Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics: Contemporary Perspectives from Italy [1 ed.] 1529226759, 9781529226751

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DISASTER S AND CHANGES IN SOCIET Y AND POLITICS

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CO NTEM P O R ARY P ER S P ECTIVES FRO M ITALY

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EDITED BY GIUSEP P E FORINO B R I S TO L

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DISASTERS AND CHANGES IN SOCIETY AND POLITICS Contemporary Perspectives from Italy Edited by Giuseppe Forino

First published in Great Britain in 2024 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2024 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​2675-​1 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​2676-​8 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​2677-​5 ePdf The right of Giuseppe Forino to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Hayes Design and Advertising Front cover image: Unsplash/​@francescolabita Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Tables Notes on Contributors

v vii

Introduction –​An Overview of the Book: Beyond Conventional Approaches to Disaster Recovery Giuseppe Forino PART I Making Sense of Post-​disaster Changes in Society and Space 1 Risk Perception, Climate Change and Disasters of the Alpine Environments: The Mont de La Saxe Landslide Elisabetta Dall’Ò 2 The Isolation of the Island: The Social Impasse in Ischia after the Earthquake and Tourism Crises (2017–​22) Giovanni Gugg 3 The Permanent Red Zone: An Ethnography of Spatial Practices in the Areas of the Italian Central Apennines Affected by Earthquakes (2016–​17) Enrico Mariani 4 Adaptive Disaster Memories: Voices from the Post-​earthquake Irpinia (23 November 1980) Gabriele Ivo Moscaritolo PART II Post-​disaster Politics 5 The COVID-​19 Pandemic and the Ladder of Power: Local Politics and Society in Italy Pietro Saitta 6 Afar from Vesuvius but Still at Risk: The Unstoppable Urbanization of the Naples Volcano’s Yellow Zone Giovanni Gugg

iii

1

11

26

48

66

87

102

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

7

Local Communities as Strangers In-​Between: The Paradigm of Aleatory Politics in Post-​earthquake Central Italy (2016–​17) Francesco Danesi della Sala

PART III Disasters and Conflicting Knowledges 8 Under the Smart City Paradigm: The Social and Spatial Transformation of L’Aquila City Centre Isabella Tomassi 9 Expertise Versus Aspiration: Ethnography of Post-​disaster Reconstruction in Emilia Silvia Pitzalis 10 Local and Professional Knowledge in Post-​disaster Reconstruction: Overlaps and Differences in Maierato Francesco De Pascale and Loredana Antronico PART IV Organizations Adapting to Post-​disaster Changes 11 Adapting to the COVID-​19 Pandemic: The Distance Learning Experience of the University of Milan-​Bicocca Sara Zizzari and Brunella Fiore 12 The National and Local Dimension of the Italian Civil Protection System: Evolution and Implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction Policies Monia Del Pinto, Ksenia Chmutina, Lee Bosher and Garyfalia (Falli) Palaiologou 13 When the Unexpected Becomes Frequent Mattia Bertin 14

Conclusions: The ‘Italian Case’ from a Global Disaster Perspective Giuseppe Forino

Index

118

135

155

171

191

204

222

235

241

iv

List of Figures and Tables Figures 1.1 2.1

2.2

2.3 2.4 2.5

3.1 3.2 3.3 6.1 6.2 10.1 13.1

The Mont de La Saxe landslide and the wall, Courmayeur Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: a ‘barrack house’ (casa baraccata) built with the anti-​seismic rules introduced after the earthquake of 1883 Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: the dense structures of metal pipes or wooden poles placed to support buildings made unsafe by the earthquake Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: a shack built by the inhabitants and used as a permanent self-organized space Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: a collapsed building and another propped up with metal support tubes Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: the deep crack in a small villa rendered uninhabitable by the earthquake, on whose entrance gate the owners have displayed an Italian flag with a double possible interpretation, in a polemical sense towards national institutions or out of a sense of belonging and community Map of the affected areas in Central Apennines Elio shows how he rearranged the terracing wall in the SAE area Visso’s spatial transformations map The Vesuvius red zone and yellow zone, 2015 Different levels of ash load expected, 2015 Location of the study area Impact of Vaia Storm as visualized by artificial intelligence tools

12 29

30

30 31 32

50 54 59 106 108 172 229

Tables 8.1 8.2

Ongoing projects and types of projects in the document ‘The new L’Aquila Smart City guidelines’ Distribution of SC projects in L’Aquila v

147 148

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10.1 12.1

13.1

Questionnaires submitted to population and professionals Summary of major disasters on the Italian territory and list of national regulatory milestones on emergency management (1870–​2020) Minor events with losses in the Vaia impact area and comparison with Vaia

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177 206

228

Notes on Contributors Loredana Antronico is Researcher at the Research Institute for Geo-​Hydrological Protection of the Italian National Research Council (CNR). She is the author of several papers on the following issues: soil erosion, debris flow and flood hazard on alluvial fans, landslide incidence, landslide susceptibility and hazard assessment, landslide monitoring and, recently, perception of climate change and related impacts. Loredana Antronico is coordinator of several regional and national research projects on these issues. Mattia Bertin is Assistant Professor at the Planning and Climate Change Lab of Iuav University of Venice, Italy. Mattia holds a PhD in Territorial Planning and Design from the Polytechnic of Milan. His main research interests lie at the intersection of urban planning and complex issues of climate change, disaster and marginality. He has over ten years of experience in research projects on post-​disaster participatory urban regeneration in marginalized areas and multi-​sector adaptation planning, in Italy and abroad. He is also advisor for local authorities on emergency planning and teaches at Iuav University of Venice, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid and Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Mattia also collaborates with FEEM Foundation Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy. He is the author of books and articles on emergency planning and climate change in urban areas. Lee Bosher is Professor of Risk in the University of Leicester’s School of Business. He is an experienced researcher that has developed a portfolio of projects related to Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and the interdisciplinary integration of proactive risk management strategies into the decision-​making processes of key stakeholders. Lee is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and has been involved in research projects that investigated DRM in the UK, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and across Europe. Lee’s books include Disaster Risk Reduction for the Built Environment (2017, with Ksenia Chmutina), Hazards and the Built Environment (2008) and Social and Institutional Elements of Disaster Vulnerability in India (2007).

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Ksenia Chmutina is Professor of Disaster Studies at Loughborough University, UK. Her research focuses on the processes of urban disaster risk creation and systemic implications of sustainability and resilience in the context of neoliberalism. A core part of her activities is science communication: she is a co-​host of the Disasters: Deconstructed podcast. Elisabetta Dall’Ò is Research and Teaching Fellow at the University of Turin, Italy. Elisabetta is an Italian anthropologist and holds a PhD in social and cultural anthropology at the University of Milano-​Bicocca (2014–​ 2018). Elisabetta has significant experience in cross-​cultural approaches and ethnographic fieldwork in hazard-​prone environments. She currently conducts anthropological research on climate change impacts on Italian alpine areas and societies and teaches anthropology of climate change and medical anthropology. She has published several articles and essays on national and international scientific journals, books and editorships. Francesco Danesi della Sala is a PhD candidate in Cultural and Social Anthropology at the University of Milano-​Bicocca, Italy. Between 2017 and 2020, he conducted ethnographic research in the post-​disaster territories of Central Italy, investigating the social and spatial experience of the communities facing the emergency as well as the politics of the reconstruction. He is currently working on his PhD project about climate change and ecological shifts in the Po River Delta, Italy, with an ethnographic focus on the Goro lagoon. Francesco De Pascale is Adjunct Professor of Geography at the Department of Foreign Languages, Literatures and Modern Cultures of the University of Turin, Italy. He holds a PhD in Geography and Earth Sciences from the University of Calabria (2015). His main research interests are geography of risk, geoethics and Anthropocene, humanistic geography, geography of perception, disaster studies and the relationship between physical and human geography. He is the Editor-​In-​Chief of the book series ‘Geographies of the Anthropocene’ (Il Sileno Edizioni), Associate Editor of AIMS Geosciences (Geography and Risk section) and Editor of MDPI Geosciences Topical Collection ‘Ethics in Geosciences’. He is the author of 80 scientific publications in national and international journals. Monia Del Pinto is Doctoral Prize Fellow in the School of Architecture, Building and Civil Engineering at Loughborough University, UK. Her research lies at the intersection of architecture and planning, critical heritage studies and disaster studies, and aims at advancing methodologies and tools for effective disaster risk reduction at the urban scale. Monia holds a PhD in Urban Planning and Disaster Risk Reduction from Loughborough University, and an MSc in Architectural Engineering from University viii

Notes on Contributors

of L’Aquila, Italy. She has professional experience in post-​earthquake reconstruction, teaching experience in architecture, and is active in Disaster Risk Management for Cultural Heritage. Brunella Fiore is Assistant Professor at University of Milano-​Bicocca where she teaches Sociology of Education and Sociology of Family. Her main interests concern: school evaluation, policy evaluation, younger/​ older generations, primary and secondary education, and families. She is the author of several essays and articles on educational and statistical topics. Her most recent books are Improving Excellence in Schools, edited with T. Pedrizzi (Mondadori, 2016), Evaluate Education: From School to University, with A. Decataldo (Carocci, 2018) and The Relationship Between Families and School: Organisational Models and Social Politics (Carocci, 2021). Giuseppe Forino is Lecturer in Planning at University of Salford, Manchester, UK. Giuseppe is an interdisciplinary human geographer working on disaster risk, climate change adaptation, policies and governance. He has conducted fieldwork in Europe, Australia, South East Asia and Ecuador. He has published over 50 academic papers and book chapters on these topics; in addition, he regularly publishes opinion pieces for larger audiences. Giuseppe is Associate Editor of International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. This is his third edited book, after Multiple Geographical Perspectives on Hazards and Disasters (with L.M. Calandra and A. Porru) (Valmar, 2014) and Governance of Risk, Hazards and Disasters: Trends in Theory and Practice (with S. Bonati and L.M. Calandra) (Routledge, 2018). Giovanni Gugg is Research Fellow at LESC (Laboratoire d’Ethnologie et de Sociologie Comparative, University Paris-​N anterre), CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique) and LAPCOS (Laboratoire d’Anthropologie et de Psychologie Cognitives et Sociales, University Côte d’Azur, Nice), and Teaching Fellow of Urban Anthropology, Department of Engineering, University ‘Federico II’, Naples, Italy. Giovanni holds a PhD in Cultural Anthropology and his studies concern the relationship between human communities and their environment in terms of risk. His main areas of interest are the volcanic area of Vesuvius, the Italian seismic areas of Central Apennines and Ischia, and the city of Nice after terrorist attacks in 2016. Among his most recent publications are Crisi e riti della contemporaneità (2023), Ordinary Life in the Shadow of Vesuvius: Surviving the Announced Catastrophe (2022) and Guarire un vulcano, guarire gli umani: Elaborazioni del rischio ecologico e sanitario alle pendici del Vesuvio (2021). Enrico Mariani is Research Fellow at the Department of Communication Sciences, Humanities and International Studies (DISCUI) at the University ix

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

of Urbino, Italy. His doctoral project, held at the same Department, concerns the relationship between housing issues, spatial practices and imaginaries in the post-​disaster Central Italian Apennines (2016–​17). He graduated with a MA in Semiotics from the University of Bologna, and his main research interests are in ethnographic methodologies, social practices and processes of signification. He is a member of Emidio di Treviri, a research group on the post-​earthquake of the Central Italian Apennines, and an adjunct lecturer of Sociological Disaster Research at the University of Verona. Gabriele Ivo Moscaritolo is an independent researcher with a PhD in Statistics and Social Science from the University of Naples Federico II, Italy. His research interests are related to socio-​historical perspectives of the 1980 earthquake in Southern Italy, with a main focus on memories of affected populations. He has been a member of the executive board of the AISO (Italian Oral History Association) and of Emidio di Treviri, a research team on the Central Italy earthquake (2016–​17). He has published papers on these issues in national and international journals. He is author of Memorie dal cratere. Storia sociale del terremoto in Irpinia (EditPress, 2020). Garyfalia (Falli) Palaiologou is Senior Lecturer in Urban Design at Loughborough University, UK. Earlier she was Research Fellow at the UCL Bartlett School of Architecture at the Space Syntax Laboratory, funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). Her research looks at the role of urban form in sustainable urban transformations, focusing on urban streets and sidewalks, street liveability, placemaking and urban regeneration, temporary cities, the architecture of the ordinary, historical urban landscapes and sustainable urban heritage. Her PhD research investigated the 20th-​century urban transformation of London terraced houses and Manhattan row houses. Her postdoctoral research looked at the use of space syntax methods to rethink zoning and delimitation practices for UNESCO historic urban landscapes. Silvia Pitzalis is Research Fellow at the Department of Economics, Society, Politic (DESP) at the University of Urbino, Adjunct Professor in Anthropology and Ethnography of Migration Processes and Cultural Contexts at the University of Bologna and in Political Anthropology at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy. She holds a PhD in Social and Cultural Anthropology, and since 2007 she has been conducting ethnographic research focusing on analysing emergencies and crises, working in national and international contexts affected by disasters (Sri Lanka and Italy) and involved in migration phenomena (Italy, Niger and Senegal). She is also the author of two books, several book chapters, and has written for x

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Notes on Contributors

academic national and international journals, as well as writing divulgation articles. She is the author of Politiche del disastro. Poteri e contropoteri nel terremoto emiliano (Ombre Corte, 2016). Pietro Saitta is Associate Professor in Sociology at the Department of Cognitive Sciences, Psychology, Education and Cultural Studies of the University of Messina, Italy. He has worked in several national and international teaching and research institutions in Europe and the USA (among these, WHO and Columbia University). He is the author of several books and essays, and his interests include urban studies, environment and disasters. Among his latest works on these topics, The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters (co-​authored with Domenica Farinella, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Isabella Tomassi is a PhD student and teaching assistant in Geography, Urbanism and Planning at the University of Lyon 2, France. Her doctoral research focuses on the post-​disaster reconstruction process following the L’Aquila earthquake (2009). In particular, her focus is on the epistemological aspects of post-​disaster planning at the intersection of human geography, anarchism, critique of science and critical disaster studies. She has published several academic and non-​academic works on these topics. Isabella is a member of the network of anarchist geographers RGL (Reseau des Géographes Libertaires), the Réseau des Territorialistes français and i-​Rec, an informal network of disaster scholars. Sara Zizzari is a cultural anthropologist and territorial sociologist with a PhD in Social Science and Statistics obtained at University of Naples Federico II, Italy. Her main research interests the impact of disasters, housing issues in post-​disaster areas, with a focus on socio-​anthropological community dynamics and risk communication. She has conducted interdisciplinary research on post-​earthquake areas in Italy and has also conducted research on the impact COVID-​19 has had on education in some Italian contexts. She is a member of the School of Sociology of the Territory. She has been a member of the Food and Culture area of the Best4food Center at the University of Milan Bicocca. Her publications include L’Aquila Beyond the Seals: The Earthquake Between Reconstruction and Memory (Franco Angeli, 2019).

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Introduction –​An Overview of the Book: Beyond Conventional Approaches to Disaster Recovery Giuseppe Forino

Disaster recovery is always a challenging time for affected places. Places, people, environments, and economies try to function and perform again, moving forward across rubbles, dust, pain and death. Disaster recovery is therefore the process by which a system which has experienced a structural failure re-​establishes a routine, organized, institutionalized mode of adaptation to its post-​impact environment (Bates and Peacock, 1989). This emphasizes the reorganization of social life and the creation of a new, stable relationship between social and environmental features (Bates and Peacock, 1989). Therefore, disaster recovery is a complex process where different actors play a game, interact, conflict and discuss what, how, why to rebuild and recover. Several common misconceptions, however, exist around the efforts for recovering places. One is that it is often stated that recovery efforts should be oriented towards bringing back the affected places and their social, political, institutional, and organizational features at their ‘normal’ state, to regain an undefined normalcy (Rivera, 2020). But, we can argue, if that state of normalcy prior to the disaster was unable to avoid the occurrence of a disaster, this state of normalcy needs to be changed. Also, who and what define ‘normalcy’? Neoliberal societies such as the contemporary, globalized and hyperconnected ones consist of a complex set of actions, procedures and flows interacting across scales, spaces and places. These can be highly dynamic and quickly change also into so-​called remote places. Normalcy, therefore, hardly exists. Places change so do humans, so do environments. In addition, recovery efforts are often trivialized through slogans such as Build Back Better (BBB), for which disasters should become an opportunity for rebuilding affected places in a way that addresses previous 1

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

mistakes or weaknesses and makes these places better than before (Cheek and Chmutina, 2022). However, in these inequal and unjust neoliberal societies, whom is this ‘better’ for? For those people or institutions who can exert their powers more than others in channelling funds and making choices? Or for those who need more, who suffered more after the disaster and have fewer opportunities? Affected places are complex, and inequalities and power relationships exist and shape them. Communities and institutions are diverse, conflicts arise at (and across) all scales. BBB, therefore, often does not mean doing things good for all, but just for some. The history of disaster recovery worldwide has already highlighted that post-​disaster reconstruction interventions may easily reproduce marginalization of the most vulnerable, as well as exploit people and resources, leaving the affected places in a state probably worse than before the disaster (Lizarralde et al, 2009). Another misconception is that recovery should be led by the so-​called experts (academics, professionals and policy m ​ akers) that know how to rebuild, what to rebuild, how to recreate the built environment, and which are the social needs and urgencies. Accordingly, the knowledge provided by these experts is the only one that can provide guidance and direction (often technocentric and non-​negotiable) for recovery (Barrios, 2016). Local communities and institutions, on the other side, are believed to not possess the necessary skills or to be too emotional to provide a valid contribution to disaster recovery. While experts hold invaluable knowledge that is key for disaster recovery, the same is true for the knowledge of local communities and institutions that usually have first-​hand experience of the places and of their social, physical, cultural and political features. The affected communities, the local institutions, those who experienced the disaster, know the place where they live and operate, and have crucial knowledge that recognizes local needs, addresses targeted interventions and incorporate communities into recovery (Walshe and Nunn, 2012). There are therefore different knowledges that should be explored in their potentials and contradictions. However, often conflicts arise across knowledges, and those in power tend to emerge and overcome neglected and marginalized voices. These misconceptions neglect the long duration of the disaster (Centemeri et al, 2022). They trivialize disasters as just a breakpoint in a social system, without considering the long-​term consequences that a disaster brings to the places, and to the way individuals and communities perceive their places and perform their political, social and cultural action (Farinella and Saitta, 2019). These misconceptions, therefore, make it more difficult to contemplate and accept the fact that disaster recovery, beyond restoring and repairing things, also changes the trajectories of communities, environments, politics and their complex interactions (Centemeri et al, 2022). 2

Introduction

This edited book will challenge these common misconceptions and calls for a necessary appreciation of the way disaster recovery changes the affected places. The book demonstrates that after a disaster, beyond human and economic costs, tangible and intangible changes happen in society, politics and organizations, and in their capacities to embrace and adapt to these changes. These changes might last in the short and long term or might just appear years after the disaster. There are changes in the ways social structures and their intertwined relationships with the environment are organized and mediated; in political narratives and discourses, and their interactions with society; in the way different knowledges interact and clash; in micro and macro practices across organizations. At different degrees and levels, all these changes touch upon the everyday life of people and organizations. The edited book recognizes that exploring and understanding these changes and the complexity of affected places after a disaster is the first step to critically interrogate disasters and their consequences, to engage with the local context, and to avoid simplified and exclusive analysis and solutions. In this way, recovery is an adaptive process that negotiates the tensions between re-​establishment of pre-​ disaster systems and significant alteration of those systems (Tierney and Oliver-​Smith, 2012). The edited book does this by exploring the case of Italy. Indeed, there is no European society whose history and evolution has been more deeply marked by disasters than Italy (Dickie et al, 2002). Italy is a country with complex and fragmented relationships between its citizens and across political levels, and with increasing spatial, social and economic inequalities. Italy is also a country with active volcanoes, seismic zones from North to South, vulnerable coastlines, river basins that flood frequently and lands vulnerable to degradation, snowfall and fires. Recent earthquakes and recurrent floods have highlighted –​once again –​its territorial fragility. Since the Second World War, illusions of economic development, unbalanced demographic trends, increasing urban dispersion and unsustainable exploitation of environmental resources have dramatically increased the exposure and vulnerabilities of some areas and communities, and worsened the conditions of natural and built environments. In parallel, neoliberal policies and politics (notwithstanding the frequent changes into national and local governments) brought economic austerity, increasing privatization and liberalization of public assets and services, and decreasing public service provisions (Cozzolino, 2019). I agree that there is no need to provide any further exceptionalism to Italy as a country (Dickie et al, 2002); however, it cannot be denied that the combination of its internal diversity and the aggressiveness of neoliberal politics and policies in these last decades makes Italy a privileged place for disaster studies. Its disasters have long been widely and successfully studied 3

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

(Almagià, 1907). There is an active, international and interdisciplinary disaster research agenda on disasters in Italy covering short-​and-​long term changes after disasters (for example, Dickie et al, 2002; Calandra, 2012; Palidda, 2018). However, there are no recent books able to grasp the diversity and complexity of the country and its disaster-​related changes from a comparative perspective, as well as to contextualize them with the most recent global research trends. The edited book therefore represents a novelty in research and collects original pieces of evidence on this issue. The book positions itself at the forefront of studies on Italian disasters (and Italy) and represents a promising contribution to the international debate on the field. It can stimulate scholars, students, policy makers and practitioners to look at disasters from a different perspective and to take into account disaster-​related changes in future research, planning, and practice. The edited book is organized into four parts. The first part describes how local communities make sense of the post-​disaster changes occurring in their material and immaterial social practices, and their relationships with built and natural environments. In Chapter 1, Dall’Ò analyses two small village in the Courmayeur area (in the Val d’Aosta region) threatened by an ancient landslide on the Mont de La Saxe slopes. The chapter focuses on how local communities uses their perceptions (memory, history and culture) about the landslide and put them into practice to be prepared for and mitigate its potentially devastating effects. In Chapter 2, Gugg reflects on how a place affected by a disaster can simultaneously change and remain the same. Gugg explores this simultaneity in the island of Ischia, located off the coasts of Naples and affected by an earthquake in 2017. In this tourist island, the earthquake raised questions about urban growth and its complex interactions with tourism and local economy, as well as with urban planning and disaster preparedness. Gugg questions the state of the reconstruction and argues that its current standstill is changing the relationship between inhabitant and their places, leading to increasing inequalities and fragilities. In Chapter 3, Mariani focuses on another area affected by an earthquake, the Central Apennines mountains, hit by seismic swarms in 2016 and 2017. Based on fieldwork about temporary housing and emergency policies, Mariani describes how local communities experience both the temporary housing provided by the Italian government and the temporary retail and commercial structures. Mariani highlights a ‘permanent emergency’ that makes local communities feel uncertain about the future over six years after the earthquake, weakening their agency and possibility for thinking about future. In the final chapter of this part (Chapter 4), Moscaritolo illustrates his oral history project about the concept of adaptive disaster memories, taking the earthquake in Irpinia (1980) as a case study. After over four decades, the 4

Introduction

traces of the destruction and reconstruction are still alive in the personal experiences and interpretations of the affected communities. Through the analysis of words from the communities of two villages, Moscaritolo shows how the inhabitants both perceive the changes that occurred and transmitted their experiences within the community and across generations. The changes of personal and community life, of the built environment and the economy, as well as the trauma and a strong-​shared social experience are embodied in the local social fabric. Through these, local communities assign a new meaning to their history, adapting their memory through the years. The second part describes how disasters can lead to changes in politics at various levels, for example, how politics can use disasters to promote specific political narratives to gain or distribute powers or how a disaster changes the interactions occurring between politics and citizens. In Chapter 5, Saitta describes how Cateno De Luca, the Mayor of Messina, a city in Sicily, used the COVID-​19 pandemic rhetoric as a performative stage, to both climb the ladder of political power and blow political competitors. In particular, the chapter portrays how pandemic management has been used to spread forms of political reliance that turn into charismatic forms of political worship and consolidate an urban type of populist authoritarianism. In Chapter 6, Gugg discusses the issues related to disaster preparedness in areas that are far from the Vesuvius volcano but still close enough to it to have severe impacts of an eruption. By analysing the ad-​hoc volcanic emergency plan, Gugg reveals that these areas are still at risk but are excluded from this plan. These areas have to rely just on their outdated and limited municipal emergency plans, which are inspired exclusively by a logic of emergency and lack coordination with regional or national institutions. In Chapter 7, Danesi della Sala again brings attention to the Italian Apennines affected by the earthquakes in 2016 and 2017. Danesi della Sala introduces the concept of aleatory politics as a way to investigate local communities in post-​earthquake affected areas. Based on his ethnographic research, the author investigates the experience of local communities that are trapped between the irretrievability of the past and the uncertainty of the future. The chapter shows how aleatory politics at different scales ends up defining a management paradigm that reinforces this ‘in-​between’ condition of the local communities. The third part covers the complex and often conflicting relationships between different types of knowledges of local communities and so-​called experts, with different visions on how governing a disaster-​affected places. In Chapter 8, Tomassi investigates the rhetoric of a smart city paradigm applied in the reconstruction of L’Aquila, a city in the Abruzzo region severely hit by an earthquake in 2009. Tomassi illustrates the social and spatial transformation led by urban planning choices made by local authorities under the techno-​ centric and depoliticized smart city paradigm. 5

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

In Chapter 9, Pitzalis interrogates the values of different knowledges in the case of post-​disaster reconstruction in the Emilia-​Romagna region, hit by an earthquake in 2012. Pitzalis investigates the different perspectives on the reconstruction conceived and implemented by national and local institutions, as well as the overlaps and clashes across different knowledges of local communities and professionals involved in damage assessment. Pitzalis shows how the technicality and bureaucratization of reconstruction practices excluded affected people from decision-​making, and perpetrated a technocratic approach that imposed a social and spatial order through professionals who claim technical knowledge superior to the one of the communities. In the same vein, in Chapter 10 De Pascale and Antronico discuss overlaps and differences across local and expert knowledge in the reconstruction of Maierato (Calabria), a village affected by a landslide in 2010. Their chapter analyses how the affected communities and professionals explore and assess different experiences of the reconstruction. Finally, the fourth part illustrates whether and how different organizations adapt their structures and procedures to changes led by disasters. In Chapter 11, Zizzari and Fiore explore how the University of Milan-​Bicocca adapted its classroom teaching to the pandemic times, and reflect on related challenges and opportunities by discussing the outcomes of survey research administered to university staff. In Chapter 12, Del Pinto, Chmutina, Bosher and Palaiologou discuss the evolution of the national and local dimension of the Italian Civil Protection system, and the contribution of implemented Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policies in Central Italy. The chapter reviews national policies and highlights their evolution and the mechanisms behind the delayed and insufficient local implementation reverberating around DRR policies at the local scale. In the last chapter of this part and of the book (Chapter 13), Bertin reflects on the concept of continuity in disasters and on how so-​called small or ‘minor’ hazards in places recurrently prone to hazards represent a challenge for disaster recovery. While the impact of large disasters usually has a national echo, more frequent ‘minor’ events are potentially even more dangerous for local economies, although they are far from being newsworthy. Bertin describes the progress of landslide and windstorm effects in the Northeastern Italian mountains before, during and after a ‘minor’ storm, demonstrating that this might cause ancillary damages inhibiting recovery. These chapters, and the related variety of approaches and cases studies, demonstrate that disaster recovery’s complexity requires a deep investigation able to grasp the changes in micro and macropractices of society, politics and organizations. In this way, the edited book provides emerging themes and 6

Introduction

new perspectives and case studies on disasters in Italy, with the possibility of comparing them with other experiences worldwide. This makes the book relevant for research, teaching, policy and practice. In terms of research, the book moves the academic agenda on disaster studies forward and highlights a series of emerging themes about post-​disaster changes that are illustrated in a variegated set of diverse case studies. In terms of teaching, the book can be useful for students aiming at exploring and understanding the complexity of disaster impacts and related recovery on society, politics and organizations in the short, medium and long term based on a range of Italian case studies. This will also allow students to have a portrait of the complexity of Italian society and politics. In terms of policy and practice, the edited book can support policy m ​ akers and practitioners to reflect on the need to incorporate local voices into disaster policy m ​ aking and operational procedures and to make the latter flexible and adaptable to suddenly changing situations, with the ultimate goal of implementing integrated disaster risk reduction solutions at multiple scales and levels. References Almagià, R. (1907) Studi geografici sulle frane in Italia, Rome: Società geografica italiana. Barrios, R.E. (2016) ‘Expert knowledge and the ethnography of disaster reconstruction’, in G.V. Button and M. Schuller (eds) Contextualizing Disaster, New York: Berghahn, pp 134–​52. Bates, F.L. and Peacock, W.G. (1989) ‘Long-​term [disaster] recovery’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 7(3): 349–​65. Calandra, L.M. (ed) (2012) ‘Territorio e democrazia’, Un laboratorio di geografia sociale nel dopo sisma aquilano, L’Aquila: L’UNA Edizioni. Centemeri, L., Topçu, S. and Burgess, J.P. (eds) (2022) Rethinking Post-​ Disaster Recovery: Socio-​Anthropological Perspectives on Repairing Environments, Abingdon; New York: Routledge. Cheek, W. and Chmutina, K. (2022) ‘“Building back better” is neoliberal post-​disaster reconstruction’, Disasters, 46(3): 589–​609. Cozzolino, A. (2019) ‘Reconfiguring the state: Executive powers, emergency legislation, and neoliberalization in Italy’, Globalizations, 16(3): 336–​52. Dickie, J., Foot, J. and Snowden, F.M. (eds) (2002) Disastro! Disasters in Italy since 1860: Culture, Politics, Society, New York: Macmillan. Farinella, D. and Saitta, P. (2019) The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters: The Management of Urban Space Through an Earthquake – M ​ essina, 1908–​2018, Cham: Springer. Lizarralde, G., Johnson, C. and Davidson, C. (eds) (2009) Rebuilding after Disasters: From Emergency to Sustainability, Abingdon; New York: Routledge. Palidda, S. (ed) (2018) Resistenze ai disastri sanitari, ambientali ed economici nel Mediterraneo, Rome: DeriveApprodi. 7

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Rivera, J.D. (2020) ‘Returning to normalcy in the short term: A preliminary examination of recovery from Hurricane Harvey among individuals with home damage’, Disasters, 44(3): 548–​68. Tierney, K. and Oliver-​Smith, A. (2012) ‘Social dimensions of disaster recovery’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies & Disasters, 30(2): 123–​46. Walshe, R.A. and Nunn, P.D. (2012) ‘Integration of indigenous knowledge and disaster risk reduction: A case study from Baie Martelli, Pentecost Island, Vanuatu’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 3(4): 185–​94.

8

PART I

Making Sense of Post-​disaster Changes in Society and Space

1

Risk Perception, Climate Change and Disasters of the Alpine Environments: The Mont de La Saxe Landslide Elisabetta Dall’Ò

Introduction The mountains and the Alps are becoming a key observation point, able to give voice to new interlocutors (Dall’Ò, 2022) and for understanding the cultural and social impacts of climate change and current short and long-​term environmental disasters: from ‘extreme events’ to the loss of ecosystems, from the gradual disappearance of glaciers to the health, social and economic consequences on the communities that have to cope with them. In this scenario, the Mont de La Saxe landslide, in addition to being a ‘natural’ phenomenon, emerges as a social and cultural issue of absolute importance for anthropology. The landslide interests a large section of the southern side of the Mont de La Saxe. Containment works –​a wall, a bypass of the Dora torrent from Val Ferret and a rockfall tunnel –​have been built to protect Entrèves (400 inhabitants) and La Palud (100 inhabitants), two small but densely populated and heavily visited villages in Courmayeur (a well-​known tourism area on the Italian side of Mont Blanc), located at an altitude of over 1,300 metres. These are two small mountain communities that over the last years I have had the opportunity to visit for research purposes in relation to risk perception and climate change. This research is part of a broader investigative framework on the Anthropocene and perception of climate change in the Mont Blanc, area to which I have dedicated myself since my PhD in 2014 and during post-​doctoral research from 2018 to 2021. 11

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From a methodological point of view, an ethnographic approach guided my field research. I spent a long time in the local communities and conducted interviews, recordings, discussions and debates with field informants and with the political and administrative authorities in charge of emergency management. I also participated in risk-​prevention activities such as evacuation simulations. I also collected and analysed academic literature and media coverage on the subject. This Alpine context offered me a clear vision of how the perception of a potential disaster or of a climate crisis is influenced by social and cultural factors rather than just by scientific ones. The Mont de La Saxe area has been in the news in recent decades due to a major landslide affecting both the eastern and western sides of the mountain. This has caused a series of barely manageable and sometimes dramatic consequences. The landslide on the eastern side is sadly known for a serious accident in 2011 that cost the life of a motorist killed by the detachment of a boulder that fell and crashed on the main road connecting the town of Courmayeur to the Mont Blanc tunnel. This road is the only alternative one to the E25 highway to reach the tunnel, and it is a important route for people, traffic, and goods between Italy and France. The first rockfall officially reported dates back to the fatal accident on 2011, but similar episodes had already occurred since the 1990s, when a number of boulders rolled down the valley, crossing the main road and ending up Figure 1.1: The Mont de La Saxe landslide and the wall, Courmayeur

Source: Author, 2022

12

Risk Perception of the Alpine Environments

in private gardens and private plots of land below the road. In an interview, a local administrator recounted how, ‘inexplicably’, the locals had never alerted the authorities to these ‘dangerous debris findings’: ‘In La Saxe we had to intervene in two different cases.1 It was an impressive job, humanly very heavy for me. … We had to clean up the slope along the main road, we had planned it, with the thawing and everything else, and we had to evacuate the inhabitants of the houses below, that was also planned … meetings, explanations, with people telling you that they have lived here for years and nothing has ever happened, and then you find out that boulders had already been found everywhere and that nobody had said anything.’ (Interview with the mayor F.D., Courmayeur, 17 July 2017) Despite the manifest ‘risk’, and despite an increasing number of detachment episodes in recent years due to growing climatic instability, the population had never felt the need to ‘alert’ the relevant bodies in order to ‘protect themselves’. One resident of the area said: ‘nothing has ever happened where I live, the rocks never reached the houses, they stopped much earlier or crumbled. They made a mess of evacuating everyone, but there was no need to do so’ (Interview with J.D., a retired resident of La Saxe, La Saxe, 15 July 2016). Although the authorities had invested a lot of resources in the preparatory phase, planning evacuations and a replacement road system for the inhabitants of the isolated hamlets, the greatest difficulties, says the mayoress, came from the community of residents: ‘It was all very complicated to manage, and you go a bit randomly, because nobody tells you what to do. You plan everything. … You get the impression that people don’t want to be rescued, they take a step backwards. … If a catastrophic event happens, people welcome you with open arms, because they are in a state of need; if you do prevention, on the other hand, you bother them, people experience it as an intrusion.’ (Interview with the mayoress F.D., Courmayeur, 17 July 2017) In early 2012, a series of collapses occurred, leading to the intermittent closure of the road to and urgently necessitating safety interventions on the main road. The economic consequences of the interruption of trade between Italy and France were crucial for the Valle d’Aosta regional government to approve a project that cut up the slope, extended the existing tunnel by 125 metres and installed additional rockfall protection nets along the slope. Concerns about the eastern slope seem to have brought the local 13

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community and regional government towards an agreement, if not regarding the perceived risk of the landslide event, at least on its management. The scenario becomes more complicated, however, when we move to the other side: the landslide phenomenon affecting the south-​western slopes of Mont de la Saxe is looming over the village of La Palud, with 8.4 million square metres of rock at risk of landslide. According to IRPI2 (Italian Research Institute for Hydrogeological Protection), this is currently one of the most critical active landslide phenomena in the Italian Alps. Since 2009, the rock surface has been monitored by a network of separate and independent systems that transmit real-​time data, and it is under observation from engineers and geologists worldwide. In April 2014, the landslide movement in La Saxe, which had already been in action for about 15 years, was suddenly reactivated. It caused thousands of cubic metres of rocks and earth to plunge down into the valley, and the ‘great emergency’ was triggered. The fear of a sudden and large collapse was so real that about 100 people were evacuated and had to stay in an emergency facility in Courmayeur for over a month. In those weeks of emergency, the national newspaper Rai News wrote: ‘Mont de La Saxe, the landslide that keeps Courmayeur in suspense. On Mont de La Saxe, in Courmayeur (Valle d’Aosta), between 265 thousand and 400 thousand cubic metres of material are ready to collapse. Since 8 April, eighty people have been evacuated. The collapses are continuous.’ The landslide was described on several occasions as a ‘sword of Damocles’ by the media, which reported the data and meticulous details of the phenomenon at a furious pace, including the number of detachments, the quantities in cubic metres and the millimetres of mass movement that ‘inexorably’ slid towards the village. In April 2014, the main Italian newspapers and magazines were all focusing on La Saxe. A few newspaper quotes are enough to evoke the state of anguish and anticipation that pervaded those moments: ‘Probable collapse imminent. Fear is back in Courmayeur. Landslide on Monte La Saxe, evacuation of eighty inhabitants in the area at risk, 265 thousand cubic metres of rock are moving at two centimetres per hour.’3 Or even, as reported by the newspaper La Stampa on 21 April 2014: ‘La Saxe landslide in Courmayeur: “Cracks up to three metres wide”. Geologist: “Since the emergency began, 20,000 cubic metres of rock have fallen”. Franco Gabrielli, head of the National Civil Protection department, is expected to arrive tomorrow.’ Fear, waiting for the apocalypse, inevitability, emergency, a sense of impotence: these were the themes that emerged from the media coverage of the event. It was a foretold catastrophe, which held ‘everyone’ in suspense as they waited for it to happen, and which called for the intervention of the authorities to protect the inhabitants. 14

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The state of emergency: the construction of the wall and the people’s disagreements As part of the state of emergency declared by the Italian Council of Ministers on 12 January 2014, the regional government, in agreement with the then head of the Civil Protection department, started working on the construction of an imposing 750-​metre-​long, 11-​metre-​high and 20-​ metre-​wide containment wall to protect the village of La Palud. The wall, entrusted to a local consortium for more than 6 million euro, was completed in a very short time (October 2014) but immediately gave rise to a series of controversies on the part of the local resident and non-​resident population. These considered the wall as invasive and even ‘suspicious’. Above all, the wall would have led to a decrease in the real estate value of their properties. Therefore, they appealed to the Regional Administrative Tribunal to block its construction. For local administrators, the construction of the wall was a matter of ‘responsibility’ –​as the commissioner Raffaele Rocco expressed at the opening of the extraordinary conference on the ‘Mega Landslide’4: ‘The wall is unique: for the first time we are acting with a view to prevention. We had warning signs of a possible landslide movement and we intervened with prevention and protection works in the built-​ up areas before the event. We can’t say when it will happen, we are in the realm of probabilities, not certainties, but the situation does not allow for underestimations.’ (Mega Landslide speech, Courmayeur, 20 June 2014) For the population, however, the methods of intervention and the measures taken were not sufficiently discussed and shared. While the regional and local institutions, civil protection bodies, politicians and technicians involved issued enthusiastic declarations for ‘the great measure taken’ and celebrated the ‘case’ as a threshold to ‘set the standard’, a critical movement was founded in the area, which appealed to the Lazio Regional Administrative Court5 to oppose the construction of the wall. In a few months, the landslide area became a veritable ‘field’ of struggles and forces (Bourdieu, 1996) in which politics, local and national institutions, media, local population, experts, scientists and environmentalists have clashed, and continue to do so. Anthropologists and social scientists in general were completely absent from the preliminary stages of consultation. It was only in early 2015, a few months after the end of the construction of the wall, that a technical forum was opened. The technical forum was organized as part of the ‘Activity 5 Sustainable risk analysis’ for the Alcotra RiskNET project6 focusing on the evaluation and analysis of risks and impacts of interventions to contain the La Saxe landslide. I took part as an 15

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

anthropologist in a focus group aimed at identifying what were presented as ‘human criticalities’. The focus group was attended by local politicians, earth science experts, engineers, geographers and even social scientists, but no representatives of the local population were invited. The aim of the focus group was to find a way for people to ‘accept’ decisions already taken (or to be taken) in emergencies, without creating ‘slowdowns’ or ‘hiccups’ in decision-​making processes. In August 2017, the Aosta Public Prosecutor’s Office opened a judicial file on the operations that followed the construction of the wall, in which nine people (public administrators) were investigated for alleged offences ranging from conspiracy to commit fraud, abuse of office and abusive exercise of the profession. The investigation, which ended in 2019 with the full acquittal of the defendants, was triggered by a report made by the Association of Engineers of the Aosta Valley to the Public Prosecutor’s Office: ‘We saw that the work was signed by two surveyors, and we felt that this was not compatible with professional competence’ (Councillor of the Valle d’Aosta engineers’ association, ANSA, 11 September 2017).7 The contestation was carried out to delegitimise the surveyors and their technical report (and ultimately their 'knowledge'), and is an example of the forces that come into play in fields like this. At the previously mentioned Mega Landslide conference, Professor Luigi Crosta, geologist at the University of Milan-​Bicocca and leading expert on the La Saxe landslide, highlighted the difficulties involved in conducting monitoring activities in an area at risk and in analysing the ever-​increasing amount of data collected: ‘We proceed with hypotheses and verifications, constantly recalibrating our interventions on the basis of the constant evolution of the phenomenon. Several working groups are at work at the same time, because we are in a race against time: the affected area, especially on the right-​hand side, has become sensitive not only to meltwater flowing in at depth, but also to precipitation.’ (Speech, 20 June 2014) Nine years after the event, the La Saxe scenario, from a geological and physical point of view, appears unchanged. The detachments have come to a halt, almost stopping completely during the construction of the wall. The long-​expected disaster did not occur. This supported the idea expressed by part of the population that the work was an ‘exaggerated’, useless or harmful measure. People said there was no reason to intervene so heavily. It is correct that there has been no collapse. At least not yet. According to studies conducted by Crosta’s research team (Crosta et al, 2011; 2017) at the Department of Environmental and Land Sciences and Earth Sciences of the University of Milan-​Bicocca, it is not possible to predict what will happen in the short term. The landslide could ‘remain dormant’ for decades, 16

Risk Perception of the Alpine Environments

or it could be reactivated and rush downstream in a few weeks, or worse, suddenly. What is certain is that ongoing climate change makes collapse scenarios even more unpredictable. For example, it is now more difficult to calculate the amount and distribution of rainfall in the area, a phenomenon to which the landslide –​which is periodically drained –​is very sensitive. The landslide is a ‘living element’ and reacts as such: ‘Water is essential. Snow has a certain function … as does ice, or the intensity of rain. We can’t yet calculate the impact of a prolonged drought like this summer, or of a water bomb on Mont de La Saxe. With climate change taking place, everything becomes less predictable, and yes, the risks of landslides are certainly increasing too.’ (Interview with Professor G. Crosta, Milan, 12 July 2017) It is a widespread and pervasive risk, but at the same time very difficult for people to perceive. A ‘muted’ risk, impossible to communicate through monitoring alone, which does not ‘alert’, which does not ‘show the evidence of the landslide coming down’. And precisely because they do not show it, on the contrary, they end up fuelling the scepticism of so many people who claim that ‘nobody has ever died here because of a few stones’ (Interview with G.B., local resident, La Saxe, 23 August 2016).

Local communities: ‘us’ against ‘them’ The order of engineers was not the only one to oppose the construction of the wall, but also a small (but powerful) section of the local population. An appeal was lodged with the Lazio Regional Administrative Court by four owners of valuable properties close to the construction area of the wall, who had to have a portion of their land expropriated. The appeal was lodged against the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the National Civil Defence, the Valle d’Aosta Region and the Courmayeur Municipality. Their first objective was to stop the construction of the wall before the decision was made to start work, but the court did not give the approval for the suspension, and the wall was built within the planned timeframe. The reaction from the local authorities was very bitter and the statements they made to the press were very harsh against the plaintiffs (almost all owners of second homes), who were described as 'four reckless tourists', or, worse, motivated by dark interests: ‘Landslide at La Saxe, 4 tourists appeal to the Lazio Tar: “We don’t want the wall” ’ and ‘The wall at risk of being stopped, funding in the balance. Wrath of the Region: “Shame on you” ’. And even the reply of the then President of the Valle d’Aosta Region against the claimants was more like an accusation of ‘immorality’ than a matter to be resolved by legal means: 17

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics

‘This is greed, this is contempt for others. I never expected anything like this. They say our decision is unfounded, but we have plenty of studies. They say we take away their air and sight, I swear! With the wall, they simply won’t see the boulders falling from Mont La Saxe. Maybe they’re afraid they won’t be able to put umbrellas and deckchairs in their gardens anymore.’ Given the intentions of the claimants, who contested both the order of the National Civil Protection for the construction of the wall, and the resolution with which the Council of Ministers had declared a state of emergency for the landslide, the local community was divided: ‘us’ against ‘them’. As the anthropologist Francesco Remotti claims, ‘identity –​what ‘we’ believe to be our identity, what we must recognize ourselves in –​is also made up of otherness, is also made up of ‘them’’ (Remotti, 2001). That ‘we’ is clearly a social construct; it consists of a whole series of social actors who share a sense of belonging to the same territory. Residents, local administrators and authorities, represent themselves as the ‘we’ of the ‘real community’, as opposed to the ‘they’: the tourists’, the outsiders, those who do not belong to the community. The language used by locals to describe ‘the others’ insists on negative characteristics. The latter are connoted as ‘greedy’, ‘unjust’ but also immoral, unaware of risks and above all ‘other’, and therefore driven by personal interests and not by the common good of the community. ‘They’ are seen as a ‘danger’ coming from outside, from the city, a threat to the integrity of the ‘community’, driven by greed, by the idea of ‘exploiting’ the territory as a consumer good or as an aesthetic good (Lazar, 2013; Walker et al, 2019). The claimants’ lawyer then hastened to tell the media that the reasons for the appeal were motivated by the need for “administrative transparency” and greater participation in decisions taken “from above”: “Our appeal is not against the wall, we are just asking for a little more transparency, which is due, we are not faced with a state secret. What we want to understand is whether the work we are talking about is appropriate.”8 He added: ‘Normally, emergencies are granted for other reasons, but here the phenomenon has been monitored for 13 years. We just want to be able to take part in the decision-​making process, not least because the claimants’ properties are very badly affected by this infrastructure. With the state of emergency, however, they have put a gag in the mouths of these people. There is talk of building a wall a stone’s throw away from their houses, a wall higher than the houses themselves.’ However, the ‘state of emergency’ was also the step by which the State was able to release 8 million euros in funding for the protection works at La 18

Risk Perception of the Alpine Environments

Palud and Entrèves. A possible suspension by the Regional Administrative Tribunal would have revoked the possibility of using these funds and blocked the works. Faced with this scenario, the positions of administrators and citizens became increasingly clear. The official position of the authorities on the issue could be summarized in the statement of the President of the Valle D'Aosta Region to the La Stampa newspaper, Aosta edition, on 14 March 2016: ‘Four owners of second homes are in fact asking the administrative judges not to make safe the area for which the Region and the Courmayeur municipality have been working practically every day for months to ensure the safety of residents and motorists in transit.’ The President accused the claimants of being irresponsible, reckless, of putting their own interests before the common good, and of endangering the entire survival of a community: ‘We have to digest the initiative of those who do not seem to have a clear idea of what it means to protect people and the common good. We will stand our ground in court, but I am also convinced that no judge in the world will agree with someone who puts the laying of an umbrella before the protection of his or her own life.’ To these statements, a reply from the claimants’ lawyer followed: As soon as they learned that the project would affect their property, my clients asked for access to the relevant documents in order to gain an understanding of the situation and ascertain whether the project was adequate to the estimated risk and therefore not excessive (but not inadequate either). Among other things, they asked to see the results of the geological studies carried out by the University of Milan, which has been commissioned by the regional authorities to monitor the landslide since 2001 and on the basis of which the valley was supposedly designed. Neither the regional authorities nor the municipality have ever complied with this legitimate request.9 In an interview conducted in Turin, a relative of one of the claimants showed me ‘the evidence’ of the official requests she had sent to the relevant authorities to consult the geological studies on the landslide. She expressed to me her feelings of frustration at receiving no reply. The most frequent feeling she described was one of ‘powerlessness and exclusion’ in relation to local decision-​making systems: ‘Nobody took us into consideration. They excluded us from the dialogue, because we are not residents, they decided at our expense. But we have had our home here for generations’ (Interview with E.R., 3 November 2016, Turin). As their lawyer suggested, the claimants commissioned a series of professionals –​engineers, geologists and architects of national repute –​to draw up ‘technical reports’ about the geomorphology and the danger of the landslide. These documents, which a claimant showed me, assess the ‘risks’ 19

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of detachment of the landslide in a way that was markedly different from the reports of the regional administration. These documents also doubt the effectiveness of the proposed solution (the wall), which was considered unsuitable for the ‘actual situation’. The claimants argue that the local and national authorities have taken decisions on the basis of inaccurate assessments and, above all, that they have acted to the detriment of ‘non-​residents’, which were considered as not part of the community and not having local electoral rights. In practice, the decision to build a wall that would have such an impact on the claimants was taken by having a state of emergency declared, in order to avoid any possibility of confrontation or public debate. This decision would have favoured only the community of residents and hoteliers involved –​the local political and electoral consensus catchment area –​who would thus not have suffered any expropriation or penalization whatsoever. The state of emergency would thus have been, according to the claimants, justification (perhaps created ad hoc) for carrying out work that was ‘good’ above all for ‘the contractual chain’, and for increasing local political consensus, to the detriment instead of ‘a handful’ of owners of second homes who had little or no say in the matter. The project was initially greeted by the local community with some scepticism and concern about the tourist season and possible disruption to the local road system. However, after the news of the appeal to the Lazio Regional Administrative Court and the positions taken by the four claimants, the local community then came out clearly in favour of building the wall. From that moment, the construction of the wall was considered by the locals as an essential measure that would finally protect them and spare them the inconvenience of having to evacuate at every alarm: ‘I am one of those who was evacuated last year. The discomfort was considerable and so was the economic damage to the activities. This wall would resolve the situation, but the claimants live in Milan and Turin. Who cares about the inconvenience and problems we face?’ (Interview with a local dealer, La Palud, 22 March 2014). According to a neighbour of the claimants, who lives on the opposite side of the street, the issue is clear: ‘they’ do not understand the seriousness of the problem; they do not feel the danger because they are not part of the community and have other interests: ‘Last year we were out of the house for a month, while they are here at most ten days a year. We can see it well, those windows are always closed. This is a safety issue, not an aesthetic one. We, who live under the landslide, want the wall’ (Interview with a local resident, La Palud, 22 March 2014). The wall, which was initially greeted with scepticism even by many residents, suddenly became a measure that was not only reasonable, but also essential; an emanation of the ‘reasonable will of the people’ who know the territory and the needs of the community well, against the 20

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interests of a ‘capricious minority’, far away and over-​represented. We and they, reiterated once again. The local community called into question by the ‘tourists’ did not just issued statements to the press but also organized legal countermeasures. The Comité d’Entrèves committee, a group of residents of the village, took charge of collecting 132 signatures and instructing a lawyer10 to send a warning to the four applicants before the date set for the court ruling. The president of this committee, a young professional from Milan, who was elected mayor in the Courmayeur municipal elections on the civic list and remained in office until 2021, explained the residents’ intentions: ‘We have decided to contact a lawyer to send them a letter expressing our concern about the consequences of the delays that this appeal would bring to the construction of a work to protect public safety’ (Statement by the President of the Comité d’Entrèves to La Stampa, 24 March 2014). Also, above all: We have communicated that any damage resulting from the failure or delay in carrying out the work as resulting from this litigation will be the subject of an action for compensation against them. If there is any damage resulting from the delay in completing the wall because of their action, we will hold them directly responsible. (Statement by the President of the Comité d’Entrèves to La Stampa, 24 March 2014) The effect of the warning was evidently immediate. The following day, the local edition of the newspaper La Stampa declared: ‘Mont de La Saxe landslide turnaround for holiday-​makers. The Tar11 has withdrawn its request to suspend the work on the protective wall’ (La Stampa, Aosta edition, 25 March 2014). The claimants had thus waived their request for a suspension but not their appeal, which would continue through the normal procedure. On 10 June 2014, the Administrative Court declared the appeal filed by the citizens against the construction of the La Saxe wall ‘extinct’, and while two of the four withdrew their appeal in its entirety, on 9 July 2014 the others opposed the decree extinguishing the appeal. I was able to investigate the motivations of those citizens who decided to withdraw their petitions. It was not (only) a change of mind dictated by an ‘awareness’ of the usefulness of the work or the seriousness of the risk, by a new assessment of the party’s experts or from the fear of not having a chance to see their reasons satisfied. What emerged from the interviews was a private negotiation, an agreement between the applicants’ family and a senior official of the regional administration, who had asked them to withdraw their appeal in exchange for a careful arrangement –​also aesthetic –​and securing of the green areas adjacent to their homes: 21

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‘We trusted him, but he did not keep his promise. The garden, what remains of the garden, is dangerous, full of scrap metal and rubble from the work. There are also holes a metre deep. … It’s just the way it is, no one has come to fix it. I’m still waiting, and it’s been more than two years. We have small children, we can’t let them play alone, they risk killing themselves.’ (Interview with E.R., Turin, 3 November 2016)

Risk perception and invisibility Defining what an emergency is, is a complex matter: from an anthropological perspective, emergency constitutes a social construct, an imaginary, that shapes not only the understanding of reality but also the action that follows this understanding (Calhoun, 2010). At stake, as in the case of the La Saxe landslide, are issues involving the interests, powers, knowledge, imaginaries and narratives of the many actors present on the social scene: experts, scientists, politicians, technicians, officials, academics, associations and citizens but also journalists, humanitarian workers and social media (Oliver-​ Smith, 2002; Benadusi, 2017; Revet, 2020; Falconieri et al, 2022). The different ways in which disasters are communicated, perceived and contextualized play a decisive role in determining the different responses of the actors involved in the face of risk and crisis scenarios and in the effectiveness of the intervention practices proposed by institutions. As anthropology has shown, there is a diversified plurality of individual and collective attitudes and cognitions towards risk, because it is essentially a ‘social construction’ (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982), for example, a construction linked to complex factors such as social context, age and gender (Finucane et al, 2000), among others. Recognizing the presence of a risk, such as that associated with the La Saxe landslide, does not only mean having experienced it, but, more generally, it means being part of a community that recognizes it as such and seeks to understand its causes and consequences. The risk in La Saxe appears to be disputed, negotiated between opposing visions, technical expertise, legal skills, local knowledge, created within a broader space of social construction of consensus, of emergency and of danger. There are certainly economic and political interests at stake, and it would be misleading not to take them into account. However, I believe it is significant analysing how belonging or not belonging to the local community redraws and shifts the boundaries of what is, or is not, an acceptable risk. Even what becomes ‘socially acceptable’, or ‘no longer sustainable’, as risk, seems to redraw the boundaries of the community. In our everyday lives we have access to sufficient information about, for example, the risks to which we are exposed, but we avoid using this information so as not to have to 22

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draw ‘disturbing’ conclusions for our future, which we cannot continuously cope with. This means that it is not enough to be aware of the existence of a risk, we must also ‘believe’ that it is real (Cohen, 2001). Human beings do not take their personal end into account, they cannot take it into account; they distract their own death from themself (Anders, 2010). This is a true coping strategy, an adaptation and defence mechanism which, through automatic or involuntary concealment, aims at ‘not seeing’ a possible anxiety element (Cohen, 2001). Some authors talk about this in terms of ‘scotomization’ (García-​Acosta and Mousset, 2001), a more useful concept than ‘denial’. It implies a selective process that takes some elements into account while discarding others, and whose aim is essentially to distance human thoughts from the idea in which the catastrophe will (or may) occur. There are many individual and collective reasons for this strategy and they are primarily historical and social in character. They stem from the interaction between socio-​economic structure, political transformations and local cultures (Falconieri et al, 2022). The challenge posed by the potential catastrophe is thus matched by a cultural reaction that obscures the risk. It does so in ways that vary from case to case, from area to area and from type to type of risk, as well as in relation to factors such as media exposure and influence, and communication of scientific knowledge, for example. In general, the mechanism of scotomization is not about deliberately concealing an ‘inconvenient truth’. Anthropologically speaking, it is a culturally and socially determined process, closely connected to the construction of everyday space and time, and linked to the theme of invisibility (Ligi, 2009). The perceptual invisibility that characterizes certain types of risk, such as those related to climate change, for example, is exacerbated and becomes particularly pervasive when cognitive invisibility is added, that is, the inability to grasp a possible change in progress. This is the case of the La Saxe landslide: the current ‘sleeping’ condition of the slope, and the absence of visible signs of its movement, also confirms a cognitive invisibility, which is not attenuated by the scientific monitoring surveys regularly published but rather reinforced by them. As Oliver-​Smith (2002) notes, many natural hazards are not sufficiently frequent or do not produce consistently frequent disasters, such that they may frequently not be perceived as threats, and therefore often are not integrated into human environments. Notes 1

2 3

The landslide involves both sides of the La Saxe mountain, directly threatening the hamlets of Entrèves and La Palud, and also involves the road leading to the Mont Blanc tunnel. http://​www.irpi.cnr.it/​proj​ect/​la-​saxe/​ [Accessed: 28 December 2022]. http://​www.rain​ews.it/​dl/​rain​ews/​media/​Mont-​de-​La-​Saxe-​la-​frana-​che-​tiene-​con-​ il-​fiato-​sosp​eso-​Cou​r may​eur-​8be05​d75-​1405-​44c0-​ba1f-​87b83​9d05​717.html#foto-​7 [Accessed: 4 April 2022]. 23

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5

6 7

8

9

10

11

In June of the same year (2014), the National Order of Geologists called together scholars from all over Italy in Courmayeur to take stock of the situation on La Saxe in a technical seminar. The Civil Protection comes under the Council of Ministers in Rome, therefore the relevant court is that of Lazio. https://​www.inter​reg-​alco​tra.eu/​fr [Accessed: 4 April 2022]. ANSA, 11 September 2017, https://w ​ ww.ansa.it/v​ all​edao​sta/​noti​zie/​2017/​09/​11/​gabrie​ lli-​pm-​su-​vallo-​esi​ste-​calunn​ia_​5​e7f0​0c2-​bf0b-​4658-​a508-​79bdb​00ff​b36.html La Stampa, 16 March 2014, https://s​ hop.lastam ​ pa.it/L ​ aSta​mpa/​sfog​lio/​mens​ile/​Edic​ola/​ PWL_​D​ESK/​LS_​1M13​E99/​?lasta​mpa Statement by the applicants’ lawyer issued on 15 March 2014 in the online newspaper AostaCronaca.it: http://​www.valled​aost​aglo​cal.it/​2014/​03/​15/​leggi-​noti​zia/​argome​nti/​ zona-​fra​nca/​artic​olo/​frana-​la-​saxe-​la-​versi​one-​di-​chi-​ha-​r ico​rso-​al-​tar.html The lawyer who was appointed was also a majority councillor of the Courmayeur municipality at the time. The Regional Administrative Tribunal.

References Anders, G. (2010) L’uomo è antiquato, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri. Benadusi, M. (2017) Antropologi nei disastri. Ricerca attivismo, Applicazione, Antropologia Pubblica, 1(1): 33–​60. Bourdieu, P. (1996) ‘Champ politique, champ des sciences sociale, champ journalistique’, Cahiers de recherche, 5: 1–​48. Broccolato, M., Cancelli, P., Crosta, G., Tamburini A. and Alberto W. (2011) ‘Tecniche di rilievo e monitoraggio della frana di Mont de La Saxe (Courmayeur, AO)’, Innovazione tecnologica nell’ingegneria geotecnica, 1: 625–​32. Calhoun, C. (2010) ‘The public sphere in the field of power’, Social Science History, 34(3): 301–​335. Cohen, S. (2001) States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, Cambridge: Polity Press. Crosta, G.B., Agliardi, F., Rivolta, C., Alberti, S. and Dei Cas, L. (2017) ‘Long-​term evolution and early warning strategies for complex rockslides by real-​time monitoring’, Landslides, 14(5): 1615–​32. Dall’Ò, E. (2022) ‘Alpine sentinels: Climate crisis and its “non-​human” perceptions in the Mont-​Blanc area’, in Casciarri, B., Leclerq, R., Staro, F. and Van Aken, M. (eds) ‘Socionatures under pressure: “Anthropology and the Climate Crisis”’, Journal des anthropologues, 168–​69. Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. (1982) Risk And Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Environmental and Technological Dangers, Berkeley: University of California Press. Falconieri, I., Dall’Ò, E. and Gugg, G. (2022) ‘Emergenza: una categoria stratificata e plurale. Riflessioni introduttive’, Antropologia, 9(2): 7–​24. Finucane, M., Slovic, P. Mertz, C.K. and Flynn, J. (2000) ‘Gender, race, and perceived risk: The “white male” effect’, Health, Risk, Society, 2(2): 159–​72.

