case.3 Subsequent cases have taken a similar approach. In Hogan v Gill [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-182, the Supreme Court of Queensland found a father was liable when he left a loaded gun in the house and his six-year-old son shot the four-year-old plaintiff in the head while the two were playing a game of “Cowboys and Indians”. In Curmi v McLennan [1994] 1 VR 513, it was held that it was open to a jury to find that the owner of a houseboat was liable in negligence when he allowed boys aged 16 or 17 years, including his son, to use the houseboat when there was an air gun and ammunition on board. Giving the judgment of the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Gobbo J said that “the question arose in the context of the general duty of care owed by those who provide a dangerous object to those who may suffer injury as a result of its use”.4 In identifying the ambit of this duty, parenthood was an important and material circumstance but it was not an essential ingredient.

1 2 3 4

Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, Dixon J at 262. Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, Dixon J at 262. Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, Latham CJ at 259, Starke J at 260. Curmi v McLennan [1994] 1 VR 513 (App Div), Gobbo J at 522.

[33.2.970] Parents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their children. Tortious liability requires personal default on the parents’ part. In Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, parents were found to owe a duty of care towards those who might be injured by the child’s use of a shanghai (slingshot). However, in that case no breach existed because the parent had expressly forbidden the use of the shanghai outside the home:1 see [33.2.960].

1 But see Pask v Owen [1987] 2 Qd R 421 (FC), where parents were negligent in allowing their son to have an air gun in his room unsupervised, knowing of the visits by friends to the room.

140

[33.2.990]

SCHOOL AUTHORITIES

School Authorities [33.2.980] School authorities and teachers have a special relationship with their pupils which gives rise to a duty of care. The nature of that duty is to see that reasonable care is taken to ensure that students are not exposed to unnecessary risk of injury. The duty is characterised by the position of vulnerability of the students and the position of authority and control exercised by the school authority.1 There is no doubt that the duty includes a positive duty to act.2 The legal debate focuses on the extent of the duty, and in particular the issue of whether the duty has been breached.

1

2

Heffey PG, “The Duty of Schools and Teachers to Protect Pupils from Injury” (1985) 11 Mon LR 1; Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; 75 ALJR 164; [2000] HCA 61, Gleeson CJ at [26]; Ashrafi Persian Trading Co Pty Ltd (t/as Roslyn Gardens Motor Inn) v Ashrafinia [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-636; [2001] NSWCA 243, Heydon J at [64]–[65]. See, eg New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4. See also White S and Orr G, “Precarious Liability: The High Court in Lepore, Samin and Rich on School Responsibility for Assaults by Teachers” (2003) 11 TLJ 101. Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749.

[33.2.990] The duty of care of a school authority is non-delegable because of the special relationship between school authorities and students:1 see [33.2.980]. This was previously unimportant because a school authority is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of the teachers employed by it. In Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749 however, the teachers were not employees of the Commonwealth. They were employed by the state of New South Wales under an agreement between New South Wales and the Commonwealth for the administration of schools in the Australian Capital Territory. The Commonwealth was held liable for the negligence of the teaching staff on the basis of its independent and non-delegable duty of care. Mason J stated: [T]he duty is not discharged by merely appointing competent teaching staff and leaving it to the staff to take appropriate steps for the care of the children. It is a duty to ensure that reasonable steps are taken for the safety of the children, a duty the performance of which cannot be delegated.2

Because the duty is non-delegable, school authorities are also liable for the negligence of independent contractors resulting in injury to students. This will also apply in situations where relief teachers may be retained through a labour hire agency. New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4 dealt with three cases brought by students alleging sexual assault at the hands of teachers. In all three cases, there was no allegation of fault against the school authority itself in occasioning the assaults. In all cases, liability rested on an 141

[33.2.990]

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argument that the liability was direct because it was non-delegable or because it was vicarious. The High Court has made it clear that the non-delegable duty is more stringent than a duty to take reasonable care. It is a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken by others. Gleeson CJ states: [T]he increased stringency to which [Mason J] was referring lay, not in the extent of the responsibility undertaken (reasonable care for the safety of the pupils), but in the inability to discharge that responsibility by delegating the task of providing care to a third party or third parties.3

In limited circumstances the duty may extend to responsibility for assault by teachers on students. The duty includes specific responsibilities of the school authority, including elements of protection. The authority will be vicariously liable for intentional acts (such as assault) if those acts are of a kind sufficiently connected to employment. A distinction is drawn between an assault occurring while maintaining discipline for misbehaviour, such as an excessive or inappropriate physical punishment which may be within employment responsibilities, albeit improper in its manner, and an assault that is clearly sexually predatory behaviour.4

1 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4. See also Sanchez-Sidiropoulos v Canavan [2015] NSWSC 1139. 2 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749, Mason J at 270 (CLR). 3 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ at [26]. See also Erilich v Leifer [2015] VSC 499. 4 See, eg Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; [2001] 2 WLR 1311; [2001] UKHL 22, where the warden of a boarding house committed sexual assaults on students and the school authority was held to be vicariously liable as the nature of the warden’s employment had many of the responsibilities of a parent. See also discussion of employers’ vicarious liability at [33.2.1070]. See also Withyman v New South Wales [2013] Aust Torts Reports 82-124; [2013] NSWCA 10 in which a school was held not to be liable for the psychological damage and harm caused to the plaintiff (a student at the time) by the termination of a sexual relationship with him by his teacher.

[33.2.1000] School authorities and teachers owe their pupils a duty of care of general supervision concerning their physical safety while they are present on the school premises.1 The duty owed by the school is higher than that of the parent: see [33.2.940]. Dicta suggesting that the standard of care by which school authorities and teachers are judged is that of the prudent parent is no longer applicable.2 The appropriateness of that standard has been judicially doubted,3 although no clear binding decision exists. A duty of general supervision is not the same as a duty of constant supervision.4 In Roman Catholic Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra & Goulburn v

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[33.2.1000]

SCHOOL AUTHORITIES

Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161; 79 ALJR 1195; [2005] HCA 31, the High Court held that the standard of care owed by the school authority did not require constant supervision. In that case, an eight-year-old girl was injured using a flying fox in the playground while the teacher on duty was supervising another area and was out of sight of the equipment. Recognising the great scope of mischief among school children, the Court nevertheless held that a system of constant supervision was not reasonable. In Johns v Minister of Education (1981) 28 SASR 206, it was found that the degree of supervision exercised by a teacher who discovered the pupils had catapults was adequate to discharge the duty of care. Victoria v Bryar (1970) 44 ALJR 174 was distinguished. In that High Court case, because the teacher actually knew that a fight was in progress the duty was more onerous. When the teacher failed to stop the fight, which involved the discharge of pipe pellets fired by elastic bands, the danger was clear. Where an additional element of danger is in existence, the supervisory duty becomes more onerous. Similarly, in H v New South Wales (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 255; [2009] NSWDC 193, a teacher was found to have breached the duty of care owed to a student who was ultimately stabbed, by failing to report an earlier incident to the principal in which a death threat had been issued to the student.5 The duty of care owed by school authorities and staff is normally confined to school hours. The headmaster in Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; 52 ALJR 142 had, by allowing pupils in early, assumed a responsibility towards them he was not otherwise bound to fulfil. Similarly, a breach was established in Barnes (an infant) v Hampshire County Council [1969] 1 WLR 1563,6 where the plaintiff, aged five, was released from school five minutes early and injured in a traffic accident. In both cases, the duty arose because of the deviation from normal practice. Where a deviation from normal practice occurs, the duty of care may be said to have been voluntarily assumed. The general rule is that once children have left the school premises, no duty of care exists on the part of the school authority or its teachers unless it has been voluntarily assumed.7 Such a voluntary assumption of responsibility may exist in relation to the supervision of school bus boarding arrangements and behaviour on the buses themselves.

1

2 3

4 5

Richards v Victoria [1969] VR 136 (FC); Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; 52 ALJR 142; Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749; Warren v Haines [1986] Aust Torts Reports 81-014 (NSWSC). Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16; 38 ALJR 106, McTiernan J at 25, Kitto J at 28 (CLR). Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749, Murphy J at 275 (CLR). He thought the more appropriate standard was that of the hospital or factory. Roman Catholic Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra & Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161; 79 ALJR 1195; [2005] HCA 31. See also Oyston v St Patrick’s College [2013] NSWCA 135, in which a school was

143

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6 7

held to have breached its duty of care to a student by failing to prevent ongoing bullying to that student. However, this is to be contrasted by New South Wales v Mikhael [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-117; [2012] NSWCA 338 in which the respondent alleged that the school had breached its duty of care by failing to provide teachers with information as to another student’s propensity to violence, even if provoked by a minor event. The respondent, who had been seriously injured by the other student, failed in his case because he had failed to establish that notifying teachers about the student’s predilection for violence would have prevented the attack on him. Barnes (an infant) v Hampshire County Council [1969] 1 WLR 1563 (HL). See Stokes v Russell (unreported, TASSC, Cosgrove J, 2 of 1983, 18 January 1983) in which it was held that there was no duty to supervise primary school children catching an ordinary bus service after school. However, the duty of supervision extends to school camps and excursions: Munro v Anglican Church of Australia, Diocese of Bathurst (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, McHugh JJA and Clarke AJA, 490 of 1985, 14 May 1987). In Horne v Queensland [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-343 (QSC), the duty of supervision extended to making travel arrangements for students between the school grounds and nearby tennis courts for an organised school activity (reversed on other grounds in Horne v Queensland (1995) 22 MVR 111 (QCA)). See also Trustees of Roman Catholic Church, Diocese of Bathurst v Koffman [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-399 (NSWCA).

[33.2.1010] The question of breach of a duty of care depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. A breach has been established where the headmaster of a school allowed pupils into the schoolyard before lessons due to commence and failed to provide supervision.1 Similarly, a breach has been established where pupils were permitted to ride bicycles from the school grounds to nearby tennis courts for an organised school activity:2 see also [33.2.1000]. Likewise, the failure to ensure supervision during a recess in which a staff meeting was held has been held to constitute a breach of duty by the teaching staff. The plaintiff pupil was injured while swinging on a rope hanging from a flagpole in the schoolyard without supervision.3 More contentiously, a state school authority received medical advice concerning the hazards inherent in the sport of rugby. It was held liable when, after having been advised of the dangers, it allowed a pupil with a long thin neck to play in the front row of a rugby scrum. The pupil suffered a cervical fracture resulting in quadriplegia.4 A breach of duty was established by a failure to give proper instruction in climbing an obstacle course while on an “adventure style” school camp.5 A school authority was held liable for having an inadequate system of inspection of school grounds when a student playing touch football during recess stepped into a pothole and broke a leg.6 The degree to which each case turns on its particular factual circumstances may be seen from the cases in which no breach of duty of care was found to have been established. In Ward v Hertfordshire County Council [1970] 1 WLR 356, the Court of Appeal held that the school authority did not breach its duty when it failed to protect pupils against contact with a flint wall with jagged surfaces. Similarly, in Kretschmar v Queensland [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-272, the

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[33.2.1030]

EMPLOYERS

Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland found no breach of duty of care where the plaintiff, a 13-year-old mentally handicapped boy, was injured while participating in a game in which there was some risk of physical contact with other participants. Adequate instruction had been provided, and the game fulfilled the purpose of developing manipulative skills and fostering team spirit. In Roman Catholic Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra & Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161; 79 ALJR 1195; [2005] HCA 31, there was no failure to adequately supervise in circumstances where an eight-year-old plaintiff was pulled off a flying fox by other students: see also [33.2.1010].

1 2 3 4 5 6

Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; 52 ALJR 142. See also New South Wales v Sticker [2015] NSWCA 180. Horne v Queensland [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-343 (QSC) (reversed on other grounds in Horne v Queensland (1995) 22 MVR 111 (QCA)). Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749. Watson v Haines [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-094 (NSWSC). Martin v Trustees of Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Sydney [2006] NSWCA 132. Bujnowicz v Trustees Roman Catholic Church [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-824; [2005] NSWCA 457. See also Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Miller [2015] NSWCA 320.

[33.2.1020] School teachers owe a duty of care to third parties in relation to the acts of pupils within the scope of their supervision.1 In Haines v Rytmeister (1986) 6 NSWLR 529, the pupils were not adequately instructed in carrying and depositing heavy boxes and the plaintiff was injured as a consequence. The defendant teacher was held liable. In Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549; [1955] 2 WLR 517, it was held that a duty of care existed towards third parties. The authority was liable for its negligence in allowing the escape of a four-year-old school child on to the highway, thereby causing the death of the plaintiff’s husband.

1

Haines v Rytmeister (1986) 6 NSWLR 529 (CA).

Employers [33.2.1030] An employer has a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of its employees. The employer’s duty of care imposes positive duties to act as well as applying to negligent actions by the employer.1 While the vast majority of actions brought by employees are for personal injury, there is no doubt that the duty extends to damage to property. This duty of an employer is usually divided into three separate duty areas:

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(1)

the duty to provide safe tools and equipment;

(2)

the duty to provide a safe workplace; and

(3)

the duty to provide a safe system of work.

That last requirement has, in practice, generated a fourth duty, that of employing competent fellow workers. As was emphasised in Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57, the employer’s duty requires the “provision of a competent staff of men, adequate material, and a proper system and effective supervision”.2 The duty to take reasonable care for the safety of employees is one to avoid exposing employees to unnecessary risk of injury. There is no qualification that particular steps need not be taken if they would unduly impede the accomplishment of the employee’s tasks. If protective measures are reasonably open to an employer, they will not ordinarily impede the accomplishment of the task.3 The duty to provide safe plant and equipment includes a requirement to provide instruction as to the operation of that equipment.4 In Laybutt v Glover Gibbs Pty Ltd (t/as Balfours NSW Pty Ltd) (2005) 79 ALJR 1808; [2005] HCA 56, an employer was found to have breached its duty where an employee had requested and not been given instruction in the method of assembling a machine used in production. The employer’s duty to provide a safe system of work extends to ensuring that such a system of work is safely operated,5 and to securing the personal safety of employees.6 In Fuller v New South Wales Department of School Education & Training [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-756; [2004] NSWCA 242, an employee fell while on a defective ladder of the employer. Notwithstanding that there was also a ladder available that was not defective, the employer was nevertheless held to have breached his duty by not having systems in place to ensure equipment available is in proper condition. In McLean v Tedman (1984) 155 CLR 306; 58 ALJR 541, the High Court held that where an unsafe system of garbage collection was being operated by employees because it enabled them to take a second job, the burden of proof lay on the employer to show that the employees would have refused to operate a safe system of work which was a reasonably practicable alternative. This appears to switch the legal burden of proof to the defendant and is contrary to English authority, which rests the whole burden of proof of negligence on the plaintiff.7

1 The commentary at [33.2.1030]–[33.2.1060] addresses the common law duty of employers. Statutory rights and obligations under workers compensation legislation are dealt with in Labour Law “Workers’ Compensation” [26.5.10]ff.

146

[33.2.1050]

2 3 4 5 6

7

EMPLOYERS

Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57, Lord Wright at 78 (AC). Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) 112 CLR 316; 38 ALJR 48, Windeyer J at 319 (CLR). Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; 85 ALJR 533; [2011] HCA 11. McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906; [1987] 3 WLR 212. Public Transport Corp (Vic) v Sartori [1997] 1 VR 168 (CA); Keeys v Queensland [1998] 2 Qd R 36 (CA). See also Victorian WorkCover Authority v Monash University [2016] VSC 178. In McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] 1 WLR 295, the House of Lords treated the matter as going to causation rather than breach of duty. The employers were held not liable to the plaintiff for failing to provide him with a safety belt because he had failed to prove that he would have worn the belt if provided.

[33.2.1040] An employer’s duty of care (see [33.2.1030]) includes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid psychiatric injury to an employee. The content of what is required to avoid psychiatric injury occupied the High Court in the matter of Koehler v Cerebos (Aust) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44; 79 ALJR 845; 139 IR 309; [2005] HCA 15. Koehler suffered a psychiatric illness which she claimed resulted from the volume of work she was expected to undertake. She alleged the employer failed to make changes and provide assistance to undertake the workload. In dismissing the worker’s appeal the Court held that the employer could not have reasonably foreseen that the appellant was exposed to a risk of psychiatric injury as a consequence of her duties at work. An employer owes a duty of care not only to its employees but also to children of employees to take reasonable care in respect of the safety of the employee parent so as to protect the children from the risk of psychiatric harm:1 see also [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1300].

1

Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 77 ALJR 1205; [2003] HCA 33; Woolworths Ltd v Perrins [2015] QCA 207. See also Handford PR, “Psychiatric Injury: Duty to Employee’s Children” (2003) 11 Tort L Rev 127.

[33.2.1050] The appropriate means of discharging the employer’s duty of reasonable care (see [33.2.1030]) depends on the facts of each case. Previous decisions on similar factual situations do not create binding precedents.1 The extent to which the trial court may be willing to depart from an analogous decision is evidenced by a comparison between Sydney County Council v Dell’Oro (1974) 132 CLR 97; 48 ALJR 471 and Bus v Sydney County Council (1989) 167 CLR 78; 63 ALJR 440. Both cases concerned the vicarious liability of an employer for the negligence of an employee towards an independent contractor rather than another employee. In the former case, the Council officer 147

[33.2.1050]

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was held to be not negligent in leaving the electrical contractor alone in the presence of live electric wires on the basis that the contractor knew of the danger; in the latter case it was held to be negligence in leaving the contractor unsupervised, because an act of negligence or inadvertence by the contractor was reasonably foreseeable. In Nair v Health Administration Corp [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-312, the New South Wales Court of Appeal found that although the risk of the plaintiff bumping her head while disembarking from a boat in the course of her employment was foreseeable and easily preventable, the employer was not liable. It was a risk to which an employee may be left exposed and it was not necessary for the employer to remind her of the risk. In Laybutt v Glover Gibbs Pty Ltd (t/as Balfours NSW Pty Ltd) (2005) 79 ALJR 1808; [2005] HCA 56, an employer was liable for failing to provide instruction as to the method of assembly of a machine used by the plaintiff in the face of a request from the plaintiff for such instructions. In Dredge v South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 374, an employer was liable for failing to provide the plaintiff police officer with a co-driver when it knew the plaintiff’s sleep pattern had been changed prior to commencing duties because of prior court attendances. The standard of care expected of an employer has moved closer to the border of strict liability with changing ideas of justice and increasing concern with safety in the community.2

1 Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743; [1959] 2 WLR 510; Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250; Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301; 60 ALJR 362. 2 Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301; 60 ALJR 362, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 308–309, Brennan and Deane JJ at 314 (CLR); Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75. See also Romig v Tabcorb Holdings Ltd [2014] QSC 249; Pasqualotto v Pasqualotto [2013] VSCA 21.

[33.2.1060] The employer’s personal duties (see [33.2.1030]) are non-delegable.1 In Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Mason J stated: The employer has the exclusive responsibility for the safety of the appliances, the premises and the system of work to which he subjects his employee and the employee has no choice but to accept and rely on the employer’s provision and judgment in relation to these matters. … In the case of the employer there is no unfairness in imposing on him a non-delegable duty; it is reasonable that he should bear liability for the negligence of his independent contractors in devising a safe system of work.2

The personal nature of the employer’s duties was emphasised in Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57,3 flowing from the doctrine of common employment. Under the doctrine of common employment, the employer was not vicariously liable for the negligence of one employee to another during employment. As a consequence, the employee’s only cause of action lay in finding a breach of the employer’s personal duty. While the

148

[33.2.1060]

EMPLOYERS

doctrine of common employment has been statutorily abrogated in Australia,4 the consequent emphasis on the personal nature of the employer’s personal duties of care may have been thought to require treatment of these duties as non-delegable. They cannot, therefore, be discharged through the medium of an employee or an independent contractor:5 see also [33.2.350]. The employer is only liable if the evidence shows an absence of care by a delegate whom the employer has entrusted with the performance of the appropriate personal duty. While the employer’s liability is strict, it is not absolute. An employer will not be responsible for the state of premises over which it cannot reasonably exert control. In DIB Group Pty Ltd (t/as Hill & Co) v Cole [2009] Aust Torts Reports 882-022; [2009] NSWCA 210 the employee was a fuel tanker driver who was injured when falling through a pit lid while delivering fuel to the appellant. The appellant was the occupier of the premises and was found liable to the plaintiff. After reviewing the relevant authorities on control,6 Basten JA, in refusing to find negligence on behalf of the employer, stated: The employer’s duty, however effected, to adopt safe systems of work and to provide proper plant and equipment, will operate differently on its own premises and in circumstances over which it has full control, as compared with premises under the control of others and circumstances over which it does not have control. Where the safety of premises is at stake, as in this case, it is appropriate to ask quite specific questions with respect to what may be expected of an employer exercising reasonable care for the safety of its employees.7

Parkview Constructions Pty Ltd v Abrahim [2013] NSWCA 460 concerned a plaintiff who was working as a painter on a building site at Greenwich. The plaintiff fell and suffered serious injuries when a metal plank on a three-board “hop-up” platform, attached to a scaffolding framework, gave way as he stepped on to it. The plaintiff sued Parkview, the head contractor on the construction site; Erect Safe, the scaffolding subcontractor engaged by Parkview, which was responsible for erecting the scaffolding; and Blue Star, the plaintiff’s employer. In holding that Blue Star owed the plaintiff a personal, non-delegable duty to ensure that reasonable care was taken to prevent him from being injured while working on the site, the Court of Appeal said that it was not open to Blue Star to escape liability by contending that it relied on the expertise of Erect Safe or the inspection and warning regime instituted by Parkview.8 The fact that the employer is personally liable for a lack of care shown by his or her delegate does not add anything in the case of actions by an employee towards other employees. The employer is in any case vicariously liable for negligence by employees in the course of their employment: see [33.2.1070]. It removes any doubt, however, regarding liability of the employer for the negligence of independent contractors (see [33.2.1080]) which may cause injury to the employees. For example, notwithstanding the appointment of an independent person to undertake the tasks necessary to maintain equipment for a safe workplace, the employer’s non-delegable duty remains if the equipment causes injury to an employee.

149

[33.2.1060]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

The non-delegable duty exists even when the employee performing the work is also the employer. In Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; 78 ALJR 907; [2004] HCA 28, Mr Wail was injured unloading and loading trolleys of linen. Mr Wail had been an employee of Brambles for many years until a restructuring by Brambles resulted in Andar Transport contracting with Brambles to provide the same service. Mr Wail was a director and shareholder of Andar Transport and was employed by it to perform the duties he had previously performed as an employee of Brambles. The Court held that notwithstanding the system of work that was and had been in place for many years while Brambles was the employer, Andar Transport had a non-delegable duty to ensure that the system of work was safe for Mr Wail. The duty to take reasonable care is placed on Andar Transport. There is no such duty placed on Mr Wail as a director personally. A distinction is drawn between the duty of an employer and any director’s duties owed by Mr Wail. The fact that Mr Wail is both the director and employee of the company does not permit what is in effect reliance on contributory negligence as a complete defence.9 The non-delegability of the duty of care does not extend to the purchase of tools and equipment. The employer is entitled to discharge its duty of care to employees in this respect by purchasing tools and equipment from a reputable source.10 The Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (UK), under which fault on the part of the supplier of the equipment is attributed to the employer, has no Australian equivalent. Where the risk of a certain work practice and the means of avoiding that risk are obvious to the employee, the employer may be entitled to expect the plaintiff employee to adopt the obvious means of avoiding the risk. This is not delegation to the employee but observance of the duty of reasonable care on the employer’s part.11 It would be different had the employee’s adoption of an unsafe work practice injured another employee, as the employer would have been vicariously liable: see [33.2.1070]. However, if the risk is brought about by the system of work, even if an obvious risk, the employer’s duty to provide a safe system of work remains. So, for example, in Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 79 ALJR 839; [2005] HCA 14, the system of work loading a truck using a movable platform presented an obvious risk that a worker might step off the back of the truck while the movable platform was not in position. This risk was obvious but the Court found that the employer had breached its duty. The work being performed was repetitive and inadvertence by employees, in the face of an obvious risk, was a matter that the employer should have taken steps to address.

1 In New South Wales and Victoria, legislative reforms have effectively amalgamated the concepts of non-delegable duty and vicarious liability: see [33.2.90], [33.2.350]; “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.720]; “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.230]. See, eg Miles v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1311; Williams v Twynam Agricultural Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1098.

150

[33.2.1070]

EMPLOYERS

2

Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Mason J at 687–688 (CLR). See also Roberts v DRB Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] ACTSC 268; Govic v Boral Australian Gypsum Ltd [2015] VSCA 130. 3 Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57, Lord Wright at 78. 4 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 216; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151AA; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 22; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 63; Employers’ Liability Act 1943 (Tas), s 5 (repealed by Legislation Repeal Act 2003 (Tas)); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24A; Law Reform (Common Employment) Act 1951 (WA), s 3. 5 Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531. 6 DIB Group Pty Ltd (t/as Hill & Co) v Cole [2009] Aust Torts Reports 882-022; [2009] NSWCA 210, Basten JA at [43]–[55]. 7 DIB Group Pty Ltd (t/as Hill & Co) v Cole [2009] Aust Torts Reports 882-022; [2009] NSWCA 210, Basten JA at [54]. 8 Parkview Constructions Pty Ltd v Abrahim [2013] NSWCA 460, Sackville AJA at [106] (McColl and Gleeson JJA agreeing). 9 See also “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. 10 Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1959] AC 604; [1959] 2 WLR 331; Peake v Steriline Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-154 (VSC). 11 Raimondo v South Australia (1979) 53 ALJR 358 (note) (HCA) (distinguishing General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953] AC 180; [1953] 2 WLR 6). See also Goldsworthy v Burnside City Corp (unreported, SASCFC, Bollen J, SCGRG/89/2160 of 1989, 10 November 1993).

[33.2.1070] An employer is vicariously liable for negligence by employees in the course of employment. Vicarious liability will not extend the liability of an employer for actions of an employee that are outside the scope of employment. It will extend to acts that are sufficiently connected to employment even if they are in some way improper in manner. For example, in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, it was considered that if, as a matter of fact, the assault on the student was connected to the application of discipline for inappropriate behaviour then vicarious liability may still apply. If the assault is in the nature of a predatory sexual assault then the employer is not vicariously liable for such deliberate action. Therefore consideration must be given to the criminal nature1 and seriousness of any act by the employee. The extent to which vicarious liability applies to employers has drawn attention in litigation regarding assaults by crowd controllers employed at hotels. For example, in Sandstone DMC Pty Ltd v Trajkovski [2006] NSWCA 205 and Starks v RSM Security Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-763; [2004] NSWCA 351 both held that there was sufficient connection between the assault

151

[33.2.1070]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

and the employment requirement to eject unruly patrons from the club that the employer was vicariously liable.2

1 See also Criminal Offences “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff; “Sexual Offences” [10.3.10]ff. 2 See also Sprod v Public Relations Oriented Security Pty Ltd [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-921; [2007] NSWCA 319.

[33.2.1080] An employer may have a duty of care to safeguard its independent contractors, but it will not be vicariously liable for their negligence. The extent of this duty of care will differ from the duty owed to employees: see [33.2.1030]. In Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, all the judges of the High Court accepted that a duty of care might exist on the part of an employer to provide a safe system of work for independent contractors.1 Mason and Brennan JJ held that there was no breach of the duty of care on the facts.2 The employer was entitled to expect the contractors to adopt a safe system of work. Because no non-delegable duty existed (see [33.2.1060]), there was no liability for any absence of care on the contractor’s part.3 Wilson and Dawson JJ held that a non-delegable duty of care was owed to the various contractors but that no breach had occurred.4 Deane J, dissenting, held that the employer was personally in breach of its duty of care to the plaintiff contractor, but said nothing about the delegability of the duty of care.5 An employer’s vicarious liability does not extend beyond employees: see [33.2.1070]. In Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR 317; [2006] HCA 19, the plaintiff suffered injury when hit on the head by a refrigerator door maintained or distributed by the respondent. Boylan Nominees had arranged a mechanic to attend to repair the door. The mechanic was not an employee and not a party to the litigation. The Court found that the respondent was not vicariously liable for the actions of the mechanic. It declined to extend the scope of vicarious liability beyond that existing between employer and employee.6

1 See also Jovanovski v Billbergia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 211, Davies J at 47–50. 2 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J at 32, Brennan J at 48–49 (CLR). 3 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J at 32, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 39 (CLR). 4 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 45 (CLR). 5 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Deane J at 54 (CLR).

152

[33.2.1090]

6

PRISON AUTHORITIES AND POLICE

For further commentary, see Burnett J, “Avoiding Difficult Questions: Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors in Sweeney v Boylan Nominees” (2007) 29 Syd LR 163. See also Beuermann C, “Vicarious Liability and Conferred Authority Strict Liability: Woodland v Swimming Teachers’ Association [2012] EWCA Civ 239” (2013) 20 Torts Law Journal 265; Singh J, “All Fun and Games: Employer Liability for Employees’ Wrongful Conduct” (2013) 87 Law Institute Journal 48.

Prison Authorities and Police [33.2.1090] Prison authorities have a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of prisoners in their charge. Because prison authorities deprive the prisoners in their custody of their liberty and assume control of their persons, they have a duty to protect the prisoners in their custody from those dangers to which imprisonment renders them particularly vulnerable. The scope of the duty has been considered by the High Court in New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 236; [2005] HCA 76. The Court noted that the content of the duty to take reasonable care in relation to a prison authority is to be contrasted with other centres, such as shopping centres where people lawfully gather.1 [T]he prison authority is charged with the custody of persons involuntarily held there. Violence is, to a lesser or a greater degree, often on the cards. No one except the authority can protect a target from the violence of other inmates.2

In that case, the respondent was assaulted by other prisoners while an inmate of Silverwater Prison in New South Wales. The respondent was a known target and the authority was under a duty to adopt measures to reduce the risk of harm. The evidence established that the authority had not adopted sufficient preventative measures to discharge its duty. The duty is not to guarantee the safety of prisoners, but to take reasonable care for their safety.3 In Howard v Jarvis (1958) 98 CLR 177; 32 ALJR 40, a prisoner perished in a fire in his cell. It was alleged that the prison authority failed to search him for matches and cigarettes before locking him up. Because imprisonment renders prisoners particularly vulnerable to the risk of fire, a duty is owed concerning such risks.4 The duty of care owed by prison authorities in the protection of prisoners from dangers which are similar in all material respects to those which they would meet in the outside world is founded on general principles. Thus, where an elderly female prisoner was injured while attempting a task which was beyond her physical capacity, it was held that the prison authorities were not negligent in failing to warn her of the risks involved.5 The position might be otherwise where a difficult and strenuous task was deliberately allocated to a frail or physically weak prisoner.6 A prison authority was liable in negligence where an inmate slipped on a puddle of water in a toilet cubicle while on weekend detention.7 153

[33.2.1090]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

A duty of care is owed to inmates in respect of the allocation of work. Further, a duty may exist in relation to the “system of work” utilised, which in the context of an employer’s duty of care is generally taken to include the arrangements or the organisation of the operation or process, the sequence in which the various steps in the operation are carried out, the coordination of different parts of the operation, the methods of using particular equipment or machines or carrying out particular processes, the supply of suitable appliances and adequate manpower, and the provision of proper instructions, warnings and notices before, during or after the operational process in question.8 The question also arises of whether the duty owed could be characterised as non-delegable, a question which becomes particularly relevant where Commonwealth, state or territory authorities contract with private firms for the provision of prison facilities and staff. The question has not yet been dealt with regarding criminal detention. In New South Wales v Napier [2002] NSWCA 402, the Court dealt with the liability of both the state and the private contractor running the prison for the psychiatric injury caused to a plaintiff. The plaintiff was not an inmate but was employed by another company to run the factory within the prison. The Court held that as the plaintiff was working within the prison, both prison authorities had a duty to him. That duty arose because of the right to direct and control the plaintiff since the employment was in a prison context and the duty of each defendant was therefore analogous to that owed to an employee: see [33.2.1030]. It was not necessary to determine in the circumstances where each defendant owed a duty, or whether the State’s duty was non-delegable. In S v Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 217; [2005] FCA 549, the duty to immigration detainees was conceded by the Commonwealth as a non-delegable duty analogous to both that of prison authority and prisoner, and hospital and patient. The duty was therefore held to accommodate “the peculiar vulnerability to which detainees known to suffer mental illness are exposed”.9 The duty required the prison authority to ensure that reasonable care was taken of detainees who, by reason of their detention, were unable to care for themselves. The Commonwealth was held to have breached that duty by neglecting to inform itself of the adequacy or otherwise of the level of treatment provided by those it had contracted to provide those services.10

1 See “Causes of Action” [33.3.180]. See also Human Rights “Prisoners” [21.6.1060]; Professional Liability “Government Authorities” [27.9.10]ff. 2 New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 236; [2005] HCA 76, the Court at [44]. 3 New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 236; [2005] HCA 76, the Court at [51].

154

[33.2.1105]

PRISON AUTHORITIES AND POLICE

4

It seems likely that a similar duty would be owed either to prisoners as a class or to a distinct subgroup of prisoners in respect of other risks to which imprisonment renders them peculiarly vulnerable. Such a duty might, eg be owed to Aboriginal prisoners as a class in light of the findings of Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report, Parl Paper No 126–130 (AGPS, 1991). See Quayle v New South Wales [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-367 (NSWDC). See also Australian Institute of Criminology, Deaths in Prison Custody (online) (http://aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/mr/1-20/20/08_prison.html, viewed 1 June 2016). 5 Quinn v Hill [1957] VR 439 (FC). 6 But see Morgan v Attorney-General [1965] NZLR 134 (SC). 7 New South Wales v Oliver [2006] NSWCA 124. 8 Haseldine v South Australia (2007) 96 SASR 530; [2007] SASC 39, White J at [85]–[86]. 9 S v Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 217; [2005] FCA 549, Finn J at [217]. 10 By contrast, see Knight v Home Offıce (UK) [1990] 3 All ER 237 (QBD), where the standard of care for a mentally ill prisoner in a prison hospital was held not to be as high as the standard of care in a psychiatric hospital outside prison. See also [33.2.1150] in regard to hospitals.

[33.2.1100] Prison authorities may owe a duty of care to persons or property injured by escaping prisoners or those on temporary release. In Home Offıce (UK) v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140, the Home Office was held to be vicariously liable where the actions of escaping Borstal trainees led to a yacht colliding with the yacht of the plaintiff. The trainees escaped due to negligent supervision by their warders, who had failed to carry out their orders concerning supervision. This duty extends only to those in the immediate vicinity of the facility whose persons or property might foreseeably be injured in an escape bid, and only where the negligent act fell wholly outside the discretion of the officers. In Swan v South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 532, the Parole Board and the Department of Correctional Services were held not to owe a duty of care to the public in the manner of release and supervision of released criminals. The exception was where there was available information which revealed a breach of parole condition which was reasonably foreseeable by those authorities as being likely to cause harm to particular persons. [33.2.1105] Police are under no duty of care to prevent a person from harming themselves or another person; nor is there a general duty to rescue. In Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, police officers found a man in his car at a secluded beach in the early hours of the morning with a plastic hose running from the exhaust pipe into a window of the vehicle. The man was writing something but the motor was not running. The man told the officers that, whilst he had been contemplating something “stupid”, he had changed his mind. He said he would return home to discuss things with his wife. The man was permitted to leave. He

155

[33.2.1105]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

committed suicide at home in his car later the same day. The man’s wife sued the police for damages, alleging that the officers had breached their duty of care towards her husband and herself by failing, inter alia, to apprehend him under s 10 of the Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) (now repealed by the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic)). Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ, in overturning the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal below, stated that: The duty which the plaintiff alleged the police officers owed her late husband was a duty to control his actions, not in this case to prevent harm to a stranger, but to prevent him harming himself. On its face, the proposed duty would mark a significant departure from an underlying value of the common law which gives primacy to personal autonomy, for its performance would have the officers control conduct of Mr Veenstra deliberately directed at himself. Personal autonomy is a value that informs much of the common law. It is a value that is reflected in the law of negligence. The co-existence of a knowledge of a risk of harm and power to avert or minimise that harm does not, without more, give rise to a duty of care at common law. As Dixon J said in [Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256], “[t]he general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third”. It is, therefore, “exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another’s actions to prevent harm to strangers”. And there is no general duty to rescue. In this respect, the common law differs sharply from civil law. The common law has been described as “individualistic”, the civil law as “more socially impregnated”. It may be said that the notion of personal autonomy is imprecise, if only because it will often imply some notion of voluntary action or freedom of choice. And, as Windeyer J pointed out in [Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205], albeit in a different context, words like “voluntary” are ambiguous. But expressed in the most general way, the value described as personal autonomy leaves it to the individual to decide whether to engage in conduct that may cause that individual harm. As Lord Hope of Craighead put it in [Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363], “[o]n the whole people are entitled to act as they please, even if this will inevitably lead to their own death or injury”. When a duty to control the actions of another is found it will usually be because the person to be controlled is not autonomous. Thus, the duty of care which a gaoler owes a prisoner is owed because the prisoner is deprived of personal liberty and the gaoler has assumed control of the prisoner’s person. The prisoner does not have autonomy. Is the duty postulated in this case to be justified on the basis that the person to whom the duty is owed is not capable of exercising personal autonomy? The majority in the Court of Appeal concluded that it was to be inferred from s 10 of the [Mental Health Act 1986] that it was the legislative view “that to attempt suicide is to be mentally ill”. If that were right, it may be said that finding the alleged duty of care would not encroach upon the autonomy of the individual because autonomy presupposes full capacity to make choices. But the inference which the Court of Appeal drew is not open. Section 10 does not reveal any legislative view that to attempt suicide is to be mentally ill. Nor, as explained below, has that been the unqualified position of the common law.1

156

[33.2.1110]

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However, police are, like prison authorities, subject to a duty of care to exercise reasonable care for the safety of people that they detain in custody.2

1 2

Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [87]–[91] (citations omitted). See Howard v Jarvis (1958) 98 CLR 177; 32 ALJR 40. For a further examination of the duties owed by police, see [33.2.390].

Transferors of Real Property [33.2.1110] A lessor of real property owes a duty of care regarding defective premises either to the tenant or to other users of the premises. By virtue of the rule in Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428, lessors were traditionally held to be immune at common law from a duty of care towards persons injured due to the defective state of premises.1 In Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, the High Court affirmed that Cavalier v Pope no longer represents the law in Australia with respect to let premises and sought to provide a more consistent ratio to that enunciated in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428.2 As to whether a vendor of real property owes a duty of care regarding defective premises is yet unclear. Some have expressed the view that vendors are not under a duty to persons injured due to defects in premises.3 The basis for this statement is the old English authority of Otto v Bolton [1936] 2 KB 46. However, this case predates Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris, and represents an extension of the rule in Cavalier v Pope, so that it may well be that it too no longer represents the law in Australia. Other commentators share this view.4

1

2

3

4

The immunity of landlords has been removed by statute in some states: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 9(1). See also “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff. In Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 196 (CLR) found that, in addition to the tenants themselves, a landlord’s duty also extended to entrants on premises “whether as an incident of a familial or other personal relationship”. See “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff. Tettenborn A, “Dangerous and Defective Premises” in Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) pp 549–550. In Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012), it is stated at p 572 that, subsequent to Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, vendors are not immune from a duty.

157

[33.2.1120]

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[33.2.1120] A lessor or vendor whose negligent work causes premises to become defective owes a duty of care to those who suffer injury or property damage because of the defects.1 While originally this liability extended only to a builder who had been engaged to work on the land of another,2 it now applies equally to an owner-builder or lessor-builder. Liability in those circumstances has been confirmed by the House of Lords in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; [1977] 2 WLR 1024 and Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414. Similarly, a landlord of property who has either designed the property or undertaken work on it before letting it owes a duty of care to those persons foreseeably endangered by the defective state of the property:3 see [33.2.1110]. In Parker v Housing Trust (SA) (1986) 41 SASR 493, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia held that a lessor of real property who has the obligation to keep the premises in good repair owes a duty of care where a person is injured by a defective appliance which forms part of the premises. The Court expressly refused to follow Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428, although that case might have been distinguished since no obligation to keep the premises in good repair existed under the lease.

1 Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 622–623 (CLR); Sharpe v Sweeting (ET) & Son [1963] 1 WLR 665 (Assizes); Bowen v Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 394 (CA). But see Otto v Bolton [1936] 2 KB 46. 2 Sharpe v Sweeting (ET) & Son [1963] 1 WLR 665 (Assizes). 3 Rimmer v Liverpool City Council [1985] QB 1; [1984] 2 WLR 426 (CA).

[33.2.1130] Substantial difficulty arises in distinguishing between circumstances where the harm or loss alleged is physical damage to persons or property, and those where it is more appropriately characterised as pure financial loss: see [33.2.820]. In England, a line of authority commencing with the Court of Appeal decision in Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373; [1972] 2 WLR 299, and culminating in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728; [1977] 2 WLR 1024, suggested that where the defects represented a present or imminent danger to the person or property of the occupants, the issue was one of damage to property. Those cases were followed in decisions in Australia, Canada and New Zealand concerning both the liability of builders and the liability of local authorities for negligent exercise of their statutory powers in allowing the building of defective houses.1 The High Court decision in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120 concerned the liability of a local authority for negligent exercise of its statutory powers in allowing the building of a house on defective foundations. Two members of the majority, Brennan and Deane JJ, considered the damage in question to be pure economic loss.2 Mason and Wilson JJ did not find it necessary to decide the question.3 Only Gibbs CJ agreed with the Anns v Merton London Borough Council position that the

158

[33.2.1130]

TRANSFERORS OF REAL PROPERTY

damage was damage to property.4 The case was decided against the plaintiffs on a different point. In Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414, the House of Lords, overruling Anns v Merton London Borough Council, held that loss suffered by the purchaser which was unaccompanied by physical injury or damage to the plaintiff’s property was pure economic loss. The defendant local authority therefore owed no duty of care towards the plaintiff irrespective of whether the house was a danger to its occupants. Murphy v Brentwood District Council was followed and applied to builders in Department of the Environment (UK) v Thomas Bates & Sons Ltd [1991] 1 AC 499; [1990] 3 WLR 457. In England, that is sufficient to dispose of the duty issue. In Australia, however, compensation for pure economic loss in such circumstances has in the past required a determination of whether a sufficiently proximate relationship exists between the builder or the local authority and the plaintiff. In two decisions involving pure economic loss because of negligent construction, the Court attempted to discern whether the requisite relationship of proximity existed. In National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Coffey & Partners Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 401, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland held on appeal, on a pleading summons, that a sufficiently proximate relationship existed between the builder and the plaintiff. In another pleading summons case, it was held that a plaintiff had to plead and prove reliance to establish the requisite proximity.5 In Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; 69 ALJR 375, the damages claimed due to the inadequacy of the building footings were considered economic loss. The relationship between the builder and subsequent owner regarding this type of economic loss possessed a comparable degree of proximity to that possessed by the relationship between the builder and the first owner so as to give rise to a duty to take reasonable care on the part of the builder to avoid such loss. The decision in Bryan v Maloney has been criticised. It has been stated that the decision does not provide sufficient guidance in the determination of the differing scenarios which may arise in respect of defective structures and economic loss and, therefore, whether a duty of care will be owed.6 While McHugh J found that the principle in Bryan v Maloney applies only to dwelling houses and not commercial buildings, the majority distinguished Bryan v Maloney in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16 because of the absence of vulnerability on the part of the plaintiff and reliance on the defendant’s advice.7 While the decision in Bryan v Maloney may be said to be based upon the relationship between builder and subsequent purchaser at a time when proximity was still operative (see [33.2.250]), it may well be possible to explain the decision by reference to some of the criteria in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999)

159

[33.2.1130]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36; for example, the vulnerability of a subsequent purchaser of domestic property.

1 Wollongong City Council v Fregnan [1982] 1 NSWLR 244; (1982) 46 LGRA 391 (CA); Clarke v Gisborne Shire Council [1984] VR 971; (1984) 57 LGRA 135; Burgchard v Holroyd Municipal Council [1984] 2 NSWLR 164; (1984) 53 LGRA 7; Ordog v Mission (District) (1980) 110 DLR (3d) 718; Nielsen v Kamloops (City) [1984] 2 SCR 2; (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 641; Mount Albert Borough Council v Johnson [1979] 2 NZLR 234 (CA); Young v Tomlinson [1979] 2 NZLR 441 (SC); JW Harris & Sons Ltd v Demolition & Roading Contractors (NZ) Ltd [1979] 2 NZLR 166 (SC); Stieller v Porirua City Council [1983] NZLR 628 (HC). The liability of local authorities in this situation is dealt with in Professional Liability “Government Authorities” [27.9.10]ff. 2 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Brennan J at 493–494, Deane J at 503–504 (CLR). 3 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 466, Wilson J at 471 (CLR). 4 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Gibbs CJ at 446–447 (CLR). 5 Opat v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1992] 1 VR 283. 6 For an example of the criticisms, see Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (1996) 40 NSWLR 101; 91 LGERA 361 (NSWCA); Zumpano v Montagnese [1997] 2 VR 525 (FC), Brooking JA at 526–544; Fangrove Pty Ltd v Tod Group Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 236 (QCA), de Jersey CJ at 236–241. 7 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16 (affirming Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-660; [2002] QCA 88); Fangrove Pty Ltd v Tod Group Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 236 (QCA). See also Woollahra Municipal Council v Sved (1996) 40 NSWLR 101; 91 LGERA 361 (NSWCA), Clarke JA at 133 (NSWLR). See also [33.2.810] for a discussion on reasonable foreseeability in relation to property damage. Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd was applied in Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36.

[33.2.1140] Statutory warranties may apply to builders and contractors in respect of negligent construction.1 Where these are available, it may in some circumstances be preferable to pursue them. Similarly, builders and contractors may be caught by the implied guarantees in ss 60 and 61 of the Australian Consumer Law,2 in relation to the supply of services. While liability under ss 60 and 61 depends upon a finding of fault, the guarantees contained therein may be absolute.

1 See, eg Building Work Contractors Act 1995 (SA), s 32; Housing Indemnity Act 1992 (Tas), s 7; House Contracts Guarantee Act 1987 (Vic), s 6; Home Building Contracts

160

[33.2.1150]

2

HOSPITALS

Act 1991 (WA), s 9(2). See also Tettenborn A, “Dangerous and Defective Premises” in Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) pp 551–553. Australian Consumer Law found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2.

Hospitals [33.2.1150] A hospital owes a non-delegable duty of care1 to its patients where care is provided by the hospital,2 although the position is otherwise where a patient has directly engaged an outside surgeon.3 The distinction turns upon whether the patient has no say in the selection of the medical personnel employed to provide care4 or whether the patient has directly engaged the physician responsible.5 The distinction may, in practice, be fine. Thus a hospital may owe a non-delegable duty concerning staff directly employed by it, but have no such duty regarding medical practitioners directly engaged by patients.6 A public hospital does not owe a general duty of care to provide public patients with a choice of doctor or to appraise a patient as to the academic standing of a registrar (who may perform surgeries under the gaze of a specialist), however there is a duty on a hospital to ensure that it provides patients with suitably qualified staff.7 No duty of care is owed by a hospital to a person or their relatives, harmed by a mentally-ill patient who the hospital has discharged and placed in the person’s care.8 The 2002 legislative reforms (see [33.2.50]) have dealt with the standard of care of professionals:9 see [33.2.90], [33.2.1620] and [33.2.1820]. The legislation in most jurisdictions deals with duties to warn of risks, and in some cases specifically excludes doctors and health care professionals.10 In Queensland and Tasmania there are statutory provisions dealing with the proactive and reactive duty of doctors to warn of risks.11

1

2

3

In New South Wales and Victoria, legislative reforms have effectively amalgamated the concepts of non-delegable duty and vicarious liability: see [33.2.90] and [33.2.350]; “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.230]; “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.720]. See, eg Miles v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1311; Williams v Twynam Agricultural Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1098. See Health and Guardianship “Institutional and Professional Liability” [20.3.10]ff. See also Cassidy v Ministry of Health (UK) [1951] 2 KB 343 (CA), Denning LJ at 365; Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 (CA), Reynolds JA at 562, where the hospital was, in appropriate circumstances, held to owe such a duty because it was not a “mere custodial institution”. Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (CA).

161

[33.2.1150]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

4 5 6

Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 (CA). Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (CA). Cassidy v Ministry of Health (UK) [1951] 2 KB 343 (CA), Denning LJ at 362; Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (CA). 7 Brus v Australian Capital Territory [2007] ACTSC 83, Connolly J at [62]. 8 Hunter & New England Local Health District v McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270; 89 ALJR 39; [2014] HCA 44. 9 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 6; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 5; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 6; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 7. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. The Western Australian provisions are limited to health care professionals: see Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5PB. See also Professional Liability “Health Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff; Walmsley S, Zipser B and Abadee A, Professional Liability in Australia (3rd ed, Lawbook Co., 2015). 10 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 5H, 5P; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 15(2)(c), 22(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 38(2)(c), 41(5); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 17(2)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 50, 60. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory or Western Australia. 11 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 15, 21; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 21. See also Professional Liability “Health Practitioners” [27.2.570]–[27.2.810].

Occupiers [33.2.1160] Occupiers owe a non-delegable duty of care1 to contractual entrants. It is based on an implied warranty that the land or premises are as safe for entry as the exercise of reasonable care can make them.2 It cannot ordinarily be discharged by delegation to an independent contractor but can be discharged in some cases where damage is caused by the careless act of an employee of an independent contractor.3 The judgment of Windeyer J in Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1 supports the view that non-delegability is not limited to those in a contractual relationship with the occupier. It extends to all those who enter under the terms of a contract and possibly may apply where no contract exists.4 In Simpson v Blanch [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-458, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that an owner of land owed a non-delegable duty to users of the adjoining highway to ensure that fences would contain animals to the property. In AD & SM McLean Pty Ltd v Meech (2005) 13 VR 241; [2005] VSCA 305, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that an occupier of land may be liable for breach of a non-delegable duty to guard against injury which was the result of activities conducted on the land, by reference to the combined effect of the magnitude of the foreseeable risk of an accident occurring and the potential damage and/or injury if an accident did occur, such that an ordinary person

162

[33.2.1170]

STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

acting reasonably would consider it necessary to exercise special care or special precautions. In that case, horses were agisted on a property which abutted a major multi-lane highway. A horse escaped and, in the middle of the night, collided with a car driven along the highway, which in turn caused the horse to collide with a car driven by the injured party. Occupiers owe no duty to protect lawful entrants on their premises from the criminal behaviour of third parties unless there is a high level of recurrent and predictable criminal behaviour. However a duty can exist if there is a contractual obligation of this nature on the occupier or some other assumption that imports such a duty.5 The duties of an occupier are codified to some extent in legislation within some jurisdictions.6

1

2

3

4 5

6

In New South Wales and Victoria, legislative reforms have effectively amalgamated the concepts of non-delegable duty and vicarious liability: see [33.2.90], [33.2.350]; “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.230]; “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.720]. See, eg Miles v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1311; Williams v Twynam Agricultural Group Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1098. See “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff for a discussion of the diminished importance of different categories of entrants since Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180 and a summary of relevant case law. Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, where the High Court declined to find that a local council had breached a non-delegable duty of care in circumstances where the plaintiff was injured as a result of the negligent acts of an employee of an independent contractor. Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 93–94 (CLR). Proprietors of Strata Plan No 17226 v Drakulic (2002) 55 NSWLR 659; 1 STR (NSW) 313; [2002] NSWCA 381; applied in Wagstaff v Haslam (2007) 69 NSWLR 1; [2007] NSWCA 28. See also Spedding v Nobles (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 29. See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 12.1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IIA; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA). For further detailed discussion of the legislative framework, see “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff.

Statutory Authorities [33.2.1170] The identification of the scope of a duty of a government department or statutory authority requires identification of the person or class of persons to whom a duty is owed. In some situations the identification of a class of persons to whom a duty is owed is a relatively straightforward task. For example, government housing departments owe a duty to the class of people who are tenants in government owned housing; welfare departments owe a duty

163

[33.2.1170]

PARTICULAR DEFENDANTS

to those who are wards of the State.1 Often though, identifying a class of persons who may face a risk which is not just a risk faced by the public generally can be a difficult issue. In Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, the Court considered to whom a duty of care was owed. The case was ultimately decided on questions of breach, having found the duty of the statutory authority was owed to those entering the Casuarina coastal reserve as if it were the occupier. As Hayne J stated, “[t]he real subject for debate was what that duty required of” the statutory authority (occupier), which is an issue to be determined in breach and causation, and not whether a duty of care was owed.2 In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54, the High Court dealt with the question of the existence of a duty of care on the part of the State government and the relevant local council (the existence of a duty by the oyster grower and distributor not being in dispute). Gleeson CJ expressed it this way: Accepting that local government authorities, and State governments, have responsibilities for public health and safety, those responsibilities are owed to the public. Mr Ryan must establish that the State, and the Council, owed a duty of care to him, as a consumer of Wallis Lake oysters. If such a duty exists, then presumably a similar duty is owed to all consumers of all potentially contaminated food and, perhaps, to all persons whose health and safety might be affected in consequence of governmental action or inaction. What is the content of the duty owed to Mr Ryan, or to oyster consumers? If it is not possible to answer that question with reasonable clarity, that may cast doubt on the existence of the duty. These are matters for separate consideration in relation to the State and the Council. One thing is clear. Reasonable foreseeability of harm of the kind suffered by Mr Ryan, whilst a necessary condition for the existence of a duty of care on the part of the Council or the State, is not sufficient. In the case of a governmental authority, it may be a very large step from foreseeability of harm to the imposition of a legal duty, breach of which sounds in damages, to take steps to prevent the occurrence of harm. And there may also be a large step from the existence of power to take action to the recognition of a duty to exercise the power. Issues as to the proper role of government in society, personal autonomy, and policies as to taxation and expenditure may intrude. Even where a statute confers a specific power upon a public authority in circumstances where mandamus will lie to vindicate a public duty to give proper consideration to whether to exercise the power, it does not follow that the public authority owes a duty to an individual, or a class of persons, in relation to the exercise of the power. In the case of both the State and the Council, it is failure to exercise those powers, not negligence in the manner of their exercise, that is said to constitute the breach.3

1 See, eg Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285. 2 Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96

164

[33.2.1180]

3

STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Hayne J at 487 (CLR). Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54, Gleeson CJ at [8]–[9]. See also Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2000) 102 FCR 307; 109 LGERA 1; [2000] FCA 1099.

[33.2.1180] The duty owed by statutory authorities has been restricted by legislation. The 2002 legislative reforms (see [33.2.50]) in most jurisdictions have included provisions dealing with public authorities:1 see also [33.2.90]. The legislation has in each case sought to codify the elements for consideration in determining both the existence of a duty and whether any duty has been breached. Looking at the existence and possible breach of a duty requires a consideration of the overall financial and other resources available to the authority to exercise its functions. Regard must be had to the variety of functions and resources available, not merely those relevant to the subject matter of any litigation.2 Claims of breach of statutory duty are restrictive. The test is generally framed so as to limit breach to circumstances where the act or omission of the authority was so unreasonable that no public authority could consider the act or omission to constitute a reasonable exercise of its functions.3 Special protection is given to public roads authorities for non-feasance to restrict the ambit of cases such as Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29 which abolished the common law non-feasance immunity for roads authorities.4

1

2

3

4

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 5; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 3 Div 1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 5 (road authorities only); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 9; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt XII; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1C. There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 110; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 42; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5W. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 111; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 36; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 40; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 84; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5Y. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 113; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 45; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 37; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 42; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 42; Road Management Act 2004 (Vic), s 102; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5Z. See also Carroll E, “Wednesbury Unreasonableness as a Limit on the Civil Liability of Public Authorities” (2007) 15 Tort L Rev 77.

165

[33.2.1180]

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166

Particular Plaintiff Interests Mental Harm [33.2.1290] A duty of care is owed to persons who have suffered no physical injury but are likely to suffer a “recognisable psychiatric illness” as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent act of the defendant.1 All states and territories (except for Queensland) have legislation dealing with mental harm claims. The legislation is not uniform and there are a number of areas in which there are significant differences between the legislation. These differences are discussed in further detail at [33.2.1320]. Ordinary grief or sorrow does not create an entitlement to damages.2 According to Windeyer J in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88: [T]he question is not whether shock would be likely to produce this particular illness, but whether there was a real risk that a foreseeable accident such as occurred would cause a man in the powerhouse to suffer a nervous shock having lasting mental consequences.3

The test of foreseeability thus has two distinct elements. It must be reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff or a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member will suffer shock because of the defendant’s carelessness. It must also be foreseeable that the nature of the shock will be such that psychiatric illness is foreseeable as a consequence.4 If nervous shock is a foreseeable consequence, liability extends to the particular form such injury takes even if it is not, of itself, reasonably foreseeable. In Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey, the plaintiff suffered a severe schizophrenic reaction because of witnessing the injuries of and assisting several individuals severely burned in an industrial accident. Even though the particular form that the psychiatric injury took was not foreseeable, nervous shock was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances. Similarly, where an electrical engineer developed a severe bread phobia as a consequence of discovering a dead mouse in a loaf of bread after consuming a portion of the bread, it was held that the phobia was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent act by the manufacturer.5 In Page v Smith [1996] AC 155; [1995] 2 WLR 644, the House of Lords held that in the case of primary victims of an accident, the test was whether the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that their conduct would expose the plaintiff to the risk of personal injury, whether physical or psychiatric. Physical and psychiatric injuries were not treated as different kinds of injury. Once it was

167

[33.2.1290]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

established that the plaintiff was in foreseeable danger of one form of personal injury (bodily injury), the duty was established and the thin skull principle (see [33.2.1330]) applied so as to create liability even for unforeseeable shock.6 In the case of Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, the High Court determined that no duty of care was owed to Tame, a person who was predisposed to developing a recognised psychiatric illness. Tame developed a psychotic depression as a result of a police officer incorrectly recording that Tame, who was a passenger in a motor vehicle accident, had at the time of the accident a blood alcohol content of 0.14. Tame became obsessed about the error. She was also emotionally disturbed by other things, including a history of mistreatment as a young child, the recent loss of a parent, marital difficulties, her own slow recovery in hospital, and her husband developing a mental illness and attempting to commit suicide. In all, Tame was predisposed to developing a psychiatric illness. One of the grounds for denying liability was that the police officer could not reasonably have foreseen that his mistake carried a risk of harm to Mrs Tame of the kind that resulted. It was not reasonable to require him to have her mental health in contemplation when he recorded the results of the blood tests.7

The test of reasonable foreseeability will usually focus upon a person of normal fortitude, however, this is not an absolute or exclusive criterion.8 A further ground was that in the circumstances, the police did not owe a duty to Tame. Where injury by shock is reasonably foreseeable, it is immaterial that the particular plaintiff is predisposed to psychiatric injury.9 The test of reasonable foreseeability is an objective test based upon the susceptibility to injury by shock of the ordinary member of the community. Where the defendant alleges that the plaintiff is predisposed to injury by shock the ordinary rule applies. The defendant must lead clear evidence supporting the predisposition, the extent of its contribution to the injury, and the likelihood that other events could have led to injury by shock.10 In Skea v NRMA Insurance Ltd (2005) 43 MVR 495; [2005] ACTCA 9, the Court of Appeal of the Australian Capital Territory dealt with an appeal on quantum. The plaintiff was not directly involved in the transport accident in which her husband and two children were injured. She attended the accident scene and saw all three injured family members – each of whom had been thrown from the vehicle. Her husband sustained serious head injuries and needed extensive care which the plaintiff provided. The issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff’s ongoing psychiatric state was due to her witnessing the aftermath of the accident or the changes to her lifestyle post-accident because of the injuries sustained by the family members or a combination of both. It was accepted that if her condition was due to lifestyle changes it was not compensable. The Court found that the plaintiff suffered from a major depressive disorder with post traumatic stress disorder which was aggravated

168

[33.2.1290]

MENTAL HARM

and exacerbated by the ongoing need to care for her injured family and assessed damages accordingly.11

1

2 3 4

5 6

7

8

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 24; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 33(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S. There is no equivalent provision in Queensland, however the statutory position is a reflection of the doctrines under common law: see Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40; [1970] 2 WLR 684 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 42–43 (QB). The position has been accepted in both England and Australia: see Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88, Windeyer J at 403 (CLR); McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 WLR 982; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35; Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 77 ALJR 1205; [2003] HCA 33. See also Zraika v Walsh [2015] NSWSC 485; Oram v BHP Mitsui Coal Pty Ltd [2015] 2 Qd R 357; [2014] QSC 230; Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126; Butler D, “A ‘Kind of Damage’: Removing the ‘Shock’ from ‘Nervous Shock’” (1997) 5 TLJ 255; Handford PR, Mullany and Handford’s Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage (2nd ed, Lawbook Co., 2006). Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 587 (CLR). Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88, Windeyer J at 403 (CLR). Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426. See also Miller v Royal Derwent Hospital Board of Management (1992) 14 Tas R 271, where it was held that it was not foreseeable that failure to provide emotional support to the plaintiff nurse on the death of a patient involved a risk of post-traumatic stress disorder although it was foreseeable it would cause grief and transient emotional reaction. In Quayle v New South Wales [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-367 (NSWDC), the mother and brothers of a young Aboriginal man who hanged himself in a police station all recovered damages for nervous shock. See also Jarvis v Scrase [2000] 2 Qd R 92; [1998] QCA 441; FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Curtin (1997) 25 MVR 289 (QCA). Vince v Cripps Bakery Pty Ltd [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-668 (TASSC). For discussion, see Rogers WVH, “Page v Smith: Shock, Foresight and Vulnerable Personalities” (1995) 3 TLJ 149; McDonald B and Swanton J, “Foreseeability in Relation to Negligent Infliction of Nervous Shock” (1995) 69 ALJ 945; Sprince A, “Page v Smith – Being ‘Primary’ Colours House of Lords Judgment” (1995) 11 PN 124; Trindade FA, “Nervous Shock and Negligent Conduct” (1996) 112 LQR 22. Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gleeson CJ at [29]; see also Gleeson CJ at [16], Gaudron J at [60]–[63], McHugh J at [71], [109]–[121], Gummow and Kirby JJ at [197]–[203], [232], Hayne J at [273]–[284], [300], Callinan J at [334]. Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35.

169

[33.2.1290]

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9

Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669, Kennedy J at 679; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426; Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88; Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912 (QBD); Benson v Lee [1972] VR 879; Petrie v Dowling [1992] 1 Qd R 284; Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997 (QBD). See also [33.2.1330] for discussion of vulnerable plaintiffs. 10 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Gibbs CJ at 556 (CLR), holding that the general rule in Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; 34 ALJR 186 applied. 11 See also “Damages” [33.10.10]ff.

[33.2.1300] Where nervous shock is alleged to flow from actual or threatened injury or death to a third party, the common law does not require a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the third party, however legislation in some states and territories limits recovery in such situations to direct witnesses at the scene or close family members:1 see [33.2.1320]. A pre-existing relationship is likely to assist in establishing foreseeability: see [33.2.1290]. While its absence makes foreseeability more difficult to establish, it does not negate it. The majority of decided cases have involved family relationships,2 rescue attempts3 or workplace relationships.4 In all but one instance, the relationship between the plaintiff and the third party was not held to be determinative of the foreseeability of harm by nervous shock.5 According to Brennan J in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, where mere passersby attend the scene of an accident: Unless their attendance at and perception of the scene is shown to be a result, and a reasonably foreseeable result, of the defendant’s conduct, they are not entitled to recover damages for psychiatric illness induced by sudden perception of it. That is, however, a question of fact.6

1 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 25; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73. 2 Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 77 ALJR 1205; [2003] HCA 33; Hambrook v Stokes Bros [1925] 1 KB 141 (CA); McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 WLR 982; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426; Mellor v Moran (1985) 2 MVR 461 (QSC); Benson v Lee [1972] VR 879; Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577 (CA); Pham v Lawson (1997) 68 SASR 124. 3 Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912 (QBD); Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88. It is not sufficient to be on board a vessel engaged in a rescue operation if the plaintiff themselves are not personally involved in the rescue operation: McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 1 (CA). 4 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88; Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271 (Assizes); White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455; [1998] 3 WLR 1509 (not followed on other

170

[33.2.1310]

5

6

MENTAL HARM

grounds in New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000] NSWCA 119). Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35; the employment relationship that had existed between the deceased and the defendant was crucial in determining that a special relationship existed between the defendant and the plaintiff (the deceased’s parents), which gave rise to a duty of care in nervous shock owed by the defendant to the deceased’s parents. Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Brennan J at 570 (CLR).

[33.2.1310] Proximity is no longer essential to establish a duty of care in cases of nervous shock. The general rule is that the shock must arise from the event itself or from its immediate aftermath. However, in the case of Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ commented: A rule that renders liability in negligence for psychiatric harm conditional on the geographic or temporal distance of the plaintiff from the distressing phenomenon, or on the means by which the plaintiff acquires knowledge of that phenomenon, is apt to produce arbitrary outcomes and to exclude meritorious claims.1

In Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; 77 ALJR 1205; [2003] HCA 33, claims were made by members of the family of an employee who had been killed at work. Initially claims were made by the estranged wife of the deceased and their three children. The wife’s claim failed at first instance because she did not establish that she had suffered a psychiatric injury. The children’s claims were dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that they did not witness the accident or the aftermath. That ruling could not stand because the High Court in Tame v New South Wales had held that direct perception was not a prerequisite to recovery. The remaining question for the High Court was whether the employer owed a duty of care to the children of its employees. The Court found that such a duty did exist and remitted the matter back to the New South Wales District Court to deal with issues such as breach of duty and whether the plaintiffs had in fact suffered psychiatric injury. While distance in time and space from a distressing event may be relevant to the outcome of a claim, they are not of themselves “decisive of liability”.2 Direct perception or the incidence of harm to the plaintiff within the immediate aftermath of an event is not an essential requirement to establish a duty of care and it seems had never been “authoritatively adopted” by the High Court as such.3 As the reasoning in Tame v New South Wales reveals, an existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, particularly where the latter assumes a position of responsibility to the former to avoid the risk of them sustaining psychiatric harm, may be sufficient to give rise to a duty of care.4 Therefore, for the plaintiff to hear of an event or its consequences, without actually witnessing it, may in the context of an antecedent relationship, be determinative of liability. This is reflected in the legislation of some states and territories:5 see [33.2.1320].

171

[33.2.1310]

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The reasoning underpinning the decision in Tame v New South Wales sustains decisions such as that of Kneipp J in Petrie v Dowling [1992] 1 Qd R 284. The plaintiff had been told by friends that her daughter had been injured in a road accident. Upon arrival at the hospital, the plaintiff was abruptly told that her daughter was dead. She suffered nervous shock as a consequence. Kneipp J apparently thought the necessary degree of foreseeability was established by the fact that the plaintiff had been made aware of the accident and attended at the hospital. That she was overwhelmed by shock before she was able to view the aftermath of the event was therefore immaterial. In Reeve v Brisbane City Council [1995] 2 Qd R 661, it was held that where there is a close relationship between a plaintiff and the victim of the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff may recover damages for psychiatric illness induced by nervous shock even if the plaintiff did not witness the accident or its aftermath but was merely informed of it.6 Two similar decisions7 in England have been expressly criticised by the House of Lords,8 and one of them overturned by the Court of Appeal.9 In the case of Halech v South Australia (2006) 93 SASR 427; [2006] SASC 29, the plaintiff’s mother had been killed in a transport accident in which three other people died. A tentative identification had been made of her body which was confirmed by the plaintiff and his sister. It transpired that the wrong body had in fact been identified. It was held that there was no duty owed to the plaintiff by the police and that, even if such a duty did exist, there was no causal connection between any breach of the duty and the plaintiff’s injury. Recovery for nervous shock may be possible where the defendant has negligently communicated information to the plaintiff. While initially it was thought no such action would lie where mere negligence was involved,10 it was held in Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61, that an action would lie if shock was foreseeable. This has been applied in Barnes v Commonwealth (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 511; 54 WN (NSW) 164.11

1 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [221]. See also Trindade FA, “Reformulation of the Nervous Shock Rules” (2003) 119 LQR 204; Dietrich J, “Nervous Shock: Tame v New South Wales and Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd” (2003) 11 TLJ 11; Butler D, “Gifford v Strang and the New Landscape for Recovery of Psychiatric Injury in Australia” (2004) 12 TLJ 108. 2 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426; see also McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 WLR 982, Lord Wilberforce at 422 (AC); Vines P, “Proximity as Principle or Category: Nervous Shock in Australia and England” (1993) 16 UNSWLJ 458. 3 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [214]. 4 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [237]. 5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30; Law

172

[33.2.1320]

MENTAL HARM

Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 25; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73. See also Freckleton I, “Actions for Pure Psychiatric Injury after the Ipp Reforms” (2005) 67 Precedent 4. 6 See also Pham v Lawson (1997) 68 SASR 124; Mullany NJ, “Recovery for Psychiatric Injury by Report: Another Small Step Forward” (1996) 4 Tort L Rev 96, discussing Quayle v New South Wales [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-367 (NSWDC). 7 Hevican v Ruane [1991] 3 All ER 65 (QBD); Ravenscroft v Rederi AB Transatlantic [1991] 3 All ER 73 (QBD). 8 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; [1991] 3 WLR 1057. 9 Ravenscroft v Rederi AB Transatlantic [1992] 2 All ER 470 (CA). 10 Blakeney v Pegus (No 2) (1885) 6 LR (NSW) 223; 2 WN (NSW) 13. See also Hunter v British Coal Corp [1999] QB 140; [1998] 3 WLR 685 (CA); Guay v Sun Publishing Co [1953] 2 SCR 216; [1953] 4 DLR 577; Furniss v Fitchett [1958] NZLR 396 (SC). 11 Barnes v Commonwealth (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 511; 54 WN (NSW) 164 (FC); Allin v City & Hackney Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 167 (MCLC); AB v Tameside & Glossop Health Authority [1997] 8 Med LR 91 (CA). Barnes v Commonwealth was cited without question as to its authority in Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [229]. For a discussion of the liability of the media for nervous shock, see Butler D, “Mass Media Liability for Nervous Shock: A Novel Test for Proximity” (1995) 3 TLJ 75.

[33.2.1320] All states and territories (except Queensland) have legislative restrictions relating to mental harm claims.1 The legislation is not uniform in its approach and the relevant provisions in each jurisdiction must be consulted individually for the correct statement of law. Different states and territories have adopted different parts of the Ipp Report recommendations,2 particularly in respect of secondary victim claims. The legislation in all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory and Queensland requires the plaintiff to have suffered a “recognised psychiatric illness” before damages may be awarded.3 A duty of care will also not be owed unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of “normal fortitude” might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care was not taken. However if the defendant knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff was a person of less than normal fortitude, the duty may be owed.4 In New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria, damages may be recoverable by a secondary victim in two situations:5 (1)

where the plaintiff witnessed at the scene the victim being killed, injured or put in peril; or

(2)

where the plaintiff is a “close member of the victim’s family” (New South Wales and Tasmania),6 or was in a “close relationship with the victim” (Victoria).7

173

[33.2.1320]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

The Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory have similar provisions but the two situations above are not provided in the alternative. Family members are required to be within the sight or hearing of the victim in order to establish liability.8 In the Northern Territory the definition of “family member” is quite extensive and includes children, step-children, grandchildren, spouses, partners, de factos, siblings, half-siblings, parents, step-parents and grandparents.9 In South Australia, the plaintiff may recover damages if the plaintiff was present at the scene of the accident, or was a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of the victim.10 The plaintiff is not required to have witnessed the accident scene so long as the plaintiff was present at the scene. Therefore a plaintiff who attended an accident scene without seeing the victim would not be barred from recovery of damages. There are no specific provisions regarding secondary victims in Western Australia. The legislation merely specifies that the circumstances which can be taken into account in determining liability include whether the plaintiff witnessed at the scene a person being killed injured or put in peril; the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim; and whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the victim.11 In New South Wales, damages to a secondary victim are to be reduced for the contributory negligence of the victim whether or not the plaintiff knows the victim.12

1 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 3.2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt VII; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 33, 53; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 8; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt XI; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1B. 2 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 1 June 2016). 3 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 31, 33; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 53; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 33, 35; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 72, 75; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 5S – 5T. Commentators have noted the change in language from the common law definition of “recognisable psychiatric illness” which may present problems for plaintiffs: Butler D, “Gifford v Strang and the New Landscape for Recovery of Psychiatric Injury in Australia” (2004) 12 TLJ 108 at 123–124. See also “Personal Injury” [33.10.830]. 4 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 33; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S. 5 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73. 6 “Close member of the victim’s family” is defined as a parent or one with parental responsibility, spouse or partner (including de facto), child or step-child, brother or

174

[33.2.1330]

VULNERABLE PLAINTIFFS

sister (including half- and step-siblings): Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30(5); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32(3). 7 “Close relationship with the victim” is not defined. The phrase may well be wide enough to include work associates and friends but may exclude family members who were no longer “close”. 8 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 36(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 25(1). 9 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 23. 10 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 53. 11 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S(2). See also Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 33(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72(2). There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 12 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30(3). See also “Damages” [33.10.10]ff.

Vulnerable Plaintiffs [33.2.1330] Defendants are bound to take their victims as they find them. As Kennedy J said in Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669: [I]t is no answer to the sufferer’s claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart.1

If injury to an ordinary person is reasonably foreseeable, a vulnerable plaintiff may recover to the full extent of the harm suffered.2 Where the defendant alleges that the plaintiff was predisposed to the type of injury suffered, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the predisposition, the extent to which it has contributed to the harm suffered, and the presence of other triggering events.3 The duty to take reasonable care may extend to the provision of non-onerous safeguards concerning unusually sensitive individuals or property. Thus, a railing around an excavation may be required to safeguard the interest of the visually impaired,4 and warning labels may be required to warn those prone to allergic reactions about the dangers of certain products.5 Similarly, once it is known that property is unusually sensitive to disturbance, for example the acute sensitivity of whelping mink to noise, special precautions may be required from those who have been made aware of the danger.6 In Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; [2012] WASCA 212, the Western Australian Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial judge who found that Hodder had been contributorily negligent in relation to an accident which left him a quadriplegic. As a result Hodder received 100 per cent of his damages. Hodder was born with cerebral palsy and an intellectual disability. Since birth he had been profoundly deaf, practically blind, virtually unable to speak, and suffered from spastic diplegia. On a trip to a local swimming pool Hodder was left unattended. He mounted a diving block which was one of eight placed on the edge of the shallow end of the swimming pool.

175

[33.2.1330]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

He entered the water head first, striking his head on the bottom of the pool and fracturing his cervical spine. In finding that Hodder was not contributorily negligent, McLure P stated that the standard for assessing contributory negligence was not subjective, noting that the exception in favour of children has not been widened to include other classes of people with impaired capacity for foresight or prudence.7 However, her Honour found that the placement of the diving blocks was an implicit invitation to use them and that what Hodder had done in response to that invitation could not have been said to have been negligent.

1 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669, Kennedy J at 679. 2 Levi v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; 58 WN (NSW) 63 (FC). 3 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; 34 ALJR 186. 4 Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778; [1964] 3 WLR 479. 5 Levi v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; 58 WN (NSW) 63 (FC); Board v Thomas Hedley & Co Ltd [1951] 2 All ER 431 (CA). 6 Nova Mink Ltd v Trans-Canada Airlines [1951] 2 DLR 241; Grandel v Mason [1953] 1 SCR 459; [1953] 3 DLR 65; Sullivan v Hydro-Electric Power Commission (Ont) (1960) 23 DLR (2d) 756. See also “Limitations on Compensation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2170]. 7 Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) (2012) 43 WAR 383; [2012] WASCA 212, McLure P at [277].

Rescuers [33.2.1340] While the common law knows no general duty to rescue,1 a rescuer may owe a duty of care once a rescue attempt has been embarked upon, and a wrongdoer may owe a duty of care to a rescuer. The duty of a rescuer is to ensure that the actions of the rescuer do not increase the risk to victims or bring others into danger.2 A duty will arise to a rescuer if it is reasonably foreseeable, both that someone seeing the predicament of an endangered or injured person would attempt to render aid, and that due to such an attempt that person might be injured. The duty of care owed to a rescuer is independent of any duty owed to the imperilled person.3 Thus it persists even if the imperilled person is contributorily negligent or owed no independent duty.4 The duty may arise even if the imperilled person escapes harm.5 While the predicament of the threatened or injured person is generally sufficient to establish the foreseeability of the rescue attempt,6 establishing the foreseeability of injury to the rescuer may be more difficult. Thus, where a would-be rescuer tripped on a hole obscured by grass while running towards a burning truck, it was held that while the rescue attempt was foreseeable, injury through tripping was not.7 Where, on the other

176

[33.2.1340]

RESCUERS

hand, a rescuer suffered a disabling back injury (to which she was in fact predisposed) through her assistance to an injured cyclist, the issue was more ambiguous. At first instance, Mohr J held in Eaton v Pitman [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-0088 that while the rescue attempt was foreseeable, the type of injury which followed was not. On appeal, that decision was overturned by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which held that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff might be injured while rendering assistance because of the nature of the assistance required.9 The Full Court did not, however, see fit to specify whether its finding was based upon the fact that some injury was foreseeable as a consequence of holding and lifting the victim, or whether it took the view that the back injury as such was foreseeable.10 Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court.11 The position remains uncertain. While a rescuer must act reasonably, this requirement is not stringently interpreted because reasonableness is considered against the exigencies of the moment.12 In appropriate circumstances, an attempt to rescue property may yield a duty of care. In Hyett v Great Western Railway Co [1948] 1 KB 345,13 the plaintiff sought to unload oil drums from a railway car belonging to the defendant to preserve them from fire. When the plaintiff was injured by an exploding drum, the injury was found to have been reasonably foreseeable. The defendant, which had negligently caused the fire, was therefore liable. However, the reasonableness of the attempt will be more stringently judged when harm to property is involved. The duty may arise even where the defendant is the endangered person.14 A rescuer is not expected to be aware of the identity of the person whose negligence caused the risk: see [33.2.330]. The unique treatment afforded rescuers reflects a strong public policy influence. In essence, a policy judgment has been made that the law ought to express its approval of heroic acts and afford redress in such circumstances so as not to discourage others who may attempt to effect a rescue. Legislation has sought to codify and protect the acts of rescuers. Most jurisdictions have enacted provisions protecting “good samaritans” from civil liability when rendering assistance in relation to emergencies or accidents:15 see [33.2.90]. Queensland has legislated to protect persons performing duties for entities to enhance public safety, which may encompass some rescuers.16

1 2

3

See, eg Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [88]. Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277; Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441; (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 545; OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department (UK) [1997] 3 All ER 897 (QBD). Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA), Willmer LJ at 981, 984,

177

[33.2.1340]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15

16

Morris LJ at 976–977; Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (CA). Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650; [1963] 3 WLR 374 (CA), Lord Denning at 669 (QB). Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441; (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 545, Laskin J at 460 (SCR). Dwyer v Southern (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 896; 78 WN (NSW) 706 (FC). Crossley v Rawlinson [1982] 1 WLR 369 (QBD). Eaton v Pitman [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-008 (SASC). Eaton v Pitman (1991) 55 SASR 386 (FC). Eaton v Pitman (1991) 55 SASR 386 (FC), King J at 389, citing Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170. For a claim for nervous shock by a rescuer, see Hegarty v EE Caledonia Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413 (QBD). Eaton v Pitman (1991) 55 SASR 386 (FC). Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA), Willmer LJ at 984. Hyett v Great Western Railway Co [1948] 1 KB 345 (CA). Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170; Harrison v British Railways Board [1981] 3 All ER 679 (QBD). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 8; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 74; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 8A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VIA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1D. Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 7.

[33.2.1350] Where harm or loss arises from a rescue attempt, that fact must be specially pleaded.1 The exigencies of the rescue situation may forestall an otherwise successful defence based upon an intervening act2 or avert or minimise the success of a plea of contributory negligence.3

1 Davis v Kitching [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-029 (QSCFC). See also Civil Procedure “Pleadings and Amendment” [5.2.10]ff. 2 Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (CA); Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA). 3 Morgan v Aylen [1942] 1 All ER 489 (KBD); Harrison v British Railways Board [1981] 3 All ER 679 (QBD). See also “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870].

[33.2.1360] The actions of a rescuer are not regarded as completely voluntary.1 The classic justification of this position is that of Cardozo J in Wagner v International Railway Co 133 NE 437 (1921): Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. … The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.2

178

[33.2.1370]

RELATIONAL INTERESTS

Even where the rescuer is aware of the risk and makes a conscious decision to continue despite that risk, the risk has not been undertaken freely and voluntarily in the legal sense.3 Therefore, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk4 is unlikely to succeed against a rescuer.

1 2 3

4

Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (CA). Wagner v International Railway Co 133 NE 437 (1921), Cardozo J at 437–438. Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA); Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650; [1963] 3 WLR 374 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 669 (QB). See “Negligence” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970].

Relational Interests [33.2.1370] Compensation can only be provided to those who are immediately injured by the defendant’s wrongdoing. The burden of compensating others who are not injured but may incur additional expenses or be deprived of expected benefits by reason of an injury to the accident victim is thought to be unduly oppressive.1 Thus, those who lose their jobs due to the destruction of a factory or whose expectations are frustrated through negligent acts which are indirectly responsible for the destruction of their livelihood are not entitled to compensation.2 Similarly, an insurer does not have an independent cause of action against a wrongdoer whose negligence has caused the loss insured against.3 An exception to the general principle involves causes of action derived from the now archaic actions for loss of services and loss of consortium. While the action for loss of services in respect of children and that for loss of consortium are today relatively uncommon, they exist except where abolished by statute, and suffice to ground an independent right of action in a parent or husband.4 Most states and territories have abolished the action,5 however the Northern Territory retains the cause of action in respect of fatal accidents.6 Queensland has maintained a limited right to claim loss of consortium under s 58 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). South Australia has legislated to extend the consortium action to provide the equivalent right to a wife.7 In Victoria, in Doughty v Martino Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 27 VR 499; [2010] VSCA 121, the Court of Appeal held that s 93 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) abolished actions for loss of servitium and consortium, or “per quod” actions8 arising out of transport accidents.9

1

French Knit Sales Pty Ltd v N Gold & Sons Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 132 (CA);

179

[33.2.1370]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

2

3

4

5

6 7 8

9

Cattle v Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) LR 10 QB 453. Adams v Southern Pacific Transportation Co 123 Cal Rptr 216 (1975); Weller & Co v Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute [1966] 1 QB 569; [1965] 3 WLR 1082. But see Reynolds v Katoomba RSL All Services Club Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR; [2001] NSWCA 234; Fortuna Seafoods Pty Ltd v The “Eternal Wind” [2008] 1 Qd R 429; [2005] QCA 405. See also Christopher v The MV Fiji Gas (1992) Aust Torts Reports 81-168 (QSC). See also [33.2.820] as to economic loss claims as distinct from economic loss consequent on personal injury sustained. Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 3 App Cas 279. By way of clarification, the insurer does not have an independent cause of action in its own name, but normally and practically, it does enjoy a right of recovery by way of the doctrine of subrogation, whereby a claim for relief or contribution is undertaken in the name of the insurer’s insured. Toohey v Hollier (1955) 92 CLR 618. In Lloyd v Lewis [1963] VR 277, Pape J struggled to construct an explanation, based upon the parent’s legal obligation to maintain the child. Despite those efforts, this is a survival of the ancient action for loss of services, an action based in the parent’s “property” in the child. See “Economic Loss” [33.10.1740]–[33.10.1750] for a further discussion of these actions. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 218; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Sch 2 cl 1; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28D; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA). Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 10. Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 65. For a discussion of valuing such a claim, see, eg Mann v Flinders Medical Centre (1999) 203 LSJS 1. Per quod: “[B]y which means; in consequence of which”: Finkelstein R and Hamer D (eds), LexisNexis Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2014) p 468. Doughty v Martino Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 27 VR 499; [2010] VSCA 121, Nettle JA at [25] (Mandie JA and Emerton AJA agreeing).

The Unborn [33.2.1380] An unborn child lacks legal personality and therefore cannot possess legal rights or be owed a duty of care, however a duty of care arises for prenatal injury should the child be born alive and thus attain legal personality.1 In Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that a cause of action would accrue where the plaintiff child was born with disabilities caused by the negligent driving of the defendant.2 In Kosky v Trustees of Sisters of Charity [1982] VR 961, it was accepted that a cause of action might also arise concerning injuries suffered because of a negligent act before conception. In that case, the child nearly died at birth and suffered residual disabilities because of an incompatible blood transfusion given to the mother eight years before his birth. Doctors owe a duty of care not to cause harm to the child, even if this was to occur while the child was in the womb.3

180

[33.2.1390]

THE UNBORN

Questions of public policy, in particular interference in family relationships, arise where the injury has been caused by the actions of one of the parents. Australian courts have been prepared to hold that a parent owes a duty of care to a child for injury sustained because of the negligent pre-natal driving of a parent. In Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411, one of the reasons for this conclusion was that in the case of personal injuries inflicted in a motor vehicle accident, the true defendant is the insurance company and the recovery of damages would assist, rather than hinder the family relationship.4 In comparison, the Queensland Court of Appeal found that as the duty that a driver owes to other road users is so well defined in the law of negligence, its extension to mother and child is a necessary and natural extension.5 These decisions do not however determine wider issues of liability and are confined to motor vehicle accidents. As de Jersey CJ was careful to stipulate in Bowditch v McEwan [2003] 2 Qd R 615; [2002] QCA 172, the decision does not deal with the broader question … such questions as whether a mother’s smoking or consuming excessive amounts of alcohol during pregnancy, or engaging in other dangerous activity and the like, could give rise to a claim by an infant born exhibiting adverse consequent effects.6

1

2

3 4 5 6

Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353; Kosky v Trustees of Sisters of Charity [1982] VR 961; Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Kerr v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285. See also Barry JV, “The Child En Ventre Sa Mere” (1941) 14 ALJ 351 at 353–355; Hirsch D, “The ‘Right’ of ‘Wrongful Life’” (2002) 10 HLB 73. See also Professional Liability “Health Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff. See also Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 (NSWCA) (which accepted that the earlier decision was correct on its facts); X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 (CA) (which affirmed the proposition that a pre-natal injury was not sustained until birth); Bowditch v McEwan [2003] 2 Qd R 615; [2002] QCA 172. This principle has been accepted in England: see Burton v Islington Health Authority [1993] QB 204; [1992] 3 WLR 637 (CA). X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 (CA); Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15, Kirby J at [66], Crennan J at [249]. Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 (NSWCA), Clarke J at 415–416. Bowditch v McEwan [2003] 2 Qd R 615; [2002] QCA 172, de Jersey CJ at [11]–[12] (McPherson JA and Atkinson J agreeing). Bowditch v McEwan [2003] 2 Qd R 615; [2002] QCA 172, de Jersey CJ at [13].

[33.2.1390] A duty of care does not arise where the claim of the plaintiff is interpreted as a “wrongful life” claim:1 but see [33.2.1400]. Thus no cause of action on behalf of the child will lie where its birth is the consequence of a negligently performed sterilisation. Similarly, no cause of action on behalf of the child will arise where a deformed or disabled child is born and the mother alleges that she was not warned that she was at risk of bearing such a child and

181

[33.2.1390]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

that, had she been appropriately warned, she would have chosen not to conceive or would have sought an abortion.2 Such claims have failed on two related policy grounds: (1)

the courts are reluctant to allow a claim which implicitly rejects the sanctity of human life; and

(2)

given that damages in tort are intended to place the plaintiff in the position which would have been obtained but for the wrongful act,3 attributing a positive value to non-existence would appear impossible.

1 See Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15; Waller v James (2006) 226 CLR 136; 80 ALJR 846; [2006] HCA 16; Bannerman v Mills [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-079 (NSWSC); Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460. See also Grey A, “Harriton v Stephens: Life, Logic and Legal Fictions” (2006) 28 Syd LR 545; Hirsch D, “Rights and Responsibilities in Wrongful Birth/Wrongful Life Cases” (2006) 29 UNSWLJ 233. 2 McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166; [1982] 2 WLR 890 (CA). See Professional Liability “Health Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth”. 3 See “Damages” [33.10.10]ff.

[33.2.1400] A duty of care is owed to parents where an unwanted child is born following an unsuccessful sterilisation or abortion,1 or a failure to diagnose a pregnancy.2 Claims have succeeded for both the birth of a healthy child3 as well as a disabled child.4 In Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 1312; [2003] HCA 38, the High Court accepted that the parents of an unplanned child born following the negligence of a medical practitioner could claim damages for the cost of raising a healthy child. A number of jurisdictions have passed legislation restricting the award of damages recoverable in wrongful birth cases:5 see [33.2.90]. It is difficult to reconcile the lack of a duty of care to the child in respect of a wrongful life claim (see [33.2.1390]) with the recognition of a parallel claim on behalf of a parent. It seems likely that the underlying basis for the recognition of a claim by a parent in such circumstances is deprivation of freedom of choice.6 No similar deprivation exists in respect of a child.

1 Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 1312; [2003] HCA 38; Udale v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1983] 1 WLR 1098 (QBD); F v R (1982) 29 SASR 437 (reversed on appeal in F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189 (FC) on the basis that the doctor had not been negligent. The cause of action was not questioned). See also Bradfield OM, “Healthy Law Makes for Healthy Children: Cattanach v Melchior” (2005) 12 JLM 305; Hirsch D, “Rights and Responsibilities in Wrongful Birth/Wrongful Life Cases” (2006) 29 UNSWLJ 233; Professional Liability “Health

182

[33.2.1400]

2 3 4 5

6

THE UNBORN

Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff. CES v Superclinics (Aust) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47 (CA). Dahl v Purnell (1992) 15 Qld Lawyer Reps 33 (QDC); Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 1312; [2003] HCA 38. Veivers v Connolly [1995] 2 Qd R 326. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 71; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 49A – 49B; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 67. See also Morley MG, “Damages for the Cost of Bringing up a Child” (2001) 75 ALJ 599; “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. Weybury D and Witting C, “Wrongful Conception Actions in Australia” (1995) 3 TLJ 53.

183

[33.2.1400]

PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF INTERESTS

184

Breach of Duty of Care Standard of Care General [33.2.1510] Breach of a duty of care depends on two things: first, there must be a degree of foreseeable risk created by the acts or omissions of the defendant; second, one must assess the reasonableness of the defendant’s response to that risk. The degree of risk turns on reasonable foreseeability. This inquiry into reasonable foreseeability is wholly factual. The question is what the particular defendant ought to have foreseen in the circumstances. It is important to distinguish between the generalised inquiry into foreseeability essential to establish the existence of a duty of care and the concrete and factual determination involved in the question of breach. Because the inquiry into breach of duty is purely factual, it can only be determined retrospectively, that is, by an inquiry into what has happened. It follows that, in contrast to the generalised inquiry essential to establish the presence of a duty, foreseeability for the purposes of breach does not yield concrete propositions of law. The factual inquiry involved in breach has sometimes been undertaken as a part of the more generalised inquiry into whether, in the circumstances of the case, a duty arose. The concept of “duty on the facts” is associated with Lord Atkin’s test of reasonable foreseeability.1 In Australia, it is now settled that there are two separate inquiries to be made. First to establish the existence of the duty. Second, to establish the nature and scope of that duty, to determine any breach. In Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, McHugh J stated: The common law has no need to – and does not – categorise the cases in which the defendant was held to have breached a standard of care. … The common law categorises cases – for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances in which a defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care – according to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant and not the activity that caused the plaintiff harm.2

It is an error of law to define a duty by reference to its breach. The inquiry to identify the duty is instead a prospective one.3 In Vairy v Wyong Shire Council, the Council argued that it was unreasonable to expect the erection of warning signs along the entirety of the 27 km coast for which it was responsible. The judge at first instance focused on the rocky outcrop from which Vairy had jumped, and asked what remedial action should have been taken in relation to that outcrop. The true inquiry, as the High Court made clear, should instead

185

[33.2.1510]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

have been a consideration of what duty the Council reasonably owed in relation to the entire 27 km coastline, not just one geographic feature of it.4 Reasonable foreseeability is not absolute but must be evaluated in terms of degree of risk. The formula is set out by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106: [A] risk of injury which is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable.5

The High Court has gone on to describe this as the “Shirt calculus”.6 The calculus deals first with the foreseeability of risk. This is an undemanding test such that “[g]iven the undemanding nature of the current foreseeability standard, an affirmative answer to the question whether damage was reasonably foreseeable is usually a near certainty”.7 Where the risk is “not insignificant” (to use the phrase in state and territory legislation),8 this will be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant’s response. Thus, in Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850, although there was a slight risk that a cricket ball would be hit out of the ground and might cause injury, that was outweighed by the fact that eliminating the risk would be burdensome and that the conduct of the defendants was lawful and in the public good. While the degree of risk of fire caused by the discharge of furnace oil by the defendant’s servants in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 was similarly slight, the discharge was easy to prevent and also constituted the crime of public nuisance. The servant’s conduct was therefore found to be negligent. In Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, the plaintiff attended a garage sale at the defendant’s residential property. She had not been there before. There was an irregularity in the concrete driveway and the plaintiff fell and was injured. The defendant was aware of the indentation in the driveway and permitted it to remain. The High Court held that the defendant had not breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. This was because the risk posed by the uneven driveway was both obvious and relatively minor.9 The occupier was not required to maintain the driveway in perfect repair, removing all potential hazards. Every judgment in that case applied s 17C of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) (now s 20 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA)), which listed the factors affecting the liability of the occupier of premises, including “the extent (if at all) to which it would have been reasonable and practicable for the occupier to take measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against the danger”. However the High Court also noted that more generally, the question to be considered was what a reasonable person would, in the circumstances, do by way of response to a foreseeable risk. Risks that are foreseeable include the risk that persons will not exercise reasonable care for their own safety.10 Often the existence of a risk is not only

186

[33.2.1510]

STANDARD OF CARE

foreseeable, it is obvious. The adequacy of a defendant’s response to that risk is not judged against a particular plaintiff who fails to exercise reasonable care. In Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, the duty is expressed to be owed to persons exercising reasonable care for their own safety. This is not to be confused with issues of contributory negligence11 by a plaintiff. In Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT), a 16-year-old girl fell from coastal cliffs onto the beach below. At trial she was found to have been adversely affected by alcohol at the time. The Court held that the defendant was not obliged to take any other steps by way of fencing, warning signs or lighting to respond to the risk which was obvious and avoidable to persons taking reasonable care for their own safety.12

1 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 580. 2 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, McHugh J at [31]. 3 See, eg Swift v Wearing-Smith [2016] NSWCA 38, Hoeben JA at [117] (Meagher JA agreeing). 4 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Gummow J at [88], [91]. 5 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 48 (CLR). 6 See, eg Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Gummow J at [72], Hayne J at [105]; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [2]; New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [57]. 7 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, McHugh J at [99]. 8 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(1)(b); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(1)(b). The Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) does not discuss duty of care or obvious risks. 9 However, see Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152, Wright and Atkin LJJ at 177–178: repetition of the performance of a task breeds familiarity with the task, which may cause a person to overlook or ignore an obvious and inherent risk. In Hennessy v Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1716, Campbell J at [94], the plaintiff was injured when he tripped on a step into a demountable hut that was “higher than normal”. The fact that he had mounted that step many times before bred familiarity, causing him to overlook its inherent risks (case reversed on other grounds in Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) Pty Ltd v Hennessy [2015] NSWCA 253). 10 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106. 11 See “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870].

187

[33.2.1510]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

12 See also Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29 for similar principles in the context of pedestrians; Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 79 ALJR 839; [2005] HCA 14 for an employer’s duty to remove an obvious risk by imposing a safe system of work; Collins v Clarence Valley Council [2015] NSWCA 263 for a cyclist injured when her wheel stuck in a gap in a wooden bridge.

[33.2.1513] The existence or extent of a duty of care is weighed against how onerous such a duty may be to perform. In Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, the appellant (a solicitor) prepared a will for his client, leaving the whole of the client’s estate to Calvert. The solicitor neglected to ask his client whether there were any family members who might make family provision claims against the estate. After the client died, an estranged daughter claimed successfully on a large portion of the estate. Calvert sued on the basis of lost opportunity in contract and tort. The High Court unanimously upheld the appeal in favour of the solicitor.1 In a separate judgment, Gageler J discussed the duty of care owed by a solicitor in preparing a will: The duty plainly cannot extend to requiring the solicitor to take reasonable care for future and contingent interests of every prospective beneficiary when undertaking every action that might be expected of a solicitor in the performance of the solicitor’s duty to the testator. If the tortious duty of care were to extend that far, it would have the potential to get in the way of performance of the solicitor’s contractual duty to the testator. Extended to multiple prospective beneficiaries, it would be crippling. The solicitor’s duty of care is instead limited to a person whom the testator actually intends to benefit from the will and is confined to requiring the solicitor to take reasonable care to benefit that person in the manner and to the extent identified in the testator’s instructions.2

1 French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ delivering the majority judgment, Gageler and Gordon JJ delivering separate judgments but agreeing with the orders made. 2 Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18, Gageler J at [58]–[59]. French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ (with whom Gageler J agreed) did not consider the extending of the duty to client to the respondent, but decided the case on different grounds: see [47]–[49].

[33.2.1516] The Shirt calculus (see [33.2.1510]) has been criticised by members of the High Court for placing undue emphasis on the expense of guarding against injury,1 and for the ease with which the calculus can be misapplied.2 In Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, McHugh J stated that: [T]he time has come when this Court should retrace its steps so that the law of negligence accords with what people really do, or can be expected to do, in real life

188

[33.2.1516]

STANDARD OF CARE

situations. Negligence law will fall – perhaps it already has fallen – into public disrepute if it produces results that ordinary members of the public regard as unreasonable.3

As Callinan and Heydon JJ stated in their dissenting judgment in New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, the Shirt calculus places undue emphasis on whether “anything of conceivable utility could have been done easily or inexpensively” to prevent risk of harm, when in reality the failure to do so is often because “it would not have occurred to a reasonably careful person either that injury would result, or that the ‘neglected measure’ would have made a difference”.4 As a result, their Honours pointed out that the Shirt calculus has the effect of finding defendants liable in negligence despite no moral wrongdoing.5 In their rationale for overruling the Shirt calculus, they referred to Lord Atkin’s justification in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 that: “The liability for negligence ... is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.”6 This view was not shared by the majority of the High Court. The case of New South Wales v Fahy involved a police officer who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of her involvement in an incident and the failure of other police officers to provide assistance. The question before the Court was whether the State’s duty of care extends to a duty to ensure that one employee takes positive action to prevent injury to another employee. By a 4:3 majority, the Court upheld the State’s appeal, determining that the State’s liability should be decided in accordance with the Shirt calculus and that there was no need to revise the calculus. Gummow and Hayne JJ, in upholding the decision in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, stated that: It is a decision that has stood for more than twenty-five years and has been applied frequently both in courts of trial and appeal and in this Court. There may be cases when the principles stated in Shirt have not been applied accurately. In particular, arguments of the kind made, and rejected, in [Vairy v Wyong Shire Council] and in [Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63] may suggest a misunderstanding of the so-called “calculus” that would seek to determine questions of breach in some cases by balancing the cost of a single warning sign against the catastrophic consequences of a particular accident. But the fact, if it be so, that Shirt has not always been applied properly does not provide any persuasive reason to reconsider its correctness.7

Kirby J agreed, stating: “The fact that the Shirt formulation has sometimes been ignored or misapplied is not a reason for abandoning it.”8 Any criticism of the Shirt calculus has not been sufficient reason for the High Court to reject it. This was reaffirmed by Gummow J (and Kirby J in dissent) in Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773;

189

[33.2.1516]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42,9 and the doctrine continues to be applied.10

1 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [219]. 2 See, eg New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [78], Kirby J at [124]. 3 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, McHugh J at [101]. 4 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [219]. 5 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [223]. 6 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 580, quoted in New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Callinan and Heydon JJ at [222]. 7 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [78]. Crennan J (at [241]) held that the case did not provide an opportunity to consider the applicability of the Shirt calculus, as the existence of the risk was incontestable. 8 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Kirby J at [124]. 9 Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [68]–[69], Heydon J at [295]; see also Kirby J (dissenting) at [134]. 10 See, eg Stokes v House With No Steps [2016] QSC 79, where Jackson J (at [57]) considered the Shirt calculus “almost universally applied on the question of negligent breach of duty at common law”. See also Hunter v McKenna (2014) 253 CLR 270; 89 ALJR 39; [2014] HCA 44, the Court at [30]; Cook v Modern Mustering Pty Ltd (2015) 304 FLR 176; [2015] NTSC 82, Kelly J at [57]–[59].

[33.2.1520] The defendant’s response to a foreseeable risk requires a standard of care of the reasonable person. The test is objective: what would a reasonable person in the position of the defendant have done in the circumstances? Mason J describes the second limb of “the Shirt calculus” (see [33.2.1510]) in this way: The perception of the reasonable man’s response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant’s position.1

The reasonable person standard is a variable standard. The question is what ought to be expected of a reasonable person having regard to the relevant relationship between the parties and the personal characteristics of the 190

[33.2.1520]

STANDARD OF CARE

defendant. Thus, the court may need to consider factors such as the age, fitness and health, intellectual capacity and sanity of the defendant. Factors such as gender and ethnicity may also play a part. However this does not make it a subjective standard. The standard expected of a public authority charged with responsibility for care and control of public land is broadly analogous to that of occupiers, but not identical.2 The public authority’s response to risk must be assessed bearing in mind the breadth of area subject for responsibility. For example, in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J said: “The fact that a defendant is a public authority with responsibility for managing large areas of recreational land may be a circumstance material to a judgment about the reasonableness of its conduct.”3 Other factors may also be relevant; for example in Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, the fact that the cliff from which the plaintiff fell was an area of natural beauty which would have been spoiled by a fence was relevant in light of the obviousness of the risk. The liability of public and other authorities is regulated by legislation in some jurisdictions: see [33.2.90] and [33.2.1170]–[33.2.1180]. The standard expected of a professional differs from that of an amateur and is covered by legislation in some jurisdictions: see [33.2.90]. The common law standard is that of the reasonable professional professing to have the particular skill.4 Generally, the test for standard of care applied is as described by Windeyer J in Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, as “the ordinary liabilities of any man who follows a skilled calling”. The test applied for these “ordinary liabilities” (in this instance, for an architect in respect of an action for negligence in the performance of his professional work) was: An architect undertaking any work in the way of his profession accepts the ordinary liabilities of any man who follows a skilled calling. He is bound to exercise due care, skill and diligence. He is not required to have an extraordinary degree of skill or the highest professional attainments. But he must bring to the task he undertakes the competence and skill that is usual among architects practising their profession. And he must use due care. If he fails in these matters and the person who employed him thereby suffers damage, he is liable to that person. This liability can be said to arise either from a breach of his contract or in tort.5

This test has subsequently been approved by the High Court in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240:6 see also [33.2.1620] and [33.2.1820].

191

[33.2.1520]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

While the standard is hypothetical, given that the issue of breach is for the court to determine, expert evidence may be called to assist the court in fixing the appropriate level of reasonableness.

1 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 47–48 (CLR). 2 Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5. 3 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [6]. 4 See Professional Liability “General Principles” [27.1.10]ff. 5 Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 84 (CLR) (Owen J and Dixon CJ concurring). 6 Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 575–576 (CLR) (a solicitor’s liability to a third party beneficiary).

[33.2.1525] The High Court has emphasised the need to look forward to determine what response is reasonable, not to look with the benefit of hindsight. In New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Gummow and Hayne JJ emphasised that: Reference to “calculus”, “a certain way of performing mathematical investigations and resolutions”, may wrongly be understood as requiring no more than a comparison between what it would have cost to avoid the particular injury that happened and the consequences of that injury. [Wyong Shire Council v Shirt] requires a more elaborate inquiry that does not focus only upon how the particular injury happened. It requires looking forward to identify what a reasonable person would have done, not backward to identify what would have avoided the injury.1

1 New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [57]. See also Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [67].

[33.2.1530] Decisions on breach of duty do not create binding precedent because they involve a purely factual inquiry. The High Court notes that: Judicial attempts to specify the content of a duty of care are destined to be as fruitless as attempts to specify the full set of values to which the reasonable traveller on the Bondi bus subscribes … there are no factors, other than the [Wyong Shire Council v Shirt] formula [in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62] by which the common law defines the standard of reasonable care required in a particular case. This is an evaluative task for the tribunal of fact – assuming that there is some evidence on which a tribunal of fact could find negligence.1

192

[33.2.1530]

STANDARD OF CARE

This is true even where cases are factually similar. In Bus v Sydney County Council (1989) 167 CLR 78; 63 ALJR 440, the High Court overturned a Court of Appeal decision. The Court of Appeal had interpreted an earlier decision of the High Court on similar facts2 as laying down a rule of law that no duty existed to safeguard an experienced tradesperson against dangers of which he or she ought to have been aware. The High Court indicated that Sydney County Council v Dell’Oro (1974) 132 CLR 97; 48 ALJR 471 was a decision on its own facts which created no binding precedent. It held that the Council was liable when one of its employees left an electrician working near exposed live wires. Although the electrician knew of the danger, there was a significant risk in that the electrician was required to stand on a potentially unstable ladder near the exposed wires. Under such circumstances, contact with the wires through inadvertence or negligence was reasonably foreseeable. Again, in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, the Court was at pains to correct the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the earlier authority of Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423; 67 ALJR 426. That case was not authority for the proposition that the coastline should be ringed with signs warning of submerged rocks in order to establish a reasonable response to a foreseeable risk of injury by diving into the sea. The Court confirmed that even in factually similar cases, the question of whether a defendant’s response to foreseeable risk is a reasonable one is a factual matter referenced only by the factors as enunciated by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106: see [33.2.1510]. So Vairy, diving from a natural rock platform, could establish that the duty required the defendant to erect a warning sign.3 However, Mulligan, diving in a tidal channel of variable depth, did not establish that the duty required the erection of a warning sign.4 In King v Philcox (2015) 255 CLR 304; 89 ALJR 398; [2015] HCA 19, Nettle J made reference to Vairy v Wyong Shire Council, stating that “it is neither possible nor desirable to state an ‘ultimate and permanent value’ according to which the question of when a duty arises in a particular category of case may be comprehensively answered”.5

1

2 3 4 5

Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, McHugh J at [28], referring to the formula in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106: see [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1520]. Sydney County Council v Dell’Oro (1974) 132 CLR 97; 48 ALJR 471. Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62. Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63. King v Philcox (2015) 255 CLR 304; 89 ALJR 398; [2015] HCA 19, Keane J at [80],

193

[33.2.1530]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

quoting Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Gummow J at [67].

[33.2.1540] Most Australian states and territories have enacted legislation codifying and limiting circumstances in which damages are recoverable. These changes seek to limit the common law operation by prescribing the extent of a duty and the reasonableness of responses, particularly where risks are obvious.1

1 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 4.2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 2; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 5A – 5P. The Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) does not discuss duty of care or obvious risks. For outline of the legislation framework generally, see [33.2.90]. See also “Damages” [33.10.10]ff.

Reasonable Foreseeability [33.2.1550] Whether a particular risk is reasonably foreseeable involves an inquiry into all the circumstances including the foreseeability of negligence by a third party or by the plaintiff. The High Court sets out the relevant test in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106. The Council was held to have been negligent in placing “Deep Water” signs in shallow water. The plaintiff, a novice water-skier, was thereby led to believe that he was in deep water and became a paraplegic when he fell from his skis and struck his head on the bottom. As Mason J said: The considerations to which I have referred indicate that a risk of injury which is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable. But, as we have seen, the existence of a foreseeable risk of injury does not in itself dispose of the question of breach of duty. The magnitude of the risk and its degree of probability remain to be considered with other relevant factors.1

This judgment builds on the landmark case of Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, where the Privy Council considered whether the ship’s engineers were negligent in discharging furnace oil into Sydney Harbour. The oil was subsequently ignited by sparks from welding operations on a nearby wharf and the ensuing fire damaged the plaintiff’s ship which was berthed at the wharf. Despite the high ignition point of the oil meaning the risk of fire was small, the Privy Council held that the defendants were liable. As Lord Reid said, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council:

194

[33.2.1560]

STANDARD OF CARE

[I]t does not follow that, no matter what the circumstances may be, it is justifiable to neglect a risk of such a small magnitude. A reasonable man would only neglect such a risk if he had some valid reason for doing so: e.g., that it would involve considerable expense to eliminate the risk. He would weigh the risk against the difficulty of eliminating it. … In the present case there was no justification whatever for discharging the oil into Sydney Harbour. Not only was it an offence to do so but it involved considerable loss financially. If the ship’s engineer had thought about the matter there could have been no question of balancing the advantages and disadvantages. From every point of view it was both his duty and his interest to stop the discharge immediately.2

Lord Reid concluded that a reasonable man having the knowledge and experience to be expected of the chief engineer of the Wagon Mound would have known that there was a real risk of the oil on the water catching fire in some way.3

He contrasted a “real risk” with one which was a “mere possibility”.4 Earlier he spoke of a risk that was not “fantastic or far-fetched”.5

1

2

3

4

5

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 48 (CLR). See Downunder Rock Cafe Pty Ltd v Roberts [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-481 (VSCA). Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC), Lord Reid at 169–170 (ALJR). Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC), Lord Reid at 170 (ALJR). Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC), Lord Reid at 170 (ALJR). Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC), Lord Reid at 169 (ALJR). See also, eg Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22, the Court at [78].

[33.2.1560] In appropriate circumstances, it may be a breach of duty to fail to foresee and take precautions against negligent conduct by the plaintiff1 or a third party:2 see also [33.2.1600]. In Kelly v Smith (1986) 42 SASR 13, the defendant left a bottle of clear liquid marked “Poison” on top of a hotel refrigerator. The plaintiff mistook the liquid for water and drank it. The plaintiff suffered severe internal injury as a consequence. The Court held that the injury was reasonably foreseeable. As Bollen J noted, “[T]he defendant was called upon to take reasonable steps to safeguard the foolish as well as the wise lodger. I assume, of course, not extremely foolish conduct by the lodger.”3 Included in the foreseeable risks that a defendant may face is the risk that a plaintiff may not exercise reasonable care for their own safety.4 However, where

195

[33.2.1560]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

the danger is either obvious5 or slight and easily averted, the defendant may be entitled to rely on the plaintiff or third party taking reasonable care for their own safety. In Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Brennan CJ expressed it this way: A public authority empowered to manage and control premises has a discretion as to the steps it will take to protect the person of those entering the premises and that discretion is governed relevantly by the purpose for which the power is conferred. If the discretion be exercised on the footing that entrants upon the premises will exercise reasonable care for their own safety, it cannot be said that there is some additional duty of care to be discharged. There is no statutory duty to take positive action to protect entrants against risks of their own making which the authority has done nothing to create or increase, even if the possibility of an entrant’s careless conduct be foreseeable.6

The High Court has confirmed that a defendant need do no more than exercise reasonable care to discharge their duties.7 The law does not impose a duty on defendants to prevent harm occurring to others.8 In Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, the plaintiff was seriously injured when he dived from a road bridge into the shallow water of a river below. Warning signs were present on the bridge at the time of the accident announcing that diving was prohibited and also pictograms to the same effect. Despite these signs, the evidence at trial was that they were not a deterrent and people continued to jump and dive from the bridge. Until Dederer’s accident, there was no recorded incident of injury from this activity. Both the trial judge and Court of Appeal held the Roads and Traffic Authority was negligent in failing to affix more adequate fencing. The Court of Appeal also found that a sign warning of shallow water would have been a reasonable response to the ongoing practice of jumping and diving from the bridge, however the existing sign did not contain such a warning.9 These findings were made because the existing signs had failed to stop people jumping and diving from the bridge. The majority of the High Court10 held that the courts below erred in basing their findings on the fact that the preventative measures taken had not stopped people diving from the bridge.11 The only requirement is that a warning be reasonable and not that it prevents the conduct in question.12 As Gummow J identified: “If the contrary were true, then defendants would be liable in any case in which a plaintiff ignored a warning or prohibition sign and engaged in the conduct the subject of the warning.”13 The High Court in Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75 concluded that, in discharging its duty of care to entrants, the occupier was not required to take any action to correct the unevenness of the driveway to protect entrants from the hazard that it posed. Hayne J stated that:

196

[33.2.1560]

STANDARD OF CARE

Any suburban house presents many features that can lead to injury. In that sense any suburban house presents many dangers. The appellant, as occupier, was not required to reduce or eliminate the danger presented by an unevenness in the driveway that was no larger than, and no different from, unevenness found in any but the most recently installed suburban concrete driveway.14

Similarly, employers are entitled to expect employees to safeguard themselves against obvious dangers.15 Thus, when an experienced plumber died when he fell through a rotten awning onto which he had climbed, the Court noted that it was “fanciful to treat the question as one to be gone into and decided by some superior officer”.16 However, an obvious danger created by reason of a system of work is not one that an employer is entitled to rely on the plaintiff taking reasonable care. In Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 79 ALJR 839; [2005] HCA 14, the worker and another employee were unloading boxes from a truck using a hydraulic lift platform. The plaintiff stepped back off the truck into space and fell heavily, not realising the hydraulic platform had been lowered by the other employee. There the Court in a joint judgment said that: It was not a question of warning the appellant of a risk. It was a question of creating a risk by failing to adopt a safe system of work. … [T]he appellant did no doubt omit to take a simple precaution of looking to see whether the platform was raised before stepping on to it, and this omission was a cause of his injuries. But in acting as he did, the appellant did not disobey any direction or warning from the respondent.17

1

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9

Bus v Sydney County Council (1989) 167 CLR 78; 63 ALJR 440; Webb v South Australia (1982) 56 ALJR 912; March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335; Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220; Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423; 67 ALJR 426. Baggermaatschappij Boz & Kalis BV v Australian Shipping Commission (1980) 54 ALJR 382. Kelly v Smith (1986) 42 SASR 13, Bollen J at 17. Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106. Legislation in some jurisdictions has limited liability where the risk is inherent or obvious: see [33.2.80]. Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Brennan CJ at [22]; see also Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63. Similarly, see Dailly v Spot-On Investments Pty Ltd [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-363 (NSWCA); Mountain Cattlemen’s Association of Victoria Inc v Barron [1998] 3 VR 302. Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42. Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [51]. Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [39].

197

[33.2.1560]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

10 Consisting of Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Callinan and Heydon JJ agreeing with the judgment of Gummow J: see Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Callinan J at [270], Heydon J at [283]. 11 Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [53]. 12 Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [54]–[55]. 13 Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [54]. 14 Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Hayne J at [96]. 15 O’Connor v Commissioner for Government Transport (1954) 100 CLR 225; Raimondo v South Australia (1979) 53 ALJR 358 (note); Sheen v Fields Pty Ltd (1984) 155 CLR 698n; 58 ALJR 93; Vunic v Housing Trust (SA) [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-211 (SASC); Jenkins v Hansen & Yuncken (Tas) Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-255 (TASSC); Sarvanidis v Chicago Bridge & Iron Constructors Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-292 (SASC). See also Goldsworthy v Burnside City Corp (unreported, SASCFC, Bollen J, SCGRG/89/2160 of 1989, 10 November 1993). 16 O’Connor v Commissioner for Government Transport (1954) 100 CLR 225, the Court at 230. 17 Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 79 ALJR 839; [2005] HCA 14, the Court at [14], [18].

[33.2.1570] The courts require road users to anticipate the negligence of others and to minimise the potential risk.1 Thus, a motorcyclist has been held liable for driving into a cyclist who turned into his path without prior warning,2 and a car driver has been expected to anticipate the possibility of a child darting from the kerb into the path of the car.3 Where, on the other hand, the plaintiff’s appearance in the path of the vehicle is essentially unforeseeable,4 or where the defendant is already driving with extreme caution,5 the position may be otherwise. However, the anticipation does not require the motorist to travel at a speed to enable them to pull up safely in every eventuality. In South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Cole (2002) 55 NSWLR 113; [2002] NSWCA 205, a driver, travelling along an unlit road within the speed limit and with headlights on was held not to be negligent because she was driving at a speed where she was unable to pull up safely when suddenly confronted by a pedestrian on the road. Road authorities must also anticipate the negligence of road users and take steps to minimise the risk, even if obvious.6 In Edson v Roads & Traffıc Authority (2006) 65 NSWLR 453; [2006] NSWCA 68, the New South Wales Court of Appeal addressed the responsibility of the roads authority to meet its duty to pedestrians. Specifically, the Court addressed a situation where large numbers of pedestrians were taking an obvious risk and crossing a freeway. At the point of crossing there was no overpass footbridge and there was a break in the fence which permitted persons to access the freeway. The Court held that a duty was owed and that, where a large number of persons were known to the authority to

198

[33.2.1580]

STANDARD OF CARE

take grave and obvious risks crossing a freeway under its control, the authority breached its duty by failing to take steps to limit the harm likely to result.

1

2 3

4 5 6

For the standard of careful driving required of motorists in general, see Grasso v Brandt (1986) 3 MVR 211 (NSWCA); Symeonakis v Symeonakis (1990) 12 MVR 233 (SASCFC); Roncoli v Tolson [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-201 (SASCFC). Lacey v Schneider (1989) 9 MVR 512 (SASCFC). Delphin v Savolainen (1989) 10 MVR 37 (NSWCA); see also Cheetham v Bou (1989) 10 MVR 242 (NSWCA) (motorist was held to be in breach of duty in striking and injuring a pedestrian who was crossing against a red light). Winters v Davidson (1989) 9 MVR 239 (NSWCA); Thomopolos v Blackburne (1989) 10 MVR 7 (NSWCA); Stewart v Carnell (1984) 2 MVR 147 (NSWCA). Hoikkala v King (1989) 9 MVR 293 (QSC); Thomopolos v Blackburne (1989) 10 MVR 7 (NSWCA). See also [33.2.90], [33.2.1180] regarding nonfeasance provisions enacted in some jurisdictions protecting road authorities.

Magnitude of Harm [33.2.1580] The gravity and magnitude of the foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s conduct are relevant in determining the existence of a breach of the duty of care.1 In Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, the High Court stated that, where dangerous substances or dangerous activities were involved, the standard of care might be so stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety. It was held that in these circumstances the requirement of reasonable care extends to seeing that care is taken. Moreover, it was stated that this principle did not only apply to substances or activities which were inherently dangerous, such as poison, loaded guns or explosives which are characterised as dangerous substances. What is looked at is the combined effect of the magnitude of foreseeable risk of an accident happening and the magnitude of foreseeable potential injury or damage if an accident does occur. It was further held that the fact that the substance or activity was entrusted to an independent contractor, so that foreseeable injury or danger could only arise if there were collateral negligence by the independent contractor, did not prevent the substance or activity being characterised as dangerous.

1

Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367.

199

[33.2.1580]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

Reasonableness of Defendant’s Response [33.2.1590] A breach of duty of care may be negated by establishing that the burden of eliminating a particular risk is unreasonable (see [33.2.1600]), or by establishing that the public utility of the conduct creating the risk outweighs the magnitude of the risk:1 see [33.2.1610]. A further argument which may be relied on is that the defendant has acted in accordance with the appropriate community or professional standards: see [33.2.1620]. This latter argument merely provides evidence that the defendant was not negligent in the circumstances, and the court may condemn the standard itself as inadequate. These considerations do not constitute defences to negligence: the legal burden of proof remains on the defendant throughout. Once the plaintiff has established the creation or non-removal of a reasonably foreseeable risk to the plaintiff, the evidential burden passes to the defendant. To negate a breach of duty, the defendant should adduce evidence tending to show the cost, difficulty or disadvantage of the measures required to eliminate or minimise the risk. Since few negligence trials depend upon the incidence of the legal burden of proof, the burden on the defendant concerning evidence of this sort is akin to having the burden of proof on the issue. In McLean v Tedman (1984) 155 CLR 306; 58 ALJR 541, the High Court appeared to place the legal burden of proof on the defendant although the judgment is inconclusive. The defendant employer argued that instituting a safe system of work was futile because the employees would have refused to comply with it. According to the employer, the time saved through the use of an unsafe system of work enabled the employees to hold second jobs. The Court held that it was for the employer to establish the likelihood of refusal. Since the employer had called no evidence on this issue, a breach was established. In Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4, Swain suffered spinal injury when diving into surf while swimming between the flags. The Court considered an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision overturning a verdict in favour of Swain. The Court of Appeal had held that there was no action that the Council could have taken in placing the flags that would have avoided injury to Swain, reversing the jury verdict in his favour. Although the appeal turned on the question of whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find as they did, the case contains a useful discussion of the ways in which a defendant can present evidence as to the steps taken in response to a foreseeable risk. The High Court by a majority of 3:2 reinstated the jury verdict. Under legislative amendments, most states and territories have sought to codify “obvious risks” and create a legal presumption of awareness of risk and no corresponding duty to warn of obvious risks.2 The existence of an obvious risk

200

[33.2.1600]

STANDARD OF CARE

does not negate the existence of a duty but is relevant in ascertaining the standard of care and the reasonableness of a defendant’s response.

1

2

Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5. See also Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [78]. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Divs 4, 5; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Divs 3, 4; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Divs 4, 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Divs 4, 6. For a more detailed discussion of these provisions, see [33.2.80].

[33.2.1600] The cost and burden of removing or minimising a danger may be relevant to the standard of care. This was illustrated by Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62 which was heard together with Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63. Both appeals were from decisions of a single judge at first instance. In Vairy v Wyong Shire Council, the Council had presented the argument that it was responsible for some 27 km of coastline and that it was unreasonable to expect the erection of signs warning of the dangers of diving from every rocky outcrop. However Bell J, at first instance, found that the rocky outcrop in question was unusual and that it was a readily accessible and popular spot. As McHugh J described: Situations may sometimes occur where, in an area under the control of the defendant, the totality of the magnitude of each risk of injury and the probability of its occurrence are outweighed by the expense or inconvenience of taking precautions to reduce or eliminate the totality of those risks.1

The existence of a duty was to be determined by an inquiry into what duty the Council owed along the entire 27 km of coastline for which it was responsible, rather than to one single outcropping.2 The cost or reasonableness of minimising the danger must therefore also be determined with reference to the entire coastline, rather than one outcropping. In each case it is a question of fact and one which in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council was not subject to any specific evidence by the defendant. The earlier decisions of Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202; 57 SR (NSW) 513; 74 WN (NSW) 310 and Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport & Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580 were appeals from jury findings of negligence. While important in their discussion about the steps to be taken to avoid a breach of the standard care, the role of the appellate court was to decide whether the jury verdict was capable of being sustained by the evidence. In Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs, runaway rolling stock belonging to the defendants entered one of the defendant’s main lines from a

201

[33.2.1600]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

private line. A fatal accident at a level crossing followed. While the defendants were not responsible for the stock running out of control, they could have installed catchpoints to prevent entry to the main line. The jury found the case of negligence proved on that basis. The cost of installing the catchpoints was minimal, but the defendants argued that installation would cause delays to stock entering the main line and would create a further hazard since catchpoints would derail a runaway truck. They argued further that a decision in favour of the plaintiff would create a need for countrywide installation of catchpoints in similar circumstances. The High Court found the delays and dangers alleged to be exaggerated and noted that the jury was required to direct its attention to the facts before it and not to the situation in the country as a whole. The Court deemed it significant, although it did not constitute a legal admission by the defendant, that catchpoints had been installed within a fortnight of the accident.3 In Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport & Tramways (NSW), the defendants were found liable for their failure to install a “dead man’s handle” on their trains. Had a dead man’s handle been installed, the train would have stopped when its driver collapsed at the controls, rather than continuing out of control. The defendants argued that the device increased the stress for the drivers because of the need to exert continuous pressure on the controls and increased the risk of rear-end collisions. The High Court upheld the jury’s finding of negligence on the basis that the jury was entitled to find that the danger of an uncontrolled train outweighed countervailing considerations. In Cekan v Haines (1990) 21 NSWLR 296, however, the countervailing considerations were more formidable and the breach of the duty of care was negated. The plaintiff, who had been arrested for drunkenness, dove head first onto the concrete floor of the police cell, becoming quadriplegic as a consequence. It was accepted that the risk of such injury could only be prevented if prisoners under the influence of alcohol were placed under constant surveillance. Kirby P indicated that a number of factors militated against such surveillance. They included the need to respect the privacy of prisoners, the cost of modifying cell arrangements or inspection practices, and the marginal utility of implementing changes, the effectiveness of which was uncertain. Mahoney J accepted that the present system of cell arrangement and the resources available for surveillance ruled out any breach in the present circumstances, but indicated that the position might be otherwise in the future, given that the concept of breach of duty was continuing to evolve.4 An argument based upon the mere cost of eliminating the risk is unlikely to succeed. The defendant usually has the option of ceasing the dangerous activity, and in appropriate circumstances the court may conclude that that step ought to have been taken. Thus, in Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643; [1953] 3 WLR 259, the House of Lords accepted in principle the argument that a factory whose floor had become slippery following flooding ought to have ceased operations until the condition could be rectified. On the facts, however, given the slightness of the risk, that extreme step was not required. 202

[33.2.1610]

STANDARD OF CARE

Where cessation is not a practicable option, a breach may be negated. In Vozza v Tooth & Co Ltd (1964) 112 CLR 316; 38 ALJR 48, the Court found that no practicable safe alternative existed for removing broken glass from a pasteuriser. Neither mechanical handling nor thicker gloves would have eliminated the risk to the employee charged with operating and maintaining the pasteuriser. Breach of duty was therefore negated. The case may be explained on the basis of an implied consent by an employee to those dangers which are a necessary part of employment and which cannot be eliminated (ie on voluntary assumption of risk).5

1 2 3

4

5

Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, McHugh J at [37]. See, the discussion of this case in Swift v Wearing-Smith [2016] NSWCA 38, Hoeben JA at [117]-[118], [120] (Meagher JA agreeing). On this latter point, see also Australian Oil Refining Pty Ltd v Bourne (1980) 54 ALJR 192 (HCA). Legislation in some jurisdictions now provides that the subsequent taking of action that would have avoided the risk of harm does not constitute an admission of liability: see [33.2.60]. Cekan v Haines (1990) 21 NSWLR 296, Mahoney J at 312–315. See also Dugdale AM, “Public Authority Liability: To What Standard?” (1994) 2 Tort L Rev 143. See “Negligence” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970].

[33.2.1610] The public or social utility of the defendant’s conduct may be relevant to the standard of care. Thus, while driving a vehicle at normal speeds or using dangerous machinery in a factory undoubtedly creates some risk of harm, those activities are not of themselves negligent. Negligence must be established by reference to their operation, construction or maintenance. Where the operation, construction or maintenance is negligent, utility is not available as a defence. Even those who drive vehicles in situations where the public interest requires the disregard of normal rules regarding maximum speeds or compliance with traffic signals and signs must drive with reasonable care. Police pursuit vehicles, fire engines and ambulances are not exempted from the requirement of reasonable care.1 While it appears that the standard of care required of rescuers may reflect the exigencies of the moment, it seems likely that that is merely an application of the standard of reasonableness to the circumstances of the case:2 see also [33.2.1340]–[33.2.1360]. Where an activity is inherently dangerous, utility may, in rare cases, excuse the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff driving a clearly marked left-hand drive ambulance during wartime was not contributorily negligent for failing to signal a right-hand turn adequately, given the difficulty in doing so and the need to use all available ambulances.3 Similarly, when a fireman was injured by the movement of a heavy lifting jack in the back of the unsuitable truck in which he was riding, the emergency situation and the unavailability of a suitable vehicle for transporting the jack negated liability.4

203

[33.2.1610]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

In cases involving diving injuries, the courts have made repeated reference to the fact that swimming and diving carry risks. While not inherently dangerous, the measure of the risk could not be said to be such that a defendant should necessarily prohibit the activity. Gleeson CJ noted the boundaries of a reasonable response by a defendant: “Where people are subject to a duty of care, they are to some extent their neighbours’ keepers, but they are not their neighbours’ insurers.”5 Utility is also relevant to injuries during sporting activities6 in schools (see [33.2.980]–[33.2.1020]) and similar institutions. No negligence is involved in merely organising sports and games with some element of risk if adequate supervision is provided and the activity does not involve any undue or unnecessary element of danger. The element of risk is outweighed by the social and educational value of participation. In Kretschmar v Queensland [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-272, no breach was involved in organising a game of “rob the nest” for intellectually handicapped children.7 The game involved no undue risk of injury and was adequately supervised. It also fostered the development of manipulative skills and team spirit. Despite injury to the plaintiff child, the utility of the conduct outweighed the element of risk. In Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, a plaintiff sustained an eye injury playing indoor cricket. The activity is clearly risky to anyone who understands what it involves: The respondent carried on the business of providing facilities for persons such as the appellant to play the game. The question for the tribunal of fact was what reasonableness required by way of response from the respondent, having regard to the respects in which the respondent was alleged to have been negligent.8

The primary judge held on the facts that the sports centre had acted reasonably in light of the risks presented by the activity and no breach was found. The High Court dismissed Woods’ appeal. Where the degree of risk is unreasonable the position may be otherwise. In Watson v Haines [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-094,9 the education authority ought to have been aware of the hazard involved when a child with a long, thin neck was allowed to participate in a rugby scrum. Since the authority took no steps to prevent the injury, it was liable in negligence. Where harm results from an accident of a type associated with a public facility such as a playground, the authority responsible for its provision may not be liable. In Chicco v Woodville City Corp [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-028,10 the plaintiff child was injured by a fellow playmate who fell or jumped from a flying fox and landed on the plaintiff. The Corporation was held not to be negligent irrespective of whether the incident was inadvertent or deliberate,

204

[33.2.1620]

STANDARD OF CARE

given that there was no negligence in the design of the flying fox and the accident was of a kind usual at children’s playgrounds.11

1

Gaynor v Allen [1959] 2 QB 403; [1959] 3 WLR 221; South Australian Ambulance Transport Inc v Wahlheim (1948) 77 CLR 215; Morgan v Pearson (1979) 22 SASR 5; Patterson v McGinlay (1991) 55 SASR 258. 2 Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441; (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 545. 3 Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd [1946] 2 All ER 333 (CA). 4 Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 WLR 835 (CA), Singleton LJ at 837 alluded to an element of willing assumption of risk. Had the jack injured a passerby, the position may have been different. 5 Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4, Gleeson J at [5]. 6 See also Sport and Leisure “Liability” [32.4.10]ff. 7 Kretschmar v Queensland [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-272 (QSCFC). 8 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, Gleeson CJ at [40]. 9 Watson v Haines [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-094 (NSWSC). 10 Chicco v Woodville City Corp [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-028 (SASCFC). 11 See also Roman Catholic Church Trustees for the Diocese of Canberra & Goulburn v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161; 79 ALJR 1195; [2005] HCA 31 in relation to a question of adequate school supervision of students using flying fox equipment in a school playground; see also [33.2.1000].

[33.2.1620] Evidence that the defendant complied with community or professional standards is relevant to the standard of care. Such evidence may establish that the defendant acted reasonably in the circumstances. A community practice may, however, itself be negligent,1 while the failure to adopt a community standard is not necessarily negligent.2 Community standards are expected to change in the light of greater knowledge of the risks involved in particular activities and increased information concerning these risks. Thus, while it was the usual practice for employers to ignore the risk of hearing loss due to excessively noisy conditions, doing so did not originally constitute a breach of duty. However, when greater medical knowledge and advice on the risk became available, the practice of not providing protection for employees was found negligent, and lack of compliance constituted a breach of duty.3 When measuring the standard of duty of a professional, the law has codified the common law position in some jurisdictions. Generally the standard for professionals or those holding themselves as having a particular skill is measured against their professional community standard: see [33.2.90]. Where questions of breach are determined by jury trial, the jury finding itself may be indicative of community standards. Many appeals on questions of negligence have involved jury verdicts. In more recent years, the trend in many states and territories has been to move away from civil jury trials for claims of negligence. In Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517;

205

[33.2.1620]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ discusses the part of the jury in such matters: The resolution of disputed issues of fact, including issues as to whether a defendant’s conduct conforms to a requirement of reasonable care, by the verdict of a jury involves committing a decision to the collective and inscrutable judgment of a group of citizens, chosen randomly. The alternative is to commit the decision to a professional judge, who is obliged to give reasons for the decision. … In a rights-conscious and litigious society, in which people are apt to demand reasons for any decision by which their rights are affected, the trend away from jury trial may be consistent with public sentiment. Even so, decision-making by the collective verdict of a group of citizens, rather than by the reasoned judgment of a professional judge is a time-honoured and important part of our justice system. It also has important collateral advantages of involving the public in the administration of justice, and of keeping the law in touch with community standards.4

1 Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552; [1956] 1 WLR 177; Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1960] AC 145; [1959] 3 WLR 262; Waterwell Shipping Inc v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-444 (NSWSC) (affirmed by HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Waterwell Shipping Inc (1998) 43 NSWLR 601; 146 FLR 76 (CA)). 2 Brown v Rolls Royce Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 210 (HL). 3 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405; [1984] 2 WLR 522. 4 Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517; 79 ALJR 565; 138 LGERA 50; [2005] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ at [7].

“Reasonable Person” Standard [33.2.1630] The “reasonable person standard” is an objective standard.1 Accordingly, reasonableness will be assessed with respect to the relevant characteristics of the defendant and the nature of the relationship with the plaintiff.

1 Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25. In the commercial sphere, a significant exception to this principle concerns the standard of care owed by company directors, which at present is a qualified subjective standard of care: Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248, Clarke and Sheller JJA at 505 (NSWLR).

[33.2.1635] The defendant’s young age may be relevant in determining the standard of care required. Young children are not expected to observe the same standard as adults. Although there is no minimum age for tortious capacity, such as exists in the criminal law, a very young child is extremely unlikely to be held to have committed a tort involving fault.

206

[33.2.1640]

STANDARD OF CARE

The standard of care expected of older children varies with the age of the child. The standard is that of an ordinary “child of the relevant age”.1 In McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; 39 ALJR 459, a 12-year-old was held not to have breached the appropriate standard in throwing a pointed metal rod at a tree, from which it glanced off and struck the plaintiff in the eye. McTiernan J thought that an adult would have appreciated the risk that the dart would glance off a tree and could cause harm to a bystander, but the defendant was judged by a lower standard.2 In Zanner v Zanner (2010) 79 NSWLR 702; [2010] NSWCA 343, an 11-year-old was edging a car into a carport when his foot slipped off the brake pedal. The car lurched forward and injured his mother, who was standing in front of it. Having moved a car a few metres into the carport several times before in the past, he was held on this occasion to have been in breach of a duty of care he owed to his mother. Little difficulty exists in establishing liability on the part of older children.3

1 2

3

McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; 39 ALJR 459, Kitto J at 214 (CLR). Concurring judgments were delivered: McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; 39 ALJR 459, Kitto J at 216, Owen J at 234 (CLR). Menzies J dissenting at 224–225 (CLR) deemed it inappropriate to consider age in determining liability for negligence although it was relevant in assessing contributory negligence. The English Court of Appeal adopted McHale v Watson in Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304. McHale v Watson has been recently applied in Goldsmith v Bisset (No 3) (2015) 71 MVR 53; [2015] NSWSC 634, Campbell J at [110], [133] in the context of contributory negligence: see also “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Gorely v Codd [1967] 1 WLR 19 (Assizes) (16-year-old liable for use of an air-rifle); Johns v Minister of Education (1981) 28 SASR 206 (12-year-old liable for discharging a ballpoint pen with a catapult); H v Pennell (1987) 46 SASR 158 (FC) (15-year-old liable for forcefully flicking a car aerial).

[33.2.1640] The assessment of contributory negligence involving children relies, to some extent, on a variable standard.1 It is recognised that children cannot be expected to exercise the foresight of the “reasonable person”. Some courts have shown leniency towards children where contributory negligence is at issue. In Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd [1949] DLR 1; [1949] AC 386, a nine-year-old who obtained petrol from a service station by lying about its intended use, and was subsequently injured when he attempted to use it to light a torch, was held not to be contributorily negligent. Because of his age, he was held to have limited knowledge of its inflammatory characteristics.2 In other cases, young children have been held to bear some responsibility, even those whose extreme youth makes it unlikely they would have been capable of committing the tort of negligence itself.3 Sometimes the age of the plaintiff has been taken into account and no reduction made for contributory negligence.4 The variability of the decisions in this area exemplify the inherent difficulty in

207

[33.2.1640]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

accounting for age under the umbrella of a purportedly objective standard.5 Where older children are involved, substantial deductions may be made.6

1 See “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]; Wright A, “Contributory Negligence and Infants” (2003) 57 Plaintiff 31. 2 Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd [1949] DLR 1; [1949] AC 386 (PC). Perhaps more to the point, while the child was aware petrol was combustible, he may not have understood the need for extreme care when igniting it. 3 Wiech v Amato (1973) 6 SASR 442; Bullock v Miller (1987) 14 Tas R 129 (both five-year-olds). 4 Beasley v Marshall (1977) 17 SASR 456 (four-year-old); Delphin v Savolainen (1989) 10 MVR 37 (NSWCA) (no deduction in the case of a seven-year-old who suddenly stepped onto a highway). 5 See also Jones v Hameister (1976) 14 SASR 328, where a 50 per cent deduction was allowed in respect of an eight-year-old who ran backwards onto a highway, and Chan v Fong (1973) 5 SASR 1, where a deduction was made in respect of a seven-year-old. In Kain v Mobbs [2008] NSWSC 383, a 15 per cent reduction was made when a 10-year-old ran from behind his school bus onto the road and collided with the side of a car travelling past. On appeal (see Mobbs v Kain (2009) 54 MVR 179 (NSWCA)), the trial judge’s finding as to the appropriate deduction for contributory negligence remained unchanged, although the appeal was allowed on other grounds. 6 Lacey v Schneider (1989) 9 MVR 512 (SASCFC).

[33.2.1645] Old age is seldom a factor in determining the appropriate standard of care. While elderly people may lack physical agility, most are capable of understanding the risks involved in particular activities and can be expected to ensure that they are not placed in a position where they must exercise physical agility to avoid danger to others. Occasionally, however, as in Daly v Liverpool Corp [1939] 2 All ER 142, diminished agility may be taken into account to negate a deduction for contributory negligence. The Court of Assizes held that an elderly person who was struck by a bus while crossing the street was not contributorily negligent in attempting the crossing at the time and place he did. [33.2.1650] It is difficult to generalise about the effect of factors such as physical or mental disease or disability upon the required standard of care. Those who understand the nature of their incapacity must not act to cause danger to others. Even insanity is not an absolute bar to liability. In Adamson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (1956) 58 WALR 56, an insane person who believed that his workmates were about to kill him stole a car and injured the plaintiff while driving through an intersection against the signal of a traffic police officer. Because his condition did not render him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct in taking the car and ignoring the instructions of the police officer, he had breached the appropriate standard. Caution must,

208

[33.2.1660]

STANDARD OF CARE

however, be used in attempting to generalise upon a decision such as this which turns on its own peculiar facts. There are few decided cases dealing with intellectual impairment or physical disability caused by disease or trauma. In Finbow v Domino (1957) 11 DLR (2d) 493,1 the Court acquitted an eight-year-old with a mental age of three of contributory negligence, suggesting a relaxed standard. However, given the inherent uncertainty of cases involving young children (see [33.2.1635]–[33.2.1640]), this is little more than suggestive. Cases concerning the sudden onset of disabling illness while driving a motor vehicle suggest that, where some degree of consciousness and capacity to control the vehicle remains after the onset of the condition, the usual standard continues to apply.2 Thus, a driver who suffered a stroke which both impaired his capacity to control the car and rendered him unaware of his impairment was held liable. The stroke did not render him an automaton as he retained some degree of consciousness.3 On the other hand, where a bee sting caused a driver to strike a tree a few feet away, because the immediate loss of control was unavoidable, negligence was not established.4 Where the trial judge has conflicting opinion as to whether a driver who lost control of his vehicle blacked out or not, a plaintiff could not rely on res ipsa loquitur:5 see [33.2.1760]. On some occasions the courts have investigated whether the driver should have recognised the symptoms of the condition before it manifested itself fully; however, in none of those cases has liability followed.6

1 2 3 4 5

6

Finbow v Domino (1957) 11 DLR (2d) 493. Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823 (QBD); Leahy v Beaumont (1981) 27 SASR 290 (FC). Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823 (QBD). But see Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263 (CA). Scholz v Standish [1961] SASR 123. Lafranchi v Transport Accident Commission (Vic) (2006) 14 VR 359; [2006] VSCA 81. Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he rebuttable inference, drawn from the mere fact that an injury occurred, that it was attributable to some fault or negligence on the part of the defendant”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. Waugh v James K Allan Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL) (heart attack); Smith v Lord [1962] SASR 88 (sudden loss of vision); Robinson v Glover [1952] NZLR 669 (SC) (sudden fainting despite prior illness). See also Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Best [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-210 (NSWCA) (driving by an epilepsy sufferer); Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263 (CA) (impaired ability due to hypoglycaemia).

[33.2.1660] The relevance of matters such as inexperience and lack of professional or other qualifications necessary for the task at hand depends upon the circumstances of the case. Where the defendant has the appropriate professional qualifications, the standard of care is that of the normally

209

[33.2.1660]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

competent professional: see [33.2.90] and [33.2.1620]. In professions such as law and accounting, where there is no hierarchical structure, allowance is not made for inexperience. In the medical profession, where hierarchical distinctions are usual, the standard of care will reflect these.1 Where an amateur has undertaken a task that would be more capably and appropriately performed by a professional, that on its own is insufficient to establish breach of duty. In Philips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] 1 All ER 566, the plaintiff had her ear pierced in the jewellery department of the defendant’s store. When the wound became infected and caused a scar, despite the needle having been passed through a flame before use, the defendant was held by the King’s Bench not to be liable. The defendant’s servant had taken the care that could reasonably be expected in the circumstances. The plaintiff was not entitled to expect hospital standards of sterilisation. However, that was not a factor in Wells v Cooper [1958] 2 QB 265; [1958] 3 WLR 128, in which the Court of Appeal held that the standard of care required of those who undertake their own domestic repairs is that of the reasonably competent domestic carpenter, not that of a professional carpenter. The defendant used 0.75-inch screws to secure a door handle, although a professional might have preferred 1-inch screws. He was not liable to a plaintiff who fell from the steps when the handle came off while the plaintiff was attempting to close the door in a strong wind.

1 See Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, regarding the medical profession and the relevant standards for general practitioners and specialists; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12 regarding barristers. See also [33.2.1150] with regards to liability of hospitals; Professional Liability “Medical Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff; “Legal Practitioners” [27.3.10]ff.

[33.2.1670] The standard of care owed by a learner driver is that of a reasonable driver.1 This standard is not to be qualified by reference to what a passenger or other person may know or ought to have known about the driver’s ability to meet the standard. There is nothing so exceptional in the relationship between a learner driver and a supervising passenger so as to call for a special duty of care. Such an inquiry may be relevant to contributory negligence and any defence related to voluntariness. It is not relevant to establishing whether a duty of care exists, nor to its scope. These principles are established by Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40, overruling Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25.

1 Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40.

[33.2.1680] A driving instructor owes a duty of care to learners undertaking instruction. The relevant standard is that of the reasonably

210

[33.2.1690]

STANDARD OF CARE

competent qualified driver giving instruction. In Preston v Dowell (1987) 45 SASR 111, an instructor was found to have breached the duty in giving the pupil the option of overtaking another vehicle on a dirt road. The learner lost control after the car touched the one it was overtaking at speed. [33.2.1690] The standard of care owed by a drunken driver towards passengers who are aware of the driver’s intoxication has been clarified by legislation in some jurisdictions, but remains uncertain at common law. The legislative reforms in most states and territories (see [33.2.50]) have codified the effect of intoxication on both the person owing a duty of care and the person injured: see [33.2.90]. There is now a presumption of contributory negligence where an injured plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident.1 In some jurisdictions, contributory negligence is also to be presumed where a person over the age of 16 years is injured in an accident by an intoxicated person while relying upon that person.2 In New South Wales, a finding of contributory negligence will be made if the injured person was not a minor and was a voluntary passenger in a motor vehicle whose driver’s ability to drive was impaired as a consequence of the consumption of alcohol or any other drug and the injured person was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the impairment.3 In the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia, the defence of volenti non fit injuria4 to claims for negligence arising when the injured person knew or ought to have known of the driver’s impairment has been largely abolished by statute.5 Where the common law applies, the dicta of McHugh J in Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34 frames a template for an argument of contributory negligence on the part of the passenger, depending on the facts of the case.6 Most decided cases have involved parties who have been drinking together before driving, although it could arise in the case of a completely sober passenger. Where the passenger is wholly unaware of the condition of the driver, the normal standard applies.7

1

2

3 4

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 95; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50(3); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 14; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5L. See also “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 15; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47. In such situations, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk does not apply. See also Katter N, “Negligence and Intoxication: Has Civil Liability Reform Gone Too Far?” (2006) 11 Deakin LR 161. Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 74. See also “Negligence” [33.9.820]. Volenti non fit injuria: “[T]he defence that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury

211

[33.2.1690]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

5

6

7

negligently caused”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 179. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48 (though note that these sections are not confined to motor vehicle accidents); Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 76; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47. See “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.970]. See also Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, where the Court was not concerned with the duty owed by the intoxicated driver to the intoxicated passenger since a breach of the duty was not raised as an issue. While the legal issue before the Court concerned Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 74, McHugh and Kirby JJ did separately address the approach to be adopted in assessing the contributory negligence of an intoxicated passenger at common law when accepting a ride from a driver known to be intoxicated, and reviewed the cases dealing with intoxicated drivers, contributory negligence and the defence of voluntary assumption of risk. See Hogg K, “Guest Passengers: A Drunk Driver’s Defences” (1994) 2 TLJ 37.

[33.2.1700] The appropriate standard of care where both the plaintiff and the defendant are engaged in a sporting event is essentially an evidentiary matter. Australian courts generally follow the approach of Kitto J in Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172. The issue is whether the defendant’s conduct which caused injury to the plaintiff [was] reasonable in all the circumstances, including as part of the circumstances the inferences fairly to be drawn by the defendant from the plaintiff’s participation in what was going on at the time.1

While the rules of the sport have evidentiary value concerning the appropriate standard, they are not determinative. Many claims for injuries arising out of altercations between sporting contestants also involve claims of assault.2 Non-compliance with the rules is only one of the relevant circumstances, and its weight must be determined in the circumstances of the case.3 In Ollier v Magnetic Island Country Club Inc [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-743; [2004] QCA 137, a contestant in a golf competition was hit by a golf ball struck by another contestant. The trial judge held that the risk of being struck by a golf ball is not a risk inherent in a game of golf. The rules provide that a player should not play a ball in circumstances where there was a risk of another player being struck. An appeal by the golfer who struck the ball which hit and injured the other player was dismissed by the Queensland Court of Appeal who held: [T]he learned trial judge was correct when he concluded that the appellant was under a duty of care to the respondent and because of his defective lookout he failed to discharge that duty and as a consequence the respondent sustained serious injury.4

A typical defence is voluntary assumption of risk, also addressed in Rootes v Shelton. The existence and extent of a duty of care is to be determined in all the circumstances of the case, including the risks which may reasonably be inferred to have been accepted by the fact of participation. The rules of the game are a

212

[33.2.1720]

STANDARD OF CARE

relevant, but not a determining, circumstance. It rests on the defendant to establish voluntary acceptance of a risk.

1

2 3 4

Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172, Kitto J at 390 (CLR). That approach has been adopted in Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866 (CA) and Johnston v Frazer (1990) 21 NSWLR 89 (NSWCA). The restrictive English approach in Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43; [1962] 3 WLR 616 (CA), where Lord Diplock took the view that liability required reckless disregard for the safety of fellow competitors or spectators, appears to have been abandoned. See also Sport and Leisure “Liability” [32.4.10]ff; Fenton TE, “Actionable Violence or ‘Just Part of the Game’? Applying Standard Trespass and Negligence Principles to Sports Violence in Canada” (2005) 13 Tort Law Review 122. See Criminal Offence “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff. Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172, Kitto J at 389, Barwick CJ agreeing at 385 (CLR). Ollier v Magnetic Island Country Club Inc [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-743; [2004] QCA 137, White J at [39].

[33.2.1720] The standard of care owed by directors of public companies is currently a qualified subjective standard of care. Directors are expected to exercise reasonable care, however, in Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248, it was held that the standard of care required of a director of a public company “will vary according to the size and business of the particular company and the experience or skills that the director held himself or herself out to have in support of appointment to the office”.1 In Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; [2011] FCA 717, Middleton J’s view was that: [T]he objective duty of competence requires that the directors have the ability to read and understand the financial statements, including the understanding that financial statements classify assets and liabilities as current and non-current, and what those concepts mean. This classification is relevant to the assessment of solvency and liquidity. Equally, a director should have an understanding of the need to disclose certain events post balance sheet date. … [I]t may well be that directors should have a degree of accounting literacy that requires a knowledge of accounting practice and accounting standards. That is not for decision in this proceeding. All that is being alleged is that where the accounts on their face refer, as here, to classification of debt and post balance date events, the director adopting and approving the accounts should have a knowledge of and apply the basic elements of the one or two standards relevant to this proceeding.2

1

2

Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248 (CA), Clarke and Sheller JJA at 505 (NSWLR). See also Business Organisations “Duties of Directors” [4.2.1970]–[4.2.2080]. Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; [2011] FCA 717, Middleton J at [124], [206]. 213

[33.2.1730]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

Evidence [33.2.1730] The plaintiff bears the legal burden of proof on all the issues in a negligence action. These include the issues of fact involved in duty of care, breach of duty, proof of damage, causation and remoteness. Care should be taken where negligence and other tort actions overlap. Both in an action for trespass occurring off the highway and in detinue, the burden of proof in respect of fault lies with the defendant. In trespasses occurring off the highway, the plaintiff need only establish direct contact by the defendant with the plaintiff’s person or property. If that is established, the defendant has the burden of proving inevitable accident.1 In detinue, the plaintiff need only establish that the chattel was bailed to the defendant, and its loss. The defendant carries the legal burden of proving that the loss occurred without fault on its part.2

1 2

See “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff for a discussion of inevitable accident. Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694; [1962] 2 WLR 1015 (CA); Nibali v Sweeting & Denney (WA) Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-258 (WASCFC). See “Trespass and Intentional Torts – Detinue” [33.8.910]–[33.8.960].

[33.2.1740] The standard of proof in negligence is on the balance of probabilities. The effect of this standard is set out by Gibbs J in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267: Of course as far as logical consistency goes many hypotheses may be put which the evidence does not exclude positively. But this is a civil and not a criminal case. We are concerned with probabilities, not with possibilities. The difference between the criminal standard of proof in its application to circumstantial evidence and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged.1

The plaintiff must establish a more than equal chance that the relevant aspect of the allegedly negligent conduct occurred. This does not require a greater probability than 51 per cent, although courts seldom quantify it precisely. If the plaintiff’s evidence succeeds in making out a case on the balance of probabilities, the evidential burden passes to the defendant. The defendant is likely to fail unless it leads evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s case, although the legal burden remains with the plaintiff. A finding that the evidential burden of proof has shifted is unlikely to be made during the course of the trial. Rather, that conclusion will be drawn by the judge in handing down judgment or in giving directions to the jury. However, particularly in the case of jury trials, a

214

[33.2.1750]

EVIDENCE

submission of no case to answer by the defendant and a decision not to lead evidence requires the court to determine whether there is a case to answer, that is, whether there is a case to be left to the jury. Even where the plaintiff succeeds on that point, the jury should be directed that it is possible for it to return a verdict in the defendant’s favour. The plaintiff does not satisfy the legal burden of proof merely by establishing that the defendant has a case to answer which has not been answered.2 When the evidential burden of proof transfers to the defendant, the defendant generally must provide cogent evidence in rebuttal, or lose the case. In Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; 39 ALJR 123, the defendant sought to rebut a prima facie case that the plaintiff’s incapacity arose from the defendant’s negligence by alleging a progressive pre-existing condition. The High Court discussed the earlier decision of Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; 34 ALJR 186 which dealt with a similar issue and concluded that the burden rested on a plaintiff to establish that incapacity resulted from the negligent act of the defendant but in circumstances where a defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s incapacity was related to a pre-existing condition, the onus of adducing such evidence rested on the defendant. The High Court stated: [I]t is not enough for the defendant merely to suggest the existence of a progressive pre-existing condition in the plaintiff or a relationship between any such condition and the plaintiff’s present incapacity. On the contrary it was stressed that both the pre-existing condition and its future probable effects or its actual relationship to that incapacity must be the subject of evidence (ie either substantive evidence in the defendant’s case or evidence extracted by cross-examination in the plaintiff’s case) which, if accepted, would establish with some reasonable measure of precision, what the pre-existing condition was and what its future effects, both as to their nature and their future development and progress, were likely to be. That being done, it is for the plaintiff upon the whole of the evidence to satisfy the tribunal of fact of the extent of the injury caused by the defendant’s negligence.3

1

2

3

TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 (HCA), Gibbs J at 269, rephrasing a quote from Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352, Dixon, Fullagar and Kitto JJ at 358. See Davis v Bunn (1936) 56 CLR 246, Evatt J at 267–269. While the passage explicitly addresses the evidentiary rule res ipsa loquitur (see [33.2.1760]), the principle it adduces is generally applicable. Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he thing speaks for itself”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; 39 ALJR 123, Barwick CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ at 168 (CLR).

[33.2.1750] Proof of negligence may derive from direct evidence given either by parties to the case or by third parties, or may be established by circumstantial evidence, but not by speculation.1 In cases of circumstantial evidence, the court infers the probability of negligence from the proof of certain facts. Those cases often cause substantial difficulty, and it is not unusual for the

215

[33.2.1750]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

members of the court to disagree. In Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470, the deceased had been struck and killed by a hit-and-run driver. The driver was never identified. Examination of the road revealed that the plaintiff was hit at its centre, that there were tyre marks for some 14 m, indicating hard braking, and that the plaintiff was carried that distance. The plaintiff had been seen healthy and sober an hour before the accident, although the post-mortem revealed alcohol in the plaintiff’s blood. A majority of the High Court held that those facts were consistent with the jury finding of negligence by the driver. Dixon and Kitto JJ dissented on the basis that the inference was little more than conjecture and not open to the jury. Numerous possibilities not consistent with fault on the driver’s part could not be excluded.2

1 See Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5. 2 Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470, Dixon CJ at 476–477, Kitto J at 486–488. Dixon and Kitto JJ reached a similar conclusion in Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352, there forming part of a 3:2 majority.

[33.2.1760] Proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence must be distinguished from the principle of evidence known as res ipsa loquitur.1 Where that principle applies,2 its import is that the mere occurrence of the accident (the “res”, or thing) constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. The earliest cases involved barrels falling from upper-storey warehouse windows onto persons below.3 In Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596; 159 ER 665, the Court established the conditions necessary for the operation of the doctrine: [W]here the thing is shewn to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.4

The principle has been applied to motor cars going suddenly out of control where there is no other explanation for the accident5 and to defects in goods discovered immediately or soon after purchase.6 In Nominal Defendant v Haslbauer (1967) 117 CLR 448; 41 ALJR 1, the principle was held to apply prima facie where the defendant drove into the back of the plaintiff’s car. When the defendant established brake failure as the cause of the accident, the plaintiff could no longer rely upon the principle and was required to prove that the defendant was negligent concerning the condition of the brakes.7 Where the evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the jury, or the judge of the fact, what was the cause of an occurrence which could speak for itself, then it can continue to do so, although if the evidence given has raised doubts it may now speak less loudly and less convincingly than before.8 216

[33.2.1760]

EVIDENCE

In Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99, the High Court rejected the applicability of the doctrine where a piece of wood was thrown out of the defendant’s circular saw and struck the plaintiff in the face. That may have been because evidence was not provided by the plaintiff on “the characteristics of circular saws” or on whether such an event was “usual or unusual or indeed highly improbable”.9 Particular difficulties arise concerning head-on collisions between motor cars. Often there is clear evidence of negligence by one or more of the drivers, but there may be no survivors to the accident and no eyewitness accounts or other evidence capable of locating fault. In Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140; 39 ALJR 288, the High Court upheld the decision of the trial judge that, where both drivers survived and each blamed the other, the loss should lie where it fell given that neither allegation of negligence had been established. Owen J expressly disapproved the view of Lord Denning in Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-op Society Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 147210 that the court had a duty to ascribe blame and without evidence establishing fault each should be held equally to blame. Owen J acknowledged that the inference of joint equal fault was open on the facts of Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-op Society Ltd and agreed that where a collision between two vehicles travelling in opposite directions on an otherwise empty road is shown to have occurred in the centre of the road, then in the absence of some satisfactory explanation, it is reasonable to infer that both drivers were to blame.11

1 2 3 4 5

6

7 8

Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he thing speaks for itself”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18. Byrne v Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722; 159 ER 299; Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596; 159 ER 665. Scott v London & St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596; 159 ER 665, Erle CJ at 601 (H & C). Davis v Bunn (1936) 56 CLR 246; Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Fredrichberg (1968) 118 CLR 403; 42 ALJR 198; Laurie v Raglan Building Co Ltd [1942] 1 KB 152 (CA); Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Best [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-210 (NSWCA). Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC); Chaproniere v Mason (1905) 21 TLR 633 (CA); Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600 (CA). See also Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Best [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-210 (NSWCA). Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1966) 115 CLR 493; 40 ALJR 330, Windeyer J at 498 (CLR); see also Australian Capital Health Authority v Moorby (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Beazley JJA and Dunford AJA, 40748 of 1994, 25 June 1997).

217

[33.2.1760]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

9

Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99, Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar and Taylor JJ at 117. 10 Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-op Society Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1472 (CA). 11 Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140; 39 ALJR 288, Owen J at 158 (CLR). The inference of joint equal fault was drawn by the High Court in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 (HCA). See also Radovanovic v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust [1980] WAR 105 (FC); Bagnall v Schmidt (1980) 25 SASR 93; Wheatland v Dixon (1995) 22 MVR 431 (WASCFC).

[33.2.1770] The principle of res ipsa loquitur1 may be excluded by evidence establishing the actual cause of the accident. In Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18, the High Court held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur did not operate where the cause of an accident was established. In that case, a worker was injured when a hose providing high pressure air to a grinder machine became loose and struck the plaintiff in the face. The cause of the accident was proved to be the hose separating from the coupling. In Lafranchi v Transport Accident Commission (Vic) (2006) 14 VR 359; [2006] VSCA 81, Lafranchi had been driving a motor vehicle that ran off the road. There was evidence that she may have suffered a blackout, but also evidence to the contrary. The Victorian Supreme Court of Appeal held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur did not apply where there was evidence available that there were a number of possible causes of the accident – negligent and non-negligent. The Court said that even if res ipsa loquitur could be invoked, the facts constituted a weak inference of negligence which was rebutted by the explanation that the driver may have suffered a blackout.

1 Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he thing speaks for itself”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150; see [33.2.1760].

[33.2.1780] For the principle of res ipsa loquitur1 to apply, the “res” or “thing” must be under the control of the defendant or its employees. The accident must point to negligence on the defendant’s part, whether personal or vicarious. No difficulty arises where the negligent act must have been committed by one or more of the defendant’s employees in the course of their employment. There is no need to identify the particular employee or employees responsible.2 If the facts tend to show negligence by the employee in the operation of a safe system of work, the defendant cannot rebut the principle by showing that it has established one.3 Difficulty may arise in establishing liability by a hospital. If the evidence shows that the negligent person was a surgeon or a nurse and the surgeon is an independent contractor rather than an employee,

218

[33.2.1800]

EVIDENCE

liability will not follow unless the hospital owes the patient a non-delegable duty of care, a proposition supported by some authority in both Australia and England.4

1 2 3

4

Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he thing speaks for itself”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150; see [33.2.1760]–[33.2.1770]. Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC). Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC); Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812 (QBD). Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 (CA), Reynolds JA at 561; Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293 (CA), Lord Greene MR at 301; Cassidy v Ministry of Health (UK) [1951] 2 KB 343 (CA), Denning LJ at 362–365. See also [33.2.1150]; Professional Liability “Medical Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff.

[33.2.1790] Where one of several independent persons could be responsible for the negligence, the plaintiff must establish that, on the balance of probabilities (see [33.2.1740]), one defendant is responsible. In Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600,1 the plaintiff was able to establish that the fault causing a bottle of soft drink to explode occurred during the bottling process rather than during manufacture or while the bottle was in the retailer’s stock.

1

Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600 (CA).

[33.2.1800] Where the principle of res ipsa loquitur1 applies, the defendant bears the evidential burden of providing an explanation of the occurrence consistent with no negligence on its part or showing that the defendant exercised all reasonable care in the circumstances.2 The defendant will succeed if the probabilities at the end of the evidence are balanced equally between negligence and no negligence on its part.3 In Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 200, Latham CJ took the contrary view that the legal burden transfers to the defendant when res ipsa loquitur applies,4 a view which has some limited support in English case law5 and which has been advocated as a desirable legislative reform by some members of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the “supermarket spillage cases”.6 In Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18, the High Court discussed the shifting of the forensic evidential burden of persuasion, as distinct from the legal burden, from the plaintiff to the defendant and noted that the distinction between the two was important but often elusive.7

219

[33.2.1800]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

While a transfer of the legal onus of proof would alleviate the difficulties faced by plaintiffs in those cases, the spillage cases are doubtful as examples of the principle. Their effect is that the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case by proving the presence of a foreign substance on the supermarket floor. It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to establish how long it has been there. The presence of a liquid or other foreign substance on a supermarket floor is not an event which would be unlikely to occur but for the negligence of the defendant but, according to the Australian case law, the plaintiff has merely to show its presence.8 The defendant must then lead evidence to establish that a careful system of floor inspection was in force and operational at the time. The plaintiff’s case will fail if the defendant discharges its evidential burden. Even if the defendant should fail to discharge its burden, the plaintiff may be unable to establish a causal connection if the court cannot determine how long the substance had been on the floor. In those circumstances, it is open to the defendant to argue that even a careful system of inspection would not have revealed the spillage because the time between the spillage and the accident was too short.9

1 Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he thing speaks for itself”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150; see [33.2.1760]–[33.2.1780]. 2 Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 200; Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Best [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-210 (NSWCA); Houston v Queensland Railways (1994) 20 MVR 198 (QCA). 3 Davis v Bunn (1936) 56 CLR 246, Evatt J at 267–269; Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 (CA); Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266 (NSWCA); Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104 (NSWCA). 4 Fitzpatrick v Walter E Cooper Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 200, Latham CJ at 207–208. 5 Moore v R Fox & Sons [1956] 1 QB 596; [1956] 2 WLR 342 (CA); Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 810 (CA). But see The Kite [1933] P 154; Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298 (PC). 6 Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 (CA), Kirby P at 244; Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266 (NSWCA), Kirby P at 68,828–68,829; Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104 (NSWCA), Priestley JA at 68,941. 7 Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 74 ALJR 743; [2000] HCA 18, Kirby J at [108]–[111], Gaudron J at [72]–[73] (dissenting but not on this point); Lafranchi v Transport Accident Commission (Vic) (2006) 14 VR 359; [2006] VSCA 81, Maxwell P and Neave JA at [55]–[57]. 8 Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 (CA); Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266 (NSWCA); Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104 (NSWCA); Drakos v Woolworths (SA) Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 431 (FC); Griffın v Coles Myer Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 478 (FC). The view was not adopted by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in a motor vehicle accident case: Jazairy v Najjar (1998) 27 MVR 498.

220

[33.2.1820]

9

EVIDENCE

The court may decide the length of time the substance has been on the floor by inference from the facts proved, though it is not clear whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the burden on that issue: see Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104 (NSWCA), Handley JA at 68,944, where an inference favourable to the plaintiff was made by the Court.

[33.2.1810] Where an appropriate standard of conduct is prescribed by governmental regulation, non-compliance with the prescribed standard is admissible as evidence of negligence.1 While evidence of compliance or non-compliance in respect of any given regulation does not constitute conclusive evidence of negligence, it is relevant to the question of whether a given action was negligent.2 If no other evidence of negligence is available, it may be proper for the court to base a finding of negligence upon the breach.3

1 2 3

Menow v Honsberger [1974] SCR 239; (1973) 38 DLR (3d) 105; Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441; (1971) 22 DLR (3d) 545. Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220; Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222 (FC). Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222 (FC), Gavan Duffy J at 237. Compare discussion in “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff.

[33.2.1820] Customary and professional standards may have probative value in a negligence action. While compliance with customary or standard practice is not conclusive evidence that due care has been taken and departure from such standards is not conclusive evidence of negligence,1 it is relevant and frequently relied on.2 Expert evidence is critical in industrial accidents.3 Where evidence on standards that are usual in a particular practice is uniformly favourable to the defendant, the court is likely to accept that the practice is reasonable.4 Where, however, conflicting views are presented, the matter is substantially more difficult, and the court must choose between the conflicting views or dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for want of evidence.5 In all cases, the final determination lies with the court and expert evidence will not be allowed to usurp the role of the judge and jury.6 Reference should be made to legislative reforms regarding the standard of care for the negligence of professionals which will be determined by whether the act of the professional was in accordance with the widely accepted practice in Australia by their peers:7 see [33.2.90].

1 2 3

Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport & Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580, Latham CJ (in dissent) at 589. Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292; 35 ALJR 163, Windeyer J at 306 (CLR). Neill v New South Wales Fresh Food & Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362;

221

[33.2.1820]

BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE

4 5

6

7

36 ALJR 297; Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Krstevski (1973) 128 CLR 666; 47 ALJR 563; Da Costa v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1978) 20 ALR 257 (HCA). Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia [1967] 1 WLR 813 (PC). Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia [1967] 1 WLR 813 (PC). See also Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (QBD); Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority (UK) [1984] 1 WLR 634 (HL). Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430; 46 SR (NSW) 251; 63 WN (NSW) 123; Hocking v Bell (1947) 75 CLR 125 (PC); Northumberland Insurance Ltd (in liq) v Alexander (1984) 8 ACLR 882 (NSWSC), Clarke J at 900. See generally 27 Professional Liability.

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33.3 Occupiers’ Liability

OCCUPIERS’ LIABILITY

Current Subtitle Author Michael Denahy

(Updating author, Update 319 – June 2016) (Updating author, Update 308 – June 2015)

BEc, LLB (Hons) (Syd), LLM (LSE) Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Heath Ross Hazelton

Meg O’Sullivan

BA (Hons), M Phil (Syd), LLB (UNSW) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

LLB (Hons), BA (Hons) Barrister, Supreme Court of Victoria

(Updating author, Update 210 – February 2007)

Andrew Felkel BEc (Hons), JD (Melb) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria (Updating author, Update 266 – October 2011)

Geoff Masel

(Updating author, Update 218 – October 2007) (Updating author, Update 210 – February 2007)

Associate Professor Jane Swanton BA, LLB (Syd), LLM (Lond) Associate Professor of Law, University of Sydney (Original author)

BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Updating author, Update 80 – August 1998) (Updating author, Update 40 – October 1996)

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33.3 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.3.10] DEFINITIONS........................................................................... [33.3.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.3.40] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.3.50] CAUSES OF ACTION................................................................ [33.3.160] PREMISES............................................................................. [33.3.160] OCCUPATION........................................................................ [33.3.170] CLASSIFICATION OF ENTRANTS........................................[33.3.210] DUTY TO LAWFUL ENTRANTS............................................ [33.3.220] Standard of Care................................................................[33.3.220] Non-delegability..................................................................[33.3.280] DUTY TO CONTRACTUAL ENTRANTS............................... [33.3.290] DUTY TO TRESPASSERS.....................................................[33.3.320] DUTY IN RELATION TO OCCUPANCY OR ACTIVITY.........[33.3.350] EVIDENCE............................................................................. [33.3.360] DEFENCES.................................................................................[33.3.470] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.......................................... [33.3.470] VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK..................................[33.3.490] EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY................................................... [33.3.500] ILLEGALITY............................................................................[33.3.510]

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226

Introduction Definitions [33.3.10] “Occupiers’ liability” may be defined as the liability to compensate persons injured on premises because of the dangerous condition of the premises. The liability of an occupier (see [33.3.170]) of premises (see [33.3.160]) for negligently causing injury or damage1 to an entrant in relation to the static condition of premises or activities conducted thereon is governed by both legislation in respect of occupiers and the common law in the Australian Capital Territory,2 South Australia,3 Victoria4 and Western Australia5 (see [33.3.230]); and by the common law principles of negligence and general civil liability legislation in other Australian jurisdictions.6 The High Court decision in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180 rejected the earlier approach whereby the standard of care expected from an occupier was stated in the form of “special duties” or “formulary rules” which varied depending on the status of the particular entrant:7 see [33.3.30]. Legislative schemes that operate to exclude civil liability in some circumstances or prescribe the defences available are discussed at [33.3.470]–[33.3.520]. Broadly speaking, a general standard of reasonable care is now owed to all entrants, both in respect of the static condition of premises and active operations or activities carried out in premises.8 The content of the occupiers’ duty is to take such care as is reasonable in the circumstances for the entrants’ safety, and to protect them from risks of injury that can be foreseen and avoided.9

1

2

3 4 5

The rules apply to property damage as well as personal injury: Commissioners of Transport (NSW) v Barton (1933) 49 CLR 114; 33 SR (NSW) 507; 50 WN (NSW) 230; Drive-Yourself Lessey’s Pty Ltd v Burnside (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 390; 76 WN (NSW) 209 (FC); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 4(1). See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 12.1, which replaces the common law rules about the standard of care an occupier of premises must show to people entering on the premises, but does not affect other common law rules (or obligations under other statutory instruments) about the liability of occupiers to people entering on their premises: see s 168(4), (5). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 4. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IIA. Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 4; Handford PR, “Occupiers’ Liability Reform in Western Australia – and Elsewhere” (1987) 17 UWALR 182.

227

[33.3.10]

INTRODUCTION

6

7

8

9

See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See also Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 2; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6; see also Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A. See Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 657–658, 662–663 (CLR); Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 156 CLR 7; 59 ALJR 201, Mason J at 20, Deane J at 32 (CLR). See Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19 for an example of liability to ensure that the occupiers’ “system” did not expose entrants to an unreasonable risk of physical injury; see also Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; 78 ALJR 933; [2004] HCA 29. The relevance of the relationship between the parties in determining the occupier’s liability in the circumstances is discussed at [33.3.30], [33.3.180]. Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180; Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [63] (Heydon J agreeing at [283]).

[33.3.20] Occupiers’ liability forms part, or is a subset, of the law of negligence:1 see also [33.3.280]. The relationship of occupier and entrant is one of the established categories of relationship (along with teachers and students, doctors and patients, employers and employees, prison authorities and prisoners) in which the common law of negligence imposes a duty on the former class of person to take care of the latter.2

1 See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff, in particular, “Definition” [33.2.20]; “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]; “Additional Control Mechanisms” [33.2.270]; “Occupiers” [33.2.1160]. 2 See Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, McHugh J at [27].

[33.3.30] The common law previously distinguished between different categories of entrant. The classification of entrants was critical to the development of a variable standard of care: see [33.3.210]. That concept is now outdated, apart from special applications of the law for contractual entrants and trespassers: see [33.3.290]–[33.3.340]. There were, in descending order of the strictness of the duty owed to them, contractual entrants, invitees, licensees and trespassers.1 To contractual entrants, or persons who paid to enter the premises, the occupier owed a duty not just to take care, but to see or ensure that care was taken: see [33.3.290]. To invitees and business visitors in whose presence the occupier had a material interest or concern, the occupier was required to “use reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual danger, which he [or she] knows or ought to know”.2 Licensees, or persons who had permission to enter the premises, were entitled to be warned of concealed dangers of which the occupier actually knew.3 Trespassers, at least

228

[33.3.30]

DEFINITIONS

those whose presence was actually known to the occupier or foreseen as likely, were owed a duty of “common humanity”.4 The rejection of the “categorisation of entrants” approach contained in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180 (see [33.3.210]) does not mean that the common law completely disregards the relationship between the parties or the circumstances surrounding entry. The nature of the relationship between the occupier and entrant is still relevant to the question of determining what reasonableness requires of the occupier, and determining whether there has been a breach of the occupier’s duty:5 see also [33.3.180].

1

2

3 4

5

See Lipman v Clendinnen (1932) 46 CLR 550, Dixon J at 554–556. Another category was “entrants as of right” in respect of whom no clear uniform formula had evolved: see Aiken v Kingborough Corp (1939) 62 CLR 179; 33 Tas LR 73, Latham CJ at 189–191, Dixon J at 205 (CLR); Burrum Corp v Richardson (1939) 62 CLR 214, Latham CJ at 228–230; Vale v Whiddon (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 90; 67 WN (NSW) 119; 17 LGR (NSW) 197 (FC); Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; 52 ALJR 142; Barr v Manly Municipal Council (1967) 70 SR (NSW) 119; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 136; 14 LGRA 164 (CA); Schiller v Mulgrave Shire Council (1972) 129 CLR 116; 47 ALJR 650; 27 LGRA 354. In Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Brennan CJ at [19]–[20] considered that the test in Aiken v Kingborough Corp still applied to determine the standard of care owed by a statutory authority, which has the control and management of premises, to persons who enter the premises as a right. Indermaur v Dames (1866) LR 1 CP 274, Willes J at 288; Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Anderson (1961) 105 CLR 42; 35 ALJR 128, Fullagar J (dissenting as to outcome) at 56 (CLR). Lipman v Clendinnen (1932) 46 CLR 550, Dixon J at 566, 568–570. Southern Portland Cement Ltd v Cooper [1974] AC 623; [1974] 2 WLR 152; (1973) 129 CLR 295; 47 ALJR 790 (PC); British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877; [1972] 2 WLR 537. The financial or other resources of the particular occupier were taken into account in determining what “common humanity” demanded: now see [33.3.340]. Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19, the Court at [24]; Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Kirby J at [60]–[63] (dissenting as to outcome); Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [43]–[44] (Heydon J agreeing at [283]); Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), Samuels JA at 67; Freudenstein v Marhop Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 724, Kirby J at [89]. See the discussion of legislative modifications to the common law position in some jurisdictions at [33.3.210], [33.3.230]. The content of the duty of care (including what constitutes reasonable conduct in the circumstances) is discussed further at [33.3.220]–[33.3.280].

229

[33.3.30]

INTRODUCTION

Scope of Subtitle [33.3.40] This Subtitle concerns the common law and statutory duties of occupiers to prevent injury to entrants to their premises: see also [33.3.50]. The focus is on the duty of occupiers rather than the classification of entrants, which reflects the significant change of emphasis in this area of law following the High Court decision of Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180: see [33.3.200]–[33.3.210]. The standard of care, in turn, was also determined primarily by reference to the occupier, however the passage of legislation codifying occupiers’ liability in some jurisdictions has since made factors subjective to the plaintiff of equal value: see [33.3.250]. This Subtitle provides a brief analysis of the old “formulary rules”, which provided a framework for the law of occupiers’ liability prior to Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna, in order to put the current law in context: see [33.3.10]–[33.3.30]. Common law developments are discussed in turn, regarding occupiers’ liability in respect of injury suffered by entrants through the criminal behaviour of third parties (see [33.3.180]), the application of occupiers’ duties to landlords (see [33.3.190]) and the limitation placed in some case law on the scope of the occupiers’ duties: see [33.3.260]. The defences examined here are considered for any special application to this area of law: see [33.3.470]–[33.3.510].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.3.50] A recurring theme in the law of occupiers’ liability is the concept of reasonableness as the determinant of the standard of care. This issue is dealt with in greater detail in “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Concurrent liability in tort and contract arising out of the same set of circumstances is explored further in “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff and “Concurrent Torts” [33.11.10]ff. The brief treatment here of defences relevant as to the law of occupiers’ liability (including considerations of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk) is complemented by a general analysis in “Defences” [33.9.10]ff. A more general treatment of available defences is set out in “Damages” [33.10.10]ff.

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Causes of Action Premises [33.3.160] “Premises” include a wide range of fixed and movable structures. Premises for the purposes of the common law rules on occupiers’ liability include not only land and structures attached to it,1 but extends to movables such as ships,2 railway carriages,3 and ladders and scaffolding;4 though not, apparently, moving motor vehicles.5 Since the discarding of the special occupancy duties and the substitution of a general standard of care6 (see [33.3.350]), the question of what types of property properly fall within the occupiers’ liability rules is no longer of great significance at common law. The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia extends to fixed or movable structures, including vessels, vehicles or aircraft.7 The obligations of occupiers also extends to the systems, processes or activities carried out on the premises, where those systems, processes or activities are established or maintained by the occupier and where persons entering the premises are required to conform to those processes.8 Where the risk of injury on or in premises arises from the plaintiff’s own voluntary activities, and not out of the state of the premises, the occupier may not owe a duty of care.9 In some jurisdictions, legislative provisions remove liability for harm suffered as a result of an inherent risk, or an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity:10 see [33.3.490].

1

2 3

4 5

There is a query as to whether or not premises include structures erected on the land of another: Munnings v Hydro-Electric Commission (Tas) (1971) 125 CLR 1; 45 ALJR 378; 25 LGRA 149, Windeyer J at 25 (CLR). Swinton v China Mutual Steam Navigation Co Ltd (1951) 83 CLR 553; London Graving Dock Co Ltd v Horton [1951] AC 737. This is implicit in cases concerning railway premises: Protheroe v Railway Executive [1951] 1 KB 376; Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 (CA); Readhead v Midland Railway Co (1869) LR 4 QB 379, followed in Francis v Cockrell (1870) LR 5 QB 501, Kelly CB at 504, Montague Smith J at 513 (construction of grand stand for racing event viewers). See also discussion on higher duty to contractual entrants, at [33.3.290]–[33.3.310]. Woodman v Richardson & Concrete Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 866 (CA). See also Baker v Gilbert [2003] NSWCA 113 (ladder above pool on private land). See Meth v Moore (1982) 63 FLR 309 (FCAFC), Toohey J at 314; Dolbel v Dolbel

231

[33.3.160]

CAUSES OF ACTION

(1962) 63 SR (NSW) 758; 80 WN (NSW) 1056 (FC), concerning defective cars. 6 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180. 7 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Dictionary (definition of “premises”); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 19; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14A(b); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 2. 8 Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19; see also South Sydney Junior Rugby League Club Ltd v Gazis [2016] NSWCA 8, Basten JA at [82] (Macfarlan and Simpson JJA agreeing). 9 In the case of Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47, the plaintiff was injured when he dived into shallow water in a lake which otherwise held no special danger. The House of Lords held that risk arose out of what the plaintiff chose to do, which was an inherently risky activity, and not the state of the premises. Lord Hoffmann at [27] (with whom Lords Nicholls and Scott agreed) noted that otherwise, “any premises can be said to be dangerous to someone who chooses to use them for some dangerous activity”. It must be noted that this decision was made in interpreting specific legislative provisions (under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (UK) and Occupiers Liability Act 1984 (UK)), codifying the law of occupiers’ liability in England. However Australian courts have found some value in the Lords’ judgments in this case: see, eg Uzabeaga v Cottesloe Town [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-739; [2004] WASCA 57, Steytler J at [67]; Wyong Shire Council v Vairy [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-754; [2004] NSWCA 247, Tobias JA at [18], [119]–[126] (Mason P agreeing) (Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council was only briefly considered by the High Court in the subsequent appeal: Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, McHugh J (dissenting) at [40] who did not accept that Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council represented the common law of Australia). 10 See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. There is also discussion of the nature and relevance of the activity carried out at the premises (see [33.3.270] and [33.3.350]); the effect of contributory negligence (see [33.3.470]), voluntary assumption of risk (see [33.3.490]) and contractual and non-contractual exclusion of liability: see [33.3.500].

Occupation [33.3.170] An “occupier” of premises is one who has a degree of control over them such that they can prevent injury to entrants.1 Where there is a right to admit or exclude visitors there is such control.2 The control by a statutory body of premises used by the public constitutes occupation.3 Exclusive possession of the premises is not necessary and thus a licensee,4 an employee of an occupier5 (see [33.3.180]) or the grantee of a right of way6 may qualify. Occupation can be shared between two or more persons.7 A contractor on a building site may be an occupier.8 A managing agent may also be an occupier.9

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[33.3.170]

OCCUPATION

Even a person who has never been in physical possession of premises may be an occupier.10

1

2

3

4 5 6 7

8

Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552; [1966] 2 WLR 581, Lord Denning at 577–579 (AC); Northern Territory v Shoesmith (1996) 5 NTLR 155; 132 FLR 138; 91 LGERA 17 (CA); Western Australia v Dale (1996) 15 WAR 464; 90 LGERA 307 (FC); Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, Brennan CJ at 334 (CLR); Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19. The South Australian and Western Australian legislation defines occupiers in terms of “control”: Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 19; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 2. The Victorian and Western Australian Acts expressly bind the Crown as occupier: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14C; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 3. Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552; [1966] 2 WLR 581, Lord Denning at 577–579 (AC); New South Wales v Broune [2000] NSWCA 3, Mason P at [69]–[70]; Clarke v Coleambally Ski Club Inc [2004] NSWCA 376, Young CJ in Eq at [57]–[61], [80] (Ipp JA agreeing at [2]) (recreational club licensed to occupy part of public reserve land; liability did not extend to public entrants generally); see also discussion of possession and control in Stojan (No 9) Pty Ltd v Kenway [2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-043; [2009] NSWCA 364, McColl JA at [82]–[85] (Ipp JA agreeing). Burrum Corp v Richardson (1939) 62 CLR 214; Schiller v Mulgrave Shire Council (1972) 129 CLR 116; 47 ALJR 650; 27 LGRA 354; Randel v Brisbane City Council (No 2) [1990] 2 Qd R 440; (1989) 69 LGRA 336. See Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29 for a detailed discussion of the similarities between the duties of a statutory authority and a private occupier; see also [33.3.220]; Central Gold Fields Shire v Haley (2009) 24 VR 378; 167 LGERA 268; [2009] VSCA 101, Redlich JA at [48]–[58] (Pagone AJA agreeing at [126]). See generally Professional Liability “Policy and Operational Distinction” [27.9.180]; Allen J, “Liability of a Public Authority as Occupier: Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory” (1995) 5 TLJ 7 at 14–16; Vines P, “The Needle in the Haystack: Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence” (2000) 23 UNSWLJ 35; Doyle J and Redwood J, “The Common Law Liability of Public Authorities: The Interface between Public and Private Law” (1999) 7 Tort L Rev 30. Humphreys v Dreamland (Margate) Ltd (1930) 100 KB 137 (HL); Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223. See Clayton v Victoria [1968] VR 562. Kevan v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1972] 2 NSWLR 710 (CA). Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552; [1966] 2 WLR 581, Lord Denning at 578 (AC); Casino Show Society v Norris [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-664 (NSWCA); Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gaudron J at [80]. The measure of the duty of each is not necessarily the same: Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223. An entrant may be a trespasser vis-à-vis one occupier and a lawful entrant vis-à-vis another: Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR 1553 (HL), Lord Goff at 1562–1563. Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 67 FLR 66 (ACTSC); Cervellone v Besselink Bros Pty Ltd (1984) 55 ACTR 1 (ACTSC); Jones v Bartlett

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[33.3.170]

CAUSES OF ACTION

(2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56. Laresu Pty Ltd v Clark [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-068; [2010] NSWCA 180. 10 Harris v Birkenhead Corp [1976] 1 WLR 279 (CA) (local authority became occupier of vacant premises after service of notice of entry). 9

[33.3.180] With certain exceptions, the duty of an occupier of land does not usually extend to taking reasonable care to prevent physical harm to others resulting from the criminal behaviour of third parties on the land, even if the risk of harm is foreseeable.1 The origins of this rule have been traced to the general principle that one person has no legal duty to rescue another from harm at the hands of a third party, as highlighted by Dixon J in Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256 stating: It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another’s actions to prevent harm to strangers. The general rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his doing damage to a third.2

While the categories are not closed, some relationships, such as that between prison authority and prisoner, employer and employee, school and pupil, bailor and bailee, publican and patron (and other venues where alcohol is sold), or parent and child constitute exceptions to this rule, and a duty to prevent physical harm will be recognised where they are involved.3 The element of control and its extent is crucial to determining whether or not a special relationship exists, so that where an occupier is in a position to control a third party, an exception to the rule may be made out.4 Additionally, it has been acknowledged that a further exception to the general rule will be found where an occupier has a high degree of certainty that harm will follow a failure to act. The threshold to this exception is not an easy one for a plaintiff to pass and the risk of harm will have to be great before an occupier will be held liable.5 A further, closely related exception to this is available to a plaintiff where an occupier fails to control the access, or the continued presence, of criminal conduct on the land6 or where the occupier had some warning or indication that the criminal conduct may occur.7 Where the injury is caused by the behaviour of third parties and is not related to the condition of the premises, it will usually be the actual occupier and not the (non-occupying) owner or landlord who may be held liable for the injury:8 see also [33.3.190]. The duty of an occupier likewise does not extend to injury to persons entering the premises with the intention of committing an offence punishable by imprisonment:9 see [33.3.210], [33.3.330] and [33.3.520].

1 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; 75 ALJR 164; [2000] HCA 61; Ashrafi Persian Trading Co Pty Ltd (t/as Roslyn Gardens Motor Inn) v Ashrafinia [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-636; [2001] NSWCA

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[33.3.180]

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

OCCUPATION

243; Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447; [2001] VSCA 180; Canterbury City Council v Petrik [2002] NSWCA 52. Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, Dixon J at 262; applied in the non-occupier’s liability case of Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15. See, eg New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 236; [2005] HCA 76; Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; 75 ALJR 164; [2000] HCA 61, Gleeson CJ at [26], Hayne J at [111]; Ashrafi Persian Trading Co Pty Ltd (t/as Roslyn Gardens Motor Inn) v Ashrafinia [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-636; [2001] NSWCA 243, Heydon J at [65]–[66] (Mason P and Handley JA agreeing); Lanahmede Pty Ltd v Koch [2004] SASC 204, Bleby J at [2], Gray J at [34]; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420; 84 ALJR 19; [2009] HCA 48. Legislation in some States and Territories may prescribe the existence and content of an occupier’s duty of care: see [33.3.230]–[33.3.260]. See also “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff (in particular, see “General” [33.5.140]; [33.5.160]); Scott G, Richardson K and Hocking B, “The Liability of Publicans: Rejection of the Canadian Approach” (2010) 18 Tort L Rev 117; Bagaric M and Erbacher S, “Causation in Negligence: From Anti-jurisprudence to Principle: Individual Responsibility as the Cornerstone for the Attribution of Liability” (2011) 18 JLM 759. See also CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (t/as Tandara Motor Inn) v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 1; [2009] HCA 47. Club Italia (Geelong) Inc v Ritchie (2001) 3 VR 447; [2001] VSCA 180, the Court at [45]–[46] (occupier held liable for the assault of a police officer in its carpark). See Wormald v Robertson [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-180 (QCA). Specific legislative regimes may also apply to define the duties of certain categories of occupier: see, eg Liquor Act 2007 (NSW), s 73(1)(b), (4)(a), (5). Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; 75 ALJR 164; [2000] HCA 61, Gleeson CJ at [30]–[34], Hayne J at [116]; Ashrafi Persian Trading Co Pty Ltd (t/as Roslyn Gardens Motor Inn) v Ashrafinia [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-636; [2001] NSWCA 243, Heydon J at [70] (Mason P and Handley JA agreeing). Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; 75 ALJR 164; [2000] HCA 61, Hayne J at [117]; McNally v Spedding [2004] NSWCA 400, Windeyer J at [27] (Sheller JA and Pearlman AJA agreeing); Spedding v Nobles (2007) 69 NSWLR 100; [2007] NSWCA 29, Basten JA at [50] (Beazley and McColl JJA agreeing on this point); Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420; 84 ALJR 19; [2009] HCA 48. Gordon v Tamworth Jockey Club Inc [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-698; [2003] NSWCA 82 (occupier was not held liable for an employee’s criminal act because there was no indication that the employee proposed to commit the criminal act); McNally v Spedding [2004] NSWCA 400 (occupier was warned of an earlier criminal act committed by a person present on the premises). McNally v Spedding [2004] NSWCA 400, Windeyer J at [27] (Sheller JA and Pearlman AJA agreeing); see also Lanahmede Pty Ltd v Koch [2004] SASC 204. However, see Real Property “Covenant to Repair” [28.7.1210]. The occupier (or lessor) may also be liable for nuisance emanating from premises if they create, continue or adopt the nuisance: see “Who May Be Held Liable?” [33.7.530]. See, eg Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 9, 10.

235

[33.3.190]

CAUSES OF ACTION

[33.3.190] A landlord and/or a tenant can be an occupier of premises for the purposes of occupiers’ liability. The immunity of landlords from a duty of care towards persons injured on premises has been removed by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. The Australian Capital Territory Act imposes the duty of an occupier on a lessor who is under an obligation to the tenant to maintain or repair the premises or who could exercise a right to enter the premises to carry out maintenance or repairs.1 The South Australian legislation imposes the duty of an occupier on a landlord who has an obligation to maintain or repair premises.2 The Victorian Act extends to landlords who have an obligation or a right to maintain or repair the premises.3 Western Australian legislation imposes the duty on a landlord who is “responsible” for maintenance or repair of premises.4 Formerly, a landlord was not considered to be an occupier at common law even with an obligation to repair.5 The High Court has now refused to follow the old common law rule granting immunity to landlords and has held that a duty is owed at common law on general principles of negligence by a landlord to entrants, and particularly to tenants and members of their family let into possession. Brennan CJ expressed the position in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428 as follows: True, a landlord who lets a tenant into possession may not have been in occupation of the premises but the landlord is in possession of the premises at the time of the tenant’s entry and, immediately prior to that time, has both the power to effect repairs to the premises and power to put the tenant into possession.6

On this basis, his Honour considered that the duty required the same standard of care as is required by occupiers to contractual entrants. That duty is limited to defects in the premises at the time when a tenant is let into possession and is owed to the tenant and those who, to the knowledge of the landlord, are entitled to occupy the premises under and for the purposes of the tenancy:7 see also [33.3.290]. In Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, the High Court took the opportunity to review the standard of care owed by a landlord to a tenant and provide a more consistent ratio to that enunciated in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris.8 Throughout the various judgments, a common theme was that Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris had enlarged a landlord’s duty to tenants at common law, however, different analyses of the content of that duty were given. Gaudron J, for instance, stated that she, by contrast to Brennan CJ in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris, was of the opinion that a landlord was under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the tenant and their household and that this extended to putting and keeping the premises in a safe state of repair.9 In their joint judgment, Gummow and Hayne JJ put the duty negatively and held that premises “will not be reasonably fit for the purposes for which they are let where the ordinary use of the premises for that purpose would, as a matter of reasonable foreseeability, cause injury”.10 Their Honours then stated that “[t]he duty requires a landlord not to let premises

236

[33.3.190]

OCCUPATION

that suffer defects which the landlord knows or ought to know make the premises unsafe for the use to which they are to be put”.11 In order to discharge this duty, a landlord will not, in an ordinary case, need to institute a system of regular inspection for defects during the tenancy.12 Nor will a landlord be required to engage experts to determine where defects might arise. An identification of the steps necessary to discharge the duty will depend, among other things, on whether or not: (1)

an ordinary person in the landlord’s position would or should have known that there was any risk;

(2)

that person would or should have known of steps that could have been taken in response to that risk; and

(3)

the reasonableness of taking such steps.13

The duty was phrased more generally by other members of the Court. Gleeson CJ held that a landlord was under no duty other than to take reasonable care to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury to a prospective tenant and members of their household. His Honour stated that no more particularity could be brought to the test.14 McHugh J put the duty in similar terms,15 as did Kirby J.16 Callinan J seemed reluctant to acknowledge any duty at common law at all and said that it was incumbent on a landlord to provide no more at the inception of a tenancy than “habitable premises”.17 The judgments in Jones v Bartlett have provided some clarity regarding the test to be applied in determining the landlord’s duty at common law to a tenant and, at the least, affirmed that the landlord’s immunity in Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428 no longer represents the law in Australia. Issues in respect of a uniform formulation of the delegability of this duty and its extent to occupiers and other entrants await further consideration.18

1

2 3 4 5

6

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 168(6), 219. Prior to this Act coming into operation, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 (ACT), s 29 (now repealed) provided that a lessor was not exempt from owing a duty of care to entrants by reason only that the lessor was not the occupier of the premises. Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 4, ss 19, 21. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14A(a). Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 9(1). Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428; Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 89–90 (CLR) (contrast with premises which are customarily let out for short periods to the public). Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, Brennan CJ at 334 (CLR). See also “Transferors of Real Property” [33.2.1110].

237

[33.3.190]

CAUSES OF ACTION

7

8

9 10 11 12

13

14

15 16 17 18

In all jurisdictions, there are statutory standards prescribing the lessor’s obligations with respect to the condition of the premises, including compliance with health and safety requirements: see, eg Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT), Sch 1 cl 54(1); Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW), s 52; Residential Tenancies Act 1999 (NT), ss 47, 48; Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld), s 185(2); Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA), ss 67, 68; Residential Tenancy Act 1997 (Tas), ss 36J, 51; Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA), s 42. There are no equivalent provisions in Victoria, but see, eg Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic), ss 65, 68, 80, 226, 238. See Real Property “Residential Tenancies” [28.9.10]ff. Both cases have since been reviewed in Hillcoat v Keymon Pty Ltd [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-642; [2002] QSC 023 (affirmed in Hillcoat v Keymon Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 527). Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gaudron J at [87]–[89]. Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [173]. Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [173]. Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [183]; see also Ahluwalia v Robinson [2003] NSWCA 175, Hodgson JA at [23] (Sheller JA and Bryson J agreeing); Aldred v Stelcad Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 201, Emmett JA at [38] (Macfarlan JA and JC Campbell AJA agreeing). Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [186], see also [174], cited in Gaskell v Denkas Building Services Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 632. Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gleeson CJ at [58]; cited in Barrett v Dubbo City Council [2006] NSWCA 65, Bryson JA at [22], [50] (Handley and Ipp JJA agreeing). Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, McHugh J at [100]. Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Kirby J at [252]–[253]. Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Callinan J at [289]. Previously, in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, the majority of the High Court provided different reasons for rejecting the imposition of a non-delegable duty of care on landlords. Toohey J at 352–355 and McHugh J at 368–370 (CLR) delivered powerful dissenting judgments on this issue: see also [33.3.280]. In Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, members of the High Court seemed prepared to consider a more consistent formulation. Gummow and Hayne JJ at [186]–[198] discussed the issue even though its significance to the case was, as Gleeson CJ at [55] put it, “merely rhetorical”. Their Honours also considered a landlord’s duties to other occupiers and entrants in some detail at [195]–[198] and appeared to give it an extent which Gaudron J at [84] did not. On non-delegable duties of owners and occupiers, see also [33.3.280], [33.3.300]–[33.3.310]. See also the discussion of Jones v Bartlett in Loose Fit Pty Ltd v Marshbaum [2011] NSWCA 372, Sackville AJA at [85]–[91] (Campbell JA and Handley AJA agreeing).

238

[33.3.210]

CLASSIFICATION OF ENTRANTS

[33.3.200] The importance of determining whether or not a defendant falls within the category of occupier has been diminished by the decision in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180. The true basis of the occupiers’ duty of care is the power of control that requires an occupier to consent to another’s entry and the power to safeguard the entrant against injury and loss from defects in the occupied premises.1 Often it will be clear that a duty of care is owed in any event, because of another relationship with the plaintiff.2 However, cases may arise where the only basis for holding that a duty is owed is occupation of premises. In such cases, the defendant will owe no duty at all unless they qualify as an occupier3 and, in this context, the classification remains significant.

1 2 3

Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, Brennan CJ at 335–336 (CLR). See, eg Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428 (lessor–lessee). As with the second defendant in Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223 (distinguished liability of first defendant, the owner of venue).

Classification of Entrants [33.3.210] It is no longer necessary to classify entrants as invitees, licensees, entrants as of right or trespassers for the purpose of ascertaining the standard of care required of the occupier: see [33.3.30]. Since Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180, the general duty owed to each1 is one of reasonable care, although what is reasonable will vary with the circumstances of the plaintiff’s entry on the premises.2 However, the position of contractual entrants remains more favourable, since the decision in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna did not overrule the higher duties generally owed to them:3 see [33.3.290]–[33.3.310]. Additionally, trespassers remain in a special category: see [33.3.320]–[33.3.340] and [33.3.510]–[33.3.520]. A single standard of reasonable care towards lawful entrants is established by the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia.4 However, it seems that the rights of contractual entrants are not affected: see [33.3.290]. Trespassers are the subject of special provisions in South Australia5 (see [33.3.330]), as are some classes of criminal acts in the Australian Capital

239

[33.3.210]

CAUSES OF ACTION

Territory, Northern Territory and Western Australia:6 see [33.3.520].

1 For the existence of the duty, see Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 663 (CLR). For a concise discussion of the development of the common law on this issue, see Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Gleeson CJ at [3]–[8]. 2 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 487–488 (CLR); Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5; Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19, the Court at [24], [35]. 3 Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426; Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Kirby J at [64] (dissenting as to outcome). 4 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(3); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5. 5 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(6). 6 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 94, 168(3); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 9, 10; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(2), (3).

Duty to Lawful Entrants Standard of Care [33.3.220] Determining what an occupier must do to discharge their duty of care is based on the test in negligence for a general standard of care in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106.1 The first question is whether or not a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that the conduct involved a real risk of injury to the plaintiff or the class of person to which the plaintiff belongs. An occupier is required to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to a customer or lawful entrant using reasonable care for their own safety.2 The factors which the common law takes into account in determining whether an occupier has discharged their duty of care are comparable to the factors required by legislation to be taken into account.3 The scope of the duty takes into consideration the nature and extent of the land or premises entered, the nature and extent of the danger and the relationship which exists between the entrant and the occupier, including the character and purpose of the relationship. The standard of care required will take into account factors such as age, sobriety, the knowledge or familiarity of the danger and/or premises on the part of the occupier and the entrant and the possibility of inadvertent or negligent conduct on the part of entrants. An occupier in the normal case does not have to take reasonable care to prevent physical harm to entrants resulting from the

240

[33.3.220]

DUTY TO LAWFUL ENTRANTS

criminal behaviour of third parties: see [33.3.180]. If the risk is not far-fetched or fanciful it is real, even though it is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur. If the risk is real, the next question is what a reasonable person would do by way of response to the risk: see [33.3.240]. This calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk, the degree of probability of its occurrence, the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities that the defendant may have.4 In certain circumstances, legislation has been enacted which details the liability and the standard of care owed by occupiers:5 see also [33.3.230]. In England, in addition to balancing the risk, gravity of injury and cost of preventative measures, the House of Lords has emphasised the need to include in the balancing exercise “the social value of the activity” which gives rise to the risk and which might be prohibited by such preventative measures.6 In the case of Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47, the House of Lords thought it unjust that the harmless recreation of responsible parents and children with buckets and spades on the beaches should be prohibited in order to comply with what is thought to be a legal duty to safeguard irresponsible visitors against dangers which were perfectly obvious.7

1

2

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 47–48 (CLR) (Stephen and Aickin JJ agreeing), cited in Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 (CA), Kirby P at 516, McHugh JA at 521; Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223, von Doussa J at 231–232; Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), Samuels JA at 67, Mahoney JA at 71, McHugh JA at 76–77; Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 423; 67 ALJR 426, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 429, Brennan J (dissenting) at 439 (CLR); Jaenke v Hinton [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-368 (QCA); Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62; Raciti v Wadren Pty Ltd [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-848; [2006] VSCA 132, Chernov JA at [11]; Morgan v Owners of Strata Plan 13937 [2006] NSWSC 1019, Brereton J at [32]; Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [68]–[69]. See “Standard of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1720]. Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [45] (Heydon J agreeing at [283]); Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Brennan CJ at 445–446, Toohey and Gummow JJ at 454, Kirby J at 478 (CLR). The weight given to an expectation that an entrant will exercise reasonable care for their own safety requires a factual judgment: Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19, the Court at [35]. On the liability of public authorities as occupier, see also [33.3.170]–[33.3.180]; “Statutory Authorities” [33.2.1170]; “General” [33.2.1520]. These principles may also inform the content of a duty of care by an occupier or owner of private land: see, eg Central Gold Fields Shire v Haley (2009)

241

[33.3.220]

CAUSES OF ACTION

3

4

5

6

7

24 VR 378; 167 LGERA 268; [2009] VSCA 101, Redlich JA at [50], [86], [94], [104]–[107] (Pagone AJA agreeing at [126]), see also Neave JA at [3]; Richardson v Mt Druitt Workers Club [2011] NSWSC 31, Adams J at [14]–[15]. Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Gleeson CJ at [11], Kirby J (dissenting as to outcome) at [47]. See also “Damages in Tort and Contract” [33.1.330]. See, eg Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241; [1987] 2 WLR 480 (where such a consideration led to a finding of no responsibility on the owner of vacant premises for the spread of a fire started by vandals to adjoining premises); Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75 (where the unevenness of a driveway surface on which the entrant tripped was so ordinary and visible that reasonableness did not require any action on the part of the occupier). See, eg Smoke-Free Public Places Act 2003 (ACT), s 8, Pts 2, 2A; Smoke-free Environment Act 2000 (NSW), s 8, Pt 2; Tobacco Control Act 2002 (NT), s 10; Tobacco and Other Smoking Products Act 1998 (Qld), ss 26V, 26Z, 26ZG; Tobacco Products Regulation Act 1997 (SA), s 46; Public Health Act 1997 (Tas), s 67D; Tobacco Act 1987 (Vic), ss 5B, 5D, 15G; Tobacco Products Control Act 2006 (WA), s 107B. See generally “Employers” [33.2.1060]; “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff; Labour Law “Duty of Employer to Ensure Safety of Employees” [26.1.1590]–[26.1.1610]; “Common Law Liability for Injury at Work” [26.8.150]–[26.8.170]; Health and Guardianship “Institutional and Professional Liability” [20.3.10]ff. Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47, Lord Hoffman at [34], [42]. Similar considerations must be considered by the court under specific legislative provisions governing the content and scope of the applicable duty of care, discussed further at “Reasonable Foreseeability” [33.2.230]: see, eg Guides Australia Inc v McMartin [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-828; [2006] NSWCA 20 (regarding Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B(2)(d)); for other jurisdictions, see also Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(2)(d); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9(2)(d); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32(2)(d); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(2)(d); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(2)(d); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(2)(d). There is no equivalent provision in the Northern Territory legislation as it is the only jurisdiction that did not make changes to the elements of negligence following the release of the Ipp Report: see Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 25 May 2016). Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47, Lord Hoffmann at [46]; see also Lord Hobhouse at [81], Lord Scott at [94]. In some Australian jurisdictions, legislative provisions remove liability for harm suffered as a result of an inherent risk, or an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity: see “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90].

[33.3.230] Legislative provisions governing occupiers’ liability in the Australian Capital Territory,1 South Australia,2 Victoria3 and Western Australia4 specify relevant matters in determining whether an occupier has discharged the duty of care:5 see also [33.3.220]. The relevant matters vary between jurisdictions, but include the gravity and likelihood of the probable injury, the circumstances of the entry, the nature of the premises, the burden on

242

[33.3.230]

DUTY TO LAWFUL ENTRANTS

the occupier of eliminating the danger and the age of the person entering the premises and their ability to appreciate the danger. In large part, these matters mirror the factors that are taken into account at common law.6 The application and interpretation of such legislation is informed by the general law principles set out at [33.3.220], unless otherwise stated.7 The inquiry into the extent to which it would have been reasonable and practicable for the occupier to take measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against the danger, should not be undertaken in hindsight. Rather, the question is what would have been the reasonable response of the occupier before the accident happened, that is, the inquiry is prospective, not retrospective.8 At this stage, however, it would not appear that the relationship between the common law and the relevant statutes in all jurisdictions has been properly resolved.9

1 2

3

4 5

6 7 8

9

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(2). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(2), (3); see Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Kirby J (dissenting as to outcome) at [66]–[71], Hayne J at [90]–[96], Callinan and Heydon JJ at [114]–[116] for a discussion of these factors. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(4). An examination of the matters specified in s 14B(4) can be found in Raciti v Wadren Pty Ltd [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-848; [2006] VSCA 132. Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(4). Liability in terms of occupiers is not specifically dealt with in the other jurisdictions, but is addressed under the common law and the civil liability legislation of the relevant jurisdiction, regarding the prescribed duty of care: see [33.3.10]; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); see also Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Gleeson CJ at [11], Kirby J at [47], Callinan and Heydon JJ at [114]. See, eg Laresu Pty Ltd v Clark [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-068; [2010] NSWCA 180, Macfarlan JA at [44] (Tobias JA and Handley AJA agreeing). Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Hayne J at [93], [97]; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Hayne J at [126]–[129]; Raciti v Wadren Pty Ltd [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-848; [2006] VSCA 132, Chernov JA at [13]; Morgan v Owners of Strata Plan 13937 [2006] NSWSC 1019, Brereton J at [32]; Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [18], [65] (Heydon J agreeing at [283]). See Gingin Shire v Coombe (2009) 169 LGERA 236; [2009] WASCA 92, Martin CJ at [43]–[47] (Miller JA agreeing), for a discussion of hindsight bias. See, eg Department of Housing & Works v Smith (No 2) (2010) 265 ALR 490; [2010] WASCA 25, Buss JA (dissenting) at [62]–[63]; McDonald B, “Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia” (2005) 27 Syd LR 443.

243

[33.3.240]

CAUSES OF ACTION

[33.3.240] The risk of injury, although real, may be so unlikely to occur, or its likely consequences may be so trivial, that it may be reasonably ignored. In some circumstances, the reasonable person may think that it is not worth the trouble or expense to avoid or reduce the risk.1 In determining whether a real risk may reasonably be ignored by the occupier, it has been held that the following additional factors are relevant: (1)

aesthetic values, that is, whether or not available precautions would be visually displeasing;2

(2)

whether the danger is ordinary or unusual;3

(3)

whether the danger is obvious or concealed;4 and

(4)

whether the risk was unreasonably ignored by the entrant.5

In some jurisdictions, legislative provisions remove liability for harm suffered as a result of an inherent risk, or an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity:6 see [33.3.490].

1 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850; Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC); Gorman v Williams (1985) 2 NSWLR 662 (CA), McHugh JA at 680–681; Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Gleeson CJ at [11]–[12]; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Hayne J at [124]. 2 Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), Samuels JA at 68–69; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5. 3 Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75; Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19, the Court at [36]; Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), Mahoney JA at 72–74; Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 (CA), McLelland AJA (dissenting) at 525; Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), Samuels JA at 33–34; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5. However, these terms are not to be understood in the technical sense in which they were used in the formulary rules: Phillis v Daly, Samuels JA at 67–68. 4 Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75; Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA); Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5. 5 Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), Mahoney JA at 74–75; Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), Samuels JA at 34; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5; Commonwealth v O’Callaghan [2001] WASCA 276, Kennedy J at [19] (Wallwork and Steytler JJ agreeing). 6 See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90], in particular, see [33.2.80]. See generally “Standard of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1720].

244

[33.3.260]

DUTY TO LAWFUL ENTRANTS

[33.3.250] Formerly, the standard of care was determined primarily by reference to the occupier, however factors subjective to the plaintiff are now of equal importance: see also [33.3.260]. Following the decision in Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180, the status and position of the occupier and the nature of the premises were likely to be regarded as more significant than the category of entrant into which the plaintiff fell: see [33.3.30] and [33.3.180]. Thus, it was said that a reasonable person would expect a higher standard of care from a person carrying on a business than from a private householder1 (see [33.3.290]); and that occupiers of premises to which members of the public or employees have regular recourse must take positive protective measures towards accident prevention.2 Moreover, a body such as a public hospital owes a heightened duty since it must take account of the fact that the category of the public for which hospitals cater typically includes old, disabled, ill, distracted and worried people in greater proportion than such people exist in the public at large.3 Factors subjective to the plaintiff are now of equal importance in determining the standard of care.4

1 2

3

4

Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223, von Doussa J at 233; Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), McHugh JA at 78. Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 (CA), Kirby P at 518; Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266 (NSWCA), Kirby P (dissenting) at 68,829; Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104 (NSWCA). Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 (CA), Kirby P at 513, 517. See also Health and Guardianship “Institutional and Professional Liability” [20.3.10]–[20.3.2590]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(2)(e), (f); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(2)(d); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(4)(e), (f); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(4)(e), (f).

[33.3.260] The constituents of reasonable care vary with evolving ideas of justice and increasing concern with safety in the community.1 The widespread availability of insurance has affected the attitude of the courts towards development of this branch of the law,2 although in more recent times, in line with commentary regarding the steady increase in premiums,3 the courts have tempered concern for community safety and in some instances have been noticeably stringent where a breach of an occupier’s duty has been alleged. Particular emphasis has been put on: (1)

the obviousness of the risks involved in an activity (see [33.3.240]) where injury has been complained of;4

(2)

the extent to which it was reasonable to expect a defendant to prevent harm;5

245

[33.3.260]

CAUSES OF ACTION

(3)

the difficulty for a defendant of providing a warning to prevent harm6 (see [33.3.220] and [33.3.330]); or simply

(4)

the ineffectiveness of a warning: see [33.3.270].7

1 Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301; 60 ALJR 362, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 308–309 (CLR). For discussion of public policy considerations in the context of negligence generally, see “Role of Justice and Community Expectations” [33.2.360]–[33.2.370]; “Public Policy” [33.2.380]–[33.2.400]. 2 Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 (CA), Kirby P at 244; Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 (CA), Kirby P at 518. 3 Wilson T, “Recent Developments in Liability for Injuries Occurring on Property” (2001) 16 APLB 13 at 20. 4 Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Toohey and Gummow JJ at [52]–[54], Kirby J at [123], Hayne J at [157]; State Rail Authority (NSW) v Watkins [2001] NSWCA 405; Borland v Makauskas [2000] QCA 521; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Hayne J at [162]–[163]. See also Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; 85 ALJR 533; [2011] HCA 11, French CJ and Gummow J (dissenting) at [43], Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ at [82]. 5 Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75; Lanyon v Noosa District Junior Rugby League Football Club Inc [2002] QCA 163. See also Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; 85 ALJR 533; [2011] HCA 11, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ at [97]. 6 Prast v Cottesloe Town (2000) 22 WAR 474; 111 LGERA 253; [2000] WASCA 274 (FC). 7 Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5; Waverley Council v Lodge (2001) 117 LGERA 447; [2001] NSWCA 439; Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61; although see Cook v Australian Capital Territory Racing Club Inc [2001] ACTSC 106 (whether defendant’s failure to warn resulted in premature termination of jockey’s career; discussion of subsequent injuries and new intervening force). See [33.3.500] for discussion of exclusion of liability and disclaimers.

[33.3.270] Where the nature of the premises or the activities taking place on the premises are such that a warning sign would not be heeded, an occupier may not breach its duty by failing to erect warning signs:1 see [33.3.470] and [33.3.500]. The likelihood that the warning sign will be effective to eliminate or reduce the harm resulting from the risk is an important consideration in determining whether the occupier has discharged their duty. Other considerations relevant to the obligation to provide a warning sign include, for example: (1)

the obviousness of the risk2 (see [33.3.240]); 246

[33.3.280]

DUTY TO LAWFUL ENTRANTS

(2)

the probability of its occurrence;

(3)

the age and maturity of those exposed to it;3

(4)

whether the occupier has an economic or other interest in the injured person’s entry into the premises (see [33.3.290]–[33.3.310]);

(5)

whether previous incidents had occurred on the premises;

(6)

whether there was any hidden feature which was reasonably discoverable by the occupier but not the entrant;

(7)

the known dangers of the activity;

(8)

the gravity of the consequences if the risk eventuates; and

(9)

the cost and implication of erecting warning signs.4

1

2

3

4

Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62; Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61. See also Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Callinan J at [276]. For discussion of the emphasis on the condition of premises, rather than the activities taking place therein, see also [33.3.350]. See also Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 50; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5O (compare exclusion of liability for public authorities where risk warning given: s 5I). The civil liability legislation in jurisdictions apart from those having an occupiers’ liability regime (see [33.3.10]) excludes a duty to warn where risks are obvious: see, eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5H (compare exclusion of liability for recreational activities where risk warning given: s 5M); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 15; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 17 (compare exclusion of liability for public authorities where risk warning given: s 39).There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J at [8], [11]–[12], McHugh J at [40]. See Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61, Kirby J at [71]. See also related discussion on contributory negligence (see [33.3.470]–[33.3.480]) and voluntary assumption of risk at [33.3.490]. For further discussion, see “Standard of Care” [33.2.1510]ff.

Non-delegability [33.3.280] At common law, a non-delegable duty is generally not imposed on occupiers (including lessors) for the negligence of independent contractors.1 An occupier’s duty of care is “delegable” in that it may be discharged in whole or in part by the occupier’s exercise of reasonable skill and care in engaging someone else to take steps to keep the property safe either generally or in particular respects.2 247

[33.3.280]

CAUSES OF ACTION

The majority of the High Court has held that the fact that negligence on the part of an independent contractor might foreseeably cause injury to members of a tenant’s family or to visitors of a tenant is not enough to impose a non-delegable duty on a landlord:3 see [33.3.190]. It was stressed, however, that the situation would be different if a landlord were to introduce hazardous activities or substances onto the premises.4 As the High Court further held that this duty of a landlord is analogous to the duty of an occupier, it would appear that a non-delegable duty will only be imposed on occupiers in those circumstances.5 In Western Australia, an occupier is not liable where the damage is due to the negligence of an independent contractor provided there is no personal negligence on the occupier’s part.6 In the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Victoria, the matter is governed by common law principles.7 For specific legislative provisions dealing with causes of action and damages recoverable for breach of non-delegable duties, see also [33.3.190], [33.3.500] and [33.3.520].

1 See “Independent Contractors” [33.6.710]–[33.6.720]; see also “Occupiers” [33.2.1160]. Non-delegable duties may be legislatively prescribed in some settings (eg hospitals), or by recognised categories of relationships: see, eg “Particular Defendants” [33.2.930]–[33.2.1180]; Health and Guardianship “Institutional and Professional Liability” [20.3.10]–[20.3.2590]. 2 Bevillesta Pty Ltd v Liberty International Insurance Co [2009] Aust Torts Reports 81-995; [2009] NSWCA 16, Hodgson JA at [53] (Nicholas J agreeing), although see Gyles AJA at [68] (not deciding); Fabre v Lui [2015] NSWCA 157, Macfarlan JA at [25] (Basten and Meagher JJA agreeing). 3 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, Brennan CJ at 333, Dawson J at 344–347, Gaudron J at 362–363, Gummow J at 382–383, 385, Kirby J at 394, 399–404 (CLR); see also [33.3.190]. See Hewitt v Benale Pty Ltd (2002) 27 WAR 91; [2002] WASCA 163, Scott J at [107]; Transfield Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hall (2008) 75 NSWLR 12; [2008] NSWCA 294, Campbell JA at [97] (Beazley JA agreeing at [2]–[3]). 4 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, Dawson J at 347 (CLR). The issue of a landlord’s liability for the negligence of an independent contractor at common law has been referred to by the High Court in Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [185]–[198], Kirby J at [230]–[235]. It was also acknowledged in that case that a landlord’s duty will be non-delegable where a dangerous substance is brought, or a dangerous activity is performed on the premises: see Gummow and Hayne JJ at [192]; see also Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223. For an application of Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris in a superior State court, see, eg Newcastle Entertainment Security Pty Ltd v Simpson [1999] Aust Torts Reports 81-528; [1999] NSWCA 351, where it was held that a non-delegable duty could not be imposed on a promoter of a rock concert and the manager of the centre where the concert was held. See generally Corkhill A, “‘Dangerous’ Substances and Activities in the Context of a Non-delegable Duty of Care” (2007) 15 TLJ 233. See also “Acts and Omissions” [33.2.320]–[33.2.330];

248

[33.3.290]

5 6 7

DUTY TO CONTRACTUAL ENTRANTS

Health and Guardianship “Rule in Rylands v Fletcher” [20.3.340]. For further discussion of circumstances giving rise to a non-delegable duty of care, see “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350]. Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 6. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(2).

Duty to Contractual Entrants [33.3.290] A higher standard of care is owed by those with contractual or economic interests in the presence of an entrant on their premises:1 see [33.3.250]. The nature of the duty owed to contractual entrants turns on the terms, express or implied, of the contract of entry. Where there is no express term or well-settled standard for the type of contract in question, the occupier is considered impliedly2 to have promised that the premises are as safe for the mutually contemplated purpose as reasonable care and skill can make them.3 This involves liability for the negligence of anyone who has been concerned with the construction, alteration, maintenance or repair of the premises, whether before or after occupation by the defendant.4 Thus, the occupier can be liable for the negligence of independent contractors or previous owners.5 The principle of the implied promise to contractual entrants that the premises are as safe for the contemplated purpose as the exercise of reasonable care and skill can make them was not overruled by Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180.6 The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia does not modify the rights of contractual entrants.7 The extent to which an occupier has a duty to contractual entrants to inspect for defects is not clear. Brennan CJ in Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428 found that the occupier did have a duty to inspect for defects, whereas Kirby J found that the landlord was not liable for a failure to inspect.8 Further, in Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that a landlord will discharge their duty in relation to defects if “reasonable steps” are taken to ascertain them and, if any exist, to remove them or make the premises safe.9 The type of contract in which such a term is implied is one which confers a right of admission to premises, such as a contract to enter a sports ground,10 theatre,11 skating rink,12 circus13 or railway station,14 or to stay in a hotel15 or boarding house.16 Where a contract confers only a right to remain on premises, as is the case with a restaurant patron,17 the higher duty is not owed. Where a legal obligation to pay for entry is incurred by the entrant it is immaterial that the duty to pay is subsequently waived.18 The part of the premises in respect of which the higher duty is owed is that to which the plaintiff has access by virtue of the contractual title. Thus, the higher duty may not be owed to the train traveller or theatre goer who is injured on the

249

[33.3.290]

CAUSES OF ACTION

part of the premises which is open to the public generally rather than limited to ticket holders.19 However, if the accident occurs on the part of the premises to which the general public is denied access, the higher duty is owed even for those parts of the premises whose use is only ancillary to the main purpose of the contract. Thus, a train traveller is owed the higher duty in respect of the condition of the rest rooms on the platform no less than of the train itself.20

1 Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426, Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 38 (CLR); Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Kirby J (dissenting) at [64]. 2 The term is implied in law: Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 346 (CA), Samuels JA at 351; Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 (CA), Clarke JA at 383 (McHugh JA agreeing); Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; [2000] NTCA 15, Angel J at [8]–[10] (Thomas and Riley JJ agreeing); Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, Kirby J at [106]. 3 In all jurisdictions, for example, there are statutory standards prescribing a lessor’s obligations with respect to the condition of the premises, including compliance with health and safety requirements: see, eg Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT), Sch 1 cl 54(1)(a); Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW), s 52(1); Residential Tenancies Act 1999 (NT), ss 47, 48; Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld), s 185(2); Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA), s 68; Residential Tenancy Act 1997 (Tas), ss 36J, 51; Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA), s 42. There are no equivalent provisions in Victoria, but see, eg Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic), ss 65, 68, 80, 226, 238. See Real Property “Residential Tenancies” [28.9.10]ff. 4 The law was expressed in this way in Francis v Cockrell (1870) LR 5 QB 501; Maclenan v Segar [1917] 2 KB 325; Watson v George (1953) 89 CLR 409; Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1; Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 (CA), Kirby P at 377–378, Clarke JA at 379 (McHugh JA agreeing); Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223; see Swanton J, “Occupier’s Liability towards Contractual Entrants” (1989) 15 Mon LR 69. 5 See Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428; Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; [2000] NTCA 15, Angel J at [21]–[23] (Thomas and Riley JJ agreeing). However, the duty does not involve liability on the part of one joint occupier for the negligence of the other: Demczuk v Polish Society Dom Mikolaja Inc (1987) 46 SASR 223, von Doussa J at 232–233. See also discussion on non-delegability of liability at [33.3.280]. 6 Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426. 7 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(5); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(5); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 8(1). 8 Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, Brennan CJ at 340, Kirby J at 393 (CLR). A helpful statement of the authorities on this point is set out in Palmer v Finnigan [2010] QSC 064, A Lyons J at [31]–[36].

250

[33.3.300]

9

10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

DUTY TO CONTRACTUAL ENTRANTS

Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; 75 ALJR 1; [2000] HCA 56, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [173]–[174]. For further discussion of a landlord’s liability as occupier in relation to the condition of the premises, see [33.3.190]. Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 (CA); Smith v Yarnold (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 316; [1969] 2 NSWR 410 (CA); Australian Racing Drivers Club Ltd v Metcalf (1961) 106 CLR 177; 35 ALJR 405; Green v Perry (1955) 94 CLR 606. See discussion on voluntary assumption of risk at [33.3.490]. See generally Sport and Leisure “Occupiers’ Liability” [32.4.160]–[32.4.330]; “Sporting Organisations’ Liability” [32.4.730]. Calvert v Stollznow [1982] 1 NSWLR 175 (CA), Samuels JA at 181 (Moffitt P and Hope JA agreeing); Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426. Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 346 (CA). Harper v Ashtons Circus Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 395 (CA). Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 (CA). Maclenan v Segar [1917] 2 KB 325. Watson v George (1953) 89 CLR 409. Calvert v Stollznow [1982] 1 NSWLR 175 (CA), Samuels JA at 180 (Moffitt P and Hope JA agreeing). Gribben v Woree Caravan Park & Motels [1970] Qd R 420, DM Campbell J at 424. Calvert v Stollznow [1982] 1 NSWLR 175 (CA), Samuels JA at 181 (Moffitt P and Hope JA agreeing); Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 (CA), Kirby P at 377, Clarke JA at 385 (McHugh JA agreeing). Morawski v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 374 (CA); but see Protheroe v Railway Executive [1951] 1 KB 376 (scope of duty limited by proximity of platform to the train).

[33.3.300] A contractual entrant can elect to sue in contract or tort.1 The same non-delegable obligation to see that care is taken is the standard applicable to both types of claim.2 The significance of this position subsequent to the High Court’s findings in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6 is discussed at [33.3.480].

1

Watson v George (1953) 89 CLR 409, Williams ACJ at 414–415, quoting Key v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1941) 64 CLR 619; 41 SR (NSW) 259; 58 WN (NSW) 214 (FC), Jordan CJ at 65–66 (SR (NSW)); Harper v Ashtons Circus Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 395 (CA), Manning JA at 398 (considering whether defence of contributory negligence available for both causes of action); Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 346 (CA), Kirby P at 349; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, Kirby J at [106]; O’Meara v Dominican Fathers (2003) 153 ACTR 1; [2003] ACTCA 24; but see Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 584–585 (CLR), who doubted whether it is normally appropriate to imply a contractual duty of care where there exists a tort duty of co-extensive content and concurrent operation. See also discussion of contributory negligence at [33.3.480]; “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff (in particular, “Concurrent Liability” [33.1.140];

251

[33.3.300]

CAUSES OF ACTION

2

“Damages in Tort and Contract” [33.1.320]); “Occupiers” [33.2.1160]. Watson v George (1953) 89 CLR 409, Williams ACJ at 414–415, Fullagar J at 419–422; Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 93 (CLR); Key v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1941) 64 CLR 619; 41 SR (NSW) 259; 58 WN (NSW) 214 (FC), Jordan CJ at 65–66; Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 346 (CA), Samuels JA at 356; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, Kirby J at [106]. See also “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350].

[33.3.310] Privity of contract between the entrant and the occupier may not be essential for the higher duty to apply:1 see [33.3.290]. As long as the entry is for reward to the occupier, in the sense that the entrant’s admission to the premises is referable to a contract (implied or otherwise) between the occupier and another, the higher duty may be owed.2 Contractual exclusion of liability and non-contractual disclaimers are discussed at [33.3.500].

1 See also Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(5); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 8 for legislative entrenchment of this rule. There are no equivalent provisions in the other jurisdictions. 2 In Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 92–94 (CLR) expressed this view tentatively (Dixon CJ agreeing at 80, Owen J agreeing at 101 (CLR)). See also Alagic v Callbar Pty Ltd (2000) 10 NTLR 86; [2000] NTCA 15; Baar v Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 472, Meares J at 482 (duty of employer to take affirmative action for protection of employee’s family, based on benefit derived by employer from relationship); Drive-Yourself Lessey’s Pty Ltd v Burnside (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 390; 76 WN (NSW) 209 (FC); Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-121 (NSWCA); Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75, Kirby J (dissenting as to outcome) at [64]–[65]; Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426, Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 38 (CLR). See also “Occupiers” [33.2.1160].

Duty to Trespassers [33.3.320] Whether or not a duty to trespassers is owed at common law depends on the necessary degree of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, usually involving reasonable foreseeability of a real risk of injury to the class of persons of whom the plaintiff is a member.1 The relationship between occupier and trespasser may be too remote to satisfy these requirements.

252

[33.3.330]

DUTY TO TRESPASSERS

Additional factors which may establish the necessary foreseeability are incapable of being exhaustively defined or identified. They include knowledge of the actual or likely presence of a trespasser or the reasonable foreseeability of a real risk of such presence:2 see also [33.3.350]. Hence, the occupier may be entitled to neglect a bare possibility that trespassers may come on to the land, but is not entitled to ignore facts which show a substantial chance that they may come there.3 Likewise, the occupier’s knowledge that members of the public regularly trespass on or use the occupier’s land in unsafe circumstances is relevant to the reasonableness of the occupier’s response and the question of breach.4

1

2

3

4

The role of reasonable foreseeability in the context of negligence generally is examined at “Duty of Care: General Principles” [33.2.210]–[33.2.400]. See also discussion on illegality at [33.3.510]. See generally “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 663 (CLR); Coffs Harbour City Council v Backman [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-614; [2001] NSWCA 202; Warnock v Victoria [2006] VSCA 205, Buchanan JA at [27] (Eames JA agreeing, Callaway JA agreeing at [4]); Critchley v Cross [2000] NSWSC 6. Southern Portland Cement Ltd v Cooper [1974] AC 623; [1974] 2 WLR 152; (1973) 129 CLR 295; 47 ALJR 790, Lord Reid (for the Privy Council) at 309 (CLR); Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), Hope JA at 26–27, Samuels JA at 31–32, McHugh JA at 39; Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Dawson J at 677–678 (CLR). See discussion at [33.3.230]–[33.3.260]. Consolidated Broken Hill Ltd v Edwards [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-815; [2005] NSWCA 380; Warnock v Victoria [2006] VSCA 205.

[33.3.330] The duty of care owed to trespassers varies between jurisdictions. An occupier in South Australia owes no duty of care to a trespasser unless the presence of trespassers and their consequent exposure to danger are reasonably foreseeable and the nature or extent of the danger is such that measures for their protection, which were not in fact taken, should have been taken.1 The legislation in Victoria and Western Australia appears to be directed only towards the standard of care owed by occupiers to entrants:2 see also [33.3.230]. Whether or not a duty of care is owed to a trespasser is left to the common law in Victoria.3 In the Northern Territory, however, no duty of care is owed to a trespasser who is on the premises with the intention of committing or in the commission of an offence punishable by imprisonment:4 see [33.3.510]–[33.3.520]. In Western Australia, where a person is on the premises with the intention of committing, or is in the commission of, an offence punishable by imprisonment,

253

[33.3.330]

CAUSES OF ACTION

the occupier only owes a duty not to create a danger with the deliberate intent of doing harm or damage to the person or their property and not to act with reckless disregard of the presence of the person or their property.5

1 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(6). 2 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(1), (2); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), ss 4(1), (2), 5(1). 3 See Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 14F – 14H. The effect of illegality on an occupier’s duty of care is discussed further at [33.3.520]. 4 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 9, 10. For discussion of the position in relation to trespassers at common law, see [33.3.320], [33.3.340]. 5 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(2), (3). A similar provision applies in relation to criminal trespass in New South Wales: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 52.

[33.3.340] The extent of the duty owed by an occupier to a trespasser is formulated in terms of a requirement of reasonable care1 rather than the formerly used notion of common humanity.2 Whether or not the occupier is in breach of duty depends on whether their response to a real risk of injuring a trespasser conforms with the standard of conduct of a reasonable person in that position.3 In determining the question, it is relevant to take account of the circumstance that the plaintiff is a trespasser, and of the kind of trespasser they are:4 see [33.3.250]. Less clear is whether it is still permissible to take into account subjective factors such as the financial or other limitations of the particular defendant occupier:5 see [33.3.220], [33.3.230] and [33.3.270].

1 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180; Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156; Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 156 CLR 7; 59 ALJR 201, Deane J at 32 (CLR); Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), McHugh JA at 38–42; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(1), (2), (6); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(3); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(1). 2 British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877; [1972] 2 WLR 537; Southern Portland Cement Ltd v Cooper [1974] AC 623; [1974] 2 WLR 152; (1973) 129 CLR 295; 47 ALJR 790 (PC); Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), Hope JA at 27, Samuels JA at 31, 34, McHugh JA at 41; but see Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 661–662 (CLR), who thought that the two criteria amounted to the same thing: see also [33.3.30]. 3 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 47–48 (CLR) (Stephen and Aickin JJ agreeing).

254

[33.3.350]

4

5

DUTY IN RELATION TO OCCUPANCY OR ACTIVITY

Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 663–664 (CLR), quoting from Herrington v British Railways Board [1971] 2 QB 107; [1971] 2 WLR 477 (CA), Lord Salmon at 120, see also Lord Cross at 142 (QB); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(4); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(4). At common law, where the trespasser is engaged in an illegal enterprise, there is a duty of care incumbent on the occupier, the extent of which is determined by the circumstances of each case: see Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438, Latham CJ at 446; Rundle v State Rail Authority (NSW) [2001] NSWSC 862, McClellan J at [82]–[89]; Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567; [1996] 2 WLR 239 (CA). See generally Wilson T, “Recent Developments in Liability for Injuries Occurring on Property” (2001) 16 APLB 13 at 16. For the effect of illegality on an occupier’s duty of care, see [33.3.510]–[33.3.520]. See also related discussion on contributory negligence (see [33.3.470]–[33.3.480]) and voluntary assumption of risk at [33.3.490]. Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 661–662, Dawson J at 681 (CLR) suggests that it is, as does the legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(2)(e), (f); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(2)(d); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(4)(e), (f); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(4)(e), (f). In Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), McHugh JA at 41–42 was unsure.

Duty in Relation to Occupancy or Activity [33.3.350] It is generally no longer necessary to draw a distinction between the static condition of premises and activities carried out on premises for the purpose of determining the standard of care. The old “special duties” or “formulary rules” (see [33.3.10]) were often said to apply only in relation to dangers consisting in the static condition of premises, while the occupier owed the general neighbourly duty of reasonable care for active operations carried out on premises.1 Since Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180, this artificial and unsatisfactory distinction will no longer be treated as a rigid barrier between different duties.2 However, it may be material in determining whether or not the necessary relationship exists in the case of a trespasser (see [33.3.320]), and the content of any relevant duty of care:3 see [33.3.220]–[33.3.270]. Moreover, the distinction remains important as far as contractual entrants are concerned, since in their case the higher duty is only owed with respect to the static condition of premises:4 see [33.3.290]–[33.3.310]. The occupiers’ liability legislation in South Australia and Victoria is expressed to apply only to the state or condition of the premises.5 The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia has held that it is not sufficient to bring South Australian legislation into application if the premises are merely the means of injury or provide access to a cause of injury. Thus, in Rabbitt v Roberts (1996) 67 SASR 358, an action for negligence in supervising a young child at a day care centre was held not to be an action under the legislation against the 255

[33.3.350]

CAUSES OF ACTION

occupier of the premises.6 However, legislation in Western Australia applies in respect of dangers which are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on them for which the occupier is by law responsible.7

1 Slater v Clay Cross Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 264; [1956] 3 WLR 232 (CA); Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v McDermott [1967] 1 AC 169; [1966] 3 WLR 267; (1966) SR (NSW) 98; 83 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 384; 40 ALJR 1 (PC). The same duty is owed to non-entrants injured by negligent activities on the property: Hilder v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 1434 (QBD); Wilkinson v Joyceman [1985] 1 Qd R 567 (FC). 2 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180, see particularly Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 486–487 (CLR); see Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 656 (CLR); Western Suburbs Hospital v Currie (1987) 9 NSWLR 511 (CA), Kirby P at 514–515; Seeley v Gray (1987) 48 SASR 130. 3 Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 656 (CLR). 4 Cox v Coulson [1916] 2 KB 177 (CA); Sheehan v Dreamland (Margate) Ltd (1923) 40 TLR 155 (CA); Fraser-Wallas v Waters [1939] 4 All ER 609 (KBD); Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 346 (CA), Samuels JA at 360. See also [33.3.500] on disclaimers and exclusion of liability. 5 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 20(1), 22; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(3). See also Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(1). 6 Rabbitt v Roberts (1996) 67 SASR 358 (FC); see also Harm v Winter (2004) 13 ANZ Ins Cas 61-593; [2004] QSC 010, Cullinane J at [16] (occupation must be an essential ingredient of the liability, and not merely descriptive of the identity or status of the person to whom liability attaches). See related discussion on evidentiary burdens and causal connection at [33.3.360]. 7 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 4(1); Handford PR, “Occupiers’ Liability Reform in Western Australia – and Elsewhere” (1987) 17 UWALR 182 at 213–215.

Evidence [33.3.360] The plaintiff bears the onus of proving breach of duty and a causal connection between the breach and the injury.1 Many claims fail because the plaintiff is unable to prove one of these two necessary ingredients. These matters are particularly troublesome in “spillage cases”, where the plaintiff suffers injury as a result of slipping on a foreign substance on the floor of the defendant’s premises. A plaintiff is not relieved of the necessity of offering some evidence of negligence by the fact that the material circumstances are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.2 However, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to point to evidence permitting an inference as to when the spilled thing or substance has been deposited on the floor. It is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that it was more probable than not that the occupier’s negligence was a necessary condition of the fall.3 There is no general principle

256

[33.3.360]

EVIDENCE

of law which imposes an evidentiary onus on an occupier to disprove negligence in every slipping case.4 Whether an inference of negligence should be drawn depends on all the circumstances,5 although the fact of a spillage may, in a given case, be regarded as some evidence of negligence.6 If the plaintiff is unable to prove how long the offending substance has been present it may be impossible to infer that the defendant should have known of its presence;7 or that there existed a causal connection between an inadequate system of inspection and cleaning and the injuries suffered.8

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

8

The general principles of causation under the law of negligence apply: see [33.3.20]. Reference should also be made to the relevant legislation governing civil liability in each jurisdiction: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 4.3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 3. There is no equivalent legislation in the Northern Territory. See also “Evidence” [33.2.1730]–[33.2.1820]. Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367, Dixon CJ at 371. Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5, French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ at [34] applying Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5D. Williamson v GJ Coles & Co Ltd [1985] VR 59 (FC), Murray J at 64, O’Bryan J at 69; Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266 (NSWCA), Clarke JA at 68,835 (though there is much to be said for this approach: Kirby P (dissenting) at 68,829). In Shoeys Pty Ltd v Allan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-104 (NSWCA), Priestley JA at 68,941 expressed the opinion that because of the causality problem the possibility of legislation to reverse the onus of proof in such cases was worth investigating. Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 (CA). Brown v Target Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 37 SASR 145 (FC) (this case may be out of line with the balance of authority on this point: see, eg discussion in Drakos v Woolworths (SA) Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 431 (FC)). Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks (1957) 97 CLR 367, Dixon CJ at 371, McTiernan, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ at 375–376; Dulhunty v JB Young Ltd (1975) 50 ALJR 150 (HCA); Williamson v GJ Coles & Co Ltd [1985] VR 59 (FC). Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 (CA), McHugh JA at 252–254; Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-121 (NSWCA); Sleiman v Franklin Food Stores Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-266 (NSWCA); Ragnelli v David Jones (Adelaide) Pty Ltd (2004) 90 SASR 233; [2004] SASC 393 (FC); Kartinyeri v Woolworths (SA) Pty Ltd (2004) 234 LSJS 145; [2004] SASC 172 (FC); see also Kocis v SE Dickens Pty Ltd (t/as Coles New World Supermarket) [1998] 3 VR 408 (CA); Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5. For an example of a non-spillage case, see Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; 85 ALJR 533; [2011] HCA 11 (workplace with dangerous activities; inadequacy of safe work system).

257

[33.3.360]

CAUSES OF ACTION

258

Defences Contributory Negligence [33.3.470] Damages are reduced under the apportionment legislation where the accident is partly the plaintiff’s fault.1 Reduction of damages for contributory negligence under apportionment legislation may also have the effect that the plaintiff’s claim is defeated altogether.2 Apart from the more obvious cases involving lack of vigilance or caution, it has also been held that accompanying a person who intends to commit an unlawful activity such as theft, amounts to contributory negligence.3 The fact that the occupier is entitled to expect the entrant to take reasonable care to avoid obvious dangers (see [33.3.220]) may sometimes mean that there is no breach of duty.4

1

2

3 4

The effect of contributory negligence on liability is legislated in all jurisdictions: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pts 7.1, 7.3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3 Div 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 7; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), ss 4, 5. This legislation applies in jurisdictions with a statutory regime for occupiers’ liability: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 168(3); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14D; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 10. See “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]; see also “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63. There are no equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions, but see Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 17; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 50; see also Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Gibbs CJ at 629, Wilson J at 640–641, Deane J at 667 (CLR). Phillis v Daly (1988) 15 NSWLR 65 (CA), Mahoney JA at 74–75; Morris v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 24 (CA), Samuels JA at 33–34; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Toohey and Gummow JJ at [50]–[54], Kirby J at [123], Hayne J at [157]; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9.

259

[33.3.480]

DEFENCES

[33.3.480] With some exceptions, contractual entrants can no longer avoid the defence of contributory negligence by framing the action in contract rather than tort: see [33.3.300]. Previously, one view of the construction of the apportionment legislation (see [33.3.470]) was that it did not apply to actions for breach of contract.1 Other cases have held that it did apply where the contractual obligation was a duty of care and the plaintiff could have elected to frame the duty of care in tort.2 In Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, a majority of the High Court found, in a review of the former s 27A of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) (now the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA)), that it did not apply to contractual claims, so that if a plaintiff could, and elected to, sue in contract, contributory negligence was not a ground for reduction in damages. The plaintiff could thereby recover for all the damage resultant from the defendant’s breach, regardless of whether their own conduct had contributed to it. This has since been reversed by legislation.3

1 Belous v Willetts [1970] VR 45 (later overruled by MacPherson v Kevin J Prunty & Associates [1983] 1 VR 573); AS James Pty Ltd v Duncan [1970] VR 705; Read v Nerey Nominees Pty Ltd [1979] VR 47, Marks J at 54; Harper v Ashtons Circus Pty Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 395 (CA). 2 Queen’s Bridge Motors & Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Edwards [1964] Tas SR 93; Smith v Buckley [1965] Tas SR 210; W & G Genders Pty Ltd v Noel Searle (Tas) Pty Ltd [1977] Tas SR 132 (NC 5). See also Bains Harding Construction & Roofing (Aust) Pty Ltd v McCredie Richmond & Partners Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 437. This view has been adopted in England: see Basildon District Council v JE Lesser (Properties) Ltd [1985] QB 839; [1984] 3 WLR 812; Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] AC 852; [1989] 2 WLR 290. 3 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 101(b) (definition of “wrong”), s 102; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 8 (definition of “wrong”), s 9; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15(1) (definition of “wrong”), s 16; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5 (definition of “wrong”), s 10; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “negligent wrongdoing”), ss 4(1), 7, 8; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2 (definition of “wrongful act”), ss 4, 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 25 (definition of “wrong”), ss 26, 44; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), ss 3A – 5. Note that in all jurisdictions (except South Australia) the legislation has retrospective effect, with the legislation defining in what circumstances retrospectivity will apply: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 152 (as originally passed); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Sch 1 Pt 2 cl 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 21A; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 21; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) (see “Legislative History”); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28AA; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) (see “Transitional Provision”). Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6

260

[33.3.490]

VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK

may therefore continue to apply in the case of some actions brought prior to the commencement of the legislation in these two States.

