A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of Suhrawardi's Illuminationism: Light in the Cave 9004523715, 9789004523715

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A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism

Investigating Medieval Philosophy Managing Editor John Marenbon Editorial Board Margaret Cameron Thèresé Cory Nadja Germann Simo Knuuttila (✝) Martin Lenz Charles H. Manekin Christopher J. Martin

volume 17

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp

A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism Light in the Cave By

Tianyi Zhang

leiden | boston

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Zhang, Tianyi (Writer on philosophy), author. Title: A philosophical enquiry into the nature of Suhrawardī's illuminationism : light in the cave / by Tianyi Zhang. Other titles: Light in the cave Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2023] | Series: Investigating medieval philosophy, 1879-9787 ; volume 17 | Revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Cambridge, 2019, under the title: Light in the cave : a philosophical enquiry into the nature of Suhrawardī's Illuminationist philosophy. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022045514 | ISBN 9789004527744 ; (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Suhrawardī, Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash, 1152 or 1153-1191. | Ishrāqīyah. | Islamic philosophy. Classification: LCC B753.S834 Z49 2023 | DDC 181/.07–dc23/eng/20221129 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022045514

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1879-9787 isbn 978-90-04-52371-5 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-52774-4 (e-book) Copyright 2023 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

To my father Yibing Zhang, who always lives in my heart

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Contents Acknowledgements xi Notes on Abbreviations and Translations xii Introduction: The Cave Story: Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project 1 1 Background and Purpose 2 2 The Cave Story Approach 7 3 Scope and Methodology 10 1 From Four Peripatetic-Style Works to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 15 1 The Contents of the Four Peripatetic-Style Works 17 1.1 Al-Talwīḥāt (The Intimations) and al-Lamaḥāt (The Glimpses) 17 1.2 Al-Muqāwamāt (The Oppositions) 20 1.3 Al-Muṭāraḥāt (The Debates) 22 2 The Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination) 24 2.1 Deification (taʾalluh) and Investigation (baḥth) 25 2.2 The Ranking of Philosophers 27 2.3 The Contents of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 30 3 The Functions of the Four Peripatetic-Style Works 31 4 Summary of Chapter 1 33 2 Presential Knowledge and the Nature of Illuminationist Philosophy 35 1 The Context of the Theory of Presential Knowledge 38 1.1 Two Problems with Avicenna’s Formal Knowledge 38 1.2 Avicenna’s Primitive Self-Awareness as the Starting Point 40 2 Establishing Illuminationist Presential Knowledge 44 2.1 Self-Apprehension 44 2.1.1 The Particularity Argument 44 2.1.2 The I-ness Argument 46 2.1.3 The Priority Argument 47 2.2 Apprehension of One’s Body and Bodily Faculties 48 2.3 Apprehension of Pain Caused by Amputation 48 2.4 Visual Perception 50 3 Presence as the Nature of All Human Knowledge 52 3.1 Two Conditions for Knowledge 52 3.2 The Nature of Human Knowledge 54 3.3 What Is “Illumination” (ishrāq)? 59

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Presential Knowledge as God’s Knowledge 61 4.1 God’s Presential Knowledge of Everything 61 4.2 God’s Knowledge of Particulars 65 The Hierarchy of Knowledge in Illuminationism 70 5.1 Three Levels of Presential Knowledge, and Formal Knowledge 70 5.2 The Relation between Presential Knowledge and Formal Knowledge 74 5.3 The Highest Human Presential Knowledge 76 Summary of Chapter 2 78

5

6

3 On Mental Considerations: Univocal Existence 81 1 The Context of the Discussion of Mental Considerations 83 1.1 Three Camps and Three Positions 83 1.2 Avicenna and Suhrawardī on the Quiddity–Existence Distinction 87 2 Suhrawardī’s Existentialism and Systematically Ambiguous Existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk) 89 2.1 Univocal Existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) and Systematically Ambiguous Existence 91 2.2 Four Arguments for Suhrawardī’s Existentialism 93 3 The qusṭās (Test) and the Real–Mental Consideration Distinction 97 3.1 Analysis of the qusṭās 98 3.2 What Are Real and Mental Considerations? 104 4 Univocal Existence as a Mental Consideration 108 4.1 The Indifference Argument and the Infinite Regress of Existence 109 4.1.1 The Indifference Argument, Self-Predication and Non-Identity 109 4.1.2 Sāwī’s Argument, and Two Peripatetic Defences 111 4.2 The Doubt Argument and the Infinite Regress of Existence 115 4.3 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Existence and Relation 118 4 On Other Mental Considerations 122 1 Oneness, Contingency, and Necessity by Another 123 1.1 Oneness 123 1.1.1 The Indifference Argument and the Infinite Regress of Oneness  123 1.1.2 An Inference: All Numbers Are Mental Considerations 125 1.2 Contingency (the Priority Argument and the Infinite Regress of Contingency) 126

Contents 

1.3 Necessity by Another 128 1.3.1 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Necessity and Contingency 128 1.3.2 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Necessity and Existence 129 2 Summary of Suhrawardī’s Arguments from Infinite Regresses 130 2.1 Ten Hybrid Infinite Regresses and Their Key Premises 130 2.2 The Universal Patterns of the Arguments from Infinite Regresses 134 3 Genera and Differentiae; Determinables and Differentiae of Determinates 135 3.1 The Determinable–Differentia of Determinate Distinction 136 3.1.1 The Replaceability Argument 137 3.1.2 The Duality Argument 138 3.1.3 The Infinite Regress Argument  139 3.1.4 The Undefinability of Determinates (and All Simple Species) 140 3.2 The Genus–Differentia Distinction 143 3.2.1 The Replaceability Argument  144 3.2.2 The Infinite Regress Argument 145 3.3 Genera, Differentiae, Determinables, and Differentiae of Determinates as Mental Considerations 146 3.4 Individuation and Differentiation 147 3.5 Simple Species and Composite Species 153 4 Summary of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 155 5 On Light Metaphysics: An Analysis of Book I of the Second Part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 160 1 Light and Existence 162 1.1 Light as the Subject Matter of Metaphysics 163 1.2 The Advantages of Light 165 2 Light and Darkness 168 2.1 The Fourfold Light–Darkness Division 169 2.2 The Division of Light 171 2.2.1 Light in the Non-metaphorical Sense 171 2.2.2 Immaterial Lights, and Adventitious Lights as Visible Lights 172 2.3 The Division of Darkness 174 2.3.1 Dusky Substances, States Pertaining to Darkness, and Barriers (sing. barzakh) 174 2.3.2 The Division of Darkness and Suhrawardī’s Critique of Hylomorphism 176

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The Argument for the Existence of Immaterial Lights 180 3.1 Argument I: Adventitious Lights Are Impoverished 181 3.2 Argument II: States Pertaining to Darkness Are Impoverished 183 3.3 Argument III: Dusky Substances Are Impoverished 184 3.4 Argument IV: Adventitious Lights, Dusky Substances, and States Pertaining to Darkness Cannot Cause Each Other 185 Immaterial Lights as Self-Apprehenders 186 4.1 The Immateriality and Substantiality of Immaterial Lights 186 4.2 The Argument that Immaterial Lights Are Self-Apprehenders 188 4.2.1 The Main Argument from the Fourfold Light–Darkness Division 189 4.2.2 Argument I: Self-Apprehension Requires No Form or Any Other Intermediaries 191 4.2.3 Argument II: The Constancy of Self-Apprehension 191 4.2.4 Argument III: Whatever the Self Cannot Apprehend Constantly Is Not the Self 192 4.2.5 Argument IV: The Self Is the Self-Apprehender Itself, and the Manifest to Itself by Itself 194 Summary of Chapter 5 196

Conclusion 199 Bibliography 203 Index 213

Acknowledgements I owe my deepest debt of gratitude to Dr Tony Street, my PhD supervisor, for teaching me how to be a good historian of philosophy, and for spending numerous, truly enjoyable, and unforgettable hours discussing my work. This book is based on my 2019 PhD thesis Light in the Cave: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Philosophy. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. John Marenbon for teaching me to be a good philosopher, discussing every chapter of this book with me, his academic advice, and organizing the Medieval Philosophy Reading Group at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, from which I, like many others, have benefited enormously. I am truly grateful to Clare College, University of Cambridge, for offering me a Junior Research Fellowship so that I could finish the final revisions of the book in the most ideal environment. I am also grateful to the Faculty of Divinity for providing me invaluable research and teaching opportunities during my time in the PhD programme and on fellowship at Cambridge. I am especially indebted to the anonymous reviewer and their very detailed report and copious handwritten comments, questions, and corrections. They were absolutely helpful. I am very grateful to Prof. Peter Adamson, who not only raised many significant questions during my viva examination but also provided much advice. Warm thanks are due to Prof. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Prof. Asad Ahmed who both kindly offered many valuable suggestions as well as to Prof. Shahid Rahman for our helpful email correspondence. I would like to thank Prof. Douglas Hedley for organizing the Plotinus Reading Group at the Faculty of Divinity. During a session of the reading group, I was first inspired to read Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project through Plato’s cave allegory. I am very grateful to my colleague Dr Mohammad Saleh Zarepour for many helpful and enjoyable discussions; to Dr Evan King for suggesting the brilliant title Light in the Cave; to Rafael Attila Tağıyev for reading and discussing the final manuscript of the book with me; and to Prof. Gholamreza Aavani, Nariman Aavani, and Dr Andreas Lammer for sharing PDF copies of new editions of Suhrawardī’s and Avicenna’s works. I am grateful to my editor at Brill, Marcella Mulder, who has been so patient and supportive throughout the process, and to my copy editor, Dr John Ramsey, for helping to polish my language. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, especially my mother Li Jin, my uncle Wei Jin, and my aunt Yinji Wu, for their endless love and spiritual support.

Notes on Abbreviations and Translations The following abbreviations are used in the book.

Suhrawardī’s Works Ḥ.Sh LMḤ LWḤ LWḤ3

QWM3

ṬRḤ1 ṬRḤ2 ṬRḤ3

Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, in Œuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques (Tome II), ed. Henry Corbin (1976; repr. Tehran, 1993), pp. 1–260. Suhrawardī, Al-Lamaḥāt, in Al-Muʾallafāt al-Falsafiyya wa-l-Ṣūfiyya, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Beirut, 2014), pp. 173–310. Suhrawardī, Al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 2009). Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (al-ʿIlm al-Thālith), in Œuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques (Tome I), ed. Henry Corbin (1976; repr. Tehran, 1993), pp. 1–122. Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Muqāwamāt (al-ʿIlm al-Thālith), in Œuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques (Tome I), ed. Henry Corbin (1976; repr. Tehran, 1993), pp. 123–92. Suhrawardī, Al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (al-Manṭiq), ed. Maqṣūd Muḥammadī and Ashraf ʿĀlīpūr (Tehran, 2006). Suhrawardī, Al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt), ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 2014). Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (al-ʿIlm al-Thālith), in Œuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques (Tome I), ed. Henry Corbin (1976; repr. Tehran, 1993), pp. 193–506.

Commentaries on Suhrawardī’s Works I.K1 I.K2 I.K3 Sha Q.D

Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (Vol. 1 Logic), ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 2012). Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (Vol. 2 Physics), ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 2012). Ibn Kammūna, Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (Vol. 3 Metaphysics), ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Tehran, 2012). Shahrazūrī, Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: Commentary on the Philosophy of Illumination, ed. Hossein Ziai (Tehran, 1993). Quṭb al-Dīn, Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq of Suhrawardī: Commentary on Illuminating Wisdom, ed. ʿAbdallāh Nūrānī and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq (Tehran, 2005).

Notes on Abbreviations and Translations 

xiii

Examples § = Section. [ṬRḤ3 486.18–488.12, §§209–10] = The Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt, page 486, line 18, to page 488, line 12, in sections 209 to 210. (If § or §§ follows the page and line numbers, the citation is part of a section or sections.) [ṬRḤ3 §§208–11, 483–89] = The Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt, sections 208 to 211, pages 483 to 489. (If § or §§ precedes the page numbers, the citation is a whole section or sections, and line numbers are abbreviated for conciseness.) III.6 “On intellectual considerations” of the Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt = Book 3, Chapter 6 I.3.3.1 “On intellectual considerations” of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq = Part I, Book 3, Chapter 3, Section 1 When significant Arabic terms or phrases appear in the book, their transliterations (in italic) are given in parentheses, e.g. “immaterial light” (al-nūr al-mujarrad), according to EI 3 system (http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/pages/help/transliteration-islam). All translations are mine, translated directly from Arabic, unless indicated otherwise.

introduction

The Cave Story: Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project To begin, I introduce my hypothesis about Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist ­project, which I relate to Plato’s famous cave allegory. I find the Cave Story particularly helpful for understanding some Illuminationist terms, principles, and ­discussions and for vividly bringing out the structure and ambition of Suhrawardī’s project. As far as I know, Suhrawardī does not indicate that he deliberately follows Plato’s allegory, although there are a number of hints in his Light Metaphysics and he regards himself as a great follower of Plato. Consider Plato’s cave allegory (with certain modifications) from Book VII of the Republic (514a–517a).1 Outside the cave: living things in the sunlight—things in the sky (the moon, the stars)—the Sun Inside the cave: entrance—fire—idols of living things—low wall—­ prisoners—shadows on the cave wall Outside the cave, there are living things in the sunlight, things in the sky (e.g. the moon and stars), and the Sun. Inside the cave, from the entrance to the cave wall at the other end, there is fire; people carry idols of living things of all kinds as they walk along a low wall so that the shadows of the idols are cast on the cave wall. Behind the low wall, prisoners, whose necks and legs have been fettered since childhood, see nothing except the shadows on the cave wall in front of them. These prisoners are convinced that the shadows are indeed real things (514a1–515c3). One day, a prisoner frees himself from the bonds, stands up, turns around his head, and sees the idols that cause the shadows. He realizes that these idols are, in fact, the real things rather than the shadows (515c4–e4), so he establishes a philosophy inside the cave, a cave philosophy, based on his investigation of the idols. Later, a second prisoner, who once had much confidence in the philosophy inside the cave, discovers many fundamental flaws in it and decides to escape from the cave. Finally, he sees the living things in the sunlight, the things in the sky, and the Sun. He realizes that they are, in fact, the real things rather than the 1 Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (1994; repr. Oxford, 1998), pp. 240–43. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_002

2

introduction

lifeless idols or their shadows; they are the archetypes and causes of the idols and shadows, and the Sun is the ultimate cause of everything (515e5–516c2). After witnessing these real things with his own eyes and constructing a fundamentally superior wisdom outside the cave, the second prisoner decides to return to the cave to bring as many of his fellow prisoners as possible into the world of light; he decides to replace their philosophy inside the cave with the wisdom outside the cave. However, he is fully aware that many prisoners will not believe him and some may even kill him if he forces them to leave the cave (516c3–517a7). So, he devises a brilliant project (or rescue plan). He reconstructs the best possible version of the philosophy inside the cave—which is in nature similar to the wisdom outside the cave and serves as an introduction to it—for every prisoner to study because the philosophy inside the cave has various versions, many of which are fundamentally wrong. While reconstructing the best philosophy inside the cave, he deliberately includes hints that lead to the wisdom outside the cave. But he is very careful so that only the sufficiently intelligent will understand his hints and instructions. Although others may not understand them, they can nevertheless learn the best cave philosophy and acquire some true wisdom suitable for them. At last, those who understand the hints and believe him follow him out of the cave and ­pursue true wisdom in the world of light. Suhrawardī is this second prisoner, and his Illuminationist project is the ­rescue plan. 1

Background and Purpose

At the end of al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (The Sources and Debates), which is his longest Peripatetic-style work, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191) complains:2 2 I will not recount Suhrawardī’s full biography. An account of Suhrawardī’s life by Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. between 1288 and 1304), a major commentator and follower of Suhrawardī, can be found in Shahrazūrī, Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa-Rawḍat al-Afrāḥ [The Pleasure Trip of the Spirits and the Garden of the Delights], ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm Abū Shuwayrib (1978; repr. Paris, 2007), pp. 375–92; cf. Spies and Khatak’s edition in Suhrawardī, Three Treatises on Mysticism by Shihābuddīn Suhrawerdī Maqtūl, with an Account of His Life and Poetry, ed. and trans. Otto Spies and S. K. Khatak (Stuttgart, 1935), pp. 90–121; an English translation can be found in Suhrawardī, The Philosophical Allegories and Mystical Treatises, ed. and trans. Wheeler M. Thackston (Costa Mesa, 1999), pp. ix–xiii. For another biography of Suhrawardī by Ibn ­Khallikān (d. 1282), see Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-Aʿyān wa-Anbāʾ Abnāʾ al-Zamān [The Deaths of the Eminent Men and the Reports on the Sons of the Epoch], vol. 6, ed. Iḥsān

The Cave Story: Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project

3

[Text 1] I am almost 30 years old.3 Most of my life was [spent] in travelling, ­inquiring, and searching for an insightful companion. But I have not yet found anyone who knows about the noble sciences (al-ʿulūm al-sharīfa) or anyone who believes in them! [ṬRḤ3 505.9–11, §225] Suhrawardī, known as Shaykh al-Ishrāq (Master of Illumination), founded the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) tradition and is one of the most significant post-­ Avicennian philosophers. However, he is one of the most misunderstood ­philosophers in the history of Arabic philosophy. So, if he were alive today, his complaint would still be relevant. It would seem that he has not yet found an insightful interpreter of his Illuminationism. Henry Corbin, who officially brought Suhrawardī to the attention of Western scholarship, reconstructs Illuminationism as “oriental theosophy” and “a deliberate resurrection of the wisdom of ancient Persia”.4 By “oriental theosophy”, ʿAbbās (Beirut, 1968–72), pp. 268–74; an English translation can be found in Ibn Khallikān, Ibn Khallikān’s Biographical Dictionary, vol. 4, trans. Mac Guckin de Slane (Paris, 1842–71), pp. 153–59. For a comprehensive survey based on various biographical sources from the 12th and 13th centuries, see Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, the Martyr of Aleppo”, Al-Qanṭara 22, no. 2 (2001), 395–419. 3 According to Shahrazūrī, Suhrawardī died in 586/1190 or 588/1192, probably at the age of 36 or 38, or at 50 in some reports, which seems unlikely; see Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ, p. 381.2–7. As reported by Ibn Khallikān, the exact date is 29 July 1191 or 17 January 1192; see Wafayāt al-Aʿyān, p. 273.2–21; Biographical Dictionary, pp. 157–58; cf. Marcotte, “Suhrawardī al-­Maqtūl”, pp. 395–96. There are various reports about Suhrawardī’s tragic death, but the underlying reason is similar: out of envy, his opponents (jurists and scholars who disputed but could not compete with him) slandered him, declared him an infidel, and asked Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, the ruler of Egypt, Yemen, and Shām (Greater Syria), to execute him. Suhrawardī was either executed or chose to starve himself to death. See Shahrazūrī, Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ, pp. 379.15–381.2. This is why he is also known as “al-Maqtūl” (the Killed). Shahrazūrī reports that Suhrawardī was “extremely clever” (fī ghāyat al-dhakāʾ); Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ, p. 381.7–8. The great theologian, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), also a schoolmate of Suhrawardī, spoke very highly of him: “His mind blazes by virtue of cleverness and acumen (dhihnuhu yatawaqqadu dhakāʾan wa-fiṭnatan)” (p. 381.10). Shahrazūrī also quotes Fakhr al-Dīn al-Māridīnī (d. 1198), a friend of Suhrawardī: “How clever this young man is and how eloquent! I have not found anyone like him in my time. But I am afraid that his excessive audacity and recklessness, and lack of caution would be the reason for his destruction” (p. 380.10–12). 4 Henry Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, trans. Liadain Sherrard and Philip Sherrard (London, 1993), p. 206; cf. Henry Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam: Spiritual and Philosophical Aspects (Volume II): Suhrawardî and the Persian Platonists, trans. Hugo M. van Woerkom (2003), pp. 9–26.

4

introduction

Corbin means “a philosophy which postulates inner vision and mystical experience” or “inner revelation (kashf) and mystical vision (mushāhada)”, which originates in the sages of ancient Persia, especially Zoroaster (Zarathustra).5 This Oriental Theosophy Approach is adopted by scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi.6 Corbin then developed an Illuminationist approach that reconstructs the history of Arabic philosophy as a whole. Dimitri Gutas has seriously critiqued Corbin’s approach to Arabic philosophy.7 Gutas argues that “Corbin thus took the older orientalist position that Arabic philosophy is mystical to its logical conclusion and elevated it to the sole hermeneutical principle of his approach”.8 He blames Corbin for rendering “Arabic philosophy nothing more than Islamic mysticism and ­theology”.9 Gutas, however, also seems to commit a mistake: he reads Illuminationism as a “­Platonic version of Avicennism” or “Illuminationist Avicennism” in light of Avicenna’s (d. 1037) central place in the history of Arabic philosophy,10 and “the uncontested and universally acknowledged debt that Suhrawardī’s philosophy owes to Avicenna in its entirety”.11 Although Gutas does not offer a systematic reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism, his idea is nevertheless tempting. Many scholars adopt an approach that I call Illuminationist

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 209. See, for instance, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna - Suhrawardī - Ibn ‘Arabī (1969; repr. Delmar, New York, 1997), pp. 52–82; Mehdi Aminrazavi, Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination (London, 1997). Dimitri Gutas, “The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Essay on the Historiography of Arabic Philosophy”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 1 (2002), 16–19. Gutas, “Study of Arabic Philosophy”, p. 17. Gutas, “Study of Arabic Philosophy”, p. 18. Gutas, “Study of Arabic Philosophy”, p. 17. Dimitri Gutas, “Essay-Review: Suhrawardī and Greek Philosophy”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 13 (2003), 309. However, Gutas later moved away from this interpretation to argue that Suhrawardī, together with Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), introduced “an extra- or supra-­rational means of acquiring knowledge that was variously described as illumination (­ishrāq), ‘unveiling’ (kashf), ‘tasting’ (dhawq), inspiration, etc.”. Dimitri Gutas, “Avicenna and After: The Development of Paraphilosophy: A History of Science Approach”, in Islamic ­Philosophy From the 12th to the 14th Century, ed. Abdelkader Al Ghouz (Bonn, 2018), p. 36. He argues (in a negative tone) that these are “anti-scientific developments in Islam after Avicenna” that are mainly motivated by the “Islamic mythological narrative” (p. 36).

The Cave Story: Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project

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Avicennism; they tend to read Illuminationism as a refinement or development of Avicennism and Suhrawardī as an Avicennian in disguise.12 John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai are among the first modern scholars who reconstruct Illuminationism as an innovative philosophy and not as oriental theosophy or a refinement of Avicennism. Both present Suhrawardī as a hardheaded, original philosopher. Walbridge writes: However, in my view it is a grave error to examine his philosophy, Illuminationism, through romantic spectacles, for Suhrawardī, despite his own attempts to mystify his project, was a hardheaded philosophical critic and creative thinker who set the agenda for later Islamic philosophy. … Suhrawardī’s critique of Avicenna’s ontology and of Aristotelian epistemology and his solutions to these problems were his successors’ starting points. The modern description of his philosophy as “theosophy” does not do justice to the rigor and philosophical influence of his thought.13 My own view is that Suhrawardī was primarily a philosopher, though one with a keen interest in how mysticism might be used as a tool of philosophical inquiry.14 Likewise, Ziai writes: My position concerning the Philosophy of Illumination … is that it is a ­distinct, systematic philosophical construction designed to avoid the ­logical, epistemological and metaphysical inconsistencies which Suhrawardī perceived in the Peripatetic philosophy of his day.15

12 13 14

15

I am not indicating that those who adopt this approach actually follow Gutas; one may certainly arrive at the position on one’s own, given the enormous impact of Avicenna on Arabic philosophy, as illustrated in a diagram in Gutas, “Study of Arabic Philosophy”, p. 7. John Walbridge, “Suhrawardī and Illuminationism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, 2005), p. 201, emphasis added. John Walbridge, “Suhrawardī’s (d. 1191) Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne: The ­Relationship of Illuminationism and the Peripatetic Philosophy”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford, 2017), p. 258, emphasis added. Hossein Ziai, “Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī: Founder of the Illuminationist School”, in ­History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (1996; repr. London, 2008), p. 438, emphasis added.

6

introduction

I belong to Walbridge’s and Ziai’s camp. Therefore, we face several interpretative choices here. First, one might accept Corbin’s position: Suhrawardī is an original theosophist, and Illuminationism is oriental theosophy. By “theosophy”, Corbin refers to ḥikma ilāhiyya (divine wisdom or philosophy), which presupposes that “‘spiritual perception’ or ‘hierognosis’ (kashf, literally ‘to unveil, to uncover’)” is the source of the knowledge.16 Believing in the essentially mystical nature of Illuminationism, Corbin focuses on Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist masterpiece Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination) and his mystical treatises. Corbin dismisses (rather unfortunately) Suhrawardī’s several Peripatetic-style works as mere “propaedeutics, because a solid philosophical training is needed by a person who wishes to set out along the spiritual Way”, but “the true theosophy must be freed from all the futile discussions with which both the Peripatetics and mutakallimūn—the Islamic Scholastics—have encumbered it”.17 I fully recognize the enormous value of Corbin’s edition of the Suhrawardian corpus and of his pioneering research on Suhrawardī.18 However, Corbin’s interpretation does not appeal to scholars who are more philosophical-minded, such as Gutas, Walbridge, Ziai, and myself, because it reduces Illuminationism to mysticism. Moreover, I argue that Corbin’s interpretation does not do justice to Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism. My understanding of Illuminationism is that it is a rigorous philosophy that uses mysticism as a tool for its investigation. This approach is essentially different from treating Illuminationism as theosophy. This is clearly indicated by Suhrawardī’s own requirement in the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt: he specifically asks readers to study his two major Peripatetic-style works, al-Talwīḥāt (The Intimations) and al-Muṭāraḥāt, before reading Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. [Text 2] If one is not skilful in the investigative sciences (al-ʿulūm al-baḥthiyya) [i.e. Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style philosophy], then there is no way for one to reach my book named Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. This book [al-Muṭāraḥāt] ought to be read before it [Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq] and after examining the handbook (mukhtaṣar) named al-Talwīḥāt. [ṬRḤ3 194.6–8] 16 17 18

Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, p. 27. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 208, emphasis added. Henry Corbin, En Islam Iranien: Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques (Tome II): Sohrawardî et les Platoniciens de Perse (Paris, 1971); for an English translation, see Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam. To my mind, this is still an unparalleled reference work for exploring the ­religious and mystical dimensions of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism.

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7

To my knowledge, Suhrawardī never asks readers to read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq alongside his mystical treatises. By strictly following this requirement, I argue that there is indeed a philosophical core of Illuminationism that can be revealed only through a rigorous philosophical enquiry. While Corbin fails to offer this enquiry, it is exactly where we should be looking for the deepest nature of Illuminationism. Although Suhrawardī presents himself as a reviver of “the ancient Persians’ noble wisdom of light, which Plato and his predecessors witnessed by [spiritual] tasting (dhawq)”,19 I find that the more significant and fundamental point is how Suhrawardī understands this wisdom. In particular, how he understands its philosophical nature is fundamental. Corbin offers no insight into this nature. The second possibility is Gutas’s early position: Suhrawardī is an Avicennian in disguise, and although he is a philosopher, he is not very original; Illuminationism is Avicennism in nature. Or, one might accept a moderate version of Gutas’s position: although Suhrawardī has some original ideas, his Illuminationism is, after all, a refinement of Avicennism. This position has gained popularity in recent years because scholars have begun to notice Suhrawardī’s obvious departure from Avicenna on significant issues. The fourth possibility is the position that Walbridge, Ziai, and myself hold: Suhrawardī is a hardheaded and original philosopher, who resorts to mysticism because of deeply considered philosophical reasons; Illuminationism is an innovative philosophical construction that cannot be reduced to Avicennism. Establishing this position is probably the most difficult because it requires a systematic reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism as an integrated whole to reveal its profound philosophical nature and to establish its originality. However, I believe that other scholars who hold this position have failed to see how Suhrawardī’s different philosophical ideas fit together. Consequently, they have not grasped the coherence of his doctrine. Grasping this coherence is the aim of this book. 2

The Cave Story Approach

Recall “The Cave Story” from the outset of this book. I propose to reconstruct Illuminationism in these terms. I believe that Suhrawardī pursued a rather

19

Suhrawardī, Kalimat al-Taṣawwuf [The Word of Sufism], in Al-Muʾallafāt al-Falsafiyya wa-l-Ṣūfiyya, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Beirut, 2014), p. 155.9–10; Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, p. 21; cf. Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh §4, 10–11]. For an analysis, see Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 9–52.

8

introduction

ambitious project, one that is reasonably related to Plato’s cave allegory.20 Only when one is fully aware of this project can one rightly grasp the true nature of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism. It is neither Corbin’s Oriental Theosophy nor Gutas’s Illuminationist Avicennism. Moreover, it is much more complicated and profound than what Walbridge, Ziai, and others have so far discovered. Now, consider the Cave Story as a way to interpret Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project. Suhrawardī is the prisoner who has returned to the cave to rescue his fellow prisoners. To achieve this goal, he composes four ­Peripatetic-style works and only one important avowedly Illuminationist work Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. The nature of the four Peripatetic-style works, which vary in both length and depth, is that they expound an entry-level Illuminationism that is reached only through the Peripatetic rational approach and presented in Peripatetic terminology and style. The intelligentsia of his time can understand them and learn some true Illuminationist wisdom. Those who also understand the ­Illuminationist hints that Suhrawardī deliberately leaves in these ­Peripatetic-style works will follow his instructions, study the final Illuminationist work Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and escape from the cave. Suhrawardī looks to three audiences: ordinary people who merely see “shadows” (material particulars); Peripatetics who investigate “idols” (­sensible species forms from which various sorts of universals can be generated in the mind); and potential Illuminationists, some of whom have the capability of escaping from the cave and witnessing the living Platonic Forms, the things in the sky, and even the Sun (immaterial particulars). My Cave Story parallels Plato’s cave allegory except that it includes the Peripatetics and that it insists that Platonic Forms are living immaterial particulars.21 20

21

It is likely that Suhrawardī knows of Plato’s cave allegory because we do have, for example, a commentary from Averroes (d. 1198) on Plato’s Republic in which the cave allegory can be found. See Averroes, Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, ed. and trans. E. I. J. Rosenthal (1956; repr. Cambridge, 1969), pp. 197–98; cf. Averroes, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, trans. Ralph Lerner (1974; repr. Ithaca, 2005), pp. 94–95. This commentary, ­finished around 1177, is believed to be based on Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq’s (d. 873) Arabic translation of Galen’s Jawāmiʿ (Summaries) of the ten books of the Republic, although Ḥunayn’s ­Arabic translation does not come down to us; see Averroes, Averroes’ Commentary, pp. 8–14. I will, however, not argue extensively that Suhrawardī actually follows and indeed provides his original interpretation of Plato’s cave allegory. In this book, I use the Cave Story as an explanatory tool to bring out the structure and ambitions of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project. “Idols” (aṣnām, sing. ṣanam), in the Illuminationist context, refer to particular sensible species forms—rather than universal intelligible forms—of natural things (e.g. sensible horse forms). Platonic Forms in Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics are called “lords/masters of idols/species” (arbāb/aṣḥāb al-aṣnām/al-anwāʿ), which are living, self-apprehending

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9

Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project (or rescue plan), therefore, consists of three parts. One part involves showing that Avicennian Peripatetic philosophy is the “philosophy inside the cave” or “cave philosophy” that is based on investigation (baḥth) or formal knowledge (ʿilm ṣūrī). Investigation involves knowing particulars in the real world by means of universals or universal forms (ṣuwar kulliyya), that is, by conceptions (sing. taṣawwur) and assents (sing. taṣdīq), and through definitions (sing. ḥadd) and demonstrations (sing. burhān). The Peripatetics are similar to the prisoners who have never left the cave (although they have seen the idols); their philosophy is, in fact, based on investigating the idols of the shadows rather than the real things outside the cave. Avicennian Peripatetic philosophy, therefore, has many fundamental deficiencies that must be overcome. Another component of Suhrawardī’s project is to construct, in his Illuminationist masterpiece Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, another fundamentally superior “wisdom outside the cave” that is based on deification (taʾalluh; lit. becoming godlike) or presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī). This wisdom involves knowing particulars in the real world unmediatedly and as they are, without any universals as intermediaries; self-awareness is paradigmatic of this way of knowing. Suhrawardī is, however, fully aware of human limitations and that, except for a blessed few, most people simply cannot reach the height of ­Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and escape from the cave. So, the third part of his project is to reconstruct, in his four Peripatetic-style works, the best possible version of a Peripatetic-style philosophy, which, in many respects, differs fundamentally from Avicennism. This Peripatetic-style philosophy is, in fact, Illuminationist in nature, but it is reached only through the Peripatetic baḥth approach, and without using the Illuminationist taʾalluh approach. It is, therefore, suitable for everyone to study. Moreover, these Peripatetic-style works serve as an invitation for potential Illuminationists to pursue the full-fledged Illuminationist philosophy in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. “immaterial lights” (anwār mujarrada)—rather than separate universal intelligible forms—and form the horizontal order in the light world. They are the complete causes of their “idols” in this world. “The Sun” in the Cave Story refers to the highest immaterial light, the “Light of lights” (nūr al-anwār), namely, God; “things in the sky” refer to other living immaterial lights of higher levels—called the “mothers” (al-ummahāt), “roots” (al-uṣūl), and “primordial conquering lights” (al-anwār al-qāhira al-aʿlūn)—that form the vertical order in the light world and cause everything else below them (including Platonic Forms of the horizontal order) through their extremely complicated interactions; and “living things outside the cave” refer to living Platonic Forms, namely, the “lords/masters of idols/species”. One should already see why I suspect that Suhrawardī is deliberately following Plato’s cave allegory. There are, in fact, a number of hints in Light Metaphysics, with the shadows–idols–lords of idols relation and the darkness world–light world distinction as two crucial indicators.

10

introduction

This is Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project. With this project in mind, one may avoid resorting to Corbin’s Oriental Theosophy Approach (because the Peripatetic-style works constitute an indispensable and essential part of Suhrawardī’s project) or to Gutas’s Illuminationist Avicennism Approach (because Illuminationism is fundamentally superior to Avicennism). The Cave Story Approach will reveal the true nature of Illuminationism. 3

Scope and Methodology

I focus on three areas of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy: the theory of presential knowledge (Chapter 2), the significant ontological discussion of “mental considerations” (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya; Chapters 3 and 4), and Light Metaphysics (Chapter 5). An investigation into these three areas elaborates how Suhrawardī’s central ideas are cohesive and leads to an in-depth understanding of the nature of Illuminationism. In terms of methodology, I borrow from Richard Rorty’s four genres of the historiography of philosophy. I present a historical reconstruction that obeys Quentin Skinner’s maxim but contains some Geistesgeschichte features.22 I describe Suhrawardī “in terms of his entire work rather than in terms of his most celebrated arguments” to demonstrate that he is and should be treated as a great philosopher.23 I also explain his particular philosophical concerns and reveal their historical and philosophical significance. A large part of my book is devoted to textual analysis and reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s sophisticated philosophical arguments, so to some extent the book may look like a medieval commentary. Suhrawardī’s writing style requires an interpreter to focus on the reconstruction of his arguments. As with Avicenna, Suhrawardī is a master of argumentation: philosophical arguments constitute a major part of his philosophical works. Moreover, even if one rejects my general interpretation of Illuminationism, my reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s perplexing arguments is of some academic value insofar as the study could serve as a basis for further research. However, non-specialists might find some arguments too difficult. My advice is to avoid going deeply 22

23

Skinner writes: “No agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done”, quoted in Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres”, in Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (1984; repr. Cambridge, 2004), p. 50. Rorty, “Historiography”, p. 57; for a discussion of Geistesgeschichte, see pp. 56–61.

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into sections that closely attend to the details of Suhrawardī’s arguments (readers can easily identify these sections by their titles). The gist of each argument is usually found at the beginning of each of these sections. I promise that one can still understand the whole story without knowing every detail of these arguments. There are certain shortcomings in my current research. (1) I concentrate solely on Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and offer little attention to his other works, including his mystical treatises. My main reason is that this is Suhrawardī’s own requirement, as shown already in [Text 2] and which I further expound in Chapter 1. Second, modern scholars all agree that the Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq should be taken as Suhrawardī’s major and mature philosophical works.24 Third, based on a survey of Illuminationist manuscripts, Walbridge argues that at least some, if not all, of Suhrawardī’s mystical allegories and related works are, in fact, his juvenilia.25 Lastly, even if some of the allegories are indeed among Suhrawardī’s mature work, this will not affect my reconstruction or conclusion. I do not deny the mystical side of Suhrawardī’s thought and these works explore that side of his thought. But my understanding of Illuminationism, as mentioned above, is that it is a rigorous philosophy and mysticism is a tool for its investigation. I argue that there must be significant philosophical reasons that lead Suhrawardī to mysticism in the first place (see Chapter 1, section 2 and Chapter 2). My focus is on the philosophical side; thus, this book is a “philosophical enquiry”. (2) I do not propose to offer thorough historical contextual studies, although I do introduce the philosophical context to interpret Suhrawardī better and recommend relevant studies of other specialists.26 I hold that the historical reconstruction of a great philosopher consists of several stages that should not be confused with each other. In the first stage of reconstruction, by focusing mainly on the philosopher’s own work, a historian’s purpose is to present a philosophy as it is and as an integrated whole to form an independent understanding of how his different philosophical ideas fit together and 24 25

26

Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Suhrawardi”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition) (2019), “1.2 Works”. John Walbridge, “Illuminationist Manuscripts: The Rediscovery of Suhrawardī and its Reception”, in Illuminationist Texts and Textual Studies: Essays in Memory of Hossein Ziai, ed. Ali Gheissari, John Walbridge, and Ahmed Alwishah (Leiden, 2018), pp. 34–36. ­Walbridge finds that “the manuscript evidence for them is surprisingly thin” (p. 34). For an overview of Suhrawardī’s mystical treatises, see Suhrawardī, Philosophical Allegories, pp. xiv–xxxii. For Corbin’s detailed discussion of two allegories, see Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 133–208. For example, Chapter 2, section 1 and Chapter 3, section 1.

12

introduction

to grasp the coherence of his doctrine. Such a reconstruction is “first-stage” in that it is absolutely fundamental and foundational rather than preliminary or rudimentary. Only on such a solid foundation should one further investigate the philosopher’s relations with his predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. A first-stage reconstruction is also necessary for one who intends to examine the philosophy in question analytically and offer a rational reconstruction.27 My reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism is primarily a first-stage reconstruction: I attempt to propose a new way of understanding how Suhrawardī’s central ideas fit together and thereby reveal the true nature of Illuminationism. However, I do hold that, even at the first stage, we must consider the necessary historical context, usually verified by Suhrawardī himself (or his medieval commentators), to understand adequately what he is doing.28 In the case of Suhrawardī, Avicennian Peripatetic philosophy is sufficient in many cases. I certainly agree that thorough historical contextual studies can provide insights into how to understand Suhrawardī. One should, however, also be aware of the possible dangers of paying too much attention to the historical context in the first-stage reconstruction. First, one might have various ­preoccupations and read Suhrawardī through one’s commitments, so one might fail to ­capture the true nature of his philosophy.29 Second, one might have the tendencies to oversimplify Suhrawardī’s arguments, attach labels to him, or group him in a particular camp too quickly. In this book, I attempt to ­reconstruct Suhrawardī’s arguments in full detail and to correct a number of traditional misinterpretations of Suhrawardī’s epistemology and metaphysics. Third, many contextual studies fall into the domain of the probable. Unless explicitly verified by Suhrawardī himself (which is rare) or his 27

28

29

Olga Louchakova-Schwartz offers a rational reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Light ­Metaphysics before a first-stage historical reconstruction; see “A Phenomenological Approach to Illuminationist Philosophy: Suhrawardī’s Nūr Mujarrad and Husserl’s ­Reduction”, Philosophy East and West 65, no. 4 (2015), 1052–81. Consequently, the result is a somewhat liberal reading of Suhrawardī’s original text within a modern and alien phenomenological context. Fedor Benevich offers a convincing example of reading Suhrawardī on Platonic Forms (as lords of species) in terms of both Avicenna and Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165), given that Suhrawardī devotes a whole section [ṬRḤ3 §171, 435–37] to arguing against Abū l-Barakāt; see “A Rebellion against Avicenna? Suhrawardī and Abū l-Barakāt on ‘Platonic Forms’ and ‘Lords of Species’”, Ishrāq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook 9 (2019), 23–53. A popular but problematic approach is to read Suhrawardī with Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1636). For instance, see Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 57–149; Sajjad H. Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence‐Essence Distinction? Suhrawardī’s Visionary Hierarchy of Lights”, Asian Philosophy 9, no. 3 (1999), 219–27.

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medieval commentators (which should also be taken with some caution), these studies are working ­hypotheses given the 900-year gap, the limitations of the extant texts, and that there is simply too much that we do not know (and perhaps could never know) about Suhrawardī’s context. In comparison, the first-stage reconstruction I propose provides the most certainty possible because it is primarily an internal study of Suhrawardī’s own texts (and studies of the necessary context). This is, indeed, the solid foundation required for further contextual studies. Some, however, might worry that my argument about Suhrawardī’s originality is undermined to the extent that I do not study the historical context thoroughly. The concern is that some of Suhrawardī’s ideas or arguments might be borrowed from others, but I cannot show this adequately without a thorough contextual analysis. However, it is not my intention to argue that every idea or argument reconstructed in this book is uniquely Suhrawardī’s. Instead, I argue that he constructs an original philosophical system and the system as a whole is uniquely his. I am not arguing that every brick of Suhrawardī’s building is created single-handedly by himself, which would be absurd. In fact, it becomes quite clear to me that, in his Peripatetic-style works, especially al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī is selecting ideas and arguments available during his time and only adopts those that he deems reasonable from within the Illuminationist perspective. If an idea or argument is untenable, he criticizes it; if acceptable but not flawless, he improves it; if correct, he adopts it. This accords well with my general hypothesis that, in his Peripatetic-style works, Suhrawardī reconstructs the best possible Peripatetic-style philosophy—which is Illuminationism in nature—out of the many versions available during his time. Therefore, to challenge my argument, one must show that Suhrawardī’s whole philosophical system is not original. (3) I often do not evaluate the strength of Suhrawardī’s arguments, although I indicate my preferences by choosing which arguments to introduce and which to analyse thoroughly.30 Instead, I prioritize reconstructing Suhrawardī’s arguments as faithfully and reasonably as possible. That is, I focus on showing the purpose of every argument and how they serve the whole system; I present them in accurate forms, work out their logic, and reveal hidden key premises. The evaluation of the strength of Suhrawardī’s arguments, in my view, is not necessary for this purpose. “What is this argument?” and “Is this a good argument?” are two different questions. Moreover, if one judges an argument too quickly, one might inaccurately evaluate it because one inadequately 30

For example, in Chapter 3, section 4, I introduce three of Suhrawardī’s seven arguments against real univocal existence.

14

introduction

understands the argument.31 The evaluation of an argument should be the topic of later stages of reconstruction. Light in the Cave is an example of reconstructing Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy through the Cave Story Approach. It is the first work of my proposed Cave Trilogy on Suhrawardī and his Illuminationism. The second and third works will probably be titled Suhrawardī’s Existential Metaphysics in his Peripatetic-Style Works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: Philosophy inside the Cave and Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics and Arabic Neo-Platonism: Wisdom outside the Cave.32 The Cave Trilogy will thoroughly reconstruct Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist philosophy (with a focus on metaphysics). I will show that Illuminationism is an innovative and perfect integration of Nominalism,33 Existentialism, and Neo-Platonism. Moreover, I hope to establish Suhrawardī as a central figure in Arabic philosophy. 31

32

33

A useful example is the evaluation of the Third Man Argument from Plato’s Parmenides (132a–b). Scholars held different views about its strength until its crucial premises, Self-Predication and Non-Identity, were revealed. See Gregory Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides”, The Philosophical Review 63, no. 3 (1954), 319–49; cf. ­Samuel Rickless, “Plato’s Parmenides”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 ­Edition) (2020), “4.3 The Third Man Argument 132a–b”. In Philosophy inside the Cave, I will argue that the metaphysics in Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works must be the very Existential metaphysics—a metaphysics that accepts the central notion of systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd) in terms of strength and weakness—of which Mullā Ṣadrā is usually considered to have founded. Wisdom outside the Cave will continue the reconstruction of Light Metaphysics (following Chapter 5) and investigate the possible impact of Arabic Neo-Platonic works, such as The Theology of Aristotle, on Suhrawardī. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, ed., Uthūlūjiyā Arisṭātālīs [The Theology of Aristotle], in Aflūṭīn ʿinda l-ʿArab (Cairo, 1955), pp. 3–164; for an English translation, see Plotinus, Plotiniana Arabica, trans. Geoffrey Lewis, in Plotini Opera (Tomvs II): Enneades IV–V, ed. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Paris, 1959); for an introduction, see Cristina D’Ancona, “The Theology Attributed to Aristotle: Sources, Structure, Influence”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford, 2017), pp. 8–29. I use “Nominalism” in a broad sense: it refers to any metaphysics that rejects the ­existence of universals in the real world. Nominalism has various versions; Conceptualism, also called “Concept Nominalism”, is one version. See Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Nominalism in Metaphysics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition) (2019).

chapter 1

From Four Peripatetic-Style Works to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq According to Suhrawardī, his Illuminationist philosophy is fundamentally ­different from Avicennian Peripatetic philosophy insofar as it is based on “another path” (siyāq ākhar) that differs essentially from “the method of the Peripatetics” (ṭarīqat al-mashshāʾīn) [Ḥ.Sh 10.5, §3] or “the approach of the Peripatetics” (maʾkhadh al-mashshāʾīn) [ṬRḤ3 194.4]. One might then expect the majority of Suhrawardī’s philosophical works to expound Illuminationism. This, however, is not the case. The only mature Illuminationist work is his masterpiece Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination), in addition to mystical treatises, other short works, and four Peripatetic-style works that “contain the vast bulk of his philosophical writing”.1 These Peripatetic-style works are al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya (The Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne), al-Lamaḥāt (The Glimpses), al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (The Sources and Debates), and al-Muqāwamāt (The Oppositions).2 At this point, the following questions arise naturally. Are these Peripatetic-style works merely Suhrawardī’s juvenilia that present his immature ideas, or are they his mature philosophical works that ­constitute an indispensable part of his Illuminationist project? If they are indeed his mature works, what are their contents? Do they merely expound Avicennism, or do they serve other purposes? How do they relate to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq? As the founder of Illuminationism, why does Suhrawardī write as many as four Peripatetic-style works, and what significance do they serve in the ­Illuminationist project? Answers to these questions are crucial for understanding the nature of Illuminationism. If these Peripatetic-style works are an essential part of 1 Walbridge, “Suhrawardī’s Intimations”, p. 257. For a discussion about classifying Suhrawardī’s work, see Marcotte, “Suhrawardi”, “1.2 Works”. 2 Scholars have not reached consensus about how to translate the titles of Suhrawardī’s books, so I refer to the works by their Arabic names. Most scholars render al-Lamaḥāt as The Flashes of Light, but al-Lamaḥāt more likely means The Glimpses, The Glances, or The Quick Looks at the Peripatetic-style philosophy (see Section 1.1). Al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-Muṭāraḥāt (al-Muṭāraḥāt for short) is often rendered as The Paths and Havens, but a more appropriate rendering is The Sources and Debates because Suhrawardī debates other schools of thought on various themes (or “sources”). © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_003

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Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project, overlooking or ignoring them leads to serious interpretative consequences. The significance of the Peripatetic-style works themselves cannot be evaluated fairly. Moreover, some might read ­Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq inadequately or inappropriately. For example, one might read it as a free-standing work and thus regard it as somewhat incomplete.3 Or, one might read it as a mystical work along with Suhrawardī’s mystical treatises rather than as a rigorous philosophical work. Consequently, one might interpret inadequately or even misinterpret the nature of Illuminationism. Its mystical tendency may be over-emphasized, and its profound philosophical nature neglected. If, however, it can be established that Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works serve as an essential part of his Illuminationist project, then the significance of these Peripatetic-style works must be re-evaluated, a new way to read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq undoubtedly is opened up, and a deeper understanding of the philosophical nature of Illuminationism can be expected. In Section 1, by carefully analysing the Introductions to the four ­Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, I explain their relations to each other. Based on solid textual evidence—the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt—I argue that these four Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq must be read together and that they constitute one and the same Illuminationist ­project. I am not the first scholar to pose such an argument.4 But this is not yet an ­established fact, so I must justify this conclusion. Moreover, in the subsequent chapters, I draw heavily on the Peripatetic-style works to reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussions about presential knowledge (Chapter 2), ­mental ­considerations (Chapters 3 and 4), and Light Metaphysics (Chapter 5). By examining the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and Suhrawardī’s famous “Story and Dream” (ḥikāya wa-manām) of Aristotle in the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt in Section 2, I explain how these four Peripatetic-style works serve the ­Illuminationist project in Section 3.

3 Nicolai Sinai remarks: “Firstly, despite the loose ends and generally somewhat unfinished feel of the Philosophy of Illumination …” “Al-Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination and al-Ghazālī”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98, no. 3 (2016), 287, emphasis added. 4 Hossein Ziai, as far as I know, is the first scholar to establish the relationship between Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq by examining the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt; see Knowledge and Illumination: A Study of Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (Atlanta, Georgia, 1990), pp. 9–11.

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The Contents of the Four Peripatetic-Style Works

In this section, by analysing the Introductions to the four Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and by consulting the commentaries by Saʿd b. Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284), Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. between 1288 and 1304), and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1311), I explain the contents and ­features of the Peripatetic-style works and their relations to each other.5 1.1 Al-Talwīḥāt (The Intimations) and al-Lamaḥāt (The Glimpses) Consider the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Suhrawardī writes: [Text 1] I have already composed for you, before this book [Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq] and during it, when interruptions hindered me from it, several books based on the method of the Peripatetics (ṭarīqat al-mashshāʾīn). I have summarized in them their fundamentals (qawāʿid). Among them, there is a handbook (mukhtaṣar) that is named al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-lʿArshiyya and contains many fundamentals. I have summarized in it [many] fundamentals despite its small volume. Other than it (dūnahu), there is al-Lamaḥāt. I have written books other than these two, and among them, there are those that I composed in my youth. [Ḥ.Sh 10.4–7, §3] We can determine the chronological order of some of Suhrawardī’s writings. In his youth, Suhrawardī wrote some books, which probably included some mystical treatises,6 but not the Peripatetic-style works. Then he began to compose the Peripatetic-style works, including at least al-Talwīḥāt and al-­Lamaḥāt;7 5 For an overview of the commentaries on Suhrawardī’s works, see L. W. C. van Lit, “The ­Commentary Tradition on Suhrawardī”, Philosophy East and West 68, no. 2 (2018), 539–63; for a study of Ibn Kammūna’s commentary on al-Talwīḥāt, see Joep Lameer, “Ibn Kammūna’s Commentary on Suhrawardī’s Talwīḥāt. Three Editions”, Journal of Islamic Manuscripts 3, no. 2 (2012), 154–84. Ibn Kammūna’s commentary (finished in 1286) on al-Talwīḥāt is earlier than Shahrazūrī’s commentary (11 September 1286) on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, which is earlier than Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary (1295) on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. My impression is that Ibn Kammūna is the most faithful commentator among the three. Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn both draw on Ibn ­Kammūna’s commentary; Quṭb al-Dīn borrows heavily from Shahrazūrī’s commentary to the extent that, in many cases, he simply repeats what Shahrazūrī has said. 6 Walbridge, “Illuminationist Manuscripts”, pp. 34–36. 7 I mainly cite Corbin’s edition of the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3] and consult Ḥabībī’s edition of the whole book [LWḤ]. I cite Ḥabībī’s edition of al-Lamaḥāt [LMḤ] and consult Maʿlūf’s edition: Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Lamaḥāt, ed. Amīl al-Maʿlūf (Beirut, 1969).

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at the same time, he was also working on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. The style of al-­ Talwīḥāt is mukhtaṣar, that is, a concise handbook that summarizes many ­fundamentals of the Peripatetic-style philosophy.8 Shahrazūrī holds that Suhrawardī’s juvenilia include most of his short ­treatises (akthar rasāʾilihi) [Sha 19.18] and that Suhrawardī began composing al-Lamaḥāt, al-Talwīḥāt, and al-Muṭāraḥāt before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. ­Shahrazūrī also contends that they were finished during the composition of Ḥikmat al-­Ishrāq [Sha 19.15–18]. He mentions nothing about al-Muqāwamāt. However, given my reading of the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt (see Section 1.3), I doubt that Suhrawardī began to work on al-Muṭāraḥāt before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Quṭb al-Dīn repeats Shahrazūrī’s claims with the exception of two important points. First, he adds al-Alwāḥ and al-Hayākil to Suhrawardī’s juvenilia [Q.D 14.13–14].9 Second, he does not seem to agree with Shahrazūrī about the timing of the composing of al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt. Nonetheless, he is certain that Suhrawardī had begun both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and that they were both finished during it [Q.D 14.10–13]. I agree with Quṭb al-Dīn on the second point but not the first; al-Alwāḥ and al-Hayākil do not seem to be Suhrawardī’s juvenilia. I now consider the brief Introductions to al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt. In the Introduction to al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 2] These, my friends, are intimations to principles of wisdom (talwīḥāt ʿalā uṣūl min al-ḥikma). [These intimations are] mentioned in the three sciences [i.e. logic, physics, and metaphysics] in their order and they are very concise (bālighatan fī l-ījāz). [LWḤ 3.6–7]

8 Mukhtaṣar may literally mean “abstract”, “epitome”, “outline”, “summary”, or “short exposition”. I render it as “handbook” because its technical meaning seems similar to what mukhtaṣar refers to in Islamic legal education: “Concise handbook of legal treatises, characterized by neatness and clarity. Originated during the Abbasid caliphate. Created as a method to facilitate the quick training of lawyers without the repetitiveness of lengthy volumes, yet evolved into a mode of access into the fundamentals of Islamic law for the educated layperson.” John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford, 2003). Ḥabībī’s edition of al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ] has 288 pages, indicating that it is not simply an abstract or epitome. 9 Suhrawardī, Al-Alwāḥ al-ʿImādiyya [The Tablets for ʿImād al-Dīn], in Al-Muʾallafāt al-­ Falsafiyya wa-l-Ṣūfiyya, ed. Najafqulī Ḥabībī (Beirut, 2014), pp. 6–108; Suhrawardī, Hayākil al-Nūr [The Temples of Light], in Mawsūʿat Muṣannafāt al-Suhrawardī, ed. Muḥsin ʿAqīl (­Beirut, 2018), pp. 867–94.

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Ibn Kammūna remarks: He names this book al-Talwīḥāt because it is very concise and brief (li-shiddat ījāzihi wa-ikhtiṣārihi). For in this book, he refers to his meaning by indication and intimation (bi-l-īmāʾ wa-l-talwīḥ) rather than by clarification or explication (bi-l-ifṣāḥ wa-l-taṣrīḥ). [I.K1 5.14–15] I suspect that Suhrawardī might have followed Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-­ Tanbīhāt (The Pointers and Reminders) in composing al-Talwīḥāt. Note that talwīḥāt and ishārāt are synonymous terms: allusions, hints, intimations, or pointers.10 This possible connection requires further study. But my impression is that Suhrawardī knows al-Ishārāt very well. In the Introduction to al-Lamaḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 3] These are glimpses at the truths (lamaḥāt fī l-ḥaqāʾiq) in an extremely concise way (ʿalā ghāyat al-ījāz). I do not mention in it [this book] what is not important in the three sciences. [LMḤ 175.5–6] By comparing these two Introductions, we know that al-Lamaḥāt is even more concise than al-Talwīḥāt; it is about half the length of al-Talwīḥāt. In fact, my impression is that al-Lamaḥāt seems to summarize al-Talwīḥāt.11 There are a number of references in al-Lamaḥāt to al-Talwīḥāt that guide readers to detailed discussions on relevant issues therein. If this is the case, then it is likely that Suhrawardī began composing al-Lamaḥāt after he had finished al-Talwīḥāt (or during its composition). 10

11

Note that, in his biography, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 1231) mentions: “I heard ­people saying great things about Shihāb al-Suhrawardī, the philosopher: people were ­convinced he was more important than any of the ancient and modern authors and that his works were superior to those of the Ancients and I decided to go and look for him.” Cecilia Martini Bonadeo, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Philosophical Journey: From Aristotle’s Metaphysics to the ‘Metaphysical Science’ (Leiden, 2013), pp. 123–24. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf comes across al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt and maintains that, in al-Lamaḥāt, “I discovered that al-Suhrawardī poorly copied Ibn Sīnā’s discourse taken from the treatise al-Tanbīhāt wa-lIshārāt” (p. 178). Although ʿAbd al-Laṭīf does not think highly of Suhrawardī, it is evident that Suhrawardī and his al-Talwīḥāt and al-Lamaḥāt are well known at that time and that ʿAbd al-Laṭīf notices the similarities between Suhrawardī’s al-Lamaḥāt and ­Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt. Hanif Amin Beidokhti holds the same view; see “Suhrawardī on Division of Aristotelian Categories”, in Islamic Philosophy from the 12th to the 14th Century, ed. Abdelkader Al Ghouz (Bonn, 2018), p. 394.

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Although al-Lamaḥāt is “extremely concise” and the most basic of the four Peripatetic-style works, this does not mean that it is insignificant. In fact, Suhrawardī’s original insights are found in al-Lamaḥāt. For example, he reduces the ten Peripatetic categories to four: substance, relation, quantity, and quality. He introduces motion as a fifth category and notes that “we have already mentioned the examination of these things in al-Talwīḥāt al-Lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿArshiyya” [LMḤ 272.8–9, §102].12 In al-Lamaḥāt [LMḤ §§123–25, 284–85], when discussing God’s knowledge, Suhrawardī outlines his theory of presential knowledge and again remarks that “the problem of knowledge should be studied from al-Talwīḥāt for its truth” [LMḤ 285.8–9, §125]. Moreover, as a summary of al-Talwīḥāt, al-Lamaḥāt is useful for grasping the key points addressed in al-Talwīḥāt. I occasionally consult al-Lamaḥāt to ensure that I do not miss points from al-Talwīḥāt. The significance of al-Lamaḥāt and its relation to al-Talwīḥāt require further study. But I hold that al-Lamaḥāt is worthy of serious study and that it is not a summary of Avicennian philosophy. Instead, it summarizes al-Talwīḥāt. According to Ziai, al-Lamaḥāt is “only an outline or a short syllabus of the major topics of Peripatetic philosophy, as presented, for instance, in Avicenna’s major philosophical work, the Healing”, and “a simple, non-argumentative presentation of the central Peripatetic philosophical principles and rules of logic, physics, and metaphysics”.13 Thus, Ziai’s evaluation of al-Lamaḥāt is untenable. 1.2 Al-Muqāwamāt (The Oppositions) Suhrawardī offers a clear explanation in the Introduction to al-Muqāwamāt about the contents of this work.14 [Text 4] This [al-Muqāwamāt] is a handbook (mukhtaṣar) that serves as the appendices (al-lawāḥiq) of my book named al-Talwīḥāt. It contains corrections (iṣlāḥ) of what needs to be corrected, that is, what the ancients (al-awwalūn) have neglected. It is not easy to mention them [the corrections] in al-Talwīḥāt because it is very concise. So what needs minimal expansion would not suit it [al-Talwīḥāt], and being concise in places in order to make up for [the ancients’] negligence in important matters 12 13 14

For a study on Suhrawardī’s five categories, see Beidokhti, “Suhrawardī on Division”. Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, p. 12; cf. Walbridge, “Suhrawardī’s Intimations”, p. 257. I cite Corbin’s edition of the Metaphysics of al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3] and consult Cihan and Yalın’s edition of the whole book: Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Muqāwamāt, ed. Ahmet Kamil Cihan and Salih Yalın (Istanbul, 2020).

