Creed & Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations & Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria 9781847011060, 1847011063

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Edited by MUSTAPHA & EHRHARDT

Ethnic and cultural fragmentation, the frequent overlap between ethnicity and religion, and socio-political changes from the 1980s have resulted in acute polarization between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. This book presents an in-depth exploration of the conflicts, which both threaten the region’s development and present a wider threat to global security. Examining the multiplicity of Muslim and Christian groups involved, the tensions between and within them, and appropriate and effective policy responses at local, national and international levels, the authors also analyse three of the most contentious issues: conflict in Jos; the Boko Haram insurgency; and the challenges of legal pluralism posed by the declaration of full Sharia law in twelve Muslim majority states.

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Abdul Raufu Mustapha is Associate Professor in African Politics, University of Oxford. David Ehrhardt is Assistant Professor of International Development at Leiden University College. See also the companion volume Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha (2014). Cover photograph Greeting the Emir of Kano during the annual Durbar Festival in Kano’s Old City, 2008 (© David Ehrhardt)

JA M ES C U R R EY an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

ISBN 978-1-84701-106-0

9 781847 011060

WESTERN AFRICA SERIES

Creed & Grievance

‘Conflict resolution specialists and Africanists will be thrilled by the publication of this incisive, original, and empirically rich analysis of Muslim-Christian engagements in northern Nigeria.The three chapters on conflict in the Jos Plateau are unrivaled for their analytic rigor and clarity, a truly brilliant achievement constituting required reading for all serious students of conflict resolution in Africa.’ – Paul Lubeck, Acting Director of African Studies Program and Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins-School of Advanced International Studies

Creed & Grievance MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Edited by ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA & DAVID EHRHARDT

Creed & Grievance

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The Economics of Ethnic Conflict The THE Economics of Ethnic Conflict: CASE OF BURKINA FASO The Case of Burkina Faso Andreas Dafinger Andreas Dafinger Commercial Agriculture, the Slave Trade Commercial Agriculture, Slave Africa Trade & Slavery inthe Atlantic & Slavery in Atlantic Africa Edited by Robin Law, Suzanne Schwarz Edited by Robin Law, & Suzanne Schwarz Silke Strickrodt & Silke Strickrodt Afro-European Trade in the Atlantic World: The Western Slave Coast c. 1550–c. 1885 Silke Strickrodt The Politics of Peacemaking in Africa: Non-State Actors’ Role in the Liberian Civil War Babatunde Tolu Afolabi Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha Creed & Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations & Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha & David Ehrhardt *The Politics of Work in a Post-Conflict State: Youth, Labour & Violence in Sierra Leone Luisa Enria *forthcoming

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Creed & Grievance MUSLIM–CHRISTIAN RELATIONS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha & David Ehrhardt

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James Currey is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) www.jamescurrey.com and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue Rochester, NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com © Contributors 2018 First published in hardback and Africa-only paperback 2018 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available on request from the British Library ISBN 978-1-84701-106-0 ( James Currey cloth) ISBN 978-1-84701-142-8 ( James Currey Africa-only paperback) The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. This publication printed on acid-free paper.

Typeset in 11/13 Bembo with Albertus MT display by Avocet Typeset, Somerton, Somerset, TA11 6RT

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To Asma’u, Seyi, Elin & Nina

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Contents

List of Maps, Figures and Tables ix Notes on Contributors xi Glossary xv Preface by David Ehrhardt xviii

1

Introduction

Religious encounters in northern Nigeria

1

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA

Part One: The Muslim & Christian Context 35

2

The Muslim majority in northern Nigeria Sects & trends

37

PHILIP OSTIEN

3

The significant minority

Christians & Christianity in northern Nigeria

83

DAVID EHRHARDT & JIBRIN IBRAHIM

4

Historical contexts of Muslim-Christian encounters in northern Nigeria

108

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA, DAVID EHRHARDT & RACHAEL DIPROSE

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viii • Contents

Part Two: Key Contemporary Issues 137

5

Challenges of legal pluralism Sharia law & its aftermath

6

Boko Haram, youth mobilization & jihadism

139

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA & AMINU GAMAWA

165

MARC-ANTOINE PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS

7

Complementarity, competition & conflict

Informal enterprise & religious conflict in northern Nigeria

184

KATE MEAGHER

Part Three: Jos – Conflict & Peace Building 223

8 Jos

Fear & violence in central Nigeria

225

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA, ADAM HIGAZI, JIMAM LAR & KAREL CHROMY

9

Rural insecurity on the Jos Plateau

Livelihoods, land & cattle amid religious reform & violent conflict

269

ADAM HIGAZI

10 Jos

Bottom-up & top-down approaches to peace building

308

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA, ADAM HIGAZI, JIMAM LAR & KAREL CHROMY

Conclusion 337 Diversity, religious pluralism & democracy

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA & DAVID EHRHARDT



Index

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349

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List of Maps, Figures and Tables

MAPS 1.1 Nigeria zones 1.2 Northern Nigeria and its religious encounter 1.3 Estimated number of people killed in inter-communal violence in Plateau and Kaduna states, Nigeria, January 2010 to November 2013 2.1 Nigeria, showing various boundaries, and percentages of Muslims by current state per 1963 census 8.1 Jos – violence flashpoints 8.2 Jos – segregated communities 9.1 The Jos Plateau and its location in Plateau State

39 238 260 273

FIGURE 4.1 Nigeria: Religious affiliation over time

121

xx 24 25

TABLES 1.1 Nigeria: disparity of poverty levels (2013) 21 2.1 Data on religious affiliation in ex-Northern states, from 1952 and 1963 censuses 41 2.2 Pew survey sample sizes and margins of error (Nigeria) 43 2.3 Pew survey results: Sunni, Shia or something else (Nigerian Muslims) 43 2.4 Pew survey results: Sufi or non-Sufi (Nigerian Muslims) 44 2.5 Summary of estimates of percentages of Nigerian Muslims by sect 46 3.1 Relative group sizes of Christian denominations in Kano in 2008 89 4.1 Percentages of Muslims and Christians in the 1952 and 1963 censuses 119 7.1 Comparison of firm head characteristics and impact of religious conflict in Kano and Kaduna 215 7.2 Experience of violence and inter-religious cooperation by religious group 215 7.3 Comparison of activity types by religious interaction 215 7.4 Comparison of activity types by economic opportunity 216

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Notes on Contributors

ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA is an Associate Professor in African Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development (ODID), University of Oxford, and the Kirk-Greene Fellow at St Antony’s College. He studied political science at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and St Peter’s College, University of Oxford. He is the Principal Researcher in the Nigeria Research Network and a member of the editorial advisory boards of the Review of African Political Economy, Sheffield, and the Premium Times, Abuja. He is the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Development Research and Projects Centre (dRPC), Kano. Dr Mustapha held previous academic positions at Bayero University, Kano, and Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. His areas of research interest are religion and politics in Nigeria, the politics of rural societies, the politics of democratization, and identity politics in Africa. His recent publications include the following edited volumes: Sects and Social Disorder: Muslim Identities and Conflict in Northern Nigeria; Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War; Turning Points in African Democratisation; and Conflicts and Security Governance in West Africa. DAVID EHRHARDT is an Assistant Professor in International Development at Leiden University College, where he teaches development studies and African politics. David conducted his doctoral research at Oxford’s Department of International Development, in which he compared the relationship between interethnic relations and ethnic categorization by the state in Kano and Amsterdam. Subsequently, his research has used mixed-methods fieldwork to study religious politics and interfaith conflict, citizenship and horizontal inequalities, and conflict resolution, mostly in the context of northern Nigeria. David is a fellow of Leiden’s African Studies Centre and a member of the Nigeria Research Network, and the Leiden Centre for the Study of Islam and Society. His articles have been published in journals such as African Affairs, Contemporary Islam, and Social Sciences and Missions, and he appears regularly in Dutch news media to talk about Nigeria. Currently, David’s research interests are informal politics and hybrid governance, conflict resolution, and African religion.

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xii • Notes on Contributors

KAREL CHROMY is an international development and humanitarian professional, specializing in impact evaluations and research methodology across (post-)conflict contexts such as Lebanon, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and Indonesia. He works to apply quantitative and qualitative research methods across disciplines to provide insight on socio-economic vulnerability, livelihoods, conflict mitigation, empowerment and social protection in fragile states. He has worked with many policy and aid organizations, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, GOAL and the International Crisis Group. Karel obtained an MPhil from Oxford University, where he was a Weidenfeld Scholar, and a BA (Hons) from Wesleyan University (Connecticut), where he graduated Phi Beta Kappa. RACHAEL DIPROSE is a Lecturer in Development Studies in the School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS) at University of Melbourne. She gained her DPhil from the Oxford Department of International Development at the University of Oxford, comparing patterns of inequalities and communal conflict in Nigeria and Indonesia. Rachael leads the cross-disciplinary SSPS research cluster on Conflict, Development and Justice at Melbourne, and collaborates with colleagues at Melbourne, in the UK and in Asia for research on States, Frontiers and Conflict. Rachael’s research focuses on the political economy and sociology of conflict, state-building and development, with a particular focus on patterns of subnational violence, mobilization and conflict de-escalation, group dynamics and identity politics, inequalities, conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Her work also explores the dynamics of contention in decentralization and multi-level governance contexts, with a particular focus on the resource and land sectors and emerging field of climate change mitigation. Much of her prior research was also concerned with the contested dimensions of development policy/programme formulation and implementation, resulting in her co-authored book, Contesting Development, published by Yale University Press which was awarded the 2012 American Sociological Association Award for ‘best new work in development’. AMINU GAMAWA is a public interest lawyer and law teacher. He provides legal and policy advice to a wide range of organizations across the private and public sectors. He is a regular commentator on VOA, BBC, Al Jazeera and social media on legal, political, social and international affairs. Gamawa holds LL.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard University, LL.B. from University of Maiduguri, and BL from Nigerian Law School, Lagos. He currently teaches at Baze University, Abuja. xii

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Notes on Contributors • xiii

ADAM HIGAZI is a Research Fellow at the Department of Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, and at the Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola (Adamawa State, Nigeria). He has an MA in social anthropology from SOAS, University of London, and a doctorate from the Department of International Development and St Antony’s College, University Oxford. His doctorate was supervized by Prof. Raufu Mustapha and was a study of politics and conflict in Plateau State, central Nigeria. He advanced this work at post-doctoral level, from 2010–2014, as Junior Research Fellow (JRF) in African Studies at King’s College, Cambridge, and as part of the Nigeria Research Network, dividing his time between Nigeria and Cambridge. In 2015 he moved to Nigeria. His work is inter-disciplinary but has a primary basis in anthropology and ethnographic fieldwork. A general research theme is the history and cultures of the Jos Plateau, and central and northern Nigeria more widely, and the social expression of religious pluralism and ethno-linguistic diversity. He has also carried out extensive fieldwork in north-east Nigeria on the impacts and dynamics of the Boko Haram insurgency. His current fieldwork is focused on transhumant and nomadic pastoralism in Nigeria, and more widely in West Africa and the Sahel. He has published in journals such as Africa: Journal of the International African Institute; Politique Africaine; Conflict, Security, and Development; and in various edited volumes. JIBRIN IBRAHIM is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Democracy and Development in Abuja and was formerly a Professor of Political Science at Babcock University, Ilishan. He is a scholar-activist with an international reputation. Professor Ibrahim received degrees in political science from the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria and a doctorate in politics from the University of Bordeaux in France. He taught political science in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria for twenty years. JIMAM LAR read History at the University of Jos, and also holds an MA in Conflict, Security and Development from King’s College London. He completed his Doctorate in African History and Politics, at the University of Bayreuth, Germany in November 2015. He is Lecturer in History at the University of Jos, Nigeria; he has done extensive research on the history of plural policing, inter-group relations in central Nigeria, the history of regional conflict prevention and management, and transnational security and mobility in West Africa. Dr Lar was Merit Beneficiary, African Peacebuilding Network (APN), Social Science Research Council of New York, Individual Grant Recipient 2016. He has published journal articles and chapters in edited volumes. His current research engagement is focused on exploring local actors and trans-border security and mobility on the Nigerian-Nigerien borderlands.

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xiv • Notes on Contributors

KATE MEAGHER is an Associate Professor in Development Studies at the Department of International Development, London School of Economics. She has a doctorate in sociology from the University of Oxford, and was a lecturer in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria from 1991–97. Combining extensive fieldwork and grounded theory, her research specializes in African informal economies, with a particular focus on Nigeria. She has published widely on cross-border trade and regional integration in East and West Africa; social networks and informal institutions; rural and urban informal economies; informal enterprise clusters; religion and the informal economy; and hybrid governance. Her current research interests are youth unemployment, labour informalization and economic inclusion. She is the author of Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria (James Currey, 2010), and co-editor of Globalisation, Economic Inclusion and African Workers: Making the Right Connections (Routledge, 2016). PHILIP OSTIEN taught in the Faculty of Law of the University of Jos, Nigeria from 1991 to 2007 (with some interruptions), where his research and writing focused on the laws and legal institutions of northern Nigeria, including, after 1999, Sharia implementation in twelve northern states. Since 2008 he has worked from Madison, Wisconsin as an independent scholar and consultant, among other things serving during 2013 and 2014 as Senior Consultant to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue on its project of Inter-Communal Dialogue and Conflict Mediation in Jos, Plateau State. MARC-ANTOINE PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS is a Senior Researcher at the Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD), a Doctor in political science, and taught as a Professor at the French Institute of Geopolitics in the University of Paris 8. A specialist on armed conflicts and humanitarian aid in Africa South of the Sahara, he graduated from the Institut d’études politiques in Paris (IEP), where he also taught, and lived during several years in Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. An Associate Fellow at the Africa Programme, Chatham House (London) and the PRIO (Peace Research Institute in Oslo), he has published some eighty articles and books, including Le Nigeria (1994), Violence et sécurité urbaines (1997), L’aide humanitaire, aide à la guerre? (2001), Villes et violences en Afrique subsaharienne (2002), Diaspora et terrorisme (2003), Guerres d’aujourd’hui (2007), Etats faibles et sécurité privée en Afrique noire (2008), Les humanitaires dans la guerre (2013), La tragédie malienne (2013), Crises et migrations (2014), Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security, and the state in Nigeria (2015), Violence, statistics, and the politics of accounting for the dead (2016), Violence in Nigeria: A qualitative and quantitative analysis, Un développement humanitaire? Les ONG à l’épreuve de la critique (2016), and L’Afrique, nouvelle frontière du djihad? (2017).

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Glossary

achaba colloquial Nigerian terms for motorcycle taxis (see also okada below) ahl al-sunna the People of the Sunna, who model their lives on the Holy Qur’an, on what the Prophet said (hadith) and on what He did (sira) – the three components of the sunna al-Umma (Umma, Ummah)

pan-Islamic concept denoting the global common wealth of all Islamic peoples. It can also be used to designate each people within that commonwealth

Ansar helper of Islam, drawing from the history of the Prophet’s migration to Medina. In the context of the Sokoto jihad, Ansaru connotes volunteers prepared to fight for the jihad. Currently, Ansaru is also a violent Islamic organization operating in northern Nigeria. arne pagans, heathens (used to describe Christians in Hausa) bid’a/ bid’ah

harmful innovation in Islam

bori

a non-Islamic Hausa spirit cult

Dar al-harb literally house of war, usually used by Muslims to refer to countries that are not under Islamic rule Dar al-Islam literally house of Islam, usually used by Muslims to refer to countries under the rule of Islam Da‘wah

preaching of Islam

Dhikr (zikr) repeated recital of short phrases or prayers, silently or aloud, individually or in group, in praise of God or in supplication to Him. Usually accompanied with the counting of prayer beads fiqh human attempt to understand divine law (Sharia), i.e. Islamic jurisprudence fitna

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trial, temptation, strife

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xvi • Glossary

fuqaha

expert in Fiqh, Islamic jurist

hajj

pilgrimage to Mecca

hijra the migration of Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to the city of Medina in 622 CE hisba (hisbah) ‘verification’, is an Islamic doctrine of keeping within the laws of Allah, based on the Qur’anic injunction of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong. Many Sharia-implementing states in northern Nigeria have implemented hisbah organizations to enforce Sharia codes of conduct alongside federal Nigerian law enforcement. hudud punishment fixed in the Quran and hadith for crimes considered to be against the rights of God ijma

consensus

ilu the town or historical community to which the Yoruba are tied isi-ewu (Igbo: goat’s head) an Igbo dish that is made with a goat’s head in a pepper sauce, and is popularly eaten with beer in many parts of Nigeria Jama‘at

community of the Muslim faithful

jihad struggle; different interpretations in the context of Islam, from personal struggle to live with spiritual discipline to a holy war against the enemies of Islam keke, keke-NAPEP

motorized rickshaw tricycles

kuffar (kaffir, non-Muslims, especially those who are not of the kafir, kuffir, kufr) ‘People of the Book’ (Christians and Jews) madhhab

a school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence

Maguzawa non-Muslim Hausa who still adhere to traditional [sing. Bamaguje] Hausa religious practices Malam (or mallam; pl. mallamai)

traditional Muslim scholar and cleric; Arabic: Mu-alim and ulema/ulama respectively)

Maliki Law one of the four major schools of law within Sunni Islam, and the main form of Islamic law applicable in northern Nigeria

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Glossary • xvii

maulid (mavlid)

the birthday of the Prophet or of leading Sufi saints

mujahid one who exerts himself in a jihad to promote the faith (pl. mujahideen) of Islam Nasara the followers of the New Testament or Christians (Nazarenes) Oba

traditional ruler in Yoruba kingdoms

okada  colloquial Nigerian terms for motorcycle taxis (see also achaba above) orisa

traditional Yoruba religion

qisas form of punishment in Islamic penal law, based on the premise of an ‘eye for an eye’ Sabon Gari in northern Nigerian cities, neighbourhood designated by colonial officials for migrants from southern Nigeria Sallah (Hausa) the two major Islamic festivals of Eid el-Fitr and Eid el-Kabir Sharia

legal system derived from Islamic principles

Shura

decision-making through consultation in Islam

silsilas chains of authority (lineages) in northern Nigerian sufi brotherhoods tahfiz

Qur’anic memorization

takfir

the practice of declaring another Muslim as a kafir

taqiyya dissimulation; a school of thought in Islam argues that Muslims in danger of their lives can dissimulate, pretending to accept situations to which, deep down, they remain opposed tariqa (pl. turuq; ‘the path’; refers to an order or brotherhood within Hausa, darika) Sufism ulama

Islamic scholars (see Malam above)

umma

(see al-Umma above)

zakat alms in Islam; it is one of the five pillars of Islam and considered an obligation (if one meets the criteria of wealth)

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Preface

This book has been long in the making. It began its life in 2010 as a collaborative research project on Islam and interfaith relations in northern Nigeria.1 Together with other members of the Nigeria Research Network, Raufu Mustapha and I undertook to map out the region’s religious diversity and to study the ways in which the three main faiths – Christianity, Islam, and traditional spirituality – interact in what we have come to call Nigeria’s religious encounter. As all the chapters demonstrate, this encounter has been varied and ever-shifting, involving violent confrontation as well as compromise and nonviolent competition, conversion, and cooperation between members of the different faiths. But over the last decades, it appears that violence has become more and more prominent, through riots, communal clashes, and even the full-blown insurgency of Boko Haram. The aim of this book is to explore northern Nigeria’s religious encounter and suggest explanations for, as well as possible solutions to, the increasing violence that characterises it.2 To my great sadness, Raufu passed away in the months leading up to the publication of this volume. As many have said, written and recognized, his passing is a great loss to all who knew him, as well as to the field of African studies and Nigerian politics in particular. Yet, at the same time, it is heartening and inspiring to recognize how many people have benefited from his guidance, advice and collaboration, and to realize the extent of the intellectual legacy he built through his publications, policy engagement, teaching, and supervision. It is also very satisfying to see our volume finally going to press. As my doctoral supervisor and mentor, as well as colleague and friend, Raufu taught me much of what I know about Nigeria, Africa, and working in the academy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the present volume touches on many of these lessons, of which I will highlight a few. Most importantly, the 1 I would like to thank the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its generous funding of this project, and all our collaborators from the Nigeria Research Network and beyond for their committed efforts to make this project a success. 2 Where the present volume engages with Christian-Muslim dynamics, the preceding and companion volume, Sects and Social Disorder, focuses on the intra-Islamic encounter between different Islamic beliefs, identities and organizations. A third volume on Islamic radicalization is also in the making.

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Preface • xix

book aims to analyse Nigeria’s religious encounter as it is, rather than as it is assumed or hypothesized to be. It aims to faithfully describe variation, nuance and complexity, acknowledging the many problems Nigerians face in their everyday lives, but also ensuring that we do not underappreciate the ways in which they creatively solve them. This way of openly viewing and considering local phenomena as they are, and appreciating their innovative strengths as well as their weaknesses, has perhaps been one of the Raufu’s most valuable lessons. In Chapter 1, Raufu argues that ‘this book seeks to explain, so that policy makers and the general public can have a better, more nuanced, understanding of the challenges to be addressed, despite the charged political context and emotions involved on all sides.’ In my experience, it was one of Raufu’s great strengths that he used his position in Oxford’s ivory tower to battle real-world problems in Nigeria. The requisite integrity and balance between dispassionate analysis and passionate political engagement are difficult to find, and particularly rare in debates about Nigerian religion. Too often, passions cloud analysis, and rigorous analysis remains devoid of political engagement. This book, like much of Raufu’s other work, tries to combine both. Finally, Creed and Grievance is the product of an ambitious and, to my mind, very effective collaboration across the boundaries of discipline and expertise, embodied in the Nigeria Research Network. This network has brought together a group of truly outstanding Nigerian and non-Nigerian scholars, all of whom are interested in issues that have immediate and important consequences for Nigerian society. Their commitment to theoretical clarity and rigorous empirical analysis informs the depth of their insights, and cuts across their varied disciplinary perspectives. Raufu was essential in building the network and facilitating its collaborations, and his commitment to interdisciplinary and societally relevant scholarship has been an important inspiration for me. In my experience, Nigeria has a way of teaching invaluable lessons to those who take the time to engage with it. Hopefully, this book conveys some of the richness and value of such engagement and inspire more effective approaches to understanding and managing religious encounters in Nigeria and, perhaps, elsewhere. David Ehrhardt Utrecht, 1 November 2017

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CHAD

NIGER SOKOTO

Lake Chad

Sokoto

Birnin Kebbi

Katsina KATSINA

Gusau

NW

KEBBI

KANO

KADUNA

Kainji Reservoir

Abeokuta Ikeja

OGUN

OSUN

Bight of Benin

F.C.T.

NC EKITI AdoEkiti

Lokoja

ABUJA

Benin City

CHAD

Yola Jalingo

Lafia

CAMEROON

NASSAWARA TARABA Makurdi

KOGI

BENUE

Key Zone boundary

EDO Asaba

DELTA

Gulf of Guinea

NE ADAMAWA

SW ONDO Akure

LAGOS

Gombe

PLATEAU

Ilorin

Maiduguri

GOMBE

Jos

Minna

OYO Osogbo

Damaturu

Bauchi

NIGER

KWARA

Ibadan

BORNO Dutse

BAUCHI

Kaduna

BENIN

YOBE

JIGAWA Kano

ZAMFARA

SS

ENUGU Awka Enugu ANAMBRA IMO

SE

Owerri

RIVERS Port BAYELSA Harcourt Yenagoa

Abakaliki

EBONYI

ABIA

Umuahia Uyo AKWA IBOM

CROSS RIVER

SS

CAMEROON

Calabar

Bight of Bonny

F.C.T. = Federal Capital Territory

SW SE NW NE NC SS

South West zone South East zone North West zone North East zone North Central zone South South zone National capital State capital

Copyright: Africa Section, Chatham House.

Map 1.1 Nigeria zones (reproduced courtesy of Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, from Africa Programme Research Paper ‘Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria’, Leena Koni Hoffman, July 2014)

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1 Introduction Religious encounters in northern Nigeria ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA

Introduction This book is about the encounters between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria and the challenges posed in the process to the wider Nigerian society. Juergensmeyer (2003, 4) notes that ‘religions move and intertwine’. This is obvious from the history of northern Nigeria over the past ten centuries when traditional African religions were joined on the scene, first by Islam, and then by Christianity. The resulting rubbing against each other – sometimes peaceably, sometimes, less so, sometimes for the common good, and sometimes for narrow sectarian ends – constitute the religious encounters. Northern Nigeria is not unique in this process of religious interaction, expansion, synthesis, conversion, competition, borrowing, conflict and change. But the outcomes in northern Nigeria have produced intensifying levels of religious conflict and violence. This is what this book seeks to explain, so that policy makers and the general public can have a better, more nuanced, understanding of the challenges to be addressed, despite the charged political context and emotions involved on all sides. In the course of the religious encounters in northern Nigeria, a religious mosaic emerged by the early colonial period, made up of five interacting components: (1) the Islamic populations of the Northern emirates; (2) pockets of Hausa-Fulani Christian converts in Zaria, southwestern Kano, Sokoto, and Katsina;1 (3) a progressively diminishing population of Maguzawa or followers of indigenous Hausa religions, especially to be found in the bori practitioners of Kano, Katsina and Zaria Provinces; (4) millions of recently converted non-Hausa Christians in the Middle 1 These Hausa-Fulani Christians are best symbolized by the Wusasa community in Zaria built around Reverend Miller.

1

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2 • Introduction

Belt and southern Borno; and (5) and an increasing population of persons from Southern Nigerian ethnicities, Christians as well as Muslims belonging to Islamic groups like the Ahmadiyya and Ansarudeen, unfamiliar in the emirates. This complex religious tapestry increasingly constituted what I call contentious religious pluralism, but it is the relationship between the Muslim and the Christian communities that is most critical. These two communities are unique because, as Juergensmeyer (2003, 7) notes, they are religious traditions with universal pretensions and global ambitions: It is a hallmark of Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists that they believe that their religious ideas are universally applicable. The followers of each of these competitive global ideologies often regard their faith as intellectually superior to the others; some adherents feel that their own traditions alone have a birthright to inherit the earth … These are transnational religions, religions of expansion. Some seek to understand the encounters between these transnational religions in terms of a ‘clash of civilizations’. That perspective is too narrow to understand the religious dynamics of northern Nigeria. As Sanusi (2006, 182) notes, since the 1970s, we have had three distinct forms of religiously-inspired collective violence in northern Nigeria – within Muslims, between some Muslims and the state, and between Muslims and Christians. It is therefore crucial to highlight the fact that ‘Muslim-Christian-African interactions emerged and developed in the contexts of distinctive local encounters’ (Voll 2006, 21). We therefore seek to provide socio-economic and historical institutional analyses of society and religious change, devoid of any prior assumptions of clash or amity. Our emphasis is on processes, outcomes and societal consequences. Importantly, we are as concerned about state-society dynamics as we are about religious beliefs and interactions. There is also a tendency to conflate economic crises from the 1970s and collective religious violence in northern Nigeria. Bako (1992, 147) asserts that there is a ‘dialectical correlation between’ the two variables, while Sanusi (2006, 183) notes that increased impoverishment of the population since 1986 is ‘a major factor contributing to religious crisis’. Without doubt, economic and political changes, sometimes for the worse, are important aspects of the religious encounters we seek to explain. But we must be careful not to reduce a complex societal dynamic to just its economic and material components. On the one hand, it is true that economic and political instability lead to heightened anxiety in individuals, to the search for certainties and anchors in life, and consequently, to heightened religiosity, increased dogma-

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 3

tism and intolerance. However, some dogmatism and intolerance are more symbolic in nature, deriving as they are, as much from immediate environmental triggers, as from entrenched normative and historical processes. For example, Ryan (2006, 218) argues that the tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria derive much of their force from their very different orientations to society and personality. Muslims seek the good society from the enactment of a legal and political system that guarantees ethical standards. Christians seek the good society from the improvement or development of the individuals who make up that society. Considerable misunderstanding has resulted from these diverse basic orientations. We therefore seek to pay full attention to the totality of the material and non-material processes that influence Muslims and Christians in the course of the religious encounters in northern Nigeria. In this chapter, a key argument is that how we study religious encounters and conflicts matters. Because of its emotive nature, people often come to studies of religion and society with preconceived notions that colour understanding and inhibit a nuanced assessment of the complex issues at stake. As we shall see, one such prominent notion in Nigeria is that northern Muslims are by definition, violence prone. Are northern Muslims any more violent than other Nigerians? If they are, are the causes cultural or historical, political and economic, and therefore more subject to public policy engagement? I argue that we need to look beyond religious prejudices to a more historical and institutionalist study of how Christianity and Islam have interacted with the wider Nigerian society. In this chapter, special attention is paid to narratives of religious tolerance and intolerance that have evolved around particular ethnic and religious communities in Nigeria. I expose the limitations of these narratives and examine the underlying historical processes that have led to inter-religious peace or violence in key parts of Nigeria as a basis for more effective strategies of public action. I then locate these distinctive histories of religious encounter within a national framework of religious polarization and regional economic inequality. An understanding of inter-religious tensions at the national level is complemented by a more detailed geography of different types of religious encounters within northern Nigeria. Here, a sub-regional framing reveals varied patterns of indigeneity and demographic polarization that create distinctive struggles and perceptions of threat between religious groups in different parts of the north. It is these narratives and national and regional framings that I principally want to interrogate as a starting point of our analyses of the wider religious encounter in northern Nigeria.

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4 • Introduction

Narratives of religious encounters An important aspect of the religious encounters involves the narratives that different parties to the encounters develop to explain, justify or simply make sense of their experiences. The encounters between religions are important in their own right. However, just as important are the ways human actors build narratives around such encounters. Multiple and even contradictory narratives may seek to explain the same experiences of encounter; some narratives contain obvious missing gaps,2 while others are adorned with embellishments not found in comparable narratives. Within these wider canvases of encounters and competing narratives, claims and counter-claims, certain stylized facts and myths begin to lay claim to popular hegemony. Barkey (2005, 5) notes, for example, that western civilization is frequently associated with individual freedom, secularism and tolerance, while Islamic civilization is associated with collective rights, individual obligations, despotism and intolerance. Needless to say, these representations do not reflect the full histories of either religion (see Barkey 2005; Dowd 2015). In the Nigerian context, Muslims, particularly the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are frequently cast as extreme and unreasonable in their religious attachment,3 while Christians are cast as more reasonable and tolerant. To fully understand the religious encounters, we must interrogate the conventional narratives and get past the stylized facts built on them. NARRATIVES OF TOLERANCE: THE YORUBA, ORISA, ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

When the late Bishop of Bissau, in Guinea-Bissau, Settimo Arturo Ferrazzetta, passed away in 1999, there were three separate funerals held for him: a Catholic one, a Muslim one and an animistic one (Sarro & de Barros 2016, 112). This was under the dominant Bissau narrative of religious tolerance known as the Convivencia, which suggests that all religious points of view must be given full and free expression. In Nigeria, it is inconceivable for a Catholic Bishop to receive a Muslim funeral. However, such narratives of religious tolerance at the community level are usually identified with the Yoruba. For example, Ryan (2006, 219) asserts that the 2 The religious eco-system of the Portuguese colonial empire in West Africa contained Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, neo-Pentecostals, followers of traditional shrines and Jews. Within this complexity, however, the equation of Portuguese culture with Catholic Christianity ‘has rendered invisible the very important Jewish diaspora along the lusophone Upper Guinea Coast’ (Sarro & de Barros 2016, fn. 4, 109). 3 Amongst some Yoruba, there is a saying that awon Hausa gba were mesin (the Hausa adopted some measure of madness along with their adoption of Islam).

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 5

Yoruba people intrigued me, and especially the ease with which the Christian and Muslim Yoruba lived together, sometimes under the same roof. One [Eid] al-kabìr I saw the Anglican chief in the town where I lived carried in a palanquin shaded with umbrellas to the Muslim praying-ground, dressed for all the world like the Sardauna of Sokoto. In the same vein, His Royal Highness, the late Olufi of Gbongan, Dr S. Babayemi asserted: ‘I make bold to say that now I am a Christian, a Muslim, and a worshipper of Ogun, Obatala and other traditional deities. That is the essence of being oba, the essence of preserving and promoting inter-religious dialogue … the Yoruba style’ (Yai 1992, ix). Olupona, (1991, 173) offers an explanation for this Yoruba religious tolerance. He notes that traditional Yoruba religious practice has historically placed no emphasis on what might be called doctrine, dogma, or belief, which is one reason it could be so eclectic. There was no sense of exclusivity, therefore there was no insistence upon adherence to a particular dogma in order ‘to join’ a religion; there was no ‘conversion,’ so to speak. On the other hand, there was a strong concern for the efficacy of a given religious system … This emphasis on non-exclusivity and efficacy is partly responsible for the high degree of interaction and accommodation among the … Muslims and Christians and traditionalists. This openness is greatest at the non-institutional level, in the daily activities of the people. However, the most elaborate exposition of Yoruba religious tolerance can be seen in the posthumous book of the pre-eminent scholar of the Yoruba religious systems, the late John D.Y. Peel (2016). Like others, Peel notes the tendency of the Yoruba to blur religious boundaries. He recalls a local-ward development committee meeting in Yemetu Aladorin in Ibadan, chaired by a local imam, and with six other committee members in attendance, four Muslims and two Christians: At the end of the proceedings, the imam recites the surat al-fatiha (the short first sura of the Koran) in Arabic, and I notice even the Christians trying to follow it with their lips. One of the Christians then says a short informal prayer in Yoruba, ending with l’oruko ̣ Jesu Kristi Oluwa wa! (In the name of Jesus Christ, our Lord!), to which everyone responds E ̣ yin Ologo! (Praise the King of Glory!). The imam rounds off by saying Hallelu! three times.’ (2016, 125) Importantly, however, Peel warns that Yoruba religious amity should not be seen as ‘a timeless cultural absolute’ (2016, 9) but as something

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6 • Introduction

needing to be constantly replenished through cultural work. Peel provides a convincing explanation of this cultural work, at the heart of which are the four levels of the hierarchy of Yoruba communities. At the core of the Yoruba community is the ilu, the town or historical community to which many Yoruba are tied by bonds of loyalty. Below the ilu are the town quarters (adugbo) and below that still, the family compound (agbo ile). Over these three layers of community are the sub-ethnic divisions (Oyo, Ijesha, Ekiti, etc.) products of colonial administrative and political divisions. It is the totality of these layers, much like the many rings of an onion, which made up the imagination and emergence of Yoruba ethnic identity in the colonial period. Peel argues that these different layers of community had important implications for the cultural work of the Yoruba. They influenced the nature of conversion from traditional Yoruba religion to either Islam or Christianity. Secondly, they influenced the nature of the new religious communities within the wider ethnic community (2016, 126). In pre-colonial times, life functioned at the level of the ilu downwards, according to the dictates and rhythms of the local orisa cults. Colonialism expanded the scale of social interaction beyond the ilu, and the local orisa cults were no longer adequate to handle the challenges of the emerging expanded context: ‘A shift of focus from orisa to God can therefore be expected wherever the vital concerns of a population shift away from the microcosm to the macrocosm. Colonialism in Nigeria certainly provided a sufficient condition of such an outcome but evidently not a necessary one’ (Peel 2016, 132). While colonialism precipitated the process of conversion from orisa to Christianity and accelerated the already existing process of conversion to Islam, the conversions took place under the rules of the orisa cults: ‘What sort of faith communities emerged from the protracted conversion process? At their heart, I suggest, we may see a balance between three attitudes, all to some extent carried forward from the old religion and closely implicated with one another: pragmatism, loyalty, and tolerance’ (Peel 2016, 132). Traditional Yoruba religion was pragmatic because there were many powerful orisa, and it was best to adopt ‘a spirit of live and let live between cult groups’ (Peel 2016, 133). It is this pragmatism that underlay the practice of tolerance. In many places both Muslims and Christians were nevertheless persecuted at the outset, ‘whether because of their alarmingly absolutist claims or the fear that they would cause the neglect of local cults that local people regarded as essential for community welfare. But tolerance returned as soon as it became clear that the new cults could be domesticated and were themselves keen to contribute to the well-being and solidarity of the community’ (Peel 2016, 133).

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 7

Two institutions carried forward from the past were critical to the accommodation of Islam and Christianity to the Yoruba world, though both would be modified in the process. The first was the festivals of a small number of important orisa that were felt to embody the identity of the whole town, such as Sango in Oyo, Agemo in Ijebu, or Ogun in Ilesha and Ondo. Christians and Muslims continued to join in these annual festivals, though ‘they gradually came to see them in more secular terms, as cultural events; or they reconfigured them in newly devised festivals aimed at community development’ (Peel 2016, 135). The second key institution was the o ̣ba-ship. As a quasi-divine being himself – ekeji orisa (second to the gods) – the o ̣ba’s most important role was to serve as the point of articulation between the town and the orisa, whose goodwill ensured public welfare. The relative domestication of Islam and Christianity to the Yoruba religious rules of pragmatism, loyalty to ilu, and tolerance meant that the Oba can add both religions to his corpus of intermediary functions as we saw in the quote from the late Olufi of Gbongan, above. In short, as Peel (2016, 152) rightly noted: Yoruba society has welcomed Islam and Christianity, and proved subtly capable of bending them to its ethos – up to a point. For while they compete vigorously with each other, they have had to do so under Yoruba rules – which have the tendency not only to domesticate them directly but to draw them into a process of mutual emulation that further enhances their shared Yoruba features. Over time, the orisa worshippers have reduced drastically in number, but the legitimacy of orisa and its institutional penetration of the society remains undiminished. Both Islam and Christianity have also asserted their own normative logics since, as Peel rightly pointed out, they ‘are compelled by their own traditions to try to realize their own distinctive visions’ (2016, 152). On balance, however, the complicated equilibrium between orisa, Islam and Christianity, hinged on pragmatism in the face of difference, loyalty to the community, and tolerance, has held up fairly well; tensions – and even violence4 – between the three religions do occur, but these are infrequent and are often not highlighted in the narratives of tolerance.

4 For example, a clash between Muslims and followers of traditional Yoruba religion led to ‘the cold blooded murder of Alufaa Bisiriyu Apalara in Lagos by the members of Oro cult of Okobaba on 3 January 1952’. Significantly, some of the Oro worshippers convicted of his murder bore Yoruba Muslim names – Raimi, Isiaka, Lasisi and Nasiru (Abubakre 1992, 126).

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8 • Introduction NARRATIVES OF INTOLERANCE: THE HAUSA, BORI, ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

With the Hausa of northern Nigeria, we see the elaboration of narratives of intolerance. While orisa set the template for understanding Yoruba attitudes to religion more generally, among the Hausa, Islam is the background template (Last 1993). For the sake of analysis, we can distinguish between narratives of Muslim-Bori and Muslim-Christian relations. Last (1993) argues that the ‘Magians’ or Maguzawa emerged as a social category out of the needs of Muslim traders visiting Hausaland. He notes that the continued existence of the Maguzawa in Muslim Hausaland is an illustration of a form of religious pluralism in that different roles are ascribed to both Maguzawa and Muslim in the context of integration within Muslim society. Central to Maguzawa notions of religion, he argues, is the idea that religion functions within the domestic and not the political sphere. Because of this disengagement from power, powerlessness and defencelessness are thus cultural styles integral to the way the Maguzawa views of religion are integrated into Muslim Hausa society. Last notes two important dimensions of Maguzawa defencelessness. Firstly, in the real world of armies and police, they offer no resistance and their main defence has been a readiness to migrate away from threats. Furthermore, they have no secure hills as refuge nor the political cohesion required to set up an independent state. The second dimension of their defencelessness ‘is the surreal world of spirits and ancestors and deities, where patronage is just as important as it is here in the real world’. While the Muslim Hausa talk of ‘this’ world and the ‘next’ world, the Maguzawa talk of ‘this’ world and the ‘other’ world of spirits. Bori or spirit possession is the means through which the Maguzawa connect to that ‘other’ world and cultivate patrons within it. The bori possession cults through which a spirit is invited to mount the adept temporarily, are part of the ritual of powerlessness. ‘Rather than drive the spirit off with some fierce rite of exorcism, a person identifies which spirit it is and invites it personally to stay permanently with them’ (Last 1993, 282). While Muslims monopolize the ‘white’ side of mystical powers, the Maguzawa, through their interactions with the spirits, monopolize the ‘dark’ side. Last concludes that the Maguzawa thus offer Muslims in the neighbourhood religious services that are unobtainable in Muslim society. ‘Initiation in spirit possession (bori) is one such service; treatment of the severely mentally ill is another; divinator diagnosis is a third. Muslims who want to be trained in these skills can turn to Maguzawa as the experts’ (Last 1993). For these reasons, the Maguzawa occupy a niche in the wider Muslim society as great farmers and as ritual experts handling problems of a particularly dangerous kind.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 9

There have also been many bori possession ceremonies in the major cities of northern Nigeria. Spirits or iskoki possess bori adepts, a process some Muslim critics describe as devil possession. The reformists of the jihad of 1804 made little distinction between bori possession and pagan spirit worship (tsafi). Bori was prohibited and the performance of it was punishable by death (Okagbue 2008). Many people in Hausa society therefore see the bori possession as ‘the work of the Satan’ (Cohen 1969 58). Despite these restrictions, ‘bori became discouraged, but, importantly, not eliminated’ (Andersson 2002, 28 quoting Cooper 1997, xxxiv). Indeed, some have even argued that the increasing restrictions on the public political and economic roles of women after the jihad encouraged some women to take to bori practices in compensation (Sinikangas 2004, 41). From Mary Smith’s classic, Baba of Karo, we get an idea of the nature of the struggle to suppress bori, and the tenacity of the women bori adepts at the turn of the twentieth century: Twenty days ago Fagaci forebade Bori-dancing in the town … Then Tanko’s wife went to Fagaci’s compound to greet his wives, and as she came out from the women’s quarters she had to pass through the room where he was sitting. She and her three co-wives knelt down to greet him, and as she was kneeling down the Bori came and possessed her – it was Baturen Gwari, the European from Gwari country. ‘Imprison me, bind me, call the police and lock me up. Isn’t there an order forbidding Bori? Very well, look at me, I have come. Lock me up then! (Smith 1981, 223) While the Islamic clerical classes have waged a relentless war to suppress bori, the activity remains stubbornly resistant to elimination, because many who are afflicted by diseases and find no conventional cure often turn to bori. Furthermore, others, wanting success in business, politics and love, also turn to the spirits of bori for help. On the other hand, bori has successfully assimilated Islamic theology and spirits into its doctrine and pantheon. It has also taken on board critical experiences that the Hausa have had to deal with – Islam, the jihad, colonialism (Okagbue 2008, 273). In short, bori has survived, despite its repression, because it has a firm gendered base among women in Hausa society, it offers valuable psycho-medical services, and it is flexible and adaptable by nature. In recent times, bori has gained new recognition as traditional medicine (maganin gargajiya) and bori healers ‘in Kano have such incomes that they have had the possibility to do several pilgrimages to Mecca … The increasing popularity of the profession has led some older bori adepts to criticise the younger that they are in the business only for the money’ (Sinikangas 2004, 24). There is also a bori practitioners group in the

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10 • Introduction

Plateau State branch of the Nigerian Union of Medical Herbal Practitioners (Andersson 2002, 4). These developments notwithstanding, the tendency to oppress and repress bori practice has a long history. Last (1993) notes that in the early years of Independence, hardworking and successful Maguzawa farmers, who did not trade, were deliberately taxed at a higher rate as ‘merchants’, even when their Muslim neighbours who usually both farmed and traded were not. He also notes that since the 1970s ‘Muslim missionaries (mainly ‘Yan izala)’ have harassed the Maguzawa in rural markets: ‘Christian missions to Maguzawa came under pressure, and Maguzawa Christians were liable to harassment of a sort they had not really experienced before. In the last twenty years, then (but especially in the 1980s), to be a real, pagan ba-Maguje was proving a serious liability’ (ibid.). Maguzawa children also find it difficult to get places in government schools. In recent times, these oppressive trends have continued. For example, in 2003–04, all bori groups in Zaria were forced to leave town and all bori-related activities banned. ‘Prior to this, a tax regime had been put in place, Bori groups being required to obtain local authority licences or permits before they could practise or perform their rituals publicly’ (Okagbue 2008, 274). Bori worshippers argue that Islam recognizes spirits (jinns) and God, and that their invocation of the spirits did not contradict Islam. ‘Bori practitioners constantly refer to Allah in their conversations; they all describe themselves as good Muslims’ (Andersson 2002, 4). As Last (1991, 56) notes, bori is effectively for both Muslims and non-Muslims, Maguzawa, even though it is often associated with the latter group. It is this blurring of the religious lines by bori practitioners that seems to have informed post-1999 – Sharia implementation – efforts to further repress the group. Harnischfeger (2014, 57) notes that Sections 405 and 406 of the Zamfara Sharia Penal Code prescribe the death penalty for participation in ‘pagan rites’,5 while Barkindo (2011, 136) notes that between 2003 and 2007 Kano hisbah – Islamic ‘police’ – prevented ‘2,852 incidents of Bori and types of gatherings prohibited by Islam.’ In the treatment of bori practitioners, we can clearly see elements of religious repression and intolerance. Paradoxically, however, the treatment of the bori practitioners is hardly mentioned in narratives of Hausa Muslim intolerance. Most of the attention in these narratives go to the way Christians are treated in northern Nigeria. We can start our analysis of the Muslim-Christian strand of the narrative of intolerance by examining Peel’s (2016, 13) comparison of ‘the exemplary Yoruba, who have so much to tell us about how different reli5 ‘Whoever … takes part in the worship or invocation of any juju … shall be punished with death’ (Section 406). The term ‘ juju’ is defined in Section 405: ‘“Juju” includes the worship or invocation of any object or being other than Allah’.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 11

gions can live together in peace’ against ‘the pattern of recurrent religious violence that has become endemic in Northern Nigeria’ (ibid., 124). Peel argues that while in Yorubaland, Islam and Christianity pursue a peaceful rivalry under the ambit of traditional Yoruba community, in northern Nigeria, ‘a jihadist tradition has contributed to a pattern of endemic religious violence whose most recent manifestation is the militant Islamist organization known as Boko Haram’ (ibid., 2). He suggests two key explanations for the ‘two sharply contrasting cases – Yorubaland and the North’ – one without religious violence and the other, suffused with religious violence: The first is sociological: the crosscutting of communal and religious ties (universal in Yorubaland, much rarer in the North), which greatly raises the cost of religious violence and so reduces its incidence. The second is cultural: the virtual absence from Yorubaland of a jihadist tradition, such as had such has a strong presence within Northern Islam. (Peel 2016, 12) What must be noted however, is the methodology adopted by Peel throughout the book. In discussing the Yoruba, there is a recourse to the anthropology of Yoruba religion situated within its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial histories. But the same methodological rigour is not extended to the study of Islam in northern Nigeria. Instead, Peel constructs his case on the weight of an ever-present ‘jihadist tradition’ without any serious consideration of the changing societal context of that tradition. He argues that while a fresh context might constrain the realization of a religion’s tradition, the more important variable is the tradition, ‘and that produces what we regard as the typical features of that religion in practice’ (Peel 2016, 13). In opposition to Peel’s position, scholars such as Dowd (2015, 23–4) insist that: ‘context matters, and it is impossible to understand the different political applications of a religion without some awareness of the different contexts in which religious leaders seek to preserve and promote the influence of that religion. Even within countries, there are different contexts that may affect how religion is applied to politics.’ The ‘jihadist tradition’ Peel is alluding to is more explicitly explain by Sanneh (1997) as ‘Islamic politicalism’, meaning that Muslims, in keeping with the traditions of the Prophet in Medina and Mecca, always want to establish a theocratic government under their control, and are therefore disinclined to tolerate others in a multi-religious context: In terms of that tradition, modern Muslim views on political authority have their roots in the Prophet’s own personal legacy in Medina and

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12 • Introduction

Mecca, where he established territoriality, dár al-Islám, as the handmaid of religious faith. It was not long before the early Muslims were rallying round the political standard, ‘lá / hukm illá bi-illáhi’ (‘no government except under God’). The words have echoed down to our day, refined and mediated by the mediaeval theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) as a stringent theocratic credo … it is from Ibn Taymiyya, among others, that modernist Muslim reformers in the last two hundred years have received their marching orders … Ibn Taymiyya … spoke about the indispensability of God and the Prophet in political affairs, what he calls siyásah iláhíya wa inába nubúwíya (divine government and prophetic vice-regency). (Sanneh 1997, 211–12) It is this notion of ‘ jihadist tradition’, or ‘Islamic politicalism’ which lies at the root of the suggestion that Hausa Muslims are intolerant of Christians because the Muslims want to capture the Nigerian state for Islam. The fear – real or imagined – of ‘Islamization’ is a common thread that runs through Christian narratives of their encounter with Muslims in northern Nigeria. In a 2016 review of the situation of Christians in northern Nigeria by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Open Doors International, the situation of Christians is presented in near-apocalyptic terms. The report asserts that ‘Islam especially has the tendency to incite its adherents to violence’ (Anonymous 2016, 55). In a Foreword to the publication, CAN National Secretary, Rev. Musa Asake warned that ‘this systemic and persistent violence towards Christians in Northern Nigeria, if unchecked and halted, could lead to the extinction of Christianity and Christian communities in Northern Nigeria’ (ibid., 6). Christians are said to suffer from targeted violence through politically motivated communal clashes, the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen attacks. ‘They also suffer from marginalization and discrimination by forced Islamization through Sharia state governments and Islamic society at large’ (ibid., 7). The report claimed that in March 2015 about 500,000 Christians were forcibly displaced from their homes, and that between 2006 and 2014 an estimated 11,500 Christians were killed in religious violence. It further noted that within the period 2000 to 2014, over 13,000 churches were either abandoned, closed, destroyed or burnt. In the same period up to 1.3 million Christians had to flee their homes. Most of the violence is said to be in the Muslim-dominated far northern states, though the predominantly Christian Middle Belt has also come under attack from Muslim herdsmen in the rural areas. Between 2000 and 2014 Church life is reported to have diminished substantially in violence ridden areas, while the behaviour of Christians towards Muslims ‘deteriorated from negative to strongly nega-

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 13

tive due to experiences of perceived marginalization, discrimination and violence by Muslims’ (ibid., 7). Meanwhile, ‘Christians … face major challenges in coping with trauma, living in mixed communities, involvement in politics, and access to employment in government services’ (ibid.). Though the report acknowledged that ‘some Christians however have also brought conflict upon themselves through their own tribalism, political agenda, hatred, retaliation and violence’ (ibid., 9), the general tone of the report is that of Christians as victims of Muslim initiated violence.

Frames and counter-frames in encounter narratives Narratives matter in situations of conflict. Horowitz (1991) emphasizes this critical importance. Narratives are used to construct diagnostic (what happened) and prescriptive (what should happen) frames which help conflict actors to explain the situation and also prescribe a preferred course of response. In short, narratives frame both the understanding and the responses of the actors in the conflict. A key function of each narrative is to assign blame and responsibility, and in doing this, competing narratives do not just sit side by side, they actively attack the other explanations offered. ‘There is the conflict itself, and there is the meta-conflict – the conflict over the nature of the conflict. Neither is coterminous with the other; neither can be reduced to the other’ (Horowitz 1991, 2). The ways in which narratives trump facts in presenting Christians as the primary victims of Muslim violence in northern Nigeria can be illustrated through the examination of the cases of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen violence. By 2009, Boko Haram had become a major security threat in Nigeria. By 2014 the insurgency was having a devastating effect on the Christian and other communities of southern Borno and northern Adamawa states. Significantly, the Open Doors/CAN report discussed above is keen to create the impression that Christians are not just random victims of Boko Haram, like many other Nigerians, but that Boko Haram is specifically targeted at Christians: If Christians are victims ‘at random’ a demographic percentage can be applied to the number of victims that corresponds with the presence of Christians in Northern Nigeria (31.2%). But if it can be accepted that Christians are targeted in Northern Nigeria, the number of Christian victims may well exceed their demographic presence by 10% (41.2%). (Anonymous 2016, 16)

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14 • Introduction

Without doubt, Boko Haram has had a devastating impact on the Christian communities in the north, especially in southern Borno and northern Adamawa. But would it be right to argue that Christians are specifically targeted, and by implication, that Muslims are not so targeted? For example, Harnischfeger (2014, 56) argues: Boko Haram leaders chose their targets carefully. When operating in a Muslim environment, they were cautious not to harm ordinary people. School buildings, for instance, were burnt at night to ensure that pupils were not directly affected. When attacking Christians, however, they killed indiscriminately. Churches were bombed during Sunday services in order to produce as many casualties as possible: men, women, and children. Available evidence does not support the Open Doors/CAN (2016) and Harnischfeger (2014) claim that Christians are especially targeted while Muslims are not. Pérouse de Montclos (2016) has argued that quantitative data on violent deaths in Nigeria are sketchy. Even when some are available, they are prone to manipulation for political or sectional gains. The best available data on violent deaths in Nigeria is from the Nigeria Watch data base. Indeed, the Open Doors/CAN study draws its empirical data from this source. Significantly, however, the interpretations of the data by members of the Nigeria Watch group completely contradict that advanced by Open Doors/CAN. Chouin et al. (2014) noted that, at the beginning, the sect did not target Christians. Instead, Islamic clerics were targeted and many of them assassinated. It was only after the clash with the state in 2009 that the sect started targeting Christians and churches. Later, the sect took advantage of inter-communal crises in places like Plateau State to try to insert itself into those crises. From 2014, the sect has frequently carried out indiscriminate attacks against mosques. Chouin et al., using the Nigeria Watch data set, came to the conclusion that despite ‘an obvious increase in deadly attacks against Christian civilians, the combined data suggest that approximately two civilian victims out of three were Muslims’ (ibid., 213). ‘Similarly, the fact that Muslims clerics seem to have paid a higher price than pastors and other Christian clerics mirrors the reality of the campaign of terror led by Boko Haram’ (ibid., 227). Olojo (2016), also using the Nigeria Watch data set, notes that violent deaths per year caused by religious issues were escalating from 2006 to 2014. Within this context, he argues that the ‘notion that religious violence in Nigeria is always characterized by conflicts between religions (Muslims versus Christians) is too simplistic’ (ibid., 91). He points out that between June 2006 and May 2014, more fatal-

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 15

ities were recorded in religious conflicts between Muslim groups, than were recorded in religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians (ibid., 103).6 Refusal to properly interrogate the data often leads to the interpretation of the complex causes of deaths in monochromic Muslim-Christian binaries. There is no doubting that many Christians have been killed by Boko Haram and their places of worship and schools destroyed. Many Christian women have also been kidnapped and turned into sex slaves. In southern Borno, Christian communities have been targeted. The point, however, is that Muslims have also suffered these same atrocities at the hands of Boko Haram. However, by framing their narrative solely around the ‘targeting’ of Christians, Open Door/CAN and Harnischfeger drive a wedge between Muslims and Christians instead of uniting them against a common enemy. It is hardly surprising that ‘few Christians in southern Kaduna and Plateau states distinguish Islam and Muslims from Boko Haram’ (Mang 2014, 96). The persistent problem of violent clashes between Muslim Fulani herdsmen and largely Christian farmers in the Middle Belt – especially southern Kaduna, Plateau, Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa – is the second area where narratives are leading to problematic framing. These clashes have become perennial since the Sahelian drought of the 1970s started forcing the nomads further south. As Higazi notes in Chapter 9 of this volume, cattle rustling and herder-farmer violence became a prominent part of the conflict in the rural areas of the Jos Plateau after 2001. During the 2011 post-election political violence, farmers and herders clashed in southern Kaduna with extensive killings, especially of the herders. Since 2015, however, the spate of violent attacks by the Fulani herdsmen has increased, especially in southern Kaduna, Benue and Taraba states. Unfortunately, the federal government under President Buhari – with sole control over the police and other security agencies – has not been as forthright and energetic in addressing the repeated violence as might be expected of a government concerned with protecting the lives of its citizens. This failure of a robust response from the government has led to accusations of ethnic and religious favouritism; it has not passed unnoticed that, in 2001, then General Buhari had championed the cause of the Fulani herdsmen after one such clash with local farmers in the Oke-Ogun area of Oyo state resulted in the death of many herders. The repeated nature of the current attacks and the lethargic government response has led to accusations that the federal government is condoning ethnic and religious 6 Islamic group vs Christian group (religious issues), 57 fatalities; Islamic group vs Christian group (non-religious issues), 42; Islamic group vs Islamic group, 60; Islamic group vs security forces, 418; Islamic group vs vigilante groups, 7; community violence involving Muslims and Christians, 332 (Olojo 2016, 103).

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16 • Introduction

impunity.7 As for Open Doors/CAN, however, there seems to be a more sinister agenda at play. They argue that although the clashes could be assumed to be purely economic, ‘the religious overtones are believed by many Christians as attacks also aimed at conquering Christian lands in order to Islamize them’ (Anonymous 2016, 10). The ‘Fulani herdsmen attacks are connected to a missionary agenda to Islamize non-Muslim areas and … local Muslim politicians use these attacks to increase their power over non-Muslim owned land’ (ibid., 74). This specifically Christian religious framing also ignores the fact that the herdsmen also kill Muslims in different parts of northern Nigeria.8 The dismissal of the economic context and the framing of the violence in purely religious and political terms is problematic and plays into the increased religious polarization of Nigerian society since the late 1970s. There are indeed many environmental, demographic, and economic aspects of the clashes between herders and farmers which must be taken into consideration, if lasting solutions are to be found. There are currently an estimated thirty to forty million nomads in the world, of which some twenty million are Fulani (Badkhen 2015, 13). In Nigeria, there are said to be 8.1 million pastoralists, 4.5 per cent of the population, tending to 285,000 camels, 19,450,000 cattle, 71,000,000 goats and 40,550,000 sheep (UNECA 2017, 5). Many studies show that these nomads, spread across the Sahel, the Horn and the Great Lakes, from west to east Africa, and regardless of religion or ethnicity, are in a state of acute crisis. The widespread nature of the crisis and the related violence led the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to commission a study of new patterns of pastoralism. According to the report, preliminary ‘findings indicate that violent conflicts involving pastoralist communities have become widespread in many African countries, particularly in the Sahel and Horn’ regions (UNECA 2017). These pastoralists are involved in conflicts in Central African Republic, Chad, north-eastern Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Mali, and the conflicts involve pastoral-state and pastoral-farmer dimensions. Demographic and environmental change, along with resource competition with farmers and expanding cities, puts many pastoralists under stress. Many young pastoralists join jihadist and other rebel movements challenging the state. Easy availability of small arms has led to a general increase in the levels of violence. This is the context for the emergence of what the UNECA report called New Fringe Pastoralism (NFP) which: 7 It was only in April 2017 that the federal government finally decided to establish and deploy 3,000 ‘Agro-rangers’ from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence (NSCDC) personnel to protect farms and agricultural investments in the country (Odeyemi 2017). 8 See for example, Mosadomi 2017.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 17

refers to a small number of pastoralists who have become increasingly involved in transnational licit and illicit activities, such as facilitating illegal international migration, human trafficking and trading in arms, drugs and contraband. Some new fringe pastoralists either are directly involved in insurgencies and transnational religious extremism or indirectly facilitate the contribution of these groups. Although these pastoralists are small in numbers, their activities have far-reaching implications for the majority of pastoralists, most of whom lead peaceful and dignified lives. (UNECA 2017, 26) Local studies of Nigerian pastoralism support the broad findings of the UNECA report at the continental level. Kuna and Ibrahim (2016, 8–9) note the increase in rural banditry, cattle rustling, and social conflicts among the nomadic communities of northern Nigeria. They identify causal triggers such as ecological and climate change, shifts in the human and livestock population, expansion in non-agricultural use of land, weak state capacity and the lack of provision of security, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), the rise of criminality and insecurity in rural areas, and the weakening or collapse of informal conflict resolution mechanisms. For their part, Muhammad-Baba and Tukur (2016, 200) note the collapse of the grazing reserve system which is expected to meet the needs of the pastoralists; Nigeria has a total of 417 grazing reserves all over the country, out of which only about forty are functional. Many of the cattle tracks connecting the grazing reserves, burtali, have also been massively encroached upon by farmers or urban expansion, making passage difficult for pastoralist. By contrast, Spain continues to maintain a network of historic paths that exceed 125,000 km for the use of about 100 Spanish families that still engage in transhumance movement of their sheep on foot, ‘looking for the best grass’ (Geographical 2016, 30).9 Momale (2016, 91) notes that all these pressures external to the Nigerian nomadic community coincide with major demographic changes taking place within Nigerian nomadic families. In the 1970s, the average number of male children per nomadic family was about five. In more recent times, this number has gone as high as 15, leading to many idle young male hands within pastoral communities. It is these disenfranchised and feral young men who join armed gangs of rustlers, kidnappers, and form the core constituency of the New Fringe Pastoralism. Finally Ibrahim and Dabugat (2016, 290) draw attention to the fact that incidents of rural banditry go beyond just the Fulani; in southern Plateau, it is reported that the Christian Taroh are also involved in attacks, while in Nassarawa, the Christian Alago 9 In April 2017, The Federal Government announced that it will demarcate 6,000 km of cattle routes across the country during the year (Premium Times 2017).

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18 • Introduction

were mentioned. In Taraba State, the Muslim Hausa are said to be part of the cattle rustling gangs. Making sense of a complex reality, sometimes under conditions of incomplete information or social distress, is done through narratives and framing. Our two examples of conflict framing – Boko Haram and herdsmen-farmers conflict – draw our attention to the possibility of simplistic narratives leading to wrongful diagnostic and prescriptive framing along narrowly ‘religious’ lines which ignore important context issues that need to be part of the response to the crises. This process then feeds into the politics of emotions: fear, hate and contentious mobilization. Dog-whistle politics – employing coded language that appears to mean one thing to the general population but has an additional, different or more specific resonance for a targeted subgroup – is a pronounced part of this politics of religious contention. In the process, both Muslims and Christians demonize their opponents in the hope that they cement the ‘unity’ of their constituencies. ‘But the fossilization of feelings only expands the frontiers of bigotry and instills fear’ (Kukah & Falola 1996, 112).

The national context of religious encounters A proper comparison of the social impact of religion among the Yoruba and the Hausa should not just consider how indigenous religion, Islam and Christianity interacted in each case, and then evolved into two opposed trajectories – one tolerant, and the other less so. It should also situate both experiences within the context of the one country in which both groups are situated. Such a context is important because as Ryan (2006, 188–9) noted, every ‘religious man or woman has a context in which he or she exists religiously; there is no such human being as the ideal, decontextualized Jew, Christian, Muslim or Buddhist … Context does not imply imperfection; it merely asserts humanity, historicity, concreteness in a particular social and cultural setting’. Context is important in the political role religion plays in any society. While Islamic practices may be driven by the canons and scriptures, they are nevertheless heavily influenced by the cultural values and practices, and historical experiences prevalent in each Muslim country (Dowd 2015, 36). We therefore need to compare social, political, economic and religious conditions in order to understand the different ways in which people apply their faith to politics ibid., 2). Such attention to context might help to explain why northern Nigeria has taken the trajectory it has. For example, in her analysis of Hindu-Muslim conflicts in Bangladesh, Roy (1994, 20) notes the very intricate ways in which

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the psychology of individual actors are related to their material location in the society and the inequality between groups. It is not surprising that the systematic distributions of advantages and disadvantages of this sort get reproduced in the patterns of social conflict. From the early colonial period, Northern Nigeria was faced with educational, social and economic disadvantages, relative to Southern Nigeria. Looking at northern and southern Nigeria from the late colonial period, it becomes clear that northern leaders were acutely aware of the educational and material advantages of the south, vis-à-vis the north. As the process of decolonization gathered pace, northern alarm about potential southern domination increased. At the budget session of the Nigerian Legislative Council in March, 1948, Nnamdi Azikiwe introduced a motion that condemned the creation of ill will among the peoples of Nigeria and urged a ‘one Nigeria’ outlook. In the debate on that motion, Tafawa Balewa reaffirmed the northern position: Many [Nigerians] deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one … particularly some of the press people … This is wrong. I am sorry to say that this presence of unity is artificial and it ends outside this Chamber … The Southern tribes who are now pouring into the North in ever increasing numbers, and are more or less domiciled here do not mix with the Northern people … and we in the North look upon them as invaders. (Coleman 1960, 361) Similarly, on 18 February 1950, the editor of the Hausa weekly Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, stated that if Nigeria were granted self-government, he believed that Southerners will take the places of the Europeans in the North. What is there to stop them? They look and see it is thus at the present time. There are Europeans but, undoubtedly, it is the Southerner who has the power in the North. They have control of the railway stations; of the Post Offices; of Government Hospitals; of the canteens; the majority employed in the Kaduna Secretariat and in the Public Works Department are all Southerners; in all the different departments of Government it is the Southerner who has the power. (Coleman 1960, 362) With this level of apprehension in the north, it is hardly surprising that religion (Islam) and identity politics (Northernization programme) were invoked to defend the region against the perceived threat of replacing European domination with southern, Christian domination. It is impossible to understand the political role of religion in the North without

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20 • Introduction

framing the issue in the context of north-south regional competition in Nigeria. Significantly, disparities between the north and south and between Muslims and Christians have persisted to this day as shown by Table 1.1. Table 1.1 shows that, in 2013, the northern states are four times poorer than the southern states, with 73 per cent of the inhabitants of the northern states living in acute poverty, compared to 24 per cent of the inhabitants of the southern states. If the data is decomposed by religion, the same pattern emerges, with the Muslim-majority states being four times poorer than the Christian-majority states. Of the inhabitants of the Muslim-majority states, 70 per cent live in acute poverty, compared to 32 per cent of those in the Christian-majority states. Finally, the data is decomposed by the self-identified religious affiliation of the household head which is considered as the religion of the household members. When this information is not available, then the religion of the female spouse of the head of household is used. If this is not available, then the most frequent religion among the remaining members of the household for whom there is information is used. What we can see is that Islam and the traditional religion categories are the poorest and, given standard errors, neither is poorer than the other. Over 72 per cent of Muslims live in acute poverty, whereas 36 per cent of Catholics and 29 per cent of other Christians do. Catholics and other Christians are significantly less poor than Muslims or those with traditional religion. These long-run and systematic disadvantages of the Muslim and northern populations is happening in a context of high-level religious fragmentation and religious polarization. The Religious Fragmentation Index (RFI) is an estimate of the probability that two randomly selected individuals within a society would be of different religious groups. This measure is 0 if there is one religion and approaches 1 with many equally sized religions, such that increasing values mean more religious diversity. Another estimate of religious diversity is the Religious Polarization Index (RPI) which hypothesizes that religious communities that are nearly equal in terms of size are more likely to view each other as competitors for adherents and social influence than religious communities that are very different from each other in terms of size. For Nigeria, the RFI is 0.74, while the RPI is 0.84. Both tending towards 1 suggests high levels of both indicators (Dowd 2015, 55–9). Given these historical and continuing material realities, it is hardly surprising that religion should play a contentious role in the politics of northern Nigeria.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 21

Table 1.1  Nigeria: disparity of poverty levels (2013) Nigeria 2013 DHS data set

Multi-poverty index (MPI) a

Poverty headcount ratio (per cent)

By region Northern states

0.425

71.68

Southern states FCT Abuja

0.105 0.108

23.56 23.54

By religion Muslim majority statesb Christian majority states FCT Abuja Mixed states

0.427 0.143 0.108 0.177

70.4 31.5 23.5 35.6

0.167 0.133

35.6 29.4

0.444 0.451 0.171

72.3 76.7 37.4

By religion of household head Catholic Other Christians Islam Traditional Missing variable Notes

a. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative’s Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) measures three dimensions of poverty – education, health and standard of living – based on ten indicators: years of schooling, school attendance, child mortality, nutrition, access to electricity, sanitation, water, floor type, cooking fuel and assets. This is based on the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data set for 2013. The closer the number for an area or group is to 1, the higher the level of poverty in the designated area or group. For example, Catholics at MPI of 0.167 are poorer than ‘Other Christians’ at MPI of 0.133. b. Muslim-Majority States (15): Yobe, Zamfara, Bauchi, Kebbi, Jigawa, Sokoto, Katsina, Gombe, Kano, Borno, Niger, Kaduna, Oyo, Kwara and Osun; Christian-Majority States (15): Benue, Plateau, Ebonyi, Cross River, Ondo, Enugu, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Abia, Rivers, Imo, Edo, Ekiti and Anambra; Mixed-Population States (6): Taraba, Adamawa, Kogi, Nasarawa, Ogun and Lagos.

Patterns of the religious encounters in northern Nigeria There is also a spatial dimension to the religious encounters between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. In this regard, northern Nigeria can be divided into three main socio-religious belts – the core Muslim areas of the ‘far North’; the largely Christian Middle Belt or ‘lower

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22 • Introduction

North’; and a mixed transitional zone in between the two10. In the core Muslim areas of the far North – Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Maiduguri – Muslims and Christians live peacefully together for most of the time, with intermittent religious riots. Most, but not all, of the Christians in this zone are likely to be relatively well-to-do southerners in commerce, teaching, and the formal bureaucracies of business such as banking and transport. Many of these southerners also staff the federal bureaucratic institutions in the far North. A second belt of religious encounter with its own unique characteristics is the mixed transitional zone stretching from southern Borno and northern Adamawa to the east, all the way to southern Kaduna to the west (see shaded area in Map 1.2, p. 24). In local government areas (LGAs) such as Chibok, Hawul and Askira Uba in Borno south, Christians are a majority. Gwoza LGA has a more even demographic of Muslims and Christians, with Christians forming a majority in some towns and villages and Muslims in others. Muslims form the majority in Gwoza town (Higazi 2016). Christians also form a substantial part of the population of northern Adamawa, southern Gombe, a few LGAs in southern Bauchi, and in southern Kaduna. In Plateau State, Christians are in the majority. What is unique about the Christians in these belts is that they are a large share of the indigenous population of the area, unlike the non-indigenous southerners of the far North. The presence of indigenous Christian communities, who nevertheless constitute a minority in their states, complicates the nature of the encounter between Muslims and Christians in the transitional zone. On the one hand, both religious communities have a contentious pre-colonial history11 as Last (2007, 610–11) notes about the different parts of the Sokoto Caliphate: That state created and maintained dar al-Islam, the region where Islam was practised and shari’a law ruled; beyond its frontiers lay dar al-harb, the territory of war where non-Muslims ruled. The frontiers between the two zones were ‘closed’ by fortified strongholds and militarized emirates; non-Muslims were meant to be kept cowed by annual expeditions across the frontier, and forced to pay tribute in exchange for peace … The old frontier emirates, which had interacted with the non-Muslims of dar al-harb, therefore had rather a different lifestyle, different culture perhaps, from that of the core cities of the Sokoto Caliphate … In short, I suggest there were in effect two caliphates – the one at the core of the system, the other at its frontier – and as historians we tend to remember and celebrate the core caliphate; but it is the 10 These

socio-religious belts are different from the geo-political zones of the northeast, northwest and northcentral. 11 Also see David 2012.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 23

frontier caliphate that the now-Christian communities recall with distaste. It was their forebears who had survived the horrors of being in dar al-harb and had struggled to maintain there their traditional way of life. On the other hand, because of their current minority status, the Christian communities in this zone claim that they are subject to discrimination within their respective states, including cultural denigration, political exclusion in state and federal opportunities, and social and economic marginalization, especially in access to government jobs, contracts and appointments (Higazi 2016, 14). Unlike the southern Christians in the far North who are often better educated, have better economic networks, and are generally more well-to-do than their Muslim hosts and, as non-indigenes, have only limited local political and bureaucratic ambitions, the indigenous Christians of the transitional zone are relatively poorer than their Muslim compatriots in their respective states, live in less developed parts of the states, and generally experience a sense of marginalization in politics and the various state bureaucracies. When Boko Haram moved into southern Borno, it attacked both Muslims who did not agree with it and Christians, but Christians in this zone tended to be disproportionately affected. From 2013 Boko Haram drove out the Christians from many of the hill settlements in the Gwoza Hills (Higazi 2016, 45), though this assertion needs to be contextualized.12 Since the return to democratic politics in 1999, this transitional zone, especially around southern Kaduna, northern Plateau (see Map 1.3), and around southern Borno as a result of Boko Haram, has become the zone of much killing and bloodletting. On the whole, the indigenous Christians of the transitional zone are much more aggressive in condemning Muslim persecution compared to the southern Christians of the far North zone, though these latter Christians are more likely to be the victims of periodic rioting and looting. It is the indigenous Christians of the transitional zone who founded the Northern Christian Association in 1964 in response to the Jama‘atu Nasril Islam in 1962 in the context of the Sardauna’s Islamization campaigns. Its members were drawn from the main Protestant churches. 12 ‘My Mandara sources were very clear that the groups on the topmost mountains were clearly split, Muslims on some hills and Christians on others – and Christians tended to have the better land, the more prosperous sites. Hence, when Boko Haram became available in those hills, the Muslims sided with Boko Haram and used the occasion to take over, if they could, their rival (Christian) lineages’ sites. So in these instances, it was not so much Muslim v. Christian as prosperous v. less prosperous, all within one single (if large) ethnic group – the Guduf … I understand that quite a few such ‘ethnic’ groups have splintered this way, with Boko Haram as the occasion, not the cause, of fighting’ (personal communication, Professor Murray Last, April 2017).

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24 • Introduction

Map 1.2  Northern Nigeria (grey line) and its religious encounter (shaded area) (Human Rights Watch 2013, p. 26)

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 25

Map 1.3 Estimated number of people killed in inter-communal violence in Plateau and Kaduna states, Nigeria, January 2010 to November 2013 (Source: Human Rights Watch 2013, p. 26 © Giulio Frigieri, Human Rights Watch)

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26 • Introduction

In this intermediate zone, apart from southern Borno, there are two other sub-zones are of special conflict-sensitivity interest: the Jos Plateau and southern Kaduna (see Map 1.3). Around Jos, conflict flared after 2000, continuing intermittently almost to the time of writing. Though this crisis was largely concentrated in and around Jos city, a rural dimension soon emerged, involving the pastoral and farming communities of the Plateau region around Jos. The ways in which these urban and rural conflicts have played out, and the relatively successful peace-building efforts in the region are the subject of the third section of this volume. As we went to press, the situation in southern Kaduna was far less cheerful. This is an area in which domestic and transnational pastoral Fulani interacted with local farmers. Since the post-election crisis of 2011 in which many pastoral and non-indigenous groups were killed and chased out, the area has known no peace and in recent years has descended into an orgy of killings and counter-killings along religious and ethnic lines. The third and final zone of religious encounter in northern Nigeria comprises the Middle Belt states of Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba. This zone is just south of the transitional zone, and it has a heavy Christian population. Furthermore, Christian elites are prominent in the administration of these states, so the Christian communities feel less beleaguered, compared to the Christians of the transitional zone. The recent form of religious conflict in this Middle Belt zone is the recurrent clashes between Muslim Fulani herdsmen and Christian farming communities. These clashes also spill over into the transitional zone, especially in southern Kaduna. These herder-farmer clashes have also been prominent in southern Sokoto, southern and western Katsina, western Kaduna, and the most of Zamfara states. However, because clashes in these latter areas are between Muslim combatants on both sides, they do not fall within the remit of Muslim-Christian encounters. In general, the outlook of the Christians in the Middle Belt zone is in between those of the Christians in the far North and the transitional zones. It is therefore clear that just as the Muslim communities in northern Nigeria are very diverse (see Mustapha 2014), much the same can be said for the various Christian communities who are divided not just on theological grounds (see Mang 2014) but also on the historical and economic constitution of their various communities. The problems in religious encounters can derive from either the actions of state authorities or from wider attitudes and prejudices within society. In some cases, it can derive from both.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 27

Structure of the volume The core objective of this volume is to provide a better understanding of the problems of religious encounters in northern Nigeria through a dispassionate examination of the issues in contention and the key events through which these issues have erupted unto the public consciousness. As subsequent chapters will argue, Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria have lived peacefully together for most of the time, but from the 1980s a process of religious polarization and cyclical violence has set in, accelerating from 1999. Facts do not speak for themselves; they always have to be selected and interpreted, based on the gaze and framing of the observer. This volume is primarily concerned with the political, economic, social and historical processes underlying relations of both conflict and peace between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. Beyond this, the contributions also share the implicit assumption that peaceful coexistence is an important public good in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. The book is divided into three Parts. Part One contains three chapters which give the historical, demographic and other contexts of Muslim-Christian relations in northern Nigeria; Part Two, also containing three chapters, explores contemporary issues in Muslim-Christian relations – implementation of ‘full’ Sharia law, Boko Haram and the economy. Part Three concentrates on the experience of conflict and peace building around the city of Jos, from 1999 to 2015. As the Jos experience shows, societies in northern Nigeria have incredible capacities for both destruction and self-regeneration. Lessons from the latter process can point to possibilities of a better future for all. In Chapter 2, Ostien examines the different sects and movements that constitute the Muslim communities of northern Nigeria. He emphasizes the diversity within Muslims and, using various techniques, estimates the sizes of different constituent groups within Islam. In Chapter 3, Ehrhardt and Ibrahim address the question of the Christian communities in northern Nigeria, what they describe as a significant minority. They also note that there are important differences within Christian groups, from their theological positions to the roles of women within the church organization. Taken together, both chapters warn against the dangers of having a simplistic understanding of one Muslim bloc confronting an equally united Christian bloc. In Chapter 4, Mustapha, Ehrhardt and Diprose give a history of Muslim-Christian relations in northern Nigeria from the 1820s to the present. It is important that the more contemporary chapters are understood against the background of historical dynamics that have shaped the perceptions of both Muslims and Christians over the decades.

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28 • Introduction

Part Two concentrates on key contemporary issues in Muslim-Christian relations in northern Nigeria: the adoption of full Sharia law in some states; the Boko Haram insurgency, and the informal economy where most people still eke out a living. Chapter 5 by Mustapha and Gamawa examines the adoption of full Sharia law in twelve northern states from 2000. It provides a history for and evaluates developments since this adoption and considers legal pluralist approaches of access to justice in Sharia states. In Chapter 6, Pérouse de Montclos highlights the grievances of the Christian minority in southern Borno. He then addresses the question of Boko Haram mobilization. He draws attention to the various historical and environmental factors responsible for the mobilization of youths into Boko Haram, including the heavy-handedness of the security forces. Their repressive conduct and the use of excessive force come under some deserved questioning. Even religious people have to seek a living. In fact, it might be argued that religiosity is itself closely connected with one’s livelihood, or lack thereof. Most Nigerians make their living from the informal sector. In Chapter 7, Meagher looks at the intimate connections between livelihoods and religious affiliation in the northern informal economy. In particular, she presents an ethnography of informal economic relations across the Christian-Muslim divide in Kano and Kaduna, two major cities in northern Nigeria, in order to explore how informal economic institutions affect religious encounters. Meagher emphasizes three main findings. First, she notes the remarkable capacity of informal institutions to maintain inter-religious cooperation across a variety of economic activities. Second, she shows that the intra-religious organizations of Kano’s informal economy seem as resilient in the face of violence as the more religiously integrated organizations in Kaduna. A third unexpected outcome is that efforts to integrate the informal economy into state-based welfare and taxation systems appear to be doing more to stoke inter-religious grievances than to create a framework of integration and accountability between state and society. Part Three looks, not just at conflict, but also at varied peace-building efforts that have taken place in the many years of violent conflict in and around Jos. Current efforts at ‘interfaith’ dialogue in Nigeria often involves religious leaders, government leaders, academic experts, and theologians, making conciliatory declarations in the media (Olupona 1992). Interfaith efforts by people such as the Sultan of Sokoto, Sultan Abubakar III, Cardinal Onayekan, Emir Muhammad Sanusi II of Kano, and Archbishop Idowu-Fearon are highly constructive, sincerely motivated, and are much preferred to the incendiary and divisive speeches by other Muslim and Christian leaders. But such leadership and media-based approaches do not often bring along ordinary members of the community. A similar top-down approach to religious tolerance

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 29

was tried in post-apartheid South Africa. As soon as he was sworn in as President, Nelson Mandela visited a church, a mosque and a synagogue to underline his government’s commitment to religious pluralism. The new democratic government adopted a policy of non-alignment with any religious tradition or denomination, while promoting each religion’s access to the media and a multi-religious educational syllabus. Unfortunately the policies have failed because ‘while religious pluralism has been driven at the level of government, a commensurate level of interreligious harmony has not been witnessed in civil society’ (Omar 2006, 292). It is necessary to go beyond notable leaders, the media and government institutions if peaceful religious relations are to be built. Communities and the wider civil society will need to be involved as part of any meaningful strategy. With a better understanding of the issues, it might just be possible for people of goodwill, of all religious persuasions, to find it easier to find a common ground for ending the enduring cycles of religious conflict and violence in northern Nigeria. That is the driving objective of this volume. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is an international NGO based in Geneva and Nairobi, and was involved in the most intensive and community-oriented peace-building effort ever mounted in northern Nigeria up to 2013. Starting with months of preliminary work involving both local and international staff, HD launched a cross-community dialogue from March 2013, ending in November 2014 with the Peace Declaration agreed to and signed by all the eight communities involved in the negotiations. There is much to be learned from the community orientation and dialogic methods of HD, very different from the conflict freezing and top-down methods of various federal and state governments. HD’s work in Jos proves that beyond toleration, communities and societies need mutual respect and full acknowledgement of their differences. In Chapters 8, 9 and 10, a group of scholars look at the protracted and violent conflicts in and around Jos. In Chapter 8, Mustapha, Higazi, Lar and Chromy seek to explain why the violence broke out in Jos and the mechanisms used by various actors in the process. The authors show that there are several structural causes to the violence, including the struggle for ‘ownership’ of the city, the definition of who is an ‘indigene’ in Jos, and the competition for jobs, scholarships and political office. At the same time, however, they argue that these structural factors, several of which have been in place since the 1930s, cannot account for the escalation of violence from the late 1990s onwards. To explain this escalation, they argue, we must consider the political and administrative changes that were implemented in Jos after 1976. These changes reinforced threat perceptions among the main Jos communities – first the predominantly Christian Berom and later the Muslim Jasawa. As such, the conflict in Jos is best

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30 • Introduction

understood as a consequence of an increasingly dire security dilemma, driven partly by the structure of the federal Nigerian state. In Chapter 9, Higazi looks at the related but distinct phenomenon of rural conflict between Muslims and Christians in the Jos countryside. Though the urban and rural conflicts are related, they are far from identical, with different actors and drivers operational in each instance. Expanding geographically from the city into the rural areas of the Jos Plateau, Higazi gives an overview of the escalating violence between the region’s Muslim Fulani and Christian Berom communities. Given the lack of academic and policy attention that these rural conflicts have received, it is one of the major contributions of this chapter that it describes, in some detail, what this rural violence has looked like. Higazi argues that the recent violence, which escalated since 2010, is mostly driven by local issues such as intergroup inequalities and social problems like alcoholism and pauperization. At the same time he also outlines some of the structural factors that are likely to have contributed to the violence, such as Islamic religious reform among the Fulani, changing patterns of land use, competition over land, jobless youths and the opportunistic mobilization for violence conducted by political leaders. In Chapter 10, Mustapha, Higazi, Lar and Chromy give an overview of the various approaches to conflict resolution that have been undertaken in Jos and Plateau State. They describe the various top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace building and suggests some of their strengths and weaknesses. The results, they argue, are mixed. While many programmes have failed to have an impact, others have likely reduced the level of violence in the neighbourhoods where they have been implemented. In the end, they argue that two, partly contradictory, principles have guided the peace-building attempts in Jos: first, the aim for inclusive civic citizenship, and second, the attempt to respect the cultural and territorial rights of indigenous minority groups. The authors argue that this approach, combined with the intransigence and opportunism of some politicians, makes it difficult to find a mutually agreeable route to peace. Moreover, local-level confidence-building measures to address every-day fears and insecurities of the embroiled groups must be addressed before broaching the more substantively contentious issues of constitutional rights. Of all the approaches studied, the community-oriented and dialogic approach of HD seems to be the most promising. In Chapter 11, Mustapha and Ehrhardt draw out the main lessons of the volume. They note that, though religious polarization between Muslims and Christians has intensified in northern Nigeria, this is not a product of inherent antipathies between the faiths, but of historical, political, economic and social processes that are amenable to public policy interventions. They look to examples from other societies to explore

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 31

mechanisms for overcoming the zero-sum logic of religious intolerance. If the quest of Islam is peace, and that of Christianity love, academics and public intellectuals of good conscience from either faith, or no faith at all, in countries like Nigeria could commit themselves to seeking the truth about the entanglement of the faiths in society. The quest for peace, love and truth can form a realistic foundation for cultivating the unconditional respect for the sanctity and dignity of each and every human life.

Bibliography Abubakre, R. ‘Deremi, 1992, ‘Religion, Culture and Politics Among the Yoruba Muslims’, in Olupona, ‘The Dynamics of Religion’. Andersson, Ulrika, 2002, ‘Working with Spirits among Muslim Hausa in Nigeria: A Study of Bori in Jos’, Working Papers in Cultural Anthropology 11, Department of Cultural Anthropology & Ethnology, Uppsala University. Anonymous (Open Doors and CAN), 2016, ‘Crushed but not Defeated: The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria’, Harderwijk, The Netherlands: Open Doors International & Christian Association of Nigeria, available at: www. opendoorsuk.org/persecution/worldwatch/nigeria/documents/nigeria-report-48. pdf (accessed 28 June 2017). Badkhen, Anna, 2015, Walking with Abel: Journeys with the Nomads of the African Savannah, Riverhead Books, New York. Bako, Sabo, 1992, ‘World Economic Recession and the Growth of Religious Intolerance in Nigeria’, in Jacob K. Olupona (ed.), ‘Religion and Peace in Multi-Faith Nigeria’, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. Barkey, Karen, 2005, ‘Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 19 (1–2), The New Sociological Imagination II, 5–19. Barkindo, Ibrahim, 2011, ‘The Role of the Institution of Hisba in the Sharia Implementing States in Northern Nigeria’, An LLM Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Chouin, Gérard, Reinert, Manuel and Apard, Elodie, 2014, ‘Body Count and Religion in the Boko Haram Crisis: Evidence from the Nigeria Watch Database’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, African Studies Centre, Leiden. Cohen, Abner, 1969, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns, Routledge, London. Cooper, Barbara M., 1997, Marriage in Maradi: Gender and Culture in a Hausa Society in Niger, 1900–1989, Heinemann, Portsmouth. David, Nicholas, 2012, ‘A Close Reading of Hamman Yaji’s Diary: Slave Raiding and Montagnard Responses in the Mountains around Madagali (Northeast Nigeria and Northern Cameroon)’, University of Calgary, www.sukur.info/Mont/HammanYaji%20PAPER.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017). Dowd, Robert A., 2015, Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Geographical, 2016, Magazine of the Royal Geographical Society, ‘The Bigger Picture’, July. Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt. —— 2014, ‘Boko Haram and its Muslim Critics: Observations from Yobe State’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and

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32 • Introduction the State in Nigeria, African Studies Centre, Leiden. Higazi, Adam, 2016, ‘A Conflict Analysis of Borno and Adamawa States, Northeastern Nigeria’, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Copenhagen. Horowitz, D.L., 1991, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. University of California Press, Berkeley. Human Rights Watch, 2013, ‘Leave Everything to God’: Accountability for Inter-Communal Violence in Plateau and Kaduna States, Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, available at www.hr w.org/report/2013/12/12/leave-ever ything-god/accountability-inte r-communal-violence-plateau-and-kaduna (accessed 28 June 2017). Ibrahim, Jibrin and Dabugat, Kop’ep, 2016, ‘Rural Banditry and Hate Speech in Northern Nigeria: Fertile Ground for the Construction of Dangerous Narratives in the Media, in Kuna and Ibrahim, Rural Banditry. James S. Coleman, 1960, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. Juergensmeyer, Mark, 2003, ‘Thinking Globally about Religion’, in Juergensmeyer, Mark (ed.), Global Religions: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, Cary, NC,. Kukah, Matthew and Falola, Toyin, 1996, Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Ashgate, UK, Avebury. Kuna, Mohammed and Ibrahim, Jibrin (eds), 2016, Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja. Last, Murray, 1991, ‘Spirit Possession as Therapy: Bori among Non-Muslims in Nigeria’, in I. M. Lewis (ed.), Women’s Medicine. Alden Press, Oxford. —— 1993, ‘History as Religion: De-constructing the Magians (“Maguzawa”) of Nigerian Hausaland’, in J.-P. Chrétien (ed.), L’invention religieuse en Afrique: histoire et religion en Afrique noire. Karthala, Paris, 267–96. —— 2007, ‘Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An Economy of Political Panic’, The Round Table, 96 (392), 605–16. Mang, Henry Gyang, 2014, ‘Christian Perceptions of Islam and Society in Relation to Boko Haram and Recent Events in Jos and Northern Nigeria’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, African Studies Centre, Leiden. Momale, Sale B., 2016, ‘Changing Methods of Animal Husbandry, Cattle Rustling and Rural Banditry in Nigeria’, in Kuna and Ibrahim, Rural Banditry. Mosadomi, Wole, 2017, ‘Herdsmen Invade Mosque in Niger, Kill 21’, Vanguard, www. vanguardngr.com/2017/05/herdsmen-invade-mosque-niger-kill-21 (accessed 15 May 2017). Muhammad-Baba, T. A. and Tukur, Mohammed Bello, 2016, ‘The State of Grazing Reserves and their Potential Capacity to Absorb Pastoralists’, in Kuna and Ibrahim, Rural Banditry. Mustapha, Abdul Raufu (ed.), 2016, Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Communities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, Woodbridge: James Currey. Odeyemi, Joshua, 2017, ‘FG to Deploy 3000 “Agro-Rangers” to Tackle Herders, Farmers’ Clashes’ Daily Trust, 5 April, www.dailytrust.com.ng (accessed 5 April 2017). Okagbue, Osita, 2008, ‘Deviants and Outcasts: Power and Politics in Hausa Bori Performances’, New Theatre Quarterly, 24 (3), 270–80. Olojo, Akinola Ejodame, 2016, ‘Muslims, Christians and Religious Violence in Nigeria: Patterns and Mapping (2006–2014)’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Violence in Nigeria: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis, African Studies Centre, Leiden. Olupona, Jacob K., 1991, ‘Kingship, Religion, and Rituals in a Nigerian Community: A Phenomenological Study of Ondo Yoruba Festivals’, Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, Sweden. —— 1992, ‘The Dynamics of Religion and Interfaith Dialogue in Nigeria’, in Jacob K. Olupona (ed.), ‘Religion and Peace in Multi-Faith Nigeria’, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

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Religious encounters in northern Nigeria • 33 Omar, A. Rashied, 2006, From Resistance to Reconstruction: Challenges Facing Muslim-Christian Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, Brill, Leiden. Peel, J.D.Y., 2016, Christianity, Islam, and Orisa Religion: Three Traditions in Comparison and Interaction, University of California Press, Oakland. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, 2016, ‘Introduction: Arguments for a Qualitative And Quantitative Analysis of Violence in Nigeria’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Violence in Nigeria: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis, African Studies Centre, Leiden. Premium Times, 2017, ‘Nigerian govt to demarcate 6,000km cattle routes in 2017 – Official’, www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/228177-nigerian-govt-demarcate-60 00km-cattle-routes-2017-official.html (accessed 7 April 2017). Roy, Beth, 1994, Some Trouble With Cows: Making Sense of Social Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, Ryan, Patrick J., 2006, ‘In my End is my Beginning: Muslim and Christian Traditions at Cross-Purposes in Contemporary Nigeria’, in Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, Brill, Leiden. Sanneh, Lamin, 1997, Crown and the Turban: Muslims and West African Pluralism, Perseus Books Group, Boulder CO. Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi, 2006, ‘Politics and Sharia in Northern Nigeria’, in Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek (eds), Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, Palgrave, Basingstoke, UK. Sarro, Ramon and de Barros Miguel, 2016, ‘History, Mixture, Modernity: Religious Pluralism in Guinea-Bissau Today’, in Patrick Chabal and Toby Green (eds), Guinea-Bissau: Micro-State to ‘Narco-State’, Hurst & Co, London. Sinikangas, Maarit, 2004, Yan Daudu: A Study of Transgendering Men in Hausaland West Africa’, A Master Thesis in Cultural Anthropology Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University, Sweden. Smith, Mary F., trans. (1981), Baba of Karo: a Woman of the Muslim Hausa, Yale University Press, New Haven and London. UNECA – United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2017 ‘New Fringe Pastoralism (NFP): Conflict and Insecurity and Development in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel’, UNECA, Addis Ababa. Voll, John, 2006, ‘African Muslims and Christians in World History: The Irrelevance of the “Clash of Civilizations”’ in Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, Brill, Leiden. Yai, Olabiyi Babalola, 1992, ‘Postscript’, in Jacob Olupona (ed.), ‘Religion and Peace in Multi-Faith Nigeria’, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

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Part One The Muslim & Christian Context

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2 The Muslim majority in northern Nigeria Sects & trends PHILIP OSTIEN1

Introduction Since 2010, the news from northern Nigeria has been dominated by Boko Haram, the radical sect that has been terrorizing the north-east in particular. But notwithstanding all the people they have killed and the other kinds of damage they have caused, Boko Haram comprises only a tiny fraction of northern Muslims. They are discussed in this chapter; but the more important aim is to describe the full spectrum of Muslims in Nigeria’s north, in all their diversity of religious belief and practice. Ethnic diversity also comes in, because of its links to sectarian difference. There is a history of sectarian conflict, as new groups enter and compete for followers, but also what appears to be increasing Muslim tolerance of religious diversity among themselves. The richness of civil society among the Muslims is illustrated with circumstantial details of some of the groups they form and the programmes of da’wah and good works they undertake. Government is an important factor, both as a system of mostly non-Islamic institutions to which Muslim attitudes may differ, and as a sometimes-heavy-handed regulator of religious practice, including preaching and proselytization. Other aspects of the complex scene are sketched ad hoc.

1

I am grateful to the editors of this volume, and to Paul Beckett, Muhammad S. Umar, Ahmed S. Garba, Baba Bala Muhammad and Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, which have helped me to avoid some errors and to make other improvements. Any remaining errors of fact or interpretation are entirely my own.

37

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38 • The Muslim & Christian Context

Northern Nigeria The term ‘Northern Nigeria’ formerly designated one of the country’s principal administrative units, along with Eastern Nigeria and Western Nigeria. In 1954, when Nigeria became a federation, the Northern, Eastern and Western Regions were the federating partners, and they remained so at Independence in 1960. But beginning in 1967 the regions were subdivided into states: 12 in 1967, now 36 plus the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja (FCT). One can only now speak, more vaguely, of ‘northern Nigeria’, with the adjective un-capitalized. Sometimes this is used to mean all of the 19 states (plus FCT) that have been carved out of the old Northern Region. Sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean ‘the far north’, comprising today’s 12 ‘Sharia states’ (Ostien 2007; Ostien & Dekker 2010). Map 2.1 clarifies these distinctions. This chapter discusses the Muslim population of northern Nigeria in the broader sense.

Ethnic difference in the north The seven more southerly states of the ex-Northern Region – Kwara, Kogi, Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau, Taraba and Adamawa – resisted the Sharia implementation impulse that swept the farther north in the early 2000s, enacting none of the relevant legislation. But similarly, in the three north-easternmost states – Borno, Yobe, and Gombe – although the centrepieces of the Sharia-implementating legislation, bringing in Sharia Courts and Islamic criminal law, were all enacted, they have never been brought into force or applied: Borno, Yobe and Gombe are ‘Sharia states’ on paper only (Ostien and Dekker 2010; Alkali et al. 2012). So there are obviously very different attitudes towards Sharia implementation across the north, even in states where the percentages of Muslims are high. These differences correlate quite strongly with ethnic differences among the peoples. The western two-thirds of the far north, where Sharia implementation has been strongest, is dominated by the Hausa language and Hausa culture. The eastern third of the far north, where Sharia implementation has been nominal only, is predominantly Kanuri. The seven southerly non-Sharia states are substantially Nigeria’s ‘Middle Belt’ – a construct in which are often also included the southern parts of Kebbi, Niger, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe and Borno States. Kwara State, in the north’s south-west, is predominantly Yoruba. Though its percentage of Muslims is high, it did not join the Sharia implementation movement even nominally; in their religious practices, its people are closer to the Muslims of Nigeria’s Yoruba south-west than to the Hausas of the far north (Gbadamosi 1978; Peel 2000; Makinde and Ostien 2011).

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The Muslim majority in northern Nigeria: Sects & trends • 39

Map 2.1 Nigeria, showing various boundaries, and percentages of Muslims by current state per 1963 census (courtesy of University of Wisconsin-Madison African Studies Program and Cartography Lab; percentages of Muslims by current state per Ostien 2012b)

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40 • The Muslim & Christian Context

Elsewhere in the Middle Belt there still exists today an incredible diversity of languages, mostly from an entirely different language family than those of the far north, each language associated with its own larger or smaller ethnic group, each group still trying to preserve as much as possible of its linguistic and cultural identity and its former local sovereignty. Percentages of Muslims in these other states are lower than in Kwara or the farther north, and that no doubt helps explain their resistance to Sharia implementation. Ethnic difference is in any case only partially correlated with doctrinal and sectarian difference among the Muslims. It is far from determinative: all varieties of doctrine and practice are to be found in all ethnic groups. Further relationships between ethnicity and sectarian affiliation among the Muslims will be apparent in what follows. PERCENTAGES OF MUSLIMS IN THE NORTHERN STATES

The last Nigerian censuses that gathered data on religious affiliation were those conducted in 1952 and 1963. The country was then divided for administrative purposes, not into states, but into regions, provinces and divisions, with further subdivisions into districts and Native Authorities. The smallest units for which data on religious affiliation are given in the census reports are the divisions. Allocation of the old divisions, and of the census data associated with them, to the present states, as nearly as may be (per Ostien 2012b), originally produced the data colour-coded in Map 2.1 (now grey tones). Table 2.1 gives details for the states of the ex-Northern Region, grouped by geo-political zone,2 and within each zone listed in descending order of percentages of Muslims in 1963; the numbers for the ‘Total North’ are given in the last row. Many observations could be made on these data. For one thing, they confirm the Muslim majority in the Northern Region in 1963: 71.7 per cent. Probably this is not far off the figure today. But the data also indicate the diversity of the religious mixes in 1952 and 1963, as between Muslims, Christians and Others (principally ‘animists’ or ‘pagans’ as they were then known: followers of African Traditional Religions), in different parts of the north. The data also show the almost uniform reduction across the north in the percentages of ‘Others’ from 1952 to 1963 (only Kano and Katsina show slight increases), as the two missionary religions, Islam and Christianity, were both trying to win converts from the Traditionalists, and both were succeeding – to different degrees in different places. It is unfortunate that no subsequent census or other systematic survey has 2 ‘Geo-political zones’: six groups of states, three in the north, defined in Nigeria’s Federal Character Commission Act and used by it to try to ensure that Nigeria’s jobs and wealth are equitably distributed among its peoples (see Mustapha 2007); the groupings are much used for other purposes as well.

