Coup, King, Crisis. A Critical Interregnum in Thailand 2020949546, 9781732610200, 9781732610217

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Coup, King, Crisis

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Coup, King, Crisis A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

Editor

with a Foreword by CHARLES F. KEYES

Monograph 68/Yale Southeast Asia Studies

Yale University Council on Southeast Asia Studies Erik Harms, Chair

Kristine Mooseker, Program Manager Yale Southeast Asia Monograph Series Editor Erik Harms

Library of Congress Control Number: International Standard Book Number:

2020949546 paper 978-1-7326102-0-0 cloth 978-1-7326102-1-7

© 2020 by Yale University Southeast Asia Studies New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8206 AI] rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means without permission in writing from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.

Distributor' Yale University Southeast Asia Studies

RO. Box 208206 New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8206

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Printed in U.S.A.

Contents

List of fllustrations

vii

Foreword

ix

INTRODUCTION

Coup, King, Crisis' A Critical Interregnum in "ihailand

1

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

Conceptualizing Tllailand's Political Change 1

Understanding "Hlailand's Domestic Political Conflict' Democracy, Social Identity, and the

"Struggle for Recognition"

31

FEDERICO FERRARA 2

Thai Ideas of Power: The Challenge of Legitimacy in Contemporary Thailand

57

CLAUDIO SOPRANZETTI

the Monarchy in Focus 3 Revisiting The King Never Smiles

83

PAUL M. HANDLEY

4 King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the Neo-monarchy of Thailand

97

CHARNVIT KASETSIRI

5 Managing Vajiralongkords Long Succession

117

KEVIN HEWISON

6 Purifying Violence: Buddhist Kingship, Legitimacy, and Crisis i11 Thailand

145

EDOARDO SIANI

Institutions under Military Rule 7 Assessing the Monarchized Militaqr and IG1akistocracy in Postsuccession Thailand PAUL CHAMBERS

V

169

Contents, cont.

8 Challenging the Indicial Coup Myth: Thai Constitutional Courts and Political Crises

199

SARAH BISHOP

9 Restoring Center, Defeating Margins?

Thai Buddhism's Struggle to Revive Its Authority

225

KHEMTHONG TONSAKULRUNGRUANG 10

The Thai Economy: A Lost Decade?

249

KRISLERT SAMPHANTHARAK 11

The Military Regime's Foreign Policy in an Era of Rising Illiberalism

271

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

Opposition to the Military Regime 12

Putting the National Council for Peace and Order on Trial

299

TYRELL HABERKORN

13 Digital Censorship and Self-censorship under

Thailand's Dictatorship

319

DAVID STRECKFUSS

14 Dances with Dictators: NGOs and Military Regime in Thailand

339

SOMCHAI PHATHARATHANANUNTH

Contributors

363

Index

367

vi

Illustrations TAB LE s 2.1

Longevity of political leaders in post- 1932. Thailand

7.1

Thai praetorianism (1922-p1'esent)

172

7.2

Influence over army leadership by faction (2004-20)

176

13.1

64

Level of dangerousness in the pre-digital and digital periods

322

FIGURE

7.1

Thailand's defense budget (2004-18)

vii

173

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Foreword

THIS VOLUME OFFERS assessments of the character of Thai politics since 22

May 2014, when the Thai army staged a coup that ended a democratically

elected government in Thailand. The coup took place as the country was going through a major transition in the monarchy The 2014 coup was the twelfth since 1932, when a constitutional monardiy was first proclaimed, and it was the second since 2oo6, the recent ones both aimed at eliminating

the role of the Shinawatras (Thaksin and his sister Yingluck) and their political followers from Thai politics. Thaksin Shinawatra, a former businessman from Chiang Mai, in northern Thailand, had first risen to political prominence in 2001 when he led the Thai Rak Thai Party to a significant electoral win. He then had led the same party to a lopsided victory in 2005. His success had been based primarily on his populist policies, including universal health care, promotion of enterprises

primarily for the emerging middle class in rural-especially northeastern and northern-Thailand, and expansion of infrastructure mainly for the benefit of the rural population. In the process, however, he alienated the old

elite, including the ranking members of the military not only by pressing for these policies but also by his enrichment ofhirnself and family, by his war on drugs, which led to many deaths, and by his heavy-handed policies toward the Muslim-led insurgency in southern Thailand. Following a coup in 2006

he was removed from office and forced to flee the country In 2.011 a new constitution was adopted, and an election soon followed. In this election, the Pheu Thai Party successor to the Thai Rak Thai Party, won an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats. Yingluck, Thaksin's sister, who then headed the party, became prime minister. The military, now supported by many in the urban middle class, once again intervened in a coup in

2014.

ix

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FORBWORD

Federico Ferrara argues, correctly I believe, that the 2014 coup was not class based, because the growth in the economy in the early twenty-first century had led to the emergence of a middle class in north and northeast Thailand and among migrants from these regions living in Bangkok that support the populist parties begun by Thaksin. Ferrara sees the conflict as a "struggle for recognition" by the disenfranchised peoples of Bangkok as well as by their regional relatives. Ferrara continues that "while the proponents of an egalitarian conception of the Thai nation may well have history on their side, for the time being royalists retain control of the country's

treasury, its military and its judiciary." Tyrell Haberkorn argues that because the junta ignored or ran roughshod over the constitutional rights of any who disagreed with the 2014 coup there is a growing demand, particularly among young people, for justice. Davl'd Streckfuss agrees, arguing that "the Thai military government has been neither terrifying nor brutal, but rather absurdly banal and profoundly stupefying. 'the junta did not just seize power; it heralded a new age where "lhai society will have little chance to communicate and might in time become paralyzed." 'this paralysis is also in part a consequence of the decline in the first decades of the twenty-first century of the Thai economy, as Krislert Samphantharak details in his contribution. It is also the result of the military's cooptation of Thai nongovernmental organizations, as detailed by Somchai Phatharathananunth in his chapter. And it is very much a result of the junta asserting control over the legal system, as Sarah Bishop shows in hers. Above all, the major question about the future turns on the role of the lung. The 2014 coup took place not long before there was a transition to a new monarch. On 13 October 2016 King Bhuinibol Adulyadej, the monarch

who had reigned for 70 years, passed away. This ushered in the transition to a new monarch, King Vajiralongkorn, King Bhumibol's son. Several of the contributors to this book see the transition as one of the major reasons for the coup, as the new lung and the military did not wish to allow for any dissent about the succession. As Pavin Chachavalpongpun notes in his introduction: "King Vajiralongkorn's dependence on the army to ensure an uncomplicated transition has resulted in an increased role for the military in Thailand's affairs of state." A major problem for the coup-makers is that King Vajiralongkorn lacks the charisma ( b a r r i ) of his father. Paul Handley, Charnvit Kasetsiri and especially Kevin I-Iewison provide detailed accounts of a succession of

Foreword

ad

crises emanating from Vajiralongkorn, many of which have centered on his

ill treatment of his wives and mistresses. One of the most dramatic stories concerning VajiralongkornS relationships with his wives and mistresses relates to his third official wife, Princess Srirasmi, whom he married in February 2001. Although he has other children, it is the son by SrirasmiPrince Dipangkorn-who was (and is) recognized as the heir apparent. Srirasmi's being the mother of this prince did not prevent the long from ending the marriage. As Hewison discusses in his contribution, in 2014 a new crisis developed when the family of Srirasmi along with her confidantes

were purged. Hewison notes, "This purge included a grand chamberlain of the Royal Household Bureau and left Srirasmi's relatives and friends destroyed, with some dead." In 2019 the king, following his ascension to the throne, married Suthida Bajrasudhabimalalalcshana (Suthida [Tidjai] Vajiralongkorn no Ayudhya), a former airline stewardess who, while his mistress, had been designated as his aide-de-camp with the rank of air force general. Vajiralongkorn also married Sineenat Wongvajirapakdi and elevated her to

become Chao khufu phra, or royal noble consort. But the king stripped Sineenat of all titles three months into the marriage, only to reinstate her almost a year later while pronouncing her "flawless" As prince, and even after becoming king, Vajiralongkorn spent much time in Germany, where he maintains a separate palace. Handley underscores that "despite his frequent absences, Vajiralongkorn is not a passive

ruler." He has assumed direct control over the royal household and palace security agencies and has taken personal command of the Crown Property Bureau (cpB). As Handley notes, "New orders in July 2017 made clear Vajiralongkorn regards the wealth of the CPB as his own." Hewison con-

cludes his contribution by saying, "For those who hoped for a more open and democratic Thailand in the twenty-Hrst century, the succession of a military-trained king, determined to expand the monarchy's powers, has disappointed." As is clearly the case, documented in many accounts (mainly non-Thai, however), the king is unpopular and is growing more so. In recent decades some leading members of the Buddhist monldiood (Sangha) have taken positions that challenge the traditional premise that the Sangha, monarchy, and state are intrinsically intertwined. Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang observes that "the waning authority of the Sangha Council

during the 1980s created a relatively free space for nonmainstream Buddhist movements to emerge," most notable of which was the antiestablishment

xii

FOREWORD

Dhammakaya sect. Efforts by the military to suppress this sect have not succeeded, but whereas this failed effort may encourage other dissident movements to emerge, for the moment most monks still appear to accept the authority of the Sangha Council. Paul Chambers agues in his chapter that "for the foreseeable future the military will continue dominating the country in partnership with the

monarchy, even though the junta transformed itself into a veiled tutelary democracy." This conclusion is echoed by several other contributors. As Claudio Sopranzetti notes, "Since the 2o14 coup, Prayuth has solidified this convergence by endorsing the three pillars of ultraroyalism, anti-corruption and moral governance." Most of the contributors to this book take a pessimistic view of the possibility for real democracy in Thailand. Their main argument is that the mil-

itary has such firm control over the levers of government that there is almost no chance that dissenting voices-from the countryside, from young people, from older democrats-can persuade the military to withdraw from or even lessen their governance. I, however, am less pessimistic. I think that the dissenting voices, especially among the young in Bangkok as well as up country, are growing in strength. Demographics are not on the side of the junta. In addition, the king's lack of charisma (bararrli), even if backed by the power and authority (ambit) of the military, will, I think, lead more and more Thais to question the current system.

Charles F. Keyes Professor Emeritus of Anthropology and International Studies

University of Washington

INTRODUCTION

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

IN MAY 2014 THE THAI MILITARY staged a coup in which it overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Almost eight years earlier, the army had rolled its tanks through the streets of Bangkok, seizing power from the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck's brother. Apparently the Shinawatras represented a threat to the political elitist class, of which the military had been a major part. Yet arguably, the

latest coup was not merely a plot to remove die Shinawatra threat from the political sphere. The entrenchment of the Shinawatras' political influence in the previous decade, perceived as an immense challenge to the political elites' power, emerged within the context of the twilight of King Bhumibol

Adulyadej's reign. Bhumibol had been on the throne since 1946. Immediately before his ascension, the royal institution had been i11 a sharp decline as a

result of the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932. Throughout his 7o-year reign, however, Bhumib of had gradually but firmly strengthened the institution. It rose to become the most important political institution in the country's modern history. Thai polities during this period was shaped mainly by

a powerful political network driven by the twin forces of Bhumibol's authoritative leadership and a powerful army. But by the time Yingluck assumed the premiership in 2011, Bhumibol was bedridden. The end of his magical reign was nigh. It is therefore logical to postulate that the putsch against Yingluck was a scheme by the political elitist class to manage the royal succession. The anxiety that accompanied the end of the Bhumibol era prompted the military to once again seize power from the civilian regime*

1

2

INTRODUCTION

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGFUN

Thailand's monarchy and military are in an intimately interwoven rela-

tionship. It is an inexorably interdependent relationship based on mutual interests. For the longest time, even though the monarchy political role was supposedly constricted in the constitution, King Bhurnibol openly operated above, beyond, and within the political realm. Through tumultuous times, he acted as an envoy of peace. In the face of violent politics, he pre~ vented the escalation of bloodshed. Consequently, he was loudly extolled as a "stabilizing force" Bhumibol's political role became an integral part of Thailand's political culture. Sources of his political legitimacy are varied.

Images of Bhumibol were carefully crafted for winning the reverence of the Thai public. He came to be viewed as a demigod, a Dhammaraja (who ruled in accordance with the Dhamma, or the teachings of the Buddha) and the father of the nation. He was a philanthropist, a developer, an educator, a sportsman, a musician, a composer, a writer, a photographer, a philosopher and a scientist. He was the savior of the underprivileged and the champion

of the poor. In politics, he was a democratic king. These superlative qualities earned Bhumibol not just exceeding popularity among his subjects but, more importantly, strong moral authority guaranteeing his legitimacy as a token to enter politics. 'lie paranormal images of Bhumibol were underpinned by aggressive propaganda launched by the palace and financed by generous budgets endorsed by successive governments, democratic or other-

wise. Bhumibol was a devoted long who was fiercely protected by the draconian lose-rnajesté law. Lose-majesté, or the crime of injury to royalty, is defined by Article 112 of the 'Thai Criminal Code, which states that defamatory, insulting or threatening comments about the king, queen or regent are punishable bye to 15 years in prison.

Working with generations of military strongmen, Bhumibol was able to place the royal institution at the political apex. He assigned a state agency, the Privy Council, first set up during the Chulalongkorn reign, to serve as the main engine propelling his political network while consolidating ties between the monarchy and the army. The most prominent president of the Privy Council was General Prem Tinsulanonda, a former army chief and a handpicked prime minister who passed away at the age of ninety-eight on 26 May 2019. The Privy Council under Bhumibol enjoyed enormous influence over the military and even determined the destiny of Thai politics. After Prom stepped down from the premiership in 1988, civilian governments were intermittently allowed to rule-yet they were short lived if they

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregna in Thailand

3

defied the royal political network. The toppling of Thaksin in 2oo6 and Yingluck in zo14 exemplified how the political elitist class, subsumed within the royal political network, treated its enemies in order to defend its interests. Thaksin won a landslide victory in the 2001 election, riding on a myriad of impressive populist policies. He transformed the marginalized

north and northeast regions into his bases of power. He offered villagers a sense of political belonging through the electoral process. For the first time, rural residents felt that they could control their own fate and lay their trust in a political party. The stairway to electoral success was, for Thaksin, within easy reach. In 2oo5 Thaksin triumphed with an even larger landslide win, becoming the first Thai prime minister to hold the premiership for a full four-year term. By then he was eager to tear down the old political script drawn by the royal political network and replace it with his own. The royal political network, defined by Duncan McCargo as "network monarchy was thus thrown into jeopardy Eliminating 'Ihaksin proved to be extremely arduous. In 2011, while Thaksin was in Dubai on a self-imposed exile, he nominated his sister Yingluck to contest the election. Yingluck's victory repeated the achievement of the Shinawatras` party and in many ways reminded the royal political network of its lasting influence with the majority of voters. The Shinawatras won every single election from 2001 to 2014. On the surface, Thaksin and Yingluck demonstrated the growing muscle of the elected institution versus the waning influence of the nonelected institution, the latter represented by the royal political network and Bhumibol's precarious health. At a deeper level, the politico-so c a l changes accelerated by the Shinawatras suggested a slow death of the old regime. With the death of Bhumibol in October 2016,

the royal political network engineered by Bhumibol himself began counting down the days. The demise was warranted, primarily because the royal political network was faithfully crafted around the existence of Bhumibol, The future of this network was further obscured by the fact that his successor, King Mafia Vajiralongkorn, failed to follow in the footsteps of his able father. The interregnum between the two reigns, one overwhelmingly sacred and the other stumbling through controversy, appeared to character-

ize Thailand for the time being. It was a dangerous interregnum because the major ally of the monarchy- the military-resisted political and social change and denied the alternative political forces led by the Shinawatra faction. The coup of 2014, the focus of this volume, can be construed as a

4

INTRODUCTION . . - - PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

reflection of a symptom of self-denial by the royal political network. "the old political script is moribund, but the new one is yet to be written. In this interregnum, one thus witnesses deep-rooted conflicts, long-drawn crises, a troubled kingship, an eccentric military dictatorship, a stifled economy, a miscalculated foreign policy, a chaotic Sangha (the Buddhist monastic order), politicized judiciaries, a persistent culture of impunity, incompetent

civil society and the proliferation of self-censorship. While some of these troubles predated the interregnum, they were exacerbated during the critical royal transition, and have continued to cast a long shadow over Thai politics beyond the transitional period. All of these are to be discussed in this book.

The Old Is Dying, and the New Cannot Be Born

The conceptual framework for this edited volume is crafted from the context just described. Almost one hundred years ago Antonio Gran sci asserted, "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid

symptoms appear" During this period, the "interregnum," society could experience a multitude of problems deriving from great anxiety over a possible shift in the status quo. In ancient times, an interregnum signified a time lag between the death of a royal sovereign and the enthronement of a new one. The royal succession inevitably brought about an interruption in the continuity of government, law, economy, and social order as well as the people's faith. in order to cope with discontinuity in the political and social order, the Romans enacted a law legalizing a proclamation of justitium,

which was a temporary suspension of laws previously binding while anticipating new and different laws being written and put in effect? Not long before Gramsci's idea of a chaotic interregnum emerged to form a political concept, Russia went through a seismic revolution in 1917. Centuries of absolute monarchy under the Romanov dynasty came to an end. Tsar Nicholas II and his entire family were executed in cold blood. Vladimir

Lenin explained his revolution as a thrust to cause a severe disruption in a political system in which the rulers still wanted to rule but the ruled no longer wanted to be ruled.' But Gramscfs concept of an interregnum elucidated further a situation whereby the old social order lost its grip and was no longer authoritative, and at the same time a new social order either had

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregrzam irz Thailand

s

not yet been designed or was too weak to ensure the functioning of society In this interregnum, the political space could become anarchic. In some cases, violence could be expected. The protracted Thai crisis, as argued in this introduction, is a reflection of Gramsci's concept. To be more specific, the royal transition exposes a

critical interregnum in which the political system of the past, imbued within the institutionalization of Bhumibol as the ultimate source of political legitimacy above elected institutions, is dying. Meanwhile, a new political system, experimented with in the past decade and spearheaded by alternative political forces-like that of the Shinawatras-remains unborn. From the coup of 2014 and the official end of the Bhumibol reign in 2016, Thailand had been entrapped in the interregnum. This is what Watcharabon Buddharaksa calls it, the crisis of authority which is in fact the crisis of hegemony and historical bloc. The situation of hegemonic crisis is a

circumstance of the society in which confusion occurs because there is no obvious hegemonic position among social forces during the time of crisis.' The monarchy of yesteryear is no longer in a position to provide political stability. Yet a new political model has not been fully envisaged. In this critical moment, the guardians of the old regime fiercely resist change. Meanwhile, the new monarch is lacking in moral authority. The royal political network is able to hold onto power only through tanks and politicized judiciaries. But Thai politics is simmering. The angry crowds are multiplying. The interregnum has produced a legitimacy crisis both in the outgoing regime and in the unborn one. Although the concept of the interregnum provides a central analytic theme tO this book, our primary goal is to reflect on how conditions in

Thailand leading up to and following the events of 2014 help us understand more enduring themes about the entanglement of the monarchy and political legitimacy The transition from Bhumibol to Vajiralongkorn must be seen as a historical moment that explains a crucial and complex period in Thai history, which includes Thaksin, the red and yellow shirt movernents and the royalist/antiqnonarchist conflicts, as well as the rise of the junta. The interregnum may have passed, but the effects are still being contended with, and the period was and still is an important period for understanding Thai society and politics. As highlighted in this volume, the interregnum has triggered a myriad of crises in Thailand on at least three dimensions-

6

INTRODUCTION

1.

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PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

a crisis of institutions that chiefly determine the fate of Thai politics. In this book, attention is paid to the roles of the monarchy and the military. The two institutions, seemingly inseparable politically, have been greatly affected by the departure of King Bhumibol. The crisis rests on the fact that Bhumibol's death brought about great instability in the monarchy Meanwhile, the military further exacerbated the political situation by holding the monarchy hostage. It has continued to exploit the royal institution br its own political benefits. It is this mission that, as Napisa Waitoolkiat and Paul Chambers argue in their study on the military,

has legitimized the army's central role on the political stage." 2.

a crisis of the state, broadly characterized by corrupt systems and a lack of good governance. The interregnum has unleashed multiple effects on state affairs caused by a royal transition from Bhumibol to Vajiralongkorn, ranging from the chaos within the Sangha, the judiciary and the economy to the crisis in foreign relations.

3. a crisis of the political classes, colored by persistent inequality, injustice, and discrimination. The division between "red" and "yellow" has morphed into another kind of division now best characterized as between "royalist" and "anti-monarchist." The gulf between them has widened following the 2014 coup in which the military employed state tools to undermine its political opponents, on the pretext of the need tO defend the monarchy. Almost everybody in Thailand is painted as a royalist or the other. As demonstrated in this volume, the people sectorfrom the media and social media users to nongovernmental and civil society organizations-has been immeasurably affected by the profound polarization during the interregnum.

Since the end of the Cold War, Thailand's political, economic, and social landscape has changed significantly. The political violence in 1992 as a result of General Suchinda Kraprayoon's ambition for the premiership was, ironically, perceived as the pinnacle of royal power a la Bliumibol. Footage of the two opposing camps, led by Suchinda and his nemesis Major

General Chamlong Srimuang, kneeling in front of Bhurnibol emerged as a symbol of the monarchy being the country's only stabilizing force. But also because of the political violence of 1992, Thailand was able to move the army back to the barracks, enabling democratization during the rest of the decade. This culminated in the writing of the 1997 constitution, dubbed the

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregtzurn in Thailand

7

people's charter. It was the 1997 constitution that partly paved the way for the rise of the billionaire-turned-politician Thaksin, who stormed the electorate in 2001. And the rest is the history of Thailand's long-drawn-out crisis encapsulated within a struggle between old and new political networks. One problem with the monarchy is that the institution was immensely personified during Bhumibofs reign. While the royalists exploited the per~ signification of Bhumibol for themselves, they disregarded the danger of the interregnum in which the new king would likely fail to match up with the revered charisma of his father. Worse, since the coup of 2014, Vajiralon born played a part in sustaining the volatile interregnum in the hope that the old royal political network would be resuscitated. Vajiralongkords lack of com mitment in promoting democracy, especially while Thailand was under military rule, may be used to buttress an argument in which the interregnum became a delaying tactic of both the monarchy and the junta against the return of a democratic government. Consequently, Thailand is trapped in a political crisis that has already damaged its prospects for democracy. But in the end, neither the monarchy nor the military can escape the possibility of becoming a casualty of the delaying game within the interregnum.