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would not benefit [al-Talwīḥāt].15 So, we mention them [the corrections] here and add to them some well-known points (nukat mashhūra).16 I name it al-Muqāwamāt. [QWM3 124.1–5] Thus, we know that al-Muqāwamāt is similar to al-Talwīḥāt in that both are handbooks and that it serves as appendices to al-Talwīḥāt. It contains the ­necessary corrections of what the “ancients” have neglected in important philosophical issues. Unfortunately, Suhrawardī does not tell us to whom “ancients” refer. In addition, some “well-known points”—presumably some Illuminationist points—are included in al-Muqāwamāt. Therefore, al-Muqāwamāt is not a systematic work like al-Talwīḥāt. My impression is that al-Muqāwamāt is a summary of al-Muṭāraḥāt. When working on Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, both of which draw heavily on al-­Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, and al-Muṭāraḥāt, I noticed that al-Talwīḥāt indeed only contains what is necessary. By contrast, al-Muṭāraḥāt has more elaboration and contains many things not found in al-Talwīḥāt. Then, I found that nearly everything that is missing in al-Talwīḥāt occurs in al-Muqāwamāt, albeit in a summarized form: an argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt is often summarized as one sentence in al-Muqāwamāt. If al-Muqāwamāt is indeed a summary of al-Muṭāraḥāt, it is likely that Suhrawardī began composing al-Muqāwamāt after he had finished al-Muṭāraḥāt (or during it). If my analysis of the Introduction to al-Muqāwamāt is accurate, ­Walbridge’s following claim is untenable. There are also points of tension among the Peripatetic works, with the Points at Issue [al-Muqāwamāt], for example, correcting the Intimations [al-Talwīḥāt]. … Suhrawardī explains that this book consists of corrections (iṣlāḥ) to The Intimations based on what had been passed down from the ancients.17 Instead, al-Muqāwamāt does not correct al-Talwīḥāt; it corrects the views of the ancients.18

15 16 17 18

That is, it would be inappropriate to mention in al-Talwīḥāt these scattered corrections, which are summarized very concisely. Presumably, these “well-known points” refer to Illuminationist points that are also ­mentioned in the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt (see [T5a] below). Walbridge, “Suhrawardī’s Intimations”, p. 259. The Turkish translators, Cihan and Yalın, hold the same view; see Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Muqāwamāt (Istanbul, 2020), p. 30.

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1.3 Al-Muṭāraḥāt (The Debates) The Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt is crucial insofar as it provides information that helps to resolve puzzles that modern scholars have regarding Suhrawardī’s philosophy. [Text 5] [T5a] This is a book that contains the three sciences. I write it in accordance with your suggestion for me (bi-ḥukm iqtirāḥikum ʿalayya), my brothers.19 I mention in it studies (mabāḥith) and rules (ḍawābiṭ) that do not exist in other books. They are very beneficial; they are taken out and extracted from my arrangements. Despite this, I do not deviate much from the approach of the Peripatetics (maʾkhadh al-mashshāʾīn). But I have set down in it points and subtleties (nukat wa-laṭāʾif) that hint at noble fundamentals (qawāʿid sharīfa) in addition to what they [the Peripatetics] mention. [T5b] If one gives up halfway after contemplating the books of the community (kutub al-qawm), satisfied with what others are not satisfied with, and if one is not skilful in the investigative sciences (al-ʿulūm al-baḥthiyya; i.e. Peripatetic-style philosophy), then there is no way for one to reach my book named Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. This book [al-Muṭāraḥāt] ought to be read before it [Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq] and after examining the handbook (mukhtaṣar) named al-Talwīḥāt. [T5c] We do not care about the order (al-tartīb) here, and we do not follow, in some places, the subject matter of a science (mawḍūʿ ʿilm). Rather, our purpose in this book is investigation (al-baḥth), though this may lead to fundamentals from scattered sciences (ʿulūm mutafarriqa). [ṬRḤ3 194.1–10] Al-Muṭāraḥāt, the longest systematic Peripatetic-style work of Suhrawardī, has the following features. According to [T5a], al-Muṭāraḥāt contains “studies and rules” that cannot be found in other books, and Illuminationist “points and subtleties”. Suhrawardī largely but not strictly follows “the approach of the Peripatetics”; many Illuminationist discussions are found in al-Muṭāraḥāt. 19

In the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh 9.6–7, §2], Suhrawardī writes: “Know, my brothers, it is your many suggestions [for me] (kathrat iqtirāḥikum) to write Ḥikmat al-­ Ishrāq that weakened my determination to refuse and dispelled my inclination to refrain from assistance.” We can see the motives of composing al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-­Ishrāq are similar—his brothers’ suggestions—but Suhrawardī’s attitudes are obviously different: willingness or even eagerness in al-Muṭāraḥāt but reluctance in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.

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According to [T5c], al-Muṭāraḥāt has a relatively free style: Suhrawardī does not confine himself to the normal order of presentation and, instead, offers interdisciplinary discussions that serve the purpose of the book: “investigation” (baḥth; see Section 2.1 for a discussion of the term). Therefore, the audience of al-Muṭāraḥāt are not beginners but intermediate learners of his ­Peripatetic-style philosophy. Another significant feature of al-Muṭāraḥāt is that it serves as a useful summary of the philosophical context of the 11th to 13th centuries because Suhrawardī interacts with many contemporary schools. He seems to have finished al-Muṭāraḥāt before completing Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, perhaps just a year or so before in 1185.20 The fact that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is mentioned twice in the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 194.7, 12] indicates that he had completed part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq before beginning al-Muṭāraḥāt. Based on [T5b], we can establish that al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and Ḥ ­ ikmat al-Ishrāq form one and the same Illuminationist project. Given that al-­Lamaḥāt contains references to al-Talwīḥāt and seems to summarize al-­Talwīḥāt and that al-Muqāwamāt serves as appendices of al-Talwīḥāt and seems to ­summarize al-Muṭāraḥāt, the complete Illuminationist project or syllabus must consist of the following five works: Al-Talwīḥāt (+ al-Lamaḥāt)—al-Muṭāraḥāt (+ al-Muqāwamāt)—Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq Given that the four Peripatetic-style works constitute an essential part of the Illuminationist project, they must all be Suhrawardī’s mature works and present his mature thought. Moreover, the correct way to read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is revealed in [T5b]: it must be read after one has systematically studied the Peripatetic-style works rather than alongside the mystical treatises. This is the way by which Ibn ­Kammūna interprets al-Talwīḥāt and how Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Many of the discussions in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq are unusually brief because the relevant discussions have already been presented in full in the Peripatetic-style works and because Suhrawardī takes for granted that readers 20

Fortunately enough, Suhrawardī explicitly mentions in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq the exact date when his masterpiece was finished: the sixth month of 582 AH [Ḥ.Sh 258.4–5, §279]. The date is 15 September 1186, according to Walbridge and Ziai, in Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, ed. and trans. John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Provo, Utah, 1999), p. 185, note 35; or 16 September 1186, according to Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, p. 15. Suhrawardī also mentions towards the end of al-Muṭāraḥāt that it was finished when he had nearly reached thirty [ṬRḤ3 505.9, §225]: around 1185, if he was born in 1155. So, al-Muṭāraḥāt seems to be finished around one year before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.

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of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq have already studied them carefully. In Ḥ ­ ikmat al-Ishrāq, the last book and the culmination of the Illuminationist project, Suhrawardī focuses on what matters the most, such as constructing his original Light Metaphysics. I show in Chapter 5, especially in sections 3 and 4, that Suhrawardī’s arguments there are rather elaborate. Now that I have explained the contents of the four Peripatetic-style works and that they and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq form the same Illuminationist project, I turn to explore the other question: how do they serve the Illuminationist project? 2 The Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination) Immediately following [Text 1] in the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 6] This is another path (siyāq ākhar) and a road that is shorter (aqrab), more ordered (anẓam), more accurate (aḍbaṭ), and much easier to acquire (aqall atʿāban fī l-taḥṣīl) than the method of the Peripatetics (ṭarīqat al-mashshāʾīn). It did not occur to me at first by thinking (fikr); 21 rather, its occurrence was by something else. Then I sought the proof (al-ḥujja) of it, until even if I disregarded the proof, for instance, no one would make me doubt it. [Ḥ.Sh 10.8–10, §3] Here Suhrawardī points out the fundamental difference between Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and the Peripatetic-style works. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq adopts another approach that is shorter, more ordered, more accurate, and much easier to acquire; moreover, the approach is secure against doubts and requires no proof. Later in the Introduction, Suhrawardī refers to this approach as “deification” (taʾalluh; lit. becoming godlike) and the Peripatetic approach as “investigation” (baḥth).22 21 22

In al-Lamaḥāt [LMḤ 176.3–4, §1], Suhrawardī writes: “Thinking here is the transition from the known to the unknown.” Sajjad H. Rizvi offers a useful remark on taʾalluh: “… Philosophizing is more than a ratiocinative discourse but is in fact closely associated with the practice of theosis (taʾalluh in Arabic) central to Neoplatonic conceptions of philosophy as a practice that seeks to invoke the divine through magical practices to understand reality. It also closely relates this practice to a prophetic inheritance and connects philosophizing to the Quranic notion.” “Philosophy as a Way of Life in the World of Islam: Applying Hadot to the Study

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Why does Suhrawardī use the term “deification” here? He might have been inspired by Plato’s emphasis in several dialogues that human beings should strive to become godlike; Suhrawardī also identifies Plato as the greatest representative of the deification approach.23 Moreover, the well-known definition of falsafa (philosophy) is particularly relevant to “deification”: “Philosophy is the imitation of God (al-tashabbuh bi-l-ilāh) according to the human capacity (bi-ḥasabi l-ṭāqa al-bashariyya) in order to achieve eternal happiness.” [Q.D 3.10–11] In the Introduction, Suhrawardī also mentions three common Sufi terms—“tasting” (dhawq), “unveiling” (mukāshafa), and “witnessing” (mushāhada)—that are synonymous with “deification”. 2.1 Deification (taʾalluh) and Investigation (baḥth) What do “deification” and “investigation” refer to exactly? While I answer the question in full detail in Chapter 2, the words refer to two epistemologies: ­Illuminationist presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) and Peripatetic formal knowledge (ʿilm ṣūrī).24 Here, I offer a brief sketch of Suhrawardī’s famous “Story and Dream” (ḥikāya wa-manām) of Aristotle,25 which Suhrawardī introduces in the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt III.1 “On apprehension and immateriality” [LWḤ3 §55, 70–74], to explain the relation between deification and investigation (i.e. between presential knowledge and formal knowledge). Moreover, this story or dream is

23 24

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of Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1635)”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 75, no. 1 (2012), 42. See John M. Armstrong, “After the Ascent: Plato on Becoming Like God”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004), 171–83. Cf. Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Reason (ʿaql) and Direct Intuition (mushāhada) in the Works of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191)”, in Reason and Inspiration in Islam: ­Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim Thought, ed. Todd Lawson (London, 2005), pp. 221–34. It is unclear whether this “Aristotle” is the real Aristotle or the pseudo-Aristotle (­presumably, the “Aristotle” of The Theology of Aristotle, who is the Arabic Plotinus). I, ­however, doubt whether Suhrawardī already has this distinction in mind; the “Aristotle” in Suhrawardī’s dream might indeed be the real Aristotle. Marco Di Branco suggests: “Obviously, the ‘Aristotle’ of Suhrawardī’s dream is nobody if not … the ‘Aristotle’ who emerges from Ibn Sīnā’s reading and re-working of the Aristotelian tradition: a character, created by the Arab falāsifa who combined, both in the formative period of falsafa and in its mature developments, some genuine elements of Aristotle’s own thought and some fundamentally Neoplatonic traits.” “The ‘Perfect King’ and his Philosophers: Politics, ­Religion and Graeco-Arabic Philosophy in Safavid Iran: The Case of the Uṯūlūǧiyā”, Studia graeco-arabica 4 (2014), 203–4; cf. Gerhard Endress, “Platonizing Aristotle: The Concept of ‘Spiritual’ (rūḥānī) as a Keyword of the Neoplatonic Strand in Early Arabic Aristotelianism”, Studia graeco-arabica 2 (2012), 265–79.

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very closely connected to the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; they should be read together. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī reports that he had been greatly troubled by “the problem of knowledge” (masʾalat al-ʿilm) but could not find answers in the books until Aristotle appeared in front of him in a dreamlike vision. ­Aristotle instructed him to “go back to yourself” (irjiʿ ilā nafsika), guided him step by step to reflect upon self-apprehension (al-idrāk lil-dhāt), and eventually, helped him grasp the true nature of knowledge (ʿilm) or understanding (taʿaqqul): “Understanding is the presence of a thing to an immaterial self (ḥuḍūr al-shayʾ lil-dhāt al-mujarrada ʿan al-mādda).” [LWḤ3 72.1–2, §55] “The problem of knowledge” that troubled Suhrawardī was, in fact, his doubts about Peripatetic formal knowledge. According to Avicenna, knowledge is “the grasping of the form of the apprehended (akhdh ṣūrat al-mudrak)”.26 But given that every form (ṣūra) in the mind is universal (in the sense that it does not make impossible the participation [al-sharika] of multiple things in itself) and that everything in the real world is particular (in the sense that things make impossible the participation in themselves), Suhrawardī doubted how we could know particulars in the most accurate manner by their universal forms. Moreover, in his later works, Avicenna himself advances the important concept of “primitive self-awareness” (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt) and argues that it must not occur by means of any form. This concept, however, obviously does not fit the framework of formal knowledge. And this is exactly Suhrawardī’s starting point. By analysing self-apprehension (or self-awareness) in detail, Suhrawardī comes to realize that human beings can certainly understand particulars unmediatedly and as they are; that is, one can understand particulars without any forms as intermediaries as long as those particulars are present. When the objects of knowledge are absent (because of the limitations of human cognitive power), we resort to their forms to know them. The self-apprehension of every human being is the paradigmatic case of presential knowledge: I know my self (dhāt) simply because of its presence or, to be exact, its non-absence (ʿadam ghayba). Self-apprehension is the most real and accurate knowledge that human beings have. My unmediated knowledge of my own body and bodily faculties and my sense perceptions are also presential knowledge. Therefore, presential knowledge exists. 26

Avicenna, Al-Najāt min al-Gharaq fī Baḥr al-Ḍalālāt [The Salvation from Drowning in the Sea of Errors], ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh (Tehran, 1985), p. 344.3. I cite Dānishpazhūh’s edition and consult Fakhry’s edition: Avicenna, Kitāb al-Najāt fī l-Ḥikma al-Manṭiqiyya wa-l-Ṭabīʿiyya wa-l-Ilāhiyya [The Book of Salvation in the Wisdom of Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics], ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut, 1982).

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Based on the ordinary presential knowledge that we already have, philosophers such as Suhrawardī naturally consider the possibility of presential knowledge at higher levels, presential knowledge of immaterial particulars— God and separate intellects—beyond this material world. If we were somehow to break through the limitations of our knowledge and thereby have God and intellects unmediatedly present to us in a way similar to how we are present to our selves, then we should be able to know them in a similarly unmediated and presential manner. This presential knowledge is, therefore, also described as “spiritual observations” (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) [Ḥ.Sh 156.8, §165] and is similar to astronomical observations. Needless to say, this approach to knowing God and intellects can be expected to be “shorter, more ordered, more accurate, and much easier to acquire” than Peripatetic formal knowledge, which requires conceptions, definitions, assents, demonstrations, and the like. Moreover, this approach is secure against doubts and requires no proof. This is also the “tasting”, “unveiling”, and “witnessing” of Sufism, at least as Suhrawardī interprets them. Therefore, the starting point of Suhrawardī is not mysticism; rather, it is profound philosophical reflection and consideration. By constructing the theory of presential knowledge, Suhrawardī not only provides philosophical justification for Sufi epistemology but renders it a legitimate tool for philosophical investigation. 2.2 The Ranking of Philosophers Towards the end of the “Story and Dream”, Aristotle praises his teacher Plato so highly that Suhrawardī feels bewildered. [Text 7] I said: Does anyone of the philosophers of Islam (falāsifat al-islām) reach him [Plato]? He said: No, not a thousandth of his rank. Then I enumerated a group of the most well-known philosophers, but he did not pay attention to them. When I went back to Abū Yazīd al-Basṭāmī (d. 874), Abū Muḥammad Sahl b. ʿAbdallāh al-Tustarī (d. 896), and others,27 he appeared to be delighted and said: Those are philosophers (al-falāsifa) and wisemen (al-ḥukamāʾ) in the real sense. They did 27

Corbin remarks very helpfully: “At the root of the tree [of the oriental wisdom] we find Hermes as the father of all sages. Then there are the two main branches” (Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 24–25). This wisdom is transmitted respectively to Basṭāmī on the “oriental side” from the ancient Persian sages and to Tustarī on the “occidental side” from the ancient Greek sages. For a detailed discussion, see pp. 15–26.

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not stop at descriptive knowledge (al-ʿilm al-rasmī; i.e. formal knowledge) but arrived at connecting, witnessing presential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī al-ittiṣālī al-shuhūdī). [LWḤ3 74.1–6, §55] The close relation between this passage and the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-­ Ishrāq is obvious. First, in both places, Suhrawardī confirms the superior rank of Plato. Secondly, we can establish now that “deification” and “investigation” in the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq refer respectively to Illuminationist presential knowledge (which is also Suhrawardī’s philosophical interpretation of Sufi epistemology) and Peripatetic formal knowledge. Moreover, Suhrawardī proposes a ranking of Islamic philosophers: Sufis are the real philosophers, and their rank is superior to the Peripatetics. Strikingly, the complete version of this ranking is found in the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and is based on the distinction between deification and investigation: [Text 8] [T8a] The ranks (al-marātib) are many and they [philosophers] belong to various classes (ṭabaqāt),28 which are as follows: [3] divine philosophers (ḥakīm ilāhī) proficient in deification (mutawaghghil fī l-taʾalluh) but lacking investigation (ʿadīm al-baḥth); [5] investigative philosophers (ḥakīm baḥḥāth) lacking deification; [1] divine philosophers proficient in deification and investigation; [2] divine philosophers proficient in deification but average or weak in investigation (mutawassiṭ fī l-baḥth aw ḍaʿīfuhu); [4] philosophers proficient in investigation but average or weak in deification; [6] seekers (ṭālib) of deification and investigation; [7] seekers of deification only; [8] seekers of investigation only. [T8b] If it happens in a time that there is a philosopher proficient in deification and investigation, then he has the leadership (al-riʾāsa) and he is the caliph of God. If it does not happen, then a philosopher proficient in deification but average in investigation [has the leadership and he is the caliph of God]. If it still does not happen, then a philosopher proficient in deification but lacking investigation [has the leadership] and he is the caliph of God. The earth (al-arḍ) will never be without someone proficient in deification. There is no leadership on the earth of God for an investigator (al-bāḥith) proficient in investigation but not proficient in deification. [Ḥ.Sh 11.12–12.8, §5]

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I presume that “classes” (ṭabaqāt) refer to the three broad categories: divine philosophers, philosophers, and seekers. These “classes” are subdivided into eight “ranks” (marātib).

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Based on their proficiency in deification and investigation, philosophers (and would-be philosophers) are ranked as follows: [1] Divine philosophers proficient in both deification and investigation [2] Divine philosophers proficient in deification but average or weak in investigation [3] Divine philosophers proficient in deification but lacking investigation (the Sufis) [4] Philosophers proficient in investigation but average or weak in ­deification [5] Philosophers proficient in investigation but lacking deification (the ­Peripatetics) [6] Seekers of both deification and investigation [7] Seekers of deification only [8] Seekers of investigation only The primary criterion of Suhrawardī’s ranking is a philosopher’s proficiency in deification: whether one is proficient in deification, capable of it but not proficient (i.e. average or weak), or completely lacking it. The secondary criterion is their proficiency in investigation. Suhrawardī uses the honorific of “divine philosopher” (ḥakīm ilāhī) for those among the first three ranks because they are all proficient in deification or Illuminationist presential knowledge. Divine philosophers are further divided into three ranks: the first rank is the Illuminationist ideal, and Suhrawardī himself obviously belongs to this rank; the third rank refers specifically to the Sufis. Here, we again see that Suhrawardī’s ideal is beyond that of being a Sufi: investigation is crucial as well. Non-divine philosophers, who are proficient in investigation but not in deification, are below divine philosophers. The Peripatetics are ranked only in the fifth position because they completely lack deification and do not know about presential knowledge. Those who belong to the last three ranks, strictly speaking, should be called “seekers” or “students” (sing. ṭālib) rather than “philosophers”. Divine philosophers are entitled to the leadership and being the caliph of God because the caliphate must be received directly from God (min al-­ talaqqī).29 Suhrawardī points out that what he means by “leadership” here is not political (i.e. not taghallub; lit. conquering). Even when a divine philosopher is “hidden” (khafī) and “extremely unknown” (fī ghāyat al-khumūl), he 29

Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, p. 45.

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still has the leadership and is “the pole” (al-quṭb). If he indeed has political leadership, it is the age of light (nūrī); otherwise, it is the age of darkness. Here, one might be reminded of Plato’s “philosopher-kings” in the Republic30 and, particularly, of similar ideas in Shīʿism.31 2.3 The Contents of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq Towards the end of the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 9] [T9a] This book of ours is for [6] seekers of [both] deification and investigation; [5+8] an investigator who lacks deification or does not seek ­deification has no share in it. We only discuss in this book and between its lines with [4] those who strive for deification (al-mujtahid al-­ mutaʾallih) or [6] seek deification. … [5+8] Whoever wants investigation alone should follow the method of the Peripatetics because it is good and accurate for investigation alone. We do not speak or discuss with them about the I­ lluminationist fundamentals (al-qawāʿid al-ishrāqiyya). … [T9b] Just as we witness the sensibles and are certain of some of their states (aḥwāl), and then we build upon them valid sciences, such as astronomy (al-hayʾa) and so on, we likewise witness things from the spirituals (al-rūḥāniyyāt), and then we build upon them. [Ḥ.Sh 12.15–13.7, §6] Following the ranking of philosophers, Suhrawardī specifies the intended audience of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Its main audience are seekers of both deification and investigation in rank [6] as well as philosophers proficient in investigation but average or weak in deification in rank [4], who seem to be the referents of “those who strive for deification”. Nonetheless, seekers of deification alone in rank [7], who are not mentioned in the passage, presumably should follow the pure Sufi approach. Those who belong to rank [5], investigative philosophers who lack deification and seek no deification (the Peripatetics), and to rank [8], seekers of investigation alone, should not read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Instead, they should confine themselves to Suhrawardī’s four Peripatetic-style works.

30 31

See Rosamond Kent Sprague, Plato’s Philosopher-King (Columbia, South Carolina, 1976). For a detailed discussion, see Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 43–51. Corbin remarks: “Even in time of occultation (ghayba), he remains the Pole, because there is no need for human recognition in order for him to be what he is, and his being is not fulfilled in any social function, but in a metaphysical and sacral one. There is nothing to transpose in the expressions: what the Ishrāqiyyūn [Illuminationists] say about the ‘Pole’ agrees literally with what the Shīʿites say about the Imām, who is exactly the ‘Pole’. After all, ishrāqī [­Illuminationist] philosophy prospered in the Shīʿite milieu” (p. 46, note 41).

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Suhrawardī notes that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq would not benefit those in ranks [5] and [8] and might even cause them to doubt because they know nothing about deification and do not seek deification. Given that divine philosophers already are proficient in deification, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq would not benefit them much either. In addition, [T9b] clarifies the notion of “the noble sciences” (al-ʿulūm al-sharīfa) [ṬRḤ3 505.11, §225], which I mentioned in the Introduction. These sciences are those that are built upon the presential knowledge, or the “spiritual observations”, of the spirituals (i.e. God and separate intellects), just as astronomy is built upon the observations of the heavenly bodies. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, therefore, is the ultimate integration of deification and investigation: Suhrawardī uses the rational investigation approach (i.e. ­conceptions, definitions, assents, and demonstrations) to expound a superior wisdom that is only attainable through the supra-rational deification approach. The fundamental difference between Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and Sufi mystical works, therefore, is that the former is filled with rigorous philosophical concepts and arguments. The purpose of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is to build the noble sciences, and this must be achieved through rational investigation. Before Suhrawardī, the Sufis only attended to deification but lacked investigation, while the Peripatetics attended to investigation but knew nothing about deification. The true significance of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism, therefore, is that it has integrated these two approaches and wisdoms perfectly. This idea of combining deification and investigation is so powerful that Toshihiko Izutsu has argued that Suhrawardī inaugurated a new era of Islamic philosophy. Izutsu calls this tradition “Ḥikmat philosophy”, and some scholars regard the tradition as the “true” Islamic philosophy.32 By first formulating the “formal structure” of the Ḥikmat-type of thinking—“a perfect fusion of mystical experience and analytical thinking”— Suhrawardī should be understood as the founder of “Ḥikmat philosophy”; Islamic Existentialist philosophers, such as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1636) and Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1873), follow his lead in fusing mystical experience and analytical thinking.33 3

The Functions of the Four Peripatetic-Style Works

We are now in a better position to answer the how-question: how do the four Peripatetic-style works serve the Illuminationist project? The first answer involves Suhrawardī’s reconstruction of the best possible Peripatetic-style philosophy. This is why I use “Peripatetic-style works” 32 33

Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, pp. xv–xvi; Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, p. 56. Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 59–62.

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rather than “Peripatetic works”. The philosophy contained in these works is not Avicennian Peripatetic philosophy but a critique, correction, and reconstruction of it. Undoubtedly, Suhrawardī accepts the Peripatetic investigation approach and acknowledges the tremendous contributions of Avicenna. This acceptance, however, does not mean that Suhrawardī believes there are no fundamental fallacies in Avicennism. Suhrawardī, as someone who has already mastered deification and now examines Avicennism from a higher perspective, knows perfectly well what ought to be kept, what must be abandoned or corrected, and what is missing, just as the prisoner who has returned to the cave knows perfectly well what is true and what is false in the prisoners’ cave philosophy. That is, he is “completing (tatmīm), elevating (tafrīʿ), and correcting (tahdhīb) the methods of the Peripatetics” [ṬRḤ3 195, footnote]. As a result of this process, his Peripatetic-style philosophy is a philosophy that is essentially consistent with Illuminationism but is reached only through the Peripatetic investigation approach. It, therefore, can be regarded as entry-level Illuminationism. Note that my argument here is more radical than simply claiming that these works are a refinement or development of Avicennism. Instead, these works are Illuminationist in nature. For example, by formulating the theory of presential knowledge, Suhrawardī replaces Peripatetic formal (ṣūrī) epistemology and thereby answers the problems about the nature of knowledge, human beings’ knowledge of particulars, and God’s knowledge of particulars. (This is the topic of Chapter 2.) Moreover, he spends many pages arguing against the real existence of mental considerations (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya), including existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, genera, species, and differentiae (and thus, common natures in Avicennism). Thus, he criticizes the Peripatetic real quiddity/essence–­ existence distinction and other similar real distinctions, and their Realist ­theory of universals. (I discuss these topics in Chapters 3 and 4.) The second answer is that Suhrawardī offers the best possible Peripateticstyle philosophy for the philosophy community. By composing the four ­Peripatetic-style works, Suhrawardī comprehensively expounds “the common ­philosophy for all investigators” (al-ḥikma al-ʿāmma li-jamīʿ al-bāḥithīn) [ṬRḤ3 195, footnote].34 They are “the books of the community” (kutub al-qawm) [ṬRḤ3 194.5–6]. They are suitable for study by people of all intellectual levels. Suhrawardī, as someone who has returned to the cave, has not forgotten his 34

“The common philosophy” is intended for the philosophy community as a whole; by contrast, “the special philosophy” (al-ḥikma al-khāṣṣa), i.e. Illuminationist philosophy, is intended only for those of higher intellectual levels and who seek both deification and investigation.

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fellow prisoners and brings with him a precious gift, the best philosophy inside the cave. The third answer is that the four Peripatetic-style works are an invitation to potential Illuminationists. By deliberately setting down “points and subtleties that hint at noble fundamentals” [ṬRḤ3 194.4–5], Suhrawardī aims to help as many “seekers” and “investigators” as possible so they can master the best Peripatetic-style philosophy and he can simultaneously guide them in their realization of the fundamental problems of Avicennism and the deficiencies of the Peripatetic approach. The works serve as an invitation to pursue, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, the superior ­wisdom, “the noble sciences”, which is the ultimate integration of deification and investigation. 4

Summary of Chapter 1

I have answered a what-question and a how-question regarding Suhrawardī’s four Peripatetic-style works: What are the contents of these works? How do they serve the Illuminationist project? First, by analysing the Introductions to the four Peripatetic-style works, I have answered the what-question. Al-Talwīḥāt is Suhrawardī’s first systematic Peripatetic-style work; al-Lamaḥāt summarizes the work and al-Muqāwamāt serves as its appendices. Al-Muṭāraḥāt is his second and longest systematic Peripatetic-style work. In its Introduction, Suhrawardī specifies the exact order for studying his works: al-Talwīḥāt, then al-Muṭāraḥāt, and lastly Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Thus, the four Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq together form the same Illuminationist project. By carefully analysing the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, I then addressed the how-question. Suhrawardī merely follows the rational investigation (baḥth) approach when composing the Peripatetic-style works, whereas ­Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is based on the supra-rational deification (taʾalluh) approach. By considering the “Story and Dream” of Aristotle in al-Talwīḥāt, I have argued that deification and investigation refer to Illuminationist presential knowledge and Peripatetic formal knowledge, respectively. According to the proficiency in deification and investigation, Suhrawardī ranks philosophers into eight tiers. The audience of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, which is the ultimate integration of deification and investigation, are limited to those who seek both deification and investigation. Those who only seek investigation ought to study Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works. In the Illuminationist project, the four Peripatetic-style works mainly serve three functions. First, they offer a reconstruction of the best possible

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Peripatetic-style philosophy. Suhrawardī, in fact, criticizes, corrects, and ­reconstructs Avicennism, the result of which is an entry-level Illuminationist philosophy and the best “common philosophy for all investigators”. This is the real significance and value of these works; they are indispensable and crucial for understanding the true nature of Illuminationism. Second, they are Suhrawardī’s gift for the philosophy community so that students of all intellectual levels can find the most suitable textbook and learn the best “philosophy inside the cave”. Third, they serve as an invitation to potential Illuminationists. By deliberately leaving Illuminationist hints throughout these works, Suhrawardī guides potential Illuminationists to reach for the heights of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and pursue the superior “wisdom outside the cave”. That the four Peripatetic-style works form an essential part of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project should be evident. It should also be evident that the true nature of Illuminationism is more philosophical than it is mystical. But what is its philosophical nature? In Chapter 2, I reveal the nature of ­Illuminationism by examining its epistemological foundation.

chapter 2

Presential Knowledge and the Nature of Illuminationist Philosophy As I outlined in Chapter 1, section 2, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī adopts the ­deification (taʾalluh) approach, which is shorter, more ordered, more accurate, and much easier to acquire than the method of the Peripatetics. Moreover, the deification approach is secure against doubts and requires no proof [Ḥ.Sh 10.8–10, §3]. I then argued that this deification approach refers to “Illuminationist presential knowledge” (ʿilm ishrāqī ḥuḍūrī).1 In this chapter, I analyse the epistemological foundation of Illuminationism: presential knowledge. In contrast to “formal knowledge” (ʿilm ṣūrī)2 with which the Peripatetics are mainly concerned, Suhrawardī first introduces presential knowledge—a new type of knowledge—in the dialogue between him and Aristotle in the “Story and Dream” (ḥikāya wa-manām) on the nature of knowledge (ʿilm), or apprehension (idrāk), in al-Talwīḥāt.3 After establishing presential knowledge, Suhrawardī argues that it must be the very kind of knowledge that God has. The discussion in al-Talwīḥāt is then fleshed out in al-Muṭāraḥāt in the same 1 I use “presential” to render ḥuḍūrī, which is the adjective form of ḥuḍūr (presence). Most scholars render ʿilm ḥuḍūrī as “knowledge by presence”, but this, in my opinion, is inaccurate. According to Suhrawardī, knowledge is the very presence of an object to an immaterial ­subject that has illumination, so knowledge is not by presence but the presence itself. Note that the term ḥuḍūr is already used by Avicenna in his analysis of self-awareness; see Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt [The Notes], ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Beirut, 1973), p. 148.15–16. I cite Badawī’s edition and consult Mousavian’s edition: Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, ed. Seyyed Hossein Mousavian (Tehran, 2013). 2 I render ʿilm ṣūrī as “formal knowledge” (corresponding to “presential knowledge”), and “­formal” here means “pertaining to the form”. Note that formal knowledge is indeed by the form; by contrast, presential knowledge is not by presence but the presence itself. In this sense, ʿilm ṣūrī is not a phrase that corresponds directly to ʿilm ḥuḍūrī; ʿilm ḥuṣūlī (occurrential knowledge, or knowledge as occurrence) is, although, as far as I know, Suhrawardī himself does not use this phrase. 3 The Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt III.1 “On apprehension and immateriality” [LWḤ3 §55, 70–74]. In Avicenna’s epistemology, “apprehension” (idrāk) refers to knowledge in general, including external and internal sense perceptions and intellectual understanding (ʿaql). Cf. Heidrun Eichner, “‘Knowledge by Presence’, Apperception and the Mind-Body Relationship: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Suhrawardī as Representatives and Precursors of a Thirteenth-Century Discussion”, in In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century, ed. Peter Adamson (London, 2011), pp. 122–23. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_004

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context: an investigation of the nature of knowledge in general and God’s knowledge in particular.4 He also discusses presential knowledge in different places in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq5 and mentions the theory briefly in al-Lamaḥāt.6 Presential knowledge has been widely discussed from various angles, but scholars disagree about how to interpret it. Corbin and Nasr are concerned primarily with its mystical aspects.7 In the past few decades, scholars have begun to attend to Suhrawardī’s philosophical motives for holding the theory and to study its historical context: the reception of Avicennian philosophy in the 12th and 13th centuries.8 My first aim in this chapter is to demystify Suhrawardī’s theory of presential knowledge. It is essentially not a mystical theory of knowledge but a philosophical one, although the highest level of presential knowledge is somewhat mystical and is linked to Sufism. Suhrawardī formulates it as a comprehensive explanation of the nature of all sorts of knowledge: knowledge is the presence (ḥuḍūr) of an object to an immaterial subject that has illumination. His purpose is to replace Avicenna’s conception of formal knowledge: knowledge is the occurring (ḥuṣūl) or imprinting (inṭibāʿ) of the form of an object in a subject. To be more specific, presential knowledge is Suhrawardī’s attempt to answer problems regarding the nature of human knowledge in general and how human beings know particulars (see Section 1.1 and Section 3). Suhrawardī further appeals to the theory to explain God’s knowledge, especially how God knows particulars (Section 4). Moreover, the theory frees Avicenna’s notion of primitive self-awareness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt; PSA)—itself a brilliant epistemological insight—from the Aristotelian epistemological framework (Section 1.2).9 That is,­ 4 The Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt VII.1 “On apprehension and knowledge” [ṬRḤ3 §§208–11, 483–89]. 5 For example, two arguments regarding self-apprehension can be found in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq II.1.6; in both I.3.3.9 and II.2.4, Suhrawardī discusses visual perception; in II.2.10, he discusses God’s knowledge. See my reconstruction in this chapter (Section 2 to Section 4). 6 The Metaphysics of al-Lamaḥāt II.4 [LMḤ §§123–25, 284–85]. 7 See, for example, Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 27–51; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Chicago, 2001), pp. 328–30. 8 Heidrun Eichner holds that Suhrawardī advances presential knowledge to solve the ­problem of the mind–body relation in Avicenna’s epistemology, while Jari Kaukua rejects Eichner’s interpretation and argues that Suhrawardī addresses the problems related to God’s ­knowledge of particulars. See Eichner, “Knowledge by Presence”; Jari Kaukua, “Suhrawardī’s Knowledge as Presence in Context”, Studia Orientalia 114 (2013), 309–24; Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 124–60. 9 I borrow the phrase “primitive self-awareness” from Jari Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity: A Philosophical Study (Jyväskylä, 2007), and Deborah L. Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows”, in The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition, ed. Shahid Rahman, Tony Street, and Hassan Tahiri (Dordrecht, 2008), pp. 63–87.

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presential knowledge allows Suhrawardī to develop the notion of PSA to its full potential. Although presential knowledge eventually leads to a kind of mystical knowledge (i.e. the highest-level presential knowledge), this can be explained in philosophical terms (Section 5.3). Suhrawardī firmly believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are, in fact, particulars rather than universals; his ambition, therefore, is to break through the limitations of human knowledge and to know all real particulars (both material and immaterial particulars) unmediatedly10 and as they are. The presential knowledge of the immaterial particulars—God and separate intellects—is what Suhrawardī means by “spiritual observations” (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) and how he interprets the “tasting” (dhawq), “unveiling” (mukāshafa), and “witnessing” (mushāhada) of Sufism. Moreover, as I argue in this chapter, presential knowledge is the epistemological foundation of Illuminationism (and not merely a solution to the problem regarding God’s knowledge of particulars).11 Lastly, I reveal the true nature of Illuminationism from an epistemological perspective. Some scholars share a somewhat traditional misinterpretation of Suhrawardī and think that presential knowledge is the same as self-knowledge.12 This misinterpretation involves the assumption that presential knowledge is Avicennian because it is obviously based on Avicenna’s PSA (see Sections 1.2 and 2.1). However, self-apprehension is one type of presential knowledge and, according to the relevant passages in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī considers at least three other kinds: the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties, the apprehension of pain caused by amputation, and visual perception. Moreover, I argue that Suhrawardī’s epistemology is essentially not Avicennian because the epistemologies are based on two fundamentally incompatible assumptions: Avicenna believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are universals, whereas Suhrawardī holds that they are particulars. 10 11 12

When I describe presential knowledge as “unmediated”, I mean specifically that it is not mediated by any form. Presential knowledge can be mediated by sense organs, insofar as sense perception is also a sort of presential knowledge (see Section 5.1 for detail). Kaukua argues that, by introducing presential knowledge, which is not a new type of knowledge, Suhrawardī aims to explain God’s knowledge of particulars better; see “Suhrawardī’s Knowledge as Presence”, pp. 315–16. See, for example, Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence (Albany, New York, 1992), pp. 1–3, 43–56; Mehdi Aminrazavi, Suhrawardi and School of Illumination, pp. 102–17; “How Ibn Sīnian Is Suhrawardī’s Theory of Knowledge?” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 2 (2003), 207–10; Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Irjā‘ ilā Nafsi-ka: Suhrawardī’s Apperception of the Self in Light of Avicenna”, Transcendent Philosophy 1 (2004), 1–22.

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chapter 2 The Context of the Theory of Presential Knowledge

Suhrawardī introduces the theory of presential knowledge against the ­background of the reception of Avicennian philosophy in the 12th and 13th centuries; in particular, he is dissatisfied with Avicenna’s explanation of the nature of knowledge, or apprehension (idrāk). This dissatisfaction is also found in the work of Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165) and Suhrawardī’s schoolmate Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210).13 1.1 Two Problems with Avicenna’s Formal Knowledge Avicenna writes in al-Najāt (The Salvation): “It seems that every apprehension is the grasping of the form of the apprehended (akhdh ṣūrat al-mudrak).”14 Likewise, in al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt (The Pointers and Reminders), he writes that “the apprehension of a thing is that its reality (ḥaqīqa) becomes an image (mutamaththila; or represented) in an apprehender” and that “the image of the thing’s reality” is “not different from that thing”.15 Therefore, apprehension involves the grasping of the corresponding form or image of the apprehended or, in other words, the occurrence (ḥuṣūl) or the imprinting (inṭibāʿ) of the form. Suhrawardī, therefore, refers to this epistemology as “formal knowledge” (ʿilm ṣūrī). Commenting on al-Ishārāt, Rāzī, however, finds Avicenna’s account of apprehension so unsatisfactory that he argues against it for more than ten pages.16 Know that there are people who reject [the idea] that the occurrence of apprehension and sense perception depends on the occurrence of the quiddity of the apprehended in the apprehender (ḥuṣūl māhiyyat al-mudrak fī l-mudrik). They prove this by an argument that applies ­generally to intellectual and sensory apprehensions and several arguments that apply specifically to each one of those apprehensions.17 13

14 15 16 17

On Abū l-Barakāt’s critique of Avicennian epistemology and his possible impact on Rāzī and Suhrawardī, see Fedor Benevich, “Perceiving Things in Themselves: Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī’s Critique of Representationalism”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2020), 229–64. Avicenna, Al-Najāt, p. 344.3. Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, Namaṭ III.7, ed. Jacques Forget (Leiden, 1892), p. 122.5–11. I cite Forget’s edition and consult Zāriʿī’s edition: Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt wa-l-­ Tanbīhāt, ed. Mujtabā al-Zāriʿī (Qom, 2013). Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, vol. 2, ed. ʿAlī Riḍā Najafzādah (Tehran, 2005), pp. 219.2–233.13. For a discussion of Rāzī’s arguments, see Eichner, “Knowledge by Presence”, pp. 122–27. Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 2, p. 219.2–4.

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As reported by Rāzī, some philosophers disapprove of Avicenna’s account of apprehension. Obviously, Suhrawardī is one of them, and he finds two problems with it. First, Suhrawardī does not think that Avicenna’s formal knowledge applies generally to all sorts of human knowledge. At least four kinds of apprehension are not formal knowledge: self-apprehension, the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties, the apprehension of pain caused by amputation, and visual perception. According to Suhrawardī, these apprehensions have one thing in common: none of them require forms as intermediaries. Rather, they occur simply because of the presence (or, in the case of self-apprehension, non-absence; see Section 3.1) of the very object of apprehension. Suhrawardī is, therefore, prompted to devise another, more comprehensive account of apprehension. The second problem is that formal knowledge cannot adequately explain how human beings know particulars. According to Avicenna, human souls are in principle intellects, so the proper objects of human knowledge are universals. Human beings, however, are not merely intellects but souls that dominate bodies and bodily faculties and that engage with the material world. So they can apprehend particulars as well, though in a universal manner: the aggregate or bundle of universal forms with “the reference to an individualized intention” (al-ishāra ilā maʿnan mutashakhkhiṣ) or, to borrow Kaukua’s phrase, “an ostensive reference to unique spatiotemporal co-ordinates, which are the foundation of the individuality of material entities”.18 Suhrawardī is fully aware of Avicenna’s solution; in al-Talwīḥāt, he paraphrases it before introducing ­presential knowledge. [Text 1] [T1a] Know that it is permissible that the [human] soul knows particulars in a universal manner (ʿalā wajh kullī). For example, it knows Zayd by [the fact] that he is tall, black, and the son of someone, insofar as those universals do not exist simultaneously (mujtamiʿa) in anyone else. [T1b] But despite that, the meaning (mafhūm) of the aggregate of those universals itself does not make impossible the participation in itself (al-sharika fī-hi) from happening; if the impossibility of the participation is presumed, then it is because of a hindrance (māniʿ) that is not the meaning [itself]. Let this be a rule for you. [LWḤ3 69.12–15, §54] 18

Avicenna, Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Madkhal [The Healing: Logic: Isagoge], ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al. (1952; repr. Qom, 2012), p. 70.11–12. I cite Madkūr’s edition and consult Di Vincenzo’s edition: Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge, ed. and trans. Silvia Di Vincenzo (Berlin, 2021). See Kaukua, “Suhrawardī’s Knowledge as Presence”, p. 312.

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In [T1a], although Suhrawardī accepts Avicenna’s solution that human beings can know particulars in a universal manner (i.e. by their corresponding forms), he does not think that this formal knowledge accurately reflects the particulars themselves. As Suhrawardī explains at [T1b], no form, be it a simple form or an aggregate of forms, by itself makes impossible “the participation in itself”. That is to say, the form can be shared by multiple things, unless some external hindrance (māniʿ) stops the sharing from happening. For example, multiple individuals, such as Zayd’s twin brothers, might share the form of Zayd—being “tall, black, and the son of someone”—unless we know for a fact that Zayd is the only son, a fact that serves as an external hindrance. Moreover, we can always imagine multiple twin brothers of Zayd in the mind. By contrast, a real particular by itself makes impossible the participation in itself. In short, I can indeed know Zayd in a universal manner by grasping him as a bundle of universals. I, however, should also be able to know Zayd unmediatedly and as he is, as a unique and particular individual. Formal knowledge cannot explain the latter case. Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are particulars rather than universals. Human beings can certainly know particulars unmediatedly and as they are as long as those particulars are present (or not absent). Only when an object is absent do we require its universal form as an intermediary to know it (see Section 3). 1.2 Avicenna’s Primitive Self-Awareness as the Starting Point As I discussed in Chapter 1, section 2, Suhrawardī recounts in the “Story and Dream” that he was greatly troubled by “the problem of knowledge” and his doubts about Avicennian formal knowledge. At the very beginning of the dialogue on the nature of knowledge, Aristotle says: [Text 2] Go back to yourself (irjiʿ ilā nafsika), and then it [the problem of knowledge (masʾalat al-ʿilm)] will be solved for you. [LWḤ3 70.7, §55] “Go back to yourself” is strongly reminiscent of Avicenna’s identical first sentence of al-Ishārāt, Namaṭ III, in which Avicenna also begins with PSA.19 Thus, Suhrawardī seems aware of that discussion and may have used it as his own starting point for constructing his theory of presential knowledge. In other words, Suhrawardī realizes that humans can know at least one 19

Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, p. 119.2.

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particular thing unmediatedly: the self. Based on a comprehensive analysis of self-­apprehension, he further argues that we can know unmediatedly many more particulars as they are. Moreover, particulars, rather than universals, are indeed the proper objects of human knowledge. The self-apprehension (al-idrāk lil-dhāt) on which Suhrawardī starts his discussion (see Section 2.1) is, in fact, Avicenna’s epistemological insight.20 Scholars recently have come to appreciate the significance of Avicenna’s PSA (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt).21 I argue that a purpose of Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge is to free Avicenna’s PSA from its Aristotelian epistemological framework and to develop the full potential of this brilliant epistemological innovation. Deborah Black reads Aristotle as holding that self-knowledge is “derivative upon knowledge of other things” or “concomitant with its awareness of an object”.22 Peter Adamson writes that The idea here would seem to be that the human intellect can always grasp itself as that which is grasping something else; thus if I think about what triangle is, I can also grasp my mind as the subject of that thought.23 The human soul is a potential intellect at first, a pure capacity that has no nature of its own; “until the intellect has been actualized by some object, there is nothing for it to reflect upon”.24 Avicenna, however, departs from Aristotle in formulating PSA, which is first introduced in the famous Flying Man thought experiment.25 Consider the thought experiment, which I paraphrase for length and clarity. 20

21 22 23 24 25



Haruo Kobayashi, “Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī on Self-Consciousness: Some Comparative Remarks”, Orient 26 (1990), 62–77; Marcotte, “Irjā‘ ilā Nafsi-ka”; Jari Kaukua, “I in the Light of God: Selfhood and Self-Awareness in Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq”, in In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century, ed. Peter Adamson (London, 2011), pp. 141–57; Self-Awareness, pp. 104–13. See Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness”; Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity; Self-­Awareness. Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness”, pp. 63, 66. Peter Adamson, “The Simplicity of Self-Knowledge after Avicenna”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28 (2018), 260. Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness”, p. 63. The Flying Man first appears in Avicenna’s al-Shifāʾ: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt: al-Nafs (The Healing: Physics: De Anima), see Avicenna’s De Anima (Arabic Text): Being the Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā’, ed. F. Rahman (London, 1959), pp. 15.17–16.17. But Avicenna expounds it, together with the notion of PSA, in a somewhat unsystematic way in his later works: al-Mubāḥathāt (The Discussions), al-Taʿlīqāt, and al-Ishārāt. For al-Mubāḥathāt, I consult Avicenna, Al-Mubāḥathāt, ed. Muḥsin Bīdārfar (Qom, 1992). I am aware that one should be cautious when using al-Mubāḥathāt and al-Taʿlīqāt because they seem to have not been penned by Avicenna himself. On the nature of

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chapter 2 Imagine that you do not grow up gradually but are created all at once as a complete and grown-up human being so that you can think normally but do not have any prior knowledge or memory. You are suspended in the air, but you cannot feel the air; you see nothing, hear nothing, and your limbs do not touch each other. That is to say, although all of your faculties can function normally, you are deprived of all objects of knowledge. There is absolutely nothing for you to sense, imagine, remember, or understand. Presumably, you also do not know any language. Under such conditions, can you still affirm the existence of your self (dhāt)?

In the discussion of PSA, I render the term dhāt as “self” rather than “essence”. In addition, I render dhātuka as “your self” rather than “yourself” in this particular context because “yourself” is typically treated as a reflexive pronoun, but “your self” refers to your self, your soul, or your I-ness. The following passage from al-Taʿlīqāt reveals several key features of PSA. Self-awareness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt) is essential (dhātī) to the soul, not acquired from the outside, as if the self occurs, the awareness occurs with it. We are not aware of the self by an organ; rather, we are aware of it by itself and from itself. Our awareness is awareness unrestrictedly (ʿalā l-iṭlāq); I mean that there is no condition for it in any respect. The self is that whose awareness is constant (dāʾimat al-shuʿūr), not at one time without another. … Our self-awareness is our very ­existence (nafs wujūdinā).26



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these two works, see Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 2014), pp. 159–64. However, they are the best sources we have for reconstructing Avicenna’s theory of PSA; al-Ishārāt touches upon PSA but the discussion there is inadequate. Kaukua notes that Avicenna’s PSA has to be reconstructed from “somewhat (though not entirely) fragmented pieces of discussion” and that “it remains a fact that Avicenna never explicitly defines his concept of self-awareness, nor does he devote a single chapter of his psychological works to the phenomenon”. Self-Awareness, p. 102; cf. Marcotte, “Irjā‘ ilā Nafsi-ka”, p. 2. There is a vast secondary literature on the Flying Man, see Michael E. Marmura, “Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’ in Context”, The Monist 69, no. 3 (1986), 383–95; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ­Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300 (London, 2000), pp. 80–92; Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness”; Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity, pp. 70–99; Self-Awareness, pp. 30–42; Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich, “The Thought Experimental Method: Avicenna’s Flying Man Argument”, ­Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4, no. 2 (2018), 147–64. Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, ed. Badawī, pp. 160.21–24, 161.10; cf. Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, ed. Mousavian, p. 481, §883; p. 482, §886.

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Thus, PSA is (1) essential or innate, (2) unmediated, (3) unconditional, and (4) constant. One has PSA even when one is asleep, drunk, or as a Flying Man, according to al-Ishārāt.27 In fact, the formation of every human being’s self or I-ness depends entirely on PSA: if one does not have PSA, if one is not actively apprehending one’s self, one will not become a self or an “I” at all. Because it underlies all our knowledge, PSA is so general—without it, no knowledge would be my knowledge—that one normally tends to overlook it. (Note that one tends to overlook one’s PSA, but not one’s self.) A useful way to understand PSA is through an analogy. Suppose that each one of us were a computer, then PSA would be the most fundamental program that constantly runs in the background and that cannot be shut down (otherwise, one would stop functioning as a self or an “I”). By blocking out all other objects of knowledge, the Flying Man thought experiment forces one to pay attention to one’s PSA, which is always there and constantly running. Avicenna’s notion of PSA, however, faces many difficulties in his general Aristotelian epistemological framework. For one, the relation between PSA and Aristotelian self-intellection is unclear.28 How would Avicenna deal with these two kinds of self-knowledge? If, at first, one is a potential intellect, then how could one, as pure capacity, have PSA?29 Second, PSA obviously involves true knowledge of the immaterial particular self, but Avicenna also holds that true knowledge is always of universals.30 Third, PSA must not require any form (insofar as it is unmediated), but Avicenna also claims that the nature of knowledge involves the occurring or imprinting of forms. Therefore, PSA is incompatible with Avicenna’s formal knowledge. By formulating his theory of presential knowledge and treating PSA as the paradigmatic case of presential knowledge, Suhrawardī frees PSA from the Aristotelian epistemological framework and the related difficulties. Given that one already has (and always has) true knowledge of a particular, namely, one’s self, then why is one prevented from having true knowledge of more particulars? In fact, it seems that the proper objects of human knowledge would be particulars instead of universals, especially given that philosophers have long questioned the real existence of universals.31 Moreover, PSA becomes a cornerstone of 27 28 29 30 31

Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, Namaṭ III.1, p. 119.2–10. Kobayashi, “Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī”, p. 76, note 33; Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness”, p. 64. Marcotte, “Irjā‘ ilā Nafsi-ka”, p. 17. Black, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness”, pp. 75–76. For Porphyry’s three famous questions on universals, see Porphyry, Isagoge, in Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis, 1994), pp. 1–19.

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Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics: every immaterial light (nūr mujarrad)—God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls—has and indeed is PSA (see Chapter 5, section 4.2 for my elaboration of this argument). Therefore, in this context of general dissatisfaction with Avicenna’s formal knowledge, Suhrawardī introduces presential knowledge. In what follows, I reconstruct Suhrawardī’s account of presential knowledge by appealing to al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. 2

Establishing Illuminationist Presential Knowledge

As the first step to establishing Illuminationist presential knowledge, Suhrawardī argues that there are four kinds of human apprehension—self-apprehension, the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties, the apprehension of pain caused by amputation, and visual perception—that cannot be formal knowledge because none of them require forms as intermediaries. Rather, they must be unmediated presential knowledge that merely requires the very presence (or non-absence) of the objects of knowledge. 2.1 Self-Apprehension Suhrawardī argues that self-apprehension must not be formal knowledge, a point that Avicenna himself acknowledges and argues for. Suhrawardī offers three arguments, which I name the Particularity Argument, the I-ness ­Argument, and the Priority Argument.32 2.1.1 The Particularity Argument The Particularity Argument appears in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and al-­ Lamaḥāt. The gist of the argument is that, given that every form in the mind is universal in itself but the self is particular in itself, self-apprehension must not require any form as an intermediary; otherwise, the apprehension of a universal would be equivalent to the apprehension of a particular, which is absurd. The Particularity Argument in al-Talwīḥāt is as follows:

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The Particularity Argument: [LWḤ3 70.9–71.4, §55] = [ṬRḤ3 484.10–14, §208] = [LMḤ 284.4–8, §123]; the I-ness Argument: [ṬRḤ3 484.7–10, §208] = [Ḥ.Sh 111.5–9, §115]; the Priority Argument: [Ḥ.Sh 115.9–14, §115]. Note that Avicenna has already put forward an argument similar to the Priority Argument; see Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, p. 79.4–11; cf. Kobayashi, “Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī”, p. 67; Marcotte, “Irjā‘ ilā Nafsi-ka”, pp. 8–9.

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[Text 3] [T3a] [Aristotle said: …] If you apprehend your self by your self, [do you apprehend it] by considering an impression (athar) of your self in your self? I said: Of course. He said: If that impression does not correspond to (lam yuṭābiq) your self, then it is not the form (ṣūra) of your self, and then you do not apprehend your self. I said: Then that impression must be the form of my self. [T3b] He said: Does your form belong to an unrestricted soul (nafs muṭlaq) or a soul particularized by other attributes (nafs mutakhaṣṣiṣa bi-ṣifāt ukhrā)? I chose the second. [T3c] He said: Every form in the soul is universal.33 If it is composite, still, [it must be composed] of multiple universals, so it does not make impossible the participation (al-sharika) [in itself] because of itself. If the impossibility of the participation is assumed, that must be because of another hindrance (māniʿ). You apprehend your self, and your self makes impossible the participation [in itself] by itself. So this apprehension must not be by means of the form. [LWḤ3 70.9–14, §55] If I apprehend my self by an intermediary, this intermediary is either an impression (athar) that does not correspond to my self or an impression that corresponds to my self, namely, the form (ṣūra) of my self. The first option is a non-starter. In [T3b], Suhrawardī considers the second option. If I know my self by the form of my self, two possibilities follow: either the form belongs to “an unrestricted soul” (i.e. the referent of the definition of “soul”), or the form belongs to “a soul particularized by other attributes” (i.e. my particular soul). The first possibility is absurd because if it were the case, then by knowing the definition of “soul”, I would know my self. If I were ignorant of what “soul” meant, I would be ignorant of my self. But I know my self all the time, without knowing the definition of “soul”. Aristotle’s comment at [T3c] is the core of the Particularity Argument, and the line of reasoning is similar to that of [Text 1]. Even if the form belongs to my particular soul, the form (and indeed every form), whether simple or ­composite, 33

From the Avicennian point of view, one might reject Suhrawardī’s premise that “every form in the soul is universal”, insofar as universality attaches to a form only when the form is related in the mind to many. But Suhrawardī makes clear that he uses the term “universal” in a less strict sense: no form by itself “makes impossible the participation in itself”.

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is still universal in the sense that it by itself does not make ­impossible the participation in itself. By contrast, my self is particular in the sense that it by itself makes impossible the participation in itself. It is inconceivable that my self is shared by anyone or anything else. The apprehension of the essentially universal form, therefore, is not the apprehension of my essentially particular self. Self-apprehension must not be formal knowledge.34 The Particularity Argument is then rephrased in al-Muṭāraḥāt, as the ­second argument there: [Text 4] If the soul apprehends its self by means of the form, then every form that occurs in the soul is universal, and its correspondence (muṭābaqa) to multiplicity is not impossible. Even if the form is taken as an ­aggregate of universals whose totality belongs exclusively to one individual soul, it still cannot escape from being universal. But every human being apprehends his self in a way that the participation [in his self] is impossible, so it is not sound at all that his understanding (taʿaqqul) of his particular self is by means of any form. [ṬRḤ3 484.10–14, §208] 2.1.2 The I-ness Argument The I-ness Argument, found in both al-Muṭāraḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, is based on the premise that the form of the self is an “it” to an apprehender, whereas the self of the apprehender is decidedly the “I”. The I-ness Argument in al-Muṭāraḥāt is as follows: [Text 5] The form that is in the soul is not the very same thing as the soul. But the self-apprehender apprehends the very thing because of which its I-ness/being-“I” (anāʾiyya) is35 rather than something that corresponds to it. But every form in the apprehender is added to (zāʾida ʿalā) its self; it is an “it” in relation to the apprehender rather than the “I” to it. So self-­ apprehension is not by means of the form. [ṬRḤ3 484.7–10, §208] 34

35

There is another possibility considered by Suhrawardī in this argument [LWḤ3 70.14–71.1, §55]. One might argue that the soul apprehends its self by “the meaning of I” (mafhūm anā), which seems to make impossible the participation in itself. Suhrawardī responds that the meaning of the term “I”, when considered merely in itself, is still a “universal intelligible intention” (maʿnan maʿqūl kullī). Only when the term “I” is related to a certain individual and carries a “particular reference” (ishāra juzʾiyya) does it become a particular term and does its meaning become particular. That is, the very thing that makes the apprehender an “I”, namely, its self.

