Christian—Muslim Relations in Africa: The Cases of Northern Nigeria and Tanzania Compared 9780755692538, 9781850436416

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PREFACE

This book has developed largely out of studies and experiences of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Europe and in Africa since 1975. These have taught me that dialogue only becomes authentic and meaningful when rooted in practice. It is only by sharing our lives, struggles, and pains, by working together creatively and effectively that we can deal with our differences meaningfully. This lesson can be learned from the African example, as described in this book. Many institutions and individuals in Denmark, Sweden, Britain, Germany, USA, Nigeria and Tanzania have helped make this book possible. A large number of these have already been mentioned in my first book, Religion and Property in Northern Nigeria (1990). I can

mention only a few who have contributed in a special way. First, I want to express my gratitude to students and staff at the two theological colleges, the ecumenical Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN), Bukuru and the Lutheran Makumira Theological College, Usa River in Tanzania, where I was based during the main periods of my research. Discussions with students and staff at Kidugala Bible School, Iringa District in Tanzania were also very helpful to me. Furthermore, I am very much indebted to my main interpreters, Polycarp Akacha (Hong), Samuel Dih (Gyel) and Yakubu Pam (Forum) in Nigeria, and Rev. Lameck Masawa (Kidugala) and Sadock Lwendo (Ilembula) in Tanzania. Many other contacts in the two countries have been helpful in my research. I shall mention only a few, to whom I will acknowledge special appreciation: Rev. Dr Wilson Sabiya (Mbamba) and Dr John Boer, Institute of Church and Society (Jos), both in Nigeria; and Prof. C. K. Omari, Dept. of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam and Rev. Dr Peter Kijanga (Singida), in Tanzania.

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PREFACE

I would like to thank lecturers at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Birmingham (England), for their advice and guidance, and Prof. Holger Bernt Hansen (Copenhagen) and Lester Crook (London) for helpful criticism and comments and for making the publication of this book possible. Cand. theol. Hans Raun Iversen, lecturer at the Faculty of Theology, Copenhagen, has been my main support and encouragement all these years and has read my manuscript several times. To him I want to express my deepest appreciation. The Danish United Sudan Mission must be thanked for its compliance and readiness to give me access to its archives, and the Danish Research Council for Humanities and Jens Norregaards and Hal Kochs Mindefond for their financial support. For proof reading of the manuscript I must thank my good friend, Aminah Molloy, in Birmingham. Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank the main contributors, Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and Tanzania. Without their openness and willingness this book would not have been possible. They are the subject of the study, and to them this book is dedicated. Lissi Rasmussen Copenhagen, October 1992

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

Abbreviations

AMNUT - All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika ASP - Afro-Shirazi Party BAKWATA - Baraza Kuu la Waislam wa Tanzania (Supreme Council of Tanzania Muslims) BICMURA - The Bulletin of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham) CA - Constitution Assembly CAN - The Christian Organization of Nigeria CCM - Chama Cha Mapinduzi (The Revolutionary Party) CDC - Constitution Drafting Committee CMS - The Church Missionary Society DFSM - Dansk Forenet Sudan Mission (The Danish branch of the Sudan United Mission) EAMWS - East African Muslim Welfare Society FCA - Federal Court of Appeal FSCA - Federal Sharia Court of Appeal HGF - The Holy Ghost Fathers MSS - Muslim Students' Society OIC - The Organization of Islamic Conference RA - Rigsarkivet (The National Archives), Copenhagen SIM - The Sudan Interior Mission SUM - Sudan United Mission TAA - Tanganyika African Association TANU - Tanganyika African United Union (National Party) UMCA - Universities' Mission to Central Africa WCC - The World Council of Churches ZNP - Zanzibar National Party

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Glossary

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

Ar = Arabic B = Birom F = Fulfulde

H = Hausa S = Swahili

abd - Ar: slave ajami - H: Arabic scripted Hausa akida - S: lieutenant or subordinate adminstrator alkali - F/H: court judge Amir al-Muminin - Ar: Leader of the Muslims baraka - Ar: blessings bidia - Ar: innovation boko - H: romanized Hausa dar-al-Islam - Ar: the house of Islam dhikr - Ar: remembrance dhimmi - Ar: protected people dini- S: religion duat - Ar: 'missionaries', dawa- 'mission' emir - Ar: Muslim leader gandu (pi. gandaye) - H: extended household gari (pi. garuruwa) - H: village gida (pi. gidaje) - H: household in the narrow sense hadith - Ar: tradition hijra - Ar: emigration jamaa - S: family jihad - Ar: struggle, striving khilafah - Ar: stewardship lamido - F: chief Liwali - H: governor maji - S: water mawali - S: client migove - (kiBena): communal work (S: ujimaa) mwalimu - S: teacher Nasara - Ar: Christians Oba - Yoruba: chief qadi - Ar: judge salat - Ar: prayer sarki (pi. sarakuna) - H: chief sikr - Ar: remembrance, prayer formula talaka - Ar: triple word of repudiation tariqa (pi. turuq) - Ar: path uhuru - S: freedom

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ujamaa - S: family hood ujimaa - S: traditional system of communal work umma - Ar: community wageni - S: immigrants wenyeji - S: indigenous, natives

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LIST OF MAPS

1. The penetration of Islam into East and West Africa (Clarke 1982:9) 2. East Africa (Trimingham 1964) 3. The Sokoto Caliphate (Crampton 1979) 4. Nigeria and its 21 states until December 1991, showing the LCCN area. The original outline of this map (with 19 states) is from Tunktlys 2 pa Afrika', DFSM, Christiansfeld 1987 5. General areas of protestant church work in Tanzania (Van Bergen 1981) 6. LCCN church area in Nigeria, showing church establishments, institutions and church divisions and names of districts (drawn on the basis of Ishaya 1984:126) 7. The Jos Plateau and its main roads (drawn on the basis of Morrison 1975) 8. Southern diocese (Lutheran Church) in Tanzania. The Bena area (drawn on the basis of Masawa 1980) Maps drawn by Russell Townsend

INTRODUCTION

Christian-Muslim relations in Africa have been and are more harmonious than elsewhere in the world. This is due to the fact that many African families are multi-religious and that Christians and Muslims remain strongly committed to their African (ethnic) identity. It also stems from the combined spiritual-material outlook on life that African people have, as indicated by two African writers: It is precisely the tolerance of African religion, African psychology, and the material-spiritual or vitalistic view of the African world that makes the coexistence of such intolerant religions possible. (Anyanwu 1976:122) The real reason for African ecumenicalism is simply the capacity of African traditional religion to tolerate and accommodate alternative religious cultures. (Mazrui 1980:95) It is implied in this communalistic African personality and the traditional religious outlook that there can be no bad religion. What is bad is lack of religion. Although there have been wars between ethnic groups, with invocation of religious powers against other groups or clans, religious exclusivism has been alien to Africa in the sense that God was claimed to be on one side or the other, or that one or the other side was fighting for God. Instead, the African outlook has been religiously inclusive because of the family solidarity of the community to which God also belongs. Hence, God naturally belonged to the community of others as well. The type of society, personality and religion, therefore, has created the conditions for a possible coexistence between religions, including new ones like Christianity and Islam.

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This is a very general statement. The task is to show how in presentday practice the theoretical basis of communalism has developed and expressed itself in two countries, Nigeria and Tanzania, and how it has been influenced by other factors. To what extent have historical, political, social or economic factors shaped and transformed the relations? The two countries have been chosen here as examples of two oppositely directed tendencies of development. In Tanzania, potentially divisive religious forces have been able to work for the good of the country as a whole, whereas Nigeria has been divided along religious lines. The aim of this book is to analyze the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria and Tanzania today and to describe those factors that determine the relationship. How do Christians and Muslims relate to each other on the level of nation and village? In both countries, Christians and Muslims belong to the same local societies. Therefore, the specific social, political and economic context has to be taken as the starting point. Socio-cultural conditions, economic organization and political structure are important for an analysis of the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Africa. It is this holistic view of human life and of religion that has determined the development of this study, and that has been the starting point for the choice of case-studies which form the basis for the analysis. Historical description serves as background for the understanding of the actual relationships. Therefore, the study will not dwell on details in the history of Christianity and Islam, except where this is necessary for understanding the present. Broad perspectives and overall comparative analyses have been considered more important than studies in depth. On the local level the analysis concentrates mainly on northern areas, as far as Nigeria is concerned, but on a national level it naturally includes both the northern and southern parts. Nigeria has an almost equal number of Christians and Muslims. Various figures list Muslims somewhere under 50 per cent and the Christian total slightly less.1 David Barrett's estimate of the comparative numbers in Tanzania gives Christianity 44 per cent and Islam 32 per cent.2 The occasional imbalance between the descriptions of Nigeria and Tanzania is partly due to the bias marking my source material. If I have considered more material on Nigeria, this is due to the different amount of time I spent in the two countries (approximately one and a half yea rs in Nigeria, compared with only four months in Tanzania). Nigeria is relatively more familiar to me.

INTRODUCTION

3

The book is based on field work (mainly in connection with the casestudies), practical experience and observation, studies of documentary sources, and reading of secondary literature. The field work was carried out in the two countries from 1977 to 1981. In Nigeria, research was done mainly in the Birom area,3 which is predominantly Christian. In this area the following villages were selected: Forum: Zabot, Kakpwis (Tsofon Forum), Kakpwen, Korot (Sabon Gidan Forum), Bisichi (mining village). Gyel: Nyango, Sot, Gyel Village. Riyom: Riyom village. Korot had the greatest number of Muslims. Furthermore, research was done in the Kilba area,4 which includes quite a number of Muslims and Christians and has been Muslim-dominated politically. Research was done here in four villages: Hong, Pella, Bangshika and Uding (see Map 6). In Tanzania, my field work (in 1980) was concentrated in the Bena area in the Southern Highlands (see Map 5), mainly in Kidugala5 (close to Njombe, see Map 8), in Mdandu, Wangama, Ilembula, Igosi, Makoga and N'ganda. Mdandu turned out to be the most interesting village in this context, with its 50 per cent Christian and 50 per cent Muslim inhabitants, and was therefore chosen as a case study.6 My field work took three forms: unstructured observation; structured and unstructured interviews; and a very limited use of questionnaires. References to published material are indicated in brackets within the text. References to archive material and field work are given in footnotes. Books are generally listed in their original language, although occasionally the English version is indicated. Where this is the case I have referred to the version used, and indicated the original year of publication in the bibliography. Only where literature dates far back, for instance to the colonial period, and the year of publication is important to have in mind, have I indicated the original year in the text (and first in the bibliography). Notes 1 See Joseph Kenny. 1985. Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria. In Richard W. Rousseau (ed.) Christianity and Islam: The Struggling Dialogue. Scranton. 2 The World Christian Encyclopedia, as reported in Action No. 79, April 1983, London. By Christian and Muslim is simply meant somebody who professes to be a Christian or Muslim when asked. The same numbers are found in John S. Mbiti. 1980. Bible and Theology in African Christianity. Nairobi. 3 The Birom area is located in the Plateau State (in the Middle Belt of Nigeria) and in what was formerly known as the Jos Division of Plateau

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Province in Northern Nigeria (see Maps 4 and 7); see Rasmussen 1990: 45-53. 4 The Kilba area is located in the northern part of former Adamawa division in Gongola State (now Adamawa State) between the Hawal and Kilengi rivers (see Map 4); see Rasmussen 1990:35-44. 5 Kidugala was originally a so-called 'Christian village', which had been chosen for Ujamaaization because it had all the relevant facilities. 6 In Nigeria questionnaires were prepared (1977-8) in English to be answered by TCCN students and secondary school students in Hong; and in Hausa to be answered by younger people in Birom and Kilba villages who could read and write Hausa. In Tanzania questionnaires were prepared (1980) in Swahili to be answered by students at Makumira Theological College and at Kidugala Bible School.

I THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN WEST AND EAST AFRICA BEFORE COLONIAL TIMES 1. The diffusion of Islam in West Africa. Islam in West Africa has a history of more than 1,000 years. The Berbers from western North Africa had gradually become Muslims some of them also wholly or partially Arabized in culture and language - after the whole of the coastal strip of North Africa had been conquered by Arab invaders in the 8th century. It was primarily these Berbers who first carried Islam to sub-Saharan West Africa, known in Arabic as bilad as-Sudan, 'The Land of the Blacks', when they crossed the Sahara as traders. By the end of the 10th century, Muslim settlements had been established in towns and commercial centres in Ghana, Mali, Walat and other regions.1 From the 11th century, it was not only Muslim merchants and traders from the North, but also militant Almoravids2 and Muslim du at (sing, dai - preacher of Islam) who were agents of conversion to Islam, and great empires came into existence (Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu). Whole states or communities were in due course Islamicized, at least officially, represented by the traditional rulers who benefited from the prestige of attachment to Islam, and who wanted to protect their kingdoms from possible Muslim military attacks and to guard against the creation of a state within the state. As a result, Islam was for a long time primarily the religion of these leaders of the kingdom, rather than of the masses. This was the first phase of Islamic expansion, the phase of theocratic development in which conversion to Islam was in the main economically and politically motivated. This made Islam a class religion, belonging to the ruling classes of conquered people.3 It was patronized to some extent by the town dwellers in the commercial centres, especially by the aristocracy who were anxious to maintain their position and their

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control of trade, but it was largely rejected by the rural farming populations.4 In this sense Islam became a factor of social division.5 Sometimes Islamic rituals were absorbed by African tradition, and Islam and indigenous custom and religion coexisted. Islam made its first appearance among the Hausa6 around the year 1350 through traders from Mali and Kanem. About the same time (from 1200) Fulani7 pastoralists gradually migrated into the Hausa chiefdom from the Senegal valleys. Some of them settled in the towns where they often became part of the higher classes. At first the rulers of Kano and Katsina adopted Islam and there is evidence of substantial Muslim presence in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. This led to the formation of the Hausa states, each having its own function.8 The states were politically independent of one another, and conflicts between them were frequent. Each state wanted to subjugate the others and to bring them under its administration (cf. Clarke 1982:28-76). The second phase of African Islamic history, beginning in the 18th century, was characterized by the transition from a class religion to a religion of whole peoples. Two factors contributed to this: the emergence of the tariqa orders (pi. turuq)9 and the jihads.10 The tariqa orders, which arose in West Africa in the period from 1100 to 1400, often attracted many who did not respond to traditional orthodox Islam. Therefore the orders came to be characterized as the 4 Islam of the masses' or the 'agents of Africanization of Islam'. These arose within the African environment, were dominated by African leadership, and their organization remained in African hands. They had greater appeal to the majority of Muslims than the strict formalism which demanded adherence to the Sharia. They were more in keeping with traditional African beliefs. The orders had a strong tendency towards political activism. They developed a political character, and in the 19th century their political expressions became stronger and stronger, accentuated by the combination of interst in the Hadith (and orthodoxy in general) and in purificationist reform of Islam. It was mainly men from within these orders who became leaders of the jihads which attempted to create new nations on a foundation of religious and social justice, to reform the Muslim leaders, and to remove syncretism. The jihads in the 19th century, in their establishment of Islamic states, were motivated socio-politically as well as religiously. They must be seen partly as a result of a tradition in Sudan where wars had been

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN WEST AND EAST AFRICA

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fought from about 1500,11 and partly as an echo of 4a contemporary political and inellectual movement going on in the Middle East - the Sufi response to Wahhabi reform in Arabia' against the self-confidence and expanding aggression of Christian Europe (Martin 1976:13). Usman dan Fodio (known as Shehu, meaning sheikh 1754—1817) was a member of the learned Torodbe-Fulani clan and identified with the Qadinyya (see Martin 1976:115ff.; Paden 1986:39f). He gathered a group of supporters from among the Fulani clerics of Hausaland, not all of them devout Muslims, and declared a jihad in the sense of a social and religious revolution against the Hausa king of Gobir. It set out to establish a purer form of Islam in what he considered to be a predominantly decadent society. From here it spread via a chain of local jihads in Hausaland through spontaneous leadership, until, by 1810, Usman's forces were in control of the Hausa states. At first Usman did not intend to use force to establish a state and society of Islamic rectitude. Only later did he realize that peaceful persuasion was not enough. Thus he neither planned nor organized the military conquest of Hausaland. The way in which the jihad spread shows that there was an underlying discontent present in the Hausa states (see Waldman 1965:353ff.). Usman's jihads had great support among the Fulani pastoralists who were discontented with their exclusion from higher levels in government and therefore wanted to establish the political power of the Hausa people. To some extent, the result of the jihads was that Hausa rulers in the various city states were substituted by the Fulani (see Abba 1979:21). Usman's jihads inspired other successful Fulani jihads in Masina on the Upper Niger. One of them was led by Ahmadu Lobo who, by 1815, established himself as ruler of an Islamic state. A final Fulani movement in the Sudan was led by Al Hajj Umar born in Futa Toro in the 1790s. About 1852 he proclaimed his jihad had built up the Tukulor empire by conquering the Bambara state of Ka'arta, and the 'mixing' Bambara states of Segu and Masina. In so doing, he also clashed with the French, who had recently arrived in these areas. Newell Booth has argued that Umar: seems to have used the framework of the jihad as an excuse for simple conquest and self-aggrandizement more than Hamadu or Uthman. Certainly Masina, the most truly Muslim state in the area could not properly be the object of a jihad. (1977:314)

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However, it is certain that Umar's jihad, like other jihads, did not develop in a socio-political vacuum, but rather in a situation of political and social chaos, and the main ambition of Umar was to carve out ;i new Islamic state and to eliminate this chaos. Further jihads took place in Senegambia in the late 19th century. Having their roots in those traditions, the jihads became not merely warfare against but struggle for, not merely a destruction of existing religio-political structures but also a constructive reform movement that wanted to establish a more just society based on the Islamic ideology of the umma (community). That would mean a society with reduced taxation, fair imprisonment, and just sequestrations in the marketplace. The fact that the jihads were Fulani-led and Fulani-inspired becomes understandable when one considers that the Fulani, as an ethnic group living in foreign countries, more than anybody else felt the oppression in the form of official corruption, excessive taxation and bribery by governments, and that they were more Islamicized than their host peoples: Injustices against them would therefore tend to be seen as injustices against their ethnic group, but also against the religion of Islam. Being largely outside the pale of government, the pious Fulani were more favourably placed to identify abuses against Islamic tenets than their counterpart indigenous Muslims, many of whom had vested interests in the existing systems. (Adeleye 1962:20). The most important consequence of the jihads was the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, the largest political unit in 19th century West Africa, a confederation of states (emirates) held together by common aims and religious allegiance to the Amir al-Muminin: 'the effective source of all authority and certainly, the common bond which held the components together as one polity' (Adeleye 1962:38). In this way the jihads broke down political boundaries and undermined ethnic loyalties to some extent, by uniting the Hausa states and making Islam the official religion of the majority, i.e., enlarging dar-al-Islam against enemies. Stress was laid upon the uniqueness and exclusiveness of Islam and its opposition to any form of accommodation with African traditional beliefs. A number of small societies or minor ethnic groups (such as the Kilba) were subjugated under the Sokoto Caliphate, while others (like the Birom) maintained their independence. These predominantly non-

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Muslim groups were struggling for their independence, and their opposition to the Sokoto Caliphate is of great present interest since it still affects the relationship between Christians and Muslims. The emirates were to a large extent self-governing but not independent. They were controlled from Sokoto through a system of supervision. Each emirate chose its emir who ruled the emirate, though on occasions the Caliph intervened in the affairs of the emirates. His authority, however, seeemed to be primarily moral. Tribute was paid to Sokoto12 and matters of high administration were referred to the capital. These were links of unity resulting from the jihad. Tribute directed the resources of the emirate from the districts and the villages, both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, to the centre. The date of introduction of Islam to the Yoruba is not certain. Suggestions range from the 14th century onwards. It is certain, however, that Islam had already become a factor in the area before the Fulani jihad of 1804, through traders and teachers. It was especially in the Oyo Empire where many Hausa slaves worked, that Islam was well established. Oyo played an important role as intermediary in the slave traffic between the northern Sudanic states and the Europeans. Muslims were taken through Oyo and shipped as slaves to Brazil and Sierra Leone. Between 1840 and 1900, in particular, the Muslim community grew signifiantly between Ilorin and the Atlantic coast. Freed slaves from Hausaland, Brazil and Sierra Leone began to return to Nigeria and reinforced the Muslim communities in the southern and western regions. The type of Islam of these freed slaves was in many ways 'mixed', embodying traditional Yoruba practices and Islamic practice. By 1871 there was a large and influential Muslim group in Ibadan. Itinerant sheikhs had come there, especially from Ilorin, which had become the main Muslim centre in the area for learning and spiritual guidance. Ilorin was incorporated into the Sokoto Caliphate in the first half of the 19th century. Otherwise, there was no attempt to create an Islamic state or Islamic political and administrative institutions in southern Nigeria. 2. The diffusion of Islam in East Africa.13 Trimingham begins his book on Islam in East Africa in this way: 'The history of Islam in East Africa belongs more to the history of the Indian coast than to African history. (Trimingham 1964:1). This is true in so

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far as it was not until late in the 19th century that Islam spread significantly among Africans in East Africa, and especially between 1880 and 1930 (Trimingham 1964:53), although the Arabs had had contacts with the east coast of Africa since the 5th century, and a Muslim community of Zanzibar probably dates back to the 9th century. The early history of Islam in East Africa was primarily the history of coastal settlements (mainly Arab), and the accounts available from that time tell not so much of the people among whom these settlements took place but of the settlers themselves and contain mainly 'dubious legends, inter-settlement warfare and ruler-lists' (Trimingham 1964:1). Also, in East Africa Islam developed in relation to trade. Southern Arabia had for a long time considered East Africa as lying within its sphere of influence and had been in contact with the coast through commerce of the Indian Ocean. Merchant people from Arabia and Persia settled on the coast and in some cases established themselves as rulers of towns by means of matrimonial alliances. For centuries, however, Islam remained an important force only on the islands and on the coast where, between the beginning of the 14th and the end of the 15th centuries, a Muslim population known to the Arabs as the 'coastalists', the Swahili, grew up, developing a distinct Islamic culture and a new language - a synthesis of Bantu and Perso-Arab elements.14 Since the outlook of the coastalists was oriented outwards towards the ocean rather than inwards towards the interior, Islam did not spread far inland in East Africa. Rather the Swahili community grew by drawing to itself new migrants from overseas and from the interior. Along the coastline small independent trading towns and villages with Muslim communities grew up - such as Zanzibar, Kilwa, Mombasa, Pemba and Sofala. The most important was Kilwa Kisiwani, situated on a small island just off the southern coast. Its first ruler, Ali ibn-Hasan, gained power around 1200. His subjects included Arabs from the Hadramawt and individual settlers from other Indian Ocean shores, as well as Africans from the mainland. Another group calling itself 'Shirazi' apparently from the northern coast (see Nimtz 1980:30) descendants of Persian immigrants, mostly farmers and fishermen - had settled as rulers along the coast in the 10th century. Around 1500 there was a commercial decline and political instability when Portuguese ships arrived on the coast. The Portuguese gained control of much of the coast in 1530 in order to 'secure the gold traffic of Sofala, to dominate the Indian Ocean and to banish all Muslims from its waters, to break the monopoly which the Islamic peoples held

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of the wealth trade with India, and to divert it by way of the new Cape route into the coffers of Portugal' (Harries 1954:24). The next 250 years was a time of slave trade and of decay, since the lines of commerce were disrupted and earlier prosperity was destroyed (see Ximtz 1980:42f.). This was also the period in which the Muslim communities encountered Christianity in the form of Portuguese aggression. The Portuguese were defeated late in the 17th century under the leadership of Arabs from Oman who became recognized as sovereigns of the coast in return for their aid. However, the Swahili culture had survived, and new Arab migrations reinforced its Arabic elements. Some of the old prosperity of the coast returned under the leadership of Sayyid Sa'id ibn Sultan who transferred his capital from Muscat (Oman) to Zanzibar in 1840 (conventionally dated). Slave markets had been established in Zanzibar, and Arabs settled as plantation owners. This situation enabled the Swahili to feel somewhat superior culturally to the inland people. This was the time when Asian Muslims began to play a role as settlers along the coast. This role, however, became one which was more economic than religious in character. In the last half of the 19th century the demand for ivory and slaves led to more Arab penetration inland, thus providing a basis for Islamic expansion. It was mainly the peoples nearer to the coast who responded positively to Islam, and especially the Yao in southern Tanzania and Malawi, and the Nyamwezi in the west. By 1800, local and regional trade in foodstuffs and livestock had existed in the interior and on the coast for a long time. Long-distance trade with the coast and overseas countries in the 19th century must be seen against this background of the development of these interior trading networks and not only as the enterprise of the Arabs and Swahilis. Thus the initiative came partly from Africans of the interior, who saw opportunities in this commercial contact and therefore opened trade routes which also served as routes for trade in local products, and partly from the Swahilis and Arabs, who were inspired by the commercial upturn encouraged by Sayyid Sa'id's activity in Zanzibar and began to send their own caravans into the interior. An important trade route went from Kilwa down south to Yao-land. Along this route trade in slaves became very important, and the Yao chiefs became the dominant slave traders, controlling much of the trade between the coast and Lake Malawi. Edward A. Alpers has analyzed the Islamization of the Yao and has noted that the motives of these Yao trading chiefs for conversion were 'divided between the need for

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political and ritual legitimization and the desire for the regularization of the economic ties with Zanzibar and the advantages offered to this end by the attachment of literacy in Arabic script' (1972:192). Thus, acceptance of Islam was also a means of legitimizing their own prestige and power (see also Swantz 1976:139). The first recorded Unyamwezi caravan took place in 1839, from Bagamoyo to Tabora and Ujiji. Ivory remained more important than slaves along this route. Muslim traders established settlements among the Nyamwezi, who allied themselves with the traders in order to gain protection and to get a share of the profits of trade. In this way Islam was carried inland to such centres as Tabora, Ujiji and Kigoma through the formation of long-distance trading networks which were a major stimulus to the integration of the coast and the interior. In East Africa, the tariqa orders did not play such a great part in this period as in West Africa but were of much later date.15 The Qadiriyya later became important in encouraging local communities, in opposing Arab interests, and in providing a medium for Muslim polities in the nationalist era (see below p.26f.). There were various Shia-groups in East Africa: the Imamites (12 imams); the Ismailis (7 imams) and the Khodja (Khoja), started by Aga Khan (7 imams). Furthermore there were the Ithnasheri (Ithna Ashariyya) and the Bohora (Bhora), two Indian movements.

3. The different nature of the history of Islam in the two parts of Africa.

On the whole, Islam has spread in Africa as a result of economic, social and political factors. In West Africa it spread primarily through caravan trade,16 in East Africa through ocean trade. In both parts of Africa, Muslim traders formed settlements along the trade routes, providing a framework within which long distance trade could take place. Islam also influenced some whose social life had been disrupted by war or slavery and who had been separated from their ethnic groups; and it appealed to the rulers who saw the advantage of adopting an international religion in the place of local ones. The strongest Islamic centres were the commercial towns on the desert fringes or on the coast. Whereas the masses of the rural populations, both in East and West Africa, were hardly affected in the early phase of Islamic expansion, the trading centres were more open to the influence of a new religion which seemed adaptable to their urban way of life. The penetration of Islam into East Africa can be characterized

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mainly as a formation of a new Muslim community, the Swahili, a virtually closed-class community based on the pattern of Islamic immigrant settlements in the Middle East, in Central Asia and North India. Islam in East Africa did not 'penetrate existing communities, but created a new community' (Trimingham 1964:67), with the exception of the Yao; on the whole, a distinct culture and formations of states were rudimentary. By contrast, the penetration of Islam in West Africa can be characterized as initially a transformation of existing communities that, in due course, led to the creation of large states or empires. In West Africa, Islam became a more integrated part of the culture, more widespread and homogeneous, whereas in East Africa, it remained more of a foreign religion (outward-looking) and was limited to certain areas, namely the coastal area and (later) certain trading centres in the interior. Trimingham explains this by the fact that the 'clerics' became detribalized in East Africa, whereas they were fully integrated in West Africa. In East Africa they broke away from traditional life completely. After their education they often went to trading centres where they might combine trade with teaching clerical studies (Trimingham 1964:64; see also Mazrui 1986). Another reason was that the Swahili traders did not become part of the social structure, as did the traders in West Africa, and conversion of chiefs in East Africa was not common. In both East and West Africa there were examples of interaction between Islam and African traditional systems and practices. Both beliefs affected each other. Different aspects of traditional life were incorporated into Islam, such as divination and magic, accepted as sihr. This took place, not so much because of an 'accommodative' or 'integrative' approach by Muslims, but rather as a result of the durability of the traditional cultures, and of the active role they played. It was because of this acculturation process that tolerance and cooperation characterized the relationship between the Muslim clerics and traders and the traditional rulers (see Sanneh 1983:227ff.). In conclusion, Islam in East Africa came about more by individual conversion,17 while in West Africa whole peoples, such as the Hausa, became Muslim, which exerted a great transformative influence upon their surroundings. Notes 1

The first black Africans to adopt Islam in significant numbers are said to have been the people of Takrur, living on the banks of the Senegal river (Trimingham 1962:43 and Booth 1977:298).