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The Muslim majority in northern Nigeria: Sects & trends • 41

Table 2.1  Data on religious affiliation in ex-Northern states, from 1952 and 1963 censuses, by geo-political zone, in descending order of percentages of Muslims in 1963 Present state (exnorth)

1952 % Muslim

% Christian

1963 % Animist and Other

% Muslim

% Christian

% Other

North-west geo-political zone Sokoto

96.3

0.5

3.2

98.9

0.4

0.7

Zamfara

96.3

0.5

3.2

98.9

0.4

0.7

Jigawa

98.4

0.4

1.3

98.0

0.8

1.2

Kano

97.8

0.5

1.7

97.0

1.1

1.8

Katsina

95.2

0.3

4.5

94.6

0.4

5.1

Kebbi

79.0

0.3

20.7

85.5

0.5

14.0

Kaduna

57.3

10.2

32.5

55.7

25.1

19.2

North-east geo-political zone Yobe

87.3

0.5

12.2

94.8

1.0

4.2

Borno

80.9

0.6

18.5

88.3

2.7

8.9

Bauchi

76.3

1.1

22.6

83.4

1.6

14.9

Gombe

70.1

2.5

27.4

75.0

6.2

18.8

Adamawa

32.9

3.8

63.3

34.6

16.0

49.4

Taraba

19.0

2.0

78.0

26.2

13.7

60.0

North-central geo-political zone Kwara

63.4

6.5

30.1

75.6

13.6

10.8

Niger

46.8

3.5

49.7

62.4

4.0

33.6

Kogi

22.5

18.5

59.1

37.5

28.2

34.2

Nasarawa

23.4

7.8

68.8

30.2

13.8

56.0

Plateau

25.5

11.4

63.1

26.1

23.2

50.7

Benue

2.8

7.1

90.1

2.8

53.4

43.8

73.0

2.7

24.3

71.7

9.7

18.6

Total north Total north

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42 • The Muslim & Christian Context

collected data on religious affiliation, so that we could know with reasonable accuracy how that process has played out over recent years, and how other factors, such as population movements and birth rates, may have affected the religious mixes in the various states.3 It is probable, however, that the percentages of Muslims are still mostly within the wide bands shown in Map 2.1.

Muslim sects in the northern states: overview Between December 2008 and April 2009, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life conducted public opinion surveys in 19 sub-Saharan African countries, inquiring into the religious beliefs and practices of the people (Pew Forum 2010). In Nigeria, this involved detailed interviews in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Pidgin, and Igbo, with a nationally representative sample of the adult population. The data for Nigeria (ibid. Appendix C: 66) are shown in Table 2.2. Two questions asked of self-identified Muslims are, first: Q37.  Are you Sunni (for example, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, or Hanbali), Shia (for example, Ithnashari/Twelver or Ismaili/Sevener), or something else? The answers to this question given by Nigerian Muslim interviewees, by percentages (ibid. Chapter 1, 21) are shown in Table 2.3. These numbers may surprise students of Nigerian Islam on two counts. One is the high percentage of Shi’as indicated. The second is the high percentage of respondents identifying with none of the major sects, calling themselves ‘just a Muslim’. The fact is that, in terms of their belief and practice, the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims in all parts of the country are Sunnis of the Maliki School of law. But there is a substantial and perhaps growing number who are weary of sectarian strife and want to get beyond it. It is interesting that, on the evidence of the Pew survey, this can extend even to refusing to identify themselves as Sunnis as opposed to Shi’as or something else. It may also be that many just do not know these distinctions. In any case, let us assume that the 42 per cent of Nigerian respondents who said they were ‘just a Muslim’, are actually Sunnis: ‘just a (Sunni) Muslim’. Adding the 38 per cent who self-identified as such, this implies that 80 per cent of Nigerian Muslims are Sunnis, plus or minus 3 The Islam Research Project – Abuja did go some way towards constructing a proxy, in lieu of any better current data, for populations by religion in the northern states, namely, percentages of elected officials by religion in the states. Complete data proved difficult to collect, however, especially at the local government level, so the information is not presented here; but see Ostien 2012a, 9–10; Alkali et al. 2012, 8–9; Bunza and Mustapha 2012, 5.

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Table 2.2  Pew survey sample sizes and margins of error (Nigeria) Total population

Among Christians

Among Muslims

Sample size

Margin of error

Sample size

Margin of error

Sample size

Margin of error

1,516

±4 points

678

±6 points

818

±5 points

Table 2.3  Pew survey results: Sunni, Shia or something else (Nigerian Muslims – percentages) Sunni

Shia

38

12

Ahmadiyya

3

Something else

2

Just a Muslim

42

Don’t know/ Refused to answer

4

the 5 per cent margin of error. This seems about right. The non-Sunnis, as the Pew data indicate, include Shi’as and Ahmadiyya, discussed below, as well as two varieties of Qur’aniyyun and other small sects. But what of sects among the Sunnis? Question 38 of the Pew survey gives us some insight here: Q38.  Do you identify with any Sufi orders – such as Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya, Christiyya, Shadhiliyya, Alawiyya, or Muridiyya – or not? IF YES, ASK: Which ones? The answers to this question by percentages are (Pew Forum 2010, Topline Questionnaire, 158) are shown in Table 2.4. These answers are less surprising than those to the previous question. They indicate that about 37 per cent of Nigerian Muslims identify with some Sufi order, the most popular being the Tijaniyya, followed by the Qadiriyya and then other small sects. The Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya in Nigeria have both themselves subdivided, into ‘traditional’ and ‘reformed’ subsets, discussed later. All the sects named in Table 2.4, totalling 34 per cent, are Sunni Sufis, leaving approximately 45 per cent who are Sunnis but not Sufis still to be accounted for. Certainly, of this large number, many really are non-sectarian: ‘just a (Sunni) Muslim’. But there is also an important subset of the non-Sufi Sunnis who are extremely sectarian. They are the Salafists: not only non-Sufi, but militantly anti-Sufi. They grew strong in parts of northern Nigeria in the 1970s and 1980s under the name of ‘Izala’: Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’a Wa’ikamatis Sunnah, ‘The Islamic Organisation for Eradicating

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Table 2.4  Pew survey results: Sufi or non-Sufi (Nigerian Muslims – percentages) Yes, identify with Sufi order – which one No,

Don’t

do not identify with Sufi

know/ Tijan-

Qadir-

Christ-

Shadh-

Alaw-

Murid-

Other

DK/

iyya

iyya

iyya

iliyya

iyya

iyya

order

Refused

to answer

orders

56

Refused

19

9

2

2

1

1

1

2

8

Innovation and Establishing Sunnah’, dedicated to fighting Sufi ‘innovations’. Today the Salafists are divided into a number of different groups, all anti-Sufi, but taking different attitudes towards modernity and the modern Nigerian state. Most are reformers, working for change from within. But some, like Boko Haram, are radicals, actively trying to overthrow the state and establish an Islamic one in its place. The sectarian strife that large numbers of Nigeria’s Sunnis are weary of is primarily the Sufi vs. anti-Sufi strife occasioned by Nigeria’s Salafists. When they say they are ‘just a (Sunni) Muslim’ many of them are saying they want no part of all that conflict. The Pew survey data provide no basis for estimating how large Nigeria’s Salafist movement is as a percentage of all the Muslims. Judging from the amount of attention Izala has received over the years, scholarly and otherwise, one might have thought the proportion to be quite high – perhaps one-quarter or more. But another recent survey suggests otherwise. In 2011 the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University conducted interviews of representative samples of Muslims in seven countries in Western Europe, West Africa and Malaysia, investigating attitudes towards a wide range of matters ( Jacobson et al. 2012). Question 7 of the Arizona survey inquired about certain practices engaged in by many Muslims, namely ziyarah (visiting the tombs of sheikhs and saints), polygamy, eating certified halal food, using tasbih (prayer beads), practising zikr (meditation), and practising mavlid (Hausa: maulidi) (celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday including recitation of poems praising him and other devotional observances). The question was: Q7.  People have various opinions about the following practices of Muslims. Are the following practices essential, desirable, makes no difference either way, or essential not to do for Muslims [and then going through the enumerated practices one by one]. (Ibid: 32–3)

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Salafists tend to condemn four of the enumerated practices – ziyarah, using tasbih, zikr and mavlid – as bid’ah (innovation), precisely the sorts of ‘innovations’ they want to root out; Salafists would be expected to say that all of them are ‘essential not to do for Muslims’. But in Nigeria, according to the Arizona survey, only tiny percentages of Muslims said it was ‘essential not to do’ most of them: 0.8 per cent for tasbih, 1.3 per cent for zikr and 0.3 per cent for mavlid (ibid.). This suggests surprisingly low percentages of Salafists. On the other hand, 15.3 per cent of Nigerian interviewees said it was ‘essential not to do’ ziyarah. This is perhaps more indicative of the strength of Salafist opinion than the others, ziyarah being closely associated with the sort of veneration of saints that Salafists especially abhor, regarding it as they do as a form of shirk, polytheism. But many ‘non-sectarian’ Muslims probably feel the same way. An educated guess therefore might reasonably fix the number of Salafists at around 12 per cent of Nigerian Muslims – plus or minus a healthy margin of error, something the Arizona survey does not specify for its results. Allowing 3 per cent for other Sunni sects – e.g. the Mahdists – this would leave about 30 per cent, out of the 45 per cent of Nigerian Muslims who are Sunnis but not Sufis, for the vague but important category of ‘just a (Sunni) Muslim’. Much is being made here of slim data and much guesswork. But to summarize: • From Table 2.3, based on the Pew survey, the percentage of Nigerian Muslims who are Sunnis is estimated at 80 per cent ± 5 per cent, but only assuming that all those who said they are ‘just a Muslim’ are actually Sunnis. From the same table, the percentage of Nigerian Muslims who are non-Sunnis is estimated at 17 per cent, of which 12 per cent are Shi’a, 3 per cent are Ahmadiyya, and 2 per cent are ‘something else’, allowing in each case for the margin of error. This leaves 3 per cent of Nigerian Muslims unaccounted for. • From Table 2.4, based on the Pew survey, the percentage of Nigerian Muslims who are Sunni Sufis is estimated at 35 per cent. • Based on the Arizona survey, the percentage of Nigerian Muslims who are Sunni Salafists is estimated at 12 per cent, and the percentage who are non-sectarian Sunnis (‘just a (Sunni) Muslim’) is estimated at 30 per cent, leaving an estimated 3 per cent as members of other Sunni sects (Table 2.5). Both of the surveys relied on for these estimates cover the whole of Nigeria; the numbers would be different for the north alone, which is the subject of this chapter. The reader should recognize a healthy margin of error arising from the imprecisions of the data-collection methods. As has

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Table 2.5  Summary of estimates of percentages of Nigerian Muslims by sect, based on Pew and Arizona surveys Non-Sunnis Shia

Ahmadiyya Other

12

3

Not accounted for

Sunnis

2

Sufis

Salafists

35

12

Just a (Sunni) Other Muslim 30

3

3

already been suggested, within the north the sectarian mix varies from place to place and from ethnic group to ethnic group. But leaving these generalizations behind, we now turn to look at the sects and other groups themselves in more detail. The sources of information are the three studies done by the Islam Research Project – Abuja (IRP-Abuja), of Muslims in Nigeria’s North-west, North-east, and North-central geo-political zones (Bunza and Mustapha 2012; Alkali et al. 2012; Ostien 2012, respectively), together with other studies and authorities cited in the text. We begin with the non-Sunnis.4

Non-Sunnis SHI’AS

The Shi’as split off from the Sunnis very early in the history of Islam, over issues about the succession to the leadership of the Muslim community that need not detain us here (see Bunza and Mustapha 2012, 15); but they came quite late to Nigeria – only in the 1980s. Islamic Movement in Nigeria

The group in Nigeria most commonly referred to as ‘Shi’a’ are the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), sometimes also called ‘the Muslim Brothers Movement’.5 This movement started in the early 1980s when many young Nigerian Muslims, especially students in northern universities, were inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979 and by its ideological purity: Western impositions must be cast off, pious Muslims must rule, and Sharia must be the law of the land. Literature from Iran flooded into the country. Some northern students visited Iran and held counsel with 4

The influence of M.S. Umar on the foregoing discussion is gratefully acknowledged. ‘Islamic Movement’: see http://www.islamicmovement.org; and Abdussalam 2012. ‘Muslim Brothers Movement’ or more briefly ‘Brothers Movement’: see Modibbo 2012, which has a good section on this group; also CDRT 2005, 27. 5

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the ruling mullahs there. Among them was Ibraheem Yaqoub Zakzaky of Zaria, now known as Sheikh Ibraheem El Zakzaky. Zakzaky founded the IMN and remains its leader. There is some question whether Zakzaky and the IMN are actually orthodox Shi’a, e.g. of the Twelver school that prevails in Iran or other varieties known elsewhere in the world. They have adopted some Shi’a practices: for instance, they celebrate the Day of Ashura, the Shi’a day of mourning for the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of Prophet Muhammad. But do they, for instance, believe in the imamate and the rule of fuqaha in the present day? 6 Zakzaky himself has downplayed the IMN’s Shi’a image (Zenn 2013b). The Amir of its Plateau State branch takes a similar line, saying that it is a misconception of some Muslims that the movement is indoctrinating Shia doctrine among Nigerian Muslims; this misconception has been a stumbling block towards its da’wah programme [7] as many Sunni youths are still hesitating to support its struggle. This misunderstanding is a result of the fact of its admiration of Imam Ayatollah Khomeini as a model in its da’wah activities. (Modibbo 2012, 13) But a different conclusion is suggested by the following report of an incident in Kano State, when the Director of Da’wah of the Kano State Sharia Commission was called in to deal with some Shi’a preachers; the report also illustrates one of the ways in which unorthodox sects are sometimes handled by government authorities in the north: In Garko Local Government, some Shia were preaching their ‘dangerous ideology’. This was reported to the Director. He called the Chairman of the Garko Sharia Council and they discussed the matter. At some point the Director went to Garko to see for himself what was happening. He went on a Friday, and went to listen to the preaching of the Shia. Among other things they were attacking the first three Caliphs [as being usurpers of the succession to Prophet Muhammad which rightfully belonged to Ali: this is classical Shia doctrine]. The Director and others agreed that this should not be allowed to continue. So they ‘drove out’ the Shia. Not by bringing 6 ‘Imamate’: in Shi’a theology, the institution of successorship to the Prophet Muhammad as divinely appointed and inspired leader of the Muslim community. In Twelver Shi’ism, the first Imam was Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law; the twelfth and last was Muhammad al-Mahdi, believed to have gone into a state of hiding (‘occultation’) in 874 C.E., pending his reappearance as the Mahdi at the end of time. For more on Mahdism see below. ‘Rule of fuqaha’: rule by Islamic jurists ( fuqaha; sing. faqih), experts in fiqh, Islamic law and jurisprudence; in Iran, this means rule by the ‘Leader’, currently Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, and members of the Guardian Council appointed by him, who have the last word in government. 7 Da’wah: issuing a summons; making an invitation; calling people to Islam; preaching or explaining Islam.

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in the police, or physically removing them, which would have made martyrs of them and which they would have liked. Instead some of the preaching organisations in the Majalisar Kungiyoyin Da’wah [Council of Da’wah Organisations] brought powerful loudspeakers to the place where the Shia were preaching, and started ‘counter-preaching’: debunking the things the Shia were saying and teaching the correct things. Eventually the Shia just went away. The Director said that of course they would simply go elsewhere and start again, and the struggle would be renewed.8 Zakzaky also figures prominently in a video on IMN made by PressTV, Iran’s television network, which calls IMN ‘the major Shia movement in Nigeria’.9 What is sure about the ideology of IMN is that like the Iranians they believe that Islam – pious Muslims in some form – must rule, and that Sharia must be the law of the land. Accordingly they reject the Nigerian constitution and laws as deriving from illegitimate sources, and say they work for the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria, whose constitution would be the Qur’an and the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. They denounce democracy at least as it exists in theory and certainly in practice in Nigeria. They do not approve of working for or cooperating with government. They do not sing the national anthem or say the pledge of allegiance or respect the flag. They denounced the programmes of Sharia implementation begun in 12 northern states in 1999/2000 as shams and inevitable failures, undertaken as they were by un-Islamic governments. After 30 years of proselytizing they are ‘widespread, with … branches and followers in almost every village, town and city in the Northern States’ (CDRT 2005, 27). They are capable of mobilizing large crowds. What they have not done is to take up arms against the state or against other Muslims, except in occasional clashes with other sects, especially in Sokoto; that has been left to the Sunni radicals of Boko Haram and Ansaru. Bunza and Mustapha (2012, 15–18) provide a good discussion of these and other matters related to IMN (see also Alkali et al. 2012, 13–14, 20–21; Umar 2001, 138–9). Given their views, the IMN have of course been under the watchful eyes of the authorities. Over the years, Zakzaky was arrested several times, but never held for long. Then, on 12 December 2015, a serious clash erupted in Zaria, between a crowd of IMN demonstrators and the Nigerian Army. Large numbers of IMN members were killed and Zakzaky himself 8 Written from notes of the author’s interview with the Director of Da’wah, Kano State Sharia Commission, conducted in Kano on 28 May 2010. 9 ‘Shiism is Growing in Africa / Nigeria’, www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSq JBWbDzuk, published 25 March 2013. I am grateful to Paul Beckett for calling this video to my attention (accessed 28 June 2017.)

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was seriously injured.10 As at this writing (October 2016) he remains in custody, pending government action on the recommendations of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry that was appointed to investigate the incident.11 Meantime, there have been further clashes between the authorities and the IMN, and between other Muslims and the IMN,12 which one can only hope do not portend a new period of sectarian warfare in Nigeria. Rasulul A’azam Foundation (RAAF)

At least two groups have split off from Zakzaky and the IMN. One is the Kano-based Jama’atul Tajdid Islam ( JTI), which left IMN in 1994, accusing Zakzaky of promoting Shi’ism. JTI rejected the Shi’ism but kept the radicalism (for a time); it is discussed further below. The other group is Rasulul A’azam Foundation (RAAF), led by Sheikh Muhammad Nura Dass, which left IMN in 1992, accusing Zakzaky of being excessively confrontational towards the Nigerian state: RAAF rejected the radicalism but kept the Shi’ism. Though now also headquartered in Kano, RAAF is strongest in Gombe and Bauchi … [It] prides itself as the only orthodox Shiite organization in Nigeria based on the teachings of Imam Ja’afar, hence their type of Shiism [ Ja’afari or Ithna’ashari (Twelver)] is as practiced in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. It is non-confrontational in its practice, and concerned more with Shiite doctrine and rituals than with confrontational politics. Thus, while IMN sees nothing good in the Nigerian State due to its secular nature and the injustices perpetrated by its leaders, RAAF not only recognizes the state as legitimate, but also argues that it must be obeyed. (Alkali et al. 2012, 14)13 10 Among

many other reports and discussions of the incident, from 12 December 2015 onward, see I. Sa’idu, ‘Scores Die in Army, Shi’ite Clash in Zaria’, Daily Trust, 13 December 2015. 11 The ‘Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into the Clashes Between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Army (NA) in Zaria, Kaduna State Between Saturday 12th and Monday 14th December 2015’ was submitted to the Governor of Kaduna State on 15 July 2016, and its contents were being reported the next week (see S. Ogundipe, ‘Judicial panel slams Nigerian Army, Police, SSS for Zaria massacre of 347 Shi’ites’, Premium Times, 20 July 2016). As at October 2016 it appears that only the Table of Contents and Executive Summary are online, see http://kdsg.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ Executive-Summary-of-the-Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-theZaria-Clashes.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017), although the rest of the report is in circulation in PDF format. As to Zakzaky’s continued detention, see e.g. B. Isaiah, ‘Shiites To Storm Abuja Over Detention of El-Zakzaky’, Leadership, 4 October 2016. 12 See e.g. A. Withnall, ‘Nine Dead as Nigeria Police Open Fire on Shia Muslim Procession Marking Ashura’ Independent, 12 October 2016; A. Ajijah et al., ‘Anti-Shiite Violence Spreads to Kano, Sokoto, Katsina; 8 Killed’, Premium Times, 12 October 2016. 13 RAAF has a Facebook page, and is occasionally in the news, e.g. ‘We’re not part of El-Zakzaky group – Shi’a Muslims’, Today, 30 April 2016, www.today.ng/news/ nigeria/114483/were-not-part-zakzaky-group-shia-muslims.

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The Ahmadiyya are a sect stemming from late-19th-century India and present in Nigeria since the 1920s, most notably among the Yoruba (Fisher 1963; Balogun 1974; Loimeier 1997, 159–62; Olayiwola 2007, 143–60). In the north-east zone they are ‘present only in Bauchi’ (Alkali et al. 2012, 16). In the north-west zone, they run mosques, schools and social activities in many cities. Apart from their ethnic Yoruba particularity, they are also noted for having active participation by women in the activities of the groups. They are noted for their missionary zeal in spreading access to Western education and health services (Bunza and Mustapha 2012: 19). Probably their greatest numbers in the north are to be found in the western part of Kogi State, inhabited by a Yoruba sub-group, the Okun: The Ahmadiyya are found in major towns in Okunland, such as Ayetoro-Gbedde, Ayegunle-Gbedde, Iyamoye and Ogidi. They account for about 40% of the Muslim population in those areas … Recently, a tiny group of Ahmadiyya (consisting about four people only) appeared in [Igalaland] and made Ankpa their base from where they carry out their preaching activities at nearby villages such as Ikanekpo and Ogodu. They have not been able to win a single Muslim to their fold … By and large, the Sunnis could be said to account for about 95%, the Ahmadiyya for 4.5% and the Shia for 0.5% of the Muslim population in [Kogi State]. ( Jimba 2012, 9, 7) The Ahmadis have in the past suffered persecution by other Muslims, many of whom believe them to be heretics and even non-Muslims on account of their acceptance of the claim to Prophethood by their founder. Mainstream Muslims believe that Prophet Muhammed is the seal of all Prophets. However, the Ahmadis seem to be better tolerated these days. They are known among other things for their efforts to promote modern systems of Islamic education in Nigeria and to better organize the hajj. Like the vast majority of other Nigerian Muslims they support the Nigerian constitution and laws and work within them. QUR’ANIYYUN

Qur’aniyyun, generically, are Muslims who accept only the Qur’an as an authoritative guide to faith and practice, to the exclusion of Hadiths. Hadiths purport to report the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad; they are stories told by people who purportedly witnessed what he said and did and told others about it, who told yet others and so on down to the present day. Most Muslims – including Sunnis, Shi’as and Ahmadis

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– find different collections of these Hadiths to be credible as reports of what Prophet Muhammad actually said and did, and accept the sayings and doings themselves, after the Qur’an, as authoritative guides to faith and practice: Allah showing the way to humans through the whole life of the divinely-guided Prophet. Qur’aniyyun reject all this, not only because of the uncertain veracity of the Hadiths, but because they believe that except when he was taking the dictation of the Qur’an – which they agree is divine – the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad were no more divinely-guided than the sayings or doings of anybody else: from their point of view, he too was a mere man. Qur’aniyyun therefore reject most of the Islamic law articulated in the various schools of fiqh – the ‘alleged’ Sharia, as they might say – which is largely based on the Hadith literature. They go their own ways, guided only by the text of the Qur’an. Two strains are known in Nigeria’s north: the Maitasine/Kala Kato and the Submitters. Maitatsine/Kala Kato

The best-known Qur’aniyyun are those now commonly called ‘Kala Kato’, for their use of this phrase to mean ‘a mere man [i.e. Muhammad] said it’, applied to the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad insofar as we can know them (Hiskett 1987). The most famous representative of this group was the Maitatsine whose followers clashed with the authorities in Kano in 1980 and subsequently in Borno and Adamawa states, resulting in thousands of deaths (see Kastfeld 1989; Anwar 1997; Olayiwola 2007). His nickname, ‘Maitatsine’, refers to his habit of condemning all and sundry, including Muslims who disagreed with him, and saying, in bad Hausa, ‘Allah ta tsine’, meaning ‘Allah curse them’ or ‘God damn them’, wrongly using the feminine pronoun ‘ta’ to refer to Allah.14 His followers continue to be nurtured within and around the system of traditional Islamic education which still exists and attracts large numbers of students in northern Nigeria. At the early stages this type of education focuses exclusively on the Qur’an: learning to recite and even to write parts or all of it out by heart. Most young people pursue this sort of education to some distance. Most of them end up orthodox Sunnis. Only those few who join Kala Kato do not consider it necessary to read or learn from any other book. Accordingly, Kala Kato are uneducated in any Western or even Muslim sense. They still exist in many places in northern Nigeria, living at the margins of society, making their livings sometimes as malams (from Ar. alim: one learned in the Islamic sciences) teaching the Qur’an, but more often as petty traders, hair and nail-cutters, water carriers, etc. In Jos one of their leaders has gone into the bread business and employs quite a 14

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Maitatsine, real name Muhammadu Marwa, was from Cameroon.

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number of his followers.15 They keep mostly to themselves, not praying in the same mosques with other Muslims or otherwise associating with them very much. Indeed, other Muslims are wary of them, because of their history of verbal and physical attacks during the Maitatsine era. They still sometimes engage in public preaching, which is not welcomed by the authorities. This report, again from Kano State, illustrates the position: In Tudun Wada LGA there is a village called Kayu. This is on a lake or river where the fishing is good, so fisher-people from various places have settled there to pursue their occupation. At this place, a Kala Kato person appeared and began trying to persuade people not to go to school, not to send their children to school, that they should read the Qur’an only, and so on. Some people were even destroying their books of Hadiths under this man’s influence. The Sharia Commission went there. They went to talk to the man and some of his followers. They engaged in discussion about the Qur’an, the Hadiths, and so on. The man was arguing his own ideology. They refuted him. The man left the place before very long. The Sharia Commission established a good Islamiyya school there.16 This shows the attitude of most Nigerian Muslims to Kala Kato insofar as they have even heard about them, which many have not. Kala Kato obviously share some beliefs with the presently more notorious Boko Haram (rejection of Western education, but on different grounds) but not others (the obligation to fight the modern state). Since the upheavals of the 1980s Kala Kato have kept mostly out of the news, except for occasional outbursts, as in Maiduguri in 2004 and Bauchi in 2009.17 Some of their clusters are dissolving back into the wider Sunni populations around them. For instance, in 2010, an official in the Bureau of Religious Affairs in Kaduna State gave this account: In 2004 [the official] was told to find out if there were any Kala Kato in Kaduna City. He didn’t find even a single one. He went to Kawu [a section of the city]. People were saying that a certain place there, near the abattoir, was the centre of Kala Kato, that they had been there for over twenty years. What he found was that they had built houses and 15 Author’s research in Jos, March–July 2010, with thanks to Ahmed S. Garba for his invaluable assistance. 16 From the author’s interview with the Director of Da’wah, Kano State Sharia Commission, see fn 8. 17 Maiduguri 2004: see Alkali et al. 2012, 15: conflict sparked by Kala Kato attempt to hold the Eid el Kabir prayer, marking the end of Ramadan, three days late. Bauchi 2009: see Daily Trust, 29 December 2009, ‘38 Killed in Bauchi Skirmishes’: conflict apparently sparked by power-struggle internal to the sect that got out of hand.

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gone into business; that they had become part of the wider society. ‘They have become normal Sunni Muslims.’ They intermarry with others, attend Western schools, pray with other Muslims, etc. There are some old-style Kala Kato people out in other parts of the state. But they are not causing any problems. They still do condemn political and traditional rulers and the innovations of modern life, but evidently this isn’t causing any problem.18 In the same vein, Olayiwola (2007, 160–3) discusses a Lagos group, known in Yoruba as Ijo Alalukurani, who used to hold to the Qur’an only, but in more recent times have assimilated to the Sunni Islam of the Yoruba Muslims all around them. Submitters

The other strain of Qur’aniyyun found in Nigeria are the followers of Rashid Khalifa, an Egyptian biochemist who settled in Arizona. They call themselves the Submitters:19 This is a world-wide organisation with many adherents in all parts of the world, including Kano, Kaduna and Katsina. Another of their names in Nigeria is Al-Quraniyyun; i.e. those who accept the Qur’an only. Their credo is simple: they do not accept any Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW). They do accept him as a prophet of Allah [but they] took the … step of rejecting all the Hadith and concentrating all their worship on Allah’s injunctions in the Qur’an. (Adamu 2003) According to Professor Adamu, the Nigerian Submitters are highly sophisticated, well educated people, familiar with the internet and its uses. They consider the Kala Kato people to be riff-raff.20 A High Court judge in Maiduguri, now deceased, was one of them: Justice Isa Othman, who had some followers in Maiduguri, children of the elite (Olayiwola 2007, 163–4). They have their ‘own version of Qur’an different from the one used by other Muslims. Some Muslims allege that this is part of America’s attempt to destroy Islam by distorting the content of the Qur’an’ (Alkali et al. 2012, 16). In Borno, though believed to be still present, little is known of the group since the death of its benefactor, Justice Othman some years ago. Apart from Borno no presence of the group was reported in any of the states of the north-east (ibid.). There are certainly few if any Submit18 Written

from notes of the author’s interview with the Deputy Director in Charge of Research, Planning & Statistics, Bureau of Religious Affairs (Muslim Matters), Kaduna State, 26 May 2010. 19 www.submission.org (accessed 28 June 2017). 20 Author’s interview with Professor Adamu, Kano, 28 April 2010.

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ters in the north-central zone either, except for Nasarawa State where the Qur’aniyyun are said to exist: ‘Some of them are educated, civil servants’ (Liman and Wakawa 2012). OTHERS

There are no doubt many other small heterodox Muslim sects springing up and dying out all the time in the north, invisible to most except perhaps the authorities. For instance, a minority but weird sect … exists in Bida town [Niger State: no further account of its doctrines provided] even though the school building where the sect taught its doctrines mostly to youths and women, situated along the eastern by-pass of the town, was destroyed in 2009 to stop further spread of the sect to other parts of Bida Emirate. The sect called ‘Salaf ’ is under the leadership of Alhaji Jimeta Bida, a Bachelor of Arts (BA) graduate in Arabic language from Libya in the early 1970s. He has been in hiding since the building that housed his Qur’anic school was destroyed in 2009. (Ndagi 2012, 4) This passage once again illustrates the firm hand the authorities sometimes take with heterodox sects, cf. the disruptions of the Shi’a and Kala Kato preachers in Kano State recounted above. Sometimes they go too far, as in different ways in the cases of Boko Haram and Darul Islam recounted below.

Sunnis As has been noted, most Nigerian Muslims are Sunnis of the Maliki School of law. They are discussed here under four main headings: Sufis, Mahdists, Salafists, and ‘just a (Sunni) Muslim’. SUFIS

Sufism is sometimes called ‘Islamic mysticism’, referring to its stress on ‘inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over legalism, and cultivation of the soul over social interaction’ (Voll and Ohtsuka 1995, 105). Sufis organize themselves into orders or brotherhoods (Ar. turuk, sing. tariqa), distinguished by the sheikhs and saints they venerate and the rites they practice, striving for ‘a personal engagement with the Divine Reality’ (ibid.). In Nigeria there are two main Sufi orders, the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya. They are treated

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together below. A much smaller order, the Muhammadiyya, is discussed briefly subsequently. Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya

The Qadiriyya were founded in the 12th century by the Iranian Hanbalite scholar Abdul-Qadir Gilani (or Jilani) (1077–1166), spreading widely in the Muslim world and brought to Nigeria when Muslims first started visiting and settling there. Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817), the leader of the 19th-century jihad from which the Sokoto Caliphate grew, was a Qadiri. Formerly, Nigerian Muslims who belonged to a Sufi group at all mostly belonged to the Qadiriyya, which was the tariqa of the Muslim ruling and learned classes especially in what is now the north-west zone, in the 19th and early 20th centuries. They are said to be very much present in virtually all the 19 Northern States and beyond. Our findings revealed that Qadiriyya both in its traditional and reformed forms is represented in every major town and city in Northern Nigeria. (CDRT 2005, 19) But certainly their presence is mostly felt in Kano and Sokoto and other north-western cities. In the north-east, [Qadiriyya’s] influence … is not quite felt, so much so that many Muslims may not even think that they exist. During interviews, Imam Shettima Habib reported that Khalwatiyya (a variant of Qadiriyya) was practiced by some ulama in Borno’s former capital of Ngazargamu … but the practice later waned. Perhaps because of the similarities in their rituals such as dhikr, it is sometimes confused with Tijaniyya. Qadiriyya is present, though insignificant in Borno, Bauchi and Adamawa states. In Borno Qadiriyya practice is attributed to only one Malam Dauda in Gwange ward of Maiduguri (Alkali et al. 2012, 10–11) Similarly, in the north-central zone its following is small (Ostien 2012a, 15–16). There is an excellent discussion of the Qadiriyya, including their rituals, in Bunza and Mustapha (2012, 9–12). The Tijaniyya were founded in the late 18th century by the Maghrebi Maliki scholar Sidi Ahmad at-Tijani (1737–1815). The tariqa has since spread widely across West Africa, including Nigeria, beginning in the first half of the 19th century, but gaining real strength in the mid-20th century when the ‘reformed Tijaniyya’ became active (see below). Compared to Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya is a tariqa for the common man. It has become quite popular in many parts of Nigeria, including all parts of the north, where its adherents are much more numerous and widespread than the Qadiriyya.

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In the middle years of the 20th century, when Tijaniyya were growing strongly and joined the new democratic politics in Nigeria, roughly 1940s to 1960s, there were a number of civil disturbances arising from Qadiri vs. Tijani wars of words, anathematizations, and physical violence (see Paden 1973; Loimeier 1997; Reynolds 1999). The intra-Sufi strife came to an end with the rise of the anti-Sufis, notably Izala, in the 1970s, when the Sufis put aside their own differences to face their common enemies. Hardly any longer is there serious animosity between the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya. These days, faced with the atrocities of Boko Haram, even the Sufis and anti-Sufis have mostly stopped fighting. The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya are not formal constructs in any legal sense, but loose networks of networks, whose nodes are leaders claiming spiritual power and religious authority from their own spiritual forebears with whom they are linked by silsilas, chains of authority. Around each leader followers gather; the more followers a leader acquires, and the more he forms his own network by giving out his own ijazas (permissions, certifications), links in silsilas descending from him, the more powerful he becomes. Followers are bound to their leaders by codes of loyalty and obedience. The rules for followers are not onerous at the lower levels of involvement and people in all walks of life can join or associate with the brotherhoods and pursue the sort of religious life they offer at the level that suits them. Many then find further outlets for their religious energies, as informed by their tariqa, by forming or joining local organizations dedicated to pious works which they themselves support and manage. In the 20th century the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya in Nigeria both divided, into ‘traditional’ and ‘reformed’ networks. The ‘Reformed Qadiriyya’ are the Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya, formed around Sheikh Nasiru Kabara of Kano (1914–96) and discussed extensively in Paden (1973) and Loimeier (1997). They are the leading network among the Qadiriyya especially in Kano but probably in most other places as well, except Sokoto where a ‘traditional’ form is still dominant (Bunza and Mustapha 2012, 11). The ‘Reformed Tijaniyya’, on the other hand, are followers of Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse (or Nyass) of Kaolack in Senegal (1900–75). The Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya, as it is known, has followers in the millions right across West Africa. This Niassene Order is particularly powerful across Nigeria. Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya has been described as the ‘largest single Muslim movement in West Africa’ (Cisse 1984). Kaolack is also an important centre of pilgrimage (Bunza and Mustapha 2012, 13). The older Tijaniyya networks in Nigeria trace their lineage back to Al-Haj Umar Tal of Futa Jalon (c. 1797–1864), who passed through what is now Nigeria in the 1830s on his way back from hajj, visiting both Borno and Sokoto and successfully proselytizing for the Tijaniyya order as it then was:

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In Borno and Yobe States in particular, a large section of the Muslim population still practices the pre-reform type of Tijaniyya, whose practice is less overt and with a large self-created distance with the authorities (for fear of being led astray). This group, for instance, believes that the moon must be physically sighted for the Ramadan fast to begin or end and are therefore reluctant to follow declarations and pronouncements on these issues by established religious authorities like the Emirs and the Sultan of Sokoto. Furthermore, they tend to be wary of accepting public funds even if its disbursement to them is clearly legitimate. (Alkali et al. 2012, 9–10) No other cases of pre-reform Tijaniyya groups were reported, and the ‘reformed’ Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya are clearly the larger by far all across the north. The local organizations formed by members of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya to give practical expression to their faith include da’wah organizations like the Tijaniyya organization Fityanul Islam. Muhammadiyya

The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya dominate the Sufi scene in Nigeria. But other small sects sometimes spring up; the ‘Muhammadiyya’ in the north-east zone, discussed in Alkali et al. (2012, 11–12), are one of them. (All quotations in this sub-section are from this source.) These Muhammadiyya (many Muslim sects have gone by this name) are separatists: they have chosen to withdraw from the surrounding society and live only among themselves, minimizing their interaction with the outside world. They are ‘confined to only Bajoga (Gombe State) and Wiringile-Bajoga a small village of 200-300 people in Shani LGA of Borno State’ (11). They are predominantly Fulani, though people from other ethnic groups have joined them. They adhere to the Maliki School of law. They ‘should not be confused with the Muhammadiyyah in Indonesia whose spiritual equivalent in Nigeria is perhaps the Izala, because of its stand of fighting against innovation (bid’ah)’ (11): Like other Sufi brotherhoods [Bajoga Muhammadiyya] rituals involve great sacrifice and devotion to one’s Creator. Hence, members engage in regular supplication or dhikr (much more than other Sufi brotherhoods), spend more time in the mosque, and celebrate the birthday of the Prophet (SAW) with great fanfare. (11) Their women are mostly confined to their homes; when they must go out, ‘such business must be finished as quickly as possible and with the maximum avoidance of public attention, particularly the curious eyes of men in the streets’ (11). Nevertheless, the Bajoga Muhammadiyya get along

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well with their neighbours and with the local authorities, so much so that ‘intermarriages now take place with their host communities’ (11). They do not reject Western education, and have requested the local government officials to establish a primary school for them. ‘Economically the Bajoga Muhammadiyya are excellent traders and farmers. Trading is mostly in the area of polythene ropes and allo [wooden slates used by Qur’anic students for writing passages from the Qur’an]. Raffia mats and ropes are also made and sold by them’ (12). No doubt many small separatist sects like the Bajoga Muhammadiyya exist all across Nigeria, living quietly among themselves, secluded as much as possible from the corrupting influences of modern society, practicing Islam as fully as they can according to their lights. We shall meet another group like them in Darul Islam, formerly of Niger State. The Bajoga Muhammadiyya were selected for study to capture diversity, being typically rural in their location, and because of the lack of literature on them, having been relatively unexplored by previous researches. Further interesting work is there to be done on Nigeria’s separatist Muslim sects. Mahdists

Another small Sunni sect, not Sufi but nevertheless defined by allegiance to their founder and his own special set of beliefs, are the Mahdiyya now found mostly in Kano. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Mahdists played an important role in the history of northern Nigeria, but they have become marginal today. There are Mahdist traditions in both Shi’ite and Sunni Islam, referring to the Mahdi, ‘the rightly-guided one’, the figure who will appear near the end of time to restore justice and peace on earth before the Day of Judgment. Mahdism is a form of millenarianism, the expectation of the (soon?) coming of the end of the world, when all will be transformed. The messianic figure of the Mahdi is associated with revival, renewal, decisive battles against the forces of evil, and the triumph of Islam. As with the second coming of Christ, the time of the Mahdi’s appearance has often been predicted, incorrectly so far it seems, but nevertheless sometimes with serious social consequences: [A] historian of the Sokoto Caliphate maintains that the most important theme in popular Muslim thought in West Africa forming the background to the major Islamic reform movements [of the 18th and 19th centuries] was Mahdism … ‘[Mahdism] has been responsible for large scale migrations eastwards and the movement of countless individuals in West Africa towards the Nile’ [Last 1967, 1]. The Mahdi, it was believed, would emerge in the east and in 1856/7 a Muslim jurist, Ibrahim Sharif al-Din, on his way through north-eastern Nigeria to

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Mecca, is said to have been followed by so many people (in search of the Mahdi) that the population of the region was substantially diminished. (Clarke 1982, 119) The best-known Mahdist movement of the 19th century was the one led by the Sudanese Sheikh Muhammad Ahmad (1845–85), whose claim to actually be the Mahdi was accepted by many, including many northern Nigerians. The Sudanese Mahdi, world-famous in his day, led his Ansars (‘helpers’) in the war against Sudan’s Egyptian overlords and their British allies in which General Gordon was killed at Khartoum in January 1885. The Mahdi died only six months later. By then, however, he had appointed as his deputy, in effect for northern Nigeria, Hayatu bin Sa’id (1840–94), a great-grandson of Uthman dan Fodio, and Hayatu had succeeded in attracting a Mahdist following especially in the Bauchi-Gombe-Adamawa axis. The Hayatu Mahdiyya subsequently played a role in the wars and politics of northern Nigeria in the late 19th century and into the colonial era, actually defeating a British force at Burmi in current Bauchi State in 1903, only to suffer a crushing defeat several months later. In 1904 a new Mahdi proclaimed himself in Satiru, in current Sokoto State, and his followers again defeated a British force in 1906, again only to be crushed several months later (Lovejoy and Hogendorn 1990). But Mahdist propaganda still continued, making the British nervous for much of the early decades of the colonial period. One prophylactic measure they took was to exile Hayatu’s son, Sa’id bin Hayatu (1887–1978), who had succeeded him as leader of the movement, to Cameroon in 1923. Sa’id was only allowed to return, to Kano, in 1946. Even then the Mahdist impulse had not been rendered completely innocuous. In 1948, at Bima Hill in present Gombe State, a sacred site for many Muslims, yet another Mahdi declared himself: [T]housands acknowledged his claim, flocking to his standard from all over Nigeria. He vowed to oust the infidel British, but he and his followers were eventually routed by policemen … However, the Mahdi was never captured and legend had it that he climbed Bima and was taken directly up to heaven in a great white cloud. (Hare 2013, 28) In 1957 people again began gathering at Bima. Upon investigation this was found to be ‘linked to a belief that at independence, which was imminent, the world would end, but not before the true Mahdi had reappeared to lead his people up into heaven’ (ibid.). Independence did come (1960); the world did not end; and finally, after the passing of so many eventful but non-apocalyptic years, the Mahdist impulse in the north seems now to have waned. The headquarters of the Hayatu Mahdiyya are still in Kano and the leadership is still in the same family. But today,

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[a]part from the few members resident in Kano and Gusau, the rest of the adherents of the Mahdiyya are found mainly in the countryside of some states in the North-West and North-East Zones of the country. These include: Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa States … The Mahdiyya group today has remained small, inactive and, on the whole, irrelevant to the religious environment of Nigeria. (CDRT 2005, 20–21) This does not mean that Muslims have stopped believing in the imminent return of the Mahdi – a belief that remains widespread in much of the Muslim world 21 – but only that no plausible candidate has presented himself in recent years. A separate Mahdist movement arose in Ijebu-Ode, in the Yoruba south-western Nigeria, in what is now Ogun State, in the early 1940s (see Clarke 1995), but they are not part of our subject here. SALAFISTS

‘Salafist’ derives from ‘salaf ’ (Ar: ‘predecessor’), referring in this context to the earliest Muslims, the ones closest to the Prophet and his times, from whom the Hadiths derive and whose practice of Islam was uncontaminated by later or (presumably) by extraneous accretions. Salafists try to base their religious beliefs and practices strictly on the Qur’an, the sunnah of the Prophet as recorded in Hadiths they find reliable, and the ijma (consensus), especially of the salaf. They reject subsequent innovations, bid’ah, especially in matters of ibadat (broadly, worship). All Muslims (except Qur’aniyyun, of course) say they are ahl as-sunnah, people of the sunnah, but Salafists more than anyone: for them it is the sunnah and nothing but the sunnah. Well-known Salafist scholars, still influential in the present day, include Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and, in more modern times, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), who cooperated with Muhammad ibn Saud in the establishment of the Saudi Arabian state. ‘Wahhabis’, followers of ibn Abd al-Wahhab, are a variety of Salafist. Salafists differ among themselves about many things – notably, for instance, about what attitude Muslims should take towards modernity and the modern secular state. They are united, however, in one thing: their opposition to Sufism. Salafism established itself as a force to be reckoned with in northern Nigeria in the 1970s as an anti-Sufi movement – a reform movement within Islam. The anti-Sufism has not gone away, but after initial Salafist gains, that contest has stabilized. A more interesting phenomenon today is the diffraction of the Salafist wave into a spectrum of attitudes towards the modern state. In the broad categorization used here, the ‘reformers’, the largest group, are working 21

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See Pew Forum 2012, 65–6.

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for reform of the state from within; the ‘radicals’ are actively trying to overthrow the state and establish an Islamic one in its place; and the ‘separatists’ are simply seeking to lead their puritan lives in as much isolation as possible. Salafi reformers: Izala, related groups and Anti-Sufism

The main organizational manifestation of Salafist anti-Sufism in Nigeria has been Izala: Jama’atu Izalatil Bid’a Wa’ikamatis Sunnah (The Islamic Organisation for Eradicating Innovation and Establishing Sunnah),22 often also going by the acronym JIBWIS. Izala has been much studied and written about (Umar 1993, Loimeier 1997, Kane 2003, Olayiwola 2007, Ben Amara 2011). Izala was formally founded in 1978 in Jos, under the leadership of Sheikh Isma’ila Idris (1936–2000) with the support of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi (1922–1992), the long-time Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Northern Region and powerful religious figure in the north. Izala explicitly defined itself as anti-Sufi: that was what the ‘eradicating innovation’ part of its name meant: identifying, preaching against, winning people away from, and hoping to suppress the alleged deviations and superstitions and magical practices of the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya, all said to be bid’ah: the wrong kind of innovations, amounting to heresy or even apostasy. What Izala proposed to put in place of all the Sufi complications was a more austere and originalist and allegedly more Godly Salafist form of Islam, mildly Wahhabi, which was also modernist: an up-to-date Muslim Protestantism if you like, adapting a purified Islam to modern conditions, and modern conditions to it. Izala showed by its own example how things could be done, notably by establishing hospitals and clinics, setting up modern ‘Islamiyya’ schools for the education of Muslims at all levels (youths and adults, primary to tertiary, Islamic and Western subjects), and promoting the education of girls and women along with the males (Umar 2001 and 2003). Unfortunately, besides these constructive activities, Izala preaching and teaching also violently attacked the Sufis, going all the way to takfir – condemning them outright as kuffar: apostates or unbelievers. Izala set up its own mosques, refusing to pray with Sufis. Polemical pamphlets and books were written and circulated; audiocassettes of preaching and teachings, full of vilification and invective, were widely distributed among the masses. Their public preaching attracted huge crowds. The Sufis reacted in kind. Civil disturbances resulted in the 1970s and 1980s in many places across the north. Extensive surveillance and often force were used by the authorities to try to forestall or quell the disturbances. Many northern 22

Or as Kane (2003) translates it, ‘Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Reinstatement of Tradition’. The translation used in the text is by the Bauchi Local Government Branch of JIBWIS (see Ostien 2007, II, 87).

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states set up Islamic Religious Preaching Boards, charged to examine and license intending Islamic preachers; it was made a crime to preach without or in violation of a license (Ostien 2012a: 32–3). When these laws were sought to be applied against the Izala preachers they themselves learned the value of their constitutional right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The work of the civil authorities, and efforts by Muslim leaders to make peace among the ulama and preach peace to the masses, finally brought about ‘the domestication of Izala’ (Kane 2003). But the war of words continues. ‘The misunderstanding between Izala and Sufis is still a problem even though the gravity of the situation has reduced extensively since there is no longer any physical violence as used to be experienced’ (Modibbo 2012). ‘The coming of the Izala … in the mid-nineteen seventies dramatically shook the loyalties of many of those in the Turuk … as well as the average Muslim who was not attached to any sectarian movement’ (Alkali et al. 2012, 6). As has been suggested above, Izala and related Salafist groups have won over perhaps 12 per cent of Nigerian Muslims (plus or minus some unknown margin of error). But they have not been equally successful everywhere. Originating as they did among the Hausa (or ‘Hausa/Fulani’), they have also found their greatest acceptance there. But in the predominantly non-Hausa north-east: While the Izala were able to make some inroads into states like Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa, they found it difficult to establish themselves in Borno because of the resistance by the ulama… The Izala were treated with great suspicion by the ulama…and the Turuk. They were often seen as ‘destroying’ Islam, and were associated with the alleged conspiracy of Jews to over simplify Islam and reduce its influence in the world.23 (Alkali et al. 2012: 12; footnote in original) In the more southerly north-central zone, in states where the populations of Hausas are small and concentrated, as in for instance in Kwara State, there Izala exists, but only among the small Hausa or ‘Muslim stranger’ settlements (Abdussalam 2012). Where the percentages of Hausa become larger, there Izala also exists, but still mostly among the Hausa. For instance, in Niger State there are three main ethnic groups: Nupe, Hausa and Gbagi (or Gwari as the Hausa know them), estimated at 40 per cent, 32 per cent and 28 per cent of the population respectively (Ndagi 2012). As to Sufis and anti-Sufis: ‘[T]here evidently appear to be more tariqa Muslims than the Izala among the Nupe. There are also more Izala followers among the 23 ‘Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi and Imam Shettima Habib [prominent Tijani leaders in Bauchi and Maiduguri, respectively] asserted that the Izala were allegedly sponsored by Jews to destroy Islam’ (Alkali et al. 2012, 12, fn 15).

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Hausa than can be found among Nupe and Gwari Muslims in Niger State.’ (Ibid.) Izala is also strong in Jos, where it was founded. It is no coincidence that there is a large Hausa-Fulani community of long standing in Jos, with many wealthy families and learned ulama among them: it was they (many of them) who were behind Izala to begin with and still support it. Izala and related Salafist reformist groups are present throughout the north, but most prominently in Hausaland and among the Hausa communities living elsewhere. ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WIDER SOCIETY AND THE STATE

Strangely enough, Izala’s attitude has been more emollient towards the wider society and the secular Nigerian state than towards the Sufis. This is perhaps partly because the Sufis, ‘purporting’ to be Muslims, are seen as ‘apostates’, ‘traitors’, the worst thing of all: ‘dissent by fellow Muslims is so much harder to tolerate than the practices of non-Muslims’ (Last 2012, 22). But it is also because the Sufis are a softer target. A hard line against the Sufis has some hope of success and little downside; a hard line against the state will get you nowhere and could get you killed. This has not deterred the Salafist radicals – Boko Haram and Ansaru, discussed below. But the vast majority of Salafists, in this chapter called ‘reformers’, have taken the point. A recent article on Salafist radicalism and Salafist counter-radicalism in Nigeria sums it up well: Virtually every Salafi would agree that a non-Islamic government ought to be replaced with an Islamic one, but the key difference is whether that should be done forcefully, even when the balance of power is heavily in favour of the non-Islamic government. [Many] Salafis have advanced a variety of arguments against the dare-the-devil position of challenging the modern state despite its preponderant command of brute force, particularly since annihilation of Muslims is the predictable outcome. They invoke the doctrine of necessity [darura] that states that Qur’anic prohibition against obeying a non-Islamic government falls into abeyance in circumstances where Muslims have no option but to obey. They contend that Muslims should devote their energies to solving far more urgent problems confronting them in Nigeria, notably widespread poverty and illiteracy, marginalization of Muslims in governmental employment and provision of services, recurrent clashes with Christians that often leave Muslims losing lives and property, and the hegemony of Western powers against Islam. (Anon. 2012, 127; see also Last 2012: passim)

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Accordingly, ‘Izala says it opposes all kinds of violence, protest or demonstration against government. This is the orientation of societal “reform without violence” advocated by Abubakar Gumi’ (Bunza and Mustapha 2012, 14–15). Far from shunning Western education, the Salafist reformers are active participants in it at all levels – both in the Islamiyya schools they have created and in state institutions, especially the colleges and universities, in which places have been made for their own subjects (Arabic, Islamic Studies, Islamic Legal Studies, Islamic Law), and in which they study and teach and work in administration in large numbers (Ostien 2012a, 26–31). Their ulama, the ‘modern’ ulama as opposed to the ‘traditional’ ones still predominant among the Sufis, ‘are those who passed through Islamiyya, Higher Islamic schools, Arabic and Islamic Institutions and or obtained degrees in Arabic and Islamic Religious knowledge from universities within and outside Nigeria’ (CDRT 2005, 48). Equally, far from shunning modern government, they are active participants in it too at all levels. ‘Because a large section of the Izala leadership is drawn from the civil service, the group has not been engaged in any conflict with the state’ (Medugu 2012, 5). They aim at ‘reforming the system, if need be, from within rather than from without’ (CDRT 2005, 26). They led the Sharia implementation efforts in the early 2000s – sneered at by Zakzaky’s Shi’a and by Salafist radicals, undertaken as they were by non-Islamic governments – seeing them as steps forward in the reform of their states in Islamic directions, and explicitly acknowledging the supremacy of the federal constitution and laws in the process (Ostien and Dekker 2010, 578). They occupy many positions in the Sharia-related state agencies then created, including the Sharia Courts (CDRT 2005, 53). Since then they have become increasingly involved in politics, arguing that it is only through their active participation in the political sphere that they would be able to articulate and protect the concerns of Muslims, as well as actualize the hopes and aspirations of the Muslim Community. (Wakili 2009, 10; cf. Anon. 2012, 134) Salafism has sometimes been seen as inherently reactionary and radical; Sufism, by contrast, has been put forward as a ‘force for counter-radicalization’ in its stead (Hill 2010; cf. Rabasa et al. 2007). But developments in northern Nigeria support the conclusion that Salafism/Wahhabism should not be understood as a monolithic set of radical Islamic doctrines irreconcilably opposed to Sufism and also implacably dedicated to violence … [N]o necessary links exist between

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Salafism/Wahhabism and violence, or even radicalism. (Anon. 2012, 140) Moderation by Nigeria’s reformist Salafis, of their anti-Sufism, would be very welcome too. The phrase ‘Izala and related groups’ has been used several times. In fact Izala split into two factions in 1992, one headquartered in Jos and one in Kaduna (Ben Amara 2011). Out of the Kaduna faction emerged a third group, the so-called ’Yan Madina, of which the late Sheikh Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam of Kano was a prominent member; Ja’far and his context have been written about in Anon. (2012) and Brigaglia (2012). Another prominent reformist Salafist scholar, teacher and preacher, was Sheikh Muhammad Auwal Albani. Albani was based in Zaria, but widely listened to in the north, via schools he ran (Darul-Hadith-Salafiyya and Albani Science Academy, both in Zaria), and through live preaching, printed matter, and TV, radio, and audio and video recordings circulating on many devices. Albani was assassinated in Zaria on 1 February 2014, along with his wife and child, as they returned from the mosque at about 10 p.m. after his usual evening teaching session. This is discussed further below. Another reformist Salafist group is the same Jama’atul Tajdid Islam ( JTI) that split off from Zakzaky’s IMN in 1994, rejecting the Shi’ism but keeping the radicalism. JTI, after some years, softened its stance towards the Nigerian state to something approximating Izala’s (CDRT 2005, 28); JTI’s ‘advocacy for … the ulama’s actual involvement in the democratic politics since 1999 signaled a major change of attitude’ (Wakili 2009, 7). Other moderate Salafist groups exist in the north and elsewhere in the country. Salafi Radicals: Boko Haram; Ansaru

Radical Salafist opinion has no doubt existed in Nigeria for some time. How it coalesced into a movement in Maiduguri in Borno State, that since 2010 has terrorized the north, can be read in Pérouse de Montclos (2014), Mustapha (2014), Smith (2015), and Comolli (2015). BOKO HARAM

Part of the story were the so-called ‘Nigerian Taliban’, who performed hijra (migration) in c. 2002, withdrawing from Maiduguri to a remote part of Yobe State. Many of them were drop-outs from northern universities, having concluded that Western education (‘boko’ in Hausa slang) was haram. They made the news in 2003–2004 when they went to war with the police. They were dispersed, but then regrouped around the person of Muhammad Yusuf.

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Another part of the story is the career of Yusuf himself. He was born in 1970 in Yobe State, the son of a malam. He became a Qur’anic student in the traditional mode, and as a boy was sent to Maiduguri to further his studies. In the 1980s and 1990s he travelled from sheikh to sheikh, furthering his Islamic education and perhaps seeking his niche. He is said to have spent time with the Shi’as – with Zakzaky in Zaria. After that he was with Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam in Kano. Ja‘far thought highly of him, and in the mid-1990s put him in charge of the youth wing of the reformist Salafist movement Ja‘far was trying to establish in Maiduguri (against determined Tijani resistance), known as Ahl as-Sunnah (claiming the name for themselves). Yusuf was a fluent and persuasive preacher in Kanuri and Hausa. Preaching frequently in Maiduguri’s prominent mosques, he attracted his own following. In his thinking, he soon moved away from Ja‘far’s reformism towards the radicalism of the Nigerian Taliban. In his preaching, by 2000 or 2001, he began taking their line, that Western learning was haram. To send your child to a government school was haram. To accept the liberal-democratic form of government contemplated by the Nigerian constitution was haram. To take any job with government was haram. And so on, taking a large array of hard-line positions against present-day Nigeria and Nigerians including most other Muslims. When, after counselling – by Ja‘far and Albani among others – Yusuf did not desist, the establishment ulama shut him out of the prominent Maiduguri mosques. He might have performed hijra with his friends, but chose instead to set up his own establishment at the outskirts of Maiduguri, building his own mosque. His charismatic preaching, arguing all the evils of the present age in support of his views, drew a large following mostly of uneducated youths, Qur’anic students at best, who were put to work in farming and informal business enterprises that generated an income for the group; with their mode of dressing, their beards, their black or red turbans according to their roles in the organization, they became a visible and threatening presence in Maiduguri. The nickname ‘Boko Haram’ was given to them and has stuck. There were rumours of support from big men who preferred to keep in the background, and of funding from abroad. Yusuf travelled widely in the north, preaching and proselytizing, all the way to Sokoto and Kebbi, and groups loyal to him grew up not only in Borno but in Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Kano and Kaduna States, and probably elsewhere. Borno State’s Islamic Religious Preaching Board reported him to state authorities (among other things he was preaching without a license), but nothing was done. Federal authorities arrested him multiple times and took him off for questioning in Abuja, but he always returned to Maiduguri in triumph, released without charge. It is unclear how openly Yusuf ’s ideas were contested in Maiduguri itself – there was fear of what his people might do. But elsewhere an

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active debate went on among northern ulama during roughly 2003–2009, in Arabic and Hausa, in schools and mosques, in print, and on audio and video cassettes, about Boko Haram’s ideas. Prominent scholars debated those ideas publicly among themselves and with Muhammad Yusuf. Many Sunni ulama, Sufi, Salafist, and independent, preached against them and warned against them. Aspects of the scholarly debate are described in detail in Anon. (2012), discussing Ja‘far’s teaching contra Yusuf, still available on audio recordings, and Yusuf ’s debate with Pantami (a Bauchi scholar), available on video CD. Sheikh Albani of Zaria too was actively involved in the discussions, as he recounted in an interview published in 2012: When he [Muhammad Yusuf ] disclosed that he has left Shi’a and returned to Sunna, I was one of those who constantly talked to him about the ideology of Boko Haram. On some occasions, I sat with him with his students and in other occasions, only two of us sat. The essence was to convince him that Islam doesn’t accept the ideology of Boko Haram. I tried to convince him that since he claimed to be the follower of Sunna, therefore Sunna has its teachings and principles, and the idea of Boko Haram is contrary to those teachings. All our efforts, because I know other scholars like late Sheikh Ja’afar also engaged him on such issues, fell on deaf ears. He proffered some defenses, which are not authentic in the jurisprudence of Islam … You may not understand fully the reasons he offered as to why Boko is Haram because they are technical issues … I have delivered many lectures on all the controversies and I know Sheikh Ja’afar has done many. I think to understand the whole issue, one needs to go back to those lectures and also get the arguments offered by the slain leader of the Boko Haram.24 For his part, Yusuf condemned the ulama in turn as heretics whom it was halal and even meritorious for anyone to kill, and some of them were in fact killed, most notably Ja‘far himself, assassinated in a mosque in Kano on 13 April 2007 as he led the morning prayers. That crime has never been solved, but is widely attributed to Boko Haram (Brigaglia 2012). And on 1 February 2014 Albani too was assassinated in Zaria. In this case Boko Haram has explicitly claimed responsibility.25 24 I. Sa’idu, ‘My Encounter with Moh’d Yusuf Over Boko Haram – Sheikh Albani’, Sunday Trust, 1 January 2012. 25 H. Idris, ‘Shekau Claims Killing Albani, Threatens Mayhem’, Daily Trust, 20 February 2014. The reaction of Albani’s followers to Shekau’s claim is worth noting: ‘We have said it times without number that we don’t believe in the existence of any terror group known as Boko Haram. Of course, we are aware of a group under late Muhammad Yusuf, but the name of the group is just being used to destabilize Muslims and to commit crimes … If somebody could come out to tell the world that they killed Malam (Sheikh Albani) because he was

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Things fell apart for Yusuf personally in June and July 2009, when the shooting by police in Maiduguri of some 17 Boko Haram members (11 June – none died) triggered retaliatory attacks on the state and its officials that began in Bauchi on 26 July and continued in Wudil (near Kano), Potiskum (Yobe State) and Maiduguri the next day. In the end the group was ruthlessly suppressed by the police and the army acting at the direction of state and federal political leaders – the governors, and the then President, Umaru Yar’Adua. An estimated 1,000 Boko Haram members or followers were killed. Government itself committed crimes in the process: many youths were massacred (although it must be said that they themselves were ready to fight to the death, convinced they would die as martyrs and would be rewarded in heaven accordingly). Muhammad Yusuf, captured alive, was executed while in police custody, without any sort of trial, as were his completely innocent father-in-law and many others. Some who were captured at the time are, at the time of writing, still languishing in prison awaiting trial. The 2012 Human Rights Watch report Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria catalogues these and subsequent crimes by both sides. After the 2009 crisis had passed the government of Borno State declared Boko Haram an unlawful society and banned it. Those who escaped alive – including Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s ‘second in command’, more ruthless than he ever was – scattered and went into hiding. That was Phase One. Phase Two, still continuing (October 2016), was announced in late June 2010 when a video-taped interview with Shekau was released. Shekau (not for the last time having incorrectly been thought by the authorities to be dead) said that he had assumed the leadership of Boko Haram, that they still held firm to their views and would continue to propagate them, and that there would be retaliation for the killings of Yusuf and others the prior year.26 The action started on 7 September 2010, with an attack on a prison in Bauchi: 721 inmates were set free, 173 of them alleged members of Boko Haram who were ‘awaiting trial’.27 In leaflets left behind by the attackers, they gave their new name: Jama`at Ahl as-Sunnah li al-Da`wah wa al-Jihad: congregation or society or group ( jama’at) of people of the sunnah (ahl as-sunnah) for calling people to Islam or propagating Islam (li al-da`wah) and jihad (wa al-jihad). The leaflets again said there would be reprisals for the massacres of 2009. They said (contd) supporting democracy, it is clear that somebody somewhere is trying to achieve a hidden agenda, which may not be unconnected with the forthcoming elections in 2015. The issue of frightening Islamic scholars not to enlighten their followers on the need to elect credible leaders may not be ruled out.’ I. Sa’idu, ‘Albani’s Students Refute Shekau’s Claim’, Daily Trust, 21 February 2014. Cf. notes 27 and 28, below, and accompanying text. 26 See e.g. H.I. Pindiga and I.U. Gusau, ‘“Dead” Boko Haram Leader Re-Emerges in New Video’, Daily Trust, 1 July 2010. 27 S.M. Sani, ‘Attack on Bauchi Prison – Boko Haram Frees 721 Inmates’, Leadership, 8 September 2010.

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that ‘fighting this government is mandatory on everyone’. They warned anyone cooperating with the security forces against the group, that ‘there is a heavy punishment waiting for you’. They also implied a widening of Boko Haram’s cause, to taking revenge against Christians for attacks on Muslims elsewhere in the north, particularly in and around Jos in Plateau State, where terrible ethno-religious violence had broken out (again) in the first half of 2010: ‘we send special condolences on the recent events in this country, particularly in the city of Suldaniyyah [ Jos]’.28 From September 2010 until the present the jihad has continued, most seriously in Borno and Yobe States but also in Adamawa, Abuja, Jos, Kano and elsewhere in the north, with bombings – including suicide bombings, a weapon new to Nigeria – shootings, beheadings, kidnappings – including the abduction on the night of 14–15 April 2014 of 276 female students from the Government Secondary School in the town of Chibok in Borno State – rape, robbery, and mayhem. Both Muslims and Christians have been attacked. Tens of thousands have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. In Borno State 22 out of 27 Local Government Areas (LGAs) were taken over by the insurgents. Government officials, traditional rulers, and ulama were killed or driven out. Courthouses, police stations, secretariats, schools, anything to do with government, were burned and razed. Education and economic development in the north-east, but especially in Borno and Yobe, have been crippled. Declaration of states of emergency and military occupation have not yet completely stopped the violence, though the military tide seems to have turned against the group from February 2015, with the entry of forces from Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic into the conflict, along with a reinvigorated Nigerian Army and the ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’ fostered by the authorities. Unfortunately the counter-attacks against Boko Haram have themselves involved further devastation and the death or displacement of thousands of innocent civilians. This is not the place for further discussion of the Boko Haram insurgency and its suppression; for further details, and citations to other authorities, see Chapter 6 by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, below. Government might have managed Boko Haram’s Phase One much better than it did. It could perhaps have defused and deradicalized most of them with a more honest and wiser handling then. That is not a moot point now: conspiracy theorists have argued that Boko Haram has been a creature or tool of government or of people in government all along.29 28 Thanks to Prof. Abdalla Uba Adamu of BUK for providing a full translation of the 7 September 2010 leaflet from Hausa to English, which is available at www.nigeriawatch.org/ media/html/2010-09-07.pdf. 29 See e.g. I. Sa’idu, ‘Hold Security Chiefs Responsible for Boko Haram – Sayyeed Zazzaki’, Sunday Trust, 1 January 2012.

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Or perhaps ‘the West’ has been sponsoring them.30 How many still hold such beliefs, after all that has transpired and as the conflict appears to be waning, is unknown. But certainly there are many lessons to be learned on all sides from this episode in Nigeria’s history. ANSARU

The month of January 2012 was made especially bloody by Boko Haram. As a prelude, they bombed a Catholic Church in a suburb of Abuja on Christmas Day 2011, killing 40 and wounding many others. Then on 1 January they announced that southerners and other Christians living in the north should leave within three days or face attack.31 A wave of shootings and bombings over the next weeks, which included gunning down more Christians in their churches, killed hundreds in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states. On 20 January Kano City was attacked: multiple bombings of police posts and other security formations, and protracted gun battles, killed over 200 people there alone, in this case mostly Muslims. Boko Haram claimed responsibility, saying the Kano State Government had been warned to release their members held in custody, or else.32 It was at this point that a separate group calling itself Jama’at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad as-Sudan announced itself: ‘Society of Helpers of the Muslims in the Land of the Blacks’. In Hausa this comes out as Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan – Ansaru for short. In a statement issued in Kano on 26 January 2012 Ansaru announced its formation and ‘expressed displeasure with Boko Haram’s style of operations, which it described as ‘inhuman to the Muslim Ummah.’33 This was amplified in a video released on 2 June 2012, in which the masked man speaking for it said Ansaru did not believe in killing innocent non-Muslims except ‘in self defense or if they attack Muslims like the cases we have in Jos’. And while the Boko Haram considers any security agents including the para-military whether big or the smallest rank as a ‘legitimate’ target for elimination, the Ansar group said they don’t believe in killing innocent security operatives except if they are attacked by them or in self defense … He said [Ansaru] considers anybody that accepted the khalimatush shahada (believing in one God and Prophet Muhammad PBUH as the 30 See e.g. M. Lalo, ‘Boko Haram is a Creation of Western Powers, says Jingir’, Sunday Trust, 1 January 2012. 31 E. Johnson and A. Awunor, ‘Boko Haram Issues 3-Day Ultimatum to Southerners’, The Moment, 2 January 2012. 32 A. Umar et al., ‘Boko Haram Claims Responsibility for Kano Attacks’, Daily Trust, 20 January 2012. 33 ‘Boko Haram – Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges’, Vanguard, 1 February 2012.

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messenger of Allah) as a Muslim who must not be killed except he/she has committed an act that is punishable by death as stated in the holy Qur’ran.34 Ansaru then proceeded to show what they would do in the way of jihad, instead of Boko Haram’s indiscriminate killing: • 25 November 2012: attacked a detention facility in Abuja where Boko Haram suspects were being held, freeing a number of detainees. • 19 December 2012: kidnapped French engineer Francis Collomp from the compound where he was living in Katsina, in retaliation, they said, for France’s intervention in Mali; Collomp escaped in Zaria in November 2013. • 19 January 2013: ambushed a Nigerian military convoy bound for Mali, in Okene, Kogi State, killing two soldiers. • 16 February 2013: abducted seven foreign construction workers in Bauchi; on 9 March Ansaru announced that the hostages had been executed and showed pictures of some of the bodies. These four incidents were all explicitly claimed by Ansaru in videos or statements released by them. Some analysts (e.g. Zenn 2013a) believe that Ansaru or those involved in it, before they announced themselves, were also involved in the kidnapping of two engineers, one British and one Italian, in Birnin Kebbi in May 2011 (both died during an attempt to rescue them in Sokoto in March 2012); and also, on the very day Ansaru came out (26 January 2012), in the kidnapping of a German engineer in Kano (he died during a rescue attempt in Kano in May 2012). After nine months of quiescence, Ansaru was also associated with the 13 November 2013 kidnapping of the French priest Georges Vandenbeusch in northern Cameroon: a spokesman for Boko Haram said ‘I can confirm that the French priest is in the hands of mujahideen (fighters) from Jamaat Ahl al-Sunna Li Da’wat al-Jihad, who carried out the operation that was co-ordinated with Ansaru.’35 What truth there is in this is not known. Vandenbeusch was released, on ‘humanitarian grounds’, on 31 December 2013. There are obvious differences between the tactics of Boko Haram and Ansaru, and also between the parts of Nigeria in which they have operated. Ansaru is thought to be linked with AQIM – Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – and Boko Haram has declared its allegiance to the Islamic 34 T. Mamu, ‘Another Islamic Sect emerges…to counter Boko Haram?’ Desert Herald, 2 June 2012. 35 A. Abubakar, ‘Boko Haram “holding kidnapped French priest”: group source’, AFP, 15 November 2013.

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State. The links between the two groups themselves remain unclear. There may for instance be differences in their ethnic make-ups, and this may have had something to do with their split, if that is what happened: Ansaru members may also have been ethnic Hausa-Fulanis from northwestern Nigeria who resented Borno-based and Kanuri-led Boko Haram. According to captured Boko Haram members, Abubakar Shekau, who is ethnically Kanuri, favored Kanuris of Borno State, while Nigeriens, Chadians, Cameroonians and Nigerian non-Kanuris were always chosen to carry out suicide bombings with the punishment of death for those who refused. (Zenn 2013a, n. 65) This and much else remains a matter of speculation. In any case, since 2013 Ansaru has not been much in the news – except that in April 2016 Nigerian security officials announced that they had captured its leader, Khalid al-Barnawi.36 As with Boko Haram, there is a growing literature on Ansaru, on the links between them and between them and similar groups abroad, and on the battles they are waging in Nigeria. A report of a lengthy interview with an Ansaru member appeared in the New York Times in April 2013.37 But let us finally turn with some relief to the third Salafist group we are to discuss, the peaceful separatists of Darul Islam. Salafi Separatists: Darul Islam

One group of Sunni separatists has been discussed already – the small Sufi sect of Muhammadiyya living in Gombe and Borno states. Darul Islam, which existed in Niger State from 1993 to 2009, was another separatist group, though apparently in no sense Sufi, but Salafist/Wahhabi in its orientation. Other groups like this have existed in the north through the years: ‘ahl al-sunna-type communities (Digawa, Salihawa or their predecessors) and individual scholars who resisted control from the centre’ (Last 2012: 16). Darul Islam was founded by a malam, apparently Hausa by ethnicity, who only wished to form a pious community that was isolated as much as possible from the surrounding society, pure in their religious practice, uncorrupted by the laxity of the wicked world.38 The community started small but grew by the end to about four thousand people, all living together near Mokwa, men, women and children. They acquired land or the right to use land where they built their settlement. They farmed, grew livestock, traded, and otherwise supported themselves by economic activity. They had their own qadi (Islamic judge). Among themselves they 36

‘Khalid al-Barnawi: Nigeria Islamist group head ‘arrested’, BBC News, 3 April 2016. A. Nossiter, ‘New Threat in Nigeria as Militants Split Off ’, New York Times, 23 April 2013. 38 Much of the material in this paragraph can be gathered from B.Y. Malumfashi, ‘Behind the gates of Darul-Islam’, Weekly Trust, 7 August 2009. 37

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applied a strict Maliki Sharia in all matters civil and criminal, except that they did not claim the right to execute any harsh punishment: serious cases were handled by excommunication or by the police. They did not reject Western education, but provided it to their children; they had their own Islamiyya schools, as well as their own hospitals. The Niger State Government knew about them and even came to inspect them, and relations were friendly. There was peace between Darul Islam and the rest of the world. Then in 2007 a new governor – Aliyu Babangida – came into office in Niger State; and in July 2009 Boko Haram blew up into a major crisis to the north and east. Two weeks after Boko Haram were crushed in Maiduguri, i.e. on 15 August 2009, Governor Babangida also took out Darul Islam.39 Claiming that they constituted a threat to the peace and security of Niger State as serious as Boko Haram, he sent armed forces who arrested all of them, kept them in detention camps for some period, and gradually repatriated them to the other states and sometimes other countries from which they had come to live in Darul Islam. The governor’s action was widely questioned, as to why it was necessary to go so far in this case, and as to the legality of what was done. All the discussion has been to no avail: the deed was done, the victims were somewhat compensated, no formal complaints have been filed, and life goes on. There seems to be no separate scholarship so far on Darul Islam. ‘JUST A (SUNNI) MUSLIM’

It remains to say something about the final class of Sunnis under discussion: those inclined to identify themselves as ‘just a Muslim’. In the northern Nigerian context, where the polarity between Sufis and anti-Sufis has been so pronounced, what this implies is: neither Sufi nor anti-Sufi. The ‘neutrals’ neither join any Sufi brotherhood nor take part with Izala and related groups against them, but live simply as ‘Sunni Muslims’, praying with all others in the mosques if they too will agree, and forming their own numberless pious groups and networks for socializing, da’wah and good works. The following, from Alkali et al., relates to Nigeria’s north-east zone, but is true generally across the north: An important group that needs emphasis in this research is a group of individual Muslims who choose to practice the religion without aligning themselves to either of the main Islamic groups described above [Sufi and anti-Sufi] … Because the rituals performed are based on the Maliki tradition, the neutrals are considered Sunni Muslims in this research. 39

See e.g. A. Wakaso, ‘3,500 Islamic Sect Members Evicted in Niger’, This Day, 16 August 2009, and subsequent news.

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No strict rituals of either the Turuk like congregational dhikr or the Izala who oppose such are practiced by this group … Neutral Muslims are found all over the northeast in all the states, and like the Turuk … they are also critical of the Izala practices especially their mode of preaching. (Alkali et al. 2012, 13) Among ethnic groups, the number of independents is perhaps highest among the Yoruba, where Izala never took hold and there is a long tradition of tolerance for diversity of religious opinion and practice, both among Muslims and between Christians and Muslims. Yoruba Muslims have been in the forefront of founding ‘independent’ organizations taking no stand on Sufi religiosity, open to people of all persuasions on that point, and getting on with their programmes. An early example is the Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria (‘Ansaruddeen’), founded in 1923 and still active throughout Nigeria (Reichmuth 1996). A second example is the Nur-Ud-Deen Society (‘Nuruddeen’), which has chapters in most Nigerian states. Details of the organization, aims and objectives and work of the Nuruddeen chapter in Plateau State are given in Modibbo 2012; here is how he describes its programmes: The programs of the society in [Plateau] state include teaching of Arabic and Islamic studies, conducting tahfiz (Qur’anic memorization) fortnightly in Jos for its members. Organising nikah (marriage) and naming ceremonies for its members within and outside Jos. Giving annual and monthly tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis). The group has its branches in Mangu, Barkin Ladi and Bassa Local Governments. It generates its funds through collection of zakat and sadaqat (alms and charity) to finance its programs. The society in the state has a cordial relationship with all Islamic groups and individual Muslims in Plateau state government. The society established many Islamiyya primary and secondary schools, with over 4,000 pupils and students enrolled in the following schools: Nuruddeen Islamic/Arabic Primary School, Nuruddeen Nursery-Primary School, Nuruddeen Teachers Training College, Nuruddeen Adult classes. All the schools have been approved by the government and other examination agencies. (2012, 9–10) In fact new NGOs and CBOs are formed by Muslim ‘independents’ all the time, for all sorts of purposes, from civic education and civil rights to fighting HIV/AIDS. Modibbo 2010 studies 19 Muslim groups active in Plateau State alone, including some Sufi groups and Izala. In 2009 the author of this essay collected information on Muslim NGOs and CBOs in Jos, which adds eight groups to Modibbo’s list, including for instance the Islamic Forum for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation and three women’s

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groups: Muslim Sisters Organization, Muslim Sisters Association, and Women Initiative for Sustainable Community Development. Another women’s group, based in Abuja, is WRAPA, the Women’s Rights and Protection Alternative, founded and run by northern Muslim women. WRAPA works for justice for women throughout the north and elsewhere in the country; it is a 2014 recipient of a $750,000 MacArthur Award for Creative and Effective Institutions.40 A relatively new independent group, founded in 1995 and now active in all northern states is the Nasrul-Lahi-il-Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT), whose mission is ‘To develop an enlightened Muslim society nurtured by a true understanding of Islam for the spiritual upliftment and welfare of mankind’ (see www.nasfat.org; also Soares 2009). The ‘independent’ groups are a heterogeneous class, ethnically, religiously and programmatically. They play important roles in their communities, thickening the mix of Nigerian civil society not only among the Muslims. Further information about them is provided in Ostien 2012a, Alkali et al. 2012 and Bunza and Mustapha 2012.

Conclusion: trends in northern Nigerian Islam Most Muslims in northern Nigeria, as throughout the country, are Sunnis of the Maliki School. But there are non-Sunnis, including some Shi’a or quasi-Shi’a, some Ahmadiyya, some Qur’aniyyun (followers of the Qur’an only, to the exclusion of the Hadiths), and no doubt other small sects. The Sunnis are also divided among themselves, along the lines of Sufis, anti-Sufis, and ‘independents’. There are two main groups of Sufis, the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya along with other smaller Sufi sects. The chief anti-Sufi Sunnis are the Salafist Izala and related groups. The Sunni independents belong neither to any Sufi nor to any anti-Sufi group, but identify themselves neutrally as ‘Sunni Muslims’. Among the main Sunni groups, which one predominates varies from place to place and from ethnic group to ethnic group. Within any one of the main Sunni groups themselves there are also ethnic variations. Yoruba Tijanis resident in Kwara State, for instance, tend to take a different attitude towards observance of Sharia 40 WRAPA: see http://wrapanigeria.org. MacArthur award: ‘MacArthur Award for Creative & Effective Institutions / Meet the 2014 Recipients – Women’s Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative’, http://www.macfound.org/maceirecipients/78; also N.S. Bivan, ‘WRAPA GETS N124M MACARTHUR GRANT’, Weekly Trust, 22 February 2014. For WRAPA’s involvement in the appeals in the Safiyatu Husaini and Amina Lawal cases in 2002–03, involving women convicted of zina in Sharia Courts in Sokoto and Katsina States and sentenced to stoning to death, see A.M. Yawuri, ‘On Defending Safiyatu Husaini and Amina Lawal’, in Ostien 2007, Vol. 5, 129–139, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1470205.

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law in their personal affairs than do Hausa Tijanis resident in Kano State. Sometimes discrete groups form around special sets of ideas. One example is Boko Haram, which has taken extreme positions within Sunni Islam on many questions of what is halal and what is haram, and fights with everybody. Another example is Darul Islam, a completely orthodox and peaceful but puritan and separatist community that formed in Niger State. Within most of the groups there are individual variations along the scale from ‘cultural Muslim’ to ‘true believer’. In short, there is presently considerable diversity of Muslim belief and practice in northern Nigeria. Diversity increased during the 20th century and especially in the second half thereof, as it did too among the Christians. TOLERANCE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

There has in the past been sectarian intolerance and violence among the north’s Muslims, notably in the 1940s and 1950s, between the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya, then in the 1970s and 1980s between the Sufis jointly and Izala, which was formed specifically as an anti-Sufi group. The preaching of Maitatsine and his followers in the 1960s and 1970s was also in part directed in condemnatory terms at other Muslims and provoked outbreaks of violence in the 1980s. This tendency has not completely died out, as the emergence in the early 2000s of Boko Haram, and its continuing war against all, demonstrates. The addition of increasing numbers of Shi’a to the Muslim mix in the north since the 1980s has also generated conflict, which flared up seriously in December 2015 and is still continuing a year later. But Izala has been ‘domesticated’ (Kane 2003), the Maitatsine/Kala Kato/ Qur’aniyyun tendency is also domesticating and in places going mainstream, and the authorities are trying to get to grips with Boko Haram. The large number of independent Sunnis who identify as ‘just a Muslim’ suggests that ideology may be fading as a divisive factor among Muslims: the increasing pluralism of the religious environment is giving rise to increasing toleration, as everyone becomes clearer about what is important today and what is not, about the things they share and the things that divide them. Religious peace is constantly preached by Muslim and Christian leaders alike. It appears that a wider tolerance, allowing everyone a large measure of freedom of thought, conscience and religion as guaranteed by the constitution, and letting no one be quick to condemn others, is winning both the ideological and the affective battles among the north’s Muslims. RELIGIOSITY

There is still a high degree of religiosity among northern Muslims, just as there is among Christians: a lot of firm belief in systems of

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metaphysical-theological-moral propositions, founded on sacred texts, of which Christianity is one broad set and Islam is another. These propositions are not only believed but are ever in one’s thoughts, on one’s tongue, and performed in many pious ways. Inducting children into the religion remains central, as do witness and missionary activity. Religion is a strong personal identifier. Its dignity is strongly defended; perceived insults can ignite rapid and sometimes fatal outbreaks of violence. It is the author’s observation that Western education even pursued to Ph.D. level does not change most of this for most Christians or most Muslims. Possibly this religiosity will gradually wane, as it has in other parts of the world. Nigeria’s believers of all persuasions firmly hope not, and are doing their best to forestall it. THE STATE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The civil authorities have sometimes had to involve themselves with religious actors, either to avert perceived threats of violence or to suppress actual outbreaks. One method of aversion used in several northern states, has been the establishment of Islamic Religious Preaching Boards, responsible to license intending Islamic preachers and discipline those who preach without or in violation of a license (Garba 2014). These Boards have not worked very well, partly because of the evident tension between them and the religious freedom guaranteed not only by the constitution but in Islamic doctrine as well. Nevertheless the authorities generally know very well what is happening throughout their domains. Dissident or heterodox preachers are quickly identified and watched. The authorities make their own assessments of the potential volatility of given situations and of the need to defuse them. Sometimes they have taken preventive actions of questionable legality and averted whatever alleged risk there actually was. Sometimes they have let things go too far, until they really did explode into serious civil unrest, at which point the civil and military authorities proceeded to deal with the miscreants without mercy and without regard to due process of law. Nigeria’s constituted authorities too are still learning what the civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution are supposed to mean in practice. EDUCATION

Muslims of almost all sects in all parts of the north are hungry for education. They are actively pursuing better educations for themselves and for their children, including Western education. An exception is Boko Haram, whose teaching that Western education is haram is rejected by most Muslims, by whom Western education is viewed as halal and

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even necessary today. More serious efforts than heretofore are being made to integrate the traditional Qur’anic schools with Westernized schools, so that the large numbers of Qur’anic students and malams still existing all over the north will be better socialized into the new Nigeria. There is a growth industry of private ‘Islamiyya’ schools at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, organized on the Western model and combining Islamic and Western subjects. Many Muslims also attend or teach in government-run schools at all levels, in which Islamic subjects are studied and taught from primary school to Ph.D. Nigeria’s Muslims, having made places for their own subjects in the Western-style schools, are full partners in the educational enterprise in all sectors, public and private, religious and secular. The remaining problem is to raise standards throughout the educational system. ISLAM IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Muslims hold elective office in more or less all parts of the north. Within the secular constitution and laws, Islam is also present in the governments of all northern jurisdictions. Even in the seven non-Sharia states, Islamic law is applied in the courts in civil cases at the election of the parties, there are Sharia Courts of Appeal to hear appeals in such cases, there are Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Boards, and so on (see Ostien 2012a, 31–7). The 12 Sharia states have gone further, at least on paper, legislating new systems of inferior Sharia Courts, giving them power to apply even Islamic criminal law (including hudud and qisas) to Muslims, and in addition variously setting up Advisory Councils of Ulama, Sharia Commissions, Zakat and Endowments Board, and Hisbah Commissions (ibid.). Every state is doing Islam in government a little differently, depending on its history and its present mix of ethnicity and religion, and all claim to be within the secular constitution and laws, each its own local laboratory of democracy. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NIGERIAN STATE

The Nigerian civil authorities monitor public attitudes towards themselves, because this is prudent and because Nigeria is a democracy, though beset by many problems. On one point of interest to the authorities, namely attitudes towards the Nigerian constitution and laws and the liberal-democratic state they contemplate, however imperfectly manifested in practice, the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims (and Christians) of all confessional persuasions accept the present constitutional arrangement and Islam’s place within it. It is what has been agreed to, it is regarded as what is most likely to lead to progress for Nigerian Muslims and for

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all Nigerians, and there is presently no viable alternative. Most Muslims work with and within the constitutional order, and strive, some of them, to make it work better in practice. There are however three well-known groups – the Shi’a IMN and the Sunni Boko Haram and Ansaru – which reject the secular state and say they are working towards an Islamic state in Nigeria. Everyone else accepts the constitution and laws, subject to amendment; for them the main problem is that the laws are constantly corrupted and subverted by human greed and incompetence from which no religious or ethnic group is immune. The IMN, while rejecting the state in theory, have not actively opposed it in practice; at least for now. But Ansaru and especially Boko Haram are waging a war against Nigeria, with which the authorities are having a difficult time getting to grips. MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY

The sort of civil society that political scientists praise is thriving among Nigeria’s Muslims. ‘Community-based organizations’ and ‘nongovernmental organizations’ of all sorts, and the pious and public-spirited citizens who constitute them, exist everywhere, pursuing their programmes at every level of social organization and intersecting with each other in many ways. This sociability or communitarianism obtains in every ethnic group – a human trait, sanctioned in Nigeria by both major religions. The Muslims come together to take council, to do da’wah and good works, and to engage in all aspects of the struggle for social betterment. Often Muslim groups cooperate with Christian and government groups to undertake joint projects. There is a large degree of practical freedom of religion practised among the north’s Muslims, with ways of being a Muslim ranging from ancient to modern all recognized and accepted.

Bibliography Abdussalam, A.A., 2012, ‘Muslims of Kwara State: A Survey’, Background Paper 3, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/ BP3Abdussalam.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Adamu, A.U., 2003, ‘Loose Cannons and Oddballs on the Islamic Internet: The Submitters’. Part II of Islam and the Internet, www.kanoonline.com/publications/islam_and_ the_internet.htm (accessed 30 June 2017). Adesoji, A.O., 2011, ‘Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State’, Africa Today, 57 (4), 98–119, http://muse.jhu. edu (accessed 21 June 2014). Alkali, M.N., A.K. Monguno and B.S. Mustafa, 2012. ‘Overview Of Islamic Actors In Northeastern Nigeria’, Working Paper 3, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/WP2Alkali.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Anonymous, 2012, ‘The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi

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80 • The Muslim & Christian Context Counter-radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram’, Journal of Religion in Africa 42, 118–44. Anwar, A., 1997, ‘Gardawa, Ulama and the State in Northern Nigeria: The Maitatsine Phenomenon, 1962–1985’, PhD dissertation, Department of History, University of Maiduguri. Balogun, I.A.B., 1974, Islam versus Ahmadiyyah in Nigeria, Dar al Arabia, Beirut, Lebanon. Ben Amara, R., 2011, ‘The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-implementation’, PhD dissertation, Department of Religious Studies, University of Bayreuth, Germany. Brigaglia, A., 2012, ‘A Contribution to the History of the Wahhabi Da‘wa in West Africa: The Career and the Murder of Shaykh Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam (Daura, ca. 1961 – Kano 2007)’, in Islamic Africa, 3 (1), 1–23. Bunza, M. and A.R. Mustapha, 2012, ‘Islamic Movements in Nigeria’s Northwest Geo-Political Zone’, Working Paper 3, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford. CDRT – Centre for Democratic Research and Training, 2005, Report of a Commissioned Study on the Ulama in Contemporary Northern States of Nigeria, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano. Cisse, Hassan, 1984, ‘Shaykh al-Islam Ibrahim Niasse’, http://tijani.org/shaykh-alislam-ibrahim-niasse (accessed 28 June 2017). Clarke, P.B., 1982, West Africa and Islam, Edward Arnold, London. —— 1995, Mahdism in West Africa: The Ijebu Mahdiyya Movement, Luzac Oriental, London. Comolli, Virginia, 2015, Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency, C. Hurst & Co, London. Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 2009, The ‘Boko Haram’ Tragedy: Responses to 26 of the Most Commonly Asked Questions Regarding the ‘Boko Haram’ Crisis and Tragedy, Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, Minna. Doi, A.R.I., 1984, Islam in Nigeria. Gaskiya, Zaria. Fisher, H.J., 1963, Ahmadiyyah: A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast, Oxford University Press, London, for Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. Garba, A.S., 2013–2014, ‘Religious Preaching Boards in Northern Nigeria’, in The Annual Review of Islam in Africa, 12 (2). Gbadamosi, T.G.O., 1978, The Growth of Islam Among the Yoruba, 1841–1908, Longman, London. Hare, J., 2013, Last Man In: The End of Empire in Northern Nigeria, Neville & Harding Benenden, UK. Higazi, A., 2013, ‘Les origines et la transformation de l’insurrection de Boko Haram dans le Nord du Nigeria’, in Politique africaine, 130, 137–64. Hill, J., 2010, ‘Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?’ Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil (accessed 21 June 2014). Hiskett, M., 1987, ‘The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment, Journal of Religion in Africa, 17(3), 209–23, www.jstor.org/stable/1580875 (accessed June 21, 2014). Human Rights Watch, 2012, Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, New York. Ibrahim, K.M., 2012, ‘Muslims of Benue State: A Survey’, Background Paper 7, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/ BP8Ibrahim.pdf (accessed 30 June 2015). Jacobson, D., M.E. Olmsted, N.D. Deckard and M. Woodward, 2012, ‘Survey of Muslims in Western Europe, West Africa and Malaysia: Sample Characteristics’, Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, http://csrc.asu.edu/research/publications/articles/survey1-sample (accessed 30 June 2017). Jimba, M.M.M., 2012, ‘Muslims of Kogi State: A Survey’, Background Paper 2, Nigeria

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The Muslim majority in northern Nigeria: Sects & trends • 81 Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/BP2Jimba. pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Kane, O., 2003, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, Brill, Leiden and Boston. Kastfelt, N., 1989, ‘Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria’, African Affairs, 88 (350), 83–90. Last, M., 1967, The Sokoto Caliphate. Longman, London. —— 2012, ‘From Dissent to Dissidence: The Genesis & Development of Reformist Islamic Groups in Northern Nigeria’, Working Paper 5, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/research/research-networks/nrn/nrn-wp (accessed 21 June 2014). Lemu, B. A., 2012 [1993], Laxity, Moderation and Extremism in Islam, Islamic Education Trust, Minna, Nigeria; International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, Va and London. Liman, S.H. and A.S.I. Wakawa, 2012, ‘Muslims of Nasarawa State: A Survey’, Background Paper 8, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac. uk/pdf/nrn/BP7Liman.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Loimeier, R., 1997, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL. —— 2012, ‘Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria’, Africa Spectrum, 47 (2–3), 137–55, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/ files/journals/1/articles/555/public/555-580-1-PB.pdf (accessed 21 June 2014). Lovejoy, P.E. and J.S. Hogendorn, 1990, ‘Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905–6’, in Journal of African History, 31: 217–244, www.jstor.org/stable/182766 (accessed 21 June 2014). Makinde, A.-F. and P. Ostien, 2011, ‘The Independent Sharia Panel of Lagos State’, in Emory International Law Review, 25 (2), 921–44, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1973946 (accessed 30 June 2017). Medugu, N.I., 2012, ‘Muslims of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, Nigeria: A Survey’, Background Paper 5, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh. ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/BP5Medugu.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Modibbo, M.S.A., 2010, ‘The Advent of Islam and the Formation of Islamic Organisations in Plateau State’, Third MPhil/PhD presentation at the Postgraduate School Seminar of the Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Jos, 18 May. —— 2012, ‘Survey of Muslim Groups in Plateau State of Nigeria’, Background Paper 4, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/ BP4Modibbo.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017). Mohammed, A., 2010, The Paradox of Boko Haram, Moving Image, Kano. Mustapha, A.R., 2007, ‘Institutionalising Ethnic Representation: How Effective is the Federal Character Commission in Nigeria?’ Working Paper 43, CRISE – Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford University, www3. qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper43.pdf. —— (ed.), 2014, Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, James Currey, Woodbridge, UK Ndagi, M.U., 2012, ‘Muslims of Niger State: A Survey’, Background Paper 6, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/BP6Ndagi. pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Olayiwola, A.F., 2007, Islam in Nigeria: One Crescent Many Focuses. Lagos: Sakirabe Publishers. Ostien, P. (ed.), 2007, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006: A Sourcebook, vol. I: Historical Background; vol. II: Sharia Implementation Committee Reports and Related White Papers; vol. III: Sanitizing Society; vol. IV: The Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes; vol. V: Two Famous Cases; vol. VI: Ulama Institutions, Spectrum Books, Ibadan, http://sharia-in-africa.net/pages/publications/sharia-implementation-in-northernnigeria.php (accessed 30 June 2017).

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82 • The Muslim & Christian Context —— 2012a, ‘A Survey of the Muslims of Nigeria’s North Central Geo-political Zone’, Working Paper 1, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh. ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/WP1Ostien.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). —— 2012b, ‘Percentages By Religion of the 1952 and 1963 Populations of Nigeria’s Present 36 States’, Background Paper 1, Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford, www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/nrn/BP1Ostien.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Ostien, P. and A.J. Dekker, 2010, ‘Sharia and National Law in Nigeria’, in J.M. Otto (ed.), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present, 553–612, Leiden University Press, http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1766431 (accessed 30 June 2017). Paden, J.N., 1973, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, University of California Press, Berkeley. Peel, J.D.Y., 2000, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antione (ed.), 2014, Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, West African Politics and Society Series, Vol. 2, African Studies Centre and Institut Francais de Recherche en Afrique, Leiden and Ibadan. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2010, ‘Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa’, www.pewforum.org/files/2010/04/ sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). —— 2012, ‘The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity’, www.pewforum.org/ files/2012/08/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf (accessed 30 June 2017). Rabasa, A., C. Benard, L.H. Schwartz and P. Sickle, 2007, Building Moderate Muslim Networks. Rand Center for Middle East Public Policy, Santa Monica, CA. Reichmuth, S., 1996, ‘Education and the Growth of Religious Associations among Yoruba Muslims: The Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria’, in Journal of Religion in Africa 26 (4), 365–405. Reynolds, J.T. 1999, The Time of Politics (Zamanin Siyasa): Islam and the Politics of Legitimacy in Northern Nigeria, 1950–1966, International Scholars Publications, San Francisco. Smith, Mike, 2015, Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War, I.B. Tauris, London. Soares, B., 2009, ‘An Islamic Social Movement in Contemporary West Africa: NASFAT of Nigeria’, in P. Konings et al. (eds), African Dynamics, vol. 8, 178–96, Brill, Leiden. Umar, M.S., 1993, ‘Changing Islamic Identity in Nigeria from 1960s to the 1980s: From Sufism to anti-Sufism’, in L. Brenner, Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 154–78, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. —— 2001, ‘Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s–1990s’, in Africa Today, 48 (2), 127–50, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/africa_today/v048/48.2umar. html (accessed 21 June 2014). —— 2003, ‘Profiles of New Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria’, in The Maghreb Review 28 (2–3), 146–69, http://apad.revues.org/4092 (accessed 21 June 2014). Voll, J.O. and K. Ohtsuka, 1995, ‘Sufism’, in J. Esposito (ed.), Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, 4th edn, Oxford University Press. Wakili, H., 1995, ‘Islam and the Political Arena in Nigeria: The Ulama and the 2007 Elections’, Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper 09-004, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, http://buffett.northwestern. edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA_09-004_Wakili.pdf (accessed 28 June 2017). Zenn, J. 2013a, ‘Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention’, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/cooperation-or-competition-boko-haram-and-ansaru-after-the-maliintervention (accessed 21 June 2014). —— 2013b, ‘The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria’ Combating Terrorism Center’ West Point, NY, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islami c-movement-and-iranian-intelligence-activities-in-nigeria (accessed 21 June 2014).