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Every self-apprehender must apprehend “the very thing because of which its I-ness is”, or the very thing that is the “I” to it (i.e. its very self). Every form, however, must be an “it”— something other than the “I”—in relation to the apprehender. This point requires clarification. Every form in the apprehender is added to its self. If B is added to A, B cannot be A itself because A must be logically prior to B for B to be added to A. No form, therefore, can be the very same thing as the self. Alternatively, I simply know intuitively that the form of my self is not my self: the form is an “it” to me, whereas my self is the “I”. This seems to be the approach that Suhrawardī adopts in the parallel passage of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. The I-ness Argument in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, presented as a reductio ad absurdum, is as follows: [Text 6] If self-knowledge is by means of an image (mithāl),36 and the image of I-ness is not the I-ness [itself]—for the image is an “it” in relation to the I-ness, and in that case, the apprehended is the image [rather than the I-ness]—then it follows that the apprehension of the I-ness is the very same thing as the apprehension of what is an “it”, and the apprehension of the I-ness itself is the very same thing as the apprehension of something other than the I-ness. This is absurd. [Ḥ.Sh 111.6–8, §115] Therefore, I must not know my self, which is the “I” to me, by the form of my self, which is an “it”, namely, something other than my self. 2.1.3 The Priority Argument The Priority Argument, which occurs only in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, is based on the premise that the apprehension of the self must be logically prior to the ­apprehension of the form of the self. Suhrawardī argues: [Text 7] Moreover, if [self-knowledge] is by means of an image (mithāl), and if [the apprehender] does not know that it is an image of itself, then it does not know itself; if it knows that it is an image of itself, then it has already known itself rather than by means of the image. [Ḥ.Sh 111.9–11, §115]

36

“Image” (mithāl) is synonymous with “form” (ṣūra), but Suhrawardī tends to avoid using the term “form” in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, given his critique of hylomorphism therein [Ḥ.Sh §§72–88, 74–88] (see Chapter 5, section 2.3.2 for a brief analysis).

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If a self-apprehender apprehends its self by means of an image, two possibilities follow: either it does not know that the image is of its self, or it knows this. If it does not know, then even if it apprehends the image, it will not apprehend its self by that image because the image apprehended in that case will not be known to be of its self. If it knows that the image is of its self, then it has already known its self first, and only afterwards does it know that the image is of its self. The image, therefore, is not required in self-apprehension. From these three arguments, it is plain to see that self-apprehension cannot be formal knowledge; rather, it is unmediated presential knowledge that does not involve any form. 2.2 Apprehension of One’s Body and Bodily Faculties After examining self-apprehension, Suhrawardī turns to the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties, which cannot be formal knowledge either. The argument, versions of which are found in both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, is also from particularity and employs a line of reasoning similar to that of [Text 1], [Text 3], and [Text 4].37 In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 8] [Aristotle] said: You move your particular body, and you know it as a specific, particular body. But what you take from the form (i.e. the meaning [mafhūm] of the form) itself does not make impossible the participation in the form from happening. So your apprehension of the form is not the apprehension of your body whose meaning (mafhūm) is inconceivable to be of anything else. [LWḤ3 71.7–10, §55] Every human being moves and controls his particular body, which is inconceivable as belonging to anyone or anything else; every form, however, is universal in itself. Therefore, the apprehension of the body cannot be formal knowledge. In the same way, Suhrawardī argues that the apprehension of one’s bodily faculties, such as imagery (al-khayāl), imaginative faculty (al-quwwa al-­ mutakhayyila), and estimation (al-wahm), requires no forms as intermediaries because they are particular in themselves as well. 2.3 Apprehension of Pain Caused by Amputation In al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī analyses two other cases of presential knowledge: the pain caused by amputation and visual perception. However, in al-Talwīḥāt, 37

See [LWḤ3 71.5–17, §55] and [ṬRḤ3 484.14–485.6, §208].

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nothing is mentioned about these two cases probably because Suhrawardī decided not to argue against the Peripatetic theory of sense perceptions in that text; he undertakes this task in al-Muṭāraḥāt. About the pain caused by amputation, he writes: [Text 9] [T9a] The following fact ensures that we have apprehensions that do not require another form except the presence of the apprehended itself. A human being feels the pain caused by the separation of connection in a limb of his and is aware of it. This is not because the separation of connection makes another form occur to him either in that limb or anywhere else. Rather, the apprehended is that separation (al-tafarruq) itself. The separation is the sensed, and the pain is caused by the separation itself rather than by a form that occurs from the separation. [T9b] So, it proves that among things apprehended, there are those the occurrence of which themselves is sufficient for apprehension, either to the soul [directly] or to something that has a specific presential connection (taʿalluq ḥuḍūrī) to the soul.38 [ṬRḤ3 485.7–12, §208] If someone’s limb is amputated, he certainly feels the pain and apprehends it. His apprehension of the pain, however, is not caused by the occurrence of any form either in that limb or any other part of his body because, ­apparently, he has lost something and not gained anything. It seems counterintuitive to assume that, in this case, he has obtained some form. Perhaps this is why Suhrawardī analyses this specific sort of pain. The object of knowledge, in this case, must be “that separation itself”, which causes the pain. Therefore, the knowledge of the pain caused by amputation should be presential knowledge rather than formal knowledge. However, because this is the only sort of pain that Suhrawardī analyses, I doubt that similar arguments would apply to the knowledge of pain in general.39 I presume that Suhrawardī’s point, made clear in [T9b], is simply that it is not the case that all knowledge requires forms as intermediaries, and he uses the pain caused by amputation as an obvious counterexample.

38 39

That is, sense organs, such as the faculty of touch. For a discussion of the apprehension of pain in general, see Yazdi, Principles of Epistemology, pp. 57–68, esp. 67–68.

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2.4 Visual Perception The discussion of visual perception in al-Muṭāraḥāt is somewhat complicated.40 Rather than explore that discussion in much detail, I focus on Suhrawardī’s own position. Suhrawardī argues that visual perception must be presential knowledge, rather than formal knowledge, by examining an everyday experience: looking without seeing. [Text 10] [T10a] The Peripatetics must acknowledge this point: they accept that a form may occur in the visual organ (ālat al-baṣar) but a human being is not aware of it, if he is immersed in his thinking (fikr) or what another sense brings to him. So, the soul’s attention (iltifāt) to that form is necessary. So the apprehension must be because of the soul’s attention when it sees [something] by witnessing (mushāhada). [T10b] Witnessing is not by means of the universal form; rather, ­witnessing is by means of the particular form. So the soul must have Illuminationist presential knowledge (ʿilm ishrāqī ḥuḍūrī) that is not by means of the form. [ṬRḤ3 485.13–18, §208] Suhrawardī argues in [T10a] that if visual perception is simply the result of the occurrence (ḥuṣūl) of the form of a visible object, then there should be no such experience as looking without seeing because, whenever the form occurs in the visual organ, visual perception should occur. This experience suggests that visual perception requires the attention (iltifāt) of the soul in addition to the occurrence of the form. In [T10b], Suhrawardī goes further and argues that visual perception requires no “universal form” but only the “particular form” and, thus, requires no form. This seems confusing. Given his previous arguments that every form in the mind is universal, I take the “universal form” to mean the object’s form imprinted in the visual organ and the “particular form” to mean the object’s inherent form. Visual perception requires only the object’s inherent particular form (i.e. the particular object itself) without its imprinted universal form; it is, therefore, presential knowledge. There is, however, an obvious gap in Suhrawardī’s reasoning. One could argue that visual perception requires the soul’s attention to the imprinted form and still hold that it is formal knowledge. Avicenna, in fact, anticipates this

40

See [ṬRḤ3 485.13–486.17, §§208–9] and [Ḥ.Sh §§101–3, 99–101].

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point, for example, in al-Taʿlīqāt.41 Suhrawardī’s argument, therefore, must be paired with his full critique of the Peripatetic intromission theory, which holds that vision requires the imprinting of images. [Text 11] [T11a] Those who reject that seeing (al-ruʾya) is by means of the ray (al-shuʿāʿ) either hold that it requires the imprinting of the visual image (al-inṭibāʿ al-shabḥī) or do not. [T11b] If one holds that it requires the imprinting of the image, one is faced with the following problem: how would it be sound for the form of the great magnitudes (al-maqādīr al-ʿaẓīma) witnessed to be imprinted in the crystalline humour (al-jalīdiyya) or the like? [ṬRḤ3 486.1–3, §209] At [T11a] Suhrawardī considers two theories of vision: the extramission theory, which holds that vision occurs by means of rays being emitted from one’s eye, and the Peripatetic intromission theory. Avicenna rejected the extramission theory, and Suhrawardī adopts Avicenna’s argument [Ḥ.Sh §101, 99–100].42 Suhrawardī instead challenges the Peripatetic intromission theory in [T11b] and [ṬRḤ3 486.3–12, §209].43 In al-Muṭāraḥāt, he summarizes his theory of vision. [Text 12] Visual perception is simply the encounter (muqābala) of a lighted [object] (al-mustanīr) with the visual organ (al-ʿuḍw al-bāṣir), so the presential illumination (ishrāq ḥuḍūrī) of the soul falls upon it and nothing else.44 [ṬRḤ3 486.15–16, §209] In other words, visual perception is an encounter of a visible object with a subject’s visual organ; moreover, the subject’s “presential illumination” (i.e. the attention mentioned in [T10a]) is necessary as well. 41

See Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, p. 23.20–22; cf. Dimitri Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avicenna”, Oriens 40 (2012), 412–13. 42 See, for instance, Avicenna, Al-Najāt, pp. 323.11–327.3. 43 Cf. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3.9 “On weakening what is said about vision” [Ḥ.Sh §§101–4, 99–103]. The general objection in [T11b] is a well-known one, found in Abū l-Barakāt and Rāzī as well; see Benevich, “Perceiving Things in Themselves”, pp. 236–39. Benevich remarks that this argument can be traced back to antiquity, for example, to Galen (p. 236, note 8). For Rāzī’s similar arguments, see Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, vol. 2, pp. 224.2–226.2. Rāzī argues against Avicenna’s theory in two ways; the first objection is the same as [T11b]. 44 Before Suhrawardī, Abū l-Barakāt also defines apprehension in terms of “encounter” (liqāʾ; synonymous with muqābala); see Benevich, “Perceiving Things in Themselves”, p. 252.

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Given the examples of the apprehension of pain caused by amputation and visual perception, it seems safe to argue that Suhrawardī holds that all external sense perceptions are presential knowledge. Presential sense perceptions, however, differ from self-apprehension and the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties in a significant respect: sense perceptions require a subject’s sense organs as intermediaries or tools, whereas no intermediary whatsoever is needed in self-apprehension and the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties (see my discussion in Section 5.1). 3

Presence as the Nature of All Human Knowledge

After establishing that the four kinds of human apprehension are presential knowledge, Suhrawardī argues further that the nature of all human knowledge, fundamentally speaking, is the presence (or non-absence) of the known to the knower. 3.1 Two Conditions for Knowledge In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 13] [T13a] He [Aristotle] said: If you have known that the soul apprehends neither by means of the corresponding impression nor by the form, then you should know that understanding (al-taʿaqqul) is the presence of a thing to an immaterial self (ḥuḍūr al-shayʾ lil-dhāt al-mujarrada ʿan al-mādda). If you want, I could say that [understanding is] the non-­ absence (ʿadam ghayba) of a thing from an immaterial self. [T13b] This [the non-absence] is more complete (atamm) because it applies generally to a thing’s apprehension of its self and of another, given that a thing cannot be present to itself, but it is not absent from its self.45 [LWḤ3 71.18–72.3, §55] And, in al-Muṭāraḥāt: [Text 14] Knowledge or understanding (al-ʿilm aw al-taʿaqqul) is the non-absence of a thing from an immaterial self. [ṬRḤ3 487.6–7, §210] 45

Cf. [Ḥ.Sh 151.6–9, §161].

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In Avicennian epistemology, ʿaql (or taʿaqqul), usually rendered as “intellectual understanding”, refers to knowledge of universals. Here, Suhrawardī has expanded the meaning of “understanding” to refer to all knowledge. The implication is that knowledge of universals has lost its superior position in Suhrawardī’s new epistemology. I show later (in Section 3.2 and Section 5) that Suhrawardī holds that presential knowledge of particulars is more perfect than knowledge of universals. From these passages, we can extract two conditions for knowledge: (1) the presence (or non-absence) of an object to a subject and (2) the immateriality of the subject. This is true of the passage from al-Talwīḥāt. In al-Muṭāraḥāt and especially Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, however, Suhrawardī adds a third condition: illumination (see Section 3.3; cf. [Text 12]). Consider, first, the presence (or non-absence) condition. In [T13b], Suhrawardī explains why he must add “non-absence” to the presence condition: in the case of self-apprehension, it is not accurate to say that my self is present to me because my self is not something other than me. One can say that A is present to B (or B is present to A) only when A is something other than B. But it is permissible to say that my self is not absent from me.46 Although non-absence is “more complete” and more accurate than presence, Suhrawardī calls his epistemology “presential knowledge”. The immateriality condition is based on Suhrawardī’s doctrine on the immateriality of the soul or the self. Here, I offer a brief sketch of his many arguments for the immateriality of the soul.47 Largely following ­Avicenna, Suhrawardī puts forward three sets of arguments. The first is based on experiential analyses of the self to show that the self cannot be material. The first argument is the Flying Man (further studies are needed to determine whether the Flying Man is a proper argument, or an indication or reminder).48 Suhrawardī asks 46 47

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Avicenna, by contrast, does not hesitate to say that “the self is in every case present to the self”; see Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, p. 148.15. The Physics of al-Talwīḥāt IV.3 “On the rational soul” [LWḤ 155.17–157.16; 163.8–166.3]; cf. the Physics of al-Muṭāraḥāt VI.8 “On apprehension, abstraction, and demonstrations and persuasions of the immateriality of the soul” [ṬRḤ2 379–92]; cf. al-Lamaḥāt IV.4 “On the soul” [LMḤ §§83–90, 259–62]. In al-Shifāʾ: al-Nafs I.1, Avicenna writes that the Flying Man is “an affirmation of the existence of the soul that we have by way of reminding (al-tanbīh) and calling to mind”. “Thus, that who is alert has a way to be mindful of the existence of the soul as something that is not the body, nor [any] body, and to be acquainted with and aware of it.” See Avicenna, De Anima, pp. 15.20, 16.14–17. Thus, many scholars hold that the Flying Man is not a proper argument but a reminder (tanbīh). In al-Mubāḥathāt III, however, Avicenna suggests that the Flying Man is an “argument” (ḥujja) or “syllogism” (qiyās) that is “conclusive/decisive” (qāṭiʿa) for “perspicacious people” (ahl al-faṭāna). See Avicenna, Al-Mubāḥathāt, p. 58.1, 5, 7, §56.

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the reader to imagine that they are the Flying Man who is created all at once with a complete body and intellect but is deprived of all objects of knowledge. As the Flying Man, you would still apprehend your self, and you would only apprehend your self without other objects of knowledge, especially your body, your limbs and organs, or any bodies of the external world. Thus, your self cannot be the same as the whole or any part of your body or anything material. The other three arguments of the set share a similar experiential nature: the self is the “I” whereas everything else is an “it”; the body and its parts change all the time but the self remains the same; the body metabolizes but the self does not. These arguments suggest that the self must be different from the body and must, therefore, be immaterial. Another set of arguments, which are demonstrations (sing. burhān), take as their premise that the soul serves as the substrate (maḥall) of intelligibles. The soul understands universal intentions (al-maʿānī al-kulliyya) in virtue of their occurring or imprinting in the soul. Given that universals are immaterial— otherwise, they would have magnitudes and positions (sing. miqdār wa-waḍʿ) and could not correspond to different things or be predicated of them—and they inhere in the soul, the soul must be immaterial as well. Otherwise, various absurdities, such as that universals would have magnitudes and positions and thus become material or that they would be divisible along with their divisible material substrate, would result. The third set of arguments are all “persuasive observations” (al-istibṣārāt al-iqnāʿiyya) that Suhrawardī lists briefly.49 3.2 The Nature of Human Knowledge How does the presence (or non-absence) of objects to subjects explain all human knowledge? How can the notion of presence help make sense of formal knowledge? Why are they not incompatible? Suhrawardī offers similar answers in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt. In ­al-­Talwīḥāt, he writes: [Text 15] [T15a] If the soul cannot make a thing itself present, such as the sky, the earth, and so on, it makes its form present. Suhrawardī seems to present the Flying Man as a proper argument in al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ 155.17–156.8], but this point requires further study. Cf. Lukas Muehlethaler, “Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) on the Argument of the Flying Man in Avicenna’s Ishārāt and al-Suhrawardī’s Talwīḥāt”, in Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy, ed. Y. Tzvi Langermann (Turnhout, 2009), pp. 179–203. 49

Cf. [I.K2 306.19–310.12].

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[T15b] As for particulars, [the soul makes their forms present] in f­ aculties present (quwan hāḍira) to it; as for universals, [it makes their forms present] in its self, since among things apprehended there are universals that cannot be imprinted in bodies. [LWḤ3 72.4–7, §55] Objects of knowledge are first divided into two kinds: those that are present to (or not absent from) the soul and those that are absent from the soul. If an object is present (or not absent), the soul knows it unmediatedly and as it is: no form is required as an intermediary. The knowledge obtained in this way is called “presential knowledge” (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī). Examples of things present to (or not absent from) the soul include the soul’s self, one’s particular body and bodily faculties, and extramental sensible particulars that are present (as well as immaterial particulars beyond this world; see Section 5.3 for a discussion of this point). If an object is absent from the soul, the soul makes its form present to it and knows it by means of its form. The knowledge obtained this way is called “formal knowledge” (ʿilm ṣūrī). Objects that are absent from the soul are subdivided into two kinds: particulars and universals. If an absent object is particular, such as Zayd, the soul apprehends it by making its particular form present to it by means of “faculties present to the soul”, or imagination. If an absent object is universal, such as humanity or animality, the soul apprehends it by making the universal form itself present to it in its immaterial self, given that universals cannot be imprinted in material faculties, as both Avicenna and Suhrawardī extensively argue.50 In al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī offers a similar but more elaborate account of the nature of knowledge. [Text 16] [T16a] We indeed require the form in certain things, such as the sky and the stars, because they themselves are absent from us. So we make their forms present, until if they [themselves] are present, in the way that the aforementioned things [the soul, the body, sensible particulars, etc.] are present, then we do not require the form. [T16b] So, all things that the soul apprehends should be divided into several kinds. As for universals, [the soul apprehends them] by the ­presence of the form because of its imprinting in the self of the soul. As for particulars, [the soul apprehends them] either by the presence 50

See, for instance, Avicenna, Al-Najāt, pp. 356–71.

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chapter 2 of themselves and the illumination (ishrāq) of the soul, or by the occurrence of their form in something present (shayʾ ḥāḍir) to the soul and the i­llumination of the soul falls upon the form. So, the soul apprehends particulars either by their presence to it or by their presence in something present (amr ḥāḍir) to it, such as imaginal forms (al-ṣuwar al-khayāliyya). [T16c] If there is an investigation of imaginal forms, we do not reveal it to anyone except a group of Illuminationists. [ṬRḤ3 487.9–17, §210]

While [Text 16] conveys roughly the same points as [Text 15], they differ on two significant points. First, Suhrawardī mentions the “illumination” (ishrāq) ­condition twice in [T16b]; I address this point in the next section. Second, when discussing the faculty of imagination, Suhrawardī uses the plural form “faculties present (quwan hāḍira) to the soul” in [T15b], and the singular form “something present (shayʾ/amr ḥāḍir) to the soul” twice in [T16b]. This difference is intentional and indeed significant. Following Avicenna, Suhrawardī distinguishes between imagery (al-khayāl), imagination (al-mutakhayyila), and estimation (al-wahm) in his ­Peripatetic-style works. Imagery is “the storage (khizāna) of all forms of the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak) after their absence from the common sense”; ­estimation is “the faculty that makes particular judgements (aḥkām juzʾiyya) in animals. … [B]y this faculty, the sheep apprehends in the wolf the intention (maʿnan) that makes it flee”; and imagination is “responsible for the conjoining and disjoining; it separates parts of a single species and combines parts of different species”.51 As indicated in [T16c], Suhrawardī formulates an original and well-known theory of the imaginal world (ʿālam al-mithāl) for those who should read ­Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.52 In II.4.7 “On that the internal senses are not limited to five”, he argues that “the truth is that these three [faculties] are one thing and one faculty, which is expressed by various expressions because of various considerations” [Ḥ.Sh 210.12–13, §224], and that “imaginal forms are assumed to be stored in the imagery, but this is invalid” [Ḥ.Sh 209.1, §221]. Then in II.4.8 51 52

The Physics of al-Lamaḥāt IV.3 “On the internal apprehenders [i.e. senses]” [LMḤ 257.18–258.5, §82]; cf. the Physics of al-Talwīḥāt IV.2 “On the animal soul” [LWḤ 153–54]; cf. the Physics of al-Muṭāraḥāt VI.5 “On the five internal senses” [ṬRḤ2, 360–65]. For studies on Suhrawardī’s imaginal world, see Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Suhrawardī’s Realm of the Imaginal”, Ishrāq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook 2 (2011), 68–79; Nicolai Sinai, “Al-Suhrawardī on Mirror Vision and Suspended Images (Muthul Muʿallaqa)”, Arabic ­Sciences and Philosophy 25 (2015), 279–97; L. W. C. van Lit, The World of Image in Islamic Philosophy: Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, Shahrazūrī, and Beyond (Edinburgh, 2017).

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“On the reality of forms in mirrors and imaginative forms”, he further argues that imaginal forms (al-ṣuwar al-khayāliyya) are, in fact, not stored in the ­imagery. Rather, they are ontologically suspended (muʿallaqa): they are self-subsistent (qāʾima bi-dhātihā) and form the imaginal world in between this material world and the immaterial light world. Our faculty of imagination (al-takhayyul) is their substrate of manifestation (maẓhar) rather than their storage [Ḥ.Sh §225, 211–13]. Therefore, on Suhrawardī’s account, the soul apprehends absent particulars by making their suspended imaginal forms manifest in the faculty of imagination (i.e. the imaginal forms’ substrate of manifestation)—the referent of “something present (shayʾ/amr ḥāḍir) to the soul” in [T16b]—and their forms are thereby present to the soul. Neither are imaginal forms stored in one’s imagination, nor are ­universal forms stored in one’s intellect. This is, in fact, Avicenna’s well-known doctrine: universal intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt, both primary and secondary) are all stored in the agent intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) and emanate on one’s intellect whenever one is engaged in intellectual understanding.53 Suhrawardī apparently adopts Avicenna’s doctrine on intellectual understanding and summarizes it neatly and faithfully in his Peripatetic-style works.54 To show a complete picture of his epistemology, I briefly sketch Suhrawardī’s view on 53

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There is a vast literature on Avicenna’s intellectual understanding, especially on whether Avicenna’s theory is abstractionism or emanationism. See Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “Avicenna on Abstraction”, in Aspects of Avicenna, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton, 2001), pp. 39–72; “Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism”, in Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 109–19; Jon McGinnis, “Making Abstraction Less Abstract: The Logical, Psychological, and Metaphysical Dimensions of Avicenna’s Theory of Abstraction”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80 (2007), 169–83; “New Light on Avicenna: Optics and Its Role in Avicennan Theories of Vision, Cognition and Emanation”, in Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century, ed. Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp (Paris, 2013), pp. 41–57; Gutas, “Empiricism of Avicenna”; Tommaso Alpina, “Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Nafs and Its Aristotelian Background”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 25 (2014), 131–83; Deborah L. Black, “How Do We Acquire Concepts? Avicenna on Abstraction and Emanation”, in Debates in Medieval Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, ed. Jeffrey Hause (New York, 2014), pp. 126–44; Therese Scarpelli Cory, “Rethinking Abstractionism: Aquinas’s Intellectual Light and Some Arabic Sources”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 53, no. 4 (2015), 607–46. The Physics of al-Talwīḥāt IV.3.1 “On explaining the rational soul, its faculties, and some of their states” [LWḤ 159–61]; the Physics of al-Muṭāraḥāt VI.7 “On the theoretical and practical faculties [i.e. intellects]” [ṬRḤ2 374–77]; the Physics of al-Lamaḥāt IV.5 “On the two theoretical and practical faculties of the soul” [LMḤ 262–64, §91].

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intellectual understanding. One’s intellect is at first a potential intellect (al-ʿaql al-hayūlānī), which is the first disposition (al-istiʿdād al-awwal); it becomes a habitual intellect (al-ʿaql bi-l-malaka) when it has access to primary intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-ūlā) and when it is ready to acquire secondary intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thawānī) by thinking (fikr) and intuition (ḥads). When one’s intellect can retrieve the intelligibles from the agent intellect without effort whenever one desires, it becomes an actual intellect (al-ʿaql bi-l-fiʿl). These three states are all dispositions of different degrees, and when the intellect actually reaches “perfection” (kamāl)—when the intelligibles are actually present in it and it is witnessing them—it becomes an acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād). Given that nothing can bring itself from potentiality to actuality (otherwise, it would never have been potential), the agent intellect is necessary. Moreover, the agent intellect must act as the storage of all intelligibles because if they were stored in one’s intellect, one’s soul would be divided into two parts: one part acting as manipulator (mutaṣarrif) and the other as storage (khizāna). Thus, we do not have intellectual memory: when we are occupied by the side of the sense (jānib al-ḥiss), the intelligibles are erased from us. However, we have acquired the habit (al-malaka), so we can retrieve the intelligibles at will. Our manipulation of imaginal forms, intentions, and judgements prepares us for the connection (al-ittiṣāl) to the agent intellect and for receiving intelligibles suitable for our dispositions.55 Thus, Avicenna’s mechanism of human intellectual understanding is preserved in Suhrawardī’s epistemology. The nature of intellectual understanding is that the soul apprehends absent universals by receiving the emanation of those universals from the agent intellect, and the universals are thereby present to the soul. Therefore, all knowledge, be it presential or formal, is the presence of an object to a subject. The only difference is that in presential knowledge a real particular object itself is present and in formal knowledge the form of an absent object is present. Suhrawardī’s notion of “presence”, therefore, can account for formal knowledge. Indeed, the notion unifies presential and formal knowledge into a single coherent system.

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The exact place of the agent intellect in Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics is unclear. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī is not very concerned with intellectual understanding. The most promising candidate is the lord of the human species, namely, Gabriel, “the bestower of knowledge and support” (wāhib al-ʿilm wa-l-taʾyīd), “the giver of life and virtue” (muʿṭī l-ḥayāt wa-l-faḍīla), responsible for all human bodies, souls, and their faculties [Ḥ.Sh 200.8–201.4, §210].

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Moreover, we can infer from [T15a] and [T16a] that presential knowledge must be superior to formal knowledge. We resort to the form only when we cannot make an object itself present given the limitations of human knowledge. If an object is present, we have no need for its form. Moreover, presential knowledge is unmediated, particular, dynamic, continuous, and comprehensive; by contrast, formal knowledge is mediated, universal, static, and somewhat one-sided. This inference is essential for Suhrawardī’s discussion of God’s knowledge later (see Section 4.1). 3.3 What Is “Illumination” (ishrāq)? In al-Muṭāraḥāt, the term ishrāq (illumination) and its derivatives begin to make frequent appearances as preparation for the full-blown Illuminationism of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.56 “The illumination of the soul” (ishrāq lil-nafs), ­mentioned twice in [T16b] above, seems to be the third condition for knowledge in addition to the presence and immateriality conditions. But what does “illumination” mean exactly? Shahrazūrī interprets ishrāq to mean “the manifestation of the intellectual lights (al-anwār al-ʿaqliyya) and their rays (lamaʿāt) on perfect souls when they are deprived of bodily matters”. More specifically, it refers to “unveiling and tasting” (al-kashf wa-l-dhawq) [Sha 16.13–15]. Shahrazūrī reasons that, given that “the philosophy of the easterners” (ḥikmat al-mashāriqa) is based on unveiling and tasting, Suhrawardī’s “philosophy of illumination” (ḥikmat al-ishrāq) must refer to the philosophy of the easterners, i.e. of the Persians (ahl al-fāris) [Sha 16.11–13]. Quṭb al-Dīn largely repeats Shahrazūrī [Q.D 11.11– 16]. Following Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn, Corbin liberally renders ishrāq in Suhrawardī’s texts as “Orient” and ishrāqī as “Oriental”. Thus, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq becomes Oriental Theosophy.57 However, this line of interpretation is obviously problematic. If one attends to how Suhrawardī uses ishrāq and ishrāqī, one will come to expect a philosophical interpretation of ishrāq. Consider a particularly relevant passage from Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq II.1.6 “Judgement: a thing’s apprehension of itself is its manifestation (ẓuhūr) to its self rather than, as the Peripatetics 56

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Here is a list of the places where “illumination” and its derivatives appear in al-Muṭāraḥāt VII.1: “illumination” (ishrāq) [ṬRḤ3 487.14, 15, 18, 20, §210], “Illuminationist presential knowledge” (ʿilm ishrāqī ḥuḍūrī) [ṬRḤ3 485.17–18, §208; 487.5, §209; 488.10, §210], “­Illuminationist knowledge” (al-ʿilm al-ishrāqī) [ṬRḤ3 487.2, §209; 489.3, §211], “presential illumination” (ishrāq ḥuḍūrī) [ṬRḤ3 486.15, §209], “the Illuminationist relation” (al-iḍāfa al-ishrāqiyya) [ṬRḤ3 489.5, §211], “the Illuminationist presence” (al-ḥuḍūr al-ishrāqī) [ṬRḤ3 489.8, §211]. See Corbin, Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 31–32.

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hold, its immateriality (al-tajarrud ʿan al-mādda)” [Ḥ.Sh §§119–20, 114–16]. The background of this judgement (ḥukūma) is presumably the Avicennian thesis that self-subsistence, with an emphasis on immateriality, is sufficient for self-intellection.58 This thesis is based on, what Adamson calls, Avicenna’s “default argument”: “Avicenna treats self-intellection as a kind of ‘default’ condition. Any self-subsisting thing, he contends, will engage in self-directed thought unless it is impeded from doing so, the possible impediment being matter.”59 Suhrawardī, however, argues that immateriality (tajarrud) is insufficient for self-apprehension because “the manifestation (ẓuhūr) of the thing to its self” is necessary as well. Otherwise, a taste (ṭaʿm) that is deprived of matter would apprehend itself in virtue of its immateriality; moreover, prime matter (al-hayūlā), as that which is “deprived of other matter” [Ḥ.Sh 115.6, §119], would have self-apprehension as well. Both cases are absurd. But what does Suhrawardī mean by “manifestation”? In self-apprehension, if I say that my self is manifest to me, then I imply not only that my self is not absent from me but also that I have the power to render my self manifest, that is, to illuminate my self. If I were not to have such power, even though my self were not absent, I could not apprehend it and thus could not say that my self is manifest to me. Therefore, a subject’s power to make an object manifest is likely what Suhrawardī means by “illumination”; a subject illuminates an object when it apprehends it. If this is the case, then illumination is indeed the third c­ ondition for all knowledge. In self-apprehension, as I have explained, illumination is necessary. In visual perception, the soul’s attention (iltifāt) in [T10a], which Suhrawardī also calls “presential illumination” (ishrāq ḥuḍūrī) in [Text 12], is also necessary. The same goes for other sorts of presential and formal knowledge. In the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī begins to construct his Light Metaphysics. He shows that every immaterial thing that has ­illumination—every immaterial thing that is “manifest in the reality of itself (al-ẓāhir fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) and manifests others by itself (al-muẓhir li-ghayrihi bi-­dhātihi)” [Ḥ.Sh 113.6–7, §117]—is an “immaterial light” (nūr mujarrad). As I show in Chapter 5, section 4.2, Suhrawardī argues at great length that self-apprehenders are the same as immaterial lights in Light Metaphysics. Illumination, therefore, implies the central notion of Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics: “immaterial light”, which refers to God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls. Moreover, illumination is one of the four kinds of extremely complex interactions between immaterial lights in the 58 59

See, for example, Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, Namaṭ IV.28, p. 146.10–12. Adamson, “Simplicity of Self-Knowledge”, p. 261.

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magnificent light world (as I discuss in Section 5.3). So, illumination also implies the whole immaterial light world. This is my philosophical interpretation of Suhrawardī’s notion of illumination. Based on my analysis in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, it is clear that from al-­Talwīḥāt (and al-Lamaḥāt) to al-Muṭāraḥāt (and al-Muqāwamāt) and lastly to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī’s doctrine is constantly developing and evolving from a Peripatetic style to a more Illuminationist one. This is exactly why he requires that readers follow his Illuminationist syllabus. 4

Presential Knowledge as God’s Knowledge

If one returns to the passages about presential knowledge in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, one immediately realizes that Suhrawardī not only offers an account of the nature of knowledge in general but also of God’s knowledge in particular. To achieve the second goal, he takes an approach from the lower to the higher, from human knowledge to God’s knowledge. [Text 17] The best approach on which the investigator (al-bāḥith) depends … is for human beings to investigate their self-knowledge first and then ascend to what is higher (mā huwa aʿlā). [ṬRḤ3 484.1–5, §208] In the discussions of God’s knowledge in his Peripatetic-style works, Suhrawardī establishes two significant theses: First, God must have presential knowledge of everything (i.e. every particular entity).60 Second, God’s knowledge of ­particulars does not threaten His immutability or simplicity.61 4.1 God’s Presential Knowledge of Everything For human beings, presential knowledge must be superior to formal knowledge and, because God is infinitely more perfect than us, His knowledge must be presential rather than formal and must be more perfect than ours. Suhrawardī writes: [Text 18] If it is sound that Illuminationist knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ishrāqī) is not by means of any form or impression, but rather, it is simply because of 60 61

[LWḤ3 72.13–73.7, §55] = [ṬRḤ3 486.18–488.2, §§209–10] = [LMḤ §123, 284] = [Ḥ.Sh §160, 150]. [LWḤ3 75.3–9, §56] = [ṬRḤ3 488.3–12, §210] = [LMḤ §§124–25, 284–85] = [Ḥ.Sh 152.7– 153.4, §162].

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chapter 2 a specific relation (iḍāfa khāṣṣa), namely, the presence of a thing in the Illuminationist way (ḥuḍūr al-shayʾ ḥuḍūran ishrāqiyyan), as in the case of the soul, then in the case of that whose existence is necessary (wājib al-wujūd)62 [this knowledge] should be more appropriate and complete (awlā wa-atamm). [ṬRḤ3 487.2–4, §209]

Suhrawardī’s full argument that God has presential knowledge of everything is found in al-Talwīḥāt: [Text 19] [T19a] The self of that whose existence is necessary is immaterial, and He is pure existence (al-wujūd al-baḥt). [T19b] Things are present to Him by virtue of a relation of being principle and having total dominion (iḍāfa mabdaʾiyya tasalluṭiyya) because everything (al-kull) is the consequent of His self (lāzim dhātihi).63 His self is not absent from Him, nor is the consequent of His self. [T19c] The non-absence of Him from His self and His consequents, and His immateriality (al-tajarrud ʿan al-mādda) account for His apprehension, as we have established in the case of the soul. All that occurs in knowledge is attributed to the non-absence of a thing, be it a form or something else, from that which is immaterial. [LWḤ3 72.15–73.2, §55] As I show in Section 3, knowledge or understanding is the presence (or non-absence) of an object to an immaterial subject that has illumination. So, to prove that God has presential knowledge of everything, Suhrawardī must establish 62

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Wājib al-wujūd, a crucial metaphysical phrase introduced by Avicenna, is very difficult to render. Scholars use “necessary existent”, “necessary existence”, “the necessary of existence”, and so on. But none of these renderings are accurate enough: “necessary existent” is mawjūd wājib, “necessary existence” is wujūd wājib, and “the necessary of existence” is al-wājib min al-wujūd. I render wājib al-wujūd as “that whose existence is necessary”, which is a literal rendering of this phrase. I hold that the emphasis of this phrase is on wājib (necessary): that which is necessary in terms of its existence. An accurate rendering of wājib al-wujūd is crucial to Illuminationism, given that Suhrawardī distinguishes sharply between “existence” (wujūd) and “existent” (mawjūd), as I show in ­Chapter 3. In most cases, Suhrawardī’s wājib al-wujūd is short for wājib al-­ wujūd bi-­dhātihi (that whose existence is necessary by itself), and al-wājib is short for wājib al-wujūd, referring to God. That is to say, everything necessarily follows from the self of God, and God necessitates the existence of everything.

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the following three points: God is immaterial; God has illumination over His self and everything (i.e. He has the power to make His self and everything manifest); and nothing, including His self, is absent from Him. The second point is not addressed in [Text 19] because, at this point in al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī has not yet introduced illumination as the third condition for knowledge. But, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, he does mention illumination. [Text 20] That whose existence is necessary does not need forms. He has the illumination and the unrestricted total dominion (al-tasalluṭ al-muṭlaq), so nothing can escape from Him. [ṬRḤ3 487.17–19, §210] Suhrawardī’s complete argument can be reconstructed as follows. The first point occurs in [T19a]: God, as that whose existence is necessary, is pure existence (al-wujūd al-baḥt), so He must be free from everything else, including matter. He must, therefore, be immaterial. Moreover, given that the self of every human being is proved to be immaterial, God must likewise be immaterial; otherwise, God would be inferior to human beings. As for the second point, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq II.1.9 “On the Light of lights”, Suhrawardī argues that God is the Light of lights (nūr al-anwār), the most perfect immaterial light. All immaterial lights—God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls—have illumination over their selves and other things. If God did not have illumination, He would be inferior to human souls. The third point, as it occurs in [T19b], is twofold: On the one hand, God’s self is not absent from Him. God is pure existence, so nothing stands in the way between Him and His self, so God’s self must not be absent from Him. Moreover, if God’s self were absent from Him, God would be inferior to human beings. On the other, everything is present to God. Everything is the consequent of His self to the extent that God is the cause (ʿilla) of everything. “Cause” has a technical meaning in metaphysics, as Suhrawardī explains: “We mean by ‘cause’ that whose existence necessitates the existence of another thing absolutely, without any conceivable delay.” [Ḥ.Sh 62.15–16, §54] God ­necessitates the existence of everything by His existence absolutely and without any delay, so He has “total dominion” (tasalluṭ) over everything. This is why the relation between God and everything is called the “relation of being principle and having total dominion” (iḍāfa mabdaʾiyya tasalluṭiyya). If A has dominion over B, then B is present to A; call this the Dominion-­ Presence Rule. Consider human beings: one’s soul has dominion over one’s

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body such that the body is present to the soul. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī argues this way: [Text 21] If we had dominion (salṭana) over things other than our body, like how [we have dominion] over our body, then we would apprehend other things like how we apprehend the body, that is, without the need for any form, as mentioned above. [LWḤ3 73.5–6, §55] Suhrawardī uses tasalluṭ to refer to God’s dominion, mastery, rule, or ­control over everything, and salṭana to refer to a human being’s dominion over the body. I, therefore, render tasalluṭ and salṭana respectively as “total dominion” and “dominion”. Given that God has total dominion over everything, in that He is the complete cause (ʿilla tāmma) of everything and responsible for the ­existence of everything, everything must be constantly present to Him in the most perfect way. Based on these three arguments, God must have presential knowledge of everything. With [Text 21] Suhrawardī provides a convenient way for us to imagine what God’s presential knowledge might be like. Suppose that we dominate not only our bodies but also everything that surrounds us: the desk, the chair, the walls, and even dust. We would know all these things just as we know our bodies. But we should also be aware that God’s presential knowledge of everything must be infinitely more perfect than our knowledge of our bodies. God, as the complete cause, has total dominion over everything, so everything must be constantly present to God in the most perfect way. We have inferior dominion over our bodies: we manipulate our bodies as tools. We, therefore, perceive our bodies only intermittently, as made evident in Avicenna’s Flying Man, and there are so many things about our bodies (especially, for instance, our internal organs) that we have to know through other means (e.g. through X-rays, CT scans, and so on). Indeed, God’s presential knowledge of everything is more similar to how we know our selves: unmediatedly, constantly, and comprehensively. Self-apprehension is the best presential knowledge that we have. Suhrawardī concludes: [Text 22] It is obvious from this that God comprehends everything (muḥīṭ bi-kull al-shayʾ) and He apprehends all instances of existence (aʿdād al-wujūd). And that [His knowledge or apprehension] is the very presence to Him and His total dominion (al-tasalluṭ), without [the need for] any form or image. [LWḤ3 73.6–7, §55]

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4.2 God’s Knowledge of Particulars According to Avicenna’s well-known (and notorious) doctrine, God only understands particulars “in a universal manner” (ʿalā naḥw kullī).64 Although the doctrine is complicated, I provide a concise sketch of it.65 Avicenna writes: [That whose existence is necessary, God] apprehends particular things inasmuch as they are universal, that is, inasmuch as they have [universal] attributes (ṣifāt). … If that individual is among what is also an individual for the intellect, then the intellect has access to that thing described (al-marsūm), and that thing is the individual that is single in its species and has nothing similar to it, such as the sun, or Jupiter. If the species is spread out in individuals, then the intellect has no access to describing (rasm) that thing.66 The proper objects of God’s knowledge are universals because God is an intellect by nature. God understands all species, which are universals, but in most 64

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Avicenna, Al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāt [The Healing: Metaphysics] VIII.6, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al. (1960; repr. Qom, 2012), pp. 358.14–362.11; cf. Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, Namaṭ VII.18, pp. 182–83. I cite Madkūr’s edition of al-Ilāhiyyāt and consult Marmura’s edition: Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing (Al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāt), ed. and trans. Michael E. ­Marmura (Provo, Utah, 2005). It is well known that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) severely criticizes Avicenna’s doctrine in the thirteenth discussion of his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa; see Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa), ed. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utah, 2000), pp. 134–43. Note that scholars hold different interpretations of Avicenna’s doctrine; my interpretation is closer to Marmura’s. See Michael E. Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s ­Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 82, no. 3 (1962), 299–312; Rahim Acar, “Reconsidering Avicenna’s Position on God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, in Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam, ed. Jon McGinnis (Leiden, 2004), pp. 142–56; Peter Adamson, “XI—On Knowledge of Particulars”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105, no. 1 (2005), 257–78; Kevjn Lim, “God’s Knowledge of Particulars: Avicenna, Maimonides, and Gersonides”, Journal of Islamic Philosophy 5 (2009), 75–98; S. Nusseibeh, “Avicenna: Providence and God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, in Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy, ed. Y. Tzvi Langermann (Turnhout, 2009), pp. 275–88; Deborah L. Black, “Avicenna on Individuation, Self-Awareness, and God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, in The Judeo-Christian-­ Islamic ­Heritage: Philosophical and Theological Perspective, ed. Richard C. Taylor and Irfan A. Omar (Milwaukee, 2012), pp. 255–81; Fedor Benevich, “God’s Knowledge of Particulars: Avicenna, Kalām, and the Post-Avicennian Synthesis”, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 86, no. 1 (2019), 1–47; Amirhossein Zadyousefi, “A Neglected Interpretation of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, Asian Philosophy 32, no. 1 (2022), 1–14. Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 360.3–10.

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cases cannot understand their particular members individually. The only exceptions are singleton species, namely, superlunary entities that include separate intellects and heavenly bodies and souls.67 By understanding those species, each of which has only one particular member, God at the same time understands those particulars individually. To put it another way, God’s knowledge is essentially self-intellection. By understanding His essence or self (dhāt), He understands from His essence what He is the principle of. And He is the principle of the complete existents (al-mawjūdāt al-tāmma) in terms of themselves (bi-aʿyānihā)68 and of the generable and perishable ­existents (al-mawjūdāt al-kāʾina al-fāsida), first, in terms of their species and [secondly] in terms of their individuals by means of (bi-tawassuṭ) those species.69 That is to say, in His self-intellection, God simultaneously understands all universal species. The superlunary species are singletons so, by understanding them, God also understands those particulars individually. The sublunary species, however, have multiple, perishable particular members, so God can only understand them by means of their species—“inasmuch as they are universal” or “inasmuch as they have [universal] attributes”. However, God cannot understand those particulars individually. Call this the Objects-as-Universals Argument. In arguing that God cannot understand sublunary particular entities individually, Avicenna’s main purpose is to avoid imputing any change in God’s essence: “It is not permissible [for God] to understand these changeables (al-mutaghayyirāt) with their change.”70 Otherwise, if God understands A and if A first exists and then perishes, God will understand two forms—“A is existent” and “A is non-existent”—that cannot exist at the same time. As a result, the essence of God, as the substrate of the two forms, will change.71 Call this the Change-in-Essence Argument. Moreover, it is impossible for God to know sublunary particular entities individually. “The perishables” (al-fāsidāt) themselves are not intelligibles but sensibles or imaginables, and their sensible or 67 68 69 70 71

Cf. Marmura, “Some Aspects”, pp. 305–6. That is, eternal entities in the superlunary world; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics of The ­Healing, p. 416, note 10. Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 359.1–2. Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 359.3. Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 359.4–7; cf. [Text 23] below, which is Suhrawardī’s response.

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imaginable forms can be apprehended only by means of corresponding particular organs; God, however, is an immaterial intellect.72 Let us mark this as the No-Access Argument. While this analysis is mainly about particular entities, Avicenna also addresses a very special particular event: eclipses (sing. kusūf).73 He argues that God likewise understands every particular eclipse in a universal manner. Avicenna suggests that God understands not only the universal model of eclipses but also every particular eclipse individually. God understands particular eclipses similar to how He understands singleton species individually. An eclipse is a special case: all the particular entities involved—the sun, the moon, and the earth—are singleton species, so God can understand them individually, together with all their particular movements. Therefore, nothing impedes Him from understanding all causes of all eclipses. Avicenna seems to hold that the cause of each eclipse is somehow different from the rest, so “you can know, through some argument, that that eclipse is but one [particular] eclipse itself”.74 But God cannot know any eclipse as a particular temporal event insofar as that will require changes in God’s essence. Moreover, temporal events are accessible only through “sensory experience” (al-mushāhada al-­ḥissiyya).75 As for particular events in the sublunary world, it seems that God cannot understand them, given that God cannot understand sublunary particular entities individually. However, Avicenna does not address this point. Avicenna’s seemingly odd theory is the logical consequence of his formal knowledge epistemology. Because the proper objects of intellectual understanding are universal forms, God, as a self-understanding intellect, has access only to universals. We have seen that Avicenna takes great pains to find some special cases in which God, by understanding universals, also has direct access to some particulars. However, God cannot understand most particulars individually because, given that the nature of knowledge or understanding involves the imprinting (inṭibāʿ) or the occurrence (ḥuṣūl) of the form of an object in a subject, the knowledge of multiple and changing particulars will necessitate multiple and changing forms in the essence of God and thereby threaten His simplicity and immutability. By formulating presential knowledge, Suhrawardī answers the Avicennian problem of God’s knowledge of particulars by explaining how God has full access to all particulars. Suhrawardī’s theory requires that we distinguish between 72 73 74 75

Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, p. 359.7–12. Cf. Marmura, “Some Aspects”, pp. 304–10. Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 360.17–361.1. Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 360.11–362.6.

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two types of particulars: particular entities and particular events. For Avicenna, God’s knowledge of both cases is formal. But, for Suhrawardī, God’s knowledge of particular entities is presential and His knowledge of particular events is formal, so the two cases must be treated separately.76 God has presential knowledge of every particular entity, whether superlunary or sublunary, immaterial or material (see Section 4.1). He ­apprehends all particular entities qua particulars rather than qua universals because ­particulars are the proper objects of knowledge, especially of God’s knowledge. Given Suhrawardī’s account of presential knowledge, Avicenna’s Objects-­ as-­Universals Argument does not apply. Moreover, Suhrawardī holds that ­particular entities are accessible through multiple presential ways (e.g. sense perceptions, the apprehension of the body, self-apprehension, etc.) and so, by the Dominion-Presence Rule (Section 4.1), God has the most perfect access to every particular entity. So too, Avicenna’s No-Access Argument does not work. Because presence is a specific relation (iḍāfa khāṣṣa, [Text 18]), God’s knowledge of multiple and changing particular entities implies multiplicity and changes only in the relations between Him and them and no changes in His essence. Suhrawardī argues: [Text 23] If His knowledge is presential and Illuminationist (ḥuḍūrī ishrāqī), rather than by means of any form in His essence/self (dhāt), then if something ceases to exist, for example, and the relation ceases to exist, no change in Himself follows [from this]. For example, suppose that Zayd exists and He is the principle of Zayd. If Zayd does not remain existent, and the relation of being principle (iḍāfat al-mabdaʾiyya) does not remain, no change in His essence follows from it. You know that if what is on your right moves to your left, this is through the change of the relation, rather than through the change in your essence. [ṬRḤ3 488.3–7, §210] This passage can be read as a direct response to Avicenna’s Change-in-Essence Argument. In formal knowledge, the form of an object occurs in a subject, 76

Benevich argues that according to Suhrawardī, God has presential knowledge of celestial intellects, and knows sublunary temporal events by means of their forms impressed in the celestial intellects; see “God’s Knowledge of Particulars”, pp. 36–40. My interpretation differs from Benevich’s on two points: First, I argue that God has presential knowledge of every particular entity, and not just of celestial intellects. Second, God knows particular events by means of the heavenly souls, rather than the celestial intellects (mudabbirāt in [Text 27] below is usually used by Suhrawardī in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq to refer to “souls” rather than “intellects”).

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so the change of the form from existence to non-existence leads to a change in the essence of the subject. But in presential knowledge, an object itself is present to a subject, so the change of the object from existence to non-­ existence leads to a change of the very presence—their specific relation—from ­existence to non-existence; the essence of the subject does not change. Moreover, Suhrawardī points out that multiple relations also do not threaten God’s simplicity. [Text 24] Relation (al-iḍāfa) is permissible in His reality (ḥaqq) ... and it does not harm His oneness (waḥdāniyya). [LWḤ3 73.2–3, §55] [Text 25] The plurality of intellectual relations (taʿaddud al-iḍāfāt al-ʿaqliyya) does not necessitate multiplicity in His essence. [Ḥ.Sh 153.3–4, §162] In both al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī acknowledges that God does not know particular temporal events directly but by means of the ­heavenly souls. In al-Muṭāraḥāt, he writes: [Text 26] [T26a] Temporal knowledge (al-ʿilm al-zamānī), insofar as it necessitates change, is impossible in the reality of that whose existence is necessary. Suppose that one knows that “Zayd will arrive”. If Zayd arrived, but one still knows that “Zayd will arrive”, then one is ignorant. If one knows that Zayd arrived, then one’s first knowledge has become invalid, so it changed. This points to formal knowledge.77 [T26b] As for the Illuminationist presential knowledge of the essences of things [i.e. particular entities] and of their forms [i.e. events] in the heavenly apprehenders (al-mudrikāt al-samāwiyya)—the change of which is not impossible—that are present by their forms and their changes to the First without His change, no change follows from this [knowledge]. [ṬRḤ3 488.7–12, §210] Suhrawardī argues in [T26a] that the knowledge of particular temporal events is formal and propositional. Given that such knowledge is formal, the change of forms will lead to changes in God’s essence. It is, therefore, impossible for 77

Cf. [LWḤ3 75.3–7, §56].

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God to know them directly, that is, by the occurring or imprinting of forms in His essence. Unlike Avicenna, however, Suhrawardī explains in [T26b] that God still has full access to particular temporal events through the heavenly souls. [Text 27] Past and future events (umūr), whose forms are stable in the heavenly managers [i.e. the heavenly souls that manage heavenly bodies] (al-­ mudabbirāt al-samāwiyya), are present to Him because He has comprehension and illumination over the bearer (ḥāmil) of those forms. [ṬRḤ3 487.19–20, §210] Although God’s essence does not change, the essences of heavenly souls can. The forms of temporal events are imprinted in the heavenly souls, of which God has presential knowledge; and, by means of the heavenly souls, those forms are thereby present to God without causing any change in His essence. (Suhrawardī is not concerned with Avicenna’s example of eclipses because they involve formal knowledge as well. Because Suhrawardī’s account explains how God has access to all particular temporal eclipses by means of the heavenly souls, Avicenna’s account is no longer needed.) Finally, when Suhrawardī argues that God has presential knowledge of everything, we should interpret the claim to mean that God has presential knowledge of every particular entity. God has formal knowledge as well: He apprehends, by means of intermediaries, the forms of all particular events and, presumably, all imaginal and intelligible forms that human beings apprehend as well. In short, God simply apprehends everything; on Suhrawardī’s doctrine, God’s knowledge is not restricted. 5

The Hierarchy of Knowledge in Illuminationism

In the introduction to this chapter, I remarked that Suhrawardī’s epistemology is essentially not Avicennian. In this section, I elaborate on the hierarchy of knowledge in Illuminationism and examine the relation between presential knowledge and formal knowledge; I also discuss the highest type of presential knowledge—a sort of mystical knowledge—for which Illuminationists strive. 5.1 Three Levels of Presential Knowledge, and Formal Knowledge Although, in the relevant texts, Suhrawardī does not explicitly distinguish the various levels of presential knowledge, the analysis I have provided allows and,

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indeed, requires us to do so. God’s presential knowledge is superior to human presential knowledge, and human presential knowledge has various hierarchical levels: self-apprehension is superior to the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties, which is itself superior to sense perceptions. Presential knowledge of the highest level may be called “presential knowledge by being principle and having total dominion”.78 On this level, the subject (S) is the principle (mabdaʾ) or the complete cause of the object (O); that is, the existence of O depends entirely on S. In other words, S has total dominion (tasalluṭ) over O. Given the Dominion-Presence Rule, O is constantly present to S. Therefore, O can never escape from the knowledge of S, and S can never be deprived of the knowledge of O (unless O ceases to exist). This is God’s presential knowledge of everything as well as the presential knowledge that separate intellects have of whatever is below them in the hierarchy of existence (see Section 5.3). It seems that self-apprehension should also be placed at this level insofar as it is also constant and cannot be deprived. But the difference is that the relation between me and my self is not “being principle” (mabdaʾiyya) or “having total dominion” (tasalluṭiyya). Instead, it is the absolute identity. [Text 28] Your self is the understanding, that which understands, and that which is understood (al-ʿaql wa-l-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl). [LWḤ3 71.3–4, §55] The second level may be called “presential knowledge by dominion” and involves the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties. On this level, although S is not the principle of O, S nonetheless has dominion (salṭana; which is inferior to God’s tasalluṭ) over O: S manipulates O as its tool. Given the Dominion-Presence Rule, and because this dominion is inferior, O is intermittently present to S, so S has intermittent presential knowledge of O (cf. the Flying Man). Moreover, as soon as S loses dominion over O, S loses the presential knowledge of O. For instance, the amputee loses the presential knowledge of their limb. The third and lowest level of presential knowledge is our sense perceptions of extramental sensible particulars. In sense perception, S neither is the principle of O nor has dominion over O; the occurrence of S’s knowledge of O is simply the result of the encounter (muqābala) of S’s corresponding sense organ with O. The mechanism of sense perception is as follows: First, S has dominion 78

I borrow Suhrawardī’s own phrase “relation of being principle and having total ­dominion (iḍāfa mabdaʾiyya tasalluṭiyya)” in [T19b].

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over its sense organs, so S has second-level presential knowledge of its organs. When S’s sense organ encounters O, O becomes present to S by means of the sense organ. In this way, S’s presential sense perception of O arises. Therefore, the major difference between sense perception and presential knowledge in the first and second levels is that sense perception requires S’s sense organs as intermediaries, whereas presential knowledge in the first and second levels requires no intermediary whatsoever. Moreover, it is very easy for S to lose the presential sense perception of O. As soon as S’s encounter with O ceases or even when S is not attending to O (e.g. looking without seeing), S loses the knowledge of O. Formal knowledge is inferior to any level of presential knowledge because the objects of formal knowledge are no longer real particulars themselves but rather their universal or particular forms. Recall that, for Suhrawardī, when we cannot make an object itself present to us, because of the limitations of human knowledge, we resort to its form as an intermediary through which to know it. Moreover, presential knowledge is unmediated, particular, dynamic, continuous, and comprehensive; formal knowledge is mediated, universal, static, and somewhat one-sided. Towards the end of al-Muṭāraḥāt VII.1 [ṬRḤ3 489.1–13, §211], Suhrawardī raises and then answers two significant questions. The first question is about correspondence (muṭābaqa) and the infallibility of presential knowledge. [Text 29] Question: Suppose that some apprehender knows something. If ­nothing occurs in him, then he does not know it; if something occurs, then ­correspondence (muṭābaqa) is necessary. Answer: Formal knowledge must be like this. As for the Illuminationist knowledges mentioned above, if they occur newly, then something new occurs to the apprehender: the Illuminationist relation (al-iḍāfa al-ishrāqiyya) and nothing else, and it needs no correspondence. [ṬRḤ3 489.1–5, §211] In formal knowledge, S apprehends O by means of the form, and the form must correspond to O if the apprehension is correct.79 It is, therefore, fallible. In presential knowledge, however, S unmediatedly apprehends O itself, so there is no correspondence. S either knows O or does not, so correct or incorrect 79

Cf. [Ḥ.Sh 15.3–7, §8]. Suhrawardī writes that if a thing is absent from you, then you apprehend it by its image (mithāl), and the correspondence, in this case, is necessary. This is formal knowledge.

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is not relevant. Presential knowledge is, therefore, infallible.80 The only thing that occurs is the “Illuminationist relation” (i.e. the presence itself) between S and O. At this point, if we consider the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (see [Text 6] in Chapter 1), it becomes clear why Suhrawardī claims that presential knowledge is secure against doubts: “Then I sought the proof of it, until even if I disregarded the proof, for instance, no one would make me doubt it.” [Ḥ.Sh 10.9–10, §3] Perhaps Bertrand Russell’s view on knowledge by acquaintance can shed some light on the infallibility of presential knowledge. Our knowledge of truths, unlike our knowledge of things, has an opposite, namely error. So far as things are concerned, we may know them or not know them, but there is no positive state of mind which can be described as erroneous knowledge of things, so long, at any rate, as we confine ourselves to knowledge by acquaintance. Whatever we are acquainted with must be something; we may draw wrong inferences from our acquaintance, but the acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive. Thus there is no dualism as regards acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of truths, there is a dualism. We may believe what is false as well as what is true. We know that on very many subjects different people hold different and incompatible opinions: hence some beliefs must be erroneous.81 The second question that Suhrawardī considers is about whether knowledge is divisible into conception and assent (taṣawwur wa-taṣdīq), a significant ­distinction that Avicenna introduced in logic.82 [Text 30] Question: Did they [the Peripatetics] not divide knowledge into ­conception and assent? 80 81

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Cf. Yazdi, Principles of Epistemology, pp. 45–46. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912; repr. Oxford, 2001), p. 69. I am not suggesting that Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge is the same as Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance, but they surely have similarities. Yazdi compares these two theories; see Principles of Epistemology, pp. 59–61. See, for example, Avicenna, Al-Najāt, pp. 7.1–8.9. Avicenna writes: “Every cognition (maʿrifa) or knowledge (ʿilm) is either a conception (taṣawwur) or an assent (taṣdīq). The conception is the first knowledge, and it is acquired through definition (al-ḥadd) and the like, such as our conception of the quiddity of human. The assent is acquired through syllogism (al-qiyās) and the like, such as our assent that the whole (al-kull) has a single principle.” Avicenna, Al-Najāt, p. 7.3–5; cf. Ahmed’s translation in Avicenna, Avicenna’s Deliverance: Logic, trans. Asad Q. Ahmed (Pakistan, 2011), p. 3.