Voluntary Assumption of Risk [33.3.490] The defence of voluntary assumption of risk is rarely successful in the context of occupiers’ liability. This defence requires a full subjective appreciation by the plaintiff1 of the danger, the absence of any constraint on the plaintiff’s freedom to choose to run the risk and an apparent willingness on the plaintiff’s part to absolve the defendant from liability.2 Inadvertence to a known risk is not the same as agreeing or consenting to accept it. It may amount to contributory negligence (see [33.3.470]–[33.3.480]), but it is not the voluntary assumption of risk.3 The defence has succeeded in the case of a 15 year old who climbed through a broken fence on to a railway line, fully aware of the risk but willing to run across the line in order to get to the other side.4 Spectators at sporting events are sometimes said to have accepted risks which are inherent in or incidental to the activity in question.5 More often, however, mere knowledge of the danger or a warning from the occupier (see [33.3.260]–[33.3.270]) will not disqualify the plaintiff,6 but will be relevant factors when considering whether the occupier is in breach of the duty of care or whether the plaintiff is contributorily negligent: see [33.3.270]–[33.3.280]. Legislation in Western Australia provides that no duty of care is owed when risks are willingly assumed by the entrant, but the occupier owes a duty not to create a danger with the deliberate intent of doing harm or damage to, and not to act with reckless disregard of the presence of, the entrant or their property.7 In some jurisdictions, legislative provisions remove liability for harm suffered as a result of an inherent risk, or an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity:8 see [33.3.240].

1 2

3 4

See McPherson v Whitfield [1996] 1 Qd R 474; Scanlon v American Cigarette Co (Overseas) Pty Ltd (No 3) [1987] VR 289. See McPherson v Whitfield [1996] 1 Qd R 474, Lee J at 480–481 for a concise summation of the elements of the principle; see also Paltidis v State Council of Young Men’s Christian Association of Victoria Inc [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-850; [2006] VSCA 122; Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [81] (Gleeson CJ agreeing at [1], Crennan J agreeing at [193]). See generally “Voluntary Assumption of Risk” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970]. Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-874; [2007] NSWCA 4, McClellan CJ at CL at [102]–[104]. Titchener v British Railways Board [1983] 1 WLR 1427 (HL); see Simms v Leigh Rugby Football Club Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 923 (Assizes). For a similar fact scenario

261

[33.3.490]

DEFENCES

5

6 7 8

where the defence was unsuccessful, see Rundle v State Rail Authority (NSW) [2001] NSWSC 862, McClellan J at [98]–[114]. Murray v Harringay Arena Ltd [1951] 2 KB 529 (CA); Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 (CA); but see Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43; [1962] 3 WLR 616 (CA). Nowak v Waverley Municipal Council [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-200 (NSWCA). Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(2). See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90] (in particular, see [33.2.80]); see also Sport and Leisure “Occupiers’ Liability” [32.4.160]–[32.4.330].

Exclusion of Liability [33.3.500] An occupier can exclude or limit liability to an entrant by contract1 or possibly by a non-contractual disclaimer.2 The exclusion will be effective if reasonable steps have been taken to draw it to the attention of the entrant. Actual communication is not necessary. However, in the case of a contractual term, notice must be given at or before the time of formation of the contract.3 In the case of contractual entrants (see [33.3.290]–[33.3.310]), this means that notice must be given at the latest at the point of entry to the premises. A non-contractual disclaimer, on the other hand, for example in the form of a noticeboard or sign on the premises, can be effective if reasonable steps have been taken to draw it to the attention of the entrant at any time before the accident:4 see also [33.3.270]. Contractual privity between the occupier and the entrant has been said not to be essential to the effectiveness of exclusions in a contract by which the entrant gains entry:5 see also [33.3.310]. However, the better view is that contractual exclusions do not as such affect the rights of a stranger to the contract, even though the contract may be one which binds the occupier to permit such a person to enter and use the premises.6 A stranger to the contract would only be bound by exclusions of liability if reasonable notice thereof was given to them.7

1 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(4); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(1). 2 Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 409; [1957] 3 WLR 1104 (CA); White v Blackmore [1972] 2 QB 651; [1972] 3 WLR 296 (CA); Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-121 (NSWCA) (the defence was described as voluntary assumption of risk). See also Seddon NC, “Fault without Liability – Exemption Clauses in Tort” (1981) 55 ALJ 22 (suggesting that the defence may not be available against persons entering in exercise of a right conferred by law). Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(1) recognises the possibility of non-contractual exclusions. See also Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5N; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5J (in relation to recreational activities).

262

[33.3.510]

3

4

5 6

7

ILLEGALITY

For discussion of the principles relating to formation of contracts and exclusion clauses, see Contract: General Principles “Offer and Acceptance” [7.1.370]–[7.1.830]; “Exclusion Clauses” [7.4.810]–[7.4.990]. On the effectiveness or otherwise of signage, see Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5; Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42; Prast v Cottesloe Town (2000) 22 WAR 474; 111 LGERA 253; [2000] WASCA 274; Waverley Council v Lodge (2001) 117 LGERA 447; [2001] NSWCA 439; Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63. Fosbroke-Hobbes v Airwork Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 108 (KB). Australian Law Reform Commission, Occupiers’ Liability, Report No 42 (AGPS, 1988) at [91] (available at https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc42.pdf, viewed 25 May 2016). There are provisions to this effect in Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(4); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 7(1). Macleay Pty Ltd (t/as Wobbies World) v Moore [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-151 (VSCFC).

Illegality [33.3.510] Unilateral illegality on the part of the plaintiff at the time of commission of a tort is not in itself a defence at common law:1 see also [33.3.320]–[33.3.340]. The mere fact that the plaintiff was acting illegally at the time of the injury is not a bar to a claim unless it is the purpose of the law against which the plaintiff offends to abrogate civil rights.2 Thus, a trespasser, even though burgling the premises, is not an outlaw.3 The defence of illegality may succeed, however, where the plaintiff and defendant are engaged in a joint illegal enterprise.4 Thus, the defence is a narrow one at common law.

1

2 3

4

See “Defences” [33.9.10]ff. The defendant may not be absolved from liability by the plaintiff’s illegal conduct where the action is based on a breach of statutory duty: see “General” [33.5.430]. Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438; Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9. Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Deane J at 654–655 (CLR) (though the trespasser may be contributorily negligent: see [33.3.470]). An occupier’s duty of care to trespassers is discussed at [33.3.320]–[33.3.340]. See further in relation to trespass: “Trespass to Land” [33.8.470]–[33.8.600]; Human Rights “Trespass” [21.11.620]. In relation to the offence of burglary, see Criminal Offences “Burglary and Housebreaking” [10.4.1470]–[10.4.1630]. Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366; Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651; 51 ALJR 184; Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438;

263

[33.3.510]

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52 ALJR 474; Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [101].

[33.3.520] Most jurisdictions have enacted specific legislative provisions regarding the duty of care owed to, or the damages recoverable by, a person who is injured on premises while committing an offence:1 see also [33.3.330]. In the Northern Territory and Western Australia, legislative provisions offer specific protection for occupiers. In the Northern Territory, the occupier or owner of premises does not incur civil liability for personal injury to a person who has entered premises and who has the intention of committing, or has committed on those premises, an offence punishable by imprisonment.2 In Western Australia, a person who is on premises with the intention of committing, or is in the commission of, an offence punishable by imprisonment, is owed by the occupier only a duty not to create a danger with the deliberate intent of doing harm or damage to the person or their property and not to act with reckless disregard of the presence of the person or their property.3 In the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania, a person, not just an occupier, does not incur civil liability for personal injury if that injury occurred while the injured person was engaging in conduct constituting an offence punishable by imprisonment for six months or more (New South Wales and Tasmania), an offence punishable by imprisonment (Northern Territory) or an indictable offence (Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and South Australia), and such conduct contributed materially to the risk of the injury:4 see [33.3.330].

1 See generally “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. 2 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 9, 10. 3 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5(2), (3). 4 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 94; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 54; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 10; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 45; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 6. In Victoria, in a claim for damages for personal injury, the court must consider whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14G. There is no equivalent provision in Western Australia: see Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4(3). See also related discussion on contributory negligence (see [33.3.470]–[33.3.480]) and voluntary assumption of risk at [33.3.490]; in particular, Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 5; Offenders (Legal Action) Act 2000 (WA), s 5. See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90].

264

33.4 Product Liability

PRODUCT LIABILITY

Current Subtitle Author Michael Denahy BEc, LLB (Hons) (Syd), LLM (LSE) Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales

(Updating author, Update 319 – May 2016) (Updating author, Update 311 – September 2015)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Author Richard Travers BA, LLB (Syd) Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales Director, Altior Pty Ltd (Updating author, November 2012) (Updating author, 2010) (Updating author, September 2007) (Updating author, 2006) (Updating author, 2002) (Updating author, 1998) (Original author)

Update 278 – Update 246 – February Update 217 – Update 206 – October Update 158 – October Update 71 – February

266

33.4 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.4.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.4.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.4.35] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.4.40] CONTRACT................................................................................ [33.4.150] CONTRACTUAL TERMS FOR SUPPLY OF PRODUCTS....[33.4.150] OPERATION OF CONTRACTUAL TERMS........................... [33.4.190] NEGLIGENCE............................................................................ [33.4.330] DUTY OF CARE.....................................................................[33.4.330] BREACH OF DUTY................................................................[33.4.440] CAUSATION........................................................................... [33.4.460] DEFENCES............................................................................ [33.4.500] DAMAGES..............................................................................[33.4.520] STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS................................................................... [33.4.630] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.4.630] STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME....................................[33.4.640] Introduction.........................................................................[33.4.640] Guarantees Relevant to Product Liability.......................... [33.4.650] Failure to Comply with Guarantees: Action against Suppliers............................................................................ [33.4.689] Failure to Comply with Guarantees: Action against Manufacturers.................................................................... [33.4.695] Failure to Comply with Guarantees: Action by Suppliers against Manufacturers.................................................................... [33.4.710] AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5.............................. [33.4.730] MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT AND UNFAIR PRACTICES............................................................................... [33.4.970] AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PTS 2-1 AND 3-1.............[33.4.970] PRODUCT RECALL AND SAFETY STANDARDS................. [33.4.1100] PRODUCT RECALL............................................................. [33.4.1100] PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS...................................... [33.4.1140]

267

268

Introduction Definition [33.4.10] Product liability law covers the range of remedies available to individuals who are injured by defective products or who otherwise suffer loss or damage caused by defective products. Defects in products include design defects, manufacturing defects and instructional defects such as inadequate labelling, warnings or instructions for use, which render the product dangerous.1 Defects may therefore be introduced into products throughout the chain of manufacture and distribution. Not all defects are compensable. Manufacturers are not treated as insurers of their products,2 nor are importers, retailers or others who handle products as they find their way into the hands of consumers. Product liability law determines which defects are compensable, having regard to the nature of the defect and the circumstances in which loss or damage was suffered.3 Product liability law also encompasses the law affecting product safety, including product recall and product safety standards.

1

2 3

For a discussion of the relationship between instructional defects and defects in the goods themselves, see Hedley S, “Quality of Goods, Information, and the Death of Contract” [2001] JBL 114. Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247, Barwick CJ at 642 (CLR). For a comparison of different theories of the meaning of defectiveness, see Clark A, “The Conceptual Basis of Product Liability” (1985) 48 Mod LR 325.

[33.4.20] Many remedies are available to those who suffer product-related loss or damage. These include: (1)

damages for breach of contract;

(2)

damages for breach of the duty recognised in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562;

(3)

loss or damage recoverable where there has been misleading or deceptive conduct, or false or misleading representations, in contravention of Ch 2 or Ch 3 of the Australian Consumer Law;1

(4)

compensation and damages recoverable from the supplier of goods under Pt 5-4 of the Australian Consumer Law where there is a failure to comply

269

[33.4.20]

INTRODUCTION

with a guarantee applying to the supply under Pt 3-2 of the Australian Consumer Law; and (5)

loss or damage recoverable from manufacturers and importers under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law.2

This range of remedies makes it possible for those who suffer product-related loss or damage to take action against designers, manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers according to the circumstances in which the loss or damage was suffered.

1 Australian Consumer Law found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. See also Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff. 2 Note that for the purposes of the Australian Consumer Law, a “manufacturer” includes a person who imports goods into Australia if that person is not the manufacturer, and if at the time of importation the manufacturer of the goods does not have a place of business in Australia: Australian Consumer Law, s 7(1)(e). See [33.4.630]–[33.4.640].

[33.4.30] The common law principle of “buyer beware” (caveat emptor) was replaced in the 20th century by a recognisable body of product liability law, offering protection to those who suffer product-related loss or damage. Before the decision of the House of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (see [33.4.330]–[33.4.340]), the common law position was as follows: The maxim of the common law, caveat emptor, is the general rule applicable to sales so far as quality is concerned. The buyer, in the absence of fraud, purchases at his own risk, unless the seller has given an express warranty, or unless a condition or warranty be implied from the nature and circumstances of the sale.1

Sellers enjoyed far-reaching protection. On one hand, they could not be compelled to give express warranties. On the other, they could exclude conditions or warranties which might otherwise be implied by statute or at common law. Over time, this level of protection has been eroded, first by the courts and later by the legislature. In the 1930s, judgments were delivered in Australia and the United Kingdom which liberalised the interpretation of the contractual terms implied by the sale of goods legislation.2 In 1932, the House of Lords delivered the landmark decision of Donoghue v Stevenson, extending liability to manufacturers of products who had not contracted directly with the consumer. This new cause of action was quickly adopted and applied.3 Since then, the legislature has taken the lead. In 1978, product liability remedies were incorporated into Pt V Div 2A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and, in 1992, a code of product liability law based on the EEC Directive4 was enacted as Pt VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law).

270

[33.4.30]

DEFINITION

While it might have been tempting to conclude that the 20th century saw the maxim “buyer beware” superseded by the maxim “seller beware”, cases on personal choice and responsibility decided in the first few years of the 21st century5 suggest that the true position is that product liability law regards the safe use of risky products as a two-way street, with the manufacturer and the consumer sharing responsibility for the safe use of the product. When the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) replaced the Trade Practices Act 1974, the code of product liability law based on the EEC Directive was perpetuated as Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law, but Pt 5 Div 2A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 was dropped in favour of a regime of statutory guarantees applied by operation of Pt 3-2 of the Australian Consumer Law. Central to this reform was a statutory guarantee that, when a supplier supplied goods, in trade or commerce, to a consumer (otherwise than at auction), the goods would be of “acceptable quality”. This innovation combined a variant of the old concept of “merchantable quality” with concepts new to product liability law, that products would be acceptable in appearance and finish, free from defects, safe and durable.6 It remains to be seen how this innovation will extend the ambit of product liability law.

1

2

3

4

5

Benjamin JP, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: With References to the French Code and Civil Law, Finnemore DL and James AE (eds) (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1950) p 627. Caveat emptor: “[L]et the buyer beware”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 27. See, eg Cammell Laird & Co Ltd v Manganese Bronze & Brass Co Ltd [1934] AC 402; Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387; David Jones Ltd v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 110; 34 SR (NSW) 561; 51 WN (NSW) 196. See Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387, Evatt J at 438–442 (reversed by Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49, Lord Wright (for the Privy Council) at 101–102 (AC), 62–63 (CLR)); Shandloff v City Dairy Ltd [1936] 4 DLR 712 (ONCA), Middleton JA (for the Court) at 713–714. Council of the European Union, Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC, 25 July 1985) (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu, viewed 4 May 2016). See, eg Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9; Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61, Kirby J at [70]; Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; 78 ALJR 933; [2004] HCA 29; Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47; Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63; Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234;

271

[33.4.30]

INTRODUCTION

6

79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19; see also Titchener v British Railways Board [1983] 1 WLR 1427 (HL); Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5. For the definition of “acceptable quality”, see Australian Consumer Law, s 54 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2).

Scope of Subtitle [33.4.35] This Subtitle explores the liability of manufacturers and suppliers for defective products. Liability may arise under contract (see [33.4.150]–[33.4.220]), tort (see [33.4.330]–[33.4.520]) or statute: see [33.4.630]–[33.4.970]. There are also legislative powers to create and impose standards of product safety and information: see [33.4.1140]–[33.4.1170]. Consumers may be protected from defective products through the exercise of product recall powers (see [33.4.1100]–[33.4.1130]) and product safety standards: see [33.4.1140]–[33.4.1170].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.4.40] The legal principles of product liability incorporate the basic principles of tort. In particular, the principle of foreseeability, which is required to establish the existence of a duty of care, is dealt with in “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Issues of causation, the determination of which are often central to the establishment of liability in product liability cases, are considered in “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. General principles of contract arise in relation to the supply of products. These principles are analysed in “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff, Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff and “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff. More specific principles dealing with implied terms relating to the supply of goods are covered in Contracts: Specific “Sale of Goods” [8.4.10]ff. Liability for misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of the Australian Consumer Law is also dealt with in Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff and “Remedies” [35.4.10]ff.

272

Contract Contractual Terms for Supply of Products [33.4.150] Damages may be recovered for product-related loss or damage which results from breach of a contract.1 While, in the absence of a contractual term, “caveat emptor”2 (see [33.4.30]) remains the general principle, a manufacturer, importer, distributor or retailer who expressly or impliedly warrants the safety or quality of goods which it supplies may be liable in damages if the warranty is breached.

1

2

In this context, supply is not limited to supply by way of sale. It extends to all types of supply, including supply by way of hire-purchase, lease and bailment. See Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff; Contracts: Specific “Sale of Goods” [8.4.10]ff; “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. Caveat emptor: “[L]et the buyer beware”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 27. Under this maxim, the buyer takes the goods as they are.

[33.4.160] Damages may be recovered where product-related loss results from the breach of an express term of a contract for the supply of a product. Reported cases involving express contractual terms are quite rare, although courts have not been reluctant to enforce contractual terms relating to product safety and quality. Such express terms have included terms that: (1)

the product would be “to the entire satisfaction of the owners’ representative”;1

(2)

a tractor would be “well made, of good materials, to do good work and develop its full rated horse power”;2

(3)

the constituents of sand would conform to analysis;3

(4)

paint would be suitable for painting a pier, be impervious to damp, prevent corrosion and rust and last from 7–10 years;4

(5)

cattle would be well suited for breeding;5

(6)

vehicles would be in good condition;6

(7)

timber would not contain specified imperfections;7 and

273

[33.4.160]

CONTRACT

(8)

aircraft would be in “serviceable condition”.8

1 Cammell Laird & Co Ltd v Manganese Bronze & Brass Co Ltd [1934] AC 402, Lord Tomlin at 409 (contract for sale of ships’ propellers). 2 Gemmell Power Farming Co Ltd v Nies (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 469; 52 WN (NSW) 162 (FC), Jordan CJ at 471 (SR (NSW)) (contract for hire of a tractor). 3 Wells (Merstham) Ltd v Buckland Sand & Silica Ltd [1965] 2 QB 170; [1964] 2 WLR 453 (contract for sale of sand). 4 Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854 (contract for sale of paint). 5 Lockhart v Osman [1981] VR 57 (contract for sale of cattle). 6 Irwin v Poole (1953) 70 WN (NSW) 186 (FC); Andrews v Hopkinson [1957] 1 QB 229; [1956] 3 WLR 732 (hire-purchase agreements covering cars). 7 CSR Ltd v Tanco Kimpex Export Corp Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 568. 8 Wyllie v Tarrison Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 184 (contract for sale of two seaplanes).

[33.4.170] Damages may be recovered where product-related loss results from the breach of an implied term of a contract for the supply of a product. Terms may be implied in contracts for the supply of goods by statute or common law.1 The most significant implied terms in contracts for the supply of products are concerned with merchantable quality and fitness for purpose.2 These terms are expressed in the sale of goods legislation as exceptions to the “buyer beware” principle: see [33.4.30]. The legislation provides that there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale except as specified in the legislation. The exceptions are: (1)

Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller’s business to supply (regardless of whether the seller is the manufacturer), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose, except where the sale is of a specified article under its patent or other trade name.

(2)

Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (regardless of whether the seller is the manufacturer), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality, provided that, if the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied condition regarding defects which the examination should have revealed.3

Other implied terms of significance for product liability law relate to the conformity of products with the description under which they were supplied.4 These terms appear in the sale of goods legislation in the following form:

274

[33.4.170]

CONTRACTUAL TERMS FOR SUPPLY OF PRODUCTS

(1)

where goods are sold by description, there is an implied condition that they will correspond with that description;5 and

(2)

where goods are sold by sample, there are implied conditions that: (a)

the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality;

(b)

the buyer will have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample; and

(c)

the goods will be free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable which would not be apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample.6

The parties to a contract for the supply of products may agree to exclude terms which would otherwise be implied by the operation of the sale of goods legislation.7 Similar terms may be implied in contracts for the supply of goods by way of hire, hire-purchase, lease and bailment by operation of the common law: see [33.4.150]. In such cases, depending on the circumstances of the transaction, the implied terms are to the effect that the goods shall be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they were hired or supplied.8

1 2

See Contracts: Specific “Terms of Contract” [8.4.740]–[8.4.1330]. Cases in which product-related loss has been held to have resulted from the breach of an implied term that a product would be of merchantable quality include Wren v Holt [1903] 1 KB 610 (CA) (beer containing arsenic); Morelli v Fitch [1928] 2 KB 636 (a ginger wine bottle which broke when opened); Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 258 (KB) (lemonade containing carbolic acid); Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441; [1971] 2 WLR 1051 (mink food containing an additive toxic to mink); Regal Pearl Pty Ltd v Stewart [2003] ASAL 55-091; [2002] NSWCA 291 (contaminated prawns); Rolfe v Katunga Lucerne Mill Pty Ltd [2005] ASAL 55-146; [2005] NSWCA 252 (contaminated lucerne chaff). Cases in which product-related loss has been held to have resulted from the breach of an implied term that a product would be reasonably fit for its purpose include Randall v Newson (1877) 2 QBD 102 (CA) (a pole for a carriage which broke, injuring horses); Corbett v Taylor (1879) 5 VLR (L) 455 (FC) (patented reaper and binder which broke down, causing crop loss); Preist v Last [1903] 2 KB 148 (CA) (hot-water bottle which burst when filled with boiling water); Frost v Aylesbury Dairy Co Ltd [1905] 1 KB 608 (CA) (milk which “contained germs of typhoid fever”); Jackson v Watson & Sons [1909] 2 KB 193 (CA) (consumption of tinned salmon causing death of plaintiff’s wife); Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603; 60 WN (NSW) 90 (light bulb which caused a fatal electrocution); Derbyshire Building Co Pty Ltd v Becker (1962) 107 CLR 633; 35 ALJR 498 (electrical saw with defective moveable guard); Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31; [1968] 3 WLR 110 (poultry food containing toxic groundnut extraction); Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88; [1969] 3 WLR 927 (boron tribromide which exploded on contact with water); Greenwood v Sefton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Wood J, 12235 of 1988, 6 July 1990) (toothpick in container of diet food); 275

[33.4.170]

CONTRACT

3

4

5

6

7

8

Brand v Bardon (unreported, NSWCA, Handley, Powell and Stein JJA, 40048 of 1995, 18 July 1997) (moisturising cream unsuitable for consumers with sensitive skin); Cinema Center Services Pty Ltd v Eastaway Air Conditioning Pty Ltd [1999] ACTSC 141 (air conditioning units); Gibbett v Forwood Products Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 290 (woodchips used in export of lobsters); Regal Pearl Pty Ltd v Stewart [2003] ASAL 55-091; [2002] NSWCA 291 (contaminated prawns). Cases in which product-related loss has been held to have resulted from the breach of implied terms that the product would be of merchantable quality and fit for its purpose include David Jones Ltd v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 110; 34 SR (NSW) 561; 51 WN (NSW) 196 (heel of shoe collapsed, causing a broken leg); Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC) (underwear containing free sulphites causing dermatitis); Coppin v Tobler Bros Canberra Marine Centre Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 183 (life jacket which did not adequately support the wearer). See Sale of Goods Act 1954 (ACT), s 19; Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 19; Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT), s 19; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld), s 17; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA), s 14; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas), s 19; Goods Act 1958 (Vic), s 19; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA), s 14. See Contracts: Specific “Terms of Contract” [8.4.740]–[8.4.1330]. For a case in which product-related loss has been held to have resulted from the breach of an implied term that a product would correspond with the description by which it was sold, see Brand v Bardon (unreported, NSWCA, Handley, Powell and Stein JJA, 40048 of 1995, 18 July 1997) (moisturising cream unsuitable for consumers with sensitive skin). See Sale of Goods Act 1954 (ACT), s 18; Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 18; Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT), s 18; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld), s 16; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA), s 13; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas), s 18; Goods Act 1958 (Vic), s 18; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA), s 13. See also Gliderol International Pty Ltd v Skerbic (2009) 170 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 16. Sale of Goods Act 1954 (ACT), s 20; Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 20; Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT), s 20; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld), s 18; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA), s 15; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas), s 20; Goods Act 1958 (Vic), s 20; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA), s 15. Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 57; Sale of Goods Act 1972 (NT), s 57; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Qld), s 56; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA), s 54; Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas), s 59; Goods Act 1958 (Vic), s 61; Sale of Goods Act 1895 (WA), s 54. However, compare the position in the Australian Capital Territory where, unlike other jurisdictions, there is no express statutory right to exclude terms and conditions implied by law. Gemmell Power Farming Co Ltd v Nies (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 469; 52 WN (NSW) 162 (FC); Derbyshire Building Co Pty Ltd v Becker (1962) 107 CLR 633; 35 ALJR 498; Cottee v Franklins Self-Serve Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 469 (CA).

Operation of Contractual Terms [33.4.190] Implied terms as to merchantability and fitness for purpose (see [33.4.170]) continue to apply to a product for a reasonable time after delivery. In Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; [1981]

276

[33.4.200]

OPERATION OF CONTRACTUAL TERMS

2 WLR 713, the House of Lords described the implied “warranty of fitness for particular purpose” as a continuing warranty that the goods will continue to be fit for that purpose for a reasonable time after delivery, so long as they remain in the same apparent state as that in which they were delivered, apart from normal wear and tear.1

What is a reasonable time depends on the nature of the goods.2

1

2

See Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; [1981] 2 WLR 713, Lord Diplock at 276 (AC). This statement appears to represent the law in Australia: Clark v Esanda Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 1 (CA), Priestley JA at 8–9 (Glass and Mahoney JJA concurring). See also Crowther v Shannon Motor Co [1975] 1 WLR 30 (CA); Lee v York Coach & Marine [1977] RTR 35 (CA); Laurelgates Ltd v Lombard North Central plc (1983) 133 NLJ 720 (QBD), all quoted with approval by Priestley JA in Clark v Esanda Ltd. See generally, Contracts: Specific “Terms of Contract” [8.4.740]–[8.4.1330]. Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; [1981] 2 WLR 713, Lord Diplock at 276 (AC). In that case, the warranty was held to be continuing eight months after delivery. In Clark v Esanda Ltd [1984] 3 NSWLR 1 (CA), a hire-purchase case, Priestley JA at 9 held it to be undoubtable that two major breakdowns of a truck within six weeks of delivery were within a reasonable time, bearing in mind the nature of the goods.

[33.4.200] A term as to fitness for purpose may not be implied (see [33.4.170]) in favour of an abnormally sensitive buyer unless the buyer informs a supplier of their sensitivity. This is so whether or not the buyer is aware of their sensitivity.1 In Griffıths v Peter Conway Ltd [1939] 1 All ER 685, the plaintiff was abnormally sensitive to Harris tweed. She contracted dermatitis from a Harris tweed coat specially made for her. Sir Wilfred Greene MR held that the vendor of the coat was not in a position to exercise his skill or judgment as to whether the garment would be suitable for the plaintiff unless the plaintiff had told him of the particular abnormality or idiosyncrasy from which she suffered.2 The vendor could not therefore be liable pursuant to an implied term that the coat would be fit for the purpose of being worn by the abnormally sensitive plaintiff. In that case, there was no evidence that the plaintiff was aware of her sensitivity before she purchased the coat. In Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366; [1955] 2 WLR 245, the plaintiff knew of her sensitivity to a form of hair dye. Lord Denning found that she was under “a duty to use reasonable care to disclose known peculiarities”.3 The significance of this finding in relation to the attempt to imply a contractual term that the hair dye would be reasonably fit for its purpose was that, in her case, the purpose was to dye the hair not of a normal person, but of a person known to be allergic

277

[33.4.200]

CONTRACT

to the dye. As the plaintiff did not make this particular purpose known to the hairdresser, she could not recover on the implied term.4

1 Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366; [1955] 2 WLR 245 (CA); Slater v Finning Ltd [1997] AC 473; [1996] 3 WLR 190, Lord Keith at 483 (AC). For a case in which the plaintiff disclosed her sensitivity and recovered damages for the breach of terms implied in a contract for the supply of moisturising cream, see Brand v Bardon (unreported, NSWCA, Handley, Powell and Stein JJA, 40048 of 1995, 18 July 1997). 2 Griffıths v Peter Conway Ltd [1939] 1 All ER 685 (CA), Sir Wilfred Greene MR at 691; see also Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441; [1971] 2 WLR 1051, Lord Hodson at 468, Lord Wilberforce at 490 (AC); Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2002] 3 NZLR 308; [2002] UKPC 9. 3 Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366; [1955] 2 WLR 245 (CA), Denning LJ at 373–374 (QB). 4 Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366; [1955] 2 WLR 245 (CA), Denning LJ at 374 (QB).

[33.4.210] A plea of contributory negligence to reduce a claim for damages, if the claim is based on breach of contract, is available in all Australian jurisdictions.1 The States and Territories reversed the former common law position formulated in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, where a majority of the High Court determined that contributory negligence was not a ground for a reduction of damages in breach of contract cases.2

1 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 101 – 105; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), ss 15 – 21A; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 10; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), ss 7, 8; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), ss 4, 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 26, 28AA; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), ss 3A, 4. Note that in all jurisdictions, apart from South Australia, the legislation has retrospective effect, with the legislation defining in what circumstances retrospectivity will apply: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 152 (as originally passed); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Sch 1 Pt 2 cl 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 21A; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 21; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) (see “Legislative history”); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28AA; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) (see “Transitional provision”). Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6 may therefore continue to apply in the case of some actions brought prior to the commencement of the legislation in South Australia. See also “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. 2 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6. A majority of

278

[33.4.220]

OPERATION OF CONTRACTUAL TERMS

the High Court, in reviewing Wrongs Act 1936 (SA), s 27A (now repealed), determined that it did not apply to contractual claims so that if a plaintiff could, and elected to, sue in contract, contributory negligence was not a ground for reduction of damages. The plaintiff could thereby recover for all the damage resulting from the defendant’s breach regardless of whether their own conduct had contributed to it.

[33.4.220] Damages for breach of contract are recoverable for all losses within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. In product liability cases, loss or damage generally takes the form of personal injuries (eg dermatitis in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49)1 or damage to property (eg loss of pheasants in Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31; [1968] 3 WLR 110). In appropriate circumstances, loss or damage may extend to include the plaintiff’s liability to those to whom it has on-supplied the goods, to its liability to pay fines in respect of the defects in the goods and to loss of profits.2

1 2

Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC). See Contract: General Principles “Damages” [7.9.320].

279

[33.4.220]

CONTRACT

280

Negligence Duty of Care [33.4.330] Modern product liability law has its origins in the “neighbour principle” enunciated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.1 In Donoghue v Stevenson, the elements of the new cause of action were found to exist on the assumed facts that a decomposing snail had been found in an opaque ginger beer bottle.2 Lord Atkin applied the neighbour principle to the liability of a manufacturer of products as follows: [A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.3

1 2 3

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 580. See “Duty of Care: General Principles” [33.2.210]–[33.2.400]. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord MacMillan at 606. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 599.

[33.4.340] The principle articulated by the House of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (see [33.4.330]) was held to range far wider than the manufacture of food and drink. In their dissenting judgments, Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomlin predicted that, if the majority view was adopted, it would follow that “every” manufacturer or repairer of “any” article owed “everyone” who might thereafter legitimately use the article a duty to exercise due care in the manufacture or repair.1 Their prediction was soon borne out. By 1936, both the High Court of Australia and the Privy Council had announced that they would follow Donoghue v Stevenson.2 Other courts had applied Donoghue v Stevenson to water supply authorities,3 distributors,4 hirers5 and repairers.6 Furthermore, the neighbour principle proved to be so flexible that Donoghue v Stevenson could be applied to all three types of product defect: manufacturing defects, design defects and instructional defects. The snail in the bottle in Donoghue v Stevenson was the result of a manufacturing defect. The tramway bin in Suosaari v Steinhardt [1989] 2 Qd R 4777 had a design defect. The labelling of the sheep dip in Grant v Cooper, McDougall & Robertson Ltd [1940] NZLR 9478 was inadequate. This was an instructional defect. Even 281

[33.4.340]

NEGLIGENCE

though the sheep dip was designed and manufactured correctly, its use carried a risk which could only be averted through proper labelling.

1 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Tomlin at 599. 2 Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387, Evatt J at 438–442; Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC), Lord Wright (for the Privy Council) at 102 (AC), 62–63 (CLR); see also Shandloff v City Dairy Ltd [1936] 4 DLR 712 (ONCA). 3 Read v Croydon Corp [1938] 4 All ER 631 (KB), Stable J at 654–655. 4 Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 174, Stable J at 183 (hairdresser selling hair dye). 5 Herschtal v Stewart & Ardern Ltd [1940] 1 KB 155, Tucker J at 170–171 (car hire company). 6 Malfroot v Noxall Ltd (1935) 51 TLR 551 (KB) (motorcycle repairer); Stennett v Hancock [1939] 2 All ER 578 (KB), Branson J at 583 (truck repairer); Haseldine v CA Daw & Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343 (CA), Scott LJ at 363 (lift engineers). 7 Suosaari v Steinhardt [1989] 2 Qd R 477 (FC). 8 Grant v Cooper, McDougall & Robertson Ltd [1940] NZLR 947 (SC).

[33.4.350] The principle articulated in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (see [33.4.330]) does not apply to defects that are known, or to defects that it is contemplated will be discovered by examination or testing of goods before consumption or use. In Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49, the Privy Council held: The principle of [Donoghue v Stevenson] can only be applied where the defect is hidden and unknown to the consumer, otherwise the directness of cause and effect is absent: the man who consumes or uses a thing which he knows to be noxious cannot complain in respect of whatever mischief follows because it follows from his own conscious volition in choosing to incur the risk or certainty of mischance.1

In Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord Atkin suggested that the manufacturer would be relieved of liability if there was only a reasonable possibility of intermediate examination.2 Later cases suggest that something more than a possibility is required. In Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J held that: [W]hat is significant is not whether an intermediate examination of the article was possible. It is whether it was contemplated that, in the ordinary course, the article would be examined, or tested, or in some way treated before it was taken into consumption or use.3

The existence of the manufacturer’s duty of care, therefore, depends not only on the manner in which a product is manufactured, but also on the circumstances in which it is used, and on the circumstances in which the manufacturer is entitled to expect that it will be used. At the time of manufacture, the manufacturer’s duty of care is potential or contingent. The duty only vests (or crystallises)

282

[33.4.360]

DUTY OF CARE

when a person who does not know of the existence of a defect in the product is injured by the product in circumstances where it was not contemplated that, in the ordinary course, the product would be examined, tested or treated before consumption or use.4

1

2 3 4

Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC), Lord Wright (for the Privy Council) at 105 (AC), 65 (CLR) referring to Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; see also Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1491 (Birm Assizes); D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368, Lord Bridge at 206 (AC). In Hodge & Sons v Anglo-American Oil Co (1922) 12 Ll L Rep 183, Lord Scrutton at 187 described the distinction, between a product known to be dangerous and one that contained hidden dangers, as follows: “The latter, if anything, seems the more dangerous of the two; it is a wolf in sheep’s clothing instead of an obvious wolf.” Lord Atkin quoted the passage with approval in Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord Atkin at 595–596. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 599. Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 86 (CLR). Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC), Lord Wright at 64–65 (CLR); Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 86 (CLR); see also Clay v AJ Crump & Sons Ltd [1964] 1 QB 533; [1963] 3 WLR 866, Upjohn LJ at 567–568 (QB); Daley v Gypsy Caravan Co Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 22 (NSWCA); McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] 2 SC 1 (Ct of Sess), Lord Nimmo Smith at 512 (discussion of the need for “a concurrence of injuria and damnum”); Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd [1960] SC (HL) 92, Lord Keith at 113, Lord Denning at 115–117, Lord Morris at 121 (also on the need for injuria and damnum to found a cause of action).

[33.4.360] The application of the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (see [33.4.330]) has been used to facilitate proof by a plaintiff of a manufacturer’s negligence. In Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49, the defendant manufacturer presented evidence of the quality control procedures in place to counter the possibility of the garments being contaminated by excess sulphites. The Privy Council was not impressed: According to the evidence, the method of manufacture was correct: the danger of excess sulphites being left was recognized and guarded against: the process was intended to be fool proof. If excess sulphites were left in the garment, that could only be because someone was at fault. The appellant is not required to lay his finger on the exact person in all the chain who was responsible or to specify what he did wrong. Negligence is found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken in connection with all the known circumstances.1

283

[33.4.360]

NEGLIGENCE

The opportunity to prove negligence by inference from the facts has assisted plaintiffs who would otherwise have confronted daunting hurdles proving their cases.2

1 2

Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC), Lord Wright at 101 (AC), 61–62 (CLR). See, eg Tarling v Nobel [1966] ALR 189 (ACTSC), Joske J at 192–193; Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812 (QBD), MacKenna J at 816; Fletcher v Toppers Drinks Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 911 (CA), Moffitt P at 913, Glass JA at 915–916; Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600 (CA), Hope JA at 629, Priestley JA at 631–632.

[33.4.370] The requirement of foreseeability must be satisfied in product liability cases as the first step towards proving the existence of a duty of care.1 Where a defendant knows or ought reasonably to know that its conduct is likely to cause harm to the person or tangible property of the plaintiff, unless it takes reasonable care to avoid that harm, the defendant is prima facie under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid that harm.2 Knowledge or reasonable foresight of harm to the plaintiff or their tangible property has usually been treated as enough to impose a duty of care on the defendant.3 The assessment of the content of the duty is a factual determination that involves analysis of all the circumstances. In Thompson v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449 at 475, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, in considering a manufacturer’s duty of care, stated: It is a question of fact in each case whether the duty owed has been breached. … The manufacturer and retailer must act reasonably in placing its product on the market. The almost infinite variety of circumstances forbids any categorical exegesis of the manner of performance of the relevant duty of reasonable care. Accordingly the duty of care cannot be categorised in the circumstances of such a case as this as being merely a duty to warn or alternatively to withdraw the product from the market. The duty is a duty to take reasonable care in the [Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562] sense to avoid injury or harm being suffered by those using the product as intended. In some circumstances a discharge of such duty of care might require and demand that the product be withdrawn from the market so as to prevent it being used. In other circumstances in order to discharge the duty it might be necessary to give adequate warning as to the risks involved in its use. It does not follow that the failure to warn with respect to those risks will necessarily constitute a breach of duty. In each case it will be necessary for the tribunal of fact to determine whether in all the circumstances those marketing the goods failed to take reasonable care and whether that failure was a cause of the injury suffered by the user.4

1

For further discussion of principles of foreseeability, see “Duty of Care: General Principles” [33.2.230]. 284

[33.4.380]

2

3

4

DUTY OF CARE

Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at 208 (CLR); Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317; 77 ALJR 1706; [2003] HCA 51, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [156] (Heydon J agreeing at [177]). Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at 208 (CLR); see also Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414, Lord Oliver at 487 (AC). Thompson v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449 at 475 (FC), the Court at 490–491, referring to Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. Contrast Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255 (CA). See also McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] 2 SC 1 (Ct of Sess), Lord Nimmo Smith at 515–522.

[33.4.380] Where a plaintiff suffers pure economic loss (as opposed to personal injury or damage to tangible property), something more than foreseeability (see [33.4.370]) must be established before a defendant will come under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid that harm. In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, the Justices of the High Court unanimously agreed that some additional factor is required to sustain a duty of care in those circumstances, but they could not agree on what the factor was. In the facts of that case, Gleeson CJ identified the defendant’s knowledge of the vulnerability of an ascertainable class of persons to suffer loss by the negligence of the defendant as sustaining the duty.1 Gaudron J found that the duty arose when the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that their acts may cause the loss or impairment of legal rights possessed by the plaintiff, individually or as the member of a class, and the plaintiff is in no position to protect their own interests.2 McHugh J favoured an approach whereby the Court inquired whether or not the case fell within an established category in which damages for economic loss had been awarded, and, if it did not, asked whether, by analogy with earlier decisions, the case should be recognised as giving rise to a duty.3 Gummow J rejected the utility of a fixed system of categories, adopting instead an approach by which “salient features” giving rise to a duty were identified and applied in the light of “control mechanisms” to prevent the imposition of duties which may be too wide.4 Kirby J adopted the three-stage test approved by the House of Lords in cases such as Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358.5 Hayne J saw the avoidance of indeterminate liability and the concern not to render “ordinary” business conduct as tortious, as two constraints to be applied to the operation of the doctrine of foreseeability. He acknowledged that other additional constraints may be identified in later cases.6 Callinan J also acknowledged the need to constrain the availability of relief for pure economic loss, and called for cautious application of the principles enunciated in Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270 and the cases following it.7 The need to enunciate a test which would allow practitioners to give confident advice in this emerging area of the law was recognised in many judgments. It has been said that as a result, practitioners seeking to identify the additional

285

[33.4.380]

NEGLIGENCE

factor beyond reasonable foreseeability, which must be established before a defendant will come under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid pure economic loss, are left with a smorgasbord of possible approaches and little concrete guidance.8 However, since this case, the High Court has had the opportunity to revisit the issue of duty.9 An examination of these decisions reveals the emergence of salient features which provide some guidance as to that additional factor.10

1 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ at 194–195 (CLR). 2 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gaudron J at 202 (CLR). 3 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, McHugh J at 216–217 (CLR). The case did not come within an existing category. See McHugh J at 218–232 (CLR) for an analysis of why a duty arose. 4 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Gummow J at 254 (CLR). See Gummow J at 254–261 (CLR) for an analysis of why a duty arose. 5 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Kirby J at 286 (CLR). The other Justices rejected the test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 2 WLR 358. See also Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59. 6 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Hayne J at 303 (CLR). 7 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, Callinan J at 324–326 (CLR). 8 For academic consideration of the issue, see Feldthusen B, “Liability for Pure Economic Loss: Yes, But Why?” (1999) 28 UWALR 84; Stapleton J, “Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus” in Cane P and Stapleton J (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Clarendon Press, 1998) p 59; Davis JLR, “Liability for Careless Acts or Omissions Causing Purely Economic Loss: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd” (2000) 8 TLJ 123; Cane P, “The Blight of Economic Loss: Is There Life after Perre v Apand?” (2000) 8 TLJ 246; Feldthusen B, “Pure Economic Loss in the High Court of Australia: Reinventing the Square Wheel?” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 33. 9 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; 74 ALJR 1; [1999] HCA 59; Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 75 ALJR 775; [2001] HCA 19; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515; 78 ALJR 628; [2004] HCA 16; Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40; Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corp Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; 88 ALJR 911; 2 STR (NSW) 151; [2014] HCA 36. 10 For a discussion of these cases, see Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27, Gillard J at [709]–[757]; Swick Nominees Pty Ltd v Leroi International Inc (No 2) (2015) 318 ALR 666; [2015] WASCA 35, Murphy JA and Edelman J at [368]–[411]. See also “Duty of Care: General Principles” [33.2.240]–[33.2.310].

286

[33.4.400]

DUTY OF CARE

[33.4.390] An example of a case in which recovery for pure economic loss was permitted in the product liability context is the Canadian decision in Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works [1974] SCR 1189; (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 530. The manufacturer of a barge crane knew the crane to be defective, but failed to warn the barge owner of the defect. The barge owner sued the crane manufacturer in negligence for failing to warn of the defect in time for the crane to be repaired in the barge’s off-season. The Canadian Supreme Court held that the manufacturer was negligent in failing to warn the barge owner. The Court held that, as the manufacturer knew of the seasonal pattern of use of the barge, it was liable to compensate the barge owner for the interruption to its business resulting from the need to carry out the repairs in the barge’s busy season. The manufacturer was not, however, liable in negligence for the cost of the repairs. In Australia, this decision has been cited as an example of the process by which formulations limiting the extent of liability may be fashioned.1 It is submitted that, whichever view is taken of the law in Australia following Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, if Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works were heard in Australia today, the manufacturer would come under a duty of care to avoid economic loss.2

1 2

Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270, Stephen J at 574–575 (CLR). For a discussion of Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 73 ALJR 1190; [1999] HCA 36, see Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-692; [2003] VSC 27, Gillard J at [709]–[757].

[33.4.400] Suppliers and manufacturers of products, the use of which carries an inevitable risk, owe a duty of care to persons who might be injured, or whose property might be damaged, by the use of the product. This principle applies at least where consumers of the product are not, or may not be, aware of the risk. The nature of the duty, and the action which suppliers and manufacturers must take in performance of it, are determined having regard to all the circumstances of the case. The more acute the danger, the higher the duty of care resting on the supplier or manufacturer; the more easily or cheaply the defect can be rectified, the more readily will a duty to rectify be found to exist.1 In some cases, the supplier’s or manufacturer’s duty may be discharged by warning of the dangerous characteristics of the product. In Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247, the duty to warn of the flammable nature of the product was held to be discharged by a warning: “CAUTION: HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE”, “[f]or further information ask for data sheet” coupled with a data sheet which read “Solvent: Petroleum – Benzene Free. Inflammability: Highly inflammable, flash point below 73°F”.2 In other cases, however, the danger may be so great that something more than a warning may be required to discharge the duty.3

287

[33.4.400]

NEGLIGENCE

Warnings must be reasonably communicated. They must describe specific dangers that arise from the ordinary use of the product.4 They should bring home to the user the gravity of the danger involved in the use of the product5 so as to allow those who might be affected by the product to modify their behaviour.6 The law no longer recognises the category of “articles dangerous in themselves” as attracting a special duty of care.7 Rather, where inherently dangerous goods are supplied, the standard of care demanded of the supplier or manufacturer rises according to the gravity of the potential risk.8 In extreme cases, the standard of care has been described as requiring “a degree of diligence so stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety”,9 “a high degree of care amounting in effect to an insurance against risk”10 or, more simply, “consummate care”.11

1 Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247, Barwick CJ at 642 (CLR); Webb v South Australia (1982) 56 ALJR 912 (HCA), Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ at 913. 2 Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247, Barwick CJ at 639 (CLR); see also Clark A, “Strict Liability for Product Defects” [1983] JBL 130. Note also the approach taken to the adequacy of the warnings considered in Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1998) 90 FCR 40 (FC); Hampic Pty Ltd v Adams [2000] ATPR 41-737; [1999] NSWCA 455. 3 Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247, Barwick CJ at 643–644 (CLR). See, eg Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255 (CA), Sachs and Lawton LJJ at 272–273, where it was held: “(i) that, where the manufacturer knows that the purchaser of a product is going to use it in such a way as may harm the employees of the purchaser, the manufacturer’s duty may extend to warning those employees; (ii) that the manufacturer’s duty did not end when the product was first produced or put on the market; (iii) that, if a manufacturer discovers that a product is unsafe, its duty may be to cease forthwith to manufacture or supply the product in its unsafe form; but (iv) that, in other cases, the duty may be fulfilled by less drastic action, such as giving proper warning to the persons potentially affected”. 4 Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, La Forest J at 618 (DLR (4th)). 5 Anderson v Enfield City Corp (1983) 34 SASR 472; 54 LGRA 69, King CJ at 477 (SASR); Thompson v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449 at 475. 6 Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (No 2) (1996) 68 FCR 367 (FC), Lindgren J at 385; but note the reservation expressed by Lehane J at 386. 7 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 596; Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514, Starke J at 523. See also “Magnitude of Harm” [33.2.1580]; Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [23.80]. 8 Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514, Starke J at 523; Todman v Victa Ltd [1982] VR 849 (FC); Burnie Port Authority v General

288

[33.4.410]

DUTY OF CARE

Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 553–554 (CLR). 9 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Macmillan at 612; Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 555–556 (CLR). 10 Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514, Starke J at 523. 11 Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514, Starke J at 523.

[33.4.410] A supplier’s or manufacturer’s duty to warn consumers of the inevitable risks involved in the use of products may be discharged in some circumstances by warning an “intermediary”. An intermediary may be characterised as another person capable of, or responsible for, averting the risk. In Holmes v Ashford [1950] 2 All ER 76, a warning as to the health effects of hair dye was held by the Court of Appeal to be adequate when given to the hairdressers and not to the person to whose hair it was to be applied (at least where it was proved that the warning had come to the knowledge of the hairdressers). By analogy, a warning given to a medical practitioner of the harmful side-effects of drugs or medical devices may be adequate to discharge the supplier’s duty to warn the patient of the existence of those side effects. In some United States jurisdictions, this question is covered by the so-called “learned intermediary” rule. In Reyes v Wyeth Laboratories 498 F 2d 1264 (1974), Wisdom J said: Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as a “learned intermediary” between manufacturer and consumer.1

A different standard is apparently applied to oral contraceptives due to the “heightened participation” of patients in decisions relating to their use.2 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that the manufacturer must warn the ultimate user of oral contraceptives of possible side effects.3 A similar principle has been recognised in Canada, more as an application of the principles derived from Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 than as a rule or an exception to a rule.4 In Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, the Supreme Court of Canada asserted that the policy rationale for the duty to warn was to ensure that the consumer was fully informed of all risks and that, in general, the manufacturer owed the duty directly to the ultimate consumer, but that different considerations might apply where there was a “tripartite informational relationship” between the manufacturer of a drug or medical device, a physician and a patient. In such situations, where an intermediate inspection of the product was anticipated, or where the consumer was placing primary reliance on the judgment of a learned intermediary, a warning to the ultimate consumer might not be necessary and the manufacturer might satisfy its duty to warn the ultimate consumer by warning the learned intermediary.5

289

[33.4.410]

NEGLIGENCE

In Australia, the position is untested.6 When a “tripartite informational relationship” of the type identified in Hollis v Birch comes before an Australian court, tension will inevitably arise between the manufacturer’s duty to the consumer under Donoghue v Stevenson and the physician’s duty to the patient under Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47,7 not least because a manufacturer of a mass-produced product must give a generalised warning suitable for broad dissemination, while a physician must communicate their advice in terms which are tailored to the capacity of the individual patient under treatment to understand the advice.8 Subject to that difficulty, it seems likely that Australian courts will approach the learned intermediary issue in much the same way as the Canadian courts.

1 Reyes v Wyeth Laboratories 498 F 2d 1264 (1974), Wisdom J at 1276. 2 MacDonald v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp 475 NE 2d 65 (1985), Abrams J at 70. 3 MacDonald v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp 475 NE 2d 65 (1985). 4 Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Can) Ltd (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 658 (ONCA), Robins J (for the Court) at 669; Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, La Forest J at 623 (DLR (4th)). 5 Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, La Forest J at 622–623 (DLR (4th)). 6 Peterson v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd (2010) 184 FCR 1; [2010] FCA 180, Jessup J at [796]–[797]; Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [219]–[220]. 7 See Health and Guardianship “Health Rights and Responsibilities” [20.1.270]–[20.1.280]. 8 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 490 (CLR). See also the caution against unnecessarily burdening patients with unnecessary information in F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189 (FC), King CJ at 192–193.

[33.4.420] A supplier’s or manufacturer’s duty of care does not extend to warning abnormally sensitive individuals of the risks of using their products. In Levi v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; 58 WN (NSW) 63, the plaintiff contracted a skin disease after using the defendant’s bath salts. Jordan CJ held that the plaintiff had contracted the disease because of an abnormally accentuated susceptibility and that: Persons who trade in and supply ordinary foodstuffs and articles of ordinary domestic use are … subject to no duty to issue warnings that the use of such articles may cause discomfort or injury to abnormal persons who may be allergic to them.1

However, where the use of a product is known to carry a risk for a small proportion of its potential users, the supplier or manufacturer may come under a duty to warn of that risk. In Thompson v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449 at 475, the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court held that, as knowledge emerged of a possible association between the use of a variety of

290

[33.4.430]

DUTY OF CARE

tampon and the onset of toxic shock syndrome affecting a small proportion of users of the product, the manufacturer may have come under a duty to warn of the phenomenon, but held that it was not established on the evidence that within the time frame in the circumstances of this case the respondents were in breach of the duty of care owed by them to the class of persons of whom the appellant was a member.2

Abnormally sensitive individuals who are aware of their sensitivity are under an obligation to disclose “known peculiarities”.3

1 2 3

Levi v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 48; 58 WN (NSW) 63 (FC), Jordan CJ at 52 (SR (NSW)) (Halse Rogers and Street JJ concurring). Thompson v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449 at 475 (FC), the Court at 494. See Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366; [1955] 2 WLR 245 (CA), Denning LJ at 373–374 (QB); Griffıths v Peter Conway Ltd [1939] 1 All ER 685 (CA); Slater v Finning Ltd [1997] AC 473; [1996] 3 WLR 190, Lord Keith at 483 (AC).

[33.4.430] Product liability law regards the safe use of risky products as a two-way street, with the supplier or manufacturer and the consumer sharing responsibility for the safe use of the product. A consumer who continues to use a product after a defect in it has, or should have become, apparent after reasonable inspection, may be responsible for the injuries that follow. A consumer who fails to heed a warning about the use of a product may likewise be responsible for the injuries that follow. As the High Court held in Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19: The obviousness of a risk, and the remoteness of the likelihood that other people will fail to observe and avoid it, are often factors relevant to a judgment about what reasonableness requires as a response. … There are, for instance, no risk-free dwelling houses. The community’s standards of reasonable behaviour do not require householders to eliminate all risks from their premises, or to place a notice at the front door warning entrants of all the dangers that await them if they fail to take care for their own safety. This is not a case about warnings. Even so, it may be noted that a conclusion, in a given case, that a warning is either necessary or sufficient, itself involves an assumption that those to whom the warning is addressed will take notice of it and will exercise care. The whole idea of warnings is that those who receive them will act carefully. There would be no purpose in issuing warnings unless it were reasonable to expect that people will modify their behaviour in response to warnings.1

291

[33.4.430]

NEGLIGENCE

This approach is seen in a series of Australian and English decisions, emphasising the importance that the common law attaches to notions of personal choice and responsibility.2 It is also seen in a series of overseas decisions concerning the use of tobacco products.3

1 Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19, the Court at [36]. See also Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [45] (Heydon J agreeing at [283]). 2 See, eg Titchener v British Railways Board [1983] 1 WLR 1427 (HL); Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5; Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363; Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9; Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1934; [2003] HCA 61, Kirby J at [70]; Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; 78 ALJR 933; [2004] HCA 29; Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46; [2003] 3 WLR 705; [2003] UKHL 47; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 223 CLR 486; 80 ALJR 43; [2005] HCA 63; Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 234; 79 ALJR 904; [2005] HCA 19; Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75; CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (t/as Tandara Motor Inn) v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; 84 ALJR 1; [2009] HCA 47. 3 Roysdon v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co, 849 F 2d 230 (1988); Paugh v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co, 834 F Supp 228 (1993); Letourneau v Imperial Tobacco Ltd (1998) 162 DLR (4th) 734 (QC); Tompkin v American Brands 219 F 3d 566 (2000); Heine v Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH 2 O 294/02 (Higher Regional Court of Hamm); Lund v JL Tiedemanns Tobaksfabrik AS (unreported, HR-2002-00753a, Norway SC, 31 October 2003); Cruz-Vargas v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co 348 F 3d 271 (2003); McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] 2 SC 1 (Ct Sess); Pou v British American Tobacco (NZ) Ltd [2006] 1 NZLR 661 (CA).

Breach of Duty [33.4.440] A breach of duty causing product-related loss has been established in a wide variety of circumstances.1 If it is determined that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that the use of the product involved a risk of injury or damage to property which was not far-fetched or fanciful,2 then whether the duty has been breached is determined by asking what actions a reasonable person would take in response to the perceived risk. This involves a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience involved in taking remedial action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant might have. The standard of response which the defendant must make can only be determined when all relevant

292

[33.4.440]

BREACH OF DUTY

matters have been “balanced out”.3 A defendant is negligent if the defendant fails to take steps to eliminate a risk which is known, or ought to be known, to be a real risk, and not a mere possibility which would never influence the mind of a reasonable person. However, where a risk is real, but so small that a reasonable person, careful of the safety of their neighbour, would think it right to neglect it, failure to take steps to rectify it may be justified.4

1

2

3

4

Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (Woollen Underwear Case) [1936] AC 85; (1935) 54 CLR 49 (PC) (underwear containing free sulfites causing dermatitis); Shandloff v City Dairy Ltd [1936] 4 DLR 712 (ONCA) (chipped glass in a milk bottle); Barnes v Irwell Valley Water Board [1939] 1 KB 21 (CA) (water supply contaminated with lead); Stennett v Hancock [1939] 2 All ER 578 (KB) (motor repairs); Grant v Cooper, McDougall & Robertson Ltd [1940] NZLR 947 (SC) (inadequately labelled sheep dip); Herschtal v Stewart & Ardern Ltd [1940] 1 KB 155 (motor repairs); Watson v Buckley, Osborne, Garrett & Co Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 174 (a hair dye which caused dermatitis); Barnett v H & J Packer & Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 575 (KB) (a sweet containing a piece of wire); O’Dwyer v Leo Buring Pty Ltd [1966] WAR 67 (plastic stopper on a bottle of sparkling wine which spontaneously ejected); Cuckow v Polyester Reinforced Products Pty Ltd (1970) 19 FLR 122 (ACTSC) (insulating material which caught fire, giving off dense smoke); Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255 (CA) (carcinogenic chemicals which affected the employees of the purchaser); Hill v James Crowe (Cases) Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 812 (QB) (wooden packing cases which collapsed); Suosaari v Steinhardt [1989] 2 Qd R 477 (FC) (defectively designed tramway bins made from sugarcane); Greenwood v Sefton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Wood J, 12235 of 1988, 6 July 1990) (a toothpick in a container of diet food); Australian Shipbuilding Industries (WA) Pty Ltd v Packer (1993) 9 WAR 375 (FC) (a steel ladder on a ship which was too steep). Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 46 (CLR). See also “Breach of Duty of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1820]. Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; 54 ALJR 283; 60 LGRA 106, Mason J at 47–48 (CLR); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54, McHugh J at [101]–[114], Gummow and Hayne JJ at [190]–[203]; Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Gummow J at [68]–[69] (Heydon J agreeing at [283]). Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC), Lord Reid at 643–644 (AC); Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; 80 ALJR 1; 142 LGERA 387; [2005] HCA 62, Hayne J at [124]; New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; 81 ALJR 1021; 4 DDCR 459; [2007] HCA 20; Gleeson CJ at [7], Gummow and Hayne JJ at [57]–[58], Kirby J at [123]. For circumstances in which a plaintiff’s claim may be defeated, see [33.4.500].

293

[33.4.450]

NEGLIGENCE

[33.4.450] In determining whether a duty of care exists, or has been breached, compliance with relevant statutes and other regulations applicable to the product is a factor to be taken into account, but it is only one factor, and it is unlikely to be decisive on its own.1 Some United States jurisdictions recognise a doctrine of statutory preemption under which, in some circumstances, a plaintiff’s claim to recover product-related loss may be preempted if the acts complained of as constituting negligence are sanctioned by statute.2 A similar result may be possible in Australian law, depending on the facts of individual cases. In Albery-Speyer v BP Oil Ltd (1980) 124 SJ 376, the English Court of Appeal struck out a pleading which alleged that the defendants were negligent in supplying petrol with an excessive lead content. The lead content of the petrol was alleged to be excessive even though it was within the limits set by regulations made under the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (UK). The claim effectively asked the Court to set stricter lead limits than Parliament had set. The Court of Appeal held that where Parliament has decided a matter of general policy, the courts cannot properly be asked to make decisions, by way of litigation under the adversary procedure, the effect of which would, or might, be that the courts would lay down, and require to be enforced with the authority of the courts, a different and inconsistent policy.3

The decision stands as authority for the limited proposition that, where the acts complained of as constituting a breach of duty are sanctioned by statute, and the defendant acts reasonably, in good faith and in pursuance of the purpose of the statute, those acts may not amount to a breach of duty.4 While this may be a reasonable proposition in relation to lead emission levels, it does not apply across the board. It is settled that compliance with applicable statutes or regulations does not necessarily provide a defence to an allegation of negligence. Hence, it is no answer to an allegation that the driver of a car was negligent in driving too fast that the speed was within the speed limit.5

1 Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 461; Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222 (FC), Herring CJ at 225; Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220; Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1358 (CA); but see Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [101]. 2 See, eg Cipollone v Liggett Group Inc 505 US 504 (1992). See also Schwartz VE, Charrow RP and Behrens MA, “Following the Supreme Court’s Analysis in Cipollone, Courts Are Finding Broad Preemption in Sophisticated Medical Device Tort Litigation” (1995) 17 J Prod & Toxic Liab 31. 3 Albery-Speyer v BP Oil Ltd (1980) 124 SJ 376 (CA), the Court at [18]. 4 However, see the Commonwealth mandatory standard defence available under Australian Consumer Law (Cth), s 142(b) (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2), which applies when goods are defective only because they complied with a mandatory standard for them: see [33.4.790]. 5 Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220.

294

[33.4.460]

CAUSATION

Causation [33.4.460] A plaintiff must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the wrongful conduct of a defendant caused or materially contributed to their injuries.1 The necessary causal connection is generally established if the plaintiff proves that they would not have been injured if the defendant had not been negligent.2 A plaintiff’s claim may be defeated if their loss was the result of a novus actus interveniens: that is, an act which breaks the chain of causation between a negligent act and the damage alleged.3 The question of whether the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the plaintiff’s injuries is a question of fact which must be determined by applying common sense to the facts of each case.4 The “but for” test of causation is a useful aid in determining issues of causation, but it is not the exclusive or definitive test.5 Its limitations must be recognised and avoided.6 The legal concept of causation is different from scientific and philosophical concepts of causation: see [33.4.470]. The divergence of approach gives rise to problems in civil cases where the standard of proof is expressed in terms of the balance of probabilities.7 This means that, when considering what happened in the past, courts treat anything that is more probable than not as certain.8 Where expert evidence suggests that the defendant’s wrongful act was a possible cause of the plaintiff’s injury, it is open to a court to find that the wrongful act more likely than not caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.9 Where the defendant’s wrongful act is one of a number of events which may possibly have caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and the competing events are different in character from the defendant’s wrongful act, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s wrongful act, and not the competing events, caused their injuries.10 It is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s wrongful act was one of a series of similar events which materially contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.11 A material contribution is one which is not de minimis; that is, one which is not so trivial as to be unworthy of consideration,12 or which plays some part in contributing to the loss.13 Where it can be shown that the negligence of the defendant caused only part of the plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff is only entitled to compensation in respect of that part of the injury actually caused by the defendant.14 The law does not equate the situation where the defendant’s negligence has materially increased the risk of injury with one where it has materially contributed to the injury.15 Proof that the defendant’s negligence materially increased the risk that the plaintiff would suffer the injuries which they in fact suffered, do not, as a matter of law, support a finding that the defendant’s negligence actually caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. However, a material increase in the risk of

295

[33.4.460]

NEGLIGENCE

injury resulting from the defendant’s negligence is a factor that courts may take into account in determining whether, as a matter of fact, the defendant’s negligence caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.16

1 Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410 (HCA), Gibbs J at 417; Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 136 CLR 681n; 50 ALJR 720, Mason J at 724 (ALJR); March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 514 (CLR); see also Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; [1956] 2 WLR 707, Lord Reid at 620 (AC); McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL), Lord Reid at 4, Lord Wilberforce at 6, Lord Simon at 8. See generally “Limitations on Compensation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2170]. Reference should also be made to the relevant legislation governing civil liability and causation in each jurisdiction: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 4.3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 1A Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 6 Div 2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 6 Div 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt X Div 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A Div 3. There is no equivalent legislation in the Northern Territory. 2 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 514 (CLR). 3 Novus actus interveniens: “[A] new act intervening”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 119. See “Causation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020]. 4 Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663; [1953] 3 WLR 279, Lord Reid at 681 (AC); March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 515 (CLR); Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268, Dixon CJ, Fullagar and Kitto JJ at 277; see also Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] AC 350, Lord Shaw at 369–370; Commissioners for Lord High Admiral (UK) v The SS Volute [1922] 1 AC 129, Viscount Birkenhead LC at 144; Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691, Lord Wright at 706; Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972] 2 WLR 1320, Lord Salmon at 847 (AC); McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL), Lord Reid at 5, Lord Salmon at 11. For a discussion of the common sense approach, see Stapleton J, “Law, Causation and Common Sense” (1988) 8 Oxford J Legal Stud 111. 5 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 508, 515–519, Deane J at 522–524, Toohey J at 524 (CLR); but see the judgment of McHugh J at 525, especially at 533–534 (CLR); see also Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32; [2002] 3 WLR 89; [2002] UKHL 22. 6 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 515–519, Deane J at 522–524, Toohey J at 524 (CLR). 7 See Evidence “General Principles of Proof” [16.2.360]–[16.2.370]. 8 Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166; [1969] 2 WLR 767, Lord Diplock at 176 (AC). 9 EMI (Aust) Ltd v Bes [1970] 2 NSWR 238 (NSWCA), Herron CJ at 242, Asprey JA at 243; Dahl v Grice [1981] VR 513 (FC), the Court at 522; see also Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538, in which Rich ACJ at 564 conceded: “If medical knowledge develops strong positive reasons for saying that the lay

296

[33.4.470]

10

11

12

13 14

15 16

CAUSATION

common-sense presumption is wrong, the courts, no doubt, would gladly give effect to this affirmative information.” However, see Blackstock v Foster (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 341; 75 WN (NSW) 393, the Full Court at 342–343 (SR (NSW)). See also Travers RC, “Medical Causation” (2002) 76 ALJ 258. Contrast Forbes v Selleys Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 149. See Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; [1988] 2 WLR 557, Lord Bridge at 1081 (AC); Kilgannon v Sharpe Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 600 (CA); Price DPT, “Causation – The Lords’ Last Chance?” (1989) 38 ICLQ 735. See also “Causation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020]. See McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL); Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; [1988] 2 WLR 557, Lord Bridge at 1090 (AC); Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; [1956] 2 WLR 707; Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry & Engineering Co Ltd [1957] 1 WLR 613 (HL); Seltsam Ltd v Minahan (1996) 13 NSWCCR 410 (NSWCA), Sheller JA at 426–427; Barnes v Hay (1988) 12 NSWLR 337, Mahoney J at 350–356. See also “Causation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020]; Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10, French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [43]–[45]. Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; [1956] 2 WLR 707, Lord Reid at 621 (AC). De minimis non curat lex: “[T]he law does not concern itself with trifles”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 52. Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10, French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [45]. Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421 (CA); Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] ICR 942; [2001] EWCA Civ 242. Difficulties arise where the expert evidence does not permit a court to conclude that the negligence of a defendant caused an identifiable part of a plaintiff’s injury. These difficulties are highlighted by the asbestos cases. Compare Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32; [2002] 3 WLR 89; [2002] UKHL 22 (a mesothelioma case); Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 (a case of renal carcinoma); Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd (an asbestos case). Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd v Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307 (CA), Mason P at 310–321. Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 (CA); Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd v Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307 (CA); ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Walsh [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-452 (NSWCA); Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29; Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd v Peterson (2011) 196 FCR 145; [2011] FCAFC 128, the Court at [96]–[105]; however, this question has not been ultimately considered by the High Court: see Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; 86 ALJR 267; [2012] HCA 5, French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ at [26].

[33.4.470] The legal concept of causation (see [33.4.460]) is different from scientific and philosophical concepts of causation.1 The divergence of the legal and scientific approaches to causation gives rise to special difficulties in “toxic tort” cases, where the damage complained of is often a disease contracted many years after the alleged wrongful act.2 Difficulties also arise where scientific or medical experts seek to express expert opinions which are based on hearsay or on statistical or epidemiological data, and are not or may not be

297

[33.4.470]

NEGLIGENCE

admissible in evidence.3 In such situations, the law allows a degree of latitude.4

1 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; [1961] Qd R 277; (1961) 35 ALJR 4, Windeyer J at 591–592 (CLR); March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 509 (CLR); McCann v Switzerland Insurance (Aust) Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 579; 75 ALJR 325; [2000] HCA 65, Gaudron J at [52]. 2 See Stapleton J, “Compensating Victims of Disease” (1985) 5 Oxford J Legal Stud 248; Adeney E, “The Challenge of Medical Uncertainty: Factual Causation in Anglo-Australian Toxic Tort Litigation” (1993) 19 Mon LR 23. 3 See Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538, Rich ACJ at 564, but see Dixon J at 570; see also Black B and Lilienfeld DE, “Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation” (1984) 52 Fordham L Rev 732. 4 See Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382, Gowans J at 386–387; see also Evidence “Opinion Evidence” [16.4.940]–[16.4.1200]. Courts have differed on the extent to which it is permissible to rely on a sequence of events as giving rise to a common sense inference of causation where medical and scientific witnesses are unable to draw the same inference on the basis of their expertise. See, eg Blackstock v Foster (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 341; 75 WN (NSW) 393 (FC), the Court at 342–343 (SR (NSW)); St George Club Ltd v Hines (1961) 35 ALJR 106 (HCA), the Court at 107 (supporting the approach of Dixon J); Hole v Hocking [1962] SASR 128, Napier CJ at 133; May v Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission [2015] FCAFC 93, the Court at [217]–[219].

[33.4.480] When bringing expert evidence in an attempt to prove that the conduct of a defendant caused or materially contributed to a plaintiff’s injuries (see [33.4.460]), it may be necessary to consider the reliability of that expert evidence.1 Courts in the United States have encountered problems with the admission into evidence of so-called “junk science”, which is evidence of medical or scientific opinions which are not accepted by mainstream physicians or scientists. In Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993), the United States Supreme Court adopted a new test for the admissibility of scientific or medical expert opinion, based on a requirement that the evidence satisfy a threshold test of scientific reliability before it can be led.2 While Australian experience has not demonstrated the need to adopt a similar discriminatory test, Australian courts may need to be alert to the need to recognise and avoid the problem which caused the United States Supreme Court to act.3

1 See Evidence “Opinion Evidence” [16.4.980]–[16.4.1140]. 2 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579 (1993), Blackmun (for the Court) at 589–591. This has been affirmed by the introduction of legislative standards for assessing expert opinion in Federal Rules of Evidence (US), r 702, which states that an expert may provide their opinion if: “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to under-stand the evidence or

298

[33.4.490]

3

CAUSATION

to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case” (available at http://federalevidence.com/downloads/rules.of.evidence.pdf, viewed 19 May 2016). See Green M, “Legal Theory: Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation” (1992) 86 Nw UL Rev 643; Goldberg R, “Scientific Evidence, Causation and the Law – Lessons of Benedictin (Debendox) Litigation” (1996) Med L Rev 32; Burbridge RJ, “Junk Science: Medicine and the Law” (2001) 75 ALJ 761; Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; 88 ALJR 786; [2014] HCA 29, the Court at [23].

[33.4.490] Where a defendant’s negligence lies in a failure to act (eg in a failure to warn of the risks of using a product), a plaintiff must prove that their loss flowed from the failure to act.1 This necessarily involves a hypothetical inquiry as to what might have happened if the defendant had performed the act that it failed to perform.2 If a manufacturer fails to warn of the risks of using a product, the inquiry is whether, if the manufacturer had given an adequate warning, the plaintiff would nevertheless have decided to use the product. Despite the obvious criticisms which may be made of the self-serving nature of a plaintiff’s evidence of what they would have done if the defendant had behaved differently, the test of how the plaintiff would have behaved is a subjective one, to be decided on the evidence given.3 In cases involving prescription drugs and medical devices, the position is complicated by the interposition of the physician between the manufacturer and the plaintiff:4 see [33.4.410]. The question must be asked: would the physician have given different advice to the plaintiff if they had been adequately warned? If not, how can the manufacturer’s negligence be said to have caused the plaintiff’s loss? There is limited Australian authority on this point. Formerly, the position in Canada was that the plaintiff had to show that the physician would have acted differently if adequate warning had been given. In Davidson v Connaught Laboratories (1980) 14 CCLT 251, the plaintiff failed in an action in the Supreme Court of Ontario against the manufacturer of a rabies vaccine who had given an inadequate warning of the side effects of the vaccine. It was held that although the warning was inadequate, if the manufacturer had given an adequate warning, the plaintiff’s doctor would not have changed his recommendation that the plaintiff have the vaccine. Consequently, the Court found that even if the manufacturer had given an adequate warning, the plaintiff would still have agreed to use the vaccine. However, the Canadian Supreme Court no longer requires a plaintiff to take the hypothetical inquiry so far as to prove how the physician would have responded if the manufacturer had acted differently.5 The position in the United Kingdom is not so lenient. There, the plaintiff is required to take the hypothetical inquiry further. In Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232; [1997] 3 WLR 1151, a medical negligence case, it was common ground that the plaintiff suffered respiratory failure leading 299

[33.4.490]

NEGLIGENCE

to cardiac arrest, brain damage and, eventually, death, after his doctor negligently failed to treat him. However, the administrator on behalf of the deceased plaintiff failed to prove that the failure to treat him caused his injuries and death. When it came to the hypothetical inquiry as to what would have happened if the plaintiff had been treated, she was not able to prove that the hypothetical treatment would have averted the catastrophe which befell the deceased. This was despite the fact there was evidence that there was a treatment available which, if given, would have averted the catastrophe. The plaintiff failed because the House of Lords found the plaintiff’s doctor would not have given him the life-saving treatment, but rather another treatment which would not have saved his life. As it would not have been negligent for the doctor to have given this other treatment, the plaintiff had failed to show that he would have been in any better position if he had received treatment. In CSR Ltd v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 463, the appellant, CSR Limited, exercised close management control of its subsidiaries. The Court of Appeal had found that one subsidiary had negligently supplied asbestos to another without warning of its harmful properties. The hypothetical question was whether, if a warning had been given, the management of the second subsidiary would have acted on it in a way that might have prevented the plaintiff from contracting mesothelioma. Beazley and Stein JJA held that, had a warning been given, steps could have been taken to reduce dust emissions and levels. Although there was no evidence “that management would have acted upon any warning”, it was open to the Court to infer that it would have or, at least, that the failure to warn contributed to the risk of injury to the plaintiff.6 Powell JA dissented on this issue, holding that damages would only be recoverable if, as a result of the first subsidiary’s failure to warn, the second subsidiary had failed to take precautions to protect its employees from injury. Given that the second subsidiary was fully informed of the hazards of the product, a warning by the first subsidiary would not have caused the second subsidiary to change its systems of working with asbestos.7 A solution to the problem of how to assess causation in such cases may lie in the developing law on the assessment of damages for loss of a chance.8

1 See also “Limitations on Compensation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020]. 2 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232; [1997] 3 WLR 1151, Browne-Wilkinson LJ at 239–240 (AC); Honoré T, “Causation and Disclosure of Medical Risks” (1998) 114 LQR 52. 3 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; 75 ALJR 734; [2001] HCA 18, Callinan J at [214]; see also Kirby J at [153]; Rogers v Whitaker (1991) 23 NSWLR 600 (CA), Handley JA at 618–619. The Court of Appeal’s finding on causation was not challenged on appeal: Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 492 (CLR); Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375; 87 ALJR 648; [2013] HCA 19, the Court at [7]–[27]. In Canada, an objective test is applied in medical negligence cases, while a subjective test is applied in product liability cases: see Reibl v Hughes [1980]

300

[33.4.500]

4

5 6 7 8

DEFENCES

2 SCR 880; (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 (medical negligence); Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Can) Ltd (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 658 (ONCA) (product liability); Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, La Forest J at 631–638 (DLR (4th)), who acknowledged that the preferential treatment of doctors “may seem anomalous”, but justified it, inter alia, because a manufacturer is likely “to act in a more self interested manner” than a doctor (see specifically at 633–634 (DLR (4th))). Further, in Hollis v Birch, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ both dissented on the issues of causation. In addition to supporting an objective test, they would not have excused the plaintiff from proving if the defendant had fully warned her doctor, her doctor would have given a different warning to her: Sopinka J at 642–646 (DLR (4th)) (McLachlin concurring). See also Black V and Klimchuk D, “Torts – Negligent Failure to Warn – Learned Intermediary Rule – Causation – Appellate Court Powers: Hollis v Dow Corning Corp” (1996) 75 Can Bar Rev 355. Here a tension is evident between the manufacturer’s duty to the consumer under Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and the physician’s duty to the patient under Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47. See also Peterson v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd (2010) 184 FCR 1; [2010] FCA 180, Jessup J at [796]–[797]; Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [219]–[220]; Health and Guardianship “Right to Information” [20.1.270]–[20.1.280]. Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, La Forest J at 638–642 (DLR (4th)). CSR Ltd v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 463, Beazley and Stein JJA at 476–492 (NSWLR). CSR Ltd v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 463, Powell JA at 465–466 (NSWLR). See, eg Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 68 ALJR 313. See also “Limitations on Compensation” [33.10.2030]–[33.10.2050].

Defences [33.4.500] If a consumer is injured or suffers property damage as a result of a supplier’s failure to take reasonable care in the preparation or presentation of a product, the consumer’s claim may be defeated. Occasions when a consumer’s claim may be defeated include: (1)

it was not intended that the product would reach the consumer in the form in which it left the supplier;

(2)

there was a reasonable probability of intermediate examination of the product which might reasonably be expected to detect the defect in it; or

(3)

the consumer’s loss resulted from their own voluntary act: see [33.4.510].

Frequently, more than one of these factors is present in the same case. In Daley v Gypsy Caravan Co Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 22,1 an electrician was electrocuted when attempting to repair the wiring of a caravan. While there was evidence that the faulty wiring was the result of negligent manufacture, it was held that the electrician knew of the possible defect in the wiring he was attempting to repair and, being qualified to do so, was seeking to investigate that defect. This was sufficient to relieve the manufacturer of liability. In Holmes v 301

[33.4.500]

NEGLIGENCE

Ashford [1950] 2 All ER 76, the manufacturer was not liable for the dermatitis caused by its hair dye because it reasonably expected the hairdressers to “interpose their judgment and reason whether they [were] going to use a hair dye or not”.2 In Kubach v Hollands [1937] 3 All ER 907,3 chemicals were supplied to a school. The supplier’s invoice specified that the chemicals should be examined and tested before use. The chemicals were not tested and a student was injured when the chemicals exploded. The manufacturer was held not to be liable for the student’s injuries. In Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin suggested that the manufacturer would be relieved of liability if there was only a reasonable possibility of intermediate examination.4 Later cases suggest that something more than a possibility is required. In Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J held: [W]hat is significant is not whether an intermediate examination of the article was possible. It is whether it was contemplated that, in the ordinary course, the article would be examined, or tested, or in some way treated before it was taken into consumption or use.5

If a previously hidden defect is discovered, and loss results from the continued use of the defective article, the supplier is not liable for the loss resulting from the continued use. In Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1491, one defendant continued to use a chisel purchased from the other, knowing it was faulty. It was held that the first defendant was not entitled to indemnity from the second for its liability to compensate an employee injured by the chisel.6 As Lord Bridge said in D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368: If the hidden defect in the chattel is the cause of personal injury or of damage to property other than the chattel itself, the manufacturer is liable. But if the hidden defect is discovered before any such damage is caused, there is no longer any room for the application of the Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 principle. The chattel is now defective in quality, but is no longer dangerous.7

1 2 3 4 5 6

7

Daley v Gypsy Caravan Co Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 22 (NSWCA). Holmes v Ashford [1950] 2 All ER 76 (CA), Tucker LJ at 80. Kubach v Hollands [1937] 3 All ER 907 (KB). Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin at 599. Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 86 (CLR). Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1491 (Birm Assizes). See also Daley v Gypsy Caravan Co Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 22 (NSWCA). For the position in contract, see in contrast, Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; [1981] 2 WLR 713, Lord Diplock at 276–277 (AC). D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] AC 177; [1988] 3 WLR 368, Lord Bridge at 206 (AC).

302

[33.4.520]

DAMAGES

[33.4.510] A plaintiff’s claim for compensation in a product liability case may be reduced if the loss results in part from their contributory negligence.1 In Badger v Ministry of Defence [2006] 3 All ER 173; [2005] EWHC 2941, the defendant negligently exposed the plaintiff to asbestos, and the plaintiff contracted lung cancer. The verdict was reduced for the worker’s contributory negligence in smoking cigarettes. Where the opportunity for intermediate inspection rests with the plaintiff and the plaintiff negligently fails to carry out a proper inspection, their claim may fail altogether,2 or there may be an apportionment of liability between the plaintiff and the defendant. In Jull v Wilson [1968] NZLR 88,3 the owner of a forklift truck was warned that a negligently performed weld on the truck was temporary only, yet continued to use it for longer than was prudent. The welder argued that he should escape liability for the faulty weld because the owner could reasonably be expected to keep the weld under surveillance, having regard to the warning given. The argument was rejected. Liability was apportioned between the welder and the plaintiff. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the decision as to whether the later negligence of the plaintiff should give rise to an apportionment of liability or defeat their claim entirely may be finely balanced. The prevailing cases tend to the view that the later negligence of the plaintiff should not necessarily excuse the earlier negligence of the manufacturer or supplier.4

1 2 3 4

See “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Daley v Gypsy Caravan Co Pty Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 22 (NSWCA). Jull v Wilson [1968] NZLR 88 (SC). See Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd [1948] AC 549; Tarling v Nobel [1966] ALR 189 (ACTSC), Joske J at 192; March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 512, 518 (CLR); Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 550, Mason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ at 412–413 (CLR); McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd v LS Booth Wine Transport Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 723; Australian Shipbuilding Industries (WA) Pty Ltd v Packer (1993) 9 WAR 375 (FC).

Damages [33.4.520] It is settled that damages are recoverable where negligent presentation of a product causes personal injury or damage to property other than the product itself:1 see [33.4.390]. Where the negligent presentation of a product causes pure economic loss, the plaintiff may recover the amount of the loss if, in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is able to prove that an additional factor beyond foreseeability2 provides a basis for an award of

303

[33.4.520]

NEGLIGENCE

damages.3 What that additional factor must be remains controversial: see [33.4.380] and [33.4.390].

1 2 3

See generally, “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. For the current approach to the concept of what constitutes proximity: see “Duty of Care: General Principles” [33.2.240]–[33.2.310]. Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 576 (CLR); McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (Helix Cotton Case) (1997) 72 FCR 1; 93 A Crim R 1. See also “Economic Loss” [33.10.1670]–[33.10.1750].

304

Statutory Liability of Suppliers and Manufacturers General [33.4.630] The Australian Consumer Law1 imposes on suppliers, manufacturers, deemed manufacturers and importers of goods that cause product-related loss or damage a statutory liability to pay compensation for that loss or damage. Part 3-2 of the Australian Consumer Law establishes a new regime of statutory guarantees of the quality of goods. If a person supplies goods, in trade or commerce, to a consumer (otherwise than at auction), Pt 3-2 applies statutory guarantees to the supply. Relevant to product-related loss or damage are guarantees that: (1)

the goods will be of acceptable quality;

(2)

the goods will be reasonably fit for any disclosed purpose, and for any purpose for which the supplier represents that they are reasonably fit;

(3)

the goods will correspond with the description by which they were supplied;

(4)

broadly, the goods will correspond with the sample or model by reference to which they were supplied;

(5)

broadly, the manufacturer of the goods will take reasonable action to make available facilities to repair the goods and any necessary spare parts for a reasonable period after the goods are supplied; and

(6)

the manufacturer of the goods will comply with any express warranty given or made by the manufacturer in relation to the goods.2

Part 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law perpetuates Pt VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, under which manufacturers, deemed manufacturers and importers of goods supplied in trade or commerce that have a safety defect are liable to compensate others who suffer loss because of the safety defect. These statutory remedies apply in addition to the traditional remedies in contract and tort.3 Their application may not be excluded or modified.4

1 2

Australian Consumer Law found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. Australian Consumer Law, ss 54 – 59. For a discussion of the consumer guarantee

305

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

3 4

[33.4.630]

regime under the Australian Consumer Law, see Paterson JM, “The New Consumer Guarantee Law and the Reasons for Replacing the Regime of Statutory Implied Terms in Consumer Transactions” [2011] MULR 8. See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 131C. See Australian Consumer Law, ss 64, 150, 276; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Valve Corp (No 3) [2016] FCA 196.

Statutory Guarantee Regime Introduction [33.4.640] Part 3-2 of the Australian Consumer Law applies statutory guarantees when a person supplies goods, in trade or commerce, to a consumer (otherwise than at auction). The statutory guarantees are not guarantees in the normal sense of that word. The statutory guarantees act as triggers for the causes of action available under Pt 5-4 of the Australian Consumer Law. When there is a failure to comply with a guarantee: (1)

Pt 5-4 Div 1 specifies what action consumers may take against the supplier of the goods;

(2)

Pt 5-4 Div 2 specifies what action consumers may take against the manufacturer of the goods; and

(3)

Pt 5-4 Div 3 specifies when the manufacturer of the goods is liable to indemnify the supplier of the goods.

[33.4.642] As the Australian Consumer Law treats suppliers and manufacturers differently, the definitions of both terms are key to the operation of the statutory guarantee regime. Moreover, a manufacturer may also be a supplier. Finally, the Australian Consumer Law defines both terms expansively, so as to include persons who would not normally be regarded as suppliers or manufacturers. In addition to its normal English meaning, “supply” in relation to goods is defined as including supply (including resupply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-purchase, and “supplier” has a corresponding meaning.1 It follows that banks and financiers may be liable as suppliers.2 A donation of goods is not a supply for the purposes of Pt 3-2 of the Australian Consumer Law, unless they are made for promotional purposes.3 In addition to its normal English meaning, a “manufacturer” includes: (a)

a person who grows, extracts, produces, processes or assembles goods;

(b)

a person who holds himself or herself out to the public as the manufacturer of goods;

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[33.4.647]

STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME

(c)

a person who causes or permits the name of the person, a name by which the person carries on business or a brand or mark of the person to be applied to goods supplied by the person;

(d)

a person (the first person) who causes or permits another person, in connection with: (i)

the supply or possible supply of goods by that other person; or

(ii)

the promotion by that other person by any means of the supply or use of goods;

to hold out the first person to the public as the manufacturer of the goods; (e)

1 2 3 4

a person who imports goods into Australia if: (i)

the person is not the manufacturer of the goods; and

(ii)

at the time of the importation, the manufacturer of the goods does not have a place of business in Australia.4

Australian Consumer Law, s 2(1) (definition of “supply”); see also s 11 which provides interpretative guidance on when conduct will amount to “supply”. For the treatment of credit providers, see Australian Consumer Law, Pt 5-5. Australian Consumer Law, s 5. Australian Consumer Law, s 7(1).

[33.4.644] A person acquires goods as a consumer if, and only if: (1) the amount paid or payable for the goods did not exceed $40,000; (2) the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption; or (3) the goods consisted of a vehicle or trailer acquired for use principally in the transport of goods on public roads.1 However, persons falling within that definition will not be treated as consumers if they acquire the goods, or hold themselves out as acquiring the goods, for the purpose of resupply or for the purpose of using the goods up or transforming them, in trade or commerce: (i)

in the course of a process of production or manufacture; or

(ii)

in the course of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures on land.2

Where the price paid or payable for the goods is unclear, there are rules for working out the price to be ascribed to the supply of the goods.3

1 2 3

Australian Consumer Law, s 3(1). Australian Consumer Law, s 3(2). Australian Consumer Law, s 3(4) – (9).

[33.4.647] The statutory guarantee regime only applies when goods are supplied to a consumer in “trade or commerce”. “Trade or commerce” means

307

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.647]

trade or commerce within Australia, or trade or commerce between Australia and places outside Australia, and includes any business or professional activity, whether or not carried on for profit.1

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 2(1) (definition of “trade or commerce”).

Guarantees Relevant to Product Liability [33.4.650] If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer (otherwise than at auction), there is a guarantee that the goods are of “acceptable quality”.1 Goods are of acceptable quality if they are as: (a)

fit for all the purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied; and

(b)

acceptable in appearance and finish; and

(c)

free from defects; and

(d)

safe; and

(e)

durable;

as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of the goods) would regard as acceptable having regard to ... (a)

the nature of the goods; and

(b)

the price of the goods (if relevant); and

(c)

any statements made about the goods on any packaging or label on the goods; and

(d)

any representation made about the goods by the supplier or manufacturer of the goods; and

(e)

any other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the goods.2

In the definition of “acceptable quality”, the words “safe” and “defects” are used in their ordinary English meaning. They are not to be confused with the term “safety defect” defined in s 9 of the Australian Consumer Law, which is relevant to the liability of manufacturers under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law. There are three situations in which the guarantee of acceptable quality will not be enlivened, even though the goods supplied were not, or are not, of acceptable quality. The first situation is where the only reason or reasons why the goods were not of acceptable quality were specifically drawn to the attention of the consumer before the consumer agreed to the supply.3 In this regard, if goods are

308

[33.4.660]

STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME

displayed for sale or hire, it is sufficient disclosure if the reason or reasons why the goods are not of acceptable quality were set out in a written notice displayed with the goods, and the notice was transparent.4 In this context, “transparent” is not used in its normal English meaning. Rather, it means that the notice must be expressed in reasonably plain language, legible, and presented clearly.5 The second situation is where the consumer examined the goods before agreeing to the supply, and the examination ought reasonably to have revealed that the goods were not of acceptable quality.6 The third situation is where the consumer to whom the goods were supplied causes them to become of unacceptable quality, or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent them becoming of unacceptable quality and they are damaged by abnormal use.7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian

Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer

Law, Law, Law, Law, Law, Law, Law,

s s s s s s s

54(1). 54(2), (3). 54(4). 54(5). 2(1) (definition of “transparent”). 54(7). 54(6).

[33.4.660] If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer (otherwise than at auction), there is a guarantee that the goods are reasonably fit for any disclosed purpose, and for any purpose for which the supplier represents that they are reasonably fit.1 The purpose is a particular purpose for which the consumer is acquiring the goods. It need not be a purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied.2 The consumer must disclose the purpose by making it known, either expressly or by implication, to the supplier or a person by whom any prior negotiations or arrangements in relation to the acquisition of the goods were conducted or made (the negotiator).3 The consumer may disclose the purpose to the manufacturer directly, through the supplier, or through the negotiator.4 This guarantee does not apply if the circumstances show that the consumer did not rely on the skill or judgment of the supplier, the manufacturer or the negotiator (as the case may be), or that it was unreasonable for the consumer to rely on their skill or judgment.5

1 2 3 4 5

Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian

Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer

Law, Law, Law, Law, Law,

s s s s s

55(1). 55(2). 55(2)(a). 55(2)(b). 55(3). 309

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.670]

[33.4.670] If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer by description (otherwise than at auction), there is a guarantee that the goods correspond with the description.1 The supply is a supply by description even if the consumer selects the goods after they have been exposed for sale or hire.2 If goods are supplied by description and by reference to a sample or demonstration model, then the guarantees in ss 56 and 57 of the Australian Consumer Law both apply.3

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 56(1). See also Ferraro v DBN Holdings Aust Pty Ltd (t/as Sports Auto Group) [2015] FCA 1127. 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 56(2). 3 Australian Consumer Law, s 56(3).

[33.4.680] If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer by reference to a sample or demonstration model (otherwise than at auction), there are guarantees in relation to those goods.1 There is a guarantee that: (c)

the goods correspond with the sample or demonstration model in quality, state or condition; and

(d)

if the goods are supplied by reference to a sample – the consumer will have a reasonable opportunity to compare the goods with the sample; and

(e)

the goods are free from any defect that: (i)

would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample or demonstration model; and

(ii)

would cause the goods not to be of acceptable quality.2

If goods are supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model as well as by description, the guarantees in ss 56 and 57 of the Australian Consumer Law both apply.3

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 57(1). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 57(1)(c) – (e). 3 Australian Consumer Law, s 57(2).

[33.4.685] If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer (otherwise than at auction), there is a guarantee that the manufacturer of the goods “will take reasonable action to ensure that facilities for the repair of the goods, and parts for the goods, are reasonably available for a reasonable period after the goods are supplied”.1 This guarantee is not enlivened if the manufacturer took reasonable action to ensure that the consumer would be given written notice, at or before the time when the consumer agreed to the supply of the goods, that:

310

[33.4.689]

1 2

STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME

(a)

facilities for the repair of the goods would not be available or would not be available after a specified period; or

(b)

parts for the goods would not be available or would not be available after a specified period.2

Australian Consumer Law, s 58(1). Australian Consumer Law, s 58(2).

[33.4.687] If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer (otherwise than at auction), there is a guarantee that the manufacturer and the supplier of the goods will comply with any “express warranty” given or made by the manufacturer or supplier in relation to the goods.1 An express warranty is an undertaking, assertion or representation: (a)

1 2

that relates to: (i)

the quality, state, condition, performance or characteristics of the goods; or

(ii)

the provision of services that are or may at any time be required for the goods; or

(iii)

the supply of parts that are or may at any time be required for the goods; or

(iv)

the future availability of identical goods, or of goods constituting or forming part of a set of which the goods, in relation to which the undertaking, assertion or representation is given or made, form part; and

(b)

that is given or made in connection with the supply of the goods, or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of the goods; and

(c)

the natural tendency of which is to induce persons to acquire the goods.2

Australian Consumer Law, s 59. Australian Consumer Law, s 2(1) (definition of “express warranty”).

Failure to Comply with Guarantees: Action against Suppliers [33.4.689] If a supplier supplies goods, in trade or commerce, to a consumer, and a guarantee that applies to the supply under ss 54, 55, 56, 57 and 59(2) of the Australian Consumer Law is not complied with, the consumer may take action against the supplier. This is provided by s 259(1) of the Australian Consumer Law.

311

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.690]

[33.4.690] A consumer may, by action against the supplier, recover damages for any loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of the failure to comply with the guarantee if “it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure”.1 The right to recover such loss or damage does not arise if the failure to comply with the guarantee occurred only because of a cause independent of human control that occurred after the goods left the control of the supplier.2

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 259(4). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 259(5).

[33.4.691] The consumer has additional rights of action against the supplier depending on whether the failure to comply with the guarantee can be remedied and whether the failure to comply with the guarantee is a “major failure”.1 A failure to comply with a guarantee is a major failure if: (a)

the goods would not have been acquired by a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the nature and extent of the failure; or

(b)

the goods depart in one or more significant respects:

(c)

(d)

(i)

if they were supplied by description – from that description; or

(ii)

if they were supplied by reference to a sample or demonstration model – from that sample or demonstration model; or

the goods are substantially unfit for a purpose for which goods of the same kind are commonly supplied and they cannot, easily and within a reasonable time, be remedied to make them fit for such a purpose; or the goods are unfit for a disclosed purpose that was made known to: (i)

the supplier of the goods; or

(ii)

a person by whom any prior negotiations or arrangements in relation to the acquisition of the goods were conducted or made;

and they cannot, easily and within a reasonable time, be remedied to make them fit for such a purpose; or (e)

the goods are not of acceptable quality because they are unsafe.2

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 259(2), (3). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 260.

[33.4.692] If a failure to comply with a guarantee can be remedied and is not is a major failure (see [33.4.691]), the consumer may require the supplier to remedy the failure within a reasonable time.1 In that event, the supplier may remedy the failure by repairing the goods, by replacing them with goods of an identical type, or by refunding any money paid by the consumer for

312

[33.4.694]

STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME

the goods plus an amount equal to the value of any other consideration provided by the consumer for the goods.2 If the consumer requires the supplier to remedy the failure, and the supplier refuses or fails to comply with the requirement, or fails to comply with the requirement within a reasonable time, the consumer may otherwise have the failure remedied and, by action against the supplier, recover all reasonable costs incurred in having the failure so remedied.3

1 2 3

Australian Consumer Law, s 259(2)(a). Australian Consumer Law, s 261. Australian Consumer Law, s 259(2)(b)(i).

[33.4.693] If a failure to comply with a guarantee cannot be remedied or is a major failure (see [33.4.691]), the consumer may, by action against the supplier, recover compensation for any reduction in the value of the goods below the price paid or payable by the consumer for the goods. This is provided by s 259(3)(b) of the Australian Consumer Law. [33.4.694] The consumer may notify the supplier under certain circumstances that they reject the goods, providing the ground(s) for that rejection. The consumer may reject the goods under the following circumstances: (1)

a failure to comply with a guarantee is not a major failure (see [33.4.691]–[33.4.692]), and the consumer requires the supplier to remedy that failure but the supplier:

(2)

(a)

refuses or fails to comply with the requirement; or

(b)

fails to comply with the requirement within a reasonable time; or

the failure to comply with the guarantee either cannot be remedied or is a major failure.1

However, the consumer is not entitled to notify the supplier that the consumer rejects the goods if: (a)

the rejection period for the goods has ended; or

(b)

the goods have been lost, destroyed or disposed of by the consumer; or

(c)

the goods were damaged after being delivered to the consumer for reasons not related to their state or condition at the time of supply; or

(d)

the goods have been attached to, or incorporated in, any real or personal property and they cannot be detached or isolated without damaging them.2

The “rejection period” for goods is: [T]he period from the time of supply of the goods to the consumer within which it would be reasonable to expect the relevant failure to comply with a guarantee referred

313

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.694]

to in section 259(1)(b) [of the Australian Consumer Law] to become apparent having regard to: (a)

the type of goods; and

(b)

the use to which a consumer is likely to put them; and

(c)

the length of time for which it is reasonable for them to be used; and

(d)

the amount of use to which it is reasonable for them to be put before such a failure becomes apparent.3

If, under s 259 of the Australian Consumer Law, the consumer notifies the supplier of goods that the consumer rejects the goods, the consumer must return the goods to the supplier, unless the goods have already been returned to, or retrieved by, the supplier.4 If the goods cannot be returned, removed or transported without significant cost to the consumer because of the nature of the failure to comply with the guarantee to which the rejection relates, or the size, height, or method of attachment of the goods, then the consumer need not return the goods to the supplier, and the supplier must, within a reasonable time, collect the goods at the supplier’s expense.5 If, under s 259, the consumer notifies the supplier of goods that the consumer rejects the goods, the consumer may elect to receive either: (1)

a cash refund of any money paid by the consumer for the goods plus an amount equal to the value of any other consideration provided by the consumer for the goods; or

(2)

replacement goods of the same type, and of similar value, if such goods are reasonably available to the supplier, and the supplier must comply with the consumer’s election.6

Property in the rejected goods revests in the supplier on notification of the rejection.7

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 259(2)(b)(ii), (3)(a). See also Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Mandurvit Pty Ltd [2014] ATPR 42-471; [2014] FCA 464. 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 262(1). 3 Australian Consumer Law, s 262(2). 4 Australian Consumer Law, s 263(2)(a). 5 Australian Consumer Law, s 263(2)(b), (3). 6 Australian Consumer Law, s 263(4), (5). 7 Australian Consumer Law, s 263(6). For other adjustments consequent on rejection, see ss 264 – 266.

314

[33.4.696]

Failure

STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME

to

Comply

with Guarantees: Manufacturers

Action

against

[33.4.695] If the guarantee of acceptable quality under s 54 of the Australian Consumer Law applies to a supply of goods to a consumer and the guarantee is not complied with, an affected person in relation to the goods may, by action against the manufacturer of the goods, recover damages from the manufacturer.1 The action for damages is not available if the guarantee was not complied with only because of: (a)

an act, default or omission of, or any representation made by, any person other than the manufacturer or an employee or agent of the manufacturer; or

(b)

a cause independent of human control that occurred after the goods left the control of the manufacturer; or

(c)

the fact that the price charged by the supplier was higher than the manufacturer’s recommended retail price, or the average retail price, for the goods.2

If an affected person in relation to the goods has, in accordance with an express warranty given or made by the manufacturer of the goods, required the manufacturer to remedy a failure to comply with the guarantee of acceptable quality by repairing the goods or by replacing the goods with goods of an identical type, the affected person is not entitled to recover damages under s 272(1)(a) of the Australian Consumer Law for any reduction in the value of the goods, unless the manufacturer has refused or failed to remedy the failure within a reasonable time.3

1 2 3

Australian Consumer Law, s 271(1). Australian Consumer Law, s 271(2). Australian Consumer Law, s 271(6).

[33.4.696] A person may recover damages from the manufacturer of goods supplied to them if a description was applied to the goods and that description was not complied with.1 The action for damages is not available if the guarantee was not complied with only because of: (a)

an act, default or omission of any person other than the manufacturer or an employee or agent of the manufacturer; or

(b)

a cause independent of human control that occurred after the goods left the control of the manufacturer.2

If an affected person in relation to the goods has, in accordance with an express warranty given or made by the manufacturer of the goods, required the manufacturer to remedy a failure to comply with the guarantee that the goods will correspond with the description by which they were sold by repairing the goods or by replacing the goods with goods of an identical type, the affected 315

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.696]

person is not entitled to recover damages under s 272(1)(a) of the Australian Consumer Law for any reduction in the value of the goods unless the manufacturer has refused or failed to remedy the failure within a reasonable period of time.3

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 271(3): If “(a) a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods by description to a consumer; and (b) the description was applied to the goods by or on behalf of the manufacturer of the goods, or with the express or implied consent of the manufacturer; and (c) the guarantee … [that the goods will correspond with the description by which they were sold under s 56 of the Australian Consumer Law] applies to the supply and is not complied with; an affected person in relation to the goods may, by action against the manufacturer of the goods, recover damages from the manufacturer”. 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 271(4). 3 Australian Consumer Law, s 271(6).

[33.4.697] If the guarantee as to repairs and spare parts under s 58 of the Australian Consumer Law or the guarantee as to express warranties under s 59(1) applies to a supply of goods to a consumer and the guarantee is not complied with, an affected person in relation to the goods may, by action against the manufacturer of the goods, recover damages from the manufacturer.1 If an affected person in relation to the goods has, in accordance with an express warranty given or made by the manufacturer of the goods, required the manufacturer to remedy a failure to comply with the guarantee as to repairs and spare parts or as to express warranties by repairing the goods or by replacing the goods with goods of an identical type, the affected person is not entitled to recover damages under s 272(1)(a) of the Australian Consumer Law for any reduction in the value of the goods, unless the manufacturer has refused or failed to remedy the failure within a reasonable time.2

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 271(5). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 271(6).

[33.4.698] Subject to s 271(6) of the Australian Consumer Law, an affected person in relation to the goods taking action against a manufacturer under s 271 of the Australian Consumer Law is entitled to recover certain specified damages. The affected person may recover damages for: (a)

(b)

any reduction in the value of the goods, resulting from the failure to comply with the guarantee to which the action relates, below whichever of the following prices is lower: (i)

the price paid or payable by the consumer for the goods;

(ii)

the average retail price of the goods at the time of supply; and

any loss or damage suffered by the affected person because of the failure to 316

[33.4.710]

STATUTORY GUARANTEE REGIME

comply with the guarantee to which the action relates if it was reasonably foreseeable that the affected person would suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.1

The reasonably foreseeable loss or damage recoverable under para (b) above is taken to include the cost of inspecting and returning the goods to the manufacturer,2 and does not include loss or damage suffered through a reduction in the value of the goods.3

1 2 3

Australian Consumer Law, s 272(1). Australian Consumer Law, s 272(2). Australian Consumer Law, s 272(3).

[33.4.700] An action against a manufacturer or importer under s 271 of the Australian Consumer Law must be commenced within three years after the day on which the affected person first became aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, that the guarantee to which the action relates had not been complied with. This time limit is stipulated by s 273 of the Australian Consumer Law.

Failure to Comply with Guarantees: Action by Suppliers against Manufacturers [33.4.710] Section 274(1) of the Australian Consumer Law specifies the circumstances under which the manufacturer of goods is liable to indemnify the supplier. The manufacturer is liable to indemnify the supplier if: (1)

a supplier of goods is liable to pay damages to a consumer under s 259(4) of the Australian Consumer Law for reasonably foreseeable loss or damage suffered by the consumer; and

(2)

the manufacturer is or would be liable under s 271 to pay damages to the consumer for the same loss or damage.

The liability arises if the supplier incurs costs because the supplier is liable under Pt 5-4 of the Australian Consumer Law for a failure to comply with: (1)

a guarantee of acceptable quality under s 54 of the Australian Consumer Law;

(2)

a guarantee as to fitness for purpose under s 55 in relation to a disclosed purpose made known to the manufacturer; or

(3)

a guarantee that the goods will correspond with the description by which they were sold under s 56 in relation to a description that was applied to the goods by or on behalf of the manufacturer of the goods, or with the express or implied consent of the manufacturer.1

317

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.710]

The supplier may commence action against the manufacturer in a court of competent jurisdiction for such relief as the supplier could have obtained if the liability of the manufacturer had arisen under a contract of indemnity made between them.2 The action must be commenced within three years of the earlier of the day on which the supplier discharged its liability to the consumer, or the day on which the consumer commenced proceedings against the supplier.3

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 274(2). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 274(3). 3 Australian Consumer Law, s 274(4).

[33.4.715] The liability of a manufacturer to a supplier under s 274 of the Australian Consumer Law is limited where the goods are not of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.1 In that event, the liability of the manufacturer is limited to a liability to pay to the supplier: [A]n amount equal to: (a)

the cost of replacing the goods; or

(b)

the cost of obtaining equivalent goods; or

(c)

the cost of having the goods repaired;

whichever is the lowest amount.2

The limitation does not apply if the supplier establishes that it is not fair and reasonable for the manufacturer to rely on it.3 In determining whether it is fair and reasonable for the manufacturer to rely on the limitation, the court is to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the availability of suitable alternative sources of supply of the goods, the availability of equivalent goods and whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the supplier.4 The limitation applies subject to the terms of any contract between the manufacturer and the supplier that would impose a greater liability on the manufacturer than the liability mentioned in s 276A of the Australian Consumer Law.5

1 2 3 4 5

Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian

Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer

Law, Law, Law, Law, Law,

s s s s s

276A(1). 276A(1). 276A(2). 276A(3). 276A(4).

[33.4.720] A term of a contract is void if it purports to exclude, restrict or modify, or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying the application of any or all of the provisions of Pt 5-4 of the Australian 318

[33.4.730]

AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5

Consumer Law, or the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision or the liability of a person in relation to failure to comply with a guarantee that applies under Pt 3-2 Div 1 of the Australian Consumer Law.1 A term is not taken to exclude, restrict or vary the application of a provision of Pt 5-4 unless it does so expressly, or is inconsistent with the provision.2

1 2

Australian Consumer Law, s 276(1). Australian Consumer Law, s 276(2).

Australian Consumer Law Pt 3-5 [33.4.730] Part 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law provides a code of product liability law under which manufacturers of defective products are liable to compensate for loss caused by or resulting from a safety defect. Its predecessor, Pt VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), was based on the European Union Community Council Directive on product liability.1 Variants of the Directive have been adopted in the United Kingdom2 and in 12 other European countries. The manner in which the various derivatives of the Directive have been applied has been the subject of considerable academic speculation.3 The Second Reading Speech for Pt VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 indicated that the intention of Pt VA was that manufacturers and importers of goods would be strictly liable for defects in those goods.4 The few court decisions on the area indicate that courts are prepared to give effect to that intention.5

1

2 3

Council of the European Union, Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC, 25 July 1985) (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu, viewed 4 May 2016). See Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK). See Whittaker S, “The EEC Directive on Product Liability” (1985) 5 YB Eur L 233; Stapleton J, “Products Liability Reform – Real or Illusory?” (1986) 6 Oxford J Legal Stud 392; Cardwell K, “The Consumer Protection Act 1987: Enforcement of Provisions Governing the Safety of Consumer Goods” (1987) 50 Mod LR 622; Newdick C, “The Future of Negligence in Product Liability” (1987) 103 LQR 288; de Val Griffiths P and Dormer RJ, “Developments in English Product Liability Law: A Comparison with the American System” (1988) 62 Tul L Rev 353; Tettenborn AM, “Maritime Consumers? – The Consumer Protection Act and Shipping Law” [1988] LMCLQ 211; Whittaker S, “European Product Liability and Intellectual Products” (1989) 105 LQR 125; Hondius EH, “The Impact of the Products Liability Directive on Legal Development and Consumer Protection in Western Europe” (1989) 4 Cant LR 34; Stoppa A, “The Concept of Defectiveness in the Consumer Protection Act 1987: A Critical Analysis” (1992) 12 Oxford J Legal Stud 210; Malkin IR, “Product

319

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

4

5

[33.4.730]

Liability under the Trade Practices Act: Adequately Compensating for Personal Injury?” (1993) 1 TLJ 63; Stapleton J, “A Personal Evaluation of the Implementation of the EEC Directive (85/374/EEC) on Products Liability” (1993) 1 TLJ 90; Travers RC, “Australia’s New Product Liability Law” (1993) 67 ALJ 516; Arenson KJ, “The Evolution of Products Liability in Australia: A Critical Analysis” (1994) 2 TPLJ 4; Kellam J, “Liability of Manufacturers and Importers for Defective Products in Australia under Part VA of the Trade Practices Act” [1994] Consum LJ 87; Boas G, “Part VA of the Trade Practices Act: A Failure to Adequately Reform Product Liability Law in Australia” (1994) 6 Bond LR 112; Harland D, “The Influence of European Law on Product Liability in Australia” (1995) 17 Syd LR 336; Howells GG, “The New Product Liability Law: The Relevance of European and United Kingdom Reforms for the Development of the Australian Law” (1996) 4 CCLJ 102; Kellam J and O’Keefe R, “A Representational Theory of Product Liability under Part V and Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)” (1996) 4 TPLJ 4; Dutson S, “International Product Liability Litigation: The Territorial Application of Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and Part 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK)” (1996) 22 Mon LR 244; Stapleton J, Product Liability (Butt, 1994); Stapleton J, “The Conceptual Imprecision of ‘Strict’ Product Liability” (1998) 6 TLJ 260; Hammond M, “The Defect Test in Part VA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): Defectively Designed?” (1998) 6 TLJ 29; Harland D, “Product Liability under Pt VA of the Trade Practices Act” (2001) 9 CCLJ 31; Twigg-Flesner C, “An Overview of Product Liability Litigation in the English Courts” (2002) 13 APLR 37; Barrett EJ, “ECJ Unscrambles Salmonella Product Liability Claim” (2006) 17 Australian Product Liability Reporter 23; Mildred M, “Putting a Product into Circulation: Uncertainties Unresolved by European Court of Justice” (2006) 17 APLR 45. Senator Tate, Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs, “Second Reading Speech: Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992”, Senate, Debates, 26 May 1992, Vol 152, p 2661 (available from http://www.aph.gov.au, viewed 4 May 2016). Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1998) 90 FCR 40 (FC) (caustic soda defectively labelled); Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436 (CA) (sleeping bag with defective elastic attachment); A v National Blood Authority (No 1) [2001] 3 All ER 289 (QBD) (blood contaminated with the hepatitis C virus). Note that the English decisions pay regard to factors arising from the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Community. Those factors do not necessarily carry weight in Australia. See also Thomas v Southcorp Australia Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 34.

[33.4.740] A manufacturer of goods is liable to compensate for loss if the manufacturer supplies goods in trade or commerce, the goods have a safety defect, and because of the defect, an individual suffers injuries or dies, or certain types of property are destroyed or damaged.1 The manufacturer is liable to compensate: (1)

an individual who suffers injuries or dies because of the safety defect;2

(2)

a person, other than the individual who suffers injuries because of the safety defect, suffers loss because of the injuries or death of that individual, provided that the loss does not come about because of a business relationship between the person and that individual;3

320

[33.4.743]

AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5

(3)

a person who, because of the safety defect, suffers loss as a result of the destruction of, or damage to, other goods of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption (not being the defective goods), if that person used or consumed, intended to use or consume, the destroyed or damaged goods;4 or

(4)

a person who, because of the defect, suffers loss as a result of destruction of or damage to land, buildings or fixtures ordinarily acquired for private use, where that person used or intended to use the land, buildings or fixtures for private use.5

1

2

3 4

5

Australian Consumer Law, Pt 3-5. An emission from a smoke stack is not supplied by the manufacturer, is not supplied in trade or commerce and is not defective: Cook v Pasminco Ltd (2000) 99 FCR 548; [2000] FCA 677. Australian Consumer Law, s 138. For decisions under Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 75AD (the predecessor provision), see Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853 (mechanical heart valve); Gliderol International Pty Ltd v Skerbic (2009) 170 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 16 (a garage roller door). Australian Consumer Law, s 139. Australian Consumer Law, s 140. For a decision under Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 75AF (the predecessor provision), see Thomas v Southcorp Australia Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 34 (gas-operated heater). Australian Consumer Law, s 141. For a decision under Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 75AG (the predecessor provision), see Thomas v Southcorp Australia Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 34 (gas-operated heater).

[33.4.743] Goods have a safety defect if their safety is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.1 The Australian Consumer Law provides that: In determining the extent of the safety of goods, regard is to be given to all relevant circumstances, including: (a)

the manner in which, and the purposes for which, they have been marketed; and

(b)

their packaging; and

(c)

the use of any mark in relation to them; and

(d)

any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing, or refraining from doing, anything with or in relation to them; and

(e)

what might reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to them; and

(f)

the time when they were supplied by their manufacturer.2

An inference that the goods have a safety defect is not to be made only because of the fact that, after they were supplied by the manufacturer, safer goods of the same type were supplied.3 Nor is an inference that the goods have a safety defect to be made only because there was compliance with a Commonwealth

321

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.743]

mandatory standard for the goods, and the standard was not the safest possible standard having regard to the latest state of scientific or technical knowledge when the goods were supplied by their manufacturer.4 A Commonwealth mandatory standard, in relation to goods, means a mandatory standard in respect of the goods imposed by a law of the Commonwealth.5

1 2 3 4 5

Australian Consumer Law, s 9(1). Australian Consumer Law, s 9(2). Australian Consumer Law, s 9(3). Australian Consumer Law, s 9(4). Australian Consumer Law, s 2(1) (definition of “Commonwealth mandatory standard”).

[33.4.746] The standard imposed by the definition that goods have a safety defect if their safety is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect (see [33.4.743]) is an objective standard.1 The standard is based on what the public at large, rather than any particular individual, is entitled to expect.2 The extent of safety of goods must be determined having regard to all relevant circumstances. The presence of one or more of the factors listed in s 9(2) of the Australian Consumer Law (see [33.4.743]) is not essential for a finding that goods have a safety defect, nor does the absence of any or all of those factors preclude a finding of defectiveness.3 The standard does not require that goods be free of risk.4 For example, it is acknowledged that certain pharmaceuticals and vaccines have unavoidable side effects. The occurrence of a side effect does not, by itself, mean that a product is defective.5 Intermediaries, including doctors and pharmacists, can be expected to provide consumers with information about complex products like drugs and pharmaceuticals, and a product may, in an appropriate case, be regarded as meeting the relevant standard when information about the risks of its use has been conveyed to the intermediaries and not to the end-users.6 Moreover, the community has limited expectations of “inherently dangerous products” including tobacco, guns and knives, and must accept a degree of risk from their use.7

1 Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1998) 90 FCR 40 (affirming Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd (1998) 40 IPR 619 (CA)); Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [186]. 2 Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [186]; McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Co [2014] QSC 34, Peter Lyons J at [211].

322

[33.4.750]

3 4

5 6 7

AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5

Morris v Alcon Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-923; [2003] FCA 151. Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1998) 90 FCR 40; Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [186]. Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [188]. Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [189]. Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum at [22].

[33.4.750] A person who is not the manufacturer of goods may nevertheless be deemed to be their manufacturer. Circumstances when this will occur are where: (1)

the person grows, extracts, produces, processes or assembles the goods;1

(2)

the person holds themselves out to the public as the manufacturer of the goods;2

(3)

the person causes or permits the person’s name, a name by which the person carries on business, or the person’s brand or mark to be applied to the goods;3

(4)

the person causes or permits another person, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods by that other person, or in connection with the promotion by that other person of the supply or use of the goods, to hold out the first person to the public as the manufacturer of the goods;4

(5)

the person imports the goods into Australia and, at the time of the importation, the manufacturer of the goods does not have a place of business in Australia;5 or

(5)

a person who does not know who manufactured the goods, and wishes to take action in respect of defective goods, requests the supplier of the goods to identify the manufacturer of the goods or the supplier of the goods, and the supplier fails to comply within 30 days of the request being made.6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian

Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer

Law, Law, Law, Law, Law, Law,

s s s s s s

7(1)(a). 7(1)(b). 7(1)(c), (2). 7(1)(d). 7(1)(e), (3). 147.

323

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.780]

[33.4.780] Four defences are available to manufacturers and deemed manufacturers of defective goods, but they bear the onus of proving those defences. In order to make out the defences, a manufacturer or deemed manufacturer must prove that: (1)

the safety defect that is alleged to have caused loss or damage did not exist at the time when the goods were supplied by the actual manufacturer1 – except in the case of electricity, where the relevant time is the time at which the electricity was generated, being a time before it was transmitted or distributed;2

(2)

the state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time when the goods were supplied by their manufacturer was not such as to enable the safety defect to be discovered;3

(3)

the goods were comprised in other goods and the safety defect in them was attributable only to the design of the other goods, to the markings on or accompanying the other goods, or to the instructions or warnings given by the manufacturer of the other goods;4 or

(4)

the goods had the safety defect only because there was compliance with a mandatory standard for them.5

A “mandatory standard” is a standard for goods or anything relating to goods and that, under a law of the Commonwealth, a state or a territory, must be complied with when the goods are supplied by their manufacturer, carrying a penalty for non-compliance. Unlike most standards, which may be complied with by meeting a higher standard, a mandatory standard is one which will be breached if a lower or higher standard is achieved.6 For the special considerations affecting Commonwealth mandatory standards, see [33.4.790].

1 2 3

4 5 6

Australian Consumer Law, s 142(a)(ii). The defence failed in Effem Foods Ltd v Nicholls [2004] ATPR 42-034; [2004] NSWCA 332 (Snickers bar). Australian Consumer Law, s 142(a)(i). Australian Consumer Law, s 142(c). This is the so-called “state of the art” defence. For criticism of the corresponding United Kingdom provision, which is worded slightly differently, see Newdick C, “The Development Risk Defence of the Consumer Protection Act 1987” (1988) CLJ 455; Newdick C, “Risk, Uncertainty and ‘Knowledge’ in the Development Risk Defence” (1991) 20 Anglo-Am L Rev 309. A defence on this ground was upheld in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2000) 102 FCR 307; 109 LGERA 1; [2000] FCA 1099 (later reversed in part but on other grounds in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54). Australian Consumer Law, s 142(d). Australian Consumer Law, s 142(b). Australian Consumer Law, s 2(1) (definition of “mandatory standard”).

324

[33.4.790]

AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5

[33.4.785] Persons bringing a claim under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law need only prove the existence of: a safety defect in the goods; the fact of injury and loss; and causation.1 In order to prove causation, applicants must show that they suffered injury or loss “because of” the defect. This notion may be contrasted with the common law notion of causation.2 There is conflicting authority in relation of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 as to whether the different words used in that Act signify that the test of causation in the competition and consumer legislation is different from the common law test.3 Applicants do not need to prove that the goods were defective when they left the manufacturer.4 It is a defence if the goods did not have a defect when they left the manufacturer, but manufacturers who wish to set up this defence bear the onus of proving it.5 In considering the elements of an applicant’s claim under Pt 3-5, there is no reason in principle why a court could not proceed by inference from the proved facts.6

1 2 3

4

5 6

Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [191]. Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [192]–[195]. Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1987) 16 FCR 410, Gummow J at 418; Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514; 66 ALJR 839, Deane J at 542 (CLR); Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [192]–[195]. Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [190]–[191]; Batchelder v Holden Ltd [2009] VSC 29, Beach J at [16]. Australian Consumer Law, s 142; Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 42-014; [2004] FCA 853, Kiefel J at [191]. Morris v Alcon Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-923; [2003] FCA 151, Nicholson J at [23].

[33.4.790] Where goods are defective only because they complied with a Commonwealth mandatory standard (see [33.4.743]), the person against whom a defective goods action has been brought may seek to transfer liability to the Commonwealth. In addition to the defence available to the manufacturer of the goods, the Commonwealth is liable to the plaintiff in place of the manufacturer if a court finds that the plaintiff would have succeeded against the manufacturer but for the defence of the goods having the defect only because they complied with a Commonwealth mandatory standard.1 A manufacturer seeking to transfer liability to the Commonwealth in this way must, as soon as possible after raising the Commonwealth mandatory standard defence, serve on the Commonwealth a prescribed notice of the action and of that defence together with a copy of the defence itself.2 The serving of the notice and defence makes the Commonwealth a defendant in the action.3 If the

325

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.790]

Commonwealth mandatory standard defence succeeds, the Commonwealth, and not the manufacturer, is liable to compensate the plaintiff, and judgment is entered accordingly.4 Costs are at the discretion of the court.5

1 2 3 4 5

Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian

Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer

Law, Law, Law, Law, Law,

s s s s s

148(3). 148(1)(a), (b). 148(2). 148(3)(a), (b). 148(3)(c).

[33.4.800] Damages may be reduced where loss or damage is caused both by a defect of goods and an act or omission of an individual or a person who suffers an injury1 or loss or damage:2 see [33.4.740]. The amount of the loss is reduced to the extent that a court thinks fit (which may be to nil), having regard to the individual’s or person’s share in causing the loss or damage.3 In this regard, the act or omission of an individual or a person includes the act or omission of others for whom the individual or person is responsible.4

1 Competition ss 138, 139. 2 Competition ss 140, 141. 3 Competition 4 Competition

and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 137A; Australian Consumer Law, and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 137A; Australian Consumer Law, and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 137A. and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 137A(1)(a)(ii), (2)(a)(ii).

[33.4.810] Manufacturers may be jointly and severally liable. If two or more manufacturers are liable to a consumer for the same loss or damage caused by defective goods,1 they are jointly and severally liable.2

1 Australian Consumer Law, ss 138, 139, 140, 141. 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 144.

[33.4.815] In addition to its ordinary meaning,1 the term “goods” is defined in s 2(1) of the Australian Consumer Law. It includes: (a)

ships,2 aircraft and other vehicles; and

(b)

animals, including fish; and

(c)

minerals, trees and crops, whether on, under or attached to land or not; and

(d)

gas and electricity; and

(e)

computer software; and

326

[33.4.820]

1

2 3

AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5

(f)

second hand goods; and

(g)

any component part of, or accessory to, goods.3

For analysis of the impact of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Pt VA (the predecessor to Australian Consumer Law, Pt 3-5) on intellectual products such as books and software, see Whittaker S, “European Product Liability and Intellectual Products” (1989) 105 LQR 125; on pharmaceuticals, see Newdick C, “Strict Liability for Defective Drugs in the Pharmaceutical Industry” (1985) 101 LQR 405; on blood and blood products, see Bastianon MP, “AIDS and the Blood Bank: The Argument for Strict Liability Exemption” (1992) 11 U Tas LR 191. See Tettenborn AM, “Maritime Consumers? – The Consumer Protection Act and Shipping Law” [1988] LMCLQ 211. Australian Consumer Law, s 2(1) (definition of “goods”).

[33.4.820] Commencement of proceedings to recover compensation for defective goods under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law is subject to procedural limitations. A defective goods action may be commenced at any time within three years after the time the plaintiff became aware, or ought reasonably to have become aware, of the alleged loss or damage, the safety defect and the identity of the person who manufactured the goods.1 However, action must be commenced within 10 years after the manufacturer supplied the goods that are the subject of the action.2 It is not clear whether and if so how the limitations provisions contained in Pt VIB Div 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) apply to liability actions brought under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law. There appear to be inconsistencies between the limitation provisions found in Pt VIB Div 2 and the limitation provision applying specifically to liability actions under Pt 3-5, found in s 143 of the Australian Consumer Law (previously s 75AO of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)). In particular, it is not necessary to prove a contravention of the Australian Consumer Law to make out a liability action under Pt 3-5 despite what both s 87G(1)(b) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and Kay v Murray Irrigation Ltd [2009] NSWSC 14113 appear to suggest. To the extent that there is an inconsistency between the legislative provisions, it appears the preferable course is to apply s 143 of the Australian Consumer Law to liability actions brought under Pt 3-5. Although Pt VIB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, in its previous incarnation as Pt VIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974, was a later amendment than s 75AO of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and may be taken to have impliedly overridden s 75AO (now s 143 of the Australian Consumer Law) to the extent of any inconsistency, s 143 is specific to Pt 3-5 and better reflects the elements that must be proved to make out a liability action under Pt 3-5. Actions by persons who suffer loss due to the injury or death of other individuals injured by goods with a safety defect are covered in s 138 of the Australian Consumer Law. State and territory laws about the survival of causes

327

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

[33.4.820]

of action vested in persons who die apply to actions under s 138, s 139, s 140 or s 141.4

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 143(1). See Kay v Murray Irrigation Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1411. 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 143(2). 3 Kay v Murray Irrigation Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1411, Fullerton J at [12]–[13]. 4 Australian Consumer Law, s 145.

[33.4.830] Remedies provided under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law are in addition to other rights and remedies. The Australian Consumer Law is not intended to exclude or limit the concurrent operation of any law, written or unwritten, of a state or territory,1 nor is the Australian Consumer Law to be taken to limit, restrict or otherwise affect any right or remedy that a person would have had if it had not been enacted.2 Where a plaintiff succeeds in establishing an entitlement to compensation under Pt 3-5 and to some other remedy, for example, damages for breach of contract or in tort, the preferable view, until determined conclusively by the High Court, is that the entitlements are alternatives, so that the plaintiff must elect which remedy will be taken before final judgment is entered.3

1 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 131C(1). 2 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 131C(4). 3 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (Oyster Case) (2002) 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 125 LGERA 1; [2002] HCA 54, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [130]. See also Newmarket Corp Pty Ltd v Kee-Vee Properties Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 157, McLure J at [335]; Laws v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 53; [2007] NSWSC 316, Rothman J at [191]; Gliderol International Pty Ltd v Skerbic (2009) 170 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 16, the Court at [69]–[71].

[33.4.840] Any term of a contract that purports to exclude, restrict or modify the application of all or any of the provisions of Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law, the exercise of a right conferred under Pt 3-5, or any liability under Pt 3-5, is void.1 A term of a contract is not to be taken to exclude, restrict or modify the application of a provision of Pt 3-5 unless it does so expressly or is inconsistent with the provision.2

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 150(1). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 150(2).

[33.4.850] The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) may commence a defective goods action under s 138, s 139, s 140

328

[33.4.860]

AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW PT 3-5

or s 141 of the Australian Consumer Law on behalf of one or more persons (identified in the application to commence the action) who have suffered loss or damage.1 Such an action may not be commenced unless the ACCC has obtained the written consent of the person, or each of the persons on whose behalf the application is being made.2

1

2

Australian Consumer Law, s 149(1). For such a case, see Glendale Chemical Products Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (1998) 90 FCR 40 (FC). Australian Consumer Law, s 149(2).

[33.4.860] An action under Pt 3-5 of the Australian Consumer Law may be brought in the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Circuit Court,1 but not in state and territory courts.2 Matters arising under Pt 3-5 may be transferred from the Federal Court to the Federal Circuit Court,3 but not from the Federal Court to the Family Court, nor to any state or territory court.4 Where an action under Pt 3-5 is instituted in or transferred to the Federal Circuit Court, that Court does not have jurisdiction to award an amount for loss or damage in excess of $750,000 or any other amount specified by the Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth).5

1 2

3 4

5

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 138, 138A. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 138B(2)(b). The Competition and Consumer Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2015 (Cth), which was before the House of Representatives prior to the Parliament’s proroguing in May 2016, proposed to repeal s 138(2)(b) and allow actions under Pt 3-5 to be brought in state and territory courts. Whether this Bill will be reintroduced in the next Parliament is unknown as of 19 May 2016. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 138A; see also Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 32AB. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 138C(3)(b), 138E(1)(b)(ii). The Competition and Consumer Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2015 (Cth), which was before the House of Representatives prior to the Parliament’s proroguing in May 2016, proposed to repeal ss 138C(3) and 138E(1)(b) and allow actions under Pt 3-5 to be transferred to state and territory courts. Whether this Bill will be reintroduced in the next Parliament is unknown as of 19 May 2016. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 138A(2).

329

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND MANUFACTURERS

330

[33.4.860]

Misleading or Deceptive Conduct and Unfair Practices Australian Consumer Law Pts 2-1 and 3-1 [33.4.970] A “person” may be liable if product-related loss or damage results from the person’s misleading or deceptive conduct, or from false or misleading representations about goods. The general prohibition against a person,1 in trade or commerce, engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive2 is reinforced by a specific prohibition which applies in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods, or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of the goods. Under this prohibition, a person may not falsely represent that goods are of a particular standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style or model, or have a particular history or particular previous use.3 The general prohibition is further reinforced by a prohibition against persons, in trade or commerce, engaging in conduct that is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or the quantity of any goods.4 Misleading or deceptive conduct is explored in greater detail elsewhere.5

1

2 3 4

5

Note that individuals and corporations are liable under the Australian Consumer Law (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2) where it operates as a law of a State or Territory; on the other hand, only corporations are generally liable under the Australian Consumer Law where it operates as a law of the Commonwealth, although the extended application provisions can widen its reach: Competition and Consumer Act 2010, ss 6, 131. See Unfair Dealing “Cause of Action” [35.1.190]–[35.1.260]; “Unconscionable Conduct and Consumer Protection Legislation” [35.9.1090]. Australian Consumer Law, s 18(1). See Australian Consumer Law, s 29(1)(a). Australian Consumer Law, s 33. This section applies to individuals as well as to corporations. The constitutional validity of the section (formerly Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 55) rests on Australia’s notification of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967) 828 UNTS 305; [1972] ATS 12 (as revised in Brussels, 14 December 1900; Washington, 2 June 1911; The Hague, 6 November 1925; London, 2 June 1934; Lisbon, 31 October 1958; Stockholm, 14 July 1967). See Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff; see also Unfair Dealing “Unconscionable Dealing” [35.9.10]ff.

331

MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT AND UNFAIR PRACTICES

[33.4.980]

[33.4.980] Damages for product-related loss or damage may be recovered from any person involved in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of ss 18 or 29(1)(a) of the Australian Consumer Law.1 The action must be commenced within six years after the day on which the cause of action that relates to the conduct accrued.2

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 236(1). See also Unfair Dealing “Remedies” [35.4.10]ff. For cases in which the cause of action was argued successfully, see Golden West Refining Corp Ltd v Daly Laboratories Pty Ltd [1995] ATPR 41-378 (FCA); Hampic Pty Ltd v Adams [2000] ATPR 41-737; [1999] NSWCA 455; Gibbett v Forwood Products Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 290; Readymix Holdings International Pty Ltd v Wieland Process Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1480. For cases in which the cause of action was argued unsuccessfully, see Minchillo v Lanes Ford Trucks Pty Ltd [1992] ASC 56-156 (VSC) (approved on appeal in Minchillo v Ford Motor Co of Australia Ltd [1995] 2 VR 594 (FC)); Crago v Multiquip Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-620 (FCA); Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg AG (No 4) (2009) 255 ALR 632; [2009] FCA 522. For cases where product presentation or advertisement were held to contravene Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 52, 53(a) (the predecessors to Australian Consumer Law, ss 18, 29(1)(a)), see: Hartnell v Sharp Corp of Australia Pty Ltd (1975) 5 ALR 493 (IRCA) (microwave ovens); Given v Snuffa Pty Ltd [1978] ATPR 40-083 (FCA) (fire extinguishers); Temperley v Playground Supplies Pty Ltd (1980) 3 TPR 506 (FCA) (children’s car seats); Barton v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 95 (FC) (toys); Gardam v Splendid Enterprises Pty Ltd (1987) 33 A Crim R 123 (FCA) (children’s pyjamas); Gardam v George Wills & Co Ltd (1988) 82 ALR 415 (FCA) (children’s pyjamas); Crocodile Marketing Ltd v Griffıth Vintners Pty Ltd (1989) 28 NSWLR 539 (alcohol and other content of wine); Narhex Australia Pty Ltd v Sunspot Products Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 535 (FCA) (wrinkle creams); Munro v Tooheys Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 74 (low-alcohol beer); Commissioner for Fair Trading (NSW) v Microwave Safe Australia Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 287. 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 236(2).

332

Product Recall and Safety Standards Product Recall [33.4.1100] Suppliers are under a duty to warn of any dangerous characteristics of consumer goods discovered after supply and, in some circumstances, to recall those goods.1 If, after supplying the goods, the supplier learns that the goods have a dangerous characteristic of which consumers of the goods are not or may not be aware, the supplier may be under a duty to institute a recall of the goods. The duty arises under the law of negligence:2 see [33.4.330]–[33.4.520]. The relevant Minister may require the supplier to recall the goods (see [33.4.1120]) or to disclose to or inform the public of the dangerous characteristics of the goods where: (1)

it appears to the Minister that the goods are of a kind which will or may cause injury to any person;

(2)

it appears to the Minister that a reasonably foreseeable use (including a misuse) of the goods will or may cause injury to any person;

(3)

there is a safety standard in force for the goods, and the goods do not comply with that standard (see [33.4.1170]); or

(4)

an interim or permanent ban on the goods is in force; and

(5)

it appears to the Minister that the supplier has not taken satisfactory action to prevent the goods from causing injury to any person:3 see [33.4.1150].

The Minister, therefore, has a reserve power to order a product recall if the supplier of the goods fails to take appropriate action. The Federal Court also has power to order the recall of goods sold in contravention of a prescribed product safety standard: see [33.4.1170]. The supplier of consumer goods found, after supply, to have a dangerous characteristic of which consumers of the goods are not, or may not be aware, is under a duty4 which arises when the supplier “acquires knowledge of the danger involved or as soon as it becomes aware of the defect and the potential danger attendant thereto”.5 In the British Columbia Supreme Court case of Cominco Ltd v Westinghouse Canada Ltd (1981) 127 DLR (3d) 544, the defendant was held to be under a duty to warn that electrical cable supplied by it was a fire hazard when laid near other cables. This hazard was not known when the cable was originally supplied. The duty arose later, when the defendant became aware of the hazard.

333

PRODUCT RECALL AND SAFETY STANDARDS

[33.4.1100]

If the circumstances are such that the supplier’s duty is to do more than simply warn of the dangerous characteristic6 (see [33.4.400]–[33.4.420]), the duty may extend to instituting a recall of the goods. A product recall is thus one of the range of possible actions which a supplier may take to discharge the duty of care placed on it by the discovery of a dangerous characteristic in a product previously supplied by it. In Walton v British Leyland UK Ltd (unreported, UKHC, Willis J, 12 July 1978), the plaintiffs were injured when the rear wheel bearing of the car in which they were travelling collapsed. It was held that the car manufacturers had known of the defect in the wheel bearings (which could be remedied by fitting a safety washer), but had taken no action to recall the cars affected. Willis J held that this was a breach of duty: In my view, the duty of care owed by Leylands to the public was to make a clean breast of the problem and recall all cars which they could in order that the safety washers could be fitted.7

A supplier must give the Minister written notice within two days if they: (1)

become aware of the death, serious injury or illness of any person; and

(2)

consider (or become aware that someone else considers) that this was, or may have been, caused by the use or foreseeable misuse of the consumer goods.8

Notice is not required if: (1)

it is clear that the death, serious injury or illness was not caused by the use or foreseeable misuse of the consumer goods;

(2)

it is very unlikely that the death, serious injury or illness was caused by the use or foreseeable misuse of the consumer goods; or

(3)

notice is required to be given in accordance with another law or industry code of practice as specified in the regulations.9

1 Australian Consumer Law, ss 122, 123 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2). 2 See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See also Pryles M, “Product Recalls in Australia” (1995) 69 ALJ 211. 3 Australian Consumer Law, s 122. 4 Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works [1974] SCR 1189; (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 530, Ritchie J at 536, 542 (DLR (3d)) (Fauteaux CJ, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Spence and Pigeon JJ concurring); Cominco Ltd v Westinghouse Canada Ltd (1981) 127 DLR (3d) 544 (BCSC), Bouck J at 554, 570–571; Braniff Airways Inc v Curtiss-Wright Corp 411 F 2d 451 (1969), Hays CJ at 453; Comstock v General Motors Corp, 99 NW 2d 627 (1959), Edwards J at 634–635 (Dethmers CJ, Carr, Kelly, Smith, Black, Voelker and Davanagh JJ concurring); Walton v British Leyland UK Ltd (unreported, UKHC, Willis J, 12 July 1978); Hollis v Birch [1995] 4 SCR 634; (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 609, La Forest J at 618 (DLR (4th)) (L’Heureaux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ concurring).

334

[33.4.1120]

5 6 7

8 9

PRODUCT RECALL

Cominco Ltd v Westinghouse Canada Ltd (1981) 127 DLR (3d) 544 (BCSC), Bouck J at 571. Norton Australia Pty Ltd v Streets Ice Cream Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 635; 42 ALJR 247, Barwick CJ at 643–644 (CLR). An excerpt from this unreported judgment is found in Ashworth JS, Owles D and Worsdall A, Product Liability Casebook: Leading US and UK Judgments (Lloyd’s of London Press, 1984) pp 131, 136. Australian Consumer Law, s 131(1), (5). Australian Consumer Law, s 131(2). The Competition and Consumer Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2015 (Cth), which was before the House of Representatives prior to the Parliament’s proroguing in May 2016, proposed that notice would not be required where the consumer goods were food but not food packaging. Whether this Bill will be reintroduced in the next Parliament is unknown as of 19 May 2016. For laws that require notice to be given and are specified by the regulations, see Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth), reg 92.

[33.4.1110] Where a person undertakes a voluntary recall of consumer goods, the person must notify the Minister and other persons of the recall. If a person voluntarily takes action to recall consumer goods because: (1)

the goods will or may cause injury to any person;

(2)

a reasonably foreseeable use (including a misuse) of the goods will or may cause injury to any person;

(3)

a safety standard is in force for the goods and the goods do not, or it is likely that they do not, comply with that standard; or

(4)

an interim or a permanent ban is in force on the goods (see [33.4.1100]);

then the first person must, within two days after taking that action, notify the Minister that the goods are subject to recall, specifying the nature of the defect in or dangerous characteristic of the goods.1 Failure to give the required written notice is an offence.2 Where consumer goods that are the subject of a recall in Australia have been or are supplied outside Australia, a similar written notice must be given to the person to whom the goods have been supplied.3

1 2 3

Australian Consumer Law, s 128(1), (2), (7). Australian Consumer Law, s 128(2). Australian Consumer Law, s 128(4).

[33.4.1120] If the Minister orders a compulsory product recall,1 the person to whom such an order is addressed must comply with the order,2 provided that the person has had the opportunity to attend a conference with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).3 As soon as practicable after the conclusion of the conference, the ACCC must make a recommendation to the Minister that they proceed with the order, proceed with it in a modified form, or not proceed with it at all.4 However, a conference is not

335

PRODUCT RECALL AND SAFETY STANDARDS

[33.4.1120]

required before issuing a product recall notice if it appears to the Minister that consumer goods of a particular kind create an imminent risk of death, serious illness or serious injury.5 In those circumstances, the Minister is still required to afford natural justice to the person affected, although the circumstances will circumscribe what is required for a fair procedure.6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Australian Consumer Law, s 122. Australian Consumer Law, s 127. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 132C. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 132D. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 132J. Pro Teeth Whitening (Aust) Pty Ltd v Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer [2013] FCA 1376, Rangiah J at [63], [73].

[33.4.1130] Instituting a product recall does not automatically relieve a person from liability for damage caused by a defect in the product being recalled. However, a consumer who is notified of the defect in the product and suffers loss or damage by continuing to use the product may have no claim against the manufacturer.1 Continued use may also be taken to amount to contributory negligence2 (see [33.4.510]) or as a situation in which liability is apportioned under s 137A of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth): see [33.4.800].

1 See, eg Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; [1981] 2 WLR 713; Taylor v Rover Co Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1491 (Birm Assizes). 2 See “Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870].

Product Safety Standards [33.4.1140] A person is prohibited, in trade or commerce, from supplying consumer goods in certain circumstances that are intended to be used or are of a kind likely to be used by a consumer. The circumstances are if the consumer goods: (1)

have had an interim ban imposed upon them1 (see [33.4.1150]);

(2)

have been permanently banned2 (see [33.4.1150]);

(3)

do not comply with a safety standard applicable to those goods3 (see [33.4.1160]–[33.4.1170]); or

(4)

do not comply with an information standard applicable to those goods:4 see [33.4.1160]–[33.4.1170].

336

[33.4.1160]

PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS

Consumer goods of the kind referred to in (1)–(3) above may not be exported without the written approval of the Minister.5 This restriction does not apply however to consumer goods that do not comply with an information standard in force for those goods, but that are “intended to be used outside Australia” (ie goods that are intended for export).6

1 2 3

4 5 6

Australian Consumer Law, ss 109, 118, 197. Australian Consumer Law, ss 114, 118, 197. See Director of Consumer Affairs (Vic) v Alpha Flight Services Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1434. Australian Consumer Law, ss 104, 106, 194. See Director of Consumer Affairs (Vic) v Alpha Flight Services Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1434; Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Delap Impex KFT (2015) 110 IPR 164; [2015] FCA 62. Australian Consumer Law, ss 134, 136, 203. Australian Consumer Law, ss 106(5), 118(5), 194(5), (6), 197(5), (6). Australian Consumer Law, s 136(5).

[33.4.1150] Where it appears to the Minister that consumer goods of a particular kind will or may cause injury to any person, or that a reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of those goods will or may cause such injury, the Minister may impose either an interim or a permanent ban on the goods.1 An interim ban, once notified by the Minister by written notice published on the internet, lasts for 60 days and may be extended or further extended, as appropriate, for a period of up to 30 days.2 The Minister may revoke an interim ban at any time by written notice published on the internet, with the ban ceasing to be in force on the day specified in the notice.3 A permanent ban, once notified by the Minister by written notice published on the internet, applies in all States and Territories4 and comes into force on the day specified in the instrument imposing the ban.5 The Minister may revoke a permanent ban at any time by written notice published on the internet, with the ban ceasing to be in force on the day specified in the notice.6

1 2 3 4 5 6

Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian Australian

Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer

Law, Law, Law, Law, Law, Law,

ss 109(1), 114(1). s 111. s 113. s 115. s 116. s 117.

[33.4.1160] Product safety is regulated by consumer goods safety standards and information standards. Safety standards are made in respect of consumer goods of a particular kind to prevent or reduce the risk of injury to any person from goods of that kind. They consist of such requirements regarding:

337

PRODUCT RECALL AND SAFETY STANDARDS

[33.4.1160]

(1)

the performance, composition, contents, methods of manufacture or processing, design, construction, finish or packaging of the goods;

(2)

the testing of the goods during, or after the completion of, manufacture or processing; and

(3)

the form and content of the markings, warnings or instructions to accompany the goods,

as are reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce risk of injury to any person.1 Information standards are made in respect of goods of a particular kind and may: (a)

make provision in relation to the content of information about goods or services of that kind; or

(b)

require the provision of specified information about goods or services of that kind; or

(c)

provide for the manner or form in which such information is to be provided; or

(d)

provide that such information is not to be provided in a specified manner or form; or

(e)

provide that information of a specified kind is not to be provided about goods or services of that kind; or

(f)

assign a meaning to specified information about goods or services.2

Consumer goods safety standards and information standards are made by the Minister by written notice published on the internet declaring that: (1)

a particular standard, or a particular part of a standard, prepared or approved by Standards Australia3 or by a prescribed association; or

(2)

such a standard or part of a standard with additions or variations specified in the notice,

is a safety standard or an information standard, as the case may be, for consumer goods of the kind specified in the notice.4

1 Australian Consumer Law, s 104(2). 2 Australian Consumer Law, s 134(2). 3 For more information, see the Standards Australia website (available at http://www.standards.org.au, viewed 19 May 2016). 4 Australian Consumer Law, ss 105(1), 135(1).

[33.4.1170] If a person has failed to comply with a safety standard or an information standard that is in force for goods of a particular kind, it is an offence for that person, in trade or commerce, to supply those goods.1 In BMW Australia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2004) 207 ALR 452; [2004] FCAFC 167, the Federal Court held that the respondent 338

[33.4.1170]

PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS

had contravened s 65C of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (see now Pt 3-3 of the Australian Consumer Law) by selling vehicles that did not comply with a prescribed product safety standard.2 The Court granted an injunction restraining the further sale of vehicles and ordered the respondent to institute a product recall of the vehicles already sold. The Full Federal Court set aside an order appointing an auditor to monitor the performance of the recall as being beyond power. A person who suffers loss or damage by failure of another person to comply with such standards may recover the amount of their loss or damage by taking action against the other person.3 Where the contravention lies in the other person supplying consumer goods for which either an interim or a permanent ban is in force and a person suffers loss or damage by reason of a defect in, or a dangerous characteristic of, the goods or by reason of a reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the goods, the person who suffers the loss or damage is deemed to have suffered it as a consequence of the supply of the goods.4 Where the contravention lies in: (1)

supplying, offering to supply, or manufacturing, possessing or having control of goods of a particular kind for which there has been a failure to comply with an information standard that is in force for those goods;5 and

(2)

a person suffers loss or damage by reason of not having particular information in relation to the goods, which they would not have suffered if the supplier had complied with the information standard; then

(3)

the person is deemed to have suffered the loss or damage by reason of the supply of the goods.6

The circumstances referred to in (1) above do not apply to goods “that are intended to be used outside Australia” (ie goods intended for export).7 An action for damages based on a failure to comply with a safety standard or with an information standard must be commenced within six years after the day on which the cause of the action that relates to the conduct accrued.8

1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8

Australian Consumer Law, ss 194, 203. At first instance, see Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v BMW Australia Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-944; [2003] FCA 727. Australian Consumer Law, ss 106(7), 136(8), 236(1). See also Unfair Dealing “Remedies” [35.4.10]ff. Australian Consumer Law, s 118(7). Australian Consumer Law, s 136(1) – (3). Note that under s 136(4), it is a defence if the person is able to prove that the manufacture, possession or control of the goods was not for the purpose of supplying the goods. Australian Consumer Law, s 136(8). Australian Consumer Law, s 136(5). Australian Consumer Law, s 236(2).

339

PRODUCT RECALL AND SAFETY STANDARDS

340

[33.4.1170]

33.5 Breach of Statutory Duty

BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY

Current Subtitle Author Edmund Lee

Barrister

BSc (Hons), LLB (Hons), MEnvLaw (Syd) Barrister, Supreme Court of New South Wales and High Court of Australia

(Updating author, Update 318 – May 2016) (Updating author, Update 306 – April 2015)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Andrew Felkel

Meg O’Sullivan

BEc (Hons), JD (Melb) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria

BA (Hons), LLB (Hons) (Monash) Barrister and Member, Victorian Bar (Updating author, Update 216 – August 2007)

(Updating author, Update 259 – March 2011)

The Laws of Australia Editorial Department

Peter J MacFarlane BA (Flinders), BLegS (Macq), LLM (Syd) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Queensland Senior Lecturer in Law, Queensland University of Technology (Original author)

(Updating author, Update 157 – September 2002)

Geoff Masel BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Philips Fox (Updating author, Update 147 – November 2001) (Updating author, Update 80 – August 1998) (Updating author, Update 40 – October 1996)

342

33.5 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.5.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.5.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.5.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.5.30] CAUSE OF ACTION.................................................................. [33.5.140] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.5.140] ELEMENTS............................................................................ [33.5.160] General...............................................................................[33.5.160] Legislative Intention........................................................... [33.5.170] Parties................................................................................ [33.5.230] Breach of Statutory Standard............................................ [33.5.250] Damage Caused by Breach...............................................[33.5.260] DEFENCES.................................................................................[33.5.390] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.5.390]

343

344

Introduction Definition [33.5.10] Where there is a breach of a statutory duty, whether or not a correlative private right of action1 exists in respect of the breach depends exclusively on the construction of the relevant statute. In some instances, the right of action of a person who suffers loss and damage by reason of another’s breach of statutory duty is expressly stated in the statute:2 see [33.5.160]. More frequently, the right of action is inferred from the nature and purpose of the statutory scheme: see [33.5.140] and [33.5.170]–[33.5.180]. A breach of statutory duty may give rise to a private cause of action where the statutory duty is for the protection of a particular class of persons within which the injured party falls: see [33.5.240]. However, unlike other torts, it is not based on general principles which can be stated. Rather, each case depends on a judicial interpretation of legislative intent:3 see [33.5.170]–[33.5.220]. Liability is strict in the sense that it is the defendant’s breach of the provision which determines liability, rather than fault through negligence or intent.4 However, the two causes of action: breach of statutory duty and negligence, are in many respects interrelated, and a breach of statutory duty is usually recognised in circumstances where liability in negligence also lies:5 see [33.5.150]. Further, proof of a breach of statutory duty is often regarded as evidence of negligence, irrespective of any other failure to exercise reasonable care.6 In those instances where there is no express right to bring an action for breach of statutory duty, the right can nonetheless be deduced from legislative provisions by identifying a legislative attempt to protect the interests of a particular class: see [33.5.220]. The enactment of general standards is insufficient.7 The action for breach of statutory duty has traditionally arisen in the context of industrial accidents8 and safety, for example, by prescribing safety standards in construction.9 However, modern applications of the tort have included statutory breaches for copyright10 and dangerous premises:11 see [33.5.140]. In appropriate cases the tort is available for damage to property12 as well as injury to the person. Usually, the legislation provides a statutory standard of care where the offending conduct would otherwise be assessed under standards imposed by the general law of negligence: see [33.5.250]. Courts have shown a reluctance to extend statutory protection to areas where redress in negligence is not already available. Accordingly, statutory duties have not been readily extended to require a public authority to undertake positive steps within the areas of its 345

[33.5.10]

INTRODUCTION

authority.13 The existence of the right to damages for breach of a statutory duty depends on the construction of the legislation: see [33.5.160], [33.5.190] and [33.5.200]. Motorists and pedestrians using the highway have been excluded from the benefit of an inferred statutory duty for their protection.14 An Act or Regulation which protects the public in general may be interpreted as giving rise to a private right of action, where individuals are exposed to the specific danger which the Act or Regulation was intended to prevent:15 see [33.5.220].

1 The phrase “private right of action” is used in this discussion to describe an action brought by an individual, based on loss or damage arising from the breach of statutory duty, as distinct from public enforcement procedures contained in legislation to deal with breach of statutory provisions. 2 See, eg Australian Consumer Law, s 236 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2 (formerly Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82)); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 115. 3 See generally Interpretation and Use of Legal Sources “Constitutions” [25.1.140]–[25.1.530]. 4 O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 477 (CLR). For further discussion of strict liability, see “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff, in particular, “Statutory Liability” [33.6.170]. 5 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 459 (CLR). 6 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 459 (CLR); Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Brennan CJ at [16]. For further discussion of negligence, see “Breach of Duty of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1820]. 7 O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 477–478 (CLR). 8 Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 (CA) (breach of Factory and Workshop Act 1878 41 & 42 Vict c 16 (UK)); O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73; Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Dank [2011] QCA 253; Langmaid v Dobsons Vegetable Machinery Pty Ltd [2014] Aust Torts Reports 82-178; [2014] TASFC 6. See also Chamberlaine v Chester & Birkenhead Railway Co (1848) 1 Ex 870; 154 ER 371, Pollock CB at 877 (Ex); Couch v Steel (1854) 3 El & Bl 402; 118 ER 1193 (KB); but see Atkinson v Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co (1877) 2 Ex D 441 (CA). The area of industrial accidents has been the subject of considerable legislative limitations through the implementation of accident compensation schemes: see Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 44, 45; Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT), s 31; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 9; Return to Work Act 1986 (NT), s 53; (formerly the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (NT), s 53: see Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (NT), s 4); Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 108; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s 25; Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 135A; Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981

346

[33.5.10]

9 10

11

12 13

14

15

DEFINITION

(WA), s 18. See also [33.5.390]. Workers’ compensation schemes are discussed generally in Labour Law “Workers’ Compensation” [26.5.10]ff. Anderson v MacKellar County Council (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 444; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 308; 14 LGRA 352 (CA). See, eg Moore v News of the World Ltd [1972] 1 QB 441; [1972] 2 WLR 419 (CA) in relation to a breach of the Copyright Act 1956 4 & 5 Eliz 2 c 74 (UK) (see now Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK)) and, in particular, the false attribution of authorship to a work; Rickless v United Artists Corp [1988] QB 40; [1987] 2 WLR 945 (CA) (statutory right created private suit enforceable after performer’s death); see also Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173; [1981] 3 WLR 33, Lord Diplock at 185–187 (AC) (Edmund-Davies, Keith, Scarman and Bridge LLJ agreeing). For further discussion of copyright, see Intellectual Property “Copyright” [23.1.10]ff. See, eg Calf v Sydney County Council [1972] 2 NSWLR 521; (1972) 26 LGRA 56 (CA) (plaintiff fell into an unfenced trench); Ching v Surrey County Council [1910] 1 KB 736 (CA) (plaintiff was injured in the playground of a school); Puflett v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 121 (1987) 17 NSWLR 372 (tenant recovered damages in consequence of a breach of statutory duty by the body corporate to maintain common property in good repair); Ridis v Strata Plan 10308 (2005) 63 NSWLR 449; 1 STR (NSW) 205; [2005] NSWCA 246. JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398 (NSWSC) (duty to trim trees adjacent to overhead power lines). Pasmore v Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council [1898] AC 387 (sewers); Bennett & Wood Ltd v Orange City Council (1967) 67 SR (NSW) 426; 85 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 135 (CA), Walsh JA at 431, 434–435 (SR (NSW)) (fire brigade); Hicks v Lake Macquarie City Council (No 1) (1992) 77 LGRA 261 (NSWSC) (land slip in a Council-approved subdivision; council powers for public health, safety, control and management of public reserves and places, sewerage and drainage); Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215; 83 ALJR 623; [2009] HCA 15, Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [144], see also French CJ at [50], [62]-[63]. However, see JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398 (NSWSC); Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29 (overturning the “highway rule”, in favour of ordinary principles of negligence, in relation to highway authorities); Macquarie Generation v Hodgson (2011) 186 LGERA 311; 6 ARLR 229; [2011] NSWCA 424. Abela v Giew (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 485; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 235 (FC); Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832 (CA), Bankes LJ at 840, see also Atkin LJ at 841. A provision that the occupier of a racetrack should not exclude anyone from entry on the basis that they proposed to “carry on bookmaking on the track” was held not to create a private right of action as the provision was not solely for the benefit of bookmakers in Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, Lord Reid at 416–417. The provision was primarily intended for the protection of those members of the public who might wish to bet on the track. The “highway rule”, which created immunity from liability for nonfeasance by public authorities, was replaced by ordinary principles of negligence in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, but special protection is given to public roads authorities by legislative enactments: see “Statutory Authorities” [33.2.1180]; Botany Bay City Council v Latham (2013) 197 LGERA 211; [2013] NSWCA 363. O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73,

347

[33.5.10]

INTRODUCTION

Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 486–487 (CLR); Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173; [1981] 3 WLR 33, Lord Diplock (Edmund-Davies, Keith, Scarman and Bridge LLJ agreeing) at 185 (AC).

Scope of Subtitle [33.5.20] This Subtitle deals with the identification and scope of situations in which a breach of a statutory duty confers or gives rise to a private right of action1 enforceable by individuals. It considers the relationship between negligence and a breach of a statutory duty (see [33.5.10] and [33.5.140]–[33.5.150]), and between a breach of a statutory duty and the common law generally: see [33.5.140]. The determination of whether or not a statute was intended to give rise to a private cause of action is considered at [33.5.170]–[33.5.220], elements of the cause of action are discussed at [33.5.160] and parties to such an action are examined at [33.5.230]–[33.5.240]. The standard of care required by the statute and the matter of causation are considered at [33.5.250] and [33.5.260]–[33.5.280] respectively. Defences, including statutory exclusions and immunities, contributory negligence and limitation periods, are discussed at [33.5.390]–[33.5.430]. Some examples of the application of this cause of action are set out at [33.5.140]. This Subtitle deals mainly with examples of breach of statutory duty arising in the occupational or workplace context.

1 The phrase “private right of action” is used in this discussion to describe an action brought by an individual, based on loss or damage arising from the breach of statutory duty, as distinct from public enforcement procedures contained in legislation to deal with breach of statutory provisions.

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.5.30] Many of the concepts involved in the law relating to breach of statutory duty are common to other areas of the law of torts. Negligence, an area of law closely related to breach of statutory duty, is discussed in detail at “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Another closely related Subtitle is “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff. The brief discussion of defences contained in this Subtitle is covered in greater depth at “Defences” [33.9.10]ff. Matters relating to the limitation of actions are dealt with in Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff. The issue of damages is dealt with more comprehensively in “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. Other more specific subtitles are cross-referenced.

348

Cause of Action General [33.5.140] A private right of action1 for breach of statutory duty (independent of negligence:2 see [33.5.150]) may be inferred from a statute: see also [33.5.10]. Such a right will arise where the legislature creates a duty intended to protect a specified class of persons, and the rights of a person within that class are infringed, by breach of the statute by a person whose conduct falls within the statutory prescription: see [33.5.160]. Historically, the principal application of this tort was in the context of workplace health and safety, and the tort was largely confined to personal injury actions brought by workers for breaches of industrial safety legislation:3 see [33.5.10]. However, the tort is now applied in a number of different contexts including damage to property,4 copyright law,5 discrimination law6 and fair trading law:7 see [33.5.10] and [33.5.390]. Actions for breach of statutory duty may have application in a wide variety of contexts in addition to the examples cited above, subject to the principles of statutory construction.8 Actions may arise, for example, in public health care systems and institutions;9 as a remedy for administrative action which is ultra vires;10 for a prisoner’s right to bring a private law action against public authorities;11 for breach of a specific statutory duty of care imposed for the protection of users of particular premises or areas;12 for local government assessing development applications,13 or breach of the Australian Standards.14 Issues related to breach of a statutory duty arising out of statutory powers may form the basis of other causes of action based in tort, primarily in actions for negligence. The relationship between breach of statutory duty and the common law was canvassed by Williams J in Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, where the plaintiff claimed damages for a breach of regulations concerning loading and unloading. He noted that a statutory right of action could be enforced for damages at common law, but it is the statute or regulation that creates the civil right and not the common law. It is the common law that supplies the remedy. It is only in this respect and to this extent that such a duty can be said to become part of the common law.15

349

[33.5.140]

CAUSE OF ACTION

The remedy given by the common law (damages) makes effective the right of the injured plaintiff to have the defendant perform the required statutory duty.16

1 The phrase “private right of action” is used in this discussion to describe an action brought by an individual, based on loss or damage arising from the breach of statutory duty, as distinct from public enforcement procedures contained in legislation to deal with breach of statutory provisions. 2 See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. 3 See, eg O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, where an injury sustained by an employee in an accident involving a lift was held to involve a breach of statutory duty imposed by the Scaffolding and Lifts Act 1912 (NSW) (now repealed). See generally Labour Law “Workers’ Compensation” [26.5.10]ff; “Occupational and Work Health and Safety” [26.8.10]ff. 4 See, eg JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398 (NSWSC), where liability was extended to include compensation for damage to property caused by a fire that occurred when overhead electrical wires came into contact with a tree on the plaintiff’s land; see also ACTEW Corp Ltd v Mihaljevic [2004] ACTSC 59, Harper M at [20]–[28] (left open the possibility of arguing whether a private right of action arose under building legislation, concerning the duty of building certifier to utility service provider for pure economic loss). For authorities relating to “dangerous premises” see, eg Calf v Sydney County Council [1972] 2 NSWLR 521; (1972) 26 LGRA 56 (CA) (plaintiff fell into an unfenced trench); Ching v Surrey County Council [1910] 1 KB 736 (CA) (plaintiff was injured in the playground of a school); Puflett v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 121 (1987) 17 NSWLR 372 (tenant recovered damages in consequence of a breach of statutory duty by the body corporate to maintain common property in good repair); Ridis v Strata Plan 10308 (2005) 63 NSWLR 449; 1 STR (NSW) 205; [2005] NSWCA 246. On the exclusion of liability regarding motorists and pedestrians using the highway, see [33.5.10]. 5 See, eg Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 36 (infringement by doing acts comprised in copyright), s 115 (action by owner for infringement of copyright). For further discussion of copyright, see Intellectual Property “Copyright” [23.1.10]ff. 6 See, eg Gama v Qantas Airways Ltd (2006) 195 FLR 475; [2006] FMCA 11. 7 See Australian Consumer Law, s 236 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2 (formerly Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82)). 8 See Interpretation and Use of Legal Sources “Australian Domestic Laws” [25.1.10]ff. 9 See Health and Guardianship “Breach of Statutory Duty” [20.3.300]–[20.3.350]; “Liability for Transmission of Disease” [20.5.610]–[20.5.670]; “Legal Duties of Human Research Ethics Committee Members to Research Participants” [20.12.900]–[20.12.940]. 10 See Administrative Law “Damages” [2.6.3600]–[2.6.3620]. 11 See Patsalis v New South Wales (2012) 81 NSWLR 742; 266 FLR 207; [2012] NSWCA 307 at [66]-[92] where Basten JA discussed the scope of the duty and the statutory defences. Human Rights “Private Law” [21.6.1070]. 12 See, eg Ridis v Strata Plan 10308 (2005) 63 NSWLR 449; 1 STR (NSW) 205;

350

[33.5.150]

13

14 15 16

GENERAL

[2005] NSWCA 246 (duty of owners corporation to maintain and repair common property). See Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 364 (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused in Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2015] HCATrans 93). Langmaid v Dobsons Vegetable Machinery Pty Ltd [2014] Aust Torts Reports 82-178; [2014] TASFC 6, the Court at [19]. Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Williams J at 52. Downs v Williams (1971) 126 CLR 61; 45 ALJR 576, Windeyer J at 74 (CLR), citing London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155, Lord Wright at 168.

[33.5.150] A breach of statutory duty is a separate and distinct tort from that of negligence.1 A breach of statutory duty may occur without negligence because of the imposition of a strict statutory standard of care: see [33.5.250]. However, equally, liability in negligence may coincide with a breach of statutory duty, and there may be a close relationship between the two causes of action:2 see [33.5.160]. A breach of statutory duty, whether itself giving rise to a private cause of action or not (see [33.5.140]), may constitute evidence of negligence although it will not be conclusive.3 Use of statutory breaches in this manner occurs principally in the areas of road traffic and workplace injuries. In Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222, Herring CJ noted that a breach of the Road Traffıc Act 1935 (Vic) (now repealed) amounted to a piece of evidence of want of reasonable care on the part of the person guilty of such breach … In other words it is for the jury to say whether the precaution laid down by the regulation, which the defendant failed to take, was one that in all the circumstances of the case a reasonably prudent man would have taken.4

1

2

3

Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Brennan CJ at [16]; Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Williams J at 48–49; Downs v Williams (1971) 126 CLR 61; 45 ALJR 576, Windeyer J at 74–75 (CLR); see also X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 152. For further discussion of negligence, see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR) (where there is “a provision prescribing a specific precaution for the safety of others in a matter where the person upon whom the duty is laid is, under the general law of negligence, bound to exercise due care, the duty will give rise to a correlative private right, unless from the nature of the provision or from the scope of the legislation of which it forms a part a contrary intention appears”). See also Government Authorities “Duty of Care When Exercising a Statutory Power” [27.9.150]. Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438, Latham CJ at 448, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 461: “When negligence as a cause of action is in

351

[33.5.150]

CAUSE OF ACTION

4

question, breach of a legislative provision requiring a specific precaution amounts to evidence of want of reasonable care … But it is not negligence per se.” See also Dennis v Brownlee (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 719; 80 WN (NSW) 1239; 9 LGRA 415 (FC), Else-Mitchell and Moffitt JJ at 722 (SR (NSW)); Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222 (FC); Abela v Giew (1965) 65 SR (NSW) 485; 82 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 235 (FC), the Court at 489–490 (SR (NSW)); Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220. Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222 (FC), Herring CJ at 225; see also CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Formosa (2009) 235 FLR 273; [2009] NSWCA 363, the Court at [60], [89].

Elements General [33.5.160] There are generally four elements required for a breach of statutory duty.1 These are: (1)

the Parliament intended to protect a specified class of person and intended to create a private right of action for breach of the duty imposed by the provision (see [33.5.170]–[33.5.220]);

(2)

the plaintiff was a person within the class of persons intended to be protected (see [33.5.240]), and the defendant was a person whose conduct fell within the statutory prescription2 (see [33.5.230]);

(3)

the obligation imposed by the statute was breached (see [33.5.250]); and

(4)

the plaintiff suffered damage see [33.5.260]–[33.5.280].

as

a

result

of

the

breach:

Although the elements of duty, breach and damage are similar to those of a negligence cause of action,3 the nature and scope of each statutory duty depends wholly on the interpretation of the particular statutory provision. Accordingly, any precise legal definition is impossible by reason of the imprecise nature of the inquiry into Parliament’s intention,4 with legislative intentions to confer a private right of action being inferred on the basis of “presumptions or by reference to matters governing the policy of the provision rather than the meaning of the instrument”.5 The statutory nature of the duty means that the scope of the obligation and the standard of care applicable depend on the particular provision allegedly contravened: see [33.5.250]. Further, those persons protected against a breach of the duty must also be identified by recourse to the statute: see [33.5.240]. For example, safety provisions may be construed as intending to protect one category of persons, but not another. The obligation may be interpreted as imposing a duty of reasonable care or imposing strict liability;6 it is a matter of construction of the statutory standard. Accordingly, liability may be incurred without negligence. Any vagueness in obligations imposed by statute tells

352

[33.5.160]

ELEMENTS

against reading the statute as intending to give rise to a private right of action:7 see [33.5.170]–[33.5.220]. The mere proscription by statute of a particular act does not, of itself, create a private right of action: see [33.5.170]. In fact, the range of statutory duties which have attracted a correlative right of private action is limited.8

1

2 3 4

5

6

There are different formulations of the elements. See, eg Downs v Williams (1971) 126 CLR 61; 45 ALJR 576, Windeyer J at 75 (CLR): to “succeed in a claim for damages for breach of a statutory duty causing him harm, a plaintiff must shew that the defendant was a person on whom the statute cast the duty: that he, the plaintiff, was a person, or one of a class of persons, for whose benefit the duty was created: that the defendant failed to perform the duty: that this failure gave rise to a civil right of action” and in Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 364 (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused in Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2015] HCATrans 93), Meagher JA at [159]: “Where it is said that a public authority owes a duty of care, it is necessary to identify the function or power, the performance or exercise of which is the subject matter of the alleged duty. Having done so, as the joint judgment in [Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 75 ALJR 1570; [2001] HCA 59] makes clear at [60], it is then necessary to address whether the existence of that duty would give rise to inconsistent obligations in the performance of that function or conflicting claims upon the exercise of the power. These questions are part of the prospective inquiry as to the existence and content of the duty.” On requirements for pleadings and particulars, see Civil Procedure “Personal Injury Pleadings” [5.2.430]–[5.2.480]. See Occupational Health and Safety “Actions for Breach of Statutory Duty” [26.8.540]. See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See Haylan v Purcell (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 1; 65 WN (NSW) 228 (FC), Davidson J at 4 (SR (NSW)) where such an inquiry is described as “fatuous”. See also Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Hayne J at [325]–[327]. See O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR), although Dixon J (at 478 (CLR)) commented that this judicial interpretation sometimes appeared to have been exercised “upon very general considerations without either the authority of any general rule of law or the application of any definite rule of construction”: see [33.5.170]. See also Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Ryan (1957) 97 CLR 89, Kitto J at 98. See, eg Barrett v Steel Products Distributing Co Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 981 (FC) (absolute duty to fence all dangerous parts of machinery); Wenck v Morris Woollen Mills (Ipswich) Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 142, Dunn J at 144–145 (“the obligation to fence every part of transmission machinery, unless it comes within the [statutory] exception, is an absolute one, not to be qualified by implying words in the section which the Legislature has not enacted”); Bouronicos v Mylex Corp Ltd [1975] VR 120 (absolute duty; breach established although plaintiff workman had removed safety guard); Dairy Farmers Co-op Ltd v Azar (1990) 170 CLR 293; 64 ALJR 535; 34 IR 40 (requirement to securely fence all dangerous parts of a machine imposed liability regarding that part of a machine which was not dangerous in itself, but which created

353

[33.5.160]

CAUSE OF ACTION

7

8

a danger only if an employee inserted their hand underneath that part). See generally “Principles” [33.6.10]ff, in particular, “Statutory Liability” [33.6.170]. Soutter v P & O Resorts Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 106 (CA); Heil v Suncoast Fitness [2000] 2 Qd R 23 (CA) (general, not specific, duty); see also McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297, McColl JA at [176]–[177] (Beazley JA and Young CJ in Eq agreeing) (certain regulations imposing obligations in terms of requirement to take “all practicable steps” and “all practicable precautions” founded a private cause of action, but no right of private action found where other regulations did not sufficiently specify the precautions or measures required). See also Interpretation and Use of Legal Sources “Australian Domestic Laws” [25.1.10]ff. See Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, O’Loughlin J at [1182].

Legislative Intention [33.5.170] The legislative intention of Parliament is critical to the creation of a private right of action.1 An express provision creating a private right of action is rare (see [33.5.160]), but its absence does not preclude such an intention where it may be inferred.2 The intention of Parliament is always a question of statutory interpretation.3 The recognition of a private right of action from a statute which, according to ordinary canons of construction, would not positively give such a right, reflects the artificial nature of the process.4 This was highlighted in O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, where Dixon J noted: Sometimes it almost appears that a complexion is given to the statute upon very general considerations without either the authority of any general rule of law or the application of any definite rule of construction.5

His Honour concluded that intention was not so much inferred as “ascribed” and depended in reality on presumptions or the scope and policy of the legislation:6 see [33.5.180].

1 The phrase “private right of action” is used in this discussion to describe an action brought by an individual, based on loss or damage arising from the breach of statutory duty, as distinct from public enforcement procedures contained in legislation to deal with breach of statutory provisions. 2 Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Webb J at 53. 3 Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 397; 41 ALJR 129, Kitto J at 405 (CLR). See also Interpretation and Use of Legal Sources “Australian Domestic Laws” [25.1.10]ff. 4 See Gardiner v Victoria [1999] 2 VR 461; [1999] VSCA 100, Phillips JA at [21] (Winneke P agreeing): “It is generally accepted that a right to sue arises … only if there can be discerned in the statute an intention on the part of the Parliament that

354

[33.5.180]

5 6

ELEMENTS

such should be so, and of course that creates the difficulty because usually Parliament has not turned its mind to the problem at all.” For a useful summary of authorities and principles, see British American Tobacco Exports BV v Trojan Trading Co Pty Ltd (2010) IPR 392; [2010] VSC 572, Hollingworth J at [26]–[63]; see also the elements required to establish breach of statutory duty, at [33.5.160]. O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR). O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR).

[33.5.180] Identifying a cause of action from legislative provisions depends on a consideration of the whole Act including the pre-existing law.1 Policy provisions can play an important role depending on whether the policy has been promulgated under the relevant statute. In the context of a breach of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Einfeld J in Chan v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 29 noted that it was necessary to balance the protection of liberty and due process, with the need for public officials to carry out their obligations honestly and in good faith, free from the fear of actions for damages.2 However, in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Hayne J warned against judges giving effect to their own ideas of policy and then imputing them to the legislature.3 In discerning a cause of action from legislation, considerations such as the provision of a penalty (see [33.5.190]), provision of a remedy other than a tortious remedy (see [33.5.200]), the availability of an alternative which gives the plaintiff compensation (see [33.5.210]), and the class of people that the statute is intended to protect (see [33.5.220]) are all relevant.4

1

2

3

Tassone v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage & Drainage Board [1971] 1 NSWLR 207 (CA); Calf v Sydney County Council [1972] 2 NSWLR 521; (1972) 26 LGRA 56 (CA) where, taking the Act as a whole, the Court upheld the claim for damages after the plaintiff fell into an unfenced trench dug by the defendant; Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, where Lord Simonds noted at 407 (AC) that “[t]he only rule which in all circumstances is valid is that the answer must depend on a consideration of the whole Act and the circumstances, including the pre-existing law, in which it was enacted.” See Anderson v MacKellar County Council (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 444; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 308; 14 LGRA 352 (CA); Cashmere Pacific Ltd (in rec & liq) v New Zealand Dairy Board [1996] 1 NZLR 218 (HC); Issa v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 1 WLR 956 (CA); Mulcahy v Hydro-Electric Commission (Tas) (1998) 85 FCR 170; Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, O’Loughlin J at [1181]; Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157. Chan v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 29, Einfeld J at 38. See also discussion on vicarious liability of employers, at [33.5.230]. Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Hayne J at [323]. 355

[33.5.180]

CAUSE OF ACTION

4

See R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340, Lord Jauncey at 168–171 (AC) for discussion of some of these and other considerations. In Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, Lord Simonds at 407–408 (AC) said that such considerations were some guidance. See also X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 152.

[33.5.190] The provision of a penalty for a breach of a statute does not usually preclude a right to sue for breach of statutory duty:1 see also [33.5.200]. Although there is judicial opinion that the inclusion of a fine or other penalty may amount to a specification of the manner in which performance must be enforced,2 there are few cases where a breach of statutory duty has been rejected on this basis.3 Indeed, Webb J in Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 considered that power to impose a penalty for a breach of regulations did not reveal any intention of the Parliament to exclude civil liability in respect of the breach, merely because it was silent on the matter.4 His Honour recognised that express provision for a statutory private right of action is rare. Important considerations include: (1)

the nature of the damage for which penalties are imposed;5

(2)

the adequacy or otherwise of the penalty;6

(3)

the comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme concerning the behaviour complained of;7 and

(4)

the category of persons intended to be protected.

Historically, the inclusion of penal provisions has created some confusion since industrial and safety legislation (imposing sanctions for breach) were also seen as providing an action in damages, while other legislation incorporating penal provisions (eg driving and licensing) was not so regarded.8 A penal statute will be more readily accepted as a source of civil liability if it enacts a safety standard in matters where the person on whom the duty is laid is already bound to exercise reasonable care.9 The relevance of these factors was addressed by Lord Normand in Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, who noted: [I]f there is a penalty clause the right to a civil action must be established by a consideration of the scope and purpose of the statute as a whole. The inference that there is a concurrent right of civil action is easily drawn when the predominant purpose is manifestly the protection of a class of workmen by imposing on their employers the duty of taking special measures to secure their safety. The penalties provided by the Act apply when a breach of the duty occurs, but each workman has a right to sue for damages if he is injured in consequence of the breach.10

More recently, in Macquarie Generation v Hodgson (2011) 186 LGERA 311; 6 ARLR 229; [2011] NSWCA 424, Handley AJA agreed with the following

356

[33.5.190]

ELEMENTS

proposition by Smart AJ in Environment Protection Authority v Alkem Drums Pty Ltd (2000) 121 A Crim R 152; 113 LGERA 130; [2000] NSWCCA 416: Any statute which creates an offence, by necessary implication, imposes a duty on the person covered by its terms not to commit an offence (or a breach of the statute) by engaging in conduct which amounts to an offence.11

Further, Handley AJA also said:12 Long-standing authority establishes the related proposition that where a statute inflicts a penalty for not doing an act “the penalty implies that there is a legal compulsion to do the act”.13

1

2

3

4

5 6

Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 397; 41 ALJR 129, Kitto J at 405–406 (CLR); Tassone v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage & Drainage Board [1971] 1 NSWLR 207 (CA), the Full Court at 212–213; Slivak v Lurgi (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 304; 75 ALJR 481; 103 IR 52; [2001] HCA 6; Macquarie Generation v Hodgson (2011) 186 LGERA 311; 6 ARLR 229; [2011] NSWCA 424. Dennis v Brownlee (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 719; 80 WN (NSW) 1239; 9 LGRA 415 (FC), Sugerman J at 720 (SR (NSW)); Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398; Gardiner v Victoria [1999] 2 VR 461; [1999] VSCA 100. In O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR) noted that “[i]n the absence of a contrary legislative intention, a duty imposed by statute to take measures for the safety of others seems to be regarded as involving a correlative private right, although the sanction is penal, because it protects an interest recognized by the general principles of the common law”. See also Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832 (CA), Lord Atkin at 841; Doe d Murray v Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 847; 109 ER 1001, Lord Tenterden CJ at 859 (B & Ad). For an example of where the presence of a criminal sanction (among other matters) told against the inference of a legislative intention to confer a private right of action, see Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273; see also Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, Lord Simonds at 408 (“the sanction of criminal proceedings emphasizes that this statutory obligation, like many others which the Act contains, is imposed for the public benefit and that the breach of it is a public not a private wrong”). Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Webb J at 53. See also Downs v Williams (1971) 126 CLR 61; 45 ALJR 576, Windeyer J at 77 (CLR): “It is a mistake to suppose that civil liability for breach of a statutory duty is always a correlative of, and dependent upon a criminal responsibility … Conversely, although the presence of a penal sanction is eloquent of a duty, its absence does not establish that there is not a duty. It may merely emphasize that the remedy for a breach of duty is a civil action by a person injured.” O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR). In Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402 (CA), Lord Smith at 408 said: “It seems to me that the fine is inflicted by way of punishment of the employer for neglect of the duty imposed by the [Factory and Workshop Act 1878 41 & 42 Vict c 16 (UK)], and must be proportionate to the character of the offence. This consideration and the fact that whatever penalty the magistrates inflict does not

357

[33.5.190]

CAUSE OF ACTION

7 8

9

10 11

12 13

necessarily go to the injured workman or his family lead me to the conclusion that it cannot have been the intention of the Legislature that the provision which imposes upon the employer a fine as a punishment for neglect of his statutory duty should take away the primâ facie right of the workman to be fully compensated for injury occasioned to him by that neglect.” See Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, Lord Simonds at 409, Lord Normand at 413 (AC). See also Gardiner v Victoria [1999] 2 VR 461; [1999] VSCA 100, Phillips JA (Winneke P agreeing) at [25] (if there is no penalty or other remedy prescribed for the breach, or the penalty fixed is inadequate, that can point towards the individual’s right to sue for breach). Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273 (Act and Regulations provided for criminal and civil sanctions, as well as avenues for disciplinary action). The area of workplace safety and industrial accidents has been the subject of considerable legislative limitations through the implementation of accident compensation schemes (see [33.5.390]) or similar legislative schemes, defining and restricting the scope of liability by reference to a particular class of persons, employees or industry (eg mine safety, dust diseases, tobacco-related death or injury). Other legislative restrictions and/or exclusions circumscribing the availability of actions available or damages recoverable are also discussed at [33.5.390]. On the availability of and requirements for actions for breach of statutory duty in the workplace context, see Labour Law “Occupational and Work Health and Safety” [26.8.10]ff, particularly “Scope of Subtitle” [26.8.30]; “Actions for Breach of Statutory Duty” [26.8.540]–[26.8.590]. See, eg Soutter v P & O Resorts Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 106 (CA), Pincus JA at 112 (McPherson JA and Fryberg J agreeing): “Where the statute prescribes a relatively modest penalty for breach it may sometimes seem harsh to impose upon the offender, as within the legislative intention, an unlimited liability for damages as well. It will not necessarily be right to do that where the offender would not otherwise be liable to pay damages, for example on the ground of negligence.” Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, Lord Normand at 413. Environment Protection Authority v Alkem Drums Pty Ltd (2000) 121 A Crim R 152; 113 LGERA 130; [2000] NSWCCA 416, Smart AJ at [146] quoted in Macquarie Generation v Hodgson (2011) 186 LGERA 311; 6 ARLR 229; [2011] NSWCA 424, Handley AJA at [25] (Whealy and Meagher JJA agreeing). Macquarie Generation v Hodgson (2011) 186 LGERA 311; 6 ARLR 229; [2011] NSWCA 424, Handley AJA at [29]. Redpath v Allan (1871-73) LR 4 PC 511, Sir Robert Phillimore at 517 cited in BMA v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201, Williams J at 289.

[33.5.200] The provision by a statute of a remedy, other than a tortious remedy, may lead to the inference that Parliament did not intend to provide a common law action for damages.1 This can be seen as an expression of the principle of statutory interpretation “expressum facit cessare tacitum”.2 This principle holds that where a particular procedure in a statute is designed to achieve something, other procedures are thereby excluded.3 The other remedies prescribed may be in the form of a statutory mechanism for appealing a decision or for compensation under a statutory scheme:4 see also [33.5.210]. The provision of a right to object to a tribunal regarding a breach of an interim development order was considered by McInerney J to

358

[33.5.200]

ELEMENTS

exclude any other private right of action in Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62; (1968) 18 LGRA 140, where he concluded: The sole question is whether an adjoining landowner is by the statute given a right to sue for damages sustained by him in consequence of the defendants’ breach of the provisions of the interim development order. In my view, the provisions of [the Act] as to the lodging of objections and … as to the hearing of appeals by unsuccessful objectors constitute the full extent of the legislative provision made by the Act for the protection of the private rights of the persons referred to in [the Act].5

However, other cases have held that a cause of action for breach of statutory duty nonetheless exists despite the presence of alternative mechanisms for enforcement or dispute resolution in the Act:6 see also [33.5.210]. Courts also consider the particular statute in the context of the pre-existing law: see [33.5.180]. In Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157, the New South Wales Supreme Court held that given it was well established by authority that there was a private cause of action under the earlier statute, Parliament should be taken to have intended, when enacting the corresponding provisions in the later statute, to have intended them to have the effect which their authorities had given to their predecessors, and thus to have intended them to preserve the private cause of action.7 In Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173; [1981] 3 WLR 33, Lord Diplock said:8 [O]ne starts with the presumption … that “where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specified manner … that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner”.9 … [T]here are two classes of exception to this general rule. The first is where upon the true construction of the Act it is apparent that the obligation or prohibition was imposed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals. … The second exception is where the statute creates a public right … and a particular member of the public suffers … “particular, direct, and substantial” damage “other and different from that which was common to all the rest of the public.”10

Furthermore, while a statutory alternative to an action in tort may make the inference of an additional cause of action less likely, the nature of the statute may still lead to the conclusion that a private cause of action is also intended, for example, where the statutory alternative is inadequate:11 see also [33.5.190].

1

See Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398, Lord Simonds at 407. See Martin v Western District of Australasian Coal & Shale Employees’ Federation Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia (Mining Department) (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 593; 51 WN (NSW) 203 (FC), where Jordan CJ at 603 (SR (NSW)) noted: “I think that it is manifest from the whole scope and purview of the Act, that the special remedy provided by the Act is the exclusive remedy for any breach of the new right to admission provided by s 52I [of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1912 (NSW) (now

359

[33.5.200]

CAUSE OF ACTION

2

3

4

5 6

7

8

repealed)].” See also Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978; [1998] 2 WLR 902 (CA); Harris v Evans [1998] 1 WLR 1285 (CA); Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273 (where the comprehensive regulatory scheme set up under the relevant Act and Regulations, including criminal and civil sanctions and avenues for disciplinary action, were factors counting against the inference of a legislative intention to confer a private right of action). Expressum facit cessare tacitum: “When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded”: Burke J, Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1976) p 141; “That which is expressed makes that which is implied to cease”: Black HC, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed, West Group, 1991) p 581. Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1; R v Wallis; Ex parte Employers Association of Wool Selling Brokers (1949) 78 CLR 529, Dixon J at 550. This principle is sometimes stated to be a restatement of the “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” principle. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: “[A] rule of statutory interpretation to the effect that where there is specific reference to certain things but not to others, the intention is to exclude those things not expressly mentioned”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 68. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566; 81 ALJR 1; [2006] HCA 50, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [54] qualified this principle by stating “But, whilst ‘rules’ or principles of construction may offer reassurance, they are no substitute for consideration of the whole of the particular text, the construction of which is disputed, and of its subject, scope and purpose.” (See also White v Betalli (2007) 71 NSWLR 381; [2007] NSWCA 243, McColl JA at [174]). The “expressio unius est exclusion alterius” principle is sometimes cited in cases where the court has had to determine whether a criminal sanction excludes a private right of action for breach of statutory duty: see, eg Preston v Star City Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1273, Wood CJ at CL at [63], [82] (the principle is said to operate as a presumption). See, eg Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4) (Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106, von Doussa J at [687]. See also Administrative Law “Other Forms of Review and Appeal” [2.7.10]ff. Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62; (1968) 18 LGRA 140, McInerney J at 76 (VR). Lubrano v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 4038 (1993) 6 BPR 13,308 (NSWSC). See also Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157, where a plaintiff unit-owner sued the owners’ corporation for breach of a statutory duty to properly maintain the common property. The defendant owners’ corporation argued that the extensive dispute resolution procedures contained in the relevant statute evinced an intention that there be no private cause of action. An earlier version of the relevant statute also contained an alternative dispute resolution mechanism and has nonetheless been interpreted as giving rise to an action for breach of statutory duty. Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157, Brereton J at [7]. See also Jacklin v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 2795 [1975] 1 NSWLR 15, Holland J at 24; Proprietors of Strata Plan No 464 v Oborn (1975) 1 BPR 9,623 (NSWSC), Holland J at 9,624; Proprietors of Strata Plan No 30234 v Margiz (1993) 7 BPR 14,458 (NSWSC); Lubrano v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 4038 (1993) 6 BPR 13,308 (NSWSC). Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173; [1981] 3 WLR 33,

360

[33.5.220]

ELEMENTS

Lord Diplock at 185 (AC) (Edmund-Davies, Keith, Scarman and Bridge LLJ agreeing). 9 Doe d Murray v Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 847; 109 ER 1001, Lord Tenterden CJ at 859 (B & Ad). 10 Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400, Brett J at 407. 11 Meade v Haringey London Borough Council [1979] 1 WLR 637 (CA).

[33.5.210] The availability of an alternative mechanism in a statute which provides a plaintiff with compensation may inhibit the identification of a statutory remedy, although this has not been so in the area of workplace health and safety legislation: see [33.5.390]. The enactment of a specific safety standard has been relied on as justifying the recognition of a private civil cause of action. In O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Evatt and McTiernan JJ considered the question in terms of there being a duty to take care of the safety of others, concluding that “the scope and object of the duty imposed and the probability or certainty that a breach of the duty will be likely to cause death or injury are factors to be considered”.1 Further, the provision of a statutory specific standard has been seen as facilitating the protection afforded by the general law of negligence.2

1 2

O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 485 (CLR). See O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Dixon J at 478 (CLR): “[A] provision prescribing a specific precaution for the safety of others in a matter where the person upon whom the duty laid is, under the general law of negligence, bound to exercise due care, the duty will give rise to a correlative private right, unless from the nature of the provision or from the scope of the legislation of which it forms a part a contrary intention appears.” In the same case, Starke J at 472–474 (CLR) did not refer to the action for breach of statutory duty. His Honour dissented from the majority view and held that the plaintiff was unable to maintain a common law action after receipt of workers’ compensation benefits. However, the view of Dixon J in O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd was affirmed in Tassone v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage & Drainage Board [1971] 1 NSWLR 207 (CA), the Court at 212–213, and applied at first instance in Wynn Tresidder Management Pty Ltd v Barkho [2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-016; [2009] NSWCA 149. For further discussion of negligence, see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff.

[33.5.220] A statute designed for the protection of particular individuals, or a limited class of the public, is more likely to be construed as one giving rise to an action for breach of statutory duty than a statute designed for the protection of the general public:1 see [33.5.240]. In Dennis v Brownlee (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 719; 80 WN (NSW) 1239; 9 LGRA 415, Sugerman J concluded that a breach by a council, of standards relating to road conditions, amounted to a breach of public duty only.2

361

[33.5.220]

CAUSE OF ACTION

An example of a provision protecting the public in general, but which would also give rise to a private right of action, would be an Act or Regulation intended to prevent harm from specific dangers to which individuals are subjected, though only in their capacity as members of the public who are brought into proximity with the danger. This view was expressed by Evatt and McTiernan JJ in O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, where it was noted: [C]ases of actions for breach of statutory duty cannot be confined to instances where the plaintiff belongs to some so-called “special class of the community”.3 … Here the dominant consideration is prevention of danger to all persons brought into proximity to a specific peril which can easily be avoided if the regulation is observed.4

A right of action may be more readily distinguished where the statute creates a public right and a particular member of the public suffers “particular, direct and substantial”5 damage, “other and different from that which is common to the rest of the public”:6 see [33.5.280]. The ability to discern a civil cause of action from the terms of legislation providing a public right was referred to by Cole J of the New South Wales Supreme Court in JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398, where his Honour noted that “one looks not to see whether the statute or regulation seeks to confer civil rights only in respect of a class but rather whether a legislative intention is found to confer a civil right”.7

1 Solomons v R Gertzenstein Ltd [1954] 2 QB 243; [1954] 3 WLR 317 (CA), Romer LJ at 265 (QB); X (minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] 3 WLR 152; Schiliro v Peppercorn Child Care Centres Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 518; [2000] QCA 18 (FC); Schulz v Schmauser [2001] 1 Qd R 540; [2000] QCA 17; Rowan v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 559 (HC); Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4) (Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106, von Doussa J at [678]–[690]. 2 Dennis v Brownlee (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 719; 80 WN (NSW) 1239; 9 LGRA 415, Sugerman J at 722 (SR (NSW)). See Tassone v Metropolitan Water, Sewerage & Drainage Board [1971] 1 NSWLR 207 (CA) (duty of council regarding safety after roadworks was not a duty to protect individuals; no correlative private right, as contrary intention evidenced in legislation); but see Calf v Sydney County Council [1972] 2 NSWLR 521; (1972) 26 LGRA 56 (CA) (where it was said the relevant section showed a clear intention to create correlative private rights). See also Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Hayne J at [325]–[327]; Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286; [1982] 3 WLR 1121 (council, as housing authority, had no reason to believe that the plaintiff was homeless and had a priority need; more appropriately pursued by application for judicial review). 3 Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832, Atkin LJ at 841. 4 O’Connor v SP Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464; 37 SR (NSW) 190; 54 WN (NSW) 73, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 486–487 (CLR). 5 Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400, Brett J at 407.

362

[33.5.230]

6

7

ELEMENTS

Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400, Brett J at 407, quoted in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173; [1981] 3 WLR 33, Lord Diplock at 185 (AC) (Edmund-Davies, Keith, Scarman and Bridge LLJ agreeing). See Rowan v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 559 (HC). JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398 (NSWSC), Cole J at 400.

Parties [33.5.230] The correct defendant is that person or entity on whom a statutory duty is imposed for the protection of a plaintiff or a class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs. If the duty is imposed on a servant or agent it cannot normally be extended to the master.1 In Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, the statutory instrument imposed certain obligations on the “person-in-charge” of the loading and unloading of any ship. That instrument also provided that unless the contrary intention appeared, “person-in-charge” meant any person directly or indirectly in control of the persons actually employed in the loading or unloading. The High Court was unanimous in finding that an action for breach of statutory duty was not available against the employer stevedoring company. Williams J noted: [I]f in a particular industry such a statutory duty is imposed, not on the employer but on an employee, a person injured by its breach would be entitled to damages therefor from the employee and not from the employer, and this would be so even though the breach occurred when the employee was acting in the course of his employment.2

An examination of the relationship between the parties is required. In Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 364, Meagher JA held that “foreseeability of harm, indeterminacy, reliance and assumption of responsibility, and the vulnerability of the appellant” between the appellant and the respondent must also be considered.3 In Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, the plaintiff sought to recover damages (in part) based on a breach of statutory duty, namely reg 1604 of the Uniform Building Regulations 1969 (Vic) (now repealed), which imposed a duty to ensure stability of existing buildings before excavation or demolition work was carried out. A High Court majority considered that the duty was imposed only on the builder involved in the excavation work, and not on the landowner against whom no action for breach of statutory duty was said to lie. A statute may impose non-delegable duties on a person or entity. Whether the statute does impose non-delegable duties is a question of statutory construction. A strict non-delegable duty would arise where a power or duty was conferred in terms, or in a context, such that it had to be performed or exercised personally by the repository of the power or duty. This is different from a normal non-delegable duty which would arise where there was nothing to prevent the engagement of a third party to perform the duty, but it appeared from the terms

363

[33.5.230]

CAUSE OF ACTION

of the statute that the legislature intended the repository of the duty to have a responsibility for ensuring the exercise of reasonable care even if a third party were engaged to perform the function.4

1 Harrison v National Coal Board (UK) [1951] AC 639 (duties imposed on a shot-firer were not duties of the mine owner). 2 Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Williams J at 46. However, the employer is liable for an employee’s tort, at least in New South Wales, by virtue of Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), s 7; see also Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 61; See also [33.5.270]. See generally “Employers” [33.2.1060]; “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350]; Occupational and Work Health and Safety “Actions for Breach of Statutory Duty” [26.8.590]. On employers’ rights to obtain indemnity from an employee in this situation, see “Assessment of Contribution” [33.11.390]. 3 Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2014] NSWCA 364, Meagher JA (Leeming JA agreeing) at [164] (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused in Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council [2015] HCATrans 93). 4 Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6.

[33.5.240] A plaintiff must be a person, or a member of the particular class of persons, a statute intends to protect. In Knapp v Railway Executive [1949] 2 All ER 508,1 the plaintiff failed because as an engine driver, rather than a road user, he was said to be outside the scope of persons protected against faulty level-crossing gates: see [33.5.220].

1 Knapp v Railway Executive [1949] 2 All ER 508 (CA).

Breach of Statutory Standard [33.5.250] The standard of care required is determined by the words of the statute. The statute may make the duty absolute, that is, where fault or circumstance has no relevance to the question of liability; or it may be that the standard of care required is strict, in the sense that the taking of reasonable care is irrelevant to the question of liability, but nevertheless certain circumstances and defences are admitted. In some cases, the standard of care imposed by the statute is not absolute, nor strict, but nonetheless still higher than the common law duty.1 Alternatively, the statute may set a standard of reasonableness akin to the standard of care recognised in an action in negligence.2 The statute may require something less than the exercise of reasonable care, for example, a requirement only to guard against a danger which is known to cause injury, or to provide and maintain safety in the workplace, so far as this is practicable.3

364

[33.5.250]

ELEMENTS

The cases demonstrate the importance of turning to the construction of the statute in order to ascertain the required degree of care imposed on the defendant. In Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250, the relevant statute provided that a male employee aged over eighteen should not be permitted or allowed to lift, carry or move by hand any object so heavy as to be likely to cause risk of injury. It was unanimously held by the Court that the rule does not impose absolute liability on an employer. The proscription was in terms of “permitted or allowed”. Those words were said to presuppose an awareness, actual or constructive, by an employer, that an employee was engaged in moving by hand an object so heavy as to be likely to cause risk of injury.4 The plaintiff bears the onus of proving that the defendant breached the statutory standard. Clear and unambiguous words would need to be present in the statute to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant.5

1 2

3

4

5

See, eg Slivak v Lurgi (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 304; 75 ALJR 481; 103 IR 52; [2001] HCA 6. See Kingshott v Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co Australia Ltd (No 2) (1987) 8 NSWLR 707 (CA) (means of access). For further discussion of negligence, see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; see also Government Authorities “Duty of Care When Exercising a Statutory Power” [27.9.150]–[27.9.170]. Examples of cases where standards other than absolute standards have applied include Austral Bronze Co Pty Ltd v Ajaka (1970) 44 ALJR 155 (HC) (requirement to maintain floors); Milankovic v Viscount Manufacturers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 1 (CA) (duty to stack goods in a manner that would best ensure their stability); Interstruct Pty Ltd v Wakelam (1990) 3 WAR 100 (FC) (statutory obligation to provide and maintain a safe working environment; in that case a suitable ladder was subject to the availability of knowledge of the risk in terms of what was “practicable”); McDonald (t/as BE McDonald Transport) v Girkaid Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-768; [2004] NSWCA 297 (private cause of action found under relevant dangerous goods regulations; regulations prescribed obligation in terms of a requirement to take “all practicable steps” and “all practicable precautions”); Parry v Woolworths Ltd [2010] 1 Qd R 1; [2009] QCA 26, Fraser JA (McMurdo P and White AJA agreeing) at [18]–[66] (reference to advisory standard contained in subordinate legislation). Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250, the Court at 165 (CLR). See also Occupational and Work Health and Safety “Actions for Breach of Statutory Duty” [26.8.590]. Slivak v Lurgi (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 304; 75 ALJR 481; 103 IR 52; [2001] HCA 6.

365

[33.5.250]

CAUSE OF ACTION

Damage Caused by Breach [33.5.260] Types of damage compensable by breach of statutory duty include not only personal injury but also property damage1 and damage to economic interests.2 Other interests such as privacy are not so protected.3

1 JD Bell (Calool) Pty Ltd v Shortland County Council (1991) 74 LGRA 398 (NSWSC); Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157. 2 Chamberlaine v Chester & Birkenhead Railway Co (1848) 1 Ex 870; 154 ER 371; West Wiltshire District Council v Garland [1995] Ch 297; [1995] 2 WLR 439 (CA). 3 Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Newspapers plc [1991] 2 AC 370; [1991] 2 WLR 513 (in which the House of Lords rejected the plaintiff’s claim for breach of statutory duty to protect his privacy from press publicity which he regarded as damaging his interests). See also O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC 188; [1997] 3 WLR 86 (overruling Thornton v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [1979] QB 626; [1979] 3 WLR 1 (CA)) concerning the interests of a homeless person in housing. However, the potential availability of other tort-based actions has been envisaged, such as breach of a statutory duty of confidentiality: see, eg Human Rights “Private Nuisance and Breach of Statutory Duty” [21.11.690].

[33.5.270] Personal injury caused by a breach of statutory duty is compensable if caused by a breach of the statute.1 In Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250, the High Court considered causation in relation to a regulation prohibiting the lifting of objects “so heavy as to be likely to cause risk of injury”.2 As with an action in negligence, where there are multiple causes, and providing the relevant statute does not require that the breach be the sole cause of the injury, the plaintiff must show that the breach of the statutory duty was, at least, a contributory cause of the damage.3 Furthermore, the application of the “but for” test has been described as inadequate for determining the issue of causation. In McGovern v British Steel Corp [1986] 1 ICR 608, Neill LJ considered the test in an action for breach of a regulation requiring walkways to be kept free of obstructions, and concluded that it provided “a useful starting point for the purpose of examining the issue of causation but it is an inadequate criterion by which to determine liability. A more detailed analysis is required”.4 In March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, the High Court considered that there were convincing reasons not to adopt the “but for” test as a comprehensive means of assessing causation in negligence.5 When considering causation, it is no longer relevant to consider whether the plaintiff or injured party played a role, by virtue of their participation as a director of the defendant, in establishing the system of work which caused the

366

[33.5.270]

ELEMENTS

injury. The High Court in Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; 78 ALJR 907; [2004] HCA 28 held that an employer can be found liable to an employee for breach of a duty despite that breach being committed by the employee in his capacity as a director of the employer. Prior to Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd, where the breach of statutory duty was committed solely through the default of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was held solely to blame for any injury resulting from the breach.6

1

2 3

4 5

6

Sherman v Nymboida Collieries Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 580; 37 ALJR 319; Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651; 51 ALJR 184, Jacobs J at 670 (CLR): “There is, next, the question whether the respondent’s injury was caused by a breach of the sub-regulation.” Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250, the Court at 165 (CLR). In Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; [1956] 2 WLR 707, Lord Reid at 621 (AC) put the test in terms of causing or making a material contribution to the injury. See Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry & Engineering Co Ltd [1957] 1 WLR 613 (HL); McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL); Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; [1987] 3 WLR 232, Lord Bridge at 783, Lord Mackay at 786 (AC). For further discussion of negligence, see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. McGovern v British Steel Corp [1986] 1 ICR 608 (CA), Neill LJ at 624. See also McGovern v British Steel Corp [1986] 1 ICR 608 (CA), where Lord Neill noted at 624–625: “From an examination of the authorities I would venture to suggest that where a breach of statutory duty has been established … the issue of causation should be approached on the following lines. (1) It is first necessary to identify the relevant breach of statutory duty and the injury which it is alleged was caused by that breach. (2) The next step is to trace the events which form the links between the breach and the injury. (3) These events may … involve the intervention of some human action either by the plaintiff or by a third party. It will then be necessary to examine: (a) whether the intervention was a natural and probable consequence of the breach; and (b) if so, whether the conduct of the intervener was nevertheless such as to break the chain of causation. Thus the intervener may have acted foolishly or otherwise in such a manner that his act rather than the breach was the cause of the injury: see, for example, [Norris v W Moss & Sons Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 346 (CA)]. (4) The onus of proving the necessary causal connection rests on the plaintiff; it is not enough for him merely to prove that there was a breach of duty which may have caused his injury. (5) The question of causation is to be decided by applying common sense to the facts of the particular case, and not by applying some logical or scientific theory of causation: see [Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663; [1953] 3 WLR 279, Lord Reid at 681 (AC)]. (emphasis added)” See also “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. See, eg Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies Ltd [1959] 1 All ER 414 (QB) (not followed by Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; 78 ALJR 907; [2004] HCA 28, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [39]); Shedlezki v Bronte Bakery Pty Ltd (1970) 72 SR (NSW) 378; 92 WN (NSW) 151; [1970] 2 NSWR 588 (CA) (dissenting judgment of Mason JA preferred by the High Court in Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd, Gleeson CJ,

367

[33.5.270]

CAUSE OF ACTION

McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [50]); Nicol v Allyacht Spars Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 611; 61 ALJR 640 (dissenting judgment of Dawson J preferred by High Court in Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [39]).

[33.5.280] The injury that occurred must be of a kind which a statute or regulation seeks to prevent: see also [33.5.220]. In Dairy Farmers Co-op Ltd v Azar (1990) 170 CLR 293; 64 ALJR 535; 34 IR 40, the High Court found that the appellant had, in breach of the statute, failed to securely fence enough of a particular machine to prevent injury of the kind that occurred. In that case, the injuries were caused by the respondent’s failure to remove broken glass from a crate before his hand was crushed by a bottle being loaded into the crate by a gripper machine. That case supports the view that a statute imposing certain levels of safety will be taken as intended to extend protection to related risks which could arise following violation of the statute: [O]nce the gripper heads were in motion, they were dangerous in that they closed the gap that would otherwise exist at the bottom of a crate. … In this respect, it is not to the point to say that the respondent’s injuries were caused by the milk bottle rather than a gripper head.1

1 Dairy Farmers Co-op Ltd v Azar (1990) 170 CLR 293; 64 ALJR 535; 34 IR 40, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 304 (CLR). See Grant v National Coal Board (UK) [1956] AC 649; [1956] 2 WLR 752, Lord Reid at 660–661, Lord Tucker at 664 (AC) (where the object of enactment is to promote safety, there can be no implication that liability for breach is limited to injury caused in a particular way); but see Gorris v Scott (1874) LR 9 Ex 125 (statutory direction that cattle be carried in pens of a certain size was intended to prevent spread of disease, therefore action failed where cattle were washed overboard).

368

Defences General [33.5.390] Statutory restrictions in several jurisdictions provide exclusions from liability and/or defences to an action for breach of statutory duty,1 such as in the context of work health and safety.2 The Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) and the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) do not confer a right of action (or a defence) in civil proceedings for breach of those Acts or the accompanying regulations.3 The push for national uniformity means identical provisions exist in the Australian Capital Territory,4 the Northern Territory,5 Queensland,6 South Australia,7 and Tasmania.8 Victoria9 and Western Australia10 have similar provisions. Where the statute contains a defence, which would be available in the case of a prosecution under the statute, such defence may not be available in any civil action.11

1

2

3

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 43, 43A; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 40, 41, 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 5Y, 5AA. See Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2014) 204 LGERA 238; [2014] ACTCA 45, Katzmann J at [713]; Patsalis v New South Wales (2012) 81 NSWLR 742; 266 FLR 207; [2012] NSWCA 307, Basten JA at [87] (Allsop P and Sackville AJA agreeing), s 43 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) applies to a breach of statutory duty and not to obligations under general law. See, eg [33.5.140]; see generally “Legislative Overview” [33.2.90]; “Statutory Authorities” [33.2.1180]; Transport “Immunities and Performance of Legislative Duties and Powers” [34.2.5370]–[34.2.5390] (discussion of immunity from private civil action). The recovery of damages is also limited by accident compensation schemes: see Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 44, 45; Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT), s 31; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 9; Return to Work Act 1986 (NT), s 53 (formerly the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (NT), s 53: see Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2015 (NT), s 4); Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 108; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s 25; Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 135A; Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 18. On the availability of and requirements for actions for breach of statutory duty in the workplace context, see Labour Law “Occupational and Work Health and Safety” [26.8.10]ff, particularly “Actions for Breach of Statutory Duty” [26.8.540]–[26.8.590]. Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), s 267; Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), s 267. 369

[33.5.390]

DEFENCES

4 5

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (ACT), s 267. Work Health and Safety (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 267. 6 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), s 267. 7 Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (SA), s 267. 8 Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (Tas), s 267. 9 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), s 34; Equipment (Public Safety) Act 1994 (Vic), s 11. 10 Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA), s 33(3). 11 Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 397; 41 ALJR 129, Kitto J at 405–406 (CLR).

[33.5.400] Contributory negligence may be raised as a defence to breach of a statutory duty in all jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory. That is by virtue of the apportionment legislation,1 which allows for a reduction in damages to the plaintiff, based on contribution to their own loss.2 In the Australian Capital Territory, if the plaintiff suffered personal injury and the wrong was a breach of statutory duty, the damages recoverable by the plaintiff in relation to the personal injury are not to be reduced because of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.3 Prior to the apportionment legislation, the High Court in Piro v W Foster & Co Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 313 had unanimously decided that contributory negligence was available in an action based on breach of statutory duty,4 adopting the English position as expressed in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152, where Lord Atkin noted: “I cannot therefore accept the view that the action for injuries caused by breach of statutory duty differs from an action for injuries caused by any other wrong.”5 In Piro v W Foster & Co Ltd, Latham CJ concluded that “it should now be held by this Court that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is a defence to such an action”.6

1

2

On apportionment legislation, including proportionate liability and contributory negligence, see generally “Contributory Negligence” [33.10.2150]; Professional Liability “Causation of Damage” [27.3.790]. See also issues of proportionate liability, contribution and indemnity between joint and several tortfeasors, discussed in “Concurrent Torts” [33.11.10]ff. See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), ss 8, 9 (where contributory negligence defence is available at common law); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 5A, 5R – 5T; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151N(3); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15 (definition of “wrong”), ss 16 – 21A; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5 (definition of “wrong”), s 10 (where contributory negligence defence is available at common law); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “negligent wrongdoing”), ss 7, 8; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2 (definition of “wrongful act”), ss 4, 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 25 (definition of 370

[33.5.410]

3 4

5

6

GENERAL

wrong), ss 26, 28AA (where contributory negligence defence is available at common law); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 3 (definition of “Negligence”), ss 4, 6. In New South Wales, the defence of contributory negligence to causes of action for breach of statutory duty accruing prior to 6 December 2002 (except for actions falling within Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151N(3)) is not available: see Statutory Duties (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (NSW), s 2 (now repealed); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 7 (now repealed). See discussion in Booksan Pty Ltd v Wehbe (2006) 14 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-678; [2006] NSWCA 3, Ipp JA (Giles and Tobias JJA agreeing) at [155]–[173], where it was found that, in relation to actions accrued prior to the amendments, Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 30(1)(c), (e) did not allow for the retrospective operation of the contributory negligence provisions inserted into the Civil Liability Act 2002, despite the transitional provision contained in Sch 1 Pt 3 cl 6 providing for its retrospective operation. For further discussion of contributory negligence, see “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 102(2). Piro v W Foster & Co Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 313, Latham CJ at 321, Rich J at 325, Starke J at 326, McTiernan J at 336 (dissenting as to outcome), Williams J at 342, overruling Bourke v Butterfield & Lewis Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 354; 27 SR (NSW) 339; 43 WN (NSW) 180. Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152, Lord Atkin at 166 (AC). See also Labour Law “Measure of Damages for Work-related Injuries” [26.8.680]. Piro v W Foster & Co Ltd (1943) 68 CLR 313, Latham CJ at 321; Kakouris v Gibbs Burge & Co Pty Ltd (1970) 44 ALJR 384 (HCA). See also Monaghan Surveyors Pty Ltd v Stratford Glen-Avon Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 94, Basten JA at [77].

[33.5.410] An action for breach of statutory duty is subject to the limitation statutes of the various jurisdictions.1 In the case of personal injuries, the limitation period is three years.2 The limitation period for non-personal injuries is six years,3 except in the Northern Territory where it is three years.4 Where the statute expressly provides for a right of action for damages for breach of a provision, the statute may prescribe a different limitation period.5

1

2

3

The law concerning limitation periods (including periods for claiming contribution and indemnity between tortfeasors) is dealt with in more detail in Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff; see particularly “Table of Limitation of Actions” at [5.10.10]. Actions for breach of statutory duty are founded in tort: see “General” [5.10.740]. Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 16B; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s 18A, Pt 2 Div 6; Limitation Act 1981 (NT), s 12(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 11; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), ss 5(1), 5A; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), ss 5(1AA), 5(1A), 27D(1); Limitation Act 2005 (WA), ss 3(1) (definition of “action”) 14. See generally Civil Procedure “Personal Injury” [5.10.990]–[5.10.1290]; “Tort” [5.10.740]–[5.10.880]. Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 11; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s 14(1); Limitation of

371

[33.5.410]

DEFENCES

4 5

Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 35; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s 4(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), s 5(1)(a); Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 38(1); Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 13. Limitation Act 1981 (NT), s 12(1). See, eg Australian Consumer Law, s 236(2) (six years) (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2) (formerly Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82).

[33.5.420] Voluntary assumption of risk (“volenti non fit injuria”) is no defence to an action based on breach of statutory duty, at least in the case of injury to employees, where a statute makes an employer personally liable: see also [33.5.280]. The leading case on this point is Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 669 in which a boy, who had knowledge of the fact that the machine he was working could be stopped by a lever, lost his hand and fingers after attempting to remove shavings from it. There was a statutory obligation on the employer to fence dangerous machinery. Talbot J noted that: With regard to the defence commonly known as that based on the maxim “Volenti non fit injuria,” it is settled [by Baddeley v Earl Granville (1887) 19 QBD 423 (followed by Davies v Thomas Owen & Co [1919] 2 KB 39)], that that has no validity against an action based on breach of absolute statutory duty.1

In cases where the employer is in breach of a statutory duty only because he or she is vicariously responsible for the plaintiff’s breach of that duty (and through no act or omission on the employer’s part), then the employer can escape liability.2 This is to be distinguished from those situations where the statute or regulation binds both the employer and the employee, and where the breach was solely the result of a breach by the employee:3 see also [33.5.270].

1 Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 669 (CA), Talbot J at 675. Volenti non fit injuria: “The principle that there is no liability in tort for an act if there was consent or assumption of risk on the part of the injured party … [A]n injury cannot be done to a willing person”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 179. Earlier, in Baddeley v Earl Granville (1887) 19 QBD 423, it had been held that the defence was not applicable where the injury arose from a breach of a duty on the part of the employer. In Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd, the Court of Appeal was unwilling to depart from that statement of law. In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656; [1964] 3 WLR 329, the House of Lords approved that view insofar as the statutory duties imposed on employers personally were concerned. However, Lord Pearce noted at 687 (AC) that the defence of “volenti” should be available where the employer was not personally in breach of a statutory duty, and was not vicariously in breach of any statutory duty through the neglect of some person who was of superior rank to the plaintiff, and whose commands the plaintiff was bound to obey. 2 Boyle v Kodak Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 661 (HL), Lord Reid at 665–666; Brancato v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 7 NSWLR 30 (CA), Glass AP and McHugh JA at 33. See also discussion on vicarious liability at [33.5.230];

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3

GENERAL

“Employers” [33.2.1060]; “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350]; see also Occupational and Work Health and Safety “Actions for Breach of Statutory Duty” [26.8.550]. On employers’ rights to obtain indemnity from an employee in this situation, see “Assessment of Contribution” [33.11.390]. Brancato v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1986) 7 NSWLR 30 (CA), Glass AP and McHugh JA at 33. See also discussion on contributory negligence at [33.5.400].

[33.5.430] Illegal conduct on the part of a plaintiff will not absolve a defendant from liability where the action is based on a breach of statutory duty. In Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651; 51 ALJR 184, the High Court held that the principle by which the law refrains from imposing a duty of care on a person engaged in a joint illegal enterprise towards another engaged in it in respect of that enterprise does not apply where the illegality arises from the breach of a specific statutory duty designed for the safety of one of the participants. In these circumstances, the defendant was not absolved from a duty of care.1

1

See Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651; 51 ALJR 184, Jacobs J (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ agreeing) at 669 (CLR); but see Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366 (illegality as a basis for denying damages in negligence; illegal use of motor car established no relationship giving rise to duty of care); Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9.

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[33.5.430]

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374

33.6 Strict Liability

STRICT LIABILITY

Current Subtitle Author Clare McKay BA, LLB (Hons) (UWA), BCL (Oxon) Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria

(Updating author, Update 307 – May 2015) (Updating author, Update 298 – August 2014)

(Updating author, Update 319 – June 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors David R Browne

Peter J MacFarlane

BEc, LLB (Hons) (Macq) Legal Editor, The Laws of Australia

BA (Flinder), BLegS (Macq), LLM (Syd) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Queensland Senior Lecturer in Law, Queensland University of Technology ([33.6.10] – [33.6.170] Original author)

(Updating author, Update 157 – September 2002)

Dr Peter Handford LLB (Birm), LLM, PhD (Cantab) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Courts of Victoria and Western Australia Barrister, Middle Temple (Updating author, Update 80 – August 1998) (Updating author, Update 16 – December 1995) ([33.6.280] – [33.6.470] Original author)

Charmaine Lye

Geoff Masel BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Updating author, Update 144 – August 2001) (Updating author, Update 80 – August 1998) (Updating author, Update 16 – December 1995) ([33.6.580] – [33.6.720] Original author)

BA (Cantab) Barrister, Supreme Court of Victoria (Updating author, Update 253 – September 2010) (Updating author, Update 218 – October 2007) (Updating author, Update 210 – February 2007) 376

33.6 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.6.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.6.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.6.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.6.30] PRINCIPLES...............................................................................[33.6.140] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.6.140] COMMON LAW LIABILITY.....................................................[33.6.150] STATUTORY LIABILITY......................................................... [33.6.170] ANIMALS....................................................................................[33.6.280] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.6.280] LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES..... [33.6.290] SCIENTER LIABILITY............................................................ [33.6.350] CATTLE TRESPASS.............................................................. [33.6.400] ABOLITION OF SCIENTER AND CATTLE TRESPASS........[33.6.450] STATUTORY STRICT LIABILITY FOR DOGS...................... [33.6.460] VICARIOUS LIABILITY..............................................................[33.6.580] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.6.580] LIABILITY OF THE CROWN..................................................[33.6.610] LOAN OF SERVICES............................................................ [33.6.620] COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT................................................[33.6.630] INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS......................................... [33.6.710]

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Introduction Definition [33.6.10] “Strict liability” is broadly defined as liability arising in the absence of fault. Strict liability principles can arise at common law or be created by statute. The law also recognises vicarious liability (see [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]), which arises by virtue of a special relationship existing between the parties, such as between employer and employee.1 An employer may be responsible for acts done by an employee, even though the employer is not personally at fault. The rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 was formerly the best known example of strict liability arising at common law. This was a self-contained cause of action where liability was not based on proof of fault. While proof of fault was not an element of the cause of action, liability was not absolute and a number of defences were permitted. However, the High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331 held that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher has been absorbed into the principles of ordinary negligence: see [33.6.150]. The High Court also confirmed that liability in relation to fire, sometimes treated as a separate area of strict liability, has been absorbed into, and qualified by, more general rules or principles including those rules in Rylands v Fletcher. As a consequence, liability in relation to fire did not survive the abolition of this doctrine from Australian law. The remaining areas of strict liability governed by common law involve animals (see [33.6.280]–[33.6.470]), such as cattle that wander onto the land of another,2 and animals known to be dangerous (scienter liability):3 see [33.6.350]–[33.6.380]. These torts have been abolished by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and South Australia.4 In Western Australia, they do not operate in respect of injury or damage caused by an animal straying onto a highway.5 Statutory provisions giving rise to a remedy apart from fault are generally the most important examples of strict liability (vicarious liability excepted). Many such provisions can be found in statutes in each Australian jurisdiction. They can be broadly divided into: (1)

provisions where a statutory obligation is used as the foundation for an action involving breach of a particular statutory standard, for example certain industrial, health and safety legislation;

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(2)

statutory actions where the plaintiff is not required to prove fault, such as certain areas of liability concerning aircraft, defective products and injuries inflicted by dogs; and

(3)

statutory compensation schemes (eg workers’ compensation) which comprehensively replace common law principles.

Where a statute imposes liability in the absence of fault, the terms of the statute will determine whether liability is absolute, strict or something less, such as a failure to exercise reasonable care. Case law suggests that as far as the statutory duty to protect workers from dangerous machinery is concerned, liability is construed as absolute.6 By contrast, in situations not involving dangerous machinery, the statutory standard imposing liability has not been construed as absolute.7

1 See, eg Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Fullagar J at 57: “The liability is a true vicarious liability: that is to say, the master is liable not for a breach of a duty resting on him and broken by him but for a breach of duty resting on another and broken by another.” See also Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215; [1960] Qd R 204; (1960) 33 ALJR 463 (both statute and common law can impose strict liability on the owner of a vehicle by deeming the driver to be the agent of the owner). 2 Tillett v Ward (1882) 10 QBD 17, Lord Coleridge CJ at 19–20: “Now, it is clear as a general rule, that the owner of cattle and sheep is bound to keep them from trespassing on his neighbours’ land, and if they so trespass an action for damages may be brought against him, irrespective of whether the trespass was or was not the result of his negligence.” 3 See, eg Fischer v Stuart (1979) 37 FLR 46 (NTSC) (distinction between wild animals and domestic animals); Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570 (dogs); Eather v Jones [1974] 2 NSWLR 19 (CA) (child bitten by horse); Irving v Slevin (1982) 30 SASR 66, Zelling J at 69 (collision between motorcyclist and dog). Scienter rule: “[T]he old common-law rule, now largely superseded by statute, to the effect that keepers of domestic … animals were strictly liable in tort for damage caused by their animals, provided that the animal’s propensity to cause damage was known to the keeper”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 156. 4 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 212 (abolition of action of cattle trespass), s 214 (abolition of scienter and other rules relating exclusively to liability for damage by animals); Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 4(1) (abolition of tort of cattle trespass), s 7(2)(a) (scienter); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18 (liability for animals to be determined in accordance with principles of negligence). 5 Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3. In Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997), the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia rejected an argument that scienter liability had been absorbed into the general law of negligence as a result of the High Court’s decision in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331. 6 Wenck v Morris Woollen Mills (Ipswich) Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 142, Dunn J

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[33.6.30]

7

RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES

at 144–145 (the obligation to fence every part of transmission machinery “unless it comes within the [statutory] exception, is an absolute one, not to be qualified by implying words in the section which the Legislature has not enacted”); Bouronicos v Mylex Corp Ltd [1975] VR 120 (breach established although plaintiff worker had removed safety guard); Dairy Farmers Co-op Ltd v Azar (1990) 170 CLR 293; 64 ALJR 535; 34 IR 40. See “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff. Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; 60 ALJR 250, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 165 (CLR): “But of course the rule does not impose absolute liability on an employer. The proscription is in terms of ‘permitted or allowed’.” See Austral Bronze Co Pty Ltd v Ajaka (1970) 44 ALJR 155 (requirement to maintain floors); Milankovic v Viscount Manufacturers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 1 (CA) (duty to stack goods in a manner which will ensure their stability not absolute). In Interstruct Pty Ltd v Wakelam (1990) 3 WAR 100 (WASCFC), the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that a statutory obligation to provide and maintain a safe working environment (in that case, a suitable ladder) was not an absolute duty, but was subject to the availability of knowledge of the risk in terms of what was “practicable”. It is the construction of the statute which is important in cases based on breach of statutory duty.

Scope of Subtitle [33.6.20] This Subtitle examines the principles governing strict liability. A general summary can be found at [33.6.140]. An analysis of the current situation regarding strict liability arising at common law is discussed at [33.6.150]–[33.6.160]. A summary of the ways in which strict liability may arise under statute appears at [33.6.170]. Tort liability for the acts of animals is considered at [33.6.280]–[33.6.470]. Although strict liability accounts for a large proportion of the actions for damage done by animals, liability may also arise under general tort law principles: see [33.6.290]–[33.6.340]. Scienter liability is examined at [33.6.350]–[33.6.390] and the rules relating to cattle trespass at [33.6.400]–[33.6.440]. The jurisdictions where scienter and cattle trespass have been abolished by legislation are examined at [33.6.450]. Statutory strict liability for dogs is considered at [33.6.460]–[33.6.470]. The principles of vicarious liability, a further example of strict liability, are discussed at [33.6.580]–[33.6.720].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.6.30] Issues raised in this Subtitle arise in a number of contexts. General principles of negligence discussed in “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff are relevant, as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 has been absorbed into the principles of ordinary negligence. Statutory provisions giving rise to strict liability are examined from the perspective of statutory duties generally in “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff.

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Other subtitles within 33 Torts do not deal with certain topics which, although closely related to the subject of animals, do not involve liability for damage done by animals. For example, the obligation to fence land, while relevant to the issue of damage caused by animals, is considered in 28 Real Property. Liability for harm caused to animals is dealt with directly in Environment and Natural Resources “Animals” [14.14.10]ff. The two defences that directly involve animals – the right to defend property against injury or damage caused by animals and the right to seize and detain an animal unlawfully on property (where this right still exists) – are considered in “Defences” [33.9.10]ff.

382

Principles General [33.6.140] The main examples of strict liability are found in statute. At common law, there existed a number of disparate areas where liability was generally imposed on the defendant irrespective of fault. For example, the tort of cattle trespass (see [33.6.400]–[33.6.440]) imposed liability on the defendant despite the exercise of reasonable care. Scienter liability for dangerous animals (see [33.6.350]–[33.6.390]) and liability for fire were further examples. In Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, Blackburn J relied on these areas of law to support a more general proposition involving strict liability for the escape of dangerous things. However, this attempt to develop a generalised approach to strict liability, subsequently qualified by the House of Lords in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (which introduced the requirement that there had to be a non-natural user of land) was gradually cut down in later cases. Ultimately, the High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331 held that, for the purposes of the common law of Australia, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher should be seen as absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence: see [33.6.150]. Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd was consistent with the approach taken by the High Court in earlier cases. In those cases, in relation to activities which themselves promoted risks, the High Court had tended not to extend the common law in terms of strict liability. In light of developments in the area of negligence, courts have been reluctant to extend principles of strict liability; rather, some element of fault or lack of reasonable care is generally required as a prerequisite to liability.1 This may influence future judicial decisions regarding the remaining strict liability torts of cattle trespass and scienter actions, in jurisdictions in which those torts have not already been abolished:2 see [33.6.450]. In contrast to the position regarding strict liability at common law, an increasing number of statutory provisions create liability without proof of fault: see [33.6.170]. In particular, Australian legislatures have been active in the introduction of no-fault motor vehicle and workers’ compensation schemes. Vicarious liability is a further example of strict liability, but is separate from these developments: see [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]. Vicarious liability is a doctrine by which the law gives injured parties a remedy against the person or corporation who benefits from an accident-producing activity, although not personally at fault. There are a number of situations in which a person is held liable for a tort committed by another without that first person being personally

383

[33.6.140]

PRINCIPLES

at fault. The most common relationships giving rise to such liability are master and servant and principal and agent.3 A master is liable for the torts (including wilful torts such as assault and theft)4 committed by a servant in the course of employment. Further, at common law, a driver of a vehicle over which the owner retains control is an agent of the owner who is liable, as principal, for the driver’s negligence.5 Certain trespasses to the person and to property are also torts of strict liability. False imprisonment6 is often regarded as a tort of strict liability7 in that, while there must have been an intention to detain the plaintiff, lack of fault, in the sense of an absence of bad faith, is irrelevant to the existence of the wrong.8 It is sufficient that there was an unlawful and total restraint of the plaintiff’s liberty, for however short a time, by the use or threatened use of force or by confinement. Conversion is also a strict liability tort.9 While the wrongful act of dealing with goods in a manner inconsistent with the owner’s rights must be accompanied by an intention to deny the owner’s rights or to assert a right inconsistent with them, there need not be any knowledge on the part of the defendant that the goods belong to someone else; nor does there need to be any positive intention to challenge the true owner’s rights.10 Detinue similarly appears to be regarded as a tort of strict liability.11 The position is less clear with respect to trespass to goods. However it seems logical to assume that trespass to goods taking the form of a direct act causing damage to goods is likely to be a strict liability tort, since no fault is required.12

1 2

3

See, eg comments in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J at 30, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 42–43 (CLR). These actions have already been abolished in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and South Australia: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 212 (abolition of tort of cattle trespass), s 214 (abolition of scienter and other rules relating exclusively to liability for damage by animals); Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 4(1) (abolition of action of cattle trespass), s 7(2)(a) (scienter); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18 (liability for animals to be determined in accordance with principles of negligence). See also Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(3) preventing strict liability from operating in respect of injury or damage caused by an animal straying onto a highway. However, in Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997), the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia rejected an argument that scienter liability had been absorbed into the general law of negligence as a result of the decision in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331. In Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, the High Court raised doubts regarding the application of strict liability in respect of the imposition of vicarious liability for the acts of an independent contractor which had not been authorised by the defendant: see also [33.6.710]–[33.6.720]. In Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held the defendant liable for an independent contractor’s negligence by reason not of vicarious liability but for failure to fulfil a non-delegable duty of care: see [33.6.580]. 384

[33.6.150]

COMMON LAW LIABILITY

4

Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370; 50 SR (NSW) 50; 67 WN (NSW) 76 (the assault in that case was said not to be in the course of employment); Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 3 WLR 276 (CA) (theft by employee; employer vicariously liable): see [33.6.600]. 5 Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215; [1960] Qd R 204; (1960) 33 ALJR 463. 6 For more detailed discussion of this tort, see “False Imprisonment” [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780]. 7 New South Wales v TD (2013) 83 NSWLR 566; [2013] NSWCA 56, Basten JA at [53]; Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, Kirby J at [140]; Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339; R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48. 8 Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364, Clarke JA at 743 (NSWLR). 9 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18. For a more detailed discussion of this tort, see “Conversion” [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]. 10 Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757; Motis Exports Ltd v Dampskibsselskabet AF 1912 A/S [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 571 (CA), Rix J at 582; Neumann v Bakeaway Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1016n (CA), Geoffrey Lane LJ at 1019–1020, Sir John Pennycuick at 1023; Rendell v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1957] VR 604 (FC). However, note that where the plaintiff is entitled to sue for conversion in respect of an equitable interest the plaintiff holds in the goods (eg as an equitable pledgee), the fact that the defendant neither knew nor had cause to know of the plaintiff’s interest may afford the plaintiff a defence: Maynegrain Pty Ltd v Compafina Bank [1984] 1 NSWLR 258; (1984) 58 ALJR 389 (PC). 11 By implication from Rapid Roofing Pty Ltd v Natalise Pty Ltd [2007] 2 Qd R 335; [2007] QCA 94. For more detailed discussion of this tort, see “Detinue” [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]. 12 For more detailed discussion of this tort, see “Trespass to Chattels” [33.8.720]–[33.8.780].

Common Law Liability [33.6.150] The rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 has been abolished as a distinct legal principle. Under this rule a person who brought dangerous things onto land, the use of which constituted a non-natural user of the land, was strictly liable for the consequences of the escape of such things if that escape was the result of the non-natural user. In Rylands v Fletcher, the defendants entered into an arrangement for the construction of a reservoir for their mill. The adjoining land contained a colliery, occupied by the plaintiff as tenant. When the reservoir was filled, the weight of the water broke through old shafts, which had been filled up during excavations for the reservoir, and flowed into the plaintiff’s mine, causing damage. Blackburn J, giving the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, found the defendant liable on the basis that “the person who for his own

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purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape”.1 The decision of Blackburn J was seen as an attempt to produce a generalised principle of strict liability for hazardous activities. Subsequent case law gradually cut down the scope of this principle. The process began when Fletcher v Rylands was appealed to the House of Lords. In Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, Lord Cairns introduced the requirement that there had to be a non-natural user of land. This referred to using land or introducing onto such land an object, substance or activity which was not in or upon the land as part of the ordinary course of things.2 Another stage in the decline of this principle was the Privy Council’s decision in Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263; (1913) 16 CLR 387, that “non-natural user” had to be some use bringing with it increased danger to others and not merely the ordinary use of the land or such use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.3 Any possibility that Rylands v Fletcher would produce a general theory of liability for ultrahazardous activities was ended after the House of Lords, in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156, denied any such theory and stated that an escape from land was a necessary part of the rule. Australian courts have also rejected the existence of any such theory.4 In more recent years, particularly due to the refinement of the concept of non-natural user and of various defences, Rylands v Fletcher liability has become more closely aligned with the law of negligence. This development was taken a step further by Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, where the House of Lords ruled that liability under Rylands v Fletcher was restricted to damage which was foreseeable. In Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 3 WLR 1467; [2003] UKHL 61, the House of Lords affirmed that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher remains a distinct part of the tort of nuisance in English law.5 In Australia, a majority of the High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331 held that the rule had been “absorbed” by the principles of ordinary negligence (subject to the qualification that there may remain cases in which it is preferable to see the defendant’s liability in Rylands v Fletcher situations as lying in nuisance or trespass).6 Thus a person who takes advantage of their control of premises to introduce a dangerous substance or to carry on a dangerous activity, or to allow another to do so, owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury or damage to the person or property of another. Where the person or property of that other is lawfully in a place outside the premises in question, the

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duty of care extends to ensuring that such care is taken, that is, the duty is non-delegable.7

1 2

3

4

5

6 7

Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, Blackburn J at 279. Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, Lord Cairns at 338–339. This would seem to exclude one of the major examples given in Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 by Blackburn J (cattle trespass) as justifying the rule. Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263; (1913) 16 CLR 387 (PC), Lord Moulton (for the Privy Council) at 280 (AC). That case involved an action by a tenant for damage to property (stock) located on the second floor of a building leased to the defendant. The damage occurred through a continuous overflow of water from a lavatory basin on the top floor brought about by the tap having been turned on and the waste pipe plugged. It was contended for the plaintiff (respondent) that it was the defendant’s duty to prevent an overflow from the lavatory basin, however caused, and that he was liable in damages for not having done so. The Privy Council expressed the view that the provision of a proper supply of water to the various parts of a dwelling is not only reasonable, but has become, in accordance with modern sanitary views, an almost necessary feature of town life. In Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J at 30 (CLR) noted that the traditional common law response to the creation of a special danger is not to impose strict liability but to insist on a higher standard of care in the performance of an existing duty: see also Wilson and Dawson JJ at 42–43 (CLR). In Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, the theory was rejected with respect to the imposition of vicarious liability for the acts of an independent contractor, and found little favour with the High Court as a general principle: see also [33.6.710]–[33.6.720]. Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 3 WLR 1467; [2003] UKHL 61 (HL), Lord Bingham at [6], [9]; Lord Hoffmann at [43]; Lord Hobhouse at [52]; Lord Scott at [82]; Lord Walker at [106]. Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 577–578 (CLR). Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 552–557 (CLR) where their Honours referred particularly to Black v Christchurch Finance Co Ltd [1894] AC 48 (PC); McInnes v Wardle (1931) 45 CLR 548; Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48.

[33.6.160] Liability for damage caused by fire may arise by application of the principles of negligence,1 trespass2 or nuisance.3 Strict liability for fire preceded the creation of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330.4 However, even before Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331,5 Australian courts had recognised that the medieval rules on the escape of fire had been absorbed into the principles of Rylands v Fletcher.6 The High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd confirmed that there was no separate principle involving strict liability for fire. The Court held that the Rylands v Fletcher principle had been absorbed

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into the general principles of negligence liability, except for a few cases, where it was preferable to see liability lying in trespass or nuisance. Some jurisdictions have legislation inherited from England which goes to the issue of liability in respect of fires started accidentally.7 The legislation cannot be applied to exclude Rylands v Fletcher liability8 or liability in nuisance,9 and seems to have been confined to providing protection from liability for fire (which in England was once assumed to be a separate principle).10 Since liability for fire and liability under Rylands v Fletcher no longer exist as separate principles, these statutes do not apply in Australia.11

1 2 3 4

See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See generally “Trespass” [33.8.10]ff. See generally “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. For the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, see [33.6.150]. Strict liability appears to have been first recognised in Beaulieu v Finglam (1401) YB 2 Hen IV, fo 18, pl 6. 5 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331. 6 Whinfield v Lands Purchase & Management Board (Vic) (1914) 18 CLR 606; [1914] VLR 662; Hazelwood v Webber (1934) 52 CLR 268; 35 SR (NSW) 140; 52 WN (NSW) 53; Wise Bros Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1947) 75 CLR 59; 48 SR (NSW) 54; 65 WN (NSW) 28; Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277 (affirmed in Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182 (PC)); Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5) (1988) 67 LGRA 108 (SASC). 7 Most states and territories (but not New South Wales or Queensland) have adopted or accepted Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 14 Geo 3 c 78 (IMP), s 86 which purports to modify strict liability for fire where the fire starts accidentally: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 170; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11(15); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 48. In the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia, this section is in force as part of the inherited law. However, the statutory protections afforded to fires started accidentally do not apply to fires caused by negligence: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 535 (CLR). 8 Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43 (CA). See also Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 3 WLR 1467; [2003] UKHL 61, Lord Bingham at [6] (statutory regulation of related areas, such as water, imposes strict liability consistently with the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330). 9 Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 (KB), Atkinson J at 495. 10 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 533–534 (CLR). 11 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 533–534 (CLR).

388

[33.6.170]

STATUTORY LIABILITY

Statutory Liability [33.6.170] Liability without proof of fault may arise under statute. Apart from workers’ compensation statutory schemes, which provide a remedy to employees for injuries arising out of their employment,1 there are a number of industrial statutes that impose degrees of liability upon owners, occupiers, or operators of dangerous machinery, and which require workers (and, in some cases, others) to be protected from harm. This is one area where strict liability may be seen to play a significant role in the workplace relationship. Apart from imposing criminal sanctions for breaches of such legislation, an injured person can often maintain a right of action for breach of statutory duty, where the question of fault will generally not be in issue.2 In Australia, certain motor vehicle compensation schemes give rise to strict liability. As with workers’ compensation schemes, early no-fault motor vehicle schemes adopted the pattern of strict liability with compulsory liability insurance. In Australia, some jurisdictions have statutory schemes for the payment of compensation for injury or death arising from a transport accident, payments being made regardless of whether or not anyone would have been liable in negligence for the accident.3 In respect of aircraft, certain Australian jurisdictions have subjected owners of national aircraft to strict liability for damage to person or property during flight, take-off and landing. Commonwealth legislation imposes similar liability in respect of international flights.4 Defective products and misleading statements may also give rise to strict liability. The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), now replaced by the Australian Consumer Law,5 was the vehicle for the introduction of product liability legislation in Australia. The Australian Consumer Law imposes strict liability in a number of contexts. For example, in an action under s 18 (misleading or deceptive conduct),6 the question whether or not the conduct was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, is generally not dependent on proof of fault.7 More specifically, Pt 3-2 Div 1 of the Australian Consumer Law provides for direct responsibility of manufacturers to consumers in relation to fitness for purpose and merchantability.8 Statutory provisions in every state and territory (except Queensland and Tasmania) provide for the recovery of damages for injuries inflicted by dogs irrespective of negligence:9 see [33.6.460]–[33.6.470].

1

Under such schemes, persons who are “workers” or “employees” as defined by the legislation are entitled to compensation where personal injury or disease has arisen out of or in the course of their employment. Although “fault” is irrelevant, there is still a need to establish a causal link between work and injury, and wilful infliction of injury is not covered. See, generally Comcare v PVYW (2013) 88 ALJR 1;

389

[33.6.170]

PRINCIPLES

2

3

4

5 6

7

8

[2013] HCA 41. Provision is also made in the legislation for specific situations such as journey accidents. See Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth); Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT); Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (NT); Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas); Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic); Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Vic); Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA). See also “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff. See, eg Machinery Regulation 1950 (ACT), reg 13(1) which provides that an occupier of premises must “securely fence all dangerous parts of machinery that is in or on the premises” and reg 13(4) which provides that this is an absolute duty. An important question in respect of such legislation is whether or not a breach can (in addition to penal sanctions) give rise to a common law action for breach of statutory duty. Whether a statute evidences a legislative intent to give a civil right for breach will depend on a number of factors, the important factor being the object and scope of the Act as a whole. See generally “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff. Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (NT); Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas); Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic). Note that where no-fault schemes are in place, an interstate plaintiff may still be able to bring a common law action. See, eg Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 (Cth); Damage by Aircraft Act 1952 (NSW); Damage by Aircraft Act 1963 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VI; Damage by Aircraft Act 1964 (WA). It has been held that Wrongs Act 1958, s 31 is directed entirely to those who suffer loss or damage from the activities of aircraft or those who travel in them, and that it was not intended to apply to those who fly aircraft or fly in them: Leith v Medhurst [1991] 2 VR 362. See also Transport “Aviation” [34.2.10]ff. Australian Consumer Law found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. Formerly Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52. Section 52 was in the same terms as Australian Consumer Law, s 18, except the phrase “[a] person must not” is now used in place of “a corporation must not” (Australian Consumer Law found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2). See generally Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 88 ALJR 176; [2013] HCA 54, French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ at [11]. Fault will be an issue where silence is the basis of the breach or where the misleading or deceptive conduct arises from a prediction as to the future, or when the defendant is an accessory: Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1; [2001] FCA 187. See Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff. Australian Consumer Law, Pt 3-2 Div 1 (“Consumer guarantees”) (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2) has been incorporated into fair trading and consumer protection legislation in all states and territories. See Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 (ACT), Pt 2; Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), Pt 3; Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT), Pt 4; Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), Pt 3; Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA), Pt 3; Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 (Tas); Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA). However, some statutes, such as the Sale of

390

[33.6.170]

9

STATUTORY LIABILITY

Goods Act 1923 (NSW), still remain in force and impose responsibility in relation to quality of goods and fitness for purpose. Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT); Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT); Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA); Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic); Dog Act 1976 (WA). In Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997), the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia rejected an argument that the statutory liability under the Dog Acts could be avoided by establishing absence of negligence: see [33.6.470]. In Tasmania, Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 19 gives rise to statutory liability irrespective of negligence, but not liability in damages.

391

[33.6.170]

PRINCIPLES

392

Animals General [33.6.280] Acts done by animals may give rise to liability in tort. Liability may arise under a number of special torts creating forms of strict liability for damage done by animals, or under general tort law principles. In the words of Lord Simonds, “the law of torts has grown up historically in separate compartments and … beasts have travelled in a compartment of their own”.1 The special strict liability torts involve liability for animals known to be dangerous (scienter liability) (see [33.6.350]–[33.6.390]), cattle trespass (see [33.6.400]–[33.6.440]) and a form of statutory strict liability for dogs: see [33.6.460]–[33.6.470]. Scienter and cattle trespass have been abolished in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and South Australia:2 see [33.6.450]. Ordinary torts that are most likely to involve liability for animals are negligence (see [33.6.290]–[33.6.300]), nuisance (see [33.6.310]) and trespass: see [33.6.330].

1 2

Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 156, Lord Simonds at 182. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 212 (abolition of action of cattle trespass), s 214 (abolition of scienter and other rules relating exclusively to liability for damage by animals); Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 4(1) (abolition of tort of cattle trespass), s 7(2)(a) (scienter); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18 (liability for animals to be determined in accordance with principles of negligence). In Western Australia, these torts are abolished in respect of liability for damage caused by animals straying onto a highway: Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(3).