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On the Almoravids, see Clarke 1982:13-27: The term Almoravid has the meaning by extension of 'holy war' and the Almoravid movement can therefore be described as the movement of those who engaged in holy war'. Whether in fact the founder and his successors as leaders of the movement and their followers 'were inspired and motivated solely by the desire to reform, defend and advance Islam' can be discussed, (ibid. p. 13). 3 In Booth's words: 'Islam made its appeal as a source of power more than a pattern of life' (1977:299). 4 On this, see Trimingham 1962:24-8; Levtzion 1968:55, 83, 106-9, 143-5. 5 For further information on the early Islamic states, see Clarke 1982:1-105; Ajayi/Crowder 1974:120-201; Trimingham in Kritzeck/Lewis 1969:13ff.; Stride/Ifeka 1971:9-25. 6 Their area covered the present Niger and Northern Nigeria. The Hausa were not one ethnic group but a community of people of various ethnic origins who spoke a common language. They emerged as a result of immigration from the north into western Sudan, probably in the 10th century (Hiskett 1973:57). 7 The Fulani are a pastoral and nomadic people, who migrated historically from west to east within the Savannah Belt. Today there are approximately 12 million Fulani in Northern Nigeria. Only one third of these are nomads. 8 It is not clear how many there were, but to mention the most important: Gobir, bordering the desert, was a northern outpost protecting the cities from attack by the Tuaregs; Zaria to the south, was domicile of slave-hunters, who ravaged forest areas in southern Nigeria and provided slaves and other commodities for export; Kano and Katsina were trading centres with large markets; Rano was the place for craftspeople; and Daura was a spiritual centre. 9 Tariqa means 'path' to Allah and goes back to the earliest mystics of Islam (e.g. in Syria and Iraq in the 8th, 9th and 10th centuries) and originated from the Sufi tradition in Islam.The orders must be seen as a counterbalance to legal orthodoxy, involving a more personal and spiritual relationship between the believer and God. Most orders are organized hierarchically with a sheikh at the head and his disciples in the lowest position. The disciple enjoyed an association with the baraka (blessings) of the founder of the brotherhood, inherited by the sheikh. 10 The Arabic word jihad literally means 'striving' in the way of Allah. Following the teaching of Muhammed himself, Muslims distinguish two types of jihad: 1) the Greater Jihad, which is the struggle of the ego, the soul against self interest, 2) the Lesser Jihad, for righteousness against tyranny and oppression, which involves military striving to counter violent threats to the Islamic community by non-Muslims, 11 The wars included: in Songhay (1498-1590) by the Askias aimed at converting 'pagans' and 'mixers' to a pure Islam; in Bundu (1690) by Malik Sy; in Futa Jalon (1726) by Alfa Karakroko; and in Futa Toro (1769) by Suleiman Bal. 12 There were two kinds of regular tribute - produce and manufactured goods — as well as percentage of the booty taken in war — military taxes, usually made up of slaves (cf. Webster/Bohanen 1967:12ff.). 13 Ethiopia is excluded from the description as it has no relevance in this context.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN WEST AND EAST AFRICA 14

15

It is difficult to define the Swahili. It is a heterogeneous socio-cultural group with a common language (kiSwahili), a common religion (Islam), and a common social structure. According to Trimingham, 'Swahili' was originally used by Arabs to designate 'coast-dwellers'. Later it came to denote 'detribalized Muslims' who speak kiSwahili, as distinguished from waShenzi, or 'barbarians' (1964:31). Later it was a classification used by the European rule. One is never only mSwahili but also mAmu, mShella, mMvita etc. or ethnically originally Arab, Shirazi, Hadimu etc. 15 Whereas Trimingham attaches very little importance to the brotherhoods in East Africa, Nimtz finds them more significant. 16 Among the Yoruba it spread from the coast. The first converts were mainly refugees and scholars from the hinterland. 17 With the exception of the Yao people (cf. Trimingham 1964:53-5).

II CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

1. The colonial administration and Islam in Northern Nigeria. By 1900 the 'race' for the area of present-day Nigeria had ended with the creation of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, the amalgamation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (proclaimed in 1900) and the new Southern Nigeria (1906). Prior to that there had been a danger of French dominance in Northern Nigeria, but this was prevented through the military efforts of Lord Lugard.1 Nigeria had now been incorporated into the world market so that it could consume the surplus in Britain and provide cheap raw materials. In the years before 1914, conflicts between the North and the South of Nigeria arose which were later reinforced by the policy of the colonial government: The Southern Administration expected Northern Nigeria to accept the humble position of a 'mere hinterland' of Southern Nigeria and allow its products to be carried on the Lagos railway at rates fixed by the Lagos authorities. (Ajayi/Crowder 1974:439) At the same time, the Northern Nigerian administration wanted to assert the separate existence of Northern Nigeria and threatened to use force to eject the Southern authorities from what they considered Northern Nigeria's territories. It was impossible for the British to establish an effective 'direct' government in Northern Nigeria with the personnel and resources it their disposal. Furthermore, they were forced to come to terms with the existing socio-political institutions or to win them over. Therefore, in order to gain imperial control of the population of Nigeria and make it respond to the needs of capitalism, the British developed a system of

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17

indirect rule: i.e. the use of the 'traditional' administrative, juridical, and fiscal institutions of the local rulers, or as Lugard defined it 'direct rule by indirect means' (Lugard 1922:223). This system was hierarchical in principle - with the British on the top. Therefore, it could only be applied to societies which Lugard considered to be hierarchically organized already in Northern Nigeria. It could not be made to operate at all in the South, where a traditional administration either had not existed or had, under western influence, already been weakened. Besides, the Fulani rulers in the North seemed to be more capable of rule than the abas (chiefs) in the South (Lugard 1922:198). The slave trade in the South had created a dependency among certain Africans on western goods, and therefore the South was far more open to western influence in the form of colonial rule. This opening up of the South to western influence made a direct, developmentoriented system of rule more relevant. The 'Northern Provinces' was the title used to describe the new entity created by the British. Before the British conquest, the administration of this area had been relatively decentralized. There had been no centralized authority in the Caliphate exercizing political power; rather, the emirates were governed by over 20 emirs who had their authority delegated by the Caliph. The polities of the Hausa states which lay outside Bornu and the Sokoto Caliphate were fairly centralized, headed by the sarakuna (kings), who were surrounded by a class of masusarauta (officials). In most of the non-Hausa, non-Muslim chieftaincies, the chiefs were usually religious dignitaries (for example, among the Birom). The British still believed that the emirate-style system of the Sokoto Caliphate was the best answer, though in a modified form. Therefore it was patronized and eventually extended even over non-Muslim groups. The emirs were, on the one hand, confirmed in their local authority; on the other hand, however, they were losing their independent power and being transformed into agents of the British (cf. Lugard 1919:297). Emirs who failed to fall in with the policies of the British were deposed and replaced (Lugard 1922:224). Some groups were placed under the emirates while the power and authority of the authentic chiefs was weakened. The larger states in the region, outside the Caliphate, were constituted into artificial emirates and their rulers styled as emirs. In smaller communities where there was no centralized authority, the British sought - for administrative convenience - to build a 'native authority', to make use of political agents, or to build up the position of petty chiefs or influential men.

18

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It seems that the colonial policy towards Islam and Muslims in Northern Nigeria was not a clearly defined and consistent strategy. Rather it was an ad hoc policy designed to secure the maximum cooperation from Muslims. Some (especially missionaries) saw it as tolerant and sympathetic and even protectionist. Others (especially the Muslims themselves) viewed it as a defeat for Islam. Others again found the policy paternalistic: its aim was not protection of and goodwill towards Islam, but the domination and control of Muslims and their subjection to overall rule by the British. Lugard's attitude to Islam was generally negative and prejudiced: 'Islam as a militant creed which teaches contempt for those who are not its votaries, panders to the weakness of the African character - selfconceit and vanity' (1922:77). The British considered Islamic culture to be more 'civilized' and 'advanced' than 'paganism7, but it was not felt to be as high as their own. Lugard's attitude was negative in the sense that he feared antagonizing Muslims. Therefore, in a speech to the Sultan in 1903, Lugard had promised not to intervene in religious matters but to respect Muslim customs and the Islamic faith. It was this concern to avoid hostile reaction from the Muslim rulers and to prevent a Mahdist uprising that led to the prohibition of mission work in Muslim areas. In Northern Nigeria Islam became an important feature of resistance by providing its ideological basis. Since Muslims were not allowed to submit themselves willingly to infidel rule, they felt that they had a duty to fight for the survival of Muslim rule against the British who tried to rule them. In many areas resistance came from the emir and his people, and the consequence of the resistance was a maintenance of the position of the emir and of the social structure of the emirate. This implied furthermore that the British aimed at a policy of minimal interference. It was this primary resistance which created an atmosphere for later nationalists and 'kept alive for later generations the feeling that British rule was "imposed" and not voluntarily accepted by the chiefs and people of Nigeria' (Tamuno 1980:294). An Islamic alternative to active resistance was hijra, the solution chosen by the Sultan of Sokoto, Attahiru I. Together with thousands of his followers, he attepted to escape from the British when they occupied Sokoto. He was later defeated and, along with over 600 followers, was slain at the second battle at Burmi (1903). Emirs of Kontagora, Bidn, Adamawa and Bauchi followed his example. In Adamawa, when Lamido Zubeiru fell from power in 1901, he tried to escape from Yola, calling

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19

upon the Muslim community to emigrate with him to a new country. There was no response. After the final destruction of the Caliphate, popular resistance to imperialism continued to find expression within the framework of the Islamic faith. This was expressed through Mahdism, which became a dangerous threat to the established government. One of the most active centres of Mahdist activites was Adamawa, where the mahdi was expected to manifest himself (in Baldi). Mahdism was anti-colonial in its ideology - against the rule of the Nasara (Christians), i.e. the colonial administration. Mahdists believed, however, that Islam would have to be reformed before imperialism could be defeated. The British, who feared Mahdist revolts, encountered Mahdism first in the Sudan and then in the Northern Provinces, at Burmi and in the Satiru rising in 1906. This uprising, one of the most dramatic Mahdist revolts, took place near Sokoto and was largely supported by peasants. It was seen as a threat to, and therefore opposed by, the Sokoto establishment and was crushed with great brutality by the Muslim ruling class with the help of the British. This happened partly because this class wanted to demonstrate its loyalty to the British, and partly because they saw in the people's unrest a threat to their own authority. Some emirs, however, were sympathetic to the rebellion, such as Muhammadu of Gwandu, who was deposed in 1906 for complicity during the revolt. In this way the indigenous power elite was divided, and Satiru came to represent an attack on both the British and the ruling class, providing 'the first instance of class collaboration between the two dominant classes: the Sarakuna and the colonial administrators' (Lubeck 1979:197). In the opinion of the British Resident in Sokoto Province, however, the revolt was just a 'sudden fanatical outbreak against all authority, white or black' (ibid.). History has shown that these earlier resistance movements (between 1861 and 1914) 'formed an indispensable prelude to the more successful nationalist movements of the post-1914 era' (Tamuno 1980:294). The earlier Islamic protest movements were not a failure. These very strong reactions in the interest of preserving independence and Islamic rule had consequences for the British in their efforts to consolidate their rule. The two apparently contradictory factors, the 'European hostility toward Islam' - a heritage of centuries of conflict in the Mediterranean area - and the 'European use of Muslims and Muslim institutions' in a paradoxical and complex way, both contributed to an enormous growth

20

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in Islam in this period. By 1931, two-thirds of the 10 million inhabitants of Northern Nigeria were Muslim. Islam became identified with resistance to the "European hostility', which was often seen as synonymous with Christian mission. The policy of indirect rule supported the Islamic infrastructure and in many ways facilitated the spread of Islam. For instance, non-Muslim groups were placed under the authority of Muslim emirs, thus enhancing the likelihood that village chiefs would embrace Islam. Further, with the dissolution of previous communities, a new need arose for new bases of social integration and new foundations for life. Migration from villages to towns and mining areas, pressures of new ways of life, the weakening of traditional customs and social sanctions, all opened the way for Islam. In this social and cultural dissolution, Islam, as a universal religion and yet one strongly rooted in the tradition of Northern Nigeria, could help to maintain social cohesion and create religious identity. Colonial policy facilitated the emergence of 'a broader Islamic identity'. The fall of the Sokoto Caliphate meant for the Muslims in the emirates a transition from the identity of the Sokoto Caliphate to a local identity and eventually to a broader Islamic identity - an identity within the Islamic iimma of the Muslim world. This was especially significant in the Kano Emirate whose rivalry with the Sokoto Caliphate was severely strained in the early colonial period (cf. Paden 1973:251). This progress toward a broader identity continued during the 1930s when pilgrimage was encouraged. Islamic identity was used as a means of categorizing Northern Nigeria. Furthermore, it was a means of expressing a certain distance from colonial and western culture. Newell Booth has summed up what colonial Islamic identity meant: Being Muslim would be a way of gaining advantages under the colonial system and at the same time expressing a certain distance from Western culture. It was a way of being part of a world-wide community which received grudging respect from Europeans while providing an alternative centre of loyalty and a basis for an independent dignity. (Booth 1977:318) The tariqa orders contributed to this broadening of the awareness of an Islamic identity through their transnational character. The brotherhoods spread rapidly in the colonial period - most rapidly in urban Muslim areas, such as Kano, Katsina, Jos and Kaduna - but also in rural areas.

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

21

They came to serve the same function in the urban areas as the family structure in the rural areas: namely an integrative social device. In addition, the orders became better consolidated institutionally during this period. With the spread of the tariqa orders in the colonial period there was a trend towards a more individual conversion to Islam (see Trimingham 1968:77). This increasingly personal nature of conversion is seen in the presence of Muslims, Christians and others in the same families or kinship groups. In pre-colonial times the spread of Islam took place more through ethnic interaction and dislocation, whereas in the colonial era it took place mainly through social change. 2. The colonial administration and Islam in Tanganyika. In the 1880s, the need for cheap raw materials and new markets created a serious European interest in East Africa. Soon after 1884, Karl Peters formed a German colonization society in Tanganyika,2 on behalf of which he made treaties with local Arab rulers. He did this in order to persuade the German Chancellor, Bismarck, to involve his country in colonialism in East Africa. By 1887, the society was recognized as the German East Africa Company, with authority to exploit the newly acquired areas. In 1891, the Germans introduced an imperial government, having defeated the coastal Muslims who had previously been ruled by the Sultan in Zanzibar, the stronghold of Islam. By 1898, the Germans controlled all Tanganyika's main population centres and lines of communication. What remained was to extend their authority over the main small-scale societies remote from the caravan routes. Unlike the British in Nigeria, the Germans failed to control the lucrative local trade which local traders, Zanzibari Indians and Arab traders, had dominated for many centuries. Instead, the Germans resorted to agricultural exploitation, attempting to make Africans develop tropical plantations or grow cash crops. Later, forced labour was used. While the British in Northern Nigeria made use of the Muslim emirs for imperial control, the Germans in Tanganyika used the Muslim alkali (local government-appointed headmen who looked after the affairs of the Muslim community) and akida (young men, mainly from the coast, who were literate in Swahili). This language, which served as their language of administration, was associated with Islam. In the beginning the German administration did not see any danger to itself in the expansion of Islam in the interior. Rather, Islamic

22

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culture was seen as a superior culture that could bring social, moral and religious progress. It was only later (after 1912) that the German administration adopted a more reserved or even suspicious attitude to Islam and Muslims. Governor von Rechenberg feared the 'fanatical anti-European Islam' and warned of the dangers of the spread of the turuq. The economic position and domination of the Arab ruling class was threatened by the German occupation of the coast. With the end of the slave trade, the basis of the Arab trade dominion was undermined. This led to various outbreaks that developed into what the Germans called the 'Arab revolt' [Abushiri] 1888-9 in Bagamoyo, as a result of which the Germans took complete control of the region. The revolt involved many sectors of the coastal society. Generally there were a number of uprisings against German rule, especially in the southern area. The most important manifestation of resistance was the Maji Maji uprising in 1905-07 which was primarily a revolt against the use of forced labour in the cotton-growing schemes, but was also a movement against economic imperialism in general, including that of the trading communities of Indians, Swahili and Arab traders. It had its centre in the south-eastern part of the country. Although the uprising was primarily based on traditional ideology (maii = water, medicine), Muslim teachers had been active in spreading the ideology, and certain Islamic practices had been used.3 The colonial policy on the coast and in Zanzibar was clearly biased in favour of the Arabs, who were able to retain some of their previous privileges under colonial rule. The Germans gave them preferential access to top administrative jobs and employed a few Arabs to assist in governing the African population. This led to Arab-African conflict, especially in Zanzibar. These tensions, due to the rise of privileged groups, surfaced in the so-called 'Mecca Letters affair' in 1908. These letters had circulated in a number of coastal and interior towns and had come to the attention of the German authorities. The content of the letters had anti-European overtones with warnings to all Muslims that the Day of Judgement was coming near. This was only one year after the Maii Maji revolt, and the Germans were fearful of a newT uprising. Therefore they put pressure on the walimu, who were seen as potential leaders cf revolt, to calm down the excitement caused by the letters. In 1909, the Germans decided that dhikr ceremonies should be outlawed4 because they believed that the Qadiriyya tariqa was partly responsible for Islamic revival on the coast and had been involved in the Mecca Letters affair.

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

23

During the First World War one of Germany's allies was Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), the centre of the Muslim world. This situation was used by the Germans to incite Muslims to oppose the British armies. This was without success, and in 1919 the British took over the administration of Tanganyika. The British colonial style was different from the German. The British opted for a system of indirect rule, at least in local government. At the local level, native authorities were relied upon, either traditional chiefs or headmen. This was based on experiences in other African countries, such as Northern Nigeria. In Tanganyika this was seen as the most expedient way of making the country respond to the needs of capitalism, to make it serve Britain's interests. The British were more interested in using the traditional ruling system than in using the Muslims as clerks and tax collectors on the mainland. Therefore they looked for men who knew English, often educated by English missions. Many of them came from the Anglican Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA), whose main school was situated in Zanzibar. This means that they were Christians in a Muslim society, some of them married to Muslim women. John Iliffe has argued that indirect rule was a historical misunderstanding in Tanganyika. The British believed that Tanganyikans belonged to 'tribes'. This was not the case, and therefore Tanganyikans had to create 'tribes' to function within the colonial framework (1969:318; see also Mbiliny, in Kaniki 1980:240). Thus the emphasis was increasingly on ethnic identities. Part of the process towards independence was the establishment of the Tanganyika African Association [TAA] in 1929, the Chama cha Umoja wa Watu wa Afrika. It was designed to 'do away with all tribal, sectarian, political, cultural, educational, territorial, and other differences to promote a solid brotherhood of Africans (memorandum, in Iliffe 1969:424). The TAA was generally Muslim-supported. The founders of the Muslim Association of Tanganyika (MAT) formed in 1934 by African Muslims in reaction to the exclusiveness of Indian Muslims, were generally the same people who were the leaders of the TAA. Locally, brotherhood leaders and other Muslims were quite active in the TAA. The first president was a Christian while the vice-president was a Muslim. Branches were formed all over the country, and by 1948 their number amounted to 54 (see Iliffe 1969:54). One of them was established in Zanzibar in 1934, whose aim it was to unite educated Christians and Muslim Africans. ''Umoja ni nguvif (Unity is strength), the Association declared in 1939.

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During 1954 and 1955, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was created in continuity with the TAA. It was a non-tribal, non-religious national movement and political party whose primary task was to win independence: 'to prepare the Tanganyikan African for selfrule and to fight relentlessly for national freedom - Uhuru' (Kaniki 1980:348). Muslims' reactions to TANU were generally positive. They seem to have joined TANU - the alternative to colonial rule - in greater numbers than Christians (see Westerlund 1980a:81—91 and Iliffc 1969:551). In Bukoba district: the Muslims had joined TANU in large numbers partly because they saw in the new party an opportunity to channel their dissatisfaction. Many were promoted to top positions in the Bukoba branch. They were by no means in control of the local party organization, but their number was sufficient to create among certain Christians the impression that Islam was a condition for becoming a TANU leader. (Hyden 1968:134) The brotherhoods supported TANU as they had supported its predecessor, the TAA. Influential brotherhood leaders became very instrumental in TANU's struggle for independence. Not all Muslims backed the party, however, and in 1957 a Muslim interest group called the AllMuslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) was formed as a 'pressure group that would lobby with the government to improve the social status of Muslims' (Nimtz 1980:89). Most of its leaders were Arabs and its adherents came mainly from the capital. AMNUT1 became a threat to TANU since it wanted to have independence: delayed until Muslims had reached the same educational level as Christians. Many sheikhs, however, disagreed, and the demand was, denounced. AMNUT thereafter became discredited by many Muslims and ceased to exist after independence. Another organization, the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), which had been founded in Mombasa in 1945 through the initiative of the Ismaili Khoja sect, came on the scene in Tanganyika and seems to have attracted many of AMNUT's former supporters. EAMWS had a large membership of Indian and Arab Muslims, but not of African. For some time it was possible for TANU to tolerate and even have some form of collaboration with this organization. One reason why TANU was able to find fertile soil, particuarly among Muslims, and to become a uniting factor for Christians and

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

25

Muslims, was the use of Swahili, which provided a direct communication between the leaders of TANU and the masses. In this way the leaders could be accepted as national leaders. Prior to 1880, Islamization was restricted mainly to the coastal region. There was very little penetration inland along trade routes and in centres. Significant conversion to Islam inland, however, gathered momentum in the German era, during and especially after the 1914—18 war. In this period Islam spread in the northern hinterland. Many Segeju and Shambaa became Muslims. Half the Zaramo were already Muslims, and the Morogora area and the hill country inland of Tanga was also Muslim. In southern Tanganyika it was mainly the Yao who were Muslims. But some Bena became Muslims as well, and the Makonde and Mwere had a mwalimu in every village by 1910 (see Nimtz 1980:213). There were many reasons for this spread, the most important being an influx of Muslims from India from the 1880s who gained a large measure of control over import and wholesale trade on the mainland, and over some important manufacturing businesses. In Tanganyika, as in Nigeria, the colonial policies, notwithstanding their intention to the contrary, facilitated the spread of Islam by favouring it (this was true in Tanganyika only during the German period). Through the Germans' employment of Swahili clerks, the prestige of the coastal people, the Swahili language, and the culture of Islam gained ascendancy during this period. Furthermore, many went from the interior to the coast to work in new centres or in German plantations and returned to their homes as Muslims. On the whole, coastal people had a greater impact inland during this period. Not only did Swahili begin to be spoken in the interior but there was also more zeal for dawa (invitation, mission) among the Muslims from the coast. Swahili and Arab traders and Muslim walimu was increasingly becoming itinerant Muslim missionaries. The Muslim walimu, however, did not play the same role as in West Africa. Only a few settled in the countryside and, according to Trimingham, did not really propagate Islam (1964:57). Trimingham further mentions that Muslim traders and other agents were concentrated in towns without close ties with the surrounding countryside. As was also the case in the Nigerian context, social tensions created by the European domination brought a need for new bases of social integration. Conversion to Islam and Christianity was a way of entering the new world of the colonialists. At the same time, as has been described, the positive contribution of Islam to nationalist movements

26

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contributed to its growth. Islam was the way, both of entering and of resisting western cultural and political domination. The Maji Maji facilitated the spread of Christianity and Islam in the south, not only because of Muslim participation in the uprising, but also because of the loss of confidence in indigenous ideology which followed the defeat of the uprising. As in Northern Nigeria, the tariqa orders arriving at the end of the 19th century played an important role in Islamic expansion. In particular the Qadiriyya order, which arrived in Tanganyika in 1929, became very popular (see Nimtz 1980:57f. and Trimingham 1964:99f). Nimtz has stated that Islam became an African mass movement through this tariqa as a reaction to the more elitist and somewhat exclusionist attitude of the coastal Arabs towards Africans beyond the coastal and inland Swahili enclaves (Nimtz 1980:184). The second most popular brotherhood was the Shadhiliyya which originated in East Africa (in the Comoro islands) and came to Tanganyika near the end of German rule. The Askariyya tariqa was organized in about 1930 by Sheikh Idris b. Sa'ad of Dar es Salaam. The last but oldest order to be mentioned is the Rifaiyya, which was more popular during the earliest years of the German period. It first came to Zanzibar from Aden and then spread to the coast. The spread of the tariqa orders brought divisions on the question: how far could Islam be adapted to African beliefs and cultures and yet remain Islamic? What is a permissible level of syncretism? Such questions created rivalry between the coastal people (who had hitherto been the Islamic authority) and the newly converted Africans, between the leaders of the brotherhoods and the ulema (Shirazi and Arabs). 3. A short history of Christian missionary penetration in Northern Nigeria and Tanganyika. In 1842, the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the Wesleyans had begun mission work in Abeokuta and Badagry in Southern Nigeria. A former slave from among the Yoruba, Samuel Ajayi Crowther, who was educated in Sierra Leone and later ordained as pastor within the CMS, came to play a very important role in this early period of Christian mission - indeed, became one of the best known figures in African church history. He became a 'symbol of African church leadership' (see Sundkler 1960:44ff). Crowther was ordained as bishop in 1864 and was given the leadership of the Niger Mission, started by the CMS in 1857. It was to be run exclusively by African staff, paid by the CMS, and to

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work hand in hand with commerce and government. The Niger Mission, however, was abandoned qua African missionary effort after 1878 and was increasingly Europeanized. Crowther then became a CMS missionary. He later came under criticism from a new group of evangelical CMS missionaries known as the Sudan Party whose objective was the conversion of the North to Christianity through 'cultural surrender' (see Cramp ton 1979:31). Crowther had advocated a long-term change of society through western education. The evangelical missionaries, however, did not aim at a wide diffusion of Christianity and civilization, and a transformation of society as a whole, but rather at a deep individual conversion. This was threatening to the emirs. Crowther was very anxious to establish good relations with Muslim rulers. He had an important influence on the rulers of the Nupe between 1869 and 1888. He won the confidence of the Emir of Bida and was allowed to select focal caravan points for mission stations. On the whole, Crowther's relations with Muslims on the personal level were very cordial (see McKenzie 1980:250-65).5 Christian missions had already been working in the North in connection with the Niger Expeditions of 1841 and 1854, but it was not until the twentieth century that formal missionary activities connected with commerce and government appear.6 In 1902, the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) opened its first mission station on the Niger. Prior to this date, in 1901, the SIM had begun work in Pategi, a small Muslim emirate in Nupe area. By 1904, the first missionary from the Sudan United Mission (SUM) - founded (as the Sudan Pioneer Mission) in Britain in 1902 - was sent to Wase to a small Muslim emirate south of the Jos-Bauchi plateau. This work was abandoned in 1909 as a result of the Emir's objections to the presence of Christian missionaries. The objective of these missionary societies was to reach the peoples of the Sudan before Islam did. In the beginning they were very optimistic about the possibility of converting Muslims to Christianity. Furthermore, they wanted to 'liberate' the oppressed Hausa from Fulani hegemony. This led to a somewhat hostile attitude on the part of the Fulani rulers to the missionaries, whom they saw as a threat to their position. Fearful of mass conversions to Islam, the Free Churches joined together to form SUM - an independent, non-denominational mission. One branch of SUM was the Dansk Forenet Sudan Mission (DFSM Danish United Sudan Mission) which had a Lutheran background. The DFSM started its work in Adamawa in 1913 as an independent branch