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chapter 2 Answer: Those knowledges should be confined to our knowledges that are not our knowledges of our selves and of things for which the Illuminationist presence (al-ḥuḍūr al-ishrāqī) is sufficient. As for what is other than those, such as the knowledge of the First and the knowledges of self-apprehenders, it is in reality not from conception and assent. [ṬRḤ3 489.6–9, §211]

Formal knowledge is divisible into conception and assent, but this distinction does not apply to presential knowledge because conception and assent are all about forms, but no forms are involved in presential knowledge.83 Thus, for Suhrawardī, presential knowledge is non-propositional. 5.2 The Relation between Presential Knowledge and Formal Knowledge We now understand how Suhrawardī’s presential knowledge is essentially different from formal knowledge and why the former is superior. A crucial question at this point is how they relate to each other. Suhrawardī does not address this problem in his discussion of presential knowledge, and, to my knowledge, he does not discuss it elsewhere. My answer, based on his discussion of fiṭrī (instinctive) knowledge, is that presential knowledge serves as the basis of formal knowledge. Given that scholars disagree on how to interpret and render fiṭrī, I use the Arabic term fiṭrī in the discussion and will justify my rendering as “instinctive”.84 Here, I offer a brief sketch of my hypothesis. According to Suhrawardī, knowledge is first divided into presential and formal knowledge. Presential knowledge is then subdivided into three types, while formal knowledge is subdivided into conception and assent. Moreover, at the very beginning of the Logic of al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes that every conception is either fiṭrī or non-fiṭrī; so is every assent. Thus, we have a crucial point for understanding the relation between presential and formal knowledge.

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Cf. Yazdi, Principles of Epistemology, pp. 46–47. There are three philosophically intriguing short articles on Suhrawardī’s fiṭrī ­knowledge: Seyed N. Mousavian, “Did Suhrawardi Believe in Innate Ideas as A Priori Concepts? A Note”, Philosophy East and West 64, no. 2 (2014), 473–80; John Walbridge, “A Response to Seyed N. Mousavian, ‘Did Suhrawardi Believe in Innate Ideas as A Priori Concepts? A Note’”, Philosophy East and West 64, no. 2 (2014), 481–86; Seyed N. Mousavian, “Suhrawardi on Innateness: A Reply to John Walbridge”, Philosophy East and West 64, no. 2 (2014), 486–501. According to Mousavian and Walbridge, the claim, which Ziai and Aminrazavi hold, that Suhrawardī’s fiṭrī knowledge refers to a priori or pre-given ­knowledge is ­undermined.

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[Text 31] [T31a] Know that knowledge is either a conception (taṣawwur), which is the occurrence of the form of something in the intellect, or an assent (taṣdīq), which is the judgement on [several] conceptions either by affirmation or negation. There is no assent except on two conceptions or more. [T31b] Each of the two is divided into fiṭrī and non-fiṭrī. The first of the first [i.e. a fiṭrī conception] is like the conception of the meaning (mafhūm) of “thing” or “existence”; the second [i.e. a non-fiṭrī conception] is like the conception of “intellect” or “angel” (malak). The two divisions of assent are like your judgments that “the whole is greater than the part” and that “the world is that whose existence is contingent”. [T31c] The non-fiṭrī [conception or assent] is obtained through thinking (al-fikr). We mean by “thinking” here that a person determines to transit (intiqāl) from his current knowledge to his acquired knowledge. [LWḤ 4.7–14] Fiṭrī knowledge, which consists of fiṭrī conceptions and fiṭrī assents, must be acquired directly without thinking (fikr), without the transition from known conceptions or assents to unknown conceptions or assents. Therefore, for Suhrawardī, fiṭrī knowledge is not a priori or pre-given; it must be acquired directly without thinking. In [T31b], Suhrawardī mentions one type of fiṭrī conceptions, those acquired directly by using the fiṭra (instinct) of the intellect (ʿaql), such as the conceptions of “thing” and “existence”. Other types of fiṭrī conceptions are acquired directly by using the fiṭar (instincts) of the senses, for example, blackness, a certain sound, a certain smell, and brightness (ḍawʾ) [Ḥ.Sh 104.4–17, §105]. I am concerned with the latter types of fiṭrī conceptions because they link presential knowledge to formal knowledge, given that these fiṭrī conceptions must be acquired by presential sense perceptions. Consider the conception of redness. I apprehend the particular redness of this apple through presential visual perception. This redness is not yet the fiṭrī conception of redness. But after apprehending more real instances of redness (e.g. by perceiving apples, tomatoes, strawberries), I form the fiṭrī conception of redness by acquiring the universal form of redness. This is the only way that I can know redness and make the form of redness occur in my intellect. Suhrawardī argues, for instance in al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, that the Peripatetic essential definition (ḥadd dhātī; i.e. genus-differentia

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definition) does not at all help one acquire the fiṭrī conception of redness.85 If I had been born blind, I would never be able to acquire, by a Peripatetic definition, the conception of redness no matter how accurate the definition seems. Moreover, no other sensibles (maḥsūsāt; e.g. sounds, smells, tastes) can help me acquire the conception of redness. The only way to acquire the fiṭrī conception of redness is to use my corresponding fiṭra (instinct): visual perception. And I have to acquire every fiṭrī conception of every sensible separately: redness, blackness, the sound of the nightingale, the smell of ambergris, the taste of manuka honey, and so on. Therefore, there are many fiṭrī conceptions that must be derived from presential knowledge: the conceptions of all sorts of colours, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile impressions, and presumably even emotions and feelings. Definitions cannot help one acquire any fiṭrī conceptions of the sensibles; this is one crucial reason for Suhrawardī’s severe critique of the Peripatetic essential definition. Given that conceptions are the basis of formal knowledge (because “there is no assent except on two conceptions or more” [T31a]) and the fiṭrī conceptions of all sensibles must be derived from presential sense perceptions, presential knowledge serves as the basis of formal knowledge. 5.3 The Highest Human Presential Knowledge Another problem, which I discuss briefly in this chapter, is whether presential knowledge is merely a mass of impressions. To the extent that presential knowledge does not involve placing things perceived under universals, how is it possible to develop a philosophical picture of the world through such knowledge? This question cannot be answered adequately without examining Light Metaphysics in detail, especially Book II of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.86 Here a sort of mystical knowledge enters Suhrawardī’s account: the significant deification (taʾalluh) approach of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. This is what Suhrawardī means by “spiritual observations” (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) and how he interprets the “tasting” (dhawq), “unveiling” (mukāshafa), and “witnessing” (mushāhada) of Sufism. Nonetheless, this mystical knowledge can be explained in philosophical terms. First consider God’s presential knowledge, which is of the highest ­level—“presential knowledge by being principle and having total dominion”. In this knowledge, all things, together with His self, are present to Him at once; God knows everything at once in one single apprehension. In other words, God has the most perfect picture of the world with its every tiny detail in virtue 85 86

[ṬRḤ3 369.3–7, §115] and [QWM3 170.8–11, §40]; see Chapter 4, section 3.1.4 for more detail. Book II is beyond the scope of this book. I analyse Book I in detail in Chapter 5.

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of His most perfect presential knowledge. Similarly, but for whatever is below them in the hierarchy of existence, separate intellects have perfect presential knowledge. Separate intellects, which in Illuminationism are called “conquering immaterial lights” (al-anwār al-mujarrada al-qāhira), are divided into two orders: the vertical order of “mothers” (al-ummahāt), “roots” (al-uṣūl), or “primordial conquering lights” (al-anwār al-qāhira al-aʿlūn), and the horizontal order of “lords/masters of idols/species” (arbāb/aṣḥāb al-aṣnām/al-anwāʿ). The latter are the Illuminationist Platonic Forms, which are living, immaterial, self-apprehending particulars. The primordial conquering lights apprehend presentially all that is below them, including the lords of species and all material particulars; the lords of species apprehend presentially all material particular members of the species for which they are responsible. Suhrawardī’s deification, therefore, refers to this most perfect presential knowledge. One can achieve this perfect presential knowledge only when one is stripped of one’s material body, ascends to the immaterial light world, and is engaged in extremely complex interactions between those immaterial lights: illumination (ishrāq) and witnessing (mushāhada), conquering (qahr) and affection (maḥabba) or love (ʿishq). [Text 32] If there is no veil (ḥijāb) between a lower light (al-nūr al-sāfil) and a higher [light] (al-ʿālī), the lower witnesses (yushāhidu) the higher, and the light of the higher illuminates (yushriqu) the lower. [Ḥ.Sh 133.14–15, §143] In Light Metaphysics, every human soul is an immaterial light. In fact, all self-apprehenders—God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls—are immaterial lights (see Chapter 5, section 4.2). When the soul is divested of the material body and ascends to the magnificent light world, there is no more veil or obstacle between it and other immaterial lights. Therefore, the soul can taste, unveil, witness, and apprehend presentially those immaterial lights and thereby share in the most perfect presential knowledge of all real particulars. In this way, human beings can build up the most perfect philosophical picture of the world through presential knowledge of the highest level. The highest human presential knowledge, therefore, has two aspects: the “spiritual ­observations” (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) of separate intellects and God, and the perfect presential knowledge of all material particulars below them. Thus, we can better understand why Suhrawardī calls the Illuminationist approach “deification”. First, as mentioned in Chapter 1, section 2, Suhrawardī seems to appeal to Plato’s idea that human beings must strive to become godlike

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and to the well-known definition of falsafa: “Philosophy is the imitation of God (al-tashabbuh bi-l-ilāh) according to the human capacity (bi-ḥasabi l-ṭāqa al-bashariyya) in order to achieve eternal happiness.” [Q.D 3.10–11] Second, when human beings make every effort to achieve the highest presential knowledge, they become like God, who possesses such knowledge. Third, the whole journey of the soul is exactly deification, a process that involves one’s getting rid of the body, ascending to the immaterial world, and imitating the most perfect God. Moreover, we can understand why Suhrawardī equates “deification” with the Sufi approach. The purification and ascendance of the soul require intense Sufi practices (riyāḍāt). Moreover, Sufi knowledge is exactly the “spiritual observations” of God and the immaterial world. 6

Summary of Chapter 2

Given the general dissatisfaction with Avicennian epistemology in the 12th and 13th centuries, Suhrawardī formulates the theory of presential knowledge to replace Avicenna’s account of formal knowledge; in particular, the theory attempts to answer the problems about how God and humans know particulars. Moreover, presential knowledge is designed to free Avicenna’s notion of PSA from the Aristotelian epistemological framework so that Suhrawardī can develop the notion to its full potential. Based on three key texts—al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and Ḥikmat al-­ Ishrāq—I have systematically reconstructed the theory of presential knowledge. There are five key takeaways. First, there are at least four kinds of human knowledge that cannot be formal knowledge: self-apprehension, the apprehension of one’s body and bodily faculties, the apprehension of pain caused by amputation, and visual perception. None of these require forms as intermediaries. Second, Suhrawardī further argues that the nature of all knowledge or understanding must be the presence (or non-absence) of an object to an immaterial subject that has illumination. The notion of presence accounts for both presential and formal knowledge: presential knowledge is the presence (or non-absence) of a real particular object itself, whereas formal knowledge is the presence of an object’s form—either its particular imaginal form or universal intelligible form—when the object itself is absent. Third, God must have presential knowledge of everything: nothing is absent from Him in virtue of His total dominion (tasalluṭ). Moreover, His knowledge of all particular entities and events does not threaten His immutability or simplicity. Fourth, I summarized the Illuminationist hierarchy of knowledge. Presential knowledge has three levels, and formal knowledge is inferior to every

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level of presential knowledge because presential knowledge is always of real ­particulars themselves. Moreover, presential knowledge must be infallible and cannot be divided into conception and assent (i.e. it is non-­propositional). I also argued that presential knowledge serves as the basis of formal knowledge to the extent that fiṭrī (instinctive) conceptions of all sensibles must be derived from presential sense perceptions. Finally, I have argued that although the highest human presential knowledge is somewhat mystical, it can be explained in philosophical terms through the Illuminationist epistemological framework. Suhrawardī believes the soul, through intense Sufi practices, can be purified from the body, ascend to the immaterial light world, and taste, unveil, witness, and apprehend presentially separate intellects and even God Himself. Doing so enables the soul to share some of their most perfect presential knowledge of all real particulars. The Illuminationist deification (taʾalluh) approach is exactly presential knowledge. Let me cite again what Suhrawardī writes in the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: This is another path and a road that is shorter, more ordered, more accurate, and much easier to acquire than the method of the Peripatetics. It did not occur to me at first by thinking (fikr); rather, its occurrence was by something else. Then I sought the proof of it, until even if I disregarded the proof, for instance, no one would make me doubt it. [Ḥ.Sh 10.8–10, §3] Presential knowledge is always of real particulars themselves rather than of their forms, so it is “more accurate” than formal knowledge. It requires no conceptions, definitions, assents, or demonstrations but merely requires the presence (or non-absence) of particulars themselves. So in this sense, it is “shorter”, “more ordered”, “much easier to acquire”, and does not occur by thinking. It is also infallible, so it is secure against doubts and does not require proof. It is now plain to see that presential knowledge is the epistemological foundation of Illuminationism. Suhrawardī’s lifelong pursuit is also largely revealed by the discussion in this chapter. He firmly believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are particulars rather than universals; his ambition, therefore, is to break through the limitations of human knowledge and to apprehend all real particulars presentially, including the material particulars of this world as well as the immaterial particulars—God and separate intellects— beyond this world. Suhrawardī is, however, fully aware that eventually, only a very few blessed individuals can escape from the cave, ascend to the light world, and witness the

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living things under the sunlight, the things in the sky, and the Sun. Most people have to resort to formal knowledge to apprehend those material and immaterial particulars that are absent from us. Through the Peripatetic investigation (baḥth) approach, we can at least learn a few things about the light world, such as the existence of God, the nature of His knowledge, the existence of separate intellects, and so on. This further explains why the Peripatetic-style works are indispensable for Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist project from an epistemological perspective. He composes these works as “the books of the community” (kutub al-qawm) [ṬRḤ3 194.5–6] to expound comprehensively “the common philosophy for all investigators” (al-ḥikma al-ʿāmma li-jamīʿ al-bāḥithīn) [ṬRḤ3 195, footnote]. Although Suhrawardī fully acknowledges the validity of the Peripatetic ­investigation approach, he does not believe that the various versions of Peripatetic philosophy are free from fundamental fallacies. Suhrawardī, as a divine philosopher proficient in both deification and investigation, knows perfectly well about these fallacies. The most serious one is that the Peripatetics take what is mental (dhihnī) to be what is real (ʿaynī) and they treat “mental/intellectual considerations” (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya/ʿaqliyya) as true metaphysical constituents of things in the real world. This position is unacceptable to Suhrawardī, so he must correct these fallacies in his Peripatetic-style philosophy. In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to Suhrawardī’s ontological discussion of mental considerations.

chapter 3

On Mental Considerations: Univocal Existence In Chapters 3 and 4, I reconstruct Suhrawardī’s lengthy and significant ­metaphysical discussion of “mental/intellectual considerations” (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya/ʿaqliyya).1 Chapter 3 is devoted to univocal existence and Chapter 4 to other mental considerations, which include oneness, contingency, necessity by another, determinables (e.g. colourness), differentiae of determinates (e.g. the differentia of blackness), genera, and differentiae. Discussions of mental considerations are found in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt, Chapter 2 “On universal and particular, finiteness and infinity, and real and mental considerations” [LWḤ3 §§12–16, 21–26]; in the Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt III.6 “On intellectual considerations” and III.7 “Completing the explanation of intellectual considerations and mental things” [ṬRḤ3 §§98–116, 340–71]; in the Metaphysics of al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3 §§36–45, 162–76]; and in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3.1 “On intellectual considerations” [Ḥ.Sh §§56–69, 64–73].2 The significance of this discussion is indicated by the length of the texts (about 60 pages in total). It is, in fact, Suhrawardī’s fundamental critique of Avicennian Peripatetic metaphysics. Despite its significance, to my knowledge, modern scholarship does not offer a systematic treatment of it.3 Perhaps, this lacuna is the result of its length and great difficulty—the discussion is nearly impenetrable. According to Suhrawardī, the most serious fallacy of Peripatetic metaphysics is that the Peripatetics take what is mental (dhihnī) to be what is real (ʿaynī). That is, they take “mental/intellectual considerations” to be metaphysical 1 I render iʿtibār literally as “consideration” (and iʿtibārī as “pertaining to consideration”), which is synonymous with jiha (“aspect” in [T1a] and [T7d] below, but jiha is rarely used by Suhrawardī). Iʿtibār roughly refers to any conception generated by the mind in accordance with its unique way of considering or understanding the real world. Some conceptions have direct ­corresponding foundations in the real world (e.g. blackness), whereas others (e.g. univocal existence, colourness) do not. See Section 3 for a discussion of the exact meaning of iʿtibār. 2 In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3 “On some judgements (al-ḥukūmāt) on Illuminationist points (nukat ishrāqiyya)”, Suhrawardī offers ten critiques of Peripatetic philosophy; the discussion of mental considerations is the very first. 3 There are studies on various aspects of this discussion. See, for instance, Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 109–17; Rizvi, “Islamic Subversion”, pp. 219–27; Jari Kaukua, “Iʿtibārī Concepts in Suhrawardī: The Case of Substance”, Oriens 48 (2020), 40–66. I am aware of Jari Kaukua, Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism: A Philosophical Study (Leiden, 2022), but I did not have a chance to integrate it into the current study. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_005

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constituents of things in the real world. By correcting this fundamental fallacy and clarifying the true ontological status of these so-called mental considerations, Suhrawardī criticizes the Peripatetic quiddity/essence–existence distinction and, indeed, the whole of Peripatetic Essentialist metaphysics. I reconstruct this discussion and argue that Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style metaphysics is Nominalist and Existential in nature and so is ­fundamentally different from Avicennian Realist and Essentialist metaphysics. Moreover, this metaphysics serves as the prelude and basis for the ­full-fledged Light Metaphysics found in the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (see Chapter 5). In this chapter, based on his own report in al-Muṭāraḥāt, I introduce the historical and philosophical context of Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental ­considerations (Section 1). I then argue that his ontological position is ­Existentialism rather than the “fundamentality of quiddity” (aṣālat al-māhiyya), a traditional misinterpretation derived from Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 1636) critique of Suhrawardī’s ontological position. The majority of modern scholars follow Ṣadrā, so there is a tradition of misinterpreting and mislabelling Suhrawardī’s position. In Section 2, I argue that Suhrawardī takes issue with univocal existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) and not systematically ambiguous existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk). He is probably the first Islamic philosopher to formulate the doctrine that the systematic ambiguity of existence is in terms of strength and weakness or of perfection and deficiency.4 That is, Suhrawardī’s innovation is the notion of gradation of existence, which serves as a foundation of the 17th-century Islamic Existential metaphysics. Then, in Section 3, I analyse the crucial qusṭās (test) in al-Talwīḥāt that Suhrawardī uses to distinguish between real and mental considerations and thereby clarify what mental considerations refer to. I show that this qusṭās is closely related to his reformulation of Peripatetic categories (from ten categories to five). Finally, in Section 4, I present a comprehensive reconstruction of three of Suhrawardī’s seven arguments—those based on the absurdity of infinite regresses—that univocal existence cannot be added to quiddity in the real world and so must be a mental consideration. Two of the three arguments are based on a single-­species regress of existence that the principles of Self-Predication and Non-Identity generate; the third argument is based on a hybrid regress of existence and relation that Mutual-Predication generates.

4 Avicenna had formulated the theory of the systematic ambiguity of existence, but he ­explicitly denies the strength and weakness of existence. See Section 3.1.

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The Context of the Discussion of Mental Considerations

The quiddity–existence distinction is undoubtedly one of Avicenna’s most ­well-known and influential metaphysical inventions.5 In recent years, scholars have begun to study the reception of this distinction, as well as the whole of Avicennian metaphysics, between the 11th and 13th centuries in the Islamic East.6 Scholars now recognize that many Islamic philosophers of the time engaged in a debate about how to understand this distinction.7 Suhrawardī is, in fact, one of the leading philosophers in the debate. 1.1 Three Camps and Three Positions Fortunately, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī provides us with a detailed and in-depth report on the historical and philosophical context of the debate about mental considerations. He summarizes the debate in al-Muqāwamāt.8 [Text 1] [T1a] Investigation and exposition of the aforementioned qusṭās in our book named al-Talwīḥāt. Know that many people have been confused about intellectual considerations and aspects (al-iʿtibārāt wa-l-jihāt al-ʿaqliyya). [T1b] There is a camp (qawm) [of philosophers] who take existence, in terms of its meaning (mafhūm), contingency, and oneness as things 5 For a summary of the modern literature on the distinction, see Damien Janos, Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity (Berlin, 2020), pp. 1–18. For its influence on Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, see Joseph Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics”, Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), 1–14. 6 Heidrun Eichner, “Essence and Existence. Thirteenth-Century Perspectives in Arabic-­ Islamic Philosophy and Theology”, in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s ­Metaphysics, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin, 2011), pp. 123–52; ­Robert Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence in the Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Islamic East (Mašriq): A Sketch”, in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics, ed. Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (Berlin, 2011), pp. 27–50; Fedor Benevich, “The Essence-Existence Distinction: Four Elements of the Post-Avicennian Metaphysical Dispute (11–13th Centuries)”, Oriens 45 (2017), 203–58. 7 This debate seems to combine the theory of aḥwāl (modes) in kalām with the Avicennian quiddity–existence distinction. See Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence”; Fedor Benevich, “The Classical Ashʿari Theory of Aḥwāl: Juwaynī and His Opponents”, Journal of Islamic Studies 27, no. 2 (2016), 136–75; “The Metaphysics of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Šahrastānī (d. 1153): Aḥwāl and Universals”, in Islamic Philosophy from the 12th to the 14th Century, ed. Abdelkader Al Ghouz (Bonn, 2018), pp. 323–55; cf. Kaukua, “Iʿtibārī Concepts”, pp. 44–45. 8 See [ṬRḤ3 §§101–7, 343–54] and [QWM3 162.10–164.5, §36].

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added (zāʾida)9 to [real] things and actual (wāqiʿa) in the real world (fī l-aʿyān). [T1c] There is an opposing camp who acknowledge that these things, in terms of their meaning, are added to quiddities, but they have no forms in the real world. They are those who are respected (al-muʿtabarūn) among the theorists (ahl al-naẓar), that is, among these two parties. [T1d] Although there is another group of common people (ṭāʾifa min al-ʿawāmm) who discuss [these issues] and hold that contingency, existence, and the like are not added to their related quiddities, neither in the mind nor in the real world, they are not among those who have the conversation (ahl al-mukhāṭaba). … Their doctrine is too inferior to deserve investigation.10 [ṬRḤ3 343.7–344.8, §101] Suhrawardī reports that there are three camps involved in the debate. Here, I briefly introduce their positions; I later address the details of the first two ­positions when I reconstruct Suhrawardī’s theory. The first camp of philosophers, as characterized in [T1b], hold that all mental considerations have corresponding forms in the real world and that they are added to quiddities. For instance, the metaphysical constituents of a real horse include horseness (i.e. the quiddity of the horse) and various univocal, universal attributes (e.g. existence, contingency, oneness, etc.) that are added to horseness. I call this first position Strong Real Distinction. The position is ­different from Avicenna’s own position that I call Weak Real Distinction.11 Suhrawardī is a major representative of the second camp, mentioned at [T1c]. They hold that mental considerations are added to quiddities only in the mind and that they have no corresponding forms in the real world. I label the second position Mental Distinction.12

9 10 11

12

Although I use “added” to render zāʾid, this does not imply passivity; zāʾid means “­additional”, “extra”, and so on. Cf. [Ḥ.Sh 64.13–14, §65]. Benevich observes that this camp includes Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān (d. 1066), ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī (d. 1145), Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210); see “Essence-Existence Distinction”, p. 208. I do not agree that Sāwī belongs to this camp (see Section 4.1.2). According to Benevich, the second camp includes ʿUmar Khayyām (d. 1123), Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d. 1153), Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī (d. 1194), Suhrawardī and later Illuminationists (including Ibn Kammūna and Shahrazūrī), Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1264), al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 1274), as well as Ṭūsians, including Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) himself and al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325); see “Essence-Existence Distinction”, pp. 206–7.

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The third camp, introduced in [T1d], holds that mental considerations are identical to quiddities and that they are not distinguished at all, neither in the mind nor in the real world. I call the third position No Distinction.13 Suhrawardī follows Avicenna’s critique of the third camp.14 He argues that if contingency were identical to quiddity and they were not distinguished at all, then “this horse is contingent” and “this human being is contingent” would be equivalent to “this horse is a horse” and “this human being is a human being”, but that equivalence would be absurd. In other words, “____ is contingent” would become a purely equivocal (bi-l-ishtirāk) predicate, but obviously it is a univocal (bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) predicate.15 Suhrawardī points out that the first two camps are theorists (ahl al-naẓar), but the third camp is a group of common people (ṭāʾifa min al-ʿawāmm), who are presumably some theologians (mutakallimūn). He holds the third camp in low esteem and says that “they are not among those who have the conversation” and that “their doctrine is too inferior to deserve investigation”. In al-Muṭāraḥāt Suhrawardī introduces five arguments from his main rivals, the Strong Real Distinction proponents, and the responses of the Mental ­Distinction proponents. Consider the first argument, which is summarized neatly in al-Muqāwamāt. [Text 2] [T2a] On the summary of the qusṭās. Those who assume that existence, contingency, oneness, and the like have forms in the real world argue that our judgement that “a thing is contingent in the real world, or one, or existent” necessitates that they [contingency, oneness, existence] have essences (dhawāt) and forms in the real world. Otherwise, the aforementioned judgement would not be sound. [T2b] We invalidate their argument by saying that “C (jīm)16 is impossible in the real world”, but it does not follow that impossibility (al-imtināʿ) 13

14 15

16

Shahrazūrī remarks that this is the position of some theologians (baʿḍ al-mutakallimīn) [Sha 180.15–18]. Wisnovsky notes that this position is first put forward by Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 936); see “Essence and Existence”, pp. 31, 43, 45. Benevich observes that this camp includes Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 1141), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), and Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 1233); see “Essence-Existence Distinction”, p. 209. Benevich, “Essence-Existence Distinction”, pp. 210–11. An often-used example of equivocal terms is ʿayn. The Arabic term ʿayn has many meanings: “eye”, “spring”, “source”, “concrete instance”, and so on. Although these meanings are signified by the same term ʿayn, they are essentially different from each other. A univocal predicate, by contrast, is predicated by one and the same meaning. Jīm is the third letter of the Abjad order of the Arabic alphabet.

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has it-ness (huwiyya)17 in the real world. Otherwise, impossibility would invoke the subsistence (thubūt) of what it belongs to as an attribute [i.e. the subsistence of C]. [T2c] It is accepted that these, namely, existence, contingency, and so on, are things added to quiddity, but we do not accept that they have real it-nesses (huwiyyāt ʿayniyya). [QWM3 162.10–15, §36] In [T2a], Suhrawardī presents the argument for Strong Real Distinction. One’s judgement that “a thing is contingent in the real world, or one, or existent” must have, as its basis, the real contingency, oneness, or existence, which is added to quiddity in the real world. Otherwise, this judgement would lose its validity and become a mere judgement about things in the mind, and it would seem that the mind could form arbitrary judgements about them.18 In [T2b] Suhrawardī offers the response of the Mental Distinction proponents. If the conclusion of Strong Real Distinction were the case, then our judgement that “C is impossible in the real world” would also have real impossibility as its basis. But it is absurd to say that “impossibility exists in the real world”. Moreover, as an attribute, impossibility would require the subsistence (thubūt) of C as its substrate in the first place, but C is impossible and cannot

17



18

The literal meaning of huwiyya is “it-ness” or “being-it”, which refers to the particular, individual essence (dhāt) of a real thing (e.g. the essence of this horse or this blackness). It is usually used in contrast to māhiyya, which literally means “what-ness” and is commonly rendered as “quiddity”, which refers to the universal, common essence of things (e.g. horseness, blackness) and is known as “natural universal” (kullī ṭabīʿī) in the Arabic tradition and “common nature” in the Latin tradition. In Suhrawardī’s texts on mental considerations, however, māhiyya in most cases is the same as huwiyya, both referring to a particular, individual essence, given his ontological position and his denial of common nature. Cf. Fedor Benevich, “Individuation and Identity in Islamic Philosophy after Avicenna: Bahmanyār and Suhrawardī”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2019), 19. Suhrawardī’s huwiyya is not to be confused with Duns Scotus’s (d. 1308) haecceity. Although both terms mean “it-ness”, they are different. Suhrawardī’s huwiyya refers to the whole particular essence of a real individual thing, whereas Scotus’s haecceity refers to the component that individuates common nature. See John Duns Scotus, “Six Questions on Individuation from His Ordinatio II. d. 3, part 1, qq. 1–6”, in Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, trans. Paul ­Vincent Spade (Indianapolis, 1994), pp. 57–113. Suhrawardī points out that, although mental considerations do not exist in the real world, the mind does not predicate them arbitrarily. Instead, “their being (al-kawn) in the mind is in accordance with (fī martaba) others’ being in the real world” [Ḥ.Sh 71.7–8, §68]. This sentence is part of [Text 10] below; see Section 3.2 for detail.

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exist in the real world. Therefore, this argument for Strong Real Distinction fails. The Mental Distinction position is presented in [T2c]. 1.2 Avicenna and Suhrawardī on the Quiddity–Existence Distinction Suhrawardī’s critique may not be directed at Avicenna himself but rather at “the followers of the Peripatetics” (atbāʿ al-mashshāʾīn) who argue for the Strong Real Distinction position, an apparently popular interpretation of ­Avicennism of that time.19 Because of the ambiguity in Avicenna’s texts, his position allows for various interpretations.20 My view is that his position is Weak Real Distinction. Strong Real Distinction refers to the position that quiddity exists prior to existence and that existence is added (zāʾid) to quiddity in the real world, similar to two pieces of Lego bricks. “Added to” is a customary expression that indicates the ontological priority of quiddity: quiddity must first have some sort of existence and then existence is added to quiddity. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950) seems to be the first exponent of this position.21 In comparison, Weak Real Distinction refers to the position that quiddity does not exist prior to existence; rather, it only exists in virtue of its existence. Consider the design of multiple chairs. The design cannot exist prior to the existence of real chairs (except in the carpenter’s mind); rather, the design only exists in virtue of the existence of real chairs.22 So, it cannot be said whether quiddity or existence is prior ontologically; they simply co-exist. However, they are still really distinct from each other insofar as they are two irreducible metaphysical constituents of real things. I do not think that Suhrawardī envisaged the Weak Real Distinction position. The direct target of his

19 20

21 22

[Ḥ.Sh 65.10, §58]. See [Text 21] in this chapter. Wisnovsky also remarks that Suhrawardī is debating “the followers of the Peripatetics” rather than Avicenna himself; see “Essence and Existence”, p. 46. The key texts include Avicenna, Al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Madkhal [The Healing: Logic: ­Isagoge], I.12; Al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāt [The Healing: Metaphysics], I.5, V.1, V.2. For an overview of modern scholars’ interpretations, see Janos, Avicenna on Ontology, pp. 19–50, especially pp. 48–49; cf. Amos Bertolacci, “The Distinction of Essence and ­Existence in Avicenna’s Metaphysics: The Text and Its Context”, in Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, ed. Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman (Leiden, 2012), pp. 257–88. See Fārābī, Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam [The Bezels of Wisdoms], ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Āl Yāsīn (1976; repr. Qom, 1984), pp. 47.3–50.1; Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 91–99. The design analogy is also useful for understanding Avicenna’s ontologically neutral or indifferent quiddities, such as horseness, which are said to be “neither one nor multiple, neither existent in the real world nor in the soul” (Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt V.1, p. 196.11): neither oneness nor multiplicity, neither existence in the real world nor existence in the soul, should be included in the design itself; if oneness is included in the design, there can only be one unique chair.

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many arguments (see Section 4) against real univocal existence is the Strong Real Distinction position. By contrast, Suhrawardī’s own position is not only the Mental Distinction view but also an Existentialism. He holds that, in the mind, existence is added to quiddity but, in the real world, there are simply ontologically indivisible particular things (i.e. indivisible substances and accidents), which are indivisible ontological blocks. As I discuss in Section 2 and Section 3, they are all stronger or weaker instances of systematically ambiguous existence. Suhrawardī also calls them “quiddities” or “it-nesses”, but no real quiddity–existence distinction is implied. Every instance of systematically ambiguous existence is a quiddity or an it-ness; existence and quiddity are absolutely identical in the real world. Contrary to Essentialism, nothing in the real world is composed of universal quiddity and univocal existence (or other univocal attributes); they are not true metaphysical constituents of real things. Another point of contention is whether Avicenna’s position is committed to the real quiddity–existence distinction. Izutsu argues that it should be interpreted as a mental distinction.23 It is, however, undeniable that, in his theological arguments, Avicenna explicitly makes use of the real quiddity–­existence distinction without any restrictions and combines it with the necessary–­ contingent distinction. According to Robert Wisnovsky, in his middle and later works, Avicenna decides to combine these two distinctions.24 I maintain that it is because he [Avicenna] realized, during the process of writing the Ilāhiyyāt of the Shifāʾ, that he could use the intensional distinctiveness between quiddity and existence to show how beings other than God were composites, that is, composed of quiddity and existence. God, by contrast, could be held to be simple by virtue of the identity of quiddity and existence in Him. Because every composite needs a composer to bring its components together, and because of the impossibility of an infinite regress, the chain of composites and composers must originate in a non-composite composer, namely, God.25 In al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 34.4–13, §24], Suhrawardī explicitly criticizes Avicenna for using the quiddity–existence distinction in theological arguments. He claims that the relevant arguments are “persuasive” (iqnāʿī) rather than demonstrative 23 24 25

See Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 95–99. See Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt VIII.4, especially pp. 346.13–347.16; Al-Ishārāt, Namaṭ IV “On existence and its causes”. Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence”, p. 32.

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because, for the Mental Distinction proponents, the quiddity–existence distinction is purely mental. So, if Avicenna employs the distinction in metaphysics without restrictions, he commits the fallacy of “taking what is mental to be what is real”. Given Suhrawardī’s critique, it might indeed be the case that he understands Avicenna to hold the Strong Real Distinction position and is actually criticizing Avicenna in his discussion of mental considerations. 2 Suhrawardī’s Existentialism and Systematically Ambiguous Existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashki ̄k) Given Suhrawardī’s lengthy critique of the real existence of mental considerations and especially of existence, the majority of modern scholars interpret his position as the “fundamentality/foundationality/primacy/­principality of quiddity” (aṣālat al-māhiyya), which is the opposite of Ṣadrā’s “fundamentality of existence” (aṣālat al-wujūd). This mislabelling derives from Ṣadrā’s ­critique of Suhrawardī, and many modern scholars read Suhrawardī through the eyes of Ṣadrā. For instance, Wisnovsky writes: To illustrate the framing role that Avicenna played, I shall point to a number of post-Avicennian philosophers, two of whom staked extreme, though opposing, positions on the essence/existence distinction, with the others fighting over the middle ground. At one end of the spectrum, Suhrawardī (d. 1191) maintained that essence was primary and basic, that is to say, real in the most basic sense, while existence got lumped together with other unreal products of conceptual distinction-making. For Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640), existence was primary and real, whereas essence was a mental construct. These two opposing positions came to be termed, respectively, aṣālat al-māhiyya (literally, the “foundationality” of essence) and aṣālat al-wujūd (the “foundationality” of existence).26 However, Wisnovsky later modifies this interpretation and rightly points out the problem of labelling Suhrawardī’s position as the “fundamentality 26

Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition”, in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, 2005), p. 111; cf. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, pp. 213–14; Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 99–118, especially pp. 109–17; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy (Albany, New York, 2006), pp. 78–80.

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of quiddity”.27 Walbridge also finds the “fundamentality of quiddity” problematic.28 But it seems that scholars have yet to offer a systemic exposition of this ­crucial topic. In what follows, I briefly interpret Suhrawardī’s ontological position as the fundamentality of existence. Ultimately, Suhrawardī’s view seems not much different from Ṣadrā’s own position. A detailed exposition requires a s­ eparate study.29 Suhrawardī argues in great length (see Section 4) that existence cannot be added to quiddity in the real world and that it must be a mental consideration, so Ṣadrā claims that Suhrawardī holds that existence does not exist in the real world and that Suhrawardī accepts only quiddity as real. Thus, Suhrawardī’s position is later labelled as the “fundamentality of quiddity”. Because his own position is that “the reality of existence” (ḥaqīqat al-wujūd) must exist in the real world, Ṣadrā criticizes Suhrawardī and sets his position in opposition to Suhrawardī’s.30 But Ṣadrā is, in fact, aware that Suhrawardī’s position is not as simple as he has characterized it. The Divine Master (al-shaykh al-ilāhī; i.e. Suhrawardī) at the end of al-Talwīḥāt argues that the soul and the separates [separate intellects] (al-mufāriqāt) above it are sheer that-nesses (inniyyāt ṣirfa)31 and pure existences (wujūdāt maḥḍa). Given this, I do not understand how he is still allowed to deny that existence is actual and is real. Is this simply a contradiction in the doctrine?32 Suhrawardī’s position is certainly not a contradiction and, as I argue in ­Section 2.2, Suhrawardī indeed holds that the heavenly and human souls, separate intellects, and God are pure and sheer existences, which are immaterial lights (anwār mujarrada) in Light Metaphysics (see Chapter 5). That is, they are not divisible at all into quiddity and existence, neither in the mind nor in the real world. They are the highest instances of systematically ambiguous existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk) because they are all engaged constantly in 27 28 29 30 31 32

Wisnovsky, “Essence and Existence”, pp. 27–28, 45–46. Walbridge, “Suhrawardī’s Intimations”, p. 268, note 6. This is the theme of my second projected monograph on Suhrawardī: Suhrawardī’s ­Existential Metaphysics in his Peripatetic-Style Works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: Philosophy inside the Cave. Mullā Ṣadrā, Al-Ḥikma al-Mutaʿāliya fī l-Asfār al-ʿAqliyya al-Arbaʿa [The Transcendent ­Philosophy in the Four Intellectual Journeys], vol. 1 (Beirut, 1990), pp. 38–44. I render inniyya and anniyya (two forms of the same term) literally as “that-ness”, which is usually synonymous with wujūd (existence). Mullā Ṣadrā, Al-Ḥikma al-Mutaʿāliya, vol. 1, p. 43.1–3; cf. [Text 6] in this chapter.

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self-apprehension. Moreover, everything that exists in the real world is, in fact, a stronger or weaker instance of systematically ambiguous existence. 2.1 Univocal Existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) and Systematically Ambiguous Existence Suhrawardī distinguishes between two types of existence: univocal ­existence and systematically ambiguous existence. He takes issue with univocal ­existence, which is predicated univocally by one and the same meaning of multiple things. He articulates the issue clearly at the beginning of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3.1: [Text 3] Existence falls (yaqaʿu; is predicated of), by a single intention (maʿnan) and a single meaning (mafhūm), upon blackness, substance, human, and horse, so it is an intelligible intention (maʿnan maʿqūl) that is more general than each one [of them]. … We claim that these predicables (al-maḥmūlāt)33 must be purely intellectual (ʿaqliyya ṣirfa).34 [Ḥ.Sh 64.10–13, §65] That is, if “____ exists” is predicated univocally (bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) of multiple things, the existence attributed to them by the predicate “____ exists” is the same in terms of intention or meaning. This univocal existence, according to Suhrawardī, must be purely mental or intellectual; it cannot have a corresponding real form and cannot be added to quiddity in the real world. It is what Ṣadrā calls “the meaning of existence” (mafhūm al-wujūd).35 Suhrawardī aims to show that univocal existence is merely a subjective consideration (iʿtibār) or aspect (jiha) generated by the mind (or, to be exact, emanating from the agent intellect; see Chapter 2, section 3.2). We can understand univocal existence as the being-there of real things, and the being-there of everything that exists is exactly the same. Univocal existence is a product of the unique way in which the mind considers or understands the world. It is the existence component of Avicenna’s quiddity–existence distinction. Through seven arguments, which I discuss in Section 4, Suhrawardī proves that univocal existence cannot be 33 34 35

Namely, mental or intellectual attributes (sing. ṣifa), such as existence, contingency, and so on. See Section 3.2. Cf. [T1b], where Suhrawardī writes that the first camp takes existence “in terms of its meaning (mafhūm)” as real; he apparently means univocal existence. For a discussion of univocal existence in Sabzawārī’s metaphysics, see Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 76–85.

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added to quiddity in the real world and that it must be a mental consideration, a secondary intelligible (maʿqūl thānin), or an intellectual attribute (ṣifa ʿaqliyya). Although Suhrawardī rejects real univocal existence, it does not follow that he would deny real existence in all senses. However, Ṣadrā accuses Suhrawardī of doing just this. In fact, existence can be predicated of multiple things univocally as well as systematically ambiguously (bi-l-tashkīk). When “____ exists” is systematically ambiguously predicated, for example, of an amoeba, a gazelle, and a human being,36 the existence attributed to each one of them is systematically ambiguous, rather than univocal, insofar as the existence of a human being is stronger or more perfect than that of a gazelle or amoeba. Suhrawardī holds that this systematically ambiguous existence, with its every instance, is real. Ṣadrā calls this existence “the reality of existence” (ḥaqīqat al-wujūd). The implication is the gradation of existence: everything is existence, stronger or weaker. I render al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk as “systematically ambiguous existence” and tashkīk al-wujūd as “systematic ambiguity of existence”. Tashkīk literally means “making [somebody] doubt”, and bi-l-tashkīk means “[something is predicated] in the manner of making [somebody] doubt”, so “ambiguous” is close to the literal meaning of bi-l-tashkīk. Moreover, this ambiguity is systematic because the multiple meanings of a term are unified under one single meaning (e.g. stronger and weaker existence, or whiteness). Systematic ambiguity is not to be confused with equivocity (ishtirāk) in which multiple meanings of a term are separate and not unified (e.g. ʿayn in Arabic; cf. my analysis in this chapter of [T1d]). Although the systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd) is already found in Avicenna, he explicitly denies that the ambiguity is in terms of strength and weakness; this is Suhrawardī’s metaphysical invention.37 (I address this point in Section 3.1.) 36

37

I borrow these helpful examples from Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of God (Notre Dame, 1996), p. 39. Miller’s book (especially Chapter 3) provides a helpful contemporary discussion of the two types of existence. Miller notes that univocal existence (he does not use the term) is the “thinnest or most impoverished of all properties” (p. 38) because existence is simply “that attribute which is common to mice and men, dust and angels” (Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways: St Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence [1969; repr. London, 2009], p. 96). By contrast, Miller remarks that systematically ambiguous existence (also not his term) is “extraordinarily rich”, and “the ways in which existence might be manifested are extraordinarily wide-ranging, and no one individual comes even close to manifesting them all” (Most Unlikely God, p. 34). Suhrawardī would accept these remarks and indeed many points mentioned by Miller, though there are some essential differences between them. On Avicenna’s theory, see Alexander Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (taškīk al-wuǧūd, analogia entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources”,

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2.2 Four Arguments for Suhrawardī’s Existentialism In this section, I argue that Suhrawardī accepts real systematically ambiguous existence and that his ontological position is Existentialism, which seems similar to Ṣadrā’s own position. I offer three arguments that are based on Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works. First, Suhrawardī explicitly takes existence (wujūd) as the subject matter of his reconstructed Peripatetic-style metaphysics. At the beginning of the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt, he writes: [Text 4] [T4a] Theoretical philosophy (al-ḥikma al-naẓariyya) has several branches. One branch is concerned with things that are not material at all, such as the true necessary (al-wājib al-ḥaqq; i.e. God), intellects, and so on [i.e. heavenly and human souls], and with divisions of unrestricted existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq). Although some of them [the divisions of unrestricted existence] are mixed with matter, this is not by way of their requirement for matter in virtue of their nature.38 [T4b] This branch is named “the highest science” (al-ʿilm al-aʿlā). Its subject matter (mawḍūʿ) is the most general thing, namely, unrestricted existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), and it investigates its essential accidents (aʿrāḍ dhātiyya) and its various kinds (aqsām). [T4c] [The highest science] includes the universal science (al-ʿilm al-kullī), namely, that which deals with the divisions of existence (taqāsīm al-wujūd), and theology (al-ilāhī).39 [LWḤ3 3.5–9, §1] In [T4b], Suhrawardī is clear that the subject matter of metaphysics is “unrestricted existence” (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), rather than Avicenna’s “unrestricted existent” (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq).40 Moreover, metaphysics investigates the

38

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in Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, ed. Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman (Leiden, 2012), pp. 327–63. In modern scholarship, tashkīk al-wujūd is often rendered as “modulation of existence” and al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk as “modulated existence” or “existence by modulation”. However, I prefer to use literal renderings whenever possible. In al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 196.11–13, §2], Suhrawardī clarifies that he refers to “the primary divisions (al-aqsām al-ūlā) of existence”, “such as contingency and effect-ness/being-effect (al-maʿlūliyya)”. Contingency, for example, can occur to both immaterial and material things, so, given its nature, it does not require matter. Cf. [I.K3 6.3–7]. Cf. [ṬRḤ3 196.10–15, §2]. Avicenna holds that the subject matter of metaphysics is “unrestricted existent”, or “­existent inasmuch as it is existent” (al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd), rather than “unrestricted existence”; see, for instance, Avicenna, Al-Najāt, p. 493.5–6. This shift in ­subject

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essential accidents of existence and its various kinds, so the subject matter is not at all quiddity (māhiyya). According to [T4a], unrestricted existence refers to instances of existence that, given their nature, do not require matter. As Ibn Kammūna [I.K3 5.17– 6.12] has remarked, they are divided into two kinds: essences (dhawāt) and attributes (ṣifāt). The essences include God, separate intellects, and souls; the attributes include it-ness (huwiyya), oneness and multiplicity, cause and effect, universality and particularity, perfection and deficiency, and so on. At [T4c], Suhrawardī indicates that metaphysics has two subdivisions: theology, which is concerned with “things that are not material at all”, and the universal science, which deals with divisions of existence (e.g. into universal and particular, one and multiple, cause and effect, necessary and contingent). Therefore, unrestricted existence, as the subject matter of metaphysics, must not be univocal existence, which is merely an attribute (i.e. being-there) added to quiddity in the mind (as I show in Section 4). Second, and more significantly, Suhrawardī argues that God is pure existence, and indeed that everything is existence. In the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt I.1 “On His essence”, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 5] [T5a] Therefore, if there is something that is necessary (wājib) among existence, He must not have any quiddity behind / other than (warāʾa) existence, in the sense that the mind could divide Him into two things. [T5b] So He is pure and sheer existence (al-wujūd al-ṣirf al-baḥt), which is not stained by anything at all, neither specifically nor generally. [T5c] What is other than Him is either a ray (lamʿa) from Him or a ray from another ray. They differ only in [degrees of] perfection (kamāl) because all of Him is existence and everything is existence (kulluhu al-­ wujūd wa-kull al-wujūd).41 [LWḤ3 35.8–11, §25]

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matter, according to Izutsu, is “of decisive significance” because it sets Avicenna’s ­metaphysics apart from the Existential metaphysics of Ṣadrā and Sabzawārī (Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 70–72). Izutsu remarks: “In this respect we must admit that Avicenna remains within the confines of Aristotelian metaphysics which, as Heidegger has pointed out, is primarily and directly concerned with the ‘existent’, and which has to do with ‘existence’ only in a secondary and indirect way” (p. 71). I agree with Izutsu on this point and further argue that Suhrawardī’s metaphysics is also Existential. According to Ibn Kammūna [I.K3 174.4–7], the last sentence reads that all of Him (­kulluhu) is existence (al-wujūd) because His quiddity is pure existence; everything (kull), including God and all other instances of existence, is existence (al-wujūd).

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Avicenna has established the point made at [T5a].42 A fundamental difference between God (the necessary) and everything else (the contingent) is that, in the mind, God cannot be divided into quiddity and univocal existence, whereas all contingents can be. God’s quiddity is His very existence, as articulated in [T5b]. So, He is “pure and sheer existence”. My argument for Suhrawardī’s Existentialism relies on [T5c]. Not only is God existence, but everything is an instance of existence. God is the most perfect existence, whereas other things are weaker or less perfect instances of existence. If God is the Light, then everything else is a ray, either a stronger ray directly from Him or a weaker ray from other stronger rays.43 This is the “gradation of existence”, which is the distinctive key feature of Existentialism that is not found in Avicennian Essentialism. Everything that exists is a stronger or weaker instance of systematically ambiguous existence. If Suhrawardī were concerned only with univocal existence, then [T5c] would not make sense. The third piece of textual evidence is the passage that Ṣadrā refers to, which I mentioned above. Suhrawardī writes towards the end of the Metaphysics of al-Talwīḥāt: [Text 6] [T6a] I became purified by my self and I observed it. I found that it is ­that-ness (anniyya) and existence (wujūd). … [T6b] During the separation, I saw nothing in my self but existence (wujūd) and apprehension (idrāk). … There remains nothing but ­existence. … [T6c] So, I make the following judgment: my quiddity is my very ­existence, and my quiddity in the intellect cannot be divided into two things. [LWḤ3 115.6–116.7, §89] This passage is extremely rich, but I do not propose to dive into detail. This is Suhrawardī’s report of his mystical experience. During his separation from the body, which is reminiscent of Avicenna’s Flying Man, he saw nothing but his existence. His existence is, in fact, identical to his self-apprehension; that is, he (and every human soul) is self-apprehending existence, a higher, stronger, and more perfect instance of existence featuring self-apprehension. 42 43

See, for instance, Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt VIII.4, especially p. 344.10–15. To readers familiar with Ṣadrā, it is immediately clear that this position is ­Existentialism. Ṣadrā also uses the Light-ray analogy, which he likely borrowed from Suhrawardī. For an analysis of Ṣadrā’s fundamentality of existence, see Izutsu, Concept and Reality of ­Existence, pp. 102–5.

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As mentioned previously, according to Avicenna, only God’s quiddity is identical to His existence and only He is pure existence. At [T6c], Suhrawardī goes one step further in undermining Avicenna’s quiddity–existence distinction (even as a mental distinction) and argues that the quiddity of the human soul is also identical to existence, both in the mind and in the real world—because, during his mystical experience, he apprehends no quiddity whatsoever but only existence—and so are the quiddities of all separate intellects and heavenly souls, which are all self-apprehending existences and more perfect than human souls. Given that God, intellects, and heavenly and human souls are all pure existences, none of which are divisible into quiddity and existence in the mind or the real world, the only way to distinguish them is by the strength and weakness, or the perfection and deficiency, of their very existences. Therefore, Suhrawardī accepts real systematically ambiguous existence. Once again, interpreting the passage to be about univocal existence does not make sense here. In fact, the three passages not only are consistent with Ṣadrā’s doctrine but also can be understood as anticipating Ṣadrā’s full-blown Existential metaphysics. My fourth argument considers Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and Light Metaphysics. Izutsu offers a version of this argument but somewhat self-contradictorily interprets Suhrawardī’s position as the fundamentality of quiddity. Suhrawardī regarded “existence” (wujūd), as a mere concept, something mental which is a product of a subjective view-point of the human mind, and corresponding to nothing real in the concrete external world. ­Superficially, this is the exact opposite of the thesis held by such Ḥikmat philosophers as Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzawārī, for whom “existence”, in the sense of actus essendi, precisely is the reality or Reality. Upon reflection, however, we find the opposition merely formal and superficial. It is a mere matter of different formulations, or rather of different ways of ­experiencing the same Reality. For Suhrawardī establishes, in place of “existence”, as something really “real” the spiritual and metaphysical Light (nūr) which is the one and single reality having an infinite number of degrees and stages in terms of intensity and weakness, the highest degree being the Light of all lights (nūr al-anwār) and the lowest being Darkness (ẓulma).44

44

Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 61–62.

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The major difference between my interpretation of Suhrawardī’s position and Izutsu’s interpretation is that I do not accept a “formal or superficial opposition” between Suhrawardī’s and Ṣadrā’s positions because Suhrawardī has clearly distinguished between two types of existence and never denies real systematically ambiguous existence. I interpret Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style metaphysics as Existentialism, although the exact similarities and differences between Suhrawardī’s Existentialism and Ṣadrā’s require a more thorough study. I agree with Izutsu on the essential similarities between Suhrawardī’s light and Ṣadrā’s existence, but I disagree with his equating light to existence, which is another common misinterpretation of Suhrawardī (one that I consider in Chapter 5, section 1). In Existentialism, everything is existence; in Light Metaphysics, things that exist in the real world are divided into two kinds: light and darkness. Lights are higher or stronger existences: existences that are “manifest in the reality of themselves and manifest others by themselves” [Ḥ.Sh 113.6–7, §117]. Lights are further divided into two kinds: substantial immaterial lights (sing. nūr mujarrad), which refer to self-apprehenders, and accidental lights, which refer to visible lights. I explore the division of light and darkness in Chapter 5, section 2. Given my four arguments, Suhrawardī’s ontological position, both in his Peripatetic-style works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, is Existentialism. An implication of my thesis is that one could argue that Suhrawardī lays the foundation for Islamic Existential metaphysics and Ṣadrā follows his lead. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, section 2, Izutsu observes that Suhrawardī is the founder of what he calls the “Ḥikmat philosophy” insofar as he first formulates the “formal structure” of the Ḥikmat-type of thinking: “a perfect fusion of mystical experience and analytical thinking”, which corresponds to Suhrawardī’s own distinction between deification (taʾalluh) and investigation (baḥth).45 One could further argue that Suhrawardī is the founder of “Ḥikmat philosophy” in that he formulated ­Existentialism more than 400 years before Ṣadrā expounds the doctrine. 3 The qusṭās (Test) and the Real–Mental Consideration Distinction I now reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations in detail. I first analyse the crucial qusṭās from al-Talwīḥāt and then explain real and mental considerations. 45

Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 59, 61.

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3.1 Analysis of the qusṭās The whole discussion begins in al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 §12, 21–22] with the qusṭās (balance, scale, measure, criterion, or test), or mīzān (a term synonymous with qusṭās). Suhrawardī presents this thought experiment to distinguish between real and mental considerations. He refers to the qusṭās repeatedly in his later discussions (for example, in [T1a] and [T2a]). [Text 7] [T7a] As the discussion reaches here, let us set up a measure (mīzān) for mental and real considerations (al-iʿtibārāt al-dhihniyya wa-l-­ʿayniyya). For among things, there are those that are added to quiddity both in the mind (dhihnan) and in the real world (ʿaynan), and there are those that are added [to quiddity] merely in the mind. [T7b] The test (al-qusṭās): First, let us take in the real existence (al-­ wujūd al-ʿaynī) an extension (imtidād) of a certain length, three cubits (thalāthat adhruʿ), for example, and name it and everything that equals it C (jīm) so that C is the name for everything whose magnitude (miqdār) is like this. And [let us also take] an extension other than it and name it and everything that equals it B (bāʾ). [T7c] Then we take the universal form of C in the mind, which falls upon (al-wāqiʿa ʿalā; is predicated of) its particulars univocally (bi-ltawāṭuʾ); [we do] the same for B. [Moreover,] we take in the mind the unrestricted extension (al-imtidād al-muṭlaq), which is said of C, B, and others [univocally]. So, the unrestricted extension corresponds to (­ṭābaqa) [both] the real particulars of C and the real particulars of B; C corresponds to its [real] particulars, and B to its [real] particulars. [T7d] So, I say that the particulars of C in the real world do not have two aspects (jihatāni): by one aspect the [unrestricted] extension corresponds to them, and by the other C-ness/being-C (al-jīmiyya) [corresponds to them]. Rather, it [a particular C] is a single extension in the real world, for example, three cubits, and it corresponds to extension-ness/ being-­extension (al-imtidādiyya) because of itself and also to C-ness [because of itself]. … [T7e] As for in the mind, the meaning (mafhūm) of C-ness and [the meaning of] extension-ness are not the same; otherwise, [given that] extension is said of B, C could likewise [be said of B], but the fact is not like this.46 Rather, every particular of C is a single extension, a single C, and a single individual; the same goes for B. 46

That is, given that we say “B is an extension” and if the meaning of C-ness and the meaning of extension-ness are the same, we could likewise say “B is C”. This would be absurd.

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[T7f] Here, two rules (sing. ḍābiṭ) can be determined. One rule is that a real distinction (al-taghāyur al-ʿaynī) does not necessarily follow from a mental distinction (al-taghāyur al-dhihnī). [T7g] The second [rule] is that the differentiation (al-imtiyāz) between C and B is not by what is behind / other than (warāʾa) extension; rather, [it is] by the perfection and deficiency (kamāl wa-naqṣ) in [C and B] themselves. Therefore, the differentiation between the individuals (shakhṣiyyāt) in existence of every universal that falls [i.e. is predicated] systematically ambiguously (bi-l-tashkīk) is not necessarily by what is behind the quiddity, such as a long distance (buʿd) and a short distance … The same goes for the more white and the less white.47 [LWḤ3 §12, 21–22] The purpose of the thought experiment is not only to introduce a qusṭās to distinguish between mental and real considerations but also to explain the origination of mental considerations. At [T7c], Suhrawardī explains the special way in which the mind analyses and understands real things. When it faces multiple particular things in the real world, the mind naturally groups and classifies them and simultaneously generates corresponding universal forms.48 For example, when the mind analyses multiple three-cubit extensions named C, given that each one of them “is C” and that “____ is C” is predicated of each one of them univocally (bi-l-tawāṭuʾ), the mind groups them together and generates a first universal form C-ness/being-C, which corresponds by itself to every real particular three-cubit extension named C. Moreover, when the mind analyses multiple particular Cs and Bs (e.g. three-cubit and two-cubit extensions) in the real world, given that every C and B “is an extension” and that “____ is an extension” is predicated of every C and B univocally, the mind again groups them together and generates a second, more general universal form “unrestricted extension” or extension-ness/being-­ extension. This universal form is the referent of the definition of “extension”, which corresponds by itself to every real particular C, B, and extensions of other lengths. Suhrawardī concludes the experiment in [T7d] and [T7e] and articulates his position. Every mental C contains a quiddity C-ness, and C-ness is divisible

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For Suhrawardī’s distinction between differentiation and individuation, see Chapter 4, section 3.4. Following Suhrawardī, I use “universal” less strictly (i.e. not in the strict Avicennian sense) in this chapter (and in Chapter 2); “universal” here means “that which does not make impossible the participation (al-sharika) [in itself] because of itself” [LWḤ3 70.13, §55].