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García-​Acosta, V. and Musset, A. (2001) Les Catastrophes et l’interdisciplinarité. Dialogues, regards croisés, pratiques, Louvain-​La-​Neuve: Academia-​l’Harmattan. Lazar, S. (2013) The Anthropology of Citizenship: A Reader, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-​Blackwell. Ligi, G. (2009) Antropologia dei disastri, Rome and Bari: Laterza. Niola, F. (2014) ‘Il concetto di ‘emergenza’ e le declinazioni del potere straordinario’, diritto.it, https://​www.diri​tto.it/​il-​conce​tto-​di-​emerge​nza-​ e-​le-​decli​nazi​oni-​del-​pot​ere-​straor​dina​r io/​ Oliver-​Smith, A. (2002) ‘Theorizing disasters’, in S.M. Hoffman and A. Oliver-​Smith (eds) Catastrophe & Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, pp 23–​47. Remotti, F. (2001) Contro l’identità, Bari: Laterza. Revet, S. (2020) Disasterland: An Ethnography of the International Disaster Community, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Walker, S., Mullagh, L., Evans, M. and Wang, Y. (2019) ‘Design ecologies: sustaining ethno-​cultural significance of products through urban ecologies of creative practice’, International Journal of Anthropology and Ethnology, 3(10), https://​doi.org/​10.1186/​s41​257-​019-​0025-​7

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The Isolation of the Island: The Social Impasse in Ischia after the Earthquake and Tourism Crises (2017–​22) Giovanni Gugg

Introduction: a volcanic island is a seismic island Together with Campi Flegrei and Vesuvius, the island of Ischia is one of the three active volcanoes in the province of Naples, whose last eruption dates to 1302. From a geological point of view, the duration of its cycles of alternation between quiescence and active phase is typically 10,000 years (Civetta et al, 2016). This involves long phases of apparent absence of activity, sporadically interrupted by low-​magnitude earthquakes located at a shallow depth in the north of the island and accompanied by widespread manifestations of fumaroles and thermal waters. It should also be noted that, as it is still active, the volcano of Ischia is potentially capable of erupting in the future, with particularly worrying effects due to the intense urbanization that affected its territory during the twentieth century. The event that changed the contemporary history of Ischia is undoubtedly the catastrophic earthquake of 28 July 1883, which caused over 2,300 deaths and the cancellation of various urban areas of the island. It had a great reverberation in the national and foreign press and a notable emotional impact, which gave rise to a saying, soon spread throughout the country ‘A Casamicciola has happened’, as an expression of ruin, disorder and confusion. It was the first serious catastrophe that the newborn Italian nation had to face, since the national government quickly promulgated the country’s first anti-​seismic legislation: the ‘Building Regulations for the Municipalities 26

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of the Island of Ischia damaged by the earthquake of 28 July 1883’, which came into force on 15 September 1884 (Castagna, 1984). At the time, Ischia was the destination of a wealthy and international tourism, attracted by the presence of establishments for thermal treatments and the healthiness of its sea, but after the disaster, and the reconstruction, the situation changed profoundly: its tourism grew a lot, causing a deterioration of the relationship between the natural and built environment. Architectural historian Andrea Maglio believes that the earthquake was a watershed: with the disaster, ‘the golden age of nineteenth-​century tourism ends and the relationship with the landscape and with the natural and built environment begins to change’ (Maglio, 2017, p 329). After more than a century, a new earthquake rocked Ischia in 2017, fortunately causing far less damage and pain. Yet, it still raised questions about urban sprawl, the lack of urban planning and controls, and the system of civil protection in a tourist island, one of the main destinations of the Mediterranean Sea, in the height of the summer season. This chapter stems from a systematic interest of the case study since the time of the earthquake, complemented by a collected database over the years of news (reports, interviews, statements) and documents (from geologists and reconstruction administrators). In addition, in May 2018 and June 2022 I was also able to visit the affected areas. I was able to observe firsthand the damaged sites and the (slow) progress of reconstruction, as well as to talk to some survivors and listen to their stories and expectations. As the social sciences applied to crisis contexts show, disaster is a dynamic process following which a specific ecosystem (environmental and social) takes some time to return to a new state of equilibrium (Revet and Langumier, 2013; Benadusi, 2014; Faas, 2016). No ecosystem has a unique balance, but rather the paradox is that the stability of a system –​ its ‘eternity’ –​evolves through change. This means that in the process of the natural transformation of places, when a calamity occurs, a sudden, traumatic and violent element of discontinuity intervenes, but which always acts as a promoter of further change (Kaiser, 2015; Switek et al, 2022). A disaster distorts space, and the response that must be worked out must necessarily adapt to the ‘new’ territory, so it always involves further transformations. This is the case with reconstruction, with which new building restrictions are generally introduced, areas of different danger are defined, or dams are built, canalizations in river areas subject to flooding and so on (Kroll-​Smith, 2018; Farinella and Saitta, 2019). Both the disaster that has occurred and the risk of a possible future catastrophe are in ‘partnership’ with space, because ‘by transforming our environment, we necessarily transform ourselves’ (Harvey, 2010, p 211). It is in this context that emergencies arise, that is, those unexpected and unwanted events that, bursting into the life of a society, interrupt the regular flow 27

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of things. What is of particular interest to the social sciences is that emergencies lay bare the most authentic features of normality, that is, the characteristics, relationships and tics of everyday life in peacetime that end up being hidden precisely by the ordinary flow of time.

Casamicciola and the earthquake The seismic history of the island begins in 1228 and has the typical seismic characteristics in volcanic areas such as earthquakes of low energy but with high intensity (Luongo, 2016, p 15). Most of the seismic events recorded in the last eight centuries have as their epicentre the north side of Mount Epomeo, corresponding to the municipalities of Casamicciola Terme and Lacco Ameno. The 19th century had the most earthquakes: in 1828 there were some victims and various damages in Casamicciola, leaving it in the local collective memory for several decades, at least until the catastrophic earthquake of 28 July 1883, which had already been preceded by other strong earthquakes in 1880 and 1881. That earthquake was the first major one after the unification of Italy (1861). It was the most intense ever recorded in Ischia, as well as the most widely documented both in literature and in archival sources. It caused 2,333 deaths and the destruction of the historical and environmental heritage of some areas of the island. The heaviest damages occurred in Casamicciola and Lacco Ameno, where only 19 of the 1,061 homes surveyed remained standing (only one in Casamicciola) (Polverino, 1996). After 134 years of substantial seismic calm, on the evening of Monday, 21 August 2017, a new, extremely localized earthquake of relatively low magnitude shook parts of the island of Ischia, in particular the municipalities of Casamicciola Terme and Lacco Ameno. A six-​second shock caused old buildings to collapse, irreparably damaging dozens of homes, leading to the evacuation of the Rizzoli hospital and the evacuation of hundreds of tourists pouring over the island’s piers to return to the inland via Pozzuoli and Naples. Two people –​Lina Balestrieri and Marilena Romanini –​died under the ruins of dilapidated buildings; 42 people were injured and 2,630 were displaced. The earthquake was of magnitude 4 but rather superficial: 1.73 km deep, near Piazza Majo, in the hilly and historical part of Casamicciola. At 20:57 a bang shocked the north side of Ischia, but not everyone felt the shock with the same intensity. Indeed, many tourists in other parts on the island continued their dinner, unaware of what happened. Closer to the epicentre, however, panic had arisen among people due to the fall of bricks and metal sheets, blackouts, screams, frenetic bustle and sirens, helicopters and dog units. Moreover, since it was the most important time of the year for tourism, there were also many guests on the island who, frightened by the tremor, hurried to leave Ischia and return to the mainland. 28

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Figure 2.1: Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: a ‘barrack house’ (casa baraccata) built with the anti-​seismic rules introduced after the earthquake of 1883

Source: This and the other photographs were taken by the author on 24 May 2018

The most serious damage occurred in the Majo neighbourhood of Casamicciola: fallen rubble and cornices, cracks in the buildings and some collapses (Figures 2.1 to 2.5). Three children were saved from the rubble after 16 hours of digging all night long. Ciro (11 years old), Mattia (eight years old) and Pasquale (seven months) were buried under their house; their rescue was followed by the whole nation on television until the following midday. Perseverance, heroism and emotion do not stop another type of narrative, that of urban illegality, according to which Ischia becomes ‘the capital island of illegalism’, where one resident out of two builds outside the law, says the Civil Protection (Amabile et al, 2017). The newspaper Il Mattino (Crimaldi and Pacifico, 2017) even claimed that in certain areas ‘90% of the houses were built illegally on landslides’. Everyone talks about illegal building, from the environmental association Legambiente (Nadotti, 2017) to the Professional Order of Geologists (Gallori, 2017), including Vincenzo De Luca, president of the Campania Region, who –​overturning the paradigm –​even accuses environmentalism, which ‘stopped everything for 25 years’ (Grignetti, 2017). Illegalism is a broad category in which a wide range of illegalities, both small and large, converge, and which historically can have very different causes. Therefore, it should be carefully analysed to avoid a doubly counter-​productive effect; on the one hand, to blame the 29

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Figure 2.2: Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: the dense structures of metal pipes or wooden poles placed to support buildings made unsafe by the earthquake

Figure 2.3: Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: a shack built by the inhabitants and used as a permanent self-organized space

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Figure 2.4: Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: a collapsed building and another propped up with metal support tubes

victims and, on the other hand, to divert attention from overbuilding of the now former ‘Green Island’ of Ischia. The urbanization of Ischia since the 1950s certainly brings with it one of the highest rates of illegal construction practice in Italy. It also causes an anthropic pressure that has raised issues related to traffic intensity, high density, congestion and proper disposal of urban liquid waste. This pushes those who are unable to keep up with the economic whirlwind to the social and geographical margins, so it is as if it devours both territory and relationships. Even in the less desirable areas of the island, the cost of housing is now prohibitive, so ‘the abuse of necessity has been a powerful social shock absorber and an extraordinary device for building electoral fortunes (and economic fortunes, as far as the abuse of speculation is concerned)’ (Rispoli, 2010, p 14). If elsewhere the change –​of the imaginary and land use –​has been more gradual, in Ischia this process has taken place in a radical and sudden way. Through a captivating image of itself, Ischia has become a laboratory of wide and branched tourist entrepreneurship affected by a real building ‘fever’, that is, a gold rush that has made the island grow demographically and economically but not as much from the point of view of services, infrastructure, planning and control. A certain idea of development –​unbridled and unlimited –​has immoderately consumed the soil and degraded the ecosystems. The lack of an ethic of responsibility has accentuated fragilities and inequalities that were already present and which 31

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Figure 2.5: Piazza Majo, Casamicciola Terme: the deep crack in a small villa rendered uninhabitable by the earthquake, on whose entrance gate the owners have displayed an Italian flag with a double possible interpretation, in a polemical sense towards national institutions or out of a sense of belonging and community

now, with the disasters that have occurred in recent years (especially the 2017 earthquake and the 2022 landslide), risks making residents even more fragile, even in very concrete terms, as in 2006, when an entire family was swept away by a landslide due to soil sealing, and in 2015, when a man died for the same reason. So, after more than a century, the earthquake of 2017 in Casamicciola has reopened discussions and comparisons between different sensibilities and approaches that are certainly constantly part of the scientific field. However –​ beyond the controversy and different interpretations of the phenomenon –​it is considered ‘an earthquake to be understood’ (Greco, 2017), an event that, evidently, pushes contemporary seismologists to their instrumental limits, if not to the limits of theoretical adjustments and reformulation of scenarios. In addition to spatial, individual and community upheavals, every disaster always poses a profound question: ‘who are we really?’ In this regard, Ariel Dorfman, journalist, and witness of the Chilean earthquake in 2010, believes that every crisis is an opportunity to reflect not only on how and when to rebuild infrastructure and housing but also ‘our precarious identity’ (Dorfman, 2010). In other words, this means addressing existential issues that allow us to rebuild the community, as well as homes. The 2017 earthquake forced us to ask 32

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ourselves some thorny, almost intimate questions: what is the island of Ischia today? What did it become in a couple of generations? What relationship have its inhabitants developed with the ecosystem, especially with its geology? We did not see some distortions in time, or we ignored them, although we could have noticed them 40 years ago. The overbuilding of Ischia became a national theme in 1977, when on 22 February the newspaper L’Unità published an unsigned article titled ‘Ischia: nessuno interviene per gli sbancamenti’1 (p 11), and on 1 March La Stampa published an article by Adriano Luise entitled ‘Un hotel di lusso a Ischia sui resti di una necropoli’2 (p 30). It was not the authorities or politicians who denounced the destruction but the children of the primary school of Ischia Porto, who wrote an appeal to preserve their land from devastation and violence. The Aragonese castle was being gutted by the construction of 35 residential houses and the demolition of centuries-​old walls, in a conscious cancellation of the past and local identity. Since then, entire pine forests and long stretches of coastline have been cleared and the land consumption has been incalculable, except for the dramatic outcome of too many tragedies: from the four German tourists swept away by a landslide in June 1978 on the Maronti beach, to the Buono family, wiped out in April 2006 by a mudflow from the Mount Vezzi, and the earthquake of 2017 between Piazza Majo and the village of Fango. Six years after that earthquake, the reconstruction has not yet begun in Casamicciola. The state funds allocated to the displaced people were only released on 3 March 2019 by the ‘extraordinary commissioner’3 Carlo Schilardi and since then, according to the local authorities, ‘the worst is behind us’ (Zivelli, 2019). The statement is challenging because the real challenge starts now: reconstruction is a very delicate phase, whose effects (positive or negative) may show themselves long afterwards. Showing caution would be the wiser choice, especially since no in-​depth and contextual (and therefore time-​consuming) analysis has been made of the social and functional complexity of the affected area, for example, a reflection between the necessary pragmatism of a rapid intervention and an equally necessary consideration of how to intervene, for whom and for what purpose. As pointed out by Bonati and Forino (2018) after the collapse of the Morandi Bridge in Genoa, after a disaster it is essential to discuss urban complexity and provide a critical and detailed overview of that specific reality: ‘It is not just a matter of reconstructing, but of doing so in function of a dynamic context, of a city in constant change in its social and economic structure’ (Bonati and Forino, 2018).

The latency time after the disaster Disasters are complex social events that significantly disrupt the daily lives of affected populations. These are upheavals observable in time and space, 33

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the extent of which depends on various elements, physical and social. As devastating and exhausting as they may be, disasters are not random events that afflict territories and communities in a capricious way and without warning; on the contrary, each society produces its own specific vulnerabilities (Perry and Quarantelli, 2005). This happens because every social system –​therefore its system of production and distribution but also of values and organization of power –​is closely linked to the ecosystem of which it is part. It is for this reason that the social scientists who deal with it consider the disaster as a rift that opens up on responsibilities, on rhetoric, on management and on vision. In this sense, disasters are not simply events or facts, but ‘ways of thinking’, so they are able to expose the power relationships between mental representations and social practices (Saitta, 2015). Of whatever type and nature the event may be, the shock of the disaster causes a ‘total social discontinuity’ because, alongside loved ones, territorial references and social relationships are lost: the disaster takes on a totalizing character that turns to disorder and disorientation, which raises the need for a rebalancing, sometimes for a redefinition or, in any case, for a reorganization –​of oneself and of the group (Vale and Campanella, 2005). This opens a time of crisis in which a territorial and social recomposition is attempted, with uncertainty and expectation, but also with dynamism and potential. We go in search of shelters, not only physical –​from rubble, atmospheric agents and winter cold –​but also cultural, in the sense that we want a way to elaborate what happened and to keep the past, present and future together. In any case, attempting to mend the fractures makes use of a connective network that protects against disintegration and holds generations together (Neal, 1997). The victims of a disaster experience a double grief, a double pain: that for what has been lost –​home, loved ones, social relationships, perhaps work –​and that for what the future holds with its uncertainties and a desire to return to the conditions of ‘before’ (D’Auria, 2014). This opens a period of ‘latency’ marked by feelings linked to uncertainty, waiting and doubts. In 1960, Pierre George wrote about the European cities destroyed during the Second World War, whose rebirth ‘was preceded by a period of inertia in which every country seemed to contemplate with amazement the immensity of its ruins. … In almost all countries the period 1945–​1950 or 1951 was a period of waiting and preparing the conditions for reconstruction’ (George 1960, p 2). Few traces of that ‘suspended time’ remain in the collective memory. For example, in one of my Vesuvian ethnographies (Gugg, 2022) I could see that the days of the last eruption, which occurred in March 1944, in one of the cities partially buried by the lava flow, are well remembered, but then there is a ‘void’ up to the reconstruction, indicated with 1955, the year in which reconstruction begins because the first urban plans are approved. Many things happened locally in 34

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that decade, but today’s difficulty in remembering arises, on the one hand, from not being able to faithfully reproduce the duration, the passage of time which, Candau observes, ‘varies extremely according to the density of events’ (Candau, 2002, p 105), while on the other hand, there is the difficulty of keeping in mind the more minute and routine aspects. It is a question of an inability to remember, both a personal one of the witnesses and of that transmitted to their heirs (Möllering, 2001; Drew and Schoenberg, 2011; Smith et al, 2015). This intermediate time between disaster and reconstruction is a phase that can last months or years and includes a precise responsibility for administrators and planners, that of providing dignified accommodation to the displaced, with comfortable accommodation and adequate services and infrastructure. Often, however, the consequences of both the disaster and the post-​ disaster persist, with the burden of debts for the public administration and inconvenience for the assisted populations. This highlights unpreparedness, mismanagement, waste of money and the perpetuation of negative psychological, social, cultural and economic effects on populations. The latter, therefore, are first victims of the disaster, then of the definitive transfer to a completely new elsewhere, built ad hoc, not always in conformity with the associative forms and the ways of using both domestic and urban space of the original place of residence. There are many such cases, documented in recent decades, such as in Gibellina in Sicily after the earthquake of 1968, where houses were rebuilt and left empty because the economy remained weak and immobile, and the architecture gradually took on the form of absence (Henwood et al, 2011; Cantarella and Giuliano, 2013). With regards the earthquake of 2017, what is evident is a progressive fading of the memory of the catastrophe of 1883, since most of the observed damage suggests poor maintenance of the buildings built after the earthquake at the end of the 19th century. Although they were earthquake proof due to the knowledge and techniques of the time, today they are very fragile, especially because the adhesive in the bricks has deteriorated and is poorly maintained. However, from the point of view of seismic engineering, buildings appear to be ‘burdened’ by successive ‘superfluous architectural addition’4 which, when combined with the existing ones without binding them to adjacent structures, have increased their overall vulnerability (ISPRA, 2017, p 15). Years later, while the state of emergency decreed by the government persists, there are more than 2,000 displaced persons, all living on the island between second homes and relatives’ homes, except for a quarter still in hotels or other closed accommodation facilities. They are gathered in the ‘Risorgeremo nuovamente’5 committee and are strongly willing to return to their homes in the red zone. The modalities for a return are beyond being defined and, as a result, the timescales still seem rather long. An initial ‘emergency commissioner’, Giuseppe Grimaldi, was appointed at the end of 35

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August 2017. On 9 August 2018 the government initiated a change of phase, appointing a ‘commissioner for reconstruction’, Carlo Schilardi, former prefect and already ‘commissioner for calamitous events’ in other Italian provinces. Those involved –​mayors and earthquake victims –​welcomed the new appointment as ‘a strong sign of optimism. … Ischia must now send a strong message to the world: the red zone must not be abandoned but made safe’ (Raicaldo, 2018).

The three post-​seismic phases In addition to the ‘latency time’, however, the ‘bureaucratic time’ must also be considered, sometimes so slow and mammoth as to aggravate the socio-​ psychological condition of the victims, as well as the ‘back to the future’ (Langumier and Revet, 2011, p 86) of the disaster area. Furthermore, all this must be included in a long but constant process of evanescence of local knowledge. From the catastrophe of 1883 to the earthquake of 2017 in Ischia there was a progressive dissolution of the collective memory, witnessed, for example, in the lack of maintenance of buildings built after the earthquake in 1883. At the time of writing, on the institutional level the Casamicciola seismic emergency has gone through at least three phases, corresponding to as many government ‘special commissioners’: Giuseppe Grimaldi, architect who since the end of August 2017 had the task of dealing of the first emergency; Carlo Schilardi, former prefect and former ‘commissioner for calamitous events’ in other Italian provinces, since 9 August 2018 in charge of the reconstruction process; Giovanni Legnini, former vice-​president of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, undersecretary in various governments and ‘extraordinary commissioner’ for the reconstruction of the areas of the 2016 and 2017 earthquake,6 since 27 January 2022 in charge of ‘a change of pace’ in the reconstruction of Ischia. During the first post-​seismic year, the ‘emergency commissioner’, Giuseppe Grimaldi, was responsible for coordinating the operational centres activated in the area, to overcome the first criticalities due to the disaster. His work was carried out together with the Prefect of the Province of Naples and the Campania Region, including the bodies and agencies of the Metropolitan City of Naples, the mayors of the municipalities affected by the seismic event, and a technical committee of seven experts who worked gratis. Specifically, the Commissioner has disposed of 7 million euros allocated by the Council of Ministers to prepare a plan of urgent interventions for the rescue, assistance and shelters for the population and the safety of the areas affected by the earthquake. In this way, the Commissioner had the power to assign a contribution for autonomous accommodation (CAS) to families whose main home had been destroyed, in whole or in part, or had been 36

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evicted, for a maximum of 900 euros per month for families of five or more people. Part of the commitment also involved securing the damaged cultural heritage and activating an extraordinary contingent of military personnel to ensure the patrolling of the ‘red areas’, which cover an area of 0.07 km2 for Casamicciola (1.2 per cent of the municipal area) and 0.012 km2 for Lacco Ameno (0.6 per cent of the municipal area) (PdRi, 2021). This initial intervention phase was also completed by a survey of the damages to public assets and private buildings (125 damaged buildings in Casamicciola and 48 in Lacco Ameno), as well as to economic activities. Field surveys were therefore conducted by specialized technicians but also by means of a direct indication from the citizens, who with pre-​established forms were able to indicate the damage, allowing for the quantification of the CAS. However, the integration of citizens in the survey did not work very well because the people who should have filled the forms should have also indicated any non-​ conforming volumes created over time (for example, small or large building abuses). The surveys, therefore, were gradually stalled over time. The second phase began on 9 August 2018, when the central government appointed a new ‘extraordinary commissioner’, but this time ‘for reconstruction’, namely the former prefect Carlo Schilardi, who had already gained similar experience in other disaster areas in Italy. Schilardi began to operate based on a decree issued after the collapse of the Morandi bridge in Genoa on 14 August 2018 and also including the Ischia case. In article 25, the decree provided for the pardoning for illegal building construction, even when these pardoned buildings are located in areas at significant seismic and landslide risk. This has caused disputes at the local level, between those who interpreted it as ‘an opportunity and a possibility’ and those of diametrically opposed opinion such as Legambiente, who considered it ‘a building amnesty that would endanger people and relaunch new abuses’ (Licciardi, 2018). However, in the light of article 17 of the so-​called ‘Genoa Decree’ of September 2018 (Legislative Decree 109/​2018), the task of the ‘extraordinary commissioner’ is to ensure a unitary and homogeneous reconstruction in the areas affected by the earthquake, also through specific plans for relocation and urban transformation, aimed at reducing situations of seismic and hydrogeological risk and landscape protection, and to this end plans the use of financial resources and adopts the directives necessary for the design and execution of the interventions, as well as for the determination of the contributions due to the beneficiaries on the basis of damage indicators, vulnerability and parametric costs. The procedure developed by Schilardi to respect this mandate is set out in the reconstruction plan of Ischia (PdRi, 2021), published by the Campania 37

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Region in July 2021. It consists of two phases and two paths: the first phase is planning, the second is reconstruction, which, however, is distinguished under public reconstruction and private reconstruction. At the same time, it also proposed a ‘Percorso procedurale per la redazione ed attuazione dei piani di condono’,7 to address the problems of the buildings on which amnesties hang. The cases to be considered are numerous and varied based on the type, urgency, legal and economic nature of the buildings, since the interventions required are not only different from each other but also with variable priorities because those for private properties damaged by the earthquakes (financed or not financed with reconstruction funds) are necessarily different from those aimed at mere restoration with seismic improvement/​ adaptation, or the interventions for school buildings obviously require a different organization from that for public works, such as, for example, the places of worship. Furthermore, planning and reconstruction concern many subjects which, therefore, must be coordinated and brought to a concrete collaboration: the Campania Region, the Extraordinary Commissioner for Reconstruction, the Municipalities of Casamicciola, Forio and Lacco Ameno, the Metropolitan City, the Regional Secretariat of the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, the Superintendence of Archaeology, Fine Arts and Landscape, and the Regional Basin Authority. There is no doubt, therefore, that while this work is and has been difficult, it has also been weighed down by its own mammoth growth, since the Commissioner Carlo Schilardi has gradually used the collaboration of 40 experts, with another 27 experts added only for the preliminary draft of the PdRi. All this has therefore seriously tested the patience and trust of local communities. This is well summarized by two engineers of Ischia, Giuseppe Conte and Antuono Castagna (2021), who revealed ‘a labyrinth of laws and ordinances for ghost reconstruction’ and, with reference to ‘Invitalia’, the Italian National Development Agency, of ‘forty invisible experts [for a] mysterious bandwagon’. This bureaucratic impasse reached a critical phase at the end of January 2022, when in an interview with the Neapolitan newspaper Il Mattino Schilardi had declared that he had received the extension of his post until December 2022 and that ‘the Region [was] late in terms of reconstruction’ (Di Fiore, 2022a). For many people, those words appeared as a form of de-​ responsibility, the culminating point of an ‘institutional disaster’ in which the commissioner structure and the other bodies in charge were unable to deal with a calamity that evidently had nothing ‘natural’ but was all ‘social’ and ‘political’. Some have pointed out that Casamicciola was ‘killed twice’, after the earthquake and the lack of reconstruction, in fact in the last four years 1,400 people have officially left the municipality (Mazzella, 2022). At that point, the political controversies mounted, with cross interviews 38

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between the regional councillor for urban planning, Bruno Discepolo, who invited Schilardi to collaborate on the reconstruction, and the commissioner himself, who replied by speaking of ‘spurious criticisms’ (Di Fiore, 2022b). The result was that on 27 January 2022, the Department of Civil Protection appointed a new ‘extraordinary commissioner’ for reconstruction, the lawyer and politician Giovanni Legnini. His first visit to Ischia took place on 24 February, when he met the mayors of the three hit municipalities, other regional authorities, and a delegation of citizens and committees of earthquake victims. On that occasion, he said that his appointment intends ‘to give a change of pace as well as a simplification for the management of the reconstruction of the buildings affected by the earthquake’ (Il Mattino, 2022). Legnini pointed out the necessity for combining the resources for the reconstruction of the police station with the regional ones, aiming at a rationalization of the reconstruction procedures. Given the time span of this chapter (written at the end of 2022), Legnini’s decisions and actions cannot be fully evaluated yet. However, it is possible to report the feelings and moods of the inhabitants of the affected areas, quite disillusioned with new announcements and promises over five years after the earthquake. The feelings are that of a stagnant situation in which those who were able to do so, proceeded autonomously and at their own expense to rebuild or repair their buildings, while many others had to completely rethink their lives, burdened also by the dramatic effects of the COVID-​19 pandemic on the island’s main tourist economy. In April 2020, for example, the hoteliers and restaurateurs of the island, exhausted after two months of lockdown, protested in front of the mayors by handing over the keys to their buildings (Frattasi, 2020). After a year, in April 2021, they again denounced the state of serious suffering in the food and hospitality sector and requested immediate interventions by institutions (Il Mattino, 2021). One year later, in March 2022, they understood with dismay that the next tourist season would be compromised too, given the war in Ukraine, because Russians would not be spending their summer holidays on the island, ‘losing 25 years of work used to build a solid market relationship with Russia’ (Zivelli, 2022).

Conclusions Six years after the 2017 earthquake the situation has not changed much, with paradoxes, delays, forgiveness and an inevitable blame. Above all, locally there is discouragement. Indeed, the most affected part of Casamicciola, Piazza Majo, is now defined by residents as ‘the new Pompeii’. As local journalist Giuseppe Mazzella wrote: In recent years, the ‘decision-​m akers’ have produced nothing. Members of Parliament. Ministers, Governors, councilors, experts, 39

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have not produced anything concrete except to continue an ‘emergency’, to provide the ‘CAS’ which stands for ‘Autonomous Accommodation Contribution’ to about 2400 displaced persons from the collapsed or uninhabitable houses of the three municipalities affected by the earthquake: Casamicciola, Lacco Ameno, and Forio. (Mazzella, 2020) The earthquake disrupted the lives of residents, and the questions it raised are still many. Will the thousands of people still displaced and living in chronic uncertainty about the future return to their neighbourhoods of Majo and Fango? If so, will they be able to live safely in their new homes? Part of this uncertainty is due to the slow pace of both reconstruction and the bureaucratic system, which officially is due to the need to ensure control and equity. However, the immediate effect is that these delays fuel precariousness and insecurity, further exacerbated by the timing of the pandemic from 2020, the war crisis in Ukraine from 2022 and another deadly landslide in November 2022. This results in a pervasive uncertainty about the future, but also in a fragmentation of the community that is unlikely to be reabsorbed if, alongside material reconstruction, social ties are not mended (Parkhill et al, 2010). We have a duty to consider the hardest hypothesis, that those centres will not survive; cities and human communities are born, grow, go into crisis, get sick, heal, but sometimes die (Gugg, 2020). To ‘medicate’ a place wounded by disaster it is therefore important to identify the basic factors of a virtuous reconstruction process: a community, a will, a possibility. In other words, in the case of Casamicciola, it is necessary to consider how much the cultural institutions are able to resist and how much the political and popular will believes in rebirth; every devastated community always has a chance of recovery if on the one hand it preserves memory and on the other elaborates an idea of the future, which it is possible to nurture and develop through encounter and debate before that instance of rebirth fatally runs out or dissolves. Obviously, the reconstruction of buildings is a fundamental condition, but it is not the only one, because it is also essential to build a less vulnerable environment, not only on an engineering level: it is not enough to bring back the old inhabitants but to restart the economy and make it fairer; it is not only necessary to respond to the needs of the displaced but to recreate a sense of place. This can be done by fostering and supporting participation, cooperation and democratic dialogue (Gugg, 2018). It is not a question of building ‘resilient’ or ‘resistant’ spaces because, however important and vital they may be, neither emergency practices nor anti-​seismic techniques are exhaustive responses to risk, but we must aim for ‘urban resilience’ (Fumo, 2019). It may seem like a play on words, but it is a 40

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radical change of perspective that focuses on the creation and preservation of a physical and social ecosystem in which memory and knowledge can dialogue, where sustainability and renewal can nourish each other, in which inclusion and relationship are the mainstays of a stronger and more far-​ sighted coexistence, both among the inhabitants and with the environment (Cardona et al, 2012). One possible tool to use is shared administration, which in Italy is still a relatively small but growing phenomenon. The principle is that alongside ‘material reconstruction’, in which active citizens contribute significantly to improving the quality of life of all members of the community, there is also a ‘moral reconstruction’, in the sense that taking care of everyone’s goods emphasizes a sense of responsibility and belonging, solidarity and the capacity for initiative (Chandra et al, 2011). The hope is that a new dynamism will emerge for which the term ‘security’ takes on a meaning like that of ‘common good’ (Gugg, 2019). In this sense, the interventions to be carried out on the island of Ischia and in the earthquake-​stricken areas, must be inspired by considerations on living and man/​environment relations, certainly perpetuating a vision of the territory centred on the sea and coastal tourism but in a fairer and more sustainable way than those experienced in the last century. In other words, rigorous, inter-​municipal and far-​sighted territorial planning is necessary, in order to aspire to renew and perpetuate the good life of Ischia. The question that must be constantly asked is: which Casamicciola is being rebuilt? And for whom? Whatever is the future we want to pursue, it is a question of identifying a path marked by strong and concrete elements. Otherwise, the abandonment will continue and so will the erosion of the soil and the community. A new collective pact is required, in which the attention is not placed only on a single action but on the overall picture, which is not restricted to the ‘red zone’ but includes the entire island. The vision must be at the same time vast and deep, transversal and complex. Above all, it must scrutinize the future with the awareness of the historical path that has led to the present state, with its fragilities and contradictions. It is necessary to reconstruct a vision of the island that does not yet exist but that will come if we proceed by practising patience and listening. Notes 1 2 3

4

5

English translation: ‘Ischia: nobody is interested in excavations.’ English translation: ‘A luxury hotel in Ischia on the remains of a necropolis.’ In the Italian legal system, the ‘extraordinary commissioner’ (‘commissario straordinario’) is a government official appointed to deal with urgent or extraordinary tasks through a centralization or increase of powers and an derogating action, for a specific time. In Italian, ‘superfetazione’ means a construction added later to an already complete building and which contrasts with the original artistic style, as if it were an unnecessary frill. English translation: ‘We will rise again.’ 41

Disasters and Changes in Society and Politics 6 7

See Chapter 3 in this book. English translation: ‘Procedural path for the preparation and implementation of amnesty plans.’

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Il Mattino (2022) ‘Terremoto Ischia, il nuovo commissario Legnini nella zona rossa: ‘Ora cambio di passo’’, Il Mattino, [online] 24 February, Available from: https://​www.ilmatt​ino.it/​nap​oli/​polit​ica/​terremoto​_​isc​hia_​comm​ issa​r io_​legn​ini-​6525​548.html [Accessed 13 April 2022]. ISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) (2017) Ricognizione degli effetti indotti dal terremoto di Casamicciola del 21 agosto 2017 M4.0, technical report by Dipartimento per il Servizio Geologico d’Italia, Rome, Available from: https://w ​ ww.ispram ​ bien ​ te.gov.it/fi ​ les20​ 17/n ​ otiz​ ie/​ relazione_​tecnic​a_​is​pra_​isch​ia_​ca​ sam​icci​ola.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Kaiser, M. (2015) ‘Reactions to the future: The chronopolitics of prevention and preemption’, Nanoethics, 9: 165–​77. Kroll-​Smith, S. (2018) Recovering Inequality: Hurricane Katrina, the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906, and the Aftermath of Disaster, Austin: University of Texas Press. Langumier, J. and Revet S. (2011) ‘Une ethnographie des catastrophes est-​ elle possible? Coulées de boue et inondations au Venezuela et en France’, in B. Glowczewski and A. Soucaille (eds) Désastres, monographic number of Cahiers d’anthropologie sociale, 7, Paris: L’Herne, pp 77–​90. Licciardi, L. (2018) ‘Anche il condono di Ischia fa litigare Lega e M5S’, AGI, [online] 20 October, Available from: https://​www.agi.it/​polit​ica/​isch​ia_​c​ ondo​no_​le​ ga_​m5s-​4509​490/​news/​2018-​10-2​ 0/​ [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Luise, A. (1977) ‘Un hotel di lusso a Ischia sui resti di una necropoli’, La Stampa, [online] 1 March, Available from: http://​www.archi​viol​asta​mpa. it/​[Accessed 13 April 2022]. L’Unità (1977) ‘Ischia: nessuno interviene per gli sbancamenti’, L’Unità, [online] 22 February, Available from: https://​arch​ive.org/​ [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Luongo, G. (2016) ‘Storia vulcanica e rischi geologici’, in U. Leone (ed) Il vulcano Ischia, monographic number of Ambiente Rischio Comunicazione, 11, pp 13–​19. Maglio, A. (2017) ‘L’altra faccia del golfo. Ischia e l’architettura mediterranea’, in A. Maglio, F. Mangone and A. Pizza (eds) Immaginare il Mediterraneo. Architettura, arti, fotografia, Naples: Art Studio Paparo, pp 329–​42. Mazzella, G. (2020) ‘Casamicciola, il viaggio nelle macerie del terremoto del 21 agosto 2017: Majo, la ‘Nuova Pompei’’, Ischia News & Eventi, [online] 18 August, Available from: https://n ​ ews.isch ​ ia.it/​new/​soci​eta/​6311-​casam​ icci​ola-​il-​viag​gio-​nelle-​mace​r ie-​del-​terrem​oto-d​ el-2​ 1-a​ gos​ to-2​ 017-m ​ ajo-​ la-​nuova-​pom​pei [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Mazzella, G. (2022) ‘Casamicciola e la caduta del Commissario alla ricostruzione fantasma’, Ponza Racconta, [online] 30 January, Available from: https://​www.ponzar​acco​nta.it/​2022/​01/​30/​casam​icci​ola-​e-​la-​ cad​uta-​del-​comm​issa​r io-​alla-​r icost​r uzi​one-​f anta​sma/​ [Accessed 13 April 2022]. 45

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Möllering, G. (2001) ‘The nature of trust: From Georg Simmel to a theory of expectation, interpretation and suspension’, Sociology, 35(2): 403–​20. Nadotti, C. (2017) ‘L’allarme inascoltato di Legambiente: “Ischia capitale dell’abusivismo e del rischio”’, La Repubblica, [online] 22 August, Available from: https://​nap​oli.rep​ubbl​ica.it/​cron​aca/​2017/0​ 8/2​ 2/n ​ ews/l​ _a​ llarme_​ di_​legambiente_​ischia_​capitale_​del​l_​ab​usiv​ismo​_​e_​d​el_​r ​isch​io_​-​173591​ 044/​[Accessed 13 April 2022]. Neal, D.M. (1997) ‘Reconsidering the phases of disaster’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 15(2): 239–​64. Parkhill, K.A., Pidgeon, N.F., Henwood, K.L., Simmons, P. and Venables, D. (2010) ‘From the familiar to the extraordinary: Local residents’ perceptions of risk when living with nuclear power in the UK’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35(1): 39–​58. Perry, R.W. and Quarantelli, E.L. (eds) (2005) What Is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, International Research Committee on Disasters, Newark: University of Delaware. PdRi (2021) Piano di Ricostruzione per i tre Comuni dell’isola d’Ischia colpiti dal sisma del 2017, Naples: Regione Campania, Available from: https://​www. ter ​r ito​r io.regi​one.campa​nia.it/​news-​blog/​piano-​di-​r icost​r uzi​one-​di-​isc​ hia-​pdri [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Polverino, F. (1996) ‘Gli edifici antisismici nel patrimonio edilizio ischitano alla fine del XIX secolo: Elementi per la conservazione e la riqualificazione’, La Rassegna d’Ischia, 3: 30–​5, Available from: https://​www.ischi​alar​asse​ gna.it/​rasse​gna/​Rasse​gna1​996/​ras​s03-​96/​ras​s03-​96.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Raicaldo, P. (2018) ‘Terremoto a Ischia, nominato il commissario per la ricostruzione’, La Repubblica, [online] 9 August, Available from: https://​ nap​oli.rep​ubbl​ica.it/​cron​aca/​2018/​08/​09/​news/​terremoto_​a_​ischia_​ nominato_​il_​commi​ssar​io_​p​er_​l​a_​r i​cost​ruzi​one-​203733​762/​ [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Revet, S. and Langumier, J. (eds) (2013) Le gouvernement des catastrophes, Paris: Karthala. Rispoli, F. (2010) ‘Il Paradiso ferito. I tanti problemi irrisolti di Ischia’, in Le coste ‘sensibili’: Oltre trenta paesaggi minacciati da grandi alberghi, palazzi, porti e tanto altro, report by Italia Nostra, 455, Available from: https://​itali​ anos​tra.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2010/​07/​Bollet​tino​_​Ita​liaN​ostr​a_​45​5_​ co​ste.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Saitta, P. (2015) ‘Eventi complessi: Introduzione a una sociologia dei disastri’, in P. Saitta (ed) Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie: Vita quotidiana, resistenza e gestione del disastro, Florence: Editpress, pp 9–​23. Smith, N., O’Connor, C. and Joffe, H. (2015) ‘Social representations of threatening phenomena: The self-​other thema and identity protection’, Papers on Social Representations, 24(2): 1–​23. 46

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Switek, B., Abramson, A. and Swee, H. (eds) (2022) Extraordinary Risks, Ordinary Lives: Logics of Precariousness in Everyday Contexts, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Vale, L.J. and Campanella, T.J. (eds) (2005) The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster, New York: Oxford University Press. Zivelli, M. (2019) ‘Ischia, il commissario Schilardi sblocca i fondi statali agli sfollati del terremoto’, Il Mattino, [online] 3 March, Available from: https://​ www.ilmatt​ino.it/​nap​oli/​polit​ica/​commissario_​schilardi_​sblocca_​fondi_​ statal​i_​sf​olla​ti_​t​erre​moto​_​isc​hia-​4336​825.html [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Zivelli, M. (2022) ‘La guerra dopo il Covid Ischia, la crisi infinita: addio al turismo russo’, Il Mattino, [online] 1 March, Available from: https://​www. ilmatt​ino.it/​nap​oli/​cron​aca/​isch​ia_​f​i ne_​turi​smo_r​ usso ​ _c​ ri​ si-6​ 5341​ 61.html [Accessed 13 April 2022].

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3

The Permanent Red Zone: An Ethnography of Spatial Practices in the Areas of the Italian Central Apennines Affected by Earthquakes (2016–​17) Enrico Mariani

Introduction The 2016–​2017 earthquakes affected an area, distributed among four regions (Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche and Umbria) and 140 municipalities, generally referred to as ‘Central Italy’. Rich in nature, culture and art (with two national parks: Monti Sibillini, and Gran Sasso and Monti Della Laga), this area is also strongly administratively and morphologically fragmented and mainly affected by a general process that is making it politically marginalized and culturally, socially and economically vulnerable (Ciuffetti, 2019; Giovagnoli, 2020). Approximately 65,500 seismic events were recorded from 24 August 2016 to 28 April 2017 by the Italian National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV, 2017), significantly exceeding the average number of earthquakes verified annually in Italy. The ‘Amatrice-​Norcia-​Visso’ seismic sequence exceeded magnitude 4 on the Richter scale 21 times, peaked at 6.5 on the morning of 30 October 2016, with the epicentre in Castelsantangelo sul Nera. The earthquake of 24 August hit the Alta Valle del Tronto and had particularly devastating effects on the border area between the Rieti and Ascoli Piceno provinces. It caused 299 victims among Amatrice, Accumoli, Arquata and Pescara del Tronto. The number of displaced people were slightly less than 5,000 in April 2016 but increased to 31,763 after the earthquakes of 48

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October 2016. Most of the inhabitants lost their homes after the earthquake in 2016 that razed the historic centres of Amatrice and Pescara Del Tronto to the ground and rendered more than 90 per cent of the towns in the Alto Nera area inaccessible. The impact of seismic events of this magnitude is capable of profoundly disrupting the relation with spatiality and temporality and, more generally, with daily life coordinates and reference points. In such cases, therefore, issues of housing and dwelling are key to understand the multidimensional impacts of disaster. This chapter draws from an extended ethnography in the epicentral area of the October 2016 earthquake, the Alto Nera (which includes the municipalities of Visso, Ussita and Castelsantangelo sul Nera). Figure 3.1 below depicts the affected area: in light grey the 140 municipalities affected by the earthquake (the so called ‘crater of Central Italy’), in dark grey the three municipalities of Visso, Ussita and Castelsantangelo sul Nera. This research focuses on a socio-​anthropological analysis of the people living in SAE (Soluzioni Abitative di Emergenza –​Emergency Housing Solutions), the temporary housing solution installed by the Italian government after the earthquake. The research revealed the profound relation between domestic housing processes and spatial and local changes in the aftermath of the earthquake. Temporary emergency urbanism, which arose with the aim of ensuring the continuity of key services and businesses until reconstruction, fits within a scenario that, at the time of writing, is still heavily scarred by the effects of the earthquake.1 This condition of permanent emergency includes Ussita, Visso and Castelsantangelo sul Nera. Given the post-​disaster framework, with reconstruction that seems distant and uncertain, the aim of this contribution is to shed light on the everyday dimension of practical adaptation and appropriation of emergency urban spaces.

Inhabiting disasters One of the major contributions of social sciences to disaster research is that of challenging a technical view of disasters. By overcoming the more constraining aspects of the technocentric approach, social scientists are able to integrate political, historical, social and semiotic factors to develop a diachronic, connectionist and processual perspective on disaster (Ligi, 2009). To understand (and try to prevent) risk exposure and the socio-​environmental impact of a disaster, it is necessary to analyse historical causes, interpret key narratives and discourses, and contextualize consequences (Quarantelli, 1998). In this way it is possible to recognize the role of long-​run dynamics that contribute to vulnerability (Wisner et al, 2004; Fordham et al, 2013), produce or reduce risk and open up possibilities for recovery in the post-​ impact period (Centemeri et al, 2022). 49

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Figure 3.1: Map of the affected areas in Central Apennines

MARCHE

UMBRIA

LAZIO

ABRUZZO

Note: In medium grey, the 140 municipalities affected by the earthquake. In dark grey the three municipalities of Visso, Ussita and Castelsantangelo sul Nera. Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Google Maps

Housing is one of the issues through which social sciences are best able to account for the profound changes taking place in the post-​disaster. The home is often associated with the idea of a refuge where external chaos is filtered through the rules and values that inhabitants attach to order, care and resource management. The resulting domestic order can be grounded in power relations that can be oppressive and tyrannical (Douglas, 1991). A dwelling, as a practical and emotional building that exists in a real and defined space, is a phenomenological (Merleau-​Ponty, 1945) as well as a social reality. People inhabit by appropriating, using, and manipulating spaces and environments. Studies on material culture show the role of objects in processes of signification (Greimas and Courtes, 1979) and distribution of agentivity (Miller, 2008). The physical structure, the house, is able to shed light on issues that have different layers and concern how individuals relate to different domains of their environment, such as institutions and power, consumption, temporalities of work and leisure, and the expression of self, status and gender identity. 50

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It is also possible to investigate how sensoriality –​sensory engagement and perception –​is involved and implicated in social and cultural configurations and, consequently, in the construction of the signification of everyday acting in domestic environments (Pink, 2015). At the same time, the construction of the domestic environment is interdependent and affected by the external environment. Dwelling practices have a relation with everyday place and space production practices (De Certeau, 1980; Low, 2016). Being at the juncture where everyday practices, social and territorial processes, and collective and individual desires intertwine, living is in a co-​evolutionary relationship with socio-​ecological contexts (Ingold, 2000). Relational interdependence (of individuals with one another) and environmental interdependence (of physical and material resources) define dwelling as the practice of constantly weaving ecological bonds in a certain environment. Therefore, loss of place –​placelessness –​is not a tangible element that is easy to quantify and compensate for. The destruction or damage of one’s home due to disaster implies a sense of loss and crisis that affects the intimate, deep structures of social living (De Martino, 1977). The loss of orientation experienced during disasters is especially caused by the destruction of one’s living environment and the displacement of inhabitants. Displacement may occur both in the emergency phase, during which it is necessary to get to safety, and in the recovery phase, during which people often resort to temporary settlements. The ability to make effective decisions related to housing issues plays a prominent role commencing from the emergency (Bilau and Witt, 2016), laying the foundations for the recovery process and continuing to influence the life of the community long term (Jha et al, 2010). Planning new settlements or satisfactorily restoring old ones can have contrasting impacts on the populations affected. Research highlights how displacement can result from, or worsen, as a result of the resettlements of emergency urbanism (Faas et al, 2020). Poor or careless planning can generate a range of negative effects: in some cases, low housing quality may be correlated with increased individual pathologies, or actualized dynamics that can reproduce pre-​existing structural vulnerabilities (Oliver-​Smith, 1991; Calandra, 2013). Understanding the effects of disorientation and disintegration on dwelling in relation to spatiality, therefore, becomes one of the main goals of social scientists in the post-​disaster era.

Case study and methodology The Alto Nera: a paradigmatic and representative case study The choice of focusing field research in the Alto Nera area –​which includes the villages of Castelsantangelo sul Nera, Ussita and Visso –​is based on previous knowledge acquired during pre-​field research documentation and observation. Besides being underrepresented in public discourse 51

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and academic research, the Alto Nera contains the whole range of main critical issues found in the 2016–​17 post-​earthquake area. As the epicentre of the shocks on 26 October 2016, in the area almost 90 per cent of all buildings are unfit for purpose. There is, however, a remarkable historical and cultural architectural heritage, which requires complex protection and renovation operations. There is also a natural heritage that forces planners to follow complex procedures to obtain retrospective planning permissions and to comply with landscape conservation rules. In the area there are several active faults, near which reconstruction is not possible. The area is also at risk of flooding and landslides classified as hydrogeological risk R4 (very high). Studies on these risks are ongoing and, if partially confirmed, they would jeopardize the reconstruction of a very large area including all three villages of Castelsantangelo sul Nera, Visso and Ussita. The combination of these factors makes planning and designing reconstruction very complex. The simultaneous presence of these elements makes this land unique and representative of the paradigmatic ‘fragility’ of the Italian inner areas (Tarpino, 2016). Therefore, by studying contemporary housing arrangements in the Alto Nera areas, we can look at local and social changes that central Apennines are going through in the long-​term 2016 post-​earthquake period from a specific, paradigmatic and representative perspective.

Methodological note on ethnography Initiated before the COVID-​1 9 pandemic, on-​site observation was conducted continuously in the areas but had to be suspended during the lockdown months between March and May 2020.The numerous informal interviews (including telephone interviews during the months when field research was suspended) and the in-​depth interviews with key witnesses living in SAE complement the personal experience of becoming a resident of the Alto Nera. During this period, the author chose to be based in Ussita for one year, from January 2020 to January 2021. The initial phase of approaching and accessing the field saw its starting point in the tricky search for accommodation, which was also solved with the help of the CASA2 association, which would later be fundamental at all stages of research. The ethnography was then extended by regularly going back in the area and keeping in touch –​even remotely –​with key witnesses. This was useful for pondering and discussing theories and interpretations on collected data. Sixty-​one residents from Visso, Ussita and Castelsantangelo sul Nera were involved in the research of which there were 33 males and 28 females. Of these, 14 work in small businesses, two hold institutional offices (Mayor of Ussita and Deputy Mayor of Visso), four are civil servants, four work for the Monti Sibillini National Park and four work in education. 52

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The themes guiding data presentation and discussion essentially follow two interconnected directions. Therefore, the next sections will address the dynamics of adapting to the new housing configuration and then compare Ussita and Visso and their different relation with spatiality and emergency urbanism.

Inhabiting post-​earthquake central Italy Return to utopia In response to the housing emergency caused by the earthquake and the destruction of the majority of private properties, the Civil Protection arranged Emergency Housing Solutions (Soluzioni Abitative in Emergenza, hereinafter SAE), which guaranteed an accommodation for those whose homes had collapsed, been seriously damaged or were located in the red zone. SAE installation operations were immediately controversial, beginning with the numerous delays in schedules caused not only by place-​related reasons but also by shortcomings of standard organizational procedures set by the Italian government around technical characteristics of temporary housing provision (Oggioni et al, 2019). These delays risked worsening the depopulation process as more people considered leaving (D’Angelo et al, 2018). Working conditions at SAE construction sites would later end up at the heart of an investigation shedding light on exploitation, inhumane hours and poor working conditions. The greatest structural and housing quality problems are recorded in Visso and Ussita, where mould immediately grew on walls and floors. The ‘rotten houses’, as the interviewees call them, still require constant maintenance, largely supported by private individuals. SAEs were handed and inhabitants returned between the summer of 2017 and the end of 2018. However, they returned at very different times, depending on the area, and this allowed the return of businesses and everyday domestic life. Nonetheless, the disorientation effect remained. To better understand adaptation difficulties, psychologists spoke of a ‘return to Utopia’: ‘That is, the initial anxiety of returning home. But when it happened because of SAEs, we began to understand that the towns we remembered no longer existed.’3

Post-​disaster material culture One of the central themes during the return to these areas is that of adaptation. Feeling at home after the earthquake is something that has much to do with everyday objects and materials. Far from being domestic or mundane, they should be seen as an active part of practices, value investments and processes of signification (Miller, 2008). The material culture of dwelling is declined in original but also differential forms in the case of areas outside SAE. These become the stage for endless 53

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Figure 3.2: Elio shows how he rearranged the terracing wall in the SAE area

Source: Author’s own

modes of appropriation (De Certeau, 1980). In fact, each SAE has a small space in front of it that is in some cases adapted as a garden or vegetable garden. Some neighbours decide to combine outdoor spaces to share the management of crop spaces, gardens, and conviviality spaces within larger spaces. Others prefer instead to create a private comfort zone by installing plastic verandas, which allow for an enclosed space under the porch in front of the SAEs’ front facade. Elio, aged 81, known in the village for his vibrant hyperactivity, has exploited inch by inch the ugly concrete wall surrounding the back of the SAE, which he raised to terrace the area. As he explains to me one afternoon when I visited him (Figure 3.2), on one side he arranged all his gardening and carpentry tools, and on the other he arranged pots with vegetables and flowers in rows on a step of the wall, where he also put a rainwater collection system. In this way, he managed to beautify and at the same time give purpose to a rejected element of emergency urbanism. Modifying the SAE can also serve to distinguish it from others. As Valeria says, in the first period, many lost their reference points: ‘At first I couldn’t even remember where we lived, because they are all the same from the outside, we couldn’t distinguish them. And then you would hear someone trying to open a door to a house that was not his own with his key. And you would tell him, relax, relax, it happens to me all the time, too.’ (30, Interview 20 June 2020) In other cases, people face a chronic shortage of space. The difficulty is now striking a functional balance between new, supplied items and those salvaged from the earthquake house. The tyranny (Douglas, 1991) of SAE can manifest as discomfort. A constricting space, which causes problems in 54

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cases of household changes and evolution (for example, separations or births). SAE, in fact, are allocated according to family composition at the time of application. Moreover, according to the lease, they are to be returned to their original state once reconstruction has taken place. Despite all the problems, it must be said that some interviewees express the desire to be able to keep the SAE even once reconstruction has taken place. Some feel attached, some have grown accustomed to the space and time, some for convenience or pragmatism, and some are afraid to return to live in the house that went through the earthquake. According to some interviewees employed in the construction industry, defending SAEs from wear and tear until reconstruction will require considerable expense. Apart from this, the solutions proposed so far –​for example, total dismantling or conversion to tourist resorts –​do not take the inhabitants’ opinion into account at all. For that matter, local knowledge about inhabiting has been ignored at all stages of the emergency, even when it could have suggested urban planning arrangements and resettlement strategies better suited to the context (Barra et al, 2018). What to do with SAE in the future is an issue that raises important questions for the future of these areas, which are still poorly addressed publicly.

Inside the interior The ‘one-​story condominiums’ are, with a few exceptions in Ussita and Castelsantangelo sul Nera, for the most part arranged in chequerboard urban layouts, perfectly facing each other. This unprecedented condition of proximity, to which people were not accustomed in areas where housing density was very low, makes peoples’ daily routes constantly visible, which can become oppressive. The search for privacy in an unprecedented way of living causes the effect, which many inhabitants seem to be aware of, of retreating inside. As much as a true urban plan for SAE areas is almost entirely absent and gathering places are lacking, this retreat can also be seen as a normalization of emergency. In relation to this, interviewees note that after a time in which post-​earthquake hardships and existential precariousness had helped encourage solidarity, tighten bonds and strengthen the perception of being part of a community (Oliver-​Smith, 2020) (for example, with some experiences of true self-​management in small groups left to live in caravans throughout the emergency in the three selected municipalities), there is now a progressive fragmentation and individualization, also due to the bureaucratization of post-​disaster journey. The ethnographic research, in fact, has been conducted at a critical time for sociality, that is the pandemic. Taking a walk near SAE areas poses problems that are tied to a ‘dimension of the visible’: the gaze always goes too far and invades internal, private spaces that are exposed. Hence avoidance, 55

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distraction and retraction are typical dynamics revealing a necessary caution in ethnographic interactions. Everyone is at home, but they cannot be seen. During a late afternoon walk in late October, when it begins to get dark early and the light of the streetlamps already illuminate a seemingly deserted SAE area, I was walking with Tiziana who dishearteningly told me, “there is no one around after 6 pm. You come home from work and the day is over. It’s not so much the Covid, we’ve been a ghost town here for four years, the social fabric here is not weaving very well, in fact it’s not there at all” (51 years old, Interview on 10 October 2020).

Inhabiting and spatiality Square villages and street villages The research revealed issues about the specific nature of each of Visso, Ussita and Castelsantangelo sul Nera’s individual environments. The theme introduced here is the relation between inhabiting and spaces of social life. In this, the most striking comparison is between Ussita and Visso. As Alberto (age 44, Interview on 6 October 2020) tells me, “there are square villages and street villages, villages accustomed to transit and built around it. They are frequented more as a stop along a journey. Visso, on the other hand, is a square village. Visso is its own square”. We will see later what the effects of this identification of Visso’s residents with its square in the post-​earthquake period are. Ussita, instead, is neither a street village nor a square village. Made up of 17 hamlets, Ussita is a ‘scattered municipality’, meaning that it has an administrative centre and a square but also many other hubs scattered over a very large area. Therefore, as we shall see, one specific aspect of Ussita is its relations with the environment and with a particular kind of actor, Mount Bove.

Mount Bove and us One of the aspects that immediately strikes me about Ussita is Mount Bove. A 2,169-​metre-​high mountain, it dominates the entire large territory of Ussita. Each hamlet has its own view of Mount Bove, and everyone says that their own hamlet has the best view of the mountain. The way the daylight colours its slopes is a topic of conversation among Ussita residents. In everyday speech they remove the article and refer to it as ‘Mount Bove’. The language reflects a process of personification: Mount Bove is an actor of the land in transformation, with whom people relate and interact. During my stay in Ussita, I also developed a special relationship with Mount Bove. Its view is able to evoke different emotions and change my mood. When the valley of Ussita is already bathed in the twilight of sunset, Mount Bove continues to reflect sunlight. Mount Bove seems to emanate sunlight itself. 56

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The search for new views and light angles became a reason for me to explore. A way to find myself in the disorientation caused by field research, during which I stayed for a year in a place that was, until then, unknown. As a result, I can fully understand when Anna (56, interview on 23 June 2020) tells me, “You can also see it in the way this valley is made, geologically. It is an amphitheatre, so welcoming. Systole and diastole, it takes in and gives back energy. The energy that Mount Bove gives is unbelievable to me, and I think it is the same for everyone here”. The displacement period, while the SAEs were under construction, prompted many to move elsewhere or find alternative accommodations. For those who chose to stay, their connection to the environment played a key role: ‘No one leaves Ussita. OK, there is destruction, but there is the mountain, Mount Bove. Its colours at dusk are spectacular. Why no one leaves Ussita? Because it is Ussita. How can I put it? I would like to explain it to you, but I would leave out … I would not explain it well. Stay here a week and you will understand. You will see.’ (Manuel, 46, Interview on 10 June 2020) The relation with the environment defines a peculiar form of place-​ making that affects the people of Ussita (Ussitani) in the post-​earthquake period. Manuel’s words highlight how, more than a local peculiarity (of local relevance, identity, of the Ussitani), this form of place-​making is an opportunity for those who find themselves living and crossing that area. Mount Bove is one of the main actors in this environment: every Ussitano has an individual relationship with it, and also a collective one (Mount Bove and Us). But it is not the only actor: multispecies forms of alliance are at the heart of the daily space production in Ussita. This is well illustrated by another excerpt from the interview with Maura, already quoted above. As she tells me about the moment of the earthquake, she says, “I could feel everything shaking, a roar that I had never heard, above us. And there I thought, everything is going to collapse, even Mount Bove. It’s over”. The perception of the end is connected to the crisis of relationships (not only human) through which we give (social and cultural) meaning to the events. To feel Mount Bove trembling, about to come down, means not only feeling in real danger. More profoundly, it means that an actor we are used to considering a friend and a relative, a guide and a totem, is put at risk. And with it, that same energy that binds us together and us to the environment. Mount Bove has wounds after the earthquake, visible to the naked eye even from far away. The Ussitani heal them with their eyes, caressing them every day. All this while repeating that it is an endless source of strength and energy, “however wounded, Ussita is also wounded, it does not stop being the most 57

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beautiful mountain, a point of reference. Take that away, and you take away my freedom” (Valeria, 30, interview on 20 June 2020). In the post-​earthquake period, with urban changes, the views on Mount Bove also changed. The relationship with the new layout was, as written above, difficult. The words of Paola (age 50, interview on 8 October, 2020) reveal the role of Mount Bove in the adaptation process: “When I saw Mount Bove from this perspective for the first time I realized that everything had changed, and I nearly faint. I went right back inside. You see, I was used to seeing it another way, it was … kind of a shock.” After some time, the dwelling processes involving Paola and her neighbours create a harmonious fabric of caring and neighbourly relationships. Their SAE area, also thanks to some urban planning arrangements, is also recognized by other residents as the most liveable. In all this, Mount Bove’s new perspective underpins Paola’s new way of relating to Ussita. The word ‘perspective’ risks impoverishing the meaning of these relationships. Actually, seeing it in a new way also means building a new way of sensing and perceiving (Pink, 2015) the connection with the whole surrounding environment. It means being involved in a process of co-​production of the environment in which different ways of perceiving and different perception combinations are involved (Ingold, 2000). According to Paola, to date, her new perspective of Mount Bove is the following: “It is beautiful, now I wouldn’t change it for the world.”