The Elections of 2019 On 24 March 2o19, Thailand held its first general elections since 2014. The

elections were supposed to be a historic opportunity for the country to return to democracy after five years of military rule, Old parties were joined by many new ones-all seeking to court the votes of millions of Thais,

many of whom had never voted before. For the international community the elections were seen as a test of Thailand's future as a democracy. In 2018 the European Union decided to resume normal relations with Thailand based on the junta's pledge to hold free and fair elections. The elections that took place, however, were criticized for being neither free nor fair. Almost as soon as the junta started to communicate its willingness to stage new elections, it used every tool at its disposal to create an uneven playing field. In 2017 it created and implemented a new constitution, which virtually guaranteed its ability to maintain control of the government regardless of the election results. Simultaneously the junta implemented the 20-year national strategy (2018-2037) that was drafted and passed by

8

INTRODUCTION

..

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

entities under the coup-installed regime and is highlighted in the constitution that obliges future governments to adhere to the strategy's plans. Cabinet members could be impeached if they refuse to comply with it.g "the junta then postponed the elections several times, banning all political activities until campaigning was finally allowed to begin a few months before the March 2019 election date. Once campaigning had begun, the junta and

the Electoral Commission (EC) took countess actions to stifle opposition parties and give their own candidates an unfair advantage. Seventy-seven political parties entered die fray, including three major ones: the Pheu "lhai (For Thais) Party, the Palang Pracharath (People's State Power) Party and the Democrat Party. Future Forward, an emerging party

spearheaded by the young billionaire Thanathorn Juangroongruangldt, also entered the race. Five hundred seats were due to be filled in the House of Representatives, with 201 seats needed tor a majority. The total number of registered voters was 51,239,638, representing a significant proportion of the country's population of 69.04 million. Of these, approximately 7 million

were first-time voters. According to the BC statistics registered on 28 March 2019, the voter turnout in the election stood at 74.69 percent, or 38,268,375 people. Thus, 12,971,263 people-25.31 percent of the total number of eligible voters-did not cast a vote." The elections were organized according to a new mixed-member apportionment system in which voters cast a single vote for both a constituency candidate and a nationwide party list, with the nationwide list used to achieve proportional representation. Under the new constitution, the prime minister is not required to be an elected member of the House of Representatives and will instead be chosen by Parliament. Additionally, Parliament

is now composed not only of 500 representatives, but also 250 senators appointed by the junta. By contrast, in the 1997 constitution, zoo members of the Senate were directly elected to serve a six-year term. Over the course of zo years, the Senate has gradually become an instrument of the 01d estab -

lishment to overpower the House of Representatives. In March 2019, the Thai media reported that the selection of senators had been completed. Reports stated that those selected had been linked to top leaders in the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), including Prime Minister Prayuth, Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan and Minister of Interior General Anupong Paochinda. Among the expected senators' names were Genera] Preecha Chan-ocha, brother of P1-ayuth, and

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

9

Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, brother of Prawit and former police chief. This list brings together a large number of military men with intimate connections to the military regime, suggesting the political ambition of the army in reserving its position in the political realm."

The Case of the Thai Raksa Chart Party One of the most important instances of irregularity in the 2019 elections was the disbanding of the Thai Raksa Chart (Thai Save the Nation) Party on 7 March 2019. The Thai Raksa Chart Party's inaugural convention was held on 7 November 2018. Owing to the design of the constitution, which was intended to weaken Thaksinls influence in politics, the Thai Raksa Chart Party was established to serve as a backup in case the Pheu Thai Party was dissolved. However, it later emerged that the party had been disbanded by order of the Constitutional Court." On 8 February 2019, in an event that was later dubbed the "S February Incident," the party announced the nomination of Princess Ubolratana Rajalcanya as its sole candidate for prime minister. Ubolratana is the eldest daughter of Bhumibol and the elder sister of King Vajiralongkorn. Her entry into politics was regarded as a political earthquake, since it was the first time a member of the royal family had become officially involved in politics. As a result, the responses from the public to her nomination were

mixed. Ubolratana received strong support from Thaksin's supporters but was heavily criticized by his opponents for intervening in politics and therefore violating the supposed tradition according to whit the monarchy

was supposed to be above politics. The response from the anti-Thaksin camp was ironic, given that the Thai monarchy has long interfered in politics, both directly and indirectly Shortly after the announcement of Ubolratana's nomination, King Vaji-

ralongkorn issued a royal statement condemning Thaksin for politicizing the monarchy and damaging the long-held tradition of royals being apolitical figures. VajiralongkorNs intervention, to a great extent, set the tone for the Constitutional Court to rule against the Thai Raksa Chart Party On 13 February 2019, the EC submitted a request to the Constitutional Court asldng for the dissolution of the party on the grounds that it had brought a member of the royal family into politics. The party was dissolved

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INTRODUCTION

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PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

with immediate effect on 7 March, and its leaders were banned from politics for ten years.

771e next government in Bangkok

After the elections, preliminary results showed that the Palang Pracharath Party won the greatest number of votes with 7,939,937, followed by the Pheu Thai Party with 7,423,,361. Future Forward amassed a total of 5,871,137 votes,

the Democrat Party 3,704,654, and the Bhumjaithai (Proud to Be Thai) Party 3,512,446. Due to the complicated electoral algorithm used to calculate the number of seats won by each party, the Pheu Thai Parry ended up winning the largest number of parliamentary seats with 135; the Palang Pracharath won 117, Future Forward won 80, the Democrat Party won 53, and Bhumjaithai won 51.13 However, one week after the preliminary results were announced, the EC claimed it had discovered mysterious "uncounted ballots," which meant that almost all political parties received additional

votes. Yet the additional votes were subject to the confusing calculation method of the EC for the party list candidates. The five political parties with the most party list candidates were: Pheu Thai (136), Palang Pracharath (116), Future Forward (81), Democrat (53) and Bhumjaithai (51)."' In terms of the geographical distribution of votes, the results showed that regionalism still largely defines Thai politics. The north and northeast regions, traditionally seen as strongholds of the Pheu Thai Party, with links to Thaksin, continue to serve as power bases for Pheu Thai. Statistically, Pheu Thai won 27.94 percent of seats in the north and 36.43 percent in the

northeast. The combined central and west regions were key to Palang Pracharath's victory. In Bangkok the situation was more complex, The Future Forward Party won 26.15 percent of votes, but Palang Pracharath won 2..74 percent of parliamentary seats. This result was unprecedented, since Bangkok has long been recognized as being dominated by the Democrat Party. The Democrat Party won only 15.44 percent of seats in Bangkok, winning zero parliamentary seats and Nnishin fourth in the popular vote in the Thai capital. In the south, the Democrat Party, as expected, won the most votes. Although the party was able to maintain its electoral dominance in the south, its overall share of the vote fell dramatically, from 73.52 percent in 2011 to 28.63 percent in 2019.

Coup, King, Crisis:A Critical Interregnum in Ufzailand

11

The stark regional differences in the party's results showcased once again the persistent nature of polarization in Thai politics. The red and yellow divide, crudely portrayed as a conflict between (conservative) urban

elites and (pro-Thaksin) rural residents, has not totally disappeared. Political reconciliation will, accordingly, be difficult. The parliamentary interregnum

period has the potential to further exacerbate political tensions. According to Thai political norms, the party winning the greatest number of parliamentary seats is eligible to initiate or form a government (a one-party government if it has an absolute majority, and a coalition government if it does not). Hence, following the elections, the Pheu Thai Party initially proposed forming a coalition government with the Future Forward Party along with other, smaller parties. However, this attempt by Pheu Thai was stymied due to the fact that the process of counting votes was enduring. Finally, the Palang Pracharath took the opportunity to set up a coalition government because it had won the most votes in the elections despite not gaining the most seats in Parliament. The wrangling between the two main opposing parties to form the next government intensified divisions in the political climate and became a part of the malaise of the interregnum. General Prayuth was able to return to the premiership with the endorsement of King Vajiralongkorn.

'No Current Political Atmosphere Prayuth formed his elected government in the aftermath of the elections in :-1019, with

Palang Pracharath as a majority ruling party. Beset by a string of

corruption scandals, the misuse of the national budget, the crippled econorny and the struggle within the ruling party, the government has encoun-

tered serious challenges derived from two factors: the widespread protests in 2.020 and the sharp rise of anti-monarchism. After the elections, it was evident that the first real challenge to the government was the mounting popularity of the Future Forward Party. Unlike parties of the past, the Future Forward Party proposed several priorities mostly designed to diminish the political power of the military-monarchy, including slashing the military budget, bringing civilian control to the military and reviewing the king's role in the constitutional monarchy." These priorities played into the hands of the military, supported by the Prayuth government, in depicting

12

INTRODUCTION

...-

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

'institution

the Future Forward Party as an enemy of the monarchy. Such a depiction provided a legitimate reason for the Constitutional Court to disband the party in February 2020. Although officially, the party was disbanded on the violation of election laws regarding donations to political parties, it was of the public understanding that the dissolution was because its existence defended both the royal and the military." Once again, the Thai court acted as the ultimate arbiter in the political conflict, a role criticized as highly politicized that could be traced back to 2oo8 with the judicial interventions against the Thaksin -endorsed Samara Sundaravej, Somchai Wongsawat and Yingluck governments. The judicial intervention was conceptualized as a land of "deep state" by Eugénie Mérieau, in which the Constitutional Court has been assigned as a surrogate king for purposes of its own self-interested hegemonic preservation." The role of the judiciaries in Thai politics is extensively discussed in this volume by Sarah Bishop.

The dissolution of the Future Forward Party led to the first round of protests mainly by students and the young generation-most of whom were key supporters of the party. But the protests were forced to stop abruptly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which, to a large extent, came to the rescue of the Prayuth government as it terminated what could have been an eruption of public fury against the party's dissolution. Although the Thai government was praised for its success in containing the spread of COVID-19 in the kingdom, it was criticized for exploiting the pandemic to

curb the people's freedom of expression. As COVID-19 began to fade away, groups of students kicked off a series of demonstrations in late July 2020. Soon, the demonstrations were joined by several sectors of Thais across the nation. The three objectives of the protest have remained: the dissolution of

Parliament, the amendment of the constitution, and the cessation of abductions and killings of the critics of the monarchy. It is the third objective that both fueled the anger of the protests and alarmed the military and monarchy about the rise of anti~monarchism. Since zo16, at least nine Thai anti-monarchist dissidents in neighboring countries were abducted, killed or forced to disappear." The latest victim, Wanchalearm Satsaksit, a Thai dissident in Cambodia, was abducted in broad daylight on 4 Lune 2020 and has yet to be found again. While the lack of solid evidence failed to connect the crimes with the palace, protesters continued to address the issue of abduction in the context of the climate of fear built upon the reign of Vajiralongkorn. His military-like royal

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

13

governance, coupled with the murky process of promoting or demoting his subordinates and the mysterious deaths of some of them, solidified a belief that there existed a connection between the palace and the tragic incidents occurring in the Thai dissidents community. 'this belief prompted Thais to

elevate their protests such that they now seem openly anti~monarchist. The protesters, accordingly, are calling for an immediate nionarcliical reform. The ten-point demand for the monarchical reform forms a basis of the protests. Among the ten points are the abolition of the lose-majesté law, the nullification of an order that grants Vajiralonglcorn a private military unit, the separation of his personal assets and that of the crown, and the scrapping of propaganda and glorification programs for the monarchy" A truly new political phenomenon in "lhailand, the wave of nationwide anti-monarchy protests has quickly transformed the political landscape, visibly as a lingering effect of the interregnum.

Outline

of the Book

In 2o14 the book "Good Coup" Gone Bad: Y71ailanal's Political Developments since Tlzaksinis Downfall was released. The result of a workshop organized at Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 2010, it delved into the military coup of 2006 and how the Thai political domain had been reshaped

after the collapse of the Thaksin government. The current volume, Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand, follows up on some of the themes in that earlier work and takes it in new directions. The first workshop for this volume took place at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto

University, in Tune 2016. The final workshop was held at Stanford University's Asia Pacific Research Center (APARC) in January 2017. The project was partially funded by APARC, thanks to the kind support of Professor Don Emmerson. Thanks also go to a number of individuals who unfailingly supported this project, including James Scott, Michael Herzfeld, Erik Harms, and especially Kristine Mooseker for her assistance with the manuscript. In this volume, as mentioned earlier, the discussion focuses primarily

on the coup of 2o14, explicating the political crisis that is described as a symptom of a dangerous interregnum during the transition from Bhumibol to Vajiralongkorn. It is divided into four parts, covering various aspects of "lliailand and the effect of the interregnum on them. The discussions on the

14

INTRODUCTION

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

conceptualization of political change, the monarchy and other key institutions, as well as the opposition to the military regime, showcase different symptoms engendered by an awkward reality in which the system of the past has ceased to function but the new one is unborn. The results have been the failure of political organs, some obsolete political ideologies, a wobbly throne, a ruthless army and a weakening democratic institution.

Conceptualizin8 Thailandk political change The political conflict that commenced prior to Thaksin's downfall has lasted into the current period and is discursively described by the royal political network as an unrelenting fight against corrupt and immoral politicians. Enemies wrote off the two Shinawatras, Thaksin and Yingluck, painting them as sources of infectious diseases that deserved to be eliminated at all costs. But Thaksin and Yingluck are not alone Ln fighting back against their enemies. Their supporters, mostly found in the red shirt movement, have

become more devotedly loyal to their leaders as the enemies continue to attack them more harshly and unjustly. From this perspective, the political conflict is not confined within the narrow narrative of the old political system being challenged by the new political alternative. But the conflict has directly involved proxies on either side of the political divide, one repre-

senting the old and the other aligning with the new. In crude terms, scholars characterize this conflict as "yellow versus red," to represent the dying old and the unborn new. Federico Ferrara in chapter 1 seeks to improve upon existing explanations of Thailand's domestic political conflict, theorizing its

"microfoundations" in a manner consistent with the facts of the case as well as what is known generally about human motivation, cognition, and behavior. He thoroughly discusses the concept of a "struggle for recognition" among the proxies of the two political poles. Ferrara argues that the Thai conflict was fueled by a desperate search for recognition, particularly by the red shirts, who have long been marginalized by the royal political network. Recognition, whether political or social, is part of an identity politics that has become more visible and convoluted through deep color-coded politics in the past decade. Members of the royal political network, loosely identified with the yellow-shirt middle class, have striven to exercise their political strength to counter the challenges from the red shirts in the rural

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

15

a

constituencies and to show their disapproval of politics la Thaksin and Yingluck. Meanwhile, politically marginalized residents of the northern and northeastern regions of Thailand, who had been able to climb up the political ladder during the Thaksin and Yingluck years through the triumphant electoral democracy reacted strongly due to their frustration with the royal political network, as evident in the red shirt demonstrations in central Bangkok in May 2010. These demonstrations ended tragically with almost one hundred protesters lolled and more than two thousand injured. Putting this in a larger context, Ferrara reflects on how Thailand's protracted state of crisis might inform the study of the middle~class backlash against electoral democracy taking place in parts of the developing world a major factor behind the early twenty-first century's global democratic recession. In the Thai case, violent identity politics reemerged during the

interregnum. Politics and society have been deeply polarized. Any early forecast of who will be the eventual winner is futile. In chapter 2, Claudio Sopranzetti presents another theoretical framework to analyze the Thai crisis through a binary concept of power defined

by "charisma versus authority." Political stability was guaranteed under Bhumibol by the worldng relationship between two types of power: charisma and authority. Charisma, or bararni. was a land of power embedded within moral conduct. Hence, Thailand needed to be ruled Br "good people." Meanwhile, another kind of power rested on the people and the ability to

mobilize them through either the democratic process or physical power, This type of power is called "amrz&t," or authority. Bhumibol demonstrated how the two concepts of power could coerdst through his own moral authority made possible by the state's propaganda and through physical power backed by the ruthless Thai army. At the height of the anti-Yingluck demonstrations, the People's Democracy Reform Committee (PDRC) repeatedly called for the return of moral politics to triumph over Yingluclis dirty politics. In this process, "good people" had to take the lead in finding a way out of the crisis. "Good people" had long been a theme within Bhumi-

bol's idealistic politics, as apparent in his numerous speeches. In other words, the monarchy was a representative of political morality. By championing "good people" over bad politicians, the PDRC gave itself a kind of royal legitimacy and hence made its anti-Yingluck mission a moral one . Sopranzetti argues that the current political crisis is not a new phenol enon. It is often misinterpreted

as a new political symptom radically

16

INTRODUCTION

-- PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

different from that of the past. Thailand has experienced crises in which power as moral conduct and power as electoral authority have been in conflict. As the conflict became dangerously intensified, Bhumibol stepped in

to set a new balance. But with Bhumibol gone, the new king lacks moral authority and has little faith in electoral power. Therefore, when Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, also the leader of the 2o14 coup, preached to Thai society about the need to support "good people" in times of crisis, his idea was rejected by those who still had faith in the power of the electorate. The solution to the current crisis rests on how the two concepts of power can coexist. But the interregnum seems to have prevented this coexistence. The moral authority of "good people" has died with Bhumibol. But the power of the electorate has not been allowed to be born either.

Y71e monarchy in focus

The royal succession in 2016 was critical to the future of Thai politics, not only because of the interruption of the reign as theorized by Gran sci, but also because of the anxiety that came with the end of royal hegemony under Bhumibol. The question for the royal political network has been' Will the next king be able to provide the same stability to its supporters? If not, what must be done? These questions in effect overshadow the importance of democracy as a preferred political regime in the post-Bhumibol period. More than a decade after the publication of The King Never Smiles, in

chapter 3 Paul Handley looks back to when the banned book was first launched in 2oo6 and marked a new trend in the study of monarchy in Thailand. In this chapter, Handley proves that his predictions about the future of the Thai royal institution in The King Never Smiles were largely accurate. Now that Bhumibol has left the political scene, Handley again offers his analysis on the nature of the monarchy, this time in the hands of Vajira~ longhorn. Should history provide insights into the current problem with the monarchy, Vajiralongkorn may find the key to his survival in a reform

of the institution. Handley discusses the concept of sacred monarchy, but he emphasizes the importance of the monarchy to be desacralized. Under the current reign, fear is used as a tactic to control the curious populace.

Coup, King Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

17

This is effective but can be only short lived. Handley argues that fear is not a recipe for the monardly's survival. Employing Samuel Huntington's thesis on the political modernization of traditional monarchies, Handley focuses on the reinvention of Thai monarchs, which he sees as a failure. Huntington asserted that the modernization of monarchy requires a redistribution of power, an ability to innovate policies and promote social and economic reforms." Vajiralongkorn, although too early into his kingship, has never demonstrated his capacity or indeed intention, to work toward modernizing the monarchy. The junta might be enthusiastic about managing the royal succession to confront the unknowns that could erupt during the transition. But it is clearly unable to keep Vajiralongkorn in check. This sends out a key message of an erratic relationship between Vajiralongkorn and the military. In chapter 4, Charnvit Kasetsiri examines the development of the concept of neo-royalism a la Bhumibol. Charnvit traces Bhumibol's ambitious lifelong project of kingmaking. He explores the early years of Bhuinibol

playing a national family man through to the tumultuous time of the Cold War, when he forged a political alliance with the military, firmly backed by the United States. During this period, the international image of the Thai

monarchy was carefully crafted. Domestically the growing despotic atmosphere drove pro-democracy students to the streets, leading to a democratic upheaval that challenged the royal power. Meanwhile, Bhumibol shored up his power on other fronts by implementing a large number of royal developmental projects to win the hearts and minds of the people, particularly in marginalized regions. The 198os was a crucial period during which the

network monarchy was fully strengthened. This paved the way for the culmination of royal power in the 199os, particularly the creation of the king's image as a stabilizing force following the Black May event of 1992. But the peak of the Bhumibol era lasted for just a decade. in the early twenty-first century new political forces emerged, finally bringing an end to the Bhumibol reign amid great anxiety about the future outlook for the monarchy. Chapter 5 follows up on the previous discussion on the monarchy by highlighting the royal crises while tracing their origins. Kevin Hewison asserts that the succession of Vajiralongkorn was hardly a new crisis. indeed, Vajiralongkorn himself has been a never-ending crisis of the monarchy from his childhood into his adult years. At the outset, Hewison seems to

18

INTRODUCTION

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

contest the idea of the dangerous interregnum by positioning the royal succession of 2016 in the larger historical context of the "fai royal family constantly dealing with challenges and controversies stemming from Vajiralongkorn's erratic behavior. In other words, Vajiralongkorn does not neces-

sarily represent a new devastating crisis that has led to a chaotic interregnum. The royal succession, according to Hewison, has been a protracted one. A sort of inertia has set in, with Thai society having had to cope with their heir apparent since he was elevated to that position in 1971. VajiralongkornS bad life decisions, from his marriages to divorces and involvement in underhand dealings, created a series of crises long tainting the process of royal succession. His notoriety has become normalized. In this chapter, Hewison examines Vajiralongkorn and the malting of his reputation, which continues to darken the monarchy while threatening the institution that was carefully constructed by his father. However, in my opinion, Gramsci's concept remains useful in interpreting I-Iewison's chapter. The crisis might not be born out of the new king's indulgent lifestyle. But it remains a quest son as to how long this series of crises will last. Will it result in the end of the monarchy? How will it affect Thailand as a nation defined by classes, with the monarchy ranking at the top? In chapter 6, Edoardo Start brings theory of kingship into a dialogue with Buddhist cosmology to highlight the relationship between monarchic legitimacy and violence. Siam shows that violence has long been a constitutive part of the legitimacy of Thai Buddhist longs, who are worshipped for their ability to wage war against the enemies of society in times of crisis. By pinpointing popular myths associating King Bhumibol with the warrior long Naresuan, and Thaksin wide the warrior king Taksin, he proposes that

notions of virtuous violence play a major role in legitimizing leadership across the 'fai social spectrum, irrespective of the recent political polarization. Siam postulates that this may enable Vajiralongkorn to attempt to secure his legitimacy by fashioning himself as a warrior king at a time that is characterized, in Thailand and beyond, by crises and by the continuous emergence of threats to society.

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

19

Institutions under military rule In the third section, the book investigates a number of critical issues that cast a long shadow over Thailand's troubled politics. A seemingly smooth royal transition is reinterpreted to reassess the interregnum, which, as this book argues, was far from a trouble-free event. In chapter 7, Paul Chambers examines the military and its intimate ties with the monarchy. Calling it a "monarchized military," Chambers asserts that the military took advantage of the royal succession not only to reinforce its relationship with the monarchy but also to entrench its position in politics. During the Bhumibol era the militaryanonarchy nexus was strengthened and became an interdependent relationship. The role of the military has not lessened after Bhumibol's death. in fact, King Vajiralongkornb dependence on the army to ensure an uncomplicated transition has resulted in an increased role for

the military in Thailand's atlfairs of state. Chambers explains that "monarchized military" can be viewed as a "social construct" that utilizes discursive symbols such as songs, emblems, flags, decorations, erudition, ideology, and various royal projects that connect kingship with the armed forces. The junta having ruled Thailand now for more than five years is a testament to its durability sustained by the lasting royal power. Prayuth twice issued warnings to Thais: in March 2018 he said, "There must not be protests under this rei8n";21 and in May the same year he said, "Under this reign, Thailand must be peacefuL"" On one level,

these statements show the alliance between the military and the monarchy.