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into extension-ness and the differentia of C (e.g. three-cubit-ness).49 However, it does not follow that in the real world, the metaphysical structure of every particular C is also divisible in this way; rather, every real C is a single, indivisible particular individual. Extension-ness and C-ness are merely two universal “mental considerations” that the mind generates when it analyses the real particular Cs. They are not true metaphysical constituents of the real Cs; they do not have corresponding real forms in the real world. Rather, their foundations are the indivisible real Cs, those particular three-cubit extensions. When we apply this conclusion to the quiddity–existence distinction, the real significance of the qusṭās becomes evident. Just as are C-ness and extension-ness, universal quiddity and univocal existence are also two mental considerations that the mind generates when it analyses real particular things; they are not true metaphysical constituents of real things and do not have corresponding forms in the real world. Univocal existence is the universal ­conception that the mind generates when it analyses everything that exists in the real world and predicates “____ exists” of them univocally (i.e. in “this horse exists” and “that man exists”, “____ exists” is predicated by one and the same meaning).50 Univocal existence is the very same being-there of all real things. Likewise, universal quiddity, such as horseness, is also the universal conception that the mind generates when it analyses real particular horses and predicates “____ is a horse” of them univocally; it is the referent of the definition of “horse”. This sort of universal quiddity is the famous ontologically neutral or indifferent “natural universal” (kullī ṭabīʿī) that is found in the Avicennian and post-Avicennian traditions and is known as “common nature” in the Latin tradition. Based on the analysis of the mind, every mental horse contains universal horseness and univocal existence that is added to horseness. However, it does not follow that, in the real world, the true metaphysical structure of every particular horse is likewise “universal horseness plus univocal existence”. Otherwise, as I discuss in Section 4, a number of metaphysical inconsistencies arise. In fact, every real horse is a single, indivisible particular individual (unless divided into substances and accidents or into bodies and souls).51 In other 49

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According to the Peripatetics, every determinate (e.g. C or blackness) is divisible into a determinable (e.g. extension-ness or colourness) and a differentia (e.g. three-cubit-ness or “being-gathering-vision” [kawnuhu jāmiʿan lil-baṣar], [ṬRḤ1 88.9–10]). Suhrawardī, however, later rejects this distinction (even as a mental distinction); see Chapter 4, sections 3.1 and 3.3. When I say that the mind predicates something of something, I mean that it thinks about and analyses things in such a way. Presential knowledge can establish these two distinctions empirically. Accidents of a substance can change. When an animal dies, its soul vanishes but its body remains. By contrast, the quiddity–existence distinction cannot be established empirically.

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words, as Suhrawardī articulates in [T7f], “a real distinction does not necessarily follow from a mental distinction”. Therefore, as I have argued in the previous sections, Suhrawardī rejects the whole universal quiddity–univocal existence distinction. In [T7f] and [T7g], the qusṭās establishes two rules. First, a mental distinction does not imply a real distinction because, when analysing real things, the mind naturally generates many universal conceptions that cannot exist in the real world but are simply the products of the unique way the mind works. The second rule relates to systematically ambiguous (bi-l-tashkīk) predication of the mind and its generation of “real considerations”, which are systematically ambiguous universal conceptions (e.g. whiteness) that have corresponding foundations in the real world. When we say that “this ivory is white” and “that snowflake is white”, we predicate “____ is white” systematically ambiguously to the extent that the whiteness of the ivory is weaker or less ­perfect than the whiteness of the snowflake. The universal conception—systematically ambiguous whiteness—corresponds directly to the stronger and weaker instances of whiteness in the real world. Although Suhrawardī also calls systematically ambiguous conceptions “universals”, they differ from univocal universal conceptions in a fundamental respect: they admit of gradation, of strength and weakness or of perfection and deficiency; they are single conceptions that simultaneously contain infinite stronger and weaker instances in themselves. For example, although whiteness functions as a universal in the sense that it unifies all instances of whiteness, it admits of gradation in terms of strength and weakness (and thus, it is systematically ambiguous) and contains infinite stronger and weaker instances of whiteness. Thus, this gradation is the decisive factor that allows whiteness to correspond to stronger and weaker instances of whiteness in the real world without depriving each instance of its particularity.52 By contrast, although the extension-ness in the qusṭās (i.e. the referent of the definition of “extension”) can unify all instances of extension, it does not admit of any gradation in terms of strength and 52

Readers familiar with contemporary Trope Nominalism might find some essential s­ imilarities in Suhrawardī’s theory. Trope Nominalism accepts the existence of real ­particular properties, such as a particular whiteness, and calls it a “trope”. The view denies the existence of universal whiteness. “Thus when there is a scarlet apple the scarletness of the apple is not a universal but a particular scarletness, the scarletness of this apple, which exists exactly where and when this apple is scarlet. Such a particular scarletness is a trope. The apple is scarlet not in virtue of instantiating a universal but in virtue of possessing a scarlet trope.” Rodriguez-Pereyra, “Nominalism in Metaphysics”, “4.1 ­Nominalism about universals”. The differences between Suhrawardī’s Existentialism and Trope ­Nominalism are, however, also evident. For one, Suhrawardī is concerned not only with the p­ articularity of tropes but also with their strength and weakness.

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weakness (and thus, it is univocal). Therefore, it cannot directly correspond to particular stronger and weaker extensions in the real world. The second rule of the qusṭās explains the gradation of systematically ambiguous universals and differentiation (­imtiyāz): real particulars of systematically ambiguous universals can be differentiated simply by strength and weakness or by perfection and deficiency, without the need for any added differentiator (mumayyiz).53 In fact, as I discuss in Section 2.1, “____ exists” can likewise be systematically ambiguously predicated. When we say that “this human being exists”, “this worm exists”, and “this grain of dust exists”, we may simply mean that they are there in the same sense (univocal), but we may also mean that their existences—similar to whiteness—differ in terms of strength and weakness, perfection and deficiency (systematically ambiguous). As I have shown in Section 2.2, Suhrawardī never denies the reality of systematically ambiguous existence. The case of systematically ambiguous existence is similar to that of whiteness: although it functions as a universal in the sense that it unifies all instances of existence, it admits of gradation and contains infinite stronger and weaker instances of existence. It, therefore, has direct, corresponding foundations in the real world: all stronger and weaker real instances of existence. As I note in Section 1.2, in Suhrawardī’s Existentialism, systematically ambiguous existence and particular, individual quiddity are the very same thing: every instance of systematically ambiguous existence is a particular quiddity or it-ness. The quiddity–existence distinction is merely a mental distinction, as Suhrawardī points out clearly in al-Talwīḥāt. [Text 8] If we say that the existence of something is not quiddity, we, in fact, mean [that they are distinguished] in accordance with the mental distinction (al-tafṣīl al-dhihnī). [LWḤ3 23.16–17, §13] As Alexander Treiger has shown, Avicenna first formulates tashkīk al-wujūd (­systematic ambiguity of existence, or modulation of existence) and applies it to the solution of theological problems.54 However, Avicenna, in al-Shifāʾ: al-­ Ilāhiyyāt VI.3, explicitly denies that existence admits of strength and weakness: Existence inasmuch as it is existence does not differ in strength and weakness (al-shidda wa-l-ḍuʿf), and it does not admit of [being] less [­existence] or more deficient (al-aqall wa-l-anqaṣ). 53 54

See Chapter 4, section 3.4 for a discussion of Suhrawardī’s theory of differentiation. Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”, pp. 353–63.

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In fact, it [only] differs in several respects: priority and posteriority (al-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur), sufficiency and need (al-istighnāʾ wa-lḥāja), and necessity and contingency (al-wujūb wa-l-imkān). As for priority and posteriority, existence, as you know, first belongs to the cause and secondarily to the effect. As for sufficiency and need, you already knew that the cause does not need the effect in terms of existence; rather, it exists by itself or by another cause. This meaning is close to the first [meaning], yet different from it in consideration (fī l-iʿtibār). As for necessity and contingency, we know that if there is a cause that is the cause of everything that is an effect, then it is necessary in terms of existence (wājibat al-wujūd), [both] in relation to the totality of all effects and in the unrestricted sense (ʿalā l-iṭlāq). Moreover, if there is a cause of some effect, then it is necessary in terms of existence in relation to that effect, and that effect, however it is, is contingent in terms of existence (mumkin al-wujūd).55 Obviously, Avicenna is mainly concerned with the systematic ambiguity of existence when existence is applied to cause and effect differently (esp. when it is applied to God and creation). In contrast, Suhrawardī’s notion of ­systematic ambiguity of existence is primarily about strength and weakness, or about perfection and deficiency, features that Avicenna explicitly denies. The gradation of existence in terms of strength and weakness is, therefore, Suhrawardī’s metaphysical invention and is the very foundation of his Existentialism. The infinite degrees of strength and weakness allow instances of systematically ambiguous existence to be differentiated simply by themselves ­without the need for any quiddity or anything else. In Chapter 5, I explain how Suhrawardī further develops and transforms this Existentialism into Light Metaphysics. Based on the analysis of [Text 7], I summarize the qusṭās (test) for mental and real considerations as: If “____ is X” is predicated of X’s real particulars univocally (bi-l-tawāṭuʾ), i.e. by one and the same meaning, X-ness/being-X is necessarily a mental consideration, which does not correspond to metaphysical constituents of X’s real particulars.

55

Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 276.13–277.3; cf. Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion”, p. 357, note 92.

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If “____ is Y” is predicated of Y’s real particulars systematically ambiguously (bi-l-tashkīk) in terms of strength and weakness, or of perfection and deficiency, Y-ness/being-Y is necessarily a real consideration, which directly corresponds to metaphysical constituents of Y’s real particulars. 3.2 What Are Real and Mental Considerations? The so-called “mental considerations” refer primarily to univocal attributes (sing. ṣifa) or descriptions (sing. waṣf; rarely used).56 As I mention at the beginning of the chapter, the main mental considerations that Suhrawardī discusses include existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, and any universal quiddity and its constituents (muqawwimāt; i.e. genus, differentia, and so on). The following two passages explain clearly what mental and real considerations are as attributes.57 [Text 9] The fact is that attributes are divided into [1] attributes that have existence [both] in the mind and in the real world, such as whiteness (al-bayāḍ), and [2] attributes by which quiddities are described (ṣifāt tūṣafu bi-hā al-māhiyyāt; or attributes that are attributed to quiddities) and they only have existence in the mind, and their real existence (wujūduhā al-ʿaynī) is [the fact] that they are in the mind … [T]hey are secondary intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thawānī). [ṬRḤ3 346.14–347.1, §103] [Text 10] Therefore, all attributes are divided into two kinds: [1] the real attribute (ṣifa ʿayniyya), and it has a form in the intellect, such as blackness, whiteness, and motion; [2] the attribute whose existence in the real world (fī l-ʿayn) is its very existence in the mind, and it only has existence in 56

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Another group of mental considerations are intellectual predicables (sing. maḥmūl ʿaqlī), such as being-black (al-aswadiyya) and being-contingent (al-mumkiniyya), which are not to be confused with blackness (sawād) and contingency (imkān), which are mental/ intellectual attributes. Being-black, for example, is the predicable derived from the attribute blackness. Blackness is real, but being-black is purely mental because its meaning is “something in which blackness subsists”. Because this “something” is contained in its meaning, being-black can refer to anything: a real crow, a mental unicorn, or whatever in the real world or in the mind. The same argument applies to all intellectual predicables. To avoid confusion, I do not introduce this group, and they are not Suhrawardī’s main concern. See [Ḥ.Sh §68, 71–72]. Cf. Mousavian, “Suhrawardi on Innateness”, pp. 491–93.

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the mind. So their being (al-kawn) in the mind is in accordance with (fī martaba) others’ being in the real world, such as contingency (al-imkān), substantiality/being-substance (al-jawhariyya), colourness/being-colour (al-lawniyya), existence, and other things that we have mentioned before. [Ḥ.Sh 71.5–9, §68] As attributes, mental considerations are secondary intelligibles.58 They have no direct corresponding foundations in the real world, but they still must accord with how things really are—with their “being” (al-kawn) or real state— in the real world. That is, mental attributes are proper reflections of how real things are, rather than merely arbitrary conceptions, and the mind cannot use them arbitrarily. We could say that these mental attributes are what the mind generates to understand the real world better and that they are products of the unique way in which the mind operates. Primary intelligibles, such as whiteness, are what the mind grasps directly from real particular things. They are real considerations or attributes; they are systematically ambiguous universal conceptions. Secondary ­intelligibles—such as contingency, substantiality (the referent of the definition of “­substance”), colourness (the referent of the definition of “colour”), univocal existence, and so on—are products of the mind’s analysis of primary intelligibles. In Chapter 2, sections 3.2 and 5.2, I introduced the first primary–secondary intelligible distinction regarding human intellectual understanding; this distinction is about whether the acquisition of a conception or an assent requires thinking (fikr) or intuition (ḥads), that is, about whether the transition (intiqāl) from the known to the unknown is involved. Here, Suhrawardī seems to have in mind an additional primary–secondary intelligible distinction, one about whether we acquire a conception (and this distinction does not have to do with assent) by presential knowledge and about whether a conception is systematically ambiguous (i.e. whether it admits of strength and weakness) or univocal. According to both distinctions, whiteness is a primary intelligible because we acquire it without thinking through presential knowledge and it is systematically ambiguous. Univocal existence, by contrast, is a primary intelligible in the first distinction because we acquire it without thinking, but a secondary intelligible in the second distinction because we do not acquire it through presential knowledge and it is univocal. 58

Cf. Walbridge, “Response to Seyed N. Mousavian”, p. 483. Izutsu notes that this ­primary– secondary intelligible distinction is also found in Ṣadrā; see Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 82–84; cf. Kaukua, “Iʿtibārī Concepts”, pp. 53–54.

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What do real considerations refer to? I maintain that an answer to this is directly related to Suhrawardī’s reformulation of Peripatetic categories (maqūlāt).59 At the beginning of the Metaphysics of his Peripatetic-style works, when discussing the categories, Suhrawardī formulates a new theory of five categories that replaces the traditional ten categories of Aristotle and Avicenna. Following ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī (d. 1145), known as Ṣāḥib al-Baṣāʾir (Author of The Insights),60 he first reduces the ten Peripatetic categories to four—to substance (jawhar), quantity (kamm), quality (kayf or kayfiyya), and relation (iḍāfa or nisba)—and then introduces motion (ḥaraka) as the fifth category.61 Time (matā), place (ayna), position (waḍʿ), and disposition (milk) are reduced to relation because they must be understood through relation; action (fiʿl) and affection (infiʿāl) are reduced to motion [LWḤ3 11.2–12.3, §3]. Suhrawardī then argues that discontinuous quantity (kamm munfaṣil), i.e. number (ʿadad), is a mental consideration and so is relation [Ḥ.Sh §65, 70]. Thus, the remaining categories of accidents (sing. ʿaraḍ) are real considerations: continuous quantity (kamm muttaṣil), which is magnitude (miqdār; i.e. line, surface, body), quality, and motion.62 Only these three categories of real accidents are added to particular quiddities (which refer to substances) in the real world, given that Suhrawardī acknowledges the real substance– accident distinction [Ḥ.Sh 61.13–15, §52].63 Therefore, real considerations refer to the categories of substance, magnitude, quality, and motion.64 Moreover, Suhrawardī argues that these four categories all admit of gradations of strength 59 60

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For a study on Suhrawardī’s five categories, see Beidokhti, “Suhrawardī on Division”. ʿUmar b. Sahlān Sāwī, Al-Baṣāʾir al-Naṣīriyya fī ʿIlm al-Manṭiq [The Insights for Naṣīr al-Dīn on Logic], ed. Ḥassan al-Marāghī Ghaffārpūr (Tehran, 2002). Apparently, Suhrawardī had studied Sāwī’s al-Baṣāʾir carefully and mentions Sāwī by the name of Ṣāḥib al-Baṣāʾir ­multiple times in his Peripatetic-style works. Arguably, however, Sāwī included motion in his list, as suggested, for example, by Ghaffārpūr in the introduction to his edition of al-Baṣāʾir (Sāwī, Al-Baṣāʾir, p. 15); Sāwī writes: “Know that motion can occur to four categories, namely, quantity, quality, place, and disposition” (p. 133.4–5). Length and distance (magnitudes) and whiteness (a quality) are mentioned in [T7g], whiteness in [Text 9], and blackness, whiteness, and motion in [Text 10]; these should be sufficient textual evidence for my argument. In Illuminationist Light Metaphysics, these three real categories of accidents are called “states pertaining to darkness” (sing. hayʾa ẓulmāniyya). See Chapter 5, section 2.3. When Suhrawardī says, in [T7a], that “there are those that are added to quiddity both in the mind and in the real world”, he means that real accidents of these three categories are added to real substances both in the mind and in the real world. However, no ­univocal attributes are added to universal quiddities in the real world; they are both mental ­considerations. Another way to show that these four categories are real is that their real existence can be established empirically through presential knowledge.

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and weakness. In particular, because the Peripatetics often deny this point, he believes that he must argue that magnitude and substance admit of strength and weakness [LWḤ3 12.7–13.12, §3]. The gradation of these four categories is consistent with the qusṭās. Moreover, Suhrawardī points out that existence is predicated of these four categories systematically ambiguously. [Text 11] Existence falls [i.e. is predicated of] systematically ambiguously (bi-l-­ tashkīk) upon the necessary (al-wājib; i.e. God) in a more appropriate and primary manner, then upon substance, and then upon those whose essences are stable (al-qārr al-dhāt; i.e. accidents except motion), and among them, those that are not relational [i.e. quantity and quality] are more perfect than relation. [LWḤ3 17.1–3, §7] If we interpret the qusṭās together with the discussion of the categories and consider all the relevant points mentioned above, Suhrawardī’s real ontological position is clear. Existence is systematically ambiguously predicated of all particular things in the real world in terms of strength and weakness, or of perfection and deficiency; the attribute (ṣifa)—systematically ambiguous ­existence—generated by this predication is a real consideration, which directly corresponds to true metaphysical constituents of real particulars. To be more specific, systematically ambiguous existence is divided into the four real categories. Systematically ambiguous existence is identical with real particular quiddity or it-ness (i.e. the four categories), all of which admit of strength and weakness. Therefore, Suhrawardī’s whole discussion of mental considerations or ­attributes is meant to investigate which conceptions in the mind have direct, corresponding foundations or forms in the real world (i.e. primary intelligibles) and which conceptions are merely products that the mind generates through its unique way of considering or understanding the real world (i.e. secondary intelligibles). In one’s metaphysical theory, one must avoid taking what is mental to be what is real and building one’s theory on these mental considerations. Otherwise, one’s metaphysics would become extremely shaky and vulnerable, as Suhrawardī writes in al-Talwīḥāt. [Text 12] You should understand and examine every discussion/doctrine (kalām) until no mental thing is taken as a real essence (dhāt ʿayniyya); [otherwise,] it would lead to absurdity. [The reason] I have been fussy (aṭnabtu) [about this] is that there is a great need (ʿaẓm ḥāja) for it later and a great confusion (kathrat al-khabṭ) in this respect. [LWḤ3 26.5–7, §16]

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Having defined his position, Suhrawardī’s main challenge is to show, by demonstrative arguments (sing. burhān), that mental considerations (i.e. univocal attributes) must not exist in the real world. Beginning in the next section and continuing until Chapter 4, section 3.2, I show that his most powerful argumentative tool is the infinite regress: the real existence of mental considerations always leads to infinite regresses, which are absurd and not permitted in Suhrawardī’s metaphysics.65 Let us now consider a few of his many arguments against univocal existence being a real attribute that is added to quiddity in the real world. 4

Univocal Existence as a Mental Consideration

Suhrawardī offers seven arguments that, in the real world, univocal existence cannot be added to quiddity; the arguments are extremely rich and complicated.66 Rather than discuss all seven arguments, I concentrate on three, which are all based on the absurdity of infinite regresses. These arguments should be taken as his primary arguments. The first two arguments involve a single-­ species chain (silsila fī nawʿ wāḥid) of existence; the third argument involves a hybrid chain (silsila mukhtalaṭa) of existence and relation. I argue that the key premises—Self-Predication and Non-Identity for the single-species chain and Mutual-Predication for the hybrid chain—must be made explicit to show the arguments’ full strength. Again, to reconstruct these arguments, Suhrawardī’s major philosophical works must be read together. Here is a list of the locations of the seven arguments:67 Argument I: the Indifference Argument and the infinite regress of ­existence [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.5, §109] (central part) = [QWM3 164.10–13, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh 64.14–65.9, §65] (whole) Argument II: the Doubt Argument and the infinite regress of existence [LWḤ3 22.10–23.5, §13] = [QWM3 164.6–10, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh §57, 65] Argument III: the hybrid infinite regress of existence and relation

65 66 67

For Suhrawardī’s arguments against real infinite regresses, see [LWḤ3 §11, 20–21] and [Ḥ.Sh §55, 63–64]. “Existence” in Section 4 refers exclusively to univocal existence unless otherwise ­indicated. These seven arguments are arranged according to their importance and strength.

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[LWḤ3 24.1–3, §13] = [ṬRḤ3 358.9–13, §109] = [QWM3 165.3–4, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh §58, 65] Argument IV: four absurdities from taking existence as a state (hayʾa) or an accident (ʿaraḍ) [LWḤ3 23.5–9, §13] (first sub-argument) = [Ḥ.Sh 65.17–66.11, §59] (whole) Argument V: an objection to another Peripatetic argument [ṬRḤ3 345.7–10, §102; 347.17–348.16, §103] = [QWM3 163.16–164.5, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh 66.11–15, §59] Argument VI: another objection to the Peripatetic doubt argument [Ḥ.Sh 66.16–67.4, §60] Argument VII: a thought experiment [LWḤ3 23.9–11, §13] In what follows, I reconstruct Arguments I, II, and III in detail. 4.1 The Indifference Argument and the Infinite Regress of Existence This argument is the first of the six arguments about univocal existence found in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; the central part of the argument can also be found in al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt. Shahrazūrī remarks that it is a “sound demonstration” (burhān ḥasan) [Sha 181.10]. 4.1.1 The Indifference Argument, Self-Predication and Non-Identity Given its succinctness, I find the version in al-Muṭāraḥāt preferable. [Text 13] [T13a] Perhaps you say to them [the Peripatetics]: if a thing is non-­ existent (maʿdūm), is its existence non-existent or does it occur (ḥāṣil)? It is absurd that the thing is non-existent but its existence is subsistent (thābit), so its existence must be non-existent. [T13b] If the thing’s existence is understood together with the judgement that “it is non-existent”, then the existence’s being-­ existent (­mawjūdiyyat al-wujūd) must not be the existence itself. ­Otherwise, the understanding (taʿaqqul) of existence would not be conceived together with the judgement that “it is non-existent in the real world”. [T13c] Therefore, the existence’s being existent (kawnuhu mawjūdan) must be because of another thing (amr) that occurs [to the existence] when the quiddity becomes actualized (taḥaqquq) and its existence becomes actualized. So, the existence must have another existence, and they form a chain to infinity. [ṬRḤ3 358.17–359.5, §109]

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Suppose that univocal existence is added to quiddity in the real world, as the Strong Real Distinction proponents hold. Let us consider existence alone. To borrow the example used in [Text 14] below, one can understand the existence of non-existent blackness but at the same time be certain that its existence is non-existent, as Suhrawardī points out in [T13a]. In [T13b], given that it is permissible that existence does not exist in the real world, existence is obviously not identical to its being-existent (mawjūdiyya) because one has understood the existence of the non-existent blackness but simultaneously judged that it does not exist. That is, univocal existence in itself must be in an indifferent or neutral state between existence and non-existence. If existence in itself is existent, it necessarily exists. But that is not the case, as is evident from the case of the non-existent blackness. If existence in itself is non-existent, it will never exist, which is absurd. I call this the Indifference Argument; it is key for generating the infinite regress of existence. In [T13c], according to the Strong Real Distinction position, everything that exists must have a real existence added to it. Given that existence in itself is indifferent, existenceA requires another existenceB added to it. Given that the second existenceB is likewise indifferent, it requires a third existenceC. An infinite regress of existence is, therefore, generated. But infinite regresses are absurd in metaphysics, as demonstrated by Suhrawardī. I argue that the single-species chain of existence is generated by two principles: Self-Predication and Non-Identity. If we can legitimately predicate “____ exists” of existence—“existence exists”—without producing a tautology (Self-Predication) and if the attribute generated by Self-Predication (i.e. another existenceB) is not identical to the existenceA itself (Non-Identity), then existenceA must have another existenceB as its attribute. The same goes for the second existenceB, which must likewise have a third existenceC. Thus, we have an infinite regress. If, however, the Self-Predication of existence—“existence exists”—leads to a meaningless tautology and is illegitimate in the first place, as happens with “whiteness is white” (i.e. no Self-Predication), then the infinite regress of ­existence will not be generated. If Self-Predication is allowed but the attribute generated by Self-Predication (i.e. another existenceB) is indeed identical to the existenceA itself (i.e. no Non-Identity), then existenceA will not have another existenceB as its attribute, and the infinite regress of existence will not be generated. These are, in fact, two Peripatetic defences that Suhrawardī introduces in [Text 17] below. Therefore, the Indifference Argument in [T13b] is crucial for generating the infinite regress of existence. Precisely because univocal existence, as the universal meaning of the term “existence”, is indifferent to existence and

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non-existence, the Self-Predication of existence—“existence exists”—is legitimate without being tautological (insofar as existence is indifferent and does not necessarily exist). Moreover, the Non-Identity between existenceA and existenceB that is generated by Self-Predication can be established (insofar as existence is indifferent, and it requires another existence added to it that is not identical to it). An infinite regress of existence, therefore, can be generated. This Indifference Argument is similar to Avicenna’s own argument regarding indifferent pure quiddity.68 Just as pure quiddity (e.g. horseness) is indifferent to existence and non-existence, Suhrawardī shows that univocal existence is likewise indifferent to existence and non-existence. A parallel argument is found in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: [Text 14] [T14a] Moreover, we say: if blackness is non-existent (maʿdūm), then its existence does not occur (ḥāṣil), so its existence is not existent (mawjūd), given that its existence is as well non-existent (maʿdūm).69 [T14b] If we have understood existence and [at the same time] make the judgement that it is not existent, then the meaning (mafhūm) of “existence” (al-wujūd) is not the meaning of “existent” (al-mawjūd). Furthermore, if we say: the blackness, which we first took as non-existent and whose existence did not occur, now exists and its existence now occurs, then the occurrence of existence (ḥuṣūl al-wujūd) cannot be the existence itself.70 [T14c] Existence then has [another] existence; the same goes for the existence of existence. This goes on to infinity.71 [Ḥ.Sh 65.4–9, §65] 4.1.2 Sāwī’s Argument, and Two Peripatetic Defences According to al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, Sāwī and other philosophers who hold the Mental Distinction position had already introduced the 68

69 70

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For Avicenna’s argument that animal in itself or animality is neither general nor particular, see Avicenna, Al-Madkhal I.12, p. 65.11–19. For a detailed exposition of the indifferent ontological status of quiddity inasmuch as it is quiddity, based on six questions posed and answered by Avicenna himself, see Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt V.1, pp. 196.6–200.12. Cf. [T13a]. Cf. [T13b]. This is the Indifference Argument for the Non-Identity of existence. The ­existence of the non-existent blackness first did not occur and was not existent; when the blackness subsequently exists, its existence now occurs and becomes existent. Thus, ­existence itself is indifferent to existence and non-existence, and existence cannot be identical to the existence of existence, or its being-existent. Cf. [T13c].

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argument from the infinite regress of existence. Suhrawardī, however, finds a “weakness” (wahn) in their versions. [Text 15] [T15a] Among the arguments of these people, which have a weakness (wahn) in them, is what Ṣāḥib al-Baṣāʾir [Sāwī] has mentioned in several places. [T15b] Their gist (ḥāṣil) is that the existence of the quiddity that is in the real world is either a thing whose essence has occurred (amr mutaḥaṣṣil al-dhāt), or it is not. If its existence is not [a thing] whose essence has occurred, then it [i.e. the quiddity] is non-existent. If its existence has occurred (ḥāṣil), then its existence has [another] existence, and existence forms a chain to infinity. [T15c] Nothing is in it [Sāwī’s argument] except the substitution (tabdīl) of the term “existence” (wujūd) with “occurrence” (ḥuṣūl). For “occurrence” is “existence” itself, so it is like saying: is the quiddity’s existence existent? [ṬRḤ3 354.6–10, §107] This passage should be interpreted together with a parallel passage from al-Muqāwamāt. [Text 16] [T16a] In his doubts on the argument that existence pertains to consideration (iʿtibārī; or subjective), Ṣāḥib al-Baṣāʾir says: Is existence something whose essence has occurred (mutaḥaṣṣil al-dhāt) or not? If it is something whose essence has occurred, then it must have [another] existence. [T16b] He slanders some who say that “is existence existent or not?” because [he holds that] it is not sound to say that “whiteness is white”. But he commits the same mistake of which he disapproves, for “that which has occurred” (al-mutaḥaṣṣil) is the same as “existent” (al-­mawjūd). [QWM3 167.3–7, §37] Sāwī finds the argument that other Mental Distinction proponents advance about univocal existence invalid because he holds that the Self-Predication of existence is an illegitimate tautology. He thus substitutes “existent” (mawjūd) with “that which has occurred” (ḥāṣil or mutaḥaṣṣil) to render their argument valid. Suhrawardī then criticizes Sāwī for missing the point: It is not the case that the Self-Predication of existence is illegitimate. If it were indeed illegitimate, Sāwī’s solution would not help at all because “existent” and “that which has occurred” are synonymous (“except the substitution of the terms” [T15c]).

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Consequently, Sāwī makes the same mistake that he accuses others of (“he commits the same mistake of which he disapproves” [T16b]).72 The essential difference between Sāwī’s and others’ arguments and Suhrawardī’s argument in [Text 13] and [Text 14] is clear: nothing is mentioned in their versions about the indifference of existence to existence and non-existence. Nothing really turns on the two key premises, Self-Predication and Non-Identity. Their arguments are weak because they cannot respond to the following two defences from the Peripatetics. [Text 17] [T17a] Some of them [the Peripatetics] say that “existence is not existent”, for a thing cannot be described by itself, just as it cannot be said that “whiteness is white”.73 [T17b] Some of them say that [although] “existence is existent”,74 ­existence’s being existence [itself] (kawnuhu wujūdan) is the same as existence’s being existent (kawnuhu mawjūdan), and it is the being-­existent (mawjūdiyya) of things in the real world.75 It is not the case that existence has another existence; rather, existence is “existent inasmuch as it is existent” (al-mawjūd min ḥaythu huwa mawjūd). [The existence] of other things that comes from existence—which is to be described as “it is existent”—belongs to existence in itself, and it is [existence] itself.76 [ṬRḤ3 354.10–15, §107] The two Peripatetic defences apparently target Self-Predication and Non-­ Identity, respectively. The objection to Self-Predication is articulated in [T17a]: some outrightly reject the legitimacy of the Self-Predication of existence—­ “existence exists”—and argue that it is a meaningless tautology, just as “whiteness is white” is. The objection to Non-Identity is presented in [T17b]: 72

73 74 75 76

If my reading of [Text 15] and [Text 16] is correct, then Benevich might have misinterpreted these two passages and consequently maintained that Sāwī belongs to the first camp, holding the Strong Real Distinction position. See Benevich, “Essence-Existence Distinction”, pp. 208, 221, 225, 249. I argue that Sāwī and Suhrawardī both belong to the second camp and hold the Mental Distinction position. That is, the Self-Predication of existence is illegitimate. That is, although the Self-Predication of existence is allowed. That is, existence is identical to its being-existent, and it must exist; so, there is no Non-Identity. That is, the being-existent of other things (i.e. the fact that “it is existent”) comes from existence, whereas existence is identical to its own being-existent, so it does not require another existence added to it to exist.

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some accept the legitimacy of the Self-Predication of existence but argue that the attribute—another existenceB—that Self-Predication generates is identical to existenceA itself. That is, existence is identical to its being-existent (­mawjūdiyya). Therefore, existence does not require another existence added to it to exist. The Self-Predication of existence, in this case, is merely emphasizing existence’s own real being-existent and the fact that existence is indeed existent in the real world. These two Peripatetic defences may have prompted Suhrawardī to improve and strengthen Sāwī’s argument. His strategy, as I discuss in the context of [Text 13], is to formulate the Indifference Argument of existence to respond to the Peripatetic arguments and to establish the key premises of Self-Predication and Non-Identity. This argument occurs in [T13b], [T14b], and [Text 18]. The Indifference Argument has its clearest articulation in al-Muqāwamāt. [Text 18] [T18a] Their statement that “existence and its being existent (kawnuhu mawjūdan) are one and the same thing” is refuted by this [the Doubt Argument; see Section 4.2] and by [what follows].77 [T18b] If a thing is not existent, then its existence is also not existent. So it is sound to negate the being-existent from existence (salb al-­mawjūdiyya ʿan al-wujūd).78 If that thing [subsequently] exists, it is sound to affirm the being-existent of existence (ithbāt al-mawjūdiyya ʿalayhi). [T18c] So existence is understood together with being-existent (al-­ mawjūdiyya) and being-not-existent (al-lāmawjūdiyya). So existence’s being existent must not be existence [itself].79 [QWM3 164.10–13, §36] If a thing exists in the real world, its existence is existent; if it is non-­existent (and we can still understand its existence), its existence is non-existent. ­Existence, therefore, can be either existent or non-existent in the real world. In other words, existence is indifferent to being-existent and being-non-existent. So, existence cannot be identical to its being-existent. Thus, Suhrawardī establishes the Non-Identity principle. Non-Identity is more fundamental than Self-Predication because if Non-Identity is established, the legitimacy of Self-Predication follows naturally. The opposite is not true because, as shown in [T17b], one can accept 77 78 79

That is, the following Indifference Argument. Suhrawardī here is responding to [T17b]. I replace al-mawjūdī—which seems to be an error in the original text—with al-­ mawjūdiyya. Cf. [T13b] and [T14b].

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Self-Predication but deny Non-Identity. The purpose of Suhrawardī’s Indifference Argument, therefore, is to establish Non-Identity. 4.2 The Doubt Argument and the Infinite Regress of Existence In addition to the Indifference Argument, Suhrawardī offers another argument to establish Non-Identity and to generate the infinite chain of existence: the Doubt Argument, which occurs in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. I find the al-Muqāwamāt version more useful to analyse. [Text 19] [T19a] We understand existence, but we differ on whether it has existence in the real world, just as we understand the root of quiddity (aṣl al-māhiyya)80 but doubt its existence. [T19b] So if understanding with doubt (al-taʿaqqul maʿa l-tashakkuk) necessitates existence being added [to quiddity] (kawn al-wujūd zāʾidan) there [in the case of quiddity], then it also necessitates [existence being added to existence] here [in the case of existence]. [T19c] Existences then form a chain in which there is a sequence and whose components exist simultaneously, but it is impossible, as we have demonstrated. [QWM3 164.6–9, §36] Just as Suhrawardī’s Indifference Argument of existence is based on Avicenna’s own argument for the indifference of pure quiddity, his Doubt Argument of 80



This phrase “the root of quiddity” (aṣl al-māhiyya) is also found in al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 348.10, 16, §103], and it refers to “the real/concrete quiddity” (al-māhiyya al-ʿayniyya) [Ḥ.Sh 66.13, §59]. The context is that the Mental Distinction proponents are responding to the Strong Real Distinction proponents’ fourth argument about real univocal existence (the first argument is introduced in [Text 2]). The gist is that the Strong Real Distinction ­proponents argue that quiddity first does not exist and then it occurs, and that the quiddity occurs because the Creator gives it existence, so existence must be really distinct from quiddity [ṬRḤ3 345.7–10, §102]. The Mental Distinction proponents respond by arguing that “the quiddities themselves are from their Creator, and they apply what [the Strong Real Distinction proponents] say about existence to the root of ­quiddity” [ṬRḤ3 348.10–11, §103]. That is, they argue that the Creator directly creates real quiddities rather than gives those quiddities their existence. It would seem that Suhrawardī’s use of this phrase might have to do with the later ­mislabelling of his position as the “fundamentality of quiddity” (aṣālat al-māhiyya). ­However, first, this is not Suhrawardī’s argument; he is reporting other Mental Distinction proponents’ argument. Second, he argues against the Peripatetics on their grounds. Third, as I have shown in Section 3, every instance of systematically ambiguous existence is a real quiddity or an it-ness, and these are identical in Suhrawardī’s ontology. Therefore, I maintain that his true ontological position is Existentialism.

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existence makes use of Avicenna’s own doubt argument about pure quiddity. Avicenna’s doubt argument is well known and appears in different places, such as al-Ishārāt, Nahj I.11 and Namaṭ IV.6.81 The version in Namaṭ IV.6 is: Reminder: Know that you understand the intention (maʿnan) of the triangle, and you doubt whether or not it can be described by “existence in the real world” (al-wujūd fī l-aʿyān).82 After that the triangle is represented (tamaththala) to you, as [constituted] of a line and a surface, it is not represented to you that it exists in the real world.83 In his version of the doubt argument, Avicenna uses the example of the triangle: one understands the triangle but simultaneously doubts whether it exists. This doubt shows that quiddity (e.g. triangle-ness) and existence must be distinct in the mind. The crucial concern is whether this mental distinction implies the real quiddity–existence distinction. Regardless of Avicenna’s own position, Suhrawardī’s rivals—the Strong Real Distinction proponents— hold that this mental distinction does imply the real distinction.84 Suhrawardī, however, denies this in the first rule of the qusṭās.85 In his own Doubt Argument about univocal existence, Suhrawardī argues that we likewise understand existence but simultaneously doubt whether it exists, just as we doubt whether quiddity exists [T19a]. If this very doubt is sufficient to establish the real quiddity–existence distinction in the real world, it likewise is sufficient to establish the real distinction between existenceA and another existenceB that it has and is added to it in the real world [T19b]. The same goes for the second existenceB and so on; an infinite regress of existence is generated [T19c]. Similar to his Indifference Argument, Suhrawardī’s Doubt Argument establishes Non-Identity. The very doubt about whether existence really exists shows that existence is not identical to its existence; otherwise, we would not doubt its existence but would know definitively that it really exists. 81 82 83 84 85

For the argument in Nahj I.11, see Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, pp. 7.17–8.18. For an analysis of ­Avicenna’s doubt argument, its influence, and later reactions to it, see Benevich, “Essence-Existence Distinction”, pp. 213–17. Or, whether “existence in the real world” can be attributed to the triangle. Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, p. 140.1–3. Cf. the comments of Ibn Kammūna [I.K3 102.9–12], Shahrazūrī [Sha 182.11–13], and Quṭb al-Dīn [Q.D 182.11–16]. See [T7f]: “One rule is that a real distinction does not necessarily follow from a mental distinction.”

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Self-Predication and Non-Identity, therefore, are established, and an infinite regress of existence can be generated. Parallel arguments are found in al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. I translate these two versions without further analysis. [Text 20] [T20a] Benefit [of the qusṭās]:86 It is not permissible to say that existence is added (zāʾid) to quiddity in the real world (fī l-aʿyān) [simply] because we understand quiddity without existence [i.e. we doubt its existence]. [T20b] For we likewise understand existence, such as the existence of a phoenix (al-ʿanqāʾ),87 inasmuch as it is like that (min ḥaythu huwa kadhā),88 but we do not know [i.e. doubt] whether it is existent in the real world.89 [T20c] So existence needs another existence, and they form an infinite chain in the manner that they exist sequentially and simultaneously, and you have already known its absurdity.90 [LWḤ3 22.10–13, §13] [Text 21] [T21a] Another respect (wajh; i.e. argument): Those who are against these people, that is, against the followers of the Peripatetics (atbāʿ al-mashshāʾīn), understand existence, and they doubt whether it occurs (ḥāṣil) in the real world or not, just as the case of the root of quiddity (aṣl al-māhiyya).91

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88 89 90 91

This passage immediately follows the qusṭās in al-Talwīḥāt and suggests that a main ­ urpose of the qusṭās is to reject the real quiddity–existence distinction. p The term ʿanqāʾ refers to a legendary bird that can be traced back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Chapter 7); see Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, p. 88, note 56. The examples used in the Doubt Argument are a phoenix and a jinni (in [T22b]), whereas the examples used in the Indifference Argument are a non-existent thing (in [T13a]) and non-existent blackness (in [T14a]). We are uncertain of the existence of the phoenix and the jinni, so we doubt it. We are certain that the existence of the non-existent thing is non-existent, so we can establish the indifference of existence. That is, we understand existence inasmuch as it is existence, just as Avicenna invites us to consider horseness or triangle-ness (pure quiddity) inasmuch as it is horseness or ­triangle-ness. Cf. [T19a]. Cf. [T19c]. For a comparison between a similar (but still different) argument from ­Bahmanyār, who is an immediate disciple of Avicenna, and the argument of Suhrawardī, see Benevich, “Essence-Existence Distinction”, pp. 217–18. Cf. [T19a].

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[T21b] So existence has another existence, and the generation of the chain [of existence] follows.92 [Ḥ.Sh 65.10–12, §57] Unsurprisingly, to defend their position, the Peripatetics reject the ­Non-­Identity principle, as Suhrawardī introduces and responds to in al-Talwīḥāt. [Text 22] [T22a] Question: Existence and its being existent (kawnuhu mawjūdan) are one and the same thing, so what belongs to others [and comes] from existence belongs to existence in itself.93 [T22b] Answer: We can understand existence as [that which is] related to a jinni (al-jinn), for example, as mentioned previously, and we do not know [i.e. doubt] if it has occurred [in the real world]. So the existence of existence is not existence, just as what is said in the root of quiddity (aṣl al-māhiyya). [LWḤ3 22.14–23.1, §13] At [T22a], the Peripatetics employ the very same defence as they do in [T17b] and argue that existence is identical to its being-existent (mawjūdiyya). If this is the case, then no infinite chain of existence can be generated. Suhrawardī resorts to the Doubt Argument in [T22b] and uses the jinni as an example. The very fact that we understand the existence of the jinni but doubt its real existence shows that existence is not identical to its being-existent, just as we doubt the real existence of quiddity. The Non-Identity principle, therefore, is tenable. 4.3 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Existence and Relation In the previous two sections, I have shown how Suhrawardī takes great pains to establish the Non-Identity of existence—existence is not identical to its existence or its being-existent—to generate the single-species chain of existence. Despite having formulated the Indifference Argument and the Doubt ­Argument, he is still worried that these two arguments may not be strong and decisive enough to undermine the Strong Real Distinction position. So, he devises another argument, one based on a hybrid chain (silsila mukhtalaṭa) of existence and relation, which the sole principle of Mutual-­Predication generates. This argument is one of the ten arguments that involve hybrid chains (which are generated from any two of the five attributes: existence, 92 93

Cf. [T19c]. That is, the being-existent of other things comes from existence, whereas the being-­ existent of existence—because they are identical—belongs to existence in itself. Cf. the last sentence of [T17b].

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oneness, contingency, necessity by another, and relation) that are found in both al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt. I explore the other nine arguments in Chapter 4, section 1 and section 2. Based on [Text 23] and [Text 24], hybrid chains are Suhrawardī’s own invention. The advantage of hybrid chains is that, because Mutual-­Predication ­generates them, Non-Identity is no longer a problem. This makes the ­Peripatetic defences in [Text 17] and [T22a] fail. [Text 23] Supposing that you [the Peripatetics] refuse the infinite chain of ­existence by [arguing] that existence is [identical to] being-existent (­al-­mawjūdiyya), then there is no doubt that the meanings (mafhūmāt) of oneness, existence, and contingency are all different: any of them can be understood without another. So the intention (maʿnan) of contingency will never be reduced to existence, nor will the intention of oneness to either of the other two. [ṬRḤ3 355.4–7, §108] [Text 24] The advantage (al-fāʾida) of hybrid chains (al-salāsil al-mukhtalaṭa) is that they can break their [the Peripatetics’] delusion (wahm) mentioned previously: existence is the same as its being-existent (mawjūdiyya).94 For the intention (maʿnan) of contingency and [that of] oneness, or existence, or relation do not become the same thing, given that two things do not become one. [Otherwise,] if there is contingency, there is no oneness; if there is oneness, there is no contingency. [QWM3 165.11–14, §36] There are four hybrid chains that involve existence: existence and oneness, existence and contingency, existence and necessity by another, and existence and relation. Suhrawardī uses the hybrid chain of existence and relation as his paradigmatic example. [Text 25] [T25a] If existence is added to quiddity, then it has a relation (nisba) to quiddity. [T25b] If our judgement that “a thing exists in the real world” requires its existence to occur (ḥāṣil) in the real world, then [our judgement that]

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Cf. [T17b] and [T22a].

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“its existence has a relation to quiddity” likewise requires this relation [to occur] in the real world. [T25c] This relationA has a second existenceB, and the second ­existenceB has another relationB. It goes on like this to infinity. [ṬRḤ3 358.9–13, §109] This argument involves “existence is related to a substrate/subject (maḥall/ mawḍūʿ)” (Mutual-Predication I) and “relation exists” (Mutual-Predication II). In [T25a], if existence is indeed added to quiddity in the real world, as the Strong Real Distinction proponents maintain, then obviously existence is related to quiddity. So we can predicate relation of existence: “existence is related to quiddity” (Mutual-Predication I), and existence thus has a real attribute, its relation to quiddity. In [T25b], given that existence has a real relation to quiddity, this relation obviously exists. So we can predicate existence of relation: “the relation [between existence and quiddity] exists” (Mutual-­Predication II), and relation thus has a real attribute, a second existenceB added to it. In [T25c], by the same reasoning, given that “the second existenceB is related to the relationA [between existenceA and quiddity]” (Mutual-Predication I), existenceB likewise has a second relationB to relationA. Given that “the second relationB exists” (Mutual-Predication II), relationB likewise has a third existenceC added to it. In this way, the hybrid infinite chain of existence and relation is generated. As Suhrawardī argues in [Text 23] and [Text 24], the advantage of the hybrid chain is obvious. Unlike Self-Predication, no one would doubt the legitimacy of Mutual-Predication. For instance, it is reasonable to predicate existence of relation and to predicate relation of existence. Moreover, without Self-­ Predication, Non-Identity is no longer a worry because Mutual-Predication involves two different attributes, such as existence and relation. Therefore, Mutual-­Predication alone is sufficient to generate hybrid chains, which are stronger than single-species chains. Suhrawardī summarizes the argument in al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muqāwamāt, and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. [Text 26] If existence is related to quiddity, then its relation (iḍāfa; synonymous with nisba) exists. And its existence has [another] relation. This ­continues to infinity. [LWḤ3 24.2–3, §13] [Text 27] Another [chain] is between existence and relation to a substrate (al-nisba ilā l-maḥall). So existenceA has relationA, and relationA has existenceB, and it goes on like this. [QWM3 165.3–4, §36]

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[Text 28] Another respect (wajh): If existence belongs [i.e. is related] to quiddity, then existence has a relation to quiddity. The relationA has [another] existenceB, and the existenceB of the relationA has [another] relationB to that relationA. This forms a chain to infinity. [Ḥ.Sh §58, 65] In Chapter 4, I consider the other mental considerations and, in Chapter 4, section 4, I summarize Chapters 3 and 4 together.

chapter 4

On Other Mental Considerations In this chapter, I reconstruct Suhrawardī’s discussion of other mental ­considerations: oneness, contingency, necessity by another, determinables (e.g. colourness), differentiae of determinates (e.g. the differentia of blackness),1 genera, and differentiae.2 As with univocal existence, none exist in the real world because the results would be absurd. I do not discuss these mental considerations in great detail. Instead, I translate and analyse the most appropriate texts for each type of mental consideration. My focus is on Suhrawardī’s own texts as the issues I address in this chapter are, to my knowledge, rarely treated systematically in the secondary literature. In the first half of this chapter, I introduce Suhrawardī’s discussion of oneness, contingency, and necessity by another.3 His arguments regarding these mental considerations are similar to those regarding univocal existence: they rely on single-species chains, which are generated by Self-Predication and Non-Identity, and hybrid chains, which are generated by Mutual-Predication (see Section 1). In Section 2, I summarize the ten hybrid chains—Suhrawardī’s own invention—that I introduced in the previous chapter, and I then identify the universal patterns of these arguments that involve infinite regresses. In the second half of this chapter (Section 3), I analyse Suhrawardī’s discussions of the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction and the genus–differentia distinction. This discussion immediately reveals his ­Nominalism about the problem of universals: Suhrawardī holds that everything in the real world is particular and individual in its own right. He rejects both real distinctions: determinables, differentiae of determinates, genera, and differentiae are all mental considerations. This is closely related to his distinction 1 I am aware that it is not accurate to use the phrase “differentia of determinate” because a determinate’s differentia, strictly speaking, is not a differentia (see Section 3.1). However, I follow Suhrawardī’s use of this phrase. For example, he speaks about “the differentia of blackness” (faṣl al-sawād) [ṬRḤ3 366.8, §115]. The “differentia”, in this case, should be understood more broadly as a differentiator. 2 In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq [Ḥ.Sh §§65–67, 70–71], Suhrawardī discusses another three mental considerations that I do not address in the current chapter: relation (al-iḍāfa), being-non-existent (al-ʿadamiyya), and substantiality/being-substance (al-jawhariyya). I examine substantiality in Chapter 5, section 4.2.4. 3 “Necessity” in this chapter refers to “necessity by another” unless otherwise indicated. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_006

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between individuation (tashakhkhuṣ) and differentiation (tamayyuz): individuation is a metaphysical issue about real things themselves (i.e. how do things become individual?), whereas differentiation is an epistemological issue for human apprehenders (i.e. how do we distinguish one individual from another?). Although Suhrawardī rejects the real genus–differentia distinction, he does not consider all species as being simple. He acknowledges only two kinds of composite species: natural species composed of body and soul and artificial species composed of matter and form. Species other than these two are indivisible simple species. Lastly, in Section 4, I summarize Chapter 3 and Chapter 4—Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations. These two chapters and Chapter 2 ­provide the necessary preparation for Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics (see Chapter 5). 1

Oneness, Contingency, and Necessity by Another

In this section, I analyse Suhrawardī’s arguments that oneness, contingency, and necessity by another cannot be added to quiddity in the real world. 1.1 Oneness Suhrawardī advances two arguments against the reality of oneness. I focus on the first argument, which is based on the single-species chain of oneness that Self-Predication and Non-Identity generate. The first argument involves another Indifference Argument for the Non-Identity of oneness. I then summarize the second argument briefly.4 1.1.1 The Indifference Argument and the Infinite Regress of Oneness Let us look at Suhrawardī’s argument in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: [Text 1] [T1a] Know that oneness (al-waḥda) is also not an intention (maʿnan) added (zāʾid) to something in the real world. [T1b] Otherwise, oneness would be one thing (shayʾ wāḥid) among things, so it would have [another] oneness. [T1c] Moreover, we say “one and multiple ones” (wāḥid wa-āḥād kathīra), just as we say “a thing and multiple things”. [Ḥ.Sh 67.13–15, §61] 4 The first argument: [LWḤ3 23.11–14, §13] = [QWM3 168.1–5, §37] (detailed) = [Ḥ.Sh 67.13–15, §61]; the second argument: [ṬRḤ3 357.18–358.5, §109] = [QWM3 167.10–15, §37] (detailed) = [Ḥ.Sh 67.15–68.3, §61].

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This argument involves “oneness is one” (Self-Predication) and “oneness is not identical to the oneness of oneness” (Non-Identity). In [T1a] Suhrawardī articulates his position and then, in [T1b], argues for the legitimacy of the Self-Predication of oneness. If oneness is a real attribute that is added to quiddity in the real world, then, as something real, oneness must be “one thing among things”, or “one existent (mawjūd wāḥid) among all existents” [LWḤ3 23.12, §13]. So, it is reasonable to predicate “____ is one” of oneness: “oneness is one”. Oneness, therefore, has an attribute—the oneness of oneness—generated by Self-Predication. The challenge is to establish the Non-Identity of oneness. As brief and obscure as it is, [T1c] presents the Indifference Argument for Non-Identity. In al-Talwīḥāt, a similar one-sentence argument can be found: “For just as it is said ‘an essence (dhāt) and multiple essences’, it is [also] said ‘one and multiple ones’.” [LWḤ3 23.13–14, §13] Fortunately, a more detailed version is found in al-Muqāwamāt: [Text 2] [T2a] Moreover, if it is said “an essence (dhāt) and essences” or “a man and men”, the nature (al-ṭabīʿa; e.g. humanity) must accept oneness and multiplicity. Likewise, when we say “oneness and onenesses” (waḥda wa-āḥād),5 there is a reference (ishāra) in it [this statement] to the ­oneness (waḥda) and multiplicity (kathra) in the nature of oneness.6 [T2b] Whatever accepts oneness and multiplicity, oneness and multiplicity must be added to it. The acceptance (qabūl) of multiplicity proves that its oneness does not necessarily follow its quiddity. [T2c] We bring up this point so that you understand from it what is in al-Talwīḥāt.7 [QWM3 168.1–5, §37] In [T2a], Suhrawardī argues that, given that one can say “oneness and multiple onenesses” or “one and multiple ones” (i.e. one can predicate “____ are multiple” of oneness and one), “the nature of oneness” (ṭabīʿat al-waḥda) must accept both oneness and multiplicity. According to [T2b], the fact that ­oneness accepts multiplicity proves that oneness is not identical to its oneness. Rather, oneness in itself must be indifferent to both oneness and multiplicity. 5 Suhrawardī appears to use āḥād as the plural form of both wāḥid (one) and waḥda (oneness). 6 That is, the fact that we can say “oneness and onenesses” indicates that the nature of ­oneness accepts both oneness and multiplicity. Therefore, oneness is indifferent to oneness and ­multiplicity. 7 As mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.2, al-Muqāwamāt serves as appendices to al-Talwīḥāt.

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Obviously, this Indifference Argument of oneness is similar to the Indifference Argument of univocal existence that I reconstruct in Chapter 3, section 4.1. Again, Suhrawardī resorts to Avicenna’s argument regarding indifferent pure quiddity. In fact, both univocal existence and oneness are pure quiddities insofar as they are the universal meanings of the terms “existence” and “oneness”. The second argument can be summarized as follows. If the distinction between quiddity and oneness is real, then quiddity and oneness must be two different things. It follows that quiddity without oneness is already one and oneness itself is also one. Two absurdities follow. First, given that quiddity without oneness is one, it must have another onenessB. By the same reasoning, given that the distinction between quiddity and onenessB is also real, they are also two, so quiddity without onenessB is again one. It, therefore, must have a third onenessC. This leads to an infinite regress of the oneness of quiddity. Second, given that oneness is also one; the infinite regress of oneness arises again. The second part of the second argument seems to overlap with the first argument. But the first argument is not a part of the second argument insofar as, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī presents them as two separate arguments. 1.1.2 An Inference: All Numbers Are Mental Considerations After establishing that oneness cannot exist in the real world, Suhrawardī infers that all numbers must likewise be mental considerations.8 In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, he argues: [Text 3] [T3a] If the case of oneness is like this, then [every] number (al-ʿadad) must likewise be an intellectual thing (amr ʿaqlī). This is because if a ­number comes from onenesses (al-āḥād) and oneness is an intellectual attribute (ṣifa ʿaqliyya), then the number must also be like that. [T3b] Another respect [i.e. argument]: if four, for example, is an accident (ʿaraḍ) that subsists (qāʾim) in human beings, then either there is a fourness (al-arbaʿiyya) in the complete sense (tāmmatan) in each individual, but this is not the case. Or, in each one, there is something from fourness, and that thing must be oneness. So the aggregate (majmūʿ) of fourness cannot have any substrate (maḥall) other than the intellect (al-ʿaql), for it is not the case that in each one there is [a complete] fourness or something from it. Therefore, given this consideration, fourness also cannot exist except in the intellect. 8 [ṬRḤ3 358.6–8, §109] = [QWM3 169.3–4, §39] = [Ḥ.Sh 68.3–12, §§61–62]. Any instance of “number” in this section refers to any number other than oneness.

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[T3c] Obviously, if the mind gathers one thing in the east and another thing in the west, it observes (yulāḥiẓu) twoness (al-ithnayniyya). If someone sees a large group (jamāʿa) [of people], one takes from them three, four, or five, according to what one’s sight falls on by grouping (bi-lijtimāʿ). One also takes [from these people] a hundred, hundreds, ten, tens, and other numbers. [Ḥ.Sh 68.3–12, §§61–62] Suhrawardī’s first argument occurs at [T3a] and is straightforward. Because oneness is a mental attribute and all numbers come from onenesses (e.g. fourness comes from four onenesses), all numbers must likewise be mental attributes. Suhrawardī offers a second argument at [T3b]. If one supposes that fourness is a real attribute that is added to four human beings, then two possibilities follow: First, there is a complete fourness in each of them. This is obviously absurd; otherwise, we could predicate “____ is four” of each individual, and each individual would be four. Second, there is something from fourness in each one of them, and that thing must be oneness. But it has already been established that oneness cannot exist in the real world, so this is absurd as well. In [T3c], Suhrawardī concludes by explaining the way in which numbers arise in the mind: “intellectual observation” (mulāḥaẓa ʿaqliyya) [ṬRḤ3 358.8, §109]. For example, when one’s mind groups four things together, one observes fourness in the mind. One possible weakness of this explanation seems to be that not all numbers arise because of mental observation. I have the concept of one billion in my mind, but I have never observed one billion real things simultaneously. I assume that Suhrawardī might respond that he is more concerned with how numbers arise in the mind initially. Nonetheless, when we have conceptualized enough numbers, we can produce any number without relying on mental observation. Thus, for Suhrawardī, no numbers exist in the real world. 1.2 Contingency (the Priority Argument and the Infinite Regress of Contingency) The argument regarding contingency is based on a single-species chain of contingency. It involves a third line of argument—the Priority Argument—for the Non-Identity of contingency.9 The most detailed version is found in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.

9 [LWḤ3 25.7–10, §15] = [QWM3 167.8–10, §37] = [ṬRḤ3 357.16–18, §109] = [Ḥ.Sh 68.13–69.4, §63] (detailed).