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3 The significant minority Christians & Christianity in northern Nigeria DAVID EHRHARDT & JIBRIN IBRAHIM

Introduction Christians and Christianity are an integral part of the fabric of northern Nigerian society. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this community constitutes a significant minority of the population of different states in northern Nigeria. In this contribution, we synthesize the main findings from the research on ‘Christianity and Democratic Governance in Nigeria’, conducted by Jibrin Ibrahim and his colleagues ( J. Ibrahim 2008a; Ojo 2008; Alubo 2008) and two working papers written as part of the Islam Research Programme (IRP) – Abuja project (Ibrahim & Ehrhardt 2012; Ehrhardt 2012b). We introduce the main Christian denominations in northern Nigeria and discuss some of the issues that are pertinent to understanding the Christian communities in the region (diversity, politics and gender). Given the extremely diverse and dynamic nature of Christianity in contemporary Nigeria, it can only fulfil this aim in a modest way by highlighting some of the major issues and developments that characterize the contemporary Nigerian ‘body of Christ’. With this modest aim in mind, the chapter will focus on a few issues in particular. First, it will give a brief overview of the history of Christianity in northern Nigeria, a demographic sketch of the Christian population of the region, and a typology that helps to differentiate the main Christian denominations and organizations. The chapter will then go on to discuss some of the main issues in the relation between Christianity and politics, followed by an analysis of the internal and external leadership roles of Christian leaders and the corresponding (democratic) challenges related to this. Finally, the chapter will focus on gender in contemporary Christian movements in Nigeria, particularly concerning the role of women in Christian organizations. Before discussing these topics, however, it is 83

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important to define what we understand as the Christian religion. Who is a Christian and what is Christianity? In this chapter, we will resist the temptation of attempting to answer this question with reference to any specific religious doctrine, foundational principles, or religious practices. Instead, we will view Christianity as a multifaceted collection of beliefs, individuals, and organizations, which may be analysed through a wide range of analytical lenses. In this way, Christianity may simultaneously be seen as the provider of a social identity, a social group, a religious doctrine, a moral compass, a source of community, or a tool for political competition. It is dependent solely on the self-identification of the actors who ‘use’ these aspects of the religion as Christians. Finally, it is useful to briefly highlight the data on which this chapter is built and the methodology behind it. As noted above, this chapter brings together different studies about Christians and Christian leadership in northern Nigeria, each with their own methods and research aims. J. Ibrahim (2008a) presented the results of a large survey research into the connections between Christianity and democracy in northern Nigeria, while Ehrhardt (2012b) presents a descriptive, partly interpretive, case study of religious leadership in Kano. In addition to these studies, statistical data from other studies are also quoted here: most significantly Ostien (2012) and Ehrhardt (2012a). Some of the interview transcripts from Ehrhardt (2012b) are quoted below.1 This evidentiary basis means that part of the chapter, particularly where it analyses religious leadership, uses Kano as an illustration of (urban) northern Nigeria; it should be noted, however, that this city may not be fully representative of other parts of the region.

Diversity in northern Nigerian Christianity THE RISE OF PENTECOSTALISM

Stereotypically discussed as a ‘Muslim’ region, northern Nigeria nonetheless has a fascinating Christian history. As Alubo (2008) argues, the origins of Christianity in Nigeria predate the formal colonization of the country, and it was introduced in northern Nigeria only in the middle of the 19th century. In southern Nigeria, however, Christian missionaries arrived as far back as the 15th century. Mostly from Portugal, Spain and 1

Interviews were held with the following in Kano (names withheld to ensure their anonymity): minister A in ECWA Kano, 5 September 2011; minister B in ECWA Kano, 5 September 2011; pastor in Redeemed Christian Church of Christ, Kano, 6 September 2011; pastor at the Baptist Church, Kano, 7 September 2011; priest in the Catholic Diocese of Kano, 9 September 2011.

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Ireland, these missionaries built schools and hospitals but combined these efforts with evangelization and widespread attempts to convert the people living in what is now southern Nigeria from their ‘traditional’ religions to Christianity. In northern Nigeria, Musa Gaiya (2004) identifies two phases of the introduction of Christianity. In the first phase, from 1857 to 1894, the main vehicle of evangelization was the Anglican Niger Mission of the Church Missionary Society (CMS). As Gaiya shows, this period began with the establishment of the first Niger Mission station in northern Nigeria and ended with the beginning of the ‘Sudan’ Mission. The second phase coincides largely with the period of colonial rule in Nigeria, beginning with the coming of the Faith Missions and ending with the rise of the first indigenous churches (ibid. 357–9). As Shankar (2014) shows, many early northern Christians converted and operated in the margins of northern, Muslim society; and yet, over time, they succeeded in creating an indigenous, northern version of Christianity. Different parts of northern Nigeria were dominated by different Christian missions, as some communities ‘adopted’ the missions most active within them; for example, while the Anglicans were prominent in Zaria, the Ekklesiyar Yan’uwa a Nigeria (EYN), the Church of the Brethren in Nigeria, was prominent in southern Borno, and the Catholics in Idomaland. In early post-colonial Nigeria, Alubo (2008) argues, the dominant Christian groups were Catholics and mainstream Protestants. However, from the mid-1980s the Pentecostal movement, and the charismatic movement more generally, began to emerge as a great force. Like the early denominations, Pentecostalism commenced in the southern half of Nigeria, mostly around Benin and Lagos from where it spread rapidly to the rest of the country, especially from the late 1990s (Gwamna 2006; McCain 1999). While the early Pentecostalist movement of the Assemblies of God have existed for over 50 years, the newer brands of Pentecostalism are more recent creations, dating back to the late 1970s and even 1980s (McCain 2006; Gwamna 2006). Pentecostal Churches are increasing in size all over the world but their success in Africa has been extraordinary. It is part of the rise of a ‘new’ Christianity, which may be summarized in the following characteristics, following D. Ibrahim (2008, 2–3): i. Christianity is a religion of agency with high capacity to transform lives. ii. Christianity offers equality among believers and all members of the congregation must aspire for the highest level of spiritual development. iii. Christianity is a rational religion and those who are born again can see proof of the power of God in their daily lives. iv. Christianity is not about families, groups or communities but about the individual who has opted for salvation.

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According to Meyer (2002, 757), a large cross-section of Africans is attracted to Pentecostalism, or charismatic Christianity more generally, for different reasons. The young generation believes that it can empower them in their quest for a better future. Middle-aged women who have responsibilities for taking care of their children and who are suffering from the yoke of male-dominated gerontocratic societies find that Pentecostalism could be a good route to building a career in trade or business, or for exercising agency outside patriarchal control. For others, affliction and ill health are the problems that lead them to Pentecostalism. The young and upwardly mobile are particularly central to the growth of Pentecostalism. In her incisive essay, Marshall-Fratani argues that the great advantages of Pentecostalism for the upwardly mobile are that it legitimates their individualism while freeing them from financial pressures imposed by cash-strapped extended family members (Marshall-Fratani 1998, 5). But perhaps most importantly, as Marshall-Fratani contends, one of the reasons for the success of Pentecostalism in Africa is the ease with which it incorporates aspects of ‘traditional’ African religions and cultural practices. This relates especially to the importance of the spirit realm, and of the forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ contending within African cosmology. Like most Nigerian ‘traditional’ religions, Pentecostalism emphasizes the existence of the supernatural spirit world. The demons who operate within this supernatural sphere can be subdued and exorcized through prayers. Thus, there are regular services for casting out demons, often marked by spectacular scenes of seizure and catharsis. As Marshall-Fratani says: What is novel about Pentecostalism is that it directly addresses the problem of the forces of evil and incites public testimony about the workings of evil forces, producing discourses, which expose these forces and show the individual how to overcome their dangerous and destructive influence. These narratives enable the individual to constitute himself as an historical agent who is not only empowered in his personal life, but together with other believers has the strength to do battle with ‘powers and principalities’, ‘raising up an army for God in the land’. (Marshall-Fratani 1998, 21) The charismatic movement, of which the Pentecostals are arguably the most successful exponents, is transforming Nigerian Christianity in a profound way. At one level, it is deepening the integration of Nigerian Christianity into the global nexus while at the same time developing local roots to sustain itself. At another level, it has introduced at least two new elements into Christian belief and practice in Nigeria. The first is the gospel of prosperity. It reverses the anti-materialism associated with the early church and justifies, and indeed legitimizes, the acquisition of

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material wealth. The second element is the gospel of power. It attracts new converts and maintains existing members on claims of a continuous capacity to perform miracles. This aspect of particularly Pentecostal belief promotes agency as a mode of social action. In yet another sense, charismatic Pentecostalism is clearly changing the nature of the clergy, or religious leadership in Nigeria (Alubo 2008, 17–18). This is not only important for the nature of the religious movements but, as we will see below, also has implications for the relationship between Pentecostal churches and the wider political arena. Phrased generally, training in many charismatic churches is less formalized than in the ‘orthodox’ Catholic and Protestant churches. Charisma, or grace, can be bestowed on anyone. This means that in some cases, church elders, with or without formal training, are ‘blessed’ by pastors and told to establish their own churches. Also, in some cases succession of church leadership becomes a family affair, going from the husband to the wife. However, in many other situations, there are seminaries and theological schools, some of which are owned by other denominations. So, in sum, a major transformation of Christianity has been occurring in Nigeria over the past three decades; new religious movements have been encroaching on the membership of the more established denominational churches. The most successful strand within the new religious movements is the Pentecostal one. The Pentecostal movement has a wide appeal, especially among the youth and the upwardly mobile. The movement is characterized by a myriad of fellowships, missions and churches that are not held together by a common organizational framework except the loose umbrella cover provided by the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN). Indeed, even a common doctrinal framework is difficult to discern. Nonetheless, the subsequent section will attempt to distil some of its basic distinctive features as it describes the diversity of Christian movements in northern Nigeria. CHRISTIANS AS A DIVERSE MINORITY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

It may be clear that, given the size of Nigeria, its ethnic and cultural diversity, and the diversity of influences on the development of its Christian community, Nigerian Christianity is a highly diverse creature (Kukah 1993). This section will attempt to describe the main currents of doctrine and organization within this rather amorphous category, summarizing the typology of Nigerian Christianity as proposed by Matthew Ojo (2008a). First, however, we will briefly look at the available data on the demographic characteristics of Christianity, particularly in the context of northern Nigeria. As has been detailed elsewhere (see Ostien in Chapter 2), there

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is little reliable data on the relative group sizes of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The last census that collected religious data was conducted in 1963; its results, aggregated for the territories that now constitute the various northern states of Nigeria, suggest that while Muslims constituted 71.9 per cent of the population of the region, Christians made up 9.7 per cent, with ‘Others’, essentially followers of African Traditional Religions constituting 18.6 per cent of the population. Although since 1963 the precise distribution of religious affiliation may have shifted considerably (for example, the large numbers of ‘Others’ have likely dwindled with the rise of the two major monotheistic religions), there are several patterns in the 1963 distribution that continue to characterize northern Nigeria to this day. Most importantly, in the large majority of northern states, Christians are in the minority. Irrespective of several decades of conversion, migration and other forms of religious mixing (cf. Gaiya 2004), it is unlikely that this general status of Christianity as the minority religion in the north has changed substantially. For Kano, the second largest city in Nigeria, this argument can be further corroborated by data collected by Ehrhardt (2012a), which also shows that Christians make up 15–20 per cent of the population of this important cosmopolitan hub. Although virtually all Christian denominations are well represented in the region, it is therefore important to remember that they represent minority populations – a fact that is significant given the highly charged and politicized relations between Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria. The demographic minority status of Christians in northern Nigeria has a clear positive correlation with deep political marginalization (see Ehrhardt 2012a). This is therefore also a major factor in Christian discourse in the north: Christian minorities of northern Nigeria tend to have a higher level of threat perception, compared to Christians from the southern states. Interestingly, however, while Christians in northern Nigeria are marginal in political terms, they may well be better off than their Muslim neighbours in economic terms: Christians in Kano are, for example, on average in a better socio-economic position than northern Muslims, due to the Christians’ educational advantages (Ehrhardt 2012a).2 Moreover, some clear patterns of economic specialization have occurred along religious lines: for example, in the current Sharia dispensation, Christians have moved into sectors considered un-Islamic or even amoral, such as the exploitation of beer parlours and brothels. This has benefited Christian communities economically, but also made their position more precarious: not only are they subject to somewhat unpredictable enforcement of 2 In the conflict situation in Jos, these region-wide relationships are reversed, with the minority Muslim Hausa being economically stronger than the Christian indigenous ethnicities that tend to dominate state-level politics.

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Table 3.1  Relative group sizes of Christian denominations in Kano in 2008 (N=149) Denomination

Per cent

Catholic

52

Pentecostal

20

Protestant

11

African Independent Church

9

Others

8

Total

100

(Source: Ehrhardt, 2012a, 2012b)

Sharia restrictions, but many Muslim northerners also look down upon what they consider as making a profit from ‘sin’.3 Furthermore, as many have argued and other chapters in this volume highlight, the political and economic inequalities are important sources of the recurrent communal tensions between Muslims and Christians. Turning to the demography of Christianity in northern Nigeria, it is clear that all Christian groups together are in a minority position in the region. Yet, given the paucity and politicized nature of Nigerian statistics, it is virtually impossible to estimate the relative size of the various Christian churches in northern Nigeria. An indication may be given by data presented in Ehrhardt (2012a) about Kano, which is included in Table 3.1. This table shows that, at least within the context of Kano, the Catholics constitute the majority Christian group, followed by the Pentecostals, the ‘orthodox’ Protestants, and many smaller (often Nigerian-origin) churches in that order. It should be borne in mind, however, that these proportions may well be particular to Kano, given its unique historical trajectory as an economic centre of gravity in the region (Bako, 1990). Although the group sizes of Kano’s Christians may thus not be representative for the wider northern region, the diversity of these communities is. We will now turn to Ojo’s (2008a) typology of Christianity, in which he differentiates the following main denominations: • The Roman Catholic Church, comprising both the global, and relatively uniform, Catholics as well as those who are part of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal; • The mainline or ‘orthodox’ Protestants, who are part of denominational churches (e.g. Methodists or Anglicans) and inter-denominational faith missions (e.g. Evangelical Church of West Africa, ECWA); 3

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We would like to thank Murray Last for bringing this trend to our attention.

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• The African Protestant churches, such as the Native Baptist Church or the United Native African Church; • The Aladura churches, such as the Christ Apostolic Church, most of which originated in southwestern Nigeria (Yorubaland); and • The Pentecostal churches, comprising (i) the classical Pentecostal churches, many of which resulted from the activities of Western missionaries in Nigeria; (ii) the indigenous Pentecostal churches set up between the 1940s and 1990s; and (iii) the newer independent charismatic churches, which have emerged since the 1970s. Besides these five main Christian movements, Ojo (ibid.) also identifies two additional, more or less residual, categories of Christians in northern Nigeria: • the pseudo-Christian churches, a residual category that includes Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and similar churches; and • the syncretistic sects, such as the highly eclectic Chrislamherb, a group that has attempted a fusion of Christianity, Islam and ‘traditional’ religion. Although there are many different dimensions that distinguish these denominations from each other, arguably the most salient division is between the Pentecostal and other charismatic churches on the one hand and the ‘orthodox’ Protestants and (non-charismatic) Catholics on the other. Although the dividing lines between these groups of churches are more complex than this discussion allows, some of the central defining characteristics of Pentecostal churches were noted to be their belief in the process of being ‘born again’ through baptism, in ‘speaking in tongues’, and in the strength of spirits and, consequently, in the power of charismatic prayer and divine healing.4 Some of these elements are not exclusive to the Pentecostal churches; a Catholic priest in Kano, for example, described a charismatic segment of the Nigerian Catholic Church, whose members also believe in the strength of the spirit world and the power of charismatic prayer. He explained that, spiritual problems can be resolved through prayers. I believe so much in this charismatic way of prayer. Some spiritual problems need deliverance. Maybe it may be strange to you … But sometimes people have spiritual problems that need to be solved spiritually. 5 4 Interview with pastor in Redeemed Christian Church of Christ on 6 September 2011 in Kano. 5 Interview with priest in Catholic Diocese of Kano on 9 September 2011 in Kano.

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Christianity in Nigeria is thus divided along many different cleavage lines, including the one between the ‘orthodox’ and charismatic churches. At the same time, however, there is a sense in which all Christians and Christian groups are considered as part of the same ‘body of Christ’. In this spirit, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was created to bring together the five main Christian organizations in Nigeria: • The Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN); • The Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN); • The Christian Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (CPFN) / Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN); • The Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC); and • The Fellowship of Churches of Christ in Nigeria (TEKAN) and Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA) Fellowships. CAN serves their common interests, such as lobbying for the rebuilding of churches that are destroyed during religious conflicts, or promoting the right of Christians to go on state-subsidized pilgrimages (just like Muslims receive state support to go on hajj). However, in interviews with Christian leaders in Kano, several leaders were quite open about what they regard as the limitations of CAN in this respect (see Ehrhardt 2012b and the following section). In addition to the encumbered representation of Christian interests, however, CAN also serves a more symbolic purpose: uniting the fragmented community of Christians. In this sense, it is significant that CAN is a highly visible political player at the national level in Nigeria, responding to issues related to Christian interests all over the country. So while Christians in northern Nigeria are organized in distinct churches, CAN unites them on the basis of shared interests.

Christianity and northern Nigerian politics It is safe to say that Christians in Nigeria are characterized by a diverse range of doctrinal beliefs, religious rituals, and forms of organization. This diversity obviously has implications for the individual and collective experiences of Christians; but it also impacts on the wider influence of Christianity on Nigerian society. This section will address this wider societal relevance of Christianity in northern Nigeria by focusing on its role in the public sphere and, more specifically, in the complicated arena of northern Nigerian politics. To appreciate the significance of religion in Nigeria’s public sphere, however, there are some contextual factors that need to be explicated. In particular, we will consider the salience of religion in northern Nigeria; the formal institutional framework that

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structures the relationship between religion and politics in the region; and, finally, the variety of public opinions on this relationship. SALIENCE, SECULARISM, AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE: THE CONTEXT OF CHRISTIAN POLITICS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

To understand the role of Christianity in political life in northern Nigeria, arguably the major factor to note is the extremely high salience of religious identities and piety among Nigerians (Lewis & Bratten 2000). More to the point, many Nigerians feel that their religion should have a major impact on their lives, and on the ways in which Nigerian society is organized. All arguments about the role of Christianity in the Nigerian public sphere should be understood within the context of the high salience of religion in the everyday lives and moral convictions of Nigerian Christians. One of the consequences of this salience is that while Nigerians generally regard political leaders critically, religious leaders (both Christian and Muslim) can boast high levels of trust and legitimacy. As such, they are considerable political authorities in their own right, even if they are not formally engaged in the political process (cf. Ehrhardt 2012a). Moreover, another consequence of religion’s salience is that there is a widespread feeling that religion should be used to improve the processes of political competition and governance. With the rise of religiosity, people increasingly search for solutions to concrete political and economic problems in the spiritual realm. The pertinent question for many Nigerian Christians is therefore not if religion should impact on politics, but how great this impact should be and how it should be realized. Few questions are as divisive, however, as the question of how to relate religion and politics. At the national level, this question boils down to the problem of organizing a multi-religious federation with a wide variety of highly salient and competitive religious groups. In the predominantly Islamic north, however, it comes down to the challenge of designing a political system that recognizes both the majority rights of the Muslims, particularly through the implementation of Sharia law, and those of the minority groups, most importantly the Christians. Or, as D. Ibrahim (2008) phrases it: the ‘external democratic challenge’ of determining how Christianity’s members, churches, and other organizations should participate in Nigeria’s political process. Clearly, there are institutions at all levels of Nigerian society that affect the position of religion in northern Nigerian politics, including the complex institutions around Sharia that have been created in some northern Nigerian states after 1999. Because of the strong regional focus of this chapter, we will briefly summarize the main national institutions

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of relevance to the relationship between religion and politics, which are circumscribed in the Nigerian constitution. Often referred to, controversially, as the foundation of Nigerian ‘secularism’, these constitutional provisions comprise four basic principles: (i) the formal equality of individual Nigerian citizens; (ii) the prohibition of a ‘State religion’; (iii) freedom of conscience and religious education; and (iv) the prohibition of political parties that are affiliated to religion. First, the formal equality of Nigerian citizens is prescribed in article 17.2(a) of the 1999 Nigerian constitution, which states that ‘every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law’ (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2010). This formal equality is strengthened by a principle of non-discrimination on religious grounds, which is delineated in article 15: ‘discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited’. The Nigerian constitution thus prescribes the equality of Nigerian citizens and the principle of non-discrimination on religious grounds, summarized in the Federal motto of article 15.1: ‘Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress’. This constitutes the first set of constitutional provisions that shape Nigerian struggles around secularity. Second, and more controversially, article 10 states that ‘the government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion’. Many analysts interpret this article as the core of Nigeria’s secular state, especially in conjunction with the articles 15.3(c) and (d) which hold that it is the duty of the state to encourage inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic, or linguistic association or ties; and [to] promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious, and or other sectional barriers. The Nigerian state is therefore not only prohibited from adopting a state religion, but it is also obliged to promote inter-religious association and marriage. It may seem that these articles provide clear directions, and constraints, for the relationship between religions and the state. However, the everyday reality of Nigerian politics has produced a range of creative ways in which to re-interpret, or even circumvent, these constitutional constraints. The third set of constitutional provisions for Nigerian secularity is contained in article 38 and pertains to the freedom of religion. Article 38(3) notes that ‘no religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination’. Thus, article 38 provides Nigerians with

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the freedom of conscience and religion, the freedom to change, practice and propagate their religion, and the freedom to educate their community members in the tenets of their religion. It also protects them, in theory, from being taught religious knowledge against their will. Fourth and finally, article 222 prescribes the way in which political parties can relate to religions. It states: no association by whatever name called shall function as a party, unless … the membership of the association is open to any citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, circumstance of birth, sex, religion, or ethnic grouping; [and] the name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria. As such, article 222 prohibits political parties from affiliating themselves with a religious community. The Nigerian constitution thus provides, formally, for citizen equality and basic freedoms of religion, while prohibiting the state and political parties from affiliating themselves with a religious community. This is not to say, however, that these constitutional injunctions translate directly into political realities. But they do provide a framework for the potential engagement of Christian organizations with politics. Simply put, nothing constrains Christians from being involved in politics. But there are constraints on the involvement of religions in the affairs of the state, for example as a state religion or as the foundational principle of a political party. With these constitutional constraints in mind, it is interesting to consider some of the predominant perceptions and views of Christians, both laymen and clergy, on the role of their faith in politics. In this respect, J. Ibrahim (2008a) presents some pertinent findings. First, the extensive survey data presented in his book show that a large majority of Nigerian Christians are in favour of democracy and, perhaps more strikingly, do not believe that governments are created by God. The latter finding is significant because it opens up legitimate avenues for contestation against the government – seeing as its leadership is not based on a divine decree. Moreover, Ojiji (2008) shows that 75 per cent of church members interviewed feel that churches should make pronouncements on politics, and just under half of the respondents feel that Christians should be engaged in politics. J. Ibrahim (2008b, 19–20) then shows that about 80 per cent of the church leaders who were interviewed feel that they should be more involved in politics and the democracy project. All these findings suggest that Nigerian Christians are open to, and sometimes explicitly supportive of, the idea of Christian religious leaders

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engaging in Nigerian democratic politics. This seems indicative of an underlying wish for further integration of the religious and political spheres – an argument that may find some corroboration in Ojiji’s (2008) finding that just under half of the interviewed churchgoers believe that religious leaders should discuss politics with their congregation. At the same time, however, both religious leaders and their followers overwhelmingly identified prayer and preaching, as the primary means of political engagement for Christian leaders and organizations (ibid., 96). This indicates that, while there may be a general wish for Christianity to be part of Nigerian politics, the ways in which this should be realized remains a subject of fundamental disagreement. Moreover, it highlights the difference between the popular demand for religion to be used to bring morality back into Nigerian politics, and the more academic debates and concerns about the politicization of religion. As discussed at length by J. Ibrahim (1989, 1991) and many others after him, the politicization of religion denotes the ways in which political entrepreneurs, including some religious leaders, use religion and religious sentiment to manipulate the Nigerian public in their own (private) quests for power and wealth. In this way, politicized religion has been identified as a cause for conflict and violence. It may be clear that this politicization stands in rather stark contrast to the widespread normative wish for a more religious form of politics, in which religion could be a catalyst of morality and good governance, rather than conflict and destruction. The diversity of views and the widespread ambivalence on the relationship between Christianity and politics is a recurrent feature in the literature on Nigerian religious life, interfaith relations, and ‘secularism’ (e.g. Alubo 2008; Boer 2006; Ehrhardt 2012b). On the one hand, many Christian organizations (including CAN) have expressed their support for the Nigerian state as a ‘secular’ state, which may be ‘neutral’ (i.e. un-religious) or multi-religious in orientation. Especially in the light of Muslim attempts to (re)implement Sharia laws, Christians have used this line of argument as a defence against what they perceive as the growing Islamization of Nigeria. On the other hand, as noted above, many Christians feel that religious values should inform politics and politicians, for example as an antidote against the pervasive self-serving corruption. Other Christians and Christian organizations have gone even further, arguing for more comprehensive integration of Christianity into the functioning of the state (perhaps partly mimicking Muslim demands for Sharia). One result of this line of argument has been the creation of Christian Pilgrim Welfare Boards, which subsidize Nigerian Christians to go on pilgrimages to Israel and Italy.

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96 • The Muslim & Christian Context CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

With this contextual description in mind, we now turn our attention to the ways in which Christian leaders and organizations relate to politics and the Nigerian state. It will highlight the internal and external roles Christian leaders adopt – as teachers, caretakers, and representatives of their followers – as well as the (democratic) challenges they face in doing so. Internal leadership roles: teachers and caretakers

The first role that Christian leaders play in their communities in northern Nigeria is that of the teacher. In all of the interviews conducted for this study in Kano, respondents emphasized the importance of teaching and preaching as part of their work as religious leaders. Religious knowledge, and its public display, is important as a basis for religious authority, and Christian leaders prioritize education as one of their salient societal tasks. It is important, however, to note that the general purpose of teaching religious knowledge may be achieved through different means: sermons and preaching, and educational activities (cf. Ehrhardt 2012b). First, preaching is perhaps the primary occupation of the interviewed religious leaders. Sermons are part of church services, where a preacher or pastor speaks ‘in the name of god and to prepare people beyond living here on earth’6, or to disseminate the general values of a religious doctrine and admonish followers to abide by its norms and regulations. A pastor of the Baptist Church in Sabon Gari Kano, phrases it thus: ‘as I prepare people for the kingdom of god, it leaves them with the responsibility of living in a meaningful society. Of tolerance, of peace, of love, of sacrifice, all of that. Because with much of that, we are expected to enter the kingdom of god’7. The second way of disseminating religious knowledge consists of direct educational activities: providing bible classes and formally organized schools. All Christian leaders interviewed noted that their church or otherwise religious organization supervised primary and/or secondary schools. Secular schooling has a long historical connection with Christianity in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, because of the emphasis put on teaching by missionaries. In many places in northern Nigeria, particularly in the cities where public education is of poor quality, Christian organizations continue to prioritize the provision of Christian and secular education to their communities. While both Christian and Muslim leaders provide formal education to their communities, secular education continues to be more of a priority among Christians than among Muslims. Besides teaching and preaching, the second role that came up in every interview was that of the caretaker: the religious leader who takes care of 6

Interview with pastor of Baptist Church on 7 September 2011 in Kano.

7 Ibid.

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his community members through counselling, advice and mediation. In all of the interviews, the role of the caretaker received most attention and the individual descriptions of this role showed many similarities between leaders, even between those with different religious affiliations. Here we will discuss a few examples of Christian leaders’ caretaking in the fields of marriage and relationship counselling, which were at the top of the list of all interviewees. Without exception, all interviewed leaders had extensive experience in dealing with marital difficulties and could give lively examples of their efforts. A minister of ECWA Kano, for example, describes a case he dealt with: I remember one husband, he fought with his wife. So in the night, around 10.30, the wife comes to knock on my door. She was crying. The husband had beaten her thoroughly, so she would not go back to that house. And I say to her: please be patient. So I asked my wife, let her escort me to their house in Brigade. So we went there. We sat down and I asked the husband – it was very hard before he opened the door, because he identified my voice … I pleaded with him: even if you don’t open the door for your wife, you will do it for me. I’m here together with my wife. So he opened the door, we sat down: ‘what happened?’ And he narrated the whole story and the wife was crying. So I realized that, when the son misbehaved, the wife would talk to him. Warn him. And you know, we in Africa … Sometimes, she beats the child. And the husband doesn’t like this, or even if she talks to him. So that caused the problem. So after we finish, I tell him the truth! I say: so you don’t want your child to cry now, but if you don’t start from now, I’m telling you, your child will one day make you cry. So please, what she is doing is right. Because you love the child, but she loves him too. Because she is the one who bore the child. And you know how much she suffered because of that child and she wants him to become a man of his own later on. So we prayed, we left the house. After two or three days, around 7.30pm, they brought a bag of rice to my house, together with the wife. He said ‘Thank you reverend, thank you very much’. I will never forget that.8 As may be expected, the origins of the marital difficulties dealt with by the interviewed leaders varied considerably. Some mentioned diverging opinions on the raising of children or other forms of parental conduct, such as the example given above. Others mentioned other causes of marital conflict, including issues around sexuality, poverty (or rather the inability of the husband to provide for the wife and family), religious differences, forced or arranged marriages, and even issues of a spiritual nature: 8

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Interview with minister B of ECWA Kano on 5 September 2011 in Kano.

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Sometimes people have spiritual problems that need to be solved spiritually. Like somebody who has been dreaming. Another wife comes to sleep with him. A night wife, or a night husband … The person is experiencing everything as if it is real, but it is not real. It is spiritual. And then he finds he cannot perform with the partner he is married to in the real natural world. So if that is the aspect, it calls for prayers.9 One of the striking aspects of these examples and discussions was the intimacy of the problems and the depth of the involvement of these religious leaders with the marital lives of members of their congregations. If the interviewee accounts are accurate, Christian leaders in northern Nigeria do not shy away from addressing highly intimate issues in marital relationships, often of a sexual nature. For example, a pastor of the Baptist Church in Kano gave the example of a wife ‘having problems with meeting her husband’, even though ‘the bible says: woman, submit to your husband’; suggesting Biblical requirements for marital intimacy. The husband, on his part, found it ‘difficult to love his wife’.10 However, other causes for rejection were also commonly cited, for example in a situation where the wife does not want to have another child while she is breastfeeding.11 Christian leaders often use their position to offer highly personal counselling services. Such services are mostly directed at members of their own community, although some of the interviewees could also give examples of their involvement with members of other denominations, sects or churches. Moreover, while this section has only considered cases around marriage and sexuality, Christian leaders also advise and lead their followers on issues of inheritance, healing, conflict and crisis management (see Ehrhardt 2012b). Given the high levels of trust these leaders can count on, and the high salience of religion more generally in the population, it is safe to argue that Christian leaders in northern Nigeria have important leadership functions within their congregations. However, this is not to say that the high level of authority of Christian leaders within their congregations in northern Nigeria is universally accepted. In fact, Nwaigbo (2003) argues that there is something of an ‘internal democratic challenge’ to the leadership of Christian leaders in Nigeria: 9

Interview with a priest of the Catholic Diocese of Kano on 9 September 2011 in Kano. Interview with pastor in Redeemed Christian Church of Christ on 6 September 2011 in Kano. 11 Interview with a priest of the Catholic Diocese of Kano on 9 September 2011 in Kano. 10

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At the moment, there is clamour for democracy in the Church … There is talk about relationship, about autonomy in the Church and about freedom of speech … There are huge questions being posed about ordination and the role of women in the Church. There is irresistible movement of people towards pluralism and the vibrating voice of liberation theology. (2003, 206) For the Catholic Church, as well as many ‘orthodox’ Protestant churches, the internal democratic challenge is closely connected to their strictly hierarchical structures. Some argue that the division of the church into laity and clergy has diminished the voice of non-clerics and culminated in the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of the clergy (ibid., 204). In this light, one of the main reasons for the success of Pentecostalism may be related to its ability to respond effectively to this laity/clergy divide. Indeed, some argue that Pentecostalism has impacted on Christian culture through the intensification of what Asamoah-Gyadu (2005) has called the praxis of the democratization of charisma. Church hierarchies are being stripped of their exclusive rights to the administration of Christian praxis. In some ways, this approach introduces popular democratic practices into church practices as the laity is empowered in its agency. The reality of many churches, however, is that new hierarchies develop, some of which may be equally or even more constraining than their predecessors. One of the most common phrases used by Pentecostal leaders, for example, has been popularized by Ruth Marshall: ‘God is not a democrat’ (Marshall 1995), underlining the personal and charismatic basis of Pentecostal authority and the resulting lack of democratic accountability inherent in this authority. The pertinence of the internal democratic challenge is corroborated by some of the findings of J. Ibrahim’s (2008b) study: for example, the study shows that only about half of the interviewed church leaders had arrived at their position through elections; the remaining half were either appointed, identified through divine revelation, or given the position simply on the basis of seniority (ibid., 64). These figures indicate the lack of internal democracy in many churches. Given the importance of Christian leaders in Nigerian society as it is, and their calls for a governance system based on solid moral principles, this apparent democracy deficit in the internal affairs of the church is of great societal significance. External leadership roles: community representation and politics

Besides their internal leadership functions, and the internal democratic challenges that they face, Christian leaders in northern Nigeria also engage with the wider society, in particular as representatives of their minority

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religious community (Kukah 1993). This section will analyse the nature of this engagement and the challenges facing Christian leaders in the context of Nigerian ‘secularism’ and the minority status of Christians in a northern Nigeria in which many states have full Sharia law (see Ostien 2007 and Mustapha & Gamawa in Chapter 5 of this volume for more details on Sharia implementation in northern Nigeria). Building on the interview data, there are roughly two ways in which Christian leaders in Kano are representatives of their communities: first, through individual involvement in electoral politics and government and, second, through collective action. As Wakili (2009) argues in his paper on the ulama and elections, Islamic leaders all over northern Nigeria capitalized on the reintroduction of the criminal code of the Sharia law in 1999 to involve themselves in ‘secular’ politics. For obvious reasons, bureaucratic positions for Sharia implementation are only available to some Muslim leaders. Christians are only included into the state apparatus as advisors on minority Christian or ethnic issues (see Ehrhardt 2012a) – even though Wakili (2009) shows that Christian leaders in other parts of Nigeria also increasingly seek government positions. Sharia politics has thus strengthened the incentives for some Islamic leaders to engage with the political process in Kano, but this involvement is virtually unattainable for Christian leaders. In addition to direct political involvement, however, a second way in which many interviewed leaders represent their communities is highly significant for Christian communities: representation through religious organizations. Prime examples of such organizations are the Christian umbrella of CAN, the wide range of faith-based NGOs, and the National Inter-Religious Council (NIREC). CAN is by far the most influential of these Christian organizations and will therefore be the focal point of the remainder of this section. In all external politics of Christians in northern Nigeria, CAN has been a particularly significant player, at the Federal, State and Local Government levels. As the primary umbrella organization of Nigerian Christians, it is the only actor that can claim to speak on behalf of the entire Christian community. As a pastor in the Redeemed Christian Church of Christ in Kano, who is the head of the Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN) bloc of CAN Kano branch, describes it: ‘CAN … is the religious instrument from the Christian side that the government of the State or even of the nation recognizes as the religious body that provides leadership for the Christian community’. As such, his role in CAN is to ‘coordinate religious affairs of this bloc, CCN, and then to represent the interests of the Christian community in the governance of the State’. This representation, he later explains, entails mostly ‘[being] a stakeholder in maintaining peace, in educating the people … so from time to time we sit together

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with the State government, with the security agencies, and then we give feedback to the people’.12 At the local level, CAN’s engagement is often aimed at local issues such as the building and maintenance of churches. This representative function is particularly important in northern Nigeria, where CAN also originated, because of the minority status of northern Christians. A Catholic priest in Kano, who is also the representative of the Catholic bloc in CAN Kano branch, describes his role in CAN as follows: We come together [and] first, everybody will pray together and then people will bring the issues of the day. The chairman will ask for a burning issue. Is there something that concerns churches that we can talk to the government or authorities about? We can draw their attention, if they are not aware of it, to see how we can have a dialogue with them. We are not confrontational, but we are there to broker dialogue. Either with the government, or with other faiths, like Islam. To see where our rights can be respected … Take, for example, a church that was burnt down in the year 2007. The churches in Tudun Wada Local Government, about 15 of them; and they cannot rebuild … These things have been giving us concern. And we have to go to the relevant authorities to find out what can be done.13, CAN is thus viewed as the main representative of the Christian community in Kano and discusses many things, ‘politics not excluded’14 because, as one interviewee explains, ‘what affects an ECWA man affects a Catholic man’. At the same time, however, he is also clear about the fact that CAN’s main concern is that ‘churches may exist and that we may practice [our religion] freely’. And, as a Baptist pastor admits, it is not usually easy to tell the State government the interests of the Christian community: ‘It is easier for the government to arrange for a meeting than for us to seek audience of government. So we use the little opportunity when the government says, ‘Come, there is something to discuss’ … to put our own issues forward for consideration’.15 Thus, while CAN is well-organized and aims to represent Christian interests, its access to Local Government and State authorities in parts of northern Nigeria is constrained and its agenda is often limited to removing restrictions on the practice of Christianity. At the national level, CAN’s political behaviour is simultaneously more encompassing and more diffuse. For example, CAN is always one of the 12

Interview with pastor in Redeemed Christian Church of Christ on 6 September 2011 in Kano. 13 Interview with a priest of the Catholic Diocese of Kano on 9 September 2011 in Kano. 14 Ibid. 15 Interview with pastor of Baptist Church on 7 September 2011 in Kano.

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first actors to respond to situations of crisis, such as the Boko Haram atrocities across the region or the many cases of (threatened) communal and riotous violence involving Christians. In this role, CAN has had both positive and negative impacts, at times promoting emancipation and nonviolence but at other times instigating antagonism and acrimony (Ehrhardt 2016). More broadly, however, CAN has also expressed clear views on Christian engagement with national politics: We, the Christians of Nigeria, believe that government is ordained by God to provide justice and security for its people, encourage and facilitate development, and protect and manage its resources. Since government is an agent of God, it must always be respected, supported and obeyed, unless it conflicts with the Law of God. We believe, therefore, that Christians must actively participate in the political process to ensure that government is just, transparent and efficient. We recognize that governance is an honourable service to humanity. Thus, we believe Christians should actively seek public office and reflect the beliefs of their faith in their public service as much as in their private lives. We insist that our politicians should be completely honest and fair in the fulfillment of their duties. Christian public servants must not give or accept bribes, favours, positions, honours or any other benefit that would compromise fairness in fulfilling their duties. (CAN 2004, 1–2) Thus, CAN clearly expresses its preference for having Christians and Christian values in government. Although this is presented as a way to ensure morally ‘good’ politics, it may also easily be understood as a way for the Christian community as a whole to strengthen its societal position (cf. Ojo 2007). Significantly, even if Christianity as such is not proposed as a structuring principle for government, Christian public servants are advised to seek the counsel of their church and Christian leaders in matters of politics and government. CAN’s position presents a good illustration of the ambivalence of many Nigerian Christians about secularism and politics, and the fine line that many Christian organizations attempt to draw in their approaches to Christianity and the public sphere. As such, it is indicative of the complexity of Christianity’s struggle with the external challenge of democratization within the wider Nigerian society – a challenge that is likely to remain on the agenda of Nigerian Christian groups for the foreseeable future.

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Gender and Christianity in Nigeria As is highlighted in J. Ibrahim (2008b), Alubo (2008), and Ojo (2008b), one important aspect of the internal democratic challenge of Christian movements relates to gender, and specifically the ways in which they envision the social roles of men and women in religious organizations and in society at large. Of course, this is a challenge for Nigerian Muslims and ‘traditional’ believers as well as Christians; nonetheless, there are clear differences between religions, and between denominations, in the ways in which this challenge is taken up. In essence, the ‘gender challenge’ for Nigerian Christians can be divided into two distinct issues: first, the relevance of gender in the organization of Christian churches and movements themselves and, second, the impact of gender on social life outside the church. We will look at each issue in a bit more detail in this section. The issue of gender in Christian organizations, is neither new nor particular to the Nigerian context. The most pertinent question in this regard is often whether women can be ordained and become part of the clergy – or, in other words, if women can hold positions of power in the church organization beyond their traditionally accepted roles as nuns, teachers or missionaries. J. Ibrahim (2008b, 79) shows some interesting data in this regard: 70 per cent of the Christian respondents in his nationwide survey are against the ordination of women in the church. Irrespective of this public resistance towards women as church authorities, different Christian groups have dealt with this question in different ways. The Roman Catholic Church arguably represents one end of the spectrum, where positions of authority (i.e. priesthood) are reserved exclusively for men. Moreover, the institution of celibacy prohibits men in positions of religious authority to marry, thus restricting the potential informal influence of women on the management of the church even further. The Anglican Church, as a second example, may be seen as representing an intermediate position on this spectrum, as highlighted by D. Ibrahim (2008). As a third example beside the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church, some of the Pentecostal churches (e.g. Foursquare Church) may be closer to the other end of the spectrum of equality of gender roles. Because, in many of these ‘new’ churches, as Martin (2001, 54) says, women are especially favoured with spiritual gifts in a movement which is, after all, expressly constituted around the gifts of the Spirit. Women supply most of the healers and prophets, they are particularly prone to be ‘slain in the spirit’, they receive the gift of tongues and the gift of prayer.

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Although the leaders of many Pentecostal churches are still men, Pentecostalism’s ‘radical egalitarianism’ of the Spirit may therefore be interpreted as a considerable move towards the equalization of gender roles. But this egalitarian impulse may be particularly significant, according to Martin, outside the direct reach of the church. This is because it has ‘allowed women to use Pentecostal religious discourse to rewrite the moral mandate on which sexual relations and family life rests’ (ibid.). Martin argues that this is ‘nudging a whole section of the poor in the direction of modernity’ (ibid., 55) by emphasizing the importance of the nuclear family over kinship, and of monogamy and faithfulness over polygamy. This, in Martin’s analysis, has prioritized issues that would otherwise have been considered ‘mere women’s issues’ and thus transformed gender relations in the direction of what she considers modernity. Although the precise impact of Pentecostalism, as well as other Christian doctrines and organizations, requires further localized and contextual empirical research, one important indicator for the connection between gender and ‘new’ Christian movements is that women are far more actively engaged with them than men (ibid.). Although data is hard to come by in Nigeria, several of the contributors to J. Ibrahim’s (2008a) edited volume also identify this dynamic in different Nigerian churches. The strong female support for these ‘new’ Christian groups indicates that, at the very least, many women consider these groups to function in their interests. This may be due to the ‘domestication of men’ that occurs in these churches, as Martin argues, but there may be other, more locally-specific, reasons at play as well. The field of gender relations and Nigerian Christianity – or religious movements more generally – therefore offers ample opportunity for further research.

Conclusion This chapter has aimed to provide an introduction to some of the main dynamics that characterize the contemporary Christian population of Nigeria, with a focus on Christianity in the northern states of the country. With this purpose in mind, it has sketched the origins of the divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Christian movements. The chapter has also presented data on the demographics and diversity of Nigerian Christianity, as well as a typology of contemporary Christian movements as proposed by Matthews Ojo (2008a). On the basis of these findings, the paper suggests that there are five main Christian movements in Nigeria, each of which comprises a wide range of individual churches. Furthermore, the chapter has discussed the political context in which these Christian religious groups function and some of the ways in which they are positioning themselves and their

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religion in Nigeria’s public sphere. In particular, the paper has examined the salience of religion and religious faith, the constitutional basis of Nigerian ‘secularism’, and evidence from public opinion currently salient among Christians on the ideal relationship between religion and politics. In terms of religious leadership, the chapter has focused on the internal and external functions of Christian leaders – i.e. teaching, caring and representing – and the corresponding (democratic) challenges that these leaders face. Special attention has been given to the issue of gender relations, and the position of women in Christian communities. The limitations of the work, however, have also pointed towards significant gaps in our current understanding. This suggestion applies to the development of authority within Christian organizations, to the complex ways in which Christian leaders and Christian organizations engage with politics and the state, as well as to the development of gender relations in the various Christian denominations. It is our hope that future research will not only lead to a better appreciation of Christianity in Nigeria, but also to concrete avenues for the improvement of interfaith relations in the country.

Bibliography Alubo, O. (ed.), 2008, ‘Profiles of selected churches in Nigeria’. In Christianity and Democratic Governance in Nigeria, edited by Jibrin Ibrahim. Abuja: Unique Dimensions. Asamoah-Gyadu, J. Kwabena, 2005, ‘African charismatics: Current developments within independent indigenous Pentecostalism in Ghana’. In Studies of Religion in Africa. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Atiemo, Abamfo, 1993, The Rise of the Charismatic Movement in the Mainline Churches in Ghana. Accra: Asempa Publishers. Bako, Ahmed, 1990, ‘A Socio-Economic History of Sabon Gari Kano, 1913–1989’. PhD diss. Bayero University, Kano. Boer, Jan H., 2006, ‘Christians: secularism – yes and no’. In Studies in Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 5. Belleville, ON: Essence Pub. CAN – Christian Association of Nigeria, 2004, ‘Nigerian Christian creed on governance’. Paper presented at the Conference on Christianity and Governance, Abuja. Eboh, Simeon, 2003, ‘Democratic culture, the church and democratisation in (West) Africa’. In Church and Democracy in West Africa, edited by F. Nwaigbo. Port Harcourt: CIWA. Ehrhardt, David, 2012a, ‘Struggling to Belong: Nativism, Identities, and Urban Social Relations in Kano and Amsterdam’. PhD diss. University of Oxford. —— 2012b, ‘Religious leadership and governance in Kano’. Working Paper 9. Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford. —— 2016, ‘“Janus” Voice: Religious Leaders, Framing, and Riots in Kano’. Contemporary Islam, 10 (3): 333–56. Federal Government of Nigeria, 2010, ‘Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria’. www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOf TheFederalRepublicOf Nigeria.htm, accessed 4 June, 2013. Gaiya, Musa A. B., 2004, ‘Christianity in northern Nigeria, 1975–2000’. In Exchange, 33 (4), 354–71. Gwamna, D., 2006, ‘Divine Healing within Pentecostalism’. PhD diss. University of Jos.

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106 • The Muslim & Christian Context Ibrahim, Dauda, 2008, ‘A profile of the Anglican church’. In Profiles of Selected Churches in Nigeria, edited by Ogoh Alubo. Abuja: Unique Publishers. Ibrahim, Jibrin, 1989, ‘The politics of religion in Nigeria: The parameters of the 1987 crisis in Kaduna State.’ In Review of African Political Economy, 45 (46), 65–82. —— 1991, ‘Religion and political turbulence in Nigeria’. In Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 115–36. —— (ed.), 2008a, Christianity and Democratic Governance in Nigeria. Abuja: Unique Dimensions. —— 2008b, ‘The Christianity democracy nexus in Nigeria’. In J. Ibrahim 2008a. Ibrahim, J. and D. Ehrhardt, 2012, ‘Christians and Christianity in northern Nigeria’. Working Paper 12. Nigeria Research Network, University of Oxford. Kukah, M. H., 1993. Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lewis, Peter and Michael Bratten, 2000, ‘Attitudes toward democracy and markets in Nigeria: Report of a national opinion survey January–February 2000’. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems. Marshall, Ruth, 1993, ‘Pentecostalism in southern Nigeria: An overview’. In New Dimensions in African Christianity, edited by Paul Gifford, 9–18. Ibadan: Sefer. —— 1995, ‘God is not a democrat’. In The Christian Churches and the Democratisation of Africa edited by Paul Gifford, 301. Leiden: Brill. Marshall-Fratani, Ruth, 1998, ‘Mediating the global and local in Nigerian Pentecostalism’. Journal of Religion in Africa, 28, 278–315. Martin, Bernice, 2001, ‘The Pentecostal gender paradox: A cautionary tale for the sociology of religion’. In The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion, edited by Richard K. Fenn, 52–66. Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. McCain, D., 1999, ‘The church in Africa in the twenty-first century: Characteristics, challenges, and opportunities’. Keynote address Heinrich Kramer Institute Consultation on Church and Society, Jos, Plateau State. —— 2006, ‘Issues influencing the church in West Africa in the new millennium’, presented at Evangelical Alliance Theological Commission Consultation, Nairobi Evangelical Graduate School of Theology. Meyer, Birgit, 2002, ‘Commodities and the Power of Prayer: Pentecostalist Attitudes Towards Consumption in Contemporary Ghana’, Development and Change, 29 (4), 751–76. —— 2004, ‘Christianity in Africa: From African Independent to Pentecostal-Charismatic churches’. In Annual Review of Anthropology, 33, 447–74. Meyer, Birgit and Peter Geschiere, 1999, Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flow and Closure. Oxford: Blackwell. Nwaigbo, F. (ed.), 2003, ‘Church and democracy in West Africa’. Proceedings of the Conference of the Fourteenth CIWA theology week, 7–11 April. Port Harcourt: Catholic Institute of West Africa. Ojiji, O., 2008, ‘The National Scene: Perceptions of Church Leaders and Members’, In Ibrahim 2008a. Ojo, Matthews A., 1987, ‘The Growth of Campus Christianity and Charismatic Movements in Western Nigeria’. PhD diss. University of London, Kings, College. —— 2007, ‘Pentecostal movements, Islam, and the contest for public space in northern Nigeria’. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 18, 175–88. —— 2008a, ‘Typology of Christian movements in Nigeria’. In Christianity and Democratic Governance in Nigeria, edited by Jibrin Ibrahim. Abuja: Unique Dimensions. —— (ed.), 2008b, ‘Profiles of selected Christian leaders in Nigeria’, in Christianity and Democratic Governance in Nigeria, edited by Jibrin Ibrahim. Abuja: Unique Dimensions. Ostien, Philip, 2007, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006: A Sourcebook, 5 vols. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. —— 2012, ‘Percentages by religion of the 1952 and 1963 populations of Nigeria’s present 36 States’ Background Paper, 1. Oxford: Nigeria Research Network.

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The significant minority: Christians & Christianity in northern Nigeria • 107 Shankar, Shobana, 2014, Who Shall Enter Paradise? Christian Origins in Muslim Northern Nigeria, c. 1890–1975. Athens: Ohio University Press. Wakili, Haruna, 2009, ‘Islam and the political arena in Nigeria: The Ulama and the 2007 elections’. Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa Working Paper 09-004. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.

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4 Historical contexts of Muslim-Christian encounters in northern Nigeria ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA, DAVID EHRHARDT & RACHAEL DIPROSE

Introduction In a context of post-civil war constitutional reform and a rapidly expanding oil economy, Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979–1983) began as an era full of promise and ambition. Looking back on the last three decades of Nigerian history, some of these ambitions have been realized, most notably in the continuing integrity of the Nigerian federation and its 1999 return to democratic politics. But success has been decidedly uneven: not only is Nigeria still challenged by rampant poverty and corruption, but it has also become notorious for incessant occurrences of localized yet often highly violent conflict. Interfaith relations have been a factor of crucial influence throughout this recent historical period, shaping Nigeria’s successes as well as its challenges. In this chapter we seek to outline the most important aspects of the historical and contemporary context in which Muslim-Christian relations in northern Nigeria are taking place. Nigerians are arguably among the most extrovertly religious people on the planet: religious identities are highly salient, religious groups and institutions are well-organized and fulfil important social and political functions, and religion has an important place in the structures and processes of Nigerian politics. This prominence of religion applies equally to affiliates of Islam, Christianity and African ‘traditional’ religions – although the last group has shrunk tremendously over the past century, due to conversions to the two dominants faiths and their multiple denominations. While relations between affiliates of different religions or denominations are often cordial, there is also an aspect of competition and conflict to Nigeria’s interfaith relations. This aspect is, for example, visible in the Boko Haram insurgency and other forms of collective violence, as well as in the political struggles around Sharia. Due to the challenging 108

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and destructive nature of the competitive aspect of interfaith relations, particularly around access to resources and representation within the state, many of the chapters in this book discuss violence as part of the repertoire of interfaith interactions. In keeping with this focus, much of this chapter will revolve around Muslim-Christian contention, as it tries to disentangle the roots and historical trajectories of interfaith encounters in northern Nigeria. However, it is also important to keep in mind that Nigerians of different faiths live together peacefully most of the time (Last 2007), in line with broader trends across Africa (Fearon & Laitin 1996). Alongside its focus on contention, our analysis will therefore also aim to reflect the more harmonious aspects of the region’s interfaith encounter. Moreover, it is important to underline that religion, and religious identities, constitute only one dimension of social organization and identification in Nigeria, albeit an important one. Ethnic divisions, regional identities, class loyalties, and other sources of identification and group formation interact with religion to weave the infinitely complex and dynamic web of Nigerian society. While the central focus of this chapter is on the historical and contemporary foundations of northern Nigeria’s Muslim-Christian encounter, it will also draw attention to the ways in which religious cleavages overlap with ethnic, class and other divisions.

Muslim-Christian encounters: a history of shock, conversions and contentious pluralism Hugh Clapperton was the first European to enter Sokoto in 1823. He returned to Sokoto and died there in 1827. As a Christian, Clapperton had the status of an ahl al kitab, people of the Book, or someone entitled to the protection of the Muslim state of the Sokoto Caliphate on account of being either Christian or Jewish (Last 1993). Though some of his activities were hindered by the reigning leader of the caliphate, Sultan Bello, there was no doubt that he enjoyed the protection of the Muslim ruler. However, this benign start to the direct relationship between Muslims and Christians changed fundamentally between 1900 and 1903, on the eve of the imposition of British colonial rule over the Sokoto Caliphate. In 1897, British military forces had conquered the southern emirates of Ilorin and Bida. In Ilorin, for example, British firepower mounted at Apata Yakuba pounded the town into submission, setting fire to much of the town in the process. After news of what had happened to Ilorin and Bida reached the Sultan in Sokoto, it was hardly surprising that when the head of the British forces, Lugard, wrote Sultan Abdurrahman Atiku, announcing the intentions of the British to establish good relations with Sokoto and

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settle therein, the Sultan replied thus: ‘I do not consent that any one of you should ever dwell with us. Between us and you there are no dealings except as between Muslims and unbelievers: war as Almighty enjoined on us. There is no power or strength save in God on High’ (Umar 2006, 1). According to Hunwick (2006, vii), we cannot understand the discord that has characterized Muslim-Christian relations in post-independence Nigeria without grounding the relations between the two faiths in this contentious history. The defeat of the Sultan at the Battle of Burmi in 1903 was an unprecedented shock to the Muslim populations of the caliphate. Muslims had always seen themselves as occupying a moral high ground vis-à-vis others. As Marshall Hodgson pointed out (in Umar 2006, 2), Muslims saw themselves as extending ‘God’s way into all the world’. British occupation reversed this presumed sense of Islamic ideological and moral superiority. As Umar rightly argues: ‘An awareness of this ideological revision contributes an important historical background to understanding the difficult and sometimes confrontational relationship between Muslims and Christians in contemporary Nigeria and the problems of religious pluralism in general’ (ibid.). The shattering of Muslim self-belief also led to a complex dynamic within the Islamic population itself; the consequences are still evolving today. At the initial shock of defeat by the British forces, two opposite positions were canvassed within the umma. On the one hand were those, like Sultan Attahiru, who advocated the adoption of the time-worn Islamic practise of hijra, or abandoning the land of Islam, Dar al-Islam, to the superior might of the unbelievers and migrating towards Mecca. Sultan Attahiru left after the initial attack on Sokoto and headed east, pursued by British forces (Last 2005). When he turned up in the south-western Kano emirate in April 1903, colonial records recall that the ‘people appear to rise en masse at the Sultan’s call: men, women, and children leaving their towns and villages deserted to follow him, thus showing a fanaticism which I, for one, never for a moment thought they possessed’ (Mustapha 1990, 37). If Sultan Attahiru chose hijra, his senior official, the Wazir of Sokoto, Muhammadu Buhari, chose a different tactic equally grounded in Islamic history: taqiyya or dissimulation. This amounted to appearing to acquiesce to occupation while striving to undermine it. This seeming submission was justified under Islamic precepts such as qadar (predestination), the need to avoid fitna, and zuhd (ascetism) (Umar 2006, 6–7). The injunction was to befriend the British with your face rather than your heart. Suspicion and resistance therefore characterized the attitude of even those who subjected themselves to British over-rule. A final group of Muslims chose to resist occupation by declaring armed resistance, jihad, against both the British and those indigenous rulers they saw as ‘collaborators’ with unbelievers. Satiru was the stage of a bloody

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resistance in 1905–06 (Mohammed 1983; Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1990). The revolt started in 1905 in the territory of Niger Republic, with a blind Muslim cleric, Saybu dan Makafo, leading his supporters to attack the French occupiers. It soon spread to Satiru, south of Sokoto, leading to the killing of Acting Resident H.R. Preston-Hillary and many members of his military column. This was the first serious defeat suffered by the British West African Frontier Forces (WAFF). The Satiru Revolt was an attack on both the British and the Sokoto Caliphate aristocracy, and was composed of ‘radical clerics, disgruntled peasants and fugitive slaves’ (Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1990, 217). Fearing the challenge to their position by radical clerics like the blind Saybu dan Makafo who had declared themselves as the Mahdi, the Sokoto aristocracy sided with the British. But when a high Sokoto official, Marafa Maiturare of Gwadabawa led 3,000 mounted and infantry troops to attack Satiru in February 1906, his men refused to fight and dispersed in disarray, causing even more concern and consternation within the Sokoto aristocracy. A combination of British (WAFF) and Sokoto forces finally attacked Satiru in March, killing 2,000 and seizing an estimated 3,000 as slaves. Dan Makafo and four others were beheaded and their heads impaled on stakes at the Sokoto market as a deterrence to others (Lovejoy and Hogendorn 1990, 225–6). Some accounts put the loss of British/Sokoto forces at 2,000 and those of the Mahdist Satirawa at 10,000 (ACED 2000). The Sultan issued a curse on anyone seeking to rebuild Satiru and in 2009, the deserted town was described as ‘frozen by a curse’ (Uthman 2009). The events at Satiru were significant in the history of Muslim/British relations in northern Nigeria because it ‘was a turning point in the consolidation of colonial rule in … Northern Nigeria. Until then, the … British presence was fragile … Most scholars agree that the suppression of the revolt re-enforced the alliance between the colonial authorities and the Muslim aristocracy’ (Lovejoy & Hogendorn 1990, 219–20). After similar defeats of Mahdist revolts in Hadejia and Bauchi, Muslims abandoned the path of armed revolt against the British (Umar 2006, 14–15). The new alliance between British occupiers and the local aristocracies resulted in the re-designation of the British in the local lingo from Nasara (Christians) to Turawa (Europeans). According to Last (2005, 2): ‘In particular, the use of the Hausa terms Bature and Turawa for the (British) Nasara seems to have arisen out of an agreement with the Emirs quite early in the colonial period, in a conscious attempt, I think, to sanitise colonial rule for Muslims. We need to know in more detail the politics of how this safer, bland term came into use – how it was imposed, presumably, by the new Native Authorities by mutual agreement; for neither party wanted a daily reminder that

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now it was ‘Christians’ ruling Muslims, or Muslims collaborating in ruling alongside ‘Christians’. ‘Turawa’ was a conveniently neutral label. ‘Nasara’ however continued to be used in Niger under French colonial rule’.1 Yet, the alliance between the British and the Muslim aristocracies remained a marriage of convenience in the face of the multiplicity of responses to colonial occupation within the population at large: submission, avoidance, rejection and the compartmentalization of Islam away from colonial influences (Umar 2006, 6). As most scholars have pointed out, the British continued to fear Mahdist uprisings well into the twentieth century. In their dealings with the Emirs and the Muslim populations, the British approached issues in a pragmatic manner, for instance, denying Christian missionaries like Reverend Miller, a leading figure in the Church Missionary Society in northern Nigeria, the right to carry out missionary activities and establish schools within Muslim communities (Shankar 2006, 92). Some have claimed that the British ‘destroyed’ Islam in northern Nigeria, while others assert that, by setting up training institutions through which Islamic training was standardized across the region, the British ‘supported’ Islam. Umar (2006, 14) claims that neither position is correct. Instead: ‘the British appropriated the Islamic institutions of the emirates, and the Muslims who ran those institutions. The British retained aspects of Islamic law … while also maintaining constant surveillance on some of the ‘ulama whom the British suspected might lead Islamic opposition to colonial rule.’ What is significant here is the sense in which the new colonial context introduced the bifurcation between power and legitimacy within the local institutions of the Muslim communities. Colonialism increased the powers of Emirs by standardizing and routinizing administration. This concentrated power in the person of the Emir and often shifted the balance of power within the ruling lineages. The ubiquitous Native Authority (NA) administration which controlled the courts, police, prisons, taxes, land, education and social services was the backbone of this colonial system. But colonial occupation nevertheless posed a serious ideological challenge to the legitimacy of the Emirs. Learned Qadis debated the pros and cons of the impact of colonialism on Islam, with divergent calls for opposition, accommodation and passive resistance. Within this tense context, the Emirs were constantly aware of the need to buttress their Islamic legitimacy as a means of securing their power. In contrast, the ulama were more preoccupied with moral and religious issues in the changed context of Christian domination: ‘Given their concep1 In Kano, however, the Government Reservation Area (GRA) where the whites lived continued to be called ‘Nasarawa’.

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tion of colonialism as morally deficient, the ‘ulama did not confer Islamic authority on the colonial regime’ (Umar 2006, 16). The shock of colonial conquest therefore led to a complex situation within the Muslim community – Emirs with enhanced powers but seeking legitimacy; the ulama divided within themselves yet holding tight to the moral compass of society; and ordinary citizens bewildered by rising sectarian divisions and foreign rule. These intra-Muslim dynamics were compounded by rising religious pluralism as the Christian occupiers, and other African Christians, increasingly made their presence felt within Dar al-Islam. Colonialism therefore led to a contentious religious pluralism that had the first paradoxical consequence of making Muslims in the Sokoto Caliphate more Islamic under British rule.2 For example, Muslim wife-seclusion (purdah) intensified in rural areas under colonial rule and was described as ‘non-traditional and possibly unique in the rural Muslim world’ (Hill 1977, 84). Colonialism also facilitated what McCall (1971) calls the fourth wave of conversion from traditional African religions to Islam. Increases in literacy, coupled with the ease of travel led to ‘vertical and horizontal reinforcements of Islam’ and facilitated increased conversion between 1900 and 1960. If British colonial administrators struck up a pragmatic alliance with the Muslim aristocracy, the same could not be said for the increasing number of European Christian missionaries and local evangelists bent on proselytizing in both Muslim areas in Northern Nigeria and in those areas of Northern Nigeria that the colonial authorities recognized as within the jurisdiction of the Emir, but where traditional African religions remained strong. According to one missionary, Kumm, Islam ‘is a religion without the knowledge of the divine fatherhood, a religion without compassion for those outside its pale … It is a religion without love’ (cited in Kukah 1993, 4). In a similar vein, the most prominent missionary in Hausaland, Reverend Walter Miller, preached the superiority of Christianity over Islam and predicted that the end of Islam in Hausaland was at hand: ‘I look forward to the time not far from hence, when educated christianized pagans will lead the way … and even encircle the more obstinate and conservative Muslim emirates’ (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, the relationship between these fiery missionaries and evangelists on the one hand, and the Muslim aristocrats and administrators, on the other, was fraught with tension. In many instances, Reverend Miller called in vain on the Colonial Office in London to come to the aid of the missionaries. The ‘persecution’ of Christians became an early narrative in colonial Northern Nigeria – 2 The explanation for this paradox might be two-fold: ‘(a) to get the Nasara out one had to please Allah, and please him now; (b) for most Britons of the [colonial administrative] class/ background, being pro-Arab, pro-Muslim was normal’ (Murray Last, personal communication, April 2017).

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even under a European Christian colonial administration. Muslims and Christians adopted an ‘exclusivist approach’ to issues of religion, seeing salvation as only possible through their particular faiths while at the same time denying any divine content in the opposing faith (McGarvey 2009). Either for prudential reasons, or as a deliberate policy of divide-andrule, the colonial administration reinforced these religious divisions within Northern Nigeria: ‘colonial-era boundaries constructed and prioritized religious differences. British occupation, border creation and patrol, and control of migration and settlement were intimately linked to the heightening of differences between Muslim and Christian African subjects’ (Shankar 2006, 90). In this delimitation of society into religious zones, the Emirs were often in agreement with the British. Against this administrative mindset, the Christian missionaries saw themselves as full partners in the ‘civilizing mission’ of colonialism, and demanded unfettered access to Muslim parts of the colonial territory. The missionary zeal for winning souls was therefore bound to come into conflict with the colonial administrator’s emphasis on the maintenance of law and order. Attempts to regulate the activities of these missionaries soon led to the second paradoxical consequence of colonialism: the split between the colonial administration and the Christian missions: When in 1910 a traditional ruler of Bauchi Province converted to Christianity … the resident in charge objected and had him deposed because the ruler’s authority depended on observing local rituals, which as a convert he had now forsaken. In another example, the colonial district officer upheld the decision by the Muslim chief to have Christian places of worship torn down – though he intervened after protest by the missionaries and prevented the chief from carrying out the demolition. In yet another incident … some mission boys were ordered flogged by the district head and his elders because some of the people associated with the mission had refused to be married under native custom and were thus flouting native authority. One colonial officer, Fitzpatrick, expresses the widespread view that colonialism was the alternative to Christianity when he wrote: ‘The Christianised African in Kabba is presently a difficulty and is rapidly becoming a problem. Today his attitude and his actions make it hard for the Native Administration to govern: tomorrow they may make it impossible.’ His view led Fitzpatrick to launch an attack on mission Christianity, especially the Protestant form of it, as a subversive, dangerous influence on Africans. Christianity, he wrote … was ‘synonymous with idleness, impudence, inefficiency, with all that is meanest and worst in a native or any other polity.’ Fitzpatrick’s views were backed by his superiors, including the governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, who wrote that Native

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Administrations should ‘receive the backing of political officers against Christian insubordination.’ (Sanneh 1997, 225) By 1945, then, the main contours of the contentious religious pluralism in Northern Nigeria were set. The religious mosaic that emerged included: (1) pockets of Hausa-Fulani Christians in Zaria, Kano, Sokoto and Katsina, symbolized by the Wusasa Christian settlement near Zaria and personages like the Fulani member of the Zaria aristocracy, Dr RAB Dikko; (2) millions of Southern Christians who moved to segregated neighbourhoods of northern cities in the wake of colonial occupation; (3) millions of Christians and traditionalists from the ethnic minorities of the ‘lower’ Northern Region; and (4) the remnants of the traditionalist non-Muslim Hausa or Maguzawa. At the same time, Northern Muslim elites – both traditional and Western-educated – became increasingly aware of changes happening around them and the disadvantaged position of the region vis-à-vis the Southern regions. Western-educated Northerners also felt nationalist stirrings, often led by Southern Western-educated Nigerians, increasingly, along with demands for reform of the NA system. ‘Nigeria’ increasingly loomed large in their consciousness – both as an opportunity and as a threat. The opportunity came in the form of the possibility of self-governance and the resumption of the Islamic social dynamic truncated by colonial occupation, while the threat came from a keenly felt realization that Southern Christians might be best placed to inherit the mantle from departing colonialists on account of their better Western education and higher levels of technical skills. In the Zamanin siyasa, or the era of politics between 1950 and 1966, the attention of both traditional and modernist Muslim northern elites focused on the construction of the ‘North’ as a bulwark against Southern domination. The social and political imagination involved in the construction of ‘One North, One People, Under One God’ under the banner of the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) sought to unite both Muslim and Christian Northerners (Kwanashie 2002). Built around such towering figures as Premier Sir Ahmadu Bello, Governor Sir Kashim Ibrahim, Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Michael Audu Buba, and Sunday Awoniyi, to name a few, the ‘one North’ that was constructed was deliberately pan-ethnic and multi-religious, even if the Hausa-Fulani Muslim component was hegemonic. For many Christian non-Hausa from the ‘Lower’ North, ‘Northernization’ had many advantages, not least, that of shielding them from competition for jobs with better-educated Southerners. The construction of ‘the North’ was therefore of mutual benefit to all concerned and that, along with the numerical preponderance of the North within the federation, was why it was such a successful strategy.

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One consequence of the ‘Northernization’ policy was the harmonious development of the Penal Code system in 1958 to replace the judicial powers of the Emirs as the British prepared to leave (Kukah 1993; Ostien 2006). All shades of opinion, both Muslim and Christian, expert and layman, Nigerian and foreign were consulted in the process of developing the Penal Code. This was in sharp contrast to the unilateral and controversial way full Sharia was imposed in many northern states after 1999, thereby causing a rift among ‘Northerners’ along religious lines (Last 2007). However, the first cracks within the united edifice of ‘one North’ came as early as 1964 with Premier and Sardauna Sir Ahmadu Bello’s increasing Islamization programme to the discomfiture of many Christian indigenous communities in the north, particularly in the Middle Belt region (discussed further below). According to Haliru Binji, Deputy Grand Khadi, after the Sardauna’s death in 1966, ‘[t]here were local tensions. Some people said the Sardauna was killed because of meddling, and anyone with [Muslim] prayer beads was killed … After the Sardauna, non-Muslims molested Muslims and put up obstacles to Islamic preachers. The Muslim Chiefs from Plateau who used to come to the JNI [Jama’atu Nasril Islam] stopped coming.’ According to Shehu Shagari, reactions to the Islamization campaigns gravely soured Muslim-Christian relations right up to the Constituent Assembly of 1977 ‘when some northerners “ganged up on the north,” and went beyond the Shari’a issue’ (Paden 1986 571–3). The coup of 1966, during which the Sardauna and many other northern political and military elites were killed also led to the creation of states in 1967, and the dismantling of the core infrastructure of ‘one North’. For instance, Benue-Plateau State under Joseph Gomwalk, a very Christian and minimally Hausa-Fulani entity, was quick to press for a separate identity – a precursor of today’s contentious politics of ‘indigene’ Christians pitted against ‘settler’ Muslims in Plateau State. These centrifugal regional dynamics, along with the transfer of power to the federal centre occasioned by first the civil war (1967–70) and then the post–1970 oil-boom, led to the emergence of a new scenario in which the politics of religious pluralism was increasingly played out on the national stage. Improving our understanding of this new scenario of the politics of pluralism is one of the core purposes of the present chapter, as well as of the volume at large.

The politics of pluralism: religious group size, Sharia and the fear of domination In contrast to the limited amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in the colonial period and the strong regionalist enclaves of the immediate

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post-colonial period, northern Nigeria became fully integrated into the Nigerian nation-state. It is this chaotic Nigerian state, which defines both the framework within which public life takes place, as well as discussions about the way to order it. Yet, on the other hand, the nation-state has to accommodate, in its own self-perception, traditions which hold strong views about public life and the norms that should govern it. In consequence, the need to address diversity in new ways … does mark states that appear in societies which have gone through a degree of secularisation, and where norms that govern collective life are no longer enforceable via authority of a religious type. (Filali-Ansary 2009, 2) Within this changed scenario, northern Nigeria has developed its particular version of religious pluralism, shaped by its Islamic caliphate heritage, its colonial history, and the fierce competition by centrifugal ethnic and religious forces within Nigerian federalism. The nation-state transformed the understanding of religious and cultural diversity and introduced new arenas in which the logics of contentious pluralism could be played out. In the contemporary encounter between Muslims and Christians northern Nigeria, the region’s historical legacy has produced three core challenges that continue to shape interfaith interactions: (1) the issue of determining religious group size; (2) the question of legal pluralism and Sharia law; and (3) the problem of interfaith competition and the related fear of domination. We will briefly discuss each of these issues in turn. DETERMINING RELIGIOUS GROUP SIZE

Measuring religious diversity became a key issue in northern Nigeria in the context of the contentious pluralism that replaced Dar al-Islam after colonization. The size attributed to particular religious groups at both the national and local levels became a source of contention as each group sought to establish its numerical dominance or relevance. Whether or not a particular religion has the majority population in some states is a hotly debated issue. Under colonial rule, assessments of populations were undertaken in the north to estimate population size and determine the nature of the local administration to be employed – through indirect rule via the Hausa-Fulani emirates, or through what Dudley (1968) calls ‘direct rule’ in which local traditional chiefs were directly responsible to the colonial administration. For example, in Kaduna State such assessments were conducted in 1907 (Kazah-Toure 1991; Smith 1960). Diprose (2012) details how these assessments in southern Kaduna State saw some districts placed under the rule of the Emir of Zaria, while others had their own chiefs that were directly supervised by the British

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provincial administration. Many of these non-Muslim groups that were placed under indirect rule were concentrated in the southern part of the Northern Region, in an area that came to be known as the Middle Belt. Ochonu (2014) described this process as ‘colonialism by proxy’. The Middle Belt zone is comprised of the southern part of modern Kaduna State as well as Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba States, and the parts of Bauchi, Adamawa and Gombe (Alubo 2006; Dudley 1968), and is made up of hundreds of self-aware ethnic minority groups. The various censuses conducted under colonial rule were just as contentious as the early colonial assessments, as they affected the distribution of seats in the federal parliament between the various regions prior to and at independence.3 Even within states, census results are hotly contested. Taking Kaduna State again as an example, the northern part is mainly made up of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, while the southern part is made up of a Christian bloc of minority ethnic groups. Diprose (2012) shows how both Muslims and Christians use the same data sources (such as the 1991 census), either including or excluding certain data, to make contradictory claims about the relative sizes of their faith community. Group size is then used to support claims of alleged marginalization from the state and socio-economic gains, so as to argue for a future increased share in political representation and other opportunities. Indeed this politicization of religion and ethnicity in Nigerian censuses have led to the exclusion of survey questions on these two variables from recent census exercises, making it difficult to objectively determine the sizes of different religious communities and, through such determination, to evaluate claims of alleged marginalization. In the 2006 population census, for instance, no questions were asked on ethnic or religious identity (Suberu 2001, 157; Slocum-Bradley 2008, 50). Without acceptable recent census data on the size of religious communities, we are left with the often incredulous claims of partisan religious activists. One way to address this problem is to rely on data from previous censuses conducted during the less politicized days of the country’s existence. This is the method used in Chapter 2 and in Ostien (2012). The shares of the different religions in the national population according to the 1952 and 1963 censuses are shown in Table 4.1. A second approach is to extrapolate the relative sizes of the religious communities from recent nation-wide surveys. However, these surveys frequently produce contradictory results. Probably the most reliable of the surveys is the Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) given the rigorous sampling method, and the fact that it has the largest sample size. The NDHS is a nationally representative survey which in 2008 interviewed 33,385 women aged between 15 and 49, and 15,486 men aged between 3 For a general overview of all census processes from the mid-19th century to 1999 see Okolo 1999.

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Table 4.1  Percentages of Muslims and Christians in the 1952 and 1963 censuses 1952

1963

Population Population by religion (%) Muslim Christian Other

Population

Population by religion (%) Muslim Christian Other

North

16,835,582

73

2.7

24.3

29,763,276

71.7

9.7

18.6

West

6,352,472

32.8

36.9

30.3

12,801,687

35.7

49.9

14.4

East

7,215,251

0.3

50.0

49.6

12,394,426

0.2

77.2

22.5

Nigeria 30,403,305 Total

47.4

21.1

31.6

54,959,426

47.2

34.3

18.5

(Source: composed from Ostien 2012)

15 and 59. Aside from limiting the survey to people by age, the survey also oversamples women which may be a limitation, since religious adherence differs, albeit slightly, by sex and age. Yet, in averaging the weighted percentage results for men and women, one can somewhat reduce this bias. Using the 2008 NDHS results for men and women aged 15–49 and averaging the weighted percentages for each gender, the population of Christians according to NDHS data for 2008, was approximately 54 per cent of the national population (12 per cent Catholic and 42 per cent Other Christian groups), Muslims accounted for 45 per cent and there was a small group of 1 per cent ‘Traditionalist’ (National Population Commission and ICF Macro 2009). The most recent NDHS results (National Population Commission and ICF International 2014), however, suggest that the balance between the faiths has shifted somewhat, as approximately 47 per cent of the sample identified as Christian (11 per cent Catholic, 36 per cent Other), 52 per cent as Muslim, and just under 1 per cent as Traditionalist. The Afrobarometer is another nation-wide survey that captures population data but with a smaller sample. The 2008 survey in Nigeria used a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of 2,324 people aged 18 years and above. This survey finds similar results on the size of religious groups to that of the NDHS 2008 discussed above – 56 per cent Christian, 43 per cent Muslim and 1 per cent animist (Afrobarometer 2008). However, one of the most respected surveying organizations in the world, the Pew Research Center, conducted a survey on Nigeria under its Forum on Religion & Public Life. It found that in 2009 the population of Christians was 46 per cent and the population of Muslims was 52 per cent, while 1 per cent were ‘other’. Pew Forum (2010) notes that results should be treated with caution as the sample size is small (1,516) and less attention was paid to ensuring demographic rigour in the sampling method compared with the larger surveys and censuses. Instead, the Pew Forum

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poll sought to ensure that the views of both Muslims and Christians were represented (ibid., Appendix B). Another survey by the Pew Foundation put the proportion of Christians in 2010 at 49.3 per cent and that of Muslims at 48.8 per cent, with followers of African Traditional Religions accounting for 1.4 per cent (Pew-Templeton 2015a). What is clear from the discussion above is that different surveys find different results on religious group size, with some attributing a majority to the Christian population, and others to the Muslim population. What is not in doubt, however, is that national-level evidence suggests that Muslim women have a higher fertility rate than their non-Muslim sisters; an average of six to seven children, compared to an average of five. The higher fertility rate is based on the fact that Muslim women tend to have lower levels of education, lower birth control use, and tend to marry earlier (15.9 years), compared to non-Muslim women (19.5 years) (Alan Guttmacher Institute 2004, 2–4; Pew Foundation 2011). Based on these fertility dynamics4, as Fig. 4.1 shows, it is projected by the Pew Foundation that Muslims will be in a majority from about 2015. Neither the use of old census data nor the extrapolation from contradictory national surveys can quell the acrimonious claims of religious partisans who want to establish the numerical superiority of their creed. Until Nigeria is able to conduct a sufficiently credible census in which questions on religious affiliation are asked, public policy will continue to be guided by the sort of methodological muddling which we have highlighted in chapter 2 and in this chapter. However, while Nigeria is notorious for its lack of reliable demographic data, there is a broad consensus that Nigerians of all denominations are deeply attached to their faith (e.g. Falola 1998; Ibrahim & Mu’azzam 2000; Last 2007, 2008) and this is why group size has become an issue in the management of religious diversity. Furthermore, it is clear to any observer of the country that there is a huge diversity of religious organizations and theological beliefs within the wider traditions of Nigerian Islam and Christianity. Religious encounters increasingly takes place in the context of an immense complexity of religious beliefs and organizations. Both for Islam and Christianity (Ibrahim 1991; Ibrahim & Mu’azzam 2000), observers have noted increases in the salience and fundamentalism of religious belief over the past three decades. This fundamentalism has not only led to a ‘veritable ‘explosion’ in the number and activities of clergy’ (Ibrahim 1991, 121), but also to the hardening opposition between Christians and Muslims in an increasingly competitive and polarized religious market place. 4 It is of course the case that infant mortality rates are also higher in northern Nigerian states, compared to the rest of the federation. Increasing access to vaccines and other health services has, however, reduced the infant mortality rates, especially since the introduction of the Millenium Development Goals.

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Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050, Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project http://globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/nigeria/religious_demography#/?affiliations_religion_ id=0&affiliations_year=2010

Figure 4.1  Nigeria: Religious affiliation over time (Source: Pew-Templeton 2015a)

The religious demographics described above have one final important consequence for Nigeria; they strongly influence the nature of Muslim-Christian conflicts. In India, where Muslims are just 14.4 per cent of the population, Hindu-Muslim relations could be characterized as hegemonic accommodation of the Muslim minority by the Hindu majority, until the rise of more belligerent Hindu nationalist governments which characterize the Muslim minority as an alien Other. Conversely, in Egypt where Muslims are 94.9 per cent of the population, and Bangladesh where Muslims are 90.4 per cent (Pew 2015), Muslim-Copt and Muslim-Hindu conflicts respectively are often shaped by perceptions of the minorities as ‘the enemy within’ by Muslim extremists. In all three instances, one group is sufficiently large and confident that it can lay claim to the nation. In Nigeria, however, where Muslims and Christians are finely balanced within the population, there is the tendency to compete for social space in an increasingly febrile environment that generates fear and anxiety for both camps. Real or imagined threats, often embellished by social media and mobile telephony, are used to mobilize support and further polarize the faith communities. The religious demographics of Nigeria therefore encourages Muslims and Christians to view their interactions in zero-sum perspectives in which the group that fails to protect itself might find the social and political scales tipped permanently against it.

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122 • The Muslim & Christian Context SHARIA LAW AND LEGAL PLURALISM

The second core issue that characterizes the encounter between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria is the situation of legal pluralism, especially after the institution of ‘full’ Sharia law by some states in the course of the 1999 transition to democracy. One of the essential challenges of any plural society lies in the way in which group rights and divergent group preferences are institutionalized within a single state framework. In the case of societies with mixed Muslim and Christian populations, this challenge is often expressed in terms of debates around legal pluralism, secularism and the role of Sharia law – see Tas (2013) and Casey (2016) for a discussion of Sharia law in Britain, and Miyandazi (2010) for an analysis of Sharia law in Kenya. Even in predominantly Muslim societies with multiple sectarian communities, legal pluralism also prevails (cf. Rabo 2011; Turner 2011). Nigeria is no exception to this simultaneous coexistence of ‘official’ state law and non-state laws. However, ‘secularism’ and the place of Sharia law have become the two central points of contention in religio-political competition in Nigeria, questioning the very core of the Nigerian federal state. The notion of Nigeria as a ‘secular state’ first became salient during the constitutional debates of the late 1970s (Bienen 1986; Boer 2005), primarily as a Christian-promoted counterweight to the Muslim call for the further institutionalization of Sharia law. As such, ‘secularism’ and ‘secularity’ have become the fulcrum of Nigerian Muslims’ criticism of Western (and, by extension, Christian) approaches to governance and law (Boer 2005). Nigerian Christians, on the other hand, to a large extent reinforce the Islamic definition of the ‘secular’ by endorsing it and clamouring for its application as a line of defence against the implementation of Islamic law. Judging by the sheer volume of writing on Sharia in Nigeria, its continuing salience in the country’s public debates, and the entrenched intensity of the positioning in these debates, it may be argued that Sharia is the most salient aspect of the politicized relation between Nigeria’s different religious communities. Of course, this salience has only increased since the re-introduction of the Sharia penal code in 12 northern Nigerian states since 1999. As may be expected from such a salient and controversial political issue, opinions and interpretations of this re-introduction of Sharia have only become more divergent. In academic terms, the following clusters of Sharia analysis may be discerned. First, there are several descriptive analyses of Sharia law as a legal and juridical system and as a blue-print for governance (e.g. Ostien 2007; Paden 2005). These interpretations largely circumvent Sharia as a political issue and consider it on the basis of its substantive characteristics as a system of law, jurisprudence, legal process and governance (Ostien 2006). Second,

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there are also historical interpretations of Sharia as a near-continuous feature of the Northern Region. As such, the recent re-introduction of the ‘full’ Sharia may be interpreted as a way, for Nigerian Muslims in the north, to reclaim their historical political traditions that were subordinated under colonial and post-colonial ‘secular’ rule (e.g. Last 2008). It is, in other words, a way in which to reinvent the Islamic traditions of governance (Ostien 2002). Partly as a result of this historical importance of Sharia in the north, many scholars point to the wide public support for its re-introduction in states such as Zamfara and Kano. Furthermore, using the results of the Afrobarometer surveys, Kirwin (2009) suggests that this support has increased since 2001, especially – but not exclusively – in the states that implemented the Sharia penal code. Interestingly, he finds that even among 25 per cent of Christians, Sharia can now count on some support. Kirwin’s finding provides further evidence for Ludwig’s (2008) observation about the overlap in value orientations between conservative Muslims and Christians, and the potential of Sharia to capture this overlap. Third, there is a literature evaluating the impact of Sharia implementation beyond its immediate implications on law and governance. In this vein, Suberu (2009a; for his more general analyses of Nigerian federalism: 2001, 2008, 2009b) examines the institutional context of its current implementation and evaluates the impact of Sharia implementation on political stability. In Suberu’s analysis, Sharia is implemented almost entirely within the framework of the fundamental federal institutions, such as the constitution, the Federal Character principle, and the ultimate superior jurisdiction of the federal courts. Moreover, he argues that it has benefited from strong internal critiques from Muslim civil society organizations, which have moderated its potentially controversial aspects. As such, Suberu (2009a) considers the state-level implementation of Sharia law as a successful tool to manage religious (political) conflict and to ‘cauterise national disintegration’. Recent research under the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) cautiously supports Suberu’s optimism, as it documents pockets of effective Sharia implementation in parts of northern Nigeria. In some of these ‘pockets of effectiveness’, Sharia institutions appear to facilitate access to justice, to enhance law enforcement, and even improve the socio-economic position of the most poor group of women and widows (Bugaje & Aliyu 2016; Ehrhardt 2016; Mustapha & Ismail 2016; Ostien et al. 2016; Tabiu & Bello 2016; Umar 2016). However, further research would be needed to establish the long-term sustainability of these limited gains. Moreover, and in stark contrast to Suberu’s optimism, there are also many analysts and Nigerian leaders who consider Sharia implementation as a poorly concealed attempt to Islamize Nigeria (Anonymous 2016; Boer 2008). Their central concern is that while

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Muslim leaders claim that Sharia only applies to those who identify with Islam, this theoretical distinction is all but meaningless in everyday reality (Ludwig 2008). The most often quoted indications of Sharia’s impact on non-Muslims are: the discrimination of women, for example through the diminished weight of their legal testimony or the restrictions on their modes of public transport; the criminalization of conversion (i.e. ‘apostasy’); the imposition of Islamic values, most notably on dress codes and alcohol; and the dominance of Islamic voices and interests in the public sphere, for example in public news media and in the regulations regarding the building of non-Muslim places of worship (HRW 2004; Ludwig 2008; Marshall 2002). Moreover, several Sharia states have incorporated the Hisbah a group formed to uphold Islamic values and suppress vice, into their institutional matrixes (Last 2008; Mustapha & Ismail 2016). It should be noted, however, that the impact of Sharia on non-Muslims is problematized by different analysts for different reasons. The basic objection to Sharia comes from those who object to the imposition of Islamic norms and regulations on Nigerian citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation. This line of argument is adopted, for example, by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Anonymous (2016) and Harnischfeger (2008). Others, such as Doi (1983) and Ostien (2002), however, maintain that the implementation of Sharia in the north may in fact be good for non-Muslims and Muslim-Christian relations. An objection of a different kind, however, is given by HRW (2004), which challenges the Islamic legal injunctions not because they constitute the imposition of religious norms, but because they are a source of human rights violations (e.g. flogging, death penalty, gender discrimination) to Muslims and Christians alike. In a different vein, Paden (2005) and Falola (1998) are examples of scholars who are not opposed to Sharia per se, but who flag its divisive potential as a source of violent conflict. Yet another line of argument, as represented again by HRW (2004) and Harnischfeger (2008), question the politicized and manipulative motivations behind the push for Sharia. Finally, Marshall (2002) represents an extreme type of objection to Sharia as the alleged ‘talibanization’ of Nigerian Islam – that is, what he interprets as the increasing similarity between Nigerian and Afghan forms of Islam. How the issue of Sharia law and legal pluralism are understood by Muslims and Christians alike, and how they are managed by the state and non-state actors, will have important consequences for the relationship between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. FEAR OF DISCRIMINATION AND DOMINATION

Interfaith competition and the fear of domination is the third core area of the religious encounter between Muslims and Christians in northern

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Nigeria. Some analysts paint a near-apocalyptic picture of the persecution of the Christian minority. For example, in a foreword to a publication on the subject by Open Doors International and CAN, the Secretary General of CAN noted that: The statistics of persecution and violence against Christians world-wide has become unprecedented in recent times … One of the worst examples … is the current phenomenon of persistent violence of Christians in Northern Nigeria … violence on Christians in Northern Nigeria has been well calculated and targeted based upon social, cultural, religious, economic and political interests … this systemic and persistent violence towards Christians in Northern Nigeria, if unchecked and halted, could lead to the extinction of Christianity and Christian communities in Northern Nigeria. (Asake 2016, 6) Similarly, Mang (2014, 106) notes that ‘Christians have become more apprehensive of Islam since the introduction of the Shariah regime of 1999’. While these views reflect the increasing religious polarization in northern Nigeria, they nevertheless reflect only one aspect of a more nuanced reality. As noted before, conflict is not the predominant way in which Muslims and Christians relate to each other on a day to day basis. Underlining this point, Last (2007, 2008), Ludwig (2008), and Paden (2005) all note that conflict and competition are only one side of the coin in interfaith relations; there are also, in Last’s words (2007, 606–7), ‘peaceful coexistence over generations … friendship, and respect’. Anecdotal evidence from Ryan (2006, 219–20) illustrates the compassion and humanity which is also part of everyday religious encounter between Muslims and Christians. On the afternoon of 1 August 2000, on the road between Lokoja and Kaduna, I nearly had … a ghastly motor accident … Quite literally, dozens of cars stopped to offer us assistance. For me, the most moving of all was a car full of senior Muslim gentlemen coming from Kano who were fingering their tasbì beads as they got out of their vehicle, compassionate concern written on their faces. They could see very clearly on my wrecked car the words SOCIETY OF JESUS and CATHOLIC CHURCH. That did not deter them from taking on the deeply human and deeply religious role of neighbors to a person in need. It took me some time to convince them that I was all right and was just waiting for the police to come and measure the skid marks on the road and the like. They only left me, at my urging, with great reluctance, concerned that I might be suffering from shock. I think of those Muslim men every time I hear my fellow Christians denounce all Muslims for their

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politicization of Islam … Before the Muslim gentlemen left the scene of the accident I prayed with them and they prayed with me to the one God who created all of us, in whose name, finally, we blessed each other: alsalàm ‘alaykum wa-ra˙mat Allàh wa-baràkàtuhu (‘Peace be with you and the mercy of God and His blessing’). Ludwig (2008) suggests an explanation for these constructive and cooperative Muslim-Christian relations, even with regard to Sharia. He argues that there is a strong overlap in values between many conservative Muslims and Christians. For example, both groups agree about the undesirability of homosexuality, gambling, godlessness and even the (over-) consumption of alcohol – even though Gaudio (2009) underlines the complexity of the relationship between northern Nigerian Islam and some of these ‘un-Islamic’ forms of behaviour. In short, most northern Nigerian Muslims and Christians consider themselves ‘god-fearing’ (Last 2007), value many of the same things, and reject those who reject faith in God. But despite this strong value congruence, northern Nigeria continues to be plagued by incessant collective violence, often framed in religious discourses. This, then, is the central puzzle of this book: how should we understand the patterns of antagonistic confrontation and violence between members of the Muslim and Christian communities in northern Nigeria, when in fact they live peacefully side-by-side for the most part? And what do we know about mechanisms that may help to reduce the damage done by these violent confrontations? Part of the answer to this puzzle lies in rejecting the exclusively ‘religious’ framing of much of the collective violence in northern Nigeria, including Boko Haram (see also Chapter 1). For example, while Harnischfeger (2014 54–5) notes that ‘most victims of Boko Haram attacks have been other Muslims’, he nonetheless insists that the violence is targeted at Christians for the purpose of the Islamization of the state! No explanation was thought to be necessary for the incongruity between wanting to kill Christians while in reality those who were killed are largely Muslims. In a similar vein, the scholars around the data set Nigeria Watch have argued that despite ‘an obvious increase in deadly attacks against Christian civilians, the combined data suggest that approximately two civilian victims out of three were Muslims.’ (Chouin et al. 2014, 213). Another Nigeria Watch scholar, (Olojo 2016, 91) argues that the notion that religious violence in Nigeria is between Muslims and Christians ‘is too simplistic’ since the data collected between June 2006 and May 2014 suggests that more people are killed in Muslim-Muslim violence than in Muslim-Christian violence. Despite the complexities thrown up in these analyses, there remains a tendency to see Boko Haram violence as targeted exclusively at Chris-

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tians. For example, when President Goodluck Jonathan stated in 2013 that Muslims are the most numerous victims of Boko Haram, CAN accused the President of ‘distorting facts’, stating that ‘the statistics … are there for everybody to see how Christians have been massacred by the terrorists’ (Chouin et al. 2014, 214). It is hardly surprising that, using the same Nigeria Watch data set, and with some questionable assumptions, CAN and Open Doors International (Anonymous 2016, 16) asserted that Christians are being specifically targeted and disproportionately killed by Boko Haram. One consequence of this monochromic ‘religious’ interpretation of Boko Haram violence is that ‘relatively few Christians in southern Kaduna and Plateau states distinguish Islam and Muslims from Boko Haram’ (Mang 2014, 96). The rejection of a narrowly ‘religious’ framing of Boko Haram will make possible a more nuanced analysis that also focuses on ‘the social variables in the different sites of conflict and on the underlying factors, both historical and current’ (Last 2007, 605). Such an approach will give due consideration to the many political, economic, social, ethnic, environmental and religious dimensions that help to explain Boko Haram’s mindless violence against both Christians and those Muslims who do not accept its narrow sectarian views (see Mustapha 2014). In political terms, domination or the fear thereof, as Ludwig (2008) argues, is at the heart of the political struggle between Nigerian Muslims and Christians. Christians fear the historical legacy of northern, Muslim political dominance in the Nigerian federation, while Muslims fear the socio-economic dominance of Nigeria’s southern regions as well as the global dominance of ‘the West’ and its secular or, more polemically, anti-religious or ‘anti-Islam’ values and political institutions. Last (2007, 2008) discusses Muslims’ anxiety in a more historically grounded context, highlighting their loss of control over the boundary between Dar al-Islam and the Christian, pagan or secularized surrounding polities. This loss of ‘closure’ is not only due to the colonial subordination of the Sokoto Caliphate and its subsequent integration into Nigeria, but also to the unsettling local effects of migration, economic change, and increasing social diversity, and changing gender and generational roles. Due to the relative strength of the Nigerian state and its pivotal role in distributing the oil resources, these mutual fears of religious dominance have not only led to ‘a battle for the control of “theological space”’ (Ibrahim 1991, 125), but also to political and economic competition, and the politicization of religion (Enwerem 1995; Ibrahim 1989). In his analysis, Ibrahim notes, on the one hand, the struggle for power by the ‘northern Oligarchy’ and, on the other, the rise of fundamentalist Christianity and Islam. The struggle for political power by Muslim northern elites goes back at least to late-colonial Nigeria, during which political competition was largely organized along regional lines: the

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predominantly Hausa/Muslim north, the Yoruba and religiously mixed south-west, and the Igbo/Christian south-east. In the late-colonial and early post-colonial years, ethnic and regional boundaries were the important rallying points for political parties. This was especially the case for the conservative northern NPC, faced with the radical populist challenge of the NEPU. Since the late 1970s, there has been the substitution of the former strong regions with many weaker and smaller states. It is this changed geo-political context that has increasingly thrust religion as the key marker in the long-standing competition for economic and political space in Nigeria. But this conflict is not just between Muslims and Christians, but also within both groups, as exemplified by Maitatsine’s use of religion to mobilize a rabble against the rest of the Muslim community (Lubeck 1985), and Boko Haram’s more recent murderous campaigns against other Muslims. As a result of this increasing politicization of religion, the pan-religious construction of the ‘one North’, constructed in the late colonial period, has come under unbearable stress as northern Muslims and Christians frequently find themselves on opposing sides of the widening religious and sectarian divides. After the civil war, in 1970, constitutional reforms severed some of the more direct links between political parties and ethnic and regional constituencies, since parties could not be formed along parochial lines as was previously the case. At the federal level, for example, the Federal Character principle and majoritarian political rules forced candidates for the presidency to seek support from all corners of the country, and incentivized political parties to actively canvass votes outside their traditional regional constituencies. As a result, the major parties no longer aligned themselves exclusively with a single ethnic group or region. But this constraining of ethnic and regional appeals might have had the unintended consequence of encouraging religious mobilization in their stead. While the constitutional reforms also removed some of the incentives for political parties to identify religiously, in other ways, electoral politics remained deeply intertwined with the discourses and institutions of religion (Bienen 1986). Furthermore, restrictions on religious mobilization might have had some impact at the federal level, but this was not often the case at the level of the states and local governments. In many cases, the population of a states or local government was sufficiently homogeneous to allow, and even motivate, political parties to use religion in dog-whistle campaigning. Moreover, even if it has become more difficult for political parties and federal candidates to campaign on an exclusively Muslim or Christian platform, individual political elites and government officials still have strong incentives to use religion to gain legitimacy and present themselves as ‘moral’ leaders. This manipulation of religion for political purposes

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goes back, as Ibrahim (1991) argues, at least to the politics of the Native Authority, who relied on religion for their own legitimacy. Such manipulation continues to this day and has arguably become a more powerful political tool due to the rise of fundamentalist beliefs, the increasing religiosity among Nigerians, and the increasing importance and assertiveness of faith-based organizations (Ibrahim 1991; Obadare 2007). It has also been reinforced, as argued by Falola (1998), by the competitive and politicized leadership of certain religious organizations, most importantly JNI, CAN and the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN). This politicization of religious authority is part of a broader dynamic of Nigerian politics, aptly captured by North et al.’s (2009) notion of the limited-access order. Ideal-typically, a limited-access society is characterized by a dominant coalition that maintains a measure of political and economic stability through continuous negotiation and the distribution of rents (patronage), both between each other and between themselves and their constituencies. In Nigeria, the dominant coalition comprises a complex and dynamic collection of religious, traditional, political, military and economic elites, whose incentives are structured largely by the distribution of rents derived from oil. They maintain their support base not through the provision of public goods, but through the control of patronage. While such a system is by definition unstable and prone to violence, the additional problem in Nigeria is that many of its leaders can increase their support base by radical, exclusionary rhetoric (or even violence) against competing groups. Such antagonism is likely one of the causes of the increasing polarization of northern Nigeria’s religious communities – even as, behind closed doors, the various elites of competing groups work together to access and divide the oil rents. The institution of ‘indigeneship’ further complicates competition over access to resources: this second tier of Nigerian citizenship, allowing state and local governments to distribute particular privileges to Nigerians who are deemed ‘indigenous’ to a particular place (and can prove this through the indigeneship certificate) (Fourchard 2015; Ehrhardt 2017). Particularly in the context of Plateau State, the notion of indigenous rights has been a focal point, and catalyst, of religious competition over political power and economic resources. Taken together, then, the fear of political and economic domination, the importance of oil rents, the logic of Nigeria as a limited-access order, and the institution of indigeneship are factors that can help our understanding of northern Nigeria’s instances of collective violence, despite the many common grounds between Muslims and Christians. That these secular and mundane issues frequently take on a religious garb in northern Nigeria is reflective of the truism in Thomas Hodgkin’s (1956, 105) assertion that ‘the language of politics was at the same time the language of religion’.