Liability under General Tort Law Principles [33.6.290] An action lies in negligence for carelessly keeping an animal that causes harm to another.1 This liability has existed since the 17th century2 and is independent of the special rules of tort liability for animals: see [33.6.350]–[33.6.470]. Negligence applies not only in cases of collisions or other accidental injury, but also where animals display vicious or hostile aggression.3 The general rules of negligence apply to such a claim. A plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care to them,4 that the defendant was in breach of that duty,5 and that the plaintiff suffered reasonably foreseeable harm 393

[33.6.290]

ANIMALS

as a result.6 Although liability is based on foresight7 and not on the defendant’s knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of the animal,8 the animal’s propensity to cause harm is one of the factors that may be taken into account in determining whether or not there was a breach of duty.9 The place where the incident occurred is also relevant in deciding whether or not the defendant took sufficient precautions.10 The defence of contributory negligence is not available at common law11 although it has been introduced by statute.12 The defence of voluntary assumption of risk is available.13 Responsibility is not restricted to the owner of an animal, so long as the requirements for negligence liability are satisfied.14 In some jurisdictions, the common law is supplemented by statutory provisions. The Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) requires a court, in determining the standard of care, to take into account the nature and disposition of the animal as well as any other relevant matters15 and, in determining whether or not the standard was satisfied, to take into account precautionary measures16 or the failure to take them.17 It is not necessary to establish prior knowledge of a vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity.18 Employees working in proximity to animals are not to be presumed to have accepted a risk of harm.19 In the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales, the fact that an animal in the defendant’s control is on the premises of a third person when damage was caused to the plaintiff is evidence of breach of duty.20 Many cases of negligent injury caused by animals occur on highways. Where the animal escapes from private premises onto a highway and does damage, historically certain problems have arisen in establishing a duty of care: see [33.6.300]. However, there is no such difficulty when animals are lawfully on a highway21 or in vehicles that are lawfully on a highway,22 whether harm is caused by want of care on the defendant’s part23 or a positive act which causes the animal to injure the plaintiff.24 Another variant occurs where an animal strays from the defendant’s land onto that of the plaintiff,25 or from one building or part of a building to another.26 In most jurisdictions where occupiers’ liability legislation is in force,27 it is probable that a person injured by an animal on private premises would rely on the common law, unless the injury is seen as having been caused by the dangerous state of the premises rather than an activity being carried out on the premises.28 This distinction is no longer relevant in other jurisdictions.29

1 Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 148 TLR 215 (HL), Lord Atkin at 217 (dog shut in parked car smashed window, causing a splinter of glass to enter the plaintiff’s eye); see also Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25, Starke J at 385 (CLR); Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992 (CA) (pack of Jack Russell terriers savaged small boy when dogs were negligently allowed to escape from defendant’s premises); Galea v Gillingham [1987] 2 Qd R 365 (QSCFC) (defendant failed to restrain German Shepherd dog which the defendant should have realised had propensity to cause injury or damage).

394

[33.6.290]

LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES

In regard to whether or not it is negligent not to foresee the possibility of injury being caused by animals for whom no one is responsible, see Trend v Trend (1987) 4 MVR 423 (WASCFC) (kangaroo hopped out in front of defendant motorcyclist, causing collision and injury to pillion passenger). 2 Mitchil v Alestree (1676) 1 Vent 295; 86 ER 190. 3 Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992 (CA); Galea v Gillingham [1987] 2 Qd R 365 (QSCFC). 4 See Thomas v Elder Smith Goldsborough Mort Ltd (1982) 30 SASR 592 (SASCFC); Carrera v Honeychurch (1983) 32 SASR 511 (SASCFC); James v Fullerton (1983) 77 FLR 321 (NTSC); Charella Farms Pty Ltd v Dalwallinu Shire (1987) 5 SR (WA) 18 (WADC). On the relationship between proximity and foreseeability, see Winters v Burrows (unreported, NSWCA, Samuels, Mahoney and McHugh JJA, CA 289 of 1986, 6 August 1987). See also “Duty of Care: General Principles” [33.2.210]–[33.2.600]. 5 See Southall v Jones (1879) 5 VLR (L) 402; Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154; Smith v Curtis (unreported, NSWSC, Grove J, 9886 of 1983, 11 November 1986); Brown v Toohey (1994) 35 NSWLR 417 (NSWCA); but see Cowell v Madden (1991) 15 MVR 114 (VSCFC). See “Breach of Duty of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1820]. 6 See Whippey v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 452; Bryan v Parks & Wildlife Commission (NT) [2005] NTSC 1, Thomas J at [72]. 7 It is foreseeable that a spirited horse breaking away might knock a passer-by (Tucker v Hennessy [1918] VLR 56 (FC)), or that if one horse on a trail ride got too close to another, it might make an unexpected movement (Carrera v Honeychurch (1983) 32 SASR 511 (SASCFC)), but not that a horse would kick (Bradley v Wallaces Ltd [1913] 3 KB 629 (CA)) or bite: Aldham v United Dairies (London) Ltd [1940] 1 KB 507 (CA), Greene MR at 511. The mere ownership of a household pet is not enough to give rise to a foreseeable risk of injury – some other element is required: Carroll v Rees (1985) 2 MVR 423 (NSWSC). See “Nature of Loss” [33.2.790]–[33.2.820]. 8 Smith v Cook (1875) 1 QBD 79; Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 148 TLR 215 (HL); Matheson v G Stuckey & Co Pty Ltd [1921] VLR 637 (VSCFC). However, see the discussion on scienter liability at [33.6.360]. 9 Collins v Carey [2003] Aust Torts Reports 81-709; [2003] QCA 291; Galea v Gillingham [1987] 2 Qd R 365 (QSCFC); Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992 (CA). 10 Fitzgerald v ED & AD Cooke Bourne (Farms) Ltd [1964] 1 QB 249; [1963] 3 WLR 522 (CA), Willmer LJ at 257 (QB). 11 Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109; Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649; Aird v Grantham (unreported, WASCA, Kennedy, Franklyn and Walsh JJ, 154, 159 of 1997, 18 September 1998); Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154; Le Poidevin Industries Pty Ltd v Trimboli (unreported, SASC, Debelle J, 2182 of 1990, 5 December 1991). 12 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 7.3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), Pt 2; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. See also Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd

395

[33.6.290]

ANIMALS

13

14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22

23 24 25

[1978] 1 NSWLR 649; Rigg v Alietti [1982] WAR 203; Boothey v Morris (2002) 219 LSJS 379; [2002] SASC 126; Aird v Grantham (unreported, WASCA, Kennedy, Franklyn and Walsh JJ, 154, 159 of 1997, 18 September 1998); Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997). See further “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Sylvester v GB Chapman Ltd (1935) 79 SJ 777 (CA) (plaintiff who put his hand in leopard’s cage to extinguish burning cigarette held to have assumed risk of mauling); Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154; Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109; Aird v Grantham (unreported, WASCA, Kennedy, Franklyn and Walsh JJ, 154, 159 of 1997, 18 September 1998); Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997). For attempts to found a defence on an exclusion clause contained in a notice, see Smith v Curtis (unreported, NSWSC, Grove J, 9886 of 1983, 11 November 1986). See further “Voluntary Assumption of Risk” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970]. The owner of a horse can be vicariously liable for the negligence of someone else who is allowed to ride it: Perpetual Trustees & National Executors of Tasmania Ltd v Graham (1990) 13 MVR 563 (TASSC). A person may still be the owner of a horse which they “give” to their child: Candy v Bennett (1991) 13 MVR 363 (VSC). A local authority can be responsible for injuries caused by the escape of a horse from land under its control, even though the land had been leased to a polo club, if it was aware that horses were escaping through inadequate fencing: Gosnells City v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437; 85 LGERA 214 (FC). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(2). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(6). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(7). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(3). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(5). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 169; Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 10. Dorsett v Adelaide City [1913] SALR 71 (horse and dray left unattended in street); Lind v Stump (1916) 12 Tas LR 74 (FC) (horse being led along road jumped and upset motorcycle); Tucker v Hennessy [1918] VLR 56 (FC) (pony and jinker left unattended in street); Barrett v Hardie & Thompson Ltd [1924] NZLR 228 (SC) (horses being driven by man on bicycle); Deen v Davies [1935] 2 KB 282 (CA) (pony left insecurely tethered); Pitcher v Martin [1937] 3 All ER 918 (KB) (pedestrian tripped by dog lead); Griffıth v Turner [1955] NZLR 1035 (SC) (cows being driven along highway at night); Gomberg v Smith [1963] 1 QB 25; [1962] 2 WLR 749 (CA) (St Bernard dog escaped from owner’s control and dented van); Hill v Clark (1969) 91 WN (NSW) 550; [1969] 2 NSWR 733 (CA) (sheep caused truck to jackknife). Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 148 TLR 215 (HL) (dog in parked car); Winters v Burrows (unreported, NSWCA, Samuels, Mahoney and McHugh JJA, CA 289 of 1986, 6 August 1987) (dog on truck). Aldham v United Dairies (London) Ltd [1940] 1 KB 507 (CA) (unattended pony bit and dragged passing pedestrian to ground). Abbott v Freeman (1876) 35 LT 783 (Ex) (reversed on a different view of the facts in Abbott v Freeman (1876) 35 LT 783 (CA)). Gayler & Pope Ltd v B Davies & Son Ltd [1924] 2 KB 75; Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992 (CA); Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570. On the

396

[33.6.300]

26 27

28

29

LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES

separate tort of cattle trespass, see [33.6.400]–[33.6.440]. It was held in Curtis v Thompson (1955) 106 LJ 61 that as there is no liability in cattle trespass for straying dogs there is no liability in negligence for failing to prevent the straying. This decision was criticised in North PM, The Modern Law of Animals (Butt, 1972) p 179. Hines v Tousley (1926) 95 LJKB 773 (CA). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 12.1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IIA; Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA). See “Occupiers’ Liability” [33.3.10]ff. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 12.1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 20(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14B(3); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1985 (WA), s 4(1). Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180 and cases related in principle, eg Calin v Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 33; 65 ALJR 426.

[33.6.300] The rule in Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341, regarding the law of negligence, no longer applies in Australian jurisdictions except the Northern Territory and Queensland. In Searle v Wallbank, the House of Lords held that owners and occupiers of land owed no duty of care to highway users to prevent their animals straying onto the highway, whether by the maintenance of fences or otherwise.1 This rule owes its origin to rural conditions in medieval England,2 but was affirmed by the House of Lords in 19473 and upheld by the High Court as applicable to Australia in State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656.4 As well as applying to farm animals, including poultry, the rule applied to domestic animals such as dogs and cats.5 Prior to 1978, the rule had been upheld in New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria6 but was rejected in Tasmania and Western Australia7 and questioned in Queensland.8 In regard to negligence,9 the rule has been abolished by legislation in most jurisdictions in Australia,10 as well as in England.11 The rule has not been abolished in the Northern Territory or Queensland12 and, in these jurisdictions, the following exceptions to the rule as developed by English case law are likely to continue to apply: (1)

The rule has no application where the animal is known to have such characteristics as to impose on the owner a duty to prevent it getting onto the highway and exhibiting those characteristics to the danger of highway users.13 The special characteristics may relate to the animal,14 the location15 or the circumstances under which it escaped.16

(2)

The rule probably does not apply when animals escape in such numbers as to cause an obstruction (although such a situation may give rise to liability in nuisance).17

(3)

The rule does not apply where a person brings animals onto, or drives them along, a highway: see [33.6.290].

397

[33.6.300]

ANIMALS

(4)

There is some suggestion that the rule does not apply to dogs.18

In addition, the immunity may be read narrowly19 and overcome by statutory provisions regulating the movement of cattle or the fencing of property, but only if the statute provides a private right of action.20 The statutory provisions in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria21 abolish the rule without substituting statutory provisions in its place. This allows the common law to impose a duty of care22 which is non-delegable.23 In this context, it should be noted that the duty is not to take reasonable care to prevent the animal straying onto the highway, but to take reasonable care to prevent it causing harm by such straying.24 Factors taken into account in determining whether or not the defendant was negligent are the state of the fencing25 and its suitability for restraining an animal of the kind in question.26 Leaving a gate open creates a foreseeable risk that animals will stray and do damage.27 However, the unauthorised conduct of a trespasser in opening a gate is not reasonably foreseeable.28 Equally, the unexplained opening of a gate, possibly by an unknown faulty latch, is not reasonably foreseeable such as to give rise to liability in negligence.29 Even though an animal is found on the highway without explanation as to how it strayed from the defendant’s property, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.30 The person on whom liability will fall is the person in control of the animal before it strayed on the highway (who may not necessarily be the owner).31 In South Australia, the abolition of the immunity also allows the common law of negligence to fill the gap, but it is supplemented by statutory provisions which apply not only to situations formerly covered by the rule in Searle v Wallbank but in all cases of liability in negligence for damage caused by animals.32 Western Australia handles this rule differently from other jurisdictions in a number of respects.33 Instead of simply abolishing this rule, it deems that the rule does not form part, and never has formed part, of Western Australian law.34 Western Australia has enacted special rules which apply to cases of negligence involving damage caused by animals straying onto the highway, a list of matters which a court may consider in determining whether the duty has been breached35 (in general, the same as the matters that would be considered at common law), and a limit of $500,000 on the damages recoverable in respect of any one cause of action.36

1

See Bentham RW, “Animals on the Highway” (1956–1959) 3 UQLJ 222; Toohey J, “Liability for Straying Stock” (1965–1966) 7 UWALR 490. 2 Prior to the 18th century enclosure movement, land was not generally fenced. 3 Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341; see also Mason v Keeling (1704) 12 Mod 332; 88 ER 1359; Jones v Lee (1911) 28 TLR 92; Ellis v Banyard (1911) 106 LT 51 (CA); Heath’s Garage Ltd v Hodges [1916] 2 KB 370 (CA); Hughes v Williams [1943] KB 574 (CA). 398

[33.6.300]

4

5 6 7 8 9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES

State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656. See Clarke PH, “Animals, Highways and Law Reform: State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell” (1979–1982) 14 UWALR 184; Atkinson M, “Trigwell in the High Court: Judicial Opinion v Legal Principle; A Case of Bad Law from Bad Philosophy” (1982) 9 Syd LR 541. Ellis v Johnstone [1963] 2 QB 8; [1963] 2 WLR 176 (CA), Pearson LJ at 28 (QB); Brisbane v Cross [1978] VR 49 (VSCFC), McInerney J at 63. Kelly v Sweeney [1975] 2 NSWLR 720 (CA); Bagshaw v Taylor (1978) 18 SASR 564 (FC); Brisbane v Cross [1978] VR 49 (FC). Jones v McIntyre [1973] Tas SR 1; Thomson v Nix [1976] WAR 141 (FC). Stevens v Nudd [1978] Qd R 96 (FC), Douglas J at 97, Andrews J at 100–104. It appears that the rule survives in relation to public nuisance: see Clarke PH, “Liability for Animals on the Highway: Legislative Reform in the Commonwealth” (1985) 34 ICLQ 786 at 788–790. State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656 confirmed that the rule applied to public nuisance. See also [33.6.310]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 214; Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 7(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18; Law of Animals Act 1962 (Tas), s 19; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 33; Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(1). As to the meaning of the provision of Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 7(2) which provided that the rule was “abrogated”, see Brown v Toohey (1994) 35 NSWLR 417 (CA); Wayman v Davies (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Meagher JJA and Fitzgerald AJA, CA 40047 of 1996, 12 August 1998). The rule was also abolished in England by Animals Act 1971 (UK), s 8(1), and in New Zealand by Animals Law Reform Act 1989 (NZ), s 5. See also North PM, “Searle v Wallbank – The Legislative Struggle” (1966) 30 Conv 44. Animals Act 1971 (UK), s 8. For Queensland, see Graham v Royal National Agricultural & Industrial Association (Qld) [1989] 1 Qd R 624 which accepted the applicability of Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341 in the light of State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656; see further Fabian v Welsh [1999] QCA 365; Smith v Williams (2006) 47 MVR 169; [2006] QCA 439. Brock v Richards [1951] 1 KB 529 (CA), Evershed MR at 535–536; Ellis v Johnstone [1963] 2 QB 8; [1963] 2 WLR 176 (CA), Ormerod LJ at 21 (QB). These dicta indicate that the rule is controversial. See also State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656; Graham v Royal National Agricultural & Industrial Association (Qld) [1989] 1 Qd R 624. Ellis v Johnstone [1963] 2 QB 8; [1963] 2 WLR 176 (CA); see also Simeon v Avery [1959] NZLR 1345 (SC), Hutchinson ACJ at 1347–1348; Collins v Carey [2002] QSC 398, Philippides J at [35]. Ellis v Johnstone [1963] 2 QB 8; [1963] 2 WLR 176 (CA), Ormerod LJ at 21, Donovan LJ at 26 (QB). In the Australian context, see A Woodley Osteopathic Services Pty Ltd v Transport Accident Commission [2013] VSCA 350, Maxwell P at [23]. Bativala v West [1970] 1 QB 716; [1970] 2 WLR 8 (animal engaged in activity which had to be carried out under high degree of human control); Graham v Royal National Agricultural & Industrial Association (Qld) [1989] 1 Qd R 624 (large numbers of stock at agricultural show confined in small, unfamiliar area).

399

[33.6.300]

ANIMALS

17 Cunningham v Whelan (1917) 52 LT 67 (Circ Ct) (24 cows on country road held to be a public nuisance); Smith v Williams (2006) 47 MVR 169; [2006] QCA 439; see also [33.6.310]. 18 Gomberg v Smith [1963] 1 QB 25; [1962] 2 WLR 749 (CA), Holroyd Pearce LJ at 35, Davies LJ at 41–43 (QB); but see Ellis v Johnstone [1963] 2 QB 8; [1963] 2 WLR 176 (CA), Donovan LJ at 25, Pearson LJ at 28 (QB); Fabian v Welsh [1999] QCA 365. 19 Kelly v Sweeney [1975] 2 NSWLR 720 (CA), Hutley JA at 726, 729. 20 State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656, Mason J at 635 (CLR). 21 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 214; Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 7(2); Law of Animals Act 1962 (Tas), s 19; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 33. 22 Davies v Davies [1975] QB 172; [1974] 3 WLR 607 (CA); Kelly v Sweeney [1975] 2 NSWLR 720 (CA), Samuels JA at 737; A Woodley Osteopathic Services Pty Ltd v Transport Accident Commission [2013] VSCA 350. 23 AD & SM McLean Pty Ltd v Meech (2005) 13 VR 241; [2005] VSCA 305; Simpson v Blanch [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-458 (NSWCA). 24 Kelly v Sweeney [1975] 2 NSWLR 720 (CA), Samuels JA at 737–738; Brown v Toohey (1994) 35 NSWLR 417 (CA). 25 McKern v Burke (1986) 3 MVR 279 (NSWCA) (driver of vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger also held 25 per cent responsible); Candy v Bennett (1991) 13 MVR 363 (VSC). 26 Gregory’s (Properties) Pty Ltd v Muir (1993) 17 MVR 86 (NSWCA); Simpson v Blanch [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-458 (NSWCA). 27 Hill v Freestone (1992) 16 MVR 118 (VSC); Eadie v Groombridge (1992) 16 MVR 263 (NSWCA). 28 Pfeiffer v Van Den Brink (unreported, SASC, Duggan J, 1912 of 1990, 10 May 1991). 29 A Woodley Osteopathic Services Pty Ltd v Transport Accident Commission [2013] VSCA 350. 30 Res ipsa loquitur: “[T]he thing speaks for itself”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. Watkins v Loosemore (1986) 4 MVR 367 (NSWSC). However, note that the circumstances of a particular case may result in a valid finding of negligence even where there is no primary evidence of how the animal escaped: Gregory’s (Properties) Pty Ltd v Muir (1993) 17 MVR 86 (NSWCA). For discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, see “Evidence” [33.2.1730]–[33.2.1820]. 31 Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington (1932) 148 TLR 215 (HL); Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992 (CA); Hill v Freestone (1992) 16 MVR 118 (VSC). See City of Gosnells v Roberts (1994) 12 WAR 437; 85 LGERA 214 (liability of local authority which purportedly leased land to animal owner). Compare to A Woodley Osteopathic Services Pty Ltd v Transport Accident Commission [2013] VSCA 350, Maxwell P at [37]–[39]. 32 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18. See Le Poidevin Industries Pty Ltd v Roberts (1990) 11 MVR 570 (SASC); Le Poidevin Industries Pty Ltd v Trimboli (unreported, SASC, Debelle J, 2182 of 1990, 5 December 1991). See also Robinson v Vogelsang (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1942, Beech-Jones J at [80]–[81]. 33 See Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3. 34 Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(1). 35 Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(4). See De Bomford v Pithers (1987) 4 SR (WA) 276 (DC).

400

[33.6.310]

LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES

36 Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(5). Where there are two plaintiffs, each has a cause of action against the defendant and each has a right to receive damages to an amount not exceeding $500,000: see Roberts v City of Gosnells (1995) 13 SR (WA) 72 (DC).

[33.6.310] The torts of public and private nuisance may be used to address damage caused by animals.1 An action for public nuisance may lie for obstruction of a highway by animals if the plaintiff can establish that they suffered special or particular damage greater than that suffered by the general public.2 For example, in Pitcher v Martin [1937] 3 All ER 918, particular damage was suffered where a dog on a loose, long lead chased a cat and the lead became entangled around the plaintiff’s legs.3 Whether a public nuisance is committed is a question of fact, and may depend on the numbers of animals involved.4 There are two main situations in which cases involving animals may give rise to liability in private nuisance. One is where animals escape from the defendant’s land onto that of the plaintiff,5 and the other is where nuisance is caused by animals remaining on the defendant’s land. In each case, it is necessary for the defendant’s conduct to amount to an unreasonable user of land or a failure to take reasonable steps to eradicate a nuisance which, to the defendant’s knowledge, causes harm to the plaintiff.6 In the first category there is, in general, no liability for the escape of animals naturally on the land.7 It would be different if animals were brought onto the land in abnormal numbers,8 or lured there by heaps of rubbish or manure,9 or (in the case of bees) kept in such a place as to cause discomfort to neighbours through their escape.10 In the second category, nuisance may be caused by the keeping of animals which through their smell,11 noise12 or infectious condition13 unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of neighbouring land. Liability in nuisance is specifically preserved by the South Australian legislation,14 and is unaffected by statutes in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales.15 Western Australian legislation provides that liability for damage caused by animals straying onto a highway16 is determined solely according to the law relating to negligence and intentional acts or omissions.17 By inference, this eliminates public nuisance in such situations unless the nuisance is committed intentionally. Legislation in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria is silent on the issue.

1

2 3

See Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) Ch 14. See “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. Pitcher v Martin [1937] 3 All ER 918 (KB).

401

[33.6.310]

ANIMALS

4

5 6

7

8

9

10 11

12

13 14 15 16 17

See Cunningham v Whelan (1917) 52 LT 67 (Circ Ct) (24 cows on country road held to be a public nuisance); but see State Government Insurance Commission (SA) v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617; 53 ALJR 656 (two sheep on South Australian country road not a public nuisance). See Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497, Gillard J at [334], observing the lack of Australian authority in this area. Peech v Best [1931] 1 KB 1 (CA), Scrutton LJ at 14. See also Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc [2002] QB 756; [2002] 2 WLR 512; [2001] EWCA Civ 1236 (landowner may be required to take steps to abate nuisance caused by animals which is not attributable to their actions); Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497 (but note the statutory regime governing land holders pertaining to this decision). See further “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. Stearn v Prentice Bros Ltd [1919] 1 KB 394 (rats); Pratt v Young (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 214 (DC) (rabbits); Brady v Warren [1900] 2 IR 632 (QB) (deer); Seligman v Docker [1949] Ch 53 (pheasants); Habinteg Housing Association v James [1994] NPC 132 (CA) (cockroaches); but see Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497 and note statutory obligations on the part of land holders regarding noxious weeds and pest animals under statutory regimes such as the Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 (Vic). Farrer v Nelson (1885) 15 QBD 258 (DC), Pollock B at 260 (pheasants); O’Gorman v O’Gorman [1903] 2 IR 573 (KB) (bees); but see Seligman v Docker [1949] Ch 53 (pheasant numbers increased through favourable weather conditions; no liability); Stormer v Ingram (1978) 21 SASR 93 (beekeeping not of itself a nuisance). See also Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497, Gillard J at [319]–[322]. Pratt v Young (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 214 (NSWDC); Bland v Yates (1914) 58 SJ 612n (CHD) (flies bred in manure); Plater v Collingwood City Council (1967) 65 DLR (2d) 492 (ONHC) (seagulls attracted by rubbish dump). O’Gorman v O’Gorman [1903] 2 IR 573 (KB), Kenny J at 581–582. See also Robins v Kennedy & Columb [1931] NZLR 1134 (NZSC). Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57; 77 ER 816 (pigs); Rapier v London Tramways Co [1893] 2 Ch 588 (CA) (horses); Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332 (horses); Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19; [1995] 3 WLR 466 (CA) (pigs). Ruthning v Ferguson [1930] St R Qd 325 (FC) (birds); Leeman v Montagu [1936] 2 All ER 1677 (KB) (cockerels); Mallock v Mason (1938) 5 LJNCCR 387 (UKCC) (dogs); Ball v Ray (1873) LR 8 Ch App 467; Broder v Saillard (1876) 2 Ch D 692; Rapier v London Tramways Co [1893] 2 Ch 588 (CA); Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295; Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332 (horses). R v Henson (1852) Dears CC 24; 169 ER 621; Ruhan v Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 439; 37 WN (NSW) 145 (FC). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(10). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Animals Act 1977 (NSW). Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(3). See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff.

[33.6.320] It is no longer possible for acts done by animals to give rise to liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. The possibility of such liability disappeared with the decision of the High Court in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331 which held that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher should be seen as

402

[33.6.330]

LIABILITY UNDER GENERAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES

absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence, except for a few cases where nuisance or trespass might be a preferable cause of action: see [33.6.150]. Even before this decision, cases in which liability for animals might have arisen under this rule were likely to be rare. This was because of the need to prove an escape, in order for the animal to constitute a danger and for the keeping of it to constitute a non-natural user.1 Moreover, legislation in some jurisdictions provides that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is not applicable to damage caused by animals.2

1 2

The rule, therefore, did not apply to livestock or domestic pets: Stearn v Prentice Bros Ltd [1919] 1 KB 394. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 215; Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 9. In South Australia, it appears that the rule is excluded by Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18, which excludes principles of tort liability other than those specifically mentioned (negligence, trespass and nuisance). Causes of action that arose before the commencement of the Wrongs Act Amendment Act 1983 (SA) were also preserved by Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(10)(c). In Western Australia, Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(3) prevents the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 operating in respect of injury or damage caused by an animal straying onto a highway: see [33.6.450].

[33.6.330] Trespass may be committed through the agency of an animal if the act that constitutes the trespass is of the owner’s volition.1 This tort is expressly saved by legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales.2 In South Australia, it is extended by a provision which provides that a person is liable in trespass not only for inciting an animal to cause injury, loss or damage to another, but also for knowingly permitting it to do so.3 Thus, it is trespass to the person (assault and battery) to set a dog onto another4 or to cause another’s horse to throw its rider off.5 It is a trespass to goods to set a dog onto the plaintiff’s animals,6 or to intentionally cause a dog to take another’s golf balls.7 It is a trespass to land to intentionally take or send an animal onto the plaintiff’s land, to drive an animal onto that land, or to negligently fail to prevent an animal from entering the land, in each case without permission.8 It is also a trespass to leave cattle that have strayed onto the plaintiff’s land on that land for an unreasonable length of time.9 The advantages of a trespass action are that it is unnecessary to prove injury, and exemplary damages may be available.10

1 2 3

Hunt v Shanks [1918] SALR 254 (FC), Murray CJ at 261. See further “Trespass” [33.8.300]–[33.8.510]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 212(2)(a); Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 4(2)(b). See also [33.6.450]. Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(8). This section appears to limit liability by imposing a requirement of proof of damage.

403

[33.6.330]

ANIMALS

4 5

Roberts v Chief Constable of Kent [2008] EWCA Civ 1588 (CA). Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; 96 ER 525. See “Trespass to Person” [33.8.350]–[33.8.460]. 6 Baker v Webberly (1631) Het 171; 124 ER 429. See Cox v McIntosh [1992] CLY 1523 (UKCC) (plaintiff’s dog attacked by neighbour’s Rottweiler). 7 Manton v Brocklebank [1923] 2 KB 212 (CA), Atkin LJ at 229. See “Trespass to Chattels” [33.8.720]–[33.8.780]. 8 Beckwith v Shordike (1767) 4 Burr 2092; 98 ER 91; Paul v Summerhayes (1878) 4 QBD 9 (DC); League Against Cruel Sports Ltd v Scott [1986] QB 240; [1985] 3 WLR 400. 9 Hunt v Shanks [1918] SALR 254 (FC). 10 See “Trespass to Land” [33.8.470]–[33.8.590].

[33.6.340] Torts other than those discussed at [33.6.290]–[33.6.330] may also be committed through the agency of an animal. For example, defamation may be committed if a person were to teach a parrot to utter slanderous remarks.1

1 Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at [17-004].

Scienter Liability [33.6.350] A person who keeps an animal which is known by that person, or presumed in law, to be dangerous may be strictly liable for damage caused by the animal. This is referred to as the “scienter action”1 because liability depends on the person’s actual or presumed knowledge of the animal’s dangerous propensities. The tort applies in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and (except where the damage is attributable to an animal straying onto the highway) Western Australia:2 see [33.6.450]. Animals, for the purpose of scienter liability, are divided into two classes: (1)

ferae naturae (dangerous by nature); and

(2)

mansuetae naturae (harmless by nature).

Classification is by species3 and is a question of law.4 The test is whether the species is likely to cause danger to human beings.5 In Filburn v People’s Palace & Aquarium Co Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258, Lord Esher MR categorised two kinds of harmless animals: (1)

those harmless by their very nature, such as pheasants, pigeons and rabbits; and

(2)

those shown by experience to be harmless (which have been tamed and domesticated), such as dogs, horses, oxen and sheep.6

404

[33.6.350]

SCIENTER LIABILITY

Other animals that are considered harmless by nature are kangaroos7 and those harmless by long experience are bees,8 camels9 and goats.10 If a species is not classified as harmless in either of these ways, it is regarded as dangerous. Animals so classified include bears,11 chimpanzees,12 dingoes,13 elephants,14 indigenous raccoons,15 lions,16 tigers,17 wild dogs18 and zebras.19

1

2

3

4 5 6

7 8

9

10 11

12 13 14

From the wording of the old form of pleading, under which the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant knowingly kept (scienter retinuit) a dangerous animal. Scienter liability in its modern form was first recognised in May v Burdett (1846) 9 QB 101; 115 ER 1213. The rule has been abolished in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and South Australia: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 214; Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 7(2)(a); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(3). Thus, there is no difference between a wild elephant in the jungle and a tame elephant in a circus, or between Indian and African elephants (Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 14 (QB)) and no difference between ordinary cattle and bucking bulls: Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109 (particular bucking bull in this case known to be dangerous). See also Applicant v Larkin [1976] WAR 199. McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 (CA), Clauson LJ at 700–701; see also Heath’s Garage Ltd v Hodges [1916] 2 KB 370 (CA), Neville J at 383. Buckle v Holmes [1926] 2 KB 125 (CA), Bankes LJ at 129; McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 (CA), Scott LJ at 695. Filburn v People’s Palace & Aquarium Co Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 260; see also Manton v Brocklebank [1923] 2 KB 212 (CA); Fitzgerald v ED & AD Cooke Bourne (Farms) Ltd [1964] 1 QB 249; [1963] 3 WLR 522 (CA) (horses); Mirvahedy v Henley [2002] QB 769; [2002] 2 WLR 566; [2001] EWCA Civ 1749 (horses) (affirmed in Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] 2 AC 491; [2003] 2 WLR 882; [2003] UKHL 16), decided under the Animals Act 1971 (UK), but referring to common law; Trethowan v Capron [1961] VR 460, Adam J at 463; Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570 (dogs). Regarding dogs, see [33.6.460]–[33.6.470] and Environment and Natural Resources “Dangerous Dogs” [14.14.450]. Lake v Taggart (1978) 1 SR (WA) 89 (DC). Stormer v Ingram (1978) 21 SASR 93. See also Williams C, “The Honey Bee and the Law: Who’s Responsible for Injuries Inflicted by Stinging Bees?” (1992) 66 LIJ 1109. Nada Shah v Sleeman (1917) 19 WALR 119 (FC); McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 (CA). See also Williams GL, “The Camel Case” (1940) 56 LQR 354. R v Drinkwater (1981) 27 SASR 396 (FC). Besozzi v Harris (1858) 1 F & F 92; 175 ER 640; Wyatt v Rosherville Gardens Co (1886) 2 TLR 282 (QB). See also Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649, Glass JA at 652–653. James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70 (SC). Fischer v Stuart (1979) 37 FLR 46 (NTSC). Filburn v People’s Palace & Aquarium Co Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258 (CA); Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404.

405

[33.6.350]

ANIMALS

15 Andrew v Kilgour (1910) 19 Man LR 545. 16 Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 18–19 (QB); Trethowan v Capron [1961] VR 460, Adam J at 462. 17 Buckle v Holmes [1926] 2 KB 125 (CA), Bankes LJ at 128. 18 Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497. 19 Marlor v Ball (1900) 16 TLR 239 (CA).

[33.6.360] Knowledge of an animal’s dangerous characteristics is presumed for dangerous animals but must be proved for harmless animals.1 When damage is done by an animal classified as dangerous,2 its keeper is liable without proof that the animal had a tendency to do such damage or, if the animal had such a tendency, that the defendant knew of it3 – scienter (see [33.6.350]) is conclusively presumed. If the animal is classified as harmless, however, the plaintiff must show two things: (1)

That the animal had done, or had attempted to do, the particular kind of harm in question on a previous occasion. Evidence that an animal displayed general aggressiveness4 or had a tendency to bite other animals5 is not sufficient evidence of a propensity to injure humans. However, one instance is sufficient,6 regardless of how long ago7 or how recently it occurred.8 It is not necessary that on the previous occasion the animal should actually have achieved its purpose; evidence of an attempt is sufficient.9

(2)

That the defendant knew of the animal’s act or attempt. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that there is some evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensity, or that facts from such knowledge can be inferred.10 Proof that the defendant was negligent in not realising the animal’s dangerousness is not sufficient.11 The knowledge of a person left in charge of an animal may be imputed to the owner. If the person in charge has full custody, such knowledge is imputed as a matter of law.12 In other cases, knowledge may be inferred, for example because the person has had charge of the premises where the animal is kept.13

Scienter is thus a strict liability tort. The defendant, as the keeper of the animal, is liable for the damage it does without proof of either intention or negligence, provided knowledge of the dangerous propensity is either presumed or proved.14 Even the unforeseeable act of a third party is no defence: see [33.6.390].

1 For examples of dangerous and harmless animals, see [33.6.350]. 2 Note that once a member of an animal species is classified as dangerous, that classification attaches to the whole of the species: James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70, Quilliam J at 73, citing Filburn v People’s Palace & Aquarium Co Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258 and Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404. 3 Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404. See

406

[33.6.370]

4

5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13

14

SCIENTER LIABILITY

generally Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442; 80 ALJR 1339; [2006] HCA 37, Gummow J at [59]. Sycamore v Ley (1932) 147 LT 342 (CA) (general fierceness in defending property); Fitzgerald v ED & AD Cooke Bourne (Farms) Ltd [1964] 1 QB 249; [1963] 3 WLR 522 (CA) (horse rushed towards people who approached it, but then shied away). Osborne v Chocqueel [1896] 2 QB 109; Glanville v Sutton [1928] 1 KB 571; but see Eather v Jones (1975) 49 ALJR 254, Murphy J at 262. Charlwood v Greig (1851) 3 Car & K 46; 175 ER 457, Cresswell J at 48 (Car & K). Sarch v Blackburn (1830) 4 Car & P 297; 172 ER 712. Parsons v King (1891) 8 TLR 114 (QB). Worth v Gilling (1866) LR 2 CP 1 (dog on chain rushed out of kennel and strained to bite passing strangers); Barnes v Lucille Ltd (1907) 96 LT 680 (KB). Mason v Keeling (1704) 12 Mod 332; 88 ER 1359, Holt CJ at 335 (Mod); Cruttendon v Brenock [1949] VLR 366 (FC); Romano v Spagnol (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Meagher and Cole JJA, CA 40566 of 1994, 17 October 1994). But see Eather v Jones [1974] 2 NSWLR 19 (NSWSCA) (knowledge of animal’s dangerous propensity may be difficult to prove, particularly where claim is based on few incidents or conjecture rather than inference). This was affirmed in Eather v Jones (1975) 49 ALJR 254, where a majority of the High Court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish the requisite knowledge. See also Collins v Carey [2002] QSC 398, Philippides J at [25]. For cases where scienter was established, see Jackson v Smithson (1846) 15 M & W 563; 153 ER 973; Hudson v Roberts (1851) 6 Ex 697; 155 ER 724; Read v Edwards (1864) 17 CB (NS) 245; 144 ER 99; Newsam v Ladd (1972) 22 FLR 16 (ACTSC). See also Wallace v Newton [1982] 1 WLR 375 (QB), decided under Animals Act 1971 (UK), s 2(2). Although it may give rise to liability in negligence: see [33.6.290]. Baldwin v Casella (1872) LR 7 Ex 325; Scott v Edington (1888) 14 VLR 41 (FC). Gladman v Johnson (1867) 36 LJCP 153 (wife); Applebee v Percy (1874) LR 9 CP 647 (servant); Cruttendon v Brenock [1949] VLR 366 (VSCFC) (friend); but see Colget v Norris (1886) 2 TLR 414 (DC), AL Smith J at 415 (fact that servant occasionally washed dog not enough); Knott v London County Council [1934] 1 KB 126 (CA) (servant kept dog as private pet – knowledge not imputed to master). May v Burdett (1846) 9 QB 101; 115 ER 1213, Lord Denman CJ (for the Court) at 110 (QB); Card v Case (1848) 5 CB 622; 136 ER 1022; Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404; Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109, Dutney J at [27]. In Draper v Hodder [1972] 2 QB 556; [1972] 2 WLR 992 (CA), a scienter claim failed at first instance, but the defendant was held liable in negligence.

[33.6.370] The keeping of an animal known or presumed to be dangerous (see [33.6.350]) is not wrongful in itself. However, despite suggestions to the contrary in English case law,1 liability is not restricted to cases where the owner fails to control the animal or allows it to escape.2 It is the keeper of the animal (ie the person in control of it) who is liable. The keeper need not necessarily be the owner.3 However, an owner cannot avoid

407

[33.6.370]

ANIMALS

responsibility by handing over custody to an employee or an independent contractor.4 A person who merely allows the animal to be on premises without providing for its upkeep is not its keeper,5 and it seems that the park authority would not be regarded as the keeper of native animals in a national park.6

1 Rands v McNeil [1955] 1 QB 253; [1954] 3 WLR 905 (CA) (applying Knott v London County Council [1934] 1 KB 126 (CA), Lord Wright at 138); see also Beer v Wheeler (1965) 109 SJ 457 (CA); but see Besozzi v Harris (1858) 1 F & F 92; 175 ER 640 (bear on chain); Pearson v Coleman Bros [1948] 2 KB 359 (CA) (child searching for toilet was mauled by caged lion). 2 Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649 (CA) (plaintiff injured by a bull in a pen at the defendant’s saleyard held entitled to recover); see also Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154 (plaintiff bitten by a German Shepherd dog in the defendant’s pool enclosure); Christian v Johannesson [1956] NZLR 664 (SC) (plaintiff bitten by a dog which was kept on a long lead in a yard). 3 M’Kone v Wood (1831) 5 Car & P 1; 172 ER 850 (occupier of premises taking care of dog left by previous tenant); Walker v Hall (1876) 40 JP 456 (Ex) (horse-trainer); Stanford v Robertson [1947] 1 DLR 493 (ABCA) (any member of family who knew of family dog’s dangerous propensity could be liable). 4 Pinn v Rew (1916) 32 TLR 451 (DC); Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649 (CA), Glass JA at 653; see also Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in liq) v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465, Lord Buckmaster at 477, Lord Parmoor at 491. 5 Smith v Great Eastern Railway Co (1866) LR 2 CP 4; North v Wood [1914] 1 KB 629; Knott v London County Council [1934] 1 KB 126 (CA). 6 In Sturdy v The Queen (1974) 47 DLR (3d) 71 (FC) (tourists mauled by grizzly bears), the only claim was in negligence.

[33.6.380] To succeed in a scienter claim (see [33.6.350]), damage must be within the risk in respect of which liability is imposed. In the case of harmless animals, liability arises only for injuries the extent to which the animal has manifested a vicious propensity.1 In the case of dangerous animals, the defendant is responsible for all damage which is the natural and probable consequence of a failure to control the animal, because it is assumed that whenever such an animal gets out of control it is practically bound to cause injury.2 An example is Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404,3 where the defendants were found liable for injury suffered by the plaintiff who was inside a booth that collapsed as a result of being trampled on by an elephant. While the damage suffered by the defendant is usually personal injury, it is possible to recover for other kinds of damage, such as injury to another animal.4 It has been suggested that the duration of the defendant’s liability following the escape of an animal from control continues until someone assumes control, unless the animal is indigenous to the area.5 In that case, liability would continue until the animal regains its natural liberty or someone aware of its

408

[33.6.390]

SCIENTER LIABILITY

vicious propensity assumes permanent control of it.6 Liability for a harmless animal continues until someone assumes permanent control of it with knowledge of its vicious propensities.

1

2 3

4 5

6

Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 18 (QB). See, eg Read v Edwards (1864) 17 CB (NS) 245; 144 ER 99 (defendant liable when dog chased and killed pheasants because dog had known propensity to chase and destroy game); Clinton v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1912] 3 KB 198 (plaintiff entered teashop carrying dog; cat with kittens bit dog and then plaintiff). Compare this to Glanville v Sutton [1928] 1 KB 571 where a known propensity of a horse to bite other horses was not sufficient to impose liability for the horse biting a man. See also Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109, Dutney J at [31]–[33]. Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 18 (QB). Devlin J suggested that a plaintiff could recover for a heart attack caused by waking up and discovering an escaped tiger on his bed: Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 17–18 (QB). But see Brook v Cook (1961) 105 SJ 684 (CA): no liability for injuries through stumbling as result of shock caused by seeing a neighbour’s monkey on the wall. Manton v Brocklebank [1923] 2 KB 212 (CA); Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570. Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) pp 336–339. Mitchil v Alestree (1676) 1 Vent 295; 86 ER 190, Twisden J at 295 (Vent).

[33.6.390] The only defences available in a scienter action (see [33.6.350]) are voluntary assumption of risk1 and default of the plaintiff. Voluntary assumption of risk has been held to be applicable in cases of injury to animal keepers,2 persons who intervene in a dog fight3 and trespassers with knowledge of a vicious guard dog.4 However, the defence can only succeed if it is established that the plaintiff willingly took the risk of injury with full knowledge of its nature.5 Warning notices such as signs saying “Beware of the Dogs” are not necessarily effective to negate liability.6 Default of the plaintiff involves the defendant establishing that the injury resulted from the plaintiff’s own actions, for example by stroking an insecurely tethered zebra7 or teasing an animal.8 The effect of the defence is to negate the causal link between the keeping of the animal and the plaintiff’s injury. Merely walking close to the animal is not sufficient, unless this is an unreasonable disregard of obvious danger.9 There is some suggestion that it is a defence that the plaintiff be a trespasser,10 so it is reasonable to keep guard dogs to protect persons or property.11 It is not clear what effect developments in the law relating to the liability of occupiers to trespassers have had on this issue.12

409

[33.6.390]

ANIMALS

An act of a stranger is not a defence to scienter liability13 and it is doubtful whether a defendant could rely on an act of God.14 Australian authority establishes that contributory negligence is not a defence to scienter at common law and therefore apportionment legislation cannot apply.15

1 See “Voluntary Assumption of Risk” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970]. 2 Sylvester v GB Chapman Ltd (1935) 79 SJ 777 (CA); Rands v McNeil [1955] 1 QB 253; [1954] 3 WLR 905 (CA). The defence may not apply where an employee is not specifically charged with the care of an animal: James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70 (SC). Note that Animals Act 1971 (UK), s 6(5) excludes the defence (available under s 5(2) of the Act) against persons employed as animal keepers. 3 Smith v Shields (1964) 108 SJ 501 (CA). 4 Cummings v Granger [1977] QB 397; [1976] 3 WLR 842 (CA) (decided under the Animals Act 1971 (UK) but referring also to common law); see also Trethowan v Capron [1961] VR 460 (action under the Dog Act 1958 (Vic) (now repealed) but discussion referring to common law); Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195. 5 Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404; Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154; see further Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109, Dutney J at [35]–[37]. 6 Pearson v Coleman Bros [1948] 2 KB 359 (CA) (“Lions, danger” sign no defence when child mauled by paws of lion thrust through cage bars); Dolan v Bright, The Times, 17 November 1962 (“Beware of the Dogs” sign did not imply that dog was vicious); see also Sarch v Blackburn (1830) 4 Car & P 297; 172 ER 712 (plaintiff unable to read). 7 Marlor v Ball (1900) 16 TLR 239 (CA) (although this case may depend on the fact that there was “gratuitous meddling”); Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154 (plaintiff patted dog known to be dangerous and was bitten, defendant liable). 8 May v Burdett (1846) 9 QB 101; 115 ER 1213, Lord Denman CJ (for the Court) at 113 (QB); Sycamore v Ley (1932) 147 LT 342 (CA); Lee v Walkers (1939) 162 LT 89 (KB); James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70 (SC) (reversed on other grounds in James v Wellington City [1972] NZLR 70 (CA)); see also Filburn v People’s Palace & Aquarium Co Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 260; Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25, Starke J at 384 (CLR); Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 19–20 (QB). 9 Besozzi v Harris (1858) 1 F & F 92; 175 ER 640; Wyatt v Rosherville Gardens Co (1886) 2 TLR 282 (QB); McNeill v Frankenfield (1963) 44 DLR (2d) 132 (BCCA), but see also Hall v Sorley (1980) 23 BCLR 281 (BCSC). 10 Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25, Starke J at 384 (CLR) (where injury is caused by animal with known vicious propensities); Trethowan v Capron [1961] VR 460. See Sarch v Blackburn (1830) 4 Car & P 297; 172 ER 712; Lowery v Walker [1910] 1 KB 173 (CA) (reversed in Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 on the ground that the House of Lords regarded the plaintiff as a lawful visitor); Pearson v Coleman Bros [1948] 2 KB 359 (CA), Lord Greene MR at 371.

410

[33.6.400]

CATTLE TRESPASS

11 Brock v Copeland (1794) 170 ER 328, Lord Kenyon at 329; Cummings v Granger [1977] QB 397; [1976] 3 WLR 842 (CA) (decided under the Animals Act 1971 (UK), but referring also to the common law). 12 See Smith v Capella State High School Parents & Citizens Association (Qld) [2004] QSC 109, Dutney J at [34]. See further “Duty to Trespassers” [33.3.320]–[33.3.340]. 13 Baker v Snell [1908] 2 KB 825 (CA), on which see Pollock F, “The Dog and the Potman: Or, Go It, Bob” (1909) 25 LQR 317; Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus Ltd [1957] 2 QB 1; [1957] 2 WLR 404, Devlin J at 21–25 (QB); Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570, Ryan J at 575. The older decision in Fleeming v Orr (1855) 2 Macq 14 (HL), a Scottish case in which Lord Cranworth (at 23–24) said that English and Scottish law were the same on this issue, appears not to represent modern law. However, see Heuston RFV and Buckley RA, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) pp 370–372. 14 Nichols v Marsland (1875) LR 10 Ex 255, Bramwell B (for the Court) at 260 (affirmed in Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1 (CA)); but see Baker v Snell [1908] 2 KB 825 (CA), Kennedy LJ at 835–836; Rands v McNeil [1955] 1 QB 253; [1954] 3 WLR 905 (CA), Jenkins LJ at 266 (QB). 15 Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649 (CA), Glass JA at 654–655; Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154, Cox J at 160; Aird v Grantham (unreported, WASCA, Kennedy, Franklyn and Walsh JJ, 154, 159 of 1997, 18 September 1998); see also the discussion in Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997); but see Rands v McNeil [1955] 1 QB 253; [1954] 3 WLR 905 (CA); McNeill v Frankenfield (1963) 44 DLR (2d) 132 (BCCA). For a discussion of contributory negligence, see “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.860].

Cattle Trespass [33.6.400] Where cattle trespass on the land of another, the person in control of the cattle commits a strict liability tort. The tort of cattle trespass is of ancient origin1 and still applies in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and (except where the damage is attributable to an animal straying onto the highway) Western Australia.2 “Cattle” for the purposes of this tort means all kinds of domesticated animals normally the subject of ownership. This definition therefore includes not only cows, bulls and oxen, but also sheep, pigs, goats, horses, asses and donkeys,3 domesticated deer,4 and possibly domesticated camels.5 The tort of cattle trespass also includes domesticated birds, such as chickens, geese, ducks, turkeys and peacocks.6 However, it does not include dogs7 or rabbits,8 which cannot be kept under the same restraint as cattle and which are unlikely to cause as much damage as bigger animals, nor is it likely to include domesticated pigeons.9 The tort does not cover wild animals, even if kept in a circus, or animals such as bees which are not normally the object of ownership.10 For the purposes of this tort, trespass occurs when the defendant’s animal trespasses on the plaintiff’s land. It is actionable without proof of damage. Any kind of trespass, even a technical trespass, is sufficient. For example, the tort 411

[33.6.400]

ANIMALS

will be established where the defendant’s horse, which is on the defendant’s land, kicks the plaintiff’s mare through the adjoining fence.11 If there is no trespass, no liability arises.12 The tort is thus closely related to the tort of trespass to land,13 but cattle trespass covers situations where the animal acts independently of human volition. If the defendant causes the animal to trespass, the tort of trespass to land may also be actionable: see [33.6.330].

1 See Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) pp 127–135. Technically, this rule includes all animals which fall within the term “avers”. 2 For the position in other jurisdictions, see [33.6.450]. 3 See Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) pp 136–137. 4 Brady v Warren [1900] 2 IR 632 (QB). 5 It has been suggested that, in Western Australia, domesticated camels are cattle: Nada Shah v Sleeman (1917) 19 WALR 119 (FC), McMillan CJ at 120. 6 See Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) p 136. 7 Mason v Keeling (1704) 12 Mod 332; 88 ER 1359, Holt CJ at 335 (Mod); Tallents v Bell [1944] 2 All ER 474 (CA); Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570, Ryan J at 574; but see Doyle v Vance (1880) 6 VLR (L) 87 (VSCFC). 8 Buckle v Holmes [1926] 2 KB 125 (CA). 9 Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) p 148; Brady v Warren [1900] 2 IR 632 (QB), Johnson J at 645. 10 See O’Gorman v O’Gorman [1903] 2 IR 573 (KB); Cadman v Saskatchewan (Department of Parks & Renewable Resources) (1988) 51 DLR (4th) 52 (SKQB). 11 Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10. 12 Manton v Brocklebank [1923] 2 KB 212 (CA). 13 See “Trespass to Land” [33.8.470]–[33.8.590].

[33.6.410] The parties to the action of cattle trespass are the landowner and the person in control of the cattle. Only a person with an interest in the land may sue, although this includes licensees.1 A person who has agisted stock on another’s land cannot sue.2 The concept of an interest in land, however, has been extended in particular types of cases. If the injury occurs to growing crops, buyers of the crops and persons with an inclusive right of pasture may bring an action.3 In personal injury cases, the “agent” of the occupier may sue.4 Highway

412

[33.6.420]

CATTLE TRESPASS

users cannot sue, which means that they must prove negligence.5 The defendant must be the person in control of the animal. The owner of the land from which the animal escapes is not liable unless they are also in control of the animal at that time, and the owner of the animal will not be liable if they are not in possession of the animal at the relevant time.6

1 2

3 4

5 6

Rutherford v Hayward (1877) 3 VLR (L) 19 (FC). See also Real Property “Licences” [28.10.10]ff. Matheson v G Stuckey & Co Pty Ltd [1921] VLR 637 (FC), Cussen J at 641; Manton v Brocklebank [1923] 2 KB 212 (CA). Although the agistor may be liable in negligence: see Smith v Cook (1875) 1 QBD 79; Sanderson v Dunn (1911) 32 ALT (Supp) 14. Wellaway v Courtier [1918] 1 KB 200. Waugh v Montgomery (1882) 8 VLR (L) 290 (FC) (daughter of owner held to be acting as father’s agent during his absence). An employee of the owner was allowed to sue in Bradley v Wallaces Ltd [1913] 3 KB 629 (CA). See also Wormald v Cole [1954] 1 QB 614; [1954] 2 WLR 613 (CA), Singleton LJ at 631 (QB). Cox v Burbidge (1863) 13 CB (NS) 430; 143 ER 171. See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Broderick v Forbes (1912) 5 DLR 508 (NSSC); Alsop v Lidgerwood (1916) 22 ALR (CN) 13 (VCC). Thus this tort does not extend to wild cattle straying onto the defendant’s land: Lade & Co Pty Ltd v Black [2007] QSC 385.

[33.6.420] Liability in cattle trespass is strict1 and, unlike other forms of strict liability, has not been modified by any criterion such as “non-natural user”.2 There is one important exception to this principle, which arises where domestic animals are lawfully on a highway and escape onto adjoining land. In that instance, the person in control of the animal is not liable unless it can be proved that they were negligent.3 The landowner is deemed to assume ordinary risks associated with the passing of traffic, including animals lawfully on the road.4 However, strict liability attaches where domestic animals stray from the defendant’s property onto the highway and then trespass on the plaintiff’s property, as the plaintiff does not assume the risks associated with animals not lawfully on the road.5

1

2 3

Cox v Burbidge (1863) 13 CB (NS) 430; 143 ER 171, Williams J at 438 (CB (NS)); Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, Blackburn J at 280; Lee v Riley (1865) 18 CB (NS) 722; 144 ER 629; Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10, Lord Coleridge CJ at 12. Such as applied under the now obsolete rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330: see [33.6.150]. Goodwyn v Cheveley (1859) 4 H & N 631; 157 ER 989; Tillett v Ward (1882) 10 QBD 17; Bourchier v Mitchell (1891) 17 VLR 27 (FC); Rayner v Shearing [1926] SASR 313; but see Gayler & Pope Ltd v B Davies & Son Ltd [1924] 2 KB 75 (pony bolted into shop: owner liable because pony left unattended), applied in Davis

413

[33.6.420]

ANIMALS

4 5

v Cole [1939] VLR 320. For the principles of negligence, see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Gayler & Pope Ltd v B Davies & Son Ltd [1924] 2 KB 75. D’Agruima v Seymour (1951) 69 WN (NSW) 15 (DC).

[33.6.430] Damage recoverable in cattle trespass is no longer limited to damage to the surface of the land or depasturing of crops.1 Recoverable damage has been extended to cover damage to animals in the plaintiff’s possession by physical attack,2 infection,3 insemination4 or the likelihood thereof,5 damage to other property (eg where the plaintiff’s train was derailed by trespassing cattle)6 and personal injury to the occupier, such as where the plaintiff was knocked down and trampled on by a trespassing heifer.7 Courts have recognised that in order to recover, the damage must be natural to the animal’s species; a test akin to the negligence requirement that the damage must be of a foreseeable kind.8 Thus horses are not generally likely to kick humans,9 although it is not too remote a consequence that a trespassing horse in a strange field at night may kick another horse there.10 For example, a trespassing cow that knocks over the occupier while blundering about in the dark has been found to be acting in accordance with its natural propensity,11 although it might be different if the damage were sustained as the result of an attack.12

1 In Yakamia Dairy Pty Ltd v Wood [1976] WAR 57 (FC), the measure of damages for wrongfully depasturing cattle was the agistment fee normally chargeable in the locality. 2 Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10; Lee v Riley (1865) 18 CB (NS) 722; 144 ER 629; Doyle v Vance (1880) 6 VLR (L) 87 (FC); Holgate v Bleazard [1917] 1 KB 443. 3 Anderson v Buckton (1718) 11 Mod 303; 88 ER 1054; Theyer v Purnell [1918] 2 KB 333. 4 See Cargill v Mervyn (1876) 2 NZ Jur (NS) 50 (SC); McLean v Brett (1919) 49 DLR 162 (ABSC); Cousins v Greaves (1920) 54 DLR 650 (SKCA); Weeks v Weeks (1977) 81 DLR (3d) 371 (PEISC). 5 Halstead v Mathieson [1919] VLR 362. 6 Cooper v Railway Executive [1953] 1 WLR 223 (Assizes). 7 Wormald v Cole [1954] 1 QB 614; [1954] 2 WLR 613 (CA); see also Waugh v Montgomery (1882) 8 VLR (L) 290 (FC). 8 See “Reasonable Foreseeability” [33.2.230]–[33.2.240]. 9 Cox v Burbidge (1863) 13 CB (NS) 430; 143 ER 171, Erle CJ at 437 (CB (NS)). 10 Lee v Riley (1865) 18 CB (NS) 722; 144 ER 629; see also Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10. 11 Wormald v Cole [1954] 1 QB 614; [1954] 2 WLR 613 (CA). 12 Lord Goddard CJ thought there would be liability in such circumstances: Wormald v Cole [1954] 1 QB 614; [1954] 2 WLR 613 (CA), Lord Goddard CJ at 625 (QB); but

414

[33.6.440]

CATTLE TRESPASS

see Mark v Barkla [1935] NZLR 347 (SC) (not ordinarily in the nature of a boar to attack humans).

[33.6.440] Defences available for an action in cattle trespass are essentially the same as those available for other strict liability torts. The defendant may plead: (1)

consent of the plaintiff,1 sometimes called “leave and licence”,2 and the analogous principle of assumption of risk;3

(2)

default of the plaintiff, for example by failing to maintain an adequate fence when under an obligation to do so;4

(3)

an act of a third party for whom the defendant was not responsible5 unless the defendant was aware of the act or could have taken precautions to prevent it;6 or

(4)

an act of God.7

Contributory negligence may also be a defence.8

1 2 3 4

5

6

7

Wellaway v Courtier [1918] 1 KB 200, Lawrence J at 203. Park v J Jobson & Son [1945] 1 All ER 222 (CA); see also Wellaway v Courtier [1918] 1 KB 200, Lawrence J at 203–204. Tillett v Ward (1882) 10 QBD 17. See “Voluntary Assumption of Risk” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970]. Rooth v Wilson (1817) 1 B & Ald 59; 106 ER 22; Singleton v Williamson (1861) 7 H & N 410; 158 ER 533; Crow v Wood [1971] 1 QB 77; [1970] 3 WLR 516; Egerton v Harding [1975] QB 62; [1974] 3 WLR 437 (CA). If there is no obligation created by covenant or prescriptive right, occupiers are not obliged to fence: Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618; [1965] 3 WLR 296 (CA). Australian fencing legislation does not affect cattle trespass claims: Rutherford v Hayward (1877) 3 VLR (L) 19 (FC). It is immaterial that the defendant may be under a duty to fence by an agreement with a third party, such as the landlord: Holgate v Bleazard [1917] 1 KB 443; Park v J Jobson & Son [1945] 1 All ER 222 (CA). McGibbon v McCurry (1909) 43 ILTR 132 (KB) (stranger negligently left gate open); see also Smith v Stone (1647) Style 65; 82 ER 533, Roll J at 65 (Style) (stranger drove cattle onto plaintiff’s land); but see Topladye v Stalye (1649) Style 165; 82 ER 615, Roll CJ at 166 (Style); Hunt v Shanks [1918] SALR 254 (FC), Murray CJ at 262. Sutcliffe v Holmes [1947] KB 147 (CA) (defendant aware of, and had taken no steps to remedy, intervening landowner’s failure to fence so as to keep defendant’s cattle out). See Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939) pp 184–185. Other forms of inevitable accident probably do not constitute a defence: Cox v Burbidge (1863) 13 CB (NS) 430; 143 ER 171, Williams J at 439 (CB (NS)); Fletcher v Rylands (1866) LR 1 Ex 265,

415

[33.6.440]

ANIMALS

8

Blackburn J at 280; Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10, Brett J at 13–14. It has been accepted as such in Canada: Flett v Coulter (1903) 5 OLR 375 (ONHC); Hatton v Morton (1921) 61 DLR 365 (ABSC). See “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870].

Abolition of Scienter and Cattle Trespass [33.6.450] Statutory provisions have abolished the scienter (see [33.6.350]) and cattle trespass (see [33.6.400]) torts in the Australian Capital Territory,1 New South Wales2 and South Australia.3 Apart from statutory liability for dogs4 (see [33.6.460]–[33.6.470]), in these jurisdictions liability for animals is dealt with entirely by ordinary torts such as negligence, nuisance and trespass. In Western Australia, the torts of scienter and cattle trespass have been abolished only as regards liability in torts for damage caused by animals straying onto a highway.5 As a result, “two different liability regimes now apply to animals depending upon whether the plaintiff’s injury or damage was ‘caused’ by the ‘animal straying onto a highway’”.6 The determinative factor is not where the accident occurs, but whether or not it is attributable to an animal straying onto a highway.

1 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 212 (abolition of action of cattle trespass), s 214 (abolition of scienter and other rules relating exclusively to liability for damage by animals). 2 Animals Act 1977 (NSW), s 4(1) (abolition of action of cattle trespass), s 7(2) (scienter). 3 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 18(1), (9). Section 18 (liability for animals to be determined in accordance with principles of negligence) is not confined to liability for the vicious behaviour of animals, but abolishes scienter for all purposes: see Le Poidevin Industries Pty Ltd v Roberts (1990) 11 MVR 570 (SASC). 4 See also Environment and Natural Resources “Dangerous Dogs” [14.14.450]. 5 Highways (Liability for Straying Animals) Act 1983 (WA), s 3(3). 6 Clarke PH, “Liability for Animals on the Highway: Legislative Reform in the Commonwealth” (1985) 34 ICLQ 786 at 795–799.

Statutory Strict Liability for Dogs [33.6.460] Legislation providing for strict liability for damage or injury caused by dogs is in force in all jurisdictions except Queensland,1 where dogs are treated in the same way as other harmless animals.2 This statutory liability is additional to any liability arising at common law, such as negligence or trespass. The reason for specially categorising dogs in this way is that they are the only animals permitted to roam freely which have the size, strength and

416

[33.6.460]

STATUTORY STRICT LIABILITY FOR DOGS

other physical attributes enabling them to inflict serious bodily injury on persons and animals.3 The nature of the liability is confirmed by the fact that statutes in the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia expressly provide that it is unnecessary to show a previous mischievous propensity in the dog or knowledge of that propensity on the part of the owner, or that the injury was attributable to the owner’s neglect.4 The intention behind the New South Wales provision is similar,5 however the strictness of the liability is limited by the availability of a number of defences: see [33.6.470]. In the Australian Capital Territory, liability is imposed where a dog attacks or harasses a person and that person suffers personal injury or property damage as a result of the attack.6 Liability is also imposed for injury suffered where, by reason of the behaviour of a dog, a person reasonably fears that the dog is about to attack them and suffers injury as a consequence.7 In New South Wales, the owner’s liability is limited to damages for bodily injury or death caused, even indirectly, by the dog wounding or attacking a person,8 or damage to personal property (including clothing) caused by the dog in the course of attacking a person,9 or injury to another animal caused by the dog attacking or chasing it.10 The statutory provisions do not in terms provide for liability in respect of personal injuries caused by the dog attacking an animal, such as a horse on which the plaintiff was mounted. However, if on the facts the dog’s attack may be regarded as undifferentiated between the person and the animal, and thus as much an attack on the person as the animal, then the personal injuries may be an indirect wounding giving rise to liability under s 25 of the Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW).11 Statutory provisions in the Northern Territory, South Australia, and Western Australia all provide, in general terms, that the owner of a dog is liable for any injury suffered as a result of the actions of a dog.12 This includes not only personal injury or property damage inflicted in the course of an attack,13 but also any other injuries directly attributable to a dog. For example, damage to a motor vehicle which collides with a dog running into the street,14 or personal injury caused by falling when trying to evade an oncoming dog.15 In South Australia there are various grounds on which the special regime of liability for dogs is displaced by general rules of negligence under the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), such as trespass to land on which a dog is kept.16 In Tasmania, statutory liability is imposed on the owner of a dog who allows that dog to attack or chase any person.17 In Victoria, statutory liability arises where a dog, under the apparent control of a person, attacks or bites any person or animal or rushes at or chases any person.18 More generally, statutory liability for dogs does not affect other rights to recover damages under statute or at common law.19 Statutory provisions generally define “owner” to include a person who keeps or has possession or control of a dog or is the “registered keeper” of the dog,20 and the occupier of premises in which the dog is kept or permitted to live.21 However, it is generally a defence for the owner to prove that the dog was at the

417

[33.6.460]

ANIMALS

material time in the possession or control of another person without the owner’s consent.22 It has been suggested that the same principles apply as in a scienter action:23 see [33.6.350]–[33.6.390].

1

2

3

4

5 6 7 8

9

Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), ss 50, 55; Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), Pt 3 Div 2 (liability for injury or death caused by dog); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 32; Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66; Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 19 (this provision does not provide for civil liability damages); Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic), s 29; Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46. The statutory cause of action has been said not to be a cause of action in tort: Downs v Secker (1989) 152 LSJS 107 (SASCFC); Keeffe v McLean-Carr [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-224 (SASC), Olsson J at 62,278; see also Wilding v Burgemeister [2012] SADC 152. Jones v Linnett [1984] 1 Qd R 570, Ryan J at 574. The owner is liable for injuries by a dog only if aware of its vicious propensity: see [33.6.350]. See generally Environment and Natural Resources “Dangerous Dogs” [14.14.450]. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report of the Law Reform Commission on Civil Liability for Animals, Report No 8 (NSWLRC, 1970) at [35]; see also New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Community Law Reform Program: Tenth Report – Liability for Injuries Caused by Dogs, Report No 52 (NSWLRC, 1988) Ch 2 “The History of the Law Relating to Dogs”; Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [15.20]. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 32(2); Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(2); Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(3). Similar provisions were previously enacted in the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania, but have been repealed. See Wallis v Dawkins (1881) 15 SALR 132 (FC); Grimwood v Campbell [1955] SASR 313 (FC); McCabe v Pickford (1982) 29 SASR 362 (FC). Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [15.21]–[15.22]. Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), s 55. Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), s 49. “Wounding” includes any hurt or injury, whether or not the skin is broken: Harden v Ridges [1983] 2 NSWLR 586 (DC) (plaintiff’s leg broken as result of being knocked down by a dog); Eadie v Groombridge (1992) 16 MVR 263 (NSWCA) (dog ran into plaintiff’s motorcycle); Zappia v Allsop (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40192 of 1993, 17 March 1994) (dog attacked and crashed into plaintiff’s bicycle). However, wounding does not include injury caused indirectly by events involving a dog, but with no act of aggression on the part of the dog: Sarkis v Morrison (2013) 64 MVR 433 (NSWCA) (dog ran out onto road and collided with plaintiff’s motorcycle, but did not attack plaintiff); compare this to Wilding v Burgemeister [2012] SADC 152, Nicholson J at [12], where the opposite position with regard to causation has been accepted in South Australia. “Wounding” under Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 25 has been held to be a form of attacking: Sarkis v Morrison, Basten JA at [30]–[32] (special leave to appeal refused by the High Court: see Morrison v Sarkis [2014] HCATrans 57). Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 25. Where wounding by a dog causes death, an action under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) is available: Companion Animals Act 1998, s 26. 418

[33.6.460]

STATUTORY STRICT LIABILITY FOR DOGS

10 Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 27. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Community Law Reform Program: Tenth Report – Liability for Injuries Caused by Dogs, Report No 52 (NSWLRC, 1988) at [4.40] has recommended the removal of these limitations. 11 Coleman v Barrat [2004] NSWCA 27 (dog attacked person on a horse, causing the horse to shy and throw its rider, who sustained injury from the fall). 12 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 32(1); Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(1); Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(2), (7). In Western Australia liability is in respect of injury to person or animal that has been “inflicted” in the course of an attack, and in respect of property damage caused in the course of attack. It is presently unclear whether “inflicted” carries the implication of direct causation, when used statutorily in express contradistinction to “caused”. 13 See, eg Boothey v Morris (2002) 219 LSJS 379; [2002] SASC 126 (FC); see also Charman v Pickering (unreported, SASC, Olsson J, 2148 of 1991, 24 October 1991) (dog attacking another dog). See also Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(2). 14 Martignoni v Harris [1971] 2 NSWLR 102 (NSWCA); Irving v Slevin (1982) 30 SASR 66. 15 Twentieth Century Blinds Pty Ltd v Howes [1974] 1 NSWLR 244 (CA); Keeffe v McLean-Carr [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-224 (SASC). 16 Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(3)(c). 17 Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 19(1). 18 Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic), s 29. However, under that Act, “dangerous dogs” are given different treatment than other dogs: see s 3(1) (definition of “dangerous dog”). See also Environment and Natural Resources “Dangerous Dogs” [14.14.450]. 19 There are express provisions to this effect in two jurisdictions: Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), s 55(6); Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), ss 25(4), 28(2). 20 In the Australian Capital Territory, liability is primarily placed on the “keeper” of the dog (Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), s 55(2)) who is defined in the Dictionary to the Act as the “registered keeper” of the dog, although in some cases (eg s 50(1)), liability may fall on the “carer”, defined in the Dictionary as an individual over 14 years of age who is in charge of the dog at the time. See also Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 7 (meaning of “owner”). In the Northern Territory, owner is not defined. In South Australia, civil liability rests on the “keeper” of the dog (Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(1)) which is defined in s 66(5) as the owner of the dog and “includes a person into whose possession the dog has been delivered”. Section 5(1) defines “owner of dog” as being the person in whose name the dog was last registered and s 5(2) includes apparent owners for the purposes of civil liability, and s 65 provides that in civil proceedings “questions of ownership or responsibility for the control of the dog will be determined as if the proceedings were criminal proceedings”. As to the meaning of “keeping”, see Newington v Gall (unreported, NSWSC, Abadee J, 11533 of 1990, 2 March 1994); Zappia v Allsop (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40192 of 1993, 17 March 1994). To establish liability for control of a dog, direct primary evidence that a person owns or is responsible for the dog is not always necessary: see Stock v Wierda (unreported, SASC, Debelle J, 2487 of 1990, 21 June 1991). In Tasmania, the owner of a dog is the registered owner or a person who ordinarily keeps the dog or, if the dog is a “child’s pet”, then the parent or guardian is deemed to be the owner: Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 6(c). In Victoria, “owner” includes temporary carers: Domestic Animals

419

[33.6.460]

ANIMALS

Act 1994 (Vic), s 3(1). However, in any event, liability under s 29 is also imposed on the person in apparent control of the dog. See also Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(5)(a). 21 Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 6(3), made applicable by s 65; Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 61(3); Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(5)(b) (unless it is proved that the dog was owned by an identified person over 18 years of age: s 46(6)). See Horbelt v Elliott (1995) 184 LSJS 31 (SASC), dealing with the essentially similar provisions in the previous South Australian legislation, Dog Control Act 1979 (SA), s 34. In South Australia, if it is proved that immediately before the alleged incident the dog was in company with or had been seen continuously and closely following a person, the person, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, will be taken to have had possession or control of the dog at the time in question: Dog and Cat Management Act 1995, s 6(2), made applicable by s 65. A similar provision exists in Tasmania where the fact that a dog, immediately before the alleged offence, is in company with or closely following a person is taken as evidence of ownership: Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 60(2). 22 See, eg Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(3)(e); Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(4). 23 Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [15.20].

[33.6.470] Several defences are available to claims for injury caused by dogs, either expressly provided by statute or arising out of judicial interpretation. In Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25, the High Court stated that the very generality of the relevant statutory provisions “provokes attempts at restriction by implication”.1 The following defences may be available:2 (1) Contributory negligence.3 Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia makes express provision for this defence.4 In the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Victoria, the position is unclear although there is some opinion that the defence is available where the legislation provides that the defendant “shall be liable”.5 (2) Voluntary assumption of risk.6 The relevant statutes do not make express provision for this defence, but courts have suggested that the defences open in a scienter action (which include voluntary assumption of risk: see [33.6.390]) are also available in actions under the Dog Acts.7 (3) Provocation. Legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Victoria provides that provocation of the dog by the plaintiff, or by the animal attacked by the dog, is a defence.8 Provocation by a person other than the owner or the owner’s servants or agents is a defence in New South Wales and South Australia.9 (4) Plaintiff as trespasser. In the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and Victoria, legislation expressly provides a defence if the injury is suffered while the plaintiff is on the defendant’s land without lawful excuse.10 In South Australia and Tasmania, the defence is available if the dog was being used in the “reasonable defence of [any/a] person or property”.11 Although other

420

[33.6.470]

STATUTORY STRICT LIABILITY FOR DOGS

jurisdictions do not have similar provisions, there is authority suggesting that a defence is available in these circumstances.12 There must be a somewhat substantial trespass: a merely technical trespass, such as resting one’s arm on the defendant’s fence,13 or waving an arm over the fence,14 may be insufficient. However, leaning on and allowing one’s arm to partially protrude over the defendant’s fence has been found to constitute trespass enlivening this statutory defence.15 It is not clear how the defence would be affected by the High Court’s holding that occupiers owe a common law duty of care to all visitors, including trespassers.16 In New South Wales, there is no liability for injury caused by a dog attack that occurs on any property or vehicle of which the owner of the dog is an occupier or on which the dog is ordinarily kept and where the person attacked is not lawfully on the property or vehicle, unless the dog is one which has been declared to be dangerous, menacing or restricted under the Act.17 In other jurisdictions, the fact that the plaintiff was not lawfully on the defendant’s property would be no defence. However, the language of the High Court in Simpson v Bannerman cannot be interpreted as allowing a defendant to escape liability under the Dog Acts merely by proving an absence of negligence. In Rokich v Gianoli (unreported, WASCFC, Pidgeon, Murray and Parker JJ, Ful 28, 29 of 1996, 4 March 1997), the argument that s 46 of the Dog Act 1976 (WA) merely established a rebuttable presumption of negligence was comprehensively examined but rejected by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

1

2 3 4

5

6 7

Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25 (HCA), Gavan Duffy CJ, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 383 (CLR); see also Starke J at 385 (CLR). In South Australia, liability for the keeper of a dog is decided in accordance with the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA). See generally “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), ss 50(3)(c)(ii), 55(4)(b); Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 28; Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(4); Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 46(2). It is not contributory negligence to continue to use a public road even though the plaintiff knows from prior experience that a dog living at premises on that road is likely to attack: Zappia v Allsop (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40192 of 1993, 17 March 1994). Boothey v Morris (2002) 219 LSJS 379; [2002] SASC 126 (defence of contributory negligence was rejected on the facts, but not because the defence was not available); see also Chittenden v Hale [1933] NZLR 836 (NZSC), Blair J at 847; Christian v Johannesson [1956] NZLR 664 (NZSC), Cooke J at 666; Knowlson v Solomon [1969] NZLR 686 (NZSC), McGregor J at 688 (dealing with the equivalent New Zealand provision, now found in Dog Control Act 1996 (NZ), s 63). For comment on these cases, seeTodd S, Hughes J, Smillie J and Hawes C, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Brookers, 2009) at [6.10.03]. See generally “Voluntary Assumption of Risk” [33.9.880]–[33.9.970]. Wilkins v Manning (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 220 (NSWSCFC); Chittenden v Hale [1933] NZLR 836 (NZSC), Blair J at 851; Christian v Johannesson [1956] NZLR 664

421

[33.6.470]

ANIMALS

8

9

10

11

12

13 14 15

16

17

(NZSC), Cooke J at 665; Knowlson v Solomon [1969] NZLR 686 (NZSC), McGregor J at 688. Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), ss 50(3)(a), 55(4)(c); Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 19(7)(b); Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic), s 29(9)(a). It should be noted that, other than for Domestic Animals Act 2000, s 55(4)(c), these are defences to statutory liability, not civil liability. However, the presumption is that similar defences must be conceptually available to civil liability. Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 25(2)(b); Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(3)(a) (keepers’ liability to be decided in accordance with the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA), now known as the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA)). In Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25, Gavan Duffy CJ, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 383 (CLR) were prepared to assume that provocation was an available defence. Domestic Animals Act 2000 (ACT), ss 50(3)(c)(i), 55(4)(a); Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(3)(c); Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic), s 29(9)(b). While these are prescribed defences to statutory liability rather than civil liability, it is presumed that similar defences may be contemplated to civil liability. Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA), s 66(3)(d); Dog Control Act 2000 (Tas), s 19(7)(a). While these are prescribed defences to statutory liability rather than civil liability, it is presumed that similar defences may be contemplated to civil liability. Wilkins v Manning (1897) 13 WN (NSW) 220 (NSWSCFC); Trethowan v Capron [1961] VR 460, Adam J at 465. See Cummings v Granger [1977] QB 397; [1976] 3 WLR 842 (CA). Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25. Rigg v Alietti [1982] WAR 203 (WASCFC). Compare Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195. Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195 (defence available despite finding that plaintiff’s arm extending over defendant’s fence was both minor and inadvertent). See Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; 61 ALJR 180. However, no reference to this case has been made in more recent decisions considering this statutory defence: see, eg Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195. See generally “Duty to Trespassers” [33.3.320]–[33.3.340]. Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), s 25(2)(a).

422

Vicarious Liability General [33.6.580] Vicarious liability involves the attribution of liability to one party for the vicarious acts of another. The principle of vicarious liability is that if a plaintiff suffers damage by the wrongful act of another and seeks to hold a third party liable for that damage, the plaintiff must establish that in doing the wrongful act the perpetrator acted as the employee or agent of the third party.1 It is not the liability of the wrongdoer which is vicarious, it is the liability of an employer or principal for vicarious acts. Accordingly, as Kitto J explained in Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, vicarious liability “should be recognised as an example of transferred epithet”.2 Earlier cases, and even some modern authorities, refer to a relationship of “master and servant” when describing vicarious liability.3 In this discussion of vicarious liability (see [33.6.590]–[33.6.720]), only modern terminology will be used. The reference will be to “employer and employee” unless directly quoting from the judgment of a court.

1 Hewitt v Bonvin [1940] 1 KB 188 (CA), MacKinnon LJ at 191. 2 Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Kitto J at 60–61. However, it should be noted that the High Court has emphasised that no clear or stable principle emerges from the case law which underpins the doctrine of vicarious liability: see Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR 317; [2006] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [11]; Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42; 86 ALJR 494; [2012] HCA 16, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [100]. 3 See, eg Tobin v The Queen (1864) 16 CB(NS) 310; 143 ER 1148, the Court at 351–352 (CB(NS)). See also Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at [21-002].

[33.6.590] Vicarious liability is an example of strict liability1 imposed for policy reasons.2 It arises by virtue of a special relationship existing between the parties.3 The principle is correctly stated in terms of liability, not duty. An employer is not liable for a breach of duty imposed on the employer but for a breach of duty imposed on the employee. The vicarious liability of the employer is separate from, and independent of, the liability of the employee.4 Accordingly, the employer is protected by any immunity that may be available to the actual wrongdoer.5

423

[33.6.590]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

The principle of vicarious liability applies to all torts at common law, with one exception: the tort of breach of statutory duty. In Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, the High Court held that the employer was not vicariously liable for breach of a duty cast by a statute on its employee only, even though the breach occurred in the course of employment. To hold otherwise would have resulted in the enlargement of the scope and operation of the statute. However, in New South Wales the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) provides for vicarious liability for torts committed by a servant in the performance or purported performance of a function imposed by statute independently of the will of the servant’s employer, so long as it is within the course of that servant’s employment or incidental to the employer’s business.6 An employer’s vicarious liability must be distinguished from their personal liability. Although a breach may have been committed by an employee or agent, or even an independent contractor (see [33.6.720]), a non-delegable duty may be imposed by law on the employer.7 Where the liability of the employer or principal is personal for this reason, the issue of vicarious liability need not be addressed.8

1 For further discussion of strict liability, see [33.6.140]. 2 Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141 (CA), Scarman LJ at 147; Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Fullagar J at 56–57; Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [34]; New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [196]; Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR 317; [2006] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [11]. 3 However, the High Court has observed that “[a] fully satisfactory rationale for the imposition of vicarious liability in the employment relationship has been slow to appear in the case law”: Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [35]. 4 Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36, Kitto J at 61. 5 Commonwealth v Griffıths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; [2007] NSWCA 370. 6 Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), s 7 read with s 5. 7 See “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350]. 8 Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531; see also Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749; Hillcoat v Keymon Pty Ltd [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-642; [2002] QSC 023; New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gaudron J at [127].

424

[33.6.610]

LIABILITY OF THE CROWN

[33.6.600] Vicarious liability of an employer for the tort of an employee, and of a principal for the tort of an agent, may arise where either the employer or the principal retains control over the manner in which work is performed. Retention of control has been an essential element in proving that the tort was committed within the course of employment or the scope of authority.1 However, the requirement for control is sometimes applied more notionally than actually. Thus, an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees who exercise professional skills or fulfil a function, whose manner of performance is governed by standards of professional duties.2 For example, the principle of vicarious liability applies to the employer of hospital medical staff.3

1

2

3

Samson v Aitchison [1912] AC 844 (PC), Lord Atkinson (for the Privy Council) at 850; Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Brennan J at 692 (CLR); Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 626; 60 ALJR 480, Gibbs CJ at 638–639 (CLR); Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; 74 ALJR 1410; [2000] HCA 52. Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Dixon J at 251–252 (CLR); Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 (CA), Reynolds JA at [47]–[49]. See Professional Liability “Negligence” [27.2.560]–[27.2.570].

Liability of the Crown [33.6.610] The Crown may be vicariously liable for torts to the extent that Crown immunity has been abrogated by statute. The general principle that the Crown and its agents are not liable in tort has been significantly modified by statute.1 If an officer or employee of the Crown acting in the course of service under the authority of the Crown commits a tort, the Crown will be liable unless the officer or employee was exercising or fulfilling an independent duty or power.2 It is on this basis that the Crown in right of the Commonwealth is vicariously liable in respect of torts committed by members of the armed services.3 However, if the law charges a public officer with a discretion and responsibility in the execution of an independent legal duty, that public officer is solely responsible for tortious acts which may be committed in the course of the office. The government or body which the officer serves or which has appointed the officer incurs no vicarious liability for such tortious acts.4 This doctrine was first laid down in Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969, in which it was held that a peace officer was personally liable for wrongful arrest and that there was no liability of the Crown which appointed the peace officer to this position. The basis of the High Court’s decision was that the peace officer was not an agent or employee of the appointor but had original, not delegated, authority. This

425

[33.6.610]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

doctrine has been specifically applied to police constables making arrests.5 In jurisdictions where it has not been abrogated by statute,6 the doctrine “is firmly established as part of the common law of Australia”.7 The doctrine in Enever v The King has been the subject of substantial criticism. The criticisms are summarised in Middleton v Western Australia (1992) 8 WAR 256, in which Acting Master Hawkins refused to strike out an action for false imprisonment and unlawful assault in respect of the acts of police on the basis that, notwithstanding the doctrine, the action might have a reasonable chance of success.8 However, the doctrine has since been applied in decisions of the Federal Court of Australia,9 the Supreme Court of Victoria,10 the Supreme Court of Western Australia,11 and the Victorian Court of Appeal.12 Further, an employee does not have the necessary independent discretion if that employee is subject to the control of the relevant Minister.13 It has been held that the doctrine in Enever v The King was abrogated by statute in the case of a teacher employed in a government school.14 However, the issue of vicarious liability for the negligence of employees of the Crown is irrelevant if it is held that the Crown, in any event, has a sufficiently extensive non-delegable duty:15 see [33.6.630].

1 See Professional Liability “Immunities” [27.9.240]–[27.9.260]; Government “Executive Authority” [19.3.580]. 2 Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344; Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570. 3 Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570. 4 Little v Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 94, Dixon J at 114. See also Field v Nott (1939) 62 CLR 660, Dixon J at 675, citing Tobin v The Queen (1864) 16 CB(NS) 310; 143 ER 1148, the Court at 351–352 (CB(NS)); Raleigh v Goschen (1898) 1 Ch 73; Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969, Griffith CJ at 979, 980, Barton J at 986, 987, O’Connor J at 994; Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97, Griffith CJ at 110, O’Connor J at 123; Fowles v Eastern & Australasian Steamship Co Ltd (1916) 2 AC 556; (1913) 17 CLR 149; Zachariassen v Commonwealth (1917) 24 CLR 166. See further Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Fullagar J at 283–284. Note that this limitation on the vicarious liability of the Crown has been abolished by statute in England by Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK), s 2(3): see Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Dixon J at 250–251; Sneddon v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 351, Meagher JA at [197]. 5 Fisher v Oldham Corp [1930] 2 KB 364. See also Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Dixon J at 249–252, Kitto J at 303–304 (CLR). 6 The immunity has been abrogated in the following jurisdictions: Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), s 64B; Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), Pt 4; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT), Pt VIIA; Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 10.5; Police Act 1998 (SA), s 65; Police Service Act 2003 (Tas), s 84;

426

[33.6.620]

7

8 9

10 11 12 13

14 15

LOAN OF SERVICES

Police Act 1892 (WA), s 137. The effects of the doctrine are ameliorated in Victoria by Victoria Police Act 2013 (Vic), ss 74, 75: see Victoria v Horvath (2002) 6 VR 326; [2002] VSCA 177; Bannerman v Victoria [2009] VSC 438 (decided under the Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic), s 123 (repealed)). Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 626; 60 ALJR 480, Gibbs CJ at 637 (CLR); Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526 (VSC), Harper J at 570. For further criticisms, see Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [19.80]. McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; [1999] FCA 1101 (FC); Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084. Bannerman v Victoria [2009] VSC 438. Mickelberg v Western Australia [2007] WASC 140; Ives v Western Australia [2010] WASC 178. Kirkland-Veenstra v Stuart (2008) 23 VR 36; [2008] VSCA 211. Bennett v Minister for Community Welfare [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-210 (WASC) (reversed on appeal on other grounds in Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 550). Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16; 38 ALJR 106. See “School Authorities” [33.2.980]–[33.2.1020]; Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749; New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4. See also Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16; 38 ALJR 106, Kitto J at 28–29 (CLR). For other examples, see “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350]; see also [33.6.630].

Loan of Services [33.6.620] Different principles apply where the services of an employee have been lent by a general employer to a particular employer. Usually, the general employer remains vicariously liable for the services performed.1 Liability will rest with the particular employer where the general employer discharges a burden of proving that, for a particular purpose or on a particular occasion, the transfer of authority has resulted in the employee acting for the particular employer.2 This burden was held to have been discharged in McDonald v Commonwealth (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 129; 62 WN (NSW) 242, where the general employer let on hire a lorry and driver for a Commonwealth department without knowing either the nature of the work that the lorry was to do or the place of work. A works foreman employed by the Commonwealth gave orders to the driver. Jordan CJ stated: If by the agreement the employer vests in the third party complete, or substantially complete, control of the employee, so that he is entitled not only to direct the employee what he is to do but how he is to do it, and the employee was performing services stipulated for, or authorised by, the third party at the time, the third party is liable … [If] the third party, though not entitled to do so as between himself and the employer, assumes to give a special direction to the employee as to how he is to do a

427

[33.6.620]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

particular act, or if he directs him to do an act outside the scope of the stipulated services, and the employee, in complying with the direction, negligently causes the injury, it is the third party who is liable.3

The burden was also held to be discharged in Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749, although the decision of the High Court may be better viewed as based upon the non-delegable duty of care on the part of the Commonwealth: see [33.6.610]–[33.6.630]. In that case, the Commonwealth had borrowed teachers from New South Wales to operate schools in the Australian Capital Territory, on terms that the Commonwealth would reimburse the State of New South Wales for the cost. It was held that the Commonwealth had failed to take reasonable steps to protect its pupils, Murphy J stating that the Commonwealth became liable for the acts and omissions of the staff whether or not these were supplied by another entity or agency.4 A particular employer may also be liable under statute for services loaned from another separate employer. For example, s 326 of the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth) makes the owner or master of a ship vicariously liable for the fault of a compulsory pilot. This section has been interpreted to mean that there is no vicarious liability for the pilot on the part of the general employer, the port authority.5

1 Savory v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Southern) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1158 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 1163. 2 Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Brennan J at 692 (CLR); Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 626; 60 ALJR 480, Gibbs CJ at 641 (CLR), citing Mersey Docks & Harbour Board (UK) v Coggins & Griffıth (Liverpool) Ltd [1947] AC 1. 3 McDonald v Commonwealth (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 129; 62 WN (NSW) 242 (FC), Jordan CJ (for the Court) at 132 (SR (NSW)); see also Airwork (NZ) Ltd v Vertical Flight Management Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 641 (CA). 4 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; 56 ALJR 749, Murphy J at 275–276 (CLR). 5 Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 626; 60 ALJR 480 (decided under the former equivalent legislation: Navigation Act 1912 (Cth), s 410B).

Course of Employment [33.6.630] Vicarious liability for employees arises only where the act or omission constituting the tort occurs in the course of employment.1 In general terms, the scope of employment and the authority which the employment confers upon an employee need to be examined. For there to be vicarious liability, the act must be “within the scope of the servant’s authority

428

[33.6.630]

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

either as being an act which he was employed actually to perform or as being an act which was incidental to his employment”.2 This is conceptually consistent with the parameters of the express and implied actual authority of an agent.3 In Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1872) LR 7 CP 415, it was held that the act of a porter pulling a plaintiff out of a carriage, due to an erroneous impression that the plaintiff was in the wrong carriage, was an act done in the course of employment for which the employer was vicariously liable. Similarly, in Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Rogers [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-246, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that an assault, committed during the course of a professional rugby league match which was intended to assist defeating the opposing team, was in the course of employment. This finding was made even though an illegitimate tackle had been used so that there was an improper mode of performing the employment duties. Whether a given act is or is not within the course of employment is “a question of fact dependent entirely upon the circumstances of the particular case”.4 In New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ stated that the scope of employment is: [F]unctional, as well as geographical and temporal. Not everything that an employee does at work, or during working hours, is sufficiently connected with the duties and responsibilities of the employee to be regarded as within the scope of the employment. And the fact that wrongdoing occurs away from the workplace, or outside normal working hours, is not conclusive against liability.5

In Lepore v New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 420; [2001] NSWCA 112, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the non-delegable duty of care owed by a school to its pupils extends to ensuring that “school pupils on school premises and during school hours” are protected from physical harm “at the hands of an employed teacher”.6 The issue of vicarious liability was not canvassed in that Court. However, the reasoning of Heydon JA in dissent was preferred by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Rich v Queensland [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-626; [2001] QCA 295, where it was held that acts which are “the very antithesis” of what an employee is employed to do are “independent unauthorised acts outside the scope of [the employee’s] service”.7 Appeals from both cases were heard together by the High Court, where it was argued that the school authorities were vicariously liable as well as liable for breach of their non-delegable duty of care. The High Court gave judgment in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4 in favour of the school authorities. Kirby J noted that for the imposition of vicarious liability, the employment must represent more than the occasion for the performance of the employee’s individual criminal and civil wrongs.8 Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ expressed the view that intentional wrongs by the employee gave rise to vicarious liability only in certain defined circumstances as follows: (1)

In the case of deliberate criminal acts of the employee, where “the person 429

[33.6.630]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

against whom liability is asserted is estopped from asserting that the person whose acts are in question was not acting as his or her servant, agent or representative when the acts occurred”,9 which would tend to occur only when there was a close connection between what was done and what the person was engaged to do. (2)

In the case of intentional torts, “where the wrongful act is done in the intended pursuit of the employer’s interests or in intended performance of the contract of employment”.10

(3)

Further in the case of intentional torts, “where the wrongful act is done in ostensible pursuit of the employer’s business or in the apparent execution of authority which the employer holds out the employee as having”.11

The House of Lords has applied an approach consistent with that of the High Court in New South Wales v Lepore. In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; [2001] 2 WLR 1311; [2001] UKHL 22, the relative closeness of connection between the nature of the employment and the particular tort was used to determine the employer liable for sexual abuse of boys carried out by the employee, in a boarding school under the employee’s care. By consideration of the job on which the employee was engaged by the employer, such a connection was found between the unlawful acts and the duties of the employee that those acts fell within the scope of their duties.12

1 This phrase “in the course of employment” and its variants “sphere” and “scope” of employment are used to indicate the just limits of an employer’s liability for the wrongdoing of an employee: see Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, Isaacs J at 117 (CLR). 2 Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370; 50 SR (NSW) 50; 67 WN (NSW) 76, Latham CJ at 378 (CLR). 3 For the relationship between vicarious liability and agency, see Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, Isaacs J at 116 (CLR); New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gaudron J at [128]. For a general discussion of agency, see Contracts: Specific “Agency” [8.1.10]ff. 4 Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, Isaacs J at 121 (CLR). In a different context, but concerning the question of whether an employee’s conduct occurred “in the course of employment”, see Comcare v PVYW (2013) 88 ALJR 1; [2013] HCA 41. 5 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gleeson CJ at [40]. 6 Lepore v New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 420; [2001] NSWCA 112, Mason P at [61], but see the strong dissent of Heydon JA at [66]–[126]. 7 Rich v Queensland [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-626; [2001] QCA 295, Thomas JA at [24]. 8 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Kirby J at [326]. 9 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gaudron J at [130].

430

[33.6.650]

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

10 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [231]. 11 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [231]. 12 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215; [2001] 2 WLR 1311; [2001] UKHL 22; see also Balfron Trustees Ltd v Petersen [2002] Lloyd’s Rep PN 1 (CA). Compare this to Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56; [2013] 2 AC 1 at [74], where Lord Phillips observed that the “close connection” test approved by all members of the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd “tells one nothing about the nature of the connection”.

[33.6.640] A principal is vicariously liable for a tort committed by an agent if the principal has authorised the act:1 see also [33.6.630]. The necessary authority is given when a principal entrusts an agent to represent that principal in the performance of a transaction with others, by the agent standing in the place of the principal and not acting in an independent capacity.2 Dixon J expressed the rationale in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41 as follows: In most cases in which a tort is committed in the course of the performance of work for the benefit of another person, he cannot be vicariously responsible if the actual tortfeasor is not his servant and he has not directly authorized the doing of the act which amounts to a tort. The work, although done at his request and for his benefit, is considered as the independent function of the person who undertakes it, and not as something which the person obtaining the benefit does by his representative standing in his place and, therefore, identified with him for the purpose of liability arising in the course of its performance.3

Thus, where the wrongful act of an employee has been authorised by the employer, the employer will be liable. The difficulty relates to unauthorised acts, that is, acts that are not within the express and implied actual authority of an agent. Here the parallel with the concepts of the law of agency becomes less clear.4

1 Hewitt v Bonvin [1940] 1 KB 188 (CA). 2 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41, Dixon J at 48. 3 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41, Dixon J at 48. 4 See Contracts: Specific “Agency” [8.1.10]ff.

[33.6.650] The fact that an act was not authorised does not necessarily result in a finding that the act was not committed in the course of employment. In Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, an employee was entitled, as part of his remuneration, to be supplied by his employer with cooked meat. The employer, on a particular occasion, supplied

431

[33.6.650]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

the employee with raw meat and instructed him to cook it in a nominated place. The employee lit a fire to cook the meat in another place and negligently allowed the fire to escape. The High Court held that the employer was responsible for the consequences of the employee’s negligence, even though the employee’s acts were beyond authority and had been expressly forbidden.1 Isaacs J explained that the act authorised by the employer was the cooking of the meat. The place where that authorised act was to be done was not essential to the employer’s liability.2 It followed that the employer had sanctioned the lighting of the fire on the property and the employee was therefore acting for the employer’s purposes rather than his own. It would have been outside the course of employment if the employee had not assumed to act within the scope of his employment or if what he had done was so remote from the duty he owed to the employer to be altogether outside of, or inconsistent with, his employment.3 In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41, a life insurance agent had been forbidden to make defamatory statements, but nevertheless made such statements in the course of canvassing. It was held that the employer was vicariously liable on the basis that “if an unlawful act done by an agent be within the scope of his authority, it is immaterial that the principal directed the agent not to do it”.4 The English Court of Appeal made a similar finding in London County Council v Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 997. Part of an employee’s duty involved moving cars, but he was forbidden to drive them. It was held that when he caused an accident by driving a car, the employer was still vicariously liable on the basis that the employee was performing the authorised act of moving cars in the unauthorised manner of driving them. However, there is no vicarious liability if the act of the employee is done to gratify private spite or to achieve revenge. In Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370; 50 SR (NSW) 50; 67 WN (NSW) 76, the employer was not held to be vicariously liable for the act of a barmaid in throwing a glass at a customer on the basis that it was “a spontaneous act of retributive justice”.5 A precise formulation of the test to be applied may be found in various editions of Salmond on the Law of Torts where it is stated that an employer is liable even for unauthorised acts if they are so connected with authorised acts “that they may rightly be regarded as modes – although improper modes – of doing them”.6 The employer is not responsible if the unauthorised and wrongful act is “not so connected with the authorised act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an independent act”.7 Gleeson CJ in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4 stated that: As Lord Wilberforce explained in Kooragang Investments Pty Ltd v Richardson & Wrench Ltd, to hold an employer liable for negligent acts of an employee is usually uncontroversial; negligence involves performing an allotted task carelessly rather than carefully. Intentional and criminal wrongdoing, engaged in solely for the benefit of the employee, presents a more difficult problem. Even so, employers may be vicariously liable for such wrongdoing, even in cases where the wrongdoing

432

[33.6.660]

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

constitutes a flagrant breach of the employment obligations … [I]t is the nature of that which the employee is employed to do on behalf of the employer that determines whether the wrongdoing is within the scope of the employment.8

Thus it is the connection between the employee’s duties and his wrongdoing which, if close enough, brings the wrongdoing within the scope of his employment:9 see [33.6.630].

1 2 3 4

5

6

7 8

9

Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, Isaacs J at 117 (CLR). Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, Isaacs J at 128–129 (CLR). Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110; [1919] VLR 264, Isaacs J at 118 (CLR). Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41, Gavan Duffy CJ and Starke J at 47. Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370; 50 SR (NSW) 50; 67 WN (NSW) 76, Dixon J at 382 (CLR). For more recent examples, see Sprod v Public Relations Oriented Security Pty Ltd [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-817; [2005] NSWSC 1074; Black v JR Perry Nominees Pty Ltd (2012) 221 IR 456; [2012] VSCA 122. Salmond JW, Salmond on the Law of Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1907); see also Heuston RFV and Buckley RA, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) p 443. Heuston RFV and Buckley RA, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) p 443. New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gleeson J at [43], [46]. For the views of the other High Court justices, see [33.6.630]. See, eg Ffrench v Sestili (2006) 98 SASR 1; [2006] SASC 44; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377; Starks v RSM Security Pty Ltd [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-763; [2004] NSWCA 351. Note that the “scope of employment” test may be modified in certain contexts by statute, eg Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s 106(1) appears to impose a wider test for vicarious liability (“in connection with”) than that imposed by the common law: South Pacific Resort Hotels Pty Ltd v Trainor (2005) 144 FCR 402; [2005] FCAFC 130, Black CJ and Tamberlin J at [42]; see also Hong Cui Huang v University of New South Wales [2014] FCCA 644, Judge Cameron at [145]. Corporations Law (Cth), s 819 (repealed) applied whether or not the conduct was within the scope of the representative’s employment or authority: see Financial Wisdom Ltd v Newman (2005) 12 VR 79; 191 FLR 138; [2005] VSCA 110. Corporations Law (Cth), s 819 found in Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), Pt 13 (Act repealed).

[33.6.660] An employee acts outside the scope of employment if they go on a “frolic” of their own.1 In Storey v Ashton (1869) LR 4 QB 476, where a driver, for personal reasons, went in the opposite direction to the route required by the course of employment, the journey was categorised as being entirely new and independent. A different result might have been reached if the employee had

433

[33.6.660]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

merely taken a somewhat longer route. Thus, in Joel v Morison (1834) 6 Car & P 501; 172 ER 1338, an employer was held vicariously liable for an employee who made a detour to call upon a friend. The same result was reached in Chaplin v Dunstan Ltd [1938] SASR 245, where a truck driver turned off a route to get a drink at a hotel. Vicarious liability may still arise in these circumstances even if the detour is a prohibited act.2

1 Joel v Morison (1834) 6 Car & P 501; 172 ER 1338, Parke B at 503 (Car & P). 2 Whatman v Pearson (1868) LR 3 CP 422.

[33.6.670] At common law, a driver of a motor vehicle over which another person retains control is an agent of the other person who is liable, as principal, for the driver’s negligence. Where a person with the right to direct and control the driving of a vehicle appoints another person to drive, in circumstances where the first person can still assert a power of control, the High Court has held that the first person is driving the vehicle by their agent.1 This situation is presumed when an owner travels in the vehicle as a passenger.2 In such circumstances, the owner of the vehicle bears the onus of proving that control of the vehicle was abandoned.3 The same principles apply to a bailee in possession of a vehicle.4 However, the principle does not extend beyond agents over whom the defendant could at the relevant time have asserted power of control.5 The owner does not have to be in the vehicle for the driver to be driving as an agent. The owner will be vicariously liable if the driver, with the owner’s consent, is driving the vehicle on the owner’s business or for the owner’s purposes.6 Where the driver is driving the vehicle with the owner’s consent and as an incident of the driver’s employment by the owner (but not specifically on the owner’s business or for the owner’s purposes), the question is whether the driver’s wrongdoing was an unauthorised mode of doing an unauthorised act or alternatively an independent act:7 see also [33.6.640]–[33.6.650]. In Commonwealth v Cocks (1966) 115 CLR 413; 40 ALJR 33, the High Court held that when an employee drove his own car with the permission of his employer and was paid for mileage on a journey by which the employee transferred from Canberra to Melbourne, the employee was not driving in the course of employment. This decision was distinguished in Greenwood v Commonwealth [1975] VR 859, where the only difference was that a similar type of trip was made on the employer’s express orders.

1 Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215; [1960] Qd R 204; (1960) 33 ALJR 463, Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ at 231; see also Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; 74 ALJR 1410; [2000] HCA 52.

434

[33.6.690]

2 3 4

5 6 7

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

Samson v Aitchison [1912] AC 844 (PC). Chowdhary v Gillot [1947] 2 All ER 541 (KB). Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215; [1960] Qd R 204; (1960) 33 ALJR 463, Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ at 231. See generally Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; 74 ALJR 1410; [2000] HCA 52. Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1120 (CA). Klesteel v Mantzouranis (2006) 46 MVR 101; [2006] NSWSC 915.

[33.6.680] The carriage of a passenger in a vehicle contrary to an express prohibition generally falls outside the scope of employment.1 Carrying unauthorised passengers is not only a wrongful mode of performance but rather considered to be the performance of an act of a class which the driver was not employed to perform at all. However, an alternative explanation was given by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Joss v Snowball (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 218; 91 WN (NSW) 45; [1969] 1 NSWR 426, that “there is no social necessity in imposing liability on an employer in respect of persons towards whom the servant for his own purposes alone has undertaken a duty”.2 Vicarious liability may arise in circumstances where an employee carries passengers contrary to a prohibition if those passengers assist the employee in the performance of employment duties.3

1 2 3

Twine v Bean’s Express Ltd (1946) 62 TLR 458 (CA); Conway v George Wimpey & Co Ltd [1951] 2 KB 266 (CA). Joss v Snowball (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 218; 91 WN (NSW) 45; [1969] 1 NSWR 426, Jacobs and Holmes JJA at 224 (SR (NSW)). Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141 (CA).

[33.6.690] Intentional tortious acts can be committed within the course of employment.1 Such acts occur in the course of employment when the employee’s conduct is prompted by the desire to further the interest of the employer and is reasonably incidental to the performance of allotted duties.2 For example, in Bonette v Woolworths Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 142; 54 WN (NSW) 57, the owner of a retail store was held vicariously liable for slander when a senior employee made an accusation of stealing.3 Similarly, an employer is not vicariously liable for a trespass if it does not order the trespass or any act comprising it or any act leading by physical necessity to the trespass. Only in those circumstances can it be said that the employee was the instrument of the employer for the purpose of the trespass.4 It is the connection between the employee’s duties and their wrongdoing which,

435

[33.6.690]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

if close enough, brings the wrongdoing within the scope of their employment:5 see [33.6.630]–[33.6.650].

1

2 3

4 5

Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41; Hayward v Georges Ltd [1966] VR 202; Commonwealth v Connell (1986) 5 NSWLR 218 (CA). See generally “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. Hayward v Georges Ltd [1966] VR 202, McInerney J at 211. For other examples, see Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1873) LR 8 CP 148 (porter ejected passenger in mistaken belief that porter was on wrong train); Dyer v Munday [1895] 1 QB 742 (store manager forcibly repossessed hire-purchase goods); Poland v John Parr [1927] 1 KB 236 (off-duty employee resorted to unlawful force to protect employer’s property from depredation). Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, Stephen J at 562 (CLR). New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4.

[33.6.700] Vicarious liability can be found in respect of fraudulent acts of employees if an employee was acting within the apparent scope of authority. In Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716, the House of Lords held a firm of solicitors vicariously liable for the fraud of a clerk who misappropriated deeds which had been received while the clerk was acting within the apparent scope of his authority, even though the employer received no benefits from the fraud.1 In such circumstances, vicarious liability arises although the act is not authorised, justified, participated in, or known of or even prohibited.2 In this context, courts have generally departed from the “course of employment” test and instead adopted agency principles directed to determining whether the employee had actual or ostensible authority to act on the employer’s behalf:3 see also [33.6.650].

1 2

3

See Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 3 WLR 276 (CA). McGowan & Co Ltd v Dyer (1873) LR 8 QB 141, Blackburn J (for the Court) at 145; New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd v Brooks [1995] 1 WLR 96 (PC); Coulthard v South Australia (1995) 63 SASR 531 (FC); Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405; [2000] WASCA 192; Ffrench v Sestili (2006) 98 SASR 1; [2006] SASC 44. Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370; 50 SR (NSW) 50; 67 WN (NSW) 76, Dixon J at 381 (CLR); Koorarang Investments v Richardson [1982] AC 462 (PC). See also Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [19.130]. In Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; 74 ALJR 1410; [2000] HCA 52, McHugh J argued (at [36]–[55]) that, in light of modern difficulties in determining the status of a worker as an employee, the relationship of principal and agent should instead be used as the basis for the imposition of vicarious liability. However, the majority of the High Court cast doubt

436

[33.6.710]

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

upon McHugh J’s proposition in that case, as the use of agency in this way risked confusing accepted principles of agency in the law of contract.

Independent Contractors [33.6.710] As a general rule, there is no vicarious liability for the tort of an independent contractor who carries out the work to be performed, not as a representative of the principal, but as a principal themselves.1 It is therefore important to define when a particular person is an “independent contractor”.2 The test was stated by Latham CJ in Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389; [1950] VLR 44 as follows: If the work done by one person for another is done subject to the control and direction of the latter person as to the manner in which it is to be done, the worker is a servant and not an independent contractor. If, however, the person doing the work agrees only to produce a given result but is not subject to control in the actual execution of the work he is an independent contractor.3

However, according to Dixon J in Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills, the determination of whether a person is an independent contractor does not depend on whether work was performed subject to actual direction and control or whether actual direction or control was possible, “but whether ultimate authority over the man in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s order and directions”.4 Accordingly, vicarious liability may arise even if the work is of such a skilful and technical character that the employer could not personally perform it.5 For example, the High Court held that an acrobat is the employee of a circus even though the employer has little room to exercise detailed direction or command.6 The “control test” has been replaced in England but is still accepted as the decisive test in Australia.7 However, the existence of control is only one of a number of indicia which must be considered. In Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J stated: Other relevant matters include, but are not limited to, the mode of remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the delegation of work by the putative employee.8

Wilson and Dawson JJ added: [T]he right to suspend or dismiss the person engaged, the right to the exclusive service of the person engaged and the right to dictate the place of work, hours of work and the like. Those which indicate a contract for services include work involving a profession, trade or distinct calling on the part of the person engaged, the provision by him of his own place of work or of his own equipment, the creation by him of goodwill or saleable assets in the course of his work, the payment by him from his remuneration of business expenses of any significant proportion and the payment to him of remuneration without deduction for income tax.9

437

[33.6.710]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

The reservation of a right to superintend and direct the performance of a task cannot in itself transform what is in essence an independent contract into a contract of service.10 This principle has been applied to honorary medical officers of hospitals. In Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553, the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the totality of the relationship between the parties, while treating control as significant. On the particular facts of the case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the doctor was engaged in his own business and not the business of the respondent hospital. The High Court has held that in general, under contemporary Australian conditions: [T]he conduct by the defendant of an enterprise in which persons are identified as representing that enterprise should carry an obligation to third persons to bear the cost of injury or damage to them which may fairly be said to be characteristic of the conduct of that enterprise.11

The court will consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine if the wrongdoer was effectively an employee of the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant has styled the wrongdoer as an independent contractor rather than an employee.12 However, it is not sufficient for A to be “vicariously liable for the conduct of B if B ‘represents’ A (in the sense of B acting for the benefit or advantage of A)”.13 There are two categories of situations in which a person may be liable for the torts of their independent contractor. The first is a true exception to the general rule that there is no vicarious liability for the torts of an independent contractor and occurs when the person authorises the doing of the act which amounts to the tort:14 see [33.6.640]. The second is where the person engages the independent contractor to perform a duty resting on the person and the independent contractor fails to perform it:15 see [33.6.720]. A principal may also be under a duty to use reasonable care to ensure that the system of work of an independent contractor is safe.16 This duty was explained by Brennan J in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194: An entrepreneur who organises an activity involving a risk of injury to those engaged in it is under a duty to use reasonable care in organizing the activity to avoid or minimise that risk, and that duty is imposed whether or not the entrepreneur is under a further duty of care to servants employed by him to carry out that activity. The entrepreneur’s duty arises simply because he is creating the risk and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee.17

Thus while a principal will not be vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor, it may incur liability where such negligent conduct causes injury to the independent contractor’s employee.18

1 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers & Citizens Co-op

438

[33.6.710]

2

3 4 5 6 7

8 9

10

11

12 13

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41, Dixon J at 48; Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Brennan J at 575 (CLR): see [33.6.640]. For a more recent example, see Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6. Note, however, that the distinction between employers and independent contractors has been the subject of criticism: see Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, McHugh J at 366–367 (CLR); see also Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44, McHugh J at [84]–[93]. However, as the High Court has observed, “whatever the logical and doctrinal imperfections and difficulties in the origins of the law relating to vicarious liability, the concept of distinguishing between independent contractors and employees is one too deeply rooted to be pulled out”: Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1; 83 ALJR 1086; 189 IR 285; [2009] HCA 35, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Bell JJ at [21], citing Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR 317; [2006] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [33]. Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389; [1950] VLR 44, Latham CJ at 396 (CLR). Humberstone v Northern Timber Mills (1949) 79 CLR 389; [1950] VLR 44, Dixon J at 404 (CLR). Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293 (CA); Cassidy v Ministry of Health (UK) [1951] 2 KB 343 (CA). Zuijs v Wirth Bros Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 561; [1955] WCR (NSW) 77. Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Fullagar J at 284–285 (CLR); Oceanic Crest Shipping Co v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd (1985) 160 CLR 626; 60 ALJR 480, Gibbs CJ at 639 (CLR); Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194; Green v Victorian WorkCover Authority [1997] 1 VR 364. For divergent considerations of this area, compare the decision of the majority of the High Court in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44 with the decision in the same matter of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (1999) 31 MVR 49; [1999] NSWCA 334. The High Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J at 24 (CLR). Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 36–37 (CLR); see also Climaze Holdings Pty Ltd v Dyson (1995) 13 WAR 487; 58 IR 260. Queensland Stations Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1945) 70 CLR 539; 8 ATD 30, Dixon J at 552 (CLR); Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 36 (CLR). Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [42]. Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21; 75 ALJR 1356; 47 ATR 559; 106 IR 80; [2001] HCA 44. Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR

439

[33.6.710]

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

14

15 16 17 18

317; [2006] HCA 19, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [29]. Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Brennan J at 575 (CLR) who dissented from the majority as to whether, in the circumstances of the case, the port authority did owe a non-delegable duty of care to the plaintiff. However, there is no vicarious liability where a person employs an independent contractor to do an act by which the commission of a tort is not a necessary or natural consequence: Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156; Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48. Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Brennan J at 575 (CLR). Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1; 83 ALJR 1086; 189 IR 285; [2009] HCA 35, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Bell JJ at [20]. Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Brennan J at 47 (CLR). Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1; 83 ALJR 1086; 189 IR 285; [2009] HCA 35, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Bell JJ at [21].

[33.6.720] Apart negligence of an principal was in Mason J stated in 33 LGRA 156:

from vicarious liability, a principal may be liable for the independent contractor if, in the circumstances, the breach of a personal non-delegable duty of care.1 As Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370;

Although the general rule is that a person is not liable for the negligence of his independent contractor, it is accepted that a person who owes a duty to a third party cannot avoid responsibility for discharging that duty by delegating performance of it to an independent contractor.2

In Stoneman v Lyons, the High Court held that a building owner, whose rebuilding operations would foreseeably damage a neighbour unless preventative steps were taken, was bound to do all that was necessary to prevent the damage and could not relieve himself of responsibility by employing an independent contractor. However, Mason J held that there was no vicarious liability if the operation was in essence “an everyday occurrence entailing safeguards which are well known and which, if implemented by a skilled and experienced contractor, eliminate the danger”.3 The test to determine when a non-delegable duty arises was stated by Mason J in Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531. This duty will arise when: [A] person on whom it is imposed has undertaken the care, supervision or control of the person or property of another or is so placed in relation to that person or his property as to assume a particular responsibility for his own or its safety, in circumstances where the person affected might reasonably expect that due care will be exercised.4

In Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428, the majority of the High Court held that on this test, no non-delegable duty of

440

[33.6.720]

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care was imposed on a landlord in respect of work on premises performed by a licensed electrician.5 What is required to discharge a non-delegable duty is set out in by the combined judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, where the High Court stated that “the requirement of reasonable care in those categories of case extends to seeing that care is taken”.6 The Court then went on to hold that: [T]he relationship of proximity which exists in the category of case into which Rylands v Fletcher circumstances fall contains the central element of control which generates, in other categories of case, a special “personal” or “non-delegable” duty of care under the ordinary law of negligence.7

It has been suggested that a non-delegable duty will arise where a person engages an independent contractor to undertake a particularly dangerous activity.8 Remarks by Olsson J in Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5) (1988) 67 LGRA 108,9 if taken out of context, may be thought to support this proposition. In that case, a council was held liable in negligence when it embarked upon the implementation of a coordinated policy that carried obvious hazards. Although the council engaged an independent contractor to carry out the policy, it was found to be in breach of its personal duty of care by failing to subject the independent contractor to sufficient control over the discharge of his responsibilities. However, the High Court has more than once disapproved of this proposition. In Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd, the majority treated the subject of the degree of care required stating that: Where a duty of care arises under the ordinary law of negligence, the standard of care exacted is that which is reasonable in the circumstances. It has been emphasized in many cases that the degree of care under that standard necessarily varies with the risk involved and that the risk involved includes both the magnitude of the risk of an accident happening and the seriousness of the potential damage if an accident should occur. Even where a dangerous substance or a dangerous activity of a kind which might attract the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is involved, the standard of care remains “that which is reasonable in the circumstances, that which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the circumstances”. In the case of such substances or activities, however, a reasonably prudent person would exercise a higher degree of care. Indeed, depending upon the magnitude of the danger, the standard of “reasonable care” may involve “a degree of diligence so stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety”.10

In Stoneman v Lyons, Mason J (with whom Barwick CJ and Gibbs J agreed) rejected the appellant’s argument that performing an extrahazardous activity imposed a higher standard than the duty to take reasonable care, and preferred the proposition that what has to be done to perform the duty to take reasonable care is proportionate to the danger created by the doing of the relevant act.11 In Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ also considered that performing

441

[33.6.720]

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an extrahazardous activity did not create a situation to which different legal principles applied.12 Beyond considerations of extrahazardous activities, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has recognised that school or education authorities owe a non-delegable duty of care for the negligence of independent contractors, to the extent that such contractors perform functions which the school has assumed for itself a duty to perform.13 This non-delegable duty does not, however, extend to functions which the school or education authority has no duty to perform, but where the duty extends simply to arranging for the performance of those functions.14 It is first necessary to identify a duty owed by the school (or hospital, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council [2014] AC 537; [2013] 3 WLR 1227; [2013] UKSC 66), which is personal to the school (or hospital).15 Vicarious liability may also arise for the breach by an independent contractor of a statutory duty cast on the employer.16

1

Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36; Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194; Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331; Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1997) 188 CLR 313; 71 ALJR 1428. 2 Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, Mason J at 574 (CLR). See “Non-delegable Duties” [33.2.350]. 3 Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, Mason J at 575 (CLR). See also Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95. 4 Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531, Mason J at 687 (CLR). 5 The landlord was held to be liable on separate grounds. See Forsayth Mining Services Pty Ltd v Jack (unreported, WASCFC, Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Murray JJ, 129 of 1993, 10 May 1995) (employer under non-delegable duty to provide safe system of work for independent contractors and their employees on site); Simpson v Blanch [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-458 (NSWCA) (property owner under non-delegable duty to prevent escape of animals onto highway). 6 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 550 (CLR). 7 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 552 (CLR), referring to Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 8 See, eg Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, Mason J at 576 (CLR); see also Honeywill & Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial Photographers) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191 (CA), the Court at 197. 9 Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5) (1988) 67 LGRA 108 (SASC); see also Cashfield House Ltd v David & Heather Sinclair Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 452 (NZHC). 10 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 554 (CLR), referring to Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 442

[33.6.720]

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11 Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; 50 ALJR 370; 33 LGRA 156, Mason J at 574 (CLR) (with whom Barwick CJ and Gibbs J agreed). 12 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194, Mason J at 29–30, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 40–43 (CLR); see also Transfield Services (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hall (2008) 75 NSWLR 12; [2008] NSWCA 294. See also Woodland v Essex County Council [2014] AC 537; [2013] 3 WLR 1227; [2013] UKSC 66, Lord Sumption JSC at [22] (Lords Clarke of Stone-Cum-Ebony, Wilson and Toulson JJSC agreeing). 13 Woodland v Essex County Council [2014] AC 537; [2013] 3 WLR 1227; [2013] UKSC 66, Lord Sumption JSC at [25] (Lords Clarke of Stone-Cum-Ebony, Wilson and Toulson JJSC agreeing). 14 Woodland v Essex County Council [2014] AC 537; [2013] 3 WLR 1227; [2013] UKSC 66, Lord Sumption JSC at [25] (Lords Clarke of Stone-Cum-Ebony, Wilson and Toulson JJSC agreeing). 15 See Peel WE and Goudkamp J (eds), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at [21-048]. 16 Andriolo v G & G Constructions Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-235 (ACTSC). See “Breach of Statutory Duty” [33.5.10]ff.

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[33.6.720]

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444

33.7 Nuisance

NUISANCE

Current Subtitle Author Jeremy Masters BA (Hons), LLB (Hons), LLM (Melb) Barrister, Victorian Bar (Updating author, Update 319 – June 2016)

(Updating author, Update 307 – May 2015) (Updating author, Update 299 – September 2014)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Associate Professor Martin Davies

The Laws of Australia Editorial Department

MA, BCL (Oxon), LLM (Harv) Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Monash University (Original author)

(Updating author, Update 157 – September 2002)

Geoff Masel BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Updating author, Update 150 – February 2002) (Updating author, Update 111 – November 1999)

Dr Paul Vout BA, LLB, SJD (Syd) Member, Victorian Bar Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Northern Ireland, England and Wales (Updating author, Update 242 – October 2009) (Updating author, Update 212 – October 2007)

Lee Pascoe LLB (Hons) (Deakin) Barrister and Member, Victorian Bar (Updating author, Update 210 – February 2007)

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33.7 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.7.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.7.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.7.40] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.7.50] PRIVATE NUISANCE................................................................. [33.7.160] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.7.160] INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS.................................................................................. [33.7.170] PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY.................................. [33.7.250] PUBLIC NUISANCE...................................................................[33.7.360] PARTIES.....................................................................................[33.7.490] WHO MAY SUE?....................................................................[33.7.490] WHO MAY BE HELD LIABLE?.............................................. [33.7.530] DEFENCES.................................................................................[33.7.650] REMEDIES................................................................................. [33.7.820] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.7.820] INJUNCTIONS........................................................................[33.7.830] DAMAGES..............................................................................[33.7.860] ABATEMENT.......................................................................... [33.7.900]

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448

Introduction Definition [33.7.10] The term “nuisance” embraces a range of legal and non-legal meanings. It is not possible to give the term a general definition.1 The word “nuisance” is used to describe each of the following: (1)

an activity or condition that is harmful or annoying;

(2)

the harm caused by such activity or condition; and

(3)

a “nuisance” in the first sense that gives rise to legal liability in the tort of nuisance.2

For example, if a quarrying operation creates noise and dust which interferes with neighbouring properties, the word “nuisance” can be used to describe both the quarrying operation itself and the interference it causes with the neighbouring properties. The third sense of the word describes the effect of the rules of liability in the tort of nuisance. In that sense, the interference created by the quarrying operation is not a nuisance unless it would give rise to a successful action in the tort of nuisance. Strictly speaking, only the second sense is correct in law.3

1

2 3

Footscray Corp v Maize Products Pty Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 301; [1943] VLR 148, Starke J at 310 (CLR), quoting Garrett EW, The Law of Nuisances (2nd ed, William Clowes & Sons, 1897) p 4. Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [21.10]. Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277, Windeyer J at 59–60 (CLR).

[33.7.20] There are two types of nuisance: private nuisance and public nuisance. “Private nuisance” was defined by Windeyer J in Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277 as an “unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over, or in connexion with it”.1 “Public nuisance” may be defined as: [A] criminal offence constituted by an unlawful act or omission [which] endangers the lives, safety, health, property or comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed in the exercise or enjoyment of any right common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.2

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[33.7.20]

INTRODUCTION

Private nuisance is the infringement of rights related to the ownership or occupation of land, whereas in public nuisance the rights interfered with are not necessarily related to land.3 Thus, in order to have standing to bring an action in private nuisance, the plaintiff must have some property rights in or over the land affected, or must be an occupant of that land: see [33.7.490]. In contrast, standing to sue in public nuisance does not depend on property rights: see [33.7.500]–[33.7.520].

1 Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277, Windeyer J at 59 (CLR), quoting Lewis TE, Winfield on Tort: A Text-Book of the Law of Tort (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1954) p 536. That definition was also adopted in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd [1945] KB 216 (CA), Scott LJ at 236. It now appears in Rogers WVH (ed), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at [14.4]. 2 Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 203–204, citing Armitage AL (ed), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1969) p 1392, see now Jones M, Dugdale A and Simpson M (eds), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (21st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at [20-03]. 3 Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 204.

[33.7.30] The basis of liability differs in nuisance and negligence, partly because the tort of nuisance is much older than the tort of negligence.1 In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid (delivering the opinion of the Privy Council) said: It is quite true that negligence is not an essential element in nuisance. Nuisance is a term used to cover a wide variety of tortious acts or omissions and in many negligence in the narrow sense is not essential.2

Because there can be nuisance by infringement of rights without physical injury or damage, there are cases where there is liability in nuisance where there would be no liability in negligence. In many cases though, the activity or condition which causes an interference actionable in nuisance also causes physical injury or damage in circumstances that would be actionable in the tort of negligence. Notwithstanding the separate historical and theoretical bases of the two torts, it has been suggested that, in cases of physical injury or damage, the overlap between the two torts is now close to complete, so that there will be few such cases of liability in nuisance where there would not be liability in negligence.3 Whether or not the overlap is complete in cases of physical injury or damage, it is unquestionable that the significance of the tort of nuisance has been much reduced by the increasing significance of the tort of negligence. In Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182, Lord Wilberforce said that “the tort of nuisance, uncertain in its boundary, may comprise a wide variety of situations, in some of which negligence plays no part, in others of which it is decisive”.4 In more

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DEFINITION

recent English cases, reasonable foreseeability of the harm that would be suffered by a person in the position of the plaintiff has been emphasised as a factor in determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s interference: see [33.7.215]. Such emphasis may be interpreted as importing elements of negligence into the tort of nuisance. Certainly these developments have been heavily influenced by the modern law of negligence.5 In the event that this line of jurisprudence is taken up in Australia, the application to nuisance of the limitations on liability for negligence contained in the various Civil Liability Acts must be considered: see [33.7.660]. In most cases of private nuisance, the question of whether an activity or condition has created an actionable interference with property rights depends on the nature of the neighbourhood in which the interference takes place: see [33.7.180]. As a result, the law of private nuisance has always had some part to play in determining what kinds of activities are permitted by law in what neighbourhoods. To that extent, its practical significance is much diminished since the introduction of zoning and planning legislation, which seeks to provide a more rational and less arbitrary basis for determining what kinds of activities are permissible in what areas.6

1

2

3

4

See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. The tort of nuisance dates back to the 12th century assize of nuisance, which separated from the assize of novel disseisin (wrongful eviction of a freehold estate holder) in the reign of Henry II: see Plucknett TFT, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed, Butt (UK), 1956) p 372. It was first pleaded as a trespass on the case in the 14th century and nuisance on the case superseded the assize of nuisance in the 16th century: see Kiralfy AK, The Action on the Case (Sweet & Maxwell, 1951) Ch 3. In contrast, negligence did not develop out of the action on the case as a recognisable tort until the 19th century: see Winfield PH, “The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts” (1926) 42 LQR 184. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid (for the Board) at 639 (AC). See, eg Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [5.1.8.2] where the authors state that in the modern common law of torts there are few instances in which damages for such harm are recoverable in the absence of negligence. See also Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 77 ATR 242; [2009] WASC 52 where Hennan J at [708], applying Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48 and Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277 (affirmed in Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182 (PC)), held that where an accidental fire damaged the property of the plaintiff (in a counterclaim for nuisance) it was necessary that the counterclaimant prove that the defendant to that claim was negligent or in breach of some duty in allowing a fire to start, or negligently failed to remedy the fire within a reasonable time. Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458;

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5 6

40 ALJR 182 (PC), Lord Wilberforce at 461 (CLR). See also Jones M, Dugdale A and Simpson M (eds), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (21st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at [20-31]. See Environment and Natural Resources “Planning: Central and Regional” [14.2.10]ff. See also Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd [1993] QB 343; [1992] 3 WLR 449; Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655; [1997] 2 WLR 684.

Scope of Subtitle [33.7.40] This Subtitle examines the torts of public and private nuisance. Both are concerned with an interference with rights caused by an activity or condition. The distinction between the two types of nuisance lies in the nature of the rights which are infringed. Private nuisance consists of the infringement of rights relating to the ownership or occupation of land, whereas in public nuisance, the rights infringed are not necessarily related to land. Public nuisance is interference with any right enjoyed by the public at large. However, the kinds of activity or condition that can constitute a nuisance are the same in both public and private nuisance: see [33.7.160]–[33.7.390]. In essence, a private nuisance arises once there has been an interference in the plaintiff’s enjoyment of their rights over their land. Private nuisance is a strict liability tort: once there is an interference, there is a nuisance at law regardless of whether the interference is reasonable or substantial.1 A claim regarding private nuisance may only be made by a person whose property rights have been infringed, or whose occupation of property has been affected: see [33.7.490]. A claim in respect of public nuisance may only be made by the Attorney-General on behalf of the public, or by an individual member of the public who has suffered an interference with rights different in kind or greater in extent from that suffered by the public at large: see [33.7.500]–[33.7.510]. In some states, local authorities are also empowered to sue in respect of public nuisances: see [33.7.520]. Persons who may be held liable are those who created, continued or adopted the nuisance: see [33.7.530]–[33.7.545]. Defences include statutory authorisation, the act of a third party, the taking of reasonable precautions, contributory negligence and a prescriptive right: see [33.7.650]–[33.7.710]. The remedies available in respect of an actionable nuisance are: (1)

an injunction to restrain the continuation of the interference in the future (or, in some cases, an injunction to restrain the commencement of a nuisance) (see [33.7.830]–[33.7.850]);

(2)

damages in respect of past interference (see [33.7.860]–[33.7.890]); or

(3)

“abatement” which is the summary removal of a nuisance by the person

452

[33.7.50]

RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES

suffering the interference, without recourse to legal proceedings: see [33.7.900]–[33.7.910].

1

But for a contrary opinion on the issue of strict liability, based on the element of reasonableness of the interference, see Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [44]–[46], relying on Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, Lord Wright at 904 (AC); Quick v Alpine Nurseries Sales Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1248, Ward J at [141].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.7.50] The law of nuisance is related to several Titles and Subtitles in The Laws of Australia. Although the basis of liability differs between negligence and nuisance, the general principles governing the law of negligence lend some perspective to this area and at times are identical to the relevant rules in nuisance (eg the test for remoteness of damage): see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. The general principles governing the assessment of damages considered in “Damages” [33.10.10]ff complement the brief analysis of damages here. Injunctions, another remedy for actions of nuisance, are discussed in greater detail within Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff. Defences relating to the tort of nuisance are in many regards peculiar to this area and with the exception of a general analysis of statutory authority in “Defences” [33.9.10]ff, are contained within this Subtitle. Further reference can be made to Environment and Natural Resources “Planning: Central and Regional” [14.2.10]ff and Real Property “Easements” [28.13.10]ff for detail concerning the rights and obligations relevant to the ownership and occupation of land.

453

[33.7.50]

INTRODUCTION

454

Private Nuisance General [33.7.160] There are two forms of private nuisance. Private nuisance may occur either by: (1)

an unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment of property rights (see [33.7.170]–[33.7.240]); or

(2)

material damage to land or other property on the land affected by the interference:1 see [33.7.250].

In Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483, the plaintiff bought an estate in a neighbourhood that contained many manufacturing works. The defendant ran a copper smelting operation in the area. Fumes from the defendant’s factory damaged the trees on the plaintiff’s estate. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the fumes constituted a nuisance. The House of Lords held that the plaintiff’s action succeeded, notwithstanding the general nature of the neighbourhood, because his property had suffered material damage. Lord Westbury LC said: [I]n matters of this description it appears to me that it is a very desirable thing to mark the difference between an action brought for a nuisance upon the ground that the alleged nuisance produces material injury to the property, and an action brought for a nuisance on the ground that the thing alleged to be a nuisance is productive of sensible personal discomfort. With regard to the latter, namely, the personal inconvenience and interference with one’s enjoyment … whether that may or may not be denominated a nuisance, must undoubtedly depend greatly on the circumstances of the place where the thing complained of actually occurs. … But when an occupation is carried on by one person in the neighbourhood of another, and the result of that trade, or occupation, or business, is a material injury to property, then there unquestionably arises a very different consideration. I think, my Lords, that in a case of that description, the submission which is required from persons living in society to that amount of discomfort which may be necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the trade of their neighbours, would not apply to circumstances the immediate result of which is sensible injury to the value of the property.2

To some extent, the distinction between kinds of private nuisance is merely one of degree. A private nuisance by material damage to property is, in effect, a particular example of an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the property rights of the owner or occupier, because material damage to property is regarded as unreasonable in itself. However, it is convenient to

455

[33.7.160]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

consider the two kinds of private nuisance separately, as the law relating to them reflects the fact that the latter type of private nuisance is more substantial than the former (and thus is more easily proven). The position with respect to personal injuries is unclear. Personal injuries may be actionable in private nuisance as an interference with the use and enjoyment of property rights, or by way of analogy with physical damage to property:3 see [33.7.230] and [33.7.250].

1 Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113 (FC), Burbury CJ at 122. 2 Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483, Lord Westbury LC at 650–651 (HLC). 3 See Davies M, “Private Nuisance, Fault and Personal Injuries” (1990) 20 UWALR 129.

Interference with Use and Enjoyment of Property Rights [33.7.170] Only unreasonable interferences are actionable in nuisance. The test of whether an interference is unreasonable is objective.1 In determining whether or not an interference is unreasonable, the court balances the desire of the owner or occupier to use and enjoy property rights without interference against the desire of others to undertake the activity that causes the interference.2 It is important to recognise that it is not the conduct of the defendant which causes the interference which must be unreasonable, but rather the interference with the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of their property. The ordinary use of residential premises is not in itself capable of amounting to a nuisance.3 Tolerance of a reasonable degree of interference is expected, on the principles of “give and take, live and let live”.4 In Bayliss v Lea (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 521; 79 WN (NSW) 218, Owen J described the court’s task as that of striking “a tolerable balance between conflicting claims of landowners”.5 In striking that balance, a court will take into account the locality in which the interference occurs (see [33.7.180]), the duration, frequency and extent of the interference (see [33.7.190]), the sensitivity of the person affected6 (see [33.7.200]), malice (if any) on the part of the person causing the interference (see [33.7.210]) and, in the United Kingdom at least, the foreseeability of the harm inflicted by the interference as a measure of reasonableness:7 see [33.7.215] and [33.7.250].

1 Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, McLure P at [247]. 2 Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483, Lord Westbury LC at 650–651 (HLC). However, note that a defendant may also be 456

[33.7.180]

3 4 5

6

7

INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

liable for nuisances created by others and nuisances naturally arising: see [33.7.530]. Southwark London Borough Council v Mills [2001] 1 AC 1; [1999] 3 WLR 939. Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 66; 122 ER 27, Bramwell B at 84 (B & B). Bayliss v Lea (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 521; 79 WN (NSW) 218, Owen J at 529 (SR (NSW)) quoting Fleming JG, The Law of Torts (2nd ed, The Law Book Company Limited, 1961) pp 362–363, see now Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [21.80]. Note that, although the defendant is usually a landowner, that is not necessarily the case: see [33.7.530]. The plaintiff in an action in private nuisance must have some recognised rights in the property affected, but need not necessarily be the landowner: see [33.7.220], [33.7.490]. This is no longer a factor in the United Kingdom: see Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [36]. See Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] 1 AC 321; [2001] 3 WLR 1007; [2001] UKHL 55; Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172.

[33.7.180] Locality is taken into account in determining whether an interference with the use and enjoyment of property rights is unreasonable. What would be an unreasonable interference in one neighbourhood would not necessarily be so in another.1 Accordingly, consideration needs to be given to whether the interference is ordinary or reasonable in each circumstance. For example, a degree of interference that would be reasonable in an industrial area may be unreasonable (and therefore actionable) in a residential area.2 In Harkess v Woodhead [1950] SASR 54, the defendant operated a factory for boiling down fats, rendering tallow, bone-grinding and drying hide and skin. Those operations produced “the rankest compound of villainous smell that ever offended nostril”3 in the “delightfully picturesque surroundings of the unspoilt areas” of the Adelaide hills.4 The Supreme Court of South Australia held that the location of the defendant’s factory was unsuitable for such a business and the defendant was held liable in nuisance. In Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, the “swathing” method of harvesting canola was found to be common in the Kojonup district of Western Australia and there was at least one genetically modified canola crop in addition to the respondent’s. In contrast, organic farming was found to be, at best, an isolated practice. The GM canola swathes that were transferred to the appellants’ organically certified property were found not to be unreasonable, although the result might have been different had the genetically modified canola crop planted by the respondent been surrounded by organic farms. If the defendant’s activities are unreasonably offensive, given their location, it is immaterial that those activities are essential in that area.5 In Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332, the defendant was held liable for nuisance by

457

[33.7.180]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

noise and smells from its stable, which was in a residential area. Sholl J rejected an argument that the defendant’s dairy performed a necessary function in that neighbourhood.6

1 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852 (CA), Thesiger LJ at 865: “[W]hat would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey.” 2 Dunstan v King [1948] VLR 269, Barry J at 269 (referring to the “quietness and beauty” of the Dandenong Ranges); Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 482; 65 WN (NSW) 218 (FC); Harkess v Woodhead [1950] SASR 54, Abbott J at 55 (“delightfully picturesque surroundings”). But see Pittar v Alvarez (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 618; 34 WN (NSW) 2, Harvey J at 625 (SR (NSW)) (“closely populated district”). 3 Harkess v Woodhead [1950] SASR 54, Abbott J at 58. 4 Harkess v Woodhead [1950] SASR 54, Abbott J at 55. 5 Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295, Richards J at 302–303; Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332, Sholl J at 337; Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43, Anderson J at 10 (VR). 6 Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332, Sholl J at 337.

[33.7.190] Duration, time of day, frequency and extent of an interference with the use and enjoyment of property rights are balanced against one another in determining whether that interference is unreasonable. A considerable interference for a short period of time may be unreasonable, as may a slight interference for a considerable period of time.1 In particular, nuisance by noise is regarded as a question of degree.2 For example, interference by noise outside normal business hours may be unreasonable if the plaintiff’s premises are residential3 but, conversely, interference by noise during business hours may be unreasonable if the plaintiff’s premises are used for business.4 In Spencer v Silva [1942] SASR 213, the plaintiff owned and lived in a small house near a wood yard owned by the defendant. Throughout each day, wood was sawed on mechanical saws at the defendant’s wood yard, creating a persistent noise. In the Supreme Court of South Australia, it was held that the noise constituted a nuisance. Mayo J said: [I]t is, I think, the persistence of the noise that constitutes the infringement of the plaintiff’s right to ordinary comfort. Possibly at intervals when very hard wood has been dealt with and the saw by chance not adequately sharpened, the consequent noise has exceeded the limit of what neighbours should be asked to bear. The plaintiff and her husband may have felt that this occurred more often than was the fact. Be that as it may, the sounds usually were, I think, not very loud, nor excessively unpleasant. What might be called the daily relentlessness has been the factor which, in my opinion, subjected the plaintiff to more than she should properly be called upon to endure.5

In general, where the interference is temporary and short-lived (eg in the case of construction or renovation by the defendant) it is regarded as reasonable:6 see [33.7.680]. However, even a short-lived interference is unreasonable if it is

458

[33.7.200]

INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

considerable in extent, for example, if it disturbs the plaintiff’s sleep.7 In Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1, the Court held that interference with the plaintiff’s hotel by noise and dust during reconstruction work on the defendant’s land was reasonable during the day, but unreasonable at night. Greene MR said: “I certainly protest against the idea that, if persons, for their own profit and convenience, choose to destroy even one night’s rest of their neighbours, they are doing something which is excusable.”8

1 2

3

4

5 6

7

8

Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 683 (QBD). Gaunt v Fynney (1872) LR 8 Ch App 8, Lord Selborne LC at 12 (nuisance by noise “emphatically a question of degree”), applied in Haddon v Lynch [1911] VLR 230 (FC); McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1 (FC); Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53. Haddon v Lynch [1911] VLR 230 (FC) (church bells rung before 9 am on Sunday); McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1 (FC) (clapping and shouts of “hallelujah” at 7 am on Sunday). But see Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53, Stanley J at 64 (“most people are awake by the hour of 5:30 [am] in summertime”). See also Seidler v Luna Park Reserve Trust (unreported, NSWSC, Hodgson J, 1166 of 1995, 21 September 1995) (screams from rollercoaster). Daily Telegraph Co Ltd v Stuart (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 291; 45 WN (NSW) 48 (persistent noise of drills during working hours); Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107 (NSWSC) (noise interference with business premises; reasonable outside business hours, unreasonable during business hours). Spencer v Silva [1942] SASR 213, Mayo J at 221. Harrison v Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co [1891] 2 Ch 409; Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107 (NSWSC); Baxter v Camden London Borough Council (No 2) [2001] QB 1; [1999] 2 WLR 566. The rule does not apply where the result of the interference is material damage: Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95. Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295 (noise from stables very early in the morning); Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332 (nocturnal noise from stables). See Stoakes v Brydges [1958] QWN 5 (QSC) (repeated nocturnal telephone calls). Andreae v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1938] Ch 1 (CA), Greene MR at 261 (All ER) (that passage only appears in the All England Report). It was quoted with approval in Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332, Sholl J at 335.

[33.7.200] Undue sensitivity of the person affected is not taken into account in determining whether an interference is unreasonable and may simply be irrelevant. In Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315; 64 ER 849, Knight Bruce V-C said that the unreasonableness of an interference is judged “not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions”.1 The law does not indulge any person’s delicacy or fastidiousness;2 if the reasonable person would not be disturbed by the interference, it does not matter that the actual owner or occupier is disturbed. For example, in Clarey v Principal & Council of Women’s

459

[33.7.200]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

College (1953) 90 CLR 170; [1954] St R Qd 57, it was held that the ordinary noises of occupation of residential premises, such as walking about, scraping chairs along the floor, talking, laughing and preparing for bed, did not constitute an unreasonable interference, although the plaintiff found them objectionable.3 Traditionally, if the interference, judged by the standard of the reasonable person, was held to be unreasonable, a sensitive plaintiff might recover to the full extent of their loss, even if this exceeds the loss that would have been suffered by a reasonable person. The unreasonableness of the interference is judged according to the standard of the reasonable person, but remoteness of damage in nuisance is judged according to the criterion of reasonable foreseeability: see [33.7.860]. If the interference suffered by the plaintiff would be regarded as unreasonable by persons of normal sensitivity, it constitutes a nuisance and the defendant is liable for all the reasonably foreseeable consequences of that nuisance, which traditionally included losses suffered by a plaintiff of abnormal sensitivity. For example, in Robinson v Kilvert (1889) 41 Ch D 88, the plaintiff complained that hot air from the defendant’s premises had damaged paper stored in the plaintiff’s premises. It was held by the Court of Appeal that this did not constitute a nuisance, as the hot air would not have interfered with a normally sensitive use of the plaintiff’s premises. In Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA found that the appellants’ complaint that “swathes” of a genetically modified canola crop had been transferred to their organic farm did not amount to an unreasonable interference with the organic farmers’ land and, further, that the claim should fail because “the appellants’ organic farming operation was abnormally sensitive to such an incursion”.4 In contrast, in McKinnon Industries Ltd v Walker [1951] 3 DLR 577, the plaintiff complained that sulphur dioxide from the defendant’s premises had damaged orchids grown on his premises. The Ontario Privy Council held that the sulphur dioxide emissions did constitute a nuisance, as they would have been regarded as unreasonable by persons of normal sensitivity. The plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from causing damage to the orchids, even though that damage exceeded that which would have been suffered by a normally sensitive person in the same circumstances. The law in the United Kingdom in this respect has taken a different course as a result of the decision in Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172: see [33.7.215]. That case overturned Robinson v Kilvert insofar as the English Court of Appeal decided that the concept of abnormal sensitivity is outmoded and that the sensitive use of the plaintiff’s premises as a music recording studio (particularly, the sensitivity of amplified electric guitars to electromagnetic interference by a railway signalling system some 80 m away) was irrelevant.5 Buxton LJ stated that:

460

[33.7.200]

INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

It is very difficult not to think that such particular rules [as requiring that a plaintiff not be abnormally sensitive to the interference in order for liability to arise] are now subsumed under the general view of the law of nuisance expressed in [Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] 1 AC 321; [2001] 3 WLR 1007; [2001] UKHL 55]: not dissimilarly to the way in which the generalisation of the law of negligence initiated by [Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562] has rendered obsolete the previous categories of dangerous chattels; duties of occupiers of land; duties attaching to specific trades; and the like.6

The Court also applied Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council to hold that the foreseeability of damage to someone in the position of the plaintiff was vital to a finding of nuisance,7 such foreseeability subsuming both duty in fact and remoteness of damage.8 Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council has received some curial consideration in Australia,9 although it has not been conclusively accepted or rejected.

1

2 3

4 5 6 7

8 9

Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315; 64 ER 849, Knight Bruce V-C at 322 (De G & Sm), quoted with approval in Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295, Richards J at 301–302. See Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 482; 65 WN (NSW) 218 (FC), Jordan CJ at 486 (SR (NSW)). Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 482; 65 WN (NSW) 218 (FC), Jordan CJ at 486 (SR (NSW)). But see Fraser v Booth (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 113; 67 WN (NSW) 66 (plaintiffs complaining of noise from flocks of pigeons held not unduly sensitive). See also Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107 (NSWSC) (plaintiff unduly sensitive in being unable to work at home outside business hours). Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169, Newnes and Murphy JJA at [782]–[783]. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [36]. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [35]. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Lord Phillips MR at [19], [26]–[28], Buxton LJ at [35], [37]–[38]. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [34]–[35]. See Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497, Gillard J at [494]–[495] (applied); Owners of Strata Plan No 13218 v Woollahra Municipal Council (2002) 121 LGERA 117; [2002] NSWCA 92, Powell JA [20]–[21] (quoted and arguably applied); Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [45] (cited, noting “fault [in nuisance] generally involves foreseeability”); Quick v Alpine Nurseries Sales Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1248, Ward J at [141] (cited, also noting “fault [in nuisance] generally involves foreseeability”). See also Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council (2013) 197 LGERA 381; [2013] NSWCA 382, Emmett JA at [139]: “[f]ault generally involves foreseeability” (citing Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967]

461

[33.7.200]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid (for the Board) at 639 (AC)).

[33.7.210] Malice renders unreasonable an interference that might otherwise be reasonable.1 A person who uses their property maliciously to cause an interference cannot be regarded as having acted reasonably. For example, in Stoakes v Brydges [1958] QWN 5, the defendant was aggrieved by noises caused by a milk vending company, and he telephoned the directors of the company late at night, with the intention of disturbing their sleep. In holding that this constituted a nuisance, Townley J took into account the defendant’s malicious motive.2

1

2

Christie v Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316 (retaliatory knocking on wall, banging, whistling and shrieking); Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 (firing of shotguns to make nervous foxes eat their young); Stoakes v Brydges [1958] QWN 5 (QSC) (repeated nocturnal telephone calls). But see Fraser v Booth (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 113; 67 WN (NSW) 66 (setting off firecrackers to scare pigeons held not malicious). Stoakes v Brydges [1958] QWN 5 (QSC).

[33.7.215] Foreseeability of the harm inflicted on a person in the position of the plaintiff may be a factor in determining whether an interference is unreasonable. In the United Kingdom, references to the modern law of negligence have led the House of Lords1 and, more recently, the Court of Appeal2 to hold that the reasonable foreseeability of the harm likely to be caused to the plaintiff, or a person in the position of the plaintiff, constitutes a further relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of the interference.3 In Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ stated that: [N]o more in nuisance than in negligence is it possible to base a claim on liability in the air, in the sense that the defendant is liable for conduct, or for a state of affairs, just because it will foreseeably cause some harm to some person. What must be foreseen is relevant damage to this plaintiff or to a category of persons into which he falls, a requirement that subsumes the tests both of duty in fact and of remoteness of damage.4

Whether this significant modification of both the rules relating to liability and remoteness of damage is adopted in Australia is yet to be seen.5

1 2 3

Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] 1 AC 321; [2001] 3 WLR 1007; [2001] UKHL 55. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [36]. 462

[33.7.220]

4

5

INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [34], citing the examples of Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [2000] 2 AC 190; [1999] 2 WLR 518, Lord Hobhouse at 209 (AC) (referring to the headnote in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC)); Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 1082 (HL). The only Australian case to date to consider Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172 is Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director of Department of Conservation & Land Management (2012) 42 WAR 287; 189 LGERA 359; [2012] WASCA 79, Pullins J at [326], to support the notion that the tort of nuisance is being subsumed into the tort of negligence.

[33.7.220] Interference with recognised rights in or over property is necessary in order to constitute an actionable private nuisance. As a result, only those with property rights in the affected premises may bring an action in private nuisance: see [33.7.490]. It is not sufficient that the person affected has merely suffered loss or inconvenience; that loss or inconvenience must arise from an interference with recognised property rights. In Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 38 SR (NSW) 33; 55 WN (NSW) 13, Dixon J said: [T]he essence of the wrong is the detraction from the occupier’s enjoyment of the natural rights belonging to … the occupation of land. The law fixes those rights. Diversion of custom from a business carried on upon the land may be brought about by noise, fumes, obstruction of the frontage or any other interference with the enjoyment of recognized rights arising from the occupation of property and, if so, it forms a legitimate head of damage recoverable for the wrong; but it is not the wrong itself.1

It is an actionable private nuisance to interfere with recognised rights such as riparian rights to water2 and the natural right to support of land,3 but not of buildings.4 In addition, interference with recognised non-possessory rights such as easements5 and reversions6 may constitute private nuisance. In contrast, obstruction of the view from the plaintiff’s property is not actionable in private nuisance, as there is no recognised right to a view.7 Similarly, there is no right to freedom from view and interference by inspection from neighbouring properties is not actionable.8 By analogy it has been held that no action lies in private nuisance for interference with television reception caused by the mere presence of a building.9 Picketing and other attempts to interfere with free movement into and out of the plaintiff’s premises constitute actionable interferences with the plaintiff’s right to use the property itself. Physical interference with free access to the premises is actionable, but not essential to liability. For example, in Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case)

463

[33.7.220]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

[1986] VR 383, members of the defendant union tried forcibly to prevent employees of the plaintiff and others from crossing a picket line and entering the plaintiff’s premises. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that the defendant’s actions constituted a nuisance, as they interfered with the plaintiff’s right of free access into and out of its property.10 In contrast, in Broderick Motors Pty Ltd v Rothe [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-059, the defendant, without using physical force, attempted to persuade people not to enter the plaintiff’s premises. He parked his car outside the plaintiff’s car dealership, which was called “Go Motors”, with a sign on the roof reading: “For Sale. Distance travelled unknown. Purchased from Go Motors 14.6.1985. Be the tenth owner of this bomb?” The word “bomb” was in red and distinctive. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that this did not constitute a nuisance. Although the defendant had tried to persuade people not to enter the plaintiff’s dealership, he had made no attempt to prevent people from doing so. An intermediate example between those two cases is to be found in Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51, where members of the defendant organisation, which was opposed to the use of performing animals in circuses, demonstrated outside the plaintiff’s circus in an attempt to deter members of the public from entering. Although the demonstrators made no attempt physically to prevent people from entering the circus, they formed lines on either side of the entrance, so that patrons were forced to “walk the gauntlet”11 between lines of shouting, placard-waving demonstrators. The Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the conduct of the demonstrators constituted a nuisance by “besetting”12 the plaintiff’s property and by surrounding the entrance to it in such a manner as to put entrants in fear for their safety.

1 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 38 SR (NSW) 33; 55 WN (NSW) 13, Dixon J at 507 (CLR). 2 Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620. But see Xuereb v Viola [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-012 (NSWSC) (no action for interference with plaintiff’s water flow by defendant’s lawful drawing of subterranean water). There is a conflict of authority about whether or not common law riparian rights are abrogated by the provisions of water legislation, where they have not been expressly abolished. See also Hanson v Grassy Gully Gold Mining Co (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 271; 17 WN (NSW) 187 (FC); Dougherty v Ah Lee (1902) 19 WN (NSW) 8; Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145; 40 ALJR 211; 18 LGRA 65 (private rights abrogated – overturned on other grounds by Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527). But see Thorpes Ltd v Grant Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (1955) 92 CLR 317; 55 SR (NSW) 117; 72 WN (NSW) 92, Fullagar J at 330–331 (CLR); Reid v Chapman (1984) 37 SASR 117 (FC) (private rights not abrogated); Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49 (NSWSC) (private rights not abrogated). For further analysis see Environment and Natural Resources “Relationship between Common Law Rights and Statutory Rights of Primary Access” [14.9.1730]–[14.9.1740]; Morison WL, Phegan CS and Sappideen C, Torts:

464

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INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Commentary and Materials (7th ed, Law Book Co, 1989) pp 831–832 (the relevant passage does not appear in the latest edition of Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012)). 3 Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93 (FC); Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC); Pantalone v Alaouie (1989) 18 NSWLR 119. But see Xuereb v Viola [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-012 (NSWSC) (no action for withdrawal of support by lawful drawing of subterranean water). See also Morgan v Lake Macquarie City Council (unreported, NSWCA, Clarke, Handley and Cripps JJA, CA 40451–40456, 40649 of 1992, 2 September 1993) (no liability where natural slippage removed support from plaintiff’s land and defendant did nothing to restore support), where Clarke JA noted that although it is often said that a landowner has a right to support for their land, it is more accurate to say that the landowner has a right not to have the support for their land withdrawn by a neighbour. 4 Kebewar Pty Ltd v Harkin (1987) 9 NSWLR 738; 63 LGRA 412 (CA). 5 Saint v Jenner [1973] Ch 275; [1972] 3 WLR 888 (CA). 6 Carter v Kenyon (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 222 (FC); McCarty v North Sydney Municipal Council (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 210; 4 LGR (NSW) 59; 35 WN (NSW) 85; Thompson v Sydney Municipal Council (1938) 14 LGR (NSW) 32 (NSWSC). 7 Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57; 77 ER 816, Wray CJ at 58 (Co) (“the law does not give an action for such things of delight”); Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 212 (FLR) (reversed on other grounds in Johnson v Kent (1975) 132 CLR 164; 49 ALJR 27; 34 LGRA 230); Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (NSWSC), Young J at 205–206. But see [33.7.380] for the position with respect to public nuisance, which may be different. It is possible that undesirable additions to the view from the plaintiff’s property may constitute nuisance: see also Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335 (CA) (prostitutes entering and leaving neighbouring premises); Laws v Florinplace Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 659 (CHD) (sex shop in residential district). 8 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 38 SR (NSW) 33; 55 WN (NSW) 13 (plaintiff’s racecourse spied on from outside); Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704; 55 LGRA 165 (plaintiff’s backyard photographed and videotaped from outside). See also Human Rights “Privacy” [21.11.10]ff. 9 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655; [1997] 2 WLR 684. See Cheer U, “Private Nuisance Clarified?” (1997) 5 TLJ 141. 10 Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383, Murphy J at 388–389. See also Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760 (CA), Mason JA at 767; Boral Bricks NSW Pty Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 IR 70 (NSWSC) (pickets forcibly attempting to stop people and vehicles entering and leaving plaintiff’s factory). 11 Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51 (App Div), the Court at 58. 12 Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51 (App Div), the Court at 58–59.

465

[33.7.230]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

[33.7.230] There is conflicting authority on the issue of whether or not personal injuries may constitute an actionable interference for the purposes of private nuisance. There is some authority to the effect that an interference with property causing personal injury is actionable in private nuisance,1 at least where the injured person has such an interest in the property as would give their standing to sue in private nuisance.2 In Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Windeyer J said: In nuisance [the plaintiff’s] claim would not be only for an injurious affection of his land diminishing the value of his interest in it. It would extend to harm done him by the disturbance of the healthy and peaceful enjoyment by him of his right there. I see no reason why those damages should not extend to any personal harm the nuisance has there caused him.3

However, the question of what an injured plaintiff must prove in order to succeed in an action in private nuisance has no clear answer. There are two views: (1)

A cause of action in private nuisance by personal injuries is made out merely on proof of the injuries,4 as personal injuries should be treated in the same way as material damage to property.5

(2)

Alternatively, that an action for personal injuries in private nuisance will generally not succeed where an action in the tort of negligence could not. According to that view, a plaintiff who has suffered personal injuries must usually also prove that the defendant failed to take reasonable care.6

As yet, there is no authoritative resolution of this difference in views.7 The only reported Australian case which considers personal injury in the context of private nuisance, Pelmothe v Phillips (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 58; 15 WN (NSW) 217,8 was decided on the abandoned presumption that the injured wife was part of the plaintiff husband’s property. Further, that case appears inconsistent with the law on standing to sue in private nuisance, which requires that the plaintiff has some kind of property right in the affected premises: see [33.7.490].

1 Pelmothe v Phillips (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 58; 15 WN (NSW) 217 (FC), GB Simpson J at 61 (LR (NSW)). However, the weight of (predominately British) authority is developing against this: see Evans v Finn (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 297; 21 WN (NSW) 118 (FC), Darley CJ at 308 (SR (NSW)) (“nervous” damage to health not actionable in private nuisance); Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655; [1997] 2 WLR 684, Lord Goff at 688 (quoting Newark FH, “The Boundaries of Nuisance” (1949) 65 LQR 480 at 488–489), 692 (there is a developing view that claims for personal injury of this type lie in negligence), Lord Hoffman at 706–707, but contrast with Lord Cooke at 718–719 (personal injuries are actionable in public nuisance and “as to the kind of harm actionable it would be hard to see any sensible difference between public and private nuisance”) (AC); Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1; [2003] 3 WLR 1467; [2003] UKHL

466

[33.7.240]

2 3 4

5 6 7 8

INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

61, Lord Bingham at [9], Lord Hoffmann at [35] (personal damages are not recoverable). On standing to sue in private nuisance, see [33.7.490]. Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Windeyer J at 318 (CLR). Luntz H, Hambly D and Hayes RA, Torts: Cases and Commentary (2nd ed, Butt, 1985) at [12.1.02]. A more qualified view is expressed in the current edition, Luntz H, Hambly D, Burns K, Dietrich J and Foster N, Torts: Cases and Commentary (7th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [14.1.1]. On material damage to property, see [33.7.250]. Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [5.1.8.2]. The debate is examined in more in detail in Davies M, “Private Nuisance, Fault and Personal Injuries” (1990) 20 UWALR 129. Pelmothe v Phillips (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 58; 15 WN (NSW) 217 (FC).

[33.7.240] The question of whether or not an interference with use and enjoyment of property rights is unreasonable depends on all the circumstances of each case. The case of Abbott v Arcus (1948) 50 WALR 41 provides a convenient illustration of the process of evaluating the unreasonableness of an interference. In Abbott v Arcus, the defendants constructed a tennis court in the garden of their house, which was next door to the plaintiffs’ house. After many years of playing on the court without interfering with the plaintiffs’ use, the defendants installed powerful electric lighting and began to use the court after dark. The Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the powerful lights and the noise made by the tennis players in the evenings constituted a nuisance. Wolff J issued an injunction restraining the defendants from playing on the court between sunset and 7 am.1 In Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43, the plaintiff owned a house which was adjacent to the Frankston Municipal Golf Links. Despite the presence of a wire-mesh fence which was designed to prevent golf balls from being hit off the golf course, many balls were hit into the plaintiff’s garden and onto the roof of her house. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that the intrusion of golf balls onto the plaintiff’s property constituted an actionable interference with the use and enjoyment of her property. Anderson J said: I know of no basis on which it can be said that the interests of golfers, whether they be playing on a municipal golf course or any other kind of golf course, are superior to the right of the occupier of premises to the undisturbed use and enjoyment of such premises. In [Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850] … where the question was whether a cricket ball unexpectedly hit into a public thoroughfare constituted a public nuisance, Lord Reid said, at (AC) p 867 (All ER p 1086): “If cricket cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played there at all.” Probably only a Law Lord would dare to say such a thing in England, but emboldened by his Lordship’s observations, I venture to say that precisely the same observations apply to golf. There exists, in my opinion, a substantial risk in this case, and it would be contrary to one’s sense of justice, as well as inconsistent with the law,

467

[33.7.240]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

that the plaintiff’s rights should be subordinated to the leisurely pursuits of sportsmen.2

Other examples of actionable interferences include the following: (1)

unreasonable interference by noise;3

(2)

smells, smoke and fumes;4

(3)

light;5

(4)

dust;6

(5)

flooding;7

(6)

escaping bullets;8

(7)

encroaching tree roots;9

(8)

“harassment and besetting”;10

(9)

withdrawal of lateral support from land;11

(10) permitting feral dogs to move from Crown land to the plaintiff’s paddocks to kill stock;12 (11) removal of support of land in its natural state;13 (but not of fill changing the natural state of the land or of a building on the land);14 and (12) repeated nocturnal telephone calls.15

1 Abbott v Arcus (1948) 50 WALR 41, Wolff J at 44–45. 2 Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43, Anderson J at 9–10 (VR); but see Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; [1977] 3 WLR 20 (CA). 3 Haddon v Lynch [1911] VLR 230 (FC) (noise from church bells); McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1 (FC) (noise from church band and cries of “hallelujah”); Daily Telegraph Co Ltd v Stuart (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 291; 45 WN (NSW) 48 (persistent noise of drills); Spencer v Silva [1942] SASR 213 (persistent noise from circular saw); Abbott v Arcus (1948) 50 WALR 41 (noise from late-night tennis matches); Dunstan v King [1948] VLR 269 (noise from sawmill); Fraser v Booth (1949) 50 SR (NSW) 113; 67 WN (NSW) 66, Roper CJ at 114 (SR (NSW)) (“swishing and whirring” noises made by homing pigeons); Field v Soccer Association (SA) [1953] SASR 224 (noise from speedway track); Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332 (noise from stables); Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53 (noise from haulage trucks); Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654 (noise from neighbouring house); De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498 (FC) (noise from parties and functions in hall); Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8 June 1979) (noise from quarry); Seidler v Luna Park Reserve Trust (unreported, NSWSC, Hodgson J, 1166 of 1995, 21 September 1995) (screams from roller-coaster). 4 West v Nicholas (1915) 17 WALR 49 (FC) (smell from toilet); Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 482; 65 WN (NSW) 218 (FC) (smoke and

468

[33.7.240]

5 6

7 8 9

10

11

12 13

14

INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

vapours from factory); Harkess v Woodhead [1950] SASR 54 (smell from boiling fats, rendering tallow, bone-grinding and drying of hide and skin); Field v Soccer Association (SA) [1953] SASR 224 (fumes from speedway track); Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332 (smell from stables); Miller v Shoalhaven Shire Council (1957) 2 LGRA 46 (NSWSC) (smell from public toilets); Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC) (smell from offal plant); Feiner v Domachuk (1994) 35 NSWLR 485 (smell from straw saturated with urine and faeces, used by commercial mushroom farm). But see Degotardi v Shellharbour Municipal Council (1953) 18 LGR (NSW) 258 (NSWSC) (smell from public toilets held not actionable). Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525 (HC) (reflected light from shopping mall canopy). Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53 (dust from haulage trucks); Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8 June 1979) (dust from quarry). Travis v Vanderloos (1984) 54 LGRA 268 (QSC); Corbett v Pallas (1995) 86 LGERA 312 (NSWCA). Evans v Finn (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 297; 21 WN (NSW) 118 (FC) (bullets from neighbouring rifle range). Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC); Barton v Chhibber [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-185 (VSC); Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49. Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383, Murphy J at 388 (pickets attempting to stop people and vehicles entering and leaving plaintiff’s factory); Boral Bricks NSW Pty Ltd v Frost [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-077 (NSWSC); Boral Bricks NSW Pty Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 IR 70 (NSWSC) (pickets attempting to stop people and vehicles entering and leaving plaintiff’s factory); Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51 (App Div) (pickets attempting to stop people entering and leaving plaintiff’s circus). But see Broderick Motors Pty Ltd v Rothe [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-059 (NSWSC) (picket with sign outside plaintiff’s premises but no attempt to stop people entering and leaving). Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93 (FC); Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC); Pantalone v Alaouie (1989) 18 NSWLR 119. But see Kebewar Pty Ltd v Harkin (1987) 9 NSWLR 738; 63 LGRA 412 (CA) (no action for withdrawal of support from building); Xuereb v Viola [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-012 (NSWSC) (no action for withdrawal of support by lawful drawing of subterranean water); Morgan v Lake Macquarie City Council (unreported, NSWCA, Clarke, Handley and Cripps JJA, CA 40451–40456, 40649 of 1992, 2 September 1993) (no liability where natural slippage removed support and defendant did nothing to restore support). Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497; Spencer v Australian Capital Territory (2007) 13 BPR 24,307; [2007] NSWSC 303. Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740; Fennell v Robson Excavations Pty Ltd [1977] 2 NSWLR 486 (CA); Sutherland Shire Council v Becker (2006) 150 LGERA 184; [2006] NSWCA 344, Giles JA at [3]–[11]. Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740; Kebewar Pty Ltd v Harkin (1987) 9 NSWLR 738; 63 LGRA 412 (CA); Sutherland Shire Council v Becker (2006) 150 LGERA 184; [2006] NSWCA 344, Giles JA at [3]–[11]. But see, eg

469

[33.7.240]

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Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 177 (abolition of common law claims for nuisance in respect of the removal of support provided by supporting land and statutory modification of duty of care); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 179 (right to support of land and buildings). 15 Stoakes v Brydges [1958] QWN 5 (QSC). See Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727; [1993] 3 WLR 476 (repeated harassing telephone calls held to be a nuisance).

Physical Damage to Property [33.7.250] Traditionally, physical damage to property was always regarded as unreasonable and therefore, subject to statute, actionable in private nuisance. Subject to statute (see below), locality is irrelevant to the question of liability.1 The plaintiff’s cause of action is made out on proof of material damage to their property.2 However, an injunction may be granted in a quia timet action (without actual proof of material damage) but on the basis that the harm is reasonably imminent: see [33.7.840]. There is also authority to the effect that, in cases of material damage to property, it is no defence for the defendant to prove that they took reasonable precautions to prevent interference or damage.3 According to the authority, liability in nuisance for material physical damage to property is strict. However, other cases suggest that the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of their property may be raised by way of defence in such a case.4 If that is so, it would seem that the taking of reasonable precautions by the defendant can be raised by way of defence, as the taking of reasonable precautions would presumably constitute a reasonable use of property. However, in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, Lord Goff distinguished reasonable use from reasonable precautions, saying: “[I]f the user is not reasonable, the defendant will be liable, even though he may have exercised reasonable care and skill to avoid it.”5 In the light of the conflict of authority, the question of whether or not there is strict liability in nuisance for material damage to property must be regarded as open.6 Although it is sometimes said that there cannot be strict liability in nuisance because the test for remoteness of damage in nuisance is reasonable foreseeability of damage, that is true only if “liability” is understood to mean “the defendant’s obligation to make compensation to the plaintiff”. If “liability” is understood to mean “establishing the plaintiff’s cause of action” or “actionability”, it is not correct to say that liability depends on reasonable foreseeability of damage in all cases of nuisance: see [33.7.860]. Other instances of nuisance by material damage to property include damage by fire,7 fumes8 and flooding.9 It is not clear whether damages for personal injuries may be recovered in private nuisance: see [33.7.230]. If such damages are recoverable at all, it is arguable that personal injuries should be treated in the same way as material damage to

470

[33.7.250]

PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

property. Thus, if liability for material damage to property is strict, it is arguable that liability for personal injuries should also be.10 In the United Kingdom, reference to the law of negligence has led the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal to hold that the reasonable foreseeability of the harm likely to be suffered by a person in the position of the plaintiff is an element in determining whether an interference is reasonable and, thus, whether there has been a nuisance. It follows that harm which a court finds was not reasonably foreseeable will not be unreasonable, such that physical damage could in theory be caused without liability in nuisance.11

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483. Compare the position with nuisance by interference with use and enjoyment: see [33.7.170]–[33.7.240]. Manson v Shire of Maffra (1881) 7 VLR (L) 364 (FC); Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95; Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113 (FC), Burbury CJ at 118–119, 122; Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 66; 122 ER 27; Furness v Clarke (1970) 1 SASR 359, Chamberlain J at 364; Furness v Clarke (1971) 1 SASR 359 at 366 (FC), Bray CJ at 367, Hogarth J at 373–374. See Barton v Chhibber [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-185 (VSC) (cause of action made out on proof that defendant’s tree roots had damaged plaintiff’s house). But see the view expressed in Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [5.1.8.2] (generally no liability for physical damage to property without proof by the plaintiff of negligence). Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95; Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, Lord Goff at 299 (AC); Feiner v Domachuk (1994) 35 NSWLR 485. See [33.7.680]. Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113 (FC), Burbury CJ at 123 (“reasonableness” of defendant’s use of defence). See Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, Lord Goff at 299 (AC), considered at [33.7.680]. Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, Lord Goff at 299 (AC). For a discussion of the cases and academic opinions, see Davies M, “Private Nuisance, Fault and Personal Injuries” (1990) 20 UWALR 129 at 132–136. In Bonic v Fieldair (Deniliquin) Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 636, Davies AJ at [12] held that the principles of the law of negligence (and not the law of nuisance) should be applied in a situation which involved unintended property damage arising from a one-off circumstance. See also Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough Borough Council [2000] QB 836; [2000] 2 WLR 1396; but see Bonnici v Kur-ring-gai Municipal Council (2001) 121 LGERA 1; [2001] NSWSC 1124 which did not follow the UK decision in Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough Borough Council. Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182 (PC); FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd v Delaney (1985) 58 LGRA 405 (SASCFC) (damage in Ash Wednesday fires); Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5) (1988) 67 LGRA 108 (SASC) (damage in Ash Wednesday fires). Note that in the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Victoria, there remains a

471

[33.7.250]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

statutory defence that the fire was accidental: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 170; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11(15); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 48. 8 Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483. 9 Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113 (FC); Furness v Clarke (1971) 1 SASR 359 at 366 (FC); Travis v Vanderloos (1984) 54 LGRA 268 (QSC). 10 Davies M, “Private Nuisance, Fault and Personal Injuries” (1990) 20 UWALR 129 at 129–140. 11 See Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] 1 AC 321; [2001] 3 WLR 1007; [2001] UKHL 55; Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172. For an Australian consideration of Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council, see Stockwell v Victoria [2001] VSC 497, Gillard J at [494]–[495] (applied); Owners of Strata Plan No 13218 v Woollahra Municipal Council (2002) 121 LGERA 117; [2002] NSWCA 92, Powell JA [20]–[21] (quoted and arguably); Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [45] (cited, noting “fault [in nuisance] generally involves foreseeability”); Quick v Alpine Nurseries Sales Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1248, Ward J at [141] (cited, also noting “fault [in nuisance] generally involves foreseeability”).

[33.7.255] An action for nuisance as a result of damage caused by a tree covered by the Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW) has been abolished in New South Wales.1 Trees to which the Act applies are those “situated wholly or principally”2 on land described in s 4 of the Act (predominantly private land). A relevant tree must still be “situated on” such land at the time of the making of an application for relief under s 7 of the Act, although it is not necessary that the whole of the tree remain. An application for relief may be made even if the tree has died and/or been reduced to a bare trunk or a stump still connected to the soil.3 The Act does not apply to land vested in or managed by a local council.4 Nor does the Act abolish actions for negligence or trespass caused by trees to which the Act applies.5 Section 9(2)(i) provides for the making of an order requiring payment of compensation “for damage to property”, but this does not extend to an order for compensation for economic loss caused by the tree. To this extent the remedies under the Act are more limited than those available for nuisance.6 The Act vests jurisdiction in relation to this purely statutory cause of action in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales.7

1 Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW), s 5. See generally Carpenter M, “Tree Disputes: The New Scheme for Resolving Conflict between Neighbours” (2007) 45 Law Soc J 54. 2 Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW), s 4(3). 3 Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [147].

472

[33.7.255]

4 5 6 7

PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW), s 4(2). Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [219]. Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [217]. Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW), s 3 (definition of “the Court”), s 7.

473

[33.7.255]

PRIVATE NUISANCE

474

Public Nuisance [33.7.360] “Public nuisance” consists of interference with any rights shared by the public, although those rights need not necessarily relate to land.1 While the kinds of activity complained of are the same in public and private nuisance, the nature of the interference is different. Private nuisance concerns the infringement of rights relating to the ownership or occupation of land: see [33.7.220]. Public nuisance consists of an interference with public rights, not liberties generally available to members of the public. For example, in Ball v Consolidated Rutile Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 524, it was held that a defendant who had caused a sand dune to collapse into the sea had not created a public nuisance, even though the collapse of the dune interfered with the ability of prawn trawlers to fish in that area. The liberty to trawl for prawns was not a public right of the kind protected by the law of public nuisance. Public nuisance is a criminal offence both at common law and in certain jurisdictions by statute.2 In Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177, Smithers J defined public nuisance as: [A] criminal offence constituted by an unlawful act or omission [which] endangers the lives, safety, health, property or comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed in the exercise or enjoyment of any right common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.3

However, public nuisance need not be based on an unlawful act, as it is primarily concerned with the effect of the act complained of as opposed to its inherent lawfulness or unlawfulness.4 Thus, criminal proceedings may be instituted against the creator of a public nuisance.5 Civil actions in public nuisance may be brought by the Attorney-General or by private persons who have suffered damage (known as “particular damage”) over and above that suffered by the public in general: see [33.7.500]–[33.7.510]. Local authorities also have some powers to restrain or abate public nuisances, and, in certain circumstances, to bring actions in public nuisance: see [33.7.520].

1

2

3

Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 204 (FLR (reversed on other grounds in Johnson v Kent (1975) 132 CLR 164; 49 ALJR 27; 34 LGRA 230). Criminal Code (Qld), s 230 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Code (Tas), s 141 (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1). There are no equivalent criminal provisions in other jurisdictions. Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 203–204 (FLR).

475

[33.7.360]

PUBLIC NUISANCE

4 5

Smithers J attributed that to a definition in Armitage AL (ed), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1969) p 1392, see now Jones M, Dugdale A and Simpson M (eds), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (21st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at [20-03]. The definition is very similar to that in Criminal Code (Tas), s 140. Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd [1993] QB 343; [1992] 3 WLR 449. See Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), Ch 8; Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 125, 628(4); Criminal Code (Qld), s 230; Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA), Pt 10; Criminal Code (Tas), s 141; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), s 13(1)(e) (considered in Smith v Cornish [1971] Tas SR 383 (NC 17); (1971) 23 LGRA 87 (squealing car tyres)); Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic), ss 61, 64. Public nuisance is also an indictable misdemeanour at common law: see R v Madden [1975] 1 WLR 1379 (CCA) (hoax emergency call). See also, eg Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld), s 6.

[33.7.370] The issue of whether a sufficient number of people are affected to constitute a class of “the public” is a question of fact in every case.1 In Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770, Denning LJ said: [A] public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large.2

It is not necessary for the nuisance injuriously to affect every member of the class; it is sufficient that a representative cross-section of the class has been so affected.3 If there is a conflict of evidence between members of the class, the question is whether those injuriously affected are representative of the class as a whole.4 An example of a nuisance which the community at large was considered to be responsible for restraining is in Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Domachuk (1988) 66 LGRA 110. In that case, the defendant carried on the business of growing mushrooms and preparing garden compost from spent mushroom compost and other materials. The compost used in growing the mushrooms was made from stable straw containing horse manure and impregnated with horse urine. Flies were attracted to the area in large numbers. The smell of the compost and the flies annoyed several neighbours. The local council5 sought an injunction restraining the continuation of the defendant’s business. Six of the defendant’s neighbours gave evidence about the effect on them of the smell and the flies. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the smell and the flies did constitute a nuisance. Waddell CJ in Eq said: While agriculture is a use permitted without the consent of the council and this circumstance provides a reason for thinking that residents should put up with ordinary agricultural smells and such flies as may be attracted, it does not, in my opinion, provide a reason why residents should not be heard to complain about the smells and fly nuisance emanating from the defendants’ premises.6

476

[33.7.380]

On the question of whether the nuisance was sufficiently widespread to constitute a public nuisance, as only six witnesses had given evidence about the effect of the smell and the flies, Waddell CJ in Eq quoted the dictum of Denning LJ in Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd,7 before continuing: The present is, I think, a borderline case. But, bearing in mind the extent of the neighbourhood affected and the statutory responsibilities of the council to deal with such situations, it seems to me that it would not be reasonable to expect any of the occupiers affected to take responsibility to put a stop to the nuisance. This being so, the nuisance should be regarded as public.8

1

2

3

4

5 6 7 8

Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770 (CA), Romer LJ at 184 (QB), quoted with approval in Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC), the Court at 825–826 (SR (NSW)); Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 204 (FLR). See R v Clifford [1980] 1 NSWLR 314; (1979) 1 A Crim R 88 (CCA), Reynolds JA at 318 (NSWLR). Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770 (CA), Denning LJ at 191 (QB), quoted with approval in Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC), the Court at 825–826 (SR (NSW)); Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Domachuk (1988) 66 LGRA 110 (NSWSC), Waddell CJ in Eq at 122–123. Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770 (CA), Romer LJ at 184 (QB), quoted with approval in Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC), the Court at 825–826 (SR (NSW)). Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC) (18 witnesses regarded as representative of whole neighbourhood); Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC) (“substantial number” of aggrieved witnesses). For the right of local authorities to sue in public nuisance: see [33.7.520]. Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Domachuk (1988) 66 LGRA 110 (NSWSC), Waddell CJ in Eq at 122. Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770 (CA), Denning LJ at 190–191 (QB). Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Domachuk (1988) 66 LGRA 110 (NSWSC), Waddell CJ in Eq at 123.

[33.7.380] Case law provides many examples of public nuisance. Some examples include use of a pathway by vehicular traffic,1 blocking of a logging track to prevent protestors arriving or leaving a protest camp,2 widespread dust, noise and vibration from a quarry,3 widespread smells,4 pollution5 or obstruction6 of waterways, fouling of a pavement by pigeon droppings,7 work on private land by an occupier or a builder which makes an adjacent footpath

477

[33.7.380]

PUBLIC NUISANCE

unsafe8 and, possibly, interference with a view:9 see [33.7.220].

1 Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Pratt v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346; (1987) 63 LGRA 294. 2 McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289, Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA at [120]–[129]. However, their Honours held at [130]–[139] that the protestors had not suffered particular damage so as to have standing to sustain their action against the loggers blocking the track. 3 Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC); Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8 June 1979). 4 Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC). 5 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid (for the Board) at 633 (AC) (“no doubt” that spilling oil into Sydney Harbour constituted public nuisance). See Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145; 40 ALJR 211; 18 LGRA 65, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ at 152 (CLR) (overturned on other grounds by Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527). 6 York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391 (obstruction of navigable river by bridge). Compare Ball v Consolidated Rutile Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 524 (no public nuisance by causing collapse of sand dune into sea). 7 Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc [2001] 1 WLR 368 (QBD); Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc [2002] QB 756; [2002] 2 WLR 512; [2001] EWCA Civ 1236. 8 Volman (t/as Volman Engineering) v Lobb [2005] NSWCA 348, Hodgson JA at [35]–[38]; Greenwood v Papademetri [2007] NSWCA 221, Campbell JA at [87]. 9 Owen v O’Connor (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 1051; 80 WN (NSW) 1535; 9 LGRA 159 (obstruction of highway interfering with plaintiff’s views and winter sunlight); Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43, Fox J at 52–53. But see Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 212; Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (NSWSC), Young J at 206 (“unsightliness alone does not constitute a nuisance”).

[33.7.390] The tort of public nuisance in public road cases has been subsumed by the law of negligence. Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ’s joint judgment in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, declared that: [I]t is the law of negligence which supplies the criterion of liability in [cases of injury on the highway.] … [T]he tort of public nuisance in highway cases has been subsumed by the law of negligence.1

Kirby J was of the view that:

478

[33.7.390]

[T]he Court should now remove the anomalous immunity [from liability of highway authorities for non-feasance], re-express the common law in Australia and subsume the liability of highway authorities in negligence and nuisance within the general law governing all other statutory bodies. … [T]he rule [that highway authorities are immune from liability for non-feasance] exists as an exception to the general liability of tortious wrong-doers in the law of negligence which this Court, and other courts, have developed and re-expressed in many significant ways in recent years.2

The reference to “the general law governing all other statutory bodies” and to “the general liability of tortious wrong-doers in the law of negligence” suggests that Kirby J was referring to one and the same thing, namely, liability in negligence. This interpretation is fortified where Kirby J, referring to Brodie v Singleton Shire Council, states that: These conclusions leave the liability of the respondents to be determined by the ordinary principles of negligence law as applied to a statutory authority with relevant duties and powers.3

Any doubt about the issue was removed in Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, where Gleeson CJ stated that: In [Brodie v Singleton Shire Council], the majority in this Court said that the liability of highway authorities should now be treated as covered by the modern law of negligence, into which public nuisance has been absorbed.4

1 2 3 4

Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ at [55]. Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Kirby J at [226], [228]. Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Kirby J at [239]. Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 81 ALJR 686; 153 LGERA 55; [2007] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ at [26], see also Kirby J at [68], Hayne J at [150]. However, see Rickard v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (2009) 54 MVR 214; [2009] NSWSC 1115 where Hoeben J at [185] quoted the statement in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512; 75 ALJR 992; 114 LGERA 235; [2001] HCA 29, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ at [129], that “[t]he time has now come … to treat public nuisance, in its application to the highway cases, ‘as absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence’”. Hoeben J said at [186]: “While there are good reasons for believing that this is a correct statement of the way in which the law is developing, in the absence of a clear statement to that effect by the High Court or an intermediate appellate Court, I am not prepared to accept the submission [that the law of public nuisance has been subsumed into the more general law of negligence for all claims involving a public nuisance on land occupied by a highway authority].”

479

[33.7.390]

PUBLIC NUISANCE

480

Parties Who May Sue? [33.7.490] Actions in private nuisance may be brought only by those with rights over the land affected by the nuisance or, possibly, by those in occupation of that land. As private nuisance is an interference with recognised rights in property (see [33.7.220]), it follows that those who have such rights may bring an action in private nuisance. It is not clear whether a person who does not have a legal right to occupation of the affected property may bring an action complaining of interference with that property. Following Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141, the Supreme Court of Victoria held in Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654, that a mere licensee may not bring an action in private nuisance. However, in Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51, the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain an alleged nuisance, even though there was no evidence about what interest, if any, the plaintiffs had in the land affected by the alleged nuisance. The Court proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs had only “some form of licence” to use the land,1 but granted the interlocutory injunction without commenting on whether the plaintiffs’ interest in the land was sufficient to give them standing to sue in nuisance. In Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655; [1997] 2 WLR 684, the House of Lords applied Malone v Laskey and held that only a person with an interest in the land can sue in private nuisance in respect of acts directed against enjoyment of rights over the land.2 If the plaintiff has exclusive occupation of the premises, they have standing to bring an action in private nuisance,3 because the fact of exclusive occupation constitutes sufficient title against those who have no better title.4 A person with a legal right of occupation, but no estate, interest or right to possession, may sue for an interference with that right of occupation.5 Similarly, a person with a legal, but non-possessory,6 right over property (such as a reversion) may sue for an interference with that right, but not for interference with rights over the property.7

1 2

Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser [1991] 1 VR 51 (App Div), the Court at 52. See Cheer U, “Private Nuisance Clarified?” (1997) 5 TLJ 141; Blay S, “The House of Lords and the Lord of the House: Making New Sense of Nuisance” (1999) 73 ALJ

481

[33.7.490]

PARTIES

3

4 5

6

7

275; Cane P, “What a Nuisance!” (1997) 113 LQR 515; Fitzpatrick TM, “Should Family Members Have Title to Sue in Private Nuisance?” (1998) 6 TLJ 171; Giliker P, “Whither the Tort of Nuisance? The Implications of Restrictions on the Right to Sue in Hunter v Canary Wharf” (1997) 7 TLJ 155. South Australian Co v City of Port Adelaide [1914] SALR 16 (interference with wharf in exclusive possession of plaintiff without title); McLeod v Rub-a-Dub Car Wash (Malvern) Pty Ltd (unreported, VSC, Stephen J, 29 February 1972), cited in Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654, Harris J at 657 (interference with premises in exclusive possession of plaintiff without title); Paxhaven Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General (NZ) [1974] 2 NZLR 185 (SC) (interference with farm in exclusive possession of plaintiff without title); Pemberton v Southwark London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 1672 (CA) (claim by tolerated trespasser). Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555; 58 LGRA 289, McHugh JA at 563–564 (NSWLR). Vaughan v Shire of Benalla (1891) 17 VLR 129 (action on the case to restrain interference with plaintiff’s right to graze sheep on Crown land); Ruhan v Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 439; 37 WN (NSW) 145 (FC) (interference with right of occupation of Crown land; unclear whether cause of action in private nuisance or public nuisance). Carter v Kenyon (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 222 (FC); McCarty v North Sydney Municipal Council (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 210; 4 LGR (NSW) 59; 35 WN (NSW) 85 (reversioner has standing to sue only if interference with property is permanent, affecting reversion); Pantalone v Alaouie (1989) 18 NSWLR 119 (nuisance to reversion; reversioner entitled to sue). Thompson v Sydney Municipal Council (1938) 14 LGR (NSW) 32 (NSWSC) (interference with tenancy, not reversion; reversioner not entitled to sue). Compare Kensington Starch & Maizena Co v Mayor of Essendon & Flemington (1880) 6 VLR (L) 265 (interference with reversion, not tenancy; tenant not entitled to sue).

[33.7.500] Actions in public nuisance may be brought by the Attorney-General or private individuals. The Attorney-General acts as a representative of the public,1 or in a relator action after complaint from a private individual or local authority.2 Private individuals who have suffered damage (known as “particular damage”) over and above that suffered by the public in general may bring on an action in public nuisance: see [33.7.510].

1 Walsh v Ervin [1952] VLR 361, Sholl J at 368: “[I]t is to avoid the multiplicity of actions which might result if many members of the public sued … that the law requires that … the Attorney-General must sue on behalf of all.” 2 It is not clear whether there is any requirement of standing to be a relator: see Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 206–207 (public had standing to be relators, if such standing was required, by reason of public right to use public park).

482

[33.7.510]

WHO MAY SUE?

[33.7.510] Particular damage over and above that suffered by the public in general must be shown by a private individual who wishes to bring an action complaining of a public nuisance. In Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400, Brett J said: [The plaintiff] must shew a particular injury to himself beyond that which is suffered by the rest of the public. It is not enough for him to shew that he suffers the same inconvenience … as other people do.1

Particular damage may be damage different in kind from that suffered by the rest of the public,2 or damage of the same kind but to a greater extent than that suffered by the rest of the public.3 For example, in Swan Brewery Co Ltd v Shire of Belmont [1974] WAR 196, the defendant created a public nuisance by obstructing the highway. The plaintiffs showed particular damage by proving that they had lost trade as a result of the obstruction, which was damage of a different kind from that suffered by the rest of the public. In contrast, in Walsh v Ervin [1952] VLR 361, the defendant also created a public nuisance by obstructing the highway. Although the plaintiff had not suffered damage that was different in kind from the rest of the public, the interference with free passage affected him to a greater extent, as his property adjoined the obstructed highway. It was held that this constituted particular damage. Conversely, in McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289, the majority of protestors encamped near a logging track, who were prevented from leaving their camp by loggers who had blockaded them in, were held not to have suffered particular loss since they had not attempted to leave their camp by hiking along an alternative and more difficult path. The Victorian Court of Appeal held that had all the appellants, like several of their number, escaped the blockade by hiking out along the bush track, they may have suffered particular loss or inconvenience as a result of that means of escape. However, those that had hiked this alternative route did not appear to have suffered special damage.4 Furthermore, the Court noted with reference to the majority of protestors who remained at the blockaded camp that “it is axiomatic that particular damage will not be made out if it was not the claimant’s intent to travel … were it not for the obstruction”.5 In Onus v Telstra Corp Ltd [2011] NSWSC 33, the owner of an airport obtained an injunction to prevent the construction of a 35-metre high telecommunications tower in close proximity to the airfield. The plaintiff proposed taking steps to lessen the danger arising from the nuisance, including runway closures and prohibitions and advices against flying which would diminish the airfield’s utility for pilot training and reduce the revenue from landing fees. The Supreme Court of New South Wales accepted that the plaintiff would suffer particular substantial injury beyond that suffered by those who flew in and out of the airfield.6 Unlike private nuisance (see [33.7.490]), it is not necessary that the plaintiff have an interest in land in order to have standing to sue.7 Thus, an interest in the form of access to a public highway may suffice.8 However, public interest

483

[33.7.510]

PARTIES

groups wishing to contest commercial activities on public land on environmental protection grounds have been denied standing to do so by courts applying the traditional test.9

1 Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400, Brett J at 406. 2 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC) (public nuisance by oil on the waters of Sydney Harbour; particular damage by loss of ship by fire); Swan Brewery Co Ltd v Shire of Belmont [1974] WAR 196 (public nuisance by obstruction of highway; particular damage by loss of trade); Taylor v City of Perth [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-191 (WASC) (public nuisance by obstruction of highway; particular damage by loss of trade). 3 Walsh v Ervin [1952] VLR 361 (interference with highway affecting landowner on highway more than public in general), quoted with approval, obiter, in Grand Central Car Park Pty Ltd v Tivoli Freeholders [1969] VR 62; (1968) 18 LGRA 140, McInerney J at 73 (VR); Neville Nitschke Caravans (Main North Road) Pty Ltd v McEntee (1976) 15 SASR 330; 40 LGRA 276 (FC); King v Phillip Island Shire Council (unreported, VSC, Nathan J, 3319 of 1988, 10 August 1994). But see South Australian Co v City of Port Adelaide [1914] SALR 16 (plaintiff unable to show greater damage than rest of public from interruption of river flow); Teamay v Severin (1988) 94 FLR 47 (NTSC) (Aboriginal communities unable to show greater damage than rest of public from sale of alcohol by defendant). 4 McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289, Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA at [135]. 5 McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289, Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA at [136]. 6 Onus v Telstra Corp Ltd [2011] NSWSC 33, Price J at [130]. 7 Kent v Johnson (1973) 21 FLR 177 (ACTSC), Smithers J at 204 (FLR). 8 Ryan v City of Victoria [1999] 1 SCR 201; (1999) 168 DLR (4th) 513, Major J (for the Court) at [52]; Attorney-General (UK) v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169; [1957] 2 WLR 770, Denning LJ at 191 (QB); Murtha M, “Granting Salmon Standing: Modernising Public Nuisance to Serve the Public Interest in Environmental Protection” (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 45 at 49. 9 See Murtha M, “Granting Salmon Standing: Modernising Public Nuisance to Serve the Public Interest in Environmental Protection” (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 45.

[33.7.520] The power of local authorities to take action to restrain public nuisances varies among the States and Territories. In New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria, local authorities are empowered to remove nuisances in certain circumstances and to proceed against persons not complying with orders for removal or abatement of nuisances.1 In the Northern Territory, councils may order the mitigation or removal of a hazard or nuisance (or potential hazard or nuisance).2 Local authorities in Queensland and Western Australia are empowered to proceed in their own names in the public interest for the enforcement of

484

[33.7.530]

WHO MAY BE HELD LIABLE?

statutory provisions in any case in which the Attorney-General might proceed on the relation of that local authority.3 However, they are not thereby empowered to bring actions in public nuisance,4 even where there are other statutory provisions empowering local authorities to remove or abate public nuisances.5 The statutory power is to enforce statutory provisions when the Attorney-General might do so. Thus it is necessary first to make an order for abatement or removal of a nuisance under the relevant statutory provision and then to institute proceedings in the public interest for breach of that order (if the Attorney-General could do so).6 In Western Australia, all public health and local government officials and officers are empowered to enter premises for the purpose of examining as to the existence of any nuisance or any contravention of the Health Act 1911 (WA).7 That Act regulates a range of matters which could otherwise constitute a public nuisance such as chemical refuse,8 substances which may obstruct sewers9 and sewage disposal.10

1

Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 125, 673 (proceedings in Land and Environment Court), s 678; Local Government Act 1993 (Tas), Pt 12 Div 6; Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic), Pt 6 Div 1. 2 Local Government Act 2008 (NT), s 194. 3 Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 240(3); Local Government Act 1995 (WA), s 9.28. 4 Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC). 5 For example, Local Government Act 1995 (WA), s 3.25, Schs 3.1, 3.2. 6 Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC); Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Domachuk (1988) 66 LGRA 110 (NSWSC). 7 Health Act 1911 (WA), s 349. See also Pt VII Div 1. 8 Health Act 1911 (WA), s 94. 9 Health Act 1911 (WA), s 93. 10 Health Act 1911 (WA), s 95.

Who May Be Held Liable? [33.7.530] The occupier of the premises from which a nuisance emanates may be sued, even if they did not create the nuisance.1 However, in order to be liable for a nuisance, the owner or occupier must have continued or adopted the nuisance.2 In Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, Viscount Maugham said: [A]n occupier of land “continues” a nuisance if with knowledge or presumed knowledge of its existence he fails to take any reasonable means to bring it to an end though with ample time to do so. He “adopts” it if he makes any use of the erection, building, bank or artificial contrivance which constitutes the nuisance.3

485

[33.7.530]

PARTIES

Thus, fault is a necessary ingredient of liability for continuing or adopting a nuisance.4 An occupier who did not create the nuisance and neither knew nor ought to have known of it, is not liable for that nuisance.5 In that context, in Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46, Lord Ackner said: “‘Ought to have known’ cannot mean more than ‘would have known, if he had taken the precautions which a reasonable landowner would take’.”6 However, if the actual creator of the nuisance is responsible for the management and control of the premises from which the nuisance emanates, liability ensues irrespective of whether the occupier has possession of the premises in the traditional sense.7 Further, if the occupier of premises did not cause the nuisance but is or ought to be aware of it, they will not be liable if it is not possible to take reasonable precautions to bring it to an end.8 In deciding whether or not the defendant has failed to take reasonable precautions to bring the nuisance to an end, the court takes into account the defendant’s actual financial and other circumstances.9 Under those principles, the occupier of premises may be liable for continuing or adopting a nuisance created by third parties,10 including independent contractors,11 by a predecessor in title,12 or by natural causes,13 or by an employee in the course of employment.14 The occupier is only liable for so much of the damage caused by the nuisance as occurred after they began to continue or adopt it.15 In England, there is an exception to the principle that an occupier who did not create a nuisance cannot be liable without fault on their part. In Wringe v Cohen [1940] 1 KB 229, the Court of Appeal held that when a nuisance is created by want of repair of premises adjoining the highway, the occupier of the premises is liable whether or not they knew or ought to have known of the want of repair. The liability arises out of the obligation to repair.16 Thus, where the premises in want of repair are leased, the lessor is liable if they have an express17 or implied18 right under the lease to enter and repair the premises. It is not clear whether that exception forms part of the law of Australia, although it appears to have been applied in Carter v Murray [1981] 2 NSWLR 77. In Cartwright v McLaine & Long Pty Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 549; 53 ALJR 413, Gibbs ACJ said that he assumed, without deciding, that the Wringe v Cohen exception was part of the law in Australia.19 However, doubt was cast on that proposition by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Rickards v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1983] 3 NSWLR 15520 and the question of whether the Wringe v Cohen exception applies in Australia must still be regarded as open.

1 Fennell v Robson Excavations Pty Ltd [1977] 2 NSWLR 486 (CA) (earthmoving contractor held liable for nuisance created on land owned by another); Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113, Neasey J at 148–153; Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53, Stanley J at 60; Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5)

486

[33.7.530]

WHO MAY BE HELD LIABLE?

(1988) 67 LGRA 108 (SASC); Pantalone v Alaouie (1989) 18 NSWLR 119 (excavating contractor held liable for nuisance created on land owned by another). See L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180 (plaintiff’s boat damaged by tar escaping from defendant’s land to land of a third party then into the river); Challen v McLeod Country Golf Club [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-760; [2004] QCA 358 (plaintiff claiming damages for property damage as a result of golf balls being hit from adjoining golf course). 2 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880; Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48; Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46 (PC). The principles apply to public as well as to private nuisance: see Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Pratt v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346; (1987) 63 LGRA 294 (council liable in public nuisance created by vehicles using pathway, because it “continued and adopted” the nuisance). 3 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, Viscount Maugham at 894 (AC). See Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301, Hodgson J at 484 (NSWLR). 4 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, Lord Wright at 904 (AC); Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46, Lord Ackner (for the Board) at 284 (ALJR); Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49; R v Shorrock [1994] QB 279; [1993] 3 WLR 698. 5 Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48; Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46 (PC); Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49; Baans v Alice Springs Town Council Inc (1991) 105 FLR 291 (NTSC). 6 Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46, Lord Ackner (for the Board) at 284 (ALJR), quoting Caminer v Northern & London Investment Trust Ltd [1949] 2 KB 64, Tucker LJ at 70. 7 Hall v Beckenham Corp [1949] 1 KB 716. 8 Eastern Asia Navigation Co Ltd v Fremantle Harbour Trust Commissioners (1951) 83 CLR 353 (not reasonably possible to extinguish burning oil on water); Burchett v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 366; 3 LGRA 232; 75 WN (NSW) 402 (FC) (defendant had no right to prevent construction and use of drain by local authority). 9 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182 (PC); Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] QB 51; [1999] 3 WLR 137 (CA). Compare Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] QB 1; [1999] 2 WLR 1142 (CA) and see discussion by Bagshaw R, “Private Nuisance by Third Parties” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 165. 10 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880; Stewart v Enfield Municipal Council (1915) 15 SR (NSW) 204; 2 LGR (NSW) 165; 32 WN (NSW) 46; Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43; Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 5) (1988) 67 LGRA 108 (SASC); Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] QB 51; [1999] 3 WLR 137 (CA). 11 Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95; McInnes v Wardle (1931) 45 CLR 548; Crawford v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 4450 of 1989, 21 February 1994); but see Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman

487

[33.7.530]

PARTIES

12

13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

(1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48 (occupier unaware of nuisance created by independent contractor). Stephenson v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (1953) 19 LGR (NSW) 137 (NSWSC), McLelland J at 140, obiter, citing Pride of Derby & Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] Ch 149; [1953] 2 WLR 58 (CA), Evershed MR at 176–177, Denning LJ at 190 (Ch). See Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301 (defendants held liable for nuisance created by tree roots that had spread from their property before they bought it). Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; 37 ALJR 277, affirmed in Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645; [1966] 3 WLR 513; (1966) 115 CLR 458; 40 ALJR 182 (PC); Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1978] QB 849; [1978] 2 WLR 774; Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49 (defendant liable for nuisance caused by spreading tree roots); Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301 (defendant liable for nuisance caused by spreading tree roots). Compare Morgan v Lake Macquarie City Council (unreported, NSWCA, Clarke, Handley and Cripps JJA, CA 40451–40456, 40649 of 1992, 2 September 1993) (no liability where natural slippage removed support and defendant did nothing to restore support). Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 (KBD), Atkinson J at 493. Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301, Hodgson J at 488 (NSWLR). See also Cull v Green (1924) 27 WALR 62 (public nuisance case to similar effect). Heap v Ind Coope & Allsopp Ltd [1940] 2 KB 476 (CA). Mint v Good [1951] 1 KB 517 (CA); Carter v Murray [1981] 2 NSWLR 77. Cartwright v McLaine & Long Pty Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 549; 53 ALJR 413, Gibbs ACJ at 555–556 (CLR). Rickards v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1983] 3 NSWLR 155 (CA), Priestley JA at 158–159.

[33.7.540] The lessor of premises from which a nuisance emanates will only be liable for a nuisance created by the lessee if the lessor expressly or impliedly consented to the activities of the tenant and the nuisance was the natural and necessary consequence of the activity1 or the result of the purpose for which the premises were let.2 In Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] 2 Qd R 574; [2006] QCA 350, McMurdo P and Philippides J (with whom White J agreed) said that: A lessor is not responsible for a nuisance created by a tenant unless the lessor let the premises for a purpose calculated to cause a nuisance, that is, by express authorization of the nuisance or in circumstances where the nuisance was certain to result from the purposes for which the property was being let.3

In the same vein, in De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498, King CJ said that “an occupier of premises who hires the premises out for a particular purpose which involves a special danger of nuisance, is liable for any nuisance caused by the hirer in carrying out that purpose”.4

488

[33.7.540]

WHO MAY BE HELD LIABLE?

The lessor of premises is liable in those circumstances even if they forbid the lessee to make a nuisance, and even if they take reasonable precautions to prevent the lessee’s use from making a nuisance.5 However, if the premises are not let for a particular purpose and the lessee creates a nuisance after the commencement of the tenancy, the lessor is not liable for that nuisance, as they have not expressly or impliedly authorised the nuisance (and can take no steps to abate it).6 Similarly, a reversioner who purchases the reversion at a time when a nuisance already exists on the leased property is not liable for that nuisance.7 The lessor of premises is liable if the nuisance was in existence at the time of the commencement of the tenancy,8 or if the nuisance is caused by want of repair in premises by the highway and the lessor has an express or implied right to enter and repair:9 see [33.7.530]. However, the lessor is generally only liable for those nuisances of which it ought to have been aware.10 Further, the liability of the lessor does not automatically exempt the lessee from all responsibility for the nuisance.11 A lessor of premises is under no obligation to put an end to a tenancy when they discover that a tenant is creating a nuisance.12 If a licence is granted rather than a lease, then the owner is liable for allowing the licensee to undertake activities on the premises which would naturally result in the creation of a nuisance.13

1 Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] 2 Qd R 574; [2006] QCA 350. 2 McEwan v Mills (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 118 (VSC), Barry J at 120; Harris v James (1876) 45 LJQB 545; Attorney-General (UK) v Stone (1895) 12 TLR 76 (CHD); De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498 (FC). See Crawford v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 4450 of 1989, 21 February 1994) (non-occupying owner of land held liable for nuisance created by the “normal activities” of an independent contractor engaged by it, on the basis that the contract had “authorised and directed” the nuisance). 3 Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] 2 Qd R 574; [2006] QCA 350, McMurdo P and Philippides J at [29] (White J agreeing). 4 De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498 (FC), King CJ at 502. 5 De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498 (FC); but see Smith v Scott [1973] Ch 314; [1972] 3 WLR 783. 6 See, eg Sykes v Connolly (1895) 11 WN (NSW) 145 (FC); Hussain v Lancaster City Council [2000] QB 1; [1999] 2 WLR 1142 (CA). Compare Lippiatt v South Gloucestershire Council [2000] QB 51; [1999] 3 WLR 137. 7 Williamson v Friend (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 133; 18 WN (NSW) 194 (FC) (not following R v Pedley (1834) 1 Ad & E 822; 110 ER 1422, Lord Denman CJ at 826–827 (Ad & E)). 8 McEwan v Mills (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 118 (VSC), Barry J at 120; Williamson v Friend (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 133; 18 WN (NSW) 194, Owen J at 140–141 (SR (NSW) Eq); Cull v Green (1924) 27 WALR 62 (FC).

489

[33.7.540]

PARTIES

9

10 11 12

13

McEwan v Mills (1865) 2 WW & A’B (L) 118 (VSC), Barry J at 120; Williamson v Friend (1901) 1 SR (NSW) Eq 133; 18 WN (NSW) 194, Owen J at 140–141 (SR (NSW) Eq); Heap v Ind Coope & Allsopp Ltd [1940] 2 KB 476 (CA) (express right); Mint v Good [1951] 1 KB 517 (CA) (implied right); Carter v Murray [1981] 2 NSWLR 77 (implied right). St Anne’s Well Brewery Co v Roberts (1928) 140 LT 1 (CA). Wilchick v Marks [1934] 2 KB 56. Peden Pty Ltd v Bortolazzo [2006] 2 Qd R 574; [2006] QCA 350, McMurdo P and Philippides J at [4], [13] (White J agreeing), applying Sykes v Connolly (1895) 11 WN (NSW) 145 (FC). Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43.

[33.7.545] A defendant will not be liable in nuisance for their conduct on the plaintiff’s own land.1 Such conduct may, however, give rise to an action in trespass.2

1 BP Oil New Zealand Ltd v Ports of Auckland Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 208 (HC), Hansen J at [80]–[86]. But see Paxhaven Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General (NZ) [1974] 2 NZLR 185 (SC); Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corp [1976] 2 NZLR 729 (SC). 2 Newark FH, “The Boundaries of Nuisance” (1949) 65 LQR 480 at 481, cited with approval in BP Oil New Zealand Ltd v Ports of Auckland Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 208 (HC), Hansen J at [81].

490

Defences [33.7.650] There are a number of legally effective defences to an action in nuisance. Effective defences include: (1)

statutory authorisation of the activity or condition that constitutes the nuisance (see [33.7.660]);

(2)

an act of a third party, but only where the defendant has not “continued and adopted” the nuisance created by the third party (see [33.7.670]);

(3)

the taking of reasonable precautions, at least in cases of nuisance by interference with use and enjoyment of property rights (see [33.7.680]);

(4)

contributory negligence on the part of the person affected by the nuisance (see [33.7.690]); and

(5)

a prescriptive right to continue the interference complained of: see [33.7.710].

Ineffective defences include that: (1)

the person affected “came to the nuisance” by moving to an area already affected by the condition or activity in question (see [33.7.700]); and

(2)

the activity or condition complained of is of benefit to the public: see [33.7.700].

The burden of proof generally lies on the defendant to justify the state of affairs established by the plaintiff as an actionable nuisance.1

1

Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113 (FC), Burbury CJ at 118, Neasey J at 154.

[33.7.660] Statutory authorisation is a defence to an action in nuisance1 provided that the authorisation is in unambiguous and compelling language. It only extends to acts expressly authorised or necessarily incidental to them and requires the acts to be done in a careful manner unless the authorisation extends by the plainest of language to the careless execution of an authorised act.2 In Manchester Corp v Farnworth [1930] AC 171, Viscount Dunedin said: When Parliament has authorized a certain thing to be made or done in a certain place, there can be no action for nuisance caused by the making or doing of that thing if the nuisance is the inevitable result of the making or doing so authorized.3

Underlying that defence is the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 491

[33.7.660]

DEFENCES

that legislation is presumed not to derogate from common law rights unless it specifically so provides. Thus, it is not sufficient that the activity complained of be authorised by Parliament; in order for the defence to be available, the creation of a nuisance in the performance of the authorised activity must also be expressly or impliedly authorised. Express statutory authorisation of the creation of a nuisance is very rare.4 Usually, statutory authorisation of nuisance is implied from the fact that the authorised activity cannot be conducted without creating a nuisance: in other words, that nuisance is the inevitable result of the authorised activity. The defence is also available where the authorisation comes from a planning permission in proper exercise of delegated powers under a statutory framework.5 In determining whether nuisance has been impliedly authorised, it is important to determine precisely what activity Parliament has authorised. In Nielsen v Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1912) 14 CLR 354, Isaacs J said: It all depends upon what Parliament has authorized. If what Parliament authorizes is a mere permissive act which may be done without committing a nuisance then a nuisance is not authorized, but if Parliament has authorized something which after taking all reasonable care and by applying the best scientific methods that are ordinarily adopted and reasonable in the circumstances, and if notwithstanding these precautions a nuisance is created, then Parliament must be taken to have authorized a nuisance to that extent.6

Thus, where the authorised activity can be undertaken without creating a nuisance, the defence is not available. In these circumstances, the nuisance is not the inevitable result of the authorised activity and Parliament is not taken to have impliedly authorised the nuisance. There are two types of case where the defence is not available for those reasons: (1)

where the nuisance is created by the defendant’s failure to take reasonable care in performing the authorised activity in the specified place and manner;7 and

(2)

where the authorised activity could reasonably be undertaken in some other place or in some other manner without causing a nuisance.8

The onus of proof is on the defendant to establish that the nuisance was the inevitable result of the authorised activity.9 In Manchester Corp v Farnworth, Viscount Dunedin continued the passage quoted above as follows: The onus of proving that the result is inevitable is on those who wish to escape liability for nuisance, but the criterion of inevitability is not what is theoretically possible but what is possible according to the state of scientific knowledge at the time, having also in view a certain common sense appreciation, which cannot be rigidly defined, of practical feasibility in view of situation and of expense.10

Thus, it is for the defendant to prove that they acted reasonably in the performance of the authorised activity and that there was no other place or manner in which the authorised activity could reasonably have been conducted without creating a nuisance.11 Although it is sometimes said that the onus requires the defendant to prove that the authorised activity was conducted 492

[33.7.660]

without negligence on its part, the use of the word “negligence” is inappropriate in that context.12 In that context, it is “negligent” to carry out work in a manner which results in damage unless it can be shown that it was the only way in which the duty could be performed.13 In determining whether the defendant has discharged the onus of proving that the work could not reasonably have been done without creating the nuisance, it is relevant to consider the expense of any precautions against creation of a nuisance.14 Thus, for example, if the nuisance could be prevented only by taking precautions that would be prohibitively expensive, the defence is available.15 Where the activity undertaken by the defendant is not, as a matter of construction, authorised by statute at all, the defence is clearly not available.16

1 2 3 4

5

6 7

8

East Fremantle Corp v Annois [1902] AC 213 (PC); Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001; [1981] 2 WLR 188. Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Barwick CJ at 256 (CLR). Manchester Corp v Farnworth [1930] AC 171, Viscount Dunedin at 183. It is more usual to find express provision that the authorised activity shall be conducted without creating a nuisance: Midwood & Co Ltd v Manchester Corp [1905] 2 KB 597 (CA); Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co [1914] 3 KB 772 (CA), cited in Fullarton v North Melbourne Electric Tramway & Lighting Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 181; [1916] VLR 231, Griffith CJ at 188 (CLR). Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd [1993] QB 343; [1992] 3 WLR 449. Compare Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19; [1995] 3 WLR 466; Ports of Auckland Ltd v Auckland City Council [1999] 1 NZLR 601 (HC). Nielsen v Brisbane Tramways Co Ltd (1912) 14 CLR 354, Isaacs J at 369. Perth Corp v Halle (1911) 13 CLR 393 (negligence in construction of authorised stormwater drain); Hansen v Burrum Shire Council [1953] St R Qd 178 (negligence in authorised raising of street level); Edwards v Blue Mountains City Council (1961) 6 LGRA 263; 78 WN (NSW) 864 (NSWSC) (negligence in authorised burning-off of rubbish at tip); Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374 (negligent exercise of road-widening power causes trespass); Carmichael v Sutherland Shire Council (1972) 25 LGRA 435 (NSWSC) (negligence in construction of authorised drainage system). Provender Millers (Winchester) Ltd v Southampton County Council [1940] Ch 131 (CA), Farwell J at 137–138 (Ch); Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137–138; Dubois v Noarlunga District Council [1959] SASR 127; (1959) 59 LGRA 53 (FC) (alternative route for drainage water would have avoided damage); Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43 (statute did not require golf course to be built in location complained of); York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391 (alternative position of bridge would have avoided creation of nuisance).

493

[33.7.660]

DEFENCES

9

10

11

12 13

Fullarton v North Melbourne Electric Tramway & Lighting Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 181; [1916] VLR 231, Griffith CJ at 186–188 (CLR); Manchester Corp v Farnworth [1930] AC 171; Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467. But see Birch v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1906) 4 CLR 324; 7 SR (NSW) 244; 23 WN (NSW) 167 (followed in Rickards v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1983] 3 NSWLR 155 (CA), which appears to suggest that the onus is on the plaintiff). Manchester Corp v Farnworth [1930] AC 171, Viscount Dunedin at 183. The full passage (or parts of it) is quoted and applied in Hansen v Burrum Shire Council [1953] St R Qd 178, Sheehy J at 187; Dubois v Noarlunga District Council [1959] SASR 127; (1959) 59 LGRA 53 (FC), Napier CJ at 133 (SASR); Edwards v Blue Mountains City Council (1961) 6 LGRA 263; 78 WN (NSW) 864 (NSWSC), Walsh J at 267–269 (LGRA); Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43, Anderson J at 14 (VR); Carmichael v Sutherland Shire Council (1972) 25 LGRA 435 (NSWSC), Helsham J at 444; Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137; Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620, Kneipp J at 635; York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 398. McDonald v Shire of Coburg (1887) 13 VLR 268 (FC) (raising road in any place would create nuisance); Bourchier v Commissioners for Railways (Vic) [1910] VLR 385 (FC) (nuisance from railway line could only be prevented by taking more than reasonable care); Howard v Bega Municipal Council (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 138; 3 LGR (NSW) 139; 33 WN (NSW) 69 (FC) (nightsoil depot authorised; nuisance inevitable); Archibald v Cabramatta & Canley Vale Municipal Council (1930) 10 LGR (NSW) 23 (NSWSCFC) (nightsoil depot authorised; nuisance inevitable); Attorney-General (SA) v Municipal Tramways Trust [1931] SASR 99 (tramcar depot authorised; nuisance inevitable); Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620 (not possible to prevent nuisance from authorised railway line without unreasonable expense); Symons Nominees Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1996) 25 MVR 174 (NSWCA) (no reasonable way of performing the authorised activity without causing the nuisance of which the plaintiff complained); Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director of Department of Conservation & Land Management (2012) 42 WAR 287; 189 LGERA 359; [2012] WASCA 79 (escape of smoke from prescribed burn in performance of statutory function; nuisance inevitable). Symons Nominees Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1996) 25 MVR 174 (NSWCA). Provender Millers (Winchester) Ltd v Southampton County Council [1940] Ch 131 (CA), Farwell J at 140 (Ch); Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137–138; Symons Nominees Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-081 (NSWSC), Brownie J at 68,679. But note the application of the various Civil Liability Acts to claims for damages for harm resulting from “negligence”, regardless of the cause of action: see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 41; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5A(1); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 4(1); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Sch 2 (definition of “claim”); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 51; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 3 (definition of “duty”); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 44; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5A(2). See also Southern Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director of Department of Conservation & Land Management (2012)

494

[33.7.670]

42 WAR 287; 189 LGERA 359; [2012] WASCA 79, McLure P at [125]–[126] (unnecessary to determine whether Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) applies to actions in nuisance but preliminary view that it would only apply if proof of negligence required), Pullin JA at [329] (Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) does not apply to nuisance because action in nuisance does not involve failure to exercise reasonable care), Buss JA at [336] (unnecessary to determine whether Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) applies and preferable not to express preliminary view); Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187 (upheld on appeal: Marsh v Baxter (2015) 49 WAR 1; [2015] WASCA 169), Kenneth Martin J at [676] (it seems that the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) does not apply to private nuisance actions). 14 Local Board of Health for City of Perth v Maley (1904) 1 CLR 702, Griffith CJ at 715–716; Bourchier v Commissioners for Railways (Vic) [1910] VLR 385 (FC); Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137. 15 Bourchier v Commissioners for Railways (Vic) [1910] VLR 385 (FC) (nuisance from railway line could only be prevented by taking unduly expensive precautions); Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620 (not possible to prevent nuisance from authorised railway line without unreasonable expense). 16 See, eg Amstad v Brisbane City Council (No 1) [1968] Qd R 334; (1967) 16 LGRA 372 (trespass); O’Brien v Rosedale Shire Corp [1969] VR 645; (1969) 22 LGRA 271 (FC); Swan Brewery Co Ltd v Shire of Belmont [1974] WAR 196; Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC); FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd v Delaney (1985) 58 LGRA 405 (SASCFC), Olsson J at 449–450.

[33.7.670] The act of a third party is a defence only where the defendant has not “continued or adopted” the nuisance created by the third party.1 Thus a defendant will not be liable where: (1)

the nuisance is not created by the defendant; and

(2)

the defendant neither knew nor ought to have known of the creation of the nuisance by the third party on their premises.2

Where the defendant is, or ought to be, aware of the nuisance created by the third party on their premises, the defendant is not liable if they could not, by reasonable precautions, put an end to the nuisance.3

1 2

3

See [33.7.530] for a discussion of this defence in relation to occupiers. Torette House Pty Ltd v Berkman (1940) 62 CLR 637; 40 SR (NSW) 8; 57 WN (NSW) 48; Montana Hotels Pty Ltd v Fasson Pty Ltd (1986) 61 ALJR 282; 62 LGRA 46 (PC). Eastern Asia Navigation Co Ltd v Fremantle Harbour Trust Commissioners (1951) 83 CLR 353 (not reasonably possible to extinguish burning oil on water); Burchett v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 366; 3 LGRA 232; 75 WN (NSW) 402 (FC) (defendant had no right to prevent construction and use of drain by local authority).

495

[33.7.680]

DEFENCES

[33.7.680] The taking of reasonable precautions is a defence to an action for private nuisance by interference with use and enjoyment of property (see [33.7.170]–[33.7.240]) where the duration of the nuisance is to be short-lived, as in the case of demolition, renovation or construction.1 However, the defence is not available where the nuisance is caused by material physical damage to property:2 see [33.7.250]–[33.7.255]. It is not clear whether the taking of reasonable precautions can be raised as a defence in other cases. The absence of precautions against interference has been held to be relevant to liability in private nuisance by interference with use and enjoyment.3 It has been suggested that the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of their property may be raised by way of defence when the plaintiff has made out a cause of action by proof of material damage to property.4 There is, however, some authority to the effect that the taking of reasonable precautions is never relevant by way of defence.5 In Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, Lord Goff said: Of course, although liability for nuisance has generally been regarded as strict, at least in the case of a defendant who has been responsible for the creation of a nuisance, even so that liability has been kept under control by the principle of reasonable user – the principle of give and take as between neighbouring occupiers of land, under which “those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action”. … The effect is that, if the user is reasonable, the defendant will not be liable for consequent harm to his neighbour’s enjoyment of his land; but if the user is not reasonable, the defendant will be liable, even though he may have exercised reasonable care and skill to avoid it.6

Further, there is authority to the effect that a lessor of property is liable for nuisance created by lessees, notwithstanding the taking of reasonable precautions on their part, at least where there is a “special risk” of nuisance in the purpose for which the premises were leased.7 It is sometimes said that there cannot be strict liability in nuisance because the test for remoteness of damage in nuisance is reasonable foreseeability of damage. However, that is true only if “liability” is understood to mean “the defendant’s obligation to make compensation to the plaintiff”. If “liability” is understood to mean “establishing the plaintiff’s cause of action” or “actionability”, it is not correct to say that liability depends on reasonable foreseeability of damage in all cases of nuisance: see [33.7.860].

1 Harrison v Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co [1891] 2 Ch 409; Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107 (NSWSC). 2 Harris v Carnegie’s Pty Ltd [1917] VLR 95. 3 Evans v Finn (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 297; 21 WN (NSW) 118 (FC); Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295, Richards J at 304. 4 Kraemers v Attorney-General (Tas) [1966] Tas SR 113 (FC), Burbury CJ at 123;

496

[33.7.690]

5

6

7

Furness v Clarke (1971) 1 SASR 359 at 366 (FC), Bray CJ at 367, Hogarth J at 373–374. Rapier v London Tramways Co [1893] 2 Ch 588 (CA), followed in Feiner v Domachuk (1994) 35 NSWLR 485. See Cross G, “Does Only the Careless Polluter Pay? A Fresh Examination of the Nature of Private Nuisance” (1995) 111 LQR 445. Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53, Lord Goff at 299 (AC), quoting Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 66; 122 ER 27, Bramwell B at 83 (B & S). De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498 (FC), King CJ at 502, citing Vanderpant v Mayfair Hotel Co Ltd [1930] 1 Ch 138. See Painter v Reed [1930] SASR 295, Richards J at 302; Crawford v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (unreported, NSWSC, McLelland CJ in Eq, 4450 of 1989, 21 February 1994) (non-occupying owner of land held liable for nuisance created by the “normal activities” of an independent contractor engaged by it, on the basis that the contract had “authorised and directed” the nuisance). For more detailed discussion: see [33.7.540].

[33.7.690] For actions in nuisance, apportionment legislation applies in all states and territories (except Western Australia) to apportion liability between the parties where the plaintiff is partly at fault. Formerly, at common law, contributory negligence was a complete defence to an action in private or public nuisance.1 The contributory negligence legislation in force in each state and territory (except Western Australia) applies to actions in nuisance where the claimant suffers damage partly as the result of another person’s fault, wrong or wrongful act and partly as a result of the claimant’s own act or ommission.2 In those states and territories, it appears that the contributory negligence legislation applies to apportion liability between plaintiff and defendant where the plaintiff suffers damage partly as the result of a nuisance for which the defendant is liable (see [33.7.530]–[33.7.545]) and partly as a result of their own fault.3 However, it has been questioned whether or not apportionment of liability under the legislation is appropriate where the defendant’s liability does not depend on fault.4 In Western Australia, the contributory negligence legislation applies to actions “founded on an allegation of negligence”,5 so it does not apply to an action in nuisance.6 Thus, contributory negligence is a complete defence to an action in nuisance in Western Australia.7

1

Boyle v Shire of Mornington (1883) 9 VLR (L) 265 (FC) (public nuisance); Green v Cale (1903) 6 WALR 17 (FC) (public nuisance); Cull v Green (1924) 27 WALR 62 (FC) (public nuisance); McMeekin v City of Maryborough [1947] St R Qd 192 (FC) (public nuisance); Easton v Kooistra [1956] Tas SR 1 (private nuisance); Przetak v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust [1961] WAR 2; (1960) 7 LGRA 131 (private nuisance).

497

[33.7.690]

DEFENCES

2

3 4 5 6 7

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 101 (definition of “wrong”), s 102; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 8 (definition of “wrong”), s 9; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15(1) (definition of “wrong”), s 16(1); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5 (definition of “wrong”), s 10(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 3(1) (definition of “negligent wrongdoing”), s 7(1); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2 (definition of “wrongful act”), s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 25 (definition of “wrong”), s 26(1). Mitchell v Tsiros (No 2) [1982] VR 301, Brooking J at 303. McWhirter v Emerson-Elliott (No 2) [1962] WAR 162, Hale J at 165; Mitchell v Tsiros (No 2) [1982] VR 301, Brooking J at 303. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. Przetak v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust [1961] WAR 2; (1960) 7 LGRA 131. Przetak v Metropolitan (Perth) Passenger Transport Trust [1961] WAR 2; (1960) 7 LGRA 131, Jackson SPJ at 6–7 (WAR). See also “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870].

[33.7.700] It is no defence to say that the plaintiff “came to the nuisance” or that the act in question benefits the public. The fact that the defendant’s use of their property preceded the presence of the plaintiff who complains of that use is irrelevant.1 Nor is it a defence to say that the nuisance has only arisen as a result of the plaintiff electing to use a particular part of its land if such use is reasonable. It is also no defence to argue that the activities complained of benefit the public,2 or that the benefit to the public outweighs the detriment suffered by the plaintiff.3

1 R v McMeikan (1869) 6 WW & A’B (L) 68 (VSCFC); see Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852 (CA); Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; [1977] 3 WLR 20 (CA); Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301 (no defence that tree roots had encroached from defendant’s land before plaintiff’s house was built). 2 Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332, Sholl J at 337. See also Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43, Anderson J at 9–10 (VR); Dennis v Ministry of Defence (UK) [2003] All ER (D) 300; [2003] EWHC 793 (QB), Buckley J at [46]–[48]. 3 York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 395–397.

498

[33.7.710]

[33.7.710] A prescriptive right to continue the interference complained of is a defence to an action in private nuisance only if the right amounts to an easement by prescription.1 The defendant must prove that they have continued the interference with the plaintiff’s property for more than 20 years. After 20 years, the defendant acquires a right to continue the interference as if it had been authorised by a grant from the owner of the land affected.2 The defence can be raised only in respect of those kinds of interference that can amount to an easement.3 It must be possible for the interference to have been the subject matter of a grant of the right to continue it, which requires some degree of certainty and uniformity of interference. Unless the interference is uniform in extent, it could not have been the subject matter of a grant, as there can be no grant of a right to commit varying degrees of interference. For example, it is possible to acquire by prescription the right to pollute a stream,4 but not if there is a progressive increase in the extent of the pollution, as the variation in interference is fatal to the claim of prescriptive right.5 Further, the defence is available only if the interference is actionable or preventable by the plaintiff during the period of use. Thus, where the interference is secret or unobservable,6 or does not constitute a nuisance until the plaintiff7 or the defendant8 changes their use, the defence fails. Whether an easement may be acquired by prescription under the Torrens system of registration of title depends on the relevant legislation in the jurisdiction.9 It may be acquired in Queensland,10 Tasmania,11 Victoria12 and Western Australia,13 but not in New South Wales14 or South Australia.15 There are no equivalent statutory provisions in the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory. There can be no prescriptive right to commit a public nuisance,16 as public nuisance is a criminal offence: see [33.7.360]. Thus, prescription is not a defence to an action in public nuisance.

1

2

3 4 5

Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852 (CA). Easement by prescription: “[A]n easement acquired by the user as of right, either from time immemorial or, where this could not be assumed because of evidence to the contrary, for 20 years, by virtue of the fiction of the lost modern grant (ie the assumption … that a grant had been made at some earlier time)”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 60. The doctrine of lost modern grant does form part of the law of Australia: Delohery v Permanent Trustee Co (NSW) (1904) 1 CLR 283; 22 WN (NSW) 66, Griffith CJ (for the Court) at 311–313 (CLR); White v McLean (1890) 24 SALR 97; Thwaites v Brahe (1895) 21 VLR 192 (FC); Tuckett v Brice [1917] VLR 36; Hamilton v Joyce [1984] 3 NSWLR 279. See Real Property “Easements” [28.13.10]ff. Carlyon v Lovering (1857) 1 H & N 784; 156 ER 1417. Millington v Griffıths (1874) 30 LT 65; Hulley v Silversprings Bleaching & Dyeing Co Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 268; see Lemmon v Webb [1895] AC 1, Lord Herschell LC at 6

499

[33.7.710]

DEFENCES

6

7 8 9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

(no prescriptive right for branches to overhang land, as degree of interference varies from year to year as the branches grow). Dalton v Henry Angus & Co (1881) 6 App Cas 740, Lord Blackburn at 827; Union Lighterage Co v London Graving Dock Co [1902] 2 Ch 557 (CA); Liverpool Corp v H Coghill & Son Ltd [1918] 1 Ch 307. Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852 (CA). Heather v Pardon (1877) 37 LT 393 (CHD). Anthony v Commonwealth (1973) 47 ALJR 83; 29 LGRA 61 (HCA). For general discussion of the Torrens system, see Real Property “Torrens System – Indefeasibility and Priorities” [28.3.10]ff; “Torrens Systems – Principles and Procedures” [28.4.10]ff. Connellan Nominees Pty Ltd v Camerer [1988] 2 Qd R 248. The position may, however, be different under Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), Pt 6 Div 4; Land Act 1994 (Qld), Ch 6 Pt 4 Div 8. An easement of way cannot be acquired by prescription: Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 198A(1). Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 40(3); Wilkinson v Spooner [1957] Tas SR 121 (recognising such rights under the repealed Real Property Act 1862 (Tas), s 40). Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 72; Nelson v Hughes [1947] VLR 227. Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 68; Di Masi v Piromalli [1980] WAR 57 (affirmed on other grounds implicitly supporting that proposition in Piromalli v Di Masi [1980] WAR 173 (FC)). Jobson v Nankervis (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 277; 61 WN (NSW) 76; Australian Hi-Fi Publications Pty Ltd v Gehl [1979] 2 NSWLR 618 (CA), Mahoney JA at 624–625; Dewhirst v Edwards [1983] 1 NSWLR 34. See MacCallum S (ed), Bradbrook & Neave’s Easements and Restrictive Covenants (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2011) at [11.16]; Baalman J, “Easements under the Torrens System” (1944) 18 ALJ 186 at 190. Anthony v Commonwealth (1973) 47 ALJR 83; 29 LGRA 61 (HCA). Dewell v Sanders (1618) Cro Jac 490; 79 ER 419 (pigeons flying over land); R v Cross (1812) 3 Camp 224; 170 ER 1362 (stagecoaches in public highway); Vooght v Winch (1819) 2 B & Ald 662; 106 ER 507 (mill in public navigable river); Harvey v Truro Rural District Council [1903] 2 Ch 638 (pegging off part of public highway).

500

Remedies General [33.7.820] There are nuisance. These are:

three

remedies

available

in

respect

of

a

(1)

an action for an injunction to restrain the continuation of the interference in the future;

(2)

an action for damages in respect of past interference; and

(3)

abatement, which is the summary removal of a nuisance by the person suffering the interference, without recourse to legal proceedings.

Injunctions to restrain future interference may be interlocutory (see [33.7.830]) or permanent: see [33.7.850]. In some cases, an injunction may be granted to restrain a threatened nuisance, even though no nuisance exists at the time the injunction is granted: see [33.7.840]. Damages may be awarded to compensate for the effect of past interferences, either by damage to person or property (see [33.7.870]) or by interference with use and enjoyment of property rights: see [33.7.880]. In some cases, damages may be awarded in lieu of an injunction, to compensate for the effect of likely future interferences: see [33.7.890]. The remedy of abatement is an alternative to the commencement of legal proceedings: see [33.7.900].

Injunctions [33.7.830] An interlocutory injunction may be granted to restrain the defendant from continuing the interference of which the plaintiff complains, pending determination of the issue of whether or not that interference constitutes a nuisance.1 In Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; [2006] HCA 46, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J said: [I]n all applications for an interlocutory injunction, a court will ask whether the plaintiff has shown that there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, has shown that the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy, and has shown that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.2

In the same case, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that the relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty

501

[33.7.830]

REMEDIES

Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618; 42 ALJR 80.3 They referred to statements by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 2 WLR 316 to the effect that, provided the court is satisfied that the plaintiff’s claim is not frivolous or vexatious, then there will be a serious question to be tried and this will be sufficient. They said that those statements do not accord with the doctrine in the High Court of Australia as established by Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd and should not be followed.4 Thus, in order to succeed in an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a nuisance, the plaintiff must show that: (1)

there is a serious question to be tried about whether the interference complained of constitutes a nuisance;

(2)

the plaintiff is likely to suffer loss for which damages will not be an adequate remedy; and

(3)

on the balance of convenience the defendant should be restrained from continuing the interference pending resolution of that question.5

In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; 60 ALJR 679, Mason ACJ said that: [I]t may be that in some cases where the public interest would be adversely affected by the grant of an injunction the plaintiff may need to show a probability, even a distinct probability of success.6

Thus, although any public benefit arising from the defendant’s actions is not relevant to the eventual determination of liability in nuisance (see [33.7.700]), it may be relevant in determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted. Similarly, in Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 ALJR 562, Gibbs CJ stated that where the interlocutory injunction sought is mandatory in form, the court must feel a “high degree of assurance” that the plaintiff’s action will eventually succeed before it grants the injunction.7 In Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland expressed the view that the granting of a mandatory quia timet injunction (see [33.7.840]) is not confined to cases of “imminent damage”, although that view is inconsistent with Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission. An offer by the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff is admissible as evidence in determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted.8

1 See also Equity “Interlocutory and Interim Injunctions” [15.8.410]–[15.8.510]. 2 Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; [2006] HCA 46, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [19]. 3 Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; 502

[33.7.840]

4 5

6 7

8

INJUNCTIONS

[2006] HCA 46, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [65] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan JJ concurring at [19]). Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; [2006] HCA 46, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [70]–[71]. See, eg McCarty v North Sydney Municipal Council (1918) 18 SR (NSW) 210; 4 LGR (NSW) 59; 35 WN (NSW) 85 (interlocutory injunction granted, although a different test was applied); Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383 (interlocutory injunction granted to restrain trade union picketing). But see, eg Stormer v Ingram (1978) 21 SASR 93 (interlocutory injunction for nuisance by bees refused). Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; 60 ALJR 679, Mason ACJ at 154 (CLR). Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 ALJR 562 (HCA), Gibbs CJ at 563, citing Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652; [1969] 2 WLR 1437; Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340; [1970] 3 WLR 348, Megarry J at 351 (Ch) (followed in Taylor v City of Perth [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-191 (WASC)). Graham v KD Morris & Sons Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 1, Campbell J at 3.

[33.7.840] A quia timet injunction1 may be granted to restrain a threatened nuisance, even though no nuisance exists at the time the injunction is granted. In Miller v Shoalhaven Shire Council (1957) 2 LGRA 46, McLelland J said: This is a quia timet suit and the plaintiffs must show a strong case of probability that the apprehended mischief will in fact arise but, as has been said, the Court should proceed upon a practical view of human affairs.2

In contrast, in Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland expressed the view that the granting of a (mandatory) quia timet injunction is not confined to cases of “imminent” damage3 or a strong probability of damage.4 That view produced conflicting authority on the issue of the probability of damage required to obtain interlocutory relief in that context. The issue has not been conclusively determined. The view in Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd should be treated with caution, as the balance of authority suggests that where the threatened nuisance is not imminent, or is not highly likely to occur, no quia timet injunction should be granted.5

1

2

Quia timet: “[B]ecause he fears”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 143. A quia timet injunction is an action to obtain an injunction to prevent or restrain a threatened act for which money would provide no adequate remedy. See also Equity “Quia Timet Injunctions” [15.8.300]. Miller v Shoalhaven Shire Council (1957) 2 LGRA 46 (NSWSC), McLelland J at 49 (quia timet injunction to prevent construction of public urinal); York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391 (quia timet injunction to prevent construction of bridge interfering with river flow). But see

503

[33.7.840]

REMEDIES

3 4

5

Degotardi v Shellharbour Municipal Council (1953) 18 LGR (NSW) 258 (NSWSC) (quia timet injunction to prevent construction of public urinal refused). Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC), McPherson J at 253. In expressing that view, the Full Court in Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 preferred the dictum in Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43; [1974] 3 WLR 329 (CA), Russell LJ at 50 (Ch) to that in Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652; [1969] 2 WLR 1437, Lord Upjohn at 665 (AC). However, the Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris view was followed in Queensland v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1985) 59 ALJR 562 (HCA), Gibbs CJ at 563 and in Taylor v City of Perth [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-191 (WASC), Brinsden J at 67,811 in the context of the granting of an interlocutory injunction: see [33.7.830]. Further, a different view of the dictum in Hooper v Rogers was expressed in Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107 (NSWSC), Hodgson J at 68,749 (Aust Torts Reports). Wherry v KB Hutcherson Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-107 (NSWSC) (quia timet injunction to restrain future excavations refused as no proof that nuisance was imminent or highly probable).

[33.7.850] A permanent injunction may be granted to restrain the defendant from continuing the interference of which the plaintiff complains,1 once it has been established at trial that interference constitutes a nuisance. There are two grounds on which an injunction may be granted. In L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180, Blair CJ said: [W]here the Court interferes by way of injunction to prevent an injury in respect of which there is a legal remedy, it does so upon two grounds, which are of a totally distinct character. One is that the injury is irreparable … the other that the injury is continuous, and so continuous that the Court … restrains the repeated acts which could only result in incessant actions, the continuous character of the wrong making it grievous and intolerable.2

Thus, if the interference is substantial, an injunction will be granted3 whether or not there is any evidence that the nuisance will persist.4 Conversely, where the nuisance is continuing, an injunction will be granted even though the nuisance has caused (and will cause) the plaintiff little5 or no6 actual loss. As the justification for granting an injunction in the latter case is the continuing nature of the nuisance and the attendant possibility of a continuing series of actions,7 no injunction will be granted where there is evidence that the defendant has abated the nuisance so that it will not continue in the future,8 or where the defendant has undertaken to abate it:9 see [33.7.900]. It is advisable for the plaintiff to seek injunctive relief in the most specific terms appropriate and possible. Once the injunction has been granted, the defendant must take steps to remove the nuisance and the ideal injunctive order specifies exactly what the defendant may or may not do.10 For example, in Abbott v Arcus (1948) 50 WALR 41, the defendants had created a nuisance by playing tennis on a floodlit court until late in the evening. The plaintiffs were granted an injunction restraining the defendants from playing tennis between sunset and 7 am. 504

[33.7.850]

INJUNCTIONS

The plaintiff is entitled to an injunction in all but exceptional cases,11 when the court may exercise its discretion to award damages (providing the plaintiff’s loss is quantifiable as damages).12 An injunction will be refused (and an award of damages made) when: (1)

the nuisance is minor or trivial;13

(2)

the injunction would cause great hardship to the defendant;14 or

(3)

a considerable time has elapsed before the plaintiff has instituted proceedings seeking an injunction, even though that delay does not amount to acquiescence on their part.15

1 2

See also Equity “Prohibitory Injunctions” [15.8.140]–[15.8.280]. L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180, Blair CJ at 189, quoting from Attorney-General (UK) v Cambridge Consumers Gas Co (1868) LR 4 Ch App 71, Page Wood LJ at 80–81. See Adams v Taringa Shire Council [1927] St R Qd 163, Macnaughton J at 166. 3 Bonshaw Freehold Gold Mining Co v Prince of Wales Co (1867) 4 WW & A’B (E) 126 (injunction to restrain substantial daily water pollution); McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1 (FC) (injunction to restrain noise from church band and cries of “hallelujah”); Spencer v Silva [1942] SASR 213 (injunction to restrain persistent noise from circular saw); Don Brass Foundry Pty Ltd v Stead (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 482; 65 WN (NSW) 218 (FC) (injunction to restrain smoke and vapours from factory); Abbott v Arcus (1948) 50 WALR 41 (injunction to restrain playing of floodlit tennis after sunset); Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] VLR 332 (injunction to restrain smell from stables); Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC) (injunction to restrain smell from offal plant). 4 Rockdale Municipal Council v Harvey (1965) 11 LGRA 344 (NSWSC), Jacobs J at 346 (public nuisance by street stalls restrained because of nature of interference, not evidence of persistence). 5 Beswicke v Alner [1926] VLR 72 (FC) (actual damage negligible; injunction granted); Adams v Taringa Shire Council [1927] St R Qd 163 (damage slight; injunction granted); Kenthurst Investments Pty Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (1964) 10 LGRA 307 (NSWSC) (actual damage “not very great”; injunction granted). 6 Madden v Coy [1944] VLR 88 (no proof of actual damage; injunction granted). 7 Wilkinson v Cooperative Estates Ltd (1919) 15 Tas LR 22 (injunction granted because of the probability of a series of actions); Beswicke v Alner [1926] VLR 72 (FC), Cussen J (for the Court) at 76–77; Adams v Taringa Shire Council [1927] St R Qd 163, Macnaughton J at 166; L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180, Blair CJ at 189. 8 L’Estrange v Brisbane Gas Co [1928] St R Qd 180. 9 Field v Soccer Association (SA) [1953] SASR 224; Kidman v Page [1959] Qd R 53. 10 Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8

505

[33.7.850]

REMEDIES

11

12

13

14

15

June 1979); Seidler v Luna Park Reserve Trust (unreported, NSWSC, Hodgson J, 1166 of 1995, 21 September 1995). Stormer v Ingram (1978) 21 SASR 93, Legoe J at 103 citing Pride of Derby & Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] Ch 149; [1953] 2 WLR 58 (CA), Evershed MR at 181 (Ch). Bonshaw Freehold Gold Mining Co v Prince of Wales Co (1867) 4 WW & A’B (E) 126 (VSC) (nuisance by substantial daily water pollution held not reducible to award of damages). See [33.7.860]–[33.7.890]. Bennetts v Honroth [1959] SASR 170, citing Armstrong v Sheppard & Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; [1959] 3 WLR 84 (CA), Lord Evershed MR at 396 (QB). But see Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC) (hardship to defendant not sufficient to exercise discretion not to grant injunction). Spencer v Silva [1942] SASR 213, Mayo J at 222. But see Baulkham Hills Shire Council v AV Walsh Pty Ltd (1968) 15 LGRA 338 (NSWSC) (delay not sufficient to refuse injunction); Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Pratt v Brisbane City Council [1988] 1 Qd R 346; (1987) 63 LGRA 294 (delay not sufficient to refuse injunction). Damages in lieu of an injunction are considered in greater detail at [33.7.890].

Damages [33.7.860] The test for remoteness of damage in private and public nuisance is the same as the test applied in the tort of negligence.1 In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid said: It could not be right to discriminate between different cases of nuisance so as to make foreseeability a necessary element in determining damages in those cases where it is a necessary element in determining liability, but not in others. So the choice is between it being a necessary element in all cases of nuisance or in none. In their Lordships’ judgment the similarities between nuisance and other forms of tort to which [Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451] applies far outweigh any differences. … It is not sufficient that the injury suffered by the [plaintiff] … was the direct result of the nuisance if that injury was in the relevant sense unforeseeable.2

Thus, the test for remoteness of damage in nuisance is reasonable foreseeability of damage, not only in cases where liability depends on fault (and therefore on foreseeability), but also in cases where liability does not depend on fault. For example, where the defendant has not created the nuisance that affects the plaintiff’s land, both liability and remoteness of damage depend on reasonable foreseeability. The defendant is liable only if it were reasonably foreseeable that the nuisance would interfere with the plaintiff’s property rights, and if they failed to take reasonable steps to abate the nuisance: see [33.7.530]. Further, the

506

[33.7.860]

DAMAGES

defendant is liable only for those consequences of the nuisance that are reasonably foreseeable. For example, if: (1)

A dams a ditch on B’s land (in such a way that it is reasonably foreseeable that water will overflow onto C’s land); then

(2)

B must take reasonable steps to prevent the water from overflowing if they know or ought to know of the presence of the dam.