Visso is its own square Visso was a “square village, but now it is a street village” (Alessandro, 50, interview on 6 October 2020) and is scattered, strung out along the SP209, the road that leads to the historic centre. Socialization practices have had to adapt to this new reality, migrating from one place to another along the SP209. Some temporary resettlement structures –​bakery, pub, bar –​become gathering places for different groups at different times of the day. “We are a group of young people who want to rebuild. We believe that the rebuilding process can only be done by staying united and taking one day at a time. At the moment, you have to understand that Visso has moved. It’s all over here” (Christian, 40, interview on 30 October 2020). But many continue to feel out of place and unable to find any points of reference between constantly changing building sites, which they do not recognize as their own anymore. SP209 itself is affected by traffic in both ways, intensified by heavy vehicles working at the various reconstruction sites. Figure 3.3 below depicts the primary spatial transformations in Visso. The SAE housing areas (highlighted in black) are situated along SP209, at varying distances, extending up to two kilometres from services and temporary commercial zones (highlighted in light grey), as well as the historic centre (highlighted in medium grey). Notably, seven years after the earthquake, the historic centre 58

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Figure 3.3: Visso’s spatial transformations map

Note: Black: SAE housing areas; medium grey: historic centre of Visso (The Permanent Red Zone); light grey: temporary shopping areas. Source: Author’s elaboration from Domenella et al, 2020, p 130.

remains within an inaccessible red zone (shown medium grey in Figure 3.3). The map underscores the displacement effects resulting from post-​disaster urban resettlements. The ethnographic experience in Visso provides insights into the everyday practices of spatial reinvention. Here, creative utilization reshapes the intended designs of public spaces, responding to contingencies and needs. While the spatial characteristics of emergency urbanism can be reinterpreted, yielding more or less satisfactory results for Visso's residents, the Red Zone designation for the historic centre remains permanent. The absence of a teeming urban fabric such as that of the historic centre takes the form of a laceration. Interviewees often speak of it in personal terms, as if they feel the absence of a limb, an organ, a vital function. Daria’s account (54, interview on 28 October 2020) uses a vivid and striking image: “Every 59

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day, passing by the Red Zone, we hold hands with our terminally ill patient.” While seeing the ban from entering the Red Zone becomes an habit in daily life, the personification is here associated with a terminal time perspective. The underlying idea is that the ban to experience a space, prolonged in time, leads to the slow extinguishing of one’s relationship with a loved one, a family member. The relationship between the people of Visso with their square and historic centre is visceral. “Visso was its square”, the interviewees agree, because daily life took place in and around there, as a whole: it was a workplace and a meeting point when out grocery shopping in the morning, or after school, or when taking an afternoon walk. It was the stage for social relations and, at the same time, home of all key economic, political, religious activities and associations. The square is the place of ritual, but it is also dynamic, the agora where a community shows itself to itself. With its bars and shops, its cultural and artistic heritage, its medieval structure made of alleyways, internal courtyards and architecture from various ages, the square of Visso is one of the main tourist attractions in an area that, after the abandonment of farming, sheep husbandry and silviculture has been fundamental for the economy of the Alto Nera since the early 1970s. Post-​earthquake tourism recovery policies move through development narratives that fail to consider the ecological and local issues in Central Italy, like many inland Italian areas (Olori and Mariani, 2022). A ‘new temporary square’ was inaugurated in Visso in March 2022. As well as providing areas for spontaneous encounters, the plan includes a requested business area and will try to recreate the spatial configuration of the town with the church, the portico, the museum and the town library. During the time spent in the field, the long delays in schedules led to scepticism even among the shopkeepers: “The new square? We can’t wait to get started, but at the same time, we wonder: What are we doing? Because the danger is that we end up there alone, looking at each other through the shop windows.” Locals claim that there is a contrast between institutional priorities declared soon after the earthquake (getting back to living the square as quickly as possible) and the energy used in constructing emergency solutions. Even if the new square can provide a place for spontaneous socialization, locals are aware that it will never be able to: “Replace the real square. I call it a shopping mall. It’s high time they started rebuilding it.” The concern therefore is losing contact for ever with that most important of places for the processes of recognition and subjectivity. It makes no difference how long it takes to rebuild: returning to the square means reclaiming, at least for a little while, a part of themselves through the routine of a space: ‘You can put up a sign and write Square on it, but people won’t live it that way. I was there in front of the Basilica di San Benedetto in 60

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Norcia [also hit by the quake of October 2016, editor’s note] when it collapsed. But they made it safe again so the place would never die. At the moment, Visso’s Square and its streets are dead. There’s no life left.’ (Carla, 39, interview on 5 November 2020)

Conclusions Pellizzoni (2018) wrote about three pairs of opposites that can be used to define an analytical framework for the post-​earthquake of 2016–​2017: Suspension/​ Acceleration of political and local processes; Temporariness/​Permanence of the emergency infrastructure; Closeness/​Remoteness in the future life of earthquake victims. However, another potential polarization exists inside which the following different positions are arranged with variable intensity and definitions: Involvement/​Detachment in political and social issues involving local transformations. The pathologization of evacuees and their successive bureaucratization are trends that can potentially be alienating (being ousted from your hometown and taken over by the government) and individualizing, which would undermine the efforts of the committees (Emidio di Treviri, 2021). After a phase that, despite the technical management of the emergency, was highly emotionally charged and intensely transformative, we are now seeing a period of stabilization and entrenchment (Hoffman, 2020) of the emergency. The lack of democratic access to the processes that are redesigning the territory, including participation in resettlement (Oliver-​Smith, 1991) could be considered one of the factors for the social rarefaction/​scarcity mentioned beforehand. As the interviewees stated, if a public debate is essentially missing, the potential for unrest is present but rooted in a kind of grey zone that creeps outwards. Powerlessness in the face of long reconstruction times makes what one would be most involved with –​the return home –​seem more remote and uncertain. Interviewees prefer not to talk about it: “It’s something for the experts.” The strong practical and emotional involvement in reconstruction, depoliticized because it is framed within bureaucratic and technocratic (therefore individualizing) processes, runs the risk of turning in on itself and becoming suppression. At the same time, the analysis of housing and spatial practices reveals adaptive and appropriative capabilities. Starting from a potentially critical situation, where resettlement had produced a negative impact on the social group and context, co-​evolutionary processes of pragmatic adjustment and mutual human-​environment transformation were activated. This happens, in this case, through balances between structural, rooted elements and contingent appropriation processes, in which we come to terms with what is there. In contrast, the normalization of the Red Zones produces the perception of a loss that one does not get used to, a loss that involves the strong 61

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interrelation among identity, spatiality, and social and cultural processes of signification. The long timeframe of the emergency (6.5 years, at the time of writing) brings about a reflection on whether one can simply restore the situation to how it was before the displacement to consider the mission accomplished (Faas et al, 2020). The Permanent Red Zones of earthquake-​affected Central Italy present us with a situation that has been completely transformed in terms of dwelling but in which long-​term vulnerabilities remain. Specifically, the vulnerabilities of living in an Italian inner area with scarcity of welfare services, ageing, depopulation, tourist monoculture and political marginalization (Barca et al, 2014; De Rossi, 2018). The contribution of ethnography is useful insofar as it allows us to learn not only about local practices, values and forms of knowledge but also about the relations among inhabitants, the environment and the spaces of emergency urbanism. The richness of these instances and relations, which we have partially investigated, prompts us to argue about the importance of opening spaces for participation at every stage of decision-​making affecting these areas, including contemporary and future resettlements. Interrogating the transformations that have taken place means confronting not only risk, disaster, and resettlement but also the processes that have produced these vulnerabilities. Reducing housing vulnerabilities and risk would mean, from this perspective, not limiting ourselves to just precise and limited infrastructural development. Rather, it is necessary to adopt a perspective that can bring inhabitants’ customs and practices back into the dialogue with resource production processes, in light of the ecological challenges and transformations that await us in the future. Notes 1

Out of 80,000 damaged private buildings in the entire area, reconstruction applications expected by the Commissarial Structure are about 50,000, for an estimated value of 20 billion euros. In light of these figures, the earthquake-​affected region in central Italy has been referred to as ‘the largest construction site in Europe’. The number of Reconstruction Grant Applications submitted by private entities for residential or productive properties damaged by the 2016 Earthquake, to date, stands at just over half of the expected total, with 28,315 applications received. Out of these, 16,680 applications, which constitute 60 per cent of the total, have been approved, for a total amount of 10 billion and 448 million euros. The funds disbursed for the construction sites, in response to the approval of projects and the authorized progress of the work, have reached nearly 3 billion euros. The slow submission of applications in the initial phase after the earthquake was attributed to a series of factors related to the pre-​earthquake situation that hindered reconstruction. These factors included the absence of Implementation Plans and Urban Master Plans, seismic and hydrogeological risks, as well as landscape and historical-​cultural constraints. Subsequently, there were two slowdowns in the increasing trend of project submissions: the first in 2020 due to the pandemic, and the second in 2021 due to rising energy and raw material prices, along with a shortage of technicians and companies caused by the effects of the superbonus 110% measure. This measure led these entities to seek commissions in locations and contexts different from 62

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2

3

those in the earthquake-​affected areas. Starting from the second half of 2022, there has been a significant acceleration in grant applications. Since 30 April, nearly 6,000 grant applications have been submitted, totaling over 3 billion euros. In the Alto Nera area, which is among the most affected areas and has particularly experienced depopulation in the aftermath of the earthquake, applications cover, on average (across the three municipalities), 30 per cent for light damage and 8 per cent for serious damage. To date, only a very small percentage of buildings have been reconstructed (Annual Report of the Extraordinary Commissioner for Reconstruction, 2021). (Annual Report of the Extraordinary Commissioner Reconstruction, 2023. See https://​sisma2​016d​ata.it/​rep​ ort-​page/​). CASA is a cultural and social promotion association and living space in Frontignano di Ussita, established after the 2016 earthquake. See http://​www.port​odim​onta​gna.it/​ Interview at ANSA news agency with Valerio Valeriani, director of Macerata’s Ambito Territoriale Sociale XVIII, which includes the Alto Nera area. Available from: https://​ www.ansa.it/​sism​a_​r i​cost​r uzi​one/​noti​zie/​2018/​10/​27/​sind​aci-​mar​che-​r icost​r uzi​one-​ non-​ce_​2​5c0c​b80-​30cf-​4d1d-​b858-​7d9e9​8975​91f.html

References Barca, F., Casavola, P. and Lucatelli S. (2014) ‘Strategia nazionale per le Aree interne: definizione, obiettivi, strumenti e governance’, Materiali UVAL, 31. Available from: https://​politi​chec​oesi​one.gove​r no.it/​media/​2299/​issue-​ 31_​d​ocum​ents​_​201​4_​in​ner-​areas_​eng.pdf [Accessed 4 September 2023]. Barra G., Marzo A., Olcuire S., Olori D. (2018) ‘“Non è dolce vivere qua”. Genesi e ricadute territoriali delle Soluzioni Abitative d’Emergenza’, in Emidio di Treviri (ed) Sul fronte del sisma. Un’inchiesta militante sul post-​ terremoto in Appennino centrale (2016–​2017), Rome DeriveApprodi, pp 111–​47. Bilau, A.A. and Witt, E. (2016) ‘An analysis of issues for the management of post-​disaster housing reconstruction’, International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 20(3): 265–​76. Calandra, L.M. (2013) ‘Cultura e territorialità: quando l’abitare diventa multitopico. Esempi da L’Aquila post sisma’, in M. Pedrana (eds) Multiculturalità e territorializzazione: Casi di studio, Rome: IF Press, pp 7–​32. Centemeri, L., Topcu, S. and Burgess, P. (eds) (2022) Rethinking Post-​ Disaster Recovery: Socio-​Anthropological Perspectives on Repairing Environments, London: Routledge. Ciuffetti, A. (2019) Appennino: Economie, culture e spazi sociali dal medioevo all’età contemporanea, Rome: Carocci. D’Angelo, A., Della Valle, C., Franchina, A. and Olori, D. (2018) ‘Cronache di un esodo: Abitare provvisorio e dispositivi di displacement nel post-​disastro dell’Appennino centrale’, in Emidio di Treviri (eds) Sul fronte del sisma. Un’inchiesta militante sul post-​terremoto dell’Appennino centrale (2016–​2017), Rome: Derive Approdi, pp 32–​79. De Certeau, M. (1980) L’invention du quotidien. 1 Arts de faire, Paris: Gallimard. De Martino, E. (1977) La fine del mondo. Contributo all’analisi delle apocalissi culturali, Turin: Einaudi. 63

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De Rossi, A. (ed) (2018) Riabitare l’Italia: Le aree interne tra abbandoni e riconquiste, Rome: Donzelli. Domenella, L., Galuzzi, P., Marinelli, G. and Vitillio, P. (2020) ‘Dall’emergenza alla ricostruzione dei territori fragili’, EyesReg, 10(3): 128–36. Douglas, M. (1991) ‘The idea of a home: A kind of space’, Social Research, 58(1): 287–​307. Emidio di Treviri, (2021) ‘Un cammino in salita. Percorsi di ricerca e perimetri critici nel post-​terremoto dell’Appennino centrale’, in Emidio di Treviri (eds) Sulle tracce dell’Appennino che cambia: Voci dalla ricerca sul post-​ terremoto del 2016–​17, Isernia: Il Bene Comune, pp 13–​25. Faas, A.J., Barrios, R., Marino, E. and Maldonado, J. (2020) ‘Disaster and climate change-​related displacements and resettlements: Cultural and political ecologies of space, power, and practice’, in A. Oliver-​Smith and S.M. Hoffman (eds) The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp 345–​57. Fordham, M., Lovekamp, W.E., Thomas, D.S.K. and Phillips, B.D. (2013) ‘Understanding social vulnerability’, in D.S.K. Thomas, B.D. Phillips, A. Fothergill and W.E. Lovekamp (eds) Social Vulnerability to Disasters, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp 1–​29. Giovagnoli, M. (2020) ‘I nodi dell’Appennino’, in L. Bindi (eds) Le vie della transumanza: Un patrimonio bio-​culturale per la rigenerazione territoriale, Campobasso: Palladino Editore, pp 55–​92. Greimas, A. J. and Courtés, J. (1979) Sémiotique: Dictionnaire raisonné de la theorie du langage, Paris: Hachette. Hoffman, S. (2020) ‘“The worst of times, the best of times”: Toward a model of cultural response to disaster’, in A. Oliver-​Smith and S.M. Hoffman (eds) The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp 141–​61. Ingold, T. (2000) The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill, London: Routledge. INGV (2017) Sequenza in Italia centrale: aggiornamento del 28 aprile, [online], Available from: https://​ingvte​r rem​oti.com/​2017/​04/​28/​seque​nza-​in-​ita​ lia-​centr​ale-​aggior​name​nto-​del-​28-​apr​ile/​ [Accessed 20 March 2022]. Jha, A.K., Barenstein, J.D., Phelps, P.M., Pittet, D. and Sena, S. (eds) (2010) Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters, Washington DC: World Bank Publications. Ligi, G. (2009) Antropologia dei disastri, Rome and Bari: Laterza. Low, S. (2016) Spatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Place, London: Routledge. Merleau-​Ponty, M. (1945) Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris: Gallimard. Miller, D. (2008) The Comfort of Things, Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Oggioni, C., Chelleri, L. and Forino, G. (2019) ‘Challenges and opportunities for pre-​disaster strategic planning in post-​disaster temporary housing provision: Evidence from earthquakes in Central Italy (2016–​2017)’, IJPP –​Italian Journal of Planning Practice, IX(1): 96–​129. Oliver-​Smith, A. (1991) ‘Successes and failures in post-​disaster resettlement’, Disasters, 15(1): 12–​23. Oliver-​Smith, A. (2020) ‘The brotherhood of pain: Emotion and social organization in the crisis of disaster’, in A. Oliver-​Smith and S.M. Hoffman (eds) The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp 227–​43. Olori D. and Mariani E. (2022) ‘The rhetoric of development in rural areas: The branding places processes in the earthquake-​affected Central Apennines’, Fuori Luogo. Rivista Di Sociologia Del Territorio, Turismo, Tecnologia, 13(3): 62–​73. Pellizzoni, L. (2018) ‘Prefazione’ in Emidio di Treviri (eds) Sul fronte del sisma, Rome: Derive Approdi. Pink, S. (2015) Doing Sensory Ethnography, London: Sage. Quarantelli, E.L. (ed) (1998) What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question, London: Routledge. Tarpino, A. (2016) Il paesaggio fragile, Turin: Einaudi. Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (eds) (2004) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disaster, London: Routledge.

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Adaptive Disaster Memories: Voices from the Post-earthquake Irpinia (23 November 1980) Gabriele Ivo Moscaritolo

Introduction ‘There is no European Society whose modern history has been deeply marked by disaster than Italy’s.’ In the very first lines of their volume, the authors of Disastro! underline the frailty of the peninsula and how these tragic events ‘seem to test the social fabric and the political system to their limits’ (Dickie et al, 2002, p 3). Actually, if we take into account the seismic events, we note that in the last two centuries, there has been a destructive earthquake (Mw > 5.5) on average every five years. Each of these events forms a link in the long chain of destruction and reconstruction that characterizes recent Italian history (Guidoboni, 2013). Despite the relevance of these tragic events, there has been inadequate interest on the part of Italian social scientists during the 20th century (Bevilacqua, 1996; Guidoboni, 2015). Only after the earthquake in L’Aquila (2009) did national scientific production align itself with international trends (Olori, 2016), and ‘this earthquake gave rise to a new generation of Italian scholars’ (Forino and Carnelli, 2019, p 414). There are many reasons behind this new wave of studies (Carnelli et al, 2016) that, among other things, has stimulated a renewed interest in the earthquakes of the past (Parrinello, 2015; Farinella and Saitta, 2019). In this chapter, I will show a particular line of research that has emerged in Italy in recent years. This perspective aims to combine an ecological approach to disasters and the methodology of oral history (Moscaritolo, 2018; Longo, 2018; 2019; Gribaudi, 2020; Moscaritolo, 2020a; 2020b). On the one hand, the ecological approach focuses ‘on the effectiveness of societal adaptation to the total environment, including the natural, modified 66

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and constructed contexts and processes of which the community is a part’ (Oliver-​Smith, 1998, p 187). Therefore, societies are influenced by their historical environmental relations and environments are deeply conditioned by the histories of societies. Disasters, often dramatically, show us this mutuality. For that reason, it is essential to consider a historically produced pattern of vulnerability because ‘disasters are quintessentially historical ones, that is they are the outcome of processes that change over time and whose genesis lie in the past’ (Bankoff, 2007, p 110). Thus, ‘any understanding or definition of disaster must be grounded in a theoretical approach that is capable of encompassing the web of relations that link society (the organization and relations among individuals and groups), environment (the network of linkages with the physical world in which people and groups are both constituting and constituted), and culture (the values, norms, beliefs, attitudes, knowledge that pertain to that organization and those relations)’ (Oliver-​Smith, 1998, p 188). On the other hand, the methodology of oral history helps us to deeply investigate the complex relationship between human beings and their environment. In the last decades, Italian oral historians made a qualitative leap in their studies. As part of this new course, the use of oral sources has gone beyond a simple bottom-​up reconstruction of the events, and attention has focused on memory, with its dynamics of selection, forgetfulness, and reworking (Bonomo, 2013). If ‘memory is indispensable to understand the continuity of the social world and the modes of its reproduction, no less than the modes in which its changes are perceived and processed by people’ (Jedlowsky, 1991, p 12), through the methodology of oral history, we can investigate the sense of the process by which individuals and groups relate to their environment. What kind of relationship exist between memory and disaster/​traumatic events? A very close one, because they are socially shared experiences and ‘shocking or extremely stressful events, those far from normal in everyday life, impact upon individuals, collectivities, and nations, and they are remembered and periodically revisited’ (Gawronski and Olson, 2001, p 298). More precisely, disasters/​traumatic events mark a turning point in the life course and they divide the flow of time into ‘what was before’ and ‘what came after’. In other words, they mark a ‘discontinuity’ and therefore require the reconstruction of a sense of ‘continuity’. After a turning point, we are no longer the same as before. However, we are still the same person (Cavalli, 1995). The construction of this sense of continuity occurs whenever people reflect on their own experiences, both from an individual and a collective level. It is the product of selective criteria of the memory that choose what to keep (remembering) and what to leave out (oblivion) of past experiences. Obviously, these selective criteria are not stable. They change over time according to the problems people are 67

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facing in the present and the tasks and goals they are confronted with in light of the future. Events such as disasters shape the history of the society we belong to; they restructure these selective criteria e give new meaning to our history. Thus, it is possible to investigate how people process the experience of discontinuity by collecting and analysing the stories of witnesses who have directly experienced certain events. Therefore, we can bring light on how people reformulate the relationship with their environment and show one of the potentialities of oral history: ‘to document a chorus of experiences of an event, to capture what individuals thought about and went through, and to hear them begin to articulate their views about the significance and meaning of their experiences’ (Sloan, 2008, p 181). Furthermore, the use of oral sources allows us to criticize the disaster narratives that shape public opinion in the aftermath of a calamity. As Simpson pointed out, when we focus on how ordinary people understood the catastrophe and the aftermath, whom they blamed and cursed, how they perceived the interventions of the government, and how they went about restoring passable conditions in which they could live out their own lives, then the story of the disaster has a different feel and logic (Simpson, 2013, p 2). In the next paragraphs, I will show this study perspective by presenting some testimonies collected about the earthquake of 23 November 1980. Most of these interviews have been published in Moscaritolo (2020a) whereas some are collected by other authors. The witnesses belong to different generations and social classes. There are institutional people (mayors and administrators who had important public roles during the emergency and reconstruction); people who were adults in the 1980; and the new generations, who have no direct experiences of the earthquake but to whom stories and memories have been transmitted. Contact with witnesses occurred in different ways, in some cases through local associations and municipalities, in others through personal knowledge networks. The use of multiple channels to reach witnesses allowed access to differentiated viewpoints and experiences. The interviews were conducted in the witnesses’ homes or in the local associations and followed the oral history methodology (Bonomo, 2013). These are ‘unstructured’ interviews, where there are no pre-​determined questions because the main aim is to bring out the witnesses’ universe of the meaning (Bichi, 2007). Interviews collected with the oral history methodology do not follow the classic question/​answer scheme; they are rather a dialogue between researcher and witness, a horizontal relationship not necessarily in one direction. Many witnesses agreed to tell their experience with pleasure while in some cases they did not want to recount the evening of 23 November. This is a very significant fact, as it is a sign that for someone the trauma has not yet been worked out. 68

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The earthquake that occurred on 23 November 1980 has been one of the most disastrous seismic events in recent Italian history (Mw 6.9). It affected a large area in Southern Italy, destroyed dozens of towns and caused 2,735 victims, 9,000 injured, and 394,000 homeless (Guidoboni et al, 2018). Over the last few decades, the media have recounted this event by emphasizing the central government’s unpreparedness in managing relief efforts or by remembering the corruption and the wastefulness during the reconstruction phase. Moreover, many Italian scholars have concentrated their attention on political and economic aspects, especially in the area around Naples (De Seta, 1983; Barbagallo et al, 1989; Barbagallo, 1997). More recently, some studies dealing with the aftermath of the seism in the most seriously affected areas have seen the light (Zaccaria and Zizzari, 2016; Gribaudi, 2020; Moscaritolo, 2020a; Ventura, 2020; Falconieri et al, 2020; Gribaudi et al, 2021). First, I will focus on the impact of the earthquake, in the second on the choices made by some small towns, in the third on the narratives that emerged about the reconstructions, and finally on the second generations’ memory.

The end of the world ‘My mother worked as a janitor in the high school of Sant’Angelo … then you can imagine the janitor’s son who becomes a student … a student in that high school who becomes a professor in that high school … the best! On 23 November I went out to the square in Sant’Angelo … and you can imagine what I felt and what happens in the town: the little professor, respected local administrator … with a beautiful wife and a happy marriage … I had gone out with my son and I felt like a god … with the child in the stroller … greeting everyone, I was walking on the clouds … and then suddenly the awareness that everything was collapsing.’ (Vincenzo V., born in 1948)1 In his testimony, Vincenzo recounts the day of 23 November 1980 when the earthquake was felt throughout Italy. The turning point is very clear because we can read the last bars of a chapter of his life. He underlines how the sacrifices and expectations of a lifetime are suddenly wiped out and his memory amplifies the difference between ‘before’ and ‘after’. Moreover, many people remember how that Sunday was an unusually sweet day. After this pleasant picture, terms such as ‘apocalypse’ or ‘end of the world’ appear in the interviews: “I felt that the world was about to end, that the ground would open up … and we would all be swallowed up” says Michele V. (1949); whereas Romualdo M. (1943) says: ‘I heard a noise of irons … an explosion … and instinctively I headed for the exit … but I realized that the stairs were beginning to writhe … 69

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the building collapsed on the other floors, and then the door collapsed on me … I could not go back into the house and I was in that condition overnight.’ The destruction and terror of those moments are etched in the minds of many of those involved. Everyone can remember where they were, whom they were with and what they were doing on that night. They can recall images, smells and sounds of the days following the disaster when the relief teams slowly began to arrive. Above all, the environment and the landscape suddenly change. In an instant these stable certainties come alive and collapse before their eyes: ‘And then I realized that … the biggest building, the Iapicca palace which was four or five floors high, it was gone … and at that moment I felt a sense of total bewilderment, of anguish … of trembling … I could neither go forward nor go backward, I was petrified by this first image.’ (Michele G., 1955) The destruction of the lived space causes a sense of disorientation similar to the sensation of ‘territorial anguish’ (De Martino, 1977), but, after this crisis in subjective experiences and the loss of reference points, a new adaptation process is necessary. This effort –​both emotional and cognitive –​occurs from the psychological to the collective level and aims to re-​establish a link with places suddenly felt as strangers. As Gribaudi underlines, ‘the fracture of memory is linked to physical disorientation, to the loss of one’s territorial references. It is nostalgia for a kind of lost homeland, for authentic social relationships, for moral certainties’ (Gribaudi, 2020, p 240). How do people reformulate their relationship with the environment? How do they relate to places that have suddenly taken the form of the uncanny (Freud, 2003)? How do societies deal with the experience of discontinuity? What is the role played by people’s memory? In the months following the 23 November, there were many debates about the future choices of the large affected area. The reconstruction had to involve small towns, cities and areas that were very different and distant from each other. From the national to the local level, all responses and proposals had to take into account the needs of the present –​dozens of destroyed towns and villages and thousands of victims –​but also the needs of the future and the memory of the past.

Before and after The area hit by the earthquake is located in southern Italy, in the middle of the Campanian-​Lucanian Apennine Mountain range. Before this tragic 70

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event, the whole area was one of the poorest in Italy, but its economy was slowly growing and life conditions improving thanks to remittances from emigrants and diversification of agricultural production (Centro di specializzazione, 1981). However, many small towns had different socio-​ economic characteristics: some of them were very poor but others had small industries and public offices. For example, in Lioni and Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi many commercial initiatives were established and the public sector allowed a good standard of living. Unlike Conza della Campania, Laviano, or Romagnano al Monte were in geographically marginal positions and had suffered extensive emigration in the past years. Overall, the whole area hit by the earthquake was very heterogeneous. In the national debate, between intellectuals and political parties, there was an agreement to allocate many funds for building reconstruction and start industrial production, as the area was not yet developed like the rest of Italy. In May 1981, the government issued Act 219. It revolved around two keywords: ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’. The aim was to ‘modernize’ the affected areas, still considered in a state of backwardness. Act 219 gave much autonomy to town governments, and the huge amount of funds allocated allowed them to consider different options for their future. More precisely, article 27 reads: Rebuilding takes place in the area of existing settlements and, if there are geological, technical and social reasons for it, in the municipal area as a whole. It can also be carried out by means of extensions, completions and adaptations, technical and functional, or by means of new works deemed necessary for the reorganization of an area and for its economic and social development. These were the basis for the housing reconstruction choices of each small town. In the local discussions, memories and trends of the past, the political and socio-​economic situation of the present, the geological surveys, expectations and imagination about the future came into play: “I intended to rebuild the town where it used to be … with its history and its culture … this intent was largely shared by the townspeople … what most people wanted was to stay together, to remain at the site of the tragedy … of the memory”, says Michele G. (1955), citizen of Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi. Felice, Mayor of Conza della Campania in office in 1980, recalls: ‘When the earthquake arrived, people realised that it was a unique and unrepeatable opportunity to think about the future in a different dimension, no longer on that hilltop … but in the valley … it was no longer conceivable that Conza, after collapsing for the third time due to an earthquake, could keep on defying the forces of nature … that’s 71

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why … this thought … made its way into people’s minds … let us all move down to the valley.’ (Felice I., 1949) The reconstructions of Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi and Conza della Campania represent two classical and opposite ways in which, after a great calamity, people can face their past and imagine their own future (Moscaritolo, 2020a). These two approaches –​‘philological reconstruction’ (which aims to restore the pre-​disaster state) and ‘re-​localization’ (the move of the entire town) (Cavalli, 2005) –​can be seen as the two extremes of a continuum encompassing all the possible post-​disaster reconstruction choices. There are other small villages hit by the 1980 earthquake that belong to these two types: Caposele with its philological reconstruction, Bisaccia and Romagnano al Monte, re-​ localized. Between these two opposite choices, we can find numerous types of ‘selective reconstructions’, which combine elements of conservation and modernization. Examples of these types are the cases of Laviano and Teora, of which stories are reported in Gribaudi (2020) and Ventura (2020). However, it must be pointed out that many other small villages rebuilt after the 1980 earthquake should be further investigated because the autonomy granted to the local communities has given rise to profoundly different outcomes.

Reconstruction Starting from different situations and motivations, populations and authorities affected by a disaster have to solve different dilemmas and make choices (Davis and Alexander, 2015). Reconstruction after a disaster concerns actions taken by human societies both to alleviate crisis situations and to direct the future of places and people. To fully understand its outcomes and effects, we should consider it as a complex social process, rather than looking only at its impact or at the material results achieved. From a long-​term perspective, different choices and stories give rise to different memories. The town of San Michele di Serino was completely demolished and then rebuilt in the same place. Many inhabitants believe this was the right choice but, in some interviews, the disorientation is always present: ‘I see and remember some streets, but via Palazzo is completely new and it was different before. I don’t recognize anything from Piazza Umberto, nothing is left of our town, only the public houses down by the river, I don’t recognize anything, I don’t recognize San Michele and I no longer recognize people.’ (Gribaudi, 2020, p 249) In Laviano, where the reconstruction was a blend of conservation and modernization, nostalgia pushes people to remember and take refuge in the places of memory: 72

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‘If we try to … dream, we always dream of the old village … that night I dreamed of the village exactly as it was. In my sleep I said: “now I have to remember”, and I walked all the way that led from the church to the castle, because I had tried the day to remember, but I no longer remembered how to get to my house grandmother from the church. At night I dreamed of it and saw it identical to the town as it was before. Because there is all the past, childhood, games and friends.’ (Gribaudi, 2020, pp 249–50) These last two interviews were collected by Gribaudi (2020) and show us how the fracture caused by the earthquake is difficult to repair. The moment of discontinuity causes a strong subjective crisis that prevents us from overcoming the disorientation and pain of losses. People who experience catastrophe as adults are more likely to feel nostalgia for a world that no longer exists, as the tragedy clearly divides their life course into two parts. In some cases, even a philological reconstruction may not satisfy the desire to regain the lost past, due to human losses and social changes that have taken place: “The story is interpreted in a certain way … successes … that are possibly measured on the ‘material’ reconstruction … but as regards the ‘spiritual’ reconstruction, so to speak … I think that Sant’Angelo stopped existing on that exact day … there are still ruins” (Tonino C., 1950). However, in cases of relocalization (Conza and Romagnano), where people live in places rebuilt in a completely different way, witnesses can positively evaluate their experience, claiming that they have managed to overcome all difficulties in the best way: ‘We have been forced to cope … when one, loses everything, in a matter of a minute, then his life changes and he accepts everything in a certain way … I have found a great dignity in the people, honestly … both when we were in the barracks and when we were in the prefabricated buildings and the houses … the people endured it in a dignified manner … I did not see scenes of panic, scenes of discomfort … here all the families have been touched by death in the family, losses … we rolled up our sleeves and moved on … we made a little town that functions well.’ (Raffaele F., 1960) In the case of Romagnano al Monte, probably one of the poorest centres in 1980, the reconstruction made it possible to overcome the poverty of the past and obtain well-​being and comfort: ‘In the old town, there was no water, there was no bathroom. It was a disaster, we went and get water from the town fountain and I took it home with the bucket, I got there I washed the dishes and 73

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threw it, I washed the clothes and threw it away. … We are really happy to be here, in the new country … at least … we are happy.’ (Gribaudi, 2021, p 346) Clearly, we cannot establish a mono-​causal connection between the choices of reconstruction and the opinions expressed by the inhabitants. Many elements certainly contribute to the formation of the opinions such as pre-​ existing tendencies, the extent of the destruction, grief, trauma, economic losses, the distribution of resources, personal experiences. Franco’s words highlight how the reconstruction of a community is a very complex issue and history can take unexpected directions: ‘When there has been an earthquake, as in every tragedy, there are those who suffer damage and become impoverished, those who go into depression and so on and there are those who instead … open their eyes as an opportunity to enter in a new world, because the earthquake closes a game, upsets the balance of a community, starts from scratch.’ (Franco A., 1957) What I would like to underline is the profound variety of opinions and narratives that can emerge years after a disaster and a large-​scale reconstruction that has changed a vast territory. However, not only the direct witnesses of the earthquake have memories about the changes that communities and territories have gone through. It is interesting to note that these narratives do not remain among small groups or social networks but spread within the entire community. They involve younger people, even those who have not directly experienced the earthquake and who attribute a new meaning to the catastrophe and to the past that no longer exists.

I was not there, but I remember ‘I have not experienced the earthquake, but I carry it inside me. The adults told us about the disaster. In our imaginations, the word became a frightening character, which frightened even the strongest and most valiant adults. … I could tell in detail, without hesitation, what the people dear to me did at 7:34 on 23 November 1980. … I remember that we asked that story, we asked that we were told “the story of the earthquake”.’ (Brancato et al, 2020, p 135) Carolina’s words highlight a peculiarity of the generation named ‘children of the earthquake’ (Moscaritolo, 2021): the deep emotional involvement with the catastrophe that preceded their birth. This is the generation born after 1980, which did not directly experience the tragedy but grew up in the shadow of 74

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the adults’ memories, in small towns under reconstruction, surrounded by the echo of tragedy. Hirsch defined their memory, ‘postmemory’: ‘Postmemory’ describes the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears to the personal, collective and cultural trauma of those who came before –​to experiences they ‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images and behaviours among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection and creation. … These events happened in the past, but their effects continue into the present. (Hirsch, 2012, p 5) Studying postmemory allows us both to understand how stories and narratives are transmitted within a social group and to deepen the reflections on the memory of traumatic/​catastrophic events. We can answer the following questions: will there still be the memory of this event in the absence of direct witnesses? If so, how do the new generations reinterpret the events that have taken place? What sense do they attribute to the catastrophe and the past they never lived? There are many psychological dynamics studied by other authors regarding postmemory (Hirsch, 1997; Hoffman, 2005; Hirsch, 2012; Frosh, 2019). Here it is important to underline that the interviewees have shown a strong awareness about the earthquake and the lost past, which is now part of their memory. Antonia has the memory of her father in her mind: ‘I have a printed image inside me that has never actually been experienced personally, an image that comes out of my father’s memories, he tells me that when he went out the door, he saw an incinerated village … a cloud of smoke and then the village that is no longer there … and then this image immediately gives me chills.’ (Antonia P., 1981) Whereas Giulio: ‘I imagine Sant’Angelo as a tidier town and with an ordered landscape … some postcards are still present where you can see a shot of Sant’Angelo from afar … in a landscape that may remember Umbria or Tuscany … in addition to the urban core there was nature, there were trees, in short, there was the countryside, without the dozens and hundreds of shack houses that you would now notice.’ (Giulio D., 1978) 75

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Through stories, photos and commemorations, the memory of the event and the vanished past have been transmitted to the youngest, and they can reconnect themselves with the previous generation through their imagination. Thanks to this act of identification and creative response, the moment of strong discontinuity that has upset the adults’ life is perceived by young people who try in the same way to re-​establish an identity continuity. In addition to the stories and images transmitted, the lived space of their childhood testifies to what preceded its generation: destroyed villages, rubble, construction sites, prefabricated buildings, and industrial warehouses. The ‘children of the earthquake’ identify their childhood with this post-​ apocalyptic landscape: ‘I remember that in the village all these voids were created, where there were houses, they began to tear them down … and they began to remove the rubble, my childhood was made of mud because there were heavy vehicles that broke the roads as they passed, then the mud came out of the roads, the weeds that grew in the rubble, the garbage that accumulated in the rubble.’ (Giuseppe D., 1976) Furthermore, post-​memory concerns the relationship between the youngest and the trauma suffered by adults. The scholars who dealt with postmemory underlined a ‘risk’ in the transmission of traumatic experience: ‘to grow up with overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s life stories displaced, even evacuated, by our ancestors’ (Hirsch, 2012, p 5). At the basis of the possibility of this risk, there is the emotional involvement between those who have directly lived a certain experience and those who witness his story. In this meeting, confusion can arise between different temporalities: ‘one who should be in a position of witnessing (for instance, the child who hears or absorbs the parent’s testimony) is instead dragged into a state of experiencing the trauma as if it were her or his own’ (Frosh, 2019, p XII). There may be the possibility of being overwhelmed by the pain of adults. On the contrary, there may be different reactions that show a different awareness about the history of one’s community. Elisa, defines herself as the “seed of hope” since she is part of the generation that would contribute to the rebirth of the community but also a “victim of memory”: ‘We have carried with us all the scars of what had been … and we could not understand why … everything was attributable to “before”, the present did not exist, the present never existed … there was only the “before” … therefore when I tell you that those of my generation are victims of memory that’s it … we have an enormous burden of information … memories … affections … feelings… community … 76

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that we have never lived … these are things that have been handed down to us … for us they remain legends … we do not have an identity we are earthquake victims … the children of the earthquake.’ (Elisa F., 1981) There is the possibility that the wound passed on by the previous generation could overwhelm those who come after, but the impression in this interview is quite different, and we can probably find what Hirsch defined as ‘postmemorial work’, that is, the personal re-​elaborations that the next generation carries out, reinterpreting the traumatic experience in new contexts, repositioning themselves and emancipating themselves from it (Hirsch, 2012). Finally, postmemory invites us to reflect on the awareness that certain events can repeat themselves in people’s lives. The disaster literature has often emphasized the removal of disasters from collective memory, as if such events were doomed to oblivion and to repeat themselves in history, without efforts to avoid tragic consequences (Mauch and Pfister, 2009, p 3). The Italian cycles of destruction/​reconstruction are an example of this trend. As Gribaudi points out, ‘oblivion prevents the reorganization of social life by openly facing the danger with prevention’ (Gribaudi, 2020, p 218). However, some testimonies highlight a strong memory of the earthquake. They show the awareness that the earthquake can occur and also a ‘preparation’ for this eventuality: ‘The earthquake is a continuous reflection … also because it will happen again … see today Amatrice, tomorrow Belice … the day after tomorrow Emilia Romagna … Irpinia … once, twice and three times … when he wants, he comes … and what will happen … I don’t know.’ (Giuseppe D., 1976) ‘We have experienced it so many times at the commemorations that it is now as if we had lived it … I’ll tell you more … a few years ago we witnessed several tremors … we are ready … we already know what we have to do … [smiles] we know what is happening … we have a clear awareness of what to do and where to go … so we are equipped although we never have it lived … that is, not in a traumatic way … as others have lived it … however it is an unconscious question we already know what we have to do … if the chandelier oscillates we already know what is happening.’ (Elisa F., 1981)

Discussion In the previous paragraphs, we have seen how one of the central elements characterizing the memory of a disaster is the interplay between continuity 77

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and discontinuity. While the catastrophic event divides the flow of time into a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, the identity of individuals and collectivities requires the construction of a sense of continuity that can allow adaptation to a suddenly changed world. Regarding the impact of the earthquake, it is clear how the witnesses’ interviews underline the extraordinariness and uniqueness of the event with images of a real apocalypse etched in their mind. In the narration, this moment is often preceded by an introduction that recounts a picture of ordinariness suddenly interrupted, precisely to emphasize the upheaval of one’s life. Here it is important to underline that the recounting of this dramatic experience –​which does not always appear in interviews –​is the first step in recognizing and re-​elaborating the event. As Jedlowski points out: What first dwells in the subject as memory or as a more or less confused fantasy becomes, thanks to linguistic and discursive tools, an object, that is, something that exists outside the subject itself, in a space in common with others. … The tale we have narrated now exists outside of us, we observe it and it observes us. (Jedlowski, 2009, p 123) This is a process that takes place on an individual and collective level, allowing us to understand and reinterpret the event and begin an adaptation to change. The process of adaptation to a completely changed reality passes first through an awareness of the sudden change and then through future perspectives that take the form of choices for reconstruction. These can be seen as a mix of different orientations: on the one hand to direct the future by changing elements of the past considered obsolete, and on the other, to recover elements of the past symbolic of one’s identity. In the case of 1980, the choices for reconstruction were decided from a bottom-​up perspective by the local administrations and today we can observe a great variety of them, which testifies to how many factors are involved and how the affected area was heterogeneous in many respects. If the choices for reconstruction represent another important step that allows an adaptation and synthesis between past, present, and future, it is also important to observe the experience and opinions of the populations about this complex social process from a long-​term perspective. As we have seen, it is possible to note a great variety of opinions that depend not only on reconstruction choices but also on multiple factors such as the perception of the pre-​existing reality, the extent of the loss suffered, the expectations generated, and the outcomes achieved. Finally, I believe that one of the most interesting aspects regarding the memory of catastrophes concerns the transmission of the memory through the generations. As we have seen, the ‘children of the earthquake’ have a profound awareness of the event as a fundamental element of the identity 78

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of their community, they reinterpret the earthquake differently from the previous generation, and above all, they have a different attitude towards the possibility that certain events may be repeated.

Conclusions ‘Metaphorically, if we think of societies as weaving daily tapestries, a disaster is a gash or a sharply discordant thread suddenly introduced into the pattern’ (Olson and Gawronski, 2005, p 1). Following this idea, a long-​term perspective on a disaster helps us to see ‘how a society repairs/​reweaves itself and moves on. In many cases, the tapestry takes off in a dramatically different direction, with new colors and designs’ (Olson and Gawronski, 2005, p 1). This metaphor is extremely useful to better frame the perspective presented in this article. First of all, one of the strengths of the historical approach to disaster research is its capacity to acknowledge both the immediacy of the catastrophe and the long-​term effects of such events (Mauch and Pfister, 2009). Consequently, it allows us to focus both on the ‘gash’ and on its ‘re-​ weaving’, that is, how human beings restart, deciding what to keep from the past and projecting themselves towards future needs. In other words, it is about understanding how societies establish continuity and adapt to a suddenly changed environmental, economic and social context. By following this approach, the methodology of oral history –​and the study of memory –​ can provide further insights as it allows us to get closer to direct experience, to the feelings, interpretations, motivations and expectations that emerge in a society where ordinary life is suddenly upset. In this sense, the experience should not be understood as a sum of data but as sedimentation and processing of events in order to re-​establish continuity, as the ability to give meaning to the present (Jedlowski, 2002, p 38). Therefore, it is through the analysis of the memory of the affected populations that we can understand the process by which they make the events of their lives coherent. How can we use these memories? Is that a pure historical knowledge? Or maybe it can help us to face the disasters of the future with more awareness? Elisa’s previously mentioned words suggest that under certain conditions learning processes can be triggered and people can be deeply aware of the environmental risks affecting their lives. Consequently, this awareness can stimulate political and decision-​making processes that can prevent future disasters and avoid the cycles of destruction/​reconstruction we have spoken about. History can be a teacher of life; however, history itself reveals that people do not always learn from their experiences. As highlighted by Schenk, ‘the manner, scope and thus benefit of this implicit or explicit learning varies greatly and depends on epoch and culture. This variation reveals the role played by history and culture in the learning process’ (Schenk, 2015, p 78). The in-​depth study of the testimonies allows us to understand these learning 79

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processes since the dynamics of memory over the years reveal an extremely heterogeneous and useful set of experiences to establish a better relationship with the environment. However, the stories of the witnesses are not enough. They need to access the political dimension. As Parrinello underlines, We need policies that encourage, support, and weave together storytelling; policies that acknowledge earthquakes as part of place and community. We need policies that help to scale up these narratives countrywide and exploit the medium (from museums to oral history repositories) to remember and recount the histories, and losses, of an earthquake country. We need this to lay the foundation for a renewed sense of place. (Parrinello, 2018, p 77) From this point of view, the earthquake of 23 November 1980 constitutes an interesting and still little explored case. Each small town has chosen its path with profoundly different results. Choices, decision-​making processes, results, interactions between populations and ruling classes, between periphery and centre form a repository of experiences and information useful for future emergencies. All of these can be useful lessons for all countries that are periodically hit by seismic events. The stories and memories that emerged after 1980 should be brought to light and valued, not flattened on tales of negative stereotypes, poverty, backwardness, corruption and defeat. Note 1

Unless otherwise indicated, the interviews were conducted by the author. The name of the witnesses and year of birth are indicated in brackets.

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Cavalli, A. (1995) Patterns of Collective Memory: Discussion papers n. 14, Budapest: Collegium Budapest/​Institute for Advanced Study. Cavalli, A. (2005) ‘Tra spiegazione e comprensione: Lo studio delle discontinuità socio-​temporali’, in M. Borlandi and L. Sciolla (eds) La Spiegazione Sociologica. Metodi, Tendenze, Problemi, Bologna: Il Mulino, pp 195–​218. Centro di specializzazione e ricerche economiche-​a grarie per il Mezzogiorno Portici –​Università degli studi di Napoli (1981) Situazione, problemi e prospettive dell’area più colpita dal terremoto del 23 novembre 1980, Turin: Einaudi. Davis, I. and Alexander, D.E. (2015) Recovery from Disaster, London: Routledge. De Martino, E. (1977) La fine del mondo: Contributo alle analisi delle apocalissi culturali, Turin: Einaudi. De Seta, C. (1983) Dopo il terremoto la ricostruzione, Bari: Laterza. Dickie, J., Foot, J. and Snowden, F. (eds) (2002) Disastro! Disasters in Italy since 1860: Culture, Politics, Society, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Falconieri, I., Fichera, F. and Valitutto, S. (eds) (2020) Irpinia 1980: Evocare il terremoto, ripensare i disastri, Arcidosso: C&P Adver Effigi. Farinella, D. and Saitta, P. (2019) The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters: The Management of Urban Space Through an Earthquake–​Messina, 1908–​2018, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Forino, G. and Carnelli, F. (2019) ‘The L’Aquila earthquake 10 years on (2009–​2019): Impacts and state-​of-​the-​art’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 28(4): 414. Freud, S. (2003) The Uncanny, London: Penguin Classics. Frosh, S. (2019) Those Who Come After: Postmemory, Acknowledgement and Forgiveness, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Gawronski, V.T. and Olson, R.S. (2001) ‘Tapping collective memory of disaster: Getting “inside” the 1985 Mexico city earthquakes’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 19(3): 297–​322. Gribaudi, G. (2020) La memoria, i traumi, la storia. La guerra e le catastrofi nel Novecento, Rome: Viella. Gribaudi, G., Mastroberti, F. and Senatore F. (eds) (2021) Il terremoto del 23 novembre 1980: Luoghi e memorie, Naples: Editoriale Scientifica. Guidoboni, E. (2013) ‘Terremoti e città: La catena dimenticata delle distruzioni e delle ricostruzioni’, in E. Guidoboni and G. Valensise (eds) L’Italia dei disastri: Dati e riflessioni sull’impatto degli eventi naturali 1861–​2013, Bologna: Bononia University Press, pp 243–​77. Guidoboni, E. (2015) ‘Terremoti e storia trenta anni dopo’, Quaderni storici, 150(3): 753–​84.

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Guidoboni, E., Ferrari, G., Mariotti, D., Comastri, A., Tarabusi, G., Sgattoni, G. et al (2018) CFTI5Med, Catalogo dei Forti Terremoti in Italia (461 a.C.–​1997) e nell’area Mediterranea (760 a.C.–​1500). Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV). doi: https://​doi.org/​10.6092/​ingv. it-​cfti5 Hirsch, M. (1997) Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hirsch, M. (2012) The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust, New York: Columbia University Press. Hoffman, E. (2005) After such Knowledge, London: Vintage. Jedlowski, P. and Rampazi, M. (1991) ‘Presentazione’, in P. Jedlowski and M. Rampazi (eds) Il senso del passato. Per una sociologia della memoria, Milan: Franco Angeli, pp 12–​13. Jedlowski, P. (2002) Memoria, esperienza e modernità: Memorie e società nel XX secolo, Milan: Franco Angeli. Jedlowski, P. (2009) Il racconto come dimora: Heimat e le memorie d’Europa, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri. Longo, M.L. (2018) ‘Vivere nel rischio. Popolazione, scienziati e istituzioni di fronte all’attività vulcanica nei Campi Flegrei (1970–​1984)’, Quaderni storici, 3: 799–​819. Longo, M.L. (2019) ‘How memory can reduce the vulnerability to disasters: The bradyseism of Pozzuoli in southern Italy’, AIMS Geosciences, 5(3): 631–​44. Mauch, C. and Pfister, C. (eds) (2009) Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses: Case Studies Toward Global Environmental History, Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books. Moscaritolo, G.I. (2018) ‘The memory of the 1980 earthquake and its aftermath in Irpinia (Southern Italy): Two case-​studies’, Global Environment, 11: 434–​55. Moscaritolo, G.I. (2020a) Memorie dal cratere: Storia sociale del terremoto in Irpinia, Florence: Editpress. Moscaritolo, G.I. (2020b) ‘Reconstruction as a long-​term process: Memory, experiences and cultural heritage in the Irpinia post-​earthquake (November 23, 1980)’, Geosciences, 10(8): 316. Moscaritolo, G.I. (2021) ‘Figli del terremoto. Generazioni e postmemoria nel cratere irpino’, in G. Gribaudi, F. Mastroberti and F. Senatore (eds) Il terremoto del 23 novembre 1980: Luoghi e memorie, Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, pp 351–​79. Oliver-​Smith, A. (1998) ‘Global changes and the definition of disaster’, in E. Quarantelli (ed) What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question, London: Routledge, pp 179–​99.

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Olori, D. (2016) ‘Per una questione (subalterna) dei disastri’, in A. Mela, S. Mugnano and D. Olori (eds) Territori vulnerabili: Verso una nuova sociologia dei disastri italiana, Milan: Franco Angeli, pp 81–​6. Olson, R.S. and Gawronski, V.T. (2005) ‘Mexico as a living tapestry: The 1985 disaster in retrospect’, Natural Hazards Observer, 30: 1–​24. Parrinello, G. (2015) Fault Lines: Earthquake and Urbanism in Modern Italy, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Parrinello, G. (2018) ‘To whom does the story belong? Earthquake memories, narratives, and policy in Italy’, in V. Lakhani and E. De Smalen (eds) Sites of Remembering: Landscapes, Lessons, Policies, Munich: RCC Perspectives, pp 69–​77. Schenk, G.J. (2015) ‘Learning from history? Chances, problems and limits of learning from historical natural disasters’, in F. Kruger, G. Bankoff, T. Cannon, B. Orlowski, F. Lisa and E. Schipper (eds) Cultures and Disasters: Understanding Cultural Framings in Disaster Risk Reduction, London: Routledge, pp 72–​87. Simpson, E. (2013) The Political Biography of an Earthquake: Aftermath and Amnesia in Gujarat, India, London: Hurst. Sloan, S. (2008) ‘Oral history and hurricane Katrina: Reflections on shouts and silences’, Oral History Review, 35(2): 176–​86. Ventura, S. (2020) Storia di una ricostruzione: L’Irpinia dopo il terremoto, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. Zaccaria, A. and Zizzari, S. (2016) ‘Spaces of resilience: Irpinia 1980, Abruzzo 2009’, Sociologia Urbana e Rurale, 111: 64–​83.

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PART II

Post-​disaster Politics

5

The COVID-​19 Pandemic and the Ladder of Power: Local Politics and Society in Italy Pietro Saitta

Introduction Disasters are both events that mirror pre-​existing social relationships (individual and collective statuses, positions, different types of exposition to power, cultural and political tics and so on) and ‘runways’, utilized by different actors to achieve old and new goals. Frequently, during these phases social and political processes become faster. Moreover, after an initial period of shock, which is also the moment during which different responsibilities and powers are assigned, and opportunities and chances are identified, the drama turns to be a performative time. That is, the moment during which political actors put into action different self-​representations –​from efficiency to care –​that match their reading of the popular sentiments of the day. To these observations it should be added that undesired events, including pandemics, can be read as events posed at the crossroad of novelty and continuation. New elements (such as regulations, social hierarchies and so on) mingle with forces, structures and ideologies that pre-​existed and that were perhaps overlooked during the phases preceding disasters. Therefore, these latter events limit themselves to make tangible what was somehow hidden or neglected; but that was already shaping the contours of reality –​that is, the structure, the culture, and the ideologies of societies and places. In this latter respect, in a past work (Farinella and Saitta, 2019) I have already observed that public memory –​that is, the circulation of popular recollections that entail what is remembered by the communities and how it is framed (Houdek and Phillips, 2017) –​helps such understanding of disasters. Borrowing from other classic cases, one can for example notice that the Chicago Great Fire 87

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of 1871 took place within the framework of an ascending economy, and this collective experience has been seen through the lens of the myth of creative destruction. For the collective memory, from the Great Fire, the city resurrected stronger than before (Sawislak, 1995). The same is true for San Francisco less than a decade after the 1906 earthquake (Dyl, 2017, p 263). The common element between these two cases is that, prior to the different disasters that hit them, both cities were in an expansion phase. On the contrary, at the onset of the twentieth century, Messina, the city at the centre of this chapter, presented a strong but declining economy (Battaglia, 2003, p 63 passim). Therefore, in 1908 the tremendous earthquake that hit the city and killed tens of thousands of people (up to 86,000 according to certain studies) showed only the limitedness of the local economy and its upcoming collapse. In short, what one can draw from the history of modern disasters in general (that is, of those undesired events that take place in presence of both media and public opinions) applies, at least partly, to the local, specific display of powers in the Italian experience with COVID-​19. With regard to this country and the heyday of the crisis, in fact, it is possible to distinguish five different phases: namely, the slow recognition of the issue; the emergence of contradictory expert voices (‘it’s almost a flu’ vs ‘it’s the end of the world’, if one can summarize the arguments in these terms); the making of an official viewpoint (‘this is serious, and social distancing is the answer’); and, finally, the temporary disappearance of the local administrations from the governance of the event. Finally, the last phase consisted in the return of the local centres of power, together with the possibility for them to use the crisis as an instrument to gain further power and legitimacy. All these phases overlapped or followed one another in quick succession during the end of February and the first nine or so days of March 2020. During this time the voice of the government turned from being shy (almost an exercise of soft power) to harsh and authoritarian. It was the time lapse during which different Decrees of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Dpcm, in Italian) took to frame the response to the crisis, and the central government held a sort of monopoly in the situation definition process. In the light of what has happened afterwards, those have been relatively ‘happy’, and perhaps too short, days during which the communication of risk and the connected measures, although uncertain and subjected to changes, followed one direction and came from one single centre responsible for governance. During this early phase, in fact, mayors and governors1 were mostly absent, and, from the perspective of a ‘technical’ observer, even respectful towards the separation of powers and the word of science. But in a political world dominated by the ‘populistic’ drive to be present and visible –​a compulsion that the disintermediation caused by social media rendered almost pathological2 –​this condition of obscurity and absence was, 88

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for many local administrators, simply unbearable. Soon, therefore, many mayors and governors (some of them portrayed in a successful video that had much circulation in the international communication system)3 realized that under the umbrella of the central State, and within the new conditions of political communication, local authorities had degrees of normative freedom that could be used to respond the ongoing challenges, and to perform according to personal projects and aspirations. Clearly, at this point the crisis became an opportunity for some politicians.

Global crisis, local responses This analysis is mostly inspired by Cateno De Luca, the mayor of the metropolitan city of Messina (Sicily) –​one of the politicians who gained the most during the health crisis by transforming it into a means to obtaining national (and even international) visibility. Authoritarian, draconian, populist, admittedly vulgar and ambitious, soon such a mayor took to compete with the central state, and he established a rule that interfered with the national indications on how to cope with the emergency. Above all, in his hands the epidemiological crisis lost its technical-​medical character to become merely political and performative. Slowly, in fact, it became clear that De Luca was deploying the pandemic as a lever to ascend to the role of next governor of Sicily (Saitta, 2020a). Moreover, either independently or in accordance with his successful example, during the same time many local administrators followed De Luca’s model. Thus, the Italian cities and regions became the battlefields of vigorous attacks launched by a number of populist mayors and governors who competed with the central State and the national and global centres of health governance, in order to pursue the objective of a territorial politicization of the crisis. In the case of De Luca, the repertoire of such struggle for visibility was based on a hyper-​normative process aimed at modifying insignificant aspects of the presidential decrees (Dpcm) related to specific liberties (such as the possibility of practising outdoor sports, walks and the like), to the regulation of shopping hours, and, finally, to the possibility of producing highly mediatized shows such as the ‘blockades’ of the ferry boats that connect Sicily to continental Italy, in order to halt the flow of non-​authorized travellers to the island. In practice, such blockades were shows, broadcasted simultaneously on the personal Facebook page of the mayor and on national television channels. Only on De Luca’s page, the first of these online events got 2 million hits –​without taking into account the number of followers on Facebook, which has grown from about 100,00 to 440,000 in a few days. Other central elements of these spectacles were the language (very violent and based on a kind of patois, that is, a mix of Italian and Sicilian dialect) and the targets of these lengthy live speeches that each night were held 89

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on the mayor’s Facebook page: the Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, the Ministry of the Interiors and the current governor of the Sicilian Region. In addition to these regular targets, an ever-​changing number of individual and collective ‘enemies’ were usually persecuted for some days: among others, a group of French buskers on an old Renault 4, caught in the act of reaching their shelter in a Sicilian town for the quarantine, and a wide group of rich local ‘skiers’ who came home from the mountains of North of Italy right before a national decree that forbade the mobility of people from different corners of the country was issued. These, clearly, were both people and ‘living stereotypes’ who were considered at risk of being positive to the virus and that embodied two poles of undesirability: that is, extreme poverty and extreme privilege. Yet, over the course of a few days, Cateno De Luca reached position 27 in the list of the most hyped politicians in Italy. Finally, at the onset of 2022, De Luca has changed his mind again. At the end of 2021, in a phase characterized by the dominance of the Omicron variant, several concerts with popular Italian pop music stars had nonetheless been organized by the mayor to celebrate Christmas and New Year’s Eve. In spite of the criticism from many sources, including the national media, for weeks De Luca had stubbornly insisted that the shows would still take place. However, at the very end of the year, the Italian pandemic scenario had changed consistently; subsequently, new/​old pessimism spread among the population once again. Suddenly, literally overnight, the events were cancelled and De Luca started to play again his fervent role of custodian of health, claiming that schools needed to be closed and that stricter measures had to be undertaken.

Sentimental connections At the centre of De Luca’s complex linguistic operation –​whose contents, objectively, were/​are often illogical, unfeasible, unconstitutional and scientifically meaningless –​one finds the unceasing search of a sentimental connection with the masses. There is a process of paternalistic communion with the city and the ‘cultural region’, which is reciprocated by means of a blind submission to a man saluted by a significant number of individuals as a rescuer and a father that cares only about the wellbeing of his ‘family’, the people (Saitta, 2020b). This was a messianic process that ultimately involved even the national media and the majority of the local commentators, including those that until a few weeks before had vehemently opposed the mayor. In the most perfect absence of the voices of the local city council and the parties, which have never been consulted during the crisis, nor were able to object at all on the matter, the opposition was left to a small number of originally disorganized citizens that, in the current regime of isolation, created an online network and utilized social media to start their war against 90

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the mayor and his methods (Rete 34+​, name of the ‘organization’). By means of appeals addressed to the central institutions and op-​eds published in the very few newspapers that resisted the climax, this improvised network tried to mobilize national authorities and the available media in defence of democracy and in opposition to the populist surge led by the mayor (Saitta, 2020c). Interestingly, therefore, one of the secondary effects of this local version of the pandemic consisted of the emotional responses and the political tactics of a spontaneous grass-​root movement that developed through the Internet in a regime of ‘social distancing’. While this mobilization comes as no surprise for, in Foucauldian terms, ‘where there is power, there is resistance’ (Foucault, 1978, p 95), the case of Messina nonetheless raises questions concerning the relation between central governments and the ‘territories’ during emergencies such as the one posed by COVID-​19. People’s perception of De Luca’s upsurge expressed ethno-​regionalist instances that bespoke of self-​determination and lack of trust in the national project. In this specific case, these sentiments are old, firmly couched in capitalism, and are, in today’s configuration, mostly right-​ wing –​although other traditions are historically connected to them, and recently, even sectors of the Italian radical left have embraced the ethno-​ regionalist ideology. Nonetheless, the question that these sentiments pose to those who advocates different forms of self-​governance –​based, in short, on humanist values –​concerns the ways of complying with and, at the same time, opposing forms of government and governmentality that have exacerbated consolidated asymmetries. Clearly, these themes are of particular importance within a context, and an epoch, which are generally ‘neo-​populist’. Here, such a term should indicate a discursive framework (Aslanidis, 2016), which is in dialogue with the locality and can be filled with diverse content. Content, however, that revolves around the contraposition of the ‘people’, including the same politician that proposes himself as a representative of the powerless, and the elites (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004). A discourse based on idioms (if not dialects), needs, sentiments of antagonism and intimate forms of cultural representation that are legitimized and organized according to standardized symbolic patterns and structures that repeat themselves in different countries and political scenarios. After all, as Lilleker and Negrine (2003, p 73) recall, ‘All politics is local’. Currently, the welding of political localism, new media and populism as a form of radicalization of the ‘grassroot sentiment’, together with the spreading of territorial identitarianisms, competitive instances against the central powers and ideological bricolages aimed at overcoming classical political definitions, have in fact intensified these tendencies. Thus, besides big names and brands of populist politics (Trump, Johnson, Salvini and Orban, to name a few), local political landscapes in the world offer many examples of populist territorial leaders who adapt styles and themes to their 91

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own smaller realities and terrains (Palumbo, 2015; Nogués-​Pedregal, 2019; van Ostaaijen, 2019; Saitta, 2020b). The obvious case in point is that national leaders’ political offers and symbolic connections must be as general as possible (even when they are addressed to specific classes and groups of interest). But the distribution of classes, occupations and related urban cultures differs with cities and regions –​together with affects, local histories, and the sentiments towards the State and the politicians. In this respect, the Italian case is a very telling one, with its divisions between North and South, its eternal Questione meridionale (The Southern Question), and the new, mirrored ‘Questione Settentrionale’ (the Northern Question), this latter being based on the material and moral superiority of the North. Within this fracture, Berlusconi and Salvini were perhaps the only northern politicians who were able to ‘convince’ the South. Within a similar scenario, the discourse of the national leader, thus, must be flexible enough to be received by a large and composite national audience, for example when broadcasted. But it must adapt to local contexts and to specific groups, when uttered over the course of events that take place in different towns and for particular audiences. An operation that often ends in failure when the person is foreign to the place. On the contrary, belonging and familiarity with the local codes frequently help the candidates who are able to read the territory. In order to be successful, especially if ‘populist’, an aspiring leader thus has to take into account the ‘demographics’ of the place where they run for election. Following this reasoning, even the economic geography of the places comes in handy. For example, it helps explaining how, in regions where manufacturing has declined, emigration rates are high, education levels are relatively low and the advanced services are not developed, the decaying traditional petty bourgeoisie is the ideal target of the populist offer (Inglehart and Norris, 2018, p 134; Margalit, 2019). Cities are not different: they are also divided in moral and material areas, and host different cultures and codes. Within such a framework, in normal times as well as during the pandemic, a politician like De Luca gives to the ‘people’ –​that is, the classes that he has targeted according to considerations regarding their impact, extension, interests, and the possibility of cultural/​sentimental ‘matching’ –​what they need. If, during the early phase of the current health crisis, the social group that the politician had identified as his own referral wanted to be reassured, he provided reassurance and an ‘iron fist’ both against the people who broke the rules, and the ‘bureaucrats’ who did not work in the interest of the city (that is, at a given time the local commissioner of the Regional Health System, Mr La Paglia, was repeatedly targeted until he was forced to quit. He was basically a scapegoat or a strawman). However, as soon as the resentment and the burden of lockdowns and restrictions became unbearable for the population, De Luca was quick to change his tone and 92

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become a champion of freedoms and liberties. Likewise, if the emergency was back, he proved himself ready to switch again, without hesitation or concerns with consistency. A certain way of interpreting neo-​populist politics, therefore, entails being chameleonic and attentive to collective feelings: the words of this type of politician should always be reflections of their people’s voice. This latter being the popular understanding of situations and the whole of feelings, opinions and reactions to stimuli –​including those pertaining to a pandemic.