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Conclusion: narratives of victimhood The conflation of the language of politics and religion often finds expression in narratives of victimhood through which each religious community seeks to present itself as the aggrieved party. In the Jos crises, for example, Muslims in Plateau State were said to have had disproportionate power under Muslim-dominated federal military regimes. Frequently cited to support this claim is the creation of Jos North LGA, the most important local government in the city. The LGA was said to have been created in 1991 under General Babangida’s military regime using the administrative boundaries proposed by the Muslim elites of Jos. The indigenous Christian ethnic groups developed a strong narrative of victimhood over the creation of the LGA. Since the transition from military to civilian rule in 1999 the Plateau Christians are said to have consolidated their control of Plateau politics, and Jos North LGA, thereby reducing the power of the Hausa Muslims who have now developed their own narratives of victimhood. A similar inversion of victimhood took place in southern Kaduna, where indigenous Christian populations had long complained of cultural and political domination under emirate indirect rule from Zaria. By the 1990s, however, as the culmination of a struggle against the practices of indirect rule and against the post-independence economic and political power of the ‘Hausa-Fulani’, influence began to shift more towards Christians, particularly with the creation of new chiefdoms for many ethnic groups in southern Kaduna. Today, it is the Muslims of southern Kaduna who are claiming to be victims of discrimination and violence (Diprose 2012). Different versions of these narrations of victimhood exist all over northern Nigeria: in southern Borno, where Christians claim to being deliberately marginalized by the Muslim Kanuri dominated government; in southern Bauchi, where the Bogoro in Tafawa Balewa claim to be victims of Muslim oppression and violence; and in Kano, where the Christians claim that they are being denied the right to build places of worship.5 None of these narratives of victimhood are necessarily true or false. Rather, they constitute invaluable mirrors reflecting the thinking of many Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria, many 5 This despite the fact that Christians who constituted 1.1 per cent of the State’s population in the 1963 census have 800 churches, while Muslims, who constituted 97 per cent of the population in 1963 have 1,113 approved Jumat Mosques and 224 unapproved Jumat Mosques. (We are grateful to His Highness, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Muhammad Sanusi II for permission to cite this 2016 census document of the Kano Emirate Council.) On the other hand, in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, the Joint Chapel Committee of the Christian community claimed that efforts to build churches on campus were being frustrated by the school administration, despite the granting of prior approval; a Catholic church under construction was even demolished. On the Kongo campus of the University, there are said to be 37 mosques to two churches (Liman 2015, 199–200).

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of whom feel that they are not getting their rightful due because of their religious affiliation. This pervasive sense of victimhood among all religious groups, particularly in the political and economic realms, is perhaps the single greatest challenge in the management of interfaith relations in northern Nigeria. Its roots, as we have suggested, lie in the history of interfaith interaction and the viciousness of intergroup prejudice and hostility, rather than merely in government bias or repression.6 6 This analysis is corroborated by Pew data from the Social Hostilities Index and the Government Restrictions Index. While both indices show higher-than-average scores for Nigeria compared to other countries, social hostilities constitute a considerably more prevalent threat to religious freedom than government restrictions. For more details, see Pew-Templeton 2015b.

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Part Two Key Contemporary Issues

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5 Challenges of legal pluralism Sharia law & its aftermath ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA & AMINU GAMAWA

Introduction The adoption of ‘full’ Sharia – both personal and criminal law – by twelve northern states after 1999 intensified the divide, tension and conflict among the adherents of Nigeria’s two major religions, Islam and Christianity. One of the main challenges of designing legal institutions in post-independence Nigeria has been the accommodation of the needs of diverse religious and ethnic groups. Cultural pluralism and access to justice by various ethnic and religious groups have been addressed through different legal frameworks. Every constitution since independence has made provisions for the recognition of customary law and Islamic law, in addition to the English common law inherited through colonization. Balancing the need for an equitable and just legal system, and demand for recognition of religious and ethnic justice systems has been challenging. Customary and Islamic courts were recognized by law because of the support they enjoy at the grassroots level as an effective means of dispute resolution. Today, the three major legal traditions in Nigeria are customary law, Islamic law (Sharia) and English law (common law). Together, these divergent systems comprise the complex body of law that is practised and enforced in Nigeria, making it an exemplary case of legal pluralism. The coexistence of different normative legal orders and enforcement mechanisms under one legal system, as we shall see, presents multiple challenges. Moreover, it should be recognized that each of these systems has considerable legitimacy in (parts of ) the Nigerian population. This is particularly true for Sharia, which is widely supported among Muslims – as well as some Christians – in northern Nigeria. In this chapter we explore the historical roots of the demand for Sharia law within Muslim communities in northern Nigeria. We then proceed 139

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to explore the implementation of Sharia law after 1999, drawing attention to substantive and procedural problems that emerged in the process. We then explore the religious violence that occurred in the wake of Sharia declaration. Specifically, we look at the accusations of Islamization and the allegation that Sharia law is undermining the evolution of a single state law for all Nigerian citizens. Finally, we suggest that the experience of Sharia law implementation might best be understood in the context of the concept of legal pluralism. This is a richer historical institutionalist approach to understanding the legal system in northern Nigeria, which has the added potential of defusing religious tensions around Sharia implementation.

The Sharia debate and the historical context Although the history of Islam in northern Nigeria dates back to the 11th century in Borno and 14th century in Kano, it was the revolution led by Dan Fodio in the 19th century that laid the foundation for the contemporary Islamic legal system in northern Nigeria (Smith 1960). Ostien (2006, 222) argues that the Muslims of Northern Nigeria are famous for having resisted – for longer than almost anyone else – the far-reaching legal and judicial changes that took place in most of the rest of the Muslim world beginning in 1850. The Ottoman Empire, the leading Muslim power at that time, borrowed a new Commercial Code largely from France in that year, Over the next hundred years, throughout the Muslim world, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Northern Nigeria, Islamic law, and courts were ousted from one legal subject-matter after another, in favour of new ones based on Western European models. Application of the classical Sharia was increasingly confined to the Law of Personal Status and the family. But even here the Sharia was not left untouched. For example, in Turkey even the personal law of Sharia was abolished in favour of Swiss family code. According to Anderson (1976, 27–8), within this context of the general retreat of Islamic law, the ‘case of Northern Nigeria was, indeed, almost unique, for up till [1960] this was the only place outside the Arabian peninsula in which the Islamic law, both substantive and procedural, was applied in criminal litigation – sometimes even in regard to capital offences.’ The only limitations to the application of Islamic law in this region were on forms of punishment, since the British abolished mutilation and torture, and other punishments found to be repugnant to ‘natural justice and humanity’. The 1900 renunciation of bodily punishments was codified under the Native Authority Ordinance of 1933 which removed some of the extant hudud1 1 ‘A punishment fixed in the Quran and hadith for crimes considered to be against the rights of God. The six crimes for which punishments are fixed are theft (amputation of the

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components of Sharia law, but the resulting legal system was still based largely on Sharia law. This innovation was, however, resented by the Emirs and grudgingly applied as ‘hukm zamanina – the law of our times’ (Sanusi 2006, 180). The first significant and major challenge to the status of Sharia law came in 1947 when the appellate trial of the Tsofo Gubba case prevented the imposition of the death penalty for homicide as provided by Sharia but disallowed by the British Criminal Code (Gubba v. Gwandu Native Authority 1947). The West African Court of Appeal overruled the conviction of the accused on the ground that the Native Court applied evidentiary rules that excluded some evidence favourable to the accused. The court ruled that the accused was denied right to equality before the law by applying on him laws that limit the defence available to him. This decision, even though a clear case of conflict of laws between Native law and British colonial criminal law, also set a limit on the powers of the Native Courts to impose the death sentence. This decision was given legislative support by the 1956 Native Courts Law, which stated that ‘a native court [which included Sharia courts] shall not impose a punishment in excess of the maximum punishment permitted by the Criminal Code or such other enactment’. Muslims were dissatisfied with this decision and it was viewed as an assault on Sharia and Islam. In 1956, a Native Courts Bill was passed which made a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and provided procedures for cases involving both categories. Late in the 1950s, non-Muslim minorities in the Northern Region raised many concerns about their future in the Muslim-majority region. As a result of these and other agitations by ethnic minorities in other regions, the British colonial administration set up the Henry Willink Commission in 1957, also known as the Minorities Commission, to look into the fears and concerns of minorities in the then three regions of the federation. The commission identified the following as the major concerns of the non-Muslim minorities in the North: I. Compulsory submission to the jurisdiction of Courts which follow a procedure which: a. Attaches greater weight to the evidence of a male Muslim than that of a female Muslim, a Christian or pagan; b.  Permits a Muslim to swear his innocence and go ‘scot-free’. (contd) hand), illicit sexual relations (death by stoning or one hundred lashes), making unproven accusations of illicit sex (eighty lashes), drinking intoxicants (eighty lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death). Strict requirements for evidence (including eyewitnesses) have severely limited the application of hudud penalties. Punishment for all other crimes is left to the discretion of the court; these punishments are called tazir’. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757.

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II. Subjection to the Muslim law of homicide, which provides for differing rates of ‘blood money’ according to the religion of the deceased. III. That the executive – the Native Administration which was often just the Emir alone – still appointed Alkalis (Sharia court judges) and still exercised a large measure of control over Muslim Courts. IV. Uncertainty as to what amounted to a criminal offence, due to the special jurisdiction of the ruler known as ‘siyasa’. (Karibi-Whyte 1993, 190–1) In 1958, the government of the Northern Region responded to these concerns by setting up a panel of jurists to study and make recommendations on: (a) the system of law at present in force in the Northern Region, that is, English law as modified by Nigerian legislation, Moslem law and customary law, and the organization of the courts and the judiciary enforcing the systems; and (b) whether it is possible and how far it is desirable to avoid any conflicts, which may exist between the present systems of law; and to make recommendations as to the means by which this object may be accomplished and as to the re-organisation of the courts and the judiciary in so far as this may be desirable. (Nwali, A.B., 151) The panel, which was chaired by Chief Justice of Sudan, Sayad Mohammed Abu Ranat, recommended a Penal Code for the North based on the Sudan Penal Code of 1899, which was also based on the Indian Penal Code of 1834. Like Nigeria, both Sudan and India have a diverse population and plural legal systems. The Penal Code was enacted into law by the Northern legislative house in 1960 (see Anderson 1961; Gledhill 1963). The Penal Code was heavily influenced by English criminal law and has some resemblance to the classical Islamic law. The Penal Code of 1960 became the first of the three great movements concerning the application of Sharia law in Northern Nigeria: The place of Islamic law in Nigeria has undergone three significant adjustments in the past half-century. The first, described above, which I will call the ‘Settlement of 1960’, was brokered by the British in the run-up to Nigerian independence. The second, the ‘Debacle of 1979’, resulted from the constitution-making process that preceded the birth of the Second Republic. The third, the ‘Revival of 1999’, was led by Governor Ahmad Sani of Zamfara State and is still in progress today in the twelve northern states that are implementing sharia. (Ostien 2006, 221)

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The 1960 Penal Code was a compromise that was intended to cater for the needs of religious minorities of the North. It is a watered down version of Islamic criminal law that narrowed down the scope of the application of Islamic law and excludes punishments like amputation and stoning. The general perception was that the 1960 Penal Code was adopted for administrative convenience in the newly created federation rather than enjoying any popular acceptance among the Northern Muslims. The Penal Code abrogated Islamic criminal law, left Islamic civil law, but transferred appeals in such cases from the Sharia Court of Appeal to the ‘English’ High Court. ‘In short, only Islamic personal law retained its special protected status at the appellate level’ (Ostien 2006, 228). Furthermore, the judicial powers of the Emirs were curtailed. The Penal Code was viewed by many Northern politicians and traditional rulers as an imposition and distortion of Islamic law. Even some Christian commentators noted the erosion of Islamic law in the Penal Code. Justice Karibi-Whyte, former Supreme Court Justice, observed that ‘the result was a veritable loss to Moslem aspirations for the preservation of their way of life. Neither in form nor content is the code essentially Moslem’ (Karibi-Whyte 1993, 223). The 1958 commission set up at the eve of independence to review and make recommendations on the reform of the criminal justice system in the North was severely criticized for doing the biddings of the colonial administration. According to Yadudu, ‘the Minorities Commission and the Abu Rannat Panel were in effect used as a smokescreen by the departing colonial administration to give local legislative legitimacy to a decision which had long been officially entertained’ (Yadudu 1992, 116). Since 1960, two separate court systems have existed in northern Nigeria: Sharia courts applying Islamic personal law in cases involving Muslims, and secular courts applying laws derived from English common law. Under the 1999 Constitution, the secular courts have appellate jurisdiction over the decision of Islamic and customary courts (Federal Ministry of Justice 1999, art. 237). The idea behind subordinating customary courts and Sharia courts to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court is to ensure compliance with the provisions of the constitution by these courts while at the same time recognizing and respecting customary and Sharia laws. So, as may be clear by now, the Sharia debate is very old in the history of Nigerian politics and interfaith relations, and revolves around the central problem of how religious communities are represented in, and have influence over, the legal and judicial institutions of the country and its various regions (Chukwulozie 1996, 27; Ibrahim 1991, 130; Yadudu 1991). Historically, the inclusion of Sharia courts in the Nigerian constitution met stiff resistance from inside and outside northern

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Nigeria: internally, from non-Muslim minority groups, and externally, from southern states and, more recently, by interest groups from outside the country. Muslim groups from the north also voiced some concerns over the establishment of the Sharia Court of Appeal under the 1979 Constitution and the introduction of Sharia criminal law starting in 1999 (Usman 1987; Kenny 1996, 348).2 In the 1977 constitutional conference, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), for example, accused the Federal Government of discrimination against Christians and made the following demand in response to the Muslims’ demand for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal: To redress this discrimination CAN demand: 1) that the Federal Government restore relations with Israel, 2) set up pilgrim welfare boards for Christians with an equal number for Christians and Muslims every year, 3) that church leaders who settle matters between and concerning Christians be paid monthly remunerations from public coffers, as applicable to the grand qadis, qadis and alkalis, 4) that Christians, like Muslims, be allowed to build churches at convenient places without hindrance, 5) that ecclesiastical courts be set up in the states of the Federation at government expense, 6) that both in our laws and political administration we be separated from the Muslims who consider it a violation of their religion for a Christian to exercise any political authority over any Muslim. (Kenny 1996, 348–9) The debates around Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the 1977 constitutional conference were clearly getting into the realms of brinksmanship and the advocacy of extremist demands by Muslim and Christian partisans. The creation of six states from the old Northern Region in May 1967 began to put stress on the Settlement of 1960. ‘The issue this raised was, how to harmonize the work of all these new state courts, while preserving the essential elements of the Settlement of 1960’ (Ostien 2006, 234). This matter of the judicial architecture keeping pace with the political sub-divisions of the country propelled the Muslim demand for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal overseeing the six state Sharia Courts of Appeal into a major political and constitutional crisis. In fact, this matter was at first approached from a non-partisan angle, when the All-Nigeria Judges’ Conference at its 1972 annual meeting in Lagos, adopted a resolution stating: ‘The Conference agreed to adopt in principle the proposal for the establishment of a Final or Upper Sharia Court of Appeal, leaving details as to composition, jurisdiction and sittings to be worked out later’ (Ostien 2 The establishment of Sharia Court of Appeal was opposed by Muslims like Yusuf Bala Usman and A.B. Ahmed because the court would give preferential treatment to Muslims over other religions in Nigeria.

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2006, 236). Furthermore, on 11 November 1975, the Supreme Military Council, now headed by General Murtala Mohammed, appointed separate Chief Judges to head the High Courts of the six northern states, separate Grand Kadis to head their Sharia Courts of Appeal, and the ‘establishment of an Upper Sharia Court of Appeal with a President or Mufti at its head was also approved’ (Ostien 2006, 236). The Debacle of 1979 was unleashed when the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) adopted the proposal for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. ‘It extended the application of Islamic law to no new persons, to no new subject-matter, and to no new part of the country’ (Ostien 2006, 238). According to Peter Clarke, ‘it was in essence little more than a technical matter in that it did not involve any modification of existing rights for Muslims or of those proclaimed by the constitution itself ’ (cited in Ostien 2006, 239). The manner in which the CDC was polarized along religious lines, and the wrecking of the demand for the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, rankled among Muslims clerics, jurists, politicians and traditional rulers. The Debacle of 1979 wrecked the Settlement of 1960, and sowed the seed for the revival of 1999: ‘Little wonder then that running through Muslim discourse in subsequent years, one feels an acute sense of victimization at the hands of Christians and of ‘Christian’ – i.e. Western – laws and legal institutions, coupled with a determination to regain lost ground’ (Ostien 2006, 243). With the religious genie out of the bottle, similar tension was created when Nigeria joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 under the military government of Ibrahim Babangida, with some Christian groups demanding that Nigeria withdraw from the OIC. A Muslim group responded to the position of the Christians by threatening as follows: [I]f Nigeria pulls out of the OIC: 1) withdrawal of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, but allowing the OIC membership to stand for an equal number of years, 2) dropping the Gregorian calendar for 25 years while the Muslim calendar alone is used, and thereafter using them both, 3) replacing Saturday and Sunday rest with Thursday and Friday for 25 years; then Friday and Sunday would be work-free, 4) replacing the red cross in hospitals and clinics with the crescent for 25 years, thereafter using them both, 5) replacing the 1st of January with the Muslim New Year as a holiday for 25 years, 6) changing army salutations from their Christian form, 7) changing academic gowns from the form of ‘Christian choirs,’ 8) changing robes of judges and lawyers which originated from ‘monks and Christian choirs.’ Along with this, the ‘Christian oriented’ Common Law should be replaced with Sharia for 25 years, after which both should exist side by side, 9)

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no more laying of wreaths at the grave of an unknown soldier, which is a ‘purely Christian’ custom, 10) changing vacation holidays from coinciding with Christmas and Easter holiday, 11) withdrawing the ‘one-sided granting of radio stations to Church organizations,’ 12) withdrawing landing rights to Christian air services (as in Jos) ‘for their international flights without passing through our international airports for security checks’. (Kenny 1996, 355) Though secularism was not explicitly mentioned by the 1999 Constitution, section 10 prohibits the adoption of any religion as state religion. The 1999 Constitution was viewed as a compromise between the demand for a secular country, and the demand for recognition of religious laws through the recognition of Sharia Courts of Appeal in section 277 (1). In 1999, twelve northern states used their constitutional powers to extend Sharia law within their respective states from Islamic personal law as in the 1960 compromise to now include Islamic criminal law as well. The recognition of three different courts by the constitution – Sharia, customary and English/secular courts – has created many conflicts of jurisdiction that are still unresolved. This conflict of jurisdiction is mostly resolved through the Federal Court of Appeal, which was granted appellate jurisdiction over all the (Oba 2004, 882). It is hard to know if the existence of these separate courts promotes physical separation between groups. This is largely due to the fact that most commercial disputes between Muslims and Christian are generally resolved through informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Where the dispute goes to court, it is generally handled by the magistrate and high court.3 So, in sum, the debate on the relationship between religion and the Nigerian law has a long history and is still salient among Nigerians. Although section 10 of the 1999 Constitution prohibits any state from adopting any religion as state religion, there are many government policies at the state and federal levels that promote and fund religious activities, for example, government sponsorship of pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem.4 Moreover, conferring Sharia and Customary Courts with jurisdiction over family disputes and personal matters, as we shall see later, raises many substantive and procedural questions regarding women’s rights. We will now look at some of the most important substantive and procedural issues that have arisen after the re-implementation of the Sharia criminal code.

3 This is a very important research topic to explore – the impact of legal pluralism on business transaction between followers of different religions in Nigeria. 4 Traditional African religion does not enjoy the same patronage from the government.

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Problematic implementation: procedural and substantive concerns Before we situate the 1999 implementation of Sharia law in the context of legal pluralism, we first examine some of the procedural and substantive issues that have dogged this revival of Sharia law. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

There are two types of criticisms that are often directed against Sharia implementation by the human rights community, one substantive and one procedural. Procedurally, the Sharia courts are accused of violating due process of law. The implementation of Sharia even where well intentioned is marred by procedural irregularities that could lead to a miscarriage of justice. The procedural problems ‘include defendants’ lack of access to legal representation; the failure of judges to inform defendants of their rights and grant them these rights; the courts’ acceptance of statements extracted under torture; and the inadequate training of Sharia court judges which has resulted in these and other abuses’ (Oba 2004, 882). The implementation of the Penal Code in 1960 was accompanied by sustained efforts to train the relevant legal personnel in the new legal system. In 1999, however, not only are the legal codes in the twelve Sharia states different from each other (Ostien 2007), there was little effort to provide training and support to the judicial officers implementing the new codes. Secondly, effort was concentrated on formulating new Islamic criminal law codes, with little effort paid to systematizing and modernizing Islamic personal law.5 The plight of women under the new Sharia codes has reflected this relative underdevelopment of Islamic personal law under the new dispensation.6 Prosecutors, judges, and police have all also been accused of abuse and misuse of power in the implementation of Sharia. For example, an aspect of the Sharia implementation that has been a subject of controversy and corruption is the attitude of the prosecutors and police regarding the choice of which courts to prosecute offenders in. According to the 2004 Human Rights Watch Report on Sharia (herein called HRW Report): In principle, cases against Muslims are normally brought before Shari’a courts, but in practice, there is some discretion, and apparently arbitrary decisions have been made as to which courts should handle which cases. 5

Personal observations communicated by Professor Muhammad Tabiu (SAN). In February 2017, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Muhammad Sanusi II announced that the Kano State Government will be modernizing Islamic Personal law in the state. (Anthony Ogbonna, ‘Law to ban polygamy: There’s a connection between polygamy, poverty, terrorism – Emir of Kano’, Vanguard, 20 February 2017. Also see Dorcas Daniel, ‘Beat your wife and lose your title – Emir Sanusi to Imams, Traditional leaders’, Daily Trust, 28 February 2017).

6

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Corruption is widespread within the judicial system, and there are often no objective or consistent reasons why certain cases are brought before a Shari’a court or a magistrates’ court. (HRW 2004, 2) The implication of the choice of court for the defendant is quite serious. For example, it was reported that in 2002 and 2003, Mohammed Bala, in Kano State, was accused of theft on two separate occasions … He was tried on the first occasion by a Shari’a court and on the second occasion by a magistrates’ court. The Shari’a court sentenced him to amputation, while the magistrates’ court sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, or a 5,000 naira fine. The reason for the different choice of courts was not known to the defendant. (HRW 2004, 20) The existence of this parallel justice system without clear guidelines on which cases go to Sharia courts and which to magistrates courts, reportedly, has enabled some police officers to extort money from people accused of some crimes. To avoid being prosecuted in Sharia courts, which has severe punishments and strict enforcement, defendants are forced to pay bribes to prosecuting police officers. The system as it is now is clearly susceptible to abuse and corruption. It is only Zamfara State that has enacted a law in 2002 to remove the criminal jurisdiction of magistrate courts over Muslims.7 Although this might sound as a solution to the procedural problem described above, some argued that it has created discrimination against a particular group in the state, the Muslims. Why should a Muslim be subjected to harsher punishment than a Christian if both are charged with the exact same crime? This is the argument put forward by those who oppose the creation of a parallel criminal justice system – i.e., it violates the principle of equality before the law guaranteed for all the citizens by the constitution. Additionally, Sharia-implementing states have been accused of a range of abuses, including: the indefinite detention of those convicted by Sharia courts because governors would not approve the carrying out of such sentence as amputations, or because the accused cannot afford a lawyer; sentencing children below the age of eighteen years for criminal offences; the cruel punishment of flogging; and discrimination against women (for example, ignoring allegations of rape) (HRW 2004, 57). Some lawyers in Sharia states have begun to avoid Sharia cases because of their controversy and adverse publicity. Human Rights Watch (2004) reported: This reluctance has been motivated in part by the public outrage generated by the crime of which the defendant was accused – for 7

This decision is arguably unconstitutional, but it has yet to be challenged in the courts.

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example in cases of sexual abuse of children, or murder – and in part by a broader fear that their role in assisting a defendant in a Shari’a case could be perceived as a criticism or challenge of Shari’a, and by extension of Islam as a whole. (70) Many lawyers and judges of the Sharia courts, like their counterparts in the customary courts and Common Law courts, are perceived as incompetent. The Sharia penal code is still not part of the legal education of lawyers and training of judges. Many Sharia court judges still do not speak English, even though the Sharia penal codes are written in legalistic English. Guidance literature for judges is sparse. In sum, then, there are several concerns about the procedural efficacy and efficiency of Sharia as it has been implemented in northern Nigeria. It is important to note, however, that most of the problems and criticisms associated with Sharia courts are common to all the courts in Nigeria. The HRW Report, for example, finds that ‘systematic torture by the police, prolonged detention without trial, corruption in the judiciary, political interference in the course of justice, and impunity for those responsible for abuses occur not only in the context of Shari’a cases, but are at least as widespread in cases handled by the parallel common law system’ (HRW 2004, 2). In view of the fact that these problems are systemic, it is hard to single out Sharia as the major reason for discrimination or poor access to justice. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS

In substantive terms, there are three main areas of concern about the implementation of the Sharia criminal code, relating to physical punishments, gender inequalities, and the Islamic police, the Hisbah. We will look at each of these in turn. First, one of the main criticisms of the Sharia Penal Codes and Sharia courts, post-1999, is the nature of punishments applied by the courts, which are regarded as cruel and degrading treatment. The death penalty, one of the punishments applicable under the Sharia penal code, was described as the ‘ultimate violation of the right to life and an extreme form of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment’ (HRW 2004, 2). According to the HRW Report, ‘Since 2000, at least ten people have been sentenced to death by Shari’a courts; dozens have been sentenced to amputation; and floggings are a regular occurrence in many locations in the north’ (2004, 2). It is important to note, however, that not all these sentences were carried out. Indeed, most have not been carried out. As Ostien et al. (2016) point out, the real injustice is that these people are sentenced to penalties that state governors balk at carrying out, thereby leaving them in a state of judicial and corporeal limbo.

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The Sharia courts have decided many cases, passed many death sentences, and sentenced many amputations of hands. However, with the exception of two cases of amputation8, both in 2001, and one execution by hanging,9 all cases were overturned on appeal. Murder, sodomy, and adultery are the offences that carry capital punishment under the Sharia code, and because under Maliki school of Islamic law pregnancy can be used as conclusive proof of adultery, there is an accusation against Sharia courts for discriminating against women by allowing men accused of adultery to go free because of different standards of proof applicable to men and women. In general, Sanusi (2006) notes that although sharia was ushered in with a flurry of sensational rulings, these have been substantially toned down. There is a general reluctance to implement sentences like death by stoning. It is not very clear how much of this is due to the pressure of the international community and how much to a belated acceptance of the position, long established in Muslim jurisprudence, that these sentences are only rarely carried out, if at all, given the near impossibility of meeting the strict standards of proof set out in the law. (2006, 178) Although none of the Sharia-implementing states repealed or amended laws passed in 2000, political pressure from within and outside Nigeria, including from Islamic civil society in the northern states, seem to have pushed them to relax application of harsh punishments. Even in states that have adopted Sharia, it is not uncommon for a state to be divided into Sharia-compliant and non-Sharia-compliant Local Government Areas. Furthermore, in virtually all Sharia states, areas under federal authority like the military and police barracks are examples of Sharia-free zones, as are neighbourhoods dominated by southerners and Christians, such as Sabon Gari in Kano. Such levels of pragmatic realism in the implementation of Sharia has dampened the tension in many states. However, this makes compliance and enforcement quite arbitrary and uncertain, which is exactly what the law is meant to avoid. Second, then, is the issue of gender inequality and the rights of women in Sharia. The two cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini are instructive as case studies here, because they attracted global attention to the implementation of Sharia in Nigeria and sparked a debate on the rights of 8 Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Kebbi, Katsina, Kaduna and Bauchi Sharia Courts have all handed down amputation sentences. There are only two confirmed cases of amputation, both in Zamfara State (HRW 2004, 36). 9 Sani Yakubu Rodi (Katsina State) 2001 was the first and only person executed based on the decision of the Sharia court. He was accused of killing a woman. The trial was conducted without any legal representation for Sani Rodi. This violates the provisions of the 1999 constitution which made such representation a right.

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women under Sharia. The cases of these two women accused of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning was based on the new Islamic criminal law adopted by Zamfara and Sokoto states respectively. These laws raised many important questions on women’s rights under the Sharia regime. However, both sentences were subsequently overturned by Sharia Courts of Appeal without even getting to the Federal Court of Appeal. The decision in the case of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini was criticized by both Islamic scholars and human rights activists as an example of wrong application of Islamic law.10 Many constitutional arguments, and arguments based on Islamic texts, were made to show how the decision violated not only the Constitution of Nigeria, but also the letter and spirit of the Islamic law which the judges in the two cases claimed to be applying. At the trial courts, neither Amina nor Safiya was represented by a lawyer, something that the constitution requires in all capital offences. Much has been written on the decision of the Sharia courts in these two famous cases (Ezeilo et al. 2003; Ibrahim 2004; Mahdi 2005). The important point to note is that, faced with contestation from Islamic civil society and women’s organizations, and a global outcry against the sentences meted out to both women, the Sharia court system has shown some capacity for self-adjustment in the direction of recognizing the rights of women. For many people, the trial of Amina and Safiya is the high water mark of the implementation of Sharia criminal law. The two cases exposed the practical and conceptual problems of the reintroduction of Sharia by the northern states without putting in place all the necessary infrastructure needed for the success of the Sharia project. As Sanusi (2006, 183) wryly notes, a number of Muslim scholars have questioned the sincerity of Muslim politicians who claim to be implementing Sharia in an environment of abject poverty, illiteracy, and highly unequal distribution of income. Some of the specific gender-based criticisms of Sharia law are: application of laws discriminatory to women (examples are laws on dress code and inheritance), lack of female Sharia judges, giving preference to male witnesses over female witnesses, and the statutory segregation of men and women in public places, etc. The adoption of Sharia is also viewed as an impediment to the ratification of human rights conventions like the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Child Rights Convention (CRC), and a challenge to the rights of sexual minorities. However, these criticisms notwithstanding, user satisfaction surveys suggest that women are the main users of the Sharia courts where they bring sundry personal and family matters, and that these women have high satisfaction ratings for the courts (see Tabiu & Bello 2016). It would seem that a defective, but 10

Professor Mustapha Ismail, Department of Arabic & Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, personal communication.

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predictable and religiously legitimate Sharia court is preferable to the cold, costly, impersonal and incomprehensible secular court system. Again, it should be noted that the condition of women in many of the non-Muslim areas and non-Sharia-implementing states is arguably no better than that of women living under Sharia. Factors like gender-based lack of access to education and economic opportunities, rife across all Nigerian states, play a role in women’s access to justice. In fact, there are certain safeguards and protection accorded to women by Islamic law that are not available to non-Muslim women under the customary law, for example the unambiguous recognition of property and inheritance rights. Even common law practices in Nigeria had provisions that are discriminatory to women, such as the demand that a woman had to get the husband’s consent before she can be issued with a passport. But these deficiencies of the common law and customary law do not justify the incidence of gender discrimination in the application of Islamic law. They nevertheless cast our understanding of the challenges of Sharia law within a comparative context. Third and finally then, we will consider the role of Islamic law enforcement in the context of Nigeria. In particular, we will look at the Hisbah11, a religious police established by Sharia-implementing states to help enforce Sharia laws, have been accused of excesses and human rights violations. The Hisbah group was created to assist in implementing Sharia because the federal police in many states refused to enforce the Sharia law or cooperate with the Sharia courts. Hisbah are involved in carrying out arrests of people suspected of violating Sharia penal code, for example, fornication and the consumption of alcohol. They are also engaged in other social functions, such as marriage counselling and informal dispute settlement. The majority of the rank and file members of the Hisbah are young men, and women in some states like Kano. There are two types of Hisbah, state-created Hisbah and independent Hisbah. State-Hisbah is created by the states, for example Kano, to aid Sharia implementation; they have legislative backing. The independent Hisbah consists mostly of committees set up informally at the community level. They have no legislative backing or government oversight. Because of the elaborate powers and responsibilities given to Hisbah, many of which are outside the scope of letters of the Sharia law, there are numerous accusations against the Hisbah by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These charges include violation of privacy, taking the law into their hands, seizure of property – specifically alcoholic drinks, harassing non-Muslims and politicization of Sharia, among other things. The former 11

‘The hisbah operate openly and are easily recognizable: they are provided with uniforms, vehicles, and an office, usually by the local or state government. In some states, the government pays them a small salary. The hisbah have structures at local government and state level. Some are directly supported by their local government (materially and financially), while others, such as the hisbah in Kaduna, claim that membership and participation are voluntary and unpaid’ (HRW 2004, 75).

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Governor of Kano, Malam Ibrahim Shekarau, was accused by his opponents of using the Hisbah to harass his political enemies. The harassment of people, both Muslims and Christians, in some states by the Hisbah in the name of enforcing the provisions of Sharia is cited as one of the reasons why people lost confidence in Sharia implementation. However, as Mustapha and Ismail (2016) pointed out in their study of Hisbah across the Sharia-implementing states, Hisbah has both coercive and service-delivery functions, and the institution has evolved into a major supplier of services to the poorest of the poor in many states. These services include dispute resolution between family members, marriage counselling, match-making for widows and single women, controlling the use of illegal drugs, traffic control, helping the needy, and organizing workshops on drug addiction. There is an uneasy relationship between the police and the Hisbah. While the police in some states work with and support the Sharia courts and implementation of Sharia laws, not all police officers are Muslims and even among the Muslim police officers not everyone is Sharia-compliant. The Hisbah members, on the other hand, are ostensibly Muslims committed to Sharia. Many police officers, especially Christians, declined to support or cooperate with the Sharia courts. The Nigerian constitution puts the police under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Federal Government and no state has power to establish state police. In 2006, the Inspector General of Police, head of the federal police force, issued an order banning the Kano Hisbah and ordered the arrest of some of its senior officers for the offence of membership and management of an unlawful society (Rabiu 2006). The Kano State Government challenged this decision at the Kano State Supreme Court12 and the Hisbah officers arrested filed a suit at the Federal High Court for illegal detention by the police. The Supreme Court declined jurisdiction and ordered for the case to be filed at the Federal High Court instead. It was never filed again (see Mustapha & Ismail 2016). The question of legality or illegality of the Hisbah, like the bigger question of constitutionality of the Sharia implementation, was avoided by the apex court. The suit filed by the arrested Hisbah commanders was decided in their favour. They were awarded damages. This decision, one could argue, is an indirect acknowledgement of the legality of the Hisbah by the Federal High Court.

Sharia through the lens of legal pluralism The 1999 revival of Sharia was greeted with large scale religious violence between Muslims and Christians across the Sharia-implementing states. 12

Attorney-General of Kano State vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 3 NILR

23.

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Harnischfeger (2008, 16) suggests that about 6,000 persons died in the violence in Kaduna, Kano and Jos in 2000. Two issues were central to the orgy of religious violence: (1) the fear that the country was being Islamized; and (2) the claim that Sharia law undermined the single state law under which all Nigerians should be governed, irrespective of religion. ISLAMIZATION?

Considering the religious polarization between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria since the Sharia debates of 1977 and the controversy over the country’s membership of the OIC in 1986, it would have been surprising if Christians did not feel worried or even threatened by the revival of Sharia law. Indeed, a similar reaction came from Christians when Sharia law was written into the Kenyan 2010 Constitution. As Miyandazi (2015) notes, the inclusion of Islamic law in Kenya’s legal system derived from the compromises made at independence in 1963 in order to include a ten-mile coastal strip, which was originally the dominion of the Sultan of Zanzibar, into modern Kenya. The Sultan acquiesced to the territorial annexation, provided that Sharia courts should be preserved and their jurisdiction retained in Islamic law over matters relating to personal status in cases where all parties were Muslim. The repetition of this 1963 formula in Kenya’s 2010 Constitution became a highly divisive issue with opponents, mostly Christian religious leaders, arguing that Kenya is a secular state with a secular constitution and it should therefore provide no room for religious institutions within the state structure. It was also argued that the inclusion of Sharia or Kadhi’s courts favoured one religion over others and was thus a violation of the equality of all religions. However, according to Miyandazi (2015), what ‘is undisputable is the legitimacy of Kadhi’s courts whose inclusion is part of the constitutional and territorial foundation of Kenya’. In Nigeria, contrary to the pervasive fear of Islamization by many Christians, Human Rights Watch reports that it did not find evidence of a campaign to ‘Islamize’ Nigeria – as alleged by some critics of Shari’a – nor of systematic attempts by proponents of Shari’a to enforce it upon non-Muslims. In most northern states, non-Muslims do not face coercion or harassment of a religious nature. For example, in most cases, non-Muslims are able to consume alcohol, albeit sometimes only in designated areas or in their homes, and non-Muslim women are able to wear their own style of dress without adverse consequences – with some exceptions. (2004, 82) Despite the accusations by some non-Muslims that Sharia limits freedom of religion, so far, no one has been charged or punished for the offence of

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apostasy by the Sharia courts. A Zamfara State Sharia court even threw out charges of apostasy brought against two Muslims that converted to Christianity.13 The 1999 Constitution, which is the supreme law of the country, has many human rights provisions that serve as a check against any law that violates fundamental human rights of Nigerians no matter their religion. Until now, not a single decision of the Sharia courts has been appealed to the Supreme Court. It can be argued that any decision of the lower courts that contradicts the provisions of the constitution would be overruled by the higher national courts. So far, the Sharia courts at the state level have an appellate system that has corrected miscarriage of justice. Many convictions by the Sharia courts were overturned by appellate Sharia courts on grounds of facts, law or both. The other allegations by Christian leaders of discrimination include complaints of the denial of land to build churches, the refusal of airtime in media houses for Christian religious programmes, the lack of representation in the various Ministries of Religious Affairs, the refusal to include Christian religious education in school curriculum, forcing Christian girls to wear the hijab in state schools, the prohibition of sale and consumption of alcohol in some states, and the harassment of alcohol sellers. It is noteworthy that Muslims living in the Christian-majority states of the South-East and South-South frequently complained of similar discriminations against their preferred mode of religious and social life. For example, the so-called central mosque in the bustling city of Port Harcourt in mid-2016 was a tiny non-descript house, barely able to take 10 per cent of the congregants. Worshipers claimed that all efforts to acquire land for a mosque befitting the size of the congregation and the prestige of the city have been frustrated by the resistance of indigenes of the state. At the same time, however, it is important to note, as scholars such as Suberu (2009) have argued, that the implementation of Sharia law has been instrumental in mitigating conflict between Nigeria’s Christian and Muslim communities by providing avenues for meeting some of the aspirations of Muslims under the overarching ambit of the federal constitution. UNDERMINING SINGLE STATE LAW

A second set of criticisms levelled against the revival of Sharia is that it undermined a single state law for all Nigerians irrespective of religious persuasion. Harnischfeger (2008, 22) states that when ‘Muslims in 13 See

also ‘Islamic prosecutors seek death penalty for Nigeria’s Christian converts’, in Associated Press, April 24, 2002 (HRW 2004, 82). Completely ignoring this evidence, Harnischfeger (2008, 16) states that the Sharia Penal Code adopted in Zamfara (Sections 405, 406) and other states, contains the death penalty for Muslims who participate in ‘pagan’ rites. He insinuates that this is obliquely targeted at Muslims wishing to convert to Christianity. As we saw in Chapter 1 of this volume, the ‘pagan rites’ in question are bori, and not Christian.

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Northern Nigeria decide to shape their penal code in accordance with their own religious tradition, they exclude non-Muslims from an important aspect of public legislation’. In the same vein, Peel (2016) makes a case for privileging state law as a common denominator for all Nigerian citizens: the most problematic feature of Sharia is not any specific provision that it has but its implication that each confessional community should have its own law – in the case of Muslims, one that is divinely mandated rather than humanly decided – instead of them agreeing together upon the laws under which all citizens will live together as members of one political community. (2016, 171) To address the issues raised by these criticisms, we must necessarily consider the issue of legal pluralism and how this relates to the claim to primacy of a single state law. The privileging of the single state law is not supported by the history of state formation across the world. According to Benton (2012, 22): ‘Early modern societies were plural legal societies. Empire-states and smaller polities alike tended to recognize the legal authority of multiple religious and cultural communities.’ Why these empires behaved in this way in the legal and political realms is made clear by Barkey (2008) who noted: I had earlier discovered an important key to empire: that empire was a ‘negotiated enterprise,’ and regardless of its strength an empire has to work with the peripheries in order to maintain a mix of compliance, tribute, and military cooperation, as well as to ensure political coherence and durability … Recognizing imperial repertoires as flexible, constrained by geography and history but open to innovation, enables us to avoid the false dichotomies of continuity or change, contingency or determinism, and to look instead for actions and conditions that pushed elements into and out of empires’ strategies. (2008, x) Explaining this logic further, Tas (2013) gives the specific example of the Ottoman Empire where eighteen different legal systems were officially recognized under the Ottoman Millet practices.14 He considers this pluralism a necessary system in such a multi-ethnic and multi-faith society: The process saved time and money for the Ottoman government too, since members of different communities did not have to go to the Ottoman Islamic Kadi courts. This was of particular benefit to the 14 A Millet court was a separate court of law under which a confessional community was allowed to rule itself under its own laws.

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Ottomans … since the Islamic Kadi court system was not sufficiently resourced to respond to the conflicts within all ethnic groups across the vast empire. By the middle of the nineteenth century … the Ottomans tried to limit these rights to customary law and sought to replace them with a more centralised legal system. When the Ottoman state started to ignore customary law and attempted to control other minority groups from a centralised power base, only selected religious groups, such as Jews and Christians, were allowed to continue living according to their customary practices. This centralised state system, which took control of power and refused to share it with different communities, has been shown to be the beginning of the end for the Ottoman Empire and the basis for the creation of the much smaller Turkish nation state. (2013, 168–9) Rabo (2011) gives us a more contemporary example of multicentric legal orders, citing Syrian family law, the Law of Personal Status, codified in 1953, and based on the Sharia as stipulated by the Hanafi madhhab. This law is the law of the state and encompasses all Syrian citizens. However, in matters of betrothal, marriage and divorce, Christians, Jews and Druze follow their own codes, and have their own religious courts … Syrian Christians are divided among more than a dozen sects, with five different codes … Although there is a handful of Jews left in Syria, the law books still feature their code. (2011, 215) Even more perplexing is the fact that urban Muslims based in Aleppo live under a different legal regime from rural Muslims in the north-east – the shawa’ia, who live around Raqqa governorate. Just as perplexing is the fact that Shi’ite Syrians, including the Alawite sect which is politically dominant, have lived under the ‘Sunnification of Shi’a personal status’15 (Rabo 2011, 215). State law historically has neither been hegemonic nor sacrosanct and contains within it many tensions. Indeed, Benton (2012) traces the process through which multicentric legal orders get gradually replaced by single state law. She argues that, before the 19th century, all legal orders featured jurisdictional tensions without strong claims of legal hegemony by states. Furthermore, she notes important patterns that emerged from the operation of these multicentric legal orders: The comparative study of legal pluralism in empires reveals repeating patterns across substantively very different legal orders. One pattern is 15

Subjecting the Shi’a to Sunni codes on personal status.

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a tendency for subjects situated everywhere within an empire to adopt both rhetoric and strategies referencing the law of the imperial center … A second relevant finding … consists of the observation that legal actors – again, at all levels – tended to show a preference over time for adjudication in forums that seemed to provide a greater possibility of enforcement of rulings … it is important to note that the merging of legal cultures often occurred despite imperial policies intended to preserve subordinate communities’ jurisdictions … Similarly, understanding the pervasiveness and persistence of strategies of appealing to imperial legal authority allows us to appreciate the effects on legal behaviour of robust claims to the dominance of state law over subordinate jurisdictions in later centuries. (2012, 21–2) But this transformation from multicentric legal orders to a dominating single state law is never totally complete, and state claims to legal hegemony remain both ad hoc and contested (Benton 2012, 26). As the history of the legal architecture of Northern Nigeria from 1900 to 1960 discussed above clearly illustrate, the region has always been marked by a multiplicity of legal norms – common law, Sharia, customary law, and even a blending of these three, as in the case of the 1960 Penal Code. Tensions and creative interaction have always characterized the relationship between these legal orders over the years. In more recent years, Nigerian state law has also had to contend with challenges from new West-Africa-wide bodies like the ECOWAS Court.16 These facts do not support the privileging of single state law which Harnischfeger and Peel advocate – virtually to the exclusion of other legal orders – and their position has no basis in the lived history of the region. As Sage and Woolcock (2012) note, there are a number of widely held false assumptions about legal pluralism in low-income countries: that state law must be uniform, comprehensive, and monopolized by the state; that the rule of law consists of a single model or form to which all constituent legal systems must conform; and that political and economic development depends on conforming to this model (because of the greater ‘predictability’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘justice’ such conformity will allegedly provide). (2012, 2) They argue that for the vast majority of people in low-income or conflict-affected countries, everyday life is characterized by negotiating between the claims of multiple rules systems with varying authority, legitimacy, coherence and capacity. 16

Cf. ‘Nnamdi Kanu: ECOWAS court dismisses Nigerian govt’s objection’, Premium Times, www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/225425-nnamdi-kanu-ecowas-court-dismisses-nigerian-govts-objection.html, 7 March 2017.

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Sage and Woolcock (2012) also draw attention to both the challenges and the opportunities posed by legal pluralism. On the opportunity side, if ordinary citizens perceived the state legal system as captured, corrupt, inefficient, or hostile, or if engaging with it requires traveling great distances, waiting in long lines, completing complex forms, enduring humiliating treatment, and paying prohibitively expensive fees, only to receive an unsatisfactory outcome (or no outcome at all), it may be beneficial to have other options available … When disputes arise, an overwhelming majority of these people eschew the state legal system and instead seek redress in a range of non-state institutions, which to them are accessible (geographically, administratively, and financially), efficient, and socially legitimate. (2012, 1–2) On the challenges side, however, is the fact that ‘the norms and procedures of many customary or traditional justice systems raise real concerns about gender equity, human rights, due process, and capture by traditional elites’ (Sage & Woolcock 2012, 3). They advocate the need to understand and nurture the political spaces ‘wherein diverse (and often opaque) rules systems – their forms, jurisdictions, sources of legitimacy, modes of dispute resolution, and enforcement mechanisms – can be recognized, and the tensions between them constructively addressed’. To our mind, such is the nature of the main challenge posed by the revival of Sharia law. That ‘state law casts a shadow over what appears to be “non state” legal processes’ (Benton 2012, 31) should not blind us to the coexistence and even the co-determination of both state law and non-state legal orders. This is especially the case, if our main concern is the access to justice of the vast majority of citizens in regions such as northern Nigeria. As Rabo (2011, 213) succinctly puts it, the questioning first of the colonial, and then the Western states ‘as the sole locus and arbiter of law’ means that legal pluralism has become a universal approach to seeking justice in a context in which ‘we find both formal/codified and informal/customary law everywhere’. The phenomenon of legal pluralism is not unique to developing countries (Farran & Hultin 2016). In the UK, for example, Tas (2013) reports that Kurdish immigrants prefer to have their own legal system, where litigants pay, instead of using the English legal system. After initial suspicion, the UK Home Office saw how efficient, legitimate and accepted the Kurdish Peace Committee (KPC) is, and now gives subventions to it. The KPC has handled approximately 3,500 cases between 2001 and 2012, ‘mainly by the Kurdish people but also by others’. Around 85 per cent of the cases are resolved successfully, usually within two or three weeks (Tas 2013, 176). The initial tensions between the English

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legal and policing systems and the KPC, and the final amicable resolution of the tensions indicate the sort of struggles that characterize contemporary legal pluralism. Casting the revival of Sharia under the rubric of legal pluralism, instead of seeing it as an attempt at religious domination, opens new opportunities for exploring access to justice issues for all who wish to take advantage of the system, whether or not they are Muslim.

Conclusion: seeking justice beyond politics and fear The revival of Sharia law in 1999 reflected many conflicting motives. Within the wider Muslim society in northern Nigeria, there was an enthusiastic embrace of the new codes, because it was the law of God, because it was seen as legitimate, and because many hoped it would curb the corruption and lack of accountability of the elites. On the other hand, this mass support would not have escaped the notice of political entrepreneurs – both politicians and ambitious Islamic clerics – eager to make political capital out of the religious fervour of the common people. This combination of religious fervour and political opportunism was in a context in which the people of the north were generally dissatisfied with their lot; they had just been forced out of political power and felt generally insecure, and, like other Nigerians, they were victims of a corrupt and mismanaged system that led to widespread poverty and apathy. Religion offered a sense of hope and an opportunity to improve their pathetic circumstances. (Sanusi 2006, 185) It is this combination of fervour and opportunism that informed the fear and violence which greeted Sharia revival. Since 2000, the euphoria seems to have fizzled out. After the initial sensational sentences of amputation, caning, and even stoning to death (which was not carried out) the people have come to realize that nothing in reality has changed and that the poor seem to be the only ones facing the wrath of the law. (Sanusi 2006, 185) But we need not be excessively pessimistic about Sharia implementation. As the work of Ostien et al. (2016) shows, despite all its shortcomings the Sharia courts are delivering justice to the poor, as good as, if not slightly better than the remote and corrupt state court system. As noted earlier, Tabiu and Bello (2016) suggest that the Sharia courts have been a useful pathway to justice for poor women. Is it therefore possible to go

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beyond the politics and fear that followed in the wake of Sharia revival, and explore the system as a source of justice, especially to the millions of Nigerians alienated from the formalism, remoteness, and corruption of the state law system? Our argument in this chapter is that looking at Sharia law through the lens of legal pluralism makes it possible to move beyond the politics of emotion and fear – important as they may be – and concentrate on the historical and social context which generate the tensions that need to be managed. In the process we foreground the central question of access to and the delivery of justice. While the lens of legal pluralism makes possible this wider exploration, it should be noted that the plurality of legalities is not always ideal or good, and it is not necessarily a panacea (Zips & Weilenmann 2011, 12). Just as the formal state courts are open to abuse, so are the Sharia courts. An emphasis on justice therefore suggests that we take nothing for granted, even when we acknowledge the relevance of multiple legal orders. Every legal order must earn its legitimacy and it is the task of public policy analysts to hold them to the promises made to the people. Finally, given the multi-religious and multi-ethnic nature of Nigeria, two tests are important for determining whether Sharia law can be a pathway to justice for all: (1) is the justice dispensed available to all citizens? and (2) are there robust mechanisms for defending the overarching public good even in this context of plural legal orders? Concerning our first question, Rabo (2011, 213) asks whether ‘all members of a society, or all citizens in a specific nation state, have access to a plurality of laws’. We believe this is important as every citizen must feel free to use any legal order which best serves their individual interests, irrespective of religion. Laws may have specific religious and cultural roots, but individual citizens must not unjustifiably be subjected to any legal order against their wish. Furthermore, every citizen, irrespective of religion, ought to be able to take advantage of the Sharia courts, should they so choose. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that Christians in commercial disputes with Muslims frequently prefer using the Sharia courts: they are quick, effective, and inexpensive.17 17

See these cases as examples: (1) Tony Okeke vs Mohammed Kofa Ruwa CV/534/2012, Case before the Sharia court Ungogo, Kano State, for the recovery of the sum of N43,500; (2) Cormolia Umeh of Sarkin Yaki Road vs Mohammed Dorayi CV/126/2012, case decided by the Gama Sharia court, Fagge Local Government Area of Kano State. It involved a claim of the sum of N74,044 by the Christian Plaintiff against the Muslim Defendant. The Christian won; (3) Mr. Christian Okechukwu vs Yunusa Musa K/Sabon Gari, CV/429/2012, claim for the recovery of debt before the Upper Sharia court Sabon Gari, Airport Road, Kano. Judgement was delivered in favour of the Christian plaintiff on 19 November 2012 and the money has since been recovered. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who noted: ‘Sharia law does not recognize the equality of non-Muslims before the law despite the occasional willingness of non-Muslims to attempt to obtain justice in Sharia courts. If this were significant, non-Muslims would be calling for deeper Shariaization. In practice, it was understood by the implementers as a reassertion of Islamic hegemonism not introduction of an enlightened form of religious pluralism.’

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Concerning our second test, Zips and Weilenmann (2011, 12) draw attention to the important distinction between two types of pluralist legal orders: (1) strong and deep legal pluralism, where the legal orders do not depend on each other for recognition; in contrast to (2) weak state law legal pluralism, where one legal order allows space for some coexistence with other legal orders. Legal pluralism in Nigeria is of the second type, because all legal orders in Nigeria are ultimately subject to the constitution of the country. Section 1 (3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that: ‘If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.’ This is sufficient basis for the protection of the common good in the context of legal pluralism, if the state law system can be strengthened to properly uphold the constitution and eschew rampant corruption.

Bibliography Anderson, J.N.D., 1957, ‘Law and Custom in Muslim Areas in Africa: Recent Development in Nigeria’, Paris: Institut international des civilisations différentes. —— 1961, ‘A Major Advance’, Modern Law Review, 24 (5), 616–25. —— 1976, Law Reform in the Muslim World, London: The Athlone Press. Barkey, Karen, 2005, ‘Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 19 (1–2); The New Sociological Imagination II, 5–19. Benton, Lauren, 2012, ‘Historical Perspectives on Legal Pluralism’, in Brian Z.Tamanaha, Caroline Sage, and Michael Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chukwulozie, V.C., 1986, Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Nigeria. Ibadan: Daystar Press. Ezeilo, J.N., Ladan, M.T. and Afolabi-Akiyode, A. (eds), 2003, Sharia Implementation in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges on Women’s Rights and Access to Justice, Enugu: Women’s Aid Collective. Falola, T., 1997, ‘Christian Radicalism and Nigerian Politics’, in P. Beckett and C. Young (eds), Dilemmas in Nigerian Democracy, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Farran, Sue and Hultin, Niklas, 2016, ‘Special Section: Legal Pluralism and Its Contribution to the Global South–Global North Paradigm’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 48 (3), 347–53. Federal Ministry of Justice, 1999, ‘Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria’, Federal Ministry of Justice, Abuja. Gledhill, A., 1963, The Penal Codes of Northern Nigeria and the Sudan. London: Street & Maxwell; Lagos: African University Press. Gubba,Tsofo, v. Gwandu Native Authority reported in XII WACA, (1947), 141. Harnischfeger, Johannes, 2008, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. HRW – Human Rights Watch, 2004, ‘Political Shari’a’? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria’, New York: Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/ report/2004/09/21/political-sharia/human-rights-and-islamic-law-northernnigeria (last accessed 11 July 2017). Ibrahim, J., 1991, ‘Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria’, in Journal of Modern African Studies, 29 (1), www.jstor.org/stable/160995 (last accessed 22 June 2014).

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Challenges of legal pluralism: Sharia law & its aftermath • 163 —— (ed.), 2004, Sharia Penal and Family Laws in Nigeria and in the Muslim World: Rights-Based Approach. Abuja: Global Rights Partners for Justice. Kano State of Nigeria Gazette No. 6, Vol. 35, 20 November 2003, Kano. Karibi-Whyte, A.G., 1993, History and Sources of Nigerian Criminal Law. Ibadan: Spectrum Law Publishing. Kenny, Joseph, 1996, ‘Sharı-a and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a “Secular” State’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 26 (4), www.jstor.org/stable/1581837 (last accessed 22 June 2014). Mahdi, S., 2005, ‘Women’s Rights in Shari‘ah: A Case for Codification of Islamic Personal Law in Nigeria’, in P. Ostien, J.M. Nasir and F. Kogelmann, Comparative Perspectives on Shari‘ah in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Miyandazi, Victoria, 2015, The Road to Transformation: Conceptualisation, Interpretation and Application of the Concept of Equality under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Thesis (M.Phil.), University of Oxford, (Social Sciences Division, Faculty of Law, St Anne’s College). Mustapha, A.R., 2014, ‘Understanding Boko Haram’, in A.R. Mustapha (ed.), Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, Woodbridge, UK: James Currey. Mustapha, A.R. and Ismail, M., 2016, ‘Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria over 15 Years: The Case of Hisbah’, Report for the dRPC/NSRP project, 15 Years of Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria, Nigeria Stability & Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), Kano: Development Research & Projects Centre. Nasir, Jamila M., 2007, ‘Sharia Implementation and Female Muslims in Nigeria’s Sharia States’, in P. Ostien (ed.), Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006: A Sourcebook: Vol. III, 76–118, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Nwali, A.B., 1991, ‘Constitutional Structure and Position of the Judiciary with Particular Reference to the Sharia Court of Appeal’ 1989 Judicial Lectures: Continuing Education for the Judiciary, Lagos: MIJ Professional Publishers. Oba, A.A., 2004, ‘The Sharia Court of Appeal in Northern Nigeria: The Continuing Crises of Jurisdiction’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 52 (4), 859–900, www. jstor.org/stable/4144468 (last accessed 22 June 2014). Ostien, Philip, 2006, ‘An Opportunity Missed by Nigeria’s Christians: The 1976–78 Sharia Debate Revisited’, in Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. —— 2007, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999–2006: A Sourcebook, Vol. 4, ‘The Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes’, Ibadan: Spectrum. Republished by the University of Bayreuth at www.sharia-in-africa.net/pages/publications/ sharia-implementation-in-northern-nigeria.php (last accessed 5 September 2017). Ostien, Philip, Garba, A. and Abubakar, M., 2016, ‘Nigeria’s Sharia Courts’, Report for the dRPC/NSRP project 15 Years of Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria. Nigeria Stability & Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), Kano: Development Research & Projects Centre. Peel, J.D.Y., 2016, Christianity, Islam, and Orisa Religion: Three Traditions in Comparison and Interaction, Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Rabiu, Ruby, 2006, ‘Ban on Hisbah: Kano sues FG’, Daily Trust, 14 February Rabo, Annika, 2011, ‘Legal Pluralism and Family Law in Syria’, in Werner Zips and Markus Weilenmann (eds), The Governance of Legal Pluralism: Empirical Studies from Africa and Beyond, Berlin: Lit Verlag. Rheault, M. and Tortora, B., 2012, ‘Northern Nigerians’ Views Not in Line With Boko Haram’s’, Gallup poll, www.gallup.com/poll/152780/northern-nigeriansview s-not-line-boko-haram.aspx (last accessed 2 April 2012). Sage, Caroline and Woolcock, Michael, 2012, ‘Introduction’ in Brian Z. Tamanaha, Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, 2006, ‘Politics and Sharia in Northern Nigeria’, in Benjamin F.

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164 • Key Contemporary Issues Soares and Rene Otayek (eds), Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Smith, M.G., 1960, Government in Zazzau, 1800–1950. London: Oxford University Press. Suberu, Rotimi T., 2009, ‘Religion and Institutions: Federalism and the Management of Conflicts over Sharia in Nigeria’, Journal of International Development, 21 (4): 547–60. Tabiu, M. and Bello, I., 2016, ‘Report on Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria: Impact on Women’, Report for the dRPC/NSRP project on 15 Years of Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria. Nigeria Stability & Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), Kano: Development Research & Projects Centre. Tas, Latif, 2013, ‘One State, Plural Options: Kurds in the UK’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 45 (2), 167–89. Usman, Yusufu Bala, 1987, The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria, Kaduna: Vanguard. Yadudu, A.H., 1991, ‘Constitution-Making and the Politicization of Shari’a in Nigeria’, Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, 19. —— 1992, ‘Colonialism and the Transformation of Islamic Law in the Northern States of Nigeria’, in Journal of Legal Pluralism, 24 (32), 103–39. Zips, Werner and Weilenmann, Markus, 2011, ‘Introduction: Governance and Legal Pluralism – an Emerging Symbolic Relationship?’ in Werner Zips and Markus Weilenmann (eds), The Governance of Legal Pluralism: Empirical Studies from Africa and Beyond, Berlin: Lit Verlag.

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6 Boko Haram, youth mobilization & jihadism1 MARC-ANTOINE PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS

Introduction Better known under the nickname Boko Haram (‘Western education is sacrilege’), the ‘Sunni Community for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’ ( Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad) emerged as a sect in the Borno region of north-east Nigeria, bordering Niger, Chad and Cameroon.2 In March 2015, one of the factions of the group paid allegiance to Daesh (ISIS) and decided to be called the Islamic State in West Africa (Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah). Some in the media have presented this insurgency as part of a global jihad or, in the Nigerian context, a clash of civilization between Muslims and Christians. But the reality on ground has been quite different. Muslims have been the main victims of the group for a simple demographic reason: they are a majority in the north-east of Nigeria and civilians bear the brunt of the conflict.3 In fact, Boko Haram has attacked both Muslims and Christians. If the group has sometimes targeted Christian minorities, it has mainly killed Muslims who rejected its doctrine or cooperated with the security forces.4 Paradoxically, the realization of this common terrorist threat may have fostered the sense of national unity that propelled both Muslims and Chris1 This chapter draws on my earlier piece, ‘A sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: the case of Boko Haram’, 2016. 2 The name Boko Haram was coined by local journalists during the uprising of July 2009, especially on Radio Kaduna. Before, the sect bore no name and was sometimes called Yusufiyya, after its founder Mohammed Yusuf. Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, it then claimed to be the ‘Sunni Community for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’ ( Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad). 3 According to some estimates, Christians may represent 30 per cent of the population in Gombe and Adamawa States, 20 per cent in Borno, and less than 10 per cent in Yobe; see Mulders 2016, 103. 4 Pérouse de Montclos 2014a; Chouin et al. 2014.

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tians to vote together for a democratic change in 2015, when President Muhammadu Buhari was elected. Today, Boko Haram, or what remains of it, is very fragmented, and it is important to go beyond the issue of religious fanaticism to analyse properly the local dynamics that explain how the sect mobilized combatants. The group has gone through four principal phases of recruitment, mainly in the region of Borno: firstly, a period of Islamic preaching (da’awah) under Mohammed Yusuf between 2003 and 2009; then, a descent into terrorism under Abubakar Shekau from 2010; a transformation into a guerrilla movement after the declaration of emergency rule in North-East Nigeria in 2013; and finally a spatial expansion of attacks after the launch of an international coalition made up of Nigerian, Nigerien, Chadian and Cameroonian armies in 2015.

Christian minorities in the north-east and Boko Haram: the context Studying the sociology of a rebellion is always a challenge due to the inherent insecurity. My investigation started along the Niger/Nigeria border as far back as 2005 to analyse the ‘Talebans of Nigeria’, the seeds of a movement that would later become Boko Haram. After the extra-judicial killing of the founder of the sect in 2009, I visited Maiduguri several times. This was the group’s fiefdom. In the course of my investigation, I met internally displaced persons as well as political decision makers and religious clerics in Kano, Zaria and Abuja, and I interviewed refugees, humanitarian personnel, and security officers in Diffa in the Republic of Niger, over 100 km north of Maiduguri. To this corpus should be added 51 interviews with presumed Boko Haram members in the Koutoukalé and Kollo prisons in Niger in February and May 2015. If it was not possible to draw a demographic profile of possible Boko Haram members, such a small survey revealed the strong influence of peer networks and a complex pattern of recruitment. Interestingly enough, others studies found similar conclusions.5 According to Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, 60 per cent of 119 former Boko Haram members interviewed in Internally Displaced People’s camps in December 2015 and January 2016 reported that their first introduction to the group was through friends, neighbours and family. If decision makers and peace builders considered Islam to be the most prominent reason in explaining why individuals were attracted to the ideology, less than 10 per cent of Boko Haram respondents identified 5 Drawn from 47 interviews conducted from September to November 2015 in Borno, Yobe and Gombe States, the profile of the youth who had refused to join the sect was as diverse. Some were uneducated and unemployed, others were educated had jobs and had attended government or Islamic schools; see Inks et al. 2016.

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religion as a reason for joining the insurgents and only 12 per cent to 14 per cent were recruited at mosques, madrassas or Koranic schools.6 Before the military crackdown and the extra-judicial execution of its leader in 2009, the sect first tried to convince people to join its ranks through an inner spiritual effort, the ‘major jihad’. Mohammed Yusuf, a very charismatic and persuasive young speaker, began by preaching in mosques controlled by a Saudi-inspired Salafist movement called Izala. He then acquired his own religious centre in the railway station district of Maiduguri. He especially drew the youth who were looking for ‘the peace of the mind’, to borrow the phrase of a combatant who joined the group in the little city of Geidam in 2006.7 Sometimes, material incentives also drove recruitment to get loans and have enough capital to start a business. Others adhered to the sect because of family and generational conflicts. The possibility to marry, in particular, attracted young men who were unable to pay for a dowry, an established tradition challenged by Salafists. Like every sect, the group was endogamous and its members could only marry amongst themselves. As Mohammed Yusuf was based in Maiduguri, Boko Haram mainly proselytized amongst the Kanuri people of Borno and Yobe States in Nigeria, Diffa in the Republic of Niger, Lake Chad and the Mandara Mountains in Cameroon. Surveys conducted in 2015 have shown that 30 out of 51 alleged Boko Haram members in the Republic of Niger and 22 out of 47 in North-East Nigeria were Kanuri.8 But the sect did not intend to revive the old Kanem-Borno Empire and was never an ethnic liberation front.9 Mohammed Yusuf preached in Hausa and rather tried to extend the group’s influence as far as Kano and Sokoto in the North-West.10 In Kogi State, it also established a cell in Okene, its most southern outpost, where it encouraged Ebira Muslims to join the jihad. Thus several ‘lieutenants’ or spokesmen of the group were not Kanuri. Aliyu Tishau was a Tiv from Benue; Abu Qaqa hailed from Kogi State and probably died in jail in January 2012 after his capture by security forces in Kaduna. Interestingly enough, the preaching period (da’awah) of Boko Haram was focused on ‘bad’ Muslims and hardly concerned itself with Christian minorities. In fact, past riots in Borno were primarily related to intraor inter-ethnic violence, more than inter-religious issues. In 1982 in the suburbs of Maiduguri, clashes between the security forces and the Maitatsine sect were a purely Muslim affair. As for spontaneous riots, some were understood as a curse and God’s punishment, for instance during 6

Botha & Abdile 2016. Interview with the author, Koutoukalé prison, Republic of Niger, 27 February 2015. 8 Pérouse de Montclos 2015b, 62; Inks et al. 2016, 9. 9 Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine 2015a. 10 Olojo, Akinola 2015. 7

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moon eclipses that were seen as a bad omen in Maiduguri on 4 April 1996 and 10 January 2001. This does not mean that Christian minorities were not persecuted. Just before the Biafra War, the killings of Christian Igbo immigrants in the north-east were motivated by political and economic reasons against a social class of traders and civil servants who were perceived as being foreigners. If Maiduguri was the only important Muslim city spared by the first wave of massacres in May 1966, the mediation of the Shehu of Borno did not succeed in preventing the second round of pogroms in September, when rumours alleged that northerners had been molested in the south-east of Nigeria. Since the end of the Biafra War, Christian minorities indigenous to Borno have also complained about discrimination regarding freedom of religion and access to land, the media, universities and executive positions. At independence, emirate officials had responded to non-Muslims pressure by giving Christians a greater representation.11 But their position changed during the military rule and the Second Republic. To get Muslim votes and the support of Kanuri notables, for instance, Borno politicians stopped issuing certificates of occupancy for churches in 1979. Governor Asheik Jarma of the Nigerian People’s Party, who was elected in 1983 after Mohamed Goni of the Great Nigeria People’s Party, went as far as trying to destroy churches around the government secretariat in Maiduguri, in order to expel them to Auno, 27 km away.12 Local Christian communities still felt insecure during the Fourth Republic, after the end of military rule in 1999, when Borno politicians promised to extend the application of the Sharia law to criminal matters. Following the 2003 elections, for instance, Governor Ali Modu Sherif did nominate a supporter of what subsequently became Boko Haram as the head of the State Commission for Religious Affairs. In the same vein, indigenous Christian minorities in Borno have complained about restrictions to teach their religion in the schools, a matter they took to court as far back as 1979. Despite sections 10 and 38 of the 1999 Constitution that proclaim freedom of religion, the teaching of so-called ‘Christian Religious Knowledge’ is in fact limited to church private schools in Borno. By contrast, Islam is the only religion taught in all Borno government public schools, and ‘Christian Religious Knowledge’ is replaced by Arabic lessons. As for Koranic teachers, they are trained and employed by the government.13 11

Whitaker, Sylvester 1970. However, he failed to achieve his plan because the military coup of Muhammadu Buhari in December 1983 ended his tenure. 13 Some Muslims in Borno argue that such restrictions actually aim at preventing interreligious tensions and conversions. Indeed, Christian children in church schools learn to sing hymns in local dialects that might attract Muslim children, whereas the latter have to memorize the Quran in a language, Arabic, that people do not understand. Muslims also argue 12

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The power distribution in the core North-East also exacerbated the fears of indigenous Christian minorities about political marginalization. In Bauchi, elected governors and deputies have all been Muslims since 1979. The same pattern prevailed in Borno: while elected governors since the Second Republic hailed from the northern part of the State, their deputies often came from the Biu Emirate to the south, mostly from amongst the Babur/Bura ethnic group. So far, however, they have all been Muslims. Likewise, Yobe State has had Muslim governors and deputies since its creation in 1991, except for a brief military interlude in 1996–1998. This skewed religious dominance has gone together with Kanuri domination. When Yobe State was created, its capital was installed in a Kanuri city, Damaturu, which was much less populated and less cosmopolitan than Potiskum.14 Authorities have argued that this choice made sense from a geographical point of view, as it did in Jigawa State, where Dutse was less populated than Hadejia.15 Looking at a map, however, does not confirm their claim: within their respective states, both Damaturu and Dutse are not more central than Potiskum and Hadejia. In fact, the Kanuri produced all elected Yobe State governors of the Fourth Republic, except for one in 2007–2008. The situation is different only in other North-East states where there are more Christians, such as Gombe, Adamawa and Taraba.16 In this context of Muslim domination, indigenous Christian minorities in Borno were sometimes the victims of riots, for instance on 11 November 1998 when a military governor tried to impose the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge in public primary schools.17 On 27 March 2000 in Damboa, demonstrators also protested violently against the illegal extension of the Living Faith Church.18 In Maiduguri in February 2006, fighting between the police and a mob intent on catching and lynching a pickpocket led to riots. The wider context to the riots was the anger against the publication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in Danish newspapers. (contd) that Islamic Religious Knowledge is not taught either in the government public schools of the predominantly Christian South-South, probably because the federal zoning system does not take care of non-indigenous Muslim minorities (the situation, however, should be different for indigenous Christians in the North-East). Interviews with the author in Maiduguri, May 2016. 14 The Kanuri of Borno had previously secured a switch from Bauchi to Maiduguri as the capital of the old Northeast State when it was created in 1967. 15 Interviews under Chatham House rule, Abuja, May 2016. 16 I wish to thank my colleagues Kyari Mohammed and Leena Hoffman for this information. For a religious and ethnic background of governors and their deputies in the north-eastern states, see: http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/Annex.pdf 17 On 19 February 1995, a young Muslim madman hacked a woman to death in a church of Maiduguri. He was lynched by the worshippers but the situation was quickly brought under control by the authorities. 18 They killed 20 persons according to press reports, or only one, according to the Borno State Chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Bishop Mohamed Abubakar Naga. Interview in Maiduguri on 7 May 2016.

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Demonstrators grouped on Ramat Square and went on rampage, setting fire to churches and killing up to 100 people, including a Catholic priest, Mike Gajere. The riots provoked retaliatory violence against Muslim minorities in southern Nigeria, especially in Onitsha. But it is not clear if members of the Yusufiyya movement that subsequently became Boko Haram were involved at this stage. And when they eventually rioted against police abuses in Maiduguri and Bauchi on 26-31 July 2009, they mainly targeted public buildings and state symbols, even if they also did destroy some churches.

From Mosque to prison: the role of military repression It was after the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf that the movement went underground and started to plan attacks on churches. This sequence of events suggests that we must nuance the understanding of Boko Haram as focused against Christians.19 Indeed the military crackdown on Boko Haram inaugurated a new period in the life of the organization and exacerbated the sense of persecution felt by members of the sect. Chased from the cities, the movement went underground and fled into the countryside and neighbouring countries. In Maiduguri, Boko Haram houses were destroyed, sold, given to informers, or confiscated by district heads. Survivors sought revenge for the seizure of their goods and the murder of their relatives. With just a motorbike and an old gun, some started in 2010 to target and kill collaborators seen to be affiliated to the Borno State Governor, Ali Modu Sherif, who was also regarded as being very corrupt. After a brief interim leadership of Mallam Sanni Umaru, Abubakar Shekau emerged as Boko Haram leader and adopted terrorist methods such as suicide attacks and car bombings outside of Borno. The ‘hawks’ within the organization thus took over the leadership from the ‘doves’, who were killed by the security forces or by the more radical elements in the group. Through its brutality, the Nigerian army itself contributed to Boko Haram’s recruitment. Abuse by security forces gave rise to sympathy for the victims, even when such sympathizers did not subscribe to the ideology of the sect. In spite of his total opposition to the ideas professed by Mohammed Yusuf, for example, an Izala sheikh from Sokoto, Abubakar Gero Argungu, said publicly that the members of Boko Haram killed in 2009 could be considered Muslim martyrs; following this declaration during Ramadan celebrations in Yola in 2010, his mediation was accepted by the insurgents in 2011.20 19 For an opposite view according to which Christian minorities in the North are the main victims of violence because they are allegedly ‘singled out, selected and focused upon’ as the ‘most potentially targeted group’, see Mulders 2016, 14. 20 I wish to thank my colleague Kyari Mohammed of the Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola, for briefing me on this case.

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Actually, Inspectors General of Police and Chiefs of Army Staff were quite aware of the perverse effects of their heavy-handed repression,21 a position which raises serious questions about their inability to avoid the abuses against civilians. Indeed, many investigation reports have not been published because they directly indicted the security forces in exacerbating the conflict. Established in 2011 and chaired by an ethnic Kanuri former Nigerian ambassador to Chad, the Galtimari Commission acknowledged the mistakes and ‘atrocities’ perpetrated by soldiers, police officers, and federal agents of the JTF ( Joint Task Force). To mention but a few, it pointed to a ‘culture of impunity’, the ‘use of militia gangs’, ‘extra-judicial killings’, ‘incidences of rape’, ‘destruction of private property’, violations of the rules of military engagement, lack of trust and collaboration, ‘operational lapses’, ‘service rivalry’, ‘under-funding’, ‘under-equipment’, rampant ‘corruption’, etc. ‘In the face of such catalogue of unprofessional behavior’, wrote members of the Commission, ‘it would be difficult to cultivate, let alone sustain, public support for continued military presence in the area.’22 As a result, it was recommended to ‘replace the present troops with new ones’ who would be familiar with the terrain, speak the local languages, and ‘have a human touch, care and concern by avoiding unnecessary brutality and ruthlessness’. In addition, police officers linked to the murder of Mohammed Yusuf and his followers were to be tried, a judicial commission of inquiry was to look into the atrocities committed by some JTF personnel, and the victims of the crisis were to be paid compensation for damaged property and the refund of hospital bills for those who sustained injuries. Finally, the Commission recommended that the authorities identify third parties through whom dialogue could be opened with the insurgents. To restore the confidence of the insurgents in the good faith of the government, it was suggested that the authorities transfer ‘back to Maiduguri with adequate publicity’ 61 Boko Haram detained members who were wrongly assumed to have been killed. By way of conclusion, the members of the Galtimari Commission expressed regret that the recommendations of their predecessors were never implemented. Their own report was also dumped. In Borno and Yobe, civilians still continued to join the ranks of insurgents to seek revenge for parents killed by security forces, or simply because they feared being arrested and tortured to death. In February 2013, three months before the declaration of emergency rule in North-East Nigeria, the National Assembly in Abuja passed the Terrorism Act which exacerbated the problem by authorizing the military to renew three-month detentions indefinitely and to hold suspects in custody without sending them before the police or 21

22

Interviews under Chatham House rule in Abuja in 2011. Galtimari 2011, 10.

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the courts.23 From this point of view, it appears that detention has been a key issue in the sect’s development. The prison, rather than the mosque, has in effect become the place of recruitment: not so much because it allowed for the indoctrination of jihadists but because individuals arbitrarily arrested were likely to join the combatants. Thus, Boko Haram has destroyed or damaged 15 out of 18 prisons in Nigeria’s North-East, as well as 106 out of 122 police stations and 10 out of 17 military barracks according to an official countdown for the years 2010–2015. When the group resurfaced in 2010, it is no coincidence that its first military action was to attack the central prison in the city of Bauchi. At the time, the goal was to free members of the sect who could go back into combat and were in their thirties according to a survey of 144 suspects being held in detention 24. But Nigerian prisons also have a characteristic in common with many others in Africa: most of their occupants are awaiting a trial that may never come. Very few of Boko Haram’s combatants, for example, were convicted of terrorism and given a sentence. In Nigeria, there were only seven cases in 2013, 40 in 2014, and up to 110 in the first five months of 2015. These figures should be compared to the tens of thousands of people apprehended by the security forces since the beginning of the crackdown in 2009. Cameroon, which was less impacted by the crisis, has been more proactive and condemned 89 ‘terrorists’ to death in 2015.25 Amnesty International estimates that, in Nigeria alone, a total of 20,000 people were imprisoned on suspicion of supporting Boko Haram.26 Neighbouring countries are equally concerned since they joined the war on terrorism. For Cameroon, unofficial sources report that around 500 people were imprisoned in Maroua in the beginning of 2015. In the Republic of Niger, authorities have detained 200 suspects in the high security prison of Koutoukalé, to which have been added 160 others who were rounded up following battles in Bosso and Diffa in January 2015, and perhaps up to a total of 600 in May 2015. Chad has not provided any statistics. Today, prisoners remain a major issue for Boko Haram in its demands, as evidenced by the negotiation surrounding the release in Banki of 21 of the kidnapped Chibok girls allegedly in exchange for four commanders 23 The pieces of legislation adopted by Cameroon in December 2014 and Chad in July 2015 were somewhat similar in this regard. They defined terrorism in very vague terms, which allowed the repression of all forms of political opposition and the application of death penalty for non-violent acts, for example damage to property or disruption of public service during a demonstration. In addition, they militarized justice and lengthened pre-trial detention in police custody: from 48 hours to 90 days in Chad, for periods of two weeks renewable indefinitely in Cameroon. 24 Onuoha 2014, 4. 25 Jeune Afrique 16 March 2016. 26 Amnesty International 2015b.

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of the sect in October 2016.27 The main difference is that the group has lost whatever social support it previously enjoyed before the imposition of emergency rule in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in May 2013. Indeed, the Nigerian military eventually realized that they needed to win the hearts and minds of the people. So they did set up local militias, called Kato da Gora (‘the men with clubs’), who knew the terrain better and who were able to root out insurgents hidden amongst the population. As a result, Boko Haram was no longer content with just retaliation against targeted individuals. The group took on a new strategy of indiscriminate terror and massacred entire villages in order to dissuade their inhabitants from joining the ranks of the CJTF (Civilian Joint Task Force). This in turn led to an escalation of violence which took on the proportions of a civil war. In the same vein, Boko Haram began to pay ‘volunteers’ and coerce young recruits while trying to keep control of the areas it had seized. Like other guerrilla groups that did not profess Islam, Boko Haram forced children to kill their mothers and fathers so that they would be rejected by their people and be compelled to stay in their combat units. ‘Collaborators’, for instance, were often executed by members of their family to force parents to cooperate with the insurgents or to flee and denounce their own children to the military. According to witnesses in Maiduguri, it is also possible that combatants deliberately attacked the army in order to provoke retaliation and to push civilians towards joining the ranks of the sect.

The criminalization of the jihad During the 2013–2014 period, the criminalization of Boko Haram was a response to three main challenges: thwarting local government militias with a campaign of terror, making up lost revenues with pillaging, and replacing captured or killed members with ‘mercenaries’ who were motived by money more than Islam. As it was no longer able to collect donations or to reap the benefits of Mohammed Yusuf ’s investments in the microfinance sector, the sect resorted to kidnapping, extortion, and the holding-up of banks which were accused of violating Sharia by practising usury.28 Boko Haram also attracted opportunist youths.29 This 27 In April 2013, Abubakar Shekau had also negotiated the release of his wife Hassana Yakubu, along with her children, in exchange for the liberation of a French family kidnapped on the border with Cameroon. 28 The youth who could not repay their microfinance loans were also forced to engage in combat or were killed. 29 Before July 2009, the sect was already joined by ‘political thugs’ of the ‘Ecomog’ militia allegedly mobilized by Borno Governor, Ali Modu Shariff, to win the state elections in April of 2003 and 2007.

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included ‘mercenaries’ who were not considered Muslims, especially around Lake Chad. Historically, the aboriginal people living there were pagans who developed small settlements along the Komadugu River. Called So, Sao, Soa, or Soya, they probably founded the present-day ethnic groups of Buduma or Kotoko.30 Some were assimilated by the Kanuri of Kanem-Borno; others were chased onto the islands of Lake Chad by Muslim raids. These groups who live on the lake are quite enigmatic to the peasants who live onshore.31 They are difficult to access and live in isolated floating atolls scattered in the middle of swamps of a lake which is compared to a big pond. They have a reputation for banditry and witchcraft as their people and cattle survived in a hostile riverine environment infected with epizootic diseases, worms, bilharzia and malaria parasites.32 The Buduma, in particular, are an acephalous society with no ruler. They may count up to 80,000 persons and are made up of a variety of clans like the Guria in the East and the Maijigojia in the West.33 They are called Buduma by the Kanuri in the South and Kuri (from the word for their oxen) or Yedina by the Kanembu in the North.34 ‘Yedina’ refers to the name for Lake Chad, yedi or yade, with the suffix ‘na’ meaning ‘son of ’ in Kanuri. As for ‘Buduma’, it is in fact considered a Kanuri name which translates as ‘people (ma) of the grasses (budu)’. The root budu could also stem from the Kanuri word ‘to swim’. Hence Buduma would mean ‘the people who swim’.35 Indeed they are well-versed in boat transport, fishing and raising livestock. In Nigeria, they adopted the Kanuri language and inter-married with dominant groups. The Buduma entered the market economy in many distinct phases. First they had to intensify their fishing and trading activities with Borno when colonialism put an end to cattle raiding, their previous major source of income.36 Around 1935, Igbo merchants then introduced new fishing techniques. The Buduma used nylon for making nets and lines, and dried the fish to preserve and transport it, a process that helped extend their market throughout Nigeria. From 1946, the Buduma also started using motorboats instead of reed canoes. Moreover, many of them were forced to resort to fishing for a living because their cattle died and suffered from floods and unusually high water levels in the 1950s. Finally, competition 30 The word so could also be Arabic and refer to all dark-skinned peoples of the Sudan. See Cohen 1962, 153–4. 31 Boutrais 1997, 475. 32 In 1897, the explorer Emile Gentil already mentioned them as pirates; cf. Dion 2014, 157. 33 In the 1990s, estimates varied between 35,000 to 50,000 people, including 25,000 in Chad Republic, 4,000 in Niger, 3,000 in Nigeria and a few hundred in Cameroon. See Konrad 2009, v. 34 Verlet 1967, 191. 35 Baroin 2005. 36 Bouquet 1990

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on Lake Chad increased during the period of drought in the 1970s. In the port of Baga Kawa, for instance, it is estimated that the proportion of Hausa ‘immigrants’ rose from 5 per cent in 1976 to more than 50 per cent in the 2000s.37 In the early 1970s, the construction of a road linking Maiduguri to Baga actually helped to develop the sales of fresh fish under the supervision of the so-called yanburdo, a name derived from the Kanuri word gurdo or gurdoma, which means ‘itinerant trader moving from one market to another’.38 These new Hausa, Kanuri or Igbo businessmen bought their own trucks and operated independently from the traditional association of smoked fish traders. They also supported the use of dumba traps, a fishing method introduced by Malian immigrants in the late 1980s. As the lake contracts during the dry season, from December, a dumba is a kind of net that obstructs receding water to catch the fish trying to swim back to the main stream. The problem is that such traps create conflicts because they prevent fishermen living downstream from getting any fish, especially those who use different equipment and fishing methods.39 Consequently, the Federal Government of Nigeria banned dumba in 1992, while local governments tried to regulate and tax it from 1988. In 1993, village heads (lawan) agreed to issue written licenses that could be checked by the army patrols on the lake.40 When the Federal fisheries department tried to enforce the ban from 1995, however, local governments officials were prevented from taxing and licensing the use of dumba. As a result, traditional chiefs filled the void created by the withdrawal of local governments. They resumed their allocation and taxation of fishing rights with the complicity of federal joint patrol officers who collected illegal fees. In Baga, for instance, fishermen had to pay both the lawan and the army. This arbitrary taxation was irrespective of fluctuations in fish stock or demand. Fifteen years later, the chaos of the Boko Haram crisis was an opportunity for the Buduma to take revenge. Converting to radical Islam was a way to be recognized as true Muslims by the dominant groups in Borno. Some Buduma also joined Boko Haram to escape army raids, take control of the fishing trade, and get rid of the competition of Hausa or Igbo traders who lent money with interest to maintain boats despite the Sharia prohibition on usury. Last but not least, opposing factions within Buduma society took advantage of the crisis to settle scores. The Maijigojia of the North and the Bujia of Bosso (maybe 20 per cent each of the Buduma) were allegedly the first to join the insurgents, while their rivals, the Guria of Bol in the Republic of Chad (35 per cent) and the Mai Bulwa (25 per 37

Seignobos 2015, 109. Imam 2005. 39 Sarch 2000. 40 Seidler 2014. 38

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cent) of Kiskra and N’Guigmi in the Republic of Niger were more reluctant to rally to the movement.41 In any case, the situation became very tense when the armies of Chad and Niger joined the MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force) and began military operations on Lake Chad in 2015. To cut off Boko Haram’s supply lines, the authorities banned the fish trade, a decision which pushed another group of Buduma youth to join the insurgents. From this point of view, the determination to fight revealed not so much religious fanaticism but the necessity to make a living, together with the fear of being captured alive and tortured to death in prison, without any possibility to surrender. Meanwhile, Boko Haram continued to find recruits because of the brutality of the military. According to a survey conducted in Internally Displaced Person’s camps in January 2016, 57 per cent of former Boko Haram fighters identified revenge as having a strong or being the only influence for joining the group.42 Indeed, the security forces often cause death in a majority of fatal incidents where they get involved. As a result, the more the police and the army intervene with the use of force, the bloodier the fighting.43 Such a systematic pattern has a lot to do with a general culture of impunity which triggered the uprising of Boko Haram in July 2009 in the first place. The security forces were thus responsible for half of the fatalities recorded by the NigeriaWatch database in the course of the conflict, especially after the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf. Out of 32,292 victims reported by the Nigerian press and human rights organizations between June 2006 and March 2016, 16,133 were killed by the security forces and 16,159 by the insurgents.44 In fact, these figures are probably a low estimate. The military, for instance, do not admit killing civilians, only ‘terrorists’. Likewise, people who die in detention are assumed to be ‘insurgents’, yet without having been tried in court and convicted. In general, the army tends to focus on Boko Haram atrocities against civilians. In Borno, however, retired civil servants who witnessed extra-judicial killings claim that the security forces had a more deadly impact. Until the emergency rule in 2013, they argue, Boko Haram only targeted individuals and public officials. Moreover, the insurgents do not have the same firepower. As for the Nigerian media, they hardly investigate rural areas, but the total number of victims could possibly reach 70,000 people.45 Actually, violations of the humanitarian law did not stop since an international coalition was put into place in January 2015. Quite on 41

Seignobos 2015, 111. Botha & Abdile 2016. 43 Pérouse de Montclos 2016b. See also the NigeriaWatch annual reports: www.nigeriawatch. org/index.php?html=7. 44 Data on file with the author; see www.nigeriawatch.org. 45 Interviews under Chatham House rule in Maiduguri in 2015 and 2016. 42

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the contrary, the security forces of Chad and Cameroon replicated the Nigerian army’s mistakes, with collateral damages, arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial executions that instigated a climate of fear likely to push civilians into the hands of the insurgents. In the villages of Bia, Doublé and Magdeme along the border, for instance, Cameroonian forces killed more than 71 people who were then buried in mass graves in Mindif. In turn, governmental militias took advantage of the situation to settle old scores and eliminate rivals in the areas around Amchidé and Cheripouri. In May 2015, the authorities themselves recognized that 25 prisoners had died in detention and that 192 civilians had ‘disappeared,’ while human rights defence organizations counted 40 dead just in the Maroua prison.46 Although its regime was more democratic under a president elected in March 2011, the Republic of Niger has also militarized its war on terror, with a 50 per cent increase in troops in three years. In the region of Diffa, the declaration of a state of emergency in February 2015 immediately led to arbitrary arrests and two or three extra-judicial executions within the following two weeks. Officially, the objective was to control the population’s movements, to create a buffer-zone along the border, and to deprive Boko Haram of its sources of finance. Consequently, authorities of the Republic of Niger forbade selling gasoline, using vehicles registered in Nigeria, and travelling by boat or by motorcycle, both during the day and at night.47 As a result, local peasants were no longer able to move, to get fuel for their pumps, and to export their pepper and their fish to Nigeria, a country that usually purchased about 80 per cent of their agricultural products. The lack of market opportunities forced many to abandon their crops and pushed some youth to work for the insurgents. On Lake Chad, the army even ordered the total evacuation of islands after an attack that killed some 40 Nigerien soldiers in Karamga in April 2015. Forced to leave everything behind, nearly 25,000 civilians had to walk north into the desert, up to N’Guigmi, where nothing had been prepared to receive them and from where some preferred to go south to rebel-held areas in Nigeria.

What next? Boko Haram has three possible futures: dispersion and extinction, as happened to the Maitatsine Islamic sect after a Nigerian military crackdown 46

Amnesty International 2015a; United Nations High Commission for Human Rights 2015, 12. 47 As early as 2010 in Nigeria, the prohibition of motorcycle taxis in Borno also led to the unemployment of some 34,000 young men, some of whom joined the ranks of Boko Haram; cf. Anyadike 2015, 9.

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in the city of Kano in 1980; recession, along the lines of remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army, who fled Uganda to hide in the Central African Republic; or internationalization in response to the regionalization of the war on terrorism under the aegis of the African Union. Each of the first two scenarios is quite likely. In the beginning of 2015, the election as president of Nigeria of the ex-General and former Governor of the old Northeast State, Muhammadu Buhari, boosted morale and inclined civilians in Borno to support the army, a crucial cooperation in the war against an invisible enemy like Boko Haram. Between resistance and collaboration, some factions of Boko Haram may now be pushed to adopt a strategy of negotiation (taqiyya), which is condoned by Islam and consists in temporarily giving up armed struggle when circumstances impose a peaceful coexistence (muwalat) with the infidels.48 Because they fear arrest and torture, others might refuse to consider negotiations and opt to continue looting and fighting a ‘low-cost’ insurgency, even with no foreign funding or backing. The growing involvement of women and children in combat clearly shows that Boko Haram is increasingly finding it more difficult to recruit new fighters.49 The first female suicide bombing to be reported was carried out on military barracks in Gombe State in June 2014. Since then, women and children have featured prominently in suicide attacks in Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Such a characteristic differentiates Boko Haram from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. While it is more millenarian and apocalyptic, Daesh (ISIS) has indeed governed a territory and tried its hands at building political alliances with some Sunni constituencies. On the contrary, Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram has antagonized almost all Muslims in its region of operation and foreclosed the possibility of collaboration to run its so-called caliphate.50 Also, it has been so brutal with Muslim civilians that it has lost support and repulsed even al-Qaeda and Daesh. The internationalization scenario is far less certain. In March 2015, a faction of the group paid allegiance to Daesh and took the name of the Islamic State in West Africa (Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah). But the similitudes observed in the videos of the two entities cannot be interpreted as proof of an operational connection between the insurgents of Nigeria and those of Iraq, Syria or Libya.51 Actually, it is first and 48

In case of absolute necessity, compromise (muwalat) with infidels is justified by the Koran’s Surah (III, 28) on the Family of Imran, rather than the option of war ( jihad) or exile (hijra). 49 It is now estimated that females constitute around 10 per cent of the 5,000 to 10,000 members of the group; see Botha & Abdile 2016. 50 Thurston 2016, 24. 51 In February 2016, the Nigerian secret services announced that a recruiter for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Abdussalam Enesi Yunusa, had been arrested along with seven alleged members of a dissent group, Ansaru. But his nationality was not revealed and rumours about Boko Haram combatants in the city of Sirte with the Islamic State in Libya have never been confirmed.

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foremost the communication war of an endogenous movement that always mixed revolutionary references from abroad as well as from home, with the Sokoto Caliphate and the jihad of Usman dan Fodio in 1804. The ‘Talebans’, which were the embryo of the group, thus took their cues from Afghanistan when, in 2003, they established a rural base called ‘Kandahar’ at Kanama, near the Niger border. After his falling-out with the Izala movement, Mohammed Yusuf himself named his ‘centre’ (markaz) in Maiduguri in honour of Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, a thirteenth-century Damascene theologian who came from the south of modern-day Turkey. The founder of Boko Haram also drew on the Salafi thoughts of the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who mentored the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi. Since then, his successors have somewhat expanded their territorial ambitions, and the new name of Boko Haram, the Islamic State in West Africa, refers to Ifrîqiyah, one of the three provinces of the Maghreb in the Middle Ages.52 However, Daesh, which dates from 2014, was never the only foreign reference of the group. As they disagreed with Abubakar Shekau, who killed mainly Muslims instead of Christians, some members of the Shura (executive council) of the sect paid more respect to the doctrine of al-Qaeda. For example, in August 2009, just after the assassination of Mohammed Yusuf, one of his successors, Mallam Sanni Umaru, declared to the Nigerian press: [Boko Haram] is just a version of the Al Qaeda, which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised, which is according to the wish of Allah.53 Hence in January 2012 a dissent group formed a ‘Community of Defenders of Black Muslims’ ( Jama’at Ansar Al Muslimin Fi Bilad al-Sudan), criticizing Abubakar Shekau because his actions essentially targeted Muslims. Small in number but much closer to al-Qaeda in terms of doctrine, members of this ‘Ansaru’ faction have kidnapped and killed expatriates in Nigeria. According to unverified sources, they are also said to have participated in Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s attack against the In Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria and the Arlit uranium mine in 52

In mid-2016, ISIS announced the replacement of Abubakar Shekau as Boko Haram leader, thus confirming the long-rumoured split within the sect between supporters of Shekau’s ruthless and bloody method and those of ISIS. The new leader, Habib Muhammad Yusuf ‘al-Barnawi’, first appeared in a video as a spokesman for Boko Haram in January 2015 and is allegedly the second son of Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf. 53 Vanguard 14 Aug. 2009. See also the statement of another spokesman, Abu Qaqa, reported by Mark 2012.

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Niger, in January and June 2013, respectively.54 In February 2015, Ansaru again distributed a charter that confirmed its proximity to the ideology of al-Qaeda. However, at the time of writing, it is not known if Ansaru is still active since the arrest of its alleged leader and founder by the Nigerian Army in April 2016. Some followers of Mohammed Yusuf have thus been able to maintain individual contacts with other African or Arab jihadist groups.55 Yet there exists no tangible evidence of any substantive alliance in the sense of coordinating attacks or attracting foreign combatants from Europe, America or Asia. Specifically, none of the previous trials of Mohammed Yusuf in Nigeria succeeded in proving his supposed links with an Islamist training camp in Mauritania or with the Tablighi Jamaat (Society for Spreading Faith) in Pakistan. Allegations of funding from a British NGO, the Al-Muntada Trust Fund, were also never proven, including in Great Britain.56 In the same way, unproven allegations were made against Mohammed Ashafa, a follower of Boko Haram arrested in Kano in 2006, that he received money from the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, the GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat), to recruit and train 21 combatants at a place called Agwan in Niger State. If one believes the story of Aliyu Tishau, a former commandant of Boko Haram in Bauchi arrested by the Nigerian secret services before escaping in 2011, Mohammed Yusuf actually refused to send mercenaries to Islamist groups involved in a plot in Mauritania in 2004.57

Conclusion To understand properly the development of Boko Haram, the problem is in fact to crosscheck partial or contradictory information. A first challenge is to go inside the ‘haze of dust’, a metaphor referring to the artificial sandstorm created by Tuareg rebels to cover combatants and confuse their victims.58 Propaganda by the military does not help 54

Zenn 2013, 111. to Bernard Barrera, the General in charge of Operation Serval in Northern Mali, the French Army captured (on 2 March 2013) only one Boko Haram member who sought refuge in the Adrar des Ifoghas and who was in charge of kidnapping Fulani young boys in the region of Gao to provide al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb with child soldiers. This is very far from the 300 fighters mentioned by some journalists who claimed that Boko Haram had a training camp near Timbuktu in 2012. See Barrera 2015, 216. 56 Smith 2015, 87. For the report clearing Al-Muntada of the accusation and written by a corporation of lawyers linked to European and Saudi oil companies, see: www.almuntadatrust.org/pdf/am-international-report.pdf. 57 Sahara Reporters 21 Sept. 2011, http://saharareporters.com/2011/09/21/punch-interview-i-told-inspector-general-police-advance-abuja-would-be-bombed-says-boko. 58 Lecocq & Schrijver 2007. 55 According

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either. The analysis is often spoiled by the storytelling of a global jihad linked to Al-Qaeda or Daesh and focused on Christians. Such narratives are not only popular in the media, they also help authoritarian and corrupt regimes to get international financial and military support in their ‘war on terrorism’.59 Nonetheless, Boko Haram did not need any foreign instruction to rebel against the Nigerian government. The criminalization of the sect is deeply embedded in local dynamics. Attempts at drawing foreign Islamist connections reveal the complexity of a global jihad vision which has degenerated in reality into a multitude of micro social conflicts. However, the internal dynamics of the conflict in Greater Borno also open ways for a local settlement, especially with the last waves of Boko Haram recruits: ‘mercenaries’, opportunist Buduma fishermen, child soldiers, captured civilians. Buying social peace and granting an amnesty to combatants would certainly have a high price and would not solve other related issues, for instance, the need to reconcile families torn apart by the conflict in Borno. Moreover, the core group of fanatics would remain a problem. But a realistic approach points to the fact that fighting Boko Haram in Libya, in Iraq or on the Internet is an illusion. The solution must be local and entails important reforms for states around Lake Chad, starting with the penchant for military collateral damage and the lack of accountability of the security forces. Protecting Christian minorities is only a tiny part of a wider agenda for change. 59

Pérouse de Montclos 2014b, 20–22.

Bibliography Amnesty International (2015a), Cameroun: les droits humain en ligne de mire. La lutte contre Boko Haram et ses conséquences, London: Amnesty International, 79 pp. Amnesty International (2015b), Stars on their shoulders. Blood on their hands: War crimes committed by the Nigerian military, London: Amnesty International, 129 pp. Anyadike, Obi (2015), ‘Road to redemption: Unmaking Boko Haram’, IRIN News, 1 October. Baroin, Catherine (2005), ‘What do we know about the Buduma ? A Brief Survey’, in Catherine Baroin, Gisela Seidensticker-Brikay and Kyari Tijani (eds), Man and the Lake: Proceedings of the 12th Mega Chad Conference, Maiduguri, 2nd − 9th December 2003, University of Maiduguri, Centre for Trans-Saharan Studies: 199–224. Barrera, Bernard (2015), Opération Serval: notes de guerre, Mali 2013, Paris: Seuil. Botha, Anneli and Abdile, Mahdi (2016), Getting behind the profiles of Boko Haram members and factors contributing to radicalisation versus working towards peace, Vienna: King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID), 7 pp. Bouquet, Christian (1990), Insulaires et riverains du lac Tchad: Etude géographique, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2 vols, 415 pp., 464 pp. Boutrais, Jean (1997), ‘Les populations du bassin tchadien: des sociétés non-hydrauliques’, in Jungraithmayr Herrmann, Daniel Barreteau and Uwe Seibert (eds), L’homme et l’eau dans le bassin du lac Tchad, Paris: ORSTOM.