Failure to take such steps will render B liable for nuisance caused by overflowing water.3 However, if: (1)

water overflows onto C’s land; and

(2)

the overflow causes loss in some unforeseeable manner;

such loss is too remote a consequence of the nuisance for which B is liable and C will be unable to recover damages from B in respect of it. Thus, if C suffers nervous shock as a result of seeing their precious rose garden flooded with water, damages in nuisance will not be recoverable for any loss suffered as a result of that shock. In contrast, where the defendant has created a nuisance that causes material damage to the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff’s cause of action is made out on proof of the damage to their property and it is not necessary to prove that the damage was reasonably foreseeable in order to establish that an actionable nuisance exists: see [33.7.250]. However, the defendant is liable only for those kinds of damage that are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the nuisance. For example, if: (1)

X sets up a factory that emits fumes next to Y’s property; then

(2)

Y will be able to establish the existence of a nuisance simply by proving that the fumes have caused physical damage to their property (even if X has taken all reasonable care to prevent such damage).4

However, if the fumes cause physical damage to Y’s property in some unforeseeable manner, that damage is too remote a consequence of the nuisance and Y will be unable to recover damages in nuisance from X. Thus, if: (1)

the fumes emitted by X’s factory react with the glass in the windows of Y’s house;

(2)

the reaction was not reasonably foreseeable, given the state of scientific knowledge at the time; and

(3)

the glass in Y’s windows melts and blackens as a result of the fumes from X’s factory;

507

[33.7.860]

REMEDIES

the interference with Y’s property by the fumes from X’s factory is a nuisance, but the loss suffered by Y is too remote a consequence of that nuisance. Because the test for remoteness of damage is the same for all kinds of nuisance, it is sometimes said that liability in nuisance depends on reasonable foreseeability of damage. That is true only if “liability” is understood to mean “the defendant’s obligation to make compensation to the plaintiff”. If “liability” is understood to mean “establishing the plaintiff’s cause of action” or “actionability”, it is not correct to say that liability depends on reasonable foreseeability of damage in all cases of nuisance. In the passage quoted from The Wagon Mound (No 2), the Privy Council stated that reasonable foreseeability of damage is “a necessary element in determining damages” in all cases, not that it is a necessary element in making out the plaintiff’s cause of action in all cases. It is also clear that, in the quoted passage, “liability” is being used in the second of the two senses described above. In Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ said on the issue of reasonable foreseeability that: What must be foreseen is relevant damage to this plaintiff or to a category of persons into which he falls, a requirement that subsumes the tests both of duty in fact and of remoteness of damage.5

What is meant by the requirement of reasonable foreseeability subsuming “the tests both of duty in fact and of remoteness of damage” is not entirely clear. If this is simply to say that reasonable foreseeability of the harm as an element of reasonableness of the interference is not conceptually different to the reasonable foreseeability of the harm for the purposes of compensability of that loss (ie remoteness), then the statement is not remarkable, although the use of the words “subsumes” suggests otherwise.6

1 2

3 4 5

See “Reasonable Foreseeability” [33.2.230]. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid (for the Privy Council) at 640 (AC), referring to Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC). Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880. Directors of St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642; 11 ER 1483. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/as Soundstar Studio) [2004] All ER (D) 342; [2004] EWCA Civ 172, Buxton LJ at [34], citing the examples of Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [2000] 2 AC 190; [1999] 2 WLR 518, Lord Hobhouse at 209 (AC) (referring to the headnote in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC)); Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 1082 (HL). 508

[33.7.870]

6

DAMAGES

See also Delaware Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2002] 1 AC 321; [2001] 3 WLR 1007; [2001] UKHL 55.

[33.7.870] Damages for property damage and personal injury are assessed in the same way as for other torts where such damages are recoverable.1 In cases of property damage, the diminution in value of the property provides the primary measure of damages.2 Alternatively, the plaintiff may recover the reasonable cost of restoring the property,3 provided that the cost does not exceed the diminution in value.4 In addition, the plaintiff may recover incidental expenses arising from the damage to the property, such as loss of profits5 and the cost of moving elsewhere6 and damages to compensate for the annoyance, anxiety and inconvenience caused by the damage.7 A plaintiff who has taken steps to abate a nuisance (ie to remove it without recourse to legal proceedings: see [33.7.900]) cannot recover the costs of abatement as damages in subsequent legal proceedings.8 The act of abatement removes the nuisance and the plaintiff is only entitled to damages for any harm suffered before the abatement.9 However, if the plaintiff has not taken steps to abate the nuisance prior to legal proceedings, they may recover the cost of future preventive measures as part of damages for the cost of making good the damage done by the nuisance.10 If damages are recoverable in cases of personal injury (see [33.7.230]), they are quantified in the same way as in other torts, such as negligence.11

1 2

3

4

5 6 7

8

See “Personal Injury” [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]; “Interests in Property” [33.10.1350]–[33.10.1560]. Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93 (NSWSC); Owen v John L Norris Holdings Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1337 (NSWSC); Hosie v De Ferro (1984) 3 BPR 9418 (NSWSC). Adams v Mayor of Brunswick (1894) 20 VLR 455 (FC); Cox v Mayor of Essendon (1894) 16 ALT 7 (VSC); Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93 (FC); Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36 (CA); Barton v Chhibber [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-185 (VSC). Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93 (FC); Public Trustee (NSW) v Hermann (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 442; Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374. Cox v Mayor of Essendon (1894) 16 ALT 7 (VSC). Evans v Finn (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 297; 21 WN (NSW) 118 (FC). Hosie v De Ferro (1984) 3 BPR 9418 (NSWSC); Travis v Vanderloos (1984) 54 LGRA 268 (QSC), Derrington J at 272–273 (LGRA) (annoyance, anxiety and inconvenience caused by the damage might justify an award of exemplary or aggravated damages). Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC) (following Morgan v Khyatt [1964] AC 475; [1964] 1 WLR 475; [1964] NZLR 666 (PC)); Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC); Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49, Kaye J at 47–48 (VR).

509

[33.7.870]

REMEDIES

9

Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC), Wood J at 68,971–68,972, quoted with approval in Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49, Kaye J at 47–48 (VR). 10 Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49. 11 Pelmothe v Phillips (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 58; 15 WN (NSW) 217 (FC).

[33.7.880] Damages in cases of interference with use and enjoyment (see [33.7.170]–[33.7.240]) are assessed by reference to the extent of the inconvenience felt by the plaintiff. Where the nuisance has interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment without materially damaging the property itself (see [33.7.250]), the plaintiff cannot recover damages for the diminution in value of the property.1 In McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1, Murray CJ said: With regard to the question of damages, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything for the depreciation in value of his property, which is alleged to have occurred. … The cause of action is the injury to his right to live in a certain degree of comfort in his own dwelling house. That right has been actually infringed, and, therefore, he is entitled to some damages, but the sum of forty shillings, usually awarded for nominal damages, will, in my opinion, be sufficient.2

Where the nuisance has caused interference in the past, but no physical damage to person or property, it is inappropriate to award damages for a diminution in value of the property that may not be permanent, as the interference may cease in the future, particularly if the plaintiff has also sought and has been granted an injunction to restrain future interference.3 Thus, damages compensate for the plaintiff’s subjective experience of past discomfort or inconvenience,4 with damages for loss of amenity in personal injury cases providing a loose analogy for the process of quantification.5

1

2 3 4 5

Evans v Finn (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 297; 21 WN (NSW) 118 (FC), Darley CJ at 309–310 (SR (NSW)); McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1 (FC), Murray CJ at 21; Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8 June 1979); see Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC) (nominal damages awarded for intrusion of defendant’s tree roots onto plaintiff’s land). But see Jones v Sydney Municipal Council (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 315 (FC) (new trial ordered after jury awarded nominal damages); Owen v John L Norris Holdings Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 1337 (NSWSC) (parties agreed that diminution in value was the appropriate measure of damages, although the nuisance was by interference with use and enjoyment). McKenzie v Powley [1916] SALR 1 (FC), Murray CJ at 21, citing Soltau v De Held (1851) 2 Sim (NS) 133; 61 ER 291, Kindersley V-C at 158 (Sim (NS)). Jones v Sydney Municipal Council (1880) 1 LR (NSW) 315 (FC), Manning J at 319. Aldridge v JO Clough & Son Pty Ltd (unreported, WASC, Burt CJ, 1246 of 1979, 8 June 1979). Bone v Seale [1975] 1 WLR 797 (CA), Stephenson LJ at 803. See “Amenities of Life” [33.10.940].

510

[33.7.890]

DAMAGES

[33.7.890] Damages may be awarded in lieu of an injunction (see [33.7.830]–[33.7.850]) where the nuisance is a continuing one. It is undesirable that the plaintiff be forced to (or be free to) bring a series of actions against the defendant in respect of the same, continuing nuisance. This is the usual justification for the grant of a permanent injunction (see [33.7.850]), but it may also justify an award of prospective damages in lieu of an injunction. The power to grant damages in lieu of an injunction was conferred on the English Court of Chancery by the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ Act) 21 & 22 Vict c 27 (UK). Similar legislation exists in each Australian state1 except Queensland. However, Queensland courts have power to award damages in lieu of an injunction,2 as do the courts of the two Territories.3 Using that power, the court may award damages for future losses to which the continuing nuisance is likely to give rise, in lieu of granting an injunction to restrain the continuation of that nuisance. A “good working rule” about when to exercise the discretion to award damages in lieu of an injunction is found in the judgment of Smith LJ in Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. In general, damages may be awarded if: (1)

the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small;

(2)

is one which is capable of being estimated in money;

(3)

is one which may adequately be compensated by a “small money payment”; and

(4)

it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction.4

Damages may also be awarded in lieu of a quia timet injunction, where the nuisance has not yet occurred.5 Furthermore, damages may even be awarded where the plaintiff has not sought an injunction, if an injunction might have been ordered.6 However, such an award of damages cannot be made in New South Wales or Tasmania.7 Damages may not be awarded in lieu of an injunction to a private individual who has suffered particular damage as the result of a public nuisance.8 In York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J said: I would seriously doubt that … it would be a legitimate exercise of the relevant discretion [ie the discretion to award damages in lieu of an injunction] to permit any person … in effect to buy the right to create and continue a public nuisance at the expense only of such damage, if any, as it may be held that one member of the public has suffered.9

1

2

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 68; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11(13); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 38; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 25(10). Conroy v Lowndes [1958] Qd R 375, Philp J at 383; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty

511

[33.7.890]

REMEDIES

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC). Although the Queensland equivalent of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ Act) 21 & 22 Vict c 27 (UK) was repealed in 1900 (Equity Act 1867 (Qld), s 62, repealed by the Repealing Rules 1900 (Qld) and the Statute Law Revision Act 1908 (Qld)), the jurisdiction created by the repealed provision survived the repeal. Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 20(1); Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 14(1)(b). Those provisions are not versions of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ Act) 21 & 22 Vict c 27 (UK), but they appear to have the effect that the courts in those Territories have the power to award damages in lieu of an injunction: see Tilbury MJ, Civil Remedies (Butt, 1990) Vol 1 at [3255]. Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 (CA), Smith LJ at 322–323, quoted in York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 400; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC), McPherson J at 253–254. Tilbury MJ, Civil Remedies (Butt, 1990) Vol 1 at [3263] cautions against regarding the “good working rule” as exhaustive of the matters to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion. Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC), McPherson J at 252, citing Leeds Industrial Coop Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851. On quia timet injunctions, see [33.7.840]. Noagues v Hope (1874) 4 QSCR 57 (FC); Dixson v Tange (1891) 12 LR (NSW) Eq 204; 8 WN (NSW) 31; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC). York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 399; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11(13)(b). Neville Nitschke Caravans (Main North Road) Pty Ltd v McEntee (1976) 15 SASR 330; 40 LGRA 276 (FC), King J at 350–351 (SASR), citing Attorney-General (NZ) v Birkenhead Borough Council [1968] NZLR 383 (SC). See York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 400. York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 400.

Abatement [33.7.900] Abatement of private nuisance is an alternative to the commencement of legal proceedings. “Abatement” was defined by the Court in Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693: Abatement means the summary removal or remedying of a nuisance by the person injured without having recourse to legal proceedings. … In the general law of nuisance the expression is used as referring to a method of self-help available to the injured person.1

In order to constitute abatement, the preventive measures taken by the person affected must remove the nuisance rather than simply guard against it. For example, in Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126, the Supreme

512

[33.7.900]

ABATEMENT

Court of New South Wales held that laying PVC pipes that could withstand encroachment by tree roots did not constitute abatement, as it did not remove the tree roots causing the interference. Abatement is an alternative to legal proceedings. It is usually confined to simple cases, which do not justify the expense of legal proceedings, or urgent cases, which require an immediate remedy.2 A person who abates a nuisance is not entitled to seek a remedy at law thereafter,3 as the abatement removes the nuisance and thus the person’s cause of action.4 Conversely, the right to abate is lost if the plaintiff institutes legal proceedings and is refused a mandatory injunction.5 A person who abates a nuisance is not entitled to recover the cost of abatement by way of damages in subsequent legal proceedings.6 However, where the steps taken by way of abatement are also reasonable steps taken in mitigation of damages, the person taking those steps is entitled to recover the cost of abatement as being reasonable mitigation, although the position may be different where the abatement involves going onto the defendant’s land and interfering with the defendant’s land or with property on it.7 The law does not favour the remedy of abatement in preference to legal action.8 A person who is entitled to abate is not obliged to do so, and is not disentitled from obtaining an injunction because of a failure to abate.9 A person is entitled to adopt any method of abatement that they choose, provided it is reasonable in the circumstances.10 The person affected may abate the nuisance by taking steps on their own land to remove the interference, for example, by blocking off water flowing from the defendant’s land11 or by cutting off encroaching tree branches.12 Alternatively, they may abate the nuisance by entering on the defendant’s land to remove the cause of the interference, for example, by cutting a channel into a bank on the defendant’s land to allow water to drain away.13 However, where abatement involves the person affected entering on the land of another, the law requires a strong reason to justify the abatement.14 The person affected must usually give notice of their intention to enter the occupier’s land,15 especially where the occupier did not create the nuisance.16 However, notice need not be given to the occupier where the nuisance causes such immediate danger to life and health as to render it unsafe to wait.17 The person affected need not wait until damage has actually been suffered before exercising the right to abate.18

1 2

3

Farley & Lewers Ltd v Attorney General (NSW) (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 814; 80 WN (NSW) 1693 (FC), the Court at 817 (SR (NSW)). Burton v Winters [1993] 1 WLR 1077 (CA); Owners of Strata Plan No 30339 v Torada Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1154, Palmer J at [29]–[31] (demolition of brick boundary wall without the plaintiff’s consent was not available to the defendant as abatement of any nuisance caused by the wall). Except in respect of damage suffered before the abatement: see Young v Wheeler

513

[33.7.900]

REMEDIES

4

5 6

7 8

9 10

11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18

[1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC), Wood J at 68,971–68,972, quoted with approval in Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49, Kaye J at 47–48 (VR). Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207, preferring Baten’s Case (1610) 9 Co 53; 77 ER 810 to Job Edwards Ltd v Birmingham Navigations [1924] 1 KB 341, Scrutton LJ at 356. Burton v Winters [1993] 1 WLR 1077 (CA). Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC) (following Morgan v Khyatt [1964] AC 475; [1964] 1 WLR 475; [1964] NZLR 666 (PC)); Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC); Richmond City Council v Scantelbury [1991] 2 VR 38; (1988) 68 LGRA 49, Kaye J at 47–48 (VR). See [33.7.870]. Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301. Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207, citing Lagan Navigation Co v Lambeg Bleaching, Dyeing & Finishing Co Ltd [1927] AC 226, Lord Atkinson at 244–245. Lawlor v Johnston [1905] VLR 714. Nicol v Nicol (1887) 13 VLR 322 (FC). See Richter v Risby [1987] Tas R 36; (1987) 27 A Crim R 68 (abatement by forcibly removing environmental protester held not reasonable). Nicol v Nicol (1887) 13 VLR 322 (FC). Lemmon v Webb [1895] AC 1. Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200. Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207. Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207, citing Lemmon v Webb [1895] AC 1, Lord Davey at 8. See Proprietors of Strata Plan No 14198 v Cowell (1989) 24 NSWLR 478; 74 LGRA 301, Hodgson J at 488 (NSWLR) (highly desirable that occupier be given notice to abate nuisance themselves before large sums of money are spent by a neighbour on works designed to prevent further damage). Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207, citing Jones v Williams (1843) 11 M & W 176; 152 ER 764, Parke B at 181 (M & W). Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207, citing Jones v Williams (1843) 11 M & W 176; 152 ER 764, Lord Abinger CB at 182 (M & W). Traian v Ware [1957] VR 200, Martin J at 207, citing Baten’s Case (1610) 9 Co 53; 77 ER 810, Coke CJ at 54–55 (Co). See Penruddock’s Case (1597) 5 Co 100; 77 ER 210.

[33.7.910] Abatement (see [33.7.900]) of public nuisance may be undertaken only by private individuals who have suffered particular damage over and above that suffered by the rest of the public,1 or by the representatives of the public who would be entitled to sue in respect of the public nuisance.2 Although there is some authority to the effect that abatement may be made by any member of the public aggrieved by the nuisance,3 the

514

[33.7.910]

ABATEMENT

stronger view is that the remedy of abatement is available only to those members of the public who would be entitled to bring legal proceedings in their own name.4

1

2 3

4

Alexander v Mayor & Corp of Sydney (1861) 2 Legge 1451 (FC); see Mayor of Colchester v Brooke (1845) 7 QB 339; 115 ER 518; Dimes v Petley (1850) 15 QB 276; 117 ER 462; Bagshaw v Buxton Local Board of Health (1875) 1 Ch D 220, Jessel MR at 224. See also [33.7.510]. Bagshaw v Buxton Local Board of Health (1875) 1 Ch D 220, Jessel MR at 224–225. See [33.7.500]–[33.7.520]. Fergusson v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd (1884) 10 VLR (L) 279 (FC), Higinbotham J at 287 (VLR (L)); R v Hampden Shire; Ex parte M’Mahon (1886) 8 ALT 74 (VSC); see Re Glenelg Shire; Ex parte Sealey (1885) 11 VLR 64. Bagshaw v Buxton Local Board of Health (1875) 1 Ch D 220, Jessel MR at 224–225.

515

[33.7.910]

REMEDIES

516

33.8 Trespass and Intentional Torts

TRESPASS AND INTENTIONAL TORTS

Current Subtitle Author Timothy B Maxwell LLB (Hons) (Melb), BA (Hons) (Melb), MPhil (Hons) (Cantab) Member of the Victorian Bar

Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria Barrister (Updating author, Update 319 – July 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Dr Paul Vout BA, LLB, SJD (Syd) Member of the Victorian Bar Solicitor, Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Northern Ireland, England and Wales (Updating author, Update 251 – July 2010) (Updating author, Update 244 – December 2009) (Updating author, Update 213 – May 2007)

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Adelaide (([33.8.10] – [33.8.1280], [33.8.2130] – [33.8.2170] Original author))

Professor D Gardiner BA, LLB, LLM (Hons) (Syd) Dean, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology (([33.8.1510] – [33.8.2020] Original author))

Benjamin Fitzmaurice

Geoff Masel

LLB, Grad Cert Leg Prac (Tas) Barrister and Member, Tasmanian Independent Bar and Victorian Bar

BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox

(Updating author, Update 218 – October 2007) (Updating author, Update 209 – January 2007)

CD Baker MA, BCL (Oxon) Practitioner, Supreme Court of South Australia Barrister at Law, Inner Temple

(Updating author, Update 141 – May 2001) (Updating author, Update 71 – April 1998) (Updating author, Update 6 – May 1995)

The Laws of Australia Editorial Department (Updating author, Update 157 – September 2002)

518

33.8 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.8.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.8.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.8.30] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.8.40] INTENTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS.................................[33.8.150] TRESPASS................................................................................. [33.8.300] GENERAL...............................................................................[33.8.300] TRESPASS TO PERSON...................................................... [33.8.350] General...............................................................................[33.8.350] Battery................................................................................ [33.8.360] Assault................................................................................[33.8.420] TRESPASS TO LAND............................................................ [33.8.470] TORTS TO CHATTELS..............................................................[33.8.710] TRESPASS TO CHATTELS................................................... [33.8.720] CONVERSION........................................................................[33.8.790] DETINUE................................................................................ [33.8.910] REPLEVIN.............................................................................. [33.8.970] ECONOMIC TORTS................................................................. [33.8.1080] GENERAL.............................................................................[33.8.1080] INTIMIDATION......................................................................[33.8.1090] CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS.......................... [33.8.1150] INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT..........[33.8.1180] CONSPIRACY...................................................................... [33.8.1260] DECEIT.................................................................................[33.8.1290] PASSING OFF......................................................................[33.8.1330] INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD................................................... [33.8.1390] FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS.......................................................................... [33.8.1510] GENERAL.............................................................................[33.8.1510] FALSE IMPRISONMENT..................................................... [33.8.1520] General.............................................................................[33.8.1520] Character of Defendant’s Conduct and Means of Detention.......................................................................... [33.8.1570] Defendant’s Fault (Intent or Lack of Due Care).............. [33.8.1640] 519

Plaintiff’s Submission to Restraint....................................[33.8.1670] Damage............................................................................ [33.8.1690] Defences.......................................................................... [33.8.1700] Remedies......................................................................... [33.8.1720] Evidentiary Matters.......................................................... [33.8.1770] MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.............................................. [33.8.1790] General.............................................................................[33.8.1790] Essential Elements...........................................................[33.8.1820] Remedies......................................................................... [33.8.1910] Evidentiary Matters.......................................................... [33.8.1920] ABUSE OF PROCESS.........................................................[33.8.1940] MISCELLANEOUS TORTS......................................................[33.8.2130] INTENTIONAL INDIRECT INFLICTION OF PERSONAL INJURY................................................................................. [33.8.2130] ACTION ON CASE FOR DAMAGE TO REVERSIONARY INTEREST IN LAND OR CHATTELS..................................................... [33.8.2140] ACTION ON CASE FOR CAUSING HARM........................ [33.8.2150] ACTION FOR MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE........... [33.8.2160] INFRINGEMENT OF ABSOLUTE RIGHTS......................... [33.8.2170]

520

Introduction Definition [33.8.10] “Intentional torts” may be defined as wrongful acts causing harm or damage and involving intention on the part of the wrongdoer. However, the nature of the intention required varies from tort to tort. Fleming distinguishes intentional torts from negligent torts and inevitable accident in the following terms: An intentional tort, properly so called, is one in which the wrongdoer either desires to bring about a result which is an injury to another, or believes that the result is substantially certain to follow from what he does. A negligent tort is one where the defendant, as a reasonable person, should have foreseen that his conduct involved a foreseeable risk, though falling short of substantial certainty that such a result would ensue. Inevitable accident, finally, refers to cases where the particular consequence was neither intended nor so probable as to make it negligent.1

The nature of the intention required is examined in relation to the individual torts covered in this Subtitle. Intentional torts are normally classified by reference to the nature of the interest protected. (1)

Trespass covers mainly intentional invasions of the interests in security of person or property. Trespass may be committed intentionally or negligently, but negligent trespass is now almost of theoretical importance only in Australia and accordingly trespass in all its forms is considered in this Subtitle (the present status of negligent trespass in Australia is considered at [33.8.310]).

(2)

Other intentional torts cover circumstances where the damage is to economic interests, interests in reputation, interests in not being improperly subjected to legal process or like interests.

Some torts, of which one example is nuisance, may be committed intentionally, but an intention on the part of a wrongdoer is not a requirement of the tort. Such torts are not covered in this Subtitle: see [33.8.40].

1

Fleming JG, The Law of Torts (9th ed, LBC Information Services, 1998) p 84.

[33.8.20] The historical origins of the law of tort are still of some importance in understanding the modern law. The writs or forms of action 521

[33.8.20]

INTRODUCTION

brought in relation to wrongful acts of a defendant causing injury or damage to the plaintiff were trespass and trespass on the case. Those forms of action corresponded to different causes of action. In trespass, the plaintiff was originally required to declare that the harm to their person or property occurred by means of an act of the defendant that was done violently and by force of arms. The relaxation of this requirement meant that the plaintiff merely had to show that the harm to themselves arose directly or immediately from the positive act of the defendant (and not through omission), though the declaration remained the same. By contrast, in trespass on the case, the plaintiff’s declaration needed only to state the facts of the case relied on to establish the cause of action. It came to be established that trespass on the case lay in relation to wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant that led indirectly to the harm suffered. The meaning of “directly” and the subsequent development of the two causes of action which underlie the whole of the present common law of torts are examined under trespass itself (see [33.8.300]). However, it should be noted that trespass on the case, apart from covering indirect invasions of the same interests as those covered by trespass (ie those in person and property), was extended to the protection of other interests, for example those in reputation, economic interests and in not being improperly subjected to legal process, as well as some more specialised interests such as the interest in a franchise or in the right to vote. It became customary to refer to trespass on the case as “the action on the case” or even, merely “case”.

Scope of Subtitle [33.8.30] This Subtitle deals with trespass and certain actions on the case where intention is an essential element. The threshold requirement of intention and related concepts are discussed at [33.8.150]–[33.8.190]. A general overview of the historical origins of trespass and the interrelated area of negligence is introduced at [33.8.300]–[33.8.350]. Trespass to the person comprises the torts of battery (see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]), assault (see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]) and false imprisonment: see [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780]. False imprisonment is discussed with malicious prosecution and abuse of process because of its close relationship with those two torts (neither of which is a form of trespass). Trespass to land is a direct infringement of a plaintiff’s possession of the land and is discussed at [33.8.470]–[33.8.600]. The various torts to chattels (trespass, conversion, detinue and replevin) are dealt with at [33.8.710]–[33.8.970]. The economic torts of intimidation, causing loss by unlawful means, intentional interference with contract, conspiracy, deceit, passing off and injurious

522

[33.8.40]

RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES

falsehood are examined in [33.8.1080]–[33.8.1400]. Other actions constituting intentional torts (but not a trespass) are malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]) and abuse of process: see [33.8.1940]–[33.8.2020]. Finally, certain miscellaneous torts such as the intentional indirect infliction of personal injury (see [33.8.2130]–[33.8.2135]), damage to reversionary interests (see [33.8.2140]), the former action in Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145; 40 ALJR 211; 18 LGRA 651 (see [33.8.2150]), misfeasance in public office (see [33.8.2160]–[33.8.2167]) and infringement of absolute rights (see [33.8.2170]) are discussed.

1

Overruled by 69 ALJR 527.

Northern

Territory

v

Mengel

(1995)

185

CLR

307;

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.8.40] Several Titles and Subtitles are related to the discussion of intentional torts. Torts committed by means of false statements are not considered in detail within this Subtitle. More comprehensive consideration of deceit can be found in 35 Unfair Dealing, in particular, “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff and “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff; defamation and injurious falsehood in Communication “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff and “Criminal Defamation” [6.2.10]ff, and passing off in Intellectual Property “Passing Off and Related Torts” [23.7.10]ff. Nuisance, which may be committed intentionally but does not require intention by the wrongdoer to be established, is considered in “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. In Australia, the cause of action for negligent trespass survives. For a more detailed discussion of negligence, see “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. “Defences” [33.9.10]ff and “Damages” [33.10.10]ff are also relevant. Analogous criminal offences are examined in Criminal Offences “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff. Discussion of criminal procedures offering legal justification for a claim of false imprisonment can be found in Criminal Procedure “Criminal Investigation” [11.1.10]ff. 28 Real Property contains information relevant to trespass to land, including “Principles of Real Property” [28.1.10]ff; “Landlord and Tenant” [28.7.10]ff; “Licences” [28.10.10]ff; “Easements” [28.13.10]ff; “Physical Limits to Land” [28.15.10]ff and “Possession” [28.16.10]ff.

523

[33.8.40]

INTRODUCTION

524

Intention and Related Concepts [33.8.150] There is no general principle of tortious liability for intentional wrongdoing. The mere intentional infliction of loss or damage on another person is not necessarily tortious: although see [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170]. For example, a business person is entitled to protect their own trading interests by driving out competitors, provided the methods used do not fall within any of the specific torts protecting economic interests1 (see [33.8.1080]–[33.8.1280]) or conduct prohibited by statute. It makes no difference that the defendant is acting out of a vindictive desire to injure the plaintiff rather than to protect their own trade interests,2 although it does if the defendant has conspired with another person for this purpose.3 It is not tortious for a defendant to persuade a third party lawfully to terminate that party’s contract with a plaintiff, even if the defendant’s intention is to damage the plaintiff rather than to protect the defendant’s own interests: see [33.8.1220]. Valuable information possessed by the plaintiff may be used by the defendant for profit and the plaintiff’s loss, provided it is not the subject of copyright or patent, or is confidential and the defendant has an obligation of confidence. In CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013; [1988] 2 WLR 1191, the House of Lords held that no tort was committed by the manufacturer of machines which allowed the transfer of the contents of tapes sold commercially by the plaintiffs onto tapes in private ownership, though the plaintiffs would inevitably suffer loss. Existing copyright law did not prevent the transfer, but it was for the legislature to close the gap.4 A further example is the right of landowners to take as much water as they please from water flowing in undefined channels beneath the land, even though this diminishes or prevents the flow to other landowners.5 The defendant’s motive in taking the water is immaterial.6 There was no liability in tort where the defendant, from a vantage point outside the plaintiff’s horse-racing stadium, broadcast commentaries on racing held within the stadium, even though this deprived the plaintiff of the ability to exploit a valuable asset.7

1

Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598 (CA) (no tort of conspiracy found; affirmed in Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25); Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; 59 ALJR 77, Deane J (with whom Gibbs CJ, Mason, Dawson and Wilson JJ agreed) at 439–446 (CLR) (holding that there is no “tort” of unfair

525

[33.8.150]

INTENTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS

2

3

4

5

6

7

competition in Australia); Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 340–343 (CLR); Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329; 72 ALJR 1508; [1998] HCA 64, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [32]. See generally Sellenger B, “Chasing the Golden Goose: A Legal Approach to Sports Accessing Gambling Revenue” (2006) 34 ABLR 7. Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1, Watson LJ at 92, 95, 107–108, Herschell LJ at 124–126, Macnaghten LJ at 151–152, Shand LJ at 164, 166–167, Davey LJ at 172–173, James LJ at 180. See the discussion in A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [53] (elements of tort of malicious prosecution). See discussion on the tort of causing loss by unlawful means (see [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170]); conspiracy by the use of unlawful means (see [33.8.1260]–[33.8.1270]); and whether justification may operate as a defence: see [33.8.1280]. See, eg Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42; 86 ALJR 494; [2012] HCA 16. For a discussion of the issues of authorisation and control in liability for copyright infringements, see Intellectual Property “Copyright” [23.1.10]ff; “Definition” [23.6.10]–[23.6.30]; see also “Other Actions” [23.6.780]–[23.6.810]. See generally Clapperton D, “Locking in Customers, Locking Out Competitors: Anti-circumvention Laws in Australia and Their Potential Effect on Competition in High Technology Markets” (2007) 30 MULR 657. Chasemore v Richards (1859) 7 HLC 349; 11 ER 140; Bradford Corp v Pickles [1895] AC 587; Stephens v Anglian Water Authority [1987] 1 WLR 1381 (CA), applied in Xuereb v Viola [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-012 (NSWSC). See also Fleming JG, “Negligence and Property Rights” (1988) 104 LQR 183. Bradford Corp v Pickles [1895] AC 587, McNaghten LJ at 601. See also Xuereb v Viola [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-012, Giles J from 39; Quick v Alpine Nurseries Sales Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1248, Ward J at [12] (obiter dictum). Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 38 SR (NSW) 33; 55 WN (NSW) 13. Similarly, tort law does not protect the interest in enjoyment of an uninterrupted view from one’s land: Bathurst City Council v Saban (No 2) (1986) 58 LGRA 201 (NSWSC) (unsightly junkyard operated by defendants did not, by itself, constitute a nuisance).

[33.8.160] The distinction between an intentional act and a voluntary act is best considered in connection with the tort of assault: see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]. This tort is constituted by an act of a defendant directly causing a plaintiff to apprehend physical contact. The intention is adjudged entirely in relation to the consequences of the act rather than the act itself – the apprehension suffered by the plaintiff must have been intended to happen by the defendant. However, it is enough if the defendant must have known that that consequence was certain or substantially certain to happen and has nevertheless persisted in acting. Accordingly, a mere intention to act is irrelevant unless the consequences of that act are also intended.1 A voluntary act, on the other hand, is a mere willed muscular movement. The performer of a voluntary act of this nature is not liable in trespass if they are not culpable in relation to its consequences. Culpability may

526

[33.8.180]

arise because the act is an intentional act in the sense described above or because the failure to foresee the consequence gives rise to a liability for negligent trespass:2 [33.8.310]. For a case in which the firing of a gun was found not to be voluntary and hence, could not found a claim of battery, see Dale v Fox [2012] TASSC 84.

1

2

McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 387–389 (CLR); Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820, the Court at 474 (CLR). See further Fleming JG, The Law of Torts (9th ed, LBC Information Services, 1998) Ch 2; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [2.35]; Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [4.10]. See generally Cockburn T and Madden B, “Intentional Torts Claims in Medical Cases” (2006) 13 JLM 311. See “Defences” [33.9.10]ff. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [2.45]–[2.50].

[33.8.170] The requirement of intention may be satisfied when an act is intended or when the consequence of a defendant’s act is desired by the defendant in the sense that the defendant wants it to happen: see [33.8.2130]. It is also likely to be satisfied where the consequence is so substantially certain that the defendant must be taken to know that it will happen and therefore to intend it.1 Most of the case law on whether or not the requisite substantial certainty exists is in the criminal law field, but Garratt v Dailey, 279 P 2d 1091 (1955), an American case, is an example of it in the civil law.2 The defendant, a five year old boy who had moved a chair in which the plaintiff, a heavy and arthritic person, had been sitting, was held liable for a battery when that person returned and, having attempted to sit down on the place where the chair had been, fell heavily and suffered injury. The Washington Supreme Court held the defendant liable for an intentional battery on the ground of the substantial certainty of the consequence: see [33.8.390].

1 2

See, in a case of battery, Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA at [215]. Garratt v Dailey, 279 P 2d 1091 (1955), Hill J at 1093–1094 (Schwellenbach, Donworth and Weaver JJ concurring), cited in Wade JW, Prosser WL and Schwartz VE, Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz’s Cases and Materials on Torts (9th ed, Foundation Press, 1994) p 9.

[33.8.180] Intention and recklessness are related concepts: see also [33.8.2130]. Recklessness exists where the consequences of the defendant’s act are not so substantially certain that they must be taken to have intended them (see [33.8.170]), but the defendant is so indifferent to the likely consequences of that act that they must be taken to have foreseen them.

527

[33.8.180]

INTENTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS

Recklessness figures very sparingly in the law of torts and is usually only sought to be established in order to found a claim for aggravated or exemplary damages.1 An early case in which recklessness was found to be established was Guille v Swan, 19 Johns 381 (1822). The defendant went aloft in a balloon which came uncontrollably to rest on the plaintiff’s garden, resulting in damage, both from the balloon and from a large crowd of spectators who trampled the garden. He was held liable in trespass. Clearly the actual place of rest was by no means certain, but the balloon had to come down somewhere and it was held that the defendant ought to have foreseen that his exploit would naturally draw a crowd of people, either from curiosity or for the purpose of rescuing him from a perilous situation.2 In Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, the Court of Appeal of Victoria stated of the tort of battery that: [I]t may be that an act should also be considered intentional if it is substantially certain that the act will result in contact with the plaintiff; and perhaps also if the act is reckless with respect to contact with the plaintiff. That may be the conceptual justification for the decisions in [James v Campbell (1832) 5 C & P 372; 172 ER 1015] and [Ball v Axten (1866) 4 F & F 1019; 176 ER 890].3

In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377, another battery case, Spigelman CJ opined that “a test of reckless indifference to a result will, in this context, satisfy the requirement of intention”.4 Where A intending a blow at B misses and strikes C, American case law regards A’s intent towards B to be transferred to C, so that there is against C an intentional battery.5 There is some early English case law supporting this conclusion but the issue of intention is not detailed by the courts in those cases.6 In Australia, there is a sole obiter dictum of Latham CJ in Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61 supporting that doctrine of transferred intent:7 see [33.8.2130]. Given the availability of the concept of recklessness8 and of negligence as a means of committing trespass (see [33.8.160], [33.8.300]–[33.8.310]), there seems little need for the importation of the American doctrine into Australian law.

1 It seems that damages of this sort may now be awarded in the tort of negligence: see [33.8.410]. See also “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. 2 Guille v Swan, 19 Johns 381 (1822) (defendant held liable for all damage suffered by plaintiff, including those inflicted by crowd of spectators and helpers). 3 Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, Buchanan JA, Ashley JA and Weinberg JA at [215]. 4 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377. See also Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775, Rothman J at [36] in the context of

528

[33.8.190]

5 6 7 8

intentional infliction of harm. The decision was affirmed on appeal, however the Court of Appeal did not have occasion to consider the issue of intent: Clavel v Savage [2015] NSWCA 61. Fordyce v Montgomery 424 SW 2d 746 (1968), Hogan PJ at 751. James v Campbell (1832) 5 C & P 372; 172 ER 1015 (Assizes); Ball v Axten (1866) 4 F & F 1019; 176 ER 890 (Assizes). Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61, Latham CJ at 12 (CLR). Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131 (SC) seems to accept the application of recklessness as amounting to the requisite intention to constitute trespass (defendant recklessly imprisoned plaintiff); see also Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474; [2001] QCA 234, McMurdo P at [11]–[12]; R v Venna [1976] QB 421; [1975] 3 WLR 737 (CA), James LJ (for the Court) at 428–429 (QB). However, see Macpherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184 (FC), Zelling J (dissenting) at 199–200 (cautioning the over-generalised use of the term). A defendant who deliberately closes their mind to the obvious consequences of their action is taken to know and intend what they do, and is taken to be reckless in the required sense: R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600 (CA), Geoffrey Lane LJ (for the Court) at 604. See also Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377, Spigelman CJ at [80]: “[A] test of reckless indifference to a result will, [in the context of the tort of wilful infliction of harm], satisfy the requirement of intention”: see also [33.8.2160].

[33.8.190] Intention is distinguished from desire, motive and malice. Desire is one form of intention, and does not establish a motive. To say that a person desires a certain consequence does not imply that the person has a personal motive for wanting it. So a jailer who regretfully locks up their best friend in the course of duty is rightly said to desire that consequence, without having a personal motive for wanting it. Apart from torts requiring proof of malice, no tort is defined in terms requiring consideration of the motive of a defendant.1 Motive may be defined as the defendant’s reason for acting. The defendant’s motive may, however, be relevant to the amount of damages awarded: see [33.8.180]. In particular, a bad or evil motive on the defendant’s part may justify the award of damages exceeding the amount needed to compensate the plaintiff for the actual damage suffered, whether by the award of aggravated or of exemplary damages.2 Malice is an extra ingredient of wrongful intention. Its relevance in the law of torts falls within one of two spheres: (1)

Certain torts require proof of malice as part of the cause of action. Chief examples are conspiracy (see [33.8.1260]–[33.8.1280]), injurious falsehood (see [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400]), malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]) and liability under the Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 principle: see [33.8.2130].

529

[33.8.190]

INTENTION AND RELATED CONCEPTS

(2)

Malice may rebut a privilege or defence otherwise available to the defendant. The leading modern examples are the defences of fair comment and qualified privilege available in an action for defamation.3 In both cases, the burden of proof of malice rests on the plaintiff.

The meaning of malice differs according to the context. It may mean spite, vindictiveness or a wanton desire to hurt or cause distress (as under the Wilkinson v Downton principle: see [33.8.2130]). The malice in this sense does not always need to be affirmatively established but may be inferred from the circumstances of the case.4 In other torts, malice is considered a broader concept than spite or ill-will.5 In the tort of injurious falsehood (see [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400]), malice is generally equated with dishonesty and it is beside the point that the defendant is acting to protect its own financial interests. The malice necessary for malicious prosecution, or to defeat fair comment or qualified privilege as defences in defamation, is often established by showing that the defendant took advantage of a privileged occasion to pursue some collateral, improper purpose of their own, without proof of dishonesty.6 Malice may also be a motive other than a desire to bring a criminal to justice:7 see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930].

1 For a failure to distinguish intention from motive, see Barretts & Baird (Wholesale) Ltd v Institution of Professional Civil Servants [1987] IRLR 3 (QBD). Strikers were held to be not liable for interfering with the plaintiff’s contract even though that was an unavoidable by-product of the strike, because they were merely acting to put pressure on their employers to improve their conditions of service. The latter point concerns motive rather than intention and should have been irrelevant. 2 See “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. 3 See generally Communication “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff; “Injurious Falsehood” [6.3.10]. 4 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Fullagar J at 155–156, Kitto J at 162–163, 166, Taylor J at 173–174 (malice inferred where arrest made on grounds which could not conceivably justify it); Luetich v Walton [1960] WAR 109 (malice inferred where there was an arrest for a non-existent offence). 5 A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [2] (case determining elements of tort of malicious prosecution). 6 Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA); Stevens v Midland Counties Railway Co (1854) 10 Ex 352; 156 ER 480; A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [88]–[95] (malicious prosecution); Broadway Approvals Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd (No 2) [1965] 1 WLR 805 (CA); Hooper v Truscott (1836) 2 Bing NC 457; 132 ER 179 (CCP) (defamation). 7 Dent v Standard Life Association (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 560; 21 WN (NSW) 182 (FC), Simpson J (with whom Cohen and Pring JJ agreed) at 565 (SR (NSW)); Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832, Devlin LJ at 766 (AC).

530

Trespass General [33.8.300] The generic tort of trespass has evolved from the old forms of actions for trespass to person, land and chattels. Its characteristics may be summed up as follows: (1)

a defendant must commit a positive act which must directly invade a plaintiff’s interest in their person or property (land or chattels); and

(2)

fault on the defendant’s part is necessary, whether in the form of intentional wrongdoing or negligence: see [33.8.150]–[33.8.190].

The plaintiff need not prove actual injury or damage as part of the cause of action. Trespass is actionable per se. The distinction between trespass and trespass on the case (see [33.8.20]), resting principally on whether the interference with the plaintiff’s interest arose directly or indirectly, caused problems because if the plaintiff made an incorrect choice in the form of the action (eg trespass in a case of indirect injury), the plaintiff was non-suited and the action had to be started again.1 This problem was removed by the English legislature in the 19th century. Under s 3 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 15 & 16 Vict c 76 (UK), the forms of action were abolished. Under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 36 & 37 Vict c 66 (UK), the rules of pleading were changed so that the plaintiff need not specify the cause of action relied on, but need only plead the relevant facts necessary to establish a particular cause or causes of action. Misnaming an action would therefore not lead to it being struck out, provided the facts stated revealed the existence of a cause of action. Moreover, the plaintiff could now sue in the alternative, for example trespass, or if not trespass, then case. That is likely to be the position in all Australian jurisdictions.2 The modern law has developed from the position established by that legislation. The cause of action in trespass has become particularly associated with intentional, direct invasions of the plaintiff’s interests in person or property. The cause of action in case, as a means of protecting those interests, has become particularly associated with negligent invasions of the plaintiff’s interest in their person or property causing actual injury or damage, whether arising directly3 or indirectly. For this reason, the cause of action for negligent case is now called “negligence”, but the modern tort of negligence has the essential characteristics of the action on the case – the need to prove fault and actual injury or damage as part of the cause of action.4 Another cause of action deriving from case is the

531

[33.8.300]

TRESPASS

innominate tort of intentional, indirect infliction of actual injury or damage to property of the plaintiff: see [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170]. Case extended to the protection of interests other than those protected by trespass, and these torts remain today as nominate torts, for example defamation,5 nuisance,6 deceit (see [33.8.1290]–[33.8.1320]) and injurious falsehood:7 see [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400].

1 “Non-suit”: “[A]n order of dismissal of proceedings where there is insufficient evidence to justify a verdict for the plaintiff, leaving the plaintiff free to sue again on the same cause of action”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 118. “Non-suit” is a term which formerly described the abandonment of a case during trial, prior to the jury’s verdict. 2 Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 11 r 2 (for actions commenced before 1 August 2011); Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 16.02 (for actions commenced on or after 1 August 2011); Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), rr 406 – 407; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 14.7; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT), r 13.02; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 149; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 98(2)(b) (however query whether the requirement in r 99(1) that a statement of claim must state the name of each cause of action pleaded gives rise to the risk of a plaintiff being non-suited); Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r 227(1); Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), r 13.02; Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 20 r 8(1). 3 Before the passing of the 19th century legislation, case was allowed to be brought for negligent, direct injury in Williams v Holland (1833) 10 Bing 112; 131 ER 848 (CCP). 4 See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [2.45]–[2.50]. 5 See generally Communication “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff; “Injurious Falsehood” [6.3.10]ff. 6 See “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. 7 See Communication “Injurious Falsehood” [6.3.10]ff.

[33.8.310] The tort of trespass requires fault on the part of a defendant in see the form of intentional or negligent wrongdoing:1 [33.8.150]–[33.8.190]. It is established in Australia that the cause of action for negligent trespass survives. The High Court of Australia held in Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820 that the two causes of action for negligent trespass and the tort of negligence continue to co-exist in the case of negligent injury or damage, or direct injury or damage. The Court said: The essential ingredients in an action of negligence for personal injuries include the special or particular damage – it is the gist of the action – and the want of due care. Trespass to the person includes neither. But it does include direct violation of the protection which the law throws round the person. It is true that in the absence of intention of some kind or want of due care, a violation occurring in the course of traffic in a thoroughfare is not actionable as a trespass. It is unnecessary to inquire

532

[33.8.310]

GENERAL

how that comes about. It is perhaps a modification of the general law of trespass to the person. But it does not mean that trespass is the same as actionable negligence occasioning injury.2

Generally, there is no advantage to a plaintiff in relying on trespass rather than negligence. The plaintiff in negligence must establish a duty of care, whereas in trespass there is no such requirement, but the likelihood of any advantage to the plaintiff arising from this is remote.3 Trespass is actionable without proof of damage, but the likelihood of anyone wishing to sue for a negligent act which causes no injury or damage is again remote. Statute may attach different limitation periods to trespass and negligence and Williams v Milotin was such a case. However, the particular provision of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) in force in that case was repealed and replaced by the present provision drawing no distinction between trespass and negligence as far as actions for personal injury are concerned.4 The Limitation Acts of other states and territories also make no such distinction.5 The only attribute of trespass on which a definite advantage may exist for plaintiffs relates to the burden of proof rule in trespass. The plaintiff in trespass need prove only direct contact with their person, caused by the defendant’s act.6 Defendants then have the burden of showing that the act was involuntary or that they were not at fault,7 that is, that they neither intended the act or its consequences, nor were they negligent in relation to it. That defence came to be called “inevitable accident”. However, in Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299, the Full Court held that a different rule applied in cases of highway trespass, the plaintiff there having the burden of proof on fault as well as other issues. Bray CJ justified that ruling by reference to what was said by the High Court in Williams v Milotin and to the statement by Bramwell B in Holmes v Mather (1875) LR 10 Ex 261, that a person who goes onto the highway is deemed to accept the risk of accidental direct contacts with the person. Bray CJ concluded from the latter point that the plaintiff must prove that the contact was non-accidental, that is, assume the burden of proving fault.8 That case establishes a distinction between highway and non-highway trespass as far as the burden of proof of fault is concerned and, whilst appearing arbitrary to 21st century sensibilities, remains the common law of Australia. In cases of non-highway trespass to the person, the rule that the defendant must establish a defence of inevitable accident, assuming the plaintiff to have established the necessary direct invasion of their person arising from the defendant’s act9 (see [33.8.160]–[33.8.190]) clearly should apply to cases of trespass to land (see [33.8.450]–[33.8.580]) and to chattels

533

[33.8.310]

TRESPASS

(see [33.8.710]–[33.8.970]), as there is no good reason to distinguish between them. The same act may affect person, land and chattels at the same time.

1 Holmes v Mather (1875) LR 10 Ex 261; Stanley v Powell [1891] 1 QB 86; National Coal Board v JE Evans & Co (Cardiff) Ltd [1951] 2 KB 861 (CA); Blacker v Waters (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 406; 45 WN (NSW) 111 (FC); McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267; Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC)) (affirmed in Chin v Venning (1975) 49 ALJR 378). 2 Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820, the Court at 474 (CLR). The position adopted by the High Court may be contrasted with that taken by the Court of Appeal in England which held that an action for negligent trespass to the person as such no longer exists, but lies simply in negligence: Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573) (CA), Lord Denning MR at 239 (QB) (although Diplock LJ at 243 (QB) preferred to characterise it as an alternative description with no procedural consequences). Letang v Cooper was not disturbed by the House of Lords in Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498; [1993] 2 WLR 120. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [2.45]–[2.50]. 3 In Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, a case in which an occupier of land shot a trespasser without intending to, the High Court ignored trespass and decided the case on principles of negligence. On the issue of possible advantages to actions in trespass in general, see Trindade FA, “Some Curiosities of Negligent Trespass to a Person – A Comparative Study” (1971) 20 ICLQ 706. 4 Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), ss 35 – 36. 5 Basic limitation periods on actions for personal injuries in the Australian states and territories are uniform. Actions must be commenced within three years from the date of the infliction of the personal injury: Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 16B; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), ss 18A, 50C, 58 – 60; Limitation Act 1981 (NT), s 12; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), ss 11, 31 – 32; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), ss 35 – 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), ss 4 – 5A; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), ss 5(1AA), (1A), 23A. Limitation Act 2005 (WA), ss 14(1), 16. See Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff. For the limitation period where a plaintiff does not become aware of the infliction of harm in the nature of a personal injury until after the standard limitation period for personal injuries, see Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442; 80 ALJR 1339; [2006] HCA 37, Gleeson CJ, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [7], [15]–[17], Hayne J at [132] (construing Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), s 5(1A)). See generally Sarmas L, “Mixed Messages on Sexual Assault and the Statute of Limitations: Stingel v Clark, the Ipp ’Reforms’ and an Argument for Change” (2008) 32 MULR 609. 6 Weaver v Ward (1616) Hob 134; 80 ER 284. 7 McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267; Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 (CA), Kirby P at 236, 239 (expressing ambivalence on the correctness of the onus to be applied), Clarke JA at 243, 248–249 (Hope JA agreeing); Ross v Warrick Howard (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 4 SR (WA) 1 (WADC). Gibbs CJ also expressed a preference for the United Kingdom approach in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573 (on the question of onus): see Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Gibbs CJ at 619 (CLR). By

534

[33.8.320]

8

9

GENERAL

contrast, the English High Court in Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426; [1959] 2 WLR 241 placed the burden of proof of fault in respect of trespass on the plaintiff in all cases, following the Canadian decision in Walmsley v Humenick [1954] 2 DLR 232 (BCSC). Fowler v Lanning was followed in New Zealand in Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131 (SC): see [33.8.180], [33.8.1640]. Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC), Bray CJ at 315–316 (trespass for injury on highway) (affirmed in Chin v Venning (1975) 49 ALJR 378). See also Bailey RJ, “Trespass, Negligence and Venning v Chin” (1976) 5 Adel L Rev 402; Blay SKN, “Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person” (1987) 61 ALJ 25; Yeo S, “Determining Consent in Body Contact Sports” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 199. See “Mistake” [33.9.140]–[33.9.160] and “Inevitable Accident” [33.9.170]–[33.9.190]. In Hogan v Gill [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-182, the Supreme Court of Queensland concluded that the firing of a bullet from a rifle by a six-year-old child was involuntary, without reference to the burden of proof rule.

[33.8.320] The requirement of directness in trespass to the person (see [33.8.350]–[33.8.460]) is anachronistic and problematic, and has been overtaken by approaches focusing on intention: see [33.8.310]. The direct/indirect distinction has been abandoned in England and Wales1 and in the United States, and has been questioned in Canada2 and New Zealand.3 In the United States, for example, the Second Restatement of the Law: Torts states that: An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a)

he [or she] acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and

(b)

a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results4 [emphasis added].

Professor Dobbs observed that: With the abolition of the forms of action, the distinction [between direct and indirect harm] is meaningless and confusing. In any event, it has been subsumed by the intent rules: if the defendant acts on an intention to inflict a harmful or offensive bodily contact, and he [or she] succeeds, he [or she] is liable for the battery whether the harm is direct or not.5

The problematic nature of the direct/indirect distinction was illustrated in the famous case of Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; 96 ER 525. In that case, a lighted squib or firecracker was thrown into a crowded, covered market place. Upon landing on a stall, the stallholder picked it up and threw it away. This was repeated by another stallholder until the squib exploded, blinding a young boy in one eye. The injury was held, by majority, to have been caused by the initial casting of the squib, notwithstanding the interventions of the stallholders. The latter were regarded as mere automatons and not the initiator of a new and independent force causing the harm. De Grey CJ stated that:

535

[33.8.320]

TRESPASS

The throwing [of] the squib was an act unlawful and tending to affright the bystanders. So far, mischief was originally intended; not any particular mischief, but mischief indiscriminate and wanton. Whatever mischief therefore follows, he is the author of it. … Every one who does an unlawful act is considered as the doer of all that follows; if done with a deliberate intent, the consequence may amount to murder; if incautiously, to manslaughter. … I look upon all that was done subsequent to the original throwing as a continuation of the first force and first act, which will continue till the squib was spent by bursting. And I think that any innocent person removing the danger from himself to another is justifiable; the blame lights upon the first thrower. The new direction and new force flow out of the first force, and are not a new trespass. The writ for Register, 95 a. for trespass in maliciously cutting down a head of water, which thereupon flowed down to and overwhelmed another’s pond, shews that the immediate act need not be instantaneous, but that a chain of effects connected together will be sufficient.6

The artificial nature of the direct/indirect distinction is evidenced in Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820. In that case, the High Court held that if a cyclist injured by the defendant’s truck had been intentionally struck, the only action would be for battery. If the cyclist had been injured indirectly by the defendant, then only negligence arose. But since the injury was caused directly but unintentionally, both battery and negligence could lie.7

1 Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573 (CA), Lord Denning MR held at 239, 242 (QB) (Danckwerts LJ agreeing), that the distinction between trespass and case is obsolete and should be abolished, to be replaced with an inquiry into whether the acts were intentional (assault and battery) or unintentional (negligence), although his Lordship proceeded to say that “[i]f one man intentionally applies force directly to another, the plaintiff has a cause of action in assault and battery, or … in trespass to the person”. Accordingly, some confusion remains as to whether directness continues to distinguish trespass from case in England. 2 See Linden AM, Klar LN, Feldthusen Bruce, Canadian Tort Law (14th ed, LexisNexis, 2014) p 55. Linden cites as reflecting Canadian law the United States case of Garratt v Dailey, 279 P 2d 1091 (1955), a case in which a chair was pulled out from under a person about to sit down, causing that person to fall to the ground: see [33.8.170]. Wilfully and deliberately failing to disclose to the plaintiff that their food or water source was poisoned has also been held to be a battery in Canada: MacDonald v Sebastian (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 636 (NSSC) (held that the facts also supported a finding of negligence and breach of duty). 3 In Iversen v Zendel Industries (NZ) Ltd (1993) 7 PRNZ 205 (Procedure Reports of New Zealand), Williams J opined that the distinction between direct and indirect harm lacked any logical basis. His Honour refused to strike out a pleading of battery caused by exposure to a toxic chemical: see also Todd S, Hughes J, Smillie J and Hawes C, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Brookers, 2009) pp 95–96, fn 26. See generally Collins L and McLeod-Kilmurray H, “Toxic Battery: A Tort for Our Time?” (2008) 16 Tort L Rev 131. 4 See American Law Institute, Second Restatement of the Law: Torts (2nd ed, American Law Institute Publishers, 1965) s 13. 5 Dobbs DB, The Law of Torts (West Group, 2000) pp 53–54. Intention under the

536

[33.8.325]

6 7

GENERAL

United States law for the purposes of trespass to the person includes the intention to do an act the consequence of which is the “virtual certainty”, directly or indirectly, of the harm suffered. Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; 96 ER 525, De Grey CJ at 899 (Wm Bl). Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820, the Court at 470 (CLR).

[33.8.325] Battista v Cooper (1976) 14 SASR 225 further tested the requirement of directness, if not actually abandoning it. A wife and her children claimed for compensation under the former Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1969 (SA) for the mental harm suffered following the murder of their respective husband and father in an armed hold-up. Not all of the children were present at the time of the murder, but suffered harm on learning of the murder. Bray CJ, with whom Jacobs and King JJ agreed, first determined that the statute equated the sort of physical and mental injury for which compensation was recoverable under the Act with the sort of damages that may be recovered at common law. The Full Court then held that all of the claimants were entitled to compensation. On the issue of the indirectness of the mental harm caused, Bray CJ stated: I do not see why all those who would have had an action in tort for damages for personal injuries against the criminal wrongdoer should not be treated alike under the [former Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1969], whether they are directly or indirectly injured as a result of the crime.1

The Supreme Court of Victoria applied Battista v Cooper in Walker v Hamm [2008] VSC 596 at first instance.2 In that case, two police officers were found to have committed assault and battery on a man and his elderly mother in the former’s home. Another son of the woman was called to the scene and witnessed the aftermath. He later developed a psychiatric injury. Smith J held the police officers liable for that injury as well, notwithstanding the apparently indirect connection between the battery of the first brother and mother and the mental harm suffered by the second brother. Noting that High Court authority had in recent years held defendants liable for mental harm suffered by those who learned of the negligently caused death of a close family member, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs were not present at the time or at the scene, Smith J stated: If Battista v Cooper (or an extended [Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57]) were not to be adopted and applied … we would have the bizarre situation that a person who commits an intentional tort such as assault and battery which results in psychiatric injury to a close member of the family of the persons assaulted who was not present, is not required to compensate that person, whereas if the defendant had caused the same injuries through negligent conduct, the defendant would be liable. It has been said that the common law is “founded on common sense and experience, rather than strict logic”. … It would, in my view, defy common sense and logic for the law to allow the recovery of damages to a wider circle of persons injured as a result of negligent acts than those injured as the result of intentional acts.3

537

[33.8.325]

TRESPASS

Nevertheless, on appeal, the Victorian Court of Appeal (Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA) disagreed with the primary judge: Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340. The Court of Appeal held that “contrary to the submission for [the second respondent], the act must have a direct rather than consequential impact on the plaintiff”.4 Developments in the law of negligence, combined with the difficulties referred to above, probably require a realignment of the law of torts along the lines of intentional torts and unintentional torts, with the former being actionable per se and unrestricted by the rules of remoteness:5 but see [33.8.340]. However, the High Court declined to consider such a realignment when it refused special leave to appeal from the Victorian Court of Appeal decision in Carter v Walker.6

1 Battista v Cooper (1976) 14 SASR 225 (FC), Bray CJ at 229 (Jacobs and King JJ agreeing), applied in Fagan v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150 CLR 666; 56 ALJR 781, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ at 673–675 (Murphy J agreeing), Brennan J at 681 (CLR) (on an application for award of damages under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1972 (Vic)). 2 Walker v Hamm [2008] VSC 596, Smith J at [107]–[114], [118]–[121], [123]–[128]. 3 Walker v Hamm [2008] VSC 596, Smith J at [129]. See also [33.8.180]. 4 Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA at [215]. 5 See generally Descheemaeker E, The Division of Wrongs: A Historical Comparative Study (OUP (USA), 2009); Handford PR, Mullany and Handford’s Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage (2nd ed, Lawbook Co., 2006) at [9.100], [28.60]–[28.70], [28.90]–[28.230], [28.270]–[28.280]. 6 See Walker v Carter [2011] HCATrans 250.

[33.8.330] Mistake, however reasonable, is not generally a defence to trespass.1 There is no inevitable accident (see [33.8.310]), since the invasion of a plaintiff’s interest is intentional.2 Where the mistake is a reasonable one, that is, made without negligence on the defendant’s part, trespass operates as a tort of strict liability.3

1 See “Mistake” [33.9.140]–[33.9.160]. For a case where reasonableness is relevant to a defence involving a mistake, see Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 1 AC 962; [2008] 2 WLR 975; [2008] UKHL 25 (battery in self-defence under the mistaken belief of a threat will only be a defence if the mistake was not only honest but also reasonable in all of the circumstances). 2 See “Inevitable Accident” [33.9.170]–[33.9.190]. 3 See, eg Colwill v Reeves (1811) 2 Camp 575; 170 ER 1257 (Assizes). See also “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff.

538

[33.8.340]

GENERAL

[33.8.340] The remoteness rule for trespass1 (see [33.8.310]) has not been authoritatively settled. The Privy Council decision in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 replaced the earlier rule in Re Polemis [1921] 3 KB 560 as far as the tort of negligence is concerned.2 In Re Polemis, the English Court of Appeal held that a defendant was liable for the direct physical consequences of their act even if they could not reasonably have been anticipated. The Wagon Mound (No 1) replaced this with a test of culpability, that is, that a defendant is liable only for the foreseeable consequences of their negligence. If the culpability criterion were applied to trespass, the defendant would be liable only for the consequences of a trespass which the defendant intended or should have foreseen.3 That point was undecided in an early Australian decision on the applicability of the remoteness rule to intentional wrongdoing,4 although the Court seemed to favour The Wagon Mound (No 1) approach, and that appears to be how the decision has been understood in later judgments.5 In Canada, courts have continued to apply the Re Polemis rule in intentional trespass cases.6 It was also the test applied in a case concerning intentional trespass to chattels in New Zealand.7 In National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA adopted the principles in France v Gaudet (1871) LR 6 QB 199, stating that “some more stringent test of remoteness than reasonable foreseeability is required for the strict liability tort of conversion”.8 The test is one of express notice or special knowledge. This case involved the fraudulent dealing of a number of cheques which the bank credited to a third party’s account. It was held by Phillips and Batt JJA that it was the fraud of an intermediary and not that of the bank which caused the loss. Therefore, the loss was too remote for the bank to be liable.9

1 2

3

4 5

6

See “Mistake” [33.9.140]–[33.9.160] and “Inevitable Accident” [33.9.170]–[33.9.190]. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC), Viscount Simonds (for the Privy Council) at 422 (AC). Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451 (PC), Viscount Simonds (for the Privy Council) at 424, 425 (AC). Hogan v AG Wright Pty Ltd [1963] Tas SR 44 (trespass to land and real property rights). Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [2129]–[2130]; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82, Spigelman J at [104]. Bettel v Yim (1978) 88 DLR (3d) 543 (ONCC); Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital

539

[33.8.340]

TRESPASS

7 8

9

(1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634 (ONHC) (reversed on other grounds in Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital (1981) 125 DLR (3d) 276 (ONCA)). See Glazebrook PR, “Assaults and Their Consequences” [1986] 45 Cam LJ 379, who takes the view that, unless the consequence is intended, the test for remoteness should always be that of reasonable foreseeability. See generally Jacobs S, Commercial Damages (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [10.910]–[10.1450]. Wilson v New Brighton Panelbeaters Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 74 (HC). National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [64]. See also [33.8.790]–[33.8.900] for discussion of the tort of conversion. National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Phillips JA at [4], Batt JA at [52].

Trespass to Person General [33.8.350] There are three torts of trespass to the person: battery (see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]), assault (see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]) and false imprisonment. False imprisonment, by reason of its relationship to malicious prosecution and abuse of process, is treated separately in [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780].

Battery [33.8.360] “Battery” is committed by a physical act of a defendant which directly interferes with the person of a plaintiff, and the defendant either intended the act (in the sense of intending to contact the plaintiff); should have foreseen the result of it; or was recklessly indifferent to it:1 see [33.8.400]. The requirement of a physical act contrasts with assault (see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]) which may be committed by words, or with false imprisonment (see [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780]) which does not require an interference with the person of the plaintiff. Battery is actionable per se, without proof of actual injury. Intentional battery is both a tort and a crime.2 Where an intentional battery is alleged to have been committed, the standard of proof, although still the civil standard of the balance of probabilities rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, must reflect the gravity of the allegation.3 Negligent battery is a tort but not a crime unless amounting to criminal negligence. Consent of the plaintiff may be a defence to a civil action for battery but may not be to a criminal prosecution arising out of it.4 Participation in a fight for money does not necessarily establish consent to battery committed

540

[33.8.370]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

in the course of the fight. Nor is a prize-fight necessarily a criminal offence, so as to found the defence of illegality.5 Consent is a defence to the tort of trespass to the person in a medical or other therapeutic context.6

1

2 3

4 5 6

It is sufficient that the defendant intended to do the act that resulted in, or was substantially certain to result in, contact with the plaintiff, or was reckless with respect to contact with the plaintiff. It is not necessary that they intended any injury: see, Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA at [215], applied in Dale v Fox [2012] TASSC 84; see also, eg Re T; T v T [1988] Fam 52; [1988] 2 WLR 189, Wood J at 62, 66–68 (Fam). See also Trindade FA, “Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery” (1982) 2 OJLS 211 at 220; Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [2.60]; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [3.15]–[3.30]. See Criminal Offences “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff. Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; 39 ALJR 177, the Court at 521 (CLR); Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 712; Exchange Hotel Ltd v Murphy [1947] SASR 112, Reid J at 116; Lemmer v Bertram [1971] 2 SASR 397, Walters J at 399; Brown v GJ Coles & Co Ltd (t/as Coles New World Supermarket) (1985) 8 FCR 304; 17 A Crim R 79 (FC), Davies J at 308, Sheppard J at 326, Everett J at 346–347 (FCR). M v K (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 392 (BCCA), the Court at [34]–[39] (unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under the age of 16 years). Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331. See generally Yeo S, “Determining Consent in Body Contact Sports” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 199. Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [48]ff (Beazley JA agreeing); White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [53]–[133] (Barrett JA and Emmett JA agreeing). See also Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300.

[33.8.370] There is no liability for battery in relation to everyday physical contacts. The non-liability in battery in relation to everyday contacts such as tapping a person on the shoulder to attract that person’s attention, taking their arm to make a conversational point or jostling against another person in a crowd was based on consent conclusively presumed as a matter of law rather than absence of hostility, although the presumption of consent has now given way to “a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life”.1 In Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, a police officer who took the arm of the accused to detain her without intending an arrest committed battery; the contact was not an everyday physical contact.2 In Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, the Court of Appeal upheld a finding that an employee of a casino who had merely placed his hand on the plaintiff’s shoulder to get his attention, rather than forcefully spinning him around, had acted within the bounds of ordinary daily 541

[33.8.370]

TRESPASS

conduct and thus had not committed a battery. Notwithstanding that finding, the Court stated that the placing of a hand on the shoulder can be a battery3 and affirmed the observation in Collins v Wilcock4 that any touching of a person, however slight, may amount to a battery. In Watkins v Victoria (2010) 27 VR 543; 203 A Crim R 20; [2010] VSCA 138, the Court of Appeal (Ashley JA and Beach AJA, Mandie JA agreeing) found that three police sergeants (including the sergeant in charge of the relevant police station) had failed to positively authorise themselves or each other to use reasonable force to take the fingerprints of the plaintiff, as required by s 464K(7) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Accordingly, their use of force against the plaintiff, which the trial judge had found was exercised either to take the fingerprints or in self-defence (including punching the plaintiff in the face), was unlawful and constituted multiple instances of battery against the plaintiff.

1 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (for the Court) at 1177, quoted with approval in Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, Sheller JA at [53] (with whom Priestley and Heydon JJA agreeing). 2 The suggestion in Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237; [1986] 3 WLR 1 (CA) that hostility is required for battery is inconsistent with both earlier and later authority and would appear to be wrong. See Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (for the Court) at 1179–1180; Re T; T v T [1988] Fam 52; [1988] 2 WLR 189; Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; 60 ALJR 422; 20 A Crim R 156, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ at 25, 27 (CLR); Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; [1989] 2 WLR 1025, Goff LJ at 73 (AC). See also Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, Sheller JA at [49]–[55] (Priestley and Heydon JJA agreeing). 3 Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, Sheller JA at [51] (Priestley and Heydon JJA agreeing) cited with approval in Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [242]. 4 Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, Sheller JA at [53] (Priestley and Heydon JJA agreeing); Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (for the Court) at 1177.

[33.8.375] A surgical or dental procedure carried out without the consent of the patient or the court is a battery.1 A battery will also be committed where a plaintiff has been misled about the nature or necessity of a surgical or dental procedure which is consequently performed.2 In Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, the New South Wales Court of Appeal found that a dental surgeon who carried out root canal therapy and fitted crowns to the plaintiff’s teeth over a twelve month period during 53 consultations at a cost of $73,640 was “at least reckless as to whether the treatment proposed was either appropriate or necessary for the purpose of addressing the [plaintiff’s] discomfort”.3 Accordingly, the dental surgeon was found to have engaged in an intentional act of battery, any damages awarded for

542

[33.8.375]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

which were unconstrained by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).4 The Court awarded damages of $300,000 for pain and suffering and exemplary damages of $150,000.5 In that case, Basten JA stated that: In a therapeutic context, the defence to a tort of trespass to the person is consent. Where there has been ostensible consent, which is later challenged, the convenient starting point is to consider the validity of the consent, rather than asking whether it has been obtained by fraud. In principle, consent may be legally ineffective as a result of an innocent mistake or carelessness on the part of the person obtaining it. Further, the nature of the consent required is necessary to inform the concept of fraud in this conext.6

After a review of domestic and international case law, Basten JA added that: [A] practitioner’s honest and reasonable belief that the patient has consented is not a defence to a claim in tort. The absence of consent may flow from the incapacity of the patient, innocent misrepresentation or maladministration by the practitioner or hospital, or fraud on the part of the practitioner or other person responsible for obtaining consent.7

The approach in Dean v Phung was adopted and elaborated on in White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18.8 There is no need for a plaintiff to know that a defendant is making contact with their person. For example, it would constitute battery to move a sleeping person or an infant.9

1

2

3

Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; [1989] 2 WLR 1025, Bridge LJ at 51, Brandon LJ at 55, 63–64, Griffiths LJ at 69, Goff LJ at 71, 73, 79 (AC). For circumstances where the consent of the court is necessary, see Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, a majority decision of the High Court. As to the power of a court exercising its “parens patriae” jurisdiction to authorise a medical treatment where a mature minor is found to have capacity to refuse consent and does so, see X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network (Randwick and Westmead) (incorporating the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children) (2013) 85 NSWLR 294; [2013] NSWCA 320. Parens patriae: “[P]arent of the country. The expression is used to describe the Crown in certain legal contexts”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 126. See generally Willmott L, “Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: A Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis” (2010) 17 JLM 556; White B, Willmott L and Allen J, “Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Treatment: Criminal Responsibility for Established Medical Practice?” (2010) 17 JLM 849; Magnusson RS, “Specific Consent, Fiduciary Standards and the Use of Human Tissue for Sensitive Diagnostic Tests and in Research” (1995) 2 JLM 206 at 218–221, 228–229, 231. Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223 (and the cases there cited). White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [70]–[74] (Barrett and Emmett JJA agreeing). Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [67] (Beazley JA agreeing).

543

[33.8.375]

TRESPASS

4 5 6

7 8 9

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B; Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [30] (Beazley JA agreeing). Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [75] (general damages), [82] (exemplary damages). Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [48] (Beazley J agreeing). In Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, the Court at 490 stated that “the consent necessary to negative the offence of battery is satisfied by the patient being advised in broad terms of the nature of the procedure to be performed”. See the other cases cited by Basten JA in Dean v Phung at [48]–[65]. Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [48]. White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [54]ff (Barrett and Emmett JJA agreeing). See Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [2.60]; Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [4.15].

[33.8.380] The interference with a plaintiff’s person must be direct to establish battery: see [33.8.320]. Directness is a question of fact and one which may give rise to differences of opinion. In Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; 96 ER 525, the Court took a generous view of the extent of direct harm remediable by trespass, holding that where a lighted firework was thrown by the defendant into a crowded market place and was immediately thrown further on by two persons acting either for self-preservation or protection of their goods, it was sufficiently direct to be trespass. The persons throwing the firework acted in the agony of the moment without time for consideration. Even so, Blackstone J dissented, thinking that the action should have been brought in case.1 In Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131, the defendant, who laid poisoned baits on his land which were eaten by the plaintiff’s dogs when the plaintiff crossed the land despite a warning by the defendant, was held not liable in trespass on the ground that the poisoning of the dogs was too indirect. The Court observed that it might have been different had the defendant thrown the baits to the dogs. Despite this, the provision of poisoned food to a human being is probably an indirect interference, but clearly liability would exist for the intentional, indirect infliction of personal injury: see [33.8.2130]. Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340 concerned a claim in battery for nervous shock by a plaintiff who arrived in the immediate aftermath of a physical altercation between police, his elderly mother and his brother and who did not directly witness that altercation. Overturning the primary judge’s ruling that a nervous shock injury to a non-bystander could constitute battery, Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA noted that “[d]irectness has been a requirement of [battery] in English, and then Australian, law. The requirement

544

[33.8.390]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

of directness, and its role in the development of the action on the case, has often been explained”.2

1

2

Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; 96 ER 525, Blackstone J at 894–895 (Wm Bl). See also Ruddock v Taylor (2003) 58 NSWLR 269; [2003] NSWCA 262 (Minister’s decision to cancel the respondent’s visa and authorise his detention was the proximate cause of the respondent’s detention). This decision was overturned by the High Court on the ground that the Court of Appeal misconstrued Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 189, which permitted detention if an officer “reasonably suspects” that a person is an unlawful non-citizen: Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [27]–[28]. See generally Prichard MJ, “Trespass, Case and the Rule in Williams v Holland” (1964) Cam LJ 234; Ounapuu A, “Abolition or Reform: The Future for Directness as a Requirement of Trespass in Australia” (2008) 34 Mon LR 103; Cockburn T and Madden B, “Intentional Torts Claims in Medical Cases” (2006) 13 JLM 311. Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, Buchanan, Ashley and Weinberg JJA at [216].

[33.8.390] The act of a defendant claimed to constitute a battery must have an effect on the person of a plaintiff. The defendant need not lay hands on the plaintiff – the use of a weapon is sufficient.1 It seems to be sufficient to constitute battery where an act affects clothes the plaintiff is wearing.2 It is also battery to upset the chair in which the plaintiff is sitting or to snatch an object (eg a book) from the plaintiff’s hand.3 In Kaye v Robertson (1990) 19 IPR 147; [1991] FSR 62, the English Court of Appeal accepted the possibility that shining a bright light (in this case, the flashlight bulb of a reporter’s camera) in the eyes of a sick patient, thereby injuring him, might constitute battery.4 Battery has been committed by removing a chair from beneath the plaintiff as she was about to sit down, causing her to fall and injure herself.5 Where there is a direct act of interference with the plaintiff’s person which commences without any wrongful intent on the defendant’s part, the defendant is liable for continuing that interference once it becomes known to them.6 The defendant’s act must also cause the (direct) interference with the plaintiff’s person:7 see [33.8.320] and [33.8.380]. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340 stated that “contact with the plaintiff’s body appears to be a necessary feature of the law of battery in the various jurisdictions” of Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America and New Zealand.8

1

Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Ad & E 602; 112 ER 966; see also Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 558; 150 A Crim R 314; [2004] NSWCA 431, Giles JA (dissenting on the facts of the case) at [73].

545

[33.8.390]

TRESPASS

2

3

4 5 6 7 8

Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Ad & E 602; 112 ER 966; Piggly-Wiggly Alabama Co v Rickles, 103 So 860 (1925); Skousen v Nidy 367 P 2d 248 (1961) (sexual harassment; mental suffering considered an injury for which damages can be claimed). See generally Trindade FA, “Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery” (1982) 2 OJLS 211; Blazey-Ayoub P, “The Law of Spitting” (1998) 22 Crim LJ 151; Collins L and McLeod-Kilmurray H, “Toxic Battery: A Tort for Our Time?” (2008) 16 Tort L Rev 131. Hopper v Reeve (1817) 7 Taunt 698; 129 ER 278 (CCP) (collision with coach containing plaintiff, throwing plaintiff out of coach); Fisher v Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc, 424 SW 2d 627 (1967) (snatching plate from plaintiff’s hand); Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000] 3 All ER 890 (DC) (hitting adult, causing fall of child). Kaye v Robertson (1990) 19 IPR 147; [1991] FSR 62 (CA), Glidewell LJ at 152–153 (IPR) (Bingham and Leggatt LJJ agreeing). Garratt v Dailey, 279 P 2d 1091 (1955); see also [33.8.170], [33.8.320]. Fagan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [1969] 1 QB 439; [1968] 3 WLR 1120 (DC). Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 (CA) (no battery where the plaintiff put her hand through a glass door at the moment the defendant slammed it shut). Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 340, Buchanan, Ashley, and Weinberg JJA at [226].

[33.8.400] There is a conflict in judicial and academic authority on whether or not absence of consent by a plaintiff constitutes part of the cause of action in battery. If it is part of the cause of action, its absence must be proved by the plaintiff. If it is a defence, the burden of establishing its presence rests on the defendant.1 In principle, the latter position seems preferable.2 The defendant should be required to identify and prove those facts relied on to establish the plaintiff’s consent, rather than the plaintiff being obliged in general terms to establish the absence of their own consent. There seems no good reason for distinguishing consent from all the other grounds on which liability for an intentional trespass may be negatived, all of which clearly operate as defences. Battery is therefore defined to exclude the issue of the plaintiff’s absence of consent: see [33.8.360]. However in White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, argued cogently in obiter dicta for the contrary view, qualifying his conclusion by stating that the evidentiary burden may shift to the defendant where evidence supportive of fraud has been adduced.3 His Honour recognised that this position was contrary to the persuasive authorities cited above. The plaintiff’s consent must be given to the act complained of, and must not be induced by factors such as fraud or duress. In Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA stated that: In a therapeutic context, the defence to a tort of trespass to the person is consent. Where there has been ostensible consent, which is later challenged, the convenient starting point is to consider the validity of the consent, rather than asking whether it has been obtained by fraud. In principle, consent may be legally ineffective as a result

546

[33.8.400]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

of an innocent mistake or carelessness on the part of the person obtaining it. Further, the nature of the consent required is necessary to inform the concept of fraud in this conext.4

After a review of domestic and international case law, Basten JA added that: [A] practitioner’s honest and reasonable belief that the patient has consented is not a defence to a claim in tort. The absence of consent may flow from the incapacity of the patient, innocent misrepresentation or maladministration by the practitioner or hospital, or fraud on the part of the practitioner or other person responsible for obtaining consent.5

Consent must be given by a person who has capacity to consent.6 An effective consent may be given by a person who has not yet reached the age of majority, provided that person is capable of understanding the issue to which the consent relates.7 In the case of young children who are incapable of giving a binding consent, it seems that their parents or guardian may consent on their behalf to normal surgical procedures performed for their benefit, even in the case of non-therapeutic procedures such as cosmetic surgery or an appendectomy.8 However, in the case of the non-therapeutic sterilisation of a mentally handicapped minor who was unable to give a binding consent because she did not understand the nature of the operation, the majority of the High Court held that the consent of the Family Court was necessary, and that the consent of a parent or guardian was insufficient.9 An operation conducted without a relevant consent may still be lawful on the basis of necessity.10

1

2

3 4 5 6 7

8

See “Consent” [33.9.200]–[33.9.280]. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [6.10]–[6.50]. Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, McHugh J at 310–311 (CLR). See also Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551; (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 1. In Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, the quality of the plaintiff’s consent to dental treatment was treated as a matter going to the dental surgeon’s defence without any apparent dispute. White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [94]–[130] (Barrett and Emmett JJA agreeing). Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [48] (Beazley JA agreeing). Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [58] (Beazley JA agreeing). See “Incapacity” [33.9.290]–[33.9.330]. Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830, Fraser LJ at 168–169, 172, Scarman LJ at 183–184, 189 (AC) (approved by the majority of the High Court in Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300). Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case)

547

[33.8.400]

TRESPASS

(1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 249–250 (CLR). 9 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 254–258 (CLR). 10 Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442 (BCSC), Macfarlane J at 445. See also “Necessity” [33.9.340]–[33.9.380]. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [6.105]–[6.135].

[33.8.410] Compensatory damages are awarded for personal injury suffered by a plaintiff as a result of a battery according to the normal principles of assessment for personal injury.1 However, in intentional wrongs there is also the possibility of an increased award going beyond mere compensation for the injury in the form of aggravated damages or exemplary damages where permitted by statute.2 Compensatory damages must be assessed before aggravated or excessive damages are assessed.3 Even if there is provocation on the part of the plaintiff, there can be no reduction of compensatory damages on that account, although it may justify not awarding anything by way of aggravated or exemplary damages.4 The personal financial circumstances of the defendant are relevant to the quantum of aggravated or exemplary damages,5 as is the likelihood of the defendant engaging in the conduct again.6 In Johnstone v Stewart [1968] SASR 142 and Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423, the Supreme Court of South Australia made one award to cover both aggravated and exemplary damages. Part of the reason was that the same conduct justified the award of either damages, and there was a need to avoid overcompensation. However, in later cases, courts have found it appropriate to itemise the award.7 In Lackersteen v Jones (1988) 92 FLR 6, for example, the defendant police officers assaulted the plaintiff after a wrongful arrest, one menacing him with a revolver and actually firing it close to him. The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory awarded, in addition to other damages, $15,000 aggravated damages and $15,000 exemplary damages. In Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412, the plaintiff, having been arrested by police, was beaten by them and urinated on by one officer. $10,000 aggravated damages and $10,000 exemplary damages were awarded by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland.8 In Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597, the Full Court of the Appeal Division doubled to $10,000 the trial judge’s award of damages (including aggravated damages) against a department store, its security guard employee and two police officers as joint tortfeasors for the unlawful detention of the respondent in the store.9 In Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223 (dental surgeon recklessly indifferent to the appropriateness or necessity of

548

[33.8.410]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

lengthy and expensive dental work, thereby vitiating his patient’s consent), Basten JA observed that:10 Two factors which often cause hesitation in determining whether to award exemplary damages are not present in this case. First, highhanded conduct by police officers, which is a common circumstances justifying such an award, is often defended on the basis that the officer whose conduct was impugned was reacting in fraught circumstances and the conduct continued for only a brief period of time. In the present case, the course of conduct adopted by the dentist was carefully planned and carried into execution over a period in excess of one year. Secondly, with respect to police officers and others, there is a concern that the effect of such an award will affect them only indirectly, if at all, because the financial burden will be borne by the State, or in some cases an insurer. It appears to have been assumed in the present case that the burden would be borne by the dentist personally. By contrast, the appellant submitted, without contradiction, that the dentist had not himself met the judgment for repayment of amounts expended by the employer [of the patient, whose teeth were initially affected by a work accident] (or more accurately its workers’ compensation insurer) which had been the subject of an earlier judgment. Accordingly, the submitted, the dentist remained unjustly enriched to the extent of the $73,640 in fees received for a course of conducted which he admitted was not necessary. The appellant submitted that any amount by way of exemplary damages should include that figure together with interest calculated at 10% in an amount of $61,858, giving a total of $135,500. The appellant accepted that in an assessment of exemplary damages to be awarded against an individual, capacity to pay was a relevant consideration. However, to rely on such a consideration, it would be necessary for the defendant to call evidence which would permit the court to assess the impact of the award upon him: Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 at 657-658 (Hutley JA). No evidence of that kind was called, and the appellant noted that, at least at the date of the trial, the dentist continued in his dental practice.

Taking these factors into consideration, the Court awarded the patient $150,000 in exemplary damages.11 In Coffey v Queensland [2012] QSC 186, Henry J awarded $12,000 in exemplary damages and $8,000 in aggravated damages (in addition to $8,000 in general damages) to a prisoner after four prison officers used excessive force to obtain a DNA sample from him by taking 239 strands of his hair, far in excess of what was needed for such a sample. On appeal, Holmes JA held that the award of exemplary damages was, in the circumstances, inadequate and doubled it to $24,000.12 Legislation in some jurisdictions provides that exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages are not to be included in certain claims for damages for personal injury13

1

See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90] regarding the protection of good samaritans and volunteers who act in good faith from the risk of civil liability. See also “Personal Injury” [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]. 549

[33.8.410]

TRESPASS

2

3 4

5 6 7 8

Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549. In Coloca v BP Australia Ltd [1992] 2 VR 441, the Victorian Supreme Court held that there is no rule of law precluding the recovery of exemplary damages (or, it seems, aggravated damages) in an action for negligence, though it seems clear that something more than mere negligent conduct would be required of the defendant: O’Bryan J at 444–445 (VR). See Midalco Pty Ltd v Rabenalt [1989] VR 461 (FC); Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 1 AC 962; [2008] 2 WLR 975; [2008] UKHL 25, Scott LJ at [22] (see also McBride NJ, “Trespass to the Person: The Effect of Mistakes and Alternative Remedies on Liability” (2008) 67 CLJ 461). See generally McCarthy C, “Exemplary and Aggravated Damages in Medical Negligence Litigation” (1998) 6 JLM 187; Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126. White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [146] (Barrett and Emmett JJA agreeing). Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283, McTiernan J at 183–184, Owen J at 187 (CLR); see also New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208, Hodgson JA at [140]–[143] (Nicholas J agreeing, Sheller JA agreeing at [9], [31]). See also Criminal Law Principles “Application of Provocation to Offences Other than Murder” [9.3.1510]–[9.3.1530]; Criminal Offences “General” [10.2.1770]. See Wenn v Evans (1985) 2 SR (WA) 263 (WADC). There appears to be no “defence” of contributory negligence at common law for an intentional tort: New South Wales v Riley, Hodgson JA at [103]–[107]; Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd v Salmon [2007] NSWCA 322, McColl JA at [25], Basten JA at [126]–[128] (Nicholas J agreeing, Sheller JA agreeing at [9], [31]). See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]; “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.600]; “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. For further discussion of unintentional or “negligent trespass”, see [33.8.300]–[33.8.310]. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [2.45]–[2.50]. XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352, Gibbs CJ at 461 (CLR) and Brennan J at 472 (CLR). White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [146] (Barrett JA and Emmett JA agreeing). See, eg TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82, Spigelman CJ at [162], [165] (Mason P agreeing). See the discussion of aggravated versus exemplary damages in Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), McDonald J at 633–634 (VR), including the following passage cited from Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549, the Court at 8 (CLR): “Aggravated damages, in contrast to exemplary damages, are compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, go beyond compensation and are awarded ‘as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself’” (citing Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1; 98 ER 489, Lord Pratt CJ at 19 (Lofft)). See also P v R [2010] QSC 139, Daubney J at [38]–[42], [43]–[46]; Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70. See also New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court at [33]–[40], discussing aggravated and exemplary damages where assault and trespass to land is committed: see [33.8.460].

550

[33.8.420]

9

10 11

12

13

TRESPASS TO PERSON

For a discussion of exemplary damages in the context of a finding of vicarious liability, see Smith v Cheeky Monkeys Restaurant (2009) 9 DCLR (NSW) 241; [2009] NSWDC 257 (vicarious liability of employer for trespass to the person committed by an employee; exemplary damages can be awarded against employer); see also Walker P, “Vicarious Liability for Exemplary Damages: A Matter of Strict Liability?” (2009) 83 ALJ 548. Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [80]–[81] (Beazley JA agreeing). Dean v Phung [2012] Aust Torts Reports 82-111; [2012] NSWCA 223, Basten JA at [82] (Beazley JA agreeing). See also the discussion by McColl JA in Whitbread v Rail Corp (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 130, at [19]–[25] (Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing). Coffey v Queensland [2012] QCA 368, Holmes JA at [11]–[17] (McMurdo P and White JA agreeing). See also the award of aggravated damages against a police officer who unlawfully searched the plaintiff and struck him with a baton: Majindi Northern Territory (2010) 27 NTLR 89; [2010] NTSC 25. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52; however see, eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 3B (Act not applicable to civil liability or damages for intentional act done with intent to cause injury, death or sexual assault, with prescribed exceptions); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52(2), which states that the exclusion does not apply to intentional wrongs. For further discussion, see “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. See generally Cockburn T and Madden B, “Intentional Torts Claims in Medical Cases” (2006) 13 JLM 311; Cockburn T and Madden B, “Comment – A Renewed Interest in Intentional Torts following Legislative Changes to the Law of Negligence?” (2006) 14 Tort L Rev 161.

Assault [33.8.420] “Assault” is defined as an act or statement by a defendant which directly produces apprehension in a plaintiff of battery to be committed on the plaintiff by the defendant, and where the defendant either intended that result or should have foreseen it.1 Assault is defined to include negligent assault. As a form of trespass, it is actionable per se. Like battery (see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]), assault is also a common law crime.2 The points made about battery as a crime apply also to assault. The intention requirement of assault is an intention to cause apprehension in the plaintiff of the commission of a battery on them by the defendant: see [33.8.160]–[33.8.190]. Apprehension of battery in this context means to anticipate the battery with the fear or in the knowledge and expectation that it will take place.3 Pointing an unloaded gun at the plaintiff is an assault even though there is no intention to commit battery.4 As in the other forms of

551

[33.8.420]

TRESPASS

trespass, recklessness on the part of the defendant is sufficient to create liability: see [33.8.180].

1

2 3

4

See ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274, Hargrave AJA at [16] (Ashley and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreeing), applied by Rothman J in Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775 at [90]. However (and with respect), contrary to point (5) of his Honour’s summary of the elements of the tort of assault, there is no need for the plaintiff’s apprehension of imminent physical contact to have “caused injury, loss or damage to the plaintiff” since assault is actionable per se. In Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441 Kyrou J at [226] concluded that Hargave AJA’s point (5) “must be understood in the context of a claim for special damages”. Insofar as Kyrou J was making clear the absence of any requirement for injury, loss or damage for recovery by a plaintiff of ordinary damages, his Honour (with respect) must be correct. On assault and battery generally, see Trindade FA, “Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery” (1982) 2 OJLS 211. Criminal Offences “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff. Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, Sheller JA at [56]–[57] (Priestley and Heydon JJA agreeing); Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [2.4.3]. Brady v Schatzel; Ex parte Brady [1911] St R Qd 206; McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157, Sholl J at 163–164, 174. However, see Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309 (FC) (a defendant pleading self-defence under the Criminal Code (WA) (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule) was required to prove, as an element of assault under the Criminal Code, the plaintiff’s intention to use force or at least to create in the defendant an apprehension of immediate physical contact).

[33.8.430] To constitute an assault (see [33.8.420]), the apprehension suffered by a plaintiff must be of the commission of a battery (see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]) on the plaintiff by a defendant. For example, it is not assault to enter a crowded theatre and shout, knowing it to be false, “Ladies and gentlemen, please leave – there’s a bomb planted in the theatre”. If injuries are suffered in an ensuing stampede, the defendant would be liable under a number of possible torts, such as intentional indirect infliction of personal injury (see [33.8.2130]), negligence1 or deceit: see [33.8.1290]–[33.8.1320]. However, it is probable that if the plaintiff sees a stone, which has been thrown in their direction by the defendant, coming towards him, it is assault even though the plaintiff does not know at the time the source or means of propulsion of the stone.2 If, however the plaintiff never sees the stone and it narrowly misses, it is not assault since there is no apprehension of physical contact with the plaintiff’s person. It is sometimes suggested or assumed that the plaintiff’s apprehension must be reasonable. In ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274 included such a requirement at point (4) of a summary of elements of the tort.3 That seems incorrect, however, at least for intentional assault.4 In Macpherson v Beath (1975) 12 SASR 174, Bray CJ said: 552

[33.8.430]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

The reasonableness of the [plaintiff’s] apprehension may or may not be necessary. I do not pause to canvass that, though it seems to me … that if the defendant intentionally puts in fear of immediate violence an exceptionally timid person known to him to be so then the unreasonableness of the fear may not prevent conviction.5

Bray CJ’s reasoning was applied by Anderson J in White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95.6 The reasonableness of the plaintiff’s apprehension is relevant to negligent assault, but negligent assault is of minimal importance. Words accompanying physical gestures may indicate an intention to cause apprehension of a battery where the physical gesture is not enough in itself. In Fogden v Wade [1945] NZLR 724, the accused appeared from the shadows and followed a girl at a close distance to her abode, at which point he made a suggestion that she had time for a “quick one”.7 He was convicted of assault. Where a verbal threat of violence is conditional, there is an assault, at least where there is some accompanying threatening gesture and the violence is not such that the defendant has a right to carry it out. In Police v Greaves [1964] NZLR 295,8 the accused made two threats to the police while brandishing a carving knife at the door of a house of which he was not the occupier; one that he would use the knife if they came any closer, the other that he would use it if they did not leave immediately. He was convicted of an assault.9 A threat by an occupier of land to use reasonable force to evict a trespasser from the land would not be an assault since the occupier has that right.10

1 2

3

4

5 6 7 8

See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See, eg Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Ad & E 602; 112 ER 966 (defendant threw boiling water on the plaintiff, soaking and damaging his clothes and injuring the plaintiff); Gambriell v Caparelli (1975) 54 DLR (3d) 661 (ONCC) (a person hit from behind was held to have an action in battery, but not assault). In ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274, Hargrave AJA at [16] (Ashley and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreeing), citing Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451, Taylor J at 455. In Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [223]–[227], although critical (at [228]–[231]) of some aspects of Taylor J’s judgment in Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451, and having qualified several of Hargrave AJA’s list of elements of the tort of assault in ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274, did not contradict Hargrave AJA’s requirement of reasonableness of apprehension on the part of the plaintiff. Macpherson v Beath (1975) 12 SASR 174 (FC), Bray CJ at 177 (Zelling J agreeing). White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [364]. Fogden v Wade [1945] NZLR 724 (SC), Blair J at 727. Police v Greaves [1964] NZLR 295 (CA). In comparison, see Tuberville v Savage

553

[33.8.430]

TRESPASS

(1669) 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684, where words had the effect of unmarking or neutralising a threat made by a positive act. The plaintiff laid his hand on his sword but qualified the gesture by warning the defendant: “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.” As the judges were in town, this amounted to a declaration of the plaintiff’s intention not to assault the defendant. 9 See also Rozsa v Samuels [1969] SASR 205 (the plaintiff threatened to punch the defendant taxidriver; the defendant in response threatened to use his knife, and moved to get out of his taxi, which was held not to be justified); Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SASC): see [33.8.440]. 10 See, eg Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231 Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 645, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 654–655 (CLR). See also “Illegality” [33.3.510]–[33.3.520].

[33.8.440] Words alone may constitute assault only if they directly cause the apprehension of a battery:1 see [33.8.430]. In Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850; 138 ER 1437, Jervis CJ used language indicating that the threat of present violence alone was enough to be an assault: “[T]here was a threat of violence exhibiting an intention to assault, and a present ability to carry the threat into execution.”2 It seems reasonably clear that a threat of present violence, unaccompanied by any physical gesture, has the necessary directness for assault where it is uttered by one party in the presence of the other. The position when the threat is not made in the plaintiff’s presence is less settled. There are problems over directness where the apprehension is not of an imminent battery. In Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451, the defendant was alleged to have made threats of violence over the telephone in order to induce the plaintiff to execute a deed. The defendant sought to have struck out as revealing no cause of action an allegation of assault on him by means of the telephone threats. The Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to strike out the cause of action. Taylor J said: In the age in which we live threats may be made and communicated by persons remote from the person threatened. Physical violence and death can be produced by acts done at a distance by people who are out of sight. … I do not think that these, if they result in apprehension of physical violence in the mind of a reasonable person, are outside the protection afforded by the civil and criminal law as to assault. How immediate does the fear [of] physical violence have to be? In my opinion … it depends on the circumstances. Some threats are not capable of arousing apprehension of violence in the mind of a reasonable person unless there is an immediate prospect of the threat being carried out. Others, I believe, can create the apprehension even if it is made clear that the violence may occur in the future, at times unspecified and uncertain. Being able to immediately carry out the threat is but one way of creating the fear of apprehension, but not the only way. There are other ways, more subtle and perhaps more effective.3

This ignores the fact that if the violence is to be carried out at some time in the future there is not the necessary directness or immediacy of apprehension of harm to constitute assault. This was pointed out by White J in Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11, in which his Honour said that the correct question was not that posed by Taylor J, but: “[H]ow immediate must the

554

[33.8.440]

TRESPASS TO PERSON

threatened physical violence be after the utterance of the threat which creates the fear?”4 His Honour found an assault proved on the following facts: a young woman voluntarily entered the accused’s van but asked to be let out when he offered her money for sexual favours. The accused accelerated the van and refused to let her out, saying: “I am going to take you to my mate’s house. He will really fix you up.”5 He was convicted of assault, since although the threat was of future violence, the violence would occur at the end of a brief period of imprisonment imposed by the defendant and with a high degree of certainty. There was therefore the requisite immediacy of connection between the feared violence and the threat.6 In R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97, a man battered his partner and threatened to kill her. He pursued her with a rifle, a handgun and a knife, although the rifle had no bolt and was not loaded. He was convicted of assault and appealed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge had failed to direct the jury that an accused must have a present ability to carry out the threat. His appeal against the conviction was refused, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal concluding that the direction to the jury on assault was adequate and that it is the apprehension of physical violence that constitutes assault, even though the victim does not know when that physical violence may be effected.7 In White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, anti-nuclear protestors were arrested by police and detained in a shipping container for trespasses to property which they were subsequently found not to have committed. Anderson J found that in addition to being subjected to battery and false imprisonment by the police, the protestors had suffered various instances of an apprehension of imminent battery by reason of the words or gestures of police, including threats to spray protestors with capsicum spray, amounting to assaults.8 “Words alone can constitute an assault, or words coupled with gestures.”9

1

2 3 4

5

White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [364]. See Williams G, “Assault and Words” [1957] Crim LR 219; Handford PR, “Tort Liability for Threatening or Insulting Words” (1976) 54 Can Bar Rev 563. Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850; 138 ER 1437 (CCP), Jervis CJ at 860 (CB). Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451, Taylor J at 454–455. Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SASC), White J at 16. See R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314 (NSWCCA), Lee J at 317–318 (Carruthers and Loveday JJ agreeing); Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [231]. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [3.55]–[3.60]; Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126. Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SASC), White J at 12.

555

[33.8.440]

TRESPASS

6

7

8 9

Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SASC), White J at 14. See also Fisher v Police (SA) (2004) 154 A Crim R 511; [2004] SASC 232, White J at [33]; R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97, McColl JA at [57]–[72], Howie J at [185]–[187]. R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97, McColl JA at [65]–[87] (Studdert and Howie JJ agreeing), citing Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451, Taylor J at 454–455. White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [368]–[375]. White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [364].

[33.8.450] The preferred view of Australian authorities is that consent (see [33.8.400]) may provide a defence to intentional torts such as assault or battery:1 see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]. This is subject to certain serious cases for which consent provides no defence at criminal law (see [33.8.420]), such as grievous bodily harm or manslaughter. McHugh J in Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300 stated that a person who intentionally inflicts harm on another person must prove “that the harm was lawfully consented to or that the harm occurred in circumstances which the law recognizes as a justification or excuse”, the onus being on the defendant to plead and establish the plaintiff’s consent.2 However in White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA argued cogently in obiter dicta for the contrary view, qualifying his conclusion by stating that the evidentiary burden may shift to the defendant where evidence supportive of fraud has been adduced.3 His Honour recognised that this position was contrary to the persuasive authorities cited above.

1 See “Consent” [33.9.200]–[33.9.280]. See Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [244]. See generally Syrota G, “Consensual Fist Fights and Other Brawls: Are They a Crime?” (1996) 26 UWAL Rev 169; Yeo S, “Determining Consent in Body Contact Sports” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 199; but see Blay SKN, “Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person” (1987) 61 ALJ 25 (advocating the placing of the onus on the plaintiff in an action for battery); compare the discussion on differing burden of proof between highway and non-highway trespass to the person: see [33.8.310]. 2 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, McHugh J at 310–311 (CLR), citing as support the cases of Hart v Herron [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-201 (NSWSC); Sibley v Milutinovic [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-013 (ACTSC); Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (for the Court) at 1177 (WLR): see also [33.8.370]. See also Re Lenfield (1993) 114 FLR 195 (ACTSC). See generally Retsas AP and Forrester K, “Consent: Implications for Health Care Practitioners” (1995) 2 JLM 317.

556

[33.8.460]

3

TRESPASS TO PERSON

White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [94]–130] (Barrett and Emmett JJA agreeing),

[33.8.460] Damages awarded for assault in the absence of personal injury or nervous shock (see [33.8.2130]) arising from it will be aggravated or exemplary damages.1 Where personal injury, nervous shock or similar psychiatric or medical condition results from the assault,2 compensatory damages may also be awarded: see [33.8.410]. An award of aggravated damages for trespass may be awarded where it is consistent with the principles of privacy and exclusive possession:3 see [33.8.470]. In New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court held: It is well established that the tort protects the interest of the plaintiff in maintaining the right to exclusive possession of [his or] her place of residence, free from uninvited physical intrusion by strangers. … Aggravated damages are a form of general damages, given by way of compensation for injury to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the wrongdoing. The interest of the plaintiff against invasion of the exclusive possession of the plaintiff extends to the freedom from disturbance of those persons present there with the leave of the plaintiff, at least as family members or as an incident of some other bona fide domestic relationship. The affront to such persons may aggravate the infringement of the right of the plaintiff to enjoy exclusive and quiet possession.4

In ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274,5 Hargrave AJA (Ashley and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreeing) set out the elements of the tort of assault in circumstances where no battery or other physical contact has occurred. Included in the summary at point (5), Hargrave AJA stated that the “plaintiff’s reasonable apprehension [that a threat by the defendant to inflict harmful or offensive contact will be carried out] caused injury, loss or damage to the plaintiff”. In Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J concluded that Hargrave AJA’s point (5) “must be understood in the context of a claim for special damages” since “assault is actionable without proof of damage” (ie actionable per se).6 Insofar as Kyrou J was making clear the absence of any requirement for injury, loss or damage for recovery by a plaintiff of ordinary damages, his Honour (with respect) must be correct. An injunction may be awarded to restrain a future apprehended assault and/or battery.7

1

See “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. See also “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90] regarding the protection of good samaritans and volunteers who act in good faith from the risk of civil liability. For a discussion of exemplary damages in the context of a finding of vicarious liability, see Smith v Cheeky Monkeys Restaurant (2009) 9

557

[33.8.460]

TRESPASS

2

3

4

5 6 7

DCLR (NSW) 241; [2009] NSWDC 257 (vicarious liability of employer for a trespass to the person committed by an employee; exemplary damages can be awarded against employer); Varmedja v Varmedja [2008] NSWCA 177, Tobias JA at [159]–[162] (Hodgson and McColl JJA agreeing); see also Walker P, “Vicarious Liability for Exemplary Damages: A Matter of Strict Liability?” (2009) 83 ALJ 548. See “Personal Injury” [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]. See generally Handford PR, Mullany and Handford’s Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage (2nd ed, Lawbook Co., 2006) at [2.70]–[2.100]. New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court at [29]–[32]; see also Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231. For further discussion of trespass to land, see [33.8.480]–[33.8.580]. New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court at [29]–[31]; New South Wales v Corby [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-050; [2010] NSWCA 27, Basten JA at [47]–[48] (Beazley and Tobias JJA agreeing). ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559; [2008] VSCA 274, Hargrave AJA at [16] (Ashley and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreeing). Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [226]. Egan v Egan [1975] Ch 218; [1975] 2 WLR 503; Fitzwilliam v Beckman [1978] Qd R 398; Zimitat v Douglas [1979] Qd R 454; Parry v Crooks (1981) 27 SASR 1 (FC); Corvisy v Corvisy [1982] 2 NSWLR 557; Daley v Martin (No 1) [1982] Qd R 23. See generally Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff; Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [22.130]–[22.140]; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [3.200].

Trespass to Land [33.8.470] “Trespass to land”1 is committed by an act of a defendant which constitutes a direct invasion of land in the possession of a plaintiff2 (see [33.8.500]) or otherwise directly infringes that possession without lawful authority, justification or excuse, and the defendant intended that result or should have foreseen it. Trespass to land is actionable without proof of damage.3 It is not at common law a criminal offence, but is made so under the provisions of various statutes relating to enclosed lands.4 Trespass to land may be committed either intentionally or negligently: see [33.8.490]. In intentional trespass to land, mistake, however reasonable, is no defence: see [33.8.330]. This, together with the fact that the tort is actionable without proof of damage, enables trespass to be used as a means of determining title to land. A deliberate trespass is not a trifling matter.5 The possessor may seek an injunction against the alleged trespasser (see [33.8.590]), who would be entitled to succeed if they could prove a better title to the land: see [33.8.480]. Humphrey v Nowland (1859) 2 Legge 1167 stated that: [A] mere trespasser cannot, by the very act of trespass, immediately and without

558

[33.8.470]

TRESPASS TO LAND

acquiescence, give himself what the law understands by “possession” against the person whom he ejects, and drive the latter to produce his title, if he can, without delay, reinstate himself in his former possession.6

1

2

3

4

5 6

“Land” includes buildings on the land, fixtures, trees and unsevered crops. For example, see SSYBA Pty Ltd v Lane [2013] WASC 445 (affixing brackets onto a concrete building wall). See New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court at [29]; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 68 ALJR 401; 72 A Crim R 32, Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 435–436 (CLR) (dealing with the allied criminal offence of trespass to land). Dumont v Miller (1873) 4 AJR 152 (VSC); Waters v Maynard (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 618; 41 WN (NSW) 166 (FC); Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 645, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 654–655 (CLR); Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; 78 ALJR 1099; [2004] HCA 37, Hayne J at [241]; Hill v Higgins [2012] NSWSC 270, Harrison J at [36]. However, aggravated damages may be awarded where there is a fundamental breach to the enjoyment of exclusive and quiet possession: New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court at [31]: see [33.8.460]. Exemplary damages may be awarded where the trespasser has acted in an outrageous and oppressive manner: New South Wales v Ibbett, the Court at [39]. See also [33.8.580]; “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 89(1); Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth), ss 11 – 12, 20; Enclosed Lands Protection Act 1943 (ACT), s 4; Trespass on Territory Land Act 1932 (ACT), s 4; Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901 (NSW), s 4; Trespass Act 1987 (NT), ss 5 – 8, 11; Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld), s 11; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), s 17, 17A; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), ss 14A – 14D, 19A; Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic), s 9(1)(d) (trespassing in public places); Criminal Code (WA), s 70A (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule). Hill v Higgins [2012] NSWSC 270, Harrison J at [36], citing Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 654–655 (CLR). Humphrey v Nowland (1859) 2 Legge 1167 (NSWSCFC), Dickinson J (for the Court) at 1169 (citing Browne v Dawson (1840) 12 Ad & E 624; 113 ER 950, Lord Denman CJ (for the Queen’s Bench) at 629 (Ad & E)), reversed without disturbing this point in Humphrey v Nowland (1862) 15 Moo PC 343; 15 ER 524 (PC), Chelmsford LJ (for the Privy Council) at 352 (Moo PC). Further, where legal title exists, the courts have been easily satisfied that acts of the holder of that title in relation to the land amount to possession: Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19; [1969] 2 WLR 1359 (PC (Bahamas)); Baker’s Creek Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Hack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) Eq 207; 10 WN (NSW) 217 (FC), Owen CJ at 226 (LR (NSW) Eq). It is different where the defendant is in undisputed possession of land to which the plaintiff claims title. There the court will generally refuse to grant an injunction for trespass, so the plaintiff must sue in ejectment for recovery of the land: Pedler v Washband [1949] St R Qd 116; Forbes v Cocks [1950] QWN 14 (QSC); but see Maiden v Maiden (1909) 7 CLR 727; 9 SR (NSW) 396; 26 WN (NSW) 77 (defendant son claimed possession of his mother’s farm

559

[33.8.470]

TRESPASS

under an alleged agreement with his plaintiff mother; it was held that notwithstanding the claim was substantively an action for ejectment, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to grant equitable injunctive relief). See generally Bethune v Heffernan [1986] VR 417; (1985) 20 A Crim R 122 (defendants in the foyer of a police station became trespassers when they refused to leave the premises on being requested to leave by the police officer). See generally Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff; Real Property “Rights between Concurrent Owners” [28.1.2270]–[28.1.2480]; “Indefeasibility of Title” [28.3.170]–[28.3.570]; “Possession” [28.16.10]ff. As to the historical meaning of a claim for ejectment, see Menzies J’s explanation in Commonwealth v Anderson (1960) 105 CLR 303; 34 ALJR 323 at 320 (CLR). See also Broadway Pty Ltd v Lewis [2012] WASC 373.

[33.8.480] In a claim of trespass to land, a plaintiff need not establish a legal title to the land. The title required is possession, not ownership. In Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555; 58 LGRA 289, the plaintiffs were held to have a sufficient title to sue in respect of an invasion by someone not claiming ownership, although the plaintiffs had no documentary title and sued only on the basis that they had treated the land as their own over a period. Possession at common law involves both physical control and intention. The requirement of physical control is satisfied by proof of the defendant’s actual control over the land, the requirement of intention by proof of the plaintiff’s intention to assert exclusive possession over the land, tolerating entry only by those who had their permission (though joint possession is possible). Possessory title prevails against everyone except a person who has a superior title.1 While the principles were worked out in relation to Old System land, they apply equally to land under the Torrens system.2 A person admitted to land for a special and temporary purpose, such as conducting building operations, may be held to have exclusive possession in some circumstances.3 However, if the plaintiff is only using the land under a licence which falls short of giving exclusive possession, there is generally no title to sue in trespass4 even if the acts done interfere with the use and enjoyment of the licence:5 see [33.8.520]–[33.8.550]. The true owner of land may in certain circumstances commit trespass to it. For example, a tenant of land has an action in trespass against the true owner for any entries onto the land which are against the will of the tenant and not provided for in the lease:6 although see [33.8.2140]. Where there is a contest concerning possession between a person having a lawful title as owner or tenant and a person seeking to prove possession, the lawfulness of the title of one party sways the balance in that party’s favour.7

1 Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555; 58 LGRA 289 (CA), McHugh JA at 563–564 (NSWLR) (Kirby P and Hope JA agreeing); Wheeler v Baldwin (1934) 52 CLR 609, Dixon J at 632–633; Perry v Clissold [1907] AC 73; (1906) 4 CLR 374 (PC), Macnaghten LJ (for the Privy Council) at 79 (AC).

560

[33.8.490]

2

3 4

5

6

7

TRESPASS TO LAND

Spark v Whale Three Minute Car Wash (Cremorne Junction) Pty Ltd (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 1087; Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555; 58 LGRA 289 (CA), McHugh JA at 563 (NSWLR) (Hope JA agreeing). See also John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (NSW Branch) (2009) 178 FCR 461; 186 IR 17; [2009] FCA 645, Moore J at [61]–[75] (whether occupation of building site by builder amounted to possession sufficient to bring trespass proceedings against union officials). See also Real Property “Exclusive Possession” [28.7.150]; “Licence and Third Parties” [28.10.270]–[28.10.280]; “General Principles” [28.16.1170]. Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Australian Building Construction Employees’ & Builders Labourers’ Federation (1988) 83 ALR 385 (FCA). Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415 (HC), Gallen J at 428–429; Georgeski v Owners Corp SP 49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534; [2004] NSWSC 1096, Barrett J at [41], [73]–[74], [107]–[108]; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; 76 ALJR 1098; [2002] HCA 28, McHugh J at [502]–[504]. See Vaughan v Shire of Benalla (1891) 17 VLR 129 (FC). The plaintiff must have something more than a mere licence (eg a possessory or proprietary interest): Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd v Reid [1946] VLR 237 (FC) (affirmed in Reid v Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1); Mason v Clarke [1955] AC 778; [1955] 2 WLR 853, Viscount Simonds at 794 (Oaksey LJ agreeing, and Morton LJ agreeing on this point), Keith LJ at 806 (AC) (plaintiff entitled to enforce profit a prendre by an action for trespass; sufficient degree of “possession” was found to support such an action); Simpson v Knowles [1974] VR 190; (1973) 29 LGRA 313, Norris J at 195–196 (VR); McDowall v Reynolds [2004] QCA 245, McPherson JA at [7] (Davies and Mullins JJA agreeing). However, see Burwood Land Co Ltd v Knox (1895) 21 VLR 381 (FC) (the mortgagor and a grazing licensee jointly in possession could maintain a trespass action for injury to their possessory rights): see also [33.8.830]. In Vaughan v Shire of Benalla, it was held that the plaintiff could sue on trespass for interference with his rights under a grazing licence. Vaughan v Shire of Benalla is inconsistent with other cases allowing a mere licensee to sue for trespass: see, eg Bateman v Lashbrook (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 478; 47 WN (NSW) 198 (FC). The key to understanding the outcome in these inconsistent cases appears to be the kind of analysis conducted by Barrett J in Georgeski v Owners Corp SP 49833 (2004) 62 NSWLR 534; [2004] NSWSC 1096, namely, an anaylsis of the rights and interest conferred on the plaintiff by the licence and/or any relevant statute. See generally Real Property “Licence and Third Parties” [28.10.270]–[28.10.280]. Gifford v Dent (1926) 71 SJ 83 (CHD) (sign projecting into air space over plaintiff tenant’s premises constituted trespass justifying injunction) (see [33.8.580]); Mason v Clarke [1955] AC 778; [1955] 2 WLR 853, Viscount Simonds at 794 (AC) (Oaksey LJ agreeing, and Morton LJ agreeing on this point); Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (Great Britain & Ireland) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 334; [1957] 2 WLR 1007. See also Real Property “Landlord and Tenant” [28.7.10]ff. Baker’s Creek Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Hack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) Eq 207; 10 WN (NSW) 217 (FC).

[33.8.490] Trespass to land may be committed intentionally or negligently. Thus, in League Against Cruel Sports Ltd v Scott [1986] QB 240; [1985] 3 WLR 400, in relation to the liability for trespass to land of a master of hounds for an entry by the hounds on the plaintiff’s land, it was said that the

561

[33.8.490]

TRESPASS

master was liable if he intended their entry or by negligence he failed to prevent them from entering.1 Trespass to land in this respect merely conforms to the normally understood position as regards trespass in Australia (see [33.8.310]), though it is out of line with the rule regarding trespass to the person established by the English Court of Appeal in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573: see [33.8.1600].

1

League Against Cruel Sports Ltd v Scott [1986] QB 240; [1985] 3 WLR 400, Park J at 247–252 (QB).

[33.8.500] An act of a defendant must directly cause the relevant interference with land. The issue of directness is different from the issue of whether or not the defendant is at fault in relation to it. For example, in a trespass action brought by the plaintiff against the Esso Petroleum Co for discharging oil from its tanker into the Ribble estuary, from where it was carried by the force of the tide onto the plaintiff’s foreshore and into a lake, Denning LJ (with the agreement of Radcliffe and Tucker LJJ in a subsequent appeal to the House of Lords) took the view that the causation was too indirect to constitute trespass.1 Morris LJ, however, stated that “there may be trespass if something is thrown upon land or if the force of the wind or of moving water is employed to cause a thing to go on to land”.2 This appears to confuse the intention needed to commit trespass with the issue of directness: see also [33.8.380] and [33.8.490]. In two very similar cases, Gregory v Piper (1829) 9 B & C 591; 109 ER 220 and Watson v Cowen [1959] Tas SR 194, the issue of directness is either ignored or assumed. In Gregory v Piper, the question was whether the defendant employer was liable in trespass for ordering his employee to pile various types of rubbish outside the plaintiff’s land but not to allow it to touch the plaintiff’s wall. The rubbish, having dried out in the course of time, rolled down a slope and settled against the wall. The Court held that the defendant was liable on the ground that the movement of the rubbish against the wall was a “natural”3 or “probable”4 consequence of the original dumping. Whether it was a direct consequence was not addressed. Liability was imposed on the defendant in similar circumstances in Watson v Cowen. The defendant had ordered his independent contractor to bulldoze some land at the top of a slope. The earth that was removed shifted down the slope and eventually settled on the land of the plaintiff. Green J held that to be trespass on the ground that it was inevitable, Gibson and Crawford JJ on the ground that the movement of the earth down the slope was the natural and probable consequence of the bulldozing. The issue of directness was again ignored.

562

[33.8.510]

TRESPASS TO LAND

If the consequence is indirect, then the plaintiff must establish another tort such as negligence or nuisance:5 see [33.8.490].

1

2 3 4 5

Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 3 WLR 200 (CA), Denning LJ at 195–196 (QB), reversed by a majority of the House of Lords on appeal in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corp [1956] AC 218; [1956] 2 WLR 81, but see the dissent of Radcliffe LJ at 242, Tucker LJ at 244 (AC). Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 3 WLR 200 (CA), Morris LJ (dissenting) at 204 (QB). Gregory v Piper (1829) 9 B & C 591; 109 ER 220, Bayley J at 593, Parke J at 595 (B & C). Gregory v Piper (1829) 9 B & C 591; 109 ER 220, Parke J at 594 (B & C). Lemmon v Webb [1894] 3 Ch 1 (CA) (damage caused by the intrusion of trees boughs encroaching onto plaintiff’s neighbouring land due to a storm was nuisance, not trespass) (affirmed in Lemmon v Webb [1895] AC 1). See also Young v Wheeler [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-126 (NSWSC); Robson v Leischke (2008) 72 NSWLR 98; 159 LGERA 280; [2008] NSWLEC 152, Preston CJ at [40]. For a case of fire spreading from one shop to another within a single complex, see Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 77 ATR 242; [2009] WASC 52 (brought in negligence and nuisance rather than trespass). See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff.

[33.8.510] Unauthorised entry is the normal form of trespass to land. Any form of entry, however slight, is trespass unless it falls within the scope of a licence, express or implied:1 see [33.8.520]. It has been held to be trespass to land to place a ladder against the plaintiff’s wall.2 Causing the entry of an object on to the land is also trespass.3 Shooting the plaintiff’s cat, which was on the roof of a shed on the plaintiff’s land, from the defendant’s land has also been held to involve trespass to land by invasion of the plaintiff’s air space:4 see [33.8.580]. The Supreme Court of Tasmania pronounced itself satisfied that “an owner’s rights extend to a height sufficient to cover the facts of this case”.5

1 2

3 4 5

Simpson v Bannerman (1932) 47 CLR 378; 33 SR (NSW) 13; 50 WN (NSW) 25. See generally Butt P, “Conveyancing and Property” (2010) 84 ALJ 213. Westripp v Baldock [1938] 2 All ER 779 (KBD) (affirmed on appeal in Westripp v Baldock [1939] 1 All ER 279 (CA)) (defendant builder placed ladders, planks and sand up against plaintiff’s wall, causing damage by damp). Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242 (QBD). Davies v Bennison (1927) 22 Tas LR 52 (disapproved in Storm v Geeves [1965] Tas SR 252). Davies v Bennison (1927) 22 Tas LR 52, Nicholls CJ at 57.

563

[33.8.520]

TRESPASS

[33.8.520] Entry within the terms of a licence given by an occupier (see [33.8.480]), whether express1 or implied,2 is not trespass: see [33.8.510] and [33.8.540]. The burden of establishing the existence of such a licence rests on the entrant. For example, there is an implied licence for pedestrians on the highway to step onto an occupier’s open driveway to avoid a vehicle parked on the footpath. There would also be an implied licence to enter the driveway for insignificant entries such as to retrieve property or an errant child.3 A person who enters the land for a purpose outside the terms of the licence is a trespasser even though a licence to enter exists: see also [33.8.480]. In Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426, a person who had the authority of the occupier of the house to keep an eye on it while the occupier was away, and who was told about the whereabouts of the house key, was held to be a trespasser when he gained entry to the house for the purpose of committing theft, even though he clearly had authority to enter the house for reasons connected with security. Mason J stated that: [The] common law principle [is] that a person who enters premises for a purpose alien to the terms of a licence given to him to enter the premises enters as a trespasser. It is a matter of determining the scope of the authority to enter, which the licence or invitation confers. If a person enters for a purpose outside the scope of the authority then he stands in no better position than a person who enters with no authority at all. His entry is unrelated to the authority.4

Among the examples of implied licence examined, the High Court in Barker v The Queen approved Byrne v Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 762, in which cinema inspectors visited the plaintiff’s cinema to investigate fraud, bought tickets and watched a performance, but the purpose of their entry was to check the numbers on the tickets and the number of the audience. They were held not to be trespassers since there was an invitation to persons generally to enter the cinema and that could not, in the circumstances, be limited to a particular purpose which would render the inspectors’ conduct trespassory.5 Byrne v Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd was applied by the Full Federal Court in Barker v The Queen (1994) 54 FCR 451; 78 A Crim R 1.6 On the other hand, in Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457,7 the plaintiff’s business premises were open during business hours to members of the public. The premises were visited by the defendant’s television reporters and camera operators. The reporter harassed the staff and asked questions which had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s ordinary business, and the camera operator took video recordings of the premises as well as inside interior doors. The defendants were found to have trespassed from the moment of entry, since their unannounced entry was for a purpose unrelated to any

564

[33.8.530]

TRESPASS TO LAND

implied invitation to the public to visit the premises to do business with the plaintiff or bona fide seek information.

1

2

3 4 5

6

7

Amess v Hanlon (1873) 4 AJR 90 (VSCFC); see also TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82. It is a defence even though the licence was given by mistake. See also Real Property “Licences” [28.10.10]ff. Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286; Amstad v Brisbane City Council (No 1) [1968] Qd R 334; (1967) 16 LGRA 372; Singh v Smithenbecker (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 207; 40 WN (NSW) 11 (FC); Semple v Mant (1985) 39 SASR 282; 21 A Crim R 110 (FC). See also Real Property “Licences” [28.10.10]ff. Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 59 ALJR 124; 13 A Crim R 250, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ at 7 (CLR). See Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426, Mason J at 346–347, see also Brennan and Deane JJ at 364–365 (CLR). Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426, Mason J at 343–344, Brennan and Deane JJ at 359 (CLR); Byrne v Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 762 (CHD). Barker v The Queen (1994) 54 FCR 451; 78 A Crim R 1, Jenkinson and O’Loughlin JJ at 472–473 (FCR). For later case treatment, see also Walker as Commissioner for Fair Trading (WA) v Rugs A Million Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 127, Simmonds J at [14]–[20]; R v Davidson; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1996] 2 Qd R 505 (CA) (in a murder investigation or an offence of similar gravity, deception and secret tape-recordings of conversations by police, not being illegal conduct, did not the affect admissibility of confessional evidence). See also Fletcher v Harris (2005) 190 FLR 59; [2005] ACTSC 27, Higgins CJ at [49], [59]–[61]. Followed in Emcorp Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1988] 2 Qd R 169; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82, Spigelman CJ at [50]ff (Mason P and Grove J agreeing); see generally Handley RP, “Trespass to Land as a Remedy for Unlawful Intrusion on Privacy” (1998) 62 ALJ 216; Hudson AH, “Consumer Protection, Trespass and Injunctions” (1988) 104 LQR 18. However, see Church of Scientology Inc v Transmedia Productions Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-101 (NSWSC). It is not trespass to land to photograph a person’s land from a public street or adjoining land: Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704; 55 LGRA 165, Young J at 706 (NSWLR). See generally Stewart D, “Protecting Privacy, Property, and Possums: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd” (2002) 30 FL Rev 177.

[33.8.530] Those persons who enter as of right or in execution of public duty do not commit trespass whatever may be the will of an occupier: but see [33.8.540]. Such persons may be entrants on premises which the occupier is bound to hold open to the public, or bound to hold open to the public under some conditions, as in the case of parks and highways or public buildings and railway premises. They may be entrants on private premises for a purpose authorised by law, such as police officers and fire officers in some circumstances.

565

[33.8.530]

TRESPASS

An important category of entrants as of right on private premises are those who enter in execution of the criminal law. Those entries are often made under statutory powers, but at common law entry was justified in four cases by:1 (1)

a police officer or citizen in order to prevent murder;

(2)

a police officer or citizen if a felony in fact has been committed and the felon has been followed to a house;

(3)

a police officer or citizen if a felony is about to be committed and could be committed unless prevented; and

(4)

a police officer following an offender running away from an affray.2 In other cases, a warrant of arrest is required.3

At common law, a police officer charged with the duty of serving a summons to appear before a court of summary jurisdiction is not entitled, without the consent of the person in possession of land and without any implied leave or licence, to go on the land in order to serve the summons. The summons is not coercive in nature and does not compel a defendant to appear; it is only for the purpose of giving notice to the defendant. The rule is otherwise where the summons is to appear to answer an indictment,4 or where the entry is for the purpose of executing a court’s judgment, order or warrant. A statutory power to serve a summons does not necessarily carry a power to enter on land against the will of the occupier.5

1 Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA), Hope AJA at 630 (NSWLR) (Meagher JA agreeing), citing Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849; [1981] 2 WLR 814, Donaldson LJ at 853 (QB) (Hodgson J agreeing). See also Criminal Procedure “Investigation of Persons and Places” [11.1.1390]–[11.1.3370]. 2 Compare New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57 where two police officers wrongly entered land without lawful justification. 3 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 647–648 (CLR); see Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA). See also Criminal Procedure “Arrest” [11.1.140]–[11.1.740]. 4 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 641, 643–644 (CLR); Munday v Gill (1930) 44 CLR 38, Dixon J at 86 (CLR). 5 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 644–645 (CLR).

[33.8.540] The implied licence which police have to enter premises (see [33.8.530]) and speak to an occupier at their door may be expressly negatived in advance1 or withdrawn during its course:2 see [33.8.570]. In Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 59 ALJR 124; 13 A Crim R 250, Brennan J found himself unable to adopt the reasoning in English cases3 where

566

[33.8.550]

TRESPASS TO LAND

“vulgar and vigorous injunctions to depart were construed as mere abuse falling short of an express withdrawal of a licence to be on the premises”.4

1 2 3 4

Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231. Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434, at 435–436 (KB). Snook v Mannion [1982] Crim LR 601 (QBD); Gilham v Breidenbach [1982] RTR 328 (QBD). Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 59 ALJR 124; 13 A Crim R 250, Brennan J (dissenting) at 19 (CLR).

[33.8.550] Trespass to land may be committed by some trespassory act done on land after lawful entry: see also [33.8.520]. In Singh v Smithenbecker (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 207; 40 WN (NSW) 11, the defendant had entered land lawfully to discuss with the owner of the land the delivery of sheep which he had bought from the owner. He then without permission drove the sheep off the land and removed the gate of the property from its hinges in doing so. For those acts, he was held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to be liable in trespass. In Bond v Kelly (1873) 4 AJR 153, a person who had been given permission to enter land in order to cut timber, cut more than the permitted amount. He was held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria to be a trespasser as to the excess. In those cases, the unauthorised acts could clearly be regarded as trespasses to the land itself. However, in Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280, the defendants, who had a contractual right to enter and retake possession of certain goods which they had sold to the plaintiffs but which had not been paid for, entered and took those goods. However, the defendants also took other goods they were not entitled to take, and entry for this latter purpose was clearly not authorised. Barwick CJ and Menzies J thought that in respect of the original entry there could not be a partial trespass to land which was both for a lawful and an unlawful purpose.1 There was therefore no trespass to land. Kitto J also apparently thought the original entry was non-trespassory but that subsequent trespasses to land were committed when the defendant seized the wrong goods, which exceeded the limits of the licence.2 In Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597, police officers who entered a property pursuant to a search warrant authorising “entry by day” were found to have committed trespass to that property when they lawfully entered the property during the day but did not conclude the search until after sunset. In Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; 82 ALJR 1021; [2008] HCA 26, six police officers entered a property following a report of domestic violence at the premises. The police found the appellant but his fiancee had left. After providing the police with the telephone number of the place to which his fiancee

567

[33.8.550]

TRESPASS

had gone and permitting them to conduct a cursory check of the premises, the appellant asked them to leave. The police refused, and a scuffle broke out. The High Court held that whatever the power the police possess at common law to prevent breaches of the peace, it does not extend to, and should not be enlarged to, a power to enter and remain on the premises to investigate breaches of the peace: see also [33.8.570]. The Court held there was no continuing or threatened breach of the peace until the violence resulting from the police’s refusal to leave.3 Further, neither s 357F nor s 357H of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) authorised the police to remain on the premises.4 Where a licence has been validly revoked by the licensor, the licensee has a reasonable period of time within which to vacate the land. If that is not done, the licensee becomes a trespasser:5 see [33.8.470], [33.8.510]–[33.8.520] and [33.8.570].

1 Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280, Barwick CJ and Menzies J at 598–599 (CLR). 2 Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280, Kitto J at 606 (CLR). 3 Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; 82 ALJR 1021; [2008] HCA 26, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [40]–[54]. 4 Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; 82 ALJR 1021; [2008] HCA 26, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [26]–[39]. 5 Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605, Latham CJ at 619, Starke J at 631 (CLR). It does not appear to be trespass for a tenant of land to hold over after the expiration of the tenancy: Falkingham v Fregon (1899) 25 VLR 211; Commonwealth v Anderson (1960) 105 CLR 303; 34 ALJR 323; Sommerhalder v Burjan [1962] SASR 271. But see Reschke v Hensley [1913] SALR 105 (FC), where the finding of trespass was not raised on appeal: Hensley v Reschke (1914) 18 CLR 452.

[33.8.555] A mistaken view of a right to enter onto property does not excuse the entry or provide a valid defence to a trespass.1 In Schumann v Abbott [1961] SASR 149, the wrongful insistence of two private investigators that they had a right to enter certain premises by license, contrary to fact, constituted trespass to land justifying an award of exemplary damages.

1 Basely v Clarkson (1681) 3 Lev 37; 83 ER 565, cited by McMeekin J in Moore v Devanjul Pty Ltd (No. 5) [2013] QSC 323 at [16].

[33.8.560] Trespass “ab initio”1 was a common law doctrine that applied where entry on land or premises was made under authority of law rather

568

[33.8.570]

TRESPASS TO LAND

than by the consent of an occupier. If, by reason of acts committed after entry by the entrant, that authority was abused, the original entry was regarded as trespassory.2 The doctrine of trespass ab initio did not apply where something was lawfully done on the land justifying the original entry, even though abusive acts were also committed.3 It is unclear from the authority what is meant by “abuse of authority”. Clearly it does not extend to a mere omission, for example a failure to pay for food and drink, since an omission cannot be a trespass.4 It may follow from this that the abuse of authority must itself take the form of a trespass. If so, the only value of the doctrine to a plaintiff is to allow damages to be awarded for trespass to land from the time of the original trespass. Under the modern law of damages, that seems unlikely to make a significant difference to the amount of damages awarded. If, however, the abuse of authority extends to a non-trespassory act, trespass ab initio has a substantive function. None of the cases point firmly in that direction however. In Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299; [1968] 2 WLR 201, Lord Denning MR talked of trespass ab initio as being no longer law, and the rest of the Court of Appeal treated it as obsolete.5

1 2

3 4 5

“Ab initio”: “[F]rom the beginning”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 1. For early Australian authority, see Windeyer v Riddell (1847) 1 Legge 295 (NSWSC FC). However, see McGrath v Marshall (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 106 (doctrine of trespass ab initio not applicable where entry into an inn was by authority of the landlord and not through common law right as travellers). Canadian Pacific Wine Co Ltd v Tuley [1921] 2 AC 417; [1921] 60 DLR 520 (PC (Can)); Elias v Pasmore [1934] 2 KB 164. Six Carpenters’ Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 146; 77 ER 695 (QB). Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299; [1968] 2 WLR 201 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 313, Diplock LJ at 317 (QB); Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426, Mason J at 344, Brennan and Deane JJ at 363 (CLR); but see Cinnamond v British Airports Authority [1980] 1 WLR 582 (CA), where Lord Denning MR at 588–589 took a different view (car-hire drivers loitering in airport and offering services contrary to Heathrow Airport “byelaws” were banned from entering the airport save as bona fide airline passengers).

[33.8.570] The continuation of a person’s or object’s presence on land is a continuing trespass giving rise to new causes of action arising from day to day, where that presence is trespassory. In Holmes v Wilson (1839) 10 Ad & El 503; 113 ER 190, bulwarks were erected on the plaintiff’s land. Compensation was paid but the bulwarks remained. The plaintiff commenced a second proceeding. Lord Denman stated that:

569

[33.8.570]

TRESPASS

Trespass is the proper remedy for wrongfully continuing a building on plaintiff’s land, the erection of which the plaintiff has already recovered compensation; and a recovery, with satisfaction, for erecting it, does not operate as a purchase of the right to continue such erection ... [T]he former and present action are for different trespasses. The former was for erecting the buttresses. This action is for continuing the buttresses so erected. The continued use of the buttresses for the support of the road, under such circumstances, was a fresh trespass.1

In Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421, the defendant builders completed building work on land with the permission of the occupier, but left rubbish on the roof of the house. Under agreement with the occupier, they were bound to remove the rubbish within a reasonable time. The plaintiff then acquired the tenancy of the premises, and some time afterwards the basement of the premises became flooded by rainwater when the rubbish entered and blocked a gully on the premises. It was held by the Court of Appeal that leaving the rubbish was a trespass and that it was a continuing trespass, and therefore the plaintiff as tenant in possession had the right to claim damages for it.2

1 Quoted with approval by McKechnie J in SSYBA Pty Ltd v Lane [2013] WASC 445 at [60]. 2 In Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421 (CA), Scrutton LJ at 425–427 (KB) characterised the matter as an action for trespass, rather than on case or negligence, as damage resulted directly from the defendants’ leaving the rubbish, and no duty was owed to the new tenant. See also Sargant LJ at 427–428, Greer LJ at 428 (KB) (once the terms of the licence ended, the non-removal of the rubbish gave rise to continuing trespass and a damages claim).

[33.8.580] An infringement of air space above a plaintiff’s land may give rise to an action for trespass to land:1 see [33.8.510]. However, an occupier is not entitled to protect the air space above the land up to the sky. In Lord Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479; [1977] 3 WLR 136, the defendants had flown an aeroplane over the plaintiff’s land in order to take an aerial photograph of it. The plaintiff objected and sued in trespass. The Court found there to be no trespass. Griffiths J observed: The problem is to balance the rights of an owner to enjoy the use of his land against the rights of the general public to take advantage of all that science now offers in the use of air space. This balance is in my judgment best struck in our present society by restricting the rights of an owner in the air space above his land to such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land … and declaring that above that height he has no greater rights in the air space than any other member of the public.2

Griffiths J was unimpressed by the plaintiff’s argument about the exploitative nature of the flight and the plaintiff’s fear that the photographs might fall into the wrong hands. Similar photographs could lawfully be taken from adjoining

570

[33.8.580]

TRESPASS TO LAND

land or the air space above it. However, he thought that constant surveillance of the plaintiff’s land by air flights over the land might give rise to an actionable nuisance.3 Although air flights are therefore in general excluded from the ambit of trespass,4 the exclusion has not been extended to building work which necessitates the occupation of the air space above the plaintiff’s land by machinery such as cranes or scaffolding, even if it does not interfere with general use and enjoyment. In Woollerton & Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 411, a compromise was arrived at.5 A trespass was found to exist through the insertion of a crane into the plaintiff’s air space and an injunction was awarded, but the injunction was suspended until the building work was complete. In Graham v KD Morris & Sons Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 1, the plaintiff was granted an injunction in relation to the intrusion by a crane jib which was occasionally suspended directly above the plaintiff’s house. In LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490; 74 LGRA 282, the defendants, having failed to reach agreement with the plaintiffs on the terms on which the defendants should be allowed to invade the plaintiff’s air space, began with the building work and the intrusion by scaffolding without permission. The Court issued a mandatory injunction against the defendants to remove the scaffolding and awarded damages to the plaintiffs in trespass based on the original sum he had asked for to allow the trespass.6

1

2 3 4

5

Barker v Adelaide City [1900] SALR 29 (FC) (electric cables above the plaintiff’s land); Lawlor v Johnston [1905] VLR 714 (placing of overhanging ventilation pipe); Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (Great Britain & Ireland) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 334; [1957] 2 WLR 1007 (advertising sign encroaching above tenant’s premises); Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 311; [2007] VSCA 311 (metal cladding of building extending over neighbouring property). See generally Browne D, “Airspace: Can It Be Sold? What Is It Worth?” (1992) 30 LSJ 42; McGill D, “Building Works Intruding Into Air Space” (1994) 24 QLSJ 159; Kincaid D, “The Sky Is the Limit: Ownership of Air Space and Its Effect on the Development of Land” (1994) 33 Valuer and Land Economist 47; Grattan S, “Judicial Reasoning and the Adjudication of Airspace Trespass” (1996) 4 APLJ 128. Lord Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479; [1977] 3 WLR 136, Griffiths J at 488 (QB). See generally “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff; Real Property “Physical Limits to Land” [28.15.10]ff; Transport “Aviation” [34.2.10]ff. The application of trespass to land by air flights is removed by legislation in some jurisdictions: Damage by Aircraft Act 1952 (NSW), s 2(1); Damage by Aircraft Act 1963 (Tas), s 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 30; Damage by Aircraft Act 1964 (WA), s 4. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, Queensland or South Australia. See also Transport “Statutory Provisions Affecting Surface Damage Liability” [34.2.4470]–[34.2.4490]. Woollerton & Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 411 (CHD).

571

[33.8.580]

TRESPASS

6

LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490; 74 LGRA 282. There is no real authority on the converse situation, ie the depth below the surface of land to which the landowner’s possession may be taken to extend: see, eg Di Napoli v New Beach Apartments Pty Ltd (2004) 11 BPR 21,493; [2004] NSWSC 52 (injunction granted for trespass into subsoil of plaintiff’s land and mandatory injunction to remove trespassory rock anchors); Lord Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479; [1977] 3 WLR 136, Griffiths J at 487–488 (QB). See generally Real Property “Depth Limitations” [28.15.300]. Mineral rights in Australia are normally vested in the State Crown. See Environment and Natural Resources “Mining” [14.12.10]ff.

[33.8.590] An injunction may be granted to restrain threatened trespass to land or its threatened continuance or repetition: see [33.8.470].1 It is also possible to issue an injunction to prevent disclosure of information or publication of photographs obtained by the trespass, where such disclosure would be “unconscionable”, meaning it would cause irreparable and unquantifiable damage.2 However, in exceptional cases of disproportionate harm or hardship constituting oppression of the trespasser, equitable damages are available in lieu of an injunction as a discretionary remedy.3

1 Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457; Church of Scientology Inc v Transmedia Productions Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-101 (NSWSC); Mosman Park Town v Dalden Properties Pty Ltd (1986) 64 LGRA 9 (WASC); HB Homes Pty Ltd v Beer [1986] 2 Qd R 379 (mandatory injunction); LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490; 74 LGRA 282 (mandatory injunction); SSYBA Pty Ltd v Lane [2013] WASC 445 (mandatory permanent injunction). See generally Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [4.80]; Handley RP, “Trespass to Land as a Remedy for Unlawful Intrusion on Privacy” (1998) 62 ALJ 216; Hudson AH, “Consumer Protection, Trespass and Injunctions” (1988) 104 LQR 18; Stewart D, “Protecting Privacy, Property, and Possums: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd” (2002) 30 FL Rev 177. 2 Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 (exemplary damages would sufficiently compensate for future damage, removing the need for an injunction); Emcorp Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1988] 2 Qd R 169 (injunction issued); Rinsale Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-231 (QSC); but see Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; 76 ALJR 1; [2001] HCA 63; Brighten Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 319; Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi (2011) 254 FLR 87; [2011] NSWSC 196 (“unconscionable” test applied; injunction refused in all three cases). 3 Break Fast Investments Pty Ltd v PCH Melbourne Pty Ltd (2007) 20 VR 311; [2007] VSCA 311, Dodds-Streeton JA at [46]–[49], [120], [135]–[139] (Ashley JA and Cavanough AJA agreeing).

572

[33.8.600]

TRESPASS TO LAND

[33.8.600] In addition to compensatory1 and aggravated2 damages, exemplary damages may be awarded for trespass to land: see [33.8.460], [33.8.470] and [33.8.410]. In Schumann v Abbott [1961] SASR 149, the wrongful insistence of two private investigators that they had a right to enter certain premises by license, contrary to fact, was held to justify an award of exemplary damages.3 In TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9, journalists gained entry to a property by deception to confront the managing director of a building company and to obtain film footage for a television program. The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that the conduct of the appellant and its journalist constituted a contumelious disregard of the rights of the managing director. The Court concluded that there was a proper basis for the award of exemplary damages where a trespasser has manifested a preparedness to infringe the legal rights of others and had commercial reasons to continue to do so.4 Decisions awarding exemplary damages for defamation are of little assistance in trespass to land, as the two areas of law protect different interests.5 The Court of Appeal further held that neither the element of public interest nor the substantial truth of the imputations made in the television program were related to the conduct constituting the trespass, and were therefore irrelevant to the assessment of damages for the trespass. The conduct leading to and constituting the trespass was unrelated to any issues of public interest in freedom of speech.6 In contrast to the decision in TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd, in Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi (2011) 254 FLR 87; [2011] NSWSC 196 Hall J concluded that the prerequisites for an award of exemplary damages were not made out in a case where young defendants were requested by a senior person in Animal Liberation to commit trespass by entering a piggery and filming and photographing the conditions therein for the purpose of showing the images to a veterinarian.7 The Court found that the defendants did not damage the property; they took precautionary disinfection and anti-contamination steps; and they did not themselves disclose the film and photographs or related information to the media or to anyone not immediately involved in their “investigation” of the animal welfare conditions at the piggery their entry was not one made of their own initiative for the purpose of advancing their own self-interest, but was done in pursuit of action which they wrongly and misguidedly considered to be a justified method of investigation.8

Where there is an overlap with statutory regimes such as the Australian Consumer Law,9 damages may be discounted accordingly, to avoid double counting.10

1

Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 (damages awarded comprising compensatory

573

[33.8.600]

TRESPASS

damages for damage to plaintiff’s shop and exemplary damages for outrageous behaviour of defendant); but see TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82, on requirement to distinguish the differing heads of damage. 2 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9, Spigelman CJ at [16] (Beazley JA agreeing), citing the primary judge. See also TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82, Spigelman CJ at [153], [157] (Mason P agreeing); Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi (2011) 254 FLR 87; [2011] NSWSC 196, Hall J at [173]–[174], [178]. 3 Schumann v Abbott [1961] SASR 149, Reed J at 158–160. 4 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9, Spigelman CJ at [28] (Beazley JA agreeing), Hodgson JA at [102]; see also New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57, the Court at [31] (aggravated damages may be awarded for a fundamental breach of the enjoyment of exclusive and quiet possession) and [39] (exemplary damages may be awarded where the trespasser has acted in an outrageous and oppressive manner). See generally “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. 5 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9, Spigelman CJ at [36] (Beazley JA agreeing), Hodgson JA at [98] (agreeing on this point). 6 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9, Spigelman CJ at [33]–[34] (Beazley JA agreeing), Hodgson JA at [98] (agreeing on this point). See generally Mallam P, Dawson S and Moriarty J, “Media and Internet Law and Practice” (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [12.815]. 7 Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi (2011) 254 FLR 87; [2011] NSWSC 196, Hall J at [168]–[172], [174]–[176]. 8 Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi (2011) 254 FLR 87; [2011] NSWSC 196 Hall J at [168]. 9 Australian Consumer Law found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. 10 See, eg Craftsman Homes Australia Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 519 (partly affirmed in TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323; [2008] NSWCA 9, without disturbing this point). Compare [33.8.1310], [33.8.1380], [33.8.1390]. The legislation may also affect the recovery of exemplary damages (eg for misleading and deceptive conduct): see generally Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.1.1960]–[35.1.1970]; “Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation” [35.4.560]–[35.4.670] (subject to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth), the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth): see [33.8.1080]).

574

Torts to Chattels [33.8.710] The main torts to chattels are trespass (see [33.8.720]–[33.8.780]), conversion (see [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]), detinue (see [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]) and replevin: see [33.8.970]. There is also an action on the case (see [33.8.20] and [33.8.940]) for wrongfully damaging or destroying a chattel. This action is particularly, though not exclusively, available to chattel owners who cannot establish title to maintain trespass, conversion or detinue, that is, they have neither possession nor the right to immediate possession of the chattel. Trespass is entirely concerned with the protection of possession. Conversion and detinue protect mainly proprietary rights in chattels, though they do this by requiring the plaintiff to establish a right to possession of the chattel. None of the main torts has the primary purpose of protecting against causing damage to the chattel, although they may do this incidentally. Causing damage to chattels may fall within the scope of a large number of other torts, for example negligence1 or action on the case.2 The term “chattel” refers to property of a tangible nature which is not land nor attached to land. There can be no trespass to property of an intangible nature such as an internet domain name3 or a telephone number.4 “Chattel” is a more precise term than “goods”, which seems to have a purely commercial significance. It is clear that the tortious protection now under consideration extends beyond items of purely commercial significance. Although the definition of chattel refers to property of a tangible nature, the torts under consideration may indirectly protect rights of an intangible nature by reason of the fact that the document establishing or evidencing the right is a chattel which may be tortiously dealt with. Further, the value of the document is not that of the paper itself but that of the right it protects. So shares5 and other documents including cheques6 fall within the relevant sphere of protection. Once an item of property attached to land becomes severed from it, it becomes a chattel.7 Offspring of domestic animals become, at birth, a chattel distinct from and separate to the mother (dam) for the purposes of the torts of conversion, detinue and, almost certainly, trespass, with title passing through the dam (except in the case of swans, in which case the young cygnets belong equally between to owner of the cock and the hen).8

1

Available to a mere possessor such as a bailee: The Winkfield [1902] P 42 (CA). See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; Contracts: Specific “Definition” [8.5.10]–[8.5.40].

575

[33.8.710]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Available for intentional or negligent conduct: Mears v London & South Western Railway Co (1862) 11 CB (NS) 850; 142 ER 1029 (CCP). Where negligence is relied on, the action appears indistinguishable from negligence itself. Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158 (plaintiff could not recover damages in conversion); OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762; [2005] 2 WLR 1174; [2005] EWCA Civ 106 (CA), Peter Gibson LJ at 777–778, Mance LJ (dissenting as to outcome) at 784 (QB) (no tort of conversion of a chose in action; did not amount to an interference with contractual relations), upheld by the House of Lords in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, although see Nicholls LJ (dissenting) at [221]–[237], Baroness Hale (dissenting) at [304]–[305], [308]–[317]. See generally Contracts: Specific “Tangible Personalty” [8.5.170]; Human Rights “Trespass” [21.11.620]–[21.11.640]. Telecom Vanuatu Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1209 (although Bergin J notes the “powerful dissenting opinions” endorsing the extension of economic torts in this direction, at [181]–[184]). Haddow v Duke Co NL (1892) 18 VLR 155 (FC) (shares); Hardy v Cotter (1881) 7 VLR (E) 151 (shares); Kay v Barnett [1909] QWN 39 (QSC) (title deeds). See also Equity “Contract of Bailment” [15.2.520]; “Tracing at Common Law” [15.10.300]–[15.10.330]. Turner v New South Wales Mont de Piete Deposit & Investment Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 539; 10 SR (NSW) 900; 27 WN (NSW) 87. For cheques, see among other authority, Day v Bank of New South Wales (1978) 18 SASR 163; 33 FLR 376 (FC); Wilton v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1973] 2 NSWLR 644 (varied on other grounds by Wilton v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1974] 2 NSWLR 96 (CA)); Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria [1989] VR 617; see also Reynolds v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [1985] QB 881; [1985] 2 WLR 93 (CA) (no trespass to land under search warrant, but trespass to certain documents seized under warrant). See generally Weerasooria WS, “Assessment of Damages in Cheque Conversion” (1996) 24 ABLR 236; Edwards R, “Ripper Trust Account Rip-Off” (2004) 20 BLB 33. Dymocks Book Arcade Ltd v McCarthy [1966] 2 NSWR 411 (NSWSCFC) (plaintiff’s severed timber incorporated into defendant’s new bookstall); Bilambil-Terranora Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465; (1980) 52 LGRA 1 (CA), Reynolds JA at 477, Mahoney JA at 489 (NSWLR) (gravel extracted from land). See also the discussion of trespass to land and tortious interference with non-profitable chattels in Lahoud v Lahoud [2009] ANZ ConvR 9-032; [2009] NSWSC 623, Ward J at [186]–[192]. See generally Restitution “Overview” [29.1.2380]–[29.1.2390]; “Torts” [29.1.2410]–[29.1.2470]. Grant v YYH Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 360, McColl JA at [37], [56] (Tobias AJA agreeing), citing Case of Swans (1572) 7 Co Rep 15b; 77 ER 435; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351; [1999] HCA 53.

Trespass to Chattels [33.8.720] “Trespass to chattels” is committed by an act of a defendant which directly infringes a plaintiff’s possession of that chattel, and the defendant intended that result or should have foreseen it. Trespass to chattels is actionable without proof of damage, although there is some doubt

576

[33.8.750]

TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

whether a mere touching of the chattel is trespass: see [33.8.770]. It is not, as such, a common law crime.1

1

In the United States case of CompuServe v Cyber Promotions, 962 F Supp 1015 (1997), the sending of spam to the plaintiff by electronic signals has been held to be a sufficient interference with the plaintiff’s computers to constitute trespass to chattels: see Hughes G and Sharpe A, Computer Contracts (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [1A.4000]. See generally Human Rights “Commercial Uses of Information” [21.11.340]; “Trespass” [21.11.620]–[21.11.640]; see also Rollo T, “Liability for Spam through Trespass to Goods” (2001) 8 PLPR 77 (criticism of use of trespass tort as method of protecting privacy).

[33.8.730] In an action for trespass to chattels, a plaintiff must be in actual possession of the chattel at the time of a defendant’s act. However, an extension has been recognised allowing a bailor-at-will to sue for trespasses to the bailee-at-will’s possession.1 This is generally based on a constructive possession in the bailor. Clearly, the bailee who is in actual possession may also sue in trespass. The bailor for a term, however, may not sue for trespass committed during the term, since during the term the bailor has no right to demand return of the chattel from the bailee and cannot therefore be regarded as being in constructive possession. Possession held on one’s behalf through a servant or agent is, however, an actual possession, the servant or agent having mere physical control rather than possession: see [33.8.860].

1

Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1294 (Assizes). See also Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff.

[33.8.740] Possession for the purpose of trespass to chattels is established in the same way as trespass to land: [33.8.470]–[33.8.480], [33.8.530] and [33.8.570]–[33.8.580]. There must be intention and physical control. The “intention” may be defined as an intention to hold the chattel for oneself or one’s own purposes. The possession which the law awards to bailees is not a true exception since the bailee, though holding the chattel for the bailor, almost invariably has a personal interest in so doing. The element of physical control is easily satisfied in the case of lawful possessors. It may be satisfied through another person holding the chattel on one’s behalf, whether as servant or agent: see [33.8.730]. [33.8.750] The plaintiff in an action for trespass to chattels need not prove a title to the chattel but need only show actual or constructive possession:1 compare [33.8.480]. Nor can the plaintiff be defeated by proof of title in a third party, unless the defendant can in some way show a connection to the third

577

[33.8.750]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

party, for example, by acting as the third party’s agent: see [33.8.860].

1 Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1294 (Assizes), where it was held that a bailor-at-will remained in actual possession and could therefore bring trespass: see [33.8.730]. However, that suggests that the bailee is not in possession, which is not the case. It is better to regard the bailee as being in actual possession, and the bailor as being in constructive possession through the bailee. Standard Electronic Apparatus Laboratories Pty Ltd v Stenner (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 833 (SC), which seems to require the plaintiff to show a special property in the chattel indicating a lawful possession under a contractual or other transaction with the true owner, should be understood as meaning that that is merely one way of establishing title to sue in trespass. See also Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158, White J at [150]–[153]. See generally Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [5.10]–[5.70].

[33.8.760] To establish trespass to chattels, the interference with possession (see [33.8.730]) must be a direct consequence of a defendant’s act. Thus, in Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131, the Court held that the laying of poisonous baits which were taken and eaten by the plaintiff’s dog was not trespass. The defendant’s act must directly invade the plaintiff’s possession or that of the plaintiff’s bailee-at-will: see [33.8.730]. That is made clear in the judgment of Dixon J in Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 341 and had majority support in the High Court, although Latham CJ thought that legal authority if not logic supported the view that any wrongful handling of goods was trespass as against a person with the right to immediate possession at the time of the handling.2 The majority decision in the case was that the respondent who filled, with his own wine, bottles brought to him by the appellant’s customers (who were in the position of bailees-at-will of the bottles for the appellants) did not commit any trespassory act, since the bailees consented to the act. It follows logically that the customer/bailees also did not commit trespass since they could not invade their own possession, though doubt is thrown on this, in the case of a bailee who “breaks bulk” or destroys the chattel, by some old authority cited by Dixon J in his judgment.3

1 Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Dixon J at 227 (CLR). 2 Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Latham CJ (dissenting) at 217 (CLR). 3 Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Dixon J at 227–228 (CLR) (conversion was also not established on the facts; no impairment of property in the bottles or of immediate right to possession): see also [33.8.890].

578

[33.8.780]

TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

[33.8.770] Trespass to chattels is actionable without proof of damage. In Kirk v Gregory (1876) 1 Ex D 55, the defendant removed jewellery from the bedroom of a recently deceased person into another room for safekeeping, from where it disappeared, probably through theft. The executor of the estate succeeded against the defendant in trespass, even though the Court accepted that the defendant was not liable for the theft (or conversion) of the jewellery. Nominal damages only were awarded against her in trespass.1 Where the chattel is touched but not moved, it would seem that trespass should in theory be available, subject to application of the principle that the law does not concern itself with trifles.2

1 2

Kirk v Gregory (1876) 1 Ex D 55 (DC). Everitt v Martin [1953] NZLR 298 (SC) (held that a mere negligent touching was not trespass); however, see Wilson v Marshall [1982] Tas R 287 (FC) (a policeman unlocking a car door using a piece of wire did not constitute trespass to chattels). See generally Civil Procedure “Torts Actionable without Proof of Damage” [5.10.760]–[5.10.780].

[33.8.780] Inevitable accident (see [33.8.310]) is a defence to actions for trespass to chattels:1 see also [33.8.860]. In National Coal Board v JE Evans & Co (Cardiff) Ltd [1951] 2 KB 861, the plaintiffs placed an electric cable beneath the land of a county council without its knowledge or permission. The cable did not show up on council maps of the territory. The defendant’s employee, while excavating a trench on the land by bulldozer (under contract with the council), struck and damaged the cable. It was held by the English Court of Appeal not to be trespass since the defendant neither knew nor ought to have known of the presence of the cable. As in trespass generally, where the trespassory act is committed intentionally but under a mistake (whether reasonable or not), as to the defendant’s entitlement, trespass to chattels is committed: see [33.8.330]. An example is Colwill v Reeves (1811) 2 Camp 575; 170 ER 1257, in which the defendant seized furniture in the plaintiff’s possession in the mistaken belief that it formed part of the goods of a bankrupt. The Court held that to be trespass.

1

See “Mistake” [33.9.140]–[33.9.160] and “Inevitable Accident” [33.9.170]–[33.9.190], although in highway trespass the burden of proof on the issue of fault rests on the plaintiff: see [33.8.1650]–[33.8.1660]. See also “Evidence” [33.2.1730]–[33.2.1820].

579

[33.8.780]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

Conversion [33.8.790] A satisfactory definition of the tort of conversion is difficult or even “well nigh impossible”.1 The methods of converting are so various that no definition affords much guidance on whether a specific act is a conversion. In Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Dixon J stated that “the essence of conversion is a dealing with a chattel in a manner repugnant to the immediate right of possession of the person who has the property or special property in the chattel”.2 In Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P summarised the essential elements of the tort as “an intentional act or dealing with goods inconsistent with or repugnant to the rights of the owner, including possession and any right to possession”.3 He added that [s]uch an act or dealing will amount to such an infringement of the possessory or proprietary rights of the owner if it is an intended act of dominion or assertion of rights over the goods.4

A number of points may be made in elaboration: (1)

title to sue in conversion may be established even by a party with mere possession of a chattel without title, although the normal plaintiff is the owner or one who derives title from the owner (special property) (see [33.8.830]);

(2)

the phrase “immediate right of possession” distinguishes the case where the right is to future possession rather than immediate; a right to future possession does not suffice to create title to sue in conversion5 (see [33.8.850]);

(3)

the defendant’s act must constitute a denial of the plaintiff’s right, but there is no requirement that the defendant should intend to deny the plaintiff’s right to the chattel, merely that they should intentionally deal with it and that dealing should constitute a denial of the plaintiff’s right6 (see [33.8.800] and [33.8.890]);

(4)

the tort is one of strict liability and thus a mental element in knowing that a wrong is being committed is not required. Nevertheless, intention is not irrelevant. The act or dealing in question must be intentional; further, the intention must be the exercise of such dominion as is repugnant to the rights of the owner;7

(5)

for possession or keeping to be a conversion, a demand is required of the party with the immediate right to possession.8 The demand must be unconditional9 and specific;10

(6)

the dealing with the chattel must be intentional and, generally, physical; conversion cannot be committed negligently11 (see [33.8.870] and [33.8.890]);

(7)

a claim in conversion is not based upon the fraud of the defendant;12 580

[33.8.790]

CONVERSION

(8)

there will be no conversion if a person dealing with goods had (apparent) authority to pass title to another who gave value, even if the person dealing in the chattel fraudulently misapplies the value received;13

(9)

a co-owner converts the property owned in common by doing an act that can only be justified by claiming the right of exclusive possession, such as destruction of the property, or otherwise permanently destroying the right of the plaintiff to possession of the property. A co-owner cannot be sued for conversion merely by making use of the common property in a reasonable way;14 and

(10) mere unauthorised possession or use of another’s chattel, without an intention to exercise dominion, is not a conversion of it.15

1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 2 WLR 1353; [2002] UKHL 19, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead [39]; and quoted by Allsop P in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342 at [124]. Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Dixon J at 229 (CLR). See generally O’Donovan J, Company Receivers and Administrators (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [11.1170]–[11.1290]; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [5.75]–[5.165]. Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [124] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing). Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [124] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) cited and applied by McColl JA in Grant v YYH Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 360 at [40]. Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 84, Allsop P and Handley AJA at [54]–[56] (Campbell JA agreeing) (a fraudster had authority to deposit cheques with the appellant in return for the issue of trust units in the name of the fraudster’s wife; the fraudster misapplied the proceeds of the units). Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted on 12 February 2010 in Heperu Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd [2010] HCATrans 16. See generally Tyree AL and Sheahan J, “Delivery of Cheques by a Stranger” (2009) 20 JBFLP 342. Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Dixon J at 229, Williams J (dissenting) at 242–243 (CLR); see also Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 84, Allsop P and Handley AJA at [58] (Campbell JA agreeing); CHEP Australia Ltd v Bunnings Group Ltd [2010] NSWSC 301, McDougall J at [181]–[182] (upheld on more limited grounds in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342). Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [125] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) (appellant continued to use pallets for its own purposes despite a demand by the respondent that it either hire or return them). Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [117] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing); Clayton v Le Roy [1911]

581

[33.8.790]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

9

10

11 12 13

14 15

2 KB 1031, Fletcher-Moulton LJ at 1048–1050; Barclay’s Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec Developments Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1253, Millet J at 1257; Spackman v Foster (1883) 11 QBD 99, Grove J at 100–101. Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [118] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing); Rushworth v Taylor (1842) 3 QB 699; 114 ER 674. Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [118] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing); Abington v Lipscomb (1841) 1 QB 776; 113 ER 1328. Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 84. Levy v Watt (2014) 308 ALR 748; [2014] VSCA 60, Santamaria JA at [70] (Warren CJ and Tate JJA agreeing). Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 84, Allsop P and Handley AJA at [50], [80], [93], [98] (Campbell JA agreed). However, there is Australian authority indicating that use of a chattel in the knowledge that it is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s right to possession of the chattel amounts to conversion: Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 295. Gwinnett v Day [2012] SASC 43, Stanley J at [40] citing Baker v Barclays Bank Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 822. See also [33.8.820]. Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [117], [138], [144], [146] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing); Grant v YYH Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 360, per McColl JA at [42] (Tobias AJA agreeing). For example, see Jeffries v Pankow 112 Ore 439; 223 Pac 903 (1924), cited in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop at [144]. Contrast with Milk Bottles Recovery Ltd v Camillo [1948] VLR 344.

[33.8.800] Conversion may overlap with trespass to goods (see [33.8.720]–[33.8.780]) where the dealing consists of depriving the plaintiff of actual possession of goods. Unless, however, the wrongful taking is accompanied by the requisite intention for conversion, trespass rather than conversion is the proper basis of action. In Fouldes v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540; 151 ER 1153, the plaintiff failed to establish conversion where the defendant put the plaintiff’s horses ashore from the defendant’s steamer, in order to persuade the plaintiff to follow them ashore. The plaintiff remained on the steamer and the horses were subsequently impounded by a third party. Lord Abinger CB said: In order to constitute a conversion, it is necessary either that the party taking the goods should intend some use to be made of them, by himself or by those for whom he acts, or that, owing to his act, the goods are destroyed or consumed, to the prejudice of the lawful owner. As an instance of the latter branch of this definition, suppose, in the present case, the defendant had thrown the horses into the water, whereby they were drowned, that would amount to an actual conversion; or as in the case cited in the course of the argument, of a person throwing a piece of paper into the water; for, in these cases, the chattel is changed in quality, or destroyed altogether. But it has never yet been held, that the single act of removal of a chattel independent of any claim over it, either in favour of the party himself or any one else, amounts to a conversion of the chattel. In the present case, therefore, the simple removal of these

582

[33.8.810]

CONVERSION

horses by the defendant, for a purpose wholly unconnected with any the least denial of the right of the plaintiff to the possession and enjoyment of them, is no conversion of the horses.1

The plaintiff’s right to the possession of the horses was not denied by the defendant, only the right to exercise it on his ferry boat. The Court of Exchequer observed that an action of trespass would have been available had the removal been wrongful, but the plaintiff chose to sue in conversion rather than trespass.2

1 2

Fouldes v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540; 151 ER 1153, Lord Abinger CB at 547 (M & W). Fouldes v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540; 151 ER 1153, Lord Abinger CB at 544–545, Alderson B at 549 (M & W).

[33.8.810] The title to sue in conversion may be established through a plaintiff’s property in the chattel, through special property in it, or through possession of it without title: see [33.8.830] and [33.8.850]. It is trite to say that the interest in the property must be a lawful interest.1 Property in the chattel is the most obvious ground on which to establish a right to maintain conversion, but the owner of the chattel must also prove the right to immediate possession of it. The owner may, typically, have surrendered that right by bailing the chattel for a term.2 In Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1990] VR 41, it was held that the drawer of a cheque in favour of a third party has the right to immediate possession of the cheque until it arrives into the hands of the payee or “into the hands of someone of whom the drawer cannot complain”3 and so has the right to sue for conversion if the cheque is intercepted. However, where the cheque has actually reached the person who is the payee authorised to receive it, property in the cheque passes to the payee and the action for conversion is available only to the payee.4 A bailor for a term has no right to immediate possession of the chattel during the term and so cannot sue in conversion.5 A bailor-at-will may bring conversion on the basis of its right to immediate possession: see [33.8.730]. When a bailment for a term is terminated by an act of the bailee during the term which is repugnant to the bailment,6 the right to immediate possession of the chattel automatically revests in the bailor, giving it the right to sue in conversion (even in relation to the act of the bailee that terminates the bailment).7 In Coastal Recycled Cooking Oils Pty Ltd v Innovative Business Action & Strategies Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 831, the plaintiff provided receptacles into which restaurants and other “customers” could place used cooking oils for collection and recycling into diesel fuel. The plaintiff did not pay for the used oils and the customers did not pay for the use of the containers or the safe

583

[33.8.810]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

removal of the used oils. The defendant was contracted to collect the full receptacles but several of its employees used the oils collected for their own purposes. Rein AJ held that the plaintiff had title to sue in conversion as title had passed to the plaintiff when the oil was deposited in the receptacles by customers.8 The plaintiff may establish a special property in a chattel by showing possession of the chattel at the time of the defendant’s act, and that that possession has been obtained under a transaction with the true owner (or one legally entitled to the chattel’s possession at the time of entering into the transaction with the plaintiff). In Standard Electronic Apparatus Laboratories Pty Ltd v Stenner (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 833, the plaintiffs, who were bailees manufacturing, from materials provided by the defendants, medical components for the defendants, were held to have a right to sue the defendants in conversion for removing some of the completed units without permission and without paying for them, because of their special property in the materials. The special property was found to arise because of the lien which the plaintiffs held over the goods until payment, but it seems that the lien merely established bailment for a term rather than at will. For the purposes of an action in conversion, the drawer of a cheque is its true owner until the cheque is delivered to the payee.9 Where title to a cheque is voidable because the cheque was obtained pursuant to a fraudulent transaction, avoidance of the transaction by the person defrauded probably does not operate retrospectively to confer title in the cheque to the defrauded party from the date of the fraud.10

1 Carolan v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1566, Button J at [83] (plaintiff found in possession of a suitcase containing $702,000 in cash unsuccessfully sought a declaration that the detention of the money by police constituted trespass to goods, conversion or detinue. Button J was not satisfied that the plaintiff had established a lawful interest in the cash). 2 For surrender of bailment, see Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. On the accrual of cause of action in conversion, see generally Civil Procedure “Torts Actionable without Proof of Damage” [5.10.760]–[5.10.780]. 3 Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1990] VR 41, Tadgell J at 46 (affirmed in Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd [1991] 2 VR 407 (FC)); see also Citibank Ltd v Papandony [2002] NSWCA 375. See generally Weerasooria WS, “Assessment of Damages in Cheque Conversion” (1996) 24 ABLR 236; Walker PA, “Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet’?” (2009) 33 MULR 235. 4 See Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd v Heperu Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 84. Special leave to appeal to the High Court had been granted on 12 February 2010 in Heperu Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd [2010] HCATrans 16; however, the case settled the day before judgment was to be handed down: see Gibson J and Harvey E, “11th Hour Payout in $15M Fraud Case”, Sydney Morning Herald (online) (available 584

[33.8.820]

CONVERSION

at www.smh.com.au/nsw/11th-hour-payout-in-15m-fraud-case-20100825-13sc5.html, viewed 1 May 2016). However, see Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v CG Maloney Pty Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 420 (property in the cheque revested in the plaintiff on rescission of the contract for fraud); applied in MBF Australia Ltd v Malouf (2008) 3 BFRA 222; [2008] NSWCA 214. See generally Tyree AL, “Cheques Obtained by Fraud” (2003) 14 JBFLP 288; Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [5.135] (misdelivery by bailee or carrier may be conversion). 5 Gordon v Harper (1796) 7 TR 9; 101 ER 828 (KB). 6 For lawful termination of a bailment, see Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. 7 Mulliner v Florence (1878) 3 QBD 484 (CA); Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, Dixon J at 225–228, Williams J (dissenting) at 241–242 (CLR); Union Transport Finance Ltd v British Car Auctions Ltd [1978] 2 All ER 385 (CA). 8 Coastal Recycled Cooking Oils Pty Ltd v Innovative Business Action & Strategies Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 831, Rein AJ at [24]–[29]. 9 Westpac Banking Corp v Hughes (2012) 1 Qd R 581; [2011] QCA 42, Chesterman JA at [61] citing Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1990] VR 41 at 46. 10 Westpac Banking Corp v Hughes (2012) 1 Qd R 581; [2011] QCA 42, Chesterman JA (Martin J agreeing) (Martin J agreeing) at [90]-[94].

[33.8.815] The intention to act or deal with a chattel in a manner that is repugnant to the rights of the owner should be assessed in the real context in which the act takes place. Thus, in Fouldes v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540; 151 ER 1153 the ferry manager did not commit trover by taking the plaintiff’s horses off the ferry and putting them ashore after the plaintiff had refused to remove them. This was so because the acts were to take the horses to the river bank, not to take them to his own use or some other person’s, but merely to remove them from his ferry. Whilst there can be a conversion for a limited period of time, this would occur only if there was an intention to exercise dominion over the goods inconsistent with the rights of the owner, including the right to possession. As Rolfe B said in Fouldes v Willoughby: “In every case of trover, there must be a taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner’s right of possession.”1

1

Fouldes v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540; 151 ER 1153, Rolfe B at 1157 (ER). See also Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [125] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing).

[33.8.820] Where more than one person has an interest in property, a person with a co-interest may commit an act of conversion by, for example, asserting exclusive possession to the property to the exclusion of another interest holder: compare [33.8.470]. In Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA

585

[33.8.820]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

295, scaffolding which was the subject of a bailment by contract was itself on-hired by the bailee, contrary to the terms of the bailment. It was then commingled with scaffolding owned by the unlawful sub-bailee. When the sub-bailee went into receivership, the receiver took all of the commingled scaffolding into his possession before licensing yet another company to use all the scaffolding, notwithstanding the rights of the original owner and bailor of the first scaffolding. Beazley JA held that the primary judge was correct to find that the commingling of the scaffolding created joint ownership of all of the scaffolding and that one co-owner may convert the joint property by asserting exclusive possession as against the other co-owner.1 Beazley JA stated: [A] person with a co-interest may commit an act of conversion. For example, in the case of joint owners of property, each joint owner is entitled to possession of the property, but does not have a right to exclusive possession. If a joint owner does an act that is justified only by the right of exclusive possession, then it commits an act of conversion as against the other joint owner.2

The Court of Appeal confirmed that by the bailee’s breach, the original contract of bailment had been terminated by operation of the common law of bailment (notwithstanding a specific termination clause in the contract), entitling the owner to immediate possession of its scaffolding. The licence by the receiver to the last company to use all the commingled scaffolding amounted to an assertion of a right to exclusive possession amounting to conversion.3

1 Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 295, Beazley JA at [93] (Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA agreeing). Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused on 31 June 2008 in Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2008] HCATrans 228. See also Kitano v Commonwealth (1974) 129 CLR 151; 48 ALJR 343; Re Gillie; Ex parte Cornell (1996) 70 FCR 254; Gwinnett v Day [2012] SASC 43. 2 Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 295, Beazley JA at [90] (Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA agreeing). 3 Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 295, Beazley JA) at [46]–[47], [59], [84]–[85], [125]–[127], see also at [74] (Spigelman CJ and Ipp JA agreeing).

[33.8.830] Mere possession of a chattel unaccompanied by actual title may confer a right to the possession of the chattel, so that conversion may be brought against a dispossessor and against a later possessor who does not dispossess a plaintiff (on the basis of so-called possessory title). None of this applies as against the true owner or one who derives a right to possession of the chattel under a transaction with the true owner. Nor may an officer of a company assert a right to immediate possession against a subsequent possessor where the right to immediate possession belongs to the company.1 The clearest recognition of possessory title in Australian law is the joint judgment of Isaacs and Rich JJ in Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538; 24 SR

586

[33.8.830]

CONVERSION

(NSW) 502; 41 WN (NSW) 10,2 a claim in detinue (see [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]) no different from conversion for these purposes, in which they said: Possession … is not merely evidence of absolute title: it confers a title of its own, which is sometimes called a “possessory title”. This possessory title is as good as the absolute title as against, it is usually said, every person except the absolute owner.3

Accordingly, there seems to be no reason for regarding finder’s possessory title as a special case. The finder clearly acquires actual possession as the result of the find (even though the finder may commit the crime of larceny at common law by deciding to keep the find without disclosing it, knowing that by taking reasonable steps they can discover the identity of the true owner and return it). That actual possession is enough to enable the finder to bring conversion against a third party was recognised early in the law by Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Str 505; 93 ER 664, in which the plaintiff, who was a chimney-sweep’s boy, having found a jewel in the chimney and having had it valued by the defendant jeweller, was held to be entitled to succeed in conversion against the jeweller, who refused to return it. However, in some circumstances the landowner or occupier of land on which a find has been made obtains a possessory title superior to that of the finder. That possessory title is based on the fact that the occupier is regarded as having actual possession of the chattel prior to the find being made. The law in certain circumstances presumes an intent on the occupier’s part to control the chattel even though they are not aware of its existence. There is a judicial feeling that the return of a lost chattel to its true owner may be facilitated by vesting possession of the chattel in the occupier of the land on which it was found.4 The element of physical control has been found to exist where the chattel was found underneath the surface of land or attached to it.5 However, in the case of a finding on the surface of land, for example the floor of a building, the occupier only obtains possessory title if they have manifested an intention to exercise a sufficiently exclusive control over the building and the things which may be on it or inside it. In Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004; [1982] 2 WLR 503, the Court of Appeal held that a bracelet found on the floor of the airport executive lounge went to the passenger who found it, because there was insufficient manifestation of an intention to exercise control on the part of British Airways. In the case of findings on the surface of buildings (and probably of land generally),6 a superior right of the finder as against the occupier seems limited to the case of finding on land to which there is a measure of public access, whether as of right or by invitation of the occupier. This probably extends to a find made during the period in which the public access exists (thus preserving the effect of the old decision in Bridges v Hawkesworth (1851) 21 LJQB 75). Even where there is public access to the land, a find made while trespassing is likely to go to the occupier rather than the finder.7 However, the mere presence of a dishonest or unlawful intent is not generally thought to preclude the finder from establishing possessory title against third

587

[33.8.830]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

parties. In Bird v Fort Frances (Town) [1949] 2 DLR 791, the Ontario High Court held that a boy who had found some money underneath a house where he may have been trespassing was entitled to succeed in conversion against the defendant municipality, into whose possession the money had come, for refusing to return the money to him. The High Court expressly found that the question of whether the boy had committed larceny as a finder was immaterial.8 The rule seems well settled that the possessory rights of a finder who finds in the course of employment vests in the employer.9

1 Burnett v Randwick City Council [2006] NSWCA 196. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused on 2 March 2007 in Burnett v Randwick City Council [2007] HCATrans 091. See generally Barry C, “Lifting the Corporate Veil on Personal Property” (2006) 44 LSJ 68. 2 For early cases recognising a right to sue in conversion based on some form of possessory title, see: Brown v Mackenzie (1871) 10 SCR (NSW) 302 (FC) (applied in Kiwi Munchies Pty Ltd v Nikolitsis (2006) 63 ATR 365; [2006] VCAT 929, Macnamara DP at [40]); Bennett v Flood (1864) 3 SCR (NSW) 158 (FC); Tinaroo Shire Council v Purcell [1904] St R Qd 186 (local authority with control of road had sufficient property in trees to sue for conversion); for later confirmation, see Perpetual Trustees & National Executors of Tasmania Ltd v Perkins [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-295 (TASSCFC). 3 Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538; 24 SR (NSW) 502; 41 WN (NSW) 10, Isaacs and Rich JJ at 546 (CLR). See generally Real Property “Possession” [28.16.10]ff; Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [5.100]–[5.105]; Aitken L, “Recovery of Chattels in the Common and Civil Law: Possession, Bailment, and Spoliation Suits” (2008) 82 ALJ 379. 4 Chairman of National Crime Authority v Flack (1998) 86 FCR 16 (FC). See generally Smith S, “Finders Keepers” (1998) 72 ALJ 853 at 857. 5 Underneath land surface: Elwes v Brigg Gas Co (1886) 33 Ch D 562; Ranger v Giffın (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531; Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher [1996] QB 334; [1995] 3 WLR 772 (CA) (finder’s use of owner’s park was not permitted). Attached to land: South Staffordshire Water Co v Sharman [1896] 2 QB 44; City of London Corp v Appleyard [1963] 1 WLR 982 (QB). 6 Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004; [1982] 2 WLR 503 (CA) speaks only of buildings. 7 Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004; [1982] 2 WLR 503 (CA), Donaldson LJ at 1017 (QB); Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher [1996] QB 334; [1995] 3 WLR 772 (CA). 8 Bird v Fort Frances (Town) [1949] 2 DLR 791 (ONHC), McRuer CJHC at [14], [29]–[30]. However, see the comments of Donaldson LJ in Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004; [1982] 2 WLR 503 (CA), at 1017 (QB): “The finder of a chattel acquires very limited rights over it if he [or she] takes it into his [or her] care and control with dishonest intent or in the course of trespassing.” 9 Willey v Synan (1937) 57 CLR 200, Dixon J at 216; Ranger v Giffın (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 531; although see Byrne v Hoare [1965] Qd R 135 (FC) (constable who found gold ingot while on duty held not to have made the finding by reason of his office). Later cases, however, have reaffirmed the general rule: Director of Public

588

[33.8.850]

CONVERSION

Prosecutions (Cth) v Hart [2005] 2 Qd R 246; [2005] QCA 051, McPherson JA at [22] (Williams JA agreeing). Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004; [1982] 2 WLR 503 (CA) adds the requirement that the finding be not wholly incidental to the employment: Donaldson LJ at 1014 (QB). However, the employer may manifest an intention to vest exclusive possession of chattels in an employee as bailee: Burnett v Randwick City Council [2006] NSWCA 196.

[33.8.840] Parties to illegal transactions have been held entitled to rely on the right of property to maintain an action in tort, even though they could not have enforced the illegal transaction. For example, a party to an illegal contract has been allowed to sue in conversion based on that party’s right of property in the chattel;1 it is not possible to allow this where the plaintiff must rely on the terms of the illegal transaction to establish title to sue in conversion,2 or the plaintiff needs the assistance of the defendant to complete the transaction.3 However, mere intention by the plaintiff to engage in criminal conduct with the chattel is not sufficient to deny a right to sue in conversion based on property in the chattel.4

1

2

3 4

See Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] 1 KB 65 (CA); Singh v Ali [1960] AC 167; [1960] 2 WLR 180 (PC) (although this decision has been criticised in Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; 70 ALJR 47, McHugh J at 607–610 (CLR)). See also Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538; 24 SR (NSW) 502; 41 WN (NSW) 10. See Contract: General Principles “Proprietary Claims” [7.2.1140]–[7.2.1170]. See generally Butler P, “Illegally Tainted Transfers and Resulting Trusts: Nelson v Nelson” (1996) 19 UQLJ 150; Gamble R, “Contrasting Approaches to Statutory Illegality” (1996) 24 ABLR 397; Phang A, “Of Illegality and Presumptions: Australian Departures and Possible Approaches” (1996) 11 JCL 53; Kremer B, “An ‘Unruly Horse’ in a ‘Shadowy World’?: The Law of Illegality after Nelson v Nelson” (1997) 19 Syd LR 240. Thomas Brown & Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen (1962) 108 CLR 391; 36 ALJR 229; see also Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538; 70 ALJR 47, Dawson J (dissenting) at 576–577, Toohey J (dissenting) at 592, 596 (CLR), and discussion of issues of public interest and the need for consistency with statute. See also Equity “Pleading and Illegality” [15.13.1020]–[15.13.1050]. Thackwell v Barclays Bank plc [1986] 1 All ER 676 (QB). Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18; 63 ALJR 11.

[33.8.850] The right to immediate possession has to be established on the basis of a proprietary or possessory interest in the chattel, rather than on the basis of a mere contractual right to its possession: see [33.8.810]. A claim for conversion is not maintainable by a person who has only an equitable interest in the goods.1 In Jarvis v Williams [1955] 1 WLR 71, the plaintiff sold goods to a third party and at that party’s request, delivered them to the defendant. The goods were not

589

[33.8.850]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

paid for and the plaintiff entered into a new contract with the third party to take the goods back if the third party paid the costs of collection. The plaintiff then demanded the return of the goods from the defendant. This was refused. The Court of Appeal held that this was not detinue (see [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]) since the plaintiff had no title to maintain that action. His property to the goods passed by virtue of the contract of sale, and by delivering them he had lost possession and his unpaid seller’s lien. His right to the goods was therefore purely a contractual one against the third party and his action in detinue against the defendant therefore failed (detinue is no different from conversion in the right to bring an action). The effect of a contract for the return of goods previously sold where it is not of a character to revest the property in them must be distinguished from the situation where the seller has exercised a right to rescind the original contract for sale. In Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v CG Maloney Pty Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 420, the property in cheques for the payment of goods had passed to the supplier of the goods, but the plaintiff drawer exercised a right to rescind for fraudulent misrepresentation2 by a third party, thus avoiding a voidable contract: see [33.8.810]. The supplier paid the cheques into its account with the defendant bank and the bank collected the amount due on the cheques. The defendant bank was held liable for conversion of the cheques, since it was in no better position than the supplier against whom rescission had been made by the plaintiff, and that rescission was retrospective in revesting title in the plaintiff. Where the transaction is void from the beginning, the drawer retains title to the cheque and a third party can obtain no title unless the instrument is negotiable and the third party is a holder in due course: see [33.8.810].

1 MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehman Bros International (Europe) [1998] 4 All ER 675 (CA) (equitable owner under a trust had no title to sue in conversion at common law unless they had actual possession or an immediate right to possession of the goods). 2 See generally Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff.

[33.8.860] The right of a third party (“jus tertii”) is no defence to an action for trespass or conversion (see [33.8.710]–[33.8.780]) where the defendant has infringed the plaintiff’s actual possession, except in special circumstances.1 The special circumstances are that the defendant’s act should in some way derive legitimacy from the third party’s title through its assertion against the defendant. This may occur where the defendant has acted as the agent of the third party or defends the action on its behalf, or has been evicted by its title paramount.2 The same three exceptions protect the bailee in an action against it by the bailor;3 otherwise, the bailee is estopped from denying its bailor’s title. Apart from bailment, where the plaintiff seeks to rely on a right to possession (as opposed to actual possession) at the time of the defendant’s act (see [33.8.730]), there is general support for a defence of jus tertii to apply. This 590

[33.8.860]

CONVERSION

is on the ground that in order to show a right to the chattel’s possession, the plaintiff must establish title and may therefore be defeated by showing the existence of a higher title elsewhere.4 This onus on the plaintiff has been said to apply even though the third party is in no way asserting its title (compare [33.8.790]), although this requirement has been subject to reservations. There is an alternative view that jus tertii is no defence, even in that situation, except in the three exceptional cases stated.5

1

2

3

4

Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1294 (Assizes) (trespass); Jeffries v Great Western Railway Co (1856) 5 El & Bl 680; 119 ER 680 (QB) (conversion). On defences and damages under jus tertii generally, see Intellectual Property “Conversion and Detinue” [23.1.5360]–[23.1.5430]; Real Property “Jus Tertii Plea” [28.16.220]; see also “Evidence” [33.2.1730]–[33.2.1820]; “Misappropriation of Goods” [33.10.1500]–[33.10.1510]. Heuston RFV and Buckley RA, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) pp 122–123. An earlier edition of this work (Heuston RFV, Salmond on the Law of Torts (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1961) p 280) is cited with approval in Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1294 (Assizes), Hinchcliffe J at 1296–1297 (WLR) (Salmond allows the defence where the defendant voluntarily makes restitution to the third party, which Wilson v Lombank denies). Edwards v Amos (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 204 (NSWSC); Biddle v Bond (1865) 6 B & S 225; 122 ER 1179; Wenpac Pty Ltd v Allied Westralian Finance Ltd (1994) 123 FLR 1 (WASC), Malcolm CJ at 30 (FLR). See also Contracts: Specific “Jus Tertii and Bailee’s Estoppel” [8.5.540]–[8.5.550]; “Originally Involuntary Bailments” [8.5.1690]–[8.5.1740]. The earliest proponents of the conventional view were Pollock F and Wright RS, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Clarendon Press, 1888) p 92; Holdsworth WS, A History of English Law (Methuen, 1925) Vol 7 pp 426, 429. It was also adopted by Salmond and Winfield respectively in the early editions of their torts textbooks: Salmond JW, The Law of Torts (Stevens and Haynes, 1907) p 332; Winfield PH, A Text-Book of the Law of Tort (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1943). Australian texts have also adopted this position: Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [4.190], though now with reservations; Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [3.2.6]; Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [4.14]–[4.15], [4.51]. This view does not explain why possessory title is generally not enough to establish a right to recover possession against persons other than the owner or other persons with superior title. The case chiefly relied on to support that position was Leake v Loveday (1842) 4 Man & G 972; 134 ER 399 (CCP), where evidence of the title of the third party was admitted to show that the plaintiff had no title to the goods at all, rather than to defeat any possessory title of the plaintiff (which, on the facts, the plaintiff did not have). Other cases often cited in support of the position are Wood v Mason Bros Ltd (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 66; 8 WN (NSW) 114 (FC); Henry Berry & Co Pty Ltd v Rushton [1937] St R Qd 109 (FC), Henchman J (Webb J agreeing) at 118–121, however, the plaintiff in each of these cases had neither possession nor the right to possession. Accordingly, these three cases were less than ideal test cases for the determination of this controversy. For academic attempts to controvert the

591

[33.8.860]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

5

established textbook positions, see Atiyah PS, “A Reexamination of the Jus Tertii in Conversion” (1955) 18 Mod LR 97; Baker CD, “Jus Tertii: A Restatement” (1990) 16 UQLJ 46; but see Jolly A, “The Jus Tertii, and the Third Man” (1955) 18 Mod LR 371. See generally Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [5.115]. Wood v Mason Bros Ltd (1892) 13 LR (NSW) 66; 8 WN (NSW) 114 (FC), Henry Berry & Co Pty Ltd v Rushton [1937] St R Qd 109 (FC) were cases in which a third party did intervene on the facts, although this circumstance did not materially affect the judicial comments on jus tertii in those cases.

[33.8.870] The determination of what intentional physical dealings with chattels amount to conversion is the most difficult part of the tort. To say that the act must be repugnant to the plaintiff’s right of property in the chattel does not clarify very much. Further, “[t]he question of the sufficiency of the act or dealing is the qualitative act of interference – the extent in terms of right, not time”.1 The interference need not be a permanent one. Some of the main methods by which conversion may be committed are examined at [33.8.880]–[33.8.900], but the list is not complete and no finite list can ever be drawn up. Although the courts and text writers state the law and frame the definition of conversion in terms of there being one type of interference constituting the tort, analysis seems to show that there are two main ways of committing conversion. These are: (1)

dealing with possession of the chattel in such a way as to render the plaintiff’s right to possession impossible or more difficult to exercise; and

(2)

purporting to deal with the title to the chattel in such a way as to deny the plaintiff’s title.

Some cases fall within both categories and others can be difficult to categorise.

1 Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [141] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing).

[33.8.880] There exist a number of ways in which conversion may be committed by dealing with possession.1 First, it is conversion to dispossess the plaintiff, at least where the intention of the defendant is to hold the chattel for itself or another.2 A thief commits conversion without asserting any title to the chattel. It is also conversion to dispossess the plaintiff’s bailee.3 Temporary dispossession such as joyriding in a motor car was held to be conversion in Aitken Agencies Ltd v Richardson [1967] NZLR 65.4 This seems justified on the ground that the risk of accidental damage or restoration of the car should lie on the wrongdoer.5 Aitken Agencies Ltd v Richardson accordingly seems preferable to Schemmell v Pomeroy (1989) 50 SASR 450 which held that

592

[33.8.880]

CONVERSION

joyriding in a car, while it was trespass, was not necessarily conversion unless there was a wrongful intent to drive the car recklessly or destructively at the time of taking the car, or the car was actually destroyed.6 The latter conclusion in particular does not fit easily into the principles of conversion. Second, it is conversion for a carrier7 or bailee8 to deliver the chattel which is the subject matter of the contract of carriage or bailment to the wrong person even when acting under a reasonable mistake, although there is no conversion for delivery in accordance with the instructions received.9 There is an exception to the general rule in the case of the involuntary bailee of goods, for example a person who has received unwanted goods through the post. If the bailee, acting without negligence,10 takes reasonable steps to return the goods to their owner, it is not liable if the goods are lost. Third, it is a conversion for a person in possession of a chattel to refuse to return it on demand made by the person entitled to its immediate possession:11 see [33.8.810] and [33.8.850]. The refusal of the demand must be unreasonable.12 A person in possession of a chattel is entitled to a reasonable time to investigate the validity of a demand, provided there is initially some doubt as to the claimant’s title to the goods.13 Where the demand is made by the plaintiff’s agent, it is not unreasonable to require evidence of the agent’s authority to be produced,14 nor is it unreasonable to refuse to return the chattel where inconsistent demands are made on the defendant and the defendant is instituting interpleader proceedings.15 Fourth, it is conversion intentionally to destroy the plaintiff’s chattel totally or to change its form. The crushing of grapes in order to produce wine is therefore a conversion as is grinding of another’s corn,16 but not the bottling of wine in order to preserve it.17 It was also held to be conversion to expose a car intentionally to the risk of forfeiture by using it for unlawful purposes when forfeiture was the natural and probable consequence of the conduct.18

1

2 3 4

5 6

See also Prosser W, “The Nature of Conversion” (1957) 42 Cornell Law Quarterly 168 at 174; Jones A M and Dugdale MA (eds) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at [17–08], both cited by Allsop P in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342 at [135]–[136]. Glass v Hollander (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 304; 52 WN (NSW) 76 (FC). Rendell v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1957] VR 604. See also Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. Aitken Agencies Ltd v Richardson [1967] NZLR 65 (SC). But contrast with Jeffries v Pankow 112 Ore 439; 223 Pac 903 (1924), cited in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop at [144]. See Wellington City v Singh [1971] NZLR 1025 (SC). Schemmell v Pomeroy (1989) 50 SASR 450, White J at 451–452: “Not all instances of an illegal use of a motor vehicle would constitute conversion, each is a matter of 593

[33.8.880]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

7 8

9

10

11

12 13 14 15 16 17

18

fact and degree.” Contrast Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Finch [1962] 1 QB 701; [1962] 3 WLR 110 (CA). Youl v Harbottle (1791) 1 Peake 68; 170 ER 81 (Assizes). Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn (A’asia) Pty Ltd v Collier’s Interstate Transport Service Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 384; Sydney Corp v West (1965) 114 CLR 481; 12 LGRA 79; 39 ALJR 323, Barwick CJ and Taylor J at 490 (CLR); Helson v McKenzies (Cuba Street) Ltd [1950] NZLR 878 (SC and CA). McKean v McIvor (1870) LR 6 Ex 36. See generally Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [5.135] (misdelivery by bailee or carrier may be conversion): see [33.8.810]. Statute may also prescribe certain situations in which a carrier may be liable in conversion: see, eg Transport “Transit and Stoppage in Transit” [34.1.250]; see also Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [5.130]. Elvin & Powell Ltd v Plummer Roddis Ltd (1933) 50 TLR 158 (KBD). See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; Contracts: Specific “Originally Involuntary Bailments” [8.5.1690]–[8.5.1740]. Howard E Perry & Co Ltd v British Railways Board (UK) [1980] 1 WLR 1375 (CHD); Upton v TVW Enterprises Ltd [1985] ATPR 40-611 (FCA); Flowfill Packaging Machines Pty Ltd v Fytore Pty Ltd [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-244 (NSWSC). EE McCurdy Ltd (in liq) v Postmaster-General [1959] NZLR 553 (SC), McGregor J at 556–557. Flowfill Packaging Machines Pty Ltd v Fytore Pty Ltd [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-244 (NSWSC), Young J at 62,520. Clayton v Le Roy [1911] 2 KB 1031 (CA); Pratten v Pratten [2005] QCA 213. EE McCurdy Ltd (in liq) v Postmaster-General [1959] NZLR 553 (SC). Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757, Blackburn J at 764, 768. Philpott v Kelley (1835) 3 Ad & E 106; 111 ER 353 (the requisite refusal was not found on the facts; the bottling was not done as an act of ownership amounting to conversion; limitation issues also arose from the long period of delay between the alleged demand and bringing of proceedings). Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Finch [1962] 1 QB 701; [1962] 3 WLR 110 (CA), Willmer LJ at 711, Danckwerts LJ at 706 (QB).

[33.8.890] Conversion in most cases requires a physical dealing with the chattel. It is not conversion to sell without delivery the plaintiff’s chattel, nor is it conversion (though it may be injurious falsehood (see [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400]) merely to assert a title to a chattel belonging to the plaintiff, without possession.1 Where the goods of the plaintiff have left their possession and fallen into the hands of an innocent third party, the question whether subsequent dealings by that party with the goods constitute conversion is determined by the principles laid down by Blackburn J in Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757. His Honour drew a distinction between merely custodial dealings with goods, and dealings which purported to affect the title to those goods. The prime example of the latter is sale. It is conversion to sell and deliver another person’s goods without that person’s authority, whether the sale is made as principal or as agent. The 594

[33.8.890]

CONVERSION

buyer who takes delivery in such a case also commits conversion. So does any person who handles the goods in furtherance of a transaction involving the title to the goods.2 In contrast, the parties to a bailment, which is a temporary transfer of possession not intended to transfer title, do not commit conversion, at least where they are in ignorance of the plaintiff’s rights. A bailee who restores possession to the bailor does not commit conversion, since that is merely restoring matters to where they were, not purporting to create new rights. However, a bailee who restores to a bailor with knowledge of the plaintiff’s claim commits conversion, because the bailee has a wrongful intent regarding the plaintiff.3 The bailee’s best course is to interplead, allowing the court to determine the entitlement as between bailor and third party:4 see [33.8.880]. Pledge causes difficulty in this connection. No immediate transfer of title from pledgor to pledgee is intended to occur, but where the pledgor fails to redeem the goods by the due date, the pledgee has a right to sell them and pass on a good title to the buyer in order to recoup the loan from the proceeds of sale. This raises the question of whether conversion is committed at the time of entering into the pledge itself or at the subsequent sale. There are two inconsistent decisions.5 Although delivery as well as sale by the defendant is usually required to constitute conversion, there are exceptions. In Motor Dealers Credit Corp Ltd v Overland (Sydney) Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 516; 48 WN (NSW) 205, the Full Supreme Court held that a defendant who bought a car belonging to the plaintiffs from a third party, then resold it and ordered the third party to deliver the car to the buyer, committed conversion because it had constructively delivered possession through the third party, and had also refused the plaintiff’s demand for return of the car. In other cases, it may be sufficient for a defendant or its agent to cause some change of the character in which a person in actual possession holds that possession. Thus, in Van Oppen & Co Ltd v Tredegars Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 504,6 the defendants’ managing director claimed that his company owned goods which had been delivered by the plaintiff carriers by mistake to the address of a firm. He agreed with the firm to sell the goods to it and the latter used and disposed of the goods in the course of their business. The defendants were held liable for conversion because by means of the sale, the character of the firm’s possession had been changed. In comparison, in Public Trustee (NSW) v Jones (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 526; 42 WN (NSW) 173, the defendant held an auction sale of furniture at X’s bidding. The furniture in fact belonged to the plaintiff. X’s servants divided the furniture into lots and made delivery of each lot to the successful bidder. The defendant auctioneer was held not liable in conversion. He had neither changed the character of X’s possession by the sale (since X thought throughout that he had a right to sell the furniture), nor had he effected delivery.7 In order to amount to conversion, an act which enables the defendant to obtain an exclusive possession must be an act which relates to the possession or right

595

[33.8.890]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

to possession of the chattel. In Kitano v Commonwealth (1974) 129 CLR 151; 48 ALJR 343,8 the plaintiff and three companions sailed from Japan to Darwin in a yacht which they co-owned. In Darwin they fell into dispute. The plaintiff and another co-owner applied independently of each other for a certificate of customs clearance of the boat. That certificate was granted to the other co-owner who sailed the yacht away without the plaintiff. The High Court held that the granting of customs clearance could not amount to conversion since it had nothing to do with the right to possession of the yacht. The cause of the plaintiff’s loss was the act of the other co-owner. There is divided authority on whether use of the plaintiff’s chattel by one who has obtained possession of it in good faith and without knowledge of the plaintiff’s rights constitutes conversion,9 but there is Australian authority that use of a chattel in the knowledge that it is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s right to possession of the chattel amounts to conversion.10 The defendant need not assert any title to the chattel for this to be so: see [33.8.790]. The concept of “absolute denial of title”, whereby a defendant is liable for conversion although there has been no assumption of possession by the defendant, on the ground that it has absolutely denied and repudiated the plaintiff’s title to the chattel, has had little impact in Australia. In Short v City Bank of Sydney (1912) 15 CLR 148; 13 SR (NSW) 517, the Court held that a mere assertion of title to a chattel was not a conversion.11 In Motor Dealers Credit Corp Ltd v Overland (Sydney) Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 516; 48 WN (NSW) 205, absolute denial of title was relied on as one ratio of the Court, but the primary ratio, based on constructive delivery, seems quite satisfactory to explain the case.12

1 Short v City Bank of Sydney (1912) 15 CLR 148; 13 SR (NSW) 517. 2 Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757, Blackburn J at 767, see also Brett LJ at 783, 785 (Baron Amphlett agreeing but dissenting as to outcome) (“mere simple asportation”); Consolidated Co v Curtis & Son [1892] 1 QB 495, Collins J at 498–500; Hillesden Securities Ltd v Ryjack Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 959 (QBD); Stephens v Elwall (1815) 4 M & S 259; 105 ER 830; RH Willis & Son v British Car Auctions Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 438 (CA); but see National Mercantile Bank Ltd v Rymill (1881) 44 LT 767 (CA) (private sale effected by principal; auctioneer merely delivered goods). See generally Walker PA, “Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet’?” (2009) 33 MULR 235. 3 Winter v Bancks (1901) 84 LT 504 (KB). For discussion of bailment, see Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. 4 See Contracts: Specific “Jus Tertii and Bailee’s Estoppel” [8.5.540]–[8.5.550]. 5 Parker v Godin (1728) 2 Str 813; 93 ER 866 (pledgor who pawned a plate on behalf of a bankrupt committed conversion at moment of pledge, although the report does not indicate whether the pledgee had sold the goods; there was almost certainly knowledge by the pledgor of the plaintiff’s rights); Spackman v Foster (1883) 11 QBD 99 (person who receives goods as pledge in good faith does not commit

596

[33.8.890]

CONVERSION

conversion). Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [3.3.4.2] point out that there is no sense in distinguishing between pledgor and pledgee here. Both or neither should be liable. Spackman v Foster seems the preferable decision. See generally Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff; Criminal Offences “Offences of Dishonesty” [10.4.10]ff. Compare Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Finch [1962] 1 QB 701; [1962] 3 WLR 110 (CA), Willmer LJ at 711, Danckwerts LJ at 706 (QB). 6 Van Oppen & Co Ltd v Tredegars Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 504 (KB); Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700; 55 WN (NSW) 246 (FC), Jordan CJ at 717 (SR (NSW)) (Davidson and Nicholas JJ agreeing). 7 Public Trustee (NSW) v Jones (1925) 25 SR (NSW) 526; 42 WN (NSW) 173 (FC), see also Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700; 55 WN (NSW) 246 (FC), Jordan CJ at 717 (SR (NSW)) (Davidson and Nicholas JJ agreeing); but see Douglas Valley Finance Co Ltd v S Hughes (Hirers) Ltd [1969] 1 QB 738; [1967] 2 WLR 503 (defendant held to have taken constructive possession). 8 Applied in Re Gillie; Ex parte Cornell (1996) 70 FCR 254, Finn J at 257 (FCR). Compare [33.8.820]. 9 Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34, compare Latham CJ (dissenting as to outcome) at 218–219, McTiernan J at 235, Williams J (dissenting as to outcome) at 242–243 with Starke J at 221–222, Dixon J at 229 (CLR). See also McKenna & Armistead Pty Ltd v Excavations Pty Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 515; 74 WN (NSW) 289 (FC). 10 Model Dairy Pty Ltd v White [1935] ALR 432 (VSC) (defendants knowingly used plaintiff’s milk bottles for purpose of delivery of their own milk); Craig v Marsh (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 323; 52 WN (NSW) 123 (FC) (defendant used plaintiff’s manufacturing equipment which plaintiff left behind on vacating tenanted premises, despite warning by landlord to defendant on his taking over the tenancy of the premises that the equipment did not form part of the lease); Cook v Saroukos (1989) 97 FLR 33 (NTSC) (defendant authorised a third party to use (and possess) plaintiff’s commercial equipment which plaintiff had left behind while abroad); Hill v Reglon Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 295 (defendant receiver licensed to a third party the use of scaffolding that was commingled, notwithstanding plaintiff’s right to possession and joint ownership of the scaffolding). All four cases were held to be conversion. See generally Aitken L, “The Abandonment and Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 68 ALJ 263. 11 See also Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; 47 SR (NSW) 158; 64 WN (NSW) 34. 12 Motor Dealers Credit Corp Ltd v Overland (Sydney) Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 516; 48 WN (NSW) 205 (FC). For English authority, see England v Cowley (1873) LR 8 Ex 126 (defendant’s threat fell short of act of interference by defendant amounting to possession or denial of plaintiff’s title, although see dissenting judgment of Martin B); British Economical Lamp Co Ltd v Empire Mile End Lane Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 386 (KB) (an owner refused to allow a person to enter their land to retrieve goods left on the land; mere refusal is not necessarily a conversion, unless it is a denial of the person’s rights of ownership); Oakley v Lyster [1931] 1 KB 148 (CA) (the combination of the defendant’s assertion of ownership and use of disputed goods established conversion; defendant’s act was an absolute denial and repudiation of the plaintiff’s right).

597

[33.8.900]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

[33.8.900] A bank’s duty to a customer to exercise reasonable care and skill with respect to cheques and telegraphic transfers is purely contractual and not tortious.1 Likewise, the contract between a banker and a customer also creates the customer’s duty to take usual and reasonable precautions when drawing a cheque so as to prevent any fraudulent alteration which may cause loss to the banker.2 Reasonable foreseeability is not the measure of damages for consequential loss in conversion.3 In National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, in a case involving the fraudulent treatment of cheques, Callaway JA held: Liability in conversion is strict: like liability for breach of contract, which is also strict, it lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from deceit and is quite unlike negligence. The ordinary measure is the value of the chattel and consequential damages require some knowledge (or express notice) on the part of the defendant of facts whereby additional loss of the relevant kind is likely to result. To put the point another way, the consequential loss must be of a kind that should have been within the contemplation of the defendant as a likely consequence having regard to the defendant’s knowledge (or express notice) of the facts. There is, to that extent, a closer analogy with damages for breach of contract than with damages for negligence.4

1 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Callaway JA at [9], Batt JA at [45]–[48]. See also Professional Liability “Bankers” [27.5.10]ff. 2 Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Sydney Wide Stores Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 304; 55 ALJR 574, Gibbs CJ, Stephen, Mason, Aicken, Wilson, Wilson and Brennan JJ at 315, 317 (CLR); London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan [1918] AC 777; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80; [1985] 3 WLR 317 (PC (HK)); National Australia Bank Ltd v Hokit Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 377 (CA), Clarke JA at 398–402 (NSWLR); National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [46]. See generally Damian T, “The Customer is Nearly Always Right: Banks and Unauthorised Cheque Payments” (1996) 7 JBFLP 277; Hetherington M, “Responsibility for Payment of Forged Cheques: Lessons from NAB v Hokit” (1996) 7 JBFLP 313; Luntz H, “Banker and Customer: Reciprocal Absence of a Duty of Care” (1996) 4 TLJ 99. 3 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Callaway JA at [9], Batt JA at [69]. For further detail on damages (including exemplary damages), see “Conversion and Detinue” [33.10.1520]–[33.10.1560]. 4 National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Callaway JA at [9]. See also France v Gaudet (1871) LR 6 QB 199, Mellor J for the Queen’s Bench at 205.

Detinue [33.8.910] The essence of “detinue” is wrongful detention of a chattel to 598

[33.8.920]

DETINUE

which the plaintiff has the right of immediate possession:1 see [33.8.810]–[33.8.830] and [33.8.850]. Wrongful detention is established by a demand for the chattel by the plaintiff and a refusal of that demand by the defendant. A conditional demand which later becomes unconditional will suffice to establish an element of detinue.2 The cause of action in detinue may arise in either of two ways: (1)

the defendant has actual possession of the chattel and unreasonably refuses to restore it to the plaintiff on the latter’s demand (see [33.8.920]); or

(2)

the defendant was in possession of the plaintiff’s chattel under a bailment3 with the plaintiff, and has wrongfully parted with possession: see [33.8.940].

Even in the case of a wrongful parting with possession, there must be a demand and refusal for the cause of action to arise (compare [33.8.880]), so that at common law the limitation period on the action for conversion or negligence leading to the loss of possession commences before that applicable to an action for detinue.4 Detinue is now clearly recognised as a tort rather than a mere proprietary action.5

1 2 3 4

5

Grant v YYH Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 360, McColl JA at [43] (Tobias AJA agreeing); Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [318]–[319]. Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342, Allsop P at [165] (Giles and Macfarlan JJA agreeing). See generally Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. John F Goulding Pty Ltd v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1932) 48 CLR 157; [1932] VLR 408. For statutory provisions preventing an action in detinue being brought after the expiry of the limitation period for conversion, see Civil Procedure “Torts Actionable without Proof of Damage” [5.10.760]–[5.10.780]; “Fraud and Mistake” [5.10.2390]–[5.10.2410]; see also Health and Guardianship “Basis of Institutional Liability” [20.3.530]–[20.3.560]. Bellinger v Autoland Pty Ltd [1962] VR 514, Herring CJ at 519, 520, not accepting earlier doubts expressed in Pizer v Pizer [1926] VLR 231, by MacFarlan J at 233. Those doubts arose because detinue in early law was not a tortious action but a proprietary action for the recovery of chattels. In England, detinue as a tort has been abolished by Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (UK), s 2(1), and is now raised under actions for conversion.

[33.8.920] There are three substantive characteristics of detinue.1 These are as follows: (1)

The plaintiff must make a demand for the chattel whose possession the plaintiff is entitled to at the time of making the demand.2 An oral demand is sufficient.3

599

[33.8.920]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

(2)

The defendant must have refused that demand.4 A mere failure to respond to a letter demanding return of the goods is insufficient, at least where the demandee is not under a legal obligation to reply.5

(3)

Where the chattel is in the defendant’s possession, the refusal to return the chattel must be unreasonable; where it is not in the defendant’s possession, the defendant must have wrongfully parted with possession.6

1 This paragraph quoted with approval by Jackson J in Black Diamond Group Pty Ltd v Manor of Maluka Pty Ltd [2015] 1 Qd R 180; [2014] QSC 219 at [41]. 2 Timewell v Virgoe (1868) 5 WW & A’B (L) 147 (VSCFC); Banks v Ferrari [2000] NSWSC 874, Dowd J at [59]–[60]; but see Crowther v Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd [1985] Aust Torts Reports 80-709 (SASCFC), Bollen J at 69,102 (suggested that a demand may not be needed if the defendant has clearly demonstrated an intention not to return the chattel). 3 Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [321], citing Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481 at 520-521. 4 Nelson v Nelson [1923] St R Qd 37 (FC) (no refusal where the defendant failed to reply to the plaintiff’s letter of demand for return of the goods); CHEP Australia Ltd v Bunnings Group Ltd [2010] NSWSC 301, McDougall J at [180], [183]–[185]; Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [323]. 5 Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [324], citing Nelson v Nelson [1923] QSR 37 at 40. 6 EE McCurdy Ltd (in liq) v Postmaster-General [1959] NZLR 553 (SC) (not detinue to refuse return of chattel before the institution of interpleader proceedings by the defendant). See also Contract: General Principles “Tort and Restitutionary Liability of Minors” [7.3.550]–[7.3.570].

[33.8.930] A plaintiff’s title to sue in detinue is the same as that in conversion: see [33.8.810]–[33.8.850]. The plaintiff must have a right to immediate possession at the time of the refusal which derives from some proprietary or possessory interest in the chattel.1 The interest in the property must be a lawful interest.2 Detinue is wider than conversion in that it lies against one who is not in possession at the time of the demand and refusal, provided an obligation on the part of the defendant to retain possession on the plaintiff’s behalf can be established. This occurs in the majority of cases where there is a bailment between plaintiff and defendant.3

1 Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538; 24 SR (NSW) 502; 41 WN (NSW) 10; City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Southern Aerial Super Service Pty Ltd (1961) 106 CLR 477; 35 ALJR 206; Sandeman v Robinson (1877) Knox 382 (NSWSCFC). 2 Carolan v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1566, Button J at [83] (plaintiff found in possession of a suitcase containing $702,000 in cash unsuccessful sought a declaration that the detention of the money by police constituted trespass to goods,

600

[33.8.940]

3

DETINUE

conversion or detinue. Button J not satisfied that the plaintiff had established a lawful interest in the cash). John F Goulding Pty Ltd v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1932) 48 CLR 157; [1932] VLR 408, Stark, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 167; Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [326]–[327]. See generally Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff.

[33.8.940] Detinue lies against a bailee who has lost possession at the time of the demand in three situations. First, the loss of possession may have occurred through a prior conversion (see [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]), in which case the only difference between the causes of action relates to the limitation period;1 dating from the act of conversion, or from the time of the demand in the case of detinue. Second, where a bailee has deviated from the terms of bailment, they are liable for even accidental loss or destruction of the chattel in the course of the deviation.2 Finally, the bailee is liable for loss or destruction of the chattel caused by their negligence in its safe keeping. Once a plaintiff has proved loss, a defendant has the burden of establishing that the loss occurred without fault.3 Gratuitous bailees may be liable in detinue but are subject to a less onerous standard of care than commercial bailees.4 The defendant discharges that burden of proof of demonstrating that it took due care by showing a cause of the loss of the chattel not pointing to negligence on its behalf, or showing that it took reasonable care.5 Detinue lies in relation to acts or omissions of the defendant causing loss or destruction of the chattel, but not in relation to acts or omissions causing mere damage.6

1 2

3

4

5 6

See Civil Procedure “Torts Actionable without Proof of Damage” [5.10.760]–[5.10.780]. Lilley v Doubleday (1881) 7 QBD 510; McKenna & Armistead Pty Ltd v Excavations Pty Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 515; 74 WN (NSW) 289, the Court at 518 (SR (NSW)). Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694; [1962] 2 WLR 1015 (CA). See also Tottenham Investments Pty Ltd v Carburettor Services Pty Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-292 (NSWCA) (onus on bailee/defendant to disprove negligence). Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694; [1962] 2 WLR 1015 (CA), Ormerod LJ at 697–698 (QB); Graham v Voigt (1989) 95 FLR 146; 89 ACTR 11 (ACTSC). For the standard of care required of a bailee for reward, see Nibali v Sweeting & Denney (WA) Pty Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-258 (WASCFC). On bailment generally, see Contracts: Specific “Originally Involuntary Bailments” [8.5.1690]–[8.5.1740]. Houghland v RR Low (Luxury Coaches) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 694; [1962] 2 WLR 1015 (CA), Willmer LJ at 700 (QB). There is available to the plaintiff (at least in relation to bailments for reward) an action on the bailment itself which has the same effect as an action for detinue, in throwing the burden of proof on the bailee to show absence of fault as to the way in 601

[33.8.940]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

which the damage occurred: Cowper v JG Goldner Pty Ltd (1986) 40 SASR 457; Lieberopoulos v Jettner (1987) 140 LSJS 25 (SADC). In both cases the chattel was effectively a total loss. Where that is so, detinue is also available and it may have an advantage over the action on the bailment because of the suggestion in those two cases that the latter action is limited to commercial rather than gratuitous bailments, although that suggestion runs contrary to Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107. Gratuitous as well as commercial bailees may therefore be liable under the bailment for negligence causing mere damage to the chattel.

[33.8.945] Chattels may be legitimately detained by police for the purposes of an investigation or for use as evidence in a prospective prosecution. Detention by police for such purposes will be a defence to a claim for trespass to goods, conversion and detinue.1

1 See Carolan v New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1566, Button J at [82], citing Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18; 63 ALJR 11, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 43-44 and Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1980] QB 49 (plaintiff found in possession of a suitcase containing $702,000 in cash unsuccessfully sought a declaration that the detention of the money by police constituted trespass to goods, conversion or detinue. Button J was not satisfied that the plaintiff had established a lawful interest in the cash).

[33.8.950] Where a defendant is still in possession of chattel, an action in detinue may result in one of three forms of judgment. Judgment may be given for: (1)

the value of the chattel as assessed and damages for its detention;

(2)

return of the chattel or recovery of its value as assessed and damages for its detention; or

(3)

return of the chattel and damages for its detention.1

A judgment in the first form is appropriate if the chattel is “an ordinary article of commerce”. It deprives the defendant of the common law option of returning the chattel, and the plaintiff is entitled to such a judgment as of right if the defendant has not returned the chattel by the time of judgment. A judgment in the second form gives the defendant the option of returning the chattel but entitles the plaintiff to apply to the court seeking the specific restitution of the chattel at a later stage. Under the third form of judgment, the plaintiff is limited to obtaining specific restitution of the chattel and the only damages are those awarded in respect of the period of detention. However, the forms of judgment depend on the current state of the Rules of Court in particular courts in particular jurisdictions:2 see [33.8.960].

1 General & Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644

602

[33.8.960]

2

DETINUE

(CA), Diplock LJ at 650. See also Juhlinn-Dannfelt v Crash Repairs Pty Ltd [1969] QWN 1; Haythorpe v Rae [1972] VR 633 (presentation of passbook to bank was evidence of entitlement to money held in the account, although respondent’s requisite possessory interest in the passbook failed on the facts; disapproved by Public Trustee (Vic) v Gray-Masters [1977] VR 154 (VSC FC) on other grounds); Wade Sawmill Pty Ltd v Colenden Pty Ltd (t/as Pilks Pine) [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-927; [2007] QCA 455 (order made for return of chattel, conditional on payment of allowance for defendant’s improvement of the chattel). For further detail on damages and remedies, see “Conversion and Detinue” [33.10.1520]–[33.10.1560]; Restitution “Overview” [29.1.2380]–[29.1.2390]; see also Intellectual Property “Conversion and Detinue” [23.1.5360]–[23.1.5430]; “General” [33.6.140]. General Motors Acceptance Corp (Aust) v Davis [1971] VR 734 (specific restitution enforceable by writ of delivery); but see Buttigieg v VL Finance Pty Ltd [1986] VR 392 (FC) (applied in Watch Tower Bible Society v Sahas (2008) 36 WAR 234; [2008] WASCA 51, Pullin JA at [14]–[18], EM Heenan AJA at [51]); Linke v Schramm [1932] VLR 352 (by writ of attachment). See Civil Procedure “Judgments Other than Money Judgments” [5.7.1770]–[5.7.1810]; “Summary Dismissal, Settlement and Discontinuance” [5.5.1]ff; “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff (in particular, “Application of Limitation Acts” [5.10.260]–[5.10.320]); “Adjustment to Present Value” [33.10.550]; Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [5.235]–[5.250].

[33.8.960] The jurisdiction to order specific restitution may not be confined to proceedings in a particular form, and may rely on a combination of common law and equitable principles in the administration of statutory powers. In McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303, Young J held that the Supreme Court has a discretion under s 93 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) (see now s 93 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)), to order specific restitution of chattels in lieu of damages. Young J added that ordinarily the Court will not exercise its discretion in favour of a plaintiff to order the return of a chattel unless the chattel has a “special value” or is unique and damages would not give full compensation.1 It also will not exercise the discretion where it might be unjust to do so, or where it might bring the plaintiff more benefit than they were entitled to or deserved, or where there had been unreasonable delay. Young J considered that a yacht had sufficient individuality to attract the jurisdiction but that if value had been added to the yacht, the plaintiff must make allowance for the added value if he desired restitution.2 In Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591, Hope J held that the Supreme Court in its equitable jurisdiction always had jurisdiction to make an order for the return of a specific chattel. In Hope J’s view, the equitable jurisdiction was not limited to cases where the chattel was unique or had sentimental value, but extended to cases where purchase of a similar article by the plaintiff would involve damaging delay.3 Hope J did not consider that an order for specific restitution of a chattel could be classed as an injunction.4 However, in Island Way Pty Ltd v Redmond [1990] 1 Qd R 431, Cooper J granted a mandatory injunction for the return of a chattel (documents) in 603

[33.8.960]

TORTS TO CHATTELS

summary proceedings under O 57 r 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1900 (Qld) (now superseded by r 262 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), see also r 285), without requiring the institution of common law proceedings for detention. In Wade Sawmill Pty Ltd v Colenden Pty Ltd (t/as Pilks Pine) [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-927; [2007] QCA 455, Keane JA, held that, where a plaintiff applies for specific restitution of a chattel pursuant to s 25 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), a judge is empowered to make an order for the specific return of the chattel on condition that the plaintiff pays to the defendant an amount of money which reflects a just allowance for any improvement to the chattel.5

1 McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303, Young J at 307–308 (NSWLR). See generally Restitution “Mistakenly Rendered Goods and Services” [29.1.790]–[29.1.800]; “Torts” [29.1.2410]–[29.1.2470]. See also the discussion of tortious interference with non-profitable chattels in Lahoud v Lahoud [2009] ANZ ConvR 9-032; [2009] NSWSC 623, Ward J at [186]–[194]. 2 McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303, Young J at 312 (NSWLR). 3 Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591, Hope J at 596–597. 4 Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591, Hope J at 596. 5 Wade Sawmill Pty Ltd v Colenden Pty Ltd (t/as Pilks Pine) [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-927; [2007] QCA 455, Keane JA at [24] (McMurdo P and Daubney J agreeing). See generally Equity “Definition” [15.6.10]–[15.6.30]; “Conversion and Detinue” [33.10.1520]–[33.10.1560].

Replevin [33.8.970] The tort of replevin is usually applicable to goods seized by way of distress or other judicial process. The action provides a means whereby a person who has been deprived of chattels by such a process may recover them provisionally in summary proceedings, pending an action to determine the rights of the parties. There is authority that the scope of the tort is confined to these circumstances.1 The tort appears to have become obsolete, the uncertainties concerning its scope and even its survival possibly acting as a deterrent to attempts to use it.

1 Mellor v Leather (1853) 1 El & Bl 619; 118 ER 569 (QB) (constable took possession of a horse in the course of investigating alleged theft); but see Mennie v Blake (1856) 6 El & Bl 842; 119 ER 1078 (KB), Coleridge J at 850 (El & Bl) (suggesting the action may be generally available in “exceptional cases”).

604

Economic Torts General [33.8.1080] The principal economic torts at common law are intimidation (see [33.8.1090]–[33.8.1140]), causing loss by unlawful means (see [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170]), interference with contract (see [33.8.1180]–[33.8.1250]) and conspiracy: see [33.8.1260]–[33.8.1280]. Other economic torts include deceit (see [33.8.1290]–[33.8.1320]), passing off (see [33.8.1330]–[33.8.1380]) and injurious falsehood: see [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400]. It was settled quite early in the common law that there was no “tort” as such of intentional interference with an economic interest.1 It makes no difference if unfair business competition is used,2 or even that the defendant acted maliciously.3 However, protection may be available where the defendant has intentionally damaged the plaintiff by the threat of or the use of unlawful means, or has intentionally and wrongfully interfered with an existing contractual right of the plaintiff, or has conspired with another person to cause the plaintiff loss. The four principal economic torts considered form the leading common law means of this protection through the law of tort, since the “tort” in Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145; 40 ALJR 211; 18 LGRA 65 has been overruled: see [33.8.2150]. There is also statutory tortious protection introduced by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (as amended from time to time), reinforced by allied legislation in the various states and territories.4

1

2 3 4

Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889) 23 QBD 598 (CA) (affirmed in Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25); confirmed in Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; 59 ALJR 77, Deane J at 439–446 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Dawson and Wilson JJ agreeing) (no tort of “unfair competition”). See generally Intellectual Property “Other Actions” [23.6.780]–[23.6.810]. Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25, Halsbury LJ at 36–37, Morris LJ at 50, Field LJ at 51–52, Hannen LJ at 58–59. Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1, Watson LJ at 92, Herschell LJ at 140–141, Shand LJ at 166–167. See Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT); Fair Trading Act

605

[33.8.1080]

ECONOMIC TORTS

1989 (Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA); Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) 2010 (Tas); Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA). See generally “Economic Loss” [33.10.1670]–[33.10.1750]; “Tort” [35.1.2020]–[35.1.2060]; Unfair Dealing “Economic Duress” [35.7.580]–[35.7.650].

Intimidation [33.8.1090] There are two methods of committing the tort of intimidation. These were identified by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269 as: (1)

intimidation of the plaintiff by threats of an illegal act so that the plaintiff is induced to act to their own loss, as intended by the defendant; and

(2)

intimidation of another person by threats of an illegal act so as to intentionally compel that other to do harm to the plaintiff, whether the other person’s harmful act is a wrong by them or not.1

The first form is less common than the second. The tort remains part of the law of Australia.2

1 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269, Devlin LJ at 1205–1207 (AC). 2 Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2014) 318 ALR 107; [2014] VSCA 348, Maxwell P, Neave, Redlich, Beach JJA and Kaye AJA at [52]–[59] (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 15 May 2015 in Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCATrans 122).

[33.8.1100] A threat intimidating a plaintiff may itself be a tort, for example assault (see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]) or trespass to land1 (see [33.8.470]–[33.8.600]), or a breach of contract:2 see also [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1250]. Although these are clearly actionable wrongs, there may be independent scope for the tort of intimidation in that situation. Taylor J in Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451 envisaged that telephone threats of battery to be committed at some time in the future could amount to assault.3 That may be pushing the tort of assault beyond its recognised limits, but there appears to be no reason why the action of the defendant should not have been held to be intimidation, since the threat was of a future unlawful act and its object was to coerce the plaintiff into executing documents, which in fact he

606

[33.8.1110]

INTIMIDATION

did. However, intimidation is not available where the plaintiff does not act on the threat.4

1 2

3 4

Lavender v Betts [1942] 2 All ER 72 (KB) (landlord removed windows and doors to persuade the tenant to leave the premises). Perera v Vandiyar [1953] 1 WLR 672 (CA) (landlord cut off tenant’s electricity and gas, with the result that the tenant was effectively evicted; no trespass to land, but interference with contractual rights); see also Spira v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 57 NSWLR 544; [2003] NSWCA 180 (special leave to appeal refused in Spira v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2004] HCATrans 465); Habib v Commonwealth (No 2) (2009) 175 FCR 350; [2009] FCA 228, Perram J at [19]–[20]. See also Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff. Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451 (NSWSC), Taylor J at 455. Habib v Commonwealth (No 2) (2009) 175 FCR 350; [2009] FCA 228, Perram J at [19]; Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Brennan J at 357, 371–373 (CLR). See generally Fridman GHL, “Interference with Trade or Business – Part II” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 99.

[33.8.1110] Intimidation of third persons by threats of illegal acts to harm a plaintiff is well acknowledged. In Keeble v Hickeringill (1809) 11 East 574; 103 ER 1127, Holt CJ said that if a man should lie in the way with his guns, and fright the boys from going to school, and their parents would not let them go thither; sure that schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his scholars.1

In that case, it was not conceived that the action depended on interference with any property right, but on the coercive threat of illegal action causing business loss. That was finally confirmed by Tarleton v McGawley (1794) Peake 270; 170 ER 153. In that case, the defendant was held liable when he frightened natives away from trading with the plaintiff by firing guns at them with the deliberate intention of preventing the trade, though it was clear that the plaintiff had no special right to conduct the trade involved. The leading modern authority on the tort of intimidation by illegal means is Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269, where union members threatened the plaintiff’s employer with an unlawful strike if the plaintiff was not dismissed, and the employer lawfully dismissed the plaintiff. The tort therefore comprehends not only threats of criminal or tortious acts but also threats of breach of contract.2

1 2

Keeble v Hickeringill (1809) 11 East 574; 103 ER 1127, Holt CJ at 575–576 (East). Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710; [1968] 3 WLR 506 (CA) (strike was not unlawful, as proper notice was given); Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843; Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971]

607

[33.8.1110]

ECONOMIC TORTS

1 NSWLR 760 (CA). See generally 10 Criminal Offences; Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff.

[33.8.1120] Intent to harm a plaintiff is essential to the cause of action in intimidation.1 In Huljich v Hall [1973] 2 NZLR 279, it was held that intimidation was not established where the defendant issued a threat to the plaintiff and the plaintiff took action to his own loss, where that action was not intended by the defendant.2

1 Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843; Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760 (CA); Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 342–343, Brennan J at 357, 371 (CLR). See generally Fridman GHL, “Interference with Trade or Business – Part II” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 99. 2 Huljich v Hall [1973] 2 NZLR 279 (CA).

[33.8.1130] There is conflicting authority on whether justification may be a defence to the tort of intimidation. Justification was thought to be a defence to an action for conspiracy to intimidate by the use of unlawful means by Nagle CJ at CL in Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843.1 His Honour considered that the defence was available to members of a trade union who were acting in good faith in what they perceived as the interests of the union, though he found that such a defence was not established on the facts of the case. Latham v Singleton is now hard to reconcile with the judgment of Brooking J in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637 to the effect that justification is in no circumstances a defence to the torts of unlawful means (see [33.8.1250]) or conspiracy to use unlawful means: see [33.8.1280].

1 Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843, Nagle CJ at CL at 869 (NSWLR); see also Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530; 79 ALJR 217; [2004] HCA 56.

[33.8.1140] Loss arising from intimidation must be proved as a consequence of conduct induced by the threat of an illegal act.1 Damages in actions for intimidation are at large. Aggravated and exemplary damages may be appropriate.2

1 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637.

608

[33.8.1150]

2

CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS

Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2) (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 2 VR 636. See “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220].

Causing Loss by Unlawful Means [33.8.1150] The use of unlawful means (see [33.8.1170]) by a defendant to inflict an intended loss on a plaintiff is a tort about which there is much uncertainty. There is a logical argument for the tort’s existence in that if the threat to commit an unlawful act may constitute the tort of intimidation (see [33.8.1090]–[33.8.1140]), the actual performance of that act should also be a tort. In Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, the High Court stated that “this embryonic or emerging tort … is in need of further definition”.1 It was made clear that “[t]he emerging tort requires that the unlawful act be directed at the person injured”.2 There is a considerable number of dicta in support of the existence of the tort;3 there are decisions arising in actions for interlocutory injunctions where a prima facie case of unlawful interference was established;4 a refusal to strike out a cause of action;5 a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal applying the tort;6 and a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court at first instance applying the tort.7 On being invited to decide that the tort did not form part of Australian law, the Victorian Court of Appeal found that only the High Court had the power to resolve the question.8

1

2 3

Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 343 (CLR). See generally Fridman GHL, “Interference with Trade or Business – Part II” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 99. Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 343 (CLR). Kitano v Commonwealth (1974) 129 CLR 151; 48 ALJR 343n, Mason J at 173–174 (CLR); Copyright Agency Ltd v Haines [1982] 1 NSWLR 182; (1982) 61 FLR 236, McLelland J at 194 (NSWLR) (not addressed by the Full Federal Court in Haines v Copyright Agency Ltd (1982) 64 FLR 184); Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia (1970) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 743; [1970] 2 NSWR 47, Else-Mitchell J at 748 (WN (Pt 1) (NSW)) (the Full Court of Appeal considered but did not determine the matter in Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760 (CA), Jacobs JA at 764–765, Mason JA at 767–768 (Jacobs and Holmes JJA agreed)); Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 666–667; Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329; 72 ALJR 1508; [1998] HCA 64, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby

609

[33.8.1150]

ECONOMIC TORTS

4

5 6 7

8

and Hayne JJ at [31]–[36]. However, see the reservations expressed in Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (2001) 118 LGERA 117; [2001] QCA 342, Williams JA at [72]–[75] (Helman J agreeing) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 26 June 2002 in Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council [2002] HCATrans 326). For English decisions, see Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570; [1983] 2 WLR 778, Diplock LJ at 609–610 (AC) (Edmund-Davies, Keith, Brandon and Brightman LJJ agreed) (overruled on other grounds in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, Nicholls LJ at [184]–[188], Walker LJ at [264]). For a review of the English law on this topic, see Kodwo Bentil J, “Improper Interference with Another’s Business or Trade Interest as a Tort” (1993) J Bus L 519; Lee J, “Restoring Confidence in the Economic Torts” (2007) 15 Tort L Rev 172. See generally Sales P and Stilitz D, “Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful Means” (1999) 115 LQR 411. Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Gardner [1968] 2 QB 762; [1968] 2 WLR 1239 (CA) (indirect inducement or procurement of a breach of contract); Brekkes Ltd v Cattel [1972] Ch 105; [1971] 2 WLR 647. Public interest considerations were also given weight in these applications. See also Acrow (Automation) Ltd v Rex Chainbelt Inc [1971] 1 WLR 1676 (CA) (injunction granted to restrain third party from aiding and abetting breach of original injunction). Lonrho plc v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479; [1989] 3 WLR 631 (CA). Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v Aulsebrooks Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 354; (1984) 2 IPR 337 (CA). Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 667–668. See also the discussion in Poynder v Kent [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-984; [2008] VSCA 245, Osborn AJA at [120] (Buchanan and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreeing) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 29 May 2009 in Poynder v Kent [2009] HCATrans 120). For further discussion of misfeasance in public office, see [33.8.2160]. Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2014) 318 ALR 107; [2014] VSCA 348, Maxwell P, Neave, Redlich, Beach JJA and Kaye AJA at [31] (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 15 May 2015 in Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCATrans 122); Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, Beach J at [222].

[33.8.1160] A defendant’s intention to cause loss to a plaintiff must be a motivating factor to establish the tort of causing loss by unlawful means. The intention requirement of the tort is not that there is a predominant purpose to injure the plaintiff,1 but that the intention to cause loss to the plaintiff must be at least a motivating factor, in the sense that but for it the defendant would not have acted.2 It is not settled whether there need be any targeting of the plaintiff, or whether it is sufficient that loss to the plaintiff, or a class including the plaintiff, is substantially certain.3 A police officer acting beyond power to obtain truthful evidence from a potential witness in a manner intended to be fully and fairly disclosed at trial will not constitute an intention to cause harm.4

610

[33.8.1170]

CAUSING LOSS BY UNLAWFUL MEANS

The defence of justification is probably not available to the tort of causing loss by unlawful means. This is discussed in relation to the tort of causing loss by unlawful means and conspiracy at [33.8.1280].

1

2

3 4

Lonrho plc v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479; [1989] 3 WLR 631 (CA), Dillon LJ at 488–489, Ralph Gibson LJ at 492, Woolfe LJ at 494 (QB) (followed in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 668). Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v Aulsebrooks Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 354; (1984) 2 IPR 337 (CA); see also discussion of authorities in Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (2001) 118 LGERA 117; [2001] QCA 342, McMurdo P at [18]–[25] (Helman J agreeing) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 26 June 2002 in Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council [2002] HCATrans 326). Lonrho plc v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479; [1989] 3 WLR 631 (CA), Dillon LJ at 488, Woolf LJ at 494 (QB). Poynder v Kent [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-984; [2008] VSCA 245, Osborn AJA at [119] (Buchanan and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreed) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused on 29 May 2009 in Poynder v Kent [2009] HCATrans 120).

[33.8.1170] Unlawful means include those means accepted as unlawful for the tort of intimidation (see [33.8.1090]–[33.8.1140]), including crime, tort and breach of contract:1 see [33.8.1180]–[33.8.1250]. An agreement that is void at common law as being in restraint of trade cannot be used to establish unlawful means for the purpose of suing in tort.2 A fraudulent misrepresentation may constitute unlawful means, even though no completed tort is established by it.3

1 2

3

See generally 10 Criminal Offences; Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff. Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25, Morris LJ at 50–51; but see Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Gardner [1968] 2 QB 762; [1968] 2 WLR 1239 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 782–783 (QB) (Davies LJ agreeing) (although see Russell LJ at 776 (QB)); Brekkes Ltd v Cattel [1972] Ch 105; [1971] 2 WLR 647. On restraint of trade, see generally Restrictive Trade Practices “Restraint of Trade” [30.1.10]ff. Lonrho plc v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479; [1989] 3 WLR 631 (CA), Dillon LJ at 489 (QB); National Phonograph Co Ltd v Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 335 (CA). See also Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff.

611

[33.8.1170]

ECONOMIC TORTS

Intentional Interference with Contract [33.8.1180] The tort of intentional interference with a contract may take one of two forms. First, there is liability in tort for intentionally inducing a party to a contract to break the contract. That liability is to the other party to the contract. That type of interference with the contract is generally referred to as “direct interference”. Second, there is liability for intentionally bringing about a state of affairs under which a party to a contract is rendered incapable of performing it. That type of interference is generally referred to as “indirect interference”. There are fundamental differences between the two and they will therefore be considered separately.1 There can be no liability under either form if there is no pre-existing contract, the breach of which can be procured.2 The following six elements must be satisfied in both forms, as explained by Beach J in Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498.3 First, there must be a contract. Second, the defendant must know that such a contract exists. Third, the defendant must know that if one of the contracting parties does or fails to do a particular act, that conduct would be a breach of contract. Fourth, the defendant must intend to induce or procure that contracting party to breach the contract by doing or failing to do that particular act. Fifth, the breach must cause a loss or damage to the plaintiff. Sixth, no defence of justification should be applicable.

In Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26, with respect to “intention” in the intentional interference with contract, Lindgren J said: In my opinion, the authorities establish conclusively that the gravamen of the tort is intention. Although the requirement of knowledge of the contract is sometimes discussed as if it was a separate ingredient of the tort, it is in fact an aspect of intention. The requirement that the alleged tortfeasor have “sufficient knowledge of the contract” is a requirement he have sufficient knowledge to ground an intention to interfere with contractual rights. Both this intention to interfere with contractual rights and the necessary supporting knowledge of the contract refer to the “actual” or “subjective” state of mind of the alleged tortfeasor … Although an alleged tortfeasor must have “a fairly good idea” that the contract benefits another in the relevant respect, knowledge of the contract may be sufficient for the purpose of grounding the necessary intention to interfere with contractual rights although the precise term breached is not known.4

1 For Australian acceptance of the distinction between direct and indirect interference, see Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, Beach J at [204], [212]–[218]; Woolley v Dunford (1972) 3 SASR 243, Wells J at 267; Davies v Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76 (FC), Bray CJ at 99–100.

612

[33.8.1190]

2 3

4

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343. See generally Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff. Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, Beach J at [206]. Following Daebo Shipping Co Ltd v Go Star (2012) 207 FCR 220; [2012] FCAFC 156, and see Traffıc Calming Australia Pty Ltd v CTS Creative Traffıc Solutions Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 741; Talacko v Talacko [2015] VSC 287. Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26 (FC), Lindgren J at 43 (FCR) (Lockhart and Tamberlin JJ agreeing); Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323 (reckless indifference or wilful blindness to the truth may suffice to establish the necessary intention); Daebo Shipping Co Ltd v Go Star (2012) 207 FCR 220; [2012] FCAFC 156; Orica Investments Pty Ltd v McCartney [2007] NSWSC 645, White J at [329]. Arguably, the recent Federal Court authorities treat knowledge and intention as separate elements, contrary to Lindgren J’s analysis, however this is unlikely to make a practical difference: Traffıc Calming Australia Pty Ltd v CTS Creative Traffıc Solutions Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 741, Almond J at [24], [45]–[54]. See also OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, Hoffmann LJ at [39]–[41]; Nicholls LJ (dissenting as to outcome) at [202] (applied in Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2009] NSWSC 1033, Einstein J at [291]–[300]). See generally Walter DJ, “Personal Liability of Receivers and Managers for Interference with Contractual Relations” (2005) 5 INSLB 103. See also Intellectual Property “Other Actions” [23.6.780]–[23.6.810].

[33.8.1190] The means used by a defendant do not have to be unlawful where there is direct interference with a contract.1 In the leading case of Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 El & Bl 216; 118 ER 749, it was held that a party to a contract had an action in tort against a third party who persuaded the other party to the contract to break it. Although unlawful means do not have to be used by the defendant in the cases of direct interference, an actionable breach of contract must be proved:2 see [33.8.1250].

1

2

Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, Beach J at [205] (the relevant act of persuasion, inducement or procurement is treated as being unlawful in and of itself); Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269, Fullagar J at 77 (CLR) (Dixon CJ and Kitto J agreeing). The Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Scarletti Pty Ltd v Millwood Printing Co Pty Ltd (unreported, VSC App Div, Phillips CJ, Crockett and Southwell JJ, 8500 of 1993, 28 July 1994) has expressed the opinion that in all cases of interferences with contractual relations, the acts constituting the interference must themselves be unlawful, although this was a case of indirect interference. See generally Izzo M, “The Limits of Lumley v Gye: Commercial Disputes and the Tort of Interference with Contractual Relations” (2005) 13 TLJ 188. See OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, Hoffmann LJ at [44].

613

[33.8.1200]

ECONOMIC TORTS

[33.8.1200] Direct interference may be proved by showing that a defendant has dealt with a contract-breaker in a way that the defendant knows to be inconsistent with the contract. In British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch 556, the defendant had bought cars from third parties, knowing that the sale was a breach of the contract entered into with the plaintiffs and inducing a breach by offering a sufficiently high price. However, in Independent Oil Industries Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394; 54 WN (NSW) 152 it was held that, where the defendants had stipulated the terms on which they were willing to supply their petrol to retail petrol dealers and the effect of that was to cause the dealers to break their contracts with the plaintiffs, the defendants were not liable in tort, since they had not knowingly and intentionally procured the breaches. Jordan CJ stated: It may be that no tort is committed unless it is established that the doing of the act was procured either with the intention to procure by its means the breach of the particular contract, or at least with knowledge that the doing of the act would necessarily and inevitably involve a breach of contract.1

In James v Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339, it was decided that a statement (made by an officer of the Commonwealth) of an intention to prosecute for breach of the law, made in good faith, could not constitute the tort, even though it arose from an erroneous view of the law and even though a contracting party was induced to commit a breach of contract as a result. It is also not a ground of liability for the defendant to accept the benefit of a breach of contract which a party to the contract has already decided to commit. In Batts Combe Quarry Ltd v Ford [1943] Ch 51, the defendant sons accepted financial assistance from their father in setting up a quarry. That constituted a breach of contract by the father who had contracted with the plaintiffs not to assist in setting up a rival quarry in the area. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the sons were not liable, as the father’s breach of contract was not procured by or brought about by persuasion or pressure exerted on the father by the sons. In Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323, the Court of Appeal held that it was not enough to ground an intention to interfere with contractual relations if the party was ignorant of the contract or the existence of its terms. However, “reckless indifference or wilful blindness to the truth may lead to a finding of the necessary intention”.2 Picketing of premises by trade unionists may operate as persuasion of union members to break their contracts of employment, and amount to a form of direct interference.3

1 Independent Oil Industries Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394; 54 WN (NSW) 152 (FC), Jordan CJ at 415 (SR (NSW)) (Long Innes CJ in Eq and Davidson J agreeing); see Short v City Bank of Sydney (1912) 15 CLR 148; 13 SR

614

[33.8.1210]

2

3

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

(NSW) 517, Isaacs J at 160 (CLR); Sanders v Snell (1997) 73 FCR 569 (FC), the Court at 585 (FCR) (reversed by Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329; 72 ALJR 1508; [1998] HCA 64, without disturbing this discussion). See also Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157; [2001] FCA 1040. See generally Bonollo F, “Seeds, Weeds and Unlawful Means: Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss and Interference with Trade and Business” (2005) 31 Mon LR 322. Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323, the Court at [171]; see Orica Investments Pty Ltd v McCartney [2007] NSWSC 645, White J at [330]. See also OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, Hoffmann LJ at [40]–[41], approving the statement in Emerald Construction Co v Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 700–701. See generally Walter DJ, “Personal Liability of Receivers and Managers for Interference with Contractual Relations” (2005) 5 INSLB 103. David Jones Ltd v Federated Storemen & Packers’ Union of Australia (NSW) (1985) 14 IR 75 (NSWSC), Waddell J at 79–80; Boral Bricks New South Wales Pty Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 IR 70 (NSWSC), Brownie J at 82 (IR).

[33.8.1210] Mere knowledge of a contract on a defendant’s part plus an intention to interfere with its performance is sufficient for the tort of intentional interference with contract, and malice need not be established.1 In Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ stated: Liability does not depend on whether there is a predominant intention to injure and it has been held that constructive knowledge of the terms of a contract is sufficient, so that a defendant may be liable if he or she recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining those terms. But it is still accurate to describe the tort as one that depends on an intention to harm for that is necessarily involved if a person knowingly interferes with the enjoyment by another of a positive legal right, whether such knowledge is actual or constructive.2

Where knowledge of a contract is established, exact knowledge of its terms is unnecessary. In Emerald Construction Co v Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691,3 the defendants were held liable on proof that they intended to bring a contract to an end by breach or other means, although they assumed the contract contained a provision under which it could be lawfully terminated. In HC Sleigh Ltd v Blight [1969] VR 931, the defendant was held not liable where, at the time of entering into a contract to purchase a business, he had no prior knowledge of a binding agreement between the plaintiff and the vendor, notwithstanding the fact that he later obtained that knowledge at a time when he could still have repudiated his contract with the vendor without liability on his part. Where the existence of a contract is not actually known of by the defendant, but is obvious, knowledge of it by the defendant may be inferred.4 However, an alternative supplier of maintenance lift services was not obliged to infer, merely from the fact that a potential customer is already having its lifts serviced, that there was a continuing contract whose breach it must be careful not to induce.5

615

[33.8.1210]

ECONOMIC TORTS

There may be no requirement that the plaintiff be targeted by the defendant as the victim of the interference, provided there is a sufficient degree of inevitability that the plaintiff or a class including the plaintiff will suffer interference with their contract. Thus, in Falconer v ASLEF [1986] IRLR 3316 there was liability in relation to the calling of a rail strike which caused booked tickets to be unusable by passengers at the stated time. The action was based on indirect interference with the contract, but there is no difference between the intention requirement for direct and indirect interference with contract.