On another level, such statements suggest an anxiety stemming from the possibility of popular revolts against the new reign. Under Bhumibol, the

military was able to manipulate his reverence with relative ease to dominate politics. Under Vajiralongkorn, the challenges for the military to manipulate the monarchy are manifold. This is a case of the Thai army needing to find new strength at a time when the new system is still unborn. Sarah Bishop, in chapter 8, delves into the judicial crisis. This chapter revisits the role of the 'Thai Constitutional Court. Prior to the 2014 coup, it had become increasingly common for the Thai Constitutional Court to be criticized for its politicization. "Judicial coups" become a well-known term in the political vocabulary of "fllailand. In the aftermath of the 2014 coup, the Constitutional Court was perceived to have been responsible for the

coup. Drawing on analyses of cases already highlighted in the literature on

2.0

INTRODUCTION

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

the Thai Constitutional Court, Bishop offers an alternative to such accounts.

The chapter commences with a reappraisal of the expansion of judicial power in Thailand, showing ways in which that expansion was more complex than is often appreciated. Bishop argues that the expansion was a product of a variety of long-term demands and not merely of the elites' plans. She provides evidence of political actors on both sides of the political spectrum remaining engaged with courts and that, far from seeking to create crises, as sometimes claimed, the Constitutional Court often seemed to be actively trying to avoid crises. While the role of the Thai courts in recent years has often been problematic, it is not appropriate to equate the

effect of actions of the Thai Constitutional Court prior to the 2014 coup with that of actions after the coup. In other words, it is misleading to simply blame the Constitutional Court for the 2014 coup. Bishop's findings unveil the true significance of the coup and the damage wrought by it during this royal transitional period. Following the chapter on the judiciary, there is a discussion on the Sangha. In chapter 9, Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang elaborates on the problems with the Sangha in the twilight of the Bhumibol era and the beginning of the Vajiralongkorn reign. Thai Buddhism, despite its status as the de facto state religion, has indeed been in crisis for decades. "flue Sangha Council, the central authority overseeing the Sangha-the official monastic order-has been under attack for its immense wealth, laxity, and inability

to connect with the younger and more pluralistic Thailand. The Sangha Council's dwindling authority has allowed the rise of new Buddhist movements that undermine its hegemony. Among them is the controversial Dhamniakaya Temple, which has rapidly expanded and attracted thousands of ardent followers. Previously, these two giants, the Sangha and the Dham -

makaya, had always managed to avoid direct confrontation. However, conflict became inevitable when the Sanglia Raja, the supreme leader of the Thai Sangha, passed away and a troubled succession followed. This incident coincided with the 2014 coup, whose main supporters were conservative

nationalist elites who portrayed Dhanimakaya as a threat to their national identity and so urged the junta to intervene. The result was the highly dramatized raid of the Dhainniakaya Temple, which ended in the unfinished victory of the Sangha Council. The junta's intervention did not address the underlying problem of this archaic organization, rendering any attempt to restore the Sangha Council's past glory as potentially futile. In May

2018

Coup, King, Crisis' A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

21

another influential monk, Buddha Issara, was arrested for, among other things, royal forgery. He was an activist monk with a pro~rnonarchy agenda. He helped form the PDRC, which successfully removed Yingluck from power and installed a military regime. It remains unclear whether Buddha Issara was charged up on the instructions of King Vajiralongkorn. Nonethe less, the crisis in the Sangha might not have intensified if Bhumibol, a highly moral patron of Buddhism, was still alive. In fact, the crisis arose in tandem with the decline of royal power. Thailand's deeply troubled Buddhism best exemplifies how the religious institution has been trapped in the interregnum following the departure of Bhumibol, once a staunch pillar of the Sangha.

Krislert Samphantharak explains the economic situation during the current crisis by underlying the core weaknesses of the Thai economy. In chapter Io, Krislert posits that through tumultuous times in the past, the Thai economy remained largely immune from political hiccups; this earned it the reputation of "Teflon Thailand," an economy that was unaffected by crises. But Teflon Thailand has proven not to be durable after all. In 2014, after more than a decade of political turmoil, the Thai economy succumbed. Krislert offers interesting insights into the country's economic slowdown. "lhailandls economic performance was disappointing during this critical pe-

riod, with the average annual GDP growth being only3.2 percent, the lowest in Southeast Asia with the exception of Brunei. But Krislert cautions that it would be naive to conclude that the enduring political conflict was entirely responsible for the economic recession. In fact, the economic slowdown began long before the eruption of the Thai political crisis. This argument points to the fundamental weaknesses in the Thai economy, which include a lack of productivity improvement, out-of-fashion commodities, an ageing

society, a troubled education system and rising inequality. However, the chapter stresses that the interregnum, coupled with the global economic downturn, further exacerbated domestic economic problems. While Thailand is still searching for a new political system agreeable to all sides of the political divide, its economy continues to be clouded by uncertainty Chapter 11 diagnoses the effects of the 2o14 coup on the country's foreign policy. In this chapter I argue that the latest military intervention in politics and the royal succession together shaped a new kind of foreign policy that broke free from its traditional alignment with the West. in fact, the return of an authoritarian regime in Thailand this time coincided with

zz

INTRODUCTION

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

shifts in regional and international politics. The rise of China, the advent of Donald Trump in the United States, and the democratic recession in Myanmar and Cambodia all worked to the advantage of the military regime in Thailand. Dictators in the region rushed to congratulate the coup in Bangkok so as to underpin their own dictatorships at home. I argue that the

congregation of illiberal regimes in the region, including Thailand, has created a large dark hole in democratic development in Southeast Asia.

Opposition to the military regime

In chapter 12, Tyrell Haberkorn opens the final section with a crucial discussion on the questions of social justice and impunity "lie military regime has been marked by a series of human rights violations, including curtailment of freedom of expression, torture, disappearances, arbitrary detention and unjust prosecutions, which depart from the letter and spirit of the law. Five years after the coup, the "Hiai dictatorship shows no sign of waning. It is assumed that the junta's reluctance to relinquish power is partly because it realizes it has w`olated many laws that it claimed to enforce. Hence, this

chapter outlines how and on what charges General Prayuth and other members of the NCPO, the governing body of the coup, could be indicted under domestic criminal law and with respect to Thai.land's international human rights violations. Closely examining an attempt by a dissident organization to indict the NCPO for the coup, Haberkorn analyzes three possible cases of rights violations for future prosecution: the torture of Sanserif Sri-ounruen, the death while in custody of Suriyan Sucharitpol-

wong, and the (lack of) freedom of expression of Jatupat Boonpattaraksa.

While cases like these are not uncommon in Thailand's merciless political domain, defiance of the law has reached an unprecedented level that effectively terrifies the anti-junta and anti-monarchist elements. This climate of fear developed during the interregnum . Chapter 13 by David Streckfuss examines the rising self-censorship under the Prayuth regime. While I-laberkorn introduces the cases of intimidation against enemies of the regime, Streckfuss focuses on the state of paranoia among Internet users in the digital age. Paradoxically, although the digital landscape is known to be unfenced and hence proffers more space for free speech, the state continues to curb expressiveness by catego-

Coup, King Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

23

rizing it as a platform of speech crime that must be censored. This situation has turned cyberspace into a space for banal discussions, where meaningful discussion is muzzled, particularly on matters relating to the monarchy. Communications on social media, at a certain point, are paralyzed. With the enactment of harsh laws, such as the Computer Crime Act, on top of the lose-majesté law, the junta has successfully coerced social media users to practice self-censorship. Many arrests against lose-rrzajesté violators were driven by their activities on social media. Such cases include Jatupat and Praves Praphanukul, a lawyer arrested for lose-majesté due to his various statements on Facebook conveying anti-monarchist sentiment. Praves refuses to appoint a legal defense in court because he rejects the legitimacy of the politicized judicial system. In the final chapter, by Somchai Phatharathananunth, the role of nongovernmental organizations is thoroughly explored. Somchai argues that Thai NGOS used to be the leading force for democracy in the country. They played a major role in the popular protest that toppled a dictatorial government in 1992. After the demise of dictatorial rule, the NGO democracy movement became an important actor in the political reform process initiated by the elites. NGOS actively participated in political reform hoping that cleaner electoral politics would benefit the poor. "f11ey also played an important role in deepening democracy by mobilizing to expand social and political rights of the underprivileged in Thai society. However, in the first

decade of the twenty-first century, NGOS turned from vanguards of democracy to supporters of authoritarian rule by supporting the anti-democratic People's Alliance for Democracy and the military coup in 2oo6. This pattern

was repeated during and after the 2014 coup. Why did nGo transform themselves into antidemocratic forces? To answer this question, this chapter argues that the hostility toward democracy developed among NGOS long before the 2oo6 coup. Such hostility grew out of their frustration with the failure of elected governments to respond to their demands, which reached its height during the Thaksin government and continued into the Yingluck period. NGOS' hostile attitude toward democracy was influenced by their close ties with the elites, and their dependence on elites' funding in

particular.

24

INTRODUCTION

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

A Final Note This book sets out to examine the current state of Thai politics, which is entrapped within a capricious royal transition. Miles away from the capital, the north and northeast regions of "lhailand are still desolately searching

for a new social contract through which they can claim a fairer share of political resources, once generously offered to them by Thaksin. The old political paradigm, dominated by conservative loyalist elites, scarcely offered them political benefits; it thus became unwanted. But both Thaksin and Yingluck, still viewed as their saviors, will not return home anytime soon given that they continue to be viewed as a threat to the establishment. The rise of the Future Forward Party might have created hope for younger Thais. But their political eidstence met with an abrupt end, leaving a political power vacuum filled with uncertainty. So where does Thailand go from here? The answer is not straightforward. In this critical interregnum, the old system refuses to die. The refusal is often accompanied by ruthless measures to eliminate political enemies. The Shinawatra siblings are currently fugitives. The former Future Forward Party is struggling to make a comeback. Pro-democracy activists in Thailand are locked up from time to time. Dissidents overseas were annihilated. Elections are unlikely to deliver a genuine democratic regime. Certain clauses in the constitution are written to prevent influential parties, like that of

Thaksin or Thanathorn, from achieving a parliamentary majority. In the meantime, palace politics is not any less complicated or unpredictable. Queen Sirikit is bedridden. Should she pass away, Thailand will enter a prolonged mourning, The official coronation of Vajiralongkorn was on 4-6 May 2019, accompanied by an unexpected wedding and hence the elevation of the royal consort, Suthida (Tidjai) Vajiralongkorn no Ayudhya, to the status of Thailand's new queen. In July 2o19, Vajiralongkorn appointed Sineenat Wongvajirapakdi as his royal noble consort, the first woman to be a concubine of the long in almost a century. But three months later, he disowned her, stripping her of all titles and ranks citing her disrespectful conduct toward his wife Queen Suthida-a condemnation that appears in

the Royal Gazette." She disappeared from the public eye. Even more surprisingly, in August 2020, Vajiralongkorn reconciled with Sineenat, releasing

her from prison and transporting her back to Germany. Vajiralongkorn shortly thereafter issued a decree calling Sineenat "flawless" and ordered to

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in Thailand

25

have her titles and military ranks reinstated." Members of the public are not free to discuss these events, even those that will undoubtedly affect their lives. Since the Thai monarchy cannot be separated from politics, developments within the walls of the palace matter greatly to Thais. While the death of Prem in May 2.019 may have signaled the complete end of the Bhumibol era, royal dominance continues to cast a long shadow over Thai politics."

Thailand has come a long way from its political revolution of 1932. However, Thai democracy has progressed at a snail's pace. The royal political network, popularized by the demigod Bhumibol, is facing serious challenges.

But the monarchy's defenders are in denial of the shifting royal power. They are also in denial of the emerging political order for which the majority of Thais yearn. In this volatile royal transitional period and beyond, upholding political power becomes exceedingly important for the royal political network. If it fails, violence could ensue. An intriguing question is when any of this might occur.

Notes 1

The "official reason" behind the coup, however, was that the Yingluck government was corrupt. This is a classic justification of the coup in the Thai political context. 'lie military also claimed that its intervention in politics was necessary in order tO stop the conflict from escalating into violence.

2

Pavin, "Neo-Royalism and the Future of the Thai Monarchy," 1198.

3 McCargo, "Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand "

4 Grarnsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, 276. 5 See Agamben, State Di Eccezione.

.

6 Bauman, "Times of Interregnurnj 49

7 Watcharabon, "The Old Is Dying and the New Cannot be Born," 46. 8 Napisa and Chambers, "Arch-Royalist Rent," 47. Also see Raymond, Thai

Military Power. 9 'the National Strategy for 2018-2037 contains six strategies: national security; competiveness enhancement; human resources development and empowerment; broadening opportunity and social equality, environmentally friendly development and growth; and reforming and improving government administration. It was formally incorporated in the 2017 constitution in Section 65, which states, in essence, that the state should set out a national strategy as a goal for the

26

INTRODUCTION

-.

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

country's sustainable development under the principle of good governance to be used as a framework for formulating consistent and integrated plans in a congruous force to achieve such goal. Io

11

See statistics on the voter turnout in the 24 March 2019 elections, compiled by the Election Commission of Thailand (in Thai): https://w'ww.ect. o.tb/ewt/ewb' ect_tb/download/artide/article_2o19o328165o29.pdf.

For details, see "Ped Raicheu Sor Vor Suit Betset Sam Por" [Revealing names of senators, as picked by the three Ps], 9 March 2019, https://www.posttoday.con1/ politic/report/582759.

12

"Constitutional Court Disbands Thai Raksa Chart," Bangkok Post, 7 May 2019, https=//wwwlziangkokpost.con1/news/politics/16407géfconstitutionalmourtdisbands-thai-raksa-chart.

13 For a full report of the election results, see "Prakat Khans Kamrnakan Karnluaktang Ruang Phon Karnluaktang Samacbik Sapha Phutan Rasadon Babbangket Luaktang" [Announcement of the Economic Committee Thailand on the result of the elections of the members of representatives], hrtps~//www.eet.go.th/ chumphon/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=546. This report is based on the official announcement of the Election Commission.

14 Peck, "Final Election Results Leave Thailand Divided." 15 Yoda, "Thailand's Future Forward Party Survivies Dissolution Threat."

16 The party was loaned 191.2 million baht (about US$6 million) from its leader, Thanathorn, which, according to the court, counted as a donation . 17 Mérieau, "Thailand's Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court." 18 Pavin, "The Case of Thailand's Disappearing Dissidents"

19 Hathairat and Streclcfuss, "The Ten Demands that Shook Thailand." to 21

Huntington, "The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies." "Nanook Lan Nai Ratchakarn Nee Tong Maimee Prating Ruangmaidee Kerd-

khueng Praong Tod Phranet U" [Prime Minister says in dis reign there must not be protests or bad events. The long is watching, Thai Post, 22 March 2018, https:f/www.tl-iaipost.net/main/detail/5591 22

"Prayuth Yum Ratchakarn Nee Baan Muang Tong Sa-ngob Plodphai Wanni Maitoug Pratuang Kamlaugdcaunna So Karnluektang [Prayuth emphasizes in this reign Thailand must be safe. There must not be protests today. The country is heading toward elections, Prachatai, 23 May 2018, https://prachatai.com/ journal/2018/05/77074.

23 See the Royal Gazette dated 21 October 2019 (in Thai): http:/fwww.ratchakitcha

.soc.go.th!DATA/PDF!2562/B/o55/T_ooo1.PDF.

24 Ruffles, ""Hlai King Reinstates 'Flawless' Consort."

25 Pavin and Kurlantzick, "Prom Tinsulanonda's Legacy."

Coup, King, Crisis: A Critical Interregnum in 'Htailand

27

References

Agamben, Giorbio. Stato Di Ecceziorie [State of exception]. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri,

2003.

Bauman, Zygmunt. "Times of Interregnum." Ethics and Global Politics 5.1 (2012):49-56.

BLL11, Martin, and Martin Rhodes. "Between Crisis and Transition: Italian Politics in the 199os" In Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics, ed. Martin Bull and Martin Rhodes. London: Frank Cass, 1997. Gran sci, Antonio. Selection from Prison Notebooks. Ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowe11~Smith. London: Lawrence and Wis fart, 1971. Hathairat Phaholtap and David Streckfuss. "The Ten Demands that Shook Thailand" New Mandala, 2 Sep. 2020. https://wwwnewmandala.org/the-ted demands~that-shook-thailand/

.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies." Daedalus 95.3 (Summer 1966):763-88.

la/lcCargo, Duncan. "Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand." The Pacyic Review 18.4 (Dec. 2005):499-519. Mérieau, Eugénie. "'llaailand's Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997-2015)." journal of Contemporary Asia 46.3 (2o16):445-466.

Napisa Waitoolldat and Paul Chambers. "Arch-Royalist Rent: The Political Economy of the Military in Thailand." In Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia, ed. Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2o17.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun. "The Case of Thailand's Disappearing Dissidents." New York Times, 14 Oct. 2019. https://wvwv.nytimes.c:om/2019/10/14/opinion/thailand-dissidents-disappearance-rnurdenhtml.

. "Neo-Royalism and the Future of the Thai Monarchy." Asian Survey 55.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2015)-1193-216.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Joshua Kurlantzick. "Prey Tinsulanondas Legacy -and the Failure of Thai Politics Today." Council on Foreign Relations, 28 May 2o19. httpsz/lwww.cfr.org/blog/prem-tinsulanondas-legacy~and-fail~ ures-thai-politics~today?utn1_mediun1=social_share&utm_source=tw.

Peck, Grant. "Final Election Results Leave 'Thailand Divided." The Diplomat. Io May 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2o19/o5/final-e1ection~results-leave-tl1ailand-divided/' . Raymond, Gregory Vincent. Thai Military Power. Copenhagen: NIAS Press,

2o18.

28

INTRODUCTION .

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

Ruffles, Michael. "Thai King Reinstates 'Flawless' Consort." The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Sep. 2020. https:l/www.smh.com.aulwor1d/asia/thai-1d.ng-reinstates-flawless-consort-zozoogoz-p55rub.htm1.

Watcharabon Buddharaksa, "The Old Is Dying and the New Cannot Be Born: 'Past and Present' of Thailand's Organic Crisis." In Revisiting Gramscik Notehooks, ed. Francesca Antonini, Aaron Bernstein, Lorenzo Fusaro and Robert

Jackson. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Yuda, Masayuld. "Thailand's Future Forward Party Survives Dissolution Threat" Asian Nikkei Review, 21 Ian. 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Thai1and-

s-FutureForward-part surv1'ves-dissolution-threat.

Conceptualizing '171ailarzd's Political Change

1 Understanding 7Nailand's Domestic Political Conflict: Democracy, Social Identity, and the "Strugglefor Recognition"

FEDERICO FERRARA

THA1LANO'S PUBLIC IMAGE of a tranquil, tradition -bound Buddhist kingdom, united in its submission to the transcendental leadership of a "universally revered" monarch, did not survive the ravages of the ugly political

conflict that engulfed the country since 2005.1 Thailand's royalist establishment and its supporters, drawn primarily from Bangkok's middle- and upper-middle classes as well as the conservative southern region, were once seemingly secure in their position atop the nation's status hierarchy but have scrambled to salvage a fading political order against the most severe threat ever mounted to the establishlnent's continued existence. Backing the challenge to the country's royalist political order is a "coalition of the ascendant" that joins new business elites with portions of the former

peasantry-especially in the ethnically distinct and historically underdeveloped north and northeast regions--whose modernization has swelled the ranks of the urban working class and propelled the emergence of a provincial lower-middle class.2 Steadfastly defending a political system claiming to embody unique, centuries-old traditions, royalists have fallen back on their control of the armed forces, the civil service and the justice system to effectuate the removal of five prime ministers leading popularly

elected governments, dissolve four governing political parties, suspend the political rights of hundreds of politicians, jail an unprecedented number of people on charges of sedition and lose-rrrajesté, and twice exploit periods of military rule (2006-7, 2014-present) to redesign the count;-y's institutional

31

32

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FEDERICO FERRARA

architecture in order to break-or otherwise render inoffensive-the elect total dominance of their "populist" rivals. Perhaps most significantly, the elite-level struggle waged by royalists and allies of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has contributed to politicizing and polarizing ordinary people like never before in the history of Thailand. Indeed, the conflict has played out most memorably in the streets of Bangkok, where rival mass movements have taken turns staging prolonged, disruptive, and at times violent demonstrations. Beginning in 2oo5 and 2oo6, royalist protesters clad in yellow shirts- symbolizing their allegiance to the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1927-2016; r. 19462o16), at the time the world's richest and longest-serving monarch-or, more recently, in the red, white, and blue of the country's tricolored flag

have hounded elected governments accused of corruption and anti-monarchist subversion, setting the stage for their removal at the hands of the military or the courts. In response, 'Ihaksin's populist, red-garbcd supporters have sought to bring down royalist administrations accused of thwarting

their aspirations of empowerment. Military crackdowns on red shirt demonstrations in April and May 2010 resulted in the deaths of nearly one hundred people. On occasion, supporters of the two groups also clashed with or attacked one another-over the six months leading up to the military coup of 2.2 May 2014, a series of incidents claimed the lives of some two dozen civilians and a handful of police of-licers. In an implicit acknowledgment that the romanticized image of a united, harmonious nationcontrived though it ever was-now lay in ruins, Thailand's ruling military junta explicitly justified its seizure of power by promising to "make love of unity spring from the nation's people as it did before" (hai . .. . praehachon

Mai chat poet k h a n rak khwatn sarrzakkhi cheri dao kap huarig thi than ma).3 Iunta officials openly described the measures imposed pursuant to that goal, which have amounted to the most expansive rollback in civil and political rights in four decades, as the means by which to restore Thailand's "submission culture" and rekindle the people's love for its traditional institutions.5

Thailand's persistent state of crisis-itself the culmination of eight decades of political instability, over which the country has experienced a succession of 13 coups and 19 constitutions-has been the subject of disparate interpretations. Explanations that stress the "classless" nature of the struggle,6 said to boil down to a clash of elite factions and their networks of

Understanding Thailand? Domestic Political Conflict

33

patronage, paint an overly simplistic picture of the ordinary people who participate in the activities of both camps, infantilizing them as rubes whose support can be purchased through material inducements or manufactured Mou8h propaganda. Having said that, writers who stress the importance of elite interest are correct to point out that the crisis's portrayal as the expression of "class conflict" fails to account for the cross-class nature of both alignments, as vast swaths of the country are solidly "red" or "yellow" regardless of class. The statistic often mentioned in works that emphasize the role of inequality- namely, that the provinces voting with

the royalist Democrat Party are a great deal more affluent than those where

Thaksin and his allies are most popular7-introduces the possibility that voters define their economic interests on the basis of how much their regions stand to gain from redistributive, "populist" policies. But while it is certainly the case that Thaksin-backed political parties have done especially well in relatively poor regions (the north and northeast) and especially poorly in relatively aitluent regions, their support within these regions did not vary all that strongly with measures of provincial income per capita, nor did it track all that closely with how well such provinces have done

economically in the last 15 years." Even in the city of Bangkok, where class is a rather more accurate predictor of partisan affiliations, the "pathological hatred of ThaksinHQ prevalent among the middle and upper-middle classes far exceeds what a reasonable assessment of the threat that "populist" policies present to this constituency's economic interests might warrant. Inequality matters. Materialist explanations, however, cannot entirely

account for the ways in which it matters. Questions of a different nature can be raised about writings that have

sought to explain Thailand's ongoing political crisis as the expression of a more ideological conflict. In an update to an old but popular theory that traced Thailand's instability back to the different conceptions of democracy held by urban and provincial populations," for instance, Dan Slater points to "an underappreciated tension between different types of democratic accountability," arguing that the "careening" between "populist and oligarchic modes of politics" generally takes place when "actors who argue that

democracy requires substantial inclusivity of the entire populace (vertical accountability) clash with rivals who defend democracy for its constraints against excessive concentrations of unaccountable power, particularly in the political executive (horizontal accountability)."" Others have been

34

1 - . - PEDERICO FERRARA

more cautious in granting "democratic" status to the aspirations of the opposing sides, given the illiberal, "post-democratic" attitudes prevalent in both," as well as the tendency of royalists in particular to believe in accountability only when it applies to elected politicians. After all, Thailand's "royal nationalism"-an ideology elevated by the state to the status of a civic religion since the dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1958-

63)-has always been founded on the notion that the stability and prosperity of the nation require that "good people" (khan di, i.e., privileged royalists) be subje t to no formal mechanism of accountability at all." The military coup staged on 22 May 2014 removed all doubt on the subject, as royalists cheered the establishment of an illegal, self-appointed "political executive" that did away with all forms of "accountability" and granted itself absolute, unchecked powers in order to suppress all expressions of dissent. Far more accurate and useful as a starting point for analysis is Slater's characterization of the two camps' visions as "oligarchic" and "populist," which sets up an explanatory puzzle centered on identifying the reasons why different social constituencies came to align behind alternative ideological stances, some~ times in apparent contrast with economic self-interest.