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182 • Key Contemporary Issues Chouin, Gérard, Reinert, Manuel and Apard, Elodie (2014), ‘Body count and religion in the Boko Haram crisis: Evidence from the Nigeria Watch Database’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security, and the state in Nigeria, Waposo Series no. 2, Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria; Leiden: African Studies Centre: 213–36. Cohen, Ronald (1962), ‘The just-so So? A spurious tribal grouping in Western Sudanic history’, Man, 62:153–4. Dion, Isabelle (2014), Vers le lac Tchad: Expéditions françaises et résistances africaines 1890– 1900, Milan: Silvana Editoriale. Galtimari, Usman Gaji (ed.) (2011), Final Report of the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North-East Zone of Nigeria, Abuja: Federal Government of Nigeria. Imam, Muhammad Sani (2005), ‘Yanburdo: A study of specialised fresh fish traders in the Lake Chad Basin’, in Catherine Baroin, Gisela Seidensticker-Brikay and Kyari Tijani (eds), Man and the Lake: Proceedings of the 12th Mega Chad Conference, Maiduguri, 2nd − 9th December 2003, University of Maiduguri, Centre for Trans-Saharan Studies: 431–50. Inks, Lisa, Wolfe, Rebecca and Ouvry, Iveta (eds) (2016), Motivations and empty promises: Voices of former Boko Haram combatants and Nigerian youth, Portland OR: Mercy Corps, 24 pp. Konrad, Walter (2009), ‘People of the grasses’: Studies on the Buduma (Yedina) of Lake Chad, Maiduguri, University of Maiduguri. Lecocq, Baz and Schrijver, Paul (2007), ‘The war on terror in a haze of dust: Potholes and pitfalls on the Saharan front’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25 (1): 141–66. Mark, Monica (2012), ‘Boko Haram vows to fight until Nigeria establishes sharia law’, The Guardian, 27 January. Mulders, Arne (2016), Crushed but not defeated: The impact of persistent violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria, Abuja: Harderwijk, Christian Association of Nigeria’s National Executive Committee, and Open Doors International (Netherlands). Olojo, Akinola (2015), ‘Les limites spatiales de l’insurrection de Boko Haram dans le Nord du Nigeria: le cas de Sokoto’, Hérodote 159: 76–85. Onuoha, Freedom (2014), ‘Why do youth join Boko Haram?’ Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2014a), ‘Boko Haram, les chrétiens … et les autres’, Etudes 4211: 7–18. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2014b), ‘Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis’, London, Chatham House, Research Paper. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2015a), ‘Boko Haram et la mise en récit du terrorisme au ‘Sahelistan’: une perspective historique’, Afrique contemporaine 255: 21–41. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2015b), ‘Boko Haram et la souveraineté du Nigeria: une histoire de frontières’, Hérodote 159: 62. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2016a), ‘A sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: the case of Boko Haram’, published in Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (5): 878–95. Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (ed.) (2016b), Violence in Nigeria: A qualitative and quantitative analysis, Series 3, Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria; Leiden: African Studies Centre, Waposo. Sarch, Marie-Thérèse (2000), ‘Institutional evolution at Lake Chad: Traditional administration and flexible fisheries management’, in Hussein Solomon and Anthony Turton (eds), Water wars: Enduring myth or impending reality? Africa Dialogue Monograph Series 2, Durban: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes: 133–64. Seidler, Valentin (2014), ‘When do institutional transfers work? The relation between institutions, culture and the transplant effect: The case of Borno in north-eastern Nigeria’, Journal of Institutional Economics 10 (3): 371–97. Seignobos, Christian (2015), ‘Boko Haram et le lac Tchad’, Afrique contemporaine 255. Smith, Mike (2015), Boko Haram: inside Nigeria’s Unholy War, London: I.B. Tauris. Thurston, Alex (2016), ‘The disease is unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious and political worldview, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.

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Boko Haram, youth mobilization & jihadism • 183 United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (2015), Report on violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the affected countries, New York: UNHCHR. Verlet, Martin (1967), ‘Le gouvernement des hommes chez les Yidena du lac Tchad dans le courant du XIXè siècle’, Cahiers d’études africaines 7 (25). Whitaker, Sylvester (1970), The politics of tradition: Continuity and change in Northern Nigeria, 1946–1966, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 578 pp. Zenn, Jacob (2013), ‘Nigerian al-Qaedaism’, in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown and Hassan Mneimneh (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol.16, Washington DC: Hudson Institute.

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7 Complementarity, competition & conflict Informal enterprise & religious conflict in northern Nigeria KATE MEAGHER

Introduction: religious conflict and cooperation in northern Nigeria Since the late 1980s, interfaith relations in northern Nigeria have been marked by intensifying conflict, involving over 10,000 deaths as well as widespread economic disruption (Haynes 2009). Repeated clashes between the Muslim majority and Christian minorities have taken place in various northern cities. While identity-based violence tended to take an ethnic form prior to the 1980s, such clashes began to assume an explicitly religious tone with the Maitatsine riots and the infamous ‘burning of churches’ in the 1980s. Local struggles over land and authority, controversy over perceived slights to Islam, and reactions to the implementation of Sharia law in several northern states triggered waves of religious clashes in the succeeding decades, often spreading through several northern cities. Since 2009, the activities of the extremist Islamic group, Boko Haram, have set off new rounds of religious violence in the core north. These tales of carnage make it easy to forget that historically, religion has played an integrative rather than a conflictual role in northern Nigeria. Economic historians have documented the role of Islam in bridging ethnic divides and providing a framework for economic cooperation and trade across northern Nigeria and West Africa more broadly (Austen 1987; Curtin 1975; Hopkins 1973; Lovejoy 1980). More recently, economic anthropologists and sociologists have traced the role of ethno-religious networks in extending informal trading systems across Nigeria and outward into neighbouring West African countries (Anthony 2000, 2002; Forrest 1994; Hashim & Meagher 1999; Meagher 2009a). How can communities locked in such violent religious conflict also participate in relations of close economic collaboration? Is mounting religious violence in northern Nigeria breaking down older relations of trust and inter-religious 184

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cooperation, or do informal economic linkages across religious lines help to mitigate contemporary religious divisions? These questions will be addressed in the context of empirical research on cross-religious informal economic organization carried out in the northern Nigerian cities of Kano and Kaduna. An ethnography of informal economic relations across the religious divide will be used to trace a more complex picture of the informal institutional processes at work under the surface of contemporary religious tensions in northern Nigeria. The objective is to explore how popular institutions of economic collaboration and the political mobilization of religious conflict shape social resilience amid religious tension and conflict. Three surprising findings emerged from the research. The first relates to the remarkable capacity of informal institutional resources to maintain inter-religious cooperation across all categories of activities, including those involving competition and value conflicts between religious groups. The second surprise is that the religiously separate organizations of the Kano informal economy seem as resilient in the face of violence as the more religiously integrated organizations of the Kaduna informal economy. A third unexpected outcome is that efforts to integrate the informal economy into state-based welfare and taxation systems appear to be doing more to stoke inter-religious grievances than to create a framework of integration and accountability between state and society. These unexpected outcomes highlight the importance of analysing the dynamics of religious conflict from below as well as from above, in order to understand how social tensions are addressed and reconfigured through their encounter with local institutional realities.

Perspectives on religion, conflict and economic development Recent attention to religion as a source of conflict and a disruptive force in economic development has largely eclipsed a much older literature that represents religion as a mechanism for bridging communal divides and fostering economic development (Austen 1987; Evers 1992; Lovejoy 1980; Meagher 2009b; Northrup 1978; Platteau 2000). African economic history is full of references to the role of religion in the development of cross-cultural trading networks that linked societies across ethnic lines, and forged common identities among people of different ethnic origins (Austen 1987; Cruise O’Brien 1975; Long 1968). Jean-Philippe Platteau (2009) has repeatedly argued that, in the African context, religion can be ‘an engine capable of driving changes in behaviour that are conducive to capital accumulation and productive effort … Religion thus appears to have far more influence on people’s behaviour than formal rules

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and state institutions, providing a useful bridge between tradition and modernity.’ In contemporary times, economic anthropologists have continued to emphasize the constructive role of religion in adjusting to the punishing circumstances of economic restructuring and state failure. Accounts of new Pentecostal movements in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have noted a tendency toward dis-embedding believers from communal obligations, and re-embedding them in more ethnically diverse, and increasingly international, religious networks (Fouchard et al. 2005; Gifford 1998; Marshall 1998; Maxwell 1998; Meagher 2009b; Ojo 2005). Contemporary movements in both Christianity and Islam reveal efforts to remoralize and reintegrate the volatile category of urban youth into productive forms of social engagement, as noted in Zimbabwe’s Assemblies of God Church (Maxwell 1998: 353), and the Sufi brotherhoods of Senegal (Menkhaus 2007; Villalon 1995, 1999). Far from fostering a ‘clash of cultures’, African religious movements have a long history of facilitating processes of cross-ethnic integration and market development, revealing a potential for peace-making even in the ravaged institutional terrain of contemporary Africa. However, accounts of religion providing a bridge across ethnic divisions tend to focus on the activities of a single religious group. They tell us little about what happens when conflicts arise between different religious groups, competing for converts, scarce resources or state support. Recent economic literature has shifted attention from the regulatory capacities of particular religious groups to the potential for conflict in contexts of religious diversity. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) focus on diversity itself as a cause of conflict, showing that religious diversity, like ethnic diversity, is associated with an increased propensity to conflict. By contrast, economists Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) argue that the central issue is religious polarization rather than religious diversity per se. While diversity reflects the sheer heterogeneity of religious groups, polarization refers to the extent of threat religious groups can pose to each other. From this perspective, religious polarization is greatest where two religious groups are of equal size, rather than where there are many different groups. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003: 208) found that religious fragmentation had no significant effect on growth, while religious polarization had a ‘negative impact on growth through its effect on investment, government expenditure and the probability of civil wars’. While religious differences within a society have increasingly been associated with conflict, a more institutionally sensitive stream in the literature suggests that institutional features that diffuse or mitigate political and economic tensions can overcome religious differences. A number of studies have examined contexts in which religious divisions have

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been associated with peace rather than conflict, highlighting the institutional features that produce cooperation in contexts of ethno-religious polarization (Armakolas 2011; Jha 2007; Stewart 2008; Varshney 2001). Moreover, this perspective is borne out by numerous examples from economic history in which ethnically specialized trading networks have provided a bridge between ethnic or religious groups, fostering economic complementarity, repeated social interaction, and even assimilation across ethno-religious lines in India, in the Mediterranean and in West Africa (Greif 1989; Lovejoy 1980). Douglas Anthony’s (2000, 2002) insightful work on Hausa-Igbo relations in Kano prior to the Nigerian Civil War documents a similar process, in which Igbo residents married locally, converted to Islam, and even became assimilated to Hausa ethnicity despite pervasive practices of ethnic specialization in economic activities among the Igbo as well as the Hausa. He indicates that informal social interaction played an important role in weaving ethnically distinct business networks together and assimilating entrants across ethno-religious divides: ‘any generalized depiction of the gulf between groups fails to take into account the ability of individuals to build bridges … friendships, marriage, commercial and political cooperation, and simple civility played a key role in connecting individuals and, sometimes, communities’ (Anthony 2002: 33). While economic specialization along religious lines provided the framework of social organization, informal social interaction created the glue that bound different groups together. Four critical points come out of this literature that are key to exploring the role of cross-religious informal economic relations in mitigating or exacerbating religious conflict in northern Nigeria. The first is that religious polarization, in which two groups are more evenly matched, may make societies more prone to conflict than religious diversity per se. The second point is that even where religious groups are demographically polarized, conflict can be prevented by institutional arrangements that promote collaboration and diffuse tensions. Third, organizations within civil society constitute part and parcel of the institutions for maintaining peace, though there is some dispute as to whether these must involve inter-ethnic organizations, or if ethnically specialized organizations backed by informal cross-ethnic economic and social interaction can accomplish the same ends. Finally, there is some indication that, in the longer run, grassroots institutional arrangements may require some backing from the state, to deny formal recognition to extremist mobilization and to ensure equitable redistribution of economic resources. In the context of northern Nigeria, the issues of religious polarization, and the respective roles of grassroots organization and the state in institutionalizing and maintaining peaceful inter-religious relations provide a useful framework for examining how religious conflict is shaped by

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informal economic organization. Does a more even distribution of Christians and Muslims (like Kaduna) make particular cities more prone to conflict than cities with very small Christian minorities (like Kano)? With livelihoods and employment acting as key points of tension in the structurally adjusted economy of contemporary Nigeria, do religious networks become fault lines rather than bridges across social divides? In the face of rampant poverty and unemployment, has rapid entry into informal activities by all manner of social groups led to greater religious integration within informal economic networks and associations (Meagher 2010; Meagher & Yunusa 1996)? These issues will be explored through an examination of inter-religious relations in the informal economies of Kano and Kaduna.

Methodology The sites and activities in the study were selected to reflect the differences in three dimensions: religious polarization, inter-religious organization within the informal economy, and potentially divisive economic relations across religious lines. The northern Nigerian cities of Kano and Kaduna were selected to reflect differences in religious polarization. They represent important cities with large informal economies and a history of religious conflict, but with very different institutional histories. Kano has a population of 2.16 million inhabitants according to the 2006 census. Founded centuries before colonialism, Kano was the capital of the commercially dominant Kano Emirate in pre-colonial times, and remains the faltering commercial capital of northern Nigeria in the post-colonial era. It is a predominantly Muslim city, but has a commercially active Christian minority of about 15 per cent of the population, made up largely of non-indigenes from the south of Nigeria. Kano was one of the northern states to adopt Sharia law in 2000. By contrast, Kaduna is a colonial city, founded by the British in 1913 as the capital of then Northern Nigeria. With a population of just under 1 million as of the 2006 census, Kaduna also has a Muslim majority, but about 40 per cent of the population are Christian, and both Christians and Muslims involve a significant proportion of indigenes of the State. This creates a more polarized relationship between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna, since neither religious group has a significant numerical or political advantage over the other, leading to intense struggles over political authority. Efforts to institute Sharia law in Kaduna State were hotly contested through political and violent means, and ultimately abandoned in huge sections of the state. Three activities were selected in each city to reflect inter-religious relations of complementarity, competition and value conflicts. Comple-

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mentarity refers to symbiotic economic relations across the religious divide; competition refers to situations in which Christians and Muslims compete within narrow markets; and value conflicts relate to activities in which economic relations linking Muslims and Christians involve an activity that is religiously proscribed by one or the other religion. In Kano, the relations of ‘complementarity’ were captured by relations between Muslim motorcycle taxi drivers and a high dependence on Christian passengers, while ‘competition’ focused on informal tyre and battery traders; value ‘conflict’ was exemplified by sellers of goat-head pepper soup (Igbo: isi-ewu), a popular Nigerian beer snack, which is dependent on economic relations with Muslim butchers. In Kaduna, a slight variation in the activities was necessary because of the different religious and economic composition of the city. There, complementarity was represented by relations between religiously mixed tailors and Muslim embroidery specialists, ‘competition’ focused on motorcycle taxi drivers, who are more religiously mixed than in Kano, and value conflict was again represented by relations involved in the production of goat-head pepper soup. In a context of highly organized informal business relations, enterprise associations served as the main access-point for analysing economic organization and inter-religious relations. In Kano, there was one motorcycle taxi association, two main tyre and battery dealers’ groups, one main association for beer and allied food sellers, and a butchers’ association. Eight interviews were carried out with leadership of the various associations. A further 14 interviews were carried out with rank-and-file members of these activities. In Kaduna, six interviews were conducted with leaders of tailors’, motorcycle taxi and goat-meat traders’ associations, and 11 interviews with rank-and-file members of these activities. Interviews were followed up with a survey of 60 motorcycle taxi riders, tyre and battery dealers, goat-head sellers and butchers in Kano, and 50 tailors, motorcycle taxi riders, goat-head sellers and butchers in Kaduna, based on stratified random sampling. Motorcycle taxis have since been banned in Kano, and partially banned in Kaduna, but the activity, its associations, and the lessons for religious conflict live on.

Religion and the informal economy in Kano Kano is a commercially dynamic city, with well-established business groups and associations dating back centuries (Hashim and Meagher 1999; Lovejoy 1980). The largely Muslim indigenes of the city have deeply embedded systems of commercial organization in which virtually every economic activity has an association and a leader – including grain traders, cloth dyers

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and even beggars. These guild-like systems of organization were linked with the pre-colonial state, but have been significantly weakened by colonialism. By contrast, the significant community of Igbo Christian migrants in Kano have retained a very strong indigenous system of commercial associations. Migrating to Kano in the late colonial period, often as traders or civil servants, the Igbo enjoy higher levels of education owing to colonial policies that limited education in the Muslim north. Across Nigeria, Igbo commercial institutions have made them particularly successful in small scale business activities, and in Kano they tend to dominate trade in a range of modern goods such as auto parts and building materials. This has been a sore point in times of inter-communal stress, but relations between Igbo Christians and Hausa Muslims in Kano have been characterized as much by cooperation as by tension (Meagher 2009). Douglas Anthony (2000) has documented significant trends of Igbo conversion to Islam and even assimilation to Hausa identity during the 1950s, and ongoing processes of integration and Islamic conversion among Kano’s Igbo population, even after the Nigerian Civil War. While conversion to Islam is now less common among the Igbo population of Kano, strongly institutionalized systems of commercial cooperation and economic interdependence continue to influence relations between Muslims and Christians in the context of economic competition and religious tension. COMPLEMENTARITY: MOTORCYCLE TAXIS History and structure

From the late 2000s, Kano hosted the largest motorcycle taxi sector of any state in Nigeria, until the activity was banned in Kano in 2013, over a year after fieldwork was concluded. Motorcycle taxis, also known in Nigeria as okada or achaba, emerged as an important urban livelihood activity during the 1980s (Meagher 1991; Meagher and Yunusa 1996). While they have long been a common sight in Nigerian cities, and were routinely treated with tolerance by government authorities who had no employment alternatives to offer to the growing ranks of retrenched, unemployed and underpaid citizens, the activity has never been legally recognized. It remains informal by definition, and therefore extremely vulnerable to state crackdowns as well as to routine extortion by traffic authorities. The activity expanded rapidly after the onset of structural adjustment in 1986, but in the past decade has been viewed less as a critical default activity for the unemployed than as a growing traffic hazard and security risk across the country. Hospitals in many large Nigerian cities have a special ward designated for victims of motorcycle taxi accidents, known commonly as the ‘Okada Ward’. In northern Nigeria, motorcycle taxis have also been linked to religious violence in Borno, Jos and other states, and have been

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increasingly associated with the extremist Islamist organization, Boko Haram (Agbese et al. 2010; BBC News 2012; Time Magazine 2011). In Kano, the livelihood dimension of motorcycle taxis has been central. The activity absorbed a vast segment of retrenched or moonlighting employees and civil servants, failed traders, struggling pensioners, and unemployed youth and Koranic students streaming in from the rural areas. In 2011, the number of motorcycle taxi operators in Kano State was generously estimated at 2 million, accounting for one-quarter of the estimated 8 million motorcycle taxi drivers in Nigeria as a whole (Nnabugwu 2011). In Kano municipality, motorcycle taxis were identified as one of the largest informal enterprises in the city. Some of these operators owned their motorcycles, but a significant proportion did not. While some were engaged in hire-purchase arrangements, the majority of operators without their own vehicles used motorcycles belonging to civil servants and business people to whom they made daily returns, creating further pressure on incomes. Kano also became the refuge of motorcycle taxi operators from other northern Nigerian cities where the activity was banned in recent years for urban planning or security reasons. The constant influx of motorcycle taxis from other states added to the pressure on incomes among Kano’s motorcycle taxi drivers, as well as to the traffic problems and security risks created by the activity. In Kano, motorcycle taxis were almost completely dominated by Muslim operators. Estimates from interviews with practitioners and associational leaders in the city indicate that well over 90 per cent of its motorcycle taxi operators were Muslims, while Christians made up a negligible share. The minority status of Christians and the constant influx of operators from other northern cities and from rural Kano maintained a high Muslim presence within the activity, as did the government practice of handing out motorcycles to clients as part of job creation or poverty alleviation schemes. However, Muslim motorcycle taxis depended on good relations with local Christians to maximize access to passengers and to Kano’s vast Sabon Gari market in the Christian quarters, which constituted a critical centre of activity for them. Associational organization

Motorcycle taxi drivers in Kano were organized under the state branch of a national association, Amalgamated Commercial Motorcycle Owners and Riders Association of Nigeria (ACOMORAN). A Kano branch was only formed in the mid-2000s when the then governor of Kano, Mohammed Shekarau – a politician then nursing presidential ambitions – urged the many small local motorcycle taxi associations to form one single state-wide association. The result was that the Kano branch of ACOMORAN assimilated the more fragmented locality-based grassroots associations scattered around the city and the state as the lower rung of the associational

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structure, giving the top-down character of the national organization a measure of grassroots anchoring. Conversely, membership in a registered national association gave Kano’s motorcycle taxi operators a greater political profile, although it did not change the fact that the activity itself remained informal and without legal standing. The Kano branch of ACOMORAN enjoyed effective links with the Kano State Government, as well as with the federal government, particularly since their Chairman was also the President of the national association (interview, ACOMORAN officials, Sabon Gari, 18 October 2011). Indeed, owing to the large nation-wide constituency represented by motorcycle taxis, presidential candidates sought links with ACOMORAN during the 2011 election campaigns (Shuaibu 2011). Governors in various states of southern as well as northern Nigeria also take an active interest in the leadership of state branches of ACOMORAN, owing not only to the fact that motorcycle taxis constitute a large vote block, but also because of their high visibility and mobility, making them a useful tool for political mobilization. Inter-religious relations and signs of stress

Membership in the Kano Branch of ACOMORAN is almost entirely Muslim. There do not appear to be any Christians in the executive, and we did not find any Christians among the registered members of the association at the unit level, even in Sabon Gari where Christian motorcycle taxi operators were concentrated. This does not seem to reflect any religious tensions at the occupational level. All operators interviewed indicated that relations between Muslim and Christian operators were congenial, involving routine lending of tools or parts, and mutual assistance in cases of accidents. Kano motorcycle taxi operators also spoke of complementary relations with Igbo Christian motorcycle suppliers. A number of riders indicated that many of them obtained their motorcycles on hire-purchase agreements from Igbo traders. They said they preferred the Igbo hire-purchase arrangements to hire-purchase schemes offered by the Kano State Government, because the Igbo arrangements were open to anyone, while the government schemes are very selective (interview Kofar Ruwa 23 October 2011). Motorcycle taxi operators indicated that religious conflict had not brought any shift in relations with Christian operators, or Christian passengers. Young and old, registered and unregistered operators emphasized the interdependence of riders and passengers, Christian or Muslim, owing to the need for income and the need for cheap transport. Nor did the introduction of Sharia law in Kano appear to have weakened relations between Muslim operators and Christian passengers. When Sharia injunctions explicitly banned motorcycle taxis from carrying female passengers, who constitute the majority of commuters in Kano, many Muslim operators disagreed with and even flouted the provision

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for livelihood reasons (Punch 2006). The measure was so unpopular that the then Governor Shekarau had to relax it in his second term in order to avoid alienating the large Muslim motorcycle taxi constituency. It was left to each operator’s conscience whether to carry women passengers or not. However, mounting religious conflict in Kano seemed to have heightened the sense of vulnerability felt by motorcycle taxi operators, but not to focus animosity on Christian operators or passengers. Operators claimed that religious riots only disrupted business for a few days. When tensions were high, they looked out for signs of trouble, and informed each other by phone. After a few days, they resumed business, picking up Christian passengers and relating to Christian colleagues as normal. They said that religious crises affect Christian and Muslim alike, so it would not divide them. Operators consistently claimed that riots would not stop them entering the largely Christian ‘settler’ quarters of Sabon Gari. Economic necessity obliged them to continue going there because so much business came from there. One young operator described how he was almost killed in the May 2011 riot which erupted while he was in Sabon Gari, but within a few days was discussing the riot with a Christian passenger (interview, okada operator, Sabon Gari, 24 October 2011). The main cleavages within the activity revolved around issues of registration rather than religion. Tensions existed between the top-down activities of ACOMORAN shaped by the State Government, and the bottom-up concerns of the rank and file. Although not based on religious differences, these tensions have a potential for exacerbating religious conflict. The central concerns of ACOMORAN reflected government concerns with security and revenue generation, giving rise to a registration drive in 2010. The objective of registration was to stabilize the activity by isolating unregistered criminal elements within the activity. Registration provided riders with an ID card, a number painted on their motorcycle, and ultimately a system of daily taxes for all active operators. Negotiations between ACOMORAN and three insurance companies were underway for the creation of a health insurance scheme to provide coverage for all registered operators in cases of accident, for a modest daily fee estimated at N10 (Nnabuwu 2011) (6.5 US cents or 4 UK pence at the time). Despite efforts to make registration attractive, the registration drive became increasingly coercive, involving ACOMORAN officials going out with police to the various units, and seizing motorcycles of unregistered operators to force them to register. ACOMORAN officials claimed to have registered 100,000 operators across Kano State by late 2011, but this amounted to less than 10 per cent of Kano operators and resistance to registration remained high. Discussions about taxing motorcycle taxi operators were also underway. However, taxation efforts were put on hold in 2011 owing to the unpopularity of the proposed measure, which triggered

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a large protest by motorcycle taxi operators who secured the intervention of the then Emir of Kano against it (Blueprint 2011; interview, Revenue Officer, Fagge Local Government 26 October 2011). Other measures to regulate the activity have included a national law imposing helmets for operators and passengers in January 2009, which led to protests in many parts of Nigeria.1 Efforts by government and ACOMORAN to stabilize the activity often appear to have exacerbated volatility and conflict owing to their negative effects on tenuous livelihoods. Among rank-and-file motorcycle taxi operators, concerns were dominated by livelihood rather than security and revenue issues. Key among these were rising unemployment, excessive entry and flooding of the sector by new entrants, official harassment and social welfare support. Efforts to stabilize the activity met with a mixed response between older operators with little hope of finding something better, and young operators who felt diminished by their association with the activity. Older operators, largely men who had been in the business for ten years or more and had families, tended to support measures that conferred respectability, such as registration and health insurance, as long as the fees were affordable and brought commensurate benefits. By contrast, younger operators or those who had been in the business for five years or less tended to regard motorcycle taxis as an activity of last resort. One operator put it bluntly: ‘This is not a job!’ Registration numbers painted on their motorcycles were seen as a humiliation that labelled them as failures. Another operator, who had previously worked as a commercial car driver, explained that the worst problem he faced in the business was waking up every day and knowing that he had nothing else to do. The unregistered majority felt aggrieved at being vicariously identified with criminal elements. Moreover, the registration drive tended to intensify the official harassment that they suffered from traffic police, who extorted money from them. Registration created an additional income risk of being stopped for not being registered, or having their motorcycle seized by ACOMORAN officials and being forced to pay the registration fee as well as a fine for the release of their motorcycle. On top of petrol and maintenance costs, hire-purchase fees or daily returns to owners, and the threat of the removal of the petrol subsidy in 2012, the registration drive did not increase security for motorcycle taxi operators. Instead, it intensified their vulnerability and sense of grievance for being scapegoats for instability and urban violence simply because they were Hausa and poor. While registered riders were largely supportive of the ACOMORAN leadership, some reservations were expressed about whether the leadership 1 At this pre-insurrection period the Yusufiyya Movement (Boko Haram) was heavily involved in micro-finance schemes which provided its members with a livelihood through operating okada. It was the attempt to enforce the helmet rules on okada riders in 2009 which finally sparked the violent confrontation between the sect and state authorities.

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represented motorcycle taxi operators or the government. According to one unregistered operator: ‘If they have something they want from government, they will support whatever government does’ (Interview, Hadejia Road, 26 October 2011). While there was clear evidence of complementary inter-religious relations between the largely Muslim operators and Christian suppliers and passengers, and a general resilience of collaborative relations in the face of repeated religious violence, the combination of frustration and poverty from below and a highly politicized association made the activity increasingly vulnerable to the religious brinksmanship of Nigerian local and national politics. The in-migration of operators from areas where the activity had earlier been banned owing to its association with terrorist activities only added to the environment of volatility. In April 2012, the Kano State Government proposed the banning of okada operations in the state, allegedly to reduce crime. The proposal was met with hostile reception from okada operators. When Boko Haram gunmen attacked the Emir of Kano’s convoy on 19 January 2013, the Kano State Government reacted by banning okada from Kano streets, though some operators defied the ban by operating surreptitiously (Muhammad 2013). Since then some motorcycle taxi operators have shifted to driving the three-seater motorized rickshaws locally known as keke-NAPEP, while others have changed activity or continue to operate motorcycle taxis in more marginal areas of the city. COMPETITION: INFORMAL TYRE DEALERS History and structure

In Kano, the Hausa and Igbo informal tyre markets have grown up in separate locations, and are organized according to the indigenous business practices of each group. The activity remains predominantly informal in both cases; dealers are largely unregistered, and the activity has often been a target of police harassment owing to accusations that the markets were used to sell stolen tyres. These two tyre markets continue to run parallel operations based on distinct ethnic business systems, interacting with each other on the basis of cooperative competition. Far from aggravating ethno-religious strife, competition between these two ethnic business networks has given rise to a range of synergistic practices that have built a measure of solidarity between them, and even encourage a measure of mutual assimilation. Both markets also operate alongside a formal-sector tyre and battery sector, which operates in registered shops in other parts of the city. Associational organization: Hausa informal tyre dealers

The Hausa tyre market grew up in Fagge Quarters, where Hausa dealers began to sell new as well as used tyres, though largely at the retail level.

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Many Hausa tyre dealers suffer from a chronic shortage of capital, which has been exacerbated over the years by rising costs and weak internal organization. Generally viewed as a shady business, the tyre business faces a further problem of young men with no work milling around the tyre market. Efforts are made to find them things to do, including setting them up in related micro-businesses such as washing tyres, selling inner tubes, etc. Tyre dealers negotiate taxes individually with the local government revenue collector, and with the state revenue collector in the case of larger businesses. The Fagge tyre dealers were originally organized according to the Hausa guild system, involving an association led by the senior members of the activity and with strong linkages to the pre-colonial state. Owing to the weakening of the Hausa guild system under colonialism, the association has been unable to keep pace with the needs of the business, involving a growing demand for a wider range of new business and financing services. The old tyre guild was left to disintegrate and ceased to exist with the death of the aged leadership some 20 years ago, leaving Hausa tyre dealers without any overarching occupational organization. Larger dealers seem content to rely on personal connections to officials to solve their business problems, but less well-established dealers indicate a strong demand for an association to represent their interests and provide basic business services. Efforts since the late 1990s to organize Hausa tyre dealers have only managed to produce a cooperative of smaller dealers who are attempting to pool capital in order to improve their ability to buy tyres in bulk. There is talk of scaling this cooperative up into a wider association with elected leaders, which elicits cautious support from non-members who have heard of the plan. The lack of an effective association gives the Fagge tyre dealers few occupational linkages with the state. While established dealers use personal connections to protect their interests, younger or less well-off dealers lack channels to represent their interests. The new cooperative association relies on journalists to take their views to government. However, Fagge tyre dealers can rely on identity-based relations with the local government to negotiate down taxes to a bare minimum, and often to bypass them for those facing hard times. One dealer noted that the local government creates new taxes and even bogus taxes to fleece other (non-indigenous) businesses, but they cannot try it with indigenous Hausa tyre dealers. Associational organization: Igbo informal tyre dealers

Igbo migrants to Kano in the 1950s and 1960s entered tyre dealing from tyre repair (vulcanizing), but moved quickly into the sale of new tyres from importers in Lagos, Onitsha and Ibadan. Igbo informal tyre dealers are organized according to the indigenous Igbo business system,

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involving strong occupational organizations, links to additional sources of capital through hometown business networks, and exceptionally effective apprenticeship systems (Forrest 1994; Meagher 2010; Silverstein 1983). As a result, the Igbo tyre market in Sabon Gari is a larger and more dynamic market than the Fagge Hausa tyre market. A well-established occupational association, called the Kano Tyre-Sellers Welfare Association, offers significant regulation and business services within the Igbo tyre market. In addition to dispute resolution and social welfare contributions for bereavement and ceremonies, the association organizes security arrangements with the police, retains lawyers to deal collectively with accusations of theft or sale of stolen goods, and negotiates directly with local government officials over taxation. The association collects local government taxes in bulk and remits them to the government. It also imposes quality control checks on goods entering the tyre market, enforces controls on entry through a ban on ‘touts’ (jobless youth without their own business capital), and imposes fines and levies on members for occupational lapses or other offenses. A critical role of the Igbo tyre dealers’ association is the pooling of resources for capital purchases where necessary, and there appears to be some access to loans through hometown business networks with places of origin in southern Nigeria, overcoming the chronic capital shortage also faced by Hausa tyre dealers. The Igbo apprenticeship system also contributes to improving skills, labour control and access to capital. Its strict training regime, involving years of service to a master and inculcation into business skills and networks is complemented by the provision of significant start-up capital at the end of the apprenticeship – a practice known as ‘settling’ an apprentice (Forrest 1994; Meagher 2010). These institutional features of the Igbo business system create a number of embedded advantages for Igbo tyre dealers. Many of their practices, such as settling apprentices, strict regulation against touts, and quality checks, are also perceived as excluding Hausa entrants. By contrast, the Igbo leadership maintain that the Sabon Gari tyre market is multi-ethnic, and insist that the Sabo tyre dealers association is not ethnically exclusive. About 10 per cent of the dealers are non-Igbo, though these are largely Yoruba and Bendelite who are southern Nigerian migrants like the Igbo. There is also a growing number of Hausa Muslim dealers in the Sabon Gari tyre market, though many of them operate ‘under’ an Igbo dealer – meaning they are dependent subsidiaries of Igbo dealers. Most of the Hausa dealers in Sabon Gari remain outside the Sabo tyre dealers association owing to barriers of language, fees and business norms. There are about 200 members in the Sabo tyre dealers’ association, including some 10–20 non-Igbo members. The number of Hausa members was unclear, but interviews indicated there may be one or two. Despite their

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embedded institutional advantages at the business level, Igbo tyre dealers also lack effective links with the state. The association complains of an inability to mobilize the local government to provide even the most basic services, despite the fact that businesses within the largely Christian quarters of Sabon Gari pay much higher taxes than indigenes (Mgboh 2012). They also have limited channels to represent their concerns to the State Government, despite their high level of associational organization. Inter-religious relations and signs of stress

Despite competitive tensions between the Hausa and Igbo tyre dealers, the two tyre markets demonstrate a high degree of cooperation across religious lines. The Hausa dealers in Fagge feel out-performed by and excluded from Igbo business advantages on their own turf. The Igbo dealers in Sabon Gari feel that they lack the political connections enjoyed by Hausa dealers to avoid taxation and access concessions and assistance from the state. Yet both groups continue to engage in a range of cooperative practices, including extension of credit, training and other forms of business assistance across religious lines, as well as emulation of each other’s business practices in response to new business challenges. Not only do the Hausa and Igbo tyre traders assist each other despite being competitors in the same activity, but they are involved in institutionalized relations of cooperation linking the two groups. With regard to business cooperation, short- and even longer-term credit is routinely extended between Igbo and Hausa dealers in Sabon Gari, and also between Igbo dealers in Sabon Gari and Hausa dealers in Fagge. They also rely on each other to supply a wider range of products if one dealer lacks what a customer needs. Igbo and Hausa dealers will call each other and send goods over on credit. Such in-kind credit can range from a few tyres to as many as 200, depending on the relationship between the two dealers. Disputes between the two markets are resolved among the dealers without bringing in the police. Both Igbo and Hausa dealers have customers across the religious divide as well, and there were few worries about loss of customers of the other religion. As a number of them indicated, business is about price and about character, not about religion. A former chairman of the Igbo tyre dealers’ association (interview, tyre dealer, Sabon Gari, 25 October 2011) explained: ‘My best customer is a Muslim. I can trust my credit facility to them … Business is about the market. If someone starts discussing religion, I will be sceptical. Leave religion, leave tribe.’ Hausa dealers in Fagge were similarly sanguine about their access to Christian customers. They argued that ‘customers respond to price not religion’, and also suggested that many Christians come to Hausa dealers in Fagge because they are less prone to sharp practices than the Igbo dealers. Limited concerns about

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loss of customers had more to do with all customers’ fears of coming into Sabon Gari or into Kano, rather than a specific reluctance to buy from a dealer of the other religion. With regard to borrowing business institutions from each other, both Igbo and Hausa dealers have been imitating key aspects of each other’s business practices to address challenges in their own operations. The late AG Abdullahi was committed to the introduction of Igbo business practices to Hausa tyre dealers. He attempted to introduce the practice of strong business unions to the Fagge tyre dealers in the late 1990s, when he noticed that Igbo dealers were able to expand their businesses faster by pooling resources and purchases within their strong union. While these efforts failed to take root fully before AG Abdullahi’s death, the struggling cooperative represents ongoing efforts to organize explicitly modelled on Igbo business associations. Conversely, the Igbo dealers were adapting to religious tensions by integrating Hausa operators into their business activities, and integrating their business activities into Kano society. From the early 1990s, Igbo tyre dealers began taking on Hausa workers in their shops, both to overcome the language barrier and to attract a wider range of customers. Igbo dealers have also been integrating Hausa as dealers, both through apprenticeship and as business colleagues with their own capital. Hausa apprentices are not only trained, but ‘settled’ – a practice which is normally reserved for relatives or townsmen. While Hausa apprentices are less willing to serve the long Igbo training periods, sums as high as N500,000 (c. GBP £2057; US $3363 at 2011 rates) were given to settle Hausa apprentices. This process of inter-religious training seems to be accelerated rather than reversed by the effects of religious conflict. Conflict has made parents from the south-east increasingly reluctant to send their children to Kano, making Igbo apprentices difficult to come by; at the same time, integrating members of Hausa society into the business has become more critical to good community relations and effective business operation. Igbo dealers have also begun to use Sharia courts for settling disputes with Hausa correspondents. Various dealers confirmed that Igbo businessmen have been using Sharia courts for the past five years. They are seen as faster than Magistrates Court, and the Hausa seem to respect their rulings more. According to one Igbo tyre dealer, the mainstream court system was full of delays: ‘remand, remand … the way of Magistrates Court is different from Sharia court. We prefer Sharia court’ (interview, tyre dealer, Sabon Gari, 27 October 2011). Igbo tyre dealers also engage in philanthropy to demonstrate a commitment to Kano society. The Igbo tyre dealers’ association collect money from members for ‘public service’, involving donations to institutions caring for orphans, prisoners and the disabled. They organize delegations to visit care homes and prisons to make their donations,

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and often alert the media to ensure that their efforts to be helpful to the community are noticed. In the October 2011 meeting of the tyre association, N85,000 (c. GBP £337; USD $531) was collected for such donations. Both of the two main tyre markets are located in areas particularly vulnerable to being affected by the outbreak of religious riots. Sabon Gari, as the main Christian enclave in Kano, is a main site of attack, and Fagge is located on the border between the Christian and the Muslim settlements. But dealers in both markets insist that they just close up shop when there are signs of trouble. While Hausa dealers maintained that this is sufficient to protect them from losses, Igbo dealers indicate that some of them suffer significant losses during religious riots, and losses have forced some out of business. However, both sides are adamant that continued outbreaks of religious riots have not affected their mixed customer base. In interviews, they insist that customers respond to price and quality of goods, not religion. However, there is evidence of a growing generalized unease among customers owing to fear of going into certain areas. With regard to personal safety, dealers on both sides showed unwavering confidence that their colleagues from the other side of the religious divide would protect them if they were ever caught up in an outbreak of religious violence. Interviews elicited a number of personal stories by Hausa dealers who were caught inside Sabon Gari when trouble started, and they were either hidden or escorted out by Igbo dealers. A young Hausa dealer operating inside the Sabon Gari tyre market said that he would continue to do business there despite the religious tensions. He noted that cooperative relations have begun to fray somewhat amid escalating religious violence, but he maintained that human relations are still strong and he continues to feel safe working in Sabon Gari. Despite ongoing cooperation, respondents indicated four worrying ways in which religious tensions have begun to change the tyre business in Kano. These relate to (a) the relocation of tyre markets away from zones of conflict; (b) increasing evidence of lingering resentment in the aftermath of conflict; (c) intensifying resentment about taxation patterns; and (d) the growing tendency of Igbos to leave Kano, or to send their families home. With regard to market relocation, some Hausa tyre dealers from the Sabon Gari market have shifted to selling tyres along Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) Way, away from areas at high risk of conflict. However, Hausa dealers who have shifted to IBB Way still procure their supplies from Igbo dealers in Sabon Gari, who give them credit and commercial discounts. Physical relocation of Hausa dealers out of Sabon Gari does not necessarily indicate a cutting of commercial cooperation between Hausa and Igbo dealers. A second sign of fraying relations is a tendency for resentment between groups to linger longer after conflicts end. Instead of a few days, it can

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now take a few weeks, or even months for business to go back to normal between Fagge and Sabo dealers. But repeated visits and commiserations eventually restore commercial relations. Thirdly, both Igbo and Hausa dealers are also becoming increasingly resentful of what they perceive as structures of exclusion. Hausa dealers indicate a belief that Igbos enjoy disproportionate business advantages in terms of access to capital and credit, blocking Hausa business advancement in their own domain. Conversely, Igbo dealers show growing anger over rising taxation in the face of declining services. Because of the politics of stranger communities, Sabon Gari pays the highest taxes in Kano for a poorer level of services than the core Hausa areas. Until some improvements after 2012, Sabon Gari was wholly characterized by filthy surroundings and deplorable roads. Garbage blocking the drainage system causes chronic problems of flooding in the Sabo tyre market, and lack of electricity and other basic services cause mounting frustration within the Igbo business community. Complaints to the local government have been dismissed with the claim that clearing the drains in Sabon Gari is not in their budget. A final sign of trouble noted by both Hausa and Igbo tyre dealers is that Igbos have begun to leave Kano owing to fear for their safety. Even those who were not leaving were beginning to move their families out of Kano, and noted that the fear and uncertainty was biasing investment toward short-term rather than longer-term projects. Igbos making longer-term structural or industrial investments are shifting their capital elsewhere. Overcrowding of Sabon Gari as a settler Christian ‘safe haven’, and the growing unwillingness of townsmen in the south-east to countenance any permanent investment in Kano are further undermining the productive engagement of Igbos in the Kano economy. While solving the crisis depends on investment to generate more employment, what is happening in Kano is the opposite: the gradual polarization of religious communities, and the undermining of a key local source of small enterprise investment, which is a critical source of job creation. VALUE CONFLICT: GOAT-HEAD PEPPER SOUP SELLERS History and structure

The goat-head pepper soup (isi-ewu) business is an overwhelmingly female activity, and exclusively Christian owing to its strong link with the selling of beer. Although it is by definition a Christian activity, the goat-head pepper-soup business depends on close interaction with butchers – a Muslim male activity. Pepper-soup producers buy the goats’ heads already cut and cleaned directly from butchers in the abattoir,

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leaving no ambiguities about what they will be used for. Purchases are often a number of times per week, and until the late 2000s could be in quantities as large as 50 heads for a single customer. There appeared to be 10–20 people involved in the isi-ewu business in Sabon Gari, and about 50 butchers specializing in goats’ heads and rams’ heads in various parts of Kano. This activity has been affected significantly by the imposition of Sharia law in Kano State, particularly since the banning of alcohol. Not only has this made the beer-selling business extremely difficult, but it has attracted negative political attention to all associated activities, making isi-ewu producers very hesitant to be identified, to be counted or to do interviews. It has also subjected them to an intensification of police harassment and taxation since the mid-2000s. The relaxing of Sharia prohibitions since 2011 did not entirely ease the pressures on those whose livelihoods are associated with beer parlours. Beer shipments are still intercepted by the Hisbah (Islamic religious police) on their way to Sabon Gari, and the bottles publicly destroyed. Such spectacles are shown on the local news with approving commentary. Rather than constituting a source of conflict between Christians and Muslims involved in various stages of the activity, however, the goat’s-head business has tended to harmonize the interests of Christians and Muslims involved. Both constitute lowly or despised groups in Hausa Islamic society: isi-ewu producers because they are involved in the selling of beer, and butchers because they are traditionally a semi-servile caste within Hausa social structure. Both groups agree that isi-ewu has ‘given value’ to something that was previously just thrown away, and are mutually concerned about the factors that have contributed to undermining the activity in the past few years. Some of these factors have nothing to do with religious conflict, particularly the lack of electricity, which poses serious problems for keeping such a delicate type of meat fresh, and the rising cost of goats and other ingredients. Religious conflict is also recognized as a problem by both sides, owing to its negative effect on the market for isi-ewu. Associational organization

Goat-head pepper-soup producers are organized in an association called the Food Sellers and Beverage Association. The Association includes beer parlour proprietors who sell other types of pepper soup as well. We focus here on goat-head pepper soup since it is one of the few meat dishes that is almost invariably associated with beer drinking at the commercial level. Owing to the negative political atmosphere surrounding beer selling, the association and its members are extremely hesitant about engaging with outsiders. The Association was formed around 2009 in response to intensifying problems of taxation and police harassment. Proprietors

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complained that the standard Health tax, Sanitation tax and Signboard tax were supplemented by a TV tax if there was a television to entertain viewers, a ‘chicken tax’ if chicken pepper soup was sold, and ‘fish tax’ for fish pepper soup, etc. Police used to lock up their shops if they refused or were unable to pay. The association now negotiates taxes with the local government, and collects them in bulk. This has reduced individual tax levels by more than half, according to the experience of a number of proprietors. One indicated that she paid N7,000 (GBP £12; US $23) in taxes four years ago, but now only pays N3,000 (GBP £12; US $20) via the Association, which is able to eliminate a number of the bogus taxes that were being collected in the confusion of the early Sharia era. The Association also engages in basic social welfare activities, principally organizing delegations and collections to assist with ceremonies of members, though some members had mixed feelings about these social activities. There are a number of other problems faced by isi-ewu producers that are more difficult for the Association to address. Top on their list of worries was the lack of electricity in Sabon Gari. Electricity is crucial both for keeping goats’ heads, and for cold beer. The small generators most proprietors can afford cannot run a refrigerator, so most have to manage with ice during the long and frequent power outages. After electricity and taxes, the next most serious problem was religious tensions, particularly associated with Boko Haram, which since 2009 has attacked churches and beer parlours. Isi-ewu producers noted that Boko Haram was frightening away customers, leading to a serious decline in sales since 2009. Dramatic rises in shop rents was also a widely reported problem, owing to the increasing congestion in Sabon Gari as Christians from other parts of Kano metropolis crowded into this ‘safe haven’. The Association did not appear to have access beyond the local government level, which would be ineffectual for addressing issues of electricity provision, Sharia and security, which are state- and federal-level matters. Butchers operate in open air abattoirs around Kano, but those who supply isi-ewu joints tend to be concentrated in the Fagge abattoir near Sabon Gari. Many of the butchers are members of a well-established national association, the National Butchers Union of Nigeria. Within the Union, they have their own branch concerned with the preparation and selling of goat and ram heads, called the Masu Babbaka Branch, which is printed on their ID cards. Not all goat-head butchers are members of the Union, but the better-established ones are. In addition to modest dues to their Union, butchers pay only N20 (GBP 80 pence; US 12 cents) taxation to the local government as market fees. While butchers shared the concerns of pepper-soup producers about electricity and religious instability, they did not feel that taxation was a problem.

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204 • Key Contemporary Issues Inter-religious relations and signs of stress

Relations between isi-ewu producers and butchers are remarkably congenial considering the fraught context of beer selling in a Sharia environment. No isi-ewu producer had any complaints to make about relations with butchers, except concerns about the rising cost of goats’ heads, which the butchers recognized themselves as a problem. Butchers regard isi-ewu producers as important customers. Some butchers have regular customers among the isi-ewu producers with whom they have been doing business for years. It was estimated that isi-ewu producers accounted for 40 per cent of the goats’-head market in the 1990s, and are still about one-third of the market. Butchers extend credit to established isi-ewu customers, who can phone in an order, and have it delivered to their shop in Sabon Gari. Butchers said they had no problem with selling goats’ heads to isi-ewu producers, since it is only meat, and what people choose to drink with it is their own business. Isi-ewu producers also noted that even with all the pressures of Sharia law, they still have both Christian and Muslim customers. They also noted that both Christians and Muslims have increasingly been frightened away by the rise of Boko Haram. Both isi-ewu producers and butchers complained of the declining sales over the past two years, each estimating independently that the market in 2011 was barely one-third of what it was a few years earlier. It is notable that neither isi-ewu producers nor butchers saw religious crisis as their biggest problem (though this may have changed since the Boko Haram attacks on Kano since January 2012, and the triple bomb attack on the isi-ewu and beer parlours in July 2013). Both mentioned lack of electricity as their main worry, and isi-ewu producers saw taxation as their second biggest problem, though they felt things had improved markedly since they formed their own association. Both saw religious crisis as an issue, and felt that the atmosphere of religious tension reduced movement and generally undermined business. But tensions and the threat of violent crises did not appear to undermine relations between isi-ewu producers and butchers, or to make isi-ewu producers surly toward Muslim customers. As a number of butchers explained, Muslim and Christian are interdependent. Religious crisis is a mutual enemy that restricts movement and undermines business. There was a clear recognition among butchers that politicians were part of the problem. One butcher suggested that solving religious crises would require punishing the powerful instigators as well as the poor rabble that carried out the actual violence. A number of young butchers (and motorcycle taxi riders) complained of experiences of themselves or friends being locked up for nothing in the police sweeps that take place after religious violence – experiences that intensified a sense of grievance among young Muslim men.

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Religion and the informal economy in Kaduna As a colonial city on the frontier between the Nigeria’s Muslim and Christian populations, Kaduna has a shorter and more-fractious history than Kano. It is a government and industrial rather than a commercial city, and has a more bureaucratic atmosphere. As previously indicated, the religious composition involves large indigenous Christian as well as Muslim populations, with Christians amounting to about 40 per cent of the city’s inhabitants. The organizational culture of the city is much more influenced by formal organizational practices, with a strong presence of government offices, factories and formal-sector labour unions. The large population shares of indigenous Muslims and Christians, combined with repeated outbreaks of religious violence have led to a higher degree of religious polarization in Kaduna than in Kano. Since the rise of Sharia law in the northern states from 1999, Kaduna has become increasingly religiously segregated. Muslims have tended to withdraw to Kaduna North Local Government Area (LGA), while Christians have shifted to Kaduna South LGA. COMPLEMENTARITY: TAILORS History and structure

In Kaduna, tailoring stands out as a major informal activity in which large numbers of both Christians and Muslims participate, although Muslims are in the majority. Estimates put the number of tailors in Kaduna metropolis at about 20,000. Rather than simply competing with each other for customers, however, tailoring involves a high level of complementarity across religious lines owing to the long-standing specialization of Muslim tailors in embroidery, an important element of fashion in both traditional and modern clothing. Highly skilled embroiderers are concentrated in Tudun Wada, the historical settlement for migrants from other parts of northern Nigeria. Christian as well as Muslim tailors from all over Kaduna and even from other northern cities subcontract embroidery to craftsmen in Tudun Wada, which has become a regional centre for high quality embroidery. While religious tensions have affected the tailoring business, it is notable that the main problems cited by Muslim and Christian tailors alike is high taxation and the lack of electricity. Tailors in Kakuri and Central market complained of official harassment and extortion in the guise of new taxes. Problems of electricity were also felt to be serious, since specialized sewing machinery such as edging or buttonholing machines, as well as irons, require electricity. While some tailors have generators, the cost of running generators strong enough to operate machinery and irons for any significant length of time costs more than the money earned

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from production, and the removal of the petrol subsidy has only made matters worse. Religious conflict was normally well down the list of problems raised by tailors, and felt to be less of a threat to their wellbeing than these other issues. Associational organization

There appear to be three main tailors’ associations currently operating in Kaduna. The first two are religiously mixed associations at both the executive and membership levels. The third is a new embroiderers’ association based in Tudun Wada, which appears to be entirely Muslim. The two main tailors’ associations developed from a single association that started up in the early 1990s and drew together smaller associations across the city to form a single union in 2002 in response to increased levels of taxation and official harassment (Andrae and Beckman 2010). In 2006, efforts by the formal-sector textile workers union, the National Union of Textile, Garment and Tailoring Workers of Nigeria (NUTGTWN), to incorporate tailors into its membership led to a splitting of the tailors’ association between an enterprise association and a tailoring branch of the labour union. The enterprise association, known as the Kaduna State Tailors Union, has since registered as the Kaduna branch of the Nigerian Union of Tailors, a Nigeria-wide organization. The current Chairman of the Kaduna State branch is a Kaduna Muslim, but nearly half of 20 executive officers are Christian. At the local government level, the increasingly Muslim area of Kaduna North has five Christians among its 20 executives, while the largely Christian Kaduna South includes about eight Christians among its 20 officers. The Chairmen in both cases are Muslim. The slight Muslim bias in the leadership reflects a Muslim dominance among Kaduna tailors generally, even in the more Christian area of Kaduna South. This may also reflect a withdrawal of Christian migrant tailors from Kaduna over the past two decades of mounting violence. The enterprise association appears to have extended its membership through negotiating down taxes and licence fees, and arranging to pay them in bulk to the local government. Various respondents indicated that taxes had been reduced from N2,000-3,000 (£8-£12; $13-$19) or more to a flat rate of N1,200 (£5; $8) per year through the intervention of the association, though this reduction is only extended to members. The Kaduna State Tailors Union also provides basic social welfare assistance, taking up collections to assist members whose shops were burnt during riots, and sending delegations for ceremonies. Members pay N100 (40 pence; 65 cents) per month in dues. While many enterprise associations in Kano struggled to access the state above the local government level, the Kaduna State Tailors Union is much more politicized. The Chairman

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appears preoccupied with forming linkages with higher levels of government, describing himself as a ‘politician’ and the association as an ‘NGO’. There was a strong emphasis on indigeneity as critical to leadership. The Union accesses resources from their political representatives rather than from membership contributions, and has sought the patronage of the local government, state government commissioners, as well as trying to link up with the national small enterprise associations such as NASSI and SMEDAN, and with federal-level officials in the Presidency and the Central Bank. Where Kano entrepreneurs spoke of the need for capital, the executives of the Kaduna State Tailors Union speak of the need for bank loans on concessional terms. The upward orientation of the Union is manifest in a gap between the primary concerns of Union officials and those of the membership. The Chairman and other officials claim their main needs are better machines and bank loans, while members tend to rank electricity, taxes and import competition as their most serious concerns. The second association, the Kaduna State Tailors Branch of the national textile labour union (NUTGTWN), tended to focus more on defending tailors’ livelihood rights against the government, rather than seeking out state patronage. It also tended to be more attractive to non-indigenes, particularly from southern Nigeria, which involves a higher share of Christians, but also a significant share of Muslims. Like the Kaduna State Tailors Union, the tailors’ branch of the textile labour union initially focused on negotiations with local government officials over taxes, which have been cut from over N3,000 to N1,200 (£12 to £5; $19 to $8) per year – possibly before the unions split. For the past six years, taxes have been collected in bulk by the association and remitted to the local government, sometimes via the market manager. This association also involves a religiously mixed leadership and membership. The Chairman is Muslim, but there are five Christians among the nine officers of the executive. Accounts of tailors’ needs focus on taxation, electricity and the erosion of markets through international competition – all much closer to the concerns expressed by the rank and file. At the ground level, there seems little substantive difference between the two tailors’ unions, which appear to be divided more by national and state politics than by religious identities or occupational concerns (Andrae and Beckman 2010). The third union emerged within the Tudun Wada embroiderers. While some of the embroiderers are in the other two tailors’ unions, others broke away in 2009 to form a separate association. They indicated that while relations with the other associations are cordial, they have different concerns from tailors, who are more preoccupied with machines. Because they are predominantly hand-workers, the embroiderers indicated that capital and access to markets are bigger problems for them. Some of the most skilled

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embroiderers include Muslim non-indigenes from historical centres of embroidery, such as Kano and Oyo. The subtle bias toward indigenes in the tailors’ enterprise association and the more southern modernist bias in the textile labour union seem likely to alienate the upper echelons of the Tudun Wada embroiderers for historical and occupational rather than religious reasons. Inter-religious relations and signs of stress

While religious conflict was not raised specifically by tailors as a key problem, it has clearly affected the way tailors operate. In contrast to Kano actors, who insisted that cooperation between Christian and Muslim colleagues and customers remained strong, Kaduna tailors immediately described the ways in which such cooperation is breaking down. Christian and Muslim tailors alike indicate that there is less subcontracting by Christian tailors to Muslim embroiderers because of a growing fear of entering Tudun Wada. Tailors explained they were uncomfortable with the ‘atmosphere’ in the area. Others said that they still subcontract to Muslim embroiderers, but only by getting Muslim colleagues to accompany them into Tudun Wada, or by sending the goods through a Muslim colleague. Both Christian and Muslim tailors also indicated that relationships with customers are being affected by religious conflict. Customers now prefer to use tailors located closer to where they live, with the result that tailors of both religious backgrounds are losing customers who live farther away. Conflict has also afflicted many tailors with loss of property, and loss of customers and business networks if they relocate into more religiously segregated parts of Kaduna. Fear of being caught up in a riot has also encouraged a growing practice of phoning tailors to come to the houses of customers, rather than customers going inside the market to tailors’ shops. While this does not seem to lead customers to shift to tailors of the same religion, it does appear to be squeezing women out of tailoring, since moving around the city to customers’ houses is more socially awkward and dangerous for women in a city prone to sudden outbreaks of violence. Some Tudun Wada embroiderers claimed they had not suffered any loss of business, since other customers always came to replace any that had left. They insisted that they still have a range of Christian as well as Muslim customers, and that Christmas remains a busy season for them. Other embroiderers, perhaps slightly less skilled, indicated that business had declined by 40-50 per cent because of the growing fear of entering the market. The Chairman of the Kaduna State Tailors Union argued that the religiously integrated character of the tailors’ union would strengthen religious solidarity among tailors, but this seems to be undermined by the wider pressures of religious conflict within the city. Credit relations with colleagues and customers appear to remain strong, but the opportu-

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nities for interaction across religious lines are beginning to break down as people withdraw into increasingly segregated enclaves. COMPETITION: MOTORCYCLE TAXIS History and structure

In contrast to the situation in Kano, the motorcycle taxi business in Kaduna involves a mixture of Muslim and Christian operators. Muslims predominate in Kaduna North, and the Christians in Kaduna South. As in Kano, the origins of the motorcycle taxi business are tied to rising unemployment and retrenchment of formal-sector workers, as well as to falling real incomes. Estimates using registration records indicated upwards of 23,000 motorcycle taxi drivers in 2011 in these two local governments alone, about half of whom were registered. Religious conflict did not appear to be a major concern of Kaduna’s motorcycle taxi operators. Their central concern was the desire for some real work – the motorcycle taxi business being widely regarded as disguised unemployment. While okada operators in Kano had a high percentage of young unemployed operators, in Kaduna they were dominated by former company and factory workers, with a limited share of ex-civil servants and traders. In interviews, motorcycle taxi operators maintained that they were only engaged in the motorcycle taxi business because they had families to support. Levels of education seemed noticeably higher than they were among Kano’s okada riders, and respondents indicated that some of them were university graduates. In the context of high unemployment and retrenchment of factory workers and civil servants over the past 25 years, the motorcycle taxi business has become over-saturated, driving down incomes. As one respondent in Kaduna South put it, ‘Okada pass passengers’ (there are more motorcycle taxi operators than there are passengers – interview, motorcycle taxi operator, 3 November 2011). Many were worried by low incomes and increasingly difficult operating conditions. In the words of another Kaduna okada operator, ‘Okada is just daily income. What you get today you use today, and tomorrow you start again from scratch’ (interview 3 November 2011). While many in Kaduna South owned their own motorcycles, operators in Kaduna North indicated that the majority of them did not. Their motorcycles were owned by civil servants and the wives of influential people, who gave them out and collected daily returns of N300-N500 (£1-£2; $2-$3). This made incomes particularly constrained among the largely Muslim okada riders in Kaduna North. For reasons similar to those in Kano, motorcycle taxis were banned in ten Local Government Areas in Kaduna State in May 2014, including Kaduna North and Kaduna South LGAs, though enforcement is less strict (The Nation 2014).

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210 • Key Contemporary Issues Associational organization

As in Kano, the main association for motorcycle taxi operators in Kaduna is the national motorcycle taxi union, ACOMORAN. The association has been operative in Kaduna since the mid-1990s. The ACOMORAN leadership, while Muslim dominated, is religiously mixed, and is reflective of the religious composition of the membership at the Zonal level. In 2011, the Kaduna State Executive had only one or two Christians out of 13 officers. However, in Kaduna South, the Chair and Vice-Chair were Christians, while Kaduna North had all Muslim officers. At the membership level, ACOMORAN appeared well established. Members had ID cards, stickers on their licence plates that were supposed to tie them to picking up passengers at particular bus stops which are marked out across the town, and operators paid N20 (8 pence; 13 cents) per day for an operating ‘ticket’. ACOMORAN contributed to the hospital costs of members who had accidents, and assisted members in times of bereavement. More importantly, membership protected okada operators from harassment and extortion by the Road Safety Corps and traffic police, as well as providing occasional training about rules of the road. These benefits were often nominal, as many operators indicated that official harassment continued to be a problem, and any training was often a publicity gesture rather than a response to real needs. As indicated above, registered members were in the minority (about 30 per cent) in Kaduna North, and in the majority (60 per cent) in Kaduna South. Some avoided registration because the sticker restricted movement, though many registered members indicated that they often picked up passengers outside their official bus stop. The high share of motorcycle operators who did not own their own motorcycle in Kaduna North likely contributed to low registration there, given the difficulties of paying returns in addition to associational fees and taxes. In Kaduna South, okada operators said the level of taxation attendant on membership was manageable, but they did not feel they were receiving any services from the government in return for their taxes. Inter-religious relations and signs of stress

In contrast to tailors, motorcycle taxi operators in both Kaduna North and Kaduna South did not express any reservations about going into every part of the city during the day. At night, their concerns were about robberies and official harassment rather than about religious violence. Okada operators indicated that the risk of robberies was particularly high around Christmas and Eid – periods of religious festivities when family expenditure tended to be high. The imposition of a 9 p.m. curfew after the riot in May 2011 put moonlighting okada operators at risk of official extortion and often violence. Many tried not to operate at night, but those with day jobs found that difficult. While ACOMORAN would

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Complementarity, competition & conflict • 211

not assist non-members, ordinary operators said they assisted fellow riders who suffered accidents, regardless of membership or religious affiliation. Both Muslim and Christian operators said that they did not experience any religious tensions from passengers, except in the first few days after a riot, which was seen as a normal response while people are waiting for things to settle down. Christian operators also indicated they would avoid going into Tudun Wada for a few days after a riot, but otherwise felt free to enter that area. Since Sharia law was never imposed throughout Kaduna, motorcycle taxis do not experience any legal restrictions on carrying female passengers. There was little evidence of religious tensions among Kaduna’s motorcycle taxi operators, despite the fact that the market was over-saturated, and Muslims and Christians were in competition with each other for passengers. Levels of religious integration within the Association seemed to confer an adequate level of legitimacy. The main source of tension appeared to arise from the ways in which the atmosphere of religious conflict both delegitimized and silenced motorcycle taxi riders politically. They felt that they had no way to protest against any planned removal of the fuel subsidy despite the threat it posed to their livelihoods. Operators feared that protests could easily explode into something worse, including renewed riots or the real possibility of ‘shoot-to-kill’ orders being given to police. As in Kano, okada operators felt that they had been unjustly criminalized by the police in the context of religious violence. VALUE CONFLICT: GOAT-MEAT TRADERS History and structure

The goat-head pepper-soup business is organized slightly differently in Kaduna than in Kano. In Kaduna, women who prepare goat-head pepper soup commercially also normally run beer parlours, but there is an intermediary between them and the butchers. Kaduna’s isi-ewu producers buy their goat heads in the market from goat-meat traders, who deal directly with butchers. For this reason, the Kaduna study concentrated on these intermediaries, though isi-ewu producers were also interviewed. As in Kano, the goat-head pepper-soup business is dominated by Christian women, often but not exclusively Igbo. Similarly, the goat-meat sellers from whom they buy their goat heads are also dominated by Christian women, particularly Delta Igbo women, though Christian women from other parts of southern Nigeria, and a growing number of northern Muslim men are moving into the business. Goat-meat sellers depend on butchers to slaughter their animals, and spend a significant part of their time inside the abattoir overseeing the processing of the carcases. As in most parts of Nigeria, the butchers are Muslim, to ensure that the goat

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212 • Key Contemporary Issues

meat is acceptable (halal) to a wider range of customers. The meat is then taken to market, where goat-meat sellers have access to a cold store. Lack of electricity is a constant problem, forcing many to spend additional money on ice, and to sustain losses from spoiled meat, especially in the hot season. Associational organization

There was more than one association available to goat-head pepper-soup producers, though all focused on their role as proprietors of beer parlours. This included promotional associations run by breweries, as well as a more secretive association organized by beer parlour operators themselves. Women running goat-head joints were reluctant to say much about it, but indicated that it was formed around 2006/07 to defend proprietors from excessive taxation and licence fees. Even in Kaduna, the liquor licence became more costly under the influence of Sharia politics. Proprietors have used the association to negotiate fees and taxes, which they now pay in bulk through the association, bringing taxes down from as much as N4,000 to N1,500 (£17 to £6.50; $26 to $10) in 2010, though they expected an increase to N2,000 in 2011. The goat-meat intermediaries also have an association, though most felt that taxation was not a major problem. Goat sellers only pay the goat tax for live goat purchases, and the market stall fee for their place in the market. The association serves as a guarantor for credit, as well as carrying out the standard social welfare functions of sending delegations for ceremonies and bereavement. Butchers were organized under the national Butchers Association, Kaduna State Branch, though not all of those operating in the abattoir were members. Inter-religious relations and signs of stress

Relations between largely Christian goat-meat sellers and Muslim butchers appear strong and congenial. Most goat-meat sellers work with a particular butcher over long periods of time, in some cases 10 or even 20 years. Butchers often carry out services on credit, allowing anything from a few days to over a month for payment. Both goat-meat sellers and butchers seemed to feel their solidarity was resilient in the face of religious riots. Most Christian goat-meat sellers expressed confidence that butchers would protect them if necessary, a sentiment that was reiterated independently in interviews with butchers. A few were less sanguine – one goat-meat seller who had been ten years in the business indicated that she no longer felt safe working in the abattoir. However, both goat-meat sellers and butchers confirmed that in times of crisis, they would warn goat-meat sellers on the way to the market, and hide those who were already inside the market. In a city suffering from serious religious

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Complementarity, competition & conflict • 213

tension and sudden outbreaks of religious violence, it is striking that some Christian women insisted that they felt safe working inside the abattoir, surrounded by Muslim men with sharp knives. With regard to customers, both isi-ewu producers and goat-meat sellers continue to have many Muslim as well as Christian customers. They indicate that Boko Haram frightens away many Muslim customers when bombings occur, but do not regard this as a long-term threat to their market (although this was before the acceleration of attacks after December 2011). Goat-meat sellers seem more worried about the loss of customers, owing to mounting fears of entering the market in case a crisis should erupt. Despite strong occupational relations between Christian goat-meat sellers and Muslim butchers, there was a growing sense of unease in the face of repeated religious crisis. Butchers and goat-meat sellers alike felt that the environment of instability and fear was eroding their market, and undermining cooperation. Again this was not generally expressed as a religious division between working colleagues, but as an environment of insecurity that made economic interaction difficult. Others just seemed to feel sad that vital economic cooperation was becoming so difficult. More widely expressed were worries that crises impose mounting costs on their businesses through spoilage of meat, loss of customers and other business losses. Where many customers buy meat on credit, loss of customers often means the disappearance of credit already granted, and this gradually undermines the willingness to give credit to people from other communities who may move away when things get tough.

Comparative analysis of religious conflict and informal enterprise in Kano and Kaduna A survey of 110 informal operators across these various activities in Kano and Kaduna was carried out with a view to exploring factors underlying resilience and susceptibility to religious conflict among informal producers. The survey facilitates a comparative perspective on the relationship between business relations and religious conflict at a city-wide level. Table 7.1 presents key aspects of the social composition of the surveyed activities in Kano and Kaduna, focusing on the share of Christians, indigenes and women. Relative to their share of the overall population, Christians are generally over-represented in Kano informal enterprise, and under-represented in Kaduna. The proportion of non-indigenes in the study activities of both cities is about 50 per cent. In Kano, non-indigenes made up 48 per cent of firm heads, including 18 per cent from other parts of the core north, 25 per cent from south-eastern Nigeria, and 5 per cent from the south-west and Middle Belt. In Kaduna where non-indigenes

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214 • Key Contemporary Issues

accounted for 54 per cent of firm heads, 36 per cent were from other parts of the north, none hailed from the south-east, and 18 per cent were from the south-west and Middle Belt. The low proportion of women, averaging only 10 per cent across the two cities is predominantly a reflection of the nature of the activities selected. Motorcycle taxis, tyre trading and butchering are all-male businesses, and conflict has significantly reduced the share of women involved in tailoring. The only traditionally female preserves were the isi-ewu/goat-meat businesses, and men have begun to move into these activities in both Kano and Kaduna. With regard to the impact of religious violence, the survey shows that a greater proportion of informal operators in Kaduna suffered personal losses in property or personal harm to themselves or loved ones: 60 per cent of Kaduna operators had suffered losses in riots, compared to 43 per cent in Kano. However, roughly 50 per cent of informal operators in both cities continue to offer credit to customers across religious lines, a figure which glosses over the fact that motorcycle taxi operators are largely barred from offering credit because of the nature of their activity. Net of motorcycle taxis, 75 per cent of informal operators in Kaduna and Kano still offer credit across religious lines. However, the data indicate that, despite measures to attract customers of all religions, 30 per cent of small operators in Kano, and 48 per cent in Kaduna experienced a loss of customers from the opposing religious group. Many in both cities explained that this is less a product of religious mistrust or antipathy than a result of fear of going into certain areas, particularly as both Kano and Kaduna have become increasingly residentially segregated. With regard to religious cooperation, the majority in both cities still feel that cooperation across religious lines is strong. However, 45 per cent of small operators in Kano feel that business cooperation is beginning to break down, compared to only 36 per cent of operators in Kaduna, a city with much more severe experience of religious violence prior to the time of the research. Many respondents in both cities attributed the weakening of inter-religious cooperation to fear and constraints on moving around freely, than to an experience of mistrust between colleagues, though a minority signalled a sense that even trust between business associates was beginning to break down. While the effects of inter-religious violence across cities show significant differences, Table 7.2 indicates that effects across religious groups are comparatively similar. Roughly half of both Christians and Muslims have experienced losses during religious violence, though Muslims suffer higher levels of physical harm, while Christians suffer higher levels of property losses. Both religious groups are also relatively similar in their experience of weakening inter-religious business cooperation, at between 40-43 per cent of operators.

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Table 7.1  Comparison of firm head characteristics and impact of religious conflict in Kano and Kaduna (percentage of firms) City

Christians

NonWomen indigenes

Personal losses in riots

Give Experience Business credit loss of coacross customers operation religious across weakening lines religious lines

Kano

26.7

48.3

8.3

43.3

51.7

30.0

45.0

Kaduna

24.0

54.0

12.0

60.0

50.0

48.0

36.0

Average

25.5

50.9

10.0

50.9

50.9

38.2

40.9

Table 7.2  Experience of violence and inter-religious cooperation by religious group (percentage of firms) Religion

Indigenes

Personal losses

Physical harm

Weakening of business cooperation

Muslim

59.8

50.0

36.6

40.2

Christian

17.9

53.0

25.0

42.9

Average

49.1

50.9

33.6

40.9

Table 7.3  Comparison of activity types by religious interaction (percentage of firms) Activity type

Indigenes Christians Personal losses in riots

Physical Loss of Business harm in customers coriots across operation religious weakening lines

Complementarity

46.7

17.8

48.9

33.3

37.8

42.2

Competition

55.6

31.1

40.0

35.6

22.2

42.2

Conflict

40.0

30.0

80.0

30.0

75.8

35.0

Average

49.1

25.5

50.9

33.6

38.2

40.9

Shifting the focus from cities to activity groups, Table 7.3 examines how relations of cooperation, competition and value conflict in both cities affect inter-religious relations. Significantly, indigenes account for approximately half of the operators in the first two activity categories, and

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216 • Key Contemporary Issues

Table 7.4  Comparison of activity types by economic opportunity (percentage of firms) Activity type

Christians Indigenes Property losses or physical harm in riots

Physical harm in riots

Loss of customers across religious lines

Business cooperation weakening

Last Resort (motorcycle taxis)

11.1

60.0

60.0

46.7

20.0

42.2

Opportunity (tyre, tailor)

37.8

42.2

28.9

22.2

40.0

42.2

Traditional (goat head, butcher)

30.0

40.0

80.0

30.0

75.0

35.0

Average

25.5

49.1

50.9

33.6

38.2

40.9

understandably, for only 40 per cent among the beer-related activities of the third category. Christians are more heavily represented in the competition and conflict categories. Personal losses during riots affected between 40-48 per cent of operators in the first two categories, rising to 80 per cent among butchers and goat-head sellers owing to the vulnerability of these activities in the Sharia context. By contrast, actual physical harm is more evenly distributed among all activity types, averaging between 30-35 per cent of each category. Again, it is interesting to note that the butcher/goat-head group, characterized by religious value conflict, with the highest level of personal losses in riots, and experiencing the greatest withdrawal of customers across religious lines, are least prone to indicate a weakening of inter-religious business cooperation. Some of the underlying tensions and paradoxes of inter-religious relations are illuminated by re-categorizing the activities involved in terms of the economic rather than the inter-religious relations. The new activity categories include: employment of last resort (motorcycle taxis), activities of opportunity (tyre dealers and tailors) and traditional activities (goat-head sellers and butchers). Using these economic categories, Table 7.4 indicates that Christians are under-represented in the least-attractive economic activity (motorcycle taxis), and more heavily represented in the more lucrative activities. By contrast, indigenes (including Christians in Kaduna) constitute 60 per cent of actors in the arduous motorcycle taxi business, but less than half of actors in the other two more remunerative activities, where southern Christians are more heavily represented.

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Complementarity, competition & conflict • 217

The motorcycle taxi business also absorbs a heavy toll of personal losses in religious violence (60 per cent), and by far the heaviest toll of physical harm – almost 50 per cent of motorcycle taxi riders have had personal experiences of physical harm to themselves or loved ones, compared to just over 20 per cent of tailors and tyre traders, and 30 per cent of butchers and goat-head sellers. While motorcycle taxi riders have the lowest experience of loss of customers among the three categories, they share the highest sense of breakdown in inter-religious business cooperation at 42 per cent of actors. Poverty, lack of opportunity and vulnerability to religious violence seem to go hand in hand. Activities of opportunity (tailors and tyre dealers) are more successful at insulating themselves against personal losses, but are as worried as motorcycle taxi riders about weakening business cooperation (42 per cent). Conversely, goat-head sellers/butchers show significantly higher levels of personal losses and loss of customers, as well as having a high share of Christians, but are least prone to experiencing a weakening of inter-religious business cooperation. This indicates that class and indigeneity issues play a role in the weakening business cooperation across religious lines. Indigenes in marginal activities seem particularly prone to a sense of weakening business cooperation. The minority sentiment that inter-religious business cooperation is breaking down appears to be driven by a sense of frustrated opportunity, rather than by a ‘clash of civilizations’ between Christians and Muslims.

Conclusion This study of the inter-religious relations in the northern Nigerian informal economy reveals that informal occupational institutions have done more to mitigate than to exacerbate religious conflict. The key findings relate, on the one hand, to the surprising resilience of cooperative business relations between religious groups, even in the context of serious and repeated outbreaks of religious violence. On the other hand, these findings highlight warning signs that the resilience of informal cooperative institutions cannot withstand such levels of religious conflict indefinitely. In the face of poverty, unemployment, political manipulation and ongoing violence, the economic interdependence and embedded forms of inter-religious collaboration that have helped to hold Nigerian society together have begun to fray. The weakening of inter-religious cooperation has been intensified given the sustained onslaught of Boko Haram attacks on Kano and Kaduna in 2012 and 2013. Despite the religious and ethnic structure of informal economic organization, institutionalized informal business relations have created

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218 • Key Contemporary Issues

ties that bind, even in the face of decades of severe inter-religious violence in northern Nigeria. Interviews as well as survey data show a surprisingly high level of inter-religious cooperation, not only between activities with symbiotic interests, but also in contexts of direct competition or inter-religious value conflicts. Economic interdependence and strong institutions of occupational solidarity and credit relations have resisted religious divisions across all three categories of activities. An official of the Kano State Traders Union (KASTU) explained: ‘We are not a family, but we are a family in business. If something happens to you, I will go to your office and say sorry … They are my customers. I know they are kind. Their people in Jos are killing my people there, but they are my customers, my friends … What makes us fight is just money’ (interview, Secretary, KASTU, Kano, 20 October 2011). These bonds of economic interdependence and inter-religious trust exist both where informal activities are organized in separate ethno-religious networks, as in Kano, as well as where they are religiously mixed, as in Kaduna. In both cities, and in all three categories of activities, less than half of the actors experienced a weakening of inter-religious trust, despite repeated rounds of devastating violence over the past two decades. The message of these findings is not that the market can resolve problems of religious conflict. On the contrary, free market reforms have played a central role in creating the poverty, unemployment and infrastructural decay that are key drivers of religious conflict in northern Nigeria. The resilience of inter-religious relations in the Nigerian informal economy is not a product of market liberalization, but of the informal institutional environment of credit systems, apprenticeship and occupational associations. As Varshney (2001) and others have pointed out, maintaining peace in the face of religious divisions depends on the promotion of institutions that foster collaboration and diffuse tensions. In the politically polarized environment of northern Nigeria, it is informal rather than formal institutions that seem to be playing this peacebuilding role. By contrast, market reforms, which focus on stripping away such institutional ‘constraints’, are more of a threat than an aid to the promotion of religious peace. Despite optimistic signs of social resilience, however, cracks are beginning to show. In Kaduna, the tension was palpable, and people spoke openly about relocation to more segregated residential and working areas, even at the cost of customers and business networks. Increasing residential segregation along religious lines not only restricts the freedom of movement and social interaction that promotes inter-religious cohesion, but undermines the willingness of operators to give credit across religious lines, when customers may disappear with their credit after the next riot. Even in the less polarized context of Kano, however, processes of religious

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dis-integration are in evidence. The withdrawal of Christians into the Christian dominated Sabon Gari, and the growing exodus of Igbos from the city, is undermining precisely the dynamics of integration and job creation that are key to reducing religious conflict. The growing tendency of Hausa traders to imitate Igbo business institutions also suggests a worrying effort to displace rather than cultivate existing relations of religious interdependence. A final warning sign relates to the politicization of informal activities and associations. While both religiously separate and mixed associations have been able to build ties of mutual trust and economic interdependence across religious lines, these informal institutions are not on their own strong enough to resist intense polarizing pressures at the political level. As Armakolas (2011) observed in the Balkan context, religious integration requires the support of the state in times of crisis, both by denying formal recognition to extremist mobilization, and by reinforcing equitable social and economic treatment in accordance with the law. Unfortunately, the official environment in northern Nigeria has often tended to have the opposite effect, tying the hands of more-moderate politicians and officials, and encouraging support for partisan behaviour, sometimes even in violation of the law. Fortunately, more constructive political action has gained ground since the escalation of Boko Haram attacks from December 2011. Kano State officials sent the Muslim Hisbah vigilantes to provide security for churches in the wake of the Boko Haram Christmas bombings, and powerful statements of solidarity were issued by the then Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero and the leaders of the Igbo community (Habib 2012). While constructive responses from above have helped to shore up inter-religious cohesion, political opportunism continues to be a problem. The findings show that, in religiously mixed as well as in religiously separate occupational associations, divisive political mobilization can weaken inter-religious solidarity. On the one hand, Kano faced a growing risk of polarization among mono-religious forms of occupational organization; on the other, even Kaduna’s religiously mixed associations are struggling with dynamics of religious polarization in the context of indigeneity politics. Moreover, the growing trend toward political mobilization of informal enterprise associations by state governments threatens to undermine the accountability of associational leadership to their constituencies, in religiously separate as well as mixed associations. Political interference threatens to replace occupational concerns with political agendas, and to privilege resource extraction for taxation and insurance schemes over investment in local livelihood needs. The bottom line is that, although informal economic institutions within civil society play an important role in mitigating religious conflict, the state plays a critical role in shoring up or eroding their integrative effects in times of crisis.

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These findings suggest that there is great scope for building on existing institutions of inter-religious collaboration and conflict resolution embedded in popular business organization. The informal economy is not only based on ethno-religious legacies from the past, but offers integrative institutional resources for the future. Importing new institutions of conflict resolution based on Western notions of ‘good governance’ can often do more harm than good if they do not build on existing collaborative institutions that are embedded in popular values and practices. However, any solution must address the real economic causes of conflict rooted in poverty, unemployment, and the erosion of popular livelihoods. Focusing on building security and mutual tolerance will do little if the underlying strains of poverty and unemployment are left unaddressed. This underlines the need to focus on the livelihood concerns of informal actors, which involve infrastructural investment in electricity and transport, local business incentives and job creation as much as social welfare and conflict resolution measures. Finally, new policy approaches to rebuild governance in northern Nigeria should beware of initiatives that harness and politicize informal enterprise associations for purposes of state security or revenue generation. Political mobilization of informal enterprise associations tends to weaken downward accountability and grassroots trust in associational executives unless it is accompanied by a rapid and demonstrable improvement in relevant services and livelihood conditions. Such mobilization can also weaken inter-ethnic trust in contexts of ethnically or religiously based occupational organization. Unless such initiatives are backed by significant and non-partisan investment in improving popular livelihoods across all religious and occupational groups, they are likely to increase rather than reduce the vulnerability of society to religious mobilization, conflict and governance failures.

Bibliography Agbese, A., Mohammed, A. and Lalo, M. 2010, ‘Blood trails okada ban in Jos over violence’ Daily Trust, 20 June, www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/blood-trail s-okada-ban-in-jos-over-violence/87181.html (last accessed 20 July 2017) . Andrae, G. and Beckman, B. 2010, ‘Alliances Across The Formal-Informal Divide: South African Debates and Nigerian Experiences’ in Ilda Lindell (ed.) Africa’s Informal Workers: Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa, London: Zed Books. Anthony, D. 2000, ‘“Islam Does Not Belong to Them”: Ethnic and Religious Identities among Male Igbo Converts in Hausaland’, Africa, 70 (3), pp. 422–41. —— 2002, Poison and Medicine: Ethnicity, Power and Violence in a Nigerian City, 1966–1986. Oxford: James Currey. Armakolas, I. 2011, ‘The “Paradox” of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-nationalist Local Politics during the Bosnian War’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (3), pp. 229–61. Austen, R.A. 1987, African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency.

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Complementarity, competition & conflict • 221 London: James Currey; Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Bangura, Y. 2006, ‘Ethnic Inequalities in the Public Sector: A Comparative Analysis’, Development and Change, 37 (2), pp. 299–328. BBC News 2012, ‘Nigeria: Jos motorbike taxi ban prompts clashes’, 13 June, www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-africa-18427539 (last accessed 20 July 2017). Blueprint 2011, Kano not ripe for motorcycle tax – Revenue board, 1 November, http://blueprintng.com/index/2011/11 (last accessed 2 November 2011). Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 2000, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars, Washington, DC: World Bank. Cruise O’Brien, D. 1975, Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Curtin, P.D. 1975, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Evers, H.-D. 1992, ‘Large Markets and Small Profits: A Sociological Interpretation of Javanese Petty Trade’, in L. Cammann (ed.), Traditional Marketing Systems. Feldafing, Germany: Foundation for International Development. Forrest, T. 1994, The Advance Of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the International African Institute. Fouchard, L., Mary, A. and Otayek, R. (eds) 2005, Entreprises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l’Ouest. Ibadan: IFRA; Paris: Karthala. Gifford, P. 1998, African Christianity and its Public Role. London: Hurst. Greif, A. 1989, ‘Regulations and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders’, The Journal of Economic History, 49, pp. 857–82. Habib, H. 2012, ‘Hisbah men guard Christian worshipers in Kano’, Daily Trust, 15 January, www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/hisbah-men-guard-christian-worshipers-inkano/91797.html (last accessed 20 July 2017). Hashim, Y. and Meagher, K. 1999, Cross-border Trade and the Parallel Currency Market: Trade and Finance in the Context of Structural Adjustment – A Case Study from Kano, Nigeria. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Haynes, J. 2009, ‘Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 47 (1), pp. 52–75. Hopkins, A.G. 1973, An Economic History of West Africa. London: Longman. Jha, S. 2007, ‘Maintaining Peace across Ethnic Lines: New Lessons from the Past’, Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2 (2) pp. 81–93. Long, N. 1968, Social Change and the Individual. A Study of the Social and Religious Responses to Innovation in a Zambian Rural Community. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Lovejoy, P.E. 1980, Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade, 1700–1900. Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University Press. Marshall, R. 1998, ‘Mediating the Global and Local in Nigerian Pentecostalism’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 28 (3), pp. 278–315. Maxwell, D. 1998, ‘“Delivered from the Spirit of Poverty?” Pentecostalism, Prosperity and Modernity in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 28 (3), pp. 350–73. Meagher, K. 1991, Limits to Labour Absorption: Conceptual and Historical Background to Adjustment in Nigeria’s Urban Informal Sector. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. —— 2009a, ‘The Informalization of Belonging: Igbo Informal Enterprise and National Cohesion from Below’, Africa Development, 34 (1). —— 2009b, ‘Trading on Faith: Religious Movements and Informal Economic Governance in Nigeria’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 47 (3), pp. 397–423. —— 2010, Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Africa. Oxford: James Currey. —— 2015, ‘Leaving No One Behind? Informal Economies, Economic Inclusion and Islamic Extremism in Nigeria’, Journal of International Development, 27 (6), pp. 835–55. Meagher, K. and Yunusa, M.-B. 1996, Passing the Buck: Structural Adjustment and the

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222 • Key Contemporary Issues Nigerian Urban Informal Sector. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Menkhaus, K. 2007, ‘The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts’ African Affairs, 106 (424), pp. 357–90. Mgboh, D. 2012, ‘Sabon Gari’, Sun News Online, 17 November, http://sunnewsonline. com (last accessed 2012). Montalvo, J.G. and Reynal-Querol, M. 2003, ‘Religious Polarization and Economic Development’, Economics Letters, 80, pp. 201–10. Muhammad, AbdulSalam, 2013, ‘Okada riders defy ban, return to Kano streets’, Vanguard, 21 August, www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/okada-riders-defy-banreturn-to-kano-streets (last accessed 21 July 2017). The Nation (2014), ‘Kaduna Assembly bans okada in 10 local govts’, May 1, thenation onlineng.net (last accessed 17 October 2017). Nnabuwu, F. 2011, ‘Three insurance companies indemnify 8m okada riders, passengers’, Vanguard, 8 August, www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/three-insurance-companies-in demnify-8m-okada-riders-passengers-2 (last accessed 20 July 2017). Northrup, D. 1978, Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ojo, M.A. 2005, ‘Nigerian Pentecostalism and Transnational Religious Networks in West African Coastal Regions’, in L. Fouchard, A. Mary and R. Otayek (eds), Entreprises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l’Ouest. Ibadan: IFRA; Paris: Karthala, pp. 395–415. Platteau, J.-P. 2000, Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. —— 2009, ‘Institutional Obstacles to African Economic Development: State, Ethnicity and Custom’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 71, pp. 669–89. Punch (Nigeria) 2006, ‘45 Convicted for carrying female passengers’, 6 January, http:// punchng.com. Shuaibu, I. 2011, ‘Presidency: “Okada Riders Didn’t Endorse Jonathan”’, This Day, 24 March, http://allafrica.com/stories/201103240847.html (last accessed 20 July 2017). Silverstein, S. 1983, Sociocultural Organization and Locational Strategies of Transportation Entrepreneurs: An Ethnoeconomic History of the Nnewi Igbo of Nigeria, Graduate School Thesis, Boston University. Stewart, F. (ed.) 2008, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Time Magazine 2011, No Bikes for You: Nigeria Bans Motorcycles in Terror-Struck City. http:// world.time.com/2011/07/08 (last accessed 8 July 2011). Varshney, A. 2001, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond’, World Politics, 53, pp. 362–98. Villalon, L.A. 1995, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— 1999, ‘Generational Changes, Political Stagnation, and the Evolving Dynamics of Religion and Politics in Senegal’, Africa Today, 46 (3-/4), pp. 129–47.

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Part Three Jos – Conflict & Peace Building

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8 Jos Fear & violence in central Nigeria ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA, ADAM HIGAZI, JIMAM LAR & KAREL CHROMY

Introduction: Jos – paradise lost? The violent politicization of religion has intermittently marked Jos, the capital of Plateau State, from 2001 to 2015. How this came to be, and how it is now gradually being overcome, is a lesson for many communities in northern Nigeria. Jos represented one of the most volatile ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Since September 2001, there have been a series of destructive episodes of collective violence in Jos. While the rioting has not been continuous, it has divided much of the religiously plural city into Muslim and Christian areas and created a climate of fear and uncertainty (Danfulani & Fwatshak 2002; Bagudu 2004, 2008; Higazi 2007, 2011; Ostien 2009). Jos is a city in central Nigeria with approximately 1 million inhabitants, situated on the high Plateau in an area of great ethnic and linguistic diversity, with a large number of ‘minority’ ethnic groups and also a century or more long presence of Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and others. There is also a large presence of people with origins in southern Nigeria in Jos, especially the Yoruba and Igbo. While previously known as a peaceful part of Nigeria, Jos has since 2001 gained notoriety as a communal violence flashpoint. Thousands of people have been killed in the violent conflicts in Plateau State (not just in Jos city) between 2001 and 2015. In addition to the heavy loss of life caused by a series of riots, there was extensive population displacement and damage to property and the city’s infrastructure. The riots also led to a collapse of trust between Muslims and Christians in Jos. While interaction continues in markets and can be cordial, mutual suspicion is pervasive. Contrasting with the image of Jos as a picturesque peace-loving destination, the cycle of repeated violence came as a surprise to many Nigerians. The city was regarded as cosmopolitan in both outlook and composition. Muslims and Christians 225

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co-existed peacefully for decades, even when – from the 1980s – religious violence escalated in other parts of northern Nigeria (Ibrahim 1989; Kukah 1993; Falola 1998; Gofwen 2004; Last 2007). Many Nigerians remember Jos as a ‘home away from home’ and, even today, write with nostalgia about ‘growing up in a city where your religion or ethnicity never mattered’ (Agboro 2012). However, by the turn of the twenty-first century, Jos was a byword for the dysfunctional politics of violent ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. Why did Jos change from a ‘land of peace and tourism’ to ‘a heart-wrenching site of repeat mass murders, hate speech and massive destruction of lives and property’ (Ibrahim 2010)? This chapter explores the historical and social contexts of violence in Jos, showing how religion has been used to advance political and economic interests. It is often argued that the conflict in Jos is caused by a number of factors, including the struggle for the ‘ownership’ of the city between Christians and Muslims, struggle for the control of the paramount rulership of the city, the definition of who is an indigene and who is a settler and, based on these, the control of access to jobs, scholarships and political office. We argue that these are important structural causes of the conflict, but since they have existed since the 1930s, they cannot explain why the city became convulsed by violence from the 1990s onward. We argue that a series of political and administrative changes from 1976 re-shaped political opportunities and how the Christian indigenes and the Muslim settlers (re)interpreted the structural characteristics of Jos. Over time, this process of re-interpretation led to perceptions of communal threat on the part of both indigenes and settlers. Given the acute nature of the perceived threats, the two groups increasingly sought ways to defend and protect their core interests. The breakdown of established inter-group institutions for managing conflict was central to the search for new ones – including pre-emptive violence. We trace the basic structures of the security dilemma that the indigenes and the settlers faced and, in each case, show the shift away from ‘normal’ politics toward ‘deviant’ violent action. These arguments will be presented as follows. First, the remainder of this section will outline our theoretical orientation and methodological choices. The second section will introduce the reader to the major actors that have played a role in the violence in Jos, while the third section will describe the patterns of violence that have characterized Jos since 2001 in order to highlight the complexity of the puzzle that we are trying to address. Finally, the fourth and fifth sections will analyse the origins and development of the two central security dilemmas that have fuelled the Jos violence: that of the Berom (and other ‘indigenous’ groups) and of the ‘non-indigenous’ Jasawa.

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Jos: Fear & violence in central Nigeria • 227 WHY DO GROUPS FIGHT? DRIVERS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN JOS

Why do ethnic groups with a long history of relatively peaceful coexistence resort to violence when it destroys their human and material resources? Why do the groups in Jos continue to fight in the face of few gains for the majority? In the Nigerian public discourse, depending on one’s political or religious predisposition, the fighting in Jos might be explained in either of two ways: (1) the oppressive indigeneship which condemns the ‘settlers’ to second class citizenship; or (2) the actions of a violent Muslim minority intent on imposing its interests on others. An example of the indigeneship perspective is encapsulated by Joseph Daudu (SAN), former President of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) who stated: The cause [of the Jos crisis] is rooted in discrimination, the kind of which pervades throughout the nation. Being a country apportioned into 36 states, there is every possibility that dominant group(s) within each state would lord it over minority groups on the basis of indigeneship or ethnic group … The Federal Government must intervene constructively. It is about time every Nigerian felt at home in any part of the country that he chooses to live. (Anaba 2011) On the other hand, others blame the Jos crisis on what is generally termed Hausa-Fulani Muslim ‘hegemonic expansionism’, with its roots in the colonial period and the Sokoto Jihad of 1804. For instance, an association of southern ethnic groups in Jos blames General Ibrahim Babangida for causing the crisis in Jos. The group asserts that, if not for the creation of Jos North Local Government Area by [the] Babangida administration in 1991 which is the bone of contention, there wouldn’t be any conflict as such … the creation of the local government has more of religious and ethnic motives than developmental purposes as it has been done with the aim of expanding the Hausa Fulani’s territory to control the entire town. (Ikwe 2011) This latter perspective thrives on stereotypes of culturally intolerant and violence-prone Muslims, steeped in medieval thought. Both perspectives subscribe to some form of a ‘clash of civilizations’ mentality: there are irreconcilable oppositions between indigenes and settlers; Christians and Muslims. As noted earlier, however, Jos was a cosmopolitan haven for much of its colonial and post-colonial history. Why did the ‘clash of civilizations’ not prevent relatively peaceful coexistence prior to 2001?

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In order to move beyond the constricting clash of civilization narratives (see also Last 2007), we explore the security dilemmas faced by the two main combatant communities. This builds a picture of the dynamic of local political structures and networks in Jos in order to expose the complex social processes and the manner in which these influence the eruption of local collective violence. Weakly functioning national institutions are often the context for such eruptions. While institutions exist in Jos, giving the appearance of a fully functioning administration, their practical impact is variable to the point that conflicting groups – with unequal access to the institutions – cannot count on the fair and impersonal enforcement of group and personal rights, and bureaucratic rules. Faced with such ‘unpredictable’, even ‘anarchic’, political institutional environments, ethnic and religious groups often seek the provision of protection and security beyond state institutions. THE SECURITY DILEMMA

Whether or not groups choose to resort to violence is related to their perceptions of threats to their core interests. The security dilemma (SD) provides a useful heuristic for assessing how perceptions of security help explain when violence is more likely to erupt. Under conditions of institutional weakness or near-anarchy and significant insecurity, the security dilemma, usually deployed in the study of international relations, can usefully be recast and applied to intra-state, identity-based domestic conflicts. Local political and judicial institutions in Jos effectively provide little or no recourse for identity-based grievances. For example, simple court proceedings may take years to process. Physical security, through effective policing, is minimal. In fact, the security forces are often accused of complicity in violence. In environments such as these, where state efficacy is significantly impaired, identity groups are compelled to provide their own protection against ‘external’ threats, which in this case means other local identity groups. Inherent to this type of insecurity are questions of whether neighbouring groups are a threat, to what degree, and determining whether or not this threat grows or diminishes over time (Posen 1993, 27). The answers to these concerns influence how probable it is that inter-group conflict will erupt in actual violence. Furthermore, the inability of competing groups to distinguish offensive and defensive measures by the opposing side creates uncertainty and apprehension because neither actor can determine whether the other has aggressive intentions. In building informal ethnic or neighbourhood militias, for example, competing actors often fail to realize that they themselves reduce the security of the system by strengthening their own defences (Roe 2002, 59; Rose 2000, 11–21). Status-quo actors – those

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who benefit the most from the existing system – adopt postures that are liable to be interpreted as aggressive because others cannot discern intent ( Jervis 1976, 64). As it is the safer assumption, the anarchy and self-help nature of a system typically prompts actors to react to worst-case scenarios. Such an environment of institutional failure and communal security self-help are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the security dilemma present in Jos. What emerges are the ‘structural considerations [that] push decision-makers into a position where they must continually make judgments as to others’ intentions’ (Roe 2002, 61). In this context, there is room for the security dilemma to emerge: ‘are they planning to attack us or not?’ Those pushing for change in the context of contentious politics frequently underestimate the willingness of ‘status-quo’ groups to fight for their current position by taking actions to deter perceived opponents (Rose 2000, 36–8). One such tactic is pre-emptive war. In an effort to minimize total potential losses, groups may be willing to accept great risks through a pre-emptive strike. Where the balance between two groups is relatively even and there is a tactical advantage in initiating an attack (as was the case in Jos North), the chance for the ‘status-quo’ group to risk preventative measures increases greatly. This is particularly true where both sides feel they are potential losers if the stakes are not properly managed. In the context of the political insecurity prevalent then in Jos North LGA, ethno-religious groups are the unit of analysis. An important feature of group security is freedom from political, economic and cultural discrimination. This includes the biased distribution of these resources between different groups, what has been labelled ‘horizontal inequalities’ (Stewart 2008). This does not imply that individuals are not mistreated for their affiliations with particular ethno-religious groups, but that this mistreatment is apparent, and sometimes addressed, when an entire group suffers systematic inequity. Group identities carry with them functional aspects as well. They lower barriers to collective action by providing a common platform around which members cooperate to achieve certain ends. How successfully identities are mobilized influences how strong these units are in relation to others with a weaker identity, which under weak central authority may give them offensive power (Posen 1993, 30–31). In the absence of any method to assess the offensive implications of another’s identity, most groups use history: how did other groups behave the last time they were unconstrained and is there a record of past transgressions? Sadly, under conditions of insecurity, groups are more likely to assume that their neighbours are aggressive than not (ibid.). It is difficult to gauge the relative power of a group, which is frequently limited to subjective measures. Consequently, what appears to be sufficient to one group’s defence will seem, and often be, offensive to its neighbours (ibid.,

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28–9). In response, the opposing group will attempt to strengthen its own position. But offensive moves are not limited to military means alone. On a domestic level, perceived vulnerabilities are not necessarily derived from armed aggression but from political and economic processes constructed to systematically deprive certain groups of access to resources or power (Roe 2002, 66). This includes the dispersion of communities within states or their denial of access to important institutions. Threatened groups may respond by strengthening their societal identity through cultural means to reinforce social cohesion and distinctiveness (Waever et al. 1993, 191). But cultural action for freedom might also be complemented with demonstrations or political activism. Misperceptions may arise from a group’s (1) poor evaluative capabilities, or (2) misleading information provided by dominant actors within the group (Glaser 1992, 514). A group’s desires are generally communicated in either verbal or written form, but ‘insufficient communicative channels’ may complicate this process (Roe 2002, 66–7). This allows misinformation to infiltrate political communication, especially when state processes are fragile. Dominant actors within a group may employ exaggerated threat perception with the purpose of mobilizing constituents for non-altruistic ends (Snyder 2000). Regardless of intent, misperceptions escalate mobilization and armament – particularly under conditions of restricted communication flows and imperfect information – which reduce security. In political systems, politicians frequently fail to recognize the impact that their actions have on a broader context in that such actions may be interpreted as threatening (Posen 1993, 29). A chain of identifiable precipitants frequently precedes riots and persuades actors that violence is an appropriate, even necessary, action. These take the form of external ‘shocks’ such as elections, reports of violence elsewhere, or rumours of impending threats. Rumours are particularly important because they narrow the perceived options of potential rioters and commit them to a course of action (Horowitz 2001, 75; Bordia & DiFonzo 2005, 87–90). By shifting the perceptual balance toward extreme action, rumours reinforce an environment of fear and insecurity and confirm the danger that an opposing group presents, which in turn facilitates violence emerging from fear (Knapp 1944, 22; Kakar 2005, 53–9). A rumour is an informal mechanism for social communication (Bordia & DiFonzo 2005, 89–91; Hasan-Rokem 2005, 31). However, rumours are not the source of violence. Actors with an incentive to promote violence may spread false information, but these are accepted only under conditions where there is a market for them; when they are accepted, then the process of transmission (i.e. retelling) inflates factual assertions to reflect an underlying sense of fear and insecurity (Turner & Killian 1957, 403).