1 British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson [1940] 1 All ER 479 (HL); Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26 (FC); News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410 (FC) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused in Australian Rugby Football League Ltd v News Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 692n). See generally Fridman GHL, “Interference with Trade or Business – Part II” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 99. 2 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 342 (CLR). This case was applied in Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 173 ALR 702; [2000] FCA 823 (reversed in part by Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157; [2001] FCA 1040 without disturbing this point). 3 Emerald Construction Co v Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 691 (CA). 4 JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269; [1964] 3 WLR 541 (CA), Reid LJ at 323–324 (AC); Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570; [1983] 2 WLR 778 (overruled on other grounds in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, Nicholls LJ at [184]–[188], Walker LJ at [264]; see also Hoffmann LJ at [40]–[41], Nicholls LJ (dissenting as to outcome) at [192]). For knowledge of a corporation in this connection, see Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323. See generally Edmundson P, “Sidestepping Limited Liability in Corporate Groups Using the Tort of Interference with Contract” (2006) 30 MULR 62. 5 Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v Debelak (1989) 89 ALR 275 (FCA). 6 Falconer v ASLEF [1986] IRLR 331 (County Ct).

[33.8.1220] There is no liability for direct interference with contract where a defendant has persuaded a party to a contract lawfully to terminate it or otherwise not perform it. “Procuring” or “inducing” a breach is actionable, but “advising” is not, on the basis that the former creates a reason to breach and the latter merely points out that a reason already exists.1 In Petree v Knox (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 503; 34 WN (NSW) 235, it was held that a plaintiff who was lawfully dismissed by his employer, allegedly as a result of a misrepresentation made to the employer by the defendant, had no cause of action in the absence of actual fraudulent misrepresentation on the defendant’s part.2 Even if fraud existed, the liability would be for injurious falsehood (see [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400]) or possibly conspiracy (see [33.8.1260]–[33.8.1280]) and not for direct interference.

616

[33.8.1230]

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

Breach of a contract by a company acting through its directors or other employees does not amount to a tortious inducement of breach of contract by those persons,3 but directors can be held liable if they did not act bona fide or within the scope of their authority.4 The contract must be an enforceable contract.5

1

2 3

4

5

Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, Beach J at [208]; Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Corke Instrument Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd (2005) 223 ALR 480; [2005] FCA 799, Finkelstein J at [19]. Petree v Knox (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 503; 34 WN (NSW) 235 (FC); but see MacKenzie v MacLachlan [1979] 1 NZLR 670 (SC). O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18; 43 SR (NSW) 1; 60 WN (NSW) 3 (applied in LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74, Young CJ in Eq at [90], [94]–[95] (Hodsgon JA agreeing)). Cook Strait Skyferry Ltd v Dennis Thompson International Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 72 (HC); Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 328, Einstein J at [60]. See Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff. See generally Edmundson P, “Sidestepping Limited Liability in Corporate Groups Using the Tort of Interference with Contract” (2006) 30 MULR 62. Doust v Godbehear (1925) 28 WALR 59 (FC) (tort not committed where the contract was unenforceable for lack of writing under the Statute of Frauds 1677 29 Car II c 3 (IMP)); News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410 (FC), the Court at 516–517 (FCR) (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused in Australian Rugby Football League Ltd v News Ltd (1996) 187 CLR 692n).

[33.8.1230] “Indirect interference with contract” includes physical acts of a defendant or the use of threats or other coercive action against third parties rendering performance of the contract impossible.1 This can be distinguished from the case of direct interference, where an actual breach of contract must be induced: see [33.8.1190]. It is also a distinguishing feature of indirect interference that the means used by the defendant must be unlawful: see [33.8.1170]. In Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570; [1983] 2 WLR 778, the interference was exceptionally indirect. The defendant trade unionists had a dispute with the plaintiff shipowners, who had entered into a charter party contract of one of their ships. The charterers had subchartered the vessel, which was still lying in port. The subcharterers had a contract with a tugboat company to move the ship. The defendants persuaded the employees of the tugboat company to break their contracts of employment by refusing to move the ship. The main charter party was therefore rendered impossible of performance. This caused loss to the plaintiffs since no hiring charge was payable by the charterer if the ship was stopped by industrial action. The House of Lords held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action in tort against the

617

[33.8.1230]

ECONOMIC TORTS

defendants on the ground that they had used unlawful means (knowingly inducing breaches of the tugboat employees’ contracts) to bring about indirectly an interference with the main contract. Indirect interference only suffices to establish the tort if the means used can be described as unlawful. It was expressly recognised in Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton2 that an actionable breach of the main contract need not be established.3 The ship-owners who were prevented from performing the contract to make available the ship were able to establish a cause of action, again distinguishing the rule in Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 El & Bl 216; 118 ER 749 under which the contract-breaker is not allowed to sue: see [33.8.1190]. In Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1995] Ch 152; [1994] 3 WLR 1221, the English Court of Appeal held that to knowingly to deprive a person of the opportunity to claim a remedy for interference with contract was not tortious.

1 GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376 (KB); JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269; [1964] 3 WLR 541 (CA); Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383 (picket lines). See generally Nyland C, “The Battle of Bombo: Besetting Laws and the Right to Picket in New South Wales” (1995) 8 AJLL 177. 2 Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570; [1983] 2 WLR 778, Diplock LJ at 609–610 (AC) (Edmund-Davies, Keith, Brandon and Brightman LJJ agreeing). 3 Thereby avoiding the artificiality of holding, as in Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106; [1969] 2 WLR 289 (CA), that proof of the defendants’ intention to directly and deliberately interfere with the plaintiffs’ contracts established an actionable breach even though an exclusion clause protected the contracting parties against liability. However, the reasoning in Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins was accepted in Woolley v Dunford (1972) 3 SASR 243, Wells J at 267, 292. The decision has been criticised: see Cane P, “Tortious Interference with Contractual Remedies” (1995) 111 LQR 400. Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570; [1983] 2 WLR 778 was overruled on other grounds in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; [2007] 2 WLR 920; [2007] UKHL 21, Nicholls LJ (dissenting as to outcome) at [184]–[188], Walker LJ at [264].

[33.8.1240] A plaintiff must establish damage as part of the cause of action for both direct and indirect interference with contract. In Goldsoll v Goldman [1914] 2 Ch 603, Neville J stated that: [I]f the breach which has been procured by the defendant has been such as must in the ordinary course of business inflict damage upon the plaintiff, then the plaintiff may succeed without proof of any particular damage which has been occasioned him [or her].1

618

[33.8.1250]

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

Damages can be awarded at large, for example, compensatory damages for loss of prestige were awarded (in addition to injunctive relief) where the defendant removed the plaintiffs’ tyres from cars at a motor show and substituted their own tyres, thereby resulting in a breach of the plaintiffs’ contract with the car manufacturers.2

1

2

Goldsoll v Goldman [1914] 2 Ch 603, Neville J at 615 (restraint of trade), (affirmed by Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292 (CA)); see also Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; 21 SR (NSW) 398; 38 WN (NSW) 6; Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [8], [14], Kirby J at [85]; Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69, Gummow J at [75]–[77]. GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376 (KB); Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; 21 SR (NSW) 398; 38 WN (NSW) 6.

[33.8.1250] Justification is available as a defence to an action based on direct interference with contract where a contract whose breach is induced is inconsistent with, and therefore a breach of, an earlier contract made with a defendant. For example, where X sells land to D for $10,000 and then sells it to P for $15,000, D may lawfully induce a breach of contract between X and P. The same principle applies where, although the second contract is not inconsistent with the first, the first contract gives the defendant a right equal or superior to that of the plaintiff.1 In Pete’s Towing Services Ltd v Northern Industrial Union of Workers [1970] NZLR 32, the defendant was allowed to plead justification for informing the plaintiffs’ employees that they were doing work that they were not legally entitled to do, in consequence of which they abandoned that work.2 However, in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J cited a long line of authority in holding that justification would not be established as a defence to an action for interference with contractual relations by showing that the defendants were acting in the “performance of a duty to advise members of the union and protect their interests in relation to an industrial dispute”.3 In determining the limits of a defence of justification, regard may be had to the nature of the contract broken, the grounds for the breach, the means employed to produce the breach, the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the contract, and the object of the person in procuring the breach.4 The onus of proving justification is on the interfering party, and rarely succeeds.5 Justification is not available as a defence to an action for indirect interference with contract by the use of unlawful means:6 see also [33.8.1130], [33.8.1230] and [33.8.1240] and compare [33.8.1160] and [33.8.1280].

619

[33.8.1250]

ECONOMIC TORTS

An act which would in itself be wrongful as infringing a legal right of another person may be justified if shown to be no more than was reasonably necessary for the protection of some actually existing superior legal right in the doer of the act. For the purposes of the tort of interference with contractual relations, “actually existing superior legal right” refers to a right in real or personal property or a right or duty found in statute. In Australian law, the defence of justification does not depend on a discretionary balancing of social and individual interests, nor can justification be found in mere self-interest of the actor or of entities linked with it.7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Edwin Hill & Partners v First National Finance Corp plc [1989] 1 WLR 225 (CA); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307; 81 ALJR 1414; [2007] HCA 33, Gleeson CJ at [23]. Pete’s Towing Services Ltd v Northern Industrial Union of Workers [1970] NZLR 32 (SC); see also Brimelow v Casson [1924] 1 Ch 302 (held that inducing breaches of contract was justified on grounds of public interest and morality; but the correctness of this decision is debatable). See generally Fridman GHL, “Interference with Trade or Business – Part II” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 99. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 677; see Building Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 104; 37 IR 380 (FC), the Court at 142–146 (FCR). Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v South Wales Miners’ Federation [1903] 2 KB 545 (CA), Romer LJ at 574 (affirmed in South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 239), cited with approval in Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843, Nagle CJ at CL at 869 (NSWLR); see also Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd v Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union of Australia (1987) 89 FLR 349 (NTSC), Nadar J at 352–355. Building Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 104; 37 IR 380 (FC), the Court at 141–146 (FCR); see also Griffıths v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 111 (FCA) (justification is a defence, rather than an element of the tort); Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530; 79 ALJR 217; [2004] HCA 56, the Court at [162]. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 678. See also [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170]. See generally Agyemang AA, “Interference with Contractual Relations: The Concept of Justification” (1990) 28 LSJ 60. See Zhu v Treasurer (NSW) (2004) 218 CLR 530; 79 ALJR 217; [2004] HCA 56, the Court at [120]–[146].

Conspiracy [33.8.1260] (1)

The tort of conspiracy may take two forms. These are:

an agreement or combination between two or more persons to commit a lawful act with the predominant purpose of injuring or damaging a plaintiff, and the act is carried out and the purpose achieved; or

620

[33.8.1260]

(2)

CONSPIRACY

an agreement or combination between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act with an intention to injure a plaintiff, and the act is carried out and the intention achieved.1

The difference lies in the intention required. Where unlawful means are used (see [33.8.1170]), a mere intention to cause injury or damage to the plaintiff (resulting in damage) is sufficient. When lawful means are used, the intention to cause injury or damage must be predominant.2 However, some intention to injure or damage the plaintiff is an essential requirement.3 It is not enough if such injury is merely foreseeable or even likely. Thus, in Vickery v Taylor (1910) 11 SR (NSW) 119; 28 WN (NSW) 43, an agreement to raise the price of a company’s shares by making false statements was held not actionable by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales since there was no intention to injure the plaintiff, even though he suffered foreseeable loss as a consequence. Conspiracy may be committed by husband and wife, but not by an employer and employee where the latter is acting in the course of employment. A company cannot be held liable for a conspiracy with its board of directors nor can the members of its board commit conspiracy with each other when acting merely in their collegiate decision-making capacity.4 However, there is Australian authority that a trade union may be found to have conspired with its members.5 The main advantage of conspiracy as a tort appears to be that it allows a plaintiff to succeed in proving a tort in relation to acts not in themselves unlawful.6 However, the need to show a predominant purpose to injure the plaintiff makes success in this form of the tort unusual. In particular, the protection of the interests of a trade union and its members is a legitimate purpose even though in carrying it out a combination of members of the union inflict damage on the plaintiff.7 Liability exists in cases where the union members go beyond the scope of legitimate protection of trade union interests.8 It is a legitimate purpose to act to uphold a high principle rather than to protect material interests.9

1

Leading examples of High Court recognition of the conspiracy to use unlawful means are: McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343; Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713; 8 ABC 58, Dixon J at 717–718 (CLR); Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269, Fullagar J at 78 (Dixon CJ and Kitto J agreeing), Taylor J at 108–109, Menzies J at 125 (CLR). Other Australian authorities include Galea v Cooper [1982] 2 NSWLR 411; (1982) 66 FLR 270; Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691; [1999] FCA 499. See SSC & B: Lintas New Zealand Ltd v Murphy [1986] 2 NZLR 436; [1986] Aust Torts Reports

621

[33.8.1260]

ECONOMIC TORTS

2

3

4

5

6

7 8 9

80-008 (HC); Canada Cement LaFarge Ltd v British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd [1983] 1 SCR 452; (1983) 145 DLR (3d) 385. See generally Gronow M, “Conspiracy: The Tort that Failed?” (1995) 3 TLJ 255; Odgers SJ, Nash G and Bagaric M, Federal Offences (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [40.64060]–[40.64120]. See also Intellectual Property “Other Actions” [23.6.780]–[23.6.810]. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 687. The point was conceded in that case, but it was the ratio of the House of Lords in Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188. See now Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 43 FCR 1, Von Doussa J at 19 (FCR); Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (WA) (1999) 93 FCR 34; 94 IR 244; [1999] FCA 899; McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; [1999] FCA 1101 (FC), Weinberg J at [131], [143]; Yukong Line Ltd (Korea) v Rendsburg Investment Corp (Liberia) (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 294 (QBD); Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466; [2007] FCAFC 132. See generally Philips D, “Major Blow against Contracting Out Business Operations?” (2000) 5 ELB 83; Edmundson P, “Chasing Tax Fraudsters Using the Tort of Conspiracy” (2008) 37 AT Rev 131; Preston BJ, “Climate Change Litigation” (2009) 26 EPLJ 169; Keay A, “Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director’s Duty to Creditors” (2008) 32 MULR 141. Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 341–342 (CLR). See generally Fridman GHL, “Interference with Trade or Business – Part II” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 99. O’Brien v Dawson (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 295; 58 WN (NSW) 206 (FC) (affirmed in O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18; 43 SR (NSW) 1; 60 WN (NSW) 3); R v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233; [1965] 3 WLR 1138 (Assizes), Nield J at 245 (QB); see also Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 43 FCR 1 (fraud being the exception). Martell v Coal Miners’ Association (Vic) (1903) 29 VLR 475 (FC) (lawful excuse vitiated by unlawful means); Brisbane Shipwrights’ Provident Union v Heggie (1906) 3 CLR 686; Egan v Barrier Branch of Amalgamated Miners’ Association (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 243; 34 WN (NSW) 129 (FC) (the union, being a quasi-corporate body, may be sued for conspiracy); Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637. McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343, Evatt J at 410; McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; [1999] FCA 1101 (FC), Weinberg J at [131]. Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435; McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343. Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 (HL Ir); Huntley v Thornton [1957] 1 WLR 321 (CHD). In both cases there was a vindictive desire to punish the plaintiffs. Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe [1958] 1 WLR 1057 (CA) (conspiracy to boycott plaintiff’s ballroom was aimed at the existence of a colour bar in the ballroom and not actionable in tort, as protecting union members’ interests was a lawful purpose).

622

[33.8.1270]

CONSPIRACY

[33.8.1270] Where the conspiracy alleged is to commit a tort, there is conflicting authority on whether the allegation of conspiracy is superfluous and should be struck out.1 It is doubtful whether or not, apart from the possibility of extra damages,2 which could equally be awarded for the tort itself, the conspiracy allegation adds anything significant to suing the tortfeasors as joint tortfeasors, on the ground that they have undertaken concerted action in the furtherance of a common design3 and are each liable for the whole damage caused. Where the unlawful means are not tortious, the conspiracy allegation may be necessary, since the tort of causing loss through unlawful means is not finally established despite increasing support from authority. Presumably the meaning of “unlawful means” does not differ according to whether the tort is conspiracy or causing loss by unlawful means: see [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170]. Conspiracy to commit a breach of a statutory provision is not actionable if the statutory provision itself does not give rise to a private right of civil action for breach of statutory duty.4

1

2

3 4

For the argument that it should be, see Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700, Dunedin LJ at 716 (“mere suplusage”); R v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233; [1965] 3 WLR 1138 (Assizes), Nield J at 239–240 (QB); Galland v Mineral Underwriters Ltd [1977] WAR 116 (FC). For authority to the contrary, see Jervois Sulphates (NT) Ltd v Petrocarb Explorations NL (1974) 5 ALR 1 (NTSC) where the conspiracy element justified an award of aggravated damages; Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691; [1999] FCA 499, Drummond J at [113]–[120]. For conspiracy to commit intimidation (see [33.8.1090]–[33.8.1140]), see Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269; Latham v Singleton [1981] NSWLR 843; Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269, Fullagar J at 78–79 (CLR) (Dixon CJ and Kitto J agreed) (conspiracy to trespass). Ballard v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 208; [2008] NSWSC 1019; see also Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1; 72 ALJR 873; [1998] HCA 30, Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [32]–[34]. Brooke v Bool [1928] 2 KB 578; Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691; [1999] FCA 499, Drummond J at [37]. Michaels v Taylor Woodrow Developments Ltd [2001] Ch 493; [2001] 2 WLR 224. Compare Queensland v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] ATPR 41-691; [1999] FCA 499, Drummond J at [104]–[110]. See generally Jacobs S, McCarthy M and Neggo D, Injunctions Law and Practice (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [10.1100]–[10.1220]. On tort and conspiracy generally, see Labour Law “State Courts and State Industrial Relations Commissions” [26.3.850]–[26.3.860]; Restrictive Trade Practices “Restraints of Trade on Employment” [30.1.420]–[30.1.510]; “Defences” [33.9.10]ff; “Damages” [33.10.10]ff; Unfair Dealing “Economic Duress” [35.7.580]–[35.7.650].

623

[33.8.1280]

ECONOMIC TORTS

[33.8.1280] There is conflicting authority on whether justification may operate as a defence to the tort of unlawful means (see [33.8.1150]–[33.8.1170] and compare [33.8.150]) or to conspiracy by the use of unlawful means: see [33.8.1260]. Justification was recognised as available in principle to trade union members acting in protection of the interests of the union in an action for conspiracy to intimidate by the use of unlawful means.1 However, in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J found himself bound by previous authority to hold that the defence was not available to an action for interference with contract by unlawful means or to a claim for interference with trade or business by unlawful means.2 Therefore, by logical extension, it was not a defence to an action for conspiracy to use unlawful means: see [33.8.1170]. The difficulty of a plaintiff in meeting a defence of justification in an action in defamation cannot be sidestepped by claiming damages for injury to reputation in an action for damages for conspiracy. Such damages (including for injured feelings) cannot be recovered in this action.3

1 Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843, Nagle CJ at CL at 869 (NSWLR) (defence failed on the facts since defendants’ actions went beyond the mere protection of the interest of the union); Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 (HL Ir). 2 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 1 VR 637, Brooking J at 677–678 (VR): see [33.8.1250]. 3 Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 (CA); McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; [1999] FCA 1101 (FC), Weinberg J at [140]–[141]; Ballard v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 208; [2008] NSWSC 1019, McDougall J at [64]–[67], [71].

Deceit [33.8.1290] In Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gleeson CJ stated that “[t]he tort of deceit provides a legal remedy for harm suffered in consequence of dishonesty”.1 In 1789, the action for deceit was extended to include parties other than those negotiating on a contract.2 In Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187, the Earl of Selborne LC said: I conceive that in an action of deceit … it is the duty of the plaintiff to establish two things; first, actual fraud, which is to be judged of by the nature and character of the representations made, considered with reference to the object for which they were made, the knowledge or means of knowledge of the person making them, and the intention which the law justly imputes to every man to produce those consequences

624

[33.8.1300]

DECEIT

which are the natural result of his acts: and, secondly, he must establish that his fraud was an inducing cause to the contract; for which purpose it must be material, and it must have produced in his mind an erroneous belief, influencing his conduct.3

Later in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, Lord Herschell said of the tort of deceit: First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always be an honest belief in its truth. And this probably covers the whole ground, for one who knowingly alleges that which is false, has obviously no such honest belief. Thirdly, if fraud be proved, the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial. It matters not that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made.4

1

2

3

4

Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gleeson CJ at [17]. See also Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff. See also Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff (subject to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth), the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth): see [33.8.1080]). See generally Young L, “Sex, Lies and Money: The High Court Considers Deceit and Paternity Fraud in Magill v Magill” (2007) TLJ 1; Fletcher J, “The Tort of Deceit and Misrepresentations of Paternity” (2007) LIJ 42. Pasley v Freeman (1789) 3 TR 51; 100 ER 450. See generally Fullagar WK, “Liability for Representations at Common Law” (1951) 25 ALJ 278; Hampson CEK, “Blocked Contractual Arteries? Try a Section 52 By-pass” (1993) 1 TPLJ 22. Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187, Earl of Selborne LC at 190; see also Magill v Magill (2005) 33 Fam LR 193; [2005] VSCA 51, Callaway JA at [7], Eames JA at [42] (Ormiston JA agreeing) (affirmed in Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [112]–[113]). Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, Herschell LJ at 374; see also Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; 76 ALJR 1348; [2002] HCA 35, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [179]. See also discussion on injurious falsehood at [33.8.1390]–[33.8.1400] and passing off at [33.8.1330]–[33.8.1380].

[33.8.1300] In Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ set out the five elements required to establish the modern tort of deceit.1 The elements of deceit are that: (1)

the defendant made a false representation;2

625

[33.8.1300]

ECONOMIC TORTS

(2)

the false representation was made with the knowledge that it was false, or the defendant was reckless or careless as to the falsity of the representation;3

(3)

the false representation was made with the intention that the plaintiff would rely on it;4

(4)

the plaintiff acted in reliance on the false representation;5 and

(5)

the plaintiff suffered damage which was caused by reliance on the false representation.6

1 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [114]. 2 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 (CA), Bowen LJ at 483 (approved in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No 2) [2003] 1 AC 959; [2002] 3 WLR 1547; [2002] UKHL 43). A false representation may be made by conduct (or, eg where there is a common law, equitable or statutory duty to disclose): Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563; 69 ALJR 629, Brennan, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 576–577 (CLR); Schneider v Heath (1813) 3 Camp 505; 170 ER 1462 (Assizes) (concealing physical defects of goods sold). See Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff (subject to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth): see [33.8.1080]). 3 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, Herschell LJ at 374. 4 Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 (HL), Viscount Maugham at 211. 5 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA), Jessel MR at 21; Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 (CA), Bowen LJ at 483 (approved in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No 2) [2003] 1 AC 959; [2002] 3 WLR 1547; [2002] UKHL 43); Arnison v Smith (1889) 41 Ch D 348 (CA), Lord Halsbury LC at 369. 6 Pasley v Freeman (1789) 3 TR 51; 100 ER 450, Buller J at 56 (TR); Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187, Blackburn LJ at 196; Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 (HL), Viscount Maugham at 211.

[33.8.1310] The future use of the tort of deceit may be limited where there is an overlap with s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.1 The Commonwealth trade practices legislation and the fair trading legislation of the States and Territories concerning the protection from misleading and deceptive conduct has largely covered the field previously held by the tort. However, the tort of deceit will still be useful where the conduct complained of is not confined to conduct “in trade and commerce”.

626

[33.8.1320]

DECEIT

A person may recover for actual damage flowing from the fraudulent misrepresentation,2 and exemplary damages for deceit have been held to be recoverable in Australia.3 Where there is an overlap with statutory regimes such as the Australian Consumer Law, however, damages may be discounted to avoid double counting.4

1

2

3

4

Australian Consumer Law is found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. See generally Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff (subject to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth): see [33.8.1080]). Further, a defendant cannot rely on a defence of contributory negligence in answer to a claim for deceit: see “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.600]. South Australia v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161 (HCA); Yorke v Ross Lucas Pty Ltd (1982) 69 FLR 116; 2 TPR 199 (FCA), Fisher J at 320–321 (affirmed by Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661; 59 ALJR 776). Hill v James [2004] NSWSC 55, Bergin J at [279] (also discussing the English authorities to the contrary at [276]–[284]); see also Musca v Astle Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251 (FCA); Denison v Fawcett (1958) 12 DLR (2d) 537 (ONCA). See generally Jacobs S, Commercial Damages (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [3.1290]. See generally Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.1.1960]–[35.1.1970]; “Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation” [35.4.560]–[35.4.670].

[33.8.1320] Private matters of adult sexual conduct and a false representation of paternity during a marriage will not give rise to the tort of deceit.1 In Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, the ex-husband of the defendant commenced an action in deceit alleging false representations were made concerning the paternity of the second and third children born during his marriage to the defendant. The plaintiff was awarded $70,000 in damages by the County Court of Victoria. The defendant successfully appealed this decision to the Victorian Court of Appeal,2 and the ex-husband’s appeal to the High Court of Australia was unanimously dismissed. The statements of the High Court in Magill v Magill provide a conclusive view that the tort of deceit is not amenable to cases involving the allegation of paternity fraud.3 It seems clear that such matters will be left to the moral code, religious or otherwise, of the relevant parties. However, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ did recognise three marital situations where the tort of deceit may be used:4 (1)

failure to disclose to the other spouse any matters which will cause physical injury (eg if one spouse has a sexually transmitted disease);5

(2)

a false representation by one spouse which can vitiate the consent of the other party to a marriage (eg a false claim to be unmarried);6 and

627

[33.8.1320]

ECONOMIC TORTS

(3)

a false representation by one spouse which induces the other to “take some commercial or contractual step resulting in damage”.7

A parent may also have recourse to the family law regime in Australia by seeking an order for the repayment of any moneys wrongly paid for child support8 or child maintenance9 in reliance on false representations as to paternity.

1 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51. 2 Magill v Magill (2005) 33 Fam LR 193; [2005] VSCA 51 (affirmed by Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51). 3 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gleeson CJ at [49], Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [133], Hayne J at [160], Heydon J at [202]. 4 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [129]. 5 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [129], citing Beaulne v Ricketts (1979) 96 DLR (3d) 550 (ABSCTD). See McDonnell DL and Monroe JG, Kerr on the Law of Fraud and Mistake (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1952) p 47; Cartwright J, Misrepresentation (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) pp 337–339. 6 See Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s 23(1)(d). 7 Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [129], citing Ennis v Butterly [1996] 1 IR 426; [1996] IEHC 51; Smythe v Reardon [1949] St R Qd 74. 8 See Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), s 143(1). See generally Family Law “Child Support” [17.11.10]ff; “Jurisdiction” [17.1.10]ff; “Family Court Orders” [17.19.10]ff. 9 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 66X. See generally Family Law “Maintenance in Marital and De Facto Relationships” [17.12.10]ff.

Passing Off [33.8.1330] In Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 466; [2007] FCA 70, Buchanan J stated that “[t]he essence of the tort of passing off is a wrongful representation, usually implied by conduct, of a non-existent association with the plaintiff”.1 The tort is intended to prevent economic loss by protecting the property in the goodwill of a business which is likely to be injured by the misrepresentation made by passing off one person’s goods or services as the goods or services of another. In Orange Crush (Aust) Ltd v Gartrell (1928) 41 CLR 282; 29 SR (NSW) 19; 46 WN (NSW) 1, Isaacs J said that the right protected by the tort of passing off “is not a property in the mark, name or get-up, but in the business or goodwill likely to be injured by the misrepresentation” conveyed by the defendant’s use of the mark, name or get-up with which goods or services of another are

628

[33.8.1340]

PASSING OFF

associated in the minds of a particular class of the public. The plaintiff’s “property is in its nature transitory, and only exists so long as the mark is distinctive of the plaintiff’s goods in the eyes of the public or a class of the public”.2

1

2

Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 466; [2007] FCA 70, Buchanan J at [15] (affirmed by Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 586; [2007] FCAFC 170). See generally Intellectual Property “Passing Off and Related Torts” [23.7.10]ff. See also Millen D, “Fat Spat: Packaging, Passing Off and Misleading the Metabolically Challenged” (2005) 12 TPLJ 37. Orange Crush (Aust) Ltd v Gartrell (1928) 41 CLR 282; 29 SR (NSW) 19; 46 WN (NSW) 1, Isaacs J at 292 (CLR). See also Campomar Sociedad Ltd v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; 74 ALJR 573; [2000] HCA 12, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [108]–[110]; Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158, White J at [68].

[33.8.1340] The tort of passing off has three elements.1 To succeed in an action for passing off, a plaintiff must establish that: (1)

the plaintiff’s goods have, or its business has, acquired a certain goodwill or reputation;

(2)

the actions (eg by misrepresentation, whether intentional or not)2 of the defendant have caused, or in all probability will cause, the ordinary purchasers of the plaintiff’s goods, or the ordinary customers of the plaintiff’s business, to believe that the defendant’s goods are those, or that the defendant’s business is that, of the plaintiff; and

(3)

in consequence, the plaintiff has suffered, or is likely to suffer, injury in their trade or business.3

1

ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 (FC), Gummow J at 355–356 (FCR). See also Bodum v DKSH Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 280 ALR 639; [2011] FCAFC 98, Greenwood J at [212]-[215] (Tracey J agreeing); Intellectual Property “Definition” [23.7.10]–[23.7.40]; “Proof of Passing Off and Defences” [23.7.770]–[23.7.810]. See Ricketson S and Creswell C, Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Design and Confidential Information (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [CD.920], [28.25]. See generally Holyoak J and Mazzocchetti F, “The Legal Protection of Economic Interests” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 185; Slater AH, “The Nature of Goodwill” (1995) 24 AT Rev 31; Gardiner J, “It’s None of Your Business!: Section 52 and the Tort of Passing Off” (1996) 4 TPLJ 60; Katekar BF, “Coping with Character Merchandising – Passing Off Unsurpassed” (1996) 7 AIPJ 178; O’Brien D, “The Tort of Passing Off and Foreign Traders” (1997) 5 TPLJ 98; Davis L, “Creation and Protection of Trade Mark Rights in Second Life: Inadequacies in Australia’s Current Law” (2007) 18 AIPJ 183; but see the problems highlighted in Carbone D,

629

[33.8.1340]

ECONOMIC TORTS

2

3

“Electronic Commerce and Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet” (2009) 37 ABLR 239. See Intellectual Property “Defendant’s Conduct” [23.7.450]–[23.7.520]. However, evidence of fraudulent intent may go towards establishing the misrepresentation: ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 (FC), Lockhart J at 345; Bodum v DKSH Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 280 ALR 639; [2011] FCAFC 98, Greenwood J at [213] (Tracey J agreeing); Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] AIPC 92-432; [2011] FCA 1319, Kenny J at [67]. Cadbury-Schweppes Pty Ltd v Pub Squash Co Pty Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 193 (PC); Fletcher Challenge Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 196; Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 2 TPR 48 (FCAFC); Irrewarra Estate Pty Ltd v A & S Arnott Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 360; see also Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158, White J at [67], [77]. See also discussion on related areas at Intellectual Property “Trade Marks” [23.8.10]ff and statutory schemes at Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff. See generally Martin F, “Protection of International Business Reputation in Australia” (1993) 21 ABLR 317; Millen D, “Fat Spat: Packaging, Passing Off and Misleading the Metabolically Challenged” (2005) 12 TPLJ 37.

[33.8.1350] The tort of passing off may still apply even if a plaintiff’s business has ceased trading. It is important to distinguish the right being protected by the tort (ie the right of property in the business or goodwill in connection with which the mark is being used) from any right of property in the mark itself. It is a question of fact and degree at what point in time a person who ceases to carry on a business will no longer have the benefit of the goodwill which accrued from it.1

1 Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158, White J at [71], [79]; Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor (t/as New Star Industrial Co) (1975) FSR 256 (PC (Sing)), Diplock LJ at 269, 270–272; Pink v JA Sharwood & Co Ltd (1913) 30 RPC 725 (summarised in Narayanan P, Trade Mark Cases (Sweet & Maxwell, 1985) Vol 1 p 494); Re Neuchatel Asphalte Co’s Trade Mark [1913] 2 Ch 291, Sargant J at 302; Thai World Import & Export Co Ltd v Shuey Shing Pty Ltd (1989) 17 IPR 289 (FCA), Gummow J at 302 (IPR); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605; 72 ALJR 1065; [1998] HCA 42, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [16]–[22].

630

[33.8.1370]

PASSING OFF

[33.8.1360] The tort of passing off is not restricted to competing trade rivals. It is sufficient to establish the tort of passing off where there is a false suggestion by the defendant that its business was connected with that of the plaintiff, capable of damaging the reputation and thus the goodwill of the plaintiff’s business.1

1

Campomar Sociedad Ltd v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; 74 ALJR 573; [2000] HCA 12, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [110]; Fletcher Challenge Ltd v Fletcher Challenge Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 196, Powell J at 204 (NSWLR); AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449 (HL); Harrods Ltd v R Harrod Ltd (1924) 41 RPC 74; Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 1) [1979] AC 731; [1979] 3 WLR 68, Diplock LJ at 742 (AC). See generally Katekar BF, “Coping with Character Merchandising – Passing Off Unsurpassed” (1996) 7 AIPJ 178; O’Brien D, “The Tort of Passing Off and Foreign Traders” (1997) 5 TPLJ 98; Sellenger B, “Chasing the Golden Goose: A Legal Approach to Sports Accessing Gambling Revenue” (2006) 34 ABLR 7; see also Sport and Leisure “Use of an Athlete’s Image by a Sponsor” [32.1.570]. For examples where the tort has been flexibly defined to protect goodwill, see Intellectual Property “‘Goodwill’ and ‘Reputation’ Defined” [23.7.180]–[23.7.200].

[33.8.1370] If the manufacture of goods or the use of a business name is permitted by licence which is subsequently revoked, any further manufacture or use of the business name may offend the tort of passing off. The applicable principle was referred to by White J in Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158,1 noting the speech of Lord Wright who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in JH Coles Pty Ltd v Need [1934] AC 82; (1933) 49 CLR 499; 7 ALJR 360: It may be noted that both the Chief Justice and the Full Court of Victoria proceeded on the basis that the appellant’s trade names had not lost their distinctive character and this also was the conclusion of the dissentient Judges of the High Court. Their Lordships, after considering the evidence, agree with that opinion, and also with the further opinion of all these Judges that all the right that the respondent ever had in regard to the user of the appellant’s trade names was a revocable licence to use these names so long as the business arrangement continued between the appellant and the respondent. From these conclusions it follows that prima facie the appellant is entitled on well-recognized principles to an order restraining the respondent from the unauthorized use of the appellant’s trade names after the licence was revoked, since the continuance thereafter of such user necessarily involves a passing off by the respondent of his business as being a business for the sale of the appellant’s goods

631

[33.8.1370]

ECONOMIC TORTS

and as being a business in which the appellant has at least an interest, and in this way there would be practised a deception of the public to the prejudice of the appellant’s business reputation and goodwill.2

1 Hoath v Connect Internet Services Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 566; [2006] NSWSC 158, White J at [78]. 2 JH Coles Pty Ltd v Need [1934] AC 82; (1933) 49 CLR 499; 7 ALJR 360 (PC), Wright LJ at 503 (CLR) (for the Privy Council). See generally Slater AH, “The Nature of Goodwill” (1995) 24 AT Rev 31.

[33.8.1380] The future use of the tort of passing off may be limited where there is an overlap with s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.1 The Commonwealth trade practices legislation and the fair trading legislation of the States and Territories concerning the protection from misleading and deceptive conduct and consumer protection generally has largely covered the field previously held by the tort. However, the tort of passing off is still useful where the conduct complained of is not confined to conduct “in trade and commerce”. Such circumstances include those remedies available to a church2 or charitable or non-profit organisation.3

1 Australian Consumer Law is found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2). See Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff (subject to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth), Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth): see [33.8.1080]). In some circumstances, legislation (eg the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)) may also limit the damages recoverable in a passing off action: Intellectual Property “Remedies for Common Law Action of Passing Off” [23.8.3320]–[23.8.3330]. 2 Attorney General (NSW) Ex rel Elisha v Holy Apostolic & Catholic Church of East (Assyrian) Australia New South Wales Parish Association (1989) 37 NSWLR 293; 95 FLR 392 (affirmed in Holy Apostolic & Catholic Church of East (Assyrian) Australia New South Wales Parish Association v Attorney General (NSW); Ex rel Elisha (1989) 18 NSWLR 291; 16 IPR 619 (CA)). See generally Miller R, “From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Spreading Branches of s 52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974” (2005) 79 ALJ 43. 3 Guide Dogs Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dogs Association (NSW & ACT) (1998) 42 IPR 481 (FCA), Sackville J at 497 (IPR) (affirmed in Guide Dogs Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dogs Association (NSW & ACT) (1999) 43 IPR 531; [1999] FCA 316 (FC)). For further discussion on remedies, see generally “Loss of Reputation” [33.10.1100]; “Alternatives to Damages” [33.10.2280]; Equity “Taking Accounts” [15.11.10]ff; Intellectual Property “Passing Off and Related Torts” [23.7.10]ff; “Goodwill outside Jurisdiction” [23.7.290]–[23.7.310]; Remedies [23.7.920]–[23.7.970].

632

[33.8.1390]

INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD

Injurious Falsehood [33.8.1390] The tort of injurious falsehood is essentially an action on the case. The tort is to protect traders and others from suffering provable economic loss caused by false and malicious statements about their property, goods or services.1 A definition of the tort was stated by Bowen LJ in Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524: That an action will lie for written or oral falsehoods, not actionable per se nor even defamatory, where they are maliciously published, where they are calculated in the ordinary course of things to produce, and where they do produce, actual damage, is established law. Such an action is not one of libel or of slander, but an action on the case for damage wilfully and intentionally done without just occasion or excuse, analogous to an action for slander of title. To support it, actual damage must be shewn, for it is an action which only lies in respect of such damage as has actually occurred.2

This definition has been accepted in Australia.3 Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law4 dealing with misleading and deceptive statements has meant the common law action of injurious falsehood has lost its common use. However, the tort of injurious falsehood may still be of relevance where: (1)

the said statements do not arise from conduct “in trade or commerce”; and

(2)

there is an element of maliciousness giving rise to a right to seek aggravated or exemplary damages.5

1

2 3

4

5

See Communication “Injurious Falsehood” [6.3.10]ff. See generally Harper M, “New Tricks for an Old Tort: Liability for sucks.com Blog Websites under the Tort of Injurious Falsehood after Kaplan” (2006) 34 ABLR 385. Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (CA), Bowen LJ at 527–528. Hall-Gibbs Mercantile Agency Ltd v Dun (1910) 12 CLR 84; Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1; 49 ALJR 117, Stephen J (dissenting) at 13, 16, 21–22 (CLR); Swimsure (Laboratories) Pty Ltd v McDonald [1979] 2 NSWLR 796, Hunt J at 799; Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2008] Aust Torts Reports 81-946; [2008] NSWCA 66, McColl JA at [95]–[97] (affirmed by Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460; 83 ALJR 654; [2009] HCA 16); McCrohon v Harith [2010] Aust Torts Reports 82-056; [2010] NSWCA 67, McColl JA at [119] (Campbell JA and Handley AJA agreeing). See generally Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126. Australian Consumer Law is found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2). See Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff (subject to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 1) 2010 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth): see [33.8.1080]). See “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages”

633

[33.8.1390]

ECONOMIC TORTS

[33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. On the availability of exemplary damages for certain torts in Australia, see generally Jacobs S, Commercial Damages (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [3.730].

[33.8.1400] The tort of injurious falsehood has four elements. A successful plaintiff must establish that: (1)

the defendant published false words to third parties;

(2)

the false words refer to the claimant or their property or business;

(3)

the false words were published with malice;1 and

(4)

special damage has followed as a direct and natural result of the publication of the false words.2

1 See Communication “Malice” [6.3.200]. 2 Griffıth v Australian Broadcasting Corp (No 1) [2007] NSWSC 711, Kirby J at [3]; see also Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69; Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; [2006] HCA 46, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [56], see also Kirby J at [164], Heydon J at [210], [214] on injunctive relief; Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460; 83 ALJR 654; [2009] HCA 16. See also Communication “Elements of Action” [6.3.160]–[6.3.210].

634

False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process General [33.8.1510] False imprisonment (see [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780]), malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]) and abuse of process (see [33.8.1940]–[33.8.2020]) cover a range of torts which have been included for convenience within the broad category of intentional torts. “False imprisonment” is an action in trespass to the person which is committed when the voluntary conduct of one person directly subjects another to total deprivation of freedom of movement without lawful justification. It is the most common in practice of this miscellaneous group, arising usually in the context of confinement under purported arrest by a police officer or confinement by a retailer of a suspected shoplifter. Conduct amounting to false imprisonment may be preceded or accompanied by an assault (see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]) or battery: see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]. Special damage is not required. “Malicious prosecution” is an action on the case which is of dwindling significance. It represents an abuse of proceedings by a person who acts with malice and without reasonable and probable cause, to wrongfully set the law in motion. Where proceedings terminate, if they are capable of doing so, in favour of the person against whom the proceedings were initiated, an action lies in tort against the wrongdoer who was actively instrumental in bringing them. Malicious prosecution is narrowly circumscribed in practice by judicial adherence to the elements and the heavy onus on the plaintiff to prove malice and absence of probable cause. The principal difference between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is that the former involves conduct which is itself wrongful, whereas the latter involves conduct which is procedurally lawful but committed for wrongful purposes: see [33.8.1550]. Although malicious prosecution was originally limited to prosecutions strictly so called, it has been extended to some civil proceedings, particularly bankruptcy and winding up petitions. Other abuses of legal proceedings analogous to malicious prosecution also gave rise to a series of distinct torts. These are now included within the category of malicious prosecution because they are sufficiently analogous to the parent action to be included within it. They

635

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1510]

include wrongful issue of mesne process1 such as warrants for the arrest of witnesses or a ship, a search warrant, wrongful registration of a judgment or writ of execution. There are also lesser known or used torts associated with a different form of abuse of process. These include the action on the case for collateral abuse of process (see [33.8.1950]), maintenance (see [33.8.1990]) and champerty: see [33.8.2000]. Collateral abuse of process occurs when the process of the court is put in motion for a purpose which, in the eye of the law, it is not intended to serve. Both maintenance and champerty involve an officious intermeddling in litigation.

1 That is, process in the form of writs issued in an action subsequent to the originating writ and up to a writ of execution, meaning therefore all such process which intervened between the beginning and the end of the suit: see also [33.8.1800], [33.8.1820]. See New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused in New South Wales v Delly [2008] HCATrans 226 on 13 June 2008; varied by New South Wales v Delly (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 367).

False Imprisonment General [33.8.1520] “False imprisonment”1 is an action in trespass to the person which is committed when the voluntary2 conduct of one person directly3 subjects another to total deprivation of freedom of movement, without lawful justification or consent.4 It may be accompanied by assault or battery (see [33.8.1530]) and must be distinguished from the tort of malicious prosecution: see [33.8.1550]. Such deprivation may be caused by imposing unreasonable alternative means: see [33.8.1580]. The tort provides a remedy to an individual against unlawful restraint of personal liberty of movement, the most elementary and important of all common law rights.5 Liberty or freedom of locomotion is the principal interest protected by the tort. Any restraint on the personal liberty, not warranted by law, is a false imprisonment.6 As one of the traditional actions in trespass, proof of damage is unnecessary because such torts are actionable without need for damage:7 see [33.8.1770]. As Lord Griffiths stated in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692: “The law attaches supreme importance to the liberty of the individual and if he [or she] suffers a wrongful interference with that liberty it should remain actionable even without proof of special damage.”8

636

[33.8.1520]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

The two elements of the tort derive from the gist of the action, which is the total deprivation of liberty caused directly by the defendant’s conduct. Those two elements are total deprivation of liberty of movement (see [33.8.1570]) which is caused directly by the defendant’s voluntary conduct: see [33.8.1590]–[33.8.1600]. Unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment is a question of fact on the evidence: see [33.8.1780]. It is for the defendant to demonstrate lawfulness in justification and not for the plaintiff to establish unlawfulness as one of the elements: see [33.8.1640] and [33.8.1770]. Nor is it for the plaintiff to establish intent or lack of due care in non-highway cases in Australia: see [33.8.310], [33.8.1600] and [33.8.1640]–[33.8.1660]. Although the tort retains the term “imprisonment” because of the association in the early cases of deprivation of liberty by means of close physical restraint in prison or similar physical confinement (see [33.8.1570]–[33.8.1580]), provided the deprivation is total it need not arise from actual physical confinement and may extend beyond the use of force to restraint by threats, or submission to assertion of authority, provided it has an effect on the mind and freedom of the plaintiff: see [33.8.1670]–[33.8.1680]. The courts have not considered that there is any minimum time during which the deprivation needs to exist, provided there is a real and substantive deprivation which is total:9 see [33.8.1570]–[33.8.1580]. Traditionally, the deprivation has to be the direct consequence of the voluntary conduct of the defendant (see [33.8.1600]) or of persons for whom the defendant is responsible: see [33.8.1590] and [33.8.1630]. The conduct of the defendant directly causing total restraint of movement was one of the distinguishing features of the action in trespass compared with the action on the case for malicious prosecution arising as a result of the indirect or consequential effect of the defendant’s conduct.10 The concept embodied in the use of the term “deprivation” in the definition indicates that the limitation on movement must be against the person’s will or without consent, but the plaintiff need not be aware of the restraint to ground the action: see [33.8.1670]–[33.8.1680]. In appropriate circumstances, consent to restriction of movement (volenti) proved by the defendant will provide lawful justification and it will no longer be deprivation giving rise to false imprisonment: see [33.8.1700]. Remedies available include reasonable self-help (see [33.8.1720]), the prerogative remedy of habeas corpus (see [33.8.1730]) and damages: see [33.8.1740]–[33.8.1760].

1

The description is misleading having regard to the conduct now falling within the ambit of the tort. “False” is used in the sense merely of “wrongful” or without justification in law, and the term “imprisonment” suggests some form of physical

637

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1520]

confinement, which is no longer necessary: Blundell v Attorney-General (Police Department) [1967] NZLR 492 (SC), Hardie Boys J at 503–504 (reversed on other grounds in Blundell v Attorney-General (Police Department) [1968] NZLR 341 (CA)). However, some early cases involved unlawful conditions of confinement in a prison: Cobbett v Grey (1850) 4 Ex 729; 154 ER 1409: see [33.8.1620]. 2 The conduct must be voluntary in the sense of being done as the result of the free exercise of the will, though not necessarily amounting to intention. For whether it must also be intentional, see [33.8.1650]. 3 “Directly” in the sense traditionally used for trespass means that the imprisonment follows so closely on the defendant’s act that it can be considered part of that act: Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131, Herring CJ at 133. Contrast indirect or consequential impact: see [33.8.1600]. 4 See Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285, Gray J at [982]–[993] (partly reversed in South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331; [2010] SASC 56 (FC), without disturbing this point); New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused in New South Wales v Delly [2008] HCATrans 226 on 13 June 2008; varied by New South Wales v Delly (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 367). Lawful justification includes lawful arrest, reasonable exercise of disciplinary powers by parents, teachers and captains of vessels, lawful detention by corrective service and mental institutions and special rules applicable to the defence forces: see [33.8.1700]. See also plaintiff’s submission to restraint at [33.8.1670]–[33.8.1680]. 5 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Fullagar J at 152; Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48. 6 Bridgett v Coyney (1827) 1 Man & Ry KB 211, Lord Tenterden CJ (for the Court) at 215–216. In the United States, numerous legislatures and courts have modified the original protection of citizens to protect merchants in shoplifting cases as long as the merchant acts on reasonable grounds of suspicion even in the absence of the shoplifter’s guilt: American Law Institute, Second Restatement of the Law: Torts (2nd ed, American Law Institute Publishers, 1965) s 120A Comment (a); West Virginia v Muegge, 360 SE 2d 216 (1987); Lindsey v Sears, Roebuck & Co 389 So 2d 902 (1980); Johnson v K-Mart Enterprises Inc 297 NW 2d 74 (1980). 7 This is one of the features distinguishing false imprisonment from malicious prosecution which, as an action on the case, requires damage as the gist of the action: see [33.8.1550], [33.8.1690]. 8 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 (HL (NI)), Griffiths LJ (with whom Keith, Templeman, Oliver and Jauncey LJJ agreed) at 703. Damage will have an impact on the damages recoverable: see [33.8.1690]. 9 Interference with personal liberty, even for a short period, is not a trivial wrong: Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; 45 ALJR 444, Walsh J at 632 (CLR) (affirmed in Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339). Duration is one circumstance which will be relevant to damages: see [33.8.1740]. 10 For a comparison with malicious prosecution, see [33.8.1550]. See also [33.8.1600] for discussion of directness and [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930] for further commentary on malicious prosecution.

[33.8.1530] Restraint of a person giving rise to an action for false imprisonment may give rise to other actions in tort. Where the total restraint results from the threat of the use of force sufficient to give rise to an assault, the

638

[33.8.1540]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

false imprisonment may be preceded or accompanied by conduct giving rise to an action for assault.1 Where actual physical force is applied, it may amount to a battery.2

1

2

“Assault” occurs when one person creates in another an apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive direct contact. It may be both a tort and a crime: see [33.8.420]–[33.8.460]. “Battery” is the voluntary application of direct force to the person of another. It may be both a tort and a crime: see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410].

[33.8.1540] Particular complications occur in cases of restraint arising from submission to legal process, including arrest: see [33.8.1700]. A writ or warrant for a person’s apprehension which results in submission to the order of the person executing it when exhibited, may amount to restraint without formal arrest.1 In such cases, where a prosecution ensues, it is necessary to distinguish between conduct giving rise to false imprisonment and conduct giving rise to an action on the case for malicious prosecution:2 see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]. If an unlawful arrest is effected by the defendant, it can amount to false imprisonment.3 If the restraint by arrest derives from the conduct of a ministerial officer4 such as a member of a police service, acting at the defendant’s direction or order (see [33.8.1550]), that may amount to false imprisonment by the defendant.5 In each case, the conduct of the defendant has directly caused the total deprivation of liberty. If the ministerial officer exercises independent discretion and judgment, though on information supplied by the informer, it is the ministerial officer and not the informer who has directly caused the deprivation of liberty.6 The informer may be liable for malicious prosecution if the elements of that tort are made out: see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1810]. The following example illustrates these principles. Where a police officer refuses to detain a suspect in the exercise of discretion but indicates an arrest will be made if the defendant makes a charge and signs a charge sheet, and the defendant signs the charge sheet and the suspect is detained and the officer has not exercised independent discretion and judgment, the imprisonment is said to be by the person who made the charge.7 However, where the officer exercises discretion in deciding whether to take the suspect into custody on their own judgment, even though there has been a request of the informer to sign the charge sheet, it is the officer’s conduct which caused the deprivation and not that of the informer.8 As Collins MR stated in Sewell v National Telephone Co Ltd [1907] 1 KB 557:

639

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1540]

The act that was done [signing a charge sheet] was merely to provide a prosecutor, and that does not let in liability to an action for false imprisonment, unless the person who takes that step has taken on himself the responsibility of directing the imprisonment.9

If legal process is resorted to as the means of confinement, the party who initiated the legal process may be regarded as the party who actively promoted the confinement as principal. If the conduct engaged in while executing the legal process is ministerial and turns out to be unlawful, false imprisonment may result. Once the matter goes before a magistrate, the proceedings are no longer ministerial but become judicial, and any further confinement (usually remand in custody) is the direct result of judicial discretion, though it may continue to be the indirect consequence of the supply of information to which malicious prosecution may still apply.10 In Lock v Ashton (1848) 12 QB 871; 116 ER 1097 it was held that if a party is arrested and taken before a magistrate who remands him, the party must seek their remedy for the first imprisonment in an act of trespass (false imprisonment) and for the imprisonment on the remand in an action for malicious prosecution. The dividing line is the laying of the information before the magistrate. However, the magistrate can be held liable for false imprisonment by issue of a warrant for arrest and imprisonment without authority.11

1 Arrowsmith v Le Mesurier (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 211; 127 ER 605 (CCP); Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180; 140 ER 1052. See generally Criminal Procedure “Arrest” [11.1.140]–[11.1.740]. 2 The distinction between the direct interference in the trespass of false imprisonment and the indirect interference giving rise to the action on the case for malicious prosecution is discussed at [33.8.1550]. 3 Adams v Kennedy (2000) 49 NSWLR 78; [2000] NSWCA 152; applied in New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused in New South Wales v Delly [2008] HCATrans 226 on 13 June 2008; varied by New South Wales v Delly (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 367). 4 See Kodilinye G, “False Imprisonment through Ministerial Officers: The Commonwealth Experience” (1979) 28 ICLQ 766. 5 Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534. However, see Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, where a British-born migrant holding a permanent transitional visa had his visa cancelled by the Minister. The migrant was detained under Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 189. The order cancelling the visa was quashed, however, it was held by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [49]–[51] that the detention was lawful at the time because those who detained the migrant reasonably suspected that he was an unlawful non-citizen. Compare the dissenting judgments of McHugh J at [55]–[100] and Kirby J at [154]–[156], [180]–[181] (applying a strict construction of statutory threshold of “reasonable suspicion”). See also Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). See generally Kneebone S, “Before the High Court: Ruddock and Others v Taylor” (2005) 27 Syd LR 143; Mackay A, “Harm Suffered by Children in Immigration

640

[33.8.1550]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Detention: Can Tort Law Provide Redress?” (2006) 14 Tort L Rev 16; Churches S, “Flow-on from Findings of Lack of Legislative Reach or Invalidity: False Imprisonment and Compulsory Examinations Founded in Invalid Summonses” (2008) 16 AJ Admin L 12; Churches S, “False Imprisonment Based in Failure to Exercise Statutory Power Lawfully (or Based in an Absence of Statutory Power), and Compulsory Examinations Founded in Invalid Summonses: How Clear Does Retrospective Legislation Making Good a Defective Condition Precedent Have to Be?” (2010) 17 AJ Admin L 71. 6 Grinham v Willey (1859) 4 Hurl & N 496; 157 ER 934; Davidson v Chief Constable (North Wales) [1994] 2 All ER 597 (CA); Coles Myer Ltd v Webster [2009] Aust Torts Reports 82-033; [2009] NSWCA 299, Ipp JA at [110]–[114] (Hodgson JA and Handley AJA agreeing). 7 Ryan v Simpson (1872) 6 SALR 38 (FC); Dickenson v Waters Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 593; 48 WN (NSW) 232 (FC). See generally Thomson JA, “Slouching towards Tenterfield: The Constitutionalization of Tort Law in Australia” (1995) 3 Tort L Rev 81. 8 Hopkins v Crowe (1836) 4 Ad & E 774; 111 ER 974 (KB); Roberts v Buster’s Auto Towing Service Ltd (1976) 70 DLR (3d) 716 (BCSC) (informer withheld material facts from police); Gosden v Elphick (1849) 4 Ex 445; 154 ER 1287; Grinham v Willey (1859) 4 Hurl & N 496; 157 ER 934; Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184 (QBD). 9 Sewell v National Telephone Co Ltd [1907] 1 KB 557 (CA), Collins MR at 560. 10 Lock v Ashton (1848) 12 QB 871; 116 ER 1097; Diamond v Minter [1941] 1 KB 656; Brown v Chapman (1848) 6 CB 365; 136 ER 1292; Harris v Dignum (1859) 1 F & F 688; 175 ER 908; Sewell v National Telephone Co Ltd [1907] 1 KB 557 (CA); Childs v Lewis (1924) 40 TLR 870 (KB); Clubb v Wimpey & Co Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 69 (KB) (this issue was not disturbed on appeal in Clubb v Wimpey & Co Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 148 (CA)); Trotter v South Australia (unreported, SASC, Zelling AJ, SCGRG 357 of 1984, 27 November 1992). Similarly in Canada, see Foth v O’Hara (1958) 120 CCC 305 (Alta SC). 11 Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA). See generally Trindade FA, “The False Imprisonment of Dr Spautz” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 29.

[33.8.1550] There are fundamental distinctions between false imprisonment (see [33.8.1520]) and malicious prosecution: see [33.8.1790]. One such distinction is that if the process leading to confinement (eg arrest) is lawful, it cannot amount to false imprisonment but only to malicious prosecution.1 If the arrest is unlawful, the action properly lies in trespass for false imprisonment.2 That difference is important if the ministerial act is carried out pursuant to a decision judicially given within jurisdiction. In such circumstances, conduct including ministerial acts in pursuance of the judicial order are protected until the order is set aside. Since the conduct pursuant to the order is lawful, no action for false imprisonment lies against either the ministerial enforcer of the judicial order or the person who initiated proceedings on which the judicial order was based.3 If the order of the court is itself beyond jurisdiction, ministerial acts carried out pursuant to it are not protected.4 Nor may magistrates acting outside jurisdiction be immune from liability in trespass.5 No action for false imprisonment lies against a person who

641

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1550]

has procured the imprisonment of another by obtaining a judicial order of a court of justice, even if the order is erroneous, irregular or without jurisdiction.6 There are four clear distinctions between trespass by false imprisonment and the action on the case for malicious prosecution, which derive from the different natures of the torts (trespass and case) and the attendant differences in the elements: (1)

Trespass is actionable per se and without the need for special damage,7 while damage is the gist of an action on the case including that for malicious prosecution.8

(2)

In false imprisonment it is for the defendant to justify,9 and malice does not make the party a trespasser from the beginning,10 whereas in malicious prosecution the malice is an essential element which the plaintiff must establish.11

(3)

In false imprisonment the plaintiff need not establish want of reasonable and probable cause,12 but that is an element requiring proof by the plaintiff in malicious prosecution.13

(4)

Traditionally, as a trespass, false imprisonment requires that the restraint flow directly from the defendant’s conduct. In Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534, Willes J observed: The distinction between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is well illustrated by the case where, parties being before a magistrate, one makes a charge against another, whereupon the magistrate orders the person charged to be taken into custody and detained until the matter can be investigated. The party making the charge is not liable to an action for false imprisonment, because he does not set a ministerial officer in motion, but a judicial officer. The opinion and judgment of a judicial officer are interposed between the charge and the imprisonment.14

Where restraint is indirect, such as occurs when a judicial officer is interposed, an action on the case, for example for malicious prosecution or even for negligence, could arise provided there is damage which forms the gist of such causes of action.15 If imprisonment was maliciously16 intended and indirectly caused, malicious prosecution applies. The traditional distinction based on directness is now less certain as a requirement for false imprisonment than it was previously: see [33.8.1600].

1 Salmon v Percivall (1631) Cro Car 196; 79 ER 772; Reynolds v Kennedy (1748) 1 Wils 232; 95 ER 591; Sutton v Johnstone (1786) 1 Term Rep 493; 99 ER 1215 (no action for malicious prosecution where commander had subordinate court-martialled for disobedience); Panton v Williams (1841) 2 QB 169; 114 ER 66; Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832. See also Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570, Gibbs CJ at 117–118 (CLR). The position is the same

642

[33.8.1560]

2

3 4

5

6

7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

in Canada: Grimes v Miller (1896) 23 OAR 764; Campbell v McKay (1905) 38 NSR 333 (NSSCFC). Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180; 140 ER 1052; Hazell v Parramatta City Council (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 229; 15 LGRA 263 (SC); Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147; Cubillo v Commonwealth (1999) 89 FCR 528; [1999] FCA 518. See generally Clarke J, “Case Notes: Cubillo v Commonwealth” (2001) 25 MULR 218. Riddell v Pakeman (1835) 2 Cr M & R 30; 150 ER 13 (no trespass action lies for mere irregular process); Prentice v Harrison (1843) 4 QB 852; 114 ER 1118. Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841; 117 ER 323 (KB); Brooks v Hodgkinson (1859) 4 Hurl & N 712; 157 ER 1021; West v Smallwood (1838) 3 M & W 418; 150 ER 1208; Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534; but see Brown v Chapman (1848) 6 CB 365; 136 ER 1292, Coltman J (for the Court) at 376–377 (CB). Houlden v Smith (1850) 14 QB 841; 117 ER 323 (KB); O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 QB 288; [1956] 3 WLR 172 (CA); Re McC (a minor) [1985] AC 528; [1984] 3 WLR 1227. Carratt v Morley (1841) 1 QB 18; 113 ER 1036; West v Smallwood (1838) 3 M & W 418; 150 ER 1208; Roche v Grant [1935] 2 DLR 553; (1935) 63 CCC 315 (NSSCFC). Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 (HL (NI)): see [33.8.1690]. Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). Brandt v Craddock (1858) 27 LJ Ex 314. Magnay v Burt (1843) 5 QB 381; 114 ER 1293. Tarlton v Fisher (1781) 2 Doug KB 671; 99 ER 426; Newton v Constable (1841) 2 QB 157; 114 ER 62; Ames v Waterlow (1869) LR 5 CP 453; Clissold v Cratchley [1910] 2 KB 244 (CA). Holroyd v Doncaster (1826) 3 Bing 492; 130 ER 603; Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167, Hawkins J at 170. Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167; QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245. Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534, Wiles J at 540. Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA).

[33.8.1560] Restraint of the person may also result in criminal liability. Both false imprisonment and kidnapping were common law criminal offences from the 17th century or earlier. Kidnapping as a common law crime was an aggravated species of false imprisonment.1 In all Australian jurisdictions, forms of false imprisonment or deprivation of liberty, including kidnapping, have been made statutory offences.2 The most common basis for claims in tort for false imprisonment are the purported arrest or taking into custody of a person suspected of the commission of a criminal offence. The most common

643

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1560]

defence raised is that of lawful justification based on the lawfulness of the arrest or custody: see [33.8.1700].

1

2

A husband cohabiting with a wife could be guilty of kidnapping if the wife were held or taken away against her will: R v Reid [1973] QB 299; [1972] 3 WLR 395 (CA). Similarly, a parent could be guilty of kidnapping their own child: R v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 3 WLR 186; see also Davis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 392, Howie J at [26], [31], [52]–[55] (Basten JA and Whealy J agreeing) (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 8 November 2007 in Davis v The Queen [2007] HCATrans 652); R v McEachran (2006) 15 VR 615; [2006] VSCA 290, Callaway JA at [40] (Smith AJA agreeing). Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 38; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 86; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT), s 195; Criminal Code (Qld), s 354 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 39; Criminal Code (Tas), s 191A (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 63, 63A; Criminal Code (WA), s 332 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), App B Schedule). See Criminal Offences “Definition” [10.2.10]; “Threat Offences” [10.2.140]–[10.2.250]; “False Imprisonment” [10.11.1830]–[10.11.1860].

Character of Defendant’s Conduct and Means of Detention [33.8.1570] Total deprivation of liberty of movement is necessary to ground the action of false imprisonment.1 As Lord Jauncey stated in R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340, the tort of false imprisonment involves “total deprivation of liberty, that is to say of all such liberty as the individual presently enjoys and not deprivation of total liberty, namely liberty which is otherwise wholly unrestricted”.2 The interference must amount to deprivation, that is, curtail the freedom of locomotion. Robert Goff LJ, in the judgment of the court in Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 observed: [T]he word “detaining” can be used in more than one sense. For example, it is a commonplace of ordinary life that one person may request another to stop and speak to him; if the latter complies with the request, he may be said to do so willingly or unwillingly, and in either event the first person may be said to be “stopping and detaining” the latter. There is nothing unlawful in such an act. If a police officer so “stops and detains” another person, he in our opinion commits no unlawful act, despite the fact that his uniform may give his request a certain authority and so render it more likely to be complied with. But if a police officer, not exercising his power of arrest, nevertheless reinforces his request with the actual use of force, or with the threat, actual or implicit, to use force if the other person does not comply, then his act in thereby detaining the other person will be unlawful. In the former event, his action will constitute a battery; in the latter event, detention of the other person will amount to false imprisonment. Whether the action of a police officer in any particular case is to be regarded as lawful or unlawful must be a question to be decided on the facts of the case.3 644

[33.8.1570]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Partial deprivation is not a sufficient curtailment for this trespass although partial deprivation of freedom of movement may give rise to alternate actions on the case, such as negligence or nuisance, provided there has been the requisite damage or special damage flowing from the partial curtailment and the other requirements of those torts have been made out.4 If a person is blocked in their physical progress along a road but is free to move in other safe and reasonable directions, there is no total restraint and hence no false imprisonment.5 A person who is bailed, for example, even though the person is in the custody of the bail, would not be totally deprived of freedom so as to constitute an imprisonment because freedom within limits is still available. In the early cases, the restraint was often by physical confinement under lock and key6 but even in the earliest times it was accepted that any means of depriving a person of liberty of movement would constitute false imprisonment. In Termes de la Ley (c 1520), it was described as follows: “Imprisonment” is no other thing, but the restraint of a man’s liberty, whether it bee in the open field, or in the stocks or in a cage in the street or in a man’s own house, as well as in the common gaole; and in all the places the party so restrained is said to be a prisoner so long as he hath not his liberty freely to goe at all times, to all places whither he will without baile or main, prise or otherwise.7

Restraint in fact within defined bounds is an imprisonment.8 Placing a person in a boat propelled by mechanical means without control of direction or speed is a form of moving confinement9 within the bounds of the vessel, as is the case of a motor vehicle travelling at such a speed as to prevent a passenger alighting in safety.10 The most common forms of restraint are achieved through the more subtle form of deprivation of liberty by assertion of authority which causes justified apprehension that failure to submit when requested to do so will result in compulsion by force.11 There must be boundaries imposed by the defendant which determine the restraint,12 though the boundaries need not be physical:13 If a constable tell a person given into his charge, that he must go with him before a magistrate, and such person in consequence goes quietly, without any force being used by that constable, it is a sufficient imprisonment to support an action of trespass.14

The formation taken up by security officers and police in Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 in escorting the innocent but suspected shoplifter to the store security room denied the party the right to proceed at his own pace and by his own route, and was telling evidence in establishing restraint of liberty within the boundaries defined by the officers.

1 2

Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 668 (KB). R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340, Jauncey LJ at 178 (AC); Bridgett v Coyney (1827) 1 Man & Ry KB 211, Lord Tenterden CJ (for the Court) at 215–216. See also exceptions where deprivation of liberty is simply an incident of a prescribed statutory purpose 645

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

3 4

5 6

7

8

9 10

11

12 13 14

[33.8.1570]

(eg detention of unlawful non-citizens): Behrooz v Secretary of Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 219 CLR 486; 78 ALJR 1056; [2004] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ at [21]: see also [33.8.1620]. Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ at 1180. Walsh v Ervin [1952] VLR 361. See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. See generally Hollott P, “Property Owners Can Claim Compensation if an Adjoining Public Road Is Resumed” (2002) 40 LSJ 56. Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 668 (KB), Patteson J at 752 (QB). Williams v Jones (1736) Cas t Hard 298; 95 ER 193. The placing of sentinels at a door may be sufficient: Glynn v Houston (1836) 1 Keen 329; 48 ER 333 (Ch); Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 (CA); see also McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289, the Court at [40]–[41]. Cited with approval in Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 (CA), Duke LJ at 51, Atkin LJ at 53; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 599 who added that it “involves restraint within a particular space”. See now Rastell J (ed), Les Termes de la Ley (1721 ed, The Lawbook Exchange, 2012). Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 (CA), Atkin LJ at 53–54. Confinement within the entire country is not an imprisonment because of the options of movement within that extensive geographical area: Louis v Commonwealth (1987) 87 FLR 277 (ACTSC). R v Macquarie (1875) 13 SCR (NSW) 264. Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26; Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SASC). See generally Trindade FA, “The False Imprisonment of Dr Spautz” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 29. Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; 45 ALJR 444 (affirmed in Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339); Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div); McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2004] VSC 289, Ashley J at [89] (affirmed in McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289); Bulsey v Queensland [2015] QCA 187, Fraser JA at [74]–[75] (Atkinson and McMeekin JJ agreeing). Similarly in Canada: Chaytor v London, New York & Paris Association of Fashion Ltd (1961) 30 DLR (2d) 527 (NLSC). Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 668 (KB), Coleridge J at 744 (QB). Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA), Hope AJA at 638 (NSWLR) (Meagher JA agreeing). Chinn v Morris (1826) 2 Car & P 361; 172 ER 163 (Assizes), at 361 (Car & P); Horner v Battyn (1739) Bull NP 61; Pocock v Moore (1825) Ry & M 321; 171 ER 1035 (Assizes).

[33.8.1580] Unreasonable alternative means of movement may result in total restraint. If a choice is provided to a person restrained in some measure which allows the possibility of some form of liberty of movement, but only at the risk of personal danger or some other unacceptable circumstance, no real alternative has been provided and deprivation can be regarded as total.1 In R v Macquarie (1875) 13 SCR (NSW) 264, the alternative of jumping from a moving vessel into a harbour was not a reasonable alternative. In Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26, an alternative of jumping from a moving motor

646

[33.8.1590]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

vehicle travelling at speed was no real alternative.2 There is old authority that alternative locomotion which involved trespassing on another’s land would be an acceptable alternative.3 A party who has voluntarily limited choice of movement by agreement may be limited to the conditional circumstances or alternatives to which they agreed.4

1

2

3 4

Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26, Townley J at 30 (example of a person locked in a room with a window; unreasonable option of leaping with risk to life and limb). In the American case Talcott v National Exhibition Co 128 NYS 1059 (1911), the huge press of a football stadium crowd prevented egress and no assistance was provided by the occupier. The plaintiff was not aware of a means of escape, nor was an escape route made apparent. In those circumstances no reasonable alternative was available. In Burton v Davies [1953] St R Qd 26, Townley J observed at 30: “This cause of action is founded upon his detaining her in his motor truck without her consent, not by actual physical force, but by driving at such a speed as to prevent her from alighting. I am of the opinion that such conduct upon the defendant’s part amounted to the wrong of false imprisonment. If I lock a person in a room with a window from which he may jump to the ground at risk of life or limb, I cannot be heard to say that he was not imprisoned because he was free to leap from the window.” See also Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 (SASC). Wright v Wilson (1699) 1 Ld Raym 739; 91 ER 1394. Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (Balmain Ferry Case) (1906) 4 CLR 379; 7 SR (NSW) 372 (affirmed in Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd [1910] AC 295 (PC)): see [33.8.1670]–[33.8.1680], [33.8.1700].

[33.8.1590] To render a defendant liable for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant personally,1 or through the conduct of others for whom the defendant is responsible (see [33.8.1630]), participated in the confinement by directly confining the plaintiff or by active promotion amounting to participation in the direct confinement:2 see [33.8.1770]–[33.8.1780]. As Sir J Martin CJ stated in Maine v Townsend (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 1: [B]efore any person can have a verdict against him on such a count there must be evidence that he either directed the imprisonment, or was party to it, or gave oral or written directions for the arrest to be made … to make him liable he must be a party either directly or indirectly to the arrest.3

Often there will be joint tortfeasors, for example where both employer (or principal) and employee (or agent) are liable, the one vicariously and the other personally.4 In other circumstances, there may be different sequences of

647

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1590]

personal liability arising from the chain of circumstances involving a series of false imprisonments, for example private citizen or security officer, then police officer.5

1 Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; 45 ALJR 444 (affirmed in Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339); Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447 (FC). 2 Dickenson v Waters Ltd (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 593; 48 WN (NSW) 232 (FC); Casley v Commonwealth [1981] WAR 85; (1980) 41 FLR 127; Aitken v Bedwell (1827) Mood & M 68; 173 ER 1084 (Assizes), Lord Tenterden CJ at 68 (Mood & M). 3 Maine v Townsend (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 1, Sir J Martin CJ at 7. 4 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). 5 Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 322 (BCSC) (affirmed in Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd (1970) 12 DLR (3d) 646 (BCCA)).

[33.8.1600] The traditional rule in an action for false imprisonment is that a defendant’s conduct must directly cause the imprisonment: see [33.8.1640]–[33.8.1650]. In Australia, a distinctive but waning feature of the tort of trespass is that there must be some direct rather than merely consequential interference.1 “Direct” means that the interference followed so closely on the defendant’s act that it could be considered part of that act.2 Under that traditional Australian approach, an action for trespass by false imprisonment in a non-highway case lies (see [33.8.310]) for a direct voluntary contact, but the defendant may raise in defence the absence of fault (ie an absence of intention and that all reasonable care has been taken):3 see [33.8.310], [33.8.1520] and [33.8.1640]. The Australian position is that in cases involving both direct and intentional interference (the usual position in false imprisonment cases) the plaintiff is limited to an action in trespass, but in cases of direct unintentional interference causing actual damage, the plaintiff can sue either in trespass or negligence:4 see [33.8.1640] and [33.8.1660]. The traditional position in Australia in relation to trespass contrasts with the position in the United Kingdom, where it has been suggested since 1964 that where an injury is inflicted unintentionally, whether directly or indirectly, the plaintiff is limited to actions on the case and cannot sue in trespass, which is limited to intentional infliction of harm.5 It follows that in such jurisdictions, intention rather than directness is the distinguishing feature essential to the cause of action: see [33.8.1640]. There have been signs in dicta in Australian courts that the view expressed in England which requires intention for actions in trespass is to be preferred and that the traditional Australian approach is waning.6 A critical question is whether the act or omission of the party caused the unlawful imprisonment of the plaintiff. The act of imprisoning a person by the conduct referred to must be the proximate cause of the imprisonment.7 This

648

[33.8.1610]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

may occur by an omission to act in certain circumstances: see [33.8.1610]. Merely giving information, to which another gives consideration before acting on it, can never be the proximate cause for the purpose of false imprisonment because it is the intervening discretionary act of that other and not the act of the informer which causes the imprisonment.8 “Procuring”, in the sense of providing information on which another acts to detain or arrest, is relevant to malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]) but not relevant to false imprisonment.9

1

2

3 4

5 6 7 8

9

Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131; Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820, the Court at 474 (CLR); McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 387–389, 401 (CLR) (a case on assault and battery and trespass to the person). Hutchins v Maughan [1947] VLR 131, Herring CJ at 133. See, eg Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 (CA), where the Governor’s decision to extend the plaintiff’s incarceration was duly executed by prolonged detention. McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 401 (CLR). Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC) (affirmed in Chin v Venning (1975) 49 ALJR 378); West v Peters (1976) 18 SASR 338 (FC). For further discussion of unintentional or “negligent” trespass, see [33.8.300]–[33.8.320], [33.8.2130]. See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426; [1959] 2 WLR 241; Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573 (CA). Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Gibbs CJ at 618–619 (CLR); Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 (CA), Kirby P at 237–240 (NSWLR). Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 616, McDonald J at 629. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 617. See Aitken v Bedwell (1827) Mood & M 68; 173 ER 1084 (Assizes); Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180; 140 ER 1052. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), McDonald J at 629 (VR).

[33.8.1610] Failure to release from restraint may render a person liable for false imprisonment. Participating in the continuation of wrongful confinement can amount to false imprisonment, even if unconnected with an original, even lawful, restraint.1 When a lawfully incarcerated prisoner acquires the right to discharge or release from detention, failure to release from continuing restraint amounts to false imprisonment.2 In England, a right of discharge would not be acquired merely from the opportunity deriving from remission for good conduct of part of a sentence of confinement. Such opportunities in England normally do not confer

649

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1610]

rights prior to the original sentence expiring,3 but in Australia retention in custody beyond a period of earned remissions may amount to false imprisonment.4

1 Morriss v Winter [1930] 1 KB 243 (it was held, however, that a prisoner’s eligibility for early discharge did not, under the terms of the relevant statute, amount to a legal entitlement). See also discussion of unintentional or “negligent” trespass at [33.8.300]–[33.8.320], [33.8.2130]. 2 Withers v Henley (1614) Cro Jac 379; 79 ER 324; Migotti v Colvill (1879) 4 CPD 233 (CA); Mee v Cruikshank (1902) 86 LT 708 (KB); Casley v Commonwealth [1981] WAR 85; (1980) 41 FLR 127. See generally Edney R, “Judicial Deference to the Expertise of Correctional Administrators: The Implications for Prisoners’ Rights” (2001) 7 AJHR 91. 3 Morriss v Winter [1930] 1 KB 243; Hancock v Prison Commissioners (UK) [1960] 1 QB 117; [1959] 3 WLR 583; Williams v Home Offıce (No 2) [1982] 2 All ER 564 (CA) (affirming Williams v Home Offıce (No 2) [1981] 1 All ER 1211 (QBD)); R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340. However, see R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [1999] QB 1043; [1999] 1 WLR 103 (CA) (affirmed by R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48), which adopted a similar approach to the Australian position in Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 (CA). 4 Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 (CA). See generally Fordham M, “False Imprisonment in Good Faith” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 53.

[33.8.1620] Intolerable conditions of detention do not normally affect lawfulness of restraint. There was some English authority that even lawful confinement may be rendered unlawful as a result of the nature or conditions of confinement.1 Those views have been rejected as erroneous in the United Kingdom. Lord Jauncey in R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340 concluded that “imprisonment is either lawful or false and questions of degree do not arise”.2 Allegations of ill-treatment or inadequate treatment during lawful confinement may support actions in other torts in both trespass (eg for assault or battery against other prisoners or corrective service officers), or actions on the case (eg for negligence)3 in respect of the particular conduct amounting to ill-treatment or inadequate treatment.

1 Cobbett v Grey (1850) 4 Ex 729; 154 ER 1409; Osborne v Milman (1886) 17 QBD 514 (reversed on other grounds in Osborne v Milman (1887) 18 QBD 471 (CA)); Middleweek v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1992] 1 AC 179; [1990] 3 WLR 481 (CA). See also discussion of authorities in Behrooz v Secretary of

650

[33.8.1630]

2

3

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 219 CLR 486; 78 ALJR 1056; [2004] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ at [11], [21]–[22], McHugh, Gummow and Heydon JJ at [51], [55], Kirby J (dissenting) at [81]–[82], [131]–[133]. See also Sleiman v Commissioner of Corrective Services (NSW) [2009] NSWSC 304, Adams J at [34]–[66]. R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340, Bridge LJ at 165, Jauncey LJ at 178 (AC); Arbon v Anderson [1943] KB 252. While acknowledging that a person may have recourse to other criminal law and common law remedies (eg assault, negligence), the High Court has held that an argument based on unlawful conditions of detention did not affect the constitutional validity of legislation (Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 197A): see Behrooz v Secretary of Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 219 CLR 486; 78 ALJR 1056; [2004] HCA 36, Gleeson CJ at [11], [21]–[22], McHugh, Gummow and Heydon JJ at [48], [51]–[57], Kirby J (dissenting) at [78]–[82], Hayne J at [162]–[171], [174]–[176]. See generally Fordham M, “False Imprisonment in Good Faith” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 53; Edney R, “Judicial Deference to the Expertise of Correctional Administrators: The Implications for Prisoners’ Rights” (2001) 7 AJHR 91; Hoel A, “What Rights Do You Take to Prison? Habeas Corpus and Prison Conditions” (2009) 83 ALJ 395. In L v Commonwealth (1976) 10 ALR 269 (NTSC), a remand prisoner was attacked by two convicted prisoners prone to violence and the prison authorities were held to owe a duty to protect remand prisoners by keeping them apart. See Nada v Knight [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-032 (WASCFC). On assault and battery, see [33.8.360]–[33.8.460]. On negligence, see generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. See also discussion of unintentional or “negligent” trespass at [33.8.300]–[33.8.320], [33.8.2130].

[33.8.1630] Vicarious liability may attach to a person who is responsible in law for the conduct of others.1 It is for the plaintiff to establish the facts which show the relationship giving rise to that responsibility: see [33.8.1780]. That general principle of vicarious liability applies in respect of employees where the employer and employee become joint tortfeasors. As Willes J stated in Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1872) LR 7 CP 415: A person who puts another in his place to do a class of acts in his absence, necessarily leaves him to determine, according to the circumstances that arise, when an act of that class is to be done, and trusts him for the manner in which it is done; and consequently he is held answerable for the wrong of the person so intrusted either in the manner of doing such an act, or in doing such an act under circumstances in which it ought not to have been done; provided that what was done was done, not from any caprice of the servant, but in the course of the employment.2

It applies also to agents: [T]he principal is liable to third persons in a civil suit “for the frauds, deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or misfeasances, and omissions of duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although the principal did not authorize, or justify, or participate in, or indeed know of such misconduct”.3

651

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1630]

It applies to intentional torts such as false imprisonment where the restraint is caused by the act of the person’s agent or other persons for whose acts the person is liable.4 A special constable of a railway company has been held liable as the employee of a company and if, in the course of employment, the constable arrests a person without justification, an action for false imprisonment lies against the company.5 A conductor and inspector of a tramway company have been held to be servants of a company and if they seize and restrain a passenger for fare evasion without justification, an action for false imprisonment lies against the employer company.6 A council health inspector may be an employee of a local authority and may render a council vicariously liable for false imprisonment by the employee.7 A retail store security officer may render the company liable for the false imprisonment committed by its employee within the scope of employment.8 A government minister, in the absence of statute giving immunity from liability for tortious conduct, incurs the same liability for their torts as any other citizen.9 Even in cases where no express or implied authority exists, the principal may subsequently ratify the acts of a servant and by such action render the principal liable.10

1 Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36. See generally “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]. See generally Handford PR, “Trimming the Wings of Vicarious Liability” (2001) 9 Tort L Rev 97; Dal Pont GE, “Definitional Challenges through the Law of Tort” (2003) 11 TLJ 68; McCarthy L, “Vicarious Liability in the Agency Context” (2004) 4 QUTLJJ 268. Note also Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, Kirby J at [151], where there are joint tortfeasors, each party must prove a separate immunity or defence, and cannot take advantage of the fact that one party enjoys statutory immunity for their tortious conduct: see also [33.8.1700]. 2 Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1872) LR 7 CP 415 (CCP), Willes J (for the Court) at 420 (affirmed by Bayley v Manchester, Sheffıeld & Lincolnshire Railway Co (1873) LR 8 CP 148). 3 McGowan & Co Ltd v Dyer (1873) LR 8 QB 141, Blackburn LJ at 145, quoting from Story J, Commentaries on the Law of Agency as a Branch of Commercial and Maritime Jurisprudence, with Occasional Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law (4th rev ed, Charles C Little & James Brown, 1851) at [452]; Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333; 74 ALJR 1410; [2000] HCA 52. See Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] AC 716, Macnaghten LJ at 737, cited with approval in Percy v Glasgow Corp [1922] 2 AC 299, Viscount Haldane at 306. 4 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div); see also Presidential Security Services of Australia Pty Ltd v Brilley (2008) 73 NSWLR 241; 188 A Crim R 299; [2008] NSWCA 204, Allsop P at [10], [23]–[24], Beazley JA at [29] (provisions of Acts creating criminal offences can be applied equally to bodies corporate as well as individuals, unless a contrary intention appears). 5 Goff v Great Northern Railway Co (1861) 3 El & El 672; 121 ER 594; Edwards v Midland Railway Co (1880) 6 QBD 287; Lambert v Great Eastern Railway Co [1909] 2 KB 776 (CA).

652

[33.8.1640]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

6 7

Percy v Glasgow Corp [1922] 2 AC 299. Hazell v Parramatta City Council (No 2) (1968) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 590; [1968] 2 NSWR 497 (NSWSC). 8 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 601 (VR) who found: “In my opinion, the resultant detaining of the respondent from the moment he was approached until he was allowed to leave the Myer security room to which he was escorted, was a serious encroachment on his liberty, which Evans actively promoted and in which he participated, and for which the first respondent Myer Stores Ltd is vicariously liable.” See generally Walker P, “Vicarious Liability for Exemplary Damages: A Matter of Strict Liability?” (2009) 83 ALJ 548. 9 Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, McHugh J at [121] who found: “A Minister is not exempted from tortious liability because the Minister believed that he or she was bona fide acting within power”; see also Kirby J at [142], [151] (here, the effect of the Court quashing the Ministerial order cancelling the visa was to render the ministerial decision void ab initio, depriving the decision of any legal authority to ground a defence of lawful justification (at [167])): see [33.8.1700]. 10 Landry v Bathurst Lumber Co (1916) 35 DLR 701 (NBSC (App Div)) (defendant company caused employee to be arrested, on the word of its accountant; held that, by permitting its name to be used in the subsequent prosecution, the company was estopped from setting up that it did not authorise the action and arrest).

Defendant’s Fault (Intent or Lack of Due Care) [33.8.1640] Fault, in the form of intentional or negligent wrongdoing (see [33.8.160]–[33.8.170] and [33.8.310]), is not a necessary element for false imprisonment in Australia, but is rather a matter for a defendant to disprove: compare [33.8.1600]. Although questioned in dicta in Australia,1 trespass to the person in non-highway cases such as false imprisonment does not require proof of fault by the plaintiff (unlike negligence): see [33.8.310], [33.8.1520] and [33.8.1600]. It is for the defendant to raise as a defence the absence of fault, that is, that intention to detain was absent and all reasonable care was taken or that the action was otherwise justified by law:2 see [33.8.1700]. Further evidentiary matters are discussed at [33.8.1770]–[33.8.1780]. In the reported cases involving false imprisonment, fault has not been disputed because the conduct of the defendant in detaining the plaintiff has invariably been intentional. Unfortunately, the reported cases and leading textbooks are not unanimous in addressing the issue of intent and its inclusion or exclusion as a necessary element in the tort. Some academic writers3 have included “intention” in the definition of the tort of false imprisonment, however this is not the settled position in principle in Australia. The Australian application of this concept in practice is discussed at [33.8.1650].

653

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1640]

Others allow that the conduct may be intentional or negligent in the alternative:4 see [33.8.1660].

1

2

3 4

Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Gibbs CJ at 618–619 (CLR); Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 (CA), Kirby P at 235–240 (NSWLR). The tension between the test of onus stated by Diplock J in Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426; [1959] 2 WLR 241 and that of Windeyer J in McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267 was acknowledged but not decided in Platt v Nutt, Clarke JA at 243, 248–249 (NSWLR) (Hope JA agreeing): see [33.8.310]. McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 388 (CLR) (a case on assault and battery and trespass to the person); Carnegie v Victoria (unreported, VSCFC, Crockett, O’Bryan and Gray JJ, 998 of 1976, 14 September 1989) (cited in Ferguson v Queensland [2007] QSC 322, Lyons J at [14]–[15]); Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [251]; Sadler and Victoria v Madigan [1998] VSCA 53, Winneke P at [32]–[33] (Charles and Batt JJA agreeing); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div); Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442; 80 ALJR 1339; [2006] HCA 37, Gleeson CJ, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [47]; Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285, Gray J at [983], [985], [992]–[993] (partly reversed in South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331; [2010] SASC 56 (FC), without disturbing this point). Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [2.80] (intentional and direct). Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) [2.5.1], [2.5.4] (coincidence of act and intention not required); Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [3.25]; Luntz H, Hambly D, Burns K, Dietrich J and Foster N, Torts: Cases and Commentary (7th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [11.3.16]; Richards B, de Zwart M and Ludlow K, Tort Law Principles (6th ed, Lawbook Co., 2013) at [4.75]; Fordham M, “False Imprisonment in Good Faith” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 53 at 64–65. Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [2.80] recognises the existence in Australia of negligent trespass (presumably including the so-called tort of negligent false imprisonment). See “Intentional Torts” [33.9.140]–[33.9.610]. See also Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 (CA), Kirby P at 240; R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48, Slynn LJ at 24 (AC) (affirming R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [1999] QB 1043; [1999] 1 WLR 103 (CA)). See generally the discussion in Platt v Nutt, Kirby P at 238–240 (NSWLR). In Armellin v Ljubic [2009] ACTCA 22, the Court at [27] expressly preferred the approach of Kirby P, stating that “though a trespass to the person without intent or negligence will not be tortious, the plaintiff must prove either the intent or negligence”.

[33.8.1650] Australian courts have differed on the relevance of a defendant’s state of mind in actions for false imprisonment: see [33.8.1640]. In England it is intention which distinguishes trespass from actions on the case:1 see [33.8.20] and [33.8.300]. In Australia, it is directness2 (see [33.8.1600]) although in practice false imprisonment is usually associated with intention to detain.3 654

[33.8.1650]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

In false imprisonment, the defendant may have intentionally subjected the plaintiff to the total restraint but it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove more than the bare fact of the restraint (see [33.8.1770]–[33.8.1780]), though judgments and academic writers sometimes accept that proving the defendant’s intention to imprison is a requirement:4 see [33.8.1640]. Unlike malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1550] and [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]), the conduct need not have been motivated by malice,5 though malice may be relevant to the award of damages for false imprisonment.6 Although the defendant may raise evidence of lack of intention to totally restrict the plaintiff’s liberty of movement by way of defence (see [33.8.1700]), the reported cases have usually involved intention. “Person” for this purpose includes a corporation, in which case the intention or malice is that of the relevant representative of the corporation.7

1 2

3

4

5

6

7

Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573 (CA). Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820, the Court at 470, 474 (CLR); McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 387–389, 401 (CLR) (a case on assault and battery and trespass to the person). Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div); see also Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 (CA), Clarke JA at 743–744 (NSWLR). Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 614 (VR), in response to a submission that for an imprisonment to take place the defendant had to intentionally subject the respondent to a total restraint of movement, stated “[t]his proposition is undisputedly correct” after citing Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; 115 ER 668 (KB). It is correct as far as total restraint is concerned, but not as far as intention is necessary. Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 (CA), Clarke JA at 743–744 (NSWLR). In England, it has been held that the tort of false imprisonment was one of strict liability, rendering the Governor’s defence of justification based on good faith irrelevant: R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48, Slynn LJ at 24, 26, Browne-Wilkinson LJ at 27, Steyn LJ at 28–29, Hope LJ at 32–33, 35, Hobhouse LJ at 42 (AC) (affirming R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [1999] QB 1043; [1999] 1 WLR 103 (CA)). Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). See R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48 (affirming R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [1999] QB 1043; [1999] 1 WLR 103 (CA)) (false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability). Goff v Great Northern Railway Co (1861) 3 El & El 672; 121 ER 594, Blackburn J (for the Queen’s Bench) at 682 (El & El); Edwards v Midland Railway Co (1880) 6 QBD 287, Fry J at 288.

655

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1660]

[33.8.1660] The question of the lack of due care (negligence) on the part of a defendant in actions for false imprisonment is unclear: see [33.8.1640]. In practice, false imprisonment is normally associated in Australia with intentional wrongdoing. In England, that has been the position in principle since 1959.1 Some academic writers2 argue that trespass is not available for imprisonment carelessly caused so that unless there is damage grounding an action on the case for negligence, as in Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 1 WLR 623,3 no action lies. The facts giving rise to an arguable claim in negligence may often contain the elements for false imprisonment.4 On principle, false imprisonment in Australia should be available for negligently caused direct interferences which confine a person, particularly given that false imprisonment is one of the species of trespass to the person which is actionable per se without proof of damage: see [33.8.1520] and [33.8.170]. The decisions in Australia confirming the principle for trespass have generally been cases of battery (see [33.8.360]–[33.8.410]) and logically, it remains open in Australia in cases of false imprisonment.5

1 Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426; [1959] 2 WLR 241; Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573 (CA). 2 Harding AJ and Tan KF, “Negligent False Imprisonment – A Problem in the Law of Trespass” (1980) 22 Mal Law Review 29. 3 Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 1 WLR 623 (CA); see also De Freville v Dill (1927) 96 LJKB 1056 (medical practitioner negligently certifying plaintiff insane). See also Sappideen C, Vines P and Watson P, Torts: Commentary and Materials (11th ed, Lawbook Co., 2012) at [3.125] (on policy grounds, preferable that plaintiff should bring action in negligence for actual injury). 4 See, eg Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; 34 A Crim R 364 (CA); Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285, Gray J at [985]–[986] (partly reversed in South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331; [2010] SASC 56 (FC), without disturbing this point). 5 See Heffey PG, “Negligent Infliction of Imprisonment: Actionable ‘Per Se’ or ‘Cum Damno’?” (1983) 14 MULR 53 at 59; Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [3.25]–[3.36]; Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at [2.5.1]. For some passing judicial observations, see: Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [21]–[22]; Ferguson v Queensland [2007] QSC 322, Lyons J at [16]–[18]. For the position in New Zealand, see Hayward v O’Keeffe [1993] 1 NZLR 181 (HC). For further discussion of unintentional or “negligent” trespass, see [33.8.300]–[33.8.320], [33.8.2130].

656

[33.8.1670]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Plaintiff’s Submission to Restraint [33.8.1670] To establish false imprisonment a restraint must affect the mind and freedom of a plaintiff. To ground an action for false imprisonment there must be some constraint on the party’s will so great as to induce the party to submit to deprivation of liberty, or the constraint must be imposed without the constrained person’s consent. It is the effect on the free exercise of liberty of movement which amounts to the deprivation. If a person goes voluntarily without being taken in charge, or told that they must come or otherwise be subjected to an assertion of authority, there is no restraint against the plaintiff’s will.1 Hence a telephone call requesting a person to go to a police station which results in attendance at a particular place can reflect voluntary response to a request.2 It is a question of fact whether the restraint was a voluntary or involuntary submission leading to imprisonment:3 see [33.8.1780]. If a party agrees in advance to a limitation on freedom of movement, restraint within the terms of the agreement may not be restraint against the party’s will.4 There are many examples in ordinary life where entrance to the premises of another is on terms amounting to voluntary conditional foregoing of some liberty of movement. A paying passenger using a ferry service may agree to limitations on the right of freedom to enter and exit a wharf to use the service.5 An employee miner may agree to descend a mine shaft with conditions in the contract of employment which restrict freedom to ascend to the surface until the end of the shift.6 A paying passenger using public transport may agree to restrictions on alighting from a vehicle until a designated passenger destination has been reached rather than a signal stop.7 In each case, the existence of a contract or licence may determine reasonable limitations voluntarily agreed to which reduce freedom of movement for a particular purpose or during a specified time. The question of reasonableness in accommodating the right to revoke such consent has not yet been settled and needs to be considered in the future.8 The necessity for assessing the impact on the victim’s mind9 has to be modified in the light of categories of cases highlighting restraint as the actionable wrong even where the victim is incapable of exercising choice of movement through, for example, incapacity,10 and in the light of cases holding that the victim need not even be aware of restraint to succeed: see [33.8.1680]. In such cases, the effect on the mind of the plaintiff need not be present (although it may be relevant to justification (see [33.8.1700]) and damages (see [33.8.1740]–[33.8.1760])), since there has been restriction of liberty without voluntary consent. One means of reconciling these apparently conflicting lines is that those cases requiring an assessment of the effects on the mind of the plaintiff are limited to the categories of case on assertion of authority, which by its nature requires an

657

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1670]

impact on the mind to succeed. In other categories of cases which are not dependent on assertion of authority and its effects on the mind of the victim, awareness is unnecessary since there has still been interference with freedom not voluntarily agreed to by the plaintiff.

1 Arrowsmith v Le Mesurier (1806) 2 Bos & PNR 211; 127 ER 605; Cant v Parsons (1834) 6 Car & P 504; 172 ER 1339 (Assizes); Peters v Stanway (1835) 6 Car & B 737; 172 ER 1442 (Assizes); Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769 (QB); Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216; [1969] 2 WLR 1252 (DC); Grinham v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W Discount Stores) (unreported, SASC, Mullighan J, 99 of 1992, 1 May 1992). 2 Ferguson v Jensen [1920] 53 DLR 616; (1920) 33 CCC 218 (SaskCA). 3 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 614 (VR); see also Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (for the Court) at 1180. 4 Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd [1910] AC 295 (PC). 5 Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd [1910] AC 295 (PC). 6 Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67; see also Burns v Johnston [1916] 2 IR 444 (KB) (affirmed in Burns v Johnston [1917] 2 IR 137 (CA (Ir)). 7 Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (Balmain Ferry Case) (1906) 4 CLR 379; 7 SR (NSW) 372, O’Connor J at 389 (CLR) (affirmed in Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd [1910] AC 295 (PC)). 8 Tan KF, “A Misconceived Issue in the Tort of False Imprisonment” (1981) 44 Mod LR 166. See generally Contract: General Principles “Implied Power” [7.8.80]–[7.8.120]; Criminal Sentencing, “Breach and Revocation of Parole” [12.8.870]–[12.8.1120]; Environment and Natural Resources “Environmental Harm: Pollution Control and Hazardous Substances” [14.6.10]ff; “Biodiversity” [14.7.10]ff; Individual Rights to Water [14.9.2480]–[14.9.2990]; Real Property “Licences” [28.10.10]ff; “Consent” [33.9.200]–[33.9.280]. 9 The effect on the mind of the plaintiff has been asserted most strongly in cases where control by assertion of authority has been involved: Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CB (NS) 180; 140 ER 1052, Willes J at 204 (CB (NS)); Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 (CA), Atkin LJ at 54; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). In Canada, it has been described as “a psychological type of imprisonment”: Chaytor v London, New York & Paris Association of Fashion Ltd (1961) 30 DLR (2d) 527 (Nfld SC), Dunfield J at 536. See generally Henning T, “Case and Comment – Sammak” (1994) 18 Crim LJ 165 at 171. 10 For example, incapacity through illness: Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769 (QB), Tindal CJ at 220 (Bing NC).

[33.8.1680] A plaintiff in action for false imprisonment need not be aware of the restraint. Consistent with cases on assertion of authority (see [33.8.1670]), it might have been thought that there could be no false imprisonment if the victim were unaware of the denial of liberty1 because there would be no effect on the mind of the victim. There was early conflict on whether the victim had to be aware of the restraint to constitute false

658

[33.8.1690]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

imprisonment. While Herring v Boyle (1834) 1 Cr M & R 377; 149 ER 1126 held that awareness was necessary, the contrary view was expressed in dictum of Lord Atkin in Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44: [A] person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and while he is a lunatic. … So a man might in fact, to my mind, be imprisoned by having the key of a door turned against him so that he is imprisoned in a room in fact although he does not know that the key has been turned.2

That later view prevailed in the House of Lords, which overruled Herring v Boyle in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692.3 That position has been confirmed in Australia.4 Knowledge of the unlawful restraint will nevertheless be relevant to the issue of damages:5 see [33.8.1740]–[33.8.1760].

1

2 3

4

5

This is the position in the United States (ie that the person physically restrained knows of the confinement or is harmed by it): American Law Institute, Second Restatement of the Law: Torts (2nd ed, American Law Institute Publishers, 1965), ss 35, 42. Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 (CA), Atkin LJ at 53–54. Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 (HL (NI)); also supported in academic writing: Prosser WL, “False Imprisonment: Consciousness of Confinement” (1955) 55 Colum L Rev 847. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 615. See generally See generally Henning T, “Case and Comment – Sammak” (1994) 18 Crim LJ 165 at 171; Trindade FA, “The False Imprisonment of Dr Spautz” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 29. Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA); Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 682 (Assizes); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div).

Damage [33.8.1690] As a species of trespass to person, false imprisonment is actionable without proof of damage or special damage.1 As Griffiths LJ stated in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692: “The law attaches supreme importance to the liberty of the individual and if he suffers a wrongful interference with that liberty it should remain actionable even without proof of special damage.”2 The absence of the requirement of special damage for false imprisonment is one of the distinguishing features between false imprisonment and the action on the case for malicious prosecution, which requires proof by the plaintiff of special damage:3 see [33.8.1890]. Damage, though not an element of false imprisonment, is relevant to damages: see [33.8.1740]. Damage in the form of pecuniary loss, deleterious effects on

659

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1690]

the plaintiff’s health, mental suffering, loss of dignity, mental suffering, disgrace and humiliation are legitimate components in an award.4 Continuing representation by the defendant of the plaintiff as a wrongdoer by providing further information resulting in execution of a search warrant5 or by conduct amounting to increasing prejudice,6 or failing to prove justification at trial,7 or by persistence without apology or admission of mistake8 may aggravate the injury and be addressed in damages.

1 Carnegie v Victoria (unreported, VSCFC, Crockett, O’Bryan and Gray JJ, 998 of 1976, 14 September 1989) (cited in Ferguson v Queensland [2007] QSC 322, Lyons J at [14]–[15]); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 599 (VR). 2 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 (HL (NI)), Griffiths LJ at 703 (WLR) (Keith, Templeman, Oliver and Jauncey LJJ agreeing). 3 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692 (HL (NI)); Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA); see also Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 280; [2001] FCA 370, the Full Court at [34] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 26 June 2002 in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart [2002] HCATrans 340). 4 Sadler and Victoria v Madigan [1998] VSCA 53, Charles JA at [63]; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 603 (VR); Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA). See generally Trindade FA, “The False Imprisonment of Dr Spautz” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 29. 5 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). 6 Mitchell v Jenkins (1833) 5 B & Ad 588; 110 ER 908 (question of malice improperly withdrawn from the jury). 7 Simpson v Robinson (1848) 12 QB 511; 116 ER 959 (defendant pleaded justification but adduced no evidence). 8 R v Newman (1853) 1 El & Bl 558; 118 ER 544; Risk Allah Bey v Whitehurst (1868) 18 LT 615 (QB); Darby v Ouseley (1856) 1 Hurl & N 1; 156 ER 1093; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div).

Defences [33.8.1700] There is no false imprisonment if there is lawful justification for the restraint. Murphy J stated that “[i]f imprisonment is proved it is for the defendant if he is to escape liability to prove a lawful justification for the imprisonment either at common law or by statute”.1 However, it is not an answer to the claim of wrongful imprisonment that the officers acted in accordance with their perceived statutory duty.2 Where a person is detained pursuant to a court order which is later held to be invalid, the legality of the detention and thus the liability of the state for false imprisonment will depend on the status of the court that made the order. In New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26, a preventative detention order made by the Supreme Court of

660

[33.8.1700]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

New South Wales with respect to a violent offender pursuant to the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) which had earlier been found to be unconstitutional (Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; 70 ALJR 814) was nonetheless effective until so found, thereby rendering lawful the detention of the respondent and precluding damages for false imprisonment. The High Court observed that it was a well established rule that the orders of a superior court of record were valid until set aside, unlike the case of orders of inferior courts.3 There is no longer any general right to detain to enforce payment of a civil debt unless such right is conferred by statute.4 The usual justification claimed as a defence at common law is restraint by a police officer, security officer or private person to prevent or inquire into the commission of a criminal offence.5

1

2

3

4

5

Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 599 (VR), citing Carnegie v Victoria (unreported, VSCFC, Crockett, O’Bryan and Gray JJ, 998 of 1976, 14 September 1989); Holroyd v Doncaster (1826) 3 Bing 492; 130 ER 603; Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; 45 ALJR 444, Walsh J at 626 (affirmed in Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339); Washburn v Robertson (1912) 8 DLR 183 (Sask SC). Where there are joint tortfeasors, each party must prove a separate immunity or defence, and cannot take advantage of the fact that one party enjoys statutory immunity for their tortious conduct: Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, Kirby J at [151]. Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, Kirby J at [144]; Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136; [2007] SASC 285, Gray J at [986] (partly reversed in South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331; [2010] SASC 56 (FC), without disturbing this point). See the explanation by Gageler J: New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; 87 ALJR 737; 230 A Crim R 16; [2013] HCA 26 at [56]. See also the reasons of the plurality at [32]–[35]. Sunbolf v Alford (1838) 3 M & W 248; 150 ER 1135; Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 322 (BCSC) (affirmed in Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd (1970) 12 DLR (3d) 646 (BCCA)). In Hay v Butler & Crooks (1991) 7 WAR 333, a firm of solicitors caused the issue of a warrant under the Restraint of Debtors Act 1984 (WA) to recover legal fees, which warrant was discharged. The Court held that it was not within the scope or purpose of that Act to assist a creditor to collect a debt which is the subject of a bona fide dispute by the exertion of pressure which must inevitably accompany a warrant. In such circumstances, the institution of such proceedings was heavy-handed. See “Intentional Torts” [33.9.140]–[33.9.610].

661

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1710]

[33.8.1710] The action in trespass for false imprisonment is subject to the limitation statutes of the various jurisdictions.1 False imprisonment, being a form of trespass with a potentially extended duration, may be a continuing wrong and consequently the period of limitation may run not from the initial imprisonment but from the termination of imprisonment.2

1 In cases of personal injury, including those arising from false imprisonment, the period is three years from accrual: Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 16B; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), ss 18A, 50C; Limitation Act 1981 (NT), s 12; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 11; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), ss 35 – 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), ss 5 – 5A; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), ss 5(1AA), 23A; Limitation Act 2005 (WA), ss 14(1), 16. See generally Civil Procedure “Tort” [5.10.740]–[5.10.880]. 2 MacKenzie v Martin [1953] 1 DLR 161; (1952) 104 CCC 264 (ONCA) (affirmed in MacKenzie v Martin [1954] SCR 361; [1954] 3 DLR 417); see also Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, O’Loughlin J at [1322], [1546] (affirmed by Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455; [2001] FCA 1213). For cases where the plaintiff subsequently becomes aware of the mental harm suffered by reason of the false imprisonment, see Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442; 80 ALJR 1339; [2006] HCA 37, Gleeson CJ, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [5], [17].

Remedies [33.8.1720] Self-help is available in the form of reasonable force to break from unjustified restraint.1 The force must be reasonable in all of the circumstances to justify that form of self-defence.2

1 Rowe v Hawkins (1858) 1 F & F 91; 175 ER 640 (Assizes). 2 Codd v Cabe (1876) 1 Ex D 352 (CA); Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1967] 2 WLR 129 (DC), Winn LJ at 519 (QB) (Lord Parker CJ and Widgery J agreeing).

[33.8.1730] The formal historical remedy for release from unlawful imprisonment is application to a superior court for a writ of habeas corpus.1 The most important species of that prerogative remedy provided for violations of personal liberty was that provided for deliverance from unlawful confinement.2

1 See Jenks E, “The Prerogative Writs in English Law” (1923) 32 Yale LJ 523; de Smith SA, “The Prerogative Writs” (1951) 11 Cam LJ 40; Plucknett TFT, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed, Butt (UK), 1956).

662

[33.8.1740]

2

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

See Administrative Law “Prerogative Orders” [2.6.1090]–[2.6.1720].

[33.8.1740] The full range of general damages is available to a plaintiff in a successful action for false imprisonment.1 Damage is not necessary to attract an award of damages and interference with personal liberty, even for a short period, is not a trivial wrong.2 Damages are awarded for the duration of the false imprisonment, or up to the time of a lawful order which authorises the detention.3 Murphy J stated that “[t]he damages in an action for false imprisonment are generally awarded not for a pecuniary loss but for a loss of dignity, mental suffering, disgrace and humiliation”.4 Cultural loss suffered by a part-Aboriginal person can sound in damages. No deduction should be made for any benefits, such as education, received as a result of separation from tribal backgrounds.5 It is because the law attaches supreme importance to any interference with personal liberty that contemptuous damages can be awarded.6 The circumstances of the detention, including the defendant’s conduct and its impact on the plaintiff, are relevant.7 Nevertheless, losses which are the direct result of the false imprisonment are recoverable as compensatory damages. These include the following: (1)

medical costs associated with any deleterious effects on the plaintiff’s health;8

(2)

money paid to secure release;9

(3)

reasonable legal costs of proceedings to quash any unlawful order;10

(4)

reasonable costs of alternative means of return travel following unlawful detention on a vessel;11 and

(5)

loss of a position such as a directorship of a company following arrest on a charge which was false.12

1

2

3

See Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA), Clarke JA at 12–18 (NSWLR) (Priestley and Beazley JJA agreeing); Ballard v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 208; [2008] NSWSC 1019, McDougall J at [65], [70]. See “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. See generally McCarthy G, “Mengel: A Limited Remedy in Damages for Wrongful Administrative Action” (1996) 4 AJ Admin L 5; Walker P, “Vicarious Liability for Exemplary Damages: A Matter of Strict Liability?” (2009) 83 ALJ 548. Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; 45 ALJR 444, Walsh J at 632 (affirmed in Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; 46 ALJR 339); Nye v New South Wales [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-725; [2003] NSWSC 1212, O’Keefe J at [33], citing Diamond v Minter [1941] 1 KB 656, Cassels J at 663 (KB). See, eg McDonald v Coles Myer Ltd (t/as K-Mart Chatswood) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-361 (NSWCA), where damages were awarded although the plaintiff had not actually been imprisoned. See, eg Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Presland (2005) 63 NSWLR 22; [2005]

663

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1740]

NSWCA 33 Spigelman CJ at [101]; see also Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, O’Loughlin J at [1546] (affirmed by Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455; [2001] FCA 1213). 4 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 603, who went on to observe: “As to the injury to dignity, mental suffering and the like, whilst the intervention of a judicial officer will usually make any consequent imprisonment too remote from the initial false imprisonment, yet damages for an initial false imprisonment may be aggravated by persistence in the assertion of facts which continue the slur on the plaintiff’s reputation, damaged by the false imprisonment. Lawrence LJ in [Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA)] stated that this continued ‘up to the moment when damages are assessed’.” 5 Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, O’Loughlin J at [1499], [1543], [1549]–[1554] (affirmed by Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455; [2001] FCA 1213); Morro v Australian Capital Territory (2009) 234 FLR 71; [2009] ACTSC 118, Gray J at [141]. 6 Kuchenmeister v Home Offıce [1958] 1 QB 496; [1958] 2 WLR 453, Barry J at 513 (QB); Nye v New South Wales [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-725; [2003] NSWSC 1212; Houda v New South Wales [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-816; [2005] NSWSC 1053; McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289. See “General Compensatory Damages” [33.10.170]; “Contemptuous Damages” [33.10.240]. 7 Watters v Glace Bay Town (1987) 34 DLR (4th) 747 (NSSC (App Div)); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div); Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA), Clarke JA at 18 (NSWLR) (Priestley and Beazley JJA agreeing); Manga v Attorney-General (NZ) [2000] 2 NZLR 65 (HC). 8 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). See generally Horvath M, “Charge First, Investigate Later, Acknowledge Fault … Never: A Tale of Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process” (1999) 35 Plaintiff 34; Alexander P, “Costs of Wrongful Arrest, False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Actions” (2007) 81 Precedent 46. 9 Clark v Woods (1848) 2 Ex 395; 154 ER 545; De Mesnil v Dakin (1867) LR 3 QB 18; Norton v Monckton (1895) 43 WR 350 (QB). 10 Foxall v Barnett (1853) 2 El & Bl 928; 118 ER 1014. 11 See Boyce v Bayliffe (1807) 1 Camp 58; 170 ER 875, cited in Hoey v Felton (1861) 11 CB (NS) 142; 142 ER 749 (on the facts, plaintiff’s special damage pleaded, being the cost of transshipment, held not to be a sufficiently direct consequence of the confinement); McDonald v Coles Myer Ltd (t/as K-Mart Chatswood) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-361 (NSWCA), Powell JA at 62,690; Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA), Clarke JA at 13 (NSWLR) (Priestley and Beazley JJA agreeing). 12 Childs v Lewis (1924) 40 TLR 870 (KB); Hoey v Felton (1861) 11 CB (NS) 142; 142 ER 749.

[33.8.1743] Aggravated damages as a form of compensatory damages may be awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the defendant’s aggravation of the damage.1 If the defendant’s unfounded slur of guilt persists even up to the trial, such conduct is relevant to aggravated damages. As Parke B stated in Warwick v Foulkes (1844) 12 M & W 507; 152 ER 1298:

664

[33.8.1743]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

A man is taken up on a false charge of felony; surely he has a right to give evidence to shew that it was not only lightly made and soon abandoned, but that it was seriously made, and persevered in to the last moment.2

Lawrence LJ in Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 observed: [A]ny evidence which tends to aggravate or mitigate the damage to a man’s reputation which flows naturally from his imprisonment must be admissible up to the moment when damages are assessed. A false imprisonment does not merely affect a man’s liberty, it also affects his reputation. The damage continues until it is caused to cease by an avowal that the imprisonment was false.3

In Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597, an award of $10,000 was confirmed by the Appeal Division of the Victorian Supreme Court to a regular shopper of a national retail shopping chain following the customer’s detention in the store’s security office, where he was interviewed for an hour before being allowed to leave. He was later subjected to a 50-minute search of his dwelling following the issue of a search warrant by a magistrate on information supplied by the defendant’s security officer. Factors considered to be relevant to aggravation in Myer Stores Ltd v Soo were perseverance by the initiation of a search warrant subsequent to the false imprisonment,4 harbouring and publicising continued suspicions even up to trial,5 failure to give any evidence at trial,6 failure to admit any mistake or to apologise,7 and the plaintiff’s knowledge of the unlawful restraint.8 In that case, aggravated damages were awarded “to compensate him for the added hurt to his feelings and the mental anguish perpetrated by the continued insinuations of suspicion of his guilt right up to verdict”.9 It should be noted that a subjective element may be involved in assessing aggravation.10

1

2 3 4 5 6

Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1964] AC 371; [1962] 3 WLR 229, Morris LJ at 419 (AC); McIntosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112; 30 ACTR 19 (ACTSC); Morro v Australian Capital Territory (2009) 234 FLR 71; [2009] ACTSC 118, Gray J at [138]. In Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549, the Court at 8 (CLR), referring to Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1; 98 ER 489, Pratt LCJ at 19 (Lofft), distinguished aggravated damages from exemplary damages as follows: “Aggravated damages, in contrast to exemplary damages, are compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like. Exemplary damages on the other hand, go beyond compensation and are awarded ‘as a punishment to the guilty to deter from any such proceeding for the future and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself’.” See generally “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]. For discussion on mitigating factors on damages for false imprisonment, see [33.8.1760]. Warwick v Foulkes (1844) 12 M & W 507; 152 ER 1298, Parke B at 509 (M & W) (Gurney B agreeing). Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA), Lawrence LJ at 40. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 603. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 603. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 604; see also

665

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1743]

Simpson v Robinson (1848) 12 QB 511; 116 ER 959, Lord Denman CJ (for the Queen’s Bench) at 514 (QB); Driscoll v Collins (1892) 31 NBR 604 (NBSC). 7 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 604; McDonald v Coles Myer Ltd (t/as K-Mart Chatswood) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-361 (NSWCA). 8 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 603. 9 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 606. See also McDonald v Coles Myer Ltd (t/as K-Mart Chatswood) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-361 (NSWCA) (aggravated damages awarded for the defendant’s false imputations during trial that the plaintiff was mentally ill); White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [461]–[470] (exemplary damages awarded for the defendant’s Ministers making unfounded provocative and offensive public statements, including describing the plaintiffs as “feral”). See generally Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126. 10 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 610 who commented: “The concept of aggravation is itself elusive, for there may be aggravating features which would not subjectively concern one plaintiff but would subjectively concern another, such as Mr Soo, just as I believe that the evidence demonstrates that they did here.”

[33.8.1747] On the other hand, provocative conduct by a plaintiff may reduce the amount of aggravated damages otherwise appropriate, or even disentitle a plaintiff from such damages.1 Exemplary damages go beyond compensation and are awarded “as a punishment to the guilty to deter from any such proceeding for the future and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself”.2 Exemplary damages have always been available in an appropriate case of false imprisonment.3 In New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303 made the following comments regarding when exemplary damages will be appropriate.4 Circumstances of aggravation do not necessarily demonstrate conduct of a kind warranting an award of exemplary damages. Such an award is justified by reference, not to the effects on the plaintiff, but to the knowledge, intention or recklessness of the tortfeasor [Port Stephens Shire Council v Tellamist Pty Ltd (2004) NSWCA 253; 135 LGERA 98, Ipp JA at [401]]. An award of exemplary damages may be justified by “conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights” [Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [14]]. On the other hand, actual subjective advertence to wrongdoing is not necessary, at least, it would seem, in circumstances where the conduct is objectively outrageous so that the tortfeasor can properly be described as reckless [New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445, Spigelman CJ at [35]–[49]].

666

[33.8.1750]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

They will not be awarded as of right when the defendant is a police officer; rather, the ordinary principles must be applied to the facts of each case.5

1 2

3 4

5

White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [439]. Hoey v Felton (1861) 11 CB (NS) 142; 142 ER 749. See generally “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. See also Jacobs S, Commercial Damages (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [3.730]. Huckle v Money (1763) 2 Wils 205; 95 ER 768; New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57. New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303, Basten JA at [115] (Ipp JA agreeing at [25]), cited with approval in White v South Australia (2010) 106 SASR 521; 4 ARLR 348; [2010] SASC 95, Anderson J at [446]–[447]. New South Wales v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; 177 A Crim R 538; [2007] NSWCA 303, Ipp JA at [25].

[33.8.1750] Joint and several tortfeasors pose particular difficulties in assessing damages. At common law a cause of action against joint tortfeasors merged in the first judgment recovered.1 That rule has been abolished by statute in all Australian jurisdictions so that separate judgments in different amounts may be awarded and recovered on the same occasion against co-defendants who are joint tortfeasors.2 Joint tortfeasors may also be liable as concurrent wrongdoers or tortfeasors under the proportionate liability and civil liability legislation of the States and Territories.3

1

2

3

Brinsmead v Harrison (1872) LR 7 CP 547 (Ct Ex Chamber); see also Bracks v Smyth-Kirk (2009) 263 ALR 522; [2009] NSWCA 401, McColl JA at [94]–[99] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 28 May 2010 in Bracks v Smyth-Kirk [2010] HCATrans 145). XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352; Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131. The legislation is Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 12; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt IV; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IV; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7. See also “Concurrent Torts” [33.11.10]ff; Civil Procedure “Parties to Action” [5.4.150]–[5.4.260]; Intellectual Property “Standing, Scope of Claim and Multiple Defendants” [23.6.560]–[23.6.630]. See related discussion at Unfair Dealing “Damages” [35.4.100]–[35.4.330], which

667

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1750]

also deals with issues of contributory negligence, not relevant to trespass, but which may be applicable to alternative or additional claims in negligence.

[33.8.1760] Mitigation by a defendant is relevant to damages:1 see [33.8.1740]. The defendant is entitled to give evidence which tends to show that the charge has been withdrawn or an apology given.2 In Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39, Lawrence LJ observed that: [I]n the same way the defendant would be entitled to give any evidence which tended to show that he had withdrawn, or had apologised for having made, the charge on which the false imprisonment proceeded. … A false imprisonment does not merely affect a man’s liberty, it also affects his reputation. The damage continues until it is caused to cease by an avowal that the imprisonment was false.3

Other circumstances falling short of justification but explaining the defendant’s conduct may be given in evidence as relevant to mitigation. Such circumstances may include the plaintiff’s persistent annoyance of the defendant4 and detention of a person in respect of whom a warrant had been issued in the reasonable but mistaken suspicion that he was endeavouring to escape.5 In a case where the defendant had suffered recent losses of property through theft, evidence of that fact was rejected.6

1 On mitigation generally, see “Limitations on Compensation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2170]. 2 Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 602–604 (VR). 3 Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA), Lawrence LJ at 40. 4 Thomas v Powell (1837) 7 Car & P 807; 173 ER 352 (Assizes). 5 Pursley v Bennett (1885) 11 PR 64 (ONHC). 6 Yardley v Hine (1867) 17 LT 264 (QB).

Evidentiary Matters [33.8.1770] In an action for false imprisonment, a plaintiff carries the burden of establishing no more than imprisonment directly caused by a defendant:1 see [33.8.1520], [33.8.1590] and [33.8.1640]. The plaintiff need not prove that the imprisonment was unlawful.2 The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct, by being active in promoting and causing the imprisonment, was the proximate cause of the imprisonment:3 see [33.8.1590]–[33.8.1600]. Once imprisonment by the defendant is proved by the plaintiff, the defendant, if they are to escape liability, must prove lawful justification for the imprisonment either at common law or by statute.4 This contrasts with malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1550]) where the plaintiff has the onus of proving malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause: see [33.8.1920]–[33.8.1930].

668

[33.8.1780]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Where claims are pursued to trial for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, a very clear distinction in the charge to the jury is required.

1

2

3 4

Slaveski v Victoria [2010] VSC 441, Kyrou J at [251]; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 611 (VR): “It is enough to prove there was a constraint upon the respondent’s will so great as to induce him to submit to deprivation of liberty.” See Lee v Jones [1954] 1 DLR 520 (Man QB); Frey v Fedoruk [1950] SCR 517; [1950] 3 DLR 513. Carnegie v Victoria (unreported, VSCFC, Crockett, O’Bryan and Gray JJ, 998 of 1976, 14 September 1989), cited in Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 599 (VR); Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, O’Loughlin J at [1150] (affirmed by Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455; [2001] FCA 1213); Ferguson v Queensland [2007] QSC 322, Lyons J at [14]–[15]. Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), McDonald J at 629 (VR). See Holroyd v Doncaster (1826) 3 Bing 492; 130 ER 603; Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167, Hawkins J at 170; see also [33.8.1700].

[33.8.1780] Whether or not a person has been unlawfully restrained so as to constitute a false imprisonment is a question of fact on the evidence.1 Evidence includes primary facts and inferences which may be drawn from those facts.2 Particular questions of fact arise within the broad question, such as whether there was restraint in fact or constructively by submission, and whether restraint was voluntary.3 It is necessary for the plaintiff to establish the facts which constitute the relation of principal and agent. The authority of the agent of a corporation must be shown to be direct and special or implied from the urgency of the occasion.4 A wide range of evidence is admissible up to the moment the damages are assessed at trial (see [33.8.1740]–[33.8.1750]) and in relation to mitigation:5 see [33.8.1760].

1

2 3 4

5

Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (for the Court) at 1180; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), Murphy J at 599, McDonald J at 632 (VR). See generally 16 Evidence. Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; 53 ALJR 293; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div), O’Bryan J at 614 (VR). Cant v Parsons (1834) 6 Car & P 504; 172 ER 1339 (Assizes). Bank of New South Wales v Owston (1879) 4 App Cas 270 (PC); Trade Practices Commission v Queensland Aggregates Pty Ltd (No 3) (1982) 61 FLR 52; 1 TPR 417 (FCA), Morling J at 63 (FLR); Cousins v Canadian Northern Railway (1908) 9 WLR 308 (Manitoba Chambers). Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA). In Warwick v Foulkes (1844) 12 M & W 507; 152 ER 1298, Parke B observed at 509 (M & W): “A man is taken up on a

669

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1780]

false charge of felony; surely he has a right to give evidence to shew that it was not one lightly made and soon abandoned, but that it was seriously made, and persevered in to the last moment.” In Dunphy v Moore (1865) 13 LT 179 (QB), it was held that actions taken consequent on a false imprisonment, as a matter of practice and not in excess, are part of the transaction and need not be specially pleaded. Thus the searching and stripping of the plaintiff in that case were relevant to aggravate the damages to be awarded.

Malicious Prosecution General [33.8.1790] “Malicious prosecution”1 is an abuse of proceedings2 by a person who acts with malice and without reasonable and probable cause to wrongfully set the law in motion, usually on a criminal charge, though exceptionally also by a limited number of civil proceedings.3 Where the proceedings terminate (if they are capable of doing so) in favour of the person against whom the proceedings were initiated, an action lies in tort against the party who was actively instrumental in bringing the proceedings. As an action on the case4 (see [33.8.20] and [33.8.300]) it is a tort of ancient origin5 initially associated with the old writ of conspiracy to abuse legal procedure. The scope of the tort has been narrowly circumscribed in Australia and England by a stringent adherence to the essential elements.6 However, the essential elements are not merely a number of independent and disintegrated requirements.7 The essentials which a plaintiff must prove are that: (1)

actionable proceedings were instituted or continued by a defendant against the plaintiff (see [33.8.1820]–[33.8.1840]);

(2)

those proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff, as far as they were capable of termination (see [33.8.1850]);

(3)

the proceedings were initiated or continued without reasonable and probable cause (see [33.8.1860]);

(4)

the defendant was activated by malice (see [33.8.1870]); and

(5)

special injury or damage was caused to the plaintiff: see [33.8.1890].

1 Although malice is required, the tort is not strictly limited to “prosecutions” so called: see also [33.8.1800], [33.8.1820]. 2 The relationship to other actions available in respect of abuse is discussed at [33.8.1800] and it is considered that malicious prosecution is more difficult to establish because of the greater number of matters to be proved: QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245, Macrossan J at 256 (Qd R). See generally

670

[33.8.1800]

3 4

5

6

7

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Mullany NJ, “The Conduct of Defence and Abuse of Process” (1995) 22 Brief 9. Principally liquidation proceedings against a company and bankruptcy proceedings against an individual: see [33.8.1820]. The cause of action was associated originally with indirect interference, whereas trespass to the person such as false imprisonment was direct: see [33.8.1550]. In Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666, Diplock J at 159 (QB) explained: “The action for malicious prosecution was an action on the case in consimili casu to the action brought by the old writ of conspiracy which lay only when there was a combination between two or more persons maliciously to indict the plaintiff for treason or felony. The action on the case for malicious prosecution was available against a single defendant, and could be founded upon any form of legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal, brought maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause against the plaintiff by the defendant.” This case was reversed on other grounds in Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). It dates at least to the reign of Elizabeth I, as reflected in cases such as Jerom v Knight (1587) 1 Leo 107; 74 ER 99; Fuller v Cook (1584) 3 Leo 100; 74 ER 567. See also Soare v Ashley [1955] VLR 438; Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89; National Australia Bank Ltd v McFarlane [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-819; [2005] VSC 438; Winfield PH, The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 1921). In other Commonwealth countries it has been more popular, particularly in India, Canada and West Africa: Kodilinye G, “Setting in Motion Malicious Prosecutions: The Commonwealth Experience” (1987) 36 ICLQ 157. Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 282 (CLR); Assheton v Merrett [1928] SASR 11, Richards J at 13.

[33.8.1800] There are several features which distinguish malicious prosecution from other actions in tort. Comparison has been made with associated trespass actions, particularly the distinction between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution: see [33.8.1550]. False imprisonment involves conduct which is itself wrongful, whereas malicious prosecution addresses conduct which is procedurally lawful but carried out for wrongful purposes: The foundation of the action lies in abuse of the process of the court by wrongfully setting the law in motion, and it is designed to discourage the perversion of the machinery of justice for an improper purpose.1

Malicious prosecution is probably the best known of a series of torts of infrequent occurrence, where a civil action lies for abuse of legal procedure. The tort involves abuse of proceedings, including by analogy mesne process2 associated with proceedings, but others involve abuse of process.3 Abuse of process (see [33.8.1940]) is a broad category which includes the tort of collateral abuse of process (see [33.8.1950]), the archaic torts of maintenance (see [33.8.1990]) and champerty: see [33.8.2000]. Other torts include the ill-defined tort of misfeasance in a public office: see [33.8.2160].

671

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1800]

The complex interests involved in and protected by the tort of malicious prosecution perhaps explain the judicial oscillation between fear of encouraging false accusers and apprehension of scaring away just ones. In terms of the interests protected by this action on the case, it shares with the other abuse of process actions protection of the public interest in not permitting legal procedure to be used for improper motives and without reasonable cause to harass innocent citizens. It must balance the public interest in allowing justifiable process to proceed, often with necessary cooperation between police and citizen, which may be threatened should citizens be exposed to malicious prosecution merely by reporting suspicions to the authorities.4 In balancing public interests, the element of reasonable and probable cause (see [33.8.1860]) is used in malicious prosecution and often poses the major difficulty to a plaintiff’s success.5 Malicious prosecution also safeguards the civil liberty of freedom from unjustifiable legal process. There is also an analogy with the civil action of defamation,6 since both defamation and malicious prosecution seek to vindicate the private right to protection of character, in this case prejudiced through publication arising from the unjustifiable litigation. However, malicious prosecution is also available where damage is to personal freedom and property or pecuniary loss, whereas defamation is limited to harm to reputation.7 Since the courts have carefully defined the circumstances in which an abuse of legal process will be permitted to be redressed through malicious prosecution, they are cautious in permitting alternative causes of action, including negligence,8 to proceed if the requirements of malicious prosecution are not made out. For policy reasons, it has long been held that there is an immunity from civil action for words, even false words used by witnesses and others in proceedings:9 but see [33.8.1810].

1 Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322 (PC (Ind)), Sir John Beaumont (for the Privy Council) at 330. See also Houda v New South Wales [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-816; [2005] NSWSC 1053, Cooper AJ at [355]–[370]. 2 That is, process in the form of writs issued in an action subsequent to the originating writ and up to a writ of execution, meaning therefore all such process which intervened between the beginning and the end of the suit. 3 It has been argued that it is too difficult for the innocent to obtain just redress under this tort: Fridman GHL, “Compensation of the Innocent” (1963) 26 Mod LR 481; Fridman GHL, “Abuse of Legal Process” (1964) 114 New LJ 335; Law Reform Committee of South Australia, 83rd Report of the Law Reform Committee of South Australia to the Attorney-General Relating to Civil Actions for Perjury Committed in Criminal Proceedings and to the Tort of Malicious Prosecution (Law Reform Committee of South Australia, 1984) p 9. 4 Fanzelow v Kerr (1896) 14 NZLR 660 (CA), Denniston J at 667. 5 Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832, Viscount Simonds at 744 (AC);

672

[33.8.1810]

6 7

8 9

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Tempest v Snowden [1952] 1 KB 130 (CA), Evershed MR at 133 (KB). In QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245, Macrossan J at 256 (Qd R) stated: “In the tort of malicious prosecution, want of reasonable and probable cause is an additional ingredient for which proof is required in addition to malice.” See Communication “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff. See generally Human Rights “Privacy and Common Law” [21.11.140]; Pizer J, Dias E and Pound A, Victorian Administrative Law (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [CHR.13.60]. Compare Communication “Criminal Defamation” [6.2.10]ff; “Injurious Falsehood” [6.3.10]ff. Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228; [1989] 2 WLR 624 See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. “[N]either party, witness, counsel, jury, or Judge, can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office”: R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 55; 98 ER 529, Mansfield LJ at 56 (Lofft), applied in Munnings v Australian Government Solicitor (1994) 68 ALJR 169 (HCA), Dawson J at 172 (ALJR) (varied by Munnings v Australian Government Solicitor (No 2) (1994) 68 ALJR 429 (HCA), without disturbing this point); D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [42], McHugh J at [99]. See also related discussion on tort of misfeasance in public office at [33.8.2160].

[33.8.1810] A range of crimes exist to protect legal process from abuses, particularly the crime of perjury involved in the giving of false evidence on oath.1 Perjury is a crime but not a tort,2 and malicious prosecution is not available on policy grounds simply for bearing false witness.3

1

2

3

See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 35(1); Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), Pt 3.4; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 327; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT), s 96; Criminal Code (Qld), ss 123 – 125 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 242; Criminal Code (Tas), s 94 (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 314 – 315; Criminal Code (WA), s 124 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), App B Schedule). See also Law Reform Committee of South Australia, 83rd Report of the Law Reform Committee of South Australia to the Attorney-General Relating to Civil Actions for Perjury Committed in Criminal Proceedings and to the Tort of Malicious Prosecution (Law Reform Committee of South Australia, 1984). See Criminal Offences “Perjury” [10.11.1990]–[10.11.2070], which also discusses similar legislated offences, such as false swearing and procuring false testimony. Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45; [1958] 3 WLR 463; Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470; [1970] 3 WLR 202. Civil liability for perjury may be imposed by statute, eg Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 72. See also Evidence “Privilege against Self-incrimination” [16.7.800]–[16.7.1200]; “Public Policy” [33.2.380]–[33.2.400]. Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130 (this includes conspiracy to commit perjury); Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; [1989] 3 WLR 563 (CA), Slade LJ at 470 (QB). However, it may be relevant to an action for abuse of process (see [33.8.1940]): Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470; [1970] 3 WLR 202, Morris LJ at 477 (Reid LJ, Viscount Dilhorne and Diplock LJ agreeing),

673

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1810]

Wilberforce LJ at 480 (AC); Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 171; 80 WN (NSW) 593; [1964] NSWR 363 (FC).

Essential Elements [33.8.1820] Actionable proceedings grounding an action for malicious prosecution are not limited to criminal prosecutions, but extend to a limited range of recognised civil proceedings1 where damage results. The recognised civil proceedings are particularly bankruptcy2 and winding-up3 petitions and mesne process associated with proceedings.4 The word “prosecution” in the title of the action is not used in the technical sense it bears in criminal law, and the tort may lie for the wrongful invocation of civil process. Australian authority suggests there is a wider view of the range of civil proceedings grounding the action than may have prevailed in the past.5 A person aggrieved by the wrongful institution of civil proceedings usually has quick and effective interlocutory means of terminating or staying the action. In some instances, the very institution of the proceedings (eg the publication of an application to wind up a company) may work considerable damage which is not undone by the later dismissal of the application. In such cases, the tort may offer a means of recouping that damage. However, the traditional rules which applied to determine what proceedings are actionable for the purposes of the tort meant that the tort usually did not lie for the wrongful institution of most ordinary civil actions. The action for malicious prosecution originated as an action on the case for which accordingly damage was, and is, an essential ingredient:6 see [33.8.1890]. The judgment of Holt CJ in Savill v Roberts (1698) 12 Mod 208; 88 ER 1267 is the starting point of the modern analysis of the requirement of damage. Holt CJ discussed three categories of damage for which the tort will lie. The history of the treatment of those categories is traced by Diplock J in Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666. Essentially, the tort lies where a plaintiff establishes that the impugned proceeding caused damage of the kinds referred to by Holt CJ or the recognised extensions to those kinds: “First, damage to his name if the matter whereof he be accused be scandalous. Secondly, to his person, whereby he is imprisoned. Thirdly, to his property, whereby he is put to charges and expences.”7 The relevant damage must be pleaded. Refinement of the requirement of legally recognisable damage had reduced the scope of the tort where the wrongful institution of civil proceedings was in issue. Plainly, a civil action today does not generally expose a defendant to loss of liberty. As regards pecuniary loss, the law does not recognise the difference between solicitor/client and recouped party/party costs borne by a successful defendant as damage of which the law takes notice.8 Further, by a legal fiction, the prosecution of a civil case in which scandalous or defamatory allegations are made and successfully defended is not recognised as damage because the defendant’s reputation is regarded as cleared at the same time as the allegations 674

[33.8.1820]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

are publicly heard. Thus, Bowen LJ observed in Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674: In no action, at all events in none of the ordinary kind, not even in those based on fraud where there are scandalous allegations in the pleadings, is damage to a man’s fair fame the necessary and natural consequence of bringing the action. Incidentally matters connected with the action, such as the publication of the proceedings in the action, may do a man an injury; but the bringing of the action is of itself no injury to him. When the action is tried in public, his fair fame will be cleared, if it deserves to be cleared: if the action is not tried, his fair fame cannot be assailed in any way by the bringing of the action.9

Bankruptcy and winding up proceedings were distinguished in Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre from ordinary civil proceedings because in such matters the application is required to be publicly advertised before the individual or company can defend themselves. Accordingly, the law recognised the wrongful prosecution of such proceedings as imparting damage to reputation.10 An aggrieved defendant in ordinary civil proceedings under the traditional rules was obliged to show that loss beyond costs had been incurred. For example, in Jervois Sulphates (NT) Ltd v Petrocarb Explorations NL (1974) 5 ALR 1, the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory made an award of aggravated damages for malicious prosecution to a plaintiff who showed loss in being excluded from certain housing and mineral leases as a result of an injunction wrongfully obtained in the Warden’s Court. A malicious prosecution for the wrongful institution of civil proceedings to recover a debt, notwithstanding dissemination or publication within business circles, failed on traditional grounds in Barker v Sands & McDougall Co Ltd (1890) 16 VLR 719. The decision of the Appeal Division of the Victorian Supreme Court in Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 suggested a substantial revision of the traditional approach to ordinary civil actions in light of significant changes: In modern society the quick and wide dissemination of publicity relating to litigation, both pending and current, by radio, television and news print might injure the fair fame of an accused person who subsequently was found to be not guilty, or of a defendant who later has had judgment entered against him set aside on appeal.11

In that case, the Court held that the civil process (summons to enjoin a solicitor from practising without a practising certificate) could result in damage to fame and reputation and was a real risk under existing law and court procedures.12 The wrongful institution or prosecution of most criminal charges exposes the accused to loss of liberty. Some summary charges (eg subject to imposition of a fine) do not expose the defendant to loss of liberty, in which case one of the alternative heads of damage must be shown. However, unlike in civil proceedings, the fact that the defendant has sustained costs beyond those awarded in his favour will constitute damage of which the law takes notice.13 If it is necessary for an accused person to rely on damage to reputation, it must be 675

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1820]

shown that injury to reputation is necessarily and naturally entailed by the proceedings against them.14 Wrongfully pulling a train alarm cord did not carry such an imputation in the case of Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666,15 but failing to pay a tram fare apparently did in Rayson v South London Tramways Co [1893] 2 QB 304.16 The wrongful issue of mesne process,17 just as in the case of originating process initiating proceedings, may give rise to an action if the requirements for the tort are by analogy made out, including absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice. Decided examples include the wrongful issue of a warrant for the arrest of a witness,18 the wrongful issue of a writ of execution,19 arrest of a ship,20 malicious registration of a judgment,21 and malicious procurement of issue of a search warrant.22 Whether an action lies for a malicious prosecution before a court-martial or other military authority is uncertain,23 although proceedings initiated maliciously in a foreign jurisdiction may ground an action.24 The tort of malicious prosecution does not extend to disciplinary or similiar administrative proceedings.25

1 The traditional view expressed in authoritative cases such as Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA) was that in general, malicious prosecution was not available for ordinary civil proceedings because such proceedings could not result in damage recognised for that tort: Brett MR at 682, Bowen LJ at 689. 2 Johnson v Emerson (1871) LR 6 Ex 329. 3 Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA). 4 That is, process in the form of writs issued in an action subsequent to the originating writ and up to a writ of execution, meaning therefore all such process which intervened between the beginning and the end of the suit. 5 Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div). The early Australian decisions are conflicting. Barker v Sands & McDougall Co Ltd (1890) 16 VLR 719 and Fenn v Paul (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 315; 49 WN (NSW) 130 (FC) decided that the action does not lie for malicious civil proceedings, whereas Lachaume v Broughton (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 475; 20 WN (NSW) 161 (FC) and Houghton v Oakley (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 26; 16 WN (NSW) 183 (potential risk of imprisonment) considered that the action does lie on proof of special damage. See also Jervois Sulphates (NT) Ltd v Petrocarb Explorations NL (1974) 5 ALR 1 (NTSC) (damage to property). Some English decisions including Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; [1989] 3 WLR 563, especially Slade LJ (for the Court of Appeal) at 471–472 (QB) would confine the proceedings within traditional limits (overruled on other grounds in Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188). For the New Zealand position, see Rawlinson v Purnell Jenkinson & Roscoe [1999] 1 NZLR 479 (HC). 6 Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666, Diplock J at 159 (QB) (reversed on other grounds in Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA)); Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 285 (CLR). Quartz Hill Consolidated

676

[33.8.1820]

7

8 9 10

11 12 13 14

15 16

17

18 19 20

21 22

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA), Brett MR at 682. Savill v Roberts (1698) 12 Mod 208; 88 ER 1267, Holt CJ at 208. In Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666, Diplock J at 161 (QB) used “scandalous” as a synonym for “slanderous” (reversed on other grounds in Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA)). See also Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 285 (CLR); Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322 (PC (Ind)), Sir John Beaumont (for the Privy Council) at 330. Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA), Brett MR at 682. Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA), Bowen LJ at 689–690. Fenn v Paul (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 315; 49 WN (NSW) 130 (FC), Street CJ at 319 (SR (NSW)); QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245, Macrossan J at 259 (Qd R). Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div), Kaye and Beach JJ at 267. Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div), Kaye and Beach JJ at 267–268. Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666, Diplock J at 164–166 (QB), citing Wiffen v Bailey [1915] 1 KB 600 (CA), Buckley LJ at 608, Pickford LJ at 614. Berry v British Transport Commission was reversed on other grounds in Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). Reversed on other grounds in Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). Rayson v South London Tramways Co [1893] 2 QB 304 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 307, emphasising that the action was available on a criminal offence, notwithstanding the statutory penalty was a fine rather than imprisonment. The plaintiff’s conviction in Rayson v South London Tramways Co was decided with a judge and jury, whereas in Berry v British Transport Commission [1961] 1 QB 149; [1960] 3 WLR 666, the initial conviction was determined by the Brighton Justices, then overturned by the Recorder. The distinction is nonetheless artificial, and is criticised accordingly in Berry v British Transport Commission, Diplock J at 163, 166 (QB). That is, process in the form of writs issued in an action subsequent to the originating writ and up to a writ of execution, meaning all such process which intervened between the beginning and the end of the suit. Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470; [1970] 3 WLR 202; Dunshea v Ryan (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 163; 18 WN (NSW) 181 (FC). Clissold v Cratchley [1910] 2 KB 244 (CA). Munce v Black (1858) 7 ICLR 475 (Ex); Castrique v Behrens (1861) 3 El & El 709; 121 ER 608; Redway v McAndrew (1873) LR 9 QB 74; Turnbull v The Strathnaver (1875) 1 App Cas 58 (PC (NZ)), Sir Robert Phillimore (for the Privy Council) at 67; The Collingrove (1885) 10 PD 158; The Walter D Wallet [1893] P 202. Gibbs v Pike (1842) 9 M & W 351; 152 ER 149 (insufficient proof of malice on the facts). Cooper v Booth (1785) 3 Esp 135; 170 ER 564 (Assizes), Mansfield LJ (for the

677

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1820]

Court) at 144 (Esp); Wyatt v White (1860) 5 Hurl & N 371; 157 ER 1226. Since an application is granted ex parte, there can be no capacity for termination in the plaintiff’s favour. 23 Sutton v Johnstone (1786) 1 Term Rep 493; 99 ER 1215; Warden v Bailey (1811) 4 Taunt 67; 128 ER 253 (imprisonment for regimental order was outside the scope of military authority); Dawkins v Rokeby (1866) 4 F & F 806; 176 ER 800 (Assizes); Marks v Frogley [1898] 1 QB 888 (CA); R v Army Council; Ex parte Ravenscroft [1917] 2 KB 504 (distinguished in Millar v Bornholt (2009) 177 FCR 67; [2009] FCA 637, Logan J at [37]). In view of the establishment of a constitutionally valid military court of Australia, following the decision of the High Court in Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230; 83 ALJR 993; [2009] HCA 29, an action for malicious prosecution in future will more likely lie before such a court. 24 Bank of Australasia v Nias (1851) 16 QB 717; 117 ER 1055 (KB); Castrique v Behrens (1861) 3 El & El 709; 121 ER 608; Taylor v Ford (1873) 29 LT 392 (QB). 25 Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419; [2000] 2 WLR 306; Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98, Heenan J at [220]–[230] (affirmed in Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83). See generally Cane P, “The Scope of Malicious Prosecution” (2000) 116 LQR 346.

[33.8.1830] Proceedings (see [33.8.1800] and [33.8.1820]) grounding an action for malicious prosecution must have been instituted or continued by a defendant. A distinction must be made between preliminaries to proceedings and institution of proceedings themselves. Arrest of a person without a warrant does not involve the institution of proceedings and although such conduct may ground an action for false imprisonment (see [33.8.1510]–[33.8.1680]), it cannot ground an action for malicious prosecution.1 If a charge is laid or a person is charged and appears before a magistrate or justice, proceedings have been instituted.2 If a warrant has been issued by a justice and an arrest is made pursuant to it, the process of the court has been set in motion and it may ground an action for malicious prosecution.3 Merely providing false testimony on oath may amount to a crime (see [33.8.1810]), but does not amount to institution or continuation of proceedings.4 If the defendant institutes proceedings or is instrumental in having them instituted and supports the case by perjury, the false swearing may satisfy other elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, particularly improper motive:5 see [33.8.1870]. This element requires only that the proceedings have been commenced or continued, not that they have been pursued to finality. Should proceedings be discontinued or withdrawn, it does not mean malicious prosecution fails, provided the separate element of termination in the plaintiff’s favour (see [33.8.1850]) is satisfied also. If a prosecution or civil proceeding recognised for the purpose of malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1800] and [33.8.1820]) is commenced bona fide but subsequently the defendant discovers that there is no reasonable and probable cause and the prosecution or proceeding is nevertheless continued, that also may

678

[33.8.1840]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

ground an action for malicious prosecution.6 Mere inactivity after setting the law in motion may not ground the action based on continuation.7

1 2

3 4

5 6

7

Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147. For comparison of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, see [33.8.1550]. In Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322 (PC (Ind)), Sir John Beaumont (for the Privy Council) at 331 applied a test requiring proceedings to have reached a stage resulting in damage or presumed damage to the plaintiff. See generally 11 Criminal Procedure. Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35. Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130; Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45; [1958] 3 WLR 463; Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470; [1970] 3 WLR 202; Cumberland v Clark (1996) 39 NSWLR 514. Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 171; 80 WN (NSW) 593; [1964] NSWR 363 (FC), Herron CJ and Walsh J at 180 (SR (NSW)). Fitzjohn v Mackinder (1861) 9 CB (NS) 505; 142 ER 199, Cockburn CJ at 530–531 (CB (NS)); Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 171; 80 WN (NSW) 593; [1964] NSWR 363 (FC), Herron CJ and Walsh J at 178 (SR (NSW)); New South Wales v Abed [2015] Aust Torts Reports 82-195; [2014] NSWCA 419. New South Wales v Landini [2010] NSWCA 157, Tobias JA at [67]-[69] (Macfarlan JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) (the defendant’s presence in Court when his fabricated evidence was tendered sufficient to show an “active” step); Daniels v Telfer (1933) 34 SR (NSW) 99; 51 WN (NSW) 29 (FC), Harvey ACJ at 102 (SR (NSW)).

[33.8.1840] A defendant must have been “actively instrumental” in the institution or continuation of proceedings grounding an action for malicious prosecution.1 In criminal prosecutions, more often than not it is a police officer who is the informant and prosecutor on the record. It is exceptional for a private citizen to be regarded as having instigated a criminal prosecution.2 Provided the defendant was actively instrumental in the charge being laid, the defendant need not be on the record to be sued for malicious prosecution. The test was described by Dixon J in Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138: It is clear that no responsibility is incurred by one who confines himself to bringing before some proper authority information which he does not disbelieve, even although in the hope that a prosecution will be instituted, if it is actually instituted as the result of an independent discretion on the part of that authority. … But, if the discretion is misled by false information, or is otherwise practised upon in order to procure the laying of the charge, those who thus brought about the prosecution are responsible. … Further, the Privy Council has said in a judgment delivered by Lord Dunedin: – “In any country where, as in India, prosecution is not private an action for malicious prosecution in the most literal sense of the word cannot be raised against any private individual. But giving information to the authorities which

679

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1840]

naturally leads to prosecution is just the same thing. If that is done and trouble caused an action will lie” … The rule appears to be that those who counsel and persuade the actual prosecutor to institute proceedings or procure him to do so by dishonestly prejudicing his judgment are vicariously responsible for the proceedings. If the actual prosecutor acts maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, those who aid and abet him in doing so are joint wrongdoers with him.3

The test is one of the defendant’s active instrumentality in putting the law into force, for example, by providing information to the police which compels the laying of a charge.4 Where criminal or other proceedings are brought otherwise than in the name of the person instigating them, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was instrumental in the institution or continuation of the proceedings even though not a party to them.5 Giving a knowingly false story to the police or court may suffice, as may maintaining such a story.6 The test in Australia is one of fact and not form, as Isaacs ACJ stated in Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89: For the purposes of this form of action the law looks beyond theory and regards the person in fact instrumental in prosecuting the accused as the real prosecutor. It enables the person innocently accused to treat his virtual accuser as party to the criminal charge … while, on the one hand, a person giving information to the police is not necessarily the prosecutor yet, on the other, the mere fact that the police conduct the prosecution does not exclude him from that position.7

In appropriate circumstances both the instigator and actual prosecutor may be joint wrongdoers.8 A legal advisor who goes beyond the normal bounds of acting in good faith may also become actively instrumental.9 Where the prosecutor is an employee of the defendant, it will also be necessary to show that the employee acted within the scope of authority.10 The provision of statements or reports raising suspicions before the police or a judicial officer who then exercises independent discretion or initiative does not mean the informant has been actively instrumental.11 Accordingly, in Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184, the Queen’s Bench Division held that in providing pathology reports for the Director of Public Prosecutions, the hospital did not institute the murder charge because the police exercised an independent discretion.

1 Danby v Beardsley (1880) 43 LT 603 (CP), Lopes J at 604. There is no tort of “negligent malicious prosecution” as such: see Gruber v Backhouse (2003) 190 FLR 122; [2003] ACTSC 18, Connolly J at [32]–[33], discussing Emanuele v Hedley (1997) 137 FLR 339 (ACTSC). 2 Lightbody v Gordon (1882) 9 R 934 (Ct of Sess), Shand LJ at 940; Commercial Union Assurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Lamont [1989] 3 NZLR 187 (CA), Richardson J at 199.

680

[33.8.1850]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

3

Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 379 (CLR). This statement was applied by the House of Lords in Martin v Watson [1996] AC 74; [1995] 3 WLR 318. See also Woollard SC, “Malicious Prosecution: Qualifying as the Prosecutor” (1996) 4 Tort L Rev 23. 4 Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 282–283 (CLR); Brooke v Grimpel [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-108 (QSC), Dowsett J at 68,766; Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218, Basten JA at [36]–[37], [43] (Giles and Santow JJA agreeing, subject to Santow JA’s reservations). See related discussion at [33.8.1520], [33.8.1540], [33.8.1600]. 5 Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 282 (CLR); Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 400–401 (CLR); Dunshea v Ryan (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 163; 18 WN (NSW) 181 (FC); Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218; see also Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 378 (CLR). However, see Maine v Townsend (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 1; Zeplin v North German Insurance Co (1880) 1 LR (NSW) L 321. 6 New South Wales v Abed [2015] Aust Torts Reports 82-195; [2014] NSWCA 419, Gleeson JA at [199]–[201] (Bathurst CJ and Macfarlan JA agreeing). 7 Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 282–283 (CLR). 8 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 378–379 (CLR). See generally “Concurrent Torts” [33.11.10]ff; Civil Procedure “Parties to Action” [5.4.150]–[5.4.260]; Intellectual Property “Standing, Scope of Claim and Multiple Defendants” [23.6.560]–[23.6.630]. Joint tortfeasors may also be liable as concurrent wrongdoers or tortfeasors under the proportionate liability and civil liability legislation of the States and Territories: see also Unfair Dealing “Damages” [35.4.100]–[35.4.330], which also deals with issues of contributory negligence, not relevant to trespass, but which may be applicable to alternative or additional claims in negligence. 9 Johnson v Emerson (1871) LR 6 Ex 329; Dunshea v Ryan (1901) 1 SR (NSW) 163; 18 WN (NSW) 181 (FC). 10 Bank of New South Wales v Owston (1879) 4 App Cas 270 (PC); Lambert v Great Eastern Railway Co [1909] 2 KB 776 (CA); Percy v Glasgow Corp [1922] 2 AC 299. 11 Cohen v Morgan (1825) 6 Dow & Ry KB 8; Fanzelow v Kerr (1896) 14 NZLR 660 (CA); Danby v Beardsley (1880) 43 LT 603 (CP); Laird v Attorney-General (Jam) (1974) 21 WIR 416 (Jamaica CA). See also Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 379 (CLR); Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218, Basten JA at [43] (Giles and Santow JJA agreeing, subject to Santow JA’s reservations).

[33.8.1850] If possible, a proceeding grounding an action for malicious prosecution, must have terminated in a plaintiff’s favour.1 The plaintiff is not entitled to sue in malicious prosecution if the adverse judgment still stands,2

681

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1850]

even if it is not capable of appeal, as in the case of an order to enter into a recognisance to be of good behaviour, or even if it were found proved but the charge was dismissed as trifling.3 As Isaacs J stated in Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, the fact that original proceedings remain on foot is “evidence of probable cause of so high a nature as to create a legal presumption of the fact, and so debar the plaintiff from alleging the contrary”.4 Termination in the plaintiff’s favour includes quashing on appeal5 but not a pardon.6 It does not matter that proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favour for no reason other than the refusal of the Attorney-General to file an indictment7 or where a conviction for a lesser offence is recorded8 or the information is withdrawn before hearing.9 Whether the entry of a nolle prosequi10 amounts to a favourable termination is debatable.11 Since it represents a stay of proceedings on indictment, it can be argued that it should amount to termination. On the other hand, a fresh indictment may still be presented.12 Where proceedings cannot terminate in the plaintiff’s favour, the requirement of favourable termination is dispensed with, as in the case of ex parte applications for search warrants13 and for writs of execution.14 Whether, following favourable termination, a defendant is entitled to show that the plaintiff was in fact guilty appears extremely doubtful15 because to hold otherwise invites a threat to the administration of justice through collateral rather than appellate review16 or by intervention before termination.17 Such evidence may be admissible, however, to show reasonable and probable cause:18 see [33.8.1860] and [33.8.1900]. The plaintiff carries the onus of establishing this element.19 The plaintiff will fail if convicted20 or if the charge is found proved.21 In a case where proceedings are terminated by nolle prosequi, the plaintiff, exceptionally, must establish innocence.22 The requirement of favourable termination is waived where such termination is impossible because of the course or nature of the proceedings.23 The most obvious example is the ex parte order of a court, for example for a writ of execution24 or a search warrant.25

1 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138. 2 Stimac v Nicol [1942] VLR 66 (FC); Bouvy v Count de Courte (1901) 20 NZLR 312 (SC) (refusal of habeas corpus). 3 Everett v Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198 (CA); Basebe v Matthews (1867) LR 2 CP 684; Cameron v James [1945] VLR 113 (FC). 4 Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Isaacs J at 82. 5 Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305; A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10.

682

[33.8.1850]

6 7 8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17 18 19 20

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Re Royal Commission on Thomas Case [1982] 1 NZLR 252 (CA), the Court at 273. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527; Van Heeren v Cooper [1999] 1 NZLR 731 (CA). Boaler v Holder (1887) 51 JP 277 (QB). Johns v Hansen (1900) 19 NZLR 319 (SC) (proceedings discontinued); Van Heeren v Cooper [1999] 1 NZLR 731 (CA); see also National Australia Bank Ltd v McFarlane [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-819; [2005] VSC 438. Where the prosecution against a plaintiff is dismissed on technical grounds rather than on the merits, this is no bar to an action for malicious prosecution: Emanuele v Hedley (1997) 137 FLR 339 (ACTSC). Nolle prosequi: “[A] decision by the state or by a plaintiff, in criminal or civil proccedings respectively, not to proceed with all or part of a case”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 117. Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89; but see Mann v Jacombe (1960) 78 WN (NSW) 635; [1961] NSWR 273 (FC); Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527. “Nolle prosequi” is a means of staying proceedings at any time before judgment. It is not an acquittal and does not bar a new indictment for the same offence. See also discussion of authorities in Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98, Heenan J at [243]–[247] (affirmed in Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83). The grounds on which a no bill or a nolle prosequi may be entered are becoming increasingly diverse. Such a decision may be made in relation to a party who is almost certainly guilty, eg by witness indemnity or on compassionate grounds such as the age or mental condition of the accused or the fact that the victim in a motor-manslaughter case is the infant child of the accused. While in such circumstances the case may be said to amount to a “favourable determination”, liability in the tort would seem to be foreclosed under the head of belief in a reasonable and probable cause: see [33.8.1860]. However, some of the heads for not proceeding are less clear, and may raise difficulties, particularly as it is invariable practice for the basis of such decisions not to be made public. Wyatt v White (1860) 5 Hurl & N 371; 157 ER 1226; Fitzalan v Nicholson (1896) 13 WN (NSW) 51 (FC); Reynolds v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [1985] QB 881; [1985] 2 WLR 93 (CA), Waller LJ at 886, Slade LJ at 891 (QB) (whether reasonable and probable cause). Gilding v Eyre (1861) 10 CB (NS) 592; 142 ER 584; Smith v Cotton (1926) 27 SR (NSW) 41; 44 WN (NSW) 59 (FC); Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 542. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527. Castrique v Behrens (1861) 3 El & El 709; 121 ER 608; Gilding v Eyre (1861) 10 CB (NS) 592; 142 ER 584; Basebe v Matthews (1867) LR 2 CP 684; Bouvy v Count de Courte (1901) 20 NZLR 312 (SC), Stout CJ at 314–315. Johnson v Emerson (1871) LR 6 Ex 329. Earnshaw v Loy (No 1) [1959] VR 248, and may be relevant to the damages recoverable: see [33.8.1910]. Basebe v Matthews (1867) LR 2 CP 684; Redway v McAndrew (1873) LR 9 QB 74. Armstrong v Fuller (1866) 5 SCR (NSW) 269; Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210, Earl of Selborne LC at 216, Fitzgerald LJ at 228; Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 289 (CLR).

683

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1850]

21 Cameron v James [1945] VLR 113 (FC), Herring CJ and Duffy J at 117. 22 Cameron v James [1945] VLR 113 (FC), Herring CJ and Duffy J at 117; Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 542; see also Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98, Heenan J at [241] (affirmed in Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83). 23 Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Griffith CJ at 52–53; Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 289 (CLR). 24 Smith v Cotton (1926) 27 SR (NSW) 41; 44 WN (NSW) 59 (FC). 25 Fitzalan v Nicholson (1896) 13 WN (NSW) 51 (FC).

[33.8.1860] A plaintiff must prove an absence of reasonable and probable cause in a defendant’s institution or continuation of the proceedings grounding an action for malicious prosecution. The concept of reasonable and probable cause involves a belief based upon reasonable grounds of the existence of a state of circumstances which, if true, would reasonably lead an ordinary prudent man [or woman], placed in that situation, to the conclusion that the proceedings would probably succeed.1

The defendant’s state of mind is significant,2 as is the reasonable care taken.3 The ultimate question is both subjective and objective: whether the prosecutor actually believed and reasonably believed.4 In Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160, Jordan CJ laid down the following five conditions to establish that “one person may have reasonable and probable cause for prosecuting another for an offence”: (1)

The prosecutor must believe that the accused is probably guilty of the offence.

(2)

This belief must be founded upon information in the possession of the prosecutor pointing to such guilt, not upon mere imagination or surmise.

(3)

The information, whether it consists of things observed by the prosecutor himself, or things told to him [by others, must be believed by him to be true.

(4)

This belief must be based upon reasonable grounds.

(5)

The information possessed by the prosecutor and reasonably believed by him to be true, must be such as would justify a man of ordinary prudence and caution in believing that the accused is probably guilty.5

In A v New South Wales (2005) 63 NSWLR 681; [2005] NSWCA 292, Beazley JA preferred not to follow Jordan CJ’s five conditions.6 However, on appeal, the majority of the High Court of Australia adopted Jordan CJ’s five conditions as a guiding principle, rather than an exhaustive list of what will constitute reasonable and probable cause.7 The onus is on the plaintiff to prove a negative and a high standard of proof is required to avoid a non-suit:8 see [33.8.1920]. The traditional pleading formula 684

[33.8.1860]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

is that the defendant acted without “reasonable and probable” cause. No distinction is drawn between these two terms. The courts are reluctant to order particulars of the grounds on which a prosecution was instigated.9 In the criminal context, what the law requires of the instigator of a charge is an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based on a full conviction, founded on reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious person, placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed.10 Thus the inquiry about reasonable and probable cause has two aspects. The first is what did the prosecutor make of the material available to him and the second is what should the prosecutor have made of it. The first is a subjective test the second an objective test.11

Where a plaintiff’s explanation for the facts is consistent with innocence, a defendant must have reasonable grounds for disbelief12 or for failing to check the plaintiff’s story,13 as is the advice of a solicitor.14 Advice of counsel is admissible to show reasonable and probable cause,15 but whether the advice of others such as a police officer is sufficient probably turns on the particular facts of the case.16 Even though this element is a question of fact and not law, it has been accepted practice for it to be decided by the judge alone.17 Particular disputed or relevant facts are decided by the jury:18 see [33.8.1930]. The respective functions of judge and jury in relation to factual issues associated with reasonable and probable cause account for much of the complexity of the tort, and this particular issue has been described as a “somewhat embarrassing subject”.19 Careful delineation is required by a trial judge.20 The plaintiff must adduce evidence to support an inference of the defendant’s actual belief in instituting the original proceedings.21

1 2

3

4

QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245, Macrossan J at 256 (Qd R). Longden v Weigall (1877) 3 VLR (L) 266; Corea v Peiris [1909] AC 549 (PC (Ceylon)), Atkinson LJ (for the Privy Council) at 555; Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81; Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832, Radcliffe LJ at 753, Devlin LJ at 768 (AC); Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div), Kaye and Beach JJ at 264–265. Assheton v Merrett [1928] SASR 11, Richards J at 13; Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160 (FC), Jordan CJ at 469 (SR (NSW)). Compare A v New South Wales (2005) 63 NSWLR 681; [2005] NSWCA 292 (partly reversed on appeal in A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10). Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832, Devlin LJ at 768 (AC); Abbott v Refuge Assurance Co [1962] 1 QB 432; [1961] 3 WLR 1240 (CA), Omerod J at 453–454 (QB); Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526 (VSC), Harper J

685

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1860]

at 540–544; Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218. Grimwade v Victoria appears to have applied an incorrect “either/or” variation of the test (ie either the prosecutor had no actual belief in guilt, or that the case against the plaintiff would not reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious prosecutor to conclude that the plaintiff was probably guilty). The forensic difficulties of requiring the plaintiff to prove the two elements of reasonable and probable cause are raised in Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98, Heenan J at [251] (affirmed in Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83); see also A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [60]–[61], [70]–[71], [76]–[77]. 5 Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160 (FC), Jordan CJ at 469 (SR (NSW)). 6 A v New South Wales (2005) 63 NSWLR 681; [2005] NSWCA 292, Beazley JA at [107]–[109] (Mason P and Pearlman AJA agreeing). His Honour preferred the formulation of Dixon J in Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 382–383 (CLR). A v New South Wales was partly reversed by the High Court in A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [28], [63], [116], [117] (finding there was no disharmony between the principles formulated by Jordan CJ in Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160 (FC), and those of Dixon J in Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain). 7 A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [66] (noting that Jordan CJ’s formulation required the plaintiff to establish that one or more of the five conditions did not exist), see also [77]. 8 Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160 (FC), Jordan CJ at 469 (SR (NSW)). See Grivas v Brooks (1997) 69 SASR 532 (FC) (plaintiff sought to adduce propensity or similar fact evidence of other failed prosecutions by defendant, going to establish absence of reasonable and probable cause; wrongly excluded by trial judge). However, see Dent v Standard Life Association (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 560; 21 WN (NSW) 182 (FC) (slight evidence of absence of reasonable and probable cause is sufficient to prevent a nonsuit, although where there is a jury, the plaintiff must clearly make out the issue). 9 Stapeley v Annetts [1970] 1 WLR 20 (CA); see Hansard v Attwood [1951] NZLR 1095 (SC) denying interrogatories. 10 Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167, Hawkins J at 171; Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305; see also Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81, Dixon J at 106 (CLR); Birchmeier v Rockdale Municipality (1934) 51 WN (NSW) 201; 12 LGR (NSW) 73 (FC); Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160; Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Evatt J and McTiernan J at 387 (CLR); QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245, Macrossan J at 256 (Qd R); but see A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [83]. See generally Ipp DA, “Must a Prosecutor Believe That the Accused is Guilty? Or, Was Sir Frederick Jordan Being Recalcitrant?” (2005) 79 ALJ 233. See also A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [75]–[76]. 11 New South Wales v Quirk [2012] NSWCA 216, Tobias AJA at [70] (Beazley and

686

[33.8.1870]

12 13

14 15

16 17

18

19 20

21

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Hoeben JJA agreeing), cited with approval in Clavel v Savage [2015] NSWCA 61, Sackville AJA at [50] (Macfarlan and Emmett JJA agreeing). Jenner v Harbison (1879) 5 VLR (L) 111. Assheton v Merrett [1928] SASR 11; but see Turner v Wright (1880) 6 VLR (L) 273 (FC) (found to be conclusive, where plaintiff declined the opportunity to explain). QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245. Ravenga v Mackintosh (1824) 2 B & C 69; 107 ER 541; Cheney v Bardwell (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 401; 16 WN (NSW) 97 (FC); but see McCaffrey v Hill (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 303; 20 WN (NSW) 106 (FC) (found to be relevant to malice, rather than reasonable and probable cause). Assheton v Merrett [1928] SASR 11; Malz v Rosen [1966] 1 WLR 1008 (QBD). Sutton v Johnstone (1786) 1 Term Rep 493; 99 ER 1215; Lister v Perryman (1870) LR 4 HL 521; Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305, Atkin LJ (with whom Russell, Macmillan, Maugham and Roche LJJ agreed) at 316 (AC); Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81, Dixon J at 106 (CLR); Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 382–383 (CLR); but see A v New South Wales (2005) 63 NSWLR 681; [2005] NSWCA 292 (partly reversed by A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10). Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305, Atkin LJ at 316–317 (AC) (with whom Russell, Macmillan, Maugham and Roche LJJ agreeing); Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160, Jordan CJ at 471 (SR (NSW)); Hatzinikolaou v Snape (1989) 97 FLR 86; 41 A Crim R 389 (NSWCA), Kirby P at 98–101 (FLR). Another example is provided in Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div), Kaye and Beach JJ at 264, where it was held that it would be for the jury to determine whether the respondent honestly believed that certain regulations on which his prosecution was based had been validly made. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Starke J at 352 (CLR). The possibility exists for the jury to improperly decide the ultimate question, as warned against in Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81, Dixon J at 106–107 (CLR). A judge may also improperly appropriate the function of the jury on a factual sub-issue: Hatzinikolaou v Snape (1989) 97 FLR 86; 41 A Crim R 389 (NSWCA), Kirby P at 101–102 (FLR). See further discussion on roles of judge and jury at [33.8.1930]. Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160, Jordan CJ at 469 (SR (NSW)); Barclay v Fealy (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 627; 27 WN (NSW) 158, Pring J at 631 (SR (NSW)); but see A v New South Wales (2005) 63 NSWLR 681; [2005] NSWCA 292, Beazley JA at [108], [110], [177] (Mason P and Pearlman AJA agreeing) (partly reversed in A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [63], [65]–[66]).

[33.8.1870] It is necessary for a plaintiff to allege and prove malice in an action for malicious prosecution. The term “malice” has been the subject of “regrettable exuberance of definition” under the law.1 As in defamation, its meaning for malicious prosecution is that the defendant was actuated by an “improper purpose” other than bringing a wrongdoer to justice.2 In A v New

687

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1870]

South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, the majority of the High Court stated that “to constitute malice, the dominant purpose of the prosecutor must be a purpose other than the proper invocation of the criminal law – an ‘illegitimate or oblique motive’”.3 This may be established specifically by showing, for example, that the previous litigation was initiated for the purpose of punishing a witness for previously having given evidence against the police,4 or to block a meeting of shareholders,5 or to force negotiations concerning company control by presentation of a winding up petition.6 It may be established circumstantially by showing that the prosecution can only be accounted for by imputing some wrong and indirect motive to the prosecutor.7 The judge decides whether there is some evidence of malice and non-suits a plaintiff if there is no prima facie evidence but, having done so, it falls to the jury to determine whether there is malice in fact:8 see [33.8.1930].

1 British Railway Traffıc & Electric Co Ltd v CRC Co Ltd [1922] 2 KB 260, McCardie J at 268. See Fridman GHL, “Malice in the Law of Torts” (1958) 21 Mod LR 484. 2 Stevens v Midland Counties Railway Co (1854) 10 Ex 352; 156 ER 480, Alderson B at 356, Martin B at 357 (Ex); Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 (CA) (affirmed in Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1886) 11 App Cas 247); Dent v Standard Life Association (1904) 4 SR (NSW) 560; 21 WN (NSW) 182 (FC); Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Fullagar J at 157; Commercial Union Assurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Lamont [1989] 3 NZLR 187 (CA); Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 459, Clarke JA at 470–471, 474. 3 A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [91], quoting from Gibbs v Rea [1998] AC 786; [1998] 3 WLR 72 (PC (CI)), Goff and Hope LJJ (dissenting) at 804 (AC); see also Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98 (affirmed in Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83). 4 Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832, Viscount Simonds at 752, Radcliffe LJ at 757, Denning LJ at 764–765, 781, Devlin LJ at 781 (AC). 5 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 387 (CLR). 6 QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245. 7 Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA), Cave J (dissenting) at 722 (the judgment of Cave J affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Lord Esher MR at 727, Bowen LJ at 727, reported together); Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Kitto J at 163–165, Taylor J at 174. 8 Longden v Weigall (1877) 3 VLR (L) 266, Stawell CJ at 268; Rapley v Rapley (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 94; 47 WN (NSW) 36 (FC), Street CJ at 98 (SR (NSW)).

[33.8.1880] Reasonable and probable cause (see [33.8.1860]) and malice (see [33.8.1870]) are separate elements and both must be satisfied to ground an action for malicious prosecution:1 see [33.8.1920]. In Mitchell v John

688

[33.8.1890]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160, Jordan CJ said: It has been somewhat loosely said that evidence of absence of reasonable and probable cause is evidence of malice, but that evidence of malice is not evidence of absence of reasonable and probable cause. In truth, neither of these statements is accurate. Proof of a particular fact may supply evidence both of malice and of absence of reasonable and probable cause, as where it is established that when the defendant instituted the prosecution he knew that the plaintiff was innocent. But proof that the defendant was animated by a desire to injure the plaintiff would not supply evidence of absence of reasonable and probable cause. And evidence that the defendant had formed a belief in the plaintiff’s guilt which, though genuine, was based on unreasonably insufficient grounds, would afford no evidence of malice. On the other hand, proof that the defendant had instituted the prosecution in the complete absence of any information pointing to guilt, or upon information which was ludicrously and obviously insufficient might of itself supply evidence warranting an inference of malice in a particular case.2

Common evidence may but need not satisfy both elements, as when an inference of malice is drawn from evidence of absence of reasonable and probable cause through lack of genuine belief3 but it is not a necessary inference and it may be improper to draw such an inference in the light of other evidence.4 Malice alone does not satisfy absence of reasonable and probable cause if there is evidence of such cause.5

1

2

3

4

5

Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81, Dixon J at 103; Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218, Basten JA at [44]–[45] (Giles and Santow JJA agreeing, subject to Santow JA’s reservations). Longden v Weigall (1877) 3 VLR (L) 266; Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160, Jordan CJ at 474 (SR (NSW)); see also Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218; A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500; 81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [60]–[87] (reasonable and probable cause), [88]–[95] (malice). Harcourt v Aiken (1902) 22 NZLR 389 (CA); Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726; [1962] 2 WLR 832, Viscount Simonds at 743–744 (AC); Brooke v Grimpel [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-108 (QSC), Dowsett J at 68,771; Wan v Sweetman (1998) 19 WAR 94; National Australia Bank Ltd v McFarlane [2005] Aust Torts Reports 81-819; [2005] VSC 438. Rapley v Rapley (1930) 30 SR (NSW) 94; 47 WN (NSW) 36 (FC). The practical difficulties of applying this distinction are noted throughout the authorities: see, eg Chapman v Cole (2006) 15 VR 150; [2006] VSCA 70, Callaway JA at [18] (Warren CJ agreeing) (in directions to the jury). Turner v Ambler (1847) 10 QB 252; 116 ER 98. See also Emanuele v Hedley (1997) 137 FLR 339 (ACTSC), Higgins J at 348–349.

[33.8.1890] Special injury or damage is a necessary element of malicious prosecution as it represents the gist of all actions on the case.1 Damage for

689

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1890]

this purpose has a restricted meaning. In Savill v Roberts (1698) 12 Mod 208; 88 ER 1267, Holt CJ laid down that an action for malicious prosecution does not lie unless the plaintiff can establish damage suffered under at least one of three heads. That principle was expressly accepted by Sir John Beaumont (for the Privy Council) in Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322:2 see [33.8.1820]. The three circumscribed heads are damage to person (usually impairment of liberty), property (usually pecuniary loss) and reputation. In cases involving criminal prosecution, the actionable character of those proceedings was taken to have impaired reputation and damage was presumed.3 It was otherwise if the charge were one which did not reflect on reputation, such as failure to comply with a mere regulation.4 Imprisonment prior to hearing is a normal form of damage to the person also recognised for this purpose.5 The proceedings of which the plaintiff complains must result in some pecuniary loss other than costs for this element to be satisfied in relation to injury to property.6 Costs normally follow the cause where the proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favour and solicitor/client costs above the allowed party/party costs are not recognised as damage for this purpose.7 It is otherwise in the case of costs in defending a criminal charge,8 or where a court has no jurisdiction to award costs.9

1 New South Wales v Zreika [2012] NSWCA 37; New South Wales v Landini [2010] NSWCA 157; QIW Retailers Ltd v Felview Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 245, Macrossan J at 256 (Qd R); Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275; [1925] VLR 89, Isaacs ACJ at 285 (CLR). 2 Amin v Bannerjee [1947] AC 322 (PC (Ind)), Sir John Beaumont (for the Privy Council) at 330. 3 Rayson v South London Tramways Co [1893] 2 QB 304 (CA); Wiffen v Bailey [1915] 1 KB 600. 4 Wiffen v Bailey [1915] 1 KB 600; Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA) (pulling a communication cord improperly). 5 Savill v Roberts (1698) 12 Mod 208; 88 ER 1267. 6 Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). 7 Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA). 8 Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306; [1961] 3 WLR 450 (CA). 9 Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 171; 80 WN (NSW) 593; [1964] NSWR 363 (FC). See also Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 280; [2001] FCA 370, the Full Court at [34] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 26 June 2002 in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart [2002] HCATrans 340) (action for abuse of process. Where the entitlement to costs has been determined in proceedings, the issue ought not be reagitated in the guise of an action for malicious prosecution).

690

[33.8.1910]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

[33.8.1900] The general principle is that it is not a defence to an allegation of malicious prosecution to seek to establish that a plaintiff was guilty of the offence for which original proceedings were instituted.1 The High Court has held that a defendant cannot attempt to establish the plaintiff’s guilt in prior proceedings which terminated in the plaintiff’s favour:2 see [33.8.1850]. There is some authority for the view that, in such a case, the action fails altogether.3

1 2 3

For defences generally, see “Defences” [33.9.10]ff. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 542. Heslop v Chapman (1853) 23 LJQB 49 (Ex), Jervis CJ and Pollock CB at 52; but see Shrosbery v Osmaston (1877) 37 LT 792 (CP), Lindley J at 794; Machattie v Lee (1861) 10 LR (NSW) 182; 6 WN (NSW) 13 (cited in Sharp v Biggs (1932) 48 CLR 81); see also Williams v Banks (1859) 1 F & F 557; 175 ER 851 (Assizes), Wightman J at 559 (F & F). It is likely that such a “defence” would be established by showing there was reasonable and probable cause, rather than as a reply in itself: see [33.8.1850].

Remedies [33.8.1910] If a plaintiff satisfies the requirements for the tort of malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1830]–[33.8.1890]), the damages are generally at large,1 just as in defamation, though they must be in proportion to the injury sustained.2 The plaintiff may recover for special damage proved as well as an award of general damages.3 When the qualifying damage which the plaintiff pleads is only pecuniary loss, some doubt remains on whether the plaintiff is entitled to an award of general damages.4 Damages include aggravated damages.5 A plaintiff may also claim exemplary damages if the defendant’s conduct exhibited a contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights.6 A claim for exemplary damages must be specifically pleaded together with the facts on which the party pleading relies.7 Although to recover any damages a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause (see [33.8.1860]) and with malice (see [33.8.1870]), that alone is not sufficient to found a claim for exemplary damages.8 The award may take account of any mental distress9 and consequential loss which is not too remote. The question of actual guilt cannot be canvassed by the defendant under damages. In the joint judgment in Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, it was stated: For the reasons already given, the basis of the action puts out of consideration any question of actual guilt. The failure of the proceedings brought by the defendant, the absence of any reasonable cause and malice are the grounds. If exemplary damages are to be given, it is within the area covered by these matters that the defendant’s misconduct must be found. The uncertain psychological considerations urged in

691

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1910]

favour of giving a larger solatium to a plaintiff whose mind rightly feels the injustice of the proceedings appear to us to desert the objective standards of actual and probable loss or damage to which the common law adheres … The material and ascertainable loss suffered by the plaintiff cannot be affected by the question, and the incalculable consequences flowing from the impairment of respect, esteem and reputation, must be covered by an assessment which attributes them to the prosecution and the circumstances attending it. In other words, the damage does not depend upon a comparison between what the plaintiff did suffer and what he ought to have suffered but on an estimate of the actual and potential consequences of the defendant’s act in instituting and maintaining the proceedings. For these reasons we think that the question of the plaintiff’s actual guilt or innocence ought to have been laid out of account altogether and that the evidence received under that head was inadmissible.

1 The measure is incapable of any precise limitation: Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Starke J at 354 (CLR). For damages generally, see “Damages” [33.10.10]ff. 2 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain (1935) 53 CLR 343; 35 SR (NSW) 399; 52 WN (NSW) 138, Dixon J at 386 (CLR); Greenlands Ltd v Wilmshurst [1913] 3 KB 507 (CA), Hamilton LJ at 532–533 (defamation) (reversed on other grounds in London Association for Protection of Trade (UK) v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 2 AC 15); XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352. 3 In White v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK), The Times, 24 April 1982 (QB), each of two plaintiffs were awarded £6,500 and £4,500 aggravated damages respectively against the police for distress, anxiety and damage to reputation when the police prosecuted them for obstruction in the execution of duty, knowing that they were innocent and in order to escape the consequences of the police’s unlawful entry and arrest. See generally Horvath M, “Charge First, Investigate Later, Acknowledge Fault … Never: A Tale of Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process” (1999) 35 Plaintiff 34; Alexander P, “Costs of Wrongful Arrest, False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Actions” (2007) 81 Precedent 46. 4 Coleman v Buckingham’s Ltd (1962) 63 SR (NSW) 171; 80 WN (NSW) 593; [1964] NSWR 363 (FC), Wallace J at 183 (SR (NSW)); Hazell v Parramatta City Council (1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 229; 15 LGRA 263, Isaacs J at 248 (WN (Pt 1) (NSW)); White v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK), The Times, 24 April 1982 (QB). See “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]. 5 In White v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK), The Times, 24 April 1982 (QB), the conduct of the defendants was such that, in addition to aggravated damages, each of the plaintiffs was awarded £20,000 exemplary damages. See also Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124; Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1969] 1 AC 590; [1967] 3 WLR 1338; (1967) 117 CLR 221; 41 ALJR 66 (PC); XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352; New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57. See “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]; Jacobs S, Commercial Damages (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [3.730].

692

[33.8.1920]

6

7 8

9

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Some jurisdictions also apply similar rules to general and aggravated damages: see Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 16.44; Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 407(1)(d); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 15.7, 15.8; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT), r 13.07(3); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rr 150(1)(b), 155; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 99(1) (for actions commenced on or after 4 September 2006); Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r 227; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), r 13.07(3); Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 20 r 9(3). See generally Civil Procedure “Federal Court” [5.1.180]; “Pleading” [5.2.140]–[5.2.570]. Assheton v Merrett [1928] SASR 11. Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 552; 52 WN (NSW) 180, Jordan CJ at 558 (SR (NSW)) (special leave to appeal to High Court refused in Smith v Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd (unreported, HCA, 1935), disapproved on other grounds in Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460; 47 ALJR 369). See generally Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 545.

Evidentiary Matters [33.8.1920] The burden of proof is on a plaintiff to establish all five elements of malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1830]–[33.8.1890]) including the notoriously difficult negative element of absence of reasonable and probable cause:1 see [33.8.1860]. It should be noted that there is no requirement for the plaintiff to establish innocence provided the proceedings initially instituted were terminated favourably2 (see [33.8.1850]), except in the case of termination of criminal proceedings by a nolle prosequi.3 Inferences may be drawn from clear factual evidence including an inference of malice from an absence of reasonable and probable cause if there is no countervailing evidence.4 In a civil trial, the inference does not have to be “the only inference reasonably open”.5 The question is whether to draw an inference on the balance of probabilities and there need only be circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged. However, before the inference can be drawn, the inference must be something which follows from given premises as being at least probably true.6

1

Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 (CA) (affirmed in Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1886) 11 App Cas 247); Cox v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd [1905] AC 168 (PC). The forensic difficulties of requiring the plaintiff to prove the two elements of reasonable and probable cause are raised in Noye v Robbins [2007] WASC 98, Heenan J at [251] (affirmed in Noye v Robbins [2010] WASCA 83); see also A v New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500;

693

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

2 3

4

5 6

[33.8.1920]

81 ALJR 763; [2007] HCA 10, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [60]–[61], [65]–[66], [70]–[71], [77]. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 541. Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Smith (1938) 59 CLR 527, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 542. “Nolle prosequi” is a means of staying proceedings at any time before judgment. It is not an acquittal and does not bar a new indictment for the same offence. Longden v Weigall (1877) 3 VLR (L) 266; Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA). See also Johnston v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] NSWCA 218. Chapman v Cole (2006) 15 VR 150; [2006] VSCA 70, Callaway JA at [16] (Warren CJ agreeing). Chapman v Cole (2006) 15 VR 150; [2006] VSCA 70, Callaway JA at [14] (Warren CJ agreeing).

[33.8.1930] The functions of judge and jury in malicious prosecution are complicated, and to an extent anomalous, particularly in relation to absence of reasonable and probable cause:1 see [33.8.1860]. The normal procedure is for the judge to put specific questions concerning disputed facts to the jury and on the facts so found, decide whether or not there was reasonable and probable cause:2 see [33.8.1870]. Where there is no dispute on the facts, the judge alone should decide on absence of reasonable and probable cause.3 The jury may be consulted through precisely formulated questions on honest belief if there are contested facts, but the questions should avoid the possibility of the jury expressing an opinion on the ultimate question of probable cause.4 The question of malice is left to the jury once the judge decides whether or not there is evidence to go to the jury:5 see [33.8.1870]. Malice for this purpose is motive which the law disapproves, and that also is for the judge.

1 See [33.8.1830]–[33.8.1890] for discussion of the five essential elements which must be established for an action for malicious prosecution. There is a deliberate and long-standing judicial practice of keeping the action under a tight rein with only limited jury involvement: Pain v Rochester (1602) Cro Eliz 871; 78 ER 1096; Leibo v S Buckman Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 1057 (CA). 2 Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 726. 3 Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 726. 4 Tempest v Snowden [1952] 1 KB 130 (CA); Mitchell v John Heine & Son Ltd (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 466; 55 WN (NSW) 160, Jordan CJ at 470–471 (SR (NSW)). 5 Brown v Hawkes [1891] 2 QB 718 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 726.

694

[33.8.1940]

ABUSE OF PROCESS

Abuse of Process [33.8.1940] The principal torts included within the broad description of abuse of process are the action on the case for collateral abuse of process created in 1838 (see [33.8.1950]), the torts of maintenance (see [33.8.1990]) and its aggravated form champerty: see [33.8.2000]. Each is a separate action on the case sounding in damages though the more usual remedy is stay or termination: see [33.8.2010]–[33.8.2020]. The action on the case for collateral abuse of process differs from the older action on the case for malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]) in that the plaintiff need not show either that the initial proceedings terminated in their favour or that there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause for their institution.1 Occasionally there is some confusion between the torts of malicious prosecution and collateral abuse of process. To some extent this arises because of the different meanings of “abuse” used in different contexts either in a general sense or in a specific sense associated with a named tort. Maintenance differs from malicious prosecution in that the plaintiff need not prove absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice, and it applies only to pending action rather than proceedings which have terminated. Although the tort of collateral abuse of process does not give rise to a criminal offence, both maintenance and its aggravated form, champerty, were common law crimes as well as torts. Occasionally contempt and vexatious litigants are associated with abuse of process. Neither give rise to any tort and neither is related to the tort of collateral abuse of process. An injunction may be granted to restrain the continuation of a contempt.2 A court has inherent jurisdiction to stay an action which is vexatious.3 A court has no inherent jurisdiction to restrain a person from commencing new proceedings, or instituting an appeal, without the leave of the court.4 Statutory power found in all jurisdictions5 permits the Supreme Court, on the application of the Attorney-General, to declare a person to be a vexatious litigant, the consequence being that the person requires the leave of the Supreme Court to commence or continue any legal proceedings in any court.

1

2 3

Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 522 (CLR). See also [33.8.1800]–[33.8.1810] (immunities), [33.8.2160] (misfeasance in public office). Hammond v Commonwealth (1982) 152 CLR 188; 56 ALJR 767. See generally Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff. Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713; 8 ABC 58, Dixon J at 720 (CLR); Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311; 48 ALJR 196; see also Batistatos v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; 80 ALJR 1100; [2006] HCA 27, discussing Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210

695

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

4

5

[33.8.1940]

(court’s inherent power to protect its processes from abuse, including vexatious and harrassing conduct). Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311; 48 ALJR 196 reviews the development of the statutory power to restrain a vexatious litigant in Australia and England. See also Wentworth v Attorney General (NSW) (1988) 14 NSWLR 481. See generally Thompson C, “Vexatious Litigants – Old Phenomenon, Modern Methodology: A Consideration of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 WA” (2004) 14 JJA 64. Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 67A; Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), s 8; Vexatious Proceedings Act 2006 (NT), s 7; Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld), s 6; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 39; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 194G; Vexatious Proceedings Act 2011 (Tas), s 6; Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic), s 29; Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA), s 4. In relation to the High Court and the Federal Court, see High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), r 6.06; Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 6.02. See generally Paciocco DM, “The Stay of Proceedings as a Remedy in Criminal Cases: Abusing the Abuse of Process Concept” (1991) 15 Crim LJ 315; Ormiston WF, “Abuse of Process, Anshun and the Criminal Law – A Commentary” (1997) 71 ALJ 942.

[33.8.1950] Collateral abuse of process occurs when the process of the court is put in motion for a purpose which, in the eye of the law, it is not intended to serve.1 The tort of collateral abuse of process is recognised in Australia,2 England,3 Canada4 and the United States.5 It was first established in Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769 as a new action on the case.6 There Tindal CJ said: If the course pursued by the defendants is such that there is no precedent of a similar transaction, the plaintiff’s remedy is by an action on the case, applicable to such new and special circumstances; and his complaint being that the process of the law has been abused, to effect an object not within the scope of the process, it is immaterial whether the suit which that process commenced has been determined or not, or whether or not it was founded on reasonable and probable cause.7

The courts have attempted to achieve a formulation of the tort which keeps it within reasonable bounds.8 The concepts of improper object and fraud (see [33.8.1960]–[33.8.1980]) have been used so that the purpose must be to use the proceedings as a means of obtaining some advantage for which they are not designed,9 or some collateral advantage beyond what the law offers.10 Normally, the proceedings are used to coerce the defendant in some way outside the ambit of the legal claim to be determined by the court.11 The onus is on the party alleging it to satisfy the court that there is an abuse of process and the onus is a heavy one.12 Special damage must also be alleged and proved for this action on the case:13 see [33.8.1890].

1 Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35; Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431.

696

[33.8.1960]

2

3

4 5 6 7 8

9

10 11 12

13

ABUSE OF PROCESS

Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35; Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431. See generally Criminal Offences “Abuse of Process” [10.11.1270]–[10.11.1300]; Criminal Procedure “Grounds for the Granting of a Stay” [11.6.670]–[11.6.830]; Evidence “Estoppel by Record” [16.1.730]–[16.1.980]; Professional Ethics “Litigation Tactics” [17.2.420]. Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769; Gilding v Eyre (1861) 10 CB (NS) 592; 142 ER 584; Speed Seal Products Ltd v Paddington [1985] 1 WLR 1327 (CA), Fox LJ at 1334–1336; Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; [1989] 3 WLR 563 (CA), Slade LJ at 469 (QB) (overruled on other grounds in Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188). Guilford Industries Ltd v Hankinson Management Services Ltd (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 398 (BCSC). Prough v Entriken 11 Pa 81 (1849). See Wells W, “The Abuse of Process” (1986) 102 LQR 9. Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769, Tindal CJ at 221 (Bing NC). Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509, Isaacs J at 521–522; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 526–527 (CLR). Re Majory; Ex parte Debtor v FA Dumont Ltd [1955] Ch 600; [1955] 2 WLR 1035; [1955] 2 All ER 65 (CA), Evershed MR (for the Court) at 623 (Ch) (applied in Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407; 18 ABC 57). Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Isaacs J at 91; Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478 (CA), Scarman LJ at 498–499 (WLR). Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Isaacs J at 91. Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478 (CA), Scarman LJ at 498 (WLR); Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 529 (CLR); Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Macfarlan JA at [127]–[139] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). Hanrahan v Ainsworth (1985) 1 NSWLR 370, Hunt J at 374. See generally Mullany NJ, “The Conduct of Defence and Abuse of Process” (1995) 22 Brief 9.

[33.8.1960] An improper object is central to the tort of abuse of process.1 The party who has instituted proceedings must have done so “to effect an object not within the scope of the process” In Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Isaacs J observed: In the sense requisite to sustain an action, the term “abuse of process” connotes that the process is employed for some purpose other than the attainment of the claim in the action. If the proceedings are merely a stalking horse to coerce the defendant in some way entirely outside the ambit of the legal claim upon which the Court is asked to adjudicate they are regarded as an abuse of process for this purpose.2

Examples of improper purposes are using an action for defamation to suppress distribution of a periodical rather than to vindicate reputation;3 issuing proceedings to damage a defendant’s business under the guise of restraining a breach of confidence;4 and seeking to bring an action for defamation against 697

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.1960]

counsel assisting a Royal Commission so as to call into question the work of the Commission.5 A defendant can commit the tort of abuse of process by conducting a defence for the dominant and improper purpose of pressuring a plaintiff to settle an existing dispute with a third party.6 The test is whether the predominant purpose was an improper one. Earlier suggestions7 that the criterion was that the improper purpose be the sole purpose have given way to a predominant purpose test:8 “[A] person alleging such an abuse must show that the predominant purpose of the other party in using the legal process has been one other than that for which it was designed.”9 State of mind of a moving party is relevant to the claim for abuse of process in the commencement or continuation of an action even where that party has a prima facie case.10

1 Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769, Tindal CJ at 221 (Bing NC). 2 Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Isaacs J at 91. 3 Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478 (CA). 4 Speed Seal Products Ltd v Paddington [1985] 1 WLR 1327 (CA). 5 Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486. See also Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 280; [2001] FCA 370, the Full Court at [34] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 26 June 2002 in White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart [2002] HCATrans 340) (action for abuse of process). Where the entitlement to costs has been determined in proceedings, the issue ought not be reagitated in the guise of an action for malicious prosecution. This rule has been treated as being applicable to actions for abuse of process). 6 Gulabrai v Hamer-Mathew (unreported, NSWCA, Meagher, Beazley and Stein JJA, 40056 of 1995, 26 June 1997), cited in Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Spigelman CJ at [36] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). 7 Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Isaacs J at 91. 8 Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478 (CA), Lord Denning MR (dissenting) at 490, Bridge LJ at 502; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 648 (CLR); Butler v Simmonds Crowley & Galvin [2000] 2 Qd R 252; [1999] QCA 475; Pola v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-460 (FCA). 9 Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; [1989] 3 WLR 563 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 469 (QB) (overruled on other grounds in Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188). 10 Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Bluestone Group Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 470, Heerey J at [8].

[33.8.1970] The term “abuse of process of the court” is used in many senses and is to be distinguished from the principles underlying the torts of malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1890]) and collateral abuse of

698

[33.8.1980]

ABUSE OF PROCESS

process (see [33.8.1950]):1 compare [33.8.1810]. The core requirement of a collateral purpose in this tort is not abrogated by statements in the High Court and elsewhere about the principles applicable when a party applies for a stay of pending proceedings for abuse of process of the court:2 see [33.8.1940].

1

2

Batistatos v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; 80 ALJR 1100; [2006] HCA 27, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [1]–[15]; Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Macfarlan JA at [135] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Macfarlan JA at [135] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). See Civil Procedure “Stay of Proceedings” [5.11.330]–[5.11.400]; Criminal Law Principles “Abuse of Process” [9.1.3310]–[9.1.3370]; Criminal Procedure “Applications for Stays of Proceedings” [11.6.630]–[11.6.850]; 13 Dispute Resolution; Evidence “Stay of Proceedings” [16.7.1060].

[33.8.1980] Fraud as well as improper object (see [33.8.1960]) are required to found the action for collateral abuse.1 As Isaacs J observed in Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509: If the object sought to be effected by the process is within the lawful scope of the process, it is a use of the process within the meaning of the law, though it may be malicious, or even fraudulent, and in the circumstances, the fraud may be an answer; if, however, the object sought to be effected by means of the process is outside the lawful scope of the process, and is fraudulent, then – both circumstances concurring – it is a case of abuse of that process, and the Court will neither enforce nor allow it to afford any protection, and will interpose, if necessary, to prevent its process being made the instrument of abuse. [Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769] laid down the distinction.2

Fraud in this sense imports a purpose outside the scope of the remedy, thereby rendering it improper.3 The case law suggests that there must be some actual improper use of process in addition to the improper purpose.4 This is equivocal since the very institution of proceedings may amount to a use.5 The collateral overt act or extraneous act may even be committed before the initiation of the proceedings, provided it persists.6

1 2 3 4

Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 524 (CLR). Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1915) 20 CLR 509, Isaacs J at 521–522, referring to Grainger v Hill (1838) 4 Bing NC 212; 132 ER 769. Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Brennan J at 535 (CLR). Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35, Griffith CJ at 55; Metall und

699

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

5

6

[33.8.1980]

Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391; [1989] 3 WLR 563 (CA), Slade LJ (for the Court) at 469 (QB) (overruled on other grounds in Lonrho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448; [1991] 3 WLR 188). Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 529 (CLR). However, see the position in the United States where improper use must occur after issue of process: Rosemont Enterprises Inc v Random House Inc, 261 F Supp 691 (1966). Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Deane J at 552 (CLR).

[33.8.1990] Maintenance is an officious intermeddling in an action or suit that in no way concerns a party who maintains or assists another party to prosecute or defend it.1 It was both a crime2 and a tort.3 As a tort, the essence was the element of impropriety in interfering in a suit by giving aid to one party or the other, coupled with the absence of legal justification for doing so.4 It was limited to civil litigation and did not extend to interference in criminal5 or administrative6 matters. It has been abolished in some jurisdictions.7 In Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 80 ALJR 1441; [2006] HCA 41, the majority of the High Court found that funding arrangements made and proposed to be made by a firm did not constitute a ground to stay the proceedings. Neither the fact that the funding arrangements gave control over the litigation nor that it was prompted by the expectation of profit was enough, alone or in combination, to constitute an abuse of process.8

1 Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368, Atkinson LJ at 395. See Contract: General Principles “Range of Objectionable Conduct” [7.2.860]–[7.2.920]. 2 See Criminal Offences “Other Offences” [10.11.2260]; Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449; (1966) 43 ALJR 122 (FC), Gillard and McInerney JJ at 459 (VR). 3 See Winfield PH, “The History of Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 50. 4 Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363; [1955] 2 WLR 463 (CA), Jenkins LJ at 399 (Ch). 5 Grant v Thompson (1895) 11 TLR 207 (QB). 6 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679; [1981] 3 WLR 766, Wilberforce LJ at 694–695 (AC). 7 It was abolished in England by the Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK), in Victoria in 1969 by Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 32, Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322A; in South Australia in 1992 by Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), Sch 11 ss 1 – 3; in New South Wales in 1995 by Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 (NSW), ss 3 – 4 and in the Australian Capital Territory in 2002 by Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 221. For recent case treatment, see Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 80 ALJR 1441; [2006] HCA 41; Jeffery &

700

[33.8.2000]

8

ABUSE OF PROCESS

Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; 83 ALJR 1180; [2009] HCA 43, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [26]; see also Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2005] FCA 455; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 474; [2003] FCA 1413. See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386; 80 ALJR 1441; [2006] HCA 41, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [65]–[95]. See generally Yung C, “Litigation Funding: Officious Intermeddling or Access to Justice?” (2005) 15 JJA 61; Baillie C, “Litigation Funding” (2007) 15 Insolv LJ 128; Brown D, “Maintenance and Champerty in Australia: Litigation in Support of Funding” (2007) CJQ 288; Legg M, “Investors and Shareholder Class Actions: The Law and Economics of Participation” (2007) 81 ALJ 478; Fife C, “Third-party Litigation Funding” (2009) NZLJ 250; Spender P, “After Fostif: Lingering Uncertainties and Controversies about Litigation Funding” (2008) 18 JJA 101; Baxt R, “Litigation Funding: Crossing the Cross Roads” (2010) 28 C & SLJ 54.

[33.8.2000] Champerty is an aggravated form of maintenance of an action or suit1 (see [33.8.1990]), on condition to have part of the proceeds or things the subject of the action when recovered.2 It was both a crime3 and a tort4 at common law, but as with maintenance (see [33.8.1990]), it is of little continuing significance and has been legislatively abolished in some jurisdictions.5 Special damage (see [33.8.1890]) must be shown, for example, the refusal of a banker to provide bank guarantees and accommodation.6 Certain justifiable circumstances provide a defence, including charitable assistance of the poor7 and having a common interest.8

1

2

3

See Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; 83 ALJR 1180; [2009] HCA 43. See also Contract: General Principles “Range of Objectionable Conduct” [7.2.860]–[7.2.920]; Criminal Offences “Other Offences” [10.11.2260]. See generally Rodin M, “Maintenance by Champerty” (1935) 24 Calif LR 48; Yung C, “Litigation Funding: Officious Intermeddling or Access to Justice?” (2005) 15 JJA 61; Baillie C, “Litigation Funding” (2007) 15 Insolv LJ 128; Brown D, “Maintenance and Champerty in Australia: Litigation in Support of Funding” (2007) CJQ 288; Legg M, “Investors and Shareholder Class Actions: The Law and Economics of Participation” (2007) 81 ALJ 478; Fife C, “Third-party Litigation Funding” (2009) NZLJ 250; Spender P, “After Fostif: Lingering Uncertainties and Controversies about Litigation Funding” (2008) 18 JJA 101; Baxt R, “Litigation Funding: Crossing the Cross Roads” (2010) 28 C & SLJ 54. Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 199; [1962] 3 WLR 955 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 219 (Ch); Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679; [1981] 3 WLR 766, Wilberforce LJ at 694–695 (AC); JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413; (1983) 1 BCL 159, McPherson J at 429 (Qd R) (varied on other grounds by JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413; (1983) 1 BCL 159 (CA)); Sievwright v Ward [1935] NZLR 43 (SC), Ostler J at 46. Ram Coomar Coondoo v Chunder Canto Mookerjee (1876) 2 App Cas 186 (PC),

701

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

4 5

6

7 8

[33.8.2000]

Sir Montague E Smith (for the Privy Council) at 208; Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368; Colville v Small (1910) 22 OLR 426 (ONCA Div Ct). Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 199; [1962] 3 WLR 955 (CA). For more recent consideration, see Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd (2000) 32 MVR 263; [2000] NSWSC 932; Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; [2000] WASC 210; Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2005] FCA 455; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 474; [2003] FCA 1413. JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413; (1983) 1 BCL 159 (varied on other grounds by JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413; (1983) 1 BCL 159 (CA)). Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489; Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1, Latham CJ at 12. Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489; British Cash & Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 (CA). For defences generally, see “Defences” [33.9.10]ff.

[33.8.2010] Proceedings may be stayed1 where they are an abuse of process and it is well established that Australian superior courts and magistrates have inherent jurisdiction which extends to both civil and criminal proceedings:2 see [33.8.1940] and [33.8.1970]. Every court is “duty bound to protect itself” against an abuse of its process.3 This extends to magistrates hearing committal proceedings because they are part of the procedure of the courts for the enforcement of the criminal law.4 In the case of a criminal prosecution, the jurisdiction to grant a stay has a dual purpose namely, to “prevent an abuse of process or the prosecution of a criminal proceeding … which will result in a trial which is unfair”.5 The High Court has stressed the importance of distinguishing between the dual purposes. If a permanent stay is sought to prevent an unfair trial, the court must be satisfied that there are no other available means such as directions.6 On the other hand, if a stay is sought because the prosecution is maintained for an improper purpose, it may not be necessary for the court to so satisfy itself.7 Policy considerations must be taken into account: The first is that the public interest in the administration of justice requires that the court protect its ability to function as a court of law by ensuring that its processes are used fairly by State and citizen alike. The second is that, unless the court protects its ability so to function in that way, its failure will lead to an erosion of public confidence by reason of concern that the court’s processes may lend themselves to oppression and injustice.8

There are some fundamental differences between a stay for abuse based on an exercise of inherent jurisdiction and either of the torts of malicious prosecution (see [33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930]) or collateral abuse of process:9 see [33.8.1950]. Neither of the latter torts offers the prospect of early termination. Proceedings for malicious prosecution must await termination of the subject proceedings and the action for collateral abuse is an indirect means of putting an end. The High

702

[33.8.2020]

ABUSE OF PROCESS

Court has indicated that on the score of costs alone, the exercise of the power will protect the accused from expenditure which may not be recouped.10 The inherent power to stay extends to the prevention of an abuse of process even if the moving party has a prima facie case.11 However, the power to grant a permanent stay is one to be exercised “only in an extreme case”.12

1

Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; 63 ALJR 640; 41 A Crim R 307, Brennan J at 47–48 (CLR). 2 Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [1964] AC 1254; [1964] 2 WLR 1145; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 518 (CLR). 3 R v Sang [1980] AC 402; [1979] 3 WLR 263, Scarman LJ at 455 (AC). 4 Ammann v Wegener (1972) 129 CLR 415; 46 ALJR 638, Barwick CJ at 423 (CLR); Miller v Ryan [1980] 1 NSWLR 93 (disapproved on other grounds in Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1; 63 ALJR 630; 41 A Crim R 183). 5 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 518 (CLR); Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75; 55 ALJR 31, Gibbs ACJ and Mason J at 95–96 (CLR); Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; 63 ALJR 640; 41 A Crim R 307, Brennan J at 46 (CLR); see also R v Derby Crown Court; Ex parte Brooks (1984) 80 Cr App R 164, Sir Roger Ormrod LCJ (for the Court) at 168–169. 6 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 518 (CLR). 7 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 519 (CLR). 8 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 520 (CLR). 9 See also Batistatos v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; 80 ALJR 1100; [2006] HCA 27, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [1]–[8]. 10 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 521 (CLR). 11 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 522 (CLR). 12 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23; 63 ALJR 640; 41 A Crim R 307, Mason CJ at 34 (CLR); Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; 66 ALJR 585; 61 A Crim R 431, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 529 (CLR).

[33.8.2020] A court which finds abuse of process and an absence of an arguable basis for a proceeding to remain on foot may dispose of it by dismissal without trial.1 Damages are available to compensate for any special damage sustained as well as exemplary damages in an appropriate case, for example misfeasance in a public office:2 see [33.8.2160]. Special damage might

703

FALSE IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ETC

[33.8.2020]

extend to loss occasioned to an accused by a criminal contempt of court causing abortion of a pending trial.3

1 Rajski v Bainton (1990) 22 NSWLR 125 (CA); Batistatos v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; 80 ALJR 1100; [2006] HCA 27. 2 Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286, Smith J at 291. See also “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]; Jacobs S, Commercial Damages (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [3.730]. 3 United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v Hardy (1991) 23 NSWLR 323; 6 BR 300 (CA).

704

Miscellaneous Torts Intentional Indirect Infliction of Personal Injury [33.8.2130] The intentional infliction of injury is actionable in tort even though the injury arises indirectly from a defendant’s act:1 see [33.8.160]–[33.8.190] and compare [33.8.350]–[33.8.460] and [33.8.2150]. In Bird v Holbrook (1828) 4 Bing 628; 130 ER 911, the defendant was held liable for setting a spring-gun on his land, the gun causing injury to the plaintiff, having been set off by him while he was trespassing on the defendant’s land. Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 took it a stage further.2 It was held that provided there is a wrongful intent towards the plaintiff on the part of the defendant, the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff need only be a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s act. In that case the defendant, by way of a practical joke, purported to convey a message to the plaintiff that her husband had been injured in an accident and was lying in an inn at a distance and she should go in a cab to fetch him. The expense which the plaintiff incurred for that purpose was recovered on the basis of the tort of deceit: see [33.8.1290]–[33.8.1320]. She also suffered nervous illness, which was not recoverable on the basis of deceit since it was caused otherwise than through her acting on the defendant’s statement. It was not trespass because there was no direct physical effect on her person. Wright J recognised a cause of action which he described in the following terms: The defendant has, as I assume for the moment, wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff – that is to say, to infringe her legal right to personal safety, and has in fact thereby caused physical harm to her. That proposition without more appears to me to state a good cause of action, there being no justification alleged for the act. This wilful injuria is in law malicious, although no malicious purpose to cause the harm which was caused nor any motive of spite is imputed to the defendant.3

The liability existed although the actual damage suffered was not intended by the defendant, nor was the defendant reckless in regard to it in the sense that he actually foresaw it. His intention was merely to cause distress or alarm. Nevertheless, the defendant was “malicious”, which must refer to the fact that he had no proper motive for inflicting emotional distress on the plaintiff. The words “calculated to cause” in Wright J’s formulation have been the source of judicial consideration. In Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61, the High Court confirmed that the phrase meant foreseeably likely to cause harm, or “naturally to be expected”.4 Earlier, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Johnson v Commonwealth

705

[33.8.2130]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

(1927) 27 SR (NSW) 133; 44 WN (NSW) 54 found that the nervous shock and resulting physical illness suffered by a wife when her husband was wrongfully assaulted and detained “might fairly and reasonably have been anticipated as a consequence of the assault committed upon her husband in her presence”.5 More recently, McMurdo P in the Queensland Court of Appeal said that the phrase meant “likely to have that effect”,6 while Spigelman CJ in the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered, without deciding, that this element of the tort would be made out “if the result satisfied a test of ‘substantial certainty’”, adding that “a test of reckless indifference to a result will, in this context, satisfy the requirement of intention”.7 Considering the tort of misfeasance in public office, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527 stated that: [M]isfeasance … is a counterpart to, and should be confined in the same way as, those torts which impose liability on private individuals for the intentional infliction of mental harm. For present purposes, we include in that concept acts which are calculated in the ordinary course to cause harm, as in Wilkinson v Downton, or which are done with reckless indifference to the harm that is likely to ensue.8

1 See Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474; [2001] QCA 234. See generally Goudkamp T and Morrison A, Personal Injury Law Manual New South Wales (Thomson Reuters, subscription service) at [1.440]–[1.445]. 2 Affirmed in Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316 (CA). See generally Handford PR, “Wilkinson v Downton and Acts Calculated to Cause Physical Harm” (1985) 16 UWALR 31; Witting C, “Tort Liability for Intended Mental Harm” (1998) 21 UNSWLJ 55; Lunney M, “Practical Joking and Its Penalty: Wilkinson v Downton in Context” (2002) 10 Tort L Rev 168. 3 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, Wright J at 58–59. In Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61, a threatened suicide by the plaintiff’s employer in the presence of the plaintiff, who saw that the employer had a gun, and the subsequent discharge of the gun within earshot of the plaintiff by the employer, who nevertheless did not commit suicide, was not actionable since it was not calculated to cause her nervous shock. That is, the shock was not a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s act and statement. 4 Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1; 37 SR (NSW) 119; 54 WN (NSW) 61, Latham CJ at 11–14 (CLR). Other phrases referenced by his Honour are: “[t]he acts of the defendant, taken all together, cannot be said to be calculated or likely to cause harm to any person” (at 12 (CLR)); “what results may reasonably be expected to follow from the act in question” (at 13 (CLR)); “what the defendant might reasonably have expected” (at 14 (CLR)); “[s]uch a consequence is not within the scope of reasonable anticipation” (at 14 (CLR)). See Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474; [2001] QCA 234, McPherson JA at [25] (“objectively likely to happen”). See also McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2004] VSC 289, Ashley J at [124] (affirmed in McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union (2007) 20 VR 250; [2007] VSCA 289). 5 Johnson v Commonwealth (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 133; 44 WN (NSW) 54 (FC), 706

[33.8.2135]

6 7 8

INTENTIONAL INDIRECT INFLICTION OF PERSONAL INJURY

Ferguson J (for the Court) at 137 (SR (NSW)); see also Walker v Hamm [2008] VSC 596, Smith J at [117]–[123]. Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474; [2001] QCA 234, McMurdo P at [11]–[12]. Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377, Spigelman CJ at [80]. Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 347 (CLR).

[33.8.2135] Liability under Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 exists only if the plaintiff suffers actual nervous shock:1 see also [33.8.460]. The intentional infliction of distress, alarm or vexation is not, as such, a tort. However, recently, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236 cast doubt on the capacity of defendants to know how to intentionally cause a recognised psychiatric illness.2 Maxwell P added: First, the requirement to show physical harm as a signifier of psychological harm is anachronistic and should be entirely discarded from this area of discourse. Secondly, the term “nervous shock” – and its modern synonym “recognized psychiatric illness” – should also be discarded, based as they are on the unsustainable assumption that a clear line separates “psychiatric illness” from other (lesser) types of mental distress. Thirdly, and consequently, the focus of a court’s inquiry should no longer be on whether a clinician would attach a particular diagnostic label to the plaintiff’s condition – about which there will frequently be legitimate differences of opinion – but on the nature and extent of the mental distress actually suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Taking this approach will, as Lord Hoffman[n] suggested in [Wainright v Home Offıce [2004] 2 AC 406; [2003] 3 WLR 1137; [2004] UKHRR 154; [2003] UKHL 53], obviate the need to invoke the fiction of “imputed intention”, on which Wilkinson v Downton and [Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316] both rested. [T]he defendant will be held liable for the damage shown to have been caused by his [or her] intentionally harmful action, subject to the limit of reasonable forseeability posited in [Northern Territory v Mengel].3

Neave JA agreed with Maxwell P that no Australian case “positively precludes the expansion of the tort of intentional infliction of harm to cover cases in which the plaintiff suffered distress, humiliation or other forms of emotional discomfort, rather than physical or psychiatric injury”.4 Ashley JA disagreed.5 In New Zealand, it has been held that a plaintiff must establish something more than a transient reaction of emotional distress, however initially severe.6 Although the judgment refers to “physical harm” in general, it is very doubtful whether the ratio of the case extends beyond the infliction of nervous shock by “malicious” words or acts. Personal injury is already sufficiently covered by the tort of negligence.7 Any suggestion that this tort had been or should be “subsumed by the unintentional tort of negligence”8 was rejected by both Spigelman CJ and

707

[33.8.2135]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

Basten JA in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377.9 Their Honours cited in support of that rejection the following passage from the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4: Negligently inflicted injury to the person can, in at least some circumstances, be pleaded as trespass to the person, but the intentional infliction of harm cannot be pleaded as negligence.10

This must be correct. Modern notions of culpability, and therefore, liability, depend increasingly on the distinction between intentional and unintentional acts causing harm. The direct vs indirect distinction is anachronistic, problematic and opaque:11 see [33.8.320]. In Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775 Rothman J, having reviewed the authorities, concluded that: [C]urrent authority favours the existence of a tort of intentional infliction of harm, including psychiatric injury. The elements of that cause of action are: (i)

A deliberate act (hereinafter, “the conduct”) by the putative tortfeasor;

(ii)

An intention (including reckless indifference) to cause physical or psychiatric harm by the conduct;

(iii)

The occasioning of harm (including psychiatric injury, but not mere distress) as a result of the conduct;

(iv)

The harm being caused to a person to whom harm is intended (or a person in the immediate vicinity to whose harm the perpetrator is recklessly indifferent);

(v)

In circumstances where the conduct was reasonably likely to cause harm in a normal person; and

(vi)

The putative tortfeasor has engaged in the conduct without justification or lawful excuse.12

1 For liability in negligence for nervous shock caused by false reports, see “Mental Harm” [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1310]. See generally McCarthy C, “Exemplary and Aggravated Damages in Medical Negligence Litigation” (1998) 6 JLM 187; Magnusson R, “Recovery for Mental Distress in Tort, with Special Reference to Harmful Words and Statements” (1994) 2 TLJ 126. 2 Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236, Maxwell P at [20]. 3 Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236, Maxwell P at [31]–[32], [34]. See generally Rathmell A, “Wilkinson v Downton at Work: Employer’s Liability for Intentionally Inflicted Psychiatric Injury” (2008) 21 AJLL 339; Witzleb N, “Giller v Procopets: Australia’s Privacy Protection Shows Signs of Improvement” (2009) 17 TLJ 121; Mendelson D, “Defendants’ Liability for Pure Mental Harm to Third Parties in Australia: Still a Work in Progress” (2009) 17 JLM

708

[33.8.2140]

ACTION ON CASE FOR DAMAGE TO REVERSIONARY ETC

165; Handford PR, “Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms?” (2010) 32 Syd LR 29. 4 Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236, Neave JA at [471]. 5 Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236, Ashley JA at [164]–[165]. 6 Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415 (HC). 7 See “Personal Injury” [33.2.790]–[33.2.800]. 8 See Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; 81 ALJR 254; [2006] HCA 51, Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ at [117]. 9 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377, Spigelman CJ at [70]–[74]. 10 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471; [2007] NSWCA 377, Spigelman CJ at [65], Basten JA at [367], citing New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 602–603 (CLR); see also Giller v Procopets (2008) 40 Fam LR 378; [2008] VSCA 236, Maxwell P at [17]. 11 See also South Australia v Lampard-Trevorrow (2010) 106 SASR 331; [2010] SASC 56 (FC), the Court at [357] (mental/psychiatric injury and loss caused by removal of child by a public authority was held to be a foreseeable injury sufficient to establish the tort of misfeasance in public office (although it did not amount to false imprisonment)): see [33.8.2160]. 12 Clavel v Savage [2013] NSWSC 775, Rothman J at [36]

Action on Case for Damage to Reversionary Interest in Land or Chattels [33.8.2140] A person with a reversionary interest in land, for example a lessor, may sue for damage to the land which affects that reversionary interest:1 compare [33.8.480] and [33.8.550]. The damage must be permanent, but that merely means that it will continue unless made good. As a form of action on the case, fault in the form of intentional or negligent infliction of the damage must be proved. A similar action is available in the case of damage or destruction to chattels in which the plaintiff has a reversionary interest.2 Fault in the form of intention or negligence must be proved.3 The action is not available where the defendant’s act has caused the mere loss of the chattel. This would allow circumvention of the rule in Gordon v Harper (1796) 7 TR 9; 101 ER 828, that a person without a right to immediate possession, such as a bailor for a term, is not allowed to sue in trespass or conversion: see [33.8.810] and [33.8.850].

1 2

Rodrigues v Ufton (1894) 20 VLR 539. Mears v London & South Western Railway Co (1862) 11 CB (NS) 850; 142 ER 1029 (CCP).

709

[33.8.2140]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

3

Drive-Yourself Lessey’s Pty Ltd v Burnside (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 390; 76 WN (NSW) 209 (FC).

Action on Case for Causing Harm [33.8.2150] The High Court has overturned the former rule that, by virtue of taking an action for damages on the case, a person who suffered harm as an inevitable consequence of the unlawful, intentional, positive acts of another person was entitled to recover damages from that other person:1 see [33.8.2130]. The High Court had previously ruled to that effect in Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145; 40 ALJR 211; 18 LGRA 65. However, the High Court in Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527 overruled this principle.

1 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 344–345, Brennan J at 354–355, Deane J at 365–370 (CLR).

Action for Misfeasance in Public Office [33.8.2160] Misfeasance in a public office is a well established,1 though vaguely defined,2 action on the case. The tort is still evolving and its precise limits remain undefined.3 It is generally regarded as the common law’s only truly public tort.4 In Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286, Smith J defined it as follows: [I]f a public officer does an act which, to his knowledge, amounts to an abuse of his office, and he thereby causes damage to another person, then an action in tort for misfeasance in a public office will lie against him at the suit of that person.5

The tort is difficult to establish.6 It is not concerned with mere errors of judgment.7 It is a serious allegation.8 In Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Gummow J observed that “misfeasance in public office concerns conscious maladministration rather than careless maladministration”.9 The chief characteristic of the tort is that the act in question must be a consciously wrongful exercise of power by the public officer.10 Therefore, passing a resolution which is devoid of legal effect without knowledge of its invalidity is not misfeasance in a public office.11 If no relevant power is attached to an office, it cannot be characterised as a public office for the purposes of the tort of misfeasance in public office.12 An omission to act where the public officer is under a duty to do so may constitute the tort, and it is possible that a conscious omission, even absent a common law or statutory duty to act, may also suffice.13

710

[33.8.2160]

ACTION FOR MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE

The powers in question must belong to a public office body but need not be public in nature. Accordingly, the action lies in relation to contractual exercises of power by a public body.14 In Chapel Road Pty Ltd v ASIC (No 10) (2014) 307 ALR 428; [2014] NSWSC 346, Schmidt J observed that conduct which constitutes an abuse of power may be either a deliberate act or a deliberate omission, but that not all acts of a public officer involve the exercise of a public power or duty.15 Her Honour added that a denial of procedural fairness is an act that can constitute the tort, but that not every such denial will be sufficient. In Lock v ASIC [2016] FCA 31, Gleeson J considered that failure to take into account mandatory considerations before making a decision may constitute the tort,16 as may a failure to act in accordance with the objects of the enabling statute. His Honour also emphasised, however, that a plaintiff must show the public officer’s failure was done consciously. It may therefore be difficult to show misfeasance on the basis of a failure to act reasonably and rationally.17

1

Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 91 ER 126; Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158; [1981] 2 WLR 693; [1981] 1 NSWLR 76; (1981) 45 LGRA 411 (PC), Diplock LJ (for the Privy Council) at 84 (NSWLR); Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1986] QB 716; [1985] 3 WLR 1027 (CA), Oliver LJ at 775 (QB); Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54 (CA), Slade LJ at 68–70 (reversed on other grounds in Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 1453 (HL)); Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286, Smith J at 293; Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317; [2002] VSCA 84 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 12 December 2003 in Tahche v Cannon [2003] HCATrans 524); Porter v OAMPS Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 327; [2005] FCA 232; Rush v Commissioner of Police (2006) 150 FCR 165; 160 A Crim R 342; [2006] FCA 12; Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288); MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 6) (2011) 185 LGERA 276; [2011] NSWSC 1613, Johnson J at [212]; Commonwealth v Fernando (2012) 200 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 18. See generally Aronson M, “Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort” (2011) 35 MULR 1; Sadler RJ, “Liability for Misfeasance in a Public Office” (1992) 14 Syd LR 137; Aronson M and Whitmore H, Public Torts and Contracts (The Law Book Company Limited, 1982) pp 120–131; McBride J, “Damages as a Remedy for Unlawful Administrative Action” (1979) 38 Cam LJ 323; Dench S, “The Tort of Misfeasance in a Public Office” (1981) 4 Auckland UL Rev 182; Gould BC, “Damages as a Remedy in Administrative Law” (1972) 5 NZULR 105; Evans RC, “Damages for Unlawful Administrative Action: The Remedy for Misfeasance in Public Office” (1982) 31 ICLQ 640; Phegan CS, “Damages for Improper Exercise of Statutory Powers” (1980) 9 Syd LR 93; Craig PP, “Compensation in Public Law” (1980) 96 LQR 413; Kneebone S, “Misfeasance in a Public Office after Mengel’s Case: A “Special” Tort No More?” (1996) 4 Tort L Rev 111; Fordham M, “False Imprisonment in Good Faith” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 53; Cockburn T, “Personal Liability of Public Officers in the Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office: Part 1” (2001) 9 TLJ 80; Churches S, “Flow-on from Findings of Lack of Legislative Reach or Invalidity: False Imprisonment and

711

[33.8.2160]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

Compulsory Examinations Founded in Invalid Summonses” (2008) 16 AJ Admin L 12. 2 Tampion v Anderson (No 2) [1973] VR 715 (FC), Smith J (for the Court) at 720; Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div), Kaye and Beach JJ at 270–271; Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54 (CA), Slade LJ at 69 (reversed on other grounds in Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 1453 (HL)). See also Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Allsop P at [47]–[48] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). 3 Neilson v City of Swan (2006) 147 LGERA 136; [2006] WASCA 94, Buss JA at [31]; Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Macfarlan JA at [99]; Neilson v City of Swan (No 6) [2013] WASC 53, Allanson J at [188]. 4 Aronson M, “Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort” (2011) 35 MULR 1. 5 Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286, Smith J at 293. See also Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158; [1981] 2 WLR 693; [1981] 1 NSWLR 76; (1981) 45 LGRA 411, Lord Diplock at 172; [1981] 2 WLR 693; [1981] 1 NSWLR 76; (1981) 45 LGRA 411 (PC); and Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Deane J at 370; 69 ALJR 527; Porter v OAMPS Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 327; [2005] FCA 232, Goldberg J at [103]; Rush v Commissioner of Police (2006) 150 FCR 165; 160 A Crim R 342; [2006] FCA 12, Finn J at [121]. 6 Leinenga v Logan City Council [2006] QSC 294, Mullins J at [64]; Chapel Road Pty Ltd v ASIC (No 10) (2014) 307 ALR 428; [2014] NSWSC 346, Schmidt J at [59]. 7 Commonwealth v Fernando (2012) 200 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 18, Gray, Rares and Tracey at [130]; Chapel Road Pty Ltd v ASIC (No 10) (2014) 307 ALR 428; [2014] NSWSC 346, Schmidt J at [64]. 8 Pharm-a-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 494; [2010] FCA 361, Flick J at [66]; Skinner v Commonwealth [2012] FCA 1194, Flick J at [37]. 9 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3, Gummow J at [124]. 10 Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54 (CA), Slade LJ at 69 (reversed on other grounds in Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 1453 (HL)); Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526 (VSC), Harper J at 566–567 (A Crim R). 11 Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158; [1981] 2 WLR 693; [1981] 1 NSWLR 76; (1981) 45 LGRA 411 (PC); compare R v Huy Vinh Quach (2010) 27 VR 310; 201 A Crim R 522; [2010] VSCA 106, Redlich JA [28] (Ashley JA and Hansen AJA agreeing) (considering the elements of the common law offence of misconduct in public office). However, see judicial consideration on the wide spectrum of what may constitute judicial conduct without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction such as to give rise to civil liability, including matters of procedural irregularity, and discussion of legislative enactments on this point in Britain impacting judicial liability and the standing to sue of the aggrieved person: Re McC (a minor) [1985] AC 528; [1984] 3 WLR 1227, Templeman LJ at 559 (AC) and such early cases as O’Connor v Isaacs [1956] 2 QB 288; [1956] 3 WLR 172 (CA) (whether act done within jurisdiction; if so, whether more appropriate for the magistrate’s decision to be quashed or otherwise reversed); Davis v Capper (1829) 10 B & C 28; 109 ER 362. See generally McCarthy G, “Mengel: A Limited Remedy

712

[33.8.2162]

ACTION FOR MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE

in Damages for Wrongful Administrative Action” (1996) 4 AJ Admin L 5. 12 Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317; [2002] VSCA 84 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 12 December 2003 in Tahche v Cannon [2003] HCATrans 524) (Director of Public Prosecution not a public office); Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90 (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288) (solicitor acting for a Minister of State in proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal not acting in a public office). 13 Lock v ASIC [2016] FCA 31, Gleeson J at [136]–[138]. 14 Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54 (CA), Slade LJ at 69–70 (reversed on other grounds in Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 1453 (HL)); R v Huy Vinh Quach (2010) 27 VR 310; 201 A Crim R 522; [2010] VSCA 106, Redlich JA at [32], [39], [40], [46] (Ashley JA agreeing). 15 Chapel Road Pty Ltd v ASIC (No 10) (2014) 307 ALR 428; [2014] NSWSC 346, Schmidt J at [56]. 16 Lock v ASIC [2016] FCA 31, Gleeson J at [142]–[147]. 17 Lock v ASIC [2016] FCA 31, Gleeson J at [169].

[33.8.2162] There is no authoritative statement of a test for determining what constitutes a public officer for the purposes of the tort. None may be needed.1 As Spigelman CJ observed in Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, “[i]n almost all cases the answer will be obvious”.2 “Public officers” have been held to include police officers,3 Ministers of State,4 local authorities,5 prison officers,6 the Secretary of the Law Institute of Victoria;7 and, possibly, prosecuting counsel.8 However, “public officer” does not, for example, include the single member of an ad hoc board of inquiry set up by an Order in Council, nor counsel assisting that inquiry;9 nor a solicitor acting for a Minister in an Administrative Appeals Tribunal hearing;10 nor the Director-General of Education in Tasmania when acting in his role in relation to the dismissal of a school teacher.11 The employer of the public officer is not vicariously liable if the act is outside the scope of authority,12 or the public officer was discharging or purporting to discharge a responsibility of a judicial nature or exercising a discretion in the execution of an independent legal duty.13 The conduct and intention of a number of public officers cannot be aggregated to satisfy the requisite misfeasance and state of mind in the absence of evidence of a conspiracy between those officers.14 There is some authority for the proposition that the tort can be alleged against a corporate entity.15 The plaintiff must be a member of the public to whom the holder of the office owed a duty not to commit the act in question.16

1

Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Spigelman CJ at [3] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288); MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 6) (2011) 185 LGERA 276; [2011] NSWSC 1613, Johnson J at [269].

713

[33.8.2162]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

2

3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10

11

12 13 14

15

16

Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Spigelman CJ at [3] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288); Skinner v Commonwealth [2012] FCA 1194, Finn J at [37]. Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286; Garrett v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 332 (CA). Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1986] QB 716; [1985] 3 WLR 1027 (CA). Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 54 (CA) (reversed on other grounds in Jones v Swansea City Council [1990] 1 WLR 1453 (HL)). R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison; Ex parte Hague [1992] 1 AC 58; [1991] 3 WLR 340, Bridge LJ at 164 (AC). Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div). Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526 (VSC), Harper J at 567–568. However, see Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317; [2002] VSCA 84, the Court at [49]–[53], [61], where the Victorian Court of Appeal held an office cannot be characterised as a public office for the purposes of this tort if no relevant power is attached to it. Since a barrister acting as prosecutor performed a function rather than exercising any relevant power, the office of Director of Public Prosecutions was not a public one and there could be no tort of misfeasance in public office (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 12 December 2003 in Tahche v Cannon [2003] HCATrans 524). See also Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Macfarlan JA at [102] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). Compare discussion on immunities in civil actions at [33.8.1800]–[33.8.1810]. Tampion v Anderson (No 2) [1973] VR 715 (FC). Leerdam v Noori (2009) 227 FLR 210; [2009] NSWCA 90, Spigelman CJ at [15]–[19] (special leave to appeal to High Court refused on 3 November 2009 in Noori v Leerdam [2009] HCATrans 288). Pemberton v Attorney-General (Tas) [1978] Tas SR 1 (FC). It was held that this role was not sufficiently public in character. The correctness of this decision is questionable. Racz v Home Offıce [1994] 2 AC 45; [1994] 2 WLR 23. Grimwade v Victoria (1997) 90 A Crim R 526 (VSC), Harper J at 567–568. Tampion v Anderson (No 2) [1973] VR 715 (FC), Smith J (for the Court) at 720. The correctness of this limitation is questionable. See also David v Abdul Cader [1963] 1 WLR 834 (PC (Ceylon)); Campbell v Ramsay (1968) 70 SR (NSW) 327; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 253; [1968] 1 NSWR 425 (CA), Wallace P and Holmes JA at 428 (SR (NSW)). Katelaris v Medical Council of New South Wales (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 617, Bellew J at [52], citing Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158; [1981] 2 WLR 693; [1981] 1 NSWLR 76; (1981) 45 LGRA 411, Lord Diplock (for the Privy Council) at 84; and Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] 3 All ER 558, Clark J at 572. As to whether government contractors performing public functions may constitute public officers for the purposes of this tort, see: Aronson M, “Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort” (2011) 35 MULR 1. Chapel Road Pty Ltd v ASIC (No 10) (2014) 307 ALR 428; [2014] NSWSC 346, Schmidt J at [65]–[73].

714

[33.8.2167]

ACTION FOR MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE

[33.8.2165] The early cases suggested that there must be malice on the part of the public officer,1 but it now seems settled that a conscious abuse or excess of power by a public officer will also constitute the tort.2 A malicious or abusive exercise of powers by a public officer or public body causing the plaintiff damage may be part of a tort of wider principle, suggested by the Canadian Supreme Court in Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121; (1959) 16 DLR (2d) 689, under which any consciously abusive exercise of public powers causing damage is tortious. In Neilson v City of Swan (No 6) [2013] WASC 53, Allanson J said that: The malice requirement of the tort has been divided into targeted malice, where the public officer in question has acted with an actual intent to cause injury to a person; and untargeted malice where the officer has actual knowledge that his or her action was beyond power and would cause or be likely to cause injury, or else that the officer has acted with reckless indifference to the possibility that his or her action was beyond power and to the possibility that it would cause or be likely to cause injury.3

1 2

3

However, Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div) states that malice is not an essential element of the tort in a public office. Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286; Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1986] QB 716; [1985] 3 WLR 1027 (CA); Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div); Pemberton v Attorney-General (Tas) [1978] Tas SR 1 (FC); Garrett v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 332 (CA); Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council (2001) 118 LGERA 117; [2001] QCA 342, McMurdo P at [29]–[34] (Helman J agreeing), Williams JA at [82]–[87] (Helman J agreeing). Neilson v City of Swan (No 6) [2013] WASC 53, Allanson J at [190], citing Rush v Commissioner of Police (2006) 150 FCR 165; 160 A Crim R 342; [2006] FCA 12, Finn J at [121]; Aronson M, “Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort” (2011) 35 MULR 1 at 12, 18–25.

[33.8.2167] However, in Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, the High Court stated that the tort should be confined in the same way as those which impose liability on private individuals for the intentional infliction of harm. Accordingly, the tort is not constituted simply by an act of a public officer which they know is beyond power and which results in damage. It does include acts which are calculated in the ordinary course to cause damage or which are done with reckless indifference to the harm that is likely to ensue. Liability requires an act which the public officer knows is beyond power and which involves a foreseeable risk of harm. In their judgment, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ went on to say: There is much to be said for the view that … misfeasance in public office is not confined to actual knowledge but extends to the situation in which a public officer recklessly disregards the means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power.1

715

[33.8.2167]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

In Northern Territory v Mengel both Deane and Brennan JJ expressed a firmer view than the joint judgment about reckless indifference. Deane J said: In the context of misfeasance in public office, the focus of the requisite element of malice is injury to the plaintiff or injury to some other person through an act which injuriously affects the plaintiff. Such malice will exist if the act was done with an actual intention to cause such injury. The requirement of malice will also be satisfied if the act was done with knowledge of invalidity or lack of power and with knowledge that it would cause or be likely to cause such injury. Finally, malice will exist if the act is done with reckless indifference or deliberate blindness to that invalidity or lack of power and that likely injury. Absent such an intention, such knowledge and such reckless indifference or deliberate blindness, the requirement of malice will not be satisfied.2

Brennan J said: Misfeasance in public office consists of a purported exercise of some power or authority by a public officer otherwise that in an honest attempt to perform the functions of his or her office whereby loss is caused to a plaintiff. Malice, knowledge and reckless indifference are states of mind that stamp on a purported but invalid exercise of power the character of abuse of or misfeasance in public office. If the impugned conduct then causes injury, then the cause of action is complete.3

Damage must be proved by the plaintiff and it must be reasonably foreseeable.4 There is also a range of crimes which centre on corruption and abuse of office.5

1 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 347 (CLR); applied in Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329; 72 ALJR 1508; [1998] HCA 64 (however, see Sanders v Snell, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [37]–[39], [42], see also [46]). Northern Territory v Mengel was discussed in Spry M, “Misfeasance in Public Office and Public Sector Employment” (1997) 5 TLJ 193. See also R v Huy Vinh Quach (2010) 27 VR 310; 201 A Crim R 522; [2010] VSCA 106, Redlich JA at [28], [46] (Ashley JA agreeing); Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1; [2000] 2 WLR 1220; [2000] UKHL 33; Garrett v Attorney-General (NZ) [1997] 2 NZLR 332 (CA); Homestead Award Winning Homes Pty Ltd v South Australia (1997) 72 SASR 299; Martin v Tasmania Development & Resources (1999) 89 IR 98; [1999] FCA 593 (affirmed in Tasmania Development & Resources v Martin (2000) 97 IR 66; [2000] FCA 414 (FC)); Murcia Holdings Pty Ltd v Nedlands City (1999) 22 WAR 1; [1999] WASC 241. See generally Cockburn T, “Personal Liability of Public Officers in the Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office: Part 2” (2001) 9 TLJ 245. 2 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Deane J at 370–371 (CLR), cited in Bailey v Director General of Department of Natural Resources (NSW) [2014] NSWSC 1012, Fullerton J at [536]. 3 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, cited in Bailey v Director General of Department of Natural Resources (NSW) [2014] NSWSC 1012, Fullerton J at [537]. 4 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527, Mason CJ,

716

[33.8.2170]

5

INFRINGEMENT OF ABSOLUTE RIGHTS

Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 346–348 (CLR); see also Little v Law Institute (Vic) (No 3) [1990] VR 257 (App Div); Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1; [2000] 2 WLR 1220; [2000] UKHL 33. R v Bembridge (1783) 22 St Tr 1; 99 ER 679 (Ex). See Criminal Offences “Administration of Law and Justice” [10.11.10]ff.

Infringement of Absolute Rights [33.8.2170] Actions for damages for infringements of absolute rights1 share characteristics of trespass (see [33.8.300]–[33.8.600]), in that they are actionable without proof of damage. However, historically actions for damages for infringements are actions on the case. An example is Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd [1944] KB 693, in which the famous West Indian cricketer was refused accommodation at one of the defendant’s hotels which it sought to reserve for Caucasians. The business offered him accommodation of equal standard at another of its hotels. The argument that on this account the plaintiff suffered no damage was held to be no answer to the plaintiff’s cause of action, since the right to be accommodated at a common inn was an absolute right, commonly enjoyed by all. Citing Constantine v Imperial Hotel Ltd, Spigelman CJ in the New South Wales Court of Appeal opined that racial discrimination may be a tort.2 So too may be torture.3 Other recognised cases are interference with a franchise, with an incorporeal hereditament such as an easement or profit,4 and with the right to vote at a parliamentary election.5 It is difficult to extract much of principle from the cases of franchises and absolute rights, which may seem to be historical survivals and which do not fit very securely with the rational structure of the modern law of torts. In the first two cases, Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 91 ER 1266 and Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd, the right may be protected only against the person primarily concerned to recognise or protect it, and then perhaps only against wilful refusal to recognise it by that person. The matter is untested. Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd [1936] Ch 343, on the other hand, recognises a right that is protected against persons generally and against conduct that involves no element of intention or negligence.7

1 2

3

Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd [1936] Ch 343 (CA); Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 91 ER 126. Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Estate of Russell (2002) 55 NSWLR 232; 118 IR 144; [2002] NSWCA 272, Spigelman CJ at [75] (Davies AJA agreeing), citing Constantine v Imperial Hotels Ltd [1944] KB 693. See generally Toohey J, “A Matter of Justice: Human Rights in Australian Law” (1998) 27 UWAL Rev 129; Witzleb N and Carroll R, “The Role of Vindication in Torts Damages” (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 16. Habib v Commonwealth (2010) 183 FCR 62; [2010] FCAFC 12.

717

[33.8.2170]

MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

4 5 6 7

Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd [1936] Ch 343 (CA). Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 91 ER 126. Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938; 91 ER 126. Nicholls v Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd [1936] Ch 343 (CA).

718

33.9 Defences

DEFENCES

Current Subtitle Author Gautam Mukherji LLB (Hons), BA Barrister, Victorian Bar (Updating author, Update 319 – June 2016) (Updating author, Update 309 – July 2015)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Robert C Evans LLB (Hons), LLM (Lond) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria Barrister, Inner Temple Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Melbourne (Updating author, Update 80 – August 1998) (Updating author, Update 43 – December 1996) (Joint original author)

John G Fleming DCL (Hons), LLD (Oxon) Formerly Dean and Robert Garran Professor of Law, Canberra, University College Turner Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley (Joint original author)

Dr Helen Grant LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD (Qld) Lecturer, TC Beirne School of Law University of Queensland (Updating author The Publisher and Author wish to thank Trevor Power for his research and contribution to the updated commentary of this Subtitle., Update 159 – November 2002)

Jonathon A Redwood BCom, LLB (Hons), LLM (Harv) Barrister and Member, New South Wales Bar, South Australian Bar and Victorian Bar (List A Barristers) Senior Fellow, University of Melbourne (Updating author, Update 218 – October 2007) (Updating author, Update 212 – April 2007)

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33.9 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...........................................................................[33.9.10] DEFINITION............................................................................. [33.9.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE.............................................................[33.9.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.......................................[33.9.30] INTENTIONAL TORTS...............................................................[33.9.140] MISTAKE................................................................................ [33.9.140] INEVITABLE ACCIDENT........................................................ [33.9.170] CONSENT.............................................................................. [33.9.200] INCAPACITY.......................................................................... [33.9.290] NECESSITY........................................................................... [33.9.340] RETENTION AND RE-ENTRY OF LAND.............................. [33.9.390] RETAKING GOODS............................................................... [33.9.400] DISCIPLINE............................................................................[33.9.440] LEGAL AUTHORITY...............................................................[33.9.480] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.......................................... [33.9.600] ILLEGALITY............................................................................[33.9.610] NEGLIGENCE............................................................................ [33.9.720] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.......................................... [33.9.720] VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK..................................[33.9.880] ILLEGALITY............................................................................[33.9.980]

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Introduction Definition [33.9.10] Defences to torts may be broadly categorised into defences relating to intentional torts and those available for negligent acts and omissions. There is, however, some interface between the older defences associated with intentional torts and the fault-based defences. Defences may be available for intentional interference with goods (detinue and conversion), trespass to land, goods and the person (assault and battery). Those defences give privilege in a number of circumstances to conduct which would otherwise be actionable. Liability for intentional torts has developed to reflect their origins in the old action of trespass, where proof of direct causation was sufficient to establish liability. A range of defences to intentional torts have emerged to qualify the idea of prima facie causal liability. Defences to actions in negligence reflect the different emphases in the law of negligence on fault as an element of liability. Liability often turns on the question of whether or not conduct gives rise to an unreasonable risk of harm. The available defences therefore have a more limited operation. The principal defence for negligent acts and omissions is the partial statutory-based defence of contributory negligence, emphasising allocation of responsibility on the basis of comparative fault: see [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. The complete defences of voluntary assumption of risk (see [33.9.880]–[33.9.970]) and illegality (see [33.9.980]–[33.9.990]) again place emphasis on the conduct of the claimant. The defences to actions in negligence are now substantially controlled by the various civil liability statutes passed in each of the Australian states and territories.

Scope of Subtitle [33.9.20] This Subtitle examines the defences available for intentional torts and for negligence generally. A range of defences relevant to intentional interference with goods (detinue and conversion), trespass to land, goods and the person (assault and battery), are considered. The differences between mistake and inevitable accident are explored at [33.9.140]–[33.9.190]. Applications of consent and incapacity as defences to otherwise intentional acts are analysed at [33.9.200]–[33.9.280] and [33.9.290]–[33.9.330] respectively. Necessity, self-defence, provocation, the defence of others and of property are considered at [33.9.340]–[33.9.380]. The circumstances where rights to re-enter land or to retake goods or property may be lawfully asserted are considered at [33.9.390]–[33.9.430]. 723

[33.9.20]

INTRODUCTION

The public policy based defence of discipline is considered as it applies to parents, teachers and in a military context: see [33.9.440]–[33.9.470]. Legal authority to commit what would otherwise amount to intentional torts are further based in public policy. That includes powers of entry onto land, of arrest and powers to seize property, which are covered by a range of statutory and common law protections: see [33.9.480]–[33.9.590]. Contributory negligence is not a good defence to an intentional tort (see [33.9.600]), although it is examined in detail in the context of negligence actions: see [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Illegality as applicable to intentional torts is found at [33.9.610], and to negligence at [33.9.980]–[33.9.990]. Voluntary assumption of risk is analysed as it operates in the context of negligence: see [33.9.880]–[33.9.970].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.9.30] The actions relating to the defences discussed in this Subtitle are examined separately in “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff and “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. The law of nuisance, which may be considered an intentional tort, is discussed in a separate Subtitle together with its peculiar defences: see “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. Where defences have a special application to a particular area of law, they are explored in detail in the relevant Title, for example within 27 Professional Liability. The general principles pertaining to defences in tort are otherwise contained in this Subtitle.