Locality and meanings What has been described so far is a dynamic that, most probably, will not seem new In fact, features and effects of this political mentality should be well-​known to readers that, from Europe and Asia to North and South America, over the years have become familiar with these themes. Depending on the phase and the local circumstances, these latter can be considered the by-​product and the fuel of a set of political styles equally enclosed in the populist label. Similarly, it should be known how such mentality commonly relates to facts and formal logic; that is, by means of rejection, the selection and exclusion of factual elements, and the reliance on alternative sources and interpreters (Giry and Pranvera, 2020; Saitta, 2020d). However, if these procedures are general and valid in most national situations, one observation is that populism should also be read within specific contexts. If, as said previously, populist styles of government are ‘containers’ of meanings to be filled with different contents, the nature of such contents is not indifferent. Nor is it sufficient to understand which contents prevail at the level of one nation. The Italian experience, for example, shows that the country is divided between north and south, cities and regions. Each local level presents specific situations and intimate narrations that shape different imaginations of identity. In other words, it is common for the places and the people who inhabit them to imagine their cases as particular, unique and separated from the rest of the experiences (campanilismo, that is parochialism, is an Italian word that entails such feelings of uniqueness). Moreover, the shift from the national populism of the Five Star Movement4 to the technocratic style of Mario Draghi reveals that local populisms do not necessarily disappear. In other words, one could expect that major political and cultural phases take place through symbolic and material connections that relate the centres of powers to the ‘peripheries’ (namely, Washington DC to a number of places in the world, or Rome to Messina and other minor Italian cities). Indeed, the same ideal observer would notice that peripheral displays of populism do not necessarily vanish due to changes that manifest themselves in the central areas of political processes. For example, Biden’s succession to Trump had an effect on Rome; but Draghi’s succession 93

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to Giuseppe Conte had no effects on Cateno De Luca and other similar regionalistic politicians. In fact, the latter have deeper connections to their territory, and, at least for a certain time, their rule is likely to outlast external changes in the political phase. Over the course of events such as a pandemic crisis, alternative meanings and beliefs that emerge from popular, and populist, readings of the situation overlap with local meanings, and can be transformed into different ‘objects’. That is, in complaints, narrations and understandings that, on the surface, resemble general discourses heard elsewhere; but that, in their depth, refer to sentiments, questions and affects rooted in the locality. For example, when Cateno De Luca launched his furious attacks against the Regional Health System and the official data provided by this agency, he was not diminishing the word of science. Rather, he evoked a ‘secular theodicy’ (Herzfeld, 1992) on the State, and the health system, which is a classical theme in southern areas characterized by sanitary migration, malasanità (medical malpractices) and similar problems. On the surface, some of his tirades were compatible and could resemble the critical arguments of so-​called ‘denialists’ on the management of the pandemic. Indeed, they were (instrumental) cries for the South, the conditions this area experiences and so on. Likewise, when the mayor did not embrace the campaign for vaccines and the accompanying rhetoric of duty, he was not only relating to an audience of potential voters that were exposed to arguments, aimed at minimizing the epidemiological risk, developed elsewhere for specific reasons (CCDH, 2021; Farinelli, 2021); rather, he was also telling local ‘anti-​vaxxers’ that he shared their feeling that they had no obligations towards a system, or a political machine, that did not do enough to protect them from many sources of risk. In other words, almost each ‘general act’ –​that is, action or linguistic definition of a situation that appears to be retrieved elsewhere –​in this local context is filled with further meanings. Meanings that are the outcome of a stratification of facts and factoids, legitimate or imagined recollections of events, and, finally, ideologies, produced over the course of time and transmitted, at least in some cases, from generation to generation (for their general narrative traits and functions, if not in terms of words or images). While the overall effects are the same,5 and one might not consider the ‘locality-​effect’ a decisive variable for the understanding, say, of vaccine hesitancy, there are very few doubts that specific public sentiments, and the related political expressions, can be found in certain areas more than in others. In this perspective, hesitancy is just one of the many sentiments and expressions that thrive in different spaces following local circumstances –​ to be clear, this list of ‘expressions’ would include political and cultural objects like neo-​fascism, anti-​fascism, communism, religious revanchism, progressivism and so on. What is also important is that spaces within which such sentiments develop are, often, the same spaces that work as centres for 94

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the elaboration and dissemination of ideas. For example, historically, Verona is home to far-​r ight formations and sentiments. And, in fact, it became one of the cultural centres of the Italian right-​wing intellectual elaboration and one of the European physical spaces that symbolize certain values –​almost an epitome of neo-​fascism (Del Medico, 2004; Demirsu, 2022). For a long time, among many other things, Berlin and Amsterdam were home to avant-​garde artistic movements and to political experimentations. Until the 1990s, both cities provided the right environment for the development of alternative cultural projects and were the mecca of creatives and activists who belonged to specific artistic and political sub-​cultures (Kadir, 2016; Gutmair, 2021). While a place like Messina is not a mecca of anything, it is nonetheless well inserted within networks that oppose vaccine, pandemic management and so on. At least one of the members of the local movement, Santi Daniele Zuccarello, is very well known in the national ‘No-​vaxx’ movement. This personal ‘success’ is the outcome of the crossing of local and global, so to speak. If, in many cases, ‘no man is a prophet in his own land’, it is also true that localities can provide the right environments for cultural products (ideas, movements, artifacts and so on) and their inventors to blossom. When communities support their leading members, local minor ‘scenes’ increase their chances to blow up altogether. The interplay of individual self-​confidence stemming from local reputation, the practical support provided by members of the community, the proliferation of available nodes of external networks and the possibility for other members to share the advantages that come with the success of one individual, are all elements that bode for success, influence and centrality (Van Damme et al, 2018). Therefore, if there are mixes of ideas, and the original, local themes change over the course of the interactions and encounters with the world, it is still true that what feeds such ‘scenes’ is the locality, with its ‘dialects’, understandings of situations, talents and so on. A movement like the No-​Vaxx movement can die over the course of time, both globally and locally; but the motivations and cultural conditions behind it can survive under the ash, being re-​activated when new favourable circumstances appear. Moreover, one should add that ‘under the ash’ means that individuals (that is, intellectual, militants and so on) continue to write, elaborate and weave relations whose fruits will blossom at the right time. That is why the scrutiny of local scenes is important and their intimate features should be taken seriously: the seeds of change are scattered and can be found in unexpected places. Furthermore, this is the same mechanism that helped Cateno De Luca to build his reputation and career. De Luca comes from Fiumedinisi, a village of 1,300 inhabitants near Messina. He has been the mayor of the village for eight years before he became Regional Deputy; then was the mayor of a bigger town (Santa Teresa di Riva) and, finally, of Messina. Now he 95

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competes for the post of President of the Sicilian Region. Leaving aside the problem of the political networks to which he belonged over 30 years and that posed the conditions for the development of his political career, the collective narrations on the De Luca, that is, the vox populi, stressed that he made Fiumedinisi and Santa Teresa ‘two jewels’, that he was ‘molto dinamico’ (very active) and other similar praises. In other words, he acted as a product that is sold partly by means of publicity (for example, he famously stripped during an assembly of the regional parliament) and, for the most part, by means of word of mouth. This combination of actions, technical competence and strategic reputation building –​together with his capability of reading the territory by using ‘demographic’ lenses and entering in personal contact with the targeted population (by means of endless and ubiquitous ‘door-​to-​door’ visits) –​are the elements at the foundation of his regional successes. But the same ingredients have helped him to move on. De Luca used a major city like Messina as a platform to increase his national visibility. His coups de théâtre helped him to be the regular guest of national television programmes and reach a national audience, as many northern mayors destined to have important careers did before him. What is relevant for an analysis of the techniques aimed at producing such forms of sentimental connection, is that the term ‘theatre’ should be understood in its literal sense. De Luca’s performances, in fact, are influenced by popular theatre. He ‘wears’ popular ‘masks’ that locals are able to recognize. The use of his voice, the facial expressions, the jokes he makes, and the sense of grotesque he scientifically pursues, are theatrical. Moreover, his most recent public appearances took place inside actual theatres. He founded a band –​The Peter Pan –​and produced a CD. In addition to this, he hired two legends of the Italian music business –​the lyricist Mogol and the journalist Red Ronnie –​who helped him to set up an itinerant talent show with local musicians. The Peter Pan played in the halls where such talent show took place, and De Luca has utilized these events as a venue to meet local entrepreneurs interested in his proposal, and he has delivered short speeches addressed to local audiences composed of common people, as well as artists and their friends and families. Some of these shows were extremely successful and sold out.

Conclusions The idea behind this chapter is that global events such as a pandemic produce general understandings that constitute many benchmarks and shape the common sense on given phenomena. While this possibility bodes for a globalized world that, in fact, presents less diversity than in the past, and that is exposed to a number of identical forces, the risk is that the weight of remaining diversity is not adequately considered. In the 96

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case of the current pandemic crisis, resistance to vaccination campaigns as well as common forms of denialism can be seen as the tangible sign of organized misinformation campaigns; a matter of institutional distrust and loss of faith in capitalism; of longing for forms of irrationalism and world ordering that can be understood as a way to escape the cold logic of modern state based on measuring, evaluation and control. It is also possible to pinpoint errors in the scientific communication of risk, together with the uncontrolled multiplication of legitimate voices that provide contradictory information. In addition, it is possible to highlight the role of education (and the social distribution of it) for the correct understanding of the situation. Yet, an important role is played by the changes in the representation and perceptions of science. While social understanding of science, and related expectations, are still positivistic in nature, today’s disciplines are probabilistic; therefore, they embody doubt rather than certainty (Pellizzoni, 2020). Science, in sum, cannot always reassure individuals. Moreover, most of the citizens, regardless of their education and profession, do not seem to understand how science works: its internal logic, together with its formal mechanisms of validation, publication rituals and so on, are for many people unknown and virtually incomprehensible (Safford et al, 2021). To this, one should add that the popular culture is imbued with suspicion and dystopia. As observed by Boltanski (2012), police stories, spy stories and the like, can easily become a way of looking at the world, in search of culprits and hidden agendas. Such a way of seeing the world can turn into a way of questioning the State and its aims. The same attitude, after all, that dystopic narrations encourage and imply. While this entire framework is fascinating and complex, it is also too complex –​at least, in certain cases. In fact, while all this is certainly part of the cultural structure of millions of individuals in the world, many of them are still located in dispersed areas of the globe endowed with their own cultures, tics, histories and sentiments. The thesis of this chapter, then, is that this level –​the locality –​still matters. In a previous work (Saitta, 2020b), for example, I showed that while the northern revanchism of the original League led by Umberto Bossi and Roberto Maroni coincided with the nostalgia for a time before immigration, when places and their people were still familiar, at a later time in Messina the same concepts and targets were understood as a missed encounter with modernity and the inclusion within the State project. In recent times, not by chance, Cateno De Luca, was an ally of the League and his role was that of an ‘adapter’. That is, he helped adjust the message of a party for a local audience that since its foundation had been ‘against the South’, and he contributed to make it acceptable for a southern population that shifted from representing the target of a type of ethnic hate to becoming a target. Such shifts and understandings, as discussed, were situated 97

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within a local history and the complex of being backward –​a dynamic that has occurred many times in history and was analysed by authors like Fanon (1967) and Memmi (1957) in the context of decolonization. Similar reasonings, thus, can be applied to the case of pandemic. The hypothesis I presented is that the receptions of pandemic are inserted into cultural and mental landscapes that are, at least for a good part, firmly situated in their own territories. Such territories are spaces within which different interests are negotiated (Brighenti, 2010), but they are also a ‘land of conquest’ for political entrepreneurs. The political entrepreneur who understands issues, complexes, sentiments, languages and logics rooted in local history can utilize them for the purpose of dominating. What I propose, thus, is both a revitalization of the Gramscian notion of hegemony as a form of cultural direction triggered from the sentimental connection among the leaders (that is, the ‘party’ in the original formula) and the populations (Bates, 1975), and a very trivial analysis based on the concept of ‘cultural marketing’ –​this being a type of promotion of a message to a group of potential purchasers from a particular culture or demographic (Aiello, 2014).The case I have presented shows that for one such political entrepreneurs, Cateno De Luca, the Mayor of Messina, the pandemic has been the ‘occasion’ –​that is, that very special moment at the very base of entrepreneurs’ vision on business perspectives provided by social conditions –​which would have allowed him to extend his dominion on new political lands. The fact that other similar cases are available in the Italian pandemic scenario (for example, Vincenzo De Luca, the President of Campania) suggests that this crisis might have been a ‘chance’ for many other unknown subjects in many parts of the word. If this is plausible, the pandemic is less a matter of anthropological turns in the public sphere than a story of cultural re-​activations based on pre-​existing automatisms and intimate dispositions typical of localities. More inquiries on these dispersed levels and their interactions with the new, big issues of our modernity could be perhaps very fruitful. Notes 1

2

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5

Indeed, the correct word for this position would be ‘president of region’. For an international audience, and for clarity, I will use the term ‘governor’, which might sound more familiar to those who do not know the Italian division of powers. With regard to current political styles and obsessions, this tendency was defined ‘Technopopulism’. See De Blasio and Sorice (2020). This telling video, for example, was broadcasted by the most important international channels: https://​www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​KxtG​JsnL​gSc According to Biancalana (2020), Italy has showed the succession, or coexistence, of at least five different populist styles: League, Berlusconi, Five Star Movement and Renzi. For example, until the end of 2021 Messina and its metropolitan area (province) was the Sicilian city with the lowest vaccination rate. 98

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References Aiello, L. (2014) Handbook of Research on Management of Cultural Products: E-​Relationship Marketing and Accessibility Perspectives, Hershey, Pennsylvania: IGI global. Aslanidis, P. (2016) ‘Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective’, Political Studies, 64: 88–​104. Bates, T.R. (1975) ‘Gramsci and the theory of hegemony’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 36(2): 351–​66. Battaglia, R. (2003) L’ultimo ‘splendore’: Messina tra rilancio e decadenza, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. Biancalana, C. (2020) ‘Four Italian populisms’, in P. Blokker and M. Anselmi (eds) Multiple Populisms: Italy as Democracy’s Mirror, London and New York: Routledge, pp 216–​41. Boltanski, L. (2012) Énigmes et complots: Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes, Paris: Gallimard. Brighenti, A.M. (2010) ‘On territorology: Towards a general science of territory’, Theory Culture Society, 27(1): 52–​72. Caminiti, L. (2018) Perché non possiamo non dirci ‘indipendentisti’, Rome: Derive Approdi. Canovan, M. (1981) Populism, New York: Harcourt Brace Javonovich. CCDH (2021) The Disinformation Dozen: Why Platforms Must Act on Twelve Leading Online Anti-​Vaxxers, London: Center for Countering Digital Hate. Available from: https://​252f2​edd-​1c8b-​49f5-​9bb2c​b57b​b47e​4ba.files​usr. com/​ugd/​f4d9b9_​b7ced​c055​3604​720b​7137​f866​3366​ee5.pdf De Blasio, E. and Sorice, M. (2020) ‘Technopopulism and direct representation’, in P. Blokker and M. Anselmi (eds) Multiple Populisms: Italy as Democracy’s Mirror, London and New York: Routledge, pp 127–​47. Del Medico, E. (2004) All’estrema destra del padre: Tradizionalismo cattolico e destra radicale. Il paradigma veronese, Ragusa: La Fiaccola. Demirsu, I. (2022) The City of Hate and Its Antibodies: Contending Place-​Based Identities and the Territorialization of Belonging in Verona, PhD Thesis for the Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology, Padua: University of Padua. Dyl, J.L. (2017) Seismic City: An Environmental History of San Francisco’s 1906 Earthquake, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. Fanon, F. (1967) Black Skin, White Masks, New York: Grove Press. Farinella, D. and Saitta, P. (2019) The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters: The Management of Urban Space Through an Earthquake –​Messina 1908–​2018, Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. Farinelli, F. (2021) Conspiracy Theories and Right-​Wing Extremism: Insights and Recommendations for P/​CVE. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available from: https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​home-​affa​irs/​sys​ tem/fi ​ les/2​ 021-​04/​ran_​co​nspi​racy​_t​ he​orie​s_​an​d_​r i​ght-​wing_​2021​_e​ n.pdf 99

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Foucault, M. (1978) The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: An Introduction. New York: Pantheon. Giry, J. and Pranvera, T. (2020) ‘Conspiracy theories in political science and political theory’, in M. Butter and P. Knight (eds) Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories, New York: Routledge, pp 108–​20. Gutmair, U. (2021) The First Days of Berlin: The Sound of Change, New York: Polity Press. Herzfeld, M. (1992) The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Houdek, M. and Phillips, K. (2017) ‘Public memory’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication. Available from http://​commun​icat​ion. oxfor​dre.com/​view/​10.1093/​acref​ore/​978019​0228​613.001.0001/​acref​ ore-​978019​0228​613-​e-​181 [Accessed 9 August 2023]. Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2018) Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Authoritarianism-​Populism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kadir, N. (2016) The Autonomous Life?: Paradoxes of Hierarchy and Authority in the Squatters Movement in Amsterdam, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Lilleker, D.G. and Negrine, R. (2003) ‘Not big brand names but corner shops’, Journal of Political Marketing, 2(1): 55–​75. Margalit, Y. (2019) ‘Economic insecurity and the causes of populism, reconsidered’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4): 152–​170. https://​doi. org/​10.1257/​jep.33.4.152 Memmi, A. (1957) Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur, Paris: Buchet/​Chastel & Corrêa. Mudde, C. (2004) ‘The populist zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 4: 541–​63. Nogués-​Pedregal, A.-​M. (2019) ‘The instrumental time of memory: Local politics and urban aesthetics in a tourism context’, Journal of Tourism Analysis, 26(1): 2–​24. Palumbo, B. (2015) ‘Debt, hegemony and heterochrony in a Sicilian city’, History and Anthropology, 27(1): 93–​106. Pellizzoni, L. (2020) ‘The time of emergency: On the governmental logic of preparedness’, Sociologia italiana, 16: 39–​54. Safford, T.G., Whitmore, E.H. and Hamilton, L.C. (2021) ‘Follow the scientists? How beliefs about the practice of science shaped COVID-​19 views’, Journal of Science Communication, 20(07): A03. https://​doi.org/​ 10.22323/​2.20070​203 Saitta, P. (2020a) ‘Sicilia, L’epidemia come performance’, Il Mulino, 7 April. Available from: https://​www.rivi​stai​lmul​ino.it/a​ /s​ icil​ ia-l​ -e​ pidem ​ ia-c​ ome-​ perf​orma​nce [Accessed 8 August 2023]. Saitta, P. (2020b) ‘Fenomenologia di un neo-​populista. Declinazioni urbane dell’autoritarismo: il caso di Messina’, Argomenti, (15): 123–​50. 100

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Saitta, P. (2020c) ‘Gli effetti secondari di una pandemia. “Distanziamento sociale’ e attivismo digitale”, Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa, 2: 289–​98 Saitta, P. (2020d) ‘Teorie nella crisi: pandemia e produzione culturale’, Materialismo Storico, 2(9): 478–​91. Sawislak, K. (1995) Smoldering Cityaa: Chicagoans and the Great Fire. 1871–​ 1874, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Van Damme, I., De Munck, M. and Miles, A. (eds) (2018) Cities and Creativity from the Renaissance to the Present, New York and Oxon: Taylor and Francis. van Ostaaijen, J. (2019). ‘Local politics, populism and Pim Fortuyn in Rotterdam’, in P. Scholten, M. Crul and P. van de Laar (eds) Coming to Terms with Superdiversity: The Case of Rotterdam. Chum: Springer, pp 87–​105.

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Afar from Vesuvius but Still at Risk: The Unstoppable Urbanization of the Naples Volcano’s Yellow Zone Giovanni Gugg

Introduction: The urban enclosure of the volcano Beyond its ‘natural’ features, the state of a territory always results from the interaction between the ecosystem and human beings, whereby ‘the environment is not a pure container, but is the product of man who “humanizes” it’ (Segaud, 2010, p 18). In this sense, space is a fundamental element ‘in the construction of individual and collective identities, in the codification and contextualization of time and history, and in the politics of interpersonal, community and intercultural relations’ (Oliver-​Smith, 1996, p 308). This close relationship between humans and the environment is particularly evident in the case of ‘territories at risk’, such as those around a volcano, where the risk assessment by those who live there is always the result of a game of reciprocal cross-​references (November, 2011, p 5). However much the choice to continue living in a ‘fragile’ space may seem, from the outside, to be a ‘bewildering’ and ‘illogical’ practice, it often sinks into a local logic (into another rationality) whose causes and motivations can be recognized, for example whose socio-​historical-​political process can be identified as the background. Risks are the result of a socio-​historical process, so they should not be considered only in terms of the distance from an ‘hazardous source’ such as a volcano –​as if the question of risk depended only on contiguity with it –​but should be examined holistically to fully understand and manage them. The Vesuvius volcano is considered one of the most dangerous in the world, mainly because of the magnitude of the so-​called ‘exposed value’, 102

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one of the three elements of the algebraic equation with which risk is usually quantified, understood as the product of ‘hazard’ times and ‘vulnerability’ times, precisely, ‘exposed value’ (Ongarello, 2009, pp 30–​31). This factor –​ understood in terms of both human lives and material goods –​has grown enormously over the past 80 years, that is, since the time of the last eruption in March 1944. If we consider the Vesuvian area as the one that currently falls within the so-​called ‘red zone’ of the National Emergency Plan, its demographic growth has been steadily increasing since the last years of the 19th century thanks to the development of some small industries, such as coral and pasta; for example, in 1940 there were already around 350,000 residents (Gasparini, 2006). The size, however, changed profoundly after the Second World War, when reconstruction after the 1944 eruption and the end of the war in 1945 rapidly transformed the area into a vast and untidy urbanized zone, leading to the current 7–​800,000 inhabitants in the municipalities closest to the crater alone (Vella and Barbera, 2002). A source of considerable interests and profits, as well as often governed by private logics, this process of ‘urbanization of capital’ (Harvey, 2010) has led to such a chaotic growth of the ‘Vesuvian city’ that Amato Lamberti, a sociologist of organized crime, used harsh and discouraging words to describe it in an article in the local press: The immense suburbia that stretches from inside Naples to Nola, to Giugliano, to Torre Annunziata … is piled up in ways and forms that have the unbelievable, in that one finds it hard to understand what logic has presided over urban planning choices that seem designed to create difficulties for the life of a normal person and, above all, an ugliness that alone generates fear and insecurity. Many have spoken of urban wreckage, but the expression does not fully render a situation in which it is impossible to trace an order even of a functional nature [and in which] even the inhabitants do not always know their way around. (Lamberti, 2011) This phenomenon of unplanned urbanization has influenced the local perception of volcanic risk: if the city grows, it is evidently possible to live there; if the eruptive risk remains, it is overtaken by other priorities, such as urban liveability. Urbanization on the slopes of Vesuvius was initially curbed in 1995, first with the establishment of the Vesuvius National Park, then, a few months later, with the release of an Emergency Plan, more details of which I will provide in the next section. Considering these dynamics of land use is important because from a social science perspective, every risk is a collective historical product, a culturally hierarchical elaboration, with a localized conceptualization. This means that the cultural response provided by a human group living under a given threat always pertains to 103

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how it makes its present habitable. In other words, the assessment of how much that territory is ‘safe enough’ at a given time (or how ‘acceptable’ certain kinds of risks are) depends both on the relationship that group members have with each other in places and on the relationship that they enter with the places themselves. That is, the social scientist considers the politicization of risk, collective behaviour, morality and its relationship to politics, knowledge (including scientific knowledge) and its ambiguity, how people make decisions, who is held accountable and why, social exclusion and victimization, as well as roles within the community and theories of probability. From an anthropological perspective, therefore, what we define as risk is primarily a public discourse about power, justice, blame, responsibility and the legitimacy of decisions (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982); the result of dialectical relationships between mental representations and social practices, between objects of risk and objects at risk (Boholm, 2011).

Emergency planning After decades of laissez-​faire urban planning following the last eruption in 1944, attitudes toward the Vesuvius slowly began to change after the bradyseismic1 emergency in Pozzuoli, west of Naples, in 1983. Indeed, in 1986, the at that time director of the Vesuvius Observatory, Giuseppe Luongo, emphasized the need for an evacuation plan for the Vesuvius area in case of an eruption and submitted a dedicated report to the Prefecture of Naples. Between 1991 and 1993, guidelines for risk assessment were drawn up so that a National Emergency Plan for the Vesuvius Area (also known as ‘NEPVA’) could be drafted. The NEPVA was presented publicly on 25 September 1995. It included a risk scenario (a sub-​Plinian eruption, such as the 1631 eruption, the most powerful in the last two millennia) that determined specific threat perimeters (the red, yellow and blue zones) and the twinning between each of the most directly exposed municipalities and an Italian region (Gugg, 2018a). A first update of the NEPVA occurred in 2001 (the time margin for eruption prediction was reduced from two to one weeks) and a second one in 2013 (a new red zone and twinning were defined). Alongside this, complementary measures were arranged. Civil protection evacuation simulations were organized, almost always on a municipal scale. In 2006 a simulation took place on a larger scale, called Mesimex: Major Emergency Simulation Exercise project. The Campania Regional Council also released a law for the total blocking of residential development approval in the red zone (No. 21/​2003). A project of anthropogenic thinning called ‘VesuVia’ was also started, although it provided very poor results and ended up being abandoned after a few years. The last stage of this path took place in October 2016, when the Evacuation Plan was presented, and included a set of guidelines for the Civil Protection and the Campania Region to evacuate 104

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safely, in 72 hours, the 700,000 inhabitants of the red zone (described later) in case of a volcanic alert. With the creation of the NEPVA, a real ‘institutionalization of risk’ was induced, materialized in the introduction of standardized forms of action and behaviour, connected with a set of complex and interdependent norms and roles, thus producing a normalized space and time. In other words, the set of precepts and behaviours that citizens are required to follow is strictly dependent on both the place where they are and the stage of the emergency. Based on historical observations regarding the eruptive behaviour of Vesuvius and considering the relationship based on ‘the product between the probability of a given volcanic phenomenon occurring and the relative damage it is capable of causing’ (Rapolla et al, 2003, p 47), scientists have identified different degrees of risk within a wide area around the volcano. The NEPVA incorporated these indications by dividing the area into ‘hazard zones’ (not infrequently the subject of controversy). These are the red zone, the yellow zone, and the blue zone. The red zone, which covers about 200 km² and 24 municipalities (according to the 2013 update), is the closest to the crater and represents the area that could be invaded by pyroclastic flows, mudflows, lava, and other volcanic products. It is, in other words, the area exposed to the greatest hazard, inhabited by more than 700,000 people, and the one on which most of the public debate and policy initiatives related to Vesuvius risk are focused. The yellow zone (Figure 6.1) corresponds to the area over which up to 30 cm of ash and lapilli could fall, with risk for breathing and subjected to building collapse due to accumulation of volcanic material on buildings’ roofs. This is an area that is about 1,000 km² wide, corresponding to the red zone plus 63 other municipalities in the nearby provinces of Naples, Salerno and Avellino, and three eastern neighbourhoods of Naples (Barra, Ponticelli and San Giovanni a Teduccio), located on the east and southeast of the Vesuvius. The NEPVA specifies that based on the scenario built on historical records of the eruption in 1631, ‘only 10 percent of the yellow zone will actually be affected by particle fallout, suffering damage’,2 so of the million inhabitants of the entire zone, about 100,000 people are expected to be affected. The difficulty in ascertaining the affected places in advance depends on the impossibility of predicting in which direction the wind will move the eruptive cloud. For this reason, this area is further divided into 16 sectors, identified by the probability of the wind blowing toward them. From the analysis of historical data –​but the decisive factor for the direction of the winds and their intensity will be the season of the year in which the eruption will occur –​it appears that most likely to be affected by the phenomenon will be the municipalities east of Mount Vesuvius, toward the internal areas of the Campania region. Finally, the blue zone was established in the first NEPVA, but then incorporated into the yellow zone with the 2013 revision. It originally 105

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Figure 6.1: The Vesuvius red zone and yellow zone, 2015

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106 Notes: In this figure the darker grey is the red zone and the lighter grey is the yellow zone. The figure can be viewed in colour and in greater clarity at the link below. Source: Dipartimento di Protezione Civile –​Regione Campania –​INGV Osservatorio Vesuviano, ‘Vesuvio. Mappa di delimitazione della “zona gialla”’, Attachment 1 of ‘Piano di emergenza dell’area vesuviana’, 2015. Available from: http://​regi​one.campa​nia.it/​ass​ets/​docume​nts/​allega​to1-​dz5uz​qmf.pdf [Accessed 23 October 2022].

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included 14 municipalities in the Nola city area, northeast of the volcano, covering an area of 100 km². This was an area affected by the possibility of flooding caused by ash entrainment due to the rain that always follows an eruption. A few months before the presentation of the first version of the NEPVA, in June 1995, the Vesuvius National Park was created, whose boundaries were added to the ‘emergency perimeter’ as a concentric circle. Within this area, the environment is protected, and the construction of buildings is not permitted. Its boundaries affect 13 of the 24 municipalities in the red zone and concern almost only a ‘natural’ territory, although in some cases small built-​up areas are also touched or included, as in the case of the San Domenico district in San Sebastiano al Vesuvio, the hamlets of Casamale in Somma Vesuviana and San Vito in Ercolano. Like all risk planning, NEPVA is a bureaucratic instrument that delimits spaces, scans time and establishes specific operations carried out by certain institutional subjects organized according to a hierarchical logic of role division. In the event of an alarm, an Emergency Commissioner is appointed, and the Relief Coordination Centre is set up, after which various Mixed Operations Centres are activated in the territory, which have the task of locally coordinating the actions to be carried out but also of supporting the police and rescue groups. At the same time, various PMAs (Advanced Medical Posts) are deployed, then the VETs (Volcano Expert Teams), the FASTs (Foreigners Assistance and Support Teams), the GLABEC (Interministerial Working Group for the Preservation and Prevention of the Cultural Heritage from Natural Risks) and numerous other structures, from the Fire Brigade to the Red Cross, and even individual volunteers, come into action. All the elements of this large ‘operational machine’ converge in the SORU (Unified Regional Operations Room of the Campania Region) and, above all, in the DICOMAC, the Direction of Command and Control.

Volcanic risk in the ‘yellow zone’ Volcanic risk is extremely composite since each eruption involves different phases. In addition to seismic tremors and lava flows, whose effects remain prevalently localized in the vicinity of the cone, volcanologists speak of a sequence of expected phenomena, classifying the fallout of pumice, lapilli and ash, the flow of pyroclastic flows and the generation of mudflow (lahar) among the most fearsome. The danger of these effects is mainly related to the fact that they can affect, in a potentially dramatic way, even territories several kilometres away from the cone and slopes of the volcano. To exacerbate the situation, the randomness of external weathering (wind, rainfall and so on) can making difficult, beyond statistical assessments, to accurately predict the direction in which fallout and lahar will head (Figure 6.2). 107

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Figure 6.2: Different levels of ash load expected, 2015

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108 Notes: In this figure the darker grey is the red zone and the lighter grey is the yellow zone. The figure can be viewed in colour and in greater clarity at the link below. Source: Dipartimento di Protezione Civile –​Regione Campania –​INGV Osservatorio Vesuviano, ‘Vesuvio. Mappa del carico da cenere con probabilità di superamento 5%’, Attachment 2 of ‘Piano di emergenza dell’area vesuviana’, 2015. Available from: http://​regi​one.campa​nia.it/​ass​ets/​docume​nts/​allega​to2-​heim7​0ai. pdf [Accessed 23 October 2022].

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Even simply focusing on the last eruption, the evidence of ‘hard rain’ (the rain of volcanic ash) in the Salerno or Avellino area is countless. In the municipality of Montella, in the province of Avellino and located at 50 km from the crater, the ash of the eruption in 1944 darkened the sky and rained down on roofs, roads, and fields, creating a layer 4–​5 cm thick, ‘so much so that it was necessary to intervene to remove it’ (Cubellis and Marturano, 2010, p 172). Even though there is no official estimate on the precise number of victims of the eruption in 1944, the recorded deaths were due to the collapse of roofs weighed down by the ash. A total of 21 people died in the Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese, the countryside between Nocera and Pagani (today’s yellow zone), and 3 in Terzigno (which falls within today’s red zone).3 As geological studies (Rapolla et al, 2003) conducted in the Apennine areas east of the volcano have found, there is ‘a close connection between catastrophic alluvial events and volcanic events, framed within the framework of a secondary volcanic risk’. This is dramatically highlighted by the tragedy in 1998, when between 5 and 6 May about 40 rapid mudslides hit the municipalities of Sarno, Siano and Bracigliano (province of Salerno), the municipality of Quindici (province of Avellino) and the municipality of San Felice a Cancello (province of Caserta). A total of more than 2 million cubic metres of muddy material flew downstream, and the final toll was 160 victims, 178 houses destroyed and more than 450 damaged. In this sense, that event can be considered ‘as a “dress rehearsal” of the alluvial mechanisms that would be triggered, in the Apennine foothills areas facing Somma-​Vesuvius, following a future eruption’ (Rapolla et al, 2003, p 50). Evidently, this awareness made it even clearer that certain disasters, such as mudslides, are often the result of the failure to guard the sites and maintain them consistently and routinely (Gugg and Molisse, 2020). Since an eruption reports casualties and damage in such a large area and for so many decades after the main event, it is easy to see how anthropology can study the elaboration of volcanic risk not only in places very close to the volcano, but also in several localities outside its slopes, in the yellow zone. There, particle fallout can cause collapse, as noted, but also respiratory problems, particularly in predisposed individuals inadequately protected, damage to crops, and problems with air, rail, and road traffic. The magnitude and extent of eruption-​induced changes are related to the type of volcano. Vesuvius is a stratovolcano and, based on its past behaviour, its eruptions have been classified into three categories: ‘Plinian’, the strongest, of the same type as the one in 79 AD described by Pliny the Younger; ‘sub-​ Plinian’, less violent, but still very destructive, like the one in 1631; and ‘Strombolian’, even less powerful, but more frequent, at least until 1944 (Gasparini, 2006). Geologically, eruptions are organized into long ‘eruptive periods’ lasting several centuries and followed by long phases of quiescence. Such cycles are inaugurated by a violent Plinian or sub-​Plinian explosion 109

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that has the effect of opening the main conduit of the crater (such as that of 1631), thus making possible subsequent eruptions of the effusive type, and ending with a ‘final eruption’ that, by inducing a sinking of the volcanic cone, again closes the conduit (such as that of 1944) (Nazzaro, 2001). Evidently, each eruptive type has effects at the scale of its own energy output, and since Vesuvius is currently in a quiescent phase that, potentially, could last hundreds of years, scientists pretty much agree that the future eruption will be of the sub-​Plinian type, as in 1631, because it will require a lot of energy to clear the volcanic conduit. Precisely based on this scenario, the Civil Protection developed the current NEPVA by referring to a sub-​ Plinian eruption, named as ‘Maximum Expected Event’. At the same time, the authorities have indicated4 for the population the need to take shelter in sheltered and enclosed places, which, however, have roofs able to withstand the overload due to ash accumulation. In this way, authorities have invited the municipalities to assess and classify each building according to their roof resistance, and consequently to identify buildings with construction characteristics that can sustain overloads and allow collective shelters. An additional advice is to establish places to pile up pyroclastic products removed from roads and roofs at a time after the event. Finally, the annex accompanying the yellow zone mapping points out the likelihood of electrical blackouts, disruption of telephone connections, clogging of sewers, shutdown of engines and impassable roads. From these considerations, the implementation of the ‘Evacuation Plan’5 for some sectors in the yellow zone with an ongoing eruption is somewhat problematic, especially for the downwind areas, which could be severely compromised in terms of structure, roads and technological facilities that would become unusable. Beyond these issues, possible seismic shaking should be mentioned as they would further undermine the strength of the buildings, where the roof would be unusually weighted (a maximum limit of 300 kg per m² of ash has been identified), in a prohibitive environmental operating condition, even for helicopters. The elaboration of risk is the result of a real ‘dialogue’ between the different parties: Mary Douglas speaks of ‘cultural debate’, if not even of ‘struggle’, in which at the time of the circulation of ideas, some opinions may be more decisive than others in shaping the point of view. This is the case with technicians, volcanologists, ecologists and civil defence agents, those whom Anthony Giddens (2006) calls ‘expert systems’. These, through a codified language that is often inaccessible to most people, have access to specialized knowledge which is recognized and validated as expert knowledge: ‘For the layperson, trust in expert systems does not depend on a full initiation into these processes nor on the mastery of the knowledge they produce. Trust is inevitably also an article of “faith” ’ (Giddens, 2006, p 37). With the emergence of modern volcanology in the mid-​19th century, a certain trust in scientific knowledge, that is, in its ability to explain a phenomenon, 110

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but also to ‘predict’ it, gradually grew. In this way, today, people build their daily lives on the hope that science and scientists will warn them in time of the next eruption so that they can get to safety. At the local level, risk management is entrusted to the community of experts, who have developed NEPVA and monitor seismographs and other sophisticated instrumentation daily. In the case of Vesuvius, all this is rather advanced as far as the red zone is concerned: social, scientific and political attention is rather present on this area, while for the yellow zone it is rather absent. On the yellow zone there is a lack of information and no real public discussion, so that here the (popular and institutional) attention to the volcanic risk is much milder. In other words, in the red zone, a future scenario shapes the present one because of norms that are produced by establishing codes of conduct, determining relationships, and, in essence, becoming reality, albeit still inadequately compared to the potential risk (Gugg, 2015). Conversely, in the yellow zone, the ‘future catastrophe’ is considered just a far hypothetical episode and not something realistic, to be confronted with and committed to avert its most nefarious effects. More than 25 years after the first version of NEPVA, it should be noted that its implementation, although partial and unsatisfactory (Gugg, 2018a), has been limited to the red zone, for which there are frequently academic conferences, television broadcasts, journalistic investigations, and public debates. As for the dozens of cities and towns in the yellow zone, on the other hand, the NEPVA is all but ignored and, indeed, some mayors have been critical of scientists and Civil Protection for putting their municipality on that list, as in the case of Vico Equense in the Sorrento Peninsula and Positano on the Amalfi Coast, both seaside resorts that have feared losing tourist appeal.

The Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese among cement, ash and mud The sub-​area called ‘Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese’, located halfway between Naples and Salerno, includes 16 municipalities in the province of Salerno, of which two centres are particularly important: Nocera Inferiore and Sarno, which give their name to the entire area. The total area of the territory is 188.1 km². Nearly 300,000 people live there, with a population density of 1807 inhabitants per km². There was a particular concentration of volcanic ash fallout in this area in 1944, as evidenced by accounts of the time collected in local literature and in some collective memory research. In the book Nocera dei Pagani dalle origini ad oggi (1970), the author Enea Falcone recalls the victims of several building collapses in Pagani: In Pagani a wing of Magistrate Pepe’s building collapsed and three children and a student from Salerno, a family friend, died. … It took 111

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hundreds of workers and many unemployed people finally found work to carry away this huge amount of lapilli. Thrown down from roofs and terraces, in some narrow streets it had reached the height of about four meters, so that from the street one could enter the second floor. But where to transport, as soon as possible, all these lapilli? What landowner could allow their land to disappear forever? And so, it was thought to occupy the land of the Del Forno family, canning industrialists, who, according to public opinion, could do without the rents from that land. That clearing work lasted for several months, and specialized firms were called in, bringing their carts running on tracks, specially installed throughout the village. Pagani looked like a quarry from which construction materials were transported. Every road that was cleared represented a moment of joy, of relief for all the people, and when we could finally walk again, without the risk of falling and hurting ourselves, it was a new liberation for us all! (Falcone, 1970, p 444) In his autobiography, Un vecchio sacerdote racconta (1980), the priest Francesco Di Costanzo writes that on 23 March 1944, in Nocera, he experienced one of the most painful days of my life. … At 10 am on the streets it was as dark as night. One could not understand what was happening. We began to understand it when shortly afterwards we saw dense rain of black grains falling, which in a short time covered the streets and roofs of houses. We immediately understood the danger from that enormous weight that was going to rest on the roofs and terraces of houses. Many people got busy and with shovels tried to clear especially the terraces. My brother Vincenzo and I, with those in the building where we lived, also gave ourselves to this work. Suddenly we heard a roar. I looked. A strong cloud of dust was rising from what was the house of my other brother, Luigi. … The roof of that house had caved in, and my poor brother was left under it with four or five other people. … Generous people were immediately found who did their best to remove the rubble, but it was three floors sunk on top of each other. The work lasted several hours that were agony for me. … Nocera then had 12 dead. (Di Costanzo, 1980, pp 94–​5) In a collection of testimonies published by the Vesuvian Observatory, Mrs Raffaella Macciocchi, then 18 years old, recalls that she was in Sarno with her family after being displaced from Naples due to war bombing: In the evening, while we were eating, some people called us and told us that Mount Vesuvius was erupting I remember the sky was dark 112

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and hot red grains were falling, which the older people called lapilli. The sky remained dark until 5 a.m. when it began to get light, but the sky was always overcast. The next day we went to the roof to shovel out the material that had accumulated more than 30 cm. In opening the door to the terrace, I was hit by the still hot lapilli. It was because of this that I lost the use of my right eye. … I also remember that for a few weeks after the eruption began small earthquakes were felt. (Cubellis and Marturano, 2010, tab no. 237) After the Second World War, extensive building speculation was produced between reappropriation of the devastated territory and new housing needs. In turn, this was favoured by absences, insufficiencies, and suspensions of urban and environmental laws. In the Italian case, this situation is further sustained by inadequate legislative instruments or, even, by their derogation, as in the case of Law No. 765 of 6 August 1967. This law is known as the ‘bridge law’, which was supposed to be a bridge toward generalizable and final land-​use regulations. At the same time, however, it established a one-​ year moratorium for the application of the new, more restrictive rules. In that specific year, therefore, there was ‘a real assault on environmental diligence’ in Italy (Cederna et al, 1999, p 7). In the case of the Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese, this resulted in a progressive increase in its population and housing density. A profound transformation took place thanks to various infrastructural development policies, which created several fast roads, a strategic highway, and several industrial areas. Unlike the red zone, here there are neither urban development restrictions nor prevention and preparedness measures; therefore, the yellow zone continues to grow by pursuing chaotic patterns of urban sprawl and peri-​urbanization, which prevent proper risk planning. This has increased the urbanization and industrialization of the countryside, causing a concentration of land consumption in the plains (Di Gennaro, 2012). It has also caused an ecosystem crisis, resulting in a progressive depopulation of mountainous areas, with the relative abandonment of the forestry system and worsening of hydrogeological instability (Molisse, 2020), as the 1998 Sarno landslide dramatically showed: On May 5, the rain on Sarno was insistent, thin, warm; to cover up was to sweat because May had already almost brought, as always in the South, summer. A single omen, which was not much cared for at the time, only resurfaced in memory: the mountain had been covered for days by a very thick cloud, descending to its slopes. It was a cloud, not fog –​which is never there in these parts, because the earth never really cools down. A black rain cloud, heavy, such that it totally obstructed the view. ‘If only we could have seen’, many of the 113

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survivors say today. But the mountain’s anger, brooding for a long time, wanted no witnesses. … The landslide that hit Sarno … reconstructed in its mechanics reveals itself as the tragedy of misunderstanding and loneliness. Of the citizens among themselves. But also, between them and the institutions. Local and national. The Sarno disaster becomes, despite itself, a test. (Annunziata, 1998, p 6) In other words, it is a very fragile territory not just for its natural and environmental features but also and above all for the abuses it is subjected to. This area is characterized by a high population density, extensive and continuous urbanization, but also by many scattered buildings, such as manufacturing settlements that require intense car mobility and, finally, intensive agriculture that keeps a large part of the territory under pressure.

Conclusions In case of a new eruption, the Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese and the whole yellow zone will be in a situation of profound vulnerability that needs to be urgently addressed. Increasingly detailed and participatory planning of emergency preparedness and management is required today, but it is now also important to consider that the logic of the emergency must be overcome, in the sense that risks, accidents and disasters are not just events (and sudden occurrences) but results of long and interdependent processes. According to the most recent contributions in disaster anthropology, ‘the degree of environmental and social vulnerability, as well as the level of exposure to specific risks is determined by multiple interconnected factors’ (Falconieri et al, 2022, p 13). To address this situation, a ‘return to relationships’ becomes essential, understood to turn our gaze to the future and thus to reflect and act on the kind of security within organizations and communities. In a specific space-​time, the quality of the ecosystem (social and natural) determines the reduction or creation of disaster risk. Environmental degradation processes should be considered as the historical product of both ecological and social dynamics: processes that are evident in the loss of the planovolumetric balance of an area, or in the addition of buildings that break the relationship between nature and history, or even in the abandonment of marginal areas. In this sense, environmental degradation and vulnerability are not due to the poverty or hardship of certain sections of society but to the decisions and behaviour of institutions, even before the people. The conditions of ecological and social vulnerability, then, are identifiable in this progressive and reciprocal ‘erosion of coexistence’: between humans and their environment, as well as among humans themselves, that is, in social inequalities, corruption, discrimination, dispossession, and squandering (Lewis and Kelman, 2012). 114

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As it has been well established for several decades, vulnerability is not solely determined by poverty but must be related to the social system and daily life, as well as considered on a particular spatial scale (Wisner, 1993). In this sense, ‘the development decisions that create and maintain vulnerability are the causes of disasters, not the natural phenomena that sometimes become dangerous. From this specific vulnerability perspective, disasters are not “natural”, either in the sense of being determined by nature or in the sense of being normal and acceptable’ (Kelman et al, 2016, p 131). Addressing the threat to the Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese requires a commitment to a more harmonious and balanced coexistence with the territory: from the volcano to the mountains, through the plains and the river basins. This is still a long way to go. The emergency logic alone is, indeed, not only a brake on the possibility of a (sustainable, ecological, respectful, forward-​ looking) collective ‘conversion’ in the relationship with places but even an obstacle because it seems to halt the development of different methods and alternative points of view. This means going beyond the notion of ‘risk culture’ (for example, the need to be uninterruptedly prepared for disaster, according to a real myth, that of safety) (Revet and Langumier, 2013) and understanding, rather, the political value of the issue. In this way, there is need for a reconciliation with the ecosystem, a shared planning of the future emergency, a participatory management of the territory, a dialogue between institutions and the population that fosters exchange, experiences, and involvement (Gugg, 2018b). Notes 1

2

3

4

5

‘Bradyseism’ is a gradual uplift or descent of part of the Earth’s surface caused by the filling or emptying of an underground magma chamber and/​or hydrothermal activity, particularly in volcanic calderas. ‘Piano di emergenza Vesuvio’, Italian Civil Protection’s website: https://​www.prote​zion​ ecivi​ le.gov.it/i​ t/a​ ppro ​ fond​ imen ​ to/a​ ggiorn ​ amen ​ to-d​ el-p​ iano-n ​ aziona​ le-d​ i-p​ rot​ ezio ​ ne-c​ iv​ ile-​il-​vesu​vio [Accessed 10 July 2022]. ‘Storia eruttiva del Vesuvio’, Vesuvian Observatory’s website: https://​www.ov.ingv.it/​ index.php/​sto​r ia-​vesu​vio [Accessed 10 July 2022]. See Annex 4 of the Vesuvius Emergency Plan, 2015 version, titled ‘Indicazioni per la pianificazione di emergenza dei Comuni esposti al rischio di ricaduta di ceneri vulcaniche in caso di eruzione del Vesuvio’: https://​regi​one.campa​nia.it/​ass​ets/​docume​nts/​allega​ to4-​mkajh​6w0.pdf [Accessed: 10 July 2022]. It is important to emphasize that the ‘Emergency Plan’ and the ‘Evacuation Plan’ are two different tools: the former identifies a risk scenario (a rather strong, sub-​Plinian-​ type eruption like the one in 1631) and, based on it, establishes a certain risk perimeter (the division between red zone and yellow zone); the latter, on the other hand, is an operational tool, which identifies escape routes, meeting points, and other practices and strategies related to population removal and rescue in case of alarm. As for Vesuvius, there is a general ‘Emergency Plan’, renewed in 2013, and an ‘Evacuation Plan’ of the red zone only, issued in 2016; for the yellow zone, however, there is still no operational tool, only the recommendations mentioned in the text. 115

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References Annunziata, L. (1998) La Crepa, Milan: Rizzoli. Boholm, Å. (2011) ‘A relational theory of risk’, Journal of Risk Research, 14: 175–​90. Cederna, A. (1999) Antonio Cederna e la Penisola Sorrentina, Sorrento and Naples: CMEA (Centro Meridionale di Educazione Ambientale). Cubellis, E. and Marturano, A. (2010) Testimonianze, ricordi e descrizioni dell’ultima eruzione del Vesuvio del marzo 1944, Naples: Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV). Di Costanzo, F. (1980) Un vecchio sacerdote racconta, Naples: PLV. Di Gennaro, A. (2012) La misura della terra: Crisi civile e spreco del territorio in Campania, Naples: Clean. Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. (1982) Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Environmental and Technological Dangers, Berkeley: University of California Press. Falcone, E. (1970) Nocera dei Pagani dalle origini ad oggi, Pagani (Salerno): Arti grafiche Palumbo & Esposito. Falconieri, I., Dall’Ò E. and Gugg G. (2022) ‘Emergenza: una categoria stratificata e plurale. Riflessioni introduttive’, Antropologia, 9(2): 7–​24. Gasparini, P. (2006) ‘Vesuvio e territorio’, in Alla scoperta del Vesuvio, Naples: Electa, pp 13–​18. Giddens, A. (2006) Le conseguenze della modernità: Fiducia e rischio, sicurezza e pericolo, Bologna: Il Mulino. Gugg, G. (2015) ‘Rischio e post-​sviluppo vesuviano: un’antropologia della catastrofe annunciata’, Antropologia Pubblica, 1–​2: 141–​60. Gugg, G. (2018a) ‘Anthropology of the Vesuvius Emergency Plan: History, perspectives and limits of a dispositive for volcanic risk government’, in L. Antronico and F. Marincioni (eds) Natural Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction Policies, Rende, Cosenza: Il Sileno, pp 105–​23. Gugg, G. (2018b) ‘Alla ricerca dell’interlocutore: per una antropologia che disinneschi l’emergenza’, in I. Falconieri and S. Pitzalis (eds) Illuminazioni, Messina: Università di Messina, pp 147–​92. Available from: http://​www. rivist​ aill​ umin ​ azi​oni.it/​wpcont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2019/0​ 3/5​ .Giovan ​ ni-G ​ ugg_A ​ ​ lla-​r ice​rca-​dellinte​rloc​utor​e_​pe​runa​ntro​polo​g ia-​che-​disi​nnes​chi-​lem​erge​ nza.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2022]. Gugg, G. and Molisse, E. (2020) ‘Sarno, dopo la colata di fango: Una storia italiana di ordinaria emergenza in attesa della catastrofe’, Lo stato delle cose. Osservatorio sull’Italia fragile, [online] 2 October. Available from: http://​ www.losta​todel​ leco ​ se.com/s​ crittu ​ re/s​ arno-l​ a-​col​ata-​fango-​sto​r ia-​itali​ana-​ ordina​r ia-​emerge​nza-​att​esa-​della-​cat​astr​ofe-​giovan ​ ni-g​ ugg-e​ nnio-m ​ olis​ se/​ [Accessed 10 July 2022]. Harvey, D. (2010) Géographie et capital: Vers un matérialisme historico-​géographique, Paris: Syllepse. 116

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Kelman, I., Gaillard, J.C., Lewis, J. and Mercer, J. (2016) ‘Learning from the history of disaster vulnerability and resilience research and practice for climate change’, Natural Hazards, 82: 129–​43. Lamberti, A. (2011) ‘Lo sfasciume urbano ha creato paesaggi di paura’, Il Mediano, [online] 16 January. Available from: https://​www.ilmedi​ano. com/​lo-​sfasci​ume-​urb​ano-​ha-​cre​ato-​paesa​ggi-​di-​paura/​ [Accessed 10 July 2022]. Lewis, J. and Kelman, I. (2012) ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) versus Disaster Risk Creation (DRC)’, PLOS Currents Disasters. Available from: http://​curren ​ ts.plos.org/d​ isaste​ rs/a​ rtic​ le/​ the-​good-​the-​bad-​and-​the-​ugly-​disas​ter-​r isk-​reduct​ion-​drr-​ver​sus-​disas​ ter-​r isk-​creat​ion-​drc/​ [Accessed 10 July 2022]. Molisse, E. (2020) Dal ‘Modello Sarno’ al ‘Sistema Sarno’: Un piano strategico per il contrasto al dissesto idrogeologico e per il recupero della montagna, Final dissertation in Engineering and Architecture (advisors: G. Mazzeo and G. Gugg), Naples: Università di Napoli ‘Federico II’. Nazzaro, A. (2001) Il Vesuvio: Storia eruttiva e teorie vulcanologiche, Naples: Liguori. November, V. (2011) ‘Questionner la relation risques-​territoires’, in V. November (ed) Habiter les territoires à risques, Losanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, pp 1–​18. Oliver-​Smith, A. (1996) ‘Anthropological research on hazards and disasters’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 25: 303–​28. Ongarello, G. (2009) ‘Vivere nell’area vesuviana: Intervista al vulcanologo Prof. Giuseppe Luongo’, Studi Etno-​Antropologici, 37: 28–​34. Rapolla, A., Rolandi, G. and Bais, C. (2003) ‘Aspetti geofisici, vulcanologici e geosismici’, in Il rischio Vesuvio: Strategie di prevenzione e di intervento, Naples: Università di Napoli ‘Federico II’, Giannini Editore, pp 31–​115. Revet, S. and Langumier, J. (eds) (2013) Le gouvernement des catastrophes, Paris: Karthala. Segaud, M. (2010) Anthropologie de l’espace: Habiter, fonder, distribuer, transformer, Paris: Armand Colin. Vella, A. and Barbera, F. (2002) Il territorio storico della città vesuviana: Sviluppo e struttura urbana della fascia costiera, San Giorgio a Cremano, Naples: Lab. Ricerche & Studi Vesuviani. Wisner, B. (1993) ‘Disaster vulnerability: Scale, power and daily life’, GeoJournal, 30(2): 127–​40.

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Local Communities as Strangers In-​Between: The Paradigm of Aleatory Politics in Post-​earthquake Central Italy (2016–​17) Francesco Danesi della Sala

The disaster: ghosts in the crater It all started in August 2016. Suddenly, on the night of Wednesday 24 August, a powerful tremor with magnitude 6 hit the Tronto valley, a narrow geographical area that surrounds the homonymous river, with small villages situated across three regions (Abruzzo, Marche and Lazio). The earthquake swarm continued in the following months, with two major shocks on 26 and 30 October: the epicentre moved north in the Monti Sibillini, along the Apennine ridge that divides the Marche and Umbria regions. Another four tremors took place on 18 January 2017, after which the swarm became quiet. The territorial proportions of the disaster immediately looked unprecedented: over 140 towns and villages suffered significant damages, with some places entirely reduced to dust. I have been conducting ethnographic research in the Apennine inland territories since October 2017, with alternate stays that for personal circumstances have allowed me to reside in Macerata (Marche Region) for many months until 2021. Initially, my research was focused on how emic representations of the disaster channelled past and present conditions of vulnerability and disparity. As a follow-​up, I began investigating how the disaster governance and its political framework were shaping the local reconstruction experience. Adopting a multi-​sited approach (Marcus, 1995), 118

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I have been able to collect interviews with inhabitants, administrators, technicians, and journalists. However, the COVID-​19 pandemic had a negative impact on the prosecution of fieldwork between 2021 and 2022. Therefore, I decided to combine different research methods such as online research, netnography and institutional documentary analysis until my last visit in March 2022. Fieldwork issues and ethnographic research innovations as such have been brilliantly reframed as ‘patchwork ethnography’, a methodological shift that ‘helps us refigure … how we can transform realities that have been described to us as “limitations” and “constraints” into openings for new insights’ (Günel et al, 2020). Acknowledging material difficulties, political constraints, and frictions between personal and academic concerns made me rethink my research approach by experimenting with unusual forms of ethnographic engagement (such as social media interactions on post-​disaster activists’ groups) with my interlocutors, especially during the lockdown policy imposed between 2020 and 2021. Actually, expanding the sites of observation and conversation in the digital proved to be unexpectedly fruitful: social distancing forced my interlocutors to spend more time on social media groups, moving their discussions and claims on networks that were growing very rapidly. As soon as the lockdown policies were lifted and I could travel to the Apennines for short-​term field visits, I found my ethnographic notes to be already filled with many topics and questions collected during the previous months of ‘detachment’ from physical fieldwork. In the end, what I initially perceived as a limitation led me to an even deeper engagement with my interlocutors in the post-​disaster communities. In the early days of the aftermath, the Italian government and media adopted the term ‘crater’ to refer to the immensely extended area of the disaster. Interestingly, the word has no evident connections to scientific knowledge in seismology or disaster studies, yet it was quickly accepted as a neutral and effective rhetorical solution to identify and describe the space of the disaster. Although it had already been used in the past by academics, politicians and public administrators, the 2016–​17 Apennine swarm saw overarching exploitation of the term, which came to define the order (Foucault, 1971) of a depoliticized, shallow and non-​specific discourse both in national media outlets and institutional commentaries: as a result, the plurality of the disaster, with its many differences and local contingencies, was reduced to a one-​for-​all identifier. Ethnographic fieldwork made clear that this was a strong clue for the broader process of marginalization of the disaster. In other words, the second nature of the disaster –​a process that often unravels as a long-​term consequence –​was already encapsulated and enacted by the rhetoric of the ‘crater’. Thus, for our purposes, it is useful to start from this ambiguous metaphor –​a semantic clue of the cultural splitting of the disaster (Scheper-​Hughes, 2005) –​to understand the local conditions of extended marginalization. 119

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The word ‘crater’ usually refers to a cavity in the landscape: it may be the eruptive mouth of a volcano, the crushed area of a meteorite impact or the shell-​hole of an explosion. It is enough to say that it has to do with destructive forces that determine a striking modification and collapse of the space. As such, it is no surprise that in the context of powerful earthquakes it could emerge as an effective metaphor that connected space as territory and modification as material destruction. Moreover, a crater is formed by a sudden burst of an uncontrollable and overwhelming phenomenon that causes irreversible consequences. Seismic disasters seem to be the perfect match. Nonetheless, words and metaphors often reveal much more than they pretend to: they are situated, both historically and culturally. Their apparent neutrality and simplicity should by no means be underestimated. Thinking of the crater, one should not forget that as a geophysical feature of the landscape, it draws a clear distinction between the inside and the outside. It remarks a border in space and time, splitting the gradient with new coordinates: here and there. Here nothing happened; there is where the disaster took place. In short, it establishes a difference. In the Apennine ridge crater of Central Italy, the dichotomy entailed in this order of discourse became quite evident since the early days of the emergency. The former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, in the early days of the disaster, pronounced the well-​known motto: ‘We won’t leave you alone’, which in the last six years has been repeated countless times as a political mantra by the institutional actors that came next (five governments and four Extraordinary Commissioners –​EC from now on –​for the reconstruction). To the many inhabitants I have come to know, today the motto sounds like an infamous joke that only serves for passerelle politiche (‘political catwalks’: an Italian expression that illustrates the practice of politicians to appear in situations under the spotlight to gain people’s favour and votes). As a matter of fact, inside the crater, local communities perceived that the disaster was quickly being forgotten. Thus, its reality was becoming somewhat spectral. National media soon lowered their attention on the events and in most cases kept their focus on a couple of towns that for various reasons –​an interesting combination of cultural reputation of the towns and the political ability (or opportunism) of its administrators –​were still able to attract journalists, television programme makers, and national politicians: this is the case for Amatrice in Lazio and Norcia in Umbria. In October 2017, one year after the swarm –​ when I started my ethnographic fieldwork –​it was clear to local inhabitants that the term crater did not describe the space of the disaster anymore: it marked an ontological boundary that divided the real from the spectral. Of course, the long-​lasting presence of ruins and debris –​which as of today are still to be cleared in many towns –​has much to do with this kind of perception. Yet, to become a ghost is a matter of disconnection: victims were disconnected 120

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from their lives, homes and affections. They were forced to either settle in precarious emergency solutions or relocate along the Adriatic coast in collective residences. But as much as the disconnection is inevitable in the early stages of a disaster, the prolonged wait for the reconstruction exacerbated this condition of marginality: voices went unheard and as the seismic swarm became silent the crater got deeper. This is where a different kind of ghosts appeared. In fact, the institutional shift from the emergency phase to the reconstruction phase presented many contradictions and delays that, ultimately, mirrored the dichotomy of the crater. Institutional discourses, promises and decrees were abundant and hopeful outside; yet, they were all but real or effective inside. As stated previously, to become a ghost is a matter of disconnection: politics were disconnected from the local contingencies of the disaster. The tèchnè not only was disjunct from the polis: it was empty.