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The transmission of rumours is unique in that it has traditionally been through (point-to-point) word-of-mouth, but this has changed in post-1999 Nigeria with the rise of telecommunication technologies and social media that have intensified the scope, speed and instantaneous proliferation of rumours in ‘real time’. However, the spread of rumours is notoriously susceptible to inaccuracies and capricious distortion, and they become self-propelling (Knapp 1944, 22; Hasan-Rokem 2005, 31). Rumours provide ‘information’ about people, events or conditions; because they are unverifiable and probable, they are indistinguishable from factual information and generally accepted at face value (Knapp 1944, 22; Hasan-Rokem 2005, 31; White 2005, 241–2). Rumours are short, simple and salient. They become increasingly distorted the farther a rumour is removed from confirmed facts. Under conditions of insecurity, panic or an acute need for information – such as during a riot – rumours undergo more rapid and drastic changes. Names, numbers, events and places are liable to be distorted, with significant implications on the verifiability of received information. The success of a rumour depends on its ability to adapt immediately to evolving conditions and ride on oscillating group interests and opinions (Bordia and DiFonzo 2005, 88–92; Hasan-Rokem 2005, 31). Rumours are easily accepted because under conditions of insecurity, any identification of the source and nature of danger is preferable to none; the cost of ignoring potentially accurate information during conflict may be too lethal to contemplate and thus panic begets action, which in turn promotes belief (Knapp 1944, 32; Feldman-Savelsberg et al. 2005, 141–4, 149–52; Kakar 2005, 53). Rumours can also be reinforced by what is visually happening during a crisis – killings, plumes of flames, gunshots and screams – all may occur within the context, but rumours quickly distort the scale of the violence and those involved. The role of rumours in crises highlights the importance of solid communication networks and the provision of reliable and trusted information (White 2005, 241–2). Aside from the extensive use of radio and television (when reliable and non-partisan) to dispel public panic, civic network structures are a crucial element in conflict management by mitigating the spread of misinformation, violence and mobilization for retaliation once a riot erupts. As we highlight in Chapter 10, much of the neighbourhood-level effort at conflict resolution in Jos is rightly directed at eliminating the effects of rumour mongering through cross-communal assurance mechanisms. RESEARCH METHODS

The analysis presented in this chapter draws on extensive use of colonial archives and qualitative ethnographic methods with key stakeholders at the

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local, state and federal levels. It also draws on a 2009 neighbourhood-level attitude and perception survey following the November 2008 violence. Interviews with journalists active in the framing of the problems of Jos for the Nigerian public and a systematic survey of reporting on the Jos crisis in the Nigerian media capture public stances adopted by principal dramatis personae while unmasking the lenses through which events were presented to the public. Additional sources include judicial commissions of inquiry reports and the many documents and memoranda authored by Jos ethnic and religious groups to express their grievances and state their demands to government or judicial panels. The survey used was exploratory in scope and design. Since 2015 Jos appears to have stabilized. However, at the time of the initial research for this study in 2009, the city was in a situation of intermittent conflict, thus Jos presents an intriguing but difficult case. The resurgence of violence from November 2008 and January 2010 indicated an ongoing process of social mobilization, retribution, and the interplay of inter-group politics with economic and security concerns. Within this dynamic context, unstructured and semi-structured interviews were used to shape a limited perception survey. The key objective was to examine how individuals communicate during moments of crisis, their civic engagement, and their attitude toward the political process. The survey elicited information in three sections: demographic, the extent of involvement in civil society, and behaviour during violent conflict in 2008 (Scacco 2007, 2008a, 2008b). The survey sought to understand the drivers for variations in the experience of violent conflict within Jos itself. The survey focused on four areas of Jos North LGA: (1) Kabong/ Angwan Soya, (2) Dogon Karfe/Tudun Wada, (3) Ali Kazaure/Angwan Rogo, and (4) Dogon Dutse/Nassarawa. These areas were chosen to give as wide a range of religious encounter and inter-ethnic interactions as possible. While the selection of areas to be surveyed was not random, the selection of households and individuals within them was randomized. Depending on their responses to two key trigger questions, a subset of those surveyed was asked to participate in semi-structured interviews for additional qualitative data. Several limitations emerged over the course of the survey. First, in Muslim households, the heads frequently determined that they would respond on behalf of a randomly selected member of the household. Under these circumstances, there is a male bias in the survey dataset. Secondly, there are notably more Christian households sampled. This is tied to particular ethnic distributions of the survey sample and appears to be related to the two sampled ‘heterogeneous’ areas (one violent, the other less-violent). In mixed areas, Muslim households refused to be surveyed more frequently than non-Muslim ones, despite the fact that the interviewers were religiously mixed.

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Principal actors and their histories Since the late colonial period the governing institutions in Jos, and the question of ‘ownership’ of the town, have been contested between different groups. This point is crucial to understanding the conflict that engulfed the city after 2001 as it relates to the questions of ‘citizenship’ and ‘indigeneity’ and the integration of Jos’s diverse population. The Jos conflict runs along religious lines – between Muslims and Christians – as well as along ethnic lines. As such, it can be labelled a true ethno-religious conflict. The primary groups in contention are the Jos Muslim Hausa ( Jasawa) population and the three predominantly Christian Plateau ‘ethnic minorities’1 (Berom, Anaguta, Afizere) who claim ownership of the land on which Jos was built. The Jos Plateau is one of the most ethno-linguistically diverse parts of Africa. There are many ethnic groups recognized as indigenous to the areas surrounding Jos, but they do not claim ownership of land in the city. However, Plateau indigenes have tended to align themselves with one another politically against the Hausa Jasawa. Twentieth-century British colonialism marks the beginning of the Jos Plateau conflict. Previously, the Plateau population comprised a large number of small groups speaking different languages, organized into complex clan and lineage systems and practising a range of traditional religions. After a series of violent battles with the local clans, the British occupied the Jos Plateau in 1903. Jos was established soon after the colonial incursion and gazetted as a township in 1915 (Ames 1932; Plotnicov 1967; Bingel 1978). As a new colonial town, Jos does not have a traditional emirate administration like in other northern cities such as Kano, Zaria and Katsina; the urban governance system first implemented under colonialism empowered Hausa chiefs through a system of indirect rule. Prior to this, most Plateau ethnic minorities used decentralized non-state administrations. Paramount traditional political chiefs among the Berom, Tarok, Goemai, Ngas and other groups in what is now Plateau State were a colonial creation. By 1947, a Gbong Gwom paramount chieftaincy based in Jos was created for the Berom (Nyam and Jacobs 2004). Thanks to the Jos Plateau’s rich tin and columbite deposits, the mining industry quickly developed under colonial rule, transforming the economy and social composition. The Jos Plateau tin mining industry developed into one of the largest in the world, especially following the fall of Malayan tin mines during World War II and increased demand for columbite (Freund 1981a). However, by the late 1970s, industrial tin mining in Jos had collapsed, leaving only informal artisanal mining. 1 In the wider Nigerian context, the three ‘ethnic majority’ groups are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, while every other ethnic group is part of the 300-odd ‘ethnic minorities’. However, in the Jos context, the ‘minorities’ are more in number than the ethnic Hausa.

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Jos’s mining legacy is an essential component of its social history (Freund 1981b; Gonyok 1986). Most miners migrated from other parts of Nigeria, particularly from other northern provinces. They included Hausa from different parts of the north, but also many Kanuri and Nupe. They lived in mining camps that were run by the large mining companies, such as Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria. Much of the mining was conducted just south of present-day Jos on Berom land, causing environmental degradation. During the 2000s, these mining settlements were the sites of some of the worst violence on the Plateau as many Muslim inhabitants, including some Berom Muslims, were killed or forced out – as was the case in Kuru Jentar, Sabon Gidan Foron, Sabon Gidan Kanar, Tim Tim, Mai Adiko, Gero and elsewhere. The conflict in urban Jos is different to that in the former mining areas to the south and to the rural violence between Fulani pastoralists and Berom farmers (see Chapter 9). While Jos’s development was bolstered by the mining industry, it functioned primarily as a trading post. Most miners were Hausa or Kanuri peasants from rural areas of northern Nigeria; the Hausa people who migrated to what is now the Jos metropolis came from established northern urban centres and already possessed established trade networks (Perchonock 1974). The majority came from the area around Kano, but many also from Zaria, Bauchi and Katsina. Non-Hausa Muslims came primarily from other parts of the north, such as Gombe, Adamawa, Borno and Niger State. There do not seem to have been many pre-existing links between Hausa traders in Jos and the Hausa, Kanuri and other peasants who went to the mines. This point is key in that the demands these different Hausa groups make are different, as have been their historic relations with the Berom and other Plateau people. The Hausa people in Jos call themselves Jasawa, to signify they belong to Jos (Ostien 2009). The ‘Hausa’ population of Jos comes from diverse ethnic backgrounds, but shares a common link as Muslim traders. As a result, they have developed their own distinct identity from that of other northern Hausa-speaking areas. The term Jasawa is now well established and familiar: they have their own popular culture and are mentioned in Hausa songs, with particular references to the characteristics of Hausa people in Jos. While the Hausa have been in Jos since its origin, many of them also believe they founded Jos. This underpins their sense of entitlement to a greater role in the city’s administration and helps explain their bitterness at being excluded from power by the Plateau State government that is dominated by ‘indigenous’ ethnicities. Many Plateau State governments classify the Jasawa as ‘settlers’. However, the Jasawa’s perspective on Jos conflicts with that of the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere, who are categorized as the ‘indigenes’ and claim to ‘own’ Jos. These indigenous groups reject the notion that Jasawa have any traditional rights in the city and

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refuse to consider demands for a Jasawa district in Jos, even if it were to be under the suzerainty of the existing Berom traditional institution, the Gbong Gwom. The most powerful group among the Jos ‘indigenes’ are the Berom, who form a much larger ethnic group than the Anaguta – who are one of the smaller ethnic groups on the Plateau and in Jos and – even than the Afizere, who straddle Plateau and Bauchi States. All of these groups are now predominantly Christian, converted by missionaries over the course of the twentieth century. The religious difference with the Jasawa, who are Muslim, is the additional and crucial division between them. There is a small but significant minority of Berom Muslims, some of whom have been killed by their kin or driven out of Beromland to live with the Jasawa in Jos North and the adjoining town of Bukuru in Jos South. There are also some Afizere Muslims, but the Afizere have generally had fewer problems with the Jasawa than the Berom and Anaguta. The major political dispute from 2007 to 2015, generating insecurity and tension, was between the Berom-dominated Plateau State government of Jonah Jang (who is a Berom from Du, Governor from 2007–15 and Senator for Plateau North from 2015) and the Jasawa in Jos North. There is a seemingly more intractable violence in rural areas surrounding Jos between Berom farmers and Fulani agro-pastoralists, but that is a separate (though related) conflict (see Chapter 9). The dispute in Jos is compounded by the distinction the Nigerian constitution draws between ‘indigenes’ (or autochthons) of a state, and ‘settlers’, those Nigerians from other parts of the country ‘settled’ in such a state. Implementing the constitutional definition of ‘indigeneship’ is imprecise and challenging. The ambiguity of the definition and the strong sentiment in Plateau State have allowed various state governments to define which groups belong in Plateau State as ‘indigenes’ and which groups are ‘settlers’ in a whimsical manner. Under Governor Jang, the Hausa in Jos North were firmly defined as ‘settlers’, with fewer rights than ‘indigenes’. This has ramifications on access to state and ministerial jobs in Jos, nominations to federal positions, and to state support for higher education (Human Rights Watch 2006). In practice, it also restricts the ability of Jasawa politicians to obtain important nominations – such as for local government chairman – in Plateau State. The Jang government, in particular, was viewed as favouring a narrow Berom constituency to the detriment of all other ethnic groups. This applies especially to the ‘settler’ Jasawa, whose neighbourhoods in Jos North were completely neglected by the government. Jos is an extremely ethnically and religiously diverse city. In addition to the strong Jasawa presence in Jos North and the Plateau ethnic groups, there are large numbers of Igbos and Yorubas, and people from across southern Nigeria, including Urhobos and Itsekiris from the South-South. Most of these groups are well established and as much a part of Jos as the

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Jasawa: the ancestors of some arrived in Jos during the same period as early Hausa migrants. People from the Nigerian Middle Belt – especially Tiv, Idoma, Igala and people from Nassarawa – and other parts of Plateau State also have a strong presence in Jos. However, the dominant Jos economic groups are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Many traders left the city at the height of the crisis, or refused to attend markets, due to the insecurity. The religious segregation that resulted in much of the city in the wake of the major riots made markets in Christian areas less accessible to Muslims and vice versa, but with peace now returning to Jos the markets are gradually re-mixing in most areas and the main markets remained religiously and ethnically mixed. Both ‘indigene’ and ‘non-indigene’ Jos ethnic groups have their own ethnic or home-town associations, which constitute platforms for collective action, lobby for their communities, and function as propaganda agents. The most active of these associations are the Jasawa Development Association ( JDA), the ‘cultural’ association representing Hausa interests in Jos; the Berom Educational and Cultural Association (BECO); the Berom Elders Forum; and the Berom Youth Movement. Most Jos religious organizations have been affected by the conflict and their reactions are central to understanding the political and social dynamics of the crisis. Among Muslims, the Council of Ulama, which meets at the central mosque, has become an important body for political decision making. Jama’atu Nasril Islam ( JNI) is the main Muslim umbrella group and represents Hausa interests in Jos. The Islamic Reformist group Izala – Jama’atu Izalat al-Bid’a wa Iqamat al-Sunna (‘the Association for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna’) – was founded in Jos in 1978 and has a large following in the city (Loimeier 1997; Kane 2003). The Sufi orders (tarika) – against whom the Izala rail – are also strong in Jos, especially the Tijaniyya. This has tended to politically divide the Muslim umma during elections between tarika and Izala candidates. The umbrella Christian group is the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), but larger churches are themselves important actors. The two largest indigenized orthodox churches are the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) and the Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA), both of which are headquartered in Jos and have a strong following there. Due to their size and presence in Plateau State, there are inevitably influential COCIN and ECWA state government members. As such, COCIN and ECWA have strong political ties to the Plateau State government, though the nature of the relationship between church and state varies depending on political regime and church leadership. The Catholic Church has a strong presence in Jos and has been active in peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue. The Anglican Church is also well established in Jos and has documented the impact of the crisis on Christians, taking at times a strong political stance. The many Pentecostal

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churches are particularly popular with the youth, but their preaching on the crisis has not been properly researched.

Violent conflict in Jos For more than a decade, urban Jos was affected by intermittent communal violence between Muslims and Christians. Giving rise to what became a prevailing situation of insecurity was the violent rioting of 7-12 September 2001. While there had previously been violence in and around Jos – including the 1945 Hausa-Igbo riot, very high levels of anti-Igbo violence in 1966 (most pronounced around the tin mines and in Bukuru), and a smaller April 1994 riot – the September 2001 riot was at the time the largest to have occurred in the city itself. The immediate causes of this violent outbreak include the struggle over political appointments, blockage of streets for the purposes of Islamic praying, and the fears and tensions within Christian communities deriving from the imposition of ‘full’ Sharia laws in twelve core northern states of Nigeria (Danfulani & Fwatshak 2002). According to records collated by the Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 915 people were killed in less than a week of rioting in 2001 ( Judicial Commission of Inquiry 2002). As in most Nigerian riots, there is uncertainty over the number of deaths, but the commission’s report can be regarded as a credible minimum estimate. Human Rights Watch (2001) estimated that 1,000 were killed, while others cited higher figures (Bawa and Nwogwu 2002; Danfulani & Fwatshak 2002). Since 2001, there has been much killing and several other riots involving large-scale violence – in 2002, 2008, 2010 and 2011, and numerous localized outbreaks of violence in Jos in the following years. The 2002 riot played out on a much smaller scale than in 2001 and was largely confined to the Jos North area of Eto-Baba. Triggered by a local election following an unexpected move of a polling centre from a mainly Muslim to a mainly Christian area, clashing sides split down religious lines (Human Rights Watch 2003). While there was serious violence in rural areas of the Jos Plateau until the end of 2002, the 2002 riot was the last to directly affect Jos until 2008 (Ostien 2009). The 2008 violence was triggered by the alleged rigging of the 28 November Jos North LGA elections – the first to be held since 1999 – by the ruling Christian-dominated PDP in Plateau State. The Plateau State government’s 2008 candidate was Timothy Gyang Buba, a Berom from Du (and the younger brother of the paramount Berom chief, the Gbong Gwom) who had previously held a councillorship position in Jos South. Declared the winner of the Jos North LGA election, he thereby held political office in two different LGAs. Typically, individuals can hold political office in only one local

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Map 8.1 Jos – violence flashpoints (Map created by Isaac S. Laka, Geographical Information System (GIS) Lab., University of Jos, Nigeria; based on fieldwork data generated by the authors)

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council to which they are expected to be ‘indigenous’; holding offices, even at different times, in two local governments was unusual and not in keeping with the spirit of the constitution on ‘indigeneship’. The 2008 riot was one of Jos’s most destructive and occurred on a scale similar to that of 2001 although it did not spill over into the rural areas to the same extent as in 2001 – it was more contained within Jos North (though not entirely). This was not the case in January 2010, when the highest levels of inter-communal violence were in the rural and peri-urban areas. The 2010 riot began on 17 January in Dutse Uku in the Nassarawa area, which forms a religious ‘fault line’ in Jos North and is one of the city’s communal violence flashpoints. Fighting then spread to other parts of Jos and to Bukuru. While a great deal of property was destroyed in 2010, fewer lives were lost within the city compared to previous riots. The tragedy of the 2010 violence lay in the rural areas and smaller towns to the south of Jos. The violence in Jos triggered a tit-for-tat reaction and high levels of violence from 19 January 2010 onward, as Berom communities mobilized against Hausa and Fulani Muslims across several different local government areas. This precipitated conflicts between the Berom and Fulani in Barkin Ladi, Riyom, and Jos South LGAs that continued into 2015 (see Chapter 9). Four bomb blasts on Christmas Eve 2010 in Jos at the market in Gada Biyu and two beer parlours in Angwan Rukuba triggered a period of renewed violence in late 2010 and early 2011. Christians were the explosions’ main victims, with many killed while Christmas shopping. While the number of casualties remains unclear, most reports suggest the blasts caused up to 30 deaths and that some Muslims were then killed in reprisal attacks. Following the release of a recording featuring Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, claiming responsibility for the attacks and referring to Jos as ‘Suldaniyya’, the bombings can be attributed to the radical Islamist group. This appears to be the first large bomb attack in Nigeria carried out by Boko Haram, but there were doubts over the veracity of this message at the time. Some suggested that the bombings were organized by politicians seeking to gain advantage in the 2011 elections or primaries. However, this narrative is perhaps more reflective of the deep distrust of politicians and the state government than reality. There would be numerous other bombings in Jos perpetrated by Boko Haram in the following years, targeting churches, markets, a motor park and other public places. Throughout 2010 and 2011, intermittent violence in metropolitan Jos was largely low level, punctuated by periods of critical instability. This includes what are locally termed as ‘silent killings’: targeted homicides on individuals, but less conspicuous than group-based violence. Some killings were targeted while others were committed opportunistically when victims went into segregated areas dominated by the other faith. The

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most serious violence occurred in Dilimi, a vibrant car-part trading area. While Dilimi had a large Christian Igbo demographic, it is situated in a predominantly Muslim Hausa area near Bauchi Road. The violence was triggered by the killing of a group of Jos Muslims travelling in two cars to a wedding after they were stopped on the road near a Berom village outside of Jos. Protests along Bauchi Road and clashes between Hausa youths and the security forces followed. The violence spread to nearby Dilimi, where Igbos were attacked by the mob. Dilimi accounts indicate that there was no looting and that some Hausa traders in the area tried to protect the Igbos. The rioters appear not to have been Hausa traders, but rather ‘jobless youths’ mostly from adjacent neighbourhoods. Most Igbos have now left Dilimi, either moving out of Jos or re-establishing their businesses in predominantly Christian parts of the city. By the time of the Nigerian federal elections in April 2011, Jos was relatively calm. However, rural violence persisted primarily between the Berom and Fulani. In Jos, there was a heavy military and police presence throughout the elections, with numerous army checkpoints and helicopter patrols. Thus, while riots engulfed other parts of the north following the presidential elections (including the neighbouring states of Bauchi and Kaduna), there was no inter-religious violence in Jos. However, some Hausa politicians deemed to be too close to the PDP and the Plateau State government were attacked by members of their own community, with one of the politicians dying after being stabbed. While heavy security mitigated larger riots in Jos, there was a discernible pre-election stance within the Hausa community that they would not react to Jonah Jang’s eventual re-election. Following a brief period of post-election calm, renewed violence erupted during the August 2011 Ramadan celebrations of Eid el Fitr. The Izala (1) prayer ground is located in the predominantly Christian area of Rukuba Road. Izala lost access to the prayer ground due to security risks Muslims face in the area. However, counter to security advice and the Council of Ulama’s misgivings, Izala (1) insisted on using the Rukuba Road prayer ground on this occasion. Implemented security measures were inadequate. Moreover, Izala (1) called Sallah a day earlier than the other Muslims in Jos, which further compromised their security. During Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingre’s sermon, local Christian youths congregated on the surrounding rocks and attacked the worshippers with stones, petrol bombs, arrows and possibly guns. At least ten people were killed at the prayer ground itself, with others injured. The crowd of Christian youths trapped the Izala worshippers in the prayer ground and set fire to their cars. Altogether, 26 bodies were recorded at the central mosque, some from the prayer ground and others from around town, from clashes that broke out as worshippers returned into town from Rukuba Road.

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What shocked people the most about the August 2011 violence were the depraved acts following the prayer ground killings. Following the attack, the Jonag Jang government neither condemned the violence nor offered its condolences. Sporadic violence continued from the end of August until the second week of September, when an uneasy calm returned. During the last week of November 2011, serious violence between Muslims and Christians occurred in Barkin Ladi, a town located to the south of Jos, but there was no reaction in Jos itself. In a press release following the series of Nigeria church bombings on 25 December 2011, an alleged Boko Haram spokesman mentioned the killing of Muslims at a prayer ground in Jos during Eid celebrations as one of the reasons they attacked Christians on Christmas Day. Reportedly, 43 people were killed in the bombing of St Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, near Abuja (Vanguard 2012a). Since the 2010 Christmas Eve bombings, there have been several others in Jos. Some, but not all, of these attacks have been claimed by Boko Haram (or a purported spokesman for the group). On 19 November 2011, unknown assailants detonated improvised explosives (IEDs) at three football-viewing centres along the Christian areas along Bauchi Ring Road and at Tina Junction. On 25 December 2011, a bomb attempt at the Mountain of Fire and Miracles church, a Pentecostal church near the centre of Jos, caused minor damage; the congregation had already concluded their service and departed, but a policeman stationed there was shot dead by the fleeing attackers. Two serious church bombings in Jos followed, on Sunday 26 February 2012 and Sunday 11 March 2012. Both were suicide attacks claimed by Boko Haram. The first targeted the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) headquarters, the church with the largest following in Plateau State, killing four people.2 Some Muslims were killed in ‘reprisal killings’. Following the attack, several Hausa shops were burned down in reprisal attacks. Two weeks later, a suicide bomber killed eleven worshippers in an attack on St. Finbarr’s Catholic Church near Rayfield, an area where the Plateau State government sits and much of the elite lives. Several days of anti-Muslim ‘reprisal’ attacks followed, leaving Jos on edge. During this period, there were reports of sporadic violent incidents across both Christian and Muslim areas of the city. On Sunday 10 June 2012, a suicide bomber struck the Christ Chosen Church on Rukuba Road – a Christian area and the site of the bombings on Christmas Eve 2010 and of the attack on the Izala members at their prayer ground during Eid in August 2011 (Abdulsalami et al. 2012). Some of these attacks may have been attempts by Boko Haram to insert itself into the Jos conflict. Reports of a raid on a Boko Haram ‘hideout’ in Rikkos (a part of Jos) allegedly uncovered IEDs, bomb-making material, a gun, and different types of ammunition (Vanguard 2012b). In March 2

Conversation by the authors with Rev. Aaron Ndirmbita, COCIN HQ, Jos, 2012.

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2010, a Jos magistrate sentenced Shamsudeen Salihu to ten months in prison ‘for being a member of Al-Qaeda Network and Boko Haram as well as having a bale of military camouflage materials in his possession’. Closer examination of the case files suggests that the true offence was forming an ‘Al-Qaeda Islamic Association’ with a view to ‘enforcing the practice of Shariah in the country’ and sewing paramilitary uniforms for the ten members (Abdulsalami 2010). It is significant that there were no reports of the arrests or trials of the other nine members. More ominous was the discovery of bomb materials, such as were found in an abandoned shop in Angwan Rogo in April 2013 (Owuamanam 2013). In general, there were indications that many Christians in Jos viewed Boko Haram’s suicide bombings as part of the same conflict they were having with Jos Muslims over the previous decade; the attacks were believed not to be external to the Hausa Jasawa population in Jos, but part of their strategy in the conflict at the time (Abdulsalami et al. 2010). There are reasons to believe this viewpoint was factually unfounded; Muslim leaders in Jos condemned the Boko Haram attacks and there is no firm evidence to suggest their involvement. It is also clear that prominent Muslim Jos Sheikhs were preaching against the Boko Haram ideology, even while Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammad Yusuf, was alive. However, it is also known that a small number of Muslim youths were recruited in Jos by Muhammad Yusuf and travelled up to Maiduguri; therefore there were members of the sect from Jos. This is a small fraction of the Muslim population, but nonetheless, the perception was strong among Christians that the Jasawa are in support of Boko Haram. Many also suggested, arguably with some reason, that Muslim leaders were insufficiently forceful in their condemnation of Boko Haram, particularly in 2012 when the sect was attacking churches. It was later that the attacks became more indiscriminate, targeting ‘neutral’ markets. By 2015 Boko Haram were specifically targeting the Muslim community in Jos. On 5 July 2015 a suicide bombing of the popular Hajiya Talatu restaurant on Bauchi Road and a gun and bomb attack on an Izala mosque claimed at least 44 lives – 23 at the reataurant and 21 at the mosque.3 As in Kaduna, the combination of Boko Haram terrorism with the pre-existing ethno-religious tensions in Jos led initially to a dangerous cycle of retaliatory attacks following bombings, but later in Boko Haram’s violent campaign the attacks had the opposite effect, as they affected everybody and came to be more recognized as an outside threat to Jos. But in 2012–13 the waves of retaliatory ethno-religious violence that came in the wake of each ‘Sunday, Sunday’ bombing had the potential to snowball into a national calamity. The military mitigated several escalations, 3 ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis: Jos blast kills scores’, BBC News, 7 July 2015, www.bbc. com/news/world-africa-33406527 (accessed 2 Nov 2017)

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such as in several cases where Muslim and Christian youths attempted to attack neighbouring communities but were unable to do so due to a military presence. Both Christian and Muslim communities in Jos have now implemented additional security measures at churches and mosques, placing metal barriers to stop traffic near places of worship, especially during services and congregational prayers. Vehicles are prohibited from entering the compounds of churches and mosques, metal detectors are used, and bags are prohibited. This likely contributed to a reduction in church bombings in Jos and other northern cities implementing similar measures. When mosques also became targets, similar measures put in place by the Muslim community helped protect the mosques.

The Berom security dilemma and the burden of history Applying our analytical heuristic of the security dilemma to Jos, we explore the interaction between the history of the city, its ethnic and religious demography, its contentious politics, its civic structures, and the patterns of information flows. Through these, we can see how two opposed world views identified with the Jasawa and Berom communities emerged, and how these world views have given rise to two critical security dilemmas. Understanding these dilemmas is vital to understanding how and why a non-violent inter-communal conflict, that took shape through the colonial and early post-colonial periods, nevertheless flared into violent conflict from the 1990s. If the Jasawa claim that they were confronted with difficult political options by an unsympathetic indigene-controlled Plateau State government after 1999, the Plateau indigenes (particularly the Berom) might claim that they were similarly confronted by a series of equally unsympathetic northern-Muslim-dominated federal military governments from 1976. The Berom’s threat perception and the resulting security dilemma arose from their perception of this federal military state. The dominant forces in the federal military state were seen as the inheritors of the historical legacies of the 1804 Sokoto Jihad and the Emirate Native Authority system in the Northern Region under British Indirect Rule. For the indigenous or Berom elite, the federal military state was a new face on an old adversary. This history weighed heavily on the consciousness of the Berom. Communal combatants in Jos tend to think of history in long time sweeps. ‘History’ is not concerned with correctly recounting past events, but with giving clues to current interests and strategies. These are ‘living histories’ that pull on the political imagination. It is imperative to understand the importance of the use, and abuse, of ‘histories’ in Jos – different, conflicting versions of the same historical process. The mainstream Jasawa position is that they had their

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own leaders in Jos during the colonial period, and administered the town as it was developing. Before Plateau Province was created in 1926 Jos was under Bauchi Province for some years, but never part of the emirate. The indigenous Plateau population at this time were not in town, they were in villages outside of the town. The town being largely Jasawa from this narrative, they now feel some grievance over being denied sufficient political representation in the city in recent years, even in the areas where they form a majority. However, over the years the demands of the Jasawa to the ‘ownership’ of Jos have moderated, and now they have more modest political aspirations than they did ten years ago, with more acceptance of the need to share power in Jos with other groups. Opposing this Jasawa narrative is that of ‘indigene’ entitlement. In 2008, for instance, Berom politicians at the National Assembly in Abuja – under the aegis of the Berom Parliamentary Forum – asserted to the Senate Committee investigating the 2008 riot that the claim of Hausa rulership over pre-colonial Jos was the ‘product of demented brains that attempt to derail history. Before the coming of the White man, the Biroms had had Gbong Gwom Birom. These paramount rulers ruled for thousands of years before a Hausa/Fulani set foot on the Plateau’ (Agbedo & Abdulsalami 2008). In this context, it is notable that the monolithic ‘One North, One People, Under One God’ Northern Region was sub-divided into six states in 1967. The ‘minority’ indigenous provinces were reconstituted into Benue-Plateau State under Governor Joseph Gomwalk and immediately started to ‘emancipate’ themselves from the legacies of the north. Benue-Plateau became the first northern state to actively assert its separate identity by creating institutions such as the Benue-Plateau Radio and Television, the Benue-Plateau Construction Company, the School of Preliminary Studies, Keffi, The Nigerian Standard newspapers, and the Jos campus of the University of Ibadan. It is this pervasive, politicized, and active historical consciousness that undergirds the Berom security dilemma. In response to the violence in Jos, several national human rights organizations conducted a joint fact-finding mission in 2010. They identified four causes of the current crisis: (1) land and territoriality – i.e., who owns the territory, which means who sets the rules of engagement in organizing inter-community relations; (2) hierarchies and the right to chieftaincies; (3) which groups are entitled to the precious title of indigenes; and (4) the legitimacy of the created Jos North Local Government (Ibrahim 2010). However, these factors had existed for decades and cannot explain the seriousness of the crisis from 2001. What they make clear is the overwhelming sense of victimhood felt by both combatant communities. Competing histories fuelled competing notions of victimhood in Jos. The Berom sense of victimhood is tied to the extent to which they feel threatened by the actions (or inactions) of a federal government

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which they feel is beholden to their historical adversaries. The Berom security dilemma emerges from the question: how do you protect yourself against threats from a superior institution from above when that powerful institution is also acting in concert with a ‘fifth column’ from within? For much of the post-1976 period, this threat perception among the Berom steadily increased, colouring their understanding of the contentious issues with the Jasawa. At the same time, administrative and political changes after 1967 created opportunities at the sub-national level for pursing the policy of communal ‘emancipation’ and also advancing the opportunities of indigenous elites. For much of the period after 1967, the combined presence of opportunities and threats dictated the political strategies of the Berom elites. PAST ADVERSARIES AND PRESENT THREATS

In 1967, at the insistence of the minority ethnicities, Nigeria’s four regions were sub-divided into twelve states. While the new Benue-Plateau State was anxious to create a distinct identity, non-indigenous populations like the Jasawa were not yet perceived as a threat. In fact, a Hausa-Fulani from Keffi, Audu Abubakar, was appointed at the time to the important post of Secretary to the State Government. It was inconceivable that the tiny minority of Muslim Hausa-Fulani could pose a threat, given the plethora of indigenous ethnic groups across both the Benue and Plateau Provinces. Furthermore, Governor Joseph Gomwalk, the first graduate Nigerian military governor, was urbane and cosmopolitan. He vigorously pursued Christian indigenous interests without antagonizing dominant Hausa-Fulani interests in the federal government. While differentiating his state from the rest of the north, he also pursued a policy of directing government contracts to prominent indigenous elites like DB Zang, Ezekial Washik, Alex Fom and Clement Gomwalk (the Governor’s brother). In 1976, Governor Gomwalk was executed by firing squad for alleged complicity in a failed coup attempt during which the popular General Murtala Mohammed was killed. Gomwalk’s execution was a defining issue in the changing relationship between the Plateau indigenes and the Jasawa. The leader of the failed coup, Dimka, was a Plateau State indigene from Pankshin. Roughly 90 per cent of the officers Dimka allegedly implicated in the coup were also from various Plateau indigenous groups, including the 34 officers executed following secretive military court marshals. Joseph Gomwalk was executed in a second batch of officers. While Plateau indigenes may have accepted possible guilt of the first round of executions, there was a growing sentiment that the second batch was the military’s attempt to dispose of unwanted elite political

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opponents – wiped out by a Hausa-Fulani-dominated federal military government. This bred a powerful undercurrent of resentment among Plateau indigenous groups. Coupled with the increased hostility toward ordinary Plateau people in the north on account of General Murtala’s killing, these events shaped indigenous attitudes toward adversaries in future years. Administrative and boundary disputes further aggravated these tensions; Benue-Plateau was divided into two separate states in 1976, Benue and Plateau. In 1996, Nassarawa State was carved out of Plateau. The Jasawa were becoming a more threatening figure within a narrowing pool of indigenous populations. As the political and economic resource pool shrank through these territorial realignments, the remnant Plateau indigenes and the Jasawa confronted each other in a more direct – and threatening – manner. From 1988 onward, this uneasy coexistence deteriorated further in response to a series of decisions made by authoritarian, Hausa-Fulanidominated federal military governments. Between 1967 and 1979, Benue-Plateau and Plateau States were administered by three Christian, indigenous military governors and one Muslim.4 From October 1979 to December 1983, an elected indigenous Christian, Solomon D. Lar, was Governor. Between 1984 and 1988, Plateau again had three indigenous Christian military governors.5 However, from 1988 to the return to democratic rule in 1999, the federal government imposed four Muslim military governors and one Christian.6 Indigenes increasingly felt beleaguered by a wave of federally appointed Muslim helmsmen, some arguing that the Muslim military governors were part of a wider conspiracy of Muslim Hausa-Fulani domination.7 However, Christian governors were also posted to Muslim majority states like Kano and Katsina, but from the beleaguered lens of the local elite in Jos, these did not count.8 The situation was exacerbated by the tendency for some of these Muslim governors to extend patronage to some Jasawa elites in the form of contracts, political relevance and influence. This raised the Jasawa community’s economic and political profile at both the state 4 Joseph Gomwalk, May 1967 to July 1975; Abdullahi Mohammed, July 1975 to March 1976; Dan Suleiman, March 1976 to July 1978; and Joshua Anaja, July 1978 to October 1979. 5 Samueal Atukum, January 1984 to August 1985; Chris Alli, August 1985 to 1986; Lawrence Onoja, 1986 to July 1988. 6 Aliyu Kama, July 1988 to August 1990; Joshua Madaki, August 1990 to January 1992; (Fidelis Tapgun, January 1992 to November 1993 – elected); Mohammed Mana, December 1993 to August 1996; Habibu Idris Shuaibu, August 1996 to August 1998; and Musa Shehu (administrator) August 1998 to May 1999. 7 We are grateful to two senior Plateau indigenous elites who spoke to us in confidence for insights into the inner workings of Berom and Jos politics at this time. 8 In Kano, Dominic Oneya was Governor between 1996 and 1998, while Katsina had a long list of Christian Governors: Lawrence Onoja, 1988–89; John Madaki, 1989–92; Emmanuel Acholonu, 1993–96; and Joseph Akaagerger, 1998–99.

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and federal levels. While indigenes also benefited from this patronage, many Berom elites believed it was not nearly as politically influential or economically visible as was the case with the Jasawa. It was also during this period, that the election of Samaila Mohammed (Jasawa) to the chair of the Jos LGA further antagonized the Berom. Specifically, the Berom took issue with Mohammed’s readiness to sign indigeneship certificates for the Jasawa. It was within the increasingly febrile late 1980s that the politicized question of ‘who owns Jos’ resurfaced, first as a squabble between the Berom and the Afizere. In December 1990, tensions peaked over issues of increased urbanization, government compensation for land development, the commercialization of land, and gerrymandering. Outbidding between the two indigenous groups revolved around who first came to Jos, and who came subsequently as a ‘settler’. Thus, the reincarnation of the Nigerian national indigene/settler syndrome in Jos began in its current virulent form as a fight between indigenes. This intra-indigene fight for ownership of Jos revolved around the competing ethnic claims to three wards – Tudun Wada, Kabong and Dong. In 1991, the Emefo Commission awarded Tudun Wada and Dong to the Afizere, and only Kabong to the Berom. Berom elders appealed to the courts to challenge Emefo, but the courts ruled that there was no evidence of the Commission’s wrong-doing. The 1991 conflict with the Afizere had two important implications for the Berom. First, they lost rightful claims to wards in Jos they saw as theirs. Second, while the two largest indigenous groups in Jos were locked in a dispute, the Babangida-headed military Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) prepared to create new LGAs. Some argue that while the Jasawa argued a vigorous case for Jos North LGA that served their interests, the two indigenous groups were too divided. When the implications of their situation became clear, Berom elders moved to block the creation of the Jos North LGA. High-powered delegations of elders went to Lagos to plead the Berom case with the powerful ‘Langtang Mafia’9 within the military government, but to no avail. With the Berom hemmed into the less developed Jos South LGA, the idea emerged that creating Jos North LGA was a deliberate ploy to make the core of modern Jos into a Jasawa dominated constituency, thereby promoting Hausa-Fulani hegemony and ownership of Jos. According to an indigenous former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jos, ‘there was a hidden reason behind the creation, which the indigenes … see as a deliberate attempt to divide them to the advantage of the Hausa community and to promote Islam in the area’ (Prof. Nenfort Gomwalk, testimony to the Ajibola Commission, cited in Isa 2009). 9 These were a clutch of influential indigenous Christian military officers from Langtang in Plateau State who held important positions in the federal military administration.

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Faced with ‘enemies’ on all sides – the ‘unreliable’ Afizere, the ‘hegemonic’ Jasawa, and the ‘biased’ Hausa-Fulani-dominated federal military state, the Berom felt increasingly cornered and desperate. This was a defining moment for the Berom security dilemma: how could they protect their core territorial and political interests in the face of this concerted onslaught from without and within? This dilemma increasingly played itself out in the politics of Jos North LGA. ‘WHO OWNS JOS?’ JOS NORTH LGA, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE ROAD TO 2001

‘Ownership’ is the idiom of contestation over Jos North LGA, but the term is not used in the narrow juridical sense of owning a piece of private property. It is not property rights that are at issue, but the right to recognition of the pre-eminence of a group within a specific territory. Such recognition entitles the group to set the rules of engagement in inter-community relations. The Berom rallied round their associations – such as the Berom Educational and Cultural Organization (BECO), Berom Elders Forum, Berom Youth Movement, and the churches – COCIN and ECWA – while the Jasawa rallied round the JNI, the Central Mosque and the Council of Ulama, and the newly created Jasawa Development Association ( JDA). Both groups increasingly saw the other as a singular threat to core group interests. Prior to the 2001 violence, several elections and appointments provided sparks for Jasawa-Berom confrontation. During Babangida’s ‘transition without end’ (Diamond et al. 1997), a series of elections were held at the LGA and state levels. In one election to the Jos LGA, the courts annulled Teacher Usman’s ( Jasawa) chairmanship victory, ruling that he did not meet the necessary educational credentials. For the Jasawa, nullifying a popular mandate on technical grounds could only be understood within an ethno-religious framework: the female judge was a Christian from neighbouring Bauchi State – which has similar patterns of Muslim/Christian and indigene/ settler conflicts – and was married to a Plateau Christian indigene from Langtang. With Usman’s candidacy invalidated, the chairmanship fell to Christopher Sarki Jang (Afizere). Christopher Jang went on to pursue a narrow Afizere agenda, distributing indigene certificates, patronage, and helping to assert Afizere territorial claims against the Berom in Tudun Wada and Dong. Rather than providing avenues for conflict resolution, local-level democratic openings seemed to have served to further exacerbate conflict. Under Christopher Jang’s tenure, the Jos LGA was further sub-divided into three: Jos North, South and East. The Berom believed that the Afizere controlled Jos East, and tended to ally with the Jasawa in Jos

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North. This left the Berom with Jos South. From this perspective, the Berom faced the prospect of losing two-thirds of ‘their’ territory – Jos East to the Afizere and Jos North to the Jasawa. Like local-level democratization, territorial decentralization carried out to ‘bring government closer to the people’ only raised the political stakes. Berom elders searched for a ‘Berom’ candidate that would dislodge Christopher Jang during the following LGA elections. During the 1996 local election, the Afizere and Anaguta supported Christopher Jang’s re-election while the Berom supported the controversial Rev. Father Nyam. All the major churches – Catholic, Anglican, ECWA and COCIN – urged indigenous groups to support a single ‘consensus’ candidate; however, the Berom refused to support any candidate other than their own. Aided by his incumbency, Christopher Jang won the election, which further entrenched the Berom victimhood complex: ‘they are all against us even though it is our land’. During Christopher Jang’s second term, Jos North LGA’s community relations were stable. However, old tensions flared up in the lead up to the 1998 elections. Again, the Berom candidate lost to an Afizere-backed candidate, Frank Tardy (Anaguta). The Berom believed that Anaguta and Afizere were ‘conspiring’ with the Jasawa to keep the ‘owners’ of the land out of office. The subsequent appointment of an Afizere LGA Secretary effectively denied Berom any significant post in the Jos North LGA. Throughout 1998, the transition to democracy gathered pace at the state level. There was a strong feeling across the state that the Berom, who had never produced a Plateau State Governor, should be favoured for the office. Among the Berom, the elites and elders developed a ‘Berom Agenda’ with the key aim of Berom ‘liberation’ from the Jasawa, Afizere and Anaguta ‘conspiracy’. From the Agenda, Jonah Jang emerged as the Berom gubernatorial candidate. He had twice been a military governor (in Gongola and Benue States, not in Plateau), with influential connections within the military establishment, and was rumoured to be a member of the pro-democracy group NADECO. Unfortunately, the National PDP Chairman was Solomon Lar, an indigenous Plateau Christian from Langtang. Following the 1991 disappointment with the ‘Langtang Mafia’ over the creation of the Jos North LGA, Berom elders would have to rely on the goodwill of Tarok (Langtang) elites in order to get Jonah Jang elected in 1999. Given these obstacles, a tinge of menace crept into Berom demands for the governorship. Other indigenous groups, particularly the Tarok, began to interpret these demands as veiled threats. Two factors need to be highlighted here regarding the developing Berom security dilemma: (1) the Berom had lost a series of important judicial, electoral and administrative battles in Jos North at the local level; and (2) at the state level, their self-righteous claims to succession to the governorship were frustrated by other groups who did not share their vision and resented their tone. While

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the Berom were united as a group behind their agenda in 1998–99, they were politically isolated. The PDP primary was hard-fought. Dariye, an indigenous Christian from Bokkos LGA in central Plateau, faced Jonah Jang in the gubernatorial primaries. Initial reports suggested that Jang had won the ticket, but intra-PDP Abuja ‘politricks’ led to Dariye being declared the victor. In a hollow nod toward Berom interests, Solomon Lar chose Michael Botmang – the Berom who had been Jang’s campaign manager – as Dariye’s running mate. Botmang quickly became a hate figure among the Berom who collectively proceeded to vote for the Berom All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) candidate, Yohanna Dalyop, who inevitably lost the election. Ironically, both Berom and the Jasawa shared a sense of frustrated claims to power and isolation. Developments following the 1999 democratic transition would increasingly pit one group against the other. Each would eventually feel sufficiently disenfranchised to adopt the ‘deviant’ method of collective violence. DEMOCRACY AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

For the PDP’s Dariye to win the governorship in 1999 against Berom hostility, the PDP needed the support of the Jasawa. Believing that their community stood the best chance under a non-Berom governorship, the Jasawa supported the PDP en masse. However, Jasawa support for Dariye was accompanied by several demands: (1) the creation of their own district in the areas of the city they occupied and the appointment of their own traditional District Head; (2) the ready provision of indigeneship certificates; (3) that their children should be entitled to state scholarships; and (4) that they be entitled to government employment opportunities at the LGA, state and federal levels. Following his election, however, Dariye could not deliver on any of these demands. The Jasawa also came under increased pressure from Frank Tardy’s Jos North administration; Tardy (Anaguta) reportedly stated in 2000 that the Jasawa had no place in Jos and should return to the North. Tardy proceeded to nullify the Jasawa’s Jos North indigene certificates. Meanwhile, the Berom looked on the Jasawa-Dariye alliance with increasing apprehension. Many Berom elites sided passionately with Tardy’s vituperative attacks on Jasawa citizenship in Jos North. In response, Jasawa demands became even more strident. Democratic political discourse progressively devolved into a zero-sum articulation of mutually exclusive positions and increased communal polarization. While religion had always been an important element of the communities in conflict, it took on added significance as the Jasawa sought to physically demonstrate their numerical strength by congregating in ever larger numbers at Islamic public rituals. Friday prayers became an affair in which entire swathes of public roads surrounding mosques were blocked

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by the massed ranks of Jasawa congregants. The phenomenon of ‘street praying’ became a regular source of inconvenience to non-Muslims on Fridays in Jos, along with the ubiquitous blaring of loud-speakers. At the same time, both the Jasawa Development Association ( JDA) and Berom Education and Cultural Organization (BECO) became more aggressive in pressing exclusionary demands. BECO was vocal in asserting that if the Jasawa were allowed to have a district and a District Head, then they would soon seek to replace the Berom paramount title of Gbong Gwom Jos with an Emir. In reality, this would be impossible as the Gbong Gwom Jos is elected by a council of ten District Heads, nine of whom are Berom indigenes with the tenth being the Anaguta Ujah. An eleventh Jasawa District Head could not affect the council’s power distribution in the manner touted. However, the bug-bear of a Jasawa Emirate became yet another source of anxiety in the collective Berom imagination. Caught between the Jasawa on the one hand, and Tardy and BECO on the other, Governor Dariye was unable to balance the competing demands and the situation gradually degenerated. In a 2001 bid to placate his Jasawa allies, Dariye appointed Mohammed Muhktar ( Jasawa) as the Jos North LGA coordinator of the federal anti-poverty agency, NAPEP. Predictably, Tardy and the BECO challenged the award of an office with enormous powers of patronage to the Jasawa, but it appeared that Dariye did not fully comprehend their resolve to blunt Jasawa influence in Jos. To carry out the functions of his office, Muhktar needed an office in the LGA offices. Unable to openly defy the Governor, Tardy provided the office space requested. However, it was widely believed that he and the BECO then mobilized indigenous youths to smear faeces all over the office, rendering it unusable. As the JDA insisted that Muhktar must be allowed to perform the duties of his new office, the Berom and the Anaguta resisted. The stand-off escalated, including the circulation of incendiary flyers and hand-bills; Dariye could neither cancel nor enforce the appointment. Violence erupted on Friday 7 September 2001, when a Christian Berom woman was unable to pass through a ‘street praying’ session in the mixed neighbourhood of Congo-Russia. The rioting occurred along religious lines and quickly spread from Congo-Russia to other areas of Jos. The use of soldiers to enforce peace quelled the fighting. Muhktar’s appointment was rescinded. In response to the September 2001 rioting, all Jos North communities reached an agreement on the governance of the LGA. The core elements of the 2002 settlement were that: (1) the Chairman would be an indigene; (2) the Deputy Chair would be a Jasawa; (3) a different ethnic indigene would be the LGA Secretary; (4) councillorship portfolios would go to the Yoruba, Igbo, and one each for the Jasawa and indigenes. Danladi Atu – an Afizere with a Berom mother – became chair and a semblance

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of peace was restored until the 2008 elections. Democracy without an inclusive political culture brought nothing but grief to Jos.

Jasawa and the security dilemma of the 2008 election We now explore the Jasawa version of the security dilemma which became stark during the 2008 Jos North LGA elections. Since the return to democracy in 1999, the Jasawa’s claim to indigeneship and full citizenship in Jos has been under threat, particularly with the domination of the Plateau State government by indigenous Berom elites around Governor Jang. According to a Jasawa politician, Alhaji Danladi Passali: I contested and won the [PDP nomination for the] local government election in 2008. I won the primary election but [Governor] Jang gave it to his cousin. I won in an open primary at the stadium. I petitioned the party before I went to court. The court even pronounced that I won the election. But Jang refused because he did not respect court orders … The Hausas have been living in the present Jos for over 1000 years. [A historically inaccurate claim] … It is not that we want to be regarded as indigenes; we are indigenes of this state. We founded this place and should be given equal opportunities as normal human beings and carry out our activities. For the past 50 years, we cannot get employment or scholarship in this state. We have 90 per cent of unemployed youths in Jos, which is abnormal … Our youths are now becoming drug addicts and this is why we have high rate of crisis … These youths are all roaming about; no scholarship, no employment; nothing. How do you think we can have peace without solving that problem? (cited in Ashaka & Agboola, 2011) Local Jasawa political discourse was clearly replete with exaggeration and hyperbole, but there was also an acute and unmistakable sense of frustration over political rights and access to civic institutions. This frustration underpins the security dilemma that arose in the context of the 2008 Jos North LGA election. The alleged rigging of the vote of the 28 November 2008 local elections triggered violence that quickly spread across Jos North LGA. In 2008, religion and ethnicity overlapped with the Jos political party system. Despite their more complex composition at the federal level, the two leading parties on the ground in Jos had a distinctive religious colouration to them. The ANPP in Jos was identified with Jasawa/Muslim interests, while the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was identified with indigene/Christian interests. However, it is important to note that even at the state level there

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was still influential Jasawa representation within the PDP. The PDP also held a majority of the governorships in the majority Muslim states across northern Nigeria (Kendhammer 2010; Ostien 2009, 27–9). To complicate matters further, individual political entrepreneurs – regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation – are able to switch fluidly between parties. For example, Governor Jonah Jang switched from PDP (1999) to ANPP (2003) and back to PDP (2007) in order to realize his political ambitions (Ostien 2009, 22). The incomplete democratic process in Nigeria allowed for the untoward influence of ‘godfathers’ and over-bearing office holders. Coupled with weak institutions and low levels of security, these tendencies allow individuals and groups in power to manipulate the system. These groups frequently favour their own identity groups over fair access to all, leaving the ‘losing’ side marginalized (Kendhammer 2010). This tension between ethno-regional groups over the distribution of resources and political space gives rise to security concerns. The November 2008 local elections were an instance where the previously achieved political balance between ‘settlers’ and ‘indigenes’, reached after the 2001 crisis, threatened to swing dramatically toward the marginalized settlers, to the detriment of the ‘favoured’ indigenes. As the 2008 local elections approached, tensions heightened. The local elections would be the first held in Plateau State since the 1999 Nigerian constitution took effect, which also created the state-funded and governor-appointed Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) (Ostien 2009, 27). The first round of national local elections in 2004 originally excluded a crisis-beleaguered Plateau State (Human Rights Watch 2004). On 13 March 2006, PLASIEC conducted the delayed local government elections in 17 LGAs. Mired by poor preparation and dubious legitimacy, various LGAs reported that materials were delivered late, voters’ cards were hijacked, and security compromised (CEPAN 2009). Controversially, the state government stopped the election in mid-process. ANPP members speculated that the PDP annulled the elections when it realized it was lagging behind in key LGAs, including Jos North. PLASIEC leadership was disbanded and reconstituted under Elder Gabriel D. Zi (ibid.). A new election was scheduled for January 2008, but was then postponed. PLASIEC set the new LGA election date for 15 March 2008. Midway through voting, however, the polls were closed and the results annulled due to insufficient security, alleged cases of ‘thuggery’, and the hijacking of electoral materials (Nanshep 2008). Despite a strong police presence, inter-group struggles erupted in several wards as each political camp attempted to guard against manipulation. This exemplifies the environment of distrust and low police credibility: their presence neither provided legitimacy nor did it deter inter-group clashes. The overriding dynamic was one of near-anarchy and non-enforcement. Yet

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another PLASIEC composed of different individuals was convened and warned by Jang that the next elections needed to be a success. The next election date was set for 27 November 2008. Many communal interests were at stake in the November 2008 election. Prior to 2008 and in the absence of elections, governors appointed chairmen to preside over Plateau State’s LGAs. The first post-1999 governor, Chief Joshua Dariye, named an ethnic Afizere (Dr Danladi Atu, 2002–2006) as chair of Jos North LGA. Dariye was succeeded by his Deputy Governor, Chief Michael Botmang (Berom), following his November 2006 impeachment. While this state-level power shift was confined within the indigenous/Christian demographic, it was still a shift from one ethnic group to another and inflamed local intra-indigene tensions in Jos politics. Governor Botmang replaced the Dariye-appointed Jos North LGA caretaker with Professor B.T. Bingel (Berom) (AAIN 2008). In 2007, Jang (Berom) replaced Botmang as Governor. Jang replaced Bingel with Ngo Lydia Lodam (Berom) as caretaker of Jos North. This rapid transition from an Afizere political axis in Jos North to one dominated by the Berom had significant local implications. Since its creation in 1991, Jos North had been viewed by indigenous groups as a deliberate move to strengthen Jasawa control of Jos. This perception was buttressed by the nomination of a series of Jasawa politicians to federal political positions to represent Jos North LGA. Therefore, until Bingel’s appointment, Jos North had remained outside of Berom political control. To the Jasawa, Bingel’s appointment marked a Berom push for domination of Jos North, even without a single elected Berom councillor in the LGA (Ostien 2009)! The 2008 LGA elections promised change in the local balance of ethnic political power. This heightened both the political and symbolic significance of the elections (CEPAN 2009; Ishaq 2008). Given the tenuous local power-sharing agreement struck following the 2001 crisis, the Jasawa were concerned primarily with what combination of power-sharing between Christian and Muslim candidates should be proposed for the 2008 election. However, it remains unclear how PDP candidates were selected. Ostien (2009) suggests that Jasawa PDP members approached Jang on several occasions to request that at least one of the candidates represent their interests. Jang rebuffed each request, making it clear that he ‘can do without the Muslims’ (Ostien 2009; Karaye 2008). Given Jasawa concerns over their citizenship rights, the election increasingly assumed the dimensions of a zero-sum gambit. The eventual PDP candidate, Timothy Gyang Buba, constituted a flagrant assault on Jasawa sensibilities and their sense of ‘ownership’ of Jos North. Like Jang, Timothy Gyang Buba was a Berom from Du, which falls under the Jos South LGA. He was the younger brother of the Gbong Gwom, Jacob Gyang Buba, himself a former Comptroller-General of the

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Nigeria Customs Service and a Jang supporter. Furthermore, Timothy Gyang Buba had previously held political office in Du, which undermined his right to run for political office in a different constituency – Jos North – since under Nigerian rules an individual can only belong to one LGA (Philips 2008a; Umaru et al. 2009; Karaye 2008). Buba was ‘widely understood to have been imposed on the Jos North PDP by Jang in an undemocratic nomination process objected to not only by the party’s Jasawa but by its Anagutas and Afizeres as well’ (Ostien 2009, 28; Philips 2008a). However, designating a Christian Anaguta as Buba’s running mate placated the Anaguta contingency, which left only the Christian Afizere demographic allied with the Muslim Jasawa in support of ANPP candidates – Aminu Yusuf Baba ( Jasawa) and a Christian Afizere as his deputy (Umaru et al. 2009). The resulting political competition between the PDP and ANPP was highly uneven. Jang’s insensitive political manipulation entrenched the perception that Christians dominated the PDP at the expense of Muslim interests and representation. Its uncompromising demeanour was perceived as indicative of a rigid zero-sum political dynamic of exclusion. With an ANPP win, the Jasawa would face partial political representation, but would suffer acute political marginalization with a PDP victory. Furthermore, the perception that PDP’s indigenous Christians dominated the state and judicial authorities provided a bleak outlook for the Jasawa in terms of seeking the protection of their rights through recourse to a robust and just institutional process. From an indigenous Christian perspective, the 2008 elections constituted a win-win situation in terms of representation in local politics. Given the concentration of political power that would be possible under indigenous Christian control, there was an incentive to vote PDP. Faced with the threat of marginalization through a PDP victory, the Jasawa backed the opposing ANPP, whose political campaign and propaganda intensified an already tenuous political situation with militant slogans such as ‘PDP can win anywhere, but they can’t win in Jos North’ (cf. Ostien 2009, 30). Combined with the practice that parties in power manipulate the electoral system to capture all of a state’s LGAs in an effort to embed their domination – where the State Independent Electoral Commissions become instruments through which state governors are able to install cronies – the discrepancy between inflated ANPP expectations, PDP’s presumed electoral manipulation, and the absence of legal recourse for political wrongs yielded a hyper-reactive environment where any perceived injustice could provide an incentive for ANPP supporters to defect from participating in the normal electoral process and seek other ‘deviant’ solutions (Ostien 2009). Many Jasawa believed the November 2008 elections provided little incentive for continued engagement with normal politics. As mixed signals emerged from the colla-

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tion centre on the evening of 27 November 2008, the Jasawa’s ‘lose-lose’ predicament triggered action.

The outbreak of violence While violence is cited to have been confined to areas of Jos North LGA – in Tudun Wada, Angwan Rogo, Abattoir, Sarkin Mangu, Ali Kazaure, Angwan Rimi, Zaria Road, Eto-Baba, Farin Gada, Congo Russia, Rikkos, Katako Market and Bauchi Road – interviewees consistently expressed the view that the violence did not spread to Jos South because of strict curfews and ‘shoot-on-sight’ orders implemented following the outbreak of violence (Owuamanam 2008). This point emphasizes the volatile environment as well as the potential for the rapid spread of violence from one area to another. In many ways, the 2008 violence was more potent than the 2001 crisis, demonstrated by the speed with which it spread and the disproportionately high number of casualties over two days. Compared to the performance of past PLASIECs, the November 2008 elections ran with few blatant irregularities. The long anticipated elections brought a high number of voters to the polls across all seventeen of Plateau’s LGAs. With high stakes at risk, the perception was that each vote was significant; community-level religious and ethnic networks actively encouraged political engagement. Materials arrived on time and no major reports of misconduct or violence emerged during polling. This unexpectedly disciplined conduct prompted many to herald the elections as the most organized the state had ever experienced (CEPAN 2009, 5; Philips 2008a, 2008b). The precise details of the sequence of events leading up to the outbreak of violence remain in dispute. However, there are three consistently important features that most interpretations contain: (1) the location of the vote collation centre was changed; (2) apprehensive voters from both communities gathered in front of the collation centre; and (3) the election was said to have been lost by the ANPP. Once polls closed, ballots were to be collected from each ward and transported to the collation centre. Previously, this meant the Jos North Local Government Secretariat. In 2008, however, the collation centre was moved to Kabong Ward – an area largely populated by Christian indigenes (including the Berom). The perception among many Jasawa was that this was an unscheduled and last-minute change that was intended to cause confusion and facilitate electoral rigging. Some PDP councillors contest this view, claiming that all parties involved agreed on the administrative change of location at least a month prior to the election. Both parties supposedly acknowledged that the traditional Jos North collation centre was ‘insecure’ and agreed to shift the location to a school in

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Kabong. While it was not possible to corroborate either of these claims, it aptly demonstrates something frequently encountered in Jos: shifting narratives and clashing details. The main issue is not whether moving the collation centre had previously been agreed upon. Rather, it is crucial that ANPP supporters perceived it to be a sudden and unexpected shift. As the election loomed, the ANPP – and an apprehensive Jasawa community – waged a strong campaign against vote rigging with slogans such as, ‘A kasa, a raka, kuma a tsare’ (‘Cast your vote, escort it, and guard it’), which is what the ANPP supporters amassed at the new collation centre tried to do (cf. Ostien 2009, 31). Frustration with the simple task of determining to where the vote collation centre had been moved – information that even some ANPP party representatives did not possess – confirmed fears of efforts at vote rigging and further undermined confidence in the political process (ibid.). Electoral manipulation, however, is an all-parties affair in Nigerian elections and frequently results in situations where the ‘winning’ party is merely more effective at ‘out-rigging’ others. While mutual rigging is not an ideal democratic process, it may nevertheless function with low levels of physical violence insofar as opposing groups have a reason to ‘buy in’ to the overall political process. In Jos North, this had amounted to an informal power-sharing arrangement between the Jasawa and indigenous groups from 2001. This inclusive power-sharing dynamic changed in 2008 when PDP’s Christian leadership in Plateau State refused to accommodate Jasawa interests in any capacity. By midnight, during the collation process, most interested voters had finally been informed where the collation centre had been moved to – a primary school located in the heavily Christian Berom area of Kabong, where ANPP supporters gathered outside in steadily increasing numbers. The crowd outside the collation centre was composed primarily of young Jasawa ANPP supporters, ‘eager to defend’ their votes against alleged machinations to rig. While there is ambiguity as to when protests erupted, they apparently began prior to the official announcement of the electoral results and in response to rumours that the ANPP had lost the election. Uncontrolled information leakage from the collation centre to the crowd outside appears to have been a main contributing factor in the escalating apprehensions of ANPP supporters (Ostien 2009, 32). The problem is that the results were tallied as they arrived from each ward, giving rise to a running total in which both parties fortunes changed places as the night progressed. These inconclusive results were repeatedly leaked (Karaye 2008). Istifanus D.I. Yusuf, the PDP councillor for the Jenta Adamu Ward, was inside the collation centre at the time and asserts: When the results started coming in … the ANPP were leading … Because the results from their areas started coming in first … their

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[ANPP] returning officer made a phone call in Hausa … saying, ‘Alhaji, we have won the election’ … we heard the response [loud cheers] from outside … then ours started coming in. Naraguta B [is] the largest ward in Jos North. Jenta Adamu is the third largest … they were leading by about 15,000 votes … Maza came, there was 12,000 … The count was reduced. When Naraguta B came, it covered the gap and even went ahead … then Kabong came … Kabong is the second largest … they have about 14,000 to 16,000 votes. Then Jenta Adamu, my own ward. By the time Naraguta B, Kabong [and] Jenta Adamu [results came] it was a different thing. Then and there [the ANPP returning officer] called again, ‘Alhaji, we have lost the election’ … Then he called his people outside … This was around 1 or 2 a.m. Given the results from fifteen out of the twenty wards, there are discrepancies in the margin by which the ANPP supposedly led over the PDP. Estimates of the gap ranged from 13,000 to 30,000 (Ostien 2009, 32; Philips 2008b). More important than the absolute lead was the ANPP supporters’ perception that the ANPP lead was large enough that the PDP should not have won, whatever the results from the remaining five wards. One ANPP official reported – corroborated by a statement by Mohamed Y. Kanam, then chairman of the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) in Plateau State – that when collation officers noted this numeric trend, they suspended the collation of votes in order to wait for the results from other wards before announcing the final outcome (Philips 2008b). This prompted tension within the collation centre and transmitted to the crowd outside through unauthorized leaks. PDP supporters began to shout, ‘PDP must win!’ which was met with, ‘Ba za mu yarda ba!’ (‘We won’t agree!’) from ANPP supporters; gathered youths became agitated enough that the police stationed at the gates felt it necessary to disperse the crowd with teargas (Ostien 2009, 32). A combination of stones, cans and trash were thrown, which heightened a sense of the impending breakdown of order and several live rounds were fired by the police in the direction of the crowd (Ostien 2009, 32). The police eventually dispersed the crowd. ANPP and JNI officials contend that a group of PDP supporters remained at the collation centre after ANPP supporters were driven away by the police; they were allegedly obstreperous and threw Molotov cocktails. Independent sources have not corroborated this claim. The possible participation of the local community in dispersing the ANPP supporters may have further entrenched the perception that the location was deliberately chosen for partisan ends; and the non-dispersal of the local community would have created doubts about the impartiality of the police – a view expressed by many Jasawa. The dispersed Jasawa returned to their wards, while making mobile phone calls to those not at the collation centre (Ostien 2009, 32).

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When rumours filtered through the remaining Christian crowd at the Kabong collation centre that disgruntled Jasawa youths in Ali Kazaure had started killing, burning and looting the property of Christians, the Christian crowd itself became uncontrollable. They were then dispersed by the police at the collation centre and marched to Zaria road (ibid.). The group was allegedly fired upon as they arrived at the house of a well-known Jasawa car dealer. Shortly after, his house and business were set ablaze. The wider presence of mobile phones is an important difference between the 2001 and 2008 crises in Jos. The Niki Tobi Commission noted that angry letters to government and threats and counter-threats contained in anonymous leaflets and flyers were the main avenues for mass mobilization for the 2001 riot. In 2008, instantaneous digital transmission and repeat-transmission were in vogue. However, the heavy use of mobile phones assumes an unimpeded flow of information through social networks, which was not the case. Either by burden or design, mobile phone networks were largely incapacitated, which yielded a situation that exacerbated the security dilemma within communities. An environment that allows for the rapid proliferation of (mis)information through SMS texts, but limits recipient’s ability to easily verify facts through ‘real time’ audio or text communication, placed communities in the impossible position of discerning aggression from self-defence. Combined with the not-forgotten events of 2001, these circumstances pushed many to assume the worst and respond accordingly. This provides a useful, if partial, explanation of the speed and lethalness with which violence spread throughout Jos North and threatened to spill into neighbouring areas such as Jos South during 28-29 November 2008. COMMUNITIES AT WAR

Many Muslims believed that the crisis was part of a premeditated plot executed by Governor Jang and the state government, to eradicate dominant ‘settler’ populations in Jos (Adamu 2010; Aliyu 2008). After 2001, the hostile communities were on edge and armed themselves in case of future violence. Therefore, in 2008 each side accused the other of having planned the fight, the massacre, the destruction, in advance, of arming themselves, bringing in reinforcements from outside, arranging fake army or police uniforms for their partisans, using the security forces, all allegedly instigated and funded by big men behind the scenes, for nefarious reasons variously hypothesized. (Ostien 2009, 33) Competing narratives of victimhood help explain why it has been difficult to capture the precise numbers of casualties – each side has an

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Map 8.2 Jos – segregated communities (Map created by Isaac S. Laka, Geographical Information System (GIS) Lab., University of Jos, Nigeria; based on fieldwork data generated by the authors)

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incentive to inflate the number and damage sustained to garner both national and international sympathy. Despite numerical inaccuracies, both sides apparently suffered significant losses. Despite the results from the remaining five wards never being officially announced, PLASIEC intensified the violence by announcing a PDP victory in every Local Government Area in Plateau State (including the Jos North chairmanship) during the ongoing violence (Aliyu 2008; Karaye 2008; Obateru 2008; Ostien 2009). The violence subsided only after the military intervened. In an effort to diffuse the tense political climate, the instalment of the new chairman was postponed from 1 December 2008 to 21 January 2009. Three of these announced victories were subsequently quashed on appeal to the election tribunal, which awarded Bokkos and Wase LGAs to the AC, and Langtang North to the DPP. This raises the question as to why the ANPP in Jos North did not seek to address its grievance through the tribunal. We argue that the security dilemma faced by the Jasawa in the 2008 election undermined their confidence in the ‘normal’ electoral politics and moved action toward ‘deviant’ methods. During the 2008 riots, local-level leaders exerted the most effective influence in stopping certain communities from descending into violence. However, the processes were heavily reliant on individual religious and community leaders (e.g. ward heads) taking the initiative toward managing local responses to the conflict. Moreover, these local leaders also suffered from the prevailing problem of asymmetric (mis)information. As a result, their efficacy in managing tensions during the conflict was dependent on the degree to which they were trusted within their groups (to overcome the fear of potential loss), their role as a bridge between the local groups and the elite-level leaders, and how broadly their influence extended to all community actors (e.g. whether potentially violent youths were responsive to their appeals). As the fighting intensified on the morning of 28 November, bursts of gunfire were heard across Jos as security forces tried to prevent clashes between warring groups (Obateru 2008). The targeted nature of the violence largely focused on prominent communal symbols. Religious sites – churches and mosques – and businesses (car lots, shops, markets, etc.) were among the first attacked. Christian houses in some predominantly Muslim areas were burned and vice versa. While businesses and the markets were targeted because they are viewed as primarily the domain of the Jasawa, there was also a high degree of opportunistic violence and looting of these targets by ‘rioters’. Many of these targets were ‘repeats’ and had been destroyed during the 2001 Jos crisis. It is interesting that no damage to property or persons associated with either PLASIEC or political parties was reported (Philips 2008a). This suggests that the election itself was only a trigger for deeper communal stresses. Moreover, in an area with such diverse identity groups – where visually distinguishing Muslims and

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Christians is problematic – individual violence became circumstantial. The ability to recite some verses from religious texts and how one dressed all became important in how individuals coped with uncertainty and threats. In response to roaming ‘gangs’, wards erected barricades and posted ad hoc sentries at major entrances. This better controlled the flow of individuals in and out of areas and provided an early signalling mechanism in case of attack (McCain 2008). Despite being warned to stay indoors by official announcements, people congregated outside – walking up and down the roads by their homes and waiting by road junctions – either to deduce what was happening through sounds and visual signals (such as smoke and explosions) or be informed by people travelling along these paths (McCain 2008, cf. 2001). Telecommunication networks such as MTN experienced widespread technical difficulties throughout the crisis. The Plateau PDP cited the patchy and ineffective mobile networks from Friday 28 November and for the duration of the crisis as evidence that the 2008 crisis was pre-planned (This Day 2008). The ability to make or receive calls changed from moment to moment, making the mobile network unreliable. While text messages were a more reliable source of information transfer, they often only arrived many hours after they were sent. Communication across identity boundaries often occurs at the elite level. Ideally, cooperation and communication among elites can yield both peacebuilding and conflict management for the base, but this has not been the case in Jos. Even where there was inter-elite communication, it was superficial and implementable agreements were not reached. Moreover, the structure of intra-group vertical relations is mostly disjointed between group members and their elites. Thus, while there was some level of elite communication (through the inter-religious councils and committees), individual actors and riot participants at the base of the respective communities were mostly left ‘out of the loop’ of conflict management efforts. The majority of ordinary citizens communicated within their narrow communal networks. Beyond local communities within Jos, conflict management organizations were largely unable to do more than appeal for public calm. Even with local contacts monitoring the unfolding crisis, the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) could only ‘watch and try to inform’ state and federal authorities. Similarly, a statement released by the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)’s Executive Secretary, Prof. Ishaq Oloyede, did little more than state that ‘NIREC urges all stakeholders to exercise restraint and allow peace and harmony to reign supreme. They should not allow mischievous people to hijack a mere political misunderstanding to degenerate into an ethnic conflict or religious conflict’ (The Nation 2008). Even the Sultan of Sokoto, through the Secretary-General of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), urged ‘all Muslims and Christians all over the country

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to embrace peace and shun acts of violence in the interest of the stability and orderly development of the nation’ (ibid.). However, most people interviewed and surveyed in Jos indicated that these messages had not reached them or that they had little impact on how they responded to the situation. Information mostly flowed horizontally within communities, but very little conflict-inhibiting information flowed down from the elites into the communities through civic structures. Rumours quickly spread throughout Jos primarily via two avenues: the ‘achabas’ (motorcycle taxis) and SMS text messages. Achabas are agile and able to move quickly from one difficult-to-access area to another. In 2008, the majority of achaba riders were ‘settlers’, with Christian ‘indigenes’ composing roughly 30 per cent of the trade. There is both broad speculation and testimony that achabas played a notable role in transporting armed riot participants between wards during the 2008 violence. They purportedly also acted as a conduit for unsubstantiated rumours of killings and burnings, which heightened tensions (McCain 2008, 15). This placed extra pressure on local leaders (primarily of local churches and mosques) to use whatever influence and respect they had to assuage fears and dissuade retaliation for events that likely did not happen. The same processes applied to text messages; rumours spread by achabas were reinforced and proliferated via the use of SMS text messaging. By 1 December, like with previous instances of collective violence, the state and federal governments used the army to restore peace to Jos by introducing martial law, a ‘shoot-on-sight’ order, and a 24-hour curfew. A complete security lockdown was the only way to assuage the immediate security anxieties of various communities. However, the Jasawa also allege, seemingly with some justification, that a large number of them were killed by the police (Human Rights Watch 2009). This was reported to have been much more than crowd control – the police were allegedly going into people’s houses in riot affected areas and shooting the occupants. There are differing interpretations and perceptions of the police and military role between Muslims and Christians.

Conclusion: politics of exclusion breeds violence In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country like Nigeria, riven with poverty and inequalities between the various communities, it is important that the management of diversity is a core concern of those in positions of formal or informal authority. Frequently democracy (giving the people an electoral voice) and decentralization (bringing government closer to the people) are presented as panaceas for the governance challenges facing African countries. But if anything, the experiences of Jos suggest that while these are necessary tools for managing society, they are insufficient

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for dealing with the complex problems of inter-group relations in divided societies like Nigeria which also need deliberate policies of statecraft to bind the different segments of the country together in a peaceful union. In this regard, political and economic inclusivity are important additional factors to be taken into account, if inter-group relations are to be adequately managed. As we have seen in this chapter, in Jos in 2001 and again in 2008, the inability to manage the exclusionary zero-sum demands of some communities within the city and the threats of potential exclusion and marginalization which this posed to some communities can breed despondency, loss of faith in the system, and even the resort to violence. Managing diversity therefore requires not just that every group be incorporated into the economic and political fabric of the society in some meaningful and proportionate way, but also that avenues for pursuing grievances and resolving disputes about these important issues are constantly kept open. Despite democratization and decentralization, where groups feel short-changed by their neighbours, and processes for seeking redress are weak or absent, the door is then opened for those political entrepreneurs interested in violent contestation. The whole society suffers as a consequence. As was observed in Chapter 1, there is a swathe of territory in northern Nigeria, starting from southern Borno State and ending in southern Kaduna State (see Map 1.1, p. xx) where the current style of managing ethnic and religious diversity can learn some important lessons from the tragic experiences of Jos from 2001 to 2015 as described in this chapter. In Chapter 9 the impact of the spiral of violence on the rural areas surrounding Jos is explored, while Chapter 10 examines the ways various state and non-state actors have tried to restore peace to the troubled city, and the ways in which peace is being tentatively restored after 2015.

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266 • Jos – Conflict & Peace Building Freund, B., 1981a, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, Harlow UK: Longman. —— 1981b, ‘Labour Migration to the Northern Nigerian Tin Mines, 1903–1945’, The Journal of African History, 22 (1), 73–84. Glaser, C., 1992, ‘The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models’, World Politics 44 (1), 497–538. Gofwen, R., 2004, Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building: The Throes of Two Decades, 1980–2000, Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor. Gonyok, C. K., 1986, A History of Labour in the Tin Mining Industry of the Jos Plateau, 1903–1960, PhD thesis, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University. Hasan-Rokem, G., 2005, ‘Rumors in Times of War and Cataclysm’, in G.A. Fine, V. Campion-Vincent and C. Heath (eds), Rumor Mills: The Social Impact of Rumor and Legend. London: Transaction Publishers. Higazi, A, 2007, ‘Violence urbaine et politique à Jos (Nigeria), de la période colonial aux élections de 2007’ (‘The Politics of Urban Violence in Jos, Nigeria, from Colonial Rule to the 2007 Elections’), Politique africaine 106, 69–91. —— 2008, ‘Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria’, Africa 78 (1), 107–35. —— 2011, ‘The Jos Crisis: A Recurrent Nigerian Tragedy’, Discussion Paper 2, Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Horowitz, D.L., 2001, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, London: University of California Press. Human Rights Watch, 2001, ‘Nigeria Jos: A City Torn Apart’, Human Rights Watch 13 (9), December, www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nigeria/nigeria1201.pdf, accessed 13 April 2017. —— 2003, ‘Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria’, Human Rights Watch 15, 10 April, www.hrw.org/reports/2003/04/10/testing-democracy, accessed 2 July 2014. —— 2004, ‘Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence’, Human Rights Watch, June, www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604, accessed 3 March 2010. —— 2006, ‘“They Do Not Own This Place”: Government Discrimination against “Non-Indigenes” in Nigeria’, Human Rights Watch 18, 25 April, www.hrw.org/ reports/2006/04/25/they-do-not-own-place, accessed 2 July 2014. —— 2009, ‘Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces: Submission to the Investigative Bodies on the November 28–29, 2008 Violence in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria’, Human Rights Watch Report, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0709webwcover.pdf, accessed 22 July 2017. Ibrahim, J., 1989, ‘The Politics of Religion in Nigeria: The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State’, Review of African Political Economy 45–46, 65–82. —— 2010, ‘Deepening Democracy: Jos, Victimhood and the Other’, 234NEXT, 2 May, http://234next.omgmachines2015.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5562340-146/ story.csp, accessed 20 April 2017. Ikwe, H., 2011, ‘Group Blames IBB for Jos Crises’ 18 March, www.nairaland. com/627498/group-blames-ibb-jos-crises, accessed 2 July 2014. Isa, Abdulsalami , 2009, ‘Panel Invites Babangida, Others Over Jos Crisis’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 18 March. Ishaq, M.L., 2008, ‘Another View of the Jos Genocide’, www.gamji.com/article8000/ NEWS8359.htm, accessed 20 April, 2017. Jervis, R., 1976, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kakar, S., 2005, ‘Rumors and Religious Riots’, in G.A. Fine, V. Campion-Vincent and C. Heath (eds), Rumor Mills: The Social Impact of Rumor and Legend, London: Transaction Publishers. Kane, O, 2003, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Reinstatement of Tradition, Leiden: Brill. Karaye, S.G., 2008, ‘Time for Sober Reflection!’ Daily Triumph, 5 December, www. triumphnewspapers.com/jos5122008.html, accessed 17 March 2010.

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Jos: Fear & violence in central Nigeria • 267 Kendhammer, B, 2010, ‘Talking Ethnic but Hearing Multi-Ethnic: The Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria and Durable Multi-Ethnic Parties in the Midst of Violence’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 48 (1), 48–71. Knapp, R.H, 1944, ‘The Psychology of Rumor’, The Public Opinion Quarterly 8 (1), 22–37. Kukah, M.H., 1992, Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lalo, M., 2009, ‘Why We Gave Up Our Council Seats – Jos North Councilors’, Daily Trust, 8 February, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902090632.html, accessed 22 March 2010. Last, M., 2007, ‘Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An Economy of Political Panic’, The Roundtable: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 96 (392), 605–16. Loimeier, R., 1997, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C., 2001, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCain, D., 2001, Profile of the Religious Crisis in Jos: 2001, unpublished diaries. —— 2008, These People have Started Again: The 2008 Crisis, unpublished diaries. Mustapha, A.R, 1998, ‘Identity Boundaries, Ethnicity and National Integration in Nigeria’, in O. Nnoli (ed.), Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, London: Russell House. Nanshep, R., 2008, ‘Plateau Local Polls Cancelled’, News Tower, 14 March, www. newstower.org/vol1no4004.htm, accessed 13 March 2010. Nyam, S.D. and Jacobs, C.C., 2004, An Evaluation of the Gbong Gwom Institution from 1935–2003, Jos: Berom Historical Publication. Obateru, T., 2008, ‘Nigeria: Jos Riots Escalate’, Vanguard, 30 November. http://allafrica. com/stories/200811300002.html, accessed 19 February 2010. Ostien, P., 2009, ‘Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria’ Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa, VolkswagenStiftung, www.sharia-in-africa. net/media/publications/ethno-religious-conflict-in-Jos-Nigeria/Ostien_ Jos.pdf, accessed 5 August 2017. Owuamanam, J., 2008, ‘Jos Boils Again’, Punch (Nigeria), 29 November, www.punchng. com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art200811292555081, accessed 25 March 2010. —— 2013, ‘Family Type and Attitude to Sexual Promiscuity of Adolescent Students in Ekiti State Nigeria’, European Scientific Journal 9 (17), 171–7. Perchonock, N., 1974, ‘Jos and its Hinterland’, unpublished seminar paper, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Philips, A., 2008a, ‘Jos Crisis Not Political’, Newswatch, 8 December, www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=351&Itemid=1, accessed 13 March 2010. —— 2008b, ‘Jos Killings: A Recurring Decimal’, Newswatch, 8 December, www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=352&Itemid=1, accessed 22 March 2010. Plateau State of Nigeria, Plateau Resolves, 2004, The Plateau Peace Conference, Main Report, September. Plotnicov, L., 1967, Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Posen, B., 1993, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35 (1), 27–47. Report of the Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Crisis in Jos and Its Environs, Plateau State, Report Submitted to the Plateau State Government, 2002. Roe, P., 2002, ‘Misperception and Ethnic Conflict: Transylvania’s Societal Security Dilemma’, Review of International Studies 28, 57–74. Rose, W., 2000, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses’, Security Studies 9 (4), 1–51. Scacco, A., 2007, Individual Participation in Violent Demonstrations in Nigeria, unpublished manuscript, Columbia University.

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9 Rural insecurity on the Jos Plateau Livelihoods, land & cattle amid religious reform & violent conflict ADAM HIGAZI

Introduction The Jos Plateau is a highland area in north-central Nigeria that is both ethno-linguistically diverse and religiously plural. A substantial amount has now been written on the urban conflicts in Jos, the Plateau State capital, but much less attention has been given to the rural areas. Yet, in the wake of rioting in metropolitan Jos in 2001 and 2010, subsequently, violent conflicts spread from urban to rural areas, where the conflict dynamics differed but were no less destructive. This chapter aims to help redress this imbalance and improve our understanding of the rural conflicts. It touches on the history and sociology of selected populations on the Jos Plateau and outlines the pattern of rural insecurity there from 2001 to 2015. Insecurity takes different forms and does not only infer physical violence against people or the burning of settlements, but also crucial factors such as religious discrimination, political and social exclusion, the absence of secure land tenure, compromised access to grazing land, farmland, or water, and the destruction of crops or theft of cattle. This study delves into some of these local dynamics in order to understand patterns of collective violence across the Jos Plateau. The research findings presented here are based on more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork in Plateau State, carried out over the course of a decade (2005–15), across religious and ethnic lines and in rural and urban areas. Most of the fieldwork for this study was done during postdoctoral research in 2010–14, but in places I bring in earlier research I did on the conflicts of 2001–02 and insights from work in Plateau State in 2014–16. The analysis is based on direct observations and interpretations from long-term ethnography, hundreds of interviews of a cross section of people (Christians and Muslims of diverse backgrounds and outlooks), and 269

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documentary sources obtained primarily from the affected communities. I have used such data critically and cross-checked it wherever possible. This chapter also seeks to contextualize the field data in light of existing anthropological, historical, and political studies of the Jos Plateau.* The rural conflicts in Plateau State have included numerous episodes of mass violence, with large-scale killing, population displacement, the destruction of property, and severe disruption to farming, trade and pastoralism. The ramifications go beyond the sites of violence, directly affecting neighbouring states and straining inter-faith relations in Nigeria. The focus of this chapter is on the origins and escalation of violence on the high Plateau, in the rural environs of Jos. It does not cover the conflicts in the lowlands of Plateau State, a large territory below the steep southern escarpment of the Jos Plateau where there has also been inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence, often linked to local politics and land issues (Higazi 2008). It also only touches on the displacement of people from Plateau State into neighbouring states such as Bauchi and Kaduna and other parts of Nigeria. It should be emphasized that the hotspots of rural violence on the Jos Plateau constitute quite a sizeable area of land, but well under half the total area of the high Plateau (see Map 9.1). Some areas have remained peaceful, without, for example, farmer-herder violence despite the presence of both. Collective violence is to some extent delimited geographically and tends to be episodic rather than constant. As large-scale and brutal as the rural violence has undoubtedly been (with thousands of people killed), in most areas of the Jos Plateau people live together peacefully most of the time. Even though tensions between individuals and ethnic or religious groups arise, they are usually resolved locally through the chiefs and religious leaders without armed conflict. The extreme violence seen in some communities may be considered an aberration, though it was an increasingly frequent aberration in the years this chapter focuses on. The destabilization of the rural areas was the result of a combination of local grievances and the spill-over effects of urban rioting from metropolitan Jos, in September 2001 and January 2010, and to a lesser extent in November 2008. The violence occurred primarily along religious lines, between Muslims and Christians, in villages, mining settlements, pastoralist camps, on farms and along roads. A Berom political elite, under the governorship of Jonah Jang, led the Plateau State government from 2007–15, thus armed conflict between Fulani, Hausa and Berom communities was heavily politicized during this period. The conflicts therefore * Acknowledgement: My thanks to Norma Perchonock of the Centre for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT), Zaria, and to the reviewers, for their detailed comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Raufu Mustapha for his support and encouragement. I am however responsible for the content of this study and for any factual or interpretive errors it contains.

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need to be seen in their political and social context and not only in terms of wider Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. Christians and Muslims on the Jos Plateau do not form homogenous political or religious blocs. This is due to the different Muslim sects and Christian denominations, meaning each religious group is internally variegated. In addition, Plateau State has high ethno-linguistic diversity, with diffuse and varied patterns of local politics and different indigenous languages and historical and cultural traditions within the population. Christians and Muslims in this heterogeneous context come from many different backgrounds.1 Muslim-Christian relations in Plateau State are thus mediated by a multitude of factors: religious practice and doctrine, local history and local leadership, socio-economic and political relations, and the level and type of education. As these factors vary between communities it is unsurprising that there are differences in inter-group and inter-faith relations across the social and geographical space of the Jos Plateau. Aside from urban ethnographies of Jos (e.g. Plotnicov 1967; Andersson Trovalla 2011), there is a substantial corpus of anthropological work on the diverse rural population of the Jos Plateau in the smaller towns and villages. However, much of this ethnographic knowledge is now dated. Existing studies include writings by colonial anthropologists and administrators (e.g. Tremearne 1912; Temple 1922; Meek 1925; Davies 1944; St. Croix 1945; Gunn 1953) and academic anthropologists (e.g. Baker 1954; Conant 1960, 1962; Muller 1969, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1980; Sangree 1969, 1970, 1972; Bruce 1977; Awogbade 1983; Frank 1990, 1995, 2004; Smedley 2004). Some of the latter research was carried out in the 1950s, but most of it dates from the 1960s and 1970s, with each anthropologist focusing on a specific tribe or ethnic group (or two at most), some in the structural functionalist tradition. An early exception was Conant’s (1960, 1962) work in Dass (Bauchi State) and contiguous areas of the Plateau, which considered the regional historical context, and Bruce’s (1977) study of the Pyem around Gindiri. Structural functionalist methods were later criticized by those who sought to work more historically across ethnic boundaries and analyse the inter-connections of kinship networks, local and regional histories, and overlaps in the politics and culture of different groups (Tambo 1978; Sharpe 1983, 1986). However, the ethnographic knowledge this work cumulatively produced is far greater than what has obtained since the 1980s, when there has been little anthropological research in central Nigeria. There has nonetheless been an increase in local history writing, some of which is of significant value (e.g. Gonyok 1986; Nengel 1999; Fwatshak 2011; Danfulani and Fwatshak 2012; Mangvwat 1

Some Muslims are accepted as ‘indigenes’ of Plateau State, whereas others are viewed as ‘settlers’, depending on their ethnic backgrounds. The same broadly applies among Christians.

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2013). But some texts are produced more as political projects, with an explicit ethnic or sub-ethnic bias, rather than as scholarly endeavours (e.g. Shagaya 2005). Overall, Christians form a substantial majority on the Jos Plateau but there is also a large Muslim population, among ethnic groups considered to be ‘indigenous’ and among ‘settlers’. The categories of ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ and of who is included and who is excluded are contentious in Plateau State. In Plateau political discourse the ‘indigenes’ are the first-comers (or natives) and the ‘settlers’ are the latecomers to a particular territory (with implied lack of traditional land and institutions there). These categories can be contested, as they ignore the complexities of intermarriage, long-term residency, and the ambiguities of customary land tenure. But they are popularly used and those regarded as the indigenes of a particular area tend to hold on strongly to such ideas of primordial belonging. This is the case not only in Plateau State but also throughout much of Nigeria. Disputes over indigeneity and tensions between Muslims and Christians in the political sphere, over land, and to some extent socially, sparked violence from 2001 in urban and rural areas. The social unrest and contestation over identity and land is linked to the distinct history and sociology of the Jos Plateau. Communal violence in other parts of central and northern Nigeria has a comparable basis, but there are variations in the pattern of violence and in the nature of the grievances. The next section of this chapter outlines the historical and ethnographic context of the study area, focusing on contentious issues and processes of social change that have contributed to contemporary rural insecurity. The chapter then outlines the ‘narratives of threat’ among Christians and Muslims that frame discourses on the rural violence; in doing so it assesses the impacts of religious reform, focusing mainly on Islamic reform among Fulani pastoralists. The following section analyses mass violence and ethno-religious polarization in the rural and peri-urban environs of Jos from 2001 to 2015. The overview of the conflicts cannot possibly be comprehensive, but it aims to show the major trends, based on fieldwork carried out among Christians and Muslims in the affected areas. The perpetuation of conflict, such as through the destruction and occupation of farms, and cattle rustling is highlighted. The final sections of the chapter consider youth mobilization and political leadership, and the impacts of the military deployment on local populations. It concludes with an assessment of the Plateau State government’s handling of the rural crises from 2007–15.

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274 • Jos – Conflict & Peace Building

Historical and ethnographic context ETHNO-LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The Jos Plateau forms the largest portion of the central Nigerian highlands and takes its current name from Jos, the urban centre at its northern point, which was established as a township in 1915 by the British colonial authorities as they moved up into the area for tin mining (Ames 1932; Bingel 1978; Freund 1981a; Gonyok 1986). The origins of the name ‘Jos’ are disputed, but it may originate from a colonial-era mispronunciation of a local village, ‘Guash’ (Bingel 1978). Until the colonial incursion, the diverse Plateau peoples had retained a high level of political and social autonomy, remaining outside the spheres of Muslim emirate rule that spread to surrounding areas of lowland savannah in the nineteenth century. Colonial ethnographers and administrators referred to the local inhabitants as the ‘Plateau pagans’ (Temple 1922; Ames 1932), but the implied ‘primitiveness’ belied well-developed systems of agriculture and iron smelting, and complex kinship structures (Tambo 1978; Muller 1969 1980; Sangree 1969, 1972; Frank 1990; Jacobs 1995). From 1902, at the start of the colonial occupation of the Jos Plateau, there was a steady increase in migration onto the Plateau of people from other parts of what became Nigeria (after the amalgamation of North and South in 1914). This changed the demographic composition of the area, particularly around Jos as the town developed (Plotnicov 1967). The migrants included Muslims from other parts of Northern Nigeria – mainly Hausa, Kanuri, Fulani and Nupe – and Christians from Southern Nigeria – mainly Yoruba, Igbo, Urhobo – and the lower North (also known as the Middle Belt) (Plotnicov 1967; Freund 1981b; Gonyok 1986). Plateau Province was formed as a political unit in 1926 and was administered as part of the Northern Region (Ames 1932). In the 1950s, migrants from outside Plateau still constituted more than 90 per cent of the population in Jos town (Plotnicov 1967: 62–3), but the people considered to be indigenous to Plateau Province formed the majority in the rural areas and in the province as a whole. Today they still form a majority in the redefined boundaries of what is now Plateau State, which has a current population estimated at up to 4 million. From the late 1940s a competing Middle Belt political identity developed in Northern Nigeria that was Christian in orientation and constituted by ethnic minorities, distinct from the Hausa and Fulani Muslim majority in the region (Logams 2004). The Middle Belt movement was strong in Plateau and sought for a separate region from the Muslim majority provinces of Northern Nigeria. The aspiration for a Middle Belt

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Region was not realized, but in 1967 the three regions of Nigeria from the colonial period (1900–60) and First Republic were divided into states, of which there are now thirty-six. The Middle Belt ideological discourse has subsequently been exercised at the state level in Plateau State and other areas of central Nigeria. This has influenced local ethnic politics and Muslim-Christian relations, bringing greater political autonomy for minorities, but in some instances it has also reinforced stereotyping and division. This has affected rural as well as urban areas and has heightened indigeneity politics in Plateau. There have been fluctuations in ‘ethnic boundaries’ over time, with an increase in social scale – in the size of ethnically defined groups – having occurred because of conversion to world religions, the impacts of literacy, and colonial and post-colonial administrative practices. These social changes brought together more of the old clan and village-based identities of the nineteenth century into larger and more clearly defined ‘ethnic’ units (e.g. Frank 1990; Sangree 1970, 1972). There have been transformational changes as Plateau societies have moved from pre-capitalist subsistence agriculture towards a capitalist economic system in the context of the Nigerian state. Demographic increase in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has had major impacts on the size of ethnic groups and on competition for land. As ethnicity is relational, ethnic consciousness is strengthened through contact with groups defined as culturally or linguistically distinct (Barth 1969). Intermarriage is common across ethnic and to some extent religious lines, and is not a recent phenomenon, blurring inter-group boundaries. However, ethnic assertion remains prominent, obscuring these ambivalences. Ethnic consciousness on the Jos Plateau is old, but current political discourses around ethnicity and issues of inclusion and exclusion developed through colonial and post-colonial experiences. If we take each language to be roughly coterminous with an ethnic group – language is the principal but not the only indicator of ethnic identity in Nigeria – then the ethnic diversity of the Jos Plateau is apparent. The Berom are the largest ‘indigenous’ ethno-linguistic group on the Plateau, but there are more than forty local languages spoken in Plateau State, and at least twenty on the high Plateau (Blench 2007 2009). The local languages fall into two of the main African language phyla as classified by linguists: Niger-Congo and Afro-Asiatic (Greenberg 1963). In addition there are numerous languages from other parts of Nigeria spoken there by migrants or the descendants of migrants from the past century. A diverse group of Plateau languages form part of the Benue-Congo subdivision of Niger-Congo, including Berom, Izere, Iguta, Irigwe, Aten, Amo, Pyem and many others (Blench 2007, 2009). There are also numerous Chadic languages spoken on and around the Jos Plateau, including Ngas,

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Mwaghavul, Mupun, Ron, Kulere and the regional lingua franca, Hausa. These are classified within Afro-Asiatic and have different origins and lexical structures to the Benue-Congo languages. Among the local languages, Berom has the highest number of speakers,2 probably followed by Mwaghavul and Ngas. Taking Plateau State as a whole – including the hills and escarpment along the periphery, and the larger area of lowlands savannah to the south – Goemai, Tarok and the Kofyar cluster of languages are also among those with the highest numbers of speakers. These are the larger indigenous ethnic groups in Plateau State, but there are many smaller groups and languages too. All of them are minorities in the national context of Nigeria. Many of the smaller ethno-linguistically defined groups on the Jos Plateau are comprised of just a few thousand people. Living among them in the rural areas are Fulɓe, Hausa and Igbo inhabitants, among others: groups with a significant presence throughout Nigeria and other parts of West Africa. PASTORALISTS ON THE JOS PLATEAU

‘Fulani’ is the Hausa ethnonym used in Nigeria and in English to refer to people more properly known as Fulɓe (sing. Pullo) – their self-ascribed name. Those who self-identify as Fulɓe form the largest pastoralist population in Africa, but they are heterogeneous. The Fulani language, Fulfulde, is widely spoken – with speakers from Mauritania to Eritrea – though with substantial dialectical variations, as between eastern and western dialects of Fulfulde in West Africa (e.g. Fulfulde and Pulaar). There are a multiplicity of Fulɓe clans (lenyi) and sub-clans, tracing different genealogies and migration histories. They often express a general sense of unity as a people, even if in reality divisions are apparent. Fulani people are renowned in West and Central Africa for their rearing of cattle, pastoral transhumance, and nomadism (Stenning 1957, 1959; Riesman 1977; Burnham 1996; Pelican 2008), but many have left pastoralism and practice an increasingly diverse range of other livelihoods. A scholarly stratum within Fulani society had an important role in the transmission of Islam in West Africa, and established the nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate that encompassed much of what became Northern Nigeria (Last 1967; Burnham and Last 1994). Most of the Fulani pastoralists on the Jos Plateau today are settled, but seasonal transhumance is widely practised, whereby a section of the household or hired herdsmen move the cattle to fresh pastures and away from farms at the start of the rainy season, returning after the harvest. There are international cattle routes that traverse the Plateau, several of which have been blocked since 2001, due to the impacts of conflict and cultivation by farmers. These are, 2

There are dialectical variations in Berom, but that is not important for this analysis.