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Intentional Torts Mistake [33.9.140] In general, mistake provides no defence to intentional torts, whereas inevitable accident is a good defence. The distinction between mistake and inevitable accident is therefore important. Defendants who act mistakenly, even if reasonably, may be subject to liability: see [33.9.150]. Mistake may provide a defence if, in special circumstances, the belief was reasonable: see [33.9.160]. Defendants who plead inevitable accident must establish that they acted neither with intent to harm nor with fault: see [33.9.170]–[33.9.190]. [33.9.150] Mistake of fact or law is no defence to intentional torts, subject to exceptions.1 For example, an agent’s honest belief that a client has title to goods sought to be “repossessed” is no defence to an action in conversion by the true owner.2 In an action for intentional interference with goods (detinue and conversion), a defendant’s general intention to hold goods in the belief, for example, they are subject to a lien, will not constitute a defence if in fact no lien exists.3 The seizure by a police officer in good faith of goods to use as evidence without a relevant arrest or warrant cannot amount to a defence.4 Goods seized in the mistaken belief that they are the subject of a court order, and belong to the person named in the order when in fact they do not, will not exculpate the defendant.5 The defence is not available to a member of the public who makes an arrest in the mistaken belief that a crime has been committed.6 An official, holding a warrant for a person’s arrest, has no defence if another person is mistakenly arrested.7

1 2

3

4

5

Basely v Clarkson (1681) 3 Lev 37; 83 ER 565. Rendell v Associated Finance Pty Ltd [1957] VR 604 (FC); Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757 (broker); Consolidated Co v Curtis & Son [1892] 1 QB 495 (auctioneer). But see Wilson v New Brighton Panelbeaters Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 74 (HC). Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481, White J at 520–521. See generally “Conversion” [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]; “Detinue” [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]. Levine v O’Keefe [1930] VLR 70 (FC). See Ghani v Jones [1970] QB 693; [1969] 3 WLR 1158 where no warrant was required (considered in Puglisi v Australian Fisheries Management Authority (1997) 148 ALR 393). Glasspoole v Young (1829) 9 B & C 696; 109 ER 259.

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[33.9.150]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

6 7

Samuel v Payne (1780) 1 Doug 359; 99 ER 230; Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div). Hoye v Bush (1840) 1 Man & G 775; 133 ER 545; Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447 (FC). See generally Criminal Procedure “Arrest” [11.1.140]–[11.1.740].

[33.9.160] A reasonable belief may provide a defence to intentional torts. A police officer acting under a search warrant who seizes goods other than those specified in the warrant, in the reasonable belief that the goods are stolen, has a good defence.1 Likewise it would appear that an involuntary bailee is entitled to do what is right and reasonable in the circumstances provided the bailee has no intention to act inconsistently with the true owner’s title.2 An arrest by a police officer who is acting under the reasonable belief that the person arrested has committed an offence constitutes a defence to an action based on the lack of an offence.3 In Australia the powers of arrest are defined by both Commonwealth and State legislation: see [33.9.510]. The protection appears to be limited to the case of police officers. Defendants in that category are treated with greater leniency than otherwise prevails. The protection given to police officers reflects their duty to act on behalf of the public. They are given greater protection by statute than private citizens, who are discouraged from taking the law into their own hands. When a trespass is voluntary, liability usually ensues.4 A mistaken belief, however reasonable, that a defendant has a right to enter premises is no defence to trespass,5 as for example where someone who has no authority to grant permission gives a defendant “apparent” permission to enter the premises.6 The availability of the defence in various situations can only be comprehended “in light of the special reasons of policy or expediency bearing on the particular case”.7

1 Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd v Jones [1968] 2 QB 299; [1968] 2 WLR 201 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 313, Diplock LJ at 316, Salmon LJ at 321 (QB). See generally Criminal Procedure “Investigation of Persons and Places” [11.1.1390]–[11.1.3370]. 2 Elvin & Powell Ltd v Plummer Roddis Ltd (1933) 50 TLR 158 (KB) affirmed in James v Oxley (1939) 61 CLR 433; 39 SR (NSW) 70; 56 WN (NSW) 36, Latham CJ at 447 (CLR). See generally Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. 3 Beckwith v Philby (1827) 6 B & C 635; 108 ER 585. 4 Beckwith v Philby (1827) 6 B & C 635; 108 ER 585. See generally “Trespass” [33.8.300]–[33.8.600]. 5 Conway v George Wimpey & Co Ltd [1951] 2 KB 266, Asquith LJ at 273. 6 Conway v George Wimpey & Co Ltd [1951] 2 KB 266. 7 Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [5.20].

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[33.9.190]

INEVITABLE ACCIDENT

Inevitable Accident [33.9.170] Inevitable accident is a defence to intentional torts. It describes circumstances in which a defendant proves that the conduct was neither intentional nor negligent.1 This may be achieved by a defendant proving involuntary conduct (see [33.9.180]), or proving that the defendant is without fault: see [33.9.190].

1

McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 388 (CLR); Blacker v Waters (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 406; 45 WN (NSW) 111 (FC), Street CJ at 410 (SR (NSW)).

[33.9.180] Proof of involuntary conduct on the part of the defendant is a defence to intentional torts. In Public Transport Commission (NSW) v Perry (1977) 137 CLR 107; 51 ALJR 620, Gibbs J stated: [A] person who is lawfully upon premises, and is using the premises in an ordinary and reasonable way, becomes a trespasser only if he goes voluntarily on to a part of the premises to which the invitation does not extend: if he falls, or is pushed, on to a forbidden area he does not thereby become a trespasser.1

For example, a defendant’s mental state may be such that they are incapable of realising that a gun being held is loaded with a live cartridge, and thereby incapable of forming sufficient intent.2 A driver who is stung on the nose by a bee and crashes may be excused liability when there is no opportunity of responding to the critical situation.3 Similarly, a driver who suffers a blackout while driving, and had no reason to suspect the existence of a cardiac weakness which might suddenly result in a collision, may succeed on the defence of inevitable accident.4 However, where there is an opportunity to pull over at the onset of ill-health or a sudden emergency, a driver will be at fault in not taking the opportunity.5

1 2 3 4 5

Public Transport Commission (NSW) v Perry (1977) 137 CLR 107; 51 ALJR 620, Gibbs J at 133 (CLR) (epileptic fit). Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131 (SC) (mental state); Hogan v Gill [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-182 (QSC) (six-year-old boy). Scholz v Standish [1961] SASR 123. Smith v Lord [1962] SASR 88. Leahy v Beaumont (1981) 27 SASR 290 (FC).

[33.9.190] The Australian position on the burden of proof in a trespass action is uncertain. The traditional position has been that the burden is on the defendant to establish that the act was neither intentional nor the result of negligence once the plaintiff has proved a direct injury caused by the

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[33.9.190]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

defendant.1 An early exception was made for accidents on a highway, so that the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish either intention or negligence.2 English courts later extended that rule to all cases of trespass.3 The Australian position has been applied in some cases but questioned in academic literature and by some judges in other decisions.4

1 Blacker v Waters (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 406; 45 WN (NSW) 111 (CA); McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 388 (CLR); Tsouvalla v Bini [1966] SASR 157; Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC), Bray CJ at 310–316. 2 Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC) (not argued on appeal to the High Court in Chin v Venning (1975) 49 ALJR 378, but supported by Gibbs J at 379); Lord v Nominal Defendant (1980) 24 SASR 458 (FC), Mitchell J at 468. 3 Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; [1964] 3 WLR 573 (CA) applying the reasoning of Lord Diplock in Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426; [1959] 2 WLR 241; League Against Cruel Sports Ltd v Scott [1986] QB 240; [1985] 3 WLR 400. The English position has been followed in Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131 (SC), McGregor J at 138–139. 4 Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156, Gibbs CJ at 619 (CLR); Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 (CA), Kirby P at 240; Dale v Fox [2012] TASSC 84, Evans J at [37]; Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [5.30], [5.90]; Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) p 34; Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [2.13]–[2.20].

Consent [33.9.200] The preferred view in Australia is that consent by a plaintiff to an intentional tort constitutes a defence rather than being a tortious element of a trespass claim.1 This approach has been taken in a number of Supreme Court decisions, as well as being supported in a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.2 It was also the preferred approach of McHugh J in Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300.3 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551; (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 1 has concluded that the defendant must prove that the bodily contact was the product of volitional consent. The basis for the Canadian decision is that any interference with the body of another without their consent will be a violation of the right to personal autonomy.4 The position in Australia and Canada can be contrasted with the position in England and New Zealand. In these jurisdictions, consent operates as a tortious element to be made out by the plaintiff.5 The English courts have concluded that

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[33.9.210]

CONSENT

the absence of consent is inherent in the notion of a tortious invasion. For a plaintiff to succeed, they must, therefore, prove a prima facie violation of the plaintiff’s personal autonomy and that a reasonable person would have perceived the defendant’s actions to be carried out without the plaintiff’s consent. The necessary consent may be express or implied from conduct, but must be genuine. In general terms, this defence is similar to the consent required to make out a defence to a cause of action in negligence: see [33.9.880]. However, the differing essential ingredients of the causes of action require a separate treatment in respect of each.6

1

2 3 4 5 6

Hart v Herron [1984] Aust Torts Reports 80-201 (NSWSC); Sibley v Milutinovic [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-013 (ACTSC); McNamara v Duncan (1971) 45 FLR 152 (ACTSC); Cusack v Stayt (2000) 31 MVR 517; [2000] NSWCA 244. Cusack v Stayt (2000) 31 MVR 517; [2000] NSWCA 244, Heydon J at [13] (Meagher JA and Foster AJA agreeing). Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, McHugh J at 311 (CLR). Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] 1 SCR 551; (2000) 185 DLR (4th) 1, McLachlin J at 565–566 (SCR). Freeman v Home Offıce (No 2) [1984] QB 524; [1984] 2 WLR 802 (CA); H v The Queen [1996] 1 NZLR 299 (HC); S v G [1995] 3 NZLR 681 (CA). Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; 31 ALJR 820.

[33.9.210] Consent to a criminal act such as assault and/or battery may be a defence in civil proceedings, even though the consent would not necessarily preclude criminal responsibility.1 However, in some cases of assault where the injury is so serious that it amounts at criminal law to grievous bodily harm, murder or manslaughter, consent may not provide a defence in civil proceedings. In such cases, the interests of public policy to proscribe unlawful conduct outweigh an individual’s rights.2 That is akin to the defence of illegality (see [33.9.610]), where public policy prevents a plaintiff or defendant from relying on consent in a claim based on illegal conduct. Acts “reasonably necessary for the common intercourse of life”3 and “properly conducted games and sports, lawful chastisement or correction, [and] reasonable surgical interference”4 are all lawful in relation to what would otherwise be an assault and battery in criminal law. However, prize fighting is clearly unlawful despite the presence of consent. Similarly, in contact sports a brawl outside the rules of the game may not be protected by consent.5

1

Bain v Altoft [1967] Qd R 32 (FC), Gibbs J at 41. See generally Criminal Offences “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff.

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[33.9.210]

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2

3 4 5

Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331, McInerney J at 340; R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 WLR 556. But see Hegarty v Shine (1878) 4 LR Ir 288 (CA), Ball LC at 294. In Victoria in Neal v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 454; 213 A Crim R 190, the Court of Appeal at [70] noted the position in Canada as consistent with Australia and New Zealand by reference to R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371; 141 DLR (4th) 503. In this case the Supreme Court of Canada held that that any apparent consent to sexual intercourse would be vitiated by “fraud” if the accused’s failure to disclose his HIV positive status were dishonest and had the effect of exposing his sexual partner to a significant risk of serious bodily harm. Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10; 60 ALJR 422; 20 A Crim R 156, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ at 27 (CLR). Attorney-General’s (UK) Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; [1981] 3 WLR 125 (CA), Lord Lane CJ at 719 (QB). Giumelli v Johnston [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-085 (SASCFC), King CJ (for the Court) at 68,709–68,710. See also [33.9.240].

[33.9.220] Express consent may be given in many circumstances to provide a defence to what would otherwise be an intentional tort.1 In practice, express consent will often involve consensual arrangement. An example is a patient agreeing to a physical examination by a medical practitioner or authorising a surgeon to operate.2 A failure to fully inform a patient of the risks involved in medical procedures does not vitiate consent provided the patient is “advised in broad terms of the nature of the procedure to be performed”.3 Some authority suggests that consent is vitiated in elective surgery when an operation is not performed by an appropriate specialist, and is performed without information about scarring and pain.4 However, once consent has been given for medical procedures, the action sounds in negligence and not in assault and battery.5 In Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2 WLR 480, Lord Diplock commented that: Consent to battery is a state of mind personal to the victim of the battery and any information required to make his consent qualify as informed must be relevant information either actually possessed by him or which he is estopped from denying he possessed, because he so acted towards the defendant as to lead to the latter reasonably to assume the relevant information was known to him.6

The better view is that there is no distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic treatment.7 Consent by both adults and minors for the removal of human tissue (including blood) for transplantation is governed by legislation in all Australian jurisdictions.8

1 S (an infant) v S [1972] AC 24; [1970] 3 WLR 366, Lord Reid at 43, Lord Hodson at 57 (AC); T v T [1988] Fam 52; [1988] 2 WLR 189. 2 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, King CJ at 190. See Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). 3 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson,

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[33.9.230]

4 5

6

7

8

CONSENT

Toohey and McHugh JJ at 490 (CLR) affirmed in Reeves v The Queen (2013) 88 ALJR 215; [2013] HCA 57. This may be contrasted with the position in the United States of America (insofar as it is possible to discern a common or dominant approach among the various United States jurisdictions) where courts have held that what is required to avoid a charge of battery and assault is consent based on knowledge of all the facts relevant to the formation of an intelligent and informed consent: see Canterbury v Spence, 464 F 2d 772 (1972). See Professional Liability “Duty to Inform and Advise” [27.2.610]–[27.2.630]. D v S (1981) 93 LSJS 405 (SASC). Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2 WLR 480, Lord Scarman at 883, Lord Diplock at 892 (AC). See generally Professional Liability “Negligence” [27.2.550]–[27.2.920]. Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2 WLR 480, Lord Diplock at 894 (AC). See also Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 (CA), where Samuels JA at 578 said that “consent is of relevance only in relation to the cause of action in assault since the remedy for failure to warn lies in an action in negligence”. When the action is in negligence for failure to warn, the issue is one of the standard of information required to give a patient an informed choice. See Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Informed Decisions about Medical Procedures, Report No 24 (Law Reform Commission of Victoria, 1989) (available from https://www.alrc.gov.au, viewed 27 May 2016). Gold v Haringey Health Authority [1988] QB 481; [1987] 3 WLR 649 (CA). See also the doubts expressed about the distinction in Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300. Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT); Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (NT); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA); Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas); Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic); Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA). Significantly, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 10(c) and Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 10(2) provide for the right of a person not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without their full, free and informed consent. This means not only must the consent be voluntary but the person concerned must have been given sufficient information for an informed decision to be made. This might be interpreted to involve information such as the nature of the person’s condition and the treatment options available involving explanations of possible risks, side-effects and benefits of the treatment.

[33.9.230] The doctrine of consent retains primacy over the interests of an unborn child. This occurs even though, for example, a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment may endanger the life of her unborn child. In the English1 and Canadian2 jurisdictions, the courts have made clear that the interests of an unborn child will not be elevated over and above the common law rights of pregnant women, whose autonomy is protected by the doctrine of consent. Judge LJ stated in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 that:

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[33.9.230]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

[W]hile pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of a woman it does not diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment. … She is entitled not to be forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her will, whether her own life or that of her unborn child depends on it.3

The Court of Appeal’s decision in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S does recognise that in a number of different ways an unborn child is protected by law.4 However, it is not a separate person from its mother and as such, its right to protection cannot prevail over the right of the mother to personal autonomy, even if the life of the unborn child depends upon it.5 The Court acknowledged that to some the failure to act “may appear morally repugnant”6 and “[m]any doctors would believe that for them to do nothing in the face of such intransigence, at least for the sake of the unborn child, was not consistent with the ethics which underpin their profession”.7 However, the Court held that the right to bodily integrity requires protection and as the legislation in question did not authorise the admission and detention of the mother against her will, these actions were unlawful.8 In rendering this decision, the Court of Appeal referred to the earlier cases of Re T (adult: refusal of treatment) [1993] Fam 95; [1992] 3 WLR 7829 and Re S (adult: refusal of treatment) [1993] Fam 123; [1992] 3 WLR 806,10 finding that the decisions did not correctly reflect the existing state of the law.11 According to the Court, the decisions failed to consider that at common law, a child in utero has no legal rights until born alive. Canadian authority also favours the view that the rights of the mother are paramount12 with importance once again being based upon the lack of legal rights possessed by a child until born alive.13 Australian legislation which prohibits abortion,14 or prohibits procuring an abortion for someone else,15 and in this way recognises the right to protection of a foetus, does not override a pregnant woman’s right to autonomy and refusal of treatment. A woman’s decision to refuse treatment does not constitute an abortion. The common law in Australia, like the common law in England and Canada, does not recognise an unborn child as a human being until it is born and born alive.16 The position in the United States of America is more complicated because of constitutional substantive due process considerations that recognise an unborn child as a human being capable of existence independently from the mother’s womb after the first trimester.17 No Australian court, however, has yet been required to rule upon the matter. Until that time comes, the issue is still open in Australia.18

1 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA). 2 Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v G [1997] 3 SCR 925; (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 193; Re Baby R (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 69 (BCSC); Re A (1990) 72 DLR (4th) 722 (ONUFC). 3 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), Judge LJ (for the Court) at 50 (Fam).

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[33.9.230]

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18

CONSENT

St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), the Court at 50 (Fam); Re MB (caesarean section) [1997] 2 FCR 541 (CA). St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), the Court at 50 (Fam). St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), the Court at 50 (Fam). St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), the Court at 52–53 (Fam). St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), the Court at 50, 51, 57, 58, 62 (Fam). Re T (adult: refusal of treatment) [1993] Fam 95; [1992] 3 WLR 782 (CA). Re S (adult: refusal of treatment) [1993] Fam 123; [1992] 3 WLR 806. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA), the Court at 48 (Fam). Instead, the Court at 47–48 (Fam) endorsed the assessment of the law in Re MB (caesarean section) [1997] 2 FCR 541 (CA). See also Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276; [1978] 3 WLR 687; C v S [1988] QB 135; [1987] 2 WLR 1108; Re F (in utero) [1988] Fam 122; [1988] 2 WLR 1288 (CA). Re Baby R (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 69 (BCSC); Re A (1990) 72 DLR (4th) 722 (ONUFC); Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v G [1997] 3 SCR 925; (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 193. Re Baby R (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 69 (BCSC); Re A (1990) 72 DLR (4th) 722 (ONUFC), Steinberg UFCJ at 729; Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v G [1997] 3 SCR 925; (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 193, Lamer CJ, La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Lacobucci JJ at 939, 941, 954, 955 (SCR). Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 82 – 84; Criminal Code (Qld), ss 224 – 226 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), ss 81 – 82A; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 65 – 66; Criminal Code (WA), s 199 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule). The offence of abortion has been abolished in Tasmania: Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) (now repealed) and in the Australian Capital Territory: Crimes (Abolition of Offence of Abortion) Act 2002 (ACT) (now repealed). However, an offence of child destruction exists: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 42. In Victoria the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 65(1) makes it an offence for an unqualified practitioner to perform an abortion while s 66 abolishes any rules of common law giving rise to an offence for procuring an abortion. Criminal Code (NT), ss 208A, 208B, 208C (found in Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT), Schedule 1). X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 (CA), Clarke JA at 38; Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Kerr v T [1983] 1 Qd R 404 (FC), the Court at 407; Attorney-General (Qld); Ex rel Kerr v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285, Gibbs CJ at 286; Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353 (FC), Winneke CJ, Pape J at 360–361. See also R v King (2003) 59 NSWLR 472; 139 A Crim R 132; [2003] NSWCCA 399, Spigelman CJ at [70]–[76], referred to in Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15, Crennan J at [245]. See “The Unborn” [33.2.1380]–[33.2.1400]. The seminal and controversial decision being Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 US 833 (1992). For further discussion of this issue, refer to Scott R, “Maternal Duties Toward the

733

[33.9.230]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Unborn? Soundings from the Law of Tort” (2000) 8 Med L Rev 1; Reed H, “A Pregnant Woman’s Rights Versus a Foetus’ Rights: What Is the Australian Position?” (1996) 4 JLM 165.

[33.9.240] Consent may be implied from circumstances. For example, consent may be implied when a person engages in a sporting activity or presents an arm for vaccination. In sporting events, provided that undue force is not used, a plaintiff is taken to have consented to “such violence as is ordinarily and reasonably to be contemplated as incidental to the sport in question”.1 In such circumstances the injury would constitute neither a criminal nor a civil wrong.2 Where the injury, however, is incurred contrary to the rules of the sport, “a player is not to be taken as having consented to prohibited acts, even although it is known that they may, and probably will occur”.3 In Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 59 ALJR 124; 13 A Crim R 250, the High Court described the circumstances where a consent or licence to enter land will be implied as a matter of law: The most common instance of such an implied licence relates to the means of access, whether path, driveway or both, leading to the entrance of the ordinary suburban dwelling house. If the path or driveway leading to the entrance of such a dwelling is left unobstructed and with entrance gate unlocked and there is no notice or other indication that entry by visitors generally or particularly designated visitors is forbidden or unauthorized, the law will imply a licence in favour of any member of the public to go upon the path or driveway to the entrance of the dwelling for the purpose of lawful communication with, or delivery to, any person in the house. Such an implied or tacit licence can be precluded or at any time revoked by express or implied refusal or withdrawal of it.4

In Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231 the High Court applied the principles in Halliday v Nevill in holding that where consent is withdrawn, there is no right at common law (or implied statutory right under a facultative statute prescribing the manner of service of a summons) for a police officer to enter private land to serve a summons.5 Provided there is no indication by a fence or notice that entry is forbidden, consent is implied for a person entering property unintentionally, to avoid an obstruction on the footpaths, to recover an item which has fallen or blown upon the land or to recover a straying child or animal.6 The permission is implied not imputed. It must have a basis in evidence or at least in the common behaviour of the community.7 When a person enters or holds the property of another by consent, conditions may be imposed or implied. In relation to goods and land, the term “leave and licence” is used for consent in the old pleadings.

1 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331, McInerney J at 339; Hilton v Wallace [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-231 (QSC).

734

[33.9.250]

2 3

4 5

6 7

CONSENT

Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1) [1976] VR 331 (boxing). McNamara v Duncan (1971) 45 FLR 152 (FCA), Fox J at 158. See also [33.9.210]; Sibley v Milutinovic [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-013 (ACTSC), Miles CJ at 67,688. Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; 59 ALJR 124; 13 A Crim R 250, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ at 7 (CLR). The merits of the decision is considered by Goode M, “Trespass to Land by Police Attempting to Serve a Summons” (1993) 1 TLJ 1. See Waters v Maynard (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 618; 41 WN (NSW) 166 (entry by a sheriff or bailiff under a warrant or writ of execution confers a legal right to enter premises and remain there in charge of the goods subject to the warrant or writ until the execution is satisfied). Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231; Arthur v Anker [1997] QB 564; [1996] 2 WLR 602 (CA) (car parking notice). Munnings v Barrett [1987] Tas R 80, Cosgrove J at 87 (Tas R).

[33.9.250] Consent must be real in the sense of genuine. Consent obtained by threat of force provides no defence.1 Similarly, there is no genuine consent to medical procedures when consent is obtained under sedation following earlier refusals.2 Mental duress without actual or threatened force does not vitiate consent, for example, when it is obtained in a coercive relationship of employment3 or imprisonment.4 Consent requires a comprehension of the nature and character of the act.5 Consent is ineffective when the act performed is of a materially different nature. Fraud may render consent ineffective when the act consented to is not the act done. For example, consent to a surgical operation is not consent to sexual intercourse.6 Where fraud induces consent to a particular act or its consequences, but the act performed is not materially different, the consent so obtained provides a valid defence to a trespass action. For example, fraudulent representations about marital status or non-disclosure of sexual disease do not turn permitted acts of bodily contact into trespasses.7 Nevertheless, the fraud itself may be actionable.8 In the absence of direct authority, where acts have life threatening consequences, there should be no real consent without full disclosure of the facts rendering the acts harmful.9

1 2

3 4 5 6 7

S (an infant) v S [1972] AC 24; [1970] 3 WLR 366, Lord Reid at 43, Lord Hodson at 57 (AC). Beausoleil v La Communaute des Soeurs de la Charité de la Providence (1964) 53 DLR (2d) 65 (QBCA); Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226; (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449 (consent to sexual favours vitiated by unequal bargaining position due to patient’s drug dependence). Latter v Braddell (1881) 44 LT 369 (CA). Freeman v Home Offıce (No 2) [1984] QB 524; [1984] 2 WLR 802 (CA). Freeman v Home Offıce (No 2) [1984] QB 524; [1984] 2 WLR 802 (CA). R v Flattery (1877) 2 QBD 410; R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340 (CA). Hegarty v Shine (1878) 4 LR Ir 288 (QBCA); R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 (CA) (both sexual disease); McGrath v Marshall (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 106 (FC);

735

[33.9.250]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

8

9

Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249 (both marital status). However, it should be noted that R v Clarence has been largely discredited. To the extent that R v Clarence suggested that consensual sexual intercourse of itself was to be regarded as consent to the risk of the consequence of sexual disease, it is outdated and no longer authoritative: see R v Dica [2004] QB 1257; [2004] 3 WLR 213; [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. See also R v Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413. McGrath v Marshall (1898) 14 WN (NSW) 106 (FC); Garnaut v Rowse (1941) 43 WALR 29; Smythe v Reardon [1949] St R Qd 74. See generally Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff. See Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [5.50]; Kaganas F, “Compensation for AIDS Victims” (1987) 16 Anglo-Am L Rev 117.

[33.9.260] Consent may be conditional. Permission to enter land, hold goods or touch another person may be limited in scope and degree. In Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426, Mason J stated: If the right or authority to enter is limited in scope then an entry which is unrelated to the right or authority will amount to a trespass. Thus a person who has an invitation or permission to enter the land of another for a specific purpose commits a trespass if he enters for any other purpose, especially if that other purpose be an unlawful purpose.1

Any divergence from the terms of consent will remove the defence in the absence of any other justification. A surgeon has no defence if, permission having been granted for a first operation, a second operation is performed on the grounds of convenience rather than necessity.2 A dentist who carries out dental surgery when they are solely motivated by an unrevealed non-therapuetic purpose will commit assault and battery since the patient’s consent is invalidated by the undisclosed and improper motive.3 A person with a contract to cut timber who exceeds the quantity permitted loses the protection of the permit.4 A condition imposed by notice may place a defendant in the position of being unable to deny knowledge of that condition.5

1 Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338; 57 ALJR 426, Mason J at 342 (CLR). See also Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280. 2 Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442 (BCSC). See also McDonald v Ludwig [2007] QSC 28. 3 White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18. 4 Bond v Kelly (1873) 4 AJR 153 (VFC) (cited in Blay S, Gibson A, and Richards B, Torts Law in Principle (4th ed, Thomson Lawbook Co., 2005) at [7.50]. See also Singh v Smithenbecker (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 207; 40 WN (NSW) 11 (FC); Willcox v Kettell [1937] 1 All ER 222 in relation to consequences of exceeding a permit/licence more generally. 5 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2 WLR 480, Lord Diplock at 894 (AC); Arthur v Anker [1997] QB 564; [1996] 2 WLR 602 (CA).

736

[33.9.280]

CONSENT

[33.9.270] Consent may be revoked.1 Provided the revocation is valid, any defence based on consent fails. A contractual licence to enter land without grant of a proprietary interest is revocable at will even in breach of contract.2 Nevertheless, a defendant must be allowed a reasonable amount of time for compliance after the communication of a revocation.3 In false imprisonment actions based on revocation of consent, a reasonable compliance may depend on the inconvenience to which the defendant would be put as balanced against the harm suffered by the plaintiff.4 When chattels are involved similar principles may apply, for example, a right to repossess may be circumscribed by an artificer’s lien.5

1 2

3

4

5

Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 638 (CLR); Mackay v Abrahams [1916] VLR 681. Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605. Note however, that the operation of this statement is limited: see Humphries v Southern Cross Ski Club [2012] VSC 232, Judd J at [58]; Porter v Hannah Builders Pty Ltd [1969] VR 673. But see Heidke v Sydney City Council (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 143; 18 LGR (NSW) 180; 69 WN (NSW) 56. Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153, Brooking J at 155; Shair Mahomet v Commissioner of Railways (1903) 5 WALR 107, The Chief Justice at 112–113, McMillan J at 115–117. Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd v Robertson (Balmain Ferry Case) (1906) 4 CLR 379; 7 SR (NSW) 372 (affirmed in Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd [1910] AC 295 (PC)); Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co Ltd [1915] AC 67. Bolwell Fibreglass Pty Ltd v Foley [1984] VR 97 (FC).

[33.9.280] If consent is a defence (see [33.9.200]), the better view is that the defendant bears the burden of proof. In the English case of Christopherson v Bare (1848) 11 QB 473; 116 ER 554, the Court, on a preliminary issue on the defendant’s pleadings, had ruled out the defendant’s “leave and licence” defence to an assault. The ruling was made on the basis that the plaintiff had put in issue that the assault and false imprisonment had been against his will. The defendant should have pleaded not guilty and put the consent issue to the test.1 As a matter of prudence a defendant should take on the burden of proof by pleading consent, when appropriate, even if a plaintiff does not put the matter in issue.2 Support for the view that the burden lies on the defendant is found in the decision of Miles CJ in Sibley v Milutinovic [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-013.3 In a game of soccer, it was held that the burden of proof lay on the person making an injury-producing tackle to establish the consent of the injured person. The issue was considered at length by Leeming JA in White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18,4 a case in which it was held that a patient

737

[33.9.280]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

who alleges that a medical practitioner has fraudulently procured a patient’s consent bears the onus of establishing that fraud.

1 Christopherson v Bare (1848) 11 QB 473; 116 ER 554, Coleridge J at 477–478 (QB). See White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [93]–[130]. 2 Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [5.30]; Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) p 36. But see Blay SKN, “Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person” (1987) 61 ALJ 25. 3 Sibley v Milutinovic [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-013 (ACTSC). See also Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, McHugh J at 310 (CLR). McNamara v Duncan (1971) 45 FLR 152 (ACTSC); Schweizer v Central Hospital (1974) 53 DLR (3d) 494 (ONHC); Kelly v Hazlett (1976) 75 DLR (3d) 536 (ONHC); Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634 (ONHC). 4 White v Johnston (2015) 87 NSWLR 779; [2015] NSWCA 18, Leeming JA at [93]–[130].

Incapacity [33.9.290] Minority provides no automatic immunity from suit. A child “is personally liable for the consequences of his wrongful acts. That is certainly so if he was old enough … to know better”.1 For a successful defence, a minor must be able to establish an inability to understand the nature of the act. This would seem to indicate that a defence based on incapacity would only cover the very young up to about four years of age, the question being one of capacity. No such defence is available to the aged.2

1 McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384; 38 ALJR 267, Windeyer J at 386 (CLR) (12-year-old not liable on burden of proof for trespass to person; findings were not disturbed on appeal to the Full Court of the High Court on negligence issues: McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; 39 ALJR 459); Smith v Leurs [1944] SASR 213 (13-year-old liable for trespass to the person; finding not disturbed on appeal to the High Court on issues of parental liability: Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256). 2 See comments of Kourakis CJ in Allen v Chadwick (2014) 120 SASR 350; [2014] SASCFC 100 at [26] which was the subject of appeal to the High Court in Allen v Chadwick (2015) 90 ALJR 138; [2015] HCA 47) however this issue was not considered.

738

[33.9.300]

INCAPACITY

[33.9.300] The consent of a minor to an act that would otherwise be an intentional tort raises a different standard. At common law and in the absence of specific legislation regulating the consent of minors, it is not enough that the minor understand the nature of consent. The child must have achieved a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable them to fully understand the nature and implications of the proposed treatment.1 Lord Scarman stated the law as follows: The parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed. It will be a question of fact whether a child seeking advice has sufficient understanding of what is involved to give a consent valid in law. Until the child achieves the capacity to consent, the parental right to make the decision continues save only in exceptional circumstances. Emergency, parental neglect, abandonment of the child, or inability to find the parent are examples of exceptional circumstances justifying the doctor proceeding to treat the child without parental knowledge and consent.2

Lord Scarman also pointed out that, subject to any statutory provision, a minor’s capacity to make his or her own decision depends upon the minor having sufficient understanding and intelligence to make the decision and is not to be determined by reference to any judiciary fixed age limit.3

Furthermore, a majority of the House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830 held that the common law right of a minor with sufficient understanding and intelligence to consent to treatment would be effective not only in the absence of the consent and knowledge of their parents but also in the face of the express denial of consent by the parents. It followed in that case that Mrs Gillick’s (mother of five girls aged under 16 years living within the area of the relevant health clinic) attempt to ensure that no girl aged under 16 years could lawfully be given the contraceptive pill without parental consent consequently failed. The effect of the decision has been interpreted by subsequent judicial decisions in England as being that a minor of any age who is “Gillick competent” in the context of particular treatment has a right to consent to that treatment, which cannot be overridden by those with parental responsibility, but can be overridden by a court.4 The High Court of Australia is of the view that Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority correctly reflects the common law in this country.5 However, a question arises as to whether a minor who satisfies the test of competency in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority is entitled to refuse to consent to medical treatment in certain circumstances where consent to treatment has been provided by someone who has parental responsibility for the minor. The approach in the United Kingdom is that a child’s right to deal with their own body upon the ground that they are “Gillick

739

[33.9.300]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

competent”, does not extend to the refusal of treatment. In Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64; [1992] 3 WLR 758, a 16-year-old girl who suffered from anorexia nervosa was found not to be able to refuse treatment. The Court concluded that no minor, no matter their age or maturity, has the capacity to override consent to treatment given by someone who has parental responsibility for the minor or the court (at least in a life threatening situation), although the child’s view is an important consideration.6 It is unclear whether this proposition would be followed by the High Court of Australia so as to reflect the common law of this country. Obiter comments of McHugh J, however, suggest that at least as far as parental consent is concerned, any suggestion that the parent’s control over the decisions of a child is not extinguished upon the child attaining sufficient maturity to make an informed decision, is inconsistent with Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority.7 As far as the court’s ability to override a decision of a minor is concerned, the Supreme Court of New South Wales was prepared to do so in Director General of Department of Community Services (NSW) v Y [1999] NSWSC 644. Austin J exercised the Court’s parens patriae8 jurisdiction to override the wishes of a 15-year-old child to refuse medical treatment for anorexia nervosa. Austin J referred to the approach taken by the English Courts, and determined that the Court is able to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to countermand the wishes of the child if necessary, although this power should be exercised sparingly.9 Austin J’s decision, however, was based on the premise that the child, due to her illness, was not competent.10 Clear authority does not exist in Australia as to whether a court is able to override the wishes of a child of sufficient maturity when they are competent. In X v Sydney Children’s Hospital Network (2013) 85 NSWLR 294; [2013] NSWCA 320 the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the question of whether the Court could exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to override the wishes of a 17 year old who had refused treatment, and had been found at first instance to be competent.11 The Court held that a finding that a minor was competent did not limit the Court’s power to grant relief under the parens patriae jurisdiction, and nor did it limit the scope of the jurisdiction.12 Legislation exists in the case of New South Wales and South Australia recognising that a child under 18 years of age may validly consent to medical treatment.13 The New South Wales legislation has the effect of absolving a medical practitioner from liability (assault and/or battery) if the minor who has provided consent is over 14 years of age or if a parent has provided consent and the child is under 16 years of age.14 It will not resolve the issue of, for example, a dispute between parent and child as to consent.15 Section 12 of the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) provides that a medical practitioner, providing they obtain a supporting written opinion of at least one other practitioner who has personally examined the child, can perform medical treatment with a minor’s consent if they are of the opinion that the minor is capable of understanding the nature, consequences and risks of the procedure 740

[33.9.300]

INCAPACITY

and the procedure is in the best interests of the health and well-being of the minor. Pursuant to s 4 of the Act, a child is defined as a person under 16 years of age. Consequently, a minor over 16 years of age could validly consent without the doctor being required to adhere to the requirements of s 12. A number of Acts also exist which overcome the issue of consent with respect to the administering of a blood transfusion to a child. The relevant legislation permits doctors to administer a blood transfusion despite a refusal by parent or child, or if the parents cannot be located to grant consent, subject to two doctors agreeing that the transfusion is necessary to save the life of the minor.16 In New South Wales and South Australia, the legislation is wider, authorising emergency medical treatment.17 It is important in referring to any State or Territory legislation in this area to note that it operates subject to the High Court decision of P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583; 68 ALJR 449, that is, any State or Territory legislation that is inconsistent with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and therefore the “best interests” test, is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency: see s 109 of the Constitution. Until a child reaches the level of maturity at which they possess sufficient understanding and intelligence to consent, then generally, consent lies in the hands of the parents. In exercising this authority, parents must act in the best interests of the child.18 Should the parent or guardian refuse treatment and the treatment is determined by the court to be in the best interests of the child, the court may make an order consenting to and sanctioning the treatment.19 Decisions with respect to non-therapeutic procedures, for example sterilisation of a child, are beyond the capacity of parents.20 In these cases, the Family Law Act 1975 confers a general jurisdiction on a relevant body, the Family Court, to make orders in the best interests of the child.21 In the case of New South Wales, s 175 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) provides that the consent of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal22 must be obtained before special medical treatment is carried out on children under the age of 16 years, for example, sterilisation and long term injectable hormonal substances for contraception or menstruation regulation, unless it is a situation of emergency. The State legislation is, however, subordinate to the Family Law Act 1975, and consequently a person may choose to seek authorisation from the Family Court and not the Guardianship Tribunal.23 The Supreme Courts of the States and Territories also possess an inherent common law jurisdiction, parens patriae, to act in the best interests of a child.24 The State and Territory courts have been prepared to use this jurisdiction to supplement the legislation authorising treatment of a child, for example, the administration of a blood transfusion prior to an emergency situation arising.25 However, any such powers, deriving as they originally do from the royal prerogative or the

741

[33.9.300]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

common law, are subject to being overridden by inconsistent statutory provisions.26

1 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830, Lord Scarman at 189 (AC). 2 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830, Lord Scarman at 188–189 (AC). 3 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830, Lord Scarman at 188 (AC). 4 In Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64; [1992] 3 WLR 758, Lord Donaldson MR at 83–84 (Fam). 5 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ at 237–238 (CLR). See also Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 43; [2004] HCA 49, Gleeson CJ at [30]. 6 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64; [1992] 3 WLR 758 (CA), Lord Donaldson at 84 (Fam). See also Re R (a minor) (wardship: consent to treatment) [1992] Fam 11; [1991] 3 WLR 592 (CA): a 15-year-old psychiatric patient who in moments of lucidity refused consent to the proposed treatment was found not to be “Gillick competent” (Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 WLR 830). 7 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, McHugh J at 316–317 (CLR). 8 Parens patriae: “[P]arent of the country. The expression is used to describe the Crown in certain legal contexts”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 126; “parens patriae, having the care of those who are not able to take care of themselves”: Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1; 38 ER 236, Lord Chancellor Eldon at 243 (ER), cited with approval in Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ at 258 (CLR). 9 Director General of Department of Community Services (NSW) v Y [1999] NSWSC 644, Austin J at [100]–[102]. 10 Director General of Department of Community Services (NSW) v Y [1999] NSWSC 644, Austin J at [103]. 11 X v Sydney Children’s Hospital Network (2013) 85 NSWLR 294; [2013] NSWCA 320, Basten JA at [23]. 12 X v Sydney Children’s Hospital Network (2013) 85 NSWLR 294; [2013] NSWCA 320, Basten JA at [45]–[47]. For further discussion of a child’s capacity to consent to and/or refuse treatment, see Bunney L, “The Capacity of Competent Minors to Consent to and Refuse Medical Treatment” (1997) 5 JLM 52. 13 Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW), s 49; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s 12. 14 Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW), s 49; Emergency Medical Operations Act 1973 (NT), s 3. 15 K v Minister for Youth & Community Services [1982] 1 NSWLR 311. 16 Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT), s 23; Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld), s 20; Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas), s 21; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic), s 24; Human Tissue and Transplant Act 1982 (WA), s 21.

742

[33.9.310]

INCAPACITY

17 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), s 174; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s 13. 18 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ at 240, McHugh J at 316 (CLR). 19 See, eg Re R [2000] 2 Qd R 328, in which Lee J consented to a blood transfusion by the Court where the parents had consented to essential surgery but not the administering of blood transfusions to their child on the grounds of their religious beliefs; Re Elizabeth (1989) 96 FLR 248 (FamCA); P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583; 68 ALJR 449; Re Katie (1995) 128 FLR 194 (FamCA), which are examples of the Court determining that sterilisation was in the best interests of the child. Compare Re L and M; Director-General of Department of Family Services & Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (Intervener) (1993) 17 Fam LR 357 (FamCA). 20 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ at 249, 250 (CLR). 21 Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ at 253 (CLR); P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583; 68 ALJR 449, Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 597–598 (CLR); Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421 (FamCA) (a court ordered consent was granted in accordance with the wishes of the child that his bone marrow be harvested to assist in the treatment of his aunt for leukaemia); Re Katie (1995) 128 FLR 194 (FamCA); Re L and M; Director-General of Department of Family Services & Aboriginal & Islander Affairs (Intervener) (1993) 17 Fam LR 357 (FamCA). 22 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 29. 23 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), Pt 5; P v P (1994) 181 CLR 583; 68 ALJR 449, where the High Court determined that any State legislation which is inconsistent with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency: see Constitution, s 109. 24 Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1; 38 ER 236, Lord Chancellor Eldon at 243 (ER), cited with approval in Secretary of Department of Health & Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; 66 ALJR 300, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ at 258 (CLR). See also Re Eve [1986] 2 SCR 388; (1986) 31 DLR (4th) 1, La Forest J at 407–417 (SCR). 25 Director-General of Department of Community Services v BB [1999] NSWSC 1169; Re R [2000] 2 Qd R 328. 26 Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 43; [2004] HCA 49, Kirby J at [191]–[194].

[33.9.310] All Australian jurisdictions have enacted legislation to ensure that persons who have a mental illness have access to psychiatric treatment should they lack the capacity themselves to consent to such treatment.1 The legislation permits medical treatment only for the purpose of treating the mental illness that the patient is suffering. It does not authorise any other medical treatment. Where the prescribed procedures are correctly followed, the effect is

743

[33.9.310]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

as if the treatment is carried out with the consent of the patient. This legislation overcomes the need to rely upon the common law defence of necessity2 to justify treatment of persons for their mental illness.

1

2

Mental Health Act 2015 (ACT); Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW); Mental Health and Related Services Act 1998 (NT); Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) (currently in force, however at the time of writing the provisions of the Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) which will repeal the Mental Health Act 2000 have not yet commenced); Mental Health Act 2009 (SA); Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas); Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic); Mental Health Act 2014 (WA). R v Bournewood Community & Mental Health NHS Trust; Ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 WLR 107.

[33.9.320] Legislation exists in all Australian jurisdictions to provide for the treatment of persons who have an intellectual disability or who suffer a mental illness and because of their disability or illness, lack the capacity to consent to medical treatment.1 Importantly, just because an individual has an intellectual disability or suffers from a mental illness, it does not mean that they will lack the capacity to provide informed consent. It is only when this capacity is lacking that the legislation is relevant. The legislation involves the appointment of a guardian who has the authority to consent to medical procedures.2 In line with the approach for minors (see [33.9.300]), more serious medical procedures, particularly those of a serious non-therapeutic nature, require the consent of a court, tribunal or board.3 The power possessed by a guardian, court, tribunal or board must be exercised in the best interests of the patient. In an emergency, most of the Acts permit the administration of medical treatment without the need to obtain consent from the guardian or the court, tribunal or board.4 Alternatively, the common law defence of necessity and/or emergency may be available.5

1

2

Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT); Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW); Adult Guardianship Act 1988 (NT) (currently in force, however see Guardianship of Adults Act 2016 (NT) for any modifying or repealing provisions); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld); Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas); Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA). Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), s 7(3)(e); Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), ss 6E(1)(b), (d), 36, 40; Adult Guardianship Act 1988 (NT), ss 17(2)(d), 21 (currently in force, however see Guardianship of Adults Act 2016 (NT) for any modifying or repealing provisions); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), ss 33(1), 42; Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA), s 31; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), ss 25(2)(e), 39(1), (2); Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), ss 24(2)(d), 37, 39(1)(b);

744

[33.9.330]

3

4

5

INCAPACITY

Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), ss 45(2)(d), 119. Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), s 70; Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), ss 33, 36; Adult Guardianship Act 1988 (NT), s 21(4) (currently in force, however see Guardianship of Adults Act 2016 (NT) for any modifying or repealing provisions); Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT), Pts 4, 5; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 68, Sch 2 cll 6 – 17; Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA), s 61; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), ss 39(1), 45; Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), ss 39(1)(a), 42E; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), Pt 5 Div 3. Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), s 37(1); Emergency Medical Operations Act 1973 (NT), s 3(3); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 63(1)(b), (2), (3); Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA), s 61; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s 13; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), s 40; Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), s 42A; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 119. The Australian Capital Territory legislation is silent as to consent in the case of an emergency however note Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT), s 32N. Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh JJ at 489 (CLR); R v Bournewood Community & Mental Health NHS Trust; Ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 WLR 107.

[33.9.330] With trespass now based on either intent or fault, insanity would appear to provide a defence,1 depending on the mental state required by a particular tort. One view allows immunity from the tort of assault when committed by an insane person “where the nature and degree of his insanity are such as would establish a defence if the assault were the subject of a criminal charge”.2 The alternative view, which attracts greater support, is that a person would be held liable for an intentional tort when the nature and quality of the act was appreciated, although it was not understood to be wrong.3 That would also apply in the case of conversion.4

1 2

3

4

Insanity was not traditionally a defence to trespass: see Weaver v Ward (1616) Hob 134; 80 ER 284 (DC). White v Pile (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 176 (DC), O’Sullivan DCJ at 180. See Criminal Law Principles “Mental Impairment (Insanity) and Fitness to Plead” [9.3.1640]–[9.3.2080]. Morriss v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925 (QB); Beals v Hayward [1960] NZLR 131 (SC), McGregor J at 144; Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [2.60]; Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) pp 64–65. Morriss v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925 (QB), Stable J at 927.

745

[33.9.330]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Necessity [33.9.340] Necessity may provide a defence to intentional torts to persons or property.1 Necessity may justify intervention for the preservation of oneself (see [33.9.350]), another person (see [33.9.360]), one’s own property or the property of another: see [33.9.380]. Necessity is only a justification when three elements are shown. The defendant must show an imminent danger to person or property, an honest belief on reasonable grounds of the necessity to act for the preservation of person and/or property, and the acts done to avoid the imminent danger must not be out of proportion to the danger to be avoided.2 Necessity is a generic term. In its widest application, with the requirement of imminent danger, it may justify interference with the interests of persons who are not responsible for the danger. For example, a conflagration may justify the destruction of intervening property in order to promote a firebreak. It need not be shown that if the intervention had not taken place the property would have been destroyed or injured.3 The defence of necessity is only available “in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant creating or contributing to the necessity”.4 In the case of conjoined twins, the English Court of Appeal5 invoked necessity to justify an order authorising their separation. The Court held that the evil inflicted (the death of one) was not disproportionate to the evil avoided (the death of the other).6 This position is to be compared to that in Queensland,7 where the Supreme Court authorised a similar operation by reference to the statutory duties owed by medical practitioners to their patients.8 While the Supreme Court referred to the defence of necessity, it was found to be inapplicable to the Criminal Code (Qld). In doing so, the Court did not disapprove of the approach in Re A (children) (conjoined twins: medical treatment) (No 1) [2001] Fam 147; [2001] 2 WLR 480. Necessity may also apply in the instance of an intellectually disabled patient who is unable to give consent to medical treatment. In such a case, a doctor will not only be treated as having the authority to act in the patient’s best interests, but may also be under a duty to do so.9 In Australia, this area is largely regulated by statute: see [33.9.310]–[33.9.320]. The defence of necessity may be excluded where the necessitous intervention is occasioned by the defendant’s own negligence or breach of statutory duty.10

1 2 3 4

Mouse’s Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63; 77 ER 1341. Proudman v Allen [1954] SASR 336; R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 (FC). Proudman v Allen [1954] SASR 336, Hannan AJ at 344. Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242 (QB), Taylor J at 1254 (arrest of dangerous armed psychopath).

746

[33.9.350]

NECESSITY

5

Re A (children) (conjoined twins: medical treatment) (No 1) [2001] Fam 147; [2001] 2 WLR 480 (CA). 6 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: medical treatment) (No 1) [2001] Fam 147; [2001] 2 WLR 480 (CA). 7 Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454; (2001) 122 A Crim R 517; [2001] QSC 174. See also Davis C, “The Spectre of Court-sanctioned Sacrificial Separation of Teenage Conjoined Twins against Their Will” (2014) 21 JLM 973 8 Criminal Code (Qld), ss 282, 286 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1). 9 Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; [1989] 2 WLR 1025, Lord Goff at 77 (AC); R v Bournewood Community & Mental Health NHS Trust; Ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 WLR 107; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; 67 ALJR 47, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 489 (CLR). 10 Simon v Condran (2013) 85 NSWLR 768; [2013] NSWCA 388, Leeming JA at [33]–[42] (Macfarlan JA agreeing), Sackville AJA at [51].

[33.9.350] Self-defence in protection of one’s own safety is a defence to intentional torts.1 There must be an immediate danger of imminent violence.2 The defensive act must be reasonably necessary.3 If excessive force is used the defence fails.4 Once the plaintiff has been disabled and the defendant’s safety is secure, further acts are not covered by the defence.5 The defendant carries the onus of proof of justification.6 When the allegation is one of excessive force, two situations need to be distinguished: (1)

If one act would have been justified in self-defence but further acts would not, and the plaintiff alleges several acts which the defendant denies, the onus of proving further acts beyond self-defence lies on the plaintiff.7

(2)

Once further acts are established by the plaintiff and the question is one of the reasonableness of the act, the burden of proof lies on the defendant to justify them “not only with reference to the necessity for some force but as to the necessity for the particular force”.8

The following example illustrates the distinction. A plaintiff has threatened the defendant with a gun. If, having disarmed the plaintiff, the defendant exercises further force on the plaintiff, the fact of that further force must be established by the plaintiff. If that fact is established by the plaintiff, the burden passes to the defendant to justify both its necessity and reasonableness in the circumstances.

1

2 3 4

Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283; McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157; Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645; 61 ALJR 375; 25 A Crim R 163. R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 (FC); R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 (NSWCCA). Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283, McTiernan J at 181 (CLR); McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157. Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283.

747

[33.9.350]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

5 6 7 8

McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157, Sholl J at 161–163. McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157, Sholl J at 161–163. McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157, Sholl J at 161–163. Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423, Bray CJ at 428.

[33.9.360] Defence of another is a defence to intentional torts.1 In Goss v Nicholas [1960] Tas SR 133, Crawford J stated: [A] person is entitled to use force to prevent a stranger from being assaulted if he has reasonable grounds for believing that an assault upon that stranger is about to take place. In considering what force may be used, I hold that it must be reasonably proportioned to the degree of injury to be expected from the assault upon the stranger. One would not be justified in stopping a threatened assault of the character suggested by the defence here by discharging a gun on the basis that if the gun was not fired there would not be time for the defendant to reach the assailant to prevent the assault. The time factor must also be considered and if it is possible gently to restrain the would-be assailant then this should be the manner of dealing with him.2

1 Handcock v Baker (1800) 2 B & P 260; 126 ER 1270; Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423; Howard v Wing [2000] TASSC 147; see also New South Wales v McMaster (2015) 328 ALR 309; [2015] NSWCA 228, Beazley P at [161]–[184]. 2 Goss v Nicholas [1960] Tas SR 133, Crawford J at 144.

[33.9.370] In most jurisdictions, provocation not intruding on physical security is no defence in civil proceedings.1 Provocation may, however, mitigate aggravated and exemplary damages.2 Where the criminal law of assault has been modified by statute, as in Queensland and Western Australia, provocation may constitute a defence in civil proceedings.3 The burden of proof of provocation in such cases lies with the defendant on the balance of probabilities.4

1 Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283; Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153. 2 Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283; Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153; Whitbread v Rail Corp (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 130, McColl JA at [33]–[37]. See generally “Aggravated Damages” [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]; “Exemplary Damages” [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. 3 White v Connolly [1927] St R Qd 75; Wenn v Evans (1985) 2 SR (WA) 263. See also Criminal Code (Qld), s 269 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Code (WA), s 246 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule). See also Criminal Law Principles “Provocation” [9.3.1430]–[9.3.1530]. 4 Grehan v Kann [1948] QWN 40.

748

[33.9.390]

RETENTION AND RE-ENTRY OF LAND

[33.9.380] Defence of property, whether one’s own or another’s, based upon an immediate necessity to act,1 is a defence to intentional torts. When the danger is not immediate, the defence fails even if the defendant held a reasonable belief that intervention was necessary.2 The intervention must be in reasonable proportion to the danger to the property.3 Thus, protection of property, even at night, does not necessarily justify the use of firearms,4 although the use of lethal force may be considered a defence to criminal charges.5 There is no justification in shooting trespassing dogs,6 unless property in the form of livestock is in real and imminent danger and there was no reasonable alternative for preserving the property.7 The dangers of fire to property may necessitate extreme measures.8 Thus, a member of a volunteer fire brigade may be physically excluded from the site of a fire by an official who has lawful control of the site.9 In all Australian jurisdictions, the defence of necessity is recognised in legislative form in relation to fires: fire officers may destroy property for the protection of life or property in controlling or extinguishing fire.10

1

Greyvensteyn v Hattingh [1911] AC 355 (PC); Cope v Sharpe (No 2) [1912] 1 KB 496 (CA); Proudman v Allen [1954] SASR 336; Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242 (QB). 2 Kirk v Gregory (1876) 1 Ex D 55; Carter v Thomas [1893] 1 QB 673; Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734; [1971] 2 WLR 467 (CA) (where, in the absence of imminent danger, the homeless were denied the defence of social necessity in their use of someone else’s unoccupied property). 3 Norton v Hoare (No 1) (1913) 17 CLR 310; [1913] VLR 516, Isaacs, Gavan, Duffy and Rich JJ at 321–322 (CLR). 4 Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156. 5 R v McKay [1957] VR 560 (FC). 6 Barnard v Evans [1925] 2 KB 794; Workman v Cowper [1961] 2 QB 143; [1961] 2 WLR 386. 7 Cresswell v Sirl [1948] 1 KB 241 (CA); Ramage v Evans [1948] VLR 391. 8 Cope v Sharpe (No 2) [1912] 1 KB 496 (CA). 9 Carter v Thomas [1893] 1 QB 673. 10 Emergencies Act 2004 (ACT) s 34; Fire Brigades Act 1989 (NSW), ss 13, 16; Fire and Emergency Act 1996 (NT), s 23(3); Fire and Emergency Services Act 1990 (Qld), s 53(2); Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005 (SA), s 59; Fire Service Act 1979 (Tas), s 29; Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (Vic), s 30; Fire Brigades Act 1942 (WA), s 34.

Retention and Re-entry of Land [33.9.390] Reasonable force may be used1 to retain or re-enter land to keep out or expel a trespasser. Rights to retain or re-enter land overlap with defence of property and necessity. Actual possession or the right to exclusive possession is necessary to justify the use of force in keeping out or expelling a

749

[33.9.390]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

trespasser.2 A lessor when expelling a lessee on the termination of the lease should give the lessee not only notice to leave, but also a reasonable opportunity of doing so.3 “Once he re-enters, he can use whatever force is reasonably necessary … without becoming liable to an action for assault and bVattery.”4 The right of removal does not extend to the removal of the lessee’s goods where “the resulting loss to the plaintiff is wholly disproportionate to the injury averted by the defendant”.5 When excessive force is used, the defendant will be liable for the damage so caused.6 In Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, legislation provides that it is lawful for a person who is in peaceful possession at law to use such force as is reasonably necessary to prevent a trespass.7 In Queensland and Western Australia, the force must not be such that it causes “bodily harm”, and in Tasmania it must not be “intended and … likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm”.8 The dangers of violent forcible entry on land have long been recognised.9 Such practices, when conducted in a manner likely to cause a breach of the peace, amount to criminal offences by reason of received law or statute in Australia.10 Nevertheless, statutory prohibitions on forcible entry should not ultimately affect the civil rights of the person entitled to possession.

1 Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605. 2 Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605. 3 Haniotis v Dimitriou [1983] 1 VR 498, Brooking J at 501. See generally Real Property “Landlord and Tenant” [28.7.10]ff. 4 Haniotis v Dimitriou [1983] 1 VR 498, Brooking J at 500. 5 Haniotis v Dimitriou [1983] 1 VR 498, Brooking J at 502. Tenants’ protection legislation often abridges a landlord’s right to possession. For example, in South Australia and Victoria a landlord must apply to a tribunal for an order to terminate a residential tenancy agreement: Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA), Pt 5 Divs 4, 6, s 93; Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic), s 322. See generally Real Property “Residential Tenancies” [28.9.10]ff. 6 Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; 59 ALJR 156; Kohan v Stanbridge (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 576; 33 WN (NSW) 167 (FC); Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153. 7 Criminal Code (Qld), ss 277, 278 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1) (see also Lotz v Bullock [1912] St R Qd 36 (FC)); Criminal Code (Tas), ss 40 – 42 (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1); Criminal Code (WA), ss 254, 255 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule). 8 Criminal Code (Qld), ss 277, 278 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1) (see also Lotz v Bullock [1912] St R Qd 36 (FC)); Criminal Code (Tas), ss 41 – 42 (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1); Criminal Code (WA), ss 254, 255 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule). 9 Beginning in 1381 with Forcible Entry Act 1381 5 Ric 2 c 7 (Eng). 10 R v Waugh (1934) 52 WN (NSW) 20 (CCA); Criminal Code (Qld), s 70 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), s 17D; Criminal Code (Tas), s 79(1) (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 207 (discussed in Prideaux v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 163 CLR 483; 61 ALJR 600; 28 A Crim R 43); Criminal Code

750

[33.9.410]

RETAKING GOODS

(WA), s 69 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule).

Retaking Goods [33.9.400] The right to retake goods is governed by similar principles to those regulating re-entry onto land:1 see [33.9.390]. However, the mobility of most goods makes recapture both an acute and a delicate question of judgment. Not only may failure to retake render the goods untraceable, but the owner’s title may be extinguished by a transfer into the hands of an innocent party. It is necessary to distinguish two situations in relation to goods: (1)

when goods are wrongfully taken from a defendant (see [33.9.410]); and

(2)

when goods have been allowed into possession of the plaintiff: see [33.9.420].

In all cases, the defendant must establish a right to possession, or the defence fails.2

1 2

See Aitken L, “The Abandonment and Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 68 ALJ 263. Kearry v Pattinson [1939] 1 KB 471 (CA); Mitchell v Norman; Ex parte Norman [1965] Qd R 587 (FC).

[33.9.410] Goods wrongfully taken from a defendant may be defended and retaken through the use of reasonable force.1 To rely upon this defence though, the alleged interference must have been wrong from inception.2 In Queensland3 and Western Australia4 the amount of force is defined by legislation. The defendant also has the right to enter another’s land in order to retake goods:5 see [33.9.430].

1

2

3

4 5

R v Mitton (1827) 3 Car & P 30; 172 ER 309; R v Timmins [1913] QWN 44. See Aitken L, “The Abandonment and Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 68 ALJ 263. Toyota Finance Australia Ltd v Dennis (2002) 58 NSWLR 101; [2002] NSWCA 369, Sheller JA at [134] (Meagher JA agreeing). See also Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [5.130]. Criminal Code (Qld), ss 274 – 276 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1), provided no bodily harm occurs. See also R v Timmins [1913] QWN 44; Greenbury v Lyon; Ex parte Lyon [1957] St R Qd 433 (FC). Criminal Code (WA), ss 251 – 253 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule), provided no bodily harm occurs. Cox v Bath (No 3) (1893) 14 LR (NSW) 263; 9 WN (NSW) 171 (FC); Huet v Lawrence [1948] St R Qd 168 (FC).

751

[33.9.420]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

[33.9.420] When goods are in lawful possession of a plaintiff, a defendant may not use force to retake the goods despite being the owner of the goods in question. Not only may a defendant be faced with civil liability,1 but there also exists the possibility of criminal charges in relation to the goods2 and methods used to retake the goods.3 Even consensual rights to repossess goods may be replaced or qualified by statutory procedures, for example hire-purchase and credit contracts legislation.4

1 City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Southern Aerial Super Service Pty Ltd (1961) 106 CLR 477; 35 ALJR 206; Howe v Teefy (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 301; 44 WN (NSW) 102 (FC). 2 Rose v Matt [1951] 1 KB 810 (FC) (larceny by bailor); R v Turner (No 2) [1971] 1 WLR 901 (CA) (theft by owner). 3 Mitchell v Norman; Ex parte Norman [1965] Qd R 587 (FC); see Aitken L, “The Abandonment and Recaption of Chattels” (1994) 68 ALJ 263, especially at 277–279 (wheel clamping). 4 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth).

[33.9.430] The right of entry to retake property in the possession of another is limited. Two situations need to be distinguished: (1)

Where goods accidentally fall or are blown onto another’s property, a defendant is justified in entering the property in order to repossess the goods.1 It is no defence to a trespass action if the defendant is responsible for the goods being on the plaintiff’s land.2

(2)

There is no defence to entering the defendant’s land to retake goods where the goods have been allowed into the plaintiff’s possession, even though the defendant is the owner with a right to possession of the goods.3 However, it is otherwise if the plaintiff has taken the goods out of the defendant’s possession and onto the plaintiff’s land.4 Even consensual rights of entry may be abrogated by legislation.5

1 Anthony v Haney (1832) 8 Bing 186; 131 ER 372, Tindal CJ at 192 (Bing). 2 Anthony v Haney (1832) 8 Bing 186; 131 ER 372, Tindal CJ at 192 (Bing). See also Simon v Condran (2013) 85 NSWLR 768; [2013] NSWCA 388, Leeming JA at [33]–[42] (Macfarlan JA agreeing), Sackville AJA at [51]. 3 Anthony v Haney (1832) 8 Bing 186; 131 ER 372, Tindal CJ at 192 (Bing); Zimmler v Manning (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) 235 (goods left on premises); Murray v M’Neill (1885) 1 WN (NSW) 136 (FC) (purchaser in good faith). See [33.9.470]. 4 Patrick v Colerick (1838) 3 M & W 483; 150 ER 1235. 5 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth).

752

[33.9.450]

DISCIPLINE

Discipline [33.9.440] It is defensible for a parent, a person in the place of a parent, a teacher or a master to use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in physically chastising or restraining a child, pupil or apprentice.1 The authority of a teacher to punish extends beyond the school precincts.2 However, many education authorities now ban the use of corporal punishment as a means of discipline.3 The effect of such regulations is unclear. There is some authority to suggest that a ban on corporal punishment by regulations does not necessarily remove the common law defence and thus render a teacher liable in an action by the pupil for assault.4 That is presumably on the grounds that the ban on corporal punishment is not intended to deny a teacher the discipline defence. Such an immunity must depend on the circumstances in which corporal punishment was inflicted, the purpose of the regulations and the necessity of maintaining discipline. Other authority supports liability for battery committed in disregard of the regulations, presumably on the grounds that the legislation has removed an immunity from suit.5

1

2 3

4 5

Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16; 38 ALJR 106, McTiernan J at 25, Kitto J at 28–29, Taylor J at 35, 38 (CLR); Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265, Sheller JA at [53] quoting Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, Robert Goff LJ at 1177–1178. A consideration of what is reasonable in a criminal context is set out in Police (SA) v G, DM [2016] SASC 39. The common law rule is encapsulated in Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61AA; Criminal Code (NT), s 196(2) (found in Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT), Sch 1) Criminal Code (Qld), s 280 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Code (Tas), s 50 (found in Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), Sch 1); Criminal Code (WA), s 257 (found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule). No equivalent provisions are present in Victoria or South Australia. However, note section 22(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) See also [33.9.450]. Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465; R v Newport (Salop) Justices; Ex parte Wright [1929] 2 KB 416. See, eg Education Act 2004 (ACT), s 7(4); Education Act 1990 (NSW), ss 35(2A), 47(h); Education Act 1994 (Tas), s 82A; Education and Training Reform Regulations 2007 (Vic), reg 14 (Government schools); School Education Regulations 2000 (WA), reg 40(2) (Government schools). Mansell v Griffın [1908] 1 KB 947 (CA). Hunter v Johnson (1884) 13 QBD 225; Connor v Macdonald (1912) 6 QJP 119, PW Pears at 125.

[33.9.450] Reasonable chastisement considerations. These are:

is

limited

by

a

number

of

(1)

the punishment must be moderate and reasonable;

(2)

it must have a proper relation to the age, physique and mentality of the child; and 753

[33.9.450]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

(3)

it must be carried out with a reasonable means or instrument.1

If it be administered for the gratification of passion or of rage, or if it be immoderate and excessive in its nature or degree, or if it be protracted beyond the child’s powers of endurance, or with an instrument unfitted for the purpose and calculated to produce danger to life or limb; in all such cases the punishment is excessive, the violence is unlawful, and if evil consequences to life or limb ensue, then the person inflicting it is answerable to the law.2 Blows to the head are on first view unreasonable.3 However, circumstances may justify such blows where they are not hard and not likely to cause injury.4 The existence of marks on a child is not necessarily evidence of unreasonable chastisement.5 Evidence by a medical practitioner regarding unreasonable use of force is not expert evidence, but is an expression of opinion on a matter of legal and moral duty, and is therefore inadmissible.6 There is no right to spousal chastisement.7 Conduct such as confining a spouse against their will can constitute the criminal offence of kidnapping.8

1 R v Terry [1955] VLR 114. See also Police (SA) v G, DM [2016] SASC 39. 2 R v Hopley (1860) 2 F & F 202; 175 ER 1024, Cockburn CJ at 206 (F & F), cited with approval in Smith v O’Byrne; Ex parte O’Byrne (1893) 5 QLJ 126. 3 White v Weller; Ex parte White [1959] Qd R 192 (FC). 4 White v Weller; Ex parte White [1959] Qd R 192 (FC). 5 Byrne v Hebden; Ex parte Hebden [1913] St R Qd 233 (FC). 6 Armat v Little; Ex parte Little [1909] St R Qd 83 (FC). 7 R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671 (CA). 8 R v Reid [1973] QB 299; [1972] 3 WLR 395 (CA).

[33.9.460] Persons in the armed services are subject to military discipline. In Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570, Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ stated that: There having been created an elaborate system of military law and military discipline, the courts of law have been unwilling to entertain actions by members of the armed forces who find themselves aggrieved by what has occurred within that system.1

A service person is subject to all military rules, regulations and orders and all that they involve, as well as being subject to civil law.2 The relationship between civil and military authority creates problems. One such problem is the issue of whether the imposition of a military disciplinary action such as a financial penalty, imprisonment or corporal punishment, provides an immunity from civil suit. Another problem is the issue of double jeopardy where a service person falls under both civil and military law for the same offence. The High Court has been divided on the operation of such overlap, and the constitutional validity of a system of offences against military law has been challenged on federal separation of powers grounds on a number of occasions. No clear majority has yet emerged from the decided cases.3 In Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan

754

[33.9.460]

DISCIPLINE

(1989) 166 CLR 518; 63 ALJR 250 and Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11, the traditional view of cumulative systems of liability for service persons was upheld by Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ.4 The validity of military law as a supplementary system to the ordinary criminal law was supported by Brennan and Toohey JJ, but only insofar as it substantially served “the purpose of maintaining or enforcing service discipline”.5 Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ dissented in holding the military proceedings in question to be invalid.6 Deane J based his opinion on the fundamental constitutional importance of the separation and confinement of judicial powers to courts established by Ch III of the Constitution. He also considered the “disciplinary test” was conceptually inadequate to provide an exclusive jurisdiction within which military tribunals could operate.7 McHugh J agreed with Deane J.8 In Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18; 68 ALJR 499, the divergent reasoning of the majority Justices in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan and Re Nolan; Ex parte Young and the dissenting views of Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in those decisions persisted.9 The failure of any single approach to command a clear majority continued in Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308; 78 ALJR 1451; [2004] HCA 44, where the High Court (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ; Callinan and Heydon JJ dissenting) upheld the validity of provisions of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) making it an offence, punishable by court martial, for a member of the regular Australian Defence Force who was on overseas service, but on recreational leave at the time, to engage in an act of rape. McHugh J summarised the divergent views as follows: The difference between the views of Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ and on the other hand Brennan and Toohey JJ in these cases is the difference between the “service status” view of the jurisdiction and the “service connection” view of that jurisdiction. The “service status” view – which is now applied in the United States [Solorio v United States, 483 US 435 (1987)] gives a service tribunal jurisdiction over a person solely on the basis of the accused’s status as a member of the armed forces. The “service connection” view of the jurisdiction requires a connection between the service and the offence. It was the view formerly accepted in the United States [O’Callaghan v Parker 395 US 258 (1969)]. However, Solorio v United States rejected the “service connection” view.10

More recently, in White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 81 ALJR 1259; [2007] HCA 29, the High Court refused to overrule the trilogy of cases referred to above and upheld the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to grant disciplinary powers to be exercised judicially by officers of the armed forces outside the strictures of Ch III of the Constitution. The Court also refused to draw any distinction between so-called “exclusive disciplinary offences” and breaches of the general law enforceable by civilian courts. Whether an offence is to be regarded as an offence against military discipline or breach of civil order will often depend, not upon the elements of the offence, but upon the circumstances in which it is committed.11

755

[33.9.460]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

The identification of that which is reasonably necessary to the regularity of due discipline of the defence force cannot depend simply upon the absence of any counterpart for a particular norm of conduct in the general law.12

The Court did not, however, definitively address the distinction drawn by McHugh J above which highlighted the divergent reasoning of the majority in previous cases. If members of the armed services act outside their statutory authority, they are liable for any intentional torts thereby committed.13 However, no action in tort will lie against a member of the armed services, by another member of the armed services, who acts in obedience to an order not necessarily or manifestly unlawful, even if that lawful command was subsequently determined to have been unlawful.14

1 Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113; 56 ALJR 570, Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ at 133 (CLR). 2 Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11. See also Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22; 85 ALJR 836; [2011] HCA 28, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [54]–[55]. 3 McWaters v Day (1989) 168 CLR 289; 64 ALJR 41; Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518; 63 ALJR 250; Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11. 4 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518; 63 ALJR 250, Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 545 (CLR); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11, Mason CJ and Dawson J at 475 (CLR). 5 Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518; 63 ALJR 250, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 570 (CLR); Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 487 (CLR). 6 Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11, Gaudron J at 493–499 (CLR). 7 Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11, Deane J at 491 (CLR). 8 Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11, McHugh J at 499 (CLR). 9 Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18; 68 ALJR 499, Mason CJ and Dawson J at 26, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 28–34, Deane J at 34, Gaudron J at 35, McHugh J at 38–40 (CLR) gave effect to the decision of the majority in Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460; 65 ALJR 486; 54 A Crim R 11 on the grounds of stare decisis (even though McHugh J considered the reasoning of the majority in the earlier decisions erroneous and lacking a discernible ratio decidendi) and upheld the validity of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth). 10 Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308; 78 ALJR 1451; [2004] HCA 44, McHugh J at [36]. 11 White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 81 ALJR 1259; [2007] HCA 29, Gleeson CJ at [21]. 12 White v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 81 ALJR 1259; [2007] HCA 29, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ at [73].

756

[33.9.480]

LEGAL AUTHORITY

13 Lindsay v Lovell [1917] VLR 734 (FC). 14 Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22; 85 ALJR 836; [2011] HCA 28, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [65]–[67].

[33.9.470] Maritime discipline may be exercised by a person in command of a ship1 or, by analogy, an aircraft.2 Crew and passengers are required to obey all reasonable orders, and in an emergency, to work the ship.3 The authority to discipline is one of necessity, “limited to the preservation of necessary discipline and the safety of the ship”.4 The disciplinary measures taken must be in proportion to the necessity of the situation.5 When appropriate, a hearing should be accorded to the party subject to discipline.6 The burden of proof lies on the defence to establish on the balance of probabilities that the person in command had reasonable cause to believe that the steps taken were necessary.7

1

2 3 4 5 6 7

King v Franklin (1858) 1 F & F 360; 175 ER 764; Criminal Code (Qld), s 281 (as found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Code (WA), s 258 (as found in Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), Schedule. Criminal Code (WA), s 258 specifically includes “aircraft on a flight”. See also Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth), ss 34, 49. King v Franklin (1858) 1 F & F 360; 175 ER 764, Watson B at 361 (F & F); Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 682 (Hampshire Assizes). Aldworth v Stewart (1866) 4 F & F 957; 176 ER 865, Channell B at 961 (F & F); Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 682 (Hampshire Assizes). The Agincourt (1824) 1 Hagg 271; 166 ER 96. The Agincourt (1824) 1 Hagg 271; 166 ER 96, Lord Stowell at 273 (Hagg). Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 682 (Hampshire Assizes).

Legal Authority [33.9.480] Legal authority to commit what would otherwise amount to intentional torts is provided by the common law and many statutes. That authority may provide powers of entry onto land, the power to arrest or detain people or to seize property. Section 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is a modern example of a frequently invoked statute authorising the detention of an individual in circumstances that, absent the lawful statutory authority furnished by the statute, would amount to the tort of false imprisonment.1 Common law powers originated for the purpose of criminal law enforcement. The growth of the modern state has expanded many of these powers not only for criminal law purposes, but also with the aim of providing and regulating services. The general common law powers will be examined (see [33.9.490]), followed by some of the statutory powers in relation to arrest, in order to provide an indication of the scope of this defence: see [33.9.500]–[33.9.560].

757

[33.9.480]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Statutory defences should be considered in their common law setting. The critical issue when interpreting statutory powers of entry, arrest, detention and seizure is to establish how far the statutory wording abrogates common law safeguards, especially those provided by actions for intentional tort.2 It is therefore appropriate to consider the common law principles and safeguards for persons and property.3 The courts should not impute to the legislation an intention to interfere with fundamental rights. This is especially so when rights such as liberty of the person and freedom of movement are in question. The right to freedom of movement and liberty, as recognised by the tort of false imprisonment and the writ of trespass, is the most fundamental right protected by the common law.4 Statutes authorising deprivation of liberty are construed strictly and must accordingly be expressed with irresistible clarity.5 Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they do not specifically deal with the question because, in the context in which they appear, they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights.6

1 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 189(1) requires an officer to detain a person who the officer knows or reasonably suspects is an unlawful non-citizen in a migration zone. See Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48 where a majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ, McHugh and Kirby JJ dissenting) held that what constituted reasonable grounds for suspicion had to be judged against what was known or reasonably capable of being known at the relevant time and could not be retrospectively affected by judicial decisions. Compare the approach taken by the House of Lords in R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19; [2000] 3 WLR 843; [2000] UKHL 48 in holding that the continuing detention of the applicant was without lawful authority because a subsequent judicial decision was to be applied with retrospective effect such that the prison governor had acted in excess of the powers conferred on him by Parliament, notwithstanding that he had complied with the law as the court had declared it at the relevant time of his decision to continue the applicant’s detention. See “False Imprisonment” [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780]. 2 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246; Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA); Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231. 3 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246, the Court at 110–111 (CLR). 4 The liberty of the individual was described in Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, by Fullagar J at 152 as “the most elementary and important of all common law rights”. See also Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, McHugh J at [70]–[71], Kirby J at [135]–[140]. The fundamental common law right to liberty is now expressly recognised in the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 21. 5 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; 78 ALJR 1099; [2004] HCA 37, Gleeson CJ at [19]. See also Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; 79 ALJR 1534; [2005] HCA 48, McHugh J at [70]–[71], Kirby J at [154]–[156].

758

[33.9.490]

6

LEGAL AUTHORITY

Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; 68 ALJR 401; 72 A Crim R 32, Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 437 (CLR); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476; 77 ALJR 454; [2003] HCA 2, Gleeson CJ at [28]–[31]; Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; 77 ALJR 40; [2002] HCA 49, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [43]–[44]; Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562; 78 ALJR 1099; [2004] HCA 37, Gleeson CJ at [19]–[21], Hayne J at [240]–[241]; Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; 78 ALJR 1166; [2004] HCA 39, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [185].

[33.9.490] Citizens are conferred with powers at common law to prevent breaches of the peace which, if lawfully exercised, provide a defence to a tort action. In Lavin v Albert [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 WLR 955, Lord Diplock stated the position at common law: [E]very citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears to be about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking or threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him against his will. At common law this is not only the right of every citizen, it is also his duty, although, except in the case of a citizen who is a constable, it is a duty of imperfect obligation.1

At common law a citizen also has a limited power to enter premises, and if necessary to break doors to effect entry, without being subject to a tort action. This includes in order to prevent murders, to follow and apprehend a felon when a felony has been committed, and to prevent a felony being committed. The power also extends to a constable chasing an offender running from an affray.2 There is no common law power to enter premises forcibly in order to search for an alleged offender except in the above circumstances.3 Thus, a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offence in a foreign country which, if committed in Australia, would have been a felony does not justify a constable arresting such a person without a warrant.4 Where circumstances permit a forcible entry, it is an essential condition that a demand to allow entry be made and refused before the entry becomes forcible.5

1 2 3

4 5

Lavin v Albert [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 WLR 955, Lord Diplock at 565 (AC). Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849; [1981] 2 WLR 814, Donaldson LJ at 853 (QB). See also Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA). Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA), Hope AJA at 631 (NSWLR). See also R v Austen (No 2) (2010) 5 ACTLR 70; 246 FLR 362; [2010] ACTSC 136, Refshauge J at [47]–[48]. Brown v Lizars (1905) 2 CLR 837; [1905] VLR 540. Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA), Hope AJA at 630

759

[33.9.490]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

(NSWLR); R v Austen (No 2) (2010) 5 ACTLR 70; 246 FLR 362; [2010] ACTSC 136, Refshauge J at [47]–[48].

[33.9.500] Where an arrest at common law without warrant is lawfully made, it provides a justification in a tort action. In order that there be a valid arrest by the police, the person arrested must be informed on being taken into custody, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, on what charge or suspicion of what crime the arrest is being made.1 The arrest is a restraint by action or words from moving anywhere beyond the arrester’s control.2 The arrest continues “until the person so restrained is either released from custody or, having been brought before a magistrate, is remanded in custody by the magistrate’s judicial act”.3 The actual arrester may change from time to time.4 In practice, an arrested person should be taken to and detained in a police station until brought before a magistrate, or released unconditionally.5 It is not lawful for a police officer to delay taking an arrested person before a justice in order to question the person or to make further inquiries relating to the offence for which the person has been arrested, or to some other offence.6 However, a detention which is unlawful may become lawful.7 A citizen at common law can arrest another person without warrant when that person is committing a felony or when a misdemeanour is being committed, provided the misdemeanour8 amounts to a breach of the peace. In all other cases the power to arrest without warrant must be permitted by statute.9

1 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660, Lord Diplock at 442 (AC); Hatzinikolaou v Snape (1989) 97 FLR 86; 41 A Crim R 389 (NSWCA), Kirby P at 90–95 (FLR). See Criminal Procedure “Arrest” [11.1.140]–[11.1.740]. 2 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660, Lord Diplock at 441 (AC). 3 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660, Lord Diplock at 441 (AC); Webster v McIntosh (1980) 49 FLR 317; 3 A Crim R 455 (FCAFC), Brennan J at 323 (FLR). 4 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660, Lord Diplock at 442 (AC). 5 Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437; [1984] 2 WLR 660, Lord Diplock at 441 (AC). 6 Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 69 ALJR 686; 80 A Crim R 542, Brennan, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 124 (CLR). 7 Michaels v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 117; 69 ALJR 686; 80 A Crim R 542, Brennan, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 125 (CLR). 8 See Criminal Law Principles “Classification of Offences” [9.1.970]–[9.1.1160]. 9 Nolan v Clifford (1904) 1 CLR 429; 22 WN (NSW) 67, Griffith CJ at 445 (CLR).

760

[33.9.510]

LEGAL AUTHORITY

[33.9.510] All jurisdictions in Australia have statutory provisions permitting arrest without warrant.1 Some provisions align themselves closely to common law powers of arrest without warrant:2 see [33.9.500]. Others attempt to provide an exclusive arrest code that completely displaces the common law.3 The majority of statutory powers of arrest without warrant fall between the limited and the exclusive regimes. They usually require some reasonable belief and provide more extensive powers of arrest than those at common law, especially for members of the police force.4 When statutory powers of arrest without warrant are exercised, the arrester must remain within the statutory limits in order to avoid what in other circumstances would amount to actionable tortious conduct. Because of the courts’ overriding concern with any curtailment of individual liberty protected at common law, they have interpreted strictly statutory provisions purporting to authorise arrest without a warrant.5 The courts have also limited the imposition of physical restraints to the purpose specifically authorised by the statute.6 Furthermore, an arrest without a warrant will be unlawful, unless, under ordinary circumstances, the person arrested is informed at the time of the arrest of the grounds for the arrest.7

1

2

3 4

5 6

7

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), s 14A; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 3W, 3Z; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 212, 218; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 99, 100; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT), s 123; Criminal Code (Qld), ss 546 – 551; (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 271; Criminal Code (Tas), s 27 (found in Criminal Code Act 1924, (Tas) Sch 1); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 458 – 463A; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), s 25, Pt 12 Div 2. See Criminal Procedure “Arrest” [11.1.140]–[11.1.740]. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 3W, 3Z; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 99, 100. As to Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 3W, see Hyder v Commonwealth (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336. See also Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 60 FLR 124; 5 A Crim R 160 (FCAFC), for the position in the Australian Capital Territory. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 457. See, eg Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 3W; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 212; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT), s 123; Criminal Code (Qld), ss 546 – 552; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 271; Criminal Code (Tas), s 27; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 458 – 463A; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), s 128. See, eg Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41. Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 305 (CLR); Hill v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1990] 1 WLR 946, Purchas LJ at 953–955 (CLR). Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, Lord Viscount Simon at 577. See also Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [6.42] describing the House of Lords decision as “consistent with a citizen’s right to resist any substantial and unlawful interference with his or her liberty”. This is similar to the common law position: see [33.9.500]. 761

[33.9.520]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

[33.9.520] Reasonable use of force and detention for a reasonable period are two of the incidental powers which may be exercised when an arrest is made.1 Such incidental powers may include the forcible entry of premises. Before premises can be forcibly entered for the purpose of making an arrest, two conditions must be satisfied.2 First, the arrester must believe on reasonable and probable grounds that the person being sought is on the premises. Mere suspicion is insufficient to justify entry.3 Second, save in exigent circumstances, the police officer must make a proper announcement before entry so that the occupant is made aware that authority to enter is being claimed, and the occupant is given an opportunity to consent to a peaceful entry.4 The police officer must to this end state a lawful reason for entry without permission.5 There are some circumstances in which the demand of entry is unnecessary, for example in cases of hot pursuit, or when it is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence or injury or to save life.6 The incidental powers also include detention for a reasonable period. “Any detention which is reasonably necessary until a magistrate can be obtained is, of course, lawful, but detention which extends beyond this cannot be justified under the common law or statutory power.”7 Thus, in the absence of express powers, an arrest for the purpose of questioning8 or to compel attendance in an identification parade is unlawful at common law.9 Any action by the arrester which exceeds the powers of arrest destroys the justification and renders the arrester’s conduct actionable for trespass and false imprisonment.10 In the absence of further powers,11 both common law and statutory provisions require that the person arrested be brought before a justice “as soon as practicable” or “forthwith” or “without undue delay”.12 For these purposes “a justice” means a magistrate or judicial officer, and not just a person empowered to grant bail.13 Where no delay is involved in bringing the arrested person before a justice, that person may be asked questions in relation to the offence or other offences “provided the investigation is properly carried out and any necessary caution is given”.14 Delay for the purpose of investigation is not lawful and removes the defence of justification.15 What is reasonable includes a period for making a decision to prefer a charge, preparing the documentation and preferring it.16 Otherwise, the arrested person must be brought before the first justice or magistrate available within a reasonable distance of where the person is being held. For example, night arrest would justify a detention until the availability of a magistrate in the morning.17 “The making of inquiries is not a ground for extending the period of custody and denying the subject an opportunity of securing his release either absolutely or on bail by a justice’s order.”18 The burden of proof is on the arrester to justify the trespass by establishing reasonable and probable cause for the arrest by reference to the arrester’s office

762

[33.9.520]

LEGAL AUTHORITY

or otherwise.19 In Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 3 WLR 385, Diplock LJ stated that: The trespass by the arrestor continues so long as he retains custody of the arrested person, and he must justify the continuance of his custody by showing that it was reasonable. What is reasonable conduct on the part of a police officer in this respect may not be the same as what would be reasonable conduct on the part of a private arrestor.20

Reasonable conduct includes the arrester’s right to use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances.21 When physical restraint is appropriate it must only be imposed for the purpose for which it is authorised.22 It should be remembered that “[a]rrests are frequently made in circumstances of excitement, turmoil and panic”, and it would be unfair to sit back in the comparatively calm and leisurely atmosphere of the courtroom and there make minute retrospective criticisms of what an arresting constable might or might not have done or believed in the circumstances.23

1

2 3 4 5

6 7 8

9 10

11 12

13 14

Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41 (FC), Jordan CJ at 188 (SR (NSW)). See generally Criminal Procedure “Arrest” [11.1.140]–[11.1.740]. Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA). Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA), Gleeson CJ at 623, Hope AJA at 633–636 (NSWLR). Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA). R v O’Neill (2001) 122 A Crim R 510; [2001] NSWCCA 193, Mason P at [22]–[28] (officers stating no more than that they “need to speak to you” was held to be an inadequate announcement). Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA). Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41 (FC), Jordan CJ at 189 (SR (NSW)). Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41 (FC); Ex parte Evers; Re Leary (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 146; Drymalik v Feldman [1966] SASR 227 (FC); R v Banner [1970] VR 240 (FC). Clune v The Queen [1982] VR 1; (1981) 5 A Crim R 246 (FC). Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41 (FC); Ex parte Evers; Re Leary (1945) 62 WN (NSW) 146; Drymalik v Feldman [1966] SASR 227 (FC); R v Banner [1970] VR 240 (FC). See generally “Trespass” [33.8.300]–[33.8.600]; “False Imprisonment” [33.8.1520]–[33.8.1780]. For an example of express statutory powers to detain for questioning, see Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 464A(2). Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1, Mason and Brennan JJ at 297 (CLR), citing R v Iorlano (1983) 151 CLR 678; 58 ALJR 22; R v Conley (1982) 30 SASR 226; 6 A Crim R 51 (FC). R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; 47 A Crim R 211 (CCA), the Court at 98 (NSWLR). Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 306 (CLR).

763

[33.9.520]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

15 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1, Mason and Brennan JJ at 295, Wilson and Dawson JJ at 313 (CLR). 16 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1, Mason and Brennan JJ at 298 (CLR). 17 R v Kelly (1988) 90 FLR 335; 33 A Crim R 171 (ACTSC), Gallop J at 344–345 (FLR). 18 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; 60 ALJR 636; 28 A Crim R 1, Mason and Brennan JJ at 301 (CLR). 19 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Fullagar J at 152. 20 Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 3 WLR 385 (CA), Diplock LJ at 370–371 (QB). 21 Clune v The Queen [1982] VR 1; (1981) 5 A Crim R 246 (FC), McGarvie J at 18 (VR). 22 Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; 52 WN (NSW) 41 (FC), Jordan CJ at 188 (SR (NSW)). 23 McIntosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112 (ACTSC), Connor J at 123.

[33.9.530] A power incidental to arrest, either with or without a warrant, is the power to search the person arrested and to seize items in the possession of the person arrested which are evidence of the offence for which the arrest is being made.1 The incidental powers of search and seizure are not unlimited. They must be justified in the circumstances of each case. In Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB 128; [1980] 3 WLR 660, Donaldson LJ stated: It is the duty of any constable who lawfully has a prisoner in his charge to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the prisoner does not escape or assist others to do so, does not injure himself or others, does not destroy or dispose of evidence and does not commit further crime such as, for example, malicious damage to property.2

The arrester must consider these purposes and their relevance when searching or seizing.3 In the absence of a warrant, there is no power to seize goods when they are not being used for a criminal offence, when the possession of the goods is not an offence and when the goods are not required for evidence.4 Goods may be lawfully seized before an arrest, provided the seizure is “sufficiently close to the arrest to be fairly regarded as incidental to, and part of, the same operation as the arrest”.5 Apart from the common law, statutory provisions may empower a person to search and seize without a warrant in certain circumstances.6 However, the wording must be clear.7 The statutory provision must be more than merely facultative,8 or making the process of serving a summons less inconvenient.9

1 Dillon v O’Brien (1887) 20 LR Ir 300 (Ex); Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70 (FC). See also [33.9.520] for other powers incidental to arrest. 2 Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB 128; [1980] 3 WLR 660, Donaldson LJ at 134 (QB). 3 Lindley v Rutter [1981] QB 128; [1980] 3 WLR 660. 4 Gollan v Nugent (1988) 166 CLR 18; 63 ALJR 11; Levine v O’Keefe [1930] VLR 70 (FC).

764

[33.9.540]

5 6

7 8 9

LEGAL AUTHORITY

Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70 (FC), MacFarlan J at 81. See, eg Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 3T; Criminal Code (Qld), ss 266, 680 (found in Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1); Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), ss 55 – 58B; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), Pt 13. See also Criminal Procedure “Investigation of Persons and Places” [11.1.1390]–[11.1.3370]. Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231. Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ at 645 (CLR). Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; 65 ALJR 231, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 654 (CLR).

[33.9.540] Arrest or search and seizure by means of warrant is authorised in all Australian jurisdictions under a variety of statutes.1 A warrant is a written order issued under the law by a justice commanding that a particular person be brought before the justice. At common law, search warrants were limited to searches for stolen goods. Warrants made by the executive government were void when issued in the absence of some power recognised by law.2 Modern legislation may grant very extensive warrant powers.3 In George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246, the Court stated: Nevertheless, in construing and applying such statutes, it needs to be kept in mind that they authorize the invasion of interests which the common law has always valued highly and which, through the writ of trespass, it went to great lengths to protect. Against that background, the enactment of conditions which must be fulfilled before a search warrant can be lawfully issued and executed is to be seen as a reflection of the legislature’s concern to give a measure of protection to those interests. To insist on strict compliance with the statutory conditions governing the issue of search warrants is simply to give effect to the purpose of the legislation.4

The validity of the warrant will depend on the requirements of the particular statute under which it is executed, but is usually analysed under the following heads: (1)

The justice’s function ensures that the person executing the warrant should be satisfied in substance that there are grounds for the process requested.5 It requires a genuine consideration and comprehension of the materials on which the application is based, and not a perfunctory scanning of the usual formal phrases.6

(2)

The material to ground the issue of the warrant normally requires that the matters of complaint must be sworn7 in the form of a written complaint.8 Evidence must be provided to establish beyond reasonable doubt that statutory requirements prerequisite to the issue of a valid warrant have been taken.9

(3)

The facts to be established require careful study of the statutory language in order to distinguish, if necessary, between reasonable grounds for

765

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suspicion or belief.10 It is also a requirement that the person, premises and items be identified with sufficient particularity: otherwise the grounds may not be sufficiently established and the warrant will be invalid.11

1 See, eg Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Pt IAA Divs 2, 4; Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth), s 71; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 189; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 5; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT), s 124; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 273; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), s 60; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 465; Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), s 57; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), Pt 5 Div 3. See also Criminal Procedure “Investigation of Persons and Places” [11.1.1390]–[11.1.3370]. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 21, provides that a person not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. It remains to be seen if this affects how Victorian legislation is interpreted. 2 The principles were established by the cases arising out of the publication of Wilkes John (ed), North Briton (1763) No 45: Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1; 98 ER 489; Leach v Money (1765) 19 St Tr 1001; 96 ER 320 (KB); Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils 275; 95 ER 807 (CP); Wilkes v Lord Halifax (1768) 19 St Tr 1406 (CP). 3 See, eg Customs Act 1901 (Cth), ss 198, 199; Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 263. 4 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246, the Court at 110–111 (CLR). See also New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; 81 ALJR 1368; 172 A Crim R 555; [2007] HCA 32; Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; 71 ALJR 1548; 97 A Crim R 195, Kirby J at 141 (CLR). 5 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246, the Court at 111 (CLR). 6 R v Sing; Ex parte Harrison (1979) 36 FLR 322 (SC). 7 R v Soane (1738) Andr 272; 95 ER 395. 8 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246, the Court at 113–115 (CLR). 9 Swanevelder v Holmes (1990) 52 SASR 549, Olsson J at 557–558. 10 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 64 ALJR 384; 48 A Crim R 246, the Court at 115–123 (CLR). See also Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266; 40 ALJR 13, Kitto J at 303 (CLR). 11 Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576 (FC).

[33.9.550] The effect of a warrant, if validly issued, is of a limited nature. If the powers given by common law or statute in relation to the warrant are exceeded or the warrant is invalid, the arrester becomes a trespasser.1 There is a presumption that a warrant issued by a Supreme Court judge is regular.2 A warrant issued by a justice of the peace, special magistrate or inspector of police must be valid on its face.3 Such a warrant must contain statements of the justice’s satisfaction of prerequisite matters.4 In the absence of other statutory protection, the justice who issues an invalid warrant might also be liable for trespass at common law.5

766

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Nevertheless, if a person is arrested on an invalid warrant but is brought before a court of competent jurisdiction, any charges may be properly heard.6 Once a warrant is executed it becomes exhausted.7

1

2

3

4

5 6 7

Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (FC) (warrant only authorised entry “by day” but relied on for search conducted after sunset). See generally “Trespass” [33.8.300]–[33.8.600]. Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 49 A Crim R 153 (FCA), O’Loughlin J at 165 (so held with respect to Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth), s 71). That issue was left open on appeal to the Full Court: Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 50 A Crim R 98, the Court at 488 (FCR). Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 49 A Crim R 153 (FCA), O’Loughlin J at 164; Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 50 A Crim R 98 (FC), the Court at 488 (FCR). Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 49 A Crim R 153 (FCA), O’Loughlin J at 166; Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473; 50 A Crim R 98 (FC), the Court at 488 (FCR). See also [33.9.540]. Morgan v Hughes (1788) 2 TR 225; 100 ER 123; McArthur v Williams (1936) 55 CLR 324, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ at 365 (CLR). R v Hughes (1879) 4 QBD 614. R v Adams [1980] QB 575; [1980] 3 WLR 275 (CA).

[33.9.560] Statutory defences are provided for officials executing court processes including the enforcement of warrants. Such defences derive from the Constables Protection Act 1750 24 Geo 2 c 44 (UK) and are also rooted in the common law.1 Most Australian jurisdictions have enacted similar provisions.2 Where the statute uses the words “or other officer”, these have been held to include a jailer3 and persons acting in aid of officers.4 The protection in Australian statutes differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Their scope must be interpreted according to their individual provisions. Nevertheless, a number of issues are sufficiently common to merit attention. (1)

Protection is normally given to an official for any thing done in obedience to any warrant. It does not matter whether the warrant is valid or invalid.5 There can be no protection where there is no obedience to a warrant, for example when the person arrested is not the one named in the warrant,6 or when a commitment warrant specified no place of confinement,7 or when goods seized are not described in the warrant.8 There may be circumstances where gaps on the face of the warrant, such as no name, make it so defective “as to constitute a warning”,9 so that the official loses the statutory protection.

(2)

Some provisions allow a wider protection by providing a statutory defence for an “act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act”.10 Where such a defence is available, the general onus of establishing that the act was done in connection with the actual or intended statutory duty will, subject to a contrary legislative intention, rest

767

[33.9.560]

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on the defendant who seeks to invoke the defence.11 As part of this proof, a defendant must establish the factual basis of the belief of carrying out official duties. The belief need not necessarily be based on reasonable grounds. A genuine but mistaken belief wholly or partly based on an error of law may be sufficient.12 (3)

Some statutory provisions, such as those in Western Australia,13 require direct proof of corruption or malice on the part of the official in order that the statutory defence be lost. Malice carries its popular meaning of “personal spleen or ill will, or some motive other than that of bringing a wrongdoer to justice”,14 or when the arrester acts out of pique.15

(4)

In some instances, statutory requirements make the demand of a copy of the warrant or a refusal to produce after demand a condition precedent to an action.16 The onus is on the plaintiff to establish non-compliance with the statute by the defendant in relation to the demand and refusal so as to remove the statutory defence.17 The provision of a copy and information about the whereabouts of the original will be sufficient compliance.18 Compliance with the notice after six days but before the commencement of action retains the statutory protection.19

1 Constables Protection Act 1750 24 Geo 2 c 44 (UK). See also Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [6.35]–[6.38]. The position at common law is that a sheriff or other officer of the court, acting strictly within the authority of a warrant issued by a superior court of record, is protected although the judgment on which the warrant is issued is invalid. See Brown v Watson (1871) 23 LT 745. 2 Police Act 1990 (NSW), s 213; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT), ss 161 – 162; Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), ss 10.3, 10.5; Police Act 1998 (SA), s 65; Police Act 1892 (WA), s 137. In Tasmania, the Constables Protection Act 1750 24 Geo 2 c 44 (UK) has been held to apply in Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15. 3 Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15; Harper v Carr (1797) 7 TR 270; 101 ER 970 (also a church warden); Pedley v Davis (1861) 10 CB (NS) 492; 142 ER 544 (a collector of local rates to whom a distress warrant is addressed). 4 Feather v Rogers (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 192; 26 WN (NSW) 27 (FC). 5 Butt v Newman (1819) Gow 97; 171 ER 850; Feather v Rogers (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 192; 26 WN (NSW) 27 (FC); Price v Messenger (1800) 2 B & P 158; 126 ER 1213. 6 Hoye v Bush (1840) 1 Man & G 775; 133 ER 545. 7 Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15, Crisp J at 52. 8 Price v Messenger (1800) 2 B & P 158; 126 ER 1213. 9 Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15, Crisp J at 53. 10 Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 47A (for causes of action arising before 15 November 2005). There is no equivalent provision in the Limitation Act 2005 (WA)). 11 Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ at 606 (CLR).

768

[33.9.570]

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12 Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ at 608 (CLR). 13 Police Act 1892 (WA), s 137(3). 14 Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Fullagar J at 155. 15 Luetich v Walton [1960] WAR 109. 16 For example, Victoria Police Act 2013 (Vic), s 71(2). 17 Feather v Rogers (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 192; 26 WN (NSW) 27, Simpson ACJ at 197–198 (SR (NSW)); Collins v Rose (1839) 5 M & W 194; 151 ER 83, Parke J at 196 (M & W). A demand on three days notice by a plaintiff will not be defective because “the constable must be supposed to know the law, and must therefore know that the mention of those days meant nothing, and that he would not be bound to deliver the copy within a less time than the six days”. 18 Atkins v Kilby (1840) 11 Ad & E 777; 113 ER 609. 19 Jones v Vaughan (1804) 5 East 445; 102 ER 1141.

[33.9.570] Holders of judicial office and certain people involved in judicial proceedings have a wide immunity from tort liability. The law in relation to judges of superior courts is clear. No action lies against a judge of a superior court for a judicial act or utterance even if “his motive is malicious and the act or words are not done or spoken in the honest exercise of his office”.1 Superior court judges are further protected from the effects of tortious acts beyond their jurisdiction provided they act judicially.2 The immunity is based on the need to ensure the freedom and independence of judges in the administration of justice3 and in considerations aimed at ensuring the finality of judgments such that these judgments are not subject to collateral attack by disappointed litigants.4 The immunity extends to other participants in judicial proceedings such as counsel,5 jurors,6 witnesses7 and departmental officers preparing reports for courts.8 In relation to holders of judicial office in the inferior courts, the position is not as clear. At common law a magistrate or justice of the peace who exceeded a justice’s jurisdiction, even if acting reasonably and in good faith, had no defence to a tort action.9 Justices have been given statutory protection in the exercise of their functions over many years.10 All Australian jurisdictions have statutory protection for inferior court justices in varying degrees.11 The position appears to be that an “action [is] not maintainable where judicial officers act in good faith in the performance of their judicial duties”.12

1

2

Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 671; Tampion v Anderson (No 2) [1973] VR 715 (FC), the Court at 721; Henderson v McCafferty [2002] 1 Qd R 170; [2000] QSC 410; Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 62 ALJR 611; 35 A Crim R 1, Mason CJ at 557, Wilson J at 570, Dawson J at 595 (CLR). Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118; [1974] 3 WLR 459, Lord Denning MR at 135 (QB).

769

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3

Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [6.51]. 4 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [37]–[42]. The immunity also applies to claims against counsel under consumer legislation of general application: Nikolaidis v Satouris [2014] NSWCA 448. 5 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 62 ALJR 611; 35 A Crim R 1. The common law immunity and the decision in Giannarelli v Wraith was affirmed in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; 79 ALJR 755; [2005] HCA 12. See also Nikolaidis v Satouris [2014] NSWCA 448. The immunity at common law extends to barristers and other advocates such as solicitor advocates. It applies whether in an action for negligence or otherwise in the conduct of a case in court or for work done out of court which leads to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court. In Atwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16 the High Court unanimously confirmed the analysis and principles set out in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid. The majority (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ) ruled that the advocate’s immunity from suit does not extend to negligent advice given by a lawyer which leads to the settlement of a case by agreement between the parties embodied in consent orders. The majority held: “that the ‘intimate connection’ between the advocate’s work and ‘the conduct of the case in court’ must be such that the work affects the way the case is to be conducted so as to affect its outcome by judicial decision”. 6 Bushell’s Case (1670) 6 St Tr 999; 89 ER 2 (CP); Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; 62 ALJR 611; 35 A Crim R 1, Mason CJ at 572 (CLR). 7 Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130. The immunity extends to preparatory steps. See Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480; Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520; 33 SR (NSW) 219; 50 WN (NSW) 84, Gavan Duffy CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ at 525 (CLR). 8 Prince v Attorney-General (NZ) [1996] 3 NZLR 733 (HC). 9 Raven v Burnett (1895) 6 QLJ 166 (FC); Wood v Fetherston (1901) 27 VLR 492 (FC); Chippett v Thompson (1868) 7 SCR (NSW) 349 (coroner); Gerard v Hope [1965] Tas SR 15. 10 Public Offıcers Protection Act 1609 7 Jac 1 c 5 (UK); Public Offıcers Protection Act 1623 21 Jac 1 c 12 (UK). 11 See, eg Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), Pt 2.3; Judicial Offıcers Act 1986 (NSW), Pt 8A; Courts and Administrative Tribunals (Immunities) Act 2008 (NT); Magistrates Act 1991 (Qld), s 51; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 44; Justices Act 1959 (Tas), Pt XII; Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), s 14(2); Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 37. 12 Attorney General (NSW) v Agarsky (1986) 6 NSWLR 38 (CA), Kirby P at 40.

[33.9.580] Public authorities often have “statutory authority”. This is a measure of defence provided by legislation in order to carry out their functions. Many of these functions would amount to tortious acts in the form of trespass1 or nuisance liability,2 insofar as public authority activities involved in creating roads, hospitals, schools and maintaining public utilities, would infringe upon a considerable number of property and other rights unless given some protection. The principle is that if the legislature has directed and required a public authority to do something which has caused damage, liability does not rest on 770

[33.9.580]

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the activity itself but on the negligent performance of the task. presumptions of statutory interpretation imply that the allocated itself give rise to liability but that, unless clear words indicate task is not to be performed negligently. In Benning v 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Barwick CJ stated:

Therefore, the task cannot in otherwise, the Wong (1969)

In the construction of statutes authorizing the performance of works, there are cardinal rules, the observance of which is fundamental to our system of law. Firstly, the statute will not be construed to authorize any interference with common law rights without compensation without unambiguous and compelling language. It is for the Parliament to make its will in this respect plain. It is not for the courts to search out implications which so displace or reduce common law rights. Secondly, a statute only authorizes those acts which it expressly nominates and those acts and matters which are necessarily incidental to the acts so expressly authorized or to their execution. Thirdly, a statute which authorizes the doing of an act or the performance of a work in general only authorizes it to be done in a careful manner. If the authority is to extend to a careless execution of an authorized act, the plainest of language must be used.3

For example, when a public authority builds a dam for the purpose of carrying out its statutory objects, it is not liable, unless negligent, for damage caused by the escape of water from the dam after heavy rainfall in a summer cyclone.4 However, statutory provisions are construed strictly so that when a road construction authority, in pursuing its statutory objects of highway improvement, caused soil to fall away from an adjacent property, and earth moving machines crossed the boundary and removed soil and plants directly, there was no statutory protection.5 A statutory provision removing a common law right to damages is not necessarily a protection from other forms of curial relief.6 For example, the State may grant immunity for past activities carried out in good faith but may not prevent the granting of injunctive relief restraining future conduct which would amount to a nuisance at common law.7 Where public bodies undertake lawful activities, protective statutory provisions cannot be used as a defence to liability for things done and capable of being done without the need for specific statutory powers.8 Thus, in Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466; 61 ALJR 205, Brennan J explained: Freedom under the common law to engage in conduct requires no grant of statutory power to confirm it, and a limitation provision which affects liability for things done or purportedly done “under” the statute does not affect liability for things which are and can be done without reliance on a statutory power to do them. The conduct of the kitchen was something which the Commission had capacity to undertake without the grant of statutory power to undertake it. It follows that an act committed in the course of conducting the kitchen is not an act arising out of something done or purportedly done under the Act.9

The general principle has been described as follows:

771

[33.9.580]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Whether or not a statute exonerates from a liability in tort, which in the absence of the statute would be incurred, depends on the terms of the statute and their effect in the particular case. The question is always one of statutory construction.10

1 See generally “Trespass” [33.8.300]–[33.8.600] but note the treatment of the prinicple in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 in Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263; (1913) 16 CLR 387 and the limitations now placed on the general principle in Australia; see, eg Whinfield v Lands Purchase & Management Board (Vic) (1914) 18 CLR 606; [1914] VLR 662. 2 See generally “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. 3 Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Barwick CJ at 256 (CLR). 4 McTavish v Shire of Wyalkatchem [1976] WAR 188. 5 Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374. 6 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1977] 2 NSWLR 400 (CA). 7 Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council (1995) 38 NSWLR 545 (CA), interpreting Local Government Act 1919 (NSW), s 582A (now repealed). 8 Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466; 61 ALJR 205. 9 Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466; 61 ALJR 205, Brennan J at 477–478 (CLR). 10 Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Windeyer J at 307 (CLR).

[33.9.590] The burden of proof in cases of statutory authority defences (see [33.9.580]) generally lies on the defendant to justify that the tort suffered by the plaintiff has been authorised by legislation.1 In Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ observed: Where a statutory defence is available in respect of acts having such designated connexion with the actual or intended course of official duty, the general onus of establishing that connexion will, in the absence of some identified contrary legislative intention, rest on the defendant who invokes the defence.2

The High Court further held that the onus of establishing that the defendant’s ostensible pursuit of public duty was actuated by a wrong or indirect motive rests on the plaintiff asserting it.3 Further, while there must be some factual basis for the defendant’s belief, and while the actual facts known to the defendant may often be relevant to the question of the existence of a real belief, it is not necessary that the belief should be based on objectively reasonable grounds.4 A nuisance or other tort may be justified as an inevitable consequence of the exercise of statutory powers.5 For example, the statutory authority to operate and dispose of sewage may authorise a nuisance in the form of smell, but not over and above what is inevitably necessary and what might be prevented by

772

[33.9.590]

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reasonable means.6 The onus of proving inevitable consequence is on the defendant.7 If the defendant cannot establish inevitable consequence the defence fails.8 In Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120, Holland J stated: The concept of “inevitable consequence” has caused difficulty. If a particular work and its location is precisely defined and specified in a statute and the statute either requires or permits the council to perform that work, the problem is simpler to solve because little or no choice as to the work to be done or the manner of its performance may be left to the council, with the result that damage necessarily occasioned by the performance of works so defined would have to be regarded as inevitable. The problem is more complex where the duty or power is conferred in general terms so that it remains open to the council to perform a variety of works in a variety of ways, some of which would and some of which would not cause a nuisance.9

For example, statutory authority to operate a public golf course does not authorise a public authority to allow nuisance and damage to neighbouring properties.10 However, where a public body is authorised to construct or operate facilities which may cause a nuisance, the cost and expense involved may be taken into account.11 When legislation imposes strict and detailed budgetary controls in relation to a project, that may be a factor which the public authority uses as evidence in its defence. Hence, the legislature, due to financial constraint, may authorise a cheaper negligent performance of the project rather than a more expensive one which would have avoided the harm caused.12

1 2 3 4

5 6

7

Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886. Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886, Mason CJ at 606 (CLR). Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ at 607 (CLR). Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; 67 ALJR 886, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ at 608 (CLR), quoting Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147, Fullagar at 157. Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620. See generally “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. Howard v Bega Municipal Council (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 138; 3 LGR (NSW) 139; 33 WN (NSW) 69; Hawthorn Corp v Kannuluik [1906] AC 105 (PC). It does not necessarily authorise the release of effluent-enriched water which promotes the growth of water hyacinth and smartweed to the detriment of grazing land: Kempsey Shire Council v Lawrence [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-375 (NSWCA). Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137; Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Windeyer J at 306, Owen J at 334 (CLR); Edwards v Blue Mountains City Council (1961) 6 LGRA 263; 78 WN (NSW) 864 (SC), Walsh J at 268 (LGERA). In Benning v Wong, a majority of the High Court upheld a demurrer to the effect that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 did not impose strict liability on a defendant operating under statutory authority. The majority in Benning v Wong required the plaintiff to prove negligence: McTiernan J at 276, Menzies J at 278 and Owen J at 324 (CLR). The minority said that the onus of showing the exercise of care was on the defendant in such cases:

773

[33.9.590]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Barwick CJ at 256 and Windeyer J at 321 (CLR). See also Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [15.80]–[15.90]. 8 Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137; Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43; Aisbett v City of Camberwell (1933) 50 CLR 154; [1933] VLR 454; (1933) 12 LGR (NSW) 6. 9 Rudd v Hornsby Shire Council (1975) 31 LGRA 120 (NSWSC), Holland J at 137. 10 Lester-Travers v City of Frankston [1970] VR 2; (1969) 24 LGRA 43. 11 York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391, Powell J at 398. 12 Nalder v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1983] 1 Qd R 620, Kneipp J at 637.

Contributory Negligence [33.9.600] The weight of Australian authority is that contributory negligence cannot be a defence to an intentional tort.1 Contributory negligence and its operation as a defence to actions based in negligence is discussed at [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Contributory negligence is neither a defence at common law nor a defence under the apportionment legislation to assault and battery.2 In cases of negligent trespass as opposed to intentional trespass, that is to say, where the plaintiff is put to proof of negligence, the defendant may plead and prove contributory negligence.3 There is clear Australian authority that contributory negligence cannot be raised as a defence in an action for conversion and presumably other intentional torts to goods.4 There is English authority that contributory negligence cannot be raised in an action for deceit5 or fraud, conspiracy or procuring breach of contract.6 The New South Wales Court of Appeal, however, has approved a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York7 in holding that where an action for trespass lies because some direct interference is established, and indirect and unintended consequences of that interference can be compensated in such action, contributory negligence is available as a defence in respect of those indirect and unintended consequences.8

1 Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC), Bray CJ at 317. See generally “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. 2 Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153, Brooking J at 166. But see Barley v Paroz (unreported, QSC, Sheahan J, 3138 of 1976, 4 April 1979). 3 Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 (FC). 4 Wilton v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1973] 2 NSWLR 644; Day v Bank of New South Wales (1978) 18 SASR 163; 33 FLR 376 (FC); Grantham Homes Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1979) 37 FLR 191 (ACTSC).

774

[33.9.610]

5 6 7

8

ILLEGALITY

Alliance & Leicester Building Society v Edgestop Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1462 (CHD). Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile v Sogemin Metals Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1396 (CHD). Sindle v New York City Transit Authority 352 NYS 2d 183 (1973) (false imprisonment action brought by a school boy who sustained injuries attempting to escape from a bus). New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208, Hodgson JA at [106].

Illegality [33.9.610] Persons who intentionally engage in criminal conduct cannot avail themselves of legal redress in order to receive a benefit as the direct result of their criminal activities.1 However, it is not a defence merely to show that the plaintiff was engaged in a joint illegal enterprise.2 The issue is one of public policy whether the criminal law or statutory prohibition precludes civil recovery.3 Thus, a plaintiff bringing an action in detinue for the recovery of gold bars deposited with the defendant in breach of legislation was unable to recover.4 There is a paucity of authority in relation to this form of defence in relation to intentional torts. That may be explained on the basis that a person involved in criminal activities is unlikely to wish to air such activities in a public forum.5 The defence has received wider treatment in negligence actions.6

1 2 3 4 5

6

Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397; 44 ALJR 78, Kitto J at 403 (CLR). Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474, especially Murphy J who stated (at 465 (CLR)) that such a defence “should be confined strictly”. Thomas Brown & Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen (1962) 108 CLR 391; 36 ALJR 229. Thomas Brown & Sons Ltd v Fazal Deen (1962) 108 CLR 391; 36 ALJR 229. See generally “Detinue” [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]. See the fate that befell the litigious highwaymen in Case Note, “The Highwayman’s Case (Everet v Williams)” (1893) 9 LQR 197, referred to in Sykes v Beadon (1879) 11 Ch D 170, Jessel MR at 195. Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366. See [33.9.980]–[33.9.990], where the policy issues are discussed; see also Emanuele v Hedley (1997) 137 FLR 339 (ACTSC) (malicious prosecution). In Victoria, see Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic,) s 14G, which requires a court to consider whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity in determining whether that plaintiff has established a breach of the duty of care causing death or personal injury.

775

[33.9.610]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

776

Negligence Contributory Negligence [33.9.720] Contributory negligence may provide a partial defence to the plaintiff’s claim in negligence. It is partial in the sense that, if successful, it does not deny a plaintiff’s claim altogether but merely reduces the plaintiff’s damages.1 Throughout Australia the apportionment between parties is regulated by statute.2 Like negligence, the test of contributory negligence is an objective one.3 According to Professor McDonald: Contributory negligence is a failure by the plaintiff to take reasonable care for his or her own safety that contributes to his or her injury.4

1 2

3

Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 (HCA). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 7.3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pts IV, IVAA, V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. See also Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 50. These various statutory provisions abrogated the position at common law which treated a plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a complete defence: Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 11 East 60; 103 ER 926. The doctrinal convolutions used to mitigate this rule were discussed by the High Court in Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437. The convolutions involved the “last opportunity” rule which was also abolished by the apportionment legislation: March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 514, Toohey J at 524 (Gaudron J agreeing at 525 (CLR)); see also Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J at [15]–[32]. Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J at [32]. The various Civil Liability Acts, enacted in response to the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report (Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 27 May 2016), generally contain statements to the effect that the principles that are applicable in determining whether a person has been negligent also apply in determining whether a person who has suffered harm has been contributorily negligent: see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5R; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 23; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 44; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 23; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 62; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5K. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. 777

[33.9.720]

NEGLIGENCE

4

Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [12.30].

[33.9.730] The age of a child plaintiff will be relevant in determining the standard of care expected.1 A child plaintiff will not generally be subject to the same standard of care that is expected of an adult, however such concessions do not extend so far as to absolve children from the duty of self protection altogether.2 Application of the objective negligence standard to children yields the practical result that the child must demonstrate that degree of care for their own safety as could reasonably be expected of an ordinary child of similar age, intelligence and experience.3 A five-year-old plaintiff has been held capable of being guilty of contributory negligence,4 but liability in each case will depend on the circumstances. For example, a visible nine-year-old pedestrian trying to cross a moderate traffic flow has been held not to have been contributorily negligent.5 Likewise, there was no contributory negligence on the part of an intelligent 13-year-old with faulty brakes on her bicycle in failing to dismount and wheel the bicycle to school.6 However, a 13-year-old who refused to wear a seat belt was regarded as contributorily negligent.7 In Griffıths v Wood (1994) 62 SASR 204, the issue of the standard of conduct in relation to contributory negligence to be expected of a six-and-a-half-year-old child cyclist was discussed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. Three views emerged. Matheson J quoted with approval from the judgment of Sugerman J in Mye v Peters (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 298; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 26 where he said that “the test to be applied is an objective one and not one which is dependent upon the degree of intelligence of a particular child or the standard of indoctrination which it may have received”.8 Prior J said that the standard of care expected of a child is to be measured by reference to the same capacity as a normal child of that age for taking care. Olsson J said that the test was not wholly objective; the standard of conduct is that of a child of the plaintiff’s age, intelligence and experience, the last two factors being subjective issues personal to the particular plaintiff.

1

2 3

4

McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199; 39 ALJR 459. See also Chan v Fong (1973) 5 SASR 1, Walters J at 5–6; Allen v Chadwick (2014) 120 SASR 350; [2014] SASCFC 100, Kourakis CJ at [26]. See generally “Standard of Care” [33.2.1510]–[33.2.1720]. Blay S, Gibson A, and Richards B, Torts Law in Principle (4th ed, Thomson Lawbook Co., 2005) pp 290–291. Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [8.15]–[8.16]. See also Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J at [33]–[34]. Wiech v Amato (1973) 6 SASR 442; Bye v Bates (1989) 51 SASR 67. Compare Cirjak v Todd (1977) 17 SASR 316, where Bray CJ expressed the view that a child aged four years and 11 months was too young to be capable of contributory

778

[33.9.750]

5

6 7 8

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

negligence. The remarks in Beasley v Marshall (1977) 17 SASR 456, of Bright J at 458–459 are also instructive: “The descending line measuring reasonable expectation of care rapidly approaches zero as the age diminishes, but the line is apparently asymptotic. At an age of under five years the required duty of care is close to zero.” Humphrey v Hansen (1997) 25 MVR 402 (WASCFC). But see Goode v Thompson [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-617; [2001] QSC 287, where a 12-year-old child was held 20 per cent contributorily negligent for dashing unpredictably across the road. Horne v Queensland (1995) 22 MVR 111 (QCA). Byass (an infant) v Nicholson (1995) 14 SR (WA) 322 (DC). Mye v Peters (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 298; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 26 (CA), Sugerman J at 304; Herron CJ at 302 and Holmes JA at 305 (SR (NSW)) agreeing.

[33.9.740] To determine whether particular conduct constitutes contributory negligence, the gravity of the risk to the plaintiff must be balanced against the interest the plaintiff is advancing. For example, where a shopper trips over a carton in the supermarket aisle, even if the shopper knew it was usual for cartons to be placed in the aisle, the shopper is not guilty of contributory negligence when the carton was in a position outside the usual practice.1 Conversely, awareness of and remaining in a position of danger, such as standing close to demolition works, may amount to contributory negligence.2 The social utility of a plaintiff’s conduct may also be taken into account. For example, a rescuer standing out in the middle of a road on a dark wet night without regard to oncoming traffic may not be guilty of contributory negligence when hit by an oncoming driver.3

1 2 3

Suttons Foodlands Store Pty Ltd v Goldsworthy [1969] SASR 282. Mounsey v Orange Grove Bricks Pty Ltd [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-392 (WASCFC). Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170 (affirming Executor Trustee & Agency Co (SA) Ltd v Hearse [1961] SASR 51; (1961) 35 ALJR 248n (FC), especially Napier CJ at 56 (SASR)).

[33.9.750] Contributory negligence may be imputed to a plaintiff based on ordinary common law principles of vicarious liability.1 A person found liable in negligence in relation to dealings with a company may raise a defence of contributory negligence. The acts of the directors and officers may be regarded as acts of the company without the need to prove delegation of the particular functions.2 However, because common law principles of vicarious liability still

779

[33.9.750]

NEGLIGENCE

make a fundamental distinction between employees and independent contractors,3 there is no imputed liability for an independent contractor’s contributory negligence.4

1 Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [10.14]. See generally “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]. 2 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248. 3 Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd (2006) 226 CLR 161; 80 ALJR 900; 152 IR 317; [2006] HCA 19. 4 Chaplin v Hawes (1828) 3 Car & P 554; 172 ER 543.

[33.9.760] Contributory negligence does not depend on the existence of a duty of care owed by the plaintiff to the defendant or any third person. Although conduct amounting to contributory negligence may also constitute the breach of a duty which the plaintiff owes to the defendant, the plaintiff can be guilty of contributory negligence notwithstanding that they owe no duty to the defendant or any third person.1 Moreover, as the High Court explained in Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6: A person may also be guilty of contributory negligence even though the negligence of the plaintiff did not contribute to the accident which caused the damage. That is because contributory negligence is concerned with the failure of the plaintiff to protect his or her person against damage and not with whether the failure contributed to the accident.2

The defendant’s duty is only one of many factors that must be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff so conducted itself that they failed to take reasonable care for the safety of its person or property. In Astley v Austrust Ltd, the High Court (in considering the South Australian apportionment legislation) further held that there is no rule that apportionment legislation does not operate in respect of contributory negligence of the plaintiff where the defendant, in breach of its duty, has failed to protect the plaintiff from damage in respect of the very event which gave rise to the defendant’s engagement.3 Accordingly, “a plaintiff who carelessly leaves valuables lying around may be guilty of contributory negligence, calling for apportionment of loss, even if the defendant was employed to protect the plaintiff’s valuables”.4 In the United Kingdom, a plaintiff has also been held guilty of contributory negligence even though the act which occurred (his suicide) was the very act which the defendant was under a duty to guard against.5 Similarly, a plaintiff may be held contributorily negligent in failing to identify internal fraud among

780

[33.9.770]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

its employees even where the defendant is an external auditor engaged for the very purpose of detecting defalcations and fraud arising out of significant deficiencies in the plaintiff’s internal control protocols.6

1

2 3

4 5

6

Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [21]. The decision is discussed by Davis G and Knowler J, “Astley v Austrust Ltd: Down But Not Out: Contributory Negligence, Contract, Statute and Common Law” (1999) 23 MULR 795. Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [21]. Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [29]–[31] (holding the plaintiff contributorily negligent for failing to make its own inquiries about the borrowings of a trading trust before it agreed to become the trustee of the trading trust, notwithstanding that the plaintiff had obtained negligent advice from the defendant solicitors as to the plaintiff’s potential exposure to personal liability in respect of the activities of the trading trust, the very risk against which the defendant was engaged to protect the plaintiff from). Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [29]. So held by the House of Lords in Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363 (extending the term “fault” in English apportionment legislation to a situation where the plaintiff (a prisoner in that case) had deliberately injured or killed himself). Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248 (CA).

[33.9.770] A person creating an emergency cannot establish contributory negligence by minutely criticising the behaviour of those faced with the danger so created.1 The risk taken by the plaintiff to avoid the emergency or inconvenience needs to be weighed against the danger or inconvenience to which the plaintiff was subjected.2 This means that allowances should be made for the possibility of mistakes by others as well as dangers of the plaintiff’s own making. An emergency does not of itself absolve a plaintiff from contributory negligence.3 A motor car driver who lacks the skill of a reasonable driver when faced with an emergency will be guilty of contributory negligence in failing to meet the standard expected.4 In Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) v Ashby [1951] SASR 61, Napier CJ observed: There is no warrant for making any special allowance for the difficulties of a situation which the plaintiff courted either deliberately or through the failure to exercise reasonable foresight. … It is unreasonable – where there is no necessity for it – to cut things so fine as to allow no margin of safety for the mistakes or thoughtlessness of other people.5

However, not every error of judgment amounts to contributory negligence.6 The latter view finds greater scope in work accidents when it is proper to take into

781

[33.9.770]

NEGLIGENCE

account the circumstances of work:7 see [33.9.780]. Inadvertence, inattention and misjudgment do not necessarily amount to contributory negligence.8 The possibility of mere inadvertence or thoughtlessness is not restricted to work accidents.9 Inadvertence may be the very risk against which the defendant should have guarded.10

1 United Uranium NL v Fisher (1964) 112 CLR 676n; [1965] ALR 99 (HCA). 2 Caterson v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1973) 128 CLR 99; 47 ALJR 249. 3 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Curtin (1997) 25 MVR 289 (QCA). 4 Cortis v Baker [1968] SASR 367; Antonow v Leane (1989) 53 SASR 60 (FC). 5 Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) v Ashby [1951] SASR 61, Napier CJ at 63–64. 6 Ansell v Arnold [1963] SASR 355 (FC), Napier CJ, Chamberlain and Travers JJ at 356. 7 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA). 8 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA), Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJ at 493 (ALJR). 9 Northern Territory v Shoesmith (1996) 5 NTLR 155; 132 FLR 138; 91 LGERA 17 (CA). 10 Northern Territory v Shoesmith (1996) 5 NTLR 155; 132 FLR 138; 91 LGERA 17 (CA) (recreational use of a waterhole).

[33.9.780] The circumstances of work are taken into account in work accidents involving contributory negligence defences.1 The tendency in industrial claims is to reduce the effect of inadvertence or thoughtlessness.2 “A mistake by a workman will not usually be a good defence to an action if it was due to inadvertence, hurry, absorption in work or fatigue.”3 For example, evidence that a trainee was working for the first time in an unfamiliar environment may be used to rebut a claim of contributory negligence.4 In concluding that a garbage collector was merely inadvertent rather than contributorily negligent when hit by a motor vehicle while running across a road with a garbage humper on his shoulder, the High Court in McLean v Tedman (1984) 155 CLR 306; 58 ALJR 541 took account of the following factors: (a) the prevailing condition of poor light unquestionably diminished his ability to pick out the vehicle and locate its speed and position accurately; (b) performance of his task necessarily involved preoccupation with the matter in hand; (c) at the relevant time he was carrying on his right shoulder a humper whose capacity ranged between four and eight household garbage deposits; (d) the carrying of this humper on his right shoulder when running across the road would very considerably restrict his capacity to observe an oncoming vehicle and assess its speed accurately; and (e) in order to retain his employment as a garbage collector he was expected to run across the road and keep up with the truck as it moved forward.5

Thus, when an employee is concentrating on performing the duties for which 782

[33.9.790]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

the employee has been engaged, the failure to look up in order to avoid danger from an overhead crane will not amount to contributory negligence.6 Similarly an injured worker found to be working in accordance with the culture and practice of the plant was found not to have been contributorily negligent.7 However, where an employer gives numerous warnings about a particular practice, an employee may be found contributorily negligent if injured upon disregarding the warnings.8 An experienced employee’s recognition of the danger of continuing to work without assistance may be found to be contributorily negligent when the known system of work provides for help when difficulties are encountered.9

1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA). Commissioner for Railways (Qld) v Ruprecht (1979) 142 CLR 563; 53 ALJR 606. Hanna v Commissioner for Railways (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 22; 72 WN (NSW) 15, Herron J at 29 (SR (NSW)) (reversed on other grounds in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Hanna (1954) 28 ALJR 656; 55 SR (NSW) 109; 72 WN (NSW) 47 (HCA)). Commissioner for Railways (Qld) v Halley (1978) 20 ALR 409 (HCA). McLean v Tedman (1984) 155 CLR 306; 58 ALJR 541, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ at 315–316 (CLR). Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 (CA), Kirby P at 68–71, Meagher and Handley JJA at 73. Mungekar v Hermes Precisa Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 225, Simpson J at [80] (Tobias AJA and Meagher JA agreeing). Kondracuik v Jackson Morgan & Sons (1988) 47 SASR 280. Brown’s Valve Service Pty Ltd v Cristina [1997] 1 VR 536 (CA), Smith AJA at 546–547.

[33.9.790] Breach of a statutory standard by a defendant is not decisive in relation to the existence of contributory negligence.1 In Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220, the High Court stated: Whether or not in particular circumstances it is reasonable to act upon the assumption that another will act in some particular way, as for example by performing his duty under a regulation, must remain a question of fact to be judged in all the particular circumstances of the case.2

The existence of regulations and their relation to a plaintiff’s conduct, while not decisive, is important.3 For example, regulations governing motorists approaching an intersection from different directions may provide that the vehicle to the right has right of way. If a collision occurs in such circumstances, the motorist on the right may nevertheless be contributorily negligent. In Sibley v Kais, the High Court further noted: The obligation of each driver of two vehicles approaching an intersection is to take reasonable care. What amounts to “reasonable care” is, of course, a question of fact but to our mind, generally speaking, reasonable care requires each driver as he

783

[33.9.790]

NEGLIGENCE

approaches the intersection to have his vehicle so far in hand that he can bring his vehicle to a halt or otherwise avoid an impact, should he find another vehicle approaching from his right or from his left in such a fashion that, if both vehicles continue, a collision may reasonably be expected.4

1 Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220. See “Defences” [33.5.390]–[33.5.430]. 2 Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220, Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ at 427 (CLR). 3 Hanly v Berlin [1975] Qd R 52, Hoare J at 62. 4 Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; 41 ALJR 220, Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ at 427 (CLR).

[33.9.800] Modern authorities clearly establish that failure to wear a seat belt may amount to contributory negligence.1 However, failure to adopt safety measures, for example failing to wear seat belts or crash helmets, does not automatically establish contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. A pleading of contributory negligence in relation to failure to wear a seat belt needs to be proved by evidence of the availability of a seat belt in working order, and evidence that the damage would have been significantly less serious if the seat belt had been worn.2 For example, contributory negligence is not available against a plaintiff passenger travelling in the back of a vehicle in which there is no seat belt.3 The scientific study of the effect of wearing seat belts in road accidents has become a recognised field of specialised knowledge, admissible as expert evidence.4 A claim of contributory negligence will fail in the absence of evidence to show that wearing a seat belt would have prevented the damage.5 It may even be possible in some cases to show that failure to wear a seat belt has prevented the injury from becoming more serious.6 The Australian Capital Territory legislation raises a presumption of contributory negligence for failure to wear a seat belt and requires the damages to be reduced to the extent that the court considers just and equitable. This presumption may be rebutted if the injured person can establish on the balance of probabilities that the injury was less serious than it would have been if they were wearing a seat belt at the time, or that they were not capable of fastening the seat belt without the aid of another.7 In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, South Australia and Tasmania, legislation provides that persons 16 years of age or older who are injured in a motor accident while not wearing seat belts shall be presumed contributorily negligent and have their damages reduced accordingly.8 The provisions apply even if the fact that a seat belt was not worn at the time of the motor accident did not have any casual effect on the extent of severity of the injuries.9 However, in New South Wales, the fact that damages may be reduced by a percentage that the court considers “just and equitable” leaves it open for the

784

[33.9.810]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

court to reduce the plaintiff’s damages by a percentage of nil where failure to wear the seat belt has not contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries, or when failure to wear the seatbelt was reasonable.10 The provisions are silent on the issue of which party bears the onus of proving contributory negligence, with the result that the common law rule that the defendant bears the onus of proof applies.11

1 2

Eagles v Orth [1975] Qd R 197; Richardson v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1. Ford v Barnett (1987) 5 MVR 95 (QSC); Bull v Batten (1987) 5 MVR 341 (QSCFC); Feher v Perrett Traders Pty Ltd (1988) 6 MVR 433 (QSC); Tabe v Stanbury (1988) 8 MVR 48 (SASC); Ferrett v Worsley (1993) 61 SASR 234 (FC). 3 Collins v Larsen (1995) 14 SR (WA) 131 (DC). 4 Richardson v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1; Tabe v Stanbury (1988) 8 MVR 48 (SASC). 5 Woodward v Porteous [1971] Tas SR 386 (NC 25); Hazel v Charman (1987) 4 MVR 507 (SASC); Dutcher v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1988) 7 MVR 447 (NSWSC); Coe v Kernovske (1990) 10 MVR 563 (QSCFC); Guidera v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1990) 11 MVR 423 (NSWCA), Gleeson CJ, Clarke and Handley JJA at 424; Rosecrance v Rosecrance (1995) 129 FLR 310 (NTSC). 6 Yisrael v Chamberlain John Deer Pty Ltd (1987) 5 MVR 491 (NSWCA). 7 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 97. 8 Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 74 (accidents occurring before 5 October 1999) and Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 138(2)(c) (accidents occurring on or after 5 October 1999) (damages reduced by a percentage that the court thinks just and equitable); Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (NT), s 11(1) (damages reduced by fixed rate of 25 per cent: s 11(2)); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 49(2) (damages reduced by fixed rate of 25 per cent: s 49(3)); Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s 22(3) (damages reduced by 15 per cent or more as the court thinks just and equitable: s 22(4)). 9 See Barnard v Towill (1998) 72 SASR 27. 10 Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308 (CA), Kirby P at 314–318 (Meagher JA concurring), Mahoney JA at 332–334. 11 Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308 (CA), Kirby P at 315 (Meagher JA concurring).

[33.9.810] At common law, the defence of contributory negligence is available to an intoxicated driver whose passenger is injured as a result of the driver’s negligence if, in accepting a lift, the passenger has failed to take reasonable care for their own safety.1 It is not a requirement that the passenger had actual knowledge of the driver’s intoxicated state, but only that the “passenger ought to have realised that alcohol had impaired the driver’s capacity to drive”.2 Moreover, no allowance will be made for the intoxicated state of the passenger in determining whether they were contributorily negligent. In Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J said:

785

[33.9.810]

NEGLIGENCE

[T]he issue is not whether a reasonable person in the intoxicated passenger’s condition – if there could be such a person – would realise the risk of injury in accepting the lift. It is whether an ordinary reasonable person – a sober person – would have foreseen that accepting a lift from the intoxicated driver was exposing him or her to a risk of injury by reason of the driver’s intoxication. If a reasonable person would know that he or she was exposed to a risk of injury in accepting a lift from an intoxicated driver, an intoxicated passenger who is sober enough to enter the car voluntarily is guilty of contributory negligence. The relevant conduct is accepting a lift from a person whose driving capacity is known, or could reasonably be found, to be impaired by reason of intoxication … [t]he fact that the passenger’s intoxicated condition prevents him or her from perceiving the risks attendant on driving with an intoxicated driver does not absolve the passenger from complying with the standard of care required of an ordinary reasonable person.3

Consequently, a plaintiff may be found to be contributorily negligent where they: (1)

perceive the intoxication of the driver, although not appreciating the danger or voluntarily accepting it, and accept a lift with the defendant;

(2)

are aware that the driver is likely to be intoxicated and fails to take reasonable steps to assess the driver’s condition before embarking on the journey; or

(3)

are aware that the driver is likely to become intoxicated, and by the passenger’s own drinking deprives themselves of the capacity to assess the driver’s state. “This will commonly be the case where a driver and passenger have engaged, together or close by, in an extended bout of alcohol consumption over a continuous interval.”4

The High Court also held in Joslyn v Berryman that in determining whether the plaintiff ought to have aware been aware of the driver’s impairment, the relevant facts and circumstances are not limited to events immediately before the accident, but include the extended period of interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant.

1 For the statutory position, see [33.9.820]. 2 Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J at [37] referring with approval to the reliance by Cooper J in Morton v Knight [1990] 2 Qd R 419 on the test applied by Walsh and Gibbs JJ in O’Neill v Chisholm (1972) 47 ALJR 1 (HCA). 3 Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J at [38]–[39]; Solomons v Pallier (2015) 72 MVR 365; [2015] NSWCA 266. 4 Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J at [145].

786

[33.9.820]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

[33.9.820] In all jurisdictions except Victoria, there is a rebuttable presumption of contributory negligence in claims where the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the incident.1 The presumption can be rebutted by establishing on the balance of probabilities that the intoxication did not contribute to the accident, was not self-induced or (in South Australia) was pursuant to prescription or instructions by a medical practitioner.2 If the presumption of contributory negligence is not rebutted, the court must reduce the damages by 25 per cent or greater if the court thinks appropriate.3 Legislation in some jurisdictions also regulates the circumstance where the plaintiff accepts a lift with an intoxicated driver while being aware, or who ought to have been aware, that the driver was intoxicated.4 The relevant sections provide for a presumption of contributory negligence, rebuttable only if the plaintiff can establish that the intoxication did not contribute to the accident or the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk. A fixed statutory reduction of 25 per cent applies in South Australia, while the courts in the remaining jurisdictions with such provisions have a discretion to award greater reductions as they consider appropriate.5 The provisions in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and South Australia also operate to the exclusion of the defence of volenti non fit injuria insofar as it relates to the voluntary assumption of risk arising from the intoxication of another.6 Victoria preserves the position at common law (see [33.9.810]) except for requiring the court to take into account the plaintiff’s intoxication in considering whether the plaintiff has established a breach of duty of care owed by the defendant.7

1

2

3

4

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 95; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50(3); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 14; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 5; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5L. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 49 and Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 46 further provide that a plaintiff’s intoxication is not relevant to determining whether a duty of care arises and does not otherwise affect the standard of care owed to that person. See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 95(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50(2), (5); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 14(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47(3); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 5(1), (4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5L(2), (3). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 95(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50(4); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 17; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 5(2). There is no equivalent provision in Western Australia. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 138(2)(b)(ii); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT),

787

[33.9.820]

NEGLIGENCE

5

6

7

s 15; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47. There are no equivalent provisions in Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999, s 138(2)(b)(ii) was applied and discussed in Mackenzie v Nominal Defendant (2005) 43 MVR 315; [2005] NSWCA 180, Giles JA at [47]–[51] (Stein AJA and Gzell J agreeing). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96(3); Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 138(3); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 17; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(3). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96(5); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(6). See also [33.9.910]. Volenti non fit injuria: “1. [T]he principle that there is no liability in tort for an act if there was consent or assumption of risk on the part of the injured party. 2. [T]he defence that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury negligently caused. [L: an injury cannot be done to a willing person]”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 179. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14G.

[33.9.830] The burden of proof is on the defendant in both pleading1 and proving contributory negligence.2 That is so even though contributory negligence is strictly a plea in mitigation of damages.3 As contributory negligence is not technically a defence, no res judicata4 or estoppel issue can arise. Therefore, a defendant faced by a default judgment is not prevented from raising the issue in an appropriate application to set aside the default judgment.5

1 Christie v Bridgestone Australia Pty Ltd (1983) 33 SASR 377 (FC); North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Liddle (1994) 118 FLR 109 (NTCA). 2 Hercules Textile Mills Pty Ltd v K & H Textile Engineers Pty Ltd [1955] VLR 310, Sholl J at 315–316; Rosecrance v Rosecrance (1995) 129 FLR 310 (NTSC), Mildren J at 313–320. 3 Hercules Textile Mills Pty Ltd v K & H Textile Engineers Pty Ltd [1955] VLR 310, Sholl J at 315–316. 4 Res judicata: “[A]n issue between parties settled by judicial means and not to be raised again by the same parties”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. 5 North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Liddle (1994) 118 FLR 109 (NTCA).

[33.9.840] Proven contributory negligence must be shown to be a cause of the plaintiff’s damage.1 The question of causation is one of fact to be resolved by the application of common sense.2 The causation principles applicable to determining whether the defendant’s negligent conduct was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury or loss apply mutatis mutandis in determining whether the plaintiff’s lack of reasonable care for their safety contributed to the injury or loss suffered by the plaintiff.3 A jury need not be instructed on matters of causation that are obviously matters

788

[33.9.840]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

of common sense and experience. For example, “[a] jury probably does not need to be told that the absence of a tail light could not operate to cause head-on collision even at night”.4 Where evidence cannot be produced to show that injuries would have been avoided or reduced, the defence will fail.5 A plaintiff’s conduct may be regarded as causally relevant in three ways: (1)

by being a joint cause to the accident, for example when the plaintiff’s own careless driving is a cause of an accident;

(2)

by increasing the risk of harm, for example by taking a lift with a driver adversely affected by alcohol (see [33.9.810]–[33.9.820]); or

(3)

by failing to take safety measures for one’s own safety, for example failing to wear safety equipment, which aggravates the damage caused primarily by the negligence of the defendant: see [33.9.800].

These categories are useful when it is necessary to compare the relative fault of plaintiff and defendant under the apportionment legislation:6 see [33.9.860]. The plaintiff’s negligence need only be contributory to the injury, and not necessarily to the accident causing that injury, as illustrated by (1) above.7 While the Western Australian statute refers to the defendant being guilty of an act of negligence contributing to the event which caused the damage,8 “event” has been interpreted as referring to the injury causing damage rather than the accident itself.9

1

2

3

Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268, Dixon CJ and Fullagar and Kitto JJ at 274. March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335; Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 (HCA). March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 515, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreeing at 524 and 525 (CLR) respectively; Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [9.10]–[9.60]. See also “Causation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020]. Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) p 346. Mutatis mutandis: “[T]he necessary changes having been made”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 113. As discussed under “Damages” [33.10.10]ff with respect to causation principles, in determining negligence, the various jurisdictions have followed the recommendations of the Ipp Report (Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 27 May 2016)) and provided in their respective statutes legislative statements that causation is a two-pronged analysis requiring a conclusion that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (referred to as “factual causation”) and that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused (referred to as “scope of liability”). Australian courts have yet to interpret the effect of these legislative statements on the common law test of causation formulated by the High Court in March v E & MH

789

[33.9.840]

NEGLIGENCE

4 5

6 7

8 9

Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335 and its progeny. The extent to which the common law principles of causation will require modification, how that modification impacts the test of causation and whether these new legislative statements affect the analysis of causation for contributory negligence purposes, is therefore unclear. Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268, Dixon CJ, Fullagar and Kitto JJ at 277. Woodward v Porteous [1971] Tas SR 386 (NC 25) (failure to wear seat belt not shown to have caused eye damage); Gent-Diver v Neville [1953] St R Qd 1; Coe v Kernovske (1990) 10 MVR 563 (QSCFC); Green v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-907; [2007] QCA 260. Gravells NP, “Three Heads of Contributory Negligence” (1977) 93 LQR 581. Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 (CA), Handley JA and Beazley JA at 398 and Santow JA at 412. See also Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286; [1975] 3 WLR 379 (CA), Lord Denning at 292 (QB). Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4(1). Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust v Wilson [1976] WAR 175 (FC) (disapproving Taggart v Rose [1975] WAR 41).

[33.9.850] The practice on apportionment of damages is to compare the parties’ responsibilities. Apportionment under most State and Territory legislation requires that the damages recoverable by the plaintiff “are to be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s responsibility for the damage”.1 Essentially, according to the Ipp Report: [T]he court’s discretion is exercised by comparing the degree of culpability of the defendant with that of the plaintiff. The defendant’s negligence is compared to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Regard is had to the degree to which each departed from the requisite standard of care and to the relative causative importance of the conduct of each.2

In Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, the High Court explained the process of apportioning damage: What has to be done is to arrive at a “just and equitable” apportionment as between the plaintiff and the defendant of the “responsibility” for the damage. It seems clear that this must of necessity involve a comparison of culpability. By “culpability” we do not mean moral blameworthiness but degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man.3

Hence, two factors are involved in the apportionment of responsibility: departure from the standard of care and causation. These were discussed by Burbury CJ in Smith v McIntyre [1958] Tas SR 36: A comparison of degrees of fault between two negligent actors requires an examination of the whole conduct of each in relation to the circumstances of the accident. The degree of departure from the standard of the reasonable man on the part of either should not be assessed without considering the extent to which that departure was a contributing cause of the accident. A variety of factors may enter into

790

[33.9.850]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

a judicial determination as to which party has the greater share in the responsibility for the accident. There is no single touchstone of responsibility. In one case the emphasis may be on comparative degrees of negligent conduct: it may be found that the negligence of one party is much more culpable than that of another – approaching the criminal standard of negligence – as against slight negligence on the part of the other. In another case the emphasis may be on the greater importance to be attached to the conduct of one party as a causative factor. In another case there may be little to distinguish between the conduct of each party in his departure from the standard of the reasonable man, but the negligence of one party may have brought about a hazardous situation and the negligence of the other party may have consisted in failing to avoid the consequences of that negligence. It is the whole conduct of each negligent actor in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination.4

The tribunal of fact should be instructed that the task of apportionment involves: (i)

a comparison both of culpability and the relative importance of the parties’ respective acts and omissions in causing the injury;

(ii)

that the culpability referred not to normal culpability but to the degree of departure from the standard of care expected of each of the employer and employee.5

Because the apportionment of damages under the apportionment legislation is essentially an evaluative exercise involving a comparison of degrees of fault and causal contribution, an appeal court will not lightly disturb the apportionment of damages decided by a trial judge or jury.6 An appellate court will interfere, however, where the assessment of contributory negligence was outside an appropriate discretionary range.7 A tribunal of fact is not permitted under the Australian provisions to make a finding of 100 per cent contributory negligence.8 The basis for the decision is that an apportionment of 100 per cent contributory negligence amounts to a finding that the plaintiff was effectively wholly responsible for the damage suffered, whereas the apportionment legislation proceeds on the premise that the plaintiff suffered damage partly as a result of their own fault and partly the fault of another person.9 Courts have reduced a plaintiff’s damages by as much as 90 per cent,10 but a reduction of 95 per cent was overturned on appeal in one decision on the basis that such a large reduction amounted, in effect, to holding that the plaintiff was entirely to blame.11 The view has been expressed that a reduction of more than 90 per cent is impermissible because it would necessarily mean that the defendant’s fault was so negligible that it should be ignored.12 Most jurisdictions have followed the recommendations of the Ipp Report and reversed the effect of the High Court’s decision in Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 by inserting provisions to the effect that a court may determine a reduction of 100 per cent for contributory negligence if the court

791

[33.9.850]

NEGLIGENCE

thinks it just and equitable to do so, with the result that the claim for damages is defeated.13

1 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3, s 9(1)(b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V, s 16(1)(b). See also the almost identical wording in Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 7.3, s 102(1)(b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3, s 7; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), Pts 2, 3, s 7; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt V, s 26(1)(b); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), Pt 2, s 4(1). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 102 provides that the court reduces the damages to the extent the court thinks just in accordance with the degree of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. In practical application the different wording appears to be of no consequence. 2 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) at [8.2] (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 27 May 2016). See also Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA), the Court at 494 (ALJR). 3 Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ at 16; applied in Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, the Court at [1117]–[1120]; cited in Grima v RFI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 345. 4 Smith v McIntyre [1958] Tas SR 36 (FC), Burbury CJ at 46–47. 5 Butler v Rick Cuneen Logging Pty Ltd [1997] 2 VR 99 (CA), Winneke P at 103, Charles and Callaway JJA concurring at 105. 6 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA); Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver (2001) 75 ALJR 867; [2001] HCA 24; Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, Hayne J at [156]–[157]. See also Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; 81 ALJR 1773; 155 LGERA 153; [2007] HCA 42, Kirby J at [168]–[169]; Grima v RFI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 345, Barrett JA at [42]. 7 Evans v Lindsay (2006) 46 MVR 531; [2006] NSWCA 354; see also Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, Kirby J at [119]–[120]. 8 Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 (HCA). 9 Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 (HCA), Hayne J at 68–69. 10 Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA). 11 Civic v Glastonbury Steel Fabrications Pty Ltd [1985] Aust Torts Reports 80-746 (NSWCA). 12 Kelly v Carroll [2002] NSWCA 9, Heydon JA at [37]. 13 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63. See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90].

792

[33.9.860]

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

[33.9.860] The problem of apportionment gives rise to theoretical difficulties when considering the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage. The first problem is whether culpability is to be compared, or whether the comparison is the extent to which fault contributed to the damage (often in this connection described as “causative potency”).1 A second problem concerns the bases for making any such comparison. In practice, in spite of the innumerable theoretical difficulties, both comparisons are made as questions of fact and left to the common sense of the tribunal of fact. A tribunal of fact’s apportionment may be set aside on the basis that it was outside what could reasonably have been determined.2 Regardless of whatever reservations may be entertained, the legislation has been made to work over a long period. Comparative culpability requires a comparison of the conduct of the plaintiff in departing from the legal standard of care for the plaintiff’s own safety3 with the departure from the standard of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Comparisons may be made between fault ranging from trivial inadvertence to gross negligence. For example, deliberately disregarding a safety regulation is worse than taking an easy but dangerous route to carry out a task.4 Alternatively, in a motor accident, a disregard of a statutory obligation carries greater culpability than being merely careless regarding one’s own safety.5 When considering apportionment along lines of causal responsibility or “causative potency”,6 three categories of contributory negligence are useful.7 The categories tend to merge or overlap, but provide some guide for apportionment. They may be classified as follows: (1)

Circumstances where the plaintiff’s fault is a major cause of the events by which the plaintiff has suffered damage. A standard example of this is when contributory negligence is established in a head-on motor vehicle collision caused by the negligence of both drivers.8 A less common example is where a plaintiff passenger grabs the steering wheel of a vehicle.9 That approach also explains why pedal cyclists or pedestrians often bear a large share of responsibility in negligent collisions with vehicles.10

(2)

Circumstances where the plaintiff assumes a position and thereby is exposed to a risk as a result of which the plaintiff suffers damage which would otherwise have been avoided. Such circumstances include driving with an arm protruding from a vehicle,11 or taking a lift with a driver known to be adversely affected by alcohol:12 see [33.9.810]–[33.9.820].

(3)

Circumstances where the plaintiff assumes a position which is not inherently risky, but fails to take safety provisions which, in the event of an accident, expose the plaintiff to additional damages. These circumstances include the plaintiff who fails to wear a safety belt or crash helmet:13 see [33.9.800].

In directing a tribunal of fact on the issue of apportionment, there is generally no need to use much more than the statutory language.14 Some guidance should

793

[33.9.860]

NEGLIGENCE

be given regarding the degrees of care by which the parties departed from their standard of care, a comparison of the responsibility of each party in contributing the damage, and then instructions to apportion as the jury sees “just and equitable”.15

1 Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd [1949] 2 KB 291, Denning LJ at 326. 2 Kulczycki v Metalex Pty Ltd [1995] 2 VR 377 (CA), Nathan J at 391, Ashley J at 413–414. However, the High Court has shown reluctance to interfere with jury apportionments: see Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver (2001) 75 ALJR 867; [2001] HCA 24. 3 Kondracuik v Jackson Morgan & Sons (1988) 47 SASR 280. 4 Barisic v Devenport [1978] 2 NSWLR 111. 5 Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 (FCAFC); Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10. 6 Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd [1949] 2 KB 291, Denning LJ at 326. 7 The categories are derived from Gravells NP, “Three Heads of Contributory Negligence” (1977) 93 LQR 581. That provides the most useful analysis of degrees of fault and causal responsibility available. 8 Feher v Perrett Traders Pty Ltd (1988) 6 MVR 433 (QSC); Watt v Bretag (1982) 56 ALJR 760 (HCA). 9 Jamieson v Graham (1995) 22 MVR 97 (QSCFC). 10 Karamalis v Commissioner of Railways (SA) (1977) 15 ALR 629 (HCA) (cyclist and train); Lacey v Schneider (1989) 9 MVR 512 (SAFC) (pedal cyclist and motor cyclist). Pedestrian cases include Purcell v Watson (1979) 26 ALR 235n (HCA), Cheetham v Bou (1989) 10 MVR 242 (NSWCA); Lobb v Ellis (1989) 10 MVR 88 (SASC). See also the drift away from the more generous apportionments for contributorily negligent pedestrians in Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10; Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491; 36 ALJR 362; Evers v Bennett (1982) 31 SASR 228 (FC). 11 Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268; Hanly v Berlin [1975] Qd R 52. 12 Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39; Morton v Knight [1990] 2 Qd R 419; Mendola v Warren (1993) 19 MVR 385 (ACTSCFC); Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361 (QCA); Williams v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1995) 21 MVR 148 (NSWCA); Howard v Hamilton (1996) 16 WAR 292 (FC) (both a 17-year-old passenger and a 17-year-old driver affected by alcohol and drugs). See also Hogg K, “Guest Passengers: A Drunk Driver’s Defences” (1994) 2 TLJ 37. 13 Eagles v Orth [1975] Qd R 197; Hallowell v Nominal Defendant (Qld) [1983] 2 Qd R 266 (FC); Ford v Barnett (1987) 5 MVR 95 (QSC); Bull v Batten (1987) 5 MVR 341 (QSCFC); Tabe v Stanbury (1988) 8 MVR 48 (SASC). 14 Winter v Bennett [1956] VLR 612 (FC), Herring CJ and Barry J at 628, Martin J at 635; Melbourne & Metropolitan Tramways Board (Vic) v Postneck [1959] VR 39 (FC). 15 Broadhurst v Millman [1976] VR 208 (FC), Gowans and Menhennitt JJ at 218–219, Dunn J at 223–224.

794

[33.9.880]

VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK

[33.9.870] Whether apportionment legislation is available in respect of professional negligence actions founded on an action for breach of contract, is to be resolved by reference to the relevant text, history and purpose of the particular statute.1 In Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, the Court held that an award of damages for breach of an implied contractual term to exercise reasonable care and skill could not be reduced for contributory negligence under the apportionment legislation applicable at that time in South Australia where the plaintiff sued in contract, even though the plaintiff could also have brought an action in tort.2 The High Court was influenced in its interpretation by policy considerations; specifically, the differing theoretical foundations for actions in tort and contract.3 The practical effect of the decision has been overcome by amending legislation in each of the jurisdictions to make it clear that the apportionment legislation covers a breach of contractual duty of care that is concurrent and co-extensive with a duty of care in tort.4

1 2

3 4

Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [49]. The decision is discussed by Davis JLR, “Contributory Negligence and Breach of Contract: Astley v Austrust Ltd” (1999) 7 TLJ 117; Swanton J, “Contributory Negligence Is Not a Defence to Actions for Breach of Contract in Australian Law: Astley v Austrust Ltd” (1999) 14 JCL 251. Compare the Canadian position discussed by Blom J, “Contributory Negligence and Contract – A Canadian View of Astley v Austrust Ltd” (2000) 8 Tort L Rev 70. Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ [48], [84]. See the definition of “wrong” in Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 101; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 8; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 15; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), ss 3, 7(2) (“negligent wrongdoing”); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), ss 2, 4 (“wrongful act”); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 25. In Western Australia, contributory negligence is based on the “negligence” of the plaintiff and the defendant: Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. See generally “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff.

Voluntary Assumption of Risk [33.9.880] Voluntary assumption of risk may be a complete defence to a negligence action, just as consent may be a complete defence to an action based on intentional tort: see [33.9.200]. However, whereas consent involves specific assent to the intentional tort, in the context of negligence, voluntary assumption of risk (commonly referred to by the Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria)1 involves the plaintiff fully comprehending the extent of the risk and freely choosing to accept or ignore it.2

795

[33.9.880]

NEGLIGENCE

The defence of voluntary assumption of risk3 needs to be distinguished from other defences and means of exculpation of the defendant’s conduct. It is distinguishable from contributory negligence (see [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]) in that voluntary assumption of risk, on the one hand, fastens upon the plaintiff’s subjective awareness of the risks inherent in the activity giving rise to injury, while contributory negligence, on the other hand, is concerned with the plaintiff’s failure to conform with an objective standard of care that causally contributed to their injury.4 It was not uncommon in the past – particularly in cases concerning intoxication or participation in a sporting event – to exculpate the defendant from tortious liability for negligence not on the basis of a voluntary assumption of risk, but because the defendant had not breached the duty of care they owed to the plaintiff.5 While factual overlap is not uncommon,6 the two operate at different stages of the negligence calculus. Moreover, voluntary assumption of risk – upon proof of the plaintiff’s subjective awareness and free acceptance of the risk – operates as a complete defence; for breach of duty purposes, however, awareness of certain risks may merely result in a lowering of the standard of care expected of the defendant towards the plaintiff, and whether this results in exculpation for the defendant will depend on the particular circumstances.

1 Volenti non fit injuria: “1. [T]he principle that there is no liability in tort for an act if there was consent or assumption of risk on the part of the injured party. 2. [T]he defence that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury negligently caused. [L: an injury cannot be done to a willing person]”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 179. 2 Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [10.27], (the second edition of which is cited in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, Kirby J at [125]). See also, Monie v Commonwealth [2007] NSWCA 230, Campbell JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) at [75]–[76]. 3 See generally Jaffey AJE, “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (1985) 44 CLJ 87. 4 Goodhart AL, “Contributory Negligence and Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (1939) 55 LQR 184. 5 Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39, Dixon J at 57. 6 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9.

[33.9.890] Since the introduction of apportionment legislation1 courts appear to prefer contributory negligence defences where appropriate (see [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]), thereby restricting the operation of voluntary assumption of risk.2 However, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk “stands outside the defence of contributory negligence and is in no way limited by it”.3 It would be incongruous that a negligent plaintiff fares better than one who is not, for example, that an intoxicated passenger should stand a better chance against a drunken driver than a passenger who is sober. The judicial response to this dilemma has been to impose even stricter requirements for the 796

[33.9.900]

VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK

defence of voluntary assumption of risk to the point where it is rarely successful.4

1

2

3 4

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 7.3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), Pt 3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 4. The Ipp Report observed: “Courts prefer the defence of contributory negligence because it enables them to apportion damages between the parties, thus allowing the plaintiff to recover something, even in cases where plaintiff bears a significant responsibility for the harm suffered.”: Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) at [8.23] (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 27 May 2016). Prior to the introduction of the apportionment legislation, contributory negligence was a complete defence and there was not much difference in application between the two defences, or indeed a defendant’s denial of liability on the basis of an accepted lower standard of care: Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39, Dixon J at 57. Thomas v Quartermaine (1887) 18 QBD 685 (CA), Bowen LJ at 697. Sappideen C and Vines P (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th ed, Lawbook Co., 2011) at [12.270]–[12.280]; Fleming JG, “Assumption of Risk – California Style” (1993) 1 Tort L Rev 93; Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361 (QCA). For examples of where the defence has been accepted see Roggenkamp v Bennett (1950) 80 CLR 292; Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66.

[33.9.900] Legislative changes have been introduced that ease the burden of a defendant establishing the defence of voluntary assumption of risk and will likely result in greater use of the defence by the courts. Most jurisdictions have adopted, as part of their overall implementation of the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report,1 provisions within their pre-existing civil wrong statutes that reverse the burden of proof on the issue of awareness of risk in relation to obvious risks. Generally speaking, these provisions typically provide that if, in an action for damages for negligence, a defence of voluntary assumption of risk is raised by the defendant and the risk is an obvious risk, the plaintiff is taken to have been aware of the risk unless the plaintiff proves, on the balance of probabilities, that they were not actually aware of the risk.2 An “obvious risk” is generally defined as a risk that would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person, including risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge. The statutory provisions clarify that a risk can be obvious even though it has a low probability of occurring and even if the circumstances that gives rise to the risk is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.3 In most of the jurisdictions with obvious risk provisions,

797

[33.9.900]

NEGLIGENCE

a person is deemed aware of a risk if the person is aware of the type or kind of risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise nature, extent or manner of occurrence of the risk.4 It remains to be seen how these disparate legislative provisions will be integrated within (and interpreted against) the unified common law of Australia regulating negligence.5

1 Law of Negligence Review Panel, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) (available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2002/Review-of-the-Law-ofNegligence, viewed 27 May 2016). 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5G; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 14; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 37; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 16; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 54; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5N. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. 3 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5F; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 13; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 36; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 15; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 53; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5F. For an example of a case in which the defence was successful see Schuller v SJ Webb Nominees Pty Ltd (2015) 124 SASR 152; [2015] SASCFC 162. 4 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5G(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 14(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 37(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 16(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5N(2). The exception is Victoria. 5 See McDonald B, “Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia” (2005) 27 Syd LR 443.

[33.9.910] To succeed in a defence of voluntary assumption of risk, the plaintiff’s knowledge of the facts creating the risk needs to be established.1 It is a subjective test.2 That explains the failure of the defence in some of the drunken driver cases where the plaintiff passenger was too intoxicated to gain the requisite knowledge of the defendant driver’s condition.3 The modern judicial trend is to treat intoxication cases within the rubric of contributory negligence and not voluntary assumption of risk.4 Furthermore, legislation in New South Wales has abrogated the defence in respect of any motor accident and replaced it with a presumption of contributory negligence.5 Legislation in some jurisdictions prohibits a drunk driver from raising voluntary assumption of risk as a defence against a claim by a passenger of the car. In place of the defence this legislation provides a presumption of contributory negligence against the passenger.6 It is not sufficient for a defendant simply to raise the issue in the form of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the risks inherent in the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant when a duty of care exists. That is illustrated by the operation of the defence in relation to sporting activities for negligently caused injuries.7 The modern preference suggested by one commentator is that:

798

[33.9.910]

VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK

[T]he risk-taking aspects of sport are best accommodated within the tort of negligence at the breach stage by judging what is reasonable conduct in the circumstances of the sport rather than by limiting the breadth of the duty or resorting to the defence of voluntary assumption of risk.8

This view was reflected in the reasoning and holding of the High Court in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9 in concluding that the defendant operator of an indoor cricket facility was not negligent in respect of serious eye injuries suffered by the plaintiff while playing indoor cricket at the facility. Gleeson CJ observed: As Kitto J pointed out in Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172 at 387, people have taken pleasure in engaging in risky games long since before the law of negligence was formulated, and there is nothing new or mysterious about the application of the law to such conduct. But the sporting context may be of special significance in relation to a factual judgment that must be made. Depending upon the manner in which a plaintiff seeks to make out a case of negligence, the risky nature of sporting activity in which an adult participant has chosen to engage may be of factual importance in a decision as to whether such a case has been established.9

The Chief Justice also remarked in an earlier decision that: Voluntary participation in a sporting activity does not imply an assumption of any risk which might be associated with the activity, so as to negate the existence of a duty of care in any other participant or in any person in any way involved in or connected with the activity. That, however, does not deny the significance of voluntary participation in determining the existence and content, in a given case, or category of cases, of an asserted duty of care.10

This current judicial trend towards dealing with risks associated with sporting activities has been buttressed by legislation limiting the liability of providers of recreational services.11 The same approach appears to have been established with regard to the relationship between learner drivers and instructors.12 In other situations, the difference between knowledge and appreciation of risk may be less distinct.13

1

2 3

4 5

Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39; Roggenkamp v Bennett (1950) 80 CLR 292; Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66 (FC); Monie v Commonwealth [2007] NSWCA 230, Campbell JA at [75] (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing). Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39, Latham CJ at 47, Rich J at 49, Dixon J at 60. Dodd v McGlashan [1967] ALR 433 (ACTSC); Sloan v Kirby (1979) 20 SASR 263; Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361 (QCA) (16-year-old passenger on first occasion of drinking in hotels); Howard v Hamilton (1996) 16 WAR 292 (FC). See also [33.9.810]–[33.9.820]; Hogg K, “Guest Passengers: A Drunk Driver’s Defences” (1994) 2 TLJ 37. Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34. Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), ss 74, 76 (accidents occurring before 5 October

799

[33.9.910]

NEGLIGENCE

6

7 8

9 10 11 12

13

1999); Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), ss 138, 140 (accidents occurring on or after 5 October 1999). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 96(5); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 15 (no express prohibition of defence of voluntary assumption of risk); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(6). There are no equivalent provisions in Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. See [33.9.820]. Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172, Barwick CJ at 385, (McTiernan J agreeing at 386), Taylor J at 391 (CLR). Opie H, “Condon v Basi” (1986) 15 MULR 756 at 760. See Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172 (water-skiing); Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866 (CA) (soccer). Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; 76 ALJR 483; [2002] HCA 9, Gleeson CJ at [37]. Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; 74 ALJR 1219; [2000] HCA 41, Gleeson CJ at [14]. See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25. However, in Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552; 77 ALJR 1233; [2003] HCA 34, McHugh J made obiter remarks questioning the continuing applicability of the reasoning in Cook v Cook and the general notion of a fluctuating standard of care at 564 (CLR). See “‘Reasonable Person’ Standard” [33.2.1630]–[33.2.1720]. In Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40 the High Court found there was no reason why a different duty should be owed by an unlicensed learner driver to a licensed supervisor rather than some other person. The High Court noted that there was no principle to support such different duties per Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [51], Gleeson CJ agreeing at [13], Kirby J at [105] and Crennan J at [193]. Heydon J ruled that Cook v Cook need not be over ruled and reserved his judgment at [191]. Chatwood v National Speedways Ltd [1929] St R Qd 29 (FC) (speedway spectator); Dorman v Horscroft (1980) 24 SASR 154 (German shepherd dog).

[33.9.920] To establish voluntary assumption of risk, the plaintiff must have appreciated and understood the risk.1 Mere knowledge that a risk exists is not the same as consenting to the risk.2 Thus, the defence was excluded when a car passenger thought that the intoxicated driver was capable of safe driving.3 The appreciation must be that of the risk which causes the accident, so that a passenger who knows that the vehicle has no lights4 or that the driver is inexperienced,5 or a spectator who thinks that a fence is sufficient protection,6 cannot be said to have assumed the risk of unrelated negligence which causes injury. A driver’s known propensity to drive at high speeds is not incompatible with safe driving.7 Similarly, the participation in a sporting event8 or a frolic9 does not carry with it an appreciation of unrelated acts of negligence or additional risks. Knowledge that a potential employee has served prison time for assault is not the same as consenting to the risk of being shot by that person.10

1 Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39, Dixon J at 60;

800

[33.9.930]

VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Randwick City Council v Muzic [2006] NSWCA 66, Hunt AJA at [48] (Handley and Ipp JJA agreeing); Monie v Commonwealth [2007] NSWCA 230, Campbell JA at [75] (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing). 2 Smith v Baker & Sons [1891] AC 325; Letang v Ottawa Electric Railway Co [1926] AC 725 (PC), Lord Shaw for the Privy Council at 730; Monie v Commonwealth [2007] NSWCA 230, Campbell JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) at [75] (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing). 3 O’Shea v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wale Ltd [1971] Qd R 1 (FC); Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361 (QCA) (driver “seemed alright” to 16-year-old passenger); McPherson v Whitfield [1996] 1 Qd R 474 (CA) (no foreseeable risk was apparent). See also [33.9.810]–[33.9.820]. 4 Marshall v Batchelor (1949) 51 WALR 68; Gent-Diver v Neville [1953] St R Qd 1; Beck v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co [1961] SASR 311. 5 Ranieri v Ranieri (1973) 7 SASR 418. 6 Chatwood v National Speedways Ltd [1929] St R Qd 29 (FC). 7 Perry v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 1. 8 Rootes v Shelton (1967) 116 CLR 383; 41 ALJR 172. 9 Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74 (FC). 10 Monie v Commonwealth [2007] NSWCA 230, Campbell JA (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) at [75]–[77].

[33.9.930] The plaintiff must be shown to have voluntarily undertaken to run the risk in a defence of voluntary assumption of risk.1 Voluntariness has received the widest application in relation to passengers taking free rides with intoxicated drivers.2 In most other situations there has been a marked movement away from the idea of the “free willing” individual of the 19th century to a view that a decision to run a risk may have been impelled by other considerations. The plaintiff must be totally free from any constraint. Thus, in employment situations the defence appears to be a theoretical one only.3 Since the early 20th century in Australia the defence has had no application in reported cases in relation to work accidents.4 When the defence has gone to a jury as a question of fact, it has been in terms which make it unlikely to succeed.5 Constraint or lack of voluntary choice in work accidents may be economic. Starke J stated in Key v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1941) 64 CLR 619; 41 SR (NSW) 259; 58 WN (NSW) 214: A workman may know that he is running a risk, but he may still for economic reasons be unable to give up his place or to refuse employment, and may well rely upon his employer’s duty to use reasonable care, and upon his right, or that of his dependants, to bring an action if he is injured or killed.6

Lack of voluntariness may be shown by other factors. For example, the exigencies of a situation where a sudden decision is required cannot be said to produce a free and “unconstrained” decision.7 Thus, a jockey does not voluntarily assume the risk of injury when riding a horse at a barrier practice trial, despite knowing and appreciating the particular danger which materialises.8 Likewise, a passenger who jumps from a train which stops short of the platform does not assume the risk of injury unless the risk was such that no reasonable

801

[33.9.930]

NEGLIGENCE

person would have done so.9 Rescuers, acting out of compassion, are no longer regarded as foregoing their legal remedies.10 Nor is a fireman who, acting in the course of duty, is injured as a result of a defendant’s negligence.11

1 Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39, Dixon J at 57–58. 2 Roggenkamp v Bennett (1950) 80 CLR 292; Jansons v Public Curator (Qld) [1968] Qd R 40; Sara v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1969) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 203 (CA); Jeffries v Fisher [1985] WAR 250 (FC). See [33.9.810]–[33.9.820]. 3 Tingle v JB Hinz & Sons [1970] Qd R 108, DM Campbell J at 113. 4 Bellambi Coal Co Ltd v Murray (1909) 9 CLR 568. But see Hewertson v Courtaulds (Aust) Ltd (1957) 57 SR (NSW) 398; 74 WN (NSW) 218 (FC); Dewell v Hackshalls Ltd (1956) 74 WN (NSW) 191 (NSWFC); Savage v Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 450; 77 WN (NSW) 64 (FC); Hercules Textile Mills Pty Ltd v K & H Textile Engineers Pty Ltd [1955] VLR 310; Tingle v JB Hinz & Sons [1970] Qd R 108. The position is similar to actions for breach of statutory duty where the defence will not normally operate to excuse an employer from a risk which the statute was designed to prevent being undertaken by an employee: Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 669 (CA). But see Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656; [1964] 3 WLR 329. 5 Cianciarulo v HP Products Pty Ltd [1959] VR 170. 6 Key v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1941) 64 CLR 619; 41 SR (NSW) 259; 58 WN (NSW) 214, Starke J at 627 (CLR) (dissenting). 7 Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66 (FC), Gibbs J at 92 quoting London Graving Dock Co Ltd v Horton [1951] AC 737, Lord Porter at 744 (AC). 8 Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66 (FC). 9 King v Commissioner of Railways (Qld) [1971] Qd R 266 (FC). See also Caterson v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1973) 128 CLR 99; 47 ALJR 249, showing the trend of treating such issues as questions of breach. 10 Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170; Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88. 11 Ogwo v Taylor [1988] AC 431; [1987] 3 WLR 1145.

[33.9.940] Persons may by contract, subject to statute, limit or exclude liability for negligence.1 The question is fundamentally one of contract. However, as Fullagar J observed in Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43, the common law “has always frowned upon such provisions and insisted on construing them strictly”.2 Very clear words of exculpation will be required if the defendant is to succeed in excluding liability for physical injury or property damage.3 The courts are more willing to give effect to the clause in cases of pure economic loss.4 English cases have upheld the effectiveness of non-contractual notices on the basis of reasonable notice rather than full knowledge.5 The plaintiff’s conduct was there judged by an objective standard rather than subjectively.6 Despite the absence of binding Australian authority, these English cases should not be followed.7 As far as voluntary assumption of risk is concerned, Australian principles are clear. They

802

[33.9.950]

VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK

require not only actual knowledge (see [33.9.910]), but a real appreciation of the risk (see [33.9.920]) and unconstrained choice: see [33.9.930]. A contractual exclusion of liability differs from the defence of voluntary assumption of risk in that, while the consent required for the latter must be freely given, and based on a full understanding of the risk, all that is needed to demonstrate fulfillment of the former is an objective assessment of the plaintiff’s assent to the relevant terms.8

1 2

3 4 5

6 7 8

See Seddon NC, “Fault without Liability – Exemption Clauses in Tort” (1981) 55 ALJ 22. See generally “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43, Fullagar J at 70 (not followed on other grounds in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107; 62 ALJR 508). Davis v Pearce Parking Station Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 642. See generally Contract: General Principles “Terms” [7.4.10]ff. Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500; 61 ALJR 76. Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 409; [1957] 3 WLR 1104 (CA); Buckpitt v Oates [1968] 1 All ER 1145 (QB) (17-year-old driver and passenger); Bennett v Tugwell [1971] 2 QB 267; [1971] 2 WLR 847; White v Blackmore [1972] 2 QB 651; [1972] 3 WLR 296 (CA); Birch v Thomas [1972] 1 WLR 294 (CA). Bennett v Tugwell [1971] 2 QB 267; [1971] 2 WLR 847, Ackner J at 273 (QB). Barker K, Cane P, Lunney M and Trindade F, The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) pp 65, 613–614. Balkin RP and Davis JLR, Law of Torts (5th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2013) at [10.24].

[33.9.950] Statutory provisions may limit the operation of notices concerning risks both in tort and contract. In New South Wales motor accident cases where the defence would have been available it is to be treated as one of contributory negligence in apportioning damages.1 Contractual exemptions from liability are subject to legislative control. For example, the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) allows a party to a contract to seek relief against harsh, oppressive, unconscionable and unjust terms.2 In some Australian jurisdictions, legislation renders void any agreement or understanding removing liability for personal injuries caused while travelling in a motor vehicle covered by compulsory third party insurance.3

1 2 3

Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 140. See also Unfair Dealing “Unconscionable Dealing” [35.9.10]ff. Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 216; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 133; Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s 17(3);

803

[33.9.950]

NEGLIGENCE

Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), s 169; Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA), s 26. No provisions exist in the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Queensland.

[33.9.960] Third parties are able to generally invoke the exempting provisions of contracts to which they are not parties.1 A stranger to the contract would only be bound by exclusions of liability if reasonable notice thereof was given to the stranger.2 However, in cases involving maritime freightage, the protection of exemptions has been extended from the carrier to stevedores and others handling the goods for their negligence.3 In practical terms, this realises underlying commercial arrangements and expectations. The availability of exemptions from liability has been extended to land transport in relation to the negligent subcontractors of haulage contractors.4 Apart from commercial considerations there appears to be no reason why a clause in a contract should not be treated according to the principles relating to notices.5 Nevertheless, such issues are likely to be resolved in terms of contract, the exact reach of the doctrine of privity of contract being in some flux.6

1 Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43 (not followed on other grounds in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107; 62 ALJR 508). 2 Macleay Pty Ltd (t/as Wobbies World) v Moore [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-151 (VSCFC). 3 Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 138; (1980) 144 CLR 300; 54 ALJR 552 (PC) (reversing Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 231; 52 ALJR 337). 4 Life Savers (A’asia) Ltd v Frigmobile Pty Ltd [1983] 1 NSWLR 431 (CA). 5 That was the approach taken in Wilson v Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 43, Kitto J at 85–86 (not followed on other grounds in Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107; 62 ALJR 508). 6 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107; 62 ALJR 508. It is probably limited to providing insurance benefits and influenced by Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), ss 48, 51.

[33.9.970] The burden of proof lies on the defendant to establish the three elements of the defence:1 see [33.9.910]–[33.9.930]. It remains the same in situations which are more appropriately dealt with as an aspect of the standard of care where there is a special or different duty relationship, as perhaps with a learner driver and passenger. In Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25, the High Court stated: The onus of establishing the existence of facts giving rise to a relationship of such a special or different category under which it would be unreasonable to fix the duty of

804

[33.9.980]

ILLEGALITY

care owed by the driver by reference to the standard of skill and care reasonably to be expected of a qualified and competent driver will lie on the party who asserts it.2

1

2

Commissioner of Insurance (Qld) v Joyce (1948) 77 CLR 39, Dixon J at 60; Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66 (FC) (that case contains an accepted instruction to a jury on voluntary assumption of risk by Hanger J at 83). Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 387 (CLR). See “‘Reasonable Person’ Standard” [33.2.1630]–[33.2.1720]. But note Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40.

Illegality [33.9.980] Illegal conduct is not necessarily a defence. There is no general principle which disqualifies a person from bringing an action in negligence merely because the person is engaged in an unlawful act.1 However, legislation in most jurisdictions specify that personal injury damages will not be awarded to a plaintiff injured during the commission of a crime.2 There may also be situations of joint participation in an illegal enterprise in which the conduct of the parties is such that a court is unable for public policy reasons to grant relief.3 In Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474, Mason J stated that the denial of relief “should be related not to the illegal character of the activity but rather to the character and incidents of the enterprise and to the hazards which are necessarily inherent in its execution”.4 In Australia, the tendency has been to ask whether an appropriate standard of care can be determined on the particular facts without being placed in the impossible position of relying on the illegal activity to determine that standard. In Jackson v Harrison, Mason J further stated that: [T]he plaintiff must fail when the character of the enterprise in which the parties are engaged is such that it is impossible for the court to determine the standard of care which is appropriate to be observed. The detonation of an explosive device is a case of this kind. But the driving of a motor vehicle by an unlicensed and disqualified driver, so long as it does not entail an agreement to drive the car recklessly on the highway … stands in a somewhat different position. In this case the evidence indicates that the participants contemplated that the vehicle would be driven carefully – an accident or an untoward event might, as in fact it did, lead to discovery of their breach of the law. It is not suggested that either party lacked the experience or ability to drive carefully – that they were unlicensed was due to their having been disqualified as a result of earlier traffic offences.5

Thus, a court is able to find an appropriate standard in most driving cases even when drunkenness is involved,6 but not where it is accompanied by driving away from a robbery,7 or theft of a vehicle for the purpose of joyriding.8 It is also possible to find an appropriate standard when legislation prohibits workers from travelling on building site hoists. When a worker was injured while

805

[33.9.980]

NEGLIGENCE

contravening the legislation, the standard of care expected of the operator was judged according to the standard to be expected in operating the lift for goods.9

1 Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) (1938) 60 CLR 438, Latham CJ at 446, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 460; Zalewski v Turcarolo [1995] 2 VR 562 (CA), Hansen J at 581, Brooking and Phillips JJ at 563, 565 (shooting by police officers in course of duty). 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 54; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 10; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 45; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 6. In Victoria, in a claim for damages for personal injury, the court must consider whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 14G. There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia. See “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. 3 Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366; Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397; 44 ALJR 78; Bondarenko v Sommers (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 269; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 295 (FC); Holland v Tarlinton (1990) 10 MVR 129 (NSWCA); Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24; [1990] 3 WLR 542 (CA). See also Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 (CA); Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 40 FCR 303 (FC) (“conspiracy” to defraud insurer but not a situation of damages); Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446; 85 ALJR 480; [2011] HCA 9, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [70]–[74], [103]–[106] (claimant steals a car and allows someone else to drive the stolen car. The driver has an accident and the claimant is injured. Claimant asked to be let out of the car prior to the accident and is therefore found to be withdrawing from the joint criminal enterprise and entitled to make a claim in negligence against the driver). 4 Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474, Mason J at 455 (CLR). 5 Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474, Mason J at 456 (CLR). 6 Jackson v Harrison (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474, Mason J at 455 (CLR). 7 Smith v Jenkins (1970) 119 CLR 397; 44 ALJR 78. 8 Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366. 9 Progress & Properties Ltd v Craft (1976) 135 CLR 651; 51 ALJR 184.

[33.9.990] To establish illegality as a defence (see [33.9.980]), a relationship must exist between the criminal act and the act of negligence. In Bondarenko v Sommers (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 269; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 295, Jacobs JA stated that: [T]he person injured by want of care is a burglar on his way to a professional engagement, the fact that he is a burglar has no relation causally or otherwise to the injury to him in a motor accident on the highway. On the other hand, if the burglar in the act of breaking in is so negligent that he injures his accomplice, the accomplice cannot in my view sue for negligence, because the actual act of which he would be

806

[33.9.990]

ILLEGALITY

complaining as done without care would itself be a criminal act of a kind in respect of which a court would not hear evidence for the purpose of establishing the particular standard of care which would be expected in the circumstances.1

In such circumstances, the onus of establishing the facts giving rise to the relationship lies on the party who asserts it.2 Similarly, in Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366, the High Court observed: [T]he onus lies on the party who asserts that, by reason of special and exceptional facts, the ordinary relationship of a driver towards a passenger is transformed into one which lacks the requisite relationship of proximity to give rise to a relevant duty of care.3

1 2

3

Bondarenko v Sommers (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 269; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 295, Jacobs JA at 275 (SR (NSW)). Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ at 387 (CLR). But note Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40. Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243; 65 ALJR 366, Mason CJ, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 254 (CLR).

807

[33.9.990]

NEGLIGENCE

808

33.10 Damages

DAMAGES

Current Subtitle Authors Christoph Liedermann BAppFin, LLB (Hons) (Macq) Barrister, New South Wales Bar Barrister, Chalfont Chambers, Sydney (Updating author, Update 320 – July 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors Ann Cunningham

Geoff Masel

BA, LLB (UWA) Assistant Publisher, The Laws of Australia

BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Updating author, Update 143 – July 2001) (Updating author, Update 116 – February 2000)

(Updating author, Update 159 – November 2002)

Benjamin Fitzmaurice

Michael Noone

LLB, Grad Cert Leg Prac (Tas) Barrister and Member, Tasmanian Independent Bar and Victorian Bar

BA, LLB (Melb), LLM (Lond) Barrister, Supreme Court of New South Wales

(Updating author, Update 217 – September 2007)

(Updating author, Update 40 – October 1996)

Dr Helen Grant LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD (Qld) Lecturer, University of Queensland TC Beirne School of Law (Updating author, Update 159 – November 2002)

Charmaine Lye BA (Cantab), LLB (Hons) (Melb) Barrister and Member, Victorian Bar (Updating author, Update 217 – September 2007)

810

33.10 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION.........................................................................[33.10.10] DEFINITION........................................................................... [33.10.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE...........................................................[33.10.50] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES.....................................[33.10.60] TYPES OF DAMAGES.............................................................[33.10.170] GENERAL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.......................... [33.10.170] AGGRAVATED DAMAGES.................................................. [33.10.180] EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.....................................................[33.10.200] NOMINAL DAMAGES.......................................................... [33.10.230] CONTEMPTUOUS DAMAGES............................................ [33.10.240] PARASITIC DAMAGES........................................................ [33.10.250] FORM AND SCOPE OF DAMAGES....................................... [33.10.360] “ONCE AND FOR ALL” RULE............................................. [33.10.360] DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION..................................... [33.10.370] CONTINUING WRONGS..................................................... [33.10.380] FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES.........................[33.10.490] DATE OF ASSESSMENT.....................................................[33.10.490] INTEREST ON DAMAGES.................................................. [33.10.500] ADJUSTMENT TO PRESENT VALUE.................................[33.10.550] INFLATION........................................................................... [33.10.560] TAXATION............................................................................ [33.10.570] PERSONAL INJURY................................................................ [33.10.710] INTRODUCTION.................................................................. [33.10.710] STATUTORY LIMITATIONS................................................. [33.10.740] HEADS OF LOSS................................................................ [33.10.800] NATURE OF INJURY........................................................... [33.10.820] PAIN AND SUFFERING....................................................... [33.10.840] EXPECTATION OF LIFE...................................................... [33.10.850] EARNING CAPACITY.......................................................... [33.10.860] DOMESTIC CAPACITY........................................................ [33.10.930] AMENITIES OF LIFE........................................................... [33.10.940] NEED FOR TREATMENT, NURSING AND OTHER SERVICES............................................................................[33.10.950]

811

LOSS OF REPUTATION........................................................ [33.10.1100] SURVIVAL ACTIONS............................................................. [33.10.1210] INTERESTS IN PROPERTY.................................................. [33.10.1350] LAND.................................................................................. [33.10.1350] GOODS.............................................................................. [33.10.1460] Tortious Damage to Goods............................................ [33.10.1460] Destruction of Goods..................................................... [33.10.1490] Misappropriation of Goods............................................. [33.10.1500] Conversion and Detinue................................................ [33.10.1520] ECONOMIC LOSS................................................................. [33.10.1670] GENERAL...........................................................................[33.10.1670] INTENTIONAL TORTS....................................................... [33.10.1680] Deceit............................................................................. [33.10.1680] Interference with Contractual Relations......................... [33.10.1690] Conspiracy and Intimidation...........................................[33.10.1700] Injurious Falsehood........................................................ [33.10.1710] NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF ECONOMIC LOSS............ [33.10.1720] LOSS OF SERVICES AND LOSS OF CONSORTIUM..... [33.10.1740] EQUITABLE DAMAGES IN TORT........................................ [33.10.1860] LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION.....................................[33.10.1980] CAUSATION....................................................................... [33.10.1980] CERTAINTY........................................................................[33.10.2030] REMOTENESS...................................................................[33.10.2060] MITIGATION....................................................................... [33.10.2120] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE...................................... [33.10.2150] COLLATERAL BENEFITS.................................................. [33.10.2160] PUBLIC POLICY................................................................ [33.10.2170] ALTERNATIVES TO DAMAGES........................................... [33.10.2280]

812

Introduction Definition [33.10.10] Damages are constituted by a sum of money payable by way of compensation, appeasement or civil fine for the damage, that is, loss or injury, inflicted by a tortfeasor. Although “damages” and “damage” are sometimes used as synonymous terms,1 this blurs the distinction between issues of liability (whether the particular damage is compensable at law) and compensation (what sum of monetary damages, is payable to the plaintiff). Damage should be confined to a use descriptive of the loss, injury or other detriment suffered by the plaintiff. The principal remedy for tort is compensatory monetary damages. It is recognised that damages cannot return a plaintiff precisely to the pre-tort position, but the award is calculated to achieve this as far as money can. The remedial purpose of compensation is to put injured parties back as nearly as possible into the position in which they would have been had the wrong not been committed: see [33.10.170]. The full development of compensation as the underlying rationale of torts damages did not occur until the 19th century. In the old common law, appeasement, deterrence and punishment were the main remedial aims in personal tort actions. During the 19th century, tort damages gradually shifted from an emphasis on moral wrongdoing and keeping the peace to an assessment on the basis of compensation for the actual loss suffered and no more. Despite the fundamental importance of the compensation principle in contemporary torts law, it does not wholly govern the law of damages.2 The basis for the assessment of damages must and does differ according to the interest protected and the nature of the loss. The principal interests sought to be protected by tort damages relate to physical integrity, personal reputation, proprietary rights and economic wellbeing. Damages for tortious wrongdoing reflect the following aims: (1)

compensation for the plaintiff as far as possible by the payment of money for all the basic pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which has been suffered as a result of the wrong;

(2)

an additional compensatory award of aggravated damages to appease and console the plaintiff who has suffered humiliating conduct by the defendant; and

813

[33.10.10]

INTRODUCTION

(3)

1

2

3

punishment of the defendant, and deterrence of them and others from further wrongdoing by way of exemplary damages, which also reflect a court’s condemnation of gross and wilful conduct.3

See Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956, Lord Sumner at 982–983; The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, Lord Wright at 467–469 (AC) (overruled on other grounds in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64); Mahoney v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ at 527. In Hawkins v Clayton (t/as Clayton Utz & Co) (1986) 5 NSWLR 109 (CA), McHugh JA at 138 defined the aims of damages as intending “to deter wrongdoing, to compensate losses arising from conduct contravening socially accepted values, and where appropriate to distribute losses among those in the community best able to afford them” (reversed on other grounds in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240). Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122; [2001] 2 WLR 1789; [2001] UKHL 29; Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124; Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1969] 1 AC 590; [1967] 3 WLR 1338; (1967) 117 CLR 221; 41 ALJR 66 (PC); New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; 81 ALJR 427; [2006] HCA 57. See [33.10.210].

[33.10.20] Losses recoverable in tort encompass pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. “Pecuniary loss” includes lost profits, lost earnings, losses incurred in restoring damaged property to its original condition or in replacement of damaged property, and expenses incurred in mitigating loss. Such losses equate naturally with the remedy of monetary damages. “Non-pecuniary loss” comprehends personal loss of a non-financial nature including pain and suffering (see [33.10.840]), nervous shock,1 interference with enjoyment of property2 and loss of amenities: see [33.10.940]. These kinds of loss have no real monetary equivalent. The theory is that damages have the capacity to furnish solace through the provision of financial security and some roughly substitutionary enhancement of lifestyle.3 Many tort claims combine both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects. Thus, in defamation claims, the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation usually has financial consequences as well as causing the plaintiff grief and annoyance. In most personal injury actions, pain and suffering, medical expenses and loss of earning capacity are included as heads of loss: see [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]. In characterising the kind of loss suffered, it is useful to draw a distinction between normal and consequential loss for a preliminary analysis of a claim.4

1 2

See “Mental Harm” [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1320]. See “Interference with Use and Enjoyment [33.7.170]–[33.7.240]. 814

of

Property

Rights”

[33.10.30]

3

4

DEFINITION

Compensation in this area has traditionally been “accomplished to a large extent by the exercise of a sound imagination and the practice of the broad axe”: Watson Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels & Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 (HL), Lord Shaw at 118; see also Callaghan v Wm C Lynch Pty Ltd (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 830. McGregor H, McGregor on Damages (17th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at [1-035]–[1-040] adopts a “normal and consequential loss” scheme of analysis in preference to the traditional “special and general damage” distinction.

[33.10.30] Damages have traditionally been divided into special and general categories for the purpose of calculation. “Special damages” are made up of past monetary losses and expenditure incurred as a result of the wrong up to the date of the verdict. It is a feature of special damages that they are capable of arithmetical calculation. They include such matter as medical expenses and loss of income to the date of judgment.1 Rules of Court often require the plaintiff to give particulars of lost earnings and out-of-pocket expenses claimed. Special damages can usually be calculated with a high degree of exactness and, as a result, their quantum is often agreed between the parties so that they are not subject to proof at trial. “General damages” include any past and future losses sustained by the plaintiff which are not susceptible to precise quantification, including future pecuniary losses and damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.2 Accordingly, they are, of their very nature, incapable of mathematical calculation, and commonly very much at large in the sense that a judge or jury has a wide discretion in assessing them.3 General damages may be assessed not with reference to any limited period, but with reference to an indefinite future.

1

2

3

Paff v Speed (1961) 105 CLR 549; 35 ALJR 17, Fullagar J at 558–559 (CLR): “[T]hey are capable of precise arithmetical calculation or at least of being estimated with a close approximation to accuracy. The familiar examples are medical and surgical fees paid or payable, ambulance and hospital expenses, and loss of income. … In a high proportion of cases the amount of the ‘special damages’ is agreed between counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant.” CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 59; 3 DDCR 192; [2005] HCA 64, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ at [28]–[31]; Russell v J Hargreaves & Sons Pty Ltd [1957] St R Qd 440; Wilson v McLeay (1961) 106 CLR 523; [1961] Qd R 488; (1961) 35 ALJR 256. Even past monetary losses, which are normally claimed as special damages, may be included as part of general damages if the special circumstances of the claim require this to achieve fair compensation. See also [33.10.840], [33.10.940]. The term “damages at large” encompasses both compensatory and exemplary damages and simply conveys the meaning that the damages are incapable of exact pecuniary measurement: Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Windeyer J at 150 (CLR) (in relation to defamation damages). See also Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269, Lord Devlin at 1221

815

[33.10.30]

INTRODUCTION

(AC) and Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645, Lord Hailsham LC at 1073 (AC) for formulations of the term “damages at large”. For further discussion of compensatory and exemplary damages, see [33.10.170], [33.10.200]–[33.10.220].

[33.10.40] Quantification of tort damages in cases involving residents of different states and territories may raise issues of the proper law to apply and also whether or not any constitutional guarantees of rights exist.1 In the past, this has sometimes resulted in the practice of “forum shopping”. This was particularly so when the legislation of a state or territory had modified access to damages at common law or purported to differentiate between residents and non-residents of particular states or territories for the purpose of assessing damages. In Goryl v Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 463; 68 ALJR 432, the High Court held that the quantification of damages was a matter governed by the law of the court where the case was being tried, rather than the law of the place where the tort occurred. The Court also found that, insofar as state or territory legislation imposes a limit on recovery of damages by plaintiffs resident in another state or territory, it will be unconstitutional and ineffective for offending s 117 of the Constitution, which protects residents of any state or territory from any imposition of a “disability or discrimination” by any other state or territory.2

1 For a full discussion of conflict of laws issues, see Civil Procedure “Private International Law” [5.11.10]ff. For a full discussion of constitutional rights, see Government “Constitutional Guarantees of Rights” [19.6.10]ff. 2 The legislation in question was Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Qld), ss 16(b), 19, 20. Sections 16(b) and 19 enacted that should a resident of Queensland be injured outside Queensland, that person would be entitled to recover additional damages in Queensland, amounting to the difference between the damages actually recovered in the state where the accident occurred and the damages recoverable under Queensland law. Section 20 provided that any person injured in a motor vehicle accident who was not a resident of Queensland was only entitled to recover damages in Queensland, in the amount to which they would have been entitled under the law of their state of residence. See Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41; 62 ALJR 447; McKain v RW Miller & Co (SA) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1; 66 ALJR 186; Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433; 67 ALJR 343. It should be noted that not every instance of different treatment in a state or territory of a resident of another state or territory involves a disability or discrimination for the purpose of Constitution, s 117: see, eg Street v Bar Association (Qld) (Dingo Fence Case) (1989) 168 CLR 461; 63 ALJR 715, Mason CJ at 491, Dawson J at 548 (CLR).

816

[33.10.60]

RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES

Scope of Subtitle [33.10.50] This Subtitle expounds the law relating to damages available for injuries inflicted by the committal of torts. It begins with a consideration of the different kinds of damages available: see [33.10.170]–[33.10.250]. Important factors for the purposes of assessing damages are discussed at [33.10.490]–[33.10.600]. They include the date of assessment, interest, discounts, inflation and taxation. Damages for personal injury are dealt with separately at [33.10.710]–[33.10.990], and economic loss at [33.10.1670]–[33.10.1750]. The various means by which limitations may be imposed on the account of compensation are considered at [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2170]. For alternatives to damages, see [33.10.2280].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.10.60] An understanding of the distinction between damages in tort and contract, as well as reference to the special rules which have developed in certain discrete areas may be helpful when reading this discussion of damages. While the common purpose of compensation underlies awards of damages in both tort and contract, a distinction may need to be maintained for the purpose of assessing damages. The intent of damages is to restore the plaintiff to the pre-tort position, while in contract the main purpose is to meet the plaintiff’s expectation of the benefit to be obtained from the bargain. Accordingly, damages for breach of a warranty, embodying as a term a misrepresentation which induced the plaintiff to enter into the contract, might differ from those for the tort of misrepresentation: see Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff. Another distinction is the date from which limitation periods commence to run: see Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff. In a negligence action, the limitation period does not commence until the damage is suffered. However, as a breach of contract is actionable as of right and without proof of damage, time begins to run from the time of breach. Where concurrent liability exists in contract and in tort this distinction may be important: see “Concurrent Torts” [33.11.10]ff. See Contract: General Principles “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff for a full consideration of damages in the context of contract law and “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff for a consideration of concurrent liability and the similarities and differences between damages in tort and damages in contract. The tort of deceit may be committed where a person makes a representation knowing that it is false, or is reckless in its veracity. Liability for the tort of deceit, and the principles relating to damages for deceit are discussed in 35 Unfair Dealing. In the context of professional negligence, the assessment of damages raises special issues: see 27 Professional Liability.

817

[33.10.60]

INTRODUCTION

818

Types of Damages General Compensatory Damages [33.10.170] The general principle governing an award of damages is compensation. The aim of such an award is to put injured persons in the same situation as they would have been in had the tort not been committed.1 In Registrar of Titles (WA) v Spencer (1909) 9 CLR 641, the High Court adopted the classic exposition of this principle by Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 to the effect that tort damages represent: [T]hat sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation.2

In the case of personal injuries and negligence actions3 generally, damages are calculated in accordance with the compensation principle.4 Equally, this principle applies generally to claims for damage to property. Aggravated damages may be awarded where the conduct of the defendant is insulting or humiliating, such damages forming a distinct category of compensatory damages: see [33.10.180]–[33.10.190]. Exemplary damages are awarded where the wrong is carried out in a reprehensible manner: see [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. Other damages which fall outside the range of compensatory damages include nominal damages which may be awarded in cases of torts actionable without proof of actual damage, and contemptuous damages which may be awarded where, in the opinion of the court, the proceedings ought never to have been issued: see [33.10.230]–[33.10.240]. Even where the compensation principle does apply to an award of damages, there are limits on its capacity to govern all the varied aspects of the assessment of damages: modes of assessment are not themselves the measure of damages.5 The principle is able to fully regulate the assessment of past pecuniary losses, such as economic and property loss, which permit precise calculation. However, it is merely an overriding purpose in the case of the assessment of future economic loss, such as loss of expected profits and non-pecuniary loss, pain and suffering and loss of amenities.6 Recognition of the need to apply the principle broadly in such assessments of future loss has frequently found judicial expression, with emphasis on those words of the principle which recognise that it can only achieve compensation “so far as money can do it”.7 Compensation in these areas is recognised as necessarily inexact8 but calculated to restore the plaintiff to the pre-injury position, insofar as money is able to achieve this aim, taking into account all material contingencies. In these circumstances, the basis

819

[33.10.170]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

of the principle, to award the full extent of loss, is reduced to an amount calculated to provide something akin to fair recompense.9 Such an award cannot be restrained by mere calculation, and emphasis is laid on the necessity for compensation for such losses to not only do justice to the plaintiff’s claim, but also to be fair to the defendant.10 Legislation has been introduced all jurisdictions which affects the award of damages in compensatory terms.11 In New South Wales, the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) was introduced in order to place restrictions on the award of personal injury damages not covered by existing legislation such as the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) and the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).12 In Queensland, the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) was introduced to “assist the ongoing affordability of insurance through appropriate and sustainable awards of damages for personal injury”.13

1 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, Lord Blackburn at 39, approved in Registrar of Titles (WA) v Spencer (1909) 9 CLR 641, Griffith CJ at 645; Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114, Taylor and Owen JJ at 191 (CLR) (conversion); Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625; 55 ALJR 258; 12 ATR 256, Stephen J at 646–647 (CLR); Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; [1979] 2 WLR 487 (sale of land); Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at 412 (CLR) (“a plaintiff who has been injured by the negligence of the defendant should be awarded such a sum of money as will, as nearly as possible, put him in the position as if he had not sustained the injuries”); Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202; 52 ALJR 707; 9 ATR 142, Barwick CJ at 208 (CLR) (“that of which the plaintiff has been deprived by the defendant’s act”) and Stephen J at 235 (CLR) (“damages should be no more than compensatory”) (not followed on other grounds in Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772); The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, Lord Wright at 463 (overruled on other grounds in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64); British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185; [1956] 2 WLR 41, Earl Jowitt at 198 (AC). 2 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, Lord Blackburn at 39, adopted and paraphrased in Registrar of Titles (WA) v Spencer (1909) 9 CLR 641, Griffith CJ at 645. 3 See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. 4 It should be noted that where a victim claims damages for financial expenditure to be incurred in the future as a result of the tort, no exception is to be made to the general compensatory principle even if the victim derives non-financial benefits from the tort, such as where a negligent failure to warn a patient that a sterilisation procedure carried out might not be effective resulted in a child being born: Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1; 77 ALJR 1312; [2003] HCA 38. 5 Bilambil-Terranora Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465; (1980) 52 LGRA 1 (CA), Samuels JA at 482 (NSWLR). 6 The SS Mediana v The Lightship Comet [1900] AC 113, Earl of Halsbury LC at 116–117: “[H]ow is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by arithmetical calculation establish what is the

820

[33.10.180]

7 8

9 10

11

12 13

AGGRAVATED DAMAGES

exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident … But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given.” See also O’Brien v Dunsdon (1965) 114 CLR 669n; 39 ALJR 78. Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850; 154 ER 363, Parke B at 855 (Ex). Although a contract case, this principle applies equally to tort actions. Watson Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels & Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 (HL), Lord Shaw at 118: compensation is “accomplished to a large extent by the exercise of a sound imagination and the practice of a broad axe”. For a review of the “broad axe” style of assessment, see Northern Territory v Mengel (1994) 83 LGERA 371 (NTCA), Priestley J at 421–425, and the successful appeal to the High Court: Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307; 69 ALJR 527; see also Callaghan v Wm C Lynch Pty Ltd (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 830. Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 584–585. Thurston v Todd (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 335, Asprey J at 1163 (WN (Pt 1) (NSW)); Victorian Railways Commissioners v Hale [1953] VLR 477 (FC), Sholl J at 494–495 (to the effect that fairness to the defendant does not involve anything less than a “full” award of damages to the plaintiff; an emphasis on strict compensation of a plaintiff in every respect must incorporate speculation, and may result in an overscrupulous approach with an allowance for improbable contingencies) (reversed on other grounds in Hale v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1953) 87 CLR 529). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 2; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VB; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2. Explanatory note to the Civil Liability Bill 2002 (NSW). Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 4(1). For further detail see s 4(2).

Aggravated Damages [33.10.180] Aggravated damages are awarded as compensation for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by the defendant’s insulting or humiliating conduct.1 Some jurisdictions have legislated to remove the right to claim for aggravated damages for personal injury.2 They are otherwise awarded on the basis that the more insulting or reprehensible the defendant’s conduct, the greater the indignity the plaintiff suffers, and the more they should receive for the outrage to their feelings.3 Such damages are intended to redress indignity or hurt pride inflicted on the grounds that “the jingling of the guinea helps the hurt that honour feels”.4 In Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645, Lord Hailsham considered that it was appropriate that a court’s indignation at the defendant’s behaviour should be reflected in an award of damages, concluding that: In awarding “aggravated” damages the natural indignation of the court at the injury inflicted on the plaintiff is a perfectly legitimate motive in making a generous rather than a more moderate award to provide an adequate solatium. But that is because the

821

[33.10.180]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

injury to the plaintiff is actually greater and, as the result of the conduct exciting the indignation, demands a more generous solatium.5

Awards of aggravated damages are usually restricted to torts which are actionable as of right, without proof of damage, such as trespass to the person,6 to land7 or goods and the torts of conspiracy, defamation,8 malicious falsehood,9 intimidation10 and deceit.11 A trespass may be committed in a particularly insulting or humiliating manner. The relationship between the parties may be significant. For example, where a teacher assaulted a pupil, it was considered that the conduct was particularly reprehensible, justifying aggravated damages.12 Wrongful imprisonment may, by its nature, give rise to aggravated damages to compensate for the humiliation, insult and disgrace suffered by the plaintiff and to reflect the significance of the liberty of the subject; for this tort, the circumstances in which detention is imposed will be significant.13 Negligence may, in limited circumstances, justify aggravated damages but, as a rule, the horrifying circumstances in which an injury occurs are compensated in general compensatory damages.14 Injured feelings associated with an insult or humiliation, allowing aggravated damages, must be distinguished from the “horrific” conduct which may be associated with negligence,15 including the anxiety which may result from injury caused by negligent acts. Grief suffered by reason of the death of, or injury to, another will not justify aggravated damages.16 Provocative conduct by the plaintiff may reduce the amount of aggravated damages otherwise appropriate, or even disentitle the plaintiff from such damages. A provocative plaintiff cannot expect compassionate consideration for their suffering.17 This demonstrates that aggravated damages bear a character which, although generally compensatory in nature, distinguishes them from compensatory damages, which are not susceptible to reduction for provocation.18 In Law v Wright [1935] SASR 20, Piper J, in considering the position of a plaintiff who had provoked the defendant, concluded that: [I]n assessing damages, justices or a jury are entitled to take all the circumstances into consideration – “the rank and motives of the parties, the circumstances connected with the assault, and the degree of personal insult” to the party aggrieved. Where the conduct of the defendant has been specially offensive and that of the party aggrieved very innocent and forbearing, a large amount may be awarded though exceedingly little physical harm has been done. Where the party aggrieved has been very provocative he must not expect the like compassionate consideration for his suffering.19

Provocation was found, for example, where a plaintiff’s conduct so infuriated the defendant that he reacted by throwing a piece of glass at him,20 or where a plaintiff deliberately defecated on the defendant’s driveway to convey his contempt for the defendant.21 As aggravated damages are intended to compensate injured feelings, where the wrong has already been redressed to some extent by the plaintiff, a reduction in aggravated damages may be appropriate.22 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s conduct after the commission of the tort may be relevant to the question of mitigating damages, for example, where

822

[33.10.180]

AGGRAVATED DAMAGES

a plaintiff has sought to exact retribution. Subsequent conduct is of particular relevance in the context of defamation. A failure to apologise may exacerbate the humiliation resulting from the initial publication.23 Further, the conduct of the defence at trial, if improper or lacking in good faith, and thus, constituting an aggravation of the defamation, may invite an award of aggravated damages.24

1

2

3 4

5 6

7

8

Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549, the Court at 8 (CLR): aggravated damages are “compensatory in nature, being awarded for injury to the plaintiff’s feelings caused by insult, humiliation and the like”; Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Windeyer J at 149 (CLR) described aggravated damages as those “given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done”. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21 specifies that the exemption applies only to claims of personal injury caused by negligence. Section 21 applies to actions for damages in proceedings brought subsequent to 20 March 2002 regardless of when the injury occurred: Sch 1 Pt 1 Item 2(1). Section 21 does not apply to awards of damages in proceedings commenced in a court before the commencement of the Act or an award of damages or settlement or consent order made before the date of assent to the Act: Sch 1 Pt 2 Item 2(2). Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Windeyer J at 151 (CLR). Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Windeyer J at 151 (CLR), quoting Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254; [1929] VLR 215, Higgins J at 272 (CLR). Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645, Lord Hailsham LC at 1073 (AC). Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412 (FC), Williams J at 412 (Qd R) (Connolly and McPherson JJ agreeing) (police assault involving urination on plaintiff was “a conscious and contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights”). See also “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269; XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352. Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124; Kendell v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-272 (QCA). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139G; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 36; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 33; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 36 places limits on the recovery of aggravated damages for defamation by providing that damages shall not be affected by the malice or other state of mind of the publisher at the time of the publication complained of or at any other time except as far as that malice or other state of mind affects the relevant harm. See also Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 (CA) on Defamation Act 1974, s 46(3)(b), now Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 36. 823

[33.10.180]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

9 10 11 12

13

14

15

16

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24

Khodaparast v Shad [2000] 1 WLR 618 (CA). Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269. Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401; [1984] 3 WLR 350. See 35 Unfair Dealing. Costi (formerly Constantinou) v Minister of Education (1973) 5 SASR 328. It is clear that aggravated damages “afford compensation when the harm done to the plaintiff has been aggravated by the manner in which it was done”: Taylor v Beere [1982] 1 NZLR 81 (CA), Somers J at 93; Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-541; [1999] NSWSC 1113. Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA); McIntosh v Webster (1980) 43 FLR 112 (arbitrary and humiliating loss of liberty); Jones v Harvey (1983) 1 MVR 111 (NSWCA) (award of significant damages although detention for only an hour and a half); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597 (App Div) (deprivation of liberty for one hour without an apology, taken together with the defendant’s inappropriate conduct at trial, justified a substantial aggravated damages award); McDonald v Coles Myer Ltd (t/as K-Mart Chatswood) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-361 (NSWCA) (wrongful arrest and false imprisonment compounded by the defendant’s patently false and offensive imputations during trial that the plaintiff was mentally ill gave rise to aggravated compensatory damages). Freudhofer v Poledano [1972] VR 287, Gowans J (for the Full Court) at 295; Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 (CA) (severe dislocation resulting from negligent building works); Armstrong v Rudd (1978) 46 FLR 42 (FCAFC). Kralj v McGrath [1986] 1 All ER 54 (QB), Woolf J at 59–62. See also AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507; [1993] 2 WLR 507 (CA); Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Marchlewski (2000) 51 NSWLR 268; [2000] NSWCA 294. Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88, Windeyer J at 394 (CLR); Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Deane J at 587 (CLR). Law v Wright [1935] SASR 20, Piper J at 25; Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269, Fullagar J at 83–84 (CLR). Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269; Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283. Law v Wright [1935] SASR 20, Piper J at 25; see also Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283; Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423, Bray CJ at 430–431. Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283. Downham v Bellette [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-038 (TASSC) (the plaintiff claimed damages for assault, battery and false imprisonment). Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423, Bray CJ at 430–433. David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516, Lush J at 526. Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497; 51 SR (NSW) 173; 68 WN (NSW) 187, Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ at 514 (CLR); Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA).

[33.10.190] Aggravated damages (see [33.10.180]) and exemplary damages (see [33.10.200]) are often confused, but a real distinction exists between them. Aggravated damages are compensatory in nature and are directed at a restoration or appeasement of the plaintiff’s dignity. In contrast, exemplary damages mark the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s actions. It has been

824

[33.10.190]

AGGRAVATED DAMAGES

said that aggravated damages are payable where the conduct shocks the plaintiff, while exemplary damages are payable where the defendant’s conduct shocks the court. This distinction is often not recognised. Windeyer J in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, in the context of defamation, considered that the distinction was a difficult one to make both historically and analytically, while expressing the difference in terms that aggravated damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done: exemplary damages, on the other hand, are intended to punish the defendant, and presumably to serve to one or more of the objects of punishment – moral retribution or deterrence.1

While the aims of each of these heads of damages are distinct, both may be allowed in appropriate circumstances.2 Such a situation may arise in the case of intentionally insulting conduct, which both offends the plaintiff’s dignity and deserves the court’s condemnation. Where an award is made by a jury in a single sum, the ascertainment of which head or heads of damage were taken into account will not be capable of ascertainment.3 However, separate verdicts must be obtained where it is necessary to record separate judgments against several tortfeasors. Such verdicts may be required where the conduct of different defendants requires separate assessments under different heads of damage.4 Where there is an exemplary component in an award, this ought to be assessed separately from all compensatory damages – including any aggravated damages.5

1 2

3 4

5

Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Windeyer J at 149 (CLR). Johnstone v Stewart [1968] SASR 142, Bray J at 144; Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412 (FC); Vignoli v Sydney Harbour Casino [2000] Aust Torts Reports 81-541; [1999] NSWSC 1113. Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 (CA), Reynolds JA at 656; Watts v Leitch [1973] Tas SR 16. In Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 852, the Court of Appeal held that it was appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, to award different sums against the joint tortfeasors so that exemplary damages could be awarded against one defendant and not the other. This could be done even though at law each joint tortfeasor was responsible for the whole of the damage caused, irrespective of his degree of fault. As the conduct of Caltex in spiking the private entrepreneur’s tanks was an act of vandalism of the most disreputable kind, calling for the most indignant censure, Caltex was ordered to pay an amount of $150,000 more than each of the other tortfeasors. This award was upheld on appeal: XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352. Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412 (FC).

825

[33.10.190]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

Exemplary Damages [33.10.200] Exemplary (or punitive) damages are intended to punish the defendant for “conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights”.1 Other common descriptions of the requisite behaviour for an award of exemplary damages are “wilful”, “outrageous”, “high-handed”, “reprehensible”, “wanton”, “oppressive”, “insulting”, “cruel”, “malicious” and “reckless”. Exemplary damages are calculated to punish the defendant, to cause them to “smart”.2 Yet it is now clear that actual malice in the mind of the defendant is not required to be established by the plaintiff before an award of exemplary damages can be made.3 In addition to the punishment of the defendant, an award of exemplary damages may be intended to demonstrate the court’s disapproval of the conduct and to deter the defendant and others from similar behaviour,4 or to prevent unjust enrichment by subtracting a profit made by the defendant and passing it to the plaintiff.5 In Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653, Hutley JA declared that it is impossible to fix a range of exemplary damages: There is no tariff or basis for a tariff where a jury is entitled to inflict exemplary damages. Not only is the occasion for the award of such damages rare, but the jury is entitled not only to penalize the defendant for what he did but is entitled to make him an example to others. There can be no fixed scale for such deterrents. … The jury has to translate its righteous indignation at the conduct of the defendant into monetary terms appropriate to the local situation. … Whereas compensatory damages have to be approached by looking at the situation of the plaintiff in consequence of the wrongful act to which he has been subjected, punitive damages have to be looked at from the side of the defendant. If he is to be punished, it is his proper punishment which provides the basis for the assessment of damages.6

In Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, the High Court refused to follow the severe limitations placed upon the award of exemplary damages by the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269.7 Despite the obvious problems raised by the notion of “civil punishment”, where the safeguards of the criminal law do not apply, restrictions on the scope of exemplary damages in Australia are introduced by specific legislation.8 In Cotogno v Lamb (No 3) (1986) 5 NSWLR 559, a trespass to the person case, McHugh JA expounded upon the need to retain exemplary damages: An award of exemplary damages acts as an example to all those in the community who might engage in wrongdoing involving a conscious and contumelious disregard of another person’s rights. Nor should it be thought, as the argument for the defendant appeared to maintain, that exemplary damages constitute an historical anomaly which no longer serve any useful purpose. The sanctions of the criminal law are not always sufficient to protect the weak and the disadvantaged against the oppressive conduct of the powerful and the wealthy. An award of exemplary damages also serves another useful social purpose: it helps to remove the sense of grievance which the plaintiff

826

[33.10.200]

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

feels when he has been the victim of insulting behaviour. … I think that the average Australian would expect that the victim of conscious wrongdoing committed in contumelious disregard for his rights should receive more than a person who has received comparable injuries without such conduct … the courts in interpreting and applying the law should apply the standards and respond to the demands of the average, responsible member of the community.9

For the distinction between exemplary and aggravated damages, see [33.10.190]. There is also legislation in some jurisdictions which provides that exemplary, punitive or aggravated damages are not to be included in a claim for damages for personal injury.10

1

2

3

4

5

Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; 21 SR (NSW) 398; 38 WN (NSW) 6, Knox CJ at 77 (CLR). This is the preferred definition in Australia. The deterrent and social censure purposes of exemplary damages are well illustrated by XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352. This case involved an act of commercial vandalism committed by a large company against a small trade competitor. The plaintiff entered the defendant’s premises and spiked its petrol tanks. At trial, in addition to compensatory damages of $5,527, the jury awarded $400,000 exemplary damages. Both the Court of Appeal and the High Court agreed that exemplary damages should be reduced to $150,000. In dissent on this issue, Murphy J at 464–465 and Brennan J at 472 (CLR) shared the view that the original award was reasonable in the overall commercial and financial circumstances of the case – $400,000 being only 1 per cent of the defendant company’s annual operating profit after tax. For a discussion of a suggested relationship between exemplary damages and unjust enrichment, see Glover J, “Restitutionary Principles in Tort: Wrongful User of Property and the Exemplary Measure of Damages” (1992) 18 Mon LR 169 at 188. XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352, Brennan J at 472 (CLR); Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 173 ALR 702; [2000] FCA 823. See Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Rogers [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-246 (NSWCA), a case of trespass to the person where the issue of the possibility of awarding exemplary damages in cases of vicarious liability was discussed. Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549, the Court at 7–8 (CLR). In Hart v Herron (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Sheller and Cripps JJA, 226 of 1980, 3 June 1993), the Court applied Lamb v Cotogno in finding that exemplary damages for trespass to the person are not available unless there is some evidence adduced of absence of consent or of the defendant’s reckless indifference to whether the plaintiff had consented or not. Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Owen J at 158 (CLR). False allegations or other conduct by a party amounting to an abuse of process can result in a substantial exemplary damages award. In Hamer-Mathew v Gulabrai (No 2) [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-334 (NSWSC), false allegations that the plaintiff dealt in forgeries and fake art works resulted in exemplary damages of $50,000. Glover J, “Restitutionary Principles in Tort: Wrongful User of Property and the Exemplary Measure of Damages” (1992) 18 Mon LR 169 at 188–190.

827

[33.10.200]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

6 7

Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 (CA), Hutley JA at 656–657. See especially, Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269, Lord Devlin at 1226–1228 (AC). The Law Lords authorised the award of exemplary damages in only three situations, namely where: (1) the servants of the government committed oppressive acts; (2) the defendant’s conduct was calculated to make a profit exceeding any award of compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (3) there was express authorisation by statute to make such an award. For examples of the restrictive scope of exemplary damages in England, see Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645, Lord Diplock at 1129 (AC); Bradford City Metropolitan Council v Arora [1991] 2 QB 507; [1991] 2 WLR 1377 (CA); AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507; [1993] 2 WLR 507 (CA) (overruled on other grounds in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122; [2001] 2 WLR 1789; [2001] UKHL 29). 8 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 16(2), 139H; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 37; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(2)(a)(i); Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 81A; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 144; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151R; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 34; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 6(1)(a); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52, but see Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 55; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 37; Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(2)(b); Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 306B (exemplary damages only barred against WorkCover, not against an employer); Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 35; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 113A (insurer not liable for exemplary damages); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 3(1)(b); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(3)(a); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 37; Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1976 (Tas), s 6(1)(b); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(2)(a); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 37; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(2)(a); Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 93B(3)(b). The Privy Council confirmed this position in Australia in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1969] 1 AC 590; [1967] 3 WLR 1338; (1967) 117 CLR 221; 41 ALJR 66, and this was reiterated in Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549, the Court at 7–8 (CLR). See Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 (CA), Looke J at 104. See also Collis BW, “‘Tort and Punishment’ – Exemplary Damages: The Australian Experience” (1996) 70 ALJ 47. 9 Cotogno v Lamb (No 3) (1986) 5 NSWLR 559 (CA), McHugh JA at 586–587 (affirmed in Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549). 10 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52(1).

[33.10.210] Exemplary damages may be recovered in a wide range of torts. These include trespass to the person and battery,1 false imprisonment,2 trespass to land,3 trespass to chattels,4 nuisance,5 conspiracy,6 intimidation,7 and inducing breach of contract.8 Despite some arguments to the contrary,9 it is also now well established that exemplary damages can be awarded in actions for deceit.10

828

[33.10.210]

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

In motor vehicle, work-related and general personal injury claims, legislation commonly bars exemplary awards.11 Exemplary damages cannot to be awarded in a survival action.12 Exemplary damages are also excluded in actions for defamation in all jurisdictions since the passage of the uniform Defamation Acts in 2005 and 2006.13 Exemplary damages are available for “mere” negligence. In Midalco Pty Ltd v Rabenalt [1989] VR 461, the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court upheld an award of exemplary damages in a negligence action. Although this was a case where the original award was made following a concession on this issue by the defendant at trial, the decision may be viewed as an indicator of a willingness to extend the availability of exemplary damages on policy grounds – the victim in this case being a long-time employee in the defendant’s asbestos mine, who contracted the fatal disease of mesothelioma. Following Midalco Pty Ltd v Rabenalt, one can no longer say, as a matter of law, that exemplary damages are not available in negligence. It is not the cause of action but the fact of the defendant behaving with sufficiently wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s welfare which gives rise to an award of exemplary damages. Negligence and a high degree of wanton disregard may go together, and can clearly be imputed to the defendant. In Coloca v BP Australia Ltd [1992] 2 VR 441, the plaintiff employees claimed that they had suffered personal injuries as a result of their employer’s negligence in exposing them to dangerous substances in the workplace. O’Bryan J recognised that exemplary damages can be claimed for mere negligence in cases where the defendant has behaved in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. In O’Bryan J’s view, it would be illogical to distinguish between tortious liability founded in trespass or intentional wrongdoing and tortious liability founded in negligence, where the conduct of the defendant equally merited punishment.14 For example, an employer might be liable in exemplary damages if, having the means of knowledge of the risk to its employees’ health, it either deliberately abstained from finding out about these risks or simply had not bothered itself about the risks.

1

2

3

Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283; Johnstone v Stewart [1968] SASR 142; Pearce v Hallett [1969] SASR 423; Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 (CA); Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549; Lippl v Haines (1989) 18 NSWLR 620; 47 A Crim R 148 (CA). See also Criminal Offences “Assault and Related Offences” [10.2.10]ff. Fernando v Commonwealth (No 5) [2013] FCA 901. However, this was overturned on appeal in Fernando v Commonwealth (2014) 231 FCR 251; [2014] FCAFC 181, which found that, because the appellant would have been detained anyway due to the standard practice and procedure at the time, no exemplary damages could be awarded for his imprisonment. Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 (CA); XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352; Cousins v Wilson [1994]

829

[33.10.210]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

1 NZLR 463 (HC) (exemplary damages were awarded for trespass to land where no right to compensatory damages had been established by the plaintiff); Trustbank Canterbury Ltd v Lockwood Buildings Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 666 (HC) (mortgagee not entitled to exemplary damages in a trespass action); Gazzard v Hutchesson [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-337 (SASC) (severe lopping of the branches of five poplar trees resulted in compensation of $500 but exemplary damages of $3,000). See also “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. 4 Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280. See also “Trespass to Chattels” [33.8.720]–[33.8.780]. 5 Willoughby Municipal Council v Halstead (1916) 22 CLR 352; 17 SR (NSW) 202; 33 WN (NSW) 198; 3 LGR (NSW) 165. For the more restrictive English approach, see AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507; [1993] 2 WLR 507 (CA); note that the ratio of this case has been overruled by Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122; [2001] 2 WLR 1789; [2001] UKHL 29. See also “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. 6 Williams v Hursey (Hursey Case) (1959) 103 CLR 30; 33 ALJR 269. See also “Conspiracy” [33.8.1160]–[33.8.1280]. 7 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269. See also “Intimidation” [33.8.1090]–[33.8.1140]. 8 Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; 21 SR (NSW) 398; 38 WN (NSW) 6. See, eg Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; [2003] NSWCA 10, Spigelman CJ at [28]. Whether or not exemplary damages should ever be available for breach of contract is controversial, and recent decisions argue it should not be: see Artcraft Pty Ltd v Dickson [2014] SASC 108. See also Vorvis v Insurance Corp (BC) [1989] 1 SCR 1085; (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 193 for the law in Canada. See also Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff. 9 The traditional argument being that as many deceits are also punishable by the criminal law, it is inappropriate to allow exemplary damages in a civil action. The close relationship between deceit and contract may also help to explain the traditional reluctance to grant exemplary damages for this tort. 10 Musca v Astle Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251 (FCA); Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd v Fisher (1984) 38 SASR 50 (a fraudulent misappropriation case). But see Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401; [1984] 3 WLR 350, Pain J at 423 (QB). See also “Deceit” [33.8.1250]; Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff. 11 See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 81A; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 144; Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151R; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52(1), but see Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 55; Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 306B (exemplary damages only barred against WorkCover, not against an employer); Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 113A (insurer not liable for exemplary damages); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1976 (Tas), s 6(1)(b); Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 93B(3)(b). 12 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 16(2); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(2)(a)(i); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 6(1)(a); Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(2)(b); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 3(1)(b); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(3)(a); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(2)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(2)(a).

830

[33.10.220]

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

13 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139H; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 37; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 35; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 37. 14 Coloca v BP Australia Ltd [1992] 2 VR 441, O’Bryan J at 447–448. See Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 228 (BCCA); Dhalla v Jodrey (1985) 16 DLR (4th) 732 (NSSC); AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 574 (QB); AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507; [1993] 2 WLR 507 (CA) (overruled on other grounds in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122; [2001] 2 WLR 1789; [2001] UKHL 29); Trend Management Ltd v Borg (1996) 40 NSWLR 500; 72 IR 16 (CA); McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (Helix Cotton Case) (1997) 72 FCR 1; 93 A Crim R 1; Ellison v L [1998] 1 NZLR 416 (CA); Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70; L v Robinson [2000] 3 NZLR 499 (HC).

[33.10.220] Prior to making an award of exemplary damages, a court should review all evidence relating to aggravation or mitigation of the defendant’s conduct. For example, the defendant’s motivation for their tortious act and any evidence of the plaintiff’s provocation of the defendant’s wrongful action must be fully weighed.1 The need for moderation in exemplary awards was stressed by Gibbs CJ in XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352, who counselled restraint by juries and the need to be wary of the imposition of a greater penalty than would be incurred if the conduct were criminal.2 Accordingly, any criminal penalties imposed in consequence of proceedings stemming from the same wrongful act must be fully taken into account.3 Also, an appellate court, testing the reasonableness of a defamation jury verdict, may compare it with current personal injury awards in order to maintain a rational scale of values.4 The financial circumstances of the defendant must also be carefully considered to achieve a substantially just award in all the circumstances, and to avoid an unduly punitive result.5 Interest is generally not given on an award of exemplary damages as they are not compensatory in nature, either as a matter of practice or by legislation.6 For a discussion as to interest on damages for defamation and the compensatory or vindicating nature of such damages, see John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131.7

1 2

Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177; 36 ALJR 283; Andary v Burford [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-302 (SASC). XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352, Gibbs CJ at 463 (CLR). In Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153; [1990] 2 WLR 271 (CA), the plaintiff was found to have been defamed by the publication of statements which suggested she had sought to capitalise on her

831

[33.10.220]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

3

4 5

6

7

notoriety as the wife of a convicted serial killer. The English Court of Appeal stressed that the award of damages was the province of the jury. However, a new trial was awarded on the issue of damages. The Court found that, although this was a case where the jury might have awarded aggravated damages, its award was nevertheless greatly in excess of any reasonable compensatory award. The trial judge had erred in not sufficiently emphasising that this was not a case for an award of exemplary damages. Nourse LJ added that trial judges should expressly warn juries about the consequences of excessive awards for defamation, which may result in the expense, delay and anxiety of a retrial. For the Australian position on defamation, see [33.10.210]. In Blackwell v AAA [1997] 1 VR 182 (CA), the trial judge had failed to properly warn the jury about the danger of an excessive award of compensatory plus exemplary damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeal substantially reduced the damages and stressed that, for the purpose of fixing exemplary damages, both the nature of the non-exemplary damages awarded and the capacity of the defendant to pay are important considerations. Watts v Leitch [1973] Tas SR 16; Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401; [1984] 3 WLR 350; Gray v Motor Accident Commission (SA) (1998) 196 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 45; [1998] HCA 70. Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; 67 ALJR 634. XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352, Brennan J at 472 (CLR); Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 (CA), Hutley JA at 657–658. Commonwealth v Murray [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-207 (NSWCA). This has been codified in South Australia and Victoria: Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C(4)(ab); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 60(3)(c). John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 (CA). See also [33.10.500]–[33.10.540] regarding interest on damages.

Nominal Damages [33.10.230] Nominal damages are awarded in recognition of the fact that a tort has been committed but without any consequent injury or loss.1 Resort is now rarely had to this form of damages,2 however it is still sometimes used.3 The absence of actual damage means that the question of provision will not arise where damage is the gist of the action, for example, in an action founded upon negligence. Nominal damages have traditionally been awarded in actions alleging intentional torts such as trespass to the person, land4 or goods, so they may be appropriate in an action to resolve a dispute over boundaries.5 If a trespass arises from a mere touch, from a minor interference with goods, or a nominal intrusion onto land6 without any actual damage, an entitlement to at least nominal damages arises, such trespasses being actionable as of right.7 The expression “nominal damages” is on occasions incorrectly used to describe a small award of damages, perhaps made to reflect an inability to calculate the plaintiff’s true loss. It is inappropriate to resort to nominal damages merely because assessment of them may be difficult: the task of fixing damages should

832

[33.10.240]

CONTEMPTUOUS DAMAGES

be undertaken, however difficult it may be.8 Of course, a small award of damages will be appropriate when only that amount is proved. Other features of an award of nominal damages are that they entitle an award of costs against the defendant, subject to the overriding discretion of the trial judge, and that they are capable of supporting an award of exemplary damages.9 Awards of nominal damages have fallen into disuse in recent times, principally on account of the greater availability of the equitable remedies of injunction and declaration.

1 2

3 4

5 6

7

8

9

Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97, Griffith CJ at 116 (overruled on other grounds in Commonwealth v Brisbane Milling Co Ltd (1916) 21 CLR 559). Turner v New South Wales Mont de Piete Deposit & Investment Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 539; 10 SR (NSW) 900; 27 WN (NSW) 87, Griffith CJ at 548 (CLR). See, eg Gold & Copper Resources Pty Ltd v Newcrest Operations Ltd [2013] NSWSC 345. Dumont v Miller (1873) 4 AJR 152 (VSCFC); Waters v Maynard (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 618; 41 WN (NSW) 166. See also “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. Dumont v Miller (1873) 4 AJR 152 (VSCFC); Waters v Maynard (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 618; 41 WN (NSW) 166. Dehn v Attorney-General (NZ) [1988] 2 NZLR 564 (HC), Tipping J at 582–583; Hill v Cooke (1957) 58 SR (NSW) 49; 75 WN (NSW) 82 (FC), Owen J at 49 (SR (NSW)) (in regard to trespass to the person, jury award of £1 upheld, as damages “might range from a nominal amount to a substantial sum”). Law v Wright [1935] SASR 20, Piper J at 25 (“mere assault without any physical harm and monetary loss, entitles the assailed to a nominal sum”); Dumont v Miller (1873) 4 AJR 152 (VSCFC) (nominal trespass to land). Bowen v Blair [1933] VLR 398 (FC) (plaintiff’s loss in the future as a result of solicitor’s negligent advice should have been quantified, however difficult); NSW v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133; Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; 20 ALJ 451, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 143: “Where there has been an actual loss of some sort, the common law does not permit difficulties of estimating the loss in money to defeat the only remedy it provided for … an award of damages.” Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd v Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 311; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 264 (CA) (exemplary damages of $3,500 awarded in addition to nominal damages for trespass to land; the nominal damages awarded were not quantified). See also [33.10.210] in regards to exemplary damages.

Contemptuous Damages [33.10.240] Contemptuous damages are awarded to record the court’s disapproval of a claim and its view that the action should never have been brought. The appropriate amount has been described as the lowest coin of the realm, historically one farthing.1 The derisively small award is made despite the

833

[33.10.240]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

fact that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving the action. It follows that the discretion of the trial judge as to costs will usually be exercised to provide that costs lie where they fall.2 A jury award of minimal damages may constitute either nominal (see [33.10.230]) or contemptuous damages as the award is normally expressed as a single sum.3 If payment into court is made, the question of costs is normally determined by the consequences of that procedure.

1 Connolly v Sunday Times Publishing Co Ltd (1908) 7 CLR 263; Dering v Uris [1964] 2 QB 669. 2 Galsworthy v Reid (1911) 32 ALT 189 (VSC); Earnshaw v Loy (No 2) [1959] VR 252. 3 Bailey v Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 700.

Parasitic Damages [33.10.250] Parasitic damages refer to heads of loss which are only recoverable in conjunction with primary recognised losses.1 They have received very limited recognition.2 The concept of parasitic damages was condemned in England in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27; [1972] 3 WLR 502. In that case, Lord Denning MR rejected the doctrine as foreign because parasitic damages convey the idea of damages which ought not in justice to be awarded, but which somehow or other have been allowed by being attached to other losses.3 In the past, the notion of parasitic damages was employed to circumvent the refusal of courts to recognise duties of care to prevent certain types of loss, particularly purely economic loss. Such arbitrary exclusionary rules have since been rejected by the High Court.4 Now that courts are willing to directly address the policy implications of extending the scope of the interests protected by tort damages, there is no utility remaining in the artificial and unsatisfactory device of parasitic damages.5 The real issues in these cases are usually those of causation or remoteness of loss. Today, the question is whether or not the consequential damage is the legally foreseeable result of the defendant’s tort. The same principles of causation and remoteness apply whether the cause of the action in tort is for damage to property or harm to the person.6 The concept of parasitic damages is probably best understood as a remnant of the artificial devices used to modify the severity of the old forms of action at common law. In modern times, the courts have long allowed the recovery of secondary-interest kinds of loss, where there are adequate grounds for the extension of recovery of damages to different, secondary kinds of loss. For example, in the economic torts of inducement of breach of contract and

834

[33.10.250]

PARASITIC DAMAGES

conspiracy, where the primary interest protected is obviously economic, non-pecuniary damages for affront to the plaintiff’s feelings have been recognised without recourse to the artificial notion of parasitic damages.7

1 2

3 4

5

6

7

Examples include the safety of the person, of property, of reputation, or of security in economic relations. For criticism of the concept of parasitic damages, see Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27; [1972] 3 WLR 502 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 35–36, Lauton LJ at 49 (QB); Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 (HL). But see Hotson v Fitzgerald [1985] 1 WLR 1036 (QB), Simon Brown J at 1046 who accepted the correctness of “a parasitical claim for the loss of a chance”. This decision was reversed on appeal on different reasoning: Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; [1987] 3 WLR 232. Another clear example of a parasitic award is found in Seaway Hotels Ltd v Cragg (Canada) Ltd (1959) 17 DLR (2d) 292 (ONHC) (affirmed in Seaway Hotels Ltd v Cragg (Canada) Ltd (1959) 21 DLR (2d) 264 (ONCA)), where a defendant had negligently severed the power supply to the plaintiff’s hotel; the losses constituted by the consequent destruction of refrigerated food were held to permit, parasitically, a claim for financial loss of room rentals and lost profits from the bars and restaurants. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27; [1972] 3 WLR 502 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 35 (QB). Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270 (pure economic loss exclusory right rejected); Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426 (nervous shock exclusory rule rejected). In some old trespass to land decisions, where the primary interest being protected was the physical integrity of the plaintiff’s land, damages were awarded parasitically, eg for the infection of the plaintiff’s cattle with disease: Anderson v Buckton (1719) 1 Str 192; 93 ER 467. See also Pritchard v Long (1842) 9 M & W 666; 152 ER 281. But see Huxley v Berg (1815) 1 Stark 98; 171 ER 413; Bracegirdle v Orford (1813) 2 M & S 77; 105 ER 311. Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501; 68 LGRA 27, McHugh JA at 511 (NSWLR) (a claim for nervous shock, vexation and inconvenience consequent upon damage to the plaintiff’s house). See also [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020] for causation and [33.10.2060]–[33.10.2110] for remoteness. Tao Zhu v Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games [2001] NSWSC 989 (issue of non-pecuniary damages for affront to plaintiff’s feelings not discussed on appeal); Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, but see now Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489, which sets out the position of the English Court of Appeal that damages for injury to reputation and injury to feelings are recoverable only in an action for defamation and not in an action for conspiracy; Pratt v British Medical Association [1919] 1 KB 244. The position in Australia is unclear: Boase v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2005] WASC 269. See [33.10.1700]–[33.10.1710]. See also McGregor H, McGregor on Damages (17th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at [6-110]–[6-119].

835

[33.10.250]

TYPES OF DAMAGES

836

Form and Scope of Damages “Once and for All” Rule [33.10.360] Damages for all losses, past and future, must be assessed once and for all in a lump sum award. The final character of an award is necessary to assure finality of litigation1 and to avoid the unfairness of subjecting the defendant to multiple claims arising out of the same wrong.2 The application of these rules means that: (1)

an award of damages must encompass all losses, past and future;

(2)

a plaintiff cannot seek a review of an award because material circumstances affecting the award later change; and

(3)

an award of damages bars subsequent claims founded as a matter of substance on the same cause of action.

An order that damages should be payable only on the occurrence of a future event also offends the policy of finality.3 In England, it has been held that the “once and for all” rule is not necessarily offended by awards, in certain circumstances, being made conditional on the plaintiff holding part of the award for the benefit of a third party.4 This practice has not been approved in Australia. At common law, the parties to an action must give their consent to an award of periodic payments before a court may make such an order. However, statutory provisions in most jurisdictions authorise such awards in certain circumstances.5 In New South Wales, s 143 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)6 provides that both parties in transport-related personal injuries claims may consent to a structured settlement for periodic payments of damages. The court may make the order “even though the payment of damages is not in the form of a lump sum award of damages”.7 In South Australia, s 30B(1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) empower the Supreme Court, at its discretion, in all the circumstances of the case, instead of proceeding to a final assessment, to enter a declaratory judgment on the issues of liability and make an interim assessment of damages with an order for payment(s) on account of damages.8 Final assessment of damages can be postponed until there is greater certainty about the future condition of the plaintiff upon which to base the award.9 In Western Australia, s 16(4) of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA) gives a broad discretion to the court to make awards of periodic payments in motor vehicle accident claims.10 The court may, at any time, either of its own motion or on the application of any party, review such periodic 837

[33.10.360]

FORM AND SCOPE OF DAMAGES

awards and order that payments be redeemed by payment of a lump sum.11 If both parties do not want a periodic award, then the court must award a lump sum. Periodic payments, under these provisions, would most often be deemed appropriate in circumstances of catastrophic injury, when life expectancy is uncertain and the plaintiff is in need of permanent institutional care. Another factor favouring such a settlement would be the obvious inability of the plaintiff to manage the investment of a lump sum.

1 After an award has been made, a case may only be reopened where fresh evidence of post-trial events indicates that the basis on which the award was made at trial has been materially falsified by a change of mind, involving a reversal of policy, on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff must establish that the circumstances are such that it would not be fair and equitable to allow the defendant to retain the advantage of an award, the basis of which has subsequently been wholly falsified: Murphy v Stone Wallwork (Charlton) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1023 (HL), Lord Pearson at 1035. In that case, the evidence at trial indicated that the defendant would continue to employ the plaintiff for an extended period into the future. Shortly after the award, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment. But see Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; 51 ALJR 315; Wilson v Peisley (1975) 50 ALJR 207 (HCA), Barwick CJ at 209–210. Of course, the availability of appeal also depends upon the procedural rules of each jurisdiction: see Civil Procedures “Appeals” [5.9.10]ff. 2 The maxim is: “No one ought to be twice punished, if it be proved to the court that it be for one and the same cause.” See Fitter v Veal (1701) 12 Mod 542; 88 ER 1506. In that case the plaintiff recovered damages for assault and battery, and then discovered that his injuries were more serious than had been supposed. He initiated fresh legal action for additional damages. It was held that he had but one cause of action, which had been extinguished by the judgment in his earlier action. See also Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at 412 (CLR). 3 Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] AC 626. 4 Metcalfe v London Passenger Transport Board (UK) [1938] 2 All ER 352 (KB), Macnaghten J at 355. See also Hart v Nominal Defendant [1972] 2 NSWLR 253; Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority (UK) [1979] QB 196; [1979] 3 WLR 895 (CA), where Lord Denning at 220 (QB) expressed the view that machinery provisions in the Rules of the Supreme Court concerning interim awards enabled a trial court to award a lump sum on an interim basis, and thus allow a plaintiff to come back for additional periodic awards. On appeal this was held to be unsound: see Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority (UK) [1980] AC 174; [1979] 3 WLR 44, Lord Scarman at 182–183 (AC). “Provisional damages”, being awards on an interim basis allowing further applications for review, are now available in suitable cases of uncertain prognosis, in England and Wales, pursuant to Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK), s 32A. 5 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 2 Div 7; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4 Div 6; Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT), s 12; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 3 Pt 4; Workers’ Compensation and

838

[33.10.370]

DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION

Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), Pt 9 Div 4; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30BA; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 33A; District Court Act 1991 (SA), s 38A; Return to Work Act 2014 (SA), Pt 4 Div 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VC; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2 Div 4. Periodical payments of compensation in personal injury claims would do much to alleviate problems about whether the lump sum will last the distance and cover all the future needs of the victim. Taxation laws and social security structures used to favour the acceptance of a lump sum rather than voluntary agreements for periodical payments. Insofar as periodical payments replaced lost income, they inevitably attracted tax, whereas the lump sum gave the recipient the scope and opportunity to invest in such a way as to minimise future tax liability on the interest from the lump sum. The Taxation Laws Amendment (Structured Settlements and Structured Orders) Act 2002 (Cth) introduced income tax exemptions for structured settlements meeting required eligibility criteria from the 2001/2002 income year onwards, by amending the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) and Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth). 6 Note that the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) applies to accidents occurring on or after 4 October 1999. For accidents occurring from 1 July 1987, Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 81 applies. Section 81 provides for structured settlements for periodic payments of damages for future economic loss, medical expenses and home care services. Additionally, under s 81 the court must agree that there is good cause for making consent orders to implement such settlements. 7 Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 143(2). 8 For example, uncertainty in medical prognosis: Cirjak v Todd (1977) 17 SASR 316; Ikonomos v Lesiuk (1973) 6 SASR 111; Grabkowski v Majchrowski (1978) 19 SASR 290; Angelopoulos v Angelopoulos (1978) 80 LSJS 409 (SASC); Walker v Tugend (1981) 28 SASR 194; Brown v South Australia (1984) 36 SASR 147. Other grounds for making periodic payments include the effect of labour conditions (Forst v Graves (1967) 52 LSJS 464 (SASC)), the lack of evidence of extent of loss (Revesz v Orchard [1969] SASR 336) and the need for further evidence of the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity: Preston v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd [1971] SASR 221. 9 Walker v Tugend (1981) 28 SASR 194, Legoe J at 197. 10 For example, Musca v Colombini [1970] WAR 33 (FC). 11 Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA), s 16(4)(b)(i), (ii).