Reconstruction and abandonment The disconnection described previously did not happen overnight. We may consider it the by-​product of the disaster governance and the way the reconstruction process has been managed over the years. Moreover, it is important to stress how the disconnection acted as a catalyst for local representations of the disaster, which emphasized the idea of an intentional abandonment by the Italian government and institutions (Danesi, 2020). In the early months after the swarm, the Civil Protection Department was in charge of the emergency administration: this involved the protection of the population and the creation of temporary structures such as tents and container modules. At the same time, on 9 September 2016, the Italian government elected Vasco Errani –​who had already served both as Regional President of Emilia-​Romagna and EC for the 2012 earthquake –​ as EC for the Reconstruction in Central Italy. Lastly, Matteo Renzi in October 2016 declared that the SAE villages for the population would have been completed in less than seven months. The SAE (Struttura Abitativa in Emergenza, literally: Housing Structure in Emergency) was the emergency standardized housing model adopted by the Italian government in 2015 after a public announcement for a national framework agreement on emergency housing solutions (see Chapter 3). A SAE is a single-​storey house with the main structure made of steel, covered with polyurethane panels, and a little veranda made of wood. Its dimensions may vary from 40 to 60 to 80 square metres, depending on the number of tenants. According to the Italian government, the SAE villages would ensure that the population could stay close to its towns and territories for all the time needed for the reconstruction to take place. Furthermore, they would prevent the typical break-​up of social ties produced by a disaster. Actually, this kind of fragmentation was already in motion: as winter was coming on the Apennine ridge, at the 121

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end of 2017 many inhabitants were forced to leave their hometowns and move to temporary reception centres (hotels and holiday villages) along the Adriatic coast. In December 2017 –​14 months after the earthquake –​only 50 per cent of the SAE villages was completed: this amounts to 1,871 houses out of 3702. It was the beginning of a prolonged state of emergency that not only highlighted many institutional mistakes, controversies and failures but also unveiled the emptiness of the disaster policies. The standardized SAE houses proved to be all but appropriate for the mountain environment of the Apennines, with its harsh winters and heavy snowfalls. As a result, many SAE houses had technical dysfunctions and power failures that left their tenants without electricity or hot water for many days. Not to mention the mistakes made in the construction of the structures, which led to big patches of mildew appearing from under the floor in a matter of months. It should also be noted that the villages required significant work for the layout and the foundations to be laid in the proximity of the towns: this process determined the creation of parallel towns close to the town centres. The latter have remained zone rosse (inaccessible zones) until today and consequently the SAE villages have gradually lost their status of temporary solutions, becoming the new reality of its inhabitants: a reality that does not feature any space or structure devoted to the social relations of the community. The same song goes for the economic tissue and activities blasted by the earthquake: it took more than two years in some cases to organize temporary spaces for the delocalization of small businesses. And as the delays piled up month after month, it should be no surprise that those who had no option but to move along the Adriatic coast decided to never come back. The ‘Hotel Diaspora’ led to new ties, daily lives and futures; eventually, it normalized the uncertainty inside the crater as a chance for stability outside the crater (D’Angelo et al, 2018). Between 2018 and 2021 the emergency had been extending indefinitely, whereas the reconstruction remained far from taking off. To understand the state of suspension that has plagued the Apennine regions, we have to disassemble the governance structures and functions that were implemented in the crater, showing the gap between their definition and their actual activation. Lacking a standardized model of intervention, the 2016–​17 earthquake was managed by the Italian government as a chance to redeem its mistakes in recent disasters, for example L’Aquila in 2009 (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020) and Emilia-​Romagna in 2012 (Pitzalis, 2016). Distancing themselves from a centralized approach, both the Civil Protection Department and the EC Vasco Errani decided to adopt a bottom-​ up management model directed by a framework of experts. The EC, in particular, had to be responsible for the coordination between the central government, the regional institutions and the local administrations; also, his 122

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action had to be supported by the Special Offices for the Reconstruction, dislocated in all the four regions of the crater. This model led to a ruinous multiplication of functions, roles, and processes, with the delegation of duties that in most cases became confusing and conflicting even for the local institutions. But even worse was the fact that many of these functions and roles stayed vacant for many years without clear explanations. In short, the disaster governance was perfectly drawn on paper but tremendously elusive in the reality of facts: it became an abstract representation of powers, schemes, and legitimation systems with no rulers (Guarino et al, 2018; Della Valle, 2021). In addition to this, even the EC role became evanescent: the mandate, susceptible to the national government instability, changed four times and in February 2020 the former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, assigned the office to Giovanni Legnini. During my last visit to the northern Apennine towns of the crater in March 2022, the SAE villages looked everything but temporary: many verandas had been decorated and personalized with lights, plants and other ornaments. However, in the distance, I could finally recognize a few cranes with little teams of workers taking care of a house or two. As many newspapers had reported in 2021, the EC Giovanni Legnini made important changes to the regulatory system of the reconstruction, gathering more financial resources, and activating the effective processes involved in the evaluation of the damaged houses, presentation of restoration projects and their approval.1 The overall governance structure remained the same as before, but it was progressively filled with the missing officials and technicians it required. However, when I paid a visit to my informants, while acknowledging a timid start of the reconstruction, they also expressed many doubts about the actual realization of the process. Gennaro, a technician employed in the municipality of Ussita –​a small village in the Marche Apennines –​was still sceptical about the delegation of duties assigned to local administrations: ‘Local authorities are autonomous, yes, you have decision-​making power, but you work with every piece of paper. This thing is deliberate. Why does an inquiry for a reconstruction practice last an average of 360 days? Such a thing is deliberate. Maybe it’s because money is not available straight away? Maybe it’s the logistics or insurance policies … I don’t know. We are working on many things, but it won’t be easy.’ (Gennaro, 23 March 2022) He reasserted the same hesitations and assumptions that since the early days of the emergency many inhabitants had already reported. In short, the negligence and the sloppiness of the disaster governance were a deliberate act of exclusion and, more significantly, the visible proceedings of a strategy for the abandonment of the Apennine inland districts. Ethnographic engagement 123

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with emic representations of the disaster proved to be crucial: whether they expose rational explanations or symbolic readings of the events, post-​ disaster discourses and representations shed light on the relations between the national government and the stricken areas (Saitta, 2015; Ligi, 2009). Furthermore, the disaster may interrupt long-​standing silences and push people to speak out about ‘what had previously remained in the realm of unspoken dissatisfaction’ (Simpson and Serafini, 2019). In the Apennine crater, the earthquake and the governance misconduct awakened tensions and vulnerabilities that had remained dormant for decades. In this sense, the disaster may be understood as an epiphenomenon –​the tip of the iceberg –​of long-​term modernization processes that have led to a significant demographic decline in the inland areas of the Italian peninsula: with the economic boom of the 1960s, urbanization and development along the coastal cities of the Adriatic were significant and attracted the inland population looking for new opportunities and jobs. Yet, it also marked the beginning of a slow and relentless neglect of the future of these regions, with the progressive reduction or dismantlement of essential services and infrastructures. This is to say that the earthquake has been a tragic unveiling of a long-​lasting crisis, a crisis whose effects have been undoubtedly accelerated and exacerbated by the disaster governance and its politics. The changes and derogations brought by the EC Giovanni Legnini notwithstanding, bureaucracy has expanded even more and as of March 2022 the disaster decrees –​the laws that dictate the processes and requirements for the reconstruction –​have reached the impressive total of 125. Daniele, an informant from Muccia, a small town in the crater, was very upset about this situation. He had been forced to move to the Adriatic coast but eventually decided to come back and wait for the reconstruction: “Here they want to depopulate. … There’s no other explanation. Because with these continuous and sudden changes of the laws, decrees and ordinances, people cannot understand anything” (Daniele, 22 March 2022). Gennaro explained to me that practices and procedures not only had become very intricate, but they were also hardly understandable by the technicians in charge of the reconstruction projects. Ironically, he admitted: “You have a decree that goes against another one, the thread goes lost. Just add the war [in Ukraine], the increase in material costs, there you get deadlocks. I who work in this system do not know where to put my hands on these things.” Thus, while political action for the reconstruction is clearly weakened by the lack of pertinent plans and solutions, it is important to underline how the disaster governance has turned into a regime of total bureaucracy (Graeber, 2015) and why this regime is functional to the normalization of the undetermined. In fact, the continuous proliferation of decrees on the one hand conveys the idea that the reconstruction process is alive and working –​the bureaucracy as an objectivity machine (Hoag, 2011) –​on the 124

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other, it guarantees the indeterminate extension of the process itself thanks to ever-​changing procedures, deadlines and credentials. The tension between hope and uncertainty (Bock, 2017) becomes unbearable and as Daniele told me: “If you try and listen to every single thing, you become crazy.”

Aleatory politics and the production of scenarios A major issue of the disaster governance in the Apennine crater may be defined as one of missing expertise. Specifically, as Ravi Rajan (2002) has shown in the case of the Bhopal disaster of 1984, missing expertise is a threefold question that involves contingent expertise (or the administration preparedness to respond to a potential hazard), conceptual expertise (or the administration ability to devise long-​term rehabilitation strategies) and ethnographic expertise (or the contextual and grounded understanding of the disaster). Yet, in our case, the hyper-​stratification of the governance, with its manifold ramifications of decrees, functions and procedures, seems to offset the idea of missing expertise. The latter, actually, requires a State or an administration to be both absent and silent. On the contrary, as the Apennine disaster governance turned into a regime of total bureaucracy, as we said before, it became ghostly. The objectivity machine put in motion by the bureaucratization of the reconstruction –​through the multiplication of laws and processes –​served to project the hologram of hypothetical plans of intervention. Here lies the difference: a ghost is not absent. It can be seen but cannot be touched. And as soon as it appears, it is already gone. Thus, we should speak of ‘deceptive’ expertise. Moreover, it is important to trace how such an expertise emerges and what effects it may produce on long-​term scales. Disasters have been framed by socio-​a nthropological studies as extraordinary processes that reveal ordinary issues and vulnerabilities (Oliver-​Smith, 2002). In many cases, disasters have provided modern States and global economic networks with exceptional opportunities for radical interventions of modernization and development –​at the victim’s expense. Deregulation, exception and legal ‘undecidability’ (Agamben, 2003) have paved the way for abstract plans of legibility (Scott, 1998) and realignment to national or transnational goals and needs, whether they regarded urban development, economic models and infrastructures, political alignment, or social segmentation. Looking back at the Italian earthquakes in the 20th century and considering the chronic failures and social distress of their reconstruction processes (Guidoboni, 2016),2 it can be argued that State interventions plans as described previously have produced what I call ‘aleatory’ politics, a heterogeneous paradigm of disaster governance whose long-​term consequences are largely unforeseen and detrimental to local communities. More specifically, aleatory politics translate the abstract vision of the State 125

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into a supposedly codified set of rules, requirements, and processes. Thinking with Henri Lefebvre (1974), they transform the top-​down representation of the space into the possible production of a scenario, where the latter indicates the actual deployment of a dedicated governance. Failures, in this respect, depend on the disconnection of politics from the context in which they intend to intervene without the proper expertise. Moreover, one should not forget that reconstruction processes are not linear –​it is not as simple as an omniscient ruler acting upon a neutral and receptive space –​and the production of scenarios is always subject to an interface (De Sardan, 2005) of variable social interactions, appropriations, and misunderstandings. For our purposes, it is useful to retrace how aleatory politics have shaped the long-​term consequences of three of the most severe Italian seismic disasters of the last century. If we are meant to study disasters as processes, then it is of utter importance to adopt a historical perspective that allows us to detect changes and continuities across multiple dimensions, scales and contexts. To weave together the many cultural histories of disasters on the one hand gives us the opportunity to avoid simplistic sociological comparisons, on the other makes possible a critical synthesis of all these (García-​Acosta, 2002). The 1908 Messina earthquake is the starting point for our brief analytical detour. Of course, it is not a random choice. As noted by Domenica Farinella and Pietro Saitta, the Messina earthquake –​with its unprecedented devastation –​was ‘a very modern event’ (2019, p 1). In fact, it was envisaged by the State as an opportunity to produce a structural and cultural shift based on modern notions of efficiency and effectiveness (Farinella and Saitta, 2019). The enormous public expenditure for the reconstruction was a novelty in the State’s responses to earthquake destruction. It was aimed at supporting a massive urban redevelopment plan also known as Piano Borzì –​by the name of its architect –​which actually was a complete ex novo reconstruction of the city. In his diachronic study of the disaster, historian Giacomo Parrinello has shown how the outcome was clearly influenced by unwanted consequences of the emergency response, with the creation of provisional settlements, and unplanned social processes (2015). Overall, considering its long-​term effects, it intensified previous inequalities among the urban population and transformed the very structure of the city’s economy, which became an outlet for commodities from the north while providing the country with emigrant labour for the national industry (Farinella and Saitta, 2019). In short, the catastrophe produced a ‘new and paradoxical’ (Farinella and Saitta, 2019, p 277) form of integration within a national scheme. As Parrinello concludes about the aesthetics of the city: ‘The new Messina was certainly unique in its blend of planned urban modernity and shantytowns’ (Parrinello, 2015, p 111). With the 1968 Belice Valley earthquake, the shortcomings of State-​ led interventions became overtly disputed in the public arena. Initially, 126

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the reconstruction was meant as a radical development plan that would transform the Belice Valley into a functional ‘city-​territory’ for the expanding industrial national economy. Yet, the State-​driven program lacked the will as well as the actual investments needed for such a plan (Pellicano, 2020): the government dismissed its original ambitions and in 1976 –​after eight years of unjustifiable delays –​the entire institutional organization for the reconstruction was modified, bringing new funds, and allowing local administrations to control the allocation of money. Once again, Parrinello has highlighted how ‘the disorganization of relief operations and the alleged corruption, the grandiose plans for new towns and the ‘city-​territory’, and the demographic decline’ produced unintended consequences both on urban environments and socio-​economic structures (Parrinello, 2015, p 202). The reconstruction had the symbolic purpose of overcoming the typical conditions of rural underdevelopment portrayed by the national rhetoric of the questione del Mezzogiorno (an Italian political expression that refers to the social and economic disparities between the North and the South). While this plan was a failure, as of today the long-​term consequences of aleatory politics are clearly visible: the promised industrialization never arrived and the Belice Valley, with its new towns, has become a ‘hybrid of advanced urban modernity and a persistently rural environment and economy’ (Parrinello, 2015, p 204). As we come closer to the present day, this very litany becomes more controversial: as we said before, the production of scenarios depends on the interface of their realization –​an arena to which many institutional and informal actors may gain access, with conflicting interests and expectations. The 1980 Irpinia earthquake is a dramatic testimony to both the lack of long-​ sighted disaster governance and the forms of collusion and corruption that may arise within an opaque management of the reconstruction. The Irpinia district had been historically marked by precarious living conditions and economic inequalities, some of which were fostered by early industrialization policies supported by public funds (Zaccaria and Zizzari, 2016). Moreover, from 1961 to 1981, the whole area was subject to heavy emigration –​the same demographic decline we have described for the Apennines. The disaster on the one hand was exploited by the government to underline, once more, the backwardness of the Mezzogiorno, and on the other hand granted the opportunity to fully redesign the local geography with a State-​led intervention against poverty (D’Ascenzio, 2015). As noted by the final report of the Parliamentary Enquiry Committee on the Irpinia reconstruction (Commissione Parlamentare d’Inchiesta, 1991), public funds were distributed without proper surveillance and in most cases they were manipulated by a corrupted lobby of local and national politicians, entrepreneurs and camorristi: industrialization and modernization were used as an excuse to access non-​repayable contributions, while the reconstruction of houses and 127

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towns took more than forty years to be completed. The post-​earthquake ‘limbo’, despite the intended scenario, opened unexpected opportunities to experiment with new political, economic, and social configurations of power (Ventura, 2015). It saw emerging networks of actors coming from institutional, entrepreneurial and criminal backgrounds acting within an aleatory perimeter that further exacerbated previous trends of depopulation and disparity. Although six years are not enough to predict the long-​term consequences of the Apennine disaster, we can at least try to outline the contextual scenario and its observed contradictions. Our case is particularly interesting because the disaster governance and the bureaucratization of the reconstruction seem to confirm an already established ‘disinvestment’ scenario, which is perceived by local inhabitants as totally absent planning. In fact, the disaster has produced a paradox: while the historical trend has seen the reduction of public expenditure in the inland areas, the earthquake has obviously required the State to intervene with the allocation of consistent funds –​which actually became available only in 2021 –​that needed European concessions on debt threshold. As Gennaro told me: “We haven’t planned anything. And with the five years’ delay, we’re now being too hasty in doing all the things.” Moreover, the aleatory politics of the disaster unveil the subtle interplay between scenarios operating at different scales across the global and the local spectrum. Public disinvestment in marginal geographies responds to the increasing dependence of national politics on market economy, global neoliberalism and extensive privatization of primary services. In the Apennine crater, institutional sloppiness has paved the way to often controversial entrances of private actors, who found fertile grounds for the ‘shock’ exploitation (Klein, 2007) of the territories through financial support to rebuilding services and infrastructures (Danesi, 2020). Thus, privatization of the reconstruction is twofold: on the one hand, it highlights the increasing abdication of State responsibilities to private companies, on the other, it transforms the social experience of the reconstruction into a private form of suffering to which the Government is not willing to respond.

Conclusions During my last visit to the crater, I met an old couple living in the SAE village of Caldarola, a small town close to Macerata, in the Marche Region. They were sitting on a solitary bench in the middle of an alley: she was reciting the rosary and, as I passed by, gave me a sweet smile. She was very willing to talk, so I stopped for a little conversation. “It’s been six years now, we have our SAE, but it doesn’t feel like home anymore,” she told me. And then again: “Everything is so uncertain, we have lost it all, he –​looking at her husband –​has lost it all, he was an artisan … his mind is gone.” He 128

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did not say a word and seemed completely absent-​minded. But then a tear rolled down his cheek. Daniele, who has been one of my oldest informants, confessed to me: ‘Uncertainty … now it’s worse. Just add Covid and the rising costs. It’s become even worse. Do you know what is going to happen now? You have to pay the new [the reconstruction] but also the old [the suspended taxes]. The problem is that this town [Muccia] is not anymore … is not a town. You don’t have meeting places, you’re locked up inside these four SAE houses. Silence reigns like in a horror movie … in this line of SAE houses … it’s all about surviving.’ (22 March 2022) It is undeniable that disconnection within the crater has led to common feelings of estrangement, fostered by the hiatus between the social experience of the disaster and the aleatory politics of its governance. It is important to note that such a disconnection neither is transitory nor is just about the past: it turns the sense of belonging into the uncertainty of presence. As we have demonstrated previously, being in-​between seems to be the inevitable condition of a post-​disaster paradigm that crosses many cultural histories of Italian seismic catastrophes from the last century. The production of scenarios and the controversies arising at the interface of their actual deployment is a relevant aspect of the long-​term unintended consequences of disasters. Moreover, post-​disasters spaces, within such a paradigm, allow heterogeneous and experimental forms of intervention that in many cases lead to increasing vulnerabilities and inequalities among the local population. In this sense, abstract representations of the space and the very idea of a scenario end up producing something similar to what Margaret Plumwood has called ‘shadow places’ (Plumwood, 2008): these are denied places dominated by dematerialization, marginalization and disregard, with historical conditions of exploitation and political injustices. Further diachronic analyses and ethnographic engagements within the Apennine crater will be crucial to shed light on its long-​term trajectory. At the same time, as Ravi Rajan has pointed out, the absence of ‘connected’ politics should be taken as an urgent call to reflect on how our disciplines may be able to build ethnographic imagination and mindful expertise inside the institutions we critically observe (Ravi Rajan, 2020). Notes 1

2

As of September 2021, the EC Report on the Reconstruction shows that 11,093 construction sites have been opened in the crater (Commissario Straordinario Ricostruzione Sisma 2016, 2021). This amounts to 13 per cent of the private houses declared unfit for use. The reconstructions after the earthquakes in Friuli (1976) and Umbria (1997) are often considered as well accomplished reconstruction processes. However, when looking at their 129

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long-​term consequences, many inconsistencies and flaws have been observed. In the case of Friuli, Robert Geipel (1991) has underlined the pejorative effect of the reconstruction –​ which was fostered by ideas of infrastructural and commercial modernization –​on the social space of the stricken communities. On the other hand, Enrico Marcoré (2015), in his ethnographic study of Nocera Umbra, has shown how the reconstruction in Umbria 1997 did not address long-​standing issues of depopulation and disinvestment, resulting in perfectly restored yet empty ‘ghost towns’.

References Agamben, G. (2003) Stato d’eccezione, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri. Bock, J. (2017) ‘The second earthquake: How the Italian state generated hope and uncertainty in post-​disaster L’Aquila’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 23(1): 61–​80. Commissario Straordinario Ricostruzione Sisma 2016 (2021) La ricostruzione in Italia centrale –​Settembre 2021. Available from: https://​sisma2​016.gov. it/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2021/​08/​Rappor ​to20​21de​f_​1.pdf [Accessed 4 September 2023]. Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta (1991) Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sulla attuazione degli interventi per la ricostruzione e lo sviluppo dei territory della Basilicata e della Campania colpiti dai terremoti del Novembre 1980 e Febbraio 1981: Relazione conclusiva e relazione propositiva, Doc. XXIII (27), Volume I, Tomo I, Rome: Camera dei Deputati-​Senato della Repubblica, pp 154–​55. Danesi, F. (2020) ‘Dimmi di che morte dobbiamo morire: dinamiche di persuasione strutturale nel post-​terremoto del Centro Italia (2016–​2017)’, Archivio Antropologico Mediterraneo [online], 22(1): https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​ aam.2582. D’Angelo, A., Franchina, A., della Valle, C. and Olori, D. (2018) ‘Cronache di un esodo. Abitare provvisorio e dispositive di displacement nel post-​disastro dell’Appennino centrale’, in Emidio Di Treviri (ed) Sul fronte del sisma. Un’inchiesta militante sul post-​terremoto dell’Appennino centrale (2016–​2017), Rome: DeriveApprodi, pp 32–​79. D’Ascenzio, A. (2015) ‘Microcosmo imprenditoriale irpino: tra polvere e macerie’, in P. Saitta (ed) Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie. Vita quotidiana, resistenza e gestione del disastro, Florence: Editpress, pp 81–​92. De Sardan, O. (2005) Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social Change, London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Della Valle, C. (2021) ‘Dall’eccezione alla regola nei territori colpiti dal sisma’, in Emidio Di Treviri (ed) Sulle tracce dell’Appennino che cambia. Voci dalla ricerca sul post-​terremoto del 2016–​17, Campobasso: Il Bene Comune Edizioni, pp 27–​30. Farinella, D. and Saitta, P. (2019) The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters: The Management of Urban Space Through an Earthquake –​Messina, 1908–​2018, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 130

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Foucault, M. (1971) L’ordre du discours: Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970, Paris: Gallimard. García-​Acosta, V. (2002) ‘Historical disaster research’, in S.M. Hoffman and A. Oliver-​Smith (eds) Catastrophe & Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, pp 23–​48. Geipel, R. (1991) Long-​term Consequences of Disasters: The Reconstruction of Friuli, Italy, in Its International Context, 1976–​1988, New York: Springer-​Verlag. Graeber, D. (2015) The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, Brooklyn and London: Melville House. Guarino, L., Sinisi, F., Turco, L., Turchi, A. and Menghi, M. (2018) ‘La gestione dell’emergenza. Politiche e pratiche nel terremoto di nessuno’, in Emidio Di Treviri (ed) Sul fronte del sisma. Un’inchiesta militante sul post-​ terremoto dell’Appennino centrale (2016–​2017), Rome: DeriveApprodi, pp 230–​63. Guidoboni, E. (2016) ‘Il valore della memoria. Terremoti e ricostruzioni in Italia nel lungo periodo’, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, 96(1): 415–​44. Günel, G., Saiba Varma, Watanabe, C. (2020) ‘A Manifesto for Patchwork Ethnography’, Member Voices, Fieldsights, June 9. Hoag, C. (2011) ‘Assembling partial perspectives: Thoughts on the anthropology of bureaucracy’, PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 34(1): 81–​94. Imperiale, A.J. and Vanclay, F. (2020) ‘Top-​down reconstruction and the failure to “build back better” resilient communities after disaster: Lessons from the 2009 L’Aquila Italy earthquake’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 29(4): 541–​55. Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, London: Macmillan. Lefebvre, H. (1974) La production de l’espace, Paris: Editions Anthropos. Ligi, G. (2009) Antropologia dei disastri, Rome and ​Bari: Editori Laterza. Marcorè, E. (2015) ‘Nocera Umbra: diacronica di un disastro annunciato’, in P. Saitta (ed) Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie: Vita quotidiana, resistenza e gestione del disastro, Florence: Editpress, pp 197–​208. Marcus, G.E. (1995) ‘Ethnography in/​of the world system: The emergence of multi-​sited ethnography’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 24: 95–​117. Oliver-​Smith, A. (2002) ‘Theorizing disasters: Nature, power and culture in catastrophe and culture’, in S.M. Hoffman and A. Oliver-​Smith (eds) Catastrophe & Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, pp 23–​48. Parrinello, G. (2015) Fault Lines: Earthquakes and Urbanism in Modern Italy, New York: Berghahn Books.

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Pellicano, A. (2020) ‘La Valle del Belìce dopo il terremoto del 1968: rappresentazione di una complessità territoriale tra nuovi paesaggi, città ricostruite e identità’, Bollettino dell’Associazione Italiana di Cartografia, 170: 77–​93. Pitzalis, S. (2016) Politiche del disastro. Poteri e contropoteri nel terremoto emiliano, Verona: Ombre Corte. Plumwood, V. (2008) ‘Shadow places and the politics of dwelling’, Australian Humanities Review, 44: 139–​50. Ravi Rajan, S. (2002) ‘Missing expertise, categorial politics, and chronic disasters: The case of Bhopal’, in S.M. Hoffman and A. Oliver-​Smith (eds) Catastrophe & Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, pp 237–​59. Ravi Rajan, S. (2020) ‘Bhopal and beyond: An anthropology of relief and rehabilitation efforts and prospects for a socially relevant political ecology of disaster management’, in S.M. Hoffman and A. Oliver-​Smith (eds) The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective, London and New York: Routledge, pp 288–​307. Saitta, P. (ed) (2015) Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie: Vita quotidiana, resistenza e gestione del disastro, Florence: Editpress. Scheper-​Hughes, N. (2005) ‘The disaster and its doubles’, Anthropology Today, 21(6): 2–​4. Scott, J.C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Simpson, E. and Serafini, M. (2019) ‘Earthquake citizens: Disaster and aftermath politics in India and Nepal’, in M. Holbraad, B. Kapferer and Sauma, J.F. (eds) Ruptures: Anthropologies of Discontinuity in Times of Turmoil, London: UCL Press, pp 193–​217. Ventura, S. (2015) ‘Il terremoto in Irpinia del 1980: memorie individuali e collettive del sisma’ in P. Saitta (ed) Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie: Vita quotidiana, resistenza e gestione del disastro, Florence: Editpress, pp 187–​96. Zaccaria, A.M. and Zizzari, S. (2016) ‘Spaces of resilience: Irpinia 1980, Abruzzo 2009’, Sociologia urbana e rurale, 111: 64–​83.

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PART III

Disasters and Conflicting Knowledges

8

Under the Smart City Paradigm: The Social and Spatial Transformation of L’Aquila City Centre Isabella Tomassi

Introduction Fifteen years ago, President Bill Clinton popularized the notion of ‘smart city’. For him, a smart city had to be a sustainable city. But the expression was quickly taken up in the digital world. Firms such as Cisco and IBM seized on it to promote their tools and solutions. The message was clear: the (smart) city was to be digital or not be. As is it often the case in this sector, companies are moving quickly into action, without worrying about social responsibility. This chapter is about the recovery process in L’Aquila after the 2009 earthquake and adopts the ‘repairing’ prospective (Centemeri et al, 2022). The L’Aquila smart city (SC) model has to be understood as a techno-​centric and depoliticized recovery infrastructure and urban management platform. The aim of this chapter is to epistemologically address the imaginary underlying the SC paradigm when it is evoked as an operational ‘model’ of city transformation. What is at stake is the negotiation –​or lack thereof –​of the meaning to be given to the event and what its recovery should consist of. From this point of view, the reconstruction of L’Aquila in an ‘innovative’, ‘smart’ key represents nothing less than a new way of dispossession (Harvey, 2003) of public and political space (Arendt, 2013) for its inhabitants. This technocratic idea of recovery is strongly related to another one that considers catastrophes as ‘opportunity’ windows to ‘develop’ or re-​develop a ‘marginal’ or ‘internal’ area (Barca, 2014). 135

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During the recovery phase, and following government-​imposed disaster management, local authorities, along with university and research centres, have come together to imagine and plan reconstruction. In this way, rhetoric and ideologies of development have not only been imposed in the symbolic sphere of discourse (media, institutional communication, debates and conferences) but also in the physical space of the city (infrastructures). The materiality of the smart transformation can be seen above all in the rethinking of infrastructures (5G, smart tunnels, speed loops, smart grids, smart meters, urban sensors and data centres), which become the central hubs in the implementation of the smartness of the reconstruction in L’Aquila. I will highlight the links between these technical devices and the management of the territorial project (Le Breton et al, 2022) that allows us to clarify its participation in more general objectives on ecological, social, economic, and democratic levels. Moreover, I will show what place these devices have in the more classic processes of planning and urbanism in the post-​disaster reconstruction of L’Aquila. From this perspective, I argue that L’Aquila reconstruction is following a global pattern of ‘smartification’, but it is a process tackled without technical tools and without a multi-​scale and multi-​level development model (which) has placed town planning in a rear-​guard position (Andreassi, 2020, p 38). I aim to understand the SC urban infrastructure through its epistemological, imaginary, and material dimensions. I also would like to contribute to the contemporary expansion of social research on planning and recovery as vectors of a global neo-​liberal development model: ‘disaster capitalism’ (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2021; Centemeri and Tomassi, 2022). The changes that have taken place allow us to understand how the ‘usual forms of profit’ have been ‘suspended’ to other forms that are made acceptable by the way the disaster has been conceived, dealt with, and reworked (Centemeri and Tomassi, 2022).

Methodology The chapter has been developed through the analysis of official reports and documents, expert scenarios and estimations of reconstruction and economic development plans, thus exploring how the problem of repair has been addressed at the international, intergovernmental and local levels. I argue that despite the three diachronic temporalities of reconstruction, all have followed a trajectory and transformation driven by economic interests that project L’Aquila into a global economic dynamic governed by the logic of disaster capitalism through urban data extractivism (Morozov, 2013; Antenucci, 2021). In addition to the textual analysis, the contribution makes use of extracts from the field journal and the qualitative analysis of a series of semi-​directive and in-​depth interviews conducted between 2017 and 2019 with 35 decision-​makers from technical structures at all levels of 136

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the decision-​making chain (for example, the Technical Structure for the Reconstruction Mission, Universities, Municipality, the temporary housing CASE Project, Special Office for the Reconstruction). The aim is to show that the imaginary and values underlying the different smart reconstruction devices in question are strongly influenced by the professional and social environment of engineering offices from which the decision-​makers come.

Smart city: a discourse Over the past 30 years the use of digital technologies in daily life, economy and environment has created a new relationship with inhabited spaces. This digital transition of society affects urban organizations in various ways: communications and the ‘making of society’, relationships with natural and man-​made ecosystems, the value and definition of resources, daily practices of space but also the relationship to time and the future (Roseau, 2018). The concept of SC is subject to different definitions and approaches in the political realm and in the scholarship. Kondepundi et al (2015) collected and analysed 116 definitions of SC, largely showing that there is no agreement in the scientific field on what exactly a SC is. Angelidou (2014) reveals the existence of several definitions for this new approach to the city from a spatial point of view. SC is understood as an ‘idea-​marketing’ at the service of a new form of capital accumulation for some (Hollands, 2014), a phantasmatic vision of the future (Watson, 2014), a new self-​fulfilling utopia for others (Picon, 2013). At the same time the SC is inscribed in the genealogy of ideal and utopian city models that began with modernity (Moore, Campanella, Howard and so on) whereby the form of the city should regulate social ‘chaos’ and in turn shape a more just society as in the case of Françoise Choay’s pre-​urbanism (1965). The SC, however, goes beyond the classical conception of the urban plan ‘significant in its implicit rejection of the strong normativity of traditional technologies of planning, in favour of an ontology of efficiency and emergence’ (Cowley and Caprotti, 2019, p 428). SC enters urban studies as an ‘integrated and interconnected urban system or ‘system of systems’, which can be controlled and piloted and whose functioning can be optimized thanks to the power of collection, calculation and analysis of centralized control and management systems’ (Peyroux, 2020, p 815). Beyond this rather techno-​centred block of definitions, the concept of SC has expanded to include the governance of urban services based on the strengthening of the ‘knowledge society’ (Peyroux, 2020), on a par with recent images of the ‘knowledge city’ or ‘creative city’ (Joss, 2016). The utopian value of the SC concept (Grossi and Pianezzi, 2017; Bina and Ali, 2020) is gaining ground and makes it possible to analyse the imagery 137

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and values of an increasingly speculative or predictive urbanism devoted to the accentuation of a managerial vision of public action (new public management). A substantial critical literature from both research and practice communities is putting forward the limits of the SC both from the point of view of low complexity and the enormous dependence on energy and the extraction of rare raw materials. Other critical issues are the extreme normativity as a prerequisite of SC that reduces the complexity of the city and its uses, effectively increasing socio-​economic and spatial inequalities; its technical language that does not consider cultural diversity and the obstacles to its use, risking strong exclusion from access to services; and the mixing of private life in public management through the flow of mega-​data. In more than one case, the opacity of the algorithms makes the SC an example of racial discrimination (Antenucci, 2019).

Smart city paradigm as neoliberal city model The spread of what we will call the Intelligent City Paradigm (ICP) can be observed on a global scale in many areas (from large metropolises to small conurbations), which are opting or have opted for the implementation of explicit policies or approaches favouring certain ‘intelligent’ city principles: digitisation, collection, data storage and sharing, platforms, socio-​technical urban management devices, upstream or downstream of development projects at various scales from buildings to the whole urban space, under a more or less explicit ‘innovation’ banner.

Is SC a paradigm? The term SC is both intended and interpreted as a reproducible model, replicable (Béal, 2014) everywhere. Some cities have been created as ‘models’. For example, they have succeeded in becoming attractive to financial capital and investors, to a population of ultra-​educated techno-​workers, and have managed to change their image and establish new economic relationships through the entry of new actors into the urban fabrique (Douay, 2018). Its objectives thus respond to the ‘project-​based’ approach that has become established over the last 20 years, whereby the role of the public, at all scales, has been transformed from the bearer and guarantor of politically constructed consensus to the manager and arbiter of a market for unseen urban resources. The IPC is the socio-​technical basis that enables an urban data extractivism (Morozov, 2013; Antenucci, 2021) which asserts itself in urban space as the operating mode of capitalism in its contemporary form of valuating in neo-​liberal economy. In the philosophy of science, the ‘paradigm’ emerges with Kuhn’s reflective work on science. Through his work, the semantic field widens from the 138

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scientific construction of knowledge (Kuhn, 2018) to a social construction always balanced between innovation and repetition. Kuhn’s definition of paradigm allows us, on the one hand, to make a history of science less stereotyped and smooth than that which passes through a path of revolutions and decontextualized individuals. On the other hand, it allows us to understand that the history of science is made up of a normality in which acculturation, cumulation and repetition are the foundations. As Isabelle Stenger pointed out on Kuhn’s theory in her courses at the Philosophical Institute of Naples: A paradigm is not simply a way of seeing things, asking questions or interpreting results. First of all, a paradigm is something of a practical order. It does not convey a worldview but a way of doing … of intervening, of subjecting them (phenomena) to novel representations, of exploiting the slightest consequence or effect implied by the paradigm to create an experimental situation. (Stenger, 1993, p 63) From this point of view, SC is presented as the ‘natural’ continuation of the historical progress of artificializing and distancing the relationship with the environment. The possibility of ascribing SC to a scientific process is given by the analogy between the intelligence of humans and that of calculators and digital devices transposed onto the collective ‘intelligence’ that is ascribed to the city as to its rational organization. In doing so, a double semantic shift takes place: between the ‘city –​machine’ (Gey, 2012; Grimaldi, 2018) and the ‘city –​laboratory’ (Tomassi, 2019). The use of this powerful explanatory metaphor allows the city’s practitioners to respond to the challenges posed by the Anthropocene era. In this sense, the continuously experimental character of the SC as a test bed (Calvillo, 2015) leads SC to be the site of the construction of a particular urban knowledge. My intention is to understand SC as part of the history of science: is SC an epistemic leap, a ‘paradigm shift’ as its promoters would claim? Or it is instead a part of the normal mechanism of scientific-​technical innovation, raising therefore questions around the SC’s storytelling? The ambiguity in definition and techno-​scientific construction of SC makes it as an object straddling rhetoric and ideology. The narrative of and about the SC is often confused with urban marketing strategies aimed at replacing the existing and attracting transactional class ‘citizen–​clients’ with visionary discourses imbued with utopianism. It remains reasonable to ask, moreover, which types of problem and which anomalies the SC responds to. What is its heuristic scope, since the assumption is that SC is the solution to the problems of environmental sustainability, the fraying of democracy in liberal countries, the circulation of people and goods, and social and criminal security? This perspective encourages one 139

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to pay attention to the social, political, and economic dimension of the SC paradigm and to reaffirm the political role of ‘science’ by making explicit the articulation between science, politics and industry under the form of economic plans, reforms, infrastructures, financing and investments.

The reified city and the laboratory-​city: representations With the idea of the SC, there is a multiplication and visualization of data from different sensors and different administrative sources with which idealized and moralistic figures such as ‘transparency’ and ‘visibility’ are associated. I refer here to the analytical model of Douay (2018), who traces SC back to four fundamental models that are always hybridized in reality: cybernetic, statistical, ‘economistic’, or competitive ‘participatory’ or democratic. Each of these models makes the city even more dependent on services, knowledge and matters that transcend the city itself. The city thus becomes, in the age of smart neo-​liberalism, a complex of technological norms of conduct. As with other models, the fact that the ‘smart’ city is an integral part of the neo-​liberal model, in which the city is reified and reduced to a platform for economic development, is generally accompanied by reconfigurations and spatial engineering that redefine the perimeter of intervention of various actors (such as telecommunications operators, IT service companies, start-​ups). The city thus becomes a ‘laboratory’ in the sense introduced previously, for example a technical-​scientific device where one can make abstraction of boundary conditions –​inhabitants, ecologies, cultures, other knowledge –​in a new cycle of colonization and value creation. As explained by Couldry and Mejias (2019): ‘Data colonialism justifies what it does as an advance in scientific knowledge, personalised marketing, or rational management, just as historic colonialism claimed a civilising mission.’ Once the question of the legitimacy of this model is stated, there is still need for understanding in which way a city is conceived in the post-​disaster. This has ‘profound operational and political consequences’ (Fortun et al, 2017).

Recovering or repairing? Here I propose to use the category of SC as a transversal way of dealing with the material and symbolic dimensions of power relationships in correlation with the analytical notion of ‘repairing’ (Centemeri et al, 2022). Compared to the notion of recovery which too often focuses only on material and institutional aspects based on the optimism that reconstruction is always possible, the notion of repairing emphasizes the procedural character of recovery and insists on its causes, opening the door to the impossibility of repair after the disaster. Centemeri et al (2022) 140

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bring attention to three possible meanings of the notion of reparation: one more centred on the legal and moral aspects of ‘asking for reparation’ (Centemeri et al, 2022, p 9); one that highlights a functional and material understanding of reparation; and one that refers to the feminist theory of care as a commitment to the maintenance of the everyday activities that order the world. Here I will refer to repairing as the identification of disruptions (Dodier, 1995) and the setting of a breaking point in the system to avoid repetition. Specific devices (technical protocols, preparedness procedures, insurance, damage counting systems) are adopted at international level (Revet, 2020) and interface with technical problems which have an enormous impact on the trajectories of reconstruction. Questioning who is legitimized to reorganize the space of the city under reconstruction means taking recovery as a re-​foundation, for example as a constitutive act of social relations.

Post-​disaster L’Aquila: three parallel reconstruction processes ‘A headless reconstruction’: this is how, in an article published on Il Manifesto newspaper (2019), researchers from GSSI1 highlighted among other things the lack of a plan, of a clear model and ideas for L’Aquila’s reconstruction process ten years after the earthquake. This position is predominant in social sciences and urban planning analysing the reconstruction governance in post-​disaster L’Aquila. L’Aquila’s ‘repair’ process is following three distinct plans, certainly intersecting in some points but, fundamentally, separated by different temporalities, purposes and methods. These three plans correspond to the different local, intermediary and national instances that were created in the post-​disaster. The first plan is ‘the reconstruction of the historic city’: that is, the reconstruction of the private and public heritage ‘as it was where it was’ in an idea of integral conservation that does not take the disaster as an opportunity to repair the socio-​spatial inequalities present in the territory. The level of implementation of this plan was local, and its main actor is the Municipality of L’Aquila and the private building sector. The second plan is ‘the intermediate/​dislocated city’. The reconstruction inherited the weight of the management of the catastrophe, that is the legacy of the CASE Project and the other emergency constructions to the Municipality of L’Aquila, entailing the management of an oversized real estate heritage over a vast territory. The land consumption of all the emergency construction, both public (CASE, MAP, MUSP) and private (L’Aquila Municipality’s resolution of 65 houses) temporary housing amounts to 246 acres in total: which makes L’Aquila ‘a consumed territory’ (Ciccozzi and Olori, 2016). The level of implementation was both national and local, and the main subject was the STM (Technical Mission Structure). 141

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The third plan is the ‘Smart Reconstruction’. This lesser known and less visible aspect of L’Aquila’s Reconstruction concerns the systematic reception and application of the international experts’ predictions by the government and local institutions for the transformation of L’Aquila into a ‘smart’ city.2 The level of application is both global and local, and its main actors are the Municipality of L’Aquila, the University of L’Aquila, the GSSI and the private tech sector.

L’Aquila smart city: national inter-​governmental and local level projects I have analysed the grey literature produced by the European economic development agency OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development). The OECD has produced three reports after the earthquake. The OECD (2009) report followed a workshop organized by the OECD with the Ministry of Economy and Finance in anticipation of the G8 in L’Aquila in July 2009. In this report, on several occasions the ‘opportunity’ offered by the earthquake to make L’Aquila a ‘laboratory city’ is emphasized. The part of the document dedicated to ‘Projects for redeveloping the University of L’Aquila and promoting links with business’ provides for the realization of at least four projects, of which we find the GSSI for the first time in point No. 1. This new institute of high studies in Physics is enriched by a department of Urban Studies cited in the document as ‘The Nest of the Eagle’s Future’ (OECD, 2009). The explicit intention is to make the University of L’Aquila the pivot between development, repopulation through the university students and researchers that the GSSI is supposed to attract, and the digital industry, in a ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘creative economy’ perspective that will be developed throughout the report (Koukoufikis, 2019). The second document (OECD, 2012) is set in an Italian political context that has changed with the transition from the government of Silvio Berlusconi to the ‘technical’ government of Mario Monti. At the national level, in 2012, the reconstruction of L’Aquila was part of a broader plan to revitalize the degraded urban areas of Southern Italy launched by the Ministry of Infrastructure: The Plan for Cities and the Plan for Growth. In a logic of project and competition, hundreds of local governments responded, including 11 southern cities. On the other hand, the ‘Decreto Crescita’ (translated as Growth Decree), perfectly in line with the European Horizon 2020 directives, places SC as the main means of local urban regeneration. The so-​called ‘Italian Digital Agenda’ allocated 200 million euros for financing dozens of ‘high-​tech-​oriented experimental projects’ and included the ‘Smart City Communities’ programme (Di Bella, 2015). In the same year, with the end of the emergency, the new government appointed the Minister 142

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for Territorial Cohesion, Fabrizio Barca, to solve the reconstruction issue. With this, L’Aquila found itself embedded in a broader issue concerning the country’s ‘internal areas’ (Chelleri et al, 2019), those so-​defined peripheral areas of Italy who need ad-​hoc solutions for development, repopulation and infrastructure. The third document (OECD, 2013) is a sort of summary of best practices that introduce ‘resilience’ as a goal and as a way for approaching reconstruction. L’Aquila, under the neo-​liberal transformation underway with reconstruction, is becoming ‘entrepreneurial’: ‘the city ceases to be the universalist provider of services to the citizen and thinks and acts as a facilitator of market processes’ (Semi, 2019; 2021). This is one of the less obvious and less debated aspects of L’Aquila’s post-​earthquake urban transformation from a SC perspective, under the aegis of an increasingly colonial disaster capitalism (Centemeri et al, 2022).

Even at local level: smarter is better The fabrique of the SC (intervention and planning policies, sectorial policies, construction, urban services, environmental management, and local citizen mediation) refers to a definition of territorial interventions that allows both the technical aspects and the social dimensions of urban production to emerge. Through a cross-​reading of the dynamics, obligations, logics and aporias of its implementation, the reconstruction appears as an imperfect adjustment of interests, levels of action and management via a territorial productivity that generates socio-​technical disputes. This research shows that in L’Aquila, political spatial management and planning and even urban governance or mediation as well as democratic communication are faced with a techno-​solutionist (Morozov, 2013) and problem-​solving approach. Therefore, it is almost impossible to reconcile, conceptually and operationally, ‘strategic lines’ for economic development that tend to reduce and normalize the multi-​level complexity encountered, indeed by the various planning proposals for post-​earthquake territorial transformation processes. Neo-​liberalist policies (Sager, 2011) do not in fact make choices but leave everything to be self-​regulated by the interests of the private actors in play. The two documents of the STM (STM, 2010a; 2010b) and the Strategic Plan for Reconstruction proposed by the L’Aquila Mayor Massimo Cialente,3 suggest some ideas for territorial development still linked to a material reconstruction. However, a clear tension emerges in the narrative between two groups of technicians interviewed between the Reconstruction Plans and the Master Plan model. Much of the research on L’Aquila’s reconstruction agrees that it lacked planning (Ciabò, 2017) or was uncoordinated despite some plans being ready (Di Ludovico et al, 2014). Some scholars argue that L’Aquila has a headless reconstruction (Coppola, 2019) with a ‘domestic’ 143

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character (Coppola et al, 2021) due to the tension in governance between local and national powers. Indeed, if seen according to classical planning methodologies, reconstruction seems fragmentary and incoherent, as Di Ludovico et al (2014) underlined: ‘The Reconstruction Plans, the Urban Mobility Plan and the new Strategic Plan were prepared. However, these planning documents do not cover the specific issue of urban design, but rather they establish a series of uncoordinated projects’ (p 18). But if we pay attention to the transformation of the landscape of the actors and their narratives, we realize that fragmentation is instead a logic by design (Di Ludovico et al, 2014) that has characterized public research and investment over the last 20 years. The L’Aquila SC fits perfectly into this context of planning crisis. Even though the adaptation of the 40-​year-​old urban masterplan began in 2013 and a preliminary document was approved in 2015, this appears ‘disconnected from reconstruction efforts’ (Coppola et al, 2021).

The impact of SC model on L’Aquila reconstruction What is the relationship between rhetoric and ideology of ICP? If rhetoric is the structure of language, it is normalized and made habitual in everyday discourse. From this perspective, rhetorical analysis allows the ideological deposit of a community to emerge and be represented (De Cunto et al, 2022). The hegemonic discourse on innovation and attractiveness applied to the depopulated areas of inland Italy are nothing more than the manifestation of a specific mode of discourse production and a real ‘epistemic violence’ (Borghi, 2021). Creating analytical categories such as that of the ‘internal areas’ (Barca, 2012) allows for a conceptual and operational subordination relative to the classification of ‘internal’ as underdeveloped, closed, backward areas versus ‘external’ areas that are innovative, open, and modern. Filling these conceptual containers with expectations, norms and objectives established with a techno-​urban logic leads to the upheaval between rhetoric and ideology mentioned previously. In the case of L’Aquila, the spatio-​temporal transformation brought by the SC infrastructure followed the reverse path of urban mutations outside the context of recovery. It was the product of a thought nourished by values, desires, and expectations translated into projects, doctrines and knowledge at the origin of urban representations. This approach to disasters and reconstruction seems to repeat a mechanism that is colonialist and technocratic and does not consider local territorial, historical, and cultural specificities (Gaillard, 2019).

A techno-centred transformation of a territory The digital services giant IBM landed in L’Aquila on 6 December 2010 (a year and a half after the earthquake) signing an agreement with the 144

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municipality to implement remote citizen services. In my field notes, I recorded: ‘On 18/​19 April 2011, one of the few public meetings on the subject was held at Casa Onna, the workshop “L’Aquila smart town –​ intelligence of a participatory reconstruction’ in the presence of the head of IBM Italy”.’ To date, the realization of the SC is quite advanced and built through a series of parallel projects belonging to different decision-​making levels. The City of L’Aquila also received several awards such as the ‘Smart Communities Milan 2015’ for the IBM ‘Smart City’ project. The reception of the SC guidelines by the University of L’Aquila will be immediate and active. Two of the interviewees, the Vice-​Chancellor and the head of the INCIPIT (INnovating CIty Planning through Information & communication Technologies) project developed by the University of L’Aquila,4 repeatedly state that ‘L’Aquila is a gymnasium’ and that considering it a ‘green field, a blank page’ is an opportunity to make L’Aquila a ‘trial’ for experimentation. Through the CIPE (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica) funding (Delibera CIPE, 2016),5 it is possible to ‘create the ecosystem’, for example the infrastructure of the new city. The focus on the infrastructure shifts the reasoning about the city to the vision of the future inherent in this particular type of socio-​technical structure that ‘expands the scale of the present city’ (Roseau, 2018, p 53) and ‘shifts’ it to the ‘scale of the city to come’ (Roseau, 2018, p 53) since its construction as well as its duration and effects go far beyond the needs of the moment in which they were conceived and intended. The infrastructure, therefore, disrupts and destabilizes the urban equilibrium by producing changes in spatial, epistemic, and political order (Roseau, 2018). According to Professor Fabio Graziosi, engineer in charge of the Incipit project for the University of L’Aquila, who was interviewed during the fieldwork, “the support of an optical communication infrastructure, gives the opportunity to conduct experiments related to different fields of research, among which the cultural heritage enhancement”. In his view, this will enable the conditions for the development of an alternative economic model to GAFAM (Google Apple Facebook Amazon Microsoft) with regard to services that can be developed by telecommunications operators who may “be interested in coming to develop tests and validations of Intelligent Information System solutions” in L’Aquila. In the ‘logic of the laboratory’, this intervention is not conceived for its effects on the daily life of the inhabitants except in a reduced and theoretical form (Falco et al, 2018). Another important layer of the ‘smart’ transformation of L’Aquila is the smart tunnel of the underground utilities6 work, financed by Decree of the Commissioner for Reconstruction No. 24 of 24 October 2010 and CIPE Resolution No. 43/​2012. To govern this highly technological and complex process that requires scientific expertise, a ‘Cabina di Regia per L’Aquila Smart City’ (Steering 145

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Committee for L’Aquila Smart City) was created and established by Mayoral Decree No. 93 of 1 March 2018. A team of experts drafted ‘The new L’Aquila Smart City guidelines’ in February 2020, a document that seeks to take stock of the progress of the smart reconstruction in L’Aquila. My analysis of this document (Table 8.1) sheds light on the 61 ongoing SC projects, their types, and the involved actors involved. The key themes into which the document is divided correspond to the points that the actors raised during the interviews: Table 8.2 shows instead the distribution of involved actors according to the type of implemented SC measure. Table 8.2 clearly shows the presence of new actors in the fabrique of the SC city such as the local university and other universities or research centres such as GSSI, and ‘new’ private actors such as local start-​ups or global service companies. Moreover, most of the projects are centred on structural transformations of the city rather than on morphological transformations. This certainly helps us to understand this apparent contradiction between the disillusioned discourse of reconstruction by urban professionals and the enthusiastic discourse of the municipality and de-​regulation engineers. The smart transformation of L’Aquila highlights problems related to the loss of citizen autonomy, security obsession and the intrusion of the private sector into citizens’ private lives with a decreased role of the public decision-​makers in government action and strategic planning (Vanolo, 2014; Di Bella, 2015; Antenucci, 2019; Cowell, 2020). In short, since ‘infrastructures shape social uses and therefore materialise political agendas’ (Jarrige et al, 2018, p 8) the stakes of the smart reconstruction of L’Aquila appear clearer and move beyond the ideological discourse on the neutrality of knowledge and scientific research brought by local actors such as the University of L’Aquila or the GSSI, who are completely involved in this transformation all to their advantage. It seems then that the SC narrative is ultimately ‘constructed through marketing materials and top-​down conceptualisations of the smart city’ (Bui et al, 2017) and ‘may be misleading in their real-​life application and expression in specific contexts’ (Bui et al, 2017). This reaffirms a top-​down recovery decision-​making model, even far from the ‘repair’ (Centemeri et al, 2022) concept mentioned before.

Conclusions I have shown how redefining the ‘what’ of reconstruction helps to understand the scope of the discourses that are constructed to legitimize the territorial and social transformation after a disaster. In particular, I have attempted to bring the reasoning on the epistemological aspects of the SC interventions in L’Aquila after the 2009 earthquake and its socio-​technical implications. 146

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Table 8.1: Ongoing projects and types of projects in the document ‘The new L’Aquila Smart City guidelines’ Smart Governance

• Digitization and dematerialization of public services • Emergency communication with the Civil Protection • Reconstruction data storage • 5G sensors monitoring of public buildings rebuilt after the earthquake • Creation of a ‘knowledge system’ (for example, by creating a ‘citizen’s file’ containing specific data from the municipality)

Smart Mobility • Electric mobility (for example, the creation of electric vehicle recharging zones) • Incentives to replace vehicles park of municipal officers • Construction of a platform for real-​time tracking of public transportation • Study for transport optimization • Development of public transportation apps • 5G interface between the smart grid and electric cars Smart Environment

• Environmental data collection • Monitoring platform for the National Park • Parameterization of air quality • Geographic information systems • Energy efficiency of public buildings • Creation of a cloud for the photographic archiving of the city’s monuments and buildings • INCIPIT project • Creation of the MAN (Metropolitan Area Network) for the cabling of public offices • SDM (Space Division Multiplexing) extensive and pervasive wireless experimentation • Algorithm development for detecting people in public buildings as disaster resilience • Valorization of cultural heritage (Brusaporci et al, 2017) • 5G applied to virtual reality • Traceability of agri-​food products • Support of law enforcement with drones and other control tools • Cyber security projects

Smart Incubator

• Development of a technology incubator INCUBANDO • Organization of the national ITC 2018 conference • Establishment of a SC research laboratory

Smart Health

• Development of an app for cancer patients

Smart Economy

• Open data reconstruction • Encouragement of smart transformation by the EU to boost capital attraction;

Smart Living

• Citizen accessibility to bureaucratic practices for reconstruction • The L’Aquila Smart City project envisaging the construction of network infrastructure (grids) for communication, the implementation of advanced network functions or ‘Grid Automation’, and Smart Urban Services such as the construction of areas for recharging electric cars and ‘smart info’ to increase citizen awareness of their consumption

Smart People

• Development of digital networks for MUSPs and systems for the autonomy of people with visual impairments

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Table 8.2: Distribution of SC projects in L’Aquila

Smart Governance

Public

Universities, Public +​ Private research university institutes

Public +​ private

••

•

••••

•

•

•

•

•••

•••••••• ••••••••

•••

••••••••

••••

•••

•

Smart Mobility Smart Environment

•

Smart Incubator Smart Health

•

Smart Economy

•

•

Smart Living Smart People

University +​ private

•• •

••

••

Source: Author’s own

Narrating the city is also a way of making the city (Fijalkow et al, 2017). A discourse about the city such as that around SC is performative, and through tensions and rhetoric highlights the powers that run the neo-​ liberal and technocratic city. The different actors (public decision-​makers, private companies, researchers, inhabitants, technicians and urban planners) that permanently produce the discourse also produce new spatial norms at different scales. The SC discourse comes very close to a literary utopian/​ dystopian narrative. It seems to be useful to recall the strong link between the automation of individual and collective modern life and the utopian imaginary of the dawn of modernity (Moore, Campanella and so on), strongly reactivated in the 20th century by fascist ideologues with the idea of the machine city, where the ontological difference between humans and machine disappears. The SC can thus be seen as that ‘modern’ restoration analysed by Parrinello (2015) with regard to the seismic history and reconstructions of pre-​unification Italy. If catastrophe allows individuals to become subjects of a story by mobilizing their narratives (Perrow, 1999), the constitutive paradox of the urban model of technological power such as the SC is that this same model is of extreme fragility, making disasters the ‘normal’ and inevitable feature of an ultra-​complex society, highly connected to technical systems. The mixture of ‘state voluntarism’ and the ‘myth of technology’ (Jarrige et al, 2018, p 17) supports large infrastructure projects whereby 148

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complex physical and social realities are, normalized, reduced, simplified and abstracted. ‘An abstraction and detachment responsible for multiple crises and environmental catastrophes’ (Jarrige et al, 2018, p 17), which is precisely the kind of de-​territorialization (Magnaghi, 2010) that the cultural and urbanistic operation of the smart reconstruction of L’Aquila seems to us to accentuate. As already problematized elsewhere, ‘would not a surplus of complexity and technological fragility be a mistake in view of repair objectives in the face of the increase in climatic catastrophes to come?’ (Centemeri and Tomassi, 2022). The context, policies and discourses that frame the problem in socio-​technical and scientific terms, create ‘ignorance’ (Le Nour and Valentin, 2022), that is, a new form of fragility of the city in the face of future events. The case of SC in L’Aquila can be used to reflect about a model for interpreting the ways through which disasters have been dealt with over the last 40 years, and through which many processes of impoverishment and erosion of the resources of local populations have been established. This would connect the study of disasters with the political ecology of the long history of governments’ decisions and actions that together with global industries make disasters as the new normal. Acknowledgements This chapter benefited from light edits by Chris Elcock, for which I am grateful.

Notes 1

2 3

4 5

6

GSSI (Gran Sasso Science Institute) is an international higher education school for research and PhD programmes, created in L’Aquila after the earthquake by the Ministry of the Social Cohesion, as a part of the ‘knowledge city’ strategic programme of L’Aquila recovery. https://​urb​anpr​omo.it/​2016-​en/​proge​tti/​laqu​ila-​un-​cen​tro-​stor​ico-​r ico​stru​ito-​smart/​ Massimo Cialente was mayor of L’Aquila from 2007 to 2012 and was then reappointed until 2017. His role and that of his party the PD (Democratic Party) are crucial in the recovery phase. http://​incip​ict.uni​vaq.it/​ The Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) is a collegial government body chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of ministers with relevant competences in the field of economic growth. https://​sot​tose​rviz​iaq.it/​

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Expertise Versus Aspiration: Ethnography of Post-disaster Reconstruction in Emilia Silvia Pitzalis

Introduction On a warm afternoon in June 2014, during my ethnographic fieldwork in the Emilian area of the Po Valley afflicted by a seismic swarm in May 2012, I received a phone call. It was Pino, a man in his forties who was a member of Sisma.12, a local committee of people affected by the earthquake (Pitzalis, 2015). Excited, he told me that the following week, a delegation from the Sisma.12 committee would meet the Regional Councillor for ‘Productive activities, energy plan and sustainable development, green economy, construction’ Gian Carlo Muzzarelli, the ‘Extraordinary Commissioner for Reconstruction’1 Vasco Errani (both from the Democratic Party –​PD) and some experts in charge of the reconstruction in Bologna. He sarcastically told me: “You absolutely must be there! We’ll be going to have fun!” Realizing the relevance of that meeting, I confirmed my participation without hesitation. On the day of the meeting, I joined a group of people at the region’s headquarters, most of whom were my research collaborators. There were about 20 of them, with some Committee flags with red and black writing on a white background: ‘Sisma.12. ricostruire la Bassa2 dal basso’ (‘Sisma.12. Rebuild the Lowlands from below’) and a banner that read: ‘Basta con la non-​r icostruzione’ (‘Enough with non-​reconstruction’). After an hour of waiting outside the building, we went up to the second floor and entered a room. On one side, the representatives of the regional and local institutions and the ‘experts’ (two engineers and one architect) were sitting behind a large table; on the other side, the delegates of the Sisma.12 committee were standing. I immediately thought that the position in which the various actors 155

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were placed within the room indicated the role played by each of them. After a few pleasantries, the ‘Extraordinary Commissioner’ invited the experts to present what would technically happen during the reconstruction phase. During that presentation, I was confronted with significant evidence that one becomes an expert ‘not simply by forming familiar –​if asymmetrical –​ relationships with people and things, but rather by learning to communicate that familiarity from an authoritative angle’ (Carr, 2010, p 19). After this presentation, Valerio, the President of Sisma.12, got straight to the point: “We want to be involved in the decision-​making process on reconstruction. You cannot continue to exclude us.” From that moment on, I sensed an uneasiness pervading all those present, both the delegates of the Sisma.12 committee and those on the institutional side, which grew increasingly as the meeting proceeded. After Valerio’s argument, the Regional Councillor asked sarcastically: “And how would you like to be more involved?” Pino immediately replied: “We are tired of this narrative that we must rebuild houses as before. It is a slogan you carry on without any foresight. Moreover, an opportunity is being missed here: improving our homes, rethinking them in energy-​saving and green building and using reconstruction to give our children and us a better future.” This statement immediately found the consensus of the other Sisma.12 delegates, who intervened to support it with other arguments. A discussion between the opposite parties opened up an intensely conflictual space of confrontation: on the one hand, the Sisma.12 delegates seemed to express in their arguments a vision of reconstruction aimed at the desire for change for a better future; on the other hand, the institutional representatives, supported by the experts, responded to these aspirations with technicalities, stating that their claims were not in line with the budget made available by the government and a very complex bureaucratic apparatus. Although this side of actors was initially predisposed to listen to the requests presented, this attitude turned into rejection and opposition as the hours passed. At a hot point in the discussion, the ‘Extraordinary Commissioner’, visibly irritated but still polite, stated: ‘We understand your point of view, but we cannot base such a complex reconstruction on your “ecological imagination”, which is not included in the costs budgeted for reconstruction. In front of you, some technical experts have thought about how to rebuild your homes based precisely on their technical expertise [emphasis]. At some point, you must recognise that there are knowledge and choices that are beyond your competence. Please leave these things to those who know more than you.’ This ethnographic glimpse 3 shows how post-​disaster reconstruction is a highly conflicting social arena within which different ideas of the ‘reconstruction’ and positioning about it emerge, interact and clash (Barrios, 156

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2016a, 2017). Specifically, what has been described highlights the mismatch between the choices and actions implemented by institutions to respond to the disaster ‘through expertise’, proving how ‘expertise often conveys authority’ (Wayland, 2003, p 484) and the aspirations nourished by the desires of those who experienced that disaster first-​hand (Fortun, 2001; Hsu et al, 2015). Exploring ‘ethnographically’ the meaning of post-​disaster reconstruction can help understand what knowledge, expertise, power relations and discourses are produced by the different actors involved in the catastrophe. The chapter shows, on the one hand, how the technicality and bureaucratization of reconstruction practices –​firmly based on an idea of expertise as ‘crypto-​rationalist in its orientation, lingering on the logico-​ rational dimensions of expert practice and knowledge’ (Boyer, 2008, p 45) –​exclude affected people from the decision-​making process, interposing impersonal/​anonymous strategies often through experts claiming superior technical knowledge (Mosse, 2004; Newman, 2011). On the other hand, it shows how citizens claim a different vision of reconstructing their own houses in line with an idea of a ‘better future’ (Barrios, 2016b). The chapter is organized as follows: the first section introduces the anthropological approach to the study of disasters by connecting it to the specific Italian context; the second describes the particular context involved in the series of earthquakes that struck the northeastern portion of the Po Valley on 20 and 29 May 2012, outlining their developments and effects; the third and fourth sections analyse the relationship between citizens, institutions and technicians during the post-​disaster reconstruction phase.

Disasters as social phenomena In recent years, internationally, ‘the types and scope of natural and technological hazards and disasters that people face … have proliferated … with a harrowing impact’ (Hoffman, 2020, p 2). Similarly, in Italy (as elsewhere), social sciences have increased their interest in studying disasters, partly due to the country’s particular situation, which is often subject to catastrophic events of different origins (Benadusi, 2015; 2016). In this specific context, although natural or artificial disasters increasingly represent a structural issue (Farinella and Saitta, 2019), their management approach remains strongly linked to the idea of emergency (Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010; Benadusi et al, 2011; Pitzalis, 2018; Falconieri et al, 2022). Consequently, ad hoc regulations are issued after every event without any structured design of intervention plans, forecasting/​prevention and implementation of real solutions to the disaster (Button and Schuller, 2016). This ‘public’ and ‘institutional’ attitude is the product of a conceptualization of disaster as an isolated, rare and exceptional event outside the prediction patterns, the normality of everyday life, and human understanding (Barrios, 157

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2016a). However, for at least a century, social sciences have emphasized that disasters are, in fact, social events, that is, the result of a spiral of interconnected events that trigger reactions both locally and globally (Hewitt, 1983; Bankoff, 2004; Button, 2010; Oliver-​Smith, 2013; Faas, 2016), disrupting the socio-​cultural activities of the contexts with which they impact (Hoffman and Oliver-​Smith, 2019). This ‘knowledge posture’ makes it possible to avoid the abused typologies of disaster, popularized by both physical/​technical/​engineering knowledge and media narratives, to carry out comparative analyses that detect commonalities, behavioural patterns and ideas of the relationship between individuals, their social units and the environment (Button and Schuller, 2016; Ingold, 2021). In particular, for several decades, social sciences have revealed that disasters are observable processes ‘in time’ –​in that, they occur following an internal chronology –​and ‘in space’, be it territorial-​geographical or socio-​cultural (Hewitt, 1983; Alexander, 1997; Quarantelli, 1998; Hoffman and Oliver-​ Smith, 2019). In this spatio-​temporal extension, disasters often exceed the ability of affected communities to perceive them as possible and understandable (Signorelli, 1992; Barrios, 2016, 2017). However, these events are not simply passively suffered by individuals but reconfigured through social-​cultural interaction processes at multiple symbolic levels (Hoffman and Oliver Smith, 2019). Moreover, people affected by disasters find themselves entangled in a network of more or less strong interactions composed of different social actors engaged in managing the implementation of reconstruction and monitoring programs (Button and Schuller, 2016; Hoffman and Barrios, 2020; Revet, 2020). In this interaction, aid workers, extraordinary commissioners, engineers, architects, urban planners and local authorities claim specific competencies that legitimize a particular disaster management (Marchezini, 2015; Barrios, 2017). The research reported in this ­chapter –​carried out between October 2012 and December 2014 and further integrated by three follow-​ups between 2015 and 2018 –​focuses on analysing the different ideas and conceptualizations of disaster elaborated on and put into play by the different actors involved in the post-​disaster reconstruction phase. Specifically, I will explore the socio-​cultural and political reactions enacted by the social actors involved in this dynamic, focusing on the challenging and conflicting relationship between citizens, experts and institutions. The chapter will demonstrate how disasters are social-​cultural processes in which different ways of rebuilding after a disaster inevitably clash, enacting social change.