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or were, used by Fulani nomads from outside Plateau State as well as by the settled Fulani agro-pastoralists within the state. Fulani pastoralists on the Jos Plateau speak Fulfulde as their primary language. They are culturally distinct from the Hausa population, but most Fulani people who have settled on the Plateau can also speak Hausa and one or more of the Plateau languages. The migration pattern of Fulani people onto the Jos Plateau varies between locations and differs to that of the Hausa. Although most of the Plateau Fulani arrived in the area in the twentieth century from other parts of northern Nigeria, there had already been contact in the nineteenth century. As described by Bruce (1982), there was a Fulani settlement at Butu, about one mile (1.6 km) north of Gindiri (a town in current Mangu LGA). Butu was settled in the 1890s by a small group of Fulani of the Butuko’en clan and rumada slaves (who were used for herding cattle, farming, heavy domestic work and carrying goods to the market). Over time and generations the rumada would lose their original ethnic identity and take on a ‘Fulani’ ethnicity, but they usually remained distinct from other Fulani clan and kinship groups. The Fulani bought slaves from their neighbours the Pyem, who operated as middlemen, buying them from the Ron on the south-western part of the Plateau, who were ‘the main suppliers of captives’ (Bruce 1982: 194). Some Plateau communities rear dwarf cattle (muturu) – which are no longer widespread, but they are still common in some villages of the central Plateau, such as in Pankshin LGA. Fulani pastoralists introduced zebu cattle onto the Plateau as they moved up in larger numbers from the early twentieth century, pulled by a climate and environment that is conducive to pastoralism. The Jos Plateau has good pasture and is free of the tsetse fly, the vector for trypanosome parasites that cause trypanosomiasis, which kills zebu cattle. The foundation of the Veterinary Research Laboratory at Vom in 1924 (now the National Veterinary Research Institute) also attracted pastoralists over the years. In some areas Fulani pastoralists gradually sold their cattle and became farmers – as in parts of Fan district in Barkin Ladi LGA and parts of Mangu and Langai districts in Mangu LGA.3 In most places the settled Fulani diversified into agro-pastoralism. The Berom and other farming communities often regard Fulani pastoralists as ‘non-indigenous’ to the Plateau. Fulani spokespeople contest this, but unlike the Hausa community in Jos, they seldom compete for political positions in local governments and they are not agitating for their own districts or traditional rulers to supplement or replace the ‘indigenous’ ones.4 Their concern is more to do with access to grazing land 3

Interviews by the author among displaced Fulani agro-pastoralists and farmers in Boto, Tafawa Balewa LGA, Bauchi State, January 2012. 4 There are twelve Berom Districts: Bachi, Riyom (in Riyom LGA), Fan, Foron, Heipang, Ropp, Gashish (in Barkin Ladi LGA), Du, Gyel, Kuru, Vwang and Zawan (in Jos South LGA).

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and fair treatment by the state government, with recognition that they have legitimate rights on the Plateau. Until recent years, Fulani pastoralists had good relations with farming communities right across the Jos Plateau, and in many areas they still do. Berom and Fulani people lived among each other and in some districts there were cases of Fulani men marrying Berom women (but never of Fulani women marrying Berom men). They exchanged cattle and labour, milk and grain, and the pastoralists were given land to graze their cattle (Blench 2004). Some Fulani communities depended on Berom farmers for agricultural produce, while it was common for Berom boys to work as herders for Fulani families who needed additional labour to look after the cattle. Hired herders would be paid annually in cattle, allowing them to gradually build up their own herds. This was the principal means by which Plateau people obtained zebu cattle. Elderly people I interviewed, on both sides, found the recent violence painful to discuss; to them it was almost unimaginable. They recounted how when they were young Fulani and Berom children used to go out grazing together and they would eat in each other’s houses and learn each other’s languages. CONVERSION FROM TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS OF THE PLATEAU TO CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM

Most people on the Jos Plateau followed traditional religions prior to the arrival of European missionaries in 1904, though, as mentioned above, there were pockets of Muslim settlement in the nineteenth century. A majority of the Berom and most other ethnic groups of the Plateau gradually converted from traditional religion to Christianity during the course of the twentieth century, through the influence of European and indigenous missionaries. A significant minority, including from the Berom, became Muslim. In many instances that was regarded as ‘becoming Hausa’, whereas Christianity tended to reinforce local ethnic identities. Prior to British colonial rule the Berom were heavily stratified into semi- or wholly autonomous villages (Gyel, Riyom, Zawan, etc.), with Riyom providing some degree of cohesion as an important centre of indigenous religion and ritual (Baker 1954; Smedley 2004; Jacobs 1995). The Sudan United Mission (SUM) (Maxwell 1953) was the main mission organization in the Berom areas, hence the successor Church of Christ (contd) The district head in each of these is a Berom chief with the title Gwom Rwei. Under each Gwom Rwei are several village heads, called Dagwoms, as well as representatives from other ethnic groups resident in the district. All the Berom chiefs are under the Gbong Gwom, the paramount Berom ruler, a first class chief who is also chairman of the Plateau State Traditional Council (see Nyam and Jacobs 2004). The Gbong Gwom was a colonial creation, in 1947, as part of a colonial policy of creating paramount chieftaincies (like the Tor Tiv) among groups that did not historically have centralised authority, for the purposes of indirect rule.

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in Nations (COCIN) is prominent in Berom land now. The Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), later known as the Evangelical Church Winning All – a successor to the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) – and the Catholics, Anglicans, and many large Pentecostal churches, are all represented too. Initially conversion rates were very low (Baker 1954), but from the 1950s-1960s conversion steadily increased. Christianity is now the dominant religion on the Plateau, but Islam is also widely practised (including within the indigenous population) and traditional religion is still prominent in certain areas, such as among the Irigwe and Tarok. With European missionaries came Western education and medicine and the establishment of schools and clinics, as well as a Christian hospital at Vom (in what is now Jos South LGA). Mission schooling created an educated, Christian, local Plateau elite who entered into government and civil service employment. In Plateau State, the ‘indigenes’, who had been looked down upon by some of the more exposed migrants as being ‘naked pagans’, gained a lead in Western education over the Hausa and Fulani, who were more inclined towards Qur’anic education and linked into traditional trades, commercial activities and the livestock economy. Muslims in Plateau gradually sent their children to government schools in larger numbers, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, but overall they are still behind the Christians in education. However, even after the collapse of the tin mining industry in the 1970s, the Fulani and Hausa communities in and around the mining settlements – which are interspersed between Berom villages – on average remained wealthier than the local people (see below). While conversion to Christianity on the Plateau occurred mainly through missionary schools and hospitals and Christian preaching in local languages, local conversion to Islam occurred more through close social and economic interaction (and sometimes intermarriage) with Fulani and Hausa people. Islamic conversion among the Pyem people around Gindiri fits this model (Bruce 1977). There were individuals and families from most Plateau groups, including Berom, Mwaghavul and Afizere, who converted to Islam. They constituted a minority, but a prominent one in some communities, and in the Pyem case Muslims are in the majority. There were also chiefs in what was then Plateau Province who became Muslims in the early 1960s conversion campaigns of the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Nigeria in the late colonial period and in the First Republic (1960–66).5 Some of these chiefs later reverted to Christianity, while in most cases the next generation of chiefs was Christian. Some indigenous Plateau Muslims have faced 5 Interview with Muhammad Danladi Wangs, a Berom Muslim from Rim village, Riyom LGA, aged about 84. He converted to Islam while a student in Kafanchan, Kaduna State, in the 1940s/50s; Bukuru, 17 August 2013.

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discrimination, especially in the climate of intermittent religious violence in Plateau State after 2001. In the case of Berom Muslims in places like Vom, they were at the receiving end of violence from their ethnic kin. To an extent the indigenous Muslims face double marginalization, with some also complaining that because of their ethnic origins they were treated with suspicion in the predominantly ‘Hausa’ Muslim neighbourhoods they relocated to after they were displaced from villages by their ethnic kin or from majority Christian areas.6 THE EFFECTS OF TIN MINING

The main reason for the increase in the Muslim population on the Plateau was the migration of Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Nupe and other Muslims there from elsewhere in Northern Nigeria for trade, mining and pastoralism. There were also many Yoruba Muslims, a majority of them from Ogbomosho, who migrated to the Plateau (Higazi 2007). During the colonial period the Jos Plateau became one of the main tin producing areas in the world (Freund 1981a). Some local labour, from what was then Plateau Province, was used in the tin mines, but most of the labour had to be brought in from outside – mainly from other parts of Northern Nigeria. During the Second World War, to meet the increased demand for tin and columbite, labour conscription was enforced through the Native Authorities by means of a quota system, colloquially called Diban Gwamna, meaning ‘governor’s fetching’ in Hausa (Gonyok 1986; Freund 1981a). Numerous Plateau groups were adversely affected by tin mining, including the Ron, Aten, Afizere, Anaguta, Mwaghavul and Ngas. However, the largest portion of mining land was situated in areas populated by Berom communities. The predominantly Hausa and Kanuri miners, and both seasonal camps and permanent settlements of Fulani pastoralists, became established on the Plateau in close proximity to Berom villages. Hausa traders who settled in Jos Native Town during the colonial period tended to have migrated there from district headquarters in other Northern provinces, including Kano, Katsina, Bauchi, Zaria and Sokoto.7 In contrast most of the migrant labourers in the Jos tin mines were drawn from the rural peasantry of Northern Nigeria (Perchonock 1974; Freund 1981b). Some were forced to work there by the colonial authorities, while others went voluntarily. This distinction between the urban and rural 6 This view was expressed at an ‘indigenous Muslim women’s meeting’ in Jos in 2012, attended by the author. 7 ‘They were aspiring to upward mobility and found their way blocked in the capitals, so looked for other opportunities’ – Norma Perchonock, personal communication, 16 January 2017. That was a key motivation of Hausa migrants who moved to Jos, a new town with no emirate and fewer entrenched hierarchies.

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Muslim populations on the Jos Plateau is significant. Tin miners and traders in the mining camps, most of whom were Muslim, from different ethnicities but who were often labelled ‘Hausa’, were peripheral to the political and economic networks of more urbanized Hausa traders in Jos. They also had fewer channels of communication during the conflicts of 2001 and 2010, to the extent that most of the violence that was perpetrated in the mining areas south of Jos was not publicly exposed. Essential context is that tin mining created a serious problem of land alienation on the Plateau, causing major social and economic dislocation in Berom land and in other communities (Davies 1944; Baker 1954; Freund 1981a; Smedley 2004). The damage caused by mining to local agriculture was not just a result of the amount of land being mined, but also of the type of land that was mined. Davies (1944: 6) is clear on this point: Tin mining is, to a large extent, concentrated in definite areas, and there are large tracts of country where there is as yet no mining. Where tin is worked, however, it is almost invariably on alluvial land along or in the vicinity of rivers, where is also the richest farmland. Mining thus tends to alienate good farmland, of which there is little, rather than the poor land, of which there is so much. Examples may be seen at Dorowa Babuje and Zawan where much of the good farmland is now alienated from the indigenous peoples. With the collapse of industrial tin and columbite mining in the late 1970s, livelihoods in the old mining settlements changed and questions of land use and ownership came to the fore. The mining leases expired or are now about to expire, but large areas of land had already been sold or taken from the Berom and other indigenous people. In some areas, land is – or was – inhabited by ‘settler’ communities who came for mining, but elsewhere land was taken or sold to property developers as metropolitan Jos grew in size.8 The mining settlements that are dotted around the Plateau were close to a century old by the time of the 2001 riots. With the decline in mining the inhabitants adopted other livelihoods, including as commercial drivers and dry-season farmers – profitable enterprises, the latter using irrigation to 8 This includes Rayfield, which is claimed as Du land but which has developed into one of (if not the) most expensive parts of Jos. Rayfield is where most of Plateau State’s political elite live and where Government House is located. Land there was appropriated by the government in some areas and sold by Berom owners in other areas. Du is a Berom district and is where Jonah Jang (Governor of Plateau State, 2007–15) and key members of his administration came from. Jacob Gyang Buba, the paramount traditional leader of Jos, known as the Gbong Gwom (see Nyam and Jacobs 2004), and his brother Timothy Gyang Buba, who became the LGC chairman of Jos North after the disputed local government election of November 2008, are also from Du district.

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grow vegetables and fruit for large markets in Jos, Abuja and other cities. They also made money from artisanal or informal tin and columbite mining. Hausa traders controlled many of the markets and Hausa middlemen would sometimes exploit Berom farmers when they came to sell their produce. I heard accounts in the field of good relations between the Berom and their Hausa and Fulani neighbours up until 2001, but some tensions existed as well (including rivalries over women). The key point is that the mainly Hausa ‘non-indigenes’ were much wealthier than the Berom ‘indigenes’ in the old mining areas. They sustained this advantage because they had more commercial experience and acumen and wider economic networks to draw upon.9 They had also bought productive land for lucrative dry-season farming (and in some cases were given it by the Berom). Some were violently expelled from this land in September 2001 (field research and Blench 2004) and many more in January 2010.

Narratives of threat and the impacts of religious reform The focus on security in Plateau State by different sections of the population and by the state and federal governments is pitched in terms of the threat posed by collective violence and terrorism, or – in more partial narratives – by ethnic or religious ‘others’. Perceptions of what the threats to security actually consist of vary between groups and individuals. The Muslims within Plateau State, who constitute up to perhaps one-third of the population, have been viewed with suspicion and were accused of starting all the violent crises that have occurred on the Plateau over the past two decades. This is not, in fact, a realistic or reasonable assumption, but it reflects a prevalent strain of anti-Muslim feeling. The wider context is crucial, as many Christian leaders in Plateau State think that Muslims in the state have been helped in the conflicts by the Muslim majority in northern Nigeria and that they are pursuing an ‘agenda’ to Islamize the Plateau. The adjacent states to Plateau have large Muslim populations – including Bauchi (majority Muslim), Nasarawa, Taraba and Kaduna (religiously plural, with large Muslim populations), while majority Muslim cities like Kano, Zaria and Maiduguri are within relatively easy reach by road. Although there is a substantial northern Christian population and there are Christian minorities in all northern cities (see Chapter 3), Jos is viewed as the bastion of Christianity in central and northern Nigeria. 9 The differences in wealth between Berom and Hausas may partly also be a result of their differing positions in the tin mining industry. The headmen were largely drawn from the Muslim migrant population and selected by the mining supervisors. I thank Norma Perchonock for this insight – personal communication, 16 January 2017.

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There is a fear among some Christians that because of this, Muslims want to conquer Jos, continuing the nineteenth-century jihad that was fought across what are now the emirates of northern Nigeria (Fwatshak 2006). Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio’s jihad was directed principally against the Hausa states; it was launched from Gobir in what is now north-west Nigeria in 1804 as an Islamic reform movement, but by the mid-nineteenth century slave raiding had become endemic on the edge of the Caliphate, in what is now central Nigeria (Last 1967; Aliyu 1974; Blench 2011). Consequently, during this period more people moved up into highland areas such as the Jos Plateau and Kauru Hills in central Nigeria, and to the Biu Plateau, Mandara Mountains, Muri Mountains and Adamawa highlands in north-east Nigeria. Islamic authority expanded in influence to adjoining areas of the plains from Bauchi and Zaria during the nineteenth century (Smith 1960; Aliyu 1974; Morrison 1982), but the Jos Plateau remained on the fringes of the Sokoto Caliphate (Last 1967); it was not incorporated into it. The ruggedness of the Plateau helped to prevent its occupation during the jihad, as it was difficult to surmount on horseback and the terrain allowed the local inhabitants to defend themselves. The Plateau was also difficult for the jihadists to subjugate because it was comprised of so many different small-scale polities which put up resistance; there was no central authority that could be forced into submission (Morrison 1982; Mangvwat 1992; Nengel 1999). Historical memories of the jihad and the insecurity of the nineteenth century and earlier have been reactivated and incorporated into discourses of contemporary conflicts and politics in the Middle Belt (Fwatshak 2006; Blench 2011). Fulani attacks on farming communities in some areas of Plateau since 2001 (often in retaliation for attacks on Fulani pastoralists by farmers in the wake of the urban rioting) have led some local historians and others to conflate the current Fulani population with the raiders of the jihadist period. Yet, the context of the current conflicts is entirely different. A counter-point to such discourses is that the origins of most of the pastoral Fulani on the Jos Plateau (and the Hausa population) can be traced to the twentieth century, during the colonial period (Stenning 1957; Awogbade 1983). Fulani pastoralists moved up onto the Jos Plateau, once it was safe to do so, because it offered good grazing land, not because they sought to conquer it. However, while the image of twenty-first century Fulani jihadists seeking to conquer the Plateau is inaccurate, it is true that over the past 35 years there has been a more modern process of Islamic reform among sections of the Fulani in rural areas around Jos. This elicited a process of social change and impacted relations with non-Muslims.

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284 • Jos – Conflict & Peace Building ISLAMIC REFORM AMONG THE PLATEAU FULANI

The largest Salafi-inspired reformist group in northern Nigeria is Jama’at Izalat al-Bid’a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna (the Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna’ – officially called JIBWIS, but popularly referred to as Izala). Izala was established in 1978 under the patronage of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, who was Grand Qadi of Northern Nigeria and heavily influenced by Wahhabi doctrines from Saudi Arabia (see Gumi and Tsiga 1994). The leader of Izala after its formation was Shaykh Isma’ila Idris (1937–2000), who was based in Jos. There is now a split in Izala between rival Jos- and Kaduna-based factions (Izala ‘A’ and ‘B’). Izala’s purpose is to spread an ‘orthodox’ Islam, which involves ‘purifying’ the religion from Sufi mysticism and other supposedly harmful innovations (bid’a). This has generated persistent tensions with the darika (Sufi orders), especially the Tijaniyya. Some Izala preachers also antagonize Christians, criticizing Christianity and contributing to interas well as intra-religious tension and competition. Existing writings on Izala focus more on the doctrine of the movement and its impacts in urban contexts of northern Nigeria and Niger (Umar 1993; Loimeier 1997; Kane 2003; Sounaye 2009; on Izala in Plateau State see Modibbo 2012). There has been little or no research on Izala’s rural impacts. This is probably because there are more followers in the towns, but Izala does also have influence in some rural contexts. The Fulani population in parts of Plateau State were one of the first constituencies to join the reformists. Izala is now the dominant religious movement among Fulani pastoralists of the Jos Plateau, with its greatest strength in Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Bokkos LGAs. The nomadic Fulani who migrate across the Jos Plateau on seasonal transhumance are generally less receptive to ideas of Islamic reform and to the teachings of Izala. However, the majority of the Fulani population on the northern Plateau are settled, and most of them – more than 90 per cent in some communities – are associated with Izala. As a proportion of the Muslim population in different localities, Izala has a relatively larger following in the rural areas among the Fulani than it does among Muslims in metropolitan Jos, from where the movement spread. Interestingly, Izala was not as strongly entrenched among Muslims in the old tin mining communities. There were Izala mosques there, but in most of these peri-urban and rural Hausa/Kanuri communities the Tijaniyya has had a larger following. The reasons for this distinct pattern of Islamic reform are addressed in the rest of this section. One of the main reasons Izala became popular among Fulani pastoralists on the Jos Plateau is that Shaykh Isma’ila Idris, the leader of Izala until his death in 2000, was a Fulani and he preached to them in the Fulfulde language. Isma’ila Idris was born in Gwaskwaram village in Bauchi

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LGA, Bauchi State.10 His father was reportedly Jahun by clan and had moved to Bauchi from Kano (Amara 2012). Idris studied under various Islamic scholars in Bauchi and then, from 1963–1967, at the School of Arabic Studies in Kano, following which he moved to Kaduna where he came under the mentorship of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (Amara 2012). While in Kaduna Isma’ila Idris joined the Nigerian Army and became an imam to Muslim soldiers. He preached at mosques in the barracks and gained a reputation as a firebrand preacher, employing harsh rhetoric against Sufism. He was not an officer and some of the officers opposed his preaching, leading to him having to leave several of the barracks he had been deployed to, and eventually the army itself. For some years, up until he left the army, Isma’ila Idris was based at Rukuba Cantonment, the barracks of the Third Armoured Division, in Bassa LGA on the western outskirts of Jos. After leaving Rukuba Barracks Isma’ila Idris lived in Ali Kazaure ward in Jos (his house is still there) and he built up a network of followers. After the establishment of Izala in 1978 Shaykh Idris organized da’wa (proselytization) activities across a wider area of both Plateau State and northern Nigeria. The local government areas where Izala gained its largest following among the Fulani – reportedly within three years of Izala’s establishment – were Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Bokkos LGAs in Plateau State and Toro LGA in Bauchi State. This seems to be because Isma’ila Idris had relations in those areas and so, after leaving the army, when his preaching outside the barracks increased, da’wa activities were carried out more intensively there. Nonetheless, Izala gained at least some support across nearly the whole of Plateau and neighbouring states. In urban areas such as Jos, Isma’ila Idris preached in Hausa, but in the rural areas he preached to Fulani pastoralists in Fulfulde. This ensured the Fulani effectively understood his preaching and that he built up a following among them. It was particularly on the Jos Plateau – more so than in other states – that Fulani pastoralists went into Izala, with some variation in the strength of the movement between communities. Local Fulani supporters accompanied Shaykh Idris on da’wa and carried out their own religious activities under the Izala umbrella, seeking to improve the Islamic learning and knowledge of their people. They became the first generation of Izala leaders in their areas and in some cases went on to gain wider prominence, as with Shaykh Bello, the current Ardo (leader) of Bachi District in Riyom LGA, who preaches as a member of the Izala ulama at the national level. Islamic reform occurred in parallel with increased sedentarization among the Plateau Fulani. It appears that a new generation of ‘Alhajis’ 10

Salihu Umar, former secretary of Miyetti Allah, Plateau State, interviewed in September 2013.

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had already gained status among the settled Fulani of the Plateau before Izala came on the scene (Hickey and Thompson 1981), so Izala may have been a catalyst for a reform process that was already in motion. One of the main reasons Izala became popular among settled and semi-settled Fulani pastoralists was that it emphasized Islamic education and empowered them in religious matters. In the narrative of Fulani leaders in Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs – all of whom are members of Izala – prior to the coming of Izala the Hausa malams (referring to local Islamic teachers, including imams) would exercise Islamic authority over the Fulani population. According to present Fulani narratives, this relationship was based on dependence and exploitation by the established malams, and Izala ended it. The malams in question were members of the Tijaniyya order and/or Jama’atu Nasril Islam ( JNI), but Izala preached that they were not following the correct message of Islam. One of the reasons Izala was attractive to the pastoral Fulani on the Plateau was that it confronted the local Hausa religious authorities in the towns and villages and challenged them to demonstrate the Islamic basis of their practices in the Qur’an and the Hadith literature. Izala argued that many of the practices the Fulani pastoralists were being subjected to had no Islamic basis. Prior to Izala, Hausa malams reportedly carried out most of the religious ceremonies and rites for Fulani pastoralists on the Plateau. If a Fulani man died, a non-Fulani imam would likely lead the burial, and it was claimed that in such circumstances the imam would take the dead man’s clothes, as a payment.11 With the teachings of Izala, this was no longer accepted; it was even deemed un-Islamic. If a Fulani man wanted to slaughter a cow or another animal, for eating or to sell, the slaughtering had to be done by a Hausa butcher or malam. This was to ensure that it was halal, otherwise it would be labelled as a ‘carcass’ and no butcher would buy it. Hausas profited from this arrangement, as it sustained their monopolies in the meat trade and in religious rites on the Plateau but, since the spread of Izala, which has a greater focus on individual religiosity and dispenses with much of the ritual hierarchies of the Sufis, disregarding them as bid’a, Fulani people now slaughter their own animals if they want to. Through the religious education provided by Izala, Islamic leaders emerged among the Fulani in these communities, breaking the dependence on Hausa malams and other established religious orders. Some members of Izala preach that Sufis are non-Muslims, and Isma’ila Idris himself told his followers not to accept food from them (Amara 2012). The same restrictions on sharing food were preached in refer11

Interview with Ardo Idris Gidado of Gashish District, Barkin Ladi LGA, 28 September 2013.

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ence to Christians.12 This curtailed exchange relations between Fulani Muslims and indigenous Christians in some communities, though it was a mixed situation. In most areas there were Fulani Muslims who continued to exchange food with their Christian neighbours, especially at Sallah (Eid) and Christmas, even with the presence of Izala (some Izala members are willing to eat food prepared by Christians). In other cases, there were Fulanis who had always discouraged this, for the same reasons subsequently preached by Izala – fear that food prepared in non-Muslim households was not halal or could be contaminated with alcohol or pork (even from the cooking implements). But in general, Izala reduced such forms of exchange. Three Fulani informants told me, independently, that if Christians brought food to the households of Izala members who followed these sectarian prescriptions, they would often throw it to their dogs, sometimes even before the people who brought the food were out of sight.13 It was not all members of Izala who behaved in this way, but some did and the more aggressive preachers generated tension with the Sufis and with Christians. The role of Fulani women changed in areas where the Salafi ideas of Izala became dominant, with more restrictions on the economic activities they could pursue. Some Fulani women are now discouraged from selling milk in public places like markets (Blench 2010) as more live in purdah, or conditions close to it – staying mainly within the household compound, rarely venturing out of the community. This is not a universal trend among the Plateau Fulani, but it has become the way of life in some areas of Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bokkos and elsewhere. But Islamic reform has also encouraged the education of women, especially Islamic education, and to a lesser extent Western education. An example is the family of Ardo Idris Gidado, the Fulani leader in Gashish District of Barkin Ladi LGA, who was one of the first generation of Izala leaders on the Plateau. He knew Isma’ila Idris and accompanied him on da’wa. In our discussion about the social impacts of Izala, the main emphasis of Ardo Idris Gidado was on education – on Islamiyya education, which he argued had significantly raised the level of Islamic knowledge among Fulani pastoralists on the Plateau, and secular or Western education, karatun boko. He gave the example of his sons who graduated from or were currently studying at university (one graduated in animal science from the University of Maiduguri and another was reading biology there) and his daughters who have completed secondary school. 12

This was confirmed by a Fulani resident of Jebba, Bassa LGA, who is a member of the Tijaniyya, by a Fulani Christian pastor resident in Miango (also Bassa LGA), and by another Fulani Christian originally from Bokkos but now resident in Jos. All interviews carried out in Jos in 2013. 13 Interviews in a Fulani Muslim household near Jebbu (Rukuba), 14 October 2013, and with a Fulani Christian Reverend in Jos, 8 October 2013. Berom respondents confirmed this.

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Fulani Muslims still lag behind Berom, Irigwe and other majority Christian groups on the Plateau in Western education, but the number of educated Fulani youths now is higher than a generation ago.14 This is due to the combined effects of nomadic education – a government-sponsored scheme to establish schools for Fulani pastoralists and other mobile groups – and Izala’s setting up of Islamiyya schools. The latter offer Qur’anic education and secular subjects along the lines of the national curriculum. The quality of these schools was already variable, but the situation has been worsened by the conflicts, with most of the nomadic schools in the crisis-hit areas either destroyed or closed, or forced to rely on unqualified teachers. The qualified teachers in the nomadic schools were mainly non-Fulani and due to the insecurity they stopped going to work. Government schools were long neglected by the Plateau State government and in the rural areas they are even more dilapidated than in towns. The poor standard of education is compounded by frequent teachers’ strikes, in protest against government failures to pay their salaries, and in reaction to the sacking of unqualified teachers. This has negatively affected the education of children, regardless of religious or ethnic background, with widespread illiteracy persisting. This is a major contributor to violent conflict in northern Nigeria. Is there a link between the Islamic reform process in rural areas of the Jos Plateau and the subsequent violence experienced there? This is difficult to ascertain with certainty, but there are arguments for and against. The main argument against such a proposition is that, particularly in September 2001 and January 2010, violence was triggered in the rural areas in response to rioting in Jos. At the onset of the rural violence, Muslims were the main victims in terms of fatalities and displacement. The violence was widespread, particularly in Berom and Irigwe land, and targeted Muslims in general, not only communities associated with Izala. The co-ordinated attacks on the old tin mining settlements in January 2010 were, cumulatively, the most devastating in terms of the scale of killing and destruction of property, but the majority of people killed there were not Salafi (Izala), they were Tijaniyya or ‘neutral’ Muslims. Izala cannot be blamed for the rural violence when there is strong evidence to suggest that they and Muslims in general were systematically attacked in the areas outside Jos; they did not start it, but sections of the Fulani perpetuated the violence by launching revenge attacks on Berom and Irigwe villages. On the other hand, in at least some of the Fulani communities guided by Salafi teachings it seems there was a deterioration in the relationship 14 An estimate, from an educated Fulani representative in Barkin Ladi, is that 500-600 Fulani youths now complete secondary school in Barkin Ladi LGA each year. I have not confirmed this, but it is plausible, though the Berom would have significantly more.

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with their Christian neighbours prior to the onset of mass violence in 2001 and again in 2010. Fulani pastoralists tend to have their own settlements, distinct from the old mining communities, and their relations with villagers were to a large extent autonomous from that of the miners. The fact that they were attacked presents a distinct problem, given the closeness of the relationship between Fulani pastoralists and Berom farmers and others in the past. Izala followers were described as ‘stubborn and arrogant’ by Muslims and Christians alike who did not share their views. But at the same time, some of the Fulani leaders, who are members of Izala (such as Ardo Gidado), were referred to positively by their Berom Christian counterparts. There is substantial variation in the attitudes and behaviour of individuals within any given religious movement, whether Islamic or Christian, and it is clear that Izala followers have a range of religious and social outlooks. But at least in some ways the reformist zeal of Izala over time generated resentment from some of the Christians and other Muslims. We may conclude that the spread of Salafism to rural areas of the Jos Plateau made a strong mark on Islamic practice and in the relationship between Muslims and Christians. But there were material incentives for violence and influential ethnic and religious ideologies among Christian ‘indigenes’ on the Plateau that contributed to tensions too. Inflammatory rhetoric cuts both ways. Indigenized churches in Berom land and other areas of the Plateau, including mainline churches such as COCIN and ECWA and Pentecostal churches, often stereotyped Muslims and cast Islam in a very negative light. Some of the churches were influenced by local Plateau politics. Among the more intolerant sections of each community, Christians could be heard referring to the Islamic religion as ‘demonic’, while Muslims referred to indigenous Christians as arne or pagans. Such language increased in Plateau State as a direct consequence of the religious violence experienced there over the past decade, but such sentiments were already present in some measure, having increased with heightened Islamic and Christian religious activism since the 1980s.

Mass violence and ethno-religious polarization The riots in metropolitan Jos triggered enduring armed conflicts in some rural areas of the Jos Plateau. Where such violence became protracted its logic altered: tensions that were not necessarily present or sufficiently serious to be causes of violence at the outset were generated or accentuated as a direct result of the insecurity and became sources of continuing violent conflict. The origins of the rural violence on the Plateau have been frequently, but incorrectly, explained as classic farmer-herder conflicts (especially by outside

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observers). But the fact is that the disputes over grazing land and farmland, and ‘cattle mischief ’ (encroachment of cattle onto farms), only became acute and unmanageable with the spill over of rioting from urban to rural areas. Disputes between farmers and pastoralists have always occurred, but there are established procedures that communities have for managing them. It was only after the spread of religious/political violence into the rural areas from Jos that these mechanisms broke down and the contrasting patterns of life between farmers and transhumant pastoralists became a source of violent conflict. A Christian Berom leader in Jol – a village in Riyom LGA that has subsequently seen high levels of violent conflict – described their interaction with their Muslim Fulani neighbours before 2001: It was good. In the past the Fulani would not allow their cattle onto farms. Even if you cultivated land near their rugas [pastoralist camps] they would look after it. Berom farmers would drop their hoes in Fulani households and collect them the next day. When farmers arrived they would be greeted warmly and given respect. What has changed is that the Fulani youths have become stubborn.15 Since 2001 there have been some serious clashes between the Fulani in Mahanga (Rankum) and Berom in Jol. The Fulani frequently took their cattle onto farms and into the Reserved Area of Jol – which is supposed to be left uncultivated for thatching grass and as a burial site – while the Fulani people in Mahanga complained that the Berom in Jol often attacked their cattle.16 These issues were accentuated because of the violence; as the above quote implies, they were not the original causes of collective violence in this area. Once violence commenced, the consequences of religious and ethnic polarization, displacement and loss of assets (including farms, houses and cattle) affected the exigencies and logic of violence as it ensued. Cattle rustling and the destruction of farms then became major sources of instability, especially in the Berom majority LGAs of Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Jos South (Higazi 2016).17 In part, the rural conflicts became farmer-herder conflicts, but that is not how they started. This observation is further supported by the fact that armed conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have been most concentrated in the Berom majority areas of the northern Jos Plateau, where rural violence was linked to the politics of Jos and Plateau State. It is not the whole of the high Plateau that has been affected, despite compa15

Author interview with Danladi Taje, Gwom Jol, 18 April 2012. Berom people in Sho village (Barkin Ladi LGA), which also borders Mahanga/ Rankum, made the same complaints, as did those in Fang (Bachi District, Riyom LGA) and elsewhere. 17 Author fieldwork in villages across all of these LGAs, in Berom and Fulani communities and discussions with STF personnel, 2012–15. 16 The

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rable pressures on land in the central areas. The Mwaghavul paramount ruler in Kerang, for example, described ‘very good, cordial relations with the Fulani. Their grandfathers were born here and they have no other place to go.’18 This is not to say there has been no conflict on the Jos Plateau involving Fulani pastoralists outside of Berom land, as that is not the case, but the level of violence has been highest in Berom areas and some also spilled over to neighbouring LGAs. From 2013, the spread of cattle rustling destabilized parts of Bokkos LGA (predominantly Ron) that until then had remained relatively peaceful.19 At the end of December 2014 there were clashes between Mwaghavul farmers and Fulani pastoralists in Mangu LGA. Compared to the mass violence in contiguous LGAs these were relatively small in scale, but they were taken seriously by local Fulani and Mwaghavul leaders and were at least temporarily resolved.20 The first occurrence of large-scale violence between the Berom and Fulani/Hausa on the outskirts of Jos and in the villages was in September 2001. The rioting began in central Jos and spilled over into the rural areas, sparked by the killings in Jos and, reportedly, the bringing of the bodies of some of the victims back to the villages. One of the worst affected areas was Vwang District, where there were mass killings in and around Vom, Heita and nearby villages. The rioting in Jos began on the afternoon of Friday 7 September and spread into the rural areas over the following days. Berom youths mobilized against Muslim residents in Vwang and killed a large number of people. Among those killed were the two Fulani Ardos (leaders) in the district and members of their families: Ardo A. Bahago, who was the Ardo Chugwi, and Ardo Ibrahim Isau, the Ardo Turu. They were elderly men and both were killed on Sunday 9 September 2001 along with some of their children and brothers.21 There were losses on the Berom side in December 2001 and during the course of 2002 in revenge attacks by Fulani pastoralists. In September 2001 women and girls were reportedly among the Fulanis who were killed in Vwang, but when violence recurred there in January 18

Author interview with Da Nelson Andak Paul Bakfur, Miskaham Mwaghavul (Kerang Mangu LGA), 26 August 2012. 19 Fieldwork and interviews with Ron and Fulani leaders in Bokkos LGA, 7 September 2013. 20 ‘Warring communities in Plateau reconcile, buy grains for victims’, Premium Times, 9 February 2015, www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/north-central/176515-warring-communities-plateau-reconcile-%E2%80%8Bbuy-%E2%80%8Bgrains-victims.html (accessed 30 May 2015). 21 Author interview with Alhaji Jibril Abubakar, in Sabon Gidan Nabordo, Toro LGA, Bauchi State, 10 June 2010. He is leader of the Fulani community in Sabon Gidan Nabordo, most of whom were displaced there from Vom (Vwang District). The information on the large scale of attacks on Fulani pastoralists in Vwang District in September 2001 and January 2010, with lists of the names of people killed, was confirmed by several other sources, Fulani and non-Fulani. A useful spreadsheet was compiled by Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), titled ‘Names of Deceased Fulanis, Widows, Orphans, Rustled Animals, and Houses Destroyed’ and covering Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Jos South LGAs.

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2010 only males were targeted.22 These seem to have been orchestrated attacks by the Berom majority against the Fulani population and Muslims in general, who were the minority in the area. All Muslims were displaced from Vwang District. According to local records, more than 100 Fulani people were killed there in the 2001 and 2010 episodes, a figure that does not include non-Fulani Muslims (such as Hausas and Berom Muslims) who died in the attacks. Many of those who survived were traumatized because family members had been killed and they had lost their wealth: livestock, houses, vehicles and farmland. Another badly affected area outside Jos in 2001 was Heipang, a district in Barkin Ladi LGA, near Jos Airport. The violence there began early on Monday morning, 10 September. Heipang is predominantly Berom and the population there reacted to the crisis in the city by attacking Muslims in their midst, killing and displacing the Hausa population in Heipang. They then drove out Fulani pastoralists from the outlying areas of Heipang District. According to one of the Fulani men who left, eight members of his extended family were killed and he is aware of at least another seven Fulani victims. He also admitted that they were expecting to be attacked because they had received information from some of the more friendly Berom residents that youths in Heipang were mobilizing. They realized they were in danger when the violence began in Heipang town: from there, it spread to other parts of the district. It was claimed the Fulani killed some of the Berom youths who came out to attack them. Some of the Fulani escaped by paying soldiers to escort them from Heipang to Tilden Fulani in Bauchi State (two soldiers were allegedly paid 100,000 naira each – about US $600 or GBP £400 at that time).23 There was violence across other parts of Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Jos South LGAs in 2001. In areas such as Kassa, in Barkin Ladi, the Hausa inhabitants left without any killing and their houses were not burned, but they lost the farms they had been cultivating. Fulani pastoralists were also forced out of the area and lost many cattle in the process. Subsequently the Berom people in Kassa were attacked by the Fulani. There was also violence in Bachi District in September 2001, and among the numerous people killed were the Fulani Ardo and his family, while others were displaced. In subsequent years multiple attacks were carried out on Berom villagers in Bachi, with heavy loss of life and the evacuation of some 22

This comes from the testimony of Ahmad Abdullahi, who narrowly escaped from Vwang in September 2001. He stated that 24 members of his extended family were killed in Vwang in September 2001 and 27 were killed in January 2010. I recorded his testimony twice, on 30 April 2012 and in April 2015. 23 Interview with Saleh Salisu, who left Heipang in 2001 and now lives in Tilden Fulani, 29 August 2013. I also interviewed the Gwom Rwei Heipang, Da Felix Pam Tok, in 2006/07, and had earlier conversations with some of the Fulani who left Heipang.

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villages, with a portion of the land now taken over by Fulani pastoralists.24 Many of the old mining settlements also experienced violence in 2001, including Kuru Jentar, but in most areas, the scale of killing was higher in January 2010. The crisis did not only spread from Jos to Berom land. In September 2001 the Fulani population was forced out of Miango and nearby villages, in Bassa LGA, by the Irigwe, and sustained fatalities and loss of cattle there. Some of the Fulani from Miango resettled in Kaduna State, near Saminaka, some went to other parts of Bassa (including Rukuba land), while others moved to Magama Gumau and Sabon Garin Nabordo in Bauchi State. The rural violence of September 2001 precipitated some two years of sporadic violence, as groups of Fulanis attacked Berom and Irigwe villages, often at night, in 2001–03. There was internal displacement from the crisis-hit areas but from May 2004, with the federally-imposed six-month state of emergency in Plateau State and the attempt at reconciliation initiated by the state government, some internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes (often having to reconstruct them). Muslims returned to some of the villages they had fled from, such as Kuru Jentar and Vwang, only to be attacked again in January 2010. Others permanently relocated to Bauchi State or moved into metropolitan Jos. Christians are a clear majority in most rural areas of the Plateau and so in the early stages of the conflict fewer were displaced from the villages than from Jos. But even in September 2001 some Berom villages were taken over by Fulani pastoralists, who have maintained control over those areas. The Berom inhabitants were forced out of Rankum Jol, Rafin Acha and Fass, in the vicinity of Jol in western Riyom LGA, in 2001, for example.25 Rankum, which is strategically located on a hill, became a Fulani stronghold and is called Mahanga by the present Fulani occupants. The Mahanga area became a flashpoint for violence and it is suspected that many attacks on Berom villages have been carried out from there. In becoming a Fulani stronghold the settlement of Mahanga absorbed Fulanis after each crisis who were displaced from other parts of Berom land, which may explain why they sought to consolidate their position in and around Mahanga at the expense of neighbouring Berom villages. After September 2001 the next large riot in Jos was on 28-29 November 2008 (Ostien 2009), during which some of the rural environs and other towns in Plateau State were affected, but generally not on the scale of 2001 or that subsequently in 2010. On 17 January 2010 another urban 24 Interviews in Bachi District, 18 September 2013. There was further serious violence in Bachi in 2014, with particularly large attacks in January and October. The Fulani sustained some additional losses there, in lives and cattle, but most of the victims in Bachi in 2011–15 were Berom farmers. 25 Berom leaders in Jol stated that the Fulani attacked them on 11 September 2001, and it was at this time that Rankum, Rafin Acha, Dakum and Fass were taken over by the Fulani; fieldwork and interviews by the author in Jol, 18 April and 23 April 2012.

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riot erupted in Jos, starting in Nassarawa Gwom, then in the early hours of Tuesday 19 January violence began between Christians and Muslims in Bukuru, a town ten miles to the south. Berom youths then mobilized against Muslims across a larger area of Jos South, Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs, attacking, killing and driving them out from the mining settlements to which their forefathers had started migrating a century earlier. The worst massacres in rural areas of the Jos Plateau occurred in January 2010, when Muslims were targeted, and afterwards, when reprisal killings began against Christians and a spiral of tit-for-tat killings followed. At least forty settlements were targeted in orchestrated attacks on 19 January 2010, the assailants arriving in vehicles or on foot to kill the Muslims and destroy their houses. In some settlements all Muslims were targeted, while in others only males were. Consequently, a large proportion of the Muslim inhabitants who once populated the Jos tin fields have now gone. The Muslims were labelled as ‘settlers’, but after a century of habitation their origins were not always clear and many were mixed. Some were of Hausa or Kanuri origin, but many had their origins on the Plateau, with kin among the Berom, Afizere and other groups. Being Muslim on the Plateau, in other words, is not evidence of being ‘non-indigenous’. There were massacres in which hundreds were killed, mostly on the same day, Tuesday 19 January 2010. Some of the most notorious mass killings were at Kuru Jentar (where at least 183 Muslims were killed – those are the documented deaths; the real figure could be significantly higher, as some of the dead were not accounted for),26 – in Dorowan Tsoho (where Muslims were surrounded and killed in the market), Gero, Sabon Gidan Foron, Sabon Gidan Kanar, Timtim, Dogo Nahauwa and many other places.27 At the same time, Berom assailants attacked Fulani pastoralists and in some places decimated entire families, killing women, children 26

Names and details of the massacre are recorded in: ‘Report of what took place in Kuru Karama on Tuesday 19th January 2010’, The Muslim Forum of Kuru Karama, Jos South LGA, Plateau State, 5 March 2010, addressed to the Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee on 17th January Jos and Environs Crises. I visited Kuru Karama in June 2010 and in Jos and Magama Gumau (Bauchi State) recorded the testimonies of some of the men and women who escaped. 27 The evidence for this comes from visits I made to some of the affected settlements and multiple testimonies recorded among IDPs in Plateau and Bauchi in the aftermath of the attacks. Some of the destruction is still visible to anyone who visits these settlements, and it is clear that the Muslims are no longer there. A written record is ‘Plateau State Muslim Ummah: Muslims Massacred Toll Recorded January 17th 2010, Jos and Environs Crises’, obtained in Jos from the Jasawa Development Association, June 2010. This lists the names of 968 Muslims who were allegedly killed on the Jos Plateau in January 2010. In addition to the recorded names, relatives provided photos of some of the deceased. At the same time, there are other witnesses who saw what happened. There is sufficient evidence to prove that these killings happened on a large scale. Unfortunately the Nigerian police did not investigate these massacres or prosecute anybody. I carried out similar work in areas of Berom land to document the post-January 2010 violence there, including the 7 March 2010 attack on Dogo Nahauwa.

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and men, while their cattle were either stolen or slaughtered. Those who survived recount this calamity in detail and with horror. Most of the surviving Muslim inhabitants from the mining settlements were either permanently displaced into neighbouring Bauchi State or to Jos and nearby towns such as Bukuru, Bisichi and Barkin Ladi. Fulani pastoralists were at the same time displaced from many areas of Berom land – including a large area of Barkin Ladi LGA (three out of five districts: Heipang, Fan and Foron), most of Jos South LGA, and part of Riyom LGA. Many who survived fled to various parts of Bauchi State, which is predominantly Muslim and more welcoming of Fulani pastoralists, but the main problem they have there is the shortage of water during the dry season. Some areas to which they relocated are unsuitable for dageji (a breed of zebu cattle) and other cattle they were used to rearing on the Jos Plateau. Many herds were lost during the crisis and some cattle died due to the change in environment when they were moved from Plateau to Bauchi. Some of the Fulani population affected by the January 2010 crisis therefore remained on the Plateau, moving to areas of Berom land (and elsewhere) where they had more safety in numbers. These areas, which have consequently seen an increase in cattle numbers and people since 2010, became the main flashpoints of violence between Fulani pastoralists and Berom farmers on the Jos Plateau.28 In parts of Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs, Berom villagers subsequently lost land or could no longer access portions of their land, especially bush farms, as they were vulnerable to attack.29 There were further clashes between the Irigwe and Fulani communities around Miango in January 2010, followed by more Fulani reprisals there. The Miango conflict seemed to have cooled down by 2013, when Fulani pastoralists were grazing their cattle again in Irigwe land, though no longer living there.30 They still live and graze their cattle among the Rukuba people. The relationship between the Rukuba – neighbours to the Irigwe in Bassa LGA – and Fulani remained largely peaceful throughout. There are fewer Fulani pastoralists in Rukuba land than there were in Miango, but local agency made a difference, particularly the quality of leadership on 28 More pastoralists moved into eastern Barkin Ladi LGA and western Riyom LGA. Jos South LGA became a no-go area for Muslims after January 2010; Fan, Foron and Heipang Districts in Barkin Ladi LGA became no-go areas or restricted. Fulani pastoralists entered to make reprisal attacks at night, not to graze their cattle. Ropp and Gashish Districts (two out of five districts in Barkin Ladi) and parts of Riyom received an influx of displaced pastoralists. 29 For example, in Tsohon Foron, in Kapwis ward, Barkin Ladi LGA, they could not access their bush farms (interviews 17 December 2011), as was also the case in Fang, Bachi District, Riyom LGA (interviews, 19 April 2012) and elsewhere. People were being killed on their farms and the Fulani were hacking down crops with cutlasses before the harvest. 30 Unfortunately in September and October 2017, while this book was in press, there was renewed violence between Fulani herders and Irigwe villagers. Scores of villagers were killed in their homes, at night, in a series of Fulani attacks. There were also Irigwe attacks on Fulani herdsmen and their cattle in which at least seven Fulani men were killed.

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both sides, and (in this instance) the stabilizing influence of the army presence at nearby Rukuba Barracks. Peace has also been sustained between Fulani pastoralists and the Buji, Amo and other farmers in northern areas of Bassa. The same broadly applies across the central Plateau, between the Fulani and farming communities such as the Ngas, Mupun, Pyem and (apart from some clashes in December 2014) Mwaghavul. Thus there needs to be an accounting for the high concentration of violence in the Berom areas of Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Jos South. After January 2010, Fulani pastoralists launched many revenge attacks against Berom villages and killed hundreds of people. The most notorious was the attack on Dogo Nahauwa, in Du District, and other nearby villages, on 7 March 2010. At least 163 villagers were killed in Dogo Nahauwa, many of them young children.31 This is one of many attacks, which for some time were occurring on an almost daily basis, creating insecurity and fear across Berom land. Other Berom villages where night attacks and killings occurred include Vwang Kogot in Jos South LGA, Jol and surrounding hamlets and Bachi and environs in Riyom LGA, and large areas of Barkin Ladi LGA. Devastating attacks on Berom communities occurred in Kwok, near Barkin Ladi town, in November 2011, and in the Kura Falls area of Gashish district, also Barkin Ladi LGA, in July 2012. After it was reignited in January 2010 the rural violence persisted for at least seven years, to the end of 2016, and in some areas, notably Riyom LGA, it escalated during that time. The affected areas were marked by a cycle of violence fuelled by cattle rustling, the destruction of farms, competition for land, and revenge attacks by both sides. This is comparable to the pattern of conflict in 2001–03, except the post-2010 violence was on a larger scale. Some of the Fulani attacks were reprisals for earlier actions by the Berom. But it seems that there was also a strategic aspect to the anti-Berom violence in the years after January 2010. Fulani pastoralists appear to have waged a violent campaign to expel Berom villagers from swathes of agricultural land in Riyom LGA to create grazing land for themselves. This may be an attempt to compensate 31

Estimates of the number of Berom Christians killed in Dogo Nahauwa range from 150 up to 500. A list given to me by the Berom Youth Movement records the names of 163 Berom people killed in Dogo Nahauwa on 7 March 2010, but it is possible that some deaths were not recorded. There was earlier violence perpetrated by Berom Christians against Muslims in Dogo Nahauwa, on 19 January 2010. All the Muslims were driven out in the January attack. The records I obtained indicate that 35 Fulani and Hausa Muslims were killed there on 19 January –fifteen males and ten females, sixteen of whom were children (boys and girls) age eleven years or younger. On 12 January 2012 I interviewed a group of Hausa men who had been displaced from Dogo Nahauwa to Magama Gumau (Bauchi State). The 19 January Dogo Nahauwa killings were mentioned separately by Fulani men I met in Magama Gumau, Barkin Ladi and Boto. Terrible as the 7 March 2010 massacre was, with many innocent people killed, including children, it was not an unprovoked attack – it was an act of revenge carried out by the Fulani.

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for the substantial loss of lives, cattle and access to pasture they suffered earlier across Berom land. Some Fulani pastoralists justify the expulsion of Berom farmers from parts of Riyom and Barkin Ladi LGAs by arguing that they were driven off larger tracts of land in 2001 and 2010 than they subsequently acquired through force. The reconfiguration of rural space across parts of the northern Plateau elicited considerable instability as Berom farmers reacted against Fulani pastoralists and their cattle, and as Fulani attacks on villages and farms escalated. For his part, Governor Jang did not pursue dialogue, but sought to side-line Muslims, including those who wanted dialogue. There was no acknowledgement by government or Berom leaders of the massacres on 19 January 2010, and most of the churches (except the Catholics) are still in denial. The sole focus has been on mass violence perpetrated against Christians, which undoubtedly has been severe, but part of a two-way conflict. There were no sustained political initiatives by the state to try and resolve the rural conflicts and no or very limited participation by the Governor in local and international attempts at peace building. Some Fulani Ardos sought peace but others appeared to be resistant to local and external attempts at dialogue and for some years they did not rein in their youths.

Cattle rustling The extensive rustling of Fulani cattle was one of the main drivers of conflict in the rural areas after the onset of the crisis. Cattle are valuable both in cultural and monetary terms. Fulani herdsmen know each of their cows individually and usually have names for each one. There are two main cattle markets in Jos – the largest is the Bukuru cattle market (kara) in Jos South and the other is yan shanu, in the Nassarawa area of Jos North. These are both Hausa controlled markets where there is a high level of surveillance and regulation by the mainly Hausa middle men and the Fulani who are present there. The market price of a cow depends on the size and age of the animal: in 2013 the lowest price in Bukuru market was about 50,000 naira (US $300 or GBP £190 at the September 2013 exchange rates), but most cattle sold for closer to 100,000 ($600, £380). A heifer fetched between 80,000 and 150,000 naira ($500-$1,000, £300-£570), while bulls could reach 250,000 naira ($1,500, £950).32 Cattle rustling can thus be a lucrative criminal activity. Although most theft was carried out by Berom rustlers, as the conflict endured there also emerged an organized criminal component that was not ethnically 32

Fieldwork in Bukuru cattle market, Jos South, Plateau Sate, and interview with the Sarkin Zango (head of the market) and chairman of the Livestock Sellers Association, 15 September 2013.

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defined but attracted anyone seeking to make illicit profits, with Fulani, Berom and other individuals among them. Stolen cattle have tended not to be sold through local markets, as they are too close to the areas where the rustling occurs. The general pattern is that they were initially taken to Berom villages in Fan, Gyel and Vwang districts, from which Fulani pastoralists were forced out. Some cattle may be kept and reared there, but often they were transported in trucks to markets outside Plateau State – sometimes to Nasarawa State but more often to southern Nigeria (such as to Enugu).33 It is a local secret that at least some trucks of stolen cattle were transported from Fan, off the Plateau and down to the oil-rich Niger Delta (in the South-South of Nigeria). The Fulani cattle were exchanged for guns, which are in abundant supply in the Delta. Weapons were also smuggled to Plateau from north-east Nigeria (in one incident, an arms smuggler from Vom was arrested after being caught with a cache of weapons in Maiduguri). Locally made guns, manufactured in Berom settlements like Vom, became more sophisticated as the conflict went on and were widely used. Both sides, Fulani and Berom, possess what they refer to as sophisticated weapons – AK47s and other automatic rifles. When cattle rustling occurs the herder is often shot dead; this can trigger Fulani attacks on villages in the vicinity, especially if they think that is where the rustlers were from. In general, high levels of cattle rustling on the northern Plateau likely pushed some Fulani pastoralists into banditry as a means of survival after losing their herds.

Youth mobilization and political leadership Youths have been at the forefront of the violent conflicts on the Jos Plateau: they are the main participants in urban and rural conflicts. Locally, youths are sometimes viewed as performing an essential task in defending their communities, but youth mobilization is also cited as a reason for the emergence of conflict. Demographically, there is a ‘youth bulge’ in Nigeria: a majority of the population is under the age of 30 years. One of the biggest problems Nigeria faces is youth unemployment, as there are too few jobs for the growing population. This mass of jobless young men and women, some with an education, is a major source of instability on the Plateau and in other parts of the country. When high youth unemployment is overlaid with inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions and a political elite that has behaved with impunity and recklessness, the scene is set for social instability. Among the Berom, a 33 Conversations

at Miyetti Allah secretariat, Barkin Ladi, at Operation Rainbow headquarters in Jos, and in Gyel district – 2013 and 2014.

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‘youth’ was traditionally someone who still farmed. They may farm their own land or that of their elders who no longer do farm work themselves. In contemporary society age categories are not so closely tied into labour roles. It can also be politically advantageous for people who are older to remain within youth movements in a leadership capacity. The ‘executive council’ of the Berom Youth Movement at the time of research had senior members above the age of 40 years; some of them may be up to 50 years. Status and context can be important in determining if a person is a youth, because those who have attained prominence through education, money or politics may be regarded more as community leaders or ‘elders’ even if they are in their forties. In Fulani culture there is a larger number of age-sets. The exact age range for each category varies between clans and locations, but in more traditional settings (especially among nomads) they are approximately as follows, for boys/men: 1-13 years: Bacci – young children; 14-25 years: Sukaaɓe – adolescents, lads/youths; traditionally free to plait hair and go for shoro, hirde, and other social activities; the stage is called sukaaku; 26-39 years: Kori’en – among nomads they are leaders/headmen/ guides; traditionally plaiting was removed but no beard is permitted at this stage, according to pulaaku (a Fulani code of conduct; see Kirk-Greene 1986); this stage is koraaku; 40 years upwards: Ndotti’en – fully grown men, important men or elders; beards are permitted; 60 years and above: within Ndotti’en: Naye’en or Nayeeɓe – elderly people. With the impacts of socio-economic change and Islamic reform these age-sets are not as pervasive as they used to be, but they are still referred to. For example, sukaa ɓe is the general term for youths among the Plateau Fulani and it is they and the kori’en who are usually mobilized in conflict. The extent to which the elders, including the Ardos, can control their youths in violent hotspots such as in Riyom is questionable. A Berom perspective is that Fulani elders have been sanctioning the violence, even if the youths are the main participants. This is likely in some instances, but as the armed conflicts have persisted, youths on both sides who now have access to weapons have become harder to control. The prevalence of cattle rustling and the destruction of farms (principally with machetes), in particular, are major destabilizing factors, and reduce the degree of social control as individuals affected may respond independently.

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Baker (1954) and Smedley (2004) recorded in the 1950s and 1960s that Berom people farmed in groups and their labour was normally paid for in locally brewed beer. The youths would drink after returning to the village from farming, but the elders consumed beer during the day too. The beer was fermented from grains and was an important dietary supplement, relied upon by some people for sustained calorie intake. This local beer, now referred to as burukutu, is traditionally brewed from guinea corn or millet and is normally consumed from a calabash. It is cheap and consumption in the rural areas is high (especially among non-Muslims). In ‘traditional’ society, alcohol consumption was regulated according to supply, seasonal festivals and farm labour, but such limitations disappeared with the breakdown of the pre-capitalist social division of labour and the anomie caused by land alienation (some of it by mining) and unemployment. On the Jos Plateau there are now serious social problems associated with drinking and drug use (marijuana – locally known as Indian Hemp – and ‘harder’ drugs). In some respects this situation is comparable to the social problems experienced in indigenous societies elsewhere in the world, where traditional culture and customary land tenure were undermined or destroyed by colonialism and economic exploitation. Alcoholism cuts across all age categories. Burukutu and other cheap local drinks are the most heavily consumed in rural areas, but they are also available in Jos and other urban centres of the Plateau. The most serious health risks and social problems are caused by goskolo – very strong spirits that are locally distilled and may be contaminated with other substances. Consumption of goskolo and variants of it continues, despite a ban by the state government and the grievous harm it causes, sometimes leading to death. There have been protests by indigenous Plateau women against the damage goskolo is causing to their men.34 To a lesser extent, drug and alcohol abuse are also present among Fulani and Hausa youths. There are eyewitness reports that many youths who rioted in 2001 and 2010 were intoxicated with drugs and alcohol to inure them to killing. While the main participants in riots are youths, not all are, and they are convenient scapegoats for political elites and can be mobilized by the elites.

Military intervention and the politics of insecurity The persistence of insecurity in rural areas, long after the riots in Jos that triggered it had been quelled, led to a deployment of Nigerian security forces – the military-led Special Task Force (STF) – into the villages. Military personnel were assigned the role of ‘peacekeeping’ in 2010, and 34 I witnessed one such protest at the Ponzhi Tarok’s palace in Langtang, southern Plateau State, in 2005.

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their operations continued into 2016, with some changes in strategy. The military intervened in Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Jos South LGAs on the orders of Nigeria’s federal government because of the high number of casualties there, with well over 1,000 people killed in the rural conflicts on the Plateau since 2010 and the potential for the destabilization of a larger area. Cattle rustling would threaten the wider security of the Jos Plateau, but there were also unconfirmed suspicions by the state government that rural Fulani settlements were attracting militants from outside the state, including Boko Haram fighters, to join in a religious struggle. This may have been state propaganda, or simply mistaken, but it has been a recurrent theme. From December 2001 there were accusations that Muslims had invited mercenaries from Niger and Chad to fight with them in Plateau – an allegation that was always strongly denied and for which there is no available evidence. From 2011–12 there were allegations that Boko Haram was participating in the rural conflicts on the Plateau. The fact that Izala has been strongly opposed to the ideology of Boko Haram and that Boko Haram assassinated many prominent Izala shaykhs casts doubt on this narrative. This did not affect dominant discourse on the Plateau, where Muslims are widely viewed as a homogenous bloc.35 Allegations that parts of the Jos Plateau were becoming a haven for Islamist militants caused alarm. This was especially so after the deaths of two prominent Berom politicians in July 2012 – a national Senator who was visiting from Abuja and a member of the Plateau State House of Assembly. Senator Dantong and Hon. Gyang Fulani36 had gone to a village in Riyom LGA to attend the burials of victims of a Fulani attack the previous day. The attack happened following the burning of some Fulani settlements by soldiers, in retaliation for the shooting dead of a mobile policeman in the Kura Falls area. It is not clear who killed the policeman. After their settlements were burned down, well-armed Fulanis retaliated by attacking Berom villages, possibly in the belief that the actions of the soldiers were orchestrated by the Berom-dominated state government. They killed as many as 100 Berom villagers. The politicians were from the affected areas and went to see the damage and attend the mass burials, but gunmen opened fire on them from a distance. Both men collapsed and died during the attack, seemingly from heart failure caused by shock and physical exertion as they were running to escape. There is near-unanimous agreement among Berom kinsmen and from the security forces that no bullets hit the politicians. Even though there had been a 35 On

Boko Haram, the fracture with Izala, and the hostility of the insurgents towards ‘mainstream’ Salafis see Mohammed (2014); Thurston (2015); Higazi (2015). 36 A Berom man whose surname indicates a close interaction between the Berom and Fulani communities, not a Fulani identity.

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massacre the day before, it took the death of Senator Dantong, particularly, to (briefly) bring the conflict to the federal government’s attention (the Goodluck Jonathan administration). Fulani pastoralists were stereotyped and maligned in the media following the attacks at Kura Falls and the deaths of Dantong and Gyang Fulani. Berom villagers complained that soldiers were involved in some of the attacks they were experiencing. They alleged that soldiers were being hired to attack their villages at night, claiming that some of the troops deployed to the Plateau made money by allowing themselves to be hired, or because they were Muslims who sympathized with the Fulani. While this cannot be ruled out, one Fulani informant suggested that these could in reality be attacks by Fulani men dressed in military uniform, seeking to cause confusion and drive a wedge between the Berom population and the military, whose operations they assumed were influenced by the Plateau State government. He called this ‘nomadic intelligence’. Whatever the case, I personally saw the aftermath of such an attack on 25 April 2012 in Angwan Rim (Riyom LGA), where three Berom women were shot dead in their house the previous evening while eating their dinner. Witnesses told me that the gunmen were soldiers, not Fulani, and that they saw the army vehicle nearby. I could not confirm the veracity of this, but stories of soldiers attacking villages and killing people in their houses at night were commonplace. These alleged abuses led the government to order the incorporation of mobile police (MOPOL) – specially trained riot police who often work alongside the military in domestic crises – into the Special Task Force. The rotation of troops, bringing in new units and redeploying the others out of Plateau, and the tactic of mixing the soldiers up with MOPOL, improved the situation in some areas, but there was still widespread distrust.

Conclusion A cycle of violence gripped many rural communities across northern areas of the Jos Plateau in the aftermath of rioting in urban Jos in September 2001 and January 2010. These armed conflicts were particularly concentrated in Berom districts, but some other communities such as the Ron and Irigwe were also affected. Attacks by Fulani herdsmen on Plateau villages are often reported, but what is not well known, even in Jos, is the mass violence against Muslims in the rural environs of Jos. Anti-Muslim mobilization was particularly violent in Berom land. This led to widespread displacement and heavy loss of life among the Muslim inhabitants of the old mining settlements and among Fulani pastoralists. It is the main reason armed conflict on the high Plateau was mostly concentrated in the Berom-dominated local government areas of Barkin

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Ladi, Riyom and Jos South in the years after the 2001 and 2010 riots. Fulani pastoralists have carried out reprisal killings in these areas and seized land from Berom farmers (especially in Riyom) to compensate for land they were expelled from and on which they could no longer graze their cattle or farm. The targeting of Muslims in the tin mining settlements was another feature of the January 2010 violence, but received no comment from the Plateau State government of Governor Jonah Jang. It could be inferred that the state government favoured impunity for the perpetrators. This generated a sense of gross injustice and raised suspicions among Muslims of state complicity in what was an orchestrated campaign of violence. The Muslim communities in rural areas of Berom land were perhaps seen as a threat in view of the urban conflicts in Jos, and there was a sense that they were usurping local resources and dominating the ‘indigenes’. Within the Jang-led Plateau State government of 2007–15 and from the viewpoint of many Christians, a widespread belief was that Islam posed a danger to the collective security of the state. However, although Islamic groups such as Izala (not to mention Boko Haram) are widely seen as the more radical in northern Nigeria, this is an example of a predominantly Christian population, ethnically Berom, attacking long-standing Muslim communities with whom they had been living for close to a century. Following these attacks, it was the Fulani population of the area (and some of those who had been displaced into Bauchi) that responded with a sustained campaign of violence against Berom villages. The ferocity of these attacks, many of which were carried out at night, prompted villagers to sleep in the bush rather than in their homes, and alarmed the wider public in Plateau State. From 2010 to 2016 there was a cycle of violence in the rural areas, most concentrated in Berom land but also spreading to other areas. Fulani attacks on Berom villages, the destruction of crops with cattle and cutlasses, and the murder of Berom farmers in their fields occurred in conjunction with endemic cattle rustling and incidents where Fulani herdsmen and boys were murdered while tending their livestock. The relationship between Muslims and Christians in Plateau State requires careful management at all levels. Peace is attainable and has been sustained or rebuilt in some areas, but it requires sound leadership on all sides. The Berom-Fulani violence endured at least partly because there was no effective government mediation to try and resolve it. Governor Jang did not pursue dialogue with Muslim leaders in the affected rural areas and made no serious attempt to find a peaceful solution. Fulani leaders allege that the Berom-dominated state government of Jang instead armed its people and used the coercive apparatus of state against them and other Muslims on the Plateau. What is clear is that the Jang administration was

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one-sided and portrayed indigenes of the Jos Plateau as Christian victims of a wider agenda of Islamic aggression, of which Boko Haram was just one component. This denied the reality of there being Muslim indigenes and victims and that acts of violence were perpetrated by all sides. Since dialogue with extremists is all but impossible, Jang appeared to convey that he and his administration bore no responsibility for the debilitating insecurity. This version of events propagated by the state government was misleading, and the failure of leadership meant the violence became protracted. Material concerns such as security of access to farmland and grazing land and the reintegration of divided communities may only be addressed through concerted local dialogue and more impartial state policies. Long-term damage has been caused to the social relations of Christians and Muslims in the affected rural areas and this will require long-term solutions if there is to be reconciliation.

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10 Jos Bottom-up & top-down approaches to peace building ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA, ADAM HIGAZI, JIMAM LAR & KAREL CHROMY

Introduction The protracted conflicts in Plateau State between 2001 and 2015 inevitably led to a series of efforts to achieve peace and, since 2015, some semblance of peace seems to have returned to Jos, albeit tentatively. The general situation is no longer as tense and alarming as it was during the crisis years. Still, this peace cannot be taken for granted, given the recursive nature of the violence from 2001. Furthermore, it is important to learn any lessons from this peace process. This chapter examines the Jos peace processes. Specifically, it compares the efficacy of top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace building in Jos. We examine how individuals and neighbourhoods cope with insecurity at the bottom of society, and how state institutions – the Plateau State governments, and successive federal governments – have responded to the cycle of violence in Jos. At the community level, we show how the violence has re-shaped individuals’ social networks and accelerated the process of neighbourhood segregation. We examine how individuals and neighbourhoods seek safety through strategies of communal segregation and vigilantism, which have only started to be relaxed after 2015. At the state level, we examine the serial establishment of commissions of inquiry, both judicial and administrative, and the repeated inability to implement the recommendations of any. At the federal level, we examine the responses of the executive and legislature branches, and highlight the damaging tension between federal and state authorities in the management of the crises in Jos. Finally, we argue that Nigerian society has tended to approach the conflict in Jos through two opposed normative principles: (i) supporting inclusive civic citizenship which privileges the rights of individuals; or (ii) respecting the cultural and territorial rights of indigenous minority groups who are seen 308

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to be threatened by bigger and better-endowed ethnic groups. We argue that this binary approach – variously justified under the banner of individual rights or group rights – has played into the hands of intransigent and opportunistic politicians who have made it difficult to find a mutually agreeable route to peace. We emphasize local-level confidence-building measures, which address every-day fears and insecurities of the warring groups as a first step toward peace. Afterwards, the give and take of mutual recognition can set the basis for broaching the more substantive issues of individual and group constitutional rights.

Waging peace in Jos: community- and state-level responses Predictably, the cycle of repeated violence (see Chapters 8 and 9) has taken its toll on Jos. The once vibrant and cosmopolitan city became ‘a city where the inhabitants have been shocked into loathing and fear of the other’(Ibrahim 2010). Text messages, based on mischief or fear, were frequently circulated, further causing alarm and suspicion (Idam 2010).1 Following the 2001 crisis, a plethora of local organizations and inter-group networks emerged with the ostensible aim of promoting peace and communal harmony in Jos. By 2008, the prevailing perception was that government officials, civic activists and community leaders had through their activities moved Jos toward healing its communal divisions. In particular, inter-faith processes – such as the Plateau State Elders Forum, the Traditional Advisory Council in Jos, and the Plateau State Inter-Religious Council – appeared to ease inter-group tensions. However, the 2008 crisis revealed that the post-2001 healing process was far from complete; even a member of the then Plateau State cabinet, Nankin Bagudu, stated that ‘nobody expected this kind of violence this time’ (Polgreen 2008). Dialogue and communication are important components for conflict prevention and management. However, the 2008 crisis made it clear that Jos had been experiencing a ‘graveyard peace’, where the absence of violence did not mean a move toward lasting conflict resolution. Given the cyclical nature of the riots in the city between 2001 and 2015, it may be easy to dismiss the peace-building efforts in Jos. However, in reality, the results were mixed. While many programmes failed to have an impact, others contributed to reducing the levels of tension in the neighbourhoods where they have been implemented, and contributed to the current general atmosphere of the tentative return to normalcy. 1 Examples cited by a journalist include: ‘Enough is enough, don’t buy water from Hausa mai ruwa or drink mai shai’s tea. They plan to poison us’; ‘Tell your madam not to buy meat again from their butcher’; ‘open ya eyes and see’; and ‘Follow fellow Christians only.’, in Idam, 2010.

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310 • Jos – Conflict & Peace Building NEIGHBOURHOOD-LEVEL RESPONSES

Conflict resolution and violence containment strategies in Jos neighbourhoods vary from one community to another. In discussions with community leaders from selected communities in Jos it was clear that some communities had adopted collective action strategies to manage and prevent violent conflicts from breaking out.2 For example, in the neighbourhood of Dadin Kowa, diverse religious and ethnic groups attempted to curtail and manage outbreaks of violence. It remains one of the few neighbourhoods of post-2001 Jos where Muslims and Christians continue to live side by side as neighbours. However, Dadin Kowa is an exception, and one of the major consequences of the repeated outbreaks of collective violence in Jos is the intensification of communal segregation. According to Commissioner of Police Aduba, ‘in the state there are some areas where Muslims cannot go and there are some areas where Christians cannot go’ (Daily Trust 2010a). As one Anaguta Christian businessman/politician stated concerning a Muslim neighbourhood: ‘Of course, there is no way, in my right frame of mind I will go to Ungwar Rogo, except if I am going on a suicide mission.’3 Not only have the inhabitants of Jos segregated into different religious enclaves, they are also unwinding the economic institutions on which their interdependence was previously based. As one observer noted, ‘churches in Jos metropolis have opened their own abattoirs, trained and employed Christian butchers. Following in the heels of this, a Christian dominated market has recently been opened at Bukuru’ (Idam 2010). Apart from the neighbourhood of Dadin Kowa, only the federal and state ‘low-cost’ neighbourhoods (often peopled by the salaried middle classes), and the more affluent areas like Rayfield and the Government Reserved Area (GRA), have escaped the scourge of segregation. Surprisingly, some streets around the Central Mosque, like Abdulsalami Street, also remained mixed, as did Mista-Ali on the northern outskirts of Jos. There are also some instances where segregated communities have been living side by side under conditions of a tense and watchful peace. However, such areas have frequently been at the boundaries of more substantive communal enclaves (for example, Nassarawa/Angwan Rukubu, Dutse Uku/Yan Trailer, and Rikkos). On balance therefore, segregation has been a stronger strategy for seeking safety than building inclusive neighbourhood committees.4 In the process, the religious 2

Interviews with Agwom Dauji, District Head of Angwan Rukuba/Farin Gada and Da John Bot, District Head of Rikkos, August 17 2009. 3 Aminu Agwom Zang, cited in Ashaka & Agboola 2011. From 2011, Irigwe (Christian) women were going into the area on a daily basis to sell yams without molestation. 4 Interview Hon. David W. Tongak, Chairman Zonal Police and Community Relations – Angwan Rukuba, Fuduwa, Ukadum, Yan Trailer, August 2009. These are Christian

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geography of Jos has been transformed and is largely characterized by artificial borders and ostensibly ‘no go’ areas that have been etched into the population’s consciousness through bitter experience. As segregation intensified over the years, reports surfaced of secret targeted killings of individuals found in the ‘wrong’ neighbourhoods. Cases of missing persons multiplied; even in the absence of collective violence, individuals feared for their personal safety when they ventured into some parts of the city. The unofficial segregation of the city’s residents along religious lines demonstrates a long-standing and continued lack of trust that the population has in the ability or the willingness of the government to protect them. In interviews conducted with district heads and community leaders across Jos and its surroundings, the idea of conflict management was largely seen as the building of self-defence mechanisms for one’s neighbourhood.5 While they noted that they had been invited to several meetings and participated in several forums organized by government and non-government organizations (NGOs) alike, these community leaders placed their trust not on building understanding with their perceived adversaries, but on ‘defending’ and protecting their communities in times of violence. Peace initiatives aimed at the youth may have helped to reduce the level of violence in areas of Jos since 2010, but it is also likely that the increased presence of the military-led Special Task Force (STF) in the city has been the deciding factor. To an extent, the phenomenon of community self-defence explains the sophistication of weapons employed in the series of violent episodes since 2001. Jos is now said to be awash with light weapons, acquired through the smuggling networks of religious, ethnic and community development organizations. Neighbourhood watch associations, previously established across the Nigerian urban landscape as a crime-mitigation measure focused particularly on theft and armed robbery, have been restructured and reorganized in parts of Jos as a form of quasi ‘defence force’. Its membership is varied but largely comprises male youths and is loosely coordinated by community leaders and prominent residents of the communities. Many of these groups are armed. This key transformation from a community self-defence measure to a militant group occurred gradually over a number of years. However, there was a definitive spike following the 2008 local election violence, when these groups became more widespread. Since 2015, these groups are no longer as prominent as they once were. (contd) communities on the Bauchi ring road that are bordered by Hausa communities and have been scenes of some past episodes of violence. 5 All community leaders we talked to in August 2009 referred to a ‘community security mechanism’.

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312 • Jos – Conflict & Peace Building FAITH-BASED AND CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES

Inter-faith organizations are another important non-state community response to violence in Jos. The Niki Tobi Commission report suggests (see below) that both Christian and Muslim religious leaders, through their sermons and utterances, inflamed passions and misled their congregations toward communal confrontations. However, other religious leaders have played a pivotal and positive role by initiating conflict mitigation measures. For example, the Catholic Archbishop of Jos, Ignatius Kaigama, played an active role in launching an initiative focused on promoting inter-religious dialogue. While the main cause of the violence in Jos is political and socio-cultural, religion continues to play an important role in collective mobilization; therefore, religious leaders have a critical role to play in the peace process. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) have also been active in providing humanitarian aid to victims of the violence. Orji (2011) examines the role of Christian and Muslim FBOs in the humanitarian response to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by the violence in Jos. There are many types of FBOs: ecumenical coalitions such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Jama’atu Nasril Islam ( JNI); incorporated non-profit organizations such as the Catholic Church’s Justice Development and Peace Commission ( JDPC); organizations and relief projects sponsored by congregations from both sides (COCIN and ECWA for Christians and JIBWIS and FOMWAN for the Muslims) (Orji 2011, 9). Indeed, the FBOs have been more active and successful in providing relief aid after the violence than in preventing or resolving the violence in the first place. While in some cases relief material was provided only to selected communities, both Muslim and Christian groups have been effective in providing relief to a wide spectrum of the affected and have not been restricted to IDP camps. Due to cultural reasons and beliefs, some affected individuals could not cope with the degrading circumstances of going to IDP camps and often preferred to stay with relatives. This restricted their access to government relief, which were targeted exclusively at IDP camps. Apart from providing relief materials to those affected by violence, FBOs have sought to promote inter-faith dialogue, particularly among religious elites. On the Christian side, Archbishop Kaigama is prominent, while Muslims are represented by the JNI under the leadership of the Chief Imam. While these high-level meetings between Christian and Muslim leaders have improved relations for some, inter-faith meetings do not encompass all (or even a majority) of the religious leaders in Jos. Elite-level interactions have not necessarily percolated down into their respective communities. However, while elite religious leaders from both religious communities (including the Council

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of Ulama) have not explicitly preached peace, they have not incited violence. Therefore, the problem does not seem a matter of religious leadership in Jos. Provocative preaching and religious intolerance may be a greater threat in the mosques outside the authority of the JNI or the churches not affiliated to the mainline denominations. But this is difficult to establish without a detailed sermon-content analysis. Authorities have difficulty monitoring or moderating what occurs in these smaller mosques and churches as they fall within the control of lesser-known clerics and pastors, who are often not part of any inter-faith committee. In mixed communities, these local religious leaders may have good relations with one another, but this is context-specific. That said, there are hierarchies and ecumenical councils that bring together different pastors within orthodox churches – including COCIN, ECWA, the Catholics, Anglicans and Lutherans – in order to enable the central leadership to exercise its authority. This also applies to Muslims, but to a lesser extent, as JNI is structurally more akin to an association and cannot enforce its rules on the clerical class. Among the Muslims, the pan-sectarian Council of Ulama with its base at the Jos Central Mosque, seems to be very influential. Leading imams or pastors sometimes play important roles at the grassroots level in challenging confrontational preaching or ideologies. While the FBOs ostensibly focus on the delivery of post-conflict relief and religious elite dialogue, local civil society organizations have been key in efforts to promote reconciliation between the conflicting groups. They have engaged in mediation services under the auspices of the Human Security Network and in promoting Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) strategies as part of the Access to Justice Network. One local NGO (LNGO) director noted that, due to their proximity, experience and nuanced understanding of the crisis, LNGOs are well positioned to engage in peace building. However, he accepts that ‘with all attempts to bring lasting peace back to Jos, we are yet to resolve the critical issues. Our work is based at the community level, and the fact that we even establish dialogue between people who had seen themselves as sworn enemies is progress, but this must be sustained.’6 Some LNGO initiatives have focused on political and religious leaders and elites, while others have concentrated on or emanated from community activists and youth. A constant concern is the ‘de-radicalization’ of Christian and Muslim youths who have grown up in segregated communities and in an environment of high levels of insecurity and conflict (McCain 2011). Some inter-faith initiatives involving youths have been organized through the churches, while others have been kick-started by donor-funding and 6 Interview with Mr Gad Shamaki, now Director Centre for the Advocacy of Justice and Rights, Jos, in Jos 10 September 2010.

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training workshops.7 Donor monitoring of projects is often lacking and typical workshops activities involve expensive hotels that are difficult for ordinary people to access. Additionally, these events rarely attract real decision makers from the State Government or key religious or ethnic leaders. Some of the most successful inter-faith programmes have emerged from community initiatives that bring together local activists rather than religious leaders, e.g., Women’s Initiative for Sustainable Community Development (WISCD). This is an inter-faith initiative that works alongside the small Jos women’s NGO ‘Home Makers Women Development Initiative’, headed by Margaret Ahmed. WISCD brings together both Muslim and Christian women – mainly mothers who have been affected by the violence and have concerns for their families – for the welfare of their communities. Amina Ahmad represents Muslim women as part of the WISCD and began her peace-building activities following the 2001 crisis.8 WISCD has focused on trauma among children and young people as well as community sensitization to peace building and conflict. Additionally, WISCD employs an early warning and early response programme in both Jos and Wase, with ‘peace teams’ as conflict monitors reporting to WISCD and comprised of local youth. They collaborate with the Catholic and Mennonite Church emergency preparedness and response teams in running this programme.9 In the area of Anglo-Jos, the Movement for Christian Community Service of Nigeria (MCCSN) has worked with youth to help re-establish contact with the Muslim community and provide relief materials.10 In this instance, strong female leadership within MCCSN on the part of Director Bilhatu Sarki propelled reconciliation efforts. Considerable distrust between Christians and Muslims in Anglo-Jos remains, but these initiatives have facilitated movement between communities and have reduced inter-communal tension. In Jos North, Auwal al-Mansur leads the Peace Initiative (PI) working in Muslim communities with Jasawa youths at the neighbourhood level. The organizers are respected local figures and have good relations with local youth. As such, PI is a grassroots programme with a local network across Jos North that allows them to meet with youths in many different neighbourhoods to bring about non-violent responses to any perceived problems. For instance, PI convinced the Jasawa youth to allow Christians back into their areas to trade, and this was critical to the revival of the local economy.11 In an attempt to address local youth’s 7 One such effort organized by the Catholic Church and the Augustinian Society is the Apurimac Onlus, which claims to have trained 5,178 Jos youths in vocations such as in hair-dressing, tailoring, computer training and catering, ‘with a view to taking their minds away from violent crimes and civil disturbances’ (Nanlong 2012). 8 Conversation with Amina Ahmad at the Home Makers office in Jos, 29 November 2011. 9 Conversation with Amina Ahmad, 29 November 2011. 10 Discussion with Bilhatu Sarki, MCCSN office in Anglo-Jos, 29 November 2011. 11 Conversation with Ibrahim Sale Hassan, Jos North, 29 November 2011.

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unemployment problem, PI initiated a volunteer work scheme within the communities and organized youth vocational training programmes. Still, Jos has remained largely segregated despite these commendable civic efforts. However, trade and economic relations between Muslims and Christians have been reappearing and, increasingly, movement is freer than it was in 2010 and the beginning of 2011. Generally, these improvements are not spontaneous; they have required some collective decision making and a degree of trust in local leaders. At the behest of traditional rulers in Plateau State, the paramount traditional leader in Jos, and the Gbong Gwom Jos, Da Jacob Gyang Buba established a Stakeholders’ Consultative Committee in March 2010 in order to provide a platform for cross-community dialogue. Ninety community leaders, representing 13 ethnic and communal groups, youths, CAN, and JNI were invited to the first meeting (Agbese 2010a). Meetings were to be held monthly, though it is uncertain whether subsequent meetings were actually held or if the Committee established sufficient traction and credibility within their wider communities. International development organizations also feature in the Jos peace process. A DfID-funded youth programme brought Christian and Muslim youths together at training camps in the Shere Hills just outside the city. One success is the newly created network of Jos Youth Peace Ambassadors located throughout the city, especially at the flashpoints. The peace ambassadors comprise both Muslims and Christians and coordinate meetings and share information on their respective areas. The neighbourhood of Anglo-Jos is one example where there is an Anglo-Jos Youth Forum and the leader is a Peace Ambassador.12 The Peace Ambassador focused on rebuilding trust and inter-communal friendship among youths in Anglo-Jos – which is mixed and had been peaceful until the eruption of violence in 2010, resulting in damage to (primarily Muslim) people’s houses and property. In 2005, USAID launched the five-year Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) project. In Plateau State, CALM tried to establish a conflict early warning system (EWS) by harmonizing the work of local NGOs in a Conflict Mitigation and Management Regional Council (CMMRC). However, an internal assessment of the project noted that by 2009, the EWS had ‘not yet evolved in any state into a functioning “system”’ (USAID 2009, 24). The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), a Swiss-based private diplomacy organization, also sponsored many months of discussion between the leaders of about eight ethnic communities in Jos as well as representatives of the State Government and the relevant federal agencies. These are several prominent examples of what was done on conflict resolution at the community 12

Interview with Muhammed Alfa, the leader of the Anglo-Jos Youth Forum, 25 November 2011.

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level in Jos. However, it is difficult to assess the exact impact of these community-based initiatives. We can only assume that these local peace building and inter-faith networks and committees have influenced the various communities to seek constructive ways to resolve their disputes. Since the January 2010 crisis, violence has subsided in Jos. While this may be primarily due to the deployed military Special Task Force, the grassroots work of community leaders (including ward heads, pastors and imams, and local elders and youths) have also contributed to calming the situation. STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES

Various Plateau State governments had responded differently to the crises in Jos since 1994. With the transition to democracy in 1999, there have been five administrations in Plateau State: Joshua Dariye (1999–2007 with an interregnum of a six-month state of emergency in 2004); Chris Alli, a retired General and former Army Chief appointed by President Obasanjo as administrator for the state of emergency from 18 May to 18 November 2004; Michael Botmang (November 2006-April 2007), David Jonah Jang (2007–15), and Simon Lalong (May 2015, continuing at the time of writing). The governments’ responses to the recurring episodes of violence can be categorized into immediate/short term and medium/long term. Actions such as increased security presence, imposition of curfews and declaration of a state of emergency (as in 2004) are immediate measures usually intended to contain and stop the violence and restore order. These measures are important for the protection of Jos communities, but often lack coherence and coordination. For instance, the deployment of credible and reassuring force is usually not done before the outbreak of the violence. The medium and long-term responses have invariably been to institute commissions of inquiry – often headed by legal luminaries – with the mandate of establishing the causes of specific bouts of violence, identifying the key actors, and proposing remedial measures to prevent future violence. Running parallel to these commissions of inquiry was a 2004 state instituted Peace Conference, aimed at bringing the warring communities to the peace table. Justice Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry

Following an outbreak of violence on 12 April 1994, the then Military Administrator of Plateau state (Lt Col. Mohammed Mana) established the Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry. The Commission was given four weeks to submit its report and had four terms of reference: (i) establishing both the underlying and immediate causes of the riots; (ii) identifying the individuals, groups of persons and institutions directly or indirectly

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connected with the riots; (iii) apportion blame on persons or groups; and (iv), recommend any appropriate course of action. The Commission was also tasked with recommending ways of avoiding the re-occurrence of such riots (PSG 2009, Para. 1.1.2). The Commission reported that only seven people died in the riots, a far cry from the wanton killings that were to follow in subsequent years. As an underlying cause of the riots, the Commission identified the contentious question of the ‘ownership’ of Jos. This was recognized as the basis of the recurrent friction between ‘indigenes’ (Berom, Afizere and Anaguta) and ‘settlers’ ( Jasawa) (ibid., Para. 2.1.2). The Commission noted that the immediate cause of the riots was the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato ( Jasawa) as Chairman of the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North LGA, which generated protests from the ‘indigenes’ (ibid., Para. 2.1.4). The government subsequently directed the Director of Personnel Management of Jos North to continue managing the affairs of the council, thereby preventing Alhaji Mato from taking over. The Jasawa viewed this as a demonstration that the government was yielding to violent intimidation from the ‘indigenes’. Consequently, the Jasawa Development Association mobilized its members for a protest march on 12 April; the Association lost control of the crowd as the protestors took to the streets. The Commission believed that there was strong evidence that the Jasawa Development Association executive council – led by its ex-President Yaya Aga Abubakar, some other leading members, and Sanusi Mato (Alhaji Mato’s brother) – were responsible for organizing the 12 April demonstration and, therefore, responsible for the ensuing riots (PSG 2009, Para. 2.5.2). Similarly, the Commission found that Danlami Babajoda – Chairman of the Jasawa-dominated Butchers Association – was a prime instigator of the incidents leading up to the riots (ibid., Para. 2.2.6). Relying on eye witnesses, the Commission found certain individuals responsible for arson, looting and murder at the Izala Headquarters along Rukuba Road, and for setting fire to the mosque and stalls at Gada Biyu Market. The principal actors involved in these various offences were listed as Mr Baba Teacher, Madam Hanatu, Madam Rhoda, Maman Ayuba, Mr Paul, Mr Sunday and Danjuma Painter (ibid., Paras 2.5.3 and 2.5.4). In its recommendation on ways to avoid future violence, the Commission found that an ‘indigene’ of Jos is one whose ancestors were natives of Jos beyond living memory. This confirmed Berom, Afizere and Anaguta as indigenes and stated that the Hausas can only qualify as ‘citizens’ and, by implication, as ‘settlers’ (ibid., Para. 3.1.4). Furthermore, the Commission found that the Jos conflict is characterized by claims and counter claims originating from values placed on tradition, heritage, ancestry, pedigree, territory, and control over the environment and the inhabitants therein (ibid., Para. 4.0.2). The Commission advised government to engage in

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mediation and broad grassroots consultation to resolve conflicts before a further violent outbreak. Finally, it drew the government’s attention to individuals and community leaders it regarded as threatening the peace and order of the state – Alhaji Saleh Hassan and Alhaji Shehu Masalla – both members of the Jasawa community, and advised government to monitor their activities (ibid., Para. 4.0.6c). As is characteristic of the outcome of this and all other government Commissions on the Jos crises, none of the named individuals were ever prosecuted or brought to justice. Over the years, this lack of political will has enthroned a culture of impunity. Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry

On 7 September 2001, Jos was again engulfed in communal violence. The State Government (this time a civilian administration) set up a Judicial Commission of Inquiry under the late Justice Niki Tobi (then Presiding Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal, Benin City). The Commission’s terms of reference were almost identical to that of the 1994 Commission: (i) investigate the immediate and remote causes of the crisis; (ii) identify persons or group of persons responsible for the crisis; (iii) establish the extent of damage to properties and the loss of lives; (iv) obtain any relevant information or facts; and (v) recommend ways to forestall future re-occurrence (PSG 2002, 1.3, p.4). The Commission commenced sitting on 30 October 2001 and identified two major events which it regarded as the immediate causes of the crisis. First, the June 2001 the Federal Government appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed ( Jasawa) as the Co-ordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for the Jos North LGA and the resulting indigenes’ protest against the appointment. Second, the refusal of a Muslim congregation – gathered for their Juma’at prayers on Friday 7 September 2001 – to allow an indigenous Christian woman (Rhoda Haruna Nyam) to pass through a road in the Jos neighbourhood of Congo-Russia (ibid., 2.0-2.28, p.12). However, the Commission was quick to note that while these events were immediate sparks leading to the violence, there clearly were existing underlying grievances. It cited a history of ethnic and religious rivalry compounded by intolerance, mutual suspicion and animosity between the ethno-religious groups in Jos. The Niki Tobi Commission, like the 1994 Fiberesima Commission, identified contested ‘ownership’ of Jos between ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ as the main underlying cause of the crisis (ibid., 3.57, pp. 56–8). The Commission also found the government’s inability to implement the Fiberesima Commission’s recommendations to be a demonstration of governmental laxity, particularly that previously identified perpetrators were not held accountable for their alleged actions (PSG 2002, 3.165–7, pp. 98–100).

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The Commission found that the Commissioner of Police (Alhaji M.D. Abubakar), through acts of commission and omission, contributed to the inability of security operatives to promptly address the escalating situation. It recommended that Alhaji Abubakar be asked to retire from the Nigerian Police Force. Should he refuse, he should be forcibly retired (PSG 2002, Ch. 4, pp. 112, 115, 124–5). Ironically, Alhaji Abubakar later became the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Service, another demonstration of the virtual impunity enjoyed by many individuals indicted by the various Commissions on the Jos crises. The Commission also found the late Alhaji Inuwa Ali – who had testified to shooting a gun into the air to scare away suspected attackers he believed were approaching his house – was not fit to hold the traditional title of Turakin Jos. The Commission recommended he be replaced with another Jasawa (ibid., 4.57 and 4.58, p.130). The Commission also found that the then Chairman of Jos North LGA, the late Frank Tardy, contributed negatively to the Jos crisis through both his actions and inactions. It found Tardy (Anaguta) to be parochial, sectional, and ‘tribalistic’ in his conduct, and discriminatory against some of his constituents – the Jasawa in particular. The Commission recommended that his constituents impeach or recall him in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (PSG 2002, 4.65, 4.66 pp. 132–3). The Commission also found one Alhaji Saleh Bayeri – Chairman of the ethnic Fulani Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) – responsible for inciting violence between the Fulani and the Beroms and Irigwes on the outskirts of Jos. The Commission believed Bayeri misled the Fulani and blamed his confrontational leadership style for the animosity, distrust and mutual suspicion generated between the Fulani and the host communities (ibid., 4.75, 4.76, p.136). The Commission also found a range of groups and associations complicit in the September 2001 violence. Significantly, it reiterated the findings of the 1994 Fiberesima Commission on the activities of the Jasawa Development Association, which it believed was harassing and intimidating Jos residents (ibid., 4.95, 4.96, p.141). The Commission recommended the suspension of the Association for a period of two years (ibid., 4.97). Equally, it found that the Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO) Elders Solidarity Forum ( Jos North Branch) contributed immensely to the escalation of violence through incitement. As such, the Commission recommended the suspension of the BECO Elders Solidarity Forum ( Jos North Branch), also for a two-year period. The Commission compiled 101 names of suspects alleged to have committed varied offences, which ranged from homicide to the illegal possession and stockpiling of arms, arson, rape, theft and mischief (ibid., 4.113, p.156). None of these named individuals or organizations was ever brought before the courts.

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Finally, the Niki Tobi Commission addressed the contentious issue of the location of Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi – major Jasawa communities in central Jos in close proximity to the University of Jos temporary site. It found that there was an unsuccessful attempt by Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi residents to attack the University. Several university staff and students living in Angwan Rogo were also killed and their property destroyed. The Commission noted that the two communities are situated on land that was initially allocated to the University, but had been encroached upon without resistance (PSG 2002, 6.7, p.238). Furthermore, the Commission noted that the communities are large and densely populated, and lacking adequate facilities (ibid., 6.7, p.238). The Commission argued that it was neither necessary nor feasible to relocate either of the two communities, but that the government should establish a mobile police barrack within Agwan Rogo to act as a buffer between the two communities and the University (ibid., 6.8(i), p.239). The recommended police barrack was not established. The Plateau Peace Conference

Following the September 2001 Jos crisis, there were cases of clashes between Fulani herdsmen and local communities on the outskirts of Jos and, more generally, in Plateau State’s Northern Senatorial zone.13 This low-intensity tit-for-tat killing in these rural and semi-rural districts continued until the end of 2002 but restarted when the January 2010 violence in Jos spilled out from the city (see Chapter 9). In May 2002, rioting in the Jos quarter of Eto Baba resulted in claims of as many as 150 casualties (Human Rights Watch 2005, 14). The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ward congress was the riot trigger. Large-scale collective violence happened in the aftermath of the 2008 local election. Between 2002 and 2004 the collective violence theatre shifted to the southern zone of Plateau State with the main points of violence being Yelwa town in Shendam LGA, Wase LGA and parts of Kanam, Langtang North and South, and Mikang LGAs.14 By May 2004, the extent of the Yelwa killings was so severe that they prompted President Obasanjo to declare a State of Emergency in Plateau State. The Executive and Legislative arms of the State Government were suspended, and a former military administrator (General Chris Alli) was appointed as the administrator. As part of his programme to restore peace to the state, Alli convened a Peace Conference. 13

There were clashes between the Fulani and Berom, and the Fulani and Irigwe in September 2001 when the Fulani were attacked and their cattle rustled and killed as violence extended outside of Jos. The Fulani were driven out of those areas, but returned to make revenge attacks on the Berom and Irigwe villages from which they were driven out (see Chapter 9). 14 The violence in southern Plateau or the Lowlands is related to the dynamics in Jos and the Highlands, but of deeper historical roots and qualitatively different in character.

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The Peace Conference set out to: (i) provide an opportunity for every ethnic group on the Plateau to air its grievances; (ii) find lasting solutions to the lingering problems that precipitated crises; and (iii) collectively establish the parameters for co-existence between ethnic and religious groups across the state. The Peace Conference was composed of two representatives from each of the ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups, while each ‘settler’ community was given one representation. The Conference identified and accredited 54 ethnic groups, totalling 143 participants. It was structured into two parts: group discussions and plenary sessions. Participants were randomly divided into five groups to discuss the causes of the crisis, then converged at plenary to present reports and agree on recommendations (PSG 2004, 9). The main findings and recommendations centred on an endorsement of the reports from prior judicial commissions of inquiry. Furthermore, it was recommended that Plateau State town names be reverted to ‘indigenous’ ones. Cultural status inequalities between the various ethno-religious groups have been an important, yet intangible, source of grievance in Jos. Hausa is the lingua franca and, under colonial rule, Hausanized versions of place names became dominant. ‘Indigenous’ groups also alleged that the Jasawa look down on them as arne (heathens). The administration of Governor Jonah Jang, which took power in 2007, has actively changed Hausa place and street names in Jos to Berom ones – even where Berom ownership of the land or a pre-colonial Berom presence is disputed! Addressing the definition of ‘indigenes’, the Conference argued that ‘indigeneship’ is particular to a people who first settled permanently in a given area. In essence, this fell in line particularly with the 1994 Fiberesima report, which recognized the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta as the ‘indigenes of Jos’ – to the exclusion of the Jasawa (PSG 2004, 31; PSG 2009, 3.1.4, p.25). However, the Conference also recommended that the term ‘settler’ be abandoned on the grounds that it was offensive. Instead, the Conference suggested that the term be replaced with ‘citizens’ and ‘residents’ in order to address all Nigerians resident in Jos. However, this change in nomenclature from ‘settler’ to ‘citizen’ did not hide the reality of ‘indigeneship’ politics, which permeates Nigerian political life and is at the root of the Jos conflict. In effect, ‘Plateau Resolves’ (PSG 2004) reasserted a status quo that defined the Jasawa Hausa as ‘settlers’ and refuted their claims to equal citizenship in Jos. Consequently, the Jasawa representatives refused to sign the agreement. Nonetheless, the state of emergency concluded that round of Plateau State hostilities and re-stabilized the lowlands, where the 2004 violence was concentrated. It also temporarily improved the political situation in Jos itself, as the caretaker government for Jos North LGA incorporated both Muslims and Christians into a power-sharing structure. An uneasy peace remained in Jos until the November 2008 local government elections.