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of SUM. Numan became the centre of the DFSM, and Dr Niels Bronnum7 arrived there as the first Danish missionary. The main tension between the Danish mission and the government was created by the ban on mission entry into Muslim territories which the government introduced out of fear of a general Muslim uprising which could endanger the British presence. Lugard had assured the emirs that there would be no interference with their religion and that Christianity would not be forced upon them. The mission felt that a ban on entry was an overly severe interpretation of this assurance.8 Moreover, other SUM and CMS missionaries complained that this was based upon 'a theory of the administration and not an expressed wish of the Muhammedan rulers'.9 In their opinion, the government was favouring the Muslims.10 Lugard's own reason for the ban was that missions were potentially dangerous and that the Muslims could not be convinced that mission activities were not a part of the British administration. In his political memoranda he argues: I hold that it would be a misuse of the power and authority of the Government if that power were used to compel natives of the country to accept a mission which they resented and which they could not accept unless compelled by superior force. I myself am of the opinion that it it unwise and unjust to force missions upon the Mohammedan population for it must be remembered that without the moral support of the Government the people have some cause to disbelieve the emphatic pledges I have given that their religion shall in no way be interfered with. (1919:124) The ban was total for the first 30 years of British rule, except for the presence of the CMS in Zaria which had preceded the establishment of the British government and was there by the consent of the emirs. Therefore, missionaries in Adamawa were allowed to work only in those Islamic areas where the local emirs had agreed to their presence, and in those non-Islamic areas that were fully subjugated and where the missionaries could thus be protected.11 Apart from the Bachama area, which became the focus of DFSM mission work, the DFSM was forbidden to work in Islamic areas which constituted the main part of Adamawa and in non-Islamic areas (called 'unsettled areas'). Dr Bronnum was compelled to live within a certain distance from Numan

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29

and could only travel according to certain rules. Mission work could not be done outside the town of Numan because the government felt responsible for the protection of the missionaries. Lugard was furthermore concerned that the mission work would be rejected by the people and thereby create problems for his administration. Especially during the first phase of missionary activity, the missionaries were strongly dependent on colonial power. It was, however, often the attitudes of individual local officials, their sympathies or antipathies with the mission, which proved decisive for the actual policy adopted towards them. These attitudes were many and varied.13. Roman Catholic missionaries began work in Northern Nigeria with the opening of a mission station at Lokoya in 1886. Stations were opened in Dakina (1904) and Shendam (1906) by the S.M.A. fathers, who also visited Kano and some other parts of the North in the 1920s. A mission station was established in the Sabon Gari area of Kano in 1922.14 In Yola a small Catholic community was established around 1930.15 Lugard was in no way opposed to missionary enterprise (Lugard 1922:586; see also Ayandele 1966:129), as he believed that Christianity would bring a higher material civilization than Islam and that a Christian was likely to be more loyal to the British than a Muslim (Ajayi 1965:145). But both parties - the colonial government and the missions - had to balance the advantages and disadvantages of their uneasy coexistences. On the one hand, there was a fear among the British administrators that the missions would create problems for their administration (for example, by entering the predominantly Muslim societies of the Fulanis). Therefore, the government did not want to promote the interests of the missions unconditionally, but only those interests which coincided with their own. The missions, on their side, were dependent on the British administration for protection. This led to some cooperation on a secular level, such as in education and medical work, but certainly also to conflicts on a religious level, especially because of the prohibition of missionaries from Muslim areas. On the other hand, mission education contributed to the growth of a national self-consciousness, by emphasizing the fundamental equality of the Africans, as human beings, to their colonial masters. In many cases, the missions identified their work with colonial expansion in order to threaten the continuing existence of those forms of society and customs that they set themselves against. They needed help and support to break down societies whose established authorities

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opposed their work. Furthermore, they considered colonial rule to be better than the rule of traditional political chiefs. Evangelization was easier where existing communities had been broken down politically, and the mission enjoyed protection from the colonial government. In this way, missions inevitably became a part of the colonial establishment. The missions in the North had only limited success in terms of the; number of converts. Up until 1914, there were only 45 churches and about 650 pupils in mission schools (cf. Ayandele 1979:159). The missionaries had to abandon any hope of making large-scale conversions among the Muslim populations. They placed a good deal of the blame for their failure to convert Muslims on the colonial government, especially on the prohibition against evangelization in Muslim areas. One of the main reasons for the slow expansion of Christianity was the discrediting of missionaries as 'torchbearers' of imperialism. Another was the generally negative attitude of missionaries toward Islam and Muslims (which will be discussed in the next chapter). The most important reason, however, was the grip which Islam had on the Muslims. Islam had become the source of life, their pride and identity. Furthermore, it had become the bond to unite them and distinguish them from non-Muslims, especially from whites. They had no need for Christianity. During the Portuguese period, a small number of missions were established on the East African coast but were too few in number to have a deep or lasting effect after the departure of the Portuguese in the early 18th century.16 When the Germans conquered Tanganyika in 1885, however, they found missions already established there. The two largest Protestant missionary societies were both British: the Church Mission Society and the Universities' Mission to Central Africa. The first missionary was Johann Ludwig Krapf, who came to Zanzibar in 1844. He was a German and a Lutheran, but was sent by the British Anglican CMS. The missionary interest in East Africa was inspired by D. Livingstone, his journeys in East Africa, his attacks on the Arab slave trade and his combination of Christianity and commerce, the 'civilizing mission', as he called it. In 1876, a CMS station was opened at Mpwapwa on the road to Uganda! Other missionaries also used Zanzibar as a stepping stone to the interior. This could be done with the permission of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The missionaries soon realized that they could not accomplish

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31

much in Zanzibar itself with its overwhelming predominance of Muslims. The UMCA started work in Zanzibar in 1864, and soon after (1868) on the mainland at Magila in the Usambara mountains, and at Masasi and Newala in the extreme south. German missionary societies followed in the footsteps of the German imperial government. The first sustained Lutheran mission work in Tanganyika came through three Lutheran missionary societies from Germany. The Bethel Mission came to Dar es Salaam and Tanga in 1887 and later (1891) to the Usambara highlands. It moved inland into Ruanda in 1907 and into the Bukoba area, west of Lake Nyasa, in 1910. The Berlin Mission settled among the Wanyakusa and Wabena near the northern end of Lake Nyasa in 1891, and later took over the work of the Bethel Mission among the Wazaramo and Waluguru around Dar es Salaam and Uzaramo. The Leipzig Mission moved into the Kilimanjaro area in 1893 and extended its activities toward Mount Meru and into the Masai districts. Furthermore, the Moravians settled in the Southern Highlands and established their own trading centres for commerce. Many smaller Protestant societies entered Tanganyika during this period. The first Roman Catholic missionaries started their work in Zanzibar. In 1863, the Holy Ghost Fathers (HGF) settled there and moved their headquarters to Bagamoyo in 1868. The majority of both the HGF and the White Fathers (WF), who started their missionary work in East Africa in 1878 and established a station at Tabora in 1881, came from France. The HGF later came to work in Kilimanjaro (1891), Usambara (1907), and Ugogo (1910). In the beginning, the HGF and the UMCA in particular (but also the CMS) concentrated on settlements of freed slaves who had been ransomed by missionaries or who had been entrusted to their care by the British consul of Zanzibar. These settlements were also called 'Christian villages' - an idea later taken up by other missionary societies. In the settlements the converts were given intensive European education, and they eventually adopted the missionaries' culture. Furthermore, they received a small wage for their work for the mission and a piece of land to cultivate for themselves. The rules and regulations set by the missionaries were very detailed and severe. The villages (especially those of the CMS) provoked serious hostility between Arab slave owners and the missions. Some of the Arab slave owners felt threatened by these settlements, believing that they caused rebellion among their own legally-held slaves and undermined their

32

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authority. By 1896, there were 52 Christian villages attached to HGF mission stations in north-eastern Tanganyika. In terms of numerical growth, Christianity spread slowly in the early period of mission activities. Many of the African Christians were marginal people - rootless, persecuted or dispossessed - who found protection with the missionaries. Since these marginalized Africans had no contact with their traditional communities they could not readily be employed as vehicles for the spread of Christianity. Furthermore, Christianity was clearly identified with colonial rule, especially in this initial period. Nevertheless, German colonial rule generally facilitated the work of Christian missions, although the relationship between missionaries and colonialists was often problematic. One point of conflict was the question of language. Many missionaries, especially the German Protestant, emphasized the importance of the use of vernacular languages, while the German government encouraged the spread of Swahili and used it in its administration and in the government schools in the coastal areas. Many Protestant (especially Lutheran) and Catholic missionaries suspected Swahili as the 'language of Islam' and saw this as a sign that the government was favouring Islam. Some Roman Catholic, Anglican and Bethel missionaries, however, had issued from coastal bases and had always employed the Swahili lingua franca without difficulties. Therefore they did not share this concern. World War I had a dual effect on the Christian churches. While the war impeded the spread of Christianity, it did, however, give a strong impetus toward a self-governing African Christian church. (This development was further strengthened in the inter-war period.) During World War I, German officials had some of the British missionaries and their converts arrested and sent to prison. When the British took over, however, German missionaries were interned and deported, and not allowed to return until 1924. In the absence of the German missionaries, many areas had been left open to the intervention of Muslims and Catholics. Islam therefore spread in many areas (for example, in Usambara). At the end of World War I, Christianity began to consolidate its influence in many areas, and 1923-1935 marked the highpoint of mission activity and influence in Tanganyika. The primary reason for this was the change of policy which occurred when the British took over the administration of Tanganyika from the Germans. The British government's introduction of indirect rule in local government and its

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33

strong emphasis upon education promoted the expansion of Christianity between 1919 and 1945. The British stressed the great need for cooperation among the missions themselves, and between the government and the missions in the area of education. There had always been conflicts between missionary and colonial interests as far as education was concerned. In the German period, missionaries had insisted that the pupils were not used on plantations or elsewhere, but, rather, to serve missionary interests (see Lindquist 1982:23). To read the Bible was the fundamental goal of education, not least in the Lutheran mission schools. Education was a major means of advancing personal Christianity. Thus Christianity was seen as a literary movement, and Christians were called wasomaji (those who can read). Therefore very few students from the early mission schools became available for government service. The colonial government, for its part, did not even expect the mission schools to provide civil servants, since it provided its own Swahili education for this purpose. The divergence of interest between missions and government still existed to some extent in the British period,17 but the British introduced more control over mission education and urged the missions to conform to the educational policy of the government, (i.e. raise the standard of elementary schools and be more actively involved in higher education). This was the aim of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, which came to East Africa in 1924 to co-ordinate mission and government educational policy (see Oliver 1952:82). The commission made its recommendations, which the British tried to implement. These suggested that western standards of education should be adopted. This system was most attuned to the people from the west, among whom were Christian missionaries. Christian denominations spread through this system while Muslims remained with their traditional system of education. All this led to discrepancies in the educational achievements and ambitions of Christians and Muslims. The missions were often reluctant to seek government support. Some refused grants-in-aid for schools as they feared government control of the syllabus. They were anxious not to come too close to the government and thereby lose their freedom to organize religious instruction in schools as they wished (as happened in Northern Nigeria) and to determine its nature and quality. In 1925, some kind of agreement was reached between the government and the missions. The inter-war period was a period in which ecumenical cooperation between the various Protestant missions, facing the same kind of

34

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problems in their work, became vital. In the 1930s the formation of a united Protestant church was suggested, and the Tanganyika Missionary Council (TMC) was founded in 1934. It was a loose federation whose founding members included UMCA, CMS, Augustana, Berlin, Leipzig, Bethel, Moravians and the Seventh Day Adventists. It was succeeded b)r the Christian Council of Tanganyika (CCT). A Catholic counterpart to this was the Tanganyika Catholic Welfare Organization (TCWO), later the Tanganyika Episcopal Conference (TEC). This inspired the Lutherans toward closer inter-Lutheran cooperation, and in 1937 a Mission Church Federation on a Lutheran basis became a reality. The Federation included the Berlin, Bethel, and Leipzig missions plus the German Moravians and Augustana Mission. Just before World War II, another Lutheran mission agency, the Swedish Evangelical Mission Society (SEMS) began to work in Tanzania and sent missionaries to Hula in the Southern Highlands and Dongobesh. The Lutheran churches were now moving toward one united Lutheran church in Tanganyika. This was facilitated by the spread of Swahili, which made it possible for the churches to communicate and to have rituals in one language. When World War II broke out in 1940, German missionaries were again interned or deported and their church work disrupted. Large Christian communities in the Southern Highlands and around Kilimanjaro were left without missionary leadership. Other missions, in particular Swedish and American Lutheran, took over administrative responsibilities for the 'orphaned missions' (Lindquist 1982:26). In 1948, Danish missionary societies, the Danish Lutheran Mission (DLM) and the Danish Mission Society also started work in Tanganyika, in Ulanga and the Bukoba area. Prior to independence, there were 36 Christian missions (see Ilifee 1979:543). Thus, both world wars came to strengthen Lutheran cooperation and increased the internationalization of foreign mission agency involvement. Furthermore, they strengthened the Tanzanian churches and their Tanzanian leadership. Lutheran cooperation further developed after the war. In 1955, the Lutheran Church of Northern Tanzania (LCNT) was organized. A Tanzanian president was elected in 1958, who later was ordained as bishop. The Federation of Lutheran Churches (FLC) was organized in 1958. As in Nigeria, mission schools in Tanganyika had unintentionally trained many of those who became national leaders. The missions had been diverse in their attitudes to nationalism but it was a fact that many educated Christians became TANU leaders. According to Westerlund,

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35

however, Christians 'as a rule were less supportive of TANU and Ujamaa than were the African sunni Muslims'. It seems that, at least in the beginning, the Christians were more reluctant. There were many reasons for this. The Christians were favoured by the British government and had become more and more comfortable with the colonial establishment. Furthermore, as in Nigeria, missionaries discouraged Christians from political involvement. The Christian missions had made significant advances during the colonial period in both Northern Nigeria and Tanganyika.18 Christianity was more easily propagated in Tanganyika since Muslims were numerically and politically less dominant there. The colonial government, both German and British, in Tanganyika did not fear Islamic resistance to the extent that the British government did in Northern Nigeria, and restrictions on the entry of missions into Muslim areas were not introduced in Tanganyika. There were difficulties in some coastal areas, and certain restrictions were imposed as, for instance, in West Usambara where Christian missions were only allowed in on the condition that they had nothing to do with the Arabs. These restrictions, however, did not become impediments to the spread of Christianity or an obstacle to Christian-Muslim cooperation, as they did in Nigeria. The factors which facilitated the spread of Christianity in Tanganyika were the same as those mentioned in the context of Northern Nigeria. To these can be added the events of the two wars, as mentioned, and the Maji Maji revolt. The spread was channelled through Christian villages which were established in the early mission period. This strategy had been adopted by the Berlin Mission in Ubena and by the Bethel Mission in Uhaya, among others. The idea behind such villages was to provide converts with an environment which was in contradistinction to that of the surrounding region. This led to the separate development of village members and isolation from the rest of society. Non-Christians could not live in these villages or, at least, would have had a hard time doing so. Therefore, Christians, Muslims and traditional religionists eventually came to live in separate villages or within specific areas of the settlements. The criterion for living in a Christian village was clearly religion and not clanship.19 Only a few Christian villages existed in Nigeria, and most of these were founded in the southeastern part by HGF (see Ayandele 1966:47, 150; Clarke 1980:36f.; Afigbo 1980:191f.). The existence of Christian villages showed that, unlike the Muslim approach, Christian missionaries demanded a total change from tradi-

36

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN AFRICA

tional customs and religion (see Rasmussen 1990:196f.; see also Sanneh 1983:ch.4). The idea was to avoid any contact with the old African customs. The Islamic approach, however, was different. The new Muslim members were allowed to live with their families, in their usual context. This resulted from the geographical and numerical approach to mission that Christian missionaries adopted in both countries. Their success was seen in terns of the number of individuals who had been converted to Christianity, and their mission in terms of the number of individuals who still remained to be converted. This left rivalry and competition to prevail over mutual tolerance and respect. In Tanganyika, as in Northern Nigeria, independent African Christianity did not play much of a role. The movements that did enter came from other parts of Africa - either Malawi, Uganda or Kenya, or, in the case of Northern Nigeria, from the southern part of Nigeria. Thus, they were not movements arising out of a particular internal situation;, rather, they were brought by 'missionaries' just as Christianity itself had been. The first and most important independent churches in Tanganyika developed in Rungwe: the African National Church, the Last Church of God and the Watch-Tower Church. As has been noted, political protest against colonial rule took other forms in both Tanganyika and Northern Nigeria, such as Mahdism, Maji Maji, Arab revolt, etc. This could be one of the reasons why there seemed to be no strong need for independent African churches.

4. Christian missionaries' attitude to Islam and Muslims.

The early missionaries in Northern Nigeria and Tanganyika, according to the material available, reflected the polemical attitude to Islam in Europe. In all probability, they had hardly heard or read anything positive about Islam. Rather, they had heard about a 'fatalistic' religion full of superstitious ideas, bereft of any real spirituality, and socially backward to a degree that was totally obstructive to development and civilization. It was such medieval notions about 'a religion of violence' that characterized the missionaries' views of Islam in Tanganyika and Nigeria. Slavery was associated with Muslims only. Muslims were, in the words of the first SUM missionary, H. Karl W. Kumm, in 'utter darkness' and were 'demonizing Africa', and Islam, he said, was the; 'promoter of barbarism in Africa' (Boer 1979:128). Kumm was aware that Christians, too, participated in the slave trade, but he argued thai: this happened in spite of their religion whereas Muslims 'were and are;

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

37

slave raiders because of the teaching of the Koran' (Boer 1979:129). According to Kumm, Islam gives legitimacy to slavery, whereas to Christians slavery is an alien element. It was this 'Muslim terrorism' that was the main reason for his favouring European invasion in the two countries. Prejudice was one of the reasons for the very negative attitudes of missionaries to Islam. Another reason was the policy of the governments. Especially in Tanganyika, there was a clear change of attitude in the 1880s with the onset of German rule and the prohibition of the slave trade. Prior to 1880, Christian missionaries on the whole did not fear Islam as a rival but had a more positive view of it. For instance, they accepted Islam as the dominant force in Zanzibar. Krapf was extremely well received by the Sultan and they were on very friendly terms with each other. This had positive consequences for Krapf's relations with other Muslim leaders (see Sicard 1978:56-7). By 1886, one White Father announced that his mission 'was no longer on such good terms with the Arabs as it had been before' (Oliver 1952:111). Certain interests had been threatened. The Arab opposition to the German occupation led to a somewhat hostile attitude to the missions as well. The Arabs did not always distinguish between German colonial officials and other Europeans. In their struggle for political power and their attempt to drive out the Europeans, some mission stations also came under attack. The fear among missionaries of the Arabs became a fear of Islam. They began to hope that the Germans would ensure the triumph of Christianity over Islam by defeating the Arabs. German policy towards Islam did not fulfil this hope. On the contrary, they favoured the Muslims, as has been described above (p. 25f.). This biased policy increased the hostility of missionaries towards Islam. This also happened in Northern Nigeria. Through indirect rule (i.e. rule primarily through Muslim emirs) and the prohibition on missionary entry into Muslim areas, the British administration contributed to antiMuslim feelings among missionaries. This led to many situations of conflict between missions and government officials who complicated and often hindered mission activities, reciting the prohibition. In cases of disagreement between Muslim emirs and local Christians, the government took the side of the emirs and put the blame on the missionaries, accusing them of having interfered with politics (cf. the Kilba case below p. 54f.). In certain cases missionaries were removed when, 'in the minds of the local people', they had 'been associated with distur-

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bances'.20 The missionaries in being sincerely pro-Christianity can appear to be so anti-Muslim that they create antagonisms that hinder rather than assist the spread of the Gospel.'21 Therefore the Resident had the right to remove missionaries. Thus the nervousness of the British towards Muslims made Islam a hindrance and a menace to missions. The danger of Islam became a frequent subject of discussion at any missionary conference and was one of the reasons why churches joined together in both countries. The missionaries did not notice that the traditional religious environments of Nigeria and Tanganyika were hospitable and inclusive and that this had clearly influenced Muslims. In Tanganyika, after the missionary conference in Dar es Salaam in 1911, a number of periodicals began to appear which contained, among other things, material in defence of Christianity. This had a negative impact on Christian-Muslim relations (cf. Sicard 1978:63). In Nigeria, there was mounting criticism of the government by missionaries, for instance that expressed at a SUM meeting: The net result of 29 years of rule by a Government which professes to see a menace in Islam is that by their encouragement and policy there are more Moslems and Islam is better organized and more of a force than when the British occupied the country in 1900.22 The memorandum goes on to blame the government for opposing the entrance of missions into Muslim areas. It was the government that was against the missions. Had it been the Muslims themselves, why then, did the government not consistently 'educate the Emirs to an understanding and recognition of the principles of religious toleration which are characteristic of western civilization?'23 Whether toleration is a characteristic of the western civilization exemplified by the missionaires, the following will show. Christian mission in the early period in both countries was seen by missionaries as a race against Islam. The headpiece of DFSM's writing; paper from the early mission period reads: 'DFSM wants to bring the Gospel to Sudan's millions of pagans before they are conquered by the advancing Muhammedanism. WHO WILL BE THE VICTOR! CHRIST OR MUHAMMED?'24 The aim was not in the first place to convert the Muslims but to 'fight them', to prevent them from gaining a foothold in 'pagan1 communities.25 To 'stem the tide of Islam' was another mission slogan

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39

A Protestant missionary in Tanganyika, E. Schultze, wanted to use strong measures to stop the growth of Islam. Mosques and activities of vpalimu should not be allowed in areas where Islam had not yet penetrated.26 Therefore an attitude of understanding and openness would be a waste of time. Bronnum was very critical of those missionaries who wasted their time by 'sitting and frowsting in the stations and exchanging greetings with Muhammedans endlessly'.27 However, it was not only the Muslims who had to be fought. Both in Northern Nigeria and Tanganyika the Catholics also constituted some kind of menace to the Protestant missions, and there was fierce competition between Catholic and Protestant missions. 'Stemming the Catholic tide' was a primary task for Protestant missions in Tanganyika. By the First World War, there were six times as many African catholics as protestants (Duignan and Gann 1978:212). It seems that, at times, the missionaries there were more preoccupied with this competition than with their Muslim 'rivals'. Bronnum, too, aims to blow at the Catholics in his letters. There were Catholics in Adamawa Province, although they were few and limited to a certain corner of the province: We must be attentive to the call, if God shows us that we are to begin to take the Muslims into account as a people which is to be converted - if for no other reason than to prevent other missions from cropping up in our district.28 It was better to take the Muslims seriously as objects of 'proselytization' than to risk the inconvenience of Catholic presence. Furthermore, it was the practice of Protestant missionaries to build stations in areas where they knew that the Catholics were trying to infiltrate (and vice versa). The first missionaries believed that 'stemming the tide of Islam' could be achieved. They believed that the persistence of Islam as a political and economic force depended on the continuation of slavery. Once slavery was undermined Islam would crumble. Furthermore, some missionaries believed that most Muslims had been forced to become Muslims or had become Muslims out of economic consideration or because it was an easy option. Islam was considered an easier path than Christianity. As Bronnum put it: It is easier to be a Muhammedan who can enumerate what one has to do in order to become an adherent of Islam, and in easily

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understandable words indicate what will be the reward for the believing Islamite in Paradise.29 It could not be for religious reasons, as for instance for the sake of a more personal relationship to one God, that someone became a Muslim. Christianity was intellectually superior to Islam. Once Muslims had reached a higher level of awareness they would be able to understand these facts and would then convert to Christianity. Bronnum had even noticed that 'the pagans greatly resent Muhammedan doctrines but they were eager to hear about the Christian "religion"'.30 Later the missionaries were forced to realize that bringing Islam's progress to a halt was not that easy, and most missionaries abandoned the effort to convert Muslims and concentrated instead on building a barrier against Islam's penetration into non-Muslim areas. The missionaries in the two countries did not spare harsh words when they expressed their contempt for Islam.31 According to Bronnum, the Muslims were 'shrewd scoundrels' and 'foreign parasites'. They were more different from the 'pagans' than were the missionaries. Bronnum preferred 'pagans' to 'Muhammedans'. According to him, the 'pagans' should understand that Bronnum came for their sake and that he was just as much against Islam as they were, if not more.32 The Muslims were, according to Bronnum, not just uncultivated soil but soil filled with 'weeds of the worst kind'.33 They were 'extremely selfish scoundrels - grass snakes, fawning, hypocritical, slimy - oh, so repulsive'.34 Kumm, too, had only negative words to say about Muslims and Islam. Islam was 'one of the most wicked, if not the most wicked religion' (Boer 1979:128). Islam was essentially the spirit of anti-Christ. At least the 'heathen' was ignorant of Christ, whereas the Muslim rejected him. Furthermore, the Muslims where characterized by 'religious intolerance, brutality, fanaticism, unbridled covetousness, lying and deception. Wherever Mohammedanism has gone, lying and stealing and sexual diseases have spread, until certain pagan places which were clean 15 years ago, have become syphilitic cess pools'.35 It was especially on the moral level that Muslims were censured. Here the benefits of western civilization were contrasted with the evils of Islamic political oppression. Christian ideals were contrasted with the worst practices of Islam (often in a distorted form). The Muslims were 'morally crooked and soul-destroying', said the CMS missionary Walter Miller36 (Bronnum 1955:60), who differed little from those outlined above. He

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41

maintained, like some of the Catholic missionaries, that there was a direct causal link between Islamic beliefs and practices and destitution, poverty and low morality (see Boer 1979:170) - indeed, between the religion of Islam and 'evil'. Similar views were expressed by some Holy Ghost Fathers missionaries in Tanganyika.37. It is interesting to note that the arguments normally were not so much theological as cultural, historical, and emotional. There are occasional denunciations of the Islamic rejection of Christ as the Son of God and Saviour. In this way the 'pagans' were to be preferred since they were simply ignorant of Christ, whereas the Muslims rejected him and thereby attacked the very foundations of Christian mission. Islam was seen as a formalistic religion without life. Therefore, as said in DFSM's magazine SUDAN in 1920, 'Christianity conquers Islam because life must conquer death. There are no forces of life and renewal of Islam. A dead formalism does not give life'.38 These were views generally found among Christian missionaries in Tanganyika and Northern Nigeria during colonial times. There were, however, exceptions. Among the Christian clergy in Nigeria there was first of all Edward Wilmot Blyden, himself a black from the West Indies, who had a genuine respect for Islam and a high regard for the Qur'an. This comes out in his book, Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (1888) in which he sees Islam as a 'convenient half-way house from Paganism to Christianity' (p. 24). His aim was to end the stereotyped view of Islam among Christians and the mutual antagonism and distrust between Muslims and Christians, and to build instead on the common fundamentals of the two monotheistic religions. Blyden was well-versed in Arabic and was a great help to Muslims in the area of education - to such an extent that he was appointed Director of 'Muhammedan Education' in 1901, with responsibility for supervising local schools (Sanneh 1983:216). He believed that Islam did not discriminate on grounds of race, or colour, whereas Christianity failed to value the African and downgraded African culture. In this way, he implied, in his positive statements about Islam, a critique of the attitude of Christian missions to African culture. Crowther's attitude has already been mentioned. Crowther's relations with Muslims on the practical and personal level were positive, yet his public statements were rather polemical. This also applied to some of the missionaries who made very harsh and virulent comments about Islam and Muslims. In practice, on an individual level, they often remained on fairly good terms with Muslims, especially those Muslims

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who were working with the government. This seems to have been the case with Bronnum. In a letter he mentioned that the alkali in Numan came to him for reading and writing lessons. After him came the clerk of the Court and Malam Audu, who was the Arabic clerk of the District Officer, and finally the first Muslim in the area, Malam Djalingo, who was later to become chief of the Hausa colony. All of them had a friendly attitude toward Bronnum.39 To sum up, there was basic agreement between early missionaries in both Tanganyika and Northern Nigeria that Islam debased Africa, and that Christianity was a superior religion. The missionaries were also in agreement in criticizing government policy, which they considered a hindrance to the spread of Christianity. In Nigeria, the British seemed to favour and over-protect Muslims out of a desire to be on good terms with the Muslim leaders, while in Tanganyika the Germans, in particular, favoured the Muslims by employing them to work for their military and civil personnel. It was this policy, together with the prejudices which were typical of the time in Europe, that initially caused the antagonistic feelings among missionaries. As will be shown in the following sections, these missionaries' negative attitudes had consequences for the attitude of African Christians toward Muslims and for Christian-Muslim relations in general. These consequences reverberate to the present day in Tanzania and Nigeria 5. Christian-Muslim relations in Northern Nigeria and Tanganyika. One of the determining factors for Christian-Muslim relations was colonial policy in the two countries. The use of Muslim emirs/akidas in the colonial administration put Muslims in a favoured position which led to tensions and suspicions between Christian missionaries and Muslims. These tensions were heightened by the situation in Northern Nigeria, where the system of indirect rule led to a prohibition on missionary entry into Muslim areas. Furthermore, in Nigeria, rule through Muslim leaders was much more organized and widespread than in Tanganyika, where it took place on a more ad hoc and localized basis.. An exception was the rule over coastal Muslims by the Sultan of Zanzibar. The political advantage which Muslims enjoyed in both countries during the colonial period, however, was the result not only of colonial policy, but also of the religio-political role which Muslim leaders had inherited from pre-colonial days. Since the political influence of Muslim leaders was stronger in