This chapter seeks to improve upon existing explanations of Thailand's domestic political conflict, going beyond the elite level in order to theorize the conflict's "microfoundations" in a manner consistent with the facts of the case as well as what is known generally about human motivation, cognition, and behavior. Its central contention is that ':lhailand's domestic political conflict is best understood as an instance of a general phenomenon Francis Fukuyama has referred to as the "struggle for recognition."" Upon sketching out the general framework and basic theory of the case in the

next section, the chapter investigates key aspects of the conflict's "psychology" focusing most intently on the manner in which both sides' rank-andfile supporters develop partisan identities, acquiring in the process a set of preferences and beliefs that motivate them to cooperate in the provision of public goods for which individuals in both camps have regularly made personal sacrifices vastly in excess of the material rewards disbursed by rival "patronage networks." The chapters conclusion examines some implications for the study of democratic breakdown or "car-eening" in changing

societies.

Understanding Cllzailancfs Domestic Political Conflict

35

The "Struggle for Recognition A Frameworkfor Analysis Fukuyama's landmark study The Origins of PoliticaZ Order features a brief restatement of the importance of the "struggle for recognition," a universal phenomenon to which he previously ascribed a key role in the progression of human history. "Recognition"-defined as "an intersubjective state of mind by which one human being acknowledges the worth or status of another human being, or of that human being's gods, customs, and beliefs" -is described in Fukuyanla's original treatment as the centerpiece of a "non-materialist historical dialectic that is much richer in its understanding

of human motivation than the Marxist version," one accounting for "the prideful and assertive side of human nature that is responsible for driving most wars and political conflicts. Without discounting the importance of either economic or ideological motives, Fukuyama reiterated more recently that "a great deal of contemporary politics revolves around demands for recognition particularly on the part of groups that have historical reasons for believing their worth has not been adequately acknowledged."" Such demands may well have an "economic component," but "economic resources" are often "markers of dignity rather than ends in themselves?" Something similar can be said in reference to demands of a more ideological nature, tor while Fukuyama is right to contend that theories of political development must treat "ideas" as "fundamental causes," the adoption of the "moral narratives" on which political ideologies are based is rather more frequently the consequence, not the cause, of "people bind[ing] themselves into political tea1ns."18 Broadening Fukuyama's discussion of the phenomenon's "biological

roots," modern-day group struggles for recognition may be said to be driven by universal psychological dispositions human beings have acquired over the course of the species' evolutionary history. First and foremost is the human propensity for "status-seeking behavior" rooted in basic desires for subjective well-being, for control of one's social environment, for selfesteem and for the approval of others-all of which have a firmly established evolutionary basis." Indeed, as Robert Wright pointed out, though "the range of things that can bring status in different cultures" varies widely, "the mental machinery driving these various activities is fundamentally the same.>=20 At the same time, Fukuyama himself noted that demands centering on the recognition of groups, or the recognition of "an abstraction, like a

36

1 --.- FEDERICO FERRARA

god, a Hag, or a holy place," require more than the individual drive for status." The first requirement is the human capacity for abstraction and symbolic thinking. The second requirement is the "groupishness"" human beings have developed as a result of an evolutionary process that has equipped us with a "need to belongs complete with a tendency to engage in "social categorization" to define our own place in society, develop strong emotional attachments to our social groups, adopt markers that signal group athliation, and practice "parochial altruism"-that is, act in ways that further the interests of one's group and discriminate against members of other groups, sometimes at great personal cost. These psychological dispositions are also foundational elements of the "social identity theory" of intergroup conflict."

Proponents of "social identity theory" have long understood that status inequalities do not always lead to conflicts over recognition. Members of subordinate groups are known to embrace negative stereotypes about themselves or choose strategies other than conflict in order to affirm a sense of positive self-regard. Key to the avoidance of conflict is the presence of a "consensually accepted status system (or at least a status system that is sufliciently firm and pervasive to prevent the creation of cognitive alternatives to it)."25 Indeed, just as human beings can pursue status as if driven by a "higher, spiritual need,u26 natural selection has also given us the capacity to reconcile ourselves to status hierarchies and thus avoid the costs of fighting losing battles." If members of subordinate groups can challenge existing status hierarchies only to the extent that they are capable of imagining "cognitive alternatives" to the status quo, moreover, they should be most likely to develop a "positive ethnocentric identity" and choose strategies of "social

competition" in pursuit of equal or dominant status when the situation becomes unstable and illegitimate, sometimes as a result of an actual decrease in their "objective deprivation." In turn, the relational value of status renders "struggles for recognition" inherently zero-sum, for "one person's recognition can come only at the expense of the dignity of someone else.>>28 It could also be added, consistent with the work on "prospect theory,"29 that insofar as human beings value (and fear) losses far more than they value (and covet) equivalent gains, the preference to maintain the

status quo held by members of superordinate groups should be more intense than any desire for change subordinates might harbor. Indeed, social identity theory predicts that the groups whose superiority is

Understanding Thailand? Domestic Political Conflict

37

'Ln

challenged, at least to the extent that they still perceive it as legitimate, will often "react an intensely discriminatory fashion)330 and redouble their efforts to defend the status quo.

'1l1e Historical Construction of '171ailand's Political Divide Thailand's existing partisan alignments cannot be understood without reference to the place that different constituencies occupy in the "status system"

stipulated in an otlicial ideology described here as "royal nationalism"that was formulated during the country's state-building process at the turn

of the twentieth century, retooled and rendered culturally hegemonic by the royalist dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, revised and propagandized to saturation levels since the late 1970s, and increasingly challenged in the new millennium as a combined result of social change and the rise of elected politicians. Originally devised during the reigns of King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1910) and King Vajiravudh (r. 1910-25) in order to bolster the legitimacy of a newly built absolutist state, from its inception "royal nationalism" has conceived the 'fai nation in organic, hierarchical terms. Having

succumbed temporarily to the egalitarian ideas espoused by a Bangkokbased "movement for popular sovereignty -whose vanguard in the new "bureaucratic bourgeoisie,"" organized for the occasion in the People's Party (Khana Ratsadon), abolished the absolute monarchy in 1932-"royal nationalism" returned to serve as the state's official ideology upon the completion of the royalist counterrevolution a quarter of a century later. The alliance formed by the palace, the military, the civil service and

urban capitalists under the aegis of King Bhumibol and Field Marshal Sarit was never cohesive enough to build the kind of strong "authoritarian Leviathan" that emerged elsewhere in the region," or for that matter avert the establishment of a series of ill-fated electoral democracies since the 197os. Even so, royalist elites never lacked the unity of purpose required to suspend electoral democracy, by way of military coup, whenever their

efforts to domesticate or undermine elected governments failed to yield the intended results. Among the keys to the extraconstitutional authority still exercised by "good people," particularly when it comes to "protecting the

monarchy" and the social hierarchy over which "the institution" presides, has been the hold of its official ideology Inculcated through schooling and

38

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-- FEDERICO FERRARA

aggressive legal enforcement, as well as a massive, t a x p a y e r - d e d propaganda campaign that built for King Bhumibol a "cult of leadership" described by some as second only to North Korea's Kim dynasty," royal nationalism places anyone who questions "natural" hierarchies of status and power, underwritten by convenient interpretations of Buddhist ideas of merit and karma," beyond the pale of true "Thainess" On that basis, though all Thai nationals have long been formally guaranteed the same legal rights of citizenship, individuals are in practice understood to have legitimate claims to rights, prerogatives, and powers that vary with their respective distance,

in terms of the merit and purity revealed by social status, from the country's sacral monarchy." Arranged hierarchically between the "earth" and the "sky"-metaphors commonly used in Thailand to describe ordinary people and the monarchy-are the Buddhist clergy, the aristocracy, high-ranking state officials, business elites and Bangkok's middle and upper-middle classes, while a hierarchy of "informal citizenship" distinguishes between

the legitimate political role reserved for members of ethnoregional groups based on the degree to which their language and culture deviate from Central Thai standards."

'the existential challenge mounted more recently against Tllailand's royalist order materialized as a combined result of macrostructural processes and more contingent developments related to the rise and fall of Thaksin Shinawatra. Having first been elected prime minister in 2001, with the

support of Bangkok's staunchest royalists as well as "the greatest assemblage of large business groupsuse ever to coalesce behind a political party in Thailand, Thaksin's Thai Ran Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party went on to dominate the 2005 general elections in every region except the south. Aside from

registering massive gains in the north and northeast regions, Thai Rak Thai dominated constituencies in and around Bangkok. Ki the latter areas, the party's support among the middle and upper-middle classes had not been dented by the incumbent administrations contemporaneous prosecution of a deadly "war on drugs" in 20o3, or by the state violence it unleashed in 2004 in response to the unrest in Thailand's predominantly Muslim, southernmost provinces-events that would later serve to rationalize Thaksin's unlawful removal at the hands of the military. Meanwhile, Thaksin's "populist" policies had stopped well short of establishing a modern welfare state or restructuring the country's regressive fiscal system," while his incessant promotion of the monarchy-however insincere-signaled no desire to

Understanding Yhailandk Domestic Political Conflict

39

upturn Thailand's royalist order. Only Thaksin's quest to parlay his electoral mandate into the expansion of his government's power at the expense of unelected institutions implicitly challenged the long- standing royalist view that "political legitimacy emanates down from the monarchy" as opposed to "up from the people.""'° So, too, did "lhaksin's exhortation for ordinary people to work toward their economic advancement" implicitly challenge the royalist belief in natural hierarchies, reaffirmed most recently in King Bhumibol's articulation of a philosophy-the "sufficiency economy"-that limits the role of provincial populations to "localized and modest pursuits."" Thailand's partisan alignments as they exist today emerged largely as a consequence of actions taken by royalists after the 2oo5 elections in order to neutralize the threat that "lhaksin Shinawatra had come to present to their interests, status, and power. Academic work on partisanship in the United States suggests that voters identify with "partisan groups" by

"calllingl to mind some mental image, or stereotype, of what these sorts of people are like and squat[ing] these images with their OWI1 self-conception." Identification, therefore, is generally a question of how individuals "think of themselves in relation to" group stereotypes: "the terms Democrats and Republicans clearly call to mind different constituent groups, and how people feel about these social categories has a great deal to do with whether they identify with a partisan group and, if so, which one.731.1" Exhibiting at least an intuitive understanding of this dynamic, royalists founded their appeals to the urban middle class-the crucial swing constituency in Thai1and's periodic oscillations between democracy and dictatorship-on the creation of a stereotype of "typical" 'Ihaksin supporters that contrasted sharply with the self-image of Bangkok's educated class. The strategy had

already been tested, with encouraging results, as part of the Democrat Pat~ty's efforts to protect its stronghold in the south, where Thaksin and his supporters were successfully cast as a "demonic" other and a threat to local "moral ideals.>=45 It was much the same story in Bangkok, where royalists preyed on the urban middle class's fears of economic redistribution,"'

exploited the anxieties stoked by the former peasantry's economic and political rise," and questioned 'Ihaksi.n's democratic legitimacy by making

use of stereotypes that have long served to justify the placement of provincial populations-northeasterners in particular-at the bottom of "lhailand's status hierarchies. The success with which royalists have played up the notion that the provincial electorate's ignorance, credulousness, and

40

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FEDERICO FERRARA

corruption require the placement of the majority of the electorate under

the tutelage of "good people" underscores the power of these cultural stereotypes, especially when used in combination with the invocation of the monarchy as a symbol of social hierarchies besieged by the forces of modFor while this image of the provincial electorate may well have been "dangerous nonsense,>>49 its reaffirmation of the urban middle class's wounded sense of moral superiority also armed them with a righteous reason, in the words of ernization, globalization, and electoralisrn personified by Thaksin.

the American conservative William F. Buckley, to stand "athwart history,

yelling Stop.D5°

"Red" vs. "Yellow": The Politics of ldentity As evidenced by the results of the general elections that formally returned the country to civilian rule on 23 December 2oo7, the public relations campaign undertaken by royalists before and after the military coup of 19 September zoo6 drastically reduced the support Thaksin and his allies had once enjoyed in Bangkok and its surroundings. An unintended, Lf not entirely unforeseeable, consequence of the royalist efforts, however, was the concurrent hardening of Thaksin's support in the north and northeast.

Indeed, the fact that the hierarchical worldview of the country's royal nationalism was invoked to justify That11;-rpe of

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Table 7.2 Influence over array leadership by faction (2004-20), continued

I

178

7

PAUL CHAMBERS

the Royal Thai Army Headquarters, (2) the Royal Thai Army, (3) the Royal Thai Navy, (4) the Royal Thai Air Force, (5) the Royal Thai Police and (6) the permanent secretary of defense. The constitution also allowed political parties to nominate unelected

candidates for premier, including ex-junta leaders and ex-military personnel. If majority of the Lower House could not agree on who should be premier, then the 250 junta-appointed senators could join Lower House Members of Parliament (MPS) in selecting the premier, with unelected ex-junta leaders eligible." Meanwhile, an ncpo-appointed committee selected the commis-

sioners who oversee Thailand's elections." The junta similarly approved the appointments of heads of the other "independent organizations," including the ombudsman, Constitutional Court and National AntiCorruption Commission. Finally, junta and military leaders could remain influential across

771ailand's future democracy through a new National Strategy Committee (nsc), overseeing a National 20-Year Strategy for the years 2017-36, which broadly aimed to address reconciliation, reform, and national security issues.21 But according to Democrat Sat fit Pitutecha, "The committee is

coded in the draft as though to provide an extension of [military] power?" Thirty-five individuals sit on the NSC. Of the 17 permanent members,

only one must be elected (Lower House president). Nine others are dominated by the military or junta: Senate speaker (unelected); commanders of the army, air force, navy, armed forces and police; permanent defense minister; National Security Council secretary-general; and the junta~appointed president of the National Economic and Social Development Board. The Cabinet selects the remaining nonpermanent members (experts in various

fields) to Nveyear terms, as endorsed by the junta-appointed Senate. The selects the initial group of nonpermanent members." The NSC reviews the strategy every five years and can revise it based on changing circumstances. All government agencies and officials (including elected officials) must adhere to the legally binding strategy (in terms of policies, budgets, and missions). Otherwise the nsc can' order the National Anti-Corruption Commission to prosecute them, which can potentially lead to elected/unelected members being removed by the Constitutional Court. Elected governments must report progress on the strategy every annual quarter to the military-dominated Senate. Failure to comply can lead NCPO

the Senate to sanction the government.

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

179

Ultimately, the strategy was intended to extend military power following the eventual dissolution of the NCPO. The strategy retained military control over Thailand's policy and budgeting directions following the end of junta rule, ensures that elected governments either abide by military preferences in the strategy or else be forced from oitice, and gives senior military brass sitting on the NSC veto power in guiding Thai democracy. Enactment of the

nsc-led strategy cemented the establishment of behind-the-scenes "moderator" military tutelage, under the monarchy but above any government, perpetuating a leading role for senior armed forces personnel for at least the 20-year period of the strategy The strategy can always be extended.

Policies offunta Control The NCPO maintained control over Thailand's overall population by using nine control tactics. The first-central to the legitimization of the otherswas the junta's usurped replacement of legality with military-imposed false legality Such legal authority was derived from the application of Section 44 of the ncpo's Inly 2014 interim constitution." Section 44 states that whenever the junta leader believes it is necessary to deal with "any act," he can regardless of the legislative, executive or judicial force of issue "any order that order," and it will be considered "legal, constitutional and conclusive."" Section 44 is a catchall that legitimized all junta actions. The second strategy was the use of arbitrary arrests, often by a junta~ created Peace Maintaining Force (pmp). The PMP was tasked with arresting and detaining any person perceived by the junta as a subversive." Soldiers could hold suspects for seven days (though more days could be tacked on). "Attitude adjustment" detentions involved arrests without charge, where the detainees were forbidden access to attorneys and where there were allegations of military torture. By 2016, it was already estimated that there had been 1,oo6 people summoned for attitude adjustment." The third tactic, prosecution of civilians through military courts, commenced shortly after the 2014 coup. Procedures were more rapid in such courts than in others, were much less transparent and were presided

over by military judges. Indeed, the NCPO placed military courts at the top of the judiciary. Postcoup military decree 37/2557 required that criminal cases connected to national security (e.g., sedition, lose-rriajesté) be tried in

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military courts. By late 2016, approzdmately 1,811 civilians had appeared before military courts. A fourth tactic was the repression of political rights. Order No. 7/2.14 banned public gatherings of more than five people, with violators potentially receiving one year in prison. Article 12 of Order No. 3/2015 forbade gather~

ings of more than four people, with punishments of up to set months in prison. By 2016, these orders had quashed 130 academic discussions and public forums. In July 2o15 the NLA adopted the Public Assembly Act, which banned demonstrations within 150 meters of royal places, or inside parts of Government House, Parliament, and courthouses, and forbade

"disturbances" close to any public venue. Violators faced prison terms of up to six months." A fifth tactic was the dismantling of local democracy. In 2o14, NCPO Announcement 85/2014 suspended elections at subdistrict, municipality,

and provincial levels. New leaders would be appointed by provincial governors. Order No. 22/2016 transferred local administration appointment powers directly to the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Interior. Order No. 64/2016 replaced Bangkok's elected governor with NCPO loyalist Police General Asawin Kwanmuang. Section 252 of the 2017 constitution allowed for the appointment of local administrators in lieu of elections. These reforms recentralized central (military) authority over local administration.3° A sixth strategy was seizing direct control over policies in Thailand's

deep south, a region where insurgency has been endemic. Announcement 34/2014 canceled civilian control over the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center, transferring control to the army-dominated Internal Security Operations Command." Announcement 98/2014 formalized a

three-level structure to confront the insurgency. At all levels, the military could veto policy input by civilians." In 2019, when Thailand became a facade democracy, such military control over deep south policies continued. A seventh tactic was media censorship. Article 97/2014 stated that all media were prohibited from criticizing the junta. Article 103/2014 prohibited the revelation of information that might discredit the coup-makers. Radio, television, and the Internet came under the purview of the Oiiice of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC). Of the NBTC's seven commissioners, four were army oiiicers and one earned a certificate from "lhailand's National Defense College." Order No. 41/2.016 empowers the NBTC to shutter any telecommunications media deemed as

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

181

failing to cooperate with the NCPO or presenting information seen as a threat to national security." Computer crimes prosecutions rose sharply in Thailand after the 2014 coup: there were 6 in 2011, 13 in 2012, 46 in 2013, 71 in 2014, 321 in 2015 and 399 in 2016.3s The number has continued to rise, and in fact the Thai government has, since 2017, increased prosecutions based on the Computer Crimes Act rather than using Section 112 (lésemczjesté) of the Criminal Code. The NCPO specifically sought to unite all Internet gateways in Thailand in an effort to censor all Internet traffic.36 The eighth strategy was to enshrine military control over police while granting police authority to the army Order No. 13/2016 specifically granted military officials (including paramilitaries) the authority to arrest, investigate, and detain, powers previously granted only to police. Since the 2014 coup there has been "a systematic purge (of police) to ensure that those in key positions will cooperate with the military,>>37 The purge was owing to NCPO suspicions that pro-Thaksin police might resist the junta. The ninth tactic was the use of rhetoric, ritual, teachings, and populism. Punta leader Prayuth delivered weekly addresses on television and radio called "Returning Happiness to the People." The broadcasts promoted the

achievements of the NCPO. Meanwhile, the junta showered the country with pro-junta songs, shows, movies, media, and pseudo-fascist "values" required to be taught to children in schools." In 2015, the NCPO hired Thaksin's economic guru (Sornkid Jatusripitak) and initiated a diluted variant of populism--pracharath (translated as "state populism").3° The junta later gave this name to its self-established party in the 2019 election.