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[Text 4] [T4a] Know that the contingency (al-imkān) of a thing must be prior to the thing’s existence in the intellect. For contingents must [first] be ­contingent, and then they exist. It is not sound to say that “it [first] exists and then becomes contingent”. [T4b] Contingency falls (yaqaʿu) upon [i.e. is predicated of] different things by a single meaning [i.e. univocally]. [T4c] Moreover, contingency belongs to quiddity as an accident (ʿaraḍī lil-māhiyya), and it is attributed to quiddity (yūṣafu bi-hi; or quiddity is described by it). So, contingency is not a self-subsistent thing (shayʾ qāʾim bi-nafsihi), and it is not that whose existence is necessary (wājib al-­wujūd). For if its existence were necessary by itself, it would subsist by itself and would not require a relation to a subject (iḍāfa ilā mawḍūʿ). Therefore, contingency is contingent. [T4d] [Moreover,] its contingencyB is understood before its existence, for whatever is not contingent first cannot exist. So its contingencyB is not itself. [T4e] The same goes for the contingencyC of its contingencyB and so on to infinity. This leads to an impossible chain, for its individuals exist simultaneously and sequentially. [Ḥ.Sh 68.13–69.4, §63] This argument involves “contingency is contingent” (Self-Predication) and “contingency is not identical to the contingency of contingency” (Non-Identity). In [T4c], Suhrawardī argues for the legitimacy of Self-Predication. If contingency is a real attribute added to quiddity in the real world, it must be either necessary by itself or contingent by itself. The first option is absurd because, as an accident of quiddity, it requires “a relation to a subject”. So it is not “a self-subsistent thing” or “that whose existence is necessary” (which God alone is). Therefore, it is reasonable to predicate “____ is contingent” of contingency: “contingency is contingent”. Passages [T4a] and [T4d] establish Non-Identity. This is a third line of argument for Non-Identity that I call the Priority Argument. A clearer formulation of this argument is in al-Muṭāraḥāt (as well as in al-Muqāwamāt). [Text 5] The contingency of contingency is not contingency [itself]. This is because the contingency of a thing must be prior to [the thing] itself, but nothing can be prior to itself. [ṬRḤ3 357.17–18, §109]

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The contingency of everything that exists must be prior to the thing itself because, as shown in [T4a] and [T4d], a thing must be contingent first, and then it exists. If contingency, as a real attribute, exists, it must also be ­contingent first, and then it exists. So the contingency of contingency is prior to contingency itself. But nothing can be prior to itself, so the contingency of contingency cannot be contingency itself. “Contingency is contingent” (Self-Predication, because it is an accident that subsists in quiddity), and “contingency is not identical to the contingency of contingency” (Non-Identity, because its contingency must be prior to itself), so contingency must have another contingency. The second contingency is ­likewise contingent and not identical to its contingency, so it has a third contingency. Thus, an infinite regress of contingency is generated. 1.3 Necessity by Another Suhrawardī formulates two arguments regarding necessity by another: one is based on a hybrid chain of necessity and contingency; the other is based on a hybrid chain of necessity and existence.10 1.3.1 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Necessity and Contingency I find the version in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq preferable because of its concision. [Text 6] [T6a] Necessity is also like this [a mental consideration], for necessity is an attribute (ṣifa) of existence. If necessity is added to existence and does not subsist by itself, then it is contingent. [T6b] So, its multiple necessities and contingencies go on sequentially to infinity. [Ḥ.Sh 69.4–6, §63] This argument involves “necessity by another is contingent” (Mutual-­ Predication I) and “the contingency of necessity is necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication II). In [T6a], Suhrawardī argues that if necessity by another is added to ­existence and quiddity, then it is a real attribute. Given that no attribute is necessary by itself (which God alone is), “necessity by another is contingent” (Mutual-­Predication I). Suhrawardī writes that “necessity is added to 10

The first argument: [ṬRḤ3 357.5–12, §109] (detailed) = [QWM3 165.5–6, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.4–6, §63]; the second argument: [LWḤ3 25.10–11, §15] = [ṬRḤ3 357.15–16, §109] = [QWM3 165.7, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.6–9, §63].

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existence”, which is similar to his phrasing in al-Muṭāraḥāt that “necessity is an intention (maʿnan) added to its existence and quiddity in the real world” [ṬRḤ3 357.6–7, §109], because necessity, strictly speaking, is an attribute of existence. This is based on Avicenna’s well-known division of “existent” (mawjūd): God alone is “that whose existence is necessary by itself” (wājib al-­ wujūd bi-dhātihi), whereas everything else that exists in the real world is “that whose existence is contingent by itself” (mumkin al-wujūd bi-dhātihi). Only when the existence of the contingent is rendered necessary by an external cause does the contingent exist; otherwise, it would remain contingent and be neither necessary nor impossible.11 Therefore, necessity is an attribute of existence. Mutual-Predication II is omitted from the passage above but can be found in al-Muṭāraḥāt: [Text 7] Moreover, the contingency [of necessity] itself is not that whose ­existence is necessary, for it is an accident (ʿaraḍ) in quiddities. So it is contingent, and it does not occur unless by its necessityB by another. And that ­necessityB is contingent. [ṬRḤ3 357.8–10, §109] Given that “necessity by another is contingent” (Mutual-Predication I), necessity must have a real contingency added to it. Given that this contingency, as an attribute, cannot be that whose existence is necessary, it is contingent by itself and necessary by another. Therefore, “the contingency of necessity is necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication II), and contingency thus has another necessityB by another. By the same reasoning, given that “the second necessityB by another is also contingent” (Mutual-Predication I), it has another contingencyB. Given that “the second contingencyB is also necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication II), it has a third necessityC by another. In this way, a hybrid infinite chain of necessity and contingency is generated. 1.3.2 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Necessity and Existence A detailed version of the second argument is not locatable, so I consider the version from Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.

11

Cf. Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt, Namaṭ IV.9, pp. 140.12–141.2.

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[Text 8] Moreover, existence must have necessity, and necessity must have ­existence. In this way, another infinite chain follows from the repetition of existence on necessity and necessity on existence. But it is impossible, as shown previously.12 [Ḥ.Sh 69.8–9, §63] This argument involves “necessity by another exists” (Mutual-Predication I) and “existence is necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication II). In [Text 8], Suhrawardī, however, does not say much about Mutual-Predication, probably because the reasoning is similar to the previous argument. Nonetheless, I reconstruct the argument as follows. If necessity by another is a real attribute added to existence and quiddity, then it obviously exists. Therefore, “necessity by another exists” (Mutual-­ Predication I). Necessity thus has existence. This existence cannot be necessary by itself, so it is necessary by another. Therefore, “existence is necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication II), and existence thus has another necessityB. By the same reasoning, necessityB also exists, and the existenceB of necessityB is also necessary by another. Thus, a hybrid chain of necessity and existence can be generated. 2

Summary of Suhrawardī’s Arguments from Infinite Regresses

In this section, I first summarize each of the ten hybrid chains and then ­identify the universal patterns in Suhrawardī’s arguments that involve both single-­species chains and hybrid chains. 2.1 Ten Hybrid Infinite Regresses and Their Key Premises At this point, we have come across three hybrid infinite chains, generated respectively from existence and relation (see Chapter 3, section 4.3), necessity

12

The passage that occurs immediately before [Text 8] is somewhat puzzling. It reads: “The necessity of a thing is prior to (qabla) the thing, so it is not the thing [itself]. For a thing must become necessary and then exist; it does not exist and then becomes necessary.” [Ḥ.Sh 69.6–8, §63] This seems to be a separate argument that involves a single-species chain of necessity by another. If this assessment is correct, then the passage is a Priority Argument for the Non-Identity of necessity (i.e. necessity is not identical to the necessity of necessity), given its similarity to [T4a], [T4d], and [Text 5] from this chapter. But Suhrawardī does not spell it out as a complete argument, so I simply mention it without further analysis.

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by another and contingency (Section 1.3.1), and necessity and existence (Section 1.3.2). There are seven more such hybrid chains. The ten hybrid chains are generated from any two of the following five attributes: existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, and relation to a substrate/subject (nisba/iḍāfa ilā maḥall/mawḍūʿ). In Chapter 3, section 4.3, I analysed the advantage of hybrid chains: because Mutual-Predication generates them, any instance of Non-Identity—especially the Non-Identity of existence that has caused Suhrawardī much trouble—is no longer a problem. The arguments based on these hybrid chains, therefore, are stronger. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī briefly mentions two hybrid chains, one of existence and relation and the other of necessity and existence. In Ḥikmat al-­ Ishrāq, there are the three hybrid chains that I previously introduced. His full discussion of all ten hybrid chains is found in al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 355.4–359.5, §§108–9] and al-Muqāwamāt [QWM3 164.14–165.14, §36]. In al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī mentions all of them and analyses six; in al-Muqāwamāt, he summarizes nine of the hybrid chains briefly. Following the order they are presented in al-Muṭāraḥāt, here is a list of the arguments’ locations: 1. Existence and oneness: [ṬRḤ3 355.7–14, §108] = [QWM3 165.2–3, §36] 2. Contingency and oneness: [ṬRḤ3 356.9–15, §109] = [QWM3 165.1–2, §36] 3. Existence and contingency: [ṬRḤ3 356.15–357.5, §109] = [QWM3 164.14–16, §36] 4. Necessity and contingency (Section 1.3.1): [ṬRḤ3 357.5–12, §109] = [QWM3 165.5–6, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.4–6, §63] 5. Oneness and necessity: [ṬRḤ3 357.15, §109] = [QWM3 165.6–7, §36] 6. Necessity and existence (Section 1.3.2): [LWḤ3 25.10–11, §15] = [ṬRḤ3 357.15–16, §109] = [QWM3 165.7, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.6–9, §63] 7. Existence and relation (Chapter 3, section 4.3): [LWḤ3 24.1–3, §13] = [ṬRḤ3 358.9–13, §109] = [QWM3 165.3–4, §36] = [Ḥ.Sh §58, 65] 8. Contingency and relation: [ṬRḤ3 358.13–15, §109] = [QWM3 165.1, §36] 9. Necessity and relation: [ṬRḤ3 358.15, §109] 10. Oneness and relation: [ṬRḤ3 358.15–16, §109] = [QWM3 165.4–5, §36] I do not propose to reconstruct the remaining seven hybrid chains in detail; instead, I establish the Mutual-Predication premises in each case. I cite Suhrawardī’s own words whenever possible. (1) Existence and oneness: [Text 9] [T9a] So we say: if existence is added to quiddity in the real world, then there is no doubt that they are two. For if they are one and the same,

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then if there is existence alone, there is no quiddity, and if there is quiddity, there is no existence. If they are two, then existence has oneness and quiddity has another oneness, for it is absurd for twoness to occur without two onenesses. Therefore, existence must have oneness. [T9b] That oneness must have existence, for if it had no existence, then oneness would not exist in the real world. [ṬRḤ3 355.7–12, §108] Given that the distinction between existence and quiddity is real, it is reasonable to say that “existence and quiddity are two”. Each of them, therefore, must be one, so “existence is one” (Mutual-Predication I in [T9a]). Oneness, as a real attribute, has already occurred in the real world, so obviously “oneness exists” (Mutual-Predication II in [T9b]). (2) Contingency and oneness: [Text 10] [T10a] For the contingencies of quiddities are multiple, so contingency must have oneness. … [T10b] If oneness is added to contingency and is related to it, then oneness is not that whose existence is necessary by itself. Otherwise, it would need no subject (mawḍūʿ). So oneness is contingent. [ṬRḤ3 356.9–12, §109] Given that multiple quiddities have multiple contingencies, one quiddity must have one contingency, so “contingency is one” (Mutual-Predication I at [T10a]).13 Given that oneness, as a real attribute, is in need of a subject, it is not necessary by itself, so “oneness is contingent” (Mutual-Predication II at [T10b]). (3) Existence and contingency: [Text 11] For existence is not necessary because of itself (wājib li-dhātihi); ­otherwise, it would not need a subject (mawḍūʿ). [ṬRḤ3 356.16–17, §109] Given that existence, as a real attribute, is in need of a subject (mawḍūʿ), it is not necessary by itself, so “existence is contingent” (Mutual-Predication I

13

This is another line of argument for “X-ness is one” (X-ness stands for any of the four attributes other than oneness) and is somewhat different from the argument from the real distinction in [T9a].

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in [Text 11]). Contingency, as a real attribute, has already occurred in the real world, so “contingency exists” (Mutual-Predication II). (4) Necessity and contingency: see Section 1.3.1. (5) Oneness and necessity: Oneness, as a real attribute, is contingent by itself. Every contingent that exists must be necessary by another, so “oneness is necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication I). Given that the distinction between necessity and quiddity is real, they must be two, so “necessity by another is one” (Mutual-Predication II, following [T9a]). Alternatively, one can follow the line of argument in [T10a]. (6) Necessity and existence: see Section 1.3.2. (7) Existence and relation: see Chapter 3, section 4.3. (8) Contingency and relation: Given that contingency, as a real attribute, is added to quiddity, “contingency is related to a subject” (Mutual-Predication I). Moreover, [Text 12] The relation (al-nisba) is not that whose existence is necessary by itself, for it is a state (hayʾa),14 and all states are contingent because of their dependence (tawaqquf) on their subjects (mawḍūʿāt). [ṬRḤ3 358.13–14, §109] That is, given that the relation between quiddity and contingency, as a real attribute, is in need of a subject, it is not necessary by itself, so “relation is contingent” (Mutual-Predication II). (9) Necessity and relation: Necessity, as a real attribute, is added to quiddity, so “necessity by another is related to a subject” (Mutual-Predication I). The relation between quiddity and necessity, as a real attribute, is contingent by itself. Every contingent that exists must be necessary by another, so “relation is necessary by another” (Mutual-Predication II). (10) Oneness and relation: Oneness, as a real attribute, is added to quiddity, so “oneness is related to a subject” (Mutual-Predication I). Given that the distinction between relation and quiddity is real, they must be two, so “relation is one” (Mutual-Predication I, following [T9a]).

14

Note that hayʾa (state) and ʿaraḍ (accident) are synonymous, although, in Ḥikmat al-­ Ishrāq, Suhrawardī prefers to use hayʾa, which marks the terminological departure from Peripatetic philosophy. This departure will become evident when I reconstruct the ­fourfold light–darkness division in Chapter 5, section 2.

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2.2 The Universal Patterns of the Arguments from Infinite Regresses Having examined all the arguments from infinite regresses (Chapter 3, section 4 to Chapter 4, section 2.1), I now summarize the universal patterns of these arguments based on both single-species chains and hybrid chains. To generate a single-species chain, there are two steps.15 The first step is to establish the Non-Identity of any of the following three attributes: existence, oneness, and contingency. Three lines of arguments can be identified: the Indifference Argument (existence and oneness), the Doubt Argument (­existence), and the Priority Argument (contingency). Non-Identity of existence: “Existence is not identical to the existence of existence.” First, according to the Indifference Argument, existence is indifferent to existence and non-existence (e.g. the existence of non-existent blackness), so existence must not be identical to the existence of existence (see Chapter 3, section 4.1). The Doubt Argument maintains that, given that we understand existence but doubt whether existence is actual in the real world (e.g. the existence of a phoenix or a jinni), existence must not be identical to the existence of existence (see Chapter 3, section 4.2). Non-Identity of oneness: “Oneness is not identical to the oneness of oneness.” Oneness is indifferent to oneness and multiplicity because it is reasonable to say “oneness and multiple onenesses”, so oneness must not be identical to the oneness of oneness (see Section 1.1.1). Non-Identity of contingency: “Contingency is not identical to the contingency of contingency.” Nothing can be prior to itself, but the contingency of contingency is prior to contingency itself (because, in the mind, a thing must become contingent first before it exists), so they must not be identical (see Section 1.2). The second step is to generate a single-species chain.16 Given that X1-ness is X (Self-Predication), X1-ness has a real X2-ness (Non-Identity); given that X2-ness is also X, X2-ness has another real X3-ness; and so on. A single-species infinite regress arises: X1-ness—X2-ness—X3-ness … Two steps are also involved in generating a hybrid chain of any two of the following five attributes: existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, and relation to a subject. The first step is to establish the Mutual-Predication between

15 16

Self-Predication is easy to establish, so I do not mention Suhrawardī’s arguments here. X stands for the predicate derived from X-ness (e.g. X = existent, X-ness = existence).

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any two attributes. Suhrawardī’s universal arguments for ­Mutual-Predication can be summarized as follows. 1. “X-ness exists.”17 X-ness, as a real attribute, has already occurred, so X-ness exists. 2. “X-ness is one.” Given that the distinction between X-ness and the subject to which it is added is real, they must be two, so X-ness is one (following [T9a]). Alternatively, given that multiple subjects have multiple X-nesses, one subject must have one X-ness, so X-ness is one (following [T10a]). 3. “X-ness is contingent.” Given that X-ness, as a real attribute, is in need of a subject, it is not necessary by itself, so X-ness is contingent. 4. “X-ness is necessary by another.” X-ness, as a real attribute, is in need of a subject, so it is contingent by itself. Every contingent that exists must be necessary by another, so X-ness is necessary by another. 5. “X-ness is related to a subject.” X-ness, as a real attribute, is added to a subject, so X-ness is related to a subject. The second step is to generate a hybrid chain.18 X1-ness is Y (Mutual-­Predication I), so X1-ness has a real Y1-ness; Y1-ness is X (Mutual-Predication II), so Y1-ness has a real X2-ness; X2-ness is also Y, so X2-ness has another real Y2-ness; and so on. A hybrid infinite regress arises: X1-ness—Y1-ness—X2-ness—Y2-ness … 3 Genera and Differentiae; Determinables and Differentiae of Determinates I now turn to the last part of Suhrawardī’s discussion of mental considerations: the genus–differentia distinction, and the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction. The full discussion is found in al-Muqāwamāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt; relevant points are also mentioned in al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥ ­ ikmat al-Ishrāq.19

17 18 19

X-ness stands for the four attributes other than the attribute from which the predicate of X-ness is derived (e.g. if “X-ness exists”, X-ness is not existence). X and Y stand for the predicates derived from X-ness and Y-ness (e.g. X = existent, X-ness = existence). [LWḤ3 19.7–11, §10; §12, 21–22 (the qusṭās in Chapter 3, section 3.1); §14, 24–25] = [ṬRḤ3 III.7, 365–71, §§114–16] = [QWM3 §§40–42, 169–73] = [Ḥ.Sh §64, 69–70].

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3.1 The Determinable–Differentia of Determinate Distinction Suhrawardī himself does not use the exact terms “determinable” and “differentia of determinate”. However, when he writes about the “genus” (jins) and “differentia” (faṣl) of a simple species, such as colourness (lawniyya) and the differentia/characteristic of blackness (faṣl/khuṣūṣ al-sawād), he obviously means “determinable” and “differentia of determinate”. Herbert Granger offers a clear explanation of the logical difference between the determinable–differentia of determinate relation and the genus– differentia relation. A species is a complex of its genus and another element (or set of elements) called its differentia—man, for instance, is often said to be a complex of the genus animal and the differentia rational—and it is differentiated within its genus through the addition of its differentia to its genus: man is marked off as a more specific form of animal and distinguished from other animal species through the addition of rational to animal. Furthermore, genus and differentia must be logically independent; that is, an analysis of one of them does not reveal the other as an entailment. For if the genus entailed its differentiae, it would entail incompatible attributes, since many of the differentiae of a genus are incompatible; if the differentia entailed its genus, it would be difficult to see what would prevent the species from being equivalent to its differentia and, in turn, what would keep the differentia itself from being a species of the genus. The logical independence of the genus and differentia would mean, among other things, that at least in principle the differentia could belong to quite different sorts of genera: rational might belong to spirit and machine as well as animal. Now, a determinate is not a complex composed of its determinable and some element logically independent of its determinable; it may be thought of as an area within its determinable marked off and distinguished from the other determinates of that determinable without the aid of any additional elements: white, red and blue are all distinct determinates of the determinable color, but they are not distinguished by means of any items analogous to differentiae. Whatever might appear to be a determinate’s differentia is probably logically dependent on its determinable and should be identified with the determinate itself. For example, a sphere is a shape having each point on its surface equidistant from a common center. ‘Having each point on its surface equidistant from a common center’ might appear to be the sphere’s differentia because it seems to be added to shape to distinguish the sphere from other ­determinate shapes. Yet it is

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not a differentia; for it is identical with the sphere and thus is not logically independent of the characteristic shape.20 In short, the determinable–differentia of determinate relation and the genus– differentia relation differ in two fundamental respects. First, a determinate’s differentia (e.g. the differentia of blackness) is logically dependent on its determinable (e.g. colourness), whereas a differentia (e.g. rationality) is logically independent of its genus (e.g. animality). Second, as a consequence, a determinate (e.g. blackness) is not a complex of its determinable (e.g. colourness) and its so-called differentia (e.g. the differentia of blackness), whereas a species (e.g. humanity) is a complex of its genus (e.g. animality) and its differentia (e.g. rationality). Suhrawardī, however, is not quite concerned with the logical differences between these two relations. His main concern is to show that determinables, differentiae of determinates, genera, and differentiae are all mental considerations rather than true metaphysical constituents of real things. Here, I simply point out that he has the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction in mind, although he does not use the same terms. Suhrawardī advances three arguments to prove that the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction cannot be real.21 3.1.1 The Replaceability Argument I call Suhrawardī’s first argument against the real determinable–­differentia of determinate distinction the Replaceability Argument. He argues from the replaceability (tabaddul) of a determinate’s differentia. Consider the ­version in al-Talwīḥāt: [Text 13] [T13a] For if colourness has an existence that is not the existence by which the characteristic of blackness (khuṣūṣ al-sawād) is and given that colourness does not invoke the characteristic of blackness because of its quiddity (otherwise, the characteristic of blackness would necessarily follow colourness), 20 21

Herbert Granger, “Aristotle and the Genus-Species Relation”, The Southern Journal of P­ hilosophy 18, no. 1 (1980), 38, emphasis added. The Replaceability Argument: [LWḤ3 24.7–10, §14] = [QWM3 169.12–14, §40] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.11– 14, §64]; a Peripatetic defence and Suhrawardī’s response: [QWM3 169.15–170.2, §40]. The Duality Argument: [ṬRḤ3 366.8–12, 14–15; 368.3–5, 14–17, §115] = [QWM3 170.2–4, §40] = [Ḥ.Sh 69.14–70.1, §64]. The Infinite Regress Argument: [ṬRḤ3 366.12–14, §115].

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[T13b] then we could retain the colourness of blackness while removing its characteristic and connecting to it the characteristic of whiteness, just as we retain matter while removing [its original] form that we replace [with another form]. [This is absurd.] [LWḤ3 24.7–10, §14] In [T13a], Suhrawardī introduces two premises. First, he supposes the ­determinable–differentia of determinate distinction (e.g. colourness and the differentia/characteristic of blackness) is real so that each of them has a real existence that is not that of the other. Second, colourness does not imply the characteristic of blackness; otherwise, every colour would be black, which is absurd. Consequently, at [T13b], given these two premises, one could replace the original characteristic of blackness with another characteristic, such as the characteristic of whiteness, and connect the latter to colourness, just as a ­carpenter can make a piece of wood into a chair. The absurdity here, which is not spelt out by Suhrawardī, seems to be that one cannot “imagine the replacement” (tawahhum tabaddul) of the characteristic [QWM3 169.13, §40]: one ­cannot change, for instance, the blackness of a crow to whiteness.22 3.1.2 The Duality Argument I call Suhrawardī’s second argument the Duality Argument. He argues from the duality of a determinate. A complete version is found in al-Muṭāraḥāt. [Text 14] [T14a] Moreover, if colourness and the differentia of blackness (faṣl al-sawād) exist in the real world, and obviously, neither of them is a substance, then [both of them] must subsist in a substrate (al-qiyām bi-maḥall). [T14b] Either, they are both states (hayʾa) that subsist in the substrate (maḥall) of blackness. Then blackness will be two accidents rather than one. [This is absurd.] [T14c] Alternatively, the differentia is a state in the colour, or the colour is a state in the differentia.23 Whatever the case, it follows that the differentia and the colour are two independent (mustaqill) accidents rather than one. [ṬRḤ3 366.8–12, §115] 22 23

One might offer painting or dyeing as a counterexample. However, painting does not change a colour but adds a different colour to the original one. Dyeing is more complicated, and Suhrawardī might not have this in mind. The “colour” here should mean “colourness” or colour qua colour—a determinable— rather than a particular colour, such as blackness—a determinate.

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At [T14a], Suhrawardī reasons that if the distinction between colourness and the differentia of blackness is real, each of them will have a distinctive existence. Moreover, they both require a substrate, because apparently, neither of them is a substance. Two possibilities follow: First, at [T14b], they share the substrate of blackness. But in this case, blackness will be two accidents rather than a single accident. This contradicts the fact that blackness is one accident. Second, at [T14c], one might be the substrate of the other: either colourness is the substrate of the differentia or the differentia is the substrate of colourness. In both cases, colourness and the differentia will be two independent accidents rather than one.24 If the first option is the case, then colourness is an accident in the substrate of blackness and the differentia is another accident in colourness, so there are two accidents. If the second option is the case, the differentia is an accident in the substrate of blackness and colourness is another accident in the differentia, so again, there are two accidents. In short, the real determinable–differentia of determinate distinction necessarily leads to the duality of every determinate—an absurd consequence.25 3.1.3 The Infinite Regress Argument The third Infinite Regress Argument, which is found only in al-Muṭāraḥāt, involves two infinite regresses: [Text 15] Moreover, the two accidents [colourness and the differentia of blackness] fall into one category (maqūla) [i.e. the accidental category of quality]. Then the same goes for each of the genus intention (al-maʿnā al-jinsī) and the differentia intention (al-maʿnā al-faṣlī). An impossible chain f­ ollows. [ṬRḤ3 366.12–14, §115] This argument is an application of the Infinite Regress Argument against the real genus–differentia distinction. Here I reconstruct this argument based on that one, which I analyse in Section 3.2.2. The premise of this Infinite Regress Argument is the same as that of the Duality Argument in Section 3.1.2: if the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction were real, then colourness and the differentia of blackness would both be accidents. If this were the case, “accident” would be a genus; colourness and the differentia of blackness 24 25

They are “independent” in the sense that each of them counts as an accident rather than as a part or a constituent of an accident. Suhrawardī might have been following ʿUmar Khayyām’s (d. 1123) argument about ­colourness, which Wisnovsky summarizes in “Essence and Existence”, p. 38.

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would be two species under it. Colourness would then require a differentia X (colourness is composed of being-accident and X); the differentia of blackness would require another differentia Y (the differentia of blackness is composed of being-accident and Y). Determining what X and Y refer to is not required for reconstructing the argument. Now, consider X and Y; they would also be accidents: X and Y would be another two species under the genus “accident”. By the same reasoning, X requires another differentia X2 (X is composed of being-accident and X2); Y likewise requires another differentia Y2 (Y is composed of being-accident and Y2). Eventually, two infinite regresses would be generated: one from the infinite differentiae of colourness (X) and the other from the infinite differentiae of the differentia of blackness (Y): differentia X—differentia X2—differentia X3 … differentia Y—differentia Y2—differentia Y3 … 3.1.4 The Undefinability of Determinates (and All Simple Species) Based on the three arguments above, Suhrawardī concludes that determinables and differentiae of determinates (e.g. colourness and the differentia of blackness) are mental considerations rather than true metaphysical constituents of determinates. [Text 16] In reality, colourness is a description pertaining to consideration (waṣf iʿtibārī), and so are genera and differentiae. So, blackness is a single reality (ḥaqīqa wāḥida), and its existence in the soul should be like its existence in the real world. So it does not have any essential [constituent] (dhātī) in any respect. That is, it has no part (juzʾ). [ṬRḤ3 368.10–12, §115] [Text 17] The truth is that colourness pertains to consideration (iʿtibāriyya). If it pertains to consideration, it is not a [real] part in the reality / real world (fī l-ḥaqīqa), for the subsistence (al-taqawwum) of a real thing is not by virtue of it. … Rather, colourness is a consideration that the mind relates to quiddity. [QWM3 170.4–8, §40] Having established that the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction cannot be real, Suhrawardī argues in al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt

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that this distinction is not even a legitimate mental distinction.26 The mental structure of blackness, for example, is not colourness plus the differentia of blackness. Rather, colourness merely is a mental consideration that the mind generates and relates to blackness (given that blackness is a colour), and so is the differentia of blackness (given that blackness is a different colour from whiteness). In fact, the mental structure of blackness should be absolutely simple and strictly correspond to its simple metaphysical structure. So, as pointed out in [Text 16], it cannot be divided even in the mind.27 That the distinction is not a mental distinction is significant in that the claim is closely related to a crucial aspect of Suhrawardī’s theory of definition: a determinate (e.g. blackness) cannot be defined at all.28 In al-Muqāwamāt, immediately after [Text 17], Suhrawardī writes: [Text 18] [T18a] The simple [things] among those that are directly experienced (al-mushāhadāt), such as blackness, do not have any definition (ḥadd) or any part (juzʾ) at all, and they cannot be defined. [T18b] A person who has [the corresponding] sensation (ḥāssa) has already experienced blackness. Everything by which you define blackness must be more obscure (akhfā) than blackness. The definition (al-taʿrīf) [of blackness] cannot benefit a person who does not have that sensation. [T18c] Moreover, no sensible can make the conception of another sensible happen. The same goes for sound and so on.29 [QWM3 170.8–11, §40] I have briefly analysed this passage in Chapter 2, section 5.2. The conception of blackness is an example of fiṭrī (instinctive) conception. In general, fiṭrī knowledge, which consists of fiṭrī conception and fiṭrī assent, refers to the kind of knowledge that one acquires directly through one’s corresponding fiṭra (instinct) and without the transition from the known to the unknown, without thinking (fikr). Suhrawardī argues that the fiṭrī conception of everything that is sensible cannot be acquired at all by a Peripatetic essential definition but must be acquired directly through corresponding sensations. Suhrawardī establishes 26 27 28 29

[ṬRḤ3 367.9–369.7, §115] and [QWM3 170.6–11, §40]; cf. [ṬRḤ1 87.11–88.13]. Another way to establish this point is to turn to Granger’s argument: the differentia of blackness is logically dependent on colourness, so blackness cannot be a complex ­composed of the two. For a discussion of Suhrawardī’s theory of definition, see Ziai, Knowledge and ­Illumination, pp. 77–128. Cf. [ṬRḤ3 369.3–7, §115].

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this thesis in two ways. First, [T18a] reveals the metaphysical reason. Because the metaphysical structure of every determinate, such as blackness, is absolutely simple, their mental structure must likewise be simple. A Peripatetic essential definition (ḥadd dhātī) that is composed of a genus and a differentia, therefore, cannot apply to a determinate that cannot be divided into a determinable and a differentia even in the mind. Second, [T18b] reveals the epistemological reason. Suhrawardī argues that the definition of blackness cannot make someone who is born blind know blackness. Rather, one can only know blackness through the corresponding fiṭra (instinct): visual perception. Moreover, the definition of blackness is redundant for those who already know blackness through visual perception. At [T18c], Suhrawardī further points out that one must use one’s corresponding sensations to perceive each sensible separately. The conception of blackness, for example, certainly cannot make one know the conception of a sound. In al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī offers a more detailed exposition of the argument. [Text 19] [T19a] The truth is that the reality (ḥaqīqa) of blackness and whiteness has no part (juzʾ). Blackness has no unknown differentia (faṣl majhūl), as assumed by the Peripatetics. Rather, blackness is known as it is. The conception (taṣawwur) of the sensibles among things, inasmuch as they are sensible, is instinctive (fiṭrī). [T19b] The definition of blackness as “a colour that gathers vision” (lawn jāmiʿ lil-baṣar) is a definition by what is more obscure (akhfā) than blackness. [T19c] Those that are directly experienced (al-mushāhadāt) are the principles (al-mabādiʾ), to which instinctive [conceptions and assents] (al-fiṭriyyāt) must end, and they have no definition. [ṬRḤ3 369.3–7, §115] The Peripatetic definition of “blackness” is “a colour that gathers vision”, where “colourness” is its genus or determinable and “being-gathering-vision” (kawnuhu jāmiʿan lil-baṣar) [ṬRḤ1 88.9–10] is its differentia. In [T19a], Suhrawardī argues that the metaphysical and mental structure of blackness (and indeed of any determinate) is absolutely simple. Blackness, therefore, has no parts: it has no genus or differentia. So the Peripatetic definition of blackness, which is composed of a genus (i.e. colourness) and a differentia (i.e. being-gathering-vision), does not show blackness as it is. It only appears to be a definition but is not. In fact, the conception of blackness (and indeed every

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sensible) is a fiṭrī (instinctive) conception, which can only be acquired through the corresponding fiṭra (instinct). If one knows blackness by visual perception, one knows it as it is; there is no unknown differentia such as “being-gathering-vision”. Moreover, at [T19b], Suhrawardī maintains that, by defining “blackness” as “a colour that gathers vision”, the Peripatetics have committed the fallacy of defining a thing by what is more obscure than the thing itself.30 Therefore, in [T19c], the fiṭrī conceptions of the sensibles are the principles and starting points of all human knowledge. In this sense, as I have argued in Chapter 2, section 5.2, presential knowledge is the basis of formal knowledge. Moreover, as I argue in the next section, given that Suhrawardī also refuses the real genus–differentia distinction, he rejects the Peripatetic essential definitions of all simple species, which include both simple real accidents, such as blackness (a quality) and length (a magnitude that is mentioned in the qusṭās analysed in Chapter 3, section 3.1), and simple real substances (usually referred to as quiddities or it-nesses), such as the human body and soul (al-jism wa-lnafs al-insāniyya) [QWM3 170.12–14, §41].31 3.2 The Genus–Differentia Distinction As I have already mentioned, Suhrawardī also rejects the real genus–differentia distinction. At the beginning of III.7 of al-Muṭāraḥāt, he articulates his position clearly. [Text 20] [T20a] Investigation and outcome (baḥth wa-taḥṣīl): If you know this, then they [the Peripatetics] cannot go back and establish in the real world one nature (ṭabīʿa) for animality (al-ḥayawāniyya) and another nature for rationality (al-nāṭiqiyya), and they are two [different natures].

30 31

Cf. [Ḥ.Sh 18.11–12, §13]: “A definition must be by what is more obvious (aẓhar) than the thing [defined] rather than by what is like it or what is more obscure (akhfā) than it.” As I show in Section 3.5, Suhrawardī holds that the metaphysical structure of a real human being is a human body plus a human soul, both of which are real particulars. (A human being is not animality plus rationality, which are two universal mental considerations.) Although human, as a composite species, is composed of body and soul, the body and soul are both simple species, which must be known presentially and thus cannot be defined. In Light Metaphysics, a human body is called an “idol” (ṣanam), a “human fortress” (ṣīṣiya insiyya), and a human soul is called an “immaterial light” (nūr mujarrad), a “human managing light” (nūr mudabbir insī). Both the body and soul emanate from the human Platonic Form, a self-apprehending “conquering immaterial light” (nūr mujarrad qāhir) that Suhrawardī calls a “lord/master of idol/species” (rabb/ṣāḥib ṣanam/nawʿ).

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[T20b] Those who are outstanding (al-mutamayyizūn) among the knowledgeable people (ahl al-ʿilm) acknowledge this point.32 Therefore, they say: it is not sound to say that “[something is] created (yujʿalu) as an animal and then created after that as rational”; rather, [they say that] creating (jaʿl) something as an animal is the same as creating it as a human being. [ṬRḤ3 365.7–10, §115] Suhrawardī does not take genera and differentiae (e.g. animality and rationality) as true metaphysical constituents of real things. In al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, he offers two arguments to show that the genus–differentia distinction is not real. These arguments resemble the Replaceability Argument and the Infinite Regress Argument against the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction, respectively.33 3.2.1 The Replaceability Argument This Replaceability Argument is similar to the argument I reconstructed in Section 3.1.1. Immediately following [Text 20], Suhrawardī writes: [Text 21] [T21a] Suppose that animality and rationality are two [different] existent [things] in the real world, and animality has an existence that is not the existence of the differentia. [T21b] But animality inasmuch as it is animality (min ḥaythu ḥayawāniyya) is not conditioned by any single differentia; otherwise, it would not be sound for animality to occur together with another differentia that is not that differentia. [T21c] Given that animality is not conditioned by any differentia and it has existence in the real world, then it is sound to assume an animality on which multiple differentiae replace (yatabaddalu) each other and animality remains as it is, just as in [the case of] the shared matter (al-hayūlā al-mushtaraka). [ṬRḤ3 365.10–15, §115] The first premise of this argument, at [T21a], is that if animality (a genus) and rationality (a differentia) are metaphysical constituents of real human 32 33

Apparently, Suhrawardī is not the only one who holds such a position. Presumably, this is the common position of the second camp, namely, the Mental Distinction proponents, as introduced in Chapter 3, section 1.1. The Replaceability Argument: [ṬRḤ3 365.10–17, §115]. The Infinite Regress Argument: [LWḤ3 24.11–15, §14] = [ṬRḤ3 365.17–366.8, §115].

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beings, then each of them will have a real existence that is not that of the other. The second premise, at [T21b], is that animality does not imply rationality (or indeed any differentia); otherwise, every animal would be rational, which is absurd. So, it is permissible to replace rationality with another differentia, such as the differentia of horse (whatever it is) [T21c]. Again, Suhrawardī does not explain the resulting absurdity, but he seems to suggest that one simply cannot conceive of replacing one differentia with another. It is certainly inconceivable that a man could change into a horse or some other animal (of course, unless one resorts to science fiction). 3.2.2 The Infinite Regress Argument Suhrawardī’s Infinite Regress Argument here is the argument from which I derived the reconstructed argument in Section 3.1.3. In al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 22] [T22a] If the genus has an existence that is not that of the differentia in the real world, then substantiality (al-jawhariyya) predicated of matter (al-hayūlā) and form (al-ṣūra) has an existence in matter [and another existence in form]. It [matter] then has another existent differentia [call it X]. [T22b] Moreover, its differentia [X] is another substance as well, for only a substance can make a substance subsist (yuqawwimu). That by which the differentia [X] is added to substantiality (mā zāda bi-hi al-faṣl ʿalā l-jawhariyya; X2) has another existence in the real world, so it must have substantiality as well. In this way, they form a sequential chain. [T22c] Moreover, the composition of recipient and form (tarkīb qābilī wa-ṣūrī) occurs in matter. [LWḤ3 24.11–15, §14] In this argument, Suhrawardī uses “substance” as an example of genus and “matter” and “form” as two species of “substance”. According to the Peripatetics, matter and form are both substances. Ibn Kammūna remarks: “it is well known that substance is the genus of five things: body, matter, form, soul, and intellect” [I.K3 112.12–13]. Suhrawardī, in [T22a], argues that if the genus–­ differentia distinction is real, then matter (a species) will be composed of two metaphysical constituents: substantiality (a genus) and a differentia (call it X). But then, in [T22b], X must also be a substance: if it is an accident, it cannot make matter (which is a substance) subsist. However, a differentia is supposed to make its species subsist. Given that X is a substance, X likewise is composed of substantiality and another differentia (X2). Note that X2 is what Suhrawardī

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means by “that by which the differentia [X] is added to substantiality” because X cannot subsist except by its own differentia X2. By the same reasoning, X2 must also be a substance, so X2 has a third differentia (X3). Thus, an impossible infinite regress arises: differentia X—differentia X2—differentia X3 … Moreover, at [T22c], Suhrawardī identifies another absurdity: matter would be composed of substantiality and a differentia (X) and thus would no longer be simple. This contradicts the Peripatetic view, as Ibn Kammūna points out [I.K3 113.3–5]. Therefore, the genus–differentia distinction cannot be real. The key to generating this type of infinite regress is to find the highest genus to which both elements of the distinction belong. In the genus–differentia ­distinction, the highest genus Suhrawardī finds is substance (jawhar), given that both genus and differentia are substances.34 In the real determinable– differentia of determinate distinction, the highest genus is accident (ʿaraḍ) or state (hayʾa; see Section 3.1.3). Given that “____ is (the highest genus)” can be predicated of both elements, each of them must require another differentia, X and Y, to differentiate them from other members of that genus. Given that “____ is (the highest genus)” can be predicated as well of their differentiae X and Y, their differentiae must require other differentiae, X2 and Y2. This leads to infinite regresses of differentiae. 3.3 Genera, Differentiae, Determinables, and Differentiae of Determinates as Mental Considerations In al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, after establishing that neither the genus–differentia distinction nor the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction is real, Suhrawardī further reveals the true nature of genera, ­differentiae, determinables, and differentiae of determinates.35 [Text 23] [T23a] So, a genus is a diffused/general consideration (al-iʿtibār al-shāʾiʿ), which is sound to be predicated of multiple things insofar as it is their shared quiddity (māhiyya mushtaraka la-hā). … 34

35

The argument in [Text 22] is a special case: the genus “substance” in that distinction (i.e. matter = substantiality + X) is identical to the highest genus, so we do not need to consider the genus. But if the example is the animality–rationality distinction, then we will also need to consider the genus “animality”: animality is a substance and must require a differentia (Y), but Y is also a substance and so requires another differentia Y2. This leads to another infinite regress. [ṬRḤ3 368.8–12, §115] and [QWM3 172.3–15, §41].

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[T23b] A differentia is a consideration exclusive to a thing’s substance, a differentiator (mumayyiz) of it in understanding, and it does not attach to the thing because of an external attribute (ṣifa), such as the ability to laugh (al-ḍāḥikiyya) and the ability to write (al-kātibiyya), both of which attach [to a human being] by the consideration of external motions (ḥarakāt khārija). A differentia itself is not a real external attribute (ṣifa khārija ʿayniyya); rather, it is a consideration that the mind considers, as if (ka-annahu) it is from the substance of the thing. [T23c] In short, a genus is the nearest common consideration (iʿtibār ʿāmm) to a thing’s substance, and a differentia is the nearest differentiating consideration (iʿtibār mumayyiz) to a thing’s substance. [QWM3 172.3–10, §41] Suhrawardī remarks, in [T23a], that a genus is a common consideration (iʿtibār ʿāmm) that the human mind generates. Animality, for example, is a common mental quiddity that human beings and horses share insofar as we predicate “____ is animal” of both human beings and horses. Animality, as Suhrawardī argues, cannot be a metaphysical constituent of human beings or horses in the real world, although it is “the nearest common consideration” to their substances and indeed appears to be a constituent of their substances. Similarly, at [T23b], a differentia is a differentiating consideration (iʿtibār mumayyiz) that the human mind generates. Rationality, for example, is a ­mental attribute exclusive to human beings, and the attribute allows us to ­differentiate humans from other species of animal, given that we cannot predicate “____ is rational” of any other animals. However, rationality, as a mental attribute, is different from real attributes, such as the ability to laugh (al-­ḍāḥikiyya) or the ability to write (al-kātibiyya). These abilities have external motions (ḥarakāt khārija) as their direct foundations in the real world and thus can be established empirically by presential knowledge—magnitude, quality, and motion are the only three categories of real accidents in Illuminationism (see Chapter 3, section 3.2)—whereas rationality has no such direct foundation. Although rationality is “the nearest differentiating consideration” to the substances of human beings and indeed appears to be a metaphysical constituent of their substances, it nonetheless cannot be a constituent. The analysis applies similarly to determinables and differentiae of determinates, such as colourness and the differentia of blackness. 3.4 Individuation and Differentiation At this point, I ought to introduce Suhrawardī’s distinction between ­individuation (tashakhkhuṣ) and differentiation (tamayyuz), which occurs in al-­Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and al-Muqāwamāt prior to his discussion of mental

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considerations.36 This discussion is quite complicated as Suhrawardī addresses many scattered points. Here, I focus on those points that are relevant to mental considerations.37 In short, individuation is a metaphysical issue that has to do with real things themselves, whereas differentiation is an epistemological issue that has to do with human apprehenders.38 By “individuation”, Suhrawardī means that a thing metaphysically becomes individual or particular in itself, in the sense that it makes impossible by itself the participation in itself (manʿ al-sharika). Individuation does not imply that a thing becomes individual from something universal or common (as happens with Avicennian common nature). There are another two terms synonymous with differentiation (tamayyuz): becoming-multiple (takaththur) and becoming-specific (takhaṣṣuṣ). These three terms refer to the same mental process from different ­perspectives: How do universals become multiple and specific (takaththur and takhaṣṣuṣ)? How do we distinguish between their instances (tamayyuz)? This mental ­process is not to be confused with individuation, which is a real metaphysical process. In al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, respectively, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 24] [T24a] The individuation (al-tashakhkhuṣ) of a thing is indeed in terms of itself. [T24b] Its differentiation (tamāyuz) is indeed in comparison to other things that share the same common intention (maʿnan ʿāmm) and in consideration of multiplicity (kathra),

36 37

38

[LWḤ3 18.7–19.6, §9] (only on differentiation) = [ṬRḤ3 333.2–339.18, §§89–97] = [QWM3 161.8–162.9, §35]. For a contextual study of Bahmanyār’s and Suhrawardī’s accounts of differentiation and individuation, see Benevich, “Individuation and Identity”. Benevich remarks: “For him [Suhrawardī], discernibility [i.e. differentiation] is a necessary condition for individuation” (p. 18). I, however, argue that, for Suhrawardī, differentiation and individuation are two different processes that must be distinguished from each other. There are two similar readings of Aristotle’s view on individuation: “The traditional view has been that individuation is a metaphysical issue: what is it that makes one individual different from another (of the same kind)? However, some scholars have argued that Aristotle at no point addresses this issue, but is instead concerned with the epistemological question of how we tell one individual from another.” Thomas Ainsworth, “Form vs. Matter”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition) (2020), “3. The principle of individuation”. Suhrawardī addresses both the “metaphysical individuation” as tashakhkhuṣ (individuation) and the “epistemological individuation” as tamayyuz (­differentiation).

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[T24c] so that if there were a thing that had no sharer (mushārik), it would need no added differentiator (mumayyiz zāʾid), although it would still have individuation. [ṬRḤ3 335.12–14, §93] [Text 25] [T25a] Individuation is not differentiation (al-tamayyuz), according to what is mentioned previously. For differentiation is in relation to an apprehender (mudrik), and it pertains to consideration (iʿtibārī). [T25b] If a thing were unique (infarada), then it would need no differentiator (al-mumayyiz) but would still need individuation. [QWM3 162.8–9, §35] Individuation is a metaphysical issue about real things themselves: how do things become individual? According to [T24b] and [T25a], differentiation is clearly an epistemological issue for human apprehenders: when multiple things share a “common intention” or “something universal” (amr kullī) [ṬRḤ3 333.16, §90] in one’s mind, how does one tell one individual from another? To differentiate things, we resort to differentiators (sing. mumayyiz). In al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, Suhrawardī mentions three types of added differentiators: quiddity itself, differentia, and accident.39 First, if two real things participate in something accidental (ʿaraḍī) in the mind, we differentiate them by their very quiddities (e.g. a white man and a white horse). Second, if they participate in a genus intention (maʿnan jinsī), we differentiate them by their differentiae (e.g. a man and a horse). Third, if they participate in a species intention (maʿnan nawʿī), they are differentiated by their accidents (e.g. a white man and a black man). In these cases, we differentiate things by adding universals (i.e. these differentiators) and by introducing extra distinctions, among which the genus–differentia distinction and the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction are especially (potentially) problematic. If one is not cautious, one will likely treat these added universal differentiators—especially differentiae (e.g. rationality) and differentiae of determinates (e.g. the differentia of blackness)—as true metaphysical constituents of real things, consider these mental distinctions as real distinctions, and regard differentiation as a real metaphysical process rather than a purely mental process. This is exactly the position that Suhrawardī argues against at great length and why he stresses, in [Text 23], that differentiae (and differentiae of determinates) are “differentiators” and “differentiating considerations”. 39

[LWḤ3 18.7–19.6, §9] and [ṬRḤ3 333.16–334.10, §90].

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There is a fourth type of non-added differentiator: strength and weakness, or perfection and deficiency (e.g. the strong and weak whiteness of snow and ivory), of quiddity itself. In al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 334.4–10, §90], Suhrawardī points out the Peripatetics’ weakness (ḍuʿf) or ignorance on this point. The Peripatetic way of differentiating, for example, two extensions as lengths (e.g. C is a three-cubit extension and B is a two-cubit extension), involves introducing a real determinable–differentia of determinate distinction: C and B share ­extension-ness (al-imtidādiyya) but differ in terms of their added differentiae (i.e. three-cubit-ness and two-cubit-ness; see Chapter 3, section 3.1). Suhrawardī, however, has shown that the distinction is not real and even fails as a mental distinction (see Section 3.1). Thus, he establishes the second rule of the qusṭās: “Therefore, the differentiation between the individuals in existence of every universal that falls [i.e. is predicated] systematically ambiguously (bi-l-­tashkīk) is not necessarily by what is behind the quiddity” [LWḤ3 22.5–6, §12]. That is, particular instances of systematically ambiguous universals—e.g. length (a magnitude), whiteness (a quality), and horse (a substance)—can be differentiated simply by the strength and weakness of quiddity itself without adding a differentiator or introducing an extra distinction. This move allows Suhrawardī to avoid some of the redundant distinctions that the Peripatetics introduced. Hence, his new Peripatetic-style metaphysics is leaner and more accurate. Here, we see that his metaphysical inventions of the systematic ambiguity of existence and the strength- and weakness-gradations of all real categories (substance, magnitude, quality, and motion) are crucial to his theory of differentiation. In [T24c] and [T25b], Suhrawardī uses a thought experiment to argue that differentiation is merely a mental process. He supposes that there is a thing that is unique in every respect in the real world or, in other words, that if this thing does not participate with anything else in any universal or common intention in the mind, then no differentiation whatsoever is needed. But its individuation in the real world is still necessary, given that everything that exists in the real world is individual and particular in itself such that it makes impossible by itself the participation in itself (manʿ al-sharika). What, however, is the cause of individuation, according to Suhrawardī? He first argues against the popular Peripatetic thesis that individuation is by matter.40

40

[ṬRḤ3 334.13–335.5, §§91–92] and [QWM3 161.12–162.3, §35].

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[Text 26] [T26a] Those who say that which makes the participation impossible (al-māniʿ ʿan al-sharika) is matter are not cautious. This is because, in the mind, matter is equivalent to others in not making the participation impossible (ʿadam manʿ al-sharika). [T26b] If, from [the fact] that matter does not make the participation impossible in the mind, it does not follow that it does not make the participation impossible in the real world, then other things are equivalent to matter. [QWM3 161.12–14, §35] Suhrawardī’s reasoning at [T26a] is that if, in the mind, matter does not make the participation in itself impossible, then in the real world it should likewise not make the participation impossible. So matter cannot serve as the cause of individuation. At [T26b], Suhrawardī continues: Otherwise, if one argues that, regardless of the fact that matter cannot make the participation impossible in the mind, it is still the cause of individuation, then other universals in the mind can be the cause of individuation as well. In short, there is no special reason to take matter as the cause of individuation. Neither matter nor any differentiator can be the cause of individuation. In al-Muqāwamāt, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 27] [T27a] A fundamental (qāʿida): Know that a differentiator (­al-­mumayyiz) is not suitable for making a thing particular (juzʾī) or individual (shakhṣī), that is, by making the participation [in that thing] impossible (manʿ al-sharika). A differentia, such as rationality (al-nuṭq), is a differentiator of animal, but it does not individuate it. The same goes for blackness, whiteness, and other [accidents]. [T27b] The meaning (mafhūm) [in the mind] of those that are ­accidental (al-ʿaraḍiyyāt) and everything that is assumed [by the Peripatetics] to necessitate making the participation impossible does not make the participation impossible. The aggregate (majmūʿ) of what does not make the participation impossible must not make the participation impossible either, such as the mental composition of [multiple] universal things (tarkīb dhihnī min umūr kulliyya). [QWM3 161.8–12, §35] In [T27a], Suhrawardī argues that no differentiator, whether a quiddity, differentia, or accident, can individuate a thing by making the participation in that thing impossible because, as claimed in [T27b], every differentiator is a

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universal, and no universal can make the participation impossible. Even if two or more differentiators form an aggregate, the aggregate or bundle of universals is still universal in itself and, therefore, cannot also serve as the cause of individuation. As he writes in al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-Muqāwamāt, Suhrawardī’s position is that the cause of individuation is the very it-ness (huwiyya) of a thing: [Text 28] So, things make impossible the participation [in themselves] by their real it-nesses (al-huwiyyāt al-ʿayniyya). But its differentiation (imtiyāz) is by those that make them specific (mukhaṣṣiṣāt) [i.e. differentiators]. [ṬRḤ3 335.11–12, §93] [Text 29] So, there is no judgement except that individuation is by consideration of the it-ness that occurs in the real world (al-huwiyya al-wāqiʿa ʿaynan). Every it-ness that occurs in the real world is individuated and makes the participation [in itself] impossible. [QWM3 162.3–4, §35] Suhrawardī’s huwiyya (lit. it-ness, or being-it) refers to the particular, individual essence (dhāt) of things (e.g. the essence of this horse or of this blackness). Everything in the real world is individuated by its particular it-ness, which is a bare fact that requires no explanation, and not by matter or any universal differentiators. Differentiation does require explanation, so Suhrawardī formulates the theory of differentiation above. The significance of Suhrawardī’s discussion of the genus–differentia distinction in general and the individuation–differentiation distinction in particular is that it immediately reveals his Nominalist position on the problem of universals. He apparently holds that everything in the real world is individual and particular in its own right.41 Given that he has argued at length that neither genera nor differentiae are metaphysical constituents of real things, Avicennian natural universals (sing. kullī ṭabīʿī) or common natures (e.g. humanity), as composites of genera and differentiae, apparently cannot enter the metaphysical structures of real things. Common natures must be mental considerations, albeit “the nearest considerations to things’ substances”, as Suhrawardī 41

To my knowledge, John Walbridge was the first scholar to argue that Suhrawardī is a ­ ominalist. For instance, Walbridge writes: “Thus in metaphysics Suhrawardī rejects realism N with regard to universals, holding that everything that exists is a particular; in this he may be compared to nominalists like Ockham” (“Suhrawardī and Illuminationism”, pp. 207–8).

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characterizes them in [Text 23]. Our minds generate these considerations to group and understand real natural things. What actually exist in the real world are those it-nesses, those indivisible ontological blocks, which are all stronger or weaker instances of systematically ambiguous existence (see Chapter 3, sections 2 and 3) and which are not common natures plus accidents plus matter that individuates common natures. In this sense, Suhrawardī’s metaphysics is an innovative integration of Nominalism and Existentialism. 3.5 Simple Species and Composite Species Given that Suhrawardī rejects both the genus–differentia distinction and the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction, would he hold that everything—be it blackness, a horse, or a chair—in the real world is simple? In al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and al-Muqāwamāt, he addresses this issue.42 In short, Suhrawardī acknowledges two kinds of composite species: natural species composed of body and soul and artificial species composed of matter and form; all other species are indivisible simple species. In al-Muqāwamāt, he clearly articulates his position. [Text 30] [T30a] Know that whoever defines the simple sensibles (basāʾiṭ al-maḥsūsāt) is stupid.43 A simple reality (al-ḥaqīqa al-basīṭa) is what does not have two creations (jaʿl) in it at all. The key to identifying species among simple things is that what is taken as a species has the perfection of quiddity (kamāl māhiyya), and they [species] cannot be divided except by relations (iḍāfāt),44 such as blackness, the human body and soul.45 [T30b] Things other than these are composites (murakkabāt). It is either natural, such as a horse, a man, and water.46 And the rule of being-species (nawʿiyya) of these things is being-perfection (kamāliyya): if you imagine the replacement (tabaddul) of what is other than them,

42 43 44

45 46

[LWḤ3 19.7–11, §10; 24.4–7, §14] = [ṬRḤ3 366.16–367.3, §115] = [QWM3 170.12–171.2, §41]. Cf. [Text 18] and [Text 19]. By “relations”, Suhrawardī probably means that blackness, for instance, cannot be divided in itself, unless we relate it to other colours. Its relation to other colours allows us to divide blackness in the mind into colourness and the differentia of blackness although, strictly speaking, blackness is indivisible in the mind, as I explained in Section 3.1.4. Man, as a composite species, is composed of body and soul, but the body and soul are both simple species. It is unclear why Suhrawardī holds that water is a composite reality.

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such as the whiteness of Zayd or the blackness of a horse, their natural it-nesses (al-huwiyyāt al-ṭabīʿiyya) remain. [T30c] Or, [a composite reality] is not natural, such as a chair. [QWM3 170.12–171.2, §41] Everything in the real world is either a simple reality (ḥaqīqa basīṭa) or a ­composite reality (ḥaqīqa murakkaba). Suhrawardī, at [T30a], points out that a simple reality has only one creation (jaʿl) or, in other words, it has one metaphysical constituent, such as blackness (an accident), the human body (a material substance), or the human soul (an immaterial substance). As I showed in Section 3.1, blackness, as a determinate, cannot be the composite of colourness and the differentia of blackness. Moreover, in Section 3.2, I showed that the human body and soul, as a material species and an immaterial species, cannot be divided into genera and differentiae metaphysically. By contrast, a composite reality (e.g. a horse or a human being) has two creations, or two metaphysical constituents. The composite reality is subdivided into two kinds: “natural composite reality” (ḥaqīqa murakkaba ṭabīʿiyya) and “composite reality that is not natural” (ḥaqīqa murakkaba ghayr ṭabīʿiyya). A natural composite species is not composed of genus and differentia. Instead, it is composed of body and soul. Suhrawardī accepts the real body–soul distinction for an obvious reason: everyone can establish this distinction empirically through presential knowledge. For example, if an animal dies, its soul vanishes but its body remains. Thus, the body is really distinct from the soul. In al-Muṭāraḥāt, he explains that [Text 31] [T31a] Only single species (al-nawʿ al-waḥdānī) exists in the real world. If a species is composite, then the parts of which it is composed exist in it. [T31b] Among the composite [species], there is the animal that occurs from soul (nafs) and body (badan). In reality, it is not the case that one of them is a genus and the other is a differentia.47 We have already pointed 47

Interestingly, in a parallel passage from al-Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī still uses the terminology of “genus” and “differentia” to characterize the body and soul. However, by al-Muṭāraḥāt, he no longer abides by this characterization. Presumably, this change of attitude is the result of presenting al-Talwīḥāt as a more Peripatetic-style work. He writes in al-Talwīḥāt [LWḤ3 19.8–11, §10]: “A species that is not simple (al-ghayr al-basīṭ) is that whose differentia changes the answer to what it is, and its genus and differentia have two creations, such as the form of animality. For the creation of animality and its existence are not the creation of its being-body in the real world; rather, being-body could remain in the real

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out that the case of being-body (al-jismiyya) of the animal is not that of colourness.48 [ṬRḤ3 366.17–367.3, §115] Although Suhrawardī does not offer an explanation, understanding why all artefacts are composite realities is straightforward. A chair, for instance, must have two creations: one creation is its matter, such as the pieces of wood, nails, and so on, from which it is made; the other is its form (or design). Only when its material parts are composed in accordance with the form does it function as a chair. When it loses its form and no longer serves the purpose of a chair, its material parts still remain as they are in the real world. Therefore, all artefacts are composite and have two creations. 4

Summary of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4

In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I have reconstructed Suhrawardī’s lengthy and significant metaphysical discussion of mental considerations (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya) that is found in his three Peripatetic-style works—al-Talwīḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and al-Muqāwamāt—and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. I first introduced the historical and philosophical context of this discussion in Chapter 3, section 1. Suhrawardī, in al-Muṭāraḥāt, reports that three camps of philosophers in the Islamic East are involved in a debate during the 11th to 13th centuries. The debate involves the reception of the Avicennian quiddity– existence distinction in particular and Avicennian Realist and Essentialist metaphysics in general. The three camps are proponents of the Strong Real Distinction position (i.e. existence is added to quiddity both in the mind and in the real world), proponents of the Mental Distinction position (i.e. existence is added to quiddity in the mind but not in the real world), and proponents of the No Distinction position (i.e. existence is not added to quiddity at all). The third camp offers the weakest and most untenable of the positions, so Suhrawardī’s main rivals are the Strong Real Distinction proponents. I then, in Chapter 3, section 2, established Suhrawardī’s ontological position as a version of Existentialism. My reading is contrary to the popular readings

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world but animality does not.” Here “genus” and “being-body” refer to the particular animal body; the “differentia” and “animality” refer to the particular animal soul. The body could remain in the real world but the soul does not; this shows that they are two distinct metaphysical constituents. “Being-body” (al-jismiyya) refers to the real particular body that exists extramentally rather than the universal referent of the definition of “body”, whereas colourness is merely a universal mental consideration.