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43

Northern Nigeria than in Tanganyika, conversion to Islam was, to a greater extent, seen in political terms. Conversely, the British viewed the missionaries and their converts as actual sources of political discontent among the Muslim leaders (see the Kilba case below p. 54f.). In fact the missionaries' tactics for containing Islam did have political overtones. The missionaries seemed to interpret every religious step taken by Muslims as aspiration for political power. A manifestation of this was the establishment of the Northern Nigerian non-Muslim League in the Jos area. This was a political organization aided by Christian missionaries (principally the SIM and SUM) whose intention was to counter Islamic expansionist moves. Islamic identity in the north did have political implications. Conversion to Islam strengthened the Hausa and this, in turn, promoted dissent between the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south. This dissent also had an effect upon ChristianMuslim relations within Northern Nigeria. In Tanganyika, however, the political significance of conversion to Christianity and Islam was not dissent but rather cooperation, as manifested in the various resistance movements, especially TANU, whose goal was not only independence, but also unity. The system of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria led to a gap between north and south which later became one of the causes of the civil war of 1967-70. This gap was first of all a consequence of the educational imbalance between the two parts of the country created during the colonial period. The problem of missionary entry became, by implication, the problem of introducing western education. Western education was restricted in the north because of the prohibition, whereas in the south Christian missions had free play. Here they advanced rapidly and succeeded in establishing a substantial number of schools. This educational imbalance in favour of Christians led to a dichotomy between the north and the south educationally, ethnically, politically, religiously and economically. The north entrenched itself in a policy of self-protective withdrawal from western culture, whereas people in the south were deeply influenced by it. Even within the north, southerners had advantages which created an insecurity among Muslims in relation to Christians. This dichotomy between two 'blocks' of people did not exist in Tanganyika, although there was a concentration of Muslims in the coastal areas who feared that western schools, often run by Christian missions^ would alientate Muslims from their tradition. However,

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Muslims were not left entirely without western education as they were in Northern Nigeria, where they were indifferent, if not averse, to western education. Some Tanganyikan Muslims attended mission schools while others attended the schools founded by Shi'ite sects, such as the Ismailis, Ithnasharis and Bohoras - all originally Indian sects. Furthermore, in the German period, it could even be said that Muslims had an educational lead because of the state schools which had been built on the coast by the Germans. The government even threatened to set up government schools in mission areas, staffed with coastal Muslims. During the period of British rule in Tanganyika, there was not as much cooperation between the missions and the government in the education field as there was in Northern Nigeria. This was one of the reasons why schools were not predominantly mission schools, but state schools where the language was Swahili. Swahili gradually became the language of instruction in inland mission schools as well. Towards the end of colonial rule, however, Muslims in both countries became increasingly conscious of their limited opportunities, due to their lack of education. They hoped that independence would bring them these opportunities. According to Nimtz, it was this lack of secular education that 'brought Muslims much sooner to TANU's ranks than Christians' (1980:89). This indicates that it was through the common struggle for independence that Muslims wished to achieve educational balance with Christians. This was not the case in Northern Nigeria, where, on the contrary, educational imbalance was one of the main reasons for Christian-Muslim opposition to each other. While in Northern Nigeria contradictions and conflicts between people during the colonial period had strong religious overtones, this was not the case in Tanganyika, where settlement patterns and ethnic conditions were the determining causes. Nimtz has mentioned four main rifts (1980:29f.). There was the Shirazi versus 'outsiders' rift, which was a split between the wenyeji (indigenous natives), who were the 'masters' or the 'lords' of the coastal towns, and the wageni, the non-natives, immigrants, 'guests', who could be Africans, Arabs or Europeans. The Omani1 Arabs were the principal opponents of the Shirazi since they constituted a challenge to their political hegemony (Nimtz:31) by taking the coastal-interior trade away from them. During the last years of British rule, however, Arabs and Shirazi began to see common cause in standing together against Africans. The main rift was between the Arabs and the Africans and stemmed

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

45

from the fact that the Arabs could claim ethnic ties with Muhammad. This gave them a strong sense of self-dignity and self-importance in relation to non-Arab Muslims, whom they assigned to a mawali (client) status. African Muslims, especially from the interior, were not accepted as equals by the Arab minority, and this led to antipathy on the African side. The Arab-African rift widened during the colonial period. Abolition of slavery, recruitment of Africans into higher positions after World War II, and the growth of nationalism all had this effect. Furthermore, the British clearly accorded higher status to Arabs than to Africans, and this increased the antipathy, especially in Zanzibar. It was such antipathy that led to the revolution in January 1964 which overthrew the Arab rulers who had inherited complete power from the British. In mainland Tanganyika, however, the Arabs had to accept an independent government under African rule whereby relations between Arabs and Africans were more friendly. Another rift was that between Europeans and others. The overriding criterion by which the European rulers discriminated was that of colour and race. The religious distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, which was central in the minds of the British in Northern Nigeria, was far less significant in Tanganyika. Instead, the distinction between whites and non-whites was emphasized. The 'whites' were the Europeans, and, in Swahili society, included Indians and Arabs as well; the Shirazi, on the other hand, were classified as 'non-whites' or Africans. This distinction influenced the way of thinking of the Africans themselves who, by the end of the colonial period, had taken over the distinction between the watu wa weupe (whites) and the watu wa wensi (blacks). The last rift to be mentioned here was that between free persons and slaves - a rift which continued long after slavery was abolished, especially in Zanzibar (Nimtz 1980:39f.). African nationalist propaganda against British colonial rule and (by implication) against Arab dominance in Zanzibar made frequent reference to slavery. In both countries, the growth of Islam concealed an implicit resistance to colonial rule. This was especially true of Islamic expansion in the form of turuq. In Tanganyika, Swahili culture offered an alternative source of cultural values. Islam constituted a new source of strength, a means of rejecting European control. Active resistance to colonial rule and the struggle for independence, however, became more of a unifying factor for Christians and Muslims in Tanganyika than it did in Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria, the main resistance took the shape of Muslim

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revolts, mainly Mahdist revolts against the invaders (the British and, later, the Southern Nigerians), who were identified as Christians. There was also Islamic resistance in Tanganyika, such as the Abushiri revolt and the Mecca Letters affair, but these did not create divisions between Christians and Muslims like those which occurred in Nigeria. On the whole there was very little nationalist activity and sentiment among northerners before the late 1940s. There were peasants' revolts but these were local protests against specific abuses committed by the colonial administration. Although no direct connection has been proved between Mahdism and mission, Mahdist resistance had consequences for ChristianMuslim relations in Northern Nigeria. Christians feared that the Mahdi would rise in Nigeria. This fear increased the anti-Fulani sentiment. Islam in Northern Nigeria was generally a lot more 'resistant' than in Tanganyika. Muslims were more dedicated to preserving the Islamic politico-religious system established by the Sokoto jihadists. Therefore, according to Mahdists, the emirate system had compromised with the 'Christian' colonial government in accepting indirect rule and had betrayed Islam. Independence, too, would be unacceptable if it were to undermine Islam. Therefore, (Mahdist) criticism in the north was directed at this 'compromise' between the emirate and colonial rule; i.e. at the application of the principle of indirect rule. It was not a demand for independence as in the south and in Tanganyika. It was more reformist than revolutionary. This strong urge to preserve Islam was one of the reasons why national movements striving for independence in Northern Nigeria did not have the same unifying potential as in Tanganyika. Indeed, in Tanganyika this unification was not only a potential, but one of TANU's stated goals. ' Umoja ni nguvu* was still the slogan. Umoja and uhuru belonged together, or rather umoja was a condition for uhuru (see Kimambo/Temu 1969:152). It was a struggle for both independence and unity, with Swahili as the unifying language. In Nigeria, it was mainly the Christian-educated elite in the south that was involved in nationalist movements. Protest against colonialism here also took the shape of independent churches such as the Nationalist Church of Nigeria. As already noted, the awakening in the north was not so much a protest against colonial rule as it was a reaction to ihe advanced southerners. It did not grow out of a feeling of common identity with the south. In the south, some kind of unity was created by the opposition to British rule; in the north, it was opposition to the

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES

47

south that created unity. This opposition had very strong religious overtones which were conveyed in a statement made in London by a northern politician, Abubakar Imam, in 1943. In it, he explained to southerners what the average educated northerner thought: We despise each other . . . we call each other ignorant; the South is proud of Wetern knowledge and culture, we are proud of Eastern (culture) . . . To tell you the plain truth, the common people of the North put more confidence in the white man than in either their black Southern brothers or the educated Northerners' (quoted in Coleman 1958:360). In the 1950s, the nationalist movements in Nigeria became structured into political parties. These parties were established specifically and exclusively on a regional basis. There was no nationwide party like TANU. The first party to be introduced in the north was the Northern People's Congress (NPC) which was basically a Hausa and Fulani (i.e. Muslim-dominated) organization supported by the emirs. The party wanted to unify the north in order to resist the domination by southerners at the federal and state level. The Northern Elements' Progressive Union (NEPU), whose leader was Aminu Kano, was established in opposition to the rather conservative orientation of NPC. It was also dominated by the Hausa and Fulani, but was rather critical of the established power elites in the north. In the southern part of Northern Nigeria, whose population was predominantly non-Muslim, the two parties, the Middle Zone League.(MZL) and the Middle Belt People's Party (MBPP), the latter eventually developing into the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), were established in opposition to NPC. MZL was led by David Lot, a pastor trained by SUM. The members of MZL and UMBC were almost exclusively Christians, and the two parties had support from Christians in other areas of Northern Nigeria as well - particularly in Adamawa Province, where the question about the establishment of an independent region as a counterweight and defence against the Fulani and Hausa was a central theme in the struggle of the parties. The missionaries in the area had sympathy with the Christian politicians on the grounds that they were Christians. Furthermore, the missionaries wanted to secure religious freedom. Religious freedom was not crucial to the Nigerian Christians; rather, they sought the autonomy of ethnic minority groups, whether

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they were Christian or not. This missionary sympathy was seen by the British as representing an attitude that contributed to the creation of an unfavourable and negative political atmosphere. During the late colonial period, however, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, saw the importance of religious unity and tried to promote a united front in the north by looking for ways of bringing religious groups together (see Paden 1986:303f.). In his Christmas messages in the years before independence he directly addressed the question of Christian-Muslim relations on various occasions, and urged the people of Northern Nigeria to 'forget their religious differences and keep in mind only the brotherhood of man before God'. He appealed to them to live together in peace and added, 'our diversities may be great but the things that unite us are stronger than the ones that distinguish us'.40 In his 1959 Christmas message, he tried to lessen the fear Christians felt of oppression by a Muslim government after independence by stressing the government policy of religious tolerance, and expressed his gratitude to the Christian missions for their contribution to the north: Families of all creeds and colour can rely on these assurances; we have no intention of favouring one religion at the expense of another. Subject to the overriding need to preserve law and order, it is our determination that everyone should have absolute liberty to practice his beliefs according to the dictates of his conscience . . . I extend my greetings to all those of our people who are Christians on this their great feast day. Let us forget the difference in our religions and, remembering the common brotherhood before God, dedicate ourselves afresh to the great tasks which lie before Immediately prior to independence, Christian-Muslim antagonism was softened to some extent, and ideas of religious unity entered the minds of some Muslims and Christians. The Muslim stance on religious unity was summarized by Aliyu, maman bida (regional minister of social service) when he addressed the Medical Advisory Board in 1952: You and I, Christians and Muslims, 'people of the Book' share many common beliefs. It should not be difficult for us to link our differences and to work out in unison a joint attack on the evils which beset us, poverty, misfortune and ill health.42

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49

Muslims in Northern Nigeria - especially the ruling class and the educated - feared that in a self-governing Nigeria the north would, in effect, be a backward protectorate governed by southerners. They feared that southerners would take the places of the Europeans in the north, since it was they who possessed the power. On the Christian side, however, there was a strong fear of persecution and discrimination by the Muslim majority after independence (see Cramp ton 1979:84), that Muslims would take over the rule from the British and introduce an Islamic system without religious freedom. Hence some Christians even spoke against the creation of a new state in spite of the fact that NPC and the government had made repeated statements that the north was for everyone, irrespective of ethnicity, language, and creed. Missionaries feared that a new state would mean an end to mission.43 Therefore the missions were anxious to establish as many stations as possible before independence and to give the churches as much independence and official responsibility as possible. This was the tactic of the Danish branch of the Sudan United Mission (DFSM) and other missions which handed over the property of the mission to Africans out of fear of Muslim domination after independence. The churches had to be consolidated and transferred to African leadership whereby they would have a better chance of survival.44 It seems that the primary interest on both the Muslim and Christian (at least missionary) sides in Northern Nigeria was one of preserving their own respective religious traditions and practices rather than promoting unity and independence. The same kind of fear existed in Tanganyika, but on the part of the Muslims. This fear manifested itself, for example, in the petition of AMNUT to TANU to delay independence until the gap between Christians and Muslims had been narrowed. Christians enjoyed preferential entry into education, which led to some social differentiation (see Kaniki 1980:364), and were also more likely to be employed by the government. Therefore, some Muslims saw Christians in general as aspiring heirs to the colonial throne. This was not a widespread fear, however, and it was overcome without having deep implications for Christian-Muslim relationships. Looking at the significance of resistance and nationalism on the whole, it must be concluded that, in Tanganyika, Christian-Muslim cooperation (first of all in TANU) was part of the dynamics of the process towards uhuru. In Northern Nigeria, however, early resistance was primarily an Islamic reform movement and only indirectly was it

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resistance to colonial rule. The later nationalist movements for independence, on the other hand, were led either by a mission-educated elite in the south, often campaigning against the north on religious grounds, or by parties formed along ethnic lines and with local interests. In Nigeria resistance was not, as in Tanganyika, a process that could unite Christians and Muslims. The colonial situation, colonial policy, missionary attitudes, and resistance in the two countries have been dealt with as the background for understanding the present relationship between Christians and Muslims. But what actually was the relationship between African Christians and Muslims during the colonial period? That is, how much impact did missionaries' attitudes have on Nigerians and Tanganyikans in their daily contacts with each other - contacts that had traditionally been marked by tolerance? There is hardly any material available on relations at this grass roots level. As an example, I shall mention the Kilba case in Adamawa Province, the north-eastern part of Nigeria, which reflected a situation of conflict between the local Christians and the Muslim chief.45 The main goal of the Kilba after 1945 was to gain independence from the Islamic-dominated Yola Emirate.46 They felt oppressed by the Muslim Fulani. The DFSM became one of the organizations that the Kilba could use as a means in their political struggle: not because the missionaries involved themselves in the struggle - on the contrary - but because the Kilba, through attachment to the mission and the access to western education which it afforded, were able to mount their struggle against the Fulani.47 This opposition to the Fulani became an acute problem after 1945, when it became more and more difficult for the Fulani to keep the area together and to stem the pressure from the ethnic minorities. Around 1950, the so-called District Head, the Muslim Kilba chief whose name was Santuraki, increasingly found himself in opposition to the various groups, probably because of growing political pressure from the Lamido in Yola.48 In 1953, the British Resident initiated an investigation of the situation, undertaken by a government official. The Christian Kilba found the investigation's procedure biased and did not accept it, and a delegation of 600 Kilba went to the government official in Mubi (40 miles from Pella) and complained. The mission was blamed for the complaints and was accused of having interfered with politics. In a meeting with the Resident in 1953, the two missionaries, Pilgaard-Pedersen and Bundgaard said to the Resident: 'We do not accept that the mission is blamed for what the

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51

Christians do. We must stay out of politics but the Nigerian Christians must not. We are the parents and one cannot blame the parents for what their adult children do'.49 Bundgaard, however, was removed by the Resident in 1954 from Amadawa Province because he, according to the Resident and local Fulani, had involved himself in politics. The quotation and the whole affair show that the missionaries distinguished clearly between mission and church, between what missionaries did and what Nigerian Christians did. The missionaries were not 'members of the church in Nigeria but of their own church at home'.50 This was one reason why it was so important for the missionaries in the 1950s to hand over the responsibility to African leadership in the face of Islamic pressure. As Pilgaard said, 'We have built an African church not a European (one)'.51 The missionaries did not take into account that this distinction had long-term political consequences for mission work, however unintended. Their work entered a political situation that they did not control. There were other instances that led to conflict between local Christians and Muslims among the Kilba. The Andarawus case was one of them. The Resident claimed that Andarawus, a Kilba Christian, had insulted the Muslims in a sermon. A Muslim law-court imposed a penalty because of his 'offence'.52 In 1957, four Christians were arrested by the Muslim chief for holding an open air meeting. The charge was that: a) they had spoken about politics; b) they had said that Christianity was better than Islam; c) they had broken the rule that if more than five people were gathered, permission had to be obtained from the Native Administration; and d) they had preached secretly. This arrest took place while there was a 'minority commission' in the area to investigate what should be done to protect the minority from attacks. In this way, the chief had placed the Christians in good hands. The Kilba State Union - a political-ethnic organization whose members were mainly Christians - now demanded the dethronement of the Kilba chief. It was very difficult for the missionaries to get permission from the emir in Yola to start evangelist work in villages. This was the reason for many conflicts between Christians and the emir's people. In a meeting between the emir and African leaders of the church (plus two missionaries), one of the Nigerian pastors said: We are all children of the Emir whether we are pagans, Christians or Mohammedans. We also know that there is something that

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children do not like - if one of them feels that he is not treated in the same way as his brothers and sisters. It hurts us Christians that we must ask for permission from the Emir to build a prayer hut while the Muhammedans need not. Please, if the Emir would consider to give us all an equal position we would be grateful.53 This plea was well received, and the emir agreed to discuss the matter. The quotation also shows the tone of respect and understanding which existed between the church leaders and the emir. These instances of conflict were due more to colonial policy than to the actual attitude of the emir and his people. Nevertheless, they did lead to attitudes of hostility and suspicion on both sides in the Kilba area. On the whole, however, Christians and Muslims, on the household and village level, in the whole of both Northern Nigeria and Tanganyika, were able to maintain an attitude of religious tolerance and mutual respect inherent to their African tradition. This becomes obvious in the pages that follow. Notes 1 Lord Lugard was High Commissioner in Northern Nigeria 1900-1906 (when he left for Hong Kong). He returned as Governor of both Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1912, and became Governor-General of Nigeria from 1914 when the amalgamation of Nigeria was proclaimed. He retired in 1919. 2 'Tanganyika' was used for German East Africa when the British took over after World War I. 3 On Maji Maji, see Kimambo/Temu 1969:116-22. 4 This was repealed in 1911. 5 For more complete accounts of Christian mission in Southern Nigeria, see Ayandele:1965 and Ajayi:1965, among others. 6 Prior to the Niger Expeditions, missionaries had been there on a very small scale only, and with insignificant influence. 7 On Bronnum and the DFSM, see Mogens Jensen. 1992. To Mcend og deres Mission. Christiansfeld 8 Engskov to the DFSM, 14 December 1939, RA 59. 9 H. G. Farrant. 1950. 'Nigeria, the Church and the Future'. In World Dominion, p.97. 10 Memorandum sent to J. H. Oldham, Edinburgh House, 16 December 1929, p. 6, RA 69; Lightbearer 1922:68; see also CMS archives, Farrant to John, A9P1,1925. 11 CMS archives, Farrant to John, A9P1, 1925. 12 Correspondence with government, 1913, RA 57. 13 This is described and examplified by Kasfelt 1984:3. 14 Sabon Gari means 'new town'; it is a separate area where strangers lived and worked. 15 Brennum to Engskov, 22 August 1939, RA 59.

CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS DURING COLONIAL TIMES 16

53

On the Portuguese period, see Sicard 1978:53f. This divergence comes out in the statement: 'Nicht Schulen, nicht Erziehung ist das Wesen der evangelishe Missions-arbeit, sondern Verkiindigung der Predigt und zwar so, dass sie als eine Aufforderung zu einer Entscheidung fur Christus vor den fremden Volkern gewissenmassig verstanden werden kann\ ('Not schools, not education is the essence of evangelical Mission work, but the preaching of the sermon so that this can be consciously understood as a challenge to a decision for Christ by the foreign people.') (Conference in Kidugala 10 January 1933, Kidugala Bible school archives). 18 The percentage of Christians in Tanganyika stood at 3 per cent in 1913, and 30 per cent in 1960 (Lindquist 1982:23). 19 Mihayi 1971:31; on Christian villages, see Kieran:1971. 20 This was said by Acting Resident Stappleton, quoted in a letter from Pilgaard to Engskov, 16 December 1954, RAII:11. 21 Report on conversation held 15 December 1954 in Yola Provincial Office on conditions laid down for missionaries operating in certain areas in the northern region of Nigeria. RAII 11, paragraph 7. 22 Memorandum sent to J. H. Oldham, Edinburgh House, 16 December 1929, RA 69. 23 Report on conversation 15 December 1954 (see note 21). 24 'DFSM vil vaere med til at bringe Evangeliet til Sudan's millioner af Hedninger, for de bliver erobrede af den fremtraengende Muhammedanisme. HVEM SKAL SEJRE? KRISTUS ELLER MUHAMMED?'. RA 3. 25 Bronnum to Pedersen, 13 January 1914, Reg. B4/1914 RA 5. 26 E. Schultze. 1913. Soil Deutsch — Ostafrika christlich oder mohammedanish werden? Berlin, p. 52f. In Westerlund 1980a:52. 27 'Sidde og lumre pa stationerne og udveksle hilsener i det uendelige med muhammedanere.' Report on conversation, 15 December 1954 (see note 21). 28 'Vi ma vaere lydhore overfor kaldet, hvis Gud viser os at vi skal begynde at regne med Muhammedanerne som et folk, der skal omvendes - om ikke af anden grund, sa for at vi kan undga, at der falder andre missioner ned midt i vort distrikt' (Bronnum to Engskov, 22 August 1939, RA 59). 29 'Det er lettere at vaere Muhammedaner som kan opregne hvad man skal foretage sig for at blive islams tilhaenger, og med let forstaelige ord tilkendegive, hvad der bliver den troende Islamits belonning i paradiset.' (Bronnum 1955:10). 30 Numan 22 December 1914. Correspondence with government, RA 57. 31 The term 'Islam' is hardly used in early missionary writing which, instead, favours 'Mohammedanism' - a misconception implying that Muhammad occupies as central a position in Islamic faith as Christ does in the Christian. 32 Bronnum to Pedersen, 13 January 1914, Reg.B4/1914 RA 5. 33 Bronnum to Pedersen, Reg.B2/1915 RA 5. 34 'Yderst selviske slyngler - snoge, krybende, hykleriske, slimede - oh, sa frastodende.' Reg.B/1914 RA 5. 35 1. V. Cleverdon. 1936. Pools on the Growing Sand. Melbourne, p. 161, quoted in Boer 1979:128. 36 Miller was one of the pioneer missionaries in the Hausa mission in Zaria. He tried to introduce Christianity to Kano and came into conflict with the emir. 17

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J. A. P. Kieran. 1966. The Holy Ghost Fathers in East Africa. PhD thesis, London. 38 An anonymous Swedish article in SUDAN 1920, no. 5, p. 71. 39 To Pedersen, Reg.15/1916 RA 5. 40 Nigerian Citizen, 28 December 1957; quoted in Paden 1986:305. 41 Nigerian Citizen, 30 December 1959; quoted in Paden 1986:305. 42 Nigerian Citizen, 29 May 1952; quoted in Paden 1986:303. 43 Pilgaard to Engskov/N. B. Hansen, 7 October 1953, RA 11:11. 44 Hojvig to Engskov, March 1965, RA 11:12. 45 On the Kilba case, see Rasmussen 1990:35-44. This description is based on Kastfelt 1984:130ff. and DFSM archive material, RA II. 46 The Kilba were one of the groups that were subjugated under the Caliphate. 47 RA 75. 48 Conference in Numan, 1-7 January 1950, RA 66; Alfred Jorgensen 7 July 1953, p. 243, RA 75. 49 Pilgaard to Engskov, 24 September 1953, RA 11:11. 50 Conference in Numan, 1-7 January 1950, RA 66. 51 Pilgaard to Engskov and N. B. Hansen, 25 September 1954, RAIIrll. 52 Pilgaard to Engskov, 5 March 1958, RAII:11. 53 Pilgaard to Engskov, 6 June 1957, RAII:11.

Ill DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRESENT TIME

1. Independence in Nigeria (1960) and Tanzania (1961). A. The political development after independence.

Nigeria gained independence from Britain on 1 October 1960, and became a republic in 1963. The political leadership now moved from the south to the north. The NPC, led by Ahmadu Bello formed the government - according to the Westminster model. Ahmadu Bello saw his manifest duty as the continuation of the work of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio. He identified with the Islamic world and promoted Nigeria's Islamic identity among the comity of the world's Islamic nations. Relations were established with Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. After three years of democracy, Nigeria was taken over by the army. After this the Muslim leadership in the country, along with the leadership of the western region, was wiped out. The army attempted to impose a military system of government to replace the federal system. It was after this 1966 coup that tensions between northern Muslims and southern Ibos began. Ibos were attacked and driven out of the north. A second coup was made in 1966 whereby Yakubu Go won, a northern Christian from the Middle Belt, was brought to power. The Muslim establishment in the north found it traumatic to be ruled by a Christian from the Muslim north. In 1967, twelve states (six in the north) replaced the four regions. This was again replaced by a 19-state structure in 1976. From 1967-70, the tensions between the north and the Ibos in the south developed into a civil war. After this, preparations for a return to civilian rule bagan. In July 1975, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed took power an anti-western, chiefly anti-American ruler. After he was killed in a coup attempt in 1976, General Obasanjo took over.

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From 1977, the plans for civilian rule took form and, in October of that year, the constituent assembly began sittings. In 1979, the military handed over power to the civilians. A presidential system of government - influenced by the American example - was adopted, and Shehu Shagari, the NPN (successor of NPC) candidate, was installed as president. The Second Republic was a reality. The Shagari administration was not able to satisfy the desire of the northern Islamic power elite to advance the cause of Islam in a decisive way. The dissatisfaction with Shagari and his administration led to a military coup on New Year's Eve, 1984. The two following military rulers, Buhari and Babangida, both northerners and Muslims, have not succeeded in changing this situation. In 1986, President Babangida initiated the transition process designed to lead to civilian rule by the end of 1992. This has opened up religious issues in the political debates. Tanganyika became independent from Britain on 19 December 1961, and became a republic in 1962, with Julius Nyerere as president. The president was given important executive powers. TANU enjoyed great recognition and support from the people. There is no doubt that the common language, Swahili, has made these cultural and political efforts to create unity easier. Furthermore, none of the many minor groups has been big enough to opt for independence or constitute a threat to other groups. No one feared that the national economy would be dominated by one single ethnic group. This kept the nation together. After the Zanzibar revolution of 12 January 1964, when the Arab sultan was overthrown and Islamic rule in Zanzibar ended, the two countries united to form Tanzania. In 1963-4, a five-year economic plan was developed, based on TANU's socialist principles. The economy of the country was to be a a mixture of private and public initiative. This was made more radical in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which stated that the most important means of production of the country were to be placed under public control. The necessity of basing the development of the country on its own efforts, and of the hard work this would involve, was pointed out. The decisive importance of agriculture was emphasized and, as far as TANU was concerned, the necessity of having a politically educated leadership without private economic interests. In 1977, TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the two ruling parties on the Tanzania mainland and in the islands (Zanzibar and

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRESENT TIME.

57

Pemba), merged to form the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi - The Revolutionary Party). In 1985 President Nyerere retired, and Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a Muslim, became president. Nigerian politics was, in the period after independence, characterized by shifting governments and different political parties, some closely associated with Islam. There was, however, no consistent political ideology in these shifting governments. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the political leadership was stable, with only one political party, and a consistent fundamental effort was made to attain economic independence, following a clear vision of self-reliant socialism and development. The strategy to deal with the problem of identity following independence in the two countries was fundamentally different. B. Christian and Islamic organizations.