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The Commissions of Inquiry and the Peace Conference ultimately failed to deliver peace to Jos. Governor Jang tried two other strategies for building peace, but both were equally unsuccessful. First, in 2011, he established ‘Operation Rainbow’ (OR) with UNDP backing. It was initially billed as a multi-sector approach to conflict management, involving the entire range of security agencies in Jos. Its distinguishing feature was the intention to work with local ‘peace committees’ at the neighbourhood level who would then form an early warning system that would inform a central committee of security personnel, government officials and community representatives. The programme was also meant to engage the youth in skills acquisition and act as a channel for distributing relief to crisis affected areas. In practice, however, there was minimal civilian engagement and the scheme’s vehicles were appropriated by the police. The Jasawa distrusted OR and argued that it was a means for Governor Jang to exercise direct personal control over the Jos security apparatus. Second, in October 2012, Governor Jang appointed five senior special assistants on community relations, representing respectively the Hausa, Fulani, Tiv, Igbo and Yoruba communities in the state (NSRP 2014). While this might look like inclusive politics, from the Jasawa point of view, putting them in the same category as ‘settler’ communities like the Igbo and Yoruba only confirmed the rejection of their claims to indigeneship. There was always a tension between a pan-indigenous ethnic groups’ front against the Jasawa, on the one hand, and a specifically Berom ethnic agenda exemplified by the person of Governor Jonah Jang, on the other. This tension came to a head in the run-up to the 2015 elections, when Governor Jang sought to impose a fellow Berom, the late Senator Gyang Pwajok, as the gubernatorial candidate of the ruling PDP. After his eight years in office, most people expected Governor Jang to promote a candidate from another indigenous ethnic group. Jang’s Berom-centric parochialism – he was also accused of concentrating infrastructural developments in Berom areas – alienated many from the other indigenous groups and led to the splintering of the PDP. General Jeremiah Useni, an indigenous Christian from Langtang reportedly stated that, ‘Jonah Jang … was the cause of the persistent violence in the State’ (Adinoyi 2012b), while the Leadership newspaper – thought to be broadly sympathetic toward Christian northern interests – accused Governor Jang of intolerance: We advise Governor Jang to change his style of governance. His Achilles heel has been his exclusionary politics, which his adversaries, including his estranged deputy, have accused him of. Plateau State is now divided along ethnic and religious lines and the consequences have been devastating. The governor must eschew exclusionist politics and

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see himself as the father of all, irrespective of ethnic backgrounds and religious persuasions. (Leadership 2010) Ajibola Commission of Inquiry

There have always been some national-level ethno-religious undercurrents to the Jos crises. Prior to 1999, the impression among the indigenous ethnic groups in Plateau was that the Jasawa were supported by various Hausa-Muslim-dominated federal military governments. With the 1999 return to democracy, the Plateau indigenous Christian groups were quick to establish a majoritarian stranglehold on Plateau State politics. According to Danfulani: ‘The Christians were eager to exercise their voting right to wrestle political control from the Hausa-Fulani Muslims whom they regard as “settlers”. In 1999, no Hausa-Fulani Muslim was voted to either the Senate or the National House of Assembly and only one was voted to the Plateau State of Assembly’ (2006, 4). In this zero-sum logic of communal politics, democracy only changed who controlled which institution, and who was excluded. At the same time Governor Jang was coming to office in Plateau State in 2007, President Umaru Yar’Adua, a Muslim Hausa-Fulani from Katsina, also took office in Abuja. This set the stage for clashes between Jos and Abuja over Plateau politics, beginning in 2008. Leaked US diplomatic cables suggest that federal agencies had warned Governor Jang against holding local elections in Jos North in 2008 (Daily Trust 2011). The Plateau State Government disputes this claim. Following the 2008 riots, the state and federal governments were involved in open confrontation. President Yar’Adua was accused of alleged partiality toward the Muslim Jasawa population. According to the Northern Christian Elders Forum (NOCEF), virtually all the Federal Government officials who visited Jos, all of whom are Muslims … including the wife of the President, Hajia Turai Yar’Adua only visited the Central Mosque and places where displaced Muslims were being camped in Jos without visiting displaced Christians in their camps … They did not even have the courtesy to visit the governor who is the chief security officer of the State nor the Traditional ruler of Jos, the Gbong Gwom Jos, Dr. Victor Pam. They only went to the central mosque in Jos to see Muslims and left … We are disappointed. (Omipidan 2009) With Jang’s noted intolerance on the one hand and Yar’Adua’s curious and questionable response to the riots, on the other, the state and national governments were set on a collision course; they established competing commissions of inquiry to investigate the 2008 riots. President Yar’Adua was first to announce an administrative panel of inquiry to probe the crisis

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and appointed Major General Emmanuel Abisoye as Chairman. At first, the Plateau State Government responded with a Supreme Court law suit in order to challenge the President’s constitutional right to set up such a tribunal. A senior official of Jang’s government argued that the role allegedly played by Major-General Emmanuel Abisoye (rtd) in the trial and elimination of prominent Plateau sons in the military in the Dimka coup of 1976 was still fresh in the minds of Plateau people. According to him, most of those sentenced to death and executed by the Abisoye military trial panel were innocent of the offences for which they were killed. (Commissioner Nuhu Gagara, cited in Adinoyi 2008) Despite protests from the State Government, the Abisoye Commission investigated the 2008 crisis and submitted a report to the Federal Government. This report was classified and has not been released. In January 2009, the Plateau State Government established a parallel Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 2008 crisis. Former Minister of Justice and international jurist Bola Ajibola presided over the six-man Commission. Once again, the Commission’s terms of reference were almost identical to those of the 1994 and 2001 commissions, with the only addition being that the Commission should ascertain the extent of lives lost and property damaged (Ajibola 2009, 1.4, p. 9). The Commission received 161 memorandums, but was boycotted by the Jasawa community, who viewed it as a pernicious tool of the hostile Jang administration. In a February 2009 letter to the Commission, the Jos North Branch of the Jama’tul Nasril Islam ( JNI) notified the Commission that Muslims in Jos North would not participate in the Commission’s proceedings (ibid., 8.0, pp. 315–17.). Moreover, legal challenges were filed at federal and state High Courts against both the state and the Commission (ibid., 1.16, p. 19). In its findings, the Ajibola Commission concluded that the 28 November 2008 riot was the result of a Jasawa-youth-instigated attack in the Jos area of Ali Kazaure which quickly spread to other parts of the city (Ajibola 2009, 2.0, pp. 22–33). While acknowledging that the Jasawa ‘suffered massive casualties’, the Commission asserted that it was ‘the feeling that the Hausa Fulani had lost the election and had by that token lost access to one of the major opportunities for economic domination and advancement amongst their people, which pushed them to violence’. It recommended that the government compulsorily acquire and redevelop Jasawa neighbourhoods. This would effectively disband the Jasawa community. However, as if to acknowledge the fears driving the Jasawa community, the Commission also

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recommended that the state government should promote inclusion and participation through a ‘State Character’ principle similar to the Federal Character policy of the federal government, ‘as this would take into consideration citizen’s right in any part of Nigeria that they may find themselves … This means that all persons who are bona fide citizens should have equal rights, opportunities and access and not to deny those designated as non-indigenes of an area the access to some of the most important avenues of socio economic mobility be it government jobs, academic scholarships, university admission or fees.’ (Agbese 2010b) According to the Ajibola Commission, Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingre (the leader of JIBWIS and later chairman of the Council of Ulama in Jos) was mentioned in several memorandums as indirectly responsible for the riots, as a result of his fiery preaching within the Jasawa community. The Commission recommended that the police investigate and prosecute Jingre (Ajibola 2009, 4.2.11, pp. 234–8). The Commission also recommended that the government monitor Alhaji Saleh Hassan’s connection to the Jasawa Development Association, noting earlier indictments of the Association in previous inquiry reports by Fiberesima in 1994 and Tobi in 2001 (ibid., 4.2.10, p.233). Similarly to previous commissions, the Ajibola Commission also found the Jasawa Development Association indirectly responsible for the unrest, recommending its leaders be investigated and the Association proscribed if allegations were proved true (ibid., pp. 195–8). The Commission cleared the Plateau Government of any responsibility for the crisis, but counter-narratives alleging the Plateau State Government’s culpability were retained in a memorandum presented to the Commission by Human Rights Watch and in a letter from JNI (ibid., pp. 221–8). However, leaked US diplomatic cables suggest that Nigerian federal authorities apportioned a degree of responsibility on the Jang government. The then National Security Adviser, Gen. Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar, allegedly told US officials that the Jang administration was responsible for the violence by ignoring national recommendations against holding elections. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)15

In 2013 and 2014, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), based in Geneva, undertook an ‘inter-communal dialogue and conflict mediation process in Jos’ that appears to have had good success in reducing tensions and minimizing conflict there. HD’s Senior Advisor for Africa, until his untimely death in March 2017, was David Lambo, a Nigerian, who before joining HD had worked with UN organizations in Africa for many years, including the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the 15

We are grateful to Phil Ostien for insights into the workings of HD in Jos.

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UNHCR. In 2012 Lambo obtained funding for HD’s work in Jos; the process in fact dealt not only with the conflict in Jos city itself ( Jos North Local Government), but also with the quite different problems in the surrounding countryside, in Jos South, Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs. Led by Lambo, preparatory work began in January 2013, with wide consultations among the ethnic communities, women and youth leaders, government officials, religious leaders, peace professionals and others. Steering committees were formed for the Afizere, Anaguta, Berom, Fulani and Hausa communities; a Women Steering Committee was also formed. The five ethnic steering committees convened large meetings of their communities, which adopted position papers stating their grievances. From these an agenda for discussions among the communities was agreed. Commencing in August 2013, and continuing through May 2014, eight week-long sessions of the ‘HD Intercommunal Dialogue Forum in Jos’ were held, with five members of each community participating. Representatives of the Plateau State Government participated in all sessions, and a representative of the National Security Adviser also frequently attended. The dialogue sessions were also informed by outside experts on each session’s topic, and by government officials directly concerned, who were invited to speak and discuss. In late 2013 the Forum decided to invite representatives of several other groups resident in Jos to join: Igbo, South-South peoples and Yoruba. They formed their own steering committees, held their own communal meetings, and joined the Dialogue Forum beginning with its December 2013 session. Each session resulted in agreed sets of formal recommendations on the topic at hand: e.g., ‘Recommendations of the HD Intercommunal Dialogue Forum in Jos On the Issues of Religious Tolerance, Culture, Beliefs and Customs’; ‘Recommendations on Issues Related to Traditional Rulership, Its Structures, Demarcation of Community Boundaries, and Renaming of Streets, Villages and Towns’. After the last formal session of the Forum in May 2014, the steering committees continued to meet, working particularly to deal with ongoing killings in the countryside. A Tension Management mechanism was established. A list of ‘actionable projects’ was prepared from the Forum’s recommendations and further funding was sought to execute them. The process finally concluded at a closing ceremony in Jos, held on 11 December 2014, at which the ‘HD Jos Forum Inter-communal Dialogue Process Joint Declaration of Commitment to Peace and Cooperation’ was signed.16 In the meantime, the Women’s Steering Committee had also been active, organizing grassroots women’s meetings in the countryside and in Jos, sometimes for women of different ethnic groups separately, sometimes jointly. A ‘Jos Women’s Declaration on Peace’ was also 16 Available at   www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Declaration-ofCommittment-to-Peace-by-the-HD-Jos-Forum-December-2014.pdf.

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signed at the closing ceremony.17 Meantime work continues on actionable projects under the auspices of the Jos Peace Dialogue Forum, which has been separately incorporated and now obtains its own funding.18 The HD process in Jos and environs was seen to be highly successful at bringing communities together, getting them talking and thinking constructively about addressing their problems, and reducing tensions and conflict. This process highlighted the fact that mere tolerance is not enough. For there to be constructive peace, communities must learn to listen to each other, respect the views of others, acknowledge their differences, and collectively seek compromises to improve the circumstances for everyone. The governments of both Plateau and Kaduna States invited Mr Lambo and HD to come and do more of the same, in southern Plateau and southern Kaduna and the work has continued in both places, resulting, recently in ‘The Kafanchan Peace Declaration’ of 23 March 2016,19 and ‘The Southern Plateau Peace Declaration’ of 22 December 2016, signed by representatives of over 30 communities in six LGAs in southern Plateau.20

Peace building in the context of contentious politics: federal-level responses We noted above the conflict that developed between the federal and state governments following the 2008 riot. Regarding the Yar’Adua government’s alleged bias in favour of the Jasawa, a Plateau State official asserted: ‘we cannot be treated as second class citizens in our own country by anybody’ (Commissioner Nuhu Gagara, cited in Adinoyi 2008). In response, federal officials condemned the belligerent posture of the Jang administration and its attempts to ‘blackmail’ the Federal Government. According to a presidential spokesman, rather than work towards peace, the State government has been making divisive statements that cannot in any way help the cause of peace … the Governor has not demonstrated enough capacity to deal with the situation dispassionately … And it is only after the federal government initiated moves to probe what happened that he just suddenly woke up 17 Available at   www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Women-of-Jos-

Declaration-December-2014.pdf. e.g., www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/contributions.nsf/Eng/A8954E6579BC084585 257F6800706C8D. 19 Available at   www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Kafanchan-PeaceDeclaration-23.03.2016.pdf. 20 Available at   www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Southern-PlateauPeace-Declaration.pdf. 18 See,

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to set up his own panel … I just hope they will not do anything to cause a breach of the peace in the State so they would not force the President into taking actions he would rather prefer not to take, in the interest of our democracy. (Segun Adeniyi, cited in Onuorah & Akhaine 2009) However, underlying these contentious politics between the state and federal authorities was the division of powers within Nigeria’s federal structure and its implications for conflict management. Constitutionally, state governors are the chief security officers of their states. In reality, however, effective control of the police and the army lay with the Federal Government. As cycles of violence continued in Jos, Governor Jang chose to put the blame at the door of the Federal Government, even suggesting that it might be complicit in the violence: I have been shouting this thing all along but nobody wants to pay attention to what we are saying. How do you implement reports when the very people who are caught in the act are ferried to Abuja and released? … In 2008, over 60 Chadians/Niger citizens were arrested in the state in connection with the killings and since they took them to Abuja, nothing has been heard about them … Nobody has ever been brought to book so far by Abuja, who controls the entire security apparatus. The governor is just a mere chief security officer for nothing. He has no control over the police commissioner posted to his state; neither are other security chiefs answerable to him. (Governor Jang cited in Eya 2011) The claim that all those arrested are always released is untrue.21 Nevertheless, Jang’s repeated claim of federal complicity permeated indigenous communities. Significantly, even President Goodluck Jonathan’s ostensibly Jang-friendly federal administration faced the blame-game from Governor Jang. President Jonathan’s former National Security Adviser, General Azazi refuted the Plateau State Governor … Azazi has rather accused the governor of ignoring security advice on the situation in the state. Azazi said Jang should learn to act as a leader with regard to the security situation in the state and not shift blame. (Adinoyi & Olaleye 2011) Like Dariye before him, Jang sought to exploit the division of powers between different levels of government to ignore politically inconven21 After the Dogo Nahauwa atrocity (see Chapter 9), 164 persons were arrested, charged and taken to court; of them, 15 were found guilty and sentenced to 10 years in jail (see Idam 2010; Agboola 2010a).

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ient advice. Similarly, federal authorities also tended to ignore Plateau State issues whenever it suited their purposes. For example, the Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry indicted the then Plateau Police Commissioner (M.D. Abubakar), asking for his dismissal. The indictment notwithstanding, President Jonathan nominated, and the Senate approved, M.D. Abubakar as Police Inspector General. Responding to loud protests from the Jang administration (Adinoyi 2012a), the Police Service Commission claimed that federal authorities were allegedly unaware of the Niki Tobi Commission report (Nwosu and Shiklam 2012). The difficult relationship between Jang’s administration and successive federal administrations hindered efforts at addressing the Jos conflict in an effective, coordinated and comprehensive manner. CONFLICT FREEZING, RITUALS OF INQUIRY AND LEGISLATIVE INERTIA

Given the political and constitutional position outlined above, federal responses to the Jos crisis have been limited to: (i) militarily freezing the conflict to manage escalation and contagion; (ii) establishing commissions of inquiry, whose reports are never publicly released or acted upon; and (iii) the inability, at the legislative arm of the Federal Government, to get to grips with the problem. Different combinations of soldiers, police and other security forces, as well as a variety command structures, have been used in attempts to quell the riots and keep the peace in Jos and Plateau State. At one point, the GOC commanding the Jos army division also controlled the Special Task Force (STF). The two positions were subsequently separated, with equally ranked Generals in charge of each. While military deployments contained initial fighting, both the military and police were soon dragged into the conflict; different communities accused either the military or the police of bias and brutality. The indigenous ethnic communities tended to prefer the police, while the Muslim and Jasawa communities tended to prefer the army. Governor Jang even went as far as condemning General Saleh Maina, the Muslim GOC in Jos, accusing him of bias. In response, General Maina claimed that he did not receive the necessary support from local elites and communities, stating that, unlike other places, one of the challenges we face in Jos is the lack of participation of the principal stakeholders. In other places, the stakeholders, at all levels were active participants towards the restoration of law and order … here [ Jos], what we get are incitements, either from a commissioner, local government chairman or a federal legislator, including even traditional rulers. They are either silent or saying things

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that will worsen the situation … they now turn back to look for whom to blame, which is most often times the military. (cited in Adeoti 2010) However, the account of the respected indigenous Christian General Domkat Bali seems to contradict General Maina’s assertion: The GOC, Maina or – whatever his name is – I did call him many times but he won’t pick my phone … I called to show interest in what was happening, because I am here in Jos … I tried calling him again but he still refused to pick my calls. (cited in Olaleye 2010) While General Maina was eventually recalled to Abuja, the military was not viewed as more impartial, professional or effective. Even after President Jonathan ordered Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshall Oluseyi Petinrin, ‘to take full charge of security situation in Plateau State immediately’ (Ogbodo & Olumide 2011) in 2011, the expected ‘magic solution’ of military action did not materialize. If anything, the killings continued, particularly in Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs, with the military caught in between two combatant communities that frequently accused it of bias or complicity. The army succeeded in freezing particular instances of rioting, but in general, it proved incapable of providing an enduring cessation of hostilities. Like the Plateau State Government, the Federal Government also frequently established presidential panels on the Plateau conflict. In 2002, the Federal Government formed the Justice Okpene Judicial Commission of Inquiry into communal conflicts in the states of Benue, Nassarawa, Plateau and Taraba. This was followed by the 2004 Presidential Peace Initiative Committee on Plateau State, headed by the Emir of Zazzau, Alhaji Shehu Idris. In 2009, the Abisoye Administrative Commission of Inquiry was formed, while the Presidential Advisory Panel on Plateau headed by Solomon Lar followed in 2010. However, Commission reports were seldom released officially and no actions were taken to pre-empt future violence. Even though President Goodluck Jonathan once ‘directed the Secretary to the Government of the Federation … to bring up all pending reports by recent committees set up by the Federal Government on the Plateau for immediate review and implementation’ (Ogbodo & Olumide 2011), there was no evidence of follow-up action. Establishing inquiries and panels became a ritual to give the appearance of action whilst nothing was being done in reality. These panels seemed to serve the purpose of administratively ‘kicking the can into the long grass’, without any consequential action. They also provided momentary distractions for the combatant communities. Different theories explaining these ineffective panels have been proposed. Archbishop Kaigama – a leading advocate

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for peace in Jos – accused state and federal politicians of lacking political will: We know what to do as Nigerians to bring to an end to the recurring crises, but I don’t believe that there is the political will both at the national and state levels to ensure that these repeated occurrences of violence are stopped permanently … I can’t see anything done concretely apart from bringing in soldiers and trucks. What else is being done to maintain security and promote peace that is permanent? … Even if you bring two million soldiers here and attach five soldiers to each family, they are not going to bring back peace. (cited in Owuamanam 2011) On his part, Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, asserted that federal authorities ‘deliberately refrained from acting firmly simply because of political reasons, making political alliances and not wanting to offend’ (cited in Ohia 2010). What both Kaigama and Soyinka seem to miss, however, is that the conflict’s driving ethno-religious forces, interests, and ideologies are not external to the Federal Government, but are embodied within the government itself. Abuja is not a rationalist island inured from the sectarianism and religious bigotry that poisoned public life in Jos. The federal political paralysis is indicative of cracks within the legislative and executive arms of government in Abuja; cracks which mirror similar sectarian divisions in Jos. An important intervention by the Federal Government is the 2010 presidential panel on Jos, which produced 20 recommendations, including the need for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, the creation of new local governments and districts in Jos North, the adoption of zoning and local government power rotation among ethnic groups, the establishment of grazing reserves in four vulnerable LGAs to curtail frequent conflicts between farmers and Fulani cattle owners, the assistance of all IDPs, ‘especially the Fulani’, to return and re-possess their properties, the establishment of Joint Consultative Peace Committees at the ward, village and district levels, the search for a constitutional solution to the problem of indigeneship, and the transfer of the conduct of local elections from state election bodies to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (Daily Trust 2010b; Bisalla 2010). While few federal panel reports have been officially released in the past, their contents have frequently been leaked in advance by panel members seeking to block particular recommendations they do not like through instigating their communities to embark on pre-emptory protests. This has led to paralysis on Jos within the federal executive, as restive indigenous communities protested some of the recommendations of the 2010 panel even before any official pronouncement (Agboola 2010b). The political

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paralysis is not limited to the federal executive. It is even more acute at the federal legislative level. The two arms of the National Assembly set up ad-hoc committees following the 2008 Jos riots. Even the very composition of the House of Representatives panel was immediately attacked by indigenous youth in Plateau (Confederation of Plateau State Youth Movements, cited in Abdulsalami, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, neither committee sat to deliberate on the problem or submitted any findings. Discussions of the Jos problem in the legislature often degenerated into religious and ethnic partisanship. For example, when the Jang administration proposed the ‘Operation Rainbow’ as a mechanism to monitor and apprehend conflict at the community level in Plateau, the issue became a bone of contention on the floor of the House of Representatives with Abdul Ningi from Bauchi State seeking to stop the Plateau Government, while a member from Plateau, Bitrus Kaze, stoutly defended the proposed formation. Meanwhile, communal killings raged on in 2011 and 2012 (Ameh 2011; Ndiribe & Ovuakporie 2012).

Conclusion The conflict in Jos has been one of Nigeria’s most enduring challenges. Different levels of political agency – from individuals to wards and neighbourhoods in Jos, and ultimately to the different arms of the Federal Government – have devised a variety of responses to the problems. Current efforts for peace in Jos are based on prioritizing one of two conflicting moral principles: (i) should the government abolish constitutional ‘indigeneship’ clauses and promote a civic citizenship instead, which would afford all Nigerians equal rights regardless of their origins, or (ii) should the government prioritize ethnic territorial and cultural rights of the indigenous groups? Arguing for a pan-national civic citizenship, the then Governor of Kaduna State, the late Patrick Yakowa, advocated expulsion of the indigene/settler clause from the constitution … pointing out that steps must be taken to ensure nationality overshadows indigene/settler syndrome in the country … ‘some of us are looking anxiously to the revision of the Nigerian constitution that would soon be embarked upon by the National Assembly and there is no doubt that this is one of the issues that should be thrown out such that anybody who has lived in any part of this country for a number of years becomes automatically an indigene.’ (cited in Akowe 2012) Some legal scholars also argue against indigeneship (Odinkalu 2010). However, supporters of indigenous rights highlight the political and

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economic inequalities between Nigeria’s ethnic groups. Based on these inequalities, advocates suggest that special measures are needed to protect indigenous groups within their ancestral territories. As participants at an African Leadership Forum conference observed, in order to co-exist peacefully, non-natives must recognize and respect the culture, customs and traditions of the host community, just as Christians living in Kano, Sokoto, Katsina and other northern cities do … The non-natives must be willing to be integrated into the culture of the host community by taking traditional titles, witnessing cultural festivals and marrying across the religious divide. This should be enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as means to promote peace. (Danfulani 2006, 21) Posed in this contradictory way of individual rights versus group rights, the Jos conflict has been difficult to resolve, since the demand for the primacy of one set of rights over the other can only be justified on normative political grounds. However, solutions to the problems in Jos can also be sought through practical every-day politics of inclusion and accommodation – statecraft – without necessarily resolving the constitutional issue of the primacy of individual or group rights. Both the Berom and the Jasawa feel threatened and frustrated and share a common security dilemma, which has incentivized violent action in the past. Special measures can be adopted first to mitigate these security dilemmas before the issues of individual or group rights are addressed. This requires close attention to confidence-building measures – regular joint committees, disclosures of youth and vigilante activities and formations, procedures for investigating questionable occurrences – all of which should help in signalling and verifying communal intent at all levels. Sustainable peace can only be built, first by assuaging group fears and insecurities, and second by promoting inclusive politics. The activities of community organizations, civil society groups, faith-based organizations, and the INGO HD, described in this chapter, have gradually set the stage for the conflict-weary communities of Jos to begin the tentative process of building mutual confidence and peace. This has addressed the first condition for peace. As for the second condition for building peace, since 2015 the positive community level developments have been complemented by developments at the level of the State Government. As the 2015 elections got underway, there was a re-alignment of political forces, with many indigenous groups opposing Governor Jang’s attempt at imposing a Berom candidate on the PDP. The coming together of these indigenous groups and the Jasawa under the opposition APC created a basis for promoting political inclusion, especially after APC’s Simon Lalong won the governorship. Under

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Lalong, the Jasawa have one state Commissioner (Minister) out of the 17 in the cabinet; under Jang, of the 24 Commissioners, none was Jasawa. Second, the Deputy Chief of Staff to Lalong is also a Jasawa, giving the community a direct access to the Governor. Third, the Amirul Hajj, head of the state’s delegation to the hajj rituals in Saudi Arabia in 2015 was also a Jasawa. Despite being identified as the ‘Muslim’ faction in Jos politics, this was the first time a Jasawa was being appointed to this Islamic office. Finally, Governor Lalong’s administration also recommended three Jasawa for consideration for federal appointments.22 This is the style of inclusive politics and statecraft that had been missing in Plateau State for a long time. For their part, the Jasawa seem to have dropped or moderated their earlier claims to ‘ownership’ of Jos. In these ways, both combatant groups seem to be stepping away from their previous zero-sum approach to politics. It is indicative of this new climate that the Nzem Berom Cultural festival, which it had not been possible to hold in the previous eight years because of insecurity, was successfully held in April 2016 (Premium Times 2016). Meanwhile, Governor Jang, now a Senator in Abuja, has been whipping up sentiments around indigenous land rights. In recent years, rural banditry has intensified across central Nigeria. Frequently, local farming populations have fought against Fulani pastoralists as both communities compete for land and water resources, and blame each other for initiating the violence. Senator Jang has cast himself as the champion of indigenous land rights against the Fulani pastoralists and he has been accused of fomenting ethnic tension by ‘sponsoring street protests in the state against a non-existent plan to establish grazing reserves’ for the pastoralists (Ehikioya 2016). Peace in Jos cannot be taken for granted, but the lessons of providing security for individuals and groups and promoting the politics of inclusivity are lessons with wider applicability across northern Nigeria. 22

We are grateful to Barrister Garba Ahmed for these details of the Jasawa relationship with the Lalong administration.

Bibliography Abdulsalami, Isa, 2009, ‘Jang restates commitment to peace in Plateau’, Guardian (Nigeria), 5 January. Adeoti, Femi, 2010, ‘Jos crisis: My story – GOC’, The Sun (Nigeria), 17 May. Adinoyi, Seriki, 2008, ‘Jang defies Yar’Adua: Sets up parallel panel to probe Jos crisis’, This Day, 31 December. —— 2012a, ‘Plateau indigenes kick over Abubakar’, This Day, 26 January. —— 2012b, ‘Plateau crisis: Fulani leaders arrested, detained’, This Day, 14 July. Adinoyi, Seriki and Olaleye, Wale, 2011, ‘Azazi Counters Jang, says he ignored advice on Jos crisis’, This Day, 10 September.

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Jos: Bottom-up & top-down approaches to peace building • 335 Agbese, Andrew, 2010a, ‘Gbong Gwon inaugurates c’ttee on Jos crises’, Daily Trust, 3 March. —— 2010b, ‘Jos crisis 2008: Ajibola panel indicts Hausa community – exonerates Jang’, Daily Trust, 15 February. Agboola, Mariam Aleshinloye, 2010a, ‘Dogo Na Hauwa: 15 sentenced to 10 years imprisonment’, The Sun (Nigeria), 17 December. —— 2010b, ‘Ethnic nationalities in Jos threaten court action over report’, The Sun (Nigeria), 8 September. Ajibola, Prince Bolasodun Adesumbo, 2009, The Justice Bola Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Unrest in Some Parts of Jos North on November 28, 2008. Report submitted to the Plateau State Government, Jos, 27 October. Akowe, Tony, 2012, ‘Why indigene/settler clause should go, by Yakowa’, The Nation (Nigeria), 8 July. Ameh, John, 2011, ‘12 killed in Plateau midnight attack’, Punch (Nigeria), 23 February. Ashaka, Kenny and Agboola, Mariam, 2011, ‘Hausa are Jos indigenes – Passali’, The Sun (Nigeria), 25 September. Bisalla, Suleiman M., 2010, ‘Plateau crisis: More details emerge from Lar c’ttee’, Daily Trust, 25 August. Daily Trust, 2010a, ‘Plateau polarized into two, say police’, Daily Trust, 14 March. —— 2010b, ‘Nigeria: The Presidential Panel Report on Jos crises’, Daily Trust, 2 September. —— 2011, ‘Wikileaks: Jang ignored warnings ahead 2008 elections’, Daily Trust, 8 September. Danfulani, Umar, 2006, ‘The Jos Peace Conference and the Indigene/Settler Question in Nigerian Politics’, ASC, Leiden and University of Jos. Danfulani, Umar H.D. and Fwatshak, Sati U., 2002, ‘Briefing: The September 2001 events in Jos, Nigeria’, London: African Affairs, Royal African Society. Ehikioya, Augustine, 2016, ‘Jang sponsoring grazing reserve protests in Plateau – Lalong’, The Nation (Nigeria), 1 July. Eya, Willy, 2011, ‘“Men behind Jos killings” – Jang’, The Sun (Nigeria), 20 February. Human Rights Watch, 2005, ‘Revenge in the Name of Religion: The Cycle of Violence in Plateau and Kano States’, Human Rights Watch 17 (8), www.hrw.org/sites/default/ files/reports/nigeria0505.pdf (last accessed 25 July 2017). Ibrahim, Jibrin, 2010, ‘Deepening democracy: Jos, victimhood and the other’, 234 NEXT, 2 May. Idam, Jossy, 2010, ‘Fresh tension in Jos’, The Sun (Nigeria), 4 April. Krause, J., 2011, ‘A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Violence in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria’. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Leadership, 2010, ‘Front page Comment: Way out of the Jos crisis’, Leadership (Nigeria), 31 December. McCain, D. 2011, ‘Christian Religious Extremism, Radicalization and Militancy in Northern Nigeria’. Paper presented to the Centre for Peace Initiative and Development, Minna, Niger State, 12 November. Nanlong, Marie-Therese, 2012, ‘Jobs for Jos Youths’, The Nation (Nigeria) 5 July. Ndiribe, Okey and Ovuakporie, Emman, 2012, ‘Reps divided over late Dantong’, Vanguard, 13 July. NSRP – Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2014, ‘Policy Brief: Responses of Plateau State Government to violent conflicts in the state’, www.nsrp-nigeria.org/ wp-content/uploads/2014/11/E189-NSRP-Policy-Brief-Response-of-PLSG-toViolence_FINAL_web.pdf (last accessed 25 July 2017). Nwosu, Nduka and Shiklam, John, 2012, ‘Abubakar “fit and proper” to be IG, says PSC’, This Day, 27 January. Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm, 2010, ‘Nigeria at 50 – Unresolved Issues of Indigeneship and Citizenship: Jos as an Illustration of the Major Fault-lines’. Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association, Kaduna.

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336 • Jos – Conflict & Peace Building Ogbodo, John-Abba and Olumide, Seye, 2011, ‘Jonathan orders Petinrin to end Plateau violence’, Guardian (Nigeria), 13 September. Ohia, Paul, 2010, ‘Obasanjo: Jonathan’s inability to see Yar’Adua bizarre’, This Day, 11 March. Okulaja, Ayo, 2011, ‘Governor weeps as women protest in Jos’, 234NEXT, 1 February. Olaleye, Olawale, 2010, ‘Bali berates Jos GOC’, This Day, 14 March. Omipidan, Ismail, 2009, ‘You’re biased, Northern Christian leaders tell Yar’Adua’, The Sun (Nigeria), 12 January. Onuorah, Madu and Akhaine, Saxone, 2009, ‘Presidency faults Plateau on Jos crisis panel’, Guardian (Nigeria), 12 January. Orji, Nwachukwu, 2011, ‘Faith-Based Aid to People Affected by Conflict in Jos, Nigeria: An Analysis of the Role of Christian and Muslim Organizations’, Journal of Refugee Studies 24 (3), 473–92. Owuamanam, Jude, 2011, ‘No sincere efforts to address Plateau crises – Bishop Kaigama’, Punch (Nigeria), 28 March. Polgreen, L., 2008, ‘Deadly Nigeria clashes subside’, The New York Times, 30 November. Premium Times, 2016, ‘Festival suspended for 8 years due to insecurity holds in Jos’, Premium Times, 15 April. PSG – Plateau State Government, 2002, White Paper on Niki Tobi Commission Report. —— 2004, ‘Plateau Resolves: The Plateau State Peace Conference, Main Report’, September. —— 2009, White Paper on the Fiberesima Commission Report, April. USAID Nigeria, 2009, June, ‘Mid-Term Evaluation of the Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) Project’, Burlington VT, ARD.

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Conclusion Diversity, religious pluralism & democracy ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA & DAVID EHRHARDT

Introduction In Chapter 1, this volume began with the admonition that narratives and representations of northern Nigeria’s interfaith encounter feed into the real everyday interactions of Muslims, Christians, and other believers and non-believers throughout this region. Breaking through the stylized representation of Christian-Muslim confrontation, the volume’s chapters have presented a mosaic of different interfaith encounters: from the constructive accommodation of informal market interactions to the full-blown insurgency of Boko Haram. This concluding chapter highlights three key arguments about northern Nigerian interfaith relations that resonate with the empirical material presented in the preceding analyses. In doing so, it hopes to outline fertile and important avenues for further research, as well as possible entry points for policy approaches. Firstly, we will reiterate that, since the 1980s, religious confrontations between Muslims and Christians have intensified. The material presented in the various chapters of this volume highlight the religious violence connected to this confrontation, including around the declaration of full Sharia law, Boko Haram, and the series of crises in urban Jos and its hinterland. These developments support the contention by Marshall (2009, 214) that greater religious polarization is resulting from ‘competing theocratic projects’ in Nigeria. However, the chapters also demonstrate that this polarization, and its recurrent violent confrontations, are not a product of inherent antipathies between the faiths, but of a particular mix of historical, economic, social and, in particular, political processes. These processes can be the target of public policy if there is a will to change the situation. 337

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Secondly, the argument is made that, despite religious polarization, there may still be common grounds for transcending the zero-sum logic of religious intolerance and engendering traditions of friendly competition, compromise and cooperation. There is nothing inevitable about the violence and fear that have characterized the religious encounter in more recent years and, in fact, most Muslims and Christians live together rather harmoniously. In this vein, Dowd (2015, 96) warns that we should be mindful of the conclusions we draw because while ‘religious diversity appears to lead to intense religious competition that results in extremism in Nigeria, it is important to remember that appearances may be deceiving’. He argues that while there is sufficient historical evidence to support the contention that religious diversity in developing and politically unstable settings often gives rise to religious conflict initially, ‘there is also evidence to suggest that such diversity eventually leads to the religious compromise and accommodation that are necessary for liberal democracy’ (Dowd 2015, 9). This chapter will highlight examples of such accommodation from the preceding chapters and suggest some of the ways in which they may be strengthened. Finally, we will place northern Nigeria in the wider, global context of interfaith relations. What lessons might we draw from this region’s experiences, and what models from outside the region might help to understand, or even improve, its current situation? Specifically, the case of ‘Senegalese exceptionalism’ is raised as a practical illustration of the type of state-religious and inter-religious dynamics that could serve as a model for Nigeria in the search for a more harmonious relationship between religious groups on the one hand, and between them and the state, on the other.

Confrontation For decades, northern Nigeria has been a thriving market place for faith and religion. Demand for religion is high, and preachers, scholars, pastors and other leaders compete with each other for a share of the enormous followership this region contains. In a context of state-building, patronage and democratization, this competition has become increasingly confrontational, resulting not only in increasingly polarized rhetoric but also residential segregation and, at times, even interfaith violence. This observation is not new (e.g. Ibrahim 1991); yet at the same time, the dynamics behind the confrontation still require more intensive analysis, particularly as the democratic dispensation appears to be stabilizing. In pursuit of this end, several chapters in this volume have studied cases of interfaith confrontation, from the Sharia riots in the early 2000s (Chapter

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5) and Kaduna’s religious segregation (Chapter 7) to the more recent violence in Plateau State (Chapters 8, 9 and 10), and the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast (Chapter 6). Taken together, these cases paint a complex and varied picture of Nigeria’s religious confrontation. Throughout this book, it is clear that most of the dynamics, causes and motivations for interfaith violence are highly contingent on local particularities and historical conjunctures. Importantly, this localized character of northern Nigeria’s interfaith confrontations belies any single, comprehensive explanation, including one that considers them as part of an alleged global confrontation between the Islamic world and the (Christian) West. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, we may be able to identify subtler, partial explanations that carry across cases. We will use the remainder of this section to highlight three such trends, related to youth and intergenerational dynamics, indigeneship and the looming presence of the state, in the hope that they may suggest avenues for further research and policy interventions. First, all cases of confrontation underline the importance of youth and intergenerational dynamics. For one, as Higazi (Chapter 9) highlights, youths are often at the forefront of collective violence. This has been true on the Plateau and in Jos, as well as in Boko Haram: violence, in many cases, is predominantly an occupation for the young. Youths are also dominant in vigilante organizations, such as the Civilian Joint Task Force in the north-east or Jos’ neighbourhood watch associations. Finally, young people often make up the bulk of religious reform movements, demanding change from the old ways of their parents and grandparents and catalysing interfaith competition. Of course, we do not suggest that young people, or even the youth bulge, are to blame for Nigeria’s religious confrontations; rather, our more modest claim is that intergenerational dynamics and the concerns of young Nigerians have to be an integral part of any approach to resolving northern Nigeria’s violent confrontations. Second, all confrontations analysed in this volume are framed in a context of economic decline and increasing competition for access to resources and opportunities. The precise causal connection between economic competition and violent confrontation is varied and complex; yet there is little doubt that the two dynamics interact and feed off each other. Moreover, in all cases economic competition clearly interacts with political concerns over power and domination; it appears that democratization has done little to assuage the perennial intergroup fear of domination that has been a driver of Nigerian politics and state-building ever since independence (Mustapha 2002). In this regard, several chapters refer to Nigeria’s Federal Character Principle and the resulting importance of indigeneship as a factor translating economic competition into interfaith, or political, confrontation. It is therefore safe to suggest that throughout

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the country, but nowhere more than in Plateau State, indigeneship is intensifying the ethnic or religious nature of the struggle over ownership, control and resources (Chapters 8, 9 and 10; cf. Fourchard 2015; Ehrhardt 2017). Addressing this issue is therefore another access point to further study and possibly to attenuate northern Nigeria’s interfaith confrontations. Third and finally, the importance of the Federal Character and indigeneship suggest the importance of policy and the Nigerian state in understanding interfaith confrontations; and in fact, in all cases of confrontation and violence in this volume, the state looms large. Its role, however, is varied and multifaceted; we highlight three of its roles as a source of formal institutions, as an object of competition, and as an actor in violent confrontations. First, the state is a source of formal policy and institutions that structure intergroup competition and, at times, intensify confrontation and increase the likelihood of violence. The increasing importance of indigeneship constitutes one example of the impact of state policy on interfaith confrontations; but the most powerful example in this volume is arguably the way in which political and administrative changes shaped conflict in the city of Jos (Chapter 8). Here, institutions and ethnic politicking conspired to fundamentally reshape public perceptions of political and economic opportunities, thus intensifying the ‘security dilemma’ between Christian ‘indigenes’ and Muslim ‘settlers’ and engendering segregation and violence. Formal institutions, written by the state, are thus one aspect of the state’s presence in northern Nigeria’s interfaith confrontations. Second, the chapters in this volume have abundantly illustrated the importance of the state as an object of interfaith competition. This is perhaps clearest in the contestation around Sharia implementation in northern Nigeria, as it revolves around the fundamental relationship between religion and the state (Chapter 5). But the state is also at stake in the confrontation in Jos, where ownership over the local government as well as local traditional institutions has become a protracted bone of contention between ‘indigenous’ Berom and ‘settler’ Jasawa (Chapter 7). Third and finally, the state is also an active participant in situations of violent confrontation. Boko Haram is perhaps the most painful example of this role, as the interaction between the Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram has likely been one of the drivers of the particular trajectory of radicalization this movement has experienced (Chapter 6). But the chapters on Plateau State also highlight ways in which the state was implicated in the dynamics of violence, such as the role of Governor Jonah Jang in feeding the interfaith conflicts on the Jos Plateau (Chapter 9). Beyond direct involvement in violent confrontations, the Nigerian state, whilst not formally declaring itself as secular, generally professes a

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neutrality and laissez-faire attitude in religious matters (Soares 2006, 15). This stance has been extremely unsatisfactory from the point of view of securing religious peace. Firstly, it has given wide latitude to religious elites and political entrepreneurs to operate as they wish, with little regard for the rights of others. This is most noticeable by the sheer level of noise pollution coming regularly from mosques and churches, with little effort to regulate them. Secondly, at local government and state levels in religiously homogenous states, it has been possible for the ethos of a particular religion to be imposed as a matter of course, sometimes with little regard for the interests of religious minorities. Thirdly, even at the federal level, the presumed neutrality of the state is frequently compromised by the opportunistic manoeuvring of political elites and the consequent penetration of the state by religious interests. To transcend the religious polarization and violence in Nigeria, it would be necessary, not only to promote inter-religious civic institutions, but also to address the relationship of the Nigerian state to religious forces as a whole.

Compromise, cooperation, and (nonviolent) competition The sustained scholarly and public focus on interfaith confrontation would appear to suggest that northern Nigeria is in a constant state of contestation and violence between its various religious denominations. Nothing, however, is further from the truth. Most of the time, and in most places, Nigerians with diverging religious convictions live and work together peacefully, even as these (old) patterns of accommodation and cooperation have increasingly come under pressure. In the informal economy, for example, where most Nigerians are forced by circumstances to pursue livelihood strategies, we find ample signs of interfaith collaboration and economic complementarity – even if stresses are beginning to show as cities like Kaduna become more and more spatially segregated along religious lines (Chapter 7). The chapters in this volume have given many examples of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Ostien, for example, observes a trend among northern Muslims to identify rather ecumenically as ‘just-a-Muslim’, rather than as affiliated to any specific sect. Moreover, he suggests that popular support for the freedom of conscience and religion is increasing in the region (Chapter 2). Ehrhardt and Ibrahim suggest that cities like Kano have often long-established and effective systems of economic specialization and cooperation between religious groups. They also highlight the existence of more radical forms of interfaith integration in the various all-encompassing syncretistic sects, such as Lagos’ Chrislamherb (Chapter 3). The chapters on the Plateau and Boko Haram describe how

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young people, across religious lines and in the face of recurrent violence, organize self-defence (vigilante) groups in an attempt to directly address the violence (Chapters 6, 8, 9 and 10). Finally, and most optimistically, Meagher describes how trust, economic complementarity and religious occupational associations help to maintain collaborative interfaith relations in the informal markets of Kano and Kaduna, even in the face of recurring religious violence and counterproductive liberalization efforts by the state (Chapter 7). What then, in general, have the authors of these chapters identified as the conditions under which interfaith cooperation in Nigeria is possible? Again, of course: as each case is different, there is no single set of conditions that we suggest universally facilitates interfaith cooperation. Instead, we want to highlight two mechanisms that may be important parts of the puzzle in many parts of the region: first, the importance of informal, non-state institutions and social resources and, second, the importance of inclusive and conflict-sensitive statecraft. Historically, northern Nigeria has produced a rich tapestry of local and often informal ways of facilitating cooperation, trust and integration between members of different religious and ethnic communities. This tapestry includes a range of what we could call social resources for cooperation: from the informal rules for assimilating ‘settlers’ into urban spaces and identities to the occupational associations of traders in the informal market and the religious trading and support networks, all are examples of social resources that Nigerians can tap into in order to work together more easily with their compatriots with different religious affiliations. In the period since independence, some of these resources for cooperation have persisted or transformed in northern Nigeria; take, for example, the resurgence and reinvention of traditional authorities as inclusive ‘fathers’ of their communities, or the reinforced importance of market associations in the era of state retreat and structural adjustment. Some resources, however, withered away under the postcolonial economic and political pressures, such as the rules for urban assimilation and the fluidity of religious affiliations and boundaries. Finally, new forms of social resources for cooperation also arose, for example in the shape of ‘modern’ non-government organizations working towards interfaith dialogue and conflict resolution (cf. Chapter 10). Although the nature of these social resources for cooperation is clearly highly diverse, the chapters in this volume suggest that some version of them is often at the heart of successful interfaith accommodation in northern Nigeria. This resonates with recent work by Dowd (2015), who argues that, perhaps counterintuitively, there is a positive relationship between religious diversity and interfaith tolerance. To support his argument, Dowd conducted a survey on religious observation and political attitudes in

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November 2006 in four Nigerian cities. The results of the survey showed a correlation between religious diversity and tolerant political attitudes. In the two settings with little inter-religious diversity, Kano and Enugu, Christian and Islamic religious communities promoted voting and political interest, but not respect for religious liberty. In the moderately diverse settings of Jos, religious communities promoted more demanding forms of political activism, but discouraged support for religious liberty. However, in Ibadan, the highly religiously diverse setting, ‘Christian and Islamic religious communities had neither a positive nor a negative impact on the indicators of political participation included in the study, but a very positive effect on support for religious liberty’ (Dowd 2015, 123). These results suggest that religious segregation, rather than religious diversity, has inhibited religious tolerance in Nigeria. Furthermore, the survey suggests that in Nigeria, despite the inter-religious violence, religious observance tend to have a positive effect on support for religious liberty among members of all three religious groupings: Muslims, mainline Christians and Pentecostals (Dowd 2015, 119). Finally, Dowd argues that two factors are crucial for explaining the positive effects of religious observance and religious diversity on attitudes of tolerance: ‘(1) the length of time a setting has been religiously diverse, and (2) the degree to which a setting is religiously integrated’ (2015, 125). On this basis, Dowd suggests that how religious diversity is managed, the role of religious institutions and leaders, and the involvement of the populace and civic organizations, are important in halting polarization and promoting integration – an argument that strongly resonates with the findings in this volume. In addition to informal social resources, however, the management of religious diversity also relies on inclusive and conflict-sensitive forms of governance and statecraft. Religious competition will, for the foreseeable future, remain a fact of life in northern Nigeria. Two of the key things that matter for preventing (violent) confrontation are, on the one hand, the way in which this competition is allowed to interact with other forms of political and economic competition and, on the other, the extent to which religious competition comes to encompass and ‘colour’ (non-religious) everyday interactions between members of religious groups. Social resources such as informal associations, rules and networks can fulfil part of this task, but all chapters in this volume underline that the state is also an indispensable party to any lasting method of facilitating interfaith accommodation. We have already seen ways in which the Nigerian state has engendered confrontation between religions in the north; but what insights do the chapters give us about the ‘best practices’ of the Nigerian state in fostering religious cooperation? Trends in response to this question are still difficult to discern. But the chapters do give evocative examples that hopefully stimulate further

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research in this area. Mustapha et al. (Chapter 10), for example, describe what they call inclusive statecraft in Jos: after years of political partisanship in favour of the ‘native’ Berom under Governor Jang, his successor Lalong decided to give important several political appointments to ‘settler’ Jasawa. The Jasawa community, in turn, also moderated their grievance claims against the state and the Berom. Another example, at least in part, may be found in the northern experiments with Sharia implementation (Chapter 5). On the one hand, of course, Sharia has been a bone of interfaith contention and source of political contestation and even violence. But on the other hand, and particularly in the longer run, it might be that this decentralized version of religious law within the context of a federal, multireligious constitution provides an innovative and lasting solution to the competing political claims of Nigeria’s various religious groups. While it is too early to evaluate this claim comprehensively, early results from recent field studies1 suggest that at least in some parts of the north, Sharia institutions are providing relatively good public services to Muslims and Christians alike. If this trend expands and continues, it suggests that Sharia implementation constitutes an institutionalized example of inclusive statecraft that relies on the mechanics of decentralized law-making under the protective umbrella of a strong, multireligious constitution. Although different in appearance, the examples of Governor Lalong and (tentatively) Sharia implementation are both attempts to channel the political dimension of religious competition peacefully and in a way that is sensitive to the interests of both majority and minority groups in a particular locality. This is what inclusive statecraft means, and while the chapters of this volume give hints about the best practices currently in operation in Nigeria and the conditions under which they are possible, more systematic research in this field would be a welcome addition.

Indigenizing democracy, tolerance and pluralism While interfaith relations in northern Nigeria are in many ways unique, they have also long been deeply connected to the rest of the world. Christians and Muslims alike are highly aware of the global dynamics between their religions, and issues like the Israel-Palestine conflict, the civil war in Syria, or the migration policies of the United States and Europe are frequent topics of conversation and intense debate throughout the region. Events abroad thus have an impact on interfaith relations within Nigeria, while Nigerian religious dynamics also spread outside its borders. 1 Papers presented at the validation meeting of the study on 15 years of Sharia implementation in northern Nigeria, held in Abuja on 5-6 September 2016 and organized by the development Research and Project Centre and the Nigeria Research Network.

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Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the Boko Haram insurgency, in which not only the insurgency movement had important foreign links of support and refuge, but Nigeria also relied strongly on the military support of its neighbours (Niger, Chad and Cameroon) in defeating the movement at its peak in 2015 (Chapter 6). This section looks beyond this case of direct military support from abroad and considers some of the lessons on interfaith accommodation that have come out of other countries and regions, to see if there are lessons to be learnt from comparison with the Nigerian situation. We will consider, first, the literature on civic associations and interethnic relations and, second, the remarkable example of religious tolerance and pluralism in the Senegalese state. Earlier in this chapter, we have argued that local social resources (institutions, networks, organizations) are often crucial to successful interfaith accommodation. These findings resonate with studies on India by Varshney (2001) which suggest that religious pluralism can be associated with peace rather than conflict, provided there are civic (and preferably inter-religious) organizations in civil society to manage tensions. In the related context of contentious politics in Bosnia, Armakolas (2011) makes a similar point about the importance of inter-ethnic and inter-religious networks in mitigating extremist religious mobilization in the city of Tuzla. He also highlights the role of formal institutions such as the police force and local government in supporting inter-ethnic organizations in the face of extremist pressures. At the same time, however, he argues that associational civic links are significant for opposing extremism: yet, the sustainability and success of the opposition depends crucially on the ability of the political system to ‘distance’ itself from the extremist influence. Grassroots activism may prove futile if the ‘battle’ for the political system is lost. (Armakolas 2011, 29) This last point raises the important question of the nature of state institutions in Nigeria at the local, state and federal levels. More specifically, it raises the question of whether local non-state resources are sufficient to facilitate religious accommodation in the absence of the other crucial ingredient: inclusive statecraft. In many ways unlike Nigeria, Senegal represents a successful case of the indigenization and vernacularization of democracy, religious tolerance, and pluralism within the state. This has ensured social harmony and political stability in an African environment, usually identified with military coups, civil wars and ethnic conflicts (Diouf 2013, 4). Since the colonial period, the history of state-Islam relations in Senegal was characterized by tensions, confrontations and cooperation within the Muslim groups and between the Muslim groups and the state. Yet, despite these,

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the system of peaceful collaboration between the religious groups and the state not only emerged, but has also been durable. At the core of this system of exchange between religious groups and between them and the state, is an implicit ‘social contract’ binding all the elements of the system together. The reciprocal interactions between the state, religious elites, and religious society has resulted in a socio-political system ‘in which Islamic institutions have been central but have coexisted with a nominally secular state and have made no significant challenge for the control of the state’ (Diouf 2013, 7). Though the Senegalese state has not been able to develop a transformative agenda for its society, politically, the state ‘at least was not a political artefact, working in a void, without effective links with society at large’ (Diouf 2013, 6). Senegal has managed not only to root its state in society, but also to inculcate mutual respect between Sufi groups, and between Muslims and Christians. The level of social tolerance has become so entrenched that in city of Popenguine, Catholics and Sufi disciples help build one another’s mosques and churches (Diouf 2013, 2). While Babou (2013) point out some of the limits of the Senegalese ‘social contract’, there is no doubt that Senegalese ‘exceptionalism’ has managed to root the state in society, and in the process, generate the basis for tolerance, democracy and respect for pluralism. This engagement between the state, religious leaders and religious civil society has resulted in the coproduction of a state characterized by the respect of the autonomy of discursive space of each of the partners – a space in which they act jointly or separately in the execution of administrative tasks; the guidelines regulating their interactions; and the public display of their signs, images, language, and identity. (Diouf 2013, 10) How Nigeria can transform from its nominal but illusory religious ‘neutrality’, to an embedded but autonomous actor able to tap into the religious sentiments and organizations in the country to create a respect for diversity and pluralism, remains a critical challenge. At the heart of that challenge is the fractious nature of elite politics in Nigeria and the huge temptation of resorting to ethnic and religious mobilization for political advantage. This book has aimed to make a humble contribution to addressing this challenge by bringing together detailed empirical studies of the workings of interfaith relations in northern Nigeria, in the hope that this will bring new insights and direct popular, scholarly and policy interest in the direction of Nigeria’s key challenges. But more work remains to be done.

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Bibliography Armakolas, I, 2011, ‘The “Paradox” of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-nationalist Local Politics during the Bosnian War’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (3), 229–61. Babou, Cheikh Anta, 2013, ‘The Senegalese “Social Contract” Revisited: The Muridiyya Muslim Order and State Politics in Postcolonial Senegal’, in Mamadou Diouf (ed.), Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal, New York: Columbia University Press. Diouf, Mamadou, 2013, ‘Introduction – The Public Role of “Good Islam”: Sufi Islam and the Administration of Pluralism’, in Mamadou Diouf (ed.), Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal, New York: Columbia University Press. Dowd, Robert A., 2015, Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ehrhardt, D., 2017, ‘Indigeneship, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Institutional Change in Northern Nigeria’, African Affairs, 116 (464) 1–22. Fourchard, L., 2015. ‘Bureaucrats and Indigenes: Producing and Bypassing Certificates of Origin in Nigeria’, Africa, 85, 37–58. Ibrahim, J., 1991, ‘Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria’, Journal of Modern African Studies 29, 115–36. Marshall, Ruth, 2009, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Mustapha, A.R., 2002, ‘Coping with Diversity: The Nigerian State in Historical Perspective’, in Abdi I. Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar (eds), The African State: Reconsiderations, Portsmouth: Heinemann, 253–79. Putnam, R.D., 2000, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon & Schuster. Soares, Benjamin, 2006, ‘Introduction’, in Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, Leiden: Brill. Varshney, A., 2001, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond’, World Politics, 53, 362–98.

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Abdulsalami, Isa 241–2, 332 Abubakar, Shekau 67n25, 68, 72, 165n2, 166, 170, 173n27, 178–9&n52, 239 Abubakar III, Sultan 28 Abubakar, Alhaji MD 319, 329 Abuja 38, 46, 66, 69–71 Adam, Sheikh Ja’far Mahmoud 65–6 Adamawa 21–2, 38, 41tab, 51, 55,  59–60, 62, 118, 165, 169, 173, 234, 283 Boko Haram attacks 69–70 northern 13–14 Adamu, Abdalla Uba 53 Afghanistan 124, 140, 179 Afizere 233–5, 247–9, 251, 254–5, 279–80, 294, 317, 321, 326 African traditional religions 1,  5–7, 10–11, 20, 40, 88, 103, 108, 113–14, 119, 233, 278–9 impact of colonialism on 6, 9,  85, 278 orisa 4, 6–8 see also under Pentecostal  movement African Union 178 Ahl as-sunnah 60, 66, 68

Ahmad, Amina 314 Ahmad, Sheikh Muhammad 59 Ahmadiyya 2, 43, 45–6, 50, 75 Albani, Sheikh Muhammad Auwal 65–7&n25 Algeria 179–80 All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) 250, 252–3, 255–8, 261 Alli, Chris 316, 320 Alubo, Ogoh 83–5, 87, 95, 103, 118 Amalgamated Commercial Motorcycle Owners and Riders Association of Nigeria (ACOMORAN) 191–4, 209–10 Anaguta 233–5, 249, 251, 255, 280, 310, 317, 319, 321, 326 Anderson, J.N.D. 140, 142 Andersson, Ulrika 9–10 Ansaru 48, 63, 65, 72, 74, 79,  178n51, 179–80 attacks on military 71 criticism of Boko Haram 70 kidnappings/executions 71 links with al-Qaeda 71 Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria 74 see also Nur-Ud-Deen Society 349

*WAS Creed.indb 349

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Arizona survey see under religious affiliation Asake, Musa 12, 125 Atiku, Sultan Abdurrahman 109–10

Gbong Gwom chieftaincy 233,  235, 237, 244, 251, 254, 277n4, 281n8, 315, 323 see also Fulani-Berom violence;  security dilemma: Berom-Jasawa Babangida, Aliyu 73 Boko Haram insurgency 11–12, 18, Babangida, Ibrahim 130, 145, 227,  27, 37, 48, 54, 76, 79, 108, 247–8 184, 303–4, 337, 339, 345 Baker, T. 278–9, 281 abductions/kidnapping 69, 172, Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa 19, 115  180n55 Bangladesh, Hindu-Muslim allegiance to Daesh (ISIS) 71, conflicts in 18, 121  165, 178–9&n52 Barkey, Karen 4, 156 atrocities/massacres/campaign of al-Barnawi, Khalid 72  terror 56, 68–70, 102, 173, Bauchi State 243, 332 176, 217 Boko Haram/Ansaru conflict car bombings/suicide attacks 70,  67–8, 70–71, 170–72, 180  7, 170, 178, 204, 210, 218, Christian community of 22, 114 241–2 colonial Mahdist revolts 11, 59 criminalization of 173–4, 181 displacement of people into 270, funding of 66, 173–4, 180  292–4n26&27, 295–6n30, future of 177–80 303 hijra 65 ethnic minority groups 118, ‘Nigerian Taliban’ 65–6, 166,  234–5, 271, 280  178 indigene-settler/Muslim public contestation of ideas 66–7  Christian conflicts 130, 169, reprisals for state suppression 248  68–9, 73, 170–72 Kala Kato conflict in 52 see also security force crackdown Muslim population 38, 49–50,  on Boko Haram  55, 60, 62, 66, 169, 280, Boko Haram recruitment 166–7 282–5 of Buduma/Kotoko 173–6, 181 Bello, Ahmadu 5, 23, 115–16, 279 mobilization of youth see under Benton, Lauren 156–9  youth Benue State 15, 26, 38, 118, 167, security force brutality as trigger 330  for 170–72, 176–7, 340 Benue-Congo languages 275–6 of women and children 178&n49 Benue-Plateau State 116, 244–6 Boko Haram targets 13–15, 23, Berom 30, 239–40, 246–7, 250,  126–7  256–7, 278, 280, 294 attacks on Christian minorities Berom Educational and Cultural  69–70, 102, 127, 165–8, 170  Association (BECO) 236, 248 Muslims as main victims of 67, Berom Elders Forum 236, 248  126, 128, 165, 167, 301 language 276 see also under Bauchi State; Berom Youth Movement 236,  Borno State; Jos,  248, 296n31, 299 ethno-religious violence in

*WAS Creed.indb 350

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Bordia, P. 230–31 bori practice 1, 8 repression of 9–10, 86 Borno State 2, 13–15, 22, 26,  41tab, 51, 55–7, 60, 62, 85, 140, 165 Boko Haram conflict/violence  in 28, 68–9, 73, 170, 181, 190 Chibok 22, 69, 172 grievances of Christian minority  28, 130, 167–9 Gwoza 22–3 Kanuris of 38, 66, 72, 130,  167–9, 171, 174–5, 225, 234, 274, 280, 284, 294 see also Maiduguri Botmang, Michael 250, 254, 316 Brigaglia, A. 65, 67 Bruce, R. 271, 277, 279 Buba, Jacob Gyang 254, 315 Buba, Timothy Gyang 237, 254–5 Buddhism 2, 18 Buhari, Muhammadu 15, 110, 166, 168, 178 Bunza, M. 46, 48, 50, 55–6, 64, 75

Chad 16, 69, 72, 165–6, 171–2,  176–7, 301, 328, 345 Chadic languages 275 Lake Chad 167, 174–5, 181 Chouin, Gérard 14, 126–7 Chrislamherb 90, 341 Christian Association of Nigeria  (CAN) 12–15, 91, 100–1, 124, 129, 236, 315 coalition with JNI 312 responses to violence 102, 125 perceptions of discrimination  against Christians 144 symbolic purpose of 91 Christian Council of Nigeria (CNN) 91, 100 Christian identity see under religious identities Christian leadership roles 83–4, 92 caretaker/counsellor 97–8 political sphere/community  representation 83, 91–2, 94–6, 99–102, 104–5, 129 teacher/preacher 96–7 see also politicization of religion Christian hierarchy, democratic challenges to 96, 98–100, 105 Cameroon 59, 69, 71–2, 165–7, Christian populations of northern 172n23, 177, 345  Nigeria 83 Catholics/Catholic Church 4, 20, demographics of 83, 87–90, 104  70, 85, 87, 89, 99, 101, 103, diversity of 83, 87, 104 119, 125, 170, 241, 279 religiosity of 76–7, 92 Catholic Charismatic Renewal see also Christian leadership  89–90  roles; Christian hierarchy, Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria democratic challenges to;  (CSN) 91 religious affiliation Idomaland 85 Christianity 1–2, 83 peace-building efforts/interfaith history of 83–5  dialogue 236, 249, 297, 312 Yoruba domestication of 7 cattle rustling see under rural see also conversions; Christian banditry  populations of northern Central African Republic 16, 178 Nigeria; indigenous Christian Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue communities (HD) 29–30, 325–7 citizenship 250, 252, 254, 308, Centre for Peace Advancement in 321, 332 see also indigeneship Nigeria (CEPAN) 253–4, 256 civil society 29, 37, 75, 123,

*WAS Creed.indb 351

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 150–1 see also under conflict resolution colonial resistance 112 Battle of Burmi 109–10 Satiru revolt 59, 110–11 colonialism 1, 19, 59, 84, 188–9, 233, 300 decolonization 19 see also  Independence indirect rule under 117–18, 130,  233, 243–4, 277n4 Native Authority (NA) 112,  114–15, 129, 140–41, 243, 280 see also Independence conflict framing 3, 15–16, 18, 20,  27, 126–7 role of encounter narratives in  3–4, 7–8, 10, 12–13, 15, 18 conflict resolution 17, 30 220, 248,  310, 316, 342 informal mechanisms 17, 219 early warning systems 315, 322 role of civil society organizations  in 186, 219–20 see also peace building, Jos conflict resolution, state level  responses 308, 316, 329–30 Ajibola Commission of Inquiry  247, 323–5 contentious state-federal  government relationship 327–9 Fiberesima Commission of  Inquiry 316–19, 325 ineffectiveness/lack of political  will 308, 318, 329–32 Niki Tobi Judicial Commission  of Inquiry 237, 259, 312, 318–20, 325, 329 Okpene Judicial Commission of  Inquiry 330 Plateau Peace Conference 316,  320–22 presidential panel on Jos 331 conflict/violence 1

*WAS Creed.indb 352

Muslim-Muslim see conflict/  violence, Muslim sectarian Muslim-state/government 2, 16,  48–9, 63–4, 68–9, 79, 170 north-south regional  competition 19–20, 115–16, 124, 127–8, 338 patterns of 3, 19, 21, 30, 126,  226, 272 transitional zone 22–3, 26 see also Boko Haram insurgency;  identity-based violence; Jos Plateau, patterns of collective violence; Muslim-Christian religious encounters/conflict; politicization of religion: population displacement conflict/violence, Muslim sectarian  2, 15, 42, 44, 76, 126 anti-Sufism 43–4, 56, 60–65,  73, 75–6, 236, 284–7 Maitatsine riots 51–2, 76, 128,  177, 184 persecution of Ahmadis 50 Shi’ite clashes, Zaria 47–9, 76 constitutional rights 30 freedom of religion 62, 76–7, 79,  93–4, 101, 154 see also Nigerian constitution:  provisions of corruption 108, 160, 170–71, 181 in judiciary 147–9, 159, 161–2 see also patronage Council of Ulama, Jos 236, 240, 248, 312–13, 325 customary law 139, 142, 152,  157–9 courts 143, 146, 149 dan Fodio, Uthman (Usman) 55, 59, 140, 179, 283 Danfulani, Umar 225, 237, 271, 323, 333 Dar al-Islam 22 impact of colonialism on 110–13,  127

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Dariye, Joshua 250–51, 254, 316, 328 Darul Islam 54, 58, 72–3, 76 da’wah programmes 37, 47&n7, 48, 57, 73, 79, 287 democracy/democratic governance  23, 29, 56, 65–6, 78, 108 and Christianity 83–4, 92, 94–5,  99 denunciation of/hard-line  positions against 48, 66–7n25 indigenizing 344 transition to 122 DiFonzo, N. 230–31 discrimination 227, 229, 319 against women see under gender  inequality see also religious discrimination Dowd, Robert A. 11, 18, 20, 338, 342–3

elections, local/state 237, 247–58, 261, 281n8, 311, 320–22, 324–5, 331, 333 elections, national 15, 26, 168, 192,  239–40, 178 Independent National Electoral  Commission (INEC) 331 elites 116, 128, 160, 241, 247,  261–3, 281, 298, 300, 329 Christian 26, 279, 312–13, 341,  346 dominant coalition of 129 Muslim 53, 115, 127, 130, 246,  312–13, 341, 346 traditional/indigenous 159, 243,  245–7, 249–50, 252, 270 English law (common law) 139,  142, 145–6, 149, 152, 158–60 colonial system 141, 143 ethnic identity see under identity ethnicity 16, 40, 72, 28, 118, 187, 226, 252, 275, 277 see also identity: ethnic ethno-linguistic diversity 269, 271, 274, 275–6 see also under Muslim communities of northern Nigeria ethno-religious polarization 272, 289–90 see also religious polarization Evangelical Church of West Africa see indigenous Christian churches: Evangelical Church Winning All exclusion 23, 129, 201, 251, 255,  269, 321 politics of 263–4, 275, 322 see also Jang, Jonah: exclusionary  politics of; marginalization

economic inequality 3, 88–9, 229, 263, 333 link with violent confrontation  339 economy 27 oil 108, 127 structural adjustment/  liberalization 188, 190, 342 see also informal economy education, Islamic 50–51, 61, 74,  77, 168 Islamiyya schools 52, 61, 64,  73–4, 78, 287–8 Qur’anic schools 51–2, 66, 76,  168, 279, 288 of women 287 education, Western/secular 64, 73,  77–8, 96–7, 115, 288 Boko Haram views on 52, 65–6,  77, 165 faith-based organizations (FBOs) integration with Qur’anic 57, 100, 129 see also under peace  schools 78 building, Jos mission schooling 279 Falola, Toyin 18, 120, 124, 129 Ekklesiyar Yan’uwa a Nigeria (EYN) Federal Character Principle 123, 85 128, 325, 339

*WAS Creed.indb 353

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France 71, 140 Fulani-Berom violence 12–13,  15, 18, 26, 30, 236, 240, 288, 290–91, 298, 302, 319, 334 historic relations 233–4, 277–8,  282–3, 290 lethargic government response  to 15–16, 29–30, 293, 297, 303–304 Mahanga settlement 290, 293 reprisal attacks/mass killings  270, 291, 294–6&n30, 297, 301, 303, 320 see also pastoralists: Fulani Fulani pastoralists, Jos Plateau 272,  276–7, 280, 285–9, 298 Fulfulde language 276–7, 284–5 Islamic reform among 272,   284–7, 290 rumada slaves 277 fundamentalism, rise of 120, 127,  129 Fwatshak, S. 225, 237 gender inequality discrimination against women  149–50, 152 see also women’s rights gender relations 127 role of women in Christian  organizations 83, 99, 103 impact of Pentecostalism on  103–104 Gombe State 22, 38, 49, 60, 62,  66, 70, 72, 118, 169, 178, 234 Bajoga 57–8 Bima Hill 59 Gomwalk, Joseph 116, 244–5 grazing reserves 17, 331, 334 Great Nigeria People’s Party 168 Gumi, Sheikh Abubakar 61, 64, 284–5 Gwari (Gbagi) 62–3 Hadiths 48, 50–53, 60, 75, 140n1, 286

*WAS Creed.indb 354

Harnischfeger, Johannes 10, 14–15, 124, 126, 154–5, 158 Hassan, Alhaji Saleh 318, 325 Hausa 1, 62, 72, 76, 175, 194 language 42, 44, 65, 67, 70,  276–7, 321 social impact of religion on 18,  38, 66 Hausa-Fulani Muslims 4, 57, 62–3,  72, 115, 117–18, 123, 130, 225, 274, 286 see also Fulani-Berom violence Hausa-Igbo relations 187, 190, 194–202, 219 see also under Jos Plateau violence Hausa Jasawa Muslims 29, 234, 237, 242, 245–7, 250–51, 254–8, 277 see also Jos, ethno-religious violence in; security dilemma: Berom-Jasawa Hausa narratives of intolerance Muslim-Bori 8–10 Muslim-Christian 8, 10–13,  18–19 see also Jos, ethno-religious  violence in Hausaland 8, 63, 113 hijra 65–6, 110 Hisbah 10, 78, 149, 124, 202, 219 abuse of power by 149, 152–3 Horowitz, D.L. 13, 230 human rights violations 124, 151,  159, 176–7, 244 amputation, flogging, death by  stoning 75n40, 143, 148–51, 160 detention without trial 49, 71,  149, 153, 171–2, 176–7 torture 147, 149, 171, 176, 178 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 68,  124, 147–54, 235, 237, 253, 320, 325 HRW Report (on Sharia) 147–50 Ibadan 5, 196

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Index • 355

identity Christian 84, 190, 245, 274 ethnic 6, 40, 62–3, 72, 108, 118,  190, 275–7 regional 108–9 religious 84, 92, 108–9, 118,  261–2 identity-based violence 228–30,  261, 272 ethnic 184 role of religious diversity in  184–6, 263–4, 274, 338 identity politics 19, 40, 108, 244–5, 253, 262, 274–5 see also Northernization programme Idris, Sheikh Isma’ila 61, 284–7 Igbo 128, 168, 174–5, 187, 189–90,  192 language 42 Independence 38, 59, 118, 142–3, 154, 168 indigeneship 129, 227, 233, 235, 239, 246–7, 250, 252, 321, 331–2, 339–40 see also citizenship indigenous Christian churches 85 Church of Christ in Nations  (COCIN) 236, 241, 248–9, 278–9, 289, 312–13 Evangelical Church Winning  All (ECWA) 89, 91, 97, 101, 236, 248–9, 279, 289, 312–13 indigenous Christian communities  22–3, 88–90, 168–9, 205, 226, 245–6, 250, 252, 257, 271, 287, 289, 318, 322–3, 330 Hausa-Fulani 1, 115–16 narratives of victimhood  130–31, 244, 249, 259 Northern Christian Association  23 role of women in 27, 57 see also Afizere; Anaguta;  Berom; Pentecostalism informal economy integration into state welfare/

*WAS Creed.indb 355

 taxation systems 28, 185 inter-religious cooperation in  28, 184–5, 187–8, 216, 218, 314–16, 337, 341 systems of specialization in 88–9,  187, 202, 205, 341 see also Kano/Kaduna, informal  economies of interfaith relations 28, 105, 108, 131, 143, 270–71, 337, 346 competition in 117, 124–5, 344,  338–9, 344 conflictual/violent 109, 184,  338–40, 343 global 338, 344 history of peaceful coexistence  11, 22, 27, 109, 125–6, 178, 226–7, 270, 195, 341–2, 346 see also Muslim-Christian  relations interfaith tolerance see religious tolerance insecurity 166, 213, 228–9, 235–7 role of rumours in 230–31 see also rural insecurity; security  dilemma Iran 46–9, 55 Iraq 49, 178–9, 181 Irigwe 275, 279, 288 clashes with Fulani 293, 295,  302, 319–20n13 Islam 1, 4, 19, 77–8 interaction with Christianity 3 interaction with indigenous  religion 1–2, 11, 18, 40, 113 Yoruba domestication of 6–10 Islam Research Project (IRP) – Abuja 42n3, 46, 83 Islamic law see Sharia law Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) 46–9, 65, 79 Islamic politicalism 11–12 see also jihadist tradition Islamic religious police see Hisbah Islamic Religious Preaching Boards 61–2, 66, 77

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Islamic reform 30, 43, 55–8,  283–8 see also Mahdism; Salafist groups Islamic State (ISIS) see under Boko Haram insurgency Islamization 23, 95, 116, 123, 126,  140, 154–5 fears of 12, 154, 282 Izala 43–4, 56–7, 62–5, 73–6, 167,  170, 179, 240–42, 289, 301, 303, 312, 317 ‘domestication’ of 62, 76 split between Jos/Kaduna  factions 236, 284 Jama’atu Nasril Islam ( JNI) 23, 43,  116, 129, 236, 248, 258, 286 peace building efforts 312–13,  315, 324–5 Jama’atul Tajdid Islam ( JTI) 49, 65 Jang, Christopher 248–9 Jang, Jonah 240, 249–50, 254,  281n8, 316, 325, 332–4, exclusionary politics of 235,  248, 252, 254–5, 259, 270, 297, 321–2, 324, 333, 344 Operation Rainbow 322, 332 relationship with Federal  Government 323–4, 327–9 response to violence 241,  303–4, 334, 340 Jasawa Development Association ( JDA) 236, 248, 251, 294n27, 317, 319, 325 JIBWIS see Izala Jigawa State 60, 169 jihad see jihadist tradition jihadist tradition Ansaru 71 Boko Haram 68–9, 165, 167,  172–3 changing societal context of 11 contribution to religious  violence 11–12, 16, 227 global/international 178–81 as reform movement 9, 12, 283

*WAS Creed.indb 356

Sokoto 9, 55, 110–11, 179, 227,  243, 283 see also Islamic reform Jingre, Sheikh Sani Yahaya 240, 325 Jonathan, Goodluck 127, 302, 328–30 Jos communal segregation in 236,  239, 260map, 308, 310, 315, 343 intergroup inequalities in 30,  146, 229, 235, 321 history of peaceful coexistence  226 see also Plateau State Jos, ethno-religious violence in  14–15, 25map, 26, 29–30, 130, 154, 190, 225, 233, 269 Boko Haram attacks 14–15,  69–70, 190, 239, 241–2, 301 conflict management 231, 262–3 imposition of Sharia 237 indigene-settler perspective  29, 225–7, 233–6, 239, 247–8, 252–3, 259, 263, 271n1, 272, 281, 294, 317–18, 340 institutional weakness 228–30,  233, 252–3 riots/looting/killings 237,  239–41, 256–9, 261–3, 288, 290, 293–4 use of mobile phones 259, 262 violence flashpoints 238map see also peace building,  Jos; Plateau State, rural inter-communal violence in; security dilemma: Berom-Jasawa Jos ethno-religious violence,  politicization of 225–6, 245–7, 270, 317, 331 adoption of collective violence  250–52 contested ownership of city 29,

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see also Kano/Kaduna, informal economies of Kaduna, inter-religious relations  28, 188–9, 208, 210–12, 342 impact of Sharia law on 52, 188,  192, 199, 202–4 and polarization/segregation  188, 218, 339, 341, 343 Kaduna State 19, 22, 38, 53, 127,  154, 167, 240, 242, 264, 270, 282, 293, 327, 332 colonial administration of  117–18 inter-communal violence in  25map, 15, 23, 26, 52, 101, 130, 154, 206, 208, 210–14 Tudun Wada 52, 101, 205–8, 211 see also Kano/Kaduna, informal  economies of; Zaria Kaduna State Tailors Union 206–88 Kaigama, Archbishop Ignatius 312, 330–31 Kanuris see under Borno State Kano 49, 55, 59–60 Christian leadership of 84,  88–91, 96–8, 100–101 Sabon Gari 96, 150, 191–3,  197–204, 218 violence/Boko Haram attacks in  28, 67–71, 101, 154, 177–8, 188, 190, 192, 199–200, 203–4 Kano, inter-religious relations 190,  193–5, 198–201, 203–84, 218, 342 impact of Sharia law on 52, 188,  192, 199, 202–4 Kano/Kaduna, informal economies  of 28, 185, 188, 342 competition (tyre dealers/  motorcycle taxi industry) 188–90, 195–8, 205–10, 214, Kaduna 52, 65–6, 125, 185, 188–9, 216tab, 217  205–19, 284–5 complementarity (motorcycle indigene population 213  taxi industry/tailoring  226, 233, 240–41, 244, 247–50, 254, 318, 340 election rigging/manipulation  237, 239, 249–50, 252–8, 261 Jos North LGA 130, 227, 229, 235,  237, 239, 244, 247–57, 259, 261, 314, 317–19, 323–4, 326, 331 Ali Kazaure 232, 256, 258, 285,  324 Angwan Rogo 232, 242, 256,  320 Kabong 232, 247, 256–8 Nassarawa 17, 232, 236, 239,  246, 294, 297, 310, 330 Tudun Wada 232, 247–8, 256 Jos Plateau, patterns of collective  violence in 30, 226 competition for land 16, 30, 184,  275, 280–82, 291, 296–7 conflict over indigeneity 272,  275, 277, 294, 303 ethno-linguistic diversity 233,  269, 271, 274–6 government handling of crisis  272, 292–3, 297, 303–4, 340–41 Hausa-Igbo conflict 236, 240 impact of military deployment  272, 300–302, 311, 316, 324, 329–30 impact of religious reform 272,  282–90 youth mobilization see under  youth see also population displacement;  rural banditry; rural insecurity Jos South LGA 239, 247–8, 254, 256, 259, 279, 290, 292, 294–7, 301, 303 Juergensmeyer, Mark 1–2

*WAS Creed.indb 357

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industry) 188–94, 205–9, 216tab, 342 impact of religious conflict on  213–16&tabs, 217–18 politicization of 219–20 systems of commercial  organization 189–92, 195–200, 203, 206–10, 212, 217 value conflicts (isi-ewu business)  188–9, 201–4, 211–12, 214, 216tab, 217 Kano State 1, 9–10, 22, 40, 53, 56,  58, 65, 76, 187, 208 Kala Kato clashes with  authorities 51–2, 54 Sharia Commission 47, 52 Kano State Traders’ Union (KASTU) 218 Karibi-Whyte, A.G. 142–3 Katsina State 1, 22, 26, 40, 53, 71, 115, 150, 233–4, 246, 280, 323, 333 Kebbi 38, 66, 71 Kenya 16 Islamic/Sharia law in 122, 154 kidnapping 15, 17, 71, 173&n27,  179–80n55 Chibok girls 69, 172 Kogi State 38, 50, 71, 118, 167 Kukah, M.H. 18, 87, 100, 113, 116, 226 Kwara State 38, 40, 62, 75, 118

 202, 207, 211, 219–20, 341 rural 269, 276, 281 Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda 178 Ludwig, F. 123–7

Maguzawa 1, 8, 10, 115 Mahdist traditions 45, 47n6, 54, 58–60, 111–12 Maiduguri 22, 52–3, 55, 65–6, 166–71, 173, 175, 179, 242, 282, 287 Maina, Saleh 329–30 Mali 16, 71, 175 marginalization 118, 253, 255, 264 Christian claims of 12–13, 23,  88, 130, 169 Muslim claims of 63 see also exclusion Marshall-Fratani, Ruth 86, 99, 337 Martin, Bernice 103–4 Mecca 9, 11–12, 59, 110 Middle Belt zone 2, 12, 15, 21, 26, 38, 40, 116–18, 213, 236, 274–5, 283 migration 42, 58, 114, 117, 175,  190, 234, 274, 276–7, 284, 294 international 17 labour 280 military rule 130, 145, 168–9, 243, 246–7, 323, 329 see also states of emergency millenarianism 58, 178 Lagos 53, 85, 144, 196, 247, 341 missionaries, Muslim 10, 16, 40, 50 Lalong, Simon 316, 333–4, 344 missionaries, Christian 84–5, 89, Lambo, David 325–7  96, 103, 112–14, 235, 278–9 Last, Murray 22–3n12, 58, 63, 72, Church Missionary Society  89n3, 109–11, 113, 116,  (CMS) 85 123–7, 228, 276, 283 Faith Missions 85 on oppression of Maguzawa 8, 10 Niger Mission 85 legal pluralism 140, 159–62 split with colonial administration multicentric 157–8  114–15 see also Sharia law, challenges of Sudan United Mission (SUM)  legal pluralism under  85, 278 livelihoods 28, 188, 190–92, 194, Miyandazi, Victoria 122, 154

*WAS Creed.indb 358

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Index • 359

modernity 44, 60, 104, 186 Modibbo, M.S.A. 47, 62, 74, 284 Mohammed, General Murtala 145, 245–6 Muhammadiyya 55, 57–8, 72 Muslim Brothers Movement see Islamic Movement in Nigeria Muslim-Christian relations 304 influence of religious  demographics on 13, 16–17, 22, 27, 88, 121 historical 27, 108–9 see also interfaith relations;  Kaduna, inter-religious relations; Kano, inter-religious relations religious affiliation; religious pluralism: contentious; Sharia law, ‘full’ implementation of Muslim-Christian encounters/  conflict 2–3, 12–15 ‘clash of civilizations’ mentality  2, 165, 216, 227–8 contentious pre-colonial/  colonial history 22, 109–14, 116–17, 128 fears of religious domination  116–17, 124–5, 127, 154, 160, 338–9 spatial dimension to 21–3&n12,  24map, 26 violence/violent confrontations  63, 69–70, 102, 108, 127, 160, 337 see also Fulani-Berom violence;  Hausa narratives of intolerance; identity-based violence: religious Muslim communities of northern  Nigeria 1–3, 27 ethnic/linguistic diversity of  37–8, 40, 50, 75–6, 79 religiosity of 2, 74, 76–7, 286 separatist 57–8, 61, 72, 76 systemic disadvantages of 20–21,  88–9

*WAS Creed.indb 359

turuk/tariqa 54–6, 62, 74 tolerance of religious differences  among 37, 57–8, 76 urban-rural distinctions 280–81 see also conflict/violence, Muslim  sectarian; Fulani pastoralists Muslim NGOs/CBOs 74–5 Mustapha, A.R. 46, 48, 50, 55–6, 64, 75 Mwaghavul 276, 279–80, 291, 296 Nasarawa State 15, 26, 38, 54, 118, 282, 298 National Butchers Association 212, 317 National Union of Textile, Garment and Tailoring Workers of Nigeria (NUTGTWN) 206–7 New Fringe Pastoralism 16–17 Niger Republic 69, 111, 180 Diffa 166–7, 172, 177 Niger State 38, 54, 58, 62–3, 72–3, 234 Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) 100, 262, 309 Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) 123, 322 Nigeria Watch database 14, 126–7, 176–7, 284 Nigerian Army 68–9, 173, 175–8,  180, 240, 263, 285, 296, 302, 330 clashes with IMN 48–9 Federal Government control of  328–9 see also security force crackdown  on Boko Haram; Special Task Force Nigerian civil war 116, 128, 187, 190 Nigerian constitution 50, 64, 78–9,  122–3, 142–3

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provisions of 62, 76–7, 93–4,  105, 139, 155 reforms 108, 128, 144–5 rejection of 48, 66, 79 see also constitutional rights;  secularism: constitutional basis of nomadism/nomads 15–17, 276, 299 nomadic education 288 nomadic intelligence 302 see also pastoralists: transhumant Nigerian Tailors Union 206 Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) 115, 128 Northernization programme 19, 115–16 Nupe 62–3, 234, 274, 280 Nur-Ud-Deen Society 74 Obasanjo, Olusegun 316, 320 Okagbue, Osita 9–10 Ojo, Matthews A. 83, 87, 89–90, 102–4 Olojo, Akinola 14, 126 Onitsha 170, 196 Open Doors International 12–14, 16, 125, 127 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 145–6, 154 Ottoman Empire 140, 156–7 Owuamanam, Jude 242, 256, 331 Oyo State 7, 15, 208 Paden, J.N. 56, 116, 124–5 pastoralists 16–17, 270, 280 transhumant 17, 276, 284, 290 see also Fulani pastoralists patronage 95, 146n4, 207, 246,  248, 251, 284, 338 around distribution of oil rents  129 peace building, Jos 27, 30, 308,  332–3 community/local level 29–30,  308–9, 333 cross-community dialogue 315

*WAS Creed.indb 360

interfaith/civil society efforts  28–31, 309, 312–14, 342 involvement of youth in see under  youth Jos Peace Dialogue Forum 327 neighbourhood/grassroots level  210, 231, 310, 314, 318 promotion of inclusive civic  citizenship 30, 308–9, 332, 344 commissions of inquiry 308 see also Centre for Humanitarian  Dialogue; conflict resolution mechanisms; conflict resolution, state level responses Peace Initiative (PI) 314–15 Peel, John DY 5–7, 10–11, 156, 158 Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) 87, 91, 129 Pentecostal movement advantages of 86, 186 charismatic basis of 85–7, 90–91,  99 Christian Pentecostal Fellowship  of Nigeria (CPFN) 91 interaction with indigenous  religion 18, 40, 86, 89 gospel of prosperity 86–7 radical egalitarianism of 103–4 rise of 84–5 People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 237, 240, 249–50, 252–8, 261–2, 320, 322–3 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life see under religious affiliation Pilgrim Welfare Boards Christian 95, 144, 146 Muslim 78, 146 Plateau State 10, 22–3, 38, 47,  74, 118, 127, 129–30, 235–6, 273map colonial period 274–5, 278, 280,  283 Plateau State Independent

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 Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) 253–4, 256, 261 tin mining industry/  communities 233–4, 236, 274, 279–82, 288–9, 293, 302 see also Benue-Plateau State Plateau State, rural  inter-communal violence in 14, 17, 25map, 26, 30, 116, 129, 234, 237, 243–6, 281, 293 Heipang district 292, 295 mass violence against Muslims  302–3 urban rioting as trigger for  269–70, 283, 290, 293–6, 302 Vom/Vwang district 277,  279–80, 291–3, 296, 298 see also Fulani-Berom violence;  Jos, ethno-religious violence in; Jos Plateau, patterns of collective violence politicization of religion 95, 118, 124, 126–9, 152, 225, 346 illusory neutrality of state, 95,  340–41, 346 narratives of victimhood  130–31, 145, 303–4 population displacement 12, 69, 225, 270, 280, 288, 290–2, 295–6, 302–3, 323 internally displaced persons (IDP) 166, 176, 293, 312 population movements see migration Posen, B. 228–30 poverty 20, 63, 98, 108, 151, 160,  188, 195, 216–18, 220, 263 alleviation schemes 191 disparity of levels 21tab National Poverty Eradication  Programme (NAPEP) 251, 318 see also insecurity; rural  insecurity

*WAS Creed.indb 361

Protestantism 23, 85, 87, 89–90, 99, 144 Anglican 5, 85, 89, 103, 236, 249, 279, 313 Qadiriyya 43, 54–7, 61, 75–6 Qadiriyya-Nasiriyya 56 al-Qaeda 71, 178–80&n55, 181, 242 Qur’an 48, 50–54, 58, 60, 63, 66,  71, 74–5, 286 see also education, Islamic:  Qur’anic schools Qur’aniyyun 43, 50–51, 54, 60,  76 Kala Kato 51–4, 76 the Submitters 51, 53–4 Rabo, Annika 157, 159, 161 radicalism 128–9 Christian 104 Muslim 37, 44, 48–9, 60, 63–6, 111, 175, 239, 303, 340 reconciliation efforts 293, 304,  313–14, 331 see also conflict resolution; peace building, Jos religious affiliation 20, 28, 43,  62–3, 88–9, 97, 120–21, 124, 131, 210, 342 Arizona survey 44–6&tab census data on 39map, 40–41tab,  42, 88, 118–20&tab, 123, 130n5, 188 NDHS survey 118–19 Pew Forum on Religion and  Public Life 42–3&tab, 44&tab, 45–6&tab, 119–21&fig see also religious pluralism:  contentious religious conversions criminalization of 124 to Christianity 1, 6, 40, 85, 88,  108, 114, 278–9 to Islam 1, 6, 40, 108, 113, 175,  187, 278–9

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religious discrimination 269 against Christians 12–13, 144,  149, 155, 168 against Muslims 130, 148–9,  155, 279–80 religious intolerance 3–4, 31, 76,  289, 313, 318, 322–3, 338 cultural stereotyping and 227,  289, 302 zero-sum logic of 31, 121, 250,  254–5, 264, 323, 334, 338 see also Hausa narratives of  intolerance religious pluralism, 2, 8, 76, 99,  269, 344 contentious 2, 29, 109–10, 113,  115–17 see also religious affiliation religious polarization 3, 16, 27, 30,  125, 129, 154, 201, 205, 219, 250, 290, 337–8, 341, 343 negative impact on economic  growth 186–8 Religious Polarization Index 20 see also ethno-religious  polarization religious tolerance 3–4, 37, 57–8,  76, 327, 342–3, 346 Convivencia 4 see also Yoruba: tolerance of  religious differences among Roe, P. 228–30 rural banditry 17, 174, 298, 334 cattle rustling 15, 17–18, 269,  272, 290–91, 296–9, 301–3, 320 destruction/illegal occupation of  farms 272 rural insecurity 17, 269, 283,  288–9, 296, 304, 308–9, 314, 333–4 and narratives of threat 272, 282 politics of 300–301, 304 Ryan, Patrick J. 3–4, 18, 125 Sage, Caroline 158–9

*WAS Creed.indb 362

Sahel 16 Sahelian drought 15, 175 Salafist groups 43–6tab, 54, 60–61,  63–7, 72, 75, 179–80, 284, 287–9 see also Darul Islam; Izala Sanneh, Lamin 11–12, 114–15 Sanusi, Alhaji Muhammad II 130n5, 147n6 Sanusi, Lamido 2, 141, 150–51, 160 Sardauna of Sokoto see Bello, Ahmadu Saudi Arabia 60, 140, 146, 167, 284, 334 secularism 4, 7, 92, 96, 117, 151,  154, 340, 346 christian ambivalence about 95,  102 constitutional basis of 63, 78,  93–4, 105, 122–3, 143, 146 educational 93, 96–7, 287–8 Muslim attitudes to 49, 60, 79,  95, 100, 122–3, 127 security dilemma 30, 226, 228,  340 Berom-Jasawa 29, 226, 229,  235–7, 243–5, 248–9, 252, 259, 261, 263, 333–4 security force crackdown on Boko  Haram 68–9, 170–72, 340 arbitrary arrests/extra-judicial  executions 68, 166–7, 170–71, 176–7 brutality of 170–2, 176–7 Galtimari Commission 171 international coalition/  Multinational Joint Task Force 166, 176–7, 345 Joint Task Force 166, 171 Kato da Gora 173 Senegal 56, 186, 338, 345–6 Sharia criminal code 38, 73, 78 access to justice under 28, 78,  123, 147, 149, 152, 160 human rights issues around 124,  140&n1, 147–52

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introduction of Penal Code 116,  122–3, 142–3, 147, 149, 152, 155–6, 158 Sharia law 47n6, 78, 88, 126 Maliki school of 42, 54, 73, 75,  150 on ‘pagan rites’ 10 personal 139, 143 schools of fiqh 51 Sharia law, challenges of legal  pluralism under 28, 117, 122, 124, 139–40, 160–62 concerns of minorities/  Minorities Commission 141–4, 153–5 ‘Debacle of 1979’ 142, 145 federal courts 123, 143 historical roots 123, 139–41 parallel criminal justice system  100, 139, 143–4, 146–9 ‘Revival of 1999’ 142, 145 ‘Settlement of 1960’ 142–3, 145 undermining of single state law  122, 140, 154–8 Sharia law, ‘full’ implementation of  10, 27–8, 38, 48, 64, 100, 123, 147 religious violence/tensions  around 27–8, 100, 108, 116–17, 122–5, 139–40, 143, 145, 153–4, 184, 337–8, 340 see also under Jos, ethno-religious  violence in; Kano, inter-religious relations Sharia-related state agencies 12, 64,  124 courts/appeal courts 38, 61, 64,  64, 75n40, 78, 141–7, 149–55, 160–61 Sharia Commissions 47, 52, 78 Shekarau Malam Ibrahim 152–3 Mohammed 153, 191–3 Sherif, Ali Modu 168, 170, 173n29 Shi’as/Shi’ite tradition 42, 46, 58,  64, 67, 75, 79, 157

*WAS Creed.indb 363

Twelver school 42, 47&n6, 49 see also Islamic Movement in  Nigeria Smith, M.G. 117, 140, 283 Smith, Mary 9 Sokoto 1, 5, 26, 48, 55–6, 66 Sokoto Caliphate 22, 28, 55, 57–8 under colonialism 109, 111, 113,  127 dar al-harb 22–3 see also Dar al-Islam South-South (geopolitical zone) 155, 169, 235, 298, 326 Spain 17, 84 Special Task Force 300–302, 311, 316, 329 states of emergency 69, 166, 171,  173, 176–7, 293, 316, 320 Nigerian Emergency  Management Agency (NEMA) 262 Suberu, Rotimi 118, 123, 155 Sudan 16, 59, 85, 142 Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) 279 Sudan United Mission (SUM) 278 Sufi order/Sufism 43, 45–6tab,  54–5, 57, 62, 67, 72, 74–5, 165, 186, 286, 346 as force for  counter-radicalization 63–4 see also Muhammadiyya;  Qadiriyya; Tijaniyya Suldiniyya see Jos Sunnis 42, 44–8, 50–54, 58, 67,  72, 79, 157, 178 non-aligned/‘independent’ 73–6 see also Ansaru; Boko Haram  insurgency; Darul Islam Syria 157, 178, 344 taqiyya 110, 178 Taraba State 15, 18, 26, 38, 118, 169, 282, 330 Tardy, Frank 249–51, 319

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Tas, Latif 156, 159 Taymiyyah, Ibn 11, 60, 179 Tijaniyya 43, 54–5, 61, 65, 236,  284, 286–8 ethnic variations 75–6 Fityanul Islam 57 Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya 56–7 Tishau, Aliyu 167, 180

Woolcock, Michael 158–9

Yar’Adua, Umaru 68, 323–4, 327 Yobe State 38, 57, 60, 65–6, 68–70, 167, 169, 171, 173 Yoruba 38, 50, 53, 60, 128, 197 inter-religious tolerance among  4–8, 10–11, 74–5, 75–6 Umaru, Mallam Sanni 170, 179 Jos Plateau communities 225, unemployment 188, 190, 194, 209,  235, 251, 274, 280, 322, 326 217–18, 220, 300, 315 see also language 42 under youth loyalty to ilu 6–7 United Nations Economic Okun 50 Commission for Africa social impact of religion on 18 (UNECA) 16–17 see also Ahmadiyya Yorubaland 10, 89 vigilantism 219, 308, 333, 339, 342 youth mobilization, Boko Haram 28, al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abd  66, 167, 173, 176–7&n47, Wahhabi doctrines 60–61, 64–5, 242  72, 284 mobilization, Jos Plateau 30, Wakili, H. 64–5, 100  240, 251–2, 258, 272, 289–92, Weilenmann, Markus 161–2 294, 296–300 women peace-building processes 313–15, restrictions on economic  339  activities 9, 287 unemployment 191, 209, 252, independent Muslim women’s  298  organizations 74–5, 151 Yusuf, Muhammad 65–8, 165n2, HD Women’s Steering  166–7, 170–71, 173, 176,  Committee 326 179–80, 242 kidnappings 15 Yusufiyya Movement see Boko see also under indigenous Haram  Christian communities Women’s Initiative for Sustainable Zakzaky, Ibraheem Yaqoub 47–9, Community Development 64–6 (WISCD) 314 Zamfara State 26, 123, 142, 148 women’s rights 124, 148, 152 Zamfara courts/Penal Code 10, cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya  151, 155  Hussaini 75n40, 150–1 Zaria 1, 10, 22, 65–7, 71, 117, 130, Convention on the Elimination  166, 233–4, 282–3  of all Forms of Discrimination Christian population of 85, 115 Against Women (CEDAW) Zenn, Jacob 47, 71–2 151 Zips, Werner 161–2

*WAS Creed.indb 364

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WAS Creed 27mm_PPC_TJI_Layout 1 05/01/2018 17:20 Page 1

Edited by MUSTAPHA & EHRHARDT

Ethnic and cultural fragmentation, the frequent overlap between ethnicity and religion, and socio-political changes from the 1980s have resulted in acute polarization between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria. This book presents an in-depth exploration of the conflicts, which both threaten the region’s development and present a wider threat to global security. Examining the multiplicity of Muslim and Christian groups involved, the tensions between and within them, and appropriate and effective policy responses at local, national and international levels, the authors also analyse three of the most contentious issues: conflict in Jos; the Boko Haram insurgency; and the challenges of legal pluralism posed by the declaration of full Sharia law in twelve Muslim majority states.

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Abdul Raufu Mustapha is Associate Professor in African Politics, University of Oxford. David Ehrhardt is Assistant Professor of International Development at Leiden University College. See also the companion volume Sects & Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria, edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha (2014). Cover photograph Greeting the Emir of Kano during the annual Durbar Festival in Kano’s Old City, 2008 (© David Ehrhardt)

JA M ES C U R R EY an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

ISBN 978-1-84701-106-0

9 781847 011060

WESTERN AFRICA SERIES

Creed & Grievance

‘Conflict resolution specialists and Africanists will be thrilled by the publication of this incisive, original, and empirically rich analysis of Muslim-Christian engagements in northern Nigeria.The three chapters on conflict in the Jos Plateau are unrivaled for their analytic rigor and clarity, a truly brilliant achievement constituting required reading for all serious students of conflict resolution in Africa.’ – Paul Lubeck, Acting Director of African Studies Program and Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins-School of Advanced International Studies

Creed & Grievance MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Edited by ABDUL RAUFU MUSTAPHA & DAVID EHRHARDT