The 2019 Election and Postelection Military Power On 24 March 2019 a general election was held in Thailand. In almost all respects the election was a function of, by, and for Thailand's junta and military. The junta-endorsed zo17 constitution and organic laws guaranteed a manipulated victory for the junta's proxy party Palang Pracharath and other parties allied with it. This is because the junta could appoint, first, drafters on the Constitutional Drafting Committee to write the rules of the election which produced gerrymandering," as well as a skewed electoral formula; second, commissioners on the Election Commission to oversee the election; third, judges on the Constitutional Court

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PAUL CHAMBERS

to interpret the election; and fourth, soldiers to enforce the election results. At the same time, the junta did all it could do to assist its puppet Palang Pracharath to win the election." The results were not surprising. Though initially the outcome favored Thaksin's Pheu Thai party, the Election Commission thereupon announced that it was slightly changing the electoral formula calculation. The new calculation gave more seats to the pro-junta grouping of parties headed by Palang Pracharath, enabling it to form a coalition. Thereupon the ncpo-appointed Senate voted with this coalition to barely confirm junta chief Prayuth as Thailand's unelected prime minister in Lune 2019. The outcome allowed a pro~military government to retain power through a highly defective democratic process. To quell dissent, even before the election Army Chief General Apirat had threatened another coup if political conflict continued." The Prayuthled government, since launching its coalition, has been mired in factional bickering and Prayuth has indirectly warned of another coup if the chaos does not cease." There have been Thais who have organized protests against the NCPO and the current military-dominated regime. Specific examples include the

political groups Dao Din, Serf Kasetsart group, Liberal League of "lhammasat for Democracy (LLTD), Liberal Assembly of Chiang Mai University for Democracy (LACMUD), the New Democracy Movement (NDM) and most recently Free Youth. In July 2020, Thailand witnessed the largest demonstrations against the regime (which were led by Free Youth) since the 2014 coup.4°' Some anti-military activists have been severely beaten (by anonymous hooligans) to silence dissent. Nevertheless, anti-junta groups have

yet to prove threatening enough to pose substantial problems for the regime.

Postelection opponents to Prayuth and the military have not been limited to demonstrators alone. Within the Lower House of Parliament, the Future Forward Party (Ftp), which surprisingly saw a large number of its MPS elected in the 2o19 election, preached a platform that placed it on a collision course with the military: Its progressive and charismatic leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit espoused a popular platform of placing limits on military power and widening political space in Thailand. In response, Army Commander General Apirat threatened FFP, ranting on about communism and threats to monarchy." Ultimately, in November 2019, the repo-appointed Constitutional Court disqualified Thanathorn as

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

183

an MP on questionable legal grounds. Then, in February 2020, the court dissolved FFP, ruling that it had violated a minute technicality within the new junta- endorsed party law. Yet these actions did not stop growing public outrage regarding revelations of military privileges, abuses, and corruption. The abuses included a land scandal involving Prayuth,46 and luxury watch revelations implicating Prawit." In February 2020, a massacre of civilians committed by an army

official revealed that he had lost money in a shady military business scheme. The incident shined light on the enormous network of military enterprises

that have remained opaque and unaccountable to outside scrutiny. With the military's image tarnished, Apirat publicly promised reforms." But in

Lune, when an army whistleblower revealing malfeasance within the military was threatened with court-martial, the sincerity of Apirat's promised reforms were put into question." In sum, despite the 2019 advent of what has

appeared to be democracy, continuing military repression, impunity, and propaganda have helped to ensure that only monarchy, military, and military-dominated governance are able to shape political conditions while civilians' participation remains tightly controlled.

Monarchized Military and King M a f i a Vajiralongkorn On 1 December 2016, Thailand's new sovereign accepted the throne, but it was uncertain how he would approach the military: a pliant profligate, allowing the NCPO to control politics; a part-time monitor, sometimes concerned about military matters; or a proactive overseer, vigorously supervising the military to sustain a powerful monarchy. A clue to Rama x's mindset could be found in his decades-long connections to Thailand's security forces, observing his father's relations with the military, and his watching

the ebb and flow of Thai army factions. Following graduation from the Royal Military College in Australia, Vajiralongkorn joined Thailand's military in 1975 as an officer attached to

the Royal Thai Army's Intelligence Department. He attended the Royal Thai Command and General Staff College in 1977 and 1978, graduating in Class 56 alongside Army General Prakrit Wongsuwan (pre~cadet class 6), army chief under Thaksin (2004-5); Army General Chaiyanan Charoensiri (pre-cadet class 5), deputy minister of Transport (2005-6); and Police

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General Kowit Wattana (pre-cadet class 6), police chief (2004-7) as well as deputy premier under Yingluck (2011-12). In 1978 Vajiralongkorn was appointed deputy commander of the King's Royal Guards, First Infantry Battalion, rising to become its commander in 1980. In 1984, he was appointed commander of the First Infantry Regiment (Mahat Lek Ratchawa]lop).5° These units, under Army Region 1, were in

the Wongthewan army faction. Vajiralongkorn was a Wongthewan faction officer. In 1992 a Royal Guards Security Command (RGSC), headed by Vajira-

longkorn, was established under the Armed Forces Supreme Command. 'his "praetorian guard," which came to be called "Rachawallop (Royal Guard) 9o4,' was tasked with protecting him, and it came to include six

battalions of approximately 5,5oo troops, mostly organized from First Army Region troops and air force cadets and including an all-female "team.»5' On 19 November 2013, a 2oo8 Defense Act modification (Section 10) transferred die RGSC from the purview of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to that of the Ministry of Defense. The RGsc's modified mission was to coordi-

nate command and control regulatory practices designed to protect the king, queen, heir apparent and heir apparent's family (Section 14). The commissioner and deputy commissioner of RGSC would be chosen by Vajiralongkorn (Section 14). Also, the 25-member Defense Council within

the Defense Ministry now allowed the deputy royal aide-de-camp (army) and either the deputy royal aide-de-camp (navy) or deputy royal aide-decamp (air force) to be included in the body (Section 7).52 Prior to the 2014 coup, this Rajawallop force was sometimes assigned to protect Premier Yingluck Shinawatra and General Nip at Thonglek, the permanent minister of defense. On 6 April 2014, a royal decree was issued to expand and upgrade the powers of Rachawallop 904, as well as to

formally establish its troops to serve the RGSC under the Defense Ministry. "the decree created a chief of staff office for Rachawallop, chosen by Vajiralongkorn. Other duties included performing unspecified missions that he assigned." On 1 December 2016 King Vajiralongkorn promoted his consort, Suthida (Tidjai) Vajiralongkorn na Ayudhya, to be the deputy commissioner of RGSC while elevating her to become a four-star army general," Previously, on 17 July 2016, she had been appointed as a royal aide-de-camp (allowing her to sit on the Defense Council)."' Then, on 26 August, she was appointed

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

185

to be the commander of the Special Operations Unit of the King's Guard, Crown Prince's Division. Her ascent to the senior ranks of the military was extraordinary considering that she had only six years previously been an

airline flight attendant. On 1 May 2019, General Suthida was made queen consort, followed by the May 4-6 coronation of King Maha Vajiralongkorn. The king quickly asserted more direct control over state security

agencies. In May 2017 the Royal Thai Aide-De-Camp Department, Oiiice of Royal Court Security Police and Royal Security Command were transferred from being under the Ministry of Defense, Premier's Office and police, and brought under the palace's direct authority." In fact, by 2.02.0 the palace had gained direct control over the First Division, KingS Guard

and Royal Guard 904, both of which were absorbed into a newly renamed Royal Command Guard. These moves represented a monarchical heightening of the centralization of power over Thailand's security apparatusRama x's father Rama IX had practiced more indirect control over the military and police. The NCPO attempted to demonstrate its devotion to Rama X as a monarchized military, seeldng closer ties with the new king even before his

enthronement. In 2015, the junta feted the then crown prince to two cycling events ("Bike for Mom" and "Bike for Dad") honoring his parents. But revelations of financial scandals associated with each event earned Vajiralongkorn's wrath and embarrassment for the junta. Meanwhile, the junta designed Rajabhakti (Royal Zeal) Park (inaugurated by Vajiralongkorn in 2015) as a public garden built on army land in Hua Him District to showcase seven megastatues of "great" Thai kings. But again, corruption allegations surfaced, the NCPO (particularly Army Chief General Udomdej Sitabutr) was humiliated, and the palace was infuriated." Since 2017, relations between the Prayuth/Prawit~1ed regime and King Vajiralongkorn have been rocky First, historically, Vajiralongkorn's experi-

ence in the army was with Wongthewan while the NCPO had been led by Wongthewan's factional competitor B/QTG. Second, Vajiralongkorn enjoyed a positive bond with Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra when each was premier, while Prayuth acquired a reputation for being a Shinawatra family opponent. Third, the "Bike" and Rajabhakti Park scandals soured relations between the NCPO and the new king. Fourth, Vajiralongkorn's decision in

January 2017 to insist upon changes in the draft constitution before signing it in April was an embarrassment for the NCPO.

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Regarding the Privy Council, despite the long-rumored friction between Prem and Vajiralongkorn," the two gave an appearance of cooperation when the king reappointed Prom as Privy Council president following King Bhumibol's death. The ascendant sovereign appeared to be borrowing from Prem's model of militarizing the Privy Council-placing senior military brass on the k.ing's advisory body. The lung appointed the military strongmen Generals Teerachai Nakwanich, Daowapong Ratanasuwan, Paiboon Kumchaya, and Kamp rat Ruddit, Admiral Pongthep Nuthep, and ACM Johm Rungsuwan to the council." Teerachai is a B/QTG member, and his mother is a Mom Rachawong (literally "Royal Duchess," a distant greatgrandchild of the monarch, a condoner with high social status) dose to

the palace. However, in

2018

Teerachai was suddenly removed from the

Privy Council, indicating either the sovereign's displeasure with him personally or vexation at the B/QTG faction. Daowapong, Paiboon, and Kampanat are all members of the Wongthewan faction and worked under the NCPO. King Vajiralongkorn retained three older, highly influential military

privy councilors Generals Prem, Surat, and ACM Chalit Pukbhasuk. In 2018, upon Chalermchai's retirement as army commander, he too was appointed to the Privy Council. The large number of senior retired military officers on the Privy Council could indicate an attempt by King Vajiralongkorn to offset the army and junta dominance of B/QTG. Of the current 16 privy councilors, nine (a majority) are ex-military officials. This proportion represents an increase in the council's militarization. Turning again to military reshuffles, the October 2o16 appointments represented efforts by both the incoming king and Prom to lessen B/QTG'S sway over the junta in anticipation of King Bhumibol's death. By 2017, B/QTG'S influence had overshadowed the military and Thailand for ten years, appearing to have created an army faction dynasty. Vajiralongkorn seems to have supported the leapfrogged elevation of General Apirat Kongsompong to the strategic post of First Army Region commander in 2016 and further promotion in 2o17. Apirat reportedly enjoys close ties to tlle new king. Indeed, Apirat's father taught the the11 crown prince how to fly helicopters." In the October 2o18 annual military reshulile, Wongthewan faction leader Apirat was appointed army chief (retiring in 2020). Though Prawit's man Kukiat Sir aka was appointed as assistant army commander, the fact that he was a member of B/QTG meant that he was not in the palace-

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

187

favored faction and thus destined to be sidelined." The long's preferencesWongthewan faction and Apirat's control of army leadership were para mount. Moreover, following the 2o19 military reshuffle, there were no longer any members of the B/QTG of Prayuth/Prawit in the Five Tigers. Regarding the First Army Region

crucial to withstanding or supporting

coups-there was a similar pattern of Wongthewan's enhanced influence. Wongthewan's General Narongphan Iitkhaewthae was appointed First Army Region commander in 2018 and in 2019 ascended to become assistant army chief In 2020, upon Apirat's retirement, Narongphan is likely to become the next army commander." Under the First Army Region is the First Infantry Division (King's Guard), the unit traditionally crucial to security for Bangkok and the long. In 2019, that unit was headed by General Songwit

Noonpakdi, son of a 1991-92 junta member (General Issarapong Noon-

pakdi). In 2019 Songwit became deputy First Army commander. As a Wongthewan, he is likely to follow Apirat and Narongphan as future army commanders. Apirat, Narongphan, and Songwit are all members of Wongthewan, are all particularly dose to the new long, and all will guarantee his personalized influence across the armed forces for years to come." "fluey will likely revise the factional equilibrium such that Wongthewan comes to dominate senior army positions. As for Prayuth and the NCPO,

they are no longer a necessary force to the monarch. The new reign has consolidated its power, and the NCPO leadership's faction B/QTG, having dominated the senior army brass before the current reign, has, under the king, outlasted its royal welcome. Meanwhile, a massive military reorganization was taldng place in which army units aside from the First Division Kings Guard (such as the Second Cavalry Division) were being entirely moved out of Bangkok on the palace's orders. Thus, security in Bangkok is now tasked to the First Division King's Guard, which together with Rachawallop Infantry Unit 904 has evolved in 2o19 to become a praetorian guard called the Royal Command Guard that answers to the king alone." In December 2o18, Army Chief Apirat's son Peerapong was appointed to Rachawallop 904. Furthermore, a Royal Command Guard-dominated base of operations was established in eastern Thailand, the hub activities of B/QTG, thus checking the influence of Prayuth's and Prawit's army faction. Appointing senior military brass to the Privy Council, exerting influence over military reshuffles, and establishing a palace-controlled Royal Command

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Guard in Bangkok are indicative of a proactive monarch who appears intent on maintaining vigorous supervision over the armed forces at the dawn of his reign. Whether he succeeds in keeping junta and military leaders under his thumb will depend upon future circumstances. But at this point, he has shown a propensity for control.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that the Thai armed forces are, and will continue to be, a central institution in politics, though their future influence will likely

be veiled. Thailand has remained a khakistocracy-a parallel state of monarchized military. There are five possible future scenarios for the Thai military in terms of its influence over society as well as the nature of its atiiliation with monarchy The first, electoral ruler-type praetorianism, is where Thailand finds itself today. Military proxy Palang Pracharath is the continuation of the NCPO by more attractive appearances: a junta dressed in the guise of political party standing over a facade democracy. in 2020, though Prayuthled "democracy" has confronted protests both in Parliament and in the streets, it has managed to survive. Whether Prayuth's government can finish its term remains in doubt. Yet for the moment, especially amid the coronavirus pandemic, the state has been able to legitimize its continuation in power. The second, direct ruler-type praetorianism, refers simply to the return

of formalized military dictatorship, what Thailand experienced during the 2014-19 period. Such a scenario (though dominated by the Wongthewan

faction) might occur if, as in 1971, the senior brass together grow tired of the obstacles in managing protests or opposition in the Lower House under a facade democracy. Such a scenario might also occur if the palace endorses a coup against Prayuth by the Wongthewan faction in order to stabilize the new monarch's control to ensure that military loyalists to his liking are in senior junta and armed forces postings. This scenario would please the mil-

itary since it keeps Thailand from demilitarizing, which means continued high defense budgets and a leading political role for senior military brass. The third scenario is halfway ruler-type praetorianism, akin to the period 1979-88. This will be the scenario if the Palang Pracharath coalition

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

189

(as led by Prayuth) decides that its hold on power is too fragile but does not want to revert to straightforward dictatorship. As such, Prayuth or Prawit would become appointed military prime minister alongside an appointed

Senate while allowing the existence of an elected, though weak, Lower House.

The fourth scenario, moderator-type praetorianism, will come into play if an elected government is allowed to form, of which military or retired military oilicials are not a central part. But under this scenario, the military will remain highly influential, virtually overshadowing the state through both its continuing insulation from the directives of governments and its control of the committee overseeing the 2o~Year Strategic Plan. As such, the military would maintain supremacy across Thailand, answerable only

to the king. The final scenario, clear, unfettered, elected civilian control, is extremely

unlikely anytime soon. Indeed Thai history has shown that civilian governments that irritate military and monarchy lead to arbitrator-type praetorianism, with a coup ousting the elected civilian government, overseeing the writing of a new constitution, holding a new election, and then ensuring the ascension of a new civilian government more to the liking of the two

In 2o2o-at the time this chapter was written-military

power, as legitimized by monarchy, remains deeply entrenched. Only a specific combination of factors would shift "fllailand's path from this trajectory- negative environmental factors (such as severe economic instability), military disunity amid civilian unity supporting democratic deepening,

and a mindset on the part of a palace favoring solid, elected civilian rule. The October-December 2016 regal transition from King Rama IX to King Rama X and the 2019 coronation of King Maha Vajiralon1 born provided Thailand's "monarchized" military a rationale for prolonging and even entrenching power-its guardianship of the emergent reign. Though the king has sought to personalize his control over the armed forces, continued monarchical reliance on the military could simply enhance the military's already enormous clout. In 2019, NCPO dictatorship gave way to facade democracy. Meanwhile, in late May 2019, 98-year-old Prom died

and Surayud took over as acting chair of the Privy Council. The factional dominance of Wongthewan in the army stabilized under Thailand's new king. Army Chief General Apirat, together with Privy Council Chair Surayud, as well as Privy Councillors Chalermchai and Chalit, are today

7 - PAUL CHAMBERS

190

"managing" the royal guardianship role. Palace stalwart ACM Satitpong

Sukvimol, the lord chamberlain of the Royal Household Bureau, is also playing a growing role. Nevertheless, in the future the sovereign may decide to counterbalance leading factions against each other. Military disunity can be a successful avenue through which Thai monarchs gain a preponderance of power over the armed forces. In sum, the level of future military influence and the form it takes ultimately depend upon the method of monarchical leverage over the armed forces, the nature of military cohesion and the amount of order in society The incessant path of khaldstocracy looks set to persevere in Thailand.

Notes 1

Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel, 1948-67, 382.

2

Ibid., 392.

3 Perlmutter, Egypt, the Praetorian State, 132. 4 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 249. 5 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 2o~7.

6 Frankel, The Dual State, xiii. 7 See, for example, MeCargo, "Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand"; Mérieau, "Thailancfs Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997-2015) "

8 Briscoe, "The Proliferation of the 'Parallel State."

9 Chambers, "Military 'Sl*1adows' in Thailand since the 2oo6 Coup"; Chambers and Napisa, "The Resilience of Monarchized Military in Thailand," 427-8. lo

Chambers and Waitoolldat, "The Resilience of Monarchized Military," 428.

11 MCOT, "HM 12

the King Endorses Provisional Constitution"

Parliament of Thailand, "Announcementz The Appointment of the Members of the National Legislative Assembly."

13 Xinhua, "Thai National Reform Steering Assembly Sets Up." 14 The Five Tigers are the army commander, deputy, chief of staff and two assistants.

15 Apirat is the highly charismatic son of the 1991 coup leader General Sunthorn Kongsornpong and in 2017 was the undisputed leader of the Wongthewan army faction as well as a new "Young Turk" faction. 16 Nanuam, "Military ReshulF!le Not Just Seen as 'Power Sharlmg."`

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

191

17 Matichon, "Opening for the Soldiers' Leap." 18 Nanuam, "Chalermchai Calls for Unity within Army."

19 Teeranai. "Suthep Endorses Constitutional Loophole to Keep Prayuth in Power." 20

The Nation, "Somchai Warns of Dangers against Creating a °Biased Ec."'

21

Audjaright, "Prayut Spells out New Structures for Reform"

22

Sattaburuth, "Twenty Year Plan 'Draws out Military Rule."'

23 Kasaniakorn, "NLA Debates zo-Year National Strategy and Reforms Bills."

24 Section 44 closely resembles sections from previous military-created charters: Section 17 of the 1959 constitution, Section 17 of the 1972 constitution, Section 21 of the 1976 constitution, Section 27 of the 1977 constitution and Section 27 of the 1991 constitution. See Somchai, "Dynamics and Institutionalization of Coups in the Thai Constitution."

25 Kingdom of Thailand, Constitution (Interim). 26 Nanuam, "Army to Crack Down on Armed Groups."

27 TLHR, "Dangerous Militarization of Thai Justice." 28 Human Rights Watch, Tiiaialarzd: No New Military Trials of Civilians.

29 Kingdom of Thailand, Public Assembly Act.

30 fLaw, "Three Years of the NCPO" 31 Personal interviews with anonymous academics, Deep South Watch, Pattani, 6 Oct. 2015.

32 International Crisis Group, "Sout fern Thailand- Dialogue in Doubt," 13-5. 33 NBTC, "I-Iistory, Chairman and Commissioners " 34 Prachataf, "Authorities Can Shut Down Media."

35 Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, International Federation of Human Rights, Fortify Rights and Lawyers Rights Watch Canada,

"Thailand: Proposed Amendments to Computer-Related Crime Act."

36 Bernard, "Thailand Set to Build China-Like Internet Wall." 37 "Thailand's Junta Sidelines Pro-Thaksin Police, Governors"

38 Prachcmzf, "Authorities Can Shut Down Media." 39 Patsara and Durnrongkiat, "PM Launches 'People's State' Policy." 40 Kasamakorn, "Parties Accuse EC of Bias in Constituency Mapping."

41 fLaw, "The 2019 Elections, of the NCPO, by the

NCPO,

and for the NCPO."

42 Rojanapruk, "New Army Commander Open to Staging Another Coup." 43 Teeranai, "Prayuth Sorry for Cabinet In-fighting"

44 Regan and Olarn, "Thailand Protest Movement Puts Country's Youth on Collision Course with Military-Backed Establishment" 45 Tanakasempipat, "Thai Army Chief Decries Opposition"

192

7 - PAUL CHAMBERS

46 Khaosod, "Prayuth Deflects Questions about

600

Million Baht Land Sale"

47 Bangkok Post, "Regime Critics Slam Decision in Prakrit Watches Case" 48 Nanuam, "Mall Massacre Sparks Army Rejig"

49 Adams, "Thai Army Whistleblower Faces Court Martial." 5o The Nation, "Long Live the King." 51 Nanuam, "Elite Royal Guards Go on Defence Ministry Payroll." 52 Royal Act, Administrative Organization of the Ministry of Defence.

53 Royal Decree, "The Division and Controlling Duties of Royal Armed Guards." 54 Prachatai, "Female Lieutenant General Suthida Becomes Female General"

55 Daily News, "Gen. Suthida Appointed Royal Aide~de-Camp."

56 Teeranai, "King Granted Direct Control over Palace Agencies." 57 Prachatai, "Prem Calls for 'Optimum Benefits' from Military Budget" 58 A 2010 US Embassy cable revealed that Poem "had quite negative comments about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn" (United States Embassy Thailand, "Thailand: Ambassador Engages Privy Council Chair Prem," "1oBANGKOK192__a"). 59 Nation TV, "14 Privy Councilors Receive Approval I Manager Online, "Admiral

Pongthep Nuthep Becomes Privy Councillor. 60 Crispin, "Thai Prime Minister Prayuth's Grip Starting to Slip"

61 In 2019, Kuddat was demoted to deputy permanent minister of defense during his final year before mandatory retirement. 62 It is also possible that Deputy Army Commander Ge11eraI Nattapon Nakpanich, also a Wongthewan faction member, will ascend to lead the army, though he

would serve for only one year. 63 Chambers, "A Rebuke against a Sister." 64 Macao-Markar, "Thai Military Shake-up Raises Questions about Prayuth's Authority?