Since independence, both Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria and Tanzania have become better organized. In Northern Nigeria, a Muslim organization was founded in 1962, the Jamaatu Nasril Islam (the Society for the Victory of Islam), which was pledged to transcend divisions among Muslims, to promote Islamic schools and medical work, and to give a voice to all Nigerian Muslims. The society was seen as a meeting place for all Muslims in Nigeria, whatever their particular beliefs. It played a great role in the expansion of education among Muslims and in spreading Islam. Before the civil war its activities were restricted to the northern states only, but after the war they extended to include the south as well. The Kaduna Council of Mallams was formed in 1963, and was another effort to bring together various elements of the religious leadership in the north. In 1973, the Jamaatu Nasril Islam was merged with the Wesiomo (the West Joint Muslim Organization) to form the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs - a national Muslim organization whose aim was to develop closer links between the different Muslim communities and to speak to the government with one voice on matters concerning Islam: to cater for the interests of Islam throughout the Federation; to serve as a channel of contact with the governments of Nigeria on Islamic affairs, where necessary, and to serve as the only channel of contact on Islamic matters.1 These organizations, all headed by the Sultan of Sokoto, have brought

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Muslims in Nigeria closer together. Islam became more trans-ethnic, more national, but also more transnational. On the one hand after independence Muslims wanted to mark their own national identity; on the other hand, they were attracted by the Islamic idea of the umma Stronger ties with the Muslim world have been created. Nigerian Islam became more closely related to the Arab world. In Tanzania, the EAMWS (formed in 1945, see above p. 28) was striving for transnational and (ultimately) pan-Islamic unity, and was in this sense in opposition to TANU's work for secular national unity and nation building. In 1968, it was stated at a Regional Conference in Bukoba that EAMWS had to become 'nationalized'. Only Muslims who supported the party could become leaders of Muslims in Tanzania. Gradually the different regions of Tanzania withdrew from the organization. This caused tensions between Islam-oriented (especially non-African Shia) Muslims and national-oriented Muslims, and resulted in what has been called an 'Islamic crisis' in 1968. EAMWS was declared unlawful by the government. In the same year, the Supreme Council of Tanzania Muslims, Baraza Kuu la Waislam wa Tanzania (BAKWATA), was established. BAKWATA was closely linked with TANU. Its purpose was to assist the Muslims in religious, social and economic spheres. Education was one of its top priorities. Its structure was identical with that of TANU, and many of its leaders were government appointees, backed by those of TANU. BAKWATA, however, was not well received in all areas of Tanzania. It was viewed by some Muslims as another party or as a 'Muslim branch of TANU' (Westerlund 1980a: 104). Many Shia Muslims saw it as an organization merely for the mainland Sunni Muslims. In Tanzania there was a parallel between the struggle for political independence and efforts to Africanize or 'nationalize' Islam. The struggle for unity and self-reliance was equally present both in BAKWATA and TANU (CCM). In Nigeria there was not the same parallel, and the Muslims oriented themselves more and more towards foreign Muslim countries such as Libya and Saudi Arabia. The changing role of Islam in Tanzania and long historical connections with the countries of origin has resulted in a variety of different Islamic groups. The Sunni Muslims constitute the majority, of whom most are Africans. There are various groups of Shiites, most of whose members are Asians. The most important are the Ithnasheri, who emphasize mission; the Khodja Ismailis, who put emphasis on higher education and medicine; and the Bohora Ismailis, who constitute a

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rather exclusive community (see above p. 16). A tiny minority belong to the Ahmadiya movement, which is considered heretical by Sunni Muslims. This movement puts emphasis on mission and was the first Muslim group to publish a Swahili version of the Qur'an. In Nigeria the group of Shia Muslims is insignificant. Various groups of Muslim reformers have emerged, the Muslim Students Society (MSS), the Young Muslim Association of Nigeria and the Kungiyar Izalatul Bidia (Association of the Removal of Innovation), founded in 1978 by Isma'il Idris with the backing of Abubakar Gummi, formerly the Grand Qadi for all northern states. The influence of the Muslim brotherhoods, such as the Niass brach of the Tijaniyya, has also increased since independence (see Clarke/Linden 1984:44f.; Paden 1973:73-204). In Tanzania, 'nationalization' of Islam meant less emphasis on the Arabic language (and scripture). Important feasts such as Id al Fitr2 were changed to serve national purposes. National unity became the priority. In Northern Nigeria, however, Islam moved in the direction of Arabization in language and in ideology. This tendency can be seen in the emergence of fundamentalist movements in Nigeria (see p. 98f. below). One of the products of independence was the strengthening of the ecumenical movement amongst the churches in both Northern Nigeria and Tanzania. In 1963, the various Lutheran churches in Tanzania united to form the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanganyika (ELCT), which promoted unity and cooperation among a number of ethnic groups. In Northern Nigeria, six (later eight) autonomous churches had already joined together in 1954 and formed the Tarayyar Ekklesiyoyyin Kristi A Sudan (TEKAS) (the amalgamation of the Churches of Christ in Sudan), of which the Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria (LCCN) (earlier Sudan) became a member. Since independence there has been a gradual devolution of authority from western missions to African churches in both countries. There has been a transition from mission domination to church autonomy and the churches have been striving to achieve the 'three-self-formula': selfgovernment, self-support and self-extension.3 C. The civil war in Nigeria and the Zanzibar revolution.

In both countries ethnic groups have - out of fear of discrimination and domination - attempted to secede or to seize power from another ethnic group. The Zanzibar revolution (1964) and the civil war in Nigeria (1967-70) were two such attempts.

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During colonial times, the Zanzibaris became divided - politically, socially and racially. The British protected and respected the Arab elite as the natural rulers of Zanzibar, whereby the Arabs came to see themselves as leaders of all Zanzibaris. Furthermore, the Arabs owned most of the land. There were four main population groups in Zanzibar and Pemba through the colonial period: Africans (Mainlanders), Arabs, Asians and Europeans. The Shirazis, who had a mixed Afro-Persian ancestry, were represented among all three ethnic groups of the islands. There was a social gap between Mainlanders and Shirazis, the latter looking down upon the former. This made it impossible to create an all-African national movement. The Arabs took advantage of this disunity and isolated the Mainlanders. The Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) was the vehicle through which the Arabs hoped to continue to dominate Zanzibari politics. This political rivalry and racial bitterness was strongest from 1961, and the results of the July 1963 election clearly showed that nationalism was non-existent in Zanzibar. Therefore, on January 12, 1964 the AfroShirazi Party (ASP) (formed in 1957), in collaboration with the Umma Party (UP) (which had split from the ZNP), staged a bloody revolution. This overthrew the coalition government formed in 1959 by the ZNP and ZPPP (Zanzibar Pemba People's Party). It also meant the overthrow of the Arab sultan. An African government led by ASP and UP leaders was installed. In 1967, the eastern region seceded from Nigeria as an independent Ibo homeland under Col. Ojukwu, naming itself The Republic of Biafra. The entire eastern region became a war zone. Go won announced a decree that would give Nigeria a new constitution and divide the federation into 12 new states with a high degree of local autonomy. The eastern government rejected this planned regrouping of Nigeria, insisting instead on becoming independent and being treated as a sovereign state. In 1970, the secessionists were crushed and Ojukwu fled the country. There were many reasons for the war. One major reason was the oil that was discovered in the eastern part of Nigeria at this time. The exclusion of the Ibos from central power was another reason. There was an uneven distribution of wealth. Mineral and agricultural wealth was located in one part of the country. There was a constitutional and educational imbalance, an inequality of opportunities between the eastern part and the rest of Nigeria. Furthermore, the Fulani aristocrats feared for the integrity of their traditional social structures; while in

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their turn the southerners feared the domination of the Fulani. The question was how to preserve the integrity of Nigeria and give independence and security to the Ibos. National unity was at stake. Foreign reporters, however, wanted to see the war as a conflict between the Christian Ibos of the east and the Muslims of the north. In many western countries sympathy was expressed through Christian organizations. 'Biafran' propaganda saw the conflict in terms of the 'Muslim north' trying to swallow up the 'Christian south'. Also, Christian missionaries interpreted the war as a religious war, a religious jihad by the Muslims against the Christians (see Walls 1975:207f.). Because of this propaganda, mosque buildings in the south were partly damaged during the war. Some Muslims did use jihad terminology to describe the conflict, but most did not see the Federal side as coinciding with Islamic interests. Besides, the Federal army was led mostly by Christian officers. Nevertheless, Ibo Muslims tried to run away from their home towns and villages and kept in hiding. Many of them changed their Muslim names into Christian ones. These were published in the 'Biafra Sun'. In this way, the war seemed to deal a heavy blow to Islamic activities in that region. The aim of the Zanzibar revolution and of the civil war in Nigeria was to adjust the social and economic inequalities between two groups of people: the African majority and the Arab minority in Zanzibar, and the eastern minority and the northern/western majority in Nigeria. Both conflicts sought to eliminate frustrations and feelings of humiliation arising from domination. In both Zanzibar and Nigeria, the problem was the fear of political and economic domination of one group of people. Both conflicts had ethnic overtones, but only the Nigerian conflict can be said to have had religious overtones. Religion was used to provide the conflict with legitimacy, and thereby had an adverse influence on Christian-Muslim relations in the country and made the conflict between Christians and Muslims appear more manifestly as a conflict between two 'blocks' of people. In Zanzibar, Islam did not separate the two groups but was rather a common denominator for the Arabs and the Afro—Shirazi.

2. Christian-Muslim relations and the political goals of Nigeria and Tanzania.

Since independence, Muslims and Christians in both countries have been cooperating in political, commercial and social activities. On a national level, the distribution of ethnic groups and the political goals of

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the two countries - the socialist and non-favouring policy of the Tanzanian party, and the capitalist-oriented and (in principle) 'secular' policy of the Nigerian government - came to play, and still play, an important role in Christian-Muslim relationships. In Tanzania, no major ethnic group has dominated,4 and identification with an ethnic group is not conceived as contrary to national identity, but rather as complementary. In Nigeria, the persistence of ethnic feelings in politics, often intensified by economic differences and a high rate of mobilization in a situation without a common Nigerian language, has been (and is) strong. It has been shown that this is partly a result of British colonial policy. In the Nigerian context, religion has been used to reinforce these ethnic and socio-economic divisions. This was the case in the controversy over the Sharia Court of Appeal, 1977/78, which will be described below and then contrasted with the debate on the Marriage Bill in Tanzania in 1971. This will be done in order to show how differently the way of presenting the problem of law and unity is approached, and thus how differently Christians and Muslims relate to each other on a. national level. A. The controversy over the Sharia Court of Appeal in Nigeria 1977-78. Since independence, there has been an increased awareness of the political content of Islam in Nigeria, with emphasis on the state as a. unity of political and religious community. The Islamic factor has been growing, although its political expression has been somewhat limited This has been in harmony with a world revival of Islam occurring; during that time. Islam relates to society via the system of law, and that system of law, the Sharia, was only praticed at a state or local level in the north, with Sharia courts dealing with personal law. The Yoruba Muslims were more secularized and did not insist on being governed by the Sharia Therefore, the desire for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal (FSCA) an appellate court for cases heard under Islamic law — became absolute This would mean that there would be two separate courts of appeal below the level of Supreme Court: a Federal Court of Appeal, to hear appeals from the High Court, of each state; and a Federal Supreme Court of Appeal, to hear appeals from any state Sharia Court of" Appeal. It was this question of the role of a FSCA that generated the mosi: heated debate during the drafting of a new Nigerian constitution, the

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constitution of the Second Republic, which became effective from 1 October 1979. The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), consisting of 230 delegates from all 19 states, began in 1975 to work out a constitution on the state and its fundamental objectives. The draft began in this way: 'Nigeria is one and indivisible, sovereign, Republic, secular, democratic and social'. The term 'secular', which was later dropped, led to discussions on TV, radio, in the press, and in universities and colleges, as to whether it was appropriate to describe Nigeria as a 'secular' state. Some Muslims opposed the inclusion of the term in the constitution as they interpreted it as a term that would exclude considerations drawn from the belief in God. The CDC, however, used the term to imply state neutrality in matters of religion. Nevertheless, many Muslims felt that it could be used to impose restrictions on religion. Non-Muslims saw this desire to have 'secular' deleted as a sign that Muslims had the objective of turning Nigeria into an Islamic state. The 'hot issue' in the debate was whether or not constitutional provisions should be made for the establishment of a FSCA, and for Sharia Courts at the state level where they did not already exist. This part of the debate started on 3 April 1978, and on the following day a sub-committee of 16 members was set up. The CDC had recommended the creation of a FSCA to hear further appeals from the State Sharia Court of Appeal in cases involving Islamic personal law. The argument was that a FSCA would make for better attainment of justice in the administration of Islamic personal law. This recommendation was opposed by non-Muslims and some Muslims in the Constituent Assembly (CA)5 when it was presented on 6 April. They interpreted the recommendation as a special concession to the Sharia and the Muslims, and found it inconsistent with the secular nature of the constitution. In the end the differences of opinion were resolved in the form of a compromise by which the provisions for a FSCA were dropped, and a section was created in the existing Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) to deal with Sharia cases.6 88 members of the Assembly withdrew on the same day, and refused to continue their work for some days afterwards because of what they termed the 'cavalier manner' in which the Sharia issue had been disposed of.7 It took almost three weeks and the intervention of the Head of State with an appeal for peace before things returned to normal at the Assembly. The Sharia cause was lost, and the question was shelved.

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The arguments in favour of a FSCA were many and varied.8 The main ones were as follows: without a FSCA the rights of the majority would be oppressed; a dual legal system would destroy the unity of the nation; Islam is a holistic religion, including the legal system, and therefore a FSCA was a conditio sine qua non for being a good Muslim; Sharia could not be separated from Islam; and, finally, a FSCA would help the Nigerian nation to regain its moral consciousness. It would supply a radical solution to problems like corruption, indiscipline and social disorder, and lead to the creation of a nation of honesty, harmony and order (see Clarke/Linden 1984:82f). The reaction of the Christians was generally one of indignation. They interpreted the Draft Constitution as an attempt to promote one religion at the expense of others: a virtual declaration of Nigeria as an Islamic State. It was seen as being divisive and discriminatory. The unity of Nigerians would be lost, whereby the constitution would contradict its own intention. Therefore, religion should be kept out of the constitution. Furthermore, the provisions would reserve high executive offices at Federal and State levels for Muslims only, which meant that Christians would come to be regarded as personae non gratae. The extreme opposition came especially from MCAs from the Middle Belt and from Gongola, but also from Benue and Plateau states where Christian missions had been allowed to work. Wilson Sabiya, a Christian politician from Gongola State, radically supported these arguments: It is criminal to make non-Muslims in this country slaves of Islam and be forced to pay tribute for the protection, application, promotion and enforcement of Islam. We have had enough of this crime. We want to be free and we will go to any extent to gain that freedom. (Sabiya 1977:6. See also 1978) The Christian politicians strongly reiterated that they were not against the Sharia as such, and that they did not question the existence and relevance of the Sharia, but what they rejected was the government doing it at the expense of non-Muslim taxpayers, and that non-Muslims were being subjected to Islam. We therefore plead that if the Government has decided to become financial and institutional custodian of Islam, justice demands the inclusion of all religions. (Sabiya 1977:5) The Christians argued that Nigeria had no privileged group free to

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import foreign laws and to force them down the throats of Nigerians, whether they were British or Muslim 'imperialists': Anyone who will deny that we are heading for religious war will be deceiving himself. If the religious provisions are adopted by the Constituent Assembly then the political parties to be formed will have religious colouring. This country will be split into religious camps. (Sabiya 1977:16) The issue of a FSCA was furthermore combined with other issues, which revealed the feeling that the Christians had of being generally discriminated against. The area of education was particularly mentioned: The issue, put bluntly, is the DECLARATION OF ISLAM AS STATE RELIGION to be ENFORCED, PROPAGATED and MAINTAINED BY THE STATE at the expense of non-Muslim tax-payers. It is in this light do we understand some state Government systematic confiscation of Church Institutions, the Inauguration of Pilgrims Welfare Boards, appointment of Grand Khadis, the establishment of only Islamic Institutions in some of our Universities, the appointment of only Islamic teachers in many of our primary and post-primary Institutions, all paid and maintained by the State at the expense of non-Muslims (Sabiya 1977:2) The following recommendations were given at Ibadan in 1978 by the CSSN, the Ibadan Christian (inter-denominational) Islam in Africa Project, the Protest Action Committee.9 1 Restrict Sharia courts to where they already exist at the state level, provided they are not used as a means of victimization of nonMuslims in such states 2 Restrict the jurisdiction on Sharia courts to persons or civil law, invalidating discriminating consequences on Christian parties 3 Wherever official representation is given to Islam the Federal level should also be granted to other religions. We recommend equal treatment with government Fund, e.g. sponsoring religious projects and obligations like pilgrimages, Islamic Religious teachers in schools or colleges, buildings and mosques etc.

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4 We call for a separation between the state and religion in all its ramifications as stated in section 17 of the Draft Constitution. We advise that Nigeria should have a uniform judicial system for all her citizens, irrespective of their religious and cultural backgrounds. Hence all the non-common laws should be put in a melting pot, or else preferential treatment for a particular religion will call for strong agitations by other religious groups. These recommendations reveal a strong fear among the Christians a fear which had been under the surface for a long time. There were clearly misunderstandings on the Christian side, and the aim of the constitution did not seem to have been clear to them. For them so much was at stake. They feared that the Sharia would be imposed on them, although Muslims had argued strongly in the discussion that they were asking only for freedom to follow Islamic laws themselves, and that this would in no way affect non-Muslims. The Sharia could not be imposed on anyone who did not wish to submit himself to it. There were Muslims who argued in a 'militant way' for the total application of the Sharia, such as Dr Lateef Adegbite, a southern Muslim, and the Muslim Students' Society, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria,10 who called on all Muslims to stand firm and reject any form of compromise. Demonstrations took place in some parts of the northern states with slogans like 'No Sharia, no peace', 'No Sharia, no constitution', and *Sharia is the only answer'.11 It was perhaps these tendencies that made the Christians see the Sharia as a threat to their freedom and faith, and to resist it by all means at their disposal. The Christian opposition was supported by the members of the Muslim Committee for a Progressive Nigeria (MCPN), associated in the past with Aminu Kano and now led by the Marxist historian, Yusuf Bala Usman. This group of socialists saw religion as a device used to divide and rule Nigeria by imperialist interests. Furthermore, a FSCA would give Islam a preferential position. The Sharia law was the most backward religious, legal and customary instrument of the minority of feudal emirs for keeping down the majority of the poor and oppressed peasants and workers. The debate between supporters and non-supporters of the Sharia law, then, was not only about a FSCA, but developed into a discussion about related subjects, such as freedom of religion, the separation of church and state and of mosque and court, the nature of religion, and the Nigerian federation. Thus Yusuf Bala Usman sees the whole debate as 'an excuse for

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publication of provocative and scurrilous articles purporting to oppose or support the Sharia in newspapers, especially the Punch, the New Nigerian and the Nigeria Standard' (1987:15). The debate, which took the form of repetitions of statements and counter-statements, assertions of strength, threats of civil war and bloodshed, and then pious pleas for unity, was, according to Usman, 'intended primarily to create a religious and ethnic constituency framework for self-aggrandisement' (ibid.). Usman and Laitin see the debate as a symbolic 'covering up' of the real differences that existed. The south - which did not have a functioning Sharia system - had, in the course of the colonial experience, captured a large proportion of jobs in the civil service and in international commerce. The north, however, had captured political power in the centre. In this way, the debate on the Sharia 'symbolically represented the North exerting its influence on the constitution of the state to position itself against the economic and administrative power of the South' (Laitin 1982:413). As in the civil war, the primary cause of the conflict was not religion, although that was more important in the Sharia debate (following the tendency in the Islamic world), but was rather the distribution of political and economic power. The north wanted more control over the economy and the bureaucracy, whereas the south wanted more control over government. Religion was used as a weapon in this power struggle. Nevertheless, the result was that the debate contributed to the creation of divisions, tensions and suspicion between some Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, and thereby diverted attention from seeing and dealing with the country's socio-economic problems. It must be mentioned, however, that the Yoruba members of the Constituent Assembly came to play a somewhat compromising and moderating role in this seemingly polarizing debate (see Laitin 1982:424). Therefore, in some respects, the debate has surprisingly united other Muslims and Christians in their desire for a secular state. B. The controversy over the New Law of Marriage in Tanzania 1969—71.

Both Christians and Muslims see the family as a central institution in the life of society. Therefore the laws relating to marriage and divorce are extremely important, not least to the Muslims in Tanzania. The greatest legal uniformity among Muslims is in family life, whereas traditional customs often prevail over the application of the Sharia law in public life. Therefore de jure (Islamic laws) and de facto (customary laws) must be distinguished.

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Before 1971, each religious community had its own system of marriage and divorce laws and practices. These systems of laws comprised customary, Islamic, Hindu and civil laws and were not recognized as equal.12 There were, for example, 'provisions that made it possible to convert a customary marriage, potentially polygamous, into a monogamous one, but not vice versa' (Westerlund 1980a: 161). Furthermore, most of the existing marriage laws did not 'allow a woman to decide anything in respect of her marriage' (par. 12). The wife could not divorce her husband, but he might divorce her at will. This 'legal pluralism' with regard to marriage, introduced by the British, and the inequality of the sexes in these systems, could not continue to exist in a country where the government was striving for equality and national integration: 'All human beings are equal and every individual has a right to dignity and respect.' (par. 5). Therefore the government was anxious to provide a common system of marriage and other matrimonial matters, and a White Paper {Mapendekezo ya Serikali juu ya Sharia ya Ndoa — Government's Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage) was issued in 1969 to inform the public of the new marriage law and initiate a public debate. In January 1971 the government published a bill, based on the White Paper. This was effected in Act No. 5 of 1971, the Law of Marriage Act, which came into operation on 1 May 1971. The White Paper aimed at: a) 'creating equality of the sexes, in accordance with the message of Ujamaa1 (Westerlund 1980c:2), and b) providing uniformity (or unification), meaning one system of law applicable to all persons within the country in place of a multiplicity of systems. This should be obtained without interference with religion. Ii: was proposed that a husband should be allowed to marry more than one wife provided the first wife voluntarily and freely agreed: The law of the country should not prohibit the man from marrying another woman. Such prohibition of law would be unrealistic, as it will not deter the man from marrying another woman but will force him to divorce the first wife. Every human being has a right to dignity and he cannot be deprived of his right merely because his parents could not get lawfully married. While

everyone must have the freedom to profess the faith of his choice, he cannot in doing so be allowed to inflict indignity upon another person.

(my italics) (par. 12).

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It seems that TANU must have weighed up which practice would be least against its policy. On the one hand, polygamy was against the strong emphasis on equality, but, on the other, by abolishing polygamy and by legalizing monogamy exclusively, 'indignity' would be inflicted on the first wife and her offspring. There is a clash here between equality and 'human dignity', and the government took side with 'human dignity', knowing full well that this step would go against Christian doctrines and thereby unavoidably interfere with religion.13 Dowry (mahari) was another issue. Although its abolition was not recommended, the 'non-payment of bride price should not make the marriage invalid' (par. 14). It was proposed that the parties to an intended marriage be required to give at least 21 days' notice of their intention before the day fixed for the marriage, so that notice of objection could be made. A single system of registration was proposed, applying to all persons: Moreover, in order to remove the injustices inflicted upon a wife, the Government proposed that in any kind of marriage, neither the husband nor the wife would be allowed to inflict corporal punishment on his spouse, (par. 18) This was another instance of interference with religion, since 'according to Islamic law, a man was permitted to strike his wife if she was continuously disobedient' (Westerlund 1980a: 164). Changes regarding divorce were also proposed. Marriage Conciliation Boards were to be established in every ward, village and town throughout Tanzania (par. 25). A husband or wife who wished to apply for the dissolution of his or her marriage would be required to apply to these boards. If the Marriage Board failed to reconcile, Muslim marriages could be dissolved upon evidence that the three talaka (i.e. the triple word of repudiation) had been pronounced by the husband, as is Islamic tradition. In non-Muslim marriages, however, 'the court will order dissolution only if it is satisfied that the marriage has completely broken down and that the parties cannot continue to live together as husband and wife.' (par. 25). That means that the Muslim husband maintains his traditional right to demand divorce, as is described in the Qur'an {Sura 2 and 4), while the wife does not have the same right, but must live in insecurity. This again is against TANU's emphasis on equality of the sexes, and the uniformity with regard to divorce which the government was aiming at is compromised, with exceptions being made

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for the sake of a religious group. In this instance> once again, the same 'weighing up' had to be made when the clash between equality and dignity (in this case, religious dignity) arose. The reactions of the Muslims to the White Paper were many and varied, the most interesting being that of the Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslims who did not see the necessity of having a uniform law of marriage at all, but feared that such uniformity would threaten the autonomy of the religious belief of smaller groups. They argued that: National unity does not demand that all citizens should have the same dialect or the same religious belief. So why is it considered essential that there be a Uniform Law of Marriage and Divorce applicable to all persons in Tanzania?14 The Shia Muslims criticized proposals that were 'against Islam', especially those proposals that were brought in for the sake of equality of the sexes and to provide greater safeguards for women in marriage. They supported the allowance of polygamy with reference to Sura 4, 3, and the right of a Muslim husband to divorce his wife upon the evidence of talaka.15 Thus, the reactions of the Shia Muslims were based purely on Islamic argument,16 while any reflection on egalitarian principles seemed to be left out. Many Sunni Muslims were also critical of the new proposals. The Christian churches basically supported the White Paper for its insistence on the voluntary character of every marriage, its emphasis on the rights of women, its intention to make dowry less absolute, and especially its plan to set up Conciliation Boards in every locality.17 They were, however, critical of the proposal that a Christian man should be able to change his monogamous marriage into a polygamous one, since this was interpreted as an encouragement of polygamy at the expense of monogamy. This was an interference with Christianity which could not be accepted. The Appraisal of the White Paper very much praised the position of the churches as being close to the government's intentions and was rather biased or condenscending towards non-Christian communities. As Westerlund puts it: It seems that the churches found and used an excellent opportunity to 'play their part' to demonstrate that their radicalism or willingness for change was not only in line with the Government's

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proposals but went even further . . . Nyerere and others who had criticized the church for not playing its part actively enough, could now be repudiated . . . At the same time they had an opportunity to criticize in a depreciatory language, other communities for being reactionary, discriminating against women. (1980a: 169) On the whole, however, both Christians and Muslims supported the government's proposal. The only important change in the Marriage Bill of 1971 resulting from the religious critique of the White Paper was that a Christian marriage could not be made polygamous. In the debates that followed the Bill, the religious factor and the question of interference with religion were important. Westerlund found three dividing lines predominating: 1) men versus women; 2) African traditions versus 'modernity5; and 3) religion versus Ujamaa (Westerlund 1980a: 171). It is interesting that 'Islam versus Christianity' was not a predominating dividing line, considering that marriage and relations between the sexes were points of disagreement. On the contrary, references seemed to go across religious affiliations, while interference with religion was a prominent issue for discussion. The Party Newspaper, The Nationalist, argued that: Under socialism, the principle of equality is fundamental and indivisible. It can not be bent in favour of beliefs or traditions, the more so if these are mere expressions of old decadent ideas and whims of those who at one time or another thought that they were more human than others.18 Thus the primacy of Ujamaa or politics over religion was implicitly asserted, which may be one reason why neither Islam (Muslims) nor Christianity (Christians) was explicitly attacked and why conflicts between them did not arise on that account. Important Islamic institutions, such as polygamy and talaka were not outlawed but only modified. Was it because of the strong influence of Muslims within TANU, or was it the 'weighing up' of the government between uniformity and religious dignity and freedom that was decisive for the outcome? C. National unity and religious diversity.