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found in modern scholarship that characterize Suhrawardī as maintaining the “­fundamentality of quiddity” (aṣālat al-māhiyya). This reading is a misinterpretation derived from Mullā Ṣadrā’s critique of Suhrawardī’s ontological position. I have argued that Suhrawardī distinguishes between two types of existence: univocal existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) and systematically ambiguous existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk). Therefore, from his lengthy critique of the reality of univocal existence, it does not follow that he would also reject the reality of systematically ambiguous existence. On the contrary, based on clear textual evidence, I have advanced four arguments for thinking that Suhrawardī must accept real systematically ambiguous existence and that his ontological position is indeed Existentialism. Ultimately, his position does not seem all that different from Ṣadrā’s own position. In fact, Suhrawardī is probably the first Islamic philosopher to formulate the doctrine that existence can be predicated of real things systematically ambiguously in terms of strength and weakness, of perfection and deficiency. The metaphysical implication is the gradation of existence. His view forms the foundation of and paves the way for 17th-century Islamic Existential metaphysics. Then, in Chapter 3, section 3, I analysed the crucial qusṭās (test) from al-Talwīḥāt. Suhrawardī designs the qusṭās as a thought experiment to distinguish between real and mental considerations. Two ways of predication are involved in the qusṭās: universals predicated of things univocally (bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) must be mental considerations that the mind generates and that do not correspond to metaphysical constituents of things in the real world; universals predicated of things systematically ambiguously (bi-l-tashkīk) in terms of strength and weakness, or perfection and deficiency, must be real considerations (iʿtibārāt ʿayniyya) that correspond directly to metaphysical constituents of things in the real world. Real considerations are primary intelligibles, which are what the mind grasps directly from real particular things and which are systematically ambiguous universals. Mental considerations are secondary intelligibles, which are products of the mind’s further analysis of primary intelligibles and which are univocal universals. By considering Suhrawardī’s reformulation of Peripatetic categories, I clarified what real considerations refer to. Following ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī, Suhrawardī advances an innovative list of five categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, and motion. He argues that number (discontinuous quantity) and relation are mental considerations and that substance, magnitude (continuous quantity), quality, and motion are real categories, which are the referents of “real considerations”. In short, Suhrawardī’s ontological position is that existence can be predicated of real particular things systematically ambiguously in terms of strength and weakness and that the systematically ambiguous existence generated in this process is the

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real consideration, which corresponds directly to metaphysical constituents of things in the real world. Systematically ambiguous existence is identical to real particular quiddity, or it-ness (huwiyya), and is divided into the four real categories, all of which admit of strength and weakness. Beginning in Chapter 3, section 4, I reconstructed Suhrawardī’s many arguments against the real existence of mental considerations. His most powerful tool is the infinite regress. He offers seven arguments against real univocal ­existence, and I analysed three, all of which are based on the absurdity of infinite regresses. The first two arguments involve a single-species chain of existence that the principles of Self-Predication and Non-Identity generate. Although the ­Mental Distinction proponents already introduced the argument that involves the ­single-species chain of existence, which was revised by Sāwī, Suhrawardī finds their versions weak against Peripatetic responses. So, he introduces the Indifference Argument and the Doubt Argument—which are inspired by Avicenna’s arguments regarding pure quiddity—for the Non-Identity of existence to improve the strength of the argument substantially. The third argument involves a hybrid chain of existence and relation, which is one of the ten hybrid chains generated from any two of five attributes: existence, oneness, contingency, necessity by another, and relation. Hybrid chains are Suhrawardī’s own invention, and because Mutual-Predication generates them, Non-Identity is no longer a problem. Thus, the third argument is immune from the Peripatetic responses that target Non-Identity. Thus, hybrid chains have an essential advantage over single-species chains. Beginning in Chapter 4, section 1, I reconstructed Suhrawardī’s other arguments based on infinite regresses; these arguments focus on oneness, contingency, and necessity by another. The argument regarding oneness involves a ­single-species chain of oneness, and the key to generating this chain is another Indifference Argument for the Non-Identity of oneness. Given that oneness is purely mental, all numbers are mental considerations. The argument regarding contingency involves a single-species chain of contingency and the Priority Argument for the Non-Identity of contingency, while the two arguments regarding necessity by another involve two hybrid chains of necessity and contingency and of necessity and existence. In Section 2, I summarized ten hybrid chains and established the Mutual-Predication premises for each argument. I then identified the universal patterns of Suhrawardī’s arguments on the basis of both single-species chains and hybrid chains. Finally, in Chapter 4, section 3, I reconstructed Suhrawardī’s lengthy discussion of the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction and the genus–differentia distinction. He rejects the real determinable–differentia of determinate distinction (e.g. colourness–the differentia of blackness) through

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three arguments. He also rejects the real genus–differentia distinction (e.g. ­animality–rationality) through two arguments. He appeals to the absurdity of infinite regresses in two of these arguments, but it is not the only weapon in his arsenal. Moreover, the determinable–differentia of determinate distinction even fails to be a legitimate mental distinction. This claim is the metaphysical basis of his thesis that no simple species can have a Peripatetic essential definition. I then revealed Suhrawardī’s position on the true nature of genera, differentiae, determinables, and differentiae of determinates: they are all mental considerations—genera and determinables are common considerations (sing. iʿtibār ʿāmm), whereas differentiae and differentiae of determinates are differentiating considerations (sing. iʿtibār mumayyiz)—rather than metaphysical constituents of real things. I then introduced Suhrawardī’s distinction between individuation (tashakhkhuṣ) and differentiation (tamayyuz): Individuation is a metaphysical issue about real things themselves: how do things become individual? Differentiation is an epistemological issue for human apprehenders: how do we tell one individual from another? Suhrawardī holds that everything in the real world is individuated simply by its particular it-ness, which is a bare fact that requires no explanation. Therefore, the discussions of the genus–differentia distinction in general and the individuation–differentiation distinction in particular reveal his Nominalism regarding the problem of universals. Given that, as shown in Chapter 3, every particular it-ness is a stronger or weaker instance of systematically ambiguous existence, Suhrawardī’s metaphysics is a perfect integration of Nominalism and Existentialism. Lastly, I have shown that he acknowledges only two kinds of composite species: natural species composed of body and soul and artificial species composed of matter and form; all other species are indivisible simple species. If one considers these two chapters alongside Chapter 2, one can see plainly the coherence of Suhrawardī’s thought and that the discussion of mental ­considerations provides a necessary metaphysical foundation for his theory of presential knowledge. Given that everything in the real world is particular in its own right (for universals are merely mental considerations), they require being apprehended by presential knowledge. This holds true not only for material particulars but also for immaterial particulars: God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls. The ultimate way to know immaterial particulars is to escape from the cave, ascend to the immaterial light world, and witness the particulars with one’s own spiritual eyes. At this point, I have revealed the Nominalist and Existential nature of the Peripatetic-style metaphysics that Suhrawardī carefully modifies and presents in his Peripatetic-style works. He achieves this metaphysics through the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach alone. He shows us that, when

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investigation is used most correctly, when it avoids such fallacies as treating mental considerations as metaphysical constituents of real things, and when it rejects the real quiddity–existence distinction, the result should be a Nominalist and ­Existential metaphysics rather than Avicennian Realist and Essentialist metaphysics. This is “the common philosophy for all investigators” (al-ḥikma al-ʿāmma li-jamīʿ al-bāḥithīn) [ṬRḤ3 195, footnote], the best possible version of the “philosophy inside the cave”. One cannot help but wonder what Suhrawardī has to offer in his Illuminationist Light Metaphysics. In Chapter 5, I explore how this Peripatetic-style Existential metaphysics transforms into Light ­Metaphysics: Suhrawardī adopts a supra-rational deification (taʾalluh) approach and shifts the subject matter of metaphysics from systematically ambiguous existence to light (nūr).

chapter 5

On Light Metaphysics: An Analysis of Book I of the Second Part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq Undoubtedly, Suhrawardī is best known for his Light Metaphysics, which is peculiar and puzzling because of its light-darkness terminology and its ­contents. Terms such as “immaterial light” (nūr mujarrad), “adventitious light” (nūr ʿāriḍ), “dusky substance” (jawhar ghāsiq), “state pertaining to darkness” (hayʾa ẓulmāniyya), and “barrier” (barzakh) are unique in Arabic philosophy. Moreover, modern interpretations of Light Metaphysics differ vastly from one another, and many are either inadequate or involve misunderstandings.1 My goal in this chapter is to offer a convincing and systematic reconstruction of Light Metaphysics that is based on the first seven chapters of Book I “On light and its reality” [Ḥ.Sh §§107–23, 106–19] of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.2 I focus on the most fundamental problem of Light Metaphysics: 1 For instance, Corbin offers an informative interpretation of the mystical and religious aspects of Light Metaphysics, but he fails to reveal its rigorous philosophical nature; see Inside Iranian Islam, pp. 53–132. John Walbridge provides a comprehensive reconstruction of Light Metaphysics, but he insufficiently attends to Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works; see The Science of Mystic Lights: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), pp. 27–78; cf. The Leaven of the Ancients: Suhrawardī and the Heritage of the Greeks (Albany, New York, 2000), pp. 19–26. Aminrazavi offers another mystical interpretation, but his reading involves inaccuracies and misunderstandings; see Suhrawardi and School of Illumination. Kaukua, with whom I largely agree, mainly examines Light Metaphysics from the perspective of self-awareness; see “I in the Light of God”; Self-Awareness, pp. 124–60. Kaukua further studies Suhrawardī’s critique of substantiality (jawhariyya) as an iʿtibārī concept together with the notion of dusky substance (jawhar ghāsiq); see “Iʿtibārī Concepts”. However, as I argue in Section 2.2, Kaukua’s interpretations of some key concepts, such as “adventitious light” and “dusky substance” are untenable. Sinai offers some insights, but they are based solely on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq without the Peripatetic-style works; see “Al-Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination”. 2 Suhrawardī elaborates on his full-fledged Light Metaphysics in the second part, which consists of five books, of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. I do not touch on topics from the other four books unless necessary. The title of Book I reads “On light and its reality, the Light of lights, and what arises from Him first”. This title is problematic because “what arises from Him first” is addressed in Book II. Titles of some chapters in Book I are problematic as well. Moreover, the division of Book I into chapters and paragraphs is also questionable. Walbridge and Ziai’s edition of Ḥ ­ ikmat al-Ishrāq, which is based on Corbin’s edition [Ḥ.Sh], suffers from the same problems. I ­mention these problems as well as my suggestions in footnotes. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_007

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what exactly is light (nūr)? I first explain why it is reasonable to take light, instead of existent (mawjūd) or existence (wujūd), as the new subject matter of metaphysics as well as the advantages of doing so (Section 1). I then analyse the innovative fourfold light–darkness division of everything in the real world: immaterial lights, adventitious lights, dusky substances, and states pertaining to darkness (Section 2). Lastly, I reconstruct two complicated arguments: a two-page argument [Ḥ.Sh §§110–11, 108–10] for the existence of immaterial lights (Section 3) and an eight-page argument [Ḥ.Sh §§114–23, 110–19] that immaterial lights are self-apprehenders (sing. al-mudrik lil-dhāt) (Section 4). As far as I can tell, neither Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn nor modern scholars clearly identify or reconstruct these two arguments. If one believes that Suhrawardī had presupposed the existence of immaterial lights and their identity to self-apprehenders in Light Metaphysics, then Light Metaphysics would be less convincing and intelligible than it actually is. First of all, it is essential to have a clear idea of Suhrawardī’s goals during the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. I have argued in Chapter 1, section 2.3 that he interprets the superior Illuminationist wisdom—which is only attainable through the supra-rational deification (taʾalluh) approach—by using the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach and presents this supra-rational wisdom in rational terms. Recall that, near the end of the Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 1] Just as we witness the sensibles and are certain of some of their states (aḥwāl), and then we build upon them valid sciences, such as astronomy (al-hayʾa) and so on, we likewise witness things from the spirituals (al-rūḥāniyyāt), and then we build upon them. [Ḥ.Sh 13.5–7, §6] The purpose of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is to build “the noble sciences” (al-ʿulūm al-sharīfa) [ṬRḤ3 505.11, §225], which are based on “the spiritual observations” (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) [Ḥ.Sh 156.8, §165], or the superior presential knowledge of God and separate intellects. To build such sciences, one must follow the rational investigation approach and use conceptions, definitions, assents, and demonstrations. This is why Suhrawardī discusses rigorous philosophical concepts and arguments in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Nonetheless, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq differs from common philosophical works because of its supra-rational deification approach. Simultaneously, it differs from ­mystical works given its rational investigation approach. It is the ultimate integration of deification and investigation, that is, of presential knowledge and formal knowledge. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī offers an ultimate guide for

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potential Illuminationists inside the cave such that they catch a glimpse of the glaring light world outside. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq ought to be read alongside Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style works, which Suhrawardī himself advocates for in the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 194.6–8]. If one ignores Suhrawardī and reads Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq on its own or with his mystical treatises, one’s interpretation is bound to be inadequate or unsuccessful. The previous chapters have been necessary preparation for reconstructing Light Metaphysics. Presential knowledge is obviously the epistemological foundation of Light Metaphysics (Chapter 2). Moreover, the Nominalist and Existential metaphysics presented in his Peripatetic-style works serves as a prelude to and basis of Light ­Metaphysics (Chapters 3 and 4). Suhrawardī achieves this Existential metaphysics through the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach alone. When he uses investigation most correctly and avoids fallacies, the result is his Peripatetic-style Nominalist and Existential metaphysics rather than ­Avicennian Realist and Essentialist metaphysics. By adopting the supra-­rational deification (taʾalluh) approach, Suhrawardī further achieves Light Metaphysics, which is expressed and formulated in rational investigation terms and which in no way contradicts his Existentialism. In fact, Light Metaphysics is the ultimate development and final form of Existentialism. My overall assessment of Light Metaphysics is that it is Existentialism in nature but transcends Existentialism, given the significant shift in subject matter from systematically ambiguous existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk) to light (al-nūr). 1

Light and Existence

Although only one sentence, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq II.1.1 “On [the fact that] light needs no definition” is absolutely crucial. [Text 2] [T2a] If in existence, there is something that needs no definition or ­explanation, then it is the manifest (al-ẓāhir); [T2b] nothing is more manifest (aẓhar) than light (al-nūr), so light is the last thing that needs definition. [Ḥ.Sh §109, 106] Suhrawardī defines “the manifest” (al-ẓāhir) as that which needs no definition or explanation. He then equates light to “the most manifest” (al-aẓhar). Hence, the following equation:

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Light = the most manifest in existence (al-aẓhar fī l-wujūd) = that which needs no definition or explanation whatsoever. Although the meaning of this passage is clear, its purpose is puzzling. I argue that Suhrawardī’s true intention is to establish light as the proper subject ­matter of metaphysics, which is the first crucial step to building Light ­Metaphysics. To my knowledge, neither Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn nor modern scholars have clarified this point. 1.1 Light as the Subject Matter of Metaphysics Speaking of the subject matter of metaphysics, consider Avicenna’s al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāt (The Healing: Metaphysics) I.2. [T]he existent inasmuch as it is existent (al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd) … should be made the subject matter (al-mawḍūʿ) of this science [Metaphysics], given what we have said. For we do not need to learn its quiddity (māhiyya) or to affirm (ithbāt) it [to prove its existence]. Otherwise, we would need another science that is not this science to be responsible for the explanation of the state (al-ḥāl) [of the subject matter] in it, given that no science affirms its own subject matter or investigates the quiddity of its subject matter, but rather, it simply accepts its that-ness (inniyya) and its quiddity.3 Every science must simply accept the existence and quiddity of its subject matter because no science proves the existence of its own subject matter or investigates its quiddity. Instead, these are the responsibilities of higher-order sciences. For example, physics simply accepts the existence and quiddity of body (jism). Given that metaphysics is “the first philosophy” (al-falsafa al-ūlā) above which there is no other science, the following criterion is apt for the subject matter of metaphysics: “we do not need to learn its quiddity or to affirm it [to prove the existence of the subject matter]”. Otherwise, if the existence and quiddity of the subject matter of metaphysics were not simply accepted, we would need another, even higher science to prove the existence of its subject matter and investigate its quiddity. But that would contradict the accepted view that metaphysics is the first philosophy. Based on this criterion, Avicenna identifies the subject matter of metaphysics as “the existent inasmuch as it 3 Avicenna, Al-Ilāhiyyāt I.2, p. 13.8–13. “That-ness” (inniyya or anniyya; two forms of the same term) is usually synonymous with “existence” (wujūd).

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is existent” insofar as the existence of existent requires no proof (existent is that which exists, so its existence certainly requires no proof) and the quiddity of existent also requires no definition (Avicenna argues in al-Ilāhiyyāt I.5 that “existent” is a primary and self-evident concept).4 This passage should be read as the background for [Text 2]. At the very beginning of Light Metaphysics, Suhrawardī argues that light is the proper subject matter of metaphysics. According to [T2b], light is “the most manifest in existence” (al-aẓhar fī l-wujūd); they are interchangeable. Suhrawardī’s light is neither a metaphorical sense of light (see Section 2.2.1) nor is it confined to visible light in the material world. In addition to visible lights, Suhrawardī’s “light” contains another category: immaterial lights (sing. al-nūr al-mujarrad) or self-apprehenders (sing. al-mudrik lil-dhāt) that refer to God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls. To form an accurate understanding of Light Metaphysics, we must always keep in mind the exact referents of “light” and that Suhrawardī has non-metaphorically extended the meaning of “light” to refer not only to visible lights but also to self-apprehenders. Light Metaphysics, therefore, is the metaphysics of “the most manifest” (al-aẓhar). Given that Avicenna’s criterion for the subject matter of metaphysics is equivalent to Suhrawardī’s “the manifest in existence” (al-ẓāhir fī l-wujūd; whose existence requires no proof), namely, “that which needs no definition or explanation in existence” (whose quiddity requires no definition), and given that Suhrawardī’s light is precisely “the most manifest in existence”, light is the proper subject matter of metaphysics. This is Suhrawardī’s intention in II.1.1 ([Text 2]), which can be summarized in the following syllogism: The manifest in existence is the proper subject matter of metaphysics. Light is the most manifest in existence. Therefore, light is the (most) proper subject matter of metaphysics. But why is light equivalent to “the most manifest in existence”? The claim seems arbitrary. At Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq II.1.6, Suhrawardī explains: [Text 3] If you want to have a rule (ḍābiṭ) for light, then let it be that light is the manifest in the reality of itself (al-ẓāhir fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) and manifests others by itself (al-muẓhir li-ghayrihi bi-dhātihi). [Ḥ.Sh 113.5–7, §§116–17]5 4 See Bertolacci, “Distinction of Essence and Existence”. 5 This is an example of the paragraphing problems in Book I: a complete sentence is broken into two sentences across two paragraphs.

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First, in the material world, our everyday experiences make it evident that visible lights are the most manifest. Someone might object and argue that the loudest sound, the strongest smell, taste, or touch is also extremely manifest. Light is the most manifest (al-aẓhar) because light is not only manifest in itself but also manifests others. It is the fact that only light manifests others that distinguishes light from other contenders and makes light the most manifest. There is another sort of most manifest thing, which is also manifest in itself and manifests others: self-apprehenders. Because both visible lights and self-apprehenders share this common feature of being manifest in themselves and manifesting others, Suhrawardī extends the referents of “light” to include self-apprehenders and equates self-apprehenders with immaterial lights. Moreover, as I discuss in Section 3, immaterial lights are the ontological causes of visible lights (as well as the ontological causes of dusky substances and states pertaining to darkness). Indeed, immaterial lights are lights of a higher mode; they are the most manifest immaterial substances, whereas visible lights, as adventitious lights (sing. al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ), are the most manifest accidents of material bodies. Someone might argue that the human soul is not visible, so it is not manifest. However, manifestation (ẓuhūr) is not confined to materiality or to being manifest to the eye. Instead, the manifestation in the immaterial sense is exactly the manifestation of a self-apprehender’s self to itself. Moreover, this immaterial manifestation is indeed superior and more perfect. Even if I were blind, my self would still be manifest to me constantly. For both Avicenna and Suhrawardī, primitive self-awareness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt), or self-apprehension (al-idrāk lil-dhāt), is innate, unmediated, unconditional, and constant, and it is responsible for the very formation of every self or I-ness (see Chapter 2, section 1.2). Therefore, self-apprehenders are the most manifest and are even more manifest than visible lights. In short, Light = the most manifest in existence (al-aẓhar fī l-wujūd) = that which is manifest in the reality of itself (al-ẓāhir fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) and manifests others by itself (al-muẓhir li-ghayrihi bi-dhātihi). Light = visible lights (common usage) + immaterial lights / self-­apprehenders (extended usage). 1.2 The Advantages of Light Why does Suhrawardī choose light as the new subject matter of metaphysics and replace Avicenna’s existent inasmuch as it is existent (al-mawjūd bi-mā

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huwa mawjūd) and his own, earlier notion of systematically ambiguous ­existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk)? I argue that Suhrawardī must have deeply considered reasons. First, focusing on light avoids the quiddity–existence distinction. Existent and existence always carry with them the quiddity–existence distinction, given that this distinction is a basis of Avicenna’s metaphysics (e.g. al-Ilāhiyyāt I.5, V.1, V.2, and VIII.4). The distinction’s impact on post-Avicennian philosophers is enormous. In Chapter 3, I show how Suhrawardī took great pains to reject the distinction as a real metaphysical distinction. Appealing to light is a way to exclude the distinction from his Light Metaphysics altogether. No one would likely associate light with the quiddity–existence distinction because light is simply light. Although Suhrawardī extends “light” to include immaterial lights (i.e. self-apprehenders), neither visible lights nor self-apprehenders carry the implications of the quiddity–existence distinction. Secondly, focusing on light avoids any confusion between univocal ­existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) and systematically ambiguous existence (al-­wujūd bi-l-tashkīk). As I argue in Chapter 3, section 2, Suhrawardī treats existence, rather than existent, as the subject matter of his Peripatetic-style metaphysics, and he understands “existence” to refer specifically to systematically ambiguous existence (i.e. the reality [ḥaqīqa] of existence), whose instances all ­differ in strength and weakness, or perfection and deficiency, and which must be sharply distinguished from univocal existence (i.e. the meaning [mafhūm] of existence). Systematically ambiguous existence is the same as real particular quiddity or it-ness (huwiyya) and is divided into four real categories—­ substance, magnitude, quality, and motion—all of which admit of strength and weakness. By contrast, univocal existence, which is just the “existence” in the quiddity–existence distinction, is a mental consideration (iʿtibār dhihnī) that the mind generates when it understands the being-there of real things, and the being-there of everything that exists is exactly the same. Light is real and is not easily confused with mental considerations (i.e. any univocal, universal conceptions) that the mind generates. Moreover, light naturally comes in gradations, which matches well with the strength and weakness of systematically ambiguous existence. So, the aforementioned distinctive features of light—its being the most manifest (i.e. being manifest in itself and manifesting others), its simplicity, its realness, and its innate strength and weakness—motivate Suhrawardī to choose light as the new subject matter of his Light Metaphysics. As I discuss in Chapter 3, section 2.2, some modern scholars equate Suhrawardī’s notion of light to Mullā Ṣadrā’s notion of existence, but this is

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another popular misinterpretation.6 “Existence” refers to everything that exists, including all real substances and accidents, whereas “light” only refers to those high-level instances of existence—“the most manifest in existence” (al-aẓhar fī l-­­wujūd)—that include the most manifest substances (i.e. self-apprehenders) and the most manifest accidents (i.e. adventitious, visible lights). The relation between systematically ambiguous existence and light is Systematically ambiguous existence = all real substances and accidents (divided into magnitude, quality, and motion) Light = the most manifest in systematically ambiguous existence = ­immaterial lights / self-apprehenders (the most manifest substances) + adventitious, visible lights (the most manifest accidents). Therefore, my overall hypothesis is twofold. First, in the Peripatetic-style works, Suhrawardī presents a carefully modified and reconstructed Nominalist and Existential Peripatetic-style metaphysics. He confines himself only to the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach and produces what he believes to be the best possible version of “the common philosophy for all investigators” (al-ḥikma al-ʿāmma li-jamīʿ al-bāḥithīn) [ṬRḤ3 195, footnote]. This is, in my Cave Story, the best possible “philosophy inside the cave”. It is the best possible version of common philosophy because it rejects the real quiddity–existence distinction, avoids fallacies such as treating mental, universal considerations as metaphysical constituents of real things, and its subject matter is systematically ambiguous existence such that it has gradations of strength and weakness, perfection and deficiency. Second, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī develops this Peripatetic-style ­Existential metaphysics and transforms it into Light Metaphysics, whose ­subject matter becomes light, or the most manifest in existence. This allows him to shift his focus and investigate high-level instances of existence: lights, and especially immaterial lights. This also requires a new approach, namely, the Illuminationist supra-rational deification (taʾalluh) approach because the superior immaterial lights (i.e. God and separate intellects) require “spiritual observations” (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) to be apprehended. Thus, the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach becomes inadequate. With light as the new subject 6 For instance, Izutsu, Concept and Reality of Existence, p. 62; Rizvi, “Islamic Subversion”; Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, pp. 168–69. Walbridge questions the equivalence of light and existence but focuses on the equivalence of light to univocal existence; see Science of Mystic Lights, pp. 40–41, 49.

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matter, Suhrawardī gets rid of the problematic quiddity–existence distinction and no longer needs to argue with the Peripatetics regarding what is real (e.g. systematically ambiguous existence) and what is mental (e.g. univocal existence, pure quiddity / common nature, and so on). Instead, in Light Metaphysics, he focuses on the real worlds (the material world, the imaginal world, and the light world) and, especially, on immaterial lights. Doing so allows him to explain metaphysically everything in the real world(s) more efficiently. Thus, Light Metaphysics is Existentialism but transcends Existentialism. 2

Light and Darkness

In the first half of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq II.1.3 [Ḥ.Sh §109, 107–8], after ­establishing light as the proper subject matter of metaphysics, Suhrawardī puts forward a fourfold light–darkness division of everything in the real world (i.e. all instances of systematically ambiguous existence).7 This division is the crucial second step to building Light Metaphysics. I cannot stress the significance of §109 enough. Later, the fourfold division serves as the key premise for both the argument for the existence of immaterial lights (see Section 3) and the ­argument that they are identical to self-apprehenders (see Section 4). Suhrawardī writes in §109: [Text 4] [T4a] Things are divided into light (nūr) and brightness (ḍawʾ) in the reality of itself (fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) and what is not light and brightness in the reality of itself. [T4b] Here, the referent (al-murād) of “light” and “brightness” is the same, for I do not mean by light and brightness what is regarded as [­something] metaphorical (majāzī), such as that which means ­something obvious (al-wāḍiḥ) in the intellect, although its happening also goes back in the end to this light.8 7 II.1.3 is titled “On light and darkness” and II.1.4 “On [the fact] that the body requires the immaterial light in its existence”. Both titles, to my mind, are inaccurate. In the first half of II.1.3 [Ḥ.Sh §109, 107–8], Suhrawardī does discuss the light–darkness division, but in the second half [Ḥ.Sh §110, 108–9] he argues that adventitious lights are deficient and their cause cannot be dusky substances or states pertaining to darkness. In fact, the second half of II.1.3 and most of II.1.4 (excluding §112 and §113) constitute a two-page argument for the existence of immaterial lights (see Section 3). This is an example of the problematic chapter divisions in Book I. 8 That is, that something obvious in the intellect is called “light” metaphorically is because the real light is the most manifest in the real world; cf. [Q.D 277.7–8].

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[T4c] Light is divided into what is a state of another (hayʾa li-­ghayrihi),9 that is, the adventitious light (al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ), and the light that is not a state of another, that is, the immaterial light (al-nūr al-mujarrad), or the pure light (al-nūr al-maḥḍ). [T4d] What is not light in the reality of itself is divided into what needs no substrate (al-maḥall), that is, the dusky substance (al-jawhar al-­ghāsiq), and what is a state of another, that is, the state pertaining to darkness (al-hayʾa al-ẓulmāniyya). [T4e] The barrier (al-barzakh) is the body (al-jism). It is described as a substance that can be intended by pointing (yuqṣadu bi-l-ishāra).10 And it has already been witnessed that if light disappears from a ­barrier, the barrier remains dark (muẓlim). [T4f] Darkness (al-ẓulma) is but an expression of the non-existence of light (ʿadam al-nūr). … So, it is certain that everything that is neither light nor what pertains to light (nūrānī) must be dark. [T4g] If light disappears from a barrier, the barrier does not need anything else to become dark. So these barriers must be dusky substances. Among barriers, there are those from which the light does not disappear, such as the sun and others. These barriers participate in b­ arrier-ness/ being-barrier (al-barzakhiyya) with those from which the brightness (al-ḍawʾ) can disappear, and they differ by their enduring brightness (al-ḍawʾ al-dāʾim). So the light by which these barriers differ from those is added (zāʾid) to barrier-ness and subsists in it. So it is an adventitious light, and its bearer (ḥāmil) is a dusky substance. So every barrier is a dusky substance. [Ḥ.Sh §109, 107–8] 2.1 The Fourfold Light–Darkness Division The fourfold light–darkness division is a logical division. If we combine the non/manifest distinction and the substance–state/accident distinction, then everything in the real world can be logically divided into four categories: ­manifest substance, manifest state, non-manifest substance, and non-­manifest state.11 Suhrawardī then identifies and investigates the exact contents of each category. 9 10 11

“State” (hayʾa) is synonymous with “accident” (ʿaraḍ), but Suhrawardī prefers to use “state” in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, which marks the terminological departure from Peripatetic ­philosophy. That is, the barrier, as the body, has spatiotemporal coordinates and is sensible. In the rest of the chapter, “manifest” means “that which is manifest in the reality of itself and manifests others by itself” unless otherwise indicated.

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In [T4a], Suhrawardī offers the primary division of everything in the real world: the manifest and the non-manifest. The manifest is light (nūr), whereas the non-manifest is darkness (ẓulma). He claims, at [T4f], that darkness “is but an expression of the non-existence of light” (ʿadam al-nūr) and thereby clarifies the exhaustiveness of the light–darkness (i.e. the non/manifest) division: everything in the real world is either light or darkness, and there is nothing in between. This is a crucial point and is related to a Peripatetic thesis. The Peripatetics maintain that darkness is the expression of “the privation of light” (intifāʾ al-nūr). That is, we say that something is “dark” only when it is possible for that thing to accept light (qābil lil-nūr) but does not have light. If something cannot accept light in the first place, it cannot be said to be “dark”. Therefore, “air (al-hawāʾ) is neither dark (muẓlim) nor bright (muḍīʾ)” [ṬRḤ1 654.6] insofar as air is transparent and cannot accept light in the first place. This thesis undermines the exhaustiveness of the light–darkness division, so Suhrawardī argues in the Logic of al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ1 654.3–12] that it is a fallacy: “taking every term/name of non-existence (asmāʾ al-aʿdām) in the same sense”. Suhrawardī’s objection is an empirical argument: “If someone whose vision is healthy opens one’s eyes and does not see something, one names it ‘darkness’ (al-ẓulma), regardless of whether it is void (khalāʾ), air, or a wall (ḥāʾiṭ).” [ṬRḤ1 654.9–11]12 In other words, Suhrawardī does not think that the Peripatetic thesis accords with how we normally use the term “darkness” (ẓulma). Another way to put it is that, according to the Peripatetics, darkness is a sort of non-­existence (ʿadam) or negation (salb) with possibility (imkān) as its condition, a “privation with possibility” (intifāʾ maʿa imkān). However, Suhrawardī argues that darkness is “simply privation” (intifāʾ fa-ḥasb) without possibility as its condition [ṬRḤ1 655.1–6]13 and that the Peripatetics commit a fallacy when they take every non-existence as a “privation with possibility”. Suhrawardī presents the secondary division in [T4c] and [T4d] according to the substance–state distinction. He writes in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: [Text 5] Everything that has existence outside the mind either subsists (ḥāll) in another in a totally diffused (shāʾiʿ) manner, and we name it “state” (al-hayʾa), or does not subsist in another in the totally diffused manner, and we name it “substance” (jawhar). [Ḥ.Sh 61.13–15, §52]

12 13

Shahrazūrī paraphrases this point at [Sha 289.2–5]. Cf. [Ḥ.Sh 108.1–3, §109].

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2.2 The Division of Light According to [T4c], lights that are substances are immaterial lights (sing. alnūr al-mujarrad), whereas lights that are states are adventitious lights (sing. al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ). 2.2.1 Light in the Non-metaphorical Sense Suhrawardī explicitly tells us in [T4b] that he is not using “light” in any metaphorical sense. Whenever he mentions “light”, he means light in the real sense: either adventitious, visible lights, which are the most manifest states, or immaterial lights, which are the most manifest substances. Accepting Suhrawardī’s usage is fundamental for an accurate understanding of Light Metaphysics. Before Suhrawardī, when philosophers in the Arabic tradition talk about “light” in metaphysics, they are almost definitely using “light” in a ­metaphorical sense. Nicolai Sinai has examined the use of “light imagery … in medieval ­Arabo-Persian literature prior to al-Suhrawardī”, such as in The Theology of Aristotle, the “Light Verse” (24: 35) of the Qurʾān, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) Mishkāt al-Anwār (The Niche of Lights), and so on.14 To this literature, we could add Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfizārī’s (fl. tenth c.) Arabic translation of a passage from Plato’s Republic (Book VI, 506d3–509b10).15 For example, in the first chapter of Mishkāt al-Anwār, Ghazālī maintains that “the real light is God, may He be exalted, and that [applying] the expression ‘light’ to anything else is purely metaphorical and has no reality”.16 Ghazālī also argues that “the ‘seeing light’ (al-nūr al-bāṣir)—i.e. the eye—is more appropriately called ‘light’ than the ‘seen light’ (al-nūr al-mubṣar)”, and that “the intellect (ʿaql) more completely measures up to the concept of light than even the eye”.17 Ghazālī uses “light” in a metaphorical rather than a literal sense. Suhrawardī does not agree with Ghazālī that God is the only real light; 14

15 16 17

Sinai, “Al-Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination”, pp. 274–75. Sinai argues that Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is inspired by Ghazālī’s Mishkāt al-Anwār, but there is no strong textual evidence to support his argument. Walbridge has also examined the history of the usage of light and darkness in, for instance, the Light Verse of the Qurʾān, Ghazālī, and the ancient Persian tradition; see John Walbridge, The Wisdom of the M ­ ystic East: Suhrawardī and Platonic Orientalism (Albany, New York, 2001), pp. 51–64. For ­Mishkāt al-Anwār, see Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights (Mishkāt al-Anwār), ed. and trans. David ­Buchman (Provo, Utah, 1998). David C. Reisman, “Plato’s Republic in Arabic: A Newly Discovered Passage”, Arabic ­Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004), 263; for the Arabic text with an English translation, see pp. 280–300. Sinai, “Al-Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination”, p. 282. Sinai, “Al-Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination”, pp. 283–84.

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rather, adventitious lights and immaterial lights are all lights in the real sense. Moreover, Isfizārī writes: “so just as the thing by means of which vision sees visible objects is called ‘light’, so too the thing by means of which one intellects the intelligibles is called ‘light’.”18 Apparently, this is another metaphorical use of the term “light”. In [T4b] Suhrawardī is clear that he is not concerned with metaphorical senses of “light”, so we should avoid interpreting his usage metaphorically when we read Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Light is just light, which refers specifically to “the most manifest in existence” (al-aẓhar fī l-wujūd) in [Text 2] and “that which is manifest in the reality of itself (al-ẓāhir fī ḥaqīqat nafsihi) and manifests others by itself (al-muẓhir li-ghayrihi bi-dhātihi)” in [Text 3]. There is nothing metaphorical about Suhrawardī’s light. 2.2.2 Immaterial Lights, and Adventitious Lights as Visible Lights In Arabic, “immaterial light” is nūr mujarrad, which literally means “peeled/ denuded/deprived light” and is short for “light deprived of another (i.e. the body)”. Thus, my slightly loose rendering is “immaterial light”. Previously I preferred the translation “pure light”, but readers unfamiliar with Suhrawardī’s texts might find the translation confusing: one might wonder in what sense visible light is not pure. “Immaterial light” does not have this problem, and it can be distinguished easily from visible light. Currently I use “pure light” as a literal rendering of nūr maḥḍ, which is synonymous with nūr mujarrad. Suhrawardī uses nūr mujarrad more frequently than nūr maḥḍ. “Adventitious light” is my literal rendering of nūr ʿāriḍ, which is short for “light adventitious to another (i.e. the body)”. Here, I focus on the question of what “adventitious light” refers to and defer a thorough discussion of immaterial light until Section 4. In [T4g], Suhrawardī provides the clearest articulation that adventitious lights are visible lights that we see every day. Suhrawardī writes that “among barriers [i.e. bodies], there are those from which the light does not disappear, such as the sun and others” and that “it [the light] is an adventitious light”. So the light of the sun is a paradigmatic example of adventitious lights. Similarly, he also ­mentions “sensible (al-maḥsūs) adventitious light” in [Ḥ.Sh 108.9, §110]. These are the relevant passages from Book I, so it should be safe to identify ­adventitious lights with visible lights.19 18 19

Reisman, “Plato’s Republic in Arabic”, p. 293. In Book II, however, there might be another sort of adventitious lights, which refer to “states pertaining to light” (hayʾāt nūriyya) that subsist in immaterial lights. In the immaterial light world, there are extremely complicated interactions between immaterial lights

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Kaukua has proposed a metaphorical and somewhat problematic i­ nterpretation of Suhrawardī’s notion of “adventitious light”. Kaukua believes the phrase refers to the “manifestations of quiddities”, something “akin to the instantiations of Platonic Forms”.20 Kaukua’s overall understanding of the ontology of Light Metaphysics is also largely revealed by his understanding of Suhrawardī’s use of “adventitious light” and “dusky substance”. Take for instance our example of a horse: it is manifest as a particular horse, or to put this in Suhrawardī’s terminology, it is illumined by an adventitious light in which it appears as a horse. But in itself the horse is a dusky substance, which can never become manifest in its entirety. This is because the horse is manifest to me only at a particular time, and from a particular perspective. The substance itself which underlies these appearances, from one moment to another, remains inaccessible to me. Thus, although I may form a concept of the horse as a single, independent and continuously existing substance, I can never experience it as such. And in the end, insofar as our being is being manifest, the substance of the individual horse is nothing but such a conception. Really, there are only so many manifest instantiations of light that advene in the form of a horse.21 Kaukua’s interpretation faces several difficulties. First, “manifestations of quiddities” could only be called “lights” metaphorically, but Suhrawardī is clear in [T4b] that he is not doing so. Second, “manifestations of quiddities” do not seem to be states (sing. hayʾa) or accidents (sing. ʿaraḍ), but adventitious lights are states or accidents, as Suhrawardī clarifies in [T4c]. Third, the interpretation of “the form of the horse” as a dusky substance is problematic. As I argue in Section 2.3.2, “dusky substance” refers to Suhrawardī’s “self-subsistent magnitude” (al-miqdār al-qāʾim bi-nafsihi) [Ḥ.Sh 80.6–7, §77], the Illuminationist alternative to Peripatetic “prime matter”.

20 21

such that, when some immaterial lights receive rays from others, states pertaining to light arise in them [Ḥ.Sh 160.2–3, §168]. This point is relevant because, in [T4c], the definition of “adventitious light”—the light “that is a state of another (hayʾa li-ghayrihi)”—also seems to apply to these states pertaining to light. However, to my knowledge, Suhrawardī does not explicitly confirm that these states are also called adventitious lights. Walbridge holds that adventitious lights refer to “luminous accidents in immaterial lights, physical lights, rays”; see Leaven of Ancients, p. 24. Kaukua, “I in the Light of God”, p. 146, note 17; p. 145, note 16. Kaukua, “I in the Light of God”, pp. 145–46, emphasis added; cf. Self-Awareness, p. 147; “Iʿtibārī Concepts”, pp. 57–58.

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2.3 The Division of Darkness According to [T4d], dusky substances (sing. al-jawhar al-ghāsiq) are darknesses that are substances, whereas states pertaining to darkness (sing. al-hayʾa al-­ ẓulmāniyya) are darknesses that are states. 2.3.1 Dusky Substances, States Pertaining to Darkness, and Barriers (sing. barzakh) I follow modern scholarship and render jawhar ghāsiq as “dusky substance”. The difference between ghāsiq (dusky) and muẓlim (dark) is somewhat unclear, but I notice the consistency of Suhrawardī’s terminology. He pairs ghāsiq with jawhar to form jawhar ghāsiq (dusky substance) and never pairs ghāsiq with hayʾa (state) or any other terms. So, when he simply mentions al-ghāsiq (the dusky) or its plural form al-ghawāsiq (those that are dusky), he means jawhar ghāsiq (dusky substance) or jawāhir ghāsiqa (dusky substances). The term muẓlim (dark) does not appear often. In Book I, muẓlim appears around four times (all in II.1.3 [Ḥ.Sh §§109–10, 107–9]): three occurrences refer to substance [Ḥ.Sh 108.2, 4, §109; 108.12, §110]; the other seems to refer to substance and state together [Ḥ.Sh 108.3, §109]. Therefore, muẓlim seems more general than ghāsiq. This is reasonable: neither dusky substances nor states pertaining to darkness are lights (i.e. those that are manifest), so they are both muẓlim (dark). It is difficult to translate hayʾa ẓulmāniyya. In Arabic, ẓulmānī is obviously different from muẓlim, although they share the same root (ẓ-l-m). Any ­rendering must show this difference, so “dark” should not be used to render both muẓlim and ẓulmānī.22 Suhrawardī is also consistent in the way he uses ẓulmānī: he only pairs it with hayʾa to form hayʾa ẓulmāniyya. Thus, I render hayʾa ẓulmāniyya as “state pertaining to darkness”, which is complex in ­structure but is more accurate given that this sort of state pertains to darkness.23 In [T4e] Suhrawardī confirms that barzakh is the Illuminationist synonym for “body”. Barzakh literally means “interval”, “gap”, “obstruction”, or “isthmus”. I adopt the standard rendering of barzakh as “barrier”. It is unclear why Suhrawardī chooses this strange term.24 Shahrazūrī comments on barzakh:

22 23 24

Most scholars, however, translate hayʾa ẓulmāniyya as “dark state”. I render nūrānī as “pertaining to light”, which corresponds to ẓulmānī as “pertaining to darkness”. But Suhrawardī rarely uses nūrānī. For a discussion of the meaning and etymology of barzakh in Illuminationism, see Malihe Karbassian, “The Meaning and Etymology of Barzakh in Illuminationist Philosophy”, in Illuminationist Texts and Textual Studies: Essays in Memory of Hossein Ziai, ed. Ali ­Gheissari, John Walbridge, and Ahmed Alwishah (Leiden, 2018), pp. 86–95. Karbassian

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Given that a barzakh is an obstruction (al-ḥāʾil) between two things, and dense bodies (al-ajsām al-kathīfa) are obstructive, there is no dispute that the body should be called barzakh. [Sha 288.13–14] Quṭb al-Dīn repeats this in his commentary [Q.D 277.17–18]. Shahrazūrī’s remark is based on a passage in Book IV of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq in which Suhrawardī writes about the division of barriers or bodies. Suhrawardī writes: [Text 6] Every simple [body] (fārid) is either opaque (ḥājiz), which blocks light entirely, or transparent (laṭīf), which does not block light at all, or translucent (muqtaṣid), which blocks light in an incomplete manner and has [various] degrees in blocking.25 [Ḥ.Sh 187.9–11, §194] Earth is opaque; water is translucent; air (faḍāʾ) is transparent [Ḥ.Sh 187.14– 15, §194]. Thus, not every body is obstructive: an opaque body is obstructive, whereas a transparent body is not and a translucent body is partially obstructive. But translucent and transparent bodies are also barāzikh (barriers). ­Therefore, Shahrazūrī’s interpretation seems unsatisfactory. My preliminary assumption is that barzakh means “a thing that intervenes between two things”; body is that which is in between the four categories of light and darkness, so Suhrawardī calls it barzakh.26 Given [T4e] and [T4g], we know that bodies are dusky substances in nature and necessarily have states pertaining to darkness (i.e. the accidental categories of magnitude, quality, and motion; see the next section). Some bodies (e.g. the sun) also have adventitious lights; some bodies have immaterial lights. For instance, human bodies have human souls and heavenly bodies have heavenly souls. Therefore, Suhrawardī might call body barzakh because body combines the four categories.

25 26

concludes that “the Illuminationist word barzakh, meaning ‘body’, is a usage particular to Suhrawardī that cannot be traced back to Persian texts in pre-Islamic Iran” (p. 93). Body is divided into “simple body” (jism fārid) and “composite body” (jism muzdawij): a composite body is composed of two different simple bodies [Ḥ.Sh 187.8–9, §194]. Corbin (History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 213) remarks: “The characteristic term barzakh, when used in eschatology, means the intermediate, and when used in cosmology, it means the inter-world (the mundus imaginalis). In al-Suhrawardī’s philosophy of the ­Ishrāq it assumes a more general meaning: it designates in general everything that is body, everything that is a screen and an interval, and which of itself is Night and Darkness.”

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2.3.2 The Division of Darkness and Suhrawardī’s Critique of Hylomorphism What are dusky substances and states pertaining to darkness? And how do they relate to barriers? The metaphysical basis of Suhrawardī’s division of darkness is his 15-page critique of Peripatetic hylomorphism in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3.3–5 [Ḥ.Sh §§72–88, 74–88]. The critique is based on his discussions of Peripatetic categories in the Metaphysics of his Peripatetic-style works. This critique is very dense and complicated.27 So, rather than reconstruct the critique, I summarize Suhrawardī’s position because doing so helps to explain the referents of “dusky substance”, “state pertaining to darkness”, and “barrier”. In short, Suhrawardī rejects hylomorphism, i.e. the real matter–form distinction, because it is both metaphysically invalid and redundant. Instead, he introduces an alternative to hylomorphism—bodies are self-subsistent magnitudes plus accidental magnitudes and qualities—that only involves the real substance–accident/state distinction. His alternative theory should be understood within the general framework of his Nominalist and Existential metaphysics. According to Suhrawardī’s interpretation of Peripatetic hylomorphism, every body involves two real matter–form distinctions: (1) prime matter (al-hayūlā al-ūlā) and the corporeal form (al-ṣūra al-jismiyya/al-jirmiyya) and (2) matter (al-mādda) and species form (al-ṣūra al-nawʿiyya). Prime matter is some “bare existent (mawjūd fa-ḥasb) that receives magnitudes (maqādīr) and forms” [Ḥ.Sh 80.7, §77], while the corporeal form, which is also called “the substantial extension” (al-imtidād al-jawharī) [LWḤ3 14.9, 10, §5], is the universal substantial form responsible only for universal extensions (i.e. universal length, width, and depth). Together, prime matter and the corporeal form compose matter. A body is composed of matter and a species form (i.e. the form of one of the four elements). Let us call prime matter “PM”, matter “M”, corporeal form / substantial extension “F1”, and species form “F2”. All of them are real substances and are universals. Peripatetic hylomorphism, therefore, can be characterized as:

27

John Walbridge, “Al-Suhrawardī on Body as Extension: An Alternative to Hylomorphism from Plato to Leibniz”, in Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and ­Mysticism in Muslim Thought, ed. Todd Lawson (London, 2005), pp. 235–47; İshak Arslan, “Pushing the Boundaries of the Universe: The Criticisms of Peripatetic Cosmology in ­Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and its Commentaries”, Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences 1, no. 1 (2014), 129–55; İshak Arslan, “An Early Attempt at Unifying the Universe: Suhrawardī’s Concept of Miqdār”, Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences 3, no. 2 (2017), 45–67.

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Body = matter (prime matter + corporeal form) + species form Body = M (PM + F1) + F2 [E.g. water = matter (prime matter + corporeal form) + form of water]. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī criticizes both of these matter–form distinctions at length and offers his alternative theory. He argues that there is no prime matter but rather self-subsistent magnitudes (sing. al-miqdār al-qāʾim bi-nafsihi) [Ḥ.Sh 80.6–7, §77], which differ in strength and weakness (and thus employs his Existential vocabulary). This is Suhrawardī’s alternative notion (call it “MS”) to prime matter. An easy way to explain a self-subsistent magnitude is to describe it as a material mass or gunk, which is a pure material substratum that is a magnitude.28 Self-subsistent magnitudes are all particulars, and they differ in strength and weakness (i.e. they are particular larger or smaller magnitudes). Although self-subsistent magnitudes are called “magnitudes” (sing. miqdār), they are substances and should not be confused with accidental magnitudes. Consider Suhrawardī’s favourite example, wax. A self-subsistent magnitude is the material mass or gunk of the wax, without the shape and also without the qualities of the wax. It is a pure particular substantial magnitude. Self-subsistent magnitudes (MS) are essentially different from Peripatetic prime matter (PM). Although they are both substances, prime matter (PM) is universal and the same whereas self-subsistent magnitudes (MS) are particular and all differ in strength and weakness.29 Self-subsistent magnitudes must have accidental magnitudes, which Suhrawardī also calls “the mathematical body” (al-jism al-taʿlīmī) [LWḤ3 14.4, §4] and which consist of length, width, and depth. Accidental magnitudes belong to the accidental category of magnitude (miqdār), or continuous quantity (kamm muttaṣil); they also admit of strength and weakness. Accidental magnitudes form the particular shapes of the wax and are changeable (and thus, 28

29

It seems that Suhrawardī’s notion of “self-subsistent magnitude” bears some similarities with the notion of “bare particular” in contemporary Substratum theory. The essential difference is that self-subsistent magnitudes are particular magnitudes in themselves, whereas bare particulars are simply particulars. For a discussion of “bare particulars”, see Theodore Sider, “Bare Particulars”, Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006), 387–97. Sider writes: “If universals and particulars are separate, connected to each other only by a relation of instantiation, then, it is said, the nature of these particulars becomes mysterious. In themselves, they do not have any properties at all. They are nothing but a pincushion into which universals may be poked” (p. 387, emphasis added); cf. Howard Robinson, “Substance”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition) (2018), “Bundle theories versus substratum and ‘thin particulars’”. Ainsworth, “Form vs. Matter”, “2. Prime matter”.

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they are accidents), but the self-subsistent magnitude of the wax endures and does not change. There is no pure self-subsistent magnitude without any accidental magnitude (e.g. there is no wax without a certain shape). Accidental magnitudes (call them “A1”) are essentially different from the Peripatetic corporeal form or the substantial extension (F1), insofar as accidental magnitudes (A1) are accidental, particular, and differ in strength and weakness whereas the corporeal form (F1) is substantial and universal. Recall that the corporeal form (F1) is the universal substantial form responsible only for extensions qua extensions (i.e. length, width, and depth) but not for particular accidental extensions. Moreover, self-subsistent magnitudes must have qualities (sing. kayfiyya), which belong to the accidental category of quality and which also differ in strength and weakness. In the case of a simple body (e.g. spheres and the four elements), its qualities include being cold, hot, dry, wet, and so on; in the case of a composite body (i.e. minerals, plants, animals, and artefacts), its qualities are a mixture (mizāj) or composition (tarkīb) of multiple qualities of simple bodies (e.g. the human body is the most perfect mixture of the qualities of the elements). Suhrawardī proposes that qualities (call them “A2”) replace the Peripatetic notion of species forms (F2): qualities (A2) are accidental, ­particular, and differ in strength and weakness, whereas species forms (F2) are substantial and universal. In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī writes: “Given that the ‘forms’—which the Peripatetics establish and they say that ‘they are not sensible’—have been removed, what is left is qualities (al-kayfiyyāt) that are stronger or weaker.” [Ḥ.Sh 87.9–11, §87] Suhrawardī’s alternative theory to hylomorphism can be formulated as: Body = self-subsistent magnitude + accidental magnitude + quality Body = MS + A1 + A2 [E.g. wax = material mass/gunk (enduring) + shape (changeable) + ­quality of wax]. In Suhrawardī’s theory, the only substance is the self-subsistent magnitude (MS); the accidental magnitude (A1) and quality (A2) are both accidents. Therefore, he is basically arguing that the real substance–state distinction is already sufficient and that there is no need for hylomorphism, which introduces four redundant substances. (Moreover, for Suhrawardī, all four substances are universal mental considerations rather than real metaphysical constituents of bodies.) Suhrawardī’s alternative theory should be interpreted in the general framework of his Nominalist and Existential metaphysics. I have argued in Chapter 3, section 3.2 that systematically ambiguous existence is divided into four real categories: substance, magnitude, quality, and motion, all of which admit of strength

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and weakness. Here, the self-subsistent magnitude, the accidental magnitude, and quality are three of the four real categories and each differs in terms of strength and weakness. In light of the analysis above, consider the division of darkness in Light Metaphysics. Dusky substances are self-subsistent magnitudes (MS), while states pertaining to darkness are accidental magnitudes (A1) and qualities (A2). Motion seems to belong to states pertaining to darkness as well, although the main examples from Book I are shape (shakl) [Ḥ.Sh 109.5, §111] and magnitude (miqdār) [Ḥ.Sh 109.7, §111]. Thus, I maintain that states pertaining to darkness refer to the three real categories of accidents: magnitude, quality, and motion.30 Barriers are bodies, which are dusky substances together with states pertaining to darkness (i.e. self-subsistent magnitudes plus accidental magnitudes and qualities): Barrier (body) = dusky substance (self-subsistent magnitude) + state ­pertaining to darkness (accidental magnitude + quality) Barrier (body) = MS + A1 + A2. Moreover, through an empirical argument in [T4e] and [T4g], Suhrawardī argues that barriers are dusky substances in nature. If a barrier loses its adventitious light, it necessarily becomes dark (i.e. not manifest in any way, neither visible nor self-aware). Some barriers cannot lose their adventitious lights (e.g. the sun), but it is conceivable that if they were to lose their adventitious lights, they would become dark. Here, although Suhrawardī is speaking of his same Nominalist and Existential alternative to hylomorphism, his focus shifts. In his Peripatetic-style metaphysics, he criticizes hylomorphism and contrasts his alternative theory to it; in Light Metaphysics, he shows bodies and their constituents are all darkness (i.e. the non-manifest) in nature, and he expounds their relations to the two categories of light, especially immaterial lights (see Section 3). Another crucial point is that Suhrawardī confirms that, in Light Metaphysics, there is no pure dusky substance that is devoid of any state pertaining to darkness (i.e. there is no self-subsistent magnitude without any accidental 30

However, both Shahrazūrī [Sha 288.13] and Quṭb al-Dīn [Q.D 277.16] maintain that states pertaining to darkness refer to the nine accidental categories (al-maqūlāt al-tisʿ al-ʿaraḍiyya) without adventitious light. Walbridge holds the same view; see Science of Mystic Lights, p. 50. But in my opinion, this is a misinterpretation. As I have shown in Chapter 3, section 3.2, Suhrawardī reduces the nine accidental categories to four and argues that there are three real accidental categories: magnitude, quality, and motion.

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magnitude and quality). In fact, pure dusky substance must be a universal mental consideration. [Text 7] The substantiality (jawhariyya) of the dusky substance is intellectual (ʿaqliyya),31 and its dusky-ness/being-dusky (ghāsiqiyya) pertains to non-existence (ʿadamiyya).32 So it does not exist inasmuch as it is like that (min ḥaythu huwa kadhā); rather, it exists in the real world together with characteristics (al-khuṣūṣiyyāt; lit. those that are characteristics). [Ḥ.Sh 110.6–7, §111] In other words, dusky substances (i.e. self-subsistent magnitudes) must not be confused with Peripatetic prime matter insofar as the former are particulars and admit of strength and weakness, and they must have particular accidental magnitudes and qualities without which they cannot exist. 3

The Argument for the Existence of Immaterial Lights

At this point in his argument, Suhrawardī has established the fourfold light– darkness division, and we have determined the referents of three of the four categories. Suhrawardī’s third step in Book I is to argue for the existence of immaterial lights. The argument occurs over two pages [Ḥ.Sh §§110–11, 108–10] in the second half of II.1.3 and in II.1.4 (excluding §112 and §113). The key premise of this argument is the fourfold light–darkness division of everything in the real world. This division exhausts every real thing. Moreover, adventitious lights, dusky substances, and states pertaining to darkness are all impoverished (sing. faqīr) or deficient in themselves, and they cannot cause each other. Therefore, the cause of their existence must be the fourth category: immaterial lights. Suhrawardī’s argument consists of four sub-arguments. Argument I: adventitious lights are impoverished, and their cause cannot be dusky substances or states pertaining to darkness [Ḥ.Sh §110, 108–9] Argument II: states pertaining to darkness are impoverished, and their cause cannot be dusky substances [Ḥ.Sh 109.5–10, §111]

31 32

In Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3.1 [Ḥ.Sh §67, 70–71], Suhrawardī argues that substantiality is also a mental consideration. See Section 4.2.4. Suhrawardī establishes this claim in [T4f]; see Section 2.1.

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Argument III: dusky substances are impoverished, and they cannot cause each other [Ḥ.Sh 109.10–110.2, §111] Argument IV: adventitious lights, dusky substances, and states pertaining to darkness cannot cause each other [Ḥ.Sh 110.2–4, §111] Conclusion [Ḥ.Sh 110.4–6, §111] Another premise in the argument is the rich–impoverished distinction, which Suhrawardī introduces in II.1.2 “On the definition of the rich”. As with II.1.1 ([Text 2]), II.1.2 is also one sentence: [Text 8] That which is rich (al-ghanī) is that whose essence (dhāt) does not depend on another and nor does its perfection (kamāl); that which is impoverished (al-faqīr) is that whose essence depends on another and so does its perfection. [Ḥ.Sh §108, 107] Suhrawardī’s rich–impoverished distinction should not be confused with the Avicennian necessary–contingent distinction (which Suhrawardī adopts). Although “the absolute/unrestricted rich” (al-ghanī al-muṭlaq) refers exclusively to God, the Light of lights (nūr al-anwār), other immaterial lights are also rich to the extent that they do not depend on anything in the other three categories of the fourfold division. The other three categories are all impoverished in the sense that they depend on another category or categories. By contrast, God alone is that whose existence is necessary by itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-­dhātihi). Everything else in the real world is that whose existence is contingent by itself (mumkin al-wujūd bi-dhātihi). Therefore, Suhrawardī’s rich–impoverished distinction and the Avicennian necessary–contingent distinction do not ­correspond to each other. 3.1 Argument I: Adventitious Lights Are Impoverished To establish the first sub-argument, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 9] [T9a] The sensible adventitious light (al-nūr al-ʿāriḍ al-maḥsūs) is not rich in itself; otherwise, it would not need the dusky [substance] (al-­ ghāsiq). Given that the adventitious light subsists in the dusky substance, it is in need (fāqir) and contingent. [T9b] The existence of the adventitious light is not from the dusky substance; otherwise, it would necessarily follow the dusky substance. But this is not the case.