The context, the event, the post-​earthquake: the Emilia case In May 2012, several tremors of varying magnitude (the strongest of which reached 5.9 on the Richter scale) hit the northeastern portion of the Po Valley. 158

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The most affected region was Emilia-​Romagna,4 with 33 municipalities affected in Modena, Reggio Emilia, Ferrara and Bologna provinces: 28 people died, 300 were injured and about 45,000 were displaced. Before the earthquakes, this area represented 2 per cent of the national GDP, with 48,000 companies employing 190,000 people, thanks to flourishing industrial and agricultural activities. The official post-​disaster management models in Emilia were first implemented by the Civil Protection (CP) (June–​October 2012) and then by local institutions under the ‘Extraordinary Commissioner’ Vasco Errani. Two different modes of emergency intervention immediately characterized the post-​earthquake period: an official one, organized by the State and implemented by the CP, and an informal one, resulting from the protagonism of the population affected by the disaster and the support of numerous solidarity groups from all over Italy (Pitzalis, 2016). The CP interventions aimed to give hospitality to the people through the classic model of emergency intervention: a military device based on technical expertise which takes charge of a specific territory and specific people for a certain period (Fassin, 2010; Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010) following the principle of ‘care, cure and control’ (Agier, 2008). The ‘encampment phase’ (Castorina and Roccheggiani, 2015) began in June 2012: this was an exceptional disaster management method that involved the setting up of 28 reception camps, with 7,427 people assisted by the rescue operations and the assessment of the earthquake damage by technicians, firefighters, police, and armed forces (Pitzalis, 2016). According to research collaborators, the resettlement of the population within the camps was carried out without considering relational criteria, thus breaking the social ties present before the earthquakes. As experienced and witnessed by some of them, the structuring of the official camps was based on top-​down control over the population affected. Their daily activities and movements were organized and limited within the space and time established in the camp by a set of regulations and timetables that “managed entrances and exits, recreational moments, meal distribution” (Interview with an affected person from the formal camps, 22 May 2013) and other daily practices. In this specific context, a more generic ‘humanitarian economy’ (Benadusi et al, 2011) intersected with a particular ‘shock economy’ (Klein, 2007), which also characterized the reconstruction phase. This post-​disaster management mode weakened the welfare system, which led to a strong ‘infantilization’ of the population affected. The emergency legitimized social control and imposition; individual freedom was sacrificed to assist the people in the name of ‘security’ and ‘urgency’ (Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010). This top-​down imposition produced a decisive rejection by some people afflicted by the earthquake who, in response to this system, created numerous ‘self-​managed’ or ‘spontaneous’ camps: these were informal camps created by the initiative of those who rejected the CP system. In urban centres, 159

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they were set up in public places (gardens, parks, campsites), while in rural areas, they were placed near damaged houses. In these ‘imaginary spaces of autonomy conceived as outside or beyond power’ (Moore, 1998, p 351), a network of relations was generated and characterized by solidarity throughout Italy and decentralized relational resources, including subjects from different realities united by the desire for self-​organization and the need for a horizontal relationship. The organization of some public assemblies –​ the first of which was held at the ‘Aurelio camp’ in Rovereto sul Secchia (Mo) –​proved to be fertile ground for the production of substantial debates from below on the economic and socio-​political aspects of the earthquake (Pitzalis, 2016). In July 2012, “thanks to the collaboration between volunteers and the affected population from the self-​managed camps” (Interview with an affected person from the informal camps, follow-​up 16 July 2018), the idea emerged of setting up a “committee of earthquake affected people” who demanded to be involved in post-​earthquake management, beginning with their active participation in the decision-​making processes regarding the reconstruction. Established in October 2012, Sisma.12 defines itself as a ‘territorial, nonpartisan and transversal citizens’ committee’. The project was designed to meet the “needs of people affected by the disaster by providing them with a tool to represent themselves” (transcription of the public assembly of Sisma.12 in Medolla [in Modena province], fieldwork of 16 February 2013) and to pursue the idea of ‘citizen participation’. The two primary goals of Sisma.12 were to act as a catalyst for information concerning the actual extent of the financial contribution for the reconstruction recognized by the government, their distribution, traceability, the timing of the evaluation of damaged houses, and to think and propose alternative rebuilding methods compared to the governmental one. The intent was to confront the institutions, acting as main interlocutors for these subjects and to be active protagonists in the decision-​making process regarding reconstruction and “not passive implementers of the decisions dictated from above” (interview with a member of the Sisma.12, follow-​up 15 November 2017). These grassroot practices expressed the need to re-​socialize political space (Abélès, 2010) through various socio-​cultural mediations and discourses that considered the aspirations of the people affected by the disaster built on their desires. As the incipit of this contribution shows, the relationship between Sisma.12 and the institutions has always remained conflictual despite numerous encounters. Mutual misunderstandings led the population to a growing distrust of political representatives. In the case of Emilia, the Sisma.12 committee members saw the disaster as an opportunity to acknowledge their condition as citizens unheard by the institutions. In particular, during the reconstruction phase, institutions 160

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were accused of speculating on the disaster, in line with the ‘shock economy’ paradigm (Klein, 2007). According to the collaborators, the institutional policies implemented in the post-​disaster period were influenced by private interests, individualism and favouritism, which conveyed an even more devastating ‘disaster economy’ (Gunewardena and Schuller, 2008). Although the institutions responsible for post-​earthquake management, politically represented at the time by the Democratic Party (PD), described Emilia’s reconstruction as free of Mafia infiltration, effective and efficient, the Sisma.12 committee members highlighted how, years (2012–​18) after the earthquake, the situation was still characterized by precariousness, injustice and vulnerability due to a ‘slow and ineffective reconstruction’, which they renamed the ‘non-​reconstruction’ (in Italian ‘la non ricostruzione’). In this scenario, the post-​disaster reconstruction in Emilia became an arena of strong social contention, played out through different roles and power relations. First, the socio-​cultural and political idea of reconstruction saw two opposing visions. On the one hand, institutions (at the national and local levels) saw the disaster as an opportunity to ‘perform according to modern notions of efficiency and effectiveness’ (Farinella and Saitta, 2019, p 2), producing an idea of reconstruction based on technical expertise and the constitution of a complicated bureaucratic apparatus (Herzfeld, 1992; Graeber, 2015). This attitude demonstrates how decision-​makers in both disaster prevention and management processes direct their protocols towards the present concerns. In doing so, they shape future guidelines following current circumstances, thus hampering new ideas (White and Haughton, 2017, pp 412–​19). On the other hand, the members of Sisma.12, as collective subjects definable as ‘enunciative communities’ (Fortun, 2001), elaborated an imaginary fuelled by specific aspirations (Appadurai, 2013) based on a precise desire of change for a better future, capable of proposing alternative ways of thinking about the reconstruction.

Rising conflict between expert’s knowledge and people’s aspiration The conflicting visions and different interests advanced by members of Sisma.12, institutions and experts have amplified the conflicts over post-​ disaster reconstruction. The techno-​bureaucratic device in Emilia has expressed itself according to precise rhetoric with specific objectives: “we will not do as we did in L’Aquila”5 to build a differentiation between political orientations, legitimizing its political mandate in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (Hajek, 2013); ‘it is a tragedy that was not foreseeable’, to bring the disastrous event within the sphere of the ‘unpredictable’ and the ‘exceptional’ and to carry out actions justified in terms of cogency (Button and Schuller, 2016); ‘we will rebuild as it was where it was’ to restore a 161

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superficial sense of return to normality (Alexander, 1997), denying the transformative power of disasters (Hoffman and Oliver-​Smith, 2019); ‘it is difficult, but we will get back up’ to create empathy (Pitzalis, 2016); ‘we have created an effective earthquake management system’ to demonstrate persistence and competence (Button and Schuller, 2016; Barrios, 2017); ‘the people of Emilia are coping on their own’ to delegate responsibility for recovery to affected people (Fassin et al, 2015). From the first inspections carried out by public experts with a regional mandate, institutional actions validated an idea of reconstruction that seemed to disregard the specificities of individual cases, standardizing them within a homogeneous, non-​negotiable and self-​declared ‘pertinent’ vision due to its supposed scientific scope (Barrios, 2017). Despite the accusation of Sisma.12 members, the rigid institutional organization of the reconstruction phase appealed to contemporary governance principles of equity and transparency (Barrios, 2016a). This structuring spawned a heavy bureaucratic machine (Ferguson, 1990; see Graeber, 2015) regulated by numerous ordinances, as complex as they were contradictory, which significantly slowed down the progress of the financial contributions provided by the government. In the case of the post-​disaster situation in Emilia, the ‘governance of reconstruction’ (Barrios, 2017), through its techno-​bureaucratic apparatuses, proved to be a cumbersome mechanism that lengthened the reconstruction’s temporality and aggravated the perception of the existential precariousness of the people involved (Fassin, 2010). This element emerges forcefully during an interview with Giulio, a high school teacher and owner of a destroyed house: ‘What upset me the most is that reconstruction is a matter only for the experts and the institutions. … That is, I am excluded from any path of choice! I cannot rebuild my house as I want, maybe modifying it for the better, like insulating the outside walls or putting up photovoltaic panels, nothing! They denied me that! You know, Silvia, it’s all about responding to procedures and regulations rather than to people’s needs and aspirations!’ (Interview, 5 June 2013) In the case of Emilia, the implementation of a reconstruction entrusted exclusively to the knowledge and skills of experts and embedded in all-​ embracing bureaucratic apparatuses (Herzfeld, 1992) imposed a specific vision of the disaster that denied the affected populations the possibility of using the destruction positively, to improve their urban and housing context, by implementing, for example, a type of sustainable ecological building. Post-​disaster reconstruction was, thus, governed by producing a generalized technocracy that builds, selects and legitimizes specific knowledge, discarding others (Revet, 2009, 2011). Alessandra, a specialized 162

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worker in her fifties with a house to demolish and rebuild, told me during an informal conversation: ‘We want to rebuild our houses by improving them. We don’t want to rebuild them as before, and I’m not just talking about seismic upgrading, which fortunately has been taken into consideration by the institutions, but also energy upgrading. We have the opportunity to use the devastation produced by the earthquake in a positive way to improve ourselves and anticipate an ecological discourse that will become increasingly important. In short, even how we rebuild must be a choice that looks not only at the present time but also at the future one!’ (Informal conversation, fieldwork of 5 December 2016) As the ethnographic glimpse described in the introduction of this contribution shows, the institutions’ refusal to listen to the affected population’s requests to rethink post-​disaster proactively and innovatively was motivated by the fact that these reconstruction methods would have been too costly and as such that they did not fit into cost-​benefit analyses and planning budgets (Barrios, 2010). This is what Teresa, a 60-​year-​old and owner of a destroyed house, says during an interview: ‘The possibility of a better reconstruction was denied. Then all that legislation, an incredible mess. I didn’t understand anything … but so did my engineer … I saw him put his hands in his hair, reading all those papers. We had to be careful to stay within our costs. The crucial aspect of cost restriction began to emerge more and more. They wanted us to remain within costs, but they were waving the quality of the reconstruction card. How can you save money if you build better? Do you understand? It’s schizophrenic! First came the earthquake, then this technical and bureaucratic management, one disaster after another.’ (Interview, 7 July 2017) Thus, in the post-​earthquake phase in Emilia, expert eligibility evaluations, imposed as non-​negotiable techniques emerging from the governance of reconstruction (Barrios, 2016), based on highly restrictive legislation, prevailed at the expense of the afflicted people’s proposals to build according to alternative techniques they considered more effective (Hoffman and Barrios, 2020). In sum, the institutional post-​disaster reconstruction path was exclusionary in its practices, undertaken based on an ‘alleged scientificity’ and a certain degree of self-​referentiality deemed a priori adequate (Boyer, 2008). The arguments and institutional choices followed a restrictive rule interpretation that prevented interchange and collaboration between the local population, experts, and institutions. 163

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Competing experts Another aspect that I would like to emphasize concerns the drafting of the ‘sworn report’, a technical report on the state of the property entrusted by the people affected by the earthquake to a private expert/​technician (an engineer or an architect), should the opinion of the institutional experts appear inadequate, with the possibility of requesting the municipality to adjust the AeDES (Agibilità e Danno in Emergenza Sismica) classification. The activation of this procedure shifted the clash’s centrality onto the experts, who were grappling with the interpretation of the regulations in force when not also dealing with the evaluation of the technical expertise of others (Boyer, 2008; Holmes and Marcus, 2008; Carr, 2010). In this competitive and asymmetrical relationship, the private technician was in a liminal position, on the borderline of a complicated relationship between public technicians and affected people. This expert was caught between the professional obligation of complying with the standard and the sensibility dictated by professional ethics to listen to his client’s needs, requirements and desires (Herzfeld, 1992; Fassin, 2015). The continuous requests for additions to financial contribution applications by public technicians and the constant production of documentation proving the validity of the contribution burdened the work of private technicians, both in terms of time and workload. In this sense, the actions of the public expert were interpreted by the private ones as a hostile attitude, expressed in the strict application of the rule (Herzfeld, 1992; Fassin et al, 2015; Graeber, 2015). Amilcare, a private technician with 20 years of experience, told me during an interview: ‘They try everything until they find the technical loophole. And for what? Two cents on a contribution. Also, this way of doing things is very short-​sighted because once you spend money to rebuild the house, you should give people a chance to do specific work well. If people don’t have the opportunity to do a good job, in the end, it is better that you don’t give them a contribution. Otherwise, it doesn’t work; it doesn’t make sense. Instead, they do everything to take away, thinking they are doing something right, but they are not!’ (Interview during a follow-​up, 15 January 2018) During the interview, Amilcare deeply questioned the public technician’s belief in the concurrence between his professional mandate and his personal ethics and the appropriateness of his actions. He continued: ‘Only one [application] was not accepted … because of a personal conflict, but I have never seen him [the public technician] before. … 164

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It was rejected because, according to him, there were no findings but, in my opinion, he was just obsessed with some nonsense which, however, wasted a lot of our time. After all, we had to start all over again.’ (Interview during a follow-​up, 15 January 2018) The conflict between the two experts led people afflicted by the earthquake to describe institutional technicians as “cold technocrats”, “heartless bureaucrats”, and “enemies of reconstruction”. This aspect highlights how contemporary theodicy causes a dehumanization of these figures, relegating them to the grey zone of moral worlds of reference (Herzfeld, 1992; Boyer, 2008; Graeber, 2015). However, the actions of public technicians also appear to be underpinned by a ‘solid professional morality’, declined according to a shared behaviour of rigorous application of the norms in force. If experts ‘act on the basis of values and affects’, we also can state that moral economies are configured in a dialectical tension between ‘how values and affects are produced, circulate, and are appropriated around a given situation that society construes as a problem’ and how moral subjectivities ‘reveal the values and affects involved in the ethical issues and dilemmas faced by the agents with respect to these problems. … Moral subjectivities are influenced by moral economies, which reinforce, contest, or displace’ (Fassin, 2015, p X). On the one hand, the specific moral economies and moral subjectivities construct, based on typical elements of the expertise, a shared habitus; on the other, they elaborate a disciplining reference model, which regulates behaviour, decisions, and actions. Thus, experts ‘inform their daily decisions and actions but are also informed by the ethos of their profession and the ethical climate of the public sphere’ (Fassin, 2015, p X). This dual aspect emerged clearly during an informal conversation I had with Enrico, a public technician temporarily employed in one of the municipalities affected by the earthquake: ‘I am a technician with an institutional mandate. My task is to verify the application of the Law, and, in turn, I must follow the standard for evaluations. Do you understand? We are all subject to the rules that define procedures and what can and cannot be done. So, I understand the people who complain. We also realise how numerous the ordinances are and how difficult it can be to understand them … sometimes even I have difficulty. So, I understand when someone comes here and complains. These people have lost their homes; let’s not forget that! However, as a professional expert, I also know that you cannot leave everything to the singularity of cases. It is not possible to listen to all demands. There are rules to follow that exclude something individual for the good of all.’ (Informal conservation: fieldwork of 16 April 2018) 165

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For Enrico, there is a gap between the institutional mandate and individual ethics, legitimized by the production and application of rules that he, as an experienced professional, must follow in the name of the ‘common good’. There is no room for personalism in this area of rule application: everyone must be equally subject to it (Graeber, 2015, p 48; see Fassin, 2015). His work mandate obliges him to keep the spheres of individual ethics distinct from professional and practical ethics, underpinned by the concepts of authority and effectiveness (Herzfeld, 1992). In conclusion, this section has highlighted how decisions and procedures implemented by institutions have widened the conflict, which has pitted not only afflicted people against institutions but also involved experts with different mandates.

Conclusions The post-​earthquake experience and perception of the affected population, significantly different from the official representation of reconstruction, made it difficult for the involved people to conceive management and institutional intervention as decisive and effective. The collaborators involved in the research endure an ambivalent condition. On the one hand, they experienced the uprooting from a previous living dimension, in which environment and living collaborated in their substantial, experiential correspondence; on the other hand, they suffered the failure of post-​disaster reconstruction, which sanctioned the splitting of this correspondence, making it permanent and definitive to the point of occupying the entire horizon of collective political expectations. This triggered strong friction from a conceptual, procedural and practical point of view, making the collaboration between those who design and organize the space, those who manage it, and those who experience it and live with it daily more problematic (Lupton, 1999). The space experienced by subjects, both individually and collectively, is charged with different connotations than the space conceived, organized, and controlled by the organs of power since those who make room are not those who manage it and use it to organize production and social reproduction (Lefebvre, 1999). Moreover, disasters result from the interconnection between the environment, society, and technologies. At this juncture, the people involved –​bearers of constructions (material and immaterial), symbols, and languages –​meet and interconnect (Hoffman and Oliver-​Smith, 2019). If ‘places do not just have locations but histories’ (Ingold, 2007, p 102), the inhabiting must be understood as the product of the reciprocal relationship between people and places, also, and above all, in a future perspective. Taking this fundamental relationship into account when designing reconstruction would make it possible to overcome a mechanistic approach 166

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to reconstruction and to think of the buildings destroyed by the earthquake not only as places made of concrete and bricks but as elements of a precise feeling structure typical of the social and imagined life of the situated community (Appadurai, 1996). Hence, as a sphere for guaranteeing the quality of living, in the present and future, which contrasts with the techno-​ bureaucratic processes of existence initiated by the governance of post-​disaster reconstruction, as a social habitat in which the aspirations of people who, despite having experienced a catastrophe, can rethink it in improving terms, are given a chance to be heard. The intervention and management policies implemented in the Emilian post-​disaster were characterized by an impersonal, non-​negotiable and depoliticized technicality (Newman, 2011), which responded to the affected populations’ sense of loss and uncertainty with scientific and technical notions with a strong generalizing character (Revet and Langumier, 2013). This political behaviour depowered the population’s local ways of making sense of the event, prolonging and exacerbating their vulnerability (Barrios, 2016b). The rigidity of these axiomatic assumptions produced among the people afflicted by the earthquake a widespread misunderstanding of procedures, questioning the real effectiveness of the solutions proposed by the technical-​administrative apparatus, thus creating a highly asymmetrical social space in which expert’s knowledge and affected people’s aspirations have a clash and conflicted, creating a ‘disaster upon disaster’ (Hoffman and Barrios, 2020). Notes 1

2

3 4

5

In Italian legislation, the ‘Extraordinary Commissioner’ is a government official designated to deal with urgent or exceptional tasks by centralizing or increasing powers and acting in derogating the ordinary Law for a determined period. The ‘Bassa’ is the north-​eastern sector of the Po-​Emilian valley, so called because it is below sea level. From the fieldwork diary, 24 June 2014. The Emilia-​Romagna Region comprises two zones: the larger one includes the north of the region and is called ‘Emilia’; the smaller, southern part is called ‘Romagna’. The series of earthquakes of May 2012 affected the ‘Emilia’ area. The post-​disaster phase implemented after the earthquake in L’Aquila in 2009 by the highly politicized government produced equally devastating economic, social and political repercussions. For a more in-​depth review, see Forino and Carnelli (2019).

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Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Lefebvre, H. (1999) La production de l’espace, Paris: Éditions Anthropos. Lupton, D. (1999) Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marchezini, V. (2015) ‘The biopolitics of disasters: Power, discourses, and practices’, Human Organization, 74(4): 362–​71. Moore, D.S. (1998) ‘Subaltern struggles and the politics of place: Remapping resistance in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands’, Cultural Anthropology, 13(3): 344–​81. Mosse, D. (2004) ‘Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of air policy and practice’, Development and Change, 35(4): 639–​71. Newman, S. (2011) ‘Postanarchism and space: Revolutionary fantasies and autonomous zones’, Planning Theory, 10: 344–​65. Oliver-​Smith, A. (2013) ‘Malinowski Award lecture: Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation: The view from applied anthropology’, Human Organization, 72(4): 275–​82. Pitzalis, S. (2015) ‘Positioning as a method: The earthquake in Emilia Romagna and the forms of “exilience”’, Archivio Antropologico Mediterraneo, 17(1): 29–​40. Pitzalis, S. (2016) Politiche del disastro: Poteri e contropoteri nel terremoto Emiliano, Verona: Ombre corte. Pitzalis, S. (2018) ‘La costruzione dell’emergenza: Aiuto, assistenza e controllo tra disastri e migrazioni forzate in Italia’, Argomenti, 10: 103–​32. Quarantelli, E.L. (eds) (1998) What Is a Disaster?, London: Routledge. Revet, S. (2009) ‘Vivre dans un monde plus sur: Catastrophes ‘naturelles’ et securitè “globale”’, Cultures & Conflicts, 75: 3–​51. Revet, S. (2011) ‘El mundo internacional de las catastrofes naturales’, Politica y sociedad, 48(3): 537–​54. Revet, S. (2020) Disasterland: An Ethnography of the International Disaster Community, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Revet, S. and Langumier, J. (eds) (2013) Le gouvernement des catastrophes, Paris: Karthala. Signorelli, A. (1992) ‘Catastrophes naturelles et réponses culturelles’, Terrain, 19: 147–​58. Wayland, C. (2003) ‘Contextualizing the politics of knowledge: Physicians’ attitudes toward medicinal plants’, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 17(4): 483–​500. White, I. and Haughton G. (2017) ‘Risky times: Hazard management and the tyranny of the present’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 22: 412–​19.

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Local and Professional Knowledge in Post-​disaster Reconstruction: Overlaps and Differences in Maierato Francesco De Pascale and Loredana Antronico

Introduction Disaster risk management is defined as the set of actions (or phases) that can be undertaken by governments and civil society before, during and after the occurrence of a calamitous event (catastrophe) that impacts communities (Alexander, 2002; Coppola, 2011). In particular, the term post-​disaster means (i) all the activities and actions implemented to manage the emergency generated following the impact of the calamitous event (response) and (ii) all the actions taken for the recovery, rehabilitation and post-​disaster reconstruction (recovery). Social, economic and environmental aspects are important to ensure the success of actions as part of post-​disaster reconstruction; the lack of consideration of these aspects by decision-​makers can increase the vulnerability of local communities. Also, community involvement and the active participation of members of the community should be encouraged (Coppola, 2015). This chapter will deal with the social dimension of post-​ disaster reconstruction in the case study of Maierato (Calabria, Southern Italy) (see Figure 10.1). This town was hit, in February 2010, by a large landslide which forced the local authorities to evacuate the entire community (about 2,300 inhabitants). The landslide, which fortunately did not cause any human casualties, destroyed a few uninhabited country houses and compromised

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Figure 10.1: Location of the study area

Source: Authors’ own

approximately 800 metres of an important road that provides access to the inhabited area (Borrelli et al, 2014). This event produced relevant social and economic impacts. To understand if its impact led to a different perception and post-​event experience among the community and professionals (administrators and local technicians), this chapter compares the results obtained from two different participatory surveys, both carried out in February 2018 in Maierato. The first survey, carried out through structured interviews, involved the community of Maierato with the aim of investigating, among other things, the perception and awareness of the landslide risk as well as knowing the point of view of the population on the 2010 emergency management phase and the subsequent recovery phase. The second survey, carried out through semi-​structured interviews, saw the involvement of the administrators and managers of the technical and Civil Protection offices of the municipality in charge during the period in which the 2010 landslide occurred and the subjects who held these positions 172

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at the date of the survey, which is to say eight years after the event. This second survey brought to light the point of view of local administrators and technicians on the management of the 2010 emergency, on the recovery and rehabilitation of the population.

Some considerations about psychological issues involving people affected by traumatic events In the context of disaster studies, emergency psychology could be defined as ‘the immediate and post-​immediate psychosocial and spiritual support given to the trauma victims, their family members, close circles as well as witnesses of a distressing and traumatizing event’ (Limone and Toto, 2022, p 2). Soto-​Baño and Clemente-​Suárez (2021) integrate this definition by referring to the field of psychology responsible for the study of the reactions of individuals and the community before, during, and after these traumatizing situations, as well as the implementation of psychological intervention strategies that contribute to cushioning the psychological and emotional impact of these events. Some emergency psychology projects such as OPSIC (Operationalising Psychosocial Support in Crisis), coordinated by Danish Red Cross (Denmark) have also been supported by the European Commission.1 Furthermore, in Swiss Confederation there are guidelines promoted by the Réseau National d’Aide Psychologique d’Urgence (RNAPU) according to which ‘emergency psychology corresponds to immediate and post-​immediate psychosocial and spiritual support’ (RNAPU, 2022). Emergency psychology can help us to understand and influence preparation for, and responses to disaster (Robinson, 2018). In addition, it promotes the management of human defences with the aim of preventing a particularly stressful event from causing permanent discomfort to the individuals and to the community; such discomfort is precisely what was found by examining the testimonies of many people interviewed in Maierato. Emergency psychology consists of two general sectors: collective emergency psychology and individual emergency psychology. The first deals with the effects of extreme traumatic events affecting entire communities, for example: disasters linked to extreme natural events and serious socio-​political situations. In these cases, the critical event is collective. The psychology of individual emergency, on the other hand, deals with the effects of extreme events that affect individuals directly or to which they are witness or of which they become aware, in relation to loved ones, for example, socio-​existential events (rape, severe physical and psychological assaults, mobbing and so on) or clinical situations. In all these cases, the critical event threatens the individual who remains traumatized (De Felice and Colaninno, 2003; Bernardo and De Pascale, 2015). 173

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Dwelling on post-​disaster situations, three categories of interventions were devised in order to help and support not only the victims but also the personnel involved in critical and stressful events: (a) employee assistance programmes; (b) peer assistance programmes carried out by employees without clinical skills; and (c) Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), a stress management model from critical events developed by the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (Everly et al, 2000; De Felice and Colaninno, 2003; Bernardo and De Pascale, 2015; Price et al, 2022). The CISM is a global programme that addresses the situations of the moment due to the critical event, covering the entire time frame of a crisis, from the pre-​critical phase, through the acute phase to the post-​critical phase. The CISM includes seven key elements: 1. Education/​immunization before the crisis both at the individual and organizational level; 2. demobilization, for allowing the worker involved in an event to move from disaster work to habitual work or family life; 3. individual intervention during the crisis through different techniques, but above all by promoting stabilization, stress relief, mobilization of resources, normalization and recovery of functionality; 4. ‘defusing’, that is the meeting of a small number of people who participate in the assistance of the victims of a critical event with the aim of alleviating the effects of the difficult experience experienced during the rescue operations (Stanulovic, 2005); 5. ‘debriefing’, that is a structured meeting aiming at preventing emotional difficulties and protect the mental health of all the people involved in the event, analysing thoughts, sensations, emotional reactions and behaviours (Stanulovic, 2005); 6. procedures for family support and consultancy for organizations; 7. ‘networks’, which consist in identifying and activating reference systems for psychological evaluation and subsequent treatment, if necessary. (De Felice and Colaninno, 2003) Perhaps more controversial is the practice of collecting first-​hand testimony from those most directly involved as survivors or rescuers, who may have been directly exposed to scenes of death, to physical injury, or personal physical hazards. CISM peer support, as a protective factor against intolerance of uncertainty, favours psychological safety which may help to minimize symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder (Meriandi et al, 2017; Hill and Hamm, 2019). For many years, debriefing of critical incidents has been found useful following exposure to trauma and has even become standard practice in some contexts. However, following a series of systematic reviews that 174

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have suggested that it may have negative psychosocial effects, it is now considered best practice to select and treat only those who have experienced psychological disorders following disasters (Rose and Bisson, 1998; Everly and Mitchell, 2000; Rose et al, 2003). Key considerations in understanding this debate are (i) how debriefing is defined and (ii) to which extent people volunteer or are encouraged to take this path. The range of ways in which debriefing can be defined is wide and can include, for example, a short single session, an individual or group discussion, an extended, repeated and in-​depth examination of concerns or a vivid review of traumatic events. It has been suggested that putting pressure on people to participate in such activities can be harmful to mental health, even when the intention is good. A lack of clarity in the debate may lead some to conclude that it is probably best to let exposed individuals deal with direct or vicarious trauma in their own way, unless they actively seek psychological intervention or show clear symptoms of psychological disturbance (Percy et al, 2011). Furthermore, while it is clear that disasters cause psychopathology, it is less clear what form this psychopathology takes. Ever since the mental health profession developed the diagnosis of post-​traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), PTSD has been the main focus of research into the aftermath of a disaster. The criteria for PTSD include (APA, 2000): (1) having been exposed to a traumatic and frightening event; (2) reliving the traumatic event, usually in flashbacks or nightmares; (3) avoiding situations and stimuli that could awaken the trauma, for example by numbing one’s feelings or distancing oneself from others; and (4) increasing the level of arousal, for example having difficulty sleeping, irritability and problems concentrating. In this context, data on the experiences of disaster responders were also collected for research rather than therapy purposes. Studies have been conducted on the subjective experiences of nurses after an earthquake, of rescuers after terrorist attacks, railway accidents and highway collapses (Marmar et al, 1996; Shih et al, 2002; Ben-​Ezra et al, 2008; Bills et al, 2009). These reports certainly have value in informing us about the nature of human experience in the response phase. Provided that ethical concerns can be fully addressed, it may be worth using qualitative and inductive projects to gather more data on these experiences, including the one covered in this chapter.

A participatory methodological approach To understand if the Maierato landslide’s impact led to a different perception and post-​event experience among the community and professionals, this study compares the results obtained from two different participatory surveys. The first survey, involving face-​to-​face interviews with the population living in Maierato, was conducted by means of a structured questionnaire with the purpose of obtaining data on risk perception, social vulnerability 175

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and resilience of the community involved in the 2010 landslide disaster (Antronico et al, 2020a). The questionnaire consists of 58 questions with different response formats: close (yes/​no, multiple-​choice, 3-​level scale (in no way, low, high), 5-​level scale (range 1–​5), and open-​ended questions. A total of 200 face-​to-​face interviews were conducted over a period of 30 days in January 2018 and the method for selecting surveyed participants was non-​proportional quota sampling. Most of the interviewees, even if they at first showed a bit of distrust towards the interviewer, turned out to be, generally, collaborative and diligent in answering questions, they also seemed happy with the fact that after eight years they were returned to face the calamitous event (disaster) that had struck them, with particular reference to their psychological condition. All participants gave their voluntary and informed consensus before the interviews. The second survey, conducted in February 2018 using qualitative methods through semi-​structured interviews, saw the involvement of professionals (administrators and local technicians) to investigate the management of the emergency following the landslide in 2010 and the recovery and rehabilitation of the population (Antronico et al, 2020b). The semi-​structured interview is made up of a system of pre-​determined and built-​in stimulus questions in order to make the interviewees express their opinions, beliefs and attitudes relating to the object of study (Lucidi et al, 2008). The semi-​structured interviews were developed by performing a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The themes were identified through in-​depth and repeated reading of the transcripts of the interviews so as to form a complete picture of the collective experience, positions, perceptions and knowledge of the participants (Aronson, 1995, Braun and Clarke, 2006; Forino et al, 2018). Also, in this case, all participants gave their voluntary and informed consensus before the interviews. Within the scope of this study, only the queries on topics related to the issues dealt with in the second survey (semi-​structured interviews) were taken into account out of all the 58 questions of the questionnaire submitted to the population. Table 10.1 shows the list of topics of semi-​structured interviews and the open questions administered to the professionals, as well as the queries of the questionnaire analysed in this paper for comparison with the opinions of professionals.

Sample characteristics The sample population interviewed in the first survey consists of 200 adult respondents; 49 per cent of them were women and 51 per cent men. In total, 36 per cent of respondents were aged between 18 and 39, 35 per cent between 40 and 59, and 29 per cent were aged 60 or over. In the second survey, ten professionals were interviewed, including two mayors, four city 176

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Table 10.1: Questionnaires submitted to population and professionals Topics

Open questions submitted to professionals

Questions submitted to population

1. Emergency Q1. Could you briefly describe what happened during the landslide Q9. How did you behave if you were involved in the Maierato management or how people behaved? Do you know if the institutional subjects landslide in 2010? (multiple-​choice) of 2010 (firefighters, Civil Prot. and so on) intervened during the 2010 Q17. From whom did you get the information concerning the emergency found difficulties/​obstacles in the behaviour of the evacuation operations? (multiple-​choice). community? Q29. Are you aware of any works built in Maierato to reduce landslide risk? (yes/​no) Q18. Indicate your opinion on the activities carried out immediately after the landslide and any improvements /​ worsening in subsequent years (5-​level scale (range 1–​5)

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• Information on the landslide event • Interest on the part of local authorities in the landslide event • Securing the areas at risk • Interest on the part of the political class • Coordination of the subjects present on the territory (local Q4. In your opinion, was there adequate coordination of the parties involved (municipality, region, Civil Protection, volunteers) during authorities, region, central government, civil protection, volunteers) the emergency? How did the community perceive this coordinated • Economic help action? Are you satisfied? Q3. In your opinion, was the communication and information during the event effective? Is the population still sufficiently informed at present?

2. Recovery Q1. How much do you think people were involved, on that occasion, and from a psychological point of view? rehabilitation of the population Q2. Do people currently still feel psychologically involved? Were there any changes in the community after the February 2010 event? What are the main differences from the past?

Q14. Were you and your family involved in the evacuation? (Yes/​no) Q15. If so, have you or any member of your family been a victim of PTSD? (Yes/​no) Q16. If so, have you had any psychological help/​support? (yes/​no) Q19. I will list a series of events for you. How much do you personally think you are exposed to each of these events in Maierato? (3-​level scale) Q30. I f in the future, in Maierato, a new extreme geo-​hydrological event (landslide or flood) should occur, to what extent do you personally feel prepared to face it? (5-​level scale [range 1–​5])

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Q 2. D  o you believe that the community is informed about what the authorities responsible for securing the territory have done immediately after the event and are doing today (defence works, territorial restrictions, alert systems …)? In your opinion, is the population satisfied (both for interventions immediately after the event and for those of today)?

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councillors, two technicians from the municipal technical office and two municipal civil protection managers who held these positions when the landslide occurred or in the period in which the interviews were carried out, that is, eight years after the landslide event. In the presentation of the results, the ten professionals selected and interviewed were identified, for privacy reasons related to the sensitivity of the argument, with the letter P and numbered from 1 to 10.

Analysis of data and comparison of community and professional opinions The following sub-​sections report the opinions/​evaluations of the professionals on the topics of the semi-​structured interviews, and subsequently, the results obtained concerning the same topics from the questionnaire administered to the population.

Topic 1: Investigation of emergency management following the landslide of February 2010 The professionals interviewed unanimously believe that the behaviour of the community during the emergency was responsible, correct, respectful, orderly and sufficiently cooperative towards the local policy makers, the Fire Brigade, the Civil Protection, the Police and the Voluntary Associations. In particular, P4 states “In a few hours the evacuation was completed without problems; no obstacles detected; the population accepted any solution”.2 On the topic about the activities performed immediately after the event and on the perception of it by the population, similar points of view emerge among the professionals interviewed. In particular, P1, P2, P3 and P10 said something similar to this: “currently the population is not fully aware of the emergency safety measures carried out immediately after the event, despite the fact that meetings have been held to inform and involve citizens of the proposed interventions”. P3, P8 and P9 reiterate about “the dissatisfaction of the population with the interventions carried out”. This dissatisfaction of the population is due to the prevailing interest of traffic problems related to the interruption of the provincial road, considered by the population of considerable importance for local economic activities as it connects Maierato with neighbouring areas. The same professionals highlight that the responsibility for this unresolved criticality is to be attributed to the supra-​municipal authorities. As regards the aspects relating to communication between institutions and citizens and the information diffused during the landslide, most of the professionals interviewed agree on one point, namely that the population was well informed during the emergency. According to P1, P3, P7, P9 and 178

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P10 “during the emergency phase all the institutions intervened adequately and the whole population perceived the attention of the institutions and felt protected, therefore satisfied”. On the coordination of those involved during the emergency, there is also a unanimous opinion from the professionals interviewed on the excellent work done by all the institutions involved, in particular by those who coordinated the activities in the emergency phase, and by the associations involved. P7 added that “in times of emergency, the community is more compact and everything takes place in the best possible way”. As regards the survey questionnaire administered to the population, the most frequent answer to the question “How did you behave?” was “I tried not to panic” (96 answers) followed by “I tried to help my neighbours” (72), “I tried to get information from TV, social networks, Internet, radio, neighbours and professionals” (66). As to how the information on evacuation operations was obtained, from the interviewed population we see that it was mainly from the Civil Protection (135 responses) and from the municipal Police (70) followed by the Fire Brigade (36). The question “Are you aware of the works carried out in Maierato to mitigate landslide risk?” received the following answers: 56.5 per cent of respondents did not know anything about them; 29.5 per cent were aware of them and most of these respondents affirmed they were “water drainage works”, while 14 per cent answered that “there are no works”. With regard for the opinion of the population on the activities carried out immediately after the landslide and any improvements/​worsening in subsequent years, 54 per cent of the interviewees were very satisfied with the information on the landslide event received immediately after the event, while only 17 per cent are very satisfied with the information after eight years (37 per cent less). Some 36 per cent of the population interviewed is very satisfied with the interest on the part of local authorities immediately after the landslide, while only 20.5 per cent is very satisfied with this interest after eight years (about 16 per cent less). With regard to the safety work carried out in the area at risk, 29.5 per cent are very satisfied with what was done immediately after the event and 36 per cent are averagely satisfied, while only 20.5 per cent are very satisfied with what is being done after eight years and 42.5 per cent feel averagely satisfied. In total, 56 per cent are not at all satisfied with the interest of the political class immediately after the event, while 48 per cent are not satisfied with this interest after eight years. Some 49.5 per cent of respondents were very satisfied with the coordination of the subjects present in the area immediately after the event, while only 20 per cent were satisfied with this coordination at the date of the interview. In total, 83.5 per cent said they were not satisfied with the financial aid received immediately after the event and 87.5 per cent did not feel satisfied with it after eight years. 179

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Topic 2: Investigation on recovery and rehabilitation of the population following the landslide of February 2010 The professionals interviewed expressed a unanimous opinion on the psychological involvement of the population during the traumatic event experienced in February 2010. Above all, P3 and P4 highlight the disturbance of citizens and their insecurity towards the future: P3 says as follows: “from people’s faces the sense of bewilderment and the fear of what the future might hold for them were evident. Most of them were very shaken, with an almost absent look”. According to P4 “they did not expect such an event; it was the future that troubled the citizens; they had the nightmare of not being able to return to their homes and resume their daily lives”. P8 also highlights that “everyone’s psychological conditioning was directly proportional to the fear of losing what they had”. According to some professionals, psychological discomforts still persist in many citizens who experienced the 2010 landslide event. These problems emerge especially during “particularly intense rains”. P1 explains even better that “the event was a ‘watershed’ in the community; when it rains, the majority of the population feels the sensation of danger linked to the fear that a new landslide phenomenon may occur even beyond the risk area”. Despite the persistence of such psychological discomforts, according to some professionals, after the event the population is more sensitive to problems relating to geo-​hydrological risk in their territory. P6 affirms that “certainly today the population is more aware of what could happen in case of heavy rain, given the vulnerability of the territory. Even today the memory of that tragic day is still alive in each of them”. P8 argues that “people have changed; awareness has greatly increased that certain problems, such as geo-​hydrological instability, are much closer to the community than one might think”. As far as regards the survey questionnaire administered to the population, it was found that 87 per cent of respondents has been involved in evacuation operations with their family members after the landslide, and 18 per cent of them affirmed they had been subject to post-​traumatic stress disorder. Only 5.2 per cent of the respondents involved in evacuation operations and affected by post-​traumatic stress disorder affirmed they had received psychological support, while 94.8 per cent answered that they had not. When asked “List a series of events. How much do you personally think you are exposed to each of these events in Maierato?”, 71 per cent of respondents perceived the level of exposure to landslide as “high”. We asked respondents to evaluate, on a five-​level scale merged into three categories (low, medium, high), their personal preparedness to face a geo-​ hydrological event in the future. Only 23.5 per cent reported that they would feel very prepared to face it, the rest of the population interviewed would 180

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feel little or not at all prepared to face it. The reasons expressed vary: from the lack of information and training, to the failure to take account of a municipal Civil Protection Plan; from the lack of resources to face similar events, to feeling “abandoned”. The most significant response confirmed by several subjects, especially women, is the following: “Due to the experience I have had, I am always alarmed and every time I hear noises other than the rain or the noises of nature, I go into fibrillation”.

Discussion The results highlight the efficiency of the organizational machine in the emergency phase in the case of Maierato. All this took place thanks (i) to the ability of the subjects involved during the emergency to foresee and know how to manage the reactions of citizens during the evacuation phase and (ii) to convey the information and communication of the alarm correctly in order to avoid damage to people. An efficient management of the emergency during the landslide event took place also thanks to the resilient behaviour of the citizens of Maierato, who reacted positively to the extreme event and implemented the correct behaviour to be adopted, precisely, in case of extreme events, trying not to panic while trying to help people nearby and to get information from professionals during the emergency. With regard for the aspects relating to communication, information and coordination of the subjects involved during the emergency, the opinion of citizens and professionals matches: the former consider it very satisfactory/​satisfactory and the latter effective. According to the majority of professionals, however, “today the population is not satisfied because it believes that the attention of the institutions has faded over time” and is not fully aware of the emergency safety measures carried out immediately after the event. The opinions expressed by the professionals are confirmed by the citizens interviewed. In fact, if we analyse the data obtained by the interviewed population about their judgement of the activities carried out immediately after the landslide and any improvements/​ worsening in the following years, interesting elements emerge. Basically, these data can be interpreted as a perception of attention to the event which, if, at first, seemed high enough, it tends to fade more and more over the years (especially in reference to the attention of local authorities and of the coordination of all territorial subjects). With regard for the safety of the area at risk, the population does not seem convinced enough of the interventions carried out both immediately after the event and today. Therefore, meetings or conferences, together with the technicians, would be necessary, through which to illustrate the actions and work carried out in the landslide area. Still on the safety of risk area, a clarifying action by the professionals would be appropriate, to fill the information gap 181

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on the community. Antronico et al (2017, 2019) also highlight a participatory state of emergency of local communities and an absence of communication between local institutions and citizens in an area of southern Calabria adjacent to the study area. Furthermore, the economic aid received both immediately after the event and today has been almost totally “rejected”. In many cases these were negligible figures, according to many citizens, and then even rejected “for reasons of dignity” by the citizens themselves. On the other hand, apathy, sadness, anger, deep melancholy describes the state of mind of those who have lost so much: their lands, their businesses, animals, and so on. This highlights that, if on the one hand the communication during the emergency phase was effective, on the other hand there is a communication deficit in the post-​disaster period following the emergency phase. Several case studies in Italy show that the collaboration between institutions and citizens and the communication between the various institutional subjects involved and the affected community is at a high level only immediately after the disaster (Carnelli and Ventura, 2015; Forino, 2015; Mela et al, 2017; Gugg, 2018), but the focus on the places and people affected gradually tends to fade until the next disaster occurs (Antronico et al, 2019). One aspect on which the institutions should have insisted, not only immediately after the landslide, but also continuously over time, is the psychological support from the whole community. The persistence of post-​ traumatic stress disorders in many citizens, highlighted both by the professionals and by the responses of the citizens interviewed, would have required targeted interventions and treatments in Emergency Psychology (Barbato et al, 2006). The presence of a team of psychologists would have been appropriate who should have intervened, even months after the traumatic event, taking care of the citizens who have encountered this type of problem. The fear that persists in many citizens of Maierato consists of an emotion, often preceded by a sense of surprise, caused by the awareness of a present and imminent danger that they perceive as a threat to their safety. This constitutes an essential guarantee against dangers, a conditioned reflex that allows one to temporarily escape death (Barbato et al, 2006, p 37), while panic, even if it is generated by a real danger, produces dysfunctional and sometimes dangerous behaviours. If these reactions are not followed and controlled, they could represent the prelude to more serious and disabling psychic disorders, as in the case of the women interviewed who suffer from panic attacks in case of heavy rain or suspicious noises. Norris et al (2002) reported that 68 per cent of their research samples evaluated and found PTSD in disaster victims. The second most common psychiatric problem was depression, found in 36 per cent of the samples. Anxiety in various forms was shown in 32 per cent of the samples. Health problems were also often present (23 per cent of the samples). It was usually not clear whether the health problems of the victims were real or were based on the somatization of the stress of the lived experience (North, 2002). Certainly, 182

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PTSD is increasingly recognized as a common and debilitating mental disorder and considerable efforts have been made to develop and research treatments for those affected (Bisson et al, 2007; Ponniah and Hollon, 2009; Stewart and Wrobel, 2009; Bastien, 2010; Crumlish and O’Rourke, 2010; Mevissen and de Jongh, 2010; Mevissen et al, 2010). According to most professionals, following the landslide event in 2010, awareness of exposure to geo-​hydrological events such as landslides and floods has increased among citizens. The opinions expressed by the professionals are confirmed by the citizens interviewed even if the latter complain of a lack of information on the risk and on the correct behaviour to be adopted during an extreme event. Despite the fact that certain conditions tend to increase vulnerability (rapid and inappropriate urbanization, population rise, environmental degradation, growth in socio-​economic inequality, ineffectiveness of governance processes and so on), the absence of risk information and of the correct behaviour to be adopted during an extreme event represents one of the human responsibilities in creating the conditions of vulnerability to natural hazards. Indeed, enhancing landslide risk awareness remains a key future challenge for implementing an effective disaster risk reduction programme.

Conclusions In post-​disaster reconstruction, it is important to consider its social aspects for improving the design, development, implementation and management of measures for risk adaptation, mitigation and reduction in both emergency and ordinary conditions. In particular, the success of post-​disaster reconstruction policies also depends on the consultation and participation of the community. This chapter aims at investigating different aspects related to the social dimension of post-​disaster reconstruction in the context of the case study of the Maierato through a participatory approach. If there has been an efficient organization during the emergency and the community has shown excellent resilience and adaptability, over the years, due to psychological, political, cultural and economic factors, there has been an increase in social vulnerability which has negatively influenced the recovery of the territory. One significant element of social vulnerability is the persistence of PTSD in many citizens, which would require targeted Emergency Psychology interventions and treatments and which a team of psychologists should have dealt with immediately, in the post-​shock period. The analysis also shows a lack of information being shared among the population by the local authorities on the interventions carried out in the landslide area both immediately after the event and after eight years. Furthermore, the population is generally not satisfied with the structural interventions carried out and, in particular, complains about the failure to restore a road 183

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considered to be of vital importance for social, economic and commercial relations with neighbouring communities. Many citizens feel frustrated and abandoned by local and national institutions due to significant indirect losses which have not been recovered by satisfactory actions for compensation and economic aid to the population. Finally, many citizens complain of a lack of information on the risk and on the correct behaviour to be adopted during a new extreme event. This chapter highlights the central role played in disaster risk management by the human component related to the psychological and social impacts that occur after an event. The human component is certainly difficult to evaluate and measure but it guarantees that the social vulnerability is reduced should similar conditions arise again and, consequently, increases resilience. Acknowledgements The authors thank Giovanni Gullà for his support, and Professor Ian Michael Robinson for his language revision.

Notes 1 2

https://​cor​dis.eur​opa.eu/​proj​ect/​id/​312​783 [Accessed: 21 January 2023]. All quotes have been translated from Italian by the authors.

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Forino, G., (2015) ‘Disaster recovery: Narrating the resilience process in the reconstruction of L’Aquila (Italy)’, Geografisk Tidsskrift-​Danish Journal of Geography, 115(1): 1–​13. Forino, G., Von Meding, J. and Brewer, G.J. (2018) ‘Challenges and opportunities for Australian local governments in governing climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction integration’, International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment, 9(3): 258–​72. Gugg, G. (2018) ‘Anthropology of the Vesuvius emergency plan: History, perspectives and limits of a dispositive for volcanic risk government’, in L. Antronico and F. Marincioni (eds) Natural Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction Policies, Rende: Il Sileno Edizioni, pp 105–​23. Hill, E.M. and Hamm, A. (2019) ‘Intolerance of uncertainty, social support, and loneliness in relation to anxiety and depressive symptoms among women diagnosed with ovarian cancer’, Psycho-​Oncology, 28, 553–​560. Limone P. and Toto G.A. (2022) ‘Protocols and strategies to use emergency psychology in the face of an emergency: A systematic review’, Acta Psychologica, 229, 103697. doi: 10.1016/​j.actpsy.2022.103697 Lucidi, F., Alivernini, F. and Pedon, A. (2008) Metodologia della ricerca qualitativa, Bologna: Il Mulino. Marmar, C.R., Weiss, D.S., Metzler, T.J., Ronfeldt, H.M. and Foreman, C. (1996) ‘Stress responses of emergency services personnel to the Loma Prieta earthquake Interstate 880 freeway collapse and control traumatic incidents’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 9(1): 63–​85. Mela, A., Mugnano, S. and Olori, D. (eds) (2017) Territori Vulnerabili. Verso una Nuova Sociologia dei Disastri Italiana, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Meriandi, J., Liao, N., Lewe, D., Morvay, S., Stewart, B., Catt, C. et al (2017) ‘Deployment of a second victim peer support program: A replication study’ Pediatr. Qual. Saf., 2: e031. Mevissen, L. and de Jongh, A. (2010) ‘PTSD and its treatment in people with intellectual disabilities: A review of the literature’, Clinical Psychology Review, 30(3): 308–​16. Mevissen, L., Lievegoed, R. and de Jongh, A. (2010) ‘EMDR treatment in people with mild ID and PTSD: 4 cases’, Psychiatric Quarterly, 82(1): 43–​57. Norris, F.H., Friedman, M.J., Watson, P.J., Byrne, C.M., Diaz, E. and Kaniasty, K. (2002) ‘60,000 disaster victims speak: Part 1. An empirical review of the empirical literature, 1981–​2001’ Psychiatry, 65: 207–​39. North, C.S. (2002) ‘Somatization in survivors of catastrophic trauma: A methodological review’, Environmental Health Perspectives, 110: 636–​40.

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Percy, C., Chen, Y.F., Bibi, A., Coles-​Jordan, D., Dodson, E., Evans, T. et al (2011) ‘The contribution of human psychology to disaster management: mitigation, advance preparedness, response and recovery’, in C.A. Brebbia, A.J. Kassab and E.A. Divo (eds) Disaster Management and Human Health Risk II, Reducing Risk, Improving Outcomes, Southampton: WIT Press, Vol 119, pp 195–​208. Ponniah, K. and Hollon, S.D. (2009) ‘Empirically supported psychological treatments for adult acute stress disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder: A review’, Depression and Anxiety, 26(12): 1086–​109. Price, J.A.B., Landry, C.A., Sych, J., McNeill, M., Stelnicki, A.M. et al (2022) ‘Assessing the perceptions and impact of critical incident stress management peer support among firefighters and paramedics in Canada’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 19: 4976. doi: 10.3390/​ijerph19094976 RNAPU (2022) Emergency psychology. www.psy​urge​nce.ch; Réseau National d’Aide Psychologique d’Urgence (RNAPU), [online], Available from: http://​www.psy​urge​nce.ch/​en/​def ​init​ion#:~:text=​EMERGE​ NCY%20PSY​CHOL​OGY%20Ac​cord​ing%20to%20the%20dire​ ctiv​ es%20 of%20the (Accessed 22 January 2023). Robinson, S.J. (2018) ‘How can psychology inform disaster research?’, Procedia Engineering, 212: 1083–​90. Rose, S. and Bisson, J. (1998) ‘Brief early psychological interventions following trauma: A systematic review of the literature’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 11(4): 697–​710. Rose, S., Bisson, J. and Wessely, S. (2003) ‘A systematic review of single-​ session psychological interventions (“debriefing”) following trauma’, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 72(4): 176–​84. Shih, F.J., Liao, Y.C., Chan, S.M., Duh, B.R. and Gau, M.L. (2002) ‘Taiwanese nurses’ most unforgettable rescue experiences in the disaster area after the 9–​21 earthquake in Taiwan’, International Journal of Nursing Studies, 39(2): 195–​206. Soto-​Baño, A., Clemente-​Suárez V.J. (2021) ‘Psychology of emergencies in Spain: Conceptual delimitation, action areas, and healthcare system proposal’, Papeles del Psicólogo/Psychologist Papers, 42(1): 56–​66. doi: 10.23923/​pap.psicol2020.2939 Stanulovic N.K. (2005) Psicologia dell’emergenza: L’intervento con i bambini e gli adolescenti, Rome: Carocci. Stewart, C.L. and Wrobel T.A. (2009) ‘Evaluation of the efficacy of pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy in treatment of combat-​related posttraumatic stress disorder: A meta-​analytic review of outcome studies’, Military Medicine, 174(5): 460–​69.

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PART IV

Organizations Adapting to Post-​disaster Changes

11

Adapting to the COVID-​19 Pandemic: The Distance Learning Experience of the University of Milan-​Bicocca Sara Zizzari and Brunella Fiore

Introduction In the last two years our society was radically transformed in the face of the disastrous COVID-​19 pandemic that suddenly struck the entire world. Every day, in our daily lives, we realize how our habits, practices and expectations are different, compared to how they were before the pandemic suddenly hit the whole world. A characteristic of disaster is in fact that it is perceived and represented as a chronological wound (Ligi, 2009) that cannot heal and that cuts stories of life in two, for individuals and for entire communities. The impact of disasters certainly changes according to socio-​cultural and environmental contexts: just think that a disaster that happened 40 years ago is different from one happening today (Zizzari, 2019). The dynamics of these events are not always the same, and this fact poses additional problems when they must be faced, and an example is the COVID-​19 pandemic. The various studies that have reconstructed the dynamics of previous flu pandemics from a long-​term perspective have shown that, since the 18th century, they have occurred on average three times every hundred years, but there is no periodicity of their occurrence and therefore no predictive basis. Their historicization is vital for risk management, preventing/​mitigating future consequences. Risk scenarios, tied to viral behaviour, don’t always mirror the past; they're novel with each occurrence. We are therefore moving in an insidious and complex situation, which tends to change as sensitivities and contexts change (Silei, 2020). 191

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In public opinion the COVID-​19 pandemic appeared exceptional and seemed to come out of the blue. This happens because, Assman (2008) argues, there is no communicative memory: for example, the Spanish flu of 1918–​20, which snuffed out more than 39 million lives worldwide and generated more than half a billion cases of infection (Bedyński, 2020), only re-​emerged in public memory after the COVID-​19 outbreak, thus reinforcing its tragic meaning rather than suggesting damage control strategies. In the numerous examples of such disasters, which have been repeated in human history with impressive regularity, a usual repertoire of ‘response’ seems to take place, unable to develop a process of progressive accumulation of experience and knowledge (Zaccaria and Zizzari, 2020). Among the elements that make an event more or less destructive, there is, as already mentioned, the interaction between socio-​cultural variables –​ society, technology and environment –​which can have the effect of increasing or decreasing the level of social vulnerability (Oliver-​Smith, 1999). Social institutions, as well, play an important role in this because they certainly contribute to building the perception not only of the risk but also of the categories of fault and danger and how these determine the degree of vulnerability to a disaster. Proof of this is that the pandemic, in addition to having severely challenged governments and institutions, disrupted various sectors in the way which they responded to a risk, and thus it became a catastrophe. Despite the presence of a strategy and a specific response plan drawn up by the World Health Organization (WHO) since the outbreak, the adoption by government authorities of effective measures aimed at containing and delaying contagion to ensure public health safety –​probably due to the fear of serious economic fallout –​has often been delayed. Above all, coordinated action has been dramatically lacking. Even by considering the exceptional nature of the situation and the rapidity of the COVID-​19 diffusion, it became evident that many European national health systems have encountered dramatic difficulties in adopting measures to counter the spread of the virus (Eurofound, 2020). Among the affected sectors, in addition to the economy, there is the social sector that saw exasperated social inequalities and forced the social relationships to re-​organize in new spaces and new times. It has disrupted the technological sector by revealing the importance of technological infrastructures and the need to improve them, and then also the environmental, the geo-​political and anthropological ones. The COVID-​19 pandemic surprised the tourism industry (Corbisiero, 2020) and affected urban societies on the move, causing risky mobility for some and ‘immobility’ for others (Caiello et al, 2020). Moreover, the COVID-​19 outbreak has introduced a lot of challenges for higher education institutions across the world. Lockdown and other COVID-​ 19 regulations have forced a sudden shift from face-​to-​face learning to online learning in many academic institutions. While this shift was considered a 192

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possible solution to higher education crises in the era of COVID-​19, it has been shown that this shift came with numerous challenges for students and academics. Despite these challenges, COVID-​19 also created opportunities such as the need for innovation and capacity development (Mseleku, 2020). By and large, the changes were more about addressing the immediate and urgent need of continuing schooling, teaching online, and finding creative ways to reach students at home rather than using this opportunity to rethink education. While understandable in the short term, these changes will very likely be considered insubstantial for the long term. The use of new technologies avoided teachers losing contact with students and helped to give them the opportunity to continue their training, although partially (Hasan and Bao, 2020; Vicente et al, 2020; Hawley et al, 2021). Experimenting with a type of teaching that included the use of various technological and digital tools, however, revealed in many cases the fragility of the most disadvantaged students and less wealthy families, emphasizing also the economic and social gap (Aguilera-​Hermida, 2020; Dwidienawati et al, 2020). In addition to missing out on educational opportunities from the various extracurricular activities organized by civil society associations, a very significant number of students lacked access to the tools that are necessary to enjoy online education and then lacked the necessary skills to use them properly. If we then consider foreign families, language difficulties also add up. According to data from Save the Children, 57.2 per cent of the poorest families lack an Internet connection, and 14.3 per cent of families with minor children do not have one (Saraceno, 2020). Quarantine and distance learning have therefore exacerbated problems already present in Italian schools and universities, above all the one of inequalities. The digital inequalities are added to the socio-​economical ones, due to access to computers and to the Internet having been much more complicated for families with low–​middle incomes and in peripheral areas (ISTAT, 2019). In addition, the shortcomings of educational institutions became evident, as they are often equipped with inadequate networks digital assets that are too old. Teaching activities are one of the main objectives of universities but are often taken for granted and under-​valued, while research activities receive a lot more attention. On the one hand, the emergency pointed out some vulnerabilities in Italian universities but, on the other hand, it enhanced their resilience. In a short time, most of the universities were able to ensure the continuity of their teaching activities, replacing face-​to-​face experiences with online alternatives. Furthermore, the pandemic has succeeded in bringing educational activities back to the centre of attention, intensifying reflections on the quality of the delivery of the educational offer, the potential of distance learning to strengthen that offer, and the role of universities as active players in the territory (Decataldo et al, 2021; Hodges et al, 2020). 193

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In the next section, we will present some results of a survey administered to university lecturers to investigate their response to the emergency during the COVID-​19 pandemic.

The survey administered to university lecturers at the University of Milan-​Bicocca The Lombardy region, in Italy, was the first area in the world, after China, to face a dramatic uprising in COVID-​19 cases. The first lockdown (including the closure of universities) began therefore on 24 February 2020. The University of Milan-​Bicocca was one of organizations in the private or public sector that most quickly managed to reorganize its activities online. With a decree of 4 March 2020, the Chancellor of University of Milan-​Bicocca declared that activities related to lessons, exams and thesis graduation would be conducted with off campus and digital modalities, starting from 5 March 2020 until the end of the emergency. This chapter presents and discusses some of the data collected in a large research project, ‘Giving value to the emergency: Quality indicators to evaluate teaching practice and design curricular and territorial training proposals’, funded by the University of Milan-​Bicocca to investigate challenges and opportunities for teaching during the pandemic. The research includes a questionnaire administered to university staff. The questionnaire data are then compared to administrative data about the same staff, extrapolated from the information systems of the University of Milan-​Bicocca. The survey concerns the effective use of distance learning tools available on the university’s online platform. Therefore, subjective perceptions of the distance teaching experience and self-​reported behavioural indicators are integrated with objective data already available in the University of Milan-​Bicocca database. The questionnaire included closed-​ended questions and used validated international scales. The focus of the survey is based on the detection of dimensions related to technostress, the perception of self-​efficacy, work-​ life balance and teaching planning methods. The validated scale tried to capture a multiplicity of dimensions underlying the emergency situation experienced in the teaching activities. These validated scales are mainly five-​ point Likert-​type scales (from 1 =​completely disagree to 5 =​completely agree). However, respondents had also the opportunity to better articulate their thoughts through open-​ended questions. The questionnaire was administered to 1,205 lecturers of the University of Milan-​Bicocca who taught at least one course between October 2020 and January 2021, corresponding to the first semester of the 2020/​21 academic year. Specifically, the questionnaire was sent to full, associate and assistant professors, as well as associate lecturers including PhD students, research fellows and 194

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adjunct professors. The questionnaire was administered with CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) methodology and distributed to the lecturers’ institutional email addresses through the Qualtrics web platform. The study started on 8 March 2021; reminders were sent to those who had not answered yet or filled the questionnaire just partially on 13, 18 and 24 March. A total of 955 questionnaires were collected, of which 481 were fully completed. The respondents were composed by 49.8 per cent men and 50.2 per cent women. Age ranges were under 35 (13.6 per cent), 35–​55 years (61.5 per cent) and over 56 (24.9 per cent). Some 33.3 per cent are associate professors, 32.2 per cent associate lecturers, 18.6 per cent full professors and 15.9 per cent assistant professors. We collected some information also on the family structure: 55.8 per cent of the respondents live with their partner and children, 18.9 per cent live with their partner, 13.8 per cent live alone, 7.8 per cent live with other people who are neither partners nor children and 3.7 per cent of respondents live with only their children. The questionnaire collected information on subjective perceptions of the experience of distance teaching and self-​reported behavioural indicators.