References Adams, Brad. "Thai Army Whistleblower Faces Court Martial" Human Rights Watch, 3 June 2020. httpszl/www.hrw.org/news/2o2o/o6/o4lthai-army-whist1eb1ower-faces-court-martia1#.

Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, International Federation of Human Rights, Fortify Rights and Lawyers Rights Watch Canada. '"lllailal'ld: Proposed Amendments to Computer-Related Crime Act Fail to Address Human Rights Concerns," 25 Oct. 2016- https://ww'w.icj.org/wp-

Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy

193

content/upioads/2016/10/Thailand-CCA-Amendments-Advocacy-2o1r5-

EnG.pdf, accessed 27 June 2o18. Audjarint, Wasamon. "Prayut Spells out New Structures for Reform." The Nation, 5 Ianuary 2017. https://www.nationthailand.com/national/3o3o3445, accessed 27 ma 2018. Bangkok Post. "Regime Critics Slam Decision in Prawit Watches Case." 28 Dec. 2018. httpsz//www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1602434/regimecritics-slam~decision-in-prawit-watches-case.

Bernard, Doug. "Thailand Set to Build China -Like Internet Wall." Voice of America, 28 Sep. 2015. https://www.voanews.com/east~asia/thailand-setbLiild-china-internet-firewall, accessed 27 June 2018. Briscoe, Ivan. ""H1e Proliferation of the 'Parallel State" Working Paper 71. Madrid: PRIDE, 2008. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238621742 _The_Proliferation__of_the_Para1le1_State, accessed 28 June 2018. Chambers, Paul. "Military 'Shadows' in Thailand since the 2006 Coup" Asian Ajairs: An American Review 40.2 (2013):56-82. d o : 10.1080/00927678 .2o13.788413. https://wwwxaiidfonline.comldoiffull/io,1o8o/00927678.2013 .788413,, accessed 3 Mar. 2017.

. "A Rebuike against a Sister and the Personalizing of Monarchical Control" New Mandala, 9 Feb. 2019. https://wwwnewrnandala.org/a-rebuke-against a-sister-and-the-personalising-of-monarchical-control/',

accessed 4 Mar.

2019.

Chambers, Paul, and Napisa Waitooikiat. "The Resilience of Monarchized Military in Thailand." journal of Contemporary Asia 46.3 (2016):425-444. d.oi: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1161060, accessed 4 Mar. 2017. Crispin, Shawn. "Thai Prime Minister Prayuth's Grip Starting to Slip." Asia Times, 8 Mar. 2017. https://wwwasiatintes.com/2017l03/article/prayuths grip-starts-slip/, accessed

21

July 2o19.

Daily News. "Gen. Suthida Appointed Royal Aide-de-Camp." 18 Inly

2016.

http:/lwww.dailynews.co.th/politics/335649, accessed 27 June 2018. Frankel, Ernst. The Deaf State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship.

New York: Oxford University Press, 194o. Human Rights Watch. Thailand: No New Military Trials of Civilians, 13 Sep. 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/13/thailand-no-new~mi1itary-

trials-civilians, accessed 26 Tune 2018.

Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. fLaw. "The 2019 Elections, of the NCPO, by the NCPO, and for the NCPO." Nov. 2o19. https://ilaw.or.th/node/5004, accessed 20 June 2020.

7 . PAUL CHAMBERS

194

. "Three Years of the NCPO and Its Reinforcement of 'Stable, Prosperous and Sustainable Powers'" to May zo17. https://ilaw.or.th/nodel45o6, accessed 21 Duly 2019. International Crisis Group. "Southern Thailand: Dialogue in Doubt." Asia Report No. 270, 8 July 2015. https://www.refworld.org/pdfld/559cfdf94.pdf,

accessed 21 July 2019. Kasamakorn Chanwanpen. "NLA Debates 20-Year National Strategy and Reforms Bills." The Nation, zo Apr. 2017. http://www.nationthailand.con1/ politics/3o312818, accessed 29 June 2o18.

. "Parties Accuse EC of Bias in Constituency Mapping." The Nation, 30 Nov. 2018. https://www.gatofuns.com/2018/11/parties-accuse-ec-of-bias-in-co11stituencymapping/, accessed 15 December 2018.

Khaosod. "Prayuth Deflects Questions about 6oo Million Baht Land Sale." 4 Nov. 2o14. https://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2014/11/04/14150 98178/. Kingdom of Thailand. Constitution (Interim).

22

July 2o14. http://www

.ratclialdtchasoc.g0.th/DATA/pDF/2557/A/055/LpDF, accessed 27 June 2018.

. Public Assembly Act. Trans. Pakorn Nilprapunt. Government Gazette 132, part 63 Kor, 14 Duly

2015.

http://Iawdraftenblogspot.co1n/2o15/o8/

translation-thai-public-assemblyact-of.htn1l, accessed 21 Duly 2019. Macau-Markar, Marwaan. "Thai Military Shake-up Raises Questions about Prayuth's Authority." Nikkei Asian Review, 16 Dec. 2018. https://asia.nild45 The report did not mention the burn marks from electrocution on his body. It concluded that his allegations were "unfounded.»4"

Putting the National Council for Peace and Order on Trial

311

Following a transition, the investigation into the torture of Sanserif Sriounruen can be reopened and may lead to a different outcome. Although torture is not currently defined as a crime within the Thai Criminal Code, Thailand is a state party to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other

Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (cAT). As part of the obligations as a state party to CAT, in 2014 the Department of Justice, worldng with human rights activists, drafted a law on torture and disappearance. The law defined the crimes of torture and disappearance, stipu-

lated evidence needed and investigation practices, and delimited specific

punishments for state officials who tortured and disappeared civilians. In March 2017 the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly put its examination of the law on hold. When there is an eventual transition, the draft law may be taken up again and passed; even if the special law is not passed, torture can be addressed as assault. A careful accounting of torture cases will be a necessary part of ensuring state accountability for the coup and related crimes generated by it. Only a few people have spoken out about being tortured, such as Sanserif Sri-ounruen and three others detained with him, but it is reasonable to assume that many more of those held for the up to seven days of incommunicado detention permitted under martial law and Head of the NCPO Order No. 3/2558 were tortured.

Death in custody: Suriyan Sucharitpolwong On 16 October 2015, Suriyan Sucharitpolwong, Jirawong Watthanathewasilp

and Prakrom Warunprapa were arrested and detained incommunicado under Head of the NCPO Order No. 3/2558. Then, on 21 October, the three men, who were thought to be close to then Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, were publicly accused o f lose majesty and sent by the Bangkok Military Court to be remanded at the Nakorn Chaisri temporary remand facility for alleged national security suspects at the nth Army Circle military base in Bangkok. Three days later, on 24 October, there were news reports that Prakrom had committed suicide by hanging the day before. No autopsy was carried out, although this was contra to the Criminal Procedure Code, which mandates autopsies of individuals who die in state custody. His family cremated his body the next day. Then, on 7 November, the minister

312

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-- TYRELL HABERKORN

of justice announced that Suriyan, a famous fortune-teller also known as "Mor Yong," had died in custody. He claimed that an autopsy had been carried out by the Institute of Forensic Medicine and found that the cause of death was "respiratory and blood circulation failures due to blood infection." Like in Prakrom's case, Suriyan's family cremated his body the next day." The question that remains is whether the statements by the authorities were true, or whether they were covering for murder or other foul play. Following a transition, the case of the death in custody of Suriyan Sucharitpolwong should be fully and openly investigated. He may have died of a blood infection acquired accidentally or by chance, or he may have died via other means. In the absence of an open, public investigation, it is impossible to know. If his death was the result of actions by state officials, then an investigation into possible murder should be carried out. Even though the body was not preserved, there may be additional forensic records kept by the authorities, and those involved in his detention could be questioned. If evidence is found of murder or other foul play by the authorities, then those responsible should be fully prosecuted under criminal law. In a broader sense, as TLHR pointed out following Suriyan's death, there are significant problems with holding individuals, particularly civilians, on military bases that cannot be accessed by the public and are out of view. Detaining civilians for long periods in such facilities extends the risk of ill treatment that is possible during the first seven days of detention under the provisions of martial law and Head of the NCPO Order No. 312558. By November 2016, TLHR had documented the cases of 45 civilians and two state oilicials who were-or had been-held in the Nakhon Chaisri tempo-

rary remand facility since the coup. The cases included those who had been accused of lose majesty, robbery, bombing, weapons possession, public assembly and other cases." But, there may have been others whose identities

are not yet known to the public. A full accounting of those held and the treatment they received at this facility; and any other secret detention facilities, will be another necessary part of post-transition accounting of

the recent past.

Putting the National Council for Peace and Order on Trial

313

Freedom of expression: Iatupat Boonpattararaksa Unlike the two previous cases, the violation of the rights of Iatupat Boonpattararaksa, or Pai, a 2o17 graduate of the Faculty of Law at Khon Kaen

University (KKU), can less easily be tied to specific provisions of existing or possible future criminal law. Pai is a prominent critic of the NCPO and a member of Dao Din, a group of KKU students and graduates who organize with villagers in northeastern Thailand to secure greater environmental, livelihood, and general human rights. In late 2016, he already faced prosecution in four cases related to his political expression critical of the regime. His fifth case, for which he was arrested in December 2o16 (this was the only one in which prosecution was complete by the fourth anniversary of

the coup in 2018), was an accusation of one count of lose majesty stemming from having shared a BBC 'Dpi news article about King Maha Vajiralongkorn on Facebook. Although more than 2,600 people shared the article, Iatupat was the only one to have been accused. He was arrested on 2 December 2016, only a few days after the new king was announced. Although he was initially granted bail, his bail was quickly revoked after the court deemed that another Facebook post he made, criticizing the court's actions in another case, demonstrated that he did not sufficiently fear either the court or state power generally. Although Pai initially pled innocent,

after two days of hearings that were held in camera-with journalists and observers barred from the courtroom-he changed his plea to guilty and confessed. The court sentenced him to five years in prison, which was then reduced by half to two~and-a-half years as he had confessed. He was released on

10

May 2019, several weeks ahead of schedule, as part of an

amnesty granted by Rama X on the occasion of his coronation. The 162 known cases of Article 112 accusation and prosecution since the May 2014 coup represent the largest number of concurrent cases since the law's initial promulgation in 1957. The record number of cases is matched by record punishments under the law, including a record sentence of 7o 22.

years for ten Facebook posts deemed defamatory in one case; the sentence was reduced to 35 years because the defendant confessed." All uses of Article 112 are a restriction of freedom of expression, and Jatupat's case in particular is also a clear instance of selective application of the law to constrict the expression of an outspoken critic of the junta. In addition, Jampafs arbitrary and targeted arrest and remand has a further chilling effect' other

1~.v"

314

12.

TYRELL HABERKORN

citizens do not know it or when, they may face similar treatment. Thai and international human rights organizations have long called for an end to Article 112 prosecutions, noting that they are in conflict with Thailancfs obligations as a state party to the ICCPR. Both the 2014 interim constitution and the 2017 constitution provide for protection of freedom of expression. But the NCPO, as well as earlier elected governments, has maintained that the institution of the monarchy constitutes a special case in which an exception is warranted.51

Unlike the examples of torture and death in custody, there is no clear section in the Thai Criminal Code under which members of the NCPO or other involved figures could be prosecuted for restricting others' freedom of expression and political freedom. Accountabilit then, may instead take the form of releasing those who have been unjustly prosecuted and convicted and repealing the laws, including Article 112, that facilitated the dispossession of their rights.

Toward the Future Similar to Resistant Citizen's filing of a criminal complaint against the NCPO for launching the coup, outlining specific cases in which the NCPO

may face prosecution in the future seems naive when democracy appears far off despite elections having been held. But the uncertainty of the timing

and form of a transition from military, or military-inflected, rule back to some approximation of democracy is the precise reason why such analysis is necessary and is utopian, in the sense of describing a desirable future and treating it as possible, rather than a naive desire. Working to make this future real is necessary to redress the injustice experienced by Sanserif Sriounruen, Suriyan Sucharitpolwong, Iatupat Boonpattararaksa and many others.

Nores 1

Abhisit was appointed prime minister on 17 December 2008 and remained in office until 3 July 2011.

Putting the National Councilor Peace and Order on Trial

2

315

People's Information Center for 'Impose Affected by the Dispersal of Protests in April-May 2010, Truth for Justice.

3 ' f a i Lawyers for Human Rights, "The Miracle of 'Law"' 4 For the most recent figures, see Internet Dialogue on Legal Reform, "Latest Statistics," https ://freedom.ilaw.or.th/no de!209/.

5 International Commission of Jurists, "Re' Recommendations for the Repeal or Alnendment"; TLHR, " ' h e Miracle of 'Law."' 6 TLI-IR, Collapsed Rule outLaw, 26. The NCPO refuses to make its statistics about

arrests and prosecutions available to the public, and so human rights organizations have responded by keeping their own records. Actual numbers are likely to be higher as this number, which accounts only for the period 22. May 2014-22 May 2o17, is based on cases known to activists. 7 TLHR, Collapsed Rule outLaw, 30. 8 By 2.2 April 2019 the NCPO had issued 130 NCPO Announcements, 2.4 NCPO Orders, and 152 Head of the NCPO Orders, in addition to the 239 laws passed by the ncpo-appointed National Legislative Assembly; International Com mission of Jurists, "Re: Recommendations for the Repeal or Anlendment"; TLHR,

"Miracle of 'I.aw."' rid hi Eoseewong argues that the orders and announcements promulgated by the NCPO are not law, but rather its opposite or a form of antilaw. He writes, "the orders of the NCPO are therefore not law. ' h e content is not legal. ' h e exercise is not legal. ' h e process is not legal. Claiming that the law is used unselectively does not make it legal, because as I have explained, the content means that its use cannot be anything but selective"; rid hi, "When Orders Become Laws." 9 For an analysis of the antidemocratic properties of the Khans Nitirat, "Declaration of the Khana Nitirat." 10

2017

constitution, see

Sikkim, The justice Cascade.

11

All translations in this chapter are my own. \Nhen citing "Thai-language sources, I include both the original Buddhist Era publication date and then the Common Era date in brackets. Criminal Indictment, Mr. Pansak Srithep et al. v. (general Prayutl-1 Chan-ocha et al., 2.

12.

Ibid., 1-2.

13 The center was established in early April 2010 following the proclamation of the Emergency Decree by then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in order to coordinate the dispersal of red shirt protesters. 14 Criminal Indictment, Mr. Pansy Srithep et al. V. (general Prayuth Chan-ocha et al., 6. 15 Ibid., 6-7.

16 Ibid., 7. For tiirther details, see NCPO Announcements Nos. 1, 5, 11, and 30. 17 Criminal Indictment, Mr. Pansak Srithep et al. v. General Prayuth Chan~ocha

et al., 8. 18 Ibid.

316

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TYRELL HABERKORN

19 Ibid., 9. to Ibid.,

9-10.

21

Ibid., 10.

22

Ibid.

23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 1o-1. 25 Ibid., 11. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 12.

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 13. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 13-4. 33 Ibid., 14, 34 Ibid., 14. 35 Ibid., 15-6.

36 Ibid., 17.

37 "The Court Does Not Accept the Case" 38 "Resistant Group Appeals over NCPO Lawsuit" 39 TLHR, "Appeal Court Upholds the Ruling."

40 TLHR, "The Owners of Sovereignty"

41 Amnesty International, "Make Him Speak by Tomorrow"; Duayjai, Pattani Human Rights Organization and Cross Cultural Foundation, Torture and Ill Treatment in the Deep South. 42 Amnesty International, 'Make Him Speak by Tomorrow," 34.

43 Asaree, "Police Condemned for Unlawful' Dismissal of Torture Allegation."

44 Amnesty International, 'Make Him Speak by Tomorrow," 34-5. 45 Quoted in ibid., 35.

46 Asaree, "Police Condemned for 'Unlawful' Dismissal of Torture Allegation." 47 Department of Rights and Liberties Protection, Ministry of justice, "Draft Act

on the Prevention and Suppression." 48 International Commission of jurists and Human Rights Watch, "Ioint Letter to Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN." 49 TLHR, "Statistics about Detainees and Wardens" 50 "Thailand Iails Man for 35 Years for Insulting the Monarchy on Facebook."

Putting the National Council for Peace and Order on Trial

317

51 In 2012, the Constitutional Court ruled d'lat enforcement of Article 112 did not contravene the rights and liberties protections put in place by the 2007 constitution: Constitutional Court, Ruling No. 28-2.9/2555.

References Amnesty International. 'Make Him Speak by Torriorrow": Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in Thailand. London: Amnesty International, 2o16, ASA 39/4747/2016.

Asaree Thaitrakulpanich. "Police Condemned for 'Unlawful' Dismissal of Torture Allegation by Red Shirt Bomb Suspect." Prachatai, 30 June 2015. http:// wwwprachatai.com/english/node/5233, accessed 10 June 2018. Constitutional Court, Ruling No. 28-29/2555. Issues Examined Nos. 16 and 44/2555, 10 Oct. 2555 [2012]. "On the Matter of Whether or Not Article 112 Is in Conflict with Article 3 (paragraph 2), Article 29, or Article 45 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 4-5 of the Constitution."

"The Court Does Not Accept the Case of Resistant Citizen against the Head of the NCPO." Thai Rate, 29 May 2558 [2015]. httpai'/v\m*w.tl1airath.co.th/content/ 501917, accessed 15 June 2018.

Criminal Indictment. Mr. Pansak Srithep et al. v. General Prayuth Chan-ocha et al. 22 May 2558 [2o15].

Department of Rights and Liberties Protection, Ministry of Justice. "Draft Act on the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disapp clarance B.E. 18 Feb. 2558 [2o15]. Dubai, Pattani Human Rights Organization and Cross Cultural Foundation. Torture and IH Treatment in the Deep South Documented in

2014-2055.

Bangkok: Duayjai, Pattani Human Rights Organization and Cross Cultural Foundation, 2016.

International Commission of Jurists. "Re: Recommendations for the Repeal or

Amendment of Head of the NCPO and NCPO Orders and Announcements." Letter to the secretary-general of the Council of State, 22 April 2019.

International Commission of Iurists and Human Rights Watch. "Joint Letter to Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN, Re: Nakhon Chaise Facility" 24

Nov. 2015. Khana Nitirat. "Declaration of the Khans Nitirat: The Draft Constitution and the Referendum" Prachrxlai,

10

node/6251, accessed 15 June 2016.

June zo16. http;/lpracllatai.orglenglisl1/

318

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rid hi Eoseewong. "When Orders Become Laws." Trans. Tyreil Haberkorn. Prachatai, 18 Jan. 2o16. http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/5772, accessed June 2018.

10

People's Information Center fOr Those Aliected by the Dispersal of Protests in April-May

2010

( p I ) . Trathfor Iastice; A Fact-Finding Report on the April-

May 2010 Crackdowns in Bangkok. Bangkok: PIC, 2017. "Resistant Group Appeals over NCPO Lawsuit." Bangkok Post, 29 July

2015.

https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/637956/resistant-groupappeals-ovencase-against-ncpo, accessed 25 Sep. 2020. Silddnk, Kathryn. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics. New York: W W Norton, 2011. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR). "Appeal Court Upholds the Ruling and Dismisses the Case of Resistant Citizen against Prayuth and Others for Overthrowing the Government." 18 Feb. 2016. https:/ltlhr2o14.wordpress .com/1016/oz/18/resistancecitizen-appeal-prayuth-dismiss/, accessed 10

June 2018.

. Colkzpsed Rule of Law: The Consequences of Four Years under the National Council for Peace and Order for Human Rights and Their' Society. Bangkok: TLHR, 2018. . ""U1e Miracle of 'Law': The Judiciary and the 22 May 2014 Coup, Three Years of the Coup Regime of the National Council for Peace and Order," 1 Aug. 2017. http://www.t:lhr2o14.com/t11/?p=4774, accessed 3 Mar. 2017.

. "The Owners of Sovereignty'

Resistant Citizen, the Supreme Court, and

Coup." 12 Mar. 2019. https://www.t1hr2o14.com/?p=112918zlang =en, accessed 19 May 2019.

the

2.14

. "Statistics about

Detainees and Wardens at the Temporary Detention

Facility on the One-Year Anniversary of Mor Yong's Death." 9 Nov. 2016. http;//www.t1hr2o1A.com/thl?p=26Q2. accessed

Io

Tune 2o1s-""l11ailand Tails

Man for 35 Years for Insulting the Monarchy on Facebook" Independent, June 2o17. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/wor1d/asia/thai1andmonarchy-insult-man-jailed-king-facebook-vichai-thepwongsoeia1-mediaon1ine-b1ock-a7783166.html, accessed to June 2018.