Different Causes of Action [33.10.370] Where the same act gives rise to losses of a different character, such as destruction of property and personal injury,1 a separate action for damages may lie for each distinct category of loss or damage. In Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183, Adam J noted that it was firmly established that a cause of action for damage arising out of a collision is distinct from a claim for property damage caused by the same accident. He stated that although only one legal wrong is relied upon, the damage is different.2 He relied on the authority of Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141, where the driver of a cab which was run into by the defendant’s motor car received an award of damages for

839

[33.10.370]

FORM AND SCOPE OF DAMAGES

property damage to his cab. A later action for recovery of personal injury of damages was also allowed. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff had two causes of action and that: [T]he same sort of evidence would prove the plaintiff’s case in the two actions. Apply that test to the present case. In the action brought in the county court, in order to support the plaintiff’s case, it would be necessary to give evidence of the damage done to the plaintiff’s vehicle. In the present action it would be necessary to give evidence of the bodily injury occasioned to the plaintiff, and of the sufferings which he has undergone, and for this purpose to call medical witnesses. This one test shews that the causes of action as to the damage done to the plaintiff’s cab, and as to the injury occasioned to the plaintiff’s person, are distinct.3

Although separate actions can be brought for damages for personal injury and property damage arising from the same act, multiple claims for the same kind of damage will not be entertained.4

1 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; 67 WN (NSW) 227, Fullagar J at 467 (CLR); Williamson v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 252; 76 WN (NSW) 648 (FC), Herron J at 261 (SR (NSW)); Wells v D’Amico [1961] VR 672; Van Amstel v Country Roads Board [1961] VR 780; Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183, Adam J at 184; Armytage v Commissioner for Government Transport [1972] 1 NSWLR 331, Brereton J at 338; Marlborough Harbour Board (NSW) v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223 (CA), Hope JA at 230–233. 2 Azzopardi v Bois [1968] VR 183, Adam J at 184. 3 Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141 (CA), Brett MR at 146. In Marlborough Harbour Board (NSW) v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223 (CA), Hope JA at 231–232 commented on the rule in Brunsden v Humphrey: “The better view would seem to be that, although for pragmatic and possibly historical reasons separate actions can be brought for damages in respect of personal injury and damage to property, if an action has been brought for damage to property, or for both personal injury and damage to property, other actions cannot be brought for damage to other property as a result of the same ‘casualty’. There would not be, as has been submitted in the present case, a separate cause of action in respect of each knife and fork lost when the [ship] sank … Brunsden v Humphrey has been said to be but an example of the broader proposition that damages is [sic] the gist of the action for negligence. I have never quite understood this statement, for ‘gist’ is defined to mean ‘the real ground or point of a matter’, ‘the substance or pith of a matter’, and ‘the essence’. No doubt damage is a necessary element of negligence in law, but equally so are duty and breach. They are all of the gist of the action for negligence.” 4 Marlborough Harbour Board (NSW) v Charter Travel Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 223 (CA), Hope JA at 231; Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758; [1963] 2 WLR 210, Lord Pearce at 780 (AC). See [33.10.360].

840

[33.10.380]

CONTINUING WRONGS

Continuing Wrongs [33.10.380] A continuing wrong may give rise to a fresh action on each recurrence of damage. This usually occurs in the context of nuisance and trespass1 or continuing acts of negligence.2 In Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell (1886) 11 App Cas 127, the House of Lords established that more than one action arises out of the same set of facts where a single act not actionable as of right causes specific damage on separate occasions.3 The defendant’s past mining excavations had caused a continuing series of subsidences of the plaintiff’s land. It was held that, although damages had been recovered by the plaintiff for an earlier subsidence, this did not bar the plaintiff from bringing fresh actions for damages for further subsidences. Lord Halsbury, considered that “the wrong … wholly consists, in causing another man damage, and I think he may recover for that damage as and when it occurs”.4 Lord Blackburn dissented, taking the view that “there is no other instance in our law where an action lies in consequence of damage against a person doing an innocent act”.5 Damage alone is not a sufficient cause of action. This observation is correct, and therefore the Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell rule, although well established, has been held in England to be restricted to its circumstances and confined to similar cases of subsidences of land.6 However, in D’Aquino v Trovatello [2015] VSCA 78, McLeish JA stated that: I am unable to accept that Lord Halsbury’s observations are to be confined to cases pleading a cause of action for subsidence, and do not apply to actions in nuisance. In the first place, as senior counsel for the applicants pointed out, counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) in the House of Lords framed his argument in terms of nuisance. Moreover, a leading Australian text treats the case as an authority governing the question of successive occurrence of damages in nuisance. Finally, there is no reason in principle why claims for subsidence of land should be treated any differently from claims in nuisance in this respect.7

1

2

3 4

Holmes v Wilson (1839) 10 Ad & El 503; 113 ER 190; Hole v Chard Union [1894] 1 Ch 293 (CA); Earl of Harrington v Corp of Derby [1905] 1 Ch 205. See also “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff; “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. Adams v Ascot Iron Foundry Pty Ltd (1968) 72 SR (NSW) 120; 89 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 27 (CA); Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, Deane J at 589 (CLR): “[T]here is something to be said for the view that a distinct cause of action accrued each time new damage was incurred by reason of the continuing breach of duty.” See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. Followed in Thynne v Petrie [1975] Qd R 260; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC), Thomas J at 262–263. Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell (1886) 11 App Cas 127, Lord Halsbury at 135.

841

[33.10.380]

FORM AND SCOPE OF DAMAGES

5 6 7

Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell (1886) 11 App Cas 127, Lord Blackburn at 141–142. Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758; [1963] 2 WLR 210, Lord Pearce at 780 (AC). D’Aquino v Trovatello [2015] VSCA 78, McLeish JA at [57] (Warren CJ and Ashley JA agreeing) (citations omitted).

842

Factors in Assessment of Damages Date of Assessment [33.10.490] There is no longer any rigid rule about the appropriate date of assessment for damages.1 The date of assessment was traditionally set at the date of the tort, but the current approach on this issue is now flexible, and is dependent on the achievement of full and fair compensation. The current judicial approach to the date of assessment issue was discussed by Mason CJ in Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51: The date of assessment determines which party, the plaintiff or the defendant, bears the risk of changing prices during the inevitable delay between the injury and the delivery of judgment. If an early date is used for assessment (the date of the injury for example) in an inflationary economy or where goods of the kind injured are appreciating, it is the plaintiff’s position which is eroded. If a later date such as the date of judgment is used, it is the defendant who is exposed. There is a general rule that damages for torts or breach of contract are assessed as at the date of breach or when the cause of action arises. But this rule is not universal; it must give way in particular cases to solutions best adapted to giving an injured plaintiff that amount in damages which will most fairly compensate him for the wrong he has suffered.2

The time at which damages are assessed can significantly affect the amount awarded. In particular, temporal remoteness and mitigation of loss are principal factors in the choice of the appropriate date.3 Important considerations in setting the appropriate date of assessment include: (1)

the application of the compensation principle to the full economic circumstances of the loss;4

(2)

the precise identification of the tortious duty and its breach;

(3)

the use to which the parties have put the subject matter of the dispute in the period from breach to trial; and

(4)

whether the duty of mitigation of loss has been adequately fulfilled by the plaintiff.

In personal injury claims (see [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]), the date of assessment is normally the date of making the award, as the plaintiff is usually seeking compensation for past and future losses, arising continuously to the date of the award, and often over a long period of time.5

843

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.490]

In property loss cases, whether reinstatement cost or diminution of value is the chosen measure, a date other than the date at which the cause of action arose may be chosen as the appropriate date of assessment, in order to achieve the objective of full and fair compensation.6 Similar flexibility is now routinely applied to economic loss cases.7

1 Monetary instability led to a reappraisal of the prima facie rule at common law that damages for breach of contract are assessed at the date of the breach, and for tort at the date of the cause of action arising. The first assaults on the breach-date rule occurred in the field of international monetary obligations: Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443; [1975] 3 WLR 758 (a debt payable in foreign currency was a debt payable in that currency at the time of the execution of judgment). See also The MV Eleftherotria v The MV Despina R [1979] AC 685; [1978] 3 WLR 804. 2 Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51, Mason CJ at 355–356 (CLR). 3 For remoteness, see [33.10.2060]–[33.10.2110]; for mitigation see [33.10.2120]–[33.10.2140]. 4 Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51, Mason CJ at 355–356 (CLR). The High Court split 5:2 on the issue of the date of assessment of damages, in an action against solicitors whose negligence had denied the plaintiff the opportunity of suing a third party for personal injury. The majority held that the appropriate date was the date when the trial of the aborted action should have come started, while the minority favoured the hearing date of the action against the solicitor. The difference turned on the application of the compensation principle. Both the majority and the minority sought to replace what was lost, but the minority felt that has best done by a later date of assessment rather than an earlier date plus interest. All agreed that changes to legislation after the putative date of the aborted trial should not be taken into account. See also Sachs v Miklos [1948] 2 KB 23 (CA); Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114, Taylor and Owen JJ at 191–192 (CLR); Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 (CA), Donaldson LJ at 456–458; Wollongong City Council v Fregnan [1982] 1 NSWLR 244; (1982) 46 LGRA 391 (CA), Glass JA at 253 (NSWLR); Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394; 63 ALJR 297, Mason CJ at 398–399 (CLR); Rentokil Pty Ltd v Channon (1990) 19 NSWLR 417 (CA). 5 Willis v Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105; 48 WALR 93; O’Brien v McKean (1968) 118 CLR 540; 42 ALJR 223, Barwick CJ at 545 (CLR); Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority (UK) [1980] AC 174; [1979] 3 WLR 44; Beasley v Marshall (No 1) (1986) 40 SASR 544. See also [33.10.710]–[33.10.990]. 6 See, eg Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 (CA) (reinstatement measure applied at date of award, 10 years after the tort). See also [33.10.1390], [33.10.1490], [33.10.1520]. 7 Rentokil Pty Ltd v Channon (1990) 19 NSWLR 417 (CA).

844

[33.10.500]

INTEREST ON DAMAGES

Interest on Damages [33.10.500] Awards of interest on damages are now authorised by statute and at common law.1 All Australian jurisdictions have primary or secondary statutory provisions for the award of both post-judgment2 and prejudgment3 interest. Post-judgment interest attaches to the judgment debt and accrues automatically until the debt is paid. Prejudgment interest is discussed here because it forms part of the damages award, being granted to compensate plaintiffs for the time during which they have been kept out of their just monetary deserts.4 The award of prejudgment interest also encourages defendants either to seek settlement or to proceed to trial without undue delay. In applying the statutes, courts have two discretionary decisions to make: first, whether or not interest must or may be awarded on all or part of the damages award and, if interest may be awarded, whether it will be; and second, at what rate to award interest: see further [33.10.510]. The award of interest is approached in a broad and practical way and is for real and not merely theoretical losses.5 In deciding whether or not to award interest and over what period, relevant factors include: (1)

what is fair between the parties;6

(2)

consistency from case to case;

(3)

the fact that one party has had use of the money while the other has not;7

(4)

the effects of taxation and inflation;8 and

(5)

the plaintiff’s delay in making the claim.9

The fact of payment into court of some or all of the amount claimed is irrelevant to the exercise of the discretion on interest. At common law, it is established that compensation may include an allowance for the time during which plaintiffs have been kept from their just monetary deserts. The period between the time a cause of action arises and the date of an eventual damages award can be quite lengthy. It is, therefore, appropriate that plaintiffs are entitled, at law, to receive interest to compensate them for being kept out of enjoyment of their award during this period. In Ruby v Marsh (1975) 132 CLR 642; 49 ALJR 320, Barwick CJ explained: The purpose of giving courts the power to award interest on damages is to my mind twofold, and neither aspect of the purpose should be lost sight of. In the first place, the successful plaintiff, who by the verdict has been turned into an investor by the award of a capital sum, and whose claim in the writ has been justified to the extent of the verdict returned, ought in justice to be placed in the position in which he would have been had the amount of the verdict been paid to him at the date of the commencement of the action. In the second place, the power to award interest on the verdict from the date of the writ is to provide a discouragement to defendants, who in the greater number of actions for damages for personal injuries are insured, from

845

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.500]

delaying settlement of the claim or an early conclusion of proceedings so as to have over a longer period of time the profitable use of the money which ultimately the defendant agrees or is called upon by judgment to pay.10

In Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36, the High Court recognised “loss of use of money” as a legitimate and proximate head of loss in damages, and thus recoverable in its own right. Damages were measured by reference to compound interest rates, to compensate the plaintiff for being forced to borrow money as a result of overpayment of taxation due to the negligence of the defendant, a tax accountant. Although this case arose in a commercial context, the joint judgment of Mason CJ and Wilson J indicates that there is a general alternative to reliance upon the statutes allowing prejudgment interest.11 The joint judgment rejected the argument that it was not the intention of the legislature to allow compensation for loss of use of money beyond the terms of the interest statutes. Since this decision, it is vital to distinguish between interest “on” damages and interest “as” damages. In applying Hungerfords v Walker in the context of a personal injuries claim, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commonwealth v Chessell (1991) 30 FCR 154 emphasised the need for the plaintiff to establish that consequential financial loss was actually suffered as a result of the late payment of the amount due for loss of earnings up to trial. Such loss may arise in different ways, for example, in the form of the investment cost of being deprived of money which could have been invested at interest or used to reduce an existing indebtedness. Or, the loss may arise in the form of the borrowing cost, that is interest payable on borrowed money.

1

2

Previously, at common law, an award of interest on damages was not permitted: Milner v Delita Pty Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 299, Lockhart J at 309. Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36, Mason CJ and Wilson J at 148 (CLR): “Equity has adopted a broad approach to the award of interest. It has long been accepted that the equitable right to interest exists independently of statute. … Equity courts have regularly awarded interest, including not only simple interest but also compound interest, when justice so demanded, eg money obtained and retained by fraud and money withheld or misapplied by a trustee or fiduciary. … In admiralty, simple interest has been awarded in a variety of cases standing outside the authority conferred by statute. … Likewise in Scotland the courts followed the civil law. The principle is that interest is awarded, as of right, whenever a principal sum of money was ‘withheld, and not paid on the day when it ought to have been paid’”, referring to Carmichael v Caledonian Railway Co (1870) LR 2 Sc 56; 8 Macph 119 (HL), Lord Westbury at 131 (Macph). That rule derived from the time when interest was synonymous with usury. Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), s 7 read with Court Procedures Act 2004, Sch 1 Item 20 and Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1620; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 101; Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 85; Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 59; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 114; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 165; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 101; Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA), s 8. 846

[33.10.500]

INTEREST ON DAMAGES

3

Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), s 7 read with Court Procedures Act 2004, Sch 1 Item 20 and Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1619; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 100; Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 84; Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 58; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 34; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), ss 58 – 60; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 32. 4 Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60; 65 ALJR 349, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 66 (CLR): “An award of interest up to the date of judgment is an award of interest in the nature of damages … This statement acknowledges that the award of interest is an integral element in the attainment of the object of damages, namely, to compensate a plaintiff for injury sustained. Hence the award of interest is compensatory in character. While ‘interest should not be awarded as compensation for the damage done’ … the award of interest is nevertheless an essential element in the achievement of true compensation for that damage”, referring to Jefford v Gee [1970] 2 QB 130; [1970] 2 WLR 702 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 146 (QB). See Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Callinan (1978) 140 CLR 427; 52 ALJR 637. Interest is routinely awarded: Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390, Lord Wright at 400; Homeowners Insurances Pty Ltd v Job (1983) 2 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-535 (NSWCA), Glass JA at 78,106; Falkner v Bourke (1990) 19 NSWLR 574 (CA). If, for example, the plaintiff has received substantial compensation under a statutory compensation scheme prior to the trial, then interest may not be allowed. Interest is only awarded for detriment suffered by the plaintiff being kept out of their money compensation. However, whether compensation under a statute will reduce the damages due to the plaintiff is a question of statutory interpretation: Redding v Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117; 57 ALJR 393. 5 Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 22 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203); John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 (CA), McHugh JA at 142–144. 6 Pheeney v Doolan (No 2) [1977] 1 NSWLR 601 (CA), Moffitt P at 604–605; Bennett v Jones [1977] 2 NSWLR 355 (CA), Moffitt P at 367–371. 7 Thompson v Faraonio [1979] 1 WLR 1157; (1979) 54 ALJR 231, Lord Fraser (for the Privy Council) at 233 (ALJR); Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60; 65 ALJR 349 and more recently in Kalls Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) v Baloglow (No 3) [2007] NSWCA 298. 8 Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 (CA), Moffitt P at 338. 9 Bennett v Jones [1977] 2 NSWLR 355 (CA); Birkett v Hayes [1982] 1 WLR 816 (CA), Watkins LJ at 825; Metro Meat Ltd v Werlick [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-242 (SASCFC). 10 Ruby v Marsh (1975) 132 CLR 642; 49 ALJR 320, Barwick CJ at 652–653 (CLR). See also Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60; 65 ALJR 349, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 66 (CLR). 11 Interest as damages for loss of use of money is neither subject to the discretionary exclusion of interest pursuant to the interest statutes nor confined to any statutory set maximum rates of interest, or guidelines set down from time to time for computing statutory interest. Thus, in cases where there has been a very high loss sustained under this head, there is an advantage to the plaintiff in pursuing interest at common law rather than making a claim under the interest statutes. See Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36.

847

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.510]

[33.10.510] Statutory provisions for interest on damages vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Statutory interest1 is recoverable on awards of damages for all torts in Australian jurisdictions subject to the following exceptions: (1)

in New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a court cannot order interest to be paid on personal injury damages awarded for non-economic loss or gratuitous services;2

(2)

for motor accidents occurring in New South Wales after 30 June 1984, interest is not payable on non-pecuniary damages. Section 137 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) (for motor accidents occurring after on or 5 October 1999) and s 73 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW) (for motor accidents occurring prior to 5 October 1999), provides an incentive for early settlement of claims. It states that in general no interest is payable on an amount of damages from the date of injury to the date of the award, but that a court may award interest if the defendant has not made an offer of settlement where it would have been appropriate to do so; or taken reasonable and appropriate steps to assess the merits of the plaintiff’s claim; or where the eventual award is more than 20 per cent above the defendant’s best offer in settlement, bearing in mind the amount of information available to the defendant at the time the offer was made. The High Court has held that, where compensation is awarded under this Act for non-economic loss, interest is not to be awarded from the date of the injury but only from the date on which the Act came into force, as it is only from this date that the plaintiff can be said to have been kept out of the damages to which they are entitled;3

(3)

in Queensland, a court cannot award interest for general damages in personal injury claims;4

(4)

in South Australia, interest cannot be awarded for personal injury damages compensating non-economic or future loss;5

(5)

in Tasmania, recovery of interest on debts is restricted to awards made in conversion, trespass to goods actions and actions under policies of insurance;6 and

(6)

in Victorian motor vehicle accident cases, no interest is payable on past general damages, that is, from the date of the injury to the date of the award.7

848

[33.10.520]

INTEREST ON DAMAGES

In South Australia8 and Victoria,9 an award of interest must be made unless the defendant can establish some good cause against any award of interest at all or make out a case for a reduced award.10 A court in South Australia may award a lump sum in lieu of interest.11

1

In order to successfully claim statutory interest, the judgment must be for damages. In Foti v Banque Nationale de Paris (No 2) (BNP Case) (1989) 54 SASR 433, the judgment was properly viewed as a proper accounting by credit of notional hedging profits and not for the payment of damages as such; therefore, Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C did not apply. In Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362; [1991] 2 WLR 27, the House of Lords (interpreting Judgments Act 1838 1 & 2 Vict c 10 (UK), s 17), found that interest should be awarded on and up to the single final judgment for a quantified sum and that any earlier interlocutory judgments, even judgments directing the payment of damages, do not prevent interest being awarded from the date of final judgment in the case. 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 18(1); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 29. See also Civil Liability Act 2002, s 15 (definition of “gratuitous attendant care services”); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003, s 18 (definition of “gratuitous services”). 3 The High Court has held that, where compensation is awarded under this Act for non-economic loss, interest is not to be awarded from the date of the injury but only from the date on which the Act came into force, as it is only from this date that the plaintiff can be said to have been kept out of the damages to which they are entitled: Andjelic v Marsland (1996) 186 CLR 20; 70 ALJR 435 (upholding the decision in Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162). 4 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 60(1). See Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English [1989] 1 Qd R 678 (FC), for a discussion of the Queensland Supreme Court’s approach to the exercise of its discretion to award interest, and the correct method of setting an appropriate rate. See also [33.10.530]. 5 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 56. 6 Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 35(1). 7 Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), ss 93(15), 175(1). 8 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C(1). 9 Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 60(1). 10 For example, the defendant might seek to establish that the plaintiff had unduly delayed the litigation process and therefore a lower rate of interest is appropriate, or that to award any interest would, in the particular circumstances, constitute double recovery. See Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Driscoll [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-175 (NSWCA). 11 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C(3).

[33.10.520] The period for which interest is awarded varies between the jurisdictions. It runs from the date of the accrual of the cause of action (usually the date of the tortious act)1 to the date of judgment in all jurisdictions except Victoria, where the period runs from the date of the commencement of proceedings2 (interpreted as the date of issue of the writ),3 and South Australia.4

849

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.520]

It is within the exercise of the court’s discretion to set a shorter period for which interest is awarded. For example, if the plaintiff is found to have unreasonably delayed pursuing their claim or if the defendant, quite reasonably, had no knowledge that the plaintiff was likely to make a claim, or where there has been a substantial increase of damages on appeal, or simply due to the circumstances or commercial context of the particular case, it may not be just to apply the normal period for computing interest.5 In the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales, interest may not be awarded on damages referable to the pretrial period, where the defendant has made an offer in settlement for a claim and the court’s eventual awarded damages do not exceed the sum offered by more than 10 per cent.6

1 See, eg in regards to personal injuries damages: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 18(2)(a); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 30(1)(a). 2 Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 60. In Victoria, as an exception to this general rule, in actions for conversion or trespass to goods, interest runs from the tortious act of conversion or interference. 3 Ruby v Marsh (1975) 132 CLR 642; 49 ALJR 320, Barwick CJ at 653 (CLR). But see Faraonio v Thompson (1978) 19 SASR 56 (FC), Bray CJ at 57 (appealed to Privy Council on other grounds: Thompson v Faraonio [1979] 1 WLR 1157; (1979) 54 ALJR 231 (PC)). 4 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C. 5 Jefford v Gee [1970] 2 QB 130; [1970] 2 WLR 702 (CA); BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783 (QB), Robert Goff J at 846–847 (affirmed in BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 352; [1982] 2 WLR 253); Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 (CA), Moffitt P at 338–339; Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Driscoll [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-175 (NSWCA); Shaw v Commonwealth (1995) 124 FLR 190 (NTSC); Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English [1989] 1 Qd R 678. 6 Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1619(7), (8); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 100(4), (5).

[33.10.530] The rate at which interest is normally awarded is the ordinary commercial “simple interest” rate obtaining at the time of the award, however, in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Queensland the appropriate rate of interest is specified in legislation.1 In all jurisdictions except Tasmania, the interest statutes or regulations expressly prohibit the awarding of compound interest.2 As the English Court of Appeal explained in Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] QB 654; [1993] 2 WLR 175, the purpose of statutory interest is compensatory and not additional damages. Interest is to compensate the plaintiff for not having received money when they should have received it.3

850

[33.10.530]

INTEREST ON DAMAGES

In New South Wales, the Chief Justice, from time to time, issues appropriate and approximate, commercial rates for the guidance of trial judges.4 In Victoria, a maximum statutory rate of interest is set.5 Concerning past continuing losses which occur gradually, such as wages lost in the period from the injury to judgment in a personal injuries claim, it would overcompensate the plaintiff to award interest in full from the date of the accident to the date of judgment.6 In such cases, the rate of interest may be set at half the commercial rate, or be allowed for half the full period as a fair means of adjusting the award of interest to prevent overcompensation.7 The nominal interest rate applied by the High Court to non-pecuniary loss is 4 per cent.8 That is usually expressed as a rate of 2 per cent to be applied to past general damages for the whole period from the date of the accident to the date of the award. Alternatively, a rate of 4 per cent can be applied to past general damages for half that period. The reason for dividing either the time period or the interest rate in half is to reflect the varying lengths of time to which the interest rate is being applied.9 Where loss of use of money damages are awarded, compound interest may be appropriate. In Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36, Mason CJ and Wilson J stated that “simple interest almost always undercompensates the injured party’s true loss”.10 However, it is clear that in such cases the court has a broad discretion concerning which rate of interest to award, based on all the evidence adduced at trial.11

1

2

3

Where the rate has been left to the court to fix at its discretion, various methods have been adopted. In Wheeler v Page (1982) 31 SASR 1 (FC), King CJ at 7 asked: “What should that rate be? The precise difference between the prevailing rate of interest and the prevailing rate of inflation will vary from time to time. It is desirable, however, that there should be some stability in the rate used by judges … It would be quite wrong for the appropriate rate of interest to be made the subject of evidence. I think that the best course is to adopt a rate which appears to approximate the rate of interest applicable in times of stable currency value and which may therefore be supposed to exclude the influence of inflationary factors.” See Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1619, read with Sch 2; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 18(3), (4); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 30(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 60(3). Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), s 7 read with Court Procedures Act 2004, Sch 1 Item 20 and Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1619(6); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 100(3); Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 84(2)(a); Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 58(4); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30C(4)(a); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 60(2)(a); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 32(2)(a). In Mengel v Northern Territory (No 2) [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-266 (NTSC), the plaintiff sought interest to be calculated at compound rates. This was not allowed, because to do so, in the view of the Court (even if Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 84 permitted such exercise of discretion), would be to award damages rather than interest. In Wentworth v Wiltshire County Council [1993] QB 654; [1993] 2 WLR 175, the

851

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.530]

trial judge was held to be in error for awarding damages for the cost of borrowing money (bank interest) and then awarding statutory interest upon these damages. This constituted double recovery and an award of interest on interest contrary to the purpose of the interest statutes. 4 For example, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Practice Note No SC Gen 16 Pre Judgement Interest Rates, 16 June 2010. 5 Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 60(1), prescribes a maximum statutory rate of interest. This rate is fixed from time to time by the Attorney-General having regard to advice from the State Treasurer and reference to the guidelines provided in the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic). 6 Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 19–20 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). 7 Cookson v Knowles [1979] AC 556; [1978] 2 WLR 978; Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 19 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). 8 MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203. This lesser rate of interest for non-pecuniary damages does not necessarily apply to awards under statutory compensation schemes which modify the common law, typically by imposing ceilings on damages for non-pecuniary loss. Thus, in Andjelic v Marsland (1996) 186 CLR 20; 70 ALJR 435, the Court decided that a commercial rate of interest should apply to damages for non-economic loss under Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 79, the aim of which is to provide compensation for a significant impairment of the ability to lead a normal life. 9 On the application of MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203; see Metropolitan Meat Industry Board (NSW) v Williams (1991) 24 NSWLR 54 (CA); Hallet v Schoevers (1992) 109 ACTR 1; 106 FLR 233 (FC); Camm v Salter [1992] 2 Qd R 342 (FC). 10 Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36, Mason CJ and Wilson J at 149 (CLR). 11 Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36; Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; [2003] NSWCA 10, Heydon JA at [303]; Trans-Pacific Insurance Co (Aust) Ltd v Grand Union Insurance Co Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 675; Walker v FAI Insurance Ltd [1991] Tas R 258 (FC).

[33.10.540] Interest is only awarded on actual losses suffered by the plaintiff.1 As the fundamental aim of awarding interest is to compensate the plaintiff for being deprived of the use of the money due to their, interest should be payable on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of loss. This basic approach is subject to a number of statutory exceptions. First, in relation to pecuniary and non-pecuniary components there is now no doubt that interest may be awarded on non-pecuniary losses such as pain and suffering, as it can be on pecuniary losses.2 In New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a court cannot order payment of interest on personal injury damages awarded for non-economic loss or gratuitous attendant care services.3 In Queensland, interest awarded on personal injury damages compensating past monetary loss “must be related in an appropriate way to the period over which the loss was incurred”.4 In South Australia, interest cannot be awarded on 852

[33.10.540]

INTEREST ON DAMAGES

damages compensating non-economic or future loss.5 In Victoria, interest cannot be awarded in personal injury and death actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents, except in respect of damages referable to loss actually suffered before the date of the award.6 The Western Australian legislation prohibits the award of interest on non-pecuniary heads of loss in personal injury and death actions.7 Second, concerning past and future components under the Australian Capital Territory,8 South Australian9 and Victorian10 legislation, interest may not be awarded on those components of a personal injury award which relate to post-trial loss, such as future loss of earning capacity or diminution of amenities of life, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary in kind.11 Although no absolute statutory bar to the award of interest on post-trial losses in other Australian jurisdictions exists, generally it is not appropriate to award interest on future loss.12 In Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J was of the view that it is not always necessary to separate prejudgment and post-judgment components of non-pecuniary loss before awarding interest.13 He pointed out the difficulty of making such a dissection for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, and stressed that awards of interest should always be made in a broad and practical way. The award of interest is therefore a matter for the discretion of the individual trial judge and any formulations of so-called “rules governing the exercise of this discretion” are out of place. As noted at [33.10.530], in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203, the High Court decided that it was not correct to apply a “real” commercial rate of interest to pretrial non-pecuniary loss aspects of the award.14 Third, where the plaintiff has received workers’ compensation payments prior to judgment on a common law claim, those prior payments should be taken into account when assessing prejudgment interest.15 The purpose of prejudgment interest is to compensate the plaintiff for being kept out of their money. A plaintiff who has received prior compensation has not been deprived of that part of the judgment which represents past earnings.16

1

This is a truism. For example, the need for and receipt of gratuitous services in personal injury claims is acknowledged as a recoverable loss: Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792: see [33.10.990]. As such, interest computed in the ordinary way is allowed on the amount awarded pursuant to that principle: Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162 (CA); Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] HCA 42. Also, if the provider of the services has suffered out of pocket loss, then an award of interest on pretrial Griffıths v Kerkemeyer loss may be made: Bowen v Tutte [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-043 (WASCFC). 2 Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980] AC 136; [1978] 3 WLR 955, Lord Wilberforce at 151, Lord Edmund-Davies at 164, Lord Scarman at 173 (AC); Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 24, Murphy J at 27–28 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). 853

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13

14

15

[33.10.540]

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 18(1); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 29. See also Civil Liability Act 2002, s 15 (definition of “gratuitous attendant care services”); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003, s 18 (definition of “gratuitous services”). Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 60(2)(b). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 56. Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), ss 93(15), 175(1); Williams v Oataway (2005) 11 VR 529; [2005] VSCA 137. Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 32(2)(aa). Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT), s 7 read with Court Procedures Act 2004, Sch 1 Item 20 and Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1619. Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 56. Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 60(3)(b). See also Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 18(2)(a); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 30(1)(a). Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Callinan (1978) 140 CLR 427; 52 ALJR 637; Thompson v Faraonio [1979] 1 WLR 1157; (1979) 54 ALJR 231 (PC); Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 17–21 (CLR) (overruled on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 21 (CLR) (overruled on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203, the Court at 663–664 (CLR): “Damages for pretrial non-economic loss, however, are assessed in accordance with the value of money as at the time of the award. In no way is any loss which a plaintiff incurs by reason of being deprived of his or her damages for pretrial non-economic loss brought about by inflationary factors. In those circumstances, to award interest on damages for non-economic loss during the pretrial period by reference to commercial rates is to compensate the plaintiff for a ‘loss’ which he or she has not sustained.” In Metropolitan Meat Industry Board (NSW) v Williams (1991) 24 NSWLR 54, the plaintiff argued for the application of a real rate of interest on non-pecuniary loss in the range of 6.84 – 7.5 per cent derived from actuarial calculations. The Court of Appeal upheld the 4 per cent MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic rate as the norm – but also acknowledged that trial judges retained a discretion to depart from this rate for good reason, such as in cases of delay by the defendant causing particular detriment to the plaintiff. The same approach to following MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic was adopted by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Camm v Salter [1992] 2 Qd R 342 and Jackson v Bagwell [1992] 2 Qd R 390. See Stenning v Johnson (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40007 of 1990, 18 April 1991); Hallet v Schoevers (1992) 109 ACTR 1; 106 FLR 233 (FC); Protonotarios v Zapasnik (1992) 106 FLR 243 (ACTSCFC). Batchelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448; 55 ALJR 494 and Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60; 65 ALJR 349 determined that where a person injured through the negligence of another, before recovering judgment for those injuries, enjoys the benefit of a payment of compensation in pursuance of the Workers’ Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) (see now Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW)) (which serves the same purpose as the award of damages at common law), it must be taken into

854

[33.10.550]

ADJUSTMENT TO PRESENT VALUE

account in ascertaining the amount of interest to be awarded. The material principle is that an award of damages and interest thereon should restore rather than improve the plaintiff’s position, and that interest should only be awarded where a plaintiff has been kept out of money due. 16 In Dutschke v Bormann (1988) 50 SASR 171 (FC), the Court held that although the workers’ compensation received by the plaintiff exceeded his pretrial loss, he was still entitled to some interest, because the compensation was paid in a lump sum redemption of the plaintiff’s entitlement to periodic payments. The employer paid the lump sum late, and interest was allowed on past loss of earnings replacement up until the lump sum was received by the plaintiff. In that case the plaintiff had been partly deprived of “earnings”, and so Batchelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448; 55 ALJR 494, discussed above, could easily be distinguished. However, this principle is in doubt, as Dutschke v Bormann was recently distinguished in McClintock v Trojan Workforce No 4 Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 216 (Applegarth J).

Adjustment to Present Value [33.10.550] Awards of damages which compensate for prospective losses may be discounted to present value. That is suggested to be necessary, because the accelerated receipt of these moneys gives an additional earning potential benefit to the plaintiff, upon their investment of the award, which they did not have prior to the tort.1 To avoid overcompensation, an adjustment is made by applying an appropriate discount rate to the award, making reference to present value tables.2 For example, in most jurisdictions, a discount rate of 5 per cent for future losses in personal injury claims is prescribed by legislation.3 Once the appropriate discount rate is decided on, arithmetical tables for computing the present value of the plaintiff’s economic weekly loss are used to make the calculation. For purely commercial cases, involving compensation for economic and property torts, it may usually be assumed that the plaintiff, as investor of the lump sum, will be in a position to obtain prevailing commercial rates, and these rates should be averaged to produce a fair discount rate. In personal injury and death claims, the prospective losses may extend irregularly over decades into the future. Also, for such claims, the plaintiff, as investor, frequently is not in a sufficiently stable financial situation to be able to arrange optimum investment returns. For these reasons, and also to indirectly take into account the factors of inflation and the future effects of taxation, a lower discount rate is set for personal injury and death claims.4 In Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, the High Court set a mandatory 3 per cent discount rate for personal injury claims in order to end judicial disagreement and speculation on the discount rate and the disparities between rates applying in different jurisdictions. The period of uniformity at a 3

855

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.550]

per cent rate was brief. In some jurisdictions the rate has since been varied by legislation.5

1 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632. 2 Luntz H, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (4th ed, Butt, 2002) extracts present value tables. 3 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 14(2)(b); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 22(2)(b); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 57(2), read with Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 61(4)(b); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 3 (definition of “prescribed discount rate”), s 55; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28A(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28I(2)(b). 4 Inflation is discussed at [33.10.550]–[33.10.560] and taxation at [33.10.570]–[33.10.600]. 5 For all personal injury and death claims: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 14(2)(b) (5 per cent); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 22(2)(b) (5 per cent); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 57(2) (5 per cent), read with Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 61(4)(b); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 3 (definition of “prescribed discount rate”), s 55 (5 per cent); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28A (5 per cent); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28I(2)(b) (5 per cent); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 5(1)(e) (6 per cent). For claims arising out of motor vehicle-related accidents: Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW), s 35B(1) (5 per cent); Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 71 (5 per cent); Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), ss 93(13), 173(1) (6 per cent). For claims arising out of work-related accidents: Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 151J(2) (5 per cent); Return to Work Regulations 2015 (SA), reg 35(1) (3 per cent); Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 134AB(32) (6 per cent on or after 20 October 1999). For other claims: Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 61 (5 per cent).

Inflation [33.10.560] The impact of inflation on damages awards may be significant.1 That is particularly so for personal injury claims, where burgeoning technical advances and rapidly rising costs of medical and nursing care often mean that as the income from the lump sum falls in value as a result of inflation, victims of incapacitating injuries are forced to rely on their own resources and social security benefits. Inflation can also be an important factor in cases of wrongful seizure or loss of property, where there is a lengthy period between the date at which the cause of action arose and the date of judgment.2 The traditional attitude of the courts has been to refuse to take inflation directly into account,3 but to devise various indirect stratagems to deal with the problem.4 The High Court reconsidered the issue of inflation in Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632. Members of the majority chose different grounds for confirming the traditional refusal to admit direct evidence of inflation. Gibbs CJ and Wilson J argued that evidence on

856

[33.10.560]

INFLATION

inflation would be entirely speculative, it being impossible to predict its future course.5 Brennan J rejected that view, holding that it is wrong to assume that there will be no future increases in the level of net earnings, when that assumption is at odds with recent experience and commonly expressed expectations. In his view, evidence of inflation should be rejected because that evidence would further complicate the assessment of damages for personal injury.6 Mason J felt that it was impractical to attempt to make long-term predictions about inflation rates, such a task being beyond the capacity even of economists.7 However, despite the apparent firm rejection of the relevance of inflation, the Court dealt with it in an indirect way – through adjustments to the discount rate: see [33.10.550].

1

2

3

4

5 6 7

Inflation is an economic condition in which the volume of purchasing power is constantly running ahead of the output of goods and services, with the result that as incomes and prices rise, the value of money falls. Where the negligence of the defendant’s solicitors caused the plaintiff a delay of three years in acquiring land and five years in building on it, the plaintiff argued that it should be able to recover damages for the increased market costs of buying the land and for increased building costs. The Queensland Court of Appeal, in Endihill Pty Ltd v Grasso Searles & Romano [1993] 2 Qd R 136, found that the cost of land and building costs had not increased at a greater rate than the rate of depreciation of the dollar and held accordingly that the plaintiff was not entitled to additional damages for the effects of inflation. In Faraonio v Thompson (1978) 19 SASR 56 (FC), Zelling J at 73–74 observed: “[T]he law at present makes an astounding assumption about future inflation, namely, that there will not be any. We say it would be quite wrong to take future inflation into account because we cannot predict the future and the award is assessed in terms of present money values … That is so even though inflation has been with us continuously, sometimes fast and sometimes slow, but always with us, since at least the end of World War II. Even the law might reasonably be expected to catch up with the known facts of life in thirty-two years.” See also O’Brien v McKean (1968) 118 CLR 540; 42 ALJR 223; Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166; [1969] 2 WLR 767; Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority (UK) [1980] AC 174; [1979] 3 WLR 44, Lord Scarman at 193 (AC); Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at 409 (CLR). The three methods adopted to take inflation indirectly into account by the court are: setting the discount rate (as in Gray v Richards (2014) 253 CLR 660; 88 ALJR 968; [2014] HCA 40) (see [33.10.550]); fixing the appropriate date for assessment of damages (see [33.10.520]); and exercising its discretion to award prejudgment interest: see [33.10.500]. Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at 419 (CLR). Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Brennan J at 468, 479 (CLR). Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Mason J at 450–451 (CLR).

857

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.560]

Taxation [33.10.570] An award of damages may itself be assessable for tax,1 for example, in recovery of past assessable income such as salary, fees, business profits, indemnity or capital gains. In such cases, the court must decide whether the damages claimed in the particular business context of the case will be subject to tax once in the plaintiff’s hands after the award has been made. The court then has two options: (1)

The court may award the gross amount claimed, with no prejudgment deduction for tax liability. This is generally used in straightforward cases, as the subsequent imposition of tax by the tax office will bring the plaintiff to a position closely equivalent to their pre-tort state.

(2)

In more complex cases, in order to achieve a just result, it may be necessary to make an appropriate positive adjustment to ensure fair compensation to the plaintiff after the tax office has taken its share of the award. For example, the court may assess the net amount of profits or income, and add an allowance for the probable amount of tax to be levied on the judgment.2 The central problem in such cases is that no court can know what vagaries of tax reform may emerge from the legislature to make such adjustment inappropriate in the medium to long term.

1 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 6-5 (income), s 15-30 (indemnity), Pt 3-1 (capital gain). See Deutsch RL, Friezer ML, Fullerton IG, Hanley PJ and Snape TJ, Australian Tax Handbook (Thomson Lawbook Co., subscription service) Chs 4, 114. See also 31 Revenue Law. For an emerging problem in relation to capital gains tax, see Tuite v Exelby (1992) 25 ATR 81 (QSC); Carborundum Realty Pty Ltd v RAIA Archicentre Pty Ltd (1993) 25 ATR 192 (VSC); Provan v HCL Real Estate Ltd (1992) 24 ATR 238 (NSWSC), discussed in Butterworth SM, “The Interaction of Damages Awards and Capital Gains Tax: Two Recent Cases” (1993) 21 ABLR 310; Magee T and Flynn M, “Liability to CGT on Awards of Damages” (1993) 67 LIJ 1067. For the Australian Taxation Office’s approach to the taxation of compensation for personal injury, see ATO Interpretative Decision ATO ID 2004/944. See further Joondalup Gate Pty Ltd v Minster for Lands (WA) (1996) 33 ATR 327 (WASCFC) (discussed in Krever R, “The Capital Gains Tax Consequences of Litigation” (1997) 71 ALJ 699); Russellan Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffıc Authority (NSW) (1992) 75 LGRA 263 (NSWLEC). 2 Gill v Australian Wheat Board [1980] 2 NSWLR 795; (1980) 49 FLR 111, Rogers J at 806–807 (NSWLR). See also Williamson v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 252; 76 WN (NSW) 648 (FC).

858

[33.10.580]

TAXATION

[33.10.580] Compensatory damages may be liable to capital gains tax if awarded after 24 June 1986. This will depend on whether any aspect of the damages compensated for the loss of a capital asset or can be characterised as an assessable capital gain; that is, an asset for the purposes of the applicable tax legislation. In respect of the income years prior to 1998–1999, s 160A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (now repealed) defined assets created between 24 June 1986 and 24 June 1992 as follows: [An] “asset” means any form of property and includes an option, a debt, a chose in action, any other right, goodwill and any other form of incorporeal property.

For assets created on or after 25 June 1992, s 160A had been amended by the definition being widened as follows: [An] “asset” means any form of property and includes … a chose in action [and] … any other right … whether legal or equitable and whether or not a form of property.

Payments involving assets that are expressly excluded from the operation of Pt IIIA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (now repealed) include damages received in respect of personal injuries, and defamation of professional character claims brought by natural persons.1 There is uncertainty about what damages awards might lawfully be subject by the Commissioner of Taxation to the imposition of capital gains tax under the 1936 Act. If a damages award can be treated as a capital receipt then it may fall under Pt IIIA under the 1936 Act. In Carborundum Realty Pty Ltd v RAIA Archicentre Pty Ltd (1993) 25 ATR 1922 (a case of negligence in inspecting and reporting on the condition of a property), damages of $75,000 were awarded, being the difference between the price paid for the property and its true market value. The Commissioner of Taxation indicated to the plaintiff that he would impose capital gains tax on this award. The plaintiff responded by seeking leave of the Court (post-judgment) to amend its statement of claim to include an award of damages for its liability to pay capital gains tax or, in the alternative, sought a declaration that if it was held liable to pay capital gains tax on the award, it was also entitled to be indemnified by the defendant for such payment. Harper J held that no capital gains tax was payable on the award, interpreting Pt IIIA as not being intended to apply to transactions which do not involve the passing of consideration. Although there was a disposal of an asset, that is, the plaintiff’s chose in action, when judgment was handed down, the amount of money which the defendant had to pay in order to eliminate the judgment debt would not have been received by the plaintiff as a result of the disposal of that debt. Therefore, it was held that, as no gain accrued to the taxpayer, no capital gains tax could be imposed on the award. In other pre-1997 cases, Australian courts have recognised the fact that both the right to sue and any actual damages awards will, unless specifically exempted, be subject to capital gains tax.3 For incomes years from 1998–1999 onwards, s 108-5(1) of the Income Tax 859

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

[33.10.580]

Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) defines a “CGT asset” as any kind of property or a legal or equitable right that is not property. These include debts and rights to enforce a contractual obligation under s 108-5(2).4 Section 118-37 provides that capital gains made from a CGT event relating to compensation or damages received from any wrong or injury or illness will be disregarded. The Goods and Services Tax5 may apply in relation to court settlements and out-of-court settlements. This will depend on whether the settlement constitutes a “taxable supply” for the purposes of s 9-5 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth). Section 9-5 of this Act specifies that a taxable supply is one the taxpayer makes for consideration, in the course or furtherance of an enterprise that the taxpayer carries on, is connected with Australia and that the taxpayer is registered or required to be registered. Damage, loss or injury, the substance of the dispute, in itself does not constitute a supply under s 9-10 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999. Most damages payouts, particularly those made in relation to personal injuries claims will not qualify.6

1 But not to defamation claims brought by corporations. See Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 118-37. See also Taxation Ruling TR 95/35, in which a very liberal interpretation was taken of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 160ZB(1) (now covered by Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, s 118-37) to the effect that “professional character” claims should be interpreted to include all personal sexual harassment, discrimination and wrongful dismissal actions, and that out-of-court settlements are also exempt from capital gains tax. Other exclusions from the operation of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, Pt IIIA are receipts from winnings, bettings, lotteries, gambling or other games of competition (s 160ZB(2)); insurance recoveries in the form of moneys received or replacement of assets under a policy of insurance (ss 160ZZK, 160ZZL) and moneys received under other policies of insurance or assurance: ss 160ZZH, 160ZZI. The provisions have now been repealed. 2 Carborundum Realty Pty Ltd v RAIA Archicentre Pty Ltd (1993) 25 ATR 192 (VSC). 3 Provan v HCL Real Estate Ltd (1992) 24 ATR 238 (NSWSC) and Tuite v Exelby (1992) 25 ATR 81 (QSC) were both breach of contract and fiduciary obligations claims concerning recovery of expected gains. In Provan v HCL Real Estate Ltd, the Court refused to make a decision on liability for capital gains tax, but in Tuite v Exelby, the Court found it probable that the Commissioner of Taxation would impose capital gains tax and adjusted the award upwards accordingly, subject to an undertaking from the plaintiff to refund the amount allowed for capital gains tax to the defendant, should the Commissioner of Taxation in fact not impose capital gains tax. See Commissioner of Taxation v Cooling (1990) 22 FCR 42; 21 ATR 13 (FC); Hepples v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 173 CLR 492; 66 ALJR 231; 22 ATR 852; Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 27 ATR 256 (FCAFC); Namol Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Pty Ltd (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 388; 27 ATR 181; Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron (1995) 95 ATC 4552 (NSWSC) (issues of general principle concerning claims for additional damages for capital gains tax liability

860

[33.10.590]

TAXATION

proximate to the breach or wrong). See also Taxation Ruling: TR 94/29. See further Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 100-25, Pt 3-1 Div 108. 5 See Revenue Law “Goods and Services Tax” [31.17.10]ff. 6 Ruling GSTR 2001/4 at [110] states that where payment made under a court order is wholly in respect of a damages claim, the payment will not be consideration for a supply. In relation to out of court settlements see, eg Ruling GSTR 2001/4 at [111] which states: “If a payment is made under an out-of-court settlement to resolve a damages claim and there is no earlier or current supply, the payment will be treated as payment of the damages claim and will not be consideration for a supply at all, regardless of whether there is an identifiable discontinuance supply under the settlement.” 4

[33.10.590] Where the award of damages is not itself taxable, taxation remains a relevant factor in two circumstances. The first case where this would occur is where the claim is for damages for a loss which would have been notionally taxable, had the plaintiff received it (eg earnings as a measure for the loss of past and/or future earning capacity in personal injury claims), and when the damages award itself clearly is not taxable. To avoid overcompensation in such cases, damages are assessed at the net amount which the plaintiff would have received after the deduction of the now notional incidence of tax.1 Second, in cases of future economic loss, an allowance should be made for the effect of tax upon the income earned by the plaintiff’s investment of the lump sum damages.2 It is difficult to assess the correct allowance, because as time goes by, the plaintiff draws ever deeper into a diminishing capital sum and the income from the fund and notional tax payable each lessen.3 In Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, the High Court held that the 3 per cent discount rate to be followed in personal injury cases includes an allowance “for tax (either actual or notional) upon income from investment of the sum awarded. No further allowance should be made for these matters”.4 That is, the discount rate (see [33.10.550]) was marginally reduced to increase the damages payable. That increase in damages is designed to offset the effects of tax on income earned on investment of the lump sum.5 Damages for the provision of voluntary care services should not be discounted by any reference to notional taxation.6

1

2

British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185; [1956] 2 WLR 41; followed by the High Court in Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772 (which overruled Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202; 52 ALJR 707; 9 ATR 142) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). Taylor v O’Connor [1971] AC 115; [1970] 2 WLR 472; Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 14–15 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203).

861

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

3

4 5

6

[33.10.590]

In Traecey v Churchill [1980] 1 NSWLR 442, the Court of Appeal attempted to lay down (by reference to the discount tables) a detailed “rule of thumb” for assessing the allowance for notional tax. Those calculations appear to have been swept aside by the approach taken to discounting by the High Court in Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632. Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Gibbs CJ at 409 (CLR). See also [33.10.550]. In Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, the decision to incorporate notional tax solely as part of a fixed discount rate was reached despite, or perhaps because of, the difficulty of reaching a clear conclusion on the impact of notional tax in any particular case. Tax scales will certainly vary in future and the rate payable may differ from plaintiff to plaintiff (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at 422–424, Mason J at 444–446 (CLR)). The justices also differed on whether the allowance is calculated by reference to notional tax on investments at the discount rate, or by reference to the tax payable on income from investments at the market rate (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at 418–421, Stephen J at 434–436, Mason J at 449–450, Brennan J at 476–478 (CLR)). However, the Court firmly concluded that the notional tax allowance is incorporated in a fixed discount rate and no other allowance is to be made on that account. For current statutory discount rates, see [33.10.550]. Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828; Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162 (CA), Kirby P and Meagher JA at 174.

[33.10.600] If required to take tax into account, the court must consider the plaintiff’s actual total taxation position at the time of judgment.1 All allowances and reliefs from taxation which have accrued over relevant tax years or would probably have accrued in the future and any probable “tax holidays” must be taken into account.2 Schemes to minimise the plaintiff’s present or future tax liability must also be evaluated.3 The lost earnings are normally treated as the top portion slice of the plaintiff’s notional income and are taxed at the relevant marginal rate applying to that top portion. Where the victim has been incapacitated for only a part of the tax year and has already paid tax at a rate which assumes uniform remuneration for the whole tax year, then the victim’s entitlement to a refund from the tax office should be taken into account in assessing the loss.4

1 Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Gibbs J at 16 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203); Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625; 55 ALJR 258; 12 ATR 256, Gibbs J at 641–643 (CLR); British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185; [1956] 2 WLR 41, Earl Jowitt at 203–204 (AC). No evidence will be admitted on prospects for possible future changes to rates of, or incidence of, taxation: British Transport Commission v Gourley, Lord Goddard at 209 (AC); McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543 (CA), Moffitt P and Samuels JA at 547–548, Hutley JA at 562. 2 Neilsen v Hempston Holdings Pty Ltd (1986) 65 ALR 302 (FCA). 3 Newman v Clements [1966] WAR 84; Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell

862

[33.10.600]

4

TAXATION

Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625; 55 ALJR 258; 12 ATR 256, Barwick CJ at 636–637, Stephen J at 661–665 (CLR). Rakena v Richardson & Co Ltd [1968] NZLR 915 (CA); Hartley v Sandholme Iron Co Ltd [1975] QB 600; [1974] 3 WLR 445.

863

FACTORS IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

864

[33.10.600]

Personal Injury Introduction [33.10.710] Damages are intended to restore the injured plaintiff to their pre-accident circumstances, as far as money can achieve that end. In practice, monetary damages can never fully undo pain and suffering and the loss of amenities of life resulting from injury. Indeed, for many serious injuries, medical treatment and rehabilitation services will fall far short of achieving a full restoration of the victim’s pre-accident physical and intellectual capacities. Nevertheless, money can give the victim a substantial degree of solace in the form of long-term financial security and permit them to purchase necessary medical and rehabilitative services and substitute pleasures to alleviate their post-accident condition.1 The full pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff is valued on a personal basis. The award is not meant to place the plaintiff in a better position than they were in prior to the accident, and the normal contingencies of life are taken into account,2 as is, indirectly, the factor of inflation.3 Where the same tortfeasor has inflicted similar harm on the plaintiff on separate occasions, it may be appropriate to assess the cumulative effect of the damage suffered and award reasonable compensation for the overall, aggregate harm inflicted on the plaintiff, rather than to make separate awards for each instance of damage.4 Compensation is not measured by the severity of the injury but by the foreseeable consequences of the injury to the particular victim in each case. Making use of “comparable verdicts” (ie awards made by other courts in similar cases) was not officially permitted except in the Australian Capital Territory,5 but this has been doubted.6 However, in reviewing a defamation damages award, the High Court approved the technique of making a general comparison between compensation verdicts in defamation and personal injury cases, in order to maintain some degree of relationship and a sense of due proportion between the scale of values applied to the two types of claim.7 The compensatory nature of such damages requires an appropriate basis, namely a basis for comparison of the victim’s state against what it would have been had the injury not occurred. Thus, for example, where a claimant would

865

[33.10.710]

PERSONAL INJURY

not have been born had the defendant not been negligent in failing to diagnose rubella in the claimant’s mother, there was no appropriate basis for compensatory damages.8

1 In a series of judgments, Murphy J stated his view that damages awards for personal injury should also meet the true “social costs” of accidents: Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Murphy J at 599 (CLR); Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Murphy J at 454 (CLR); Redding v Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117; 57 ALJR 393, Murphy J at 150 (CLR). Other commentators who have applied an economic analysis to tort damages have similarly argued that individual misvaluations of claims are not important so long as, on average, the valuations approximate the real cost of injuries to society: Calabresi G, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale University Press, 1970) Ch 9. See also, Posner RA, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed, Little Brown & Co, 1977). 2 For example, career contingencies, including promotion, retrenchment, retirement, possibilities of illness, misadventure or early death. A reduction for contingencies is usually most important in assessing future earning capacity, but may be applied to other heads of damage; and the only negative contingency generally to be disregarded is the possibility of some further tortious injury: Koeck v Persic [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-386 (ACTSCFC). 3 By the application of an appropriate discount rate: see [33.10.550]. 4 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; 67 ALJR 634, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 54–56 (CLR). 5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 99(1); Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118; 42 ALJR 237; Moran v McMahon (1985) 3 NSWLR 700 (CA). But see Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Bordiuk [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-190 (NSWCA), where Priestly JA (dissenting) at 67,804 observed that whatever appeal courts may rule, trial courts will continue to informally consult comparable verdicts. In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the mere fact that the trial judge had referred to the “top of the range” did not mean that he had necessarily consulted comparable verdicts in making his award. See also Motor Accidents Insurance Board (Tas) v Richards (1991) 14 Tas R 221 (FC); Morris v Zanki (1997) 18 WAR 260 (FC). See also Thomson J, “An Eye for an Eye: Compensating Non-Pecuniary Loss” (1993–1994) 11 Aust Bar Rev 76. In Motor Accidents Insurance Board (Tas) v Pulford [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-235 (TASSC), an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court was based (among other things) on the argument that compared to other Australian jurisdictions, general damages awards in Tasmania were too low. This argument failed to convince the Court. 6 Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Marchlewski (2000) 51 NSWLR 268; [2000] NSWCA 294. 7 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; 67 ALJR 634, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 62–64 (CLR); Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 (CA). 8 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15.

[33.10.720] Statutory provisions may limit personal injury claims for damages at common law. In all jurisdictions, civil liability statutes have imposed substantial limits on access to common law damages for personal 866

[33.10.720]

INTRODUCTION

injury.1 In addition, the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW) and Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) limit damages for non-pecuniary aspects of loss in motor accident claims to circumstances where the claimant is substantially impaired by the injury, and any damages awarded are proportioned according to the severity of the injury, making reference to a statutory ceiling set for the most severe case imaginable.2 In the Northern Territory, common law actions for transport related accidents were abolished for Northern Territory residents from 1 July 1984.3 Under s 93(2)(b) of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), common law actions can only be brought for motor vehicle claims if the victim suffers a “serious injury”, and heads of loss recoverable are subject to maximum amounts. Australia now has a patchwork of mostly no-fault based transport accident compensation, workers’ compensation, victims’ of criminal injury compensation and sporting accidents compensation schemes operating in tandem with the torts system.4

1

2

3

4

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 2; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt VB; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2. See [33.10.740]–[33.10.790] for more detailed discussion of the legislative provisions. Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), ss 79, 79A; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), ss 131 – 134; Matthews v Dean (1990) 11 MVR 455 (NSWSC). Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (NT), s 5. The legislation was introduced in stages. Between 1 July 1979 and 30 June 1984, common law damages were restricted to pain and suffering and loss of amenities. From 1 July 1984, the common law action was abolished for persons resident in the Northern Territory for three months prior to the action. Non-residents retain their common law right of action. Workers’ compensation schemes: Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth); Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth); Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW); Return to Work Act 2014 (NT); Return to Work Act 2014 (SA); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas); Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic); Workers’ Compensation (Common Law Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA). Transport accident schemes: Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW); Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW); Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (NT); Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas); Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic). Criminal injuries compensation schemes: Victims of Crime (Financial Assistance) Act 1983 (ACT); Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld); Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1976 (Tas); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA). Sporting accident schemes: Sporting Injuries Insurance Act 1978 (NSW). These schemes are discussed in more detail in Labour

867

[33.10.720]

PERSONAL INJURY

Law “Workers’ Compensation” [26.5.10]ff; Criminal Sentencing “Restitution and Compensation Orders” [12.9.10]ff.

[33.10.730] A plaintiff may recover exemplary or aggravated damages in addition to normal compensatory damages in a trespass to the person action1 except where excluded by statute.2 Where the defendant’s act represents a conscious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights or has been otherwise high-handed or malicious, the plaintiff may be entitled to exemplary damages.3 The plaintiff may also recover aggravated damages as compensation for hurt in addition to normal compensatory damages and hurt suffered by the insulting manner in which the injury was inflicted: see [33.10.180]–[33.10.220]. Both exemplary and aggravated damages may be awarded in cases of trespass involving extreme violence towards and humiliation of the plaintiff.4 Most personal injury actions are based on negligence,5 where damages have traditionally been limited to compensation for the suffering and foreseeable economic loss flowing from the injury.6

1 Trespass is based on direct and immediate interference with the person of the plaintiff: see “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 21; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 19; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 52. See also [33.10.180]–[33.10.220]. 3 Law v Wright [1935] SASR 20; Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; 61 ALJR 549. See [33.10.200]–[33.10.220]. In Australia the separate entitlement to exemplary and aggravated damages is now well established, but this is not so in New Zealand: see Attorney-General (NZ) v Niania [1994] 3 NZLR 106 (HC). 4 For example, Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412 (FC). 5 See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. 6 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 2 WLR 645, Lord Hailsham at 1076, Lord Diplock at 1131 (AC). But see the discussion of Midalco Pty Ltd v Rabenalt [1989] VR 461 (FC) and Coloca v BP Australia Ltd [1992] 2 VR 441 at [33.10.220].

Statutory Limitations [33.10.740] Legislative reforms introduced Australia-wide in 2002 to regulate the common law rules relating to negligence also regulate the damages which may be awarded for economic and non-economic loss in personal injury cases.1 There are similarities among the provisions in each jurisdiction, however the legislation in each State and Territory must be consulted closely to identify the differences which exist.

1 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 2;

868

[33.10.760]

STATUTORY LIMITATIONS

Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), Pt 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pts VA, VB, VBA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 2. See also “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.80].

[33.10.750] Legislation in every jurisdiction limits the damages available in personal injury claims for economic loss. Damages in respect of past and future economic loss due to loss of earnings or the deprivation or impairment of earning capacity is limited, often to an amount that is three times the amount of average weekly earnings at the date of the award (but see the statutes applicable to each State and Territory for details particular to that State or Territory).1 In South Australia, a prescribed maximum of $2.2 million and a prescribed minimum of $2,750 (each adjusted according to when the injury was sustained) are the limits of recovery for loss of earning capacity.2 In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Victoria, if an award of damages is to include any component, assessed as a lump sum, for future economic loss (in Tasmania, future loss), the present value of that future economic loss is to be determined by adopting a discount rate prescribed by governing regulations, or if no percentage is so prescribed, a discount rate of 5 per cent.3 In Queensland, this discount rate of 5 per cent is applied to the actuarial multiplier used to calculate the present value of future loss or gratuitous services.4 In South Australia a prescribed discount rate of 5 per cent (or any other rate fixed by regulation) is applied.5 There are no equivalent provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia.

1

2 3

4 5

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 98; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 12, 13; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 20, 21; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 54; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 26; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28F; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 11. Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 54 read with the relevant definitions in s 3. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 14; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 22; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28I. Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 57, read with Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 61(4)(b). Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 55 read with the relevant definitions in s 3.

[33.10.760] Legislative provisions regulate personal injury damages for gratuitous services (see [33.10.990]) provided for an injured claimant in most jurisdictions. In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, damages for gratuitous services1 may not be awarded unless the services are provided for at least six hours per week and for at least six months,2 and the court is satisfied as to various other matters generally concerning the need for those services.3 In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Victoria, the amount of damages that may be awarded

869

[33.10.760]

PERSONAL INJURY

must not exceed the average weekly earnings, calculated by the hour where the services are provided or are to be provided for less than 40 hours per week.4 In South Australia, damages for gratuitous services may not exceed four times the State average weekly earnings unless the court is satisfied that the gratuitous services are reasonably required by the injured person and that it would be necessary, if the services were not provided gratuitously by a parent, spouse, domestic partner or child of the injured person, to engage another person to provide the services for remuneration. In that event, the damages awarded are not to reflect a rate of remuneration for the person providing the services in excess of State average weekly earnings.5 In Western Australia, no damages are to be awarded for gratuitous services of a domestic nature or gratuitous services relating to nursing and attendance that have been or are to be provided to the claimant if such damages do not exceed $5,000, adjusted from 30 June 2003 in accordance with the Labour Price Index.6 Damages awarded must not exceed the average weekly earnings, calculated by the hour, where the services are provided or are to be provided for less than 40 hours per week.7 Specific legislation covering motor vehicle accidents in some jurisdictions also restrict the award of damages for gratuitous services.8

1 This provision is limited to gratuitous attendant care services in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Victoria, which consists of domestic or nursing services, or services aiming to relieve the effects of injury: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(1); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 18; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28B. Gratuitous services are also defined in those jurisdictions as services provided to a claimant which the claimant has not paid for or is not liable to pay for. There is no definition provided in Queensland or Tasmania. 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(3); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 23(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(1)(c); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28B(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IA(2). 3 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(2); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 23(1); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28B(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IA(1). 4 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(4), (5); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 23(3), (4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28B(3); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IB. 5 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 58. 6 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 12(3) read with ss 4, 13. 7 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 12(5) – (7). 8 See, eg Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), s 72 (recovery is restricted to services rendered for 40 hours per week and recovery can only be made where the services have been provided for more than six months, and then only for the period in excess of six months). For a full discussion of the proper application of s 72 to the assessment of damages for past voluntary care, see Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162 (CA), Kirby P and Meagher JA at 170–175, Mahoney JA at 185–186. Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 141B caps damages for claims arising from injuries sustained after 4 October 1999. Motor Accidents

870

[33.10.770]

STATUTORY LIMITATIONS

Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 141A disallows the recovery of damages for gratuitous care and treatment services for participants in the scheme set out in the Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW), see Daly v Thiering (2013) 249 CLR 381; 88 ALJR 67; [2013] HCA 45 (which decided the question with reference to Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 130A, which has been replaced by s 141A). In Tasmania, under Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s 27A, the Motor Accidents Insurance Board may make limited payments for gratuitous services. In Victoria, damages for gratuitous services are not available for motor vehicle accidents occurring after 1 January 1987 and even where there is a legal liability to pay for services, a statutory ceiling has been put on recovery: Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), ss 93(10), 174. For motor vehicle accidents prior to 1 January 1987, damages are determined by reference to average weekly earnings.

[33.10.770] Some jurisdictions have enacted statutory provisions limiting the personal injury damages for an injured claimant’s loss of capacity to provide gratuitous services to others: see [33.10.930]. In the Australian Capital Territory, s 100 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) provides that damages may be awarded for any impairment or loss of the injured claimant’s capacity to perform domestic services that they might reasonably have been expected to perform for their household but for the injury. It is further provided that in an action for the recovery of such damages, it does not matter whether: (a)

the injured person performed the domestic services for the benefit of other members of the household or solely for his or her own benefit; or

(b)

that the injured person was not paid to perform the services; or

(c)

that the injured person has not been, and will not be, obliged to pay someone else to perform the services; or

(d)

that the services have been, or are likely to be, performed (gratuitously or otherwise) by other people (whether members of the household or not).

Damages for any loss of the claimant’s capacity to provide gratuitous services to others may be awarded in New South Wales and Victoria only if the court is satisfied that: (1)

the claimant provided the services to dependants before the time (at least six months before in Victoria) that the liability in respect of which the claim is made arose; and

(2)

there is a reasonable expectation that, but for the injury to which the damages relate, the claimant would have provided the services to the claimant’s dependants for at least six hours per week and for a period of at least six consecutive months.1

The amount of damages awarded for such gratuitous services must not exceed the average weekly earnings of all employees in the relevant state.2 In New South Wales, it is expressly provided that the court must not include in any damages awarded to the claimant for non-economic loss a component that compensates the claimant for the loss of that capacity.3

871

[33.10.770]

PERSONAL INJURY

In Queensland, no damages may be awarded for gratuitous services supplied by a claimant prior to their personal injury to persons outside the claimant’s household.4

1 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15B(2) (also containing additional requirements to be proven); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28ID. 2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15B(4); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IE. 3 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15B(5)(b). 4 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(3).

[33.10.780] Personal injury damages for loss of employer superannuation contributions is limited in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania. The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded for economic loss due to the loss of employer superannuation contributions in those jurisdictions is the relevant percentage of damages payable for the deprivation or impairment of the earning capacity on which the entitlement to those contributions is based. The relevant percentage is the minimum percentage of earnings required by law to be paid as employer superannuation contributions.1

1 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15C(2); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 56(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 25(2).

[33.10.790] Legislation in most jurisdictions limits personal injury damages for non-economic loss. Non-economic loss may include pain and suffering (see [33.10.840]), loss of expectation of life (see [33.10.850]) and loss of the amenities of life: see [33.10.940]. In New South Wales, no damages may be awarded for non-economic loss unless the severity of the non-economic loss is at least 15 per cent of a most extreme case. The court first determines the severity of the claimant’s non-economic loss as a proportion of a most extreme case. The maximum amount that may be awarded for non-economic loss in a most extreme case is determined by ministerial declaration, adjusted from year to year by further declaration or by the percentage change in the amount estimated by the Australian Statistician of the average weekly total earnings of full-time adults in New South Wales over the previous four quarters. The court then uses the table provided in s 16 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) to determine the maximum amount payable in respect of the claim.1 In the Northern Territory, the maximum amount of damages a court may award for non-pecuniary loss is $350,000 or such sum as may be substituted therefore by Ministerial declaration,2 with a sliding scale to be applied in each case depending on the degree of permanent impairment sustained. In Queensland and South Australia, general damages are also awarded on a scale which depends on the severity of the injury.3 In Tasmania, no damages for non-economic loss are to be awarded if the amount of non-economic loss is assessed to be not more

872

[33.10.800]

HEADS OF LOSS

than $4,000 (adjusted for time by the Consumer Price Index).4 In Victoria, the maximum amount of damages that may be awarded to a claimant for non-economic loss is $577,050,5 adjusted by the Consumer Price Index as prescribed,6 and Pt VBA of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides a procedure by which damages for non-economic loss are to be assessed. In Western Australia, no damages for non-economic loss are to be awarded if the amount of non-economic loss is assessed to be not more than $12,000 (adjusted for time by the Labour Price Index),7 and damages awarded are limited as prescribed in s 9 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory does not specify a limit for a personal injury claim of damages for non-economic loss, however s 99 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) allows a court to refer to earlier decisions of any court for the purpose of determining the appropriate award.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 16, 17. Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 27, 28. Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 61, 62; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 52. Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 27. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28G. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28H. Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 9 read with ss 4, 10.

Heads of Loss [33.10.800] The conventional method of assessing damages for personal injury is to review each head of pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss relevant to the particular case and, after making reference to relevant contingencies, to assign an appropriate sum to each head of loss.1 The aggregate of these amounts provides a starting point for the final assessment. Any necessary upward or downward adjustments and discounting will then be made.2 Actuarial tables are used to assist in calculating the present capital value of future economic loss resulting from the reduction in the plaintiff’s annual earnings which the court considers that they will suffer for the remainder of their working life.3 Although actuarial evidence can often be of great assistance in assessing loss of earning capacity, its usefulness depends on the actuaries being asked questions carrying a sufficiently wide range of probable findings open on the evidence.4 Mathematical calculations based on actuarial materials are only one, albeit a very useful, guide to the correct award, and if the evidence provided by actuaries is inconsistent or insufficiently related to the individual case at hand, over-reliance upon it is likely to result in a serious injustice to one of the parties to the action.5 The application of the factors of remoteness to personal injury claims (in 873

[33.10.800]

PERSONAL INJURY

particular the “eggshell skull” rule) is discussed at [33.10.2070], and mitigation of loss in personal injury claims is discussed at [33.10.2140].

1 As an alternative to assigning an amount to each separate head of loss, provisional totals for pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss may be made. 2 Since judges have taken over from juries in much of the assessment of damages in Australian courts, there has been a movement towards a more detailed breakdown of damages awards. In cases tried without juries the component award is now the normal practice, and has been strongly encouraged by appellate courts: Wilson v Peisley (1975) 50 ALJR 207 (HC), Mason J at 216; Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; 51 ALJR 315, Gibbs J at 146–149 (CLR); Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 571–572 (CLR). 3 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402; 56 ALJR 59; 12 ATR 632, Mason J at 450–451 (CLR); Paul v Rendell (1981) 55 ALJR 371, Lord Diplock (for the Privy Council) at 373; White v Combridge (1984) 59 ACTR 18, Kelly J at 24–25. The jury has a right to consult actuarial tables in assessing probabilities of events occurring: Woodhead v Barrow [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-238 (VSC App Div). 4 White v Combridge (1984) 59 ACTR 18, Kelly J at 24–25. Of course, actuarial findings may be distorted if the actuary who provides the material does not have a sufficiently wide set of information from which to draw conclusions closely relevant to the instant case. 5 For example, on the circumstances of particular cases, the contingency of, for example premature death (or some other contingency) may be quite inadequately taken into account in the actuarial evidence informing the award, based upon normal mortality (or other normal) rates, and thus result in a successful appeal: Spargo v Greatorex (1992) 59 SASR 1 (FC), Mullighan J at 19–21.

[33.10.810] There are three principal categories of loss for personal injury.1 Victims may suffer: (1)

physical pain and suffering and loss of life expectancy;

(2)

destruction or diminution of an existing capacity, economic, mental or physical; or

(3)

creation of needs that would not otherwise exist.

This analysis of loss cuts across the classifications of pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss and special and general damages: see [33.10.20]–[33.10.30]. A particular advantage of the analysis is that it focuses on the plaintiff’s needs created by the accident. By viewing the loss from the angle of “needs created”, novel heads of loss may be recognised, such as the need for nursing services provided gratuitously by friends or family or the need for expert advice on post-judgment investment options: see [33.10.980]–[33.10.990]. This tripartite analysis of loss flowing from personal injury will be adhered to at [33.10.820]–[33.10.990]. It is appropriate to mention the danger of awarding compensation twice under different heads of loss.2 For example, if the plaintiff has been fully compensated

874

[33.10.820]

NATURE OF INJURY

for future board and lodging as a component of hospital expenses, this should not be disregarded when awarding damages for loss of earning capacity, as part of the notional future earnings would have been used for board and lodging which has already been compensated for under the hospital expenses head. Likewise, to the extent that damages awarded for loss of earning capacity and other heads produce freedom from economic uncertainty and the availability of funds for pleasurable activities, the loss should be compensated under the “loss of amenities” head.3

1 2

3

This tripartite analysis of loss was given in Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491; 36 ALJR 362, Windeyer J at 505 (CLR). In Queensland, the importance of not awarding compensation twice under different heads of loss has been recognised in legislation with respect to gratuitous care: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(3). Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 585 (CLR). See also Watson v Powles [1968] 1 QB 596; [1967] 3 WLR 1364 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 603 (QB); Smith v Central Asbestos Co Ltd [1972] 1 QB 244; [1971] 3 WLR 206 (CA).

Nature of Injury [33.10.820] The nature of the injury itself, its severity and kind, are important considerations in assessing damages. Personal injuries range from minor abrasions causing merely temporary pain and inconvenience to the permanent loss of eyesight or limbs or bodily function through injury to the spinal cord. The injury may temporarily or permanently affect the victim’s ability to continue their ordinary activities and may also shorten life expectancy. Facial scarring and other disfigurements and deformities normally result in substantial awards simply because of the psychological effects such injuries have on the victim, whether or not there is also a physical pain claim.1 Although the physical and psychological trauma resulting from similar or even identical injuries varies, victims of similar injuries tend to suffer very much in the same way and despite statements to the contrary,2 courts are guided by awards made in previous cases.3

1

In Ralevski v Dimovski (1986) 7 NSWLR 487 (CA), a 16-year old youth suffered extensive scarring of the face. Kirby P and Hope JA found that the trial judge had wrongly assessed damages on the basis that his injury would have been a greater embarrassment and disability if the plaintiff had been female. To make such a differential categorisation is wrong. A stereotyped image of beauty as a feminine domain is now socially impermissible as an approach to assessment. The true test must always be what effect the injury has had and will continue to have on the particular claimant. In Del Ponte v Del Ponte (1987) 11 NSWLR 498, a case

875

[33.10.820]

PERSONAL INJURY

2

3

involving a similarly severe facial injury to a baby girl, the Court of Appeal felt that it was appropriate and correct that it inspect the plaintiff’s scars, not so as to introduce new evidence, but in order to fully understand the trial transcript and decision. This puts to rest the old argument that as the trial judge has had the advantage of seeing the plaintiff, the appeal court should not intervene, having not had that opportunity. See also St Margaret’s Hospital for Women (Sydney) v McKibbin [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-130 (NSWCA) (deformed penis – psychological harm); Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Burbury (1989) 10 MVR 189 (NSWCA). Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118; 42 ALJR 237; Arthur Robinson (Grafton) Pty Ltd v Carter (1968) 122 CLR 649; 41 ALJR 327, Barwick CJ at 656 (CLR). Hirsch v Bennett [1969] SASR 493 (FC), Travers and Walters JJ at 499, more recently considered in BHP Billiton Ltd v Hamilton (2013) 117 SASR 329; [2013] SASCFC 75; Hall v Tarlinton (1978) 19 ALR 501 (FCAFC), the Court at 508–509; Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Marchlewski (2000) 51 NSWLR 268; [2000] NSWCA 294; Moran v McMahon (1985) 3 NSWLR 700.

[33.10.830] Nervous shock must be at the level of a recognisable psychiatric illness to be compensated in a tort action.1 Mere distress, disappointment and ordinary grief are not compensable, although worry causing an ulcer has been accorded compensation.2 Damages have been recoverable for an “intentional”, in the sense of objectively calculated, infliction of nervous shock since Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57; yet for many years the courts were exceedingly cautious in recognising liability for nervous shock in a negligence action, where the nervous shock was not consequent upon actual bodily injury to the plaintiff. This reluctance to recognise nervous shock as a compensable injury resulted in the creation of statutory nervous shock actions in all jurisdictions except Queensland, whereby spouses, parents and children can recover for nervous shock sustained following their exposure to the sight and sound of an accident suffered by another close family member.3 The mere fact that the plaintiff has had some history of psychiatric illness does not necessarily establish a predisposition or rebut the presumption that the plaintiff, at the time the shock was suffered, was a person (ie parent, spouse, rescuer, friend or mere bystander) of normal mental and emotional fortitude.4

1 Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40; [1970] 2 WLR 684 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 42 (QB); Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383; 45 ALJR 88, Windeyer J at 394, Walsh J at 414 (CLR); McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; [1982] 2 WLR 982, Lord Bridge at 432 (AC); Brice v Brown [1984] 1 All ER 997 (QB), Stuart-Smith J at 1005–1006; Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172 (CA); Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Brennan J at 559 (CLR). Compare with damages for disappointment and distress in contract, see Contract: General Principles “Damages” [7.9.40]–[7.9.1240]. Recovery of damages for nervous shock is essentially a liability rather than a remedies issue

876

[33.10.840]

2

3

4

PAIN AND SUFFERING

and is therefore only briefly noted: see “Mental Harm” [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1320] for more detailed discussion of liability. English courts have been more restrictive than Australian courts in allowing claims for nervous shock. For a review of the English authorities, see McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 1 (CA). Mitchell v Clancy [1960] Qd R 62. See Quayle v New South Wales [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-367 (NSWDC) where damages for nervous shock were awarded to the mother and siblings of an Aboriginal youth who died in custody after having been unlawfully arrested by the police. The plaintiffs were all found to have suffered a severe psychological grief reaction. Such damages are now governed by statutory schemes. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 36; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 30 – extended to de facto relationships by the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 25; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 53; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 73 – 75; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S. See Chiaverini v Hockey [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-223 (NSWCA) (“shock” under the statutory nervous shock claim has the same meaning as at common law). See also Handford PR, Mullany and Handford’s Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage (2nd ed, Lawbook Co., 2006) Chs 15, 16; Butler D, “Nervous Shock at Common Law and Third Party Communications: Are Australian Nervous Shock Statutes at Risk of Being Outflanked?” [1996] 4 TLJ 120. Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 58 ALJR 426, Gibbs CJ at 556 (CLR); Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501; Petrie v Dowling [1992] 1 Qd R 284; Dunning v Scheibner (unreported, NSWSC, Wood J, 13776 of 1988, 15 February 1994) (removal of tattoos caused nervous breakdowns and break-up of plaintiff’s marriage); Harrison v Suncorp Insurance & Finance (unreported, QSC, Lee J, 1579 of 1993, 12 December 1995) (damages for post-traumatic stress disorder leading to schizophrenic psychosis were reduced, as plaintiff had an existing genetic predisposition to development of a schizophrenia-related illness).

Pain and Suffering [33.10.840] Pain and suffering denote actual physical or mental pain, that is, the subjective sensation of conscious distress.1 Thus pain and suffering include both the plaintiff’s actual physical sensations of pain and the mental distress flowing from the realisation of the extent and permanency of the injury which they have suffered. Other anxieties and frustrations consequent on the injury, subsequent medical treatment, and “litigation anxiety” are also included.2 Past and prospective pain and suffering is the loss recoverable under this head. For future pain and suffering, particularly mental distress, courts must take care to avoid overlap with compensation for loss of amenities: see [33.10.940]. Where the injury has been suffered by a very young child, damages for pain and suffering should not be reduced simply because the child cannot remember or understand the experience.3 Most jurisdictions have acted to limit and regulate recovery of compensation for non-economic loss (see [33.10.780]), which will include pain and suffering,

877

[33.10.840]

PERSONAL INJURY

amenities of life (see [33.10.940]) and expectation of life: see [33.10.850].

1 In Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, the plaintiff was allowed nothing for pain and suffering because he was rendered unconscious by the collision, had remained unconscious ever since, and, on the evidence, would never regain consciousness. 2 Wickham v Treloar (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 7; 77 WN (NSW) 350 (FC); Marziale v Hathazi (1975) 13 SASR 150; Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51; Armstrong v Rudd (1978) 46 FLR 42 (FCAFC) (gross scarring causing suffering). 3 Del Ponte v Del Ponte (1987) 11 NSWLR 498 (CA), Kirby P at 502.

Expectation of Life [33.10.850] Loss of expectation of life sounds in damages.1 A purely conventional2 sum is awarded for this loss.3 Compensation under this head is for the objective value of the part of the life which has been lost.4 It is accepted that changes in money values will affect the size of the conventional sum.5 In Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, Windeyer J voiced strong objections to this head of loss: [I fail to] grasp the idea that a man’s life is a possession of his that can be valued in money. This must be for many people repugnant to opinions … held, about the meaning of life and death, duty and destiny. And for others, less attached or persuaded in their opinions, it must be unacceptable simply because life and money are essentially incommensurable. And the idea does not become more easily acceptable when the measure of the worth of life is said to be a balance of happiness over unhappiness. … For the question is not, I think, Is life a boon? – but, Are the years of life that a man expects something that belongs to him, the loss of which can be measured in money?6

Murphy J refused to recognise loss of expectation of life as a separate head of loss in Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563: I see no reason for dealing with this separately from the element of physical injury, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. … Pain and suffering includes that arising from knowledge that life is shortened. Loss of enjoyment of life includes not only the impaired (or loss [of]) enjoyment during the shortened years, but also that of the lost years. Physical injury covers breakdown, not only of some functions but the premature cessation of all functions (ie death).7

In England, awards of conventional sums for the loss of expectation of life have been abolished.8 Most Australian jurisdictions have acted to limit and regulate recovery of compensation for non-economic loss (see [33.10.780]), which will include pain

878

[33.10.850]

EXPECTATION OF LIFE

and suffering (see [33.10.840]), amenities of life (see [33.10.940]), and expectation of life.

1 2 3

4

5

6 7 8

Rose v Ford [1937] AC 826, Lord Wright at 847–848. “Conventional” in this context means “moderate”. Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480; Benham v Gambling [1941] AC 157; Yorkshire Electricity Board v Naylor [1968] AC 529; [1967] 2 WLR 1114. Although, in practice, a survey of the size of awards indicates that courts sometimes do take into account, under this head, rather than under “pain and suffering” generally (see [33.10.840]), the distress which knowledge of their shortened life brings to the plaintiff. Where historical and projected statistics are available, the projected statistics are more likely to give an accurate estimate of future life expectancy and should be used in preference to the historical statistics: Golden Eagle International Trading Pty Ltd v Zhang (2007) 81 ALJR 919; [2007] HCA 15, and more recently, Meredith v Commonwealth (No 2) (2013) 280 FLR 385; [2013] ACTSC 221. Examples of conventional sum awards for loss of expectation of life: Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563 (20 years old – quadriplegia – 20 to 40 years to live – the trial judge awarded $6,000 under this head; on appeal, Jacobs J at 590–591 (CLR) agreed with the trial award; Barwick CJ at 564–569 (CLR) would have allowed $1,250 and Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 569–590 (CLR), $2,000); Gowling v Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd (1980) 24 SASR 321 (no intellectual appreciation that lifespan curtailed – $3,500); Walker v Tugend (1981) 28 SASR 194, Legoe J at 203 ($3,000); Cull v Judd [1980] WAR 161 (FC), Lavan SPJ, Wallace and Brinsden JJ at 165 (tetraplegic – $2,000); Nominal Defendant (NSW) v Le Busque (1987) 4 MVR 544n ($4,000); Miller v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (1988) 6 MVR 531n (WASCFC) (18 years old – brain damage – 25 years reduction in lifespan – $4,000); Bruno v Davies (unreported, SASC, White J, 413 of 1982, 29 June 1988) (32 years old – brain damage – $10,000); Barrow v CSR Ltd (unreported, WASC, Rowland J, 1148, 1161 of 1987, 4 July 1988) (65 years old at trial – mesothelioma – 10-year reduction in lifespan – $4,000); Kelly v Dowell Australia Ltd [1988] Aust Torts Reports 80-184 (VSC) (affirmed in Dowell Australia Ltd v Kelly (unreported, VSCFC, O’Bryan, King and Vincent JJ, 4772 of 1987, 14 September 1988) (70 years old at trial – mesothelioma – 18 months to live – $5,000); Stairmand v Baker (unreported, NSWCA, Priestley, Clarke and Handley JJA, CA 40778 of 1991, 7 February 1992) (38 years old at trial – terminal breast cancer with 10 weeks to live – $8,000); Tille v Parkinson [1992] 2 Qd R 322 (26 years old at trial – in coma – 4 years to live – $2,000); Lindhe v Royal Childrens Hospital (Vic) (unreported, VSC, Eames J, 6064 of 1990, 28 August 1992) (3 years old at trial – severe brain damage 30 to 40 years to live – $7,000); Coulthard v CSR Ltd (unreported, WASC, Owen J, 1421 of 1992, 2 October 1992) (46 years old at trial – mesothelioma – 15 months to live – $6,000). Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, Windeyer J at 130 (CLR). Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Murphy J at 595–596. Administration of Justice Act 1982 (UK), s 1(1)(a). Only the objective loss claim was abolished. English courts, in assessing pain and suffering, are still to take into

879

[33.10.850]

PERSONAL INJURY

account “suffering caused or likely to be caused … by awareness that … expectation of life has been … reduced”: s 1(1)(b).

Earning Capacity [33.10.860] Loss of earning capacity must produce economic loss to be compensable.1 The common law approach is that assessment of this loss is not an exercise in replacing wages which were currently being earned at the time of the injury or which might be expected to be earned for the balance of the plaintiff’s working life. The task is rather to value the capital asset of the injured person, namely, their capacity to earn money.2 At common law, the loss of the chance to exploit an earning capacity is, in itself (whatever the plaintiff’s pre-accident history of indolence and antipathy to work), a thing of potential value and thus on proof of its loss is deserving of some damages, however small.3 However, legislation in every jurisdiction limits the amount which is recoverable with respect to earning capacity, often to a maximum of three times the average weekly earnings: see [33.10.740]. This legislative approach is demonstrably different to the common law approach, which treats loss of earning capacity as loss of a capital asset rather than a replacement of lost wages earned or expected to be earned.

1 Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; 35 ALJR 174, Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ at 347 (CLR); Mann v Ellbourn (1974) 8 SASR 298 (FC), Bray CJ at 305. 2 Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; 54 ALJR 295; 10 ATR 772, Barwick CJ at 7 (CLR) (not followed on other grounds in MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic (1991) 171 CLR 657; 65 ALJR 203). This case established that in assessing damages for personal injury the court must take into account the income tax which the plaintiff would have had to pay on the earnings of which the injuries had deprived the plaintiff. 3 Mann v Ellbourn (1974) 8 SASR 298, Zelling J at 300; Baird v Roberts [1977] 2 NSWLR 389 (CA), Mahoney JA at 396–398; Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 144 CLR 202; 52 ALJR 707; 9 ATR 142, Barwick CJ at 209–210 (CLR); Gillan v Brannan [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-136 (QSCFC).

[33.10.870] Damages for loss of earning capacity will be affected by factors such as the motivation and physical and mental capacity of the claimant. It is for the plaintiff to produce evidence of the real possibility of some capacity as yet unexploited at the time of the accident, which would have been exploited in the future, but for the accident.1 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a court should assume that established capacities will be used reasonably and not excessively. For example, if there is evidence of the availability of overtime and the probability of the plaintiff taking advantage of

880

[33.10.890]

EARNING CAPACITY

this, then this should be taken into account. On the other hand, the fact that the plaintiff was eager for overtime is irrelevant if no such work was or is likely to be available in their field of employment.

1

Mann v Ellbourn (1974) 8 SASR 298 (FC), Bright J at 306, giving the example of a policeman who might have had the capacity to become a lawyer; see also Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316. On the other hand, if it is the defendant who claims that the plaintiff retains the ability to perform certain work in the future, then the onus is on the defendant to establish this fact: Woodhead v Barrow [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-238 (VSC App Div).

[33.10.880] For the period between the date of the accident and the date of judgment, a calculation of loss of earning capacity can be based upon the net wages or salary, that is, the moneys which would have been received in hand by the plaintiff but for the accident. The court must also take into account award increases, holiday pay loadings and any incentive or bonus payments which the plaintiff, on the balance of probabilities, would have received.1 Contingencies to be taken into account include the possibility of time being lost owing to sickness or accident. Any conditions of the contract of employment concerning sick pay must also be taken into account.2 Interest should not be awarded on damages for loss of earnings before trial in cases where the plaintiff has received at least equivalent workers’ compensation payments during this period.3 All the unavoidable outgoings which are directly related to the realisation of earning capacity must be deducted. However, the High Court held in Wynn v Insurance Ministerial Corp (NSW) (1995) 184 CLR 485; 70 ALJR 147 that normal family domestic and child care expenses should not be deducted. This is because such expenses will inevitably be incurred whether a plaintiff exercises their earning capacity or not; therefore, they are not directly related to the realisation of that earning capacity.

1 2 3

Bosch v Liebe [1976] VR 265 (FC); Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2010) 78 NSWLR 641; 241 FLR 125; [2010] NSWCA 137. Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; 35 ALJR 174. Batchelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448; 55 ALJR 494. See [33.10.500] for further discussion of interest on damages.

[33.10.890] The calculation of future loss of earning capacity is based on the plaintiff’s pre-accident life expectancy.1 However, a deduction must be made for expenses saved on the plaintiff’s own maintenance during the “lost years”2 and for expenditure and living expenses required to enable future earnings to be earned.3 The valuation of the lost future earning capacity involves weighing up many, often imponderable, contingencies concerning the

881

[33.10.890]

PERSONAL INJURY

ability of the plaintiff to resume in the competitive work market, the same type of work they were engaged in prior to the accident, or the ability to undergo retraining for other work, and the likelihood of independently caused disabling physical or psychiatric conditions.4 For a review by the High Court of the correct principles to apply in classifying and balancing positive and negative contingencies in damages for personal injury, see Wynn v Insurance Ministerial Corp (NSW) (1995) 184 CLR 485; 70 ALJR 147.5 The plaintiff bears the onus of proving the probable diminution in their earning capacity by presenting evidence of pre-accident and post-accident remuneration possibilities.6 Evidence may be produced that the plaintiff requires a rehabilitation period of x years before any return to work can be contemplated, followed by a period of y years of partial employability. In determining the post-accident earning capacity, it is important to take into account not only the plaintiff’s residual intelligence level, but also any behavioural problems which might constitute a severe detriment to future employment prospects.7 Past income tax returns are the surest basis for assessing the plaintiff’s pre-accident earnings.8 Problems arise where the plaintiff has not fully disclosed their earnings, and where earnings have been dishonestly obtained. If the loss is clearly the incapacity to continue to engage in criminal activity, then it cannot be compensated at law.9

1 Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480; Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980] AC 136; [1978] 3 WLR 955. 2 Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480; Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 579–583 (CLR). 3 James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Roberts (1999) 47 NSWLR 425; [1999] NSWCA 314. 4 Dessent v Commonwealth (1977) 51 ALJR 482, Mason and Aickin JJ at 487. A typical discount for contingencies for future economic loss is likely to be in the range of 5 per cent to 15 per cent: Bowen v Tutte [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-043 (WASCFC); Montemaggiori v Wilson (2011) 58 MVR 497; [2011] WASCA 177; Hobell v Leonard (unreported, NSWCA, Samuels J, Priestley and Clarke JJA, 40209 of 1989, 29 May 1990). For an example of a multiple contingencies case, see Wright v Albany Shire Council [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-239 (WASCFC) (trial judge erred in failing to make adequate allowance for the contingency of future unemployment or less remunerative employment, and by assessing future loss of earning capacity over 30 years rather than the 37-year period, the correct length of working life remaining). 5 In that case, the plaintiff was forced to resign from a senior executive position with a multinational corporation as a result of a motor car accident. Considering the possibility that the plaintiff might otherwise have taken a long period of maternity leave, and with family responsibilities might not have been willing to remain in such a high-profile and demanding job, the Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the plaintiff was any less able than any other person, male or female, to successfully combine a demanding career and family responsibilities.

882

[33.10.900]

6 7 8 9

EARNING CAPACITY

Baird v Roberts [1977] 2 NSWLR 389 (CA), Mahoney JA at 397–399; Hall v Tarlinton (1978) 19 ALR 501 (FCAFC). Wade v Allsopp (1976) 136 CLR 681n; 50 ALJR 643, Stephen J at 646–647 (ALJR). Giorginis v Kastrati (1988) 49 SASR 371 (FC); Morvatjou v Moradkhani [2013] NSWCA 157. Smith’s Newspapers Ltd v Becker (1932) 47 CLR 279; Meadows v Ferguson [1961] VR 594. See [33.10.2170].

[33.10.900] In assessing the present value of the plaintiff’s future earning capacity, the courts may make use of actuarial evidence and may also be referred to industrial awards and statistical material relating to average weekly earnings.1 The court may take judicial notice of generally known facts about minimum rates of pay and conditions of work. There is also a presumption that the plaintiff would have continued in full-time employment up to the normal retirement age, although either side can seek to rebut this presumption with evidence of work patterns in a particular industry or evidence of a pre-accident intention to retire early or opportunities for old age part-time work.2 The task of establishing the value of the lost earning capacity is highly speculative, particularly for youths and young adults who have never been in the work force.3 The balancing of individual circumstances – the adverse and beneficial contingencies in each case of sickness, accidents, periods of unemployment, industrial disputes and the possibility of early death with prospects of promotions, good health and a long life – supplements the averaging tendency of actuarial evidence.4

1

2

3

4

Wade v Allsopp (1976) 136 CLR 681n; 50 ALJR 643, Stephen J at 646–648 (ALJR); Paul v Rendell (1981) 55 ALJR 371 (PC); Rosniak v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1997) 41 NSWLR 608 (CA). Although there is a presumption that retirement will occur at the normal age of 60 years for women or 65 years for men (Dykstra v Head [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-280 (NSWCA)), this may be rebutted when dealing with the contingencies of the particular case: Ascic v Westel Co-op Ltd [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-159 (WASCFC). National Instruments Pty Ltd v Gilles (1975) 49 ALJR 349, Barwick CJ at 350; Linsell v Robson [1976] 1 NSWLR 249 (CA), Hutley JA at 251; Radakovic v RG Cram & Sons Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 751 (CA), Hutley JA at 754, Samuels JA at 761, Mahoney JA at 766; Allan v Loadsman [1975] 2 NSWLR 789 (CA), Hutley JA at 791–794; Burford v Allen [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-184 (SASC). It is erroneous to always make a deduction for contingencies – regard must always be had to the facts established: Bresatz v Przibilla (1962) 108 CLR 541; 36 ALJR 212. Norris v Blake (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 49 (CA). In White v Thiess Dampier Mitsui Coal Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 97, possibility of suicide was ignored in assessing future loss of earning capacity and pain and suffering components.

883

[33.10.910]

PERSONAL INJURY

[33.10.910] Plaintiffs who were in a business partnership at the time of the injury may recover only their past proven share of lost earnings, including the cost of hiring a substitute employee. However, the assessment of damages for loss of future earning capacity requires consideration of what would have happened in the future if the injury had not been sustained. In Husher v Husher (1999) 197 CLR 138; 73 ALJR 1414; [1999] HCA 47, the High Court decided that a plaintiff whose efforts produced virtually all the profits of a partnership with his wife, which was a partnership determinable at will, could have the whole of the lost future earnings of the partnership taken into account in determining damages for his injury.1 The relevant inquiry was what the plaintiff could have done in the workplace but for the injury and what sum of money would the plaintiff have had at his disposal. Where the plaintiff was a member of a professional partnership which employed a service company to provide equipment and staff for use in the practice, money distributed by the service company to the plaintiff’s family trust was not taken into account in assessing loss of earning capacity on the basis that this was a sophisticated commercial arrangement and had nothing in common with family partnerships or trusts.2 The loss of a chance to benefit from superannuation entitlements may also be claimed.3 The calculation of loss of superannuation entitlements consequent upon personal injury will depend on the nature of the superannuation scheme in each case: for example, whether or not it is based on accumulated or defined benefits and whether or not reasonable benefits limits apply. With the introduction of compulsory superannuation, the many new superannuation options now available in the marketplace and ever-changing government policies on the taxation of superannuation, the calculation of the future value of a plaintiff’s superannuation often requires a complex actuarial and accounting estimation of all the factors affecting the probable earnings rate of the particular fund concerned over the full period from the injury to the expected date of the plaintiff’s retirement. For tax minimisation purposes, a business person may choose to establish a discretionary family trust. In Spargo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 39, the plaintiff, before his injury, had conducted his business as a sheet metal worker by way of a company which was trustee for a discretionary family trust. The plaintiff generated the whole trust income, which was distributed notionally among the family members, but was actually raised as loans in the books of the company. The total tax paid by the family members was much less than what would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had earned the same total income. The Full Court held that it was appropriate to regard the total income of the trust as the correct measure of the plaintiff’s gross earning capacity. That income was generated solely from the plaintiff’s exertions and was, therefore, the proper measure of his pre-injury earning capacity – as opposed to the much lesser sum allocated to him by the trust – and that it followed that the net earning capacity should be calculated by reference to the tax which the plaintiff would have had to pay on the total income. This case was distinguished in McGilvray v Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty

884

[33.10.910]

EARNING CAPACITY

Ltd) [2001] WASC 345 on the basis that if the plaintiff in the latter case had dissolved his partnership and earned all the income himself, he could have contributed a sum to superannuation which would have given him a tax deduction in any event. In another South Australian case, Cole v Ellis (1992) 60 SASR 481, the plaintiff had operated a prosperous business as an abalone diver in partnership with his wife. After suffering an incapacitating neck injury in a motor car accident, the subject of the action, the plaintiff, in order to continue to exploit his valuable abalone licence, hired a relief diver and then temporarily transferred his licence to another diver. It was the plaintiff’s intention to transfer the licence to his son when the son reached the age of 21, in a few years’ time. The plaintiff then settled the entire assets of the business in a discretionary family trust, the beneficiaries of which were the plaintiff, his wife, their two children and two private companies. The plaintiff and his wife were the sole shareholders in, and directors of, a company which was the trustee. There was no change in the conduct of the business, the plaintiff continuing to do all the work he was capable of – other work being carried out by substitute divers. The substitute divers were paid one-third of the gross proceeds of each catch and were required to pay one-third of expenses. The plaintiff argued that damages for loss of earning capacity should be measured on the basis of the amounts paid by the partnership and the trust to the substitute divers. The defendant argued that the correct measure was the reduction in the plaintiff’s share of the profits of the partnership or reduction in distribution of income to him from the trust. Mullighan J held that the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity was to be assessed in the same way when considering the discretionary family trust as in the case of a partnership. Thus, it was necessary to consider the nature of the partnership arrangements and the extent to which the earning capacity of the injured partner had been committed to the business. In this case, the plaintiff committed his labour to the partnership, which was effectively the sole source of income to the partnership. In these circumstances, Mullighan J held that the starting point in assessing damages for past loss of earning capacity was the total cost of replacing the plaintiff as the diver, less the amount of income tax he would have paid, and not the share of the profits from the partnership, which but for the accident, he would have received.

1

2 3

Husher v Husher (1999) 197 CLR 138; 73 ALJR 1414; [1999] HCA 47, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at 141–150 (CLR). See also the analysis of Husher v Husher by Murphy JA in Smith v Zhong (2015) 49 WAR 215; [2015] WASCA 202 at [59]–[78]. Slonim v Mizrachi Nominees Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 453; [1998] VSC 214. See, eg Jongen v CSR Ltd [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-192 (WASC).

885

[33.10.920]

PERSONAL INJURY

[33.10.920] When young children suffer total and permanent loss of earning capacity, there are two broad approaches to assessing their loss. In contemporary Australian society, it would be undesirable to attempt to assess children’s future prospects on the basis of class or ethnic background. In Settree v Roberts [1982] 1 NSWLR 649, although the child was only eight years old, the basis chosen for the assessment by the Court of Appeal was the current wage of a water board labourer.1 The second, more tenable approach is to make a social or value judgement of the case and make a just award in all the circumstances of the case, rather than purport to apply any formula or precise calculation.2

1 D’Ambrosio v De Souza Lima (1985) 60 ACTR 18, Blackburn CJ at 20–21, referring to an unreported section of Hutley JA’s judgment in Settree v Roberts [1982] 1 NSWLR 649 (CA). 2 Bullock v Miller (1987) 14 Tas R 129 (TASSC); NSW v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133.

Domestic Capacity [33.10.930] Loss of domestic capacity is relevant in cases where the plaintiff has been incapacitated by personal injury from performing unpaid work such as house cleaning, cooking and the care of children, but only where statute permits such an award.1 At common law, this loss is viewed now as a loss not suffered by the plaintiff personally but by the recipients of the services instead of being analogised as or equated with the loss of earning capacity: see [33.10.860]–[33.10.920]. In Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792,2 the High Court held that in a claim for personal injury the plaintiff was entitled to recover an amount equivalent to the commercial cost of nursing and domestic services which had been provided in the past and would be provided in the future by the family or friends of the plaintiff. In Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, Mason CJ, Brennan, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ affirmed the view of Stephen and Mason JJ in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer that the true basis of the claim was the need of the plaintiff for the services; that the plaintiff did not have to show that the need was or might be productive of financial loss; and that the plaintiff’s damages were not to be determined by reference to the actual cost to the plaintiff of having the services provided or by reference to the income forgone by the provider, but by reference to the cost of providing those services generally in the market. Some jurisdictions, whether by purported application of the rules in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer or by extension of them, or otherwise, permitted recovery of damages reflecting the impaired capacity of plaintiffs to provide domestic services to their families.

886

[33.10.930]

DOMESTIC CAPACITY

In Burnicle v Cutelli [1982] 2 NSWLR 26, the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal did not deny that the lost capacity of injured plaintiffs to assist their families was compensable, but said that, if the loss was to be compensated, compensation was to be given not as special damages but as part of general damages. In other words, it was held not to be a financial loss to be measured by the commercial value of the services now provided by another person, but rather as a non-pecuniary loss of pride and satisfaction in doing the work, and a consequent sense of frustration and inadequacy, which might sound moderately in general damages. That case was followed in Western Australia3 but not in Queensland4 or in the Federal Court (sitting on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory),5 where such loss was recognised as a personal pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. In Sturch v Willmott [1997] 2 Qd R 310, the Court stated that valuing the loss of parenting capacity should be viewed as analogous to assessing the loss of earning capacity, and should, therefore, ordinarily be measured (both for the survival period and for the period after the plaintiff’s expected death) by an objective reference to the full commercial replacement cost of caring for the plaintiff’s children, whether or not this care would in fact have been productive of financial loss for the plaintiff had she not been misdiagnosed. A bench of five members of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319; [1999] NSWCA 338 then adopted a concession by counsel that Sturch v Willmott was correct and Burnicle v Cutelli was incorrect. Sullivan v Gordon was followed in Western Australia6 and the Australian Capital Territory.7 The opposite view was taken by a majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.8 In CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 59; 3 DDCR 192; [2005] HCA 64, the High Court finally held that the rule in Sullivan v Gordon was not part of the Australian common law.9 Where a personal injury prevents a plaintiff from providing gratuitous personal or domestic services to another person, the damages recoverable cannot include an amount calculated by reference to the commercial value of the services. If it is desired to confer the rights recognised in Sullivan v Gordon on plaintiffs, the correct course is to have the problem examined by an agency of law reform, and dealt with by the legislature if the legislature thinks fit. The Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria have enacted provisions regarding the loss of capacity to provide gratuitous care: see [33.10.760].

1 2

3

CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1; 80 ALJR 59; 3 DDCR 192; [2005] HCA 64. See also [33.10.760]. See also the Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW) and the discussion of that Act and the Kerkemeyer principle in Daly v Thiering (2013) 249 CLR 381; 88 ALJR 67; [2013] HCA 45. Maiward v Doyle [1983] WAR 210 (FC). See also Daly v General Steam Navigation Co Ltd (The Dragon) [1980] 1 WLR 120 (CA).

887

[33.10.930]

PERSONAL INJURY

4 5

6 7 8 9

Sturch v Willmott [1997] 2 Qd R 310 (CA). Cummings v Canberra Theatre Trust (unreported, FCAFC, Brennan, Fisher and Mcgregor JJ, 18 June 1980), discussed and followed in Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373 (FCAFC), Kirby J at 384–385, Gallop and Morling JJ concurring. This latter case was complicated by the fact that apart from the wife’s claim for loss of her domestic capacity, the husband had also brought a separate action for loss of consortium, and the Court was concerned that there should not be double recovery. The husband provided the domestic services, and the Court based itself on the High Court’s recognition of the economic value of gratuitous services in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792. Note also the discussion of this case in Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] HCA 42 so far as it pertains to interest. Easther v Amaca Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 328; Thomas v Kula [2001] WASCA 362 (in both cases Maiward v Doyle [1983] WAR 210 (FC) was not discussed). Brown v Willington [2001] ACTSC 100. Weinert v Schmidt (2002) 84 SASR 307; [2002] SASC 340. For further commentary, see Madden B, “High Court Considers Sullivan v Gordon Damages” (2006) 44 Law Society Journal 70.

Amenities of Life [33.10.940] “Loss of the amenities of life” denotes a loss of the capacity of an injured person consciously to enjoy life to the full as, without injury, they might have done.1 A great range of possible situations may result from the injury, ranging from a near-total loss of amenities suffered by a fully conscious and mentally unimpaired quadriplegic, to the case where the actual loss of amenities is very slight,2 or where the injury has caused brain damage resulting in permanent euphoria on the one hand or total unconsciousness on the other. In Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, the High Court held that loss of amenities had both objective and subjective elements. Even where the plaintiff has been rendered permanently unconscious by the injury, a real objective loss has been suffered, for which compensation should be awarded. Windeyer J expressed the opinion that the objective loss should be only modestly compensated, and this view has generally been followed.3 The post-accident life expectancy of the plaintiff is a significant factor in deciding the appropriate award on the subjective side of loss of amenities.4 Aged plaintiffs will receive substantially less than young people suffering the same catastrophic injury, such as quadriplegia. In Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephen JJ found that where there is consciousness of the loss, an award for loss of amenities may make provision for substitute pleasures for those lost: The present plaintiff still possesses powers of enjoyment through the use of her senses; her sight, her hearing and her taste are unaffected and in place of sport, entertainment, cosmetics and clothes she may find pleasure in recorded music, in a movie projector and the hire of films, in days spent on drives in a chauffeured car, perhaps in special foods. She can thus experience pleasure and ward off melancholia

888

[33.10.940]

AMENITIES OF LIFE

by such distractions as may be to her taste and within her means. Many of her former modes of enjoyment are closed to her but some new ones remain to be explored and from which she will be capable of deriving pleasure.5

If the injury has rendered the plaintiff impotent, this may be regarded as a significant loss of amenity. In such cases, the fact that the plaintiff is unmarried should not be relevant.6 In “functional overlay” cases a plaintiff may be fully recovered from their physical injury but continue to suffer a long-term, genuine psychological condition affecting their enjoyment of life: see also [33.10.830]. Loss of amenities damages may be awarded on adequate proof of such continuing disability. Loss of amenities encompasses a very broad range of loss, and allows the courts scope for recognising novel kinds of non-pecuniary loss. Included is the loss of longstanding relationships of kindness and material support,7 the experience of sexual satisfaction and of parenthood, and the loss of the opportunity to exercise physical skills and intellectual abilities. Loss of social prestige and rank may also be compensated under loss of amenities.8 Most jurisdictions have acted to limit and regulate recovery of compensation for non-economic loss (see [33.10.780]), which will include pain and suffering (see [33.10.840]), amenities of life, and expectation of life: see [33.10.850].

1

2

3

4 5 6 7

8

Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, Taylor J at 113 (CLR). The kind of loss compensated under this head can be described as the loss of familiar activities and experiences, which may be summed up, in contemporary language as “loss of personal lifestyle”. As where a planned holiday was foregone: McCreary v Whitney (1987) 6 MVR 303 (TASSC); more recently considered in Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2010) 78 NSWLR 641; 241 FLR 125; [2010] NSWCA 137. See, eg Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, Windeyer J at 130 (CLR), followed in Hall v Fare [1973] WAR 156. But see Walker v Tugend (1981) 28 SASR 194, Legoe J at 203, a case where the plaintiff suffered severe brain injury reducing him to a vegetative state in which he was not capable of recognising his family or his present plight. Legoe J found the loss of amenities to be reasonably substantial and awarded $6,000 under this head. Clark v Kramer [1986] WAR 54 (FC). Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 578–579 (CLR) (the injury was quadriplegia). Vassilef v BGC Marine Services (NSW) Pty Ltd [1980] Qd R 21; Stewart v Andri (1994) 19 MVR 1. But see Fairhurst v Aspden [1961] QWN 14. Hines v Commonwealth [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-338 (NSWSC). The loss of support of a partner who has left the relationship as a result of the plaintiff’s injury is a particularly difficult head of loss to assess as it depends on the pre-accident strength of the relationship bond between the parties and usually a combination of material and less material aspects of support. For example, in Napaluma v Baker (1982) 29 SASR 192 an Aboriginal plaintiff received substantial damages for loss of amenities when, as a consequence of a head

889

[33.10.940]

PERSONAL INJURY

injury, he had been permanently reduced in status as a member of his tribal community, and was deprived of the opportunity to take part in ceremonies owing to his post-accident inability to keep tribal secrets and pass them on to others. See also Dixon v Davies (1982) 17 NTR 31.

Need for Treatment, Nursing and Other Services [33.10.950] Past and future expenses of medical treatment, medication, hospital and nursing costs and theatre fees are normally fully recoverable under personal injury damages.1 However, it should be noted that courts may not allow recovery of the costs of new and experimental treatments unless they are satisfied that the plaintiff will obtain a substantial benefit and amelioration of their condition.2 Cost of transport to and from hospital or other places of treatment is also recoverable. If operations will have to be carried out in the future, then a sum should be awarded which, when invested, will yield the right amounts to pay for operations as they become due. In assessing compensation under this head, the plaintiff’s well-being, reasonableness and practicality are the primary considerations.3 An institutionalised accident victim may also claim for reasonable additional costs of nursing care during home visits.4 Where there is a free or subsidised public hospital care system, the question of whether or not such care is to be assessed on an actual, nominal or no-charge basis is a matter of interpreting the relevant statutory scheme and agreements made thereunder. If the policy of the relevant legislation is that accident victims are not to be treated as entitled to free care and treatment, then the claim should be assessed on the basis of actual cost.5

1 Medical expenses must relate to diagnosis and treatment: Hines v Commonwealth [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-338 (NSWSC); Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563. If a court is not satisfied that the plaintiff has established the expenses as purely medical rather than medico-legal, the claim may be partly disallowed: Burford v Allen [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-184 (SASC). 2 Neal v CSR Ltd [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-052 (WASCFC); Smith v Day [1992] 1 Qd R 233; Field v Nominal Defendant (Qld) [1992] 2 Qd R 288; Locher v Turner [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-336 (QSC); all these are based on the statements in Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Gibbs and Stephens JJ at 573. 3 Lyons v Lyons [1981] VR 497, Gobbo J at 509–510. 4 Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Barwick CJ at 566 (CLR) (claim refused on cost/benefit analysis and on practical grounds); Beasley v Marshall (No 1) (1986) 40 SASR 544 (SC and FC). 5 Handley v Datson [1980] VR 66; (1979) 41 FLR 458 (FC); Lyons v Lyons [1981] VR 497.

890

[33.10.960]

NEED FOR TREATMENT, NURSING AND OTHER SERVICES

[33.10.960] Costs of alterations to a plaintiff’s residence and costs for care at home may be recoverable under personal injury damages. In catastrophic injury cases, the courts once routinely assessed damages on the basis of inevitable long term institutional care.1 Courts now acknowledge community attitudes against institutionalisation and in favour of independent living by victims, and their desire for reintegration, so far as is possible, back into society; they therefore find it reasonable to allow such claims. Future care costs awards made on the basis of such “live at home” or “in shared accommodation” scenarios are not necessarily smaller than those based upon institutional care.2 A commonly claimed expense is for the reasonable costs of converting the plaintiff’s house into a place where they can continue to reside. It has been argued that to avoid over-compensation, the resulting improved capital value of the house should generally be taken into account by the court making a deduction. The basic measure being the difference between the actual cost of the conversion and the increased capital value of the house.3 However, this may not be appropriate when the increased capital value only accrues upon the death of the claimant. Also, often the alterations may deteriorate over time and will require repair and maintenance at the expense of the claimant.4 In such cases, the court might rightly decide to make no deduction for increased capital value. In Southern Regional Health Board v Grimsey (1998) 8 Tas R 166,5 the plaintiff did not have an existing building to modify and was allowed the full capital cost of a purpose built house without deduction on the basis that this would not exceed the cost of modifying an existing building. Typical claims are for installation of access ramps, modifications to bathroom and toilet and air-conditioning the premises. Purchase of a wheelchair or prothesis and the cost of conversion of a vehicle are also items readily allowed.6 The cost of employing persons to provide care in the home is also allowable.7

1 2

3 4 5

Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, Barwick CJ at 566, Gibbs and Stephen JJ at 573 (CLR). See also Farr v Schultz (1988) 1 WAR 94 (FC). Wieben v Wain (1991) 13 MVR 393 (QSCFC); Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Mackie [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-053 (NSWCA) (need for special vehicle); Burford v Allen [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-184 (SASC) ($7.5 million award made on the basis that a seven-year old female victim of quadriplegia would live at home until the age of 18 years and then in shared accommodation with appropriate care); McNeilly v Imbree (2007) 47 MVR 536; [2007] NSWCA 156, Basten JA at [155] (the award should consider the relationship between the additional cost and the anticipated benefit). McNeilly v Imbree was overruled on other grounds in Imbree v McNeilly (2008) 236 CLR 510; 82 ALJR 1374; [2008] HCA 40. Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792. Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162 (CA), Kirby P and Meagher JA at 176; Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308. Southern Regional Health Board v Grimsey (1998) 8 Tas R 166 (FC); applied in Crockett v Roberts (2002) 11 Tas R 393; [2002] TASSC 73 (FC); qualified in Chadwick v Allen [2012] SADC 105.

891

[33.10.960]

PERSONAL INJURY

6

7

Thurston v Todd (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 231 (CA); Cull v Judd [1980] WAR 161 (FC); Campbell v Nangle (1985) 40 SASR 161 at 180, King CJ at 192, approved in Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis (1996) 186 CLR 49; 70 ALJR 450, Gummow J at 67. But see Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878; [1988] 3 WLR 1247 (CA) (damages for purchase of special accommodation should not be the net capital cost of the purchase but the additional annual cost over the plaintiff’s lifetime of providing that accommodation; that such annual cost was to be taken as 2 per cent of the net capital cost which, if necessarily expended, was not to be reduced by reason of any element of betterment not required to meet the plaintiff’s needs; and that in addition, damages amounting to the full capital cost of any conversion works necessary to adapt a property for the plaintiff’s needs were to be awarded, save insofar as they enhanced the value of the property). Housecroft v Burnett [1986] 1 All ER 332 (CA); Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878; [1988] 3 WLR 1247 (CA); Burford v Allan (1993) 60 SASR 428 (FC).

[33.10.970] Travelling expenses of third parties may be recoverable under personal injury damages. In Wilson v McLeay (1961) 106 CLR 523; [1961] Qd R 488; (1961) 35 ALJR 256, the plaintiff, who was a young woman of 22 years of age, sought recovery of the travelling expenses of her parents, who visited her from interstate while she was seriously ill in hospital for three months after the accident. Taylor J held that such expenses are not allowable in special damages, but that in circumstances of necessity a reasonable amount might be recovered for such expenditure in general damages. Having decided that “it was of some importance in the alleviation of her condition that she should have the comfort and assistance of her parents”,1 Taylor J allowed the plaintiff £200 of her claim of £267.50 under this head.2

1 Wilson v McLeay (1961) 106 CLR 523; [1961] Qd R 488; (1961) 35 ALJR 256, Taylor J at 528 (CLR). See also Richardson v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1; Wann v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 596. 2 In Torrent v Lancaster [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-089, the Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court allowed such expenses as special damages, using the needs based rationale of Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792. For examples of cases where the application of this test has resulted in the claim being wholly or partly disallowed, see Bresatz v Przibilla (1962) 108 CLR 541; 36 ALJR 212; Richardson v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1 (visits made while victim was unconscious).

[33.10.980] Financial management expenses may be recoverable under personal injury damages. If a plaintiff is incapable of managing the investment of a lump sum award by reason of intellectual disability or physical infirmity resulting from the accident, then it is appropriate that an amount be included in the award to cover the cost of expert financial management expenses.1 As the receipt of a large lump sum converts the plaintiff into an investor, and considering the vital necessity of investing the sum wisely and the degree of expertise required to do so, a strong case can be made on behalf of the great

892

[33.10.980]

NEED FOR TREATMENT, NURSING AND OTHER SERVICES

majority of plaintiffs who are mentally unimpaired, but who do not possess financial skills or experience, for an entitlement to financial management expenses. The contrary view is that the accident itself did not create the need for financial management services – rather, it is the award verdict which should be seen as the cause for the need for expenditure on such services.2 Although this argument merely manipulates the causation issue to contradict the basic principle of taking one’s victims as one finds them (see [33.10.2070]), it was nevertheless the view strongly affirmed in Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis (1996) 186 CLR 49; 70 ALJR 450, where the High Court held that the cost of fund management is not recoverable as damages from the defendant unless it is necessitated by disabilities resulting from the defendant’s negligence. The High Court stated that the “take the victim as found” principle only applies to the effect of the defendant’s negligence on the plaintiff’s body, mind and interests and that it must not be extended to an obvious lack of capacity of a plaintiff to manage a large lump sum award.3 In Willett v Futcher (2005) 221 CLR 627; 79 ALJR 1523; [2005] HCA 47, this was affirmed, the High Court noting that the compensatory basis required comparison with the position the plaintiff would have been in without the award of a lump sum for damages, not with the position that the plaintiff would have been in had the disabling injuries not been sustained but the plaintiff nonetheless had a lump sum to invest. That comparison is irrelevant and inapt because in the ordinary course, a person who is not injured will not have to husband a large sum of money over a long period of time in such a way as to ensure it produces an even income stream until the complete exhaustion of the fund at the end of the period.

1

2

3

Treonne Wholesale Meats Pty Ltd v Shaheen (1988) 12 NSWLR 522 (CA); Teno v Arnold [1978] 2 SCR 287; (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 609; Campbell v Nangle (1985) 40 SASR 161 at 180; Beasley v Marshall (No 2) (1985) 41 SASR 299 (Public Trustee appointed to manage award); Burford v Allen [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-184 (SASC) (physical infirmity of a seven-year old quadriplegic – the award was $7.5 million which included $230,000 for the professional management of the award by two accountants); Hines v Commonwealth [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-338 (NSWSC). See further Willett v Futcher (2005) 221 CLR 627; 79 ALJR 1523; [2005] HCA 47 (management fees of $876,506 allowed for a 59-year period); Gray v Richards (2014) 253 CLR 660; 88 ALJR 968; [2014] HCA 40 (allowed recovery of damages to pay management fees for the component of the primary damages set aside for fund management; but it did not allow the recovery of damages to manage the later income of the fund, as the discount rate assumes that such costs will be drawn directly from the income already). Treonne Wholesale Meats Pty Ltd v Shaheen (1988) 12 NSWLR 522 (CA), Clarke JA at 529–530; Fox v Commissioner for Main Roads [1988] 1 Qd R 120, Thomas J at 123; Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Rosniak (1992) 27 NSWLR 665 (CA). See Morris v Zanki (1997) 18 WAR 260 (FC).

893

[33.10.990]

PERSONAL INJURY

[33.10.990] Services provided gratuitously may be recoverable under personal injury damages, except where limited by statute: see [33.10.760]. Where the plaintiff’s injuries have made it necessary for domestic and nursing services to be rendered on a continuing basis, where the plaintiff is confined for long periods to a wheelchair or bed, it is not unusual for members of the plaintiff’s family, and sometimes close friends, to voluntarily and gratuitously provide such services. Of course, simple companionship and assistance given by a plaintiff’s close relatives and friends are not compensable, if such services are of the type which would have been expected and provided, whether or not the injuries had been suffered.1 However, other much needed nursing and care services are frequently provided. Until the decision of the High Court in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792,2 claims for the value of gratuitous services were not allowed, on the basis that if no financial loss could be shown, no indemnity could be allowed.3 In Griffıths v Kerkemeyer,4 it was established that the true loss in such cases is the existence of the plaintiff’s need for the services.5 Where the “need” created by the injury is not that of the plaintiff personally, but of another (eg for the care of the plaintiff’s children who have been deprived of their injured parent’s care), then the Griffıths v Kerkemeyer principle does not apply. However, recovery of such needs-based losses may nevertheless be allowed, subject to each claim satisfying the ordinary requirements of foreseeability, causation and proximity.6 Public gratuitous services cannot be claimed under Griffıths v Kerkemeyer.7 Private gratuitous nursing services are recoverable. In Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, the High Court held that damages for such gratuitous assistance should, as a general rule, be assessed by reference to the cost of having that service provided commercially.8 The objective market monetary value of the services is the correct measure – not the actual income foregone by the provider of the services.9 In some cases the market cost may be too high to be the reasonable value of the services. Where, for example, the cost of providing the services at a remote location is much greater than providing those services in a densely populated area, it might be necessary to discount the market cost or value of the services needed by the plaintiff on the ground that the market cost or value was unreasonable in the circumstances. In other cases, there may be so little competition to provide the services that, judged objectively, the market cost is not the reasonable value of the services. Griffıths v Kerkemeyer damages are not to be reduced on account of services which, if it can be established, probably would have been provided to the plaintiff in any event. Also, in Van Gervan v Fenton, it is made quite clear that damages are not to be reduced because, before the accident, the plaintiff elected to pay for similar services or had the benefit of having them performed gratuitously.10 It is also wrong to discount awards for the contingency that the providers of the gratuitous services might predecease the plaintiff.11 If the plaintiff enters into a binding agreement for the provision of the services, the

894

[33.10.990]

NEED FOR TREATMENT, NURSING AND OTHER SERVICES

defendant’s liability should be confined to the contractual cost of the services, unless the cost exceeds the reasonable loss of the services, on the basis that it was the defendant, and not the plaintiff, who in such a case would obtain the benefit of the bargain.12 A comprehensive description of “services”, in this context, was provided by Kirby J in Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373: (1) The services must be reasonably necessary … That is, they must go beyond the mere rearrangement of domestic chores or the tender attention to comfort that can be expected in an affectionate environment. (2) The services must be such that, but for the gratuitous and benevolent activities, it would have been necessary to secure assistance at a cost … (3) Where gratuitous services have been given, it must be considered whether they should be discounted so that they do not amount to a windfall for the wrongdoer. The plaintiff is not relieved from the general obligation to mitigate loss and to avoid unnecessary costs and extravagance. In some cases of minor residual injuries, sensible re-arrangements in the home will be reasonably expected and will relieve the wrongdoer from liability.13

A defendant’s liability to pay damages for gratuitous future care to be given to an injured plaintiff is not reduced because the defendant, rather than a third party, is likely to provide that care. Damages for past and future gratuitous services constitute a sum designed to provide for the injured plaintiff’s established needs. The identity of the person who provides the services does not affect the existence of the need or the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation for loss giving rise to the need.14 Prejudgment interest is allowable on Griffıths v Kerkemeyer damages except where excluded by statute.15 A commercial rate of interest should be allowed, but made in a way that reflects that damages compromise amounts accruing over time, not a single lump sum.16 The fact that the plaintiff is insured for the loss sustained is not relevant to a Griffıths v Kerkemeyer claim.17 Most jurisdictions have placed statutory restrictions upon the recovery of Griffıths v Kerkemeyer damages: see [33.10.750].

1 2

3

4 5

Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792; Spargo v Greatorex (1992) 59 SASR 1 (FC). See also the Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW) and the discussion of that Act and the Kerkemeyer principle in Daly v Thiering (2013) 249 CLR 381; 88 ALJR 67; [2013] HCA 45. Blundell v Musgrave (1956) 96 CLR 73, Fullagar J at 92–93. There had to be either a legal obligation or a strong moral or social obligation, which failure to meet would destroy the plaintiff’s reputation for honest dealing. Following Donnelly v Joyce [1974] QB 454; [1973] 3 WLR 514, Megaw LJ (for the Court of Appeal) at 462 (QB). In Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792, Gibbs J at 168–169

895

[33.10.990]

PERSONAL INJURY

6 7

8

(CLR), formulated the following test: if the plaintiff has need of services which are or may be productive of financial loss, then the fact that the services are and will be provided gratuitously will not be conclusive proof of the absence of financial loss. The matter should be viewed in two stages. Stage 1 involves two questions: is it reasonably necessary to provide the services, and would it be reasonably necessary to do so at cost? If the answer to both these questions is “yes”, then Stage 2 is reached and a further question is asked: is the character of the benefit which the plaintiff receives gratuitously such that it ought to be brought into account in relief of the wrongdoer? If the answer to this question is “no”, damages are recoverable. Stephen J at 170–181 and Mason J at 181–194 (CLR) delivered separate judgments in broader terms, and did not formulate a test for the operation of the new principle similar to that of Gibbs J. It is also noteworthy that Stephen J at 176 (CLR) made a reference to loss-distribution, pointing out that “the charitable friend or relative is a peculiarly inappropriate person to be saddled with any ultimate loss, being inherently unlikely to have any capacity to serve as an efficient loss distributor”. In contrast, the tortfeasor in many cases will carry liability insurance cover. In Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 329–333 (CLR) preferred the judgments of Stephen and Mason JJ to the more restrictive test of Gibbs J, pointing out that Griffıths v Kerkemeyer is based on a rejection of the established common law rule that, in an action for damages for tort, the reasonable cost of services required as the result of the tort, is a claim for special damages and can only be recovered if the plaintiff has a legal (or perhaps a moral or social) obligation to pay for them. Yet, as pointed out in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer by Stephen J at 179 (CLR), the principle laid down in Donnelly v Joyce [1974] QB 454; [1973] 3 WLR 514 (CA) “deprives of all substantive significance the distinction between special and general damages: if a plaintiff’s accident-caused need is the loss to be compensated, the reasonable cost of satisfying that need being only a means of quantifying the damages to be awarded, the distinction between these two kinds of damages becomes unreal”. Consequently, after Van Gervan v Fenton, it should now be accepted that the true basis of a Griffıths v Kerkemeyer claim is the need of the plaintiff for those services provided for them and that the plaintiff does not have to show, as Gibbs J at 168 (CLR) held, that the need “is or may be productive of financial loss”. For a reiteration of this principle, see Sturch v Willmott [1997] 2 Qd R 310 (CA), Macrossan CJ at 312–319. Waters v Mussig [1986] 1 Qd R 224; Newman v Nugent (1992) 12 WAR 119 (FC). See the discussion at [33.10.760], [33.10.930]. In Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792, Gibbs J at 169–170 (CLR) stated that where public services are involved, the wrongdoer is entitled to have the benefit of the gratuitous services because of strong grounds of public policy, based presumably on a loss-distribution rationale and on the absence of sacrifice where public benevolence is concerned. Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828; Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245; 64 ALJR 222. See Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373 (FCAFC), Kirby J at 381: “[S]ervices provided by relatives and friends may not be exactly the same as those provided by commercial agencies. The latter will also necessarily have an element of profit in their charges. On the other hand, the former may provide services in a more cost-effective, intensive and prolonged manner, thereby reducing the pain, suffering and general damages of the accident victim.” See also Davies v Tenby Borough [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 469 (CA), Scarman LJ at 479; Johnson v Kelemic [1979] FLC 90-657 (NSWCA), Mahoney JA at 78,495; Kovac v Kovac

896

[33.10.990]

9

10 11 12 13

14 15

16 17

NEED FOR TREATMENT, NURSING AND OTHER SERVICES

[1982] 1 NSWLR 656 (CA); Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] HCA 42. In Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, the High Court rejected a rule of measurement which had appeared to be emerging in several cases involving a provider who is normally a member of the workforce, and who loses remuneration by giving up employment in order to care for the plaintiff. The rule was that if such a provider incurs a smaller loss than the cost of engaging outside help at commercial rates, then the provider’s actual loss should, prima facie, be the measure of the plaintiff’s loss. The Van Gervan v Fenton decision overruled Veselinovic v Thorley [1988] 1 Qd R 191 (FC), Thomas J at 200, and reversed Van Gervan v Fenton [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-103 (TASSCFC). In the latter case, the provider gave up her job as a nursing aide to provide care for her injured husband, the plaintiff. Confirmation of the “market cost of services” as the normal rule to apply to a provision of services claim was confirmed in Marsland v Andjelic (1993) 31 NSWLR 162 (CA), Kirby P and Meagher JA at 173. Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 337, Gaudron J at 350–351 (CLR). Brittliffe v Brittliffe (1989) 8 MVR 571 (NSWCA). Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 334–335 (CLR). Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373 (FCAFC), Kirby J at 380–381. In the past, ordinary domestic household services have been less generously dealt with in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792 claims. For example, in Kovac v Kovac [1982] 1 NSWLR 656 (CA), Mahoney JA at 678–679 and Samuels JA at 668–669 held that the provision of such services must include both an element of “sacrifice”, financial or otherwise, and be beyond the normal incidents of family life. Following the decision in Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327; 66 ALJR 828, earlier decisions such as that in Kovac v Kovac; Johnson v Kelemic [1979] FLC 90-657 (NSWCA), Mahoney JA at 78,495, Maiward v Doyle [1983] WAR 210 (FC) and Carrick v Commonwealth [1983] 2 Qd R 365 (FC) should be viewed with extreme caution, as they are based on an erroneous assumption that Gibbs J’s judgment represented the ratio decidendi of Griffıths v Kerkemeyer. This has been shown to be incorrect. Gibbs J’s judgment was a dissent on the central point of principle that the plaintiff’s loss is represented solely by their need. In Van Gervan v Fenton, Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 335 (CLR) noted: “It does not seem reasonable that the defendant’s liability to pay damages should be reduced at the indirect expense of the provider by invoking notions of marital or family obligation to provide the services free of charge or at less than market rates. Yet post-Griffıths awards have been reduced on this or similar theories. [See Johnson v Kelemic; Kovac v Kovac; Carrick v Commonwealth.] Moreover, a plaintiff should be entitled to arrange their affairs in the way in which that person pleases and should not be constrained by monetary considerations from dispensing with gratuitous services and obtaining outside services if they are desired.” Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354; 71 ALJR 107. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 18(1) and Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 29 prevent payment of interest on gratuitous attendant care services. See also [33.10.500]–[33.10.540]. Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321; 74 ALJR 1247; [2000] HCA 42. Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411 (CA) (approved in Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354; 71 ALJR 107, Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ at 378–379);

897

[33.10.990]

PERSONAL INJURY

Re GDM and Protected Estates Act 1983 (NSW) [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-190 (NSWSC). See also Wann v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 596 (social security benefits); but see Gutkin v Gutkin [1983] 2 Qd R 764.

898

Loss of Reputation [33.10.1100] The tort of defamation protects the reputations of individuals and corporations,1 providing damages as the principal remedy. Damages for loss of reputation can also be recovered for other torts, including slander of goods, slander of title, injurious falsehood (see [33.10.1710]), passing off, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.2 Damages for loss of reputation are awarded for the primary purposes of consolation for the plaintiff’s loss of standing in their community and for the public vindication of the plaintiff.3 Upon proof thereof, consequential economic losses may also be recovered.4 The plaintiff’s duty to mitigate their loss is an important factor in assessing damages in defamation claims. Legislation in all jurisdictions outlines several factors affecting mitigation of damages in defamation suits, although the list provided is by no means exhaustive. The factors include the making of an apology, the publication of a correction and the recovery of damages for the same defamatory statement made in any other publication.5 Aggravated damages may be awarded for mental distress and wounded feelings suffered by the plaintiff due to republication of the libel6 or other conduct of the defendant which increases the hurt suffered by the plaintiff.7 The uniform Defamation Acts place limits on the recovery of aggravated damages for defamation by providing that damages shall not be affected by the malice or state of mind of the defendant at the time of the publication or at any other time except to the extent that malice or other state of mind affects the harm sustained by the plaintiff.8 Exemplary and punitive damages may not be awarded for defamation.9 The scope for appellate review of jury defamation damages verdicts and the social and economic policy considerations applying in this area are examined by the High Court in Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 211; 65 ALJR 314 and Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; 67 ALJR 634, by the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court in Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 402 and by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Kendell v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-272.10 In all jurisdictions, the uniform Defamation Acts require the court and not the jury to perform the task of assessment of damages. The relevant provision requires the court to “ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the relevant harm and the amount of damages awarded”.11

899

[33.10.1100]

LOSS OF REPUTATION

A maximum amount of damages that may be awarded for non-economic loss, unless an award of aggravated damages is warranted, is also specified.12

1 Orion Pet Products Pty Ltd v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Vic) Inc (2002) 120 FCR 191; [2002] FCA 860, referring to Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234; [1963] 2 WLR 1063; Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 (CA); Australian Broadcasting Corp v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510 (FC). Damages for loss of reputation are discussed fully in Communications “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff. See Taylor v Jecks (1993) 10 WAR 309 (FC) on the meaning of “defamatory words”. 2 Savill v Roberts (1698) 12 Mod 208; 88 ER 1267; Walter v Alltools Ltd (1944) 61 TLR 39 (CA). For injurious falsehood and passing off, see [33.10.2160]. There is some old authority for loss of reputation damages being awarded in trespass to goods claims: Brewer v Dew (1843) 11 M & W 625; 152 ER 955; Thurston v Charles (1905) 21 TLR 659 (KB). But see Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 (CA). See also [33.10.180]; “False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process” [33.8.1510]–[33.8.2020]; Intellectual Property “Passing Off and Related Torts” [23.7.10]ff. 3 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; 40 ALJR 124, Windeyer J at 150–152 (CLR); Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 402. 4 Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 (CA). 5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139I; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 38; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 35; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 38; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 38; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 38; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 38. Other common law factors include the defendant’s belief in the truth of their statement (Forsdike v Stone (1868) LR 3 CP 607; Gumina v Williams (No 2) (1990) 3 WAR 351 (FC)); the plaintiff’s provocation (Watts v Fraser (1835) 1 M & Rob 449; 174 ER 154); the plaintiff not having a good reputation prior to the defamatory statement (Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491); and the plaintiff’s failure or refusal to take up an offer of the defendant to respond to the published allegations: Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577. The mere fact that the same defamatory statement has been previously published by other persons is not a relevant consideration in mitigation of damages: Jensen v Clark [1982] 2 NZLR 268 (HC). 6 David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 (FC), Lush J at 527, Kaye J at 534; Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1985) 64 ACTR 1, Blackburn J at 81–84; Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 402. 7 David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 (FC), Lush J at 527 (defendant made apology in a belated, inadequate form to exacerbate the plaintiff’s sense of injury); Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 (CA), Hutley JA at 239–242; McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) (2013) 277 FLR 418; [2013] NSWSC 933; Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577. For a weighing of factors material to the award of aggravated damages, see Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 183; 107 ACTR 1; 7 BR 309, Miles CJ at 38–40 (ACTR) (not followed on other grounds in John Holland Group Pty Ltd v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2006) 204 FLR 290; [2006] ACTSC 108); Kendell v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-272 (QCA). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002

900

[33.10.1100]

(ACT), s 139G; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 36; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 33; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 36 place limits on the recovery of aggravated damages for defamation by providing that damages shall not be affected by the malice or state of mind of the defendant at the time of the publication or at any other time except to the extent that malice or other state of mind affects the harm sustained by the plaintiff. 8 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139G; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 36; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 33; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 36; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 36. 9 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139H; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 37, Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 35; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 37; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 37. 10 Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 402 (reviewed in part in Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 693 (FCA)). See also Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen (unreported, NSWCA, Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Clarke JA, CA 40079 of 1993, 13 October 1993) which, in applying the Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; 67 ALJR 634 approach, found that the amount awarded at trial was out of all proportion to harm suffered; Kendell v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-272 (QCA). 11 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139E; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 34, Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 31; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 32; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 34; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 34. 12 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 139F; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 35; Defamation Act 2006 (NT), s 32; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 35; Defamation Act 2005 (SA), s 33; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas), s 35; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic), s 35; Defamation Act 2005 (WA), s 35.

901

[33.10.1100]

LOSS OF REPUTATION

902

Survival Actions [33.10.1210] The survival of actions to the estate depends on the legislation enacted in all Australian jurisdictions.1 Subject to a few exceptions,2 these statutes defeat the ancient common law rule that a personal action dies with the person.3 The effect of the legislation is to give to the estate the action which the deceased would have had if they had survived. Thus, the estate cannot recover damages which the deceased personally could not have recovered prior to their death, such as certain superannuation benefits and insurance moneys payable only on death. For the same reason, any contributory negligence of the deceased will reduce damages in exactly the same proportions as it would have in an action brought by the deceased prior to death: see [33.10.2150]. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered in a survival action.4 The normal duty to mitigate loss as far as reasonably possible applies to the estate. Where the injured party might have taken certain steps to mitigate a loss and those steps are not equally available to representatives of the estate, the estate may be entitled to fuller compensation than the deceased would have obtained if they had survived to bring the action.5

1

2

3

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.4; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 5(1); Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(1); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 2; Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27; Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4. All of these statutes derive from the original survival of actions legislation: see Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 24 & 25 Geo 5 c 30 (UK). See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 15(2); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 5(2); Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(1); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 2(2); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(1). Defamation actions now survive the death of the defamed only in Tasmania. The Acts also expressly exclude the tort of seduction and the now redundant matrimonial torts of criminal conversation, adultery and enticement (Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 120 abolished these ancient matrimonial torts). See [33.10.2150]. The maxim is “actio personalis moritur cum persona – a personal action dies with the person”: Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; 170 ER 1033; Commissioners for Lord High Admiral (UK) v The SS Amerika [1917] AC 38, Lord Parker at 42–49; Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603; 60 WN (NSW) 90; Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172 (CA), Samuels JA at 175–184.

903

[33.10.1210]

SURVIVAL ACTIONS

4

5

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 16(2); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(2)(a)(i); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 6(a); Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(2)(b); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 3(1)(b); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(3)(a); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(2)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(2)(a). This exception is anomalous. The purpose of exemplary damages is to punish the tortfeasor and there is no good reason why the tortfeasor should not be punished simply because the victim of the tort has died. Also, the exception is anomalous because exemplary damages can be obtained in an action brought against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. See Vesey v Public Trustee (SA) [1960] SASR 71; Re Chase [1989] 1 NZLR 325 (CA). Otter v Church, Adams, Tatham & Co [1953] Ch 280; [1953] 1 WLR 156.

[33.10.1220] Losses are recoverable by the estate in the survival period (ie the period before the death of the victim of the tort). These losses are: (1)

(2)

Pecuniary losses (a)

Medical, hospital and like expenses are fully recoverable. This is true, regardless of whether or not the accounts had been fully settled prior to the victim’s death.1

(b)

The value of gratuitous services rendered to the deceased (Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792 damages (see [33.10.990])) have been characterised as economic loss, and thus held to be recoverable by the estate.2

(c)

The lost earning capacity of the deceased – the normal measure of which is the net wages or salary which would have been earned by the deceased but for the injury.3 Where the deceased dies as a result of the tortious act, the period of lost earnings prior to death is usually quite short.4 Interest is allowed, as a matter of course, on damages for loss of earnings and expenses incurred prior to death.5

Non-pecuniary losses The Queensland, South Australian and Western Australian legislation bars the recovery of any form of non-pecuniary loss by the estate.6 This absolute bar to recovery makes good sense. To permit recovery to the estate of damages for this most personal aspect of loss lacks a compensatory rationale and represents an unjust windfall. In all the other jurisdictions, recovery is barred of non-pecuniary loss only insofar as it flows from the tortious act or omission which gave rise to the estate’s cause of action: (a)

Pain and suffering: The estate may recover damages under this head in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and in cases where the death was not caused by the tortious act giving rise to the estate’s action.7 To recover damages for pain and suffering in the survival period, the

904

[33.10.1220]

estate must produce evidence of “reasonably prolonged suffering”.8 (b)

Loss of amenities: In the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Tasmania and Victoria, where recovery is permitted of non-pecuniary loss by the estate and where the death was not caused by the wrongful act giving rise to the cause of action, compensation for loss of amenities in the survival period is recoverable. In Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, the High Court held that unlike pain and suffering, which is concerned solely with the subjective sufferings of the victim, damages for loss of amenities of life contain both subjective and objective components. In a survival action, the estate may have difficulty in establishing the subjective element, that is the deceased’s sense of the loss they have suffered, but the estate may still recover for the purely objective loss of amenities even where the deceased was unconscious throughout the survival period. Damages are likely to be quite modest under this head in survival actions.

(c)

Loss of expectation of life: In the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and in cases where it can be established that the default has caused some loss of expectation of life but has not caused the death, the estate may recover damages for the deceased’s now purely notional loss of expectation of life.9 In Fitch v Hyde-Cates (1982) 150 CLR 482; 56 ALJR 270, Mason J made it clear that the loss of expectation of life contains no element of economic loss.10 This head of loss is difficult to satisfactorily justify as a separate loss, or to quantify, in actions brought by the victim in person. It is quite incongruous as a head of loss in a survival action, bringing a windfall, however modest, to the estate.

1 See Harper v Phillips [1985] WAR 100 (FC). 2 Harper v Phillips [1985] WAR 100 (FC). Because this head of loss is so intimately related to the deceased’s personal needs, recovery by the estate appears, at first glance, to be anomalous. However, as in the typical case, the persons who have provided the services and the chief beneficiaries of the estate will be identical, the fundamental compensatory aim of the law is generally satisfied. Rather than adopting a simplistic pecuniary/non-pecuniary classificatory approach to the Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792 head of loss (see [33.10.990]), it would be better if courts investigated the full circumstances of the provision of care in each case. 3 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 54(2) limits earnings recoverable to three times the average weekly earnings per week when making a dependency claim. See also [33.10.860]–[33.10.920]. 4 Jackson v Stothard [1973] 1 NSWLR 292, Sheppard J at 297, 299. 5 Harper v Phillips [1985] WAR 100 (FC). See also [33.10.500]–[33.10.540].

905

[33.10.1220]

SURVIVAL ACTIONS

6

Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(2)(a); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 3(1)(a)(i) – (iii); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(2)(d). 7 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 16(3)(b)(i); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(2)(d); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 6(c)(ii); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(3)(c)(ii); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(2)(c)(ii). 8 Bishop v Cunard White Star Co Ltd (The Queen Mary) [1950] P 240, Hodson J at 247. 9 For example, if the deceased had a life expectancy of 30 years at the time of the actionable default and the medical evidence is clear that this expectancy had been reduced by 50 per cent as the result of the tort, and then during this residual period of 15 years, the deceased died of some independent cause, then the claim for damages for loss of expectation of life would survive to the estate. 10 Fitch v Hyde-Cates (1982) 150 CLR 482; 56 ALJR 270, Mason J at 495 (CLR); Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; 39 ALJR 480, Taylor J at 114 (CLR).

[33.10.1230] Losses recoverable by the estate for the period after death include pecuniary losses only. It clearly offends the compensatory principle to permit the estate to recover for any post-death and thus entirely notional, non-pecuniary aspects of loss. In all jurisdictions, the survival of actions statutes give a right to the estate to recover reasonable funeral expenses for the deceased. This is the only entirely new head of loss expressly given to the estate by statute and not derived (and permitted to survive) from the deceased’s own rightful claim prior to death. Funeral expenses may also be recovered in the dependants’ action in all jurisdictions except Victoria and Queensland. In these two States, funeral expenses are only recoverable by the estate in a survival action. Post-death loss of earning capacity is not recoverable by the estate: see [33.10.860]–[33.10.920]. This is now clearly established by amendments to all the survival of actions statutes.1 In consequence, there is no longer any danger of the tortfeasor having to meet two separate claims for compensation brought by the dependants, and by the estate, for what is the same post-death loss of earning capacity. This rule also means that, apart from recovering funeral expenses, unless there is a significant survival period in which loss may be sustained and claimed, there is no longer any practical purpose in bringing a survival action. The estate can recover only what the deceased could have recovered in their personal action. As an annuity ceases with death, damages for its cessation ought not to be recoverable by the estate.2

1 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 16(3)(b)(ii); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 2(2)(a)(ii); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)

906

[33.10.1240]

2

Act 1956 (NT), s 6(c)(iii); Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66(2)(d)(ii); Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA), s 3(1)(a)(iv); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27(3)(c)(iii); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 29(2)(c)(iii); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4(2)(e). There was a period of uncertainty on the issue of recovery of prospective pecuniary loss in survival actions and the provisions above were enacted to annul the effect of the decision of the High Court in Fitch v Hyde-Cates (1982) 150 CLR 482; 56 ALJR 270 (which followed the House of Lords in Gammell v Wilson [1982] AC 27; [1981] 2 WLR 248). Both these cases had decided that the survival of actions legislation permitted the estate to maintain an action for damages to recover a sum representing the deceased’s earning capacity in the “lost years”. But see Gammell v Wilson [1982] AC 27; [1981] 2 WLR 248, Lord Scarman at 76–77 (AC); Fitch v Hyde-Cates (1982) 150 CLR 482; 56 ALJR 270, Mason J at 491 (CLR). The underlying rationale of these two cases may have been abrogated by the amendments to the survival of actions legislation as it relates to the deceased’s loss of earning capacity.

[33.10.1240] Where dependants of the deceased bring a “Lord Campbell’s Act action” for the loss of economic support,1 an allowance should be made in the assessment of damages for the possibility of a survival action being brought in future by the estate. Equally, damages already awarded to the estate in a survival action must be set-off against dependants’ action claims, as necessary, to preclude the possibility of duplication of damages. In practice both the survival action and the dependants’ action are normally brought jointly. Damages are not affected by the contingency that the surviving spouse will remarry, whether as a separate deduction, or as an item added to the amount otherwise judged to be an appropriate deduction for the vicissitudes of life.2

1

2

All Australian States and Territories have (with variations) re-enacted the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (Lord Campbell’s Act) 9 & 10 Vict c 93 (UK): see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 3.1; Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT); Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), Pt 10; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), Pt 5; Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt III; Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA). De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338; 77 ALJR 99; [2002] HCA 52; McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543.

907

[33.10.1240]

SURVIVAL ACTIONS

908

Interests in Property Land [33.10.1350] The law protects a range of interests in land. Remaindermen and reversioners will be concerned about the physical integrity of land, a landlord about its earning capacity, a person in possession about the exclusiveness of that possession and the occupier about its freedom from invasion by noise and odours.1 Where the plaintiff has less than a full title to land, the damages recoverable should reflect their limited interest.2

1

2

See “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff; “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. For a general analysis of environmental issues, see 14 Environment and Resources. See, eg Grosvenor Hotel Co v Hamilton [1894] 2 QB 836 (CA) (where a leased building is damaged, the tenant may recover the value of the lease plus consequential losses, such as the cost of removal); Rust v Victoria Graving Dock Co (1887) 36 Ch D 113, Cotton LJ at 133, 137 (where the sole interest in land is as security against a loan, recovery is possible only to the extent that the damage affects the security of the loan); Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council [1925] 2 KB 750 (a reversioner must show that the reversion has been damaged, and may recover only to the value of the reversion); Taylor v Auto Trade Supply Ltd [1972] NZLR 102 (SC) and Masters v Brent London Borough Council [1978] QB 841; [1978] 2 WLR 768 (if a property has successive owners and is affected by a continuing nuisance, each owner may recover for the damage sustained during their ownership).

[33.10.1360] Principles of assessment of loss for physical damage to land, buildings and other fixtures generally vary with the kind of loss rather than the cause of action.1 Recovery of damages for physical damage to land may be based on a range of different torts: trespass,2 nuisance,3 negligence,4 the escape from the defendant’s land onto the plaintiff’s land of something likely to do mischief,5 or interference with riparian rights or an easement.6 Physical damage to land,7 buildings and other fixtures may be caused by vibrations, impacts,

909

[33.10.1360]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

floods, fire or simple neglect.8 Land may also be undermined.9 Judicial remedies for such damage are an injunction or damages. Non-judicial remedies, such as abatement for nuisance, may also be available.

1 In many cases, plaintiffs sue on several causes of action based on the same set of facts. Some differences in methods of assessment between the various torts do exist. The remoteness rule in trespass may differ from other torts (see [33.10.2110]), aggravated and exemplary damages may not be available for mere negligence (see [33.10.210]). Also, damage is the gist of the action in some torts but not in others, giving rise to the possibility of nominal damages only in the latter cases: see [33.10.230]. The damage required in private nuisance before it is actionable is less than that in negligence, as mere annoyance and inconvenience are a sufficient basis for action. Damages for public nuisance are recoverable only after the plaintiff establishes that their loss is greater than that suffered by the general public. 2 See “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. 3 See “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. 4 See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff. 5 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. In Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, the High Court has finally “absorbed” the old separate Rylands v Fletcher tort into the general law of negligence. The absolute liability of Rylands v Fletcher has been found to be no longer part of Australian common law. See also, to similar effect, the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53. 6 See Real Property “Easements” [28.13.10]ff. 7 Land itself is permanent and cannot be wholly, physically destroyed. However, misuse of land can cause virtual total destruction of its economic value, eg by severe erosion of the topsoil or the inducement of salination. 8 See, eg Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 (CA) (vibrations); Hutchison v Davidson [1945] SC 395 (fire); Hole & Son (Sayers Common) Ltd v Harrisons of Thurnscoe Ltd [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345 (QB) (neglect of land); Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall (No 2) [1973] 2 NZLR 45 (SC) (professional negligence resulting in damage to building); Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240 (solicitor’s negligence in failing to take reasonable steps to locate executor and beneficiary of estate resulted in deterioration of estate property). 9 See, eg Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36 (CA).

[33.10.1370] There are two alternative measures for the assessment of compensatory damages for physical damage or destruction of land and fixtures. These are: (1)

the cost of repair or full reinstatement of the property;1 and

(2)

compensation for diminution in the value of the land and fixtures caused by the damage.2

In some rare instances, the cost of repair will coincide with the diminished value measure.3 Usually, the cost of repair will be substantially greater than the 910

[33.10.1380]

LAND

diminished value. Choice between the two measures depends on which measure will give best effect to the overriding principle of compensation in the particular case.4

1

2

3

4

Hollebone v Midhurst & Fernhurst Builders Ltd [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 38 (QB); Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198 (CA); Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36 (CA); Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224 (CA) (overruled on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3). Reinstatement may extend in extreme circumstances to compensation for the full cost of purchasing alternative equivalent premises to those destroyed: Dominion Mosaics & Tile Co Ltd v Trafalgar Trucking Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 246 (CA). Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 (KB); Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374; Rentokil Pty Ltd v Channon (1990) 19 NSWLR 417 (CA). See, eg Cox v Mayor of Essendon (1894) 16 ALT 7 (VSC); Hutchison v Davidson [1945] SC 395. In Ward v Cannock Chase District Council [1986] Ch 546; [1986] 2 WLR 660, Scott J at 577–578 (Ch) rejected the cost of the plaintiff purchasing a closely equivalent property as being too amorphous. Hutchison v Davidson [1945] SC 395, Lord Russell at 405, 408, Lord Moncrieff at 410, Lord Normand at 413; Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36 (CA), Samuels JA at 39; Bilambil-Terranora Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465; (1980) 52 LGRA 1 (CA), Samuels JA at 482 (NSWLR); Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245 (FC), McPherson J at 258; Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49 (NSWSC). There may once have been a prima facie general measure of loss rule based on diminution of value of the land: Jones v Gooday (1841) 8 M & W 146; 151 ER 985. This is no longer good law: McGregor H, McGregor on Damages (17th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at [34-003]–[34-020].

[33.10.1380] The diminished value measure (see [33.10.1370]) should apply if the cost of full reinstatement is out of all proportion to the value of the property before the tort. For example, in Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489, only the value of the wooden house destroyed by fire was awarded, because local regulations required rebuilding to be in brick, at much greater cost.1 However, where the building is a residential dwelling, the current strong trend is normally to allow the plaintiff the cost of reinstatement.2 The fact that there is not a precise measure of the cost of repairs to the residence available to the court, is no bar to the court awarding damages of a reasonable sum to remedy the defects.3 If the property is held solely as a financial investment or economic asset, the diminished value will usually be the appropriate measure.4 Where, however, the plaintiff is carrying on a business in the building, reinstatement costs may be

911

[33.10.1380]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

allowed,5 or the cost of purchasing suitable alternative premises, where this is considerably lower than reinstatement costs and can thus be seen as mitigating damages.6 Where the plaintiff, as investor, intended to demolish the building which has been destroyed, and the tortfeasor’s act has saved them the trouble of doing so, only the expenses incurred in removing debris and making the site safe, plus compensation for loss of trade fixtures, should be recoverable.7 Likewise, if the buildings added no value to the land on which they stood, and the plaintiff sells the damaged building without reinstatement, then all that can be recovered is the lost rental between the time of the tortious act and the sale to the third party plus any incidental expenses incurred by the plaintiff.8 If, owing to the tort, the plaintiff has been placed in a financial situation where they are unable to mitigate the loss by purchasing another property, then the diminution of value measure should be applied at the values pertaining at the date of judgment.9

1 Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 (KB). 2 Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36 (CA); Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224 (CA) (overruled on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3). See also [33.10.1400]. But see Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374. 3 Hamlin v Bruce Stirling Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 374 (HC), Williamson J at 384. 4 Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council [1925] 2 KB 750; CR Taylor (Wholesale) Ltd v Hepworths Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 659 (QB); Leppard v Excess Insurance Co Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 512 (CA); Pantalone v Alaouie (1989) 18 NSWLR 119; Hansen v Gloucester Developments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 14 (FC). See also Ogus AI, The Law of Damages (Butt, 1973) pp 164–165. 5 Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198 (CA) – a contract case, but the same reasoning should apply in tort, ie that although reinstatement usually results in a structure more valuable than the old one there should be no discount applied on a “new for old” basis. To make such a reduction would be to force the plaintiff to modernise. In Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd there was no question of betterment. The reinstated factory had the same capacity as the one destroyed. But see Westwood v Cordwell [1983] 1 Qd R 276. 6 Dominion Mosaics & Tile Co Ltd v Trafalgar Trucking Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 246 (CA) (the loss of value of the premises was a mere £60,000 compared with £390,000 as the cost of replacement premises). 7 Hole & Son (Sayers Common) Ltd v Harrisons of Thurnscoe Ltd [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345 (QB); CR Taylor (Wholesale) Ltd v Hepworths Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 659 (QB). 8 Fish Steam Laundry Pty Ltd v Col Johnson Electrics Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 585. 9 Rentokil Pty Ltd v Channon (1990) 19 NSWLR 417 (CA).

912

[33.10.1390]

LAND

[33.10.1390] Before reinstatement damages (see [33.10.1370]) are awarded, the court should be satisfied that the plaintiff’s desire to repair the property is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. In Hollebone v Midhurst & Fernhurst Builders Ltd [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 38, the Queen’s Bench considered the unique quality of the house which had been destroyed and continuity of the plaintiff’s social position to be relevant factors in deciding in favour of the reinstatement measure.1 The fact that no reasonable alternative building is available is also a weighty factor.2 It is clear that Australian courts now lean strongly towards full reinstatement damages where the damaged or destroyed property was the residence of the plaintiff.3 In Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224, Kirby P and McHugh JA interpreted the principle of restoring plaintiffs to their original position to normally require the award of reinstatement damages in cases where the property destroyed is the family home.4 Where damages based on repair costs are awarded in land cases, no deduction is made for betterment through the replacement of new for old.5 To make such a deduction would be to force the plaintiffs to invest in new buildings.6 The apposite date for assessment of reinstatement damages is not fixed. It will depend on whether any delays in repairing the building were reasonable. Additional costs due to reasonable delays are fully recoverable.7 The longstanding rule in The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, that loss caused by the plaintiff’s impecuniosity is not recoverable, was departed from in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64.

1

2

3

In this case the repair cost was £19,000 and the diminished value £15,000. The plaintiff was a pillar of English county society and would have had to move some distance to find an equivalent mansion. At the other end of the social scale, an Irish working man was awarded damages to fully repair a property so that he, his wife and eight children might continue to satisfy their hankering for rural life by keeping goats, horses and a large quantity of rustic junk on one and a half acres in an otherwise residential urban area: Ward v Cannock Chase District Council [1986] Ch 546; [1986] 2 WLR 660. Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198 (CA). This was a contract case. The building destroyed was a factory. Rebuilding was the only way in which the plaintiff could carry on its business and retain its labour force. The plaintiff was also obliged to mitigate its loss by returning to production as soon as possible. Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36 (CA) (in this case the loss in value was nil since the site was part of a redevelopment zone); Carosella v Ginos & Gilbert Pty Ltd (1982) 57 ALJR 315 (HCA); Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224 (CA) (overruled on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3). But see Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374; Philips v Ward [1956] 1 WLR 471 (CA). 913

[33.10.1390]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

4

5

6 7

This, despite the fact that the cottage in question was just a typical suburban dwelling of its era and class in that area of western Sydney. “[The plaintiff] wants a home, not a sum of money. A sum equivalent to the value of her home will not give her a home”: Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224 (CA), McHugh JA at 335 (NSWLR) (overruled on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3). Hollebone v Midhurst & Fernhurst Builders Ltd [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 38 (QB), Norman Richards QC at 41; Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198 (CA), Lord Denning at 468, Widgery LJ at 473, Cross LJ at 476 (QB). But see Bushells Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1948] St R Qd 79 (FC); Westwood v Cordwell [1983] 1 Qd R 276. See also Ogus AI, The Law of Damages (Butt, 1973) p 134. Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198, Widgery LJ at 473 (QB). Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall (No 2) [1973] 2 NZLR 45 (SC), Beattie J at 70–72; Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 (CA); Wollongong City Council v Fregnan [1982] 1 NSWLR 244; (1982) 46 LGRA 391 (CA). But see Philips v Ward [1956] 1 WLR 471 (CA), Denning LJ at 473.

[33.10.1400] Consequential financial loss flowing from damage to or destruction of land and fixtures may be recovered. For example, fees paid to professional advisers,1 loss of profits,2 loss of rent,3 disruption of business,4 damage to chattels,5 the cost of moving from one building to another,6 replanting a garden7 or fighting a fire.8 Moneys spent in reasonable mitigation or prevention of further loss are also recoverable.9

1 Jones v Shire of Perth [1971] WAR 56; (1970) 23 LGRA 374, as referred to in Winky Pop Pty Ltd v Mobil Refining Australia Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 348; Taylor v Auto Trade Supply Ltd [1972] NZLR 102 (SC). 2 Cox v Mayor of Essendon (1894) 16 ALT 7 (VSC); British Celanese Ltd v AH Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 959 (QB); Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall (No 2) [1973] 2 NZLR 45 (SC); Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corp [1976] 2 NZLR 729 (SC). 3 Rust v Victoria Graving Dock Co (1887) 36 Ch D 113 (CA); Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 (KB); Taylor v Auto Trade Supply Ltd [1972] NZLR 102 (SC); Hole & Son (Sayers Common) Ltd v Harrisons of Thurnscoe Ltd [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345 (QB). 4 Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corp [1976] 2 NZLR 729 (SC); Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 (CA). 5 British Celanese Ltd v AH Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 959 (QB); Hogan v AG Wright Pty Ltd [1963] Tas SR 44. 6 Philips v Ward [1956] 1 WLR 471 (CA); Grosvenor Hotel Co v Hamilton [1894] 2 QB 836 (CA); Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 35042 (2006) 12 BPR 23,673; [2006] NSWSC 1157. 7 Jeffrey v Weeding [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-032 (TASSC). 8 New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v O’Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80 (SC); Hazelwood v Webber (1934) 52 CLR 268; 35 SR (NSW) 140; 52 WN (NSW) 53.

914

[33.10.1420]

9

LAND

New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v O’Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80 (SC); Jeffrey v Weeding [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-032 (TASSC).

[33.10.1410] Distress, worry, vexation and physical inconvenience caused by the damage and destruction to land and fixtures may be recoverable.1 In nuisance,2 damages are recoverable for annoyance, inconvenience or discomfort whether or not physical damage has been caused to the plaintiff’s property. Reasonableness and moderation are the guiding notions in assessing these non-pecuniary kinds of loss.3

1

2 3

Gabolinscy v Hamilton City Corp [1975] 1 NZLR 150 (SC); Perry v Sidney Phillips & Son [1982] 1 WLR 1297 (CA), Lord Denning at 1302; Clarke v Gisborne Shire Council [1984] VR 971; (1984) 57 LGRA 135; Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501; 68 LGRA 27 (CA) (damages for stress and nervous breakdown associated with living in badly defective house); Mouat v Clark Boyce [1992] 2 NZLR 559 (CA); Hamlin v Bruce Stirling Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 374 (HC), Williamson J at 384. See “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. Bone v Seale [1975] 1 WLR 797 (CA), Stephenson LJ at 803 (£1,000 awarded for intermittent odours emanating from a pig farm over 12.5 years); Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654 ($500 awarded for serious domestic noise over one year); De Jager v Payneham & Magill Lodges Hall Inc (1984) 36 SASR 498 (FC) ($1,500 awarded for repetitious playing of amplified music). Of course, substantially larger sums could be awarded upon proof of actual ill-health caused by the nuisance.

[33.10.1420] Where specific recovery (the primary remedy for wrongful occupation of land) is not possible, damages are recoverable. If land owners cannot recover the land itself, for example, because the title has passed to a third party, damages can be awarded to compensate for permanent deprivation. Damages are assessed on the basis of the value or sale price of the lost premises.1 Damages for temporary wrongful occupation are normally limited to compensation for the period of that wrongful occupation.2 Such damages, for occupation and use for a limited period, are termed “mesne profits”.3 As the action is based in trespass, the same principles of assessment are used whether the plaintiff had possession or a mere right to possession. The occupation value is assessed on the basis of the plaintiff’s loss.4 Usually, this will be the objective rental value of the land.5 However, the plaintiff need not show that the land would or could have been let during the period of wrongful occupation.6 Consequential damages may also be awarded in addition to damages for use of the property. For example, damages for materials of the plaintiff used by the defendant during the period of wrongful occupation;7 for interest on a sum

915

[33.10.1420]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

offered to a plaintiff by a third party as a bonus on a new tenancy;8 and for diminution in the value of the land (or its repair cost) where the land was damaged.9 No deductions are made from the damages for the value of buildings or other improvements constructed by the defendant, unless the plaintiff encouraged or approved of these works. The plaintiff is not obliged to pay for unwanted “improvements”.10

1 Spencer v Registrar of Titles (1910) 103 LT 647 (PC). 2 Formerly, a person with a right to immediate possession, but who was actually out of possession, was unable to sue for compensation until possession was regained: Minister of State for Interior v RT Co Pty Ltd (1962) 107 CLR 1; 36 ALJR 61, Taylor J at 6 (CLR). The reason was that trespass is available only to those with possession. However, when ejectment proceedings were taken and possession recovered, the plaintiff was then able to sue for all the acts of trespass during the period of dispossession. This principle was based on trespass by relation. See Lee v Blakeney (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 141; 3 WN (NSW) 119 (FC); Nilan v Nilan (1951) 68 WN (NSW) 271 (FC); Minister of State for Interior v RT Co Pty Ltd, Taylor J at 5 (CLR). By statute, it is now possible to take simultaneous actions for the recovery of land and for compensation in some jurisdictions: Landlord and Tenant Act 1899 (NSW), s 12 (in tenancy cases); Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r 350; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), r 21.03. 3 Lee v Blakeney (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 141; 3 WN (NSW) 119 (FC), Darley CJ at 145 (LR (NSW)); Lollis v Loulatzis [2007] VSC 547. 4 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 (CA). It has been suggested that the value of the property to the defendant is a relevant consideration: Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285 (CA). 5 Hall & Co Ltd v Pearlberg [1956] 1 WLR 244 (QB); but see McArthur & Co v Cornwall [1892] AC 75 (PC), where on the special facts of the case, damages were assessed on the basis of the annual net profit of the estate. 6 Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285 (CA). See Inverugie Investments Ltd v Hackett [1995] 1 WLR 713 (PC) discussed in Watts P, “Restitutionary Damages for Trespass” (1995) 112 LQR 39. 7 Bilambil-Terranora Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465; (1980) 52 LGRA 1 (CA); Hall & Co Ltd v Pearlberg [1956] 1 WLR 244 (QB). 8 Lee v Blakeney (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 141; 3 WN (NSW) 119 (FC). 9 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal & Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 (CA); Hall & Co Ltd v Pearlberg [1956] 1 WLR 244 (QB); Tai Te Whetu v Scandlyn [1952] NZLR 30 (SC). 10 Tai Te Whetu v Scandlyn [1952] NZLR 30 (SC), based substantially on Lord Cawdor v Lewis (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 427; 160 ER 174. This principle was criticised in Roy v Lagona [2010] VSC 250.

[33.10.1430] Damages are recoverable for property permanently lost. For example, an easement involving the exclusive use of a right of way or if the loss has resulted from the breach of a restrictive covenant.1 In such cases, the value of the interest is assessed at the proper and fair price which should be payable 916

[33.10.1460]

GOODS

for the defendant’s acquisition of the particular right in question.2 A fair percentage of the profit to be obtained by the defendant from the development has been the favoured measure of loss adopted in England. What is a fair percentage will vary with the degree of interference and the nature of the plaintiff’s affected interest.3

1 2

3

See Real Property “Easements” [28.13.10]ff; “Restrictive Covenants” [28.14.10]ff. Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408; [1975] 2 WLR 282; Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (CHD); Carr-Saunders v Dick McNeil Associates Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 922 (CHD); Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA). See, eg Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408; [1975] 2 WLR 282, Graham J at 419–420 (Ch) (40 per cent of profit); Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (CHD) (5 per cent of profit).

[33.10.1440] Nominal damages may be awarded if the plaintiff has an action in trespass but cannot prove damage: see [33.10.230]. In the past, nominal damages have been used to establish title. The appropriate modern remedy is a declaration or an action for possession of the land. [33.10.1450] Exemplary and aggravated damages may be awarded if the wrongful occupation was both a conscious and contumelious action: see [33.10.180]–[33.10.200]. For example, a landlord who forcibly evicts a tenant, where there has been no breach of the lease and without a bona fide claim of right, may be liable to pay such damages.

Goods Tortious Damage to Goods [33.10.1460] For tortious damage to goods and chattels, the normal measure of compensation is the amount by which their value is reduced because of the damage.1 That amount is usually calculated by adding the cost of repair to any residual diminution in value which may exist after the repair. There may also be consequential losses, such as the cost of hiring another chattel during the repair period.2 If an ordinary chattel is so badly damaged that the cost of repair exceeds its undamaged value, the normal measure used is its replacement cost. Thus, the owner of a motor car is expected to purchase an equivalent substitute vehicle if the repair cost exceeds the car’s value, even if the damaged car was in excellent condition until the accident.3

917

[33.10.1460]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

Where the defendant has improved the plaintiff’s chattel and then sold it, damages for conversion are based on the pre-improvement value of the chattel, even though the defendant knew they had no right either to make the improvement or to sell the chattel.4 Further, restitution of the chattel to the plaintiff, whether the claim is advanced in detinue,5 or on a restitutionary action,6 will not be ordered unless the plaintiff compensates the defendant for improvements to the chattel.7 Damage to rare or unusual chattels, for which substitutes are not readily available, may justify damages being assessed on the measure of repair and reinstatement.8 In making such an award, the court must be satisfied that it is reasonable, in all the circumstances and given the essential qualities of the particular chattel, for the plaintiff to have the chattel repaired.9

1 Many of the leading cases on tortious damage to chattels concern shipping collisions. While compensation for damage to or destruction of an ocean-going ship is usually more complicated than cases involving damage to common goods such as motor cars, the same principles apply to all chattels. For examples, see The SS Gracie v The SS Argentino (1889) 14 App Cas 519, Lord Herschell at 522; Admiralty Commissioners v The SS Susquehanna [1926] AC 655, Viscount Dunedin at 661; Performance Cars Ltd v Abraham [1962] 1 QB 33; [1961] 3 WLR 749 (CA), Lord Evershed MR at 40 (QB); Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 (CA), Harman LJ at 1071. 2 O’Grady v Westminster Scaffolding Ltd [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238 (QB), Edmund Davies J at 239; Lagden v O’Connor [2003] 1 All ER 277; [2003] UKHL 64. 3 Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 (CA); Jansen v Dewhurst [1969] VR 421; Murphy v Brown (1985) 1 NSWLR 131. 4 Munro v Willmott [1949] 1 KB 295. 5 McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303. 6 Nash v Barnes [1922] NZLR 303 (SC); Greenwood v Bennett [1973] QB 195; [1972] 3 WLR 691 (CA). 7 At least, where the plaintiff receives an incontrovertible benefit, and the improvement is not detachable from the chattel: McKeown v Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 303, Young J at 308–311. 8 O’Grady v Westminster Scaffolding Ltd [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238 (QB); Anthoness v Bland Shire Council (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 659; 77 WN (NSW) 506 (FC); Jansen v Dewhurst [1969] VR 421; Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 (CA). 9 Motor cars: O’Grady v Westminster Scaffolding Ltd [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238 (QB) (MG TB motor car – repair cost as basis of assessment. In this case Edmund Davies J appeared to be influenced by the plaintiff’s affection for the vehicle); Anthoness v Bland Shire Council (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 659; 77 WN (NSW) 506 (FC) (Bristol motor car – repair cost as basis of assessment). In Murphy v Brown (1985) 1 NSWLR 131, the Court of Appeal agreed that the plaintiff only needs to establish the reasonable cost of necessary repairs, and that there is no additional onus to prove the value of the vehicle before the accident and after repair. The practical effect of this decision is to make it incumbent upon defendants to bring in evidence of loss assessors if they seek to establish that the plaintiff will unreasonably profit from

918

[33.10.1470]

GOODS

being recompensed for the cost of repair. Ships: The court may be influenced by whether or not a market in substitute ships exists and whether or not the particular ship was especially valuable: Victoria v Howie [1985] Aust Torts Reports 80-722 (VSCFC); Davidson v JS Gilbert Fabrications Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 1 (FC).

[33.10.1470] Consequential losses may be recovered where the damaged chattel was used for productive purposes. Loss is normally measured by the extent of profits lost while repairs to the chattel were being carried out.1 Usually, the gross amount of lost profits is awarded without an adjustment for taxation.2 If the owner of a profit-earning chattel hires a substitute, consequential damages cover the hire costs rather than lost profits. The period of hire may include an allowance for delay while the defendant (or its insurer) decides whether or not to authorise repairs.3 There is clearly a limit to this form of compensation, extending only until the moment when the plaintiff should have purchased a suitable replacement. Where no substitute chattel has been hired, the owner may recover a percentage of the capital value of the chattel wasted due to its idleness during repairs.4

1

2 3

4

Martindale v Duncan [1973] 1 WLR 574 (CA); The SS Gracie v The SS Argentino (1889) 14 App Cas 519 (in this case damages were based on special losses on a future contract; such special loss may not meet the remoteness test, although general loss of profits would do so). The component of the award which compensates for lost profits is itself taxable. Martindale v Duncan [1973] 1 WLR 574 (CA). In an early case a carpenter was allowed damages for loss of actual earnings arising from the defendant’s conversion of his tools: Bodley v Reynolds (1846) 8 QB 779; 115 ER 1066. See also Kidd v McRae (1921) 23 WALR 98 (plaintiff could not prove consequential loss since he had failed to prove his intention to use the machinery for his business); Venables v West (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 54; 20 WN (NSW) 26 (FC) (plaintiff entitled to an additional sum representing the probable increase in numbers of converted livestock); Mrs Eaton’s Car Sales Ltd v Thomasen [1973] 2 NZLR 686 (SC) (damages awarded to a car dealer included its loss of profit on resale of the car, since this was within the reasonable contemplation of the defendant); Millar v Candy (1981) 58 FLR 145 (FCAFC) (damages awarded to hire-purchaser of written-off car limited to its value and cost of hiring a replacement, and did not include the amount of hire-purchase instalments since these were not increased by the defendant); Harrisons Group Holdings Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1989) 51 SASR 36 (in a case of conversion of a cheque, the plaintiff was compensated not only to the extent of the value of the cheque but also for the loss of the ability to put the money lost to productive use in its business). Admiralty Commissioners v The SS Susquehanna [1926] AC 655; Admiralty Commissioners v The SS Chekiang [1926] AC 637; The Lord Citrine v The Hebridean Coast [1961] AC 545; [1961] 2 WLR 48.

919

[33.10.1480]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

[33.10.1480] If repairs result in a chattel being restored to a condition better than that existing prior to the accident, no deduction for betterment will normally be made from the damages.1 Certainly no deduction should be made simply for the replacement of new for old, as this would effectively force the plaintiff to invest in new equipment. Only if the specifications of the goods are changed may the defendant argue that the costs incurred have gone beyond reasonable repair costs.

1 Anthoness v Bland Shire Council (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 659; 77 WN (NSW) 506 (FC), the Court at 666 (SR (NSW)); Hyder Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd (2002) 18 BCL 122; [2001] NSWCA 313. But see Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 88 (CA); Bacon v Cooper (Metals) Ltd [1982] 1 All ER 397 (QB).

Destruction of Goods [33.10.1490] For destruction of goods, the normal starting point for the measure of loss is their market value at the time of the loss.1 However, if it is reasonable for the plaintiff to wait some time before purchasing a substitute, for example, if they are waiting until the defendant’s insurer declares the chattel a “total loss”, then the date for the assessment of value may be extended. The assumption underlying this approach is that the plaintiff seek to purchase a substitute at the earliest reasonable date after the accident.2 The value awarded is reduced by the scrap value of the destroyed chattel.3 For profit-earning chattels, value includes the chattel’s ability to earn a profit as well as its capital value.4 Loss of a chance to make a profit may often be difficult to establish with certainty, but once a probable loss of some substance is established by the plaintiff, then they are entitled to fair compensation for the loss.5 Costs of adaptation of a replacement chattel to fully perform the functions of the destroyed chattel may be recovered.6 Damages for loss of use of a destroyed chattel in the period between destruction and replacement are calculated in the same way as damages for loss during repair: profits,7 hire charges,8 and other consequential losses are recoverable.9 If there is an unreasonable delay in the purchase of a substitute chattel, damages for loss of use are not awarded for that period.10

1 “Destruction” includes a “constructive total loss” where, although part of the property remains intact, it is in such a condition as to make repair uneconomic. 2 For an example of the difficulties of assessing the value of a destroyed chattel where

920

[33.10.1500]

GOODS

an inadequate market exists, see J & E Hall Ltd v Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620, Greer LJ at 624. 3 See, eg Von Stanke v Northumberland Bay Pty Ltd [2008] SADC 61. 4 The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, Lord Wright at 465 (AC) (overruled on other grounds in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64); Electricity Trust (SA) v O’Leary (1986) 42 SASR 26 (FC). 5 Electricity Trust (SA) v O’Leary (1986) 42 SASR 26 (FC) (the value of a promising two-year old racehorse was assessed by taking the auction ring price which would have been fetched by a typical two-year old gelding of similar pedigree, and then adding a figure representing a reasonable allowance for the loss by the plaintiff of the chance to race a horse which had already demonstrated an above average ability to generate profits). 6 The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, Lord Wright at 468 (AC) (overruled on other grounds in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64). 7 Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd v O’Loughlin (2000) 79 SASR 185; [2000] SASC 429. 8 Moore v DER Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1476 (CA); Anthanasopoulos v Moseley (2001) 52 NSWLR 262; [2001] NSWCA 266. 9 The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, Lord Wright at 468 (AC) (overruled on other grounds in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64); Millar v Candy (1981) 58 FLR 145 (FCAFC). See also [33.10.1470]. 10 O’Grady v Westminster Scaffolding Ltd [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238 (QB), Edmund Davies J at 241.

Misappropriation of Goods [33.10.1500] The normal starting point for measure of loss of misappropriated goods is their value at the time of the tort. Yet, while misappropriation usually gives rise to a loss equal to the full value of the goods, this is not always the case, and must not be allowed to obscure the broad principle that damages are awarded by way of compensation.1 Damages should not normally exceed the harm sustained by the plaintiff.2 This is particularly so where the action is brought against a defendant who has also acquired an interest in the chattel, even though that interest is not of a proprietary nature. In Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114, the action concerned eggs, the sale of which was vested in the plaintiff Board by the Marketing of Primary Products Act 1958 (Vic) (now repealed). The defendant producer, who wrongfully sold his eggs away from the Board, nevertheless had the statutory right to participate in the sale of the eggs by the Board after certain deductions. It was held that the Board could not recover the full value of the eggs, but only the difference between the price for which it would have sold the eggs, had they been delivered for sale, and the amount which in that event it would have had to pay the producer. Taylor and Owen JJ said, that if the full value were recovered, the Board would be in a better position financially than if the defendant had complied with the Act and this

921

[33.10.1500]

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would not accord with the general principle on which compensatory damages are assessed in contract and tort.3 Menzies J agreed.4

1 Furness v Adrium Industries Pty Ltd [1996] 1 VR 668 (App Div). 2 Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114, Taylor and Owen JJ at 191–192 (CLR); Western Credits Pty Ltd v Dragan Motors Pty Ltd [1973] WAR 184 (FC), Wickham J at 190–191. However, in cases where the misappropriated goods have been intentionally and wrongfully extracted from the plaintiff’s land, the plaintiff will generally be awarded the market value of the chattel without any allowance being made for the costs of removal from the land: Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osboorne (1896) 17 LR (NSW) Eq 242, Owen CJ at 268; Minter v Eacott (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 93 (FC). But see Bilambil-Terranora Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [1980] 1 NSWLR 465; (1980) 52 LGRA 1 (CA), where the plaintiffs were allowed the market value of gravel less the cost of removal, where the defendants acted under a mistake of law as to their rights. See also Dymocks Book Arcade Ltd v McCarthy [1966] 2 NSWR 411 (CA) (where the cost of removal exceeded the value of fixtures when removed, the plaintiff was entitled only to nominal damages). 3 Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114, Taylor and Owen JJ at 190–191 (CLR). 4 Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185; 40 ALJR 114, Menzies J at 192 (CLR). See Furness v Adrium Industries Pty Ltd [1996] 1 VR 668 (App Div).

[33.10.1510] Whether goods have been restored to the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff had full title are important factors which affect the measure of damages for misappropriation of goods. A bailee of a chattel may usually recover its full value from the tortfeasor.1 The basis of this rule is the liability of the bailee to account to the bailor for the loss of the chattel, and the fact that a bailor for a term does not have an action for trespass against the third party tortfeasor. The owner of a chattel is entitled to claim damages from the bailee for damage to or destruction of the chattel, even when the owner may have suffered no real loss.2 Hire-purchase cases are the main example of plaintiffs who are limited by way of damages to their interest in the chattel. The finance company is also limited to recovering damages for the amount of unpaid liability, whether or not the action is brought against the hirer or a third party.3 The hirer suing for wrongful repossession of the goods is limited by way of damages to their actual loss.4 The same principles of limiting damages have been applied to actions by bailees and lienees,5 and also to an action by a mortgagee.6

922

[33.10.1510]

GOODS

Whenever the plaintiff’s interest is worth more than the value of the chattel, then damages may not exceed the value of the chattel.7

1

2

3

4 5 6

7

The Winkfield [1902] P 42 (CA) (in this case the bailee was the Crown and, as such, not liable to persons who had bailed postal packets to it); Chabbra Corp Pte Ltd v The Jag Shakti [1986] AC 337; [1986] 2 WLR 87 (PC). One of the policy reasons for allowing the holder of a limited interest in a chattel, such as a bailee, to recover the whole value, by way of damages from a third party, is that it is then justifiable to preclude further action against the third party – so that once the bailee has recovered damages, the bailor cannot sue. The rule is different where a mere possessor recovers the full value of the chattel. Here the defendant may still be liable in damages for the value of the chattel to the true owner: Attenborough v London & St Katharine’s Dock Co (1878) 3 CPD 450 (CA). Where, however, the defendant has been sued to judgment by the true owner first, this is an eviction by title paramount sufficient to give rise to the defence of jus tertii (the right of a third party) against an action brought by the previous possessor. Indeed, on satisfaction of the judgment, the defendant obtains the true owner’s title: Purcell v Thomas (No 2) [1904] St R Qd 189; Franklin v Giddins [1978] Qd R 72, Dunn J at 78. For a more detailed analysis of bailment, see Contracts: Specific “Bailment” [8.5.10]ff. Citicorp Australia Ltd v BS Stillwell Ford Pty Ltd (1979) 21 SASR 142 (FC) (where plaintiff had recovered the value of converted goods under an insurance policy). But see Chinery v Viall (1860) 5 H & N 288; 157 ER 1192 (unpaid seller converted goods by disposing them to a third party – the price of the goods was deducted from their value since the buyer was no longer bound to pay for them); Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280 (plaintiff buyers obtained the whole value of the goods converted on the ground that they remained contractually liable for the price); Obestain Inc v National Mineral Development Corp Ltd (The Sanix Ace) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 465 (QB); RG & TJ Anderson Pty Ltd v Chamberlain John Deere Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 363 (CA). Wickham Holdings Ltd v Brooke House Motors Ltd (1967) 1 WLR 295; Chubb Cash Ltd v John Crilley & Son [1983] 1 WLR 599 (CA); Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd v Mirror Motors Pty Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 548; 77 WN (NSW) 666; Maynegrain Pty Ltd v Compafina Bank [1982] 2 NSWLR 141 (CA). Chubb Cash Ltd v John Crilley & Son [1983] 1 WLR 599 (CA); Harris v Lombard New Zealand Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 161 (SC). Standard Electronic Apparatus Laboratories Pty Ltd v Stenner (1960) 77 WN (NSW) 833. Donnelly v Graves (1880) 6 VLR (L) 247 (FC). But see Kidman v Farmers’ Centre Pty Ltd [1959] Qd R 8 (holder of a bill of sale was held entitled to the whole value of the property). Pacific Acceptance Corp Ltd v Mirror Motors Pty Ltd (1960) 61 SR (NSW) 548; 77 WN (NSW) 666 (FC); Chubb Cash Ltd v John Crilley & Son [1983] 1 WLR 599 (CA); National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd [2002] 4 VR 252.

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[33.10.1510]

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Conversion and Detinue [33.10.1520] The date of assessment of damages, even when the market price of goods fluctuates, should not affect recoverable damages. Formerly, damages were awarded in conversion for the market value of the goods converted at the date and place of conversion. Conversely, where a plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of a detained chattel, the damages in detinue represented the market value of the goods at the date of judgment.1 Therefore the traditional advice was to sue in detinue on a rising market and, on a falling market, in conversion. In modern law, choice of action should not determine the amount of recoverable damages. The fundamental principle of compensation should ensure that if the plaintiff sues in conversion on a rising market, damages may consist of the value of the goods at the time of conversion plus special damages for consequential losses to cover the rise in value since that time.2 Of course, this is subject to the plaintiff taking all reasonable action to mitigate their loss. The plaintiff must not knowingly sit by, taking no action, while the market value of the goods rises.3 Equally, if the plaintiff sues in detinue on a falling market, the fall in value of the goods from the date of original detention may be recoverable as consequential damages.4

1 Western Credits Pty Ltd v Dragan Motors Pty Ltd [1973] WAR 184 (FC), Jackson CJ at 187; Chubb Cash Ltd v John Crilley & Son [1983] 1 WLR 599 (CA); Associated Midland Corp v Bank of New South Wales [1983] 1 NSWLR 533, Hutley JA at 536, Mahoney JA at 550; Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481, White J at 530–531. See also “Conversion” [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]; “Detinue” [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]. 2 Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Trafigura Beheer BV [2007] EWCA Civ 794; Haddow v Duke Co NL (1892) 18 VLR 155 (FC); Sachs v Miklos [1948] 2 KB 23 (CA), Lord Goddard CJ at 3941 (KB); General & Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644 (CA), Diplock LJ at 650; Western Credits Pty Ltd v Dragan Motors Pty Ltd [1973] WAR 184 (FC), Wickham J at 191; but see Ley v Lewis [1952] VLR 119 (FC). Some authorities treat the traditional date of assessment at the time of the conversion as a mere prima facie rule: Gorman v HW Hodgetts & Co [1932] SASR 394. 3 Sachs v Miklos [1948] 2 KB 23 (CA), Lord Goddard CJ at 40–41; Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481. 4 Rosenthal v Alderton & Sons Ltd [1946] KB 374 (CA), Shed J at 378; General & Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644 (CA), Pearson LJ at 647. See also Solloway v McLaughlin [1938] AC 247 (PC); BBMB Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd v EDA Holdings Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 409 (PC). These two cases reflect a restitutionary element in the damages awarded. For example, in Solloway v McLaughlin the defendant had shares belonging to the plaintiff deposited with him. He sold the shares and then, the shares having fallen in value, bought in an

924

[33.10.1530]

GOODS

equivalent amount at the lower price, which he appropriated to the plaintiff’s account. The defendant was held liable in conversion for the value of the shares at the date of the conversion. The damages awarded were restitutionary, not compensatory in nature, since the plaintiff had not intended to sell the shares. This follows from the principle that the defendant should not acquire a benefit from their wrong.

[33.10.1530] Consequential damages may be recovered for the loss of the opportunity to sell goods at their highest price, and for loss of income or profits which would have been earned with the goods.1 Where the defendant has wrongfully remained in possession of the chattel after converting it, restitutionary damages may be recoverable, providing that consequential loss was reasonably foreseeable.2 In Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246, the plaintiff was wrongfully refused the return of portable switchboards which it had hired out to the defendant, who in the course of business continued to use them. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was able to recover in detinue a reasonable hiring rate for the switchboards until they were returned. Further, no deduction was to be made for the contingency that the plaintiff would not have otherwise hired out all the switchboards in the defendant’s possession. The basis of the damages award was that the defendant should pay for the benefit it received, not compensate the plaintiffs for its loss. There was a clear restitutionary basis to the award of damages. Hillesden Securities Ltd v Ryjack Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 959, established that similar damages may be awarded in conversion.3 In Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481, where the plaintiff’s actual loss arising from the conversion of his machinery was literally incalculable, the Supreme Court approved compensation for detinue4 on similar principles to Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd. However, the Court held that because the plaintiff was not in the business of hiring out his machines, the basis of compensation should be the cost of hiring in, rather than hiring out, similar machinery, with a consequential deduction being made for the saving to the plaintiff of not having to service his own machinery. Since no deduction was applied in Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd for contingencies such as the goods not actually being hired out, the basis of this deduction in Egan v State Transport Authority is not entirely clear in the context of restitutionary, as opposed to compensatory, damages. It may be that the deduction was applied so that the plaintiff in Egan v State Transport Authority would not be unjustly enriched. In Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175, Giles J held that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff in a detinue action to show an available market in which the plaintiff would have hired out the goods but for the defendant’s unlawful detention,5 and recognised that unjust enrichment provided the rationale.6 Giles J also appeared to support the view, relying on certain remarks of Somerwell LJ in Strand Electric & Engineering Co v Brisord Entertainments Ltd, that this form of compensation 925

[33.10.1530]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

could not be awarded where the defendant had made no use of the plaintiff’s chattel for its own purposes.7 There seems no good reason in principle why mere adverse detention should not form an adequate basis of “restitutionary” damages of this sort, and that would seem to have been all that was present in Egan v State Transport Authority.8

1 For example, Brilawsky v Robertson & Cannell (1916) 10 QJPR 113; Solloway v McLaughlin [1938] AC 247 (PC); General & Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644 (CA), Pearson LJ at 647; Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246 (CA); Hillesden Securities Ltd v Ryjack Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 959 (QB). 2 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] 2 WLR 1353; [2002] UKHL 19; Saleslease Ltd v Davis [1999] 1 WLR 1664 (CA). 3 Hillesden Securities Ltd v Ryjack Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 959 (QB). See also “Conversion” [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]. 4 See also “Detinue” [33.8.910]–[33.8.960]. 5 Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175, Giles J at 178–179. 6 Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175, Giles J at 188. 7 Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175, Giles J at 182–183; Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246 (CA), Somerwell LJ at 252. See further discussion of these principles in Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342; Black Diamond Group Pty Ltd v Manor of Maluka Pty Ltd [2015] 1 Qd R 180; [2014] QSC 219. 8 These cases all concerned chattels having a commercial value. In some cases the courts have awarded only nominal damages for the tortious dealing with chattels of no value: Baume v Commonwealth (1906) 4 CLR 97, Griffith CJ at 116–117; Kay v Barnett [1909] QWN 39. In Brandeis Goldschmidt & Co Ltd v Western Transport Ltd [1981] QB 864; [1981] 3 WLR 181 (CA), the Court awarded only nominal damages where the defendant wrongfully detained the plaintiffs’ copper during a period when the market value was falling, on the basis that the plaintiffs did not intend to sell the copper, nor make use of it in their business. Solloway v McLaughlin [1938] AC 247 (PC) was distinguished on the ground that the latter case concerned a sale and final disposition of the shares. There appears, however, to be a clash between Brandeis Goldschmidtz & Co Ltd v Western Transport Ltd, and a principle laid down in The SS Mediana v The Lightship Comet [1900] AC 113, the Earl of Halsbury LC at 116, which was accepted and applied in Birmingham Corp v Sowsbery [1970] RTR 84 (QB), to the effect that substantial damages are obtainable where the defendant has wrongfully made use of the plaintiff’s chattel, even though the plaintiff has suffered no actual loss. There might also be the possibility of an award of aggravated or exemplary damages, depending on the conduct of the defendant.

[33.10.1540] Payments made by the defendant to the plaintiff may reduce an award of damages. In New South Wales, the Court of Appeal was satisfied 926

[33.10.1540]

GOODS

in Associated Midland Corp v Bank of New South Wales [1983] 1 NSWLR 533, that payments proved to have been made for the plaintiff’s benefit had to be taken into account in order to reduce the plaintiff’s loss in an action based on conversion.1 It concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to no damages at all.2 Where it is sought to set-off payments which the defendant or those connected with them have made for the benefit of the plaintiff, it is necessary to show that the benefits are sufficiently connected with the conversion. Otherwise, the transactions may be held to be collateral or res inter alios acta3 and are ignored. In Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v AMEV Finance Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-228, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the defendant bore the onus of displacing the prima facie measure of loss, the face value of a cheque converted, to arrive at the real loss. The defendant was entitled to credit to the extent to which proceeds of the converted cheque were used to discharge the plaintiff’s liability to a third party. However, other payments were ignored because they related to a lease agreement and not the conversion, and did not involve a windfall profit to the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.4

1 2

3

4

See also “Conversion” [33.8.790]–[33.8.900]. The High Court dismissed an appeal (Associated Midland Corp Ltd v Bank of New South Wales (1984) 51 ALR 641), but without finding it necessary to determine the damages issue. In the Supreme Court of Victoria, Ormiston J in Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria [1989] VR 617, also reduced damages below the prima facie measure, by taking account of payments made to the plaintiff. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet: “[A] third party transaction ought not to be prejudiced by a transaction among others”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150. In Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd [1991] 2 VR 407, the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria referred to Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v AMEV Finance Ltd [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-228 (WASCFC) with approval. In the Court below (Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1990] VR 41), the trial judge had refused to reduce the damages below the face value of the cheque converted. He found that the source of payments made to the plaintiff, on account of which the defendant sought the reduction, was unclear and they were not made out of the proceeds of the conversion. The appeal was dismissed, a major consideration being that the payments in that case had been made to conceal the fraud which had been practised on the plaintiff. The joint judgment of Murphy and Vincent JJ at 411–412 referred to Associated Midland Corp v Bank of New South Wales [1983] 1 NSWLR 533 (CA), Mahoney J at 550. In that case, Mahoney JA said that the damages may be reduced in law, eg where the defendant has made a payment which the plaintiff would otherwise have to make, or on an equitable basis where the defendant is allowed the cost of an improvement to the chattel. The equitable principle involved is that equity seeks to avoid unjust enrichment to the plaintiff. The Court in Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd

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[33.10.1540]

INTERESTS IN PROPERTY

went on to decide that payments outside these areas may be held to be collateral or be properly described as res inter alios acta. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet: “[A] third party transaction ought not to be prejudiced by a transaction among others”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 150.

[33.10.1550] Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases of trespass to goods, detinue and conversion where the defendant’s conduct amounts to contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights during the period of misappropriation.1 In Graham v Voigt (1989) 95 FLR 146; 89 ACTR 11, Kelly J awarded aggravated damages for the distress of the plaintiff at being deprived of his stamp collecting hobby due to the loss of albums which the defendant had converted.2

1 See, eg Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584; 42 ALJR 280 (conversion); Egan v State Transport Authority (1982) 31 SASR 481 (detinue); Pargiter v Alexander (1995) 5 Tas R 158 (exemplary damages for trespass to goods; examination of difference in damages for detinue and trespass). See also [33.10.200]; “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. 2 Graham v Voigt (1989) 95 FLR 146; 89 ACTR 11. In making this award, Kelly J (at 155) applied the contract decision, Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233; [1972] 3 WLR 954 (CA), stating: “Admittedly [Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd] and the holiday cases generally were concerned with damages for breach of contract but I do not see why the same general approach cannot be taken in respect of damages for tort”. This statement must now be reviewed in light of High Court decision in Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; 67 ALJR 228.

[33.10.1560] A plaintiff has a choice of remedies where the property detained is money or a chattel which the defendant has converted into money. The plaintiff may choose to either sue in tort for damages, or to “waive the tort” and sue in quasi-contract for money had and received.1

1 For a full discussion of this remedy, see Restitution “Restitution” [29.1.10]ff. See also Benning v Wong (1969) 122 CLR 249; 43 ALJR 467, Windeyer J at 320 (CLR) (obiter).

928

Economic Loss General [33.10.1670] Economic losses may be recovered in tort even when they are unconnected with any damage to, or loss of, tangible property. Such purely economic loss includes past or prospective profits and wasted expenditure and the cost of replacing lost services. A broad range of interests and actions are involved in this area of torts law, and it is often difficult to draw a clear distinction between issues of liability and injury and issues of loss and damages. This range of interests and actions is treated under three headings: (1)

Intentional infliction of economic loss. The so-called “economic torts” have long provided protection of business interests.

(2)

Negligent infliction of economic loss. In the past, the common law did not permit recovery of damages for the negligent infliction of purely economic loss. This exclusion of liability for financial loss was based on the need to protect public utilities, industrialists and business entrepreneurs from multiple and indeterminate claims. Since 2002, legislation has regulated the recovery of damages for economic loss in negligent personal injury actions: see [33.10.730].

(3)

Damages for loss of services and for loss of consortium are measured on the monetary value of the services – the cost of their replacement – and this is best analysed as basically an economic loss.

Intentional Torts Deceit [33.10.1680] The measure of damages in deceit will be based on the actual damage directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement.1 The tort of deceit may be committed where the defendant in making a statement, either knows of its falsity, or is reckless as to its veracity, not caring whether it is true or false, and with the intention that the plaintiff believe and act on the representation.2 Lord Atkin in Clark v Urquhart [1930] AC 28 said: I find it difficult to suppose that there is any difference in the measure of damages in an action of deceit depending upon the nature of the transaction into which the plaintiff is fraudulently induced to enter. Whether he buys shares or buys sugar,

929

[33.10.1680]

ECONOMIC LOSS

whether he subscribes for shares, or agrees to enter into a partnership, or in any other way alters his position to his detriment, in principle, the measure of damages should be the same, and whether estimated by a jury or a judge. I should have thought it would be based on the actual damage directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement.3

In an action for deceit, a plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum representing the prejudice or disadvantage the plaintiff has suffered in consequence of altering their position under the inducement of the fraudulent misrepresentation made by the defendant.4 The onus of establishing damage is on the plaintiff and if such damage cannot be proved then the action will fail.5 The damages for deceit are the same as those which may be granted under s 82 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).6

1 Clark v Urquhart [1930] AC 28. 2 For a detailed treatment of liability, see “Deceit” [33.8.1250]; Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff. 3 Clark v Urquhart [1930] AC 28, Lord Atkin at 67–68. See also Unfair Dealing “Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation” [35.4.560]–[35.4.670]. 4 Toteff v Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647, Dixon J at 650; Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158; [1969] 2 WLR 673 (CA), Lord Denning MR at 167 (QB); Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; 58 ALJR 560, Gibbs CJ at 220 (CLR); Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254; [1996] 3 WLR 1051; Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69; National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd (2002) 4 VR 252; [2002] VSCA 18, Batt JA at [57]; Cleary v Jeans (2006) 65 NSWLR 355; [2006] NSWCA 9, Handley JA at [32]–[34]; Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647, Johnson J at [25]. 5 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337; De Vries v Wightman [1961] Qd R 196 (HCA). 6 C-Shirt Pty Ltd v Barnett Marketing & Management Pty Ltd (1996) 37 IPR 315, Lehane J at 342.

Interference with Contractual Relations [33.10.1690] In order to obtain damages for wrongful interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must establish financial loss, usually lost profits or wasted expenditure.1 The most well-defined instances of wrongful interference with contractual relations are inducing a breach of contract or doing something inconsistent with its due performance.2 It is not necessary to give proof of specific damage, as long as damage is established. Damages are at large,3 and all reasonably foreseeable damage is recoverable. Aggravated and/or exemplary damages may be awarded in cases of gross or malicious interferences: see [33.10.180]–[33.10.220]. Non-pecuniary damages are recoverable in addition to economic loss.4

930

[33.10.1700]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Damages recoverable for wrongful interference with contractual relations may be greater than for actual breach of contract. For breach of contract, the damage must be in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the agreement, whereas in tort all damages foreseeable at the time of the tort will be recoverable, subject to the usual duty on the plaintiff to mitigate the loss.5

1

2 3

4

5

Goldsoll v Goldman [1914] 2 Ch 603, Neville J at 615–616; Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69; British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori [1949] Ch 556, Roxburgh J at 569 (Ch). See “Intentional Interference with Contract” [33.8.1180]–[33.8.1250]. See also Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff. Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Gregory & Co [1896] 1 QB 147 (CA), Lord Esher MR at 153; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2) (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 2 VR 636. Pratt v British Medical Association [1919] 1 KB 244, McCardie J at 281–282 (damages for professional and social ostracism); GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376 (KB) (damages for lost prestige). For other differences, see “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. See also Contract: General Principles “Breach” [7.6.10]ff; “Damages” [7.9.40]–[7.9.1240].

Conspiracy and Intimidation [33.10.1700] Exemplary damages (see [33.10.200]) may be awarded in addition to general compensatory damages for the torts of conspiracy and intimidation. These actions are sometimes brought together with an action for inducement of breach of contract, to help protect the plaintiff’s business interests and financial wellbeing. In Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269, Lord Devlin defined the tort of intimidation as being harm done to a plaintiff through a threat to do an unlawful act. To satisfy the requirements for intimidation, D must intentionally deliver an unjustified threat which places pressure on X to take, or abstain from, some particular action. This threat from D must cause X’s subsequent conduct, which either results in reasonably foreseeable loss to X (two-party situation) or ultimately results in reasonably foreseeable loss to Y (three-party situation).1 In a two-party situation, when threatened with a breach of contract, X has a choice of remedies: X may sue for anticipatory breach of contract or may wait for the breach to occur and sue for damages in contract. In the alternative, X may seek an injunction or an order for specific performance in advance or at the time of the breach, or may treat the contract as repudiated; or X may seek tortious damages for all the positive losses flowing from the act of intimidation. In a three-party situation, Y will usually be confined to the tortious damages remedy.

931

[33.10.1700]

ECONOMIC LOSS

Exemplary damages will often be appropriate for intimidation, where the defendant’s intimidatory conduct has been cynically calculated to make a profit which would exceed any compensation payable to the plaintiff.2 Exemplary damages can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay. The tort of conspiracy involves an agreement to injure the plaintiff, made by two or more persons where the purpose of the combination is held to be illegitimate.3 Conspiracy is not actionable per se – it is essential for the plaintiff to establish actual loss. Loss of profits and expenses are the typical heads. All losses directly consequent on the tort are recoverable. Non-pecuniary damages may also be recovered if founded on some pecuniary loss.4 As with intimidation, exemplary damages may also be recovered where the conspirators intended to financially ruin the plaintiff, or to profit from their tort even after complying with an order to fully compensate the plaintiff.5

1 See “Intimidation” [33.8.1090]–[33.8.1140]. 2 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 2 WLR 269, Lord Devlin at 1227 (AC). 3 See “Conspiracy” [33.8.1260]–[33.8.1280]. 4 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495; McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; [1999] FCA 1101. 5 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2) (Airline Pilots’ Case) [1991] 2 VR 636, Brooking J at 645–646.

Injurious Falsehood [33.10.1710] Actual economic loss must be proved by the plaintiff to obtain damages for an injurious falsehood.1 An injurious falsehood is committed when the defendant, maliciously and without justification or privilege, publishes to a third party written or oral falsehoods of fact about the plaintiff, calculated to cause harm to their trade. Actual economic loss resulting from these falsehoods must be proved by the plaintiff.2 Where the injurious falsehood impugns the plaintiff’s title to property, the plaintiff may recover, on proof, any resulting diminution in the market value of that property.3 Damages may also be awarded on proof of loss of a contract of sale caused by the defendant’s slander, and the plaintiff may also recover the costs of litigation made necessary to clear doubts over the title when these doubts have been created by the defendant’s slander.4 For slander of goods or disparagement of quality, damages can be recovered for lost profits and other consequential economic loss caused by the false statement. The plaintiff must prove the loss, as far as possible, by detailing the custom lost

932

[33.10.1710]

INTENTIONAL TORTS

as a result of the statement. The plaintiff may also recover for general loss of goodwill.5 Non-pecuniary loss such as damages for injured feelings cannot be recovered by means of this tort.6 A passing-off action is based on the plaintiff establishing that the defendant has either by the name, the get-up, the formula or the advertising of their product, has misled the public into thinking that it is the plaintiff’s product.7 It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove actual fraud in the misrepresentation, so long as actual or probable damage to the plaintiff’s business, reputation or goodwill is established.8 Once it is proved that a deceptive product has been put on the market, the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages.9 This presumption of damage relates to the goodwill on the plaintiff’s business.10 Apart from loss of goodwill, typical heads of loss are lost profits through the need to reduce prices in competition with the defendant, and loss of reputation by the passing off of an inferior product.

1

Malachy v Soper (1836) 3 Bing NC 371; 132 ER 453; Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69; Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v LG Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 113 IPR 11; [2015] FCA 227. 2 See “Injurious Falsehood” [33.8.1260]; Communications “Injurious Falsehood” [6.3.10]ff. The three ancient common forms of injurious falsehood were “slander of title”, “slander of goods” and “disparagement of quality”. The modern action has expanded to encompass all false and damaging imputations which interfere with the plaintiff’s economic wellbeing: Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (CA); Hall-Gibbs Mercantile Agency Ltd v Dun (1910) 12 CLR 84; Shapiro v La Morta (1923) 40 TLR 201 (CA). 3 Barrett v Associated Newspapers Ltd (1907) 23 TLR 666 (CA). 4 Elborow v Allen (1622) Cro Jac 642; 79 ER 553. 5 Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (CA); E Worsley & Co Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 290 (CHD); this has been doubted in Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680; 83 LGERA 115. 6 Fielding v Variety Inc [1967] 2 QB 841; [1967] 3 WLR 415 (CA). 7 Inverse passing off, whereby the plaintiff claims that the defendant’s goods or efforts which have made something valuable are theirs, has also been recognised as a wrong: Bullivant v Wright (1897) 13 TLR 201 (CHD). See Intellectual Property “Passing Off and Related Torts” [23.7.10]ff. A statutory passing off action is available under Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 52, 53. See Unfair Dealing “Misleading or Deceptive Conduct” [35.1.10]ff. Prohibitory injunctions, account of profits and declaratory relief are also frequently sought remedies for passing off: see 15 Equity. 8 Petersville Sleigh Ltd v Sugarman [1987] VR 295; Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 44 IPR 281; [1999] FCA 461. 9 Draper v Trist [1939] 3 All ER 513 (CA). 10 AG Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1918) 35 RPC 101; Treasure Cot Co Ltd v Hamley Bros Ltd (1950) 67 RPC 89; Hexagon Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting

933

[33.10.1710]

ECONOMIC LOSS

Commission (Alvin Purple Case) (1975) 7 ALR 233 (NSWSC); Unik Time Co Ltd v Unik Time Ltd [1983] FSR 121 (CHD).

Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss [33.10.1720] In cases involving negligent misstatements,1 damages usually relate to a very specific financial loss.2 Recoverable loss is limited to the person to whom the negligent misstatement is made. Despite the relationship of the parties being, in many cases, closely akin to contract, there is no doubt that the tortious measure of damages applies to negligent misstatement claims.3 That is, the amount necessary to restore the plaintiff to the position they were in before the statement – subject to the loss being reasonably foreseeable. Barring of recovery of expectation loss may be criticised on the ground that a common purpose for seeking advice and acquiring information is with the aim of obtaining some future financial gain. Yet, the twin dangers, of allowing the recovery of too remote losses in tort and of subverting the doctrine of consideration in contract, have continued to limit recovery to actual reliance and indemnity losses suffered by the plaintiff. The correct measure to apply often depends on the commercial reasonableness of the plaintiff’s actions in reliance on the misstatement. For example, if the economic context of the case is that of a property boom and bust, where both parties should have been fully aware of the volatility of the market and the high financial risk involved in the particular loan transaction, and a negligent over-valuation was made of the secured property, then the lender may well be restricted to damages assessed on the measure of the difference between the sum loaned and what would have been loaned if the tortfeasor had not been negligent in making the valuation. In Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Excel Finance Case) (1994) 61 SASR 424,4 an auditor was held not to owe a duty of care to a lender of money who had relied on audited accounts in deciding to make the loan. The findings that the plaintiff was not a member of the company receiving the loan (to whom an auditor owes a statutory duty) and that the auditor had not intended to induce the plaintiff to rely on the audit certificate were decisive.5 This case illustrates how the duty issue continues to be manipulated as the key control mechanism to access the damages remedy in the area of economic loss. Three examples illustrate approaches to the assessment of loss for negligent misstatement: (1)

An oil company was held responsible for its negligent estimates of the throughput of petrol at a service station, which caused the proprietor to whom the station was leased to suffer substantial economic loss. Although damages were settled out of court, it would appear, on the reasoning of Lord Denning MR, that recoverable damages should include the proprietor’s loss of capital, with interest thereon, up to the closure of the

934

[33.10.1720]

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF ECONOMIC LOSS

business, plus at least a proportion of the notional earnings from other business activities foregone due to the period of wasted effort in running the non-viable service station.6 (2)

The plaintiff suffered financial loss as a result of purchasing property for development which was affected by road-widening proposals. The purchase was made in reliance on information given by the defendant municipal council that the land was not so affected. There was no dispute over the primary head of loss, which was for the difference in the actual value of the land as affected by the road-widening proposal and the purchase price paid by the plaintiff. Nor was payment of an interest component disputed. However, the defendant disputed consequential damages claimed for expenses incurred over a period of about 18 months following the purchase, including rates and taxes, insurance premiums and other costs. The High Court upheld the claim to these expenses because the plaintiff would not have bought the land but for the defendant’s negligent misstatement. The land was useless for the purpose for which it was acquired. Consequently, the recoverable loss extended beyond the diminution of value of the land and included recouping the expenses of acquisition and the retention of the property for a reasonable period.7

(3)

The plaintiff, a financier, in reliance on the defendant valuer’s negligent over-valuation of a property, loaned money on the security of a second mortgage. The defendant argued that the measure of loss should be restricted to the difference between the amount actually loaned and the amount which the plaintiff would reasonably have advanced in reliance on a correct valuation. In support of this test, the defendant submitted that it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff would have loaned more than 80 per cent of the valuation or have used the property as part of a group of securities or have bought out the first mortgage on the property and so compounded the loss. The Court rejected these arguments, and measured damages as the total loss flowing to the plaintiff from its entry into the loan transaction in reliance on the over-valuation.8

1

For a full treatment of liability, see “Misstatements” [33.2.510]–[33.2.680]. See also Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt [1971] AC 793; [1971] 2 WLR 23; (1970) 122 CLR 628; 44 ALJR 478 (PC), Lord Diplock at 635 (CLR); L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65; San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 61 ALJR 41; 60 LGRA 405. Statutory liability for innocent misrepresentation exists under the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) and Misrepresentation Act 1972 (SA). A statutory misrepresentation action is available only where the plaintiff has actually entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made and, as a result, suffers loss. The Acts give a remedy of rescission or such damages as the court considers fair and reasonable: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act

935

[33.10.1720]

ECONOMIC LOSS

2

3

4 5

6 7

8

2002, ss 173 – 175; Misrepresentation Act 1972, ss 6 – 7. Australian Consumer Law (Cth), Pts 2-1, 3-1 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2) also imposes liability for negligent misstatements about consumer contracts. See Unfair Dealing “Misrepresentation” [35.2.10]ff. Personal injury damages and other non-pecuniary losses are recoverable but, by the nature of the action, such claims are uncommon. In Brickhill v Cooke [1984] 3 NSWLR 396 (CA), damages were awarded for the inconvenience suffered by the plaintiffs during rectification work on their house. Kyogle Shire Council v Francis (1988) 13 NSWLR 396; 66 LGRA 167 (CA); but see the majority view of Mahoney JA at 412–414 and Clarke JA at 417–419 with the dissenting view of Kirby ACJ at 402–407 (NSWLR). Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Excel Finance Case) (1994) 61 SASR 424 (FC). But see R Lowe Lippmann Figdor & Franck v AGC (Advances) Ltd [1992] 2 VR 671 (App Div); Columbia Coffee & Tea Pty Ltd v Churchill (t/as Nelson Parkhill) (1992) 29 NSWLR 141. See also Corbett A, “The Rationale for the Recovery of Economic Loss in Negligence and the Problem of Auditor’s Liability” (1995) 19 MULR 814. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] 2 WLR 583 (CA), Lord Denning at 814–822 (QB). L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (Shaddock’s Case) (1981) 150 CLR 225; 55 ALJR 713; 46 LGRA 65, Mason J at 255 (CLR); Chase v de Groot [1994] 1 NZLR 613 (NZHC) (reinstatement measure applied to pure economic loss claim). Trade Credits Ltd v Baillieu Knight Frank (NSW) Pty Ltd (1985) 12 NSWLR 670.

[33.10.1730] Several kinds of economic loss are recognised as recoverable. These include lost profits,1 expenses,2 loss of use of moneys,3 the loss of an expected legacy under a will4 and the loss of value in property or investments.5

1 See Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works [1974] SCR 1189; (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 530; Allied Finance & Investments Ltd v Haddow & Co [1983] NZLR 22 (CA); Jindi (Nominees) Pty Ltd v Dutney (1993) 26 ATR 206 (QSC). 2 See Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; 51 ALJR 270; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240. 3 See Hungerfords v Walker (1989) 171 CLR 125; 63 ALJR 210; 20 ATR 36. 4 See Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 297; [1979] 3 WLR 605; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240. 5 See Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 465–466 (dicta), Deane J at 502–503 (CLR) (dicta) (disapproved on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3); Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; [1990] 3 WLR 414; Pullen v Gutteridge, Haskins & Davey Pty Ltd [1993] 1 VR 27 (FC).

936

[33.10.1740]

LOSS OF SERVICES AND LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

Loss of Services and Loss of Consortium [33.10.1740] A claim may be made by an employer or head of a household for the value of lost services of a tortiously injured employee or household member.1 Actual loss must be proved by the plaintiff, and the wrongful conduct must have been actionable at the suit of the person whose services are claimed to have been lost.2 In Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Fullagar J explained that damages were strictly limited to pecuniary loss actually sustained through the loss of the services of the servant and (so far as it was not included in the estimate of that loss) expenditure necessarily incurred in consequence of the injury to the servant.3

Where loss has been incurred by an employer paying for their injured employee’s medical or hospital expenses, they will generally be recoverable.4 Also, if as a result of contractual or statutory obligation the employer has paid salary or wages to a wrongfully injured employee during their period of total or partial incapacity, then the employer is entitled to an indemnity from the tortfeasor. The actual wages or salary paid may not always represent the proper measure of the value of the lost services. However, normally they afford the best prima facie evidence of the true value of the services.5 Costs incurred by an employer in obtaining and training a substitute employee may also be recovered.6 In circumstances where loss of profits to the employer is a foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor’s act incapacitating the employee, there is nothing in principle against recovery of lost profits. This will occur typically in the case of key employees, who may be difficult to replace.7

1

The action is per quod servitium amisit: “[B]y which the master’s right to services was lost”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 130. This ancient action had its origins in the proprietary interest the “master” of a household had in the services of the other members of the household. In England, this tort has been confined to the truly domestic sphere of services provided by spouses, children and household servants. In Australia, the scope of the action has remained quite broad: Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Dixon J at 248 (CLR); Tippett v Fraser (1999) 74 SASR 522; [1999] SASC 267; Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258; 86 ALJR 1206; [2012] HCA 40. Even nervous shock occasioned by the employee following the tortiously caused death of a spouse may provide the basis for a per quod servitium amisit action: Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172 (CA). Only persons holding a public office, such as members of the armed services and police force, are outside the requisite private or domestic relationships required for a successful per quod servitium amisit action in Australia. Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 58 prevents an award of damages for loss of “servitium” unless: (1) the injured person died as a result of injuries suffered; or (2)

937

[33.10.1740]

ECONOMIC LOSS

2 3

4

5

6 7

general damages are assessed (before allowing for contributory negligence) at $30,000 or more. Section 58(3) limits the amount recoverable to three times the average weekly earnings per week. Paul Chapman Building Pty Ltd v Boyd (1992) 27 NSWLR 255; Evans v Port of Brisbane Authority [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-169 (QSC). Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Fullagar J at 290 (CLR). On the proper method for assessing damages in such cases and the need to avoid double-counting, see Gregory v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-306 (QSC). See Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237; 52 SR (NSW) 3; 69 WN (NSW) 49, Fullagar J at 290–291 (CLR); Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Scott (1959) 102 CLR 392; 33 ALJR 126, Fullagar J at 408 (CLR). Apart from the per quod servitium amisit action, Workers’ Compensation legislation in Australia gives a statutory right of action to an employer who has been required to pay compensation to an employee, to claim an indemnity from the tortfeasor. It might be argued that medical and hospital expenses should normally more appropriately be recovered in a separate action and not as part of a per quod servitium amisit action, because such loss is highly foreseeable and thus should be recoverable by the employer irrespective of any lost services of the injured employee. Per quod servitium amisit: “[B]y which the master’s right to services was lost”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 130. Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Scott (1959) 102 CLR 392; 33 ALJR 126, Fullagar J at 408–409 (CLR); Sydney City Council v Bosnich (1968) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 168; [1968] 3 NSWR 725 (CA), Asprey JA at 173 (WN (Pt 1) (NSW)). In Commonwealth v Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227, Latham CJ at 239 expressed the view that even voluntary payments of wages by an employer might be recouped. Chapman v McDonald [1969] IR 188 (HC). Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v Argent Pty Ltd (1972) 46 ALJR 432 (HCA); Ryan v AF Concrete Pumping Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 113. Proof of lost profits and their quantification may be difficult. See Attorney-General (NZ) v Wilson & Horton Ltd [1972] NZLR 364 (SC), Henry J at 373: “[B]usiness concerns have long built into their structures means of covering loss of services from sickness, accident and even erratic work attendance … Loss through negligent injury by third parties may not be of any great consequence in the totality of the loss from non-attendance, for whatever reason, of employees generally.”

[33.10.1750] The action for loss of consortium is still available in some Australian jurisdictions. This action is based on a trespassory interference by the defendant with the proprietary interest a husband once held in his wife and her services and companionship.1 This action has been abolished in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia.2 An alternative approach to reform adopted in the Northern Territory, Queensland and South Australia has been to extend the consortium action to also permit wives to recover for the loss of their husband’s services.3 Queensland prevents an award of damages for loss of consortium unless: (1)

the injured person died as a result of injuries suffered; or

(2)

general damages are assessed (before allowing for contributory negligence) at the amount prescribed under the regulations.4

938

[33.10.1750]

LOSS OF SERVICES AND LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

Victoria is the only State in which the action survives in an unamended form. In the jurisdictions where the action still exists, it has long been extended beyond trespass to encompass negligently caused personal injury, including nervous shock.5 The consortium action is not available on the death of the spouse, nor does it survive the dissolution of the marriage.6 It is also now recognised that the loss of “domestic capacity” is recoverable in personal injury damages in the injured party’s own personal action:7 see [33.10.930]. In the Australian Capital Territory, damages are recoverable in respect of loss of capacity to perform domestic services under s 100 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). In New South Wales and Victoria, damages for loss of capacity to provide gratuitous services may be awarded in given circumstances.8 Material and temporal loss have been divided under the two heads of “servitium” and “consortium”. Servitium relates to the spouse’s reduced capacity to perform household duties and manage household affairs: see also [33.10.1740]. Consortium relates to the sharing of a domestic and conjugal life and includes damages for loss of support, assistance, companionship and comfort (which includes sexual intercourse). Damages are not allowed for spiritual suffering by way of injury to feelings.9 In assessing damages for loss of services, the starting point is to estimate the degree to which the spouse’s capacity to perform the services has been reduced. Recovery is not dependent on proof of actual loss through the employment of a substitute housekeeper.10 Even where other members of the family take over the injured spouse’s household duties, compensation under this head can still be obtained.11 Compensation may also be obtained for the loss of “outside” services, where the injured spouse was assisting in the plaintiff’s business.12 For loss of support, assistance and companionship, the court must take into account current social mores and, for example, take judicial notice of the fact that husbands are usually expected to take their share of domestic burdens.13 The plaintiff can also recover compensation for an adverse change in the quality of companionship, as where the injured spouse suffers a personality change following the infliction of nervous shock.14 For loss of sexual services, Birch v Taubmans Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 93; 74 WN (NSW) 7015 suggested that compensation is to be made only insofar as the impairment destroys fertility. However, later decisions have allowed damages simply for the loss or interruption of sexual life between the spouses.16 In making their assessment, courts consider the overall social picture presented by the post-injury conjugal relationship.17 In line with other tort actions, a plaintiff in a consortium action must take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss. Wage loss may be claimed in this connection.18 Where a claim for mitigation expenses is made, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the reasonableness of the sacrifice. In all cases, reasonableness must be judged solely by reference to the material aspects of the relationship;

939

[33.10.1750]

ECONOMIC LOSS

thus the normal measure of the plaintiff’s basic loss will be the provision of paid domestic assistance to fulfil the domestic role vacated by the injured spouse. The recognition of a wife’s personal claim in Griffıths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161; 51 ALJR 792 to damages for needs created by the accident for domestic assistance (see [33.10.990]) and her own claim for loss of domestic capacity (see [33.10.930]) has in no way reduced the entitlement of a husband’s right to recover damages for loss of his wife’s services.19

1 The other ancient domestic torts of enticement (an action for damages for loss of services and society and injury to the feelings which a husband could bring against a person who, with knowledge of her married state, enticed his wife away) and adultery or criminal conversation were abolished by Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 120. The action of seduction enables a parent or guardian to claim damages from one who unlawfully seduces away a child or female menial servant from the household. This archaic action is rarely brought today. It was abolished in South Australia in 1972: see Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 68. 2 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 218; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Sch 2 s 1; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28D; Acts Amendment (Actions for Damages) Act 1986 (WA), s 4, amending Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 3. 3 Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 13; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 65. 4 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 58; Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld), s 6. 5 For example, Smee v Tibbetts (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 391; 70 WN (NSW) 261; State Rail Authority (NSW) v Sharp [1981] 1 NSWLR 240 (CA). See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff, especially “Mental Harm” [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1320] for further discussion of liability in relation to nervous shock. 6 Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; 170 ER 1033; Osborn v Gillett (1873) LR 8 Ex 88; Mallett v Dunn [1949] 2 KB 180; Parker v Dzundza [1979] Qd R 55, Hoare J at 57; Locher v Turner [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-336 (QSC). 7 The independence of a husband’s consortium action from the personal action of his injured wife was stressed in Petricola v Metropolitan Transit Authority [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80-247 (VSCFC). 8 See [33.10.760] for more detailed discussion of these provisions. 9 Toohey v Hollier (1955) 92 CLR 618, the Court at 624; Best v Samuel Fox & Co Ld [1952] AC 716, Lord Morton at 734. But see Markellos v Wakefield (1974) 7 SASR 436; Fisher v Smithson (1978) 17 SASR 223, Bright J at 227; Johnson v Kelemic [1979] FLC 90-657 (NSWCA); Thorne v Strohfeld [1997] 1 Qd R 540 (CA). 10 Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 (CA), Moffitt J at 729. 11 Bresatz v Przibilla (1962) 108 CLR 541; 36 ALJR 212, Owen J at 550 (CLR); Birch v Taubmans Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 93; 74 WN (NSW) 70 (FC); Hunter v Scott [1963] Qd R 77, Gibbs J at 85; Fisher v Smithson (1978) 17 SASR 223, Bright J at 227. 12 Parkhill v Qualmer (1887) 3 WN (NSW) 131; however, this case was treated with caution in Talbot v Lusby [1995] QSC 143. 13 Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 (CA), Hutley JA at 741.

940

[33.10.1750]

LOSS OF SERVICES AND LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

14 State Rail Authority (NSW) v Sharp [1981] 1 NSWLR 240 (CA). See “Mental Harm” [33.2.1290]–[33.2.1320] for further discussion of liability in relation to nervous shock. 15 Birch v Taubmans Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 93; 74 WN (NSW) 70 (FC). 16 McIntyre v Miller (1980) 30 ACTR 8; Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 (CA), Hutley JA at 739. 17 Meadows v Maloney (1972) 4 SASR 567; Markellos v Wakefield (1974) 7 SASR 436; McIntyre v Miller (1980) 30 ACTR 8; Andrewartha v Andrewartha (No 1) (1987) 44 SASR 1. 18 See Kealley v Jones [1979] 1 NSWLR 723 (CA), Moffitt P at 730–732, Hutley J at 741–742. 19 Norman v Sutton (1989) 9 MVR 525 (NSWCA); Johnson v Nationwide Field Catering Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 494. However, there can be no double recovery for the same loss in the separate actions of the spouses.

941

[33.10.1750]

ECONOMIC LOSS

942

Equitable Damages in Tort [33.10.1860] A discretion to award equitable damages either in addition to, or in lieu of, a specific order in an action in tort lies in a court exercising equitable jurisdiction, when proceedings are susceptible of injunctive relief.1 Where the normal primary remedy is a specific order, equitable damages must not be awarded in lieu of an injunction if the result is to permit the defendant to make a compulsory purchase of the plaintiff’s rights.2 In Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287, a case of private nuisance, AL Smith LJ stated the following “good working rule” to apply to the issue of whether or not to award damages in lieu of a specific remedy: (1)

If the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small,

(2)

And is one which is capable of being estimated in money,

(3)

And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment,

(4)

And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction: – then damages in substitution for an injunction may be given.3

Although exercise of equitable relief cannot be overly encumbered and is always ultimately at the discretion of the court, the emphasis of the Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co rule remains valid. In its evaluation of each case, the court must assess the behaviour of the plaintiff and the defendant, the nature and seriousness of the injury, and any undue hardship and inconvenience which might be occasioned to the defendant in having to comply with a specific order to act or desist from further action.4

1

The power to award equitable damages was given to the old Court of Chancery by the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ Act) 21 & 22 Vict c 27 (UK), s 2. The Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory Supreme Courts have Lord Cairns’ Act jurisdiction by virtue of Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 26, and Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 62. The Lord Cairns’ Act has been copied by all Australian legislatures: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 68; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 30; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11(13); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 38; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 25(10). In Queensland, Lord Cairns’ Act jurisdiction continues despite the repeal of the original express statutory power (Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld), s 10, repealed by Repealing Rules 1900 (Qld), Sch 2, and Statute Law Revision Act 1908 (Qld), Sch 2): see Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245, McPherson J at 250–251. See also Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff; “Compensation and Damages” [15.9.10]ff.

943

[33.10.1860]

EQUITABLE DAMAGES IN TORT

2

3 4

Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 (CA), Lindley LJ at 315–316; Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88; [1980] 3 WLR 361 (CA). But see Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; [1977] 3 WLR 20 (CA), where damages were awarded in a case of negligence and continuing nuisance. In exercising his discretion in favour of damages in lieu of the usual grant of a prohibitory injunction, Lord Denning MR at 980–982 (QB) emphasised the primacy of the public interest in protecting the environment and open access to sporting facilities over the private interest of enjoyment of one’s home and garden. Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 (CA), Smith LJ at 322–323. See Norton v Angus (1926) 38 CLR 523.

[33.10.1870] The rights to equitable relief and common law damages are not co-terminous. If an injunction1 is denied, then the right to common law damages may still be pursued.2 Indeed, a plaintiff will usually have the option of seeking damages in the alternative in equity or at common law. However, if equitable damages are awarded, then, pursuant to the maxim “equity follows the law”, the court will normally follow the common law principles of assessment, and damages will be the same as if they had been obtained at common law.3 Equity can provide the full range of compensatory or merely nominal damages.4 Although equity normally follows the law, it does not do so slavishly and it is not ultimately bound by any of the rules and factors applicable to assessment of damages at law. For example, as equitable damages are given in lieu of the specific remedy, the date for assessment of damages in equity will usually be the date of judgment, but that is not a prima facie “correct date rule” of assessment. For equitable damages, the date for assessment should be that which is fair and equitable in all the circumstances of the particular case.5 Equitable damages are likely to be more advantageous to the plaintiff than damages at common law only in the case of continuing wrongs. That is because equitable damages may include compensation for prospective losses which may be occasioned by future wrongdoing.6 Only past wrongs can create an action for damages at common law.

1 See Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff. 2 Bosaid v Andry [1963] VR 465; Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; [1979] 2 WLR 487. 3 McKenna v Richey [1950] VLR 360, O’Bryan J at 361; Wenham v Ella (1972) 127 CLR 454; 46 ALJR 498, Barwick LJ at 460 (CLR); Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30; [1973] 2 WLR 405, Megarry J at 60 (Ch); Stewart v Layton (t/as BM Salmon Layton & Co) (1992) 111 ALR 687 (FCA) (assessment of damages for breach of fiduciary obligation). See also Equity “Compensation and Damages” [15.9.10]ff. 4 Dillon v Nash [1950] VLR 293, Sholl J at 301 (nominal damages). For exemplary damages, see Smith v Day (1882) 21 Ch D 421, Brett LJ at 428, discussed and departed from in Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298; [2003] NSWCA 10.

944

[33.10.1870]

5

6

Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30; [1973] 2 WLR 405; ASA Constructions Pty Ltd v Iwanov [1975] 1 NSWLR 512, Needham J at 518–519; Madden v Kevereski [1983] 1 NSWLR 305, Helsham CJ at 306; Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; [1979] 2 WLR 487, Lord Wilberforce at 400 (AC). Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (CHD); Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420; [2011] NSWCA 342; Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408; [1975] 2 WLR 282; Barbagallo v J & F Catelan Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 245.

945

[33.10.1870]

EQUITABLE DAMAGES IN TORT

946

Limitations on Compensation Causation [33.10.1980] Establishing a connection between every aspect of the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s tortious act or omission is a prerequisite to the recovery of damages.1 In March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, the High Court stressed the need to apply a practical and commonsense approach to all issues of factual causation.2 They took the view that no test, including the “but for” test, can be a definitive test for causation:3 There are … convincing reasons precluding [the “but for” test’s] adoption as a comprehensive definitive test of causation in the law of negligence. First, the clear weight of authority is against the substitution of such a formularized test of causation for a “common sense idea of what is meant by saying that one fact is a cause of another” … Secondly, unqualified acceptance of the “but for” test as even a negative or exclusionary test of causation … would lead to the absurd and unjust position that there was no “cause” of an injury in any case where there were present two independent and sufficient causes of the accident in which the injury was sustained. … Thirdly, the mere fact that something constitutes an essential condition (in the “but for” sense) of an occurrence does not mean that, for the purposes of ascribing responsibility or fault, it is properly to be seen as a “cause” of that occurrence as a matter of either ordinary language, or common sense. Thus, it could not, as a matter of ordinary language, be said that the fact that a person had a head was a “cause” of his being decapitated by a negligently wielded sword notwithstanding that possession of a head is an essential precondition of decapitation. Again, the mere fact that a person makes a gift of money to another is not, in any real sense, a “cause” of the damage sustained by that other person when his agent negligently loses the money notwithstanding that the loss would not have occurred “but for” the original gift.4

Such reliance on ad hoc appeals to common sense to solve causation problems has made it clear that many decisions on causation may, at heart, be normative decisions based on policy considerations. In Air Express Ltd v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 249; 55 ALJR 107, Mason J argued that although the law sees causation as a question of fact, it recognises a variety of theories and standards of causation, applying that which is in point of policy most appropriate to the question arising for decision.5 In Barnes v Hay (1988) 12 NSWLR 337, Mahoney JA expressed the view that a causation decision is a two-stage process. The first stage is to see whether or not the relationship between the two events is capable of being held to be causal. The second, normative stage is then to decide whether or not the first event should be held to be the cause of the second. That may involve a functional evaluation

947

[33.10.1980]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

of the relationship between the parties and consideration of the purposes and policy of the relevant part of the law.6 It is also clear that in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd, the High Court finally rejected the old, too simple, tests for cause, such as the “real cause”, “effective cause”, “last opportunity” and “last clear chance” tests which have sometimes been employed in the past.7 If, on the balance of probabilities, the injury or loss would have been incurred anyway, whether or not the defendant was in breach of any duty owed to the plaintiff, then the claim will not succeed.8 Where the relevant breach of duty is a failure to give any or any sufficient advice or warning, such as the risks of surgical procedures, the test on the causation issue is subjective: whether or not the particular plaintiff on the balance of probabilities should have taken heed of the advice or warning.9

1 Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170, the Court at 122 (CLR); Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 (FC), Smith J at 358. Establishing a causal relationship is perhaps most difficult in those accident cases where there are no eyewitnesses and the forensic evidence is inconclusive. Inference of cause or no cause is on the balance of probabilities in light of all the established facts. The surrounding circumstances (eg the “hit and run” nature of an accident or the failure of a breath test by the defendant) are often decisive in tipping the finding of causation the plaintiff’s way. See Livingstone v Halvorsen (1978) 53 ALJR 50; TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 (HCA); West v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1981) 148 CLR 62; 55 ALJR 544; Nominal Defendant (NSW) v Puglisi (1984) 58 ALJR 474 (HCA); JLW (Vic) Pty Ltd v Tsiloglou [1994] 1 VR 237 (FC); Ipswich Interstate Transport Terminal Pty Ltd v Walker [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-327 (QSC). 2 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 515, Deane J at 523, Toohey J at 524 and Gaudron J (agreeing) at 525 (CLR). See also McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL), Lord Reid at 5: “[T]he practical way in which the ordinary man’s mind works in the every-day affairs of life”; Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 550, McHugh J at 428 (CLR). 3 This was the old test at common law making recoverable only that loss which would not have occurred but for the breach of tortious duty. It was criticised by Mahoney JA in Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501 (CA), at 507–522; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 (CA), at 317–336 and Barnes v Hay (1988) 12 NSWLR 337 (CA), at 341–357. Since March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, formularised tests such as the “but for” test have been discarded. See Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514; 66 ALJR 839, Mason CJ, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 525 (CLR); Halvorsen Boats Pty Ltd v Robinson (1993) 31 NSWLR 1 (CA). 4 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Deane J at 522–523 (CLR) quoting from Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268, Dixon, Fullagar and Kitto JJ at 277. In March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd, McHugh J 948

[33.10.1990]

5 6

7

8

9

CAUSATION

at 534 (CLR) dissented on this issue, emphasising his view about the primacy and efficacy of the “but for” test and reiterating his judgment on this issue given in the contract case of Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 (CA), McHugh JA at 351–352: “So far as the law of tort is concerned, the ‘but for’ test must be taken in this Court to be the leading and, in all but exceptional cases, the exclusive test of causation. And I can see no reason why the same test should not be applied in contract.” Air Express Ltd v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1981) 146 CLR 249; 55 ALJR 107, Mason J at 323–324 (CLR). Barnes v Hay (1988) 12 NSWLR 337 (CA), Mahoney JA at 353. See also Mahoney JA’s expression of this normative approach to causation in Petrou v Hatzigeorgiou [1991] Aust Torts Reports 81-071 (NSWCA), at 68,566; and see Malone WS, “Ruminations on Cause-in-fact” (1956) 9 Stan L Rev 60; Zwier PJ, “Cause in Fact in Tort Law – A Philosophical and Historical Examination” (1981–1982) 31 De Paul L Rev 769; Horwitz MJ, “The Doctrine of Objective Causation”, in Kairys D (ed), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (3rd ed, Basic Books, 1998) p 360. March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, Mason CJ at 511–514 (CLR). Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] AC 350, Lord Shaw at 370 (“real effective cause” test); The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449 (“direct and natural” test) (overruled on other grounds in Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64); Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437, the High Court at 450–464 (“last opportunity” and “last clear chance” tests). These tests were originally developed to ameliorate the operation of contributory negligence as a complete defence, before the enactment of the apportionment of damages legislation: see [33.10.2150]. Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428; [1968] 2 WLR 422; Robinson v Post Offıce [1974] 1 WLR 1176 (CA); Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; [1987] 3 WLR 232. Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; 72 ALJR 208; 96 LGERA 410; [1998] HCA 5, Kirby J at 482–484 (CLR); Lilley v Alpine Resorts Commission (Vic) [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-475 (VSCA). See Professional Liability “Health Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff.

[33.10.1990] The burden of proof of establishing the cause of losses suffered by the plaintiff rests on the plaintiff on the balance of probabilities.1 The plaintiff may be defeated in this task by the existence of an evidential gap. For example, in McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1, the evidential gap concerned the aetiology of dermatitis. The experts, given the state of medical knowledge, simply could not make an assessment of the probability of the onset of dermatitis being due to the defendant’s breach of duty. Yet, in a clearly policy-based decision, the House of Lords allowed the plaintiff to overcome this causation difficulty by presuming that where the defendant is in breach of duty, then to materially increase the risk of injury equates with a material contribution to that injury. Despite limited support from some Australian judges,2 the reasoning in McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) is not likely to be followed.3 Australian courts have continued to insist on the pursuer of damages bearing the full burden of establishing, on the balance of probabilities, the material cause of their loss.4

949

[33.10.1990]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

The plaintiff does not necessarily have to lead evidence of the connection of their loss to the defendant’s wrongful acts or omission. That may be established by inference from other facts.5

1 Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; 39 ALJR 123, Barwick CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ at 168 (CLR); Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 642–643 (CLR); Public Trustee (as Administrator of Estate of Saroukas) v Sutherland Shire Council (1992) 75 LGRA 278 (NSWCA). 2 See, especially Quigley v Commonwealth (1981) 55 ALJR 579 (HCA), Murphy J at 584. See also Birkholz v RJ Gilbertson Pty Ltd (1985) 38 SASR 121 (FC). Pisano v Fairfield City Council (1991) 73 LGRA 184 (NSWCA) (Court presumed reliance rather than required its proof). 3 McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL), Lord Reid at 4–5. The ratio decidendi of McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) is not easy to extract. Lord Wilberforce at 5–7 went further than the other Lords, being of the view that the creator of the risk should, at least in the relationship of employer and employee, justly bear the evidential difficulty; thus, on policy grounds, shifting the burden of proof onto the employer defendant to prove that its breach of duty did not cause the injury. In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; [1988] 2 WLR 557, the House of Lords supported the result in McGhee v National Coal Board (UK) as a pragmatic decision on the primary facts of the case. For an extended examination of McGhee v National Coal Board (UK), see Weinrib EJ, “A Step Forward in Factual Causation” (1975) 38 Mod LR 518. 4 For examples of Australian “evidential gap” cases, see Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248 (FC); Fernandez v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 190 (CA) (affirmed in Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 136 CLR 681n; 50 ALJR 720); X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26, Mahoney J at 33; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29. 5 Pisano v Fairfield City Council (1991) 73 LGRA 184 (NSWCA).

[33.10.2000] Where there are multiple causes of the loss, the question is whether the causal events were combining causes or whether they were each sufficient causes of the loss. Difficult problems involving multiple causes are decided on pragmatic, common sense lines, following March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335: see [33.10.1980]. It is convenient to distinguish two situations: first, where there are concurrent causes, neither being sufficient on its own to cause the loss; and, second, where there are successive causes. (1)

If concurrent sufficient causes exist, each capable of giving rise to legal liability, then each tortfeasor will be independently responsible for the whole of the loss.1 If one of the concurrent sufficient causes is an entirely innocent and unforeseeable event (such as a lightning strike) then no recovery will be allowed against the other tortious actor, as the plaintiff cannot establish that they are worse off as a result of the tortious act.2 950

[33.10.2000]

CAUSATION

Where the independent sufficient cause is foreseeable, then the issue is not causation but remoteness (ie the loss was reasonably foreseeable);3 or duty (ie the defendant possibly owes a duty of care to protect the plaintiff from harm by third parties).4 (2)

Problems involving successive sufficient causes arise in cases where the plaintiff suffers a loss or injury which is later aggravated, diminished or overwhelmed by another event. The issue then arises, whether or not the later event should be taken into account in assessing damages flowing from the initial event. There is a choice between recognising that a later event has in fact obliterated the connection between the ultimate injury and the initial tortious event and, on the other hand, the policy imperative of ensuring that the plaintiff is not worse off as a result of the successive tort than they would have been if the first tort had not been committed. In Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1970] 2 WLR 50, the House of Lords held that if the later causal event does not extinguish or diminish the loss5 and is criminal or tortious in nature, then the original tortfeasor remains liable for all the loss which they originally caused to the plaintiff. It was also held that the successive tortfeasor is entitled to take the plaintiff as they find the plaintiff, and is liable only for any additional loss inflicted on the plaintiff.6 However, in the later decision of Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794; [1981] 3 WLR 155, the House of Lords held that where the overtaking event is an innocent event, that is, some natural misfortune such as a supervening illness – then the original tortfeasor is liable only for that part of the loss or damage which remains solely attributable to the initial wrongful act.7 Thus, although both these cases concerned supervening events, in Baker v Willoughby the supervening event was held to have no factual relevance to the first tortfeasor’s continuing responsibility for all the damage stemming from the earlier event. In contrast, in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd, the supervening event was found to have overwhelmed and substantially terminated the responsibility of the defendant beyond the point of interruption.8 The cases of Baker v Willoughby and Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd both concerned a supervening event which substantially obliterated the damage occasioned by the earlier event. They are distinguished and reconciled on the ground that in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd the supervening event was a natural one which could be traced back to an old injury not caused by any tortious act, whereas in Baker v Willoughby the supervening event was both tortious and criminal in nature. The policy informing the Baker v Willoughby decision is clear: a plaintiff should not be in a worse position as a result of successive torts than they would have been in if the first tort had not been committed at all. The real question in each case is to identify the damage for which each tortfeasor should be held responsible.9 Also, the Baker v Willoughby decision optimises victims’ chances of obtaining full compensation by protecting them 951

[33.10.2000]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

against the real risk of the second tortfeasor being a person of no financial substance and not worth suing. Despite their obvious logical inconsistency, both these cases have a legitimate policy basis, and both have been followed in Australia.10

1 Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v Henderson & Lahey [1988] 2 Qd R 216 (FC); Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; [1956] 2 WLR 707. 2 Fennell v Robson Excavations Pty Ltd [1977] 2 NSWLR 486 (CA), Glass JA at 492. 3 Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 (CA). See [33.10.830]–[33.10.930]. 4 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; 59 ALJR 564; 56 LGRA 120, Mason J at 467 (CLR) (disapproved on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; 72 ALJR 152; 96 LGERA 330; [1998] HCA 3); Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293; 65 LGRA 224 (CA) (overruled on other grounds in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day); Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504. 5 Where the overtaking cause extinguishes or diminishes the loss, as where a surgical operation effects a full or partial cure, the original tortfeasor will, to the extent of such cure, be no longer responsible: Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1970] 2 WLR 50, Lord Reid at 494 (AC); Faulkner v Keffalinos (1970) 45 ALJR 80 (HCA), Windeyer J at 85. 6 The facts of Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1970] 2 WLR 50 were that the plaintiff had been struck by a car driven by the defendant. The plaintiff’s left leg was injured. This injury caused stiffness in the ankle and there was a possibility that the leg would develop a degenerative condition in the future. The plaintiff had difficulty finding suitable employment but eventually found a job with an income comparable with his earnings before the injury. The plaintiff then became the victim of an armed robbery at his place of work. He was shot in the left leg and the leg was amputated. 7 In Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794; [1981] 3 WLR 155, the plaintiff slipped on the floor at his workplace. The back injury he suffered reduced his earning capacity by 50 per cent. Subsequently, he was totally disabled and rendered unemployable by a condition known as spondylotic myelopathy which had its origins in a neck injury suffered many years before the accident at work. 8 The defendant was held not responsible for loss of earning capacity and other pecuniary loss beyond this point. The defendant remained responsible for some continuing non-pecuniary loss from the first accident. 9 Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351; [2000] 3 WLR 1184 (CA); Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421 (CA). 10 Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1970] 2 WLR 50, this approach has been followed in Godden v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board [1972] 2 NSWLR 183 (CA); Nicholson v Walker (1979) 21 SASR 481; Craig v Troy (1997) 16 WAR 96 (FC); Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) v Aboushadi [1999] Aust Torts Reports 81-531; [1999] NSWCA 396. But see Griffıths v Commonwealth (1983) 50 ACTR 7; 72 FLR 260; Nilon v Bezzina [1988] 2 Qd R 420 (FC). The approach in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794; [1981] 3 WLR 155 has been followed in

952

[33.10.2010]

CAUSATION

Leschke v Jeffs (1995) 49 QJPR 138; Faulkner v Keffalinos (1970) 45 ALJR 80; Zumeris v Testa [1972] VR 839 (FC); State Government Insurance Commission (WA) v Oakley (1990) 10 MVR 570 (WASCFC).