An overview of lecturers’ answers We analyse here some specific elements emerging from the questionnaire and linked to perception of lecturers according to the teaching during the pandemic period. In particular, the following question, labelled APPREND, was asked: ‘Thinking about your distance learning experience, what are the two learning experiences related to teaching that you think you have developed in this teaching period (October 2020–​January 2021)?’ In the following part we will offer a twofold analysis of the answers about this specific question. We think that this question is particularly relevant to understand how lecturers faced the emergency situation caused by the COVID-​19 pandemic. Our aims are twofold. On the one hand, we intend to offer a meta-​analysis about how the respondents interpret the question ‘APPREND’. We analyse how the question was received and understood, as well as how the respondents answered (approach dimension). On this regard, we suppose indeed that the length of the answer, a missing answer or a not fully centred answer can provide relevant information about how the respondent experienced learning while teaching in the selected timespan. On the other hand, we focus on the content of the answers and their main emerging dimensions (contents dimension). Within the questionnaire, the APPREND variable is a string variable with a maximum number of characters (space included) equal to 2,000. We analysed that the medium number of characters for respondent are equal to 120 with a standard deviation of 159. Quartiles of percentile 25 are equal to 36 characters, percentile 50 is equal to 86 and percentile 75 is equal to 195

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146. Of the 481 respondents, 71 (14.7 per cent of respondents) did not answer the question: 39 respondents left a blank space; 28 respondents said they did not know or they could not answer; in some cases, they assume a critical position affirming ‘I do not want to answer’ or ‘I don’t understand the question’. Therefore, a relevant percentage of respondents did not answer. The question specifically asked the respondents to list two relevant learning experiences related to teaching. We observe that 86 respondents (17.8 per cent) provided only one dimension, and that sometimes the answers were not centred on the question. We observed that respondents focused both on short personnel considerations about how the experience had gone and on the acquired skills (as required by the question). The open question offered by the APPREND variable, unique within the survey, somehow became a way for the respondents to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the distance learning experience. More frequently, distance learning is associated with a negative perception, as reported in the following quotes: ‘That distance learning doesn’t work’ (woman, 51 years old, 15 years of experience, Associate Professor, Applied Biology); ‘it can never replace face-​to-​face teaching’ (woman, 47 years old, 22 years of experience, Associate Professor, Numerical Analysis); ‘face-​to-​face teaching allows an irreplaceable resource’ (man, 57 years old, 25 years of experience, Full Professor, Physics); ‘there are many things still to change for a valid distance learning’ (man, 66 years old, 30 years of experience, Full Professor, Psychiatry); ‘that it is a deadly bore to talk to a screen with boxes with the initials!!!’ (woman, 61 years old, 28 years of experience, Associate Professor, Biochemistry); ‘distance learning is a useful complement. I feel the lack of a non-​frontal lesson’ (man, 50 years old, 16 years of experience, Associate Professor, Ecology); ‘it is a very effective way to impoverish academic life, to empty the university of meaning, to depress relationships with students. So to take the nervous breakdown’ (man, 15 years of experience, Associate Professor, Anthropology); ‘there is only one learning: please leave distance learning to computer universities, so that the discredit they have largely deserved does not fall on us as well. Teaching must be in the presence’ (man, 64 years old, 30 years of experience, Associate Professor, Pedology). Less frequently, distance learning is associated with positive elements: ‘Online teaching and assessment can also work (for the theoretical part)’ (man, 61 years old, 30 years of experience, Full Professor, Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System); ‘distance learning is not an a priori negative condition’ (woman, 59 years old, 27 years of experience, Associate Professor, General, Clinical and Paediatric Nursing Sciences). We also found recurring dimensions linked to acquired skills, such as Interaction/​Involvement, Implementation of technological skills (WebEx, Moodle platform, data analysis), Flexibility and Time. 196

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Interaction/​involvement In the answers, ‘interaction’ shows up 49 times, and ‘involvement’ 23 times. It is often associated with ‘student’ (155 times in the text) and didactic (102). Some respondents underline the distance learning implemented the interaction with students and also that distance learning requires the implementation of interaction modalities. This need for more interaction is also in order to compensate the absence of face-​to-​face interaction. Some respondents found the tools in the platform useful for interaction. According to respondents, the need for strategies to improve interaction is something required both from students and from lecturers. Some respondents underline how the awareness about the need to interact with students during the lessons remained also after the most critical emergency phases, as these quotes demonstrate: ‘Greater awareness of the importance of direct interaction with the student’ (man, 60 years old, 34 years of experience, Full Professor, Geology); ‘knowing how to interact with the student even if it is not easy despite all the available technologies’ (man, 36 years old, seven years of experience, Assistant Professor, Information Technology). If many respondents refer to this dimension, not all have noted the possibility of implementing satisfactory strategies: distance learning would seem to set limits, as these quotes report: ‘Difficulty interacting with students, my balance is negative’ (woman, 68 years old, 20 years of experience, Associate Professor, Gynecology and Obstetrics); ‘keeping students’ attention spans high is more difficult than in presence. Often, the lack of visual feedback makes it difficult to understand if the topics dealt with are clearly understood’ (man, 34 years old, six years of experience, Adjunct Professor, Informatics).

Implementation of technological skills (WebEx, Moodle platform, data analysis) The possibility of learning or improving the use of new technological tools is one of the most suitable aspects emerging from the questionnaire (as also found in Chen et al, 2020; Leonardi, 2020). As some of the respondents underline in the quotes, not many changes have occurred in the teaching methods, while changes occurred in the teaching strategies which are supported by these technological tools: ‘1. More familiar with the use of technologies for recording lessons, 2. more familiar with the use of technologies for the provision of streaming teaching’ (woman, 55 years old, 17 years of experience, Associate Professor, International Law); ‘after so many years of teaching, I don’t think I have learned fundamental news on teaching in general. I learned to manage the tools provided by the university to carry out distance learning’ (woman, 69 years old, 46 years of experience, Associate Professor, International Law); ‘I don’t think I have developed 197

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learning related to didactics thanks to distance didactics, and I don’t see how I could have done it. If anything, I may have developed skills related to the use of tools, but certainly not related to teaching’ (woman, 53 years old, 26 years of experience, Associate Professor, Psychology). Many respondents underline that technological tools allow and need to experiment new form of evaluation (19 occurrences) of students’ learning: ‘The use of technology facilitates the management of some specific activities (evaluation, for example, or deliveries of papers), but makes interaction with students more complex’ (man, 40 years old, 10 years of experience, Adjunct Professor, Sociology); ‘separation of moments of transmission of content with moments of elaboration of the same for the first time I inserted self-​assessment quizzes every week on topics of the course’ (woman, 15 years of experience, Assistant Professor, Philosophy).

Flexibility The respondents underline in some cases a greater need to be flexible (20 occurrences) in distant learning, according to the different needs of students and managing times: ‘Flexibility towards students’ needs’ (man, 32 years old, three years of experience, Research Fellow, Chemistry). I do not think I have developed learning related to teaching or learned to use new communication systems. I am aware of techniques to involve students more, even if, for reasons of time, I have not yet been able to apply them to my distance learning lessons, and I don’t see how I could have done it. If anything, I may have developed skills related to the use of tools, but certainly not related to teaching. (Woman, 53 years old, 26 years of experience, Associate Professor, Psychology) Another respondent said: ‘I learned to use new communication systems. I am aware of techniques to involve students more, even if, for reasons of time, I have not yet been able to apply them to my lessons’ (man, 48 years old, 14 years of experience, Associate Professor, Physiology).

Time Respondents cite time 20 times explicitly. The use (16) of new modalities of times is underlined as one of the most important factor of distance learning (Bawens et al, 2020): Necessity of order, more attention to the times (also internal) of the lesson. Ability to make students share and create awareness of method in the study and rules of ‘democracies’ and respect in the lesson: for 198

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example, all questions at the end, constant study over time, time management, confidence with the idea that professors and students they have the same values: concept of universitas. Importance of the teacher (many more students have sought dialogue). (Woman, 55 years old, 25 years of experience, Full Professor, Roman Law and Ancient Rights) Respondents also said: ‘Useful for logistical aspects (revision of tasks, reception to reach) bad for the workload required of the teacher to keep student participation high especially when there are several courses at the same time’ (woman, 53 years old, 26 years of experience, Full Professor, Medical Statistics); ‘the preparation of courses in asynchronous mode is more flexible organizationally but much more time-​consuming’ (man, 48 years old, 20 years of experience, Assistant Professor, Informatics). From these answers, it emerges that this new form of time organization could give respondents a higher level of stress linked also to stress related to the use of technological tools, as the literature already showed (Mercer and Gregersen, 2020; Li and Wang, 2021): Course planning and teaching require the acquisition of theoretical, methodological, and sophisticated techniques which, in order to be learned, require a great deal of time, time and energy. … The result of a greater commitment to the didactic dimension –​such as the one that the pandemic situation has imposed on us –​is otherwise the burn-​out, work every weekend and every night, insomnia, depression. (Man, 38 years old, 4 years of experience, Adjunct Professor, Sociology)

Conclusions The pandemic has dramatically reshaped the way global education is delivered. Millions of learners were affected by educational institution closures due to the pandemic, which resulted in the largest online movement in the history of education. With this sudden shift away from classrooms in many parts of the world, universities had to rapidly shift to virtual and digital strategies. Many believe that the adoption of online distance learning will persist after pandemic (El Said, 2021). The pandemic represented a moment of great destabilization for lecturers, as methods and modalities of teaching consolidated over the years have been suddenly questioned and have undergone a rapid and forced transformation (Ferragina et al, 2020; Giovannini, 2020). Our analysis reveals how much the wellbeing of university lecturers has been compromised in many dimensions related to teaching (time management, professional, use of technologies but also relational and affective) (Decataldo and Fiore, 2022). Many respondents revealed a sort of intolerance towards the situation that has been forced by the 199

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pandemic-​related adverse circumstances. In many cases we are witnessing a refusal that is underlined, even before an explicit declaration of respondents, by a lack of response to specific questions in the questionnaire (Mercer and Gregersen, 2020; Mishra et al, 2020). Although it is too early to judge how reactions to COVID-​19 will affect education systems around the world, there are signs suggesting that it could have a lasting impact on the trajectory of learning innovation and digitization. The expansion of online learning in higher education will further accelerate, and universities will organize themselves more systematically to adopt technology-​based learning aspects that they have found most useful. In our analysis, net of the resistance to change and fatigue manifested by the lecturers, we observe some reflections regarding a possible reorganization (Molino et al, 2020; Simamora et al, 2020; Susilaningsih et al, 2020). For example, the attention to the aspects of interaction and involvement of students in teaching methods seem to emerge as a positive novelty the respondents seem to focus on. In addition, universities will have a unique opportunity for positive change as a result of the pandemic and the need for global connections. It is possible that universities will rearrange teaching schedules and locations so that students can participate in different and more challenging learning opportunities, regardless of their physical location. Online learning could increase and become a daily routine for many students (Zaho, 2021). Even the use of technological tools during the pandemic is considered something that enriches the background of experience into teaching (Ramella and Rostan, 2020; Rapanta, 2020). Governments, education systems and schools offered distance learning and teaching without much preparation, planning and, in some cases, digital experience (Kamenetz, 2020; Sun et al, 2020). Notwithstanding this, the COVID-​19 pandemic can be a resource for change for several reasons. First, the pandemic was global and affected virtually all universities. Because of this, educators and students have been offered the opportunity to rethink the education we actually need, instead of the inflexible and outdated model we have probably been clinging to for a long time. Second, educators around the world have demonstrated that they can change collectively and en masse. References Aguilera-​Hermida, A.P. (2020) ‘College students’ use and acceptance of emergency online learning due to COVID-​19’, International Journal of Educational Research Open, 1, https://​www.scienc​edir​ect.com/​scie​nce/​arti​ cle/​pii/​S26663​7402​0300​11X [Accessed on 10 July 2021]. Assman, J. (2008) ‘Communicative and cultural memory’, in A. Erll and A. Nünning (eds) Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp 109–​18. 200

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Bauwens, R., Muylaert, J., Clarysse, E., Audenaert, M. and Decramer, A. (2020) ‘Teachers’ acceptance and use of digital learning environments after hours: Implications for work-​life balance and the role of integration preference’, Computers in Human Behavior, 112: 106479. Bedyński, W. (2020) ‘Liminality: Black death 700 years later. What lessons are for us from the medieval pandemic?’ Society Register, 4(3): 129–​44. Caiello, S., Colleoni, M. and Daconto L. (2020) ‘Emergency (im) mobilities: Insights from the Covid-​19 pandemic in Italy’, Fuori Luogo, 7(1): 27–​35. Chen, J.C., Dobinson, T. and Kent, S. (2020) ‘Lecturers’ perceptions and experiences of Blackboard Collaborate as a distance learning and teaching tool via Open Universities Australia (OUA)’, Open Learning: The Journal of Open, Distance and e-​Learning, 35(3): 222–​35. doi: 10.1080/​ 02680513.2019.1688654. Corbisiero, F. (2020) ‘Supporting tourism: How Covid-​19 will affect travel in the future’, Fuori Luogo, 7(1): 69–​79. Decataldo, A. and Fiore, B. (2022) ‘Digital-​insecurity and overload: The role of technostress in lecturers’ work-​family balance’, Italian Journal of Sociology of Education, 14(3): 75–​102. Decataldo, A., Fiore, B. and Zizzari, S. (2021) ‘Distance learning: Giving value to the COVID-​19 emergency’, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference of the journal Scuola Democratica, Vol: III: Pandemic and Post-​ Pandemic Space and Time, 2–​5 June 2021 (pp 619–​29). Rome: Associazione ‘Per Scuola Democratica’. Dwidienawati, D., Bramatoro Abdinagoro, S., Tjahjana, D. and Gandasari, D. (2020) ‘E-​L earning implementation dur ing the COVID-​1 9 outbreak: The perspective of students and lecturers’, Journal of the Social Sciences, 48(4): 1190–​1201. El Said, G.R. (2021) ‘How did the COVID-​19 pandemic affect higher education learning experience? An empirical investigation of learners’, Academic Performance at a University in a Developing Country, UR, https://​doi.org/​10.1155/​2021/​6649​524. Eurofound (2020) Living, Working and COVID-​19. COVID-​19 series. Luxemburg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available from: https://​www.eurofo​und.eur​opa.eu/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​ef_​publ​icat​ ion/​field_​ef_​d​ocum​ent/​ef2005​9en.pdf [Accessed 28 February 2022]. Ferragina, E., Barone, C., Helmeid, E., Pauly, S., Recchi, E., Safi, M. et al (2020) ‘In the eye of the hurricane: French society a month into the lockdown: Coping with Covid-​19: Social distancing, cohesion and inequality’, [online], Available from: https://​hal​shs.archi​ves-​ouver​tes.fr/​ hal​shs-​03070​263/​docum​ent [Accessed 1 October 2021]. Giovannini, E. (2020) ‘La sostenibilità nella crisi del COVID-​19’, Pandora Rivista, 2: 1–​8. 201

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Hasan, N. and Bao, Y. (2020) ‘Impact of “e-​Learning crack-​up” perception on psychological distress among college students during COVID-​19 pandemic: A mediating role of ‘fear of academic year loss’, Children and Youth Services Review, 118. Hawley, S.R., Thrivikraman, J.K., Noveck, N., Romain, T.S., Ludy, M.J., Barnhart, L. et al (2021) ‘Concerns of college students during the COVID-​ 19 pandemic: Thematic perspectives from the United States, Asia, and Europe’, Journal of Applied Learning and Teaching, 4(1): 11–​20. Hodges, C., Moore S., Trust, T. and Bond, A. (2020) ‘The difference between emergency re- mote teaching and online learning’ EDUCAUSE Review, [online], Available from: https://​er.educa​use.edu/​arti-​cles/​2020/​ 3/t​ he-d​ if​f eren ​ ce-​betw​een-​emerge​ncy-​rem​ote-​teach​ing-​and-​onl​ine-​learn​ ing [Accessed 10 July 2021]. ISTAT, 2018/​2019 ISTAT, PC e tablet in famiglia, April 2020] [online] 7, Available from: http://​www.istat.it/​it/​archi​vio/​240​957 [Accessed 12 March 2022]. Kamenetz, A. (2020) ‘Panic-​gogy: Teaching online classes during the coronavirus pandemic’, Available from: www.npr.org/​2020/​03/​19/​817885​ 991/p​ anic-g​ ogy-t​ eachi​ ng-o ​ nli​ ne-c​ lass​ es-d​ uri​ ng-​the​coro​navi​rus-​pande​mic [Accessed 12 March 2022]. Leonardi, P.M. (2020) ‘COVID-​1 9 and the new technologies of organizing: Digital exhaust, digital footprints, and artificial intelligence in the wake of remote work’, Journal of Management Studies, [online], Available from: https://​www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/​pmc/​artic​les/​PMC​7675​ 341/​[Accessed 8 April 2022]. Li, L. and Wang, X. (2021) ‘Technostress inhibitors and creators and their impacts on university teachers work performance in higher education’, Cognition, Technology & Work, 23(2): 315–​30. Ligi, L. (2009) Antropologia dei disastri, Bari: Ed. Laterza Mercer, S. and Gregersen, T. (2020) Teacher Wellbeing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mishra, L., Gupta, T. and Shree, A. (2020) Online teaching-​learning in higher education during lockdown period of Covid-​19 pandemic’, International Journal of Educational Research Open, 1: 100012. Molino, M., Ingusci, E., Signore, F., Manuti, A., Giancaspro, M.L., Russo, V. et al (2020) ‘Wellbeing costs of technology use during Covid-​19 remote working: An investigation using the Italian translation of the technostress creators scale’, Sustainability, 12(15): 5911. Mseleku, Z. (2020) ‘A literature review of E-​learning and E-​teaching in the era of Covid-​19 pandemic’, International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology, 5(10): 588–​97.

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Oliver-​Smith, A. (1999) ‘The brotherhood of pain: Theoretical and applied perspectives on post-​disaster solidarity’, in A. Oliver-​Smith and S.M. Hoffmann (eds) The Angry Earth: Disasters in Anthropological Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp 156–​72. Ramella, F. and Rostan, M. (2020) Universi-​DaD. Gli accademici italiani e la didattica a distanza durante l’emergenza Covid-​19, [email protected], [online], Available from: https://​www.coll​ane.unito.it/​oa/​items/​show/​75 [Accessed 3 March 2022]. Rapanta, C., Botturi, L., Goodyear, P., Guàrdia, L. and Koole, M. (2020) ‘Online university teaching during and after the Covid-​19 crisis: Refocusing teacher presence and learning activity’, Postdigital Science and Education, 1–​23. Saraceno, C. (2020) ‘La sostenibilità nella crisi del COVID-​19’, Pandora Rivista, 2: 228–​33. Silei, G. (2020) Società del rischio e gestione del territorio, Pisa: Pacini Editore. Simamora, R.M., De Fretes, D., Purba, E.D. and Pasaribu, D. (2020) ‘Practices, challenges, and prospects of online learning during Covid-​19 pandemic in higher education: Lecturer perspectives’, Studies in Learning and Teaching, 1(3): 185–​208. Sun, R., Zhang, H., Li, J., Zhao, J. and Dong, P. (2016) ‘Assessment-​for-​ learning teaching mode based on interactive teaching approach in college English’, International Journal of Emerging Technologies in Learning, [online], 15(21): 24. Susilaningsih, F.S., Komariah, M., Mediawati, A.S. and Lumbantobing, V.B. (2020) ‘Quality of work-​life among lecturers during online learning in COVID-​19 pandemic period: A scoping review’, Malaysian Journal of Medicine and Health Sciences, 17(4): 163–​6, [online], Available from: https://​ medic.upm.edu.my/​upl​oad/​doku​men/​2021​0617​1151​2533​_​MJM​HS_​0​ 374.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2022]. Vicente, H., Delicado, A., Rowland, J., Estevens, J., Weiss, A., Falanga, R. et al (2020) ‘Going virtual: Finding new ways to engage higher education students in a participatory project about science’, in H. Kara and S.M. Khoo (eds) Research in the Age of COVID, Response and Reassessment, Vol. 1, Bristol: University Press, pp 20–​9. Zaccaria, A.M. and Zizzari, S. (2020) ‘Global risk and social distance at the time of the epidemic and pandemic events’, Fuori Luogo, 7(1): 9–​12. Zhao Y., Pinto Llorente A.M., Sánchez Gómez M.C. and Zhao L. (2021) ‘The impact of gender and years of teaching experience on college teachers’ digital competence: An empirical study on teachers in Gansu Agricultural University’, Sustainability, 13(8): 4163, doi: 10.3390/​su13084163. Zizzari, S. (2019) L’Aquila oltre i sigilli: Il terremoto tra ricostruzione e memoria, Milan: Franco Angeli.

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The National and Local Dimension of the Italian Civil Protection System: Evolution and Implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction Policies Monia Del Pinto, Ksenia Chmutina, Lee Bosher and Garyfalia (Falli) Palaiologou

Introduction The Italian Civil Protection is part of the EU Civil Protection system and operates in a range of emergency scenarios within and outside the national territory. The system’s organization and efficiency for centralized disaster response are not counterbalanced by an equally strong and systematic action in disaster risk awareness, mitigation and preparedness at the local scale. Only recently this trend is being slowly reversed, with the implementation of norms that maximize the involvement and responsibility of local actors in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) action. Italy has a track record of disasters, as well as norms regulating the consequent aid delivery, with the first laws on the subject emanated by the Italian Kingdom and dating back to the 19th century. Over the 1900s, the socio-​political transformations of the country reverberated in character and content of body of norms on emergency management, whereas the need for an organic and coherent system for disaster response culminated in the institution of the National Civil Protection Service (Bignami, 2010). Over the last century, major changes in emergency legislation were undertaken in response to disastrous events (Table 12.1), with extraordinary measures retaining the character of una-​tantum aid delivery to the affected populations (Allegretti, 2017). 204

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The normative turns of the first half of the 20th century, in favour of centralization and militarization of emergency relief, marked the disconnect between aiders and aided, and can be looked at as the seed of the public disengagement in disaster risk mitigation and response, increasingly recorded over the following decades. Even after the demilitarization of the National Civil Protection in 1992, and the consequent incentives to citizens’ participation, the problem persisted as shown by the gap between risk perception and action of citizens, and civil protection authorities (Crescimbene et al, 2015; Avvisati et al, 2019) –​a divide that the most recent norms, such as the Decree emanated in 2018 introducing participatory action in the Civil protection code, attempt to fill (D.L. 1/​2018, Articles 4/​c; 18/​2; 31–​42).

Italian emergency management: overview of the normative evolution The formal institution of the Italian National Civil Protection in 1992 represented a milestone toward the reorganization of the national system of emergency management and found its core innovation in the decentralization of functions. In the Italian body of norms, laws regulating the aid delivery and emergency (forerunner of the National Civil Protection service) date back to the Kingdom of Italy, after 1860. The progress in emergency response, and the accompanying normative apparatus, show a reactive character, with events testing the validity and efficiency of the measures in place and justifying their amendments (Table 12.1).

Pre-​republican phase In the Kingdom of Italy (1861–​1945), the first norm issued to regulate the emergency response was Law n. 2359/​1865, which introduced the ordinance-​making power of mayors and prefects –​ who were granted the authority to occupy private property for emergency purposes –​and formalized the hierarchical organization in disaster response. With the law enforced until 1919, the disaster response was regulated by norms emanated ex-​post, mainly focusing on the reconstruction or risk mitigation in the affected locations, and lacking a systematic, structured approach. Examples of reactive, ex-​post measure are the Decree n. 4943/​1879 focusing on aid delivery to populations affected between 1870 and 1879 by floods, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes; Decree n. 193/​1909 on post-​earthquake reconstruction in Marsica and Calabria, and seismic classification of local territory in Messina; and the Law n. 744/​1911 on flood-​mitigation measures in mountainous aeras and along the river Po. Although reactive and operating ex-​post, some of these measures established virtuous milestones –​as the 205

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Table 12.1: Summary of major disasters on the Italian territory and list of national regulatory milestones on emergency management (1870–​2020) Year

Event

Law

1870

Rome flood

1872

Vesuvius eruption

1873

Belluno earthquake

Regio Decreto 4943/​1879 ‘Approvazione del soccorso ai danneggiati dell’Etna, del Po ed altri fiumi’/​‘Approval of aid to the [territories] damaged by Etna [eruption], Po and other rivers [flood]’

1879

Etna eruption

1883

Campania earthquakes

1894

Calabria earthquake

1905

Calabria earthquake, Vicenza flood

1906

Vesuvius eruption

1907

Calabria earthquake, floods in Lombardia (River Po)

1908

Messina earthquake

1915

Marsica earthquake

D.L. Lgt. 1399/​1917 extends the scope of RD 193/​1909 to the national territory Rdl 1915/​1919: Ordinamento dei servizi di pronto soccorso in occasione di terremoti /​‘Set of rules regulating first aid in case of earthquakes’

1948

Piemonte flood

1949

Campania flood

1951

Como flood Ferrara and Rovigo (Polesine) flood

DL 1010/​1948 Law 184/​1952 ‘Regolamentazione dei corsi d’acqua’/​ ‘Regulations on waterways’

1966

Florence flood Grosseto flood Triveneto floods Venezia flood

1968

Piemonte floods

1968

Belice earthquake

1972

Ancona earthquake

1973

Calabria and Sicilia floods

1976

Friuli earthquake

1977

Liguria flood

1979

Valnerina earthquake

1980

Irpinia earthquake

Case-​specific norms were issued in response to the single events (Ministry of Public Works) Norms for risk prevention: Regio Decreto 193/​1909 ‘Norme tecniche ed igieniche obbligatorie per le riparazioni, ricostruzioni o nuove costruzioni degli edifici pubblici o privati nei Comuni colpiti dal terremoto del 28 dicembre 1908 o da altri precedenti’/​‘Mandatory technical and sanitary norms to reparation, reconstruction, and fabrication of public and private buildings in the municipalities hit by earthquake before, and on, 28 December 1908’ L. 774/​1911 ‘Norme per la sistemazione idraulico-​forestale dei bacini montani, per le altre opere idrauliche e per le bonifiche’/​‘Norms regulating essential works on mountain water reservoirs, and additional hydraulic and reclaim works’

Law 996/​1970 ‘Norme sul soccorso e l’assistenza alle popolazioni colpite da calamità —​Protezione Civile’/​‘Norms on rescue and assistance to populations affected by calamities’ Implemented with DPR 66/​1981

DPR 66/​1981 –​‘Regolamento di esecuzione della legge 8 Dicembre 1970, n. 996, recante norme sul soccorso e l’assistenza alle popolazioni colpite da calamità’/​‘Implementation norms for Law 8 December 1970, n.996, regulating rescue and assistance to populations affected by calamities’

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Table 12.1: Summary of major disasters on the Italian territory and list of national regulatory milestones on emergency management (1870–​2020) (continued) Year

Event

Law

1991

Etna eruption

Law 225/​1992 –​ Istituzione del Servizio Nazionale della Protezione Civile/​‘Establishment of National Service of Civil Protection’

1997

Umbria earthquake

1998

Sarno flood

L401/​2001 –​ Disposizioni urgenti per assicurare il coordinamento operativo delle strutture preposte alle attività di protezione civile e per migliorare le strutture logistiche nel settore della difesa civile/​‘Urgent instructions to ensure the operating coordination of civil protection structures and to enhance logistic structures in the area of civil defence’

2002

San Giuliano di Puglia earthquake

DGR 4732/​2007 –​ Direttiva Regionale per la pianificazione di emergenza degli Enti Locali/​‘Regional Guidelines for Local Emergency Planning’

2009

L’Aquila earthquake

2012

Emilia earthquake

Law 100/​2012 –​ Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del Decreto-​legge 15 Maggio 2012, n. 59, recante Disposizioni urgenti per il Riordino della protezione civile/​‘Conversion into Law with modifications, of the Decree 15 May 2012 n.59 for urgent dispositions on the restructuring of Civil Protection System’

2016

Central Italy earthquake D.Lgs. 1/​2018 –​ Codice della Protezione Civile/​‘Civil Protection Code’

Source: Author’s own

extension, in 1917, of the seismic classification to all the earthquake-​prone areas on the national territory. In the absence of a central organization in charge of aid delivery, the disaster response was mostly disorganized and incoherent. The need for organized action was captured and addressed by citizens and formalized with the creation of local associations (‘friendly societies’) delivering medical assistance and rescue (Bignami, 2010, p 119). The rising presence of associations on the national territory culminated, in 1904, in the institution of the National Society for Aid Delivery (Federazione Nazionale Pubbliche Assistenze, FNPA), established in Spoleto, Umbria, forerunner of the current National Association for Public Assistance (Associazione Nazionale Pubbliche Assistenze, ANPAS) and the civil protection volunteering. FNPA was a secular institution, its ethos underpinned by the principles established in the 1894 Geneva Convention, tapping into the solidaristic ideas of mutual aid (ICRC, 1949). The first norm regulating an organic response to disaster was the Decree n.1915/​1919 that provided guidelines on the organization and delivery of 207

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first aid services in case of earthquakes. The central response was coordinated by the Ministry of Public Works and its civil engineering department, Genio Civile. These regulated the activation of the national infrastructure system for transport, delivery and stock of supplies, and engaged the prefects to manage infrastructures and muster areas at the provincial scale. The central role of Ministry of Public Works in the emergency response, along with the auxiliary function of civil engineering department, prefects, sanitary officials and delegates of Ministry of Interior Affairs, were further regulated with Law n. 473/​1925 establishing the fundamental actors in aid delivery, whereas the procedures for first-​aid delivery in the aftermath were regulated by the Decree n. 2389/​1926. The decree restated the role of prefects as coordinator of the military forces and Red Cross during emergency response at the provincial scale, once informed by the mayors (Bignami, 2010). The laws issued during the fascist decades increased the military presence in the post-​disaster aid delivery, while reducing presence and agency of voluntary associations and civil society (Bignami, 2010). The central role of military forces in disaster contexts was formalized with the Decree n.1931 that assigned the emergency response to Ministry of Defence: disruptions were hence tackled adopting extraordinary measures aimed at repair and restoration, while minimizing and containing the possible disorders arising in the process –​an aspect that, ever since, cyclically surfaced in the emergency management over the following decades, until recently, as shown after the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake (Alexander, 2010; Bignami, 2010; Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019). The centralization and militarization of the emergency response system marked the start of a deep disconnection between the authorities delivering assistance and the civil society, treated as recipient of aid yet subject to control and deprived of agency both in in the emergency contexts, and in emergency planning (Del Pinto, 2021). The highly militarized and hierarchical approach to emergency lasted for nearly two decades, until 1948 when Decree n. 1010, issued by the newly established Republic of Italy, returned the jurisdiction to the Ministry of Public Works –​in charge of emergency management, provision of temporary shelters, reactivation of the affected infrastructures, and reconstruction (D.L. 1010/​1948). The review of Italian laws issued after the Second World War shows that after 1945, emergency management underwent progressive changes –​yet, the pre-​republican organization of aid delivery showed, in nuce, some of the key aspects that would persist in the postbellum decades, imprinting the National Civil Protection System (NCPS). In particular, aspects that were retained in the emergency management system were: • centralization of functions from Ministry of Public Work; • a response system relying on the logistic contribution of military forces; 208

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• a cascade response system, with the consequent activation of a local/​ regional and national response to the emergency; • the character of emergency and urgency, requiring/​justifying extraordinary measures; • presence of volunteers/​humanitarian associations.

After 1945 Following the Second World War and the institution of the Italian Republic, changes occurred in the legislation, reflecting the postbellum supranational trends: the transformations in post-​war welfare States on one hand, with social assistance to prevent ‘communist expansion’, and the separation of military and civil forces, to prevent fascist relapses (Bignami, 2010; Petersen et al, 2018). For disaster response, this translated into the State assisting the populations affected by disasters putting in place extraordinary measures and financial aid, and in demilitarization of some aspects of emergency management. The regulations issued after 1948 codified the synergy of the centralized, top-​down emergency management action of the national government, and the bottom-​up action of volunteers, finally reintroduced among the players operating in the post-​disaster scenarios. After the authority of the Ministry of Public Works on emergency management was restored with Decree n.1010/​1948, new questions arose, including the distinction between, and areas of interest of, civil defence and civil protection; the need to coordinate the range of players involved in the emergency response; and the need for forecast, prevention and mitigation of risks, in addition to the management of post-​disaster emergency. These themes informed unsuccessful proposals for specific laws throughout the 1950s, such as the DDL n.1593/​1950 that suggested task reallocation and organization of response (Camera Deputati, 1950; Bignami, 2010). During this decade, despite the increasing awareness among policy makers of the need for preventive measures to be undertaken ‘in times of peace’, the normative and operational milestones of disaster governance were still issued after key disruptive events. For example, the numerous floods recorded between 1948 and 1951 were followed by the Law n.184/​1952 to regulate watercourses, which also aimed at their maintenance and monitoring. In the next decade, a major achievement toward the establishment of a national service safeguarding human life and assets in case of disaster-​ induced emergency was the organization of the Fire Brigades Service (Corpo Nazionale dei Vigili del Fuoco) with Law n. 469/​1961 that also defined the corresponding set of rules. However, the outdated normative on aid delivery and emergency response, dating back to the pre-​republican age, stayed in place until challenged by events in the late 1960s. These events, including but not limited to the 1966 Florence, Venice, and the destructive 1968 earthquake 209

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in Belice, once again tested the capacity of response and coordination of the existing aid delivery system, and highlighted the need for an organic, coordinated network of actors and procedures in the aftermath of disaster. Only in 1970, almost ten years after the institution of the Fire Brigades, the concept and functions of civil protection were introduced with Law n. 996/​1970 that regulated ‘delivering aid and assistance to people affected by calamities’ (The Italian Government, 1970). This law outlined procedures meant to be a baseline for the civil protection service, to be demilitarized and separated from civil defence and to have a widespread organization from central to local. The document, however, starting from its headline, restates the separation aided/​aider and consolidates the reactive character of civil protection action, responding to ‘extraordinary events’, rather than preventing them by mitigating risk. The document also shows a change in terminology from the previous laws, with the newly introduced definitions of ‘protezione civile’ (civil protection) and ‘calamità naturale’ (natural calamity).1 In the same years, in the international arena, while UNESCO emanated the first resolution for assistance in case of ‘natural disasters’ (UNGA, 1971), the pioneer research in disaster studies challenged the definition by removing the naturalness out of it (O’Keefe et al, 1976), and initiated the paradigm shift, from hazard-​centred to vulnerability-​centred approach (Gaillard, 2019). Law n. 996/​1970 was implemented in 1981 after an 11-​year normative gap. During this decade, the challenges faced in response to large disasters –​1976 Friuli earthquake and 1980 Irpinia earthquake –​contributed to speed up its overdue enactment, as well as to inform amendments and integrations to the original text (Ventura, 2010; Bignami and Menduni, 2020). In particular, the importance of hazard classification of the Italian territory for planning and disaster prevention purposes, and the role of mayor as governmental officer in the emergency, were codified in the implementation Decree DPR 66/​1981. The new role of the mayors can be seen as the first and most relevant step towards the incorporation of the ‘aided’ (through the citizens’ representatives) in the chain of emergency management. Mayors, however, often lacked the adequate skills and technical knowledge to be involved in the emergency management –​a gap that the further regulations in 1992, 2012 and 2018, have attempted to fill, turning the first citizen into the first local civil protection authority (Alexander, 2010a; Bignami and Menduni, 2021). Albeit a milestone toward formalization of the National Civil Protection Service, the 1981 document lacked incisiveness in its measures –​for example, the shift of focus toward the local response that it elicited was formal but not substantial until 1992; similarly, the emergency planning at the local scale was acknowledged but not made compulsory until 2012. It was only with the Law n. 225/​1992, the document finally setting forth the National Civil Protection Service, that the local response was codified through two key passages in the new norm: (i) the decentralization 210

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of the emergency response, based on the principle of subsidiarity –​that is, prioritizing the activation of a local response to emergency, and only resorting to superior levels in case of insufficient capacities (subsection1); (ii) the definition, at the municipal scale, of role and accountability of mayors, in charge of direction and coordination of aid and assistance to the affected population, and also accountable for informing the prefect and the regional council of the state of emergency (art. 15). The law assigns coordination roles to the mayor and to a delegated national commissioner, and defines the technical and logistic support system for aid delivery encompassing Fire Brigades, civil protection volunteers, military forces, private and public services, universities and research bodies, and the national technical services for geology, hydrology and seismology. While outlining the competencies of civil protection, the document also distinguishes for the first time the stages of forecast, prevention, aid delivery and resolution of the emergency –​ each pertaining to a specific actor (art. 3). The changes in management and terminology suggest an attempt at reframing the connotation of disaster –​to be intended not as an unexpected, exceptional event to cope with, but as a disruption that can and must be prevented and managed. The content of the law was developed over half a decade building upon the past normative, learning from the ground, and supranational normative, and was finally approved in the aftermath of another disastrous event, the 1991 Etna volcanic eruption (Bignami and Menduni, 2020). The 1992 law was followed by the definition of guidelines for emergency planning, the Augustus Method, codified in 1998 and informing the civil protection action at the local and national scale (Bignami, 2010; OECD, 2010; Allegretti, 2017). Although innovative, the 1992 Law was far from perfect and underwent updates and revisions over the years –​ yet, it provided the National Civil Protection with operative guidelines until 2012, when Law 100 (Disposizioni urgenti per il Riordino della Protezione Civile) reorganized roles and responsibilities of the key actors, and posed a temporal limitation of 90 days to the state of emergency. The reorganization was motivated by a series of events –​including the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake that highlighted mismanagement and/​or power imbalances in the emergency management (Allegretti, 2017; Alexander, 2018). Among the key aspects clarified and restructured by Law 100/​2012 is the mandatory character of the Municipal Civil Protection Plan that must be compiled, approved and periodically updated, for a more incisive DRM action at the local scale. The year 2012 was also the year of the Emilia earthquake, hitting the regions of Pianura Padana; the event, although recording magnitude and extension similar to the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, registered a different approach to the emergency management. In 2016–​17, the Central Italy earthquakes demonstrated once again the high fragility and low awareness and preparedness of many hazard-​prone areas, from Lazio, Abruzzo, Marche, Umbria, while 211

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unveiling the uneven adoption of local civil protection measures in the affected municipalities (Di Bucci et al, 2020; Del Pinto, 2021). These events, in combination with the fragilities unveiled by the 2012 and 2009 seismic crisis, pose the urgent need for a systemic action to reduce not only physical but, most importantly, attitudinal vulnerabilities and attempt at mitigating disaster risk. An overhaul of the emergency response system was proposed in 2017 and codified in Decree n. 1/​2018, aiming at strengthening the local civil protection system by reviewing the role of the mayor and the Municipal Civil Protection Plans (MCPPs). In this overdue attempt at balancing the disproportion between central and local civil protection action, the legislator ascribes mayors with increased responsibility: new duties encompass supervision tasks on integration and coordination of emergency and ordinary governance, supervision of finance and budget allocation for civil protection action, as well as selection of adequately trained staff for the strategic local civil protection roles (art. 6). Municipalities –​hence once again, yet indirectly, the action of mayors –​are also in charge of creating the conditions for an adequate emergency response, starting from allocating resources to local DRR (budget and staff). The law also restates the relevance of Municipal Civil Protection Plan to become the core document informing not only emergency response but also local disaster risk mitigation action (art. 12).

Reflections: the slow process of formal and substantial evolution Although innovative in contents, with reviewed procedures aiming to facilitate the implementation of DRR measures at the local scale, the Italian National Civil Protection System emerging from the revised body of norms appears to retain a centralized character, imprinted by the pre-​republican set of rules on aid delivery: still disproportionally centred on emergency response and designed by, and for, aiders, with a technocratic perspective. The most recent Decree n. 1/​2018 provides a first attempt at counterbalancing this trend, stressing importance and responsibilities in the local actors –​mayors and municipalities –​but its efficiency is yet to be tested by events. If the centralized system resulted in effective risk modelling, event forecasting and in providing a synergic, rapid emergency response –​showing that remarkable improvement were made since the slow response in disasters of late 1970-​early 1980 –​the impact of recent disasters still demonstrates insufficient preparedness and mitigation. Furthermorethe issues arising during and after the emergency regarding approach to emergency management, responsibilities, and impact on the recovery stage, show that many areas can and must be still revised and improved (Alexander, 2013, 2014). If we focus on the most recent national earthquake emergencies, the cases of L’Aquila (2009), Emilia (2012) and Central Italy (2016) have 212

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demonstrated (i) a general lack of preparedness in disaster-​prone areas and (ii) the failure at replicating previous models of emergency management, due to contextual differences (Mannella et al, 2017; Russo and Pagliacci, 2019; Del Pinto, 2021). Another relevant aspect surfacing in the normative review is the slow path toward the coordination of disaster risk governance and territorial governance: the prescriptions from L225/​1992 required for civil protection plans to accord with the territorial planning action (art. 3 subsection 6), implying a subordination of DRM action to transformations in the built environment. Two decades later, in 2012, the legislator shows a mutated awareness by reversing the relations between ordinary and emergency planning action and their instruments. With Law 100/​2012, in fact, it is the territorial planning that must be coordinated with (hence, subordinated to) civil protection planning. In 2018 this aspect is further restated, and the increased responsibilities ascribed to mayors and local authorities could result into an integrated approach to ordinary and emergency planning. The prioritization of DRM action shows increased disaster risk awareness, yet the planning recommendations can only be fully achieved in the presence of MCPPs –​an aspect that is not obvious, in that plans are not always provided, or updated, with the consequent reverberations on planning as well as general safety.

The local dimension: challenges for the MCPP Since their inception with the L255/​1992, although acknowledged among the essential local services with the DL 401/​1993, and made mandatory since 2012, MCPPs have shown a slow implementation over the national territory –​in 2019 only a fraction of municipalities had a MCPP approved. Even in highly seismic areas, regardless of the frequency and magnitude of events, it is not uncommon for municipalities to be lacking MCPPs or relying on outdated versions (Del Pinto, 2021). There are some attitudinal and strategic barriers preventing MCPPs from consistently featuring among, and informing, local governance instruments: on the one hand there is a deeply engrained and widespread lack of disaster risk culture, whereas on the other hand there is the disciplinary segregation and lack of budget in small municipalities (Cornia, 2015; Del Pinto, 2021). In the widespread absence of a pervasive disaster risk culture, emergency plans are generally perceived and treated as mandatory paperwork and are seldom informed by actual commitment toward disaster risk mitigation: this reflects the lack of investments in DRR policies –​particularly in the small municipalities affected by budget cuts –​and is exacerbated by the disciplinary segregation between the areas of ordinary and emergency planning (Bignami and Menduni, 2021; Del Pinto, 2021). Local emergency plans, particularly in small 213

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municipalities, are generally designed for minor disruptions, not accounting for the eventuality of larger emergencies as, in these cases, external protection is expected from the activation of the National Civil Protection System.

MCPP in theory The slow diffusion of the mandatory MCPP, and the widespread over-​reliance on central aid of local administrations, show that the decentralization is formal but not substantial. Ideally, through the MCPP, mayors can coordinate the emergency and exercise their capacity of first civil protection authority on the municipal territory, without resorting to superior aid –​unless the disruption overcomes the local response capacity (Allegretti, 2017; Alexander, 2018). This is made possible because the MCPP defines tasks and procedures to be adopted in the emergency by the local actors and regulates operations, as well as the use of critical infrastructures, within the municipal administrative boundaries. As restated in the most recent Civil Protection Directive emanated in 2021, local civil protection plans are developed and compiled in accordance with the regional civil protection guidelines and then approved with official resolution by the local council (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2021). The most recent guidelines on the subject, emanated with the Decree 4732/​2007 and updated in 2013 inform on the recommended content of a municipal, or inter-​municipal, civil protection plan (PCMDPC, 2007). Based on the guidelines, the MCPP should encompass information on the municipal territory (infrastructure and critical infrastructures, land use maps, topography, hazard maps) and indicate relevant regional laws and planning instruments in force at the regional, provincial, and municipal level (PCMDPC, 2007). Once the hazards are defined, the plan frames the system of communication with the central warning systems, outlines local hazard scenarios and defines the local warning thresholds to activate the response system. Plans also contain hazard and vulnerability assessment of the municipal territory –​different for individual hazards and their combinations –​ and provide indicators of exposure of critical infrastructures. Coordination and communication between local and regional actors are regulated in the dedicated section (local warning system) establishing in detail when, and how, the mayor resorts to the available support system of aid delivery. The local emergency is managed through the Communal Operational Centre (Centro Operativo Comunale, COC) consisting of separate units focusing on specific aspects –​from technical operations, healthcare services, telecommunications, public services, infrastructures, management of vehicles for emergency operations, volunteering and functions of support to population (PCMDPC, 2007). One final but important component of a MCPP is the individuation of areas and infrastructures serving the emergency: exodus paths, waiting areas for first aid in the emergency and 214

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aftermath, open areas for emergency sheltering and temporary sheltering, muster areas for rescuers and logistics. In addition to this, for each scenario and operational stage, the plan must indicate actors and the corresponding tasks.

MCPP in practice The highly organized structure of the plan is meant to not only provide information on the hazard insisting on a territory but also to respond to their manifestations promptly and effectively; yet, it is not uncommon for the plans to fail in adequately anticipating the local emergency needs. This can happen either because plans are not up to date, or because the procedures are designed around incomplete scenarios, not accounting for multi-​hazard emergencies, the urban network of evacuation routes or the presence of local and non-​local population (Pilone et al, 2016; Del Pinto, 2021). It has been highlighted, particularly in the earthquake emergency that loss of information between the various actors is likely to occur when the Regional or National Civil Protection takes over the local emergency coordination (Del Pinto, 2021). The information loss, besides determining delayed response, poses management issues when superior decisions are in contrast with the enforced local MCPP –​especially if the latter is not accessible or not communicated to all the involved parties. A common example epitomizing this criticality refers to the use of open spaces and resources. It is not uncommon, in fact, that the procedures codified in the local emergency plans regarding muster areas and temporary sheltering areas are invalidated and replaced with super-​imposed emergency decisions (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019; Del Pinto, 2021). These occurrences highlight possible frictions and discrepancies that arise at the interface of top-​down and ground-​up emergency management, which are not accounted for, and not yet addressed by the Italian legislator. Even when civil protection guidelines leave room for non-​structural mitigation and preparedness measures to feature in the MCPP, these tend to codify the top-​down procedures of emergency response and management, seldom posing equal efforts in outlining ground-​up preparedness action involving the general public. Most of the time, citizens only feature in the plan as the recipients of external aid protection rather than as active subjects exercising capacity of self-​protection, and the efforts of volunteers associations to revert this trend are hardly successful (Di Camillo et al, 2014; Del Pinto, 2021).

The silo mentality and disciplinary divide at the local scale Another relevant aspect when looking at the local dimension of the NCPS and the production of MCPP is the disciplinary segregation of disaster 215

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governance and urban governance. This divide is reflected in (i) disaster-​ blind town planning, with land development strategies seldom sensitive to DRR principles and (ii) on context-​blind emergency plans, replicating the quantitative approach of the town plans, often outsourced, and easily overlooking contextual aspects relevant to urban disaster risk (Del Pinto, 2021). The disciplinary divide at the local level is expressed through the silo mentality and separation of know-​how between the different actors of ordinary and emergency planning, mirroring in practice the theoretical gap between the two dimensions –​a systemic flaw that is hard to be reverted, notwithstanding the most recent efforts towards synergic action (Bramerini, 2013; Del Pinto, 2021). Hence, DRM in ordinal planning is dismissed as civil protection matter, and local civil protection operators only focusing on DRM procedures. As a consequence, not only emergency and ordinary planning are treated and perceived as distinct and separate actions, but they are also given different priorities. Research in the territories affected by the 2016 Central Italy earthquake has shown that, before the earthquakes, the development and implementation of emergency plans in the small municipalities represent a critical topic. The documents informing the plan, when they exist, are produced to meet the mandatory requirements, with limited budget, by technicians who are seldom DRM experts. Once approved, plans are considered internal documents for first responders, hence not adequately shared with the public (Del Pinto, 2021). These aspects not only reflect but also foster a widespread disengagement of the local society with disaster risk in a twofold way: (i) with insufficient communication to the public of emergency plan information –​ hence, knowledge –​and (ii) with the omission of citizens from the list of actors mobilized in the first response. The latter point is a widespread lacuna and inherent contradiction of MCPP, in that, in the early aftermath of disaster and before any civil protection intervention, citizens are active players in that they instinctively exercise their capacity of self-​protection (Wisner et al, 2011; Gaillard et al, 2019).

The risk perception action gap and how to fill it As mentioned earlier, the norms issued between 1920 and 1940 represented the backbone of national approach to disaster risk management: on the one hand, they provided the concept of an organized structure adopting established, unified guidelines; yet, on the other hand, they planted the seed for local disengagement with the exclusion of civil society from the picture –​ a gap that, one century later, is still being filled with the emanation of ad-​ hoc regulations. The prolonged centralization contributed to the delayed development of a relatively weak local emergency response system, in that the strong presence of central aid favoured the atrophy of the bottom-​up 216

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initiatives that the most recent norms attempt at fostering (OECD, 2010). Additional socio-​cultural reverberations of the decades-​long centralization are represented by the public distrust in the DRM system, and generalized disengagement from DRR, perceived as a subject for ‘experts’: these aspects prevent the diffusion of DRR culture among the general public and the local administrations (Caruso, 2013; Avvisati et al, 2019; Del Pinto, 2021). The normative evolution on emergency response in Italy has resulted into a system that can rely on a large network of governmental and non-​ governmental actors –​from the Civil Protection Department, armed forces, research institutes and universities, private stakeholders, as well as national, regional and local governments (OECD, 2010). These synergies ensure effective and widespread techniques for disaster risk assessment, disaster models, forecast modelling and early warning systems, and a widespread network for monitoring. From a logistic perspective, the central management allows fast and effective response to large-​scale disruptions (OECD, 2010). While the effective disaster risk modelling, forecasting and response to large-​scale emergencies made possible by the central organization offer an exemplary model within and outside Europe, at the local scale the municipal disaster risk management is still far from perfect. The imprinted, top-​down, technocratic approach of the National Civil Protection System results in a weak local response to emergency, with an over-​ reliance on the central response to manage large emergencies; uneven DRM preparation of local operators (from the mayor to local volunteers) with the exception of the professionally trained Fire Brigades; a formal but not substantial adoption of emergency plans; lack of integration of disaster governance into territorial planning; and a lack of communication with, and integration of, citizens, consolidating a decades-​long disengagement and in turn resulting in reduced capacity of self-​protection (Pilone et al, 2016; Del Pinto, 2021). The next goal for the National Civil Protection authorities is to now engage with the citizens, aiming at providing external protection not only in the form of aid delivery but as practices enhancing the individual capacity of self-​protection before the emergency happens (Wisner et al, 2011; Del Pinto, 2021). This means on the one hand, to maximize the disaster preparedness of civil society ‘in times of peace’ and, on the other hand, to guarantee a systematic model of assistance to population in case of disaster that accounts for, and responds to, contextual differences (Alexander, 2018; Di Bucci et al, 2020). The most recent 2018 normative change appears as the first incisive step to rebalance the system in favour of ground-​up action and demonstrate a shift in the conceptualization of ‘external protection’ by the Central Civil Protection Authorities. Yet, while the Decree 1/​2018 is waiting to be fully implemented, the most recent large national emergencies are still unresolved: from Abruzzo (2009), to Emilia (2012), up to Central Italy (2016), post-​earthquake reconstruction is a slow and costly process. In 217

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a scenario where the physical reconstruction is the most urgent item on the agenda, the prompt revision and update of local civil protection plans –​both at the regional and at the municipal scale –​appears an optimistic expectation. Note 1

The definition of natural calamity art. 1: ‘Ai fini della presente legge s’intende per calamità naturale o catastrofe l’insorgere di situazioni che comportino grave danno o pericolo di grave danno alla incolumità delle persone e ai beni e che per la loro natura o estensione debbano essere fronteggiate con interventi tecnici straordinari.’ Translated as: ‘For the purposes of this law, a natural disaster or catastrophe is understood to mean the occurrence of situations which cause serious damage or danger of serious damage to the safety of people and property and which, due to their nature or extent, must be faced with extraordinary technical interventions.’ The scope of the established service of civil protection is in art. 2: ‘ Il Ministro per l’interno provvede, d’intesa con le altreamministrazioni dello Stato, civili e militari, e mediante il concorso di tutti gli enti pubblici territoriali e istituzionali, alla organizzazione della protezione civile, predisponendo i servizi di emergenza, di soccorso e di assistenza in favore delle popolazioni colpite da calamita’ naturali o catastrofe.’ Translated as ‘The Ministry of the Interior, in agreement with the other civil and military State administrations, and through the collaboration of all the territorial and institutional public bodies, organizes civil protection, arranging the emergency, rescue and assistance in favour of populations affected by natural calamities or catastrophes.’

References Alexander, D. (2010a) ‘Civil protection amid disasters and scandals’, Italian Politics, 26: 180–​97. Alexander, D.E. (2010b) ‘The L’Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian government policy on disaster response’, Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 2 (4): 325–​42. Alexander, D.E. (2013) ‘An evaluation of medium-​term recovery processes after the 6 April 2009 earthquake in L’Aquila, Central Italy’, Environmental Hazards, 12(1): 60–​73. Alexander, D.E. (2014) ‘Communicating earthquake risk to the public: The trial of the “L’ Aquila Seven” ’, Natural Hazards, 72: 1159–​73. Alexander, D. (2018) ‘Civil protection in Italy: Coping with multiple disasters’, Contemporary Italian Politics, January 2017: 1–​16. Allegretti, U. (2017) ‘The Italian civil protection system: Present situation and prospects of reform’, Forum Di Quaderni Costituzionali Rassegna, 6: 1–​27, [online], Available from: https://​www.foru​mcos​titu​zion​ale.it/​wordpr​ess/​?p=​9370 [Accessed 20 August 2023]. Avvisati, G., Bellucci Sessa, E., Colucci, O., Marfè, B., Marotta, E., Nave, R. et al (2019) ‘Perception of risk for natural hazards in Campania Region (Southern Italy)’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 40(April): 101164, https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.ijdrr.2019.101​164 Bignami, D.F. (2010) Protezione Civile e Riduzione Del Rischio Disastri. Metodi e Strumenti Di Governo Della Sicurezza Territoriale e Ambientale, (1st edn), Italy: Maggioli Editore. 218

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Bignami, D. and Menduni, G (2020), ‘Piani comunali di protezione civile: origini, sviluppo, e nuove azioni di pianificazione territoriale (parte I)’, Territorio, 95: 170–​76. Bignami, D. and Menduni, G. (2021) ‘Piani comunali di protezione civile: origini, sviluppo, e nuove azioni di pianificazione territoriale (part II)’, Territorio, 96: 137–​46. Bramerini, F. (2013) ‘Una strategia di prevenzione del rischio sismico per gli insediamenti’, Strategie D Mitigazione Del Rischio Sismico E Pianificazione CLE: Condizione Limite Per L’Emergenza, Urbanistica Dossier, 130: 5–​7. Camera Deputati, R.I. (1950) Disegno Di Legge n 1593, Italy. Caruso, T. (2013) ‘Trust, clientelism and state intervention in disaster relief policy: The case of Southern Italy’, Human Affairs, 23(2): 230–​45. Cornia, A. (2015) ‘In search of an Italian risk culture-​prevalent approaches towards disasters among experts survivors and people at risk’, International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 18(2) : 125–​39. Crescimbene, M., La Longa, F., Camassi, R. and Pino, N.A. (2015) ‘The seismic risk perception questionnaire’, Geological Society Special Publication, 419(1): 69–​77, https://​doi.org/​10.1144/​SP419.4 Del Pinto, M. (2021) Urban Form and Disaster Risk: The Role of Urban Public Open Spaces in Vulnerability of Earthquake-​P rone Settlements, Loughborough University. Di Bucci, D., Dolce, M., Bournas, D., Combescure, D., De Gregorio, D., Galbusera, L. et al (2020) ‘Super Case Study: earthquakes in central Italy 2016–​2017’, Science for Disaster Risk Management 2020: Acting Today, Protecting Tomorrow, https://​doi.org/​10.2760/​438​998: 132–​150 Di Camillo, F., Marrone, A., Silvestri, S., Tessari, P. and Ungaro, A. (2014) The Italian Civil Security System, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Gaillard, J.C. (2019) ‘Disaster studies inside out’, Disasters, 43(S1): S7–​S17. Gaillard, J.C., Cadag, J.R.D. and Rampengan, M.M.F. (2019) ‘People’s capacities in facing hazards and disasters: an overview’, Natural Hazards, 95(3): 863–​76. ICRC. (1949) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention, 22 August 1864). Imperiale, A.J. and Vanclay, F. (2019) ‘Command-​and-​control, emergency powers, and the failure to observe United Nations disaster management principles following the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 36(October 2018): 101099. Mannella, A., Di Ludovico, M., Sabino, A., Prota, A., Dolce, M. and Manfredi, G. (2017) ‘Analysis of the population assistance and returning home in the reconstruction process of the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake’, Sustainability special issue: Resilience To Natural And Man-​Made Disasters, 9(1395): 1–​20, https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​su9081​395 219

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O’Keefe, P., Westgate, K. and Wisner, B. (1976) ‘Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters’, Nature, 260(15): 566–​7. OECD. (2010) OECD Review of Risk Management Policies: Italy 2010, Paris: Review of Italian National Civil Protection System. PCM DPC. (2007) Manuale Operativo per La Predisposizione Di Un Piano Comunale o Intercomunale Di Protezione Civile, October. Petersen, K., Mioni, M. and Obinger, H. (2018) ‘The cold war and the welfare state in Western Europe’, in F. Nullmeier, D. González de Reufels and H. Obinger (eds) International Impacts on Social Policy: Global Dynamics of Social Policy, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 47–​59. Pilone, E., Mussini, P., Demichela, M., and Camuncoli, G. (2016) ‘Municipal emergency plans in Italy: Requirements and drawbacks’, Safety Science, 85: 163–​170, https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​j.ssci.2015.12.029 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2021) Direttiva 30 Aprile 2021 Riguardante Gli Indirizzi Di Predisposizione Dei Piani Di Protezione Civile, Italy. Pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 160 del 6 Luglio 2021. Russo, M. and Pagliacci, F. (2019) ‘Reconstruction after an Earthquake: Learning from the past. The case study of Emilia Romagna’, Scienze Regionali, 3: 523–​30. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (1971) Assistance in Case of Natural Disasters, in ‘Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its 25th session, 15 September-​17 December 1970’, A/​8028 (1971): 83–​4. Ventura, S. (2010) ‘I terremoti italiani del secondo dopoguerra e la protezione civile’, Storia e Futuro Rivista di Storia e Storiografia Contemporanea, 22, [online], Available from: https://​storia​efut​uro.eu/​i-​terrem​oti-​itali​ani-​dop​ ogue​r ra-​pro​tezi​one-​civ​ile/​ [20 August 2023]. Wisner, B., Gaillard, J.C., and Kelman, I. (2011) ‘Framing disaster: Theories and stories seeking to understand hazards, vulnerability and risk’, in B. Wisner, J.C., Gaillard and I. Kelman (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction, Abingdon: Routledge, pp 15–​30, https://​doi. org/​10.4324/​978020​3844​236.ch3 Regulations

The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (2018) Codice della protezione civile, Decree n. 1, 2 January 2018. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (2012) Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-​legge 15 maggio 2012, n. 59, recante disposizioni urgenti per il riordino della protezione civile. Law n. 100, 12 July 2012. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1993) Individuazione, ai fini della non assoggettabilità ad esecuzione forzata, dei servizi locali indispensabili dei comuni, delle province e delle comunità montane. Decree n. 401, 28 May 1993. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1992) Istituzione del Servizio nazionale della protezione civile. Law n. 225, 24 February 1992. 220

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The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1981) Regolamento di esecuzione della legge 8 dicembre 1970, n. 996, recante norme sul soccorso e l’assistenza alle popolazioni colpite da calamita’. Decree n. 66, 6 February 1981. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1970) Norme sul soccorso e l’assistenza alle popolazioni colpite da calamita’ –​protezione civile. Law n. 996, 8 December 1970. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1961) Ordinamento dei servizi antincendi e del Corpo nazionale dei vigili del fuoco e stato giuridico e trattamento economico del personale dei sottufficiali, vigili scelti e vigili del Corpo nazionale dei vigili del fuoco. Law n. 469, 13 May 1961. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1952) Piano orientativo ai fini di una sistematica regolazione delle acque e relazione annua del Ministero dei lavori pubblici. Law n. 184, 19 March 1952. The Italian Government, Il Presidente della Repubblica (1948) Autorizzazione al Ministero dei lavori pubblici a provvedere a sua cura e spese, ai lavori di carattere urgente ed inderogabile dipendenti da necessita’ di pubblico interesse determinate da eventi calamitosi. Decree n.1010, 12 April 1948. Kingdom of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III Re D’Italia (1925) Conversione in legge con approvazione complessiva, di decreti Luogotenenziali e Regi aventi per oggetto argomenti diversi. Law n. 473, 17 April 1925. Kingdom of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III Re D’Italia (1919) Ordinamento dei servizi di pronto soccorso in occasione di terremoto. Decree n. 1915, 2 September 1919. Kingdom of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III Re D’Italia (1911) Norme per la sistemazione idraulico-​forestale dei bacini montani, per le altre opere idrauliche e per le bonifiche. Law n. 774, 13 July 1911. Kingdom of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III Re D’Italia (1909) Norme tecniche ed igieniche obbligatorie per le riparazioni ricostruzioni e nuove costruzioni degli edifici pubblici e privati nei luoghi colpiti dal terremoto del 28 dicembre 1908 e da altri precedenti elencati nel R.D. 15 aprile. 1909, Decree n. 193, 18 April 1909. Kingdom of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele II Re D’Italia (1865) Sulle espropriazioni per causa di utilita’ pubblica. Law n. 2359, 25 June 1865.