10

13 I

Digital Censorship and Self-censorship under Thailand? Dictatorship

DAVID S T R E C K F U S S

Introduction IT IS NOT SURPRISING that the military junta that overthrew "1hailand's democratically elected government in May 2014 used repressive laws to squelch any sign of opposition1 What is surprising is the vast array of objectively trifling infractions that incurred such disproportionate, even gross, sentences. A human rights lawyer faced 5o years in prison for lose-majesté when he

allegedly "imported content deemed defamatory to the monarchy" The Ministry of Digital Economy and Society threatened to prosecute anyone who befriends three notorious critics of the regime on Facebook.3 A group of administrators of a satirical Facebook page, "We Love General [Gen.] Prayuth," were charged with sedition, which carries up to seven years' imprisonment; two were additionally charged with Iése-maje5fé.4 A person

who made ten posts deemed defamatory of the monarchy on a fake Facebook page he created to get back at a friend was given a record 7o-year sentence.5 A fifty-nine-year-old Thai traditional herbalist was given a 20year sentence for having in "a tiny corner" of his website a small banner linked to anti-monarchy acti\.rity.' A man was found guilty of "attempted less-rriajesté" for having unsent defamatory draft messages in his e-maiI.7 A student who shared a translated biography of "Hlailand's new king was given a five-year sentence." A woman who said "Uh-huh" in response to a comment deemed as defamatory to the monarchy in a Facebook chat was threatened with lose-majesté herself for not informing the authorities of the crime.9

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A11 these cases came out of a world very different from the one defined by print media and the sorts of censorship it spawned. This was not the comparatively simpler world where authors sparred with their censors in order to say something to "the public" through the printing of their writings, Was importing defamatory material the same as having a banned book? Was there a charge for each banned book? Was it illegal to have an association with seditious authors? Was it possible previously to have a defamatory letter that never got sent to anyone? Was it a crime to share something that had not been adjudged to be defamatory? Was it wrong to simply reply "Uh-huh" in a private conversation, however objectionable was the initial

statement? A decade ago, it was common to hear that the Internet was introducing a new age of democratization, a hope fanned by the start of the Arab Spring." But it was clear by early 2019 that social media is not just a doubleedged sword-with as much antidemocratic elements as democratic ones -but perhaps a sword of which one side was getting much sharper and the other much duller. As Brian Loader writes, Internet platforms "may just as likely be considered as threats to democratic governance by facilitating apathy, surveillance or social control." What exactly is "the public" in this new age? What is censorship or self-censorship? How does a speech crime or a printed-word crime change when it becomes digital within a "virtual

public sphere"?" When the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) launched its 2014 coup, it seemed like many run-of-the-mill coups that Thailand has so often seen. After that, however, the military junta issued decree after decree, bit by bit disassembling civic society completely overthrowing any sem-

blance of rule of law, and retaining absolute and arbitrary "legal" power. It created its own "interim constitution" that gave the military regime absolute

power and set out to create a constitution that would guarantee military domination over society for the next few decades." Thousands were charged with sedition, monitored or forcefully invited to have their attitudes adjusted." The government closed thousands of websites deemed a threat,

actively encouraged pro-regime netizens to seek out and report antigovernment or anti»monarchy websites, and poured money into Internet $u.1'V€1l1311€€_14

Understandably, most in Thailand have chosen to exercise self~censor~

ship, as noted by many governments, news agencies and human rights

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organizations." Since 2015, Thailand's designation in Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" index has been "Not free." The country's press freedom continues to drop to the bottom quarter of the index of countries." The actions of the NCPO have "resulted in significant self-censorship by the public and the media," which have "widely practiced self-censorship"" How has the junta been so apparently successful in this effort? Why do theories about censorship seem inadequate to explain what is going on in Thailand? And, perhaps most important: Is what is happening in Thailand unique or is it part of something more universal? Older studies of censorship have focused on state repression. Newer studies have extended the field of repressors beyond the state, showing that "censorship" and "self-censorship" are practices that are deeper and more widespread than before." Certainly, the military regime used crude repression. However, at the same time, as I have argued elsewhere, there are many other kinds of actors and arenas involved in both censorship and selfcensorship in "lhailand, a "defamation state )>19 I argue that the new digital

landscape has enlarged the space of political speech but also transformed what might be defined as a speech crime; and so, self-censorship has taken on a new importance for actors wishing to speak out or to protect themselves. Next, I consider how digital technologies affected those wanting to voice criticism of the military government. Through an online survey and follow-up interviews employed in this study, I show how they had to navigate through a weaponized digital landscape and how the dictatorship used various mechanisms to drive them into silence either directly or via

self-censorship.

Thai Actors in Relation to Censorship The military government had certain restrictions, technologically, budgetarily, and even strategically, that kept it from shutting up Thailand completely. Its control was far from complete despite the massive state net-

work (which included large segments of civil society) that continued to charge, arrest, detain, try, and imprison. It was difficult to imagine what kind of communication these days would not be digitalized eventually. Something deemed defamatory that would have appeared in, say, the Bangkok Post newspaper 15 years ago would have resulted in one charge." Now,

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with the Computer Crimes Act, multiple charges can be applied for each post, share or even "like" In this section, we explore the various manifestations of digital speech crime. I have written elsewhere that prior to a fully digitalized age, the censors in Thailand, roughly speaking, evaluated the dangerousness of something according to how "real" it seemed, the extent of damage perceived as being created, and the extent to which it was distributed, all key components of a "defamation regime" Table 13.1 shows just how much the landscape has changed in Thailand (and, perhaps, other authoritarian regimes). All the pre-digital media were digitizable, which made them even more risky. But in the digital period, there were also a number of new media, which further increased the risk of spealdng out in Thailand. Table 13.1 Level ofdan erousness in the pre-digital and digital periods

-

Digital period (present)

Pre-digital period Medium

Sanction

Medium

Sanction

Broadcast news/

Pre- and/or self-

programs

censor

Social media posts

Sanction/block

Movies

Pre-censor

Social media shares

Sanction

Newspaper reports

Post-sanction

Social media responses

Occasional sanction

Non»Bction literature

Ban

YouTube uploads/posts

Sanction/block

Fictional literature

Ban

Compact discs (CDs)

Sanction

Other forms of art

Depends

(at some distance) Thai broadcast news/

Pre- and/or self~ censor

programs (at considerable distance) English news reports and Rarely sanctioned academic articles (at considerable distance) No sanction Other language news

reports

(at some distance) Thai print news

Self-censor

(at considerable distance) Review of reporter's English news and acafor articles demic articles, the first of which is digitalized and credentializationl visa renewal easily accessible

(at considerable distance, unless digitalized

Generally, state

Thai art, including

uninvolved

literature and movies

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The problem of politics and politicians The Pheu Thai politician Watana Muangsook was an outspoken critic of the NCPO on his Facebook page. Detained four times within two years of the coup, Watana opposed the draft constitution in the referendum of 2016, where criticism of the draft was banned. "No matter how many times you take me to adjust my attitude," he defiantly claimed, "I'll still vote no on this draft.as2' His open opposition was presumably what led to the statement he was forced to sign in May 2014 "agreeing" not to carry out political activities. Watana was reportedly charged with violating NCPO Order No. 39, which forbade any political activity, and the Computer Crimes Act of 2oo7. When he was on a hunger strike in protest, the NCPO threatened to charge Watana with another violation of Order No. 39 and sentenced him to the new

seven-day attitude adjustment curriculum reserved for particularly stubborn people." What would have been the pre-digital crime- telling a news reporter that he opposed the draft? I-landing out a leaflet on a busy sidewalk? As it was, Facebook provided a platform for Watana to express sentiments as an individual and to reach thousands. And that was why the act was deemed dangerous and required addressing.

Fear and rational paranoia In academics

Academics had many restrictions placed on them by the regime. They were forbidden by law to give critical comments to the press or hold academic

seminars or forums without permission (which was often denied) from military authorities. One particular up-country academic holds a high position and frequently sponsors human rights-related events and invites

foreign diplomats. When the military audiorities noted his lack of enthusiasm in promoting the draft constitution, the NCPO designated him as an influential intellectual leader in the province--phu mi ithrphon thing k h a n hit-which was intended not as a compliment but as a warning. He was

monitored closely and became more inclined to "avoid touching on politically sensitive issues.v2s A Bangkok-based academic teaching at one of the country's most prestigious universities felt the weight of the current circumstances: "I could not say or write on many sensitive issues regarding

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Thai political elite in my public talks, lectures, seminars. Academics cannot discuss or give an honest analysis to the public, so the tirndamental problems are left untouched, and there's no hope of finding the solution 1:24 He was guarded "when discussing politics with [his] colleagues" and about "the content of [his] lectures regarding Thai politics," seemingly on key areas* Thai history, the monarchy and its role in politics and society, and the military. His sole strategy was "to keep my tone and content of criticism as academic as possible. I also avoid criticizing individuals or name names (such as Prayuth), but instead attack the organization, policies, and actions done by the junta?" This academic, though feeling that his university position "seems no

longer a good protection anymore as several academics have been prosecuted and arrested" and that in fact "everyone is vulnerable," continued

writing and giving interviews because he believed "[i]t is important to show to the public and the world that not every Thai accepts the military rule": This regime based its control on fear and the silencing of] dissidents, so as long as I can, I want to send messages to due public and international com-

munity that we have to overcome fear and that Thailand still has dissidents, and also to tell that 'lhailand under the junta is not calm and peaceful but is full of serious problems. I think a critical voice is necessary and very important specifically under this land of repressive regime.

One scholar of the provinces found that writing academic articles in English allowed her to preserve her own voice and avoid running afoul of the

military authorities. 'Tm sure if the junta could read English well," she said, "it would not be happy about what I have writ"ten.1:2° But such bilingual

scholars understand that writing in English also defeats the purpose. One academic said he felt freer writing in English as the NCPO, he believed, did "not care much about scholarly articles, especially English articles. They know that the circulation is so small, no one reads it except a few scholars and thus there is no effect in undermining their legitimacy." But that left this scholar with what he termed a "dilelnma":" "If I write for academic journal[s], I can be more critical and also safe but create no impact. To make an impact, I have to write in Thai or give an interview in Thai for a newspaper, magazine or website, which makes me feel unsafe"

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Bigger~than-life social media presences Prakrit Rojanaphruk is a veteran journalist who has been working with the

English version of the Khaosod newspaper. He is known for his steadfast support of the freedom of the press- military government or no-and for his outspoken views on the lose-majesté law. He is very active on social media and has some 66,ooo followers on Twitter. Under the military government, he made a special effort to engage with those who made comments on his Facebook page as he understood their importance in providing him some level of protection. Pravit characterized his ongoing tug-of~war with the government as "a poker game" combined with "carrot-and~stick." He was called in often by the NCPO, and they had allocated a person to solely monitor his posts and tweets. In interrogations they threatened to charge him with sedition, but then at the last moment they relented, hoping, per-

haps, he would be "more accommodating." When his NCPO minders talked about forbidding him from leaving the country, Prakrit admitted, "There is something behind your brain telling you that maybe you should act a bit more nicely."za Pavin Chachavalpongpun (editor of this volume) is a Thai scholar who teaches at the highly randed Kyoto University in Japan. He is a prolific writer who has produced a stream of books and academic articles, penned endless op-eds, and is on a seemingly never-ending world tour of speaking engagements. He has made Kyoto a congregating point for Thai and foreign

anti-coup malcontents. He is social-media savvy with more than half a million followers on Facebook. While the NCPO had been in power, he became perhaps the leading voice of Thai opponents of the military regime.

The Thai military regime did everything it could to get its hands on him' cancelled his passport, tried to convince Japan that he was a "pseudoacademic" and that Japan ought to expel him, harassed his family remaining home in Thailand, and tried to get his speaking engagements cancelled (in which they occasionally succeeded). Pavin admitted once that he had adapted his writing after the coup-

not by practicing more self-censorship, but by practicing less. "If anything," he said, "I am now more critical, daring (perhaps since I know that I will not return to Thailand anytime soon). This is particularly so when I come to write on controversial or sensitive issues like the monarchy. I continue to push the boundary" This was not as true for his Facebook posts. He said

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while the Thai authorities did not bother much about his English posts, he had to "be a little more careful" with his Thai posts as most of his audience was Thai. As such, the "main targets" of his Thai posts were "the coupmakers, criticizing them and attacking their (lack of) intelligence." He took no small satisfaction in having attracted the attention of the head of the junta,

who "called me specifically a khan hang s u i [an interior or bad person." Pavin, saying that his writing was "more open, more provocative" than the five years before the coup, when "we could not really openly talk about the monarchy," was now "willing to talk about it, alongside the shift of polit-

ical situation." He did admit, though, that he had to "still practice selfcensorship" in stories "involving particularly members of the royal family." To write about that, he said, was "too risky," even though he did not expect to be allowed back in Thailand in the near future."

The tricky art of subtle criticism (and avoiding exile) An up-country university professor spent considerable time communicating her thoughts on Facebook, a medium she found "somewhat 'less public." She began posting in earnest when she "realized the magnitude of Thai political conflicts," criticizing the Democrat Party and especially the government crackdown on red shirt protests in 2010. Her criticism of the NCPO was noted and won her a cordial "invitation" to a "talk" with the military after the coup. Since then, she said, "I tend to be more sarcastic,

using humor and parody to try to get away with my 'object of ridicule." She tried to be "very cautious about what I posted" but nonetheless was unable

"to resist the urge to criticize the junta and its backers" She instead "resorted to sarcasm and 'subaltern' ways of expressing my opinions.1}3° A play whose message was not subtle enough was the parody The Wolf Bride, performed twice at Tliamuiasal University in 2013. For the police and prosecutors, the play, set in a fictional time and place, seemed too obviously

to be about Thailand and the Thai royalty Not just the director of the play, but also the actors, were charged with lose-majesté. Most were able to flee, but two members of the production were captured, put on trial, and sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison." Perhaps because the market for serious fiction in Thailand is very small, fiction is not a matter of huge concern for the state. Nonetheless, Thai fiction

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writers still need to be careful to mask their message. One young writer from the provinces said that it was difficult to compete in national writing compe-

titions and so he sometimes altered his stories to make them more palatable to mainstream Thai society, which he considered a form of self-censorship. He also had to be careful to veil his references to what might be interpreted as real places or people. When writing, he said, "I can't just say 'long this, queen that,' 'military this, soldier that.'" He did not think that such limitations were "destructive or humiliating" though. His solution was to write allegories set in the future: "I avoid direct references, but I still have my message" He said that in Thailand, "people are so literal." He recounted how a few years earlier

a short story about zombies "within the Ministry of Public Health" was denied the top prize in a competition because it specifically named the ministry. Having zombies in "a ministry" would have been acceptable, but not an actual Ministry of Public Health. In Thailand, conducted this informant, "You have to censor anything that smacks of realityim A recently published short story uses more than one form of subterfuge -a fictional setting with fictional characters, but also rendered in Lao. Below is a conversation between myself and an informant familiar with the story. The exchange shows, again, the tension between letting readers in on the joke and somehow concealing it from the authorities (or at least leaving the author plausible deniability of the censor's interpretations)." INFORMANT: A short story titled ******, published in a collection of contem-

porary san short stories, retells Thai political history in the form of fig son. It's reality in disguise. I think it is a way of letting out the peoples frustrations without jeopardizing their freedom under the junta's rule. Readers who are very familiar with Thai politics will "get" the message right away, while those who have enough background knowledge will get the opportunity to use clues and hints to connect the dots. If it is so obvious to Thai readers, wouldn't the authorities quicldy "get it" as well? Or does the disguise somehow not make it directly threatening, even though the author, the reader and the authorities all know what it really means? INEORMANT; It was written in Lao san [with the Thai scriptl. The characters were just villagers. One would be hard pressed to say it's about Thailand. I think the author cleverly wrote it to where you would need a lot of effort to try to claim it's a real story. AUTHOR: But you said above that Thai readers, or maybe san readers, would "get it" right away. Would they? AUTHOR:

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INPORMANT: Those who are already into Thai politics. A layperson may not

have a clue. Too much deciphering and imagination involved [on the

part of the authorities]. After all, the author can claim it's just a fictional story. AUTHOR: But what about state authorities? And aren't many/most san people, even lay people, already into Thai politics these days? INFORMANT: Yes, they are, haifa. Or that he [the author] won't get in trouble

because the authorities don't read. AUTHOR: Haifa. So literature is not that dangerous in Thailand?

Inasmuch as art can be a vehicle for political protest, the challenge for Thai fiction writers, dramatists, and filmmakers is how to tell a story so that

another segment of society--the audience-will get the message while another segment of that same society-film censors and military leaderswill not. If the latter does, then it could result in some land of penalty, from bans to censored scenes to serious prison time. Apichatpong Weerasethakull, Thailand's most internationally known director, cannot-or will not-show his best stull' in Thailand. His 2015 film Cemetery of Splendor has been

shown almost everywhere but Thailand. At least his foreign audiences seem to understand it (as long as they know about the May 2014 coup). A reviewer for the New York Review cfBooks called Apichatpong's movie a "cinematic protest" that was both "passionate" and "oblique," a movie with a strong political message that was visible only "by sideways glance and

implication."" The director intended the film to have a political meaning. Would foreign audiences get it? He admitted that they "might feel it less," and he "peppered [the film] with imagery that may be lost on some audiences. But it doesn't matter really if you look at the film from different angles." He was asked whether, as with his other movies, audiences lose something if they do not have the historical context. "No problem," he replied with a laugh. "For me, you can get many different meanings from a movie but I make the movie that I want to make and that's it. And if it has room for interpretation, it's better." Would 'Ihai audiences get the message more directly? Does the question even matter if the movie is never shown in a Thai theater? In any case, Apichatpong may be done with Thailand: "Iii say I still just strive to make the Iilm I like to make, but it's getting to the point of self-censorship. I'll say about a topic, 'I-Iey, you cannot say that because you'lI be in jail." Implying he may not make any more movies in Thailand, he said, 'Tve started to feel suffocated by this limitation after a few years?"

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Censorship, Self-censorship, and Their Sociopolitical Ef[1ects

Thai journalists have been under pressure from the NCPO to toe the government line and to post positive stories. Given the nature of the profession, perhaps it has been within "Hiai journalism circles that the practice of selfcensorship has been most apparent. A veteran reporter said, "Self-censorship

has existed in Thailand for ages." It has been especially pronounced when reporting on certain topics: "Normally the [Bangkok]-based or the Thai Buddhist media will try to avoid discussing or referring to royal family members" in a negative way, and "about senior monks or anything questioning Buddhism." The military government made it worse: The repression of journalists was more blunt during the coup periods, when military and special authorities (Ministry of Information and Communications Technology) were given easier procedures to nab and nail journalists." Self~censorship exerted a big influence on her work: "It is like part of your brain already. It will automatically pop up when you need it, as we have been socialized and are familiar with it." The role of editors has become

central to this process. The reporter said that when she wanted to explain something in a story, even if she was using comments made by intellectuals and scholars, "I have to comb the wording carefully." Even then, sections got edited or omitted, or "sometimes the tone [of the piece] was changed and the substance was diluted." So even if she had already self-censored, "there are hands to help censor again, without being examined or rnon~ itored by the authorities." She reported that sources like academics were often so busy self- censoring that "sometimes they can't [express them-

selves] clearly, as they don't want to, so at times those ambiguous remarks [from these sources] don't help the readers in understanding things at all." It is laws affecting the press-lés mnjesfé, libel, and the Computer Crimes Act-»that have forced Thais "to live in this self-censorship regime." Thai society, she observed, "doesn't have a space for those who think differently or critically." The Thai media can report on shadows only and not "the untouchable subjects." She added, "Those who live and spend some time in Thailand will quickly learn about self- censorship and understand the nature and undesirable culture of the academic and media circles.""

Pravit described many instances of self-censorship, even at his own newspaper, which had a reputation for brave reporting. One instance was a

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story concerning the death of the royal dog, a cherished companion of the former king, and the story of a man charged for making a sarcastic remark allegedly disparaging the good name of the royal dog." Khaosod ran a story on its website, but the editor, after thinking about it for eight hours, decided to take down the story, saying it was "too sensitive." Pravit explains that designating a topic or story as "too sensitive" is the common way ofjustifying self~censorship, meaning: The media owners and editors will not take the risk of running any story that is deemed too sensitive. It's a coded word; chiefly it starts with the editor but eventually journalists internalize it. And so in effect l am aware that I am So, you can see various levels of selfinternalizing this self-censorship. censorship taking place and 1 have to keep reminding myself that I should not internalize self-censorship because once you do that and accept it as normal, you will stop seeing it as a problem at all and you become part of this whole machinery. I don't think a majority of Thai journalists are even disturbed by the fact of self-censorship."

Younger reporters also felt the soft influence of self-censorship. One young journalist, when asked how it has affected her writing in the public sphere, said that when she first started reporting, "I would pitch articles related to anti-monarchy groups that were rejected by editors. I was naive and thought that I could write it however I wanted to." But after some time on the job and moving to a new section of the paper, she saw that she "got sentences

removed from my article due to a risk of violating the lose-majesté law." It was then that she "knew the limits and refrained from adding anything that I knew my editor would remove." After the coup and more seasoned, she said she "intentionally left out quotes from my interviewees that suggest

criticism of the royal family.""° The up-country academic Facebook user claimed she engaged in a lot of self-censoring: "I stopped counting how many times I finished typing my

status updates on Facebook simply to delete them. I think Fm less direct now. I wish I didn't have to do this. I wish I could speak my mind.U41 The effects of censorship and self-censorship have further diminished Thai society's ability to collectively reason and progress. One up-country scholar said that the ncpo's absolute power under Section 44 had "created

a climate of fear, which will have a long-term effect on Thais and 'fai society. The announcements and orders of the NCPO will turn Thailand into an obedient society, which is not in the interests of the country>>42

- . . - '

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Another provincial academic worried about how suppression of speech would affect Thailand: I think the long-term effect would be that we would become a depressed society where people hate the powers that be so much but they can't express themselves. People would no longer be interested in participating in any propagandist events. Actually, Fm self-censoring now at this very moment. So when the time for a change comes, the people will let out their frustrations, anger and hatred. When that day comes, it will be too late for any elites to adjust themselves."

An anonymous respondent, a "fai living overseas but often worldng in Thailand, was too afraid to till in any details in the online survey used for this study. S/he wrote about feeling uncomfortable answering some of the questions but added, "I also feel that this is unfortunate." However, the respondent was clear about the effects of censorship and self-censorship on Thailand: "It provides a skewed understanding of Thai history, politics and culture and promotes a narrow ideology to propel the authority and power in society, leading to a gap, hierarchy and stratification that hinder free speech, academic freedom, open exdiauge of ideas and public deliberation A young journalist bemoaned, "It still makes me frustrated that there is censorship" on the issue of the monarchy, and she thought it boded ill for Thailand's future. "It will be like a couple in a relationship who have problems but aren't talldng. They know what the problem is, but no one wants to talk. One day, one of them will explode.=~>44

Conclusion On the one hand, the situation described here seems clear: There is a paranoid military state (that was then elected into a paranoid, vaguely democratic state) that has seemed to arbitrarily select targets for repression. It has tried to induce a portion of the population to act as informants, while

creating huge contingents of cybersp ecialists to track down would-be opponents of the monarchy-an institution whose basic identity itself has suddenly shifted. The junta, along with a sizeable portion of civil society essentially eliminated the notion of news and politics and seems sometimes to be suppressing not "political opponents" (since it was impossible to have them since there were no politics as such) but just vague threats: community

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groups marching from Bangkok to the northeast, people who spoke out too publicly or frankly- in a sense, the public at large. The regime seemed to act not just arbitrarily, but worse, perhaps, randomly, without a clear goal in mind." Nevertheless, the random prosecution of speech crimes has achieved its desired effect: People control their thoughts and actions at a wider scale than they might have before. On the other hand, the aim of the dictatorship and its absurdist politics seems larger than just preventing individual speech acts. Rather, the aim seems to be to exhaust and make hopeless anyone with political ideals. By the junta spealdng and acting so absurdly, "public discourse" itself became (and remains largely) meaningless. Any engagement with absurdist politics is bound to lead to absurd and nonsensical discourse. But it also can be dis-

astrous. A comment on social media can be pointless and yet become quite threatening if shared too much. In such a situation, do definitions of "selfcensorship"-"control of what you say or do in order to avoid annoying or offending others, but without being told officially that such control is necessary"-make sense anymore?'*" Is it not an act of self-censorship when you fall silent in the face of language that has been so tortured and violated that meaningful comment can no longer be made? The ceaseless absurdities on center stage tend toward self-censorship because of the sense of enormous loss they engender, sapping away one's spirits, energy, and imagination. Those who chose to speak out against the military government as discussed in this chapter did so because at the time, Me regime did not care or even have a way of assessing whether what was expressed was actually a threat. The line has not been clear. Under dictatorship, the opposition could not even clearly delineate itself as "the opposition" Even the military

state was unable to differentiate or classify what it believed to constitute a threat. The situation was not like it was with censorship in apartheid South Africa or the Soviet Union, where the censor and the writer were aware of each other, or sometimes knew each other." In those days, there could be a real sense of critical intellectuals opposing a dictatorship and its oppression. The building blocks used to make sense of the world during that period

were created under the regime of print media-facts, the truth, rationality, and so on. Under Thailand's dictatorship, the shared sense of the meaning of a certain kind of political vocabulary was broken: the regime spoke one language and the opposition largely another. Faced with such a diallenge, there was no "opposition" as such--just millions of atomized individuals,

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separated and largely isolated. Channels for spealdng may have multiplied, but their effects did not always add up. At the same time, the 1nilitary's possibilities for seemingly random disciplinary intervention proliferated as well. One not only asked oneself how one should speak, but whether speaking at all made any sense anymore. The red lines have never been clear in Thailand, but they are even less so since the 2014 coup. The frustration was expressed by one informer who wonders whether there was any reason for "speaking truth to power when truth is immaterial": Like these criminal cases for] Facebook messages or text messages-this is the outer edge of a galaxy of possible interesting thoughts-this is not the stuff that starts a movement, this is not intellectually sustained, it's not theoretically rich-it's speech detritus, in a sense, but to me that's what's scary about it. It°s the thing that you don't know that you said, that you didn't know that you didn't know that you said."