The two debates became test cases on the degree of tolerance and the will to unite in the two countries. When we compare them it becomes

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evident that the 'weighing up' between uniformity and religious freedom which was predominant in the proposals of the Marriage Law in Tanzania (and also in the succeeding parliamentary debates) was almost non-existent in the Sharia controversy in Nigeria. The aim of the Sharia Court of Appeal was uniformity, as was the aim of the White Paper, but it was a uniformity that would include only a part of the nation, namely the Muslims. In Tanzania, the government wanted to introduce a Unitarian legal system which could serve all religious groups while safeguarding the equality and human rights of all individuals. The Nigerian motivation was not so much human dignity and equality among all people of the nation as it was the wish of the Muslims to have their own legal system included on a higher level. In this way, the Nigerian proposal was sectional - the principle of noninterference with religion was almost non-existent - and the following debate became divisive. The Tanzanian proposal, on the contrary, was uniting, and the attempt not to interfere with religion was important. Connected with this is the fact that the discussion that followed the two proposals in Nigeria was spontaneous, whereas in Tanzania it was initiated and accepted by the government. In both cases the proposals came to challenge the very nature of Islamic Law, but in Tanzania a compromise was reached. The Muslims were granted special treatment according to Islamic law, and the Christians were granted their request that a Christian marriage could not be made polygamous. Religious pluralism was accepted by both groups, and the debate did not harm the relationship between Christians and Muslims. In Nigeria, no solution or compromise was reached within the legal system, and the result was a reinforcement of hostilities between the two groups of people. Religious pluralism was accepted only by some. This minimization of religious differences and exaltation of the nation in Tanzania had its background in the sense of unity that existed there even before the formation of TANU. It never came to a principal discussion on state and religion or on the rights of the dhimmi19 because of the socialist goals and even-handed policy of the government. Also, the Muslims favoured the nationalization policy. All this was utilized and cultivated by Nyerere. Such a tradition did not exist in Nigeria for reasons that have already been explained in the historical account. Nigeria had been ethnically, politically and economically much more divided, and it was therefore not possible to achieve the same kind of integration and unity in the country. Hence the two debates took different directions in the two countries

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in ways which were symptomatic of Christian-Muslim relations on a national level. The Marriage Law discussion in Tanzania indicated that religion could not and should not be used to create conflicts between people, since politics (Ujamaa) had priority over religion and religious differences. Everyone had something to contribute. As Nyerere expressed in his introduction to Uhuru na Umoja: TANU did not fall into the trap of a religious hostility due to the deliberate and inflexible rule of the Party that a man's religious beliefs were never to be commented upon or used in political arguments. (Nyerere 1966:2). There was in Tanzania an overall non-religious political ideology which in its nature was uniting. This ideology had the upper hand over religious differences. National unity came before religious conformity. This was not the case in the debate on Sharia in Nigeria. This discussion - and it must be noted that the Sharia Court of Appeal would have had much more far-reaching consequences had it been given jurisdiction - indicated that religion could be (and was) used to create conflicts between people in a country where there was Muslim political dominance at the federal level.20 In Tanzania, equality was central to the proposals. In Nigeria, Islamic uniformity was central. This must also be seen against the background of the degree of application of Islamic Law within Nigeria and Tanzania. The traditional systems of Islamic law have been preserved better in Northern Nigeria than anywhere else in Africa, although 'it can never be over-emphasized that Islamic law has not had as much influence as outsiders assume it to have' (Ijaodola 1969:131. See also Anderson 1970:219). This is due partly to the fairly late contact with western civilization and partly to the protectorate forms of colonial rule which tended to perpetuate the status quo.

On the whole, Islamic law is far more integrated into the life and social patterns of the people in West Africa than it is in East Africa. This is due to the fact that Islamic law in the West has been treated more as a variety of native law and custom with various local 'compromises' (i.e. on a territorial rather than a personal basis), whereas in East Africa it is treated as a distinct system to be applied only to persons or communities clearly identified as Muslims. Another reason is that adherence to the law constituted a form of rebellion against western rule in West Africa, while the rebellions took other foms in East Africa. Trimingham has rightly pointed out that:

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A feature of West African Islam is its flexibility in practice in regard to African custom, and its immobility and rigid opposition to change, when subject to pressure from outside. The Maliki school which prevails in West Africa allows for the application of customary law, but prohibits any interpretation of Sharia law to adapt it to modern conditions. (Trimingham 1959:148). Trimingham uses the term 'harmonization' of Islamic law and customary law, or 'parallelism' (Trimingham 1968:98), stemming from the elders being the guardians or guarantees of custom. Such a 'harmonization' or compromise, which is a fact in Nigeria, does not take place to the same extent in Tanzania. In the interior of Tanzania, Islamic law is not 'harmonized' with local customs, but simply neglected. The knowledge of Sharia law, therefore, is often rather rudimentary. Sharia is frequently understood in the wider Swahili sense of the word, which sees it as a concept rather than strictly as Islamic law. Thus, local customs are not 'harmonized' but instead modified by the addition of Islamic regulations. It is also important to note that the turuq, the Muslim brotherhoods, seem to have a greater appeal for the majority of Muslims in Tanzania than the formalism demanded by strict adherence to Sharia (see above p. 16 and Nimtz 1973). The degree of application of the Islamic law is reflected in the two case-studies. In Tanzania, Sharia is limited to family and marriage and therefore functions better in the cities, whereas in Nigeria it is applied more widely, and the insistence on Sharia is much stronger. Islam is a holistic way of life, and hence is compromised if the Sharia does not cover all aspects of life. It is a compromise to accept a secular state. Although a new Islamic consciousness is present in Tanzania today, together with 'an increasing sense of Muslim solidarity' (Swantz 1976:147), it does not constitute a danger to national unity as such, or to Christian-Muslim relations, because of the acceptance of African values and tradition which is a part of the Ujamaa-policy and the common policy of the country to which both Christians and Muslims are asked to contribute. Religious pluralism is accepted in Tanzania, or, rather, religious pluralism is subsumed under the overall interest of the nation, and tensions are thus discouraged. This is expressed in what is called 'civil religion': symbols, ideals and practices which tend to legitimize national integration in multi-religious societies. Civil religion has been present in Nigeria as well as in Tanzania, but has played a much greater role in the latter. It is found in

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the national anthem, in the parliamentary prayer, and in the public holidays.21 In both countries the main basis of civil religion comes from Christianity and Islam. In Tanzania especially, national leaders have aspired strongly to civil religion for the sake of national unity. They have emphasized political primacy and discouraged divisive religious sentiments. Thereby, civil religion came to decrease tensions between Christians and Muslims in the country. Civil religion began with the period of Tanzania's independence in 1961 and the dissolution of TANU. The focus of this religion has been Ujamaa.21 Ujamaa assumed a religious quality that provided a sense of national unity in a highly pluralistic society. In the following pages, it will be shown how Ujamaa united Christians and Muslims.

3. Christian-Muslim relations and socio-economic structures in the villages.

The majority of the Nigerian and Tanzanian populations live in rural areas. The primary goal of the two case-studies which follow is not to provide a detailed analysis of life in the two villages, but indications of the social conditions which determine Christian-Muslim relations there, the socio-economic trends in the two villages which promote or threaten a 'mutual understanding' between the two religious groups, and the day-to-day struggle of Christians and Muslims to build a society in which they can live together. It is at the village level that the dynamics of Christian-Muslim relations can best be seen. A. Korot - a Christian-Muslim village in Northern Nigeria. 'Zaman tare ta ke hadamu, domin zaman tare ta muhimi fiye da babanci tsakanamu' (Our tradition unites us because our tradition is more important than the differences between us). These Hausa words were expressed by Muslim villagers in Korot. Korot is also called Sabon Gidan Forum (the new part of Forum), which indicates that the settlement is newer than the rest of the villages in the Forum area.23 The village is situated in a predominantly Christian area, the Birom area outside Jos in Plateau State (see maps 4 and 7, and Rasmussen 1990:45ff.). It has a population of 80 Muslims out of 300 (tax-payers), a number of them being Fulani-Hausa.24 The number of Christians is a little higher. In the quotation above, the villagers did not mean traditional religion when they spoke of 'tradition', since the Muslims in Plateau State are very keen to defend Islam against trends in popular Islam, such as the

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tariqa orders which adapt Islam to African tradition and culture (see above p. 10f.). On many lorries in Northern Nigeria can be seen the inscription: Babu wani Sarki sai Allah (There is no traditional chief execept God). It expresses a critique of the traditional concept of kingship (Hinds 1981b:12). The chief in Korot was at the time a Muslim, and his traditional function was sometimes criticized. An indication of the distance from African tradition felt by the Muslim villagers in Korot was their refusal to speak the indigenous language, Birom, and their insistence on speaking Hausa, the language permeated with Islamic ideas. They clearly showed that they identified themselves with the Muslim Hausa. Later it became clear to me that the villagers were implying traditional customs when they spoke of 'tradition'. They told me that the tradition of praying together in situations of urgent need (such as severe drought) brought them together with non-Muslims. However, by 'tradition' they first and foremost meant traditional kinship systems (or social formation) and traditional openness towards religion. It was the identification of fellow-members of the group, the family, the lineage and the village that implied a sharing of values and norms, a common understanding and mutual interest. This is connected with the fact that many families in Korot have adherents of both religions, all living under one roof, working together and participating in each other's celebrations. In order to determine the relationship between the kinship system and Christian-Muslim relations, an indication of the social organization in Korot is necessary. The Birom area consists of 11 village-areas or districts; Forum is one of them. These areas contain many villages, vaguely bound to each other. Each village has its gwom (priest-chief), elected by the 'elders' or family heads. The villages (gari), which are self-sufficient, are made up of 'groups' (gandu) of patrilineal exogamous families (gida), extended as well as nuclear. A gandu is a unit of people closely related to each other patrilineally by blood, and living in close proximity to each other. The gari (or jama a; see Rasmussen 1990:99f.) is the political unit, the gandu is the social unit, the unit of reproduction, whereas the gida is the fundamental productive unit. The gida is not economically self-sufficient: or self-subsistent. Previously, the masu gida (the heads of the families) might well join forces to engage in cooperative or corvee labour (gayya), or rent land through a mutual obligation (aro)y but today cooperation between the gidaje is very rare, and production increasingly takes place

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within the individual gida, which have become more isolated. The unity between the villages, groups and families is maintained through the common recognition of the village head, spirits and priests. Thus the social organization is built on kinship systems and a common religion, and political leadership is as a rule sanctioned by religious norms. The impact of the mining industry in the area, and the nearby industrial city, Jos,25 is becoming stronger and stronger. Many farmers in Korot have a job in Jos or in the mines in order to supplement their own food supply with cash income. This, however, creates social inequalities. Although many self-employed people in Jos, such as carpenters and tailors, work in their own compound, and women traders may set up their tables at their doors, migration means a dissolution of the family as a producing and consuming unit and, more importantly, deprives it of its function as the primary socializing agency in politics and religion. Both production and socialization is increasingly taking place outside the family. Furthermore, with the migration of men to mining and industrial centres, the burden of agricultural production has been placed on women and boys who are becoming culturally distanced from the husbands. The world of the gidaje has been transformed, and strains are being imposed on the cohesiveness of the gandaye which are becoming smaller, less embracing in function, and less able to shield individuals in crises. Marriage among the Birom is polygamous and patrilocal. The collective aspect of marriage as a social family affair, with both social and religious sanctions, is disappearing. Marriage as an arrangement between two families is being replaced by a contract between two individuals in which the prospective husband, and not his kinsmen, pays the bride wealth. This understanding of marriage is closer to the Islamic idea of marriage but contributes to the disintegration of the traditional family structure. Although the church often discourages it, Christians and Muslims intermarry and the wives increasingly maintain their religion, especially those women who are economically self-reliant. Due to the individualistic tendencies, however, these marriages tend not to unite Christian and Muslim families and clans, but rather to join individual Christians and Muslims. Ownership of land is of crucial concern, as land not only provides the present livelihood but is a form of security for later years. The right to use the land is the mark that one belongs to a certain community. That right is the bond that ties the individual to the community, consisting of gariy gida and gandu. Originally, land was communally owned and

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controlled, but a system of individual ownership is now the practice, whereby each man upon his marriage inherits his own farm which he knows and which he uses for himself, his wife, his children and anyone else entirely depending on him. Sale of land is recognized. Land has become a transferable economic commodity, and distribution of land is becoming increasingly unequal. The villagers in Korot claim that it is still tradition that brings them together. Tradition is such a continuously integrative force in Korot that it creates solidarity between its members. Thus, it is still social relatedness and extended family solidarity that bring Christians and Muslims together. However, with the increasing dissolution of the traditional family-system, and with the alteration of social relations between producers in Korot, it must be questioned how long this will last. The Muslims in Korot (who are second and third generation Muslims) perform their salats (prayers) in the mosque, and it is the performance of rites, the experience of baraka (blessings), and the adoption of Islamic customs that differentiate them from others in the village, rather than any theological difference. The chief is a Muslim but his authority is more secular than was traditionally the case, since his village is not so much.a cultural unit as a political one. Korot differs vitally from Hausa villages where Islam has been incorporated into the village system in such a way that 'the village system is no longer a whole religion or a whole culture but has become a "part religion", a "part society'" (Pluedemann 1975:79, 82). In Korot conversion to Islam is not a means to ethnic identity, as it is in ethnic groups which are totally Islamicized. It is not Islam that builds social unity, but rather it is ethnic identity that determines the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. The status of a Muslim or a Christian is ascribed in the kinship organization rather than in the religious group, as it is kinship that gives a person his place in society. Christianity, brought by the British branch of the Sudan United Mission, came to Forum in 1913, and at that time there were very few Muslims in the area. The preaching of the church was addressed first and foremost to individuals and not to social units. The individual, not the family or the group, was to make the decision to become Christian. The traditional understanding that, life is a total religious experience, and only shows its full value in close relationship with others, was neglected. Conversion was a personal step, an affair between man and God. The introduction of church discipline provided a further basis for

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this individualistic concept of religion, as compared with the collective understanding of sin in African tradition, or with the umma (community) in Islam where sin is a matter for the whole society. In addition, Christians and Muslims joined different political parties which had a further effect on the distancing relationship between them. Despite the trend towards religious individulism in Korot, the villagers claim that tradition brings them together. However, with the continuous impact of western individualism, how long will it last? The integrating force of tradition carries less and less weight in Korot. Christianity and Islam do not act as integrating forces in the community, but do tend to create ties between certain members of the community. When will the religious tolerance that still characterizes the people in Korot break down? B. Mdandu - a Christian-Muslim Ujamaa village in Tanzania. 'Umoja ni nguvu bali utengano ni udhaifu' (Unity is strength and disunity is weakness). Bena farmers referred me to this political slogan during my visit to a Christian-Muslim village in Tanzania called Mdandu, which is situated between Njombe and Makambako in Iringa Region in the southern part of Tanzania (see map 8). Ubena (the Bena area) is divided into two main parts: Njombe and Makambako. Njombe District (mjini) contains 14 smaller units (jumla ya sharika): Igosi, Ikuna, Imalinyi, Kibena, Kidegembye, Kidugala, Lupembe, Mdandu, Mgololo, Mhardzi, Njombe, Ukalawa, Ulembwe and Yakobi. Makambako District contains 9 units: Igongolo, Ilembula, Makambako, Mawande, Palagavanu, Saja, Uhambule, Usuka and Wanging'ombe. Before the Arusha Declaration.26 the Wabena were widely dispersed. In some areas two to three families lived together with a distance of two to three kilometres to their nearest neighbours. They rarely saw each other except at the bigger events in the church and in the mosque, or in connection with communal work, migove (ujimaa). In some areas, Wabena lived together in iong villages' (ngelele). These were often chosen for Ujamaa. More than 50 per cent of the villages in Iringa Region were already existing villages to which individual farmers moved (Masawa 1980:2). The aim of the policy of Ujamaa was to bring peasants together in villages for cooperative production. After the Arusha Declaration, farmers were urged to move together in official villages. By 1974, only 15 per cent of the rural population lived together in these registered

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villages. The pace of development was too slow for the government, so villagization was made into an order. In areas which produced food crops, such as the Iringa Region, this radically changed the pattern of living. The peasants in Ujamaa villages lived more closely together so that schools, water supplies, medical facilities and other services could be provided more easily. Also, an official village government was introduced which gave more influence to the party and state on a local level. The population of Mdandu is approximately fifty per cent Muslim and fifty per cent Christian, both groups having their own religious buildings, a mosque and a church, the latter evidently supported economically from abroad. Most of he Muslims are third-generation Muslims (originally the Muslims came to Mdandu from the coast for trading purposes). Mdandu is one of the many self-initiated Ujamaa villages in this area started in 1969-70 which were later (1970) taken over by 'planning teams' assisted by government and party officials. The settlers in Mdandu seem to be satisfied with life in general in the villages and with the degree of communality.27 Mdandu must be considered one of the more successful villages, with almost a quarter of the whole production being collective, and many collective activities going on. However, the people in Mdandu are facing many difficulties, as they are in many other Ujamaa villages in the area, such as bureaucratic methods of decision-making and control, inefficiency of leadership, undemocratic participation in the activities of the village, low participation in communal farming, disproportionate sharing of resources, suspicion and lack of trust among the farmers, etc.28 The failures of the implementation of Ujamaa have been criticized by a number of western intellectuals who base their ideas on socialistic idealism. They argue that there has been an absence of an overall political commitment to socialist transformation and conformity with the interest of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, meaning that Ujamaa villages have been over-capitalized and bureaucratically run.29 The concerns of the peasants in Mdandu are not with the theories of socialist idealism, but with practical matters. How can we survive and supply our material needs in the best way? How can we build up this Ujamaa village so that we all have equal benefits? Critique from an idealistic point of view is important and must be considered, but more important is the concrete struggle of the peasants to get something out of their common efforts. This was pointed out by Amilcar Cabral:

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Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for their things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win. Material benefits, to live better, and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.30 The question of importance in this context is therefore not so much the contribution or hindrance of Islam or of the church to this struggle for Ujamaa, but rather the influence of the struggle on the relationship between Christians and Muslims. It is questionable and perhaps irrelevant to ask about the influence of religion or of the religious community on Ujamaa in Mdandu, since the distinction between religion and Ujamaa is neither relevant nor realistic for those who live in the village. It is seen as a totality. Religious community is identical with Ujamaa, the community that grows out of living and working together. As Bishop Mwoleka, a strong advocate for the participation of the church in the building of Ujamaa, has pointed out: We need to realize that as we go to stay in the villages we won't have a division of two communities in one village - one community for the religious and the other for the villagers. We will be one community with them. No doubt the families will be located here and there but there will be no real unity among all of them. Our family will also be one among them. Each and every occupation will be for the good of all. Our aim is the unity of the village. (Mwoleka/Healey 1976:39) It becomes irrelevant whether one is a Christian or a Muslim since the efforts to build up the Ujamaa community seem to be more important than those diversities that may exist between Christians and Muslims. There seems to be no room for prejudices and theological controversies in Mdandu. As one of the Muslim peasants said: 'We live in the same Ujamaa village. How can there be conflicts among us? We are all to contribute to the well-being of the village'. And there is no room for conflicts in the policy of Tanzania. It has constantly been pointed out that there is no difference between Christians and Muslims: neither of them is favoured, both are to contribute to Ujamaa, and all are disqualified only through laziness (Nyerere 1968a: 151-2). At the same time Christians and Muslims are repeatedly urged to 'play their part' in the socialist policy of the government and in the implementation of Ujamaa (see Westerlund 1980a:57ff.). This is in a

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way the paradox of the relationship between religion and Ujamaa nationally as well as locally: 'Ujamaa (or the party) hauna dini' {Ujamaa has no religion), or (reversed) 'Dini haina siasa' (religion has no politics); and yet simultaneously, 'Dini ni siasa' (religion is politics). The explanation of this paradox is that the farmers in Mdandu do not see themselves as Christians and Muslims but as Wajamaa (the people of Ujamaa). It is their common experiences of success and failure as Wajamaa that become common experiences of hope and God's intervention in their daily lives. In other words, it is the common practice of Ujamaa that creates mutual understanding of dini. In this sense, 'Ujamaa ni dini' {Ujamaa is religion).31 The Ujamaa village offers an opportunity to unify one's life. In the Ujamaa village, it is by one and the same activity that the members supply their material needs, by which they create their mutual concern, and by which they are plunged into God. How? Members of the Ujamaa village work with the same objectives, sharing the hopes, the hardships as well as the joys. The activity, therefore, by which they supply their material needs becomes the medium through which they knit the texture of their relations into mutual concern. This mutual concern when sustained becomes a training which prepares them for that experience which is our destiny. Members of the Ujamaa village will then need little help in order to discover and rejoice in the fact that God is already in their midst. This activity unifies the material and the spiritual. (Mwoleka/Healey 1976:12). Thus a western concept of dialogue - a 'constructed' dialogue between Christians and Muslims - would be absurd and artificial in Mdandu, since what determines dialogue and makes it meaningful is not a mutual understanding on a theoretical level but the practice of 'going out with the hoes to cultivate cooperatively', of working together in mutual responsibility and sharing the experience of weakness and disunity. The effort to build up networks of production and contribute to the well-being of the village is more important than theological issues. Dialogue, if that term is applicable in this context at all, is generated and works from within in the village of Mdandu, from practice through solidarity of the hardship of the people.

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C. Kinship and Christian-Muslim relations. The two case studies indicate that Christian-Muslim relations in agriculture-based societies are determined partly by the mode of production structures (Ujamaa in Tanzania and kinship organization in Northern Nigeria), and partly by the degree of integration of traditional norms and customs and the religious tolerance and patience of Nigerians and Tanzanians which makes it possible for Christians and Muslims to live side by side. I shall now try to conclude and reflect more generally on these two conditions. The description of the social formation in Korot would apply to many villages in the Middle Belt and Northern Nigeria,32 and to some extent in Tanzania. However, the traditional framework of kinship together with cooperative systems is breaking down, and labour is increasingly drawn from smaller groups. Attempts at generalization about social formation and Christian-Muslim relations are doomed to failure, but the importance of the social conditions or mode of production structures within which Christians and Muslims live is generally primary. In order to determine how these social formations concretely determine the various societies, thorough studies of social stratification within these societies and the influence of international capital must be undertaken. In Northern Nigeria the presence of social and political oppositions, of conflicts between ethnic groups, and of the dominance of one group over others should also be looked into. Suffice it to say that the breaking down of traditional structures of kinship organization, and the disintegration of the extended family and the African community, is a threat to Christian-Muslim harmony in both Nigeria and Tanzania. 'The African is a community man. The African is born socialized', said one African teacher (Onuoha 1965:31). 'Man is a family', Kiwovele used to say, 'one stands and falls in and with the family'.33 The Hausa would say that man is 'a village', since it is the village that takes precedence over the family. 'Despite the progress of social change, man is still a family in Tanzania-Africa', according to Kiwovele (1975:3). However, since the internal structure of the family is dependent on kinship relations and relations of production, this 'man is a family' concept is very much in danger. Its basis is changing fundamentally with the integration of the family into the modern national and international economy. In many Muslim Hausa communities, this breakdown seems to be complete (cf. Greenberg 1947). The extended family is weakened by the loss of its religious functions and is no longer a functional unit.

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The conclusion is that Christian-Muslim relations are to some extent dependent on the existing kinship structures. Godelier would say that kinship functions as the system of relations of production and therefore 'regulates the politico-religious activities and serves as the ideological scheme for symbolic practice'.34 Kinship relations not only determine who has the control over access to the means of production and the output produced by the community, but also provide the social framework of politico-religious activities. Consequently, where family ties within the kinship structures are closely knit, personality - Christian and Muslim - is understood within the context of this community. The life of an individual Christian or Muslim, his well-being, activities and decisions, are regulated and moulded by the entire family. Individuality is thus being-in-relation and cannot be elevated at the expense of the community. Where kinship structures are very loose, Islam and Christianity have become private matters and relations between them are on an individual basis. D. Ujamaa and Christian-Muslim relations. Tanzanian socialism was based on the assumption that balanced rural development could best be achieved by 'traditionalizing' the structural and organizational aspects of rural life. Modernization did not have to come from without but could be generated from within (cf. Mushi 1971). Therefore, to achieve this socialist rural development, traditional organizational norms and principles had to be used, and primarily the values of the traditional extended family system. Hence the term Ujamaa was used to indicate that, officially, the policy was based on the traditional pattern of social living, on the close-knit cooperation and interdependence of the African family: jamaa.35 Any Ujamaa village had to be built on the three traditional principles of mutual respect, wealth-sharing, and work by all and exploitation by none. This appeal to Ujamaa as an African ideology was important, although Nyerere's description of traditional communalism may not have been realistic. There may have existed a system of Ujamaa, but this cooperation was practiced mainly within each household. This communalization should have been given a 'class-content', acording to Freyhold (1979:116), so that it would be less an 'attitude of mind' than a destruction of the petit-bourgeois conditions of production, replacing them with a collective mode of production. In many villages, however, persistence of traditionalism became an obstacle to Ujamaa villagization.36 Relationships based on kinship ties were carried over to

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the Ujamaa village and clan ties were so strong that only people from close lineages cooperated keenly. Only when these people could see for themselves the practical advantages of working together on genuinely communal farms could Ujamaa progress, structured on communal rather than kinship lines. Ujamaa villages and their failures will not be dealt with here in detail, but a few important aspects will be underlined.37 The old pattern of trade dependence on the west still persisted. Tanzania continued to rely heavily on foreign capital (particularly from the west). Therefore Ujamaa was first and foremost a Tanzanian resistance to neo-colonialism. Its aim was to transform an externally dependent economy into a self-sustaining economy. The international conditions for this have not been very propitious. Both internal and external factors must be considered when we evaluate the success of Tanzanian socialism. The bureaucratic implementation of the policy which, according to Shivji (1976:107), has acted as a barrier to political mobilization and the release of productive forces, and to a continuation of the preceding agricultural policies, and which furthermore has led to the 'separation of power and property', must be seen in light of the neocolonial structures, in a 'dialectical and historical relationship' (Shivji 1976:86). As the example of Mdandu has shown, despite kulaks and bureaucracy, Ujamaa has brought Christians and Muslims together and provided new opportunities for witness about God acting in their lives and in human communities. This is one of the social consequences, mentioned above, which has not been taken seriously by researchers. It was also the intention of TANU that Ujamaa should unite Christians and Muslims, and conflicts between them were discouraged: All along TANU fought hard to suppress or discourage religiopolitical struggles, especially between Muslims and Christians, whether institutionalized or not. Religious considerations were decisively reduced to secondary priority. (Westerlund 1980b:5762). The development that Nyerere wanted for Tanzania depended not on religious authority, but on the efforts and ability of the people to work hard: An individual who can work - and is provided by society with the

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means to work - but does not do so, is wrong. He has no right to expect anything from society because he contributes nothing to society. (Nyerere 1968b:6) Along with this subordination of religion to politics, or despite it, religious organizations were challenged to support and be involved in the country's socialist policies. This is what Westerlund describes as the paradox between 'Don't mix religion and politics' - primarily addressed to the Muslims who constituted a threat because of their political demands - and 'Play your part' - primarily addressed to the Christians who tended to separate religion and politics and were therefore often in opposition to the policy of Ujamaa (see Westerlund 1980a:52-62). Hence Nyerere often criticized the Christians for being too passive, too conservative or 'too preoccupied with life after death'. In a speech to the Young Christian Students in 1980 he said: 'What about living today? The Church should give us time to live longer, then we can go to heaven at a later stage'.38 However, he often seems to have more confidence in individual Christians than in the Churches as such. He continued: A dedicated Christian behaves as a law abiding citizen and does not need to wait until the church speaks . . . I do not believe that the Christian intellectual is distinct from any other intellectual. He has a particular role to play as a citizen of his country.'39 Westerlund is right to argue that Nyerere often looked to the Muslims as better examples and to Islam as a less foreign religion: 'Moslems have adopted a more enlightened attitude than many Christians', he said (Nyerere 1972:246). Also: 'Learn from the Moslems. The Moslems have their religious teachers, the Sheiks, because the Arabs did not come as missionaries, they did not build a mission station. They came - they saw! You have the teachers of Islam, the sheiks, those who teach the Islam religion, but they live with the people. You do not point out to some area in the town, some area in the rural areas and say, 'there is where the Muslim teachers live'. They have no place of their own.40 I shall not discuss how Christianity (Christians) and Islam (Muslims)

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have influenced the socialist policies of the country on a national level. This has been discussed in detail by Westerlund (1980a). My concern here is rather the influence of the policies of the country on ChristianMuslim relations. The conclusion is that, although Christianity and Islam are divisive factors in Tanzania, the official basis of African socialism, (i.e. the common African values and the overall aims of the Party) are favourable conditions in terns of unifying Christians and Muslims (see also Anglars 1972:167f.). Whether that has been the case in practice is related to the question of how far Tanzania has gone in making her intended policy into a reality and in establishing concrete structural and organizational machineries to utilize the values and norms of the traditional extended family system. How far has Tanzania mobilized and involved the masses in deciding their own development? In order to evaluate these internal relationships, one has to examine the exogenous factors which have made success very difficult: the old pattern of trade dependence, foreign investment, aid, economic connections with imperialism, etc. The concept of umma in Islam is very close to the Ujamaa ideal of community.41 However, Christians have often criticized Muslims for not understanding the meaning of Ujamaa, since, unlike the churches, they have not started self-reliance projects, but are more interested in biashara (commerce). On the other hand, they do not suffer from being dependent on foreign aid. Christians often emphasize the connection between Christian faith and Ujamaa. They would say that Ujamaa is easier to practice for Christians because they already know what fellowship and sharing is.42 As a Christian village member expressed it, 'Christians now understand that there is a connection between religion and social development'.43 Mzee Mhehemedzi,44 who lived in Kidugala and was a former member of the Party, told me: If one is against the policy of Ujamaa, one goes against one's Christian faith. Ujamaa and Christian faith cannot be separated. Jesus himself was a socialist and pro-Ujamaa. Therefore, the women in Kidugala are better Christians because they do most of the work on the ujamaashambas.'45 Many successful Ujamaa villages in Iringa District are initiated by a group of Christians, and the Christians have been playing a very important role in building Ujamaa.46 Makoga is one of these villages (see map 8), initiated by 65 Christians on the 18 August 1969. It was