[33.10.2010] A novus actus interveniens (new act intervening) will sometimes sever the chain of causation between the defendant’s tort and the plaintiff’s injury or loss.1 A person will not be liable for damage done if the chain of causation between their act or breach of duty, causing harm to the plaintiff, is broken by a later, entirely unconnected and unforeseeable, supervening event, such as a natural catastrophe2 or grossly negligent act of a third party,3 or a subsequent injury which is self-inflicted or has otherwise been caused unreasonably by the victim on themselves,4 unless the injury has been caused by the very act against which the defendant had a duty to guard.5 If the intervening event is in the normal course of things, it will not usually qualify as a novus actus interveniens6 and whether or not an intervening act breaks the chain of causation depends on the application of a common sense test to the particular circumstances of each case.7 In personal injury claims, the novus actus interveniens issue has most often been raised where the victim has been subject to subsequent negligent medical treatment.8 In the leading case, Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504, the plaintiff suffered an injury due to the defendant’s negligence which was later greatly aggravated by the negligence of a medical practitioner. The Court stated: A line marking the boundary of the damage for which a tortfeasor is liable in negligence may be drawn either because the relevant injury is not reasonably foreseeable or because the chain of causation is broken by a novus actus interveniens. … But it must be possible to draw such a line clearly before a liability for damage that would not have occurred but for the wrongful act or omission of a tortfeasor and that is reasonably foreseeable by him is treated as the result of a second tortfeasor’s negligence alone. … Whether such a line can and should be drawn is very much a matter of fact and degree.9

It would seem that the harm in such a case will be attributed solely to the medical practitioner only if the treatment in question was more than merely negligent, and was altogether extraordinary.

1 2

3

Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1; Richards v Victoria [1969] VR 136 (FC); Robinson v Post Offıce [1974] 1 WLR 1176 (CA). For example, fire, storm and flood. See Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries (Owners) Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 588 (HL), Lord MacDermott at 601; Carslogie Steamship Co v Royal Norwegian Government (The Carslogie) [1952] AC 292. Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349 (CA); Home Offıce (UK) v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 WLR 1140; Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625; [1981] 2 WLR 1038 (CA); Environment Agency (formerly National

953

[33.10.2010]

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4

5

6

7

8

9

Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22; [1998] 2 WLR 350 (QB), Lord Hoffam at 29–31 (AC). McKew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621 (HL). But see Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (SA) (1995) 182 CLR 1; 69 ALJR 118 for a case in which the plaintiff, even though he voluntarily retired from his employment four and a half years before he was obliged to, was able to recover damages for his loss of earning capacity during this period, on the grounds that his injuries were a causative influence in the premature termination of his employment. Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363. Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (UK) [2000] 1 AC 360; [1999] 3 WLR 363; Telstra Corp Ltd v Smith [1998] Aust Torts Reports 81-487 (NSWCA). Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514. See Keeffe v McLean-Carr [1993] Aust Torts Reports 81-224 (SASC); The Oropesa [1943] P32. Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170; Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 (FC), Smith J at 358; Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504. See Yeo S, “Making Sense of Liability for Intervening Acts” (1997) 5 TLJ 45. See also [33.10.1980]. Martin v Isbard (1946) 48 WALR 52; Moore v AGC (Insurances) Ltd [1968] SASR 389; Lawrie v Meggitt (1974) 11 SASR 5; Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504; Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351; [2000] 3 WLR 1184. Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504, the Court at 528 (CLR).

[33.10.2020] Even if a causal connection exists, damage that is too remote does not give rise to liability. Causation and remoteness are often both in issue in the one case, with discussion moving back and forth from one issue to the other: for example, where there is intervention by a third party, as where vandals gain access to the defendant’s property, and by damaging the defendant’s property, eventually cause damage to the plaintiff’s property. Simultaneous causation, remoteness and duty issues are raised. Whether or not the damage was reasonably foreseeable depends on whether the chain of causation was in fact broken by the intervention of the vandals, which in turn depends on whether the intervention was a foreseeable consequence of the plaintiff not maintaining its property.1 Remoteness of damage has been distinguished from causation, in that remoteness has long been seen to be an issue of policy whereas causation has traditionally been viewed as a purely factual issue, free of policy considerations. However, judicial recognition of the role of policy in the causation inquiry (see [33.10.1980]) represents a breakdown in the traditional insistence on the separation of factual issues of causal connection from policy-based issues of remoteness of loss. In March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, McHugh J expressed the minority view: Once it is recognised that foreseeability is not the exclusive test of remoteness and that policy-based rules, disguised as causation principles, are also being used to limit 954

[33.10.2030]

CERTAINTY

responsibility for occasioning damage, the rationalisation of the rules concerning remoteness of damage requires an approach which incorporates the issue of foreseeability but also enables other policy factors to be articulated and examined. One such approach, and the one I favour, is the “scope of the risk” test … the “scope of the risk” test enables relevant policy factors to be articulated and justified in a way which is not possible when responsibility is limited by reference to commonsense notions of causation or to more specific criteria such as “novus actus interveniens”, “sole cause” or “real cause”, all of which conceal unexpressed value judgments.2

1 2

Ward v Cannock Chase District Council [1986] Ch 546; [1986] 2 WLR 660. March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; 65 ALJR 335, McHugh J at 535–536 (CLR). However, the majority opinion in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd adopted the common sense rubric to apply to causation problems: see Mason CJ at 515, Deane J at 522, Gaudron J (agreeing) at 525, Toohey J (agreeing generally) at 524 (CLR).

Certainty [33.10.2030] Losses claimed must be established by the plaintiff with sufficient certainty to satisfy the court, both of their existence and extent. Entirely speculative losses are not recoverable.1 The degree of certainty required by the law varies with the nature and circumstances of the loss. The law is stricter in its requirement of certainty of past pecuniary losses than of future pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary species of loss in general. However, mere difficulty of calculation is no bar to recovery.2 Pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life consequent on personal injury, and loss of reputation in defamation, are losses well recognised by the law as deserving of compensation, and the patent impossibility of assessing such losses scientifically is not deemed to be a bar to recovery of substantial damages.3 Multiple issues of causation, remoteness, certainty of loss and problems of proof are often simultaneously active in a single case, and the outcome may be determined by the court’s characterisation of the issue.4 For example, in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; [1987] 3 WLR 232, in which the defendant’s breach of duty had increased the risk of long-term injury to the plaintiff, at trial5 the Judge treated the claim as the loss of a 25 per cent chance of getting better and awarded 25 per cent of full damages. The House of Lords preferred to characterise the case as a simple causation problem, and found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that his injury was caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. In Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316, the High Court explained that, in deciding past factual issues on the balance of probabilities, the issue is causation, and there must be a definite finding as to the existence or non-existence of the facts alleged. However, concerning future 955

[33.10.2030]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

consequences to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s tort, in light of the plaintiff’s own pre-existing susceptibilities and other relevant facts, the issue is certainty of loss, and the court must therefore evaluate all the possibilities and probabilities and assess damages on the basis of percentages.6 In Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 68 ALJR 313, the High Court reaffirmed the decision in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd in a strict commercial/trade practice context. This decision makes it quite clear that Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd is not to be confined to personal injury claims or even tort-based claims, but shall apply to all problems concerning prospective loss and damage in civil suits.7

1 This is an old legal maxim. McGregor H, McGregor on Damages (17th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at [8-001]–[8-015] provides a general statement of the requirement of certain loss and refers to some ancient authorities. There is also the latin maxim de minimis non curat lex (of trifles the law does not concern itself): Cro Eliz 353: An Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England 1846 9 & 10 Vict c 95 (UK); An Act to Extend the Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England 1850 13 & 14 Vict c 61 (UK). Kennard v Jones (1791) 4 TR 495; 100 ER 1139; Wilson v Rastall (1792) 4 TR 753; 100 ER 1283; Wellington v Arters (1792) 5 TR 64; 101 ER 37; Haines v Davey (1836) 4 Ad & E 892; 111 ER 1019; Boosey v Purday (1849) 4 Ex 145; 154 ER 1159; Branson v Didsbury (1840) 12 Ad & E 631; 113 ER 953; Manton v Bales (1845) 1 CB 444; 135 ER 613; Hawkins v Alder (1856) 18 CB 640; 139 ER 1521; Marsh v Bower (1772) 2 Black W 851; 96 ER 502; Rochdale Canal Co v King (1849) 14 QB 122; 117 ER 49; R v Betts (1850) 16 QB 1022; Hinings v Hinings (1864) 10 LT (NS) 294; Gibbs v Tunaley (1845) 1 CB 640; 135 ER 692; Jones v Tatham (1818) 8 Taunt 634; 129 ER 530. 2 In Callaghan v Wm C Lynch Pty Ltd (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 830, the Court (at 834) observed: “Many cases illustrate that uncertainty in the quantification of damage, either in cases of contract or tort, does not prevent an assessment provided that some broad estimate can be made … Obviously the law will disregard possibilities that are slight or chances which are nebulous; otherwise all the circumstances of the situation must be taken into account … where precise evidence is obtainable the court naturally expects to have it. Where it is not the court must do the best it can.” See also Bowen v Blair [1933] VLR 398 (FC), Mann ACJ at 402; NSW v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133; Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; 20 ALJ 451, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 143 (CLR). 3 Paul v Rendell (1981) 55 ALJR 371, Lord Diplock (for the Privy Council) at 372: “A judgment as to what constitutes proper compensation in money terms for pain, suffering or deprivation of amenities of life, can only be intuitive, and the assessment of future economic loss involves a double exercise in the art of prophesying not only what the future holds for the injured plaintiff but also what the future would have held for him if he had not been injured.” 4 In Callaghan v Wm C Lynch Pty Ltd (1962) 79 WN (NSW) 830, the Court (at 834) noted: “A distinction must be drawn between cases where the plaintiff leaves the case uncertain as to the causation of damage … or in cases where questions of remoteness arise as opposed to cases where difficulties arise due to the fact that the assessment of

956

[33.10.2040]

5

6

7

CERTAINTY

damages cannot be made with mathematical accuracy. Lack of relevant evidence may of course make it impossible to assess damages at all, eg where there are a number of contingencies on which the loss may depend. But, where it is established that damage has been incurred for which a defendant should be held liable the plaintiff may be accorded the benefit of every reasonable presumption as to the loss suffered.” Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750; [1987] 3 WLR 232. But see the characterisation of the issue by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26. For an application of Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316, see Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123, Deane J at 121–126 (CLR). See also Waribay Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison [1991] 2 VR 391 (App Div); Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou (1999) 47 NSWLR 473; [1999] NSWCA 323. A similar problem of uncertainty as to the extent of future economic loss may occur in cases of professional negligence by an accountant concerning advice about investment prospects. Where it is found that there is a real possibility that the plaintiff may have made the same investment decision even if properly advised by its accountant, then this is a contingency which must be taken into account by making an appropriate reduction to the amount of damages: Hyland v Campbell [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-352 (QCA). For discussion of professional liability, see also Professional Liability “Auditors and Accountants” [27.4.10]ff.

[33.10.2040] The loss of a chance of receiving a benefit or of avoiding an injury may be established as damage.1 Where the loss of a chance to make money is established, damages are assessed by calculating the likely sum expected to have been made, and then reducing it by taking into account the chance of any adverse contingencies. For example, such an adjustment must be made in actions against solicitors whose negligence has denied the plaintiff an opportunity to sue a third party.2 A discount for adverse contingencies is also often made in personal injury actions when assessing the value of the damage to the plaintiff’s earning capacity.3 The object is not to work out how much the profit would have been, but to decide how much the chance of making that profit is worth in money.4 Damages are reduced as the probability of the loss diminishes. Once the assessment of damages becomes entirely speculative, nominal damages are awarded.5 There can be no recovery for loss of a chance if the right which has been lost cannot be quantified in money terms.6

1

Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 (CA); Howe v Teefy (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 301; 44 WN (NSW) 102 (FC). These are contract cases, but, in principle, there is no distinction between contract and tort on the issue of certainty: Hardware Services Pty Ltd v Primac Association Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 393, Thomas J at 400–401; Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51, Wilson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 363 (CLR); Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; 66 ALJR 550;

957

[33.10.2040]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

2

3

4 5 6

Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; 66 ALJR 123. See also “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association (UK) [1958] 1 WLR 563 (CA), Lord Evershed MR at 573–576; Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; 63 ALJR 51, Brennan J at 371–372 (CLR); Nikolaou v Papasavas, Phillips & Co (1989) 166 CLR 394; 63 ALJR 297, Mason CJ at 398–399 (CLR). Following Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240, these professional negligence actions are now taken in tort. See also David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1990) 23 FCR 1 (FC) (overruled on other grounds in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; 66 ALJR 768; 24 ATR 125). Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151 (CA); Hardware Services Pty Ltd v Primac Association Ltd [1988] 1 Qd R 393, Thomas J at 399–401 (a professional negligence claim, where it was correctly stated that there should be no distinction between the approach to assessment of damages for loss of a chance and the quantification of damage based on uncertain future events, whether or not the action is framed in contract or tort). Howe v Teefy (1927) 27 SR (NSW) 301; 44 WN (NSW) 102, Street CJ at 307 (SR (NSW)). Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207; [1972] 3 WLR 801; JLW (Vic) Pty Ltd v Tsiloglou [1994] 1 VR 237. Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127; 20 ALJ 451, Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 143.

[33.10.2050] For future events which might or might not occur, the courts must assess the degree of probability of those events occurring.1 In Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ explained: The probability may be very high – 99.9 per cent – or very low – 0.1 per cent. But unless the chance is so low as to be regarded as speculative – say less than 1 per cent – or so high as to be practically certain – say over 99 per cent – the court will take that chance into account in assessing the damages. Where proof is necessarily unattainable, it would be unfair to treat as certain a prediction which has a 51 per cent probability of occurring, but to ignore altogether a prediction which has a 49 per cent probability of occurring. Thus, the court assesses the degree of probability. … The adjustment may increase or decrease the amount of damages otherwise to be awarded. … The approach is the same whether it is alleged that the event would have occurred before or might occur after the assessment of damages takes place.2

Once events have occurred converting a chance into a certainty, then the chance is disregarded and the assessment is based on the facts.3

1 See Mallett v McMonagle [1970] AC 166; [1969] 2 WLR 767, Lord Diplock at 174–175 (AC); Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207; [1972] 3 WLR 801, Lord Reid at 212, Viscount Dilhorne at 219 (AC); McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543 (CA), Moffitt P and Samuels JA at 550–551; Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; 68 ALJR 313.

958

[33.10.2060]

2

3

REMOTENESS

Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638; 64 ALJR 316, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ at 643 (CLR). In agreeing with the general thrust of the reasoning of Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ on this point, Brennan and Dawson JJ at 640 (CLR) differed only in thinking that it was “undesirable for damages to be assessed on the footing of an evaluation expressed as a percentage. Damages need not be assessed by first determining an award on the footing that the hypothetical situation would have occurred and then discounting the award by a selected percentage. Damages founded on hypothetical evaluations defy precise calculation … we would not favour the use of the term ‘probability’ to describe the possibility of occurrence of a situation when the possibility is minimal”. Halvorsen Boats Pty Ltd v Robinson (1993) 31 NSWLR 1 (CA).

Remoteness [33.10.2060] The concept of remoteness is the principal tool used by the common law to prevent an endless chain of consequences. However, the test for remoteness of damage is not uniformly formulated for all torts and kinds of loss. In negligence actions until 1961, a plaintiff needed to show only that a tortious act had been committed, and that that act directly caused the damage suffered.1 In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mort’s Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 1)) [1961] AC 388; [1961] 2 WLR 126; (1961) 34 ALJR 451, the Privy Council stated a new test of reasonable foreseeability for remoteness (or proximity) of damage. The necessary degree of foreseeability was settled in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165. The test adopted was to ask whether or not there was a “real risk” of the damage occurring, and whether the risk was one which would not be brushed aside as far-fetched.2 The precise damage caused need not be foreseen. It is necessary to foresee only the kind of injury or loss. For example, in Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837; [1963] 2 WLR 779, injury through burning by a naked flame from a kerosene lamp was held to be of the same kind as injury by explosion. The precise concatenation of circumstances and extent of injury need not be envisaged.3 Where a plaintiff suffers further damage as a consequence of foreseeable initial damage, the further damage will be too remote unless it is of the same kind as the initial damage or was itself reasonably foreseeable.4 There is no simple answer to how broadly or narrowly the different kinds of loss are defined. The foreseeability formula is flexible enough in application to fulfil its policy-based function of ensuring that for different interests, different kinds of loss will be more broadly or more narrowly recognised by the courts.5

1

Re Polemis [1921] 3 KB 560 (CA). See “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff.

959

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2

3 4 5

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165, Lord Reid (for the Privy Council) at 170 (ALJR). The facts of the Wagon Mound cases were that oil had been negligently allowed to escape from a ship in Sydney harbour. The oil spread under the Morts Dock wharf and caught fire due to welding operations on the wharf. The fire caused extensive damage to the wharf and adjacent ships. In The Wagon Mound (No 2), it was found that even though the ignition of fuel oil spread on water was unlikely to occur, the negligent discharge of the oil was an act wholly lacking in social utility and was so easily prevented that the defendant was held liable. Thus, notions of fault were introduced into causation. Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837; [1963] 2 WLR 779, Lord Guest at 856–857 (AC). Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 (CA). The policy-based function of the remoteness issue is well illustrated by Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council [1995] Aust Torts Reports 81-351 (NSWSC). In this case, the plaintiff husband and wife complained that due to the defendant council’s negligence in processing their subdivision application they had not only suffered loss of profits but that the husband had developed serious psychiatric and physical illnesses. The New South Wales Supreme Court held that the couple were only entitled to recover compensation for their probable economic indemnity loss, and refused to countenance the recovery of damages for illness in such an action against a local council. While the foreseeability formula was routinely applied, the economic policy grounds for this limitation on recovery were also stated. On appeal, however, this point was overruled by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, which held that the plaintiffs were permitted to claim damages for vexation: Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1998) 44 NSWLR 1; 104 LGERA 355.

[33.10.2070] The defendant takes their victim as found, with all the victim’s physical and mental attributes.1 In Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501, McHugh JA explained: When a defendant takes a plaintiff as he finds him, he does not take him as a naked human being divorced from his environment. Clearly enough taking the plaintiff as you find him involves taking him in at least his social and earning capacity setting … I think that the defendant must take the plaintiff with all his weaknesses, beliefs and reactions as well as his capacities and attributes, physical, social and economic.2

This so-called “eggshell skull” rule is not an exception to the Wagon Mound3 foreseeability remoteness rule (see [33.10.2060]), as well explained by Glass JA in Havenaar v Havenaar [1982] 1 NSWLR 626: [This rule] does no more than recognise that the possession by the plaintiff of special proclivities capable of enlarging the lesser harm which would be suffered by others is always foreseeable as a possibility notwithstanding that the particular proclivity and the way in which it has worked itself out in producing special harm may not be foreseeable even as possibilities.4

1 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669; Bourhill (Hay) v Young (Pregnant Fish

960

[33.10.2080]

2 3

4

REMOTENESS

Wife’s Case) [1943] AC 92; Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405; [1962] 2 WLR 148; Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164; 39 ALJR 123. For other examples of the application of the “eggshell skull” rule, see Love v Port of London Authority (UK) [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541 (QB) (weak heart); Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; 34 ALJR 186 (quiescent spondylitis); Warren v Scruttons Ltd [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 497 (QB) (eye happened to be ulcerated at time of tortious injury to finger – deterioration of eye condition linked to finger injury); Winteringham v Rae (1965) 55 DLR (2d) 108 (ONHC) (allergy to anti-tetanus serum injected after dog bite); Sayers v Perrin (No 3) [1966] Qd R 89 (FC) (poliomyelitis resulting from electric shock); Robinson v Post Offıce [1974] 1 WLR 1176 (CA) (allergy to anti-tetanus serum injected after minor cut to skin suffered at work); Wilson v Peisley (1975) 50 ALJR 207 (HCA) (unusually vulnerable personality); Bishop v Arts & Letters Club of Toronto (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 107 (ONHC) (haemophilia); Hoffmueller v Commonwealth (1981) 54 FLR 48 (NSWCA) (neurotic personality); Bryden v Health Department [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-075 (VSC) (reaction to BCG inoculation). See also “Vulnerable Plaintiffs” [33.2.1130]. Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501 (CA), McHugh JA at 537. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC). Havenaar v Havenaar [1982] 1 NSWLR 626 (CA), Glass JA at 631.

[33.10.2080] In personal injury cases, the foreseeability test for remoteness has been applied very broadly, allowing recovery for quite unexpected consequences.1 One need only foresee the initial trauma to be held responsible for quite unforeseeable complications.2 Injuries which have been held to be not too remote include injury caused by grossly excessive consumption of alcohol in order to relieve pain from the original accident, and distress and inconvenience suffered through being imprisoned for criminal offences committed as a result of a personality change triggered by the original accident. “Unexpected consequences”, nevertheless, must pass the basic indemnity test applying to all tort damages. Thus, where a plaintiff complained that his injuries prevented him from being the owner-builder of his dream house and, in consequence whereof, he sold the original block of land, bought other land and then contracted a builder to build, he was not entitled to recover his claim for the difference in value between what the value of the house originally intended to have been built would have been and what the value of his new house was. The true measure was limited to the value of the labour the plaintiff was not able to employ in building a house himself, by reason of the accident.3

1

See, eg Havenaar v Havenaar [1982] 1 NSWLR 626 (CA); Meah v McCreamer (No 1) [1985] 1 All ER 367 (QB). But see the limits defined in Meah v McCreamer (No 2) [1986] 1 All ER 943 (QB); Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504; Nader v Urban Transit Authority (NSW) (1985) 2 NSWLR 501 (CA). But see State Rail Authority (NSW) v Wiegold (1991)

961

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2 3

25 NSWLR 500, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal resolutely refused to allow damages for the consequences of impecuniosity flowing from the tort – in this case resort to criminality, then conviction and, ultimately, imprisonment of the plaintiff. That case has since been applied in Hunter Area Health Service (NSW) v Presland (2005) 63 NSWLR 22; [2005] NSWCA 33. Beavis v Apthorpe (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 852 (FC); Stephenson v Waite Tileman Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 152 (CA). Spargo v Greatorex (1992) 59 SASR 1 (FC).

[33.10.2090] The test of remoteness (see [33.10.2060]) has been strictly applied in property loss cases. However, this approach conflicts with the Wagon Mound1 foreseeability test: see [33.10.2060]. This is doubtless due to judicial notice taken of the prevalence of insurance cover to protect certain kinds of property, and to the traditional concern of the courts about the indeterminate nature of consequential economic loss. There have been many claims where plaintiffs have wholly or partly failed because their loss has been held to be too remote. In The Liesbosch v The SS Edison [1933] AC 449, it was held that the plaintiff’s financial susceptibility to damage due to its impecuniosity should not increase the damages payable. The plaintiff was not permitted to recover the additional costs of hiring a substitute dredge. The lack of funds was either too remote or an independent cause of loss. This has now been overruled by Lagden v O’Connor [2004] 1 AC 1067; [2003] 3 WLR 1571; [2003] UKHL 64. A wrongdoer now takes even an impecunious victim as they find them. Therefore the wrongdoer must bear the consequences if it was reasonably foreseeable that the injured party would have to borrow money or incur some other kind of expenditure to mitigate their damages.

1

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC).

[33.10.2100] It is clear that the same foreseeability test for remoteness applies in nuisance, as in negligence.1 That is so despite the fact that proof of the defendant’s negligence is not always a precondition for liability in nuisance. As a result, in nuisance, foreseeability is sometimes required only to define the extent of recoverable damage, and not to establish initial liability.

1

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617; [1966] 3 WLR 498; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 21; 84 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 59; 40 ALJR 165 (PC), Lord Reid at 168 (ALJR) (public nuisance); Hiap Lee (Cheong Leong & Sons) Brickmakers Ltd v Weng Lok Mining Co Ltd [1974] 2 MLJ 1, Lord Cross (for the Privy Council) at 4 (private nuisance). See also “Negligence” [33.2.10]ff; “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. 962

[33.10.2120]

MITIGATION

[33.10.2110] In trespass, there is some dispute about the correct test for remoteness of damage. There is some authority in favour of the foreseeability test, especially in cases of negligent trespass.1 However, trespass already has two control devices (“directness” and “possession”) making a third (“foreseeability”) unnecessary. For trespass actions, where liability is not based on intention, the defendant should normally be liable for all the direct consequences of their tortious conduct.2 For other intentional torts such as deceit,3 and for the strict liability torts,4 it is clear that all losses which flow directly from the defendant’s act can be recovered in damages.

1

2

3

4

For the sake of consistency, eg Hogan v AG Wright Pty Ltd [1963] Tas SR 44; Svingos v Deacon Avenue Cartage & Storage Pty Ltd (1971) 2 SASR 126 (FC); TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82. See also “Trespass and Intentional Torts” [33.8.10]ff. But see Mayfair Ltd v Pears [1987] 1 NZLR 459 (CA). Pears trespassed in parking his car in a building owned by Mayfair Ltd. The car caught fire and as a result the building was damaged. Pears was not negligent. It was held at trial and on appeal that unintended and unforeseen damage occurring in the course of an intentional trespass to land was not recoverable. This case was favourable referenced to in Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69, Kirby J at [79]. Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158; [1969] 2 WLR 673 (CA); Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; 76 ALJR 163; [2001] HCA 69. See also [33.10.1680]; “Deceit” [33.8.1250]. In Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331, the Court absorbed the old, separate Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 tort into the general law of negligence. Thus, the foreseeability test should now normally apply to most “escape causing mischief” situations; see Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; [1994] 2 WLR 53 (CA and HL). However, there may be odd instances in the future, when a Rylands v Fletcher type of situation might more properly be founded solely (or alternatively) in nuisance or trespass, rather than negligence. For the coexisting relationship between trespass and negligence in Australia, see “Trespass” [33.8.300]–[33.8.600]. See also “Strict Liability” [33.6.10]ff.

Mitigation [33.10.2120] The duty to mitigate (or minimise) the loss requires the plaintiff to act reasonably in responding to the defendant’s tort.1 In its function, mitigation is closely aligned with causation and remoteness. At issue is the striking of a fair balance between the parties, to fairly compensate the plaintiff without unduly penalising the defendant. The same principles of

963

[33.10.2120]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

mitigation apply in tort and contract.2 The doctrine of mitigation relieves the defendant from paying that portion of the loss over which the plaintiff had full control and should prudently have avoided. The classic statement of this duty was made in the contract case, British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673, where Viscount Haldane LC said that the plaintiff has the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss … [and is debarred] from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps … [this] does not impose on the plaintiff an obligation to take any step which a reasonable and prudent man would not ordinarily take in the course of his business.3

The onus of proof of failure to mitigate rests on the defendant,4 and the reasonableness or otherwise of the plaintiff’s actions following the damage depends on all the circumstances of each case and on the financial resources and ability of the individual plaintiff.5 The following points must be considered: (1)

the plaintiff’s attempts to mitigate must not be judged in hindsight. The law is satisfied if the party placed in a difficult situation, by reason of the breach of duty owed, has acted reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures, and they will not be held disentitled to recover the cost of such measures merely because the party in breach can suggest that other less burdensome measures might have been taken;6

(2)

whether the loss flows from a tort or breach of contract, the plaintiff is not obliged to sacrifice or put at risk their own interests or reputation;7

(3)

if the plaintiff’s chattel has been destroyed by a tortious act, the plaintiff is only obliged to seek a suitable, equivalent chattel in the locality of the loss, and is not obliged to travel far and wide to find a suitable replacement;8

(4)

if the defendant’s fraud or other wrong has locked the plaintiff into a “horns of a dilemma” situation, one from which they cannot easily escape without great financial risk, then the plaintiff may reasonably incur loss in mitigation even if the loss incurred substantially exceeds the loss which would have been incurred if no mitigating steps had been attempted;9 and

(5)

the duty to mitigate does not normally oblige the plaintiff to embark on risky litigation against a third party.10

The courts routinely award the plaintiff damages for expenses incurred in reasonable attempts to mitigate and confine the loss.11 Also, if the plaintiff has reasonably delayed repairing damaged property on good commercial grounds, this should not lead to a reduction in damages.12

1 The duty to mitigate the loss is an important factor in deciding the appropriate date for assessment of damages: see [33.10.490]. The term “mitigation” is used also in tort, in the context of deciding whether to make an award of exemplary and/or

964

[33.10.2130]

MITIGATION

aggravated damages: see [33.10.180]–[33.10.220]. Any behaviour of the plaintiff which is a provocation of the defendant’s tortious conduct can be said to mitigate the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct and make such an award inappropriate. 2 See Contract: General Principles “Remedies” [7.9.10]ff. 3 British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673, Viscount Haldane LC at 689. 4 Metal Fabrications (Vic) Pty Ltd v Kelcey [1986] VR 507 (FC); Goldburg v Shell Oil Co of Australia Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 711 (FCAFC). However, in Queensland, a dissatisfied respondent may give the claimant written notice suggesting specified action the claimant should take to mitigate damages: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 53(1), (2). The plaintiff’s duty to mitigate is not limited by this notice: s 53(3). The court may reduce damages if it finds that the claimant has failed to take responsible steps pursuant to s 53(2) to mitigate against damage: s 53(4). 5 Clippens Oil Co Ltd v Edinburgh & District Water Trustees [1907] AC 291, Lord Collins at 303; Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438; 55 ALJR 562, Brennan J at 446–447 (CLR); Perry v Sidney Phillips & Son [1982] 1 WLR 1297 (QB); Archer v Brown [1985] QB 401; [1984] 3 WLR 350, Pain J at 417 (QB); Lorca v Holts’ Corrosion Control Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 261 (FC). 6 Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons Ltd [1932] AC 452, Lord Macmillan at 506 (a contract case, but the principle is equally applicable in tort). 7 Sacher Investments Pty Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 5; Metal Fabrications (Vic) Pty Ltd v Kelcey [1986] VR 507 (FC); London & South of England Building Society v Stone [1983] 1 WLR 1242 (CA); Karacominakis v Big Country Developments Pty Ltd (2000) 10 BPR 18,235. 8 Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 88 (CA) (plaintiff failed to find a replacement second hand tractor and mower). 9 Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158; [1969] 2 WLR 673 (CA); Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 at 271; 60 ALJR 49, Gibbs CJ at 227–228, Brennan J at 251, Dawson J at 270 (CLR); Burns v MAN Automotive (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 653; 61 ALJR 81. 10 Pilkington v Wood [1953] Ch 770; [1953] 3 WLR 522, Harman J at 777 (Ch). See also Treloar v Henderson [1968] NZLR 1085 (SC); Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464. 11 See, eg Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 (CA), Samuels JA at 356–357; New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v O’Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80 (SC) (plaintiff recovered costs of fighting a fire in attempting to mitigate loss); Crofts v Murton [2009] EWHC 3538 (QB) (plaintiff claiming medical expenses incurred in trying to mitigate loss stemming from an injury). 12 See, eg Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 (CA) (increased costs recovered following reasonable delay in repairing building: see [33.10.490]); Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97.

[33.10.2130] An allowance for betterment may have to be made if, in mitigation of loss, the plaintiff improves their position by the replacement of new and superior machinery, equipment or buildings for old and inferior chattels or fixtures. The issue of whether or not to make a deduction for betterment turns on the interplay of two viewpoints. First, the view that a plaintiff’s position should not be improved by the award of damages.1 In

965

[33.10.2130]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

contrast, which accords better with the basic indemnification rationale of torts law, is the view that the plaintiff should not be forced to invest in new machinery, equipment or buildings against their will.2 Each case must be taken on its own facts, but if the replacement is merely new and not of superior specifications or quality, and no second-hand replacements are available, then the additional loss should normally be borne by the blameworthy defendant and not by the innocent plaintiff.3

1

2 3

Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 88 (CA), Moffitt P at 94–96; Hyder Consulting (Aust) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd (2002) 18 BCL 122; [2001] NSWCA 313. Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 88 (CA), Samuels JA at 104, 108–109. Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447; [1970] 2 WLR 198 (CA). That is a contract case but the mitigation principle enunciated here should apply equally to contract and tort claims.

[33.10.2140] In personal injury claims, an injured plaintiff is expected to seek usual medical advice and treatment, which may include undergoing surgical procedures.1 The onus is always on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s injuries were capable of alleviation. If failure to mitigate the loss is established, then damages will be assessed as if the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss. Where a plaintiff has refused medical treatment, the burden lies on the defendant to prove that the refusal was unreasonable and this constituted a failure by the plaintiff to mitigate the damage sustained.2 The test of reasonableness applicable is to ask whether or not a reasonable person would have refused treatment in the circumstances as they existed for the plaintiff, and subject to factors such as any difficulties of understanding and the particular medical history and condition that affected the plaintiff.3 Where the injuries suffered have caused loss of employment, the plaintiff’s failure to claim unemployment benefits should not be deemed a failure to mitigate this loss. All that a plaintiff is reasonably required to do is to actively seek alternative employment.4

1

Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158; 34 ALJR 186, Dixon CJ at 159 (CLR); Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 (CA); Plenty v Argus [1975] WAR 155 (FC). 2 Geest plc v Lansiquot [2002] 1 WLR 3111; [2002] UKPC 48. 3 Glavonjic v Foster [1979] VR 536; Karabotsos v Plastex Industries Pty Ltd [1981] VR 675 (FC); Donjerkovic v Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty Ltd (1980) 24 SASR 347; Lorca v Holts’ Corrosion Control Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 261 (FC); Fontaine v Quality Platers (1994) 12 WAR 71 (FC). 966

[33.10.2150]

4

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Vassilef v BGC Marine Services (NSW) Pty Ltd [1980] Qd R 21.

Contributory Negligence [33.10.2150] Apportionment of damages legislation applies in all Australian jurisdictions.1 The apportionment legislation provides that a plaintiff’s damages may be reduced on a percentage basis if the defendant can establish that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct either wholly or partly caused their injury or loss.2 From the perspective of damages, the statutes provide that the court is to apportion loss as it thinks just and equitable, having regard to the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage. Two criteria are considered: the comparative causal potency of the acts of the parties and the comparative blameworthiness of those acts. Causal potency is a relevant factor, but is not necessarily decisive.3 Blameworthiness may be more important. It refers to departure from the standards laid down by law, rather than moral blameworthiness.4 It is necessary to compare and evaluate how far each of the parties’ conduct departed from the standards required by law.5 The whole of the conduct of each negligent party in the circumstances of the accident must be subject to comparative examination in making an apportionment.6 On the issue of apportionment, the finding is not on a question of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and weighing different considerations. It involves an individual choice or discretion as to which there well may be differences of opinion by different minds.7 As a result, appeal courts are normally reluctant to disturb the findings of trial courts on the issue of apportionment of damages.8

1

2

3

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 7.3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt V; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt V; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA). Before these apportionment Acts, if contributory negligence was established by the defence, then it acted as a total bar to the recovery of damages. See also “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. See further Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 (HCA) which determined that apportionment legislation does not permit a plaintiff to be found to have contributed to their loss 100 per cent. If the plaintiff were truly 100 per cent responsible then the claim should have failed on causation and the issue of contributory negligence should never have arisen. This has been overruled by statute in some jurisdictions: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63. Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd [1949] 2 KB 291 (CA), Denning LJ at 326.

967

[33.10.2150]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

4 5

6

7 8

Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10; Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437; Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club Social Club [1983] 1 VR 153. See Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA); Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376; 61 ALJR 25; Nicholson v Nicholson (1994) 35 NSWLR 308 (CA) (although this was a claim under the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), the judgments in the case also provide a thorough discussion of the principles applying to contributory negligence in common law claims). Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA), the Court at 494; Rukavina v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1992] 1 VR 677 (App Div), Crockett and Southwell JJ at 683–685. The British Fame v The MacGregor [1943] AC 197, Lord Wright at 201. For an example of an appellate court overturning a finding of contributory negligence, see Guidera v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1990) 11 MVR 423 (NSWCA), the Court at 423–434 (MVR). See Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361 (QCA); George v Dowling (1992) 59 SASR 291 (in both these cases the plaintiffs travelled with a drunk driver and damages were reduced – in the second case, the plaintiff also knew that the vehicle was defective); Kalokerinos v Burnett (unreported, NSWCA, Kirby P, Clarke and Powell JJA, 40243 of 1995, 30 January 1996) (the plaintiff patient failed to seek a second medical opinion following the defendant’s failure to diagnose a cancer, despite being aware of bleeding occurring four months following the misdiagnosis). Contributory negligence is discussed in detail in “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870].

Collateral Benefits [33.10.2160] The tests for determining what account should be taken of collateral benefits in a claim for damages have not been applied consistently by the courts. Collateral benefits are those benefits received from sources other than the defendant which but for the tortiously inflicted loss or injury, the plaintiff would not have received. These benefits may be either financial or in the form of services. Benefits include insurance policy proceeds, pensions, payments from statutory compensation schemes, social security benefits and gifts of money, free and subsidised health care, pharmaceutical benefits, rehabilitation services and assistance with obtaining suitable new employment. Three tests have been applied to collateral benefits: (1)

the causation test: if the benefit results from the tortious event then it is set-off, but if not then it is not;

(2)

the equity test: determines whether it is fair and equitable that the defendant profit from a benefit given to the plaintiff by a third party. It determines whether the plaintiff should receive more than they have lost; and

(3)

the source of benefit test: if the benefit comes from a public source it ought to be set-off, but not if it comes from a private source.

These tests have not been applied consistently. In National Insurance Co of New 968

[33.10.2160]

COLLATERAL BENEFITS

Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; [1961] Qd R 277; (1961) 35 ALJR 4, Dixon CJ recognised that no legal rule exists which can be applied to every case where an advantage accrues to the injured person which, but for the injuries, they would not have attained: Intuitive feelings for justice seem a poor substitute for a rule antecedently known, more particularly where all do not have the same intuitions. But unfortunately the plain fact is that no legal rule exists that can be applied to every case where an advantage accrues to the injured man which but for the injuries he would not have obtained.1

In National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne, both Dixon CJ and Windeyer J rejected a simple causation test and emphasised a test centred on the purpose and character of the particular benefit conferred.2 It is clear that insurance moneys received for an injury or loss under an insurance policy are not to be taken into account when awarding damages for the same loss or injury.3 Pensions and superannuation benefits have also generally been characterised as quite independent of any right of action in tort, and are not to be set-off against damages for loss of earning capacity.4 Neither charitable gifts from nor ex gratia payments by governments are set-off against damages.5 In Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; 35 ALJR 174, the Court decided that sick pay which had been received by the plaintiff as ordinary wages must be taken into account as a collateral benefit, in diminution of damages.6 The same principle applies to holiday pay.7 However, voluntary payments by an employer and loans by the employer to an injured employee plaintiff, which were not intended to be repaid if the plaintiff was unsuccessful in their action for damages, are probably not to be set-off.8 Victims of accidents often become entitled to sickness, invalid or unemployment benefits under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth). In Redding v Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117; 57 ALJR 393, a test case on invalid and unemployment benefits, the High Court was split 6:1 in favour of not taking invalid pensions into account in assessing the plaintiff’s earning capacity, and 4:3 in favour of setting off receipt of unemployment benefits as a factor in assessing future economic loss.9 The Act was subsequently amended, and from 1 May 1987 social security benefits are no longer payable for the period covered by the common law lump sum award; any benefits already received prior to the award must be repaid.10 A further amendment of the Act provides that social security recipients can be required to pursue their claim for torts damages, effective on different dates depending on the nature of the social security benefit.11 The Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) provides that insurers or others liable to make compensation or damages payments must directly reimburse the Commonwealth with the amount of any Medicare or nursing home benefits which have been already received by the insured for which the damages have now become payable. If there has been an

969

[33.10.2160]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

apportionment for contributory negligence, this will be reflected in the amount to be reimbursed. All workers’ compensation payments received by a plaintiff are repayable out of any common law damages award received for the same injuries. For any of the statutory compensation schemes, one must examine the intention of Parliament concerning what benefits were intended by the legislature as an alternative to common law damages in part or in whole.12

1 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; [1961] Qd R 277; (1961) 35 ALJR 4, Dixon CJ at 572 (CLR). 2 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; [1961] Qd R 277; (1961) 35 ALJR 4, Dixon CJ at 573, Windeyer J at 599–600 (CLR). 3 Bradburn v Great Western Railway Co (1874) LR 10 Ex 1 (CA). 4 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569; [1961] Qd R 277; (1961) 35 ALJR 4; Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; 35 ALJR 174; Jongen v CSR Ltd [1992] Aust Torts Reports 81-192 (WASC). See also [33.10.860]–[33.10.920]. 5 Wollington v State Electricity Commission (Vic) (No 2) [1980] VR 91. Ex gratia: “[P]ayments made without any admission of legal liability”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 67. 6 Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; 35 ALJR 174, Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ at 346 (CLR). 7 Bosch v Liebe [1976] VR 265 (FC). 8 Alley v Minister of Works (1974) 9 SASR 306; Beck v Farrelly (1975) 13 SASR 17 (FC); Donnelly v Joyce [1974] 1 QB 454. 9 This decision resolved a long debate in Australian appellate courts over whether or not unemployment benefits ought to be set-off. But see Tuncel v Renown Plate Co Pty Ltd [1976] VR 501 (FC); Dessent v Commonwealth (1977) 51 ALJR 482 (HCA), Barwick CJ at 485; Baird v Roberts [1977] 2 NSWLR 389 (CA), Mahoney JA at 395; McIntosh v Mair (1979) 21 SASR 150; 46 FLR 363; Cobb v O’Donoghue [1980] Qd R 402; Henman v Stephenson [1980] Qd R 410n; Morley v Murray (1980) 42 FLR 271. 10 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), Pt 3.14, ss 1169, 1178. 11 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), ss 1161, 1166. 12 For issues relating to damages at common law and compensation payments received or payable under Workers’ Compensation statutory schemes for the same injury, see Bulut v Koksal [1988] VR 241 (FC); Manser v Spry (1994) 181 CLR 428; 68 ALJR 869; Kempsey District Hospital (NSW) v Thackham (1995) 36 NSWLR 492 (CA); Harris v Commercial Minerals Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 1; 70 ALJR 425; James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Newton (1997) 42 NSWLR 729 (CA); Franklins Self Serve Pty Ltd v Wyber (1999) 48 NSWLR 249; [1999] NSWCA 390.

970

[33.10.2170]

PUBLIC POLICY

Public Policy [33.10.2170] For reasons of public policy, some categories of loss or damage are not recoverable.1 This includes losses which require the proceeds of criminal activity to be taken into account, or which are incurred as a result of such activity. For example, in Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541; [1970] 2 WLR 1005, the plaintiff sued on behalf of herself and her children for their loss of economic support on the death of her husband, a professional criminal. It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to take into account the deceased husband’s criminal earnings in ascertaining loss of support.2 In claims for loss of an advantage which would have been gained from illegal activity, the nature of the criminal acts and the degree of their unlawfulness are important considerations. The degree of connection between the loss and the acts is also pertinent. If the plaintiff’s unlawful acts are merely infringements of regulatory offences, then this will not normally bar recovery of damages.3 Damages or other sums paid by the plaintiff to a third party as compensation for a wrongful act committed by the plaintiff are not recoverable. It is clearly contrary to public policy to permit a plaintiff to be indemnified for the consequences of their own wrong. In Wodrow v Commonwealth (1993) 45 FCR 52, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that public policy considerations would operate to deny the existence of a duty of care in respect of psychological harm to a paranoiac plaintiff employee, brought on by his employer’s reasonable threat of disciplinary action. The Court also found that the threat of disciplinary action did not cause the plaintiff’s mental illness but merely provided the occasion for it.

1

2

Reasons of public policy uphold the fundamental notions of justice and morality upon which the common law is founded. The categories of public policy are never closed. Other claims which may be doubtful on public policy grounds are those for “wrongful birth”, where parents seek compensation in medical negligence suits for expenses which will be incurred in raising an unwanted child. However, such actions have succeeded: in CES v Superclinics (Aust) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47 (CA), the Court held that compensatory damages could be awarded for the birth of an unwanted child against a clinic where doctors had failed to diagnose the plaintiff’s pregnancy in time for her to terminate the pregnancy. The Court limited damages to losses flowing directly from the negligent advice, and did not include the expenses of rearing the child, as those expenses were incurred by the mother’s own choice. Statutory provisions now limit the award of damages in wrongful birth cases: see “Legislative Overview” [33.2.50]–[33.2.90]. See also “The Unborn” [33.2.1380]–[33.2.1400]; Professional Liability “Health Practitioners” [27.2.10]ff. The continuing scope and applicability of the rule in Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541; [1970] 2 WLR 1005 is the subject of debate. Professor Fleming regards the case as exceptional – “Generally speaking, the mere fact that the plaintiff happened to be engaged in something unlawful at the time of his injury is no 971

[33.10.2170]

LIMITATIONS ON COMPENSATION

3

disqualification in tort”, and adds in a footnote, the rule’s “bite is least where the illegality is not even associated with the accident but only with damages: public policy would rarely oppose recovery of lost earnings merely because they would have been made in a tainted employment”: Fleming JG, The Law of Torts, (8th ed, Law Book Co, 1992) p 305 (not included in subsequent 9th edition of the text). The result in Burns v Edman seems harsh: in allowing a tortfeasor to escape payment of damages, the entirely innocent dependants are deprived compensation. There seems to be neither good deterrent nor appeasement value in the exercise of public policy against recovery of damages in this case. For a local example, see Meadows v Ferguson [1961] VR 594 (loss of illegal earnings as starting price bookmaker’s clerk). The outcome often will depend on a court’s (often unexplained) view of legitimate public policy goals. It is difficult to be certain in predicting the characterisation of breaches of regulatory offences as involving minor or major degrees of moral culpability. For examples of cases where damages were obtained despite commission of unlawful acts, see LeBagge v Buses Ltd [1958] NZLR 630 (SC) (plaintiff in breach of work regulations imposing a maximum number of trading days per week); Mills v Baitis [1968] VR 583; (1968) 17 LGRA 242 (FC) (plaintiff carrying on business in breach of local planning scheme zonings); McIntosh v Williams [1976] 2 NSWLR 237 (CA); McIntosh v Williams [1979] 2 NSWLR 543 (CA) (deceased breadwinner in breach of police regulations in receiving remuneration for casual outside employment). But see Brownbill v Kenworth Truck Sales (NSW) Pty Ltd (1982) 59 FLR 56 (FCA). See also Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956; Meah v McCreamer (No 2) [1986] 1 All ER 943 (QB). In Saunders v Edwards [1987] 1 WLR 1116 (CA), Bingham LJ at 1134 expressed a pragmatic approach: “[I]t is unacceptable that any court of law should aid or lend its authority to a party seeking to pursue or enforce an object or agreement which the law prohibits. On the other hand, it is unacceptable that the court should, on the first indication of unlawfulness affecting any aspect of a transaction … refuse all assistance to the plaintiff, no matter how serious his loss nor how disproportionate his loss to the unlawfulness of his conduct … I think that on the whole the courts have tended to adopt a pragmatic approach to these problems, seeking where possible to see that genuine wrongs are righted so long as the court does not thereby promote or countenance a nefarious object or bargain which it is bound to condemn.” In CES v Superclinics (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Newman J, 14479 of 1988, 18 April 1994), it was held that the loss of opportunity to perform an illegal act does not give rise to a claim for damages at common law.

972

Alternatives to Damages [33.10.2280] If common law damages are inadequate, injunctive relief may be granted.1 Specific injunctive relief may be ordered to protect proprietary interests. Orders are readily granted at the behest of proprietors of land, to prohibit the continuance of a public or private nuisance affecting the beneficial enjoyment of the property, to stop land being further undermined or to stop trespassing.2 The usual equitable principles apply. In particular, in exercising its discretion whether or not to grant an order in such cases, the court must justly balance the rights and interests of all affected parties. In Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; [1977] 3 WLR 20, an action in negligence and nuisance was brought for damages and an injunction to restrain members of a cricket club from playing cricket without first taking adequate steps to prevent balls being hit out of the ground into the plaintiff’s house and garden. In refusing an injunction, Lord Denning stressed the need to take into account the general public interest in maintaining village cricket. This Court of Appeal decision has not found support in England or Australia, the traditional view being maintained that an injunction may be granted although compliance with it may inconvenience the general public or a public utility.3 Quia timet4 injunctions may be granted to forestall some feared or apprehended interference with property rights.5 Mandatory injunctions may be granted to compel the performance of some positive act or acts.6 There is no invariable rule that claims to ordinary chattels may not be protected by injunctions, either interlocutory or final.7 However, where the subject matter of injunctive relief is ordinary goods, the applicant must very clearly establish the reasons why damages would be inadequate. Specific injunctive relief may be ordered to protect economic interests. Injunctions have long been granted as the only really effective remedy for interference with, and outright theft of, industrial8 and intellectual property.9 Interference with contractual relations,10 injurious falsehoods about the business circumstances of the plaintiff, and the wrongful passing off of goods or services also often result in the grant of injunctive relief. Much of the relevant law has now been subsumed into the statute book.11 Industrial disputes also often give rise to actions for damages for consequential financial loss plus injunctive relief. The torts of intimidation and conspiracy are the background to the issue of prohibitory orders where the plaintiff can establish serious disruption of working conditions or business operations.12 Australian courts have adopted a very cautious attitude towards a grant of orders to restrain apprehended assaults.13 The courts take the general view that

973

[33.10.2280]

ALTERNATIVES TO DAMAGES

the restraint of criminal conduct should be left to the operation of the criminal law.14 In circumstances which justify the remedy, it is now clear that injunctions may be granted to restrain threatened or apprehended assaults. In Egan v Egan [1975] Ch 218; [1975] 2 WLR 503, the plaintiff had suffered continual physical threats and actual violence from her 19-year old son. Oliver J said that he could see [no] logical reason why, where there is a clear threat of further assault – against the background of a clear history of assaults taking place over the past year or two – [that] this court should be powerless to interfere to protect a threatened plaintiff by way of an injunction and to restrain further assaults.15

He granted an injunction to order the son to leave his mother’s home and to restrain him from further assaulting, molesting, annoying or otherwise interfering with his mother. Australian courts have generally recognised the jurisdiction to restrain assaults, but have proceeded with caution.16 Specific injunctive relief may be ordered to protect threatened defamatory statements.17 Courts of equity have not normally restrained the publication of material which is alleged to be defamatory before that material is actually judged to be defamatory of the plaintiff. Thus, at least since the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, the courts, while not denying the power to interfere in defamation cases by way of interlocutory injunction, have in practice not done so. The reasons are the courts’ reluctance to usurp the “constitutional function” of the jury as the body which decides whether or not material is defamatory of the plaintiff, and, more importantly, the principle of freedom of speech. Yet, notwithstanding the importance of these considerations, it is conceivable that the balance of convenience may well dictate the protection of the plaintiff’s reputation by way of interlocutory injunctive relief pending trial.18 If relief by way of an injunction is denied, common law damages may still be pursued.

1 Injunctions are dealt with in detail in Equity “Injunctions” [15.8.10]ff. 2 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 (CA); Beswicke v Alner [1926] VLR 72 (FC); Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88; [1980] 3 WLR 361 (CA); York Bros (Trading) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main Roads (NSW) [1983] 1 NSWLR 391. 3 Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88; [1980] 3 WLR 361 (CA). 4 Quia timet: “[B]ecause he fears”: The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) p 143. 5 Attorney-General (Can) v Ritchie Contracting & Supply Co Ltd [1919] AC 999, Lord Dunedin (for the Privy Council) at 1005. To obtain a quia timet injunction, the plaintiff must prove both that there is a real probability that the activities of the defendant are imminent and that if performed they will cause substantial damage: Byrne v Castrique [1965] VR 171; Connorville Estates Pty Ltd v Hydro-Electric

974

[33.10.2280]

Commission (Tas) [1967] Tas SR 26; Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43; [1974] 3 WLR 329 (CA); Grasso v Love [1980] VR 163; (1979) 39 LGRA 101 (FC), Starke, Murphy and Brooking JJ at 167 (VR); Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272; [2012] FCA 748. See “Nuisance” [33.7.10]ff. 6 Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652; [1969] 2 WLR 1437. In granting such orders, courts should always ensure that the party receiving the order knows precisely what they must do. The court must also be satisfied that the order to act is practical in terms of execution and that it will not impose an undue and unfair economic burden upon the party ordered to perform the requisite act or acts. 7 Aristoc Industries Pty Ltd v RA Wenham (Builders) Pty Ltd [1965] NSWR 581; Doulton Potteries Ltd v Bronotte [1971] 1 NSWLR 591; Belgrave Nominees Pty Ltd v Barlin-Scott Airconditioning (Aust) Pty Ltd [1984] VR 947 (chattels were airconditioning plants which were intended to be fitted permanently into buildings). Kaye J at 955, in exercising his discretion in favour of injunctive relief, said: “I am satisfied that there is a strong probability that … [detriment would accrue to the plaintiffs] if a mandatory injunction were refused and that those detriments would be grave ones. It may be that those detriments could be compensated by an award of damages. But having regard to the plaintiffs’ pecuniary circumstances and the closeness to completion of the buildings … I conclude that in all the circumstances it would not be just to confine the plaintiffs to their remedy in damages.” 8 In passing off cases, an injunction will be issued only on proof of false representation and irreparable damage if the passing off continues, and a general prohibition will be refused if a more limited prohibition (eg as to the use of certain words) gives sufficient relief: Associated Newspapers Group plc v Insert Media Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 509 (CHD). Different considerations apply to the grant of orders sought to protect the public interest in fair trading under Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 52, 80 (now Australian Consumer Law (Cth), ss 18, 232; found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2): World Series Cricket Pty Ltd v Parish (1977) 16 ALR 181 (FCAFC). 9 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 2 WLR 316 (although note that on a different point, three judges of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kirby JJ) disapproved this case in Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; 80 ALJR 1672; [2006] HCA 46); Gabriel v Lobban [1976] VR 689; Henry Roach (Petroleum) Pty Ltd v Credit House (Vic) Pty Ltd [1976] VR 309. 10 An order will only be granted where damages are clearly inadequate and other remedies have been exhausted: Harry M Miller Attractions Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1970] 1 NSWR 614; Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383; News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410 (FC). 11 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth); Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); Designs Act 2003 (Cth). Injunctions granted pursuant to Australian Consumer Law (Cth), s 232 are not subject to the same limitations applicable in equity. Locus standi restrictions are lifted, and because the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 protects the public interest, laches does not necessarily defeat an application where it would in equity: World Series Cricket Pty Ltd v Parish (1977) 16 ALR 181 (FCAFC). See also Phelps v Western Mining Corp Ltd (1978)

975

[33.10.2280]

ALTERNATIVES TO DAMAGES

12

13 14

15 16

17

18

33 FLR 327 (FCA); R v Judges of Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Pilkington ACI (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 142 CLR 113; 53 ALJR 230; ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1992) 38 FCR 248 (FC). See, eg Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760 (CA); Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383. Egan v Egan [1975] Ch 218; [1975] 2 WLR 503, Oliver J at 221 (Ch). Fitzwilliam v Beckman [1978] Qd R 398; Zimitat v Douglas [1979] Qd R 454; Parry v Crooks (1981) 27 SASR 1; Daley v Martin (No 1) [1982] Qd R 23; Corvisy v Corvisy [1982] 2 NSWLR 557. A somewhat broader view has been taken of injunctive relief from harassment which occurs in a commercial or industrial context, for “watching and besetting” and public nuisance: Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors & Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760 (CA); Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia (Dollar Sweets Case) [1986] VR 383. In the context of domestic violence, tort injunctions have now been overtaken by a range of efficient and effective statutory injunctions and protection orders: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 114(1); Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW); Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), Pt 5; Peace and Good Behaviour Act 1982 (Qld), s 4; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA), Pt 4 Div 7; Justices Act 1959 (Tas), Pt XA; Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), Pt 4; Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). For a full discussion of this legislation, see Family Law “Jurisdiction” [17.1.10]ff; “Domestic violence” [17.5.10]ff; “Family Court Orders” [17.19.10]ff. Egan v Egan [1975] Ch 218; [1975] 2 WLR 503, Oliver J at 221 (Ch). See Fitzwilliam v Beckman [1978] Qd R 398; Zimitat v Douglas [1979] Qd R 454; Parry v Crooks (1981) 27 SASR 1; Daley v Martin (No 1) [1982] Qd R 23; Corvisy v Corvisy [1982] 2 NSWLR 557. Chappell v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153; National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v General Television Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 62 ALJR 553. See also Communications “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff. Chappell v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153.

976

33.11 Concurrent Torts

CONCURRENT TORTS

Current Subtitle Author Michael Denahy BEc, LLB (Hons) (Syd), LLM (LSE) Solicitor, Supreme Court of New South Wales (Updating author, Update 319 – June 2016)

This Subtitle is current to 1 June 2016.

Previous Subtitle Authors P Heffey

Karina Szwaja

LLB (Hons) (Melb), BCL (Oxon) Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University (Original author)

BA, LLB (ANU) Barrister, Victorian Bar Sessional Academic, Faculty of Law, Victoria University

Charmaine Lye

(Updating author, Update 306 – April 2015) (Updating author, Update 282 – April 2013)

BA (Cantab), LLB (Hons) (Melb) Barrister and Solicitor, Supreme Court of Victoria (Updating author, Update 209 – January 2007)

Geoff Masel

The Laws of Australia Editorial Department (Updating author, Update 156 – August 2002)

BA, LLB (Melb) Consultant, Phillips Fox (Updating author, Update 152 – April 2002)

978

33.11 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION.........................................................................[33.11.10] DEFINITION............................................................................[33.11.10] SCOPE OF SUBTITLE........................................................... [33.11.20] RELATED TITLES AND SUBTITLES..................................... [33.11.30] CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS............... [33.11.140] SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION...........................................[33.11.140] General............................................................................. [33.11.140] Joint Tortfeasors............................................................... [33.11.150] Several Concurrent Tortfeasors........................................[33.11.170] Independent Tortfeasors...................................................[33.11.180] CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFICATION...........................[33.11.190] Common Law Position..................................................... [33.11.190] Solidary Liability................................................................[33.11.200] Joint Liability..................................................................... [33.11.210] CONTRIBUTION.......................................................................[33.11.350] GENERAL............................................................................. [33.11.350] RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION................................................ [33.11.360] LIABILITY TO MAKE CONTRIBUTION................................[33.11.370] ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTION...................................[33.11.390]

979

980

Introduction Definition [33.11.10] Concurrent tortfeasors (joint or several) are generally liable to the person they cause damage to for the full extent of the damage caused to the victim, and not just for an amount proportionate to their responsibility. Where there are joint tortfeasors, the concurrence relates to the sequence of events leading to the injury and some sort of joint enterprise. Where there are several tortfeasors, the concurrency is said to refer to causation only. Legislation accords a right to proportionate contribution among such tortfeasors.1 Accordingly, a tortfeasor who is sued may claim contribution from a concurrent tortfeasor whether or not the latter is sued by the injured person. The amount of contribution generally recoverable is such as may be found by a court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of the concurrent tortfeasor’s responsibility for the damage. In deciding on apportionment, a comparison of culpability and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage must be considered. This comparative assessment must examine the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the act giving rise to the injury.

1

The leading text on this subject is Williams GL, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault in Great Britain, Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Stevens & Sons, 1951).

Scope of Subtitle [33.11.20] This Subtitle examines the law relating to multiple tortfeasors. It begins with an examination of the various classifications of multiple tortfeasors. These classifications (joint, several, concurrent and independent tortfeasors) are examined at [33.11.140]–[33.11.180]. A general overview of the principle of solidary liability applicable to all concurrent tortfeasors is provided at [33.11.200] and the differential consequences resulting from the classification of tortfeasors as either joint or several concurrent tortfeasor are considered at [33.11.210]–[33.11.220] and [33.11.240]. The limits on successive actions are dealt with at [33.11.230]. The basic legislative provision according a right of contribution to concurrent

981

[33.11.20]

INTRODUCTION

tortfeasors is presented at [33.11.350], followed by an examination of the various difficulties in determining who can make a claim (see [33.11.360]), and against whom a claim can be made: see [33.11.370]–[33.11.380]. The quantum of contribution is discussed at [33.11.390]–[33.11.400], and the curtailment of the right of an employer to claim an indemnity from an employee is examined at [33.11.410].

Related Titles and Subtitles [33.11.30] The topics of concurrent tortfeasors and contribution are relevant throughout the spectrum of the law of torts. Of particular importance are the following aspects of the law of torts: multiple causation (see “Limitations on Compensation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2170]); contributory negligence (see “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]); concurrent liability in contract and torts (see “Concurrent Liability” [33.1.140]); vicarious liability (see “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]); and limitation of actions: see Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff.

982

Classification of Multiple Tortfeasors System of Classification General [33.11.140] When more than one tortfeasor inflicts damage on a person, the tortfeasors may be classified as either concurrent or independent. The term “concurrent tortfeasors” is further divided into two subcategories: “joint” and “several” tortfeasors. The difference between the two is that joint tortfeasors are responsible for the same tort, while several tortfeasors are responsible for the same damage.1 In the case of joint tortfeasors, there is concurrence relating to causation and concurrence relating to a common design (ie concerted action toward a common end). In the case of several tortfeasors, the concurrence relates only to causation. The plaintiff can bring proceedings against each of them separately for the entire amount of the loss claimed, or they can bring proceedings against them jointly in the same action. The independent tortfeasor category applies where the plaintiff complains of different damage at the hands of more than one tortfeasor, and there is neither concurrence of causation nor concurrence of a common design. To avoid confusion between several and independent tortfeasors, the former are described as “several concurrent” tortfeasors. The distinctions between the categories of multiple tortfeasors are explained and illustrated at [33.11.150]–[33.11.180]. The legal consequences which arise from particular classifications are examined at [33.11.190]–[33.11.240].

1

Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131.

Joint Tortfeasors [33.11.150] Joint tortfeasors are persons who, in furtherance of a common design, inflict damage on a person by means of a tort. There are certain situations where this has been said to arise: (1)

vicarious liability for the conduct of agents, employers of partners (see [33.11.153]);

983

CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

[33.11.150]

(2)

breach of a joint duty (eg joint occupiers of property) (see [33.11.157]); or

(3)

concerted actions: see [33.11.160].

A common design may be indicated by a special relationship between the person who actually commits the tort and another person. In The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140, Scrutton LJ said: Certain classes of persons seem clearly to be “joint tortfeasors”: The agent who commits a tort within the scope of his employment for his principal, and the principal; the servant who commits a tort in the course of his employment, and his master; two persons who agree on common action, in the course of, and to further which, one of them commits a tort. These seem clearly joint tortfeasors; there is one tort committed by one of them on behalf of, or in concert with, another. … I am of the opinion that the definition in [Clerk JF and Lindsell WHB, The Law of Torts (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1921) p 59], is much nearer to the correct view: “Persons are said to be joint tortfeasors when their respective shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design”.1

1 The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140 (CA), Scrutton LJ at 155–156; quoted in Vero Lenders v Taylor Byrne Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1430, Greenwood J at [57].

[33.11.153] Where an employer is held vicariously liable for a tort committed by an employee in the proper course of the employee’s employment, the employer and employee are joint tortfeasors.1 Similarly, joint liability arises where a principal is held liable for the tort of an agent2 or an employer is held liable, under the doctrine of non-delegable duty (as opposed to vicarious liability), in respect of a tort committed by an independent contractor.3 Accordingly, provided that the appropriate nexus is established, if the plaintiff proves that the servant or agent has committed a tort, they do not have to prove that the principal or employer has committed a tort.

1 Vancouver v Rhodes [1955] 1 DLR 139; Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131, Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ at 580-581 (CLR). See “Vicarious Liability” [33.6.580]–[33.6.720]. 2 JF & BE Palmer Pty Ltd v Blowers & Lowe Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 89. 3 Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57; McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1987] AC 906; [1987] 3 WLR 212; Kondis v State Transport Authority (Vic) (1984) 154 CLR 672; 58 ALJR 531; Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; 60 ALJR 194; Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520; 68 ALJR 331; Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; 78 ALJR 907; [2004] HCA 28.

984

[33.11.160]

SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION

[33.11.157] In most jurisdictions, a firm is generally liable to the same extent as a partner of the firm who has committed the wrongdoing causing loss or injury. Where a partner of a firm (other than an incorporated limited partnership) acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm causes, by any wrongful act or omission, loss or injury to any person not being a partner, the firm is liable to the same extent as the partner. The legislation in each jurisdiction respectively reflects this position.1

1

Partnership Act 1963 (ACT), s 14; Partnership Act 1892 (NSW), ss 9 – 12; Partnership Act 1997 (NT), s 14(1), Partnership Act 1891 (Qld), s 13; Partnership Act 1891 (SA), s 10; Partnership Act 1891 (Tas), s 15; Partnership Act 1958 (Vic), ss 14, 16; Partnership Act 1895 (WA), s 17. See also XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366; [2002] UKHL 48.

[33.11.160] Where two or more persons agree expressly or tacitly to take “concerted actions to a common end”,1 and in the course of furthering that common end one of the persons commits a tort, all parties to the agreement are jointly liable. It is not enough that the situation involves an activity that is merely “a coincidence of separate acts which, by their conjoined effects, cause damage”.2 Rather, there must be a concerted action to a common end.3 It seems, however, that this rule tends to apply only where the common end is in itself a tort or where the means agreed upon to attain the common end involve the commission of a tort. Accordingly, if a group of people agree to rob someone, or to enter premises to obtain evidence, all members of the group will be liable for torts committed during the execution of the plan even though their respective roles may vary.4 Equally, the various parties involved in the publication of defamatory matter, such as author, printer, publisher and distributor, are jointly liable in defamation.5 Further examples include: (1)

motorists who agree to race one another;6

(2)

manufacturers who agree not to warn consumers of risks associated with their products;7 and

(3)

drivers who stop on a motorway to disagree.8

In Brooke v Bool [1928] 2 KB 578, a landlord and his lodger entered a tenant’s premises, which the landlord had a right to enter, to check for leaking gas. The landlord checked the lower part of a gas pipe with a lit match. The lodger subsequently checked the upper part with a lit match. The latter actions of the lodger caused an explosion for which the landlord was held jointly liable in negligence.9

985

CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

[33.11.160]

It appears that it is not sufficient to impose joint liability on the basis that parties are acting toward a common end that is not in itself a tort and one of the parties unexpectedly acts negligently (eg where one of two hunters negligently shoots a third party).10

1 The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140 (CA), Bankes LJ at 152, quoting from Clerk JF and Lindsell WHB, The Law of Torts (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1921) p 59. 2 The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140 (CA), Scrutton LJ at 156. 3 The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140 (CA), Scrutton LJ at 156. 4 Smithson v Garth (1691) 83 ER 711; Schumann v Abbott [1961] SASR 149; Johnston v Burton (1970) 16 DLR (3d) 660; Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412; Coleman v Watson & Shaw [2007] QSC 343; Stereff v Rycen [2010] QDC 117. 5 Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131; Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478 (CA). It is not essential for all parties to appreciate the tortious nature of the activity: Dougherty v Chandler (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 370; 63 WN (NSW) 183 (FC); Mihaka v Wellington Publishing Co (1972) Ltd [1975] 1 NZLR 10 (SC). For more on defamation, see Communications “Civil Defamation” [6.1.10]ff, and specifically [6.1.470]. 6 McDonald v Dalgleish (1973) 35 DLR (3d) 486. 7 Rogers v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co 761 SW 2d 788 (1988). 8 Mason v Burke (1968) 68 DLR (2d) 19, the Court at 23. 9 The case could be explained on the basis that the parties tacitly agreed to use negligent means to the common end given the landlord’s authority and the example he set. 10 Cook v Lewis [1951] SCR 830; [1952] 1 DLR 1; Willis v Allen [1923] SASR 146.

Several Concurrent Tortfeasors [33.11.170] Several concurrent tortfeasors are persons who, by their separate and independent acts, cause one and the same damage to a person. There must be, according to Sargant LJ in The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140, “a concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage”.1 The only nexus between the tortfeasors relates to causation, in the sense that the damage would not have occurred in the absence of the wrongdoing of all the tortfeasors. A victim of nuisance may have several causes of action for the same damage. For example, several factory owners may be responsible for smoke emanating from their respective factories, or for depositing harmful matter into a stream, the combined effect of which is to create a nuisance for the plaintiff. Vehicles belonging to neighbouring occupiers may, in combination, obstruct access to the plaintiff’s shop.2

986

[33.11.180]

SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION

Separate acts of negligence may coincide to harm the plaintiff. For example: (1)

two negligent motorists may collide and injure a passenger or pedestrian;3

(2)

the plaintiff’s home may be defectively constructed due to the negligence of the builder, consulting engineer and local council4 or the excavator and water company;5 and

(3)

an employee may be injured due to the negligence of both the employer and occupier of the premises;6 or the employer and manufacturer of defective equipment.7

In contrast, in the situation where the intervening recklessness of one driver may be so extreme as compared with the negligence of another, they may be held to be the sole cause of the damage, and therefore the sole tortfeasor.8

1

2

3

4 5

6 7

8

The Koursk v The Itria [1924] P 140 (CA), Sargant LJ at 159–160. See Nilon v Bezzina [1988] 2 Qd R 420 (CA), McPherson J at 424 (Qd R); Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131. Sadler v Great Western Railway Co [1896] AC 450 (distinguished in Mendoza v City of Melbourne (1897) 22 VLR 611; Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2006] VSC 138). See further the discussion in Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635; 76 ALJR 114; [2001] HCA 66, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [85]; Newcrest Mining Ltd v Thornton (2012) 248 CLR 555; 87 ALJR 198; [2012] HCA 60. Bridge v Chadwick (1950) 50 SR (NSW) 230; 67 WN (NSW) 154 (FC), Maxwell J at 233–234 (SR (NSW)); Dodsworth v Holt (1964) 44 DLR (2d) 480; Wright v Lodge [1993] 4 All ER 299 (CA). See Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170. Morton v Douglas Homes Ltd [1984] 2 NZLR 548 (HC), Hardie Boys J at 612–614. Thompson v London City Council [1899] 1 QB 840 (CA) (distinguished in Snowy Mountains Organic Dairy Products Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2006] VSC 138). Spargo v Haden Engineering Pty Ltd (1993) 60 SASR 39 (FC); Hanson v Matthew Bros Contractors Ltd (1990) 55 SASR 183. Shepherd v SJ Banks & Son Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 437; Suosaari v Steinhardt [1989] 2 Qd R 477 (FC); Martin v Stratman [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-262 (SASCFC). Wright v Lodge [1993] 4 All ER 299 (CA).

Independent Tortfeasors [33.11.180] Independent tortfeasors are persons who, by separate and independent acts, cause different incidents of damage to a plaintiff.1 The concurrence relates to the causation, and the tortfeasors are only responsible for the damage they commit individually. Examples of independent tortfeasors

987

CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

[33.11.180]

include when one tortfeasor negligently injures the leg of the victim and another tortfeasor shoots the plaintiff in the leg,2 or when a negligent medical practitioner exacerbates the plaintiff’s injury through “inexcusably bad” medical treatment.3 The subsequent injury is regarded as separate from the original injury, even where it exacerbates that injury, if it results from an intervening act or is too remote a consequence of the original negligence and therefore not forseeable.4 Alternatively, if subsequent negligent conduct is reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the original tort, the tortfeasors will be several concurrent tortfeasors (see [33.11.170]) in respect of that part of the plaintiff’s loss to which they have both contributed.5

1 Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1961] 2 QB 162; [1961] 2 WLR 523 (CA), Devlin LJ at 188–189 (QB). For a further discussion of causation, see “Causation” [33.10.1980]–[33.10.2020]. 2 Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; [1970] 2 WLR 50. 3 Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504, the Court at 530 (CLR). 4 Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 323; 49 ALJR 233; Grundy v Lewis (1995) 62 FCR 567. 5 Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504, the Court at 528–529 (CLR); Thomas Borthwick & Sons (A’asia) Ltd v Samco Meats Pty Ltd [1995] 2 VR 474 (CA); Grundy v Lewis (1995) 62 FCR 567.

Consequences of Classification Common Law Position [33.11.190] The common law only permitted one action against joint tortfeasors (see [33.11.160]), whereas separate actions were possible and necessary against several concurrent tortfeasors: see [33.11.170]. In the case of joint tortfeasors, the tortfeasors are usually said to be responsible for the same tort; at common law, there was one cause of action usually arising from a singular act or omission. In the case of several concurrent tortfeasors, the tortfeasors are said to be responsible for the same damage, allowing several separate causes of action to be brought. Statutory reforms have substantially altered the original common law position. However, the distinction between joint and several concurrent tortfeasors is still of some significance, as is the distinction between concurrent tortfeasors and independent tortfeasors: see [33.10.180]. An important feature of joint and several concurrent tortfeasors categorisation is that collective responsibility for the resulting harm ensues regardless of whose individual action caused the actual injury.

988

[33.11.200]

CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFICATION

Solidary Liability [33.11.200] Liability in tort is solidary under the common law (see [33.11.190]), but the notion of proportionate liability has been introduced by statute in particular circumstances. At common law, each concurrent tortfeasor, whether joint (see [33.11.160]) or several (see [33.11.170]), was liable for the full extent of the damage caused to the plaintiff, not just a proportionate amount according to their contribution.1 This is known as “solidary” or “joint and several” liability. The plaintiff could choose to sue only one or a selected few of the tortfeasors; having sued more than one to judgment, the plaintiff could choose to levy execution against only one or a selected few. In any event, the plaintiff could not recover in total more than the full amount of the loss which they suffered.2 To the extent that a plaintiff had received compensation from one concurrent tortfeasor, the others were to that extent discharged.3 Whether or not receipt of a settlement sum from one tortfeasor prevented recovery depended on whether the settlement sum was received in full satisfaction of the tort, even if the settlement sum was incorporated in a consent judgment agreed to by the claimant.4 In South Australia, the relevant legislation abolishes solidary liability in favour of proportionate liability for persons concurrently liable for defective building work. The Development Act 1993 (SA) states that the court has the power to enter judgment against a defendant or each defendant for an amount that is “just and equitable having regard to the extent to which the act or default of that defendant contributed to the damage or loss” if: (a)

the building work is defective; and

(b)

the defect or defects arise from the wrongful acts or defaults of two or more persons; and

(c)

those persons would, apart from this section, be jointly and severally liable for damage or loss resulting from the defective work; and

(d)

an action is brought against one or more of those persons to recover that damage or loss.5

In all jurisdictions, legislation provides for proportionate liability to apply to tortfeasors who are liable for the same damage.6 The legislation provides that judgment against one tortfeasor is no longer a bar to an action against any other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a tortfeasor in respect of the same damage.7 Except in Victoria, legislation also states that if more than one action is instituted in respect of the same damage, the amount recoverable under the judgments given in subsequent actions cannot exceed in aggregate the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given.8 In Newcrest Mining Ltd v Thornton (2012) 248 CLR 555; 87 ALJR 198; [2012] HCA 60, the High Court held that where damages for the same injury had been awarded, the limit on recoverability of damages imposed by s 7 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) does not apply to a separate action brought against a tortfeasor if the first judgment 989

CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

[33.11.200]

given was a consent judgment to settle that claim. In all jurisdictions, the plaintiff is not entitled to costs in any subsequent actions unless the court is of the opinion that there were reasonable grounds for bringing the action.9 Solidary liability has never applied to independent tortfeasors: see [33.11.180]. Such tortfeasors, not having caused the same damage to the plaintiff, are only answerable for the particular damage that each one has caused. Compensation paid by one independent tortfeasor does not discharge others.10

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

8

Bell v Thompson (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 431; 51 WN (NSW) 138 (NSWSCFC), Jordan CJ at 435 (SR (NSW)); Dougherty v Chandler (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 370; 63 WN (NSW) 183, Jordan CJ at 375 (SR (NSW)); Speirs v Caledonian Collieries Ltd (1956) 57 SR (NSW) 483; 74 WN (NSW) 23 (affirmed in Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202; 57 SR (NSW) 513; 74 WN (NSW) 310); Barisic v Devenport [1978] 2 NSWLR 111 (CA), Moffitt P at 116–117. The principle must on occasions yield to the requirements of a particular case: Martin v Stratman [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-262 (SASCFC); Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10. D’Angola v Rio Pioneer Gravel Co Pty Ltd [1979] 1 NSWLR 495 (CA). Sadler v Cresco Fertilizers Pty Ltd [1939] VLR 438; Castellan v Electric Power Transmission Pty Ltd (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 159; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 67 (CA); Kohnke v Karger [1951] 2 KB 670; Ruffıno v Grace Bros Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 732. Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635; 76 ALJR 114; [2001] HCA 66; Allison v KPMG Peat Marwick [2000] 1 NZLR 560 (CA); Heaton v AXA Equity & Law Life Assurance Society plc [2002] 2 AC 329. Development Act 1993 (SA), s 72. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Pt 2.5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 12; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), Pt IV; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), Pt 3 Divs 1 – 2; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IV; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 20(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 12; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(2); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(a); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12(1); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AA; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), ss 5(1), 7(1)(a). See also [33.11.220]. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 20(2)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 12; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(3)(a); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(b); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12(2)(a), (4); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(b); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(b). See also [33.11.230]. 990

[33.11.220]

CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFICATION

9

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 20(2)(b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 12; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(3)(b); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(b); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12(1), (2)(b), (3); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(b); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AB; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(b). 10 Eyre v New Zealand Press Association Ltd [1968] NZLR 736 (SC), McGregor J at 745.

Joint Liability [33.11.210] Persons who take concerted action to a common end are collectively responsible for any resulting damage, irrespective of the particular role played by each person. For example, the member of a gang of robbers who sits in a getaway car is responsible for the battery and trespass to goods committed by other members of the gang in the course of the robbery.1 The principle of joint liability assists a plaintiff who cannot prove who actually caused the damage. For example, three persons may have been throwing rocks at the plaintiff, but the plaintiff may not be able to prove which person threw the rock that hit them. If the three persons are proved to have been taking concerted action to a common end, they cannot take advantage of the plaintiff’s inability to prove who caused the physical contact, or, if there is more than one injury, who caused which.2

1 2

For further examples, see Downham v Bellette [1986] Aust Torts Reports 80-038 (TASSC); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597. Arneil v Paterson [1931] AC 560.

[33.11.220] The common law rule1 that a judgment against one joint tortfeasor (see [33.11.190]), even if unsubstantiated, barred the commencement or continuance of action against the others, has been abrogated by statute in all jurisdictions. The position, based on the premise that the act of one tortfeasor was the act of all tortfeasors, was that the one cause of action “merged”. The common law rule was based on the notion that having once made certain and established their right by having obtained a judgment against one of a number of joint tortfeasors, a plaintiff should not be allowed to bring a multiplicity of actions in respect of the same wrong. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that liability was several as well as joint, in the sense that the plaintiff could sue any one tortfeasor, or all the tortfeasors together, for the whole damage.2 The merger principle resulted in one judgment for one sum of damages being entered against all of the tortfeasors. The merger rule did not apply to several concurrent tortfeasors, or to

991

CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

[33.11.220]

independent tortfeasors.3 At common law, several tortfeasors could not be joined in the one action, but this is now permitted. The purpose of the common law rule which barred subsequent actions was to avoid the unnecessary multiplication of claims. This rule was abolished by statutory provisions to the effect that where damage was suffered by any person as a result of a tort, judgment recovered against any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage would not be a bar to action against any other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a joint tortfeasor in respect of the same damage.4

1 Brinsmead v Harrison (1871) LR 6 CP 584 (affirmed in Brinsmead v Harrison (1872) LR 7 CP 547). 2 Rich v Pilkington (1691) 90 ER 704; Mitchell v Tarbutt (1794) 101 ER 362. Even in actions for conspiracy, joinder was not compulsory: Mills v Mills (1631) 79 ER 809. 3 Sadler v Cresco Fertilizers Pty Ltd [1939] VLR 438; United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1. 4 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 20(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(2); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(a); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12(1); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AA; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7. These provisions are derived from the now-repealed Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 (UK), s 6(1)(a). There are some variations between the provisions. In particular, the Victorian provision applies generally to joint liability for any debt or damage, and expressly allows not only an action but also continuance of an action. This provision is based on Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK), s 3.

[33.11.230] All jurisdictions except Victoria provide that where more than one action is brought against tortfeasors in respect of the same damage (whether joint tortfeasors or otherwise), the sums recoverable shall not, in the aggregate, exceed the amount of damages awarded in the judgment first given. It is also provided that in any of the actions, other than that in which judgment is first given, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to costs unless the court is of the opinion that there were reasonable grounds for bringing the action.1 The purpose of these provisions is to discourage the excessive litigation which might result from “verdict shopping” for a higher award of damages.2 In Victoria, this purpose is now sought to be achieved by the costs sanction only.3 A plaintiff who obtained judgment against one tortfeasor and then pursued an action against another tortfeasor would have to prove that the first judgment remained unsatisfied,4 and that there was some good reason why the second tortfeasor was not sued at the same time as the first, for example an inability to find the second tortfeasor at that time.

992

[33.11.240]

CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFICATION

The effect of the common law rule was that only one judgment could be awarded in an action against joint tortfeasors. Under the statutory provisions, a plaintiff bringing separate actions against different joint tortfeasors can obtain separate judgments; similarly, a plaintiff suing different joint tortfeasors in the same action. Normally, where judgments are entered against defendants in the same action the judgments are for the same amount, but not necessarily. Exemplary (as opposed to aggravated) damages may be awarded against one defendant but not another,5 or in different amounts as against different defendants.6 Again, the plaintiff may obtain a consent judgment following a settlement against one defendant, and later a regular judgment against another defendant in the same action.7 However, if after obtaining a judgment against one tortfeasor whose common law liability is limited by statute, a plaintiff sues in respect of the same damage another tortfeasor whose liability is unlimited, then the plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the shortfall in common law damages.8

1

2

3 4 5 6 7

8

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 20(2); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(a) – (b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(2) – (3); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(a) – (c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 12(2) – (4); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(b); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(b). The limit on recovery, however, may only apply to compensatory damages (ie including aggravated damages but not exemplary damages): see XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352, Gibbs CJ at 459–460, Brennan J at 469–470 (CLR); De Reus v Gray (2003) 9 VR 432; [2003] VSCA 84. See also “Types of Damages” [33.10.170]–[33.10.250]. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AB. This provision is derived from Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK), s 4. Bryanston Finance Ltd v de Vries (No 1) [1975] QB 703; [1975] 2 WLR 718 (CA). XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; 59 ALJR 352. De Reus v Gray (2003) 9 VR 432; [2003] VSCA 84. Bryanston Finance Ltd v de Vries (No 1) [1975] QB 703; [1975] 2 WLR 718 (CA); Wah Tat Bank Ltd v Chan Cheng Kum [1975] AC 507; [1975] 2 WLR 475 (PC); Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635; 76 ALJR 114; [2001] HCA 66. South Australia v Mountford (2001) 79 SASR 389; [2001] SASC 85 (FC), affirmed in Nau v Kemp & Associates Pty Ltd (2010) 77 NSWLR 687; [2010] NSWCA 164.

[33.11.240] Statutory reforms have altered the common law rule that release of one joint tortfeasor effectively releases all the joint tortfeasors. Release by deed or accord and satisfaction of one joint tortfeasor at common law resulted in all tortfeasors being discharged.1 Consequently, a

993

CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS

[33.11.240]

plaintiff who released a joint tortfeasor in return for payment of part of the damages could not then claim the balance from another joint tortfeasor.2 In Tasmania, it is expressly provided that a release of one joint tortfeasor does not discharge another joint tortfeasor unless the release so provides and relieves that person from liability to make contribution to another person.3 However, although legislation outside Tasmania does not, in express terms, apply to releases, the High Court has held that the legislation has abolished in its entirety the common law rule that there is only one indivisible cause of action for a joint tort. Therefore, the rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases the other has been impliedly abolished by the statute.4 A release, however, must be distinguished from a covenant not to sue. If a covenant not to sue is given to one joint tortfeasor this does not discharge the others; they cannot rely on the covenant and may still be sued. The question whether an agreement is a release or a covenant not to sue is one of interpretation and depends on the intention of the parties as gleaned from the document. Given that the rule regarding releases discourages settlements, courts are inclined to interpret an agreement as a covenant not to sue one joint tortfeasor rather than a release which discharges them all.5 An express or implied reservation of the plaintiff’s rights against another tortfeasor will save the agreement from being interpreted as a release.

1 Cutler v McPhail [1962] 2 QB 292; [1962] 2 WLR 1135; JF & BE Palmer Pty Ltd v Blowers & Lowe Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 89. 2 Cocke v Jennor (1614) 80 ER 214; Cutler v McPhail [1962] 2 QB 292; [1962] 2 WLR 1135; JF & BE Palmer Pty Ltd v Blowers & Lowe Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 89; Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271; 42 ALJR 89, Taylor J at 286 (CLR); Vancouver v Rhodes [1955] 1 DLR 139. This common law rule did not apply to several concurrent tortfeasors. 3 Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(3). 4 Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131; Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635; 76 ALJR 114; [2001] HCA 66. 5 Gardiner v Moore (No 2) [1969] 1 QB 55; [1966] 3 WLR 786; Bryanston Finance Ltd v de Vries (No 1) [1975] QB 703; [1975] 2 WLR 718 (CA), Lord Diplock at 732 (QB).

994

Contribution General [33.11.350] Previously at common law, no general right to contribution among tortfeasors was recognised.1 This doctrine subsequently applies to unintentional tortfeasors and tortfeasors whose independent acts resulted in joined injury.2 Following the enactment of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 (UK), all Australian legislation now accords a right to contribution. There are variations in wording across jurisdictions, but essentially the legislation provides for the recovery of contributions from those liable for the same damage.3 The legislative provisions adopted in the Australian jurisdictions largely mirror those of the British Act.4 In certain jurisdictions, a common liability in tort or liability derived from a breach of a contractual duty that is concurrent and coextensive with a duty of care in tort must first exist.5 This does not include, for example, the situation where the wrongdoer would only be liable for breach of contract; a common or coordinate obligation is required.6 Under the statutes in all jurisdictions other than South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, the right to contribution only exists when all the persons who are liable to the plaintiff are liable in tort.7 Both the person who claims contribution and the person against whom the claim is made must be tortfeasors, either joint tortfeasors (see [33.11.160]) or several concurrent tortfeasors: see [33.10.170]. The courts have been increasingly inclined to find defendants liable under concurrent duties in tort and contract where appropriate.8 If a plaintiff in a contribution claim can demonstrate that they were liable to the original victim in tort (albeit found liable in contract), that should be sufficient to found a right to contribution.9 Another solution to the problem arises if the plaintiff sues both defendants in the one action and the court assesses their respective responsibilities for the plaintiff’s injury.10 In South Australia and Tasmania, the legislation applies to liabilities under tort, contract and statute.11 In Victoria, the restriction of contribution rights to tortfeasors has been removed by legislation which provides that a claim can be made for contribution whatever the legal basis of the liability of the claimant and the person against whom the claim is made, whether it be tort, breach of contract, breach of trust or otherwise.12 For example, a breach of s 11 of the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) would be covered.13 The basic legislative provision has given rise to difficulties of interpretation, particularly the phrases “any tortfeasor liable” (see [33.11.360]) and “who is, or would if sued have been liable”: see [33.11.370]. In other words, who can claim contribution and against whom can a claim be made? If a claim is established,

995

[33.11.350]

CONTRIBUTION

the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person must be just and equitable, having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage.

1 This common law rule was subject to some qualification: see Merryweather v Nixan (1799) 8 TR 186; 101 ER 1337 (joint tortfeasors); Dall v Blue Wren Taxi Co Pty Ltd [1926] VLR 365 (FC) (several concurrent tortfeasors); Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 130 ER 693 (auctioneer who innocently sold goods on instructions of the defendant and was held liable to the true owner entitled to complete indemnity from the defendant). 2 See Williams GL, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault in Great Britain, Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Stevens & Sons, 1951); Dall v Blue Wren Taxi Co Pty Ltd [1926] VLR 365. 3 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(1); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(c). Beyond these statutory provisions, a right to contribution may still be recognised in some instances at common law or in equity: see, eg Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382, Lee J at 384–385. 4 Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 (UK), s 6. 5 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 19; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 5; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 3A. 6 Jones v Mortgage Nominees Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 418. 7 Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 92 ACSR 677; [2013] FCA 115, Nicholas J at [31]–[32]; TAL Structural Engineers Pty Ltd v Vaughan Constructions Pty Ltd [1989] VR 545 (FC) explains the restrictions imposed by the Victorian statute. 8 MacPherson v Kevin J Prunty & Associates [1983] 1 VR 573 (FC); AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 7 ACSR 759 (NSWSC); Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; 62 ALJR 240; Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1; 73 ALJR 403; [1999] HCA 6. See “Tort and Contract” [33.1.10]ff. 9 Rap Industries Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-876 (NSWSC); AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 7 ACSR 759 (NSWSC). There is, however, contrary authority: Brown v Sevrup Fisheries Pty Ltd [1970] Tas SR 1. 10 Coppin v Tobler Bros Canberra Marine Centre Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 183. 11 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 4; Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 2. 12 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 23A(1), 23B(1). It applies to a claim for damages for a breach of the Australian Consumer Law, s 18 (found in Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2; previously Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52). See also

996

[33.11.360]

RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION

Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; 78 ALJR 411; [2004] HCA 7, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [21]–[27]. 13 Pricom Pty Ltd v Sgarioto [1994] ATPR 41-365 (VSC).

Right to Contribution [33.11.360] The right to contribution (see [33.11.350]) is accorded to a person who, pursuant to the relevant legislation, is liable for the plaintiff’s damage. In New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australia, “any tortfeasor liable” in respect of that damages may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would have been if sued, liable in respect of the same damage.1 In the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, “a person liable” in respect of any relevant damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage.2 This phrase has been interpreted to mean that if judgment attributing liability against the first defendant has been given, it is not open to the second defendant to instigate the question of the first defendant’s liability in order to contest a claim for contribution.3 This has also extended to a consent judgment.4 The claimant for contribution does not have to prove in the contribution proceedings that they were indeed liable, nor is it open to the person against whom the claim for contribution is made to prove that the claimant was not liable at all or not liable for the amount of damages assessed.5 Nevertheless, a claim that the damages awarded were excessive could possibly be raised in deciding the issue of just and equitable contribution.6 The phrase “any tortfeasor liable” is not confined to the situation where a tortfeasor has been found to be liable by a court. It also covers the situation where the claimant has settled a claim made by the plaintiff without admission of liability7 or by means of a consent judgment in the plaintiff’s favour.8 In such a case, however, it appears that the person seeking contribution must establish that they would have been held liable if sued; it is not enough for the claimant to simply demonstrate that the claim was settled in good faith.9 The effect of this is discouragement of settlement where there is doubt as to liability.10 In Victoria, a person who in good faith has made or agreed to make any payment in settlement or compromise of a claim made against them in respect of any damage (including a payment into court which has been accepted) is entitled to recover contribution without regard to whether that person is or ever was liable in respect of that damage, as long as (assuming that the factual basis of the claim against them could be established) that person would have been liable.11 This means that a person may recover contribution even though they would not have been held liable by a court if there had been a hearing. Such a provision is said to encourage settlements in instances of consent judgments. Judgment given in an action brought by or on behalf of the person who suffered the damage against a person from whom contribution is sought is conclusive in the proceedings for contribution as to any issue determined by that judgment in favour of the person from whom the contribution is sought. Additionally, in

997

[33.11.360]

CONTRIBUTION

assessing the amount of contribution recoverable, if the court finds that payment made in settlement was excessive, it must disregard any part of the payment which appears to be excessive.12 In Tasmania, a person may recover contribution after settlement with the person who suffered damage, and thereafter commence or continue an action against another person who is liable, or would have been liable, if sued by the person by whom the damage was suffered at the time when the cause of action arose. In such an instance, the person must satisfy the court that the settlement amount was reasonable. If the court finds that the settlement amount was excessive, it may fix the amount at which the claim should have been settled.13 A person whose liability has not been the subject of a court ruling or a settlement, but is merely anticipated, cannot claim contribution.14

1 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(c). See also [33.11.350]. 2 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(1) – (2); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B. 3 Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46; Van Win Pty Ltd v Eleventh Mirontron Pty Ltd [1986] VR 484; (1985) 58 LGRA 259 (FC); James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Seltsam Pty Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 53; 73 ALJR 238; [1998] HCA 78. A person liable for contravening legislation which prohibits misleading conduct may be a tortfeasor: Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson [1996] ATPR 41-454 (FCA), Burchett J at 41,570–41,571. A person who pays workers’ compensation may not be able to claim contribution because such payments are not damages: Martin v Stratman [1994] Aust Torts Reports 81-262 (SASCFC). The right extends to recovery of contribution towards any costs recoverable by a plaintiff: James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Wyong Shire Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 679; [2000] NSWCA 107. 4 Woolworths (WA) Pty Ltd v Berkeley Challenge Pty Ltd (2004) 28 WAR 540; [2004] WASCA 196. 5 Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46; Hunnerup v Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co (Aust) Ltd (1974) 7 SASR 215, Jacobs J at 227–228. 6 Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46, the Court at 212–213 (CLR). 7 Stott v West Yorkshire Road Car Co [1971] 2 QB 651; [1971] 3 WLR 282 (CA); Bakker v Joppich (1980) 25 SASR 468; Baylis v Waugh [1962] NZLR 44 (SC); John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd v Jordin (No 2) (1985) 79 FLR 210 (NTSC); but see Bawden v Saint Carthy and Southern Transport Pty Ltd (unreported, SASC, Johnston J, 1026 of 1983, 5 February 1988), Johnston J at 25–26. In South Australia, it is provided that a tortfeasor who becomes liable may recover contribution,

998

[33.11.370]

8 9

10

11 12 13 14

LIABILITY TO MAKE CONTRIBUTION

notwithstanding that judgment in an action founded on the tort has not been given determining the tortfeasor’s liability: Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(8)(a), (b). Woolworths (WA) Pty Ltd v Berkeley Challenge Pty Ltd (2004) 28 WAR 540; [2004] WASCA 196. Stott v West Yorkshire Road Car Co [1971] 2 QB 651; [1971] 3 WLR 282 (CA); Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46, the Court at 212 (CLR); Hall v Bonnett [1956] SASR 10 (FC), Napier CJ and Abbott J at 17–19; Saccardo Constructions Pty Ltd v Gammon (1991) 56 SASR 552 (FC); Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 71 ALJR 131, Gummow J at 616–617 (CLR). The amount of the settlement may be used as a basis for determining the amount of contribution: Bakker v Joppich (1980) 25 SASR 468, Wells J at 475. The reasonableness of the settlement must be assessed in the light of facts which were known or ought to have been known by the person seeking contribution at the time of the settlement: Saccardo Constructions Pty Ltd v Gammon (No 2) (1994) 63 SASR 333 (FC), King CJ at 336, Millhouse J concurring, Perry J dissenting. See Marschler v G Masser’s Garage (1956) 2 DLR (2d) 484; State Electricity Commission (Vic) v Fooks [1994] 1 VR 259 (App Div), Tadgell J at 267, Brooking J concurring. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B(4). Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 23B(5), 24(2B). Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(d). Van Win Pty Ltd v Eleventh Mirontron Pty Ltd [1986] VR 484; (1985) 58 LGRA 259 (VSCFC).

Liability to Make Contribution [33.11.370] In all jurisdictions, a contribution claim can be brought against a “tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage”.1 A claim for contribution can only be brought against a person who is liable either because they were sued and held liable, or not sued, but would have been liable if they had been sued. The claim may be brought in a situation where the tort occurs at an interval2 or simultaneously. This basic provision has been varied in the Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria: see [33.11.350]. This variation will not be applicable in cases where proportionate liability applies: see [33.11.200]. Under the basic provision applying in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australia, a claim for contribution can only be made against a tortfeasor who has caused the plaintiff the “same damage” as that caused by the claimant.3 Therefore, the claimant and the person against whom the claim is made must be concurrent tortfeasors, either joint or several4 and, at least in Victoria, there must be a common plaintiff.5 The two or more torts may have been committed simultaneously (eg a pedestrian injured by two colliding vehicles or where, in an interim period, negligent medical treatment aggravates

999

[33.11.370]

CONTRIBUTION

the original injury)6, or successively (eg a rescuer struck by a negligent driver while assisting a negligent victim).7 A person is not liable in respect of the same damage as a second person where their respective torts were causes of distinct aspects of the claimant’s overall condition, neither having caused the whole of it (eg the first person initiating and the second worsening it).8 South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria are the only jurisdictions where the same damage may have been brought about by wrongs other than tort, such as breaches of a contractual duty of care or statute.9 All other jurisdictions require that such a breach is concurrent with a duty of care in torts in order to constitute a wrong. The phrase “tortfeasor who is … liable” means a person who is responsible in law, and not a person who has been held not liable or who would, if sued, have a good defence.10 Accordingly, if the person against whom the claim for contribution is made has already been sued by the injured party and has obtained judgment in that suit, the claim for contribution must fail.11 This is so even if the judgment obtained involves no finding for the defendant on the merits (eg a consent judgment) and to which no other defendant has standing to object.12 However, this rule does not apply where the defendant has not been sued to judgment.13 For example, if the action had been dismissed for want of prosecution14 or for reasons other than a clear determination of the merits.15 Similarly, the fact that a defendant has been held liable only for breach of contract will not prevent the recovery of contribution if the defendant could also have been held liable in tort.16 Contribution cannot be claimed against a person who has a statutory immunity from suit by the injured party in respect to the loss if the statute conferring such immunity operates substantively rather than merely procedurally.17 If, however, an injured party sues two tortfeasors and succeeds against one and fails against the other, the former may appeal against the judgment in favour of the latter in order to preserve a right of contribution.18 However, the right to contribution is affected by the relevant statutory limitation period, as established by the relevant legislation.19

1 Note that wording is not uniform between jurisdictions; see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(1); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(1); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B(1); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(c). 2 Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504. 3 For an example of where this requirement was not satisfied, see Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Steel Mains Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 323; 49 ALJR 233; Little v Suncorp Insurance & Finance (No 2) [1994] 2 Qd R 273; Grundy v Lewis (1995) 62 FCR 567; Pricom Pty Ltd v Sgarioto [1994] ATPR 41-365 (VSC); Birse Construction Ltd v Haiste Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 675 (CA). See also Thompson v 1000

[33.11.370]

4 5 6 7 8 9

10

11

12

13 14 15

16 17

18

19

LIABILITY TO MAKE CONTRIBUTION

Henderson & Partners Pty Ltd (1990) 58 SASR 548 (FC) (vicariously liable principal was not a tortfeasor); Howkins & Harrison v Tyler [2001] Lloyd’s Rep PN 1 (CA). A claim for contribution cannot be made against someone whose liability is merely alternative to that of the claimant: Lauren v Jolly [1996] 1 VR 189 (CA). Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 109; 78 ALJR 411; [2004] HCA 7, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [3]. This is not so, however, if the situation is one of gross negligence: see Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Ltd (1985) 156 CLR 522; 59 ALJR 504. Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112; 35 ALJR 170 (psychiatric injury caused partly by assault and partly by medical negligence). Rahman v Arearose Ltd [2001] QB 351; [2000] 3 WLR 1184 (CA) (psychiatric injury caused partly by assault and partly by medical negligence). Alex Kay Pty Ltd v Fife (1966) 9 FLR 246 (ACTSC); Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 92 ACSR 677; [2013] FCA 115, Nicholas J at [31]–[32]. Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46; see Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664; [2000] FCA 1106. Bitumen & Oil Refineries (Aust) Ltd v Commissioner for Government Transport (1955) 92 CLR 200; 55 SR (NSW) 108; 72 WN (NSW) 46; for a more recent example, see Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v Boland (2000) 179 ALR 664; [2000] FCA 1106. James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Seltsam Pty Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 53; 73 ALJR 238; [1998] HCA 78, discussed in Cane P, “Multiple Torts, Contribution and the Dynamics of the Settlement Process” (1999) 7 TLJ 137. See Castellan v Electric Power Transmission Pty Ltd (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 159; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 67 (CA); Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 67 FLR 66 (ACTSC); Hood v Commonwealth [1968] VR 619 (FC). Holland v Metropolitan Health Services Board (WA) [2001] WASCA 155, applying Hart v Hall & Pickles Ltd [1969] 1 QB 405; [1968] 3 WLR 744 (CA). Hart v Hall & Pickles Ltd [1969] 1 QB 405; [1968] 3 WLR 744 (CA); Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 67 FLR 66. Nottingham Health Authority v Nottingham City Council [1988] 1 WLR 903 (CA); Corvi v Ellis [1969] SC 312 (CSIH); but see Walsh v Curry [1955] NI 112 (CA). Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (No 2) (2000) 78 SASR 216; [2000] SASC 418 (FC); Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (No 5) (2003) 85 SASR 325. Commonwealth v Flaviano (1996) 40 NSWLR 199 (CA); Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liq) v Airservices Australia (2000) 203 CLR 136; 74 ALJR 1184; [2000] HCA 39. Walter H Wright Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1958] VR 318 (FC); Hanson v Wearmouth Coal Co Ltd [1939] 3 All ER 47 (CA). It appears that this avenue is not open once the former tortfeasor has paid the injured party, as the latter tortfeasor’s liability has then been discharged: Castellan v Electric Power Transmission Pty Ltd (1967) 69 SR (NSW) 159; 87 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 67 (CA); James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Seltsam Pty Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 53; 73 ALJR 238; [1998] HCA 78. Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 21(1); Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s 26(1); Limitation Act 1981 (NT), s 24; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 40; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(4);

1001

[33.11.370]

CONTRIBUTION

Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(5); Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(4), (5); Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 17.

[33.11.380] Although the words “or would if sued have been liable” (see [33.11.370]) provide no indication of the time at which the hypothetical action is deemed to have been brought, the words “if sued” have been interpreted to mean “if sued at any time”. A defence which was not originally available to a tortfeasor as against a victim may become available some time after the cause of action arises: for example, the victim’s claim against a tortfeasor may become statute-barred or released. Does this mean that no claim for contribution can be made against the tortfeasor?1 In Brambles Constructions Pty Ltd v Helmers (1966) 114 CLR 213; 39 ALJR 410, the High Court held that in such a situation a claim for contribution can be made. The words “if sued” were construed to mean “if sued at any time”. According to Windeyer J: A person from whom contribution can be claimed is … anyone who would had he been sued have been held liable for the same damage … I see no reason for limiting the denotation of the description by assuming that the words “if sued” refer to some particular point of time. It is enough that there was a time, before the liability of the defendant tortfeasor was actually ascertained, at which the plaintiff (the victim of the tort) could have successfully brought an action against some other person (the third party), either independently of or jointly with the defendant.2

In South Australia, the relevant legislation provides that an action for contribution may be brought against a third party, even though the period within which the plaintiff could have commenced the action against the contributory has expired.3 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA) states: The relevant time limit is the longer of the following: (a)

the period within which the person who suffered the harm could have brought an action against the person from whom contribution is sought;

(b)

2 years after the damages payable by the person entitled to contribution are finally determined.4

In Tasmania, the relevant legislation stipulates that where damage is suffered by a person as a result of a wrongful act, a person who is liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from “any other person who is, or would, if sued by the person by whom the damage was suffered at the time when the cause of action arose, have been, liable in respect of the same damage”.5 In Victoria, the position appears to be different. The relevant legislation provides that: A person shall be liable to make contribution … notwithstanding that that person has ceased to be liable in respect of the damage in question since the time when the damage occurred unless that person ceased to be liable by virtue of the expiry of a period of limitation … which extinguished the right on which the claim against that person in respect of the damage was based.6

1002

[33.11.380]

LIABILITY TO MAKE CONTRIBUTION

A person’s liability in respect of any damage means “such liability which has been or could be established in an action brought against that person in Victoria”.7 Consequently, if a person has ceased to be liable by virtue of the relevant period of limitation, that person is protected against a claim for contribution. In various jurisdictions, a claim for contribution can be made against a tortfeasor who has settled with the injured victim, as a tortfeasor who “would if sued have been liable” before the settlement.8 South Australian legislation specifically provides that a tortfeasor can bring an action for contribution from a third party even though “the person who suffered the harm” has released that third party from liability or has obtained judgment against them.9 Similarly, under Victorian legislation, a tortfeasor may be liable to make contribution even if they have “ceased to be liable in respect of the damage in question since the time when the damage occured”.10 Allowing claims for contribution in such circumstances may, however, discourage defendants from settling. Accordingly, in Tasmania, it is provided that a release of one joint tortfeasor relieves that joint tortfeasor from liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor, and has the effect of reducing the amount of damages that the latter can be required to pay to the person who suffered injury.11 The basic legislative provision in all jurisdictions states that “no person shall be entitled to recover contribution … from any person entitled to be indemnified by him”.12 Accordingly, if one tortfeasor gave the other an indemnity against liability prior to the commission of the tort, the former cannot claim contribution from the latter in respect of liability to which the indemnity clause extends. This provision avoids circuity of action. A tortfeasor is equally relieved of an obligation to make contribution if the injured person has given them an indemnity against liability.13 Claims for contribution made by insurance companies exercising their rights of subrogation have been limited by ss 65 and 66 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). Outside the area of workers’ compensation and compensation for injury or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle personal injury,14 subrogation rights are denied for claims against members of the insured’s family, friends of the insured, uninsured persons driving the insured’s motor vehicle with the insured’s consent, or employees, subject to the conduct that gave rise to the loss occurring in the course of employment and not being serious or wilful misconduct. The purpose of this legislation is to avoid shifting a loss from a good to a poor loss distributor.15

1

2

This question must be distinguished from the question of whether the contribution claim is made within any special limitation period governing the contribution claim itself. Such limitation period varies according to the jurisdiction. See [33.11.370]; Civil Procedure “Limitation of Actions” [5.10.10]ff. Brambles Constructions Pty Ltd v Helmers (1966) 114 CLR 213; 39 ALJR 410,

1003

[33.11.380]

CONTRIBUTION

3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11

12

13 14 15

Windeyer J at 221 (CLR). See Quinn v Llesna Rubber Co Pty Ltd [1989] VR 347; Moore v Government Railways Commission (WA) (1990) 3 WAR 409. Compare George Wimpey & Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corp [1955] AC 169; [1954] 3 WLR 932. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(8)(d). Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(4)(a), (b). Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c). Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B(3). See Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (UK), s 1(3). Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B(6). But see State Electricity Commission (Vic) v Fooks [1994] 1 VR 259 (VSC), Tadgell J at 265–266, Brooking J concurring. Harper v Gray & Walker [1985] 1 WLR 1196 (QB), applied in Australia in Century Insurance Ltd (in prov liq) v New Zealand Guardian Trust Ltd (unreported, FCA, French J, 81 of 1995, 2 October 1997). Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(8)(b). Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23B(3). Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(3)(b). Possible alternative criteria governing the reduction are set out in the section. Such reduction could discourage an injured person from settling. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(3)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(9)(a); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AD(4)(a) (expressing the point in substantially similar terms); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(c). For a consideration of this proviso, see Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 67 FLR 66. Alex Kay Pty Ltd v Fife (1966) 9 FLR 246 (ACTSC). Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 9(1)(e). The legislation gives effect to the recommendations of Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, Report No 20 (AGPS, 1982) at [309]–[313].

Assessment of Contribution [33.11.390] In proceedings for contribution, the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by a court to be just and equitable, having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage.1 This is the general basis for assessing contribution under the relevant legislation in all jurisdictions. The court also has the additional powers to make an order exempting a person from liability, or order that the contribution to be recovered is to be declared as a complete indemnity.2 In Amaca v New South Wales (2003) 77 ALJR 1509; 1 DDCR 39; [2003] HCA 44, the High Court examined the circumstances in which an exemption may be granted. In their joint judgment, their Honours noted that:

1004

[33.11.390]

ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTION

[W]ithout identifying the duty owed, and the breach or breaches committed, it was not, and is not, possible to identify the extent of that party’s responsibility for the damage. Nor is it possible to say that that party should be exempted from liability despite it having breached a duty which it owed the plaintiff. (It is unnecessary to consider whether, or in what circumstances, it would be proper to exempt a negligent party from liability to contribute. It may be that the power to exempt is engaged only where the party to be exempted was not at fault but found liable for some form of strict liability. That question was not argued and need not be decided.)3

In Western Australia, when there are two or more tortfeasors, the amount of contribution recoverable from any person is what the court finds to be just and equitable. The court has the power to exempt any person from liability to make a contribution or direct that the contribution recovered amounts to total indemnity.4 The relevant legislation fails to specify that the court is to have regard to the extent of the person’s responsibility for the damage. In Victoria, the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person is assessed by the jury or the court if the trial is by judge alone.5 The assessment is to be made on the basis of what is just and equitable, having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage. The jury or the court has the power to exempt the person from liability to make contribution or to direct that the contribution recovered amounts to a complete indemnity. In other jurisdictions, there is little support for the view that this task is entrusted6 to the court.7 The formula for apportioning damages, at least in negligence cases, is substantially the same as that which is applied in the context of apportionment for contributory negligence. The court has a wide discretion,8 and appellate courts appear reluctant to interfere with the exercise of that discretion.9 The relative culpability – in kind or degree10 – of the individual tortfeasors is considered, as is the causal importance or potency of the respective causal acts.11 Therefore, it is possible that one tortfeasor will owe a higher duty than another. In Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492, the High Court stated: The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant of their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage involves a comparison both of culpability, ie of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man (Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, [the Court] at 16) and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage: [Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663; [1953] 3 WLR 279, Lord Reid at 682; Smith v McIntyre [1958] Tas SR 36, Burbury J at 42–49 and Broadhurst v Millman [1976] VR 208, Gowans and Menhennitt JJ at 219] and cases there cited. It is the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination. The significance of the various elements involved in such an examination will vary from case to case; for example, the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage will be of little, if any, importance.12

The method for assessing apportionment as set out in Podrebersek v Australian 1005

[33.11.390]

CONTRIBUTION

Iron & Steel Pty Ltd was reiterated in the case of Grima v RFI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 345.13 The New South Wales Court of Appeal considered what is “just and equitable” pursuant to s 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), having regard to the respective degrees of “responsibility” for the damage suffered. Where one tortfeasor is strictly liable and another liable for negligence, comparative culpability is less to the point than comparative causal potency. For example, when a claimant’s liability is a strict statutory liability, and the defendant was the one at fault, the claimant may be entitled to a 100 per cent contribution.14 In the United Kingdom, however, this is not invariably the case.15 Where two parties are both held strictly liable on the basis of vicarious liability, without any individual fault, they may be required to bear the loss equally,16 although factors such as the greater control of one party in the context of which the injury or damage occurred may make a difference.17 Where the comparative causal contributions cannot be quantified the court is not obliged to apportion contribution equally. Different tortfeasors may expose a claimant to different risks of exposure, which may be considered.18 If the liability of one tortfeasor to the injured person is limited (eg by statute or prior agreement), that tortfeasor cannot be required to pay a contribution in excess of the limit. In Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways (1958) 101 CLR 73; [1958] Qd R 528; (1958) 32 ALJR 228, Fullagar J said: [T]he amount of the liability to pay contribution cannot be greater than the amount of the primary liability … A person cannot be said to be so liable except to the extent to which damages can be recovered from him at law. In any case, I do not think that it could be lawfully held to be “just and equitable” within the meaning of [the Act] that a person should be ordered to pay by way of contribution to another tortfeasor a larger amount than he could be compelled to pay to the person injured.19

The tortfeasor’s proportion of responsibility is determined first, and then, if necessary, any relevant limit is applied. In South Australia and Victoria, it is specifically provided that a person shall not be required to pay an amount which exceeds any limit set by an agreement before the act or omission giving rise to the liability (South Australia), or before the damage occurred (Victoria).20 Where a plaintiff sues more than one tortfeasor in respect of damage to which the plaintiff’s own negligence has contributed, the plaintiff’s damages are reduced in the same amount against each tortfeasor. The responsibility of the plaintiff is compared to the total responsibility of all the defendants, and the amount the plaintiff can recover is scaled down equally in respect of each defendant. This reduction is independent of any apportionment of damages between the tortfeasors themselves on the basis of contribution.21 This approach is in keeping with the basic principle of solitary liability, namely that a plaintiff is entitled to full compensation from all the tortfeasors, not merely proportionate compensation from each: see [33.11.200]. If, however, a particular tortfeasor is not entitled to a reduction of damages because contributory negligence is not a defence to the tort in question, judgment against that tortfeasor will differ in

1006

[33.11.390]

ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTION

amount from a judgment in favour of the same plaintiff against another tortfeasor who can invoke the defence of contributory negligence.22 In South Australia and Victoria, legislation provides that a person from whom contribution is sought cannot be required to pay an amount in excess of damages calculated after reduction for the injured person’s contributory negligence.23 In each state and territory, proportionate liability provisions exist which enables liability to be apportioned between individuals according to their respective responsibilities.24 In Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10, attention was drawn to the differences between the proportionate liability provisions contained in Pt 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and the contribution provisions of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW). French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ said: Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act represents a departure from the regime of liability for negligence at common law (solidary liability), where liability may be joint or several but each wrongdoer can be treated as the effective cause and therefore bear the whole loss. Under that regime, a plaintiff can sue and recover his or her loss from one wrongdoer, leaving that wrongdoer to seek contribution from other wrongdoers. The risk that any of the other wrongdoers will be insolvent or otherwise unable to meet a claim for contribution lies with the defendant sued. By comparison, under Va regime of proportionate liability, liability is apportioned to each wrongdoer according to the court’s assessment of the extent of their responsibility. It is therefore necessary that the plaintiff sue all of the wrongdoers in order to recover the total loss and, of course, the risk that one of them may be insolvent shifts to the plaintiff.25

In Victoria, liability can be apportioned between concurrent wrongdoers for claims for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages (whether in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise) arising from a failure to take reasonable care, and for a claim for damages for a contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.26 However, these provisions don’t apply to personal injury claims or other claims specifically excluded by the Act.27 The liability of a concurrent wrongdoer is limited to an amount reflecting that proportion of the loss or damage claimed that the court considers just having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility for the loss or damage.28

1 2

3

Different criteria may apply in personal injury matters in New South Wales: see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(2) – (3); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(2); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 13; Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 7; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(5), (7); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(2); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(2). Amaca v New South Wales (2003) 77 ALJR 1509; 1 DDCR 39; [2003] HCA 44, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [20].

1007

[33.11.390]

CONTRIBUTION

4 5 6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13 14 15

16

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(2). Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(2). The authority of Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Fenwick (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 482 (NSWSC) has been questioned in Zunter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 594; [2005] NSWSC 119. See also Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways (1958) 101 CLR 73; [1958] Qd R 528; (1958) 32 ALJR 228; Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; 78 ALJR 907; [2004] HCA 28, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [60]–[61]. Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Fenwick (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 482 (NSWSC); Stevens v Collinson [1938] 57 NZLR 64 (SC) (overruled on another point by Collinson v Wairarapa Automobile Association Mutual Insurance Co [1958] NZLR 1 (CA)); but see Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways (1958) 101 CLR 73; [1958] Qd R 528; (1958) 32 ALJR 228. Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Fenwick (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 482 (NSWSC); Stevens v Collinson [1938] 57 NZLR 64 (SC) (overruled on another point by Collinson v Wairarapa Automobile Association Mutual Insurance Co [1958] NZLR 1 (CA)); but see Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways (1958) 101 CLR 73; [1958] Qd R 528; (1958) 32 ALJR 228. AV Jennings Construction Pty Ltd v Maumill (1956) 30 ALJ 100 (HCA); Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10; Sinclair v William Arnott Pty Ltd (No 2) (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 88; 81 WN (Pt 2) (NSW) 204 (FC), Walsh J (for the Court) at 95–96 (SR (NSW)); Australian Breeders Co-op Society Ltd v Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488 (FCAFC). See “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. Whether or not a court should have regard to benefits received by any of the tortfeasors is considered in Rein NG, “Just and Equitable! The Relevance of Benefit in a Claim for Contribution against a Joint Tortfeasor or Wrongdoer” (2001) 9 TLJ 298. For instance, whether there is negligence or active deceit, and how far removed from the standard of care the action is; see Chandra v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1046. Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366; [2002] UKHL 48. Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492, the High Court at 494. See also Liftronic Pty Ltd v Unver (2001) 75 ALJR 867; [2001] HCA 24; Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 65 (HCA); Watt v Bretag (1982) 56 ALJR 760 (HCA); Braithwaite v South Durham Steel Co Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 986 (York Assizes); Wright v Lodge [1993] 4 All ER 299 (CA); EM Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane [1999] Aust Torts Reports 81-499 (CA); James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Roberts (1999) 47 NSWLR 425; [1999] NSWCA 314. Grima v RFI (Aust) Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 345, Barrett JA at [41] (Meagher JA agreeing; Emmett JA agreeing “with some reservation” at [89]). Sherras v Van der Maat [1989] 1 Qd R 114. See Higgins v William Inglis & Son Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 649 (CA). Daniel v Rickett, Cockerell & Co Ltd [1938] 2 KB 322; Jerred v T Roddam Dent & Son Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 104 (Leeds Assizes); Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271 (Liverpool Assizes). Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 215; [1960] Qd R 204; (1960) 33 ALJR 463, the Court at 235 (CLR).

1008

[33.11.400]

ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTION

17 Fatur v IC Formwork Services Pty Ltd (2000) 158 FLR 136; [2000] ACTSC 110. 18 James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Roberts (1999) 47 NSWLR 425; [1999] NSWCA 314; Bitupave Ltd v McMahon (1999) 18 NSWCCR 481; Baghdadi v P & M Quality Smallgoods Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 406. 19 Unsworth v Commissioner for Railways (1958) 101 CLR 73; [1958] Qd R 528; (1958) 32 ALJR 228, Fullagar J at 87 (CLR). 20 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(9)(b); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(2A). The Victorian provision also includes statutory limitations. 21 Fitzgerald v Lane [1989] AC 328; [1988] 3 WLR 356; Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 118 FLR 248 (CA). For an example of a mode of apportionment, see Cole v Lawrence [2001] NSWSC 92. 22 Barisic v Devenport [1978] 2 NSWLR 111 (CA). See generally “Contributory Negligence” [33.9.720]–[33.9.870]. 23 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 24(2A)(b), 26. 24 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 7A; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 4; Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT), Pt 2; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), Pt 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), Pt 9A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Pt IVAA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1F. For a discussion of apportionable claims and proportionate liability under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), see Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 89 ALJR 572; [2015] HCA 18. 25 Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613; 87 ALJR 505; [2013] HCA 10, French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ at [10] (citations omitted). 26 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AF(1). A “concurrent wrongdoer” is defined as a person who is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions caused, independently of each other or jointly, the loss or damage that is the subject of the claim: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AH(1). 27 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 24AE, 24AG. 28 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24AI(1).

[33.11.400] A complete indemnity is recoverable by a blameless wrongdoer from a blameworthy one. Such recovery was recognised at common law1 and is authorised under the contribution legislation.2 In general, the successful complainant may not recover the costs of defending the original action brought by the injured victim. However, such costs may be granted in exceptional cases.3 Only in Western Australia does legislation specify the situations where a person is entitled to a complete indemnity. There are three instances of this indemnity: (a)

if his complicity in the tort arose from fraud or misrepresentation practised on him by the person from whom the indemnity is sought so that he honestly believed and had no reasonable cause to suspect the truth of the matters represented to him and would not have been liable in tort if such matters had been true;

1009

[33.11.400]

CONTRIBUTION

(b)

where the act was not clearly illegal or tortious in itself and the person seeking indemnity had no knowledge when the tort was committed of the true legal character of the act;

(c)

where he is responsible on grounds of vicarious liability ... where the act was done without his connivance, knowledge or express authority.4

These categories are to a large extent declaratory of the common law.5 Subject to legislative or contractual provision to the contrary, an employer who is vicariously liable for an employee’s tort can recover a complete indemnity from that employee, whether the employee’s tort was intentional6 or negligent.7 Equally, an employer can recover from an independent contractor, if the employer is liable in respect of the contractor’s tort.8 A person whose complicity was procured by the fraud or misrepresentation of another can recover a complete indemnity from that other.9 Accordingly, an innocent converter of a chattel can claim an indemnity from the wrongdoer from whom the chattel was acquired.10 An employee who committed a tort in the bona fide execution of an employer’s orders can recover an indemnity from the employer.11 A tortfeasor may have indemnity against liability arising from either an express clause or implication of a contract.12

1 Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 130 ER 693. 2 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(3)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(9); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(2); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(c). 3 Hanson v Matthew Bros Contractors Ltd (1990) 55 SASR 183; Sherras v Van der Maat [1989] 1 Qd R 114; Patten v Moffatt [1999] NSWSC 1322. 4 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1A). 5 Vicarious liability: Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 2 WLR 158; McGrath v Fairfield Municipal Council (1985) 156 CLR 672; 59 ALJR 655. Complicity arising from fraud or misrepresentation: Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816; Krakowski v Trenorth Ltd [1996] Aust Torts Reports 81-401 (VSC); Parmley v Parmley [1945] SCR 635; [1945] 4 DLR 81. Execution of orders leading to tortuous conduct: Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 130 ER 693. 6 Ryan v Fildes [1938] 3 All ER 517 (Liverpool Assizes); Davenport v Commissioner for Railways (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 552; 70 WN (NSW) 334 (FC). 7 Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 2 WLR 158. However, a partially-responsible employer will suffer a reduction: Jones v Manchester Corp [1952] 2 QB 852 (CA). 8 Honeywill & Stein Ltd v Larkin Bros (London’s Commercial Photographers) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 191 (CA); Thompson v Henderson & Partners Pty Ltd (1990) 58 SASR 548 (SASCFC) explains the relationship between a principal and an agent. However, an employer in breach of its own non-delegable duty by virtue of a contractor’s negligence must arguably suffer a reduction: see Voli v Inglewood Shire 1010

[33.11.410]

ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTION

Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 100 (CLR); Canberra Formwork Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Ltd (1982) 67 FLR 66 (ACTSC); Nikolic v Commonwealth Accommodation & Catering Services Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 413 (ACTSC); Arthur v Commonwealth (1992) 108 FLR 206 (ACTSC). 9 Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816; Parmley v Parmley [1945] SCR 635; [1945] 4 DLR 81. 10 Adamson v Jarvis (1827) 130 ER 693. 11 Edwards v Joyce [1954] VLR 216, Sholl J at 220; Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corp [1976] 2 NZLR 729 (SC), Mahon J at 744. 12 Florida Hotels Pty Ltd v Mayo (1965) 113 CLR 588; 39 ALJR 50; Mowbray v Merryweather [1895] 2 QB 640 (CA); Betts v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 107 FLR 352 (ACTSC).

[33.11.410] The right of an employer to obtain an indemnity from an employee for whose tort the employer is vicariously liable has been curtailed. This right to obtain an indemnity from an employee arises both under the contract of employment and under the contribution legislation.1 There is an implied term in all contracts of employment that the employee will not intentionally or negligently cause the employer damage or cause the employer to incur vicarious liability by virtue of the employee’s tort. In Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 2 WLR 158, the House of Lords refused to imply into a contract of employment a term that the employer would insure the employee against liability. As a result, the employer’s insurer, exercising its right of subrogation and without the consent of the employer, was able to recover a complete indemnity from the employee. The decision in Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd has been generally poorly received, both in England2 and Australia.3 It has been reversed by legislation in New South Wales,4 the Northern Territory5 and South Australia.6 These statutes provide that if an employee commits a tort for which the employer is also responsible, the employee is not be liable to indemnify the employer in respect of the vicarious liability incurred by the employer and, unless the employee is “otherwise entitled to indemnity in respect of that lialibility”,7 the employer is liable to indemnify the employee in respect of liability incurred by the employee. The legislation, however, does not apply to a tort committed by an employee if the conduct of the employee was serious and wilful misconduct, or conduct that did not occur in the course of the employee’s employment.8 It is further provided that where an employee is entitled to be indemnified pursuant to an insurance policy in respect of liability that the employee might face in relation to that tort and the employer is proceeded against, the employer shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee.9 In Tasmania, there is legislation requiring the employer to insure employees in respect of their liabilities to fellow employees.10 The effect of Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd has been substantially limited by s 66 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). This section provides that the insurer does not have the right to be subrogated to the rights of the

1011

[33.11.410]

CONTRIBUTION

insured against the employee where the conduct of the employee was not serious or wilful misconduct.11 The Act does not apply to workers’ compensation or compulsory third-party motor vehicle insurance.12

1 Harvey v RG O’Dell Ltd [1958] 2 QB 78; [1958] 2 WLR 473; Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74; [1963] Qd R 256; (1963) 37 ALJR 25; 9 LGRA 1, Windeyer J at 100 (CLR). See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 21(3)(a); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), s 5(1)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 12(4); Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 6(c); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(9); Wrongs Act 1954 (Tas), s 3(1)(c); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 24(2); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), s 7(1)(c). 2 See Williams GL, “Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity” (1957) 20 Mod LR 220 at 437. Insurers officially agreed in cases of accidents between co-employees to refrain from exercising their rights of subrogation against employees without the consent of their employers, unless there was clear evidence of collusion or wilful misconduct. See the discussion in Gardiner G, “Reports of Committees: Lister v The Romford Ice and Cold Storage Company Ltd” (1959) 22 Mod LR 652. The case of Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 2 WLR 158 was distinguished by a majority of the Court of Appeal in Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792; [1973] 2 WLR 843, which found that rights of subrogation are not implied into indemnity contract in industrial setting. 3 See Commercial & General Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Offıce (NSW) (1973) 129 CLR 374; 47 ALJR 612, the Court at 380–381 (CLR); Rowell v Alexander Mackie College of Advanced Education (1988) 25 IR 87 (NSWCA), Mahoney JA at 95–96. Comments of Fox J in Marrapodi v Smith-Roberts (unreported, ACTSC, Fox J, 16 September 1968) noted in Jeffrey P, “An Anomalous Indemnity” (1970) 44 ALJ 3. 4 Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW), s 3. This legislation confirms the interpretation given to earlier legislation, Employee’s Liability (Indemnification of Employer) Act 1982 (NSW), s 2(3) by the High Court in McGrath v Fairfield Municipal Council (1985) 156 CLR 672; 59 ALJR 655. 5 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 22A. 6 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 59; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(9)(c). 7 Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW), s 3 expressly precludes a claim by the employer for contribution as well as indemnity. For an example of a case where the employee was “otherwise entitled to indemnity”, see Santa Teresa Housing Association Inc v Jamieson (1993) 3 NTLR 131; 120 FLR 315 (CA). 8 Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW), s 5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 22A(3); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 59(3); Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 6(9)(c). The Northern Territory statute also provides for “gross” misconduct. 9 Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW), s 6; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 22A(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 59(2). 10 Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s 97(1). 11 For a discussion of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 66, see Deutz Australia

1012

[33.11.410]

ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTION

Pty Ltd v Skilled Engineering Ltd (2001) 162 FLR 173; [2001] VSC 194. On the meaning of “serious or wilful”, see Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd v Pyke [1992] 2 Qd R 25 (FC). 12 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 9(1)(e). Compulsory third-party motor vehicle insurance must cover both the employer and the employee.

1013

[33.11.410]

CONTRIBUTION

1014

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[References are to paragraph numbers] 1017

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[References are to paragraph numbers] 1019

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[References are to paragraph numbers] 1020

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[References are to paragraph numbers] 1023

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[References are to paragraph numbers] 1025

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W Wade JW, Prosser WL and Schwartz VE, Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz’s Cases and Materials on Torts (9th ed, Foundation Press, 1994)..........................................[33.8.170] Wadsley J, “Liability for References – A Breath of Life” (1994) 10 PN 147... [33.2.820] Walker P, “Vicarious Liability for Exemplary Damages: A Matter of Strict Liability?” (2009) 83 ALJ 548...................................[33.8.410], [33.8.460], [33.8.1630], [33.8.1740] Walker PA, “Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet’?” (2009) 33 MULR 235......................................................... [33.8.810], [33.8.890] Wallace IND, “Murphy Rejected: The Bryan v Maloney Landmark” (1995) 3 Tort L Rev 231.........................................................................................................................[33.2.820] Walmsley S, Zipser B and Abadee A, Professional Liability in Australia (3rd ed, Lawbook Co., 2015)........................................................................................... [33.2.1150] Walter DJ, “Personal Liability of Receivers and Managers for Interference with Contractual Relations” (2005) 5 INSLB 103................................[33.8.1180], [33.8.1200] Watson JA, “A Sketch II: Praecipe to Negligence & Contract” in Gleeson JT, Watson JA and Peden E (eds), Historical Foundations of Australian Law (Federation Press, 2013)........................................................................................................................[33.1.10] Watts P, “Restitutionary Damages for Trespass” (1995) 112 LQR 39........... [33.10.1420] Weerasooria WS, “Assessment of Damages in Cheque Conversion” (1996) 24 ABLR 236......................................................................................................[33.8.710], [33.8.810] Weinrib EJ, “A Step Forward in Factual Causation” (1975) 38 Mod LR 518.....................................................................................................................[33.10.1990] Wells W, “The Abuse of Process” (1986) 102 LQR 9..................................... [33.8.1950] Weybury D and Witting C, “Wrongful Conception Actions in Australia” (1995) 3 TLJ 53.........................................................................................................................[33.2.1400] White B, Willmott L and Allen J, “Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Treatment: Criminal Responsibility for Established Medical Practice?” (2010) 17 JLM 849.........................................................................................................................[33.8.375] White S and Orr G, “Precarious Liability: The High Court in Lepore, Samin and Rich on School Responsibility for Assaults by Teachers” (2003) 11 TLJ 101................ [33.2.980] [References are to paragraph numbers] 1036

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Whittaker S, “European Product Liability and Intellectual Products” (1989) 105 LQR 125......................................................................................................[33.4.730], [33.4.815] Whittaker S, “The EEC Directive on Product Liability” (1985) 5 YB Eur L 233.........................................................................................................................[33.4.730] Wilkes John (ed), North Briton (1763) No 45.....................................................[33.9.540] Williams C, “The Honey Bee and the Law: Who’s Responsible for Injuries Inflicted by Stinging Bees?” (1992) 66 LIJ 1109................................................................... [33.6.350] Williams G, “Assault and Words” [1957] Crim LR 219.....................................[33.8.440] Williams GL, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault in Great Britain, Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Stevens & Sons, 1951).................................................................................................[33.11.10], [33.11.350] Williams GL, Liability for Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law of Tortious Liability for Animals, Distress Damage Feasant and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (Cambridge University Press, 1939)..................................................[33.6.310], [33.6.380], [33.6.400], [33.6.440] Williams GL, “The Camel Case” (1940) 56 LQR 354....................................... [33.6.350] Williams GL, “Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity” (1957) 20 Mod LR 220....................................................................................................................... [33.11.410] Willmott L, “Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: A Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis” (2010) 17 JLM 556............................................[33.8.375] Wilson T, “Recent Developments in Liability for Injuries Occurring on Property” (2001) 16 APLB 13....................................................................................... [33.3.260], [33.3.340] Windeyer WJV, Lectures on Legal History (2nd ed (revised), Law Book Co., 1957)........................................................................................................................[33.1.10] Winfield PH, A Text-Book of the Law of Tort (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1943)......................................................................................................................[33.8.860] Winfield PH, The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 1921).......................................................................................[33.8.1790] Winfield PH, “The History of Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 50.........................................................................................................................[33.8.1990] Winfield PH, “The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts” (1926) 42 LQR 184...........................................................................................................................[33.7.30] Witting C, “Tort Liability for Intended Mental Harm” (1998) 21 UNSWLJ 55.........................................................................................................................[33.8.2130] Witzleb N and Carroll R, “The Role of Vindication in Torts Damages” (2009) 17 Tort L Rev 16................................................................................................................. [33.8.2170] Witzleb N, “Giller v Procopets: Australia’s Privacy Protection Shows Signs of Improvement” (2009) 17 TLJ 121..................................................................... [33.8.2135]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1037

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Woollard SC, “Malicious Prosecution: Qualifying as the Prosecutor” (1996) 4 Tort L Rev 23.........................................................................................................................[33.8.1840] Wright A, “Contributory Negligence and Infants” (2003) 57 Plaintiff 31....... [33.2.1640]

Y Yeo S, “Am I My Child’s Keeper? Parental Liability in Negligence” (1998) 12 AJFL 150.........................................................................................................................[33.2.950] Yeo S, “Determining Consent in Body Contact Sports” (1998) 6 Tort L Rev 199...................................................................................[33.8.310], [33.8.360], [33.8.450] Yeo S, “Making Sense of Liability for Intervening Acts” (1997) 5 TLJ 45.......................................................................................................................[33.10.2010] Yorston M, “Liability of Statutory Authorities for Negligent Misstatements” (2002) 76 LIJ 68.................................................................................................................... [33.2.550] Young L, “Sex, Lies and Money: The High Court Considers Deceit and Paternity Fraud in Magill v Magill” (2007) TLJ 1......................................................................[33.8.1290] Yung C, “Litigation Funding: Officious Intermeddling or Access to Justice?” (2005) 15 JJA 61.............................................................................................[33.8.1990], [33.8.2000]

Z Zwier PJ, “Cause in Fact in Tort Law – A Philosophical and Historical Examination” (1981–1982) 31 De Paul L Rev 769................................................................[33.10.1980]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1038

Torts [References are to paragraph numbers]

Abatement definition........ [33.7.40], [33.7.900] nuisance......... [33.7.40], [33.7.820] legal proceedings, alternative to.................................[33.7.900] private individuals, by................................[33.7.910] Aboriginal Culture and Tradition false imprisonment and cultural loss, damages for..........[33.8.1740] Abuse of Process absence of arguable basis for proceedings................... [33.8.2020] champerty.....................[33.8.1510], [33.8.1940] aggravated form of maintenance............. [33.8.2000] collateral.......................[33.8.1510], [33.8.1940], [33.8.1950] distinction.................[33.8.1970] fraud......................... [33.8.1980] improper object central to...............................[33.8.1960] damages........................ [33.8.2020] dismissal of action........[33.8.2020] maintenance................. [33.8.1510], [33.8.1940] officious meddling in action........................[33.8.1990] malicious prosecution — see Malicious Prosecution perjury...........................[33.8.1810] usage of term................ [33.8.1970]

industrial — see Industrial Accidents Act causation recovery of damages..................[33.10.1980] duty of care — see Duty of Care Agent vicarious liability............ [33.6.600] authority to act...........[33.6.640] independence of agent........................... [33.6.640] Aggravated Damages — see Damages assault, for.......................[33.8.460] exemplary damages, distinguished................. [33.10.190] false imprisonment, for.............[33.8.1743], [33.8.1747] cultural loss suffered, recognition of...........[33.8.1740] injury to plaintiff’s feelings..........................[33.10.180] intimidation................... [33.8.1140] provocation................... [33.10.180] Airspace infringement as trespass to land..................................[33.8.580] Animals cattle trespass — see Cattle Trespass dogs, injuries by............. [33.6.460] contributory negligence.................. [33.6.470]

Accident

defences......................[33.6.470] 1039

INDEX

owner..........................[33.6.460] provocation.................[33.6.470] trespass by plaintiff....[33.6.470] voluntary assumption of risk..............................[33.6.470] scienter liability............... [33.6.10], [33.6.280], [33.6.350] damage within risk, imposition of liability...................[33.6.380] dangerous animals...... [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.350] keeping.................. [33.6.370] knowledge of dangerous characteristics........ [33.6.360] proof where animals harmless.................[33.6.360] defences available default of plaintiff.................. [33.6.390] voluntary assumption of risk.........................[33.6.390] strict liability....................[33.6.10], [33.6.140] tort liability.................... [33.6.280], [33.6.350] carelessly keeping, action in negligence.................. [33.6.290] private nuisance......... [33.6.310] public nuisance.......... [33.6.310] Rylands v Fletcher rule, liability under.............[33.6.320] Searle v Wallbank rule............................. [33.6.300] trespass committed through agency of animal...... [33.6.330], [33.6.340]

justification in tort action common law..........[33.9.500] delay in taking person before justice.................... [33.9.500] statutory provisions.............. [33.9.510] Assault apprehension suffered by plaintiff............................[33.8.430] battery, distinguished...... [33.8.360] consent defence to intentional torts, as a..................................[33.8.450] damages, aggravated or exemplary........................[33.8.460] defence action against consent to act............. [33.9.210] definition......................... [33.8.420] exemplary damages...... [33.10.210] false imprisonment, accompanying.............. [33.8.1520], [33.8.1530] injunction........................ [33.8.460] intent, with......................[33.8.420] negligent..........................[33.8.420] restraint of person.........[33.8.1530] trespass to person.......... [33.8.350], [33.8.420]–[33.8.460] words, by........................ [33.8.440] Assessment of Damages — see Damages adjustment to present value, compensation where prospective losses.............................[33.10.550] breach of contract...........[33.1.270] conflict of laws............... [33.10.40] date of assessment tort............................ [33.10.490] defamation, for............[33.10.1100]

Apportionment damages — see Damages Arrest without warrant

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1040

INDEX

“forum shopping”........... [33.10.40] inflation, impact of....... [33.10.560] property, wrongful seizure or loss of.......................[33.10.560] interest on damages...... [33.10.500] actual losses suffered by plaintiff..................... [33.10.540] period for which awarded.................... [33.10.520] rate at which awarded.................... [33.10.530] simple interest rate...[33.10.530] statutory provisions for............................. [33.10.510] residents of different States constitutional guarantees of rights, whether........... [33.10.40] issues of proper law...[33.10.40] taxation actual total taxation position time of judgment..............[33.10.600] award of damages taxable...................... [33.10.570] damages for loss.......................[33.10.590] future economic loss.......................[33.10.590] tort, for............................[33.1.270]

Australian Consumer Law contract term excluding, restricting or modifying application Pt 3-5..........................[33.4.840] Pt 5-4..........................[33.4.720] product liability............. [33.4.170], [33.4.730] product-related loss or damage liability provisions.......... [33.4.630] remedies under Pt 3-5.... [33.4.830] statutory guarantee regime suppliers and manufacturers, treatment.....................[33.4.642] supply of goods......... [33.4.640] Automobile — see Motor Vehicle Bailment conversion of goods....... [33.8.890] definition......................... [33.8.890] Battery absence of consent by plaintiff............................[33.8.400] assault, distinguished......[33.8.360] consent of plaintiff absence of, effect...... [33.8.375], [33.8.400] defence to intentional torts, as a..................................[33.8.450] damages

Assets definition awarded after 24 June 1986..........................[33.10.580] Attorney-General (A-G) private nuisance action...[33.7.500] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) defective goods action commencement............... [33.4.850]

compensatory............. [33.8.410] exemplary...................[33.8.410] defence, consent to act... [33.9.210] definition......................... [33.8.360] directness of interference..................... [33.8.380] effect of act of defendant.........................[33.8.390] everyday contacts, no liability in..................................... [33.8.370] exemplary damages...... [33.10.210]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1041

INDEX

false imprisonment, accompanying.............. [33.8.1520], [33.8.1530] injunction........................ [33.8.460] intentional....................... [33.8.360] interference with person..............................[33.8.360] directness of............... [33.8.380] medical treatment, failure to obtain consent.................[33.8.375] negligent..........................[33.8.360] non-liability in everyday contacts........................... [33.8.370] personal injury, compensatory damages.......................... [33.8.410] restraint of person.........[33.8.1530] standard of proof............ [33.8.360] trespass to person........... [33.8.350]–[33.8.410] weapon, by use of.......... [33.8.390] Birth wrongful damages, restriction on..................................[33.2.90] duty of care owed to parents...................... [33.2.1400] Breach — see Damages for Breach of Contract duty, of — see Breach of Duty statutory duty, of — see Breach of Statutory Duty

Breach of Duty conspiracy..................... [33.8.1270] duty of care — see Duty of Care statutory — see Breach of Statutory Duty Breach of Statutory Duty breach of statutory standard, where standard of care determined by statute.........................[33.5.250] causation of damage.......[33.5.270] “but for” test.............. [33.5.270]

Breach of Contract assessment of damages — see Assessment of Damages damages — see Damages for Breach of Contract defence contributory negligence.................. [33.1.320]

cause of action private right.................[33.5.10], [33.5.20], [33.5.140] statute designed for protection of individuals giving rise to.................................[33.5.220] common law, and.......... [33.5.140], [33.5.200] compensation, alternative remedy for statutory remedy, inhibition.................... [33.5.210] concepts............................ [33.5.30] contributory negligence....................... [33.5.400] damage caused by breach..............................[33.5.270] injury which statute sought to prevent........................[33.5.280] types of.......................[33.5.260] defences contributory negligence.................. [33.5.400] illegal conduct by plaintiff....................... [33.5.430] statutory exclusions, in.................................[33.5.390] voluntary assumption of risk..............................[33.5.420]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1042

INDEX

defendant correct, determining...[33.5.230] statutory duties imposed on................................[33.5.230] definition........................... [33.5.10] elements required............[33.5.160] illegal conduct by plaintiff............................[33.5.430] industrial safety.............. [33.5.140] duty to take care of safety of others..........................[33.5.210] injury plaintiff causing own.............................[33.5.270] type.............................[33.5.280] legislative intention penalty, provision of................................ [33.5.190] private right of action, as to.................................[33.5.170] judges imputing policy ideas.......................[33.5.180] remedy other than tortious remedy........................[33.5.200] limitation of actions........[33.5.410] negligence, and................ [33.5.10], [33.5.150] parties defendant, statutory duties imposed on.................[33.5.230] plaintiff, protection of................................ [33.5.230] penalty, effect of provision of..................................... [33.5.190] plaintiff illegal conduct by...... [33.5.430] person statute intends to protect.........................[33.5.240] protection of...............[33.5.230]

private right of action......[33.5.10], [33.5.20], [33.5.140] legislative intention of Parliament.................. [33.5.170] remedy other than tortious remedy, intention of Parliament...[33.5.200] right of action................... [33.5.10] provision of penalty does not preclude......................[33.5.190] standard of care............. [33.5.150], [33.5.160], [33.5.250] absolute...................... [33.5.250] strict............................[33.5.250] statute for protection of individuals.......................[33.5.220] statutory nature of duty................................. [33.5.150] voluntary assumption of risk.................................. [33.5.420] Builder duty of care.....................[33.2.810] negligent construction, statutory warranties...................... [33.2.1140] Building construction defective distinguished from damage to property....[33.2.810] negligent, statutory warranties................. [33.2.1140] Burden of Proof contributory negligence....................... [33.9.830] motor accident........... [33.9.800] passenger accepting lift with intoxicated person......[33.9.810] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1770] malicious prosecution...[33.8.1920] negligence action............. [33.2.10], [33.2.1730]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1043

INDEX

Buyer buyer beware, replacement of principle by product liability law.....................................[33.4.30] caveat emptor, maxim of....................................... [33.4.30] sensitivity of, and fitness for purpose............................[33.4.200] Bystanders duty of care.....................[33.2.330] Capital Gains Tax (CGT) compensation payments awarded after 24 June 1986..........................[33.10.580] Car — see Motor Vehicle Cattle Trespass abolition of tort...............[33.6.450] strict liability....................[33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.400] damage recoverable... [33.6.430] defences available......[33.6.440] non-natural user......... [33.6.420] parties to action......... [33.6.410] Causation breach of statutory duty................................. [33.5.270] “but for” test breach of statutory duty.............................[33.5.270] product liability cases........................... [33.4.460] contract, in...................... [33.1.280] legal causation concept of..................[33.4.460], [33.4.470] negligence, and — see Negligence

product liability — see Product Liability recovery of damages act or omission and loss, connection between.................. [33.10.1980] burden of proof......[33.10.1990] damage too remote.....................[33.10.2020] multiple causes.......[33.10.2000] regulation of......................[33.2.70] test in contract and tort, compared.........................[33.1.280] Caveat Emptor maxim of...........................[33.4.30] product liability law, replacement of principle by.................. [33.4.30] Certainty establishment of losses claimed with sufficient certainty, in action for damages................ [33.10.2030] future events, probability of occurring..................... [33.10.2050] loss of chance, receiving benefit or avoiding injury............[33.10.2040] Champerty...[33.8.1510], [33.8.1940] maintenance, aggravated form of................................... [33.8.2000] Chattel

novus actus interveniens.................[33.10.2010]

conversion — see Conversion definition......................... [33.8.710] detinue — see Detinue replevin — see Replevin reversionary interest in, action on the case......................... [33.8.2140] tortious damage to compensation......... [33.10.1460] profit-earning chattel..................... [33.10.1470]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1044

INDEX

rare and unusual chattels................... [33.10.1460] restoration better than prior to accident, no deduction for betterment...............[33.10.1480] torts to.............................[33.8.710] trespass to...................... [33.8.300], [33.8.720]–[33.8.780] actionable without proof of damage....................... [33.8.770] actual or constructive possession...................[33.8.750] actual possession at time of act............................... [33.8.730] defence of inevitable accident...................... [33.8.780] definition.................... [33.8.720] exemplary damages....................[33.10.210] interference with possession...................[33.8.760] possession for purposes of................................ [33.8.740] actual or constructive........... [33.8.750] interference with... [33.8.760] third parties, right of................................ [33.8.860] title to chattel............. [33.8.750] wrongfully damaging or destroying........................[33.8.710]

malicious prosecution...[33.8.1820] public nuisance............... [33.7.360] Collateral Benefit claim for damages, in causation test..........[33.10.2160] equity test...............[33.10.2160] source of benefit test.......................... [33.10.2160] Common Law buyer beware, replacement of principle by product liability law.....................................[33.4.30] caveat emptor, maxim of....................................... [33.4.30] contribution among tortfeasors......................[33.11.350] joint tortfeasors one action possible against...................... [33.11.190] one judgment awarded in action against...................... [33.11.230] release of one, effect......................... [33.11.240] judgment against one tortfeasor, action barred against another...........................[33.11.220] Compensation amenities of life, loss of................................... [33.10.940] capital gains tax

Children capacity immunity from suit....[33.9.290] consent intentional tort............[33.9.300] contributory negligence by.................................. [33.2.1640] unborn — see Unborn Child Civil Proceedings

awarded after 24 June 1986..........................[33.10.580] consortium, loss of..... [33.10.1750] consumer guarantee, breach of..................................... [33.4.693] damage or loss, product-related................ [33.4.630] damages — see Damages defective goods proceedings commencement............... [33.4.820]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1045

INDEX

discretionary family trust............................... [33.10.910] domestic capacity, loss of................................... [33.10.930] earning capacity, loss of.............. [33.10.860]–[33.10.920] expectation of life, loss of................................... [33.10.850] loss or damage, product-related................ [33.4.630] manufacturers or importers, recoverable from...............[33.4.20] product-related loss or damage............................ [33.4.630] reputation, loss of....... [33.10.1100] superannuation entitlements, loss of................................... [33.10.910] Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) manufacturers, statutory liability of — see Product Liability product liability — see Product Liability Concurrent Liability contract and tort..............[33.1.140] Concurrent Tortfeasors — see Tortfeasors Consent battery............................. [33.8.400] intentional tort, as defence to..................................... [33.9.200] assault and battery..... [33.9.210] burden of proof..........[33.9.280] conditional..................[33.9.260] criminal acts...............[33.9.210] express consent.......... [33.9.220] genuine....................... [33.9.250] implied from circumstances............. [33.9.240]

interests of unborn child............................[33.9.230] revoked.......................[33.9.270] Conspiracy agreement between two or more persons intention of injury....[33.8.1260] purpose of injury or damage..................... [33.8.1260] breach of statutory duty............................... [33.8.1270] contributory negligence no defence............................ [33.9.600] economic tort, as.......... [33.8.1080] exemplary damages..... [33.10.210], [33.10.1700] justification as defence.......................... [33.8.1280] tort of........[33.8.1260]–[33.8.1280] forms........................ [33.8.1260] tort, to commit..............[33.8.1270] unlawful means.............[33.8.1270] Constitution quantification of damages residents of different States constitutional guarantees of rights......................[33.10.40] Construction maxims expressum facit cessare tactitum.......................[33.5.200] Consumer Sales of Goods acquiring goods as consumer, what qualifies as...................... [33.4.644] Contract causation, test for........... [33.1.280] common law duty of care and...................................[33.1.140] concurrent liability in

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1046

INDEX

tort...................................[33.1.140] contractual relations, interference with...... [33.10.1690], [33.10.2280] damages — see Damages direct interference justification as defence..................... [33.8.1250] means not unlawful....................[33.8.1190] no liability, where.... [33.8.1220] physical acts.............[33.8.1230] proof......................... [33.8.1200] threats....................... [33.8.1180] intentional interference with...........[33.8.1180]–[33.8.1250] damage to be established as part of cause of action........................[33.8.1240] direct interference — see direct interference forms........................ [33.8.1180] indirect interference...............[33.8.1180] what constitutes...[33.8.1230] inducing breach of contract..................... [33.8.1180] knowledge of contract and intention to interfere, sufficiency of............[33.8.1210] lawful termination or non-performance...... [33.8.1220]

terms — see Contractual Terms Contractual Terms Australian Consumer Law exclusion, restriction or modification of application or consequences of Pt 3-5.....................[33.4.840] Pt 5-4.....................[33.4.720] fitness for purpose of product, implied term....................[33.4.190] guarantee compliance failure liability exclusion, restriction or modification............... [33.4.720] implied term product, application to.................................[33.4.190] liability in contract, effect on.................................... [33.1.260] liability of manufacturer of defective goods exclusion, restriction or modification............... [33.4.840] merchantability of product, implied term....................[33.4.190] Contribution apportionment of liability............................ [33.1.330] breaches of contract, between defendants liable for.......[33.1.330] liability to make............[33.11.380]

malice, whether need be established................[33.8.1210] law of tort and.................. [33.1.10] relationship between... [33.1.20], [33.1.30] theoretical basis, different........................ [33.1.10] occupiers’ liability — see Occupiers’ Liability

right to tortfeasors................. [33.11.360] legislative provisions............ [33.11.350] tort, between defendants liable in..................................... [33.1.330] tortfeasors, among — see Tortfeasors Contributory Negligence

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1047

INDEX

to..................................... [33.9.600] age, consideration of...... [33.9.730] motor accident apportionment of damages...... [33.1.330], [33.5.400], apportionment of [33.9.850], [33.9.860], damages......................[33.9.860] [33.10.2150] disregard of statutory comparative obligation................... [33.9.860] culpability...................[33.9.860] emergency situation... [33.9.770] factors to be failure to wear seat considered................. [33.9.850], belt..............................[33.9.800] [33.9.860] child.......................[33.9.730] finding of 100 per cent contributory intoxication of negligence................... [33.2.90], passenger....................[33.9.820] [33.9.850] onus of proof............. [33.9.800] legislation................... [33.9.890] passenger accepting lift with professional negligence intoxicated driver....... [33.9.810] actions........................ [33.9.870] negligence setting aside finding...[33.9.860] defence awareness of danger....... [33.9.740] to..............[33.9.720]–[33.9.870] breach of contractual duty of care, occupiers’ liability defence to........................[33.1.320] action in contract not breach of statutory tort.............................. [33.3.480] duty................................. [33.5.400] apportionment of breach of statutory damages......................[33.3.470] standard...........................[33.9.790] product liability.............. [33.4.510] burden of proof...............[33.9.830] remaining in position of motor accidents..........[33.9.800] danger..............................[33.9.740] causation......................... [33.9.840] seat belt, failure to children wear.................................[33.9.800] standard of care....... [33.2.1640] child............................[33.9.730] company dealings........... [33.9.750] statutory standard, breach conduct constituting........[33.9.760] of..................................... [33.9.790] emergency, acting in.......[33.9.740] tort, defence to claims in..................................... [33.1.320] industrial claims what constitutes.............. [33.9.760] circumstances of work........................... [33.9.780] work accident..................[33.9.780] person creating emergency situation... [33.9.770] emergency.................. [33.9.770] inadvertence or intelligence, consideration misjudgment...............[33.9.770] of..................................... [33.9.730] Conversion intentional torts, defence [References are to paragraph numbers] 1048

INDEX

causation, test for........... [33.1.280] consequential loss, liability............................ [33.8.900] context of act.................. [33.8.815] damages assessment..............[33.10.1520] consequential damages..................[33.10.1530] exemplary damages..................[33.10.1550] payments made by defendant................[33.10.1540] sue in quasi-contract for money.....................[33.10.1560] definition......................... [33.8.790] detention of goods by police...............................[33.8.945] exclusive possession, assertion by joint owner......................[33.8.820] finder’s possessory title.................................. [33.8.830] immediate possession, establishment of right to..................................... [33.8.850] intentional physical dealings with chattels............................ [33.8.890] absolute denial of title............................. [33.8.890] delivery by carrier to wrong person......................... [33.8.880] determination............. [33.8.870] dispossession of plaintiff....................... [33.8.880] innocent third parties......................... [33.8.890] pledges....................... [33.8.890] refusal to return chattel......................... [33.8.880] use in good faith........[33.8.890] joint owner, assertion of exclusive

possession....................... [33.8.820] nature of action...............[33.8.790] parties to illegal transactions, entitlement to sue in conversion.......................[33.8.840] possession of chattel dealing with, conversion by................................[33.8.880] title, unaccompanied by................................[33.8.830] third party, right of......... [33.8.860] title to sue in...................[33.8.810] tort of chattels.................[33.8.710] trespass to goods, overlap with................................. [33.8.800] Corporation contributory negligence in dealings........................... [33.9.750] Counsel immunity from tort liability............................ [33.9.570] negligence immunity from........... [33.9.570] Criminal Conduct restraint of person.........[33.8.1560] Criminal Offences consent............................ [33.9.210] illegality.......................... [33.9.990] intentional torts...............[33.9.610] malicious prosecution...[33.8.1820] public nuisance............... [33.7.360] restraint of person.........[33.8.1560] Crown vicarious liability, immunity abrogated by statute........[33.6.610] Cyclist contributory negligence....................... [33.9.860]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1049

INDEX

child............................[33.9.730] Damages absolute rights, actions for infringement..................[33.8.2170] action to trespass........ [33.10.1440] damage caused by animals....................... [33.6.430] aggravated — see Aggravated Damages apportionment contributory negligence................. [33.1.330], [33.9.850], [33.9.860], [33.10.2150] nuisance......................[33.7.690] occupiers’ liability..... [33.3.470] assault, for.......................[33.8.460] assessment — see Assessment of Damages battery............................. [33.8.410] breach of contract — see Damages for Breach of Contract breach of duty...................[33.4.20] breach of statutory duty.............. [33.5.200], [33.5.270] types of damage.........[33.5.260] causation causal connection, damage too remote.....................[33.10.2020] cause of losses suffered, burden of proof.................. [33.10.1990] connection between loss and tortious act, recovery of damages..................[33.10.1980] multiple causes, whether combined causes.... [33.10.2000] novus actus interveniens............ [33.10.2010] causes of action different, separate action for damages

where.............................[33.10.370] certainty future events, degree of probability.............. [33.10.2050] loss of chance avoiding injury, of........................[33.10.2040] receiving benefit, of........................[33.10.2040] losses to be established, existence and extent of............................ [33.10.2030] collateral benefits, tests for determining causation test..........[33.10.2160] equity test...............[33.10.2160] source of benefit test.......................... [33.10.2160] compensatory, capital gains tax liability where awarded after 24 June 1986......................[33.10.580] conflict of laws............... [33.10.40] contemptuous damages, court’s disapproval of claim.....[33.10.240] continuing wrongs, fresh action on recurrence of damage... [33.10.380] contract, in........................ [33.1.10] assessment of damages......................[33.1.270] causation of damage....................... [33.1.280] contribution between defendants.................. [33.1.330] contributory negligence.................. [33.1.320] foreseeability..............[33.1.290] non-remote damage recoverable................. [33.1.300] purpose of award........ [33.1.10], [33.1.250]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1050

INDEX

remoteness test...........[33.1.290] statutes of limitation.................... [33.1.340] terms affecting liability....................... [33.1.260] contribution tortfeasors, among......[33.11.10] conversion — see Conversion definition......................... [33.10.10] detinue — see Detinue economic loss — see Economic Loss equity, in object of award rights to equitable relief and common law damages not co-terminous......[33.10.1870] exemplary damages — see Exemplary Damages false imprisonment — see False Imprisonment “forum shopping”........... [33.10.40] general damages............. [33.10.30] compensatory damages....................[33.10.170] goods tortious damage to — see Goods inadequacy of injunction as alternative remedy....................[33.10.2280] independent tortfeasors......................[33.11.180] industrial disputes.......[33.10.2280] injunction, grant of alternative remedy, as......... [33.7.890], [33.10.2280] intimidation................... [33.8.1140] joint tortfeasors............ [33.11.150],

[33.11.170] land building fixtures, physical damage to assessment of loss......................... [33.10.1360] consequential financial loss, damage or destruction from........................[33.10.1400] distress, worry, vexation..................[33.10.1410] measures for assessment cost of repair measure..............[33.10.1370] diminished value measure.............[33.10.1370], [33.10.1380] physical inconvenience.........[33.10.1410] reinstatement damages, desire to repair property... [33.10.1390] liability for contribution................... [33.11.350] malicious prosecution...................[33.8.1910], [33.10.1100] mitigation allowance for betterment...............[33.10.2130] duty to mitigate loss......................... [33.10.2120] personal injury claims, usual medical advice and treatment.................[33.10.2140] negligence legislative reform......... [33.2.30] product liability..........[33.4.520] nervous shock, for — see Nervous Shock nominal damages tort committed, no consequent

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1051

INDEX

injury or loss............[33.10.230] once and for all rule damages for losses, past and future lump sum award................... [33.10.360] periodic payments..............[33.10.360] parasitic damages, concept of................................... [33.10.250] pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses recoverable in tort......[33.10.20] personal injury — see Personal Injury private nuisance................ [33.7.40] product liability — see Product Liability property permanently lost...............................[33.10.1430] protection of interests in land..............................[33.10.1350] public nuisance................. [33.7.40] public policy categories of loss or damages not recoverable.......[33.10.2170] purpose.....[33.10.170], [33.10.710] remedies for nuisance.....[33.7.820] damages in lieu of injunction................... [33.7.890] personal injury........... [33.7.870] property damage........ [33.7.870] test for remoteness.....[33.7.860] use and enjoyment, interference with.............................[33.7.880] remoteness of damage — see Remoteness of Damage reputation, loss of....... [33.10.1100] several concurrent

tortfeasors......................[33.11.170] special and general........ [33.1.300], [33.10.30] specific recovery not possible....................... [33.10.1420] survival actions — see Survival of Actions tort and contract, distinction between........................... [33.10.60] tort, in.............. [33.1.10], [33.1.30] assessment of damages......................[33.1.270] causation of damage....................... [33.1.280] contribution between defendants.................. [33.1.330] contributory negligence.................. [33.1.320] discretion to award......................[33.10.1860] exemplary damages... [33.1.310] non-remote damage recoverable................. [33.1.300] purpose of award....... [33.1.250] reasonable foreseeability..............[33.1.290] remoteness test...........[33.1.290] statutes of limitation.................... [33.1.340] tortfeasors, more than one action against sum not to exceed that awarded in first judgment.......[33.11.230] unlawful intentional and positive acts, harm caused by.... [33.8.2150] wrongful occupation conscious action, exemplary and aggravated damages..................[33.10.1450] damages

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1052

INDEX

recoverable............. [33.10.1420] Damages for Breach of Contract — see Breach of Contract; Damages assessment — see also Assessment of Damages.................... [33.1.270] contributory negligence....................... [33.1.320] disappointment and distress............................ [33.1.300] exemplary — see also Exemplary Damages.......................[33.10.210] loss of reputation............ [33.1.300] physical inconvenience...[33.1.300] physical or physiological injury...............................[33.1.300] product liability.............. [33.4.150] contributory negligence, plea of................................ [33.4.210] express term, breach of................................ [33.4.160] implied term, breach of................................ [33.4.170] losses within reasonable contemplation of parties......................... [33.4.220] purpose...........[33.1.10], [33.1.250] statutes of limitation.......[33.1.340] Deceit contributory negligence no defence............................ [33.9.600] damages..... [33.10.60], [33.10.180] economic loss............. [33.10.1680]

not giving rise to..... [33.8.1320] overlap with statutes......................[33.8.1310] private adult matters, where applicable................. [33.8.1320] Defamation agency of an animal....... [33.6.340] injunctions interlocutory........... [33.10.2280] joint tortfeasors............. [33.11.160] statements by employees, vicarious liability for...... [33.6.650] Defective Goods — see Product Liability ACCC’s commencement of action...............................[33.4.850] Commonwealth mandatory standards compliance, due to..................................... [33.4.790] compensation for loss — see Product Liability compensation proceedings commencement............... [33.4.820] damages.......................... [33.4.800] goods, definition............. [33.4.815] mandatory Commonwealth standard, complying with................................. [33.4.790] manufacturer of.............. [33.4.740] contract term excluding, restricting or modifying liability....................... [33.4.840] deemed....................... [33.4.750]

paternity, false representation of................................... [33.8.1320] private adult matters, where applicable...................... [33.8.1320] tort of............................ [33.8.1290] elements of...............[33.8.1300]

defences......................[33.4.780] Federal Court............. [33.4.860] joint and several liability....................... [33.4.750] onus of proof............. [33.4.780] remedies..................... [33.4.830]

false representation of paternity [References are to paragraph numbers] 1053

INDEX

objective standard as to..................................... [33.4.746] recall and liability.........[33.4.1130] remedies.......................... [33.4.830] injuries, for...................[33.4.10] safety, extent of.............. [33.4.743] safety defect...................[33.4.743], [33.4.746] claim under Pt 3-5 Australian Consumer Law...........[33.4.785] transfer of liability to Commonwealth...............[33.4.790] types of............................. [33.4.10] Defective Premises duty of care builders.....................[33.2.1130] statutory warranties............ [33.2.1140] first and subsequent owners...................... [33.2.1130] statutory authorities.................[33.2.1130] financial loss, causing...[33.2.1130] physical damage, causing.......................... [33.2.1130] Defence (Legal Proceedings) breach of contract, contributory negligence....................... [33.1.320] breach of statutory duty................................. [33.5.390] contributory negligence.................. [33.5.400] illegal conduct of plaintiff....................... [33.5.430] limitation statutes.......[33.5.410] voluntary assumption of risk..............................[33.5.420] conspiracy, whether defence to justification....................[33.8.1280]

contributory negligence — see Contributory Negligence false imprisonment lawful justification... [33.8.1700] limitation statutes.....[33.8.1710] illegality criminal act and act of negligence, relationship.................[33.9.990] illegal conduct............[33.9.980] intentional interference with contract, justification.... [33.8.1250] intentional tort — see Intentional Tort intimidation, whether defence to justification....................[33.8.1130] malicious prosecution...[33.8.1900] negligence — see Contributory Negligence; Voluntary Assumption of Risk actions........ [33.9.10], [33.9.20], [33.9.30], [33.9.720] nuisance.......................... [33.7.650] act beneficial to the public..........................[33.7.700] act of third party........[33.7.670] apportionment legislation................... [33.7.690] plaintiff came to nuisance......................[33.7.700] prescriptive right to continue......................[33.7.710] reasonable precautions................. [33.7.680] statutory authorisation..............[33.7.650], [33.7.660] product liability.............. [33.4.500] contributory negligence.................. [33.4.510]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1054

INDEX

tort intentional torts........... [33.9.10], [33.9.20], [33.9.30] negligence................... [33.9.10], [33.9.20], [33.9.30] trespass cattle, by.....................[33.6.430] mistake no defence.... [33.8.330] trespass to chattels inevitable accident..... [33.8.780] right of third party..... [33.8.860] Desire intention, distinguished...[33.8.190] Detinue bailment loss of possession at time of demand....................... [33.8.940] cause of action in........... [33.8.910] damages assessment..............[33.10.1520] consequential damages..................[33.10.1530] exemplary damages..................[33.10.1550] payments made by defendant................[33.10.1540] sue in quasi-contract......... [33.10.1560] judgment forms...............[33.8.950] plaintiff’s title to sue...... [33.8.930] restitution, jurisdiction to order................................ [33.8.960] substantive characteristics..................[33.8.920] tort to chattel.................. [33.8.710] wrongful detention of chattel..............................[33.8.910] Discipline intentional tort, defence to

armed services, persons in.................................[33.9.460] maritime discipline.... [33.9.470] parent..........................[33.9.440] person in place of............................[33.9.440] reasonable chastisement............... [33.9.450] teacher or master....... [33.9.440] Discretionary Trust family trust — see Family Trust Dogs — see Animals injuries or damage caused by contributory negligence.................. [33.6.470] defences......................[33.6.470] provocation.................[33.6.470] strict liability..............[33.6.460] trespass by plaintiff....[33.6.470] voluntary assumption of risk..............................[33.6.470] owner, definition............. [33.6.460] Donoghue v Stevenson neighbour principle application of............. [33.4.360] exclusion from........... [33.4.350] product liability law origins.........................[33.4.330] scope of......................[33.4.340] principles.........[33.2.20], [33.2.40], [33.2.210] Driving standard of care driving instructor, of.............................. [33.2.1680] drunken driver, of.... [33.2.1690] learner driver, of...... [33.2.1670] Due Care

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1055

INDEX

contractual liability.........[33.1.140] and...................................[33.1.140] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1660] control mechanisms........ [33.2.300] Duty of Care — see Standard of Donoghue v Stevenson — see Care Donoghue v Stevenson acts and omissions elements.......................... [33.2.210] nonfeasance rule........ [33.2.330] employer, of — see Employer physical harm or loss arises, existence of damage recoverable... [33.2.320] determination of........[33.2.680], affirmative action, duty to [33.2.1513] take..................................[33.2.270] justice and fairness in breach of analysis.......................[33.2.360] compliance with community or weighed against onerous professional nature........................[33.2.1513] standards...................[33.2.1620] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1660] damages, legislative restrictions foreseeability of risk of on..............................[33.2.1540] injury.............[33.2.60], [33.2.210], defendant’s response, [33.2.240], [33.2.290] reasonableness acts and omissions..... [33.2.320] of..........[33.2.1590]–[33.2.1620] amended legislation... [33.2.250] magnitude of harm...[33.2.1580] personal injury product liability..........[33.4.440] claims......................... [33.2.790] public or social utility of product liability claims — see defendant’s product liability conduct..................... [33.2.1610] property damage........ [33.2.810] statutory compliance, effect relationship to of............................[33.4.450] proximity....................[33.2.210] reasonable remoteness of foreseeability...[33.2.1550]–[33.2.1570] damage....................... [33.2.230] reasonable person test for duty of care, first standard................... [33.2.1520], element....................... [33.2.230] [33.2.1630]–[33.2.1720] “unforeseeable plaintiffs” age of rule............................. [33.2.240] defendant............ [33.2.1635], hospital, of — see Hospital [33.2.1645] insurance, role of............[33.2.400] bystanders....................... [33.2.330] judicial analysis as to existence commercial loss, actions of..................................... [33.2.360] for....................................[33.2.300] landlord........................... [33.3.190] community expectations, role of..................................... [33.2.360] limiting circumstances......[33.2.60] contractual relationships negligence — see Negligence

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1056

INDEX

neighbour principle.........[33.2.230] non-delegable duty......... [33.2.350] novel cases, in................ [33.2.310] occupier — see Occupiers’ Liability parent, of — see Parent personal injury claims — see Personal Injury positive action, duty to take..................................[33.2.330] precautions, whether reasonable......................... [33.2.60] prison authority, of — see Prison Authorities product liability breach of duty............[33.4.440] statutory compliance, effect of............................[33.4.450] Donoghue v Stevenson, neighbour principle in.................................[33.4.330] application of........ [33.4.360] exclusion from...... [33.4.350] scope of................. [33.4.340] foreseeability, requirement of................................ [33.4.370] manufacturer’s duty to warn abnormally sensitive individuals..................[33.4.420] personal injury or damage to property suppliers of products owe duty of care........... [33.4.400] pure economic loss, recovery for............ [33.4.380], [33.4.390] suppliers of products duty of................... [33.4.400] warnings by..........[33.4.400], [33.4.410] proximity of

relationship......................[33.2.210] concept, rejection of................................ [33.2.680] justice, fairness and reasonableness as elements of................................ [33.2.360] personal injury claims......................... [33.2.800] product liability claims — see product liability public policy and....... [33.2.380] relationship to reasonable foreseeability..............[33.2.210] reliance, role of..........[33.2.270] third party, of............. [33.2.340] public authorities.............. [33.2.90] public policy exemptions under.......[33.2.390] proximity and.............[33.2.380] pure economic loss, actions for....................................[33.2.300] reasonable — see foreseeability of risk of injury relational interests.........[33.2.1370] reliance proximity, role in....... [33.2.270] vicarious..................... [33.2.340] rescue, to effect...............[33.2.330] school authorities, of — see School Authorities statutory authority, of... [33.2.1170] legislative restrictions on..............................[33.2.1180] test, lack of uniform case law, developing..................[33.2.310] third party justice and fairness in extension to.................................[33.2.360]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1057

INDEX

unavoidable dependence.................[33.2.340] vicarious reliance....... [33.2.340] tort law, use in determination of..................................... [33.2.680] unavoidable dependence third party, of............. [33.2.340] unborn child, to — see Unborn Child vulnerable plaintiffs...... [33.2.1330] Economic Loss damages injurious falsehood................ [33.10.1710] intentional infliction................. [33.10.1670] intentional tort — see Intentional Tort limiting legislation... [33.10.750] loss of consortium..............[33.10.1670] action for........... [33.10.1750] nervous shock....[33.10.1750] personal injury................. [33.10.1750] loss of services.......[33.10.1670] actual loss proved................[33.10.1740] claim by employer............[33.10.1740] negligent infliction................. [33.10.1670] assessment of loss.....................[33.10.1720] losses recoverable........ [33.10.1730] specific financial loss.....................[33.10.1720]

damages, award of............................ [33.10.1710] negligent misstatements, caused by................. [33.2.510], [33.2.820] physical injury, resulting from.................................[33.2.820] property damage, resulting from.................................[33.2.820] pure claim for................. [33.2.820] Economic Tort causing loss by unlawful means........[33.8.1150], [33.8.1170] intention....................[33.8.1160] classification of torts as................................... [33.8.1080] conspiracy — see Conspiracy deceit — see Deceit injurious falsehood...... [33.8.1390], [33.8.1400] intimidation — see Intimidation passing off — see Passing Off Emergency contributory negligence when acting in.......................... [33.9.770] Employee indemnity, right of employer to obtain, where vicarious liability for tort........................... [33.11.410] injury in course of employment — see Injury

injurious falsehood

strict liability, where loan of employee services...........[33.6.620] vicarious liability............. [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.580], [33.6.600] act committed in the course of employment................[33.6.630] proximity of nature of employment and tort......................... [33.6.630]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1058

INDEX

act unauthorised......... [33.6.650] carriage of passenger in vehicle contrary to prohibition............. [33.6.680] fraudulent acts............[33.6.700] intentional tortious acts............................. [33.6.690] loan of services..........[33.6.620] outside scope of employment................[33.6.660] strict liability..............[33.6.590] tortfeasor, joint......... [33.11.153] Employer competent staff, duty to provide.......................... [33.2.1030] duty of care...................[33.2.1030] appropriate means of discharging............... [33.2.1050] children of employees, owed to...............................[33.2.1040] employee, owed to..........[33.2.1030]–[33.2.1040] independent contractors, owed to...............................[33.2.1080] non-delegable............ [33.2.350], [33.2.1060] right to obtain indemnity from employee....................... [33.11.410] safety, provision of system of work........ [33.2.1030] tools and equipment.................[33.2.1030] workplace................. [33.2.1030] vicarious liability — see Vicarious Liability employees.................[33.2.1070] independent contractors................[33.2.1080] Employment

vicarious liability — see Vicarious Liability Entry police, by execution of public duty, in.................................[33.8.530] withdrawal of implied licence........................ [33.8.540] public duty, in execution of..................................... [33.8.530] Evidence negligence action burden of proof...........[33.2.10], [33.2.1730] circumstantial evidence................... [33.2.1750] customary and professional standards, probative value of.............................. [33.2.1820] direct evidence......... [33.2.1750] multiple defendants................ [33.2.1790] non-compliance with prescribed governmental regulation................. [33.2.1810] res ipsa loquitur circumstantial evidence, distinguished........[33.2.1760] defendant, res must be under control of.............[33.2.1780] evidential burden..................[33.2.1800] exclusion of principle of..........................[33.2.1770] speculation insufficient................ [33.2.1750] standard of proof..... [33.2.1740] occupiers’ liability.......... [33.3.360] Exemplary Damages — see Damages

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1059

INDEX

aggravated damages, distinguished................. [33.10.190] aggravation or mitigation, defendant’s conduct......[33.10.220] assault, for.......................[33.8.460] basis of award...............[33.8.1747] battery............................. [33.8.410] conscious wrongdoing, punishment for..................................[33.10.200] false imprisonment, for............. [33.8.1740]–[33.8.1747] cultural loss suffered, recognition of...........[33.8.1740] intimidation................... [33.8.1140] tort, award in................. [33.1.310], [33.8.1740], [33.8.1747], [33.10.210] trespass to land, for........ [33.8.600] Expert Evidence admissibility....................[33.4.480] causation, as to............... [33.4.480] “junk science”.................[33.4.480] False Imprisonment assault and battery accompanying.............. [33.8.1520], [33.8.1530] burden of proof.............[33.8.1770] cultural loss, recognition of................................... [33.8.1740] damage actionable without proof of......... [33.8.1520], [33.8.1690] relevance to damages....................[33.8.1690] damages...[33.8.1740]–[33.8.1747], [33.10.1100] aggravated................ [33.8.1743] exemplary.................[33.8.1747] joint and several

tortfeasors.................[33.8.1750] mitigation by defendant..................[33.8.1760] defences lawful justification for restraint.....................[33.8.1700] limitation statutes.....[33.8.1710] defendant conduct directly causing imprisonment........... [33.8.1600] burden of proof... [33.8.1770] lack of due care by..............................[33.8.1660] liability of.................[33.8.1590] participation in confinement..............[33.8.1590] state of mind, relevance.................. [33.8.1650] definition....................... [33.8.1520] deprivation of liberty concept of.................[33.8.1520] partial....................... [33.8.1570] total, requirement for............................. [33.8.1570] unreasonable alternative means of movement, by......[33.8.1580] fault, element of........... [33.8.1640] imprisonment concept of.................[33.8.1570] conduct of defendant directly causing..................... [33.8.1600] burden of proof... [33.8.1770] intention........................ [33.8.1650] intolerable conditions of detention........................[33.8.1620] lack of due care by defendant.......................[33.8.1660] fault, element of.......[33.8.1640] legal process, restraint arising

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1060

INDEX

from submission to.......[33.8.1540] liability of magistrate... [33.8.1540] limitation of actions......[33.8.1710] malicious prosecution, distinguished................ [33.8.1550], [33.8.1800] negligence..................... [33.8.1660] fault, elements of..... [33.8.1640] proof of damage, actionable without..... [33.8.1520], [33.8.1690] question of fact.............[33.8.1780] remedies... [33.8.1720]–[33.8.1760] damages — see damages writ of habeas corpus....................... [33.8.1730] restraint of person awareness by plaintiff of.............................. [33.8.1680] criminal liability.......[33.8.1560] failure to release from..........................[33.8.1610] intolerable conditions of detention...................[33.8.1620] lawful justification for............................. [33.8.1700] legal process, arising from submission to........... [33.8.1540] mind and freedom of plaintiff, affecting....................[33.8.1670] other actions in tort, giving rise to...............................[33.8.1530] reasonable force to break from..........................[33.8.1720] unreasonable alternative means of movement, by......[33.8.1580] trespass to person, as.....[33.8.350], [33.8.1510], [33.8.1520], [33.8.1550] lawful justification, without..................... [33.8.1520]

voluntary conduct of person....................... [33.8.1520] unlawful restraint constituting....................[33.8.1520] question of fact........ [33.8.1780] vicarious liability.......... [33.8.1630] writ of habeas corpus... [33.8.1730] Family Trust damages for loss of earning capacity......................... [33.10.910] Federal Court of Australia manufacturers of defective goods, liability actions............... [33.4.860] Federal Magistrates Court manufacturers of defective goods, liability actions............... [33.4.860] Fire common law liability, negligence trespass or nuisance........[33.6.160] strict liability.....................[33.6.10] Fitness for Purpose buyer’s abnormal sensitivity........................ [33.4.200] guarantee.........................[33.4.660] product’s implied contractual terms................................[33.4.190] Foreseeability contract, test in............... [33.1.290] duty of care, in — see Duty of Care product liability actions pure economic, recovery for............ [33.4.380], [33.4.390] tort, test in.......................[33.1.290] Fraud collateral abuse of process.......................... [33.8.1980] contributory negligence no defence............................ [33.9.600]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1061

INDEX

vicarious liability employee acting within scope of authority.................[33.6.700] Fraudulent Misrepresentation causing loss by unlawful means............................ [33.8.1170] Goods consumer, acquiring goods as..................................... [33.4.644] consumer goods, recall of — see Product Recall conversion and detinue of consequential damages..................[33.10.1530] date of assessment of damages..................[33.10.1520] exemplary damages..................[33.10.1550] payments made by defendant................[33.10.1540] sue in quasi-contract for money.....................[33.10.1560] sue in tort for damages..................[33.10.1560] definition......................... [33.4.815] destruction, measure of loss.............................. [33.10.1490] guarantees — see Product Liability Guarantees liability — see Product Liability misappropriation measure of damages..................[33.10.1510] measure of loss...... [33.10.1500] product liability — see Product Liability recall — see Product Recall retaking goods, defence to intentional torts goods in lawful

possession...................[33.9.420] goods wrongfully taken........................... [33.9.410] right of entry to retake..........................[33.9.430] right to retake.............[33.9.400] safety defect...................[33.4.743], [33.4.746] claim under Pt 3-5 Australian Consumer Law...........[33.4.785] supply statutory guarantee.....[33.4.640] tortious damage to compensation......... [33.10.1460] consequential losses...................... [33.10.1470] restoration better than prior to accident.................. [33.10.1480] trespass to — see Trespass to Goods unsafe — see Product Safety Standards Goods and Services Tax (GST) award of damages.........[33.10.580] Government Authority — see Statutory Authority duty of care identification of scope.........................[33.2.1170] Guarantee acceptable quality of goods...............................[33.4.650] demonstration model or sample corresponds to goods......[33.4.680] description corresponds to goods...............................[33.4.670] express warranty, compliance with................................. [33.4.687] fitness for purpose of goods...............................[33.4.660]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1062

INDEX

parts and repair facilities, availability...................... [33.4.685] product liability — see Product Liability Guarantees repair facilities and parts availability...................... [33.4.685] sample or demonstration model corresponds to goods......[33.4.680] statutory guarantee regime application..................[33.4.647] consumer, acquiring goods as................................ [33.4.644] suppliers and manufacturers, treatment.....................[33.4.642] supply of goods......... [33.4.640] warranty, express, compliance with................................. [33.4.687] Habeas Corpus release from unlawful imprisonment................ [33.8.1730] High Court of Australia quantification of damages where residents of different States...............................[33.10.40] Hospital duty of care to patient non-delegable............ [33.2.350], [33.2.1150] Illegality in Contract breach of statutory duty, defence of, where illegal conduct by plaintiff............................[33.5.430] conversion, parties to illegal transactions..................... [33.8.840] defence to negligence criminal act and negligent act, relationship.................[33.9.990] illegal conduct............[33.9.980] intentional torts

intentional criminal conduct.................. [33.9.610] intimidation threats of illegal act............................. [33.8.1090] occupiers’ liability, defence of unilateral illegality of plaintiff....................... [33.3.510] Importer product-related loss or damage liability............................ [33.4.630] statutory liability — see Product Liability Incapacity defence to intentional tort access to psychiatric treatment.....................[33.9.310] consent of minor to act............................... [33.9.300] insanity....................... [33.9.330] intellectual disability.....................[33.9.320] mental illness.......[33.9.310]–[33.9.320] minority......................[33.9.290] Independent Contractor employer duty of care owed by..............................[33.2.1080] negligence, liability for............................... [33.6.720] vicarious liability..... [33.2.1080] occupiers’ liability.......... [33.3.280] vicarious liability............ [33.6.710] Industrial Accidents

illegality

breach of statutory duty................................. [33.5.140] contributory negligence.... [33.9.770], [33.9.780]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1063

INDEX

duty to take care of safety of others...............................[33.5.210] Industrial Disputes actions for damages....[33.10.2280] Inevitable Accident defence intentional torts......... [33.9.140], [33.9.170] trespass to chattels..... [33.8.780] Inflation award of damages, impact on.................................. [33.10.560] definition....................... [33.10.560] Injunction assault or battery, to restrain............................ [33.8.460] damages, award of alternative remedy, as......... [33.7.890], [33.10.2280] inadequate.............. [33.10.2280] defamation, against interlocutory........... [33.10.2280] injurious falsehood, in action for................................[33.10.2280] mandatory................... [33.10.2280] nuisance, remedy for................. [33.7.820]–[33.7.850] permanent........................[33.7.850] public nuisance........[33.7.820]–[33.7.850] quia timet....................... [33.7.840], [33.10.2280] specific injunctive relief............................ [33.10.2280] trespass to land, against............................. [33.8.590] Injurious Falsehood action on the case, as... [33.8.1390] damages, award of......[33.10.1100]

economic loss.........[33.10.1710] definition....................... [33.8.1390] elements of action........ [33.8.1400] injunctive relief...........[33.10.2280] Injury personal injury — see Personal Injury work, at concurrent claim in contract and tort....................... [33.1.140] employer duties of — see Employer negligence by employer — see Employer psychiatric injury..... [33.2.1040] Insurance duty of care, role in........[33.2.400] negligence law, importance to..................................... [33.2.400] Insurance Company tortfeasors claims for contribution.............. [33.11.380] Intention desire, distinguished....... [33.8.190] malice, distinguished...... [33.8.190] motive, distinguished......[33.8.190] Intentional Tort damage economic interests, to...................................[33.8.10] improperly subjected to legal process..........................[33.8.10] interest in reputation, to...................................[33.8.10] damages conspiracy.............. [33.10.1700] deceit...................... [33.10.1680]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1064

INDEX

injurious falsehood................ [33.10.1710] interference with contractual relations..................[33.10.1690] intimidation............ [33.10.1700] defences............[33.9.10]–[33.9.30] burden of proof in trespass....................... [33.9.190] consent.... [33.8.450], [33.9.200] assault and battery....................[33.9.210] burden of proof..... [33.9.280] conditional.............[33.9.260] criminal acts.......... [33.9.210] express consent..... [33.9.220] implied from circumstances........ [33.9.240] interests of unborn child.......................[33.9.230] real, genuine consent...................[33.9.250] revoked.................. [33.9.270] contributory negligence.................. [33.9.600] discipline maritime discipline............... [33.9.470] parent, person in place of parent.....................[33.9.440] persons in armed services.................. [33.9.460]

consent of minor to act.......................... [33.9.300] insanity.................. [33.9.330] intellectual disability................ [33.9.320] inevitable accident.... [33.9.140], [33.9.170] involuntary conduct... [33.9.180] legal authority arrest at common law without warrant..... [33.9.500] delay taking person before justice.... [33.9.500] statutory provisions......... [33.9.510] citizens’ powers at common law......................... [33.9.490] common law and statutes, provided by........... [33.9.480] court processes, officials executing............... [33.9.560] fundamental rights, intention to interfere with.... [33.9.480] holders of judicial office...................... [33.9.570] power to search arrested person................... [33.9.530], [33.9.540] power to seize items... [33.9.530], [33.9.540] reasonable use of force in arrest...................... [33.9.520]

reasonable chastisement.......... [33.9.450] teacher or master...[33.9.440] illegality, intentional criminal conduct....................... [33.9.610] incapacity

statutory authority burden of proof................. [33.9.590] public authorities......... [33.9.580] warrant, effect....... [33.9.550] mistake of fact or law...........[33.9.140], [33.9.150]

access to psychiatric treatment................[33.9.310]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1065

INDEX

necessity..................... [33.9.340] defence of another...................[33.9.360] defence of property................. [33.9.380] provocation............[33.9.370] self-defence........... [33.9.350] reasonable belief........ [33.9.160] retaking goods goods in lawful possession..............[33.9.420] goods wrongfully taken...................... [33.9.410] right of entry to retake..................... [33.9.430] right to retake........[33.9.400] retention and re-entry of land reasonable force.... [33.9.390] definition........................... [33.8.10] intention desire, motive and malice, distinguished.............. [33.8.190] essential element..........[33.8.30] recklessness, and........[33.8.180] requirement, satisfaction of................................ [33.8.170] intentional act and voluntary act, distinction between.........[33.8.160] intentional wrongdoing, tortious liability............................ [33.8.150] law of tort, historical origins of....................................... [33.8.20]

rate............................[33.10.530] statute, under............[33.10.510] Interest in Land damages, recovery of — see Damages Interest on Money rate damages, on............. [33.10.500] Interlocutory Injunction what constitutes.............. [33.7.830] Interpretation maxims of expressum facit cessare tactitum.......................[33.5.200] Intimidation aggravated damages.....[33.8.1140], [33.10.180] exemplary damages..... [33.8.1140], [33.10.210], [33.10.1700] intention to harm.......... [33.8.1120] justification as defence.......................... [33.8.1130] loss, proof of.................[33.8.1140] threats of illegal acts, by another person compelled to harm plaintiff........... [33.8.1090] plaintiff induced to act to own loss........................... [33.8.1090]

trespass — see Trespass Interest damages, on.................. [33.10.500] actual loss suffered by plaintiff..................... [33.10.540] period for which awarded, variation of...............[33.10.520]

third persons.............[33.8.1110] threat as tort............. [33.8.1100] tort of............................ [33.8.1080] damages....................[33.8.1140] intention to harm......[33.8.1120] justification as defence..................... [33.8.1130] loss, proof of............ [33.8.1140] methods of committing...[33.8.1090]–[33.8.1110]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1066

INDEX

Intoxication negligence claims, plaintiff in....................................... [33.2.90] Joint Tortfeasors definition....................... [33.11.150] employer and employee....................... [33.11.153] tort committed in proper course of employment......... [33.11.153] vicarious liability..... [33.11.153] joint liability concerted action to a common end, where............... [33.11.160], [33.11.210] members of group committing tort, where................ [33.11.160] judgment against one barred action against another abrogated by statute....................... [33.11.220] more than one action brought in respect of same damage.......................... [33.11.230] one action possible against........................... [33.11.190] partner and firm............ [33.11.157] acting in ordinary course of business.................... [33.11.157] release of one joint tortfeasor, effect..............................[33.11.240] Judge malicious prosecution, function in................................... [33.8.1930]

trespass or conversion of goods, whether defence..............[33.8.860] Land private nuisance.............. [33.7.160] retention and re-entry defence of intentional tort, reasonable force......... [33.9.390] reversionary interest in, action on the case......................... [33.8.2140] trespass to — see Trespass to Land Landlord and Tenant duty of care of landlord........................... [33.3.190] standard of care......... [33.3.190] nuisance created by lessee, liability............................ [33.7.540] occupier’s liability.......... [33.3.190] Legal Authority defence to intentional tort arrest at common law without warrant....................... [33.9.500] delay taking person before justice.................... [33.9.500] statutory provisions.............. [33.9.510] citizens’ powers at common law..............................[33.9.490] common law and statutes........................[33.9.480] court processes, officials executing.................... [33.9.560]

Juror immunity from tort liability............................ [33.9.570] Jury (Civil) malicious prosecution, function in case of...........................[33.8.1930] Jus Tertii

fundamental rights, intention to interfere with..............[33.9.480] judicial proceedings... [33.9.570] powers to search and seize............................[33.9.530] reasonable force......... [33.9.520] statutory authority

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1067

INDEX

burden of proof..... [33.9.590] public authorities...[33.9.580] warrants, statutes for............................... [33.9.540] effects.................... [33.9.550] Lessee nuisance, liability for......[33.7.540] Lessor defective premises duty of care regarding...................[33.2.1110] financial loss, causing......................[33.2.1130] negligent work causing......................[33.2.1120] physical damage, causing......................[33.2.1130] nuisance created by lessee, liability for...................... [33.7.540] Liability apologies and.................... [33.2.90] occupiers, of — see Occupiers’ Liability proportionate.....................[33.2.90] Libel aggravated damages....[33.10.1100] exemplary damages..... [33.10.210], [33.10.1100]

amenities of life, of...... [33.10.940] causing, by unlawful means........[33.8.1150], [33.8.1170] intention....................[33.8.1160] compensation for amenities of life, of.............................. [33.10.940] consortium, of....... [33.10.1670], [33.10.1750] domestic capacity, of.............................. [33.10.930] earning capacity, of..........[33.10.860]–[33.10.920] services, of............. [33.10.1740] consortium, of............[33.10.1670], [33.10.1750] compensation......... [33.10.1740] domestic capacity, of.... [33.10.930] earning capacity, of.............. [33.10.860]–[33.10.920] expectation of life, of damages, award of...[33.10.850] reputation, of — see Reputation services, of..................[33.10.1670] compensation......... [33.10.1740] Maintenance officious meddling in action.............................[33.8.1990]

Limitation of Action breach of contract...........[33.1.340]

tort of....... [33.8.1510], [33.8.1940] Malice

breach of statutory duty................................. [33.5.410] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1710] tort, action in.................. [33.1.340]

contract, interference with............................... [33.8.1210] intention, distinguished...[33.8.190] malicious prosecution — see Malicious Prosecution property rights, interference to, unreasonable................... [33.7.210] Malicious Falsehood aggravated damages

Lord Campbell’s Act 1846 (UK) loss of economic support, assessment of damages...................... [33.10.1240] Loss

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1068

INDEX

for..................................[33.10.180] Malicious Prosecution...[33.8.1790]–[33.8.1930] abuse of process.......... [33.8.1510], [33.8.1790] distinguished............ [33.8.1970] action on the case.........[33.8.1790] actions in tort distinguished................. [33.8.1800] bearing false witness.... [33.8.1810] burden of proof.............[33.8.1920] civil proceedings, wrongful institution of..................[33.8.1820] criminal prosecutions....[33.8.1820] damages....................... [33.8.1910], [33.10.1100] defence.......................... [33.8.1900] defendant, institution of proceedings by..............[33.8.1830] absence of reasonable and probable cause......... [33.8.1860] actively instrumental..............[33.8.1840] definition....................... [33.8.1790] elements of....................[33.8.1790] essential....................[33.8.1820] false imprisonment, distinguished................ [33.8.1550], [33.8.1800] favourable termination, requirement of.............. [33.8.1850] judge and jury, functions of................................... [33.8.1930] malice meaning of............... [33.8.1870] plaintiff to allege and prove.........................[33.8.1870] reasonable and probable cause as separate elements................... [33.8.1880]

perjury, crime of........... [33.8.1810] plaintiff’s guilt as defence.......................... [33.8.1900] reasonable and probable cause absence of................ [33.8.1860] malice as separate element..................... [33.8.1880] remedies........................ [33.8.1910] restraint of person.........[33.8.1540] special injury or damage, requirement for............. [33.8.1890] termination of proceedings in plaintiff’s favour........... [33.8.1850] Manufacturer defective goods, of — see Defective Goods liability of — see Product Liability product-related loss or damage liability............................ [33.4.630] statutory liability — see Product Liability warnings by.................... [33.4.420] abnormally sensitive individuals..................[33.4.420] failure to warn........... [33.4.490] Medical Expenses personal injury.............. [33.10.950] Medicare benefits claim for damages, assessment of............................ [33.10.2160] Mental Capacity incapacity defence to intentional tort where..........................[33.9.330] Mental Harm — see Nervous Shock Minor consent to intentional

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1069

INDEX

tort...................................[33.9.300] immunity from suit.........[33.9.290] intentional torts, defence of minority...........................[33.9.300] Misfeasance public office, in, action for............. [33.8.2160]–[33.8.2167] Misleading or Deceptive Conduct product related loss or damage Australian Consumer Law, contravention of......... [33.4.970] damages......................[33.4.980] “person”, liability of................................ [33.4.970] recovery........................[33.4.20] Misleading Statements strict liability...................[33.6.170] Misstatement negligent — see Negligent Misstatement Mistake defence intentional torts, to.....[33.9.140] fact or law............. [33.9.150] reasonable belief... [33.9.160] trespass to land......... [33.8.470], [33.8.555] trespass, no defence to.................. [33.8.330], [33.8.470] Mitigation damages, of — see Damages false imprisonment, in case of................................... [33.8.1760] Motive

negligence.................. [33.9.800] apportionment of damages.................[33.9.860] breach of statutory standard................. [33.9.790] emergency situation................. [33.9.770] failure to wear seat belt......[33.9.730], [33.9.800] intoxication of passenger............... [33.9.820] onus of proof.........[33.9.800] carriage of passenger, contrary to prohibition.......................[33.6.680] compensation schemes... [33.6.170] exemplary damages...... [33.10.210] liability of owner............ [33.6.670] Motorist negligence of others, anticipating....................[33.2.1570] Necessity defence of intentional torts, to another, defence of............................[33.9.360] persons or property................. [33.9.340] property, defence to............................[33.9.380] provocation............[33.9.370] self-defence........... [33.9.350] Negligence assumption of risk, plaintiff’s........................... [33.2.80]

intention, distinguished...[33.8.190] Motor Vehicle accident contributory

breach of duty of care — see Duty of Care burden of proof................[33.2.10], [33.2.1730] carelessness, as................. [33.2.10]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1070

INDEX

causation product liability cases.........[33.4.460]–[33.4.490] community expectations, role of..................................... [33.2.370] concurrent liability, liability in tort...................................[33.1.140] concurrent tortfeasors... [33.11.170] contributory — see Contributory Negligence costs.................................. [33.2.30] damages — see Damages dangerous activities, inherently.......................... [33.2.80] defences consumer’s claim may be defeated, where.......... [33.4.460] defences to actions.......... [33.9.10], [33.9.20], [33.9.30] contributory negligence.................. [33.9.720] definition........................... [33.2.10] Donoghue v Stevenson — see Donoghue v Stevenson duty of care breach of — see Duty of Care elements of claim in.........[33.2.10] evidence — see Evidence food donors, protection of....................................... [33.2.90] good samaritans, protection of....................................... [33.2.90] independent contractors.......................[33.6.720] independent tortfeasors......................[33.11.180] insurance, role of............[33.2.400] intoxication plaintiff, of................... [33.2.90]

joint tortfeasors............. [33.11.160] legislation..........................[33.2.50] legislative reforms........... [33.2.30], [33.2.40], [33.2.50], [33.2.90] misstatement — see Negligent Misstatement nuisance and.... [33.7.30], [33.7.50] obvious risk...................... [33.2.80] personal injury claims — see Personal Injury plaintiff’s assumption of risk.................................... [33.2.80] product liability causation...[33.4.460]–[33.4.490] damages......................[33.4.520] defences... [33.4.500]–[33.4.510] duty of care — see Duty of Care proximity — see Duty of Care Searle v Wallbank, rule in..................................... [33.6.300] standard of proof.......... [33.2.1740] tort of burden of proof............[33.2.10] development................. [33.2.20] legislative reforms...... [33.2.30], [33.2.40], [33.2.50], [33.2.90] voluntary assumption of risk — see Voluntary Assumption of Risk volunteers, protection of...[33.2.90] Negligent Misstatement areas already regulated by statute.............................. [33.2.615] contractual relationships, statements made in course of..................................... [33.2.610] economic loss................ [33.2.510],

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1071

INDEX

[33.2.820] foreseeability...................[33.2.520] information and advice, in provision of.....................[33.2.510] limitations on scope........[33.2.520] principles.........................[33.2.510] proximity.....[33.2.520], [33.2.530], [33.2.680] reliance........[33.2.520], [33.2.540], [33.2.580] contractual relationships, statements made in course of................................ [33.2.610] knowledge that statement would be relied on.....[33.2.560] reasonableness............[33.2.550] third parties............... [33.2.620], [33.2.630] voluntary assumption of responsibility..............[33.2.580] interchangeability of............................[33.2.590] special relationship, duty of care arising from.................... [33.2.570] special skill and competence by maker, relevance............. [33.2.600] third parties company auditors, actions by investors or lenders against........................ [33.2.660]

duty of care to persons who may suffer actual or threatened injury to third party.................[33.2.1300] foreseeability............[33.2.1290] proximity...................[33.2.800], [33.2.1310] personal injury, damages........................ [33.10.830] Nonfeasance Rule.............. [33.2.330] Nuisance defences.......................... [33.7.650] act beneficial to the public..........................[33.7.700] act of third party........[33.7.670] apportionment legislation................... [33.7.690] plaintiff came to nuisance......................[33.7.700]

members of identifiable class............................[33.2.640] reliance.... [33.2.620], [33.2.630] restrictive approach....[33.2.670] unidentifiable..............[33.2.650] Nervous Shock assault, as result of......... [33.8.460] damages........................ [33.2.1290] legislative restrictions................[33.2.1320]

prescriptive right to continue......................[33.7.710] reasonable precautions, taking..........................[33.7.680] statutory authorisation..............[33.7.650], [33.7.660] defendant’s conduct on plaintiff’s land..................................[33.7.545] definition........................... [33.7.10] exemplary damages...... [33.10.210] foreseeability test........[33.10.2100] injunction to restrain..........[33.7.820]–[33.7.850] lessee...............................[33.7.540] liability.............................. [33.7.30] lessor of premises, nuisance created by lessee........[33.7.540] occupier of premises..................... [33.7.530] negligence and................. [33.7.30],

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1072

INDEX

[33.7.50] plaintiff’s land, defendant’s conduct on...................... [33.7.545] public — see Public Nuisance remedies abatement................... [33.7.820] alternative to legal proceedings............[33.7.900] private individuals, by...........................[33.7.910] action for damages.....[33.7.820] injunction, in lieu of............................[33.7.890] interference with use and enjoyment.............. [33.7.880] personal injury...... [33.7.870] property damage....[33.7.870] remoteness of damage.................. [33.7.860] action for injunction................... [33.7.820] interlocutory injunction...............[33.7.830] permanent injunction...............[33.7.850] quia timet injunction...............[33.7.840] several concurrent tortfeasors......................[33.11.170] Nursing Home benefits claim for damages, assessment of............................ [33.10.2160] Occupational Health and Safety breach statutory duty, of........[33.5.390] employers duties of — see Employer Occupiers’ Liability

activities carried out on premises.......................... [33.3.350] child at day care centre...............................[33.3.350] common law duties.......... [33.3.40] contractual entrants, duty to duty of care, non-delegable............ [33.2.350], [33.2.1160] inspection for defects........................ [33.3.290] privity of contract...... [33.3.310] sue in contract or tort.............................. [33.3.300] contributory negligence....................... [33.3.470] actions for breach of contract.......................[33.3.480] defences contract.......................[33.3.500] non-contractual disclaimer.............. [33.3.500] contributory negligence action in contract not tort......................... [33.3.480] damages, apportionment of............................[33.3.470] illegality, plaintiff of, unilateral.....................[33.3.510] voluntary assumption of risk..............................[33.3.490] definition........................... [33.3.10] duty of care.....................[33.3.180] contractual entrants, to — see contractual entrants, duty to landlord...................... [33.3.190] lawful entrants, to — see lawful entrants, duty to person committing offence........................ [33.3.520]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1073

INDEX

trespassers, to — see trespassers, duty to entrants classification................[33.3.30], [33.3.210] invitees....................... [33.3.210] licensees..................... [33.3.210] right............................ [33.3.210] trespassers.................. [33.3.210] evidence, causal connection between breach of duty and injury...............................[33.3.360] onus of proof............. [33.3.360] landlord........................... [33.3.190] lawful entrants, duty to independent contractor’s negligence, common law position of.................. [33.3.280] non-delegability......... [33.3.280] obvious risk................[33.3.220] relationship between entrant and occupier...............[33.3.220] standard of care determining by reference to occupier................. [33.3.250] legislation.............. [33.3.230] reasonable care constituents............[33.3.260] risk, ignoring......... [33.3.240] test at common law......................... [33.3.220] warning signs, necessity of............................[33.3.270] negligence, as part of law of....................................... [33.3.20] nuisance — see Nuisance

defendant within category, whether.......................[33.3.200] duty of care criminal behaviour of third parties.................... [33.3.180] landlord’s immunity abolished.................... [33.3.190] occupier of premises, control of premises..................... [33.3.170] premises, fixed and movable structures.........................[33.3.160] standard of care legislation................... [33.3.230] reasonableness as determinant...................[33.3.50] statutory duties..................[33.3.40] trespassers, duty to duty of care varies between jurisdictions................[33.3.330] proximity relationship.................[33.3.320] reasonable care requirement, extent of duty.............[33.3.340] reasonable foreseeability of injury.......................... [33.3.320] Offences — see Criminal Offences Parent duty of care concerning children general supervision... [33.2.390], [33.2.940]

occupancy and activity duties...............................[33.3.350] occupation

scope...........................[33.2.930] special circumstances............. [33.2.950] third parties, to, in respect to actions of child......... [33.2.930], [33.2.960] unborn child — see Unborn Child vicarious liability of, for torts of children........................... [33.2.970]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1074

INDEX

Partnership civil wrongs partners jointly and severally liable.........................[33.11.157] Passing Off business no longer trading, applicable to..................[33.8.1350] connection with business, false suggestion..................... [33.8.1360] elements of....................[33.8.1340] intention of tort.............[33.8.1330] licence to use, revocation of................................... [33.8.1370] overlap with statutes.....[33.8.1380] right protected by......... [33.8.1330] Penalty legislation incorporating penal provisions........................[33.5.190] Perjury abuse of process........... [33.8.1810] Person trespass to — see Trespass to Person Personal Autonomy duty of care towards others and.................................[33.2.1105] relevance to common law.................................[33.2.1105] Personal Injury assault, as result of......... [33.8.460] battery, as result of......... [33.8.410] crime, in commission of...[33.2.90] damages amenities of life, loss of.............................. [33.10.940] assessment................[33.10.720] contingencies to be taken into account..................... [33.10.710] discretionary family

trust...........................[33.10.910] domestic capacity, loss of.............................. [33.10.930] earning capacity, loss of..........[33.10.860]–[33.10.920] actuarial evidence...............[33.10.900] life expectancy before accident................[33.10.890] net wages or salary, based on.........................[33.10.880] physical and mental capacity of claimant.......... [33.10.870] young children.... [33.10.920] exemplary or aggravated damages, trespass to person action........................[33.10.730] expectation of life, loss of.............................. [33.10.850] expenses, past and future care at home........[33.10.960] domestic services................ [33.10.990] financial management expenses.............. [33.10.980] gratuitous services................ [33.10.990] hospital................ [33.10.950] medical treatment..............[33.10.950] medication........... [33.10.950] nursing.................[33.10.950] prejudgment interest................. [33.10.990] private nursing services................ [33.10.990] residence, alteration to..........................[33.10.960] test for................. [33.10.990] theatre fees.......... [33.10.950]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1075

INDEX

travelling expenses of third parties.................. [33.10.970] fixing of........................[33.2.90] heads of loss............ [33.10.800] creation of needs....................[33.10.810] economic, mental or physical capacity, destruction or diminution.......[33.10.810] physical pain and suffering...............[33.10.810] mitigation............... [33.10.2140] nature of injury........ [33.10.820] nervous shock.......... [33.10.830] pain and suffering, physical and mental distress of.....[33.10.840] pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss........................... [33.10.710] remoteness..............[33.10.2080] restoration to pre-accident circumstances........... [33.10.710] restrictions....................[33.2.30] statutory limitations on......... [33.10.740]–[33.10.790] economic loss, for........................ [33.10.750] gratuitous services, for........................ [33.10.760] claimant’s loss of capacity to provide............[33.10.770] non-economic loss, for........................ [33.10.790]

proximity....................[33.2.800] reasonable foreseeability..............[33.2.790] economic loss claim, distinguished................... [33.2.820] intentional direct infliction... [33.8.2130], [33.8.2135] private nuisance............. [33.7.160], [33.7.230], [33.7.250] volunteers..........................[33.2.30] work-related exemplary damages where........................[33.10.210] Police detention of chattels, whether tortious............................ [33.8.945] duty of care...................[33.2.1105] entry by execution of public duty, in.................................[33.8.530] withdrawal of implied licence........................ [33.8.540] Premises — see Occupiers’ Liability Principal and Agent vicarious liability............ [33.6.600] authority to act...........[33.6.640] driver of vehicle, negligence where..........................[33.6.670] independence of agent........................... [33.6.640] Prison Authorities duty of care persons or property injured by escaped prisoner.......[33.2.1100] prisoner, safety.........[33.2.1090]

superannuation loss.......................[33.10.780] superannuation entitlements, loss of.......................[33.10.910] unexpected consequences..........[33.10.2080] duty of care

Private Nuisance — see Nuisance; Public Nuisance abatement........................ [33.7.900] actions

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1076

INDEX

standing...................... [33.7.490] animals, damage caused by.................................... [33.6.310] damages............................ [33.7.40] defences — see Defence (Legal Proceedings) definition........................... [33.7.20] injunction......[33.7.820]–[33.7.850] land or property, material damage to..................................... [33.7.160] liability............................ [33.7.530] parties occupation, legal right of................................ [33.7.390] rights over land affected....................... [33.7.390] personal injuries.............[33.7.160], [33.7.230], [33.7.250] physical damage to property, unreasonable................... [33.7.250] tree, caused by........... [33.7.255] property rights interference with use and enjoyment...................[33.7.160] actionable private nuisance.................[33.7.220] circumstances of each case........................ [33.7.240] duration..................[33.7.190] extent..................... [33.7.190] frequency...............[33.7.190] locality taken into account.................. [33.7.180] loss or inconvenience........[33.7.220] malice renders unreasonable..........[33.7.210] personal injuries.... [33.7.230]

undue sensitivity of person affected.................. [33.7.200] unreasonableness determined by foreseeability....[33.7.215] unreasonable interferences actionable................... [33.7.170] objective test......... [33.7.170] remedies............................ [33.7.40] tort.....................................[33.7.40] Product defective............................[33.4.10] implied contract terms, application.......................[33.4.190] product-related loss or damage, liability for...................... [33.4.630] Product Liability Australian Consumer Law, under............................... [33.4.730] breach of contract — see damages for breach of contract breach of duty compliance with relevant statutes and regulations..................[33.4.450] product related loss....[33.4.440] buyer beware principle, replacement by law.......... [33.4.30] causation.......[33.4.460]–[33.4.490] assessment of............. [33.4.490] “but for” test.............. [33.4.460]

time of day............ [33.7.190]

expert evidence.......... [33.4.480] failure to act...............[33.4.490] legal concept of........ [33.4.460], [33.4.470] negligence...[33.4.460]–[33.4.490] proof........................... [33.4.460] standard of proof....... [33.4.460] toxic tort cases, in......[33.4.470] compensation for loss or damage

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1077

INDEX

proceedings to recover Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, commencement by...........................[33.4.850] commencement of............................[33.4.820] courts..................... [33.4.860] Federal Court or Federal Magistrates Court, in............................[33.4.860] limitation of actions....................[33.4.820] remedies to recover.... [33.4.20], [33.4.830] statutory liability of manufacturers.............[33.4.630] Australian Consumer Law, under......................[33.4.730] compensate, liable to............................[33.4.740] contracting out, prohibition of.........[33.4.720], [33.4.840] deemed manufacturer..........[33.4.750] defences.................[33.4.780] elements to be proven....................[33.4.785] goods, definition....[33.4.815] joint and several liability.................. [33.4.810] reduction of damages, grounds for............ [33.4.800] safety defect, liability for.......................... [33.4.740] transfer of liability to Commonwealth..... [33.4.790] statutory liability of suppliers and importers............. [33.4.630] conformity of product with description

guarantee.................... [33.4.660] implied term as to......[33.4.170] contractual terms operation of..............[33.4.190]–[33.4.220] supply of products, for............ [33.4.150]–[33.4.170] contributory negligence.... [33.4.210], [33.4.510] damages for breach of contract............................[33.4.150] contributory negligence, plea of................................ [33.4.210] express term, breach of................................ [33.4.160] implied term, breach of................................ [33.4.170] losses within reasonable contemplation of parties......................... [33.4.220] negligence.................. [33.4.520] damages for negligence....................... [33.4.520] defective goods — see Defective Goods defences........[33.4.500]–[33.4.510] contributory negligence.................. [33.4.510] duty of care breach of.................... [33.4.440] statutory compliance, effect of............................[33.4.450] Donoghue v Stevenson, neighbour principle in.................................[33.4.330] application of........ [33.4.360] exclusion from...... [33.4.350] scope of................. [33.4.340] foreseeability, requirement of................................ [33.4.370]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1078

INDEX

manufacturer’s duty to warn abnormally sensitive individuals..................[33.4.420] personal injury or damage to property suppliers of products owe duty of care........... [33.4.400] suppliers of products duty of................... [33.4.400] warnings by..........[33.4.400], [33.4.410] oral contraceptives... [33.4.410] express warranty by manufacturer definition.................... [33.4.687] guarantee of compliance................. [33.4.687] fitness for purpose implied term as to......[33.4.170] abnormally sensitive buyer......................[33.4.200] operation of........... [33.4.200] reasonable time after delivery, application for.......................... [33.4.190] foreseeability in actions pure economic, recovery for............ [33.4.380], [33.4.390] guarantees — see Product Liability Guarantees implied terms nature of..................... [33.4.170] operation of................[33.4.190] statutory liability of — see statutory liability of manufacturers law.....................................[33.4.10] common law principle of buyer beware replaced by......[33.4.30] origins.........................[33.4.330]

product-related loss or damage......................... [33.4.30] damages for misleading or deceptive conduct.................. [33.4.980] manufacturer’s liability compensation for loss — see compensation for loss or damage statutory — see statutory liability of manufacturers warnings..................... [33.4.420] failure to warn.......[33.4.490] merchantable quality implied term as to......[33.4.170] operation of........... [33.4.190] misleading and deceptive conduct Australian Consumer Law, contravention of......... [33.4.970] damages......................[33.4.980] liability for................. [33.4.970] negligence causation — see causation damages......................[33.4.520] defences... [33.4.500]–[33.4.510] duty of care — see duty of care origins of law..................[33.4.330] remedies......... [33.4.20], [33.4.830] risky products, responsibility shared.............................. [33.4.430] safety defect manufacturer’s liability....................... [33.4.740] objective standard as to.................................[33.4.746] statutory liability of manufacturers Australian Consumer Law, under...........................[33.4.630] compensate, liable

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1079

INDEX

contract term excluding, restricting or modifying liability....................... [33.4.720] manufacturer, by........ [33.4.695] damages................[33.4.697], [33.4.698] description corresponds to goods..................... [33.4.696] express warranty noncompliance damages.................[33.4.697] repairs and spare parts unavailability damages.................[33.4.697] time limit for action..................... [33.4.700] supplier, by.................[33.4.689] compensation.........[33.4.693] damages.................[33.4.690] major failure.........[33.4.691], [33.4.694] rejection of goods..................... [33.4.694] remedy of failure required..................[33.4.692] refusal, failure or impossibility of compliance........[33.4.694] supplier’s action against manufacturer.............. [33.4.710]

to.................................[33.4.740] contracting out, prohibition of................................ [33.4.720] deemed manufacturer.............. [33.4.750] express warranty definition................[33.4.687] guarantee of compliance............ [33.4.687] guarantees — see Product Liability Guarantees limitation period.........[33.4.700] safety defect, liability for............................... [33.4.740] sample, guarantee of correspondence to...... [33.4.680] supplier of goods, indemnification by manufacturer of..........[33.4.710] supply of product contractual terms for............ [33.4.150]–[33.4.170] operation of.........[33.4.190]–[33.4.220] express term for......... [33.4.160] implied term as to, damages for breach......................... [33.4.170] tort, basic principles of.....[33.4.40] Product Liability Guarantees acceptable quality of goods...............................[33.4.650] demonstration model or sample corresponds to goods......[33.4.680] description corresponds to goods...............................[33.4.670] express warranty, compliance with................................. [33.4.687]

manufacturer’s liability to indemnify supplier................. [33.4.710], [33.4.715] fitness for purpose of goods...............................[33.4.660] repair facilities and parts availability...................... [33.4.685]

damages for failure to comply........................[33.4.697]

damages for failure to comply........................[33.4.697]

failure to comply

Product Recall [References are to paragraph numbers] 1080

INDEX

compulsory, order for... [33.4.1120] dangerous characteristics, duty to warn of.......................... [33.4.1100] manufacturer instituting, liability where.............................[33.4.1130] notification.....................[33.4.1110] suppliers, duty of.......... [33.4.1100] voluntary....................... [33.4.1110] Product Safety Standards banned goods declaration by Minister.................... [33.4.1150] prohibition from supplying.................. [33.4.1140] consumer goods safety standards....................... [33.4.1160] failure to comply.......... [33.4.1170] goods prohibited from being supplied......................... [33.4.1140] information standards... [33.4.1160] Minister may declare goods banned........................... [33.4.1150] Property damage to defective construction causing economic loss, distinguished.............. [33.2.810] economic loss claim, distinguished.............. [33.2.820] private nuisance......... [33.7.160] reasonable foreseeability..............[33.2.810] test of remoteness..............[33.10.2090] Property Rights

actionable private nuisance.................[33.7.220] circumstances of each case........................ [33.7.240] duration, time of day......................... [33.7.190] frequency and extent..................... [33.7.190] locality taken into account.................. [33.7.180] malice renders unreasonable..........[33.7.210] personal injuries.... [33.7.230] undue sensitivity of person affected.................. [33.7.200] unreasonableness determined by foreseeability....[33.7.215] unreasonable interferences actionable................... [33.7.170] objective test......... [33.7.170] Proximity — see Remoteness of Damage duty of care — see Duty of Care negligent misstatement — see Negligent Misstatement Public Health product safety — see Product Safety Standards Public Nuisance — see Nuisance abatement........................ [33.7.910]

injunctive relief...........[33.10.2280] private nuisance interference with use and enjoyment of.............. [33.7.160]

actions parties to Attorney-General...[33.7.500] local authorities.....[33.7.520] private individuals............. [33.7.500] animals, damage caused by.................................... [33.6.310] civil actions.....................[33.7.360]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1081

INDEX

criminal offence.............. [33.7.360] damages............................ [33.7.40] definition........ [33.7.20], [33.7.360] dust, noise and vibration.......................... [33.7.380] examples......................... [33.7.380] injunctions.... [33.7.820]–[33.7.850] interference with rights shared by public.............................. [33.7.360] number of persons affected....................... [33.7.370] interference with view....[33.7.380] liability............................ [33.7.530] obstruction of highway...[33.7.380] particular damage.......... [33.7.500], [33.7.510] pollution of waterways...[33.7.380] remedies............................ [33.7.40] smell and insect presence....... [33.7.370], [33.7.380] tort.....................................[33.7.40] Public Office misfeasance in, action for............. [33.8.2160]–[33.8.2167] Public Policy duty of care — see Duty of Care loss or damages not recoverable for reasons of..............[33.10.2170] Real Property Licence express or implied terms of, entry within........... [33.8.510], [33.8.520] revocation by licensor.... [33.8.550] use of land under............[33.8.480] Recklessness intention related concepts......... [33.8.180] tort law, in.......................[33.8.180] Reliance

duty of care — see Duty of Care negligent misstatement — see Negligent Misstatement Remoteness of Damage concept used by common law...............................[33.10.2060] contract, in...................... [33.1.290] defendant takes victim as found “eggshell skull” rule......................... [33.10.2070] physical and mental attributes.................[33.10.2070] foreseeability test, nuisance and negligence................... [33.10.2100] personal injury cases............................ [33.10.2080] test for.........................[33.10.2060] property loss cases....................... [33.10.2090] test in contract and tort, distinguished................... [33.1.290] tort, in............................. [33.1.290] trespass, in..................... [33.8.340], [33.10.2110] unexpected consequences.............. [33.10.2080] Replevin goods seized by way of distress............................ [33.8.970] obsolete tort.................... [33.8.970] tort to chattels.................[33.8.710] Reputation loss of breach of contract, damages for............................... [33.1.300] damages..................[33.10.1100] Res Ipsa Loquitur circumstantial evidence, distinguished................. [33.2.1760]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1082

INDEX

defendant, res must be under control of...................... [33.2.1780] evidential burden.......... [33.2.1800] exclusion of principle of................................... [33.2.1770] standard of proof.......... [33.2.1790] Rescue actions of rescuers........ [33.2.1360] attempt, harm or loss arising from...............................[33.2.1350] duty of care....................[33.2.330], [33.2.1340] Risk obvious risk...................... [33.2.80] voluntary assumption — see Voluntary Assumption of Risk Rule Donoghue v Stevenson, in — see Donoghue v Stevenson Rylands v Fletcher, in — see Rylands v Fletcher Rylands v Fletcher actions of animals, no liability under............................... [33.6.320] common law liability......[33.6.150] rule in................................[33.6.10] abolition..................... [33.6.150] Safety Defect — see also Defective Goods.................................. [33.4.743] claim under Pt 3-5 Australian Consumer Law................[33.4.785] manufacturer of defective goods...............................[33.4.740]

to..................................... [33.4.746] Safety Standards products, for — see Product Safety Standards School Authorities duty of care.....................[33.2.980] breach....................... [33.2.1010] general supervision............... [33.2.1000] non-delegable............ [33.2.350], [33.2.990] third parties, to.........[33.2.1020] Scienter Liability................. [33.6.10] abolition of tort...............[33.6.450] damage within risk, imposition of liability............................ [33.6.380] dangerous animals........... [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.350] keeping....................... [33.6.370] knowledge of dangerous characteristics.............[33.6.360] proof where animals harmless..................... [33.6.360] defences available default of plaintiff...... [33.6.390] voluntary assumption of risk..............................[33.6.390] Seat belt

deemed....................... [33.4.750] defences......................[33.4.780] onus of proof............. [33.4.780]

passenger....................[33.9.800] Self-defence defence

manufacturer’s liability............................ [33.4.740] objective standard as

intentional torts, to.....[33.9.350] Slander goods, of

contributory negligence where failure to wear................ [33.9.800] apportionment of damages......................[33.9.860] child............................[33.9.730]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1083

INDEX

[33.2.1630]–[33.2.1720] breach of statutory duty............. [33.5.150], [33.5.160], [33.5.250] absolute...................... [33.5.250] strict............................[33.5.250] directors of public companies..................... [33.2.1720] driving instructor, owed by.................................. [33.2.1680] drunken driver, owed by.................................. [33.2.1690] forward-looking approach........................[33.2.1525] intellectual incapacity or physical disability........................[33.2.1650] learner driver, owed by.................................. [33.2.1670] occupiers, liability of determining by reference to occupier......................[33.3.250] legislation................... [33.3.230] reasonable care...........[33.3.260] risk may be ignored...[33.3.240] test at common law... [33.3.220] warning signs, necessity of................................ [33.3.270] professional...................[33.2.1660] reforms to.....................[33.2.90] Shirt calculus............... [33.2.1510], [33.2.1520] criticism....................[33.2.1516]

damages..................[33.10.1100] title, of damages..................[33.10.1100] Social Security claim for damages, assessment of................................. [33.10.2160] Sport and Recreation sporting event standard of care where plaintiff and defendant engaged in...............................[33.2.1700] Standard of Care breach of duty of care................................[33.2.1510] compliance with community or professional standards...................[33.2.1620] damages, legislative restrictions on..............................[33.2.1540] decisions do not create binding precedents.................[33.2.1530] defendant’s response, reasonableness of..........[33.2.1590]–[33.2.1620] existence or extent of duty...........................[33.2.1513] factual inquiry..........[33.2.1530] failure to take precautions against negligence of plaintiff or third party............[33.2.1560] magnitude of harm...[33.2.1580] minimising danger, cost and burden of..................[33.2.1600] public or social utility of defendant’s conduct..................... [33.2.1610] reasonable foreseeability ..............[33.2.1550]–[33.2.1570] reasonable person standard................... [33.2.1520],

sporting event, plaintiff and defendant engaged in....[33.2.1700] Standard of Proof intentional battery...........[33.8.360] n egligence action.......... [33.2.1740] Statutes of Limitation breach of statutory

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1084

INDEX

duty................................. [33.5.410] damages, claims for breach of contract...... [33.1.340] tort, in.........................[33.1.340] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1710] Statutory Authority duty of care, identification of scope............................. [33.2.1170] legislative restrictions on..............................[33.2.1180] intentional tort............... [33.9.580], [33.9.590] Statutory Compensation Schemes.................................[33.6.10] Statutory Duty breach — see Breach of Statutory Duty Statutory Guarantee Regime application.......................[33.4.647] consumer, acquiring goods as..................................... [33.4.644] suppliers and manufacturers, treatment......................... [33.4.642] supply of goods.............. [33.4.640] Statutory Interpretation construction linguistic canons or maxims expressum facit..... [33.5.200]

things onto land......... [33.6.150] Crown, liability of.......... [33.6.610] defences.......................... [33.6.440] definition........................... [33.6.10] dogs, injuries done by.... [33.6.460] defences......................[33.6.470] contributory negligence..............[33.6.470] provocation............[33.6.470] trespass by plaintiff.................. [33.6.470] voluntary assumption of risk.........................[33.6.470] owner, generally defined........................[33.6.460] principles governing........ [33.6.20], [33.6.140] Rylands v Fletcher, rule in — see Rylands v Fletcher statutory liability aircraft........................ [33.6.170] defective products......[33.6.170] liability without proof of fault............................ [33.6.170] misleading statements...................[33.6.170] motor vehicle compensation schemes...................... [33.6.170] workers compensation schemes...................... [33.6.170] statutory provisions......... [33.6.10], [33.6.140] vicarious liability — see Vicarious Liability

Stay of Proceedings abuse of process, for.... [33.8.2010] Strict Liability animals.......... [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.280], [33.6.350] cattle trespass — see Cattle Trespass common law liability fire, damage caused by................................[33.6.160] person bringing dangerous

Superannuation loss of entitlements, compensation for..................................[33.10.910] Supplier duty owed by.................. [33.4.400]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1085

INDEX

goods, of, statutory guarantees....................... [33.4.640] product guarantees, failure to comply............................ [33.4.689] product recall by...........[33.4.1100] product-related loss or damage liability............................ [33.4.630] compensation............. [33.4.693] damages......................[33.4.690] major failure..............[33.4.691], [33.4.694] rejection of goods...... [33.4.694] remedy of failure required...................... [33.4.692] refusal, failure or impossibility of compliance............ [33.4.694] warnings by, as to product risks..............[33.4.400], [33.4.410] dangerous characteristics........... [33.4.1100] intermediaries, to....... [33.4.410] Supply product liability — see Product Liability Survival of Actions damages recoverable..................[33.10.1210] legislation in Australian jurisdictions.................[33.10.1210] Lord Campbell’s Act 1846 (UK)............................ [33.10.1240] loss of economic support........................ [33.10.1240] losses recoverable period after death...[33.10.1230] funeral expenses............ [33.10.1230] loss of earning capacity..............[33.10.1230]

period before death....................... [33.10.1220] loss of amenities............[33.10.1220] loss of expectation of life......................[33.10.1220] non-pecuniary losses............ [33.10.1220] pecuniary losses................. [33.10.1220] Taxation award of damages........[33.10.570], [33.10.590], [33.10.600] Teacher duty of care.....................[33.2.980] third parties in relation to acts of students................[33.2.1020] Third Party breach of duty of care towards failure to take precautions against negligence....[33.2.1560] conversion, right of third party, defence............................ [33.8.860] duty of care owed to — see Duty of Care negligent misstatement claim regarding — see Negligent Misstatement voluntary assumption of risk, exempting provision of contracts.......................... [33.9.960] Threat tort, as........................... [33.8.1100] Tort absolute rights, actions for infringement..................[33.8.2170] abuse of process — see Abuse of Process animals — see Animals causation, test for........... [33.1.280]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1086

INDEX

chattels, to — see Chattel concurrent liability in contract............................[33.1.140] conspiracy — see Conspiracy contract law and concurrent liability.....[33.1.140] convergence between...[33.1.10] relationship between.... [33.1.20] theoretical basis, different........................ [33.1.10] contributory negligence — see Contributory Negligence conversion — see Conversion damages — see Damages defences intentional tort — see Intentional Tort negligent acts — see Negligence definition........................... [33.1.10] detinue — see Detinue economic — see Economic Tort false imprisonment — see False Imprisonment intentional — see Intentional Tort interference with contract — see Contract intimidation — see Intimidation law of tort......................... [33.8.20] purpose......................... [33.2.10] liability, reason for........... [33.1.10] solidary.....................[33.11.200] malicious prosecution — see Malicious Prosecution misfeasance in public office — see Misfeasance negligence — see Negligence personal injury, intentional direct infliction... [33.8.2130], [33.8.2135]

public nuisance................. [33.7.40] remoteness of damage.... [33.1.290] replevin — see Replevin reversionary interest in land or chattels, action.............. [33.8.2140] Tortfeasors classification of............. [33.11.140] concurrent definition.................... [33.11.10] liable for full extent of damage..................... [33.11.200] several separate and independent acts causing damage.................[33.11.170] several actions possible against..................[33.11.190] solidary liability....... [33.11.200] contribution....................[33.1.330], [33.11.10], [33.11.350] assessment................ [33.11.390] comparative causal contributions........[33.11.390] indemnity recoverable by blameless wrongdoer............[33.11.400] right of employer to obtain indemnity from employee............. [33.11.410] claims limitation of.........[33.11.380] timing of action...[33.11.380] liability to make...... [33.11.350], [33.11.370] “or would if sued have been liable”................. [33.11.370], [33.11.380] right to......................[33.11.360] legislative provisions according............. [33.11.350]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1087

INDEX

subrogation rights of insurance companies............[33.11.380] independent classification of multiple tortfeasors................. [33.11.140] separate and independent acts different items of damage.................[33.11.180] joint — see Joint Tortfeasors joint and several false imprisonment...[33.8.1750] multiple, classification..................[33.11.140] Trespass action for chattels — see Chattel evolution of................[33.8.300] animals, committed through agency of..... [33.6.330], [33.6.340] burden of proof...............[33.8.310] cattle, by — see Cattle Trespass directness and................. [33.8.320] false imprisonment, by — see False Imprisonment fault on part of defendant.........................[33.8.310] goods — see Trespass to Goods intentional or negligent wrongdoing..................... [33.8.310] intentional tort.................. [33.8.10] intention as essential element......................... [33.8.30] land — see Trespass to Land mistake not a defence.....[33.8.330] person — see Trespass to Person remoteness of damage... [33.8.340], [33.10.2110] Trespass to Chattels — see Chattel

Trespass to Goods aggravated damages......[33.10.180] conversion, overlap with................................. [33.8.800] exemplary damages.... [33.10.1550] Trespass to Land actionable without proof of damage............................ [33.8.470] aggravated damages......[33.10.180] airspace, by infringement of..................................... [33.8.580] continuing trespass......... [33.8.570] defence mistaken view of right to enter............................[33.8.555] definition......................... [33.8.470] directness of invasion to land...............[33.8.470], [33.8.500] execution of public duty, entry as of right............................ [33.8.530] exemplary damages....... [33.8.600], [33.10.210] implied licence police officers’ right of entry........................... [33.8.530] withdrawal of........ [33.8.540] infringement of airspace above land..................................[33.8.580] injunction to restrain threatened........................[33.8.590] intentional or negligent.......[33.8.470], [33.8.490] interference with land.....[33.8.500] legal title to land, plaintiff need not establish.................... [33.8.480] licence express or implied terms of, entry within...............[33.8.510], [33.8.520]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1088

INDEX

revocation by licensor....................... [33.8.550] use of land under....... [33.8.480] mistake as defence.........[33.8.470], [33.8.555] possessory title to land...[33.8.480] trespass ab initio.............[33.8.560] trespassory act after lawful entry................................ [33.8.550] unauthorised entry.......... [33.8.510] Trespass to Person aggravated damages......[33.10.180] assault — see Assault battery — see Battery false imprisonment — see False Imprisonment intentional....................... [33.8.160] personal injury, damages........................ [33.10.730] Unborn Child duty of care owed to.... [33.2.1380] prenatal injury, child born alive..........................[33.2.1380] unwanted child, unsuccessful sterilisation or abortion.................... [33.2.1400] “wrongful life” claim.........................[33.2.1390] Unlawful Means

causing......................[33.2.1130] negligent work causing......................[33.2.1120] physical damage, causing......................[33.2.1130] duty of care negligent work causing premises to become defective................... [33.2.1120] Vicarious Liability agent, tort of, principal for....................................[33.6.600] attribution of liability to one party acts of another........... [33.6.580] attribution of responsibility principles....................[33.6.580] Crown, of........................[33.6.610] employer, of employee, negligence of........... [33.2.1070], [33.6.600] independent contractor, negligence of............[33.2.1080] employment relationships..................... [33.6.10], [33.6.140], [33.6.590] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1630] independent contractor... [33.6.710] non-delegable duty, amalgamation with................................... [33.2.90]

causing loss by............ [33.8.1150], [33.8.1170] intention....................[33.8.1160] Vehicle motor — see Motor Vehicle Vendor

parents, of, for torts of children........................... [33.2.970] strict liability....................[33.6.10], [33.6.140] public policy reasons, imposed for............................... [33.6.590] Voluntary Assumption of Risk

defective premises duty of care regarding...................[33.2.1110] financial loss,

breach of statutory duty, whether defence to........................[33.5.420] dangerous activities, inherently.......................... [33.2.80]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1089

INDEX

negligence, defence to....[33.9.880] apportionment legislation................... [33.9.890] burden of proof..........[33.9.970] limitation or exclusion of negligence contract, subject to statute.................... [33.9.940] notices concerning risks statutory provisions limiting.................. [33.9.950] plaintiff’s knowledge of facts............................ [33.9.910] risk awareness of..........[33.9.900] obviousness of.......[33.9.900] understanding of....[33.9.920] voluntarily undertaking............[33.9.930] third parties, exempting provisions of contracts..................... [33.9.960] occupier’s liability, defence to..................................... [33.3.490] Warning manufacturer, by abnormally sensitive individuals..................[33.4.420] consumer’s failure to heed............................ [33.4.430] duty.............................[33.4.420] failure to warn........... [33.4.490] suppliers, by, as to product risks..............[33.4.400], [33.4.410] consumer’s failure to heed............................ [33.4.430] dangerous characteristics........... [33.4.1100] intermediaries, to....... [33.4.410]

oral contraceptives..... [33.4.410] Warranty express definition.................... [33.4.687] guarantee of compliance with.............................[33.4.687] Witness immunity from tort liability............................ [33.9.570] Words assault, as........................[33.8.440] Words and Phrases abuse of process........... [33.8.1970] apprehension of battery............................. [33.8.420] assault..............................[33.8.420] battery............................. [33.8.360] breach of statutory duty... [33.5.10] causation...... [33.4.460], [33.4.470] champerty......................[33.8.2000] chattels............................ [33.8.710] collateral abuse of process.......................... [33.8.1950] conversion.......................[33.8.790] damages.......................... [33.10.10] desire...............................[33.8.190] detinue.............................[33.8.910] “eggshell skull” rule... [33.10.2070] express warranty.............[33.4.687] false imprisonment....... [33.8.1520] goods...............................[33.4.815] inflation......................... [33.10.560] injurious falsehood....... [33.8.1390] intentional tort.................. [33.8.10] junk science.................... [33.4.480] jus tertii...........................[33.8.860] maintenance.................. [33.8.1990]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1090

INDEX

malice.........[33.8.190], [33.8.1870] malicious prosecution...[33.8.1790] manufacturer................... [33.4.642] motive............................. [33.8.190] negligence......................... [33.2.10] negligent misstatement... [33.2.510] nonfeasance rule............. [33.2.330] nuisance............................ [33.7.10] obvious..............................[33.2.80] occupiers’ liability............ [33.3.10] premises.......................... [33.3.170] private nuisance................ [33.7.20] private right of action......[33.5.10], [33.5.20] public nuisance................. [33.7.20] recklessness.....................[33.8.180] replevin........................... [33.8.970] res ipsa loquitur............ [33.2.1760]

solidary liability............ [33.11.200] supply (goods)................ [33.4.642] tort.....................................[33.1.10] trespass ab initio.............[33.8.560] trespass to land............... [33.8.470] Workers Compensation claim of damages, payment of benefits in....................[33.10.2160] Workers Compensation Schemes...............................[33.6.170] Wrongful Birth damages public policy grounds...................[33.10.2170] restrictions on...............[33.2.90] duty of care owed to parents...........................[33.2.1400]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1091

INDEX

1092

Words and Phrases [References are to paragraph numbers]

A ab initio...................................................................................................[33.8.560] abatement............................................................................... [33.7.40], [33.7.900] acceptable quality................................................................................... [33.4.650] actio personalis moritur cum persona................................................[33.10.1210] aggravated damages............................................................................. [33.10.180] assault................................................................................................... [33.8.1530] asset.......................................................................................................[33.10.580]

B battery.................................................................................[33.8.360], [33.8.1530] “but for” test...........................................................................................[33.1.280]

C carer........................................................................................................ [33.6.460] cattle........................................................................................................[33.6.400] caveat emptor.........................................................................[33.4.30], [33.4.150] child........................................................................................................ [33.9.300] close member of the victim’s family...................................................[33.2.1320] collateral benefits.................................................................................[33.10.2160] Commonwealth mandatory standard......................................................[33.4.743] concurrent wrongdoer...........................................................................[33.11.390] consortium...........................................................................................[33.10.1750] contemptuous damages.........................................................................[33.10.240] contra proferentem..................................................................................[33.2.580]

D damages at large..................................................................................... [33.10.30] damages...................................................................................................[33.10.10] [33.4.460], [33.10.2030] de minimis non curat lex...................................................................

1093

WORDS AND PHRASES

doctrine of common employment........................................................ [33.2.1060]

E easement by prescription........................................................................ [33.7.710] ex gratia...............................................................................................[33.10.2160] exemplary damages...............................................................................[33.10.200] express warranty.....................................................................................[33.4.687] expressio unius est exclusio alterius...................................................... [33.5.200] expressum facit cessare tacitum.............................................................[33.5.200]

F family member......................................................................................[33.2.1320] ferae naturae........................................................................................... [33.6.350] foreseeable........................................................................... [33.2.250], [33.2.790]

G general damages.................................................................. [33.1.300], [33.10.30] gist.........................................................................................................[33.10.370] good samaritan..........................................................................................[33.2.90] gratuitous services................................................................................ [33.10.760]

H highway rule............................................................................................. [33.5.10]

I incrementalism........................................................................................[33.2.680] independent contractor........................................................................... [33.6.710] independent tortfeasors.........................................................................[33.11.180] inherent risk.............................................................................................. [33.2.80] inherently dangerous products............................................................... [33.4.746] intimidation.........................................................................................[33.10.1700]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1094

WORDS AND PHRASES

J joint tortfeasors......................................................................................[33.11.150] junk science............................................................................................ [33.4.480] jus tertii............................................................................[33.8.860], [33.10.1510]

K keeper......................................................................................................[33.6.460]

L land......................................................................................................... [33.8.470] leave and licence.................................................................................... [33.6.440] loss of the amenities of life................................................................. [33.10.940]

M major failure........................................................................................... [33.4.691] mandatory standard................................................................................ [33.4.780] mansuetae naturae.................................................................................. [33.6.350] manufacturer.......................................................................... [33.4.20], [33.4.642] mutatis mutandis.................................................................................... [33.9.840]

N negligence................................................................................................. [33.2.10] negligent misstatement........................................................................... [33.2.510] negligent wrongdoing.............................................................................[33.1.320] neighbour test......................................................................................... [33.2.210] nolle prosequi.................................................................. [33.8.1850], [33.8.1920] nominal damages.................................................................................. [33.10.230] [33.2.350], [33.2.990] non-delegable duty................................................................................. non-pecuniary loss..................................................................................[33.10.20] non-suit................................................................................................... [33.8.300] novel disseisin.......................................................................................... [33.7.30] novus actus interveniens................................................. [33.4.460], [33.10.2010] nuisance.................................................................................................... [33.7.10]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1095

WORDS AND PHRASES

O obvious risk........................................................................... [33.2.80], [33.9.900] obvious......................................................................................................[33.2.80] occupier...................................................................................................[33.3.170] owner of dog.......................................................................................... [33.6.460] owner...................................................................................................... [33.6.460]

P pain and suffering.................................................................................[33.10.840] parasitic damages................................................................................. [33.10.250] parens patriae.......................................................................[33.8.375], [33.9.300] particular damage................................................................................... [33.7.360] pecuniary loss.........................................................................................[33.10.20] per quod servitium amisit.................................................................. [33.10.1740] per quod................................................................................................ [33.2.1370] person-in-charge..................................................................................... [33.5.230] premises.................................................................................................. [33.3.160] private right of action........................[33.5.10], [33.5.20], [33.5.140], [33.5.170] professionals........................................................................................... [33.1.140] public nuisance...................................................................... [33.7.20], [33.7.360] public officers....................................................................................... [33.8.2162] public or other authority.......................................................................... [33.2.90] punitive damages.................................................................................... [33.1.310]

Q quia timet injunction.............................................................................. [33.7.840] quia timet......................................................................... [33.7.840], [33.10.2280]

R reasonable person standard............................................. [33.2.1520], [33.2.1630] rejection period.......................................................................................[33.4.694] relevant time limit................................................................................ [33.11.380] res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet....................................... [33.10.1540]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1096

WORDS AND PHRASES

res ipsa loquitur.................... [33.2.1650], [33.2.1740], [33.2.1760], [33.2.1770], [33.2.1780], [33.2.1800], [33.6.300] res judicata............................................................................................. [33.9.830] res..........................................................................................................[33.2.1760]

S safety defect............................................................................................[33.4.743] scienter action.........................................................................................[33.6.350] scienter retinuit....................................................................................... [33.6.350] scienter rule...............................................................................................[33.6.10] servitium............................................................................................. [33.10.1750] several concurrent tortfeasors...............................................................[33.11.170] Shirt calculus........................................................................................ [33.2.1510] special damages................................................................... [33.1.300], [33.10.30] strict liability............................................................................[33.2.10], [33.6.10] supply......................................................................................................[33.4.642] survival period.................................................................................... [33.10.1220]

T taxable supply.......................................................................................[33.10.580] tort.............................................................................................................[33.1.10] trade or commerce..................................................................................[33.4.647] transparent...............................................................................................[33.4.650]

V vicarious liability.................................................................................... [33.6.580] volenti non fit injuria.................... [33.2.1690], [33.5.420], [33.9.820], [33.9.880] vulnerability............................................................................................ [33.2.340]

W warranty of fitness for particular purpose............................................. [33.4.190] wounding................................................................................................ [33.6.460] wrongful act.........................................................................[33.1.320], [33.1.330] wrong................................................................ [33.1.320], [33.1.330], [33.9.870]

[References are to paragraph numbers] 1097

WORDS AND PHRASES

1098