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[T9c] Given that a thing cannot necessitate what is nobler than itself (ashraf min dhātihi), then how [could the dusky substance necessitate the adventitious light]? So that which gives (al-muʿṭī) all dusky substances their lights cannot be their dark quiddities (al-māhiyyāt al-muẓlima) or their states pertaining to darkness. [T9d] You will know that most states pertaining to darkness are caused by light, even if the light is adventitious. [T9e] [Dusky substances and states pertaining to darkness] are obscure (khafiyya).33 Then how could they necessitate what is less obscure than them or similar to them? [T9f] So, the giver of lights to barriers is not a barrier or a dusky ­substance. … It is something outside barriers and dusky substances [i.e. immaterial lights]. [Ḥ.Sh §110, 108–9] In [T9a], Suhrawardī establishes that adventitious lights are impoverished in themselves. Every state that subsists in a substrate is impoverished in itself because it is dependent on the substrate. Thus, it is contingent by itself. Given that adventitious lights are states that subsist in dusky substances, they must be impoverished in themselves. Suhrawardī then presents two arguments for the claim that adventitious lights cannot be caused by dusky substances or states pertaining to darkness. The first argument occurs in [T9b]. If the cause of adventitious lights were dusky substances, then every dusky substance would have an adventitious light and would be manifest to the eye. This is absurd insofar as only some dusky substances, such as the sun, have adventitious lights. The same applies to states pertaining to darkness. The second argument occurs at [T9c] and [T9e]. Suhrawardī argues at [T9c] that given that what is lower (akhass) cannot necessitate what is nobler (ashraf) and adventitious lights are nobler than dusky substances and states pertaining to darkness, they cannot be caused or necessitated by them. At [T9e], he explains that adventitious lights are nobler because they are manifest (sing. ẓāhir), whereas the two categories of darkness are obscure (sing. khafī). “Nobler” (ashraf) here clearly means that whatever is nobler is higher in the hierarchy of systematically ambiguous existence. So, the key premise of the second argument is that what is manifest is higher in the hierarchy of existence than what is obscure. Although this seems intuitive, Suhrawardī has not yet established the premise because he first needs to prove the existence 33

“Obscure” (khafī) is the antonym of “manifest” (ẓāhir). The two categories of darkness are obscure, whereas the two categories of light are manifest.

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of immaterial lights and then establish the hierarchy of light and darkness. I understand the second argument as functioning as a prelude to the hierarchy of light and darkness, which Suhrawardī establishes later in Book I and Book II. At [T9f], Suhrawardī concludes that the cause of adventitious lights must be something outside the two categories of darkness; that is, the cause must be immaterial lights. 3.2 Argument II: States Pertaining to Darkness Are Impoverished The second sub-argument is: [Text 10] [T10a] Dusky substances as barriers have things (umūr; i.e. states) pertaining to darkness, such as shapes (al-ashkāl) and so on, and characteristics (khuṣūṣiyyāt) of magnitude. Even though magnitude is not added to a barrier,34 the magnitude nonetheless has some specification (takhaṣṣuṣ), edge (maqṭaʿ), and limit (ḥadd), by which one magnitude becomes an individual (yanfaridu) [different] from another.35 [T10b] These things by which barriers differ [from each other] do not belong to barriers by themselves. Otherwise, barriers would participate in them (tashārakat fī-hā). [For instance], the limits of magnitudes (ḥudūd al-maqādīr) do not belong to barriers by themselves; otherwise, all [barriers] would be equal in them. [T10c] So, that [i.e. states pertaining to darkness] belongs to the barrier from something else [i.e. light]. [T10d] If shape and other states pertaining to darkness were rich, their existence would not depend on the barrier. [Ḥ.Sh 109.5–10, §111] Based on my analysis above of Suhrawardī’s alternative theory to Peripatetic hylomorphism, I read [T10a] as Suhrawardī’s claiming that each dusky substance, or self-subsistent magnitude (MS), must have its particular accidental magnitude (A1), which accounts for its particular shape. Moreover, it must also have its particular qualities (A2). At [T10b], Suhrawardī argues that dusky substances cannot be the cause of their own states pertaining to darkness: their own accidental magnitudes (A1) 34 35

According to their doctrine of hylomorphism, the Peripatetics argue that the universal corporeal form or the substantial extension (F1) is added to the body. Suhrawardī holds that barriers themselves are self-subsistent magnitudes, i.e. dusky substances. That is, every self-subsistent magnitude has its particular accidental magnitude (A1), consisting of length, width, and depth.

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and qualities (A2). Dusky substances are the same in nature insofar as they are self-subsistent magnitudes (i.e. pure material masses or gunks). Moreover, if one understands dusky substances in the mind, they are the same universal mental consideration, one that is composed of substantiality (jawhariyya) and dusky-ness (ghāsiqiyya; i.e. the non-existence [ʿadamiyya] of light), as shown in [Text 7]. If dusky substances were to cause their own states pertaining to darkness, then all states pertaining to darkness would be the same. This consequence would be absurd. Moreover, as Suhrawardī articulates in [T10d], states pertaining to darkness are impoverished in themselves, given that they depend on their dusky substances. Suhrawardī concludes at [T10c] that the cause of states pertaining to darkness must be something outside the two categories of darkness; it must be light. Nonetheless, as mentioned in [T9d], some states pertaining to darkness can indeed be caused by adventitious lights. For instance, the light of the sun makes things hot and dry (and being hot and dry are qualities). The fundamental cause of all states pertaining to darkness, however, must still be immaterial lights. 3.3 Argument III: Dusky Substances Are Impoverished To establish the third sub-argument, Suhrawardī writes: [Text 11] [T11a] If the reality as a barrier (al-ḥaqīqa al-barzakhiyya) were rich and necessary by itself, it would not need states pertaining to darkness or other things that make it specific (al-mukhaṣṣiṣāt) for the realization (taḥaqquq) of its existence. [T11b] For if barriers are deprived of magnitudes and [other] states, they cannot become multiple (takaththur) because of the lack of a differentiator (al-mumayyiz) from distinguishing states (al-hayʾāt al-fāriqa), and the essence of any barrier cannot become specific. [T11c] Intuition (al-ḥads) judges that lifeless dusky substances (al-jawāhir al-ghāsiqa al-mayyita)36 cannot cause the existence of each other, for there is no priority (awlawiyya) [among them] according to the lifeless reality as a barrier (al-ḥaqīqa al-barzakhiyya al-mayyita). [Ḥ.Sh 109.10–110.1, §111]

36

Suhrawardī argues that only immaterial lights are living (sing. ḥayy) because they actively apprehend themselves [Ḥ.Sh 117.7–9, §121].

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In [T11a] and [T11b], Suhrawardī establishes that dusky substances are impoverished. Here, he is arguing on a conceptual level, considering that differentiation (tamayyuz), becoming-multiple (takaththur), and becoming-specific (takhaṣṣuṣ) refer to the same mental process: universals becoming multiple, specific, and differentiated (see Chapter 4, section 3.4). If we analyse barriers in the mind, they are composed of the same universal pure dusky substance, as shown in [Text 7], and different states pertaining to darkness that make them multiple and specific and by which we differentiate them from each other.37 Suhrawardī continues, at [T11c], to argue that dusky substances cannot cause each other. Given that dusky substances are the same in nature, none of them exists prior to the others so to cause the others. Suhrawardī does not argue that the cause of dusky substances cannot be adventitious lights or states pertaining to darkness because the point is obvious: given that, as states, both adventitious lights and states pertaining to darkness already depend on dusky substances, they certainly cannot exist prior to dusky substances and be their cause. 3.4 Argument IV: Adventitious Lights, Dusky Substances, and States Pertaining to Darkness Cannot Cause Each Other Although adventitious lights, dusky substances, and states pertaining to darkness are all impoverished in themselves, it does not necessarily follow that their cause is something outside of them. There is another possibility: they might cause each other. Suhrawardī offers the fourth sub-argument to rule out this possibility. [Text 12] [T12a] It cannot be the case that the existence of a barrier, its states pertaining to darkness, and its light states is out of each other by way of [forming] a circle (ʿalā sabīl al-dawr). [T12b] For it is impossible for a thing to depend on what depends on it. [Otherwise,] it would make existent (yūjidu) that which makes it existent (mūjid), so it would be prior to that which makes it existent and itself. This is absurd. [Ḥ.Sh 110.2–4, §111] Suhrawardī argues against a vicious circle. Although the case that we are considering involves three elements, namely, adventitious lights, dusky substances, 37

Suhrawardī uses mental distinctions in his arguments, as long as they are not taken to be real distinctions. He is building Light Metaphysics by relying on the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach; this is a good example.

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and states pertaining to darkness, we can nonetheless analyse the basic model: A and B cannot cause each other. If this can be established, the argument also applies to A and C and to B and C. Therefore, A, B, and C cannot cause each other. Suppose that A and B cause each other. A causes B, so A is prior to B. B also causes A, so B is also prior to A. However, if A is prior to B, and B is also prior to A, A is prior to A itself. B likewise is prior to B itself. Because nothing can be prior to itself, this reasoning is absurd. Based on the four sub-arguments above, Suhrawardī concludes: [Text 13] If they [dusky substances, adventitious lights, and states pertaining to darkness] are not rich because of themselves, all of them are in need of something that is not a dusky substance, a light state, or a state pertaining to darkness. So it is an immaterial light. [Ḥ.Sh 110.4–6, §111] Given that adventitious lights, dusky substances, and states pertaining to darkness are all impoverished in themselves and they cannot cause each other, their cause must be something outside them. Given that the fourfold light– darkness division exhausts everything in the real world, their cause must be the fourth category: immaterial lights. Therefore, immaterial lights necessarily exist; ­otherwise, nothing would exist in the first place. 4

Immaterial Lights as Self-Apprehenders

The existence of immaterial lights has been established, but what exactly are immaterial lights? Suhrawardī’s fourth crucial step in building Light Metaphysics is to argue that immaterial lights are self-apprehenders. He does this in an eight-page argument [Ḥ.Sh §§114–23, 110–19]. Before presenting the argument, he first reveals two rules (sing. ḍābiṭ) about two features of immaterial lights. 4.1 The Immateriality and Substantiality of Immaterial Lights The first feature of immaterial lights is their immateriality. [Text 14] Rule (ḍābiṭ): Since you have known that every light that can be pointed to (mushār ilayhi) is an adventitious light, if there is a pure light (nūr maḥḍ), then it cannot be pointed to, and it does not subsist in a body. Moreover, it must have no direction (jiha) at all. [Ḥ.Sh §112, 110]

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Although mushār ilayhi (“which can be pointed to”) usually corresponds to tode ti, which in Aristotelian texts indicates individuality or particularity of things, Suhrawardī uses the phrase to indicate that something is material and sensible. In [T4e], he writes that a barrier is “a substance that can be intended by pointing (yuqṣadu bi-l-ishāra)”, which means that all bodies have spatiotemporal coordinates and are sensible. In the fourfold light–darkness division, immaterial lights are substances. Given that substances “do not subsist in another” (in [Text 5]), immaterial lights must not subsist in bodies or anything else. Moreover, immaterial lights are not bodies; otherwise, they would belong to the category of dusky substance. Therefore, they cannot be pointed to and have no direction. That is, they are immaterial. Adventitious lights, in contrast, can be pointed to and have directions, given that they subsist in dusky substances. Substantiality is the second feature of immaterial lights. [Text 15] Rule: An adventitious light is not a light for itself (nūr li-nafsihi), as its existence is for another, so it is but a light for another (nūr li-ghayrihi). So an immaterial pure light (al-nūr al-maḥḍ al-mujarrad) is a light for itself, and every light for itself is an immaterial pure light. [Ḥ.Sh §113, 110] This passage involves a distinction between “light for itself” (nūr li-nafsihi) and “light for another” (nūr li-ghayrihi). This distinction is based on a relevant threefold distinction of “existent” (mawjūd) that is found in the Metaphysics of al-Muṭāraḥāt I.2 “On another general discussion regarding existence and non-existence”. [Text 16] [T16a] The existent (al-mawjūd) is divided into existent for itself and by itself (mawjūd li-dhātihi wa-bi-dhātihi), existent for itself but not by itself (mawjūd li-dhātihi lā bi-dhātihi), and existent neither for itself nor by itself (mawjūd lā li-dhātihi wa-lā bi-dhātihi). [T16b] As for the existent that is for itself and by itself, it is the First. For it is existent by itself, not by another cause. It is existent for itself, as its existence is not for another thing, unlike states (al-hayʾāt). [T16c] As for the existent for itself but not by itself, it is a substance that is in no need of a substrate (al-maḥall). … And that which is not existent for itself, nor by itself, such as an accident (al-ʿaraḍ) … [ṬRḤ3 212.18–213.7, §11]

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From [Text 15] and [Text 16], “for itself” (li-dhātihi/nafsihi) means that a thing exists for (the sake of) itself and that it does not subsist in another; “for itself” thus describes substances. By contrast, “for another” (li-ghayrihi) means that a thing exists for (the sake of) another and that it subsists in another; “for another” thus describes accidents or states. Therefore, the for itself–for another distinction is another expression of the substance–accident/state distinction. The for itself–for another distinction should not be confused with the rich–impoverished distinction. “Rich” refers only to immaterial lights, whereas both immaterial lights and dusky substances, as substances, are for themselves. Immaterial lights are substances, so they need no substrates and are not for another; they are hence “lights for themselves”. Adventitious lights are states, so they are “lights for another”. Therefore, the second feature of immaterial lights is substantiality. 4.2 The Argument that Immaterial Lights Are Self-Apprehenders In II.1.5–7 (excluding §124)38 of Book I, Suhrawardī expounds the third and the most significant feature of immaterial lights: self-apprehension (al-idrāk lildhāt), which is exactly Avicenna’s primitive self-awareness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt; PSA). In Chapter 2, I explain how Suhrawardī’s theory of presential knowledge treats PSA as its paradigmatic case. In what follows, I show how PSA becomes one of the cornerstones of Light Metaphysics: every immaterial light has and indeed is PSA. Although the argument spans §§114–23, I focus on §§114–16 because they are sufficient for reconstructing the argument.39 The key premise of the argument is the fourfold light–darkness division. Self-apprehenders exist in the real world because all human beings apprehend themselves. If it can be proved that self-apprehenders cannot be dusky substances, adventitious lights, or states pertaining to darkness, then they must be immaterial lights. The most difficult step, as we shall see, is to show that a self-apprehender is not a dusky substance, because of “the manifestation of its self at it” (ẓuhūr dhātihi ʿindahu) [Ḥ.Sh 110.7–8, §114]. Suhrawardī devotes four sub-arguments to establishing this crucial premise. 38 39

This is another example of the problematic division of Book I. My focus is on the key moves in the argument, but §§117–23 add more detail and strength to the argument. While §§117–20 introduce some relevant points, Suhrawardī argues in §§121–23 that the other three categories cannot be “manifest to itself by itself” (ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi) and, in §§114–16, that a self-apprehender is manifest to itself by itself, and it is, therefore, an immaterial light.

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The Main Argument from the fourfold light–darkness division [Ḥ.Sh §114, 110–11] Four sub-arguments that a self-apprehender is “the manifest to itself by itself” (al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi) Argument I: self-apprehension requires no form or any other intermediaries [Ḥ.Sh §115, 111] Argument II: the constancy of self-apprehension [Ḥ.Sh 112.1–4, §116] Argument III: whatever the self cannot apprehend constantly is not the self [Ḥ.Sh 112.4–11, §116] Argument IV: the self is the self-apprehender itself, and the manifest to itself by itself [Ḥ.Sh 112.11–113.5, §116] I do not discuss the following sections of the text. Rule (ḍābiṭ): every light is manifest in itself and manifests others by itself [Ḥ.Sh §117, 113–14] Another expression (ʿibāra; i.e. argument): from the analysis of the thatness (anniyya) of the human soul [Ḥ.Sh §118, 114] Judgement (ḥukūma): a thing’s manifestation to its self (al-ẓuhūr li-­dhātihi) is not the same as its immateriality (tajarrud) [Ḥ.Sh §§119–20, 114–16] Argument: neither dusky substances, nor states pertaining to darkness, nor adventitious lights are manifest to themselves by themselves [Ḥ.Sh §§121–23, 117–19] 4.2.1 The Main Argument from the Fourfold Light–Darkness Division Suhrawardī’s Main Argument is: [Text 17] Whatever has a self (dhāt)40 that it cannot neglect is not dusky because of the manifestation of its self at it (ẓuhūr dhātihi ʿindahu). Nor is it a state pertaining to darkness in another. For even a light state (al-hayʾa al-nūriyya) is not a light for itself (nūr li-dhātihā), let alone a [state] pertaining to darkness. So, it must be an immaterial pure light that cannot be pointed to. [Ḥ.Sh §114, 110–111]

40

In the discussion of PSA, I render the term dhāt as “self” rather than “essence”. See Chapter 2, section 1.2.

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It is a fact that self-apprehenders exist in the real world because, at least, all of us apprehend our selves and we exist. Suhrawardī argues that self-­apprehenders cannot be dusky substances, states pertaining to darkness, or adventitious lights. Therefore, they are immaterial lights. To establish that self-apprehenders cannot be states pertaining to darkness or adventitious lights is straightforward: self-apprehenders are substances, so they cannot be states or accidents. But establishing that self-apprehenders cannot be dusky substances is more difficult. Suhrawardī argues that a self-­ apprehender’s self is “manifest at it” (ẓāhira ʿindahu), so the self-apprehender, as something essentially manifest, must be light and cannot be darkness. It is, therefore, an immaterial light. However, Suhrawardī is well aware that “the manifestation of its self at it” (ẓuhūr dhātihi ʿindahu) of a self-apprehender is far from self-evident and requires a detailed analysis. Two alternatives must be eliminated: (1) The self-apprehender might apprehend its self by the image (mithāl) or the form (ṣūra) of its self. If this were the case, then the form would be manifest. However, the self itself would not necessarily be manifest, and then the self-­ apprehender would not necessarily be light. (2) The self-apprehender might be something essentially non-manifest (call it X, which might be the brain, or some other organ, or substantiality [jawhariyya]; see [Text 19] below) to which manifestation (ẓuhūr) is added as an attribute. If this were the case, then X itself would not necessarily be manifest and would not be light (e.g. the brain is a dusky substance). Instead, X would only become manifest when manifestation is added to it as an attribute. Suhrawardī must eliminate these two alternatives. He first argues contrary to (1) that, in self-apprehension, it is the self itself, rather than its form, that is manifest. This is because self-apprehension requires no form or any other intermediaries (Argument I). He further argues contrary to (2) that the self-apprehender is the manifest self itself, or “the self that is manifest to itself” (al-dhāt al-ẓāhira li-nafsihā) [Ḥ.Sh 112.3, §116], rather than something X to which manifestation is added as an attribute (Argument III). In short, he shows that the self-­apprehender is “the manifest to itself by itself” (al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi) and “the manifest itself” (nafs al-ẓāhir) [Ḥ.Sh 113.1–2, §116] (Argument IV).41 This is exactly the purpose of §115 and §116 in which the following four ­sub-­arguments are found. 41

Both phrases exclude the two alternatives. “The manifest to itself by itself” means that the self-apprehender “by itself”—rather than (1) by the form of its self or (2) by the added manifestation—is “manifest to itself”, so it is light in itself. “The manifest itself” means that the self-apprehender is essentially manifest: (1) no form is required, and (2) manifestation, rather than something added, is its very essence.

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Suhrawardī first argues that (I) self-apprehension requires no form or any other intermediaries; from (I), it follows that (II) the self-apprehender must apprehend its self constantly; and from (II), it follows both that (III) whatever the self cannot apprehend constantly is not the self and that (IV) the self is the very self-apprehender and the manifest to itself by itself. Based on these four sub-arguments, every self-apprehender must be an immaterial light. 4.2.2 Argument I: Self-Apprehension Requires No Form or Any Other Intermediaries Argument I presents an already familiar point: self-apprehension cannot be formal knowledge (ʿilm ṣūrī). In Chapter 2, section 2.1, I explain that this point is also the first step in Suhrawardī’s theory of presential knowledge and reconstruct three arguments: the Particularity Argument, the I-ness Argument, and the Priority Argument. Both the I-ness Argument and the Priority Argument are found in §115 of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (see [Text 6] and [Text 7] in Chapter 2) without the Particularity Argument. Briefly recall these arguments. The Particularity Argument: every form in the mind is universal in itself, whereas the self is particular in itself, so self-apprehension must not require any form as an intermediary. The I-ness Argument: the form of the self is an “it” to an apprehender, whereas the self of the apprehender is the “I”, so the knowledge of the two cannot be the same. The Priority Argument: the apprehension of the self must be logically prior to the apprehension of the form of the self, so no form is required in self-apprehension. 4.2.3 Argument II: The Constancy of Self-Apprehension At the beginning of §116, Suhrawardī writes that [Text 18] [T18a] You are not absent from your self or from your apprehension of your self. For it is impossible that the [self-]apprehension is by means of a form or anything added (zāʾid). So you do not need, in your ­apprehension of your self, anything other than your self that is manifest to itself (dhātuka al-ẓāhira li-nafsihā) or [your self] that is not absent from itself (al-ghayr al-ghāʾiba ʿan nafsihā).42 42

I presume that Suhrawardī adds “your self that is not absent from itself” to “your self that is manifest to itself” to remind readers of the relevant discussions in al-Talwīḥāt

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[T18b] So your self’s apprehension of your self must be because of itself (li-nafsihā) and as it is (kamā hiya), and you must never be absent from your self or any part of your self. [Ḥ.Sh 112.1–4, §116] The constancy of self-apprehension is an inference from Argument I. In [T18a], Suhrawardī argues that, given that self-apprehension requires no form or any other intermediaries, the sole requirement of self-apprehension is “the self that is manifest to itself”. Moreover, in [T18b] Suhrawardī derives two features of self-apprehension from his claim that the self is never absent from itself given that they are identical. The first feature is absolute accuracy: the self must always know itself as it is (kamā hiya) rather than as anything else (e.g. the form of the self). The second feature is constancy: the self must constantly, rather than intermittently, apprehend itself. In fact, Avicenna had already established the constancy of self-apprehension. He writes in al-Taʿlīqāt (The Notes): “The self is that whose awareness is constant (dāʾimat al-shuʿūr), not at one time without another.”43 In Chapter 2, section 5.1, I also placed self-apprehension at the highest level in the hierarchy of presential knowledge, of which one key feature is the constancy. 4.2.4 Argument III: Whatever the Self Cannot Apprehend Constantly Is Not the Self In §116, Suhrawardī goes on to argue: [Text 19] [T19a] That from which your self is absent, such as the heart, the liver, the brain, or other organs,44 together with all barriers, states pertaining to darkness, and light states, must not be the apprehender within you (al-mudrik min-ka; i.e. the self). So the apprehender within you is not an organ or anything that is a barrier (amr barzakhī); otherwise, you would not be absent from it. But you have awareness (shuʿūr) of your self that is continuous (mustamirr) and does not disappear.

43 44

and al-Muṭāraḥāt. He does not introduce manifestation (ẓuhūr) until Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; in al-Talwīḥāt and al-Muṭāraḥāt, he uses non-absence (ʿadam ghayba). See Chapter 2, sections 3.1 and 3.3 for a discussion of the relations between presence (ḥuḍūr), non-absence, illumination (ishrāq), and manifestation. Avicenna, Al-Taʿlīqāt, p. 160.23–24. See Chapter 2, section 1.2. According to Quṭb al-Dīn, the heart, the liver, and the brain are the most essential organs for a human’s survival [Q.D 284.18–19]. So, they are the most promising candidates for being the self of the self-apprehender.

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[T19b] If substantiality (al-jawhariyya) is the perfection of quiddity (kamāl al-māhiyya) or if it is taken as an expression of the negation of a subject or substrate (salb al-mawḍūʿ aw al-maḥall), then it is not something independent (amr mustaqill) that your self itself could be. [T19c] [Alternatively], if substantiality is taken as an unknown intention (maʿnan majhūl) and [it has been established that] you do not apprehend your self continuously by something added (amr zāʾid), then the substantiality that is absent from you cannot be all of your self or even part of it. [Ḥ.Sh 112.4–11, §116] Given that the self apprehends itself constantly, as established in Argument II, it follows that whatever the self cannot apprehend constantly is not the self. In this passage, Suhrawardī examines what the self is not. Recall that the purpose of Argument III is to eliminate the alternative that a self-apprehender might be something essentially non-manifest (call it X) to which manifestation (ẓuhūr) is added as an attribute. If this were the case, then the self-­apprehender, as X, would not be light. X could be something in one of the two categories of darkness or it could be substantiality (jawhariyya), which is a key feature of immaterial lights (see Section 4.1). In [Text 19], Suhrawardī eliminates these possibilities. In [T19a], Suhrawardī argues that I cannot apprehend any organs of my body constantly, given that none of my organs appear in my self-apprehension. (In fact, I normally know very little about my organs, until I have an X-ray examination or a CT scan.) The same applies to all barriers, states pertaining to darkness, and adventitious lights; I apprehend none of these things constantly. Suhrawardī further shows, in [T19b] and [T19c], that the self cannot be substantiality.45 Substantiality is either a known or unknown intention (maʿnan). If substantiality is a known intention, it could be, for instance, “the perfection of quiddity” or “the negation of a subject or substrate”. However, Suhrawardī elsewhere argues that substantiality is another mental consideration, particularly in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq I.3.3.1 [Ḥ.Sh §67, 70–71]. [Text 20] Know that substantiality is also not something added (zāʾid) to beingbody (al-jismiyya) in the real world; rather, creating (jaʿl) something as a body is by itself creating it as a substance. This is because substantiality, 45

Cf. Kaukua, Self-Awareness, pp. 114–23. Kaukua observes that the context here might be Abū l-Barakāt’s and Rāzī’s critiques of Avicenna’s argument for the substantiality of the soul from self-awareness.

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in our opinion, is nothing but the perfection (kamāl) of the quiddity of something in the sense that it does not need any substrate for its subsistence (qawām).46 [Ḥ.Sh 70.13–15, §67] That is, when we come across bodies in the real world, the mind may predicate “____ is a substance” of them univocally: “this body is a substance” and “that body is a substance”. But it does not follow that substantiality, as a univocal and universal attribute, is a real metaphysical constituent of them because, otherwise, an infinite regress would arise.47 Rather, substantiality is a consideration that the mind generates when it considers the body as something that “does not need any substrate for its subsistence”. “The negation of a subject or substrate” in [T19b] is the definition of substantiality (cf. [Text 5] above). Suhrawardī points out that this negation is, in fact, because of “the perfection of quiddity”: something is strong and perfect enough to not require a substrate. At any rate, what really exist are stronger and weaker instances of systematically ambiguous existence and these are the same as individual and particular quiddities or it-nesses (huwiyyāt) in Suhrawardī’s Existentialism. Some of them are strong enough to not require a substrate and the mind, when it considers them in this manner, generates substantiality. Therefore, as Suhrawardī argues in [T19b], substantiality cannot be “something independent” (amr mustaqill). Rather, as a mental consideration, it is mind-dependent and depends on how things are in the real world.48 Thus, the self, which is an independent substance, cannot be substantiality. Moreover, if substantiality were my self, I would always apprehend substantiality—either as “the perfection of quiddity” or as “the negation of a substrate”—in my self-­apprehension. However, this would be absurd. Finally, at [T19c], Suhrawardī argues that if substantiality is an unknown intention, then I do not apprehend it. But, as Argument II establishes, I apprehend my self constantly. Therefore, substantiality cannot be my self. 4.2.5 Argument IV: The Self Is the Self-Apprehender Itself, and the Manifest to Itself by Itself Suhrawardī considers what the self actually is and identifies the self as the self-apprehender itself. 46 47 48

Cf. Kaukua, “Iʿtibārī Concepts”, pp. 45–48. The real existence of substantiality, as with any other mental considerations, leads to an infinite regress. Suhrawardī argues that if substantiality exists, then it must be a substance itself, and its substantiality is yet another substance [Ḥ.Sh 71.2–4, §67]. As I show in Chapter 3, section 3.2, mental considerations are proper reflections of how real things are, rather than arbitrary conceptions.

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[Text 21] [T21a] If you examine carefully, you will find that by which you are you (mā anta bi-hi anta) [i.e. the self] is but a thing that apprehends its self (shayʾ mudrik li-dhātihi) and it is your I-ness (anāʾiyya). Everything that apprehends its self and its I-ness participates with you in this. [T21b] Therefore, apprehender-ness/being-apprehender (­al-­mudrikiyya) is not an attribute (ṣifa) or something added (amr zāʾid), whatever it might be.49 It is not a part of your I-ness; otherwise, the other part would be unknown in that case. If the other part were behind apprehender-ness and being-aware (al-shāʿiriyya), then it would be unknown, and it would not be from your self whose awareness is not added. … [T21c] Therefore, it [the self-apprehender] is the manifest to itself by itself (al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi). There is no characteristic (khuṣūṣ) with it so that manifestation (al-ẓuhūr) would be a state (ḥāl) of it. Rather, it is the manifest itself (nafs al-ẓāhir) and nothing else. So it is a light for itself (nūr li-nafsihi). So it is a pure light (nūr maḥḍ). [Ḥ.Sh 112.11–113.2, §116] In [T21a], given that my self must be what I apprehend constantly, as ­Argument II establishes, and that I am my self itself in virtue of the absolute identity between me and my self, it is reasonable to say that I am also what my self apprehends constantly. It follows that my self is “a thing that apprehends its self” (shayʾ mudrik li-dhātihi). This argument applies to every self-apprehender. In [T21b], given that the self is the very self-apprehender, it follows that apprehender-ness (al-mudrikiyya) must be the self itself. Suhrawardī considers two alternatives: apprehender-ness might be an attribute added to the self, or it might be a part of the self. On the one hand, if apprehender-ness were an added attribute, then the self in itself would be unknown, and the self would apprehend itself through the added attribute. However, this is inconsistent with an inference from the Priority Argument (part of Argument I) in §115. [Text 22] [T22a] Whatever the case, it is inconceivable that a thing knows itself by anything added to itself. [T22b] For it [the added thing] would be an attribute (ṣifa) of it. If it is judged that every attribute added to its self—either knowledge or anything else—is of its self, then it has already known its self prior to all attributes and without them. So it has not known its self by the added attributes. [Ḥ.Sh 111.11–14, §115] 49

Cf. [Text 22] below.

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A thing must know itself first before knowing that any added attribute is of it; otherwise, it would never know that an attribute is indeed its attribute. Therefore, the very fact that the thing already knows that every attribute is of it suggests that self-apprehension is always prior to and without the need for any attributes. On the other hand, if apprehender-ness were a part of the self, then the other part would be unknown. In that case, the unknown part would not be the self (given that Argument II establishes that the self apprehends itself constantly), and the self would still be the very apprehender-ness. At [T21c], Suhrawardī reasons that, given that the self is the very self-­ apprehender and the very apprehender-ness, it follows that the self is ­essentially manifest. The self is not something X to which manifestation is added. Rather, the self is “the manifest to itself by itself” (al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi) and “the manifest itself” (nafs al-ẓāhir). The self is even the very self-apprehension and manifestation.50 Given that the manifest is equivalent to light in Light Metaphysics ([Text 2]), the self is light. Moreover, the self is a substance, so it is a “light for itself”, an immaterial light. Suhrawardī concludes: [Text 23] Everything that apprehends its self is a pure light, and every pure light is manifest to its self and apprehends its self. [Ḥ.Sh 114.8–10, §118] 5

Summary of Chapter 5

Given the significance of Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics and its puzzling nature, I have offered a systematic reconstruction based mainly on Book I of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq; my focus has been on the most fundamental problem of Light Metaphysics: what is light (nūr)? I began by explaining the nature of the second part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: Suhrawardī expounds the superior Illuminationist wisdom—which is only attainable through the Illuminationist supra-rational deification (taʾalluh) approach—by using the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach and presents this supra-rational wisdom in rational terms. His purpose is to build a new science: Light Metaphysics. 50

Suhrawardī writes: “It is not permissible for you to say: ‘My that-ness (anniyya) is a thing that manifestation follows.’ Otherwise, that thing would be obscure (khafī) in itself. Rather, your that-ness is the very manifestation and light-ness/being-light (al-nūriyya)” [Ḥ.Sh 114.5–6, §118].

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In Section 1, I explored a crucial question: how can light be the subject matter of metaphysics? According to Avicenna, the subject matter of metaphysics must be “the manifest in existence”; Suhrawardī argues that light is “the most manifest in existence” because light is both manifest in itself and manifests other things. Consequently, light is the proper subject matter of metaphysics. I then argued that Suhrawardī must have chosen light, instead of existent (mawjūd) or existence (wujūd), as the subject matter of metaphysics for a few reasons. In doing so, he, first, avoids the quiddity–existence distinction and, second, avoids any confusion between univocal existence (al-wujūd bi-ltawāṭuʾ) and systematically ambiguous existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk). Moreover, Suhrawardī’s notion of light is not equivalent to Ṣadrā’s existence because “light” refers to only “the most manifest in existence” (i.e. high-level instances of existence), whereas “existence” refers to everything that exists. I argued that Light Metaphysics is Existentialism but transcends Existentialism. In Section 2, I analysed the fourfold light–darkness division. Based on the non/manifest distinction and the substance–state/accident distinction, everything in the real world can be divided into four categories: immaterial lights (manifest substances), adventitious lights (manifest states), dusky substances (non-manifest substances), and states pertaining to darkness (non-manifest states). Suhrawardī explicitly clarifies that he is not using “light” in any metaphorical sense, so adventitious lights are visible lights. By considering his critique of Peripatetic hylomorphism, I have shown that dusky substances refer to self-subsistent magnitudes (sing. al-miqdār al-qāʾim bi-nafsihi), which are particular material masses or gunks, and should not be confused with prime matter. I also explained how states pertaining to darkness refer to the three real categories of accidents (i.e. magnitude, quality, and motion) and how barriers, which are bodies, are composites of the two categories of darkness. I then reconstructed Suhrawardī’s argument for the existence of immaterial lights in Section 3. Adventitious lights, dusky substances, and states ­pertaining to darkness are all impoverished in themselves (because they are dependent on the other categories for their existence) and they cannot cause each other (given the absurdity of a vicious circle), so their cause must be something outside of them. Given that the fourfold light–darkness division exhausts everything in the real world, their cause must be the fourth category: immaterial lights. Therefore, immaterial lights necessarily exist. In Section 4, I examined the nature of immaterial lights. Suhrawardī first points out two features of immaterial lights: their immateriality and substantiality. He then establishes the third feature self-apprehension through a lengthy and complicated argument. In short, we know that self-apprehenders exist and they cannot belong to the other three categories, so they must be immaterial lights.

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Nonetheless, Suhrawardī must establish a crucial premise: a ­self-­apprehender is the same as “the manifest to itself by itself” (al-ẓāhir li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi). Based on a detailed analysis of self-apprehension, he puts forward four sub-arguments for this key premise: Given that self-apprehension does not require form or any other intermediaries, the self-apprehender must apprehend its self constantly. Moreover, it follows that whatever the self ­cannot apprehend constantly is not the self and that the self is the self-­apprehender itself and is the manifest to itself by itself. Therefore, self-apprehenders are immaterial lights.

Conclusion Throughout this book, I have put forward a historical reconstruction of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism and have focused on three areas: the theory of presential knowledge (Chapter 2), the ontological discussion of mental ­considerations (Chapters 3 and 4), and Light Metaphysics (Chapter 5). My intention has been to use the Cave Story to help reconstruct Illuminationism. The reconstruction has the following essential features. First, the reconstruction demonstrates that Suhrawardī’s four Peripatetic-style works are indispensable. In the Introduction to al-Muṭāraḥāt [ṬRḤ3 194.6–8], Suhrawardī explicitly requires readers to study his Peripatetic-style works first before reading Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. It follows that the four Peripatetic-style works—al-Talwīḥāt, al-Lamaḥāt, al-Muṭāraḥāt, and al-Muqāwamāt—and his only mature Illuminationist work Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq together form the same Illuminationist project. Therefore, we must treat these works as one huge book and read them together when reconstructing Suhrawardī’s discussion of each topic. Second, the reconstruction emphasizes the importance of the ­deification– investigation distinction. We should always keep in mind that the ultimate Illuminationist approach is deification (taʾalluh), which refers to the spiritual observations (al-arṣād al-rūḥāniyya) of God and separate intellects; these spiritual observations correspond to the tasting (dhawq), unveiling (mukāshafa), and witnessing (mushāhada) of Sufism. However, we should also be aware that Suhrawardī is not a Sufi. Instead, he is a hardheaded philosopher who adopts mysticism as a tool for philosophical investigation. As a philosopher, he fully acknowledges the validity of the Peripatetic rational investigation (baḥth) approach. In fact, he holds that a true philosopher must be proficient in both deification and investigation, which refer to presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) and formal knowledge (ʿilm ṣūrī), respectively. As I show in Chapter 2, Suhrawardī resorts to mysticism only for deeply considered philosophical reasons. He firmly believes that the proper objects of human knowledge are particulars rather than universals. Therefore, his ambition is to break through the limitations of human knowledge and to apprehend all real particulars—both material and immaterial—presentially (in a way similar to how one unmediatedly apprehends one’s self). Third, the reconstruction moves from Existential Peripatetic-style metaphysics to Light Metaphysics. Suhrawardī believes that investigation, when used correctly—when it avoids such fallacies as taking mental considerations as metaphysical constituents of real things and when it rejects the real ­quiddity–existence distinction—should result in the same wisdom that is © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004527744_008

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achieved through deification. Thus, taken together, his Peripatetic-style works reconstruct the best possible Peripatetic-style philosophy, which is the best version of “the common philosophy for all investigators” (al-ḥikma al-ʿāmma li-jamīʿ al-bāḥithīn) and the best “philosophy inside the cave”. I have argued in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that the nature of Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style metaphysics is Nominalism and Existentialism and is thus in direct contrast to Avicenna’s Realism and Essentialism. The foundation of this Existential metaphysics is the systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd) in terms of strength and weakness, or perfection and deficiency. In other words, the systematic ambiguity of existence tracks the gradation of existence. Suhrawardī’s views form the foundation of and pave the way for the 17th-century Islamic Existential metaphysics. Moreover, since Suhrawardī holds that a philosopher of the highest rank must be proficient in both deification and investigation, he further transforms his Existential Peripatetic-style metaphysics into Light Metaphysics, which is the superior Illuminationist wisdom that is attainable only through deification and formulated in investigation terms; Light ­Metaphysics is the “wisdom outside the cave”. As I show in Chapter 5, Light Metaphysics takes light (nūr), “the most manifest in existence” (al-aẓhar fī l-wujūd), as its new subject matter. This allows Suhrawardī to set aside problems that taking existent (mawjūd) or existence (wujūd) as the subject matter of metaphysics causes. Instead, Light Metaphysics focuses solely on what is real: on real particulars, especially on immaterial lights (sing. al-nūr al-mujarrad), or self-apprehenders (sing. al-mudrik lil-dhāt), namely, God, separate intellects, and heavenly and human souls. In this way, Suhrawardī can more efficiently explain everything in the real world metaphysically. I believe that by following the Cave Story Approach, we can ­rediscover and ­revitalize Suhrawardī, the real Shaykh al-Ishrāq (Master of Illumination), and reveal the true philosophical nature of Illuminationism. I hope that I have offered a plausible account of why Suhrawardī is an original and hardheaded philosopher and not a theosophist or an Avicennian in disguise, as well as why his Illuminationism is an innovative integration of Nominalism and Existentialism. (It also integrates Neo-Platonism, but that is an argument for another monograph). Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism is not Corbin’s Oriental Theosophy. The Illuminationist project includes the four Peripatetic-style works that must be studied before Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. So, contrary to Corbin, one cannot ­dismiss the Peripatetic-style works as mere “propaedeutics”, and the Peripatetic discussions in these works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq are not “futile”.1 In the Peripatetic-style 1 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 208.

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works, Suhrawardī criticizes, corrects, and reconstructs ­Avicennism. The result is an entry-level Illuminationist philosophy with distinctive Nominalist and Existential features, such as the epistemology of presential knowledge and Existential metaphysics. Moreover, I have shown that Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is indeed a rigorous philosophical work, which cannot be correctly and adequately interpreted without examining the relevant philosophical discussions in the Peripatetic-style works. In fact, Light Metaphysics is not mystical. Rather, it is an extension of Suhrawardī’s Existential metaphysics and is intended to be a new science based on supra-rational deification but formulated in rational investigation terms. I do not deny the mystical side of Suhrawardī’s thought. This side, however, should not be over-emphasized. Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism is also not Gutas’s Illuminationist Avicennism. It is undeniable that Suhrawardī owes philosophical debts to Avicenna and that Avicennism is indeed his starting point. This, however, does not make him an Avicennian in disguise. Suhrawardī’s ambition is to become a philosopher of the highest rank, which requires him to be proficient in both deification and investigation. Pure investigation—Avicenna’s approach—is inadequate. Moreover, there are simply too many fundamental differences between ­Illuminationism and Avicennism. The epistemological foundation of Illuminationism is presential knowledge, which takes particulars as the proper objects of human knowledge, whereas Avicennian epistemology is formal knowledge, which takes universals as the proper objects of knowledge. The nature of Suhrawardī’s Peripatetic-style metaphysics and Light Metaphysics is Nominalism and Existentialism; Avicennian metaphysics is Realism and Essentialism. I hope that Light in the Cave has proposed a new way of understanding Suhrawardī’s aims, how his central ideas cohere, and how he realizes both in his writings. I also hope that, as a consequence of my interpretation, we reconceive Suhrawardī’s position in the Arabic philosophical tradition. While I have established the Nominalist aspect of Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism in Light in the Cave and, to a large extent, its Existential aspect, I plan to continue exploring his Existentialism in a future monograph Suhrawardī’s Existential ­Metaphysics in his Peripatetic-Style Works and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq: ­Philosophy inside the Cave, as well as its Neo-Platonic aspect in Suhrawardī’s Light Metaphysics and ­Arabic Neo-Platonism: Wisdom outside the Cave. The Cave Trilogy aims to demonstrate that Illuminationism is an innovative and ­perfect integration of Nominalism, Existentialism, and Neo-Platonism, to establish Suhrawardī as a towering figure after Avicenna, and to contribute to a new understanding of the history of Arabic philosophy.

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Index ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī 19n10 Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī 12n28, 38, 38n13, 51n43, n44, 193n Adamson, Peter 41, 60 Aminrazavi, Mehdi 4, 74n84, 160n1 apprehension (idrāk) 26, 35n3, 38–40, 52–59, 61–64, 70–74 al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl (agent intellect) 57–58, 58n Aquinas, Thomas 83n5 Aristotle 41, 43, 117n87, 148n38, 187 Aristotle, of Suhrawardī’s dream 25–28, 25n25, 40, 45, 48, 52 The Theology of Aristotle 14n32, 25n25, 171 aṣālat al-māhiyya (fundamentality of quiddity) 82, 89–90, 115n, 156 Averroes 8n20 Avicenna 4–5, 7, 9, 19, 19n10, 26, 32, 35n1, n3, 36–43, 41–42n25, 44n, 50–51, 53, 53n46, 53–54n48, 56–58, 60, 62n62, 65–68, 70, 73n82, 78, 82n, 83, 85, 87–89, 87n20, n22, 92, 93–94n40, 95–96, 100, 102–3, 111n68, 115–16, 129, 155, 163–66, 181, 188, 192, 197, 201 Bahmanyār b. al-Marzubān 117n90, 148n37 baḥth (investigation) 9, 22, 24–33, 80, 158–59, 161–62, 167, 185n, 196, 199–201. See also formal knowledge (ʿilm ṣūrī) Benevich, Fedor 12n28, 51n43, 68n, 84n11, n12, 85n13, 113n72, 148n37 Black, Deborah L. 41 categories (maqūlāt) 20, 106–7, 106n61, n62, 150, 156–57, 166–67, 176–79, 179n Cave Story (Approach) 1–2, 7–10, 8n20, 8–9n21, 14, 32–34, 79–80, 158–59, 162, 167, 199–201 common nature 86n17, 100, 152–53 Corbin, Henry 3–4, 6–7, 27n, 30n31, 36, 59, 160n1, 175n26, 200–1 Oriental Theosophy (Approach) 3–4, 6–7, 10, 59, 200–1 definition (ḥadd), Peripatetic 73n82, 75–76, 141–43, 143n30, 158, 162–64

determinable–differentia of determinate distinction 100n49, 122, 122n1, 135–43, 146–47, 149–50, 153n44, 157–58 Di Branco, Marco 25n25 differentiation (tamayyuz/imtiyāz/ tamāyuz) 99, 102, 122n1, 123, 147–52, 148n37, n38, 158, 184–85 divine philosopher (ḥakīm ilāhī) 28–31 Duns Scotus, John 83n5, 86n17 Eichner, Heidrun 36n8 Existentialism (Existential metaphysics) 14, 14n32, 82, 88–97, 92n36, 93–94n40, 95n43, 101n, 102–3, 107, 115n, 150, 153, 155–59, 162, 167–68, 176–79, 194, 197, 199–201 bi-l-tashkīk (systematically ambiguous), predication 92, 99, 101–2, 104–5, 107, 150, 156–57 gradation, ontological 82, 92, 95, 101–3, 106–7, 150, 156, 166, 167, 200 strength and weakness (perfection and deficiency) 14n32, 82, 82n, 88, 92, 94–96, 99, 101–7, 150, 156–57, 166–67, 177–80, 194, 200 systematically ambiguous conceptions/ universals 99, 101–2, 105, 150, 156 tashkīk al-wujūd (systematic ambiguity of existence) 14n32, 82, 82n, 92, 92–93n37, 102–3, 150, 200 al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk (systematically ambiguous existence) 82, 88, 90–97, 92n36, 92–93n37, 102–3, 107, 153, 156–59, 162, 166–68, 178–79, 194, 197 fallacy 81–82, 143, 170 Fārābī, Abū Naṣr al- 87 fiṭrī (instinctive), knowledge 74–76, 74n84, 141–43 Flying Man 41–43, 41–42n25, 53–54, 53–54n48, 64, 71, 95 formal knowledge (ʿilm ṣūrī) 9, 25–28, 35n2, 36, 38–40, 54–59, 67–70, 72–76, 72n, 78–80, 143, 161, 199, 201

214 genus–differentia distinction 122–23, 135–37, 143–47, 149, 152–55, 154–55n47, 157–58 Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid al- 4n11, 65n64, 171, 171n14 Granger, Herbert 136–37, 141n27 Gutas, Dimitri 4–5, 4n11, 7, 201 Illuminationist Avicennism (Approach) 4–5, 7, 10, 201 heavenly souls 68n, 69–70 Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq 8n20 huwiyya (it-ness) 86, 86n17, 88, 102, 107, 115n, 143, 152–53, 157, 158, 166, 194 hylomorphism, Peripatetic; and Suhrawardī’s alternative theory 47n, 176–80, 183–84, 183n34, 197 prime matter (al-hayūlā al-ūlā) 60, 173, 176–77, 180, 197 self-subsistent magnitude (al-miqdār alqāʾim bi-nafsihi) 173, 176–80, 177n28, 183–84, 183n34, 197 Ibn Kammūna, Saʿd b. Manṣūr 17n5, 19, 94, 94n41, 145–46 Ibn Khallikān 2–3n, 3n3 illumination (ishrāq) 51, 56, 59–63, 70, 77 Illuminationist project 1–2, 8–10, 15–16, 23–24, 31–34, 80, 199–200 Illuminationist wisdom (oriental wisdom) 2, 4, 6–9, 27n, 31, 33–34, 59, 161, 196, 200. See also taʾalluh (deification) imaginal world (ʿālam al-mithāl) 56–57, 168 immateriality (al-tajarrud ʿan almādda) 53–54, 59–60, 62–63, 186–87 individuation (tashakhkhuṣ) 123, 147–53, 148n37, n38, 158 infinite regress 82, 108–21, 122–35, 139–40, 145–46, 146n34, 157–58, 194n47 hybrid chain/regress (silsila mukhtalaṭa) 82, 118–21, 122, 128–35, 157 Mutual-Predication 118–21, 128–35, 157 single-species chain/regress (silsila fī nawʿ wāḥid) 82, 108–18, 122–28, 130n, 134, 157 Non-Identity 109–11, 111n70, 113–18, 123–28, 130n, 134, 157 Self-Predication 109–15, 123–24, 127–28, 134, 157

Index inniyya/anniyya (that-ness) 90, 90n31, 95, 163, 163n, 196n intellect (ʿaql) 39, 41, 57–58, 65–67, 71 intellectual understanding (ʿaql/ taʿaqqul) 26, 52–53, 57–58, 65–67, 71, 78, 105 intelligibles (maʿqūlāt) 57–58, 104–5, 107, 156 Isfizārī, Abū Ḥāmid al- 171–72 iʿtibār (consideration) 81n1, 97–108, 156–57 iʿtibār ʿaynī (real consideration) 81n1, 97–99, 101–7, 156–57 iʿtibār dhihnī/ʿaqlī (mental/intellectual consideration) 32, 80, 81–87, 81n1, 97–101, 103–8, 104n56, 122–23, 140–41, 146–49, 152–53, 156–59, 166, 178, 180, 193–94 maḥmūl ʿaqlī (intellectual predicable) 104n56 ṣifa dhihniyya/ʿaqliyya (mental/ intellectual attribute) 104–5, 125, 147 Izutsu, Toshihiko 31, 88, 93–94n40, 96–97, 105n, 117n87 Karbassian, Malihe 174–75n24 Kaukua, Jari 36n8, 37n11, 39, 41–42n25, 160n1, 173, 193n Khayyām, ʿUmar 139n25 light–darkness division 97, 161, 168–70, 180–90, 182n, 197 darkness (ẓulma) 169–70, 174–80, 182–85 barzakh (barrier) 169, 169n10, 174–75, 174–75n24, 175n26, 179, 182–85, 183n34, 187, 192–93, 197 hayʾa ẓulmāniyya (state pertaining to darkness) 106n62, 169, 174–75, 179, 179n, 182–85, 197 jawhar ghāsiq (dusky substance) 169, 173–74, 179–85, 183n34, 189–90, 197 light (nūr) 97, 162–73, 168n8, 171n14, 182–83, 186–88, 197, 200 nūr ʿāriḍ (adventitious light) 97, 164–65, 167, 169, 171–73, 172–73n19, 179, 181–84, 186–88, 197 nūr mujarrad (immaterial light) 8–9n21, 44, 60, 63, 77, 90, 97, 143n31, 161, 164–67, 169, 171–72, 172–73n19, 180–81, 184n, 186–98. See also light world (world of light); ẓāhir (manifest)

Index Light Metaphysics 1–2, 8–9n21, 44, 58n, 60, 76–78, 96–97, 143n31, 159–62, 160n1, 164, 166–68, 179, 196–97, 199–201 light world (world of light) 2, 8–9n21, 60–61, 77–80, 172–73n19 conquering immaterial lights (al-anwār al-mujarrada al-qāhira; separate intellects) 71, 77, 143n31 lords/masters of idols/species (arbāb/aṣḥāb al-aṣnām/al-anwāʿ; Suhrawardī’s Platonic Forms) 8, 8–9n21, 58n, 77, 143n31 idol (ṣanam) 1–2, 8–9, 8–9n21, 143n31 primordial conquering lights (al-anwār al-qāhira al-aʿlūn) 8–9n21, 77 Light of lights (nūr al-anwār) 8–9n21, 63, 181 Louchakova-Schwartz, Olga 12n27 Māridīnī, Fakhr al-Dīn al- 3n3 al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd (existent inasmuch as it is existent)  93–94n40, 163–64 Miller, Barry 92n36 Mousavian, Seyed N. 74n84 mukhtaṣar (handbook) 6, 17–18, 18n8, 20–22 Mullā Ṣadrā 12n29, 14n32, 31, 82, 89–92, 95n43, 96–97, 105n, 156, 166, 197 mutakallimūn (Islamic theologians)  85, 85n13 mystical treatises/allegories, Suhrawardī’s 6–7, 11, 11n25, 15, 17–18 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein 4, 36 necessary (wājib)–contingent (mumkin) distinction 88, 95, 103, 129, 181 Nominalism (Nominalist metaphysics) 14n33, 101n, 122, 152–53, 152n, 158–59, 176–79, 200–1 Peripatetics (mashshāʾūn), and their views 8–9, 24–31, 50–51, 59–60, 73, 75–76, 80, 81–82, 83–88, 100n49, 106–7, 113–14, 115n, 118–19, 141–43, 145–46, 150–51, 156–58, 170, 176–78, 183n34 followers of the Peripatetics (atbāʿ almashshāʾīn) 87–88, 87n19, 117

215 Peripatetic-style works, Suhrawardī’s 6, 8–9, 11, 13, 14n32, 15–24, 31–34, 80, 158, 162, 167, 199–201 Persia, ancient (Persians; Persian tradition) 3–4, 7, 27n, 59, 171, 171n14, 174–75n24 Plato 1, 7, 25, 27–28, 30, 77 cave allegory 1–2, 8, 8n20, 8–9n21 Republic 1–2, 8n20, 30, 171 Porphyry 43n31 predication, three kinds of bi-l-ishtirāk (equivocal) 85, 85n15, 92 bi-l-tashkīk (systematically ambiguous) See bi-l-tashkīk under Existentialism bi-l-tawāṭuʾ (univocal) 85n15, 91, 98–103, 105, 127, 156, 194 presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) 9, 25–29, 31–32, 35–37, 35n1, 40–41, 43, 44–52, 55, 58–59, 61–64, 67–79, 100n51, 105, 106n64, 143, 147, 154, 158, 161–62, 199, 201 non-absence (ʿadam ghayba) 52–53, 62–63, 191–92n42 presence (ḥuḍūr) 26–27, 35n1, 52–59, 62–64, 68–74, 76–79 salṭana (dominion, of human) 63–64, 71–72 tasalluṭ (total dominion, of God) 62–64, 71, 76, 78 quiddity (māhiyya), pure/indifferent/ neutral 86n17, 87–88, 87n22, 100, 111, 111n68, 115–16, 117n88, 125, 146–47, 157. See also common nature quiddity–existence distinction (essence– existence distinction) 82–89, 94–96, 100–2, 100n51, 108–21, 115n, 155–57, 163–64, 166–68, 197, 199 Mental Distinction 84, 84n12, 85–89, 111–13, 113n72, 115n, 144n32, 155, 158 No Distinction 84, 85, 85n13, 155, 158 Strong Real Distinction 83–89, 84n11, 113–14, 115n, 116, 118–19, 155 Weak Real Distinction 84–87 qusṭās (test) 82, 97–104, 107, 116–17, 117n86, 150, 156 Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī 17n5, 18, 59, 175, 179n, 192n44

216 Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn al- 3n3, 38–39, 51n43, 193n rich (ghanī)–impoverished (faqīr) distinction 180–86, 188 Rizvi, Sajjad H. 24n22 Rorty, Richard 10 Russell, Bertrand 73, 73n81 Sāwī, ʿUmar b. Sahlān al- 84n11, 106, 106n60, n61, 111–13, 113n72, 156–57 self (dhāt) 40–48, 52–54, 62–63, 71, 95–96, 165, 188–96, 190n, 198 self-apprehender (al-mudrik lil-dhāt) 60, 77, 97, 161, 164–67, 188–98, 188n39, 190n, 200. See also nūr mujarrad (immaterial light) under light–darkness division self-apprehension (al-idrāk lil-dhāt), Suhrawardī’s 26, 44–48, 46n34, 53, 59–60, 71, 95–96, 165, 188–98 self-awareness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-dhāt), Avicenna’s 26, 36–37, 40–44, 41–42n25, 78, 165, 188, 192 self-intellection 43, 60, 66 Shahrazūrī, Shams al-Dīn al- 2–3n, 3n3, 17n5, 18, 59, 85n13, 109, 170n12, 174–75, 179n sharika (participation) 26, 39–40, 45–46, 45n, 46n34, 48, 99n48, 148–52 Shīʿism 30, 30n31 Sider, Theodore 177n28 singleton species 66–67 Sinai, Nicolai 16n3, 160n1, 171, 171n14 Skinner, Quentin 10, 10n22 subject matter (mawḍūʿ) of metaphysics 93–94, 93–94n40, 163–68, 197, 200 substance–accident/state (hayʾa) distinction 20, 88, 100, 100n51, 106–7, 106n63, 143, 156–57, 166–67, 169–70, 176–79, 183–85, 187–88, 197. See also categories (maqūlāt) for itself (li-dhātihi/nafsihi)–for another (li-ghayrihi) distinction 187–88

Index substantiality (jawhariyya) 105, 145–46, 180, 187–88, 193–94, 194n47 Sufis 27–31 Basṭāmī, Abū Yazīd al- 27, 27n Tustarī, Muḥammad Sahl b. ʿAbdallāh al- 27, 27n Sufism 27, 31, 36–37, 76–79, 199 taʾalluh (deification) 9, 24–31, 33, 76–79, 161–62, 167, 196, 199–201 dhawq (tasting, spiritual) 4n11, 7, 25, 27, 37, 59, 76, 199 kashf (mukāshafa; unveiling) 4, 4n11, 6, 25, 27, 37, 59, 76, 199 mushāhada (witnessing, mystical) 4, 25, 27–28, 30, 37, 76–77, 199 spiritual observations (al-arṣād alrūḥāniyya) 27, 31, 37, 76–78, 161, 167, 199 taṣawwur wa-taṣdīq (conception and assent) 73–76, 73n82, 105, 141–43 Treiger, Alexander 102 wājib al-wujūd (that whose existence is necessary) 62–63, 62n62, 69, 93–95, 107, 127–29, 181 Walbridge, John 5, 11, 11n25, 15, 21, 74n84, 90, 152n, 160n1, 167n, 171n14, 172–73n19, 179n Wisnovsky, Robert 85n13, 87n19, 88–90 al-wujūd al-baḥt/maḥḍ/ṣirf (pure/sheer existence) 62–63, 90, 94–96, 94n41 al-wujūd al-muṭlaq (unrestricted existence) 93–94, 93–94n40 al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ (univocal existence) 82, 91–92, 92n36, 95, 100–1, 105–21, 115n, 156–57, 166, 197 ẓāhir (manifest) 60, 97, 162–67, 169–72, 182, 182n, 189–91, 190n, 191–92n42, 194–98 Ziai, Hossein 5, 16n4, 20, 74n84 ẓuhūr (manifestation) 59–60, 165, 188–90, 190n, 191–92n42, 195–96, 196n