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rewarded as the best Ujamaa village in the region. In 1980, it was still the church leaders who explained what Ujamaa meant and the villagers went to church every day before they went to the Ujamaa shambas. That year the common production {umma) was 6,500 tons of maize and the individual (binafsi) amounted to 35,000 tons, which means that almost one-sixth of the total production was collective. This was decreasing, and on the whole the success of the village as Ujamaa was on the decline. The reason given was bad leadership in the church, together with poor cooperation between the chairman and the church. The church shambas were no longer the models for Ujamaa production. Ng'anda was originally a part of Makoga, but separated in 1975. It was almost 100 per cent Christian and seemed to be more successful than Makoga. In 1980, more than one-third of its production was collective. Wangama was another successful Ujamaa village, rewarded for three years as the best village in the region. People had moved to Wangama in 1974. In 1980, it was well organized. The evangelist47 was chairman because of his education. The church in Wangama was not missioninfluenced. In all these villages there were common facilities such as storerooms, Ujamaa-shops, guesthouses and workshops, and a number of the dwellings were brick houses granted by the government as reward. Kidugala, which was the first mission in the south (1898), was a socalled 'Christian village' (see above p. 39), and was chosen for Ujamaa in 1970 as it already had common facilities such as a school and dispensary. It can be said that in Kidugala it was again the Christians who took the initiative. Entire villages were moved from the mountains to the dry Kidugala where they lived in grass huts. Kidugala never functioned well as an Ujamaa village, and in 1980 there were only a few cooperative farms. One of the problems was bad leadership. Other reasons given both in Kidugala and in Wangama were that, because of the individualizing effects of the mission station, Kidugala could not function as Ujamaa. The Christians were originally taken out of their context and brought together in a village. When Ujamaa was introduced, the Christians did not have to start from the beginning but they already had what was essential for the implementation of Ujamaa: medical and educational facilities. Therefore the Christians in Kidugala felt that they were 'better'. Ilembula is another village in which the mission played a central part and where Ujamaa did not function very well. In the less mission-influenced and more successful villages, the Christians considered themselves first of all as wajamaa (i.e., members of the villages as political and social groups) and the church as a part of

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Ujamaa. As one of the farmers in the area expressed it: 'Kanisa ni faida kwa Ujamaa kwasababu wakristo ndiyo wajamaa wenyewe.' (The Church is an advantage for Ujamaa because the Christians themselves are wajamaa).^ The Christians in the mission-influenced villages seemed to look more to the missionaries than to each other as wajamaa. The example of Mdandu, together with that of the villages in which the church has been active, showed that Christians and Muslims first of all act and work as wajamaa (i.e. as a social unit), and not as members of certain religious groups (i.e. as a religious unit).49 They work for Ujamaa without emphasizing their religious identity, and there is no conflict in that. Therefore it is misplaced to be too preoccupied with the involvement of the church in villagization from the perspective of the village. Where Christians are wajamaa, the church is a part of Ujamaa, and Christians have often been stimulating Ujamaa and villagization, just as the Christian congregation has been stimulated by Ujamaa. The same would apply to the Muslim community: where Muslims are wajamaa, the umma is a part of Ujamaa. Muslims, however, have been less privileged, because they did not have any facilities and thus always had to move, whereas Christian villages, provided with schools and hospitals, were automatically selected for villagization. Both Christianity and Islam became the necessary legitimation of political authority on a national as well as local level. The important thing was not whether one was a Christian or Muslim, but that one was a religious person and thereby by definition a trustworthy person. The concepts of sin and community are important for the development of Christian-Muslim relationships. What determines who can be a member of a community? Four different concepts can be found in this context: the traditional African, the Christian, the Muslim, and the Tanzanian socialist (Ujamaa): 1 In the traditional society, sin is collective. Sin is what destroys the life-force of the community. It is anti-social and thereby anti-God. It is what negates life, what is against human life in its solidarity. One can be excluded - or rather, one excludes oneself - only by not being a part of the community, by refusing to participate in the social activities. Sin is a social offence. It is connected with shame (i.e. it is community-oriented). 2 In the so-called 'Christian villages' in Tanzania, the individual is excluded from the village when other members or the church decide that this individual must be excluded from the community on account

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of his or her sin: for instance, by beer drinking, polygamy or adultery. It is more a question of how the individual behaves in his private life than of his social behaviour. Sin is connected with guilt as an inner feeling. One has to accept what the Christian community has decided. Sin is individual behaviour. 3 In the Muslim community, sin is a social fault - something committed against the sunna (laws) of the umma. Sin is a communal responsibility which does not lead to exclusion but to dawa - a call back to the right conduct. In Muslim cultures, as in traditional society, sin and shame are connected. 4 In the Ujamaa community, the national policy and the building of Ujamaa is more important than individual behaviour. Sin is laziness, for 'Mtu ni kazi' (man is work), and 'Kazi ni Uhai' (work is the essence of life). The individual can only be ex-communicated if he refuses to work for a long time. Sin is that which is anti-work. Only the Christian (or missionary) understanding of sin is individualistic, which to some extent explains Kidugala's lack of success. The understanding of sin and guilt is very important in the context of Ujamaa^ and Christians and Muslims can learn from each other and from others in a situation where sin cannot be internal, a matter of how one feels inside, but has to be social, a matter of what one does in relation to the community as a whole: whether one contributes to the well-being of society. The conclusion to be reached is that the traditional preconditions for Christian-Muslim relationships are common to both Nigeria and Tanzania. However, the situation of cooperation as it has been 'urged' upon Tanzanians promotes coexistence between Christians and Muslims.50 Due to a situation of conflict and inequality - political, economic and religious - between different areas of Nigeria, generated by the development of capitalism, coexistence and cooperation between Christian and Muslims is threatened there. In Tanzania, furthermore, religious freedom, tolerance and respect at the village level is legitimized by the national ideology, which not only respects and accepts individual freedom with regard to religion, but takes this as its starting point.

4. Tendencies in Christian-Muslim relations today. A. The role of Swahili and Hausa. Swahili as the national language in Tanzania has played an important part in fostering unity and nationalism in the country and thereby also

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in uniting Christians and Muslims. Knowledge of Swahili is considered a matter of national pride. Swahili was accepted as the sole national language in 1967. In 1954, the Tanganyika Broadcasting Cooperation introduced broadcasts in Swahili and English, and Swahili newspapers began to appear in increasing numbers. TANU recognized Swahili as the national language in 1960. After the Zanzibari revolution in 1964, Swahili became the official language of Zanzibar. On 4 January 1967 a directive was issued that: Swahili be used for all Government business, and that the use of English or any other foreign language unnecessarily is to cease forthwith. All Ministries, District councils, Cooperative Unions, and parastatal organizations are therefore obliged to use Swahili in their day to day business.51 More than 35 per cent of Swahili vocabulary is of Arabic origin. Missionaries have been concerned with ridding Swahili of this influence in translations of the New Testament. It was also the intention of the colonialists to cleanse Swahili of its Arabic content and Islamic heritage. They did not succeed, and Christians now proudly speak Swahili and use it in their religious practice and do not see it as an 'Islamic language'. It is interesting to note, however, that there is a tendency today to Bantuize Swahili. This tendency is also appreciated by Muslims. It could be said that Christianity and Islam have to some extent become indigenized through Swahili. Nigeria does not have a unifying African language. There are about 200 different ethnic groups in the country, who all speak their own particular language. The only way of communication between north, south and east is through English. There are three main African languages: Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. In the northern states, however, Hausa does to some extent have a similar function as Swahili and is used as a second language to English in the legislature, the law courts, and in government matters. Originally, Hausa was a language spoken by a certain ethnic group, but became the major lingua franca in the north during the 20th century and thereby a vehicle of communication and identity within the northern context. Historically, Hausa was written in ajami script (Arabic-scripted Hausa). This was Romanized and thereby, according to the Muslims, de-Islamicized into what was called boko in the pre-colonial missionary period

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and in the colonial period by missionaries and colonialists. Gradually boko replaced ajami, until by 1960, it had supplanted ajami completely (see Arfani 1984). Hausa vocabulary is also influenced by Arabic, although not to the same extent as Swahili. Nevertheless, Muslims often see it as a language permeated with Islamic ideas and prefer to speak it rather than their own ethnic language. Hausa thus becomes a symbol of identity for them. Therefore, although Hausa is spoken by most northerners, Christians as well as Muslims, it has not played the same unifying role as Swahili. Nor has Hausa ever been used politically as a symbol of Nigerian patriotism and self-determination, as Swahili has in Tanzania. On the contrary, it has been used as a symbol of northern patriotism and self-determination, and thereby had a divisive effect. B. The influence of dialogue meetings.

Since the early 1960s, Christians in Nigeria have taken initiatives on the level of formal dialogue in order to create a better understanding and closer cooperation between Christians and Muslims. The Roman Catholic church in particular has, since the Second Vatical Council (1963-5), encouraged this kind of dialogue. The Second Vatican Council urged Christians to deepen their knowledge of Islam and to emphasize what Christians and Muslims have in common rather than what divides them. Both Christians and Muslims are searching for the truth. Because of their faith in God they are close to each other (cf. Sicard 1978:64). In 1962 and 1963, two meetings between Catholics and Muslims were held on a private basis in Kano and Zaria for the purpose of improving relations between Christians and Muslims. The first 'official' Christian-Muslim dialogue was organized in 1974 by Fr. Chukwulozie at the Pastoral Institute in Ibadan under the theme: 'How can we make our religious beliefs real and operative in this materialistic age?' Christians and Muslims met to discuss their common problems and how to solve them, and, in particular, how to combat materialism. In addition, the modernization of religious concepts and language was considered as a way of making religion more intelligible to contemporary Nigerians. Several papers were given on the dignity of the human being and the role of religion in society. A committee of five was set up at the end of the meetings to continue dialogue activities, and the journal Nigerian Dialogue was launched to publicize the contents of dialogue meetings and explain in detail the nature of the dialogue. The committee never

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actually met, but issues of Nigerian Dialogue were published (see Chukwulozie 1975; Clarke 1984:131f.). Other meetings followed, among which an important seminar was held at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, on 30 November and 1 December 1982. A group of Christian and Muslim scholars and students met to discuss 'The Place of Religion in Education in Nigeria'. The aim of this meeting was primarily to promote Christian dialogue in universities. On the Protestant side, in 1959 churches in Africa launched a parachurch organization, the Islam in Africa Project, which aimed: to keep before the churches . . . their responsibility for understanding Islam and the Muslims of their religions, in view of the Church's task of interpreting faithfully in the Muslim world the Gospel of Jesus Christ; and to effect the research and education necessary for this. {IAP Constitution and Guidelines, 1973) The IAP has its headquarters in Nairobi. In Nigeria, the IAP study centre was in Ibadan until it was shut down in 1977. Its library was then moved to the Institute of Church and Society. This Institute has been intrested in Islam since it was founded by the Nigerian Council of Churches in 1964. Although the IAP initially centred its work in West Africa, it has influenced the churches in East Africa as well. Some Muslims have been participating actively in dialogue, especially those from the more open Yoruba society. Dialogue meetings have been arranged on their initiative, such as one in Ilorin in August 1978. The Sharia debate in 1978 meant a breakdown of the dialogue. Abubakar Gummi declared that a closer unity between Christians and Muslims was against God's will. Indeed, dialogue with Christians was dangerous to Muslims and should not take place.52 In Tanzania, the Second Vatican Council has influenced the attitude and approach of Christians to Islam and to Muslims, and may have been reflected in the Arusha Declaration in 1967, with its emphasis on the need for all Tanzanians to work towards increasing cultural contact between the peoples of Tanzania in the interest of national integration and collective responsibility for the nation. However, there has been hardly any interest in genuine dialogue meetings. Books have been published with a more positive approach to Islam, such as Anglars' (1972) Wana wa Ibrahimu, Wakristu na Waislamu ('The children of Abraham, Christians and Muslims'). This book tries to

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help Christians and Muslims to appreciate each other's faith as two sides of divine revelation and thus come to appreciate one another as human beings, with a common humanity and a common responsibility. Also, courses on Islam have been included in Christian training colleges and pastoral institutes with the aim of creating greater understanding. In Nigeria, as well as in Tanzania, there is the view, both on the Christian and the Muslim side, that dialogue is simply another attempt at proselytization. Others, particularly Christian missionaries, fear that conversion is being obscured in favour of dialogue, which may result in the undermining of their work and of the Christian mission. On the whole, it must be said that these formal arrangements, which are often 'constructed ventures' involving a few interested intellectuals from universities or other higher institutions of learning, without backing from their respective religious or cultural groups, do not have much influence on the masses of Christians and Muslims who meet daily at work and who have to make the local efforts at concrete cooperation. Religious beliefs and values come about from the social relationships between people in their daily working life together, supported by a political desire to uphold the commitment to mutual respect for different religious views and traditions. Therefore Christian-Muslim understanding does not grow out of conferences and theological discussions, but out of social relationships between people. C. The influence of fundamentalism.

Islamic fundamentalism is understood as the Islamic reform movement53 which can be traced all over the Muslim world, a desire to return to the basic principles of Islam in the Qur'an and the Hadith of the Prophet. The desire and demand for a greater political role for Islam in Nigeria have grown steadily since independence, with the south joining in the struggle. On the whole, religion has become more and more important in Nigerian society, together with a growing fundamentalist tendency within both Islam and Christianity. This is related to the socio-economic changes Nigeria has undergone since independence. Disillusionment with the existing political development has grown, a lack of belief that the present political leadership is capable of solving the problems in society. Democracy is increasingly viewed as a betrayal of Islam. Islam becomes, seen as a structured and coherent system in contrast to the anarchy and chaos created by modernization. This fundamentalist tendency, which is threatening to non-Muslims, has contributed to the reinforcement of tensions between Christians and

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Muslims in the country. Fundamentalist tendencies can also be traced in Tanzania, although not to the same extent as in Nigeria and not with the same effects. In Nigeria, the fundamentalist tendency especially manifested itself in the Sharia discussion of 1977-78, as described above, and in various outbreaks of violence started by the Islamic sect, Maitatsine. Maitatsine is an unorthodox sect, originating in Northern Nigeria, and stands in the Twelver or Imami Shi'ite tradition. The sect is not accepted by orthodox Muslims. Its prophet, Muhammadu Marwa,54 finds his followers from among students and the disinherited and unemployed in the cities, often foreigners who cannot earn their living at home. The sect is anti-western, and wants to cleanse Islam of materialism, science and technology. It idealizes life in urban poverty in a situation of urban growth, in contrast with a growing class of the rich and decadent, trapped by its national wealth. In December 1980, the Maitatsine sect declared jihad and attempted to take over the big mosque in Kano. Hundreds of people were killed, among them Marwa himself.55 This took place after a number of complaints against the sect in the old city of Kano, and after Governor Alhaji Abubakar Rimi had given the Maitatsine an ultimatum to vacate the area within two weeks. A federal government commission was set up to investigate the riot, and a number of restrictions on religious preaching were issued to prevent similar riots. Nevertheless, several disturbances took place after this in which people were killed and churches burnt down; in Maiduguri in 1982; in Yola in 1984; and in Gombe in 1985.56 Not only the Maitatsine sect has expressed a violent attitude. There have been clashes between the Izalatul Bidia and the brotherhoods in Plateau State, in Wukari and elsewhere. The Muslim Student's Society (MSS) has also been involved in violent incidents, for instance at Ahmadu Bello University when students protested against the consumption of alcohol on the campus (Hickey 1984:255). Muslim students - encouraged by the MSS - have refused to recite the national anthem at the Federal Government College in Sokoto on the grounds that it is a rite of the religion of nationalism. The students were arrested. In 1982, Muslim students burnt down churches and hotels in various areas of Kano municipality following their disagreement about siting an Anglican church near a mosque in Fegge.57 This was based on a Sharia point of law that no Christian place of worship should be built within a certain distance of a Muslim mosque. The church, however, had been built many years before the mosque.

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The Kaduna riots in March 1987 were especially in the nature of a Christian-Muslim conflict. They originated in a religious conflict in Kafanchan, a predominantly Christian area (approximately 60 per cent) in Kaduna State. Christians and Muslims clashed over the participation of a former Muslim, Rev. Abubakar Bako, in a Christian evangelical campaign under a banner announcing 'Mission 87'. He had become a 'born again' Christian. Some Muslims present felt that he had misinterpreted certain Qur'an passages. This created disturbances that spread quickly to other towns, Zaria and Kaduna. 152 churches and 5 mosques were destroyed, and some Christians fled to the south. At least 19 people were killed, and 62 injured.58 The police were very reluctant to interfere in the riots, and the intervention of military troops from Kaduna State was necessary to quell them, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), an umbrella organization formed to consolidate the position of Christians in relation to Muslims, condemned the destruction and in a communique (15 April) requested the Federal Military Government to guarantee the right of every Nigerian to live in any part of the country and practice the religion of his choice.59 On 23 April 1991, a Shi'ite fundamentalist group, similar to the Maitatsine, led by Zaka Zaki from Zaria, attacked Christians and set fire to their churches in Bauchi. At least 80 people were killed and 12 churches burnt.60 The situation seems, on the whole, to have become increasingly tense, as more and more young Africans have joined the fundamentalist Islamic sects. Their leaders have demanded that the governors close the breweries, and that the government allow Muslims to practise the Sharia law. On 13 October 1991, fatal clashes between Christians and Muslims took place in Kano. The cause was the arrival in Kano of the German evangelist, Reinhard Bohnke, and the way in which this was announced, which aroused the anger of some Muslims. The riots took place only a week after the police rejected a visit by a South African Muslim imam. Many people were killed.61 The Governor in Kano said that 35 were injured and 74 arrested, while a church, a mosque and 15 cars were burnt. Reporters counted more than 120 burnt-out shops. The government has reacted strongly against these fundamentalist tendencies and tried to keep them under control. President Shagari made it illegal to belong to the Maitatsine sect or to operate in its name. Some Muslims have felt that the army has been on the Christian side in an overall strategy to turn the Nigerian state and all its organs against Islam.62 An Advisory Council on Religious Affairs, consisting of 12

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Christian and 12 Muslim members, was set up with legal and governmental backing. One of its duties was to foster religious harmony.63 The Council, however, became a battleground for the Christians and Muslims, and in January 1988 the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) ordered the Christian members to boycott a meeting. This took place following a statement from a Muslim member, Alhaji Abubakar Gummi, in which he showed disrespect for the Nigerian Constitution and a desire for the Islamization of Nigeria. In all cases of violent disturbance, religion has been used to achieve political goals. Every outbreak has started in a situation in which political stability was threatened. In Kano, for instance, Shagari's government had big problems with the opposition parties. Niels Kastfelt went as far as to state that: 'Maitatsine' became a good way of thinking about politics. It developed into a symbolic category which was instrumental in associating otherwise apparently disparate phenomena related to power and ideology (1989:89) In Kafanchan it was officially announced that the disturbances were the result of a conspiracy of military officers from southern Zaria that aimed to depose the Emir of Zaria and the Governor of Kaduna. Thus, Governor Chris Garuba issued in a statement that 'some unpatriotic Nigerians are using religion as a vehicle to achieve their political ambitions' (Amosu 1987:551). These outbreaks must be seen as a symptom of uneven socioeconomic development, the product of rapid social change, of social polarization and dislocation. They expressed the desperation of the poorest of the poor.64 But the disturbances threatened the unity of the Muslims, and also provoked a strong reaction from Christians, who felt insecure. As such, they reinforced tensions between Christians and Muslims. The Muslim societies in Nigeria have become divided, with a deep split being created between the more traditional, conservative establishment, as represented by most of the emirs and their councils, and the newer and more fanatical groups, who do not eschew violence as a means of achieving the desired Islamic state. Fundamentalist tendencies can be found in the Izalatul Bidia, the Jamaatu Nasril Islam, the Muslims Students' Society and the Young Muslims' Association of Nigeria. All these movements are disillusioned with what they see as the decadent society inherited from the west (the

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dissolution of marriages, abuse of alcohol, etc.). Their members are often young, well-educated and urbanized Muslims from a middle-class background. They want pure Islam based on the Qur'an and Hadith, without bidia (innovation). They demand a redistribution of Nigeria's resources and a total removal of all aspects of modernization. For them, an Islamic state would be an attractive solution to the problems in Nigeria. In their eyes, there is no separation between religion and politics. Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria as an anti-western (and for some anti-Christian) movement has also increased the tensions between Christians and Muslims. Islam has now moved beyond the limits of Northern Nigeria into the wider context of the nation-state, which makes Islamic fundamentalism appear more threatening to non-Muslims. Although all the political parties declared themselves religiously neutral, the Christians have felt that the largest party, the National Party of Nigeria, has a definite bias in favour of Muslims. There was a suspicion among the Christians during civil rule that highly placed Muslims in the government were using their position to promote Islam and to Islamicize the country. Furthermore, the Christians complained of the economic support that Nigerian Muslims receive from Islamic international organs to promote Islam. They spoke of an international conspiracy that wants to Islamicize Nigeria by all means available, including economic and political pressure. They wondered why mosques were built in direct connection to the airports in the country. Christians also complained that the government spent N 118.8 million (US $8.5 million) on pilgrimages to Mecca while Christians could not get equivalent support to go to Jerusalem (see Chukwulozie 1986:161). The reaction of Muslims to this request for Christian Pilgrims Boards was to argue that pilgrimage is not a religious obligation or act of faith for Christians as it is for Muslims.65 Government support for Christian pilgrimages to Rome and Jerusalem, however, was granted in 1985. In a declaration of 1984, Christian leaders condemned the attitude of the government to their faith. The declaration was directed against the; Muslims who were accused of consistently disturbing the peace. They claimed that the government was not holding certain Muslim leaders responsible for the Maitatsine riots. The Christian leaders also cited the; government ban on open-air preaching as being directed against them Furthermore, they felt that the Muslims had been favoured in the area of education. The declaration revealed the fear that some Christians fell: of the trend of Islamic fundamentalism.66

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In addition, Nigeria's membeship of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference), which was announced in January 1986 without the Christians being consulted - not even the Christians in the government made the Christians highly suspicious of the government. The Christian Students' Movement and other radical Christians said that membership of the OIC was tantamount to 'Islamization' of the country and warned that this could lead to a religious war.67 This led to the setting up of a committee to examine the issue, and President Ibrahim Babangida tried to reassure the Christians that this would not affect the secular principle of the country's constitution.68 All this took place at a time when an attempt was made to introduce the Sharia Court in the southern states and to make Friday a work-free day for Muslims to worship. The end result was that Nigeria did not participate in the next OIC meeting, but the President never announced whether Nigeria had withdrawn or maintained its membership. In 1992/3, a new civil rule - the Third Republic - is to be introduced in Nigeria. Many Muslims in Nigeria today wish, or rather see it as their duty, to organize a political party with a view to installing a Muslim as the president of the country. They wish to have their lives governed by Islam and not by secularism. It has been a mistake, they feel, to separate religion and politics. Therefore, it is high time to introduce an Islamic platform for the new rule, and to base it on Islamic principles and values. Christians and other non-Muslims view this as a threat to national unity and the relationship between Christians and Muslims becomes increasingly tense. At the beginning of 1988, an assembly began to draw up a new constitution for the Third Republic. This became a repetition of the situation in 1978. The question of Sharia law was again the cause of strong conflict,69 and Babangida had to intervene and demand that this question be shelved, for the time being. Babangida has several times made it clear that the present military administration will not be succeeded by 'extremists'. The secular nature of Nigeria will not be compromised.70 This question was again at stake in an attempted coup of 22/23 April 1990. Groups (mainly Christian) from the central and southern parts of Nigeria had supported this 'revolution' in order to register disagreement with the transition to a civil government and to stem the concentration of power in the (mainly Muslim) north. In Tanzania, Islamic fundamentalism has been present in a more

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moderate form, although Muslims have become more politically conscious. The Tanzania Muslim Youth League has declared its intentions of a separate development for Muslims in practically all social matters. Since 1981, some Muslim groups (especially on the islands) have claimed that Tanzania should be a Muslim state because they constitute the majority. This has had little influence on the majority of Muslims in the country. In 1984, the Islamic Trust Fund was founded by Al Haj Aboud Mahmoud Maalim to better the situation of Muslims socially, especially in the area of education, and to create a better knowledge of Islam. In Zanzibar, there has been dissatisfaction with the union of Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania. There is a desire for more self-rule along Islamic lines. When President Mwinyi took over from Nyerere in 1985, the Muslims, especially in Zanzibar where he originates, saw a chance; of getting power and introducing some kind of Islamic rule. Some Muslims expected appointments to higher government posts. Some Christians, in their turn, feared that he might bring about changes thai: would favour Muslims. Mwinyi, however, continued the non-favour policy in the footsteps of Nyerere, for whom national unity and equality between human beings were more important than religious affiliation Thus, in a speech given in Moshi, President Mwinyi called on the Church to mould Tanzanians into God-fearing and law-abiding citizens He stated his belief that the right cure to what he called 'this moral crisis' did not lie in jail terms, but in religious teachings. Only religion could shape the soul of a human being, directing it to love and sympathy for fellow human beings. The President later praised Christians for being a loving and good-spirited flock. In support of this statement, he quoted the Qur'an. He also urged closer church-state cooperation.71 The same attitude was present in the preparation for the 1990 election. A CCM manifesto stated that parliamentary candidates were to be elected only on the basis of their leadership ability and their commitment to party ideology and policies, and not on the basis of religious affiliation. There have been only sporadic disturbances and few signs of disharmony. These have been created by few and small groups, have generally been externally influenced and inspired, and have been dealt with on a local Party level. In recent years, however, there have been some tendencies - movements hostile to other religions - which threaten the harmony between

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Christians and Muslims in the country. One example is a series of public lectures conducted by a group of Muslim scholars. The lectures were given throughout the country, from the beginning of 1986 to May 1987, under the name BAKWATA and later the Muslim Solidarity Trust Fund. The tone of the lectures was acrimonious and aggressive. They attacked various Christian doctrines and concluded that Christians are misled (cf. Smith 1988:106-11; Smith 1990:179f.). Other open debates, or rather polemic exchanges, have taken place between Christians and Muslims. Such debates are to be found on video-cassettes. Videos by the South African Muslim, Ahmad H. Deedat, have also been circulated. None of this has improved the situation. The presence of embassies from Muslim countries have contributed to these tensions. Through these embassies, various Arab countries have not only provided funds for Islamic studies abroad, but also disseminated valuable information concerning Islamic states not represented in Tanzania. Furthermore, they have made contributions in the field of education and health, and for the building of mosques. Partly as a result of this, BAKWATA has (since 1985) become more conscious of pursuing Islamic interests, and finance has become available for the building of mosques and for scholarships. Teachers from Arab countries have been brought in to teach both in existing and in newly established Islamic schools. Radical Islamic movements have appeared in recent years, such as the Union of Muslim Youths, the Union of Muslim Students and the Union of Muslim Preachers, all connected with the office opened by the Muslim World League in Dar es Salaam. WARSHA is a local group which is determined to impose its own views of Islam, mainly through writing. BAKWATA has warned the government against the activities of WARSHA (see Smith 1990:179). However, these radical movements have not expressed themselves in a violent way, as has been the case in Nigeria. However, it is not only Islamic fundamentalism that strains the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and Tanzania. Christian fundamentalist revival groups have also increased the tensions with provocative mission campaigns. These are part of a worldwide revival of biblical fundamentalism which emphasizes the 'reborn' individual rather than the established church. Christian fundamentalism, which is a reform movement rather than a mission movement, is thus more individualizing, while the Islamic movement is collectivizing.