The Thai military government and its manifestation was neither terrifying nor brutal, but rather absurdly banal and profoundly stupefying. The junta did not just seize power; it heralded a new age where Thai society will have little chance to communicate and might in time become

paralyzed.

No yes 1

I especially wish to thank Eli Elinoff for his paper-saving advice, and the editor for his understanding and patience.

2

"Court Accepts Charges against Lawyer Facing 50 Years."

3 Netta, "A Decade of Article 112 Cases." 4 "Sedition Law Political Tool of the Junta."

5 "Military Court Breaks Record with 35-Year Jail Term." 6 "Military Court Sends Elderly Man to Iail" 7 Thaweeporn, "Thai Man Found. Guilty of Attempted Lose-Majesté"

8 "Lose-Majesté under King Rama X?

9 "Police to Activists"; Human Rights Watch, "Thailand: Junta Arrests Activist's Mother" 10

Touya de Marianne, "On Post-colonialism, Feminism, and History," 41, 47-8.

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11

Loader, "Digital Democracy."

12

Watana Muangsook, a Pheu Thai Party politician who has been summoned to several attitude adjustment sessions, reportedly claimed on his Facebook page that "people have the rights and liberties to state their opinion of the draft constitution, which is guaranteed even under Article 4 of the Interim Constitution" ("Iunta Critic Again to Be Taken in for Military Re-education"). Section 4 makes a vague commitment to rights, stating: "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, human dignity, rights, liberties and equality previously enjoyed

by the Thai people shall be protected under this Constitution." As none of the provisions in the constitution says anything about citizens' rights, and as no case, to my knowledge, made to the courts calling for rights has succeeded, in a practical sense at least 'Thai citizens enjoy no rights (Thailand, Constitution of

the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim), B.E. 2557 [2o14]). 13 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, "Thailand, One Year after the Coup." For a more academic treatment of' the junta's repression, see l\fleCargo, Alexander, and Desatova, "Ordering Peace"; McCargo, "Thailand's Urbanized Villagers and Political Polarization."

14 US Department of State, "Thailand"; "Police Spend 28 Million Baht." 15 "Although the Internet and Social~Networking Sites Contain a Greater Diversity of Content and Debate than Traditional Media, Online Censorship and Selfcensorship Has Increased since the Coup," in Freedom House, "Press Freedom"; International Freedom of Expression Exchange, "Thailand, One Year after the

Coup"; "Media freedom organizations say self-censorship and censorship enforced by authorities have dramatically increased under martial law, with political gatherings and criticism of the coup forbidden" ("Thailand junta Squelches Forum on Media Cellsorship"); US Department of State, "Thailand," 16, 19. 16 Freedom House, "Thailand Profile"; "2o17 World Press Freedomlndex." 17 US Department of State, "'lhailand" 18 Matthew Bunn points out the contributions of Gran sci, Althusser, Foucault,

and Bourdieu in constructing what he calls "New Censorship Theory." Bunn considers censorship as more than "a negative, repressive force, concerned only with prohibiting, silencing, and erasing" He views it also as a "productive force

that creates new forms of discourse, new forms of communication, and new a diffuse, ubiquitous phenomenon in which a host of genres of speech; actors (including impersonal, structural conditions) function as effective censors"

whose manifestations "are ultimately more powerful and significant than overt, formal repression" and where "space for agency' is either severely bounded or illusionary" (Bunn, "Reimagining Repression," 30). 19 Streckfuss, Truth on Trial, 5.

zo The caveat, though, was the peculiar Thai law that could make a printed defamatory statement a crime in every separate province in which the article appeared. So one article could result in, say, five prosecutions in five provinces. A later law at least allowed the cases to he consolidated in Bangkok. 21 "Ratchaburi Court to Rule on Case."

Digital Censorship and SegfcerzsorslUp under Dictatorship

22

335

"Detained Watana Faces Re-education Camp"; "Watana's Daughter Petitions US Embassy"; "Next Step Is Iail, Regime Warns Watana."

23 Informant 14. When there were follow-up interviews, discussions took place in English and Thai. Some responses, whether in English or Thai, were slightly edited for readability. 24 Informant 32.

25 Informant 32.

26 Informant Io. 27 Informant 32. 28 Interview, Bangkok, 17 Feb. 2016.

29 Facebook interview, 22 Apr. 2016. 30 Informant

10.

31 Not only was The Wolf Bride the first Thai play to result in criminal charges, it might also have been one of the few times-if not the first-that an actor was charged for the crimes of his diaracter ("'Illai "theater Actors in Exile after Coup"). 32 Informant 3,

33 Informant 12. 34 Winslow-Yost, "Thailand's Genial Nightmares."

35 Kohn, "Apichatpong Weerasethakul." 36 Informant 22. She went on to say that self-censorship has to be exercised when reporting on Muslim issues where "scholars and media and religious leaders hardly criticize or question patterns, behaviors, the state of affairs of Muslim organizations, pondoks [private Muslim schools], insurgents, education, health care."

37 Informant 22. 38 "Thai Man May Go to Prison for Insulting Kings Dog."

39 Interview, Bangkok, 17 Feb. 2016.

40 Informant 25. 41 Informant 10. 42 Informant 14. 43 Informant

10.

44 Informant 25. 45 Kuhonta and Aim, "Democratic Regression in Thailandf' 46 "Self-cens orship: Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary."

47 See, for instance, die South African and Soviet contexts in Coetzee, Giving Ojénse, 10, 35.

48 Interview with informant, 2 Mar. 2016.

13

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References Index." Reporters Without Borders, 2o17. httpszl/rsf .org/en/ranking/2017, accessed 10 July 2019.

"2017 World Press Freedom

Bunn, Matthew "Reimagining Repression: New Censorship Theory and After." History and Theory 54 (Feb. 2015):25-44.

Coetzee, I. M. Giving OjCensez Essays on Censorship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

"Court Accepts Charges against Lawyer Facing 50 Years in Jail for Lose-Majesté." Prachatai, 26 July 2017. hups://prachatai.com/english/node/7292, accessed 10 July 2019.

Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. New York: Zone, 1994. http:llwww .antiwor1d.se/projectfreferences/texts/The_Society%2o__Of%2o_7he%2o

_Spectacle.pdf, accessed IO July 2019.

"Detained Watana Faces Re-education Camp" Bangkok Post, 19 Apr.

2016.

http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/938o97/detained-watana-faces~

re-education -camp, accessed 10 July 2019. Freedom House. "Press Freedom."

2015.

https://freedomhouse.org/report/'

freedom-press/freedom-press-2015#.VxUGSNR97IU, accessed 10 July 2019.

.

"Thailand Profile," 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2017/thailand, accessed 10 July 2o19. Human Rights Watch. "Thailandz Junta Arrests Activist's Mother." 6 May 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/06/thailand-junta-arrests-activists mother, accessed 10 July 2019. International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX). "Thailand, One Year after the Coup: Muzzling a Tame Media." 22 May 2015. https://ifex.org/ thailand-one-year-after-thecoup-muzzling-a-tame-media/, accessed 18 Sep. 2020.

"Junta Critic Again to Be Taken in for Military Re-education." Praclfzataf,14 Apr. 2016. http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/6041, accessed 10 July 2019. Kohn, Eric. "Apichatpong Weerasethakul on Why 'Cemetery of Splendour'

Will Be His Final Film in Thailand." Irrdiewire, 30 Sep. 2015. http'//www .indiewire.com/article/apichatpong-weerasethakuhon-why-cemetery-oi splendour-wiltbe-his~final-film-in-thailand-2o15o93o.

Kuhonta, Erik Martinez, and Aim Sinpeng. "Democratic Regression in Thailand: The Ambivalent Role of Civil Society and Political Institutions." Contemporary Southeast Asia 36.3 (Dec. 2o14);333-55.

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Lose-Majesté Linder King Rama x: Six Observations" Prachcztai, 12 Dec. 2o16. https://prachatai.com/english/node/6763,

accessed 10 Inly 2019.

Loader, Brian. "Digital Democracy." In The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Dernocracy, ed. Benjamin Isak fan and Stephen Stockwell, 479-9o. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.

McCargo, Duncan. "Thailand's Urbanized Villagers and Political Polarization." Critical Asian Studies 49.3 (July 2017):365-78.

McCargo, Duncan, Saowanee T. Alexander and Petra Desatova. "Ordering Peace: Thailand's 2016 Constitutional Referendum." Contemporary Southeast Asia 39.1 (2017):65-95.

Netta Wong vat. "A Decade of Article

112 Cases" Prachataf, 15 Nov. 2o17. https:/lprachatai.com/english/node/7466, accessed 10 Duly 2019.

Military Court Breaks Record with 35-Year Jail Term for Lose-Majesté." Pracho~ tai, 6 Sep. 2o17. https'//pracliatai.com/english/node/7194, accessed 10 July 2019.

Military Court Sends Elderly Man to Jail for Almost 20 Years for Lose-Mojesté." Prachalai, 9 Aug. 2017. https://prachataicom/english/node/7319, Io

accessed

July 2019.

Next Step Is Jail, Regime Warns Watana." Bangkok Post, 22 Apr. 2016. http://wvwnbangkokpost.com/news/politics/942393/next-step-is-jail-regime warns-watana, accessed Io July 2019. Police Spend 28 Million Baht to Target Viewers of Lose-Majest Content."

Pmchatai, 23, May 2017. https://prachatai.com/english/node/7160, accessed 10

July 2019.

Police to Activists: Take Ja NewS Mom as Example." Prachotai, 9 May 2o16. https://prachatai.com/english/node/6129, accessed 10 July 2019. Ratchaburi Court to Rule on Case against Prachatai Reporter 29 Jan." Prachatai, 26 Jan. 2018. https://prachatai.com/english/node/7585, accessed 10 July 2019.

Sedition Law Political Tool of the Junta: fLaw" Prochatai, 30 Aug. 2017. https://prachatai.com/english/node/735o, accessed 10 July 2019. Self-censorship: Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary." Cambridge Dictionary,

2019. dictionarycambridge.org/dictionary/englislUself-censorship,

accessed 9 July 2019. Streckfuss, David. Truth on Trial in Ylzailarzd: Defamation, Treason, and LéseMajesté- London: Routledge, 2011.

Thai Man May Go to Prison for Insulting KingS Dog," New York Times, 14 Dec. 2015. http://www.nytimes.co1n/2015/12/15/world/asia/thailand-lese-majeste-

tongdaeng.htrnl?_r=o, accessed Io July 2019.

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"Thai Theater Actors in Exile after Coup." Prachatczi, 6 Duly 2015. http://www .prachatai.org/english/node/5261, accessed 10 July 2o19. Thailand, Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim), B.E. 2557 [2o14].

https://www.i1o.org/dyn/natleMdocs/ELECTRONIC/1oo483/120552/F188478 0617/THA100483%20Tl1a.pd£ accessed

10

Duly 2019.

"Thailand Junta Squelches Forum on Media Censorship" Al Iazeera, 2.9 Ian. 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2o15/1/29/thailand-junta-squelches-

forum-on-media-censorshiphtml, accessed to July 2019. Thaweeporn Kummetha. "Thai Man Found Guilty of Attempted Lose-Majesté." Prachatai, 12 Dec. 10

2013.

https://pracl1atai.com/englishfnode/379o,

accessed

July 2019.

Touya de Marianne, Eric. "On Post-colonialism, Feminism, and History: Hole Beji, Baudrillard, and the Arab Spring" Dalhousie French Studies 102 (Summer 2014):39-48.

US Department of State. "Thailand." In Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, 13 Apr. 2o16. httpsu'/2oo9-2o17.state.gov/j/dr1/rls/hrrpt/2o15/ eap/2528o3.htm, accessed 25 July 2019.

"Watana's Daughter Petitions US Embassy." Bangkok Post, 20 Apr. 2016. http:// www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/940569/watanas-daughter-petitions-

us-embassy, accessed 10 July 2019. Winslow-Yost, Gabriel. "'lllailand's Genial Nightmares." New York Review Books, 13 Mar. 2o16. http:llwww.nybooks.comldaily/2016/o3l13lcemeter of-splenclor-thailand-genial-nightmares/, accessed 10 July 2019.

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14 Dances with Dictators: NGOs and Military Regime in Thailand

SOMCHAI

PHATHARATHANANUNTH

THIS CHAPTER ANALYZES factors that influenced nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) to support antidemocratic activities, including the coups in 2oo6 and 2014. NGOs used to be the leading force of democratic movements in "lllailand.' Although they emerged in the i96os, Thai nGos rarely played any significant political role until the 199os. A new period of direct involvement of NGOS in democratic struggle occurred after the 1991

military coup. The Campaign for Popular Democracy (cpD), a unifying organization for some 4o to 5o NGOS and affiliated student and academic groups, was active in opposing the military junta through seminars, meetings, and rallies across Thailand Later, the CPD joined the Confederation for Democracy, a new coordinating organ that was set up to lead protest against the military-led government of General Suchinda Kraprayoon. A

massive popular protest in May 1992 was brutally cracked down on by the military, resulting in more than 50 dead and hundreds injured? However, the uprising finally led to Suchinda's downfall. After this, the NGO democracy movement became an important actor in the political reform process initiated by the elites. NGOS actively participated in political reform hoping

that cleaner electoral politics would benefit the poori4 NGOS assisted in deepening democracy by mobilizing to expand the social and political rights of the underprivileged in Thai society5 However, in the first decade

of the twenty-iirst century, NGOS turned from being the vanguard of democracy to supporters of authoritarian rule by supporting the antidemocratic People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the military coups

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in 2oo6 and 2014.6 Why did NGOS, once the leading force of democratic movements in Thailand, turn themselves into antidemocratic forces? To answer this question properly, we need to examine the engagement of NGOs with elected governments, especially the Thaksin government, and their relationship with royalist elites from the 199os onward, because the authoritarian turn of NGOS in the present period originated from those experiences. This chapter contains five sections. The first outlines the conceptual framework. The second section examines the development of the anti-electoral democracy attitude among NGOs. The third explores the no~elite relationship. "this is followed by a fourth section that looks at the effect of the idea of elite civil society on NGOS and by a final section dealing with NGOS

and the military coups of 2oo6 and

2014.

NGOs and Democracy According to Krista Brumley, there has been much enthusiasm over the

potential of NGOS to promote social change. NGOS are viewed as agents who are not only able to enact positive social change within communities but are also able to strengthen civil society7 For some, the contribution of NGOS to development may be important for political rather than economic reasons. NGOS bolster civil society by virtue of their participatory and democratic approach.8 In addition, they are portrayed by liberals as agents of democratization, development, and the empowerment of marginalized groups There are three main arguments to support such a claim. First, NGOS, as autonomous actors, are said to pluralize and strengthen the insti-

tutional arena. More civic actors means more opportunities for networking and creating alliances of civic actors to bargain with the state. Second, NGOS help widen and deepen popular participation because they work with grassroots organizations of poor and marginalized groups. Third, NGOS challenge state power at the national and local levels. They press for change and put forward an alternative set of perspectives and policies. noos have also played an important part in democratization in different parts of the world." This perspective fits with what happened in the 19905 but conflicts with the role of Thai NGOS in the present time. A more plausible view can be found in scholarly works critical of NGOS. These works point out that NGOs do not always engage in activities that

Dances with Dictators: NGOs and Military Regime in: Thailand

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lead to some kind of social transformation. They fail to alleviate poverty, are relatively unsuccessful in promoting democracy, are dependent on donors, and are co-opted by governments or other powerful actors. Instead

of promoting social change, NGOS sometimes uphold the status quo." Furthermore, they are internally undemocratic, characterized by authoritarian or charismatic leaders who discourage staff autonomy and participation in decisionunaldng processes. NGOS are also over-represented by the urban middle class and lack mass-based rural constituencies. Many of them face problems maintaining their links with grassroots groups in civil society More important, NGO activities are accountable to donors rather than to rural constituencies." Such a situation leads scholars to ask whether NGOS

have lost their "special relationship" with the poor, their radical ideas, and the alternatives, to the orthodoxies of the rich and powerful." We can add that in "lhailand, NGOS have lost their special relationship not only with the poor but also with democracy.

71fze Development

of an Anti-Electoral

Democracy Attitude

among NGOs

The hostility toward democracy developed among Thai NGOS long before the 2oo6 coup. One source of this hostility was NGOs' frustration with the failure of elected governments to respond to their demands. The end of military rule in 1992 opened space for popular mobilization. NGOS and

other social activists organized protests against dam projects, demanded land rights and engaged in other issues. Although the protests were strong

enough to force the government to sign agreements to solve farmers' problems, they were unable to prevent the government from breaking such agreements. NGOS tried to overcome the problem by organizing protracted protests on a massive scale in front of Government House. They believed that such a strategy would force the government to comply with their demands. The strategy was put into practice by the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) in 1997 for 99 days and seemed to work well when the Chavalit Yongchaiyuth government agreed to solve all problems raised by the AOP. The agreements were then ratified as cabinet resolutions. The concessions achieved by the AOP were hailed as the beginning of a new chapter in Thai history. However, most of these concessions did not materialize. When

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Chuan Leekpai succeeded Chavalit as prime minister, all the concessions made by the Chavalit government were reversed." This reversion not only demoralized AOP members but also confirmed the view held by NGOS that elections were a means used by local businessmen and women to pursue their self-interest in national politics; therefore, electoral politics had no value for the poor." Nevertheless, the passing of the 1997 constitution, which nGos had been engaged in drafting-especially in the areas of decentralization, participation, and empowerment"-gave NGOs hope for parliamentary democracy. As Sulak Sivaraksa has pointed out, the AOP and most NGOS believed that the 1997 constitution, "the people's constihition" as NGOS called it, could be the best constitution Thailand had ever had." Because of

this belief when the first general elections under the 1997 constitution were held in 2001, NGOS still tried to pursue their objectives through parliamentary politics. They took their revenge against the Chuan government at the polls by supporting Thaksin Shinawatra, Chuan's main rival." Apart from this tactical move, NGOS supported Thaksin also because they believed that he represented the progressive faction of Thai capitalism and had the most advanced social policies, similar to those of NGOs." Thaksin in return promised the AOP and n o s a sympathetic government responsive to their demands if he won. According to the prominent NGO leader Phondej Pinpratip, in the first year of the Thaksin government,

Prawase Wasi, Sulak Sivaraksa and Sem Pringpuangkaew-three influential figures within the NGO community-got along well with Thaksin." When Praise launched his project, the strategy ofpalangphaerz dirt (the forces of the land), the Office of the Prime Minister officially supported in." Never-

theless, conflict between the two sides emerged in the second year because Thaksin did not keep his promise and instead adopted more hostile policies

toward noos." Thaksin further upset NGOS by challenging their development strategies. While NGOS encouraged villagers to rely on a subsistence economy, Thaksin urged them to participate in the market economy. For NGOS, capitalist economic development benefited only the rich and made the poor poorer. They believed that to avoid the negative effects of capitalism, villagers should withdraw from the market economy and rely on a subsistence econ omy as they had done in the past. Villagers were able to return to self-reliance because the community had its own culture and way of

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development." Thaksin was not interested in the self-reliant agriculture NGOS. On the contrary, he wanted to change villagers into "entrepreneurs" through involvement in the market economy. Village funds, debt-restructuring schemes, the promotion of local products and credit programs were provided to assist villagers with business start-ups or investments in agricultural production. At the same time, Thaksin promoted export-oriented agriculture and trade liberalization. His government signed free trade agreements with Australia and ASEAN/China, and tariffs on the fruit and vegetable trade between Thailand and China were eliminated in October 2oo3. Thaksin's policies were severely criticized by his opponents

supported by

on the grounds that they contributed to high indebtedness, land concentration and the general demise of small-scale farmers." nGos accused Thaksin of poisoning community values with a culture of money, further destroying the unique culture of villages. They also viewed Thaksin's rural policies as vote buying in disguise." It should be noted that, for NGOS, the conflict over development strategies is a matter of life and death, since the presence of nGos in the countryside is justified by the value of their development strategies. If Thaksin's policies prevailed, there would be no need for NGOS to be there. For NGOS, the situation was at first irritating, then infuriating and worrying. They accused Thaksin of hijacking "their constitution" for his self~interest.2° Bitterly disappointed with Thaksin, NGOS tried to oppose him but did not get support from their constituencies. Thaksin was very popular among rural voters, who benefited from his policies. NGOS tried in vain to persuade villagers to oppose him. Even when the protest to oust Thaksin from power reached its peak, NGOS found it difficult to persuade

villagers to support the effort. According to villagers, it would have been

madness to oppose a prime minister who had helped them more than any other prime minister had." As we have seen, Thaksin's rural policies not only cut into NGOS' mass

base but also contradicted their rural development strategies. If Thaksinls popularity continued to grow, there was a possibility that NGOS would lose most of their support in the countryside. In other words, the very existence of nGos was threatened by Thaksin. To prevent such a scenario for nGos, Thaksin had to be removed from power. However, Thaksin was more powerful than any previously elected Thai prime minister. Apart from the popularity of his policies, Thaksin's power came also from the domination

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PI-IATHARATHANANUNTH

of his party, Thai Rak Thai, in Parliament." It was obvious that n o s were not strong enough to mount a meaningful struggle against him within the framework of electoral democracy." Losing faith in electoral democracy, NGOS branded Thal