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13

When the Unexpected Becomes Frequent Mattia Bertin

The minor events When we mention the relationship between climate change and extreme events, the focus is usually on those impacts described as disasters. Nowadays, there are many accounting and monitoring tools used to describe major impact events, for precipitation, wind or fire (ANCE/​CRESME, 2012; ISPRA, 2020). However, major events are only a part of climate-​related extreme impacts. There are a number of minor events, with a significantly higher frequency, which are not particularly considered in the statistics, and which escape monitoring. These minor events are beginning to occur cyclically in the same territories, causing effects by their repetition that are not normally quantified or monitored by studies on the relationship between climate change and disaster. This chapter will attempt to enlighten the role of these minor events in increasing local vulnerability. We will carry out this analysis in correlation with a disaster event of international relevance: Vaia Storm of 26–​30 October 2018 in Northeastern Italy. We will explore the relationship between minor events in the same territory and Vaia Storm, to understand the differences in impacts and reactions activated by these two types of phenomena.

Major events ontology The evolution of a major event starts with the manifestation of a catastrophe (Thom, 1980) and causes a deviation from the linear state of normality towards a state of exception. This evolutionary process may cross the boundary of non-​self-​sufficiency and require the intervention of external 222

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organizations of equal or higher standing to return to a state of normality (UNISDR 2015; Bertin et al, 2020). When a major event, definable as a disaster, occurs, aside the technical support system, an informal solidarity system usually comes into play. In Italy, the technical support system is the National Civil Protection System (see Chapter 12), which, by employing mainly voluntary personnel, acts in the territory bringing in means, resources and basic goods, and suspending the normal rules of management of tenders and supplies to favour rapid resolution. The informal solidarity system operates alongside this formal system by collecting funds and donations to help the affected population and restore damaged heritage. These recovery operations take a long time to manage, but they guarantee a substantial return to a state of normality, albeit with very different levels of effectiveness depending on the territory, the involved institutions and the event itself. A major event has a rhetorical power that places it in the collective imagination. This rhetorical power, which makes it the subject of media coverage, guarantees the appropriate reaction. As we will see in the chapter, this conception causes two different issues in relation with climate change and increase of the events. The first is that we normally consider the catastrophe as time 0, for example as the moment of the beginning of the disaster, when in fact they are elements embedded in broader local histories and times. The second is that we only measure the impact of an event itself, and there is no technical or scientific inclination to count the effects of the repetition of self-​contained events.

It is the context that causes the disaster The assumption that the triggering event is the initial moment of disaster, however, is a misunderstanding. Going back to the same definition of risk, where risk is the composition of hazard, vulnerability and exposure, this misunderstanding becomes more evident. If the manifestation of the event was the generator of disaster, then risk would be related only to hazard, namely the probability of that event happening at that location with that intensity. Understanding the role of vulnerability and exposure means understanding that it is the context that generates the disaster (IFRC/​ RCC, 2004). In the literature a large amount of evidence exists describing the relationship between marginality, socio-​economic fragility and the effects of a disaster (Campanella, 2006; Lee, 2020). Some macroscopic cases, such as that of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, are particularly effective in describing this. In New Orleans, the impact of Hurricane Katrina precisely described a geography of damage prevalent in the poorest parts of the metropolis, increasing the already significant social and economic disparity between population classes (Blakely, 2012; Fields et al, 2017). Regarding Italy, 223

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Fabian and Bertin (2021) demonstrate with geostatistical tools a significant relationship between the socio-​economically disadvantaged areas of the country and the propensity to disaster with the same impact. Since the connection between context and effects is so significant, at a time when the number of extreme events is increasing, understanding what the most fragile aspects of established contexts are, and how they relate to events, becomes a requirement.

The incorrect accounting of minor events In order to carry out an in-​depth investigation of minor events repetition, it is needed to develop a consistent methodology, able to assess the impacts of these repetitions. First, we have to define a minor event. According to Italian ‘Decreto Legge’ (legislative act, DL) n. 1 of 2018 (the benchmark law in Italy for National Civil Protection System and disaster management), minor events, or Type A events, are: ‘emergencies related to calamitous events of natural origin or deriving from human activity that can be dealt with by means of interventions that can be implemented, by the individual competent bodies and administrations on an ordinary basis’ (DL 1, 2018). We can indicate as minor events all those events for which it is necessary for a municipality to open an event report (Activation of the Municipal Operations Centre) but in which no supra-​municipal intervention support was required. These events are limited in area, have low restoration costs and cause a limited number of victims. For this reason, they are usually underestimated, and it is difficult to find ordered and structured databases to study them, both individually and especially in their repetition. There is no official database for this type of event, either in the institutional domains of the State or the regions, or in the domains of public or private research centres. To carry out this research, I have referred to a set of seven databases. Nonetheless, they are more suited to establishing a framework for the phenomenon than to providing precise data on it. At the end of the chapter there is a list of the databases interrogated to carry out this framing activity. Alongside the work on the databases, a questionnaire-​guided interview was carried out with a number of National Civil Protection System officials and coordinators, in particular in the Veneto region, useful for supporting the recognition of a process of six-​monthly or annual repetition of minor events in many territories of the region, especially in mountain and foothill environments. The main challenge in counting minor events is that they are considered in their singular occurrence and not in their repetition in the same geographical contexts. The assessment of the event is developed as a count of infrastructural, built, environmental and socio-​economic damages, in terms of restoration costs. Direct damage is thus assessed separately from the 224

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socio-​economic processes resulting from the damage itself (Berke et al, 2009). If instead of the event, the focus of the analysis is shifted to the territory in which it occurs, the assessment changes. The repetition of the event in frequent times increases in a nonlinear sequence, causing an incremental instability in local communities. This composition acts by undermining three main systems of trust: the one of the market in local production; the one of the tourist system in local attractiveness; and the one of residents in the quality of local life. The composition is non-​linear because each repetition causes an increase of a higher magnitude than the previous step, in an exponential trend (Brown et al, 2010). The first system challenged by the repetition of minor events is market trust in local production. In recent decades, artisanal, industrial and eno-​ gastronomic production has been integrated at an international level, forming integrated networks of exchange and continuity of processing. Let’s assume that due to a minor event a production site loses part of its efficiency: for example, damage to stock, or a power cut, or waterlogging in the production plant. This local event will have an effect in other related territories in terms of a slowdown in production or non-​delivery of products. If the event repeats, the target market may assess the supply as too unstable and look for other suppliers. In this way, the repetition of the event will lead to socio-​economic damage far greater than that which can be counted as a direct effect: it will involve a loss of customers and therefore of jobs. The second system challenged by the repetition of minor events is the trust of the tourism system in the local attractiveness. A minor event could lead to a severe discomfort for tourists on the site or those booked for a trip to the affected location. The event could cause a difficulty in local mobility, or the interruption of hotel and restaurant services, or the closure of required sightseeing or sports venues. The single event will only be a difficulty for the tourists directly involved, whether present or booked. However, if the event is repeated, international players in the sector may decide to give up promoting that location, which is considered unreliable for continuity of service. In addition, the name of the location could be associated with a sense of insecurity and disservice that would make it unattractive to travellers. This would cause considerable economic and social damage to the affected community, leading to a loss of induced economic activity and jobs. The third system challenged is the trust of residents in the local quality of life. Any single event can lead to the interruption of road systems, the breakdown of essential services, the suspension of public services, health and education systems, and the loss of income. Any repetition of the event, and hence of the disruptions described, will lead to a significant decrease in the perceived local quality of life, and will consequently call into question the suitability of the place as a place to live and work. This questioning will encourage the working and study age groups to move away, starting with 225

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those with greater economic and cultural resources. The repetition of the event may therefore lead to depopulation, especially in the classes most involved in the construction of local wealth. The composition of this induced damage, linked to repetition, will lead to a situation of abandonment and loss of local economic attractiveness, implying a further indirect economic damage. The municipal economic provisioning sources are in fact directly linked to contribution through taxation and indirectly linked to redistribution by the State in relation to the number of residents. Depopulation would result in double financial damage and put the affected municipality in the position of having fewer funds to repair the damage caused by a minor event. This damage, stratified over time, will not bring with it the national and international coverage of media as a major event. The neglect and stratification of damage that cannot be restored by the municipality on its own will not be mitigated by the National Civil Protection System and the informal involvement caused by media coverage of the event. The repetition of minor events, therefore, brings with itself all these challenges. A major event, which is obviously more visible, nowadays has effective management tools. The repetition of minor events does not. In the next section we will see a comparison between Vaia Storm and minor events that occurred in previous years in the same impact area.

Vaia Storm and the meteorological impacts on the Eastern Alps The impact of climate change on the Eastern Alps, in the regions of Veneto, Trentino-​Südtirol (Trentino-​ST), Friuli-​Venezia Giulia, is clearly manifesting itself through an increase in extreme events, both minor and major. The impacts are of different types: intense rainfall, intense wind, intense snow, landslides and fires in periods of severe drought. Most of these events are described as of minor intensity (Type A) and are managed by local authorities, without media coverage. However, these events, if described as elements of a ten-​year process, have a much greater effect than the Vaia Storm event, which had global resonance and is now known throughout Italy as the largest intense wind event in the country’s history: grade 12 on the Beaufort scale.

Minor events in the Vaia impact area The territory of the Eastern Alps is distributed between the Veneto (Provinces of Vicenza, Verona, Treviso, Belluno), Friuli-​Venezia Giulia (Provinces of Udine, Pordenone) and Trentino-​Sudtirol regions (Provinces of Trento, Bolzano). There are 1,033,665 inhabitants in this area (ISTAT, 226

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2022). It is a territory that hosts strategic axes of connection between North–​ South and East–​West Europe, being the place where the Mediterranean and Baltic–​Mediterranean corridors cross. At the same time, it is a local system mainly composed of smaller and marginal municipalities, characterized by scarce population, growing average age and abandonment. Between 2013 and 2021, 142 local extreme events were recorded in this area by the analysed databases. It is very complicated to estimate the damage of each of these events as there is no official recognition for this type of impact to date. However, the research presented here carried out an impact analysis starting from the number of casualties resulting from these events. To do this, we used the database of the Research Institute for Hydrogeological Protection –​National Research Committee (IRPI–​CNR), which collects, among other data, all the events in which there has been at least one human loss. A ten-​year period was chosen, from 2009 to 2018, ending with the Vaia event. As shown in Table 13.1, there were 34 casualties from extreme events over the last ten years, an average of 3.4 per year. There were three casualties directly related to Vaia Storm. In total, there were four deaths in 2018, in line with the average. The mobilization of emergency resources, the suspension of school activities and the declaration of a state of emergency certainly prevented many casualties and reduced hurricane impact. This confirms that, while the Regional and National Civil Protection Systems have grown considerably in the face of extreme events, the same cannot be said for their capillary capacity to deal with minor events.

Overview of Vaia Storm Vaia Storm was accurately forecast by ARPAV –​Regional Agency for Environmental Prevention and Protection of Veneto Region on 26 October 2018 and estimated to hit the region between 28 and 30 October. The administrative offices of the Eastern Alps Regions declared a state of emergency for those days, suspended school activities and mobilized the National Civil Protection System. The hurricane impacted the Alpine territory with up to 870 mm of rainfall, and winds of up to 217.3 km/​h. The event resulted in damages equal to €2,809,400,000, affecting a total of 494 Italian municipalities, covering a total area of 2,306,968 ha. Damages have been also reported in neighbouring areas of Austria, Slovenia, and Switzerland. The hurricane led to 42 million trees being felled (Figure 13.1), reaching up to 47 per cent of the municipal forest availability in several municipalities (Chirici et al, 2019). The event also resulted in disconnection of more than 250,000 electricity utilities and road interruption for important extents throughout the territory, which is difficult to reach alternatively due to its mountainous location. 227

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Table 13.1: Minor events with losses in the Vaia impact area and comparison with Vaia Date

Municipality

Province

Region

Casualties Vaia

15/​06/​09

Calalzo di Cadore

Belluno

Veneto

1

18/​07/​09

Borca di Cadore

Belluno

Veneto

2

04/​09/​09

Tarvisio

Udine

Friuli/​VG

1

05/​09/​09

Fortezza

Bolzano

Trentino/​ST

1

12/​04/​10

Castelbello-​Ciardes

Bolzano

Trentino/​ST

9

09/​05/​10

Dro

Trento

Trentino/​ST

1

31/​08/​11

Borca di Cadore

Belluno

Veneto

2

04/​08/​12

Val di Vizze

Bolzano

Trentino/​ST

2

09/​10/​12

Stenico

Trento

Trentino/​ST

1

16/​05/​13

Lavagno

Verona

Veneto

1

02/​08/​14

Refrontolo

Treviso

Veneto

4

31/​08/​14

Renon

Bolzano

Trentino/​ST

1

12/​10/​14

Valli del Pasubio

Vicenza

Veneto

1

05/​08/​15

San Vito di Cadore

Belluno

Veneto

3

19/​11/​16

Manzano

Udine

Friuli/​VG

1

19/​04/​17

Arco

Trento

Trentino/​ST

1

05/​08/​17

Cortina d’Ampezzo

Belluno

Veneto

1

29/​07/​18

Bieno

Trento

Trentino/​ST

1

29/​10/​18

San Martino in Badia

Bolzano

Trentino/​ST

1

X

29/​10/​18

Predaia

Trento

Trentino/​ST

1

X

29/​10/​18

Dimaro

Trento

Trentino/​ST

1

X

Vaia total casualties

3

Minor events total casualties

34

Source: Author’s elaboration from Research Institute for Hydrogeological Protection –​National Research Committee

The event was managed by a coordination of national and regional forces based at the CCS –​Provincial Rescue Coordination Centres. The main CCS, controlled by the Veneto Region in agreement with the National Civil Protection Department, was set up at the civil airport of Belluno. The direct management of the event lasted 12 days and gave priority to the supply of food, medicines and power generators, as well as the construction of camp structures to accommodate the evacuees. The next step was to clear the roadways of trees, lay temporary bridges and restore electricity utilities with emergency equipment. Finally, the slopes were made safe 228

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Figure 13.1: Impact of Vaia Storm as visualized by artificial intelligence tools

Source: Author elaboration from freewayml.com

from the risk of fall for dislodged tree material and of landslides on human settlements and infrastructures. The entire operation was carried out under a Type C emergency regime, which means of national importance, and with extraordinary finance through the funds of the National Department of Civil Protection. The management of the event was rapid and effective in terms of restoring human settlements and sports facilities. This led to a rapid restoration of economic activities, public services, and to the influx of tourists. Notwithstanding this, the post-​event management was criticized for two reasons: the slow removal of fallen tree materials; and the absence of recovery and disaster risk reduction planning for the Eastern Alps area. Once the restoration of the urban, infrastructural and sport systems was completed, the management of the event slowed down considerably. A significant amount of fallen trees has been collected and piled up but mainly in the valley bottoms and less inaccessible slopes. Entire slopes are still covered with materials from the crashes at the time of writing. These 229

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materials have been only minimally treated and have become dangerous due to pests, slope slides and fires. Over the years, these risks have already manifested several times, with an uncontrolled increase in a parasite, the spruce bark beetle, which is now endangering the surviving forests. There has also been an increase in landslide events in inaccessible slopes, which are now affecting the streams at the bottom of the valley, creating obstacles to normal flow. Finally, collapsed material is providing fuel for ongoing winter fires due to drought. These abandoned materials represent a great danger for the territory of the Eastern Alps and are drivers for an increase of hazard occurrence and vulnerability to new events.

The lack of a vision for the Eastern Alps As described in the previous paragraph, considering the events as anthropic singularities, which are inserted into an independent natural continuum, can be prejudicial. Vaia Storm is part of a series of minor events frequently repeated in the same territories. Even after the emergency has ceased and the anthropic systems have been completely rebuilt, Vaia Storm continues to interact with these events on a territorial scale. Climate change, which exacerbates these phenomena in intensity and frequency, must lead us to reflect on the settlement and socio-​economic variables that lead to these minor events. Currently there is a European Strategy on the Alps, expressed through the Interreg Alpine Space Programme. However, this strategy has a purely local support function, and there is no integrated trans-​scale disaster risk reduction plan capable of dealing with these issues (Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010). The Alpine Space planning, and in particular extreme events in the Eastern Alps, is handled as funding for the linear development of a territory that is partly marginal and partly strategic (SNAI, 2013). In this view, catastrophic events are seen as accidents in a development path, and not as an intrinsic manifestation of a conflict produced by the development model adopted. There is an urgent requirement for a planning and design process in the Eastern Alps that considers minor events as a unavoidable pattern. This process has to be carried out in different domains: landscape, urban, economic and infrastructures (Berke et al, 2009; Berke et al, 2014; Meyer and Schwarze, 2019). This paradigm has to be grounded in the anticipation of the disaster through a deep transformation of the territory in the built and socio-​economic spheres (Burby et al, 1999; Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006). In the absence of this kind of process at different scales, we will see an increase in minor events. These would bring one of the cornerstones of European continuity such as the Eastern Alps regions to inaccessibility and collapse, with serious effects and repercussions also on the plains below and on the European Union in general. 230

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Rethinking adaptation as transformation and not as defence Rethinking development planning and design in the Eastern Alps means primarily questioning the current model of climate change adaptation. The widespread adaptation approach starts from a principle of protection of the current organization of buildings, urban agglomerations and socio-​ economic systems (Forino et al, 2015; Coppola et al, 2021). To provide this protection, adaptation plans, strategies and transformational actions are envisaged to improve and update surface aspects (roofing, trees, canalization, retrofitting, drainage systems) in order to maintain economic activities and urban settlements (Russo, 2021). This kind of approach still considers catastrophic events as alterations occurring in stable systems. What the increase in the frequency of both minor and major events demonstrates, instead, is the inevitability of disaster (Levine et al, 2005). We need to exploit available knowledge of expected impacts to displace the widespread view of adaptation as a process of defending the present. A way towards this change is to consider the expected damages scenarios not just an information for emergency planning but as an anticipation of facts yet unverified. This means that adaptation must be seen as a process of anticipating post-​event reconstruction before damage occurs (Watson, 2017). It is opportune to reconsider minor events as prodromes of a long process of decay. It is opportune to take advantage of this long time not for continuous restoration, but to radically transform Alpine buildings, urban structures, services, infrastructures, and economies. The consideration of minor events as a driving pattern must lead the project of the eastern Alpine system to redefine a new evolutionary model.

Conclusions Considering minor events as singularities is leading the territory of the Eastern Alps to collapse in several respects. Minor events must be considered in their repetition, and not as self-​contained singularities. Spatial and economic planning is needed to completely rethink the structure of the Eastern Alps in an approach of open, transformative adaptation and not simply defence of existing systems. In the same way, a reorganization of disaster studies is necessary to monitor and quantify the effects of repetition of minor events in order to have a better framework of ongoing disasters. Databases consulted • viewer-​za.irpi.cnr.it/​?za_​cod=​Vene-​B Visualizzatore eventi di alluvione e frana per bacino idrografico –​Istituto di Ricerca per la Protezione Idrogeologica –​Comitato Nazionale delle Ricerche 231

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• avi.gndci.cnr.it/​ Archivio Aree vulnerate da calamità geologiche ed idrauliche –​ Gruppo Nazionale per la Difesa dalle Catastrofi Idrogeologiche –​Comitato Nazionale delle Ricerche • sici.irpi.cnr.it/​avi.htm –​Sistema Informativo sulle Catastrofi Idrogeologiche • Elenco degli eventi di frana, inondazione e allagamento con vittime (Anni 2007–​2021) –​Cinzia Bianchi e Paola Salvati, 2021 • regione.veneto.it/w ​ eb/p​ rotezione-c​ ivile/b​ ollettini-​idro Avvisi di criticità idro-​geologica –​Regione del Veneto • iononrischio.protezionecivile.it/​ a lluvione/​ m appe-​ i nterattive/​ g li-​ effetti-​delle-​alluvioni-​sulla-​popolazione/​ Gli effetti delle alluvioni sulla popolazione –​Dipartimento Nazionale di Protezione Civile • iononrischio.protezionecivile.it/​ a lluvione/​ m appe-​ i nterattive/​ l e-​ alluvioni-​nelle-​regioni-​italiane/​Le alluvioni nelle Regioni italiane –​ Dipartimento Nazionale di Protezione Civile Acknowledgements This research was funded by PNRR-Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza, Missione 4 «istruzione e Ricerca», Componente 2 Investimento 1.5, Ecosistema INEST-Interconnected Nord-Est Innovation, Spoke 4. The Research Coordinator for Spoke 4 is Professor Lorenzo Fabian. References Ahrens, J. and Rudolph, P.M. (2006) ‘The importance of governance in risk reduction and disaster management’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 14(4): 207–​20. ANCE/​CRESME (2012) Primo Rapporto ANCE/​CRESME, Lo stato del territorio italiano. Insediamento e rischio sismico e idrogeologico. [First ANCE/​ CRESME Report, The State of the Italian Territory Housing and Seismic and Hydrogeological Risks], Rome: Camera dei Deputati. Berke, P., Cooper, J., Aminto, M., Grabich, S. and Horney, J. (2014) ‘Adaptive planning for disaster recovery and resiliency: An evaluation of 87 local recovery plans in eight states’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 80(4): 310–​23. Berke, P., Song, Y. and Stevens, M. (2009) ‘Integrating hazard mitigation into new urban and conventional developments’, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 28(4): 441–​55. Bertin, M., Musco, F. and Fabian, F. (2020) ‘Rethinking planning hierarchy considering climate change as global catastrophe’, Climate Risk Management, 30: 100252. Birkmann, J. and von Teichman, K. (2010) ‘Integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation: Key challenges-​scales, knowledge, and norms’, Sustainability Science, 5(2): 171–​84.

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Blakely E.J. (2012) ‘Recovery of the soul: Rebuilding planning in post-​ Katrina New Orleans,’ Hous. Policy Debate, 22(1): 117–​31. Brown, D., Platt, S. and Bevington, J. (2010) Disaster Recovery Indicators: Guidelines for Monitoring and Evaluation, Cambridge: CURBE, Cambridge University Centre for Risk in the Built Environment. Burby, J.R., Beatley, T., Berke, P., Deyle, R.E., French, S.P., Godschalk, D.R. et al (1999) ‘Unleashing the power of planning to create disaster-​resistant communities’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 65(3): 247–​58, doi: 10.1080/​01944369908976055. Campanella, T.J. (2006) ‘Urban resilience and the recovery of New Orleans’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 72(2): 141–​6. Chirici, G., Giannetti, F., Travaglini, D., Nocentini, S., Francini, S., D’Amico, G. et al (2019) ‘Stima dei danni della tempesta “Vaia” alle foreste in Italia’, Forest@, 16: 3–​9. doi: 10.3832/​efor3070-​016 Coppola, A., Lanzani, A.S., Zanfi, F., Del Fabbro, M. and Pessina, G. (2021) Ricomporre i divari. Politiche e progetti territoriali contro le disuguaglianze e per la transizione ecologica, Bologna: Il Mulino. DL 1 (2018) ‘Codice della protezione civile’, Gazzetta Ufficiale, 17, 22 January 2018. Fabian, L. and Bertin, M. (2021) ‘Italy is fragile: Soil Consumption and climate change combined effects on territorial heritage maintenance’, Sustainability, 13: 6389. Fields, J.T. and Wagner, J.A. (2017) ‘Living with water in the era of climate change: Lessons from the Lafitte Greenway in post-​Katrina New Orleans’, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 37(3): 309–​21. Forino, G., von Meding, J. and Brewer, G.J. (2015) ‘A conceptual governance framework for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction integration’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(4): 372–​84. IFRC/​RCC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) (2004) World Disasters Report 2004, Geneva: IFCR/​RCC. ISPRA (2020) Annuario dei Dati Ambientali –​Edizione 2019, [Environmental Data Yearbook –​2019 Edition] 89/​2020, Available from: isprambiente. gov.it/​it/​pubblicazioni [Accessed 2 March 2022]. ISTAT –​Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (2022) Classificazioni statistiche e dimensione dei comuni, [online], Available from: https://​www.istat.it/​it/​ archi​vio/​156​224 [Accessed 2 March 2022]. Lee, D. (2020) ‘The impact of natural disasters on neighborhood poverty rate: A neighborhood change perspective’, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 40(4): 447–​59. Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D. and Reicher, S. (2005) ‘Identity and emergency intervention: How social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries shape helping behavior’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(4): 443–​53. 233

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Meyer, P.B. and Schwarze, R. (2019)‘Financing climate-​resilient infrastructure: Determining risk, reward, and return on investment’, Frontiers of Engineering Management, 6(1): 117–​27. Russo, M. (2021) ‘Resilienza e ricerca per lo sviluppo sostenibile’, in V. D’Ambrosio and M. Rigillo (eds) Transizioni. Conoscenza e progetto climate proof, Naples: Clean, pp 238–​46. SNAI (2013) ‘Strategia nazionale per le Aree interne: definizione, obiettivi, strumenti e governance. Documento tecnico collegato alla bozza di Accordo di Partenariato trasmessa alla CE il 9 dicembre 2013’, [National Strategy for Inner Areas: definition, objectives, tools and governance. Technical document related to the draft Partnership Agreement sent to the EC on 9 December 2013], Rome: Agenzia per la Coesione territoriale. Thom, R. (1980) Parabole e catastrofi. Intervista su matematica, scienza e filosofia, Milan: Il Saggiatore. UNISDR (2015) Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction-​Making Development Sustainable. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). Watson, B.G. (2017) ‘Designing resilient cities and neighborhoods’, in J. Kayden, and J. Leis (eds) Urban Disaster Resilience: New Dimensions from International Practice in the Built Environment, New York: Routledge, pp 21–​34.

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Conclusions: The ‘Italian Case’ from a Global Disaster Perspective Giuseppe Forino

This edited book aimed at exploring to what extent disasters (and disaster recovery) change the affected places. The book argued that disasters change how people make sense of and perceive their place, how politics provides for the needs of the people, how different knowledges interact in managing affected places, as well as how organizations perform their everyday activities. The book provided a journey about these changes occurring into different post-​disaster contexts in Italy. Its chapters focused on cases from the North to South of the country, from islands to mainland, and from rural to urban areas, covering a range of post-​disaster environments after hazards occurred very recently (from earthquakes in 2016–​2017 to the COVID-​19 pandemic since 2020) or decades ago (the Vesuvius eruption in 1944 or the Irpinia earthquake in 1980). In Part I contributors shared their views on how case studies can illustrate main changes into society. In this regard, some contributors focused on the different perceptions about risk. As internationally demonstrated, risk and disaster perceptions must be taken into account to communicate and elaborate public actions and interventions (Alcántara-​Ayala and Moreno, 2016). However, these perceptions highly vary across people and communities. In Chapter 1, Dall’Ò explored this variety, demonstrating the existence of different perceptions across local communities, experts and institutions about landslide risk in a mountain area of Northwest Italy. In this area, the struggle is how to build social and political consensus around landslide risk reduction measures. To do this, exploring the way risk is negotiated, understood, and both accepted and contested locally is important to undertake fruitful ways to implement disaster risk reduction.

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Similarly, the other chapters of Part I explored people’s feelings and emotions about affected places. In the well-​known case of the L’Aquila earthquake in 2009, the ethnographic work of Bock (2022) demonstrated that the Italian government initially gave citizens a sense of hope about a successful reconstruction, by bringing mass media in the affected areas and rhetorically claiming ‘we will never leave you alone’, ‘we are with you’, ‘never more these tragedies!’, ‘housing for all as soon as possible’ (Forino and Carnelli, 2019). A few years later, when it was realized that all these promises had not come to fruition, this hope disappeared, with the state moving from being an agent of hope to become a source of hopelessness and uncertainty (Bock, 2022). This generates, I believe, what Mariani defined in Chapter 3 as a ‘suspended time’ for areas affected by earthquakes in 2016–17 in Central Italy. In these areas, local communities navigate between a sense of abandonment in a permanent state of emergency and the need to rebuild their everyday life in this temporary and precarious built, social and cultural environment. This is also what happened in Casamicciola, on the island of Ischia, affected by an earthquake in 2017, investigated by Gugg (Chapter 2). Five years after the earthquake, people feel a sense of abandonment from institutions, as the most affected area is still undergoing a reconstruction that is uncertain in its schedule and modes. In this suspended time, people re-​elaborate their relationship with the others, their places, the built and social environment. In Chapter 4, Moscaritolo explored the suspended time of a disaster but in the memory of affected people. In his oral history project focusing on the memory of the earthquake in Irpinia (1980), Moscaritolo explored how people construct and reconstruct their memory of those tragic times and create and recreate their own narrative of the disaster and of the changes into places and society. Individual and collective memory is highly adaptive: people decide to remember some aspects and forget others based on the situation, the time, the context. The book has also revealed the potential for analysing post-​disaster changes in terms of politics. This is the focus of Part II, which considered disasters and disaster recovery as shaped by political actors and dynamics, pursuing often specific agendas (Tierney, 2012). Since its start, the COVID-​ 19 pandemic has worked politically in different countries to perpetrate a specific agenda of multiple government levels (Barbieri, 2020). This is what also Saitta demonstrated in Chapter 5. In the city of Messina, in Sicily, local politics used the pandemic management, and the conflicts arising at different government levels, to build populistic narratives for climbing the political ladder in local, regional and national political discourses. From a diverse but complementary perspective, the way disaster risk plans are funded, designed and implemented is also political and depends on political choices. In Chapter 6, Gugg highlighted differences in emergency planning 236

Conclusions

in areas potentially affected by the volcanic activity of the Vesuvius volcano. Gugg argued that while the areas that are mostly exposed to volcanic risk (the ‘red zone’) have a dedicated emergency plan, other areas that can be hit by the volcanic eruption but are not considered under the ‘red zone’ (the so-called ‘yellow zone’), do not have a similar type of emergency planning. This represents a problem for an adequate volcanic risk planning in the Vesuvius area and subtends the needs for a collaborative, political discussion among different stakeholders at multiple levels. In Chapter 7, Danesi della Sala coined the intriguingly expression of ‘aleatory politics’ that defines the political baseline for post-​disaster interventions by the Italian government, based on top-​down representations into abstract visions and scenarios in the affected places, without consideration of contextualized and local needs. By bringing the case of places affected by earthquakes in Central Italy, Danesi della Sala demonstrated that this aleatory politics, with its random and bureaucratized application, fails in fulfilling the needs of affected communities. As with previous studies on the same earthquakes (Emidio di Treviri, 2018; 2021), other Italian earthquakes (Parrinello, 2015; Farinella and Saitta, 2019), and different global contexts (Oliver-​Smith, 1991), this failure will bring with itself social and political changes that will need careful evaluation. The aforementioned chapters, however, also mentioned indirectly the question of conflicting knowledges into post-​disaster environments. Who does possess the necessary knowledge? Which are the experts with the right to talk and show their muscular knowledge? What knowledge is neglected? This is a very recurrent argument in disaster scholarship that has for a long time investigated how local knowledge is often marginalized and neglected (Wisner, 1995), is used in a rhetorical way or clashes with top-​down, self-​ defined expert visions from politics, practitioners and academics (Lizarralde et al, 2009). Part III, therefore, highlights the challenges and opportunities of different types of knowledges aiming at intervening in post-​disaster recovery in Italy. In Chapter 8, Tomassi questioned the application of smart city epistemological and empirical stances as applied in L’Aquila. Managing post-​disaster recovery through a techno-​centric and technocratic smart city approach consisting of big data, apps and technology tends to exclude those who cannot participate and to favour, instead, private and lobby interests. Similarly, in Chapter 9 Pitzalis focused on the reconstruction after the earthquake in Emilia in 2012. Pitzalis highlighted the competing visions existing between technicians in charge of housing damage assessment and the citizens that lost their houses and asked for more individual assessment in order to have more personalized reconstruction solutions. These chapters therefore revealed the risk of pursuing technocratic approaches in disaster recovery that are structured mainly under the form of top-​down 237

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schemes, with government organizations following ‘command and control’ mechanisms (Alexander, 2002). Civil society is mainly perceived as a passive receiver of information, while disaster recovery becomes a centralized set of solutions proposed by those holding technical skills, capacities, knowledge and experience, that are frequently insensitive to local cultures and contexts (Gaillard et al, 2010). In the same section, however, Chapter 10 by De Pascale and Antronico proposed a slightly different view on the role of different knowledges. Indeed, they interrogated both citizens and technicians in Maierato, a small village in the Calabria region affected by a landslide. The authors demonstrate that affected communities share (and critique) common visions about both positive and negative issues that occurred with post-​disaster reconstruction, including risk communication, psychological issues and satisfaction about reconstruction. Lastly, Part IV is dedicated to the way organizations adapt to changes generated by a disaster. Disaster scholarship offers examples of organizations adapting to different extents to different conditions posed by a disaster through factors such as leadership, supply chain management and disaster planning, among others (Jia et al, 2020). On the one side, these demonstrate a high level of proactivity, while on the other side they reveal a slow adaptability that often goes through repeated failures (Saitta, 2015). In Chapter 11, Zizzari and Fiore highlighted the need for a complex organization such as a public university in Milan to adapt to the changes suddenly appearing during the COVID-​19 pandemic. The need to ensure learning and teaching continuity led the university to adopt an online teaching delivery mode. Staff had to reflect and pay new attention to fundamental aspects of teaching such as the interaction and involvement of students in the virtual classroom, the potential of technological tools in learning and the need to consider cultural aspects in teaching. On a different topic, Del Pinto, Chmutina, Bosher and Palaiologou (Chapter 12) provided an overview of the changes in civil protection and emergency legislation and laws in Italy, based on experience of occurring disasters. Notwithstanding their adaptability, these legislation and laws fail to include local communities in the decision-​making process. While laws change, they continue to fail to regulate an inclusive disaster recovery. In Chapter 13, Bertin demonstrated that while the Veneto region, in the northeastern part of Italy, has developed its own disaster risk reduction planning based on previous disaster experience, this does not include yet a series of ‘minor’ and more recurrent events, therefore missing the opportunities to think about regional disaster risk reduction in a more integrated perspective. In conclusion, this edited book demonstrated that disasters change, to a small or large extent, society. These changes can be tangible or intangible, short and long term, and cannot always be appreciated immediately. Instead, 238

Conclusions

they might need time to emerge and evolve. They reshape how people see their places, how political features are set, how different knowledges are privileged or hidden, or how organizations behave. These changes –​I believe this book has demonstrated –​need more attention in scholarship in terms of theoretical engagement, empirical tests and methods. These contributions on Italy, hopefully, represent a starting point for this. References Alcántara-​Ayala, I. and Moreno, A.R. (2016) ‘Landslide risk perception and communication for disaster risk management in mountain areas of developing countries: A Mexican foretaste’, Journal of Mountain Science, 13(12): 2079–​93. Alexander, D. (2002) ‘From civil defence to civil protection –​and back again’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 11(3): 209–​13. Barbieri, K. (2020) ‘COVID-​19 impact: How the pandemic is affecting politics’ [online], Available from: https://​sc.edu/​uofsc/​posts/​2020/​04/​ covid_​impa​ct_​o​n_​po​liti​cs_​b​arbi​eri.php#.Yu_​Z​E3ZB​xPZ [Accessed 25 August 2023]. Bock, J.J. (2022) Citizens Without a City: Destruction and Despair After the L’Aquila Earthquake, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Emidio Di Treviri (ed) (2018) Sul fronte del sisma. Un’inchiesta militante sul post-​terremoto dell’Appennino centrale (2016–​2017), Bologna: DeriveApprodi. Emidio di Treviri (ed) (2021) Sulle Tracce dell’Appennino che cambia: Voci dalla ricerca sul post-​terremoto del 2016–​2017, Campobasso: Il Bene Comune. Farinella, D. and Saitta, P. (2019) The Endless Reconstruction and Modern Disasters: The Management of Urban Space Through an Earthquake–​Messina, 1908–​2018, Cham: Springer. Forino, G. and Carnelli, F. (2019) ‘Introduction to the special issue: The L’Aquila earthquake 10 years on (2009–​2019) –​Impacts and state-​of-​ the-​art’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 28(4): 414–​18. Gaillard, J.C., Wisner, B., Benouar, D., Cannon, T., Creton-​Cazanave, L., Dekens, J. et al (2010) ‘Alternatives for sustained disaster risk reduction’, Human Geography, 3(1): 66–​88. Jia, X., Chowdhury, M., Prayag, G. and Chowdhury, M.M.H. (2020) ‘The role of social capital on proactive and reactive resilience of organizations post-​disaster’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 48: 101614. Lizarralde, G., Johnson, C. and Davidson, C. (eds) (2009) Rebuilding after Disasters: From Emergency to Sustainability, Abingdon; New York: Routledge. Oliver-​Smith, A. (1991) ‘Successes and failures in post-​disaster resettlement’, Disasters, 15(1): 12–​23. Parrinello, G. (2015) Fault Lines: Earthquakes and Urbanism in Modern Italy (Vol. 6), New York: Berghahn Books. 239

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Saitta, P. (ed) (2015) ‘Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie: vita quotidiana, resistenza e gestione del disastro’, Fukushima, Concordia e altre macerie, Florence: Editpress. Tierney, K. (2012) ‘Disaster governance: Social, political, and economic dimensions’, Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 37(1): 341–​63. Wisner, B. (1995) ‘Bridging “expert” and “local” knowledge for counter-​ disaster planning in urban South Africa’, GeoJournal, 37(3): 335–​48.

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Index Page numbers in bold refer to tables and page numbers in italic refer to figures.

A Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese  109, 111–​14, 115 aleatory politics  125–​8, 129, 237 Alpine Space planning  230 Annunziata, L.  114 Antenucci, I.  136, 138, 146 Antronico, Loredana  176, 182 Augustus Method  211 B Barrios, R.E.  2, 156, 157, 158, 162, 163, 167 Belice Valley earthquake 1968  35, 126–​7 Bertin, Mattia  223, 224 Bock, J.J.  125, 236 Bonati, S.  33 Brancato, M.  74 building  illegal  29–​31 amnesty  37 lack of maintenance  35, 36 overbuilding  31, 33 regulations  26–​7, 113 speculation  113 unplanned in risk areas see Vesuvius and urbanization bureaucracy  reconstruction and  36, 38, 40, 61, 124–​5, 128, 162 techno-​  157, 161, 162, 163 C camps, state organized and ‘self-​managed’  159–​60 Casamicciola earthquake 1883  26–​7, 28, 35 Casamicciola earthquake 2017  27, 28–​33 contribution for autonomous accommodation (CAS)  36–​7, 40 Extraordinary Commissioners  33, 36, 37, 38, 39 latency period  33–​6

Piazza Majo  29, 30, 31, 32, 39–​40 post-​seismic phases  36–​9 reconstruction plan (PdRi)  37–​8 seismic history prior to  28 stalled reconstruction  33, 36–​9, 39–​40 survey of damage  37 urban resilience  40–​1 vulnerability of buildings  35, 36 CASE Project  137, 141 Castelsantangelo sul Nera  48, 49, 50, 55 Centemeri, L.  2, 49, 135, 136, 140, 141, 143, 146, 149 Central Apennines earthquakes 2016–​17 211–​12, 212–​13, 216 Central Apennines earthquakes 2016–​17, aleatory politics in aftermath  118–​32 aleatory politics and production of scenarios  125–​8, 129 bureaucracy slowing reconstruction  124–​5 ‘crater’ metaphor  119–​21 disaster governance structures and functions  122–​5, 127, 128 ghostly nature of  120–​1, 125 disconnections from area of disaster 120–​1, 129 Extraordinary Commissioners  120, 121, 122–​3, 124 ‘Hotel Diaspora’ and depopulation strategy  122, 123–​4 methodology  118–​19 reconstruction and abandonment 121–​5, 128 Central Apennines earthquakes 2016–​17, spatial practices after  48–​65 choice of Alto Nera case study  51–​2 disaster research in social sciences  49–​51 emergency housing  49, 53–​6, 54, 121–​2, 123, 128–​9 post-​disaster material culture  53–​5 retreating indoors  55–​6 ‘return to Utopia’  53

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emergency housing and spatiality  56–​61 Mount Bove  56–​8 move from square to street villages 58–​61, 59 square villages and street villages  56 lack of democratic decision-​making post-​  61 loss of reference points  54 map of affected area  50 methodology  52–​3, 62 Permanent Red Zones  49, 59–​60, 59, 61–​2 polarizations following  61 reconstruction applications  62–​3n1 Chicago Great Fire 1871  87–​8 ‘children of the earthquake’  74–​7, 78–​9 Chmutina, Ksenia  2 Civil Protection  204–​21 continuing flaws in centralized system  212–​13 coordination of disaster risk and territorial governance  213, 215–​16 local challenges for MCPP  213–​16 in practice  215 silo mentality and disciplinary divide  215–​16 in theory  214–​15 overview of national emergency management  205–​12 after 1945  209–​12 pre-​republican phase  205–​9 regulations on emergency management (1870–​2020)  206–​7 risk perception gap, overcoming  205, 216–​18 climate change  extreme events and links with  222 impact in Alps  12–​14, 17, 226, 231 invisibility of risks related to  23 minor events and links with  222, 230 rethinking adaptation model  231 cognitive invisibility  23 collective memory  dissolution of disasters from  28, 34–​5, 36, 77 and understanding disasters  87–​8 Comité d’Entrèves  21 Communal Operational Centre (COC)  214 communicative memory  192 continuity/​discontinuity  34, 67–​8, 73, 76, 77–​8, 79 Conza della Campania  71–​2 Coppola, A.  143, 144, 171, 231 Couldry, N.  140 COVID-​19 pandemic  conducting research in  55–​6, 119 impact on tourism  39 COVID-​19 pandemic and local politics in Messina  87–​101 five phases  88

global response to  89, 96–​7 importance of locality  97–​8 locality and meanings  93–​6 local responses to global crisis  89–​90 political opportunism in  89–​90, 98 resistance to vaccination campaigns  94, 95, 97 sentimental connections  90–​3 territorial politicization of crisis  89 understanding of the science  97 COVID-​19 pandemic, higher education adapting to  191–​203 challenges for higher education institutions  192–​4 digital inequalities  193 government responses to pandemic  192 methodology  194–​5 a moment of destabilization for lecturers  199–​200 overview of survey responses on distance learning  195–​9 expressions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction  196 flexibility  198 implementation of technological skills  197–​8, 200 interaction/​involvement  197 time  198–​9 potential for lasting changes  200 social inequalities  192, 193 Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)  174 Crosta, G.  16, 17 D Dall’Ò, Elisabetta  11 Danesi della Sala, Francesco  121, 128 deceptive expertise  125 decision-​making  209, 215, 217 competing experts and  164–​6 disagreement of local communities with expert  15–​17, 17–​22, 22–​3 encouraging local participation in  62, 171, 183, 205 lack of democratic access to  61 resisting involvement of local communities in  155–​7, 160, 161–​3, 166–​7, 237 Sisma.12 demanding a role in  160–​1 technocratic approaches and exclusion of local people in  144–​6, 237–​8 Decree 1/​2018  205, 212, 224 Decree 66/​1981  210 Decree 1010/​1948  208, 209 Decree 1593/​1950  209 Decree 1915/​1919  207–​8 Decree 2389/​1926  208 Decree 4732/​2007  214 Del Pinto, Monia  208, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217

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INDEX

De Luca, Cateno  building career and reputation  95–​6 interpreting attacks on Regional Health System  94–​5 neo-​populist politics  92–​3, 97–​8 online network of opposition to  90–​1 performative events  89–​90, 96 political opportunism  89–​90, 98 De Pascale, Francesco  173, 174 depopulation  declining quality of life and  225–​6 economic damage  226 ecosystem crisis and  113 policy in Central Apennines  122, 123–​4 reconstruction delays and increased  53 trends  127, 128 uncertainty driving  40 Di Costanzo, Francesco  112 Di Ludovico, D.  143, 144 disaster capitalism  136, 143 disaster research in social sciences  49–​51, 66–​7 disaster risk management (DRM)  171, 204 evolution of national system  205–​12, 206–​7, 216–​17 excluding minor, recurrent events in Veneto region  222, 224–​6, 226–​7, 228, 230 Municipal Civil Protection Plans (MCPPs)  212, 213–​16, 217 public distrust of  217 role of psychological and social impacts in  173–​5, 178–​83, 184 territorial governance and  213 see also emergency management disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies  183, 204, 212 absence in Eastern Alps  229, 230 lack of investment in  213–​14 opposition in La Saxe to  13, 15–​17, 17–​22, 22–​3 public disengagement with  205, 208, 216–​17 disasters  chance for rebirth of communities  40 context as cause of  223–​4 distorting space  27–​8 evolution of  222–​3 Italy’s vulnerability to  3, 66 latency period after  33–​6 misconceptions about recovery  1–​2 reflections on identity  32–​3 reframing understanding of  211 rhetorical power  223 as social phenomena  157–​8 weaving metaphor  79 discontinuity/​continuity  34, 67–​8, 73, 76, 77–​8, 79 displaced people  Central Apennines earthquakes 2016–​17 28, 33, 35, 40, 48–​9, 51, 59 Emilia earthquake 2012  159

distance learning at University of Milan-​Bicocca  challenges of COVID-​19 for higher education  192–​4 a moment of destabilization for lecturers  199–​200 potential for lasting changes  200 social and digital inequalities  192, 193 survey of lecturers  194–​5 survey responses  195–​9 expressions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction  196 flexibility  198 implementation of technological skills  197–​8, 200 interaction/​involvement  197 time  198–​9 Dorfman, Ariel  32 Douay, N.  138, 140 E ecological  approach to disaster studies  66–​7 approach to rebuilding  156, 161, 162, 163 vulnerability  31–​2, 109, 113, 114–​15 emergency, condition of permanent  49 Emergency Housing Solutions see SAE (Soluzioni Abitative in Emergenza) emergency management  after Vaia Storm  228–​30 continuing need for improvement  212–​13 evolution of national  205–​12, 206–​7, 216–​17 following Maierato 2010 landslide  178–​9, 181–​2, 183–​4 of major events  222–​3 see also disaster risk management (DRM) emergency planning  208, 210, 213 disciplinary divide  216 guidelines  211 for Vesuvius Area  104–​7 emergency psychology  173–​5, 182–​3 emergency urbanism  after Central Apennines earthquakes 2016–​17 49, 53–​6, 54, 121–​2, 123, 128–​9 spaces of  56–​61 Emilia earthquake 2012  211, 212–​13 Emilia earthquake 2012, post-​disaster reconstruction  155–​70 competing experts  164–​6 conflict between institutions, experts and local population  155–​7, 161–​3, 166–​7 opposing visions  161 cost restrictions  156, 163, 164 different modes of emergency intervention  159–​60 disasters as social phenomena  157–​8 Extraordinary Commissioners  155–​7, 158–​9 impact of earthquake  158–​9

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Sisma.12 committee  155–​7, 160–​1, 161–​2 state organized and ‘self-​managed’ camps 159–​60 entrepreneurial city  143 Entrèves  11, 19, 21 environmental degradation  31–​2, 109, 113, 114–​15 Errani, Vasco  121, 122, 155, 159 experts  2, 38, 125, 217 competing  164–​6 conflict with local people in Emilia  155–​7, 161–​3, 166–​7 specialist knowledge of  2, 110–​11, 157 disputing  15–​17, 17–​22, 19–​20, 22–​3 Extraordinary Commissioners  37 Casamicciola earthquake 2017  33, 36, 37, 38, 39 Central Apennines, earthquakes, 2016–​17 120, 121, 122–​3, 124 Emilia earthquake 2012  155–​7, 158–​9 F Falcone, Enea  111–​12 Farinella, Domenica  2, 27, 66, 87, 126, 157, 161, 237 Fiore, Brunella  199 Fire Brigades Service  179, 209, 211 Forino, Giuseppe  33, 66, 176, 182, 231, 236 Foucault, Michel  91, 119 Friuli earthquake 1976  129–​30n2, 210 Frosh, S.  75, 76 G Genoa Decree  37 Giddens, Anthony  110 Graziosi, Fabio  145 Gribaudi, G.  66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 77 Grimaldi, Giuseppe  35, 36 GSSI (Gran Sasso Science Institute)  141, 142, 146, 149n1 Gugg, Giovanni  34, 40, 41, 104, 109, 111, 115, 182 H Harvey, D.  27, 103, 135 higher education see COVID-​19 pandemic, higher education adapting to Hirsch, M.  75, 76, 77 housing  50–​1 contribution for autonomous accommodation (CAS)  36–​7, 40 emergency housing following 2016–​17 earthquakes  49, 53–​6, 54, 121–​2, 123, 128–​9 spatiality and  56–​61 Hurricane Katrina 2005  223 I IBM  144–​5 identity, reflections on  32–​3

illegal building  29–​31 amnesty  37 Intelligent City Paradigm (ICP)  138, 144 Interreg Alpine Space Programme  230 invisibility, risk perception and  17, 22–​3 Irpinia earthquake 1980, adaptive disaster memories from  66–​83 adaptation to change process  78 before and after  67, 69, 70–​2, 77–​8 and awareness of future disasters  79–​80 impact of earthquake  69–​70 methodology  66–​8, 79 postmemory  74–​7, 78–​9 reconstruction  70, 71–​2, 72–​4, 78, 127–​8 relationship between disaster events and memory  67–​8 taking refuge in places of memory  72–​3 ‘victims’ of ’ memory  76–​7 Ischia  26–​47 Casamicciola earthquake 1883  26–​7, 28, 35 Casamicciola earthquake 2017  27, 28–​33 contribution for autonomous accommodation (CAS)  36–​7, 40 Extraordinary Commissioners  33, 36, 37, 38, 39 latency period  33–​6 Piazza Majo  29, 30, 31, 32, 39–​40 post-​seismic phases  36–​9 reconstruction plan (PdRi)  37–​8 seismic history prior to  28 stalled reconstruction  33, 36–​9, 39–​40 survey of damage  37 urban resilience  40–​1 vulnerability of buildings  35, 36 COVID-​19  39 environmental issues  31–​2, 33 future vision  41 illegal building  29–​31 amnesty  37 landslides  32, 33 tourism  27, 28, 31, 39 volcanic and seismic history  26–​8 J Jarrige, F.  146, 148, 149 Jedlowski, P.  67, 78, 79 K Kelman, I.  114, 115 Klein, N.  128, 159, 161 Kuhn, T.  139 L Lamberti, Amato  103 La Palud  11, 14, 15, 18–​19 L’Aquila earthquake 2009  211, 212–​13 L’Aquila earthquake 2009, smart city model recovery process  135–​54 distribution of smart city projects  146, 148

244

INDEX

entrepreneurial city  143 methodology  136–​7 national inter-​governmental and local level projects  142–​3 new actors in fabrique of smart city  138, 146, 148 ongoing smart projects  145, 147 reconstruction processes  3 parallel  141–​2 headless reconstruction  141, 143–​4 smart city model impact on  144 smart city discourse  137–​41, 148–​9 neoliberal city model  138 paradigm  138–​40 recovery and repair  140–​1 reified city and laboratory-​city representations  140, 142, 145 Smart City guidelines  145, 146, 147 techno-​centred transformation  135–​6, 144–​6, 148–​9 ‘latency’ period following disasters  33–​6 Laviano  72–​3 Law 100/​2012  211, 213 Law 184/​1952  209 Law 219/​1981  71 Law 225/​1992  210–​11, 213 Law 473/​1925  208 Law 765/​1967  113 Law 996/​1970  210 Lefebvre, Henri  126, 166 legislation and regulation  building  26–​7, 113 emergency  204–​5, 205–​12, 206–​7, 238 after 1945  209–​12 pre-​republican phase  205–​8 Legnini, Giovanni  36, 39, 123, 124 local politics in COVID-​19 pandemic  see COVID-​19 pandemic and local politics in Messina M Macciocchi, Raffaella  112–​13 Maglio, Andrea  27 Maierato, local and expert knowledge in post-​disaster reconstruction  171–​87 communication deficit after initial emergency phase  179, 181–​2, 183 comparisons of community and professional opinions  178–​81 on emergency management  178–​9, 181–​2, 183–​4 on recovery and rehabilitation of population  180–​1, 182, 183 emergency psychology  173–​5 support interventions  182–​3 landslide  171–​2 map  172 methodology  172–​3, 175–​6, 177 sample characteristics  176–​8

Mariani, Enrico  60 material culture  50, 53–​5 mayors  role in emergency management  210, 211, 212, 213 working with MCPPs  214 see also De Luca, Cateno Mazzella, Giuseppe  38, 39–​40 MCPPs  see Municipal Civil Protection Plans (MCPPs) Mega Landslide conference  15, 16 Mejias, U.A.  140 memories of Irpinia earthquake 1980, adaptive disaster  66–​83 adaptation to change process  78 before and after  67, 69, 70–​2, 77–​8 and awareness of future disasters  79–​80 impact of earthquake  69–​70 methodology  66–​8, 79 postmemory  74–​7, 78–​9 reconstruction  70, 71–​2, 72–​4, 78, 127–​8 relationship between disaster events and memory  67–​8 taking refuge in places of memory  72–​3 ‘victims’ of ’ memory  76–​7 memory, collective  dissolution of disasters from  28, 34–​5, 36, 77 and understanding disasters  87–​8 memory, communicative  192 mental health  173–​5, 180–​1, 182–​3 Messina  earthquake 1908  88, 126 see also COVID-​19 pandemic and local politics in Messina Ministry of Public Works  208, 209 minor events, Vaia Storm and repetition of  222–​34 comparing number of casualties in minor events and storm  227, 228 databases  224, 231–​2 disaster risk reduction planning  229 emergency management  228–​30, 229 meteorological impacts on Eastern Alps  226–​30 lack of vision  230 minor events in impact area  226–​7, 228 overview of storm  227–​30 minor events  222–​6 context causing disaster  223–​4 and evolution of major events  222–​3 incorrect accounting of  224–​5 systems challenged by repetition of  225–​6 rethinking climate change adaptation  231 missing expertise  125 Mont de La Saxe landslide  11–​25, 12 disagreement over construction of containment wall  15–​17 difficulties in predicting collapse scenarios  16–​17

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DISASTERS AND CHANGES IN SOCIETY AND POLITICS

investigation into alleged offences of public administrators  16 technical forum  15–​16 media reporting  14, 18, 21 methodology  12 preventative work on East side  13–​14 risk perception  13, 15–​17, 19–​20, 22–​3 state of emergency  14, 15–​17, 18–​19, 20 ‘us’ against ‘them’ in local community  17–​22 appeal of second home owners to stop building of wall  17–​20 local community response to appeal  20–​1 second-​home owners withdraw appeal  21–​2 moral economies  165 moral reconstruction  41 moral subjectivities  165 Morandi bridge collapse  33, 37 Morozov, E.  136, 138, 143 Moscaritolo, Gabriele Ivo  66, 68, 69, 72, 74 Mount Bove  56–​8 Municipal Civil Protection Plans (MCPPs)  212, 213, 213–​16, 217 in practice  215 silo mentality and disciplinary divide  215–​16 in theory  214–​15 N National Emergency Plan for the Vesuvius Area (NEPVA)  104–​7, 110, 111 neo-​populist politics  91–​2, 92–​3, 97–​8 North/​South divide  92, 93, 127 plans to revitalize South  142–​3 O OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development)  142, 143, 211, 217 Oliver-​Smith, A.  3, 22, 23, 51, 55, 61, 67, 102, 125, 158, 162, 166, 192, 237 online learning  see distance learning at University of Milan-​Bicocca oral history  methodology  67, 68, 79 project see memories of Irpinia earthquake  1980, adaptive disaster P Parrinello, Giacomo  66, 80, 126, 127, 148, 237 Pellizzoni, L.  61, 97 performative events  89–​90, 96 Permanent Red Zones, Central Apennines  49, 59–​60, 59, 61–​2 The Peter Pan  96 philological reconstruction  72, 73 Pitzalis, Silvia  122, 133, 157, 159, 160, 162

placelessness  51 Plan for Cities and the Plan for Growth  142–​3 Plumwood, Margaret  129 populist politics  91, 93–​4, 97 at local level  91–​2, 92–​3, 97–​8 postmemory  74–​7, 78–​9 post-​traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  175, 180, 182, 183 psychiatric problems, post-​disaster  180–​1, 182–​3 psychology, emergency  173–​5, 182–​3 Q quality of life, perceptions of  225–​6 R Ravi Rajan, S.  125, 129 reconstruction and abandonment after Central Apennines earthquakes  121–​5, 128 adapting to ‘new’ territory  27–​8 after Irpinia Earthquake 1980  70, 71–​2, 72–​4, 78, 127–​8 applications in Central Apennines  62–​3n1 bureaucracy and  36, 38, 40, 61, 124–​5, 162 complexities in Alto Nera region  52 continuum of choices  72 cycles of destruction/​  77, 79 desire to improve on pre-​earthquake buildings  156, 161, 162, 163 latency period between disaster and  33–​5 moral  41 philological  72, 73 powerlessness in face of long timescales for  61 spatial transformation and  56–​61 stalled after Casamicciola earthquake 2017  33, 36–​9, 39–​40 reconstruction plan, Ischia (PdRi)  37–​8 see also Emilia earthquake 2012, post-​disaster reconstruction; L’Aquila earthquake 2009, smart city model recovery process; Maierato, local and expert knowledge in post-​disaster reconstruction regulations  192 repairing environments  140–​1 risk  culture  115, 213 institutionalization of  105 Mont de La Saxe landslide, disagreement over  13, 15–​17, 19–​20, 22–​3 overcoming gap between state and citizens’ perceptions of  205, 216–​18 perception and invisibility  17, 22–​3 quality of ecosystem and links to  31–​2, 109, 113, 114–​15 as social construction  22 trust in science to predict  110–​11

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INDEX

Vesuvius volcano  emergency planning  104–​7, 110, 111 local perceptions of risk  103–​4 quantifying risk  102–​3 risk in yellow zone  107–​11, 108, 114–​15 see also disaster risk management (DRM); disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies Rocco, Raffaele  15 Romagnano al Monte  71, 72, 73–​4 Roseau, N.  137, 145 S SAE (Soluzioni Abitative in Emergenza)  49, 53–​6, 54 construction  121–​2 future for  55 life 6 years on in  128–​9 loss of temporary status  122, 123 modes of appropriation  53–​4, 54 retreating indoors  55–​6 shortage of space  54–​5 and spaces of social life  56–​61, 129 Saitta, Pietro  2, 27, 34, 66, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 124, 126, 157, 161, 237, 238 San Francisco earthquake 1906  88 San Michele di Serino  72 Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi  69, 71, 72, 73, 75 Sarno landslide 1998  109, 113–​14 Schenk, G.J.  79 Schilardi, Carlo  33, 36, 37, 38 scotomization  23 ‘shadow places’  129 shared administration  41 ‘shock economy’ paradigm  159, 161 silo mentality  215–​16 Sisma.12 committee  155–​7, 160–​1, 161–​2 Sloan, S.  68 smart city model in reconstruction of L’Aquila  135 distribution of smart city projects  146, 148 impact of model on L’Aquila reconstruction  144 L’Aquila Smart City guidelines  145, 146, 147 national inter-​governmental and local level projects  142–​3 new actors in fabrique of smart city  138, 146, 148 ongoing smart projects  145, 147 smart city discourse  137–​41, 148–​9 neoliberal city model  138 paradigm  138–​40 recovery and repair  140–​1 reified city and laboratory-​city representations  140, 142, 145 techno-​centred transformation  135–​6, 144–​6, 148–​9 social media  89–​90, 90–​1, 119 social phenomena, disasters as  157–​8

social sciences, disaster research  49–​51, 66–​7 Spanish flu 1918–​20  192 spatial transformation, post-​disaster  56–​61 Mount Bove  56–​8 move from square to street villages  58–​61, 59 Permanent Red Zones  49, 59–​60, 59, 61–​2 square villages and street villages  56 state of emergency  Mont de La Saxe landslide  14, 15–​17, 18–​19, 20 permanent  49, 236 temporal limitation  211 Vaia Storm  227 see also emergency management Stenger, Isabelle  139 ‘suspended time’  34, 236 T technocratic approaches to disaster recovery  217, 237–​8 alternative approaches to  49 in Emilia  157, 161–​3, 165, 167 in L’Aquila  135–​6, 144–​6, 148–​9 technological skills in COVID-​19 pandemic  192–​3, 197–​8, 199, 200 time  ‘before’ and ‘after’ divisions  67, 69, 70–​2, 77–​8 and distance learning in COVID-​19 pandemic  198–​9 ‘suspended’  34, 236 Tomassi, Isabella  136, 139, 149 tourism  60, 111, 225 Ischia  27, 28, 31, 39 traumatic events  emergency psychology and  173–​5, 182–​3 investigating recovery and rehabilitation after  180–​1, 182, 183 memory and  67–​8 postmemory and  74–​7, 78–​9 U Umbrian earthquake 1997  129–​30n2 University of L’Aquila  142, 145, 146 University of Milan-​Bicocca see distance learning at University of Milan-​Bicocca urban data extractivism  136, 138 urbanization, unplanned see Vesuvius and urbanization urban resilience  40–​1 Ussita  49, 50, 53, 55, 56–​8 V vaccination campaigns, resistance to  94, 95, 97 Vaia Storm and repetition of minor events  222–​34 comparing number of casualties in minor events and storm  227, 228 databases  224, 231–​2

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DISASTERS AND CHANGES IN SOCIETY AND POLITICS

disaster risk reduction planning  229 emergency management  228–​30, 229 meteorological impacts on Eastern Alps  226–​30 lack of vision  230 minor events in impact area  226–​7, 228 overview of storm  227–​30, 229 minor events  222–​6 context causing disaster  223–​4 and evolution of major events  222–​3 incorrect accounting of  224–​5 systems challenged by repetition of  225–​6 rethinking climate change adaptation  231 Ventura, S.  69, 72, 128, 182, 210 Verona  95 Vesuvius and urbanization  102–​17 ash load expected, 2015  108 blue zone  105–​7, 106 danger of eruption  102–​3 eruption in 1944  103, 109 latency period after  34 memories of  111–​13 eruptive categories  109–​10 Evacuation Plan  104–​5, 110, 115n5

National Emergency Plan for the Vesuvius Area (NEPVA)  104–​7, 110, 111 National Park  103, 107 perceptions of risk  103–​4 population growth  103 red zone  103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111 Sarno landslide 1998  109, 113–​14 yellow zone  105, 106, 108, 114 ash and mud in Agro Nocerino-​Sarnese  111–​14 chaotic urban sprawl  113 volcanic risk in  107–​11, 108, 114–​15 Visso  49, 50, 53, 56 Red Zone of historic centre  59–​60, 59, 61–​2 spatial transformation post-​disaster  58–​61, 59 the square  60–​1 vulnerability  ecological and social  31–​2, 109, 113, 114–​15 of Italy to disasters  3, 66 Z Zizzari, Sara  69, 127, 191, 192

248