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Where Nigerian Islam has attempted reform, it has taken place in the shape of a return to a strict observance of the Qur'an and Hadith and, where possible, of the Sharia law. This is in line with the vision of an Islamic society which Usman dan Fodio introduced into the Nigerian scene. However, a split between the traditional conservative establishment and the newer and more militant groups took place in the late 1970s. A rejection of, rather than an adaptation to, African forms has been chosen. In this process, the original adaptation to African ways of thought has been reversed, and there is a development in the direction of increasing Arabization. Nigeria is becoming more and more attached to the Arab world. For the Christians in both Nigeria and Tanzania there is a development in the opposite direction, namely towards a stronger Africanization. The Christian message must be 'inculturated' in areas such as language, liturgy, theology and leadership. The Bible is being translated into more and more African languages. Often there is a striving to understand African customs more fully, and to preserve and include them in Christian preaching and life. Much of this takes place under the influence of the independent churches which originated as a protest against westernization. A common factor in both Christian and Islamic reform is a reaction against western dominance; but for Muslims it is the dominance of western materialism which is being rejected, while for Christians it is rather the dominance of western theology and church guardianship. The difference is primarily in the matter of whether African traditions should colour religious life. As a consequence, by removing a possible bridge between Christianity and Islam, Islamic fundamentalism has touched, and perhaps damaged, that which has kept Christians and Muslims together and created a mutual tolerance. This was the fellowship around traditional African practices, such as the custom of praying together in situations of urgent need. Notes 1

Daily Times, 17 August 1973, p. 14. Id al Fitr is the most important Islamic feast and marks the end of the fasting month, Ramadan (the ninth month in the Islamic calendar). 3 These formulae were first introduced by the CMS missionary, Henry Venn; see Beyerhaus/Lefever 1964:28. 4 The Chagga may have been superior economically but not politically. 5 This included the majority of the Yoruba Muslims. 6 For appeals from the State Sharia Courts of Appeal, the FCA should be 2

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constituted by three justices of appeal who were versed in Islamic Law (West Africa 17 April 1978, p. 737). 7 New Nigerian, 14 April 1978. 8 On the debate, see Ofonagoro et al 1979. 9 Jos notes II. See p. 116 below. 10 See the press release in Clarke/Linden 1984:167-8. 11 West Africa, 24 April 1978. 12 Par. 3 in the White Paper, found in Eastern Africa Law Review 1969, vol. 2:3 (DSM) p. 319-27. 13 Westerlund has interpreted this 'weighing up' as stemming from the strong Muslim influence within TANU (1980a:163). 14 Memorandum by the Shia Ithna Asheri Council of Tanzania, p. 6, quoted from Westerlund 1980a: 166. 15 'Islam does not regard marriage as a necessary permanent relationship, and its adoption often leads to a relaxation of the marriage bond. Its facility to divorce breaches more than anything else the old idea of marriage as a contract between two groups.' (Trimingham 1959:173). 16 On the authority of men over women, see Sura 4:34/38. 17 The Appraisal by the Committee of the Church of Dar es Salaam, p. 2ff. (see Westerlund 1980a: 167). 18 The Nationalist, 23 January 1971, quoted in Westerlund 1980c:8. 19 Dhimmi is a protected status granted on payment of tax. 20 Usman has shown that this development of manipulating religion started with the assassination of Murtala Muhammed in 1976. To Muslims, Murtala was a Muslim martyr and his assassins were Christian villains; to Christians, he was a Muslim villain and his assassins were Christian redeemers. (Usman 1987:12). 21 On civil religion in Tanzania, see Westerlund 1980a:66f. 22 Ujamaa means literally 'extended family', 'familyhood'. The aim of Ujamaa was to bring the peasants together in villages so that they could cooperate in production and be reached easily by social services, including the agricultural extension service. 23 1 visited Korot in April 1978, in 1979, and in 1981. 24 1977 figures. 25 In 1975, Jos had approximately 100,000 inhabitants. 26 The Arusha Declaration was issued on 5 February 1967 and stated the goals towards which TANU wanted to lead the people of Tanzania. The policy was to build a socialist state in which there should be no exploitation, and the major means of production should be under the control of peasants and workers. Self-reliance was an important target, with a future which lay in the development of agriculture and of rural areas. 27 As observed in August 1980. 28 Substantial inequalities in land ownership in Mdandu are pointed out in John Sender's paper (1974). His statement is based on the Third Year Sociology Undergraduate Field Study of Ujamaa villages in Njombe District. Mimeod Reports, University of Dar es Salaam, Dept. of Sociology 1972. 29 It was first of all Issa G. Shivji in his 1976 book, Class Struggles in Tanzania, who claimed that the leadership in Tanzania was a new ruling and

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governing class which served its own interests of international capitalism. Philip Raikes, for example, also argued in Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development (1973) that the current structure clearly reflected the preferences and consumption patterns of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which controlled almost all aspects of government decision making (p. 5). 30 Amilcar Cabral. 1969. Revolution in Guinea. London:70. 31 Cf. the concept of civil religion above p. 78f. 32 This is not like the Hausa situation, where Muslims live in villages and Christians on isolated farms. 33 J. B. Kiwovele is a Lutheran theologian, who was, for a period, Bishop in the southern diocese. 34 Maurice Godelier. 1975. Modes of Production, Kinship and Demographic Structures. In Maurice Bloch, Marxist Analysis and Social Anthropology. London, p. 14. 35 Nyerere 1968a: 164, Introduction. 36 Such as Omuramazi and Kalebezo, as described in Proctor 1971. 37 Anybody who takes interest in Tanzania would be familiar with the formal intention of the Ujamaa programme. For further details, see for instance P. L. Raikes and A. Coulson in Review of African Political Economy, 3/1975 and Boesen/Storgaard Madsen/Moody 1977. There has been a great deal of stereotyped criticism of Ujamaa. These critiques are often based on reductionist analyses, as they pay no attention to the importance of the concrete struggles of the peasants in the villages and the social and ideological consequences of this struggle (among these 'reductionists', I would mention Issa G. Shivji, M. von Freyhold, Philip Raikes and, to some extent, John Saul). Tanzania is seen as being completely capitalist, and therefore only capitalist phenomena are analysed. Important initiatives, socialist tendencies, and the potential of the farmers are left out. In Freyhold's analysis, the peasants are the oppressed class, with the state bureaucracy as its oppressive counterpart. Resistance to the government is not examined for its content but merely as a resistance to capitalist exploitation. For example, the intention of villagization by force was to integrate the peasants into a reproduction that could be subordinate to the control of the cooperatives. What one family could not do for itself, a group of families might be able to do, provided a minimum of communal farming land. It was easier to educate the peasants and to make possible a more efficient production if they lived in villages. In the reductionist analysis, however, this is reduced to its capitalist content. Force was the instrument of the dominating class to further its material interests in a planned way. This criticism is undoubtedly relevant and important - there have been, and there are, capitalist elements in the implementation of socialism in Tanzania (and its failures), such as kulaks and authoritarian bureaucracy, but the working of socialist enterprises and the on-going concrete struggles for the implementation among the peasants themselves should not be belittled or neglected. The positive experience of living and working together which many Ujamaa villagers have had, despite their difficulties, should not be underrated, but seen as a part of the totality which must be the object of analysis. Another aspect which is overlooked in some analyses of the implementation

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRESENT TIME.

105

of the Ujamaa policy is the fact that Tanzania is subject to the capitalist market mechanism and international division of labour. The roots of underdevelopment do not lie exclusively in the 'peasant mode of production', as Goran Hyden has suggested (1980:237), but primarily in the international capitalist system to which Tanzania is tied. Shivji has argued that Tanzania is a peculiar form of neo-colony and that the development of the productive sectors of the economy is therefore hindered (1973:4-18). 38 Daily News, 20 September 1980. 39 Ibid. 40 Nyerere, Maryknoll, New York. 16 October 1970. Quoted from van Bergen 1981:329, Appendix 14. 41 Van Bergen said of the Muslims that 'they consider co-existence with other religions essential. People have to act and work as Tanzanians in the first place. The country is their most important frame of reference.1 (1981:27). 42 Information gathered from questionnaires. 43 Zacharias Mwangama. 1979. The Ministry of the Church in the Mpande Ujamaa Village. Diploma, Makumira. 44 Lulapangilo Zakaria Mhemedzi is one of the 'Modern Tanzanians' described by Martha V. Mlagala in Iliffe 1973:113-15. 45 Interview 26 August 1980, Kidugala. 46 Information gathered from questionnaires. 47 An evangelist is appointed by the eldest in the village congregation to lead the 'evangelizing' work in the area. Most evangelists today have followed courses in Bible schools. 48 From questionnaires. 49 Cf. also Anglars 1972:175: 'Ujamaa wetu una msingi mbali mbali, lakini sote tunataka kuishi kijamaa. Mara nyingi watu hutafuta ujamaa kabla hawajaanza kufuta hata dini.' (Ujamaa has many different foundations but we all want to live in a family community. Often people find Ujamaa before they even start finding religion.) 50 This may also have been occurring within the radical political parties in Nigeria: UPN and PRP. 51 Wilfred Whiteley 1969:137. On Swahili see, for instance, Batibo 1984. 52 New Nigerian, 11 May 1978. 53 The Arabic concept that comes nearest is usuliyya, which comes from usul al din and means the 'origin or roots of religion'. Often the term salafiyya is used - 'what comes from the past' or 'the predecessors'. 'The past' refers to the early Muslims who faithfully observed the Islamic laws. A better form for many Muslims would be tajdid (reform) and mujaddidun (those who try to bring the Islamic society back to the right path). The past (usuliyya or salafiyya) and reform (tajdid) are always connected. 54 Muhammadu Marwa was most probably born in the 1920s in the pagan Mufu tribe near Marwa in northern Cameroon, possibly brought up in the tradition of Mahdism. He moved to Kano in 1945 and by 1962 was known as a controversial preacher and commentator on the Qur'an. He may have declared himself a prophet in 1979. "According to official figures 4, 177 were killed (Usman 1987:71). On the Kano disturbances, see Nicolas 1981:47-70.

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56 O n t h e Maitatsine a n d disturbances, see Isichei 1987:194-208; Hickey 1984:251-6; Hiskett 1987:209-23; Clarke 1983:119-22; Christelow 1985:69-84; Kastfelt 1989:83-90; L u b e c k 1985:369-89; also West Africa, New Nigerian and

Daily

Times. West Africa, 8 N o v e m b e r 1982, p . 2873. 58 The figures are according to the Donly Poull (investigation board) that was set up to investigate the incidents. (Africa Confidential vol. 28, no. 9, 29 April 1987, p. 1-2.) On the Kaduna riots, see Opkara 1987; Amosu 1987. 59 Lutheran World Information 15/87 p. 19. 60 Kristeligt Dagblad 25-4-91. 61 According to The Nigerian Tribune, the number was 300. 62 Ibrahim Suleiman. The Tragic Irony of Nigeria Today. In Impact International, 9-22 October 1987, p. 7. 63 West Africa, 18 January 1988, p. 68. 64 The official federal government Commission of Inquiry into the Kano disturbances, headed by Justice Aniagulu, recognized that the Maitatsine problem was connected with the unemployment of rural-born youths who after harvest migrated to Kano and there became 'vulnerable to temptations'. Lubeck sees the Maitatsine sect as primarily a social revolutionary movement. The economic, social and political contradictions accompanying the petroleum boom created the necessary preconditions for the attraction to such a movement (see Lubeck 1979; 1985). 65 Daily Times, 8 September 1981, p. 15. 66 Inquiry, September 1984, pp. 66-7. 67 West Africa, 3 February 1986. 68 New African, March 1986, p. 21; Impact International, 28 February-13 March 1986, p. 4. 69 On the background to this debate, see Ubah 1990; Opeloye 1989. 70 Impact International, 11-24 November 1988, p. 5. 71 Panafrican Lutheran Information vol. 2, no. 6, September/October 1986. 57

IV CONCLUSIONS

'Umoja ni nguvu, bali utengani ni udhaifu' (Unity is strength, and disunity is weakness). These Swahili words express the experiences of Christians and Muslims in both Nigeria and Tanzania down through history to the present time. The unity and separation between Christians and Muslims has shown itself differently in the two countries, according to their historical background, their political development, and their modes of production. Many factors have contributed to these experiences of unity and separation. One of the most important was the different way in which Islam spread into the two parts of Africa, making Muslims more or less open to contact with people who adhered to other religions. In West Africa, Islam became more Africanized, with more of an independent, dynamic, local authenticity than in East Africa, where it remained a foreign, Arab-coloured religion. Islam was more heterogeneous and limited to certain areas in West Africa, which made it less united and more open to other religions. Furthermore, it had a stronger hold on the people and was more orthodox. Whole peoples became Islamicized, placing them in opposition to other groups around them, whereas in East Africa Islam was more of an individual phenomenon. In Northern Nigeria, there was from the beginning a stronger tradition of fundamentalism, with the jihad led by Usman dan Fodio and the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate in which small ethnic groups were forced to be included. The Mahdist tradition also added to the experience of fundamentalism. There is no doubt that fundamentalism became one of the factors of division between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. Such fundamentalist movements have been absent in the history of Tanzania. In the southern and western regions of Nigeria, Islam did not

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become as strong as in the north, nor as integrated into the culture. This is one explanation why Christian-Muslim relations have been more harmonious in the south of Nigeria than in the north. In the colonial period, Christian-Muslim relations were primarily influenced by government policies, the attitudes of Christian missionaries to Islam and Muslims, and the way in which the resistance to colonial rule was organized. This period had much deeper implications for the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria than in Tanzania. The colonial power, especially in Northern Nigeria, favoured Islam, helping Islam to become a strong force. At the same time, Islam was identified with resistance to the 'European hostility' which was often seen as synonymous with Christian mission. Furthermore, in the 1930s, Islamic identity in Northern Nigeria was used to categorize Northern Nigeria and to express a certain distance from colonial and western culture. In Tanganyika, the German policy on the coast and in Zanzibar was clearly biased in favour of the Arabs, which created certain tensions between Arabs and Africans. On the whole, it must be said that the cooperation between government and missionaries was better in Tanganyika than in Nigeria. The indirect rule system in Nigeria created a gap between two 'blocks' of people: the predominantly Christian south and the predominantly Muslim north. Because of the government's prohibition on missionaries' entry into Muslim areas, an educational imbalance was created between south and north. This was the cause of much tension. In Tanganyika there was no significant prohibition on missionary entry into Muslim areas, and no ethnic group became superior to other groups. There was, however, an educational imbalance, which became one of the reasons why Christians and Muslims struggled together for independence. In this way, the educational problems there served as a uniting rather than a divisive influence. The negative attitude of the missionaries towards Islam and the Muslims in both countries created a certain hostility on both the Muslim and the Christian side. The missionaries, who carried with them the cultural and theological baggage of contemporaneous Europe, took the offensive against Islam as a thoroughly evil and violent religion, riddled with superstition and socially backward. Protestant mission thus saw itself as a fight against Islam (as well as against Catholicism). This attitude helped to make the relationship between Christians and Muslims more tense.

CONCLUSIONS

109

The struggle for independence became more of a unifying process in Tanganyika than in Nigeria. The early Muslim protest movement in Northern Nigeria, especially the Mahdist, was more of a reaction to the advanced southerners than a resistance against colonial rule. The later protest movements were dominated by the Christian elite in the south, and there was no feeling of common identity between north and south. In Tanganyika, however, the resistance movements, especially TANU, led to closer cooperation between Christians and Muslims. The strong fear that Christians and Muslims had of each other taking power after independence in Nigeria was not at all widespread in Tanganyika. Since independence in Nigeria, the tensions between Christians and Muslims, created during colonial times, have been intensified, and religion has been used in situations of conflict, such as during the civil war and during the Sharia discussion, to reinforce existing conflicts. Thus, religion has been used to divide. Tanzania never had a civil war and has no major group to dominate other groups. Therefore religion has not been used to reinforce existing conflicts, as became clear during the Marriage Law debate which might easily have provoked conflict. Rather, religion has been used to unitey and as a potential source of unity, to assist positively in the processes of nation building and nationalism. In Nigeria, an increasing fundamentalist tendency, especially among young Muslims, has strained the relationship between Christians and Muslims, as has been demonstrated by the disturbances in Kafanchan and Bauchi and during the Sharia discussion. This tendency has also been seen in Tanzania, but only to a very limited extent, with little influence on Christian-Muslim relations at the grass-roots level. A major factor that makes Christian-Muslim relationships in Tanzania more harmonious than in Nigeria or, for that matter, the rest of Africa, has been the experience of Ujamaa. Despite the difficulties of accomplishing Ujamaa, this experience, both in its development and in its life-setting in the villages, has been shared by Christians and Muslims, and has been a source of a positive encounter between the people of the two religious groups. The .influence that the policy of Ujamaa has had in bringing Christians and Muslims closer to each other seems to continue to exist. In Nigeria there has been no Ujamaa and no common language to bring Christians and Muslims together. However, it must be pointed out that the strong tensions that have been mentioned are not characteristic of the relationship between the masses of Christians and Muslims,

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but rather between a minority of Muslim and Christian fundamentalist movements. There are Christians and Muslims who seek cooperation and dialogue, on a political, social and philanthropic level. Few Muslims seek active conflict and open confrontation with the Christian society. On a local level, Christians and Muslims still coexist peacefully. This is due to the openness and tolerance that is characteristic of the African outlook on religion and life, the community spirit and the tradition of togetherness, and the understanding of the human being as 'in relation'. The dictum l I am because we are' as a definition of the African experience is all-encompassing and cannot be used to separate Christian and Muslim groups. Neither religious affiliation is seen as more important in creating the collective identity; rather it is the collective identity which shapes individuals from both religious groups. The pluralistic family structures which exist are also initially important. Christians and Muslims have been found in the same families sharing fellowship of work together. This has brought Christians and Muslims together in a natural contact, whereas the conferences and dialogue meetings which have been artificially arranged from above to dispel ignorance and prejudice in Nigeria since the early 1970s have not had much impact. Despite the mutual tolerance which has traditionally existed in the two countries, hatred and misunderstandings are lurking beneath the surface as a threat to the process of cooperation. This is the case especially in towns, where Islam is more widespread and where human relationships are becoming more and more impersonal. At the same time, there is a movement towards mutual understanding. There is a growing awareness on both sides that cooperation is imporant — indeed a necessity. The main conclusion of this analysis is that Christian-Muslim relations in the two countries have been determined partly by socio-economic conditions and political aims, and partly by the openness in the traditional African religious outlook. Despite the trends in Tanzania towards public debate, confrontations have rarely taken the form of doctrinal disputes but have rather been confrontations over spheres of influence (often building on historical contradictions) and over how the structure of society should be shaped. Doctrines have not been a significant threat to the harmony between Christians and Muslims, and attempts to eliminate conflicts on a theoretical, theological and formal level have, therefore, had very little effect. The traditional preconditions for good relations between Christians

CONCLUSIONS

111

and Muslims have been similar in the two countries. By looking at the historical development, especially at the local level, it becomes clear that the situation of cooperation which, partly as a continuation of the African tradition, has been urged on the Tanzanians has promoted harmonious coexistence. This has led to dialogue and a mutual understanding of each other's faith. In Nigeria, however, religion has been used in situations of conflict to cement the existing conflicts. Although some kind of cooperation still exists at village level as a legacy of the traditional model of cooperation, in practice this is becoming weaker over the years. Dialogue is not a new concept in either of the two countries. But it is a dialogue from below. It has taken place among the ordinary people in their daily lives, not through oral communication but through practical cooperation as a common modus vivendi. Tanzania, in particular, has set a fine example here.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival and documentary sources The major documentary sources in Nigeria have been the National Archives in Kaduna (NAK). I have especially gone through the important Provincial Annual Reports from Adamawa and Plateau Provinces. These have been important for the analysis of the attitudes of the British colonial administration towards the mission and the Nigerian Christians and Muslims. The Archives of the Danish Branch of the Sudan United Mission (DFSM) in Rigsarkivet (National Archives, RA) in Copenhagen include, among other things, contemporary reports from mission stations and missionaries in Nigeria to the mission executive committee in Denmark, diaries from individual mission stations and mission schools, plus official and private letters from individual missionaries. This material has been helpful in the analysis of the attitudes of missionaries to Islam and Muslims. Certain local conflicts between Christians and Muslims have also been described. RA refers to the first group of material 1906-61, RAII to the second group 1953-69 (available from 1986). The Church Missionary Society's archives in Birmingham contain largely the same kind of material as the DFSM's archives, mainly correspondence between mission and government. The Sudan United Mission's (SUM) archives in Jos had only a very few documents available at the time, since its headquarters suffered damage during the 1939—45 war. I found only a few documents on Forum, the history of the area, and of the mission/churches. At the Institute of Church and Society, some newer documents concern church meetings which involved certain problems in relation to Islam (Jos notes).

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Newspapers and Magazines As far as the present time is concerned, the two Nigerian newspapers, New Nigerian and Daily Times, and the Tanzanian Daily News, have provided useful information. In particular, the chapters on the Sharia Debate and on Islamic fundamentalism are based on newspaper material. The magazine The Lightbearer, found in the SUM archives in Jos, contains annual field reports and extracts from letters, as well as articles. The years 1905 and 1908 are missing. In Tanzania, articles from the Pastoral Orientation Service have been used. This was published by the Catholic Pastoral Institute which served as a centre for information and research. SUDAN, DFSM's monthly magazine and Under Afrikas Sol, its yearbook, have been studied from beginning to end. Both of them include, apart from letters and reports from missionaries, various articles written by Nigerian Christians. Other Material has been found in the University library in Dar es Salaam and in the East Africana Section at the same university. The library of Makumira Theological College was also useful, especially some of its students' Diploma and BD dissertations. Archive material from the German Berlin Mission in the Southern Highlands, found at Kidugala Bible school, contains mainly conference reports, starting from 1933. Other supplementary material was found in the Jos University Library and the National Museum Library, Jos. In addition, relevant material was consulted in the libraries of Lagos and Ibadan Universities. Much valuable material on the contemporary period has been found in African and international magazines, such as Impact International, West Africa, Arabia, Afkar, New African, Lutheran World Information, Inquiry, Africa Confidential, and Focus on Christian-Muslim Relations. Abba, Usufu. 1979. The 1804-jihad in Hausaland as a Revolution. In Usman 1979:20-33 Adeleye, R. A. 1962. Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria

1804-1966.

London Afigbo, A. E. 1980. Education, Urbanization and Social Change in Colonial Africa. In Kalu, 1980:128-49 Ajayi, J. F. A. 1965. Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891. London and Crowder, M. 1974. History of West Africa. London Alpers, E. A. 1972. Towards a History of Expansion of Islam in East Africa: The matrilineal peoples of the Southern interior. In Ranger/Kimambo, 1972 Amosu, Akwe. 1987. Riots in Kaduna State. West Africa 23 March 1987:550 Anderson, J. N. D. 1970. Islamic Lam in Africa. London

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Anglars, H. D. 1972. Wana wa Ibrahimu. Wakristu na waislamu. Tabora Anyanwu, Kane C. 1976. Alien Religious Influence on African Religion and Social Change. Ufahamu VI: 13 Arfani, Ahmad Hallirio. 1984. Hausa: Missionizing the script. Afkar, July 1984:66-7 Ayandele, E. A. 1965. Missionary Enterprise versus Indirect Rule among the Angas of the Bauchi Plateau. In Bulletin of the Society for African Church History vol. 2, no. 1:73-83 1966. The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842-1914. A Political and Social Analysis. London -1979. Nigerian Historical Studies. London Batibo, H. M. 1984. The Important Contribution of Arabic to the Development of Kiswahili. Islam Today, April 1984 Bergen, Jan van. 1981. Development and Religion in Tanzania. Madras Beyerhaus, P., and Lefever. 1964. The Responsible Church and the Foreign Mission. London Blyden, Edward Wilmot. 1888. Christianity\ Islam and the Negro Race. London Boer, Jan Harry. 1979. Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context. A Case Study of the Sudan United Mission. Amsterdam Boesen, J. and Storgaard Madsen, B. and Moody, Tony. 1977. Ujamaa Socialism from Above. Uppsala Booth, Newell (ed.) 1977. African Religions. New York. Bronnum, Niels H. 1955. Mellem Aikvator og Sahara. Copenhagen 1956. Under Dcemoners Aag. Copenhagen. Christelow, Allan. 1985. The 'Yan Tatsine Disturbances in Kano - A search for a perspective. The Muslim World vol. LXXV, no. 2, April:69-84 Chukwulozie, Victor, C. 1975. Christian-Muslim Relationship in Nigeria. Unp. paper. Jos. 1986. Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Nigeria. Ibadan Clarke, Peter B. 1980. Islamic Millenarianism in West Africa: A 'revolutionary' ideology? Religious Studies 16:317-39 1982. West Africa and Islam. London 1983. Christian Approaches to Islam in Francophone West Africa in the Post-independence Era (c. 1960-1983). From Confrontation to Dialogue. BICMURA vol. 1, no. 2, April 1984. Islam, Development and African Identity: The case of West Africa. In Religion, Development and African Identity, Seminar Proceedings. SIAS Uppsala 1987 -1988. Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria: Methods and aims. Third World Quarterly April. Vol. 10, no. 2 and Linden, Ian. 1984. Islam in Modern Nigeria. A Study of a Muslim Community in a Post-Independence State 1960-1983. Munich Coleman, J. S. 1958. Nigeria: A Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles Crampton, E. P. T. 1979. Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Zaria Duignan, Peter and Gann, L. H. (eds.) 1978. Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960. Vol. 1.4. Cambridge Freyhold, Michaela von. 1979. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment. London

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Gbadamosi, Taudeen G. O. 1978. The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba 18411908. Brental Goldfrank, L. 1979. The World-System of Capitalism: Past and Present. London Gotom, Musa 1985. Herausforderung der Kirchen durch den Islam im Kontext von Nigeria. Zeitschrift fur Mission vol. 11, no. 4:208-15 Greenberg, Joseph H. 1947. Islam and Clan Organization among the Hausa. Southernwestern Anthropology vol. 3 Harries, Lyndon P. 1954. Islam in East Africa. London Hickey, Raymond. 1984. The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria: A note. African Affairs vol. 83, no. 331, April Hinds, Jeremy. 1981a. Mahdism with special reference to Northern Nigeria. TCNN Research Bulletin 9, April 1981b. Present trends in Islam in Nigeria. TCNN Research Bulletin 8, January -1984. The Appeal of the Shan a. TCNN Research Bulletin 14, June Hiskett, Mervyn. 1973. The Development of Islam in Hausaland. In E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa. London 1987. The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An assessment. Journal of Religion in Africa XVII:3 Hyden. Goran. 1968. TANU Yajenga Nchi. Political Development in Rural Tanzania. Lund Political Studies 8 1980. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. London Ifesieh, Emmanuel Ifemegbunam. 1988. The Place of Religion in Nigeria's Current Socio-economic Problems. Neue Zeitschrift fiir Missionswissenschaft vol. 44, no. 1:39-55 Ijaodola, J. O. 1969. The Proper Place of Islamic Law in Nigeria. Nigeria Law Journal (Lagos) vol. 3 Ikenga-Metuh, Emefie. 1986. Muslim Resistance to Missionary Penetration of Northern Nigeria 1857-1960. A missiological interpretation. Journal of International Association for Mission Studies 6, vol. II1-2 Ikime, Obaro. 1980. Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan, Historical Society of Nigeria. Iliffe, John. 1969. Tanganyika under German Rule. London 1973. Modern Tanzanians. Nairobi/Dar es Salaam 1979. A Modern History of Tanzania. Cambridge Ishaya, Edward. 1984. 'A Search for Identity'. An historical review and critical analysis of the Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria. MA thesis, St. Paul, Minnesota Isichei, Elisabeth. 1987. The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A revolt of the disinherited. Journal of Religion in Africa 17:194 Kalu, Ogbu. 1980. The History of Christianity in West Africa. London Kaniki, M. H. Y. 1980. Tanzania under Colonial Rule. London Kastfelt, Niels. 1984. Kristen Mission og Politisk Forandring i Nigeria. Vol. I-II. Copenhagen (Currently being revised and published.) 1989. Rumours of Maitatsine: A note on political culture in Northern Nigeria. African Affairs vol. 88, no. 50, January:83-90. Kenny, Joseph. 1986. Sharia in Nigeria - A historical survey. BICMURA vol. 4, no. 1, January

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Map1

The penetration of Islam into East and West Africa

NUBIA: Christian Kingdoms VI - XIII Cs Arob conquest XIIIXIV Cs.

TB ^ Koirwon (670) ..-•* xTahuda —

Abyssinian Highlands

Christian Kingdom fromc.^lC

ETHIOPIAN

Mecca

Medina (Muhammad died 632)

Lines of Islamic expansion (with dates) Approximate limit of desert Approximate limit of tropical forest

Zoilo x^Berbero 2 .Horgeiso SOMALIA Kirrit*

Uvinza UHEHE TONGWE Bogomoyo*^""" D »" = z Dor es Solaam

Qumel

The Sokoto Caliphate

Map3

Kano

Katsino • Kazoure*

I

Sokoto Empire

I Pagan Areas

Other Muslim Areas

Hausa States

Bornu

NIGER CHAD

BENIN

OGUN —LAGOSr

CAMEROUN Since Oecember 1991, these 21 states have been further divided to make 31 states in all. Gongola State has been divided into the new Adamawa and Taraba States. ilThe LCCN areo coincides roughly •I with Adamawa State.

•.. PENTECOSTAL^ " *" / /